SOCIAL PROTECTION POLICY MAKING IN KENYA:
A STUDY OF THE DYNAMICS OF POLICY TRANSFER

By

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DECLARATION

Student Number: 5578-073-3

I, Marion Atieno Ouma, declare that this thesis, Social Protection Policy-Making in Kenya: A Study of the Dynamics of Policy Transfer, is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.


Signed:

[Signature]

Marion Atieno Ouma Date: 08 October 2019

This thesis is being submitted for examination with my approval.

Signed:

[Signature]

Supervisor: Prof. Jimi Adesina Date: 08 October 2019
DEDICATION

To our Mother, Roselyne Ouma

Our rock, a virtuous woman

Who has given everything of herself

And whom I proudly take after, in every way.
ABSTRACT

Power, and how it is exercised within social relations is pivotal in explaining policy change. Hence, this dissertation explores policy change in Kenya by examining the transfer and subsequent adoption of social protection policies in the form of cash transfer schemes. Instead of the current analytical frameworks drawing from political settlements, political institutions, and ideational approaches in explaining policy uptake, the research studies policy making from a policy transfer and power nexus. The study examines power relations among multiple actors in the national context to explain the adoption of social protection policies. Hence this dissertation articulates power dynamics and asymmetries inherent in policy-making involving national and transnational actors as underpinning policy transfer processes. The thesis is premised on the following interrelated arguments; firstly, I show how transnational actors created and manipulated interests and incentives based on their resource base in three significant ways: controlling the policy agenda, constraining the agency of other actors and influencing the preferences of actors in the policy space. The interaction of interests and resources – financial, and ideas and knowledge – converged to bring about policy change. Secondly, I focus on the role of ideas and knowledge within policy space to show how the creation of a discursive hegemony and a structure of knowledge, social construction and policy narratives played a significant role in shaping learning and influencing national actors. Thirdly, I argue that transnational actors used structural mechanisms based on financing and coerced government to adopt social protection policies through a catalysing mechanism and imposition of conditionalities. The study depicts how transnational actors conditioned and manipulated national context and institutions to align with the idea of cash transfers. This thesis employs a qualitative approach to study policy transfer and subsequent adoption of two cases of transfer schemes in Kenya, the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) and the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP).

Key words: Kenya, social policy, cash transfers, social protection, CT-OVC, HSNP, policy transfer, actors, ideas, knowledge, interests, incentives, transnational actors, international organisation
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and the Voice of Truth, tells me a different story....
when am standing on this mountain, I didn’t get there on my own....
One more crown I lay at your feet.

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<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>Area Advisory Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>APSP</td>
<td>Africa Platform for Social Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AU-SPF</td>
<td>African Union Social Policy Framework</td>
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<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Aid</td>
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<td>CCT</td>
<td>Conditional Cash Transfer</td>
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<tr>
<td>COTU</td>
<td>Central Organisation for Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Cash Transfer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT-OVC</td>
<td>Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSG</td>
<td>District Steering Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPRI</td>
<td>Economic Policy Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERDPF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERS</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Strategy</td>
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<td>FPE</td>
<td>Free Primary Education</td>
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<td>FSD</td>
<td>Financial Sector Deepening</td>
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<td>GOK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
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<td>GBP</td>
<td>Great Britain Pound</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>HSNP</td>
<td>Hunger Safety Net Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>International Policy Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAACR</td>
<td>Kenya Alliance for Advancement of Children Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>KEWOPA</td>
<td>Kenya Women Parliamentarian Association</td>
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<td>KES</td>
<td>Kenya Shilling</td>
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<td>LEAP</td>
<td>Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGCSD</td>
<td>Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium Term Expenditure Framework</td>
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<td>NARC</td>
<td>National Rainbow Coalition</td>
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<td>NDMA</td>
<td>National Drought Management Authority</td>
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<td>NESC</td>
<td>National Economic and Social Commission</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NHIF</td>
<td>National Health Insurance Fund</td>
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<td>National Safety Net Programme</td>
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<td>NSSF</td>
<td>National Social Security Fund</td>
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<td>P4R</td>
<td>Programme for Results</td>
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<td>PEPFAR</td>
<td>President’s emergency Plan for AIDS Relief</td>
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<td>PILU</td>
<td>Programme Implementation and Learning Unit</td>
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<td>PSNP</td>
<td>Productive Safety Net Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSSN</td>
<td>Productive Social Safety Net</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>PWSD-CT</td>
<td>Persons with Severe Disability Cash Transfer</td>
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<td>RRI</td>
<td>Rapid Results Initiative</td>
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<td>Social Assistance Grant for Empowerment</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>Swedish International Development Aid</td>
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<td>SPAF</td>
<td>Social Protection Actors Forum</td>
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<td>TOWA</td>
<td>Total War Against AIDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGASS</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly Special Session</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRISD</td>
<td>United Nations Research Institute for Social Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This thesis examines the dynamics of the process of transfer and the subsequent adoption of social protection policies in Kenya. Social protection programmes have expanded rapidly in low-income countries over the past two decades (World Bank, 2015b). In particular, the number of cash transfer programmes targeted at poor citizens has grown substantially, with studies indicating that almost all the countries in sub-Saharan Africa have a scheme under implementation. The current wave of cash transfers originated from Latin America in the late 1990s, where they were domestically driven as a response to poverty and the social and political threats presented by rising inequality. The subsequent success witnessed in a decrease in poverty and inequality levels drew international attention and the same programmes have been transported to Africa (Costa Leite, Suyama and Pomeroy, 2013).

International organisations have played a key role in diffusing the idea of cash transfers as instruments of poverty reduction, resulting in a change in social policy paradigms across countries in Africa. Kwon, Cook and Kim (2015, p. 127) suggest that changes in social policies can come from one of two sources: “… one that emphasises global influence on national social policymaking while the other sees national initiatives as the main driver of social policy”. The former has characterised the experience of social protection policymaking in Africa, where external factors and pressures have driven policy adoption. Unlike Latin America, where social protection was locally initiated, except for a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa, notably, South Africa, donors and international organisations have been on the forefront of initiating cash transfer policies (Devereux 2011; Barrientos & Villa 2015). Besides the transfer of the policies, international donors and organisations continue to shape financing and implementation of the programmes.

Social protection policies constitute part of the global social policy agenda. Social policy plays a wide range of roles in development, ranging from poverty reduction and redistribution to enhancement of national cohesion and building solidarity (Aina, 2004; Mkandawire, 2005; Adésína, 2007). Divergent views emerge on the rise of cash transfers as the social policy option in Africa. Some scholars decry the narrowing of social policy to cash transfers and as inadequate transformational instruments to meet the multiple functions of social policy.
(Mkandawire, 2010a; Adésínà, 2011). Proponents agree with the view but argue that the programmes form a foundation of the development of broader welfare regimes where governments are reluctant to invest in social policy, and that cash transfer programmes provide relief in instances of high unemployment (Ferguson, 2015). To support arguments for cash transfers, scholars have carried out impact assessment studies with studies highlighting the positive effect of the programmes. Evidence gathered indicates increased enrolment in schools, reduction in early marriages and pregnancies among girls, and improved nutritional status of households among other micro-level benefits for households receiving cash benefits (Levine, van der Berg and Yu, 2011; Pettifor et al., 2012; Barrientos et al., 2013; Ayuku et al., 2014; Zembe-Mkabile et al., 2015).

Due to the globalised nature of the world, international policy initiatives like social protection cannot be ignored by nation-states. Global agendas easily permeate national plans through transfer, diffusion and policy learning. With most action on the transfer of cash transfer happening in the last 15 years, Kenya is viewed as an early adopter, starting the first programme, the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC), in 2004. The policy adoption process was however complex. Policy transfer processes are complicated due to an array of variables arising out of multiple actors, multisitedness and multiple interests in the policy space. The complexity of the process is evident from the initial phase of defining the policy problem, setting the agenda for the policy solution through to decision-making and implementation. Political processes, divergent interests and knowledge, and intricate power relations with the policy space further complicate the transfer and adoption mechanisms.

The focus of this thesis is therefore on the dynamics of the policy processes leading to the adoption of cash transfer policies in Kenya, with a focus on the mechanisms of transfer and the dynamics around adoption. Key themes of the study evolve around power relations, knowledge, ideas and structural approaches. The study is therefore relevant to a broad range of scholarship in developing parts of the world and in Kenya.

1.2 Problem Definition and Research Questions

Whilst there is a large body of research on the impacts of social protection programmes there have been few empirical investigations of the processes by which social protection policies have been transferred to developing countries (de Haan 2011). Questions arising from literature
on the transfer of the policies include those about the donor-driven nature of the policies (Howarth, 2010; Adésínà, 2011), and the role of external agencies in the promotion of the policies in aid-dependent countries (Peck, 2011; Tambulasi, 2013; Güleç, 2014). In view of these questions, the thesis seeks to examine how international power structures conditioned the transfer and adoption of social protection policies in Kenya.

Some studies on the adoption of policies emanating from transfer processes in Africa focus on structural forces and conditionalities as the main transfer mechanism. For instance, studies on structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) consider how international organisations, among others the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), pursued coercive instruments of conditionalities to enforce the ideas of the Washington Consensus in the 1980s and 1990s in developing countries (Jones, 2014; Gumede, 2017). Provision of aid and loans would be offered if and when governments accepted the stipulated prescriptions. The same mechanisms the international organisations employed to enforce market liberalisation and fiscal discipline persist today. This study demonstrates the use of similar mechanisms in the adoption of social protection policies in Kenya.

Three broad bodies of research emerge in recent debates on social protection policies and cash transfer programmes. First are discussions focussed on structural pressures (Mkandawire, 2010a; Adésínà, 2011; Abdulai, 2019) similar to those employed by international organisations during the era of SAPs. The argument is that international organisations imposed the adoption of cash transfer policies. Second are studies that argue that ideational mechanisms were the key variables facilitating the adoption of social protection policies. In these discussions, the adoption of cash transfers is considered to have been a result of norm-sharing where transnational actors used social learning approaches as the key mechanism to shape the policy preferences of national policymakers (Foli, 2015). Third is the focus on national political settlements and domestic politics as explanatory variables and key determinants in the adoption of cash transfer programmes (Lavers and Hickey, 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 2017; Wanyama and McCord, 2017; Chinyoka and Seekings, 2016). Here, attention shifts from the influence of international actors to domestic processes as the key accelerators to the adoption of cash transfers. An in-depth discussion of the explanatory variables is offered Chapter three of the thesis.

While these frameworks are important in understanding the rapid uptake of cash transfer programmes in Africa, this study posits that the policy process is much more complicated and
cannot be explained with one variable without considering the multiple dynamics in the policy process. In addition, apart from the first body of knowledge which considers aspects of dominance of international organisations in the transfer process, the other two are silent on issues of power in the policymaking process. This study therefore discusses empirical evidence of the multiple mechanisms of policy transfer with consideration to power relations as they relate to the adoption of social protection policies in Kenya.

This study seeks to examine the uptake of social protection policies in Kenya drawing from Dolowitz and Marsh’s policy transfer framework. Policy transfer encompasses ideas of policy diffusion, lesson-drawing and policy learning. Dolowitz and Marsh in their seminal work define policy transfer as the “… process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 344). Learning “occurs when policy-makers adjust their cognitive understanding of policy development and modify policy in the light of knowledge gained from past policy experience” (Stone, 2004, p. 548). Learning involves a transfer of norms and knowledge through ideational mechanisms, and while necessary for policy adoption, it is not sufficient by itself to bring about change. Obinger, Schmitt and Starke (2013, p. 113), in quoting Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009, describe policy diffusion as a “process by which policy choices in one country affect the policy choices of other countries.” Policy diffusion involves processes where countries borrow policies from others in similar geographical spaces, leading to a convergence of similar policies. Convergence though is not often the result of diffusion. Recent convergence of social protection programmes in the form of cash transfer programmes for instance cannot be explained as an outcome of policy diffusion. Rather it is a consequence of structural determinants driven by the same global forces and policy networks through either economic or ideational mechanisms leading to patterns of similar ideas across a geographical space (Stone, 2004).

Previous studies employing policy transfer in Africa centred on public management to explain policy uptake and the implementation of structural adjustment prescriptions. In studies of social protection, recent studies consider policy diffusion in the spread of social pensions within Southern Africa. An example is the diffusion of social pensions in Lesotho (Granvik, 2015). By drawing on cash transfer programmes, this study seeks to extend the literature on social policy, social protection policies and cash transfers in Africa. Touted as the poverty reduction
strategy for the moment, cash transfers offer an ideal topic of study following their rapid expansion and adoption on the continent. The study however seeks to go beyond studies associated with the programmes as poverty reduction strategies. The study views the programmes within social policy studies and the broader context of social welfare instruments rather than their present conflation as social policy. Convergence of opinion among scholars indicates that international organisations have been at the forefront of driving the adoption of the policies through various mechanisms. In explaining the adoption of the two programmes in Kenya, this study therefore pays attention to the nexus of power, politics, knowledge, and structural determinants to explain the uptake of cash transfer policies and schemes in Kenya. The focus is on the role of international organisations within the national policy space. The study therefore seeks to examine the policy process within this dynamic interconnection of mechanisms using the case of two cash transfer schemes – Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) and Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP).

The main objective of this study is to examine the dynamics of adoption of cash transfer policies in Kenya from a policy transfer perspective. Kenya represents an early “adopter” of the policies with the implementation of the CT-OVC in 2004 followed by that of four other cash transfer programmes between 2007 and 2009. Besides being an early adopter, Kenya has had a long relationship with international organisations since independence with a large number of international organisations and non-governmental organisations having their regional hub in the capital city, Nairobi. Government partnership with financial institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank, spans an extended period cutting across many sectors, including poverty reduction strategies. Thus, this proximity to international organisations in relation to policymaking processes is worth studying as it shapes policymaking processes. Kenya continues to receive a huge amount of financial resources and the prevailing dependency on aid cannot be ignored when studying policy uptake. Governments with a reliance on financial aid often have few alternatives in the adoption of policies advocated by aid agencies. For aid dependent countries, structural pressures in policy transfer processes cannot be ignored.

Coupled with the persistent poverty characteristic of many African countries and with the increased focus on poverty highlighted by the Poverty Reduction Strategies programmes, Millennium Development Goals and now the Sustainable Development Goals, Kenya provides an archetype for understanding policymaking for poverty reduction. In addition to these factors, political processes shape policymaking and with Kenya having transitioned to a new political
dispensation since 2010, the political influences on policy uptake are worth examining. Bearing in mind these factors, Kenya provides an ideal case for studying social protection policy uptake. The following objectives and research questions guided the study:

1.2.1 Research Objectives

   a) Investigate the role of actors, ideas, incentives and interests in the development and promotion of the CT-OVC and HSNP as social protection instruments in Kenya.
   
   b) Analyse the context – institutional, social, political and economic factors mediating the policy transfer process.

To adequately achieve the objectives, the study was guided by the following research questions:

1. How did policy actors, ideas, incentives and interests shape the development and adoption of the CT-OVC and HSNP?
2. What institutional, administrative and political factors have facilitated or constrained the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP in Kenya?
3. What lessons can be drawn from the transfer and adoption of the cash transfer programmes in Kenya?

1.3 Scholarly Context of the Study

Social Policy Studies

Recent interest in studies of social policy in Africa by scholars across the globe provides the basis for the literature from which this study draws. With the persistence of poverty, despite various global and domestic initiatives, the adoption of social protection policies in Africa has created new interest in studies of social welfare and social policy in general. Though studies have centred on the impact and technical aspects of programmes, recent research, albeit not numerous, seeks to situate the programmes within the wider debate on social policy and welfare regimes. This study situates cash transfer programmes within the idea of transformative social policy, where social policy is envisaged broadly with the functions of enhancing “production, protection, reproduction, redistribution and social cohesion or nation building” (Adésínà, 2011, p. 455). The literature focuses on understanding broader social policy in developing countries.
Policy Studies

By drawing from literature on policy studies, the research situates itself within two themes: policy transfer and policymaking processes, and related literature. Debates on policy transfer have focussed on voluntary mechanisms as the basis of transfer, and north to north learning with little focus on policy transfer in developing countries and among developing countries themselves. Policy transfer in this study draws from various literature, including but not limited to mechanisms of transfer, agency of actors, incentives, power, ideas and institutions in the policy space (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Weyland, 2007; Béland, 2009; Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Benson and Jordan, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2012; Kingdon, 2013). However, studies on the politics of social policymaking in Africa remains scant. Studies on political processes in policymaking processes are limited too. With the resurgence of poverty reduction and new focus on social protection policies as tools for poverty reduction, recent debate is emerging focussed on the politics of policymaking of social policy and social protection. The current literature on social protection uptake and social policymaking processes focuses on the neopatrimonialism in African states and political settlements as key determinants for uptake (see Hickey and Bukenya, 2016; Lavers, 2016; Lavers and Hickey, 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 2017). However, these views do not constitute sufficient explanations of the politics of policymaking and social protection uptake in Africa.

A number of important contributions have been made recently in studying the role of international organisations - a factor that remains dominant in policymaking in Africa. While social protection programmes emanated from the South, specifically from Latin America, and transferred to developing countries in Africa, the agents of transfer are international organisations and epistemic communities. The study therefore is situated within international relations studies as it examines the roles of international organisations and transnational actors within the policy space in view of existing social relations and power relations. The present research builds upon studies of the role of international organisations in policymaking. We examine various mechanisms, including coercion and voluntary processes, and the persisting influence of international organisations in public and social policy. A number of research studies make a contribution to understanding the uptake of various social and public policy in
developing countries (Kpessa, 2010; Tambulasi, 2013; Güleç, 2014; Foli, 2015) and it is from this literature among others that this study draws.

1.4 Contribution of the Thesis

The thesis makes several theoretical and empirical contributions to the existing literature. Besides situating the study of social policy in Africa into global welfare literature, the thesis contributes to literature on social protection and policy transfer. First, existing literature explains the adoption of social protection policies from a political settlement approach and therefore as driven by national interests. I provide an alternative integrated explanation demonstrating that the adoption of cash transfer policies in developing countries was underpinned by power, based on asymmetrical relations between the promoters and the adopting country. This analysis recognises voluntary mechanisms of policy change and social learning but illustrates that even voluntary mechanisms can be imbued by power and soft coercion. As I will demonstrate in this thesis, even when international organisations used ideational mechanisms and social learning, there were underlying aspects of power through a discursive hegemony based on who produced the knowledge and how it shaped the preferences of domestic actors.

Second, this study contributes to the theoretical study of policy transfer in Africa. Through the employment of policy transfer in social policy I demonstrate that as depicted by Dolowitz and Marsh in their theoretical framework, international organisations used a combination of mechanisms in policy transfer. I demonstrate that it is difficult to achieve policy transfer through one mechanism. Mechanisms of transfer, ranging from voluntary to coercive, are often intertwined, making it difficult to neatly separate them from each other. It is difficult to explain policy transfer based on one variable as there are multiple variables at play concurrently.

Finally, the thesis contributes to literature on social policy in Kenya. The case studies of the CT-OVC and HSNP have generated data and information which relate to policymaking processes in Kenya in light of transnational influence. External influence is demonstrated by historicising social policy choices since independence. Second, the research forms part of studies that consider the process, dynamics and the politics of social protection adoption in Kenya within policy transfer studies. In addition, the study contributes to the broad study of social policy by situating cash transfers within the current discourse on social protection in Kenya and on the continent.
1.5 General Background of Social Protection in Kenya

Implementation of cash transfer schemes in Kenya began in 2004 with the CT-OVC programme. Following on this, four other programmes – the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT), the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP), Persons with Severe Disability Cash Transfer Programme (PWSD-CT) and the Urban Food Subsidy (UFS) – were started by the Government of Kenya and international organisations. The Urban Food Subsidy has since been discontinued. Following the uncoordinated process of adoption and implementation, the government with international organisations developed the National Safety Net Programme in 2013, as an initiative bringing the four cash transfer programmes under one umbrella to improve and enhance interventions. Set out as a coordination body, the National Safety Net Programme (NSNP) aims to harmonise and bring coherence to the programmes to “increase efficiency and effectiveness of the programmes …… under one common framework” (Government of Kenya, 2016b, p. iii). Accordingly, the NSNP is described as:

A mechanism to (i) coordinate fragmented programming; (ii) strengthen implementation systems; and (iii) finance the scaling of these [sic] programmes to ensure greater coverage (Government of Kenya, 2016b, p. v).

The implementation of the various cash transfers schemes began before policy development. However, the programmes are aligned with the National Social Protection Policy and the Constitution upon which they draw their mandate. The “Constitution aims to move Kenya towards a more equitable and inclusive future” (Government of Kenya, 2016b, p. 1). Specifically, Article 43(1)e states; “every person has a right to social security …. [and] the state shall provide appropriate social security to persons who are unable to support themselves and their dependents” (Government of Kenya, 2010, p. 31). The operationalisation of this section of the Constitution is provided for, from among others, the implementation of the four cash transfer programmes.

1.5.1 General Background of the CT-OVC

UNICEF, in partnership with the Ministry of Home Affairs, started the CT-OVC programme in 2004 to respond to increased child vulnerability brought about by HIV and AIDS, rising orphanhood and a breakdown of family support structures (Bosworth et al., 2016). The broad objective of the CT-OVC was retention of children in their communities with the specific
objectives of enhancing health and educational outcomes through provision of monthly cash payments to households taking care of orphans. Equally, the programme is a response to persistent poverty among orphaned and vulnerable children which was at 54.1% against the national average of 46.6% (Government of Kenya, 2007b).

The growth of the CT-OVC scheme is envisaged in three phases. In the first phase (2004-2006) described as the pre-pilot phase, UNICEF financed the programme through its own funding and financing from the Swedish International Development Agency in three locations to 500 households receiving KES 500 (USD 6) per month (Bosworth et al., 2016). The second phase of the programme (2007-2009), involved setting up technical structures for implementation and a gradual increase in numbers of beneficiary households following increased financing from the World Bank, Department for International Development (DFID) and Government of Kenya (GOK). The period involves intense training for government officials within the implementing ministries and the Ministries of Finance and Planning, and contact with the political class leading to “political acceptability” of the programme. The current phase, from 2009 to present, has involved the expansion of the programme following increased government spending on social protection programmes, and a World Bank credit facility to GOK.

Out of 8,767,954 households in the Kenya the current reach for the CT-OVC is 240,000 households in all the 47 counties in Kenya (World Bank, 2015a) representing 2.7 per cent of the households. Management of the programme is by the Department of Children’s Services in the Ministry of Labour and East African Affairs. The CT-OVC programme currently constitutes the largest cash transfer programme in geographical and beneficiary reach and represents the highest national expenditure on cash transfers. In the 2015/2016 fiscal year Government of Kenya financing towards the programme was KES 9 billion (USD 83.8 million), representing 0.4 per cent of total government expenditure in the fiscal year (Government of Kenya, 2015b).

1.5.2 General Background of the HSNP
The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) started in 2008 following a bilateral agreement between the Government of Kenya and the UK Government with the aim of reducing poverty in Northern Kenya by delivering cash transfers to households in four counties – Mandera, Wajir, Turkana and Marsabit (Government of Kenya, 2012). The unconditional social protection programme is poverty-targeted to the poorest and the most vulnerable in these four
counties. Drought and famine exacerbate chronic poverty levels which stand at 94% in Turkana and Marsabit, 88% in Mandera, and 84% in Wajir (Government of Kenya, 2007a).

The programme is managed through the Programme Implementation and Learning Unit situated within the National Drought Management Authority under the Ministry of Devolution and Planning and delivered by contracted service providers. The current programme reach for the HSNP in the four counties is approximately 100,000 households out of 394,203 households in the 4 counties. The programme therefore covers about 25% of the households in the 4 counties (Government of Kenya, 2016b). The DFID constitutes the largest financier with other funding coming from the Government of Kenya and the Australian Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade. While the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) funding grant for the programme is £85.59 million for 10 years to 2017 (DFID, 2013), government funding and ownership has been minimal, though this is changing with 2016 budgetary allocation at KES 1.4 billion (Government of Kenya, 2016a) – less than 0.1% of government expenditure in the financial year.

One of the objectives of the HSNP is to “implement a scaled-up, integrated, effective, government-led and financed safety net programme” (PILU and NDMA, 2018, p. 1). The programme aims at improving the welfare and the social economic indicators among households in the targeted districts. In addition, it seeks to build resilience in the communities and among households to cope with shocks.

1.6 Structure of the Thesis
This study focused on social policy and social protection and in particular the process of transfer and adoption of cash transfer policies in Kenya. This chapter has introduced and provided the background information on the research, and laid out the rationale of the study and the problem statement of the research.

Following the introduction, Chapter two presents a review of literature informing the study. This chapter is a review of literature on global social welfare and social policy formation, as well as a review of trends and influences on social policy in Africa and the genealogy of cash transfer and its rise within social policy. In Chapter three I review the recent theoretical perspectives explaining the current adoption of social protection and cash transfer policies. The
chapter goes further and highlights the limitations of the approaches. Reviewing the different approaches helps to situate this study within the existing approaches. In this chapter, I explain the theoretical and conceptual framework guiding this, drawing from policy transfer and power perspectives.

Chapter four outlines the methodology employed in the study by drawing on a social constructivist approach to explaining the transfer and adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. Studies related to policy transfer are dominated by positivist approaches with large “N” and in studies where case studies are adopted, one case is often employed in explaining policy transfer. However, this study research draws on the study of multiple cash programmes to maximise the explanations of policy transfer.

In Chapter five I provide a history of social policy in Kenya. This chapter probes Kenya’s post-independence social policy choices as taken by the post-independence Government of Kenya. In this discussion, three determinants are examined: the persistent colonial legacy, market-driven development model, and the influence of international organisations. In this chapter I discuss the political context which has determined social policy options in Kenya since independence. The persistent nature of the three determinants is discussed within the periods of economic and political change. The chapter demonstrates the effect of the three influences through the four post-independence political regimes as demonstrated through the oscillation of government support towards social policy.

In Chapter six, I examine how different social actors exercised power within the social protection policy arena to influence the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. The conclusion is that power deriving from the asymmetrical resource base of the international organisations underpinned the uptake of the programmes. In addition, in the chapter, I demonstrate that domestic actors in their agency reacted to and resisted the exercise of power by international organisations to some extent.

Building on this analysis of power relations, in Chapter seven, I examine ideational mechanisms and social learning as key mechanisms of influencing preferences and beliefs in the policy transfer process. The chapter goes beyond explanations of the key mechanisms, and discusses how proponents of cash transfers created a discursive hegemony based on how knowledge was produced, by whom and for what purposes. In addition, the chapter considers
how knowledge and learning was made powerful through social re-construction of populations groups, and the power of policy narratives.

In Chapter eight is an examination of financing as a structural mechanism in the policy transfer process. I demonstrate how international organisations catalysed the adoption of the two programmes through financing of pilot programmes to drive up their adoption. The chapter also examines the Programme for Results (P4R) model adopted by donors in financing social protection in Kenya as a soft coercive mechanism aimed at incentivising the government to increase financing for the programmes.

Chapter nine considers the role of national institutions and domestic politics as facilitative and mediating factors in the adoption process. The analysis highlights domestic contextual social, political and economic factors facilitating the adoption of the CT-OVC and HSNP. In doing so, the chapter shows the critical junctures and the windows of opportunity that international organisations capitalised upon in the policy transfer process. In the chapter I highlight how promoters of cash transfers policies manipulated and sometimes created opportunities to align their agenda to new or existing processes. In addition, there is a discussion on the constraining factors to adoption and expansion.

Following this is the concluding chapter where I present the conclusions and the policy implications that emerge from the study. The chapter highlights the gaps in the research and offers suggestions upon which studies on social protection and policy transfer may be based.
CHAPTER 2: SOCIAL POLICY, WELFARE AND CASH TRANSFERS

2.1 Introduction

As one of its objectives, this study sought to establish the change in the social policy regime of Kenya following the adoption of cash transfer schemes. For this reason, it was necessary to go beyond a review of the current knowledge and literature on policy transfer as the theoretical foundations for the study, but also to survey the literature on the history of the welfare states and on social policy and development in Africa. To this end, literature review focussed on two major areas: firstly on the emergence of social policy and the history of welfare states in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, and secondly on the historical ideology behind the idea of cash transfers and the rise of cash transfers in developing countries in particular across Africa. The literature on social policy and welfare states provides an understanding of the global and domestic context of social protection and social provisioning. In addition, review of literature provides a conceptual clarification of terms, thereby situating cash transfers within the social protection discourse and subsequently, social policy.


This chapter is organised as follows: First is the historical background of the development of welfare states in Europe. Then is a discussion of social policy in post-independence Africa. The section traces the historical development of social policy to establish the impetus and imperatives that led to their growth, dismantling and changes. Further, the section provides a background to Africa’s attempt at building welfare states after independence. Here, I situate the discussions on social protection and cash transfers within the broader social development debates. This is followed by a section tracing the neo-liberal ideology behind cash transfers. The historical analysis aims at situating cash transfers within the current social protection paradigm and largely provides evidence of how ideas become hegemonic and are transnationalised beyond their sites of origin. In addition, the historical tracing of the idea aims to demonstrate cash transfers as a neo-liberal agenda that departs from the philosophical ideas espoused by earlier welfare regimes, particularly in Nordic countries. The following section
examines the rapid rise of cash transfers in the social protection agenda in Africa over the last two decades. Here I attribute the adoption of cash transfers to international agencies and I discuss from literature criticisms proffered by scholars on the current social protection agenda. I conclude the chapter by providing an assessment of literature on an alternative paradigm to the cash transfer agenda in the form of transformative social policy.

2.2 History of Welfare States in Europe

Several authors have attempted to define the various terms and concepts related to social policy and social welfare. With the emergence of other terms, such as social protection and cash transfers, the landscape becomes confusing conceptually, and consequently in practice. Social policy is defined as “collective public efforts aimed at affecting and protecting the social wellbeing of people in a given territory” (Adésínà, 2009, p. S38). Meanwhile, Alcock et al. describe a welfare state as “… one that comprises income maintenance and social security, health policy and services, and personal social services, education and training policy and employment and housing policy” (Alcock, Payne and Sullivan, 2000, p. 1). The development of welfare states aimed to help mitigate the effects of market forces “by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of market values, by minimising the extent of insecurity, by enabling individuals and households to meet social risks and contingencies like sickness, old age and unemployment and by ensuring that all citizens regardless of state are offered the best standard available of social services” (Briggs, 1961, p. 288).

Going beyond the conceptual definition of terms, Titmuss (1974) provides a description of three “contrasting models or functions of social policy.” First is the “residual welfare model of social policy.” In this model, emphasis is placed upon the market and family and kin as the key providers for social policy benefits. Government intervention is provided only when there is failure of the market and family. Government support is therefore often temporary, serving as a safety net until the person is able to get back on his/her feet (Titmuss, 1974). Support in this case is likely to be highly targeted and aimed at the “deserving poor”. In the second model which he refers to as the industrial achievement-performance model, social benefits are related and fixed to one’s productivity, employment and performance in the market place. Those in the informal sector and the jobless therefore face exclusion based on the prescriptions of the model. Last is the institutional redistributive model where social welfare is considered part of the society, is universalistic and grounded on the norms of solidarity and social equality.
Current discussion on social policy focusses on government investment in terms of budgetary allocation to categorise welfare states. A look at the current classification of social policy provisioning in Africa reveals this fixation with measurements based on expenditure on cash transfer programmes. However, as Esping-Andersen notes, when considering welfare states, government commitment ought to go beyond expenditure as the parameter for measurement of its commitment (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In his typology of welfare regimes, he makes three classifications of northern states based on the principles of rights and stratification. Similar to Titmuss’ residual welfare model are the liberal welfare states which are marked by inadequate means-tested benefits. Often this leads to stigmatisation of those receiving the benefits. Essentially, through the residual model, the state encourages market provision. Second is the corporatist welfare states, which comprise regimes that were mostly shaped by provision from the church. Rights and benefits are attached to class and status. The state only intervenes when the family’s capacity to provide failed. In such welfare regimes, preservation of family values was paramount and therefore there was exclusion of non-working wives. Family benefits were provided to encourage motherhood. Esping-Andersen’s third classification in the typology is the social-democratic welfare states typical of Scandinavian countries. Welfare here is provided on a universal basis with the universal insurance benefits graduated according to one’s earnings. The model promotes solidarity and since all benefit, all feel obliged to pay. This model has however faced the criticism of crowding out markets.

Welfare states in European countries have their origin before World War I. Rapid unprecedented and consensual growth occurred in the post-war period following the expansion of democracies (Korpi, 2006). Literature shows four main approaches to explain welfare state development in the North. First is the theory that focuses on economic development and industrialisation. As the model suggests, capitalist development produced certain forms of social policy (Huber and Stephens, 2012; Tillin and Pereira, 2017). According to accounts, due to movement of people, the need to provide social provision arose, leading to the creation and the development of the welfare state. The early welfare state was therefore functionalist and an outcome of the “needs” of industrial society, with economic development and the changes in demographics and organisations prompting government to respond to growing social needs (Huber and Stephens, 2012; Schmitt et al., 2015). Governments needed to respond to growing social needs. In quoting critical scholars, (Tillin and Duckett, 2017, p. 256) indicate that that social policy in the North came as a “corrective to economic dislocations, rather than as a form of collective public action to improve well-being.”
Second is the approach which perceives the development of the welfare state as emanating out of class struggles and political mobilisation (Korpi, 1985; Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1986; Huber and Stephens, 2012). Drawing from power resources theory, proponents of this approach contend that redistribution is a function of working-class mobilisation and the more the working class organises, in other words, the more political resources they can accumulate, the more generous and extensive the welfare state will become (Korpi, 2006). With the advent of democracy in Europe, workers were able to organise and make demands on the state. The welfare state therefore emerged from democratic class struggle as trade unions, interest groups and left-wing parties sought to influence policy (Schmitt et al., 2015). This approach identifies the distribution of power based on organisation or property between labour organisations and “left parties on the one hand, and centre and right-wing political forces on the other as the primary determinants of the differences in the size and distributive impact to the welfare state across countries” (Huber and Stephens, 2012, p. 14). Welfare policy development arises out of “the struggle between different classes over who stands to benefit from welfare policies” (Ulriksen, 2012, p. 1486), thereby producing a distinct set of choices about social policy. The power resources theory ties in with the Marxist approach, where welfare states developed partly to head off revolution or instability caused by mass revolt as the working class demanded more rights (Rothstein, Samanni and Teorell, 2012). The theory is useful as it provides an explanation for the variation of systems of social protection across similar industrialised economies (Ibid).

The third explanation derives from the nature of political institutions (Tillin and Pereira, 2017). Explanations on the welfare states by institutionalists focus on the role of democratic political institutions in fostering the growth of the welfare state. Institutions include electoral systems, plural party systems, executive and legislative relations, and the judiciary and government structure which produce sequencing and path dependency tendencies (Chandhoke, 2005). Though formal institutions of democracy, including “free and competitive elections, are necessary, they are not sufficient conditions to generate enough pressure for redistribution” (Myles and Quadagno, 2002, p. 37). Pressure groups like trade unions and citizen movements through their disruptive power are the key force of change (Mati, 2013b). The final explanation sees the growth of welfare states arising out of international influences as a result of diffusion and transfer, with countries emulating or learning from other countries (Schmitt et al., 2015).
2.2.1 Explaining Variation in Welfare States

In Germany, the Bismarckian reforms of the 1880s represented an early model for social insurance and security (Briggs, 1961). The reforms required mandatory insurance against sickness and calamities, provision of a pension upon retirement and in cases of disability. Before this period, provision of social protection was through voluntary associations, kin, churches and guilds (Schmitt et al., 2015). The Bismarckian system and social protection was based on the conservative corporations’ type of welfare capitalisms with the “main aim and emphasis to provide job and income security for male workers” (Palier and Martin, 2007, p. 536). The pensions systems were based on intergenerational transfers, relying exclusively on a pay-as-you-go system, meaning benefits were tied to employment (Bonoli and Palier, 2007). Security was the main focus of the Bismarckian model, rather than poverty alleviation, and therefore this model was lacking in norms related to equality. For this reason, social insurance provision played a lesser role in “economic and political concerns, rather than placing importance on the concept of social right and equity” (Kwon, Mkandawire and Palme, 2009, p. 53). Bismarckian models were therefore based on industrialisation with the level of social protection dependent on one’s employment situation. The social security scheme in Germany created immense interest among other European countries, leading to diffusion where similar reforms were adapted in Denmark, prompting the early formation of welfare state building in the Nordic countries. In examining social security legislation between 1820 to 2013, (Schmitt et al., 2015) find that in the 19th century the role of the state in providing welfare had started to emerge in developed countries and by the 20th century as a core task of emerging nations.

Uptake and the spread of social security was however slow. By the 19th century, welfare in the form of universal provisions in Europe was provided to only a few needy people. In Britain social provision was based on the Poor Law, administered by parishes and provided on the basis of need with a distinction between the deserving and underserving poor. The Poor Law intended to encourage work and discourage dependency. Pursuant to that, it employed stringent targeting criteria (Alcock, Payne and Sullivan, 2000). By the 20th century there was a shift in the attitude towards poverty. Based on poverty surveys by Booth and Rowntree, the economic logic of the British Poor Law of 1834 was disputed as being impractical to implement in democratic societies, and on the basis that the poor were not poor as a result of their own fault but due to social and market factors (Briggs, 1961). Moreover, “the Poor Law treated the claims of the poor not as an integral part of the rights of the citizen but as an alternative to it” (Marshall, 2014, p. 33). In 1909, the government in Britain introduced non-contributory pensions targeting...
those aged 70 and older and later on social insurance based on a tripartite arrangement between workers, the employer and the state (Alcock, Payne and Sullivan, 2000). The period between the first and the second world wars provided room for the growth of the welfare state, particularly in Britain where destitution and poverty had become prevalent. The Beveridge Report of 1942 was influential in the formation of the British welfare regime as it advocated universalism of social policy (Beveridge, 1942). The thrust of the report was a recommendation to the government to tackle the five giants: “want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness”, and called for adequate income, health care, education, housing and employment.

While acknowledging the importance of social insurance, the report highlighted that “social insurance was only one part of a comprehensive policy of social progress” (Beveridge, 1942). Though social insurance may provide income security, it could only address the aspect of “want” but not the other four giants. The way to freedom from “want”, according to the report, included the improvement of state insurance to mitigate interruption and loss of earning power due to old age or disability, adjustment of income to smooth consumption, and in terms of child allowances, among other benefits. The plan proposed to cover all citizens with regard to consideration to the different cycles of life with the objective to protect all individuals from all social risks. In addition, the plan envisaged the state as the centre in social policy provision.

Compared to the other countries in the North, Nordic countries are considered later adopters of social policy, as the social-democratic welfare state took off post-industrial era (Palier and Martin, 2007; Kwon, Mkandawire and Palme, 2009). Even though initial forms of the welfare model were borrowed from the Bismarckian model, the state remained a player in expanding social welfare provisions in the Nordic countries (Kuhnle, 2011). The Nordic welfare regime is a political construction whose successful development is attributed to the policies of the social democrats. Within the social-democratic welfare state, it was the “coalition of the social-democratic party and working class” which led to the development of social policy (Kwon, Mkandawire and Palme, 2009, p. S3). The form of welfare state adopted was characterised by inclusivity. Though the Nordic welfare states were selective at the beginning with minimum “coverage because of the emphasis on economic development”, with the need to industrialise, “soon social policy became couched in universalism and democratic governance” (Kwon, Mkandawire and Palme, 2009, p. S9).
Shaped by the ideas of Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish welfare model was built on the construction of social policy as an investment and not a cost, thereby providing the imperative for government to finance economic support to families and households through cash transfers and other policies. Myrdal coined the term “productive social policy”, where social policy was valued as an avenue to increase production (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The Swedish model aimed at universal social and economic security, and access to education and healthcare for all. The Nordic model paid equal attention and emphasis to both social policy and economic development. An advantage the Nordic countries had as late industrialisers was the benefit of learning from those who had gone before them. Indicative of most of the countries in Europe, especially the Scandinavian countries, was the commitment to provision of broad-based social protection measures aimed at production and redistribution.

Changes have occurred over the years to the Bismarckian model with incremental and progressive reforms. Some of these changes relate to governments’ adoption of non-contributory pensions and voluntary private pension funds. Most of these reforms have not been abrupt but have involved negotiation with social partners. In European democracies, due to the nature of welfare state development, welfare state programmes have strengthened citizen loyalty to national institutions, enhancing bottom-up legitimacy. Welfare programmes have operated as anchors that political institutions have used to secure allegiance (Ferrera, 2005), thereby bringing about socio-political stabilisation.

Though different countries in Europe have taken different times and paths in adoption of social protection benefits, social pensions represent the most common form of provision in terms of coverage. In their empirical work, Schmitt et al. (2015) find that the adoption of social protection in both the North and South is a result of diffusion through transnational forces – witnessed a convergence of social protection schemes in the same region, though timing and scope vary. In Latin American countries, theoretical approaches explaining the growth of welfare states include elite responses as a result of pressures from politically influential or militant groups. As electoral competition increased following democratisation, the political elite’s response to the pressures reflected elite attempts to co-opt and integrate previously exempted groups. In Latin American countries several factors led to improvement of social welfare, including a militant labour movement, mobilisational activities of the leftist political parties and a functioning electoral system, together with welfare capitalism (Teichman, 2008;
In growing democracies new social programmes may be driven by electoral impetus. In the next section, I consider attempts at welfare state building in Africa.

2.3 Historical Perspective on Social Policy Choices in Africa

Contemporary social policy in Africa needs to be studied within the historical perspectives that have shaped it. The colonial heritage has been significant in shaping the nature of social policy in Africa. The different social policy periods, colonial, pre-independence and present, as Mkandawire points out, have been “… shaped by ideas, interests, path dependence and international norms” (Mkandawire, 2015, p. 592). This is unlike Europe, where the welfare state emerged as a drive from trade unions and political parties representing the “working class, middle class and in some cases rural populations demanding redistribution” (Lavers and Hickey, 2016, p. 4), social policymaking in Africa has been largely determined by exogenous factors. The exception is the period after independence when social policy was led by the imperatives of a better life for all as governments endeavoured to extend social development to previously excluded Africans.

Social protection is not new to Africa. Though touted as a new concept in global policies, the practice has been evident across the continent. Through mutual support and informal mechanisms, Africans have practiced social protection activities based on the normative values of altruism, reciprocity and solidarity, with kinship and family constituting the main sources of support (Surender, 2013). Across Africa, there existed and still exist informal mechanisms of social protection which include funeral and burial societies, taking in of orphans and communal ploughing to ensure that all are adequately protected from idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Such mechanisms ensure material and economic provision for all, including the poor and vulnerable. However, there has been little systematic recording of these forms of traditional social protection. Myrdal (1981) extends the thought, stating that there was little attempt at studying or gathering data to understand what counted as important in the African way of life. Unfortunately, some of the traditional mechanisms of social protection have been eroded due to globalisation, breakdown of the family structure and urbanisation. Osei-Hwedie (1998, p. 6) conceptualises social policies “as formal and informal rule and guidelines underlying the organised efforts of society to meet the need of its members and ameliorate the problems confronting them on individual, group and community bases.” From this definition, one can infer that social policy existed in all societies and in Africa before colonialism. Social
policy and social provision then recognised “individual needs as part of wider societal needs”, unlike the current paradigm steeped in individualism and individual rights (Lavinas, 2013). Individualism as a criterion for provision was minimum as “kinship ties and networks provided strong bases for social provisioning” (Osei-Hwedie, 1998, p. 6).

Noticeable growth of poverty started during the colonial period, a factor that Bevan attributes partly to the movement into cities by able-bodied men for work (forced or wage labour) and the introduction of cash and markets (Bevan, 2004). During this period, state provision was meant to address the needs of the colonisers; it was therefore characterised by discrimination and exclusions (Aina, 2004). Social policy provisions for the colonised, in terms of education and health, were provided by missionaries and religious institutions. These were the first institutionalised groups providing care for those unable to fend for themselves. No distinctions were made of the deserving and undeserving poor. Investments aimed at improving the economic status of the Africans during this period was minimal as the colonial government regarded the native population as inferior (Myrdal, 1967). There was a lack of deliberate investment aimed at improving the economic status of Africans by the colonial regime. Due to industrialisation and migration to urban areas for labour, initial forms of formal social security (borrowed from Britain) based on employment, started to emerge (Bevan, 2004). Social security was later extended to Africans after independence though the social insurance provision in the form of pension, which favoured the relatively small population in formal private employment (Brooks, 2015).

Drawing from the periodisation provided by Shivji (2009), the growth of social development in Africa post-independence can be divided into three stages: first, the age of developmentalism (1960-1970), when “development was a process of class struggle” (Shivji, 2009, p. 7); second, Africa’s lost decade in the 1980s, when the neo-liberal agenda determined the social policy demands and preferences for countries across Africa, and third, the current dispensation, which he terms the age of globalisation. After independence, African countries adopted what could be interpreted as welfare developmentalism as they sought to change the conditions created under colonialism (Osei-Hwedie, 1998; Adésínà, 2009; Kwon, Mkandawire and Palme, 2009; Shivji, 2009). This followed a period of European rule where almost all economic and social activities benefitted a small non-indigenous group of people (Osei-Hwedie, 1998). Various imperatives led to the form of developmentalist states adopted, but most paramount was the link to the struggle for independence as “an assertion or the humanness of the African people”
In terms of the ideological orientation towards provision, “African socialisms” emphasised the equality of all people, promoted “equality of access to resources and opportunities with structural transformation based on the notions of social justice and egalitarian redistribution” (Osei-Hwedie, 1998, p. 10). During the period there was modest growth in African economies. The investment translated into the expansion of primary and secondary schools, introduction of tertiary education and improvement in medical and health statistics marking a period of improvement for many Africans (Osei-Hwedie, 1998). Among other imperatives was the need for national development to fulfil expectations, which involved the double tasks of developing the economy and building the nation (Shivji, 2009). But Cheru (1992) argues that the post-independence development model was not a departure from the colonial development model but that the “age of developmentalism” was characterised by developmental concerns, top-down and statist social development practices (Cheru, 1992; Shivji, 2009).

Post-independence social policy in Africa was state-led and anchored on the norms of nation-building and solidarity (Aina, 2004; Garba, 2007; Adésínà, 2009). Illustrating from the case of Ghana, Tanzania and Western Nigeria, Adésínà (2015) validates the deliberate trajectory adopted towards economic and social development, albeit following different development models. In Western Nigeria, for example, a combined route of agriculture and an industrial development model was adopted while Tanzania’s path hinged on Ujamaa, a “peasant-based” development strategy (Adésínà, 2015). Through most post-independence countries, the period was marked by deliberate state-funded investment in social subsidies and social programmes like education and health (Aina, 2004; Chachage, 2007) based on values of equity and people-centeredness (Garba, 2007). Guided by a genuine desire to improve the social welfare of citizens and promote social cohesion, social expenditure grew especially towards education. As a result, there was marked growth in the sector as education was perceived to enhance social and economic growth and a personal avenue for getting out of poverty. Investments in health paid off by drops in levels of mortality and increased literacy levels (Chachage, 2007; Adésínà, 2009).

The period was however short-lived as the political elite started draining surplus from the peasants as the state became a site of accumulation with state power used for private accumulation – a regressive and destructive policy pursued by the ruling African elite (Mafeje, 1997; Fanon, 2005). But as argued elsewhere, the view that ‘bad policies’ by African leaders
led to the deterioration of development including human development outcomes like health, literacy and mortality needs to be juxtaposed within the global context of the rise of capitalism, and external shocks arising from unfair trading practices (Arrighi, 2002). Moreover, the development period was interrupted by structural adjustment programme and political mismanagement of power, leading to an oscillation of the state’s role in economic and social development for the next four decades (Kwon, Mkandawire and Palme, 2009).

In the 1980s, the dualism between economic development and social development began to emerge as government and international funding was channelled towards infrastructural development. The international financial institutions (IFIs) forced governments to adopt the recommendations of the Washington Consensus, focussed on effecting liberalisation of markets, adoption of macro-economic policies and rolling back the role of government. Expenditure in social policy began to drop. Structural adjustment policies, promoted by the IMF and World Bank, aimed at restoring macro-economic balance were presented as urgent and inevitable (Diagne, 2011). First to be targeted for retrenchment were state-led social provisions considered wasteful, requiring governments to cut down in line with the adjustment prescriptions (Aina, 2004). By the 1980s, state financing for health and education significantly reduced to comply with Structural Adjustment Programmes’ (SAPs) conditions. To further make the case for cuts in social spending, it was argued that Western countries had established their welfare states at a higher level of economic development which developing countries had not attained yet. The urgency was for governments to grow their economic base before investing in social development.

As expenditure in social policy shrunk, some interventions were altogether abandoned (Mkandawire, 2013) as countries forged ahead to attain “economic development”. But as Myrdal (1974, p. 729) postulates, development is “the movement upward of the entire social system”, therefore the social system encompasses the economic and all non-economic factors (including consumption through education and health). Consequently, the failure to invest in what is considered non-economic domains affects the whole system and may lead to stagnation of development and growth. Mkandawire (2011) in addition argues that economic and social development are inseparable and therefore the failure to invest in one ultimately impacts on the other.

SAPs basically required governments to limit their direct participation in provision of social services and instead encourage market forces to play a bigger role. SAPs led to the loss of a
long-term perspective of social development in particular. A result of SAPs was that social services – “education, health, nutrition, rates of literacy and life expectancy” – declined (Adésinà, 2009; Shivji, 2009) as national liberation ideologies were rubbed (Shivji, 2009). Poverty numbers rose and poverty deepened as the poor could not afford to pay for basic services (Adésinà, 2009; Surender, 2013). The retrenchments in social spending coupled with the political trajectory – one-party, authoritarian, clientelistic politics – adopted by some nationalists states led to disintegration in development in a number of countries, Kenya included (Aina, 2004). The number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) grew following the failure of the state and markets in provision of services, while unemployment spiked due to job cuts, leading to the growth of the informal sector (Surender, 2013). Following the neo-liberal prescriptions, some form of palliatives were offered to remedy the devastation of SAPs (Shivji, 2009), among them targeted social protection schemes. But targeting in itself rather than universal provisions is regressive (Korpi and Palme, 1998) as it leads to high poverty and inequality. A clear demonstration is evident in South Africa where inequality has risen over the years due to the occupation of targeting means of provision to poor people (Adésinà, 2014). Targeting also creates stigma, leading to an erosion of self-respect and dignity among the poor and therefore low uptake of services.

In what he terms “contradictory advocacy”, Adejumobi (2004), notes that whereas African states were compelled to cut down on social spending, these constituted the very areas where countries in the North were increasing spending. Reports indicate that since “1980 public social spending has increased by more than 20% across the OECD with variation across countries” (Adema, Fron and Ladaique, 2011, p. 9). The same sentiments can be argued today of cash transfers in Africa in comparison to the European conceptualisation of social policy. In Europe social policy encompasses more than cash transfers and includes housing, universal health care and education unlike the single advocacy for cash transfers in Africa. Following on this discussion, the next section traces the path leading to introduction of cash transfers in social policy.

2.4 Neo-liberalism: The Genealogy of the Ideology

The emergence and spread of cash transfers across developing countries is usually attributed to Latin America, Brazil and Mexico in particular. Ideologically, though, the roots and the idea of cash transfers have their antecedents in the North (Lavinias, 2013). The formation of the neo-
liberal agenda bringing about the idea of cash transfers as welfare solutions can be traced in three phases. The first phase involves the foundational aspects in Europe with Friedrich Hayek, the Austrian-British economist, to the second phase, which involved the spread of neo-liberal ideas to America, and lastly their expansion to the developing world through the Washington Consensus.

2.4.1 Phase I: Founding of Neo-liberalism

Neo-liberalism sprang up as a reaction to the New Liberalisation, Progressive and New Deal before World War II. With the first meeting of like-minded persons, Austrian born economist Fredrich Hayek, established and spread the idea through the Mont Pelerin Society meeting in 1947 based on the ensuing social, political and economic events. Emerging in the period between the two wars, neo-liberal economists proposed a doctrine centred on the promotion of free markets, deregulation and limited government participation in the economy as a response to the New Deal. The ideas of neo-liberalism were a battle of ideas against those who believed government has a “responsibility to intervene in the market to soften the sharp edges” (Klein, 2007, p. 17). The Mont Pelerin Society, as it later came to be known, depicted the New Deal and the development of the British welfare state as communism. Hayek’s ideas, which started as an intellectual exercise, later permeating politics, were against an expanded state in managing the economy (Thorsen, 2010). In his book The Road to Serfdom, he stated:

“This argument is twofold: the first is economic and can only briefly be stated: The state should confine itself to establishing rules applying to general types of situation and should allow individual’s freedom in everything which depends on the circumstances of time and place because only the individual concerned in each instance can fully know these circumstances and adapt their actions to them. If individuals are able to use their knowledge effectively in making plans, they must be able to predict actions of the state which may affect these plans. But if the actions of the state are to be predictable, they must be determined by rules fixed independently of the concrete circumstances which can be neither foreseen nor taken into account beforehand; and the particular effect of such action will be unpredictable. If, on the other hand, the state were to direct the individual’s actions so as to achieve a particular end, its action would have to be decided on the basis of the full circumstances of the moment and would therefore be unpredictable. Hence, the familiar fact that the more the state “plans”, the more difficult planning becomes for the individual” (Hayek, 2007, p. 114).

After the Second World War, the ideas spread as opposition to Keynesian economic policies, which aimed at increasing and promoting the necessity of the welfare state in response to the excesses of capitalism. Keynesianism prescribed an active state, in maintaining the economy
through the provision of full employment (Jones, 2014). Other measures promoted by Keynes centred on the relief from poverty with high levels of public spending by government on welfare programmes and public services. Following the market crash of 1929, there was “consensus that laissez-faire had failed and that government intervention was necessary to redistribute wealth and regulate corporations” (Klein, 2007, p. 17). In what she describes as “a time of unabashed faire,” in the period between the 1930s and 1950s governments launched public works programmes to create much-needed jobs and unveiled the new social programme. The period can be described as a time of compromise between the left and the market for “avoidance of depression and the prevention of unemployment.”

Keynes’ proposition was of a mixed regulated economy, which was considered a revolution in public policy in the form of the New Deal (Klein, 2007). Keynes proposed a system of compromises, checks and balances with a coexistence between a free market with free public health care, public school, decent wages by corporations and respect for workers’ right to form unions. In addition, he proposed taxation and redistribution of wealth to mitigate inequalities brought about by the market (Stiglitz, 1994; Klein, 2007). Keynes argued that markets were not self-regulating and that unemployment would persist following the Great Depression unless government intervened (Stiglitz, 1994). Policies to create jobs and rescue the suffering from the collapse of the economy were therefore necessary through government intervention. During the period of laissez-faire, the welfare state was embraced by the West (Klein, 2007).

Hayek’s idea however, and that of other proponents, placed the market at the centre of the economy with the definition of neoliberalism premised on individuals as consumers who ought to be left to make choices by themselves through markets. Markets offered greater freedom from government interference and according to liberal thought were more efficient in distribution of goods (Hayek, 2007). The efficiency of markets, according to Hayek, promoted the power of human initiatives for innovation, including self-interest and individual pursuit for happiness. The efficiency of markets in distribution of services was alleged to be less costly and provide better social outcomes. The proponents therefore promoted markets as the best providers of even basic goods and needs like housing, health care, education and pensions. Markets were promoted as superior to government in dealing with and addressing policy issues. However, by the 1970s, the ideas of Keynes started to fall apart following crises in the North, which resulted in a rise in inflation leading to a recession and rising unemployment. The crisis provided room for the revival of the doctrine of free markets. Neo-liberalism emerged as a
critique to Keynesianism spearheaded by Milton Friedman, an American who critiqued state involvement in the economy (Gamble, 2001). Neo-liberal economists asserted that government was wrong to follow the prescriptions offered by Keynes, “the architect of the New Deal and modern welfare state” (Klein, 2007, p. 17).

Defenders of “Classical Liberalism,” Hayek and those in Europe and in the early Chicago School had in mind a strong but limited state. The role of the state they prescribed was macro-economic, as the policing and controlling of monopoly, supervision of monetary policy and addressing the social question of safety nets meant protecting the vulnerable from the harsh effects of market capitalism. And all this government was to do within the framework that enhanced the protection of private property rights. The idea of a strong but limited state were pushed by the thoughts and pressure of the Chicago School comprising among others Milton Friedman who argued that market mechanisms ought to be employed in broader policy spheres. This resulted in for instance, the increasing prominence for proposals for voucher schemes for education or social security and privatisation in the US, and the internal market of the National Health Security introduced by Thatcher’s government in the UK.

2.4.2 Phase II: Transnationalisation of the Ideology
The second phase marked the growth of neo-liberalism beyond scholars to include think tanks, businessmen, academics, journalists and politicians (Jones, 2014). This period was marked by policy actions of other ideological entrepreneurs. Think tanks particularly played a key role in promoting and carrying out research for free-market neo-liberal ideas, connecting them with the political class and political problems. The idea grew to become a transatlantic network beyond its root in Europe from Vienna and London. It comprised the establishment of think tanks first in Britain and the US after the post-war period which later expanded. The think tanks were funded by American businesses like General Electric and General Motors. Think tanks became the preferred mode of transmitting neo-liberal thinking, as those who ran them were able to influence politicians and decision makers. The main way in which think tanks did this was (a) communication of messages (b) by generating innovative policy ideas (c) by creating databases of contacts and connections to increase influence of the movement. The heterogeneity of the think tanks enabled their flexibility and intellectual dexterity to the armoury of neo-liberalism as it was an elite-driven movement whose proponents include academics, politicians and journalists funded and financed by rich business enterprise and foundations (Jones, 2014).
Focus shifted from the anti-New Deal roots with a simple message: “the superiority of markets over all forms of government intervention or collections” (Jones, 2014, p. 562), moving from an intellectual movement to a “global hegemonic force”. Friedman’s radical ideas were that government spending on social service education was inefficient and instead government should provide families with vouchers to access services at private institutions – not just as a stopgap measure but as a permanent reform (Klein, 2007). With this message, new neo-liberal politics gained ground as a response to the social and economic problems with the markets depicted as more efficient in allocating resources than governments. Efficiencies, as argued, could only be achieved through incentives which were seen to be inherent in market mechanisms. Therefore, markets were promoted as best in delivery of public goods. These utopian beliefs in markets gained ground in Britain, the United States and globally from the 1970s.

With these ideas taking root across the Atlantic, change in policies became inevitable as the ideology moved to the political sphere. The propagation of neo-liberal ideas for example resulted in the US adopting a different kind of micro-economic management with experimentation of the private sector in housing and urban policy. In what he calls “neo-liberal theory of the state,” Jones (2014) outlines some implications for government in the public sphere. Keynesianism ran into the problem of stagflation – high inflation and unemployment – leading to the loss of trust in politicians and political institutions. This led to tax revolts in the US in the 1970s, the collapse of industrial relations in Britain, and urban unrest and violence following the break and belief in the superiority of government and in collective action. This situation allowed libertarians and Classic Liberals space to offer ideas of neo-liberalism as the policy alternative for the fightback by the super-elite forces in North America and Europe. Neo-liberal ideas undermined and strengthened the belief and led to the election of Thatcher as prime minister in the UK in 1979 and Reagan as president of the US in 1980. Following, a major shift occurred towards the adoption of the neo-liberal faith in free markets and by the 1980s neoliberalism became an alternative for shaping all policies (Gamble, 2001). Reagan and Thatcher represented the political arm of the neo-liberal ideology, with both considered by their promoters as political leaders with the courage to implement free markets in the real world (Klein, 2007). With cuts in welfare and the renewed emphasis on the markets, the intentions of the conservative and Republican policymakers coupled with the unhindered rise of the neo-liberal ideas brought a situation of winners and losers. The poor and disadvantaged lost out due
to cuts in welfare, the middle class was squeezed while upper tier gained through lower income taxes and personal subsidies in mortgages, tax relief, the privatisation of state assets and nationalised industries and through the trickle-down effect (Jones, 2014).

The adoption by the state of neo-liberal ideas led to some negative consequences. First was the rise of inequality as middle and upper earners benefitted more from state subsidies than the poor. Second was the rollback of the public provision and a reduction of public services provision, and the squeeze in collective industrial action. Third was the cutback of provisions of assistance to the poorest based on arguments of rising costs of welfare. The general consequence was that neo-liberal policies hurt the most vulnerable members of society.

Beyond promoting the ideology by think tanks and business enterprises, the key power of the idea was that it resonated with the moment as it promoted the idea of opportunity and free enterprises, which converged with American ideals of individualism. Two lessons on the diffusion of ideas emerge from the legacy of the transAtlantic neo-liberal politics. First the neo-liberal network is an example of a highly disciplined and effective political movement; second it is an illustration of the power of ideas in influencing political and social outcomes. Both characteristics, as will be demonstrated later in the thesis, have been emulated by transnational actors in promoting the institutionalisation of cash transfer and social protection schemes in developing countries. In addition, neo-liberal ideas have persisted with their tenacious tendencies seen in the promotion of safety nets and targeted cash transfers in Africa by a globalised transnational network of individuals and organisations away from the promotion of other social policy instruments.

2.4.3 Phase III: Expansion of the Idea to Developing Countries

The extension of neo-liberal ideas into the rest of the world, particularly developing countries, gained ground with the imposition of “structural adjustments” by the Bretton Wood Institutions and other regional and global institutions. SAPs were based on Friedman’s claims on the link between economic and political freedom. The language expertly developed by neo-liberal promoters and thinkers was based on freedom and economic opportunity. Globally, the neo-liberal vision was grounded on the substitution for public funded education and healthcare systems for a free market which would be more efficient than the state. But markets are unreliable in distribution of public goods, as they create inequalities and leave the poor without support (Stiglitz, 1994). Governments therefore have a role in promoting stability.
Neo-liberal networks and promoters often took advantage of crises to impose the policies, as was the case in Latin American countries and across Africa (Stiglitz, 1994; Klein, 2007). By the 1990s neo-liberalism had entered the discussion on globalisation, becoming a hegemonic discourse promoted by powerful international actors. Its emphasis in developing countries focussed on market deregulation and “public sector reforms which aimed at making government agencies similar to private companies” (Thorsen, 2010, p. 189). Other requirements imposed by international organisations summarised as the “Washington Consensus” included proposals to reform the tax regime, for governments to liberalise trade, put in place strong property rights, privatisation of state enterprises, removal of trade barriers and drastic cuts in government spending (Klein, 2007; Jones, 2014). This list was considered the bare minimum for economic stabilisation of countries in the South. And whereas previously “the World Bank and the IMF had made policy recommendations when they handed out loans, emboldened by the desperation of developing countries, those recommendations morphed into radical free-market demands” (Klein, 2007, p. 163). The imposition led to the privatisation of services which had to be paid by individuals, resulting in the adoption of the policies constraining development in Africa. The effects of the policies in relation to Kenya are discussed further in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Debates about the precise role of government in social provisioning abound, however, “there is a broad agreement that government has a role to play in making any society and any economy function efficiently and humanely” (Stiglitz, 1994, p. 218). The fiscal and economic crisis in developing countries in the 1980s provided an opportunity for the implementation of safety nets. Following the devastation brought about by SAPs, there was urgent need to protect the vulnerable from the effects of liberalisation (Lavinias, 2013).

The idea of cash transfers as safety nets is derived from Hayek’s leaning towards the provision of money as freedom. He thus stated:

Strictly speaking, there is no “economic motive” but only economic factors conditioning our striving for other ends… If we strive for money, it is because it offers us the widest choice in enjoying the fruits of our efforts. Because in modern society it is through the limitation of our money incomes that we are made to feel the restrictions which our relative poverty still imposes upon us, many have come to hate money as a symbol of these restrictions. But this is to mistake for the cause the medium through which a force makes itself felt. It would be much truer to say that money is one to the greatest instruments of freedom ever invented by man. It is money which in existing
society opens an astounding range of choice to the poor man – a range greater than that which not many generations ago was open to the wealthy. We shall better understand the significant of this service of money if we consider what it would really mean if, as so many socialists characteristically propose, the “pecuniary motive” were largely displaced by “noneconomic incentives.” If all rewards, instead of being offered in money, were offered in the form of public distinction or privileges, position of power over other men, or better housing or better food, opportunities for travel or education, this would merely mean that the recipient would no longer be allowed to choose and that whoever fixed the reward determined not only its size but also the particular form in which it should be enjoyed” (Hayek, 2007, p. 125).

Spreading the idea first in Latin America, the World Bank and other development agencies advocated safety nets through the “social risk management” strategy, offering a pro-market approach to combating poverty (Lavinas, 2013). The World Bank promoted cash transfers as interventions to assist individuals and households to manage risks.

2.5 The Rise and Rise of Cash Transfers in Africa

Following the harsh effects of the SAPs, Kenya, like other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, adopted the “government-led” Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP). The national PRSP (2001–2004), with the objectives of poverty reduction and economic growth, aimed to promote economic growth while ensuring poverty reduction. Despite these efforts, poverty and inequality have persisted (Atieno and Shem, 2007). Meanwhile continents like Latin America and Asia have made remarkable progress in poverty reduction largely as a result of reduction in unemployment, the impact of labour reforms including an increase in minimum wage, expanding access to education and economic growth (Higgins, 2012). Part of the contribution towards poverty reduction can be attributed to social protection programmes, in particular Bolsa Família (Barrientos, 2012). It is estimated that between 12 to 18 percent drops in levels of poverty in Brazil can be attributed to Bolsa Família (Higgins, 2012; Barrientos et al., 2013). The drop in poverty attributed to the cash transfer schemes is however marginal in comparison to the impact of labour income as a result of reduction in unemployment. Successful implementation and positive human development achievements witnessed through the Bolsa Família Programme have resulted in its diffusion to other developing countries.

In realisation of the negative effects and the failure of SAPs, coupled with a focus on the Millennium Development Goals, the World Bank sought to mitigate the situation through what it termed social risk management (Brooks, 2015). Its focus was on cushioning the “deserving poor”. The idea of targeted safety nets towards the deserving poor, children, older persons and
those unable to work was promoted through international conferences with the aim of “producing new research on social investments to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty” (Brooks, 2015, p. 556). Implementation of cash transfers as social protection measures began to emerge. Different contextualised definitions of social protection exist. According to the Government of Kenya, the term refers to

“… policies and actions, including legislative measures, that enhance the capacity of and opportunities for the poor and vulnerable to improve and sustain their lives, livelihoods, and welfare, that enable income-earners and their dependants to maintain a reasonable level of income through decent work, and that ensure access to affordable healthcare, social security, and social assistance” (Government of Kenya, 2011b).

Cash transfers are considered part of social assistance programmes. Occasioned by the high foreign financial investment, the mercurial rise of cash transfers as a policy option has changed the social policy landscape in Africa (de Haan, 2011). The strong positive narrative surrounding cash transfers – the positive impacts on human development indicators – have also driven the rise of cash transfer programmes. It is recorded that 40 countries in Africa have a cash transfer programme of some sort, having risen from 21 in 2010 (World Bank, 2015b). The rise of social protection in Africa has also been propelled by the framing of social protection – though from a broader agenda – as a global social policy and driven by regional and international agendas like the African Union Social Policy Framework (AU-SPF) and the International Labour Organization Social Protection Floor Recommendations.

However, there are aspects of this narrative that are open to critique. First, some discourse on this topic presents cash transfers as the main or even only antidote to poverty and vulnerability. Even when practitioners acknowledge that cash transfers might be one of many policy instruments used for social protection, they still dominate deliberations on the social protection agenda. There are also unanswered questions about the way the transfers are targeted, and whether social protection for one category of vulnerable people might come at the expense of other groups. Another concern rises from the fact that many cash transfer programs in Africa are largely funded and implemented by international organisations, such as NGOs and IFIs, often with little attention to local political and economic contexts. Critics of the single use of cash as a social policy instrument view it as a return to neo-liberal tendencies aimed at addressing market failures (Adésinà, 2014). The preoccupation and emphasis on cash is also viewed as a way of getting the poor to the markets, thereby reinforcing residualistic tendencies.
of social provision (Lavinas, 2013). Furthermore, cash transfers offer simpler alternatives for governments than the seemingly more complicated avenues of addressing endemic poverty.

Unfortunately the “aggressive policy merchandising” (Adésínà, 2011, p. 455) by international actors and the fixation on cash provisioning to the poor has led to a narrowing of social policy to social protection and further to cash transfers (Mkandawire, 2010). Unlike Europe, where broad-based social policy instruments were adopted to address need, cash transfers in Africa are seen to be the basis for poverty reduction. Mkandawire (2011) argues that the way poverty reduction and social policy is implemented in Africa now has the same characteristics as the Poor Law; the heavy targeting employed particularly in cash transfer programmes and the preoccupation with “graduating beneficiaries” out of programmes and not out of poverty are reminiscent of the characteristics on which the Poor Law was based. He draws attention to the under-theorisation of social policy in Africa by pointing to a couple of biases that have led to this state. He asserts that though the convergence on social concerns, economic welfare, equity and social justice in both developed and developing countries are now more than ever starkly visible, the purposes of social policy seem to diverge.

Whereas the dualism of economic and social policy in Africa seems to be promoted against much broader universalistic welfare regimes, growing evidence from emerging democracies demonstrates that investment in social policy regimes indeed enhance productivism in capitalistic systems. African countries too can learn as they go along just as the developed countries did. Part of the attribution to the oversimplification of welfare regimes to social assistance tools of cash transfers, Adésínà (2015) argues, emanates from a conceptual misunderstanding and a lack of rigour in understanding the historical background on social policy and the welfare regime paradigm, a conceptual trap that both scholars and practitioners of social protection fall into. This calls for revisiting readings on the welfare regimes paradigm and social policy to bring clarity on the intended meaning of the two concepts in relation to addressing and “bringing a person to a full decent life”.

A shift beyond the cash transfer narrative needs to occur if Africa is to attain “development”. Unfortunately, Africa has remained a laboratory of social policy instruments like cash transfers that do not fully serve the purpose of bringing about the gains that were achieved during the pre-1980 pre-colonial period (Adejumobi, 2004). As has been demonstrated there is a need to shift back to what has historically not only played a key role in poverty reduction but also towards encouraging national cohesion and equity. Transformative social policy therefore calls
for “a much broader vision…. multitasking for achieving multiple objectives such as production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and nation building” (Adésínà, 2011, p. 455). This approach is formed around the ideas of “recognition of the multiple tasks of social policy… inherent interconnection of economic and social policies… diversity of instruments in the social policy repertoire… the wider vision of human well-being and capability” (Adésínà, 2014, p. 3).

2.6. Transformative Social Policy as an Alternative

The transformative social policy approach describes social policy as “collective public efforts aimed at affecting and protecting the well-being of people in a given territory” (Adésínà, 2009 p. 38). Transformative social policy envisages a non-residual approach, “unlike neo-liberal principles, which are based on the notions that the poor can be treated as a residual category targeted by specific programmes” (Haarstad and St Clair, 2011a, p. 214). Targeted and residual programmes, unlike transformative social policy, “fail to link poverty to broader social, political and economic structures or shared interest with the non-poor groups and the middle class” (Haarstad and St Clair, 2011 p.g.214). Furthermore programmes that take on universal approaches to provision can transform structures and forms of inequality and poverty and “raise human well-being as it can transform social institutions, social relations and the economy” (Adésínà, 2015, p. 113). Universal policy regimes enhance attainment of rights of the poor and provide better quality and accountability (Adésínà, 2011) as they can “build on shared interests between classes and social groups and create a foundation for solidarity and coalitions between classes and groups, re-embedding elements of the middle class and constructing universally accessible public infrastructure for health, education and employment promotion” (Haarstad and St Clair, 2011a, p. 215).

Social rights, linked to the idea of citizenship, represent avenues through which provision of social protection and social policy are anchored (Marshall, 2014). One of the reasons for the loss of social rights is the residual role that was assigned to social policy during the period of SAPs (UNRISD, 2006). Social rights are therefore anchored in inclusivity “with shared rather than divergent interests between the poor and middle classes, and support for public infrastructure benefiting the poor” (Haarstad and St Clair, 2011a, p. 215). Social rights will be achieved with better “social compacts that bridge class and promote inter-class solidarities” (Ibid). Transformative social policy further offers the opportunity to reconcile the female role of reproduction, providing an engendered aspect to social protection. SAPs led to a
retrenchment of the state with the effects particularly pronounced on women as the burden of care, especially healthcare, fell on them – leading to a reversal of the achievement of social rights. The adoption of broad-based social protection instruments, with a focus on ex ante social protection instruments like land reforms, can offer this form of reconciliation. For instance, land reforms as social policy instruments not only dismantle inequalities in asset redistribution but increase per capita land holding among rural households, thereby ameliorating the problem of landlessness (Musavengana, 2017; Tekwa and Adésínà, 2018). The current paradigm with the fixation on cash transfers does not have legitimacy with the people and most of all the focus on individuals undermines the social norms of reciprocity.

2.7 Conclusion
Evidently, the (non-) growth of social policy in Africa has taken a different trajectory from that of early adopters of the welfare state and industrialisers. Although attempts were made post-independence at expanding social development to the local population, the attempts were curtailed both by endogenous and external factors. Divergences in outcome are evident as social policy has been influenced by several external factors. Consequently, social policy across Africa, unlike that of OECD countries, remains residual, market-based and inadequate for the needs of a majority of the population. The current overreliance on cash transfers for the poor moreover is individualist, thereby eroding opportunities for solidarity and social cohesion for the wider societal good (Haarstad and St Clair, 2011b). The preoccupation with cash transfers further has the ability to draw attention from other social policy instruments like education, health or land reform that are needed in countries with large numbers of those living in poverty.

In this chapter, I sought through a review of literature on the development and outcomes of the welfare state in Europe to provide a historical review of social policy in Africa to demonstrate how international influences permeated social policy in Africa, bringing about the idea of cash transfers. The chapter has also offered a critique of the current social protection paradigm and proffered an alternative framework as transformative social policy. In the next chapter, through a review of literature and empirical studies I examine various explanatory frameworks on the adoption of social protection and cash transfers on the continent after which, I develop the conceptual framework guiding this study.
CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

This chapter maps out the existing knowledge from the literature on social protection promotion and advocacy and discusses the major explanations and weaknesses of the existing paradigms explaining the drivers of adoption of social protection policies. I then present an alternative analytical framework for understanding social protection uptake. The developed conceptual framework provided a guide for analysing, explaining and understanding the dynamics of policy transfer and the policymaking process leading to social protection adoption in Kenya. The literature review provided a clear connection between the theory, earlier findings on the adoption process of social protection policies, and the purpose of this study. Since the introduction of social protection policies in developing countries almost three decades ago, much of the literature on the policies has focused on technical issues and the impact of the programmes and policies on livelihoods (de Haan, 2011). Following the rapid adoption of these policies, particularly in the form of cash transfer schemes, attention by scholars has now turned to examining the policymaking process and the factors that drive adoption.

Recent explanations of growth of the social protection policies in developing countries emanate from two theoretical perspectives. First are explanations focused on national politics based on political settlements as the analytical framework for explaining policy uptake. Arguments offered by scholars from the political settlement perspective suggest that the variations in adoption of social protection policies across Africa arise from the political contestations and negotiation between political elites, votes, bureaucrats and transnational actors (Hickey et al. 2018). Besides the adoption of social protection policies, the political settlements approach has been used as an analytical framework to understand various economic and political processes in Africa (Behuria, Buur and Gray, 2017). Within studies of social protection adoption, scholars have developed explanatory variables emanating from the role of political institutions. The variables largely derive from the recent highly contested processes of democratisation that have characterised Africa in the past decades. Paying attention to institutions, including
political parties and elections, the argument raised by the scholars in relation to policy changes is that competitive elections shift incentives upon which the political elite leverage social protection as a resource to win or retain electoral support (Hickey et al., 2018). Both strands acknowledge the role of international organisations as drivers of social protection uptake but with a caveat. Further the studies pay little attention to international organisations’ relationships with the political elite, bureaucratic actors, members of epistemic communities among others within the policymaking space in the adoption process.

Second, based on the role of international and donor organisations within the policymaking process, are explanations of social protection adoption deriving from ideational approaches. Scholars studying social protection adoption from this approach argue that the diffusion of ideas from early adopters is the driver of policy change. They consider learning a collaborative process and the key mechanism for policy transfer. Scholars from this perspective argue that learning through a collaborative process of international actors together with national agents have driven policy reforms. According to ideational perspectives, the adoption of social protection policies entails learning new solutions to problems of poverty and vulnerability. National agencies and actors thereby embrace the ideas and information through a learning process.

This chapter is organised as follows: In the first section is a review of the literature on political settlement and social protection. This section is followed by a discussion on ideational approaches as explanatory variables in studies of social protection adoption. In both sections I discuss the limitations of the analytical frameworks. In the third section I present the theoretical framework from which this study draws, followed by the last section where I present the analytical framework for the study.

3.2 Political Settlement and Political Institutions
Some recent studies examining the spread of social protection policies in Africa focus on political settlements and national political institutions as explanations of social protection policy adoption across Africa. The political settlements approach was developed by Khan in relation to the need to understand “patterns and evolutions of distribution of power” and to explain different outcomes of policies and the conflicting aspects of institution. As a framework, the political settlements approach is defined as the “relative holding power of
different groups and organisations contesting the distribution of resources” (Khan, 2010, p. 1). As an analytical framework, the political settlement approach is centred on the analysis of how the distribution of organisational power explains the economic and political effects of institutions and policies (Khan, 2018). Scholars using the adapted political settlement framework for insight into understanding various economic and political processes, institutions or social order, have variously described the dynamism of political settlements as “a novel way of studying political economy… offers an opportunity to understand diversity… more open than mainstream institutional theory” (Behuria, Buur and Gray, 2017, p. 508,521,523).

In their adapted political settlement approach for studying the expansion of social protection policies, Lavers and Hickey (2016) integrate the role of ideas and ideologies. Adapted from Khan’s political settlement approach and to address the shortcomings of Khan’s framework, they incorporate aspects of policy networks, resources, role of international actors, and the role of ideas. Furthermore, their framework suggests a comparative methodology for collecting data and suggests steps to be taken in conducting studies using the political settlements in explaining the politics of social protection policies.

Scholars drawing from the adapted political settlement approach employ it to measure how choices related to social protection provision have been used as a source of patronage in competitive clientistic systems and also weak dominant parties where the ruling coalition can adopt social protection as a means to gain support, deflect weak opposition and serve the interests of the political elite (Khan, 2018). But where there is a strong dominant party with little pressure from weak opposition the value of using social protection for patronage purposes is limited. Recent studies that have employed the political settlement approach as a framework to explaining social protection adoption in Africa are mostly associated with the Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre.

3.2.1 Political Settlements and the Spread of Social Protection Policies in Africa

In relation to the rapid rise of social protection policies across Africa, scholars analysing social policy uptake and reforms argue that the rise in uptake of the policies can be understood by examining the political contestations and negotiations between political elites, voters, bureaucrats and transnational actors (Hickey et al., 2018). In the adapted version of the political settlements approach, the uptake of social protection programmes and policies is viewed within the framework of political shifts and dynamics occurring in countries where social protection
policies have recently been adopted. Central to the argument is that political agency and commitment by domestic political imperatives constitute the basis for a variation of adoption across Africa. Though the studies recognise the role of transnational actors and external influence in the policymaking process, their influence is downplayed. It is argued that their role is often overestimated at the expense of national politics (Hickey et al., 2018). In explaining the variation in adoption in the different countries – rapid adoption or resistance – scholars aligned to political settlement framework argue that this is a result of variations in constitution of the political elite and their relation to voters, bureaucrats and transnational actors. In countries where uptake was rapid – Kenya, Ghana and Zambia to some extent – the political settlement is characterised by high competition among the political elite (Lavers and Hickey, 2016) while countries where there has been resistance, like Uganda, these cases are characterised by shifting dynamics “from a developmental dominant coalition to an increasingly weak dominant party settlement” (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016, p. 4).

Democracy can encourage the enactment of social policies. Democratisation processes, referring to the frequency of competitive elections and the adoption of multi-party-political systems, are considered to have played a key role in the shifts towards the adoption of social protection instruments by providing incentives to the political elite. According to studies drawing from the adapted approach, “the changing balance of power within and around ruling coalitions, shapes elite incentives and ideas in ways that shape commitment to particular policy agendas” (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016, p. 3). This shift is attributed to electoral cycles as the political elite seek to solidify their electoral base or as a means of patronage. At the intersection of electoral cycles is the role of incentives and ideas in pursuing favourable political elite commitment to social protection policies, in particular the current commitment to social assistance programmes. In this sense the political settlements approach focusses on “the interaction between transnational processes and the changing balance of interests and ideas within particular political settlements that provide shifting incentives for the introduction and expansion of social protection” (Lavers and Hickey, 2016). The argument that ensues therefore is that political agency has been the key driver of the adoption of social protection policies as the political elite seek to balance their interests through the provision of rents, in this case, through providing cash transfers.

According to the scholars using the political settlement approach, several imperatives have led to the need for adoption of social protection programmes. First, there are the existential and the
legitimacy needs of the ruling class and the political elites. For instance, following the breakdown of previous governments in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front was worried that the food crisis of 2002 and 2003, which was brought about by severe famine and drought that heightened food security issues, portended an existential threat to the ruling coalition. Political elites in Ethiopia therefore adopted the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) (Lavers, 2016a). This statement however ignores that the push for cash transfer was driven by transnational actors and the design of the PSNP was an outcome of government insisting on cash handouts for provision of labour. The PSNP is a cash and food-for-work programme established in Ethiopia in 2005. The PSNP 4 goal reads as “Resilience to shocks and livelihoods enhanced, and food security and nutrition improved, for rural households vulnerable to food security” (GFDRE, 2014, p. 3). According to the political settlement analysis, the PSNP was adopted in part to stabilise the coalition of parties as the political elite was wary of losing power after two successive regimes before it collapsed. Fear of collapse of government and the political settlement characterised by “an extremely weak excluded faction, cohesive intra-elite relations within the ruling coalition and top-down hierarchical system”, the ERDPF adopted the PSNP (Lavers, 2016a). In a bid to stem the unrest that may have ensued, the political elite in seeking legitimacy aligned with dominant paradigmatic ideas of the PSNP sold by international organisations and donor institutions. But if the concern of the ruling class was regime stability through the adoption of a cash transfer scheme, the PSNP would have been a universal scheme with no conditionalities. As it is the programme is targeted with a relatively low coverage of potential electorate. In addition, there is no evidence that social protection and cash transfer schemes in particular are the most significant source of political instability.

A similar analysis is employed in Rwanda in view of the adoption of the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP). VUP was conceived in 2007 “as an integrated local development programme to accelerate poverty reduction but also enhance rural growth” (Gahamanyi and Kettlewell, 2015, p. 48). One of the components of the programme is unconditional cash transfer for labour-constrained households while households with the ability to work are engaged in public works programmes. Political settlements scholars argue that besides the high rates of poverty and inequality in Rwanda, the ruling elite adopted the social protection programme as part of the distributional regime in the country but also as a means of settling and not causing a threat to the political settlement (Lavers, 2016b). The idea of threats to legitimacy for the two countries as the reason for adoption of social protection
policies however seems unrealistic considering that both Rwanda and Ethiopia at the time were under the leadership of “strongmen” with highly centralised systems of governance under the President and the Prime Minister respectively. It is therefore highly unlikely that there was a threat to the ruling coalitions.

The second imperative leading to the adoption of cash transfers according to the political settlement approach is neopatrimonialism. Central to this argument is that patrimonial politics was a key driver at national level leading to policy change. The argument derives from enduring debates on neopatrimonial politics, which assumes that in most countries in Africa, resources and services are distributed based on clientelist politics (Kelsall, 2013). The assumption from neopatrimonial arguments is that distribution of services is only possible based on how the political elite can obtain votes from their clients. In this case, social protection is allocated as rents, which are distributed by the political class in order to get votes from the recipients. Social protection was therefore framed as a way through which politicians can accrue political power and will through the extension of cash transfer benefits to their constituents. In countries where social protection policies have been implemented, cash transfer benefits are considered to be aligned to the interests of the political elite (Hickey and Seekings, 2018).

Neopatrimonial politics is claimed to be persistent among African countries, with structures that endure through the years. In Zambia, access to services and public goods are still subject to patrimonial rules, with clientelisms and reciprocity still dominating (Harland, 2014) and the political settlement still hinged in rent allocation practices (Pruce and Hickey, 2017). Social cash transfer featured as one of the manifesto commitments for the Patriotic Front, which won election in in 2011. The unexpected increase in the 2013 budgetary allocation for cash transfer distribution in particular targeted to the rural areas, was a way to fulfil election pledges (Pruce and Hickey, 2017). But if patronage politics is endemic to Zambia, questions arise as to why there was resistance to adoption before 2013. Politicians at the local levels also supported the programmes in anticipation for accruing election benefits from the programmes.

Research however indicates that political leaders do not only seek patronage from extension of social services but are aware of poverty and inequality in their countries and seek to address them (Manor and Duckett, 2017). The study shows that that due to path dependency, “political leaders are locked into pre-existing patterns of behaviour and unwritten agreements between ruling elites and various social forces” (Manor and Duckett, 2017, pp. 305–306) making them
easily succumb to patronage politics. However, in a bid to address poverty and inequality, leaders have to overcome restrictive political or policy legacies, and tackle reluctance among politicians and bureaucrats. In addition, politicians had to challenge “pre-existing political understandings that favoured prosperous interests which were sometimes in league with complacent bureaucrats” (Manor and Duckett, 2017, p. 306), for example from finance ministries worried about fiscal implications. Besides political agency at addressing poverty and vulnerability, international agencies excluded national politicians from social protection policymaking processes through depoliticisation (Wanyama and McCord, 2017). Therefore, arguments proposing patronage politics as guiding the adoption of social protection policies are of limited heuristic value. In addition, donor funding comprised a huge percentage of cash transfers and the national budget provision was not sufficient to influence political choices.

Closely related to political settlements are explanations focusing on political institutions. Political institutionalists attribute social policy reforms to the role of national internal political processes. Similar to the political settlements approach, institutionalists argue that the changing political environment in Africa, as a result of democratisation, electoral circles and other institutions, including political parties, shaped social protection programmes (Chinyoka and Seekings, 2016; Kabandula and Seekings, 2016; Siachiwena, 2017; Jacob and Hundsback, 2018). Central to the argument of national political institutions as the explanatory variable in the adoption of social protection are the dynamic changes that have occurred across the continent. The new era of competitive politics necessitated the political elite and ruling coalition to adopt and align with pro-poor reforms in social policy. The underlying assumption is that political institutions are important in understanding social policy reforms, especially those linked to social cash transfer schemes across Africa. Politics has a potent influence on events and the political class may seek redistributive services to enhance their popularity and legitimacy.

By elevating the role of political institutions over the role played by transnational actors, international actors are considered purveyors of ideas with little power to bring policy change. The reality though is that international elites through social protection have created incentives to the political elite that align with the interests of the political elite.

According to empirical explanations deriving from political institutions, social policy reforms in countries in Africa have occurred at specific times related to the electoral cycle. This is
because before periods of elections, governments made promises on expanding social cash transfers or seemed more “pro-poor” (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016; Siachiwena, 2017). Following the elections, the ruling parties and political elites getting into power have shown varied responses, ranging from increased budgetary allocation to resistance. In Zambia, budgetary allocation for social cash transfers increased following the election of Michael Sata (Siachiwena, 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 2017). Government allocation is estimated to have risen by 700 per cent in 2014. The increase attributed to the alignment of the ideological position and commitment to the improvement of the welfare of citizens, however aligns with pressure from international organisations.

But in other countries, political institutions and party competitions failed to lead to similar responses to those of Zambia. In Uganda, resistance has been marked by the government reneging on promises of extending social assistance programmes (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016). The government of Uganda has only made nominal allocations, failing in the agreed promises to increase funding as other priorities become more prominent and as the government embarks on other competing projects. Only in light of international organisations’ threats to withdraw funds has Uganda increased budgetary allocation to the programmes. Since the start of the Social Assistance Grant for Empowerment (SAGE) programme, despite great influence and pressure from donor organisations, government funding has remained limited. International actors often complain of a lack of political will, conceptualised through the amount of financial resources provided by government. Since the start of the programme the government of Uganda has only provided minimal resources in the form of office space and salaries for senior government officials (Angucia and Katusiimeh, 2015). Even in countries celebrated as early adopters like Kenya, governments have been slow to release funds, exhibiting resistance like Uganda in their slow financial commitment.

3.2.2 Limits of the Political Settlement and Political Institutions Approaches

The political settlements approach acknowledges the key role of global actors in the promotion of social protection policy reforms across Africa. However, their focus on national politics is rather thin on evidence and largely hinges on transnational action in the formation of ideas and creating incentives. By focusing on the adoption of social protection as a form of political settlement, the scholars allude to the different political dynamics at country level but fail to explain how the different national political elements led to the same outcome. In addition, they fail to explain similarities in adoption timing or design of programmes in different political
settlements. A look at the social assistance programmes across the countries shows similar designs and to some extent even similar programme names. For instance, in Kenya there is the Hunger Safety Net Programme, in Rwanda the Productive Social Safety Nets (PSSN) and in Ethiopia the PSNP. There is also little divergence in the design of the schemes, with slight variations in a couple of programmes. This aspect points to the role of another factor, which this thesis argues is the powerful role of transnational actors taking advantage of political processes to promote similar programmes. Though the political settlement approach demonstrates the different political configurations across countries, it does not explain similarities in programmes.

The weakness of the role of political institutions is demonstrated by Siachiwena (2017), who argues that shifts in political parties by individuals characterise the political and electoral process in a number of countries in Africa. Politicians therefore shift alliances from party to party, creating new allies and sometimes creating new parties as vehicles for winning elections. In Kenya, like Zambia, to win elections, politicians seek the most popular party of the time without paying attention to party ideology. In addition, as stated by the political institutionalists themselves, social protection is not a salient issue in elections across countries in Africa yet. Salience of social protection policies in electoral processes can only emanate from bottom-up processes of social protection policymaking where the agenda is not driven by external agencies like donor organisations. In countries where social protection is an important campaign issue, it is closely linked to a strong state-citizen social contract built around citizen demands rather than from processes that have little participation of citizens.

### 3.3 Ideational Approaches and Policy Change

Besides the arguments by the political settlements approach and political institutions is the thesis that social policy reform in Africa is a result of diffusion of ideas – ideational approaches. Discussions emanating from this thesis centre around policy learning and the spread of ideas in bringing about policy change. In their view, ideationalists argue that ideas are the driving force behind policy change (Baumgartner, 2013). Ideas are described as “…. claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions” (Parsons, 2002, p. 48). Ideas are described as the building blocks of policy agendas (Parsons, 2002). Ideational approaches often involve the use of reason, with idea carriers invoking concepts and applying values and weighing up evidence (John, 2012). Policy change therefore
occurs as a result of debates and arguments and contestations among policy actors. Parsons (2007) states that ideas work in three ways: first they define the problem and construct the problem; second, they shape the assumptions and the solutions to the problems and then they became discursive weapons that are used for amplification. For this reason, ideas are salient and the language employed in passing on the ideas gives them prominence. But ideas by themselves are not powerful enough to bring about policy change; who carries the idea is more powerful, thereby giving the idea power. As demonstrated in the study of social assistance in Finland, ideas are able to bring about change if they are carried, supported and imposed by powerful actors (Kangas, Niemelä and Varjonen, 2014).

Policy ideas are defined as “the causal beliefs, symbols, theories, perceptions, and lessons that underlie policy decisions and choices” (Foli and Béland, 2014, p. 5). International organisations are increasingly relying on ideational mechanisms in diffusing policy ideas rather than the use of conditionalities associated with aid. According to ideationalists, when people are exposed to “new ideas and a new way of doing things” they are able to alter behaviour and make different choices based on the new information they have. Social learning, socialisation and persuasion are the key mechanisms in ideational approaches. Ideas have an impact on policy change as they shape issues and problems in social, political and economic agendas and also shape how the problems may be solved (Boswell, Geddes and Scholten, 2011). Actors formulate and generate ideas while institutions interact with the ideas to facilitate or constrain policy change. Ideas are dynamic and how they are framed is important for policy change. The interaction of ideas with political actors and institutional forces are mediating factors for their adoption (Béland, 2009). Ideational approaches are likely to be successful when they take advantage of a policy moment that shakes and changes the stability of institutions. Policy purveyors adept at recognising mediational factors pay attention to timing as it provides an opportunity for the introduction of new ideas. Windows of opportunity may be necessary to bring about policy change but is not sufficient to bring about a major policy shift by itself (Baumgartner, 2013). Though learning may seem non-pressurising and benign in influencing policy change, in reality it is a battle, a “discourse or hegemonic struggle through which different interests and actors jostle to be in the driver’s seat of ideas and world views” (Deacon, 2012, p. 81).
3.3.1 Ideas in Social Protection Policymaking and Policy Change

Unlike the political settlements and political institutions explanations, ideationalists ascribe the uptake of social protection to the spread of ideas by transnational actors. Ideational mechanisms are increasingly used in Africa for policy transfer. Ideationalists contend that transnational actors are policy proposers, proposing social policy ideas to African countries which national governments accept. Ideas and expertise therefore are considered the central means of policy influence by transnational actors (Béland and Orenstein, 2013). Transnational actors, like the IMF, World Bank and UNICEF, considered agenda setters, come together as advocacy policy coalitions, and rally behind a certain policy idea – social protection adoption – in framing their ideas and advocating for the uptake of social protection and cash transfers. Policy change, according to ideationalists, occurs through a system of ideas that influence how politicians and policymakers learn to address problems (Evans 2009). Besides changes in social assistance programmes of cash transfers, the spread of ideas is considered key to social pensions reforms that occurred across some African countries in the 1990s (Kpessa, 2010, 2013; Kpessa and Béland, 2012). Transnational actors are therefore considered policy proposal actors (Foli, 2015) who set the agenda by defining the problem, and suggest feasible solutions which are mediated among actors at national level.

Scholars working from this perspective argue that lesson drawing and learning were the key mechanisms through which the social relations between transnational actors and national actors were created. Policy learning “occurs when policymakers adjust their cognitive understanding of policy development and modify policy in light of knowledge gained from past policy experience” (Stone, 2004, p. 548). Lesson drawing and learning imply that national actors and governments are rational actors who decided to emulate the practice of social protection. Further, learning is portrayed as a positive and progressive connotation (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). Foli (2015) in her study attributes the adoption of the LEAP in Ghana to the influence of transnational actors through ideational approaches, arguing that this was the main mechanism employed by transnational actors in diffusing the social protection programme. The argument contends that transnational actors, due to the limits of their influence as non-veto players and because they lack formal veto power, are obliged to work through persuasions, paying greater attention to convincing national actors to change policy (Béland and Orenstein, 2013). But learning and the passing on of ideas is more than a benign exercise; rather, “ideas may serve the function of seizing control of the policy terrain, undermining policy learning,
generating policy atrophy in the host local context, distorting local realities and undermining long-term sustained development” (Adésínà, 2011, p. 456).

Scholars working from this perspective consider social relations among actors in the policy space as symmetrical. This assumption is problematic at two levels: First it fails to consider the power bases of financial and knowledge resources which international actors bring into the policy space. The reality is that as a holder of material incentives and knowledge, transnational actors already possess power that they can use for the manipulation in the policy space. In policy transfer processes, policymaking is controlled by the actors with the resources who are capable of influencing the policy process and of changing actors’ interest; much of what looks like consent may be force (Howarth, 2010). The second problematic assumption is that knowledge is neutral and does not constitute a resource. The reality is that knowledge and who controls the knowledge in power transfer is a powerful player in the policy transfer process. In addition, knowledge by itself is a powerful resource which can be used to manipulate references and influence thinking of policy actors in specific directions by knowledge purveyors.

3.3.2. Limits of Idea-based Approaches in Cash Transfer Adoption

Although ideas are successful in explaining policy change, they can only explain results that come out of persuasion and advocacy. As suggested by John (2012), it is hard to say whether ideas could have brought changes by themselves. In addition, it is difficult to tell with clarity how and at what levels cognition occurred for policymakers to change their minds and adopt cash transfers. As mentioned above, ideas matter in policymaking and policy transfer and are powerful in bringing policy change when they are aligned to national contexts. What matters more however is who carries the idea and what position they hold in the policymaking arena. While understanding the role of ideas, which ideas are carried by each actor and who carries which ideas, in policy change it is important to understand how ideas are presented and how they are framed and shaped to align with the national social, political and economic context. Deriving from the point of view that ideas and knowledge are never neutral but based on the ontological and epistemological standing of the idea carrier, gives a better picture of how ideas are made and become powerful enough for policy change.
3.4. Theoretical Framework for the Study

The study drew from the body of works on policy transfer as the theoretical framework. Dolowitz and Marsh in their seminal work define policy transfer as the “… process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 344).

Policy transfer encompasses ideas of policy diffusion, lesson drawing and policy learning, with forms of transfer ranging from voluntary to direct coercion (Evans, 2009; Benson and Jordan, 2011). Policy transfer is multi-sited and multi-actor making the already dynamic social policymaking environment even more complex (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). The transfer of social protection to Africa has opened the policymaking process to an array of actors, both domestic and international. Peck and Theodore describe the policymaking environment as “associated with the anointment of favoured ‘models’…entailing the enrolment of advocates and followers, the construction of pro-policy movements and the consolidation of norms and paradigms” (Peck and Theodore, 2010, p. 170). In the process of transfer of a policy, there are borrowers and lenders; this relationship, however, hardly changes (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000).

The process of borrowing and learning is not linear and neat, but mechanisms usually interact, creating difficulty in drawing lines between coercion and voluntary dynamics (Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Peck and Theodore, 2010). Policies too always transform from that which was envisaged; they mutate, and do not arrive as they were originally packaged. Mutation and change are attributed to the borrower’s context. For example, in Latin America, where the idea of cash transfers was borrowed from, benefits are often conditional on households participating in some human development activity. In Africa where, international organisations have transferred the scheme imposing conditions has been difficult due to lack of infrastructure among other factors. An analysis of policy transfer processes requires an understanding of how actors affect the policy process, and how agents relate to one another in order to further their interests. Actors within policy transfers processes include elected officials, civil servants, institutions, consultants, think tanks, and supranational institutions among others (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).
3.4.1. Mechanisms in Policy Change

In theory, policy transfer takes coercive or voluntary forms, but in practice policy transfer results from a combination of mechanisms (Nutley et al., 2013) envisaged in a continuum ranging from learning to coercion on the extreme ends (Sugiyama, 2011; Obinger, Schmitt and Starke, 2013). Agents of transfer use combinations of mechanisms, ideas and interests to convince players to adopt policies (Béland and Orenstein, 2013). Voluntary transfer occurs due to lesson drawing. While rare, direct coercive transfers still occur as in the case of SAPs and austerity measures towards Greece (Obinger, Schmitt and Starke, 2013). Soft coercive forms of policy transfer occur in cash transfer adoption when there is pressure from supranational or international organisations usually tied to aid and financial incentives and when international organisations and national organisations advocate for certain social protection provisions (Lavers and Hickey, 2016). Indirect coercive mechanisms result from global/regional policy recommendations and mutual interconnectedness between states (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Lavers and Hickey, 2016).

3.5. Policy Transfer and Power Nexus: Theoretical Framework

The study adopts a policy transfer and power analysis as the theoretical approach. Following a review of existing literature on the subject under study, policy transfer alone was insufficient in explaining policy change, and therefore a power analysis approach was incorporated to bring about an empirically grounded analysis. Power in the study is conceptualised through Lukes’ view of power (Lukes, 1974).

Different scholars conceptualise power differently. On one end of the spectrum, power is conceived as ‘domination over’; a situation in which power is exercised through structures of authority arising out of economic strength and control (Dahl, 1957; Weber, 1986). Power is conceived as an imposition through which one’s actions cause the action of another. Policy processes, however, even when involving powerful players, are often devoid of such direct control. Yet domination still exists in policy transfer mechanisms. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s governments in developing countries were compelled by the World Bank and the IMF to adopt SAPs to secure grants and loans (see Mkandawire and Soludo, 2002). Equally, the recent financial bailout of Greece points to such high handedness by international organisations in policymaking processes. In the context of Kenya’s uptake of social protection programmes, social relations between international and national actors were non-egalitarian...
and asymmetrical. International agents were able to strategically exercise control and dominance over the transfer process through the knowledge and resources they brought to the policy arena.

Rather than see power as an imposition, one can also view it as relational. Agents always exist and engage in practices within a constraining as well as facilitating nexus of power relations. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) suggest that power is not just the ability to exert one’s will directly over the other but also extends to the ability to prevent another person or group from access to decision-making arenas. It is from this view that Lukes expands to suggest a third dimension of power. In the seminal *Power: A Radical View* (Lukes, 1974), Lukes offers a conceptualisation of power which is based on three dimensions from which this study draws. Lukes conceptualises power in three dimensions. First there is overt power, the clear visible exercise of “power over”. The second is the dimension of “non-decisions” (Lukes, 2005). In policy transfer processes, this dimension relates to the ability to control the agenda and determine what is discussed. Further, the second dimension emphasises the ability to control the political agenda and to suppress or delay decisions on issues (Torfing, 2009). It is the dimension of “manipulated consent”, where actors try to minimise conflict by influencing, shaping and determining the wants of another (Lukes 1975, pp. 21-23).

Third is the view of power as ideational, the ability of actors to shape perceptions, preferences and choices in ways that influence other actors’ understandings, thereby bringing change. Within the third dimension is the emphasis of suppression of latent conflicts through action or inaction (Torfing, 2009). Here the emphasis is on the role of ideas in convincing others to willingly accept a proposal “against their own ‘real interests’ by persuading them such activity is in their interest” (Lukes, 2005). Lukes explains it as follows:

A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? (Lukes, 2005, p. 27).
Lukes introduces the idea of “non-agenda” or “non-decisions”, a situation where policy actors’ and groups’ interests are not represented, as policy monopolies constrain and control which actors are admitted into the policy space. Actors with monopoly in structural power relations, as in the case of the adoption of cash transfers, constrain the actors of others sometimes even more “powerful” actors through various strategies like depoliticisation, which is discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. Power acts to constrain some actors from recognising their domination. As Lukes (1974 p. 24) observes: “... is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people to whatever degree, from having grievance shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things?” People therefore “accept their role in the existing order of things either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they view it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial” (Lukes, 1974, p. 2). The superiority of social elites becomes part of the natural order of things.

Lukes’ analysis brings to the fore matters of interests and legitimacy. Policymaking is a constellation of interests that actors use to legitimise their views and forms of legitimacy that in turn enable them to further their interests. It is through interests that one can distinguish legitimate from illegitimate power. Lukes suggests that it is possible for power to be exercised over people against their perceived preferences but in their real interests. To influence others’ interests, groups bring different resources into relations of power, which they manipulate to advance their interests. One aspect in the third dimension is the aspect where actors prevent the manifest emergence of grievances through shaping “perceptions, cognition and preferences” (Lukes, 2005, p. 25). Within this dimension, power is through “socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour” (Lukes, 1974, p. 22). In relation to governmentality as advanced by Foucault, meaning the techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour, strategies employed in the case of neo-liberal programmes try to shape the conditions under which these liberties are exposed as choices with governmental approaches and practices trying to shape the conditions under which choice is made (Dean, 2009).

Lukes’ third dimension relates to Foucault’s on power/knowledge. In his proposition, he argues that the third dimension is a form of hegemony (Lukes, 2005). Here Foucault mirrors Lukes in that both propose that power and knowledge are inextricably interwoven. An analysis of power within policymaking processes therefore necessitates an analysis of strategies that actors employ within and through their social relations rather than one that emphasises top-down
singular modes of coercion. To Foucault, power is not singular; rather it operates in multiple forms. Moreover, it is ubiquitous; present everywhere and operating in all kinds of social relations. Social relations are the medium through which power is exercised. His notion of power as collective action is useful in analysing policy adoption processes where power is exercised through shaping others’ perceptions, preferences and determining their wants – a form of manipulated consent. Power relations are therefore not strictly coercive but rather are dynamic and reciprocal, with actors using strategies and tactics to impose their will on others. Power operates upon a complex web of relations and is more about “management of possibilities” and ability to “structure the possible action of others” rather than through violence or direct coercion (McKee, 2009, p. 471). Power is multiple, it overlaps and at times contradicts (Foucault, 2002).

Lukes’ conception of power offers a superior framework through which to study power relations in policy transfer as it widens space for complex interactions among social agents. Moreover, it provides room to examine different strategies through which policy transfer happens, from coercion to learning, while taking into consideration both formal and informal institutions.

3.6. The Conceptual Framework for the Study

This section sets out an analytical framework developed to understand the process and the dynamics of social protection policy adoption. The framework is generated by insights from the empirical data, the theoretical underpinnings of the study and the review of literature. The conceptual framework derives from the review and a critique of literature and the researchers’ own experience in the sector. The conceptual framework influenced data collection and analysis guided by the following questions: (1) How did policy actors, ideas, incentives and interests shape the development and adoption of the CT-OVC and HSNP? (2) What institutional, administrative and political factors have facilitated or constrained the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP in Kenya? (3) What have been the changes in the social policy regime as a result of the adoption of the cash transfer programmes in Kenya? (4) What lessons be learnt from the transfer and adoption of the cash transfer programmes in Kenya?

The conceptual framework postulates the relationships and perspectives of the theoretical framework and underlying variables from the review of literature. The conceptual framework helps to focus the research process: the methodological design, the development of data
collection instruments that were used, data collection process and data analysis. The analysis/conceptual framework draws from policy transfer framework and power as conceptualised by Lukes, where we draw upon concepts of mechanisms of transfer, actors and resources. From Lukes’ conception of power, we draw the concepts of power, ideas, knowledge and interests. These concepts and information deriving from policy transfer reflects and inform on power as a theoretical framework upon which we draw on power which we incorporate the ideas of power based on Lukes’ faces of power. From Lukes’ three dimensions of power we draw upon notions of power, ideas and knowledge in explaining the mechanisms of transfer.

The research questions developed provided a road map for the conceptual framework. Specifically, we sought to identify the process leading to the adoption of social protection policies in Kenya. Each category of the conceptual framework developed derives from the objective and the research questions as outlined in Chapter 1. The first objective aims at investigating the role of actors, ideas, incentives and interests in developing and promoting the CT-OVC and HSNP as social protection instruments. Therefore, the conceptual categories relating to it are “power/social relations” and “international mechanisms”. The second objective seeks to analyse the mediating factors leading to the adoption of the programmes. From this, the category that is emerging is “domestic mediating factors”. Lastly, the last objective sought to establish the social policy regime of Kenya as a result of the adoption of the programmes. Out of this objective, the appropriate categorisation is “social policy environment in Kenya”. Based on literature, responses from participants to the research questions, the researcher developed descriptors under each category.

The analytical framework of the study is underpinned by a number of concepts. Resources in the case of social protection adoption represent both material and immaterial resources upon which actor relations within the policy network/policy space are constructed. Different actors bring with them differing resources upon which they draw and leverage to gain legitimacy in the policy space. In addition, resources are also used to influence other actors in the policy space. Resources here include financial, knowledge (ideas) and political power resources, which provide legitimacy to the participation of actors within global policymaking processes (Preece, 2013).

Mechanisms of transfer are shaped through a manipulation of resources and positions and points of legitimacy by the various actors. As policy transfer agents, international organisations
carried a repertoire of resources, enabling them to control the mechanisms of transfer ranging from “power over” mechanisms to the influence of ideas. Power therefore includes the manipulation of resources, ideas, knowledge, finances and so forth to influence the interests of other actors. Considering Lukes’ three dimensions of power, interests represent a sort of “agreement”, while ideas are used to influence the preference of actors. Power is linked to conditionalities of financial resources which countries continue to depend on from international organisation (Abdulai, 2019). The outcomes of the policy transfer process and the policymaking process are shaped by the national context, which includes institutions.

**Resources:** Resources include both material and non-material supplies upon which the process of social protection policy adoption is constructed. Power resources form the basis and the medium through which policy transfer agents pursue their aims to bring about policy change. Specifically, the resources involved in the generation of power include financial, organisational and knowledge resources from which policy purveyors derive their domination over other actors, particularly in asymmetrical social relation spaces (Bache and Taylor, 2003). We adopt the concept of resources in social protection policymaking and transfer in the interplay of actors’ relationship within the policy network. Transfer agents of social protection deploy and use resources available to them in a way and manner that then provides them with power to leverage on their policy ideas. The concept of resources was chosen to widen the analysis of dynamics of policy transfer, as these affect the outcome of the policy transfer – the adoption or rejection of the transferred policy. These material and non-material aspects in return reflect the power asymmetry that characterise the social protection policymaking space. In the framework we adapt knowledge, finance and organisation to suggest the key resources from which policymaking and social protection policy transfer are drawn.

**Mechanisms of transfer:** In this framework, various actors draw on various resources to bring about policy change. Resources are deployed as a means of mechanisms of transfer. The concept of mechanisms of transfer here draws from Dolowitz and Marsh’s continuum, which depicts mechanisms of transfer as ranging from voluntary to coercive. The term mechanisms therefore cover a variety of aspects of transfer with a range of degrees. Transfer agents in the social protection policymaking space and as policy bearers do not just use one mechanism of transfer; rather they employ different mechanisms at different times, sometimes in combination, for policy adoption to occur. Differences in mechanisms depend on various aspects including country context – social, economic, and political – and the timing of transfer.
and windows of opportunity. Negotiated transfer and direct coercive transfer are common in developing countries where recipient countries’ freedom of choice is constrained by transfer agents (Evans, 2009).

Mechanisms of transfer in this framework are directly linked and connected with resources. Where there are material resources like financial resources with high dependency of the recipient country, the policy transfer process is characterised by conditionalities linked to the country increasing resources (Abdulai, 2019). Where mechanisms are deemed to be voluntary, policy transfer agents draw upon knowledge and ideas to influence other actors through social learning and to influence the preference of actors in the transfer of policies.

Specific mechanisms of transfer drawing on the resources of transfer agents therefore include imposition of solutions and policies by the transfer agents – policy prescriptions. On the other side of the spectrum following on Lukes’ three dimensions of power is the influencing of other actors’ preference through what is considered social learning. Policy agents and transfer agents use different mechanisms depending on the country dynamics and context to bring about policy change.

**Agents:** Another component of our framework comprises actors or agents who interact in the policymaking process. Actors operating within the space are shaped by and shape resources – financial and ideas/knowledge – to bring about policy change, in this case the adoption of social protection policies like the CT-OVC and the HSNP. Borrowing from Dolowitz and Marsh, in our conceptual framework we make a distinction between policy actors that carry the policy idea and the borrowers or recipients. Policy transfer agents in the social protection policy transfer process can be categorised into two broad categories. On one hand are transnational actors – those who carry the ideas and policies – and on the other national domestic actors. Both groups of actors are related and connected to each other based on the resources they possess and their sources of power. This structure shows that though we have transnational actors and domestic actors, to influence the policymaking process, actors collaborate with each other at different times. It does not necessarily suggest oppositional stands in the policy transfer and policymaking process, but refers to social networks based on actors’ relations with each other operating within a policy network or a policy advocacy network. As mentioned in the previous chapter, agents of policy transfer in the literature include politicians, bureaucrats, policy entrepreneurs including epistemic communities, academicians, civil society
organisations or pressure groups, international organisations, global financial institutions and supranational institutions.

**Policy Context – Political, Social and Economic:** Policy context in this study describes the windows of opportunity that transnational actors use to anchor the transfer and adoption of cash transfer schemes. In the policy transfer context, the policy context is sometime regarded as “windows of opportunity” upon which actors shape their policy agenda or anchor their policy agenda transfer (Kingdon, 2013). Policy context provides opportunity for transfer agents to promote the policy agenda. Policy context is related to the policy solution and therefore provides the basis of policymaking as it relates to social realities that may be present at the national level that then requires a solution. Political context on the other hand relates to the national political institutions that may provide a facilitative bedrock for policy adoption. Institutions shape the policymaking process but policymaking may also shape institutions and in the case of policy transfer in asymmetrical relations, policy transfer agents may shape the policy context to suit policy transfer. Based on this conceptualisation, the study therefore sought to examine the extent to which the policy transfer and adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP were facilitated by the social, political and economic context and the feasibility of the policies at the time of transfer and adoption.

**Ideas/knowledge:** In this study, ‘ideas’ is used to mean “claims about description of the world, causal relationship of the normative legitimacy of certain actions” (Parsons, 2002). The notion of ideas here is borrowed from Parsons. Ideas are influential in bringing about policy change. Ideas are what policy transfer agents and actors use to frame problems and craft solutions. Ideas are closely linked to knowledge, with policy promoters seeking to change and influence other actors with ideas as they convey the agenda. Learning is considered an avenue through which policy agents pass on ideas and knowledge in policy arenas. Learning is viewed as a voluntary mechanism in policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) where knowledge and ideas are used to persuade others. Ideas matter, but who carries the ideas matter most. In policy transfer contexts involving asymmetrical social relations, the actor who possesses knowledge and ideas – the policy transfer agent – becomes a powerful authority, with the ability to manipulate ideas to bring about policy transfer. Carriers of ideas often depend on epistemic communities to make ideas and knowledge powerful.

**Interests:** In policymaking processes, actors come with different interests which compete and the one with the most powerful resources wins. Actors pursue their interests by brokering
relations and seeking to influence others with divergent interests. Interests within the policy space may include pecuniary, material, political or self-interests (Adésína, 2011; Stone, 2011). Convergence of interests is what brings about policy change. In policy spaces characterised by donor dependency, donor interests often prevail, as donors are able to marshal resources – power, skills, knowledge and finances – to influence other actors’ interests. Interests refer to the preference and power embedded in policy actors.

We believe this conceptual framework may contribute to policy transfer literature in highlighting how power relations shape the content of policy instruments that are the object of transfer. The framework will further be helpful in highlighting actors’ interaction in the interpretation of the instruments adopted in other political systems.

3.7. Conclusion

The review of literature on the various propositions explaining the current policy change in Africa in the form of the adoption of cash transfers indicates that the proposition has been heavily skewed towards domestic and national processes and politics in explaining policy adoption. The main argument by the framework in this case is that domestic and national politics shape the adoption of the policies and are the key reason for the adoption of cash transfer schemes. While offering the role of international actors as caveats in explaining the adoption of the policies, the arguments fail to adequately address the powerful role of international and transnational actors in the policy space. Moreover, political settlement and arguments on politics fail to explain the asymmetry of relations that exist in the policymaking processes and the significant role of transnational actors as key transfer agents of social policy change. Ideational approaches, though paying attention to the role of international organisations, assume that learning and ideas are power-neutral. In addition, ideational approaches assume that learning is carried out by rational domestic actors seeking solutions to problems through a collaborative process. While ideational approaches present one mechanism through which international actors promote social protection, demonstrated in Chapter 6 it is through a discursive process rather than through straightforward social learning and lesson drawing.

Consequently, this study adopts a policy transfer approach with a power analysis component to understand and explain the transfer and adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP cash transfer programmes in Kenya. In the study, we focus on the mechanisms that transnational actors used
to promote social protection policies. The study adopts a policy transfer approach combined with a power analysis as policy transfer by itself is insufficient to adequately explain the dynamics of social protection policy adoption.
CHAPTER FOUR: STUDY METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction

The purpose of this research is to explore the process and the dynamics that shaped the uptake of social protection policies in Kenya. By employing qualitative modes of inquiry, the research explored the mechanisms used in the policymaking process leading to the uptake of the policies, the domestic enabling factors in the adoption, and the resultant changes to the country’s social policy framework. To recap, the following were the research questions for the study: (1) How did policy actors, ideas, incentives and interests shape the development and adoption of the CT-OVC and HSNP? (2) What institutional, administrative and political factors facilitated or constrained the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP? (3) To what extent has the transfer and adoption of the programmes led to transformation of the social policy regime? (4) What lessons can be drawn from the transfer and adoption of the cash transfer programmes?

To adequately respond to the above questions, the research adopted a qualitative methodological approach.

This chapter describes the research methodology of the study. First is a presentation of my position in relation to the study. It then proceeds to discuss the qualitative approach used and provides a rationale of the choice based on the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of the study. The second section describes in greater detail the research design. This part explains the selection of the cases under study, the CT-OVC and the HSNP, and the sampling strategy for the recruitment of participants. The methods adopted for data generation are discussed, followed by an account of the process of analysis of the data. Lastly, the chapter highlights methodological and other challenges related to the study before offering a brief reflection on ethical issues that emerged during the study. Thereafter is a conclusion of the chapter.

4.2. The Position of the Researcher in Relation to the Study

Having worked in the social protection sector since 2007, it is prudent to state my position in relation to the study. The research setting was my previous area of work, with the study question emerging both from literature and out of my experience in the sector. Between 2007 and 2015, I participated in the development of the Kenya National Social Protection Policy 2012 and the National Social Protection Sector Review 2011. At the same time, I was involved in the initial design of the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT) and the implementation of the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP). Part of my other roles included training civil society...
organisations and working with regional economic communities in the promotion of social protection policies. In considering my role as an insider, I needed to remain aware of ethical considerations and of the biases that I bring to the study (Greene, 2014).

Several advantages accrue from being an insider. I had pre-existing knowledge of the research context and of the “historical and practical happenings in the field”. Previous interaction with the participants presented me with ease of identification and access (Greene 2014; Kerstetter 2012; Unluer 2012). I narrowed down on knowledgeable respondents and those who had participated in the process of social protection policymaking. Some of the respondents had been colleagues at various stations. But as Greene (2012) notes, such kinds of relationships can compromise objectivity; to overcome this, I endeavoured for reflexivity to allow for “analytic distance”. As I was “already native”, I had the privilege of knowledge and knew the study field, thereby cutting down on the time needed for familiarisation.

Whereas it is considered easy to access respondents, this is not always the case. Like other researchers, I had several appointments cancelled, postponed or others did not take place at all. As an insider, one is often considered knowledgeable about the field and about the topic of study (Unluer, 2012). For this reason, some respondents assumed I already knew the responses to the questions. To overcome this, I reiterated that it was their perspectives and views I was seeking. Another disadvantage common to insider researchers in qualitative studies is having one’s own biases cloud the view of the respondents. I needed to stay objective even in the way that I presented the questions. I needed to guard against passing judgement on whether a response that had been provided was accurate or untrustworthy. The use of multiple means of data collection helped to guard against this as information could be verified from other sources of data.

In the analysis of data, I was careful in checking the responses and had to stay reflexive and critical of self so as not to impose my meanings on that of the respondents. I needed to guard against dishonesty with the respondents’ answers and to report them as truthfully as I could to reflect participants’ responses and not my beliefs or biases. This vigilance was kept throughout the data generation process, analysis process, and presentation of findings and helped “enhance the confirmability” of findings (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). Ethical issues especially privacy, trust and confidentiality had to be keenly observed.
Though it may seem that the insider researcher has an advantage over the outsider in terms of knowledge, Unluer (2012) contends that this knowledge difference is not usually immensely different from that of the outsider. In addition, all researchers face biases in their studies and each should guard against these biases; this is not peculiar to insider researchers only. An outsider may come to the field with predetermined biases that act the same as that of the insider researcher. For this reason, we all need to guard against our biases and not just the insider researcher.

4.3 Research Strategy

This project is an empirical study based on a qualitative research design. It is grounded in social constructivism. The selection of the approach was informed by the phenomenon the research sought to explain; the process of social protection policy transfer in Kenya. Drawing from two cash transfer programmes, the study examined the transfer and uptake of the policies. A qualitative research approach was useful as it allowed for the study of the phenomenon in its natural setting and context (Silverman 2014). The other strengths the approach offered, was the flexibility in interpretation of meanings and the ability to unearth processes beyond the surface (Yin, 2010; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Creswell, 2012a). The approach was useful in uncovering the not-so obvious by going beyond the “policy statements, structures and the post-rationalisations of elites” (Peck & Theodore 2010, p. 172). An understanding of policy change involves studying processes that happened in the past and in a complex way (Creswell, 2012a; Starke, 2013) which quantitative methods would have been constrained in measuring. To understand these complexities, qualitative methods present the more appropriate and practical approach.

The choice of an approach in a research study emanates from the assumptions and views one holds on reality. Epistemological positions not only guide our understanding of human knowledge but also how that knowledge is attained and the characteristics of that knowledge (Crotty, 1998; Silverman, 2015). Having clarity on our position shapes the formulation of “our research questions and how we seek information to answer the questions” (Creswell, 2012b, p. 81). In addition, it guides our choice of methodology and methods, ensuring the soundness of our research and attainment of convincing outcomes (Crotty, 1998; Creswell, 2012a). Our epistemological position informs our analysis, enabling us to go beyond mere description, by providing the basis of how we derive meanings from participants.
Based on the necessity to understand the linkages of causality and mechanisms that shaped the uptake of social protection, an acknowledgement of the complexities of the matter was necessary (George and Bennett, 2005; Creswell, 2012a). For this reason, the research relied on participants’ views and the multiple meanings and perspectives which they attached to reality (Crotty, 1998; Yin, 2010). The focus of the research was on the different constructions of social realities based on the same phenomenon. It was imperative to subsume my meanings and interpretations as the researcher to understand how social realities related to the phenomenon were “produced, assembled, and maintained” (Silverman, 2013, p. 26). Crotty (1998) notes that subjectivity of meanings is often negotiated socially and through interaction with others and with social norms. Rigorous development of the questions, data collection process, and analysis ensured a rich basis for capturing these realities (Tracy, 2010). To allow for flexibility of construction of meanings, the research questions were broad. The order of questions was also changed, questions reviewed, and different questions asked to different respondents. To study the phenomenon adequately, the research applied the case study approach.

4.3.1 Rationale for the Case Study Approach

The research uses the multiple case study approach to examine adoption of social protection policy in Kenya. The use of case studies is well-established in determining policy transfer and policy change (Starke, 2013). George and Bennet (2008, p. 5) define the approach as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalised to other events”. Case study research methods are preferred when there is a need to study “a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin, 2013a). When using multiple sources and methods for data generation, the approach can reveal social processes that influence outcomes and can uncover what has been underneath the surface. Triangulation of data methods was employed to achieve this through interviews with key informants, a review of documents and through participant observation. In seeking to explain the policy process in Kenya, the approach is appropriate for the study objectives.

The strengths of a case study approach justify its selection. First, the case study approach has the advantage of inductive examination of complex interactions (George and Bennett, 2005; Thomas, 2011; Yin, 2013b) and the ability to uncover decision-making process in historical and social contexts. Secondly, it possesses the detailed exploration needed for uncovering causal factors (George and Bennett, 2005). In studying policy transfer, a case study approach
is appropriate as it stays close to policy subjects and actors, thereby developing a nuanced view of reality (Silverman, 2015). Lastly, it provides clues on causal factors while being attentive to policy studies. The study attempted to draw inferences from the dynamics that characterised the uptake of the policy by tracing the “spread of policies and ideas through historical reconstruction of decision-making at actor level” (Starke, 2013, p. 572). Therefore, case study deals with explanatory causal mechanisms and can trace “links between causes and observed outcomes” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 6). Both case study and process tracing are suitable “for in-depth investigation of a complex phenomenon” (Shearer et al., 2016, p. 1202) which occurred in the past.

As the researcher I was aware of the limitations of the case study approach. Generalisation, is often highlighted as one of its significant limitations. Thomas (2010) refers to Yin, who, due to this limitation, calls the case study the weak sibling among the social sciences. Despite this weakness, patterns and connections can be drawn with other cases. Kenya shares similarities with countries across Africa. The transfer of social protection policies happened at the same time frame and was promoted by the same transnational actors. This explains the congruence of programmes on the continent and the similarities in patterns of transfer and adoption. However, George & Bennet (2010) stress that generalisation is not the aspiration of a case study approach in the first place; rather its intent is to explain the particular, the specifics of the case (Thomas, 2011; Creswell, 2012a). To ensure transferability of the findings of the study, a “parallel criteria” to generability (Lincoln and Guba, 2000), I therefore provided sufficient information regarding the research design to enable others to decide how the findings may be transferred. The sub-sections below describe case selection, the study population and data generation.

### 4.3.2 Case Selection and the Study Population

The interest of the research was to explain the influence of external actors on a domestic policy process in Kenya. The research consists of two cases, the HSNP and the CT-OVC. For an exploration of external involvement in policy change, the two cases were representative in relation to the topic of study. The selection of the two cases was purposive due to their potential of “yielding the most relevant and plentiful data” (Yin, 2010, p. 88). They exemplified different causal mechanisms in the adoption of cash transfers. Of importance was that the cases provide the broadest range of information and perspectives (Yin, 2010) and the “strongest
possible inferences” (George and Bennett, 2005). In the selection, the nature of the two programmes was reflected upon.

The Kenya National Safety Net Programme comprises four cash transfer programmes, with both the HSNP and CT-OVC initiated through donor funding. Though similar in external influence, the initiation of the two programmes differed in certain aspects. First is the timing of initiation. The CT-OVC was one of the earliest programmes initiated in the wave of 2003. A new government had come into power after 24 years of the presidency of Daniel arap Moi. It was a recovery period following decades of economic mismanagement (Kelsall, 2013). On the other hand, the HSNP was initiated in 2007 during a period of relative economic and political stability. The two cases exhibit variation in dynamics based on Kenya’s socio-economic and political context at the time of their initiation. Second was the relationship of the initiating donor and the state. UNICEF has traditionally worked with the Government of Kenya through joint programmes, while DFID funds have been channelled through direct budget support. Case selection was also driven by pragmatic reasons, taking into consideration time, money and access. Availability of relevant documents in both local and international databases was considered during selection. Thus, theoretical and logistical considerations drove the selection of the two cases.

The combination of poverty and HIV/AIDS provided global and national impetus for the CT-OVC. Following the United Nations Special Session of the General Assembly (UNGASS) report in 2001, member states adopted a commitment to address the effects of HIV and AIDS. Highlights from the report indicated the devastating effects of the epidemic on children, prompting experimentation with cash transfers. In 2004, the programme enrolled 400 households. The number has since grown to 300,000 households in 2016. DFID was at the forefront of the initiation of the HSNP in Northern Kenya. The programme aims at reducing poverty in the drought-prone areas (Government of Kenya, 2016b). Characterised by perennial drought and famine, the counties in the area are among the poorest in the country. Implementation of the first phase was between 2007 and 2012. Food aid distribution was considered an untenable solution, hence its substitution with cash. The first phase of the programme was reaching more that 100,000 households.

1 Daniel arap Moi (1978 to 2002) became the second president of Kenya after the passing away of the first president, Jomo Kenyatta. Moi served as vice-president to Kenyatta from 1967 to 1978.
The multiple case study was not aimed at increasing representativeness, rather it was to provide an opportunity for some variation in factors (Charbonneau et al., 2016) related to relevant policy decision-making. The key guiding focus was in the dynamics that are significant in the differences between the two. Multiple cases were selected to refrain from the risk of claiming one possible explanation, leading to incorrect conclusions (George and Bennett, 2005).

### 4.3.3 Sampling

In conducting a case study research, the first step involves identifying the case or cases and then setting the boundaries of the aspects to be studied (Creswell, 2012a; Silverman, 2015). The selection of the two cases, as discussed above, was purposive for the possibility of showing different perspectives on the processes of policy transfer. Purposive sampling is appropriate when studying processes rather than individuals (Silverman, 2015). The study comprised institutions and individuals involved in the design of the two social protection programmes.

In consideration of the research question, the study took on a purposive sampling strategy. The primary inclusion criteria for the respondents was their participation in the process of transfer and uptake of the policy. Participants who were knowledgeable about the process, though they may not have been part of the process, were recruited too. The variation in sampling was to represent diverse views with the aim of drawing on different respondent perspectives about the cases. Recruited participants were “information rich cases” and selected purposefully to provide insight into and understanding of the phenomena of study (Suri, 2011; Bloomberg and Volpe, 2015). During the interviews, I employed the snowballing sampling procedure to identify other possible respondents. The organisations which were selected varied, enabling the maximisation of differences (Yin, 2010; Creswell, 2012a). Having been part of the process, I easily identified those that had been at the forefront of the development of the policy.

To identify respondents, I first developed a sampling frame of the organisations that had been part of the development of the policy. These were grouped into three clusters: government, bilateral/multilateral, international NGOs and domestic civil society organisations. Thereafter, identified individuals for interviews from these organisations. The first cluster included social protection advisers at the World Bank and DFID, social policy advisers at UNICEF and country managers and social protection managers from international NGOs and local extensions of the creation of bilateral agencies and international NGOs which included HelpAge International, HelpAge Kenya, Oxfam and Africa Platform for Social Protection. Respondents from domestic
NGOs included managers at the Kenya Alliance for Advancement of Children’s Rights and Social Protection Actors Forum. Government officials comprised Principal Secretaries from the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services, the National Treasury and the Ministry of Devolution and Planning, Directors of the CT-OVC and HSNP Secretariats, and Members of the Parliamentary Committee of Labour and Social Development.

4.3.4 Recruitment of Participants

The second level of sampling involved the selection of individuals in these organisations. For in-depth interviews, I approached the individuals who had been sampled. Most of them were willing to respond to the questions even though some were constrained for time. Follow-up was necessary for such participants until the interview was granted. These were in most cases members of parliament who divide their time between their constituencies and the parliament. Coupled with the frequent travel involved in their work, it was difficult to obtain interviews with some of them. Where people had left the employment of their organisation or had moved to other stations, I sought to locate them through the organisation. In most instances, I interviewed the person who was presently working in that capacity at the time and the person who had left. During the interviews, I asked participants for other possible interviewees and followed up with them for interviews. This helped in the identification of respondents that could have been left out in the initial sampling design. When I reached information saturation point and no new information was forthcoming, I exited the field.

4.4 Data Generation

The site for data collection was Kenya. Data for the research study was generated through multiple methods: individual in-depth interviews, document analysis, and participant observation. The combination enhanced the robustness and adequacy of the data collection. The ability to use multiple methods forms one of the advantages of a case study, enabling one to build an in-depth picture of the case (Yin, 2010; Shearer et al., 2016). Moreover, conducting a multi-method study is important for triangulation purposes. Triangulation involves verifying evidence from different sources and the use of multiple methods to “shed light on a theme or perspective” (Yin, 2013b). In addition, it enhances the “dependability of findings” (Lincoln and Guba 2000).

Before going to the field, in compliance with the university’s regulations, I presented the research proposal to the University’s Research Ethics Committee for approval and clearance.
Ethical clearance acts as a safeguard for participants and ensures that the research follows ethically sound protocols in the generation of data. A consent form, providing a brief description of the research objectives, was part of the proposal. Herein specified were participants’ right to withdraw from the interview and an assurance of confidentiality. It was clarified that no monetary benefits would be derived from taking part in the interviews. If in agreement, participants signed at the bottom of the form prior to the start of the interview. In case of violations, redress mechanisms were indicated in the form.

To facilitate the generation of data, I travelled to Kenya and conducted the field work from January to September 2016. During this time, I carried out face-to-face interviews, accessed policy documents, and participated in activities within the social protection sector. Though I had names of individuals and contacts for the interviews, it does not mean that there were no difficulties in accessing them. Individuals for the in-depth interviews were contacted before the interview to schedule the time and date. I asked for their permission to take part in the research. In some cases, participants had to seek permission from their managers before they could grant the interview.

4.4.1. In-depth Interviews

Individual in-depth interviews were used as the primary method of data collection. Besides their potential to provide “thick and rich descriptions”, in-depth interviews do capture different perspectives and a different understanding from participants. Face-to-face interviews facilitated interactive, dynamic encounters that entailed dialogue and probing of accounts and explanations for clarity. This enhanced the generation of specific in-depth information into social and political contexts of decision-making. In addition, the prolonged engagement with participants through in-depth interviews enhanced the credibility of the study (Lincoln and Guba, 2000).

Interviews were conducted with key policy staff from the three clusters discussed in 4.2.5 above. Participants included those currently working in these organisations and those who had retired or relocated to other organisations or posts. Twenty-eight in-depth interviews were conducted in total. Follow-up interviews for a few participants were done by telephone. Different interview guides were developed for each of the three clusters of respondents.

The interview questions were semi-structured. This allowed participants to present their views without the restrictions that come with structured questionnaires (Creswell, 2012a) while
enabling the researcher to be active in listening. The design of the interviews allowed for the flexibility and freedom of the participant to talk and ascribe meanings to their experience of the policymaking process (Silverman, 2015). One is more likely to get considered responses when questions are open. In most cases, the interviews were recorded. The researcher sought the permission of the participants before using the digital recorder. In some cases, participants asked not to have the interview recorded, while in others, due to security concerns, tape recorders were not allowed on the premises. In these instances, the researcher took detailed notes and aimed at reviewing the data right after the interview took place. But even when the interviews were recorded, the researcher took notes as reflections and as a back-up in case the equipment failed. Interviews were held in the participants’ offices, though in other cases, they took place in restaurants, especially for those who had retired or had left the employment of their organisations. Participants were taken through the consent form before the interview and asked to sign. Interviews were conducted in English, with each lasting about one-and-half hours. Except for one interview which was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, all the interviews were conducted in Nairobi.

Qualitative interviews allow for flexibility in several ways (Creswell, 2012a). Even though I had developed a guide of semi-structured questions, each interview differed in the order and the questions posed. Each interview also differed in demeanour depending on the relationship I had with the participant. I was more familiar with some respondents and so these interviews took on a conversational tone. Others remained formal depending on the relationship with the participant.

Each of the recorded interviews was transcribed into text for ease of analysis. The researcher endeavoured to transcribe within 48 hours of the interview. This aimed at capturing reflections and perspective while the interview was still fresh in the researcher’s mind. This was however not always possible as several interviews occurred close to each other, leading to a pile-up of records needing transcription. For ethical considerations, a number was assigned to those interviewed to protect their identities.

Some respondents had changed their roles during the policymaking process. This meant that perspectives, views, and meanings could have changed or even become conflicting over time. For instance, one respondent had been a permanent secretary in government and was now a member of parliament. A civil servant was now working with a bilateral organisation while one from a bilateral organisation is now a civil servant. Others from international organisations
had moved to government and parliament. During the interview, I sought different perspectives regarding their previous roles. Organisational ethos and ideologies are powerful in structuring our meanings of reality. They affect our responses to those realities and our construction of the realities. As a researcher, I had to take this into consideration. For this reason, questions were adjusted, and others added to derive this kind of data. It also meant asking further probing questions.

The research was cognisant of the limitations of an interview. First, they can appear staged. Respondents can also provide exaggerated accounts in regards to foresight, rationality, and creativity (Creswell 2012).

4.4.2. Document Review

Certain documents were reviewed to establish initial context, background information and historical insight related to the study. Documents have the advantage of richness in data and are often readily available. They are also not dependent on ethical considerations (Silverman, 2013). Documents were studied to reveal decision-making processes by actors in social protection. The extensive review and analysis of documents undertaken prior to the in-depth interviews was aimed at obtaining preliminary answers to the research questions. The texts reviewed were determined by the research questions. Some documents and reports were readily available on government and organisations’ websites but for those not accessible online, I relied on past contacts for access. From government ministries and the various secretariats, I obtained publications, policy documents, ministerial speeches, agreements and operational guidelines related to the programmes. From international organisations, the documents that were of interest included policy publications, reports, and loan and bilateral agreements. Documents reviewed from NGOs included reports, evaluation reports and other material on the subject under study. A preliminary list of documents was prepared with a final list presented as Annexure 2 in the thesis.

In the case where the documents were not available online, I asked permission for access. Some of the documents needed institutional permission before access while others were inaccessible due to protocol and confidentiality matters.

4.4.3. Participant Observation
In addition to in-depth interviews and document review, the study relied on observation as part of data generation. Observations were based on the research purpose and questions (Creswell, 2012a) and involved observing social interactions among the actors. I attended four in-country meetings and forums convened by the National Social Protection Secretariat and the ministries of Planning and Finance. As some of the policymaking processes are still ongoing, this provided an opportunity to gain current views on social protection. Participation in the events was an opportunity for reflection on how historical events are linked to current processes. I kept notes of my observations during the events. The limitation which arises from participant observation is the possibility of biases and idiosyncrasies in objectivity in describing and reflecting on the reality (Agyepong and Adjei, 2007; Yin, 2013b). To guard against this, I refrained from making value judgement and placed more focus on learning and analysing from the participants’ perspective.

4.5. Data Analysis

Data analysis involved an iterative process starting from field work to the writing up of the study. To begin the analysis process, I took time to familiarise myself with the data and repeatedly reading through the interviews in search of patterns within the content. As the data obtained in the study was mainly qualitative in the form of text and narratives from the research participants, thematic analysis was appropriate for analysis. Thematic analysis is “a method for identifying, analysis and reporting patterns with data” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 79).

Interview data were transcribed and entered into ATLAS.ti, a Computer Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data Analysis (CASDAQ) tool. ATLAS.ti was useful in the analysis as it allowed for the systematic handling of the large data set. In addition, it enabled comparison of data between different groups of actors (international advisers, government officials, members of parliament and domestic civil society members), and easy scrutiny of patterns and linkages.

Guided by the research questions and the theoretical framework, I undertook an initial coding exercise which entailed systematically going through the entire data set to assign codes to various sections of the transcribed texts. The initial coding process included “in vivo coding”, where the direct language of participants was used as codes (Saldana, 2015). This was done in such a way that the analysis reflected the perspectives of the participants and “to help us to preserve participants’ meanings of their view and actions in the coding itself” (Charmaz, 2006,
The initial coding process involved considering the syntax and decoding, meaning to come up with key words and phrases emerging from the interviews as codes. In the second cycle, codes developed in the first cycle were grouped into a smaller number of sets where similar coded parts of text and passages from the data were grouped into subcategories which I later reduced into categories. Codes developed during the analysis process were developed from the theoretical and conceptual framework, and from the content of the data in alignment with the research objectives and questions. From the second cycle, I developed themes that entailed identifying common patterns and categories within the interviews conducted.

Themes were drawn both from the theoretical framework of the study, a deductive process, and inductively from the data itself to be able to extend further the understanding on processes of policy transfer and to provide new information on the adoption processes of the CT-OVC and the HSNP in Kenya. A thematic analysis was useful in gaining an understanding of the knowledge and symbolic meaning that participants attached to the policy transfer process and useful in highlighting the process of social construction. It was useful in understanding what participants said about the process of social protection uptake based on their experiences, thereby enabling the interpretation of meanings from the findings and drawing of reliable conclusions.

4.6. Methodological Challenges

The study had its limitations and challenges. Limitations emanated from the research techniques employed and others arose due to the nature of the study site. Below, the limitations, their implications and how they were minimised are highlighted.

First was the limitation of the sample size for the in-depth interviews. The social protection sector is composed of a small number of actors; the sector is close-knit. For this reason, the number of people who had participated in the policy process was naturally limited. Also, the actors from international organisations involved in both programmes were from the same organisations. This limited the number of those who could be interviewed for the study; however, the depth of the interviews ensured sufficient data. Some interviews lasted up to three hours as they involved a keenness in probing and getting as much information from the participants as possible. The multiple methods of data collection further provided a means to address this limitation.
Second were the biases arising from being an insider. These have been addressed in 4.3.2. above.

Lastly, the researcher lost her field equipment during the field work. This happened at the beginning of data collection. At the time, one interview had been conducted and the respondent agreed to grant a repeat interview. The loss presented a setback as the lost items had to be replaced.

**4.7 Ethical Considerations**

Ethical considerations were incorporated throughout the phases and the process of designing and carrying out the research. When designing the questions, care was taken not to demean the respondents’ knowledge. The questions were formulated in such a way that they were not leading. Since I had had close contact with some of the respondents before, I needed to be appreciative of their views. It was prudent that I respect their perspective even when it differed from mine.

Besides the letter of introduction from the university, I endeavoured to adhere to ethical requirements of informed consent, confidentiality, and data security. The researcher obtained informed consent from all the participants after letting them know the nature of the research. Participants were in no way coerced into taking part in the study and were allowed to opt out at the time of the interview if they so wished. Participants were assured of anonymity, and confidentiality of the information they provided the researcher. To observe confidentiality and anonymity, respondents were assigned pseudonyms. Respondents were assured that information would not be disclosed that may potentially harm them in the present or future. No inducements or compensation were made for participation.

After transcribing the texts, codes were assigned to each text to protect the identities of the respondents. This enhanced confidentiality of the respondents and of their responses.

**4.8. Conclusion**

The chapter presents a detailed description of the study methodology. Qualitative approaches of inquiry were employed to explore the dynamics leading to the adoption of social protection policies in Kenya. The multiple case study captured variations and “went beyond the obvious, unveiling the behind-the scene dynamics” of the process. The case study approach was useful
in bringing out the causal mechanisms and providing a historical analysis of events of policy adoption. Case and sample selection were purposive, with sample population comprising those who had been part of the process. In-depth interviews constituted the main source of primary data, with the semi-structured questionnaires providing flexibility to both the researcher and respondents. Documents from organisations, online and otherwise, generated useful sources of historical details while participant observation further increased the richness of the data. Storage, management, and interpretation of data were facilitated through Atlas.ti. Data was thematically analysed for results through the software. Ethical considerations and methodological challenges are highlighted at the end of the chapter.

The chapter that follows presents the political economy of Kenya. This is in recognition that policy transfer and policy uptake occur within a historical, political, social and economic country-specific context.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN SOCIAL POLICY AND POLICYMAKING IN KENYA

5.1 Introduction

Since independence, the government of Kenya has aimed at improving the well-being of citizens through various social welfare programmes. The role of government as the primary duty bearer in promoting citizen well-being has however changed and oscillated over time due to external and internal pressures. For instance, external influence resulting from the spread of neo-liberalism has opened doors to external influence on policymaking processes. The outcome may often result in a disjointed set of programmes and in some cases multiple donor-initiated, donor-led programmes.

This chapter provides a historical exploration of the formulation of social policy and policymaking through four political regimes in Kenya. The chapter examines attempts by the different political regimes at creating a welfare state from independence to the present. By examining the different political regimes, I argue that three fundamental influences have defined the architecture of social policy and social welfare in Kenya over time; the country’s colonial legacy, pressure from international organisations and the political choice towards a market-driven economy. In this chapter I argue that the three factors provide the political economy foundation on which cash transfer programmes are presently built as a definition of Kenya’s social policy choices. In the four political regimes which are classified as nationalism, the lost decades, institution rebuilding and recovery, and the era of constitutionalism in practice, I examine the influential factors that shaped the social policymaking process and the outcomes thereby.

The chapter is as follows: first, I discuss persistence of colonial structures in shaping social welfare and highlight the co-existence and contradiction between the spirit of nationalism and the economic trajectory adopted by the first independent government. This is followed by the second section, where I demonstrate how external pressure in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) resulted in shrinking fiscal space for investment in social policy, leading to an almost total collapse of social services. The third section is an analysis of the government’s efforts at recovery and an attempt at rebuilding institutions for both economic and social growth. I argue that the truncated efforts at broadening social policy are a result of the government’s pursuit of economic development at the expense of social development. This
section shows how donor and international organisations’ participation in the social policy increased during this period and shaped the social protection agenda in the country. The last section highlights how the present implementation of the new Constitution and increased political competitiveness creates room for a re-imagination and possibility of broadening the social protection agenda “beyond the narrow cash transfer narrative”.

5.2 Colonial Era Social Policy and Social Development

Colonial structures continue to define the economic, political and social spheres in Africa. Vestiges of the colonial state remain visible in policies and policymaking processes in former colonies, including Kenya; these continue to determine present trajectories of social welfare and social protection. Colonial legacy refers to structures present during imperial rule that have persisted over time and continue to influence policy structures to date (Amutabi, 2009; Nyong’o, 1986; Alemazung, 2010). As in most colonies, imperial rule in Kenya did not prioritize social welfare provisioning to Africans. Benefits provided by the colonial government are described as “palliative, tentative and marginal in nature” (Mhone, 2005, p. 317), as the colonial administration developed social policy programmes only for those in formal employment, who were mainly Europeans. The colonial government invested little to improve the lives of Africans, resulting in poor welfare outcomes present to date in countries with a history of Western colonisation (Manji, 2000; Amadi, 2009; Ndege, 2009). Despite the need to extend social welfare to Africans, dissident colonial voices claimed that Africans wanted an easy life. The colonial government therefore refused to extend social welfare programmes to Africa. To justify this inaction, Seeley (1987) quotes a colonial administrator in Kenya, A.M. Champion, writing on “Native Welfare”:

“The majority of Africans are not craving for a higher standard of living; they are often quite happy folk in their squalor, dirt and customs which for many of us can only be described as wretched, degrading and revolting” (Seeley, 1987, p. 543).

The colonial government left the Africans to meet their own social welfare needs as churches and voluntary organisations attempted to fill the gap. Efforts by these organisations represented the only endeavours by the settlers in extending social welfare beyond the white population. But to qualify for assistance from the religious organisations, one needed to prove inability to work on grounds of illness or old age. To further restrict Africans’ access to social services, colonial rule forced Africans to stay in the reserves; access to the city was reserved for those
in employment. To justify their claims for lack of extension of services to the local population, the colonial government claimed that Africans were in “their natural setting and needed no relief or social services” (Seeley, 1987, p. 543).

Taxes imposed on Africans, however, drove Africans to seek labour, bringing them from the reserves into the urban centres (Nyong’o, 1986; Mamdani, 1996). As social welfare in the urban areas worsened, in brotherhood, Africans formed self-help groups and associations, along ethnic lines based on their rural origin, to support each other and act as safety nets in times of bereavement, illness and other shocks. Through the Colonial and Development and Welfare Act of 1940, the London administration called for a more interventionist state, but reality and practice were far from rhetoric, with a continuation of colonial inadequacies in social services (Lewis, 2001). The colonial government expected and emphasized that Africans should meet their own needs, with attempts at creating a welfare system for Africans by the government only envisaged after the Second World War (Seeley, 1987). Two external factors, each reinforcing the other, drove the push for better welfare. First, the impact of WWII brought about change in the attitude of the new Labour government, which got into power to attempt to address welfare programmes in Kenya. Second, the colonial government feared the loss of labour from Africans, which they depended on. The population of Africans had declined following the wars, prompting the colonial government to institute health services (Lindner, 2014). Services provided were however rudimentary, minimal and discriminatory. Male workers were privileged as the colonial government needed a healthy and stable work force. Church missions continued to provide maternal and child health (Lindner, 2014).

With increased population growth and the rise of urbanisation, new problems began to emerge—unemployment, migration to urban areas, and growing inequalities (Seeley, 1987). Government realized that economic growth was not translating into social growth and investment in the economic sector was not necessarily promoting the welfare of the people. The first international aid started coming to Kenya after the Second World War. Aid organisations like UNICEF at the time provided remedial and ex post services with an emphasis on juvenile care and child neglect (Seeley, 1987; Lindner, 2014). UN bodies started advocating for attention to be directed towards social welfare and to be geared towards developmental rather than remedial service with consideration towards three functions: remedial, preventive and developmental.
5.2.1. Nationalism Versus the Market: Tension and Contradictions

According to Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, “African Socialism”, shows the first government’s inclination towards a capitalist model of development (Government of Kenya, 1965). Like other first generation leaders on the continent including Sédar Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, Jomo Kenyatta adopted the ideology of African Socialism which at the core “aimed at Africanising political theory by making use of traditional forms of social organizations” (Speich, 2009, p. 457). As the state’s development blueprint, the key message centres on the economic development with a keen emphasis on accelerated growth. Social development formed part of the focus of government’s objectives in the sessional paper. Sessional Paper No. 10 emphasised government’s intention to follow an economic path with the expectation that resultant growth would lead to social development.

“The most important of these policies is to provide a firm basis for rapid economic growth. Other immediate problems such as Africanisation of the economy, education, unemployment, welfare services, and provincial policies must be handled in ways that will not jeopardize growth… (economic) growth then, is the first concern for planning in Kenya…” (Government of Kenya, 1965, p. 18).

The dualism of the social versus the economic, the division of the “same coin”, is evident in the above statement. The idea behind African socialism in Kenya was “to design a route for planned economic and social change in which assumedly traditional African forms of solidarity were to coexist with open market structures and forced industrialisation” (Speich, 2009, p. 450). Nyong’o (1986) however argues that the sessional paper had little to do with socialism but was a political tool to sort out differences between Kenyatta and his detractors.

In the sessional paper, the government outlined the steps to be undertaken to achieve development. Unlike its neighbour, Tanzania, which adopted a genuine “African Socialism”, model, as its developmental path, Kenya from the outset embraced a market-based path, with an emphasis on citizens’ participation in their private and national development endeavours (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001; Chinsinga, 2004). The philosophical premise for development in Tanzania was on forging an egalitarian non-exploitative society, limiting private control of the means of productions and “defined by efforts at developing a new generation of citizens committed to the nation state” (Adésínà, 2009, p. S39). In Kenya meanwhile social service provision for citizens remained at the core of government priority, but only in rhetoric - as the
president stated, like the colonial government, if Kenyans wanted to get development, they needed to work for their progress themselves. This statement represented a failure in government’s responsiveness towards its citizens by placing the responsibility of development on them (Murunga, 2004; Cheeseman, 2015). After a while the nationalist government lost its path towards development following a rise of “loss of democratic rights, detention laws and restrictions of political party organisations” (Holmquist, 1984, p. 72). The political atmosphere and the ideology underpinning Sessional Paper No. 10 contributed to the non-systematic and partial investment in social welfare and social security. The economic boom at the time accorded the government the opportunity to create a robust social policy regime which however did not represent a political priority. Political pressure and citizen demand at the time lacked the drive to push government action towards social investment.

The trickle-down model espoused in the sessional paper failed to bring about development. Based on the adopted development model, government invested in high productive parts of the country with the hope that development accruing would trickle down to the other parts of the country. The sessional paper in outlining priorities concentrated on the productive areas of the Central Province and the Rift Valley for development investment, including the setting up of factories and infrastructure like roads. Other areas, like North-Eastern Kenya, considered unproductive, received little or no investment, leading to their marginalisation, a situation that persisted for years (Wario Arero, 2007). The allocation of development projects, including schools and hospitals, were skewed towards the president’s home turf (Holmquist, 1984; O’Brien and Ryan, 2001) and so did appointments into the civil service. President Kenyatta in this way built up the hegemony of the Kikuyu elite both in economic and political terms (Ajulu, 2002). In addition, as Amadi (2009) notes, the national development plan expected to stimulate development for all people favoured the ruling elite and a small group of Kenyatta’s inner circle. Attempts by the state at redistribution made little impact as the Second Development Plan (1970-1974) still centred on economic development. With the failure of the government to enhance equity, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1972 called for a “balance[ed] distribution of wealth without sacrificing growth” (Holmquist, 1984, p. 76). The ILO report pointed to rising inequality in Kenya, terming it “growth without redistribution”. The government however made only minimal reforms at the time, marked by low state responsibility on provision of health, education, income and housing.

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From the onset, at independence, the government favoured a market-driven economy. Chinsinga (2004) gives an example of this pro-capitalist orientation in the redistribution of land rights where the government adopted a willing buyer-willing seller arrangement. While on the one hand the government made investments in social development, on the other, it invested in activities expected to bring about economic benefits. At independence, the development rhetoric and strategy, as articulated by the founding presidents, centred on the elimination of the “three vices” – illiteracy, poverty and disease (Seeley, 1987). To achieve these aspirations, the independent state, anchored in the spirit of African Socialism, described above, extended social services to the citizens with the principle objectives of “social justice and humane living conditions for all citizens … though the means to achieve these goals were entirely economic” (Speich, 2009, p. 458). Two main imperatives informed the move: first, to plug the human resource gap left in the civil service after the departure of the colonial government and to enable the country to integrate into the global economy, and second, to bring to acceptable levels of well-being the living standards of people as articulated during the struggle for independence (Manji, 2000). The enthusiasm of independence spurred the nascent state to major investments in health and education. Primary school enrolment in Kenya for example increased by more than 100 percent between 1963 at independence and 1973 (Zeleza, 1991). Other African states coming out of the period of colonialism made similar investments. Nationalism drove the agenda for investment in the people and the prosperity of the nation with improved education standards and better health, ranked as paramount investments in the government’s agenda (Adésinà, 2009).

At independence, the government extended social welfare and social security benefits previously targeted at white settlers to the rest of the working population. The extension of education and health services to reach all citizens pointed to government’s capacity for implementing broad-based social service programmes (Manji, 2000). However, the independence government failed to adequately extend social services with changes in social security and health insurance provided to government workers as part of employment relations with little transformation to accommodate unemployed Africans (Seeley, 1987). Following the adoption of Sessional Paper No. 10, the government set up the National Social Security Fund in 1965 within the Ministry of Labour to administer pension benefits, and the National Health Insurance Fund later in 1967 within the Ministry of Health for inpatient medical cover to government workers.
Several factors made it possible for the government to invest in social welfare. First, government revenue had increased from both domestic and international sources (Murunga, 2004). From domestic revenue, the government made budgetary allocations for social services. At the time, Kenya benefitted from the boom in prices of agricultural commodities out of the export of coffee and tea. Second, global oil prices remained low, making it affordable for the government to invest in infrastructure development and social services. It is estimated that the average GDP growth during the first 10 years, referred to as the “golden years”, was an impressive 6.6% (Figaro, 2013). During this period of economic prosperity, per capita income increased by about 36.8% between 1964 and 1978, attributable to growth in the agricultural sector following “conservative land reforms” (Nyong’o, 1986). Financial dividends accruing from the growth and the profit from the exports afforded the government sufficient fiscal space to make such investments without strain (Murunga, 2004). Investment in social development and social services, in particular in education and medical services expanded, leading to improvement in welfare.

Nevertheless, social provision by the government was conservative, not expansive, and largely market-based. In an attempt to bridge the gap in provisioning, the government adopted harambee, a social welfare and community development model based on an ideology of self-development (Nyong’o, 1986). With the literal meaning of “let’s pull together”, harambee became the slogan and the paradigm through which the government aimed at funding and providing for public and social goods (Cheeseman, 2015). Critics describe the model as an ideological tool that Kenyatta used to reduce social demands placed upon his government. Harambee put people and communities at the centre of their own development both by letting them define their need and letting them implement it. Government placed undue pressure on citizens to make financial and resource contributions towards projects which in most cases were primary social services like schools, hospitals and bridges among other services (Holmquist, 1984). Harambee became the pillar through which the government implemented community and rural development projects. Adésínà discusses similar initiatives in Western Nigeria, where communities supported the construction of schools with the government providing and paying teachers (Adésínà, 2009). It must be noted however that in this case, households were not under direct duress to contribute.

The government and citizens undertook significant development projects through harambee, especially in rural areas where it is estimated that harambee contributed 40 percent of capital
development. (Ngau, 1987). In concrete terms, Harambee manifested in devolving responsibility for development and social provision to people themselves rather that the idea of state-led collection effort at enhancing wellbeing. Essentially, in so doing citizens took on roles expected of the state. Meanwhile, the state rolled back social provision and development of infrastructure. Harambee became the pillar through which the government implemented community and rural development projects. The state failed in its duty and passed the task to an already taxed population, perpetuating a course that started during the colonial era – expecting individuals to take care of themselves (Seeley, 1987). The spirit of harambee later spread to social and familial relations, forcing communities to raise funds to cover school and medical fees.

5.2.2. International Influence Post-Independence

After independence, the USA and Germany became influential donors of grants towards development projects. Nordic countries, the Dutch and Japanese started providing funding towards infrastructure development in the 1970s (Seeley, 1987). The biggest rise in aid funding through the years came from the World Bank with the government’s share of externally owed debt rising from under 5% in 1965 to 40% in 1997 as shown in figure 5.1 (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001). Though most of the debt was not directed to social welfare programmes, it was tied to specific development projects aimed at promoting growth and poverty alleviation programmes.

In the mid-1970s donor funding shifted to the provision of “basic needs”, significantly affecting the nation’s aspirations espoused in the Fourth National Development Plan of 1979 to 1983. In the plan, the government articulated its intention to move from the emphasis on industrial growth to “poverty alleviation through the expansion of income earning opportunities” (Government of Kenya, 1979). Seeley (1987) contends that the increase in donor funding for projects led to a diversification and proliferation of aid organisations seeking to cover government’s reduction of social welfare expenditure. Kenya, considered a darling of the developed world at the time, continued to attract foreign aid. Scholars estimate that between 1970 and 1996, the amount of aid rose to about 45% of the government budget, making Kenya one of largest aid recipients in Africa. From Figure 4.1 it is, however, instructive to note that during the same period, the highest level of aid to GDP was 7 per cent indicating that donor organisations spending was independent of government’s own spending. At the time though, international organisations’ interference in policymaking remained minimal, especially in
relation to financial management, as the country was able to balance its financial obligations owing to relatively low petroleum prices, and a steady revenue from exports.

Fig 5.1 Evolution and pattern on total aid to Kenya

Further, in terms of macro-economic management, the donor community considered Kenya a better performer than other African countries with the relative economic growth aided by the setting up of factories and industries (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001). Though the country fell short of meeting its budgetary obligations, there was relative stability in its ability to invest in education and health and meet its financial obligations while servicing its external debts. The government however missed opportunities for expanding social services, which then became impossible during President Moi’s tumultuous political tenure characterized by heightened corruption and both domestic and international pressures, as described in the next section.
5.3. The Lost Decades – Moism

President Moi took office in 1978 following the death of the first president. His term in office, from 1978 to 2002, was characterised by both political and social agitation for change. Socially, a number of exigencies, both domestic and international, during his tenure negatively impacted the provision of social services, leading to an almost complete breakdown in services, hence the term “the lost decades”. The following section therefore considers both the endogenous and exogenous factors influencing social policy options during Moi’s term in office.

5.3.1. Deepening Inequalities

Following in the Nyayo (footsteps) of President Kenyatta after his death, Moi further entrenched ethnic divisions among Kenyans. The deepening of ethnic divisions was brought about by political precariousness and feelings of insecurity in his first years of his presidency (Holmquist, 1984; Murunga, 2004). Moi’s presidency faced a leadership and legitimacy crisis as he inherited a government and a civil service full of Kenyatta loyalists. He later consolidated power after the attempted coup in 1982 and to solidify his position, he sought political alignment with and galvanized support from his ethnic group, the Kalenjin, and other smaller ethnic groups (Chinsinga, 2004). Politically, the Kalenjin were not heavyweights in terms of political participation in comparison to the Kikuyu, Luo or the Luhya. In addition they lacked a strong economic base compared to the Kikuyu (Murunga, 2004). To cement this support, Moi embarked on a skewed distribution of public and social goods to his home area and to the regions perceived to be his support base. In so doing, his actions marginalized other areas of the country, continuing the pattern of uneven development started by President Kenyatta.

To further purge the government of dissident groups, President Moi replaced the Kikuyu in civil service with cronies from his support base and, just like his predecessor, disregarded all forms of meritocracy (Murunga, 2004). Political ethnicity became the dominant manner by which the government distributed resources, with development favouring a few parts of the country (Ajulu, 2002). For the 24 years of Moi’s presidency, reforms to social security in terms of benefits remained as part of formal labour employment with not extension to those outside employment. Single party politics ensured no protests on the matter in Parliament. He also kept criticism of his regime under control through fear and detention of those opposed to him.
5.3.2. Harambee – Pulling Together

In continuation to the spirit of harambee started by former President Kenyatta, President Moi pursued the idea of self-help development with vigour. Besides abandoning social development to the people, harambee became an instrument through which he gained access to the rural areas, providing him with a more hands-on and direct relationship than his predecessor. (Holmquist, 1984). Harambee became a tool of surveillance and governance. Moi relied heavily on the provincial administration established by the colonial government and together with his connections through harambee gained superior knowledge and an advanced grasp of politics and the dynamics at the local level. Harambee became popular as people considered it some sort of redistribution mechanism where they got back from politicians and business people who were under great political and societal pressure to contribute during events (Holmquist, 1984). Each household was expected to contribute, particularly when the president headed a fundraising event. At times, local administration forced households to contribute, which Holmquist (1984) describes as a form of tax, with the poorest hit the hardest. With time, harambee became an opportunity for endemic corruption. With little accountability mechanisms in place, politicians used it as a tool to bribe voters and embezzle funds (Waiguru, 2006; Cheeseman, 2015).

Whereas government used harambee to build and maintain infrastructure in rural areas, scholars attribute the growth of patronage and clientelism in the Kenyan political system to the practice (Amadi, 2009; Cheeseman, 2015). It became a path to political fiefdom with many ascending to power based on their contribution and loyalty to the president. In addition, politicians used harambee for their own personal benefit through coerced contribution (Cheeseman, 2015). The harambee philosophy became a means of addressing government failure in social policy (Brass, 2012) and an avenue for political and economic exploitation of the poor.

5.3.3. Pressures of Aid and SAPs

Covariate shocks in developing countries in the 1980s, and others specific to Kenya, changed the development course for the country and other countries in Africa. With the global fall in prices of primary export commodities, compounded with the spike in oil prices and internal failures in economic management (Mosley, 1986; Rono, 2002; Branch and Cheeseman, 2006), Kenya found itself in difficult circumstances (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001). Revenue deficit grew following the fall in the prices of coffee and tea, on the one hand, and increased costs of oil
and petroleum products imports, on the other hand. With these challenges the national budget deficit grew exponentially. Corruption eroded and further depleted national revenue. To balance its books, Kenya turned to external actors, the IMF and the World Bank. Following pressures of the highlighted budgetary difficulties, Kenya’s first loan from the World Bank came in 1980 (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001; Murunga, 2004; Figaro, 2012). As demonstrated in figure 4.1 above, multilateral aid increased during the period between the 1980s and 1990s following the lending from the World Bank under the SAPs and later to moderate the effects of the same programmes.

The IMF and World Bank leveraged on the lending to pressurise government on economic and political reforms. The conditionalities imposed by the lending bodies required the government to restructure public management to continue receiving financial aid and loans. In the restructuring process, the international financial institutions made it conditional for the government to cut down on its spending and reduce wastage of funds (Mosley, 1986). Government cut its expenditure on public services first, with a radically trimmed budget in the 1983/1984 financial year (Holmquist, Weaver and Ford, 1994). Government reduced budgetary allocation to education and the health sector which constituted its biggest expenditure with spending in subsequent years falling from 74413.83million in 1995/6 to 62417 by 2000/1 (Colclough and Webb, 2010, p. 14). User fees were introduced on a cost-sharing basis. The introduction of fees on public services meant that citizens paid user fees at the point of service. Patients unable to pay were denied medical assistance, resulting in unnecessary deaths due to minor ailments. School heads demanded fees with charges going beyond the financial capacity of most households. The introduction of fees at tertiary level led to frequent student protests. Inevitably, education standards in Kenya, as in other parts of Africa, fell, with irreparable consequences (Aina, 2004). The poor suffered most as they could not afford the charges levied on public goods. Poverty levels rose drastically, compounding an already difficult situation in the traditionally neglected areas like the North-Eastern Province.

IMF and World Bank demands for reforms in the public sector were aimed at creating a “lean efficient public service.” To achieve leanness, the lenders made the following demands to government; first, the World Bank and IMF required government to freeze civil service employment. With the growing number of university and college graduates, this measure escalated unemployment rates. The freeze affected young graduates hoping to secure employment within government, leading to the growth of the informal sector. The second
condition imposed was a freeze on public service wages. Practically, this further lowered the purchasing power of Kenyan public servants. Public services became unaffordable and a segment of the population opted out of public services due to the cost. Third, the government was required to retrench part of its workforce to cut down on its wage bill. The measures recommended failed to improve efficiency; instead the provision of services by the state declined. Other adjustment measures recommended were related to the privatisation of parastatals to increase efficiency (Murunga, 2004), which led to high levies imposed even on the most basic services such as water. To further get the country back to a path of a balanced budget, government instituted reforms in the money market with a significant devaluation of the Kenyan shilling. According to the reformists, the measure made sense as a weaker shilling meant the country could earn more income from export of goods. For Kenya as a net importer, the result was an imbalance of payments as commodity exports could not match commodity imports, leading to inflation, rising indebtedness and slow growth (Zeleza, 1991).

5.3.4 Government Resistance and the Rise of Non-governmental Organisations
The government did not undertake all the reforms in the manner recommended by the lenders. Slow or total non-adoption indicated resistance to some of the recommended prescriptions, leading to delays in the reforms despite pressure from the World Bank and IMF. For instance, government staggered public sector reforms, which required a reduction in the number of state employees. Instead of a decrease, the civil service expanded from 500,000 in 1982 to 715,000 in 1991, occasioned by the employment of more teachers (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001; Figaro, 2013). Some reforms were also not adopted fully and the privatisation of some state organs were never fully achieved, with only piecemeal reforms adopted. Figaro (2013) points to a case of the Kenya National Cereals Board whose reforms were delayed and, in the end, did not take place. Kenya and donor relations became strained as donors issued threats to enforce compliance on the resistant government.

Government resistance did not lead to an immediate cessation of aid. Aid continued to flow with donors and the government engaged in threats and sanctions. But from 1991, the IMF and the World Bank suspended lending to government (Murunga, 2004). Suspension of the loan agreement lasted three years, with the agriculture, education and health sectors affected the most by the withdrawal of loans. Besides economic reforms, the World Bank and the IMF required government to undertake political reforms (Branch and Cheeseman, 2008; Figaro, 2012). Moi’s regime was considered repressive, necessitating calls for political reforms both
from within and outside the country, calls he rejected, terming them an attempt by Western powers to destabilize the country. Eventually, due to sustained pressure, Moi succumbed and in 1990 acceded to calls for a return to multiparty democracy. External pressure centred on economic reforms while internally the pressure aimed at political reforms. Figaro (2013, p. 322) argues that internal factors, in particular “ethnic rivalry and economic decline” pressed the country towards economic liberalisation more than external factors did. He fails however to acknowledge that pressure brought about by SAPs partly resulted in the economic decline in the country.

The World and IMF forced Kenya and other countries in Africa to adopt SAPs to ensure continued funding support from the international community. Governments may adopt contextually unviable policies to qualify for the funding and at times for “continued support and legitimacy from the international community” (Lant Pritchett, Andrews and Woolcock, 2012, p. 5). The imposition of SAPs by external actors on sovereign states brought about some policy options that proved detrimental to citizens; some of the negative effects are still felt today (Gough, 2013). The effects of SAPs led to a further deepening of an already deficient social policy and welfare regime. Inadvertently, the policy reform measures resulted in increased poverty and a decline in the well-being of many people. The government of Kenya estimated that poverty levels at the time rose from 48% of the population in 1990 to 56% in 2001, per capita income declined from USD 271 in 1990 to USD 239, while unemployment rose to 14.6% in the same years (Government of Kenya, 2003). To protect the poor from the effects of SAPs, the World Bank advocated safety nets reminiscent of the colonial era, characterized by their minimalist provisions, residual tendencies and targeted approach (Konkel, 2014).

As people sought means to make ends meet, the informal sector provided an avenue through which most could earn a living and access affordable services. The situation opened the doors donors and aid organisations operating in the country from a previously small and homogenous group (Briggs, 2014). Due to perceptions of runaway corruption and looting, and non-accountability, donors, the World Bank and IMF, in an attempt to protect funds, switched to project aid from direct budget support with funds remitted to international organisations or directly to resident advisers for better control of funds (Murunga, 2004; Branch and Cheeseman, 2008). With most funding directed to non-state actors rather than the government, the measure opened doors for wider participation of NGOs in national policymaking processes.
(Brass, 2012). The number of NGOs grew in response to the available financial resources rather than to meet social needs.

The effects of SAPs and funding cuts led to a neglect of social policy and social protection as neo-liberal demands considered market forces as better players than the government in social provisioning (Murunga, 2004). Kenya moved further from the state-led development path to a market-oriented one (Government of Kenya, 2003). Government abandoned the provision of social protection and social services altogether while dependency on aid organisations increased. Ideologically, the IMF and the World Bank further entrenched the dualism between social and economic development. Social security for the unemployed continued to rely on overstretched kinship and familial ties greatly overburdened by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

Agitation by donor organisations and multilateral organisations led by UNICEF brought to attention the reality of the devastation of neo-liberal reforms and the effects on children. In a two-part report published entitled “Adjustment with a Human Face”, UNICEF highlighted the effects of the adjustment policies on the human condition of the poor in particular women and children (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart, 1987). UNICEF argued in the report that basic services needed to be protected from “adjustment” and social assistance ought to go beyond relief and subsidies in a way that promoted the production of the poor (Jolly, 1991). UNICEF however was careful to avoid rebuttals by outright claiming “that deterioration in the human situation was the direct result of the adjustment policies,” rather alluding to the overall economic situation – both nationally and globally (Jolly, 1991, p. 1818). With resistance and mounting criticisms, mixed results in effectiveness, poor outcomes, failure in institutional development and sustainability, the World Bank owned up to the inadequacies of the policies (Figaro, 2013). The Bank, United Nations Development Programme and the African Development Bank thereafter started an initiative to provide policy advice and support for protection of the poor. It was within the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Programme that the World Bank sought to address the “social cost of adjustment” through, among other measures, instituting “social safety net” programmes (Jayarajah, Branson and Sen, 1996, p. 60).

While the entire population suffered the consequences of the reforms, children suffered the consequences of cuts on social expenditure and bore the greatest brunt of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. UNICEF’s presence in terms of social welfare provision grew in the country in response to the situation of children. Meanwhile, the increased number of NGOs and other
donor organisations provided more than a stop-gap for welfare provision as they became service providers, monitors of public policy, information providers, and key shapers in domestic policy (Manji, 2000). These organisations included faith-based groups, NGOs and civil society organisations, most seeking to provide essential services like education and health and in some cases even infrastructure (Manji, 2000). The encroachment of NGOs on what was seen as government policy space further put the state at loggerheads with the NGOs, who they considered puppets dancing to the tune of Western ideologies in undermining the rights and legitimacy of the state (Manji, 2000; Brass, 2012). Government regulations sought to decrease NGOs’ space in political matters but with increased funding and political backing from donor countries, their influence in the social and political space increased.

During the period described as the lost decades, the role of NGOs in service provisioning became prominent. Some of the gains of the post-independence era, including increased education enrolment, a reduction in maternal and child mortality reversed or stagnated during the period both due to external and internal factors (see Zeleza, 1991; Francis, 2005). As Murunga (2004) points out, Moi’s misrule resulted in an ineffective and illegitimate state unable to function in its role of redistribution and allocation of resources. Attempts at recovery by the next government brought about a sense of hope in the prioritisation of broader social policy for all citizens. In the next section I describe how the duality of economic versus social development during Kibaki’s term failed to meet the expectations of Kenyans. I also trace the institutionalisation of cash transfer programmes and the role of donors in the process.

5.4. Recovery Phase: Institution Building - A Narrow Return to the Vision

The election of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) ended the 40-year rule of the KANU party in a convincing win in December 2002, ending 24 years of Moi rule. NARC, an amalgamation of different parties, according to political pundits transcended ethnic politics in unity for the cause and the good of all Kenyans. The euphoria that characterised the inauguration of the new government brought with it hope for a better future with high expectations for political, social and economic improvement (Barkan, 2004). The drafting of the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment (ERS), six months into the NARC administration, signalled change. And though donors provided funds for the development of the ERS, the strategy was anchored on the NARC manifesto (McCormick, Mitullah and Manga, 2007).
The ERS came after the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) which donors had initiated following the failures of SAPs. The PRSPs aimed at placing poverty at the centre of development through the participation of citizens in matters of development. Government and donors developed the PRSPs around a three-year strategic financial plan, the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework, to enable measurement and evaluation of programmes. IMF and World Bank further lending to Kenya was contingent on the development and were perceived as a continuation to SAPs and the same liberalisation measures that has led to rising poverty (Kiringai and Manda, 2002). PRSPs did not however achieve much in regard to poverty reduction as the principles of SAPs were still reflected in the poverty reduction papers and certain categories of the population that could not participate in “sustainable programmes” were left behind.

Drafters of the ERS took into consideration the failures of the SAPs and their contribution to economic and governance decline. The ERS, with the introduction of the Medium Terms Expenditure Framework, aimed at bringing about fiscal discipline through accountability (Tax Justice Network, 2009). However, the strategy paper was still heavily skewed towards economic growth as a precursor to development as indicated in the statement “rapid economic growth or the baking of a bigger national cake, is the only assured way of reducing poverty” (Government of Kenya, 2003, p. 31). The strategy paper expressed the intention of the government to increase social services for citizens left behind in the medium term. However, on social protection, the paper in passing mentioned “government’s plans to incorporate social protection programmes as an economic and social imperative as part of the social plans” (Government of Kenya, 2003, p. 33).

Apart from the ERS, the government developed a new blueprint document, Vision 2030, which set out among others government plans towards development. In it, the government laid out a plan for the country’s development and achievement to middle income status by 2030 (Fourie, 2014). Vision 2030 was developed around three pillars, social, economic and political, where it is envisaged that the country will earn and sustain a double digit economic growth and become industrialised by 2030 (Government of Kenya, 2007b). Vision 2030 set out three pursuits: achievement of higher growth, achievement of equity and poverty reduction, and the promotion of governance (Government of Kenya, 2007b). The policy document, however, like other development strategies before it, perpetuates the notion of economic development before
social development. Social development remains residual with a focus on economic development. Social protection is discussed widely within Vision 2030 with cash transfer programmes for older persons pegged as a flagship programme. Through Vision 2030, the government set out to create a fund for the financing of social protection programmes from its coffers. Emphasis is placed on providing cash grants to categories of people, including older persons.

5.4.1. Economic Progress with little social Growth
The country experienced sustained economic growth from 2003, with the steady acceleration in economic growth rate reaching a high of 7.1% in 2007 as compared to 2.9% in 2003 when Kibaki became president. A number of factors stimulated this growth, including better financial management and fiscal policies, booming commodity exports, increased foreign direct investment, increased investment in education and greater democratisation (Kimenyi, Mwega and Ndung’u, 2015). The dynamic growth and the economic outcomes failed to transform the welfare of those living in poverty. During this period, government and donor relations improved with a resumption of lending by the IMF in 2003 (Otieno, 2005). During the period from 2002, foreign aid increased, which could be attributed to increased donor interest following regime change. Fiscal space increased enough to extend social provisions with donor funding and goodwill also improving following the expansion of the political space. The new level of freedom enabled international organisations and bilateral organisations space to work with the government and provided leverage for them in the national policymaking process. Donors committed to provide funding to the government, but the divisive politics that characterized Kibaki’s presidency failed to expand social policy provisions. When NARC came to power there was hope that public service delivery would improve and jobs would be created (Chege, 2008). Perceptions however indicate little in terms of change in living conditions despite the economic growth, “only the well-off were benefitting from the expansion and benefits were concentrated to only a few” (Kimenyi and Romero, 2008, p. 8). Grand corruption increased within government as Kibaki brought back the old guard (Barkan, 2004). Amid these realities and with failure to realize social growth the excitement that brought in the NARC government faded.

5.4.2. Truncated Reforms in Social Policy
Government made some efforts at transforming social development through several policy instruments during NARC’s term. Free primary education, as promised during the campaigns,
was introduced with full implementation in January 2003. NARC showed determination by implementing the Free Primary Education (FPE) scheme with no existing budgetary allocation despite donor reservations. Experts lauded the government efforts at FPE as an inclusive policy with capacity to reduce inequalities and break intergenerational cycles of poverty among poor households (Oketch and Ngware, 2010). Through the FPE policy government abolished school fees and other levies in a bid to extend primary school enrolment and retention particularly to disadvantaged school age children. The enrolment rate rose from 92% in 2002 to 104% in 2003 of the school going children (Vos et al., 2004). Despite mixed reactions from different stakeholders, DFID provided financial and technical support to implement the programme.

The policy decision was driven by short-term political considerations rather than long-term national development considerations. Various challenges are associated with the hurried implementation of the policy. For example, classrooms were congested, and the pupil to teacher ratio was high with limited physical facilities to accommodate new entrants (Vos et al., 2004). Delays of disbursement of funds to schools affected learning for almost a year, within which time some parents opted to take their children out of public schools to private schools (Oketch and Ngware, 2010). In addition, inadequate numbers of teaching staff and a lack of learning materials compromised learning. Corrupt practices at schools and at the Ministry of Education headquarters through procurement and tendering processes led to withdrawal of DFID support, making access to learning materials more difficult. Other challenges related to teacher absenteeism and a lack of administration skills among school management.

Within the social protection sector, several reforms were implemented. Changes undertaken in the National Health Insurance Fund and the National Social Security Fund broadened the inclusion into the schemes for workers previously excluded. NSSF transformed from a provident to a pension fund opening with enrolment of previously excluded individuals from the informal sector and those in self-employment (Government of Kenya, 2003). The widening of membership represents a major reform since the enactment of the NSSF in 1965. The Government remodelled the NSSF Act to include for the growing majority of Kenyans in the informal sector whose number had risen from 10% to 80% as a share of the working population (Government of Kenya, 2013). As a result, the NSSF is now the largest social security benefit scheme in East and Central Africa (Barya, 2011). However, benefits paid out by NSSF upon retirement are minimal and inadequate, thus failing to provide sufficient income protection in old age. Coverage in terms of numbers is low and narrow (Kimenyi, Mwega and Ndung’u,
pointing to government neglect at promotion of ex ante social security programmes at the pursuit of reactionary programmes.

Reforms at the NHIF failed to yield success as planned in the Economic and Recovery Strategy (ERS). In the ERS, NARC committed to restructuring the hospital insurance fund into a social health insurance fund that would provide medical cover to all Kenyans (Government of Kenya, 2003). Even though a proposal for the National Health Insurance Scheme passed through Parliament amid great controversy, the president declined to sign the bill “due to a mix of technical and political reasons” (Abuya, Maina and Chuma, 2015, p. 2). A number of factors impeded the attempts; first, the ruling coalition and cabinet was fragmented. Internal politics and wrangling had splintered the government and the cabinet. Policymaking became partisan, with each side determined to bring failure to their opponents. Second, unlike cash transfers, the proposed national social health insurance lacked financial and technical backing from donors. Thirdly, following the capitalistic structures of the economy intertwined with the political, some business people frustrated plans with the profit motive prevailing.

Government undertook piecemeal reforms in the health sector while the NSSF and NHIF opened up and admitted membership from the informal sector and unemployed persons. In addition, payment coverage extended to outpatient services and to patients with chronic illnesses. With the failure to enact an appropriate social health insurance law, healthcare financing is still largely “out of pocket” spending. At the moment, ongoing discussions are to expand health coverage to all Kenyans.

5.4.3. Cash Transfer as the Alternative to Wider Social Policy

Through the campaign period leading to the 2002 elections, UNICEF launched a multi-pronged campaign to coincide with the electioneering period aimed at positioning the welfare of children within the political space. Following the UNAIDS report highlights on the devastation of children due to HIV/AIDS pandemic (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV, AIDS, 2001), part of the campaign appealed to political aspirants to sign a memorandum indicating their support for a 10-point agenda and commitment to improve the well-being of children if elected (Pearson, Alviar and Hussein, 2006). UNICEF took advantage of the window of opportunity presented and launched the campaign in which aspirants made promises towards the improvement of the well-being of children. As a matter of priority, Parliament set up a committee after the elections to ensure implementation of the 10-point agenda amongst them.
support for the CT-OVC. The political coalition, the euphoria of newness and determination by the government to follow through on its election promises provided fertile ground for the push for the idea of experimentation with the CT-OVC. The availability of funds by UNICEF facilitated the start of the pilot programme.

Politically, the timing for experimentation with cash transfers was ideal as it coincided with the first term of the NARC government. Ideologically, adoption of cash transfers is a continuation of market-linked solutions to social problems. It was argued among promoters of cash transfers that with cash, even the poor could access social services like health and education from the markets. Though the idea of cash transfers lacked initial political support, the opening of the policy space permitted donor experimentation first with the CT-OVC, and then other cash transfer programmes followed. The state supported the idea of the CT-OVC based on its intended outcomes and also because it was not required to fund the programme. UNICEF, together with the Department of Children in the Ministry of Home Affairs, set up the pilot programme in 2003 (Pearson, Alviar and Hussein, 2006). Under the leadership of the vice president on whose docket the department lay, the programme later gained support both in the Cabinet and Parliament.

Donor organisations funded the programme from 2003 to 2006 before the first government allocation and later DFID and later the World Bank started providing funds towards the programme. DFID started funding districts worst hit by HIV and AIDS. The World Bank however remained non-committal as it was interested in having conditionalities attached onto the programme, a move that was resisted by UNICEF, DFID and the Department of Children. Following a loan facility from the World Bank in 2009, the programme expanded. The agreement signed in July 2009 provided credit from the International Development Association amounting to USD 126 million towards the expansion of the CT-OVC for a period of four years (World Bank, 2009). Through the first credit amount of USD 50 million, the CT-OVC increased enrolment into the programme from 14,000 to 47,000 households in the next financial year (Government of Kenya, 2012). The World Bank however attached conditionalities to the programme linked to education and health as part of the agreement.

Study findings indicate that the government, though not keen on social protection, started drafting the national policy on social protection after the Livingstone Conference in 2006. Donors supported the inter-ministerial process led by the Ministry of Social Development,
Gender and Social Services (Government of Kenya, 2012). Amid wrangles and tension over ownership between the lead ministry and the Ministry of Labour and Manpower Development, MPs passed the Kenya Social Protection Policy Bill in 2012. International organisations and the government however were already experimenting with pilots for different categories of households. DFID set up the Hunger Safety Net Programme in 2007 while Concern International and Oxfam set up a cash transfer after the 2007/2008 political violence targeting households in urban slums. The Ministry of Gender initiated the Older Persons Cash Transfer in 2006 as a Rapid Results Initiative experiment with an expansion in 2008. The Cash Transfer for Persons with Severe Disability followed thereafter in 2010. Among other social protection programmes tested at the time was Kazi Kwa Vijana, a public works programme for youth which was discontinued due to corruption concerns and lack of government support.

Economic management improved during Kibaki’s tenure; nevertheless corruption associated with his inner circle led to grievances within government, making it difficult for the government to implement its promises (Murunga and Nasong’o, 2006; Kelsall, 2013). Kibaki’s term failed to translate economic growth into social development. Resentment within NARC and political manipulation finally led to the break-up of the NARC government, with the disagreements further culminating in the post-election violence in 2008. Kibaki’s term is a case of missed opportunities (Murunga and Nasong’o, 2006). With the new Constitution promulgated in August 2010, development agents and citizens expect that structures of devolution will lead to a change in social development planning. The next section is a discussion of the implications of the Constitution of Kenya for social policy and social protection.

5.5. Social Protection in the Age of Constitutionalism

The adoption of the Constitution of Kenya in August 2010 signalled a new political and economic era in Kenya. One of the aims of the Constitution is the strengthening of institutions of governance, and it also aims at promoting the attainment of equitable distribution of resources through devolved structures of implementation. In terms of social provisioning and in particular social protection, the focus is perceived as fundamental in ensuring a more equitable and inclusive society. The Bill of Rights in the in Article 43(1) (e) and highlights that:
Every person has a right to social security… (and) the State shall provide appropriate social security to persons who are unable to support themselves and their dependents (Government of Kenya, 2010, p. 31).

Within the social protection sector in Kenya, “the right to social security includes both social assistance and social insurance and thus is synonymous with social protection” (Government of Kenya, 2016b, p. 1). The Constitution highlights provision for groups of people in the various articles from Article 52(1) to 57. The categories include children, minorities, senior citizens and people with disabilities, and social protection therefore is considered a remedial avenue for social economic injustices regarding the provision of social welfare to Kenyans. The Constitution statement however represents a residual take on social policy where provision is on condition on the inability to take care of oneself.

As discussed in section 3.2.1 of the thesis is that international elites through social protection have created incentives to the political elite that align with the interests of the political elite. For this reason, politicians considered social protection as a means to gain political mileage. In the last four years of the Jubilee government, the government has increased budgetary allocation to social protection programmes, thereby expanding the number of households participating in the programmes (Government of Kenya, 2016b). Interviews from participants point to two main factors. First, the heightened competitive nature of the political system and the electoral process since 2002 makes it crucial for governments to deliver on its promises. Successive governments are increasingly coming under pressure to increase social provisions. Government is increasingly facing demands from the electorate, hence the need to commit to the expansion of programmes related to social policy. Citizen’s awareness and engagement and the extensive use of social media has increased demand and accountability from below, prompting government’s responsiveness. Though most programmes started during Kibaki’s term, the Jubilee government has relaunched the programmes to create an impression of newness to the programmes to gain political mileage. The OPCT for example has been launched three times in four years by the Jubilee government.

The second reason leading to the increase in budgetary allocation is based on a conditional funding model - the Programme for Results (P4R) Agreement which the World Bank signed on behalf of other international organisations. Through the agreement, the government is required to increase its allocation towards social protection programmes to receive sector-wide
budgetary allocation from the Bank (Government of Kenya, 2016b). The mechanisms and the operational technicalities related to the P4R are discussed in Chapter 8 of the study.

Besides the Constitution, the Jubilee Manifesto highlights the coalition’s plans to increase budgetary allocation towards social protection programmes. The proposal is highlighted in the 2017/2018 budget, with increased allocation to the OPCT (Jubilee Coalition, 2013). The plans, if actualized in 2018, represent a big leap in Kenya’s uptake of cash transfer programmes and the government’s commitment towards expansion and strengthening social protection policy. The combination, with health coverage for older persons, nevertheless still falls short of social policy provisions capable of improving the welfare of older persons.

Other institutions that support the strengthening of social protection are Vision 2030 and the National Economic Social Council (NESC). According to respondents in the study, the Jubilee government adopted the National Vision 2030, as the country’s development blueprint which is scanty. In addition, the NESC mandated to oversee the implementation of Vision 2030 is not operational, as it is not fully constituted. Though the secretariat exists, the president is yet to appoint members to the council. The Vision 2030 secretariat is operational but with a reduced mandate. The Jubilee government has instead pursued government development through the party’s manifesto with little alignment to previous development plans like Vision 2030.

With the remodelling of the social protection, where all cash transfer programmes are now under the National Safety Net Programme, efficiency and delivery of the programmes has improved. With the Government now making substantial allocations to the programmes, perceptions of ownership have increased within government. However, research participants are of the view that government leadership is insufficient with decision-making is still under the control of international actors. Government’s lack of leadership is weakened as the World Bank is providing additional financing based on deliverables by the government. Even though at different times UNICEF and DFID resisted the conditionalities, the resource factor shifted power, giving the World Bank greater influence over the design and policy direction of the NSNP. Government accepted the testing of conditionalities in the CT-OVC programme. Between the 2013/2014 and 2016 financial years financing from the World Bank for social protection programmes amounted to USD 16,452,715 (Government of Kenya, 2016b).
With government and international actors’ preoccupation with cash transfers, other social policy instruments like universal healthcare provision and improvement of learning opportunities continue to receive minimal investment. For example, the number of citizens participating in ex ante schemes like the NSSF remains limited. The Constitution is currently in its ninth year of implementation, it is therefore premature to make judgements regarding its effectiveness in transforming the social policy landscape in Kenya.

5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter it was suggested that the social policy trajectory in Kenya is based on the country’s colonial past, influenced international pressure and the narrow pursuit of economic development provided a political economy foundation for the narrow definition of social policy to cash transfers. As demonstrated in the chapter, the Government of Kenya has continuously made efforts towards institutionalisation of social development, though there have been moments of shift in policy, with the state pursuing economic development at the expense of social development. In light of the uptake of cash transfer policies, the discourse and definition of social protection has narrowed to this single instrument. In adopting cash transfer programmes, Kenya chose to select the social policy instrument in line with its dominant economic principle (Mkandawire, 2005) based on a market economy and capitalism rather than nationalism. Cash transfers represent a return to neo-liberalistic tendencies imposed during the period of SAPs, resulting in the re-commodification of social services like health and education.

While governments hold the prerogative in policymaking and choice of policy instruments to pursue, international factors often influence government decisions. For this reason, an undue emphasis on explaining internal politics as the key drivers for the adoption of cash transfers is narrow and limiting. The argument in the thesis therefore draws attention to both internal and external drivers of social policymaking in Kenya. Internally, political choices and tensions continue to redirect government on social policy with oscillations from one political regime to another. The solid anchorage of economic and social rights in the constitution offers an opportunity for Kenya to widen its social policy beyond a single instrument. Intense donor presence and control has compromised the political basis for a broader social protection policy imagination. With the lack of coalition support of social protection programmes, the programmes continue to be donor-driven and donor-led. There is therefore no political impetus
to build or identify coalitions to sustain the current social protection discussions. Moreover, the policy process excluded existing social movements like the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU), who may have been instrumental in demanding a more inclusive social protection model. The programmes have remained donor-driven, lacking anchorage in the politics of the country.

While we have explored the dominant factors that constituted the key influences in the formation of pro-policy approaches in the different political regimes in Kenya, these are not the only factors. Politics and policy change are complex matters and there are always subtle influences on decision-making and policymaking. As highlighted, the current policy regime has been largely influenced by global factors, with international organisations leading in shaping the adoption of cash transfers. Their success is derived from a process of interaction with domestic players and actors in the policy space through social relations in a process laden with power. Therefore, in the next chapter we explore power relations in the uptake of cash transfer policies.
CHAPTER SIX: INTERESTS AND POWER RELATIONS IN SOCIAL PROTECTION POLICYMAKING

6.1 Introduction


Inasmuch as power is understood to influence and shape policymaking, discussions on its role in the transfer and adoption of social protection policy remain scant. Debates concerned with the process of adoption instead lean towards explanations of social learning and ideational approaches. Recent studies emphasise domestic politics and national institutions as the key explanatory variables in the rapid adoption of the policies in parts of the developing world. However, power based on the asymmetries between the different actors in the policy space shape the social protection agenda and the implementation of the policies in Kenya. Policymaking is the constellation of power and interests, with interests guiding actors’ actions (Weyland, 2007). It is therefore imperative to examine the adoption of the CT-OVC and HSNP in this light. Even when ideational approaches constitute the main medium of transfer, elements of power are visible in the transfer process and the social relations therein. An understanding of how adoption occurred, whether through ideational mechanisms or a structural process, needs an analysis of how motivations, interests, and power drove the “political battle of poverty” (Mkandawire, 2010a, p. 43).

Through evidence, this chapter illuminates the exercise of and how power played out at two levels: international and national. Competing ideological positions at supra-structural level cascaded to the national level, thereby having a bearing on relationships among agents and influencing decisions and choices in the policy transfer process. However, the differentiation between the two levels is to aid in analysis rather than to show a distinction between the levels. In reality, social boundaries between the different levels, international and national, are blurred and social agents flow seamlessly across the different levels. In addition, as mentioned in previous chapters, policymaking and especially that involving transnational social agents is a process where one cannot clearly and cleanly separate the international from the national. In the chapter, I also demonstrate that competition and exercise of power has not just been
between domestic and transnational actors but likewise among domestic actors and transnational actors themselves.

Power here is presented from the perspective where actors exercised and displayed its various forms at various times. The analysis indicates that the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP was reinforced through asymmetrical relations between actors with transnational and international agents exercising greater power derived from their resource base. The finding underscores what other scholars discuss, namely that the exercise of power in policymaking processes arises out of asymmetrical relations among actors (Gaventa, 2006).

To properly present the empirical analysis of the topic under discussion, the chapter is organised into three sections. At the beginning is an analysis of actors’ interests in the policy space. In this section I map out actors in relation to their interests, legitimacy, and resources in the adoption and transfer of social protection policies at national level. In the section I highlight how different interests shaped the policymaking process and how their convergence shaped the uptake of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. In the second section I demonstrate how international actors legitimised their participation in the policy terrain based on the resources they brought into the policy space and how they manipulated the resources to condition the policy space for the adoption of the cash transfer schemes. In the last section I draw from Lukes’ three dimensions of power (Lukes, 2005) and analyse three mechanisms through which actors exercised power for the adoption of the programmes in shaping the agenda, through the exclusion of other actors and in shaping the preferences of others. Thereafter is the conclusion to the chapter.

6.2 Interests in Social Protection Policymaking

In this section, I analyse the policy network of relationships based on interests among the actors in the social protection policymaking process. As already mentioned, the plurality of actors, both domestic and international, entailed multiple and conflicting interests. Interests are preferences and power embodied in policy actors (Shearer et al., 2016) through which policy change comes about. Consequently, a good understanding of the interests of different players was important in studying how power and influence were exercised in the policy process. In addition, the analysis demonstrates how different actors furthered their interests and how it affected those of others. As Shearer et al. (2016) note, the one who is able to attain their interest
is the one with resources, power, capacity, and skills. As will be demonstrated in the section, through the skilful exercise of these variables, the interest of international organisations prevailed in the adoption of cash transfer programmes. From the analysis data, we identified three broad sets of interests: public and social interests, political interests, and individualistic/ideological interests. The convergence of these interests in bringing about policy change is discussed below.

6.2.1 Public and Social Interests
Governments are always looking for policy solutions to solve domestic problems. Issues shape interests and therefore the long-standing problems of poverty and vulnerability were at the forefront in the quest for policy solutions. Though all the actors within the policy space coalesced around this interest, findings indicated that it was more pronounced among members of parliament and bureaucrats. Government officials sought to enact the policies to address both new and old problems presenting in the country associated with poverty. With a rise in the burden resulting from the HIV and AIDS pandemic, urgent intervention was necessary to mitigate the effects on orphans (Bosworth et al., 2016). Old problems of perennial hunger and food insecurity in Northern Kenya prompted the provision of cash instead of food aid. Public interests therefore influenced actors, especially the bureaucratic class, and the political class who considered the CT-OVC and HSNP models in the light of their likelihood of addressing the problems (Weyland, 2007). Characteristics related to public and social interests were described as “for the people”, embedded in national development plans and for collective interests.

National bureaucrats pursued the adoption of the policies on the promise of their efficacy to improve wellbeing for the poor and vulnerable. By virtue of government structure, bureaucrats in the policy process represented the implementation arm of government. Their interests centred around their mandate as civil servants in translating government policies into programmes that could work for the poor and vulnerable, and therefore they considered the adoption of the programmes a step in this direction. Legally, being charged with translating policies as set out by the legislature into programmes, bureaucrats had a close working relation and contact with lawmakers. They therefore comprised the key agents in the policy network, acting as a point of centrality for relations with other actors. As epicentres of policy development and implementation of programmes, their interest lay in advancing government policies for the benefit of citizens. One government official explained this as follows:
Policy implementation is one of the greatest tasks for the bureaucrats… and we learn and borrow from other countries to advance the well-being of citizens from other countries (MFP-03, 29/7/2016).

For politicians, their support for and interest in the programme emanated from their role as legally legislated individuals with veto power in formulating policies for their constituents’ interests. In articulating their duty as lawmakers, they referred to the programmes as “for the benefit of all Kenyans and those they represent” as they stated:

The government and member of parliament have a mandate to safeguard its citizens and the programmes were started with that in mind. The CT-OVC is anchored in governments’ ambitions and work for the benefit and support of children (MP-01, 31/8/2016). We have an obligation as government to make things work for the poor (MP-02, 27/09/2016).

Their interest in the social protection policymaking process linked to that of their constituents and their participation sought to expand the redistribution of programmes to them. Likewise, members of civil society described their interest in the participation of the policymaking process as a representation of the poor and vulnerable. Like the members of parliament, they felt duty-bound to represent the needs of the public in the policy network.

Politicians and bureaucrats situated the cash transfer programmes within long-term national development perspectives, as stated by one government official; politician:

Social protection and cash transfers fit within the economic recovery strategy of Kenya, which was developed in early 2002, they are part of the national Medium-Term Plans and Vision 2030 (MFP-03, 29/10/2016).

Broad interests are here “considered the intersectional linkages and cross-thematic framings” (Adésinâ, 2011, p. 461), in addressing poverty, rather than the narrow view limited to social protection. National bureaucrats and politicians discussed the programmes from the perspective of linkages with broader government development plans like Vision 2030. For this reason, their support for the programmes aligned to other existing public policies like health
and education. In addition, domestic actors were interested in long-term programmes rather than short-term ones as promoted by other actors. Furthermore, actors clustering around public and social interests preferred programmes that reach a wider group of people rather than those that target only a segment of the population. For this reason, they advocated geographical targeting for a wider spread of benefits rather than targeting based on proxy identities of poverty. The political class preferred this diffusion of programmes within a wider geographical area as it boosted their political bases. Bureaucrats too supported geographically disseminated schemes for the programmes to gain the support of the political class. Moreover, geographically disseminated programmes, according to interviewed members of parliament, promoted a sense of collectiveness in the ethnically diverse country. As “representatives of all people, whether children or older persons”, politicians resisted pressure from other actors’ support for allocation of funds to particular categories of the population over others, arguing that their duty was to all citizens (MP-01, 31/8/2016). This finding shows that politicians often refrain from single-focus advocacy and therefore in contestation between different international organisations pushing for their preferred categories of recipients, politicians involved in the policy process resisted taking sides.

6.2.2 Political Interests

Elected political officials’ participation in policymaking processes emanated from their role as representatives of the people. As members of parliament, their power resource lies in their constitutional right as legislators and in the national approval of budgets (Dente, 2013). They therefore wield significant power and influence in determining the direction of government policies. Driven by a normative commitment for advancing the wellbeing of citizens, politicians promoted programmes reaching a large number of people. However, politicians do not only pursue cash transfer programme goals to bring about transformation for their constituents but also for political expediency (Weyland, 2007; Niedzwiecki, 2016). Political interests therefore tended to be short-term in relation to election cycles. The expansion of the cash transfer programmes to more people was considered an avenue through which politicians could garner votes. This view was not only expressed by other informants but by the political elites interviewed. A member of parliament explained it as part of the political game where perceptions matter and as MPs, they have to be seen by their constituents as promoting policies on their behalf:

In politics, it is about perceptions and so we have to be seen, whether you do things is what determines if you may or may not get re-elected (MP-01, 31/8/2016).
This was discussed further by a domestic actor who pointed to increased interest in social protection by politicians near election periods (MGCSD-01, 23/3/2016). The finding is expected, as pro-poor programmes can be used to gain political mileage and used for patronage (Tillin and Duckett, 2017).

Due to their powerful sway in policy matters, politicians were however excluded at various stages of the policymaking process, thus minimising their contribution to the process. Their participation was therefore reactive in response to other actors’ actions. The coalition of bureaucrats and international organisations feared their political involvement would scuttle the adoption process before the uptake of the programmes solidified. As explained by a participant from the international organisation, the deliberate exclusion of politicians from the policymaking process was because they did not want them (politicians) to bring “politics into the programmes” (IOS-02, 23/3/2016). The exclusion of the political elite and depoliticisation of the policy space is discussed further in this chapter.

Politicians are often excluded from policy processes under assertions that if allowed into the process, the programmes would fall prey to patrimonial interests leading to patronage politics (Mkandawire, 2015). This exclusion, however, apart from compromising national ownership of programmes, also signals the disregard other actors have of them as elected officials accountable to their constituents. The policy network has disregarded the importance of the political class. As one respondent explained:

“… Politicians destroyed the targeting and interfered with the programmes as they insisted that targeting of the programmes has to be done their way” (TT/C-01, 1/4/2016).

Politicians’ power in budget approval for the expansion of programmes is critical, especially in the current constitutional dispensation that makes it difficult to bypass them or constrain their agency.

6.2.3 Individualistic/Ideological Interest
The third interest driving the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP evolved around organisations seeking to pursue either their self-interest or around the ideological persuasions
aligned to their institutions. Individual and ideological interests were narrow, individualistic, and based on material and pecuniary interests. Members who clustered around the interest group were international organisations described as “heavyweight agencies and big names in development studies” (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, 2007, p. 1) in relation to their powerful influence in policymaking. International organisations have the ability to “construct the social world in which cooperation and choice take place” and to do this “they help to define the interests that states and other actors come to hold” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2005, p. 162).

Besides international organisations, other agencies promoting individual interests were domestic civil society organisations. Individualistic and ideological interests were characterised by narrowness in approach, material appeal, and self-interest.

**Narrow in approach:** The narrowness of the interests was exhibited in a number of ways. First, it involved advocacy towards strict targeting mechanisms on poverty and the promotion of a single instrument not anchored in broader social policy and national development plans. Advocacy and promotion focussed on ex-post remedies instead of a broader focus on structural factors promoting inequality and poverty, with an excessive focus on one group of the population (Adésínà, 2011). The promotion of cash transfers narrowed down from broader social policy to a single instrument (see Adésínà, 2015). The “narrowing” of the instrument and of social policy indicated the ideological persuasions of the different organisations in the policy space. For example, the World Bank promoted safety nets which provide temporary relief to households in times of distress and shocks related to their social risk management framework.

Besides proposing temporary programmes, the World Bank preferred schemes with strict targeting criteria focussed on poverty. The narrow focus on poverty, however, is inadequate in reducing poverty as it focuses on micro-level programmes instead of the structural causes of poverty. As Mkandawire (2010, p. 44) says, it “avoids the grand narratives of development and concentrates instead on small-scale micro-level projects in which personal engagement and testimony was important” and is characterised by neglect of labour markets.. Interests based on organisational ideology were characterised by short-term perspectives not embedded in the broader social development national narrative. International organisations’ financing rarely went beyond 10-year cycles, indicating the short-term agendas of international organisations.
While the primary focus of civil society organisations lay in promoting social welfare, other interests evolved around the material benefits accrued from promoting cash transfers. Findings indicate that NGOs were created specifically to promote social protection on the continent. International organisations provided funding that domestic actors had access to. But with decreased funding over time, domestic civil society organisations are no longer functional, with others moving on to other agendas. Critics of the process of transfer of the policies note that civil society organisations promoting social protection policies were a creation of international organisations. Their participation therefore did not emanate from national imperatives; rather it was in response to supporting an agenda from which they could access funds. The finding was confirmed by a member of civil society who confessed that:

It was the first time we were hearing about social protection. We had no idea what it was but there was money to start a platform and we figured we would learn along the way (CSO-01, 6/4/2016).

From the statement, two observations emerge. First is that the promotion of the cash transfer agenda was not part of the civil society agenda in Kenya and their engagement in the policy network aimed at buffeting the efforts of international organisations. Their interest in the social protection network was driven by the availability of funds offered by international organisations. The new agenda therefore presented a potential area of financing for domestic organisations. As they had little knowledge of the agenda, they depended on the international organisations for advocacy direction. It was however noted that international organisations preferred to work with international NGOs who were largely composed of foreigners and considered to have no ties to domestic actors or clientelistic forces and partnership.

Second, though acting out of social interest, domestic civil society networks (CSOs)’ impetus for getting onto the social protection “bandwagon” was to legitimise participation of international agencies. Through financing, international organisations created and formed strategic networking with the CSOs to give legitimacy to their work and to promote the policy instruments agreed upon by the bilateral agencies (Adésínà, 2014). CSO alignment with international organisations was based on the resource factor in exchange for their support for international organisations’ promotion. Domestic civil society organisations acted as middlemen between bureaucrats and international organisations on the one hand and politicians on the other and were therefore instrumental in mediating a number of policy processes.
Other actors within the policy space with individualistic interests comprised members of the epistemic communities. Comprising consultancy firms, academics and individuals, this group was described as experts in social protection. Their participation and intervention in the policy process derived from their perceived knowledge on the matter and therefore their ability to structure the collective problem and find the most appropriate solutions. Similar to CSOs, members of the epistemic community were linked to international organisations on the basis of financial resources (Adésinà, 2011). Policy transfer agents contracted them to conduct impact assessments, programme and policy design and in some cases implementation of programmes. A participant from civil society observed that:

You find there are international consultants that are writing SP policy for Kenya, then they go to Liberia and Zambia, then to another country. If you read the policies of these different countries, then they are similar. Where do the international consultants come from? They are linked to the international organisations.

It was presumed that due to their knowledge and expertise on the matter, they had the ability to define interests and set agendas. As experts, they were recruited by international organisations to support the cash transfer agenda. The power of epistemic communities lies in their ability to strengthen certain positions based on research and knowledge while pushing their clients’ interests (Dente, 2013).

To be considered “national”, consultancy firms set up offices at national level, forming alliances with academics and think tanks in-country. Some former employees of international organisations set up consulting firms which guaranteed them contracts from their former employers. Other interests pursued within the policy space were for academic advancement by conducting research and publishing of evidence on impact and other aspects related to the programmes. To this end a participant stated:

People simply want to learn, it is not like is not necessarily that people want to give transfers – out of the 45 countries providing CT, if you analyse them most of them are pilots and they are pilots and fairly small – some with a short lifespan and the reason is that there is still inquisitiveness among people especially the sellers – on what can cash do? If you give out cash what will really happen? How will communities behave? They
are testing elements of human behaviour when they give cash, it has absolutely nothing [to do with] helping people or ending poverty – to put it crudely. People want to test human behaviour. People are learning and people put a lot of money into learning processes and half the time the lessons are not taken anywhere (CSO-05, 28/09/2016).

6.2.4 Self-interest purposes

Politicians, for example, explained that though they were advocating for the programmes to bring about change to citizens, it was noted that their interests also revolved around self-interests. For example, they explained their enthusiasm in the adopting the programmes as a freedom for them from having to be “social protection for their constituents”. Their support for the adoption of the programmes therefore emanated from their need for alternative mechanisms of provision to their constituents. Members of parliament explained that the provision of the cash transfer programmes freed them from contributory obligations for their constituents related to medical fees and burial expenses to school fees and expressed support for the cash transfers based on this expectation. Expounding on this viewpoint, a participant explained:

So essentially the support mechanisms came from individuals and from politicians. They took on the burden of being the “cash transfer”. If there was a problem the politician provided the hearse, medical support, school bursaries – the politician was basically everything. And it is these issues that cash transfers are resolving (CSO-01, 12/2/2016).

This perspective points to the self-interest of MPs in the extension of cash transfer programmes. Political promotion of cash transfers was therefore both in their self-interest, for political expediency and in the public interest.

6.3 Power, Resources and Legitimacy

The success of efforts of adopters depended on several factors. These included their continued involvement in policy formulation in Kenya, their skilful persuasion and pressuring of the government, and their skilful manipulation and recognition of windows of opportunity. To pursue these factors effectively, resource bases composed of knowledge and financial resources and how actors manipulated them within the policy network enhanced the adoption of the cash transfer programmes.
International actors as dictators of policy were aware of their shortcomings as non-veto players within the policy network. To overcome these shortcomings, members of international organisations identified domestic actors to build alliances within the policy network. These alliances were built based on the resource base they possessed – financial and knowledge resources. To begin with, contrary to the assertion that international organisations find domestic allies to work with (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Béland and Orenstein, 2013), where such allies did not exist, international organisations undertook to create them. A case in point is the creation of the Africa Platform for Social Protection (APSP) supported by international organisations to drive continental advocacy efforts for social protection, and charged in turn with creating national coalitions of social protection. International organisations provided funding to domestic civil society organisations and opened up avenues for training and cooperation at national, regional and global level. Such organisations were supplied with resources – ideas, technical expertise, international recognition, and financial and material support – to promote the adoption of cash transfer policies.

On the other hand, domestic civil society organisations who act as “mediators”, mostly between the political class and international organisations, brought with them their mandate to speak on behalf of the public. Funded civil society organisations had a dual role: first was to advocate with the political class and second, they were expected to drum up support at the grassroots level. The second role aimed to build the demand side of social protection. Civil society’s role was to make the claims that the reform agenda corresponds to the will of the citizens and the elites (Delpeuch and Vassileva, 2017).

The knowledge provided by international organisations included the basics of social protection and cash transfers. For this reason, actors, including government agents and civil society organisations, depended on international organisations for capacity building and knowledge transfer upon which to frame their advocacy. For example, they depended on reports and information produced by the international bodies which corresponded with that of think tanks and epistemic communities. However, despite their national presence and being “representatives” of the people, their ideas and positions had no weight and did not bear significantly on the policy reform process within the policy network. Even within their advocacy to government and MPs, it was imperative to demonstrate alignment with international organisations to make inroads. Policy advice from local producers of knowledge is rarely taken seriously and to get their policy proposals and preferences considered, domestic
civil society organisations needed to align with international organisations to make their views become international recommendations. In addition to funding and knowledge, international organisations created ties for the domestic civil society organisations with the international global coalition and networks of social protection.

Bureaucrats, on the other hand, formed a point of centrality within the policy network. Based on their legal power as implementers of policy decisions and conveners of the Social Protection Committee, they brought together all the relations within the network. Their strong relations with international organisations was based on knowledge and material support in the form of equipment and financial support needed in running the programmes. As conveners and the central point for the promotion of the policies, they formed the core team determining inclusion and invitation into the policy network. Through an exercise of power, they decided on who could enter the policy network and at what time. For this reason, they were able to exclude other actors, particularly those they considered not to be bringing in significant resources, like civil society organisations or those whose participation would derail the policy adoption process like politicians.

The significant power of politicians as legally mandated policymakers and their participation in the policy process meant they could only be excluded for a short term. In recognition of their power as lawmakers and to allocate resources for the programmes, through a number of meetings with civil society groups and government bureaucrats, MPs were influenced towards support for the programmes.
Table 6.1 Types of actors and power base in social protection policymaking in Kenya

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<th>POWER BASE</th>
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In the next section I analyse the dynamics of power from three perspectives: first, through the shaping of agenda; second, by constraining the agency of others and lastly by influencing the preferences of other social agents.
Figure 6.2 Actors’ relation in social protection in Kenya
6.4 Power in defining the problem and its solution

This section presents how various actors exercised power in shaping the agenda for social protection policymaking in the uptake of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. Contrary to assertions that transnational organisations are “proposal actors” in the policy arena (Béland and Orenstein, 2013; Foli, 2015), findings from this research indicate their role was not only limited to prescribing the policy solution but, through an exercise of power ensured that their prescribed solution was adopted with as few deviations as possible. An analysis of how transnational actors shaped the agenda draws from Lukes’ three dimensions of power (Lukes, 2005) fitting into three categories: in shaping the agenda, through exclusion of other actors and in shaping the preferences of others.

6.4.1 Power to Shape the Agenda: Agenda Setting

Problem definition is key in policy change. Rational actor models conceive of policy change as a logical process whereby problems are assessed, solutions proposed and choices made followed by implementation of the solution (John, 2012). UNICEF presented the reality of child vulnerability and poverty arising out of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. “Adjustment with a Human Face”, a report by UNICEF, suggested that SAPs had negatively affected children. Another study by UNAIDS indicated the number of orphans in Kenya were approaching 1.6 million with about 892,000 resulting from HIV and AIDS (Bosworth et al., 2016). Both reports were important in framing the problem and solution. To address the problem of homelessness among orphaned children, non-governmental organisations and individuals had set up orphanages. The idea of cash transfers offered an alternative response to institutionalisation of children. In an internal meeting of UNICEF country advisers held in 2002, the idea of providing cash to orphaned children was suggested among other solutions. As explained in the interview,

The idea of cash provision was settled upon as it was an innovation that had not been tried as a response to the epidemic anywhere in Africa (IOS-03, 13/3/2016).

Government officials did not resist the idea. First, the reality of suffering children and households was visible. UNAIDS and UNICEF as global authorities presented credible assessments of the situation with figures to support their argument for the need of a cash transfer programme. Second, UNICEF through funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) committed to financing the pre-pilot phase (2004-
UNICEF thus defined the problem – orphanhood, vulnerability, and child poverty – backed by credible data and presented the solution to the problem as cash transfers. To make this conceptual leap effectively, promoters of cash transfers discredited orphanages as solutions to the problem and instead advocated the retention of orphans within their households and communities.

To keep the idea on government agenda and to avoid failure of the pre-pilot programme, UNICEF seconded three personnel as technical advisers to government. First was a communication specialist seconded to the Social Protection Secretariat with the role of packaging information on social protection in general. The second officer was attached to the Department of Children’s Services with the responsibilities of day-to-day administration of the programme. A participant in the study considered the officer’s tasks mundane and remarked,

> The duties of the officer sent to the Department of Children included taking care of all details related to the programme as required – whether programmatic or administrative, ranging from taking down minutes to document filing and data entry (IOS-06, 28/9/2016).

The role of the third officer, a public finance expert attached to the Ministry of Finance, was “keeping CT-OVC on the ministry’s agenda through advocacy for increased funding to the programme” (IOS-05, 20/7/2016). As a previous Ministry employee, he/she was familiar with budgeting processes and were therefore able to bring an added advantage to the transfer process by debunking notions of unaffordability. The secondment of staff to run day-to-day duties resonates with the idea of power, not necessarily as force, but as working through practice in everyday mundane and routine tasks (Foucault, 1980a). UNICEF justified the secondment of technical assistance as a response to capacity gaps within government. Yet, in reality, the secondment was less about absent expertise but more about insertion of agents of advocacy within daily interactions and policy discussions. The duties of these technical assistance advisers often conflicted with, and at times subsumed, those of government officers, leading to disagreements (TT/C_04, 13/4/2016). Through their power, international elite groups reify their decisions over time through their exercise of such power (Lukes, 2005). Insertion of technical advisers can undermine the capacity of government bureaucrats to deliver programmes as it curtails the development of accountable structures within government (Adésínà, 2011; Mkandawire, 2015).
Similar control over the “solution” was replicated in HSNP. Previous DFID support to Northern Kenya, based on provision for food relief in response to the cyclical famine and drought in the region provided a foundation for implementation of HSNP. With the realisation of the failure of previous attempts at ensuring food security, coupled with the global food crisis, DFID shifted its strategy from the provision of food aid to direct cash transfers. The HSNP neither began with a systematic scoping of a possible solution nor with the testing of effective solutions; rather transnational actors prescribed a predetermined policy solution, as described by other critiques (see Peck, 2011). In confirmation, a government official stated as follows:

DFID woke up and decided they want a cash transfer programme, they had the money for the programme for five years. The government was not consulted but since DFID had the money and were not asking government to fund the programme, the government agreed (MGSCD-02, 25/04/2016).

From the statement, two observations can be inferred. First, we should note the abruptness with which the decision was made and the lack of consultation with domestic actors by transnational actors in “providing new solutions to old problems”. Second, contrary to assertions that transnational actors are “proposal actors” (Foli, 2015), the statement suggests that transnational actors can be “policy enforcers” as they imposed the idea of cash transfers. Taking advantage of these asymmetrical relations, agents from the international organisations not only prescribed the policy solution but encompassed a more direct exercise of power through which they ensured their recommended solution was adopted. Whereas some scholars have argued that transnational actors are flexible and adaptable in their promotion of policy solutions (Béland and Orenstein, 2013), findings from our study indicate that international organisations remained rigid both in their policy solutions and paradigms and also in how they wanted the programmes implemented. Only in light of opposition from powerful veto actors like members of parliament did they become flexible and adaptable to alternative views.

To further ensure the programme was implemented as prescribed, decision-making and the day-to-day running of the programme remained the prerogative of DFID, leading to the description of the HSNP as “donor-initiated, donor-driven, donor-implemented, but government-branded” (TTC-04, 13/4/2016, CSO-05, 28/09/2016). DFID recruited and managed the programme through the Programme Implementation and Learning Unit (PILU), comprising a team of consultants. Though PILU was situated within the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), a government agency, the team reported directly to DFID.
In describing the decision-making process, a respondent involved in Phase 1 of the programme stated:

Decisions were [made] by DFID and in situations where the government is not putting in any money, government cannot be in control. The government was there to append its signature and was required to create a conducive environment for the programme to run (TTC-04, 13/04/2016).

In addition to revealing the control that DFID had over the decision-making process, this quote points to the diminution of the state’s role in the policy process from that of policy leader to that of an enabler and facilitator (Peck, 2011).

6.4.2. Competition among Ministries

As mentioned earlier, contestations over control of the social protection agenda manifested among domestic actors through bureaucratic infighting. The Ministry of Labour opposed the leadership of the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development (MoGCSD), arguing that the ministry lacked the legitimacy to lead the process of policymaking. The MoGCSD had led the process since 2006, and the decision to set up a national secretariat with the role of co-ordination of social protection policies and programmes was heavily contested by officials from the labour movement. In the ensuing contestation, Labour officials cited lack of “co-ordination power” and lack of legitimacy to coordinate the social health insurance and social security components of social protection. As each of the pillars is governed by different Acts of Parliament, there was conflict over the powers conferred on the MoGCSD. A participant in the study attributed the delay in the finalisation of the national policy on social protection to the tension and power struggles between staff of the two ministries that stalled the process at one point (MoL-01, 04/05/2017).

Contestation of the leadership of national social protection process emanated from the conceptualisation of social protection. Since the Constitution uses the words “right to social security” in Article 43 of the Constitution, the Ministry of Labour argued that social security was within their purview. To stake their claim further, the Ministry on behalf had ratified the Social Protection Floor and therefore by virtue of this, the responsibility of ensuring its implementation lay with the Ministry of Labour. On probing the matter further, our findings indicate that with the backing of international organisations, in particular, the World Bank and DFID, the National Social Protection Secretariat was set up at MoGCSD and to end the
contestation, a Social Protection Co-ordination Bill is under development to address issues of co-ordination.

6.4.3. Naming as a form of power

The ideological contest playing out at the supranational level cascaded to the national level. A perusal of documents revealed that following an agreement between the World Bank and the government for financing the social protection sector, the World Bank changed the name of the programme to National Safety Net Programme (World Bank, 2009). Resistance was notable within UNICEF in particular, who argued that the change of name indicated a return to the minimalist poverty-targeted programming. As is argued, safety nets are temporary preventative measures (Stiglitz, 2017). By being the most significant funder of the programme, the World Bank in effect was furthering its ideological interests. One of the respondents stated,

This is internal World Bank politics, they like to use the word safety nets. It shows a weakness among Kenyan senior policymakers. Why should they let internal World Bank terminology take over the programme? The World Bank was absolutely insistent that word safety nets be used. It is not just a word, it has connotations (IOS-03, 13/3/2016).

The statement reflects the weakness within the government of Kenya to control and shape the social protection agenda. It is also an indication of the locus of power in the social protection arena in relation to manipulation of power by the World Bank deriving from financial resources. Despite the rhetoric of change since the Washington Consensus, the World Bank seems stuck in this model both philosophically and ideologically. In the next sub-section, I discuss how power was exercised in constraining the actions and agency of other actors in the furthering of interests.

6.5 Power in Constraining Options, Actions, and Agency

As discussed in the previous sub-section, actors within the social protection policy arena acted in their own interest by seeking to shape the agenda. In the next section, I discuss mechanisms that were exercised in constraining the agency of other social agents within the policy space to achieve uptake by excluding other actors and setting up structures of implementation outside government.
One interviewee described the policymaking process as “a very closed system, an elitist sector”, thereby capturing the exclusivity of social protection policymaking (CSO-01, 6/04/2016). For instance, the Social Protection Committee, a network tasked with design and development of policies and programmes at national level comprised largely of government and international organisations with occasional participation of domestic civil society organisations. As noted by Shearer et al., (2016) networks can influence the balance of power by choosing to include or exclude participants. Fearing political capture, transnational actors and government bureaucrats deliberately excluded politicians from the policy process to minimise “political interference and to depoliticise the policy space” (IOS-03, 13/03/2016). As Weyland (2007) observes, domestic and external actors can share interests which they use to control the policy agenda, and for this reason international actors and domestic experts in this process excluded politicians. According to a representative from the international organisations, the move to exclude politicians ensured little interference from politicians with interests to gain mileage and expediency out of the programmes. By defining the process as technical, donors further aimed to exclude the political class. Such an observation follows on from other studies where the depoliticisation process entails advocates framing poverty reduction as a technical problem to be tackled by experts and professions even when the problem has emerged out of political circumstances (Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2007; Sanyal, 2013).

In reality, the policy problem necessitated political action as it had been brought about by political marginalisation of Northern Kenya. By suppressing the participation and agency of politicians, their input remained reactive, as confirmed by a participant:

Politicians were not involved and were just reacting to what we were doing. If any of them came, it was to complain mainly on how we had conducted targeting in their constituency (TTC-04, 13/04/2016).

By excluding politicians and depoliticising poverty and vulnerability, international actors and government bureaucrats exhibited acts of power. The action of depoliticisation of the policy space and exclusion of political elites from the policy space while giving way to technocratic governance is at the heart of neo-liberal thinking in the development discourse in Africa, which Gumede observes as “an uncritical acceptance of this definition of development has resulted in the subservience of the political elites in Africa to subordination of politics to economics” (Gumede, 2017, p. 10).
Ironically the same actors who promoted the exclusion regularly decried the lack of political will as the main hindrance to adoption of the programmes. With the shift of power in the budget-making process from Treasury to parliament as spelled out in the Constitution, expansion of the cash transfers rested on MPs. Their inclusion in the closed policy space was therefore imperative if more funding was to be allocated to the programmes. In what a participant described as a “reclamation of their policy space”, MPs in the HSNP counties rejected the targeting model proposed by donors (TT/C-01, 1/04/2016). The rejection of the targeting model by MPs had been emboldened by government allocation of funding towards HSNP Phase 2. Such resistance was inconceivable in HSNP Phase 1 as the government of Kenya was not funding the programme at all. In adopting a poverty-targeted model, in one of the counties, Turkana, 70% of all households would benefit while the other three counties would each have 10% of the beneficiaries. While the role of members of Parliament is required in the initiation of crucial bills and programmes, bureaucrats and international organisations and the epistemic community within the social protection sector carried on most of the activities with the role, so MPs remained reactive. The role of MPs in the policy process remained modest as policy formulation was largely undertaken outside the political policy space.

In reaction to this model, research findings revealed that MPs threatened to withdraw funding for the programme through the budgetary process unless an agreeable targeting model was adopted. Resistance and threats from MPs forced a revision of the targeting model to ensure equity in numbers. Members of Parliament were only able to exercise this kind of resistance as the Constitution (2010) gave them the prerogative of resource allocation without which MPs would be impotent in their participation in the policy space. Even though resistance and defiance by MPs shows that even in situations of coercion by transnational agencies, domestic actors have room to exercise their agency and national level politics prevails in policymaking processes (Béland, 2009; McCann and Ward, 2012), it needs to be noted that decisions on the adoption of cash transfer policies had already been made and the policies adopted. Members of Parliament were therefore reacting to an already defined and confined territory within the boundaries of cash transfers already determined by international organisations. Moreover, their focus was not on fundamental and important issues like how social protection and cash transfers are situated within the national social policy but on technical issues of whether or not to target beneficiaries into the programmes.
Exclusion of others within policymaking and policy implementation is not new in Kenya. The colonial administration at district level, fearing a loss of power, objected to newcomers entering what they considered their domain (Lewis, 2001). Equally, domestic Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) like the APSP and SPAF were occasionally excluded from the policy process. Paradoxically, the same CSOs were established with funding from international organisations like DFID, with the specific task of generating grassroots demand for social protection instruments, specifically cash transfers. Domestic civil society members considered international organisations and staff from the Ministry of Social Development dominant members of the Social Protection Committee with influence to decide who participates in the policy process. According to participants from domestic civil society, international agencies used highly technical terms and esoteric language in committees and networks of policymaking. Civil society members perceived the esoteric language as exclusionary strategies that constrained their meaningful participation. This is also a question of how people and organisations come into the policy terrain where they have neither the expertise nor the knowledge to participate. In addition, it reflects how international organisations constructed and invented CSOs to participate in advocacy of social protection policies – hurriedly and without consideration on whether they had knowledge or prior experience on the matter. As highlighted during an interview with a member of civil society concerning their participation within the policymaking process:

But when the policy and the Bill were being developed, we got incorporated as they know that their legitimacy and capacity to lobby on some issues is limited. It can only reach a certain point. When ultimately the policies were adopted we got out of the loop and started watching things happen at the periphery. CSOs are invited when it is convenient. CSO participation and that of NGOs in the programmes is very limited (CSO-01, 06/04/2016).

The exclusion of domestic CSOs undermined public participation, resulting in an erosion of a citizen-state contract based on social provisioning. Civil society actors viewed their occasional inclusion in the Social Protection Committee as a move by international actors to legitimise the policy process. Even when included, domestic CSOs were assigned peripheral roles like advocacy and implementation in hard-to-reach areas. Donor agencies instead contracted international NGOs more closely linked to them like Oxfam and HelpAge International as key partners in implementation. The inclusion of domestic actors in the Social Protection
Committee, especially in the policy development process, aimed at providing legitimacy to a process dominated by non-veto actors. NGOs involved in the process were largely international ones like HelpAge International and Oxfam who implemented different aspects the HSNP. The participation of national CSOs was brief and peripheral.

As members of Parliament gained more leverage, they demonstrated their power in several ways. In exercising their agency in the policy space, Kenya Women Parliamentarians (KEWOPA) developed the Social Assistance Bill. Presented as a Private Members Bill, the Bill was passed as the Social Assistance Act No. 24 of 2013, on the last day of the eighth parliament, posing a dilemma to the ongoing social protection policy process by the Social Protection Committee. The Bill, though credited to KEWOPA, was driven by CSOs. In what was termed “a process to break the deadlock between the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry of Labour”, CSOs aligned to social assistance sector and cash transfers crafted and developed the Bill which they rallied a member of KEWOPA to table in parliament. Civil society did not act alone; international organisations and the Department of Social Development, acting in the background supported the process – both technically and financially.

Some participants in the study intimated that they were ignorant of the passage of the Bill at the time. Some bureaucrats who participated in the study suggested that they only became aware of the passage of the Bill later as they had not been consulted on the matter. It is therefore unclear and could not be ascertained from the study what the process of passing the Bill was. Bureaucrats within government at the Ministry of Social Development reported that they had not been consulted in the process to provide due diligence to the Act before it became law. With the passing of the Bill, social transfer programmes, including the cash transfers schemes, came under Acts of Parliament similar to the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) and the National Hospital Fund (NHIF) with Social Protection Policy becoming the umbrella policy for the three.

The contents of the Bill conflicted with aspects of the Social Protection Policy and according to a government official in the study, the Social Assistance Bill is “unimplementable” due to structural and governance conflict with some aspects of the Social Protection Policy (ML-01, 23/08/2016). It is misleading for the Ministry to claim that the Bill is unimplementable as they covertly supported civil society lobbying of MPs for introduction of the Bill. The nature of the
Social Assistance Bill – its contents, its development and the rushed manner in which it passed through Parliament without consultation is proof of the muddied and competitive policy terrain that persists within the social protection sector. For a Bill to be passed in Parliament it has to go through three readings (Government of Kenya, 2015a) but during consultations in the stakeholders’ forum I participated in during the fieldwork period, participants indicated that they were not involved in the discussions and processes leading to the passage of the Bill. The passage of the Social Assistance Bill was therefore a rushed process. In addition, it points to the disjointed policy terrain and minimal government ownership and leadership in the policymaking process.

6.4.5. Working parallel to the grain

Findings from the study indicated that there were two significant ways in which international organisations worked outside of government structures, thereby constraining the agency of others. First, DFID chose to work with British organisations during the first phase of the programme, and second, they set up an implementation unit for outside government to manage the HSNP.

**Working through British organisations:** Contrary to normative expectations, international organisations took on the role of implementers. DFID for example subcontracted the different components of the implementation of the HSNP to British-affiliated organisations. International actors thereby became delivery service providers (Adésinà, 2011). By doing so, DFID constrained national capacity by choosing to contract implementation of the HSNP to international organisations. A review of programme documents indicate that the first line of contracts was awarded as follows: payments were awarded to the Financial Sector Deepening (FSD), Administration to Oxfam GB, Rights to HelpAge International, Evaluation to Oxford Policy Management and targeting to Save the Children (HSNP Secretariat, 2010). Though based in Kenya, the INGOs were national branches of international organisations. National organisations were subcontracted in the second tier by the contract holders to implement the programmes at the “hard-to-reach” North Eastern Province. In a further constraint of national capacity, staff members of the components were seconded from international hubs to manage the programmes. As one respondent noted:
It was also implemented by Europeans and you wonder how it is a government programme. Just two of us could be said to be nationals… The others had been recruited and came from abroad just for the purpose of the programme (TT/C-04, 13/4/2016).

The above sentiments illustrate how international organisations may infringe on policy implementation processes, creating a situation where state functions are outsourced (Peck, 2011). National staff were constrained by the international organisations who not only dominated the agenda but the implementation too. In echoing this view, a participant in the study suggested that their presence in meetings regarding the programme served diplomatic purposes, reiterating the argument that government’s role was that of an enabler for the implementation of a donor programme.

Working through PILU: The creation of a parallel management unit, PILU, further crowded out government capacity. The creation of parallel units by policy promoters is not new as during the new public management reforms in the 1980s “incentive-driven delivery agencies and autonomous offices” were set up (Mkandawire, 2015, p. 589). Apart from contracting British NGOs and firms as programme implementers, DFID created PILU as a parallel structure within the NDMA as a technical assistance team. Staff at PILU were recruited as consultants with contracts from a consulting firm contracted by DFID. The parallel structures within the programme compromised reporting lines and the decision-making process. Staff within PILU were not government employees but employed as consultants outside government structures, yet situated within a government department. Commenting on the structure of PILU in relation to staffing, a civil society member who participated in the study explained as follows:

But it was a UK-based firm [that was] given the contract to roll out the programme, staffed by British nationals and a sprinkling of [other]nationals… They did not only peddle the idea, brought in the human resources but they also appointed a monitor from their country to come and ensure that their interests are protected, and their ideas are properly propagated and that their ideas are used as per their requirement. HSNP is classic, a perfect example (CSO-05, 28/9/2016).

This statement corroborates Peck’s argument that the problematic promotion of cash transfers has involved the “privatisation of policy expertise and delivery systems” (Peck, 2011, p. 177). However, unlike the HSNP, the CT-OVC implementation began within government of Kenya
structures at the Department of Children’s Services with civil servants as implementers. A
perusal of records and information from key informants reveal that PILU manages all aspects
of HSNP implementation and the daily running of HSNP (DFID, 2013, 2014). This in effect
diminishes state capacity and erodes the state’s role as implementers of programmes and a
sovereign authority within its territory.

Government capacity is often cited as the reason international organisations chose to work
outside state structures, but on further probing, it became clear that DFID lacked trust in
government. The issue about lack of capacity within government was contested by a senior
government official who during the interviews stated the unwillingness of DFID to work within
the existing structure (MGCSD-01, 23/03/2016). The explanation was that DFID needed to
ensure the success of the pilot and therefore it was imperative for them to control every aspect
of the programme. By claiming a lack of capacity within government, participants commented
that the view contradicted DFID’s own “capacity building efforts” over the last 15 years through
the training and resources invested for learning, viewing it as a scapegoat by which
transnational actors legitimise and perpetuate their continued engagement, domination, and
control of the policy process (TT/C-04, 13/04/2016). The general view among government
participants in the study was that UNICEF was flexible while DFID remained rigid, especially
in financing procedures due to lack of trust in the government system through their constant
desire to curb fiduciary risks. UNICEF’s flexibility has to do with the fact that as a UN agency,
it is required by UN norms and standards to work with member states on the programmes they
have without circumventing the authority and leadership of the country in policy
implementation. To curb against the perceived risk, DFID ensured day-to-day activities at PILU
were under its supervision.

6.6 Ability to Influence Preference and Desires

Apart from structural mechanisms including financing, ideational approaches constituted one
of the core mechanisms through which transnational actors promoted the uptake of cash
transfer policies in Kenya. Mechanisms employed in the learning process included spreading
of norms, persuasions, socialisation and demonstrations (Peck, 2011; Foli, 2015). Mechanisms
of learning in policy transfer are deemed more acceptable than those from coercive
mechanisms (Flyvbjerg, 1998). The origins of different ideas and learning matter for policy
uptake as they can indicate different power structures and asymmetry between the learner and
the idea promoter. In addition to their financial resources, transnational actors possessed a
hegemonic position on the ideas promoted within the Kenyan learning process. Learning and influencing processes involved diverse approaches to ensure policy adoption.

Participants identified DFID as the lead organisation in the learning process, sponsoring various courses, study tours, and South-to-South partnerships. While ideational mechanisms of social protection are often presented as benign processes of knowledge transfer from one actor to another, policy learning in Kenya involved the expenditure of financial resources and persuasive power. A report on DFID’s role in influencing the adoption of the programmes for example indicates that in Zambia and Uganda the organisation set aside between GBP 10m to up to GBP 150,000 in each country for two to three years for policy influencing purposes primarily for commissioning of studies and to facilitate study tours (Hickey et al., 2009). Though it is difficult to quantify the amount of funding spent on learning purposes, the report highlights that in Ethiopia, 90% of an adviser’s working time was spent influencing the adoption of the policies in the first years of the programmes (Hickey et al., 2009). In Kenya, DFID proposed to spend 12 percent of the total budget of HSNP Phase 2 GBP 10.270 million on PILU for “(i) Management, monitoring; (ii) Long- and short-term technical assistance for capacity building and delivery; and (iii) The international procurement of independent evaluation service” (DFID, 2013). It was however difficult to quantify how much had been spent on direct influencing for policy uptake.

A large part of the learning process involved multiple training courses from early adopters, notably South Africa and Brazil, where empirical evidence demonstrated the impact of cash transfer programmes. Other learning avenues included conferences, seminars and study tours mostly targeted at mid-level civil servants comprising directors and their deputies. Participants mentioned that promoters of cash transfers organised study tours to countries that were considered to be successful in adoption and implementation, including Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa. High and medium-level government officials’ participation was desirable as transnational actors considered their ability, power, and proximity to influence others essential for policy uptake. The most influential training course according to participants was the Designing and Implementing Social Transfer Programmes course organised by the Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI) with funding from UNICEF, DFID and other organisations like HelpAge. The conversion of hard-line ministries of finance from sceptics to champions of cash transfer programmes occurred in these training sessions. A government official at Treasury who attended the training confessed:
I went to the training sceptical about the idea of giving cash to the poor but left converted. I came back and, in my briefing, asked my seniors to consider increasing the budgetary allocation we were making towards cash transfers (MFP-03, 29/07/2016).

Specific emphasis on participation in the training sessions focussed on staff at ministries of finance and planning who promoters considered hurdles to the adoption and expansion of the cash transfer programmes. Regional meetings and conferences set up as learning and sharing platforms provided avenues for exerting soft pressure and advocacy for the uptake of cash transfer schemes with the aim to inspire governments to emulate what others had achieved. The normative or symbolic appeal (Weyland, 2007) provided inspiration for the development of the Kenya National Social Protection Policy after a regional meeting organised by the African Union (AU) in 2006 under the banner “Livingstone Call for Action”.

Regional meetings and conferences are spaces in which regimes find themselves “assessed and respected” thereby adopting certain prescriptions from the promoter (Rodgers, 2014; Lavers and Hickey, 2016). As one participant mentioned, the choice of Zambia to host the conference was deliberate. The Government of Zambia had been reluctant in adopting the pilots started by various international organisations. Hosting the regional conference in the country therefore aimed at “embarrassing the government into adopting the four cash pilot programmes which were under implementation” (CSO-05, 28/9/2016). Shaming tactics are sometimes used to get “others to comply with values and norms they advance” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p. 15).

With global and regional pressure, countries seek to emulate others especially what is considered innovations like cash transfer policy to demonstrate their modernity. At times, the adoption of policies is led by the drive to look good before global public opinion, termed normative or symbolic appeal (Weyland, 2007) even though they may not be appropriated for national context. Kenya too as a member of the regional and international community felt constrained to adopt cash transfers. To influence the uptake of social protection policies, international organisations couched social protection policies as the new standard in modern development, hence making countries including Kenya willing to adopt the programme through peer pressure, similar to what Lukes refers to as persuading them what they want for themselves (Lukes, 2005; Weyland, 2007).

Furthermore, the South-to-South cooperation mediated by DFID and the International Policy Centre (IPC), was an avenue through which international organisations created learning
relations between Global South countries. South-to-South cooperation involved the sharing of knowledge and ideas through the provision of technical assistance, publications, video conferencing and study tours between Latin American and African countries. Creating a wealth of information through these avenues aimed to sell the idea of cash transfers and to showcase best practices, with the efforts aimed at creating normative appeal. Different countries adopted different learnings from Latin American countries. For example, in Kenya, officials indicated the development of the single registry as emanating from the South-to-South cooperation, with the programmers from Bolsa Família providing technical support. Though acknowledging the role of learning from the process, a participant from civil society criticised the exclusion of domestic CSOs.

Whereas one of the key aspects of the social protection experience in Brazil, South Africa and India has been the inclusive participation of CSOs, sometimes redistributive policies have been promoted as part of democratisation by wider groups of CSOs beyond the narrow definition of NGOs (Huber and Stephens, 2012; Tillin and Pereira, 2017). The South-to-South cooperation failed to create avenues for participation of domestic CSOs within African countries. Domestic critics point to the South-to-South process as exclusionary with the involvement of only government officials and international organisations. Elsewhere, others have argued that among the reasons the South-to-South cooperation has grown is because of “efforts by traditional donors to reconstruct their legitimacy in international development and the realisations and the agreement that the transfer of knowledge and practice among southern countries is more effective in promotion of international development” (Costa Leite et al., 2013; 1).

Learning and influencing therefore involved a process of intense contact with national actors. While ideational mechanisms of social protection are often presented as a benign exercise, with knowledge transfer from one actor to another, our research findings indicate the process involved great amounts of financial resources and persuasive power. Apart from knowledge and learning as mechanisms for policy transfer, structural mechanisms in the form of financial resources emerged as a key tool for persuasion for the Government of Kenya to adopt the CT-OVC and the HSNP. Financing is discussed more broadly in Chapter 7 of the thesis.
6.7 Conclusion

An examination of policy transfer in Kenya shows how power was exercised by different actors within the social protection arena. As noted in the previous chapters, international organisations, mainly the World Bank, DFID and UNICEF, were the significant international actors promoting the CT-OVC and the HSNP. To achieve their interests, they formed issue-based coalitions with members of epistemic communities and other organisations to advocate the uptake of particular forms of social protection policies in Kenya. Domestic actors comprised civil servants within specific ministries, Members of Parliament and domestic CSOs. The exercise of power at national level reflected contestation and competition at international level centring around ideological persuasions of the various supranational organisations. At national level, the exercise of power played out in subtle ways through the day-to-day interactions, communications, and relations between actors. International actors’ financial and knowledge resources and transfer prestige base made them powerful and they became producers of power (Rodgers, 2014), enabling them to shape the social protection agenda, constrain the action of other actors and to influence the preference of domestic actors in the policy transfer process. By crowding out civil servants through denial of state capacity, the DFID-driven HSNP further undermined governments leadership in the policy process.

A couple of fundamental scenarios emerge as a result of the asymmetrical relations in the policymaking process. First is the element of policy capture in the interest of international organisations. Due to resources globalised actors bring to the policymaking space, state interests through incentives and pressure became subservient to interests of international organisations. Their dominance in setting the policy agenda left little room for the state to assert its sovereignty in finding solutions to address poverty and vulnerability. Second is a façade of ownership of the programmes as national programmes. The phrase “donor programme, government-branded” aptly captures the ownership hype. While it is often argued that ownership of programmes can be measured by how much budgetary allocation governments put into programmes and whether a country has a social protection policy in place, these yardsticks may be flawed and need deeper examination. Processes of policy development are often controlled by international organisations. Budgetary allocations, on the other hand, can be influenced by incentives and pressures as I will show in the next chapter of the thesis. As observed by Shearer et al. (2016) in their study, among the international organisations within the contestations, it is the most powerful that “wins”, it is the most powerful whose interests
prevails. Chapter 7 offers an extensive analysis of the funding for the cash transfer programmes as a mechanism for transfer.
CHAPTER SEVEN: SOCIAL LEARNING, DISCOURSE AND POLICY NARRATIVES IN POLICY TRANSFER

7.1 Introduction

Policy transfer theories posit various mechanisms that facilitate the adoption of policies. According to Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), mechanisms for policy promotion are best viewed as a continuum ranging from coercive to learning, often with a combination of mechanisms employed to bring about policy adoption. In this regard, various scholars in explaining the adoption of social protection programmes across Africa demonstrate the different mechanisms employed by transnational actors in the policy process (Adésínà, 2010; Foli, 2015; Wanyama and McCord, 2017). While coercive and semi-coercive mechanisms centre on the use of resources, particularly financial resources, discussions on learning take an ideational approach in explaining the adoption of cash transfers. In studies of ideational mechanisms, social learning is often portrayed as benign. In acknowledging the role of ideational approaches in the uptake of the CT-OVC and the HSNP in Kenya, this chapter however demonstrates that the learning process, beginning from the generation of ideas and knowledge, involved premeditated strategies as a play and extension of power symmetries among social agents in the policy arena. In this regard, ideational approaches involved the creation of a “structure of knowledge” and a discursive hegemony brought about by a social construction of words and meanings. Construction is a core mechanism in “social learning”, used in framing, selection, valorisation and making assumptions about causality (Engelstad, 2009). Policy promoters further strengthened the discursive hegemony, carrying it through powerful policy narratives that resonated with the political and social context at the time.

Ideational approaches, learning through sharing of ideas, constituted one of the mechanisms of the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP; however, inasmuch as knowledge transfer and social learning were instrumental in the adoption, they still reflected sustained power structures and imbalances between the different social agents. As Foucault suggests: “It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge; it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power” (Foucault, 1980b, p. 52). Research findings suggest that power permeated throughout the ideational process from the generation of knowledge to the adoption of the programmes. The policy site inhered politics, “processes of contest, negotiation, and marginalisation,
knowledge” (Jones, 2009) served to add legitimacy to the political action to an already agreed upon solution.

The process of social protection adoption is often described as social learning where international actors promoted ideas from Latin America. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, an examination of the policymaking process shows that the problem that needed solving, that is, poverty and vulnerability, did not occasion looking around for a solution; transnational actors identified the solution and linked it to a problem. To bring about policy change, policy promoters needed to recast the problem to make it amenable to the idea of cash transfers.

This chapter discusses the power of knowledge in shaping the adoption of the two programmes and how transnational agents generated knowledge and meanings within the social protection arena to promote learning. The structure of the chapter is as follows: the first section is a discussion on social learning and the formation of discourse around the policymaking process. I look beyond a description of learning and show how ideas were made powerful based on who held and passed on the idea, and how they were made powerful in the context of Kenya. I consider how policy agents framed and articulated ideas in relation to poverty and vulnerability in the policymaking process. In the second section I consider how knowledge and ideas were generated and by whom, and how proponents of social protection programmes used the knowledge generated. Then I analyse the framing of ideas and construction of new meanings to old problems where I and consider how the social protection policymaking process gave words new meanings by discursively reconstructing poverty and vulnerability. In the last section of the chapter I consider how three policy narratives, economic, moral and social justice, were crafted in the promotion of the two cash transfer programmes and used to shape policy acceptance.

7.2 Social learning, ideas and discourse in the promotion of cash transfers

Learning is expected to lead to certain outcomes; in this case, the learning related to cash transfers and social protection aimed at the adoption of the two cash transfer programmes. It is more conducive to learn from a place of flat structure with open dynamics rather than a top-down structure with social dynamics characterised by power and superiority. Domestic organisations participating in the study acknowledged that learning emanated from international organisations. There was a convergence of opinion from participants associated
with the CT-OVC that the adoption of the programme relied on learning. One of the participants defined the World Bank as “curators of knowledge” (IOS-01, 13/3/2016). These views reflect the asymmetrical relation that characterised the learning process in the policy process and the top-down manner of the learning process. In addition, it reflects the centre of power in the policymaking process as power is knowledge, and vice versa, and that those who dominate also hold significant ideological/knowledge power (Foucault, 2002).

Whereas learning and passing on of ideas may be perceived as passive and benign, various scholars describe it as one involving a struggle of ideas and meanings among social actors in the policy process. Mkandawire (2014) states that the propagation of ideas involves a battle of minds, citing Adebayo Adedeji who claimed—in relation to the way structural adjustments were promoted in Africa—was akin to the struggle of the “Battles for the African Mind”. Though the use of ideas may seem non-pressurising and benign in influencing policy change, Deacon, McBride and Merolli (2013) describe the process as a battle of “discourse or hegemonic struggle through which different interests and agents jostle to be in the driver’s seat of ideas and world views” (McBride and Merolli, 2013, p. 301). Adésínà (2011) describes learning in policymaking in this way:

Learning is more than a benign exchange among intellectual and policymakers or medium for policy learning. Ideas may serve the function of seizing control of the policy terrain, undermining policy learning; generating policy atrophy in the host local context, distorting local realities, and undermining long-term sustainable development (Adésínà, 2011, p. 456).

According to participants managing the CT-OVC, the process of adoption involved social learning based on bounded rationality where actors went about the implementation of the programmes while learning. Social learning, though publicised as the mechanism through which the adoption of the programmes happened, is inconsistent with the research findings, which suggest that international organisations employed different tactics of power to bring about the adoption of the CT-OVC. Moreover, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, the idea of cash transfers was generated first and only then did learning take place. Two study participants put it as follows:
The start of it goes back to 2002. There was an internal UNICEF and regional directors of UNAIDS meeting and they challenged the UNICEF country manager to do more on the issue of the OVC, and that is how we came up with the idea of cash for orphans (IOS-03, 13/3/2016).

You know DFID just woke up one day and said we are starting a cash transfer in Northern Kenya (MGSCD–03, 25/4/2017).

The two statements from the interviews indicate that ideational approaches, though present, did not influence to a large extent the adoption of the programmes rather international organisations like DFID had themselves been influenced by the circulation of dominant ideas. Moreover, in the case of the HSNP, as stated by the government official, there is an indication of how DFID made the decision to start the programme prior to consultations with others in the sector. It is symptomatic of the continuity of “welfare imperialism”, where decisions concerning development and policies are crafted in the metropole for Africans, with little or no initiative by the recipient citizens (Lewis, 2001).

Where learning and ideas come from matters in policy change. Importation of ideas and learning related to social protection policies happened through international organisations who successfully monopolised the propagation of ideas. Two participants from civil society expressed this view as follows:

UNICEF, DFID and the World Bank are international organisations, and this gives them the power and opportunity to push an agenda or idea to whichever level… they have a lot of influence advocating ideas (CSO-02, 25/01/2016). Donors have strength to push forth policies… Donors determine what to do and run with it… inequalities manifest in relationships between donors and government (CSO-04, 13/05/2016).

These sentiments indicate two views by other actors on the role of international organisations. First, there is the idea that where ideas come from is a reflection of a balance of power (Baumgartner, 2013) but also that the centre of gravity in the generation and transfer of policies is still the North Atlantic (Rodgers, 2014). The North is therefore the centre of knowledge and power.

The second view reflected by the participant is the power of the promoter of the idea, as ideas on their own cannot determine policy change. As noted by other scholars in the literature, ideas
are able to bring about change if they are carried, supported and imposed by powerful agents (Béland, 2009; John, 2012; Baumgartner, 2013; Kangas, Niemelä and Varjonen, 2014). Key informants from government and domestic civil society organisations attributed the power of international organisations as the carriers of ideas to the resources at their disposal. The resources enabled them to set the learning agenda and determine what kind of ideas are discussed. These sentiments resonate with Lukes’ second dimension of power, which views power as the ability to have control of the agenda, and decide what is to be discussed, the power over negotiations and influence over agendas (Lukes, 2005). National organisations therefore considered them an authority whose ideas could not be challenged. A representative from a national organisation elaborated at length as follows:

International players played an important role because they have money and a lot of influence with the government. In my view, donors have a lot of influence at the Secretariat to the extent that government does not dispute their views often – they have influence in terms of finance, in terms of decision-making, even the technical support they want to give to government. They also contract international consultants that are writing policies for Kenya, then they go to Liberia and Zambia, then to another country. If you read the policies of these different countries, they are similar. Where do the international consultants come from? They are linked to the international organisations. So that influence in my view is crowding out the role of the government and the participation of national CSOs in SP. (CSO_02, 25/01/2016)

The statement further indicates that endorsement of an idea by powerful agents is not enough; they often have to be promoted and theorised by epistemic communities – usually those sources with the ability to conduct research, with “critical intellectual mass and connections between the place of transfer and the research node” (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2007, p. 456). International organisations stimulated the idea of cash transfers, which were then transported by think tanks and “travelling” epistemic communities comprising academics and consultants. International organisations relied on the epistemic communities’ ability to transport the ideas across borders and in their expertise and knowledge to present ideas so that they fit into the domestic context. In addition, how international organisations framed the idea of cash transfers made it powerful. Commenting on the framing of the idea of the CT-OVC, a participant from an international organisation explained it as follows:

The idea was conceived by UNICEF and we framed the idea in a good way and that is how it got accepted (IOS-03, 13/3/2017).
This statement not only indicates the power of an idea and who promotes an idea but even more the power in framing an idea.

Ideas have to be carried by agents through discourse. As described by a participant in the study, “the idea of cash transfers was propagated, it became a song; it was either cash transfers or nothing else” (CSO-04, 13/5/2016). This comment reflects the consistency and the vigour with which international organisations promoted cash transfer programmes through discourse. To create a powerful discourse requires that elites consistently and continuously articulate and communicate their ideas through discussions, deliberation, negotiation, and contestation through all available channels (Schmidt, 2011). For this reason, effective communication and argumentative skills were important resources, as these have power and the ability to change perceptions and make the impossible seem possible. A member of civil society intimated that this task therefore could only be entrusted to one of their own. He expressed these sentiments as follows:

They could not trust anyone to come and propagate the idea, it had to be someone from abroad to come and ensure that the message was delivered as required (CSO-05, 28/9/2016).

The policy transfer process required elites with the ability to construct and maintain a discourse that with clarity of the agenda and keep on with the advocacy until government took to the idea. This is in line with Ferguson's (1994, p. xiv) sentiments on how development institutions act to formulate a discourse which in turn “constructs a particular kind of knowledge, thereby creating a structure of knowledge around that object with interventions then organised on the basis of the structure of knowledge.” Discourse is more than language; it is a site of “social relations of power as it situates ordinary practices of life and defines the social action that is possible” (Foucault, 1980a).

Discourse as learning gained efficacy out of the discursive coalition that formed around it. The coalition not only sought to validate the discourse but also imposed it on others. A member of civil society commenting on the promotion by both international actors and the epistemic community explained it as follows:
Donors sold it thoroughly in two ways: One, they promoted it as programmes of choice, and second, countries were essentially told to implement it (CSO-05, 28/9/2016).

The following statement points to two aspects through which adoption took place. First was through the formation of a powerful discourse around cash transfers and second the imposition of the idea by international organisations on the government of Kenya. The collective action and the communicative force of transnational agents – what they said about the problems – was legitimate within the Kenyan context of past failed solutions in addressing high levels of poverty and vulnerability. The legitimacy of the statements by the discursive coalition, following on Foucault, “acquire their legitimacy from the institutional sites from which they are uttered and also from the status of the speaker” (Sanyal, 2013, p. 79).

While ideational mechanisms remained key in the transfer of social protection policies, it is imperative that in explaining their role we go beyond a description of the mechanism to understand how they became powerful enough to bring about policy change. An analysis of the hegemony of discourse that brought this about is therefore key to understanding the policy transfer process. Hegemony is a process through which a dominant group applies educative pressure to gain the consent and collaboration of individuals or other groups (Gramsci, 1971). Hegemony, drawing from Gramscian perspective, is described and conceived variously as a “consensus protection by an armour of coercion, a form of politics where organic intellections aim to create broad consensus while success in eliminating oppositional forces and moral intellectual leadership that aims to create a collective will” (Torfing, 2009, p. 117). Ideas and the discourse around them on their own are not powerful enough to bring about change; they only become powerful based on human agency that advocates and invests time and energy to push them forth. As demonstrated in the chapter, ideational approaches around social protection in Kenya involved the use of reason, invoking of reconstructed concepts, applying values to categories of people and the weight of evidence to support the solution (Schmidt, 2011).

By creating a “structure of knowledge” on the efficacy and effectiveness of cash transfer policies, transnational actors, drawing from their resources, participants in the process sought to attach meaning to their actions by forming them so that they formed part of a discourse. “Structures of knowledge is about how certain problems come to be constructed in the way they do, the knowledge that is authorised or legitimated in the construction of those problems
and how that knowledge can be productive and powerful” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p. 22). International organisations expressed power through the hegemony of, first, who generated the knowledge around which ideas were derived, and second, how the ideas were advanced. Ideas were easily passed through a marshalling of evidence which transnational actors used to frame issues, knowledge, and information for manipulation and persuasion. Transnational actors through their expertise presented social learning to fit with the social and political context through construction of meanings, framing and through policy narratives. Policy narratives were employed by proponents to persuade and manipulate other policy actors.

In the next section, I present findings from the study in regard to how transnational actors generated knowledge and the purpose the knowledge served in policymaking to ensure policy adoption.

7.3 Knowledge generation for ideas

In seeking to promote the CT-OVC and the HSNP, transnational actors generated and produced knowledge to bolster the agenda. The generation of knowledge derived from evaluations, piloting of programmes and from research conducted by transnational agents and from expert knowledge. Through the generation of and dissemination of ideas, transnational agents set up what Ferguson (1994) refers to as a “structure of knowledge.” Participants in the study were of the view that, knowledge emanating from research on social protection burgeoned with huge quantities of studies on various aspects of cash transfers ranging from impact to effectiveness, targeting of the fiscal space and many others. Knowledge is central in policy processes and that which is considered to be coming from experts plays “an important role in the construction and reproduction of policy narratives” (Boswell, Geddes and Scholten, 2011, p. 7). The generation of knowledge and ideas represented perpetuation of power in the policy adoption process, as those who conducted the studies were epistemic community members linked to and contracted by international organisations. Further, research findings indicate that the generation of knowledge for the construction of discourse relevant for the promotion of social protection policies can be examined from two aspects; how knowledge related to the ideas was generated and for what purpose.

Apart from knowledge generated from lead adopters of social protection programmes like Latin America and South Africa, transnational actors generated knowledge from within the two
programmes during the pilot phases. Transnational agents derived knowledge from the various evaluations on ongoing pilot programmes. While impact evaluations are designed to improve programmes, findings suggest that different international agencies carried them out in competition with other donors to convince policymakers to adopt a particular programme. Impact evaluations therefore acted as tools for advocacy and influence for each organisation’s preferred instrument. Two participants from the study explained it as follows:

The rapid expansion of the programme was actually as a result of the evidence that had been found from the 2007/2008 evaluation and later 2009/2011 that showed positive results. For the first time, there was a programme that showed that poverty had reduced by 12%. This was the first government that ever showed that and therefore treasury was convinced and bought in into expanding the cash to the CT-OVC. The World Bank was also convinced and thereby started supporting the programme (IOS-05, 20/7/2016).

These sentiments reflect the high premium that international organisations placed on evaluations as tools for advocacy to convince both the government to increase its funding to the programme but also to catalyse the participation and support of other donor organisations. Through this advocacy, the government increased funding to the CT-OVC with an increase of registered beneficiaries into the programme. UNICEF, which commissioned the evaluation, presented the results in lobbying for increased allocation of funds to the programme as proof of the effectiveness of cash transfers. In this way, the thoughts and action of development bureaucrats were powerfully shaped from the positive results emanating out of the structure of knowledge set up by the promoters of cash transfers. Research findings indicate that on the strength of the evaluation results, the World Bank used the findings in the evaluation report to “sell” a loan to the government, which facilitated the expansion of the programme. This was confirmed by a participant in the study:

The World Bank was able to push this through from the impact evaluation that was conducted at that time (IOS-03, 13/3/2016).

With the loan agreement came the exponential expansion of the CT-OVC from 3,000 in 2007 to 150,000 households in 2013 (Bosworth et al., 2016). Other cash transfer programmes in the country expanded too within this period. While the results from the evaluation were important in the advocacy for expansion of the programmes, other political economy conditions at the
time provided a window of opportunity for this form of advocacy, as is demonstrated in Chapter 9.

Transnational agents used and drew out of expert knowledge to legitimise particular agents’ actions and their preferences and biases. In presenting cash as the solution to poverty and vulnerability, some participants in the study were of the opinion that evaluations conducted by international organisations aimed at legitimising cash as the solution:

We placed an evaluation of the programme, as part of the things being a pilot, you want to show that cash transfers work and what does not work, this was 18 months after the programme had started (IOS-03, 13/03/2016).

International organisations set up the research to demonstrate that their preferred proposition works, thereby corrupting the science of research which starts out with a hypothesis that then is confirmed or nullified by the findings. However, advocacy-led research, where researchers are contracted, is structured to find evidence that donors’ choice of policy action is the correct one. All evaluations therefore demonstrated positive results, about which some participants expressed doubt. The generation of knowledge through evaluations therefore served legitimacy purposes, and not just learning per se but to prove that giving cash to the poor works.

Thirdly, different organisations produced knowledge to provide ammunition to the different competing groups of international organisations to “fight” others’ ideas and show that their programmes were more effective in addressing poverty. Within the contested space, each actor in promoting their preference generated knowledge for use to ensure acceptance in the “battle of the minds”. For example, in their reports which were widely shared by government, HelpAge Report indicated that:

HelpAge International also simulated the impacts on national poverty of an expanded social pension. Findings were that a universal pension of KES 2000 to everybody over 60 would lead to a reduction of four percentage points in the national poverty rate, from 45.9 per cent to 41.9 per cent. This would equate to over a million people being lifted out of basic needs poverty, which would be a huge success (HelpAge International, 2011, p. 3).
Through the generation of knowledge from other countries and deriving from simulations, HelpAge demonstrated that Kenya could afford an old age pension. In addition, through the models, HelpAge demonstrated that a social pensions scheme was efficient enough to end intergenerational cycle of poverty” to be able to fight for their case of the adoption of the programme. The argument however is subject to questions. First, the amount provided per household (KES 2000) is insufficient in meeting any households needs. The amount neither qualifies as sufficient to lift any household out of poverty even at low levels of poverty at USD 1.25. Second, the argument presented by HelpAge depended on studies carried out in South Africa, showing that older persons receiving the Old Age Grant were using part of it to facilitate transport costs to their children and grandchildren searching for jobs. The argument assumes that sharing is an inherent default for households receiving the cash transfers and that the same argument in South African can be used in Kenya. As Boswell and others note, sometimes facts and knowledge constitute ammunition for contested areas and for political situations (Boswell, Geddes and Scholten, 2011). Rather than serve the purpose of improvement of programmes, international organisations in this case employed knowledge as tools for persuasion for the adoption of the programmes and for fighting off attacks against preferred policy solutions from politicians or from other agents in the policy space. In such cases, ideational processes become discursive weapons that are then used in construction for policy reform (Béland, 2009).

Lastly, transnational actors produced knowledge as a resource to bolster choices and provide support for ideological biases. To do this, international organisations commissioned some evaluations with the aim of furthering their ideological preferences. Participants in the study singled out the World Bank’s agenda on imposition conditionalities specifically in this case. As explained in one of the interviews:

DFID and the World Bank were at loggerheads over conditionalities. We brokered a deal whereby this expansion to Nyanza province would be like a larger pilot test for testing conditionalities and non-conditionalities and we would bring in kind of a reputable international evaluation firm to evaluate the conditionalities. World Bank was getting ideas from Latin America, where they have promoted conditionalities. And in the evaluations, it turned out that they could not measure conditionalities versus non-conditionalities because the programme operators had not been able to implement the conditionality model (IOS_03, 13/03/2016).
But following the evaluations indicating the non-effect of conditionalities, the World Bank rejected the results as it did not confirm their bias towards conditionalities. The World Bank, apart from being conditioned by their ideological orientation had their knowledge shaped by their ideas of how cash transfers had worked in Latin America where they had experience. But imposing conditionalities on the CT-OVC is problematic. First is the assumption that the services related to education like schools, teachers, and health are available. Second, it assumes that those receiving the cash will not incur further costs in accessing the “conditions”. Third is the notion that the services are of an appreciable quality to meet the medical or educational needs and lastly is the assumption that the poor do not want to take their children to school or health clinics and must be forced to do so with conditions. With the evaluation demonstrating that conditionalities made no difference, a government official described it as a relief as the government and other donors had been opposed to the idea of conditionalities from the beginning (MGSCD-02, 12/5/2017). The knowledge generated thus served the other agents as it stalled and deflected pressure for the institutionalisation of conditionalities to the programme.

Following on the point above, the overall knowledge production process reflected the prevailing interests of each group based on the epistemological position of the group. Transnational agents sought to generate data and knowledge that confirmed their position and drew from their epistemological orientations as long as it did not contradict their agendas. To achieve this, three important observations emerged. First, donor organisations hired out evaluators or members of the epistemic community who are of the same ideological orientation. A perusal of documents reveals that the World Bank, for example, preferred Latin American organisations like Ayala Consulting while DFID mostly hired British organisations.

Second, as ideas were generated after the solution, it is possible that organisations could have kept certain issues from discussions. In the case of the World Bank and the issue of conditionalities, as one of the respondents said, “the report was never brought out to light and even until now we have no idea what was in there” (IOS-03,13/3/2016). Evaluations that were unfavourable to certain groups or those that contradicted the interests of the international organisations were kept off the agenda so as not to contaminate the process of adoption of the policies.

Third, communication to the government in relation the programme served to advance the interest of the international organisations and they kept off information that which appeared
harmful to their agenda. This was clearly a case of what Foucault terms the “rules of formation”: the power to regulate what is talked about, how to talk about it, who is authorised to talk, and how various pieces of information are combined in creating hegemony (Torfing, 2009). An example is how policy promoters choose to silence the role of labour and labour markets in improving the lives of people in Brazil. The efficacy of broader social protection instruments in countries that have reduced poverty was not discussed in the promotion, with the single narrative of cash transfers dominating the policy process. Instead, the cash transfer programmes were valorised over other policy instruments that played a key role in advancing and improving livelihoods from early adopter countries where transnational actors transferred the cash transfer agenda.

Competition among international organisations based on knowledge was important in convincing the government on adoption. Findings indicate that even though it was in the interest of international agents, especially DFID and UNICEF, to promote the HSNP and the CT-OVC, other organisations veiled as national interests prevailed in the adoption of the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT). DFID resisted attempts by the government at setting up the OPCT as it would have contaminated the randomised control test it was carrying out in the HSNP. However, the government initiated the programme with its own funding despite protests from donors forcing DFID to change the design and strategy of the experiment. The government ignored the protests and set up the OPCT, as explained by an official from the ministry implementing the OPCT:

The government wanted a programme of its own and for that reason they set up the OPCT with their own financing so that they could have control over the decisions” (MGSCD-01, 23/3/2016).

This action went against plans of international organisations who had envisaged that the government would scale up the CT-OVC and the HSNP instead of starting new programmes. An advisor with one of the donor agencies expressed it in this way:

We had advised the government to stick to one programme, but we come back after five years and there are five programmes (IOS-03, 13/3/2016).
This statement and government’s decision to implement the OPCT indicates government agency and how international competition shaped political decisions to eclipse the advice of powerful players. But instead of adopting a universal social pension in a few districts as advocated by HelpAge, according to an official in the programme, the government implemented a geographical targeting mechanism which spread the programme to all districts of the country to ensure equal geographical representation of the programme (MFP-01, 22/4/2016). Later with the HSNP, though evidence generated by transnational agents in advocacy recommended a poverty-targeted programme, members of parliament forcefully ensured the programme adopted geographical targeting to support their political interests. Besides the generation of knowledge and the purposes for which the knowledge was generated, the next section examines the social construction of words and meanings, and framing, by international organisations as a part of the structures of knowledge in the policy transfer process.

7.4 Social Construction of Words and Meanings, and Framing
Social construction of words and situations is powerful. The idea of social constructivism in public policy was made popular through the analysis by Schneider and Ingram (1993), who, in their study of social construction of older persons as deserving or undeserving in the distribution of benefits in the United States, state that “social construction of target populations is an important, albeit overlooked phenomenon that should take its place in the study of public policy” (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 334). According to Schneider and Ingram, social construction of groups and targets for public policy design decisions is often made by political elites with the aim of political expediency. This however does not represent the bottom-up case of social protection policy adoption in Kenya. Social construction and reconstruction became critical in the selling of policy ideas. To achieve this purpose the process involved not only a construction of the target groups, in other words children and people in North-Eastern Kenya, but a reconstruction of the situation, namely poverty and vulnerability. The discourse then entails ordering and labelling populations in different ways and in so doing frames issues in a way that can empower some groups and at the same time marginalise others (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). Construction of orphanhood and residents of Northern Kenya centred on marginalisation and deservedness, and though poverty and the classes or the categories of the groups is not new, its social construction entailed a remaking of the reality and the situation in line with the political and socio-economic context at the time.
Public policy entails language and accordingly, the language adopted is used in the construction of social reality, the problems and the target group. In seeking to advance cash transfers, an analysis of data from the interviews demonstrates that transnational agents positively constructed the image of the two groups in line with the social and political context, an exercise that strongly influenced decisions by the bureaucrats and the government of Kenya. The construction evolved around notions of compassion to deservedness. According to a respondent, “Socially, there is acceptance within the community that the people receiving the cash are poor and that they deserve the money,” as expressed by a government official who participated in the study (MDVP-01, 07/04/2016). But in the construction of targets there was the exclusion of some group based on how the policy promoter constructed the target groups. In their construction of the notion of deservedness, international organisations based the idea on the social situation and structure as this was the period when the HIV/AIDS pandemic was at its highest. Ideally, in nationally-led bottom-up policymaking processes, pressure to provide for the cash transfers emanated from the public sphere as a result of the positive construction of a weak group of people. In Kenya, however, as described by one participant in the study from civil society, the policy process involved an elitist group defining and constructing the groups of people deemed vulnerable with the deliberate exclusion of other actors.

Problem definition is often the first step in social construction in policy processes and design. As Bacchi (2012) states, policies “produce problems” in policy analysis, meaning that policies construct or define problems. While the definition of a problem always emerges from analysis, in this case, policy agents in the policy space skipped this stage, as a definition of the problem already existed, based on international actors’ perception of the problems and their ideological standing as already described in Chapter 6. The policy solution, cash transfer, did not flow from the objective facts of the solution, but as a solution to which a problem needed to be found. Therefore, the problem and the preferred solutions were constructed from the ideas available (Boswell, Geddes and Scholten, 2011).

It was important that the social construction of the problem align with the solution. By assigning new words and meanings to existing problems, the cash transfer narrative challenged the existing ways of doing things and specified a new approach to solving the problem. For example, “exclusion from participation” according to proponents of HSNP was a key function
of poverty. For this reason, social construction involved the use of new words within the policy space like “social inclusion, strengthening long-term community capacities and building social capital.” Other concepts revolved around “opportunity, empowerment and security of the poor and the vulnerable”. The evolution of new meanings links to Foucault’s notion of power as productive in shaping not only meanings but identities (Foucault, 1980a).

According to participants, the social reality of the moment needed to be addressed urgently and therefore the social construction by international organisations fit in well with the situation at hand. In reconstructing the distribution of food aid as a solution, DFID and other donors compared the status quo to a “perennial distribution of cocaine to which people had become addicted” (IOS-03, 13/3/2016). National agents presented little resistance to the solution provided as the government offered no new options in addressing the cyclical hunger in Northern Kenya. By also grounding the reconstruction of the idea of cash transfers on facts and knowledge, international agents limited resistance from domestic actors. Instead, domestic actors viewed them as saviours, as aptly captured by a participant who stated, s/he:

Who brings us solutions to our problems is a saviour (CSO-05, 28/9/2016).

According to a participant in the study from the government, UNAIDS statistics presented on the magnitude of the effect of HIV/AIDS on children could neither be ignored nor disputed. As one of the respondents said:

The facts were out there in the public and no one could argue that children needed help (CSO-03, 12/2/2016).

Following Schneider and Ingram (1993), the social problems required to be reconstructed afresh based on the current social situation which derived mostly from the push for the MDGs, which enabled a modification and/or a reconstruction of images of orphans and older persons.

In promoting cash transfers, transnational actors framed them as investments, with a depiction of social transfers as an avenue for economic development rather than instrumental tools for poverty alleviation. In so doing, international organisations imbued the narrative on cash transfers with power by successfully reframing welfare into benefits and away from handouts. Moreover, in the advocacy messages, proponents rejected the words “welfare” and “handouts”, which generate negative images that make people to reject the need for social assistance. Instead, policy agents replaced them with social protection and entitlements to portray positive
images. The problems that the cash transfers sought to address were set on moral positions by both donors and non-governmental organisations with the problems of orphanhood, vulnerability, and poverty among children and those in Northern Kenya constructed as needing “moralistic interventions.” As stated by a participant:

People accepted that somebody needed to do something about this as HIV was tearing through society and weakening the capacity to take care of each other. The need for that was recognised by citizens and by politicians. We will not let a child die, we will not let a very sick person die, we will do things for the poor – so that notion exists. I don’t think any politician wants to see that there are orphans hungry, not taken care of, older persons or people with disability not receiving cash (CSO_03, 12/02/2016).

The persuasion therefore advocated by international organisations that HIV and hunger needed a moral solution in terms of cash resonated with national actors. For both programmes, the identification of the problem required a framing of the target beneficiaries for the cash transfers as victims beyond their circumstances. For the CT-OVC, policy advocates framed the vulnerability of orphans around the fact that they were victims to circumstances, a reorientation which tugged at the moral side of policymakers. Meanwhile, in Northern Kenya, advocates based their persuasion on the perpetual neglect of the districts by successive political regimes, as elaborated as follows:

People agreed that these groups are actually the most marginalised and because of their marginalisation Kenyans were willing to give extra. The country accepts that they were left behind, and everybody agrees that the region has been marginalised and is very poor. The four poorest counties – Turkana, Marsabit, Wajir and Mandera become recipients of the HSNP by design as they are the poorest counties (CSO_03, 12/02/2016).

These narrations presented as facts empowered the idea of a new solution framing the neglect and marginalisation as a moral obligation which the government needed to address.

At the agenda-setting stage, different policy agents competed against each other, with different agents elevating their preferred categories or target population to benefit from the social protection policies through framing. To be effective, therefore, the “definition competition” required alignment and forming of partnership with domestic agents like bureaucracy,
politicians and civil society members. To compete effectively, agents in the policy process manipulated, responded to and perpetuated the social constructions of the target groups (Petridou, 2014). The social construction of the target groups was important as it influenced public opinion (Shanahan, Jones and McBeth, 2011) and made the idea of giving cash transfers to orphans and those in North-Eastern Kenya acceptable among Kenyans. For international organisations, the negative image of categories of people in Northern Kenya was positively constructed to influence policy perceptions for policy adoption.

International organisations depicted the idea of providing cash to children as an investment in the future, a sentiment which resonated with many in the public space. The framing of poverty, HIV and AIDS and orphanhood were rightly bestowed with the appearance of problematic concepts and reality in society which needed urgent addressing, thereby transforming the discourse on the status quo. A reframing of children’s homes as an “untenable solution,” with the growing number of orphans led to the elevation of “keeping children in their natural homes” as the solution. Later on, however, the narrow framing of vulnerability in relation to orphanhood posed challenges in the quest for the expansion of the programme as I will show in Chapter 9. This goes to show how narrowly the social construction of targets is normally restricted in scope when there is a concentration of organisations seeking to promote their target groups out of their plans and programmes rather than the wider needs of society.

In Northern Kenya, the social reconstruction of the target population necessitated bringing a shift in the way policymakers addressed poverty in the predominantly neglected areas. Driven by the tenets of human rights and social justice, the reconstruction of the marginalised group was anchored on the process of writing the Constitution at the time. As confirmed by a participant from civil society:

While civil and political rights are traditionally called rights, social and economic rights are called development … but now because of this Constitution, we are starting to see a merge in those two constructs. So, the constructs are coming together where there was an artificial divide and I think now there is more appreciation of social and economic issues as rights and this is where cash transfers come in (CSO-03. 12/2/2016).

Drawing from global rights instruments, another echoed:
Universal Declaration on Human Rights had also been crafted and you will find that social security is well articulated and very firmly embedded in declaration of human rights and as a right. Yet I hear people nowadays say we want to promote social protection as a right or right-based social protection … it is in the declaration as a right, it is not charity at all (CSO-05, 28/9/2016).

Both statements point to the reframing of the social protection agenda towards concepts related to social justice, rights, socio-economic rights and constitutionalism, which were within the discourse of rights rather than handouts and welfare programmes. But as cash transfers are conditional to a particular identity like orphanhood, it ceases to be a right by virtue of targeting. To attain maximum impact, promoters of cash transfers used language and chose words codified in national and international law. Benefits to the people were rationalised in a way that emphasised orientations towards justice. Members of civil society organisations codified their advocacy messages and language along national and international laws and human rights instruments in framing cash transfers schemes. A member of civil society expressed the institutionalisation of cash transfers for the marginalised in this way:

About the achievement of the legal principle of minimum core-obligation – the discussions on cash transfers are about civil and political rights recognised in the 1960s that when people reach a certain level and they fall below that safety net then the state is accountable (CSO-03, 12/2/2016).

Organisations working with the older persons, on the other hand, based their advocacy of older persons as carers on the HIV/AIDS epidemic and were therefore valuable in the care of orphans. The framing around giving cash to older persons meant killing two birds with one stone. Older persons were framed as morally responsible and that they always share that which they receive with members of their household, including children. Furthermore, older persons were framed as not wasteful with money, particularly older women.

Social construction of target populations influenced public officials, shaping both policy agenda and design. Constructed on deservedness, the idea of cash transfers resonated among national policy agents and the public as it aligned with views held of children and those in Northern Kenya. Public images of suffering children influenced decisions made by
policymakers and domestic actors in adopting both programmes. Both the children and the recipients of the HSNP were presented as socially meaningful and worthy of consideration for government and donor support. Each group tried to distinguish their group as being able to draw the attention of powerful national agents in the policy space. Buffeted by global and regional support, and the push from the domestic and global nodes of the international organisations, the social reconstruction of target populations and the ideal solution gained momentum. The construction was necessary in the selling of the idea to government and especially to treasury, as government needed proof of the outcome of the investment. An NGO representative explained this viewpoint in the following way:

They (referring to Treasury) still think that the way to define programmes is through an assessment on return on investment… because people who come from an economic background would argue that they do not see any change… the human rights approach would argue that there is a return in investment in providing cash transfers (CSO-03, 12/2/2016).

Similarly, the vigour in social constructions involved the understatement of certain descriptive constructions of concepts such as handouts, welfare, benefits. This action aimed to establish a discursive hegemony of “appropriate words” in the policy change process (Fischer, 2003). In cases where domestic actors resisted the ideas, especially the Ministry of Finance, in agenda-setting international actors used language and discourse centred on investment and even indicated that cash transfers could lead to growth in the national economy. Following the reconstruction of the different categories of people, poverty and vulnerability and the idea of cash transfers, transnational organisations, according to research findings, crafted policy narratives as shown in the section below.

7.5 Policy narratives and storylines
Policy narratives or storylines are important in discursive processes as they serve to bring attention to policy ideas. Most people will rely on storylines, as they function to condense large amount of information. Moreover, they “position social agents and institutional practices in ongoing, competing narratives” (Fischer, 2003, p. 23). They may emphasise certain aspects or conceal certain aspects of information or events. Ideas are not simply a plan, projects or solutions to a problem, – they carry stories. Ideas are in turn carried through stories and narratives – it is the narrative that makes ideas powerful and transportable. Policy narratives
often consist of “homologies, creation stories, oppositional dyads, before-and-after vistas, metaphors and narrative logics” (Rodgers, 2014, p. 308) and it is these aspects that form the power of ideas (Shanahan et al., 2013).

Words, images, and symbols were used to strategically craft the narratives that would bring about the adoption of social protection policies. The narratives were constructed to enhance “social learning”. Policy narratives are often generated by the advocacy coalitions “based primarily on congruent policy beliefs, coordination and desired policy output” (Shanahan, Jones and McBeth, 2011, p. 542). Policy narratives therefore carried ideas and were aimed at persuading the government of Kenya to adopt cash transfer policies. Policy narratives were documented through a number of mediums – newsletters, official documentation, policy briefs and even on social media.

To be effective, policy narratives strategically often contain a certain thread, opposers and proponents. Policy narratives on the social protection policy process were central where a broad set of actors, including the epistemic community, generated policy narratives along reconstructed meanings of both poverty and the targeted population. Cash transfer policies and programmes were communicated through the narratives as the vehicle for conveying and organising information. Policy narratives, according to Petridou (2014), influence opinions in two ways. First, they reinforce and galvanise existing opinions for the adoption of programmes. To sell the idea to policymakers, international organisations reinforced the narrative of suffering children for the policy to be taken up. Second, policy narratives are designed to bring about the conversion of previously opposing people with divergent opinions. The economic narrative around the cash transfers, as will be shown below, acted to change the views of, especially, those with different ideological orientations towards cash transfer programmes, like those in Treasury.

As discussed in the sections above, evaluations provided knowledge through which international organisations promoted cash transfer programmes. Evidence from evaluations and studies were used in the creation of narratives and in learning to promote adoption. This was explained by a respondent in the following way:
Evidence emerging from the monitoring and evaluation helped to push the government forward. It was evidence from research that showed positive outcomes that were useful in the adoption of the programmes (IOS-03, 13/3/2016).

Change occurred when the policy narrative became dominant after the push both at national and at global level.

Transnational actors together with policy entrepreneurs employed a new policy narrative that portrayed children and those in Northern Kenya as deserving of justice. As noted by Shanahan, Jones and McBeth (2011), the power of a good story is likely to shape policy learning and outcomes. Narratives by policy proponents were developed along the following lines which will be discussed below: the economic narrative, the social justice narrative, and the moral narrative.

7.5.1 Economic Narrative

In crafting the narrative around economic parameters, the idea of cash transfers resonated with Kenya’s political economy outlook of social policy as residual as described in Chapter 4. The narrative adopted by social agents in the policy space centred around the ideology of neo-liberalism which drew from the country’s political leadership definition of development. As one participant noted:

It is also part of the market thinking – neo-liberal thinking where the answer to poverty issues lay in money and getting the poor to access markets. The provision of cash transfers has also been ideological. It is the belief that it is only the market that can come and sort out issues – hence put money into people’s hands. (CSO-04, 13/5/2016)

In positing cash transfers this way, transnational actors’ over-amplification of markets as solutions to social and economic problems resonated with national development plans. The economic narrative of the HSNP revolved around giving cash to enable the poor and vulnerable to exercise economic freedom in choice instead of the prescription of food aid. In so doing, policy entrepreneurs emphasised the economic liberation of the target groups, especially in the HSNP, which targeted the poorest districts and counties. Transnational actors argued that due to the lack of economic empowerment in the area, the people were unable to buy basic goods like food. But most importantly they argued that people needed to get over their addiction to
food aid. The idea of cash became powerful for its potency to solve the economic and social problems in Northern Kenya.

To discredit food aid as a solution in Northern Kenya, comparisons made equated food distribution to the provision of drugs to addicts. Essentially the message aimed at discrediting the status quo in order to bring in a more “effective solution” to a perennial problem. A participant in the study described food aid as follows:

The main way in which vulnerability was being handled was through food aid that was fraught with leakages, costs, inefficiencies and dependency. Food aid was not seen to be sufficiently addressing the needs of the people [in] that place. There was need to address this better and therefore unconditional cash transfers were introduced (MDP-01, 7/4/2016).

Cash transfers therefore offered a new powerful set of ideas to a policy failure. The social construction of words which drove the economic narrative around commodification propelled the agenda. Arguments and discursive frames for the economic narrative of cash transfers were framed to show that that the area remained poor because the residents lacked money as a means of economic empowerment. Giving them cash therefore would not only allow them access to their basic needs, especially food, but to other inaccessible services. Cash would give them the freedom and the means to access goods and services that they truly needed and not based on prescriptions from aid or government agencies. The proponents of cash transfers painted the view that cash would open new opportunities for the poor and the underprivileged to engage in the market.

Additionally, the narrative emanated from evidence generated from the evaluations related to the economic viability towards which the recipients were allocating cash. Evidence pointed to the small businesses set up by beneficiaries of the programmes using the cash they were receiving. Cash therefore transcended just means of providing for the daily basic needs but made economic sense as it provided an avenue for entrepreneurship for the beneficiaries. Advocates of cash transfers created and promoted widely a positive narrative around the ability of beneficiaries to access credit and thereby financial inclusion of the poor. Evaluation reports for example stated that beneficiaries of cash transfers had started or improved their businesses, an influx of cash had increased among traders and access to credit from formal financial institutions had become possible (Merttens et al., 2013).
At a meso-level, the narrative laid claim to a rise in entrepreneurial spirit among recipients, and the growth and expansion of the local economy due to the circulation of cash. Spill-over effects of the transfers to others within the local economy were highlighted as some of the benefits from the cash transfers. The agenda and the social diagnosis of the problem evolved around a general lack of economic means among the people in Northern Kenya. As previously discussed in earlier chapters, the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance were framed as the villains in the storyline. This view was shared across many actors who participated in the study, with a civil society member and government official stating it as follows:

Politicians were not interested in the matter of children, because children do not vote (CSO-06, 12/08/2016). Planning and Finance were a hindrance, they were not sold to the idea and felt it was throwing money away (MGSCD_01,23/03/2016).

Consequently, the Ministry of Finance was portrayed as an oppositional force at the beginning phases of the programmes with no interest in adopting the programmes in the policy transfer process and termed as lacking political will and interest. Others deemed to be in opposition were academics and scholars producing material questioning the promotion of cash transfer programmes.

Transnational actors created the economic narrative debunk, particularly Ministry of Finance questions and doubts on affordability of the schemes. Studies on costing and feasibility studies crammed the policy space, expressing that indeed the programmes were not only effective in promoting national development but also in growing the local economy. Costing of programmes for instance in a HelpAge advocacy document illustrated that the government of Kenya could afford to provide cash transfer programmes:

Meanwhile, the annual cost of the public service pension in Kenya – covering fewer than one in ten older people – is slightly higher than what it would cost to provide a social pension to everyone over 60. Cost of a universal pension would be 0.8% relative to GDP if provided for those over 60 years and would cost 3 per cent to government expenditure (HelpAge International, 2011, p. 4).

In their argument for cash transfers, advocates therefore stated that for the government to implement cash transfers, prudent financial management in budget planning, better
management of the national resource envelope and political will was all that was required for the nation to invest in social protection policies. In keeping with the commodification narrative, study after study exhibited and conflated the economic narrative necessary for adoption of the programmes. Evaluations and studies from the international organisations showed the resultant dividend to be reaped if the government put money into the cash transfer programmes. The narrative emphasised that the government would benefit economically by investing in cash transfer programmes.

7.5.2 Social Justice Narrative

In line with the Constitution, and just emerging from the impact of SAPs, the pursuit of social justice became a buzzword onto which cash transfers were grafted. International organisations and in particular those with ideological orientations towards rights like HelpAge, DFID and others anchored their advocacy efforts around the achievement of social justice and the promotion of rights in the advancement of cash transfer programmes. The narrative crafted evolved around the injustice of poverty and vulnerability among children and those in Northern Kenya. The moment also coincided with the global agenda on the MDGs as the instrument to achieve social justice for the poor and the vulnerable. The idea of cash transfers as vehicles for development and rights resonated with the flavour of the moment. Cash transfers were couched in the language of tools for achieving social justice and extending rights, thereby giving them power: arguments that drew no resistance.

Drawing from rights documents, transnational agents mentioned the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1945, which considers social security as a social right which each individual is entitled to the provision thereof. Other global documents that were drawn from included those related to the Millennium Development Goals, which emphasised the need for a reorientation of poverty and vulnerability from a rights perspective and addressing it as a social justice. In respect to this, national documents that were inclined towards the social justice and human rights documents bolstered the campaign for the institutionalisation of social transfers as rights instruments. A review of documents indicates that for children, the Children’s Act of 2001 provides for the safeguarding of wellbeing of the child, and deriving from the Act and other documents, advocates crafted the narrative for social justice.
To further augment the narrative of cash transfers as rights, the process of drafting the Constitution in the country provided an opportune moment to link the international standards of human rights and justice to the Constitution of Kenya. There was convergence of opinion among respondents that various sections in the Constitution indicated government commitment towards the cash transfers upon which they centred their advocacy. Specifically mentioned was the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Though it may be argued that domestic organisations pushed for inclusion of social protection and social security as a right within the Constitution, and whereas it is often claimed that the development of the programmes draws from the Constitution, programmes were adopted before the Constitution came into effect in 2012. This goes to show that at times the institutions that are said to have mediated the adoption of the cash transfers were sometimes creations of the very social agents who derived their narrative from these institutions.

Within the narrative of the attainment of social justice and human rights, international organisations depicted the government as responsible for failing to ensure the attainment of social justice among the poor in Kenya. To remedy this and to redeem their image, cash transfers offered an alternative to correct past mistakes. In addition, local institutions were portrayed as having failed in securing the poor and the vulnerable in the attainment of their human rights. Contrary to the perception that the government was not concerned with the plight of the poor, a study participant noted:

Contrary to that belief the governments do not care about their people is not true, they (international actors) think the government is corrupt, [that] they (government) don’t care about us. But to say they don’t care, are selfish is not true – they also want to try to help people, they desire to respond to the needs of the people. It is not correct to say that they do not care about the welfare of their people – they are also looking for ways of alleviating our problems on the continent (CSO_05, 28/09/2016).

Advocates therefore promoted cash transfers as tools to redeem the dignity and promote the rights of the target groups. International organisations whose orientation is based on the human rights perspective pushed the ideology which resonated with domestic civil society organisations that are often considered custodians and defenders of rights and justice.
7.5.3 Moral Narrative

Policymaking is a problem-solving activity. As such the storyline created for the OVC programme emanated from the UNGASS report of 2003, which depicted the dire state and the increase of orphanhood in Africa because of the HIV pandemic, thereby creating the need to solve a problem. According to reports, the number of orphans was nearing 1.6 million, with half the number attributed to HIV and AIDS reaching a crisis level in need of an intervention to remedy the spiralling crisis (Bosworth et al., 2016). International organisations, therefore, created a narrative portraying the situation of the high rise of orphans as a crisis. The numbers of children and households presented as suffering provided a moralistic rationale for action. Statistics provided by the UNGASS report were alarmist enough to provide the impetus for action on the matter. Credibility for the report derived from the fact that UN bodies drafted it, which lent it trustworthiness among policymakers.

Transnational agents urged the government to put in place measures to address the situation. The storyline that emerged out of this narrative played out in the international arena, providing an avenue for the testing of cash transfers to alleviate the situation instead of the previously tried out interventions, where orphans were put in orphanages. Emerging from an assessment carried out by UNICEF on the state of orphanages in Kenya, advocates of cash transfers created a counter-narrative to show that caretakers in orphanages were abusing children and that individuals were soliciting funds from donors for non-existent orphanages and programmes. To strengthen their argument, promoters claimed that the government did not have enough personnel to monitor the dealings of orphanages or even track them down. As stated by one of the participants:

This rapid assessment had shown that there were many orphanages and the quality of care was very poor and this is something they could do. The Department [of Children’s Services] in collaboration with UNICEF decided that children’s homes were not the best way of dealing with the growing number of orphans and decided that bringing children to their original setting and not homes and rehabilitation centres would be the best way of dealing with it and the children homes were not enough anyway. Homes were not also the best for child development (IOS-03, 13/3/2016).
Through the powerful narrative created by international organisations to this effect, government officials felt morally obligated to improve the situation of children and agreed to have the pilot start on funds provided by UNICEF. The narrative equally influenced public opinion. One of the participants stated: “The reason why this is an amazing story (evolution of cash) is that nobody fights against [it] because it makes sense” (CSO-03, 12/2/2016). But pilots are used to influence adoption of policies through “the representativeness heuristic”, where generalisations are made from a narrow set of observations to infer to a broad population, thereby attributing undue success to the programme (Weyland, 2007). Cash transfer promoters therefore sometimes overestimated the impact of pilots to exaggerate success.

With the setting of the scene and the narrative having been played out, it became imperative that a prescription for the policy problem be offered for the diagnosis. In this case, international organisations proffered the CT-OVC as the antidote for the problem with a trial of 400 households. UNICEF recommended the provision of cash transfers as the new way of dealing with the crisis (John, 2012) aimed at averting a catastrophe. A member of civil society participating in the study elaborated as follows:

What would have happened if we were not here, thousands of people would have died, kids would have died and [become] malnourished? The humanitarian and human rights approach would argue that the return in investment has been heavy because we have developed human capital (CSO-03, 12/2/2016).

This statement highlights further how actors within the policy space escalated the crisis by sometimes exaggerating their role and also by demonstrating the moral obligation of providing cash to children.

Socially, the idea of giving cash to households with orphans aligned with normative beliefs of kinship and family. According to the findings, there was consensus across the board on the matter. A government representative involved in the study commented:

There was acceptance within the community that the people receiving the cash are poor and deserve to be helped; there was not a lot of resistance (MFP-03, 29/7/2016).
Promoters further suggested that cash transfer scheme would be easier for the government to monitor, unlike orphanages, and the provision of cash to affected families would ensure children stay at home, in their “natural setting” among family and kin instead of being in children’s homes. But the narratives entailed only a one-sided and misleading narrative aimed at creating hegemonies to facilitate the adoption of cash transfers.

It is along the above storylines that transnational actors influenced the government, other agencies and the general public on the idea of cash transfers and in particular the CT-OVC and the HSNP.

7.6. Conclusion
While ideational mechanisms remained key in the transfer of social protection policies, it is imperative that in explaining their role we go beyond a description of the mechanisms to understand how they became powerful enough to bring about policy change. An analysis of the hegemony of discourse that brought this about is therefore key to understanding the policy transfer process. Ideas and the discourse around them on their own are not powerful enough to bring about change; they only become powerful based on human agency that advocates and invests time and energy to push them forward. As demonstrated in the chapter, ideational approaches in the policymaking process involved the use of reason, invoking of reconstructed concepts, applying values to categories of people and the weighing up of evidence to support the solution, an act of power by international organisations. Furthermore, the clustering of similar policy models on the continent in a variety of settings with little variation in programme design and the rapid spread of adoption “seems to point to vertical imposition rather than social learning as the main mechanism of adoption” (Ouma and Adésínà, 2018, p. 6). Though often not viewed as such, hegemonic ideas present coercive mechanisms in policy transfer where, without exerting force, dominant actors can exercise power through ideational channels. In addition, “dominant ideas become rationalised… through theoretical justifications, and influence how policymakers conceptualize their problems and order potential solutions” (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2007, p. 456).

By creating a “structure of knowledge” on the efficacy and effectiveness of cash transfer policies, drawing on their resources, transnational actors engaged in the process, sought to attach meaning to their actions so that they formed part of a discourse. International
organisations expressed power through the hegemony of, first, who generated the knowledge around which ideas were derived, and second, how the ideas were advanced. Ideas were easily passed through a marshalling of evidence which transnational actors used to frame issues, knowledge and information for manipulation and persuasion. Transnational actors through their expertise presented social learning to fit with the context through a construction of meanings, framing and through policy narratives. Policy narratives were employed by proponents to persuade and manipulate other policy actors. As demonstrated through the research findings, knowledge and meanings in regard to cash transfers were conceptualised as systems of discourse within a specific social and political context. Social learning and knowledge were therefore an exercise of power as “power transverses and produces things….induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 110).

In the Kenyan situation, ideas by themselves were not sufficient to bring about policy change, hence the need to analyse the role of international financing and aid in the policy transfer process. In the next chapter therefore, I analyse how funding and financial resources were employed in the promotion of social protection policies in Kenya.
CHAPTER EIGHT: FINANCING, INCENTIVES AND OWNERSHIP

8.1 Introduction
Financing for social protection and social policy remains a major hindrance for initiating programmes and expanding coverage of the social policy benefits in many developing nations. In a number of countries, Kenya included, donor financing provided the impetus in the initiation of cash transfer programmes. Coupled with the ideational effects of the global elite, the provision of financing towards the programmes made cash transfer appealing to local elites. Moreover, as previously discussed in Chapter 5, Kenya’s market-led policy framework is ideationally suited for targeted cash transfers making it easy for domestic policymaker to embrace the idea.

While governments have increased budgetary allocation towards the schemes over the years, donor funding still comprises a significant portion of allocated funds. In 2016/2017 the total social protection budget for cash transfers totalled KES 24 billion. Out of this amount, the budget for the Government of Kenya was KES 17 billion, while external financing amounted to KES 6.8 billion, representing 25% of the total budget (Office of the Auditor General, 2017). Financing of cash transfer programmes from domestic sources like taxation or from mineral rents increases ownership of programmes and state-citizen accountability processes. Policymakers cite limited fiscal space as the hindrance for expansion of social policies and other services, though financing social policy may not always be about available funds. Starting with the initial funding for the CT-OVC in 2003, donor financing formed a significant portion of funding towards the provision of cash transfers in the two programmes under study but the proportion has reduced over the years as shown in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 below. Government funding towards the programmes has increased over the years and in the case of the CT-OVC, current national budgetary allocation surpasses donor funding. In 2016/2017 government funding amounted to KES 9 billion while donor funding was approximately KES 1 billion.

Donor-driven initiatives, and especially those heavily funded from external sources, generally struggle with questions of ownership. Following the Paris Declaration’s emphasis on domestic ownership of programmes, donor countries and multilateral organisations have made attempts at realigning aid activities with the aspirations and developmental objectives of recipient countries but often from the donor’s perspective. However, the experience from the Poverty
Reduction Paper Strategy (PRSPs) indicates little success in the endeavour to promote ownership. When donor financing for programmes is large, they have greater control over decision-making and control of programmes, sometimes through conditionalities. In social protection programming, this undermines the country’s capacity to define its own developmental path, thereby jeopardising ownership and accountability. The experience in regard to financing and ownership in Kenya is somewhat mixed. Study findings suggest donor funding was instrumental in adoption of the programmes with little government ownership at the beginning. With government funding over the years, levels of ownership of social protection vary from high to low, with increasing levels of ownership as more players enter the policy space.

In this chapter, therefore, I seek to examine the extent to which financial support from donors provided leverage for adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. In explaining funding as a structural mechanism of the transfer of the policy, I take into cognisance the political and economic context in which donor financing occurred. For a more nuanced analysis, the chapter is organised into four sections. First, I trace donor financing trends towards the CT-OVC and examine the impact of external aid on its initiation and expansion. I consider the political economy factors at different junctures and how they triggered government funding. In the second section I carry out a similar analysis for the HSNP, where I examine government funding and commitment in the second phase (2012 – 2017) and assess the factors that led to government “buy-in”. This leads to the third section, in which I evaluate the current funding modality by donors, Programme for Results (P4R), to examine the stimulus of incentive-based financing on increased government expenditure on social protection. In the last section is an analysis of the perception of ownership among different social agents in the social protection policy space.

8.2 Trends and Donor Partnership In Financing of the CT-OVC

In 2003, UNICEF and the Department for Children’s Services proposed the plan to initiate a cash transfer programme for families with children affected by HIV and AIDS. The cash transfer programme formed part of a 10-point strategy developed to address child well-being. Through financing from the Norwegian Government of KES 500 million (IOS-03,13/03/2016), UNICEF used part of the funds to mount a campaign to garner support for the 10-point strategy during the 2002 general election period in Kenya (Pearson, Alviar and Hussein, 2006). Through
the campaign, UNICEF lobbied aspiring Members of Parliament to sign a commitment to support the welfare of children if elected with the initiation of the CT-OVC forming part of the strategy. UNICEF, however, had to provide the initial funding for direct cash payments to households enrolled in the programme.

According to our findings, the financing for the CT-OVC and its subsequent adoption had three broad implications for the social policy regime in Kenya. First, the CT-OVC, being the initial cash transfer programme in the country, influenced initiation of other social protection programmes like the OPCT and the Persons with Severe Disability Programme, thereby bringing greater participation of the legislature into the policy space. Second, initial UNICEF funding catalysed aid for social protection programmes both from the government and international organisations. Lastly, based on government expenditure, the CT-OVC became the largest social protection programme in Kenya. Based on the focus of this chapter, I will discuss the last two implications below in relation to how asymmetrical power relations shaped policy adoption.

**8.2.1 Catalysing Aid for Cash Transfer Programmes**

UNICEF’s initial funding stimulated government and other donor funding for cash transfer programmes. There was a convergence of opinion among study participants that without the initial funding from UNICEF, the government of Kenya may not have adopted the CT-OVC at the time. Scepticism around cash transfers as a policy and programmatic solution was common at the time, with government delaying its initial funding of KES 56 million till 2006 (TT/C-04, 13/04/2016). UNICEF’s action catalysed government funding, with the latter providing support for direct transfers to households and for the strengthening of institutional capacity, including the development of the social protection policy and strategy at the Ministry of Social Development. Accordingly, the funding from DFID increased fiscal space for the expansion of the programme to additional households in other districts. The CT-OVC represents a good example of how aid can catalyse increased financing from both external and internal sources (Gore, 2013).

Key informants in the study and a review of documents indicate that additional funding from donors did not come without conditionalities. DFID’s requirements included the expansion of the programme to areas with the highest HIV and AIDS prevalence rates. To access the funding
therefore, the programme expanded based on this parameter to 17 districts affected most by the epidemic. Financing and commitment from DFID and the government in turn attracted the interest of the World Bank, whose direct involvement in the programme was previously limited. Following its successful advocacy for conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America, the World Bank sought to replicate similar schemes in Kenya. To provide funding for the CT-OVC, the World Bank proposed to introduce conditionalities to the programme. These conditionalities related to adherence of households to health and educational requirements. It emerged from the interviews that resistance from other actors prompted the World Bank to withdraw from the programme. Commenting on World Bank conditionalities, a representative of government explained:

The World Bank was interested in having conditionalities on the programmes, though they were only supporting capacity building and providing resources for access like vehicles. We tried to resist the conditionalities that the World Bank was interested in and we kept on delaying the process. But right now, they are having conditionalities tested in some areas. They are able to do this because of the budget support that they are offering (MGSCD_02, 12/5/2016).

The observation underlined perceptions of actors of the World Bank’s influence in financing programmes. Despite resistance to conditionalities from other actors, based on their financial resources, the World Bank wanted to impose conditionalities. Financial resources and their position as the global leader in social protection emboldened the Bank’s demands for conditionalities.

8.2.2 The World Bank and Conditionalities

With limited financing for expansion, it emerged from the interviews that other partners agreed to the World Bank’s demands for testing of conditionalities in a number of districts. Financing was to be linked to an HIV and AIDS programme, Total War on HIV/AIDS (TOWA), which had a component related to strengthening the capacity of households affected by the pandemic. The Bank rationalised their proposals on conditionalities as part of learning how to effectively promote human capacity outcomes in cash transfer programming. Interview sources revealed that a year into the discussions the Bank withdrew from the process, citing a change of strategy at its headquarters in Washington DC (IOS_03. 13/3/2016). With the withdrawal of the World Bank, expansion plans stalled, leading to uncertainty of funding for the programme. The action
by World Bank demonstrated how programmes dependent on donor funding can often be attached to conditions that the recipient country needs to abide by in exchange for resources even though the conditions may be adversarial (Molenaers and Nijs, 2009). Furthermore, it demonstrates how donors can manipulate financing to influence policy, especially in situations of limited fiscal space (Holmqvist, 2012; Hernandez, 2017).

But aid may not always catalyse funding from other sources. In instances where there is competition over funding and incongruence in programme designs, additional financing may be difficult to attract. As our study findings indicate, other development partners were sceptical of financing a programme providing direct cash to individuals. Joint attempts by UNICEF and the Department of Children’s Services to raise USD 60 million from the Global Fund for Malaria and Tuberculosis failed due to competition between government ministries (Pearson, Alviar and Hussein, 2006). Resistance emanated from the Ministry of Health and PEPFAR who cited little understanding of the CT-OVC. PEPFAR objectives related to health and therefore, Global Funds financing could only be accessed through a joint proposal with the Ministry of Health. To qualify for funding, the programme needed to target those directly affected by HIV and AIDS. In narrowing the targeted population in this manner, the CT-OVC would lock out other vulnerable households with children not necessarily affected by the pandemic. According to interview sources, however, Ministry of Health officials rejected the inclusion of the CT-OVC application into the joint proposal. A key informant explained it as follows:

We ran into problems with the Ministry of Health and it was the first time that a proposal was put to the committee which included civil society members, begrudgingly – I don’t think the government liked to have a large funding given to CSOs. So along comes the Ministry of Home Affairs with the 20 million dollars proposal to run the PEPFAR programme. Ngilu (the Minister of Health at the time) was not very enthusiastic (IOS_03, 13/3/2016).

This statement suggests low levels of inter-ministerial coordination that characterised the financing of programmes at the time. According to a government official, MOH agreed to the inclusion of the CT-OVC after the intervention of the Vice President at the Cabinet level.
The second hurdle to funding arose out of technicalities of directly paying cash to households. As reported by a key informant in the study, according to PEPFAR regulations, providing direct cash to households posed accountability challenges to the Fund’s financial processes. The idea of “giving funds directly to individuals sounded too radical;” therefore their aid modality favoured material support to households. He expounded the situation with PEPFAR as follows:

PEPFAR requires that all money is channelled by US-based NGO systems. So not programme model where money goes direct from the bank to the people’s pockets, there is not much room for NGOs to do anything. The reporting requirements that PEPFAR was strict and complex that the various few people that the US government had come to a level where they wanted to handle their own things. They did not want to handle anything innovative. They were much happier to give money to NGOs to help them improve the qualities of orphanages (IOS-03, 13/3/2016).

PEPFAR was not convinced of “the idea of cash” and preferred programmes that provided items like clothing, learning material and farm implements to households affected by HIV and AIDS. Direct funding to families, according to PEPFAR procedures, as explained by a government representative, were provided only through US-registered NGOs and not directly, as USAID statutes prohibit it from handing out money to individuals. Failure in securing funds from the Global Fund impeded the anticipated growth of the CT-OVC. Expansion plans were put on hold till 2005, when Treasury with lobbying from the Parliamentary Committee Group on Children made the first allocation to the programme.

8.2.3 Increased Government Expenditure on Social Protection

Funding allocation from the government of Kenya to the CT-OVC stimulated financing for other cash transfer programmes. A review of the major policy documents indicated that the government allocated KES 56 million in 2006, which expanded CT-OVC to 2,500 households within the project districts. Successive years indicate an increase in government funding for the programme, as illustrated in Figure 8.1 below:
A review of national budget documents indicate that in the first five years, funding doubled in each financial year, thereby enabling the programme to grow from the initial three pilot districts to seven districts, with combined funding from UNICEF, SIDA and DFID (Bosworth et al., 2016). In the expansion phase (2009 – 2014), starting in 2008, government funding of the CT-OVC rose exponentially. Participants in the study attributed the high increase in 2009 to a credit facility negotiated between the World Bank and the government. This was confirmed through the perusal of documents. As part of the USD 126 million loan agreement, donor requirements obliged the government of Kenya’s commitment to increased funding of the programme to which government committed USD 30 million. Other financing partners (DFID and UNICEF) committed USD 46 million while the IDA loan agreement credit facility by the World Bank totalled USD 50 million (World Bank, 2009). The World Bank, due to its dominance and heavy financial resources, administered the agreement on behalf of the other development partners. According to a government official, the World Bank, leveraging on the credit facility introduced conditionalities into the programme.

The loan provided the needed fiscal space for the expansion for additional households into the programme. Following the first payment of the IDA credit facility, the CT-OVC expansion
rose from 14,000 to 47,000 households. Funding social programmes like cash transfers from credit facilities increases national debt. Moreover, it is not sustainable to make direct cash payments from loans. As funds from the credit facility were channelled directly to government as sectoral budget, it was difficult to ascertain from this study the exact amount of government funding towards cash transfers. Documents reviewed indicate that by the end of 2015, funding for the programme from the donor pool had increased to USD 157 million of which USD 97 million was in the form of grants, while USD 60 million formed an additional IDA credit from the World Bank to the Government of Kenya (World Bank, 2015a).

8.2.4 Politics and Increased Financing

Other political economy factors coincided with the signing of the credit facility, leading to increased government funding in the second phase. The study identified the heightened political competition between the different partners in the Grand Coalition Government as a stimulating factor during the expansion phase of the programme. With both partners competing for attribution in service delivery, existing programmes got increased financing while new programmes were started at the time. For instance, the Urban Food Subsidy, a cash transfer for households in urban slums, and Kazi Kwa Vijana, a public works programme, were initiated through the Office of the Prime Minister. On the other side, the expansion of the CT-OVC provided political expediency for the President’s coalition. An observation of the political dynamics indicates that increased funding for the CT-OVC and social protection in general may have been stimulated by this competition. The observation follows other studies which demonstrate that when there is heightened political competition among coalitions of the ruling elite, there is a tendency of an increase of financing (Niedzwiecki, 2016). Besides the political competition between the ruling coalitions, respondents pointed out that government fiscal space for cash transfers expanded due to increased donor funding following rebuilding efforts after the post-election violence of 2008.

As is shown in Figure 8.1, the second significant increase in government funding was in the 2013 financial year with allocation rising to KES 8.8 billion from KES 4.4 billion in the previous year. The increase represented the highest allocation of funding in value terms since the beginning of the programme. Key informants engaged in the study attributed the considerable allocation to the Jubilee Coalition fulfillment of its election campaign in its first year in office (Wanyama and McCord, 2017, MP_02, 27/9/2016). In the subsequent year,
however, funding from the government reduced by close to KES 1.5 billion, with only modest increases in the 2015 and 2016 financial years. In the 2016/2017 financial year, government funding for the programme remained modest, rising to 9.02 billion (Government of Kenya, 2016a).

Though budget allocation through the years has favoured the CT-OVC over the other 3 programmes, against expectations, in the 2017/2018 financial year, as an election pledge the government made the highest increment for cash transfers programmes to the OPCT. With the increase came the promise of a universal programme for older persons over 70 years from January 2018 (Government of Kenya, 2017). The move by the Jubilee government resonates with Niedzwiecki (2016), who notes that government funding for cash transfer programmes is likely to increase because of political expediency. Increased government funding towards older persons considered a voting bloc is viewed as a political strategy by the government. The increase in funding for the OPCT rather than to other donor-funded programmes further suggests that national politics and agency of governments often override donor interest and pressure.

Besides the political factors identified above, the study identified the introduction of the new funding mechanism, Programme for Results (P4R), a results-based financing initiative by the World Bank and other donors, as a contributory factor to increased government funding. As will be discussed later in the chapter, international organisations introduced the financing model with the aim of incentivising the government to commit to increased funding to social protection based on specific agreed outcomes against which donors provide more funds through budget support. Before discussing the modalities of the P4R, the next section examines financing for the HSNP.

8.3 Financing the HSNP - From Donor to Partly Government-Funded
Since its inception in 2007, DFID has remained the primary funder of the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP). In its first cycle (2007 – 2013), DFID and DFAT provided funding of up to KES 5.5 billion to initiate the programme (DFID, 2014). Programme costs for the second phase (2013 – 2017) were pegged at KES 15.8 billion, including administration costs and direct cash payments. With the broad aim of reducing poverty, the HSNP is implemented under an agreement between the governments of Kenya and UK in Northern Kenya (DFID, 2013).
review of documents indicates that the total cost of the agreement brings the total DFID financial commitment for the ten years to GBP 80 million. In February 2012, following reported positive impacts attributed to the programme, the Australian Government entered into a partnership with DFID to support the scaling up of the second phase and provided approximately KES 2 billion (Government of Kenya, 2012).

As previously mentioned, the dominant view among respondents in the study was that HSNP was a DFID and not a Government of Kenya programme. A respondent associated with the programme explained that the programme started as “a purely DFID programme”, later morphing into a partnership programme with the government. He argued that the plan aimed at full ownership by the government by the end of the second phase. Perceptions on the “donor tag” have not changed over the years, though this may be attributed to continued DFID control of the programme. The tactic is not new. As stated by Stubbs, Kentikelenis and King (2016), promoters of cash transfer schemes initiated a number of programmes on the continent under similar models with the aim of stimulating government funding and expansion. Bearing national political economy dynamics, this may not always lead to programme adoption. For example, the Government of Kenya adopted the HSNP and the CT-OVC but failed to adopt the Urban Food Subsidy Programme.

A number of factors, both intrinsic and extrinsic, motivated DFID funding for the HSNP. According to Janus and Paulo (2015), different motivations influence donor funding, including the self-interest of the donor, as a response to recipient need or as a reward for the recipient country. Donor motivation may also arise out of “a moral vision in international politics” (Janus, Klingebiel and Paulo, 2015, p. 156). According to the study findings, three kinds of motivations led to DFID funding of the HSNP. First was DFID’s response to the reality of vulnerability in Northern Kenya brought about by repeated cycles of hunger and drought. Continued DFID partnership with the Government of Kenya over the years involved drought mitigation measures in Northern Kenya. Key informants involved in the study identified DFID’s motivation to finance the HSNP and noted that it rose out of a need to offer a solution to the poverty and vulnerability linked to the perennial drought cycles in Northern Kenya.

Secondly, participants in the study suggested that DFID set up the programme for learning purposes and experimentation for Kenya and other countries under similar circumstances. As suggested by a civil society member, Kenya’s open political space provides room for all sorts
of experiments for international organisations (CSO-04,13/5/2016). Moreover, technological advancements in the country like *Mpesa* enabled interested players like DFID to set up programmes for testing different payment methods for cash transfers. Thirdly, DFID’s funding and initiating of the HSNP reflected the continued global competition among international organisations. Sentiments among respondents indicated that, as a lead development partner with the Government of Kenya, and following on the initiation of the CT-OVC by UNICEF, DFID initiated the HSNP “to have its own programme”.

### 8.3.1 Within Government but Not of Government

The financing mechanism through which the HSNP is handled offers suggestions regarding its ownership as a donor rather than a state programme. Unlike the CT-OVC, DFID continues to directly fund the HSNP through non-governmental organisations and private sector while bypassing government channels. Donor financing and aid in Kenya is channelled along the following streams: project support, budget support and sector programme support. Project support entails aid flowing directly to a certain project, like in this case to a project of social protection. Budget support is channelled through government systems and appropriated through National Treasury, while sector programme support is allocated to sectors within the national scheme like education or health.

The dominant view among respondents indicated that DFID chose a direct project support funding mechanism as opposed to budget support mechanisms to reduce fiduciary risks and inefficiencies associated with government systems. The experience of budget support for Free Primary Education (FPE) informed DFID’s decision to fund the HSNP through other channels and not the government. Allegations of fraud, corruption, and inefficiencies in the management of the FPE prompted a withdrawal of financing by DFID to the sector. A government official, however, termed the fear of fiduciary risks a scapegoat through which donors wanted to perpetuate and legitimise their continued control over the programme (MGCSD-01, 23/3/2016). With the control of the HSNP, the resultant outcome as illustrated in Chapter 6 was to minimise the policy space and government’s involvement in the programme, which undermined ownership and damaged citizen-state contracts.

As discussed in previous chapters, as the primary funder of the HSNP in the first cycle (2007 – 2012), DFID wielded a significant amount of influence in shaping and implementing the
programme by excluding the involvement of other players. This resonates with findings from studies which indicate that when powerful donor agencies provide funding for programmes, the participation of other players in shaping the policy agenda often gets compromised, with decision-making processes left in the hands of a few players (Swedlund, 2013). As indicated by participants in the study, decisions regarding programme implementation, design, including targeting, and setting payment amounts were the prerogative of DFID. An analysis of power dynamics within the policy arena indicate that this scenario led to strained relationships with government agencies whose role was reduced to that of “providing a conducive terrain for implementation of a donor programme” with no real participation from other players. This was corroborated in programme documents which indicated that “government’s contribution in the first phase comprised hosting the secretariat, and providing broad policy direction and facilitating work on the ground through the former District Steering Groups (DSGs)” (HSNP Secretariat, 2010).

8.3.2 Phase 2: Increasing Government Funding for HSNP

The government started funding the HSNP in 2013 according to terms reflected in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the National Treasury and DFID on 20th February 2013. Based on the MOU, the government committed to progressively increase its financial contribution to a total of KES 4.62 billion over the four financial years between 2013/14 and 2016/17. The P4R mechanism based on the disbursement-linked indicators, specifically DL 9 “the government finances the HSNP in line with budget and policy commitments” pressurized government to initiate funding for HSNP Meanwhile DFID and AusAID committed GBP 81.5 million (approximately KES 11.64 billion) (DFID, 2013). Government funding towards the HSNP has been channeled through the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) while donor funding was primarily administered by PILU, and through non-governmental organisations like HelpAge International.

Following the agreement and as indicated in the Figure 8.2, DFID funding reduced in 2014/2015, though its total contribution remains higher than that of the government. Government funding has increased over the four-year period. Findings suggest that two significant factors may have stimulated the increase from the government. First, since 2013, the Jubilee government has significantly increased resources towards cash transfer programmes in general following its manifesto. As suggested by a Member of Parliament,
increased political competition and heightened citizen demands have increased pressure for increased government expenditure in social services (MP_02, 27/9/2016). This is evident in other social services, for example where government expenditure has increased.

**Figure 8.2 HSNP – Government and donor funding 2011- 2016**

![Graph showing government and donor funding from 2011 to 2016.](image)


The second factor, attributed to government funding to the HSNP, relates to the Programme for Results (P4R). As indicated in the result, DL 9 of the performance payment agreement requires that the government increases its funding towards the HSNP in return to a tranche-based disbursement amounting to USD 5 million (Government of Kenya, 2016b). Expounding on why the government was incentivised by the “carrot-stick approach”, a participant from the government explained as follows:

Part of the agreement is that the government would fund it 100% in 2018. There are targets now for the government to start funding it. The WB funds via the national programme and it is about the performance for results. The results for the HSNP programme are that the government must put in their money so the result has to be delivered by 30th of June every year. In order to release the WB contribution to the budget, GOK has to release its money. GOK has to release its quota of funds by the end of March. For the World Bank to be able to release their money by June the government
must have their result delivered by April latest. When the P4R was planned, there was a sense that the government was wavering in its commitment to put in funds to the HSNP and they kind of regarded it as kind of a project that had been thrust down their throat without too much consultation and therefore they thought then this is the way we will get the government to put in money (IOS_03, 13/3/2016).

The above statement shows how international organisations used coercive mechanisms to get the government to finance the HSNP through force. Subsequent funding would only be availed if the Government of Kenya provided a budget for the programme. As per the disbursement-linked indicator, if the Government of Kenya finances the HSNP in line with the Programme for Results commitments, the World Bank releases US$5 million.

However, the Government of Kenya’s commitment to the funding mechanisms and conditionalities has been lukewarm. In 2013/2014, the Government of Kenya contributed less than the amount agreed upon in the MOU (KES 249.6 million against KES 312 million) with the shortfall covered by DFID. In the 2014/2015 financial year, the government met its contribution in full (KES 624 million), though in 2015/16, at the time of the study, it had only provided 50% of its contribution (HSNP Secretariat, 2010). Interestingly, as previously mentioned, the Government of Kenya increased funding for the OPCT, thereby selecting political expediency over monetary incentives. Yet despite increased government funding, a perusal of documents and participants’ views indicated no clear long-term plan of government takeover post-2017 (MDP_01, 7/4/2016, MP_02, 27/9/2016, HSNP Secretariat, 2010). Participants from government generally expressed doubt about a 100% takeover by the government, with others suggesting a possible winding down in the absence of donor financing or a merger with other programmes. The following section examines the Programme for Results modality with the aim of demonstrating its effect on government funding towards the two programmes.

8.4 Programme for Results/Disbursement-Linked Financing

Due to shrinking donor funding and change in the aid industry, donors are moving from placing conditionalities on aid to more consensual funding mechanisms. Kenya, traditionally, receives substantial amounts of aid (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001) and with changes in donor strategy, the aid architecture in the country is changing. In the 2000s, bilateral aid accounted for 72% of total aid following changes in the 1990s and 1980s as World Bank aid went up primarily as
part of adjustment lending under SAPs (Mwega, 2009). This was however reduced to 64% of gross aid by 2012 (OECD – DAC World Bank), although bilateral aid remains substantial, as shown in Chapter 5 of this study. Budget support remains the most dominant mechanism despite challenges related to the payment modality. Swedlund (2013, p. 357) describes budget support mechanisms as “fungible, delivered with conditionalities and failing to deliver on results”. In a shift from the inefficiencies of budget support towards the financing of social protection in Kenya, the harmonised donor approach adopted the Programme for Results (P4R) modality. Arguments for performance results-based disbursements and mechanisms are that the modality will increase national ownership of donor-aided programmes, as it follows on principles of Paris and the Busan Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Performance results disbursements are based on a system where the recipient country meets a range of targets upon which tranches of funds are released following the achievement of agreed-upon results (Molenaers and Nijs, 2009; Booth, 2012; Holmqvist, 2012). It presupposes that the country decides on its own how best to achieve their goals. Moreover, tranche-based payments are meant to incentivise the recipient to reach certain targets believed to be espoused in its development strategies.

As the first country testing results-based financing in social protection, the shift brings changes in the sector’s financing architecture. Participants from international organisations in the study indicated that lessons derived from the test would inform donor financing for social protection programmes in other countries. Based on a contract between the World Bank on behalf of the other developing partners and the Government of Kenya, the P4R defines the “mutually desired outcomes” with tranche payments indicated against the achievement of each of the results (Government of Kenya, 2016b). Literature sources, however, indicate that results-based instruments in aid provisioning is not new. It was promoted and used by the European Commission in 2006 in relation to promoting governance reforms in recipient countries and in developing countries (Molenaers and Nijs, 2009), yet such programmes show little tangible evidence of effectiveness (Easterly and Williamson, 2011; Swedlund, 2013).

Reactions to and views of the funding model varied among participants in the study. Those from donor organisations supported the funding mechanism, viewing it as a means through which effectiveness, donor coordination, and harmonisation would be improved. The issue of donor coordination, as they recalled, continued to come up with the government. Participants within government, on the other hand, perceived the mechanism as a form of soft pressure on the government to achieve certain results. There was consensus however among the players
that the results agreed upon may improve implementation of the programmes, with most citing the development of the Single Registry in enhancing targeting of households. Birdsall, Mahgoub and Savedoff (2010) propose that results-linked disbursement, besides boosting the effectiveness of financing, also improves donor harmonisation and promote accountability and ownership of programmes by recipient governments.

Several expected outcomes are highlighted as results to be achieved before the release of finances in tranches. As indicated in policy documents, the aims of the tranche-based payment mechanism are to incentivise government to increase financing for social protection programmes and to enable government set up systems and procedures for delivery of programmes (Government of Kenya, 2016b). A total of four key result areas were agreed upon, with nine disbursement-linked indicators which the government needs to achieve before the release of funds. The box below shows the result areas and the disbursement-linked indicators against funds to be released by the World Bank upon achievement of the indicator.

At the time of the study, however, only one result indicator - the harmonisation of the single registry - had been achieved as part of the South-to-South cooperation with Brazil. This result was easy to achieve as the development of the single registry had started before P4R. A participant in the study described it as a “low-lying fruit that easily achievable by the government” MGCSD-01, 23/3/2016) The P4R is considered to have stimulated the payment and concretised government commitment towards the payment, without which the government would have not been committed to the payment of the funds.
Box 8.1 Disbursement-Linked Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disbursement-linked indicator</th>
<th>Amount in USD millions (2013–2017)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Result 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL 1: A set number of additional households have been enrolled in the NSNP according to the expansion plan</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL 2: A set percentage of programme beneficiaries meet the targeting criteria for the programme in which they are enrolled</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL 3: The single registry is fully operational and programme MIs are using agreed standards for internal payment controls</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL 4: A set percentage of NSNP payments are being made electronically using two-factor authentication</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL 5: A set percentage of payments are being disbursed to payment service providers on time</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL 6: Functional complaint mechanisms have been created</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL 7: Systems of scaling up the NSNP as part of the national drought risk management system</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL 8: Strategy for consolidating the cash transfer programmes</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL 9: The government finances the HSNP in line with budget and policy commitments</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adopted from Government of Kenya (2016b)

8.4.1 Stimulating Funding Through the Programme for Results

Participants in the study identified the P4R as having played a contributory role in government financing of the HSNP. As indicated in the World Bank Status Report:

The World Bank will support the National Safety Net Program through a Program for Results. The World Bank approved a US$ 250 million credit on July 23, 2013 to support the NSNP Program for Results (PforR) operation. The PforR operation has been designed to help the government to achieve the key results required to deliver the objectives of the NSNP, specifically to (i) expand the coverage of cash transfers in an equitable manner; (ii) strengthen the implementation and oversight of the five programs that constitute the NSNP to ensure good governance; and, (iii) increase coordination among the five programs and thus improve sectoral harmonization (World Bank, 2015a, p. 2).
While the P4R provided the impetus for the increased government financing of the HSNP, the claim of how far the modality has promoted ownership remains an issue to be explored further. Respondents within the donor community termed the aid mechanism as ideal as it moved away from conditionalities and also aimed at promoting ownership by the government of both the process and implementation of social protection, and the outcomes. According to an adviser from an international organisation, the P4R is not a conditionality, as it remains the prerogative of the Government of Kenya to choose how to achieve results. The “how” is left to the country to decide but disbursements are made after delivery of the result indicator. With increased government funding, as discussed in the chapter, the government’s participation and decision-making have increased. This may suggest that unintended benefits have accrued from the financing model, where a shift in power dynamics has occurred with government participating more in decision-making. Policy autonomy, however, remains compromised. Through the P4R the government is bounded within pre-determined World Bank policy positions, constraining national social forces and dynamic opportunities for policy determination. The P4R constricts national agendas by determining externally the milestones to be achieved. In addition, the “how” is not within national prerogative but is within the framework of “learning” pushed through “knowledge sharing”.

Among other benefits mentioned by international organisations was that results-based payments lowered transaction costs as a result of the harmonisation of donor funding. Moreover, in addition to promoting harmonisation, as noted by other scholars it ensures both public accountability amongst donors, as the aid contract is credible when it is open and avoids fragmentation that is often characteristic of having multiple streams of aid from different donors. Another advantage accrued from the funding mechanism mentioned by participants was the alignment of donor support with government priorities as the funds pass through general budget support. In addition, the P4R shifts focus from inputs and policy actions to output and outcomes, which, as suggested by a participant, eventually leads to stronger programming (IOS_01, 13/3/206). Participants from government confirmed that the P4R was based on consensual agreements with donor agencies, with the acknowledgement that incentives for broad budget support were instrumental in governments acceptance of the result-based modality.
8.4.2 Limitations of the Programme for Results

Although the funding mechanism is still in its early stages, concerns arose among the players as to whether the government would follow through with its commitments in achieving the results. The lack of commitment by the government was cited as one limitation of the financing arrangement. Participants expressed that while government commitment was easy to secure, according to an official within government, follow-through has proved difficult with the government failing to honour its commitments either in part or in full (MGSD, 23/3/2016). Documents reviewed indicate that for Disbursement-Linked Indicator 7 (DL 7) for example, the government failed to set up a scaled-up system for management of drought by January 2016 despite the guarantee that would release USD 20 million from the World Bank. As already mentioned, the government only achieved its funding target in the first year.

Several scholars highlight other limitations of the funding mechanism. Perverse incentives, as highlighted by Holmqvist (2012), commits a government only for a while. Yanguas, (2017, p. 222) describes the payment modality as a “hyper-teleological approach to development assistance” as it is based on the idea that “an act that produces good outcomes is considered to be morally upright”. He further adds that in consideration, the results-based modality is fixated on results and goals and may fail to take into consideration the underlying political settlements of countries. In addition, cash on delivery mechanisms are based on conditionalities (Molenaers and Nijs, 2009); the only shift is that the conditionalities are ex post as the actions are accomplished before the aid is delivered. Participants from both government and donor organisations, however, insisted that the arrangement emerged from consensual agreements based on dialogue and agreements with the government and not conditionalities. In the last section, we consider ownership in regard to the two cash transfer programmes.

8.5 Ownership and Control in Donor-Funded Programmes

As demonstrated above, provision of funding for the CT-OVC and the HSNP, provided soft pressure to the Government of Kenya to take up on the two cash transfers programmes while the P4R was a coercive mechanism to force government financing. On the other side of incentives is the question of ownership of donor-initiated and financed programmes. Findings from the research indicate varying levels of ownership of the two programmes, ranging from perceptions of high levels among the political elite to low levels among members of civil
society organisations. Ownership is understood as it is constituted among the principles in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

In seeking to understand perceptions of ownership among different social agents in the policy arena, we draw from Booth (2003, p. 45), who applies Killick’s dimension in assessing national ownership of PRSPs in some developing countries. In the assessment, we consider four dimensions:

i) The intellectual conviction of key policymakers or ministries (the technocratic dimension)

ii) Support of the top political leadership, as demonstrated by dramatic up-front actions (the political dimension)

iii) Broad support across and beyond government, for example, derived from a broad-based campaign to elicit support

iv) Institutionalisation of the measures within the policy system (stabilising expectations around a new set of incentives and convincing economic agents that they cannot easily be reversed).

8.5.1 Bureaucratic Conviction

Research findings indicate high levels of ownership among senior and mid-level government officials, largely attributed to their direct involvement in the policymaking and implementation of the programmes. Within other sectors of government not directly involved in the programmes, technocrats regarded the cash transfer schemes as donor programmes. Lack of knowledge, distance from the programmes and perceptions of international leadership led to such views. Perceptions of ownership among government employees varied depending on the level of involvement in the programme. Participants who reported high levels of ownership were most likely engaged in the implementation of the programmes or had participated in meetings or training sessions. State agencies charged with the responsibility of implementation and provision of social policy programmes like the Ministry of Gender and Social Development and their counterparts at the NDMA formed the first line of contact with transnational actors in the policy process, hence the high sense of ownership among them.

Where government departments were left out of the policy process, perceptions of ownership were lower. For instance, sentiments within the National Economic and Social Council indicated low levels of ownership of the schemes as they were not participants in the
policymaking process. Interviews with members of the Secretariat, however, revealed that the social protection policy was not brought up to the Council at the time of its development, though its mandate as stated required participation in the policy process. Ironically, the Council is an advisory body to the government on policies to accelerate development in the country. The process followed in developing the policies, as explained by key informants, lacked inclusivity of vital government departments.

Bounded rationality, learning while implementing, enhanced the sense of ownership of the CT-OVC. According to research findings, apart from the learning, other factors that contributed to the high sense of ownership within technocrats at the Department of Children’s Services are (1) the initial joint assessment and the design of the programme by both UNICEF and the Department (2) the embeddedness of the programme within the department, and (3) the implementation of the programme within the department and other government structures. Each of these factors is discussed below.

First, though the initial conceptualisation of the CT-OVC was by UNICEF, both UNICEF and the Department of Children’s Services conducted the joint assessments on the viability of the programme, thereby creating initial ownership among staff in government. The assessment regarding the effectiveness of orphanages, based on previous joint work on child protection, formed the basis of the programme. According to staff at the department, pilot districts were selected based on ongoing work between the two organisations and therefore did not seem new but a continuation of programme activities, albeit with a new component to it: cash transfers. Expansion plans for the programme, design features, and even funding activities, for instance the proposal to PEPFAR, were developed in partnership between the two organisations.

Secondly, the embeddedness of the CT-OVC within the department fostered ownership for the programme. Participants in the study highlighted this aspect as the key reason for their enhanced perception of ownership. As discussed, most of the aspects related to the programme were carried out by staff members within the ministry, including targeting and payments. Apart from ownership, the directors and other senior members at the department, like permanent secretaries, reported that they had control over decision-making, leadership and implementation of the programme.
Lastly, ownership of the CT-OVC was fostered through the involvement of staff at the department in the implementation of the programme. As one of the participants in the study explained, “When we started the programme, we did not consider it additional work, it fell seamlessly into what we were already doing” (MGSD_03, 25/4/2016). Study findings indicate that staff at both national and district level in the Children’s Department were not involved. At district level, the Area Children Advisory Councils participated in the identification and recruitment of households. Targeting, payments and the administration of the programme were carried out within the department, albeit with initial challenges. In implementing the programme and overcoming the challenges, technocrats and civil servants within the department and the ministry perceived they had built a programme from the beginning, hence the increased ownership and attachment.

The dominant view among participants in the study implied that DFID failed in promoting national leadership, and it has low perceptions of ownership among government officials. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, when decision-making and implementation are carried out by organisations outside government in a heavily donor-funded environment, national ownership may be compromised. Commenting on perceptions of ownership, a key staff member at the Department of Children’s Services offered a contrasted perception of the HSNP as follows:

When there is an international conference, you see us at the department attend to make presentations on the programme, which is unlike the HSNP, where it is the consultants who will be making the presentations and speaking – not even the NDMA (MGSD_02, 12/5/2016).

These sentiments reflect the contrary sense of perception in regard to the HSNP even in government circles. As expressed by a majority of the respondents, DFID did little to promote ownership of the HSNP to other actors within the policy space or even to the government.

Commenting on this, a participant spoke about the lack of leadership within the government in administering the programmes especially in decision-making. In comparison to Ethiopia, one participant stated:

The complaint I have is that the leadership is not so strong among the civil servants. They should be leading the way. In Ethiopia, the senior level civil service is much stronger than Kenya’s, they wouldn’t let themselves get bullied around the way Kenyan
civil servants get bullied because it is their country, they are in charge, they will take advice, go away and think about it and make decisions (IOS_03, 13/3/2016).

In addition to suggestions on the lack of strong leadership among government officials in general, the statement points to the control and power wielded by international organisations in the policymaking process which in some aspects undermined ownership of the programmes.

8.5.2. Political Leadership

President Uhuru Kenyatta’s statement in January 2015 during the Social Protection Week signalled the highest level of political ownership and support of the social protection agenda. Noting the state of poverty in the country, he said:

Forty-six per cent of Kenyans live below the poverty line and 19 per cent in chronic poverty. This is wholly unacceptable. There is little dignity for the destitute. We must take care of the vulnerable in our society and that is why as Government we are doing everything we can to empower our people. There’s little dignity for any nation that allows nearly half of its people to live in abject poverty.2

The president in his statement further articulated the government’s intention to increase budgetary allocation to social protection programmes. Drawing from key institutions which form the foundational tenets of social protection in Kenya, like Vision 2030 and the Constitution, the president pledged his support for the cash transfer programmes. The endorsement by the president indicated new levels of ownership by the political class that past leadership had previously not exhibited publicly. While a steady national budgetary increase is often cited as a measure to national ownership programmes, political statements from the elite further buffet budgetary funding efforts, thereby steering programmes into new directions of ownership. This follows on Booth (2012) who states that a country’s leadership articulates the national development objectives, thereby forming the centrality of ownership. His argument is that the core of ownership of programmes and activities in a country “is the orientation of the country’s political leadership” (Booth, 2012, p. 552) which in this case is reflected in the president’s statement and in the commitment to increased financing since 2013.

Beyond President Kenyatta’s statements, an analysis of political support among the different political parties indicated strong support and ownership across the board. This was evident first in the political manifestos by the different parties perused during the study. Both the Jubilee Party and the Orange Democratic Movement promise in their manifestos to increase funding for cash transfers. Ideologically, both the major parties show no differences in their support for social protection programmes. The rise of funding since 2003 even with the change in government indicates long-term political support for the schemes. Among the political class, as stated by a Member of Parliament in the study in reference to the HSNP:

The programme is now popular with MPs and they are very excited about it. Even the Deputy President has been talking and asking for an increase in the funding for the programme (MP_02, 27/09/2016).

This finding contradicts Booth (2012) and Kelsall (2013), who describe Kenya’s politics as short-termist, high political patrimonial politics that can render country ownership of programmes difficult even in situations where aid is a catalysing factor.

Within the CT-OVC, the inclusion and involvement of Members of Parliament through the Joint Committee on Children as advocates and champions at the initial stages fostered high levels of ownership of the programme. A Member of Parliament in the study indicated that the HSNP tried to adopt the idea of champions for the programme. However, the process, as explained by the legislator, involved developing champions among individuals and not ownership among the political class. With the government funding of the HSNP, Members of Parliament, previously excluded from the policy process, are now re-engaged following increased budgetary allocation from the state. Participation of politicians is often viewed as avenues of gaining political expediency; however, in donor-funded environments where attribution of “owners” may not be clear, it can lead to support for the programme for political gain (Niedzwiecki, 2016). Beyond rhetorical statements, Members of Parliament have exhibited support and ownership of the cash transfer programmes through the steady allocation of more funds in the budgets for the programmes and the passing of Bills on policies for institutional support.

8.5.3. Institutionalisation within Policy Systems

Various institutions set up by the state and Parliament signify some level of ownership of social protection. As mentioned above, a perusal of political manifestos and other policy documents
reflected the aspirations of different players within the social protection arena for institutionalisation. The inclusion of cash transfers into the MTEF and the budget support to implement ministries further strengthened support for CT-OVC and the HSNP. Institutionalisation included the establishment of both legal, and implementation and coordination structures related to the programmes. The adoption by Parliament of the Social Protection Policy in 2012 was viewed by actors towards institutionalisation in the country’s policy systems. Other Acts of Parliament related to social protection are the National Social Security Act 2013 and the National Health Insurance 2015. Despite the protracted bureaucratic process that delayed the development of the policy, findings indicated that within political circles there was broad support as the policy was passed with no objections. The Social Assistance Bill 2012 was the first step to legally institutionalise cash transfer programmes, even though, according to participants in the study, its implementation remains problematic.

The legal instruments of social protection stipulate implementation and coordination structures necessary for running the programmes. One such institution based on the National Social Protection Policy is the National Social Protection Secretariat at the Ministry of Gender and Social Development (Government of Kenya, 2011b). Charged with coordination responsibilities, the Secretariat aims at enhancing programme coordination and providing one-stop contact with donors and partners. Commenting on the coordination role of the Secretariat, a key informant at the Ministry within the Department of Labour indicated that the Secretariat lacks a mandate in coordinating social insurance and the health insurance components which are set up under different Acts of Parliament. Views regarding the Secretariat conflicted with some participants’ claims that international organisations pushed for its set-up even before the policy was passed, while those within the Secretariat were of the opinion that the multiplicity of programmes and activities necessitated the hurried establishment of the Secretariat for coordination purposes.

Even though donor advocacy may lead to the formation of such institutions, bureaucratic agency and political processes often supersede external influences in setting up institutions and running them effectively. In examining the New Public Management reforms in Malawi for example, Tambulasi (2013) demonstrates resistance by national agencies in implementing donor prescriptions in health sector reforms in Malawi. In addition, even if financial aid is the impetus for the setting up of institutions, their influence in political processes, like the passing of policy, remains limited unless they form a partnership with domestic players like civil
society organisations. Local and domestic agency becomes imperative in the setting up of institutions within government systems that provide an institutional base upon which programmes are implemented and shaped. A more detailed analysis of institutions in the policy process will be presented in Chapter 9.

8.5.4. Civil Society and Broader Societal Consensus

From interviews with members of civil society, it emerged that there were lower levels of ownership among them in comparison to the other actors. While the scores on political support, bureaucratic support and institutionalisation point to high levels of ownership of the programmes, participation and ownership remain low among members of civil society organisations. This was attributed to several factors. First, the inclusion of civil society was delayed. Perceptions of exclusion from the policy process spread beyond the narrow definition of NGOs to civil society as other actors expressed similar sentiments. Representatives of trade unions shared similar views, pointing to an example at the Social Protection Week in January 2015 when they expressed their concerns at being excluded from planning for the event. The second attributive factor identified in the study relates to the “top-down elitist process” of the policy development, which provided little room for meaningful participation of grassroots organisations. The esoteric process locked out those perceived to be deficient in knowledge on social protection as stated by a participant from civil society. Lastly, financial resources also hindered the participation of civil society organisations, restricting their involvement to the endorsement of agreed-upon processes.

Findings from the research, however, indicate some level of ownership by international NGOs involved in implementation, like HelpAge International and Oxfam. The result of the limited ownership and participation of civil society organisations resulted in low levels of accountability and little knowledge of the programmes among citizens. An analysis of this is however beyond the scope of this study. In seeking to address these limitations, programmes like the HSNP have an in-built accountability structure implemented through HelpAge International as the Rights Component. This is not an ideal situation as it continues to perpetuate top-down processes that do not provide appropriate and effective accountability. Efforts by national organisations like SPAF at creating accountability structures were lacklustre and did not create a sense of ownership among national and domestic civil society organisations.
8.6. Conclusion

This chapter has presented empirical findings demonstrating the effects of external financing in influencing the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. The presentation tracked financing trends in both the programmes, taking into consideration political dynamics that contributed to domestic financing. To further understand the role of donor financing in shaping policy processes, I examined the Programme for Results (P4R), and how its coercive elements forced government action towards increased funding for programmes and for the setting up of structures for effective implementation of social protection. In the final section, I examined perceptions of ownership among domestic actors in regard to the cash transfer programmes.

Evidence suggests that the initial financing of the two cash transfer programmes from external findings contributed to their adoption, without which the Government may not have started the programmes. The findings corroborate the theoretical argument of this thesis that external actors were instrumental in the adoption of social protection in Kenya, and Shearer et al.’s (2016) opinion that funding is important in developing countries and may as well be the principal impetus for policy change. Apart from influencing the adoption of the cash transfers programmes, donor funding shaped the design and architecture of programmes and influenced social relations in the policy space. Financing from donors provided leverage for international actors to control the agenda though domestic agency found expression with an increase in government funding.

In the chapter, I highlighted the catalysing impact of aid in stimulating other donor financing and government funding from domestic sources. The initial financing for the CT-OVC from UNICEF, for example, stimulated funding from the Government of Kenya, and thereafter DFID and the World Bank. In the HSNP, financing from DFID in the first phase of the programme stimulated government funding for phase 2 of the programme. The process that was followed in achieving this in the HSNP, as demonstrated, appeared incentivised by the results-based funding mechanism. These cases show that financing from donors can catalyse domestic funding for programmes depending on political moments and capitalising on windows of opportunity. The P4R follows a carrot-stick approach in stimulating government action, where despite endorsement of the funding model there seems to be reluctance in following through the agreement on the government’s side. The funding mechanism, though
instrumental and effective in achieving some of the agreed indicators, like DL 3 for setting up of the MIS system, however, is deficient in ensuring government compliance.

With increased government allocation of funding to the programmes, domestic actors exhibited increased levels of participation, leadership, and decision-making as compared to periods when donor financing is its highest. The resultant outcome of increased government funding is increased perceptions of ownership among government and political actors. As demonstrated in the chapter, levels of ownership varied among different domestic players. The political elite exhibited high levels of ownership, and among bureaucrats there were varied views while civil society organisations had low levels of ownership. The setting up of both legal, and implementation and coordination institutions to strengthen the programmes is indicative of political ownership of the policies. The next chapter explores mediational and facilitative factors that enabled the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP.
CHAPTER NINE: MEDIATIVE AND FACILITATIVE FACTORS IN POLICY ADOPTION

9.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I examined financing as a structural mechanism used by transnational actors in coercing the government to adopt the CT-OVC and the HSNP in Kenya. In as far as structural mechanisms of policy transfer may be powerful in driving policy adoption, national factors often mediate the adoption of policies. Béland (2009), in discussing the role of ideas and institutions in policy change, notes that national politics and institutions are key in policy change, emphasising that institutions, path dependencies and nation politics often facilitate policy uptake. In policy transfer within the framework of power, however, where policy entrepreneurs and policy promoters use coercive mechanisms for policy uptake, institutions, conditions, windows of opportunity and context (political, social and economic) are often conditioned or manipulated to fit within the framework of the idea or policy solution. Though participants in the study considered some institutions, contexts and windows of opportunity as mediative factors that enabled the uptake the CT-OVC and HSNP, the study demonstrates that in some cases, policy promoters created the opportunities to align with their agenda so as to facilitate adoption. And though it is argued that domestic factors are key in mediating the adoption of policies, social reality is complex and sometimes those very institutions may be a result of historical processes or sediments of prior diffusion (Solingen, 2012).

To examine national factors that mediated the adoption of social protection policies in Kenya, this chapter is divided into five sections. First, I examine the institutional frameworks that enabled the adoption of the policies. This is followed by the section where I examine the socio-economic context at the time of promotion of the policies with the aim of presenting the social reality of the effects of HIV and AIDS and poverty as facilitative factors in the adoption of the programmes. In the third section is a discussion on facilitative political processes in which I discuss the various windows of opportunity and political junctures that transnational actors took advantage of in promoting the programmes. In the last section before the conclusion, I pay attention to the role of individual champions, both politicians and bureaucrats, in promoting the uptake of social protection policies in Kenya. Lastly, I examine the factors that constrained adoption and expansion of the policies, before concluding the chapter.
For Institutional Compatibility

National institutions are key shapers of the types of policies adopted as they mould the discourse upon which policy change occurs. Policy change tends to be path dependent, with countries easily adopting policies when they already have similar or compatible policies in place (Schmitt et al., 2015). Institutional compatibility refers to a situation where policies that are already in place influence the adoption of another policy if the present policy is compatible with the new policy under transfer. Institutions as public policies and formal political frameworks create opportunities for individual action but also constrain agency. In light of the study, several national policies and frameworks are considered to have enabled policy agents to propose policy change within specific existing institutional frameworks. Though study participants stated that institutions related to social development gave impetus and justification for government adoption of cash transfers, most of the institutions mentioned were set up before the introduction of cash transfer programmes. The Constitution of Kenya, mentioned by participants as the key document from which social protection and cash transfers derive, was only promulgated in 2010. This was after all the four cash transfers under the National Safety Net Programme, CT-OVC, HSNP, OPCT, and the PWSDP, were already under implementation. And though actors referred to several institutions as the main reason for the initiation of the cash transfers, this study shows that reference to these documents aimed at legitimating views and actions already taken. The institutional frameworks mentioned during the interviews were the Constitution of Kenya 2010, Vision 2030 and the Children’s Act of 2001. Principles underlying these documents in relation to human rights, welfare and well-being, and equality facilitated the compatibility with the principles that cash transfers were based upon. Each of the three institutional frameworks will be examined below in view of their mediational role in the adoption of the cash transfer programmes.

9.2.1 Alignment with the Constitution of Kenya

The Constitution of Kenya in Article 43 (1) (e) (3) states that “Every person has the right… to social security… the State shall provide appropriate social security to persons who are unable to support themselves and their dependents” (Government of Kenya, 2010, p. 31). This article in the Constitution provides the highest articulation of social protection and social security in Kenya. Other articles closely linked with social security are health, education, reasonable working conditions and access to justice (Government of Kenya, 2011b). Participants in the study, particularly those from civil society and bureaucrats involved in the development in social protection policymaking, repeatedly invoked this section of the Constitution to justify
the adoption of the cash transfers. But this is actually not a right. Right accrue from being a citizen or a human being. In this case, this constitutional provision - as in case of South Africa’s constitution from which Kenya borrows - makes public social security conditional on the demonstrable inability to provide for oneself and one’s dependants. Additionally, as mentioned above, the cash schemes preceded the 2010 Constitution and therefore the Constitution played no role in the adoption process happening in the early 2000s. As a document born out of years of political and social struggle and discontent since independence (Mati, 2013a), the Constitution was expected to form a foundation to address socio-economic rights more universally. Rather the Constitution seems to “reinforce a residual approach to social policy”. Further, the ex-ante manner of provision – after a household falls into poverty – negates the principles of rights the Constitution purports to be promoting through social protection. The design of the programmes, as articulated in the Constitution, provides support only to those unable to support themselves in case of market failures. As Lavinas (2013, p. 24) contends, cash transfers “provide some compensation to the needy yet they remain disconnected from the anti-cyclical and permanent redistribute policies – a constitutive element of any system of universal social protection.”

In reference to the principles deriving from the Constitution, participants highlighted norms related to quality, human rights, dignity and improvement of human capabilities as tenets providing guidance in the development of policies and design of programmes. The National Social Protection Policy 2012 mentions these principles drawn from the Constitution, which provided a strong rationale for cash transfer programmes. Members of parliament in the study highlighted that decisions on expansion of programmes and passing of Bills related to social protection aligned to the spirit and the principles espoused therein. The view that the cash transfers promote and are based on the said norms are contestable. First, both the CT-OVC and the HSNP cash transfers schemes are targeted to specific categories, leaving out a great proportion of people in need of social protection. The CT-OVC for example, provides cash transfers to orphaned children, leaving out other children in need who may not be orphaned. Second, cash transfers are set at low levels based on “a basic need” amount, making it insufficient for promoting well-being or dignity.

Besides the principles of the Constitution, participants attested to the Bill of Rights as the cornerstone for social protection. As stated by one participant in reference to the alignment of the HSNP with the Constitution:
The programme is guided by the Constitution which gives it direction. This is especially from the Bill of Right Article 43, that emphasises human dignity and social justice and protection of the marginalised. Each time one comes up with a programme the government asks how it relates to the Constitution (CSO_03, 12/2/2016).

As suggested in the statement above, proponents from civil society organisations drew particularly from the human rights language of the Constitution in advocacy for the programmes. The government was increasingly seeking for and questioning programmes’ justification for the cash transfers and to do this, programmers adopted concepts and advocacy in line with concepts from the document to show alignment. Programmes that were already under implementation before 2010, like the CT-OVC and the HSNP, adopted the concepts to ensure “post-fit” with the Constitution and to incentivise the expansion of the programmes and “ownership” by the government. CSOs and humanitarian organisations were particularly keen to reference the Constitution in advocacy work.

Article 19(1) of the Constitution states: “The Bill of Rights is an integral part of Kenya’s democratic state and is the framework for social, economic and cultural policies” (Government of Kenya, 2010, p. 19). As mentioned by participants, the National Social Protection Policy derives from this article to promote the well-being of Kenyans. Besides this clause in the Constitution, state officials pointed to Article 21(3), which states as follows:

All State organs and all public officers have a duty to address the needs of vulnerable groups within society, including women, older members of society, persons with disabilities, children, youth, members of minority or marginalized communities, and members of particular ethnic, religious or cultural communities (Government of Kenya, 2010, p. 20).

As explained further by a state official, the Constitution makes provision for certain rights for vulnerable people and groups, and the duty of the Ministry of Planning includes translating the provisions in the Constitution to implementable projects. According to the economic adviser at the Ministry of Planning and Devolution, the adoption of the cash transfer programmes was imperative as it translated the Constitution into programmes (MFP_03, 29/7/2016). In highlighting their role in promoting the programmes, state officials in the implementing departments further explained the focus on children and the marginalised.
Reference to the categorisation of different groups for social protection was drawn from Articles 53 through to 57, which highlight the role of the state in provision to children, minorities and marginalised groups, older persons and people with disabilities. International NGOs and civil society organisations like HelpAge International, Save the Children and the Africa Platform for Social Protection highlighted these articles as providing the basis of their advocacy for social protection for the different groups. NGOs in Northern Kenya referred to several articles, especially Article 56, which seeks to address the continued marginalisation of the area. Respondents highlighted the contribution that the HSNP could play in reducing marginalisation, with some respondents referring to other sections of the Constitution on devolution and affirmative action as central processes in addressing poverty and vulnerability.

It is, however, important to note that the Constitution was adopted in August 2010, seven years after the beginning of the CT-OVC and three after the initiation of the HSNP. Therefore, the idea that the Constitution provided the impetus for the cash transfer programmes is exaggerated. As stated by a respondent in the study in reference to this, it means that rather than being the basis upon which the cash transfers were grounded, programmes realigned with the Constitution after their initiation. The reality is that policy entrepreneurs contributed to both creating the pre-condition for mobilisation and creating a setting for the adoption of the cash transfers. Later on, they sought to align the programmes with the Constitution.

**9.2.2 Vision 2030 as a Development Blueprint**

Vision 2030 provides yet another institutional framework that participants mentioned as compatible with social protection. This basis of Vision 2013 is however based on retrospective rationalisation, where actors especially bureaucrats and politicians tried to justify decisions made. At the time of the development of Vision 2030, the four cash transfers were already under implementation. The cash transfer schemes therefore informed the sections of Vision 2030 related to social protection, and not vice versa. Developed in 2007, Vision 2030 strategy offers a long-term perspective towards the country’s development. Vision 2030 developed around three pillars: economic, social and political (Government of Kenya, 2007b). The social pillar’s target is a just and cohesive society with social protection mentioned as one of the flagship programmes. In stressing the relevance of social protection in Vision 2013, a participant in the study stated:
Within Vision 2030 there are constituencies that have been mentioned as facing vulnerability and poverty which need to be addressed. Cash transfers sit squarely within these efforts in Vision 2030 (TTC_03, 26/1/2016).

In line with the selectivity that characterises cash transfer schemes on the continent, a perusal of the document indicated government’s plans for setting up a fund for older persons only with no reference to other groups of persons. Further scrutiny of the document revealed that though Vision 2030 claims the equal importance of the three pillars for the achievement of development, like Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, the framework takes a neo-liberal approach to development, where markets and the private sector play a major role, with the document stating that economic development is the foundation for social development. According to the participants, the government was interested in the establishment and expansion of social protection to fulfill its long-term strategy on development as articulated in Vision 2030. The statement however is discrepant with the way the social protection paradigm emerged in the country as discussed in the previous chapters. In relation to the HSNP for example, the programme was developed without government participation. DFID insulated the programme from the government and the political class. The reality of the social protection policy transfer is that it was based on coercion and soft pressure.

Though Vision 2030 states that the government will by 2012 “establish a consolidated fund for social protection” (Government of Kenya, 2007b, p. 21), by the time of this study the government had not set up the fund. Participants were sceptical of government setting it up and were doubtful that it would happen. Staff at the Secretariat were equally doubtful and outlined that “though the issue of coordination of the programmes is ongoing we doubt as Vision 2030 if this will lead to the setting up of the funds as envisaged in the Vision 2030” (MFP_01, 22/4/2016). Participants mentioned political hindrances to setting up the fund, pointing out that the current government, though interested in the expansion of social protection programmes, had paid little attention to Vision 2030 as the country’s development blueprint. Other participants mentioned that continued donor funding for social protection reduced pressure for the government to set up the fund, thereby highlighting the issue of a lack of ownership by the government on the imposed programmes.
9.2.3 Children’s Act and the National Plan for Action for OVC

Participants within the study identified the Children’s Act (2001) and the National Plan for Action for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (2008) as key institutional frameworks on which the CT-OVC was founded. As stated by a participant in the study:

> The programme is anchored on the Children’s Act of 2001 where the government has a mandate to safeguard children. Particularly after the vagaries of HIV and AIDS there was a need for the government to provide coping mechanisms for children (MGCSD_03, 25/4/2016).

A perusal of the Children’s Act and the National Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children shows no mention of social protection programmes or cash transfer schemes. Rather the documents have sections related to child well-being and welfare. The Act was developed in 2001 under the leadership of the Children’s Council with the broad aim of safeguarding the rights and securing the welfare and well-being of children in Kenya (Government of Kenya, 2001) at a time when there was “widespread suffering of children on a number of issues with orphanhood being the main source of the suffering” (MGCSD_03, 25/4/2016). The targeting model for the CT-OVC is inefficient in itself to promote the welfare and the well-being of children. In addition, it reinforces selectivity, as unselected families may be poorer than those with orphans. From the interviews, a member of the Council stated that their participation in the design of the CT-OVC was limited to the initial phase of the programme and therefore they could not influence the targeting mechanism (CSO_06, 12/8/2016). Though council members participated at some point, their role was peripheral and restricted to advocacy with Members of Parliament for increased budgetary support for the programme. The council member who is also a member of civil society confirmed that even up to the time of this study, their participation in strategic aspects of the programme is limited.

The National Plan for Action for OVC was much more explicit on addressing problems of vulnerability. In the document, social protection is highlighted as one of the strategies to “…enhance support of orphans and vulnerable children through policy development and support of safety nets such as cash transfer schemes for OVC” (Government of Kenya, 2008, p. 8). The strategic plan laid down the basis for the CT-OVC, based on orphanhood and vulnerability, and provided a framework for adding an increasing number of households into the already existing programme. With the first plan of action developed in 2004, the CT-OVC drew from
the Act in reaching out to orphaned households through the cash transfer programme. The National Plan was developed with the participation of the Department of Children and the Ministry of Health, and was therefore skewed in addressing the issue of vulnerability among children from an HIV/AIDS perspective, leaving out other factors that contribute to child vulnerability. From the interviews conducted, it was evident that the document was influential in justifying the expansion of the CT-OVC later after adoption. The plan was developed at the same time as the beginning of the CT-OVC. In addition, its development was facilitated by UNICEF, that had an interest in setting up the CT-OVC. The document was therefore created to fit with UNICEF’s preferred prescription.

Beyond compatibility of the HSNP and the CT-OVC with existing frameworks, the study examined how the socio-economic reality of the country mediated the adoption of the programmes. The examination of these factors focusses on four aspects: persistent national poverty, the effect of HIV and AIDS, marginalisation and vulnerability, and the popularity of cash transfers.

9.3 National Context as Windows of Opportunity

The national or domestic context provides windows of opportunity that enable successful policy transfer. As will be demonstrated, however, windows of opportunity themselves are dependent upon actors’ constructions (Schmidt, 2010). Transnational organisations hinge their policy advocacy around these circumstances. As has been demonstrated in Chapter 7 of the thesis, transnational actors framed policy narratives along social and economic lines to influence policy adoption. In this section, the aspects of poverty, HIV and AIDS, marginalisation in Northern Kenya, and the global popularity of cash transfers within international development circles are considered to highlight their mediative role in the adoption of the programmes.

9.3.1 The Poverty Situation in Kenya

Poverty and its manifestations were one of the dominant factors that accounted for the adoption of cash transfer programmes in Kenya. As mentioned previously in the thesis, coming out of structural adjustment programmes, poverty levels had grown and deepened (Government of Kenya, 2003) to levels that required urgent resolution. Following the harsh consequences of SAPs, poverty levels had risen to high levels as scores of the population could not afford basic
services and goods as a result of a loss of jobs. Emanating from the powerful global discourse and financial provisioning from international organisations, the idea of cash in alleviating poverty resonated at national level. International organisations conducted studies on the effects of poverty on different categories of the population. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, organisations promoting cash transfers for specific groups of people conducted studies to validate their advocacy and to create policy narratives.

Cash transfer provision as promoted by international organisations as a solution to poverty appealed to governments in the region and in Kenya too. Evidence was used to buffet the schemes and valorised the effects of studies on early adopters like Latin America and South Africa. Following on impact assessments from South Africa and other Southern African countries, it became easy for Kenya to adopt the CT-OVC and the HSNP as new policy solutions to poverty. In this respect, a representative of civil society in the study stated:

We are poor – there is poverty which has to be addressed. So, anyone who could come with what looks like a solution, people will go to them for solutions. It is just the same situation in our countries, we are poor – anyone who brings us a solution is a saviour. It is not because people are silly, they have seen people who can deal with their problems (CSO_04, 28/9/2016).

In acknowledging the issue of poverty, his sentiments reflected the continued quest by the Government of Kenya in seeking solutions for national problems of poverty from other places considered successful in poverty reduction. The idea of “a saviour with a solution” provided another opportunity for the government to test out a programme for poverty reduction. However, from past experience and as demonstrated in Chapter 5 of this study, policy solutions in Africa are exogenous. African countries and leaders do not seek policy solutions; rather, prescriptions are imposed upon them with little understanding of the domestic context, thereby having little impact on poverty reduction. Past policy options which have not yielded much in poverty reduction include but are not limited to Focus on Rural Development and the PRSPs. In addition, as demonstrated in Chapter 8, the fact that donors were providing funding for the programmes at the initial phases of the programme made it easier for the government to accept the piloting of the programmes.
Participants in the study recognised that society accepted that poverty levels were high and in need of a solution. Following normative structures of care, communities therefore accepted the idea of cash transfers. As one participant in the study put it:

There was acceptance within the community that people needed to be helped based on the poverty they were experiencing at the time. In addition, the selection criteria of both the HSNP and the CT-OVC based on some levels of poverty was an indication of acceptability of the programmes within the wider society (CSO_3, 12/2/2016).

Thus, the programmes not only resonated with the government but also within the communities where cash was to be distributed. Programmes, however, were based on targeting and in this case enforced selectivity thus worked to diminish social solidarity and cohesion (Lavinas, 2013; Adésína, 2015). Sharing and caring for the destitute has since pre-colonial periods been part of long-established kinship traditions where people take care of each other in times of need, as espoused by among others Mwalimu Julius Nyerere through Ujamaa (Ferguson, 2015). The idea of providing for the need in times of need, though with a significant change in kinship relations, was considered a key feature of social protection and remains ingrained in communities, thereby explaining the acceptance of cash transfer programmes as poverty solutions. Cash transfers themselves were primarily financed by international organisations. In addition, support for the destitute in African settings required those who could work to meet their needs – therefore social provisioning was in the context of full employment.

9.3.2 HIV and AIDS – Orphanhood Societal Social Fabric
Child vulnerability due to HIV/AIDS provided one of the national factors that propelled the acceptability of the CT-OVC. In an attempt to respond to the vulnerability brought about, Kenya tested the scheme and provided families with orphans with an initial monthly cash payment of KES 500 (Bosworth et al., 2016). Based on figures provided in 2003, the number of orphaned children in the country was close to 1.6 million and those estimated as due to HIV and AIDS approaching 892,000 (UNAIDS, UNICEF and USAID, 2002). The programme was designed to target those orphaned from HIV and AIDS. The rationale behind targeting those orphaned by HIV and AIDS is problematic. First, it was difficult to ascertain the circumstances under which the parents had died. It could only be inferred which cases were a result of HIV
and AIDS, and therefore this mode of qualification was later abandoned. In addition, it provided a moral contradiction when asking families about the cause of death. This shows the problems with the initiation of the cash transfers schemes; it was about landing on the most convincing narrative upon which to create a compelling narrative. Orphanhood was not a new phenomenon, but it suddenly became imperative to find a solution to it. The HIV and AIDS pandemic provided an opportunity to provide the solution of cash transfers.

Considered the worst epidemics in sub-Saharan Africa, with high numbers of children and households affected, a solution had to be arrived at to address the rising vulnerability among children. In explaining the reason behind decisions leading to the adoption of the programme, interview sources highlighted that the effect of HIV and AIDS on children brought to the fore the issue of orphanhood among children, with the prevalence rate of the epidemic making a solution to address the situation an urgent matter. The concern for the initiation of the programme was with the issue of HIV and AIDS rather than orphanhood, with the false assumption that all orphanhood was a result of the pandemic. One of the respondents expounded on this at length as follows:

At that time in 2002 there had been what is called the rapid assessment of OVC issues that had been conducted virtually in all countries in Southern Africa, so it was a rough and ready assessment of the impact of HIV/AIDS and its predictive impact on the numbers of orphans and what was currently ongoing to help states handle this crisis. It was very much spurred by the great sense of a crisis in Southern Africa where cases of HIV/AIDS were greater than the rest, but the rest of Africa was sort of swept up. In that general sense of Southern African crisis these rapid assessments were carried out and you can find them on the internet – each country had a separate report put together (IOS_04, 13/3/2016).

Beyond the flawed targeting approach employed in the CT-OVC, another salient issue that emerges in policy transfers is the nature in which policy promoters presented the phenomenon as a crisis. Creation of a crisis is necessary in creating windows of opportunity where the problem is presented in a dramatic manner in need of urgent attention, thereby creating an opportunity for policy ideas (Howlett, McConnell and Perl, 2015).
HIV and AIDS provided a strong impetus upon which the CT-OVC was designed and initiated by UNICEF and the Department of Children’s Services. The prevalence rate in the country at the time was estimated at 9 per cent, with some districts being as high as 15 per cent (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). A government official acknowledged that the dire situation of children at the time necessitated the adoption of the cash transfer programme by stating that:

The programme came about as a response to the UN declaration and the UNGASS 2002 response to the after-effects of HIV. As a result, there were a lot of OVC and the number of growing children without parents as HIV had grown to a great proportion. We sought out for friends who included UNICEF. They thought they needed to find a way to support the growing number of orphans (MGSCD-02, 12/5/2016).

In stressing the point, one of the participants pointed out that:

For UNICEF, it was more of mitigation for the then situation of OVC and the overstretch of kinship ways of taking care of orphans and street children (IOS_04, 12/4/2016).

The reality of the effect of HIV on children by the number of orphans and the increase of children living on the streets was evidence of the breakdown of the social fabric and the lack of proper coping mechanisms within households affected. The respondent from UNICEF, in explaining the situation, further pointed to the inadequacies and the deficiencies of alternative mechanisms like orphanages in addressing the situation. According to the National Plan for OVC, orphanages were recommended as the last resort as coping mechanisms for children. To support families and households affected, proposals included the provision of support through cash transfer programmes to enable households to take care of children. A look at the amount being offered shows that the strategies of employing cash transfers are not about poverty reduction. At the beginning of the programmes, cash transfers amounted to KES 500 per household and were later increased to KES 2000.

The logic advanced by promoters of cash transfers was that starting from a high amount of funds would not be accepted by the government. It was better to start at a low amount and get the government “trapped”. Once the programme was rolled out and in implementation, the perception was that the government could not stop the programmes for fear of reprisal; the only
way possible was for the government to increase the amount. The strategies and tactics employed by international organisations were therefore unorthodox and not policymaking strategies. In some cases, it bordered on deceiving governments to accept programmes. The design of the programmes set the amount of cash transfers at low levels and were therefore insufficient to raise recipients’ income even to the poverty line. The long-term effects on poverty reduction would be minimal. In addition, the poverty thresholds and the benefits paid are not adjusted for inflation making the value of the benefits erode over time.

9.3.3 Marginalisation and Vulnerability
Equally persuasive on the issue of the adaptability and adoption of cash transfer to the Kenyan context was the marginalisation of populations living in Northern Kenya. Evidence points to the marginalisation of the region since the colonial period. Due to its desert-like nature, the region was classified as a “low potential area” at independence, with Sessional Paper No. 10 further relegating the region to the periphery of economic and social development (Kochore, 2016). The post-colonial government made no attempt at addressing the marginalisation, even classifying the region as unproductive; a situation which has persisted to a great extent to date. Several scholars have documented this marginalisation in Northern Kenya, linking it to poor infrastructural development, low service delivery in health and education, low political representation and recent attempts at reintegration and inclusion (Wario Arero, 2007; Odhiambo, 2013; Mosley and Watson, 2016).

Participants in the study recognised the marginalisation of the Northern part of Kenya and viewed the HSNP’s provision of cash to households in the area as a remedial solution to the economic exclusion in the region. To this end, a member of civil society expounded that:

The reason why the evolution of cash is an amazing story is that nobody fights against that because it makes sense. People were gripped by the changes that were happening in this country, including constitutional changes that these groups (in Northern Kenya) are actually the most marginalised and because of their marginalisation Kenyans were willing to give extra; Northern Kenya actually has a marginalisation fund that is different from the HSNP. The country accepts that they were left behind. So the country accepts the idea of a cash programme for the region (CSO_03, 12/2/2016).
But this idea is an ex post factum rationalisation of the policy decision, as the efficacy and efficiency of the programmes can only be judged after implementation. In addition, the idea of providing cash transfers was explained by a participant as part of the food crisis happening around the time and donors were unable to provide food (IOS-03, 13/3/2016). The sentiments of the participant were echoed by others in the study who referred to the rampant government neglect of the region. In his response, the participant added that the marginalisation of Northern Kenya, as was highlighted during the Constitution-making process, offered sufficient evidence to support the HSNP in the region. But the participant’s sentiments are a revisionist account (the rationalisation dependence – ideational and pecuniary – is problematic). The programme had to be shielded from the political class for fear that it may not be accepted. The tactics and strategies used in promoting the programmes were forceful and a manipulation of facts, circumstances, and conditions to ensure policy acceptance. Buffeted by the language in the Constitution that recognised the marginalisation of the region, the idea of a solution aiming at addressing the problem was accepted across the board by policymakers. In linking the problem of marginalisation of some section of Kenyans with the constitutional moment, proponents of the cash transfers provided sufficient and plausible data to drive up advocacy for adoption of the HSNP. But, as mentioned above, the idea of cash instead of food aid was brought about following the food crisis, making it easier to provide cash rather than food.

To further make the case for the HSNP, proponents of the HSNP attributed the vulnerability and poverty levels of the region to marginalisation. But the targeting levels of those enrolled in the programme – equivalent to USD 0.67 per day per household – is lower than poverty levels applied by the World Bank of USD 1.90 per day and insufficient even to meet the daily food needs of a household, especially in times of famine and drought when the price of grains and other food rises. As alleged by HSNP that the programme aims at providing a “cushion in times of drought”, the amount provided is insufficient to cushion against the vagaries of famine. In Turkana, the poorest county, the issue of marginalisation was highlighted as the prime cause of poverty. However, while marginalisation of Northern Kenya is a political consequence, proponents of cash transfers ignored this aspect by excluding politicians from the initial phases of the programmes as has been demonstrated in Chapter 6 of this thesis. The solution to the problem of marginalisation as cash was framed as a technical solution that politicians were kept out of so as not to “politicise the programme”. By excluding politicians in Northern Kenya from the process, the action by the international organisations is consistent with studies by Ferguson (1994) and Li (2007) on how development actors frame political problems in
technical solutions as a way of excluding other actors. Interestingly, years after Ferguson’s ground-breaking study in Lesotho, international organisations continue to deal with development problems in the same manner by suggesting “technical solutions to political problems”.

Coupled with political marginalisation in the area, Northern Kenya experiences perennial drought and famine which is cyclical, thereby compounding the region’s vulnerability. As one of the participants in the study remarked:

DFID saw the HSNP as a response to vulnerability and poverty in arid and semi-arid areas. This was because the government was interested in long-term development rather than the sporadic response that was happening as a result of one-off support during the drought. The main way in which vulnerability was being handled was through food aid that was fraught with leakages, costs, inefficiencies and dependency. Food aid was not seen to be sufficiently addressing the needs of the people at that place. There was a need to address this better and therefore unconditional cash transfers were introduced. The programme was modelled along the OVC programme that had already been started earlier (MDP_01, 7/4/2016).

The HSNP easily found acceptability by the government under these circumstances of perennial hunger and drought. Acceptability from the political class and the bureaucrats also came easy because its adoption would not upset the financial equilibrium within the budget. Acceptability also came from the fact that domestic actors, especially the political and bureaucratic class, are still caught in the neo-liberal frame of thinking which accepts markets as solutions to social provisioning. The advocacy around cash transfer programmes promised to address not only the poverty and vulnerability, but to “promote development through economic empowerment of households” and it is upon these sentiments that countries have adopted cash transfers. The claim is that cash transfers have the prospect of developing skills can rectify underinvestment in capital, thereby “killing several developmental birds with one stone” (Lavinas, 2013, p. 5). Cash transfer provisioning is considered a process through which the economically disengaged can be engaged back into the economic sphere. However, this thinking is contrary to the workings of development where economic empowerment of a
household is a consequence of development and inclusivity. In addition, the statement is a case of ex post factum rationalisation.

### 9.3.4 Popularity of Cash Transfers as a Global Norm

In response to the social reality and the context, cash as an alternative to previous techniques of poverty reduction proved popular with policymakers. Four main reasons were identified during the study as having popularised cash transfers. First, from the perspective of a government official, the popularity stemmed from what he termed “the nature of the social protection provided it. The form of cash promotes the dignity and self-respect of beneficiaries” (MFP_03, 28/9/2016). Impact evaluations conducted equally pointed to this as one of the reasons for the wide support of the cash programmes. As indicated by participants, studies from within and outside of Kenya demonstrated that unlike other development assistance programmes, the provision of cash was perceived to promote the dignity of the people who received the benefits as it allowed them to choose how to meet their needs. This resonates with neo-liberal sentiments as promoted by Hayek. Previous support programmes like food aid were described as rigid and prescriptive, leaving no room for choice for beneficiaries. Promotion of dignity and self-respect together with positive impacts of cash formed part of the advocacy messages by human right organisations. This statement however is a justification for starting the cash transfers rather than the reason. The design of cash transfer itself through targeting is undignified to those enrolled in the programme. Moreover, the amount that is provided is insufficient to provide a life of dignity. Late payments, at times stretching to more than eight months, make the poor more vulnerable as they have to borrow money and later pay back when the stipends are paid.

Second, besides promoting dignity, other participants considered the acceptability of cash transfers as emanating from normative values of society in Kenya and in what they described as the African way of life. The key element of this description is that communities in Kenya have always taken care of the disadvantaged and therefore providing cash to the poor was in keeping with these principles. One of the respondents in the study explained it as follows:

> I think that the need to support poor and vulnerable people is ingrained in our African cultures deeply, so essentially the support mechanisms came from individuals to people who had problems and lately from politicians. So, they took on the burden of being the cash transfer, if there was a problem the politician was expected to provide
in death, for medical treatment, school fees so the idea of cash was based on helping out people already were already doing this. The need for this was recognised by citizens and by politicians (CSO_03, 24/3/2016).

Therefore, in following normative traditions the idea of cash transfers as a means of support to kin was easy to sell to politicians and the public. For the wider society, the spirit of helping those in need was not foreign; money was simply the new way of helping those in need. Social protection, though not in the form of cash transfer programmes, was also not a new phenomenon among communities, as other studies have shown (Ferguson, 2015). Third, participants in the study mentioned that the popularity and acceptance of cash drew from the political economy context of Kenya. Since independence, Kenya has centred on economic development supported by the idea of markets for access to basic services.

Cash transfers for the poor were equated to other schemes like the Youth Fund and the Women’s Fund, making it more acceptable to the government, by a participant in the following way:

The reason why again this is not a problem is that cash-based interventions in development are not only a cash transfer thing. The ability of people to take cash and do whatever they want to do with it is something that runs through the veins of this country since independence. We know if we give people money, they make better choices, so we have a youth fund. So, the youth may not be recipients of cash transfers, but they get quite a lot of money to set up businesses. We have a women’s fund, so the women may not be receiving cash transfers, but they have money. Over and above this, all these groups again have constituency-based funds that they can tap into that these groups that are marginalised have no capacity to tap into but other groups can tap onto (CDF) [Constituency Developments Funds], the constituency bursary fund, so the sense about using money to support development does not create uproar in the country because it seems to be an acceptable way of developing (CSO_03, 12/2/2016).

With government intervention often geared towards this market orientation, providing cash to the poor was not foreign, according to the respondent. It is estimated that for example the Youth Development Fund received KES 385 million as a revolving fund, while for the Women’s Enterprise Fund, the government allocated KES 440 million to be provided to women and
persons with disability as credit to facilitate starting businesses in the 2011/2012 financial year (Government of Kenya, 2011a). Cash as a response to the poor and vulnerable was therefore not foreign as it aligned with the country’s market-oriented trajectory. The idea of politicians providing money to their constituency is however different from the idea of cash transfers, as political handouts stem from a system of political patronage. In addition, the comparison with the Youth Fund is false, as the Youth Fund is provided for productive purposes with recipients expected to repay the funds they receive. Lastly, arguments that cash gives people choices stems from the same neo-liberal ideas about free markers espoused by the Hayek and Friedman’s visions of free markets. In addition, unlike the welfare states model advanced in the 20th century in Europe, the doctrine of cash transfers is an advance of finance-led capitalism, where the poor are expected to get provisions from markets, therefore reinforcing residual tendencies (Lavinas, 2013).

Lastly, participants in the study described cash as “neutral” meaning that beneficiaries could use it as they wished. Participants agreed that while other forms of assistance to the poor were helpful, cash was considered neutral in the sense that it did not seem prescriptive and binding to the recipients and therefore presented a better option from the human rights perspective. In addition, the cash transfer programmes were seen to be benefitting a wide spectrum of people beyond the poor and the vulnerable. One of the participants in reference to this stated that “the programme is also popular because people are making a killing out of them – private sector, NGOs, politicians and others” (CS0_05, 28/9/2016). Apart from the beneficiaries receiving the monthly stipends and the NGOs involved in the programme, this was in reference to service providers from the private sector like banks and telecommunication companies that were part of the payment systems for the cash transfer programmes. But this idea is tied to Hayek’s idea of freedom, where people are free to choose from markets. The current social protection agenda, which is about the financialisation and incorporation of the poor into markets, makes the individual responsible for their fate as the schemes extend commodification through their design, disbursing monetary rewards in exchange for the poor’s participation as consumers. They therefore do not promote the expansion of rights, but rather the retrenchment of welfare. Sentiments of popularity of cash transfers were largely within international organisations in direct implementation of programmes such as HelpAge International who were keen promoting the policies. The next section therefore is a discussion on the role of politics and politicians in mediating the adoption of the programmes.
9.4 Political Processes and Bargains as Mediative Factors

The following section considers the contribution of politics and its dynamics in shaping adoption of the social protection policies. The section provides highlights of how politicians seeking to gain political mileage afforded acceptability to the programmes. In the section, is a discussion of perceptions of government rationality and responsibility to citizens as a mediative factor in adoption.

9.4.1 Gaining Political Mileage

Politics matters for social protection uptake. This is demonstrated in the adapted political settlement framework for social protection which considers how different forms of ruling coalition redistribute social public goods in the form of social protection benefits. A political settlement “refers to the balance of distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes on which any state is based” (Lavers and Hickey, 2016, p. 4). That the political settlement configuration of a country matters in the adoption of cash transfer programmes has been studied by various authors with a view to demonstrate the role of politics in social protection adoption in Africa. To understand political acceptability of social protection in Kenya, it is key to understand Kenya’s political architecture, which has been described variously as “neopatrimonialism” (Kelsall, 2013) and based on competitive clientelist settlements (Lavers, Hickey and others, 2015). But rather than consider political settlements as the key to the adoption of social protection, I consider the kind of politics as a mediative factor in Kenya in the adoption of the two cash transfer schemes. Further, political association with cash transfers did not play a role at the adoption stages as explained in xxxx.

In this regard, political support and acceptability of the programmes emanated from the likely political mileage that would accrue to the political elites both at national and constituency level. Although both the public and Members of Parliament recognised that the government has only been putting money into the programme for the last three years, participants in the study acknowledged that the HSNP in particular had been used as a campaign tool in Northern Kenya where aspirants promised to ensure an expansion of the programme if elected to various political positions. While the study found that Members of Parliament and politicians supported the HSNP, representatives from international organisations added that this could be attributed largely to client-based patronage politics (IOS_02, 24/3/2016). Citing the rejection of the targeting model proposed by donors for HSNP by MPs for a geographical targeting approach, a participant stated that politicians regarded the programme as a campaign tool and therefore a
wide geographical distribution of the programme was to their political advantage (TTC_01, 1/4/2016).

At national level, according to participants in the study, it was easy to gain political mileage out of the programmes. In reference to the current government, a participant pointed out that the Jubilee administration had used the programmes to gain political mileage over their rivals. As explained at length by a respondent:

In Kenya, you cannot draw a line between government and political party of the day. So, government work is used towards the manifesto of the party. The government is saying the Jubilee government has done this… is it the party or the state? With time the line is so blurred. People use government programmes for political mileage, and I think it is one of the reasons that social protection is receiving a lot of political support because it is like the government is doing you a favour – read the political party. Most of these programmes came in during the time the NARC government was on and when the grand coalition was on. Maybe they did not spell it out as much as it is being done now by Jubilee government – but it was for political mileage. It is not Jubilee party doing it but the Government of Kenya. Kibaki (former president) launched the projects then but Jubilee has relaunched the programmes many times like it is a new thing – but just to gain political mileage out of the programmes (CSO_01, 6/4/2016).

The statement resonated with those of other participants in the programme, with some stating that they did not consider it wrong for politicians to use the programme for political reasons as long as the programme was receiving an increased budgetary allocation from Parliament.

But unlike the CDF which MPs have control over, political mileage from cash transfers was not considered as providing direct political mileage. With CDF, Members of Parliament have decision-making control which enables them to manipulate allocation of funds for political expediency. In addition, unlike CDF funds, social protection is a national function, with cash transfers administered directly from the national level to the recipient. MPs therefore gain political mileage by promising increases when in Parliament to their constituents. While there have been reports of MPs making decisions on who gets on to the programme, a study of this was beyond the scope of this study.
Due to the growth of the programmes over the past years and the levels of public awareness, the political class has managed to gain political mileage from the programmes through attribution. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, financing of programmes has grown even with a change of government since 2002. The Jubilee government has however ‘claimed association’ with the programmes more than the previous governments. This has been done through rebranding the programmes as Jubilee projects and through multiple launches of the programmes, in particular the OPCT programme. These actions, according to the study, were techniques through which the Jubilee government was seeking attribution to the programmes. By continuously rebranding the programmes, the public associates the programmes more with Jubilee than previous administrations. For example, the OPCT has been relaunched several times since it started in 2008— in the last five years it has been launched twice. Unlike the other cash transfer programmes, the government and the political elite view the OPCT as a means of gaining political mileage for the elections in 2017 as older persons are considered a voting bloc by politicians.

This study also found out that the perceived levels of corruption among the political class contributed to the acceptance of the programme among politicians. This was however not in relation to their control of the funds but the sense that cash transfer programmes created perceptions of “redistribution” to the poor, thereby deflecting attention from their corruption. As one of the civil society members observed:

Another reason it [the adoption of cash transfers] does not cause an uproar is that politicians are corrupt, and they would rather take the money and use it as they wish. So essentially people would argue that would you rather your grandmother gets this money, or it goes through corruption to some politician (CSO_03, 12/2/2016).

As captured by the sentiments of the above participant, perceptions around the provision of cash transfers were that if the money is not given the poor, it would be misused by politicians. Coupled with the client-patronage dynamic characterising the politics of Kenya, not only did perceptions of corruption provide acceptability within the political class but also with members of the public who according to the participant saw it as a form of redistribution.
9.4.2 Government Responsibility to Citizens

Contrary to opinions that governments take on programmes solely for political mileage, a differing opinion that emerged from this study indicated that governments are responsible and are always seeking out ways to address socio-economic problems within the country. This view differed from others as it depicted government as responsible, which is often contrary to opinions expressed by civil society organisations and at times international organisations. As stated in his view a participant in the study asserted that:

Governments have a desire to sort problems and this was one such problem. We are poor but contrary to the belief that African governments do not care about their people, this is not true, they think the government is and doesn’t care about us… which is not true. They [government] also want to try to help, they desire to respond to the needs of the people… they do care about the welfare of their people – they are looking for ways of alleviating problems and we as Africans are persuaded to take on a lot of things, some of them not so good, in order to address the plight of people. You cannot rule out the fact that when a carrot is dangled before us, we take it – we run for it. But I believe that genuinely a lot of our governments are trying to help, and they fall into a few traps here and there (CSO_05, 28/9/2016).

This view of government as responsible, though not common, was expressed by a participant from civil society. The common view often expressed in relation to development work in developing countries portrays states in Africa as unconcerned with ending poverty and other ills that affect citizens. A look at the literature indicates that development work, especially that involving transnational actors, is often about replacing the government in service provision as the government is considered to be unresponsive and failing to meet the needs of its citizens. However, contrary to other findings and in line with these suggestions from the study, governments can prioritise social spending under certain circumstances, as was demonstrated during the period after independence.

One of the factors that facilitated acceptability of the cash transfer programmes therefore emerged from government’s desire and responsibility for finding a solution to poverty, vulnerability and marginalisation in the country. And though there may be political pressure for adoption of cash transfers from donors, the sentiments reflect government responsibility in
seeking solutions to national problems. Following the discussion on government above, the next section examines the role of officials within government in the promotion of the programmes.

9.5 Individuals/Champions

While institutions matter for policy change, the mediational role of individuals remains largely unexplored. However, it emerged from the interviews that transnational actors relied on domestic actors and individuals to mediate the adoption of the two cash transfer programmes. Policy actors mentioned that individual politicians and bureaucrats influenced the policy process. Participants in the interviews repeatedly referred to them as champions of social protection. In the section below, I discuss the part played by political champions and bureaucrats in mediating the policy transfer process.

9.5.1 Political Champions

According to study participants from transnational organisations, it was crucial that the cash transfer programmes gain political support if they were to be adopted, which suggests that the idea of cash transfers was not axiomatic as a solution in the initial stages needing justification. For the CT-OVC, gaining political clout for acceptability was easy, as the Department of Children’s Services was situated within a Ministry headed by the Vice President. The Vice President, according to interviews, was influential in getting the programme’s accepted and those interviewed recalled his contribution to the adoption of the CT-OVC. Sentiments intimated that he assumed the role of champion and crusader for the programme within political circles and at the Cabinet level. His role as a policy champion was discussed by respondents in various instances. First, his role was to gather political support for the programme and then to mediate the inclusion of the cash transfer programme in the PEPFAR funding proposal. At political level, his contribution was discussed as follows:

Vice President Moody Awori played a vital role in the adoption of the CT-OVC. There were too many children on the streets and there were no families to take them in. Support for those who were living at home was largely by grandparents who themselves were overwhelmed. Most of the older persons were poor and could not even engage in any business. It started as an experiment with KES 500 and we were amazed by the results (IOS_03, 13/3/2016).
Another respondent in the study remarked:

There was the role that the Vice President at that time, Honourable Moody Awori. It was mostly not institutions but individual champions in institutions that promoted the programmes, like Moody Awori (MGSCD_02, 12/5/2016).

According to interview sources, the Vice President was instrumental in pushing the agenda at cabinet level and also for the formation of the committee of OVC in parliament. In this regard, he set the tone for acceptability of the programme within his ministry, cabinet and in parliament. His role in brokering for the inclusion of the CT-OVC into the proposal by PEPFAR has been described in Chapter 7 of the study. Through his political office, he ensured the inclusion of the CT-OVC into the PEPFAR proposal even though funding for the programme was declining at the time.

Within the HSNP, the Minister of Northern Kenya and Arid Areas was identified as the political champion for the programme. The minister, who was also a Member of Parliament from Northern Kenya, promoted the acceptability of the programme within the Cabinet and among the political class by presenting impact assessment data with colleagues within various parliamentary committees (MP_02, 27/9/2016). In advocacy for the programme, video clips were developed with the minister “championing” the programme, demonstrating the impact of the cash transfer scheme. However, one respondent stated that unlike the CT-OVC, the HSNP created only one champion. This may be attributed to the fact that in in the first phase of the programme there was no need for government financing, as DFID covered all the costs related to the programme. For the CT-OVC, proponents of the programme raised various champions of children within the parliamentary team, which may be credited for the fast adoption of the programme by members of parliament.

9.5.2 Making of Bureaucratic Champions

The bureaucratic role in policymaking is often hardly discussed beyond implementation, with scholarship on policy transfer discussions centring on the role of other actors, especially transnational actors. However, as discussed under the role of politicians in this chapter, government officials’ actions facilitated the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP, with research findings indicating that for some middle-level bureaucrats, their role went beyond
facilitating policy uptake to developing programmes that were later adopted by government. As explained by several of the participants in the study, the individuals who were important for the advancement of the social protection agenda were middle-level officials who formed the first line of contact with international organisations and members of epistemic communities. Two were specifically mentioned through the interviews, one being the Director of Children’s Services at the time, and the other the Deputy Director at the Department of Social Services. In explaining their mediational role, one study participant stated:

Champions included individuals who were people with a vision and were ready to move with the vision; they were government officials and some of the Members of Parliament. The individuals were those who believed that the programme could work. They had been converted mostly through the trips to Brazil that targeted high officials in government. They supported and pushed the agenda and were able to drive political will, able to talk and articulate the matters clearly (MGCSD-01, 23/3/2016).

As explained by the respondent, the champions were passionate about the programme. To motivate this passion, international organisations provided adequate technical and training opportunities for them. Influencing of preferences and desires was achieved through training of the identified champions which included numerous trips to countries where cash transfer programmes were under implementation, like Brazil and South Africa. Those regarded as champions were also close to ministers and Permanent Secretaries who they influenced for the uptake of the cash transfer programmes. Some of the characteristics that were considered important were their ability to influence politicians and other top civil servants, and their articulation and advocacy of the programmes. Through the various training sessions that were carried out, their skills were enhanced to enable them have the capacity to speak on the programmes and articulate them to convince other players. This was stated as follows by one of the participants:

Individual relationships that we managed to develop also provided confidence in the programmes – most of the ways in which we did things and developed relationships was largely informal, but we managed to build relationships with individuals who helped to propel the cash transfer agenda (IOS_03, 13/3/2016).
International promoters built informal relations with the bureaucrats. Informal relations here included working directly with the persons and even provision of hardware material to incentivise their championship for the cash transfer programmes. Most bureaucratic “champions” were equipped with laptops, computers, and phones by international organisations to make their work easier.

Individuals intimated that personal motivation and experience propelled champions to promote the cash transfer programmes. In an interview with one identified as a champion for the CT-OVC, he stated that:

There was also personal initiative after I had seen the situation of children. I went around the globe explaining to people about the programme, personal initiative from different people. As a head of department, it was my duty to grow the programme and to make sure it was adopted. There was also the role played by politicians particularly the VP Moody Awori at the time. The plight of OVCs could not be ignored. It was heart-breaking to see children suffer so much. One needs to have a passion for OVCs and seek to do things outside the box. I had to make sacrifices beyond me and my family. We at the department were passionate about helping the orphans and so we became fanatics to the programme. I had to provide leadership for the programme (MGSCD_02, 12/5/2016).

In speaking about the passion to see the programme, particularly the OVC, growing, the champion underscored his interest in the promotion of the CT-OVC and suggested that there were personal reasons for his interest in the programme. But from previous discussions regarding the amount and targeting, the statement is symptomatic of the levels of poverty that have become accepted. Cash transfers in inadequate amounts cannot lead to transformation. In addition, the focus on cash transfers can most likely divert budget funds from other social programmes like education and health, therefore compromising the whole aspect of poverty reduction (Lavinas, 2013). Others mentioned as crusaders of the programmes included individuals from civil society organisations that championed social protection in general. As policy entrepreneurs, study participants described several characteristics that made the champions resourceful in the policy process. Some of these characteristics included their ability to work across sectors, enabling them to advocate and work with diverse groups ranging from
civil society to Members of Parliament who they were able to lobby as playing a facilitative role.

As demonstrated in the section above, several factors mediated the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. However, study findings suggest that the following factors described below constrained to some extent the adoption and expansion of the programmes.

9.6 Constraining Factors in Adoption

Research findings indicate that there were constraining factors in the adoption of cash transfer schemes and social protection policies. Study participants indicated two barriers to the policy transfer process: perceptions of waste of funds and constrained financial resources. The two constraining factors are discussed below:

9.6.1 Perceptions of Wastage of Funds

The notion of giving cash to the poor continues to be debated as a social policy instrument choice in sub-Saharan Africa, as the idea of giving cash to the poor, no strings attached, is considered radical. Giving cash to people has sometimes been termed “throwing money down the drain” and it is these perceptions that constrained international agents’ promotion of social protection policies in Kenya. According to research findings, sceptical sentiments and doubts around the policy option arose particularly from politicians and bureaucrats at the Treasury. While the political elite facilitated the adoption of the programmes, on the one hand, participants in the study mentioned that in some circumstances they challenged the idea of “giving handouts” as a policy solution. Political inhibitions towards the idea of giving out cash were discussed in the following way by a participant in the study:

In the US, they had started to challenge social protection, saying it was a waste of resources: needs to be rethought but at least it didn’t get to that point where it was seen as social welfare – making people lazy and all that. There is a plus in the sense that there is the basic framework. The challenge remains in expanding it to include all the vulnerable people (CSO_03, 12/2/2016).

As has been discussed in previous chapters, technocrats within the Ministry of Finance were considered hindrances to the adoption of cash transfers based on the same statement above.
The idea that one could just give money to the poor was contested. Giving cash to the poor in Africa is viewed by some as a waste of money. While studies have shown the impact of the programmes on households and individuals, during the initial phases of the programme questions arose, with others worrying that “the poor will drink the money away”, or “will marry another wife”. Statements of wastage however as discussed by Ferguson (2015) emanate from neo-liberal and Marxian ideas of thought, where the previous sentiments held that social provision was achieved through work and thereafter wages could be used for access of goods. But in the case of Kenya, transfers were targeted at those unable to engage in any work to earn an income or wages. Moreover, as pointed out by several scholars, the changing dynamics of society means that a majority of even those that would wish to work, have no jobs as unemployment increasingly becomes part of Kenya’s economy. To debunk the “mindset of the poor wasting funds”, a participant in the study stated that proponents of the programmes enhanced ideational activities that involved changing perceptions through conferences, study tours and training sessions targeted at doubtful groups. For politicians, the prospect of gaining political mileage out of the programmes broke down their resistance to the programmes.

9.6.2 Limited Financial Capacity of Government

As mentioned in Chapter 8, government’s financial capacity to undertake a programme can hinder policy change. According to study participants, the adoption of the cash transfer schemes demanded extra financing from already-constrained government resources. Financial constraints hampered adoption and expansion efforts. Government structures, according to transnational actors who participated in the study, could not support the rapid expansion of programmes. Staff members were also not well equipped to administer the programmes. These challenges were more pronounced within the CT-OVC, which relied on government structures and funding for implementation.

In regard to government laxity with regard to the HSNP, a participant from the government remarked “the HSNP is an expensive programme to run and government cannot take it on as it is” (MDP_01, 7/4/2016). The statement was made in reference to the sophistication of the programme, which requires different structures of operation from the other three programmes. Respondents mentioned the complicated payment mechanism and the use of the private sector in the implementation of the programme as costly compared to other programmes within government structures. The Member of Parliament suggested that a merger with the other
programmes may facilitate its adoption by government. The statement by the Member of Parliament offers insight into government thinking around the HSNP. Despite sentiments that government was interested in taking on the cash transfer, this remains questionable. Reluctance in funding by government and threats of withdrawal by DFID indicate that the programmes were not endogenous and that adoption occurred through pressure. In addition, it is indicative of earlier arguments that policy promoters manipulated and sometimes created conditions which others perceived as mediative in the adoption of cash transfers.

The following section offers a conclusion to the chapter.

9.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have considered the facilitative and the constraining factors to the adoption of social protection policies. Drawing from the CT-OVC and the HSNP, the study has found that national context, including policy compatibility, political bargaining and the role of “individual champions”, mediated the adoption of the programmes. Where there were similar policies to the one being transferred, it was easy for policy transfers to occur and the policies to be adopted. The Constitution of Kenya of 2010, the Children’s Act and the National Plan of Action for OVCs played a contingent role upon which policies related to cash transfer policies were built. Prevailing contextual socio-economic realities in Kenya like poverty and HIV and AIDS provided windows of opportunity for promotion of the two programmes as remedies to the long-standing effects of the problems of poverty, vulnerability, and marginalisation. In the chapter, I also examined individual agency in the policymaking process, citing politicians and civil servants as champions. Inasmuch as the context shaped the adoption of the policies, what is important is how policy proponents shaped and pitched their agenda around the factors discussed above.

Besides the facilitative factors leading to the adoption of the programmes, I examined two factors that constrained the adoption and expansion of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. These factors as discussed during interviews are the perceptions surrounding cash transfer as a waste of funds and limited state resources as a constraint to expansion.

The next chapter concludes the study by bringing together the findings to come up with a key summary of findings, implications, and contribution of the study.
CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION

10.1 Introduction
The purpose of this two-case study was to explore the processes of transfer and adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP programmes in Kenya. The conclusions from this study are linked to the research questions and centre around four main areas: (1) Power was pivotal in shaping interactions, interests, incentives and resources to bring policy change; (2) Policy change involved the creation of a discursive hegemony and a structure of knowledge and social construction; (3) The structural mechanism of policy transfer involved catalysing and enforcing conditionalities on financing; and (4) Manipulation of institutions and a creation of context—social, political and economic dynamics—provided windows of opportunity and critical junctures to mediate and align with the transfer process. Below, I discuss the major findings and conclusions from this research. Thereafter I offer some recommendations regarding both practice and further research, followed by a final reflection on this study.

10.2 Summary of Key Findings and Conclusions
The main aims of this study were as follows: the first intention was to examine the role of actors, ideas, incentives and interests in the development of the CT-OVC and HSNP as social protection instruments in Kenya. The second was to examine the national context that mediated the policy transfer process. The study, through this examination, sought to provide a greater understanding into the dynamics, processes and mechanisms leading to the adoption of the social protection programmes in Kenya and other developing countries, particularly in Africa. To achieve this end, the study developed three research questions.

1. How did policy actors, ideas, incentives and interests shape the development and adoption of the CT-OVC and HSNP?
2. What institutional, administrative and political factors have facilitated or constrained the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP in Kenya?
3. What lessons can be drawn from the transfer and adoption of the cash transfer programmes in Kenya?

Below I summarise the broad findings of the research questions.
10.2.1 Power was Pivotal in Policy Change: Power Relations in the Policy Process

The first major finding of the study is that an asymmetrical exercise of power within the policy space was pivotal in the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. Social actors with different interests and sources of legitimacy, and possessing different resource bases in the policy space influenced each other to bring about policy uptake. International organisations, due to their resource base, in form of finances and knowledge, exercised greater power than other social agents. For example, they influenced the process in more ways in comparison with domestic civil society members whose influence lay in their proximity to the political elites. Politicians, on the other hand, as influential veto players and influential national actors in national policymaking processes, challenged decisions by transnational actors. Actors employed their resources as tools of power in the policy space.

Through an exercise of power, transnational actors introduced and pressured the Government of Kenya to adopt cash transfers, thereby altering the social policy landscape in Kenya. As demonstrated, contrary to views that governments and national processes remain dominant in policy formulation and that the role of transnational actors is overestimated in policymaking (Béland, 2009; Deacon and Stubbs, 2013; Lavers and Hickey, 2016; Hickey et al., 2018), this study concludes that transnational actors can force exogenous policies upon governments. Transnational actors relating to other social actors in pursuit of the adoption of CT-OVC and HSNP exercised power in three ways (Ouma and Adésínà, 2018). First, they exercised power by shaping the agenda. This was achieved, among other means by defining the problem to be addressed and providing a solution to it, and through decision-making processes. The second technique adopted by international organisations was constraining the options, actions and agency of other actors in the policy space. This was achieved largely through exclusion from and the inclusion of other agents in the advocacy network, and also by setting up parallel structures within which international organisations operated, thereby excluding other agents from the policy space. Thirdly, international organisations exercised power by influencing the preferences of other agents for policy acceptance through social learning and the transmission of norms and practices.

A conclusion that can be drawn from this finding in line with authors’ views (Bache and Taylor, 2003; Mkandawire, 2010; Peck, 2011; Prior and Barnes, 2011; Preece, 2013; Adésínà, 2014; Abdulai, 2019) is that power forms the underlying factor in policy transfer and policymaking
processes in circumstances where there is an asymmetrical relationship between the promoter and the recipient country. In this case, the promoter’s positionality is more powerful than the recipient based on their resource base, financial and knowledge, which they exercise to bring about policy change. In adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP the subtlety of the exercise of power was displayed in everyday processes and acts of policy transfer. However, it proved powerful in policy transfer processes and in shaping the implementation of the adopted policies. In addition, to buffer their resource base, international organisations formed partnerships with domestic organisations and actors within the policy space and even created organisations to promote their agenda.

10.2.2 Power in Social Learning: Discursive Hegemony, Structure of Knowledge and Social Construction

The second major finding of this study is that power in social learning involves the creation of a discursive hegemony and a structure of knowledge, and social construction to make ideas powerful for policy change. To understand how ideational mechanisms brought about policy change, the study went beyond a description of the learning activities employed and instead demonstrated how social learning mechanisms were made powerful enough to bring about change. While others portray policy learning as a benign rational process (Kpessa, 2010; Foli, 2015), the findings of the study were that social learning was complex, involving competition, manipulation and contestation, as suggested by several other authors (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2007; Adésínà, 2011; Schmidt, 2011; Mkandawire, 2014; Petridou, 2014; Rodgers, 2014). Ideational mechanisms were made powerful through the creation of a discursive hegemony. The influence of social learning, the sharing of knowledge, norms and practices through training, study tours and conferences, depended on who generated the knowledge, how it was generated and how it was used in the policy space. To further embolden ideational approaches, transnational actors and promoters of the cash transfer policies positively constructed the target groups of the CT-OVC and the HSNP and created persuasive policy narratives to bring about policy uptake.

10.2.3 Structural Mechanisms of Policy Transfer Involved Catalysing and Enforcing Conditionalities on Financing

Structural mechanisms of transfer involved soft power based on the provision of financial resources through catalysing and incentivising government financing. In the initial phases of
the transfer process, international organisations provided financing to the programmes to stimulate financing and government buy-in. In the later phase of adoption, following slow government uptake, donor organisations relied on a coercive funding model Programme for Results (P4R) to induce government financing to the programmes. Contrary to views that international organisations are policy proposers who prefer softer forms of policy transfers (Foli and Béland, 2014; Hernandez, 2017), this finding suggests that imposition of conditionalities still remains a significant mechanism of force by international organisations, as suggested by other authors (Easterly and Williamson, 2011; Peck, 2011; Molenaers, Dellepiane and Faust, 2015). Both structural mechanisms for financing bore mixed results. On the one hand, the government responded to the catalysing efforts by providing financing through budget allocation; on the other hand, it failed to increase financing resulting in the closure of programmes. The P4R, as demonstrated in the study, also produced mixed results, with the government falling short of meeting its targets.

A conclusion that can be drawn is that financial provision involved an exercise of power through catalysing aid and enforcing conditions. Financing based on conditionalities formed the core mechanism of policy transfer mechanisms without which the Government of Kenya would not have adopted programmes.

10.2.4 Power involved a Manipulation of Institutions and Context to Create Windows of Opportunity for Policy Transfer

The fourth major finding is that though the national context mediated the transfer and adoption of cash transfer policies, actors create the context to provide windows of opportunity and critical junctures. As suggested by other authors, mediative factors are often conditioned or manipulated to fit within the framework of the idea or policy solution (Schmidt, 2011). Political institutions in addition did not provide sufficient impetus for policy adoption. Recent studies explaining the adoption of social protection policies as a function of political institutions (Chinyoka and Seekings, 2016; Siachiwena, 2016, 2017) fail to consider first the constraining power of international organisations through depoliticisation of the policy space and second that some of the institutions are creations of international organisations or sediments of diffusion (Solingen, 2012). Political institutions, like electoral processes, are insufficient in explaining the adoption of social protection policies since social protection schemes are largely donor-funded and therefore are not high on campaign agendas yet.
10.3 Policy Recommendations

Following the analyses in this study, the following recommendations are suggested to guide actors – both national and international – involved in policymaking processes. Policy processes are complex and complicated, rendering the process non-linear, and requiring great attention. First, transnational actors are advised to take on a more genuine approach in involving domestic actors in policy processes. Participation and the involvement of domestic actors need to move from the cosmetic rhetoric to an active role starting from the initial stages of policy processes. This level of involvement can be achieved two-fold. First, it can be achieved through enabling national actors who take the lead in policy formulation, especially in the agenda-setting stages. In so doing, national actors’ role is not relegated to implementation or “rubber-stamping” of policy recommendations.

Second, domestic actors need to reclaim their space in national policymaking processes and take charge of making decision concerning policies. Despite the asymmetrical relationship that characterises policy transfer and those that are global in nature, space for policy engagement exists for national actors. Domestic policy actors therefore, based on their knowledge base and veto power, ought to demonstrate more agency in the policy space by creating their own spaces and taking advantage of their sources of legitimacy to shape policy processes. Due to globalisation forces and the need to learn from others, policy transfer processes will continue with powerful institutional actors like international organisations that developing countries depend on for aid continuing to influence policy outcomes. But with the changing aid landscape and the diminishing role of transnational actors in global processes, there is now greater room for domestic actors to exercise their agency within the policy space to a greater extent even in circumstances where transnational actors impose policy reforms through structural mechanisms.

Following this recommendation, to increase local ownership of the programme, transnational actors ought to recognise the skills, context, knowledge, and the mandate of domestic actors in the policymaking process. Ideational approaches in policy transfer as discussed in the thesis aim at creating ownership among recipient countries to take over the programmes. Continuous and perpetual involvement and supervision by transnational actors therefore undermine ownership of transferred policies and crowds out local capacity. In addition, the creation of parallel structures outside of existing government structures and institutions harms the role of state agencies and perpetuates the need of international actors’ presence in the policy space.
Technical assistance by international organisations therefore needs to have a determined period of time after which domestic actors ought to take a leading role in policy implementation.

Additionally, developing countries and in this particular case Kenya, need to break from tendencies of policy adoption based on donor prescriptions. Here a return to nationalistic policies that worked based on the principles of transformative social policy would provide policy options that have been tried, tested and proven. A return to the nationalistic policy era which contributed to a decrease in poverty levels with the adoption of broader policy instruments beyond the narrow policy instrumentation to selected populations is recommended.

10.4 Limitations and Future Research

The study has several limitations which we need to acknowledge. First, the study is a case selection of Kenya as one of the developing countries in Africa. While Kenya is similar to other countries in the region in that it is donor-dependent and continually struggles with poverty, it offers a different perspective following its lengthy history with donors and international organisations. A number of international organisations have their regional hubs in Nairobi. For this reason, Kenya is often receptive to donor influences, with little history of resisting policy prescriptions from the West. In addition, Kenya has continued to receive a substantive amount of aid from donor organisations and therefore is considered an easy country to work with in terms of policy adoption. Kenya offers a wide democratic space for actors to test ideas and policies, as has been recently demonstrated through technological advances like Mpesa. While Kenya offers a typical case for other countries in Africa, the factors mentioned above makes it different from others within the region and therefore its adoption trajectory and dynamics may differ from that of other countries. A gap therefore exists in studying the dynamics of the policy processes in late and resistant adopters like Uganda or early adopter but resistant countries like Zambia.

Further areas of research involve a move away from studying the processes of adoption to implementation of the programmes. This study has focused on the process of adoption of the policy without examining the dynamics at the implementation level. Examining the implementation of adopted programmes may offer different perspectives regarding adoption. As indicated in the study, transnational actors are involved in the implementation of the programmes, thereby overlapping between and straddling policy adoption and implementation.
Further studies on implementation processes on transferred policies would enrich policy transfer and social protection studies.

Another area that could be of interest in policy transfer is an examination of national agencies in developing countries in policy transfer processes. Studies on policy transfer and learning often focus on the role of the promoter of the policy to be transferred, particularly on that of transnational actors. However, as demonstrated in this study, bureaucratic agents and government officials played a significant role in policy adoption, acting as the point of centrality in regard to relationships. The relationship between bureaucrats and other agencies within the social space and how it leads to policy adoption is important. Increasingly, bureaucrats are acting beyond their mandate as policy implementers of prescribed or defined policies by political elites and are engaging more as policy entrepreneurs. Bureaucrats, or policy champions as they were referred to in this study, are more than implementers and play a key role in policy uptake as the first contacts with whom transnational actors build relationships. A deeper study on individuals as champions in policymaking processes and as policy entrepreneurship especially in pro-poor policymaking would significantly enrich studies on policy development processes.

Studies on social policy could be enriched through studies that explore the extent to which cash transfers in developing countries contribute to the functions of transformative social policy space. Further investigations on the role of cash transfers in promoting citizenship could be studied too.

10.5 Conclusion
This study has highlighted the processes, dynamics, and politics around policymaking, policy transfer and policy adoption of two social protection programmes in Kenya and the resultant outcome. The government adopted the two programmes largely through the influence of transnational actors. Social relations formed the basis upon which power was exercised within the policy space. Actors therefore formed alliances with each other depending on their resource base and their strength of influence to legitimise their involvement in the policymaking process.

Beside using various mechanisms in the policy transfer processes ranging from voluntary learning to soft coercive mechanisms, the policy process was one imbued with power based on asymmetrical social relations of domestic and international actors contributed to uptake of the
policies. The two cases studied indicated that structural forces in the form of the Programme for Results to incentivise government were used to push forth the adoption and the government putting funds in the policy process. Ideational mechanisms comprising conferences, training and other norm-sharing activities comprised the means adopted by transnational actors in the process. The question the thesis answers is how they became powerful tools for policy adoption. The discussion around these centres on policy framing through a discursive hegemony on who produced the knowledge and the policy solution through the social construction of vulnerable groups and by creating powerful policy narratives. Social learning was therefore not a benign process but one imbued with power from the producers of the knowledge.

In addition to the agency of actors, the national context shaped the policy processes, providing windows of opportunity and moments of critical juncture in the policy process. While international and transnational global policymaking was necessary for the uptake of social policy programmes in Kenya, they were not sufficient to drive policy uptake. Mediative factors like the country’s context mediated the actions of transnational actors in policy adoption.

Lastly, the study demonstrates that the plurality of mechanisms of transfer, national context, institutional interest and power formed an intricately interwoven intersectionality in policymaking. The relationship between the variables is therefore important in understanding policy transfer processes and adoption of policies.
REFERENCES


Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.


## ANNEXURES

### Annexure 1: Schedule of interviews

<table>
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Annexure 2: List of consulted documents

3. DFID (2014) Progress of the HSNP
22. HSNP Secretariat (2010) HSNP Lesson Learning and Forward Planning Workshop. HSNP Secretariat.


Annexure 3: In-Depth Interview Guides

A. Interview Guide for Government Officials (Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services, the National Treasury, Ministry of Devolution and Planning, HSNP and OVC-CT Secretariat, and Members of Parliament)

1. How did policy actors, ideas, incentives and interests shape the development and adoption of the OVC-CT and HSNP?
   - What is the relationship between your Ministry/your department and donors?
   - Which agents played a significant role in the introduction of the programmes in the country?
   - What has been the role of the following actors in social protection sector in Kenya?
     - Donors
     - Government - bureaucrats, politicians
     - Non-governmental organizations
   - How did the OVC-CT/HSNP come about? What was the idea that led to the initiation of the programmes?
   - Was the adoption of the cash transfer programmes proposed by any of the donors? Why?
   - Among the donors, bureaucrats and politicians, which one is the most influential in the promotion of the programmes? Explain.
   - How were the decisions about the adoption of the OVC-CT/HSNP made? (Probe: Role of donors, politicians, bureaucrats and NGOs)
   - Has the adoption of the programmes been influenced by similar programmes in other countries?
   - Where there any requisites to the adoption of the programmes?

2. What institutional, administrative and political factors have facilitated or constrained the adoption of the OVC-CT and the HSNP in Kenya?
   - What were the factors that facilitated the adoption? (Probe for political, economic, institutional, cultural, organisational)
   - Which factors restrained the adoption? (Probe for factors that have constrained: political, economic, institutional, cultural, organizational)
   - How prepared is the country to adopt the proposed changes and reforms (Probe for: political, economic, cultural and organizational factors)
• How has your relationship with the donors and international organizations constrained or facilitated the adoption of the programmes

3. To what extent has the transfer and adoption of the programmes led to transformations of the social policy regime in Kenya?
   • How has poverty been tackled in Kenya since independence?
   • What are the main issues of focus of policy on poverty reduction now?
   • How has the adoption of the cash transfers programmes changed the social policy landscape? (Probe: Based on roles of transformative social policy: production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and nation building
   • What are some of the notable impacts of the programmes?
   • What are some of the challenges?

4. What lessons can be drawn from the transfer and adoption of the cash transfer programmes in Kenya?
   a. What lessons can be draw from the process of the adoption and implementation of the policy and programmes?
   b. What lessons can similar countries learn from the experience of Kenya?

5. Any other comments in relation to the social protection sector

B. Interview Guides with International Organizations (DFID, UNICEF, World Bank, Oxfam and HelpAge International)

1. How did policy actors, ideas, incentives and interests shape the development and adoption of the OVC-CT and HSNP?
   • What is your relationship between your organization and with the government of Kenya in the social protection sector? How do you interact with the government?
   • What has been your role in the social protection sector?
   • Why was it necessary for the government of Kenya to adopt cash transfers as part of its social protection sector?
   • In regards to social protection what have been your proposals to the government of Kenya?
   • Among the donors, bureaucrats and politicians, which one is the most influential? Explain.
   • What has been the role of the following actors in the social protection sector:
     o Bureaucrats
     o Politicians
Non-Governmental organizations

Donors

- What are the capacities (strengths and gaps) of the domestic actors in the social protection sector?
- How were the decisions to adopt the programmes made? (Probe: Role of international organizations, government officials, NGOs)

2. What institutional, administrative and political factors have facilitated or constrained the adoption of the OVC-CT and the HSNP in Kenya?
   - What were the factors that facilitated the adoption? Why? (Probe for political, economic, institutional, cultural, organizational)
   - What are the factors that have constrained adoption? Why? (Probe for factors that have constrained: political, economic, institutional, cultural, organizational)
   - How prepared is the country to adopt the proposed programmes and changes (Probe for: political, economic, cultural and organizational factors)
   - Are there any prerequisites for the country to adopt the social protection policies?
   - How has your relationship with the government of Kenya constrained or facilitated the adoption of the programmes?

3. To what extent has the transfer and adoption of the programmes led to transformations of the social policy regime in Kenya?
   - How has the adoption of the programmes changed the social policy landscape? (Probe: Based on roles of transformative social policy: production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and nation building)

4. What lessons can be drawn from the transfer and adoption of the cash transfer programmes in Kenya?
   - What lessons can be drawn from the process of the adoption and implementation of the policy and programmes?
   - What lessons can similar countries learn from the experience of Kenya?

5. Any other comments in relation to the social protection sector.

C. Interview Guide for Implementing and Advocacy NGOs (APSP, KAACR, Social Protection Actors Forum and HelpAge International, Turkana)

1. How did policy actors, ideas, incentives and interests shape the development and adoption of the OVC-CT and HSNP?
- What is the relationship between your organization, the Government of Kenya and the international organizations in regards to the OVC and the HSNP?
- What is the role of your NGO in the social protection sector?
- Which agents played a significant role in the introduction of these programmes (NGOs, donors, Ministries, politicians)
- How were decisions about introduction of these programmes made – what role did different actors make?

2. What institutional, administrative and political factors have facilitated or constrained the adoption of the OVC-CT and the HSNP in Kenya?
   - What were the factors that facilitated the adoption of the OVC-CT/HSNP? (Probe for political, economic, institutional, cultural, organisational)
   - What factors constrained the adoption? (Probe for factors that have constrained: political, economic, institutional, cultural, organizational)
   - What are some of the proposals that are not being implemented? Why?
   - How prepared is the country to adopt the proposed changes and reforms (Probe for: political, economic, cultural and organizational factors)?
   - How has your relationship with the government of Kenya constrained or facilitated the adoption of the programmes?

3. To what extent has the transfer and adoption of the programmes led to transformations of the social policy regime in Kenya?
   - How has the adoption of the programmes changed the social policy landscape? (Probe: Based on roles of transformative social policy: production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and nation building)
   - What are some of the notable impacts of the programmes?
   - What are some of the challenges?

4. What lessons can be drawn from the transfer and adoption of the cash transfer programmes in Kenya?
   - What lessons can be draw from the process of the adoption and implementation of the policy and programmes?

5. Any other comments in relation to the social protection sector.