Unravelling Personified Development Policies in East Africa: 
A Theoretical and Empirical Study

By

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Declaration

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UNRAVELLING PERSONIFIED DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN EAST AFRICA: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY

I declare that the above thesis is my own work, and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

I further declare that I submitted the thesis to originality checking software and that it falls within the accepted requirements for originality.

I further declare that I have not previously submitted this work, or part of it, for examination at Unisa for another qualification or at any other higher education institution.

________________________    ______________________
Signature        Date

(Oceng Apell)
Acknowledgements

First, I acknowledge that “… all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose,” (Romans 8:28). Indeed, God worked out all things concerning this study together for my good – from the timing, to the provision of resources and establishment of divine helpers, until its conclusion.

In this regard, I posthumously acknowledge Professor Hennie Swanepoel, who initially primed and grounded me in the critical foundations of writing a good doctoral thesis. His extensive experience and professional acumen were instrumental in shaping my pathways for writing a PhD thesis with executable outcomes. In consonance with God’s timing, Dr Moipone Rakolojane became my supervisor, just in time to maximise and amplify the instructive values instilled in me by Professor Swanepoel. Dr Rakolojane’s distinctively personable, motivating and excellent supervisory skills furnished me with a touchstone to consistently challenge my frontiers to aim for the best. Now, at the threshold of my success, I acknowledge that God successively granted me the best supervisors I could ever get for this study.

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God bless you all....
Dedication

I dedicate this work to the Almighty God, who inspired me press forward to a wonderful finale with this resonant verse: “Commit your work to the Lord, and your plans will be established.” (PROVERBS 16:3 – ESV).
Abstract

The record failure of development aid, massive corruption, escalating poverty rates, resource-related conflicts, systematic exclusion, and general disenfranchisement across the East African Community (EAC) puzzle many development experts, as they do concerned citizens. Instead of espousing inclusive citizen participation, cyclic rounds of national leaders have governed EAC countries using retrograde ideologies, depictive of restrictive leadership interests. Underlying these interests is usually a deep-seated desire for self-entrenchment that crafty leaders impose on hapless masses. In the process, the leaders methodically personify state institutions and systems, rendering them acquiescent to their desires. Over time, destitute citizens also submit to the status quo, yielding a cadre of “acquiesced citizens”.

With respect to the above, the three objectives of this study were to analyse how personified leadership styles influence governance and development policies in East Africa; to assess the degree of citizen involvement in public governance, and how this influences development in East Africa; and to develop criteria for citizen-driven development policies that transcend personified governance in East Africa.

The findings of this thesis will enable citizens, academia, development practitioners and other stakeholders to unconditionally determine or guide national governance and development agenda. Most importantly, this study has unravelled a new approach for analysing national leadership, in a manner that can potentially enable a country to identify leaders who can champion effective principles of good governance and simultaneously achieve sustainable development.

Key terms:

Personified, development, governance, personality psychology, leadership, acquiescence, citizen participation, policymaking, accountability, donor aid, cognitive factors, self-interest
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<td>AAPAM</td>
<td>African Association for Public Administration and Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>ASP</td>
<td>Afro-Shirazi Party</td>
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<td>AWEPA</td>
<td>Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Before Christ</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLTP</td>
<td>Burundi Leadership Training Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Common Era or Current Era</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Consumer Price Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perception Index</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDPRS</td>
<td>Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOLSS</td>
<td>Encyclopaedia of Life Support Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESRF</td>
<td>Economic and Social Research Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FES</td>
<td>Friedrich Ebert Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoR</td>
<td>Government of Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank of Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>KADU</td>
<td>Kenya African Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenyan Alliance of National Unity</td>
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<td>Ltd</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGI</td>
<td>McKinsey Global Institute</td>
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<td>NRA</td>
<td>National Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLWHA</td>
<td>People Living With HIV/AIDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWD</td>
<td>People with Disabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRB</td>
<td>Population Reference Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDB</td>
<td>Rwanda Development Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>RGB</td>
<td>Rwanda Governance Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>Right-Wing Authoritarianism</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwanda Patriotic Front leaders</td>
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<td>SDO</td>
<td>Social Dominance Orientation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SID</td>
<td>Society for International Development</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
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<td>TMSA</td>
<td>Trade Mark South Africa</td>
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<td>UNLA</td>
<td>Uganda National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>UPC</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Congress</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Union for National Progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSD</td>
<td>United Nations Statistics Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNU</td>
<td>United Nations University</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIDER</td>
<td>World Institute for Development Economics Research</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

The term ‘East Africa’ previously referred to colonial territories within the British East Africa Protectorate and German East Africa. The term specifically referred to the three countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Together with Rwanda and Burundi, these three countries now collectively form the East African Community (EAC). Although the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD, 2019) scheme of geographic regions currently lists 22 territories that make up Eastern Africa, in this study the term ‘East Africa’ explicitly denotes the five countries that form the EAC because of their related history, geography, economies, culture and geopolitics.

Although co-located within the same geographic region the political, social and economic dynamics among East African countries are different. The quality and characteristics of governance that shape economic development in the region also differ remarkably across the countries. One common thread throughout the region is calamities: both natural and man-made. Whereas different countries have developed compelling coping mechanisms to address natural disasters, an even bigger human motivated challenge looms large – the proliferation of autocratic, repressive and unaccountable systems. National citizens and scholars alike have struggled over the years to decipher the irony and the tragedy of politically inspired corruption without much success. The over-simplifications of the root causes of corruption in East Africa are often misleading and flawed. State sanctioned corruption, one of the most sophisticated human rights violations in the region promotes injustice, favouritism and marginalization of citizens.

The fact that the region’s political leadership and corruption are intricately interwoven calls for a distinctive investigations approach, different from what has already been attempted, to understand the underlying dynamics and suggest evidence based solutions to deal with the challenge. Accordingly, this study seeks to explore the role of national leaders in determining governance and development outcomes in the East African region. By all intents, my research does not exhaust discussions on the entire continuum pertaining to leadership actions in East Africa. Essentially, I
approach the topic from the perspective of contributing to the knowledge gap in public policy and its implications for inclusive citizen participation in national governance and development. I discuss the ramifications entailed in this topic in the problem statement in subsequent paragraphs.

1.2 Problem statement

The African Development Bank (ADB) (2017:5) posited that, with an average annual GDP growth rate of 5.4 percent, East Africa is developing faster than any other regions in sub-Saharan Africa are. Similarly, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2017:2) argued that the EAC has an overall combined GDP of US$ 154.9 billion. In addition, Penev and Marušić (2014:38) reported that the total inflow of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in the region increased by 78 percent from $3.8 billion in 2013. Likewise, UNCTAD (2015:34) asserted that the FDI to the EAC almost doubled to $6.8 billion in 2015. In 2011, the region received $8.3 billion in total aid disbursements, up from $7.9 billion in 2010, which represents 18 percent of the total aid flows to sub-Saharan Africa (Teshager Alemu & Abebe Alebachew, 2018:50). The region’s main economic activity, agricultural trade, increased from $2 billion in 2005 to $7.5 billion in 2008, with the entire region (excepting Kenya) exporting more agricultural products than it imported (Society for International Development SID, 2012:4). Remarkably, East Africa discovered more deposits of hydrocarbons in the two years prior to 2013 than was found in any other place in the world (Deloitte & Touché, 2013:11). Uganda discovered onshore oil reserves worth $84 billion (Imaka & Musisi, 2013). In the same period, Kenya discovered coal worth $40 billion (Obiri, 2014:19). Later, Kenya discovered oil that could earn $1.2 billion annually (Otiemo, 2018). Meanwhile, Tanzania discovered offshore gas worth $27.5 billion during the same period (Kibendela, 2013:5). According to the East African Community ‘Vision 2050,’ about 80 percent (EAC Vision 2050, 2015: 25) of the East African population, that now stands at 150 million (EAC Vision 2050, 2015:17) are young. Despite the vast market and human resource potential that the population presents; the significant resource endowments and development-aid inflows during the last six decades, the East African region has failed to translate these potentials into sustainable economic growth and development.
In absolute terms, 53 million East Africans (38 percent of the regional population) lived below the poverty line in 2010 (SID, 2012:5). I argue that poor governance attributably drive these ineffective policies. Omwenga (2013:5) posits that EAC countries have not improved significantly over time in six World Bank governance indicators, which comprise “voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.” Furthermore, Transparency International (2013:5) conducted a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) survey on all five EAC countries that corroborated the above findings. The CPI survey revealed that, with the exception of Rwanda that ranked a decent 49 out of 177 countries, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Burundi ranked dismally, at 111, 136, 140 and 157 out of 177 countries, respectively (Transparency International, 2013:5). In addition, The East African (2012) has revealed that $1.33 billion has been lost in the EAC through corruption over the past decade. At the head is Uganda, which lost at least $680 million over the ten-year period, followed by Tanzania, which lost $333 million. Rwanda lost $158 million and Kenya lost $112 million, while Burundi lost $49 million (The East African, 2012).

Although East African countries profess to drive their respective national development policies, based on sound governance principles, there is a pertinent lack of objectivity in policymaking processes. Instead of espousing inclusive citizen participation, cyclic rounds of leaders advance regressive policies and ideologies that only serve self-centred executive interests. Underlying these interests is usually a deep-seated desire for self-entrenchment that crafty leaders impose on hapless masses. The egocentric system allows incumbent leaders to misuse public resources to restrain any contenders or to reward their supporters in order to preserve their regimes. The most politically attractive reward is appointing cronies, many of whom are unqualified, to crucial policymaking institutions. This narcissistic action hinders objectivity and impartiality, and consequently mismanagement pervades society, weakening it severely.

Over time, national institutions assume the personified attributes of incumbent leaders, rather than espouse democratic national interests. The erosion of democratic principles paves the way for massive corruption and donor aid leakages. These results in wealth disparities between the ruling class and the masses, which lead to the emergence of “acquiesced citizens” – a hypothetical phrase I coined to
define citizens who reluctantly subordinate to repressive and coercive regimes. Recognising an opportunity to profiteer, some donors exploit this weakness under the pretext of ‘assistance’ to ensnare oblivious nations in a cyclical aid trap. For instance, a study on trade between the United States of America (USA) with emerging markets found that, for every dollar spent on trade, $53 accrued in exports to the USA (Jackson, 2012). I argue that this trade imbalance subsists at the detriment of the donors’ trading partners. Astonishingly, some African countries believe it is opportune to cash in on donors and manage dependence, exaggerate despondency, and manipulate aid to obtain resources (Ilorah, 2013:25). Accordingly, the poor stay destitute because of this systemic dysfunction while, repressive regimes cleave to power at the expense of citizens.

The following examples shed more light on the above arguments. From the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, the West labelled a new cadre of African leaders as the ‘new generation’ or ‘new breed’ of African leaders. This term suggested that these leaders governed differently from their counterparts on the continent (Maliti, 2012). The administration of US President Bill Clinton used the term often to describe America’s newest allies in Africa (Maliti, 2012). Two Presidents in the EAC, Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, were listed among the seven new breed of African leaders (Oloka-Onyango, 2004:29). At first, several nations and international actors esteemed and appreciated the ‘new breed’ of leaders, yet with the passage of time, the so-called ‘new breed’ started behaving like their predecessors (Botha, 2012:39). Additionally, the longer these leaders entrenched themselves in power, the more inclined they were to pilfer national resources and inhibit culpability; hence, advancing contentious governance. Moreover, the turmoil and strife that propelled the ‘new breed’ of leaders to power continued to define and formed part of their governance strategy. Eyster (2014:28) asserted that corruption and poor governance remained perhaps the largest and most daunting issues impeding East African development. According to Eyster corruption was so widespread and severe that it derailed other initiatives and hindered growth. Aside from Rwanda which performed relatively well in fighting corruption, experts rated other EAC members quite low. Eyster maintained that, clearly, corruption was a large issue in these states, and the GDP per capita reflected the strain that corruption placed on a country. For instance, Burundi, with one of the
highest corruption rates in the world, also had one of the lowest per capita GDP rates (Eyster, 2014:28).

The underlying causes for the record failure of development aid, massive corruption, escalating poverty rates, resource-related conflicts, systematic exclusion and general disenfranchisement across the EAC region poses a significant knowledge gap that this study investigates further. Similarly, we can trace the inability of many East African countries to harness their huge natural resources endowments to improve the living conditions of their citizens to the complex interplay between personified leadership, governance and development, which is poorly understood. Therefore, the latter necessitates this study to contribute to the knowledge gap.

Accordingly, this study examines the extent to which personified leadership affects governance and development in East Africa. I develop theoretical models on personified leadership and compare these to empirical literature highlighting how national leadership influences governance and development outcomes. Because of the complications associated with personification as described above, I delve deep into the background of selected national leaders to unravel the root cause of personified inclination. I then investigate the adaptations and responses that citizens have developed under personified leadership. Learning more about the relationship between personified leadership and governance and development, should help citizens participate more democratically in national discourses leading to better governance and development.

1.3 Research questions

i). Why do incumbent national leaders in East Africa assume personified, rather than citizen-driven, development policies?

ii). How does personified leadership style influence governance and development policies in East Africa?

iii). How can East African citizens influence national governance and development policies under personified leaders?

1.4 Research objectives

This research
i). Analysed how personified leadership styles influenced the directions of governance and development policies in East Africa;

ii). Assessed the degree of citizen involvement in public governance and how this influences development in East Africa;

iii). Developed best-practice criteria for citizen-driven development policies that transcend personified governance in East Africa.

1.5 Importance of the study

Existing literature is vague on how personification affects development policy and governance. There are also no universally accepted definitions of the terms ‘policy’ and ‘governance’. The researcher maintains that in the process of researching on the subject of ‘personification’, this study unravelled innate factors that motivated individual policy and governance actions. Consequently, this study provides a basis for leaders, citizens and other relevant stakeholders to find common solutions that advance sustainable development policy and governance strategies. In addition, the researcher has highlighted how personification results in the creation of acquiesced citizens. This study also provided new operational definitions that explicitly hinged on theoretical logic substantiating the subject of personification. Accordingly, the discussions of key terms preserved the unambiguous testability of hypothesis and theory. Thus, whereas the study identified gaps in the current research, it also compellingly ascertained the extent to which empirical evidence supports the theory of personification.

1.6 Research methodology

This study generally undertook applied research to understand the phenomenon of personified leadership in order to solve specific, practical questions pertaining to governance and development policy in the EAC. From the viewpoint of objectives, I classified this research as broadly correlational and explanatory. This research was correlational to the extent that it attempted to establish the existence of a relationship between personified leadership, and governance and development outcomes. The explanatory component of this research attempted to clarify why and how there is a relationship between personified leadership, governance and development.
With respect to methodological rigour, I identified a broad collection of relevant studies, both published and unpublished on the subject of personified leadership. The extensive compendium of literature I consulted ensured that the resultant conclusions and recommendations stemmed from a comprehensive knowledge base. I then summarised, analysed, and synthesised the assembled literature to determine the extent to which specific research areas revealed interpretable themes or patterns. I determined that each of the research questions demanded a slightly different analytical focus in order to investigate the net impact of personified leadership on governance and development outcomes. Accordingly, I applied two research tools – meta-analytical and content analysis protocols to address the objectives, selection criteria, search strategy, and methods of the study. Before I discuss the research tools, I have discussed the stages undertaken during the research process to collect, synthesise, and interpret the information.

i). Defining the study focus

This thesis focused on the extent to which personified national leadership determined governance and development outcomes. In this context, my research focused on themes I believed define core challenges across the EAC, which included deliberately sanctioned inequalities, inability to foster sustainability of development projects and lack of well-governed democratic societies. To hone in on the research focus, I formulated study questions that guided the development of empirical and theoretical viewpoints. I envisioned that the latter would enable East African citizens and other stakeholders to address behavioural issues associated with personified leadership dispensation. Accordingly, I categorised the questions as “what, how and why” to gain an understanding of the effect, effectiveness and characteristics of development policies and governance in the EAC. I then traced cardinal influences on governance and development to the ‘personified’ decisions and actions of national leaders, with my primary focus being persons who hold or have held the office of ‘President.’ I also delved deep into behavioural psychology to comprehend the cognitive development of persons who eventually become leaders with personified inclinations. In terms of geographic coverage, I defined the target populations as the citizens of Kenya and Rwanda that formed the case studies. This is because Kenya has been the most relatively stable and economically vibrant country in the region. Rwanda, on the other hand has faced several cycles of turmoil
since its colonial legacy, but has demonstrated remarkable resilience over the years. To lend credence to the validity of my research results, I characterised the accessible population to include information derived from researchable primary databases and publications on the subjects.

**ii). Determining eligibility of studies**

In determining eligibility of literature studies for consideration, I used inclusion and exclusion criteria to set the boundaries for the systematic review after setting the research question. The above criteria were fundamental to collecting a rigorous and defensible set of data for the literature review. The inclusion criteria delineated the boundaries of this study by focusing on the type of qualitative and quantitative data to include in the study. Essentially, the inclusion criteria defined the key features of the target population that I used to answer the research questions. On the other hand, the exclusion criteria defined the parameters for the elimination of literature that did not conform to the methodological rigour of relevance and logic. Having set the boundaries of research, I excluded literature that would curtail the success of the study or increase the risk for an undesirable outcome. I also included information that was contextually relevant to the themes of this study.

Both criteria enabled me to identify eligible literature based on language style, type of publication, peer review, study design, sample size, context of source material, period, data collection method, and the acceptability or non-acceptability of grey literature. Based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria, I arrived at reasonable conclusions regarding the research impact on the external validity of the results. Accordingly, end-users can generalize the results of this thesis to understand personified national governance and development across other societal settings, populations, leadership motivations, and times.

**iii). Literature search of databases**

I conducted online research of databases using the Boolean search technique (Aliyu, 2017:216) through which I created a structured search “criteria.” While reviewing the references of article’s and sifting through abstracts, published ‘full-length’ papers, and unpublished material. The Boolean search enabled me to refine my searches using key words and modifiers. For instance, inserting the word “AND” between
terms ‘instructed’ the database to find both terms in the same record; while inserting the word “OR” meant that I wanted the database to find either of the terms, and inserting the word “NOT” meant I excluded records with a particular term. Because this technique is electronic, I rapidly sifted through databases without compromising the quality of the resultant material.

iv). Data sources

I accessed libraries in Uganda that are located at the United States Embassy, The British Council, and local universities. Other sources accessed included the World Bank, African Development Bank, Government of Uganda archives, and the National Public Library. I also consulted online libraries including Wiley-Blackwell, Wiley Online, SAGE, African Electronic Journals, JSTOR, Researchgate and other open-access or subscription-based University libraries.

v). Collection and abstraction of data

I extracted data from primary studies using electronic and paper data sheets. The data extraction sheets served as visual representations of the thesis review questions, as well as the critical appraisal of studies included in the meta-analysis. The electronic information I stored in folders on the computer, served as a historical record of the processes leading to the conclusions that I reached throughout the review process, and as a repository of data. In conjunction with the data sheets, the repository of information clearly highlighted the name of the study, study design, name of the author, year published, setting and number of participants. I also designed parameters to capture the effect, effectiveness, and quality of governance and development systems in the EAC.

1.6.1 Meta-analytical approach

Under this approach, I developed research protocols that subscribed to a high quality meta-analytical design. In particular, these protocols identified the extent of data that correlated personified leadership to governance and development outcomes. I then developed hypothesis to fill in the gaps and tested my theories against a relatively rigorous body of homogenous literature. Through the meta-analytical approach, I applied a rigorous quantitative and qualitative (re)analysis of literature to reveal the biases, strengths, and weaknesses of existing studies.
Specifically, using the meta-synthesis technique, I integrated, evaluated and interpreted the findings of multiple qualitative research studies. I combined such studies to identify their common core elements and themes. On one hand, through research integration this thesis estimated the magnitude of the effect size for the population in referenced studies. Conversely, the research integration permitted the generalization of the meta-analytic findings to other similar contexts. Ultimately, using the meta-synthesis technique, I analysed and synthesised important components of every researchable material in a process that transformed unique results into new knowledge and insights. During the interpretation of the research findings, I combined and triangulated the results of various studies to detect statistically significant phenomena in personified dispensations.

In order to aid the process of combining data from various literature studies, I drew on other statistical approaches to compliment the ‘random effects model’ that I felt suited this particular meta-analytical study. Using the random effects model, I conducted a two-stage sampling approach to zero-in on the literature subjects of interest in the EAC. This was appropriate because by the time of this study, some of the subjects of interest, for example national leaders, had long vacated their leadership positions. Leaders whose governance styles are discernible in real time are currently holding these offices. Accordingly, in the first stage, I selected studies from a sample of literature articles that I deemed were outcomes of rigorous scientifically acceptable research. Where feasible, I assembled literature from non-researched sources in order to accommodate alternative perspectives. I construed the first stage to be outcome dependent on personified leadership inclination that I treated as a continuous outcome variable in this study. In the second stage, I developed criteria where I selected a sub-sample of countries to form case studies that are generalizable to other East African countries covered in this study.

1.6.2 Content analysis

Using content analysis, I quantified and analysed the presence, meanings and relationships of specific words and concepts, and then made inferences about the messages within the texts, writer(s), audience, culture, and time of occurrence. Drawing on primary techniques of content analysis, namely, relational and conceptual analysis approaches, I enhanced the depth of my inquiry and synthesis
of the literature as explained in ensuing narratives. Using relational analysis, I examined the relationships between concepts in specific texts. On the other hand, I applied conceptual analysis to establish the existence and frequency of concepts most often represented by words or phrases in a text. The content analysis tool was particularly significant in aiding the analysis of attitudinal and behavioural characteristics and impacts of national leaders. The latter entailed the systematic analysis of the complex interplay of factors that define the relationships between leaders and citizens in personified dispensations. In this respect, the content analysis tool facilitated the accurate interpretation of literature pertaining to the psychological or emotional state of persons or groups in personified dispensations.

From the extensive body of literature, I deductively coded texts into manageable content categories. The systematic coding of sources by selective reduction enabled this study to reduce texts to categories consisting of a word, sets of words and phrases. Subsequently, I focused on, and counted the number codes for specific words or patterns that were responsive to the research questions. For instance, in analysing the effects of personified disposition on society, I used content analysis to quantify and analyse the meanings and relationships of concepts, then made deductions about the messages within the texts. Essentially, by using content analysis, I triangulated data using thematic analysis to identify themes or major ideas in documents; undertook computerised indexing of text documents; and described features of the text in quantitative terms.

Where I needed to enhance the application of the above protocols, I used online software, for example ‘Text Analyser’ (Adamovic, 2009), to analyse the frequencies and distribution of words or phrases. Fundamentally, computer analysis provided me a functional alternative to the phrase based coded analysis discussed in the preceding paragraph. Through the online software, I gained diverse insights from structured and unstructured literature. In this respect, I used algorithms to classify phrases from huge volumes of texts that would naturally be daunting for manual analysis. Not only did computer analysis improve the consistency of my research, it saved valuable costs and time, and mitigated human bias in my evaluations.
1.6.3 Data analysis and interpretation

In the data analysis process, I used domain analysis to identify domains in literature sources, while taxonomic analysis aided my appreciation of the relationships among domains. Likewise, through componential analysis, I comprehended the differences among subcomponents of domains; and using theme analysis, I appreciated how all the relationships link to the subject of study. To enhance my interpretation of information, I focused on matters of scholarship, theoretical problems, controversies and key findings in literature.

The phenomenological approach to qualitative methodology, allowed this study to draw inferences on individuals' subjective experiences and interpretations of the world. This approach was particularly important in analysing the intrinsic factors that galvanised people to assume personified inclinations. The qualitative methodology was instrumental in synthesising information about how people think, feel and act, and what they know. From the information I collected on different national leaders, I triangulated, contrasted and validated the data to ascertain if it yielded similar or conflicting results. Likewise, using the historical approach to qualitative methodology, I traced and discussed personified leadership from the advent of national independence in the 1960’s to the current social, cultural, economic and political affairs in East Africa. In addition, using this approach I reflected on the historical context of this study, and formulated possible solutions to cyclical challenges associated with personified governance and development. I then explored the genesis of personification in East Africa’s political domain, investigated the historical roles EAC citizens have played in encouraging or mitigating personified dispensations, and identified the likely directions for future research on the subject.

Basically, from the methodical interpretation process, I identified and conceptualized significant considerations from complex findings by answering questions on the research findings. In this respect, I developed inferences by comparing my findings with information garnered from related literature and previous research. In order to draw logical and scientific conclusions from my qualitative data, it was essential to quantify the data. Accordingly, I subjected my findings to quantitative analysis in order to numerically represent and manipulate qualitative deductions for purposes of describing and explaining the phenomena in the observations. By coding data as
explained in section 1.7.2 of this study, I identified emerging patterns that I quantified to determine the size of the effect in subject analyses. In order to ensure the integrity of this approach, I organised data in categories that related to particular areas of interest, for example, influences of national leaders on governance and development in East Africa in the post-independence era. Through coding, I constructed a category system that allowed systematic categorization of all the assembled data. By coding information, filtered, highlighted, and focused the salient features of the qualitative data record where I generated categories, themes, and concepts, as well as grasped meaning, and built theory.

From the above processes, I was able to develop subjective conclusions and recommendations from this study that are scientifically grounded and generalizable to other contexts.

1.6.4 Ethical considerations

In drawing ethical protocols for this study, I contemplated whether the research questions I designed were worth examining, and if the literature review methodology were an effective way of answering the questions. Similarly, I deemed it ethical to consider how this research can best expound on the work that other scholars have accomplished on the subject. Accordingly, I conducted the research cognizant that my use of processed and (re)packaged data is subject to intellectual property rules and where necessary, the consent of the authors/owners of literature. Whereas I take full responsibility for the originality of my work, in my citations and references I acknowledge the efforts and contributions of other writers. Furthermore, I engendered core values such as honesty, respect, and fairness, in my discussions of the study subject’s limitations as well as social and emotional statuses. I endeavoured to maintain the integrity of the arguments and thought-lines of the original authors quoted in this study without compromising my own subjective reasoning. I avoided perceptions of victimisation and maintained confidentiality where explicitly required by the authors. Overall, I applied the principles of utility, feasibility, propriety, accountability, and accuracy to all processes of the study.
1.7 Limitations of the study

i). Third-party reporting and restrictive environments in some countries limited accurate data collection on the values, power relations and individual actions of leaders.

ii). The overtly subjective sampling procedure applied in the study decreased the representativeness of the sampled material relative to the geographic area of coverage.

iii). To avoid being rigidly prescriptive, I restricted the definition of “personified” to the context of national governance and development.

iv). Because of the secrecy surrounding leaders and citizen behaviours, some research outcomes were attributional or approximate due to the limited resources or capabilities to observe behaviours.

v). A study of longitudinal effects, such as the length of time that I required to research the problem exhaustively, for example leadership evolution and transformation, was objectively infeasible.

vi). Even though East Africa has 22 countries, this study is limited to the five counties within the EAC, namely: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, while the case studies are limited to two countries, that is, Kenya and Rwanda.

vii). The analysis of personified leadership will be limited to an assessment of its links with governance and development.

1.8 Clarification of terms

i). ‘Personify’ means the “effects of abstractions attributable to a unique personal or human characteristic, especially leadership.”

ii). ‘Policy’ means the “lines of argument rationalising government decision, typically intended to influence and determine a course of action.”
iii). ‘Governance’ is the conscious exercise of conferred (or inferred) authority, whether individual or collective to lead, control and steer directions and decisions of society and institutions.

iv). Development implies “a desirable and positive economic, political, social and cultural initiative aimed at transforming a situation.”

v). ‘Acquiesced citizens’ is a term coined to describe national citizens who, as a result of devious exclusion and de-legitimisation, reluctantly accept to be governed under repressive and coercive regimes

vi). ‘Impersonation’ means ‘an act of pretending to be another person for the purpose of entertainment or fraud (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016).”

1.9 Conclusion of Chapter One

Chapter One highlighted the paradox pointing to the fact that although the EAC was the fastest growing region in sub-Saharan Africa with significant resource endowments, economic growth and development had not yielded concomitant results. A significant number of the population still lived on less than $1 a day, a figure below the poverty line of $1.25 a day. The region also faced extreme levels of corruption, with the exception of Rwanda, which attempted to espouse good governance ideals. Similarly, the record failure of development aid and the existence of massive corruption, escalating poverty rates, resource-related conflicts, systematic exclusion and general disenfranchisement across the region still puzzled many development experts.

In the above respect, this thesis linked governance and development challenges to individual actions/inactions of national leaders. The researcher argued that, over time, national institutions assumed the personified attributes of incumbent leaders, rather than pursuit of democratic national interests. Subsequently, a disenfranchised and disempowered population, subsisting under personified regimes, resulted in the emergence of “acquiesced citizens” – a hypothetical phrase I used to define citizens who reluctantly subjected themselves to repressive and coercive regimes. Accordingly, in subsequent discussions, this theoretical and empirical study on the subject of personification unravelled and offered solutions to the problem of poor policies in the EAC. Using a case study of Rwanda and Kenya, this study developed
suggestions to emancipate acquiesced citizens to foster their democratic participation in national governance, and development.

Chapter One also outlined the methodology I used to solve the problem of personified leadership dispensation. Particularly, I outlined the rigorous criteria undertaken to prove the hypothesis of this study. The methodology entailed a complex mix of approaches that outlined how I collected and analysed the appropriate data. In this respect, I applied universally recognized analytical methods to test and validate the theory of personification. With respect to interpretation, I organised data extracted from literature review that I refined for better analysis.

In the subsequent chapters, I endeavoured to ground this study in literature by developing definitions, arguments and an analytical framework regarding the theory of personification. This grounding was beneficial in aiding the identification of the key elements of this study that I discussed, as well as the relationship of these elements to one another, especially for the chapter on empirical analysis.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL/EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORKS

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I developed definitions, arguments, as well as analytical and conceptual frameworks pertaining to the theory of personification. I highlighted that this theory fosters an understanding on how cognitive development, social interactions and ecological factors shape an individual's behavioural inclination, which in turn determines the individual's leadership trajectory. Likewise, I argue that this theory enabled readers to comprehend how a personified disposition in national leaders (or citizens) affects their ability to implement egalitarian governance and development programmes. From this theory, I then derived a testable proposition on personified behavioural disposition in national leaders. Subsequently, I analysed literature to determine the effects of leadership actions on including citizens in national governance and development. I then concluded by ascertaining the role of citizens' in mitigating or catalysing the emergence of personified national systems.

Ultimately, I rationalised that the theory of personification enables citizens and other stakeholders to understand their leaders better, to the extent that they could participate more productively in national governance and development. Accordingly, Chapter Two started with a detailed analysis on the theory of personification to set a foundation for subsequent discussions. In succeeding paragraphs, I correlated the theory of personification with personality psychology, development philosophy, and finally, the concept of leadership. I deliberately elected these themes because this study theorised that personality traits determine leader development over time. Similarly, I reasoned that the predictive power of personality psychology also correlates with national development. This chapter ended with a brief conclusion on the discussions and provided a synoptic indication of the ensuing literature.

2.2 Theoretical and empirical dimensions of the theory of personification

Despite the significance of the theory of personification, there is limited or no reference in social research literature to how personified systems relate to national governance and development. While a few researchers have made credible attempts
to discuss personality concepts and personalised leadership, none of them explained the subject of personified leadership within the context of this study. However, this study hypothesised that personality, a component of the theory of personification denotes the manner in which individual’s reason, comprehend and respond relative to the external domain. Conversely, personified policies that are antecedent to personalised systems constitute the primary impediment to positive governance and development outcomes. However, the above hypotheses required a correlation with the concept of leadership to comprehensively exemplify the theory of personification. In the process of assembling relevant literature on personified leadership, I observed that scholars frequently encountered a broad, and at times, very perplexing corpus of literature that exemplifies the complexities in analysing national leadership. By the time of this research, no theory had yet captured holistic national leadership dynamics to the extent that it is empirically relatable to this study. It is even more frustrating to interested parties like citizens and other stakeholders that existing attempts to explain leadership theories are largely marginal, disparate and contradictory. This study therefore established an analytical and theoretical framework to discuss issues pertaining to how personified leadership relates with governance and development in order to plug the gaps in literature.

In subsequent paragraphs, I presented an overview of the proposed theory of personification. I then explored key concepts that constitute building blocks of this theory. The process entailed conceptualising why incumbent national leaders in East Africa assume personified, rather than citizen-driven, development policies; how personified leaders influence governance and development policies in East Africa, and the extent to which East African citizens influence national governance and development policies under personified leaders. Furthermore, the study drew on the operational definitions of the key terms including: personify, policy, governance, development, acquiesced citizens, leadership and impersonation in section 1.8, to build up arguments in the analytical and conceptual framework. In Chapter Three, I utilised philosophical concepts of governance and development to strengthen my discussions in Chapter Four on the empirical conducts of personification. Fundamentally, Chapters Three and Four link the theories covered in this study to practical experiences using Kenya and Rwanda as case studies.
There have been several studies that have examined the complex interplay between national leadership, governance and development. However, the impact of personified leadership on the above factors in the EAC, or anywhere else, is not well developed or is completely lacking in the literature. Therefore, this thesis proposes a conceptual framework to fill this gap. In this respect, I developed inferences, conclusions and recommendations based on the conceptualization and a review of literature regarding four theoretical fields namely: leadership, personality psychology, governance and development to address the knowledge gap. I included personality psychology because it brings to the fore the intrinsic factors that motivate the actions of leaders and their follower alike. In this context, I proposed a multidisciplinary conceptual framework that highlights the occurrence and dynamics entailed in personified leadership, governance and development.

The framework I proposed hinges on three main concepts:

a) The first concept is that leadership is a phenomenon that stems from perspectives a leader develops at childhood formative stages that external influences later reinforce in life. Eventually, these influences define whether the relationship a leader has with followers are collaborative, passive or conflicting. In this context, leaders enjoy a mutually commutative influencing relationship with their followers. Essentially, both leaders and their followers both wield legitimate and illegitimate positional powers. Thus, whereas the leader's authority to act is based on a constitution, a decree or brute force, egalitarian or selfish interests drive the motivations behind either action. In other words, leaders may choose to include or exclude citizens in participating in national discourses; however, the leader retains the final verdict over the decision-making process. I maintain that insight or advice from experts or institutions usually back an incumbent leader’s decisions. Once egocentrism perpetually blocks the leader’s discretionary vision, the phenomenon this study labels “personified leadership” kicks in. Once personification sets in, the leader systematically takes over decision-making processes in all national institutions. Over time, these institutions start echoing the essential character of the leader. Conversely, this study theorizes that depending on their interests, citizens have a role in perpetuating or mitigating personified leadership. In due course, citizens become acquiesced to personified
leadership dispensations which ‘overpowers’ the citizens using coercive means, including disenfranchisement. The ultimate catalytic effect of personified leadership is poor national governance that ultimately compromises state institutions and diminishes development outcomes.

b) The second concept is the subject of national governance within the context of personification. In most articulations, the terms “government” and “governance” are alternately used to signify the exercise of authority in any designated domain, for instance, an institution or state. As signified above, the conceptualization of the term ‘governance’ is deemed too confusing, a factor that has reduced the term to a buzzword in various circles. In order to enhance its unrestricted applicability to wide-ranging parameters, the prefix “good” is attached to “governance”, to read ‘good governance.’ This also has now become a contestable mantra alluding to good conduct of governmental and bureaucratic processes. The above discussions highlight the knowledge gap in conceptualizing the term ‘governance.’ In this respect, I have reviewed the different aspects of the theory of governance in order to unravel empirical support for the term in the literature. Furthermore, this study attempts to provide a functional definition of the word ‘governance’ as the conscious exercise of conferred (or inferred) authority, whether individual or collective to lead, control and steer directions and decisions of society and institutions. The underlying factor in this definition is the hypothesis that governance assumes multiple ‘structural and procedural’ dimensions depending on the objectives and actions of the person(s) in control.

Unfortunately, literature often ignores the motivating factor behind leaders who determine governance outcomes. Whereas available literature on governance competently illustrates particular modes of governance, there is still a significant gap in the demonstration of the longitudinal impact of personified leadership on various modes of governance. Accordingly, this thesis provides a conceptual framework to analyse and conceptualise the inherent dynamics in countries struggling to establish democratic systems but is challenged by the personified mode of governance. Furthermore, this study opens up avenues for new research by concurrently analysing the paradoxical
impacts of personified governance in light of its positive and negative impacts on national development. This conceptual framework provides a contextual perspective when analysing empirical dimensions of personified governance later in this study. Contemporary debates on alternative modes of governance underscore the ineptitude of nations to develop objective policies largely due to loss of institutional independence. This study recognizes this gap, and the need to address the vulnerability of governance institutions that the researcher attributes to personified leadership. To this end, this framework provides a means to understand the complex labyrinth of interactions between national governance institutions, non-state actors and citizens, all of whom contribute to governance. Thus, it is apparent that the principal component in any governance system is the reciprocal unencumbered respect in the relationships among actors. Unfortunately, we note the absence of mutual respect in many governance frameworks in East Africa resulting in conflict between the actors involved.

Therefore, this theoretical framework on governance identifies a good-practice relationship between national leaders and governance institutions, whose conceptualization will go unnoticed without this study. Ultimately, this thesis develops a framework of governance for policy analysis, based on the accessible literature, which can be beneficial in advancing national development. In trying to develop a pragmatic testable hypothesis of governance, I encountered a complex interplay of factors that shed more light on why certain critics feel 'governance' is a fluid concept.

c) The third concept is the subject of national development within the context of personification. This conceptual analysis traces the major concepts of development in order to build the theoretical framework of personified development. The methodology I have applied in this study covers literature review, data analysis and synthetization of data categories to deduce similar meanings and themes that will result in the creation of independent concepts on the subject of development. This study conceptualizes that national governance has causal effect on national development. By theoretical deduction, I argue that national leaders have a direct influence on governance and development outcomes. Despite its significance, there is limited or no
literature linking a leaders’ cognitive development process to national development outcomes. Kaufmann (noted in Grindle, 2007:4), corroborates my argument in asserting that “the link between governance and development is more than correlational, rather, it is causal since good governance makes development possible.” I postulate that the use of the term ‘good governance’ in relation to development means that in the minimum, some singular or several actions need to be wholesome and appropriate for development to occur. I attribute the assurance of these ‘good’ actions to national leaders who hold the final verdict in national decision-making. In yet another complex interplay of concepts, this study investigates the intrinsic factors that inspire national leadership action(s) on development through governance as a transitional conduit. However, a critical review of the diverse literature on development reveals lack of a comprehensive conceptual framework for understanding the intricacies of personified development.

Accordingly, this study synthesises the interdisciplinary literature on national development theories and empirical works, and then uses conceptual analysis to tease-out patterns and similarities within the literature. Subsequently, I applied conceptual labels in order to interpret the data and derive arguments, conclusions and recommendations. In this respect, I reviewed competing theories of development in order to comprehend various development processes with the aim of motivating discussions on diverse development challenges. I began by reviewing structural change theories and then transition to classical development theories in order to juxtapose their arguments on resource management economic investments and institutional frameworks with the theory of personification. I rationalized why the theory of personification provides a more comprehensive outlook of development over and above the structural and classical theories. I then embarked on exploring international relations theories to comprehend how nation states behave and interact in an international setting. Because of its key role in international relations, I successively reviewed political theories in order horn in on how individuals are organised politically across different configurations of power. Whereas both international relations and political theories furnished me with a wealth of information on how actors behaved on unique local and international
settings, the theories came short in describing personification within the same contextual settings.

Subsequent to the above, I analysed policy theories in the quest to understand how actors make, influence or are influenced by ‘courses of action.’ I provided a rational synopsis of policy theories in terms of its complexity and diversity in light of its enabling potential for implementation or mitigating role. Despite the limitations, the reviewed theories face at conceptualization, each analysis offered me commendable insights into policy implementation processes. From the foregoing, I offer an assessment of the benefits, costs, and risks of these theories. I also explored the implications of these frameworks on governance and development. The theories were also instrumental in highlighting the extent of leadership influence on policy institutions and on the other hand, modelling citizen amenability to policy decisions, and the overall impacts of those decisions. I then embarked on analysing demographic theories that integrate several theoretical concepts into a dynamic framework. My analysis spanned across local and international socio-economic and political forces that influence three cardinal demographic processes namely: fertility, mortality, and migration. I hoped to conceptualise the extent to which demographic theories have predictive value on the processes that shape national development in developing countries. However like other previous theories, the analysis of demographic theories was equally fraught with shortcomings; for instance, there is no conceptual rationalization on how fertility results in a demographic transition. Conversely, the theory of personification attempted to re-interpret and conceptualise various demographic concepts in order to address the gaps presented by shortcomings in theories.

As is evident from the above discussions, the analysed theories and literature pose more questions than answers. In this regard, the theory of personification offers alternative conceptualization to address the gap in literature unravelled in the review. Thus, the main building blocks of the conceptual framework on ‘personification’ are actors, their stakes and the relative power they exert to pursue these interests, as well as the institutions and systems in which these actors operate. The specific building blocks
consist of governance frameworks, development contexts, government institutions, national leaders, citizens and the international community.

2.2.1 Unravelling the epitome of personification

The Free Dictionary online (2016) defined ‘epitome’ as a representative or perfect example of a class or type. Likewise, The Cambridge Dictionary online (2016) defined the epitome of something as the “typical or highest example of a stated quality, as shown by a particular person or thing.” The Urban Dictionary (2016) provided the most contextually relevant definition of ‘epitome’ as being a perfect example of a certain quality someone, or something that "personifies" this said quality. Accordingly, this section delineated distinctive subjects, on the subject of personification, to illustrate the ‘perfect example’ of certain leadership qualities. In so doing, this study tried to understand how we could measure and perhaps project specific leadership behaviour. The researcher also explained what behaviours are associated with personified leadership. Halpin (1956:172) argued that if we concentrate on analysing how leaders behave under different situations, we would substantially enrich our understanding of leadership phenomena. Halpin maintained that it is not easy to accomplish this shift in viewpoint, because many beliefs that were not in accord with behavioural facts encumbered our ways of thinking about "leadership." In addition, Halpin posited that the term ‘leadership’ evoked strong personal views that were sentimental, and this further complicated the dilemma associated with the concept. According to Halpin, to be a leader is "good" and therefore it is good to lead, so he argued that everyone should visualise himself or herself as a leader. In this respect, Halpin argued that, instead of applying scientific rigour, most people tended to verbalise leadership largely as a catchphrase. Halpin (1956:172) underscored the point that the ambiguity of our definitions of the term ‘leadership’ limited our use of this term to ‘a rallying cry.’ In consonance with Halpin’s views, I attempt to unravel and expound on the ‘value-laden’ concept of personified leadership. This section ultimately guides the reader to conceptualise more absorbingly, the aggregate impact of personified leadership on critical national pillars of governance and development.
2.2.2 Meaning of personification

The *Free Dictionary* offered two contextually relevant definitions of the verb ‘personify’. The general English or Thesaurus version of the *Free Dictionary* defined ‘personify’ as: “1) to think of or represent (an inanimate object or abstraction); as having personality or the qualities, thoughts, or movements of a living being; 2) to represent (an object or abstraction) by a human figure, 3) to represent (an abstract quality or idea), and 4) to be the embodiment or perfect example of.” The legal dictionary defined the verb ‘personify’ as “to ascribe personal qualities to be the embodiment, characterize, copy, embody, embrace, humanize, incarnate, manifest, *orationem attribuere*, symbolize, treat as human, and typify.” Conversely, the Encyclopædia Britannica defined ‘personify’ as a “transitive verb that means 1) to conceive of or represent as a person, or as having human qualities or powers: impute personality to; and 2) to be the embodiment or personification of; incarnate.”

I used a content analysis program that coded the above definitions for specific words and configurations that were responsive to the focus of my inquiry. As a result, I identified occurrences of words that were contextually relevant to the subject of personification. The program revealed that each of the verbs *represent* and *personify* appeared four times. The program also revealed that each of the explicatory words *qualities, human* and *embodiment* appeared thrice. Similarly, the words *personality, object, incarnate, having* and *abstraction* appeared twice. Because of their inapplicability, in the above analysis this study did not consider the usage and frequency of *indefinite articles* that introduced new concepts into a discourse; *conjunctions* that connected words, phrases or sentences together; and *prepositions* that described connections linking portions of a sentence.

Accordingly, this study defined ‘personify’ as “an abstract attributable to a unique personal or human characteristic, especially leadership.” Therefore, in this study, the term ‘personification’ means the “effects of abstractions attributable to a unique personal or human characteristic, especially national leadership.”

2.2.3 Transformative stimuli of personified disposition

Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv (2013:228), in discussing personification, illustrated that the contemporaneous experiences [of phenomena like personification] are not
absolutely tangible (i.e., they are not colours, tastes and so on), but are rather abstract attributes (e.g., personality types). Moreover, sometimes personality types in ‘sequence-personality synaesthesia’ suggested that the simultaneous experiences in social descriptions fit in relational domains. Thus, Amin, Olu-Lafe, Claessen, Sobczak-Edmans, Ward, Williams and Sagiv; and Simner and Holenstein (as noted by Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, 2013:229) argued that “these experiences reflected individual characteristics (gender, personality, physical appearance, cognitive abilities, occupation, mental states, moods, attitudes, interests, inclinations) besides ‘social interactions’ between inducers (e.g., emotive and behavioural responses to other units).” As Smilek, Malcolmson, Carriere, Eller, Kwan and Reynolds (noted in Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, 2013:229) observed, we can group social and affective qualities ascribed in sequence-personality synaesthesia into four distinct types: “physical (gender, physical appearance), personal (cognitive abilities, occupation, personality, mental states, moods, attitudes, interests, and inclinations), relation (emotive and behavioural responses to other units) and social role (occupation, familial and non-familial relationships).”

I pointed out that the above literature corroborated the theoretical argument of this study that mental states, moods and attitudes precipitated specific behavioural responses in personalities. This study argued that by inference, mental states, moods and attitudes characterised the personalities of individual national leaders, and hence their governance styles. In essence, behavioural stimuli in national leaders directly influenced the ultimate course of their social, political and economic interests and inclinations. Accordingly, in order to understand the primary actions and ideological inclinations of national leaders, one must first analyse their behavioural dispositions. Hence, through behavioural analysis experts could decipher personality traits that drive national policies and governance styles.

Underwood offered an in-depth discussion on “the psychology of personality.” According to Underwood (2002:109), unlike in personality theories, “experts universally recognized that varying degrees of situational factors influenced individual behaviours and actions.” Underwood maintained that, “whereas the issue of personality formation fell more clearly within the purview of psychology than of social psychology, some of the factors in personality formation had implications for belief and attitude formation.” As higher order constructs, beliefs are antecedent to
attitudes. While attitudes often emanated from beliefs, (some attitudes have non-cognitive bases), Underwood (2002:105) argued that, “opinions, or factors that an individual embraced to be factual, denoted an individual’s subjective convictions regarding certain features of the self or the real world.” Therefore, the conceivable elements of beliefs are indefinite in scope. For instance, the mental picture that one contemplated usually related an object with certain properties and therefore, this entailed cognition. Underwood maintained that, “on the other hand, attitudes epitomized a psychological inclination or predilection expressed by individuals who reviewed objects or entities in terms of their liking or disfavour. Thus, attitudes denoted affective mind-sets that exposed emotions or sentiments ascribed to occurrences (people, things, places, ideas, etc.).”

I argue that the above literature accentuated the argument set out in preceding paragraphs that “beliefs, values and attitudes” are critical factors that promoted social and economic development. Underwood’s (2002:110) argument on situational factors that influenced individual behaviours and actions linked the behavioural actions of persons to their intrinsic beliefs, values and attitudes. This concept is significant for understanding how environmental constructs influenced the cognitive development that a national leader subsequently transforms into governance practices. This study maintains that the conceptualisation of the self in relationship to ‘others’ or the ‘world’ determined how an individual leader could possibly perceive national development policies or governance styles. I contend that this literature underscored that beliefs and attitudes that national leaders held, acted as models that portrayed their self-interests and inclinations.

Whereas Underwood (2002) dwelt on situational behavioural stimuli in the realm of social psychology, Martínez and Oishi (2006) specifically highlighted the point that both genetic and environmental factors shaped personality. Martínez and Oishi (2006:2) asserted that cultural influences are among the most important of the genetic and environmental factors. Conversely, Bouchard (2004) amplified the significant influence of genetic factors on individual psychology. Bouchard downplayed “shared environmental influences as often, but not always, of less importance than genetic factors, and often decreased to near zero after adolescence.” I argue that the above juxtapositions highlighted the inherent complexities entailed in the analysis of personality psychology. However, the
common theme in the discussions is the critical depiction of genetic and environmental factors as behavioural stimuli. The latter enriched the theoretical argument of this study by highlighting the fact that, in addition to the other stimuli already discussed, genetic heritability played an equally significant role in shaping psychological traits, and in essence, perceptible leadership disposition. Within the context of this thesis, I posit that issues of genetic heritability potentially rationalised correlations between ethnicity in familial heredity and a national leader’s governance style or actual inclination towards personification. Equally of interest to this study was the way in which cultural influences that environmental factors precipitated determined the trajectories of a national leader’s governance style. The foregoing was especially significant in East Africa, the geographic focus of this study, where cultural influences played a critical role in shaping societal livelihoods and configurations.

In addition, the proponents who bolstered arguments that social and cultural dimension constituted an important personality influence emphasised the cultural role played by society in shaping the governance style of a national leader. Thus, in the context of cultural psychology, the view held by Martínez and Oishi’s (2006:6) “endorsed relativist and constructivist notions of personality, and tended to favour emic (i.e., indigenous) over imposed-etic (i.e. imported) methodology for theory and instrument development” [in the analysis of culture]. Similarly, Markus and Kitayama; and Miller (noted in Martínez and Oishi, 2006:6) theorised that, “wherever one developed and expressed ‘personality,’ it could not be separated from the broad social and cultural context of the affective, motivational and cognitive capacities that shaped our approaches to assessing and reacting to the environment.”

Congruently, Maccoby (2000:10) argued that, “high heritability of a [genetic] trait does not imply that it is not also subject to the influence of environmental factors, or that it cannot change by alterations in environmental conditions.” According to Maccoby (2000:16), behaviour geneticists believed that environmental factors that affected distinct children in a family differently arose from the fact that some children are more genetically susceptible to environmental influences than others are. Furthermore, societies set different standards for people at various phases of their lives, and there are requirements that loom large, especially in childhood. Accordingly, Maccoby (2000:2) posited that “not all socialization occurs in childhood;
Instead, socialization and re-socialization occur when adults enter into new life roles. For instance, people socialized into the customs and standards of an occupational culture when they took up an entry-level job."

Equally, Triandis and Suh (2002:139) highlighted the significance of socialisation in relation to culture. In their analysis, Triandis and Suh “identified dimensions of socialisation that were related to cultural syndromes, such as the emphasis on child independence found in individualist cultures and the emphasis on dependence found in collectivist cultures.” I argue that the above emphases were particularly significant to this study, especially in defining how environmental factors, culture and socialisation patterns shaped the extent of a leader’s dependence on national support systems. According to Palus (2009:5), dependent leadership cultures assumed that “only people in positions of authority were responsible for leadership.” The foregoing assumption emphasised the “top-down influence, and convergence of decision-making powers to limited senior positions.” Likewise, Palus assumed that seniority and rank acted as significant cues of eminence. To Palus, all the above assumptions were therefore a “conservative approach to change.” On the other hand, Palus (2009:6) argued that independent leadership cultures assumed that “leadership styles stem from different persons based on their knowledge and expertise. This assumption encourages decentralized decision-making, a compelling need for personal accountability and proficiency on individual dependence.” To this end, Rohner (noted in Triandis & Suh, 2002:135) emphasised the strong, consistent links between socialisation practices and personality in the shaping of leaders. I argue in affirmation that the correlation between socialisation practices and individual attributes played a key role in shaping the behavioural inclinations of national leaders. I deduced from Palus’ (2009) explanation that a mode of socialisation that promoted a dependent leadership style likely developed into personified disposition, since it coalesced around the individual. However, Palus’ model also had commendable ‘safety valves’ that allowed for personal accountability and broad decision-making practices, which are aspects that potentially mitigate the proliferation of personification.

In the realm of development psychology, Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv (2013:232) asserted that “personification in synesthetic adults represented an excessive manifestation of the human tendency to perceive reality using the self as a model.
This in turn derived from younger children’s animistic thought, used as an undeveloped filter through which they learn about the social world. Thus, synesthetic personification could represent a residual expression of childhood animism, an early stage in social cognitive development.” Piaget (noted in Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, 2013:232) studied animistic thought in children and hypothesised that “the excessive animistic mode of thinking (including personification) served as a mechanism for constructing reality with the self as a model.” Piaget observed, “this is in line with contemporary accounts of the way in which we construct social reality.” I found significance in the arguments highlighting the human predisposition to comprehend reality based on “the self as a model.” The latter was crucial for understanding why leaders with personified inclinations use themselves as a paradigm of national development. Likewise, in corroborating Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv, I argue that excessive animist thinking influenced leaders with personified inclinations to the extent that they became insensitive to the development needs of their constituents. Accordingly, this egocentric behaviour permeated governance and development institutions, usually with adverse impacts.

I contend that the above literature highlighted how national leaders’ perceptions of themselves structured their view of reality. The assertions by Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv’s (2013:232) reinforced my arguments that personified inclinations emanated from early stages of social cognitive development, and ultimately defines one’s definitive behavioural disposition. The fact that personification is possibly a residual expression of childhood animism revealed the reason why some national leaders perceived their ideas as infallible “models” of national practice. The above literature provided a scientific basis to theorise that the degree of childhood animism by which individuals formed perceptions of social reality inspired their personification of national development and governance policies. This study further argues that the ‘external environment’ may be the foremost important influence on the intrinsic degree of childhood animism. Consequently, understanding childhood animism will help experts to forecast the possible trajectory of a national leader’s development policy actions and governance styles.

In close context with “… perceiving the self as a model” cited in the preceding literature, Wilson, Near and Miller (1996:285) argued that “Machiavellianism as a strategy of social conduct involved manipulating others for personal gain, often
against the other's self-interest.” Wilson et al. (1996) maintained that “everyone is capable of manipulative behaviour to some degree, but some are more willing and more able than others are.” Conversely, Dawkins and Krebs (cited in Wilson et al., 1996:286) observed that, “natural selection favours individuals who successfully manipulated the behaviour of other individuals, whether or not it was advantageous to the manipulated individuals.” Dawkins and Krebs upheld that humans frequently restricted pro-social behaviours to their own community, while overtly taking advantage of other groups. To Dawkins and Krebs, leaders who were accountable for actions directed at other individuals exhibited Machiavellian traits. The latter is close to the “spirit of Machiavelli himself, who combined his manipulative political ways with genuine loyalty toward his own city.” Likewise, Barber (noted in Wilson et al., 1996:293) tested the hypothesis of genetic relatedness in Machiavellianism. Barber administered a modified 'Mach test' to particular groupings of people, such as "family members", "friends," etcetera. Barber established that, on average, subjects expressed a lesser predisposition of Machiavellianism toward family relations and support system than they did to the broader society. I contend that the concept of manipulative Machiavellian behavioural disposition could be important for understanding national leaders’ governance styles.

As hypothesised in the above literature, I assert that we could use Machiavellian behaviours to rationalise the political and socio-economic actions of national leaders. The fact that Machiavellianism utterly described individual conduct toward other groups validated the assumptions of this study. It compellingly highlighted that personified systems promoted egocentrism in leaders and favouritism towards persons sympathetic to incumbent regimes. Of equal significance, Wilson et al. (1996:285) argued that, “we can make specific predictions about the propensity to manipulate others as a function of their in-group versus out-group status.” Wilson et al. (1996) maintained that, “we can develop specific hypotheses to predict the effects of genetic relatedness, age, gender and situational factors on the adaptedness of Machiavellianism.” Based on the foregoing, I deduced that basing on behavioural factors; we could predict the direction of development and governance in personified systems. However, in divergence with the theory of personification, Wilson et al. (1996) asserted that, “the psychological literature on Machiavellianism lacks a solid theoretical framework to guide empirical research.” I observe that although this factor
limited the empirical applicability of the Machiavellian concept, we could still use the concept to understand personification from a psychological perspective.

2.3 Correlating theory of personification and personality psychology

In this segment, I analysed the theory of personification, based on ontological, epistemological and theoretical perspectives. Drawing on ontological perspective(s), I analysed assumptions, beliefs and a collection of human values that, together, formed this study’s view of the ‘existence’ and ‘reality’ of personified systems. Likewise, the ontological perspective guided my arguments on how personified entities operated within a specific socio-geographic hierarchy in terms of intrinsic comparability. Similarly, I applied epistemological perspective(s) to explain this study's ontological perspective(s) of how the reality of personification related to other theoretical constructs analysed. The epistemological perspective focused my rationalisation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for personification in my research, the credibility of my information sources, the suitability of the literature structure, and the boundaries of my research on the subject of personification. To synthesise my arguments in this section, I applied an overarching theoretical perspective that articulated a single conceptual position on the subject. The latter hinged on a robust analytical argument, which complemented the ontological and epistemological positions adduced in this study. To begin with, in subsequent paragraphs I examined three major theoretical perspectives in personality psychology, that is, humanism, psychoanalysis and behaviourism.

2.3.1 Humanistic theories of personality and personification

According to Bland and DeRobertis (2017:1), the “humanistic perspective on personality emphasises the individualised qualities of optimal well-being and the use of creative potential to benefit others.” Bland and DeRobertis (2017:1) maintained that, “humanistic perspectives entail the relational conditions that promote those qualities as the outcomes of healthy development. The humanistic perspective serves as an alternative to mechanistic and/or reductionist explanations of personality based on isolated, static elements of observable behaviour (e.g., traits) or self-concept.” Of particular significance, Polkinghorne (noted in Bland & DeRobertis, 2017:7) posited that the pressure to conform to social ideals yielded
self-concepts that distorted and concealed elements of people’s actual personalities, thereby transforming them into social misrepresentations of their true personae. Bland and DeRobertis (2017:17) crowned their argument by asserting that rather than conceptualising personality as a fixed structure, set of traits, or self-concept, the humanistic perspective holistically/systemically portrayed the person *qua* self as continually evolving and as uniquely situated in socio-cultural and eco-psycho-spiritual contexts.

Drawing on the above discussions, I noted that under personified dispensations, individuals can actually “use their creative potential to benefit others” as Bland and DeRobertis particularly explained. However, this also infers the responsibility for personal actions squarely rests in the hands of the beholder since they exercise the will to act. In spite of this, I noted that humanistic theorists did not patently explain the inherent factors that determined an individual’s behavioural tendency, as articulated in detail by the theory of personification. In this regard, this study went beyond humanistic theories to leverage traditions of anthropomorphism and ‘childhood animism’ as discussed by Piaget (noted in Kallery & Psillos, 2004:291). I triangulated the latter with insights by Hopwood, Donnellan, Blonigen, Krueger, McGue, Iacono and Burt (2011:12) that highlighted the utility of an integrative and age-targeted approach for understanding genetic and environmental contributions to personality development during the transition to adulthood. Consequently, I inferred that actions executed by the “self,” including leadership, consciously revealed a person’s behavioural susceptibility towards personification. Therefore, when a person assumed a leadership position, I argue that the individual is accountable for their ‘conscious’ actions. These actions include taking responsibility for the outcomes of governance and development. However, the latter deviated from Rogers’ argument (noted in Pescitelli, 1996:4) that made a distinction between the ‘self’ as observed compared to real experiential causes of maladaptive behaviour. I observed that Pescitelli’s argument seems to exonerate individuals’ from taking responsibility for personal actions. On the contrary, the theory of personification holds leaders accountable for their conscious and premeditated actions.

Equally, another proponent of humanistic theory, Abraham Maslow, categorised the need for self-actualisation as the growth of an individual toward attaining the fulfilment of his or her highest needs (Maslow, 1943:383). According to Plotnik and
Kouyoumdjian (2013:443), Maslow believed that although very few individuals reached the level of self-actualisation, everyone had a self-actualising tendency. Plotnik and Kouyoumdjian maintained that in Maslow's assertion, this tendency motivated us to become the best kind of person we are capable of being. Likewise, Kritsonis (noted in Francis & Kritsonis, 2006:2) posited that Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory underscored the fact that "an individual's wants orchestrated in a hierarchy from the lower-level physiological needs to the higher-level needs for self-actualization." Maslow maintained that the "physiological needs are the highest priority because until they are reasonably satisfied, other higher-level needs will not emerge to motivate behaviour" (Francis & Kritsonis, 2006:2). To rationalise that self-actualising people are healthy, Maslow came up with his own account of healthy personalities as a deviation to psychodynamic theories that are grounded in clinical case studies. Maslow (noted in Neher, 1991:4) examined "exceptional historical figures, such as Abraham Lincoln and Eleanor Roosevelt, as well as some of his own contemporaries whom he thought had exceptionally good mental health." From the afore-mentioned study, Maslow illustrated various individualities that self-actualising individuals shared, including biological needs, physiological needs, safety needs, belongingness and love needs, esteem, cognitive needs, aesthetic needs, self-actualisation and transcendence needs (Maslow, noted in Huitt, 2007). Therefore, within the context of this study, I deduced that Maslow's perspective connoted that a national leader's highest motive would be self-actualisation and, ultimately, transcendence. This argument aligned well with the theory of personification that considers that the need to fulfil egoistic potentials drives actions of some national leaders.

In addition, the theory of personification rationalises that human motives go beyond Maslow's constructs of 'self-actualisation' to depict extreme behavioural inclinations. For instance, Maslow's theory posited that "self-actualizing people tend to focus on problems outside themselves; have a clear sense of what is true and what is false." However, the theory of personification argues that personified leadership inclinations tend to be egocentric, distrustful, and insensitive to democratic exigencies. Furthermore, whereas Maslow's ultimate human motive is transcendence, which entailed helping others to achieve self-actualisation, this study contends that, to the contrary, personified leadership frequently suppresses the masses and practises
social exclusion to the detriment of sound national governance and development. Likewise, Maslow’s theory did not explicitly explain how external factors, such as the environment or socio-cultural dynamics, influenced the trajectory of individual actions. Yet in East Africa, the environment and socio-cultural dynamics are key determinants of effective governance and development. In this respect, the theory of personification addresses the latter by recognising that external factors influenced the degree of a leader’s decision-making, and hence, subsequent actions.

This segment now examines the works of another humanistic proponent, George Kelly. Kelly thought that the mental structures that we use to interpret and predict events are personal constructs (Paszkowska-Rogacz & Kabzinska, 2012:409). Kelly’s theory contended that, “it is not important whether an event that is conceived by an individual actually exists or not; what matters are the basic facts that the individual perceives as real” (Paszkowska-Rogacz & Kabzinska, 2012:409). In addition, Kelly (noted in Heffner, 2014) posited that “when we interact with our environment and within ourselves, this manner of interacting is our personality.” Kelly (noted in Paszkowska-Rogacz & Kabzinska, 2012:409) propounded a Personal Construct Theory that hinged on the ‘fundamental postulate,’ which avers a person’s psychological processes are “channelized by the ways in which they anticipate events.” To this end, Kelly’s theory emphasised “the individual’s very personal and subjective experience of any event, which was merely data until they created their own way of understanding it” (Melanie, 2006:38).

My deductions agreed with Kelly’s assertion that “… we [humans] acted in a manner congruent with how we interpreted past events to shape our expectations of the world.” While I agreed with Kelly’s assertion, I construed that it was not a sufficient parameter to define personification. Similarly, I agree with Boeree’s observation, which asserted that “… Kelly believes that ‘to understand behaviour one needs to understand how the person construes reality more than what that reality truly is’ ” (Boeree, 2006:21). However, I observed that this concept, too, was not sufficient to define personification exhaustively. In both instances, the assumption by Kelly that individuals had cognitive interpretative abilities connoted an idealistic level of intelligence that allowed individuals to make factual assessments. In reality, not all individuals have cognitive abilities to learn from their experiences. For example, if scheming national leaders used the level of interpretative abilities posited by Kelly,
they would avoid undemocratic attempts to entrench themselves in power. This is because the process of ousting undemocratic Presidents, who fail to relinquish power, is usually very costly to the citizenry. Interestingly, the theory of personification acknowledges the limitation of functional intelligence. The theory recognises that many leaders seem to follow consistently failed contextual undemocratic precedents in their attempts to personify national systems.

### 2.3.2 Psychodynamic theories of personality and personification

In this section, I analysed the relationship between the theory of personification and leading psychodynamic theories. Although psychodynamic theories have evolved over time, they have not varied much from original theories.

According to Westen (1998:3), although not unanimous, most psychodynamic theorists largely observed five critical propositions. Westen argued that much of mental life, including thoughts, feelings and motives, is unconscious. The latter connotes that an individual, like a leader in the context of this study, can manifest behaviour or develops distinctive attributes that are incomprehensible to them. Westen maintained that individuals could have conflicting feelings that motivated them differently and often resulted in compromise toward the same person or situation because their mental processes, including affective and motivational processes, operated in parallel. Furthermore, Westen contended that stable personality patterns began to form in childhood, at a time when experiences play an important role in defining how personalities developed to influence subsequent social relationships. Additionally, Westen posited that a person’s mental representations of their own personality, other individuals, and inherent relationships guided interactions with others. To Westen, personality development involved not only learning to regulate sexual and aggressive feelings, but also moving from an immature, socially dependent state to a mature, interdependent one.

In order to understand confluences or divergences between personification and psychodynamic theories, I distilled information from the above introductory summary from which I extracted a contextually relatable theme with strong internal logic. One emergent theme was the fact that human beings are social animals that thrive on complex relationships, motivated or inhibited by their conscience. Bearing the latter
in mind, I selected and analysed psychodynamic theories in subsequent paragraphs to analyse on how childhood development processes influence an individual's personality. Specifically, I examined psychodynamic influences on mental inclination, feelings and relationships with respect to leadership. I deemed that the above concepts were important for effective contextualisation of personification in this section. Accordingly, I examined how famous proponents of psychodynamic theory of personality, such as Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler and Erik Erikson, articulated/overlooked concepts related to personification.

Sigmund Freud (1923:5) studied the psychosexual evolution of human beings, from which he developed the Structural Model, “which described the three parts of an individual's personality [id, ego and superego].” Freud (1923:5) argued that a person is born with id, the pleasure-seeker portion of our personality. He believed that the id in new-borns is crucial because it motivates individuals to satiate their intrinsic needs. According to Freud (noted in Lapsley & Stey, 2011:1), the id is “insensitive to other experiences and is purely concerned about its exclusive gratification.” The direct influence of the external world modifies the ‘id’ resulting in the ‘ego’, according to Freud. Consequently, the ego of a healthy person is the strongest part of their personality. It is the ‘executive’ of the personality in the sense that it regulates libidinal drive energies so that satisfaction accords with the demands of reality. It is the centre of reason, reality testing, and common sense, and has at its command a range of defensive stratagems that can deflect, repress, or transform the expression of unrealistic or forbidden drive energies.” Freud maintained that, “the superego is a further differentiation within the ego, which represents its ‘ideal’ state. The superego emerges because of the oedipal drama, where the child takes on the authority and magnificence of parental figures through introjections or identification.” Freud (noted in Lapsley & Stey, 2011:1) also asserted that, “whereas the id operated in pursuit of pleasure, and whereas the reality principle governed the ego, the superego bids the psychic apparatus to pursue idealistic goals and perfection. It is the source of moral censorship and of conscience.”

I found Freud’s assertions on self-satisfaction significant for gaining a better understanding of how behavioural factors potentially determined a leader’s ego, and ultimately their personality. Correspondingly, Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors and Preston (2010:16) also embraced Sigmund Freud’s arguments when they posited
that the interaction in a leader’s personality of the “id, ego and superego” and their “control of the pleasure and reality principles”, fundamentally defined the manner in which leaders behaved or made decisions. While I agree with the political psychology theories, that individual’s displayed unique or mixed personality attributes, motivation and behaviour, I aver that other external factors equally influenced the leadership style. For instance, persons subordinating to the personified leader also endorsed continuation, as is evident in Uganda, Rwanda and now Burundi, where the privileged political cronies openly advocate for perpetual incumbency of the Presidents. Accordingly, I posit that consistency and mutual agreement between the leader and subjects is vital to achieve effective democratic governance. Furthermore, I noted that whereas Freud’s constructs conveyed masculine nuances, it conspicuously ignored feminine concepts. Although the latter poses a conceptual challenge in assessing demographic impacts of leadership in a given polity, the theory of personification ably addresses this gap. Similarly, Freud’s masculine concepts may also promote chauvinist ideology in personified systems, leading to the exclusion and ultimate marginalisation of women.

Another leading psychodynamic theorist, Alfred Adler, provided some deep insights into the dynamics of personality.

Adler (noted in Morgan, 2010:56) underscored the point that two factors frequently influence every single aspect of human relations: “the inferiority complex and the striving for social feeling.” According to Adler (noted in Morgan, 2010:57), ‘Individual Psychology’ connoted the manner in which individuals and nations craved power, largely driven by profound feelings of inferiority. Similarly, Adler maintained that, “Individual Psychology could bring together for good all the intrinsic latent forces in groups, just as it has done in individuals.” Adler (noted in Morgan, 2010:60) asserted that the relative occurrence of the inferiority complex is the most crucial singular factor in determining the way in which personality developed. This inferiority complex turned into a deep-seated impetus among persons of all ages, to execute their actions in a manner that evolves to the goal of superiority.”

I noted that Adler’s emphasis on inferiority ignored the instinctively conditioned, nurturing role of caregivers, for example the mother. Similarly, Adler disregarded the extension of the parental nurturing role, ceteris paribus, through the lives of children,
which I theorise, empowers the child to think and reason positively. Conversely, I argue that cognitive development, a pivotal that shapes the eventual leadership behavioural disposition, commenced at birth and continued throughout adulthood. I base my argument on the theory-driven approach of development psychology taken by Watts, Cockcroft and Duncan (2009). According to Watts et al. (2009:265), a child is engrossed in a symbiotic relationship with the mother, lacking a fundamental sense of separation from her. From the foregoing assertion, I argue that only an intelligent being, like all normal human beings, could discern an immediate maternal connection at birth. Watts et al. (2009:265) corroborated this in their assertion that developing the rudimentary sense between the self and the mother, between internal and external forms of stimulus, clearly proved central to the infant's psychological development and formation of their ego. Contrary to Adler's theory that hinged on an "inferiority complex" per se, it is apparent from the foregoing that every formative stage in a person's life is important in determining the person's subsequent behavioural inclinations, including leadership trajectories. Interestingly, at the ego formative stage, an infant becomes fascinated with the image of the self (Watts et al., 2009:280). I also argue that an infant's fascination with self-image, if not well channelled, could eventually translate into an egoistic, personified leadership inclination later in life. Thus, the ego formative stage is critical to leadership development.

Another leading psychodynamic theorist, Erik Erikson, unravelled complexities pertaining to societal influences on childhood development (Morgan, 2010:138).

According to Erikson, "the stages of psychosocial development involved challenges that a person must overcome to be successful in the later stages. In his great classic, Erikson delineated a sequence of eight distinct phases of psychosocial ego development, generally known as 'the eight stages of man' (Morgan, 2010:143). Erikson postulated that the phases were a 'universal phenomenon' that arose from epigenetic materialization of a 'ground plan' of personality that was conveyed genetically. At the first stage he called 'infancy', Erikson juxtaposed 'trust' and 'mistrust' with the notion that 'hope' is the emergent psychosocial strength gained by the individual. Erikson believed that the feeling of 'trust' is a fundamental cornerstone of a robust personality (Morgan, 2010:147). At one and a half years, the child transitioned to the "autonomy versus shame and doubt" phase where they learned
‘will power’ as a personality skill (Morgan, 2010:148). During the stage of the four to five year old child, the resolution of conflict versus guilt produces in the child a deep sense of purpose or, if negatively resolved, the loss of direction and purpose towards the future. Erikson explained that, “initiative added to autonomy the quality of undertaking, planning, and ‘attacking’ - a task for the sake of being on the move, where previously self-will, more often than not, inspired acts of defiance or, at any rate, protested independence” (Morgan, 2010:149). The ‘school age’ period, between six and eleven, covered the years that Erikson referred to as the “latency period.” Here, tension that Erikson termed ‘industry versus inferiority’ appeared, creating a crisis that evoked a sense of ‘competency’ (Morgan, 2010:150). The next stage that nestled in between childhood and adulthood is a pivotal period in the development of the individual ‘ego’. Finally, adolescence is a period in one’s development where ‘ego identity’ and ‘role confusion’ encountered the resultant psychosocial complexity of ‘fidelity’” (Morgan, 2010:151).

Furthermore, Erikson posited that “by virtue of an entrenched ego identity exemplified by ‘fidelity or loyalty’ to oneself and one’s social milieu, the individual was now ready for intimacy.” To Erikson, “this ‘intimacy’ expressed the disposition to commit to effective relationships and partnerships. The latter required one to develop moral capability to take on such commitments, despite the fact that it necessitated considerable concessions.” Erikson posited that this is the phase associated with courtship, marriage, and early family life (Morgan, 2010:153). On this note, Morgan (2010:154) argued that “subsequently, an individual in the ‘middle years’ of their lives potentially became actively creative or stifled into degeneration. Morgan maintained that people in their mid-years who took up and cultivated generativity engendered a feeling of ‘care’ that improved the quality of life for the next generation. Conversely, individuals who lacked generativity never operated as constructive members of society. They only lived to gratify their desires, and lacked relational skills. Lastly, Erikson (noted in Morgan, 2010:155) argued that, “ego integrity in late adulthood created a pleasurable positive personality, whereas people who rued at the unproductivity of their earlier years yielded to depression.”

I found relevance in Erikson’s assertion that, in general, resolving challenges pertaining to the stages of life relative to one’s age potentially prepared an individual for effective leadership. In essence, Erikson reasoned that those who were younger
and had not mastered all of those stages of growth would not be good leaders. The reference to ‘stages of growth’ in the foregoing sentence brought to mind the concept of ‘personality,’ which is a key factor in leadership development. According to Erikson (noted in Wiggins, 2003:111), “the enthusiasm to progress toward, be cognizant of, and relate with a growing social network leads individuals to develop a personality that aligns with preordained steps in human organisms.” In the foregoing context, I noted the linkage between personality and social interaction that are crucial ingredients of leadership style. To this extent, the theory of personification identified with Erikson’s theory that leadership is about relatedness. Likewise, the theory of personification draws significant inspiration from Maslow’s (1987) rendering of “great self-esteem.” I argue that leaders with good self-esteem were dependable and focused, when interacting with the society they led. This stability is attributable, in Erikson's concept, to sound socio-emotional development in children and teenagers, continuing to adulthood. In agreement with Erikson’s theory, Fletcher (2012:14) argued that, “whereas leaders who have an avoidant manner of relating regard themselves positively, they have an exceptionally negative opinion of others.” Similarly, Fletcher argued that “... leaders who had a fearsome manner of relating with others have a negative perception of themselves and others.” In congruence with Fletcher’s observations, Erikson asserted that “common impressions of good and evil gave directions to men; these impressions assumed definitive specificity in every person’s ego development” (Erikson, 1994:17). I contend that the terms ‘good and evil’ and ‘ego development’ are contextually pertinent in analysing and understanding the theory of personification. Leaders demonstrating excessive egoistic tendencies usually disregarded democratic principles of governance in preference for personified rule. I also posit that citizens often perceived the atrocious and exclusionist policies pursued by personified regimes as ‘evil’. Conversely, leaders with ‘common images of good’ would develop a balanced ego that enables them to govern democratically.

On the contrary, Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development came short in addressing certain critical aspects that the theory of personification embraces. For instance, Erikson assumed [linear] “stages of psychosocial progression where individuals had to surmount hurdles in order to succeed later in life.” However, I wondered what could transpire when a child missed a stage of growth, for example,
through voluntary/involuntary separation, catastrophic events, and the like. I noted that Erikson does not compellingly articulate transitions between stages of psychosocial development. Does Erikson insinuate “failure” if a child fails to surmount any stage of development? Unequivocally, I point out that Erikson disregards the innovativeness, resilience and versatility of human beings to cope, adapt and recover in the face of shocks.

2.3.3 Behaviourist theory of personality and personification

Behaviourists believed that humans (and animals) are motivated primarily to receive rewards and to avoid punishments (Young, 1936:332, 333). The foregoing concept worked on the notion that “if behaviour is not reinforced, it will not continue.” Similarly, behaviourists argued that environments controlled human development by means of hereditary tradition and habit equipment (Watson, 1913:7). Of the many concepts adduced by behaviourists, I found the above assertions significant for understanding the theory of personification within the context of personality influences. In subsequent paragraphs, I examined works on behaviourism by leading theorists.

Pavlov (noted in Wolpe & Plaud, 1997:969) attracted substantial interest to the examination of issues pertaining to the comprehension of personality. Wolpe and Plaud contended that, to Pavlov, “Individual nervous systems varied in their levels of excitation or inhibition. In addition, he proposed that combinations of these two factors, which varied along physiological dimensions, determined various personality types.” Similarly, Wolpe and Plaud (1997:970) asserted that “in the paradigm stemming from Pavlovian personality genres, genetic encoding prompted people to respond distinctively to environmental stimuli.” Therefore, this study argues that if we can develop leadership behaviour in others, then it is possible to shape the character or personality of a subject in the process. In other words, we can condition leaders to adapt to a certain desired pattern using distinctive stimuli. Accordingly, I found Pavlov’s work on classical conditioning particularly important to the extent that it enhances our understanding of how humans perceive themselves, their behaviour and learning processes. I also found relevance in Pavlov’s experiments that reflected on how the environment can influence the individual.
In consonance with Pavlov’s theory, the theory of personification hypothesises that a leader’s behavioural inclination can be clearly discerned through the embodiment of their ‘true self’, as is perceptible from the unpretentious responses to stimuli that Pavlov’s animal subjects exhibited. However, the theory of personification acknowledges the primacy of the human being above all animals. This singular factor enables human minds to feign calculated responses to stimuli to elicit selfish gains. Because of this human ability to pretend, assessing the legitimacy of devious leaders with personified inclinations can be a daunting task for citizens. Similarly, while I agree with Pavlov that genetic factors play an important role in shaping personality, I contend that these do not constitute a compelling factor in formulating personification. To the contrary, the theory of personification recognises the operation of external factors, such as environment and parental influences, on human development. Additionally, the theory of personification contests the conclusion drawn from Pavlovian experiments by behaviourists to the effect that a leader’s primary concerns are for people and production. The reason for this deviance is that, under personified systems, leaders are insensitive to citizens’ demands and, rather than stimulating production for the national benefit, prefer to manipulate systems to feed their egocentric aspirations.

Skinner (2011:8) is by far one of the most influential spokespersons of all time for uncompromising behaviourism. Skinner believed that the world could solve its major problems if only we improved our understanding of human behaviour. Instead of focusing on the sequence of actions before a ‘response’ occurs, as with Pavlov's conditioned reflexes, Skinner established that our reactions to the ‘response’ greatly influenced its ensuing occurrence rate. Skinner (2011:44) dubbed ‘operant conditioning’ as reflecting “the process through which a person comes to deal effectively with a new environment.” A ‘behaving’ person directs ‘operant behaviour’, which we attribute to an act of will (Skinner, 2011:54). To Skinner, free will is an illusion and human action ensues from consequences of repetitive action. “Where consequences are bad, there is a high likelihood that people will not repeat the action; conversely, there is a high probability of repeating the actions that led to a good consequence”, an act that Skinner called the ‘contingencies of reinforcement’ (Skinner, 2011:43). Of particular relevance to this study is Skinner’s assertion that a degree of prediction [of human behaviour] is possible. The latter works on the
principle that what people have often done, they are likely to do again; they follow custom because it is customary to follow them, and they exhibit habits. Furthermore, Skinner argued that “the human mind converts the environment into experience; and action into ideas, purposes and will. The thinking person transforms into a thinking mind; consequently, the self or personality replaces the person.” Likewise, Skinner maintained that, “the self or personality is at best a repertoire of behaviour imparted by an organized set of contingencies” (Skinner, 2011:164).

This study agreed with Skinner’s assertion that the environment influenced human beings, and that the human mind translated the environment into experiences, actions, ideas, purposes and will. Consequently, the self or personality replaces the thinking mind in an individual, which essentially this study perceives as defining the character or behavioural inclination of a leader. However, I disagree with Skinner’s assertion regarding the principles of reinforcement, which suggests that an individual will most probably repeat actions that had earlier led to good consequences. In terms of leadership, the latter implies that a leader, through repetitive acts, can perfect “effective” leadership behaviour. In Skinner’s experiments, he provided food rewards to enhance the good repetitive actions of his study subjects, pigeons. I argue that in human terms, the good repetitive actions of leaders should be part of their natural obligation to the citizens, rather than expectancy for reward. To the contrary, the reward system, if not well managed, could easily sublume into an institutionalised demand for incentives, which ultimately breeds personified systems. Additionally, under Skinner’s theory, if a leader learns something, and if positively reinforced through inducement, this will result in repetitive actions. I found this argument to be precarious, especially if what the leader had learnt was detrimental to national development. The latter signified that unstructured behavioural reinforcement could easily precipitate personified systems. Similarly, the fact that Skinner used animal subjects in controlled experiments to personify human behaviour connoted that, in practice, leaders should control individuals in a specific manner to elicit certain results. I argue that this concept is very characteristic of personified leadership behaviour, where leaders seek to control acquiesced citizens under their authority to feed egoistic desires.
2.4 Correlating theory of personification and development philosophy

In Section 2.4, I briefly explored literature in the fields of development studies, international relations, political studies, policy studies, demography, economics and philosophical studies. This analysis provided an ordered assessment of the relationship that this thesis has with the body of literature.

2.4.1 Development theories

In the field of development studies, two development theories are significant within the classification of ‘linear stage’ theory. First, Rostow (1959:1) generalised a set of stages of growth, which he designated as the traditional society; the preconditions for take-off; the drive to maturity; and the age of high mass consumption. Rostow maintained that, beyond the age of high mass consumption, lie the problems which were beginning to arise in a few societies, and which may arise generally when diminishing relative marginal utility sets in for real income itself. Of Rostow’s five stages, this study concurs that the ‘traditional stage’ depicts the livelihoods of about 70 percent of the EAC’s largely peasant population. However, personified policies usually thwart efforts to transition from subsistence levels through growth in trade, infrastructure, savings and investments. Yet, Rostow’s development theory does not illustrate this factor adequately. Similarly, Rostow (noted in Parr, 2001:4) argued that the “take-off to sustained growth stage is the most critical, the most difficult to attain, and economic growth becomes the normal condition during this phase.” This stage, according to Rostow, (noted in Parr, 2001:4) “required increased capital investments, emergence of a leading industrial sector and a functional institutional structure that buttresses the leading sector.” However, I argue that leaders under personified systems often squander national resources on unstructured investments, which usually fail, to the detriment of the nation. Equally, I argue that Rostow’s assertion that an institutional framework should support the leading sector is not practical under personified systems, which endeavour to structure institutions around the personality of the leader. I also point out that whereas Rostow’s stages of growth follow a linear pattern, in reality, policy processes do not follow a predictable pattern structured along well-defined steps. The latter poses challenges in correlating the theory of personification to Rostow’s theories.
Secondly, the Harrod-Domar growth model linked the pursuit of high aggregate output performances to a number of specifically identifiable macro conditions (Vaitsos, 2003:21). Vaitsos (2003:21) maintained that these can be reduced to four main policy fronts that are conducive to high growth: high savings/investments rates; high capital productivity; high rate of technical progress; and low population growth rate. Likewise, the Harrod-Domar model illustrated the fact that every economy must save a proportion of its national income to replace depreciated capital goods (Todaro, 1977:52). However, this study posits that savings alone, as described in the model, cannot spur development. The level of savings also depends on the integrity of the persons who govern the process, a factor that is lacking in personified systems. Equally, I point out that the Harrod-Domar model focuses overtly on investments and does not explain national governance on economic growth, a factor addressed by the theory of personification. Another important limitation of the Harrod-Domar model, within the context of this study, is that it advocates ‘that every economy must save a proportion of its national income.’ This assertion assumes that policymaking institutions are functional and synchronised in given economies, a factor that I argue is absent in personified systems. To the contrary, policymaking organs in personified systems depend on the whims and caprices of egocentric national leaders who use such institutions as mechanisms to reward loyal subjects, thus eroding their objectivity.

2.4.2 Structural change theories

Goulet (2003:121) asserted that “structural change deals with the progressive process by means of which the economic, industrial and institutional structure of an underdeveloped economy transforms over time. This allows new industries to supplant traditional agriculture as the engine of economic growth.” Goulet (2003:116) maintained that “two notable representative examples of the structural-change approach are the two-sector surplus labour theoretical model of W. Arthur Lewis, and the patterns of development empirical analysis of Chenery and Syrquin.” Similarly, Todaro (1977:188) analysed the Lewis model and concluded that a developing economy consists of two sectors. According to Todaro, these sectors are the traditional, overpopulated rural subsistence sector characterized by zero marginal labour productivity, and a modern high-productivity urbanized industrial sector [that
gradually draws] labour from the subsistence sector. In the model, Todaro observed that “the extent of industrial investment and capital accumulation in the modern sector determines the speed with which expansion occurs.” He maintained that “modern-sector profits, that exceed wages, made such investment possible provided capitalists reinvested their entire profits.” However, I point out that Lewis assumes absolute capital investments in an economy, but ignores capital flight, a limitation that is characteristic of poor governance and weak monetary institutional policies in personified systems. Likewise, I posit that national leaders in personified systems siphon large sums of money from central reserves. The leaders stash the cash away in foreign accounts or offshore investments that do not necessarily contribute to the growth of their country’s economy. In addition, Lewis assumed an idealistic condition in which surplus labour transitions smoothly from the subsistence to urbanised industrial sector. However, I argue that personified systems thrive on marginalisation and exclusion policies to maintain a large disenfranchised and powerless population, who serve the egoistic interests of the incumbent regime. The above argument possibly explains why the agricultural and urban informal sectors are the most marginalised in personified economies.

In the other structural change theory, Chenery; Chenery and Srinivasan, and Chenery and Syrquin (noted in Jeniček, 2016:98) examined analyses done on countries with disparate levels of per capita income. The studies identified various idiosyncratic features pertaining to the process of development. According to Chenery et al. (noted in Jeniček, 2016), “these include the shift from agricultural to industrial production; the steady accumulation of physical and human capital; the change in consumer demands from emphasis on food and basic necessities to desires for manufactured goods and services.” Chenery et al. (noted in Jeniček, 2016) maintained that “the features also include growth of cities and urban industries as people migrate from farms and small towns, and the decline in family size and overall population growth as children lose their economic value, and parents substitute child quality for quantity.” However, I contend that this model implies rural–urban migration, and insinuates moral decadence of parents who are uncommitted to ethical family values – aspects that are characteristic of a poor governance system. Besides, the East African region that I focus on in this thesis is predominantly an agrarian community. Hence, I aver that labour surpluses are largely seasonal since
the region still depends on rain-fed agriculture. Drawing ‘excess’ labour from farms during off-seasons may only feed personified systems that are averse to investing in the agricultural sector, and ultimately distorts food productivity. Moreover, demand for agricultural products in the region has outstripped the supply, making the industry profitable. Rather than promote migration to the cities, there is need therefore to maximise the profitability of rural land resources.

2.4.3 Classical economic theories

Classical economists theorised that the combination of private capital and property, the free operation or the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, and human labour formed the basis of economic growth (Engel, 2010:2). Economists recognise Adam Smith, the foremost exponent of ‘free market’ principles, as the architect of classical economics. On his views of man, Adam Smith (noted in Hayek, 2005:117) stated that “in spite of the ‘narrowness of his comprehension,’ a unique person, who uses his own knowledge for his own purposes, assumed a position to serve men and their needs, or used men and their skills.” I find contextual relevance in Smith’s assertion that a process of socialisation, whether self-interested or benevolent, constitutes all our feelings. I argue that the notion of benevolent socialisation is essential for deconstructing personified systems as it provides a basis for consensual dialogue. At the same time, Smith harmonised his social comprehension of the ‘self’ with a profound respect that every significant ‘self’ is distinct and is capable of making objective choices. For Smith (noted in Fleischacker, 2017), “social pressures inspired and guided ethical self-transformation; in spite of this, the individual carries out their own self-transformation in the end.”

Regarding the above, I argue that social pressures are necessary to precipitate ethical transformation in order to translate personified systems into participatory democracies. However, contrary to the theory of personification, two paradoxical factors are immediately pertinent from Smith’s arguments. First, Smith advocated for a free enterprise economy under a capitalist system, which in my view erroneously assumed that human beings will not exploit each other. On the contrary, I argue that personified systems take advantage of capitalist structures to amass wealth by exploiting disenfranchised workers. The helpless workers have no option but to acquiesce in the face of the powerful and sometimes monopolistic capitalists.
Second, Smith limited the responsibilities of governments because he considered it crucial that for the development of virtue, people should have plenty of room to act and shape their feelings, on their own (Fleischacker, 2017). However, this study recognises the pivotal role that government plays in advancing the national governance and development agenda. Similarly, I argue that Smith’s advocacy for limited government functionality sets the foundation for personified systems that exploit policy gaps to serve self-interests. Interestingly, Smith also noted that self-interest is a powerful, but not the only motive, in human behaviour (Coase, 1976:1). To me this indicates a hint of personification in Smith’s argument. Conversely, Coase (1976:28) maintained that “where benevolence motivated a politician, they will be inclined to give preferentiality to their family, friends, and party members, all of whom are usually inhabitants of their region or country of origin. However, when self-interest motivated politicians, it is perceptible that the results were less satisfactory.” I observed that whereas Coase differed from Smith on the subject of self-interest, he agreed with the theory of personification that such dispensations yield poor results.

In contrast, neoclassical economists laid greater emphasis on methodological individualism (Lowenberg, 1990:623). According to Vanberg (1994:1), the latter meant that “whatever phenomena we sought to explain at the social aggregate level, ought to demonstrate how it stems out of the actions and interactions of distinct individuals.” Vanberg posited that these individuals, “whether separately or jointly, pursued their interests as they wished, based on their comprehension of the world around them.” Similarly, on the subject of ‘individuals,’ Buchanan (1987:244) asserted that, “the ‘individual’ is designed as an ‘agent’ with the distinguished capacity to evaluate, make choices and act.” Accordingly, Lowenberg (1990:621) posited that “anything the individual valued is a legitimate source of utility that is revealed by their behaviour [in which they rationalize choices],” Lowenberg maintained that “in the least, we assumed that in the economic theory of human behaviour, perceptible self-interest, for instance social status, motivated an individual to make choices.” I found the above arguments particularly relevant to the extent that it demonstrated how actions and interactions of individual human beings consequently resulted in human behaviour that is identifiable with self-interest. In tandem, Lowenberg argued that [neoclassical] assumptions “disregard the quest for egoistically conceived economic interests, nor do they ascribe any malicious or
selfish motives to a unique agent.” On this note, I point out that this indemnification does not suffice under personified systems. Instead, I argue that selfishly motivated economic concerns are the cornerstone of personified regimes. On this note, I contend that the argument by neoclassical economists that ‘human behaviour is identifiable with self-interest’ is pertinent for rationalising how personified leadership inclinations typify the theory of personification.

Conversely, neoclassical economists argued that competitive forces, operating through factor substitution and variations in relative prices, leaned towards facilitating full employment and exploiting the growth potential of the economy (Salvadori & Panico, 2006:xiii). However, Keynes, a leading neoclassical economist, asserted that capitalist economies would not always tend to a balance between supply and demand equilibrium that produces full employment (Keynes; Love, noted in Engel, 2010:5). Love (noted in Engel, 2010:5) argued that the latter is due, in Keynes’ reasoning, to a lack of demand in the economy, which requires government to boost demand to achieve full employment. Hence, the Keynesian ‘revolution’ heralded theoretical reform in economic analysis and governmental policies (Meade, noted in Engel, 2010:5). In the above respect, I point out that the assumption by neoclassical economists’ that leaders, for instance, act rationally ignores ‘selfish’ aspects of human behaviour. Likewise, I posit that over emphasis on capital accumulation as a solution to underdevelopment motivates crude amassing of wealth by leaders in personified systems, at the expense of the citizens. Rather than focus on capital accumulation alone, efforts should also focus on equitable national income distribution and institutional reforms that are responsive to citizen’s needs.

2.4.4 International relations theories

In international relations theories, Morgenthau (noted in Keaney, 2006:3) systematised six principles of realism: first, he asserted that “the state is the central actor on the world stage”. Second, Morgenthau stated that the natural state of international politics is anarchic. Morgenthau maintained that all states seek to have the greatest amount of power that they possibly can. Likewise, Morgenthau asserted that the intrinsic natures of human actors who control the states determine state behaviour. In addition, Morgenthau argued that, in pursuit of security or power, states conduct politics and adopt policies according to a rational framework. Finally,
Morgenthau contended that, “force or the ability and willingness to use force at will, is an integral part of statehood.” I agree with Morgenthau that the deep-seated disposition of human actors who govern states actually determine the character and performance of the state. This is especially true under personified disposition where leaders aim at entrenching their persona into state institutions until the systems start reflecting the leader’s essential character. Similarly, I find significance in Morgenthau’s contention that “states display an assertive power-seeking disposition that stems from the fact that human nature is deficient.” The latter corroborates my hypothesis that aggressive power-seeking behaviour is characteristic of personified systems. Drawing on Morgenthau’s theory, this forceful behaviour would drive leaders, and ultimately nations, to always seek power and domination over others.

Conversely, Slaughter (1995:720) argued that, “institutionalists perceive the international system as anarchical, while states are self-interested actors who seek to survive by increasing their material conditions.” Similarly, Slaughter (1995:726) maintained that “states are the primary actors in the international system, and that states are engaged in the pursuit of power, however the presence of institutions modifies the organizing principle of anarchy.” I observe that like realists, institutionalists perceive the state as being in ‘anarchy’. Although institutionalists have identified self-interest at state level, this study argues that self-interest - a primary factor in driving behaviour, is surrogate to personification. Similarly, Andrew Moravcsik’s liberalist theory (noted in Slaughter, 1995:728) commenced “with individuals and groups operating in both domestic and transnational civil society.” According to Moravcsik, “these are the primary actors in the international system. State behaviour is in turn determined not by the international balance of power, whether or not mediated by institutions, but by the relationship between these social actors and the governments representing their interests, in varying degrees of completeness.” Moravcsik maintained that “State preferences are derivative of individual and groups preferences, but depend crucially on which individuals and groups are represented.” I observe that the liberalist theory applicably recognise the centrality of individual behaviour in society. They correctly argue that individuals and groups have an inundating influence on state structures. In consonance, I hasten to add that personified agendas drive individual interests, which in turn, influence societal systems and ultimately the state. This contention is important in scientifically
linking individual actions to larger events that affect the governance and development in any given state.

On the other hand, constructivism as a social theory dealt with underlying conceptions of how the social and political worlds interact. Constructivists argued that men and women made everything involved in the social world. The fact that it is made by [humans] makes it intelligible to them (Jackson & Sørensen, 2006:165). Jackson and Sørensen maintained that “constructivists perceive the social world as that of human consciousness.” To Jackson & Sørensen, this cognizance “consisted of thoughts and beliefs, of ideas and concepts, of languages and discourses, of signs, signals and understandings among human beings, especially groups of human beings, such as states and nations.” Additionally, Jackson and Sørensen (2006:165) contended that “the social world is an intersubjective domain: it is meaningful to people who made it and live in it, and who understand it precisely because they made it and they are at home in it.” Likewise, Checkel (1998:326) considered two pertinent constructivist assumptions. Checkel argued that, “the first supposes that material structures beyond certain biological necessities derived meaning only by the social context of their interpretation. The second dealt with the basic nature of human agents and state behaviour in broad structural environments where rule-governed action, norms and logics of appropriateness prevail.” Zacher (noted in Checkel, 1998:329) also affirmed that “customs that regimes follow act as a check on state behaviour; they are an explanatory variable that interposes between fundamental power diffusions and outcomes.” Beyond the constructivist perspective, I argue that personification of systems negates societal norms that constrain errant political behaviour, and instead concentrates self-centred power on a leader. In addition, I posit that societal customs also actuate individual behavioural progression, occasionally leading to personified tendencies. However, I point out that constructivists need to clarify from their perspective how personified human behaviours form, as well as how leaders' personalities and interests are shaped. These critical factors define personified behavioural disposition and therefore play an important role in shaping national and international relations.

Wendt (1987:339) maintained that neorealists define international system structures in terms of observable attributes of their member states, and as a result, assert that those structures usually limit the options available to pre-existing state actors. In addition, Wendt (1987:339) asserted that neorealists believe that “human agents and social structures are theoretically interdependent or mutually implicating entities.” Regarding the foregoing, I argue that leaders with personified inclinations can potentially exploit neorealists’ institutional structures with the result that national systems eventually begin to reflect the desires of the more powerful egoistic actors. Similarly, I posit that the diminution of institutional objectivity, coupled with concentration of power around a leader, sets the stage for the transition to personified governance style. On the other hand, Wendt (1987:335) argued that, “world-system theorists define international system structures in terms of the fundamental organizing principles of the capitalist world economy, which underlie and constitute states.” Wendt underscored the point that “world-system theorists understand that ‘state actors’ are generated by ‘structures’ according to structuralist provisions.” This study opines that agentic and structural theories show a contrast between societal and individual interests – a factor characteristic of self-interest and identity formation. I point out that the latter constitutes important factors that shape a leader’s behavioural inclination. However, I argue that agentic and structural theories do not explicitly explain how personified policies impact on state relations, which is a gap that the theory of personification addresses.

2.4.5 Political theories

In the field of political theories, Dryzek, Honig and Phillips (2011:11) posited that “the classic liberalism deem that individuals are essentially impassioned by self-interest.” Furthermore, “individual motivation is the best judge of what this interest requires”. Likewise, Dryzek et al. (2011:12) argued that liberalism perceives the material aspects of interest as best realised through exchange in a market economy that benefits all. They maintained that “in the liberalism model, politics reconciles and aggregates individual interests by intervening when interests do not coalesce for mutual benefit.” To Goodin (2009:70), the latter “takes place under a supposedly neutral set of constitutional rules.” Goodin maintained that, “given that powerful individuals organized politically into minorities or majorities can turn public power to
their private benefit, checks across different centres of power are necessary, and constitutional rights are required to protect individuals against government and against one another.” However, a foremost classical liberalist, John Stuart Mill (noted in Boire, 2002:255), “refuted concepts that individual actions naturally affect society or that acts that harm individuals are also injurious to society. Mill clarified his departure on two levels. First, Mill acknowledged that the ‘self-regarding’ conduct of an individual hinders them from performing some public duty or identifiable harm to people. Secondly, to Mill that so called ‘self-regarding’ conduct is not invincible to societal control or discipline.”

I agree with classical liberalists that ‘powerful individuals’ can essentially personify public power to feed their self-interests. However, liberalists do not disambiguate at what point a person has an ‘interest’ or transitions to the hyphenated compound term ‘self-interest’. Additionally, I argue that for ‘individuals to be the best judge of their interests’ requires them, in the first place, to know that ‘interest’. On the subject of ‘self-interest’ – a variant for egotism, I contend that self-interest actually motivates personified behaviours in national leaders. It drives a national leader to perceive state institutions as an extension of their persona. Yet for conflict resolution, liberalism largely relies on politics to resolve divergent individual interests, but is silent on the role of traditional structures. The model also assumes that constitutionalism prevails in any given polity. However, I argue that under personified systems, crucial government pillars such as the judiciary and legislature are frequently compromised, resulting in constitutional quandary. This is where I agree with Mill’s opinion that “society or the state can legitimately limit a person’s actions when it has considerable negative consequences for other persons.”

In contrast, Marxists have scorned liberalism’s individualistic ontology, pointing instead to the centrality of social classes in political conflict (Goodin, 2009:71). Goodin maintained that the Marxist theory draws on philosophies of Karl Marx, who together with Friedrich Engels inspired the intellectual tenets of Marxism. According to Carnoy (2014:46), Marx believed that “the basis of social structure and human consciousness emanate from the material conditions of society. The form of the state therefore, emerges from production not from the general development of the human mind or from the collectives of men’s wills.” Carnoy maintained that in Marx’ view, “society shapes the state while the dominant mode of production and relations
inherent in that mode, in turn, shape society”. Marx (noted in Carnoy, 2014:47) theorised that “the state is the political expression of, and an essential means of ‘bourgeoisies’ class dominance in a capitalist society.” Equally, Marxists saw the market as a generator of oppression and inequality, rather than a mechanism to meet individual interests (Dryzek et al., 2011:12). However, I point out that in Marxian theory, the bourgeoisies have particular control over labour that inexorably extends their power to control state institutions. I argue that the latter would inevitably lead to an authoritarian regime that sets the premise for personified reign, since the model encourages coercive dominance and capitalist exploitation. I also argue that non-elites could occasionally escape the ‘gravity’ of Marxian class ideology to edge their way to the top of the manufacturing class, and even the state. Similarly, the property-less masses, that in Marxian theory serve as labour reserves, when mobilised can transform into a formidable force of ‘machinery’ to wrest control of the state.

Regarding political liberalism, Cappelen and Tungodden (2004:1) contended, “the discipline of liberal egalitarian theory of justice is a composite combination of the values of equality, freedom and personal responsibility.” There is significant convergence in debates around equality, with socialists preoccupied with questions of individual responsibility. Conversely, liberals present equality rather than liberty as the “sovereign virtue” (Dworkin, noted in Dryzek et al., 2011). Dworkin argued that the two strands combine to make liberal egalitarianism almost the only [enduring] tradition of egalitarianism. According to Dall’Agnol (2006:4), Dworkin [the foremost proponent of liberal egalitarianism] perceived equality to be the driving force of liberalism. Dall’Agnol maintained that “subjecting individual rights to the concept of equal respect and concern obligate that the political theory Dworkin advances be named ‘liberal egalitarianism’” (Dall’Agnol, 2006:4). To Dworkin, equality is the foundation of individual rights and social welfare (Dall’Agnol, 2006:5). Thus, Dworkin shows that the fundamental idea of ‘equality’ shapes the notion of welfare, which is the ultimate end of political actions in utilitarianism. Accordingly, liberal egalitarians advocated for the choice of a particular public policy that would increase the conditions of life for the whole community, rather than a policy that will improve only the conditions of a small group (Dall’Agnol, 2006:6). I agree with the liberal egalitarians to the extent that they view “equality” as significant for determining
courses of welfare and political actions. I also concur that equality curtails the
impetus for personified systems to discriminate along “civil, cultural, economic,
political and social rights to which all human beings are entitled.” However, I posit
that whereas liberal egalitarians hold ‘equality’ above ‘individual rights,’ the theory of
personification puts them both on a par. This is because under personified systems,
national leaders use social exclusions and marginalisation to disempower citizens, in
direct violation of their inalienable rights. In addition, I contend that the liberal
egalitarian preference for policies that affect whole communities rather than
minorities is insensitive to the needs of vulnerable populations, for instance people
with disabilities (PWDs), orphans, and people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). Such
skewed policy frameworks offer opportunities to some leaders to introduce
personified systems.

On the other hand, Etzioni (1993:1) argued that the communitarian philosophy
emphasises the importance of community in the functioning of political life, in the
analysis and evaluation of political institutions, and in understanding human identity
and well-being. Accordingly, Spring, Aharoni, Summy and Elliot (2010:94) argued
that the term “communitarianism” described the notion that human beings can
flourish only within the context of a community. Furthermore, [communitarians]
argued that the following three features characterised communities: shared goals,
and relationships that are not merely instrumental, and a sense of identity (Spring et
al., 2010:94). For communitarians, a network of social relationships subsumed
individual [identity], never the social isolates that liberalism assumed. [Individuals
also] have obligations to the community, not just to the political arrangements that
facilitate their own interests (Dryzek et al., 2011:15). Likewise, Bell (2016:2)
contended that “communitarians deemed that principles of justice originated from
particular forms of life and traditions of specific societies, and thus can vary from one
context to another.” Regarding the conception of the ‘self’ (an important factor in the
theory of personification), Bell (2016:19) maintained that communitarians believed
individuals have a vital interest in leading decent communal lives. The latter has the
political implication that there is a need to sustain and promote the communal
attachments that are crucial to our sense of well-being. Conversely, I argue that the
‘self’ is surrogate to the cognitive formation of our personalities. Contrary to the
communitarian assertion, I posit that an individual first looks inward into their intrinsic
potential before looking outward to the surrounding community. However, the community can effectively influence the behavioural inclination of an individual, including the national leader. In the same vein, communitarians suggest that individual liberties are subservient to societal norms.

In addition, I contend that society is an aggregation of several individuals, bound together by common values and objectives. Thus, society should reflect the essential liberties ensconced in its ‘composite’ group of individuals. Furthermore, citizens should have the liberty to draw leaders from among the several individuals to ensure the effective guidance of society. I also aver that there is need to mitigate the possible ascendency of a leader with personified inclinations or even the entrenchment of acquiesced ethnicities that exhibit genocidal leanings. Accordingly, communities should advocate for democratic constitutional checks and balances to protect citizens against individual, societal and government excesses.

To understand the theory of personification further, I examined political philosophies by Aristotle, a leading traditional thinker and classical democratic theorist. Aristotle (noted in Miller, 2017:8) distinguished several types of rule, based on the nature of the soul of the ruler and of the subject. “First, Aristotle reflected on despotic rule, which the master-slave relationship exemplifies. Aristotle believed that under this form of rule, natural slaves who lacked a deliberative faculty needed direction by a natural master.” Next, Aristotle considered paternal and marital rule, which he also viewed as defensible: “he argued that by nature, males are more capable leaders than females, unless the male is constituted in some way contrary to nature.” Likewise, “the ‘elder’ and the ‘perfect’ are by nature more capable of leadership than the ‘younger’ and ‘imperfect.’” In what Aristotle understood as an ‘aristocratic’ constitution (literally, the rule of the *aristoi*, i.e., best persons) Aristotle (noted in Miller, 2017:8) contended that, “the correct conception of justice required the assignment of political rights to those with virtue, property and freedom who make a full contribution to the political community.” Additionally, Aristotle (noted in Cunningham, 2002:7) characterised “the proper rule of the many, ‘polity’ and termed its deviation - democracy.” I find the foregoing account discriminatory and marginalistic, as it suggests stratification of individuals and society along clear occupations. I argue that this kind of discrimination is characteristic of personified systems in which leaders marginalise or even exclude certain categories of citizens
to satisfy their political excesses. The stratification of society may quickly transform into the enforcement of segregative caste systems that are breeding grounds for personified dispensations. Of particular interest in Aristotle’s model is the ceding of sovereignty by the masses to an individual, rather than ‘rule of the many’. This potentially results in egocentrism and dictatorship, which precipitates fertile ground for personified systems.

Conversely, Dunleavy (2009:13) posited that the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘democracy’ are compound elements that formed liberal democracy. However, Hawkesworth and Kogan (1992:196) argued that the ‘liberal’ and the ‘democratic’ elements in liberal democracy may be in tension where citizen majorities come to favour policies that curtail political and civil rights. Hawkesworth and Kogan maintained that more often, the two elements support each other; each of which is an essential component of liberal democracy. Conversely, Dunleavy (2009:13) defined liberal democracy as “a political system where the term ‘democracy’ implies organizing regular ‘free and fair’ elections to determine the establishment of governments; and constitution of the legislature, where political groups and parties freely compete, and systems efficiently assure majority rule.” Moreover, the “‘liberal’ part ensures law and constitutional safeguards protect basic civil liberties, while an independent judiciary and legal system impartially enforce legal enactments and rules” (Dunleavy, 2009:13). I contend that although Dunleavy’s model was cognisant of civil liberties, it ignored the reality of inequalities in societal structures that arose from income disparities, poverty, greed and corruption. Similarly, liberal democracy seems a little fragile for political conditions prevailing in some developing countries that require military solutions to restore peaceful coexistence.

Additionally, Hawkesworth and Kogan cited shortcomings in the liberal democracy model that had significant implications for the theory of personification. Hawkesworth and Kogan (1992:196) contended that some authoritarian governments’ permitted substantial civil freedoms, while some liberal democracies had adopted restrictions on press freedom and civil rights, or had abused the positions of minorities. I argue that this inverse incongruity on the espousal of liberties by different political dispensations is correspondingly a similar paradox in personified systems. Alternatively, classic pluralism, as defined in David Held’s Models of Democracy (noted in Eisenberg, 1995:9), is a theory about interest group competition and
distribution of power within a state. However, Young (noted in Eisenberg, 1995:58) averred contrarily, that one source of power is found in institutions that is not captured by the distribution paradigm. Young stated that conceptualising power in distributive terms meant the implicit or explicit conception of power as a kind of faculty possessed by individual agents in greater or lesser amounts. In addition, Cunningham (2002:73) argued that classic pluralists focused on conflict among ‘interest groups’ in society. Their main concern was how to maintain consistent democratic stability and peace in conflict-ridden societies. Cunningham maintained that “leaders played a crucial role to guarantee the special interests of their constituents, and at the same time also negotiated to maintain peace.”

This study noted that the classic pluralist model provided avenues for functional conflict resolution mechanisms that are responsive to societal interests, and may therefore be applicable in personified systems. Equally, political groups under the model are autonomous and can make independent political decisions, which I construe to constitute a good check on excesses under personified systems. However, the classic pluralism model does not consider societal class disparities, which is a challenge that the theory of personification addresses. Furthermore, the theory does not consider some developing countries that have never experienced ‘genuine’ multiparty politics in a pluralistic system. In such a volatile situation, devious leaders with personified inclinations could easily manipulate citizens for their own selfish gains. To an extent, this study differs with Young’s notion about the distributive paradigm, a model that can be leveraged to share national resources equally among citizens. Instead, under the theory of personification, I argue that Classic Pluralists do not take into account the need for ‘domination’, which is a trademark character of personified leadership.

Similarly, David Held (noted in Dijk, 1996:45) defined participatory democracy as a blend of ‘representative’ and ‘direct democracy’. The model aimed to develop a mode of citizenship that Jean Jacques Rousseau (noted in Dijk, 1996:45) maintained would primarily be via collective discussion and education. This study argues that leaders play a crucial role in advancing participatory processes and fostering reciprocity. Thus, the model becomes ineffectual when personified inclinations compromise the altruism of leaders. On the other hand, the protective democracy model advocated for popular control of government as a means of protecting
individual liberty (Hudson, 2006:5), as well as from infringements upon individual liberty by other citizens (Browne, 2006:46). Other political philosophers and leading proponents of protective democracy, Jeremy Bentham and James Stuart Mill, also gave useful insights into functioning of government. Bentham and Mill (noted in Hudson, 2006:5) favoured “democratic government as the best means to secure a liberal society.” Unlike Marxism, which recognises class differences and inequality in society, the protective democracy model ignored these nascent factors. However, I posit that inequality and subjective apportionment of classes in society are characteristic of personified dispensations. In this instance, undemocratic personified governments will not guarantee societal liberties since they overtly value personal, rather than national honour.

Lastly, Bohman (1997:321) contended that “proponents of deliberative democracy defended a complex ideal of an association whose common life is governed by the public deliberation of its members.” Bohman maintained that “deliberation was democratic, to the extent that it rested on a process of reaching reasoned agreement among free and equal citizens.” Likewise, Chambers (2003:308) defined deliberative democracy as “a normative theory that suggested ways in which we could enhance democracy and criticize institutions that did not live up to normative standards.” Chambers maintained that “deliberative democracy was a more just and democratic way to deal with pluralism.” Thus, in Chambers perspective, deliberative democracy focused on views anchored in conceptions of accountability and discussion. I argue that in order to mitigate personified excesses, the theory of personification could benefit from the morality, accountability and consensus inherent in the deliberative democracy model. However, I have questions about the constancy of key theoretical constructs associated with deliberative democracy, including practical applicability of equality, and rationality and reason in developing economies like those in East Africa. For instance, how does one ensure rational, practical reasoning outside the leader’s own thinking under personified dispensation? Similarly, the fact that deliberative democracy champions criticism, rationality and discussion raises questions on the inclusiveness of the model in the predominantly semi-literate areas of East Africa. Apparently, the model seems to favour enlightened political actors over the illiterate electorate. Therefore, I argue that the deliberative democracy
model, although seemingly flexible, still has loopholes that personified leaders can exploit.

2.4.6 Policy studies theories

Rose (noted in Osman, 2002:38) argued that “policymaking is best conveyed by describing it as a process, rather than as a single, once-for-all act”. This process involved negotiation, bargaining and accommodation of many different interests, which eventually gave it a political flavour. Conversely, Osman (2002:38) argued that “public policymaking not only involved the public bodies or public officials as policy actors; rather, private or non-official groups also played a very active role in policymaking.” Osman maintained that “this public private interaction constituted the structure of the political system within which policy actors influenced the policy process.” Similarly, Osman (2002:39) asserted that “policymaking entailed approaches like political system model, rational model, incremental model, mixed scanning model, group theory, elite theory and pluralist theory.” To the foregoing, Knill and Tosun (2008:4) added “institutional and process conceptual models.” Of these approaches, Easton’s (1957:383-384) ‘political system model’ is the most contextually pertinent to the theory of personification, as I discuss below.

Easton (noted in Osman, 2002:39) explained that the process of policymaking as a ‘political system’ in developing countries responds to the demands arising from its environment. Easton maintained that “the ‘political system’ comprised of identifiable and interrelated institutions and activities that made authoritative decisions (or allocations of values) that were binding on society.” In addition, Easton rationalised that “the environment provided inputs to the decision process/political system in the form of demands and supports that translate into outputs or policies.” However, I observe that the absence of external influences in the environment can yield ‘open’ or ‘closed’ political systems. Furthermore, I posit that in the EAC, socio-political systems are volatile, unstable and can have unpredictable subsystems – a factor that Easton’s model did not articulate well. Concerning the latter, I aver that erratic political environments are potential triggers for personified dispensations. This is because leaders are prone to yield to their political environment in a manner that strongly shapes their actions. Furthermore, leaders give meaning to the political situation, whether prejudiced or rational, to generate and/or shape situations for their
own interests. Consequently, personified leadership and institutions begin to control national agendas in a manner that devalues the concerns and representation of less powerful groups.

On the other hand, Shepsle and Bonchek (noted in Knill & Tosun, 2008:5) posited that, “the rational model of decision-making, first developed in the field of economic analysis formulated guidance on how to secure optimal policy decisions.” Accordingly, Shepsle and Bonchek stated that “a decision is rational if no other alternative is better than the decision maker’s preference.” I note that this model aptly enables policy practitioners to make informed, evidence-based decisions, thus avoiding subjectivity and the inequitable judgments frequently associated with personified systems. However, I posit that in practice, the need to balance political and emotional complexities frequently obscures rational decision-making by leaders. For instance, what happens in a situation where leaders need to make instant complex and intellectually important decisions? This becomes a daunting task under personified systems where intuitional decision-making centres on the leader. Over time, this egocentric tendency results in inward-looking policies that reflect the intrinsic aspirations of the leader. While I agree that the rational decision-making model inspires leaders to make better decisions, I contend that the rational decisions depend on whether the national leader religiously follows the rational decision-maker model, a factor that is lacking in personified systems.

Correspondingly, incrementalism emerged in response to the rational model. According to Quinn (noted in Rajagopalan & Rasheed, 1995:292), “a strong central vision supports the logical and proactive process of policymaking in the ‘logical incrementalism model.’” In the model, Quinn argued that “top management formally blended formal-analytical, behavioural and power-political techniques. The objective was to establish cohesion and systematic movement toward broadly defined ends, which are constantly refined as new information appears.” Quinn described the integrated model as ‘logical incrementalism’. However, Lindblom and Wildavsky (noted in Knill & Tosun, 2008:7) posited that “instead, the [incremental] model necessitates synchronized selection of goals and policies.” According to Knill and Tosun (2008:7), the latter relates to “its foundation on ‘bounded rationality’, i.e. an alternative concept to rational choice that takes into account the limitations of knowledge and cognitive capacities of decision makers.” On this note, Anderson
asserted that “incremental decisions involved limited changes or additions to existing policies.” Anderson maintained that “because decision-makers operated under conditions of uncertainty about the future consequences of their actions, incremental decisions reduced the risks and costs of uncertainty.” However, I argue that the lack of contextual knowledge in the complex EAC policy environment renders this model ineffective. Instead, it can easily result in disjointed policies and even marginalisation of the disadvantaged. Lustick and Forester (noted in Woodhouse & Collingridge, 1993) corroborated my argument in their assertion that [experts contended that incrementalism tends to] “favour organized elites over the poor and disorganized, because weaker actors were not able to protect values that stronger actors chose to discount.” Similarly, I argue that leaders in personified systems tend to build an elitist cadre of supporters around themselves. In this respect, leaders and associated elites under personified regimes also exploit the hapless, disempowered masses to meet their egocentric needs. Logsdon (noted in Woodhouse & Collingridge, 1993) lent credence to my argument in his argument. Logsdon observed that, “in general, incrementalism inadequately accounted for crucial factors that the bargaining process does not effectively represent, e.g., the future.” I argue that lack of representation is characteristic of personified systems that do not accommodate competing views from parties outside the core system. Amitai Etzioni (1967:389) asserted that “the mixed scanning model combined rationalistic decision-making, with incremental decisions in a ‘scanning’ operation that entailed search, collection, processing, and evaluation of information as well as drawing of conclusions, all elements in the service of decision-making.” Etzioni maintained that “mixed scanning also contained a strategy for the allocation of resources among the levels of decision-making and for evaluation, leading to changes in the proportion of higher versus lower levels of scanning based on changes in the situation.” According to Walt (noted in Sutton, 1999), “the mixed scanning model straddled between rational and incrementalist models.” The model divided decisions into macro (fundamental) and micro (small) classifications that compelled the policymaker to identify possible policy options for further examination (Sutton, 1999). I posit that the analytical sequencing of this model renders it impractical in the EAC political setting, since the region is deficient of strong analytical skills and political will necessary for its application. Specifically, I argue
that inexpert policymakers will find it hard to differentiate between fundamental and routine policy decisions, especially under personified regimes. I base my argument on the fact that leaders with personified inclination will endeavour to transfer liability for their undemocratic actions on to other innocent citizens. Accordingly, I posit that policymakers should sensitise and involve citizens in the processes of policy formulation so that all voices are heard.

Conversely, the group theory hypothesised that “policies are the result of an equilibrium reached through struggles shaped by the relative strength of interest groups” (Truman & Latham, noted in Knill & Tosun, 2008:7). In the theory, “groups are discernible by income, size, density, recruitment, organizational aspects, [coherence], sanctioning mechanisms and aspects of leadership” (Newton & Van Deth, 2010). Newton and van Deth maintained that, “variations in the relative strength of the interest groups may trigger policy changes.” I note that group theory presupposes that policymakers are constantly responding to group pressures; however, I argue that groups can potentially make flawed judgments. Additionally, I posit that groups can coalesce around ethnic identities, for instance in Rwanda, resulting in segregation rather than cohesion, a factor that compromises democracy and promotes personification. Mills (noted in Knill & Tosun, 2008:8) argued that the view that “governing elites determine policymaking” is also linked to group theory.

I point out that the elite model claims the electorate does not have information about public policies and that elites shape public opinion on policy questions. The fact that this model focuses on elites brings to the fore class struggles and inward-looking strategies that concentrate power on elites at the expense of democratic rights. I contend that the latter precipitates the emergence of personified systems, since political leaders will perceive themselves as the ultimate ‘possessors’ of knowledge, and not the uninformed citizens. Similarly, I contend that the elite model ignores the oversight role of traditional African structures and advocacy roles that civil society organizations play in shaping courses of public policy. I also argue that because elites form the smallest percentage of the population, they are bound to ‘collude’ to suppress or reign in the masses in order to sustain their egocentric interests.

Meanwhile, Immergut (2011:75) averred that “the pluralist theory focuses on freedom of individuals from arbitrary government authority.” In the theory that contrasts to the
liberal model, “individuals benefit from the socialization provided by the groups in which they participate.” Immergut maintained that “group bargaining was based on competition amongst interest groups to attract members and to influence governmental decision-making.” To Immergut (2011:75), “the ideal political process depended on whether individuals had the freedom to form groups – that in turn were free to lobby government. Accordingly, the latter brings forth patterns of public policy that are normatively acceptable, as long as the political system is open, competitive and bound by the ‘rules of the game’.” In a sense, Immergut maintained that “pluralist democracy is based on the ideal of a political market coming to equilibrium with interest groups playing an important intermediary role.” However, I argue that pluralists ignored the fact that individuals who form groups also have personal interests that can actually influence the thinking of larger groups. In addition, in weak or prejudiced personified governments, powerful groups serving personified leadership interests could subvert national policy processes to suit their regressive ideologies. Similarly, I point out that under pluralism, the representation of interest groups in political decision-making processes is imbalanced because personified interests, especially those backed by state power, have more formidable interests than those of ordinary citizens do.

One of the first attempts to construct a typology of social policies was the formulation of the residual-institutional model by Wilensky and Lebeaux in (noted in Hall & Midgley, 2004:25). This model divided social policies into two categories. Wilensky and Lebeaux posited that the first category, the residual model, consists of social policies that are limited and meagre. The residual model supplements the family, voluntary sector and the market [initiatives] when these institutions are unable to meet social needs. Wilensky and Lebeaux maintained that the second type, the institutional model, consisted of social policies that played a frontline role in society and promoted universal coverage and extensive social service provision. Conversely, March and Olsen (noted in Peters, 2000:2) “developed the ‘normative approach’ – a major development for institutional analysis.” March and Olsen argued that “one can best comprehend political behaviour through ‘logic of appropriateness’ that individuals acquired through their institutional memberships.” I point out that this institutional theory is very pertinent for this study, since I hypothesise that good institutions are critical for advancing sustainable national governance and
development. Equally, March and Olsen (noted in Peters, 2000:2) maintained that “people functioning within institutions are motivated by normative standards rather than their desire to maximize individual utilities.” In March and Olsen’s perspective, “these standards of behaviour emanated from involvement with institutions that were major social repositories of values.” I argue that in all institutional models, decision-making structures play a pivotal role. However, I posit that powerful individuals who exert significant political influence manage these institutional structures. For instance, an executive leader in a personified system may exploit the parliamentary majority to entrench egocentric policies, to the exclusion of democratic citizen rights.

Conversely, Caramani (2014:339) argued that “the ‘process model’ assumed that policymaking transpired in the bedrocks of diverse constraints, an infinite cycle of decisions and varied policy processes. Therefore, it is convenient to conceive policymaking as a ‘process model’, otherwise known as a ‘policy cycle.’” Caramani maintained that “the cycle models the policy process as a series of political activities, consisting of agenda setting, formulation, adoption, implementation and evaluation.” On the other hand, Ball (noted in Nudzor, 2009:91) posited that “the model depicted policy as a dynamic process that related to the interaction of actors on issues pertaining to policy formulation, articulation, dissemination and interpretation.” Thus, “the comprehension of the policy process should emphasize both the diverse ways in which policy is examined, and the ‘social agency of the policy process.’” Ball maintained that “the conception explicated the point that there were real struggles, disputes, conflicts and adjustments in the policy process, and that these took place in the pre-established terrain.” However, Knill and Tosun (2008:9) posited that “in reality different political actors and institutions may be involved in diverse processes at the same time.” I opine that individuals or groups pursuing their own material interests can influence these singular or composite stages of the process model. As compared to Karl Marx’s theory of capital accumulation, powerful individuals or groups with personified inclinations can manipulate the policy process to their own advantage and detriment of the helpless citizenry.

2.4.7 Demographic theories

In the field of demography, Hirschman’s (1981:562) two models demonstrated how demography linked to [socio-economic] development. According to Hirschman, the
first model, “labelled ‘population planning’ stressed the relevance of demographic theory and knowledge toward a few selected goals, the chief one being the reduction of fertility. In the model, development-planning aimed to bring some degree of control to the elements that played important roles in development.” Coale and Hoover (noted in Hirschman, 1981:562) affirmed the latter in their assertion that “there was growing awareness that rapid population growth may have a dilatory effect upon socioeconomic development.” However, I note that there is little empirical evidence to prove that rapid population growth and high fertility are hindrances to economic progress, as is also implied by Malthus in ‘theory of population growth’. Moreover, I posit that the subjectivity of population control may embolden leaders to decimate marginalised persons or communities. In Hirschman’s second model, I noted that the ultimate practicality of demographic scholarship tarries in empirical population research that assesses development along contrasting socio-economic dimensions. To Hirschman, the model facilitated “development plans” to apply “empirical research” on population and socio-economic resources. However, I argue that non-statistical studies, for instance ethnography, can also be empirical and yet are beneficial in their own right. Furthermore, some statistical studies can also be non-experimental, for instance, survey research, and still be valid in analysing socio-economic conditions.

On the other hand, Malthus, in his Malthusian population theory (Malthus, 1888:194) in classical economics and demography implied the “dependence of population growth on the material conditions of the economy.” Malthus argued that “human biological capacity to reproduce [potentially] surpasses the physical capacity to produce.” In this context, the supply of food is inadequate to complement rising demand. In Malthus’ view, “the perfection of a human society free of coercive restraints was utopian, because the threat of population growth would always be present.” In discussing Malthus’ theory, Currais (2000:77) posited that “when population size was small, the standard of living would be high, and population would grow as a natural result of passion between the sexes. Conversely, without constraint, population would rise geometrically, but food production would only rise arithmetically.” Because of this natural law of imbalance, Malthus (noted in Elwell, 2005:11) asserted, that “inequality was built into the very structure of human societies, and it was simply not feasible to create a technological or enlightened
society in which resources were fairly and equitably distributed to all.” However, I argue that, unlike Malthus’s moral restraints, but in consonance with his elite self-interest, personified actions of egocentric leaders also cause inequality. I posit that a great faction of Malthus’ observations on coerciveness and imbalance in society is surrogate to the tenets of personified governance. Thus, in order to entrench themselves, some leaders manipulate society and even exterminate their own destitute citizens.

On the other hand, Marxian demographic transition model considered children a necessity for survival; and an investment/production good. The Marxian view (noted in Brezis & Young, 2016:16) suggested that “the proletarianisation of the workforce resulted in a fertility increase, since the working masses attempted to accumulate the one factor of production they controlled – labour power.” To Marx (noted in Brezis & Young, 2016:16), “man controls nature and is therefore able to control nature consciously and make his own history.” Marx maintained that “this ability allows man to produce beyond subsistence and guarantees that he will not succumb to the dilemma that Malthus described.” Likewise, Marx argued that “children are a necessity for survival”; they were a production good. Similarly, Marx (noted in Brezis & Young, 2016:17) argued that “since the modes of production defined the decisions about fertility, family structures should be distinct, and so should the social classes like the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.” Regarding the bourgeoisie, Marx maintained that “children are a means for maintaining the family business and the bourgeois family based on capital, and private gain.” Similarly, “the bourgeois sees his wife as an instrument of production.” Accordingly, I note that in Marx's capitalist model, the emergent capitalist classes thrive on private ownership of the means of production, and exploit the classes who own only their labour power. This kind of power imbalance disadvantageously pits one class of citizens against the other. In the context of this study, Marx’s theory accurately portrays the struggle between political elites, egocentric leaders and the masses over control and allocation of scarce national resources. I argue that the egocentric view that Marx attributes to the proletariat exemplifies the actions of personified leaders. Also, Marx’ fallacious concept that ‘man controls nature to make history’ could squarely play into the hands of personified leaders who are motivated by the desire to ‘control’ their environment.
2.4.8 The philosophical domain

In the philosophical domain, Soumitra (2007:4) posited that the development of human civilisation had witnessed specific advances in the spiritual and material realms. Soumitra maintained that a society [comprised] of individual human beings, whose nature in turn influenced their social conditions and social behaviour. Equally, social conditions and socio-economic structure also influenced individual psychology. The higher thought processes of an evolved person could influence the collective attitudes of the society and pave the way for a new social system (Soumitra, 2007:4). The primary human attribute is his desire for liberation, which inspires him to move forward on the path of self-realisation. Soumitra maintained that human beings want liberation in the physical, mental and spiritual realms, which any social system must support. The social system plays a vital role in the reorientation of the human mind, while social freedom means political and economic freedom (Soumitra, 2007:5). This study opines that, encapsulated in Soumitra’s discourses, is the intrinsic desire for freedom from injustice, exploitation and class domination that every human being nurtures, which this study theorises as being attainable through democratic leadership.

Additionally, Samuels (noted in Soumitra, 2007:5) stressed three facets of economics: first, he says the objective of economics is to provide positive knowledge and insight into the economy. It is concerned with providing information, description and interpretation of the nature of economy, Second, economics is social control, one of the modes through which modern societies formulate a social construction of reality with regard to economy. Economics, then, has both explanation and rationalisation, and thus its ideology has come to serve some of the purposes formerly provided by religion. The content and nuances of economic theory function to control the formation of issues and policies. The third facet of economics is its function as psychic balm; that is, it provides us with a sense of order and sets our mind at rest (Samuels, noted Soumitra, 2007:5). As discussed by Samuels, economic theory provides a basis to define problems, rationalise approaches, and find solutions to society’s challenges. Accordingly, I argue that development practitioners can use the economics discipline to improve programme delivery. Although it refers to individuals constructing a social reality, the theory does not
highlight the significance of individual behaviour in the economy. In essence, I argue that the theory does not highlight how the cognitive development of an individual, who later assumes a leadership position in a given economy, will play out.

Bass and Stogdill (1990:3) contended that written philosophical principles of leadership go back as far as the dawn of civilisation, which shaped its leaders – as much as leaders shaped them. Bass and Stogdill maintained that “the Egyptian hieroglyphics for leadership (seshemet), leader (seshemu) and the follower (shemsu) were being written 5,000 years ago.” Lichtheim (noted in Bass & Stogdill, 1990:4) highlighted the fact that in 2300 B.C., in the Instruction of Ptahhotep, three qualities were attributed to the Pharaoh. “Authoritative utterness is in thy mouth, perception is in thy heart, and thy tongue is the shrine of justice”. Bass and Stogdill (1990:4) also contend that “the Chinese classics, written as early as the sixth century B.C., are filled with hortatory advice to the country's leaders about their responsibilities to the people.” Likewise, “Confucius urged leaders to set a moral example” (Bass & Bass, 2009:4). He also “urged leaders to manipulate rewards and punishments to teach what was right and good” (Wren, 2013:50). Wren (2013:50) maintained that “Taoism emphasized the need for the leader to work himself out of his job by making the people believe that successes were due to their efforts.” Similarly, Argyris (noted in Bass & Stogdill, 1990) narrated how Lao-tzu declared that “leaders must participate in and share ownership of developments.” Roman and Greek authors, such as Caesar, Cicero, Seneca and Plutarch, wrote extensively on the subject of leadership and administration. For instance, in his Parallel Lives of around 100 C.E., Plutarch (noted in Bass & Stogdill, 1990) endeavoured to show the moral similarities between 50 Greek and Roman leaders: for each Greek leader there was a Roman counterpart. Bass and Stogdill (1990:3) maintained that “the heroes in Homer’s Iliad exemplified Greek concepts of leadership, for instance, Ajax symbolized inspirational leadership, law, and order.” Furthermore, Bass and Stogdill contended that “other qualities that the Greeks admired and thought were needed (and sometimes wanting) in heroic leaders were justice and judgment (Agamemnon), wisdom and counsel (Nestor), shrewdness and cunning (Odysseus), and valour and activism (Achilles).” However, Bass and Stogdill (1990:3) also argued that “contemporary society did not regard shrewdness and cunning as highly as they once were.”
The above literature has enabled this study to ground the concept of personified leadership in Greek, Roman, Egyptian, and Chinese philosophies. Whereas these societies looked up to leaders for moral guidance and inspiration, some of the leaders exhibited authoritarian tendencies that augur well with the theory of personification. Also of significance, the literature cited above corroborates this study’s theoretical line of argument that subjects sometimes influence leadership action. The Greeks even went as far as to define certain attributes that were admirable, for example, inspirational leadership. I posit that egocentric leaders can take advantage of such societal perceptions and manipulate these to their benefit. In other words, instead of living naturally, the leader “acts out” a leadership profile to appease society. The fact that this notion is grounded in philosophy will be important in rationalising the discussions in subsequent paragraphs.

2.5 Correlating theory of personification and the concept of leadership

Leaders are important to the extent that they affect (national) policy processes that shape the governance and development of nations. Leaders have the capacity, and often resources, to persuade followers or subjects to perform their aspirations. Galbraith (noted in Fuqua, Payne & Cangemi, 1998:3) posited that “a powerful leader will be judged by how effectively they persuaded their subordinates to accept solutions to problems that led to organizational goals.” McClelland (noted in Fuqua et al., 1998:4) claimed that “the positive or socialized face of power emphasizes a concern for group goals.” McClelland maintained that “the positive or socialized face of power finds the goals that move people; helps the group to formulate the goals, takes the initiative in providing members of the group the means to achieve the goals, and gives group members a sense of support, strength, and competence needed to work hard toward achieving goals.” McMurry (noted in Fuqua et al., 1998:4) asserted that “leaders who can persuade persons are capable of influencing their audiences both emotionally and rationally.” Likewise, McMurry noted that leaders “analysed their audience in terms of relevant needs, desires and values after which they focused on a connection with their audience on common ground before moving into areas of resistance.”

Both theories discussed above highlight the power of leaders to persuade their followers. I construe that the leaders’ ‘persuasion’ connotes liberty on decision
making, rather than acquiescence, of the subjects. However, leaders who practise personified governance use coercion rather than persuasion. This study hypothesises that under personified dispensations, the affected national systems and institutions frequently assume the character of the leader. It is therefore important to study a unique leader in order to anticipate or rationalise leadership actions or even direction of national policies under the subject leader. Accordingly, this section defines and discusses the concept of leadership within the context of this study. In the second segment of this section, I explore how leadership philosophy defines national leader’s actions, behaviours and our thoughts. This analysis will enable the reader to understand how philosophical concepts of leadership evolved from the dawn of civilisation, to date. In part, three of this section, the researcher analyses the concept of traditional leadership, based on history, traditions and customs. The study also expounds on how newer forms of leadership have overtaken traditional forms of leadership. In the final part of this chapter, the study examines the abilities and attributes of leaders in terms of traits, behaviour, management and inclinations.

2.5.1 Delineation of the term “leadership”

In discussing leadership, Bass and Stogdill (1990:3) averred that “leaders as prophets, priests, chiefs and kings served as symbols, representatives, and models for their people in the Old and New Testaments, in the Upanishads, in Greek and Latin classics and in the Icelandic sagas.” In the *Iliad*, higher, transcendental goals were emphasised (Book x, line 201, noted in Bass & Stogdill, 1990), while the *Odyssey* advised leaders to maintain their social distance (Book III, line 297, noted in Bass & Stogdill, 1990). The subject of leadership was not limited to the classics of Western literature. It was of as much interest to Asoka and Confucius as it was to Plato and Aristotle (Bass & Stogdill, 1990). Similarly, Paige (noted in Bass & Stogdill, 1990:3) argued that “all societies have created myths to provide plausible and acceptable explanations for the dominance of their leaders and the submission of their subordinates.” Paige maintained that “from its infancy, the study of history has been the study of leaders – what they did and why they did it.” However, Bass and Stogdill (1990:3) argued that “in modern psychohistory, there is still a search for
generalizations about leadership, built on the in-depth analysis of the development, motivation and competencies of world leaders, living and dead.”

Winston and Patterson provided a contextually pertinent integrative definition of leadership. According to Winston and Patterson (2006:7), “a leader is one or more people who select, equip, train and influence one or more follower(s); who have diverse gifts, abilities and skills and focus the follower(s) to the organization’s mission and objectives. To Winston and Patterson, leaders caused the follower(s) to “both willingly and enthusiastically expend spiritual, emotional and physical energy in a concerted coordinated effort to achieve the organizational mission and objectives.” This study finds relevance in Winston and Patterson’s (2006) assertion that “the leader recognizes the diversity of the follower(s) and achieves unity of common values and directions without destroying the uniqueness of the person.” In this respect, this study points out that, contrary to the personified leadership inclination, this definition highlights the positivity in altruistic behaviour of leaders and their benevolence towards followers.

Conversely, I highlight some other definitions of leadership that focus on actions rallying constituents towards a common goal. According to Stogdill (noted in Silva, 2016:2), “leadership is the process (act) of influencing the activities of an organized group in its efforts toward goal setting and goal achievement.” Similarly, Hemphill and Coons (1957:7) “defined leadership as the behaviour of an individual when he is directing the activities of a group toward a shared goal.” Likewise, Tannenbaum, Weschler and Massarik (noted in Kirimi, 2007:167) “defined leadership as interpersonal influence, exercised in a situation, and directed, through the communication process, toward the attainment of a specified goal or goals.” Conversely, Antonakis, Schriesheim, Donovan, Gopalakrishna-Pillai, Pellegrini, and Rossomme (noted in Alves, Manz & Butterfield, 2005:21) considered “leadership to be purpose driven, resulting in change based on values, ideals, vision, symbols and emotional exchanges.” In my analysis, I established that the common theme in the above definitions is leadership actions that ‘influence’ or ‘direct’ activities towards the attainment of common goals. These connote the conscious actions of leaders towards subjects. Of interest to this study, Weber (noted in Alves et al., 2005:20), stated that “leadership rests in three possible sources ‘ideal-types’ of authority: charismatic authority, reflected personal characteristics; traditional authority, referred
to compliance with norms and forms of conduct; and legal authority, which resulted from functional ‘duty of office.” I analysed the above definitions and established that the common theme points to how leaders harness their organisational, visionary and convening potential to attain some tangible outcomes. This highlights the inherent powers that leaders have to influence their subjects. It is also important to recognise the interplay of words like “authority, directive, and influence” in describing the liberties that a leader has at their disposal. I argue that a leader exercising personified dispensation is able to manipulate all these attributes to their benefits.

I also deconstructed the term ‘leadership’ into three constituents: the leader, the led, and inherent relations between leader and led. Therefore, I defined leadership as being characterised by the extent to which an individual influences, serves or supports other persons to achieve mutually agreeable objectives. In my definition, a leader should be a role model who inspires ‘subjects’ towards attaining a common objective. The leader should empathise with, sympathise with, and encourage followers. Above all, a leader should exemplify sacrifice, devotion and submission to their calling in a virtuous manner.

2.5.2 Traditional leadership

Traditional leadership connotes authority and legitimacy based on history, traditions and customs. According to Max Weber (noted in Manuh & Sutherland-Addy, 2014:183), traditional leadership rested on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them. Weber maintained that the legitimacy of a ruler’s authority rests in traditional norms. Thus according to Weber, the “traditional leadership style subsisted on the conviction that bestowment of power on the leader kept with the traditions of the past.” In close context, Manuh and Sutherland-Addy (2014:183) argued that we could find the most obvious examples of traditional leadership among ethnic communities and groups. Traditional leadership loosely correlates with hereditary systems of power and privilege, as reflected for example in the survival of dynastic rule in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Nepal and Kuwait. Manuh and Sutherland-Addy posited that in these absolute monarchies, the monarch claims, even if seldom exercised, a monopoly of political power. It is apparent that traditional leadership is not uniquely African, but global. For instance, the UK, Canada, Spain, the
Netherlands and Denmark have their authority and legitimacy based on traditions, history, customs and status (Manuh & Sutherland-Addy, 2014:184). I argue that the fact that traditional leadership spans the globe is an exemplar to the East African region to draw contextual inspiration from such areas. This is because the above leadership examples consider factors that can check personified governance, for example, how to muster legitimate authority, power, and privileges. It is also beneficial to study hereditary systems of powers and privileges since personified dispensations thrive on this model of governance.

In his work “On the subject of kings and queens …” Williams (2003:59) gave a contextually pertinent account of traditional leadership from an African perspective. Williams used the term “traditional” to denote indigenous forms of African cultural group identity and nation-state governance that predated substantial European colonial influence, that is, predating the 18th and early 20th century. To accentuate his argument, Williams expounded on Godfrey Tangwa’s philosophical analysis regarding “the important role of democratic processes in traditional governance.” Tangwa (noted in Williams, 2003:61) argued that “traditional African leadership and authority systems were a harmonious marriage between autocratic dictatorship and popular democracy.” Tangwa maintained that specific formal practices (which vary between cultures) positioned the citizenry to authorise, critique and sanction the ascension of their ruler, his/her continued reign, and the selection and ascension of his/her successor. According to Tangwa, while autocratic leadership subsisted, the traditional systems allowed subjects to determine the succession and ascension of their rulers. To an extent, this veiled democracy in African traditional societies mitigated the potential transition of leadership from autocracy to personification. Of particular significance, Aletum (noted in Williams, 2003:61) corroborated the latter in his assertion that “checks and balances imposed by citizens in the transition and maintenance of leadership upheld democracy in traditional institutions.”

African scholars such as Ayittey (2006) and Turner (both noted in Shero, 2014) have suggested that “[African] leader’s fail because traditional checks and balances are no longer present to restrain executive power and ambition.” Ayittey in (noted in Shero, 2014) maintained that “literature suggests that African elders served as a bridge between the ruler and the populace; they represented the needs and wishes of the people to the ruler and gave credibility to a ruler’s pronouncements to the people.”
Correspondingly, Patterson and Winston (2016:157) asserted that “most recently, [experts] have attempted to solve African leadership problems in African ways in the area of hybridity or hybrid governing systems.” In consonance with the latter, Shero (2014) “defined hybridity as a governing structure that deliberately combined elements of Western governance with elements of traditional governance (tribal kings, chiefs and councils).” In line with the foregoing, this study posits that the Bible offers one of the most well established examples of hierarchical traditional leadership hinged on moral, ethical and righteous values. Banks and Ledbetter (noted in Shero, 2014) corroborate my view in their assertion that, “Christian leadership draws upon the texts of the Christian Bible as a source for understanding good leadership and for multiple models of that leadership.” Throughout the Old and New Testaments, we note elders as leaders frequently functioning “to balance the authority of singular leaders and to bring consensus and wisdom to policies and decisions affecting the community” (Campbell, noted in Shero, 2014).

With respect to the above, I argue that the theory of personification can draw inspiration from the concept of checks and balances in African and Biblical traditions. The traditions often have inbuilt safety mechanisms that involve elders or a council of advisors who are representative of the subjects. Furthermore, I agree with the above scholars that the amalgamation of African traditional systems of checks and balances with modern Western governance systems would create effective, hybrid democracies. This will curb egocentric behaviour by contemporary leaders, thereby curtailing the possibility of transitioning to personified dispensations. In essence, traditional systems still have a critical role to play in stabilising modern democracies. In light of the above, in subsequent paragraphs this study reviewed literature on key traditional models of leadership covering trait, behavioural and situational theories that provide the clearest basis for comparison with the subject of this thesis – the theory of personification.

2.5.2.1 Trait theory

The scientific modelling of the trait theory perhaps began with Galton (noted in Zaccaro, Kemp & Bader, 2004:102), who examined the correlated status of leaders and geniuses across generations. Galton defined extraordinary intelligence as a key leader attribute and argued that leaders inherited, and did not develop, their
qualities. Galton also proposed eugenics, which relied on selective mating to produce individuals with the best combination of leadership qualities. Terman (noted in Zaccaro et al., 2004:102) examined the qualities that differentiated leaders from non-leaders in schoolchildren to produce the first empirical study of leadership. Terman reported attributes such as verbal fluency, intelligence, low emotionality, daring, congeniality, goodness, and liveliness as characterising youthful leaders. On the other hand, Antonakis, Cianciolo and Sternberg (2004:103) posited that “the term ‘trait’ is a source of considerable ambiguity and confusion in the literature. The term sometimes and variously refers to personality, temperaments, dispositions and abilities, as well as to any enduring qualities of the individual, including physical and demographic attributes.” According to Allport (noted in Zaccaro et al., 2004:103), “…‘a trait’ is a neuropsychic structure having the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide equivalent (meaningfully consistent) forms of adaptive and expressive behaviour.” Allport’s viewpoint emphasised the idea that ‘traits’ signified unwavering or consistent patterns of behaviour that are relatively invulnerable to situational contingencies.

In the study of human personality, Kanodia and Sacher (2016:124) averred that trait theory identified and measured the degree of personality traits; very often recurring patterns of thoughts and behaviour of any human, like anxiousness, shyness, pessimist thought, optimist thought, openness to new things that exist from individual to individual. Similarly, Kanodia and Sacher (2016:125) maintained that most trait theorists contended that the same sets of traits actually make up all our personalities, and the basic difference for uniqueness is the degree to which an individual expressed their trait. Hence, the presence or absence of any trait actually does not accurately reflect a person’s uniqueness. Regarding leadership, Kanodia and Sacher (2016:128) argued that the trait model focused on the characteristics of many leaders, both successful and unsuccessful, and helped to predict leadership effectiveness. To achieve the latter, we can compare the resulting lists of [subject] traits with those of potential leaders to assess their likelihood of attaining success or failure. Kanodia and Sacher maintained that successful leaders categorically have different interests, abilities and personality traits that are significantly different from those of the less effective or unsuccessful leaders.
I argue that these leadership traits are innate and instinctive qualities that an individual either has or does not have. I find it significant that trait theory links personality, leadership and interest. It is also noteworthy that, like this study, trait theory attempts to understand or predict leadership effectiveness. However, while this study agrees with trait theory that personality traits or behavioural characteristics are inherent in the family and passed on genetically, I argue that influences on the leadership style are traceable to the childhood formative stages. Otherwise, if progenies acquired leadership skills genetically, then children who share parents would ultimately exhibit similar leadership qualities, yet we know that this is not true.

Regarding the limitations of trait theory, scholars initially focused on associations between personality traits and perceptions of leadership (Lord, DeVader & Alliger, noted in Judge & Bono, 2004:901). Scholars never focused on traits associated with leadership emergence and effectiveness (Judge & Bono, 2004:901). I digress from Judge and Bono’s assertion, principally because we cannot unvaryingly correlate any singular or multidimensional traits with leadership emergence per se. However, I concur that the use of personality traits to predict the actual effectiveness of leaders is ideal, although it is still relatively confounding. Furthermore, Derue, Nahrgang, Wellman and Humphrey (2011:13) argued that leader behaviours are more proximal to the act of leadership than are traits, and thus, are more predictive of leadership effectiveness. Derue et al. (2011:19) maintained that although traits reflect behavioural tendencies in people, the situation can affect the manifestation of those traits into behaviours. I note that trait leadership theory is silent on situational influence on leaders. In the theory of personification, I argue that cultural and environmental circumstances are critical in shaping leadership behaviours. The theory of personification explains why proponents of trait theory observe that “leader behaviours are more proximal to the act of leadership than are traits.” This is because the theory of personification argues that actions of leaders directly relate to their behaviours rather than characteristics. I also contend that whereas trait theory seems to focus on singular traits at a time, in the theory of personification, leaders can exhibit multiple traits or personalities outcomes in a non-linear manner, which reflects in their actions and, ultimately, governance effectiveness.
Overall dissatisfaction with the trait theory led to a new theory of leadership in the 1950s and 1960s that focused more on the actual “behaviour” of the leader (Hudson, 2014:3). Hudson maintained that “the behaviour theory focused more on what a leader did rather than what a person was.” Likewise, Hudson asserted that “the three leadership styles that emerged from this new belief were the Autocratic, Democratic and Laissez-Faire styles of leadership.” According to Hudson, [experts] originally thought that “a person’s personality led them to fall into an either/or behavioural pattern, but today mastering all of these behaviours and applying the appropriate behaviour to the appropriate situation is thought to be a better approach. (Hudson, 2014:3)” On the other hand, Cherry (noted in Thye, 2010:6) posited that “behavioural theory of leadership [suggested] that great leaders ‘are made, not born’.” From another perspective, Thye (2010:6) explained that, “on the subject of ‘behaviourism’, the behavioural leadership theory focused more on the actions of leaders than on mental qualities or internal states. Accordingly, people can learn to become leaders through teaching and observation.”

However, I note that behaviourism overtly relies on observable mannerisms and ignores invisible factors, such as an individual’s perceptions and intrinsic inclinations, in explaining behaviour. Conversely, in the theory of personification, I argue that mental configurations like the degree of childhood animism; coupled with external influences, shape the person’s ultimate perceptions and inclinations, thus defining the empirical behaviour of a leader. Infants are born into this sudden maze of diverse activities, to which they have to acclimatise. At this stage, an individual’s surroundings, together with the methods by which caregivers nurture infants, will significantly influence a person’s cognitive progression. As infants transition into children, they develop certain intrinsic desires that behaviourism does not consider. Certain things start appealing to the children about the world around them. They substitute material gaps with fantasy and illusions of “what would be.” As children progress to adulthood, they develop images of what they want to be, sometimes based on perceived “hero figures,” real or imagined. Through these stages, the individual learns how to ‘act out’ a specific role in order to fit within society, or even to
acquire a benefit only accessible to the ‘play-acting’. These intangible actions limit the effectiveness of behaviourism to adequately measure leadership behaviour.

### 2.5.2.3 Situational theory

Hershey and Blanchard (noted in Graeff, 1983:285) “developed ‘the life cycle theory of leadership’, which they later renamed the ‘situational leadership theory’.” Similarly, in Hershey and Blanchard’s (noted in Graeff, 1983:285) “situational theory of leadership, the primary situational determinant of the leader’s behaviour is the task-relevant maturity that consists of job maturity and psychological maturity.” Hershey and Blanchard maintained that “Job maturity reflects the capacity or ability of the individual to perform the job. It related to the level of education and experience that the individual had acquired. Psychological maturity on the other hand reflected the motivational state of the person via the individual’s level of self-esteem and confidence.” Hershey and Blanchard argued that “this dimension relates with an achievement orientation, and a willingness and ability to accept responsibility.”

According to McCleskey (2014:118), “situational leadership theory construed a leaders’ behaviour to be either task or people focused.” McCleskey deemed that the latter supports the theory’s “recognition as a behavioural approach to leadership.” To Glynn and DeJordy; Bass; and Yukl (all noted in McCleskey, 2014:118), “the theory portrayed that effective leadership is contingent on follower maturity. They maintained that this fits with other contingency-based leadership theories including Fiedler’s contingency theory, path-goal theory, leadership substitute’s theory and Vroom’s normative contingency model.” McCleskey (2014:118) argued that “both conceptualizations of situational leadership theory agreed that task-oriented and relation-oriented behaviours were dependent, rather than mutually exclusive.”

However, I highlight that situational leadership theory explicitly focuses on leadership style and behavioural actions, in effect neglecting an important category of factors – the intrinsic causative factors of leadership outcomes. In contrast, the theory of personification addresses the full continuum of a leader’s development by linking subsequent leadership action factors along the individual’s growth trajectory. For instance, the psychological aspect of situational theory looks at an individual’s level of self-esteem and confidence – factors I consider ‘superficial’. However, the theory
of personification goes beyond superficiality to focus on intrinsic cognitive and emotional factors that influence the leader’s perceptions of ‘self’ and ‘people’.

2.5.3 Contemporary theories of leadership

According to Hudson (2014:2), a contemporary definition contended that “leadership is a dynamic relationship (based on mutual influence and common purpose) between leaders and collaborators which leads both parties to higher levels of motivation and moral development as they evoke real change.” Hudson argued that “when we break this definition down, there are three key principles that become apparent namely: relationship – the connection between people, the mutual sharing of something and collaborators working together.” Hudson (2014:2) maintained that we can re-word this contemporary definition of leadership to simply state that “when collaborators work together to achieve real change, they influence the leader.” On the other hand, Taylor and Rosenbach (2006:4) posited that “a contemporary leader must be able to do the following four key things: appreciate and nurture talent even if it means hiring smarter or more talented people; focus on what is important without losing sight of the main goals; build trust and develop a close tie between leaders and followers.” However, I argue that in practical terms, leaders frequently try to portray themselves as “intellectually smart” and may snub the idea of hiring someone smarter than they are. This is especially true in personified regimes that exalt the leader as the repository of ‘wisdom’ and custodian of ‘knowledge.’ Elevating any person other than the leader could be catastrophic, and even fatal, under personified dispensations. Similarly, I contend that personified dispensations dishonour the idea that contemporary leaders build close relationships with their followers. This is because leaders under personified dispensations usually prefer to practise nepotism, cronyism, and favouritism to reward loyalists instead of collaborating with, or building relationships with followers. In my consideration, this explains why personified leadership is often unrealistic in their outlook of leadership roles.

Accordingly, in subsequent paragraphs this study examined contemporary theories of leadership to contextualise the theory of personification. The researcher hopes the outcome of this discourse addresses gaps in contemporary leadership and generally improves approaches to governance. The researcher also hopes to demonstrate that leaders are born with characteristics that vary with external influences. To rationalise
the above concept, the next section analyses key contemporary theories including transactional, transformational, contingency, participative and full range models.

2.5.3.1 Transactional Leadership

According to Burns (noted in Lowe, Kroeck & Sivasubramaniam, 1996:2), “the transactional leader initiates contact with subordinates in an effort to exchange something of value, such as rewards for performance, mutual support or bilateral disclosure.” In contrast, Bass (noted in Lowe, Kroeck & Sivasubramaniam, 1996:2) posited that “the transactional leader operates within the existing system or culture, prefers risk avoidance, pays attention to time constraints and efficiency, and generally prefers process over substance in order to maintain control.” Bass maintained that “the skilful transactional leader is likely to be effective in stable, predictable environments where charting activity against prior performance is the most successful strategy.” According to Lowe, Kroeck and Sivasubramaniam (1996:2), “the transactional leader clarifies tasks with the ‘right way’ to do things in such a manner that maintains dependence on the leader for preferred solutions to challenges.”

With respect to the above arguments, I posit that contrary to the personified leader, the transactional leader is inferably sensitive to the feelings of subordinates to the extent that they recognise and reward performance. I construe this to connote that perceptiveness enables the transactional leader to operate effectively and efficiently within the existing system or culture prevalent in any jurisdiction. Judge and Bono (2004:901) accentuated the researcher’s line of reasoning in their argument on “leadership emergence and effectiveness.” On the other hand, Burns (1978, noted in Lowe et al., 1996:2) argued that “the transactional leader focuses on the proper exchange of resources.” Similarly, Kuhnert and Lewis (noted in Judge & Piccolo, 2004:755) contended that “the transactional leader gives followers something they want in exchange for something the leader wants.” However, I posit that the point of departure between the theory of personification and transactional leadership theorists is that in the latter, subordinates depend on the leader for preferred solutions. Hypothetically, this line of reasoning buttresses personified leadership that views the leader as the epitome of solutions. This perhaps explains why both transactional and personified leaders engage in ‘conditional relationships.’
Accordingly, Avolio, Bass and Jung (1999:441, 444) described these conditional relationships as “individualized consideration and contingent reward ....” In this context, I argue that this kind of relationship thrives on pretentious exchange rather than on the responsibility and accountability of the leader.

According to Judge and Piccolo (2004:755), “transactional leadership theory has undergone several revisions, with the most recent version having three dimensions namely: contingent reward, management by exception (active), and management by exception (passive).” Judge and Piccolo maintained that, “contingent reward is the extent to which the leader sets up constructive transactions or exchanges with followers. Thus, the leader clarified expectations and established the rewards for meeting these expectations.” In general, Judge and Piccolo argued that “management by exception is the degree to which the leader takes corrective action based on results of leader–follower transactions.” As noted by Howell and Avolio (in Judge & Piccolo, 2004:755-6), “the difference between management by exception (active) and management by exception (passive) lies in the timing of the leader’s intervention.” Howell and Avolio maintained that “active leaders monitor follower behaviour, anticipate problems and take corrective actions before the behaviour creates serious difficulties.” On the other hand, Howell and Avolio argued that “passive leaders are more reactive than proactive in responding to behavioural problems.” However, Avolio et al. (1999:443) argued that “on average, there is evidence that active and passive management-by-exception do not correlate or to some extent correlate negatively.”

From the above discussions, I argue that revisions in transactional leadership extricate the theory from the pitfalls associated with personified leadership. Unlike the theory of personification, transactional leadership recognises that “the leader defines expectations and sets rewards for meeting these expectations.” Furthermore, the revisions portend that transactional leaders anticipate challenges and resolve them before they escalate into “perilous complications.” I perceive these revisions as constituting a radical shift from the original conceptualisation articulated by Burns and subsequent theorists on the subject. Similarly, I argue that Judge and Piccolo’s model did not view the concept of leadership from the root causes of behavioural
patterns. However, this study links such leadership behaviour to formative stages of childhood development and later influences in the life of a leader.

2.5.3.2 Transformational Leadership

Burns (noted in Goertzen, 2012:83) revolutionised views of leadership among scholars and practitioners. According to Burns, “transforming leadership occurs when one or more persons engage others in a manner that enables leaders and followers to raise each other to higher levels of motivation and morality.” Burns maintained that although initially starting out separate (and perhaps even unrelated), the purposes of both leaders and followers become fused. Essentially, leaders played a major role in shaping the relationship with followers. Burns believed that leaders are commonly more skilful in evaluating followers’ motives, anticipating their responses to an initiative and estimating their power bases, than the reverse. Burns asserted that transforming leaders are “guided by near-universal ethical principles of justice such as equality of human rights and respect of individual dignity.” This study argues that the attainment of what Burns calls the “near-universal ethical principles of justice” is a daunting endeavour for leaders with personified inclinations. This is because in personified dispensations, egocentric rather than ethical principles guide national leaders. Similarly, the term “universal ethics” under the theory of transforming leadership may have dissimilar meanings to different people. The subjectivity in definitions may ultimately impede the realisation of universal ethical principles of justice. Therefore, contrary to Burn’s arguments, this study posits that a leader may not be able to demonstrate morality under some contexts, a factor that will affect their ability to uphold human rights and respect individual dignity. Then there is the issue of ‘motivation’ that Burns references. Again, leaders under personified dispensations are motivated by egoistic desires that may not necessarily align with the needs of other citizens.

Additionally, Goertzen (2012:85) contended that “transforming leadership has an elevating effect on both the leader and the led because it raises the level of human conduct and interaction. In the end, the process of transforming leadership is a moral process because leaders engaged with followers based on shared motives, values and goals.” Goertzen maintained that “the concept of transforming leadership is rooted in conflict, which is often compelling because it galvanizes and motivates
people." Equally, Goertzen (2012:84) argued that “leaders do not shun conflict; they embrace it by shaping and mediating conflict.” Goertzen maintained that leaders are able to discern signs of dissatisfaction among followers and take the initiative to make connections with followers. Likewise, Goertzen also posited that “the power in transforming leadership comes by recognizing the varying needs and motives of potential followers and elevating them to transcend personal self-interests.”

Goertzen theorises that leaders connect with, and are empathetic to, their followers beyond self-interests. However, I argue that Goertzen does not explain how unethical leaders interact with their followers. Furthermore, Goertzen’s theory is silent on the impact of personified leadership practices on subjects. Moreover, this study asserts that the introduction of “conflict” into personified dispensations, as posited by Goertzen, may not galvanise and motivate people. Rather, the intrinsic persona or character of a national leader shapes their “transformation” to go beyond personal self-interests. Equally, followers of the leader also have a role in fostering or hindering his transformation.

Tizazu (2013:16) mooted further criticism of “transformational theory that treats leadership more as a personality trait or predisposition than a behaviour that one learns.” In this regard, this study places Tizazu’s depiction of transformational theory alongside the theory of personification where they agree that leadership is more of a personality trait than educable behaviour. The latter is an interesting concept since this study argues that actions of leaders have roots in their childhood formative stages, as well as other subsequent influences on their lives that shape their traits. Therefore, I argue that the morality that Goertzen (2012) associates with transformational leadership does not suffice in the realm of personified dispensation.

### 2.5.3.3 Contingency theory

Fred Edward Fiedler (noted in Levine & Hogg, 2009:152), the leading proponent of contingency theory of leadership, emphasised the point that “leadership effectiveness depends on two factors: the leader’s task or relations motivations and aspects of the situation. Fiedler’s model underscored that effectiveness of leadership is dependent (contingent) on matching its leadership style to right situations. Because situational control is critical to leadership efficacy, Fiedler broke this factor
down into three major components.” First, Fiedler asserted that “leader-member-relations referred to the degree of mutual trust, respect and confidence between the leader and the subordinates.” Similarly, Fiedler (noted in Chokchainarong, 2006:2) argued that “a leader is able to perform his task effectively if the ‘situation’ in the group, which consists of the ‘leader-member relationship, task structure, and position power’, matches his leadership style.” Therefore, in order to ensure leader effectiveness, the leader had to first determine and match his leadership style and group ‘situation’. Fiedler maintained that “tasks that are more structured (‘high’ task structure) tended to give more control to the leader, whereas unstructured and unclear tasks (‘low’ task structure) reduced the leader’s control and influence.”

Equally, Fiedler contended that “the leader position power referred to the power inherent in the leader’s position.” In essence, “a leader holds strong position power if he has the authority to hire and fire, or to promote and demote his subordinates in rank and pay. However, a leader without authority to do the above things has weak position power.”

However, I note that the contingency theory assumes that the leader always enjoys a supportive environment from their followers. In other words, absolute focus is on the leader’s actions and not the followers’ reactions. However, this is not the case in reality since personification breeds discontent and apathy among the citizens. This discord may affect the degree of support that a leader has. Likewise, under personified systems, an egotistic leader who does not respect or trust their followers may not welcome any criticism, whether constructive or not. Instead, personified institutional structures usually centre on the leader, hence contingency theory’s assumption of “high” or “low” structure may not apply, especially under absolute dictatorships. On the other hand, I note that contingency theory provides plausible checks and balances on the leader’s influence and control. This is rather paradoxical under the theory of personification, where the leader would rather advance unstructured policies that prop up their regime than support democratic aspirations.

2.5.3.4 Participative leadership theory

Wilson, George, Wellins and Byham in (noted in Choi, 2007:247) “categorized ‘participative and high involvement’ leadership styles by the extent to which the leader encourages participation.” Similarly, Chemers (noted in Choi, 2007:247)
argued that “the level of group participation defines democratic leadership.” In the same manner, Bass in (noted in Choi, 2007:247) contended that “participation is a fundamental characteristic of democratic leadership.” Regarding the latter, Choi (2007:258) argued that “the characteristics of democratic leadership such as vision, symbolism, and participation also contribute to the development of public administration and democratic governance.” In the above regard, I point out that the links between citizen participation, governance and leadership are fundamental factors in understanding the theory of personification. Still on the subject, Box, King and Stivers (noted in Choi, 2007:258) argued that “public officials might encourage citizen participation in enhancing democratic governance, because ‘we are’ government.” Equally, Lamb (noted in Amanchukwu, Stanley & Ololube, 2015:8) posited that “a participative leader, rather than making all the decisions, seeks to involve other people, thus improving commitment and increasing collaboration, which leads to better quality decisions.” I note that the emphasis of the above scholars is on the universal participation of citizens. This is important to the theory of personification as it diminishes the possibility for leaders to manipulate citizens for selfish reasons.

According to Murdock (2014), “in participative leadership the leader turns to the team for input, ideas and observations instead of making all decision on their own. Although the leader reserved the ultimate decision making task, they understood that the team possibly had skills and ideas that could benefit the decision making process.” Murdock explained that participative leadership involved the entire team and the leader worked closely with team members, focusing on building relationships and rapport. On the other side of this leadership style, Murdock argued that “you have the autocratic leadership style in which the leader tends to be more issue-focused and makes most decisions without input from the team.” According to Ejimabo (2015:10), “the participative or democratic style is more inclusive of the group.” Ejimabo maintained that “this leadership style allowed, empowered, motivated, and encouraged members of the group to express their ideas, and be involved in the decision making process of the organisation.” Conversely, “participative leaders encouraged the participation of group members but maintained the final verdict over the decision-making process” (Khan, Qureshi, Ismail, Rauf, Latif & Tahir, 2015:89).
I note that participative leadership theory enables the leader to draw on input from parties other than themselves. Participation results in citizen involvement and ownership of national governance processes. However, unlike under participative leadership, genuine citizen involvement may not be possible in personified systems since leaders are egocentric and not altruistic. Participation in national governance is a farce under personified systems, since leaders are not willing to share power or even the “national cake.” Likewise, it may not always be possible to accommodate or address all ideas tabled under participative systems. The sheer volume of information generated under this system is enormous due to the broad participation of persons. Because of the need for consensus, participative systems may bring forth a leader who assumes ‘egocentric’ control of dialogue processes under the pretext of increasing efficiency. In order to save time or even exert dominance, the emergent leader can personify decision-making processes to suit narrow personal and group interests. I contend that the latter aligns well with the assertion by Khan et al. (2015) that the participative leader has the final say in-group decision-making. Leaders in personified systems may exploit this weakness to their advantages.

2.5.3.5 Full-range theory of leadership

According to Bass (noted in Stewart, 2006:13), “four qualities described by Burns, Bass, Avolio and Leithwood as ‘full range of leadership model’ are essential for leaders. The qualities are individualised consideration, intellectual stimulation, inspirational motivation, and Charismatic Leadership, or Idealized Influence.” Furthermore, Avolio and Bass (noted in Paraschiv, 2013:254) argued that “the ‘full range leadership theory’ comprised of three typologies of leadership behaviour (transformational, transactional, non-transactional laissez faire) represented by nine distinct factors. Five of the factors were transformational (inspirational motivation - charisma, idealized influence attributed, idealized influence behaviour, intellectual stimulation, individualized consideration), three transactional and one laissez faire.” Bass (noted in Salter, Harris & McCormack, 2014:1) suggested that “if transformational leadership could be based on one’s background characteristics, values, ethics, or traits, then these traits were universal to mankind.” Of contextual significance to this study are findings by Bass (noted in Salter et al., 2014:5) that “leaders with a strong moral identity would more likely emphasize moral values in
making decisions and communication with their subordinates, which may be linked to the transformational facets of inspirational motivation and idealized influence.” I concur that values, ethics and traits are crucial attributes that play a defining role in shaping or checking the behaviours of leaders. In contrast, Antonakis and House (noted in Miles, 2007:4) “offered an extension of the full range leadership theory, a scale of non-leadership called ‘laissez-faire leadership’ that indicated an absence of leadership. Antonakis and House described laissez faire management as a situation where the leader did nothing while expecting results from the followers.” In building on Bass’s work, Antonakis and House (noted in Antonakis, 2006:9) “expanded the full range theory to account for the effects of leader expertise on organizational and follower performance, referring to this form of leadership as ‘instrumental leadership’.” According to Antonakis, “this kind of leadership focused on actions that ensured organizational adaptation, reification of vision, and facilitation of follower work outcomes.”

I note that the merit with the full range theory is that it incorporates a moral element into leadership that was missing from charismatic leadership. This factor is critical to mitigate the egocentric excesses of leaders expressed in the theory of personification. Similarly, Laguerre’s (2010:17) citing Burns' assertion argued that transformational leaders are charismatic, inspiring, morally uplifting and, most importantly, working to develop followers into leaders themselves. This contention accentuates my argument transformational leaders transcend personal interests and espouse moral and egalitarian principles of governance. However, According to Avolio (noted in Nawaz & Bodla, 2010:210), the full range leadership model did not cover all the dimensions of leadership. I could not agree more with Avolio’s argument, since in my reckoning; the theory of personification offers a more comprehensive dimension of leadership. For instance, the theory allows one to understand why leaders negate transcendent collective interests, in preference for personified leadership styles of governance. Equally important, the theory also holds national leaders accountable for development outcomes in their jurisdictions.

2.6 Conclusion of Chapter Two

In conclusion, this section developed arguments and an analytical framework regarding the theory of personification, and then highlighted factors that precipitate
personified behavioural inclinations and, ultimately, systems. Building on the latter, the study highlighted how national leaders entwine their personalities into the fabric of national institutions, and how the latter affects national development. The study also established that personality psychology relates to the theory of personification from ontological, epistemological and theoretical perspectives. The above context enabled this study to analyse the diversity of human nature with respect to the different psychological development processes that lead to personified leadership behaviour. Subsequently, the study demonstrated that personification has a direct impact on the trajectory of national development and governance. This is especially significant for citizens, since national leaders play a pivotal role in determining the course of national development and governance. Likewise, this chapter demonstrated the effect of the personified leadership disposition on societal functioning and processes. The occurrence of personified governance has a ripple effect on citizens and can progressively create a cadre of persons who acquiesce to the system. Overall, the chapter demonstrated how personification influences the relationship that leaders have with their subjects, and its effects on the course of national governance and development. The empirical arguments highlighted in this chapter accentuated the theoretical arguments in the theory of personification that explains the concept of leadership, the implications of different leadership techniques and antecedents that affect a leader’s disposition. Because of its testability, I believe the theory of personification is beneficial in measuring and predicting the outcomes of national leadership styles, especially in relation to governance and development.

The next chapter will explore the correlation between personified leadership, governance, and development. The chapter will first analyse and discuss personified leadership within the context of national governance, and subsequently development. I then delve into an in-depth analysis on the general essence and features of personification; finally, I conclude the chapter by analysing the effects of personification on national institutions and society.
CHAPTER THREE
CORRELATING LEADERSHIP, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I analyse how a personified leadership style influences governance and development policies. This entails an exposition of the meaning of leadership in light of national governance and related development outcomes. I draw on philosophical, traditional and empirical concepts of leadership to guide my discussions on how personified leadership relates with governance and development. Existing literature on the subject of leadership is not comprehensive in articulating the entirety of leadership. Upon reviewing available literature, it is evident that experts have failed to provide convincing definitions of leadership. For instance, Rost (noted in Winston & Patterson, 2006:6) “reviewed leadership definitions, only to end up with the same social science research reductionist flaw when he concluded his work on the definition of leadership.” Similarly, in his review of the leadership definitions used to date, Barker (noted in Winston & Patterson, 2006:6) “also concluded that leadership is about two things – process and behaviours.” Accordingly, I will endeavour to discuss the subject of leadership within the context of personification, with a specific focus on the formation, actualisation and behaviours of leaders. I will also examine pertinent leadership models to help comprehend their relation to the theory of personification. In subsequent sections, I will draw on philosophical concepts of governance and development to guide my discussions on the empirical dimensions of leadership. In this study, I will also discuss how ‘good’ and ‘bad’ adjuncts of governance correlate with leadership and development outcomes. The subsequent sections then delve into an in-depth analysis on the general essence and features of personification in light of behavioural stimuli of the conduct; finally, I conclude the chapter by analysing the effects of personification on national institutions and systems, then I close the chapter with a discussion on personification and society.

3.2 Governance

This section will address the second study question, “How does personified leadership style influence governance [and development] policies in East Africa?”
The research question was, among other factors, influenced by research like the one Hofstede conducted on leadership values in cross-cultural settings (1980, noted in Dumah, 2008:42). Hofstede highlighted how these studies showed differences in leadership styles that affected governance or management of a country, and also brought to the fore the need to understand how the state governs society.

Jessop (noted in Stoker, 1998:18) posited that “Academic literature on governance is eclectic and relatively disjointed.” According to Treib, Bähr and Falkner (2005:4), “existing understandings classify governance according to emphasis on politics, polity or policy.” On the other hand, Börzel and Risse (2010:114) contended that “governance consists of both structure and process.” They argued that governance, as structure, related to institutions and actor constellations. Börzel and Risse maintained that “the process of governance pinpointed to the modes of social coordination by which actors engaged in rulemaking and implementation and in the provision of collective goods.” Kaufmann (noted in Essien, 2012:24) contended that the subject of governance has fascinated humankind for ages. Early discussions on governance go back to at least 400 B.C., during which time Kautilya, thought to be the chief minister to the King of India, ostensibly developed Arthashastra, a fascinating treatise on governance. Kaufmann maintained that “in the treatise, Kautilya presented key pillars on the ‘art of governance’ that emphasized justice, ethics, and anti-autocratic tendencies. Kautilya further detailed the duty of the king to protect the wealth of the state and its subjects; to enhance, maintain and safeguard such wealth, as well as the interests of the subjects.”

I agree with the above discussions that governance is generally diverse in dimensions. In other words, governance assumes multiple dimensions depending on the actions and objectives of the person(s) in control. On the other hand, I disagree with Jessop’s assertion that governance is disjointed. This is because under the theory of personification, governance actions are premediated and conscious actions by national leaders orchestrated to disenfranchise the citizens. This study agrees with Börzel and Risse that governance is a structure that relates to institutions. This is because the theory of personification argues that leadership actions can progressively systematise institutions to reflect the essential character of the leader. Whereas I agree with Börzel and Risse that governance provides avenues for
coordination, rulemaking and implementation especially of national policies, I differ with their assertion that governance results in the provision of collective goods. This is because under personified systems, we note that governance does not necessarily yield collective but rather ‘individualised national goods’ that in extreme cases are personal to the leader. I apply the foregoing trend of argument by diverging with Kaufmann’s contention that governance maintains and safeguards wealth in the interests of the subjects. Again, under personified systems, the leader usually amasses wealth egoistically and seldom protects the interest of the citizens.

Other experts like Hyatt and Jessop and Rosenau (noted in Fox & Ward, 2008:3) posited that “the governance of daily life posed both practical challenges and theoretical questions about balances between the rights, concerns and values of individuals, the state, commerce, professions and other groupings.” I draw on the latter to illustrate that the East African region has transitioned through various governance styles since the advent of independence. Although each governance style has been distinctive and productive to some degree, the general outcome has been the same – despondent, especially where the incumbent leader forcibly perpetuates their stay in power. Nevertheless, the EAC has a vibrant population of 140 million and an overall GDP of $100 billion (IMF, 2013), although over 50% of the population lives on less than $1 a day, a figure that is below the poverty line of $1.25 a day (ADB, 2017). A Corruption Perception Index (CPI) conducted by Transparency International (2013) shows that only Rwanda of all the five EAC nations surveyed is among the top-ranked 50 countries, with the rest trailing at the bottom. Accordingly, this section of the study explores theoretical and empirical concepts to attempt to contextualise governance styles in East Africa. A review of available literature and the researcher’s own 30-year observation shows that that East African nations have made credible attempts to champion democratic principles. However, weaknesses in internal state legitimacy and capability have diminished reasonable progress, largely due to ineffective leadership.

Because of its vital role in governance and development, I discuss how leadership influences national governance in subsequent paragraphs. Fox and Ward (2008:2) contended that “governance addresses a wide range of issues including social, economic and political continuity, security and integrity, individual and collective safety and the liberty and rights to self-actualization of citizens.” Conversely, Stoker
(1998:17) asserted that “governance is primarily concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action”. Stoker maintained that the outputs of governance are not different from those of government. It is rather a matter of a difference in processes. Similarly, Stoker argued that the traditional use of ‘governance’ and its dictionary meaning defined it as a synonym for government. Stoker further contended that, “in the growing work on governance, there is a redirection in its use and import.” In the same regard, Rhodes (noted in Stoker, 1998:17) posited that “governance signified ‘a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed’.” Likewise, Avellaneda (2006:2) contended that “neo-institutional scholars have conducted several cross-national empirical studies that have found a positive relationship between the quality of institutions, governance structures and growth.” In this context, Avellaneda maintained that “a broad consensus among growth economists, development experts and aid donors views ‘good governance’ as a pre-requisite for sustained increases in living standards.” Kjær (noted in Cubitt, 2014:2) therefore advocated “that it is necessary to explore alternative routes to ‘growth-enhancing’ governance that are not dependent on predefined good governance institutions that fail, but more dependent on good research into the right political incentives for change.”

It is apparent from the above discussions that there are multiple perspectives pertaining to the subject of leadership and governance. Accordingly, drawing on a diverse assemblage of literature, I attempt to identify models that sustainably advance constructive governance and ultimately, development in East Africa. The multiple perspectives on the subject points to the need for more systematic research on ‘what works’, to avoid perpetuating approaches that have little impact. First, we need to develop a definite, distinct, and clear understanding of what governance is before we relate it to other subjects.

3.2.1 Definition of Governance

Before embarking on an in-depth discussion on the subject of ‘governance’, this I defined the term ‘governance’ in subsequent paragraphs. At the end of this section, I synthesised the various definitions of governance in order to arrive at a functional description of the term.
According to Jessop and Starkey (noted in Morrell, 2009:5), “the origin of the word ‘governance’ lies in the Greek term kybernesis (κυβέρνησις): ‘piloting’.” Jessop and Starkey maintained that “‘governance’ has contemporary connotations of steering or stewardship and different writers acknowledged this core sense.” Conversely, Rhodes and Stoker (noted in Stoker, 1998:17) posited that “there is great variation across different disciplines and literatures with no agreed definition on the word governance.” Rhodes and Stoker maintained that reviews of the literature generally concluded that “the term ‘governance’ had a variety of uses and meanings.” In the same manner, Stoker (1998:17) posited that “governance referred to the development of governing styles in which boundaries between, and within public and private sectors had become blurred”. Stoker maintained that “the essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms, which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government.” Likewise, Kooiman and Van Vliet (noted in Stoker, 1998:17) contended that “the concept of governance pointed to the creation of a structure or an order, which one could impose externally, but is the result of the interaction of a multiplicity of governing [issues] and other influencing actors.” In the same vein, Jessop (noted Morrell, 2009:5) asserted that “proponents have described ‘governance’ as a ‘vague’, ‘pre-theoretical’, ‘buzzword’.” Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (noted in Morrell, 2009:5) pointed to a ‘breadth and ambiguity of definitions’ concerning the term ‘governance’. Bache (noted in Morrell, 2009:5) stated that the use of the term ‘governance’ often lacks definitional clarity. Rhodes (noted in Morrell, 2009:5) argued that “the term ‘governance’ had, ‘too many meanings to be useful’.”

However, despite the convolution surrounding the definition of governance, in subsequent paragraphs, I highlight how leading international institutions, the academic fraternity, and research consortia have made plausible attempts to develop functional definitions of the term ‘governance’.

The United Nations, a universal organisation, and the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the two largest multilateral donors, provide definitions of governance worth considering. The OECD (1995:14) defined “governance as the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in the management of its resources for social and economic development.” The latter “encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing
the environment for economic operators to function and also to determine the
distribution of benefits and the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the
ruled” (OECD, 1995:14). The OECD maintained that “governance is the way in which
the underlying values of a nation are ‘institutionalized’.” This has formal aspects such
as separated powers, checks and balances, means of transferring power,
transparency and accountability.

Similarly, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) “defined governance as
participation, accountability, transparency, consensus, sustainability, the rule of law
and the involvement of poor and most vulnerable people in shaping decisions on
allocation of development resources.” Of equal universality is the World Bank’s
definition that “governance is the exercise of power to manage a nation’s affairs
(World Bank, 1989:60). This is not to be confused with government, which comprises
the instruments used to implement governance – “the security forces, civil services,
justice system and so forth.” In the same manner, the World Bank Institute has
compiled a widely used set of aggregate data from a broad range of sources that
measure the following dimensions of good governance: political stability and
absence of violence, the rule of law, voice and accountability, regulatory quality,
government effectiveness and control of corruption, and environmental governance.
However, Fukuyama (2013:1) argued that “four of the six World Bank Institute’s
Worldwide Governance Indicators purport to measure state aspects of state capacity
(government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and stability and absence of violence,
control of corruption), but these are aggregates of other existing measures and it is
not clear how they map onto the Weberian categories. For example, does a good
absence of violence score mean that there is effective policing?” Well, in this study
we affirmed that the answer to the latter is “no” since other factors also contribute to
the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of governance.

The argument by Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003:1) that “governance is not
synonymous with government” augurs well with the position of this study. Since
governance is not about government, what is it about? To Graham et al. (2003:1),
“governance is partly about how governments and other social organizations
interact, how they relate to citizens, and how they take decisions in a complex
world.” Graham et al. (2003:1) maintained that “governance is a process where
societies or organizations made their important decisions, determined whom they
involved in the process and how they rendered account.” Another description that “advocates for ‘control’ defined governance as the guidance or control of an activity, in order to meet a specified objective” (Jewson & MacGregor; Rosenau, noted in Fox & Ward, 2008:4). Benz in (noted in Treib et al., 2005:5) argued that “the core meaning of governance connotes the steering and coordination of interdependent (usually collective) actors based on institutionalised rule systems.” Treib et al. (2005:5) contended that “the above definition covered all three views of governance that belonged primarily to the realms of politics, polity or policy.” I agree with Graham et al. that governance is the process of governing government since in my view; governance connotes a deliberate action towards some goal. This distinction is important in the theory of personification since it links leadership actions to governance outcomes. I also concur that governance entails the involvement of various actors in decision-making and management of institutions. I hasten to add that these actors and institutions are often dependent on leadership decisions, as is illustrated in the theory of personification. I point out that the use of the words ‘policy’, ‘control’ and ‘coordination’ in the rendering of the term governance is critical in this study as these bridge leadership action with related outcomes.

In addition, “people use the word governance as a generic fundamental concept, which comprises of all institutionalized forms of political steering and integration of societies” (Blatter, 2012:3). Similarly, “the term entails larger decisions about direction and roles” (Graham & Wilson, 2004:2). In combination with specifying adjectives, governance also signifies those specific forms of control that are based on political, economic and sociological theories of behaviour. Richards and Smith (noted in Kitthananan, 2006:2) suggested that governance is a descriptive label that highlighted the recent changing nature of policy processes. Kitthananan maintained that governance demands that “we consider all the actors and locations beyond the core executive involved in the policy-making process.” Similarly, Richards and Smith (noted in Kitthananan, 2006:2) contended that “the concept of governance suggested that governments have lost their ability to solely control and shape both policy and society.” To Richards and Smith, “governments have to operate in a diverse, fragmented, complex and decentralized environment.” In essence, Kohler-Koch (noted in Treib et al., 2005:5) argued that “governance is about the ways and means by which citizens translated their divergent preferences into effective policy
choices; how the pluralities of societal interests transformed into unitary action, and how the compliance of social actors are achieved.”

Whereas I agree with Blatter that governance gives character to political navigation and inclusiveness of societies, I contend that the above is not possible under personified regimes. This is because in the latter, politics is very much entangled with the leadership as it is with the institutions, and ultimately society. I agree entirely with Graham & Wilson that governance entails decisions about direction and roles. This notion corroborates the theory of personification that ties the determination of national courses of action and different functions to the incumbent leader. To the extent that Government refers to the governing body, I agree with Richards and Smith that governments have lost their ability to solely control and shape both policy and society. However, the theory of personification argues that Government only loses its mandate when a leader with personified inclination hijacks state institutions and systems. In essence, the governing body loses its powers to make independent decisions in a democratic manner.

In descriptive terms, Hall (noted in Moti, 2012:16) contended that “the shift towards governance meant that government had become more of an enabling state, than it is a hierarchical, commanding state governing through its own authority.” In contrast to the above, Wohlmuth (1998:7) posited that “governance is the manner in which a government exercised political power.” Wohlmuth maintained that “governance relates to institutions and structures used for exercising power; considered all relevant public decision-making processes; implied that the implementation capacity for government action in a country is of relevance; and encompassed the relation between the government and the public.” However, on the subject of government capacity, Fukuyama (2013:13) posited that “the quality of government is ultimately a function of the interaction of capacity and autonomy, and that either one independently would be inadequate as a measure of government quality.” Furthermore, Göran Hydén in (noted in Carothers & de Gramont, 2011:4) asserted that “the objectives of governance form a continuum between effectiveness and legitimacy, with the former dealing with managerial efficiency and the latter addressing the relationship between citizens and the state.”
This researcher argues that Hall’s assertion reduces government to a passive constituent that mostly enables actions rather than administering the state. This is a precarious position for government, as singular or collective individuals with personified inclinations can easily usurp its powers. Similarly, although Wohlmuth credibly covers institutional and bureaucratic elements of governance, he does not particularly expound on the role that a personified leader plays in governance. This notion separates personality from the abstract entity called “government”, making it easy for leaders to negate their roles. Fukuyama’s arguments come close to the line of argument taken in this study. This is because he argues that governance is a function of capacity and autonomy that in turn are indicators of the quality of any government. Accordingly, we see the importance of the theory of personification for measuring the quality of governance and government effectiveness. This is because the theory resolutely links personalities of national leaders to outcomes of their rule.

3.2.2 The concept of governance: its ‘good’ and ‘bad’ adjuncts

The notion of good governance is relatively new. It surfaced prominently in a World Bank report on sub-Saharan Africa, “describing the crisis in the region as a crisis of governance” (World Bank, 1989). Overviews of general usage and origins of governance show that the term’s first introduction was normative. By the late 1980s, the limitations of African states – reflected in weak policy formulation, ineffective public administration, and corruption – featured prominently in official diagnoses from both sides of the structural adjustment debate (UNECA & World Bank, noted in Alence, 2004:164). Likewise, consensus emerged that dysfunctional political institutions and poor governance bear much of the blame for the region’s disappointing economic performance, hindering the successful pursuit of any development strategy, irrespective of its ideological orientation (Mkandawire & Soludo 1999; Ndulu & O’Connell; Sandbrook; van de Walle, noted in Alence, 2004:164). Whereas discussions in the 1980s concentrated on economic reform and structural adjustment, the focus now is on the ‘good governance’ as being an important factor for sustainable growth (Wohlmuth, 1998:78). Accordingly, in the 1990s, both the IMF and the World Bank became powerful advocates of high standards of legitimacy, representation, and accountability in governments seeking
to borrow from them. These institutions gave these standards the label ‘good governance’ (Woods, 2000:823).

Despite the need by international organisations to address challenges with attaining sustainable growth, they still had to circumnavigate the question of national sovereignty. For instance, the World Bank (noted in Stankowska, 2014:45) asserted that “good governance should have three aspects that include the form of political regime; the process by which a country’s management exercises authority over social and economic resources for development, and lastly, the capacity of the government to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions.” However, the International Monetary Fund [IMF] (2017:13) pointed out that the World Bank’s mandate prohibits its involvement in politics. Thus, the IMF highlighted the fact that “the Bank’s work on good governance, notably in the earlier period, typically was restricted to the latter two aspects on the assumption that the political element can be kept distinct.” Similarly, the IMF (2017:11) maintained that the Fund’s mandate restricts the definition of “good governance” for Fund purposes to economic aspects. Accordingly, the IMF (2017:8) posited that other organisations including regional banks have followed this approach, which by definition explicitly remained policy-neutral and has focused solely on effectiveness in implementing chosen policies. The IMF maintained that “recently however, the World Bank has moved away from using the term ‘good governance’. This reflects a shift from a normative to a functional-organizational approach, which focuses more on the nature and details of governance arrangements and targets assistance to improve organizational arrangements, functions, and outcomes.”

Conversely, the UNDP began exploring the concept of “good governance” at almost the same time as the World Bank. Unlike the World Bank, the UNDP had for some time already been involved in supporting government capacity in developing countries with the so-called Management Development Programs (IMF, 2017:16). As a result, the UNDP had attained a close understanding of the broad relevance of governance for development. However, the UNDP embraced the political (power-related) and democratic aspects to a much greater degree than the World Bank did. First, differences in mandate allowed the UNDP to come to the issue of development from a different perspective, mindful of the role of democratic political processes. Second, the UNDP’s areas of concern notably cover social indicators, involving such
topics as health and education, as well as access to decision-making processes on the distribution of public goods (IMF, 2017:16).

With the above background, this study explores some key definitions of the phrase ‘good governance.’ The definitions highlighted below reasonably capture the varied viewpoints on the subject, and are contextually pertinent for this study. From a broad-spectrum, Chowdhury and Skarstedt (noted in Essien, 2012:26) reasoned that “good governance is a normative principle of public administration and administrative law, which obliges the State, nation or organs of government to perform its functions in a manner that promotes the values of efficiency, non-corruptibility, and responsiveness to civil society.” Similarly, Bang and Esmark (2013:1) “described good governance as an empirically observable politico-administrative way of making public policy-making, reforming and organizing. As such, good governance covers three basic politico-administrative domains: public governance, policy and organization.” However, Zaid (2015:2) argued that “good governance is not – in and of itself – an end; it is rather a means for a greater good, which is an effective and efficient delivery of public goods by the government.” Equally, the ADB (noted in Wohlmuth, 1998:6) asserted that “the issue regarding the quality of public goods supplied at country-level makes ‘good governance’ such an important concept.”

On the other hand, Wohlmuth (1998:6) maintained that “‘good governance’ refers to the developmental potentials of democracy in Africa – as accountability, rule of law, public choice of government, and freedom of expression and association are important elements of Africa’s renewal.” Moreover, good governance, according to Wohlmuth (1998:6), also referred to the consolidation of market reforms, although different development paths are possible in market-oriented economic systems. Good governance therefore requires an adaptation and continuous improvement of market-oriented systems in a specific socio-economic context, especially in Africa. Conversely, Noman, Botchwey, Stein and Stiglitz (noted in Cubitt, 2014:1) asserted that, having focused for decades on market-based approaches that failed, developmental approaches to governance that promote a bigger role for African states now pre-occupy international actors. They maintained that the idea is to move away from policy that restricts and restrains state activity, to that which strengthens and enables capacity for growth and development. However, Hewitt de Alcántara (noted in Munshi, Abraham & Chaudhuri, 2009:13) argued that “in recent years,
giving prominence to the concept of governance in the analysis of development problems has allowed international lending institutions (and the donor community in general) to work themselves out of an intellectual and practical dead-end that relied heavily on free-market ideals.”

Additionally, Hope (noted in Khan, 2015:10) averred “that good governance comprises of political accountability; bureaucratic transparency; the exercise of legitimate power; freedom of association and participation; freedom of information and expression; sound fiscal management and public financial accountability.” Hope maintained that “good governance consists of respect for the rule of law; a predictable legal framework encompassing an interdependent and credible justice system; respect for human rights; an active legislature; enhanced opportunities for the development of pluralistic forces including civil society; and capacity development.” Stankowska (2014:44) built on the subject of human rights and posited that “good governance and human rights are mutually reinforcing.” Stankowska (2014:44) maintained that “human rights principles provide a set of values to guide the work of governments and other political and social actors. They also provided a set of performance standards against which hold these actors accountable.”

On the other hand, without good governance, one cannot respect and protect human rights in a sustainable manner. In this respect, Khan (2015:35) “defined good governance as the overall capacity development for government.” Khan maintained that capacity broadly includes the service delivery by the government. Similarly, Khan defined capacity development as “the promotion of the competency of a range of social actors, who perform the activities in a sustainable manner for positive development.” Smith (noted in Khan, 2015:10) emphasized “capacity development in an equitable manner for good governance in developing societies.” Likewise, Howe (2012:345) posited that “good governance refers to efficiency in the provision of services and economic competitiveness.” He maintained that “with time, good governance has also come to mean accountability in the provision of services and in the generation and distribution of the collective good.”

I observe that because of the indeterminate definitions of governance, many leaders in sub-Saharan countries claim to practise ‘good’ governance and participatory
development. The ambiguity of the term ‘good’ governance confuses national citizens themselves. The idealistic appendage ‘good’ complicates the already convoluted definition of governance. Apparently, neoliberals added concern for ‘good governance’ into economic programmes in order to ‘make them more efficient’. For instance, “neoliberals mulled over the question: ‘what happens to the concept of governance in a state that has limited power to make decisions?’” The answer for neoliberals has been to vaunt the merits of self-regulating markets and to suggest that markets functioned best when the state had no regulatory powers (Ives, 2015:11)”. However, some actors abuse the term ‘good governance’ by ascribing to it so many indicators that it becomes nearly impossible to achieve good governance. “At the same time, many governments engage in conflicts of interests between trying to do the right things and doing the urgently needed things right, which consume their energies and resources” (Grindle, 2004, noted in De Vries, 2013:3).

However, in order to unravel the ambiguity surrounding the concept of ‘good governance’, I pose the question: “what makes a concept good?” Gerring (1999:357) attempted to provide an answer in his argument that “‘goodness’ in concept formation cannot be reduced to ‘clarity,’ to empirical or theoretical relevance, to a set of rules, or to the methodology particular to a given study”. Of the eight ‘criteria of conceptual goodness’ spelt out by Gerring, the term ‘good governance’ in the context of this study lacks five, namely parsimony, differentiation, coherence, theoretical utility, and field utility. This probably explains why successes for the spirited attempts to coin a functional definition of the term ‘governance’ have eluded experts. Of significant interest on the discussion, De Vries (2013:4) posited that “the term governance has become dangerous in that scholars as well as (international) organizations have added a normative prefix to it, namely ‘good’. To De Vries, the latter is indicative of neglect for outputs and outcomes that increases the criteria for ‘good governance’ imposing an agenda on government which by now is overloaded.” A UNDP Governance Policy Paper (1997) stated that “good governance is participatory, transparent and accountable; it is also effective and equitable, and it promotes the rule of law.” The UNDP Paper maintained that, “… good governance ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society.” The Policy Paper also equally stresses that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are to be heard in decision-making over the allocation of
development resources. Correspondingly, Stankowska (2014:45) defined good governance as a mechanism of managing resources to achieve a fair, efficient and effective development. Thus, Stankowska maintained, we achieve good governance when in the process of checks and balances, there is a balanced system between the element of the state and societal institutions – where none of them has an absolute control.

Relatedly, Rotberg (noted in Onolememen, 2015:2) argued that “depending on the manner and mode of administering, governance can be good or bad.” Habtamu (2008) stated that “Sub-Saharan Africa’s poor economic performance is largely attributable to bad governance”. I argue that, in part, egocentric leadership motivates bad governance. I associate bad or failed governance with the Africa continent-wide ills, and, to cure Africa of its malaise, we must improve governance by some means. According to Rothstein (noted in Cubitt, 2014:5), “bad governance is not culturally restricted, but a universal challenge that affects all nations at some point in their development history.” Cubitt (2014:3) added that “The current orthodoxy, which focuses on state building, technocratic style solutions to government challenges, simply will not do. Lundgren, Thomas and York (2013:9) corroborated the above argument in their argument that, “those who maintain that weaknesses in ... macroeconomic management and poor governance seem to have played a prominent role in squandering sub-Sahara's resources.” Lately, experts have been debating the idea pertaining to “good enough governance” by pondering whether the message behind the ‘good governance agenda’ is tenable. On this note, Grindle (2007:1) “suggested that not all governance deficits need to be (or can be) tackled at once, and that institution and capacity building are products of time. Conversely, governance achievements can also be reversed.” Equally, Maghraoui (2012) contended that the fact that “the concept of good governance is grounded in a technocratic, politically neutral view of power is detrimental to accountability and oversight.” To Maghraoui, such a conception is ineffective when it comes to fighting corruption. He contended that “claims by proponents that ‘good governance’ provides techniques of policing and improving institutional performance are unrealistic. This is especially true in a context where senior government officials are not held accountable to a body that has oversight, authority and the power of enforcement.”
The above arguments underscore the intricate relationship between leadership and governance. The arguments clearly highlight the need for accountability by persons in leadership position. However, in personified regimes, national leaders are unwilling to be accountable to their citizens and national institutions since this constrains their rapaciousness. Olukoshi (noted in Cubitt, 2014:4) identified that “bureaucratic obstruction, weak judiciaries, political and administrative arbitrariness, the absence of the rule of law, corruption and rent seeking among governors, are distinguishing characteristics of bad governance that are principally to blame for the failure [of sustainable growth in Africa].” Olukoshi maintained that “it is the case that African politics is bedevilled by a number of characteristics that conspire to produce an image of bad governance on the continent. There is evidence of corruption, militarism, authoritarianism, clientelism, neo-patrimonialism or tribalism.”

In contrast, cross-national studies show that good governance is a key determinant of economic performance. “Experts have challenged econometric works showing that institutions are the key determinant of economic performance on the grounds of conceptual vagueness, causality/endogeneity problems, missing-variable considerations, measurement errors, and modelling and specification limitations” (Avellaneda, 2006:196). Avellaneda maintained that “most decisively, the new political economy of growth still lacks a proper grasp of the channels through which institutions affect growth, and the political sources of good institutions.” She asserted that, “one of the most difficult issues in the field of governance is the imperfect understanding of how politics shapes governance and development.” Likewise, Sørensen and Torfing (2009:234) asserted that “governance through the formation of networks composed of public and private actors might help solve wicked problems and enhance democratic participation in public policymaking, but it may also create conflicts and deadlocks and make public governance less transparent and accountable.” However, Stoker (1998:24) argued that “the paradox of governance is that even where government develops appropriate operating codes, governance failure may still occur.” Stoker maintained that “tensions and difficulties with the institutions of civil society, as well as inadequacies in the organizations that bridge the gaps between public, private and voluntary sectors may lead to governance failure. Equally, failures of leadership, differences in time scale and horizons among key partners and the depth of social conflict can all provide the seeds for governance
failure.” On the other hand, Cubitt (2014:6) posited that, “living with the realities of failed or ineffective governance, African citizens commonly look to alternative sources of support – religious groups, chiefs or other traditional authorities, family networks and so on.”

I observe that the above arguments corroborate Fukuyama’s (2013:3) assertion that “governance denotes government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not.” On this note, I argue that the theory of personification addresses gaps in above arguments, especially regarding Avellaneda’s assertion that there is imperfect understanding of how politics shapes governance and development. The theory of personification agrees with the insinuation by Sørensen and Torfing governance may create conflicts and deadlocks. This is because under personification, the dispensation of governance is prone to conflicts owing to its undemocratic nature. Stoker also echoes my argument in asserting that failures of leadership can lead to conflict and ultimately governance failure. Eventually, resistance to leadership over undemocratic decisions may lead to deadlocks.

Under the pretext of restoring democratic participation in national development, some donors have exploited the gaps in sub-Saharan countries caused by the ambiguity in the term ‘governance’. Studies show that, in order to preserve their economic interests, some donors purposely ensnare African countries in the cyclical aid trap. For instance, a recent study on US-funded programmes focusing on trade development in emerging markets found that for every one dollar spent on trade, $53 accrued in merchandise exports for the United States. Similarly, Rabatsky (2011) agreed, noting that “with job creation becoming more dependent on expanding American exports overseas, international aid efforts are one of USA’s most effective ways to promote economic growth.” Rabatsky (2011) also argued that the United Kingdom understands the importance of the facts that developing countries create jobs and reduce competition for domestic jobs, create new markets for their goods and services, and provide long-term payoff in trade and security. It is apparent, therefore, that there is a strong motivation for some donors to support undemocratic leaders and their governments, even at the expense of the citizens – provided the situation meet the donors’ interests. To do this, treacherous donors have coined their own skewed definitions of “good governance” to describe otherwise errant regimes.
In line with the above, Carothers and de Gramont (2011:3) argued that, for many years, aid practitioners struggled with how to address the punishing impact of ineffective, unaccountable and often rapacious states in developing countries. At the World Bank, for example, there was cumulative frustration with persistent failures of development programmes in many parts of sub-Saharan countries in the 1970s and 1980s. This led some World Bank officials to push for focus on governance, resulting in the publication of a landmark 1989 report that highlighted governance shortcomings in Africa. Carothers and de Gramont maintained that it was only in the 1990s that a confluence of factors emerged that propelled governance onto the main stage of international development, where it has since assumed varying definitions. If we are to be guided by the indicators of good governance devised by the World Bank, the region of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has the lowest score on the measure of Government Effectiveness. Compared with other developing regions, it has remained the lowest performer in this indicator for the past decade (Cubitt, 2014:2).

According to Clapham, Rothschild and Olorunsola (noted in Alence, 2004:178), “clientelism and ethnicity are both often associated with poor governance, in that they tend to encourage competition for a fixed basket of particularistic benefits, at the expense of providing more general welfare-enhancing public goods.” As discussed earlier, the contention is that within this broad spectrum, governance either hinders or promotes development. In the same manner, Ilufoye Ogundiya (noted in Ojo, Aworawo & Elizabeth, 2014:135) argued that, “governance surely hinders development where it manifests in corrupt practices; greed and insatiable appetite for resource accumulation.” On the other hand, Maghraoui (2012) argued that “strong empirical evidence supports the connection between corruption and the lack of good governance.” Maghraoui maintained that “opportunities for corruption are greater where there is a lack of institutional transparency, accountability, capability, effectiveness, fairness and access.” On the same note, Transparency International (1999) contended that “where corruption is endemic, the tasks of improving performance are more difficult.” Furthermore, scholars, professionals and policy makers are at odds on the contributory linkage between corruption and good governance, and so they emphasise the different components of the latter.

In discussing bad governance, Aliyu and Elijah (noted in Ojo et al., 2014:136) “underscored the consequence of corruption that it carts resources away from
government capital expenditure and human capital development and ends up in private pockets.” However, I argue that governance is much broader than ‘corruption’ is. Nonetheless, I agree that corruption is a typical symptom of bad governance, and it can be a particularly pernicious one. Correspondingly, Fritz (2007) argued that “oppression and the denial of rights can be other dimensions of bad governance, while yet others are lawlessness and the spread of crime, often in the context of political instability.” Similarly, Aliyu and Elijah (noted in Ojo et al., 2014:139) argued that “the manifestations of illiberal and corrupt governance would not only breed and spread poverty, for instance, as a result of wasted resources as well as distorted investment, but also portend threats to state and human security. Furthermore, chronic fiscal drain through corrupt practices would drive away crucial resources in terms of direct and indirect foreign investment.”

In concluding the section on the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ adjuncts of governance, I established from the literature review that many experts agree that good governance is a fundamental factor for poverty eradication and advancement of national development. This study also established that actors generally agree that good governance is an ideal way of advancing good public policymaking, as well as reforming and organising politico-administrative domains. In addition, good governance can also influence the manner in which a country exercises authority over social and economic resources for development. I concur that the virtues associated with good governance are strong pillars that can mitigate or even truncate the proliferation of personified regimes. As discussed in the literature review, good governance facilitates the rule of law; promotes a functional and ethical justice system; values human rights; and advances better opportunities to develop varied stakeholders. The above pillars present an institutionalised system of checks and balances against personified reign. However, I also established that ineffective political institutions and poor governance hinder efficient economic performance and constrain the attainment of meaningful development. Despite the apparent negative effects of bad governance, there is still disagreement between scholars, professionals, and policymakers on the causal relationship between dysfunctional political systems and governance. This section also established that there is a problem of conceptual clarity when it comes to understanding the term ‘good governance’ due to the varied interpretation of the phrase. In this respect, I concur
that this ‘fuzziness’ is problematic for the practical outcomes that development institutions are trying to achieve. I also argue that the varied interpretations of good governance renders it challenging to measure, and then use such measures to inform national policy processes. Accordingly, the next section will analyse theories and concepts of governance to help describe, interpret, test and categorise information on personified national leadership.

3.2.3 Overview of theories and concepts of governance

The theories and concepts of governance assume many dimensions across diverse disciplines. There are several actors involved in any national governance processes ranging from citizens, academia through non-state actors like international organisations. Thus, this section provides an understanding of the concept and theories of governance as well as its evolution. Likewise, this section also enables me to crystallize my own notion of governance, a factor that will latter guide recommendations on how stakeholders can apply the concept in the real world. The latter eventually enables the user of this research to apply these concepts to current issues on governance and development that I discuss in chapter four. Using examples from the theories, I draw the reader’s attention to factors that enhance citizen participation in governance and at the same time improve accountability by national institutions. Drawing on my analysis in section 3.2.2, I discuss the elements or characteristics of governance as introduced by different theories and models on the subject. I commence my discussions by analysing the role of non-state actors in governance given their importance in the power dynamics of developing countries.

I hypothesise that the key rationale supporting direct involvement of non-state actors in governance is the supposition that if they can influence policy processes, they will most likely recognise the outcomes of functional national policies. I maintain that this is true even if the policy outcomes do not fully accommodate the interests of the non-state actors. In other words, the unencumbered involvement of various crosscutting stakeholders in decision-making will most likely legitimise governance outcomes. “This is the major theoretical argument in favour of directly involving non-state actors in governance” (Reinicke; Kaul, Grunberg & Stern; and Reinicke, Deng, Witte, Benner, & Whitaker, noted in Börzel & Risse, 2010:127). In the subsequent paragraphs, I analyse and discuss theoretical constructs and concepts of
argumentative theory, cultural theory, democratic and legal theory, gender theory in political science, network theory, political economy, and theories of system transition and transformation as they relate to the theory of personification.

Gottweis (2006:461) posited that “during the 1990s, argumentative policy analysis became a major strand in the contemporary study of policymaking and policy theory development. The term argumentative policy analysis subsumed a group of different approaches towards policy analysis.” Gottweis maintained that “these approaches share an emphasis on language as a key feature of any policy process, and is thus as a necessary key component of policy analysis.” According to Fischer and Miller (2006:238), “argumentative policy analysis links post-positivist epistemology with social theory and methodology and encompasses theoretical approaches such as discourse analysis, post-structuralist approaches, frame analysis and interpretative policy analysis.” Fischer and Miller (2006) maintained that “although these different approaches are hardly synonymous, they nevertheless share the special attention they give to argumentation and language and the process of utilizing, mobilizing and weighing arguments and signs in the interpretation and praxis of policymaking and governance.” In the same manner, Alejandro (1993:92) posited that “this epistemological orientation is critical of the understanding that institutions of governance are not simply out there at the disposal of policymakers or citizens using them. Rather, practices and institutions are [also] present in language through concepts and ideas that embody human experience and normative claims.” Likewise, Ruysenaar (2014:45) contended that “infused within meaning-making processes and the centrality of language, is the importance of power and knowledge, which are expressed through them.” From another perspective, Habermas (noted in Ruysenaar, 2014:45) emphasised that “the importance of communication in securing and fostering the acceptance of the unequal distribution of power as well as the policy consequences that flow from it.” Habermas maintained that “ultimately, acts of end-user rendering or utility constitute the essence of institutions and the formation of political identity.”

From a cultural perspective, van Gunsteren (noted in Hoppe, 2007:289) argued that public policymaking appears to invent and impose a unitary, supposedly consensual governance culture on the many different cultures “out there” in society. Yet, Hoppe (2007:289) articulated that “taking cultural difference seriously and making it an ally
instead of an enemy is the only sensible response for a policy analysis profession in
tune with its times.” In the same vein, Ross (noted in Lichbach & Zuckerman,
2009:134) contended that “to examine how culture operates, we must approach it
through the formal and informal verbal and nonverbal narratives about the social and
political worlds that people in the same culture share.” To this end, Ross maintained
that culture is a worldview containing specific scripts that shape why and how
individuals and groups behave as they do. According to Ross (noted in Lichbach &
Zuckerman, 2009:137), this “includes both cognitive and affective beliefs about
social reality and assumptions about when, where and how people in one’s culture
and those in other cultures are likely to act in particular ways.” Regarding cultural
theory as developed in anthropology (and later introduced into political science),
Douglas (noted in Jenkins-Smith, 2012:1) posited that “cultural theory supports four
distinctive worldviews or ‘cultural biases’.” Wildavsky (noted in Jenkins-Smith,
2012:1) stated that “these worldviews are egalitarianism, hierarchism, individualism
and fatalism – that serve as the primary combinations of values that guide how
individuals formulate both broad social orientations and derive more specific policy
perspectives.” Accordingly, cultural theorists claimed, “that the social world ticks the
way it does due to selective affinity and mutual dependency between social relations,
cultural biases and behavioural strategies” (Hoppe, 2007:290).

Equally, “cultural theory scholars hypothesized that different types of social and
political relations are accompanied by values and beliefs, including constructs of
human and physical nature, that allow people to justify these relationships to each
other” (Swedlow, 2014:468). I note that the reinstatement of ‘cultural theory’ as a
constructive technique for examining political issues will facilitate the in-depth
understanding of contemporary politics from multiple perspectives. This is because
culture plays a pivotal role in African politics as much as it does in shaping or
regulating societal discourses. In corroboration of this, Matlosa (2003:86)
emphasized that “the importance of a culture to societal development, identity and
destiny is as critical as that of political culture to a political system.” Matlosa
maintained that “political culture has both direct and indirect bearing and permutation
on political and economic governance processes. Furthermore, the concept of
political culture denotes a broad array of norms, values, beliefs, attitudes and
traditions that shape systems, institutions and processes of governance. Similarly,
we can justifiably trace policy initiatives and actions of key agents in any political system at any particular time to the nature of the political culture prevailing in a given polity”. I postulate that culture has a critical role to play as a check to the excesses in personified dispensation in East Africa that is still heavily rooted in traditional society. Culture can potentially infuse strong ethics in a society, help build trust, foster strong collaborative networks, and provide conflict resolution mechanisms.

For a while, governance studies that focused primarily on the efficiency and effectiveness of given arrangements had neglected implications of the various modes of governance for democracy. While the new modes of governance have the potential to increase participation and citizen involvement, and may enhance the problem-solving capacity of politics, critical questions remain. According to Immergut (2011:70), “the link between democratic theory and public policy begins with the conception of public policy as embodying the principle of ‘democratic governance’.” Immergut (2011:71) maintained that democratic theory comprises normative models that classify democratic choice according to the types of judgments they make about inputs and outputs to the democratic process. In the model, Immergut asserted that “…‘inputs’ are the demands and preferences of individuals and groups, while ‘outputs’ are the public policies produced. Political theories vary with regard to whether they apply substantive (institutionalist, etatist) or formal (neo-utilitarian, pluralist) standards to evaluate these inputs and outputs. We base a substantive standard on a transcendent value or norm, such as justice or equality of result. By contrast, we base a formal theory, on a procedural or immanent standard.” Congruently, Qian (Qian, 2012:193) argued that, “enhancing democratic governance is a holistic measure to prevent the executive-led system from degenerating into authoritarian rule and to boost legal system construction, laying a sound foundation for rule of law moving forward.” Qian (2012:186) maintained that “democratic governance through ‘consensus democracy’ and democratic politics requires, as a matter of course, the regulation, constraints and safeguard of the democratic system. Such democratic political system in practice is also dependent on a matching value system that encompasses tolerance of competing aspirations, cooperation and compromise.”

On the other hand, Edley Jr. (1991:582) argued that “legal theory must flow from, and integrate with a political ideology. This proposition is valid at three levels. First,
legal theory must have a related and embracing political ideology to find a welcoming climate of public and elite opinion for the theory's prescriptions at the level of doctrine and reform. Second, the companion ideology, or socio-political critique, provides the test of whether the prescriptions are sound. Third, the theory itself is likely incapable of generating concrete or useful prescriptions, and thus flawed, unless the theory is informed in an immediate sense by an ideology that can provide a direction and purpose to the abstract reasoning.” Similarly, Jones, Hesterly and Borgati (noted in Wilikilagi, 2009) contended that network governance involves a select, persistent and structured set of autonomous firms (as well as non-profit agencies) engaged in creating products or services. Jones et al. maintained that “the latter hinges on implicit and open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard exchanges wherein these contracts are not legally binding socially.”

In addition to the above, Turnbull (noted in Wilikilagi, 2009) defined “Network governance as following the architecture used by nature to construct and govern complex systems like living things based on decentralism, pluralism and associative relationships rather than centralism, a social monoculture that relies only on competitive relationships that dominate the existing form of capitalism.” In the same vein, Rhodes, March and Olsen (noted in 2016 IK Vienna School of Governance, 2016) argued that “network theories of governance include approaches that investigate patterns of interest intermediation and public-private cooperation in the making and implementation of public policies. Their common concern is on how actors and agencies come to form networks, what holds them together, what determines their choices and how they influence political decisions.” From a functional point of view, Dedeurwaerdere (2005:2) posited that “the aim of network governance is to create a synergy between different competences and sources of knowledge in order to deal with complex and interlinked problems. In this functional perspective, we accomplish governance through decentralized networks of private and public actors associated with international, national and regional institutions.” Dedeurwaerdere maintained that “from a theoretical point of view, profound ambiguity characterizes the concept of network governance.” Thus in this concept, Schout and Jordan (noted in Dedeurwaerdere, 2005:2) argued that “we can
distinguish between two models of network governance: one that focuses on networks as self-organizing systems and another that involves active steering."

However, I find the concept of network governance rather ambiguous; for instance, what drives or holds networks together in the theory? I argue that there has to be a common binding factor like culture or some sort of organic solidarity based on interdependence. I note that the absence of the binding factor among other aspects leads to the acquiescence of helpless citizens to personified regimes. In addition, when related to the theory of personification where individuals are central, we immediately note that the theory of network governance does not explain in detail the role of the individual leader in influencing network decisions. Conversely, Provan and Kenis (2008:231) argued that “although all networks comprise a range of interactions among participants, a focus on governance involves the use of institutions and structures of authority and collaboration to allocate resources and to coordinate and control joint action across the network as a whole.” I posit that the above assertion assumes that persons in authority are willing to share information or coordinate joint programmes. This argument does not consider national leaders who personify institutions and systems in order to aggrandise themselves at the expense of the citizenry. Similarly, if we focus on the “nodes” and “relations” that comprise the network (cf. Graddy & Chen; O’Toole & Meier, noted in Provan & Kenis, 2008:232), then we cannot ignore the actuality of national leaders with personified inclinations.

Of further significance to this study is the “ideal-typical, ‘network governance’” of Beate Kohler-Koch (noted in Falkner, 1999:8), which is “characterized by co-operation among all interested actors (instead of competition) and by joint learning processes.” According to Kohler-Koch (1999, noted in Falkner, 1999:8), “hierarchy and subordination yield to a trade-off based on equality that aims at solving problems jointly” in a manner that dissipates across the system. I aver that instead of the self-centred lobbying that many individuals pursue, the above scenario requires cooperation that is more transparent. I also note that, like other network governance theories, Beate’s argument assumed equality and cooperation over self-interest. To the contrary, in the theory of personification national leaders with personified inclinations will govern with egocentric tendencies. They usually subvert policies that advance cooperation and equality, in preference for repressive strategies.
According to Chattopadhyay (noted in Van Der Pijl, 2009:2), “the term ‘political economy’ applied ‘economy’ (‘house holding’, from the Greek oikos, manor or household, and nomos, laws/rules) to the ‘polity’, the state.” The above broad definition sets the stage for subsequent discussions on the subject of political economy. I present below a detailed analysis of “political economy and class conflict” from classical perspectives. Van Der Pijl (2009:1) asserted that “the core axiom of contemporary, ‘neoclassical’ economics is that all humans are by nature self-interested, utility-maximizing subjects.” The subject of human self-interest is significant for understanding how political economy correlates with the theory of personification where egotism plays a central role. According to Van Der Pijl (2009:2), classical thinkers, like Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), defined the economy as the field in which rationally self-interested individuals (a ‘natural’ given) entered into ‘barter, truck and exchange’ with each other (another natural trait). Consequently, the ‘invisible hand’ of the market reconciled their individual pursuits into a system of common well-being. Equally, in his *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817), David Ricardo (also referred to in Van Der Pijl, 2009:3) analysed the process of capitalist development in terms of a class conflict between landowners, capitalists and labour over the distribution of the wealth thus generated. Conversely, in *The Poverty of Philosophy* (1847), Karl Marx (as noted in Van Der Pijl, 2009:3) “challenged Ricardo’s interpretation of capitalism as a natural, final order of things. Additionally, Marx’s ‘Critique of Political Economy’ aimed to demonstrate that the capitalist economy was not an eternal, self-equilibrating system.”

Further to the above, in discussing the ‘political economy’, the liberal thinker John Stuart Mill (noted in Brink, 2013:234), reasoned that “representative democracy was the best form of government for societies with sufficient resources, security, and culture of self-reliance.” In particular, Mill contended that representative democracy is good when it best satisfies two criteria of all good government. First, Mill posits, is that government is good insofar as it promotes the common good like the moral, intellectual, and active traits of its citizens. Secondly, Mill maintained that “government is good insofar as it makes effective use of institutions and the resources of its citizens to promote the common good.”
I find it noteworthy that the above discourses by classical thinkers emphasise the centrality of the individual in the political economy. However, none of the theories explored in the preceding literature review explicitly expounds on how the dynamics of a political economy play out under personified dispensations. I argue that the problem with the classical thinkers is that they expound on things in society ‘as is,’ largely from observed perspectives. Conversely, the theory of personification goes deeper to link an individual’s formative stages in infancy to mature and conscious leadership actions later in life. I argue that personified actions ultimately affect the development and governance of any given economy. In effect, personification theory attempts to rationalise how the actions of given personalities take shape to enable them relate, self-regulate, and empathise with others.

According to Leslie (1876:265), “political economy is ‘the science which treats of the nature, the production and distribution of wealth. Political economy investigates the nature of wealth and the laws of its production and distribution; including directly or remotely, the operation of all the causes by which the causes by which the condition of mankind, or of any society of human beings is made prosperous or the reverse.” Similarly, Caporaso and Levine (1992:1) contended that “in its earliest period, political economy sought to advise the statesman on how he could best manage the economic affairs of the state so that the wants of the citizens would be met. The emergence of political economy brought with it a debate over responsibilities of the State (or statesmen) with regard to the economy.” Of contextual relevance in their theory, Caporaso and Levine (1992:44-6) asserted that the state serves as an instrument of forces emerging among individuals or classes. Contemplated through the lens of personified theory, this study argues that the “state centred approach to political economy”, which Caporaso and Levine (1992) postulated that, “constrains sound governance since it allows ‘individuals’ the latitude to influence State affairs.” Accordingly, I argue that under this system, national leaders can deviously use the State as an instrument of force to serve personal interests. Relatedly, Caporaso and Levine (1992) corroborated my line of argument in their assertion that “the aspirations of State leaders vary significantly from that of society they govern. Consequently, in any political discourses that ensue, State leaders resist pressures from private interests and translate their will into public policy.” The researcher points out that the theory of personification ably explains the above contention.
Kollmorgen provides compelling arguments for the theory of transformation to describe focal points and corresponding theoretical-methodological tools.

Kollmorgen (2010:3) argued that first, “societal transformations represent a social practice implying the liquefaction of the social. Thus, process analyses must be the central programmatic orientation. Secondly, focal point and theoretical-methodological tools include the centrality of actors and institutions as well as the attempts to control or steer the radical change of society.” According to Kollmorgen, the latter “depends on whether one accepts the politically projected character of societal transformations and the crucial role of macro- and mezzo-actors in (trans)forming formal actor-institution-complexes by borrowing or transferring from hegemonic "model"-societies and re-combining them with remnants of the old order. The third focal point and theoretical-methodological tool constitutes the complex dimensionality and contextuality of societal transformations.” Kollmorgen (2010:4) further argued that, the success of middle-range theories of transformation dealing with partial processes as the political transition or the economic transformation depends on explicit and intensive regard to the holistic or total character of the societal transformation as well as the specific contexts the concrete transformation takes place. The fourth aspect includes modes of transformation and transformation paths. The mode of transformation refers, on the one hand to the concrete national, international and world-societal contexts of the transformation. On the other hand, it implies the decisive factors and factor combinations propelling and controlling the (institutional) change (Kollmorgen, 2010:5).”

However, Wright (2010:200) posited that “the ultimate target for a ‘theory of transformation’ is the impetus to significantly extend and reinforce the context of social empowerment within economic structures in capitalist societies in order to advance unrestricted democratic paradigms.”

Even so, Wright (2010:200) maintained that, “significant movements towards real social empowerment is a threat to the interests of powerful actors who benefit most from capitalist structures and who can use their power to oppose such movements.” Under the theory of transformation, social empowerment is a threat to the interests of powerful actors, which is symptomatic of personified systems. This is because under personified dispositions, self-interested powerful national leaders usually use their
positions to constrain rather than empower the masses. On the other hand, Wright (2010:210) argued that “coercion is more effective when rarely used because most people comply with laws out of duty or self-interest.” The abovementioned statement by Wright that people comply with laws out of duty or self-interest complicates the hypothesis for this study. This is because national leaders and other citizens alike are all ‘self-interested’, as mooted by the theory of transformation. Similarly, Wright (2010:210) averred that “ideologies are more robust when they mesh with important aspects of material interest. Thus, in the despotic form of social reproduction, the primary mechanism of social reproduction is coercion, coupled with specific institutional rules that exercise coercion. [Despotic systems also] maintain social order largely through fear, and various forms of repression primarily block potential transformative challenges.”

In discussing the theory of transition, O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (noted in Grimm, 2013:5) postulated that “a transition represents an intermediate state between two more durable [entities] – an interval between one political regime and another.” In this respect, Grimm (2013:5) argued that “we see the transition process as moving on a continuum from autocracy at the one end to democracy at the other. Thus, we could evaluate transitions by their progress along such a linear trajectory and notions of ‘stability’ and ‘fragility’ that depict the odds of an emerging stable democratic regime.” Accordingly, “transitions that failed to establish Western-style liberal democratic orders were termed failed or defective, and their respective regime outcomes labelled ‘democracies with adjectives’” (Collier & Levitsky; Diamond; Mácków; Merkel & Croissant, as noted by Grimm, 2013:5). Heydeman (noted in Grimm, 2013:6) asserted that “autocratic regimes occasionally modify their modalities of rule and configurations of power.” When this happens, Diamond; Levitsky and Way; and Nonneman (as noted by Grimm, 2013:6) contended that “the autocratic regimes prove to be highly creative and reinvent themselves as quasi-democracies or electoral democracies embedding their authoritarian core into a formally pluralist and democratic cover structure.” Equally, O’Donnell and Schmitter (noted in Mainwaring, 1989:4) argued that “the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime delimits transitions on the one side, while on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative.” “Such reformative steps and partial
openings [serve] as a substitute for, rather than a step toward, democratization” (Ottaway & Choucair-Vizoso, noted in Grimm, 2013:6). Similarly, in his analysis of transitional effect, McElhinney (2012:3) asserted that “transition in democratic regime characteristics directly links to the development of human rights.” McElhinney (2012:5) also revealed that “the presence of democratic building blocks would encourage less repressive behaviour by the government and remove potential hindrances in the transition to a democratic system.”

In analysing the theory of transformation, this study found contextual relevance in Kollmorgen’s discussion of the centrality of actors and institutions in the control or steering of change in society. Two issues are pertinent in the foregoing statement: actors and institutions. This is because in the theory of personification national leaders play a key role in determining actions of institutions, thus influencing decisions that generally affect society. From the theory of transition, this study draws inspiration from Wright’s argument highlighting how real social empowerment is a threat to the interests of powerful actors who subsist on coercion. Again, I note a relatable argument with the theory of personification where leaders disempower society using coercive means in order to aggrandise themselves or maintain illicit hold on power. However, the theory of transition did not adequately cover the role of individuals in regime governance. Nonetheless, this study provides an answer by arguing that the extent of the personification of any given regime explains the likelihood of transitions to or from democracy. In other words, the political will of a national leader practising personification will determine the possibility of a regime transitioning to democracy. Finally, Diamond; Levitsky and Way; and Nonneman articulated how autocratic regimes can reinvent themselves as quasi-democracies or electoral democracies. In the theory of personification, leaders have mastered the ability to stage manage democratic practices to dupe citizens and the international community. These regimes also manipulate electoral processes to their favour.

3.2.4 Overview of empirical concepts on governance

This section now turns to explore empirical concepts of governance by analysing researched material on governance in order to understand what is going on in East Africa. During this analysis, I lay emphasis on unravelling features of personified governance, as well as describing of the status of personification in East Africa. This
research has explored numerous theories that have potentially useful empirical and disciplinary applications. From these concepts, I highlight the associations between variables that affect governance in the region from which I develop an empirically useful model that can be tested in analytical studies. I hope my analysis can establish a direct link between the theoretical construct in this thesis and practice in East Africa – the area of study (and possibly beyond). Where feasible, I draw on examples from case studies in order to focus my arguments. I hope that the empirical discussions in this segment will improve the empirical inquiry in this thesis by strengthening overall discussions on its theoretical foundations.

Complex outcomes of governance practices have generated significant interest in empirical research on the effectiveness of governance institutions and mechanisms. Lynn Jr., Heinrich and Hill (2001:11) advanced an approach based empirical research that attempts to address "big questions" on governance. Lynn Jr. et al. (2001) proposed "a framework for research premised on the notion that any particular governance arrangement relating to a policy domain, government activity, a particular jurisdiction, an organization or organizational field subsists in a wider social, fiscal political context." Lynn Jr. et al. (2001) maintained that, "investigators often model governance in a way that loosely connects to or even decouples from a wider context. Thus, too often, research designs do not incorporate the possibility that broader patterns of interrelationships affect outcomes. These shortcomings may ignore hierarchical organizational and management variables, or to some extent, system wide or institutional mandates and incentives." To this end, Lynn Jr. et al. (2001) proposed a governance logic that "highlights relationships between structure and action at various levels of the governmental process and the outcomes of performance of governmental activity." Accordingly, in the subsequent paragraphs in I explore the extent to which empirical models of governance compellingly connect to wider political contexts. This analysis will help this study conceptualise broader patterns of interrelationships that affect governance outcomes. As posited by Lynn Jr. et al. (2001) in their argument, this study corroborates the view that donor agencies and experts face challenges in measuring and assessing governance.

Illustratively, a position paper on Aid, Governance and Fragility (UNU-WIDER, 2014:29) posited that "donors purport to design and implement 'measurable' evidence-based policies on governance reform. They justify their focus on good
governance partly because of evidence that better governance promotes economic development.” In echoing the latter, the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, (cited in Gisselquist 2012:1) noted that “good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.” However, I argue that many donors and governance experts prescribe concepts that are not responsive to local political realities, leadership characteristics, and citizen preferences. Gisselquist (2012:14) contended that “Rwanda provides an illustration of some of the challenges faced by donors and experts in defining good governance. Many observers note that Rwanda has made clear progress in terms of economic growth, public sector management, and regulatory reform since the end of genocide in 1994.” “This trend continued through 2010, but there were numerous violations of civil and political rights, and the government failed to fulfil its professed commitment to democracy” (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2011). Should we consider Rwanda well governed because of its economic progress, or poorly governed because of its democratic deficits? Below, I discuss the above paradoxical question in light of the theory of personification. The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), for instance, has been the largest bilateral donor in Rwanda, “effectively arguing that Rwanda is well governed.” Human Rights Watch, among others, “sharply criticized DFID policy in 2011, effectively acknowledging the democratic deficits” (Gisselquist 2012:14). As discussed above, the varied interpretations of good governance renders it challenging to measure, and then use the ensuing outcomes to inform national policy processes. In addition, autocratic leaders exploit disparities in the definitions of good governance to rationalise their actions because any ambiguous definitions can suffice without contest.

Conceptually, Rothstein (noted in Cubitt, 2014:4) contended that “good governance can mean social trust, security, hope and well-being, for example, which are essential for the buy-in of local people to any development project, yet there are currently no alternative normative political theories that connect these concepts, and others, to the search for good governance in Africa.” The statement by Rothstein, that “no distinct normative political theories draw cogent connections between concepts of governance”, is contextually similar to the assertion by Lynn Jr. et al. (2001) that “governance models do not account for the likelihood of broader patterns of interrelationships that affect outcomes.” I argue that these assertions pose
technical challenges with rational analysis of the empirical concepts of governance. The issue is that both scholars are challenging the scientific integrity or rigorous testability of the models. In consonance, Gisselquist (2012:21) highlighted “the problem of conceptual clarity when it comes to ‘good governance’ and why this is problematic for the practical outcomes that development institutions and the like are trying to achieve.” Accordingly, Gisselquist (2012:18) maintained that, “without explicit measures, donors [and experts], cannot rigorously test empirical hypotheses on how political and economic institutions change, much less develop evidence-based strategies about how to positively influence this change.” I note that the lack of evaluation approaches, based on evidence, can affect the capacity to assess the logically fundamental correlation between governance and development outcomes.

Further to the above, this section highlights the critical factors that affect the empirical conceptualisation of good governance. According to Streick and Schmitter (noted in Treib et al., 2005:5), empirically, “only hybrid forms [of governance exist] since one mode of governance always entails elements of other modes of governance. Otherwise, effective steering and co-ordination would not be possible, e.g., markets have to rely on a hierarchical authority in order to ensure adherence to contracts.” Likewise, Treib et al. (2005:9) maintained that “empirically, no mode of governance includes either only public or only private actors. We can only state that a certain type of actor is predominant. Similarly, empirical evidence suggests that weak or limited statehood does not automatically translate into weak governance.” In congruence with the above, Risse and Lehmkuhl; and Risse (as noted by Börzel & Risse, 2010:120) contended that “the concept of ‘governance without a state’ appears to be an empirical reality in many parts of the world.” Börzel and Risse (2010:120) provided extreme examples like failed states and war-torn societies. According to Börzel and Risse, “for the past fifteen years or more, Somalia has not enjoyed functioning statehood. Yet parts of the country, like the northern province of Somaliland, have been well governed throughout this period with rather low levels of violence.” Chojnacki and Branovic (2010, noted in Börzel & Risse, 2010:120) noted that “under specific circumstances, even warlords sometimes provide security as a public rather than a private good under specific circumstances”. “Likewise, multinational companies’ police local communities, voluntarily protect the environment, provide HIV/AIDS-related services, or agree to use sustainable energy”
Moreover, Risse (2010:3) argued that “limited sovereignty [or statehood] does not represent the end of governance. Rather, various combinations of state and non-state actors provide rule-making, collective goods and services using predominantly non-hierarchical modes of steering.”

Using empirical concepts, the above paragraph highlights the multifaceted dimensions of governance that in themselves pose conceptual challenges with measurement. This is especially true where arguments by Koechlin and Förster (2014) and Börzel & Risse (2010) challenge the assumption that “governance only exists where there is a government or some other authority.” According to Koechlin and Förster (2014), “this dialectical relationship necessitates a novel approach to governance that does not build on the usual presumptions that originate in the Western historical experience of a functioning State.” “It is also understandable that leaders as well as citizens in these countries view calls for ‘good governance’ as a cover for extending Western influence in the global arena” (Hydén & Court, 2002:23).

On the other hand, Risse (2010:2) asserted that “emphasizing governance rather than statehood then allows us to ask who is providing which rules structures and which public services under these conditions.” Accordingly, I aver that the theory of personification provides a framework to disentangle conceptual confusion surrounding the subject of governance. In essence, the theory of personification points to the ‘leader’ as constituting the most important factor that determines a particular course of governance.

Therefore, rather than focus on institutional structures that are merely instruments of governance, this study contends that it is imperative to focus on the national leader who drives the governance process. Furthermore, I argue that this concept of ‘personified leader-driven governance’ is critically significant because of the fluidity of the term ‘governance’. Risse’s (2010) assertion that “areas of limited statehood can be parts of a territory or policy area” corroborates my argument. “This conceptualization implies that even fully consolidated states might contain areas of limited statehood in which they do not enjoy domestic sovereignty, at least temporarily” (Risse, 2010:2). The theory of personification presents an unambiguous example of ‘limited statehood’ since governance under such dispensations is discretionary rather than purposeful. In essence, a State under personified
governance will most likely have isolated pockets of functioning systems that subscribe to democratic ideals.

3.2.5 Relating leadership styles to governance

This section examines leadership styles in relation to governance and development. The East African region has experienced serious challenges with distinctive national governance styles that have ultimately affected development outcomes. Although there have been atypical cases of good governance, these seem to have arisen by accident rather than by replicable design. The researcher contends that the end result of any governance action is usually traceable to a leadership style.

The OECD (2001) maintained that “‘leadership’ is at the heart of good governance and it plays a critical role in influencing national institutions.” In corroboration of the foregoing statement, Craig (2005) quoting Rev. Charles Stith, former U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania, “postulated that Sir Ketumile Masire, former President of Botswana, is the personification of good governance.” Craig argued that “Masire’s exemplary record as President and his experience in regional conflict resolution made him one of the most respected leaders on the continent of Africa.” According to Chikerema, Sithole, Chakunda and Kudzai (2012:67), “the type of leadership in a country and/or continent determines good governance and democracy.” Chikerema et al. maintain that leadership in Africa has struggled to promote pro-people policies that accommodate the needs of the populace. Similarly, Chikerema et al. (2012:67) contended that “African states and their leaders have exploited and monopolized internal sovereignty to mean absolute power, personalization of state-like services.” I argue that it is apparent that as an individual competency, leadership plays a critical role in shaping the direction and context of governance. It is the vision and disposition of the individual that determines leadership style. However, it is often difficult to discern how the leader’s action influences a system because intricate governance structures subsume these actions. The latter makes it challenging to diagnose personified leadership styles to address its related intricacies.

Nzongola-Ntalaja (noted in Onolememen, 2015:3) identified “three main types of governance namely political or public governance, economic governance, and social governance. The three types of governance are inseparable and interrelated.”
Conversely, Hydén and Court (2002:11) contended that “governance has three legs: economic, political and administrative. Economic governance includes decision-making processes that affect a country’s economic activities and its relationship with other economies. Political governance involves the formulation of policy, while administrative governance is the system of policy implementation.” However, I argue that all these types of governance require good leadership, despite the fact that they are pivotal to successful statecraft. Without good leadership, one or all of the three ‘legs’ of governance will inevitably suffer. Accordingly, the subsequent paragraphs will explore what drives governance styles in East Africa.

According to Fuertes (2012:241), “in a new mode of governance inspired by partnership working, the beneficiaries and other stakeholders may have a greater involvement in the development and implementation of national policies or programs.” However, the latter requires a governance style that encourages broad multilevel citizen participation to achieve sustainable development. A study conducted by Lameira and Ness (2010:4) “revealed a positive relationship between levels of governance and economic development.” Lameira and Ness maintained that “further evidences of the relationship between the level of governance and outcomes of development are observed in the works of other scholars” (e.g. Kaufmann & Kray; Kaufmann; & La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer).

3.2.5.1 Holistic leadership and governance

From an environmental perspective, Orlov (2003:1) asserted that “‘holistic leadership’ denotes the ability to lead from the mind, the heart and the soul. It entails the application of a methodology that encompasses a developmental systemic approach in order to impact oneself as leader, others as followers, and the environment; and journey towards transformation at individual, team and organizational/community levels.” Orlov’s holistic leadership model is quite analogous to behavioural aspects in the theory of personification, particularly the role of personality and transformation of the individual. The distinctive difference between the two models is that personification theory focuses more on the aggrandising the leader, while Orlov’s model focused on how the leader and the led interact with the environment. Theoretically, Orlov’s model presented a holistic approach to development and governance, with a delicate balance orchestrated between humans
and the environment. However, of specific significance for this study, is Tice (noted in Best, 2012:7), who “describes holistic leadership as a people-centred approach that is both process and outcome oriented.” It is immediately apparent that Tice’s model runs contrary to the theory of personification, which is more egocentric than people-centred. The researcher contends that a people-centred approach is more likely to lead to equitable distribution of resources, participatory decision-making, and ultimately, the development of human potentials. This study maintains that for the latter to materialise, an altruistic leader must drive the development and governance system. However, the fact that Tice’s model is process and outcome oriented renders it useful for understanding individuals from multiple perspectives, rather than categorizing persons using dominant or skewed perceptions.

Similarly, Taggart (2011:26) described “an integrated approach to leadership with the individual at the core.” In Taggart’s model, “the individual represents a person who has attained a high level of comfort and competency with the four principal leadership components: teaching, directing, participating and nurturing.” Other enabling elements, discussed below, support each of the four components. According to Taggart (2011:28), “teaching as a holistic leader, comprises five enabling elements: reflection and inquiry, openness, sharing, stewardship and personal mastery. Directing encompasses five enabling elements: vision, strategic, urgency, mobilize and results. The enabling elements for participatory aspect of holistic leadership include power sharing, inclusion, enrolling/aligning, collaboration and commitment. Finally, the five tightly interwoven enabling elements for embracing a nurturing mind-set, whether one is male or female, include empathy, communication, diversity, bonds and wellness.” In essence, Taggart’s model “assumes the ‘centred’ individual has achieved balance, which does not mean using the four components in equal measures. Instead, the ‘centred’ individual is able to alter their leadership behaviour seamlessly to meet the needs of followers.” However, Shelly (2015:33) raised an important factor in that “the leader needs to understand their emotions clearly in order to alter their behaviours to meet the needs of their followers.” This is “because leadership is inherently social and emotional” (Goleman, Boyatzis & MacKee, noted in Shelly, 2015:33). Equally, “leaders have the ability to influence the feelings of their follower because their emotions are contagious” (Ashkamasay & Dasborough, noted in Shelly, 2015:192). In the above
respect, we can comfortably assume that the outcome of any given leader’s influence potentially affects their followers (Walter, Cole & Humphrey, noted in Shelly, 2015:192). Goleman and Walter’s assertion corroborates the line of argument mooted by this study that the behavioural attributes of a leader ultimately shape their actions. However, this study goes further beyond their arguments to assert that the cognitive aspects, including the degree of childhood animism and surrounding environment factors, work in concert to shape a leader’s actions.

From a sociological perspective, Dahlbäck (noted in Allwood, 1973:3) asserted that “the discussion on individual-holism problem has been in existence since the advent of this science. We can find an early example of holism, in Adam Smith’s ‘The wealth of nations.’ Smith wrote on the division of labour, and by means of the example of a pin factory, he brought out one of the most important tenets of sociological holism. Equally, Smith posited that when people pool their efforts together, they manage to significantly yield much more rather than working individually. Holists, then, hold that something new and interesting happens when individuals combine and start to interact with each other. So called social wholes emerge, these social wholes are just as real as the individuals that make up the social wholes. However, most importantly they have properties that are different and distinct from the properties of the individuals that make up the social whole.” Likewise, Emile Durkheim “developed a concept of holism that opposed the notion that a society was nothing more than a simple collection of individuals” (New World Encyclopaedia, 2014). Recently, anthropologist Louis Dumont “contrasted ‘holism’ to ‘individualism’ as two different forms of societies. According to him, modern humans live in an individualist society, whereas ancient Greek society, for example, could be qualified as ‘holistic,’ because the individual found identity in the whole society. Thus, the individual was ready to sacrifice himself or herself for his or her community, as his or her life without the polis had no sense whatsoever” (New World Encyclopaedia, 2014).

With respect to the above, I argue that individual-level factors should also ideally explain societal phenomena. I also argue that such individual-level factors ultimately shape societal trajectories, when aggregated together. This study contends that we can trace many societal phenomena to the individual level in a clear and strict way. However, when we study personified leadership we need to analyse individual influences more holistically in order to contextualize it in the complexity of societies.
Conversely, “the systems thinking perspective asserted that managers face ever-increasing complexity (Jackson, 2006:647).” Similarly, the managers also faced change and diversity, and yet the solutions they have at their disposal to cope with these issues are inadequate. In essence, Jackson (2006:649) contended that systems’ thinking is holistic rather than reductionist. Thus, Jackson maintained that the notion of holism itself, and the concepts associated with it, provide for ‘systems thinking.’ Of particular significance to this study, Jackson argues that managers are not holistic enough because they concentrate on the parts of the organization rather than the whole. In doing so, they miss the crucial interactions between the parts. Accordingly, managers and leaders need to espouse systems thinking that is holistic rather than reductionist and, at least in the form of critical systems thinking, that does everything possible to encourage creativity. Equally, Jackson (2006:654) posited that “creative holism suggests that we must consider the perspectives of four paradigms—functionalist, interpretive, emancipatory and postmodern. It provides ‘generic methodologies’, representing each of the four paradigms. One advantage of creative holism is that it provides explicit theoretical link back to the paradigms. This allows us to operationalise better and more obviously, the hypotheses of particular paradigms and to test these in real-world interventions.” Midgley (noted in Jackson, 2006:654) added that “creative holism also encourages the maximum possible flexibility to ‘decompose’ existing methodologies.” In addition, “it also enables the systems practitioner access to the full range of methods to use in combination, as they deem appropriate, in support of the generic systems methodologies” (Jackson, 2006:654).

3.2.5.2 Personified leadership and governance

This study has extensively covered discussions on personified leadership and governance in other sections of this thesis. However, to ensure a logical flow as well as the theoretical and empirical integrity of this chapter, I briefly explore relationships between personified leadership and governance in subsequent discussions. This analysis will enable the reader to form an independent opinion on the hypothesis that there is a correlation between personified leadership and governance.

Winter and colleagues (Winter; and Winter & Stewart, noted in Magee & Langner, 2008:1548) have argued that “an egoistic, at times antisocial, desire for power and
influence is separable from a concern with avoiding the depraved aspects of power and instead wanting to use influence for others’ benefit.” Similarly, McClelland and Wilsnack (noted in Magee & Langner, 2008:1548) “have found that one can desire to have influence over others either for self-serving, ‘personalized,’ reasons, or for other-serving, ‘socialized,’ reasons.” The above arguments bring to the fore potentially conflicting dynamics that leaders face in administering governance – whether to serve the self or others. Under personified dispensations, the default action for the leader is to serve self above others. However, where serving others is in the leader’s interest, then they impassively pursue that course, as I explain below.

“In [some] regimes, the distribution of de facto power allows favouritism. Thus, rulers can target effectively to create political support. In this respect, ‘patrimonialism’, also called ‘neo-patrimonialism’, ‘personal rule’ or more simply ‘clientelism’, is a style of governance where politicians control power through a system of personal relationships where policies/favours are distributed in exchange for political support” (Claes & Knutsen, 2011:167). Similarly, Weber (1947) “coined the phrase patrimonialism to describe situations where the administrative apparatus is appointed by and responsible to the top leader.” Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) asserted that “deputies to the rulers’ receive delegated jurisdiction over certain domains, and they also receive a wide leeway pertaining to how to act.” These measures are mostly informal or off the record. On the other hand, Bratton and van de Walle in (noted in Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002), argued that “neopatrimonialism signifies an administrative system where the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions.” However, Claes and Knutsen (2011:167) noted that “there are several reasons that this is disastrous for economic policy and performance and they hinge mostly on how the exchange is structured in order to maximize the control and bargaining power of those running such regimes.” Equally, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002:1) argued that “in many cases, informal systems of clientelism and patrimonialism contribute significantly to stifling popular participation, subverting the rule of law, fostering corruption, distorting the delivery of public services, discouraging investment and undermining economic progress.” In terms of costs and benefits, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) cited “five economic and social phenomena associated with clientelism and patrimonialism, that is, rent-
seeking activity, public corruption, interrupted and weak implementation, ethnic politics, and the perpetuation of poverty and social exclusion.”

The discussion by Winter and colleagues linking egoism with a desire for power and influence is very analogous to the theory of personification that centres on egoistic leaders. The foregoing argument corresponds to McClelland and Wilsnack who go a notch deeper to link inconsiderate influence over others with self-serving or personalized inclinations. I argue that we can directly correlate the foregoing statement with self-centred leadership actions under personified governance. Regarding other significant areas of interest from the above literature, I assert that in extreme cases, patrimonialism is a variant of personification. They share a similarity in that, under both regimes, a small number of selected people profiteer at the expense of other citizens. For example, the assertion by proponents of patrimonialism that under personal rule politicians govern through individualised relationships is also very characteristic of personified governance. Such dispensations usually affect policymaking, especially development projects, by squandering national resources on frivolous expenses aimed at sustaining personal relationships. In fact, personified leaders running such regimes prefer to preside over dysfunctional institutions operated through favouritism rendering them too weak to erode their power bases. As posited by Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002), “clientelism and patrimonialism impede democracy and development by limiting political participation or creating economic stagnation.”

3.2.5.3 Egocentric versus citizen-centric governance

I now approach discussions in this section rationalistically, drawing on well-balanced case studies of egocentric and citizen-centric governance across East Africa. I argue that this study can best illustrate any form of “centrism” as comparative literature rather than an absolute narrative. This approach will enable the researcher to explore literature across boundaries of unique East African nations and cultures, and to enable logical juxtaposition with historical, political and social realisms in this region. Thus, the structure of this section will enable the researcher to combine the extensiveness of scholarship with ample attention to detail, without overlooking ideological constructs inherent in distinctive polities. I will conclude section 3.2.5 with an overall discussion that knots together empirical similarities identified throughout
the literature or points out of the divergences threading through the various paragraphs in this chapter.

In order to enhance comprehension of the meaning of citizen-centric governance in light of this study, I explore existing literature on the subject to give focus to this analysis. Subsequently, I link theoretical constructs on citizen-centric governance to empirical cases in East Africa, with specific focus on egocentrism. To contextualise subsequent arguments, this study draws inspiration from the definition of governance by Shah and Ivanyna (2010:4), who defined governance “as an exercise of authority and control to preserve and protect public interest and enhance the quality of life enjoyed by citizens.” Of significance to this study, this definition encompasses both the governance environment (quality of institutions and processes) and governance outcomes. Thus, Shah and Ivanyna maintained that a citizen-centric framework for measuring governance quality is based on four dimensions: responsiveness, fairness, responsibility and accountability. On the other hand, Stoker (1998) asserted that citizen-centric engagement is more compatible, by contrast, to the developmental model of democracy. I argue that the occurrence of strong foundations of responsiveness, fairness, responsibility and accountability in any political system can be a formidable check on personified governance.

Despite its significance, citizen-centric or people-centred governance is a subject that has been largely unexplored. The paltriness of the literature in this field reflects the challenges associated with the subject. However, experts have made credible attempts to define citizen-centric or people-centred governance. Unambiguously, the concept of people-centred governance has grown to surpass the conventional concept of ‘good’ governance. Yates (2005) contended that “contrary to the notion of good governance, people-centred governance has a bias and responsiveness to the poor and marginalized [community].” Equally, Yates (2005) maintained that people-centred governance offers a decent floor of social protection, insurance and income [to citizens]. Yates (2005) outlined eight policies to promote people-centred governance, which are “participation, accountability, decentralization, freedom of and access to information, legally enforceable obligations, access to justice, national cooperation and coordination, and international cooperation and coordination.” In empirical contexts, subsequent paragraphs will highlight the point that most East
African countries barely meet the parameters of citizen-centred governance as propounded by Yates.

Going one notch deeper, Shah (2007) posited that “citizen-centred local governance; that is, reforming institutions at local governance level requires agreement on basic principles.” According to Shah (2007:184), “these legal and institutional frameworks include both direct and indirect facilitative mechanisms (such as laws on participatory budgeting and independent media). The emphasis, however, is on direct provisions, principally those concerned with participation in and oversight of local representative government (legislative functions) and those concerned with bureaucratic transparency and accountability at all levels of government (executive functions).” Shah advanced three basic principles on citizen-centred governance. ‘Accountable governance’ that ensures accountability is not only restricted to public governance; it is a basic principle of regulation and expectation in all social relations. Private sector, non-profit, and civic organizations must all be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders (Shah, 2007:61). Under ‘responsible governance,’ public agencies are also responsible for democratic processes and responsiveness to citizens (Shah, 2007:92), as well as ensuring government manages its fiscal resources prudently (Shah, 2007:117). “Finally, ‘responsive governance’, is a situation where citizen empowerment assumes critical importance in combating corruption, because it may have a significant impact on the incentives faced by public officials to be responsive to public interest (Shah, 2007:242).”

From the above discussions, I agree with Yates that by taking into consideration poor and marginalized persons, people-centred governance is a democratically inclusive approach. I also agree with Yates that this model of governance enhances welfare and protection rather than exploitation and exposure associated with personified dispensation. Turning to Shah’s narrative, I note that he touches on the need to reform institutions at local governance level that I deem would benefit most East African countries that practice decentralisation. I pick particular interest in Shah’s arguments because most East African national institutions have become personified and are therefore not transparent, independent and accountable to the citizens. Having scrutinised the concept of citizen-centred governance, in the next section I discuss the concept of development and the factors that advance or impede development. Thus, in the subsequent paragraphs, I discuss to what extent
governments are being responsive and accountable to development needs of its citizens. This analysis will enable the reader to comprehend and make subjective deductions on how personified governance affects development.

3.3 Development

Hydén and Court (2002:2) posited that “since the international community adapted the concept of development for use in the late 1940s and early 1950s, development has always been a moving target, thus constantly generating demands for new approaches.” To this end, Hydén and Court maintained that “it is possible to identify at least four distinct ways by which the international community has tried to make operational a sense of development. The initial manner goes all the way back to the days of the Marshall Plan, the first major transfer of public capital to enhance the pace of international development.” “In the perspective of these economists, development in the emerging states (also known as the Third World), was best achieved through transfers of capital and technical expertise” (Rapley, noted in Hydén & Court, 2002:2). Hydén and Court (2002:3) argued that “in this first phase of development thinking that lasted into the late 1960s, the project level where Government and other public institutions played a pivotal role was the most important component. Development, then, was a top-down exercise by public agencies for the people. The second phase began in the late 1960s, when analysts and practitioners begun to recognize that a singular focus on projects in the context of national plans was inadequate. For instance, the assumption that development would ‘trickle down’ from the well-endowed to the poor, thus generating ripple effects, was a mistake. Similarly, projects were inevitably ‘enclave’ types of intervention with little or no positive externalities. Convinced to do something else to reduce global poverty; the international community decided that a sectoral approach would be more effective. In operational terms, this means substituting program in place of project as the principal concern. Two important things emerged in this second phase, the design of integrated programs to address a whole range of human needs, and the emphasis on developing human capital.”

Further to that above, Hydén and Court (2002:4) contended that “at the end of the 1970s, there was another shift, after it became apparent especially in sub-Saharan Africa, that the state lacked the technical capacity to administer the heavy
development burden placed on their shoulders. Accordingly, analysts shifted their strategic focus to the level of policy. They maintained that the World Bank took the lead on these reforms that culminated in the development of a principal guide for structural adjustment in Africa in the 1980s. The International Monetary Fund complemented these reforms by imposing the parallel financial stabilization measures. The highlight of this era was the entrance of NGOs to step in where government had failed to offer services to the people.” According to Hydén and Court (2002:5), “in the 1990s there was the recognition that development is not only about projects, programs and policies, but also about politics.” They posited that “[experts] recognized that ‘getting politics right’ is, if not a precondition, at least a requisite of development, especially in developing countries. The latter implied that actions taken by the international community challenged and undermined conventional notions of state sovereignty. Underlying this shift toward creating a politically enabling environment is the assumption that development is the product of what people decide to do to improve their livelihoods.”

Barder (2012) contended that “Amartya Sen, the Nobel prize-winning economist has twice changed our understanding of development.” Barder maintained that traditional welfare economics had focused on incomes as the main measure of well-being until Sen’s ground breaking work in the 1980s, which showed that that poverty involved a wider range of deprivations in health, education and living standards, which were not captured by income alone. According to Barder, Sen’s ‘capabilities approach’ led to the introduction of the UN Human Development Index and subsequently the Multidimensional Poverty Index, both of which aim to measure development in this broader sense. Then, in 1999 Sen moved the goalposts again with his argument that freedoms constitute not only the means but also the ends of development. Barder posited that Sen’s view that “we must judge development by its impact on people, not only by changes in their income but more generally, in terms of their choices, capabilities and freedoms” is now widely accepted. To this end, Barder argued that “we should be concerned about the distribution of these improvements, not just the simple average for a society.” Drawing on Sen’s perspectives on deprivation-induced poverty and the need to distribute benefits equitably, I draw an analogy for actions of a national leader with personified inclinations. In this comparison, I note that personified dispensations wilfully deprive citizens of their entitlements in order to
impose poverty and ultimately induce dependency. The leader usually amasses, rather than distributes, benefits to the citizens, creating artificial shortages and income inequality.

As an alternative, this study argues that development is not a function of well-being alone, but also includes other influencers that shape its trajectory. Illustratively, Seers (1969:1) argued that “it is very slipshod to compare development with economic development, and economic development with economic growth.” Seers (1969:5) maintained that “in order to understand a country’s development, we should ask the question: what is the status of poverty, unemployment and inequality. If all the three factors have declined from high levels, then this equates to development.” Likewise, Seers (1969:5) argued that “the fulfilment of human potential would complete the balance of development.” Seers reasons that “these factors include adequate educational levels, freedom of speech, and independence of the citizens of a nation that is truly independent both economically and politically.” This study agrees with Seers’ holistic perspectives that development can actually improve the welfare of citizens. Of the three factors Seers lists as affecting development, this study agrees that poverty and inequality are significant. In consonance with the latter, Singh (2002:38) contended that “we need to change directions of development from only working to achieve knowledge and efficiency, to achieving wisdom that leads towards effectiveness.” Singh (2002:38) believed that “managing transformation, developing transformational leaders and focusing on human capital are the keys to success.” He further posited that “the ultimate end of the civilized society should be human development through sustainable development.”

On the subject of human development, Sen (noted in Kabumba, 2005:11) postulates that “it entails expanding the choices for all people in society.” Sen sees development as “a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy.” Essentially, Sen views “the expansion of freedom as both the primary end and the principal means of development.” Similarly, Singh (2002:31) “described the term human development as a systems framework focusing all issues in society. From the perspective of people, these values are economic growth, trade, employment, political freedom or cultural values. It focused on enlarging human choices that in principle are infinite and can change over time.” Singh maintained that “the three essential ingredients of the choices should enable people to lead a long and healthy
life, acquire knowledge and wisdom, and access requisite resources vital for a decent standard of living." The UNDP asserted that "leadership capacity, from a human development lens connotes the capacity of human beings to collectively generate required decisions, actions and behavioural and/or role changes necessary for the pursuit of a shared goal." The perspective of the UNDP (2006:5) relates Sen’s and Singh’s points of view. This perspective refers to the “group’s capacity to generate leadership initiatives and exercise influence over its authorized leaders.”

Analogously, Harish (2015:88) argued that “transformational leaders have such an integrated view of every issue and situation, and can usher in a new paradigm of human development that ensures peace, security and well-being for all.” Accordingly, this study points out that we can trace the promotion of exclusionist policies by a national leader to influences in the cognitive development stages. I draw on Bierman’s (2003) arguments “highlighting that most children rejected by their peers, among other factors, display low rates of prosocial behaviour and high rates of aggressive or disruptive behaviour.” In line with the reasoning of this thesis, the external influence that shapes that development of a child who eventually becomes a national leader frequently correlates with the degree of national development that the subject leader advances. In other words, this study argues that a national leader, who has led a deprived childhood life, presents with a higher likelihood of advancing personified exclusionary development policies in the economic, social, cultural and political domains.

In light of the above discussions, what then is development? Hornby (noted in Orga, 2017:94) defined “development as the gradual growth of something so that it becomes more advanced and stronger.” Similarly, Abianga (noted in Orga, 2017:94) defined “development as the act or process of growth, progress and improvement within a physical setting.” On the other hand, Todaro and Smith (noted in Kabumba, 2005:11) defined “development as the process of improving the quality of all human lives.” They refer to three important aspects of development: raising people’s living levels – their incomes and consumption levels of food, medical services, education, etc. Todaro and Smith contended that we achieve these aspects of development will be through relevant economic growth processes; thus creating conditions conducive to the growth of people’s self-esteem. Todaro and Smith maintained that “we can achieve self-esteem through the establishment of social and economic systems and
institutions that promote human dignity and respect; and increase people’s freedom by enlarging the range of their choice variables, as by increasing varieties of consumer goods and services.” According to Meisel and Aoudia (2008), “development is basically, a process of institutional change. It is a result of the combined effects of numerous economic, democratic, political and social factors. It involves, by definition, a far-reaching transformation of human groups’ social regulation systems. Institutional change takes place over a timescale that is neither that of the immediate economic situation nor that of long, historical periods.”

I note that the common thread running through the above literature is the focus on enlarging human choices, while equally examining the phenomenon of development from multiple perspectives. These arguments highlight the fact that development should be free, inclusive and comprehensive. I argue that the concept of freedom and inclusivity is deficient in personified regimes that deliberately thrive on deliberate social exclusion. That is why human development is rather constrained under personified regimes.

3.3.1 Linking governance and development

According to Rodrik and Rosenzweig (2010:4608), “the adoption of institutions and policies that create incentives for its citizens to save, invest and innovate causes development in society. Though institutions secure property rights create huge potential Pareto improvements in society, in general, growth-enhancing institutions have important distributional effects.” Rodrik and Rosenzweig (2010:4601) maintained that “while there is evidence that a ‘cluster of institutions’ does have a causal effect on economic development and it is plausible that governance is connected to this, as yet governance has not been unbundled so we do not have definitive evidence for the importance of governance.” However, Spence and Brady (2010:144) contended that “experts have demonstrated that democracy is not necessarily associated with better development outcomes and yet some dictatorships are developmental. However, we do not understand yet why some dictatorships are more developmental than others are; for instance, Sub-Saharan Africa has never had a developmental dictatorship.” Spence and Brady’s statement on the lack of developmental dictatorship in sub-Saharan Africa is very pertinent for this study. The latter accurately depicts the East African region in sub-Sahara Africa,
which has considerable resource endowments but is still lagging in development indices. Of seven African economic community blocks analysed in the *CIA World Factbook* (2005), the EAC had the lowest GDP purchasing power parity. This study argues that the low level of development in the EAC is attributable to poor governance caused by personified regimes.

The work of Daniel Kaufmann (noted in Grindle, 2007:4), ‘*on the impact of corruption on growth*’, notably reasoned that the link between governance and development is more than correlational, rather, it is causal since good governance makes development possible.” Likewise, The World Bank (noted in Grindle, 2007:4) reviewed 40 different studies and concluded that “there is overwhelming evidence that good governance is crucial for successful development, as measured by high per capita income.” The World Bank maintained that “per capita income is a strong predictor of poverty rates, infant mortality and illiteracy, suggesting that good governance improves the well-being of the poor.” However, this study contends that although ‘good governance’ is essentially necessary, it is not singularly sufficient to advance development. To the contrary, competent leadership is antecedent to good governance, which in turn advances sustainable development. Other scholars have also questioned the term ‘governance’ on its own is sufficient to describe development without including a suffix like ‘good’. For instance, Rodrik and Rosenzweig (2010:4601) argued that, “the proponents of ‘governance’ have not yet made a strong case that there is something called ‘governance’ which is conceptually distinct and which is causally related to development.”

The foregoing assertion helps rationalise why the theory of personification is relevant for the study of governance. The researcher contends that this study looks at the national leaders who drive the governance process, an outcome of an action, rather than focuses on the action itself. In other words, governance is a conduit that channels leadership action to implement development.

However, Kabumba (2005:2) contended that “we should pursue development before paying attention to good governance.” Although experts see a relationship between the two phenomena, they emphasise good governance, which forms the basis of, and accompanies, sustainable development. To the contrary, this study argues that the persona of the leader is even more critical for development than good
governance is. I point out that the pursuit of development per se, or even governance, is not sufficient alone to transform a country. National leadership actions need to drive both agendas in order to combine the different strands of governance and development to achieve sustainable growth in the country. In essence, the ideal national leader should respect and follow the provisions of their constitutions, and cultivate a culture of constitutionalism, democracy and good governance. Once we lay down this foundation, then sustainable development will follow.

### 3.3.2 Holistic national development

In this section, the study links holistic leadership to holistic national development. According to Jackson (2006:650), “holism, an approach to gaining understanding, has at least been around for as long as reductionism.” Jackson maintained that the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, for example, reasoned that “the parts of the body only make sense in terms of the way they function to support the whole organism, and used this biological analogy to consider how individuals need to relate to the State.” I concur that the concept of holism has been around for long. Inherent in its proponents’ lines of reasoning is the point that, since the advent of time, man has been trying to harness synergies of their ‘wholeness’ and ‘interdependence’ to achieve certain objectives. I posit that Aristotle, an empiricist, makes the strongest case for holistic national development in his assertion that ‘the whole is more than the sum of its parts.’ However, personification – the subject of this study – is a more antagonistic form of sociality that thrives on competitive pursuit of self-interest and predation. Accordingly, its relevance for holistic development is questionable.

Like Aristotle, I aver that holistic leadership is not only about the leader, but also about those subject to the leader. It is about how the entire state system functions in relation to the individuals who constitute it. Furthermore, the crucial attributes of the holistic leader draw on their inner and outer resources, as well as social and political environment, to achieve a position of leadership over a body of individuals. Because holistic leadership universally incorporates what leaders need to do, how they need to do what is required, and who the leader is or influences, this study will explore in subsequent paragraphs the relationship between holistic leadership and holistic national development. Since all the parts of a national system essentially interrelate,
we need to understand the whole system in order to know how a particular leadership intervention, designed to improve it, might actually improve it or not. Similarly, it is critical to understand how the centralities of the individual under holistic leadership and personified leadership correlate with holistic development. Although both leadership styles centre on the individual, their behavioural trajectories are divergent. Fundamentally, holistic leadership theory focuses on the holistic system of development rather than on the leader, the follower, the circumstance or the relationship exclusively. Conversely, personified theory focuses more on the intrinsic personality of the leader in relationship to their leadership style. Therefore, both divergent leadership styles will provide an ideal comparison for purposes of this study.

According to Anheier and Isar (2010:202), “more recently, widespread community sustainability initiatives have encouraged a holistic system-based planning approach [to development] frequently including, cultural, economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainable development.” Correspondingly, Nieto (1997:41) argued that “understood in holistic terms, sustainability is a complex and multifaceted vision of development. It is a multidimensional model of development, which limits economic growth and other human activities to the capacity of nature for self-regeneration, places the improvement of the human condition (social and human development) as its primary goal, and places respect for environmental quality and the limits of nature at the core of any economic, political, educational and cultural strategy.” According to Raskin (noted in Nieto, 1997:41), “we should base development on equality in order to be compatible with the principles of a holistic understanding of sustainability.” Raskin maintained that “this implies that poverty, underdevelopment and political deprivation, as well as wealth and opulence as its antithesis stand in a causal relationship with environmental degradation.” On the other hand, Nieto (1997:42) defined ‘sustainable development’ “as that development which allows us to meet the needs and aspirations of both present and future generations always in a concrete social-historic and environmental context.” Nieto maintained that “we accomplish the latter without undermining the capacity of nature and cultures for self-regeneration, while giving special attention to the eradication of poverty, social injustice and inequalities in the relations among nations.”
Conversely, in discussing aspects of sustainable development, Tacconi and Tisdell (1993:411) contended that “sustainable development is a holistic concept and may defy exact definition and measurement.” Analogous to Anheier and Isar’s (2010) assertions cited earlier, Tacconi and Tisdell “highlighted the emergence of a holistic approach to sustainable development that incorporates economic, ecological, social and political factors.” Of significance in the argument of Tacconi and Tisdell (1993:413) is the point that “moral values influence economic decisions made on a rational basis with concern for economic goals.” Applied within the context of this study, the above assertion implies that leaders who demonstrate personified tendencies could espouse moral values to enable them make more rational development decisions. Of additional interest is Tacconi and Tisdell’s (1993:413) argument that “economic decisions do not always hinge on selfish interests of the narrow type implicit in the dominant neo-classical model. Conversely, they assert that a society’s cultural background also determines its relationship with its environment, and influences the co-evolution of the socio-economic and ecological systems.” As a reflection, in Chapter 2 of this study, we explored how “culture and socialisation patterns” shape the disposition of a national leader. I now point out that Tacconi and Tisdell’s version enables this study to infer that a cultural catalyst that induces influence over socio-economic and ecological systems can ‘tame’ leaders who entertain personified inclinations.

However, Tacconi and Tisdell (1993:413) also assert that “the cultural identity determines, for example, how a certain community adapts itself to its environment, how institutions are established and evolve and how technological development may be environmentally appropriate to or disruptive of the ecological system.” Tacconi and Tisdell (1993:411) maintained that “participation by individuals especially at community level is important for achieving sustainable social, political, environment and economic outcomes.” I observe that participation, as mooted by Tacconi and Tisdell, is a concept that is deficient in personified dispositions. However, of distinctive similarity to the researcher’s line of argument, Tacconi and Tisdell posited that “a centralized [governance] system will hardly embrace participation. Personified systems that typically ‘centralize’ around the leader negate the concept of participation that is crucial for achieving sustainable development in society.”
Still on sustainable holistic development, Starik and Kanashiro in (noted in Dominici, Roblek & Lombard, 2015:3) contended that, “for holistic models to guarantee sustainable development, they should apply the sustainable paradigm beyond its environmental dimensions.” Similarly, Gibson, Hassan and Tansey (noted in Dominici et al., 2015:3) argue that “a valid sustainable strategy should include both an economic and environmental perspective and the socio-political and cultural aspects of development.” Accordingly, in their analysis of sustainable development, Dominici et al. (2015:3) “designed a holistic framework by constituting a set of indicators patterned along social, economic, environmental and health perspectives.” Of particular significance to this study is the concept of indicators mentioned in Dominici’s framework that could guide decision-makers, especially leaders, to assess progress made towards the achievement of intended targets. Equally, Confino (noted in Dominici et al., 2015:11) argued that “as policymakers and non-government organizations seek to build long-term value, particularly at the macro level, they need to conceive value creation in a holistic sense when formulating strategy and apportioning dwindling resources.” I argue that although Confino rightly points out the need for policymakers to espouse “value creation in a holistic sense”, Dominici’s inclusion of indicators to measure progress is a crucial addition to help assess progress being made with governance and development.

Kapur (2015:1) hypothesised perhaps the most contextually relevant argument on the subject of holistic development. According to Kapur (2015:1), “holistic social development entails the social development of the human being into a whole person by developing capacities into nine domains: a) temperament, personality and self-views, b) cognition and thinking, c) affect and emotions, d) conation volition or self-regulation, e) physical and bodily-kinaesthetic, f) social/interpersonal, g) spiritual/transpersonal, h) moral character and i) citizenship.” In the same way as Aristotle (noted in Jackson, 2006:650) did, Kapur (2015:4) argued that the “holistic social development of an individual is concerned with dealing with integrated wholes rather than parts of it; the main motive of holistic social development is to bring about sustainability, exponential growth and progression of an individual.” Kapur (2015:1) maintained that “it is not just the cause of widespread poverty within the developing nations that have been the main impediment for holistic social development; on the
other hand there is an extensive agreement that appalling governance and dishonesty in particular are progress and social development inhibitors.”

I find Kapur’s argument pertinent to this study because he advocates for the holistic development of an individual, which, I believe, can mitigate the proliferation of personified tendencies. Similarly, Kapur endeavours to link the success of social development and governance. However, I point out that not all the above holistic models discuss the most crucial aspect – the persona of the leader, which is a crucial factor in determining national leadership and governance style. Given that holistic, sustainable development may entail all or a combination of “social, economic, environmental, cultural and health perspectives”, I argue that the success of all these factors hinges on leadership. Under personified dispositions, the holistic perspectives may exist singly or wholly, yet sustainable development is barely achievable because of egocentric leadership. Therefore, in order to attain holistic development, experts should first address the question of leadership as a critical factor in the composite holistic model.

3.3.3 Personified national development

What is personified development? In order to conceptualise this clearly, we first have to review the meaning of “personify” that this thesis covered in Subsection 2.2.1. Briefly, this study defines personify as “an abstract attributable to a unique personal or human characteristic, especially leadership.” Therefore, the researcher defined the term personification as comprising the “effects of abstractions attributable to a unique personal or human characteristic, especially national leadership.” Conversely, in Section 3.3, I explored literature, highlighting the point that the “definition of development goes beyond the expansion of income and wealth, and focuses on core factors of both human freedom and human development.” To this end, I point out that contemporary definitions of development concentrate on enlarging human choices from multiple perspectives, a concept that has overcome the limitations of the previous philosophies based on ‘economic growth’ and ‘economic development’. I emphasise the point that the ability of individuals to make unencumbered choices is critical in mitigating personified inclinations in leaders and among citizens.
3.4 Unravelling the epitome of personification

The *Free Dictionary* offers two contextually relevant definitions of the verb to “personify.” The general English or Thesaurus version defined ‘personify’ as: “1) to think of or represent (an inanimate object or abstraction) as having personality or the qualities, thoughts, or movements of a living being; 2) to represent (an object or abstraction) by a human figure, 3) to represent (an abstract quality or idea), and 4) to be the embodiment or perfect example of.” The legal dictionary defines the verb to personify as “to ascribe personal qualities to, be the embodiment, characterize, copy, embody, embrace, humanize, incarnate, manifest, *orationem attribuere*, symbolize, treat as human, and typify.” Conversely, the Encyclopædia Britannica (2015) defined ‘personify’ as a transitive verb that means “1) to conceive of or represent as a person, or as having human qualities or powers: impute personality to, and 2) to be the embodiment or personification of; incarnate.”

Using a ‘content analysis program’ to code for specific words or patterns that are responsive to the research question, I identified occurrences of words that are contextually relevant to the subject of personification. The program revealed that each of the verbs *represent* and *personify* appear four times. The program also revealed that each of the explicatory words *qualities, human and embodiment* appears thrice. Similarly, words like *personality, object, incarnate, having and abstraction* appear twice. Because of their inapplicability, the researcher did not consider the usage and frequency of *indefinite articles* – which introduce new concepts into a discourse, *conjunctions* – which combine words, clauses or sentences, and *prepositions* – which express relations between parts of a sentence.

Accordingly, the researcher defines *personify* as “an abstract attributable to a unique personal or human characteristic, especially leadership.” Therefore, in this study, the term *personification* means the “effects of abstractions attributable to a unique personal or human characteristic, especially national leadership.”

3.4.1 Behavioural stimuli of personified disposition

In their description and discussion of personification, Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv (2013:228) “explain that the concurrent experiences [of personification] are not purely sensory, but are rather conceptual properties, for example, personality types.
Moreover, [the latter] are at times social descriptions and this suggests that in sequence-personality synaesthesia, the concurrent belong to the interpersonal domain.” “These attributes may reflect individual characteristics (gender, personality, physical appearance, cognitive abilities, occupation, mental states, moods, attitudes, interests, inclinations) and ‘social interactions’ between inducers (e.g., emotive and behavioural responses to other units” (Amin et al. & Simner et al., as noted by Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, 2013:229). Likewise, Smilek et al. (as noted in Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, 2013:229) “classified the social and affective characteristics attributed in sequence-personality synaesthesia into four more specific types: physical (gender, physical appearance), personal (cognitive abilities, occupation, personality, mental states, moods, attitudes, interests, inclinations), relation (emotive and behavioural responses to other units), and social role (occupation, familial and non-familial relationships).”

The above literature corroborates the theoretical argument in this study that mental states, moods, and attitudes precipitate behavioural responses in personalities. The latter in turn shape the interests and inclinations in individuals. I argue that, by inference, mental states, moods and attitudes characterise the personalities of individual national leaders. I posit that we can rephrase the foregoing to denote that behavioural stimuli in national leaders directly influence the ultimate course of their social, political and economic interests and inclinations. Accordingly, in order to understand the primary actions and ideological inclinations of national leaders, one must first analyse their behavioural disposition. Hence, a behavioural analysis could help experts to decipher the personality traits that drive national policies and governance.

In discussing “the psychology of personality”, Underwood (2002:111) posited that “while personality theories focus primarily on internal structures and processes, experts universally recognize that varying degrees of situational factors influence individual behaviours and actions.” She maintained that “whereas the issue of personality formation falls more clearly within the purview of psychology than of social psychology, some of the factors in personality formation have implications for belief and attitude formation. As higher order constructs, beliefs are antecedent to attitudes. While attitudes often emanate from beliefs, (some attitudes have non-cognitive bases).” Underwood (2002:106) argued that “beliefs, or what an individual
holds to be true or real, refer to a person’s subjective judgments concerning some aspect of self or of the world. Therefore, the potential contents of beliefs are unlimited in scope. A belief associates an object with some attribute and, thus, involves cognition. On the other hand, an attitude is a psychological tendency or mental predisposition that one expresses by evaluating an object or entity with some degree of like or dislike, favour or disfavour. Attitudes are affective, reflecting emotions or feelings attached to categories or objects (people, things, places, issues, ideas, etc.)."

I contend that the above literature accentuates the arguments I made in preceding paragraphs that beliefs, values and attitudes play an integral role in the processes of socio-economic transformation. Underwood’s argument links behavioural actions of persons to their intrinsic beliefs, values and attitudes. The concept is significant in understanding how environmental constructs influence the cognitive development that an individual subsequently transforms into practices. I maintain that the conceptualisation of the ‘self’ in relationship to ‘others’ or the ‘world’ determines how an individual might possibly perceive national development policies or governance styles. This literature underscores how individual beliefs and attitudes act as models for self-interests and inclinations.

Whereas Underwood “dwelt on situational behavioural stimuli in the realm of social psychology”, Ozer and Benet-Martinez (2006:404) “specifically highlight how genetic, cultural and environmental factors form personality. [They assert that] among the most important of the latter are cultural influences.” Correspondingly, in amplifying the significant influence of genetic factors on individual psychology, Bouchard (2004) “downplays common environmental influences as frequent, but not always less important than genetic factors; and this often decreases to near zero after adolescence.” The foregoing juxtapositions highlight the inherent complexities entailed in the analysis of personality psychology. However, the common theme in the discussions is the pivotal role of genetic and environmental factors as behavioural stimuli. The latter enriches the theoretical argument of this study by highlighting the point that, in addition to other already discussed stimuli, genetic heritability plays an equally significant role in shaping psychological traits, and, in essence, outward individual disposition.
The amplification of culture as an important personality influence as noted by Ozer and Benet-Martinez (2006:408, 415) “underscores the role of society in shaping an individual.” The cultural psychology view that Ozer and Benet-Martinez (2006) posited “endorses relativist and constructivist notions of personality, and tends to favour emic (i.e., indigenous) over imposed-etic (i.e., imported) approaches to theory and instrument development. Specifically, the theory posited that recent cross-cultural studies of subjective well-being (SWB) shed light on the relation between personality influences and SWB (Benet-Martinez & Karakapoglu-Aygün; Kwan, Bond & Singelis; Schimmack, Radhakrishnan, Oishi, Dzokoto & Ahadi, as synthesised in Ozer & Benet-Martinez, 2006:404). First, culture moderates the links between extraversion, neuroticism and SWB. Secondly, across cultures, the links between the Big Five and SWB are largely mediated by intra- and interpersonal esteem evaluations.” In concordance with the above, Maccoby (noted in Triandis & Suh, 2002:135), argued that “environment, among other factors, shapes the culture, which in turn shapes the socialization patterns, which shape some of the variance of personality.” Building on the latter, Triandis and Suh (2002:139) “highlight the significance of socialization in relation to culture.” In their analysis, Triandis and Suh identified “dimensions of socialization that are related to cultural syndromes, such as the emphasis on child independence found in individualist cultures and the emphasis on dependence found in collectivist cultures.” Similarly, Rohner (noted in Triandis & Suh, 2002:135) endeavoured to “demonstrate that socialization practices consistently link with personality elements.”

In the realm of development psychology, Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv (2013:232) asserted that “personification in synesthetic adults may represent an excessive manifestation of the human tendency to perceive reality using the self as a model. This in turn derives from younger children’s animistic thought, used as an undeveloped filter through which they learn about the social world. Thus, synesthetic personification could represent a residual expression of childhood animism, an early stage in social cognitive development.” Piaget (noted in Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, 2013:232) studied “animistic thought in children and hypothesized that the excessive animistic mode of thinking (including personification) serves as a mechanism for constructing reality with the self as a model. This is in line with contemporary accounts of the way in which we construct social reality. The brain areas associated
with self-referential processing such as the insular, the precuneus, the inferior frontal cortex, and the posterior cingulate, have been found to be involved in implementation of animistic thought” (Sobczak, Sobczak-Edmans, Sagiv & Williams, noted in Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, 2013:232). Furthermore, Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv (2013:232) argued that “evidence from neuropsychology suggests that lesions of the right (and sometimes left) parietal cortex may result in peculiar misattributions of agency, which might itself sometimes involve animistic attributions.” The researcher posits that the attributions cited above are significant for understanding the concept of personified inclinations. In other words, what degree of animistic attribution results in personified leadership inclinations?

The above literature highlights how individuals’ perceptions of themselves structure their view of reality around them. This literature reinforces the researcher’s arguments that personification emanates from the early stages of social cognitive development and ultimately defines one’s definitive behavioural disposition. The fact that personification is possibly a residual expression of childhood animism reveals the reason why some national leaders perceive their ideas as infallible “models” of national practice. The above literature provides a scientific basis for theorising that the degree of childhood animism by which individuals formed their perceptions of social reality influences the personification of national development and governance policies. The researcher further argues that the ‘external environment’ may be the foremost important influence on the intrinsic degree of childhood animism. Consequently, understanding childhood animism will help experts to forecast the possible trajectory of a national leader’s policy actions and governance styles.

In close context with the “… perceiving the self as a model” cited elsewhere in this thesis, Wilson et al. (1996:285) argued that “as a strategy of social conduct, Machiavellianism involves manipulating others for personal gain, often against the other’s self-interest.” Wilson et al. maintained that “everyone is capable of manipulative behaviour to some degree, but some are more willing and more able than others are.” Dawkins and Krebs (noted in Wilson et al., 1996:286) stated that “natural selection favours individuals who successfully manipulate the behaviour of other individuals, whether or not this is to the advantage of the manipulated individuals”. Humans frequently restrict pro-social behaviours to members of their own group, while openly exploiting other groups. Leaders who are responsible for
conduct toward other groups exhibit Machiavellian traits. The latter is close to the spirit of Machiavelli himself, who combined his manipulative political ways with genuine loyalty toward his own city. Barber (noted in Wilson et al., 1996:293) tested the hypothesis of genetic relatedness in Machiavellianism. Barber “administered a modified ‘Mach test’ toward specific categories of people such as family members and friends”. On average, participants “indicated a lower degree of Machiavellianism toward family members and friends than toward people in general.” From the foregoing, I assert that the concept of manipulative behavioural disposition in Machiavellianism can be important for understanding national leaders’ governance styles. This is especially crucial in personified dispensions where leaders manipulate citizens for their own selfish interests.

As hypothesised in the above literature survey, I contend that Machiavellian behaviours can potentially rationalise political and socio-economic actions of national leaders. It is significant that Machiavellianism defined individual conduct toward other groups. The latter validates the assumptions of this study that personified systems promote egocentrism in leaders and favouritism towards persons sympathetic to incumbent regimes. More importantly, Wilson et al. (1996:288) argued that “we can make specific predictions about the propensity to manipulate others as a function of their in-group versus out-group status.” In the same manner, “we can develop specific hypotheses to predict the effects of genetic relatedness, age, gender and situational factors on the adaptedness of Machiavellianism.” Based on the foregoing, I argue that we can assume that experts can predict the inception of personified leadership and its ultimate influence on national development and governance. However, Wilson et al. (1996:296) maintained that “the psychological literature on Machiavellianism lacks a conceptual framework for guiding empirical research.” This factor limits the concept’s applicability to the empirical contextualisation of personified systems since it cannot guide empirical studies.

3.5 Institutionalised impersonation by personification

In the preceding section, the researcher unravelled how behavioural stimuli precipitate personified disposition. In this section, the researcher will explicate the personification of national institutions through impersonation. Specifically, the researcher will examine literature on how national leaders entwine their personalities
into the fabric of national institutions. The researcher will attempt to highlight how some elements that bind members of a particular state are traceable to influences on the formative character of that state by adaptable human nature. In this respect, I will examine below the evolution of the individual in contemporary culture.

According to Pickel (2004:327), “homo nationis is a dominant type of individual who has emerged in the twentieth century. This individual is born and raised in a particular national culture, and lives most of their life in as a citizen in a nation-state.” Pickel maintained that “the ‘nationalized personality structure’ is fundamental in most state-societies today. Like homo oeconomicus, individual interests drive Homo nationis, and like homo sociologicus, by social norms. However, a particular nationality – or national identity in a broad sense – gives a crucial and distinct psycho cultural specificity and political and economic context to people’s individual interests and social norms.” Pickel also argued that “the national habitus, a nationally specific personality structure, is the socio-cultural complement to the nation-state structure.” He asserted that “habits can be cognitive, emotional or moral. Habits may also be simple and automatic such as a particular gesture, or complex and reflected such as in modes of moral reasoning.”

Pickel (2004:328) pointed out subjects that this study finds relevant, for instance, “how moral reasoning, personality structure and national identity, all give political and economic context to people’s individual interests and social norms.” Similarly, the above argument illustrates how the moral reasoning and personality structure of a national leader correlates to their management of social, political and economic milieus. Pickel’s identification of the “nationalization of personality” directly points to the notion that individuals can actually impose their essential character over national systems. In this study, this is the primary tenet of personified reign.

In addition, Pickel (2004:i) rationalised the view that “the concepts of homo nationis and national habitus underscore that modern individuals are historical individuals, i.e. they have personality structures that are unlike those of individuals in other historical epochs.” According to Pickel, we should explicitly conceptualise individuals as historical, rather than as a trans-historical homo oeconomicus or homo sociologicus. Pickel maintained that “the trait of national group identity, the ‘national character’ is a layer of the social habitus entrenched firmly into an individual’s personality structure.”
In corroboration of the latter, Weber (as noted by Pickel, 2004:331) argued that “most routine action stimulates automatic reaction to habitual stimuli which guide behaviour in a repetitively followed course. Therefore, Weber viewed habit as the foundation of modern political and legal orders.”

I contend that the above conceptual constructs clearly link individual personality structure to the progression [or lack thereof] of political and socio-economic factors in a nation state. The argument that “cognitive, emotional or moral habits influence individual interests, which in turn shape ‘national character’” lends credence to this study’s hypothesis that the personification of national systems by leaders is rooted in their behavioural stimuli. This argument highlights how individual personality eclipses national group identity, to the extent that the State starts projecting the essential character of its national leaders. In summary of the preceding arguments, I posit that the literature provides evidence that an individual leader demonstrates varying degrees of influence on the formation and eventual sustenance of national institutions. Other literature that corroborates my line of argument is the assertion that “our appreciations on how norms, rules, habits, conventions and values influence our perspective on the way societies systematize and evolve.” ‘New institutionalists’ like Posner and Schotter and Williamson (noted in Hollingsworth, 2000:602) assumed “that at one time there was a state of nature and that there was a movement from individuals to institutions.” Popper and Hodgson (noted in Hollingsworth, 2000:602) called the approach “methodological individualism.” “Moreover, there are numerous instances where methodological individualists demonstrate that individuals create new rules of behaviour (Hollingsworth, 2000:602).” Hollingsworth maintained that “institutions not only constrain, but also shape individuals that embed in a complex institutional environment.” In consonance with my line of reasoning, Hollingsworth posited that in order to determine which came first – individuals or institutions – he argued that “of course, individuals’ form and change institutions; just as institutions shape and constrain individuals.”

I concur with Hollingsworth’s argument that the relationship between individuals and institutions are commutative. In this respect, the theory of personification hypothesises that whereas the personified inclinations of national leaders permeate and influence entire national institutions and systems, the personified institutions that have assumed the essential character of the leader begin to prop up the ideals of the
regime. In this study, we even established that, in addition to institutional influences, whole communities or ethnicities can actually precipitate personified inclinations, as in the case of Rwanda.

3.6 Effects of personified leadership disposition on society

On the subject of leadership, Zoogah (noted in Zoogah 2009:204) suggested that “the ability of strategic leaders’ to exert influence on situations, particularly ambiguous and unpredictable ones, influences leadership efficacy.” Likewise, Vansteelandt, Van Mechelen and Zoogah (noted in Zoogah, 2009:204) “used demands (expectations or obligations created by situational characteristics—high and low) and functions (active features or characteristics that define situations—socio-cognitive and economic) dimensions of situations to propose four generic situations that generally emerge from uncertain environments and affect organizational functioning and processes.” According to Vansteelandt, Van Mechelen and Zoogah, “the generic situations are deprivation, conflict, exploitative, and opportunistic situations.” Vansteelandt et al. maintained that “the behaviours of strategic leaders in these situations affect organizational productivity.” Still on the subject, Chemers, Hackman, and Walton (noted in Zoogah, 2009:204) posited that “functional leadership models suggest image management, relationship development, resource deployment, and conflict management as four major functions executives have to fulfil as strategic leaders.” Picking up from the latter, Zoogah (noted in Zoogah, 2009:204) suggested that the models include “image management, relationship development, resource deployment, and conflict management as four major functions executives have to fulfil as strategic leaders.” In the foregoing introduction, scholars have contextualised influences on the behaviour of leaders in diverse situations, as well as leaders’ interactions with the surrounding environment. These influences range from cognitive parameters to occurrences in an individual’s environment. With this concept in mind, the researcher in subsequent paragraphs will analyse some of these factors that relate to the evolution of personified leadership disposition on society.

John and Srivastava (noted in Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling & Ha, 2010:113) “provide evidence of core personality traits organized along five underlying factors that emerged over time. Of the five traits, three are contextually relevant to describe
[the effects of personified disposition] on society.” In describing these traits, John and Srivastava maintained that “extraversion implies an energetic approach to the social and material world. In contrast, agreeableness distinguishes a pro-social and communal orientation toward others with antagonism. Lastly, conscientiousness illustrates socially prescribed impulse control that facilitates task and goal-directed behaviour.” The above literature underscores the influence of personality on society, with ‘agreeableness’ specifically echoing Machiavellian undertones (discussed in Subsections 2.2.3 and 3.4.1). However, I argue that the above theory does not define how society assumes, and then adapts to, the personality of a domineering national leader. Similarly, I argue that ‘conscientiousness’ is a factor that is lacking in individuals with personified inclinations, since such persons are to a great extent – imprudent. I believe that is why John and Srivastava branded such leaders as exercising ‘impulsive control’. Of particular significance, I argue that the absence of the three values of “extroversion, agreeableness and conscientiousness” in individuals subject to personified leaders will inevitably yield a class of acquiesced citizens.

Accordingly, a better conceptualisation of the relationship between personification and acquiesced citizens will enable a clear understanding of development and governance outcomes to be attained. McAdams and Pals (2006:211) formulated a “model [that] provides a credible attempt to highlight how society adapts to personality stimuli.” McAdams and Pals argued that “characteristic adaptations are situated in particular social, cultural, and developmental contexts.” They maintained that “goals and interests reflect personal investments in activities, programs, and life trajectories that society makes available for the individual. Values and virtues reflect selective commitments to particular ideals that generations have passed down in families and through religious, civic, and educational institutions.” However, Pettigrew, Stewart and Healy (noted in McAdams & Pals, 2006:211) contended that “more so than traits, social class, ethnicity, gender, and even historical events help contour characteristic adaptations.” Likewise, Elder (noted in McAdams & Pals, 2006:211) argued that “characteristic adaptations will change over time, with changing life circumstances, roles expectations and with maturation over the life course.” However, McAdams and Pals averred that the [adaptations] “should not
I agree with McAdams and Pals to the extent that they aver that goals and interests reflect personal investments in specific undertakings. This is analogous to personified leadership where the pursuit to fulfil personal goals and interests influences how leaders behave. However, in a point of departure, the theory of personification goes further to link individual leadership actions to the leader’s formative stages. On the subject of acquiescence, I agree with McAdams and Pals that individuals will not acquiesce willingly to authoritarian values and goals. That is why the theory of personification hypothesises that personified reign will most likely precipitate a wave of rebellion to surmount its associated injustices. This is true even where personified values and goals have permeated any given society.

Conversely, Jones and Olken (2005:854) argued that “on average, leaders have detectable, causative impacts on national growth.” However, they assert that “the degree to which leaders matter may well be a function of their context, as different institutional systems might amplify or retard a leader’s [societal] influence.” Similarly, in analysing institutional constraints, Marshall and Jaggers (noted in Jones & Olken, 2005:855) argued that “autocratic leaders on average have a significant causative influence on national growth.” In affirmation, Jones and Olken (2005:855) rationalised the above by arguing that “autocrats have more effect than democrats do. This is because the role of leaders in democracies and autocracies differ by the constraints placed on the leader’s power, how leaders are selected, and in the ease with which bad leaders are removed from power.” Jones and Olken (2005:856) maintained that “among autocrats, we also find particularly strong leader effects in regimes without political parties or a legislature.” Overall, Jones and Olken concluded that “these results provide further and more textured support for the Weberian hypothesis that leaders matter when institutions are weak.”

I concur with the common thread in the above literature that emphasises the leader’s unfettered influence. However, I disagree that national burdens imposed upon the leader have a significant influence on the governance style. In this respect, I deviate from the Weberian hypothesis by asking, “What happens to leaders when institutions are strong?” Again, the theories wrongly assume that leaders will always be
'selected' or that institutions can sway the thinking of leaders. Under personified governance, institutions assume the character of leaders and eventually start implementing only those programmes and policies that align with the incumbent leader’s ideology. Similarly, the above literature does not adequately address what happens to citizens in the case of dictatorship. Equally, Jones and Olken’s arguments are also devoid of strategies on how societies change leaders. In essence, we note that the literature does not clearly elucidate the reaction and adaptation of citizens to personified systems. This presents a gap in a thorough comprehension of personified leadership disposition on society.

From a different perspective, Inkeles (1996:15) argued that “national character exists to the extent that modal personality traits and syndromes occur. How many modes there are, is an important empirical and theoretical manner, but one that is not relevant to the definition of national character.” Inkeles (1996:16) maintained that “[characterization of society] in terms of plurality of modes provides a more adequate psychological basis for understanding the internal dynamics of the society such as political cleavages, shifts in educational, industrial or foreign policy, and conflicting elites in various institutional structures.” In contrast, I argue that a plurality of modes provides a psychological basis to understand the internal dynamics in democratic and not personified systems. Furthermore, I posit that the attribution of modal personality to national institutions takes ontological precedence over the phenomenological simulation emphasised by Inkeles. I therefore rationalise that personality characteristics in plural modes cannot be uniform, as other modal personalities may have stronger individual traits than others may. Inkeles (1996:16) affirms the latter in arguing “… the first empirical problem is to determine what modes of personality, if any, exist in any given society.”

Further to the above, I argue that the adoption of usually inflexible personality characteristics of national leaders curtails the sustainability of national institutions. However, Jones and Olken (2005:839) contended that “the ability of institutions to restrain leaders in democracies emanates from one direction – leadership selection.” More broadly, Tsebelis (noted in Jones & Olken, 2005:839) argued that “the presence of many ‘veto players’, either constitutionally based institutions or opposing political parties, may [also] severely constrain the action space of leaders and policy outcomes.” On the other hand, “there is evidence that, in the context of legislatures,
politicians are not fully constrained by electoral pressures, allowing some room for personal ideological views and party affiliations (Jones & Olken, 2005:839).” Jones and Olken maintained that “the evidence suggests that the degree to which political leaders may affect economic outcomes may depend on the institutional context. Nevertheless, if institutions have explanatory power, it is then perhaps a natural next step to ask whether national leaders, who may partly control or substitute for formal institutions, exert personal influences on growth.”

I note that the above argument is premised on the assumption that democracies prevail in a given polity. This assumption is not synonymous with the dispensation of personified regimes that negate democratic ideals. It is also significant for this study that Jones and Olken “link actions of political leaders to economic outcomes.” Therefore, I contend that personified development occurs if a national leader manipulates national resources, both human and material, to serve their personal interests at the expense of preferential choices by other citizens. Owing to its novelty in academia, there is limited or no coherent literature on the subject of personified development. As an alternative, this section of the study will draw inferences from literature on the development impacts of “personal or personalised” rule. As I highlighted in Chapter Two, personal or personalised rules are ‘causative’ to personified rule. Jackson and Rosberg (1982:19) “defined personal rule as a system of relations linking rulers not with the public or even with the ruled but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters and rivals who constitute the system.” The assertion by Jackson and Rosberg (1982:23) that “personal rule removes constitutional rights; eliminates institutional checks and balances, and centralizes power in the presidency” is very analogous to the theory of personification. I argue that personal rule erodes catalysts of human development like choices, capabilities and freedoms of citizens, which ultimately affects national development.

On the other hand, Evans (noted in Lange & Rueschemeyer, 2005:55) contended that “when legal rule is absent, States lack do not have effective mechanisms for the control of larger numbers of state actors. This in turn promotes rampant rent-seeking and unstable hierarchy of power dominated by individuals. Such personal rule frees state actors to use their coercive power to prey indiscriminately on other for personal gain and aggrandizement.” Lange and Rueschemeyer (2005:55-6) argued that “tendencies akin to the above impede corporate action and therefore state
implementation of development projects.” Accordingly, this study notes that, as is the case under personal rule, the abuse of state power for self-aggrandisement is also characteristic of personified regimes. In both instances, individuals in positions of power draw on national resources to satisfy their own, and not national, interests. Lange and Rueschemeyer (2005:56) argued that “a bureaucratic state promotes human and social development by preventing state actors from using their positions for personal gain.” However, I agree generally with Perrow (noted in Lange & Rueschemeyer, 2005:51) who, contrary to other scholars, recognises that “bureaucracy often places power in the hands of individuals and thereby allows elites to use the structure for personal benefits.”

The term ‘bureaucracy’ connotes rigidity and excessive regulation, which in my reckoning is counterproductive for development. Similarly, bureaucracies frequently suppress citizens in order to serve the interests of those in power. In other words, there is a risk under bureaucratic systems for over-centralisation of power and resources, to the detriment of the ordinary national citizens. Deva (1986:149) clearly articulated the confusion surrounding the role of bureaucracy in development. According to Deva, “extreme and opposing formulations mark the theory of bureaucracy.” On the one hand, there is the view, presented by Burnham and Galbraith (noted in Deva, 1986:149) that “the management or ‘techno structure’ has come to rule, primarily in self-interest.” Deva maintained that “on the other hand, schools of business and public administration teach pragmatically that bureaucracy is a rational and neutral instrument of development and general welfare. Therefore, the fact that bureaucracies support the ruling class rather than the masses is a recipe for personified rule that negates equitable national development.”

The theory of personification also draws causativeness from clientelistic practices and patronage-ridden politics. Roniger (2004:353) argued that “in the 1960s and 1970s an interpretive approach assumed that clientelism was a vestige of early modern development, and that political and economic modernization would render it obsolete.” Roniger maintained that “since the 1980s, experts have recognized the systemic persistence of clientelism and patronage.” Yet in Roniger’s view, “analysts have only begun to investigate the institutional sequences and indicators of political clientelism, tying them in with such issues as democratic governance and interest representation.” According to Roniger, “clientelism implies mediated and selective
access to resources and markets that normally excludes others. Compliance or dependence on the goodwill of others conditions this access on subordination. The patrons, sub patrons and brokers provide selective access to goods and opportunities and place themselves or their supporters in positions from which they can divert resources and services in their favour.”

On the other hand, “sceptics have questioned whether democracy can possibly to alter the neopatrimonial governance widely blamed for African states’ failures as agents of development” (Alence, 2004:165). According to Callaghy; Jackson and Rosberg; and Médard (as noted by Alence, 2004:165), “‘neopatrimonialism’ described states that, despite possessing the formal structures of modern bureaucracies, operate on patrimonial principles – characterized by personalized political authority, weak checks on the private appropriation of public resources, and pervasive clientelism.” Alence (2004:165) added that “enhancing such states’ developmental performance requires the insulation of policymaking and implementation from arbitrary political interference.” I argue that the fact that scholars proclaim pithily that personalised authority and pervasive clientelism typify patrimonial principles is significant for this study. This scholarly view synchronises the terminologies ‘personalised’ and ‘clientelistic’, linking them to poor governance and ‘failed’ development. Therefore, I perceive both terminologies to be causative to the materialisation of personified leadership. I interpret this to connote that personification advances the appropriation of public resources and political interference for personal gain, hindering the successful pursuit of national development.

Accordingly, this study reasons that the exclusionist characterisation cited above renders clientelism analogous, and even causative, to personified development. The manipulation by national leaders of public goods for selfish rather than national interests ultimately results in underdevelopment. Bates and Herbst (noted in Alence, 2004:167) pointed out “the occurrence of clientelistic distribution of state patronage over the provision of welfare enhancing public goods.” “Such clientelistic actions usually permeate the state’s administrative structures, compromising public-service effectiveness and fuelling corruption” (Bayart; Chabal & Daloz; and Ekeh, noted in Alence, 2004:167). This pattern so profoundly affects opportunities for social advancement that class formation ends up being more determined by relationships
to political power than to economic resources (Diamond & Sklar, noted in Alence, 2004:167). Correspondingly, in his analysis of clientelistic networks, Auyero (noted in Roniger, 2004:366) affirms that “clientelism maintains the general skewed structure of income and opportunities open to lower-class citizens, perpetuating poverty, underdevelopment and dependency.” To this end, I contend that clientelism invigorates personified leadership behaviours, like enforcement of unequal economic and social status, thus mitigating economic progress and national development.

In the next chapter (four), I will draw on the lessons from Chapter Three to describe how personified leadership influences governance and development policies in East Africa. Thus, Chapter Four will focus on empirical concepts in the theory of personification, and expound on themes that are relevant for the deeper understanding of empirical concepts of personification. The researcher will juxtapose traditional African concepts of governance with the empirical thrust of personified rule in East Africa. By the end of the next chapter, readers should be able to discern the extent to which leaders place the “governance and development interests and needs of their followers ahead of their own self-interests and needs.”

3.7 Conclusion of Chapter Three

Chapter Three analysed the correlation between leadership, governance and development. In particular, I analysed how personified leadership style influences governance and development policies. I have summarised this section in two distinct categories for ease of reference.

3.7.1 Conclusion on governance

In examining how leadership styles affect governance of a country, I established that the current literature on governance mainly focuses on creating conditions for regimented rule and mutual action. I also affirmed that governance outputs do not significantly differ from a government’s own outputs. However, this study delved deeper to understand the general perceptions of national growth economists, development experts and aid donors, who view ‘good governance’ as a pre-requisite for achieving sustained increases in living standards. In order to align the term ‘governance’ with this thesis, I explored the literature on governance. In the end, we see that the theory of personification is important for measuring quality of
governance and government effectiveness. This is because the theory resolutely links the personalities of national leaders to the outcomes of their rule. However, I also noted that, because of the indeterminate definitions of governance, many leaders in sub-Saharan countries claim to practise 'good' governance and participatory development. The blurriness of the term 'good' governance confuses national citizens themselves. The ambiguity in understanding the term 'good governance' underscores the intricate relationship between leadership and governance, and the need for accountability by persons in leadership positions. Perhaps one of the most significant findings in this chapter is that leaders and other stakeholders, like donors, exploit the lack of clarity in the term 'good governance' to perpetuate personified reign.

I also explored the realm of policy analysis in order to understand arguments, interpretation and praxis of policymaking and governance. In this area, I delved deep in analysing the unequal distribution of power and the policy consequences that flow from it. I also studied how cultural biases and social orientations influence the process of policymaking and, ultimately, governance. I learnt that political culture has both direct and indirect bearing and permutation on political and economic governance processes. Of critical significance, we can justifiably trace policy initiatives and actions of key agents to definite political culture. I ventured to analyse how the theory of personification juxtaposes with other relevant theories with respect to governance. In contrast with other theories, the theory of personification centralises the role of an individual leader in influencing decisions. The theory of personification also highlights how national leaders with personified inclinations govern with egocentric tendencies. Unlike other theories, the theory of personification goes deeper to link an individual's formative infancy stages to mature and conscious leadership actions later in life. In effect, personification theory attempts to rationalise how the actions of given personalities take form to enable them to relate, self-regulate, and empathise with others. Ultimately, this study highlights how the political will of a national leader practising personification will determine the possibility of that regime transitioning to democracy.

Turning to empirical concepts on governance, I explored numerous theories that have potentially useful empirical and disciplinary applications. The review of literature brought to the fore the challenges that donor agencies and experts face in
measuring and assessing governance. For instance, because of the ambiguity in the phrase 'good governance,' many donors and governance experts prescribe concepts that are not responsive to local political realities, leadership characteristics and citizen preferences. As a result, autocratic leaders exploit disparities in the definitions of good governance to rationalise their actions. I pointed out that the objective to achieve good governance should not overtly rely on policy change at the expense of institutional mechanisms. Additionally, I argue that any 'good governance' system should focus on the leader as the primary driver of the institution. Nonetheless, I agree with other arguments that, without explicit measures, donors and experts cannot rigorously test hypotheses empirically on how political and economic institutions change, much less develop evidence-based strategies about how to influence this change positively. I also argue that the latter will also ultimately affect the ability to measure the causal relationship between governance and development outcomes. Similarly, the multifaceted dimensions of governance pose conceptual challenges with measurement. Accordingly, I argue that the theory of personification provides a framework for disentangling conceptual confusion surrounding the subject of governance. In essence, the theory of personification points to the ‘leader’ as being the most important factor that determines a particular course of governance. In essence, the theory of personification presents an unambiguous example of ‘limited statehood’, since governance under such dispensations is discretionary rather than purposeful.

The study then examined how leadership styles relate to governance and development. I contend that the outcome of any governance action is usually traceable to a leadership style. However, it is often difficult to discern how a leader’s action influences a system because intricate governance structures subsume these actions. The latter makes it challenging to diagnose personified leadership styles to address its related intricacies. I argue that a people-centred approach is more likely to lead to equitable distributions of resources, participatory decision-making and, ultimately, the development of human potentials. This study maintains that, for the latter to materialise, an altruistic leader must drive the development and governance system. Similarly, the researcher asserts that cognitive aspects, including the degree of childhood animism as well as surrounding environment, play a critical role in shaping the actions of a leader. Likewise, individual-level factors ultimately shape
societal trajectories when aggregated together. In this respect, we can trace many societal phenomena to the individual level in a clear and strict way. However, the study of leadership brought to the fore potentially conflicting dynamics that leaders face in administering governance – to serve the self or others. Under personified dispensations, the natural incentive for the leader is to serve self above others. Conversely, where serving others sustains the leader's interest, they impassively pursue that course. For example, under patrimonial regimes, “a small number of selected people profiteer at the expense of other citizens.” Such dispensations affect policymaking and development projects by squandering national resources on frivolous expenses.

3.7.2 Conclusion on development

In analysing the concept of development, this study delved all the way back to the days of the Marshall Plan. The Plan was the first major transfer of public capital to enhance the pace of international development through the introduction of the ‘UN Human Development Index,’ and subsequently the ‘Multidimensional Poverty Index,’ both of which aim to measure development more broadly. This study particularly notes that the Sen’s deprivation-induced poverty model accurately describes factors associated with personified dispensations. In essence, the latter wilfully deprives citizens of their entitlements in order to impose poverty and ultimately induce dependency. The researcher notes that the common thread running through most development models is the enlarging of human choices, while ensuring that development is inclusive and comprehensive. However, this study argues that the concept of inclusivity is deficient in personified regimes that deliberately thrive on deliberate social exclusion. I point out that we can trace the promotion of exclusionist policies by a national leader to influences in the cognitive development stages. In other words, a national leader who was deprived in childhood presents with a higher likelihood of advancing personified exclusionary development policies, in the economic, social, cultural and political domains.

While examining the linkage between governance and development, I encountered a paradox that “democracy per se is not necessarily associated with better development outcomes and some dictatorships are developmental.” Accordingly, I argue that good governance is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for
development. To the contrary, competent leadership is antecedent to good governance that in turn leads to sustainable development. That is why this study looks at the national leaders who drive the governance process – an outcome of an action – rather than focusing on the action itself. Since the advent of time, man has been trying to harness synergies of their ‘wholeness’ and ‘interdependence’ to achieve certain objectives, such as better ways to govern society that lead to holistic development. However, personification is a more antagonistic form of sociality that thrives on competitive pursuit of self-interest and predation. Accordingly, its relevance for holistic development is doubtful. In this context, I aver that holistic leadership is not only about the leader, but also about those subject to the leader. It is about how the entire state system functions in relation to the individuals who constitute it. Furthermore, the crucial attributes of the holistic leader draw on their inner and outer resources, as well as the social and political environment, to achieve leadership over several individuals. Given that holistic, sustainable development may entail all, or a combination, of social, economic, environmental, cultural and health perspectives, I argue that the success of all these factors hinges on leadership.

Having noted how leadership and personification correlate, I proceeded to understand the effects of behavioural stimuli on personified disposition. I established that mental states, moods and attitudes precipitate behavioural responses in personalities. The latter in turn shapes interests and inclinations in individuals. I argue that, by inference, mental states, moods and attitudes characterise the personalities of individual national leaders. I rephrased the foregoing to denote that behavioural stimuli in national leaders directly influence the ultimate course of their social, political and economic interests and inclinations. Accordingly, in order to understand the primary actions and ideological inclinations of national leaders, I contend that one must first analyse their behavioural disposition. Of particular significance, the way in which a leader conceptualises himself will determine how that individual may possibly perceive national development policies or governance styles. Perhaps more significantly, this study linked personification to early stages of social cognitive development that ultimately define one’s definitive behavioural disposition. Thus, the study identified a scientific basis for theorising that the degree of childhood animism by which individuals formed their perceptions of social reality influences the personification of national development and governance policies.
Consequently, comprehending childhood animism will help experts to forecast the possible trajectory of a national leader’s policy preferences and governance styles.

In studying the effects of personified leadership disposition on society, I established that most literature did not define how society assumes, then adapts to, the personality of a domineering national leader. Yet, this study maintains that the reaction of citizens to personified leadership disposition will create a class of indisposed subjects called acquiesced citizens. Accordingly, the adoption of usually inflexible personality characteristics of national leaders curtails the sustainability of national institutions. Therefore, this study contends that personified development will occur if a national leader manipulates national resources, both human and material, to serve their personal interests at the expense of the preferred choices of other citizens. Interpreted within the context of this study, personified leadership advances the appropriation of public resources and political interference for personal gain, hindering the successful pursuit of national development.

The next chapter will focus on empirical concepts in the theory of personification and expound on the different terminologies associated with this study. I will juxtapose traditional African concepts with the empirical thrust of personified rule in East Africa, referring to case studies of Kenya and Rwanda. The chapter will also explore the extent to which leaders place the governance and development interests and needs of their followers before their personal egotisms and aspirations. I hope that the discussions will shed more light on whether, and how, personified leadership affects national governance and development.
CHAPTER FOUR
INFLUENCE OF PERSONIFICATION ON GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I answer the thesis question, “How does personified leadership influence governance and development policies in East Africa?” The chapter focuses on empirical concepts in the theory of personification, drawn from literature and the researcher's own observation. The section also expounds on different terminologies associated with this study, but which are specifically relevant for gaining a deeper understanding of the empirical concepts of personification. I will juxtapose traditional African concepts of *Ubuntu* with the empirical thrust of personified rule in East Africa. To this end, the study discusses how *Ubuntu*, a variant of servant leadership, could move leaders away from “controlling activities” towards a more synergistic relationship between leaders and citizens. The section will also explore the extent to which leaders place the governance and development interests of their followers before their personal egotisms and aspirations.

4.2 African governance model: Personified leadership versus *Ubuntu* in East Africa

This section discusses how personified leadership correlates with the ‘servant leader’ model and leadership in the African culture of *Ubuntu*. According to Ezeanya-Esiobu (2017:23), “African countries have long overlooked home grown strategies and grassroots based approaches to governance and public administration, settling instead for foreign concepts and ideas. We can trace the reason to the colonial era when colonial masters imposed ideas and strategies that formed the bedrock of policymaking across their controlled territories. Decades after colonialism, some African countries are now beginning to question the effectiveness of inherited governance mechanisms due to their failure to generate much needed development for the region.” Accordingly, this section will explore several concepts in African governance models to establish their relevance to the theory of personification.

The concept of ‘servant leadership’ is important since it freely borrows terms from different disciplines covered in this study. For instance, “the concept of servant
leadership draws on religious terms such as God, soul and spirit; and psychological concepts such as personal growth, self-awareness and identity; and from management ‘buzz words’ terms such as flat organization and shared vision” (Page & Wong, 2000). Furthermore, “the fact that leadership begins from within” (Bender, 1997, noted in Page & Wong, 2000) lends more credence to the juxtaposition of servant leadership and personified leadership that likewise emanates from an intrinsic character. Even more significant to this study is the assertion by Kohls (1998:114) that “the servanthood in traditional African leadership seems to have been lost completely.” On the other hand, *Ubuntu*, which holds that “no one is above the law”, forms the basis of law and politics in the [African] philosophical domain (Nabudere, 2005:6). Nabudere (2005:6) argued that “this explains why in *Ubuntu* political philosophy royal power is expected to spring from the people or in modern parlance ‘power belongs to the people’.” Nabudere (2005:2) argued that “the philosophy of *Ubuntu* is therefore important because it provides Africans a sense of self-identity, self-respect and achievement. The latter enables them to deal with their problems in a positive manner by drawing on the humanistic values they have inherited and perpetuated throughout their history.” I concur that a philosophy like *Ubuntu* that restores and assures “a sense of self-identity, self-respect and achievement” is crucial to mitigate the effects of personification on citizens.

People usually think that the words ‘servant’ and ‘leader’ are opposites. Spears (2005:1) contended that when two opposites come together in a creative and meaningful way, a paradox emerges. According to Spears (2005:1), experts have brought together the words ‘servant’ and ‘leader’ to create the paradoxical idea of servant leadership that is both logical and intuitive. Similarly, the term *Ubuntu* is a composite of two words that, according to Ramose (noted in Nabudere, 2005:2), “connotes a wellspring that flows within African existence and epistemology in which the two aspects *ubu* and *ntu* constitute a wholeness and oneness. Thus *Ubuntu* cannot be fragmented because it is continuous and always in motion.” Building on the latter, I argue that within the context of this study, the ‘servant leader’ model is the opposite of personified leadership in that it builds trust around the leader, develops the ‘led’ using power entrusted to the leader, and accommodates the opinions of others positively. Conversely, the egocentrism associated with personified leadership centres power around the national leader, thus denying
citizens their inalienable rights. Contrary to the personified leadership model, McMinn (noted in Thompson, 2010) suggests that “servant leaders develop people, and help them to strive and flourish.” From the study he conducted, Thompson (2010) corroborates this, noting that “[leaders] who are committed to the growth of [team members] are more effective in contributing towards successful [outcomes].”

Of particular relevance to this thesis, “servant leader behaviours relate to the African [traditional and cultural] concept of Ubuntu” (Brubaker, 2013:114). “A person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirms of others; does not feel threatened by others’ abilities and goodness (Van Niekerk, 2013:1).” Van Niekerk (2013:1, 96, 99) maintained that “this is because they have the self-assurance that comes from knowing that they belong in a greater whole, and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are.” Accordingly, the focus on Ubuntu allows the researcher to draw on a home-grown, traditional African governance model in order to understand contemporary leadership dynamics in East Africa. The gist of this section is that Africa once had its own functional governance and indigenous traditional political systems. To this end, Arowolo (2010:1) argued that “colonialism, slave trade and missionaries are the bastion of Western civilization and culture in Africa.” This is correct to the extent that colonialism serves as a vehicle of implantation of cultural imperialism in Africa. Arowolo (2010:1) explained that “colonialism, perceived in this context, is an imposition of foreign rule over indigenous traditional political setting and foreign dominance and subjugation of African people in all spheres of their social, political, cultural, economic and religious civilizations.” Therefore, I will endeavour to unravel how the interruption of Africa’s traditional mode of governance relates to the occurrence of personified governance.

Haegert (noted in Winston & Ryan, 2008:217), “in a conceptual article, presented an ethic of care for African nursing that relies on Ubuntu and takes the definition of Ubuntu deeper by tying the concept to an African Proverb: ‘a person is a person through other persons’.” The East African countries of Rwanda (Brubaker, 2013:95) and Kenya (Koshal, 2005:1, 8, 12), case studies in this section, have espoused the concept of respecting the individual, and have placed value on working as a team and supporting each other. The edifice of Ubuntu articulates “I am because we are; I can only be a person through others” (April & Ephraim; Nussbaum, noted in
In essence, “Ubuntu focuses on the person not living for himself or herself, but rather living for others” (Gakuru; Mamadou, noted in Koshal, 2005:4). Most importantly for this segment, the philosophy of Ubuntu allows for an interactive process where everyone is essentially a leader, as they can participate and show initiative in discussing, suggesting solutions, and participating in agreed actions. Accordingly, Jolley (2011:2) asserted that “Ubuntu in a religious environment, in families, in communities, and marriage counselling is and has been effective.” Jolley maintained that “Ubuntu seeps into society, to gain a foothold and assist individuals, families, and communities, leaders, and managers to increase respect and dignity in communities.”

According to Le Grange (noted in Brubaker, 2013:115), “society regards” “Ubuntu as an African worldview able to counteract the continent’s plague of genocide, patriarchy, autocratic leadership, corruption and human suffering.” Likewise, Ncube (noted in Brubaker, 2013:115) “discussed problems concerning post-colonial discrimination, leadership scandals, and extensive corruption.” According to Ncube, “African leadership theorists suggest that the philosophy of Ubuntu holds promise for progressive and ethical change for Africa.” “The Bantu languages in East, Southern and Central Africa use the term Ubuntu to refer to a worldview or philosophical approach to human relationships that elevates the importance of humanness and shared community” (Le Grange; Murithi, noted in Brubaker, 2013:119). Similarly, Muchiri (noted in Brubaker, 2013:119) contended that “the behavioural expression of Ubuntu demonstrates compassion, dignity, respect, and a humanistic concern for relationships.” On the other hand, Mhlaba (noted in Brubaker, 2013:101) provided an example on the latter in his assertion that “in apartheid South Africa, marginalized families only survived on account of Ubuntu, as the community responded by sharing with those in need.” “Ubuntu also accounts for the transformation of atrocities into humanizing events” (Haws, noted in Brubaker, 2013:119). Based on the Ubuntu concept, Desmond Tutu upheld reconciliation, that is, the restoration of the humanness of perpetrators and victims, as better than retributive justice in the revival of post-apartheid South Africa (Graybill, noted in Brubaker, 2013:119).

As is apparent from the above literature, traditional African society had developed and was subsisting under well-defined indigenous governance and political systems before encountering influences from the western world. The philosophy of Ubuntu,
for instance, espouses the concept of servant leadership and equal support to the leader by the subjects. Of particular significance, the above literature highlights the concept of communal interdependence and mutual support by societal members through sharing, rather than personalising, resources. Similarly, the researcher argues that societal leaders in traditional Africa were obliged to share their endowment of leadership, in return for respect from the people. Accordingly, subsequent paragraphs in this study will explore the extent to which national personification in East Africa relates to the disruption of traditional African systems. The researcher hopes that new information on the subject will help national citizens and other stakeholders to conceptualise how to address the concept of personification. The study also hopes to improve governance by unveiling factors that influence and possibly impact on definitive leadership actions. Particularly, this section will attempt to address the first part of research question number two on how personified leadership style influences governance in East Africa.

Brubaker (2013:97) posited that “Ubuntu is strongly rooted, structured in and associated with Southern Africa.” However, Nussbaum (2003) contended that “Ubuntu is an underlying social philosophy found in many African cultures.” In consonance, Kithaka wa Mberia (2015:113) shed some light on the origins of the term ‘Ubuntu’. “Using the cognates and employing the comparative method”, Kithaka wa Mberia reconstructed a proto-Bantu term for ‘humanness/humanity’ and argued that the original form existed right at the inception of Bantu languages in the area where current Cameroon borders the Benue-Congo area of south-eastern Nigeria. Kithaka wa Mberia observed that “‘bubuntu’ underwent phonological, morphological and semantic changes, eventually resulting in ‘ubuntu’ in isiZulu and isiKhosa, ‘unhu’ in Shona, ‘bubundu’ and ‘ubundu’ in Luhya, ‘utu’ in Kiswahili, ‘obuntu’ in Luganda and “ubuntu” in Kinyarwanda.” According to Kithaka wa Mberia (2015:114), “since there are differences in the historical changes through which ‘bubuntu’ has undergone in various Bantu languages, the cognates of ‘ubuntu’ may differ in shades of meaning and nuances while sharing the core meaning of ‘humanness/humanity’.” Correspondingly, Bibiliya Yera (noted in Brubaker, 2013:121) posited that in religious contexts, “Ubuntu denotes grace.” In non-religious contexts “Ubuntu means the quality of being kind and generous” (Niyomugabo, noted in Brubaker, 2013:121). “Despite these simple glosses, the philosophical and cultural connotations of Ubuntu
are also present and relevant within the Rwandan worldview (Broodryk, noted in Brubaker, 2013:103).” Broodryk maintained that, “when asked to explain the philosophical implications of Ubuntu, a group of Rwandese explained that Ubuntu is an act where the recipient of Ubuntu shows that he/she is as human as the giver and deserves the same quality of humanness as the giver.” Yet, according to Brubaker (2013:122), “although Rwandese hold up Ubuntu as a cardinal and aspirational virtue, experts regularly acknowledge that laudable acts expressing Ubuntu are infrequent.”

I argue that the Ubuntu philosophy discussed above highlights our African humanness and humanity. The relevance of this philosophy to the theory of personification is that it characterises individuals as unique intellectual entities, capable of responding to emotional stimuli and demonstrating rational behaviours with or without external influence. This context is important since it clearly illustrates that traditional African society recognised that individuals were culpable for their actions. I argue that this philosophy acted as a check and balance on personal excesses and is a possible mitigating factor for personified inclination. I also noted that in religious contexts recognised Ubuntu as grace. I interpreted this to signify that religion also recognised that individuals demonstrated a certain degree of humanity. On the other hand, non-religious entities recognised the Ubuntu philosophy as connoting kindness and compassion. Essentially, all the different elements discussed above recognised the intrinsic factor in Ubuntu that moderates individual human behaviour towards others in a society. Based on the latter, I infer that good practices in specific African cultures like Ubuntu had the potential of checking personified leadership.

Still on the subject of Ubuntu, Winston and Ryan (2008:217) argued that “in Kenya, the concept of Ubuntu is analogous to Harambee. Ubuntu has similarities to Patterson’s (2003) definition of servant leadership in that it focuses on the well-being of the follower while seeing the [institution’s] interests as secondary, thus creating a community of followers within the organization” (Winston & Ryan, 2008:217). Similarly, Jolley (2011:15) asserted that “an Ubuntu practice in Kenyan villages includes the African tradition of child nurturing by the whole village.” Thus, Jolley (2011:2) maintained that “Ubuntu seeps into society, to gain a foothold and assist individuals, families, and communities, leaders, and managers to increase respect
and dignity in communities.” On the other hand, Koshal (2005:1, 3) “studied the acceptability of Patterson’s (2003) theory of servant leadership in Kenya in order to gain perspectives from African cross-cultural settings to broaden our comprehension of the model.” In particular, Koshal focused on the applicability of ‘Patterson’s construct of service’. Based on the concept of Harambee, a Kenyan culture of pulling together as a community, Koshal (2005:15) suggested that Kenyan leaders are more likely to accept and apply Patterson’s service construct. In Koshal’s (2005:1, 8) analysis, respondents consider that the servant leadership concept of service comprises six factors: “role modelling; sacrificing for others; meeting others’ needs and developing them; primary function of service; recognition and reward of employees; humility and respect for employees; and involving employees in decision-making.” Correspondingly, Leys (noted in Chesire, Mutiso & Chege, 2015:247) posited that “the Harambee philosophy of self-help development as a key feature of development planning aimed at meeting the needs and expectations of the indigenous populations.” Leys maintained that The Harambee movement ... “was responsible for the mobilization of large sums of capital for a wide variety of basic needs. Similarly, the initiative aimed at social inclusion and integration of populations in development processes.”

From the above, I noted the recurring concept of humanness and reciprocity under Ubuntu. In the case of Kenya, I noted that society had understood that “leadership is a relationship between leaders and followers.” Thus, the spirit of reciprocity in traditional Africa, especially in sharing resources, historically empowered both the leader and followers in respectable measures. The researcher therefore argues that the concept of Ubuntu, and its equivalent Harambee, potentially moulded effective ‘servant leaders’ out of African society, who by inference became good governors of society. These leaders then took charge over the processes of arbitration, nurturing, well-being, decision-making and spiritual growth of traditional society. Mangaliso (noted in Mangena, 2011:108) corroborates the latter point in his assertion that “Ubuntu forms the core of most traditional African cultures as it embraces the spirit of caring and community, harmony and hospitality, respect and responsiveness.” I argue that there was little or no room for personification of systems, since society shared all resources symbiotically and reciprocally. Traditional African society also posed no conflict of roles in leadership and governance structures. This is because
every societal member knew their role, particularly within the context of Koshal’s six factors of servant leadership, discussed in the preceding paragraph.

In line with the above, I argue that the immediate post-independence government in Kenya showed tendencies towards personification, rather than Harambee. Booth, Cooksey, Golooba-Mutebi and Kanyinga (2014:13) affirmed this in the assertion that “when Kenya became independent in 1963, it assumed a model of government comprising multiparty elections and a bicameral legislature based on Westminster principles.” Booth et al. maintained that “initially, two major political parties were formed along ethno-regional lines: Kenyan Alliance of National Unity (KANU) represented numerically large Kikuyu and Luo communities, while Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) represented numerically smaller groups. KANU won the independence elections and formed the first government with Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu as President and Oginga Odinga the Vice President. A few years into independence, the KANU government dismantled federal institutions as well as multiparty politics” (Booth et al., 2014:31) and “started promoting the ideology of ‘African Socialism’” (Leys, noted in Chesire et al., 2015:248). On this note, I argue that the dismantling of federal institutions with strong ethno-cultural foundations diminished the concept of social inclusions and humanistic concern. Instead, national leaders promoted untested ‘African socialism’ in an attempt to disrupt the human relationships that elevate the importance of humanness and shared community. I posit that this contemptible move disrupted the normal trajectory of Kenya’s social, cultural and political transition, paving the way for the rise of personified governance.

In a study of the political economy of Kenya, Booth et al. (2014:13) articulated “a clear inference to Kenya’s transition to a personified system. They contended that the ruling party [under Jomo Kenyatta] manipulated the political system in a way that compelled the opposition, KADU, to wind up in the ‘national interest’.” Similarly, Andreassen and Crawford (2013:55) argued that “KANU, under the leadership of Kenyatta started repressing the opposition and his regime became increasingly authoritarian.” Likewise, Ghai and McAuslan (1970:159) asserted that “Kenyatta’s authoritarian style, characterized by patronage, favouritism, tribalism and/or nepotism drew criticism and dissent, and set a bad example followed by his successors. He had the constitution radically amended to expand his powers, consolidating executive power.” Therefore, I point out that, having deviated from
Africa’s consensus-based systems like *Ubuntu*, the transition to authoritarian governance was inevitable. I discussed in the preceding paragraphs how *Ubuntu* philosophy posed a formidable check and balance on individual excesses. In this respect, Mengisteab (2006:3) particularly “cites well-known examples of consensus based decision making as the council of elders (kiama) of the Kikuyu in Kenya, as well as the Teso and Lango of Uganda.” Thus, Mengisteab (2006:8) maintained that “the new elite, which increasingly grew self-serving and autocratic, also could not tolerate the existence of contending points of [traditional] power. Accordingly, the leaders subverted prevailing traditional systems in preference for manipulating citizens using personified governance systems.” To this end, I agree with Lituchy, Punnett and Puplampu (2013:251) that “reverting to an Afro-centric view of leadership requires a reconnection with African indigenous knowledge like *Ubuntu* that endorse factors such as supportiveness, relationships and extended networks.”

Further to the above, I argue that the impact of Kenyatta’s governance style reverberated in Kenya, and continues to do so even after his demise. This is indicative of how deep-rooted personified systems can become. Illustratively, Andreassen and Crawford (2013:55) argued “that from 1978 to 2002 during the era of President Daniel arap Moi [who succeeded Jomo Kenyatta], political repression and control of the judiciary continued to plague Kenya.” I contend that that arap Moi’s regime was a blend of Jomo Kenyatta’s and Moi’s own version of state personification. Both regimes subverted the servanthood of the traditional African leadership that had epitomised pre-colonial Kenya. For instance, Veney and Zeleza (2013:6) argued that “under Moi, the contradictions of authoritarian-dependent capitalist development became more evident and explosive; and Kenya became a one-party state with centralized power around the President.” Veney and Zeleza maintained that “KANU became a powerful weapon to discipline members of the political class, and a dreaded mechanism of patron-client dispensations of resources.” Khamisi (noted in Andreassen & Crawford, 2013:56) accentuated the latter in his explanation that “many features of Kenyan politics over the last 50 years such as confrontational ethno-politics, corruption and political bribery, have not changed.” Conversely, Andreassen and Crawford (2013:55) argued that “in the 1990’s Kenya moved from a one-party authoritarian state to a formal democracy [albeit] with a stagnant economy.” However, Andreassen and Crawford contended
that “significant constraints on new democratic forces characterized the decade, with dramatic state instigated violence in the electoral cycles of 1992, 1997 and 2008.”

As illustrated from the above literature, I argue that Kenyatta’s personified leadership was contrary to Patterson’s theory of servant leadership, and the Harambee spirit. Manda (2009:1) illustrated this point eloquently in the assertion that most post-independence leaders manifested the eclipse of Ubuntu, indicated by the leader becoming the main centre of every reference, thus losing the essence of Ubuntu that focuses on community building. In affirmation, the researcher postulates that the above literature illustrates how personification has distorted the mandate of public institutions and the very moral fabric of Kenyan society, thereby relegating its nationals to the status of acquiesced citizens. In particular, the advent of colonialism introduced models of governance that were embryonic for African society. Kenyatta’s attempt to introduce socialism with an African dimension came with governance dynamics that were more egocentric than egalitarian. Within the foregoing context, Mangena (2011:109) asserted that “in the West, community exists to serve the interests of the individual while in sub-Saharan Africa the individual exists to serve the community. Thus, Ubuntu operates in this spirit.” Mangena maintained that “in Africa, people influence the direction their leader should take when it comes to governance issues and leadership is about serving the people.” This study argues that by resorting to egocentrism, Kenya’s immediate post-independence leaders succumbed to the trappings of personified rule, which inevitably resulted in acquiesced citizens.

Regarding Rwanda, this section will mainly focus on the incumbent President, Paul Kagame, whose enigmatic reign provides paradoxical correlation between good governance and good leadership. To this end, the researcher highlights a highly saturated quote from Parolini (2014) to set the tone for this segment.

Parolini (2014) posited that … “Rwanda has a perfect example of servant-leadership from the king’s court. The king’s servant was the second most powerful man in the country; part manservant, prime minister, head of protocol, his mouthpiece, his best friend because he spent twenty four hours with the king. The servant was from a low-caste but was more feared and respected than royals, he controlled access to the king, and he dealt with
matters of state and had a network of spies around the country. His word was the word of the king, a slight glance from him could get you killed, but he walked in absolute humility. He knew the real power he had but never showed it, that even added to his power, everyone in the room was scared of him but he acted coy and subservient to them. That is the key to servant-leadership, it is not weak leadership, it is strong leadership, [an individual] has to soften their appearance to be more approachable.”

The researcher agrees with Parolini’s assertion that humility and subservience do not necessarily mean the powerlessness of a leader. Contrary to the quandary of egocentrism that defines personified leadership, adaptability is a critical ingredient for servant leadership. Parolini’s befitting quote played out in contemporary Rwanda’s history in 1994. After successfully overthowing the Rwandan government in 1994, Kagame assumed the role of Vice President, having been the “tactician behind”, and after 1990, the commander of, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (The New York Times, July 20th, 1994). Although he deputised for President Pasteur Bizimungu, real power appeared to rest with Kagame (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016). Correspondingly, Oloka-Onyango (2004:32) posited that “in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the title new breed was generically applied to the leadership of the RPF, but more specifically to Paul Kagame – the elusive power behind the throne who in 2000 revealed his true colours and assumed full leadership of the country.” Drawing on the inferences by the two authors cited above, I argue that Kagame portrayed the unequivocal mastery of the principles of servant leadership espoused by his regal ancestors in the court of Rwanda’s kings. Onyango-Oloka (2004:32) even referred to the then Rwanda’s Presidency as the “throne”, alluding to its contextually regal nature. Accordingly, “as a servant leader, Kagame the true power behind the Presidency and military remained the dominant force in the maintenance of civil order and the administration of justice, as well as ensuring the security of the country’s borders” (Waugh, 2004:121).

From Waugh’s (2004) argument, I note a definite likening of Kagame’s leadership style to ‘servant leadership.’ The foregoing statement postulates that Kagame was cognisant of the need to project himself as a servant leader in order to delude his constituents for a while. In line with the researcher’s argument on Kagame’s servant leadership posture, Brubaker (2013:122-3) demonstrated “a strong correlation
between servant leadership behaviours and perceived leader effectiveness in Rwanda.” By showing that servant leadership behaviours are consistent with the African philosophy of Ubuntu on leader effectiveness, Brubaker has shown that the “interconnectedness of self within society and the extension of humanness within shared community” help to account for the relevance and acceptability of servant leadership within Rwanda.” I contend that Brubaker’s argument dovetails well with Parolini’s views. The argument highlights the point that humility acts as a check on the egos of national leaders, and puts community strength and success ahead of selfish personal desires. On this note, this study argues that the essential quality that amplifies the intrinsic humanity of a leader invites trust, respect and honour to the persona. This is the humanistic concern for others that the philosophy of Ubuntu demonstrates – the interconnectedness of the ‘self’ within society.

In contrast, Rwanda exhibits a peculiarity, where scholars are associating patrimonialism with positive national development. Booth et al. (noted in Cubitt, 2014:5) posited that “developmental patrimonialism embraces local norms and practices rather than fighting against them, as exemplified by contemporary Rwanda.” In this case, Khan (noted in Cubitt, 2014:5) asserted that “developmental patrimonialism has yielded a situation where politically generated opportunities for profit are institutionalized and centralized, and where economic rents are deployed efficiently with a view to longer-term development.” In corroboration of the foregoing, Booth et al. (2014:76) argued that “Rwanda is undoubtedly an outlier in the East African region. Although burdened with the least developed economy in terms of income levels and economic structure, the country is benefiting from political arrangements that set it apart.” Booth et al. (2014:x) maintained that policymaking in Rwanda, for instance, does not suffer from the acute, politically driven coordination problems besetting other East African countries like Kenya and Tanzania. While observers point to President Kagame’s personal dominance and leadership style, Booth et al. (2014:85) reasoned that the explanation is more institutional than otherwise. Nonetheless Booth et al. (2014:85) concurred that “Kagame has successfully presided over the construction of a national political settlement that provides a favourable context for the design and implementation of national development efforts.”
In analysing the above discussion, I contend that experts associate Kagame’s leadership style with patrimonialism and dominance. Apparently, this signifies Kagame’s transition from emulating the principles of servant leadership, as formerly championed by Rwanda’s kings, to espousing personified leadership. In corroboration, Reese (2014) expounded on “the writings and ideological construct embodied by Machiavelli in the 16th Century that are exemplified in the leadership of Paul Kagame, the current President of Rwanda.” Reese maintained that “as a modern day Machiavellian Prince, Kagame has inspired Rwandans with love, fear, and a unique paternalism.” Reese positively noted that “Kagame’s enigmatic and Machiavellian leadership style has helped propel Rwanda into a fledgling success story amidst the difficult political climate of Africa.” On this note, I posit that the character attributes currently associated with Kagame’s leadership and by extension, governance style, are more related with personified leadership than servant leadership. Equally, patrimonialism, dominance, fear and paternalism are descriptors of an authoritarian and totalitarian leadership style that is more inward than citizen oriented. I assert that these are the enunciating elements of personified leadership.

In line with the above arguments, Uddhammar (2013:419) examined “views expressed by Western leaders and academics about autocratic leaders, including President Kagame.” Uddhammar (2013:403) contended that “indeed the West portray Kagame as ‘enlightened’, however, they excuse his democratic deficit mostly on the grounds that he delivers on other developmental goals.” Conversely, the researcher argues that there is growing infrequency and rarity in reciprocity of humanness by President Kagame. To this end, Gisselquist (2012a) argued that “Rwanda [under President Kagame] provides an illustration of some of the challenges faced by experts in defining good governance.” Gisselquist maintained that “Rwanda has made clear progress in terms of economic growth, public sector management and regulatory reform since the end of genocide in 1994.” The Human Rights Watch (2011) averred that this “trend continued through 2010, but there were numerous violations of civil and political rights, and the government failed to fulfil its professed commitment to democracy”. Should we consider Rwanda well governed because of its economic progress, or poorly governed because of its democratic deficits? “The Department for International Development (DFID) – the largest bilateral donor in Rwanda, for instance, has effectively argued the former. Human
Rights Watch, among others, sharply criticized DFID policy in 2011, effectively asserting the latter” (Gisselquist, 2012a).

According to Reese (2014), “experts romanticize and criticize Paul Kagame’s role as a head of state in equal measure.” Reese maintained that “the critics charged that beyond the paved roads and clean sidewalks, Kagame has embraced a dictatorial flair that has blemished his remarkable achievements.” On the other hand, Reese points out that “Kagame’s supporters point to Rwanda’s rapid economic growth under Kagame’s policies. Kagame has enjoyed a great deal of success towards the objectives that he has laid out for Rwanda, but it will always carry the stigma of being at the cost of political freedom.” Analogously, Swart, van Wyk and Botha (2014:667) contended that “experts describe President Kagame as a ‘benevolent dictator’ who belongs to a group of ‘hybrid leadership’ in Africa.” To this end, I argue that Kagame’s leadership style has ultimately defined his national governance style. Similarly, I posit that because of his deviation to personified tendencies, Kagame’s governance style has failed to espouse the principles of *Ubuntu* that I discussed in preceding paragraphs. In terms of striving for policy objectivity, the researcher agrees that “the quality of development policy-making in Rwanda needs to be less associated with Kagame’s personality” (Booth et al., 2014:11). However, I note that the process of policymaking deeply enmeshes with systems in Rwanda’s national institutions. From the above arguments, this study infers that the fact that experts increasingly associate Rwanda’s social, economic and political successes with Kagame’s leadership is indicative of personification.

As highlighted above, the empirical segment on the subject of personification poses certain critical questions, as did the theoretical segment. For instance, to what extent does personified leadership in nations that practice *Ubuntu* curtail or precipitate good governance? Equally, Manda (2009:4) asked that “if we understand that *Ubuntu* offers a great foundation in the African culture or way of life, why then does a society or a nation such as Rwanda, knowing *Ubuntu* allow genocide to occur?” Similarly, Manda (2009:4) posed another related question, “why are several tribal clashes and civil wars happening in the land where supposedly *Ubuntu* understanding is rooted?” To these questions, the researcher responds that leadership is about how an individual leader and their subjects view the world. An individual’s worldview comprises personal accountability, ethics, personal calling and integrity. Accordingly,
I argue that in Rwanda, for instance, leaders who digress from the principles of *Ubuntu* should be held accountable for governance outcomes during their terms in office. This is because the inherent choice to espouse *Ubuntu* or not is a subjective leadership choice, as is the decision to personify a system.

Furthermore, the empirical account of genocide in Rwanda confirms the researcher’s views that several individuals, acting in tandem, could induce a leader to enter into personification. Conversely, the concept of *Ubuntu*, a fundamental doctrine of traditional African morals and ethics, emphasises collective identity as opposed to the Western emphasis on individual identity (Van Dyk, 2016:256). The *New World Encyclopaedia* (2016) asserted that “individual behaviour and interaction in the context of various social roles are key concepts associated with *Ubuntu*. Accordingly, *Ubuntu* is essential to traditional African jurisprudence and governance. Thus, a person with *Ubuntu* knows their place in the universe and is consequently able to interact civilly with other individuals.” I postulate that adherence to the above African values is sufficient to avert ethnic tensions in Rwanda. In addition, the researcher posited that the respectful, interactive aspects of *Ubuntu* that have helped traditional African society to live in harmony are still important for a nation like Rwanda. For instance, “one aspect of *Ubuntu* is that at all times, the individual effectively represents the people from among whom he or she comes, and therefore tries to behave according to the highest standards and exhibit the virtues upheld by his or her society” (New World Encyclopaedia 2016). Similarly, Katz (noted in Van Dyk, 2016:240) posited that the African traditional worldview emphasized the ‘self-embedded in the community’, which establishes conditions where “what is good for one is good for all, and the whole is greater than the sum of parts.”

I observe that, “while in the past Africans seem to have universally embraced *Ubuntu* as a way of life, this has eroded with the passage of time; hence, there is a call to revive the *Ubuntu* way of living” (Jansen; Kamwangamalu; Nyaumwe & Mkabela, noted in Van Dyk, 2016:228). Accordingly, Masango (noted in Van Dyk, 2016:228) believed that “such a call will assist in building [African] nation(s) to its original way of living and of respecting one another and thus counteract the current social ills of violence and abuse.” Hence, I argue that the dissolution of personified leadership in East Africa is possible when national leaders espouse traditional African principles of servant leadership, particularly *Ubuntu*. Perhaps East African leaders could also
borrow from the well-defined Christian perspective of servant leadership. As seen in Isaiah 41:8; 42:1, the Bible articulately amplifies the concept of servant leadership “based on an individual assuming the role of a servant to both God and others” (Farling, n.d.:2, noted in Cerff, 2004:7). Likewise, in the book of Matthew 20:28, we read that Jesus – a central figure in Christianity – declared in reference to Himself, “the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give His life a ransom for many.” On this note, Snodgrass (noted in Cerff, 2004:7) argued that “Christians understand their role of being servants ‘on account of’ Jesus. Snodgrass maintained that individuals ‘do not become servant leaders by choice or desire’.” Conversely, Snodgrass argued that “servanthood is the result of an individual’s personal relationship with Christ, as the character and purposes of Christ become pre-eminent in an individual’s life.” From the above discussion, I note that Christianity illustrates a clear example of ‘service above self.’ Intrinsic convictions in the heart of an individual drive these selfless acts of charity and goodwill. I therefore assert that Christian perspectives of servant leadership can positively influence the leadership behaviours in the theory of personification.

The Christian perspective also resonates well with the norms of servant leadership and ultimately Ubuntu. For instance, “the Kenyan concept of Harambee, which embodies and reflects the strong ancient value of mutual assistance, joint effort, mutual social responsibility and community self-reliance, has continued to play a cardinal role in the development of Kenya” (Bailey; Chieni, Mbithi & Rasmusson; Shikuku; Wilson, as noted by Koshal, 2005:6). Of critical significance on the subject, Koshal (2005) “links the concept of Harambee to the practice of servant leadership in Kenya.” Hence, I posit that the connection between Harambee and servant leadership is important since it diminishes the egocentricity inherent in personified leadership. In corroboration, Koshal (noted in Winston & Ryan, 2008:218) pointed out that “the notion of service in ‘Patterson’s (2003) model of servant leadership’ is like the Harambee philosophy that draws guidance from the principle of ‘collective good rather than individual gain’ as it puts others’ welfare and interest [above the leaders own].” This study agrees with Winston and Ryan’s (2008:217) assertion “that Ubuntu has similarities to Patterson’s (2003) definition of servant leadership since it focuses on the well-being of the follower, while regarding [personal] interests as secondary.” Accordingly, I submit that, in order to mitigate the impact of
personification in Kenya, the national leaders could adopt philosophical and humanitarian values fostered by African traditions. Thus, the leaders observing *Ubuntu* would express qualities that Tefff (noted in Van Dyk, 2016:230) suggested, including “kindness, good character, generosity, hard work, discipline, honour, respect and harmonious living” [as opposed to personified inclinations].

Regarding Rwanda, I contend that the country has made remarkable socio-economic and political gains in the post-genocide era since 1994. I argue that Rwanda’s national leaders could better consolidate these gains if they were to espouse unpretentious servant leadership and *Ubuntu* values. Although earlier in his Presidency, the incumbent leader, Paul Kagame, practised the principles of servant leadership in the traditions of his ancestors, he became completely transformed with the passage of time. The researcher notes that previous national leaders in Rwanda followed the same pattern of personified leadership. In an ethnically charged nation like Rwanda, the researcher argues that the time-tested values of servant leadership that sustained Rwanda’s regal system until its abolishment would be a more viable governance alternative. This study notes that the challenge with the current leadership structure, which heavily gravitates towards personified rule, is that it is exclusionary and precipitates discord rather than unity. Thus, as an alternative to the personified rule in Rwanda, I draw on Brubaker’s (2013) argument that shows “interconnectedness of self within society and the extension of humanness within shared community” can help to account for the relevance and acceptability of servant leadership in Rwanda. “The holistic and multi-dimensional approach to servant leadership that includes the rational, emotional, ethical, and spiritual sides of both leaders and followers” (Sendjaya & Cooper, noted in Mutia & Muthamia, 2016:130), provided a justifiable basis for virtuous leadership in Rwanda. The latter is significant for this study, especially in corroborating the point that true leadership is not a matter of mere style, but is fundamentally an act of character. For example, I argue that a true leader does not detract from impartiality, as administered by the country’s sovereign justice system in order to advance good governance. Since justice is a critical aspect of national governance, in subsequent paragraphs I examine how Ubuntu philosophy promotes judicial processes.
According to Hinton (2015:392,397), *Ubuntu* – a traditional humanistic philosophy, and Gacaca, an indigenous Rwandese restorative justice process are interconnected. Hinton (2015:395) maintained that “there are variant assertions over the role of Gacaca in promoting healing and post-conflict reconstruction. Endogenous methods like Gacaca courts in Rwanda represent a model of alternative or restorative justice, which are both cathartic and conciliatory. The Gacaca was reincarnated for both pragmatic and ideological reasons. From a practical standpoint, Rwanda’s formal courts faced a backlog of cases, while huge caseloads swallowed the International Tribunal on Rwanda. It was quite clear that the Rwandan formal legal system and the international criminal tribunal were not going to be able to deal with all these cases of genocide. The Gacaca was, therefore, a mechanism to decongest the country’s prisons by speeding up trials at the community level. From an ideological viewpoint, Gacaca emphasises the Rwandan government's need to promote culturally relevant approaches to reconciliation.

I observe from the above arguments that Gacaca courts are a clear illustration that indigenous African forms of restorative and transitional justice are actually still applicable in this era. It is also interesting to note that Rwanda opted for the traditional justice system as an alternative to decrease the backlog of cases. I also point out that this justice system was instrumental in expediting the process of reinstating freedoms to incarcerated suspects. In many respects, Gacaca courts, a variant of Ubuntu, possible checks and balances to personified governance since it premises on cultural systems that are familiar to the citizens.

In shedding more light on the model, Karbo and Mutusi (2008:5) assert that Gacaca is a Kinyarwanda concept which literary means “justice on the grass”. They maintain that “Gacaca courts are a traditional Rwandese phenomenon, where people sit on the grass to settle their disputes in the presence of community members. Historically, Rwanda used Gacaca courts to settle issues such as land, property, marital and other interpersonal disputes. Gacaca hearings are traditionally held outdoors and the system is based on voluntary confessions and apologies by wrongdoers.” Correspondingly, Werchick (noted in Karbo & Mutusi, 2008:5) argues that “in its pre-colonial form, Gacaca was used to moderate disputes concerning land use rights, cattle ownership, marriage, inheritance rights and petty theft, among others.
Traditionally, members of the community known as the *inyangamugayo* translated as ‘persons of exemplary conduct’ – who were renowned for courage, honour, justice and truth run the Gacaca courts. The *inyangamugayo* were special, and assumed this role based on their high moral and ethical standards. In traditional Rwanda, after the dispute had been resolved, the parties would conduct a ritual or ceremony reflecting the symbolic and practical importance of the process. Gacaca sessions often ended with the involved parties sharing drinks and a meal as a gesture of reconciliation. Serious offences would result in [authorities] ostracising the offender from the community.”

I posit that the above literature highlights the potential of Gacaca for the assurance of stability in traditional communities. The model also protected the rights of members across various domains from interpersonal differences through to property disputes. I believe the stringent threat of ostracizing also ensured observance of the law within the communities. With respect to the latter, it is no wonder that Hinton (2015:395) posited that “the Rwandan government passed a law creating Gacaca courts to prosecute crimes committed between October 1990 and December 1994.” Hinton argued that “the government determined that it was critical to eradicate the culture of impunity in Rwanda, and to deter the possibility of genocide. There was a need for justice, reconciliation, and nation building in the post-genocide era.” In consonance with the latter, Issifu (noted in Arthur, Issifu & Marfo, 2015:64) contended that, African nations have applied local conflict resolution mechanisms in managing and resolving ethnic, religious, chieftaincy and resource based conflicts. According to him, war-victimised countries including Rwanda have all used local conflict resolution methods like Gacaca to resolve conflicts to ensure sustainable peace after years of warfare. I argue that Issifu’s assertion lends credence to my position that Gacaca courts provided robust conflict resolution mechanisms in traditional African society. The fact that an ethnically fragile country like Rwanda legalised Gacaca demonstrates that the nation still finds reassurance in this model to deter and mitigate conflict.

In this context, Arthur et al., (2015:63) contend that violent conflicts have been the major critical issues in the global politics. As Sadowski (noted in Arthur et al., 2015:63) puts it, “many of violent conflicts occurring along the political and ethnic
lines are common phenomena in sub-Saharan Africa.” Sadowski (noted in Arthur et al., 2015:64) maintains that “in the past four decades, there have been numerous instances of violent conflicts with roots in ethnicity, politics and governance, territory or boundary as witnessed in several African countries - the worst being the genocide involving Hutus against Tutsis in Rwanda. In his view, in most parts of the conflict torn countries in the Africa continent, these conflicts tend to have negative repercussions on women, children and socio-economic activities of the state.” Correspondingly, Mugumbate and Nyanguru (2013:96) asserted that in managing community conflicts, the application of African traditional jurisprudence, leadership and governance is usually helpful and Ubuntu espouses these values. Likewise, in a study, Brubaker (noted in Ngunjiri 2016:226) found servant leadership and Ubuntu leadership behaviours to be highly related to perceived effectiveness of leaders in Rwanda. However, his audience reported not often observing Ubuntu leadership behaviours among their leaders.

In the above literature, Mugumbate and Nyanguru correlate the concept of African traditional jurisprudence, leadership and governance. This correlation is relevant for this study since it focuses on the themes that influence that evolution or subsistence of personified reign. In this context, it is noteworthy that Brubaker introduces the concept of servant leadership, a factor discussed in section 4.1, but this time comes with a connection to Ubuntu. By inference, I argue that Ubuntu philosophy is a critical ingredient in shaping a leaders governance style. On the contrary, leaders who do not esteem the Ubuntu philosophy will gravitate towards personification as I have already discussed severally in this study. However, I argue that if a country has strong independent institutions, such systems can check the excesses or tendencies towards personification. Karsten and Illa (2005:10) corroborated my argument in their assertion that “the contribution of the Ubuntu concept to the resolution of organizational and institutional problems now integrates countries from across Africa, for example Rwanda and Kenya in East Africa.” This strengthens my postulation that the Ubuntu model is effective at both leadership and institutional levels.

In rationalising Ubuntu as an African governance model, Ezeanya-Esiobu (2017:9) argued that “post-independent Rwanda continued with the governance system it inherited from the colonial masters. She maintained that succeeding administrations
in Rwanda invested more in the provision of social services, working together with international development partners and a budding civil society and private sector. Ezeanya-Esiobu points out that Rwanda’s *Ubuntu* philosophy, shared by much of the Bantu occupied region of Sub-Saharan Africa, calls for the protection of the weak and vulnerable by the stronger members of the society.” From the above argument, I noted that *Ubuntu* actually cascades from leadership and institutional levels through to vulnerable members of society. On this point, I contend that Ubuntu is a comprehensive African governance tool that is contextually applicable to contemporary leadership and governance dynamics.

In order to buttress my argument, I draw on Kanakulya (2015:236) who echoed my view in asserting that “the application of the principle of *Ubuntu* to governance in the East African region would help harmonise divergent views. He maintained that the foundation on which *Ubuntu* builds a society is that we are all humans who deserve respect and a chance as members of society.” Kanakulya (2015:279) maintained that, “*Ubuntu* as a principle captures and represents the three common approaches by African thinkers to resolving the African development challenges, namely: re-dignification, unification and re-construction. In re-dignification terms, ubuntu brings back the dignity of the native African as one who can also contribute to the governance and development of the region using a philosophy that they are well versed with. In terms of unification, *Ubuntu* has potential of unifying varying views within East Africa because it arises from shared spiritual and moral aspirations of the people of the region. In re-constructive terms, *Ubuntu* contributes to re-conceptualizing and re-framing of the processes and the institutions of the region.”

In conclusion, in this section I established that the concept of servant leadership reveals that outward manifestation of leadership actions emanate from within an individual. In addition to focusing on the leader, the *Ubuntu* philosophy also asserts that leadership ‘power belongs to the people.’ These observations are critical in this study because they highlight that leadership actions and follower reactions operate in tandem. It is significant to note that both actions stem from intrinsic characters of individuals. This is important in this study because the theory of personification holds individuals culpable for their actions. In this respect, *Ubuntu* provides a sense of self-identity and self-respect that enables individuals to act in a positive manner by
drawing on the humanistic values. I also noted that servant leaders develop people, and support their communities to prosper as opposed to egocentric accumulation of wealth associated with personified regimes. Essentially, the *Ubuntu* philosophy highlights our African humanness and humanity by characterizing individuals as unique intellectual entities, capable of responding to emotional and external stimuli. More importantly, the *Ubuntu* philosophy has safety provisions that moderate individual human behaviour towards others in a society. Although *Ubuntu* takes many dimensions in different African societies, the subjects of the philosophy do not compromise its core principles. For instance, Kenyan society domesticated *Ubuntu* principles by rebranding it as the “Harambee” philosophy. This motivating factor enabled Kenyan leaders to take charge over key decision-making processes and spiritual growth of society. However, the study noted that Kenya’s attempt at introducing ‘African socialism’ to replace humanistic principles bungled, as it only disrupted the ordinary trajectory of Kenya’s social, cultural and political transition, paving the way for the proliferation of personified governance.

In the case of Rwanda, this study noted that the country provided a perfect example of traditional servant-leadership from the king’s court. The king appointed a servant who was from a low-caste but eventually became more feared and respected than other royals. This servant controlled access to the king, and dealt with administrative matters of the state. Rwanda witnessed a contemporary version of servant leadership in 1994 when the current regime assumed power. After the 1994 war, Kagame, the power behind the RPF, took on the role of Vice President to a Hutu – in effect, emulating the tenets of servant leadership. As it is with all leaders with personified inclinations, Kagame’s pretence did not last long. He quickly elbowed his way to the top where he has been the President for over 20 years now. However, Rwanda’s brand of personified leadership poses a paradox in this study. Experts unanimously agree that Kagame has successfully created an enabling environment for national development. He has leveraged the *Ubuntu* philosophy successfully to strengthen Rwanda’s judicial process. Yet Rwanda is trudging under a *de facto*-personified regime. Essentially, Kagame’s actions point squarely that leadership actions determine governance and development trajectories. Thus, good leadership actions result in positive development outcomes. Kagame’s actions run contrary to
the *Ubuntu* philosophy that requires the individual to effectively represent his people, and to behave according to the highest standards upheld by their society.

Finally, this study drew inspiration from the Christian interpretation of servant leadership that depicts leadership as a selfless act of charity and goodwill. This interpretation provides a substantive check on personified excesses. In this context, I argue that *Ubuntu* philosophy of African governance can potentially shape contemporary governance styles and development outcomes. On the contrary, contemporary leaders who do not esteem the *Ubuntu* philosophy will inevitably gravitate towards personification. On this note, I point out that the next section will examine contemporary dimensions of personified governance in East Africa. This will allow the holistic comprehension pertaining to how a leader’s behavioural inclination relates to their actual effectiveness.

### 4.3 Contemporary dimensions on personified governance in East Africa

In this segment, I undertake an empirical analysis on how a leader’s behavioural inclination relates to their actual effectiveness. This entails a detailed review of extent to which personified leadership affects governance and development. Accordingly, this section will focus on two countries, Kenya and Rwanda that are the subjects of empirical case studies to illustrate the thesis and principles of personified governance in East Africa. Specifically, the rationale for selecting Kenya is that it provides the most typical basis to explore and understand causal qualitative leadership mechanisms that are not obviously apparent in other East African countries, as covered in this thesis. Also of significance, “Kenya is a regional economic power and thus overall performance of [other countries] in the region largely depends on what happens in Kenya” (Kimenyi & Kibe, 2014). On the other hand, the study on Rwanda will provide rich, deep contextual data to help the reader understand qualitative empirical phenomena pertaining to personified leadership in a manner that can be generalised to other East African countries. Of particular importance, the BBC (2015) posited that “Rwanda, a small landlocked country is trying to recover from the ethnic strife that culminated in government-sponsored genocide in the mid-1990s.” The BBC maintained that “today, Rwanda is striving to rebuild its economy with The World Bank praising Rwanda’s recent ‘remarkable development successes’, which it says have helped reduce poverty and inequality.”
Overall, I contend that the empirical case studies of Kenya and Rwanda allows this thesis to test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework of this study.

The Republic of Kenya, “after years of [unsuccessful] post-independence approach to Local Governance embraced a strong centralized governance structure to resolve regional development challenges (Khaunya, Wawire & Chepng’eno, 2015:27).” Having failed in this endeavour, Kenya adopted a devolution system of decentralised development. Khaunya et al. (2015:28) maintained that there are “various evidences of governance challenges in Kenya that include bureaucratic inefficiencies, lack of accountability and transparency, unequal distribution of national resources and minimal community participation in local development, amongst others.” Mwenzwa (noted in Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:246) argued that “specifically, since independence, the challenge regarding governance of development in Kenya has led to poor economic performance and hence negative consequences in the country.” In particular, “centralized planning excluded grassroots leaders and local communities from participating in decision-making and implementation of development projects” (Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:246). Misati and Ontita (noted in Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:246) posited that “consequently, beneficiaries have for the most part been passive as opposed to active partners in development, which has given rise to heightened dependency.” Misati and Ontita maintained that “as a result of the above, community-initiated development has been hard to come by and whenever this happened, projects have largely evolved into shadows of their true potential or stalled altogether.”

From the above contemporary discourse, I argue that we still note reference to the deliberate centralisation of governance by Kenya’s post-independence leaders. Successive Kenyan leaders have done this, with a total disregard of the cultural and traditional institutions that formerly fostered a mutually appreciative relationship between the leader and the subjects. The result, as Booth et al. (2014:ix) assert, is that “Kenyan politics [still] revolves around the inclusion or exclusion from power of the five or so major ethnic blocs.” Booth et al. maintained that, “furthermore, Kenya’s ethnic structure has never had an appropriate (i.e. federal) constitution capable of accommodating such diversity and harnessing it to collective objectives.” To this end, I argue that successive past leaders in Kenya entrenched personification into the institutional framework to the extent that helpless citizens acquiesced in the
status quo. As is the case with personified systems, leaders clamp down decisively on any real or perceived threats to their power. Furthermore, as hypothesised by the researcher in Chapter One, personified leaders also use devious inducements to reward loyalists. In the case of Kenya, Booth et al. (2014:13) “pointed out that in order to consolidate political power, the ruling party from the early period enticed the opposition with material interests – land. This enabled Kenyatta’s government to begin centralization of power with limited opposition.”

As this thesis asserts, the centralisation of power by national leaders is symptomatic of personified tendencies that exclude the masses to the benefit of a unique leader. Frequently, the centralisation of power also blurs the lines between governance institutions. “In Kenya’s case, the intermingling of political and economic power has always been intense, but has taken different forms under the Presidencies of Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi, Mwai Kibaki and now Uhuru Kenyatta. Institutions that provide some checks on interests have been weak, and their strengthening under the 2010 constitution has produced uneven results. Changes that influence the governance of growth will therefore come primarily from the executive” (Booth et al., 2014:viii). To place this argument in context, “Jomo Kenyatta, the founding President of Kenya, passed away in August 1978 after fourteen years as head of state (Adar & Munyae, 2001:1).” During Kenyatta’s Presidency, a small Kikuyu elite dominated the political realm, the so-called Kiambu Mafia, from Kenyatta’s home district. Adar and Munyae (2001:1) maintained that “this group undermined Kenyatta’s nationalist and populist background, alienating other ethnic groups, as well as many non-conforming Kikuyus.” According to Adar and Munyae (2001:1), “although Moi, the then Vice President was loyal to Kenyatta, the latter’s inner circle never accepted him.”

“Under Moi, patronage and loyalty to the President became mandatory for one’s political survival. Similarly, [the system] denied persons perceived to be against the President and KANU policies the right to contest electoral seats” (Adar & Munyae, 2001:3). “The military coup attempt [in] 1982 only accelerated the process of Moi’s control of the state and solidified Moi’s authoritarian rule” (Andreassen, noted in Adar & Munyae, 2001:4). Likewise, Adar and Munyae (2001:4) asserted that “In 1986 and 1988, respectively, parliament enacted successive Acts imposing limitations on the independence of the judiciary, with far-reaching human rights violations.” An example of the latter is that “a former British expatriate judge in Kenya, Mr. Eugene
Cotran, openly stated that in cases in which the President has direct interest, the
government applied pressure on the expatriate judges to make rulings in favour of
the state” (Africa Watch, noted in Adar & Munyae, 2001:5). The President’s control
over the parliament and the judiciary meant that he could easily manipulate the
functions of the two branches of government. Both Parliament and the Judiciary
ceased to have the constitutional rights to check the excesses of the executive.
Thus, “there were no ‘checks and balances’ on Moi’s personal authority” (Adar &
controlled parliament through [sham] elections where the ‘queue’ voting system
replaced the secret ballot system.” To this end, Adar (noted in Adar & Munyae,
2001:4) argued that “this system encouraged electoral rigging and judicious
resolutions of electoral disputes were not possible.”

According to this researcher, Kenya’s governance under President Moi exhibited the
full trappings of a personified system. In addition, President Kenyatta, who had
preceded Moi, set the foundation for personification by frustrating cultural and
traditional ‘checks and balances’ in preference for egocentric governance. Likewise,
Adar and Munyae (2001:1) argued that “President Moi opted to exploit tribalism” to
his benefit. I posit that the latter flourished at the expense of the time-tested cultural
and traditional systems inherent in Kenya, for instance, Ubuntu. From the foregoing
observation, I contend that it is apparent that governance systems in Kenya under
President Kenyatta, his successor – Moi, and to an extent Moi’s successor – Kibaki,
were deficient in accommodating societal value systems that espouse tolerance,
cooperation and conciliation. I contend that once a national governance system lacks
such social value systems, then it is apparent that systematic personified leadership
is probably creeping in. this is because such leadership thrives well in ethical and
moral voids, as I shall discuss below.

I now turn to Rwanda as a case study that synchronously provides a contrast with
Kenya in terms of the dire turmoil it has weathered and a similarity in terms of rapid
national development and relatively stable socio-economic and political dynamics. I
begin with a background from the 1980’s that will form my baseline analysis of
Rwanda’s contemporary period, the subject matter of this section. This is because I
have elaborately covered Rwanda’s historical contexts in other sections of this study.
According Sellström (1996:62), Rwanda had reached its economic limits towards the mid-80s. Experts partly attribute the latter to the dramatic fall in international coffee prices down by 75 percent between 1986 and 1992. This fall was significant since Rwanda a small but densely populated mainly rural and monoculture country wholly depended on external developments. To this end, [the World Bank] compelled Rwanda to adopt structural adjustment programmes in 1990. Politically, developments in Rwanda were influenced by the consequences of the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War. Since then, international aid to Rwanda has increasingly been linked to democratization, good governance and respect for human rights. I argue that the above stipulation is very significant in this study since the three terms alluded to entwine intricately with concepts in the theory of personification. In the subsequent narrative, I explain why this triad was important. Sellström (1996:41) maintained that “the internal conditions in Rwanda at the time were developing into conflict.” In this context, Sellström argued that since the beginning of the 1990s, Habyarimana - the then President of Rwanda, was facing strong internal and external political and military pressure for liberalization. As we had seen earlier, Sellström posited that “the pressure rotated around transition to a multiparty system, more respect for human rights, good governance and there was a new addition – fair settlement of the refugees. Such reforms, according to Sellström, could only lead to a reduction of the power and privileges enjoyed by the supporters of the one-party system, the army, local and national administrations, public enterprises etc. One could therefore expect a strong opposition from those groups to the restructuring process.” I observe that indeed such tensions ensued upwelling into a national crisis.

The BBC News Service chronicled that the long simmering ethnic tensions in Rwanda culminated into the shooting down of Habyarimana’s plane in April 1994 where he was killed. The latter provoked the Hutu militia and elements of the Rwandan military to begin the systematic massacre of Tutsi ethnicities prompting the RPF to launch a major offensive to halt the massacre (BBC 2018). Sellström (1996:53) contended that once the RPF had launched its offensive in on [8 February] 1994, it progressed rapidly. After only a short time, the RPF overran the major military base at Byumba, allowing for the re-supply of arms and ammunition. Subsequently, the RPF made an important advance when they occupied the
international airport at Kigali and the nearby Kanombe base in May, while they captured Kigali in July (Sellström, 1996:53). When the RPF declared the war to be over, it announced a cease-fire and formed a new government headed by Pasteur Bizimungu, as President and Faustin Twagiramungu as Prime Minister both Hutu. Real power, however, rested in the hands of the Tutsi commander of RPF, General Paul Kagame who became Vice President and Minister of Defence (Sellström, 1996:53). Therefore, I highlight that the above chronology of events clearly illustrates the intense power dynamics in Rwanda. The pressure on the then regime to improve its democratization, good governance and respect for human rights clearly highlighted a challenge with the governance of the nation. The latter becomes critical when we take into consideration the earlier economic crises driven by international dynamics. Operating in tandem, a simultaneous governance and economic challenge are precursors for the personification of national systems. At this stage, it takes a complete leadership reorientation to extricate a nation from plunging fully into personified dispensation as we note in subsequent discussions.

According to McDoom (2011:2), sixteen years following the culmination of its civil war in genocide, Rwanda was described as a country that had successfully exited from violence. The country has not experienced serious internal insecurity since the events of 1994 and a minor insurgency in 1997 to 1998. Yet a note of caution, McDoom maintained, must be sounded since Rwanda’s apparent stability depends in large part on the government’s main ruling party, the RPF, which won Rwanda’s civil war and ended the genocide, and in particular increasingly on its present leadership under President Paul Kagame. McDoom’s caution is very enlightening considering that only a few years before Kagame’s forces toppled a leader with personified inclination. Now early on in his reign, Kagame was already showing an inclination to encourage dependency on his leadership, the clear onset of personification. Notwithstanding the latter, Behuria and Goodfellow (2017:2) posit that in the two decades after 1994, the RPF government achieved growth rates of over 6 percent every year (with the exception of 2003 and 2013). Behuria and Goodfellow (2017:2) maintained that his led to praise of diverse groups, ranging from international financial institutions (Tumwebaze; Lagarde, noted in Behuria & Goodfellow, 2017:2) to mainstream (Collier, noted in Behuria & Goodfellow, 2017:2) and heterodox scholars (Kelsall; Booth et al., noted in Behuria & Goodfellow,
Conventional perspectives on the drivers of economic growth in Rwanda vary, but there are three identifiable narratives, all of which tend to oversimplify the drivers of growth by placing disproportionate emphasis on one particular feature of Rwanda’s development trajectory. Behuria and Goodfellow argued that “the first account focuses on Rwanda’s espousal of market reforms, supported by foreign aid, as key to its success. A second narrative focuses on the centrality of ‘second-generation reforms’—i.e. issues such as improved education indicators, social protection, and women’s empowerment—as key to the growth success (Lagarde, noted in Behuria & Goodfellow, 2017:2). A third narrative takes a heterodox perspective, attributing the country’s success largely to the use of party and military owned enterprises to intervene in strategic and long-term ways in the economy” (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, noted in Behuria & Goodfellow, 2017:2).

Correspondingly, McDoom (2011:2) argues that “following the genocide, Rwanda’s new government created a remarkable vision for the re-making of the country. The economy was the centrepiece of this vision and the regime has made impressive strides to re-build and to re-structure it to meet an ambitious developmental goal. The ‘Vision 2020’ sets out the Rwanda’s strategy to transition from a low-income, agricultural-based economy to a lower middle-income, more knowledge-based economy by the year 2020.” McDoom noted that there is certainly the political will to achieve this dream. He argued that “the country’s President, Paul Kagame, appears genuinely committed to transforming Rwanda’s economy. He has for example taken firm action against corruption, liberalized sectors such as telecoms and banking, lowered taxes to attract foreign investment, stabilized inflation, enhanced Rwanda’s trade within the region, and reformed land rights.” In the same spirit, Rayarikar (2017:2) argued that Rwanda’s new post-genocide government managed to completely turnaround the destruction, and loss of human life and capital. Rayarikar maintains that “after ending the genocide, the RPF, under Paul Kagame’s leadership, undertook a massive effort to rebuild infrastructure, kick start the economy, improve socio-economic conditions, and re-develop social cohesion within the troubled nation. This period of rapid development continues to this day with the same intensity. Rwanda has seen great improvements on indicators, and has sustained a GDP growth rate averaging around eight percent annually.” In affirmation, Porter (noted in Mann & Berry, 2015:120), claims: “[Rwanda represents]
a very rich story about management and leadership and strategy and communication.” Rayarikar (2017:3) sums it up in arguing that “considering all of this, there seems to be reason enough for Rwanda to be hailed as a model for development. Kagame and the RPF engaged in recreating the structures of the state that were destroyed. By ending the genocide and securing Rwanda, the RPF government ensured their monopoly over the legitimate use of force. The state was strengthened and civil society was allowed to grow, albeit with some restrictions.” I posit that positive Rwanda’s national transformation as discussed above directly relates to individual leadership action channelled through various institutions. I note that deliberate leadership actions channelled through independent systems, register a comparable positive development like in the case of Rwanda’s economy.

In line with the above, Mann and Nzayisenga (noted in Mann & Berry, 2015:131) contended that “today the strength and seriousness of the Rwandan state is reflected in the institutions and agencies spearheading its economic development. The Government of Rwanda (GoR) has launched progressive policies and its Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS). The government has created the Rwandan Development Board (RDB), a “pilot agency” modelled on Singapore’s Economic Development Board, and the Private Sector Federation, a “peak association” that develops the capacity of the private sector. Mann and Nzayisenga maintain that “the government uses ‘imihigo’” – a pre-colonial cultural practice where an individual sets targets or goals to be achieved within a specific period (Rwanda Governance Board 2017), to enforce mandatory ‘results oriented performance’ contracts. A plethora of other institutions have been established to promote investment, regulate utilities and promote infrastructural development and capacity” (Mann & Nzayisenga, noted in Mann & Berry, 2015:131). Analogously, MCDoom (2011:2) observed that “underlying these impressive pro-growth policies, which have been met with approval by Rwanda’s donors, is the government’s belief that economic prosperity is a cornerstone of social stability and it has pinned much on this assumption Rwanda’s leadership does recognize that this ambitious economic transition remains potentially vulnerable. Yet this dependence on the ruling party and increasingly on its leadership raises the question of what would happen in their absence.” McDoom raises a pertinent question on the over-centralisation of power and institutional functions around Kagame’s leadership. This study has

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pointed out that such egoistic tendencies signify the occurrence of personification of state systems. I validate this argument in subsequent observations by other authors.

According to Rayarikar (2017:3), “Kagame has placed himself at the centre of this economic miracle.” Rayarikar (2017:16) maintained that “President Paul Kagame plays a similar role in being at the centre of the Rwandan state. He argued that although Rwanda’s first president after the genocide was another senior RPF leader, Pasteur Bizimungu, Kagame was the one with whom all the power was actually concentrated. Bizimungu resigned in the year 2000 over dissatisfaction with the way in which Kagame stifled dissent. Power became centralised in Kigali and a new constitution was adopted in 2003 to address many of the shortcomings of previous constitutions of the postcolonial period.” Mitchell (noted in Mann & Berry 2015:5) adds that “[at the time] the apolitical approach to Rwandan development partly reflected the limited space for political discussions in Rwanda.” To Mitchell, these neoliberal currents affected development by constraining spaces where ‘economics’ can work. The fact that Rwanda’s economic progress increasingly depended on the leadership of Paul Kagame (McDoom 2011:17), portended the onset of all-out personification under his regime.

According to Reyntjens (2018:520), “at the presidential poll of August 2003, President Kagame was elected with 95.05 percent of the vote after a campaign marred by arrests, “disappearances”, and intimidation. As all parties represented in parliament either joined the RPF list or supported Kagame during the presidential election, all the directly elected MPs were part of one political platform. A European Union observer mission arrived at the paradoxical conclusion that, after the elections, “political pluralism is more limited than during the transition period.”” Reyntjens maintains that “in reality, the polls returned Rwanda to de facto single party rule, and all subsequent elections were deeply flawed. At the end of 2015, a constitutional amendment allowed Kagame to run for a third seven-year term in 2017 (he was elected with almost 99 percent of the vote) and for two five-year terms thereafter. As he had effectively been in power since 1994, he could thus potentially lead the country for forty years.” To Reyntjens (2018:521), “Rwanda is clearly a strong case of hegemonic authoritarianism, where under the guise of seemingly regular elections in a multi-party context the polls do not perform any meaningful function other than consolidating a dictatorship.” Reyntjens provided the strongest
argument describing Kagame’s reign as “authoritarian and dictatorial.” Building on the latter, I argue that this study has traced the systematic transformation of Rwanda’s post-genocide regime from a benevolent ruler to a personified state centralised around the persona of President Kagame. The constraining of political and economic spaces marked the crescendo of democratic tolerance and the transition to personified reign, yet I find this situation paradoxical. The puzzle is that Rwanda is exhibiting personified tendencies and yet the economy is still registering significant economic progress and overall national development. As stated elsewhere in this study, this paradox is worth exploring further to understand how a personified regime can still register successes with national development.

There several possible ways in which Kagame could be sustaining this paradoxical development in Rwanda. One probable way in which Kagame is able to develop a cult of personality around him and the RPF leadership is through the indoctrination of specific groups of people around the nation in targeted camps, known as the *ingando* solidarity camps. These camps are mandatory for all students who have just graduated from high school, and for older Rwandans who have been accused of associating with groups that criticise the government or for those who were involved with the genocide (Rayarikar 2017:18). I find Rayarikar’s argument pertinent because the theory of personification postulates that the process of personifying national institutions entails a systematic indoctrination of national organs to the extent that they start reflecting the essential character of the leader. Indoctrination is a methodical process of politicizing the masses to absolute acquiescence. Rayarikar (2017:35) also argued that “Rwanda’s image of embracing capitalism is not clean either. Rwanda is far from having anything resembling a free market, despite what the World Bank or the Rwandan government strongly assert from time to time. Rayarikar’s concern here is that the market is used to drastically expand the RPF’s control over Rwanda and its economy. Additionally, business groups that are backed by the government get preferential contracts to execute projects that play a role in the Rwandan development story.” Rayarikar (2017:56) maintains that “instead of being publicly owned entities, these companies have close ties with the RPF and by giving contracts to these companies the leadership of the RPF essentially pays itself and their associates. The RPF not only exerts almost complete control over the Rwandan economy, its actions also amount to corruption and nepotism.” Mann and
Berry (2015:139) argue that “the latter runs contrary to the assertion by GoR that “economic development as a first step towards security, peace and individual liberty.” In the above analysis, we now get a vivid picture of the internal workings of a personified system. It is apparent the adherents who are faithful to the personified leader also begin indulging in acts that prop up the regime like practicing corruption and nepotism, acts that lead to crude accumulation of wealth with the sole objective of controlling the economy.

Correspondingly, Mann and Berry (2015:124) argued that “government firms dominate the domestic market and spearhead the much-needed economic development in a country with a weak private sector but also contribute to a rapid accumulation of wealth among politically connected elite.” For instance, a group Kagame’s closest confidants were majority shareholders in TriStar Company (the predecessor to Crystal Ventures), which was awarded all road building contracts financed by the UNDP and the European Union after the genocide (Prunier, 2009: 195, cited in Mann & Berry, 2015:124). The growing power of these ‘party-statals’ is the result of a privatisation process that has been marked by allegations of non-competitive tendering and inadequate competition policies (Gökgür, 2012a) (noted in Mann & Berry 2015:124).

However, in another governance and development paradox, Mann and Berry (2015:121) quoting Booth and Golooba-Mutebi showed that “there is a developmental logic to Rwanda’s form of patrimonialism. This is because the state sponsored companies fulfil industrial policy-making and venture capital roles on behalf of the state. At the same time, there is a political logic here, as it allows the GoR to disperse military power through the allocation of lucrative professional opportunities. Awarding positions in the private sector eases transitions out of the armed services and ensures loyalty to the RPF”. To Mann and Berry (2015:138), economic development is a political process in which powerful groups make decisions to change the rules of the game. I observe that whereas Kagame is using state enterprises to wring loyalty from his close allies; he is also using the same conduit to advance national development. This kind of dispensation poses a question that this thesis set out to address: “what happens to the excluded citizens who now have no voice in national discourses?” We get a partial indication to the foregoing question in Goodfellow’s assertion.
According to Goodfellow (2014:7), “Rwanda’s traditionally rural society has been undergoing a seismic shift since 1994. The various waves of refugee return in the wake of the genocide, alongside a more general shift in favour of city life spurred in part by the anonymity it offers, gave urbanisation a decisive push. Indeed, between 1995 and 2000, Rwanda’s urban growth rate soared to an average of 18 percent annually, a figure almost unprecedented in global history since at least 1950. Here I observe that economic factors have precipitated massive rural urban migration that I can attribute to personified policies that result in uneven distribution of wealth. In other words, Rwanda’s acquiesced citizens have no option other than to trudge to urban centres to scavenge on trickle-downs from the politically favoured elites. Furthermore, Goodfellow (2014:17) contended that “formal institutional frameworks have in many respects been mapped onto existing structures of power and existing informal norms deriving from Rwanda’s long history of hierarchy and centralised governance. There is also systematic effort to shape informal norms and rules into formal ones, as for example reflected in the formalization of activities such as Rwanda’s community work day – umuganda, and the institution of imihigo performance contracts.” I argue that the formalization of institutional frameworks has its advantage, undoubtedly. However, the formalization of the traditional cultural systems cited above can have dire consequences on the erosion of cultural identity. This will inevitably interfere with the normal development of society, leading to disorientation and further acquiescence of the citizenry. This perspective is well illustrated in the argument below. Dawson argued that “the governance of change in Rwanda has consisted of centrally-designed and strongly-enforced ‘development’ policies (Dawson, 2018:12), which have imposed a transformation and placed considerable demands on their subjects (Gaynor, noted in Dawson 2018:12). Dawson (2018:11) maintained that “the Rwandan political system shows little sign of transformation to more inclusive governance. With the aim to transform Rwandans into ‘marketised’, modern individuals, many restrictions have been placed on their own valued practices (for subsistence, social, cultural and economic purposes). In explicit detail, Dawson (2018:11) highlighted how GoR excluded the majority of Batwa both from their traditional forest dwellings and livelihoods on one hand, and on from the economic diversification and market integration promoted for other rural inhabitants. Although some Batwa appeared supportive of the Government’s
modernization policies, many more perceive this to be a crucial time for both their culture and ability to meet basic needs. In light of the foregoing, Dawson (2018:12) argued that the removal of ethnic identities in Rwanda represented a democratic paradox as promotion of equality has precluded recognition and representation of their specific needs required to achieve meaningful poverty alleviation. Dawson maintains that the recognition of the Batwa’s indigenous status or the historical injustices surrounding their dispossession and detachment from ancestral lands and traditional practices is not on the horizon through either national politics or international sustainable development governance. I argue that the above example clearly shows the impact of disenfranchising a vulnerable population under the pretext of formalizing institutional frameworks. Such interruptions in the rural social fabric are key factors that provoke massive migration to urban areas.

In consonance with the above, Traniello (2008:30) argued that “in Rwanda’s case, the state represented the prize. In the case of ethnic rivalries, a critical predictor of severe ethnic conflicts is the ownership of the state or specifically the relationship between the ethnic group and the state. When the group that owns the state controls the land, the resources and the distribution, the state becomes the prize. The question surrounding institutions engineered with power-sharing concepts is whether they can actually encourage groups to accommodate each other, or will there always be a zero-sum game?” Traniello (2008:38) maintains that “Rwanda represents the worst case scenario that played into almost every criticism of the concept. The power-sharing settlement, the Arusha Accords, failed to mitigate violence because it lacked such necessary factors as an able and committed leadership, a shared destiny and the will to accommodate.” Traniello’s argument refocuses our attention to the commitment of leaders to advancing inclusive national discourses. That said, Kagame’s brand of personified leadership that constrains governance on the one hand but promotes perceptible development on the other hand needs further scrutiny beyond the scope of this thesis.

In conclusion, this section provided an empirical demonstration of the deliberate centralisation of governance by both Rwanda’s and Kenya’s post-independence leaders. In both countries, once the leaders started practicing personified governance, they implemented policies that totally disregarded the African cultural traditional institutions that formerly fostered a mutually appreciative relationship
between the leader and the subjects. The erosion of cultural identities let to utter disorientation of the citizen’s further entrenching ‘acquiescence.’ I also observed that in both countries, whereas parliament and the judiciary have the constitutional rights to check the excesses of the executive, they became subsumed in the vortex of personified governance. Thus, both countries demonstrated limited or no ‘checks and balances’ on their respective leaders’ personal authority. I contend that once a national governance system lacks such social value systems, then it is apparent that systematic personified leadership has probably crept in.

Lastly, Rwanda’s case study highlights that personification transitions through a series of distinctive events that take different dimensions depending on the context. This notion actually validates the theory of personification. For instance, Rwanda went through an economic crisis that the then leader managed poorly, and this quickly culminated into the need for the regime to improve its democratization, good governance and respect for human rights. Essentially, the economic crisis directly correlated with the failure of governance in the country. I established that under such situations, it takes a complete leadership reorientation to extricate a nation from plunging fully into decadent personified dispensation. Immediately after the genocide, Rwanda actually seemed to demonstrate a complete leadership re-orientation. However, currently the Rwandese leader has posed a paradox on how personified governance can actually advance positive national development. This grey area needs future exploration. In an attempt to shed more light on this paradox, the next section will examine personified leadership governance in East Africa.

4.4 Personified leadership and governance in East Africa

This section seeks to examine the intricacies and dynamics of personified leadership and governance in East Africa that have become apparent since the dawn of independence. Using case studies from Kenya and Rwanda, the researcher interrogates the role of national leaders in nurturing or retarding development. The researcher rationalises that the primary responsibility of a country’s leadership is the creation of enabling environments that are conducive for national development. Obasola (noted in Afegbua & Adejuwon, 2012:142) underscored the point that “It is instructive to note that no nation has achieved meaningful development socially, politically or economically without the input of or effective leadership.” Thus, “in
contemporary discourse, the concept of leadership and governance has attracted a wider spread interest as they serve as the pivot on which social, political and economic structures rest” (Afegbua & Adejuwon, 2012:142). Accordingly, I chose Kenya as the subject for a case study because the country has maintained remarkable stability and development, despite encountering significant changes in its political system and a myriad of regional crises on its flanks. On the other hand, I chose Rwanda as a case study subject because it has made significant strides in the area of governance and development. The country has also endeavoured to revolutionise the concept of leadership across the board.

According to Mutula, Muna and Koma (2013:263), “following Independence in 1963, Jomo Kenyatta, the first President of the Republic of Kenya, concentrated on amassing political power under the control of the central government.” Mutula et al. (2013:270) maintained that “during his regime, Kenyatta grew very hostile to those who arrayed criticism against his governance policies. Moi, who succeeded Kenyatta in 1978, continued this legacy by tightening the control of Kenyan public life in all spheres, including politics, administration, economy and management of public finance with little, if any, accountability.” “In 1995, Kenyan citizens lost their jobs if they gave as little as press coverage through the state media to any person who was out of favour with the then government of Daniel arap Moi (Maathai, 1995).” This occurred even when the subject that person was dealing with was essential to Kenya’s national development agenda. President Moi became increasingly authoritarian in 1982 after a failed coup attempt (New World Encyclopaedia, 2013). Moi championed the “Nyayo philosophy,” which means “following the leader” and was, as he claimed, a distinctive African tradition of visionary leadership under a strong centralised state (New World Encyclopaedia, 2013). “Consequently, this central control was evident in the imbalance in regional development” (Mutula et al., 2013:263). “Economically, Kenya suffered under his Presidency, mainly due to mismanagement” (New World Encyclopaedia, 2013). In the same respect, Mutula et al. (2013:263) argued that “the abuse of power and inefficiency of Presidents Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki left Kenya susceptible to poor social, political and economic development.” “These leaders rewarded political loyalty while exercising social and economic marginalization or exclusion of those who showed resistance” (Amutabi, noted in Mutula et al., 2013:265).
Drawing lessons from the above literature, I contend that the centralisation of power, coupled with egocentric actions of the respective presidents, is indicative of their personification of leadership. From the narratives, it is apparent that the presidents manipulated power and resources for personal gain, at the expense of the Kenyan citizenry. Illustratively, “although Moi practiced a distinctive African style of leadership, he used his leadership style as an excuse for despotic, corrupt, autocratic rule that did nothing to raise the living standards of the majority of Kenyans and even denied human rights and civil liberty” (New World Encyclopaedia, 2013). Particularly, Mwenzwa and Misati (2014:246) asserted that “centralized planning excluded grassroots leaders and local communities from decision-making and implementation of planned development projects. Consequently, beneficiaries have for the most part been passive as opposed to active partners in development which has given rise to heightened dependency.” Accordingly, with respect to the second question of this thesis, this study notes that the personified leadership styles of the past presidents in Kenya adversely influenced governance and development policies. The researcher argues that the intrinsic personae of the leaders precipitated the poor accountability, maladministration and deprivation meted out upon Kenyan citizens by the regimes. The common denominator among all the past leaders practising personification in Kenya is egocentric hunger for power and wealth.

To resolve the above anomalies, Gatimu and Wagacha (2015) contended that “the Kenyan constitution of 2010 proposed to revolutionize the way in which the country's political leadership interacts and functions by devolving power to county governments.” In this respect, Kivuva (noted in Mutula et al., 2013:266) argued that “the executive office in Kenya has been constitutionally redesigned to make it more accountable to other arms of government, thus ensuring that functional separation of power exists.” Analogously, Khaunya et al. (2015:27) posited that “under the devolution of power in the new constitution, county Governments in Kenya have indeed made significant progress in involvement of stakeholders on development at County level.” Khaunya et al. maintained that “Kenya engages various stakeholders in decision-making thus enhancing acceptance of various development initiatives at County Governments, which minimizes resistance from beneficiaries.” Similarly, Khaunya et al. contended that “Kenya has a more accountable political system in place with ‘checks and balances’ at all levels of the political divide.”
However, “the post-2010 political leadership has been unable to adapt to the
devolved system of governance, which calls for transparency and accountability.
Instead, leaders continue to engage in a way that is combative and confrontational,
punctuated with negative political posturing” (Gatimu & Wagacha, 2015). Khaunya et al. (2015:27) “established that the Counties faced a myriad of challenges. Key
among these is the apparent lack of political goodwill from the National Government
to fully devolve certain functions.” Similarly, Gatimu and Wagacha (2015) argued that
“this continued form of abrasive political engagement shows that the country’s
leadership has been neither dynamic nor innovative enough to measure up to the
new political systems.” Likewise, the Kenyan leadership has not been able to unite
the nation to rally around important issues like deliberation over national policies and
strategies. For instance, “the governance style of the current political leadership has
severely restricted accountability” (Khaunya et al., 2015:28) and “entrenched
impunity within the public sector” (Gatimu & Wagacha, 2015). Therefore, “the
inability or unwillingness of the political leadership to become dynamic and
innovative, and adapt to new institutional mechanisms, threatens to erode the
principles of good governance in Kenya” (Gatimu & Wagacha, 2015). [As a result of
the reluctance to transform exhibited by the leadership], “there is a strong perception
among the Kenyan public that the National government simply cannot be trusted to
redistribute resources equitably” (Khaunya et al., 2015:35).

From the above narrative, the researcher points out the enduring spill-over effect of
personification on societal structures. The notion that leaders elected under the new
2010 Kenyan Constitution are still facing challenges with persuasive transitioning to
transparency and accountability signifies the indelible imprint of personification. The
researcher argues that it takes a while to unravel and realign personified institutional
systems that have rotated around the leader for a while. In the case of Kenya, the
citizens have become acquiesced to such an extent that the achievement of good
governance which the new constitution champions may face poor prospects, for
now. As hypothesised by this study, citizens who have been influenced extensively
by personified regimes over the years have metamorphosed to espouse the
philosophy. Accordingly, Mwenzwa (noted in Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:246) posited
that “since independence, the governance of development in Kenya has faced
numerous challenges leading to poor economic performance and hence negative
consequences on the country.” In particular, “centralized planning resulted in grassroots leaders and local communities to play an insignificant role in decision-making and implementation of development projects” (Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:246).

Turning to Rwanda, Professor Twagilimana (2016) argued that “following the 1994 genocide [that pitted the Hutu ethnic group] against the Tutsi ethnic group, Rwanda became a physical, moral and spiritual wasteland doomed in the eyes of many, to be a failed state. After 100 days of a killing frenzy that took the lives of more than one million people, destroyed the social fabric of society and stripped the country of resources, the nation looked destitute and in ultimate crisis mode.” Kigabo (2010:6) contended that “the war had destroyed the entire system ranging from the economy through security, justice [framework] and infrastructure.” Positively, Twagilimana (2016) noted that “Rwanda has now risen from the ashes to be a reference in successful and exemplary post-conflict recovery in various domains, including economic development, reconciliation, good governance, women’s empowerment and gender equality, good business environment, and more.” Twagilimana maintained that “even though [others] would probably point to a system rather than to the effort of one individual to justify Rwanda’s achievements, many people have argued and indeed documented facts that Rwanda’s rebirth was spearheaded by the strong leadership, resolute political will, and an unwavering sense of purpose, urgency and resilience of one person: President Paul Kagame.” In consonance with the later view, Kigabo (2010:17) posited that “Rwanda’s impressive achievements over the past [21] years are attributable to good leadership committed to finding durable solutions for Rwandan’s people despite important challenges.”

With respect to the above, I argue that the fact that Professor Twagilimana (2016) attributed Rwanda’s success to President Kagame, rather than an efficient system as mooted by Kagame, is strong circumstantial evidence of the systematised personification of Rwanda. In other words, even the highest echelons of academia cannot separate President Kagame’s inferred leadership skills from the country’s successful development. I concur that it takes great leaders to achieve success in view of the pace and scale of Rwanda. However, I agree, as Kagame himself asserted, that leaders work through systems and institutions to achieve overall
national objectives. I maintain that national systems become even more effective with the incumbent leader's espousal of citizen-driven governance. Accordingly, I contend that realists like Kigabo (2010) look at the leadership factor more broadly rather than simply tying it to one person. Kigabo’s reasoning motivates the participation of other collaborators instead of exalting a unique leader, which may possibly advance personification of national leadership by the President.

A scholarly article by Wilber (2011) posited that “Rwanda is the first country where women constitute more than half of the political leadership.” Wilber asserted that this achievement was not an accident. Rwanda prioritised women, introducing structures and processes to advance them at all levels of leadership. For instance, in 2008, Rwandans elected women to 56 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, making Rwanda the first nation to break the halfway mark in a lower house of parliament, and placing it eleven percentage points above second-place Sweden, as of December 2010. Wilber maintained that Rwanda intentionally advanced women in political leadership, designing innovative mechanisms and drawing on established best practices. However, Wilber emphasises that “it is important to acknowledge the pivotal role of President Kagame in ensuring this success.” His direct support is essential [to champion support for women]. Political arguments aside, [Kagame] continues to advocate for female leadership. A research study done in December 2009 by the Institute for Inclusive Security in Rwanda found that [Kagame] was the singular force most cited by Rwandans [as the personality behind] women’s advances. Similarly, Randell and McCloskey (2014:108) posited that “Rwanda is widely known for its global lead in the representation of women among decision-makers and in Parliament: the only country with a substantial 64 percent of women in its Chamber of Deputies.”

The researcher argues that the compelling espousal of gender-sensitive policies by Rwanda, particularly to empower women despite the radical and cultural challenges, signifies strong leadership. I argue that by exercising authoritarian leadership over Rwandese institutions and political processes, President Kagame has managed to ensure the empowerment of women. Emancipated women play a crucial role in national development, especially in a country like Rwanda that is steadily recovering from a degenerate past. Involving women in leadership roles gives them confidence
to address issues that affect their livelihoods. Randell and McCloskey (2014:107) corroborated the researcher’s line of reasoning in their assertion that “gender equality and women’s empowerment are critical components of any program for sustainable development and poverty reduction. In Rwanda, where agriculture is the backbone of the domestic economy, women are much more likely than men to work in agricultural occupations are, and are more likely to depend on their farm work for income.” In addition, this study argues that Rwanda’s phenomenal economic growth and development success exemplifies the paradox with personified leadership. According to Coakley, Raschke, Twiss, Ovalle and Samaras (2013:57), “[President] Kagame’s extraordinary leadership is behind much of the energy and optimism in Rwanda.” Coakley et al. (2013:57) maintained that “unlike many African leaders, Kagame’s leadership is an example of disciplined focus with zero tolerance for corruption and a mixture of social engineering and innovative social entrepreneurship. Kagame has developed a vision 2020 to transform Rwanda into a modern and self-sufficient economy. The vision among other critical factors emphasizes community-based development.” To Coakley et al. (2013:57), “the combined development confirms a new future for Rwanda.”

Still on the subject of leadership and development in Rwanda, Kigabo (2010:6) posited that “the fundamental causes of this decade of quick development are most likely the following: charismatic leadership, rich and positive ideology, strict political will, and lessons from the genocide and Rwandan history.” I argue that a leadership is charismatic when it works to serve the general interest, rather than egoistic and selfish interests. Such leadership is always committed to finding durable solutions to community problems. I find Kigabo’s definition of charismatic leadership particularly pertinent to this study. Kigabo argued that “such a leader should serve the general interest of the population rather than egoistic and selfish interests” – attributes that this study associates with personified leadership. On this note, Kigabo (2010:7) contended that “since taking over power, Rwanda Patriotic Front leaders (RPF) [the political wing of Rwanda Patriotic Army] have worked to re-establish social harmony and promote sustainable economic development. For these purposes, the RPF has created mechanisms, institutions, principles and practices to serve the country efficiently. The results include the reestablishment of security, economic and social reconstruction and promotion of the private sector and civil society.” Kigabo (2010:8)
maintained that “the government of Rwanda has also invested much in good
governance, an important administrative reform based on decentralization.”

Again, we see an allusion that systems and institutions contribute to national
development in Rwanda, arguably, under the able leadership of the President. In the
foregoing example, I note an empirical paradox that personified institutions can
actually advance national development. The key to this paradox is the leadership
action. I therefore argue that under personified systems, a leader can build strong
institutions that depend on the leader. I also observe the concept of good
governance being directly linked to Rwanda’s phenomenal development and efficient
administration. The latter accentuates this study’s theory of change that good
leadership results in good governance and development. Yet again, I observe the
paradox that personified leadership can actually engender good governance. By
deduction, the researcher argues that ‘good governance’ in Rwanda is attributable to
President Kagame’s good leadership skills. This duality in President Kagame makes
for an ethical paradox that demonstrates how leaders can intentionally abuse or use
their power beneficially to foster national development.

4.5 Leadership and national development in East Africa

In this section, I set the tone of my discussion on the subject of ‘leadership and
national development’ by drawing inspiration from the study by Gray and McPherson
on the subject. Gray and McPherson (2001:712) believed that the quality of
leadership and its evolution (or non-evolution) has a major impact on policy change
and hence, growth and development. Gray and McPherson (2001:731) maintained
that “visionary leadership by an individual with political power or by a small group to
whom the leader delegates power is critical to institutional development as well as to
adopting and sustaining policies that will accelerate an African country’s economic
growth.” Similarly, Mkapa (2010:20) argued that “discourse on African development
increasingly focuses on capacity for leadership and governance, as well as its role to
engender economic growth, promote development, and ensure poverty reduction.”

I agree with the above argument to the extent that it aligns with the theory of
personification in highlighting that individuals or their designees are responsible for
advancing national development. It is also interesting to note that Gray and
McPherson link institutional development and economic growth directly to leadership actions. Despite the importance of this subject, my online research indicates that there is no composite literature that bridges the phrase ‘leadership’ and ‘national development in East Africa’ to produce a holistic picture on the subject. Accordingly, this section will therefore discuss and analyse the subject of leadership and national development in East Africa, with Kenya and Rwanda serving as case studies. Ultimately, this section will help us to understand the evolution of personified leadership in East Africa and its impact on national development.

The concept of leadership in the East Africa region has traversed a spectrum from modest political dispensations, punctuated by fragile democracy, through to extreme situations being deposed by violent military interventions. According to Fouéré, Maupeu and Nolan (2015:7), “many leaders across East Africa, most of whom are former guerrillas, gained power following armed insurgencies.” Fouéré et al. (2015) maintained that their modes of government often rely on a dominant-party paradigm; the party creates a veritable party-State that prevents democratic culture from emerging. They also argue that the long history of military élites draws attention to decisive political figures, since this has led to similar governance forms across greater East Africa. Nevertheless, according to Fouéré et al. (2015), “these are not traditional authoritarian regimes; they adapt more readily to international constraints that require democratisation and neoliberalism. They have also proven more effective in their quest for legitimacy, drawing upon development projects, security, or even representativeness.”

In East Africa, military interventions have so far spared Kenya and Tanzania. For this reason, the economic base, infrastructure and social fabric in these countries are relatively intact. Focusing on our case study, Kenya, we need to delve deep into its past to understand the genesis of its leadership with respect to the country’s national development. Gray and McPherson (2001:713) contended that “earlier [in her history], Kenya showed potential as a star of African development. The quality of its leadership has much to do with its continuing failure to realize that potential.” According to Booth et al. (2014:viii), “the intermingling of political and economic power in Kenya has always been intense, but has taken different forms under the Presidencies of Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi, Mwai Kibaki and now Uhuru Kenyatta.” Booth et al. (2014) maintained that “the intermingling of business and
politics is not a recent phenomenon in Kenya. It has historical antecedents that reach back to the colonial period.” At the same time, Booth et al. argued that “cronyism has transitioned through various distinct phases since independence and continues to evolve.”

Within the above context, Gray and McPherson (2001:713) posited that “in 1966 Kenya’s founding father, Kenyatta, made Moi his Vice President, largely to restrain the ambitions of more prominent candidates. The national assembly had the constitutional obligation to ratify the succession of Moi or designate another President within 90 days of Kenyatta’s death. The assembly chose not to rock the boat.” Gray and McPherson maintained that “President Kenyatta also tacitly encouraged a chain of events that imposed two burdens on Kenya’s economy. First, it was under Kenyatta that corruption became a macroeconomic phenomenon. Second, Kenyatta initiated a pattern of state involvement in economic affairs that resulted in a plethora of inefficient state enterprises.” Similarly, Gray and McPherson argued that “oriented toward import substitution, these enterprises continue to burden Kenya with an inefficient industrial structure, which impedes its entry into export markets.” Likewise, Gray and McPherson posited that “Kenyatta largely saw his role as that of a traditional chief, maintaining political stability, distributing benefits to the population within the resource constraints as defined by his finance ministry without stirring parliamentary and popular criticism.” I argue that Gray and McPherson present an interesting observation that Kenyatta had [but did not use his] political influence to implement the policies needed to raise Kenya’s economic growth rate. This action opens room for speculation on Kenyatta’s probable objective at the time. However, considering his personified inclinations, one cannot rule out a well-calculated scheme for advancing egocentric rather than egalitarian policies.

The discourse in the above chapter accentuates the hypothesis mooted by the theory of personification, as discussed further below. Meredith (cited in Mkapa, 2010:40) noted that “as founding fathers, the first generation of nationalist leaders—Kenyatta [and other contemporaries]—all enjoyed great prestige and high honour. They were seen to personify the States they led and swiftly took advantage to consolidate their control. On this note, I argue that in characteristic personified style, President Kenyatta anointed Moi as his successor, thus denying other more able candidates the opportunity for democratic elections.” In identifying another
personified characteristic, I argue that Kenyatta allowed the proliferation of corruption, largely as a reward to incentivise his network of loyalists. The consequence of Kenyatta’s actions had a direct impact on national policies that shaped the trajectory of national development. For instance, “during Moi’s era, Kenya registered zero average per capita economic growth rate in the years 1991–1997” (Gray & McPherson, 2001:714). Despite such overall national stagnation, the subjects loyal to the incumbent leader in personified dispensations seem to thrive as highlighted below.

According to Nzau (2010:105), “the ambitions of leaders and ethnic loyalties centred on these leaders, largely conditions the leadership of political parties in Kenya.” Nzau maintained that “many of the parties rely on a handful of patrons, usually also their leaders/founders, for the finances needed for maintaining their activities; they increasingly became susceptible to attempts at building cults of personality and internal structures of patronage.” Likewise, Nzau contended that “Party leadership in Kenya is poorly institutionalised, grossly tribal and corrupt. Thus, to these political leaders, elections are no more than exercises to rubber-stamp illegitimacy, and poor governance.” Nzau believed that “this type of leadership has stifled national development in the country since independence. Accordingly, fifty years after independence, Kenya continues to suffer chronically from immense poverty, corruption, dependency on foreign aid and lack of a national sense of direction.”

Equally, the post-independence adoption of a Unitary Constitution affected Kenya’s national development. Maxon (noted in Nzau, 2010:100) argued that “there seemed to be a move right from independence to introduce a strongly centralized governance structure.” In Maxon’s view, “two important aspects characterized the Kenyatta regime as far as development planning was concerned.” Maxon points out that “first, is that it supported – at least in principle – the ideas of African socialism; and second it was guided by highly centralised development planning which took a top-bottom approach that adopted what would be termed state capitalism; some kind of socialism with capitalist tendencies.” Kinyanjui and Misaro echo Nzau’s arguments discussed above. According to Kinyanjui and Misaro (2013:183), “while Kenya’s highly centralised political system has resulted in the widespread social-economic marginalization of rural areas, very little attention has been focused on analysing the relationship between socioeconomic marginalization and popular participation in
management of constituency development funds (CDF) geared towards rural poverty alleviation.” Accordingly, Kinyanjui and Misaro corroborated Maxon’s assertion cited above, that the over-centralisation of government structures has posed challenges to the realisation of the intended benefits of decentralisation to rural people in Kenya.

I posit that the adoption of a unitary constitution was a means used by the incumbent leader to perpetuate a personified regime. Like other discussions on the subject that I covered in preceding sections, Nzau rightly pointed out that the net effect of the personified constitution affected Kenya’s national development. Similarly, I argue that the centralisation of power grants the leader outright control and influence over national development outcomes. I argue that the top-bottom approach to development planning, which was a choice instrument of Kenya’s personified regime, was exclusionary as it cut out other grassroots citizens from participating in national discourses. However, the top-down approach seems to have been remedied when Kenya adopted a decentralisation governance structure. According to Kinyanjui and Misaro (2013:186), the government moved swiftly to avert the regional imbalances caused by political marginalisation that was playing a central role in tax collection and distribution to the remote rural areas, which are vested with the mandate of prioritising their own development goals. This has indeed reduced the disparities of the top-down approach to development, thus giving the rural communities more autonomy in handling their needs. Although the central government still plays a key role in overall nationwide development, the rural people now have a stake.

I argue that whereas the central government certainly has a key role to play in the development of the country, the extent of its involvement in decentralised structures is critical. Under personified governance, the undemocratic concentration of power in the hands of the leader negates the involvement of the masses in economic development, and thus curtails efficiency, accountability, and transparency in resource allocations for economic development, resulting in dire social inequality. In a study conducted in rural Kenya, Essendi, Madise and Matthews (2014:72) corroborated my point of view covered above in their assertion that “national development could better be achieved once individual, household and community development needs are met.” They maintained that “having improved leadership and other systems at national level was important but not sufficient unless people’s
livelihoods at household and community level are met." According to Essendi et al., “an empowered populace would best participate in governance and leadership, a situation that would be difficult to achieve in the absence of improved capabilities for the populace.” I appreciate the argument by Essendi et al. that draws critical attention to the importance of synchronising leadership and community empowerment in national governance. However, as stated below, I highlight how a personified inclination is a singular factor that can pose a huge deterrence to national development.

According to Brodén (2015:15), “until the late 1970s, Kenya was at a wave of economic progress thanks to exports and aid, although cracks against Kenyatta’s leadership started to appear. Kenyatta’s approach became increasingly autocratic as his politics became capitalistic and pro-Western, although African socialists wanted to nationalize property. Kenyatta and the family were very wealthy and the Kikuyu elite, particularly the Kiambu Mafia had taken advantage of the reform that redistributed land.” Although the then leadership purported to be following socialist ideals, Leys (noted in Nzau, 2010:101) asserted that “in reality there was nothing socialist about Kenya’s development and its leadership at independence.” Okondo (noted in Nzau, 2010:102) posited that “in terms of institutional development, the performance of these institutions as far as socio-economic development in Kenya is concerned left a lot to be desired. This is because their performance was dismal and wrought with nepotism and grand corruption; especially in agriculture, transport and communication, commerce and industry that are crucial for the socio-economic development of the country.” Nzau (2010:102) argued that “this state of affairs enhanced the role of the Civil Service particularly the Provincial Administration and other forms of state coercive apparatus as instruments of regime control rather than national development.”

In the above discussions, Nzau argued that the autocracy, nepotism and corruption perpetrated by Kenya’s leaders were squarely to blame for the poor national development. The facts that Nzau cites as root causes of underdevelopment are factors that I have argued are characteristic of personified regimes. In other words, I posit that the leader first concentrates power around themselves, appoints loyalists to shore up the regime, and indulges in acts of corruption to reward cronies. Kagema (2018:5) echoes Nzau’s position in his assertion that a small elite in Kenya controls
power, leading to poverty and class struggles among the majority of the population. Once in a position of leadership, [entitlement] becomes a right with little regard being given to the responsibilities of office. He maintained that no sustainable development could be attained where only a few selfish leaders control the national economy, while the majority of the citizens are languishing in poverty (Kagema, 2018:8). In citing the example of Kenya, Kagema (2018:9) argued that the majority of the leaders are selfish, self-centred, greedy, and only concerned with themselves, to the detriment of the impoverished masses. No sustainable development can be attained when a nation has such leaders.

Minja (2011:1) “lamented that the failure of Kenyan political leaders and executives to provide moral leadership has disappointed citizens. This action that has rendered national goals unmet, has affected political and economic development.” Minja maintained that “If Kenya is to develop both politically and economically and to achieve Vision 2030, leadership must transform to start acting ethically.” According to Minja, “the debate in Kenyan situation is whether the country actually has moral leaders who can be depended on to provide ethical leadership and if they exist, are they afraid or just reluctant to provide that leadership especially in the public sector.” The focus on leadership ethics in Kenya touches on the heart of personified governance. I find inspiration in the fact that Minja implored leaders to act ethically; however, under personified dispensations, a complete behavioural change might be able to realign and transform the leader’s perception of how to interact with the country’s subjects. Like Minja, Kagema (2018:1) argued that the “installation of competent, empathetic, equitable, and forward-thinking leaders will successfully guide the sustainable development of emerging African economies like Kenya.” The fact that Kagema pointed at leadership as the crux of development aligns well with the thinking of this thesis. However, I underscore the point that all the virtues of the ideal leader that Kagema cited are secondary outcomes of the leader’s cognitive development trajectory. In the next paragraph, I turn to Rwanda, a country with strong leadership credentials, to understand the dynamics between leadership and national development.

The Hutu uprising, also known as the ‘Rwandan Revolution’ is particularly significant in fostering the understanding of leadership and development in Rwanda. First, however, we need to understand the genesis of the social dynamics in Rwanda.
According to Mayersen (2012:3), “the German colonial authorities utilised a system of indirect rule, which effectively reinforced the pre-existing complex and highly organised Tutsi monarchical system (the mwamiship), and the power of the Tutsi aristocracy. When Belgium assumed control of Rwanda, it too implemented a system of indirect rule, utilising the indigenous Tutsi elite to implement a range of policies. Over time, the model of indirect rule was substantially modified to meet Belgian economic and developmental goals.” The primary interest for this study is in the role of ‘external forces in shaping power dynamics in Rwanda, and ultimately its leadership’. In an ethnically charged locus like Rwanda, by allying with the Tutsi, the colonialists empowered one ethnic group against the other. I argue that in this regard, the highly organised monarchical Tutsi advanced in national leadership acumen faster than the Hutu did. The fact that colonialists used the Tutsi to advance their development goals further cemented their dominion in the prevailing power play. As I discuss in subsequent paragraphs, this situation provides fertile ground for breeding personified inclinations.

In 1926, the Belgians introduced a system of ethnic identity cards, differentiating Hutus from Tutsis. Mamdani (noted in Chirwa, 2015:109) referred to this as “the origin of the racialization of the Hutu and Tutsi.” Chirwa (2015:110) posited that “the polarization between the two groups escalated, and in 1957, Hutu formed the PARMEHUTU (Party for the Emancipation of the Hutus) while Rwanda was still under Belgian rule. The PARMEHUTU, founded on a sectarian ethnic ideology, had the desire to reclaim Rwanda for the Hutu people.” According to Mayersen (2012:8), “inter-ethnic tensions in Rwanda were high throughout 1959.” Consequently, Atterbury (noted in Mayersen, 2012:8) contended that “the sudden death of the Rwandan monarch in July and the appointment of his replacement in controversial circumstances contributed to an atmosphere akin to a ‘simmering cauldron’.”

Atterbury maintained that “by November the same year, it only took a spark to ignite the Rwandan revolution. Impulsively, Rwanda rapidly plummeted into violence in which the Hutu burning of Tutsi huts spread rapidly.” Chirwa (2015:110) posited that “the ‘wind of destruction’ occurred, wherein the PARMEHUTU rebelled against the Tutsi elites by massacring many Tutsi. As a result, up to 150,000 Tutsis fled to Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and DRC.” In response, “the Tutsi reaction was swift, organised and politically impelled” (United Nations; Lemarchand; Lemarchand, as
noted by Mayersen, 2012:8). I note from the foregoing that the undemocratic brutal preservation of individual or communal hegemony has personified connotations. As discussed in the conceptual segment of this study, we shall see in subsequent paragraphs that his dispensation is untenable.

Newbury (noted in Chirwa, 2015:110) pointed out that “[the 1960s] was a time of discrimination for both Tutsis inside Rwanda and in exile. In 1960, Hutus won the municipal elections that the Belgians organized, and after a 1961 coup in Gitarama, they declared Rwanda a republic and abolished the monarchy. PARMEHUTU leader, Gregoire Kayibanda, became the first President of Rwanda in 1962, when Belgians granted official independence and national elections were held.” “Unfortunately, oppression and violence against Tutsis continued, and the refugee crisis worsened (Chirwa, 2015:110).” From the above discussions, I highlight the point that the Belgians did not properly conceptualise the fragile relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi. As a result, they triggered the outward manifestation of the intrinsic inclination of the two ethnicities. As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, unrestrained resorting to ethnic differentiation, as in the case of Rwanda, frequently plays into the realm of personified politics. Thus, ethnicity simply unites several individuals with personified inclinations. The result is the emergence of a leader with a personified agenda, premised on ethnic foundations. I argue that instead of unifying the country, PARMEHUTU leader with personified inclinations, Gregoire Kayibanda, escalated repression against the Tutsi.

A 1973 coup against Kayibanda brought another Hutu, General Juvenal Habyarimana, to power (Chirwa, 2015:111). “Just like the PARMEHUTU, Juvenal Habyarimana’s leadership also stressed the dominance of Hutus in the social, political, and economic spheres of Rwanda” (Rayarikar, 2017:11). “From 1990 onward, under the leadership of a small clique surrounding Habyarimana and his wife known as the akazu (literally, the small house), various dynamics fostered the radicalization of prejudice. First, the FPR threat was extended to all Tutsi” (Uvin, 1999:260). However, an economic downturn during Habyarimana’s reign almost brought Rwanda to a complete societal collapse. Chirwa (2015:111) contended that the resulting economic hardships caused increased competition for scarce resources between the Hutu and Tutsi. Instead of acknowledging the government’s role in the economic deterioration, it blamed the Tutsis for the country’s social and economic
woes (Kamola, noted in Chirwa, 2015:116). The situation quickly degenerated into an all-out ethnic war, where the Hutu attempted to exterminate the Tutsi through genocide. This elicited the need for Tutsi to save themselves from extinction. I underscore the point that the personified dispensation exhibited by the leadership and a cross section of the population precipitated anarchy.

Mann and Berry (2016:1) argued that “twenty years after its horrific genocide, Rwanda has become a model for economic development. The Government of Rwanda’s (GoR) guiding policy, “Vision 2020,” contains ambitious social and economic targets that aim to make Rwanda a middle-income country by 2020, increasing incomes to $900 and life expectancies to 55 years.” According to Reyntjens (2015:19), “President Paul Kagame and the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) have restored order and presided over a period of impressive modernization and economic development since 1994.” Reyntjens maintained that “from 2003, Rwanda’s annual economic-growth rate has been a robust 7 to 8 percent, and the country has made major progress in health and education. Among African countries, Rwanda has been a top achiever of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, and has moved up the ranks on the World Bank’s Doing Business index.” The Rwanda National Human Development Report (2014:48) acknowledges that “these achievements have been underpinned by a strong and committed leadership, which has mobilized citizens and created a sense of unique identity, as well as confidence and collective responsibility which has catalysed the implementation of home-grown solutions.” Rayarikar (2017:2) argued that “it is evident that this development took place under the aegis of Kagame’s leadership. It would very likely not have happened under someone else leadership.”

Underlying all the apparent progress, Mann and Berry (2016:4) argued that the GoR is attempting to use the development of markets as a way to deepen power. Mann and Berry maintained that, through the construction of a common coordinative system of control and communication (conceived of as markets), the GoR aims to create an infrastructure of power that is decentralised and embedded into everyday life. To Mann and Berry, such transformation extends beyond a prioritisation of growth and encompasses the articulation of ideologies, the provision of social spending, and the reordering of the social and physical layout. Accordingly, Mitchell (noted in Mann & Berry, 2016:5) argued that the apolitical approach to Rwandan
development partly reflects the limited space for political discussions in Rwanda, but also reflects broader neoliberal currents in development, depicting markets as apolitical spaces where ‘economics’ can work. To cultivate this national work ethic, the GoR deploys political and civic re-education and indoctrination camps traditionally called ingando, (and more recently, itorero camps – a type of traditional cultural school) designed to make Rwandans more receptive to development, modernisation, and reconciliation (Mann & Berry, 2016:30).

The rationale behind the “corrupt payments” is to make recipients feel like they have a stake in the developmental vision. These fraudulent costs place further fiscal pressure on the GoR to prioritise development. Whether or not these programmes will succeed is debatable, as high rates of population growth mean that more people live in poverty than ever before (Mann & Berry, 2016:26). In Rwanda, models like ingando could help stabilise the political environment for growth. However, its resemblance to a surveillance system could have longer-term negative impacts on the country’s political development, in the absence of media scrutiny and public oversight. Rwanda, like other African countries, has made it mandatory for citizens to register their communication devices with the government (Mann & Berry, 2016:28). As in the case of Rwanda, economic development is a political process in which powerful groups make decisions to change the rules of the game. They will only do so when they believe it is in their interests, and when they feel they can control the process of accumulation (Mann & Berry, 2016:33).

Reyntjens (2015:21) argued that “today, there are two radically opposing views of Rwanda.” Reyntjens maintained that “one view hails Rwanda’s visionary leadership, economic progress, market-oriented policies, empowerment of women, and reforms in education, health, and agriculture. The other view condemns Rwanda’s autocratic rule, human-rights abuses, persecution of the Hutu majority, and growing inequality and rural poverty.” The DFID’s Operational Plan 2011–2015 (noted in Reyntjens, 2015:30) did note “constraints on rights and freedoms” in Rwanda and a growing “concern that power is too highly centralized, with unpredictable consequences for long term political stability, economic development and human rights.” Conversely, Reyntjens (2015:31) posited that “the argument that political repression is necessary for development is empirically unsustainable. The Kagame regime’s policies are reminiscent of colonial days, when politics was obscured by a focus on technocratic
improvements in infrastructure, health, and education. Similarly, the RPF regime runs Rwanda like a corporation and seems to believe that its citizens are not political beings. In the end, this is a risky strategy.”

The leadership justifies this use of force by arguing that it must protect the country against various security threats. At the same time, its government has been criticised for its authoritarian tactics and use of violence (Mann & Berry, 2016:16). “Some have argued that a degree of authoritarianism is necessary in Rwanda, because the country is still politically fragile and because socioeconomic progress can reduce political demands and tensions” (Reyntjens, 2015:31). However, the Rwanda National Human Development Report (2014:16) argued that “institutionalizing inclusive growth and human wellbeing will ensure that pro-poor development is guaranteed to extend beyond the current government’s term.” The report maintained that “the latter is vital, considering that much of the country’s participatory and inclusive development initiatives have been inspired by – and very often driven by – the current head of State, President Paul Kagame. Equally, the Umushyikirano [a forum for national dialogue], Girinka [cultural practice where a cow is presented to another as a sign of respect and gratitude] and Agaciro [self-dignity and self-respect] initiatives have ridden on Kagame’s personal stewardship and may be difficult to sustain without his direct leadership unless these initiatives are fully institutionalized within government.”

“It is important to recall that Rwanda had been a highly centralized State since the precolonial period. Successive regimes had disenfranchised and conditioned citizens to become highly fearful of, and dependent on, rulers at all levels. The few people in leadership positions believed, behaved and worked as rulers not leaders, working for the interests of higher levels of government, often at the expense of citizens” (Rwanda National Human Development Report, 2014:52). “President Paul Kagame plays a similar role in being at the centre of the Rwandan State. His leadership in the civil war against the previous regime in Rwanda, and his party’s role in ending the 1994 Genocide automatically put him at the helm of the devastated nation” (Rayarikar, 2017:16). Similar to what Mann and Berry have stated (as noted in preceding paragraphs), Rayarikar (2017:18) contended that “one of the ways in which Kagame is able to develop a cult of personality around himself and the RPF leadership is through the indoctrination of specific groups of people around the
nation in targeted camps, known as the *ingando* solidarity camps. Two key phrases associated with personified leadership that come into play in the above paragraph are ‘centralized state’ and ‘cult of personality’.” I argue that both terminologies subsist together as one: the personality is a precursor to the centralisation of power. However, like all personified systems, the systematic indoctrination of the masses serves to entrench the essential character of the leader in the nation’s societal fabric and institutions. The foregoing is clarified in the subsequent paragraphs.

Ayittey (2017:98) posited that “although Article 34 of Rwanda’s constitution stipulates ‘freedom of the press and freedom of information are recognized and guaranteed by the state,’ Pres. Paul Kagame brooks no dissent; critics are labelled as enemies and targeted for assassination.” According to Ayittey, in 2013, Patrick Karegeya was brutally strangled to death in Johannesburg. His killer or killers remain at large. Ayittey maintained that another target at that time was Kagame’s former army chief, General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, who has been the target of a series of attacks and murder plots, which – according to the South African Government and other sources – were orchestrated by agents of the Rwandan Government. Furthermore, Ayittey posited that the democratic experiment in Rwanda has been farcical. Since 1994, Kagame has won two presidential elections (in 2003 and 2010) with more than 90 percent of the vote. On August 25, 2003, Rwanda held sham elections in which President Paul Kagame won 95 percent of the vote. His main challenger, Faustin Twagiramungu, a former Prime Minister, secured only 3 percent of the vote. Twagiramungu’s opposition party, Democratic Republican Movement, was banned. Similarly, the government-run media vilified Twagiramungu; his supporters were harassed, intimidated and jailed. Ayittey contended that this farce was repeated in 2010 when Victoire Ingabire returned to Rwanda, after six years in exile, to form the Unified Democratic Forces (UDF), a coalition of opposition parties. She was immediately arrested and charged with terrorism and endangering the security of the state. She was sentenced to an eight-year jail term. Four high-profile dissidents, who formed the Rwanda National Congress in 2010, suffered a similar fate.

Furthermore, Rayarikar (2017:4) argued that “urban development in Rwanda is not without its problems: its showcase capital Kigali displays characteristics of authoritarian planning, while other cities are vastly underfunded and underdeveloped. Besides, Kigali serves as an urban spectacle while distracting
attention from the vastly poorer parts of Rwanda.” Rayarikar maintained that “essentially, close associates of the RPF own some large business groups that operate in Rwanda. Since RPF is the ruling party, this blurs the line between the government and the private sector.” According to Rayarikar, “the rise of Paul Kagame and his power because of economic growth, along with the merging of the state with private enterprise, and support for war outside its borders hints towards Rwanda’s government gradually morphing into a fully authoritarian regime.”

In echoing the above, Clapham (2012:13) argued that “Rwanda is a prominent example of a former liberator that sought to reinvent themselves as a ‘developmental state’.” To Clapham, “Rwanda is following Asian models in which a strong State committed to rapid economic development provides public order, infrastructure and other basic services, [and] seeks to establish conditions propitious for private sector investment.” Clapham maintained that “this has the great advantage, from the movement’s point of view of continuing to guarantee the central role of the movement itself; while at the same time (if the strategy is successful) helps to meet popular demands for employment and public welfare.” According to Clapham, “this strategy may also provide continuing opportunities for State or party owned businesses, or for ‘crony capitalists’ associated with the regime, and delay the point at which challenges to the government’s continued tenure becomes acute.”

In the above discussions, we note that experts are associating Rwanda’s development planning with ‘authoritarianism,’ a characteristic that is surrogate to personification. Furthermore, and effectively accentuating the hypothesis in this study, Rayarikar points out that the lines between Kagame’s government and other institutions are blurred. This goes a long way in demonstrating that with time, institutions in personified dispensations inevitably assume the essential character of the leader. Clapham seals my argument by highlighting deep patterns of personified governance in his assertion that Rwanda’s development model guarantees the central role of the movement as it does for “ … ‘crony capitalists’ associated with the regime.” Contextually, the latter statement highlights the point that the uncanny forces of personification are pervading Rwanda.

However, not all is lost in Rwanda. Warfield and Sentongo (2011:84) posited that “despite dilemmas of justice and democracy, transformative leadership in Rwanda continues to evolve at both state and grassroots levels through processes based on
indigenous knowledge and practices like gacaca and ingando to achieve the greater good of reconciliation.” In exemplifying Rwanda, Warfield and Sentongo (2011:86) maintained that “community capacity building through grassroots leadership is a necessary and sufficient ingredient for the development and sustenance of African democracy.” To do so, Warfield and Sentongo argued that “transformational leadership, as is Kagame is effecting, must exist at various levels of the state in order to mobilise community consciousness.” Equally, Warfield and Sentongo assert that “a number of transformations and reforms involving community, civil society and national level stakeholders and other actors in Rwanda reflect a dominant utilitarian approach to leadership and progress in the country.” “While there are claims of increasing authoritarianism on the part of government, the leadership in Rwanda can be perceived as progressively developmental, moving steadily (albeit with a few hiccups) on a path to sustainable long-term development” (Hayman, noted in Warfield & Sentongo, 2011:91).

In conclusion, the above paragraph points out the paradox with personified governance that has cropped up in other segments of this thesis. The fact is that, under certain conditions that require more investigation, personified governance may advance a degree of national development. I surmise that this factor has led donors, development partners and even acquiesced citizens to continue supporting personified regimes, even where it is associated with atrocious scandals. The dilemma that all stakeholders face is whether to drop a personified leader who is registering achievements in national development, or elect an untested leader. The fact that the personification of state systems is progressive, and usually culminates in extreme conditions for the masses, complicates the situation further. Perhaps another salvaging factor in the above discussions is the fact that traditional African governance systems like gacaca and ingando are resilient. As in Rwanda, this fact gives a window of hope to citizens who are subject to personified governance, in that home-grown solutions might provide the way to go forward. This concluding line sets that stage for the next section, where I shall examine literature on the extent of citizen involvement in, and influence of, national governance in East Africa.
4.6 Citizen involvement in national governance in East Africa

In the previous section, I examined conceptual abstracts on the theory of personification that relate to empirical literature on leadership and national development in East Africa. In this section, I will attempt to answer the research question, “How can East African citizens influence national governance and development policies under personified leaders?” This section will integrate the literature from preceding sections with the researcher’s own postulations regarding probable citizen actions under personified leadership. Accordingly, this section begins with an overview of the context and background of citizen participation in national governance and development policies in East Africa. The chapter concludes with an assortment of strategies that citizens could apply to overcome personified leadership in East Africa. For case studies, the researcher selected Kenya and Rwanda, countries that reflect a broad variety of historical, cultural and social contexts.

This section will draw on perspectives from the countries cited above to enable the reader to gain an understanding of how citizen participation translates into national gains through effective, citizen-driven governance, and how citizens might have acquiesced because of suppression by leaders. According to King; Feltey and Susel; Putnam; and Arnstein (as noted by Irvin & Stansbury, 2004:55), “arguments for enhanced citizen participation often rest on the merits of the process and the belief that it is better to have an engaged rather passive citizenry.” Likewise, Irvin and Stansbury (2004:55) posited that “with citizen participation, formulated policies might more realistically reflect citizen preferences. This is because the public might become sympathetic evaluators of the tough decisions that government administrators make.” Thus, Irvin and Stansbury maintained that “the improved support from the public might create a less divisive [and peaceable] populace to govern and regulate [national issues].” Irvin and Stansbury’s postulation augurs well for this study’s assumption that citizen-led governance, rather than personified governance, would more probably result in sustainable national policies. The discussions in subsequent paragraphs will explore and analyse available literature on the subject to validate the researcher’s assumptions.
The literature covered so far highlights the complexities associated with the subject of personified leadership. This is because, to contextualise the essence of personified inclination, one needs to trace the progression of childhood to adulthood influences on a subject leader exhibiting such qualities. As the researcher has discussed elsewhere in this thesis, the subject of personification becomes even more complex where more than one person in leadership positions exhibits such qualities. To complicate issues further, the unpredictability of human personality makes it even harder to anticipate potential actions that are associated with personified leadership. While experts might deduce accurate data outcomes of leadership policy actions, the researcher posits that personified leadership is invariably measured with error. This is because some leaders who exhibit personified tendencies essentially deny having any such predisposition, while others actually flaunt it to their benefit, to subjugate any perceived or real threats. Similarly, leaders, being human, can feign character traits to suit audiences. Because of the likelihood of encountering systematic data errors in plotting a personified leadership trajectory, this researcher’s description of citizens’ influences on national governance and development policies under personified leaders will be premised on models that measure unobserved variables by using ‘known’ variables.

Consequently, this study contends that, in order for citizens to have an effect on national governance and development policies under personified leaders, they must credibly and accurately understand the ‘influencers’ of the incumbent leader. By understanding behaviour, one can predict, direct, change and control the actions of individuals or a group. This may require long-drawn, longitudinal studies of the leader, which may be too complex for the average citizen to undertake. Thankfully, the body of literature presents useful models that might help predict aspects of childhood development and their possible outcomes at adulthood. The researcher will draw on such literature to outline how citizens can effectively influence national governance and development policies under personified regimes. This study theorises that citizen participation in national governance and development policies may ensure greater transparency, ownership and accountability.
4.6.1 Participation of citizens under personified national governance

In this section, I examine the participation of citizens under personified national governance in East Africa, drawing on distinct case studies of Kenya and Rwanda. For ease of reference, the researcher will discuss each country categorically and then conclude the section with a cross-regional comparative analysis. The researcher will discuss the countries in no specific order, and will particularly try to ensure logical flow and congruence of the subsequent paragraphs.

According to Kanyinga (2014:98), “until the early 2000s, Kenya’s space for political participation was severely constrained and so was citizen participation in policy-making.” Kanyinga maintained that “the executive, and especially the President, as well as powerful bureaucrats, influenced and decided policy without consultation. The greater majority of the population was excluded from the policy process. A systematic emasculation of Parliament, the judiciary, civil society and the media during the one-party regime, constrained the space for civic engagement.” Similarly, Njagi (2015:7, 15) contended that “four years after the promulgation of the Kenyan constitution, the covenant seemed elusive, suffocated by tokenistic participation strategies, disrespect for the rule of law and open tensions between the national Government and the county Governments.” Njagi maintained that “citizens on the other hand, were unable to seize the opportunities availed to them through the constitution to influence public policy making processes. Notable civic voices argued that the space for citizens’ engagement was gradually shrinking.” As discussed in this thesis, I explained how Kenya is a typical example of a country grappling with long-drawn effects of personification.

As corroborated above by Njagi and Kanyinga, I argue that personified systems frequently prevent the participation of citizens in determining national policies. Of particular interest in the above literature, is the fact that citizens are excluded from participating in making national policies that typically affect them. The researcher argues that even the perceived sanctity and supremacy of a national constitution is no restraint to a leader with personified inclinations, as was the case in Kenya, cited above. Likewise, I argue that the exclusionist strategy practised by personified regimes renders polices unresponsive and irrelevant to citizens’ needs. The researcher maintains that engaging citizens directly in national policy processes
would enable incumbent governments to gain support, build consensus, identify acceptable solutions, and ensure operability. Interestingly, in the case of Kenya, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (noted by Kanyinga, 2014:3) “had warned that Kenya was so deeply divided along ethnic lines that if the government did not address some of the reasons causing divisions, conflict would occur. The APRM maintained that the violence indeed occurred because of the failure to respond to long-standing governance issues. It continued to threaten the consolidation of democracy and it constrained political participation.” Thus, according to this thesis, the latter highlights the volatility associated with excluding citizens from determining national issues that affects them.

“In terms of law making by Parliament and County Assemblies, Kenya’s 2010 Constitution is a clear departure from the 1963 Constitution that exclusively vested law making in peoples’ representatives” (Mukuna & Mbao, 2014:438). “In contrast, the particular need to open the political space to competitive politics after several decades of domination by the one-party regime informed the struggle for political liberalization from the late 1980s. These struggles placed primacy on people’s participation in decision-making, because the government and the ruling party often imposed decisions that promoted parochial and individual political interests rather than the public good” (Kanyinga, 2014:6). Similarly, Khaunya et al. (2015:27) argued that “the post-independence approach of Local Governments in Kenya embraced a strong centralized governance structure contrary to its initial objective meant to resolve the regional development challenges that apparently failed.” Khaunya et al. maintained that “the challenges in Kenya [were increasingly] associated with bureaucratic inefficiencies, lack of accountability and transparency, unequal distribution of national resources and minimal community participation in local development, amongst others.” Consequently, “under the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, direct participation of the people in law-making and political governance [became] a cardinal democratic ideal that surmounts decades of usurpation of the role of Parliament by the Executive that used the legislature to enforce authoritarianism in the country” (Mukuna & Mbao, 2014:438). The same constitution strongly emphasizes the need for public participation in governmental decision-making processes (Constitution of Kenya 2010). Likewise, Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) echoes the spirit of the Kenyan Constitution.
The Declaration provides that “everyone has the right to take part in the government of his/her country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.”

At a localised level, participatory development in Kenya, as in many other countries, began with, and was for a long time confined to, community development projects (Wakwabubi & Shiverenje, noted in Omolo, 2011:9). Kenya attempted to institutionalise decentralised planning and implementation of its programmes as early as the 1960s through Sessional Papers. The most elaborate was the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) Strategy, which became operational in 1983. However, the Strategy emphasised the involvement of central government field workers in planning and implementation of programmes. This, as Chitere and Ireri (cited in Omolo, 2011:9) noted, “is contrary to the conception of the participatory approach. Ideally in participation, development workers such as civil servants only facilitate the process by assisting communities to identify and solve their own problems.” Omolo (2011:10) argued that “in order to enhance participation as [Kenya] implements devolution at county level, there is need for clear mechanisms for engagement and articulation of community interests. However, failure or apathy of the middle class and local elite to engage in development processes challenge community participation in implementation processes” (Omolo, 2011:17).

However, I contend that, literally, citizen participation in Kenya’s national governance has not occurred as expected. Indeed, any transformation of Kenya’s post-independence structures has more or less been for the self-interest of the incumbent political elite, and therefore, of little or no benefit to the common man. As such, “Kenyan [leaders] have never structured the state in the interest of the masses and public good” (Gakuru, Mwenzwa & Bikuri, noted in Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:247). “Instead, the leaders use the state as a tool for coercion, enforcement and maintenance of the oppressive regime of the politico-economic elite, whose interests never coincide with those of the common man” (Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:247).

Similarly, the Kenyan Government introduced amendments of Bills approved by Parliament, for instance the important Commission on Revenue Allocation Bill, 2011, thus circumventing CIC scrutiny, and worsened by the Executive’s ignorance of CIC advisories in this regard. Mukuna and Mbao (2014:443) maintained that “other key violations of the Constitution included the grave sin of disregarding the participation of the people in law making – a complete refusal of Parliament and the Executive of High Court order to stop the passage into law of the Government Loans Guarantee and the Contingencies Fund and County Emergency Bills for being unconstitutional. To add to the long list of Bills passed by Parliament in utter violation of the requirement for the participation of the people are changes to the Political Parties Act, 2011. In June 2012, without public participation, Members of Parliament passed crucial amendments to the Act to permit floor crossing without losing their seats in Parliament. The later transpired despite calls by the chairperson of the CIC and some MPS that the Bill was unconstitutional” (Mukuna & Mbao, 2014:443).

The situation becomes more disturbing when allegations of corruption among committee members are made by none other than the Deputy Minority Leader of the National Assembly [indicating the advent of personification, corruption, manipulation, etc.] (Mukuna & Mbao, 2014:443). For example, “Counties face a myriad of challenges that stand in the way of the realized achievements. These challenges include lack of political goodwill, inadequate funding, ‘devolved’ corruption, nepotism, inability to absorb some devolved functions, mistrust among stakeholders, different implementers of devolution with varied cultures and approaches, devolved bureaucracy, a bloated workforce with duplication of duties and internal political supremacy wars” (Khaunya et al., 2015:35). Similarly, Kanyinga (2014:xii) argued that “the most important challenges facing Kenya’s democratic consolidation include ethnicity and identity politics, the [poor] electoral system, and the dominance of the executive.” Kanyinga noted that “ethnicity is a symptom of the structure and use of political power.” Specifically, Kanyinga cites “the interplay of ethnicity and the competition for executive power as critical factors that have constrained public participation and the democratic transition in general.”

From the foregoing discussion, I argue that the executive and legislative arms of the Government in Kenya have, at one point in time, excluded citizens from participating in national governance. Despite the promulgation of a comprehensive constitution in
2010, there is a strong indication that national leaders still violate the sanctity of the constitution, basically, for egoistic reasons. The deliberate circumvention of regulatory institutions by national leaders points to occurrence of personified dispensation. As has occurred in Kenya, the exclusion of citizens from participating in national governance has a ‘price’ – mass uprisings, anarchy and popular revolts, as was the case in 2007. In Kenya’s case, the vice of personification has permeated the institution of law making, which is a factor that grossly hinders unprejudiced redress of any legal issues associated with citizen participation and, ultimately, governance. Accordingly, the exclusion of the people from participating in national discourses has escalated vices like corruption, nepotism, and manipulation, which are the bastions of personified regimes.

Turning to Rwanda, decentralisation has been a key policy of the Government of Rwanda (GoR) since the year 2000, with the objective to promote good governance, service delivery, and national development. By developing and implementing the decentralisation policy, the GoR is not only doing what is right, but also doing what was prompted by popular demand by the Rwandan population (National Decentralization Policy 2012). According to the Minister of Local Government, “decentralization helped Rwanda democratize leadership and create platforms for nurturing leaders, mostly women and youth, who had hitherto been excluded from their governance” (National Decentralization Policy 2012:6). Similarly, the National Human Development Report (2014), highlights the point that “decentralization has facilitated the transformation of Rwandese from a passive population disconnected from governance, characterized by a high level of dependency on government, and powerlessness, to a more engaged and active citizenry.” The report asserts that “not only do the citizens elect their own leaders; they are also holding them accountable. This is because they are now more about the role of government and their own responsibility and potential.”

However, Interayamahanga (2011:13) differed with the above rosy picture painted by national institutions. He argued that “Rwanda citizens have cited low participation in policy/law formulation and decision-making, formulation of Local government programs and evaluation of government projects.” However, Hogg (2009:45) posited that “the Government of National Unity’s (GNU) much-touted moves towards democratic and decentralized governance exist on a nominal level, many reports
confirm the ‘disappearances’ of those who have attempted political or ideological moves outside of central governmental control.” Likewise, “most external observers note that the Rwandan government’s claims of successfully moving the nation forward along the path towards democratic governance are based on Huntington’s ‘transition paradigm’ of ‘democratization’” (Huntington, noted in Hogg, 2009:45). The ‘transition paradigm’ “assumes that a nation undergoing political transition will proceed towards democratic governance when democratic rule, freedom, good governance, and the rule of law are able to trump authoritarianism, oppression, human rights abuses and corruption” (Reyntjens; Burnet, as noted in Hogg, 2009:46). Further to the above, Hogg (2009:46) argued that “in light of the RPF’s oppressive practices, inter alia human rights abuses and quieting of political dissent, the current authoritarian nature of the regime hardly falls within the parameters of democratic governance.”

Additionally, I argue that the two dominant ethnic groups in Rwanda also play a critical role in determining the participation of citizens under personified rule. Adejumobi (2001:91) illustrated the latter in his well-articulated assertion that “Rwanda under both the Kayibanda (1962-1973) and Habyarimana regimes (1973-1994) mirrored its colonial ancestry. The State enforced exclusive group rights and privileges and provided the institutional context and legitimacy for the discrimination and domination of one group by another.” Adejumobi maintained that “the State did not define citizenship on an individual or common national basis, but from a group dimension.” Equally, Adejumobi contended that “the ethnic identity card policy, which the colonial state instituted, was retained. A perverse policy of ‘quota democracy’ or ‘majoritarian rule’ was enforced by the State, which reserved 80 percent of all public goods to the Hutus. This policy was the other side of the colonial one that emphasized the rule or governance by the ‘superior specie’ or ‘qualitative rule’. Thus, group identity and social stratification were fused into the State system.”

For a country like Rwanda with strong ethnic disparities, I argue that the issues pertaining to power sharing are rather complex. This is because power sharing involves a delicate tripartite relationship between two disparate ethnic groups and a governing leader. According to Rothschild and Roeder (noted in Traniello, 2008:32), “power-sharing institutions frequently empower the leaders of ethnic groups with the means to challenge the power-sharing agreement.” This notion specifically suggests
that power sharing can strengthen ethnic conflict. Thus, Spears (noted in Traniello, 2008:34) contended, given that, most African conflicts are internal, such as in Rwanda, "power-sharing must be about reconciliation between enemies." To Spears (noted in Traniello, 2008:34), this is an attractive option because it offers a logical approach to conflict management in terms of political and economic power. Of particular significance to this segment is the fact that scholars argue that power sharing requires elite political leaders to drive the model (Traniello, 2008:35). However, Traniello (2008:38) argued that “Rwanda represents the worst-case scenario of power sharing since the Arusha Accords (1993) designed to avert the 1994 genocide, [and] failed to mitigate violence because it lacked such necessary factors as an able and committed leadership.”

Many experts now believe that Rwanda is currently better governed under the incumbent leader, which the researcher argues, makes power sharing a possibility. A case in point is the Mo Ibrahim Index report on Africa Governance (IIAG) (noted in Mutesi, 2014). The latter specifically alludes to Rwanda as having recorded the ‘best progress’ since the year 2000, making it the ‘most successful’ among all the post-conflict countries. However, as posited in the preceding paragraphs, Rwanda has had cyclical challenges with leadership that ultimately affect or even mitigate citizen participation in governance. I argue that the leadership challenges may be perennial, since personification can become entrenched in national systems. On this subject, Spears (noted in Traniello, 2008:38) recognises that “African politics must be seen from the self-interested perspective of elites; because even though they find power sharing attractive, their primary concern remains what strategies best meet their interests and their security needs.” Spears maintained that “ostensibly, the self-interested perspective of national elite’s signifies personified tendencies that feasibly exclude citizens from rightfully participating in governance.” In essence, I posit that if a leader is not willing to share power with other citizens for egoistic reasons, then equitable governance in that jurisdiction will fail.

4.6.2 Acquiescence of citizens to personified governance

To understand the existence of acquiescence in Kenya, I will review the process of the country’s national formation that stretches far back in time and across societal dimensions. One such dimension pertained to the rationalisation of citizenship to
guarantee the rights of immigrant populations in Kenya. From the dawn of independence, the different ethnic groups have quarrelled about access to land and state resources. Archer (2009:53) maintained that some scholars argue that ethnic identities and the history of ethnic antagonism that characterises Kenyan society are key factors in understanding the current political situation. Jeffrey Steeves (noted in Archer, 2009:53), for instance, stated when writing about Kenya that “the individual in Africa is defined by one’s ethnic community and thus one’s loyalty and actions are framed within an ethnic identity.” I argue that it is even more significant that acquiescence in Kenya is directly linked to the subject of ‘interests’, which in this study is a core factor in personified governance. I also note that in order to mitigate recurrences of acquiescence, and while amending the 1963 Kenyan constitution, legislators endeavoured to exchange the executive-centred Constitution in preference for one focused on participation by the people. In reviewing Kenya’s constitution, Ojwang (2001) contended that “Kenya’s Constitution should carry the most basic principles of law that relate to a nation’s main political arrangements. Such political situations include governance patterns, as well as the public power schemes that the people have accepted, or acquiesced in, or been subjected to.” In addition, Ojwang (2001) argued that “acquiescence poses no political problem since there is no major quarrel with the power dispensations.” On the other hand, Ojwang’s main concern was that people should not be “subjected to an unpopular public power dispensation”.

However, I argue that the subjection of the citizenry to unpopular power dispensations is a precursor to acquiescence. Furthermore, as mentioned above and elsewhere in this study, Kenya has a long history of personified governance that started from the country’s independence in 1963. Because of domination and suppression by successive personified regimes, the older generation is now more acquiesced than the youth is to unpopular power dispensations. In a study that Afrobarometer conducted in 18 sub-Saharan countries, Chikwanha and Masunungure (2007) posed a critical question: “Will the youth occupy the frontlines in defence of democracy, while the elderly acquiesce more willingly to the authoritarian impulses of leaders?” Afrobarometer’s findings on Kenya were not surprising. Chikwanha and Masunungure (2007:8) established that in Kenya, there was a negligible variance regarding perceptions on authoritarian rule between youth
and the elderly. In essence, Afrobarometer (noted in Chikwanha & Masunungure, 2007:8) highlights the point that a political generational gap is not apparent in Kenya “since neither the young nor their elders express a preference for a nondemocratic order.” Despite the latter, “young people in Kenya are especially distrustful of the Presidency” (Chikwanha & Masunungure, 2007:15), and I argue that the Presidency is apparently the epicentre of personified governance. To the researcher, this finding confirms the assumption that long periods of subjection to personified rule will ultimately diffuse from the elders to the youth. Chikwanha and Masunungure (2007:9) corroborate this notion in the assertion that “the elders have a personal history of experience with authoritarian rule against which to judge the performance of the [incumbent] regime. Conversely, the youth may only hear or read about authoritarianism and therefore have no experiential benchmark for evaluating the present regime against the past. The fact that Kenyan youth are now apathetic to one party rule, military rule and one-man rule” to me indicates a systemic process of acquiescence to personified governance. It is not surprising then, that the subject of acquiescence featured prominently in the constitutional reform article discussed above, which professor Ojwang (2001) authored.

In discussing corruption as being one of the indicators of bad governance and human rights abuse in Kenya, Gathii highlights another dimension of acquiescence in the country. According to Gathii (2009:152), “corruption thrived in Kenya, especially following the systematic dismantling of the rule of law and tenets of good governance during the one-party era in the 1980s.” Gathii maintained that “corruption has been traced and linked to the Presidency.” Thus, Gathii posited that “there has been a convergence in High Court cases as well as the statements of highly placed government officials that has tended to acquiesce to high-level corruption. One of the consequences of this acquiescence to high-level corruption cases has been a culture of impunity” (Gathii, 2009:170). Similarly, Gathii (2009:177) posited that “since Kenyan courts have acquiesced to these arguments in leading cases, this has greatly hampered the prosecution of corrupt officials, especially those associated with high-level corruption.” Regarding the above assertions, I contend that when the judicial system of a country acquiesces to the personified interests of the national leader and their cronies, the “unconnected” citizens are bound to suffer injustices. This is evident in Kenya, where Gathii argued that “corruption has undermined
respect for human rights within the country. The latter degenerated to the extent that State cannot meet its obligations to respect, fulfil and protect the human rights of its citizens” (Gathii, 2009:197).

The above literature review has highlighted how the political, judicial and legislative arms of government under personified regimes can conspire to foster the acquiescence of the masses to the status quo. The study has also linked acquiescence to personified governance in the infancy of regime entrenchment, culminating in fully fledged helplessness when there is no change. Even more significant is the fact that inter-generational conduits can transmit acquiescence through from the elders to the youth, precariously obscuring the possibility of systemic change. The above insights underscore how personified governance can permeate and transform the guiding social fabric of society, thus rendering citizens distrustfully dependent on the selfish interest of callous leaders.

Turning to Rwanda, as in the case of Kenya, we see a correlation between the acquiescence of its citizens and authoritarian rule. According to Blair and Stevenson (2015:43), the struggle for the justifications to rule, as well as for popular support (or least acquiesce), in Rwanda provided an instructive case in point. Remembrance of the genocide is the main justification of the regime’s (Tutsi ethnic) minority rule. Blair and Stevenson maintained that by stabilising a specific memory of the genocide event that brought them to power, the Rwanda Patriotic Front is attempting to stabilise its own ideological foundation through a salvific discourse about the necessity for continued authoritarian governance for the salvation of Rwanda (Blair & Stevenson, 2015:28). The above assertion corroborates the theoretical framework of this thesis that citizens, as in the case of Rwanda, can actually promote the personification of the leadership and, ultimately, the acquiescence of other ethnicities to their preferred leader. As discussed earlier in this section, ethnicities in Kenya, as in Rwanda, tussled for superiority and dominance at the dawn of independence in a battle won by the African majority. This contest, as in the case of Rwanda, resulted in the acquiescence of Kenyan Asians to the egocentric demands of so-called African nationalists.

Rwanda presents an even more intriguing dimension of acquiescence. “Journalistic accounts stress Rwanda’s ‘entrenched culture of obedience’ when accounting for the
swiftness with which Hutus killed their Tutsi victims” (Lacey, noted in Paluck & Green, 2009:2). The researcher reckons that this rationalises the above paragraph that highlights how Rwanda’s incumbent Tutsi leaders are methodically indoctrinating acquiescence to vanquished ethnicities, while systematically personifying the state. A scholarly history of the genocide likewise described the Rwandan citizen’s mind-set: “when the highest authorities in that state told you to do something, you did it, even if it included killing” (Prunier, noted in Paluck & Green, 2009:2). Accordingly, Berkely (2001) asserted that the broad participation of tens of thousands of ordinary Hutus in the genocide was undoubtedly a function of Rwanda’s notorious culture of obedience. As in Kenya’s case, Rwanda’s culture of blind obedience to authority – a variant of systematised acquiescence – has deep roots in the country’s colonial legacy. “Studies show Rwandans’ deference to authority is traceable to institutional arrangements imposed by Belgian colonial rulers, who refashioned the intricate monarchical system characterized by competing patterns of local allegiance into a more centralized, oppressive, and ethnically homogenous system of governance” (Lemarchand; Newbury, as noted by Paluck & Green, 2009:5).

The researcher argues that the colonial enforcement of allegiance to a centralised oppressive governance structure starkly illustrates the genesis of systematised acquiescence. It is instructive therefore; that the current manifestation of Rwanda’s culturally rooted acquiescence has its deep roots in colonial political governance. Until the 1950s, a highly authoritarian and centralised administrative structure characterised Belgian colonial rule [in Rwanda] (Gellar, Morris & Kayigema, 2001:48). In essence, Rwanda inherited native authority systems from the colonialists (Mazrui & Wondji, 1999:450), who [tactlessly tried to] turn traditional leaders into civil servants and democratise [monarchies] (Mazrui & Wondji, 1999:209). The fact that absolutism was infused into Rwanda’s governance system from the advent of independence explains why successive governments have inclined towards personified governance. Consequently, Clark (2014) contended that “… beneath the cunning veneer of Kigali’s litter-free streets lies a government with near-absolute control over its citizens, who live in a state of perpetual and silent fear.” Caplan (1994) offered further evidence of the systematic personification of Rwanda’s governance. According to Caplan (1994:24), “there was a small, almost
exclusively Hutu intellectual elite, including academics at the country's only university, on whom the government could count for active support or, at the least, acquiescent silence.”

Again, we note the occurrence of state-inspired acquiescence forced upon a powerless ethnicity by the ruling government. The latter contravenes Kaseya and Kihonge’s (2016) definition of self-government that states “… democratic self-government means that citizens are actively involved in their own governance; they do not just passively accept the dictums of others or acquiesce to the demands of others.” The researcher argues that successive regimes in Rwanda have personified governance to the extent of undemocratically rewarding political cronies or perceived supporters at the expense of other citizens. Without any feasible options, the hapless citizens acquiesce to incumbents in an effort to preserve themselves. Gellar et al. (2001:48) posited that, “over time, a longstanding tradition of popular acquiescence to direction and control by an authoritarian central government” has emerged in Rwanda. However, as I contend, the tolerance of citizens subjected to personified governance always culminates in dissension, the subject of the next section.

4.6.3 Citizen dissension to personified governance

This section will focus on Kenya and Rwanda as case studies to aid discussions on the extent of citizen resilience to personified governance in East Africa. Furthermore, the case studies will link this section to preceding chapters. Likewise, the level of citizen participation in matters of governance in both countries is rather intense, owing to several factors such as divisive ethnic politics. Moreover, Kenya has made its way through strong autocratic dispensations and politics of exclusion perpetrated by intolerant leaders (Njogu, 2014:3) to become the most advanced economy in the region. Moreover, the Kenyan political scene has been relatively stable since Kenya’s independence in 1963. On the other hand, Rwanda is arguably the fastest-transforming country in the region, given its tumultuous past. As one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, Rwanda has experienced powerful national reconstruction and reconciliation. The country’s annual GDP growth averaged eight percent between 2001 and 2015 (World Bank, 2014), and the country has posted high economic growth, coupled with strong progress in reducing poverty and
inequality (Chuhan-Pole, 2014:166). In order to ensure comparability, the researcher will generalise the case studies to the entire East African region.

The section will also re-state research question 1.2 (iii) to highlight how citizens in East Africa cope with the vestiges of personified governance, as well as ascertain what measures citizens take, if any, to obtain policy responses that ameliorate the callous consequences of personified governance. Drawing on empirical literature interposed with theoretical abstracts, I will discuss several strategies that citizens employ to subsist under personified governance, ranging from acquiescence to overt active reaction against the status quo. To set the context, I draw on Wolf’s assertion that an enduring lesson from East Africa is that local communities are not passive victims in the face of state failure. Their resilience and capacity to respond varies from country to country (Wolf, 2012:8).

Kanyinga (2014:8) posited that, after Kenya’s independence in 1963, there were several political parties, the main ones being the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU’s membership included some of the large ethnic groups, the Kikuyu and the Luo, while KADU comprised the numerically smaller ethnic communities, many of whom feared domination by large groups. However, the first government after independence dismantled this set-up and consequently KADU – the main opposition – joined KANU to form one governing party [under President Jomo Kenyatta]. The government also introduced a series of constitutional amendments that centralised power in the Presidency (Okoth-Okombo, Kwaka, Muluka & Sungura-Nyabuto, 2011). These changes significantly constrained democratic participation [leading to dissension] (Kanyinga, 2014:8). The Presidency evolved as the most important institution because, without checks on accountability, the President could use public resources to reward followers and to punish dissenters (Kanyinga, 2014:13). The Kenyatta regime became intolerant and suppressed dissent through detention without trial. The regime of President Moi, who assumed office after Kenyatta’s death in 1978, inherited and escalated the appetite to concentrate power in the executive. [The regime made] constitutional amendments to constrain dissent and suppress viewpoints that differed from those of the government and the ruling elites in KANU (Kanyinga, 2014:21). Essentially, [the Kenyan] government was generally
responsible for making and implementing key decisions and would do so without accommodating dissent or criticism (Kanyinga, 2014:35).

From the above literature, the researcher infers that the centralisation of power around the Presidency triggered the onset of dissent to undemocratic governance in Kenya. In essence, the President and his cronies attempted to suppress the inalienable rights of citizens to participate in their own governance. This study posits that personified political manoeuvres that exclude sections of the citizenry on discriminatory grounds are bound to result in dissent, as in the case of Kenya. In an attempt to ‘legitimise’ personified governance, the incumbent government brazenly invoked the powers of the constitution, and as we will see in subsequent paragraphs, the judiciary. All these machinations failed to clamp down on the intrinsic trigger sequestered within marginalised citizens to voice their dissension to oppression.

According to Okoth-Okombo et al. (2011:141), from the mid-1960s up to early 1990s, dissenting views in Kenya were [summarily] suppressed. Moreover, the umbrella body of trade unions, the biggest national women’s movement for rights and other pressure groups and associations soon became part of the ruling and only political party, KANU. The President and the ruling clique monopolized political, social and economic activities in the country under the guise of “development”, arguing that all other people with differing opinions were anti-development. The reality was that the ruling class aimed to control all aspects of life and have hegemony over the population for purposes of safeguarding accumulation of wealth by a few. Okoth-Okombo et al. (2011) maintained that 2002 was by far the worst year for Kenya. The economy grew at a meagre 0.4 percent. During this period, the government could not collect enough revenue to enable it effectively provide key social services. Okoth-Okombo et al. (2011:148) blamed Kenya’s then woes on poor leadership by the Moi regime; an irresponsible and directionless leadership characterised by corruption, tribalism, impunity, despotism and disregard for the rule of law. Okoth-Okombo et al. (2011) posited that this was also the period when dissenting voices were brutally silenced, resulting in widespread fear amongst the citizens. Upon ascending to the Presidency, Moi moved swiftly to consolidate political and economic power with the clarion call of “Fuata Nyayo”, which loosely translates into “toe my line or perish.” Within four years of the advent of this administration, KANU made it very clear that the President, the party and the government were one institution that
would not tolerate dissent (Okoth-Okombo et al., 2011:192). Political crackdowns on the perceived dissidents led to the establishment of torture chambers, extra-judicial executions, and detentions without trial. The ultimate impact of the autocracy and bad governance was the near collapse of the economy, debilitating poverty, unemployment, the collapse of the health system, insecurity, and a myriad of social problems (Okoth-Okombo et al., 2011:154).

Again, we note from the above narrative that Kenya deepened its centralisation of state power around the President and his clique. The Presidency systematically personified state institutions, and in the process established repressive units to muzzle any dissent. However, frantic state efforts to sustain the dictatorship at the expense of the citizenry ended up with disastrous results as the economy came to a near collapse. At that moment, volatile conditions set the stage for dissension as citizens struggled to express their disapproval of the status quo. As is the case with absolute personified regimes, any perceived deviation in political ideology by the Kenyan citizens was met with brute force by the state, to the extent of extermination. Subsequently, [leaders] reduced citizens to bystanders since the state, in the words of Kanyinga (2014:35), [was] “… responsible for making and implementing key decisions without accommodating dissent or criticism.”

On this note, Omolo (2011:14) argued that “one of the shortfalls of Kenyan leadership is failure to receive criticism positively.” Thus, most citizens at the grassroots level are wary of holding their leaders accountable, lest they be victimised. Omolo (2011:20) maintained that “there is need to create a culture of social responsibility particularly amongst the middle class who are socialized against dissent.” I note that Omolo raised an interesting point about the indifference of the middle class to undemocratic governance. In corroboration of the latter point, Cheeseman (2014:6) asserted that “the Kenyan middle class has rarely acted with one voice. From the 1930s onwards, a sizeable section of the middle class has sided with authoritarian rule.” In consonance, Wasserman (noted in Cheeseman, 2014:6) posited that “in the 1950s and 1960s, the colonial government successfully used land programmes and access to credit to establish a loyal middle class in an attempt to insulate the regime from the Mau Mau uprising and radical nationalism.” Furthermore, Branch and Cheeseman (noted in Cheeseman, 2014:6) contended that “in the late colonial/early post-colonial years, this group grew in numbers as
President Jomo Kenyatta, who favoured political and economic stability and feared rapid change, repeated the trick.”

Even more intriguing, civil society in Kenya also exhibits double standards when it comes to dealing with undemocratic governance. They engage with the state in a myriad of networks, only accusing the state when they are losing grip and joining it when they have the opportunity (Murunga & Mutunga, 2000:11). Of further significance, Butler (2013:21) argued that [in some cases, even] the judiciary in Kenya works for the state to repress dissent. On a positive note, Butler (2013:3) contended that “when Kenyan politicians adopted the democratic principle of multiparty elections in 1992, they entered a new political world where accountability, a key characteristic of a functioning democracy, was expected of leaders.” In corroboration of the problem statement highlighted by the researcher, Brown (2013:726) argued that “over and over again, donors deterred measures that could have resulted in more comprehensive democratisation after Kenya legalized opposition parties.” Brown maintained that the donors did this by deliberately by endorsing inequitable elections (including suppressing evidence of their illegitimacy) and subverting domestic efforts to secure far-reaching reforms. Likewise, Brown posited that, “faced with popular mobilisation against a regime, donors’ primary concern appear to be the avoidance of any path that could lead to a breakdown of the political and economic order, even if this meant legitimising and prolonging the regime’s authoritarian rule.”

In discussing the preceding paragraphs, I agree with the thinking of Cheeseman (2014) and of Murunga and Mutunga (2000) that the reason for the acquiescence of the middle class and civil society to authoritarian rule is more pecuniary than ideological. This is true with personified governments that frequently use ‘rewards’ to foster loyalty. With a muzzled middle class and inert civil society, and until an irresistible critical mass halts personified regimes, their leaders can impose their egoistic interests over helpless citizens. As discussed earlier, Kenyan citizens got this break in 2010, with the promulgation of the new constitution. However, the most intriguing discussion covered in the preceding paragraphs revolves around the “indifference” of international and local organisations, and most baffling, of the judiciary, when citizens need their support the most. I posit that although democracy is not a human right, it provides the best defence of human rights for individuals.
Therefore, when institutions that should champion international best practices shun their roles, national citizens have no options other than to chart another path to freedom. One route might be to identify strong leaders. Brown (2001:736) argued that “because [there is a] lack of clear alternatives to incumbent leaders across the board, for example in the case of Moi, this holds back [remedial] donor actions.”

I argue that Brown highlights perhaps the most constraining force that frustrates citizen dissension to personified governance – the responsibility of leadership. As stated by Brown, “the senior opposition activists happened to perceive each other more as rivals than partners did.” Brown maintained that “opposition leaders often spent more time undermining each other than focusing on their nemesis – KANU. The extremely high stakes led to an atmosphere of distrust among them. Every candidate desired the Presidency – where power is highly concentrated.” According to Brown (2001:729), “none would agree to the post of Vice President or the enticement with an unsecure Ministerial appointment that the incumbent President could rescind at any time. No opposition leader wanted to subordinate their career to another’s, even if the likely outcome was KANU’s re-election.” Moreover, Brown posited that “the use of a tribal discourse to secure candidates’ ethnic power base transformed rivalries from personal to ethnic dimensions, this also rendered it almost impossible to gain support among other ethnic groups.”

I posit that the above paragraph highlights a number of challenges that citizens’ face while trying to resist or oust personified reign. The paragraph brings to the fore the way in which leadership plays an important role in motivating, mobilising, and coordinating the masses. In the absence of the coordination of the masses, citizen action against the incumbent personified leader would be limited or mitigated. We also note that selfish interests can derail leaders from the path of uniting people to address a common cause. The manifestation of personified inclination in opposition leaders hypothetically indicates that once the opposition leaders assume power, there is a strong possibility of their personifying the state as their predecessors did. Furthermore, there is the issue of ethnic divisions that also limit the ability of citizens to unite against personification. Thus, a fragmented citizenry will not sustain the momentum to confront any personified regime. However, in the case of Rwanda that I will discuss next, this path to emancipation can assume complex dimensions.
The discussion on citizen dissent to personified governance in Rwanda is rather complex, as it entails its colonial and socio-cultural heritage. The researcher will explore the latter, and then tie both historical dimensions to personified governance and its correlation to fomenting citizen dissent. We begin by reviewing the historical events that led to the infamous genocide in 1994.

Manchester (2010) considered that “Belgian colonial rulers may have had a hand in the 1994 genocide.” Manchester maintained that “the ethnic implications of the Belgian colonizing practices were distinctly marginalizing. When the Belgians took over the Rwanda-Urundi territory in 1918, three predominant groups consisting of the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa made up the region. Among them, there were shared religious beliefs, a common culture as well as a shared language, Kinyarwanda. Governing these three groups, Belgian colonizers made conscious choices concerning ‘phenotypic’ and financial characteristics that would instil deeply rooted ethnic marginalization for generations to come. Belgians started appointing members of the Tutsi minority to positions of influence to rule over the rest. Over time, the colonialism propaganda suppressed voices of dissent and created a world culture that accepts ‘the white man’s rule’. As a result, racial elitism ensued, with Tutsis adopting a sense of superiority and legitimized authority over their fellow citizens, who grew severely resentful when government deliberately neglected them.”

Building on the latter, this study notes that resentment and dissent always go hand in hand. As is evident in the case of Rwanda, marginalisation of a section of citizens pushed them to the end of their tether. I argue that the latter kindled dissent among the citizenry. I also note that colonial oppression catalysed dissent, which the authorities summarily suppressed.

Additionally, Manchester (2010) argued that “just before the region gained independence in 1962, the Hutus in Rwanda began a series of attacks against the Tutsi-led Belgian government killing thousands of Tutsis and sending 130,000 more into exile. As a result, Rwanda maintained a largely Hutu-dominated population strengthened by the abandoned plantations and cattle from the Tutsis who had fled seeking asylum.” Manchester maintained that “Rwanda soon became a one-party dictatorship when Habyarimana, a Hutu, overthrew the Belgian-appointed leader. Under his regime, he continued the practices of ethnic discrimination developed by
the Belgians, only in turn favouring the Hutus [over the Tutsi]. In April 6, 1994, dissidents shot down a plane carrying Habyarimana on his return from Dar es Salaam. This resulted in the systematic murder of the Tutsi by Hutu extremists. Eventually the Rwanda Patriotic Front managed to defeat the Hutu militias and created a new government” (Manchester, 2010). The above narrative is analogous to Kenya’s governance history, to the extent that colonial masters influenced the subsequent courses of national personification. “Whereas Kenya was at the brink of genocide in 2008” (Kniss, 2010:2), Rwanda was not very fortunate in 1994. In both instances, we see the deliberate systemisation of personified governance inherited from the colonialists, always ending in dire consequences.

According to Reyntjens (2011:8), “after the RPF seized power in July 1994, it established a ‘Government of National Unity’ purportedly in line with the 1993 Arusha peace accord. Initially a number of politicians, civil servants, judges and military from the old regime either remained in the country or returned from abroad, and indicated their willingness to cooperate with the RPF. During the first months of 2000, the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament were forced to resign, and the latter two went into exile. This shows how little space there were for real or suspected dissenting views.” I observe that an individual or a group of people in power was/were intolerant of dissension to their unpopular actions, to the extent of deposing a legitimate government. We get a clue on this powerful entity in Bekken’s assertion. According to Bekken (2011), “Kagame’s structural approach to silencing dissent is so effective that it renders the use physical violence unnecessary. For a people who survived [their predecessors’] legacy, the constant haunt by the fear of persecution may be worse than actual violence.” Bekken (2011) maintained that “one of the most insidious yet effective weapons against dissent has been the misuse of laws known as genocide ideology and divisionism.” However, Rwanda’s situation is unique. While [Rwanda] has been stable for more than two decades, social tensions persist (Hintjens; Hilker, noted in Smith, 2015:54). To Smith, the government has promoted peace and reconciliation through tradition-inspired peace building institutions and its invention of a specific version of history. Nonetheless, as with other scholars, Smith (2015:54) notes that suppression of dissent has made it difficult for its citizens to debate, discuss and reconcile.
From the above narrative, I note that Smith (2015) and Reyntjens (2011) both agree that the incumbent Rwandese government is intolerant of, and even suppresses, dissent. I also note that the controlling power behind Rwanda’s government rests with the Presidency. Put differently, I argue that the President has the prerogative to create space for dissenting political minorities and assure a level ground for political competition. In Rwanda, there are sayings such as “umwera uturutse I bukuru bucyabakwiriye hose,” which means “whatever comes from the highest leadership will expand all over (even if it is bad)”; and “irivuze umwami ntirikuka”, literally “what is said by the king can’t be contradicted,” which can be understood to mean that nobody should publicly oppose the leader (Balch, Verweij & Kamani, 2013:39). This study argues that the leaders in Rwanda have perpetually taken advantage of these cultural weaknesses to subdue citizens, resulting in distrust for the system. Underneath the surface, citizen dissension to oppressive governance is brewing. For instance, Thomson (2011:440) argued that “daily acts of resistance illustrate that peasant Rwandans do not believe in the policy of national unity and reconciliation, that is, their perceived compliance with its dictates is tactical rather than sincere.” Thomson (2011:455) maintained that “the marginal socio-political position of peasant Rwandans identifies the nodes of resistance where the State enacts oppressive power in their daily lives. Thus, even with coercive compliance and minimal opportunities for dissent; individuals continue to express their politics through acts of resistance.”

The above literature highlights how Rwanda’s citizens have developed complex mechanisms to express their dissension to oppressive policies. In their bid to subsist in Rwanda and express themselves, “Rwandese citizens practice three specific types of everyday resistance: staying on the side-lines; irreverent compliance; and withdrawn muteness” (Thomson, 2011:440). However, external stimulus can catalyse these ‘passive’ expressions of dissent and transform them to outright dissension. Paluck and Green (2009) studied the impacts of a radio programme in Rwanda. The study “revealed that modest interventions that legitimize expressions of dissent can increase citizens’ repertoire of available actions, and enable individuals to challenge norms of deference.” Paluck and Green maintained that the radio programme “discouraged blind obedience and reliance on direction from authorities and instead promoted independent thought and collective action in
problem solving. After one year, although the radio program had registered little impact on limited beliefs and attitudes, it had a substantial impact on listeners' willingness to express dissent and the ways they resolved communal problems.” While Paluck and Green (2009) primarily focus on social and cultural legitimisation, Zhang (2012:15) posited that “information about public participation can potentially enable people to figure out ways to take action, in spite of socio-political constraints.”

I argue that from the above literature, it is apparent that external influences play a critical role in shaping the thinking of individuals. The Rwanda example highlights how a large segment of the citizenry was vulnerable to a well-orchestrated mass media rallying call to voice dissent to the incumbent authority and leadership. This underscores the theory of personification, which argues that leaders and whole communities are subject to well-targeted external influences. In combination with the childhood perception of the world, the latter act as a catalyst for personified inclinations in leaders.

4.6.4 **Path to emancipation from personified governance**

As in preceding chapters, this section will focus on Kenya and Rwanda as case studies to highlight the ways in which citizens build momentum to emancipate themselves from the clutches of personified governance. “Compared with her neighbours, who are often besieged by civil unrest, Kenya has for long been a hub of socio-economic and political stability” (Mbodenyi, 2009:192). According to Klopp (2009:143), “Kenya has the largest and most dynamic economy in the region, key infrastructure and institutions, a vibrant press and civil society, political space and abundant human capital, creativity and entrepreneurship.” Klopp maintained that “these many resources can enable Kenya to achieve greater prosperity and freedom and become a genuine force for transformation in Africa in the 21st century.” Because authoritarian regimes [like Kenya and Rwanda] maintain the status quo just as easily as any democracy, it appears that the citizenry themselves need ways of pressuring the political and bureaucratic elite to develop (Minier, noted in Woons, 2013). For this reason, I will focus on Kenya as a case study in this section to highlight how citizens emancipate themselves from predatory personified governance. I will also examine how the intrinsic desire to own and participate in
governance processes is a driving force for citizens’ emancipation to promote better governance.

Akoth (noted in Mutula et al., 2013:284) argued that expectations that “Kenya’s new constitution would emancipate its citizens from years of authoritarian rule inspired the agitation for a new constitutional dispensation, mainly driven by dissident politicians, civil society organizations and religious groups. For instance, even though Moi had managed to contain emerging opposing voices, the 1982 coup came as a surprise to his authoritarian rule.” Akoth maintained that “this move underscores the attempt of the Kenyan governance system to move from an elite controlled top-down to a bottom-up process where Kenyans participate in determining the growth and development of the country.” In the same manner, Gutierrez-Romero (noted in Hassid & Brass, 2015:9) posited that “perhaps the most implicative instance of Kenyan citizens asserting their authority came in the 2007 parliamentary elections that saw over 60 percent of Members of Parliament (MPs) seeking re-election removed from office.” Gutierrez-Romero maintained that “popular opinion at the time, as well as research conducted later, suggested that MPs lost their offices largely for being unresponsive to citizen demands, particularly with regard to mismanagement of Constituency Development Funds (CDF).” Similarly, Klopp (2009:152) asserted that “during the 1990s, MPs attacked each other [for selfish reasons] and in the process, revealed to Kenyans the ugly internal workings of the state.” Klopp maintained that “citizens in turn expressed their anger at their MPs by voting out many incumbents, including Ministers in large numbers.”

From the above literature, it is apparent Kenyan citizens were using elections as a means to express their discontent with personified rule. “Some citizens therefore regard elections as an opportunity to vent their anger and frustration over poor governance (Mbonenyi, 2009:192).” Mbonenyi maintained that “on the other hand, some political elites in successive governments have regarded elections as an opportunity to settle scores with their opponents. Thus, although Kenya conducts its elections periodically, there has been no guarantee that they would be, and in most cases they have not been, free and fair.” The African Charter (noted in Mbonenyi, 2009:185) asserted that in the process, citizens have been denied the enjoyment of many of their rights, including the right to participate in government, as guaranteed in
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Yet, Mbondenyi (2009:184) argued that “Kenya’s legal system [which should offer a reprieve to its citizens] has been the government’s handmaiden for undemocratic tendencies such as ethnic polarization and electoral malpractices. Indeed, we could best understand the widespread violence experienced in Kenya during every election year as long-standing grievances and failures of governance that run deeper than electoral politics.”

It is also notable that Kenyan citizens have used the media to extricate themselves from the entrapment of personified governance. According to Ogenga (2010:155), “in Kenya, the power of politicians, emanating especially, from a colonial institution, the media is often threatened, censored and gagged in the name of national interest or state security or even cultural values. In such a situation then, the citizens/audiences find alternative arenas such as the internet to debate contentious issues of public interest.” Ogenga maintained that “by engaging into citizen journalism through internet blogging, Kenyan citizens are fighting back through the very same tool that Government censored.” Mbeke (2008) posited that “the above scenario explains why the Kenyan government was once reluctant to support the development of community media and broadcast in vernacular languages because of its fear of empowering citizens in a way that would challenge its hold on power and demand good governance.” This lack of support denied Kenyans a crucial media resource required in an ideal democracy (Ogenga, 2010:157).

In extreme cases, citizens emancipate themselves through outright violence against personified rule. According to Muhula (noted in Sjögren, Murung’a & Okello, 2014:82), “the jolting effect of the Kenyan post-election violence of 2008 stemmed directly from the nature of the existing constitution, which promoted a ‘winner takes all’ mentality and supported the unequal distribution of the national wealth.” In consonance, Sjögren et al. (2014:82) posited that “the violence was thus a result of disenchantment with the immediate electoral cheating overlain by deep discontent about marginalization, brutalization, and exclusion by the state and the narrow band of elites capturing it. The violence reflected the extent to which citizens had lost confidence in the incumbent state elites and in the regime’s ability to represent and mediate between popular interests, allocate resources fairly, and act as the guardian
I argue that Rwanda’s societal struggle for self-emancipation is as old as its struggle for political independence is. According to Simmons (1996:394), “during 1959–61, Rwandan society went adrift and a social and political revolution took place.” Simmons maintained that “the process of political emancipation of the majority Bahutu led to the abolishment of the Batutsi monarchy. However, this emancipation was ethnical rather than nationalistic since it served mainly the interests of the majority Hutu ethnicity.” “It’s driving force, Kayibanda, who in 1962 became Rwanda’s first post-independence President, desired a ‘social revolution’ in Rwanda to emancipate the majority Hutu community from its menial status to Tutsis by any means necessary (Mthembu-Salter, 2002:6).” Mthembu maintained that “even Rwanda’s Catholic hierarchy radically changed its stance from enthusiastic advocate of Tutsi supremacy to champion of Kayibanda and the cause of Hutu emancipation.”

According to the researcher, the pursuit of citizen emancipation along ethnic lines earlier in Rwanda’s independence set a bad precedent for successive efforts at unified national liberation actions to dislodge personified reign. However, quite commendably, the incumbent regime is making slow but progressive attempts to bridge the ethnic divide. Thus, Hartley (2015:54) argued that “while the attenuation of radicalized ethnic differences is essential for a society transitioning from Rwanda’s past, the Rwandan government has chosen to perpetrate a ‘no difference’ version of history rather than adopt a more nuanced perspective on ethnic diversity.” I argue that being a member of an ethnicity can mean gaining access to, or outright exclusion from, the enjoyment of national resources. Whereas the zeal for self-emancipation can be a uniting force for national movements, in the case of Rwanda, it became a fracturing force due to its egocentricity.

The fact that Rwandan society induced self-emancipation along ethnic lines earlier in its quest for independence explains the subsequent perpetuation of ‘mass-driven’ personified governance in the nation state. In the case of Rwanda, it is interesting that Tutsi advocated for immediate independence and an end to ‘racial’ division (Kiwuwa, 2012:77). On the same note, Mamdani (noted in Kiwuwa, 2012:77) argued that some Hutu elites and masses were not in favour of immediate independence, and worried about the readiness of society to undergo such radical transformations.
amidst existing social and political disparities (Kiwuwa, 2012:77). Instead, the Hutu argued that social and political re-equilibrium had to be in place in order to achieve such fundamental transformation. Not only did they believe in the liberating nature of democratic practice from their social and political bondage, but also sought to advance the principle of Hutu emancipation within a democratic framework (Kiwuwa, 2012:77). Here we note that even in extreme political and social positions, moderate voices with logical reasoning are bound to emerge, as in the case of the Hutu. The researcher maintains that these moderate voices frequently coalesce with like minds to stabilise political situations, as did moderate Hutu during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. On the other hand, such moderate voices can also be an impediment to opportune drives for social or political emancipation. Instead of being catalytic, they can easily dampen high spirits of revolutionaries who want to change the status quo.

With respect to Rwanda’s woes, Kayumba (2008) approached the struggle for social and political emancipation from a different perspective. According to Kayumba (2008), in general, the attitudes of Rwandans are both negative and positive towards their 1962 independence, and these are due to their ethnic antagonism. The Hutu view themselves now as not free, while the Tutsi rejoice. Meanwhile, before 1994, the reverse was true for the Hutus. Therefore, the other understands independence as an ethnic emancipation from domination. We note that the Hutu and Tutsi were brought under the control of one state by force; it did not happen naturally. Hutu feel that they have lost their independence, just as the Tutsi feel they have regained their independence, in the sense that they too can also now participate in political, social and economic activities, which the Hutu regime had denied them (Kayumba, 2008). It is revealing that Kayumba referred to the divergence between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda as ‘ethnic antagonism.’ Bonacich (1972) argued that “economic competition is the primary cause of ethnic antagonism.” Within this framework, antagonism encompasses all levels of intergroup conflict, including ideologies and beliefs, behaviours and institutions. Bonacich’s argument accentuates the researcher’s argument that a competitive spirit with a selfish twist triggered an ethnically biased struggle for emancipation in Rwanda. The result is that ethnically driven personification of state systems permeated Rwanda’s societal and institutional fabric.

The above argument rationalises why Wallis and Green (2008) argued that “Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame raised the stakes by endorsing outright military
intervention when ‘institutions lost control’.” I note that Kagame’s desperate endorsement of military intervention to restrain national institutions is twofold: on one hand, it works well to regulate a nation like Rwanda where ethnicity plays a key role in governance. Conversely, the reliance on military might to govern national institutions may point to suppressive tendencies associated with personified reign. Accordingly, Rwanda’s societal systems may in the short run not be able to take advantage of national unification to emancipate themselves from personified governance. Moreover, the current Tutsi dominance cited by Kayumba (2008) is still precarious, considering the long-drawn history of animosity between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities. Given that, “the first serious political challenge to the Tutsi oligarchy came in 1957 when in anticipation for another visit from the United Nations, a group of Hutu published a manifesto that demanded emancipation and rule by the majority” (Melvern, 2000:13). The latter signifies a highly fractured society, with over 60 years of rivalry. Melvern (2000:13) pointed out that “it is even more daunting that the manifesto was an effective appeal for Hutu solidarity, a rallying point for a revolution presumably against the Tutsi.”

The researcher argues that when Rwanda failed to rally under a unified front to fight endemic personification, the minority Tutsi had to seek solace in personal redemption. “Poor economic and political prospects confronted the Tutsi youngsters” (Campioni & Noack, 2012:266). These Tutsi had very limited options other than to self-emancipate, at whatever cost. Campioni and Noack (2012) maintained that “as civil war broke out and Obote’s proxies attacked Rwandan refugees, young Tutsi joined Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA), which offered an attractive avenue for personal emancipation as well as an appealing.” As this study noted earlier, I note again that ethnic antagonism is such a retrograding force that it inhibits national unity efforts to fight personified regimes. In Rwanda’s case, I draw attention to an emerging cyclical pattern. From the 1950s through to the 1980s, the Hutu ethnicity led a so-called revolution to emancipate themselves from a Tutsi oligarchy. In the 1990s, we saw retribution when the Tutsi allied with foreign powers to re-invigorate their drive to wrest power from their ‘antagonists’ – the Hutu. I argue the fact that the incumbent President, Paul Kagame, preferred a military option to rein in institutions is rooted in the successes that the Tutsi youngsters had registered
against Obote when they allied with NRA. This gave them a personified impetus to rout the Hutu.

With respect to the arguments propounded in this section, this study has highlighted the point that societal emancipation from personified governance can primarily come about by means of a revolution to rehabilitate the social conditions of alienated, affected citizens. As the researcher highlights in the discussion on both Kenya and Rwanda, fragmented ethnic politics constitute a major deterrent to the formation of a unified front to fight the suffering meted out by personified regimes upon their citizens. Similarly, there must be synchronised unity on three fronts to achieve national-level citizen emancipation. The individual needs to align with societal ideologies. The society, in turn, should have a unified political agenda, and only then will a nation have a unified drive for national emancipation.

4.7 Citizen involvement in national development in East Africa

The objective of national emancipation, discussed in the previous section, is to free citizens to allow them to participate in social, political and economic issues that affect them. Accordingly, this section will attempt to address question three of this thesis, which reads, “How can East African citizens influence national governance and development policies under personified leaders.” Therefore, the researcher will split this section into two themes. The first part will draw on empirical literature on East Africa to highlight the extent of citizen participation in national development under personified regimes, while the second part will focus on citizen participation in national governance. The section will close with a conclusion that rationalises the issue of whether East African citizens actually influence national governance and development, or whether the reverse is true.

4.7.1 Egalitarian citizen participation in national development

The EAC outlines a key fundamental policy framework to guide development in the region. The aims of the initiatives are “To promote investment in the region through the EAC Development Strategy, set out the priority programs for the region focusing on macroeconomic cooperation; trade liberalization and development; cooperation in infrastructure; the development of human resources, sciences and technology; and cooperation in legal and judicial as well as political affairs” (East African Community,
2017). Also listed together with the EAC policy are unique strategies that each member country is pursuing to achieve national development. Of the five East African countries listed, only Kenya mentions “equitable social development.” On the other hand, Kenya and Rwanda, in their strategies mention, “people centred” and “mobilize the people”, respectively, as critical components of their development strategies. The researcher argues that the inclusion or omission of the word “people” from a country’s strategies indicates the extent of consideration for participatory approaches in national development. It is even more damning to discover that the word “participate” only appears at the end of the narrative, in reference to private-sector participation in the economy.

A cursory review of the Summary Report on Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) for the Eastern Africa sub-region, authored by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), does not do any better than the EAC national development policies discussed above do. In fact, this report does not mention the word ‘citizen’ even once, and again, the report mentions ‘participate’ once in relation to private-sector engagement. Therefore, I argue that the so-called policy experts concerned with fostering development in the East African region relegate the significance of citizen participation. Lwaitama, Kasombo and Mkumbo (2013:20) accentuated my argument by asserting “… their review of three election manifestos political parties use to mobilize the electorate in order to induce their support for electoral victory reveals that there were no grand plans in the manifestos on the modalities of enhancing citizens’ participation in the EAC integration agenda.” According to this researcher, this revelation serves to highlight the deep egocentricity practised by leaders in the region. The scale of this egotism also explains the extent of personified governance in the region. Thus, for citizens to participate meaningfully in any development, there is need for legally backed, mass-driven counter measures to be taken by citizens to overthrow undemocratic systems.

With respect to social movements that are citizen based and driven, the community-wide civil society think-tank, launched with the support of the Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in October 2011, thinks differently about citizen participation in East Africa. According to Lwaitama et al. (2013), with fast-changing demographics, especially in the EAC region where the challenges of the youth population growth are becoming devastatingly worrisome, a new form of political expression, which now underlies the
numerous blogs such as ‘Jamii Forum’ and, ‘Vijana Forum’ is taking shape and becoming a force in civic engagement. Recently, Twaweza, an NGO, launched a project titled ‘Ni Sisi’ (It is us) to promote the idea that citizens can forge change through their own actions, rather than depend on external agencies, be they governments, donors, politicians or, in this particular respect, the EAC. Social movements that are citizen based, centred and driven are the critical agents and catalysts of any form of transformation (Lwaitama et al., 2013:9).

With the above introduction in mind, the subsequent sections of this study will dig deeper into available literature to understand the context of citizen participation in the East African region. Again, for consistency, this section will use Kenya and Rwanda as case studies to understand the extent to which East African citizens actually influence national governance and development.

4.7.2 Citizen influence in national development: Does it really matter?

In order to rationalise this section, I draw inspiration from a World Bank article on citizen participation (noted in Mansuri & Rao, 2013). In the aforementioned article, the World Bank posited that “the current wave of interest in participation began as a reaction to the highly centralized development strategies of the 1970s and 1980s, which created the widespread perception among activists and nongovernmental organizations that ‘top-down’ development aid was deeply disconnected from the needs of the poor, the marginalized, and the excluded. Underlying this shift was the belief that giving the poor a greater say in decisions that affected their lives by involving them in at least some aspects of project design and implementation, would result in a closer connection between development aid and its intended beneficiaries.”

Equally, in a recent State of East Africa Report (2016), the Society for International Development (SID) highlighted the state of inequality in East Africa and sought to explore what future inequality might have in East Africa. The Report (SID, 2016) surmised: “two powerful driving forces are shaping the future of inclusiveness and equity in East Africa. One is the inclusiveness of growth – a measure of how much the poorest East Africans are participating in generating economic growth.” According to SID the report, “the second driving force is the degree of equity, which
describes how the benefits of economic growth are shared among the region’s citizens, and particularly the share of income and wealth that accrues to the poorest East Africans. GDP figures, with a regional annual average increase of 6 percent since 2011 tell the story of an economic expansion that has taken place in East Africa in the last few years alongside significant structural changes and greater sophistication in the countries’ economies.” The SID report maintained that “this GDP growth has generated optimism and greater confidence that the region is going places. Are all citizens of East Africa perceiving or feeling the benefits of these stellar GDP growth figures registered in the region? In spite of the growth, the economic boom has not generated the jobs or prosperity that East Africans expected. The levels of poverty, hunger and malnutrition in these countries remain staggeringly high.”

Noticeably, although the above literature recognises some level of economic growth in East Africa, it still questions the extent of citizen participation in this regard. Accordingly, within the context of personified governance, this section will attempt to ascertain the extent to which citizens actually influence or even participate in national development in East Africa. To aid the discussion, the researcher will use Kenya and Rwanda as case studies to understand the extent to which East African citizens actually influence national development. The first part will discuss literature on Kenya and then subsequently close with discussion on Rwanda.

With respect to engaging in development, “rural Kenyans report that the information that is available on policy, government programs and services is difficult to obtain and interpret” (Kariuki & Mbwisa, 2014:569). There is, therefore, “a desire to learn about and access information about government programs and services that is understandable, concise and timely” (Omolo, noted in Kariuki & Mbwisa, 2014:569). Before citizens can express their opinions, and participate in the public decision-making process, they need information about the subject at hand (World Bank 2004). Although rural citizens feel that there is a lack of access to information about government programs and services, there is a desire to learn about, and access information on government programs and services that is understandable, concise and timely (Dukeshire & Thurlow, noted in Kariuki & Mbwisa, 2014:569). However, Kenya’s National Constitution (Revised Edition 2010) supports access to information by all citizens, which is a key ingredient to effective and active citizen participation.
The Constitution, for instance, directs Kenya’s national and county legislative bodies to conduct their work in an open and transparent manner. In addition to information gathered from the official business of the legislatures and public finances, Article 35 of the Constitution stipulates that citizens have the right to access all information held by the State and public officials. Public servants must also share information with citizens. Article 232 (1) (f) states that the values and principles of public service include “transparency and provision to the public of timely and accurate information.” I point out that Kenya’s legal framework provides an enabling environment for citizen participation in national development. Since leaders with personified inclinations have usurped citizen liberties to participate, certain pragmatic individuals have had to circumnavigate personified structures to articulate their influences.

Chesire et al. (2015:248) corroborated the researcher's view outlined above in their assertion that “community development has largely been through the participation of self-help groups outside the formal system of governance. Therefore, the Harambee movement was the first attempt by the government to involve local communities in community development by ensuring that the communities pulled their resources together for their own development.” To this end, Maxon (noted in Nzau, 2010:100) posited that “two important aspects characterized President Jomo Kenyatta’s regime as far as development planning was concerned. First, it supported, at least in principle, the ideas of African socialism; and second it was guided by highly centralized development planning which took a top-bottom approach that adopted what would be termed state capitalism; some kind of socialism with capitalist tendencies.” Similarly, “the Kenya Vision 2030 is the most recent development blueprint in the country whose overall objective is to achieve a middle-income nation status, which would not only be globally competitive and prosperous, but also accord high quality of life to her citizens. The Kenya Vision 2030 is a long-term development plan for the country, a result of multi-stakeholder engagement and participation starting in October 2006” (Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:248).

However, Leys (1994, noted in Chesire et al., 2015:248) observed that “the strategy [to involve communities in development] did not fully succeed since it was hijacked by vested interests.” Mbithi (noted in Chesire et al., 2015:248) concurs with Leys (1994) and points out that “the Harambee movement did not succeed because the very autonomous nature of the movement led to manipulation by politicians for
private political ends and the oversubscription to the movement by the poorest and
the most needy rural citizens”. I observe from the above literature that while sitting
governments made seemingly credible attempts to pursue participatory
development, personified interests overwhelmed these well thought-out processes.
This demonstrates clearly how personified governance can literally subjugate
democratic interests for the sake of few, if not one, individuals with personified
inclinations. Nonetheless, the inclusion of citizens in participatory development and
leadership always pays positive dividends, if done in a transparent and democratic
manner, as will be discussed in the case study of Rwanda in subsequent
paragraphs.

Rwanda adopted the Decentralisation Policy, with a focus on reconciliation and
empowering citizens with the knowledge and confidence to participate in leadership,
hold leaders and service providers accountable, and bridge the gap between the
leaders and the led. This form of citizen education and confidence building
generated impressive results by the end of Phase One in 2003. Citizens had learnt
democratic values by electing their own leaders; however, they could not hold their
leaders accountable, as the culture of fearing leaders still prevailed. Moreover, local
leaders were also not used to being accountable to citizens (Rwanda National
Human Development Report, 2014:74). Drawing on the above, I argue that with
good leadership strategies, a country can transform the behaviours of its citizens to
espouse democratic ideals. This approach mitigates the proliferation of personified
governance, since democratic values are entrenched in national systems. As is
evident above, it also takes a selfless and egalitarian leader to ensure that the nation
pursues inclusive citizen participation. However, when egocentric inclinations are
imbued in leaders, as discussed below, national systems begin degenerating rapidly,
if excesses are unchecked.

Rwanda is a country that has faced conflicts that seemed to be perpetual, and the
situation was further aggravated by the “highly centralized governance systems and
practices” (Kauzya, noted in Ndahiriwe, 2011:2). The citizens were largely excluded
from participating in the affairs of their country, either by exclusionary politics or
through violent conflicts. As a result, many remained stateless as refugees in
neighbouring countries (Ndahiriwe, 2011:2). As a way of correcting the above
scenario, the Rwanda Government decided in 2002 to decentralize governance by
giving authority to elected local authorities, hence giving the citizens a greater say, and ensuring that they have considerable input in the affairs of their country, through the policy of decentralization (Ndahiriwe, 2011:3). The policy of decentralization in Rwanda gets its legal authority from the 1992 Arusha Peace Accord, between the Government of Rwanda and the then rebel army, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). The accord emphasizes the fact that every Rwandese must participate in the development of Rwanda (Kauzya, noted in Ndahiriwe, 2011:3), as a way of sharing power, including citizens in the state building process, and avoiding violent conflicts (Ndahiriwe, 2011:3).

Similarly, Rwanda became indebted after coffee prices plunged on the world market. President Habyarimana had to negotiate with the World Bank and IMF to implement the first Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). As a result of having the IMF’s ‘stamp of approval,’ Rwanda received both increasing amounts of international aid and private bank loans. Unfortunately, the global economic climate and the SAP implementation measures brought Rwanda to the brink of societal collapse and created an atmosphere conducive to genocide. Foreign loans during this time were also contingent on Habyarimana pursuing ‘western-oriented’ development objectives (i.e., industrialization and urbanization), at the expense of rural areas. Therefore, rural discontent and feelings of relative deprivation grew (Chirwa, 2015:115).

To endear citizens to government initiatives, “the Rwandese President Paul Kagame even runs a public participation program called citizen outreach tours that often intertwine with interactive sessions with the area opinion leaders” (Kimeli, Wawire, Manyibe, Teresia & Nafukho, 2014:319). Accordingly, Kigabo (2010:96) noted that “decentralization is currently giving the power to the people and enabling them to execute their will for self-development.” With respect to the promotion of self-development, the researcher argues that this approach brings to the fore the role of the individual, rather than holistic society, in aspects of national development. Thus, while decentralisation in Rwanda empowers people, it also stimulates people to compare themselves with others, and emphasise interpersonal qualities and attributes. The researcher posits that the above aspect ominously evolves into personified tendencies that threaten egalitarian development. Accordingly, the Rwandese fraternity had to conceive a well-balanced rational approach to link the ‘self’ and decentralisation. Kigabo (2010:96) highlighted such an approach in his...
assertion that, to reinforce decentralisation and self-development, the Rwandese had to establish the traditional *ubudehe* problem-solving process.

Kigabo (2010:96) asserted that “*ubudehe* is a unique policy of promoting citizens’ collective action in partnership with a government committed to decentralization. It is a policy designed to increase the level of institutional problem-solving capacity at the local level by citizens and local governments.” Kigabo maintained that “it has succeeded in putting into operation the principles of citizens’ participation through local collective action.” Accordingly, “in order to improve the delivery of local development projects, *ubudehe* concept has enabled the Rwandan government to decentralize the planning and implementation process” (Public Governance International (PGI), 2015). The PGI report posited that by framing the program around the traditional Rwandan concept of “*ubudehe*” – which entails working together to address common problems – the government and its partners have engaged citizens at the local level to address their own development issues. The PGI report maintained that “established in 2001, *ubudehe* is a program that emphasizes a community-level approach that empowers citizens to play a lead role in alleviating poverty in their own villages. In the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, the new government faced major challenges in rebuilding the country. Extreme levels of poverty, widespread destruction of infrastructure and property, and high degrees of social fragmentation and distrust of government acted to reduce its capacity to govern effectively.”

According to PGI, given these challenges, the government recognised the need for an innovative, bottom-up approach that engaged citizens who were best positioned to lead development at the lowest administrative level: the village, or cell. Furthermore, Uvin (noted in Chirwa, 2015:106) highlighted the point that “some experts have gone so far as to argue that, over time, ill-conceived development and social strategies contributed to an environment more conducive to the occurrence of genocide.” The PGI (2015) contended that “currently, experts estimate that the *ubudehe* has directly benefited at least 20 percent of the population. Importantly, the program has coincided with advances in poverty reduction; according to one survey-based study, 95 percent of respondents have seen their incomes improve. Similarly, 96 percent reported that they were now less poor than before the program’s implementation.”
“Given the lack of natural resources of Rwanda, the current leadership has adopted more investment in science and technology and in human development so that Rwanda can be competitive and benefit from regional integration, with a goal of transforming Rwanda into a knowledge-based economy” (Kigabo, 2010:94). Abbot (2015:7) posited that “Rwanda has put frameworks in place for all layers of society to contribute to the development process through civic engagement using mechanisms of dialogue and consensus. The aim has been to recreate a sense of national identity and loyalty through an emphasis on one language, one culture, one history and one people.” Likewise, Abbot maintained that “Rwanda has one of the most effective governments in Africa. These positive comments about Rwanda clearly show that the country has a strong potential to democratize and even subvert personified reign.”

The policy on remittances from the Diaspora is one of Rwanda’s most innovative recognitions of the importance of citizens in development. According to Rubyutsa, (2012:121), “the Government of Rwanda, having realized the importance of the Rwandan Diaspora in the national development, strongly believes that the Rwandan Diaspora is an important constituent, which, if well harnessed, can contribute to the socio-economic development of the country” (The Rwanda Diaspora Policy, noted in Rubyutsa, 2012:121). It is in this regard that the Government of Rwanda initiated a Diaspora Policy in 2009 to mobilize and integrate Rwandese in the Diaspora into national development discourses (Rubyutsa, 2012:121). Moreover, at 64 percent, Rwanda leads the world in the representation of women among decision-makers and in Parliament; it is the only country with a majority of women in its Chamber of Deputies (Randell & McCloskey, 2014:107). The Government of Rwanda has been a world leader in its commitment to gender equality, achieved through legal reforms that guarantee women a representative voice in public policy, a commitment to increasing the enrolment of girls in primary and secondary schools, and institutional reforms that ensure accountability for gender sensitive policies (Randell & McCloskey, 2014:107). Randell and McCloskey (2014:118) maintained that Rwanda has shown strong leadership in removing barriers to women’s participation and inclusion, and is likely to enjoy the results for years to come.

Despite the national commitment to gender equality, many of these strategic interventions have had limited effect, to date (Randell & McCloskey, 2014:114).
Moreover, women’s effective participation in programmes targeting economic development, particularly in the agricultural sector, has lagged. Women continue to face challenges caused by poor skills and lack of effective organisations, limited access to improvements like seeds and fertilisers to support greater productivity on small farms, soil degradation, weak coordination of agricultural actors, and insufficient collaboration between farmers, researchers and extension workers (Randell & McCloskey, 2014:107). Randell and McCloskey (2014:107, 110) argued that although the government has policies and strategies in place to promote the role of women in economic development, and specifically in agriculture, they have had little impact as yet where the vast majority of women work. Burnet argued that the high political representation of women in parliament has not translated into legislative gains for women; women parliamentarians toe the party line, rarely mobilise around ‘women’s issues’, and in some cases vote for legislation that reduces legal protection for women or eliminates women-friendly policies (Abbot 2015:4). Furthermore, there is increasing concern that Rwanda’s heavily centralised power has unpredictable consequences for long-term political stability, economic development and human rights (Abbot 2015:8).

Of further significance, a post-conflict country such as Rwanda cannot deal with economic growth separately from conflict resolution and building peace and security. Peace is a precondition for security, stability, and development. The leadership of Rwanda understands that it needs political stability to attract domestic and foreign investors, and it needs peace to implement development plans and growth (Kigabo, 2010:87). Thus, this researcher argues that in order to attract investors, leaders might easily feign a degree of enthusiasm for citizen participation. Accordingly, Marobe (2015:134) argued that political leaders in Rwanda have to respect good governance principles, such as rule of law, and participatory, transparent and constitutional ruling. He maintained that government here has to be close to its people by involving citizens in the development and implementation of policies and programmes that affect them in their localities (Wama, noted in Marobe, 2015:135). Of critical significance, Zorbas (2004:38) posited that, if, as Peter Uvin argued, poverty, inequality, exclusion and prejudice – cumulatively ‘Structural Violence’ – fed into the dynamics of genocide, it followed that ‘national unity and reconciliation’ have
as a necessary foundation – the notions of economic development, equality, participation, tolerance, human rights and the rule of law.

4.7.3 Acquiesced citizens and personified development

Having rationalised in Subsection 4.6.2 that citizens in both Kenya and Rwanda acquiesce to personified governance, in this section I will explore the interaction between acquiesced citizens and personified development. Kirscht and Dillehay (2015:25) argued that the interaction between acquiescence and authoritarianism is complex. On this note, the researcher posits that since personification is a variant of acquiescence, by inference the interaction between acquiesced citizens and personification is potentially complex affair. However, the literature review of Kenya and Rwanda in subsequent paragraphs will provide evidence-based narratives on the subject. In previous sections of this thesis, we noted the conceptual patterns of acquiescence that are impulsiveness, susceptibility to stimuli, and accepting (Couch & Keniston; & Smith, noted in Kirscht & Dillehay, 2015:25). I will study various indicators of acquiescence to personified governance to give an indication of its impact on society, and to give cues to experts who are interested in finding sustainable solutions to personified state domination. To understand the extent of acquiescence, I will contextualise literature at both the individual level and communal level.

According to Mutula et al. (2013:263), corruption in Kenya has notoriously revolved around the Presidency and those who demonstrated loyalty to the ruling elite. Consequently, this central control was evident in the imbalance in regional development. The abuse of power and the inefficiency of the three presidencies of Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki left Kenya victim to poor social, political and economic development. They maintained that the high levels of corruption are attributable to authoritarian regimes enriching themselves with public resources, resulting in corruption with grave effects on social and economic developments (Mutula et al., 2013:267). Kenya emerged out of colonialism in 1963 after a prolonged liberation struggle, with a political economy marked by the existence of an authoritarian state, uneven regional development, deep social cleavages, and an intolerant political culture sustained by deep historical memories of grievance and injustice. Of further import, constrained development proliferated under the auspices of Kenya’s new
constitution [2010], which was expected to address the power disparities that had hampered the country's social and economic development since independence (Mutula et al., 2013:275).

This researcher argues that Kenya's authoritarian regimes intensified the inequalities of wealth and power within the state. As observed earlier in Section 4.1 of this thesis, such authoritarian rule with personified connotations fractured the Kenyan society, ultimately hampering economic development. Another debilitating factor is the high corruption associated with Kenya's personified regimes as cited above. It is apparent from the literature that intolerant political culture served to entrench practices for perpetuating systemic corruption that is detrimental to national development. The entrenchment of corruption in Kenya accentuates this study's argument in Chapter Four that something has gone wrong with the governance system. Transparency International could not have stated it more candidly as they did in the rationale of their mission statement. According to Transparency International (2017), corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world. Transparency International maintained that corruption undermines good government, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector, and particularly hurts the poor. I aver that the foregoing statement buttresses the arguments by Mutula et al. (2013) in the previous paragraph that record the grave effects that corruption has had on Kenya's social and economic development.

Similarly, it is apparent from the above literature that authoritarianism, a surrogate of personification, actually has an intricate and multifarious correlation with national development. Although successive Kenyan regimes have been associated with personified governance, the country has posted progressive successes in decreasing poverty, promoting social development, and maintaining political and economic stability. Kenya’s record of relative political stability and its lack of dramatic ideological shifts over the same period have done much to cement its economic dominance in the region (Kimenyi & Kibe, 2014). In fact, the researcher argues that Kenya is the most advanced economy in the East African region. Within the EAC, the Kenyan economy is the anchor. According to Kimenyi and Kibe (2014), what happens in Kenya largely determines the overall performance of the EAC region. They maintained that Kenya’s economy is the largest in the region and is much more
dynamic than those of other EAC member countries are. The country’s economy is better linked to the other economies in terms of investment flows and trade. This is attributable to its more advanced human capital base, its more diversified economy, and its role as a leader in the information communication revolution in the region. The latter strengthens Kenya’s economy, creating salutary benefits for the other member countries (Kimenyi & Kibe, 2014).

By the time of President Jomo Kenyatta’s death in 1978, a national bourgeoisie had emerged, although its hegemony was limited by the deepening crises of development and democracy (Veney & Zeleza, 2013:6). Internationalisation accompanied the nationalisation of the Kenyan economy. Thus, the dynamics of internal uneven development and integration into the world capitalist system had deepened. The researcher notes that the paradox of economic development achieved under autocracies, rather than in some democracies, intrigues experts. The fact that Kenya recorded phenomenal growth under the personified autocratic reigns of Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki is equally perplexing. For instance, Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel and Morjaria (2015:1840) posited that during the years of autocracy [in Kenya] – from late 1969 to late 1992 – the districts that were “co-ethnic” with the President, meaning they shared his ethnicity, received three times more investment in road-building projects than their population share would deserve. Moreover, the length of the roads built in those districts was more than five times their predicted share. However, remarkably, those imbalances almost completely disappeared during the two periods of democracy – 1963 to 1969 and 1993 to 2011 (Burgess et al., 2015:1840).

With respect to development under the undemocratic regime, Laura Seay (2016) presents a fascinating analysis in “The Washington Post” (WP). According to the Seay (2016), regardless of how undemocratic and human rights-violating his behaviour might be, Kagame’s defenders tend to focus on the substantial economic and development gains Rwanda has made under his leadership over the last 15 years. Seay maintained that the country’s official development statistics are impressive, as highlighted by poverty rates that dropped from 56.7 percent in 2005 to 44.9 percent in 2010. Primary school enrolment has skyrocketed, and life expectancy is steadily growing (Seay, 2016). As in the case of Kenya, the progressive development achieved under undemocratic governance poses a
paradox. Furthermore, Seay argued that the highly touted improvements in development outcomes are unevenly distributed, with people in urban areas having far greater access to improved services and opportunities, while those opportunities are often much harder to access (or are absent) in rural spaces. This assertion is closely analogous to the literature that cites uneven regional development under Kenya’s personified regimes. Seay’s (2016) contention that “… one excuse Kagame’s supporters often give for continuing to back his rule is that in the post-genocide context, a strong hand is necessary to guide the country out of conflict and into prosperity” is even more compelling.

The researcher notes that there is a clear pattern of acquiescence of citizens to personified governance that is identified in the literature on Kenya and Rwanda. The most enigmatic finding is that some citizens perceive strong-handed dictators as being the country’s solution to development. Even more puzzling is the level of development associated with Rwanda, albeit under controversial governance indulgence. According to Friedman (2012:255), in the years since the genocide, [Rwanda] has been stable and growing economically at an impressive rate. In addition, the government has set out an ambitious set of goals called “Vision 2020” that aims to move the state into international middle-income range by the year 2020. The country aims to accomplish this mainly through education and the transition to a knowledge-based economy. We can only describe the success of this program and of Rwanda over the past decade as incredible (Friedman, 2012:255). Friedman (2012:256) maintained that the extraordinary emergence of Rwanda has centred predominantly on one man, President Paul Kagame. However, we should bear in mind that this study has extensively highlighted arguments questioning Kagame’s democratic credentials. Friedman echoes the foregoing assertion in his argument that while Mr. Kagame’s vision for the future of Rwanda includes its transition into a middle-income nation, it does not include the transition to a liberal democracy. [This contrasts with] many of Rwanda’s close neighbours and other similarly situated developing nations [that] suffer from tremendous corruption, siphoning off much needed funds (Friedman, 2012:256). On the contrary, Rwanda has engaged in an aggressive anti-corruption effort that has seen a large amount of success. This fact has also led to a boom in private foreign direct investment, fuelled in large part due
to personal relationships courted and developed by Kagame between himself and prominent international business leaders (Friedman, 2012:256).

The above literature review highlights an intriguing perspective concerning Rwanda’s citizens and the international community regarding the country’s development. It is apparent that stakeholders seem to acquiesce to President Kagame’s undemocratic methods of governance, for as long as it yields the development outcomes in the magnitude that Rwanda is registering. Drawing on examples elsewhere, we see that even superpowers like China espouse a variant of development akin to Rwanda. Once considered an awkward, unsustainable blend of authoritarian politics and capitalist economics, [communist] China’s growth ‘model’ has shown impressive resilience in recent years (Kurlantzick, 2013). In 2008 and 2009, the global economic crisis decimated the economies of nearly every leading democracy, while China surfed through the downturn virtually unscathed. China’s economy grew by nearly 9 percent in 2009, while [so called capitalist and democratic societies like] Japan’s shrunk by over 5 percent, and the American economy contracted by 2.6 percent (Kurlantzick, 2013). The researcher argues that this development paradox is perhaps one of the most critical factors that engender citizen acquiescence in such personified regimes like Rwanda. The fact that an oppressive regime registers significant development milestones presents a daunting psychological enigma. According to Shkolnikov (2004:1), a number of developing countries in other parts of the world show the same popular attitudes, as citizens support regimes where leaders hold strong authority. Shkolnikov (2004:1) maintained that many countries are considering anew the view that a strong leader – a benevolent dictator – can lead countries to political stability and economic prosperity. Citizens in new democracies came to realise the unlikelihood of a constructive dialogue with public officials. Thus, the main fruit of democracy, participation in public policy, was unattainable (Shkolnikov, 2004:3).

Therefore, in light of the manifest personification in Rwanda, why then do sections of Rwandese and the international community espouse Kagame’s contentious path to development? Friedman (2012:257) partially answers this question in his argument that, while the Rwandan government is decidedly authoritarian, its development of infrastructure, education, and health sectors, along with the creation of a niche as a regional telecommunications hub, has created economic growth out of the ashes of
genocide. For example, Rwanda’s Human Development Index (HDI) score, which includes health and education indicators in addition to economic growth, rose from 0.238 points in 1990 to 0.506 points in 2013. Optimistically, Seymour (noted in Matfess, 2015:184) famously hypothesised that economic growth increases the odds of authoritarian governments giving way to democracies. Perhaps this optimism for an elusive democracy is what keeps Rwandese citizens endeared to the incumbent personified system. [Nevertheless up to now], economic growth in Rwanda has not strengthened democratic forces in the country. Rather, economic policies in Rwanda directly affiliate with the political regime and are a part of larger state intervention in the social sphere (Matfess, 2015:185).

This study contends that even humanitarian aid donors seem to be perpetuating personified development in some countries like Rwanda. Over the past decade, donors increasingly abandoned their earlier commitment to democratic governance in recipient countries in favour of, once again, more technocratic approaches to development that sits well with the authoritarian policies (Hagmann & Reyntjens, 2016:16). Hagmann and Reyntjens (2016:1) posited that in 2013, one-party regimes that did not allow for democratic participation and criminalised political dissent, ruled four of the ten most important aid recipients in Africa, namely Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Rwanda. Again, we note that against all odds and conventional wisdom, Rwanda managed to attract the funding from donors to finance its development projects. For the citizens in Rwanda, this would look like an endorsement of Kagame’s personified development policies by the international community. This study, therefore argues that, faced with such titanic odds, the citizens do not have much choice other than to acquiesce to the incumbent regime. This becomes even more astonishing when we learn in Hagmann and Reyntjens (2016:5) that Rwanda managed to convince donors that governance was ‘technocratic’ and ‘developmental’, and thus unrelated to politics and rights, which silenced their internal and external critics, and led to more aid being given as the country became more dictatorial, over time.

In conclusion, this chapter has linked governance and development under personified regimes. The chapter has also brought to the fore paradoxes associated with citizen acquiescence to personified governance where such regimes are registering successes with development. Even more astonishing is the fact that
members of the international community, who present as champions of democracy, have actually ignored atrocious personification to fund undemocratic governments. In a bid to answer how citizens could influence national development under personified governance, this study has highlighted the point that complexities associated with personified governance transcend the capacity of disempowered citizens. Accordingly, East African citizens and the humanitarian international communities can only apply catalytic actions that would establish inclusive regimes in order to realise citizen participation in the development agenda.

4.8 Conclusion of Chapter Four

As a recap, in this section, I answered the research question “How does personified leadership influence governance and development policies in East Africa?” In this respect, I focused on empirical concepts in the theory of personification, drawn from literature and my own observation. I also analysed traditional African concepts of with respect to personified rule in East Africa. Chapter Four ended with an analysis of leadership actions with respect to placing national governance and development interests ahead of leaders’ own self-interests.

In this section, I discussed how personified leadership correlates with the ‘servant leader’ model and leadership in the African culture of Ubuntu. I noted that within the context of this study, the ‘servant leader’ model is the opposite of personified leadership in that it builds trust around the leader, develops the ‘led’ by using power entrusted to the leader, and accommodates the opinions of others positively. Conversely, the egocentrism associated with personified leadership centres power on the national leader, thus denying citizens their inalienable rights. Thus, traditional African society had developed and was previously subsisting under well-defined indigenous governance and political systems. The philosophy of Ubuntu, for instance, espouses the concept of servant leadership and equal support to the leader by the subjects. In Kenya, the Harambee movement – a variant of Ubuntu – was responsible for the mobilisation of large sums of capital for a wide variety of basic needs, thereby fostering social inclusion and integration of populations in development processes. In these models of leadership, we note that society had understood that leadership is a relationship between leaders and followers. Thus, the spirit of reciprocity in traditional Africa, especially in sharing resources, empowered
both the leader and followers in respectable measures. Accordingly, there was thus little or no room for personification of systems, since society shared all resources symbiotically and reciprocally. The most exceptional finding is that Christians understand their role of being servants “on account of” Jesus. Individuals “do not become servant leaders by choice or desire”; however, servanthood is the result of an individual’s personal relationship with Christ, as the character and purposes of Christ become pre-eminent in an individual’s life.

The advent of independence dismantled federal institutions with strong ethno-cultural foundations, thus diminishing social inclusions and humanistic concern. This study posits that this devious move shocked the erstwhile social, cultural and political transition, paving the way for the proliferation of personified governance. Most post-independence leaders subverted prevailing traditional systems in preference for manipulating citizens using personified governance systems. These leaders manifested the eclipse of Ubuntu, indicated by the leader becoming the main centre of every reference, thus losing the essence of Ubuntu that focuses on community building. I argue that the latter illustrates how personification has distorted the mandate of public institutions and the very moral fabric of society, relegating its nationals to the status of acquiesced citizens. In particular, the advent of colonialism introduced models of governance that were embryonic for African society. Conversely, saw strong examples from traditional Rwanda, highlighting the point that humility keeps the egos of leaders in check, and places community strength and success ahead of selfish personal desires. Based on the latter, I argue that an essential quality will amplify the intrinsic humanity of a leader and invite trust, and imbue respect and honour for the persona. This quality is the humanistic concern for others that the philosophy of Ubuntu demonstrates – the interconnectedness of the ‘self’ within society.

The empirical literature reviewed in this study confirmed that that several individuals, acting in tandem, can tempt a leader into a pursuit of personification. On the contrary, respectful interactive aspects of Ubuntu that have helped traditional African society to live in harmony are still important for nations. For instance, one aspect of Ubuntu is that, at all times, the individual effectively represents the people from among whom he or she comes, and therefore the individual tries to behave according to the highest standards and to exhibit the virtues upheld by his or her
I then carried out a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between a leader’s behavioural inclination and actual leader effectiveness. We note that an attempt by leaders to entrench personification in the institutional framework yields helpless citizens who are acquiesced in the status quo. As is the case with personified systems, leaders decisively clamp down on any real or perceived threats to their power. This section highlighted the point that incumbent leaders entice their targets with material inducements in order to centralise power, with limited opposition. We also noted that the centralisation of power by national leaders is symptomatic of personified tendencies that exclude the masses to the benefit of a unique leader. In the end, I established that personified leadership styles by past Presidents, as in Kenya, adversely influenced governance and development policies. We also saw the enduring spill over effects of personification on societal structures, and the related challenges associated with trying to unravel and realign personified institutional systems that have long been designed to depend on the leader. To this end, this study demonstrated that citizens who have been influenced extensively by personified regimes over the years have metamorphosed to espouse the philosophy. However, strong leadership, resolute political will, and an unwavering sense of purpose, urgency and resilience, as in the case of President Paul Kagame, will spearhead isolated transformations. While I concur that it takes great leaders to achieve success according to the pace and scale of Rwanda, leaders still need to work with and through systems and institutions to achieve overall national objectives. Most significantly, I validated the view that, as in the case of Rwanda, the concept of “good governance” directly correlates to a nation’s development and efficient administration. The latter accentuates this study’s theory of change, to the effect that good leadership results in good governance and development.

In this segment, I answered the research question “how can East African citizens influence national governance and development policies under personified leaders?” This chapter integrated the literature from preceding sections with the researcher’s own postulation of the probable citizen actions that arise under personified leadership. I established that, in order for citizens to have an effect on national governance and development policies under personified leaders, they must credibly
and accurately understand the ‘influencers’ of the incumbent leader. By understanding behaviour, one can predict, direct, change and control the actions of individuals or a group. The challenge is that even the perceived sanctity and supremacy of a national constitution poses no restraint to a leader with personified inclinations, as was the case in Kenya. Likewise, I argue that the exclusionist strategy practised by personified regimes renders polices unresponsive and irrelevant to citizens’ needs. Similarly, I established that the relationship between ethnicity and executive power influences the extent of public participation in national discourses, and in democratic transition in general. In some instances like in Kenya, I contend that the vice of personification has permeated the institution of law making, a factor that grossly hinders the unprejudiced redress of any legal issues associated with citizen participation and, ultimately, governance. Accordingly, the exclusion of the people from participating in national discourses has escalated vices such as corruption, nepotism, and manipulation that are bastions of personified regimes.

I established that in the case of Rwanda, decentralisation has facilitated the transformation of Rwandese from a passive population, disconnected from governance and characterised by a high level of dependency on government and powerlessness, into a more engaged and active citizenry. However, the two dominant ethnic groups in Rwanda play a critical role in determining the participation of citizens under personified rule. Thus, the state system fuses with group identity and social stratification. I argue that for a country like Rwanda with strong ethnic disparities, issues pertaining to power sharing are rather complex. This is because power sharing involves a delicate tripartite relationship between two disparate ethnic groups and a governing leader. Nonetheless, if a leader is not willing to share power with other citizens for egoistic reasons, then equitable governance in that jurisdiction will fail. The result of despondency under any regime is usually acquiescence of citizens to personified governance. Furthermore, the acquiescence of a country’s judicial system to the personified interests of the national leader and their cronies infringes on the national freedom to participate in governance and development. This undermines the respect for human rights, to the extent that the State cannot meet its obligations to respect, fulfil and protect the rights of its citizens.

Accordingly, this study has linked acquiescence to personified governance in the infancy of regime entrenchment, culminating in fully-fledged helplessness when
there is no change. Even more significant is the fact that elders can transmit intergenerational acquiescence to youth, precariously obscuring the possibility of systemic change. The above insights underscore how personified governance can permeate and transform the guiding social fabric of society, rendering citizens distrustfully dependent on the selfish interests of callous leaders. I also illustrated the fact that colonial enforcement of allegiance to a centralised oppressive governance structure starkly fomented the genesis of systematised acquiescence. In current dispensations, I highlighted the occurrence of state-inspired acquiescence imposed upon a powerless ethnicity, as in the case of Rwanda. However, I established that the tolerance of citizens subjected to personified governance always culminates in dissension. I drew on Verga’s (2013) perspectives to highlight how citizens have developed strategies in difficult times to adapt to, and to learn from, transformations and to find sustainable alternatives to ensure a functioning community. In East Africa, the resilience and capacity of citizens to respond to state oppression varies from country to country. I illustrated the point that personified political manoeuvres that exclude sections of the citizenry on discriminatory grounds are bound to result in dissent, as in the case of Kenya. Thus, no extent of political machinations can clamp down on the intrinsic trigger sequestered within marginalised citizens to voice their dissension to oppression. I discussed the paradox that civil societies sometimes exhibit double standards in dealing with undemocratic governance. This is true with personified governments that frequently use ‘rewards’ to muzzle the middle class and disable civil society. Even where compliance is coercive and the opportunities for dissent are minimal, individuals continue to express their politics through their acts of resistance.

I also ascertained that citizens use an array of tools, from peaceful dialogue to outright violence, to emancipate themselves from personified governance. In Kenya, citizens used the media to extricate themselves from the entrapment of personified governance. However, in extreme cases, citizens emancipate themselves through outright violence against personified rule. The jolting effect of the Kenyan post-election violence of 2008 was a result of disenchantment with the immediate electoral cheating, overlain by deep discontent with the marginalisation, brutalisation, and exclusion enforced by the state. Whereas the zeal for self-emancipation can be a uniting force for national movements, in the case of Rwanda, it became a fracturing
force due to egocentricity associated with being a member of an ethnicity. The type of ethnicity can mean access to, or outright exclusion from, the enjoyment of national resources. On the other hand, moderate voices can also pose an impediment to opportune drives for social or political emancipation. Instead of being catalytic, they can easily dampen the high spirits of revolutionaries who want to change the status quo. As was the case in Rwanda, the failure to ally under a unified front to fight endemic personification usually results in societal degeneration. To this end, I posit that fragmented ethnic politics comprise a major deterrent to forming a unified front to fight the suffering meted out by personified regimes upon their citizens. Accordingly, there must be synchronised unity on three fronts to achieve national-level citizen emancipation. The individual needs to align with societal ideologies. The society, in turn, should have a unified political agenda, and only then will a nation have a unified drive for national emancipation.

Finally, I explored the interaction between acquiesced citizens and personified development. To appreciate the extent of acquiescence, I contextualised the literature at both the individual level and communal levels. I start my argument by pointing out that, as in the case of Kenya, authoritarian regimes usually intensify inequalities of wealth and power within the state. I then demonstrated that authoritarianism, a surrogate of personification, actually has an intricate and multifarious correlation with national development. However, the paradox of economic development being achieved under undemocratic governance and autocracies, rather than in some democracies, intrigues experts. Even more enigmatic is the fact that some citizens perceive strong-handed dictators as being the country’s solution to achieving development. To this end, I highlighted how stakeholders seem to acquiesce under undemocratic governance, for as long as these yield development outcomes, for example, in Rwanda currently. The foregoing highlights the fact that an oppressive regime registers significant development milestones presents a daunting psychological enigma. Similarly, humanitarian aid donors seem to be perpetuating personified development, as indicated by their abandonment of the earlier required commitment to democratic governance in recipient countries. Now, they prefer technocratic approaches to development that aligns well with authoritarian policies (Hagmann & Reyntjens, 2016:16).
CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The subject of this study, personified national development and governance, has mesmerised humankind for a long time. The fact that there are examples of incumbent national leaders that strongly correlate with development and governance lent credence to the significance of this study. This is because personified leaders have successively influenced development and governance trajectories, albeit sometimes with mixed results, some of which were avoidable. The study is even more significant for East Africa where there is pertinent concern about the objectivity of policymaking processes in the region. Instead of championing inclusive national participation, some leaders govern East African countries using retrograde ideologies, indicative of restrictive executive interests. Underlying these interests is usually a deep-seated desire for self-entrenchment that crafty leaders impose on hapless masses. The egocentric system allows incumbent leaders to squander public resources to prop up their restrictive governance systems, with dire consequences for inclusive development. Accordingly, the study unravelled the fundamentals of personified policies and suggests a platform for leaders, citizens and other relevant stakeholders to seek common solutions for sustainable governance and development.

In trying to unravel the intricacies of personification, this thesis delved deep into inherent factors that elicit personified tendencies in national leaders. The supporting literature review took me through an adventurous journey of human exploration and transformation, traversing disciplines like spirituality, biology, philosophy, psychology, religion, politics, economics and ecology. Due to the copious amount of literature at hand, I had to rely on advanced computer technology, as well as manual analysis, to arrive at answers from an epistemological perspective, while ensuring that my approach to the problem aligned well with the study’s research questions. The scope and depth of my research yielded significant insights into the subject of personified governance and development in East Africa. These findings will have major implications for defining the interactions between citizens and their leaders.
5.2 Restatement of the purpose

The objective of my study was to understand how personified governance correlates with development in the East African region. More specifically, this research sought to comprehend how national leaders, who play a critical role in shaping governance and development, metamorphose progressively to assume personified inclinations. Because personified leadership is defined by rather complex relationships, this thesis also sought to understand the role that citizens played in abetting or deterring personified reign. The researcher hoped that the outcome of the research would enable national and international stakeholders to better contextualise personified leadership within the context of national governance and development. Ultimately, this research aims to equip experts and other interested parties with tools to identify leaders with personified inclinations, and eventually develop appropriate solutions to respond to personified actions.

5.3 Summary of main points

The overriding purpose of this study was to undertake a literature review in order to understand the genesis of personified leadership, how such leadership influences national governance and development policies in East Africa, and whether such leadership styles consider citizen participation in national discourses. The study also sought to develop best-practice criteria for citizen-driven development policies that transcend personified governance in East Africa.

My theoretical findings established that the degree of animistic thinking in a child, coupled with external influences on the cognitive development of the same individual, right from their childhood through adolescence to adulthood, has a direct bearing on the leadership style of the subject individual. However, in some cases, external influences on a subject leader, even in adolescence, such as parental actions, socio-economic status, peer pressure, ethnicity, and political affiliations, also played a critical role in shaping an individual’s leadership inclination. Of equal significance, I found that an individual who is born and raised in a particular national culture, and who lives most of their life in a nation state in which they are a citizen, assume a “nationalised personality structure” fundamental to a subject state-society. This conceptual construct clearly links an individual personality structure to the
progression (or lack of progression) of political and socio-economic factors in a nation state. This study highlights the point that the connection of a personified leader to state systems inevitably infuses the leader’s influences into such institutions, to the extent that the state starts projecting the essential character of the leader. Since states do not operate in a vacuum, a personified national system often permeates into the realms of the “international balance of power.”

One of the themes to emerge from my analysis is that personified inclinations in national leaders can be traced to specific “triggers” in their upbringing that elicit and catalyse predominant egocentric outlook and actions. This study found that when unchecked, leaders with personified inclinations plunge into a delusionary state where they cannot differentiate their persona from the state institutions that they lead. The common thread in a personified reign is that it produces two cadres of nationals: acquiesced citizens, whom personified systems pummel into submission using the sheer power of state resources, and a small band of supporters who prop up and benefit from the regime. Citizens, as in the case of Rwanda, can actually promote the personification of the leadership, and ultimately the forced acquiescence of other ethnicities to their preferred leader.

The findings suggest that self-perpetuity and egocentrism is a strong motivational factor for personified national leadership in East Africa. In this respect, all leaders who gravitate towards personified tendencies first begin by subverting national constitutions and simultaneously undermining democratic ideals. On the other hand, undercurrents of resilience motivate oppressed citizens to explore avenues for wresting power back from personified regimes. It is this resilience that culminates in mass mobilisation actions that peak in regime change, and the cycle continues.

I also found that personified leadership was a major perceived influence on the quality of national governance and development. In this respect, my analysis traversed from traditional to contemporary models of governance, and examined the latter’s correlation with development. This study established that personified leadership is a deviation from Africa’s consensus-based systems like Ubuntu. Accordingly, reverting to an Afro-centric view of leadership requires a reconnection with African indigenous knowledge that endorses factors such as supportiveness, relationships and extended networks. In Afrocentric models, people influence the
direction that their leader should take when it comes to governance issues, and leadership is about serving the people. Regarding the foregoing, this study established that “servant leadership” correlates ideally with the *Ubuntu* philosophy. The servant leader fosters “interconnectedness of self within society and the extension of humanness within shared community”, as happened in the case of Rwanda. However, the above findings also yielded certain paradoxes in leadership styles.

For instance, Rwanda under Kagame exhibits a peculiarity with developmental patrimonialism, where politically generated opportunities for profit are institutionalised and centralised, and where economic rents are deployed efficiently with a view to longer-term development. In Rwanda, Kagame has drawn on the *Ubudehe* as a unique policy for promoting citizens’ collective action in partnership with a government committed to decentralisation. *Ubudehe* emphasises a community-level approach that empowers citizens to play a lead role in alleviating poverty in their own villages. This particular model of governance highlighted the fact that a blend of good tenets from traditional and contemporary governance can potentially deliver development results in a given polity. In a departure from contentious servant leadership models, I found that the Christian perspective offers a more practical ideological, philosophical, theological and religious solution. According to the teachings in the Bible, individuals “do not become servant leaders by choice or desire”; however, servanthood is the result of an individual’s personal relationship with Christ, as the character and purposes of Christ become pre-eminent in an individual’s life. The Bible teaches that, as an individual becomes obedient to the covenants associated with God, one’s nature is changed, as virtue is added to faith, followed by knowledge (or testimony), temperance (or self-discipline), patience, godliness, brotherly kindness, and charity (2 Pet. 1:5–8). This perspective removes complete reliance on intrinsic or external influences on a leader’s character, and draws on the divine essence of Christ to guide the leader.

With respect to citizens’ participation in national governance and development, this study found that it is better to have an engaged, rather than a passive, citizenry. Accordingly, with citizen participation, formulated policies might more realistically reflect citizen preferences. The researcher argues that engaging citizens directly in national policy processes would enable incumbent governments to gain support,
build consensus, identify acceptable solutions, and ensure operability. However, as in the case of Kenya in 2007, the exclusion of citizens from participating in national governance has a ‘price’ – mass uprising, anarchy and popular revolts. In some instances, in response to undemocratic regimes as in Rwanda, citizens practise three specific types of everyday resistance: staying on the side-lines; irreverent compliance; and withdrawn muteness. In cases where there is limited functionality of the constitution, for example in the 2007 Kenyan parliamentary elections, citizens assert their authority by massively voting out the cronies of personified regimes. Similarly, despite threatening, censorship and gagging, Kenyan citizens have also used the media to express their discontent with personified governance.

5.4 Relationship with previous research

The outcomes of my literature study align well with findings from previous research to the extent that it identifies the fact that cognitive development has an impact on individual perception of the self and the world at large. Research on human development is a relatively recent endeavour. Elder (noted in Berk, 2007:5) asserted that studies of children did not begin until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Investigations into adult development, aging, and change over the course of life emerged only in the 1960s and 1970s. Nonetheless, speculations about how people grow and change have existed for centuries (Berk, 2007:5). Many of these studies characterise individual development from childhood to adulthood as a smooth continuous process, while others posit that individuals develop more discretely in a series of ‘stable’ stages. However, whether growth is linear or staggered, the theory of personified leadership focuses more on how the intrinsic changes within an individual shape their perceptions of their surroundings. This breakthrough approach to analysing an individual’s transition to adulthood can consistently point out factors that potentially shape a leader’s governance style. My findings also largely align with existing theoretical, philosophical and empirical constructs that relate governance and development. The emphasis of this study is that the mode of governance adopted by any leader determines development outcomes. Similarly, by focusing on leadership action, this study answers one of the main concepts from earlier work, highlighting how experts struggle with characterising “good governance” in relation to societal development.
However, my conclusions run counter to the conventional, widely expressed views posited by several theories of leadership, most of which are extensively covered in Chapter Two of this thesis. On the contrary, by combining childhood animism, cognitive development, and external influence on the individual, I was able to formulate a new “theory of personification.” Unlike other similar studies, my approach to leadership analysis is unique because it considers the full continuum of a leader’s evolution, from childhood to maturity, and correlates this with subsequent leadership actions. Of equal significance, I established that consistent egocentric actions implemented under leaders practising personified reign breeds a sizeable class of “acquiesced citizens.” To the best of my knowledge, no previous research has identified this class of subjugated citizens. This highlights the point that scholars, researchers, and experts have overtly focused on tertiary issues like leadership, while paying little attention to primary factors like citizens who are subject to the leaders. I argue that understanding the subject of acquiescence is a critical step to inspiring or mobilising masses to counter personified reign.

My findings are (to some extent) at odds with the sparse literature that makes inferences regarding personalised politics in which individual expressive personal action dislodges collective actions. In this respect, the personalisation of politics largely assumes that people are mobilised around a “common identity”. Some authors assert that examples of personalised politics have long existed, of course, in the form of populist uprisings or emotional bonds with charismatic leaders (Bennett, 2012:22). With respect to institutions, Rahat and Shaefer (noted in Mazzoleni, Barnhurst, Ikeda, Wessler & Maia, 2015:945) posited that institutional personalisation refers to the “adoption of rules, mechanisms, and institutions that put more emphasis on the individual politician and less on groups and parties.” They maintained that “more power is granted to leaders in case of centralized personalization, and to individual politicians generally in the case of decentralized personalization.” “[Experts] have identified several factors as key drivers of personalization. Some of them are the pervasiveness of the media in the political process, the intensified economic orientation, and the modernization of society and changes in the political system (Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle, 2014:154).” Holtz-Bacha et al. (2014:154) maintained that “modernization, in its sociological sense, has
led to a weakening of the traditional social ties that used to determine an individual’s path through life.”

From the above discussion, it is apparent that experts on the subject of personalisation concentrate more on the external factors that drive individuals, groups or institutions. Similarly, proponents of the personalisation concept suggest that people confer power upon a leader in “centralized personalization.” The latter falls short in considering the intrinsic factors that catalyse egoistic inclinations in leaders, as the theory of personification depicts. This divergence highlights how the concept of personalisation omits critical factors that shape a leader’s social, political, economic and cultural orientation. This accentuates my submission that this thesis will contribute significantly to the understanding of leadership as it relates to governance and development.

5.5 Possible explanations for the findings

Theoretical and empirical studies on governance emphasise mainly two distinctive themes. There are those who view governance as being concerned with the rules of conducting public affairs, on the one hand, and those, on the other hand, who see it as steering or controlling public affairs (Hydén & Court, 2002:7). Some analysts treat governance as being reflected in human intention and action, whereas others view governance as an ongoing phenomenon that is hard to pin down, but which bears on how results are achieved (Hydén & Court, 2002:7).

I argue that researchers have paid limited attention to the fundamental role of the national leader in shaping the governance trajectory. In particular, it is not clear how citizens can overcome the personified inclinations of any given leader in order to enjoy democratic reign. The latter is complicated by the fact that to-date, there is no clear methodology, if any, for predicting personified tendencies in aspiring or incumbent leaders. In this study, I contend that this deficiency is what led to the birth of the terminology “good governance”, a term that shows that the word ‘governance’ needs to be qualified by a suffix. In the absence of concrete agreement on the definition of key terminologies that characterise national policies, experts are bound to interpret leadership actions differently. This singular factor, especially on the blurred definition of ‘governance’, heavily influenced my line of thought in this thesis.
The other thematic area I covered in this study is the subject of ‘development’. This term also has its unique definitional challenges. Like its counterpart – governance – the term ‘development’ that is heavily used by experts globally also has its own unique definitional challenges. For this reason, experts add the suffix ‘sustainable’ to buttress the word ‘development’. Tacconi and Tisdell (1993:411) accentuate my point in their assertion that, from its inception more than 20 years ago, the concept of ‘sustainable development’ has undergone substantial changes. Originally, it was used to indicate the need for a pattern of economic development compatible with the physical limits set by the natural environment. However, the concept has recently been used in a broader sense to indicate the need for a balanced and sustainable development of the ecological, political, social and economic systems. In this respect, I argue that the term ‘development’ has assumed several dimensions, ranging from connoting a process, condition or a given state of existence. However, during the course of this study, I found very limited reference or no literature at all that links the cognitive growth of a leader to the subsequent personified actions that affect national development. This gap in the literature offered me the liberty to interpret the relationship between leaders and development in a manner that favours the theory of personification. Had there been substantive studies, the outcome of this thesis would have perhaps been different.

The above two scenarios are methodologically challenging for many reasons. It goes a long way to show that the highly complex behaviours which are often of interest, for instance personified leadership, are difficult to measure, and sophisticated state-of-the-art statistical procedures often are required. It is made even more daunting by the fact that political actors are difficult to engage with as research participants. This makes it difficult to link an individual leader’s persona to their actions, say in governance or development outcomes. A leader’s political behaviour is only one aspect of his or her total behaviour as a social being. The scanty literature on these subjects, which was mainly comprised of secondary information, highlights the complexity of conducting research on leaders. For instance, scholars of political behaviour find it relatively easy to identify the bases of power or the scope of power (Lasswell & Kaplan, noted in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 2008), but power relationships are extraordinarily difficult to identify and even more difficult to measure (Dahl, noted in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 2008).
Thus, we can significantly improve the outcome of research on personified leadership by applying methodological sophistication, which largely draws on primary research.

Moreover, part of the maze of literature that I had to triangulate to understand the concept of leadership personality traversed through culture, biology, economics, politics and sociology. Throughout my navigation, I encountered challenges in trying to link leadership actions with the responses of their subjects. Even more complex was my attempt to pinpoint the catalytic momentum that would galvanise citizen actions against personified regimes. In order to define the relationships, I had to combine theoretical and empirical literature to find a middle ground. However, even the dearth of literature I reviewed still came short of predicting mass actions against personified regimes. This is partly because the prediction of such actions entails the understanding of individual motivation – a gigantic task given the numbers entailed. Again, this gap in the literature gave me the liberty to interpret the study information in a manner that advances the theory of personification.

The above-cited possible explanations for the findings also, to an extent, highlight the limitations that I encountered during conducting this study. Accordingly, the next section delves deeper into the scope of this study to shed more light on the limitations of the study, taking into account sources of potential bias or imprecision.

5.6 Study limitations

I should stress that my study has been primarily concerned with the impact of personified leadership action on national governance and development. In order not to be rigidly prescriptive, the definition of ‘personified’ was limited to the context of governance and development in this research. More specifically, this study did not focus on the cumulative contribution of other persons to the success or failure of subject national leaders. This is a significant limitation because we know that leaders do not act in a vacuum. However, the latter does not in any way diminish the findings in this study. To the contrary, I argue that each leader is solely responsible for their actions, and as this thesis highlights, several leaders deliberately pursue personified actions with the sole objective of furthering their individual interests. Likewise, a longitudinal study of the research the problem, for example leadership evolution and
transformation, was too complex and required much more time. Thankfully, the body of literature presented useful paradigms that furnished this study with a plausible conceptual model of leadership development and its potential impacts on governance and development.

Additionally, I only studied in detail issues pertaining to the role of national leaders in the EAC, and the options available to citizens to respond to personified actions. In this respect, this study only covered five out of the 22 East African countries. I particularly zeroed in on the geographically extensive countries of the EAC namely: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi because they have a rich ethnic diversity – most of whom share a common heritage and socio-economic conditions. These countries also generally face a relatively high leadership turnover largely due to the similar political dispensations in the region. All the above factors conspire to complicate the study. I deliberately applied a case study methodology that focused on two countries, Kenya and Rwanda, whose characteristics I reckoned were generalizable to the other three cohorts. In this instance, the case study methodology enabled me to investigate and explore the available literature more thoroughly and deeply to gain new insights regarding personified governance and development in the EAC. My primary concern here was not in targeting samples for proportionality. However, the largest limitation I faced in the above respect pertained to the difficulty in generalising conclusions by studying only one country. I therefore had to focus on two countries, as already described above. The methodology was also prone to possible biases in data collection. To this end, I relied on non-probability judgement to draw study samples from the population of interest. Accordingly, the people whom I surveyed did not truly comprise a random sample, which is also a limitation. I quickly noted that this method is not suitable for samples where the size of both the universe and the sample is considerably large. In other words, it was not easy for this study to achieve a plausible level of significance due to the small size of the sample.

The lack of data or paucity of reliable data led me to limit the scope of my analysis and the size of my sample. In particular, my reliance on third party reporting, punctuated by restrictive atmospheres in some countries, limited accurate data compilation on values, power relations and individual actions of leaders. The secrecy
surrounding leaders and citizen behaviours exacerbated the latter difficulty, rendering some research outcomes attributional or proximal. I also faced strong limitations in accessing data on the internet, since most peer-reviewed journal articles are only accessible at a fee or on purchase. I therefore spent much time navigating the web, trying to build up literature from fragments of publications, and largely, from freely accessible databases and online libraries.

With respect to the research methodology, I extensively consulted readily accessible published material that might have understated or exaggerated the effect of personified leadership. In terms of depth of material, I only managed to access some limited volumes of unpublished material. Similarly, the overtly subjective sampling procedure applied in the study decreased the representativeness of the sampled material relative to the geographic area of coverage. In this regard, the statistical significance of my findings may vary when compared to wide-ranging dissertations and other unpublished research. Accordingly, I was concerned about the selection bias arising out of the highly subjective meta-analytical approach. However, I used computer software that corrected or balanced my conclusions arising out of my methodological approach. I therefore believe that the outcomes of my systematic research is replicable, rational and independent, ultimately leading to the construction of viable new knowledge.

5.7 Implications of my findings

My study offers suggestive evidence that whereas personified leadership is a factual phenomenon, the accessible literature is vague on how personification affects governance and development policy. In this respect, the challenge posed in Chapter One of this study is clear: despite the institutionalisation of several national development policies and so-called governance pillars, there is limited citizen participation in national discourses. This is largely because of restrictive executive interests that are driven by a deep-seated desire for self-entrenchment that crafty leaders impose on hapless masses. This egocentrism allows incumbent leaders to misuse public resources to the advantage of incumbents and loyalists. Consequently, mismanagement pervades society, weakening it severely, resulting in the national institutions assuming the personified attributes of incumbent leaders.
In Chapter Two, this study linked the theory of personification to various traditional, classical, philosophical and contemporary theories of leadership. This was significant in grounding personified leadership within the existing literature. This analytical adventure enabled me to coin a new definition of the term ‘personification’ that will now hopefully find usability in the annals of literature. One significant finding in this chapter is that mental states, moods and attitudes precipitate specific behavioural responses in personalities that ultimately characterise the personalities of individual national leaders. The implication of the latter is that behavioural analysts could potentially decipher the personality traits that drive national governance and development policies. Of equal significance in this chapter is the finding that culture and socialisation patterns also shape a national leader’s disposition. This points to the fact that external factors shape a leader’s perception of the world. The theoretical implication is that we can now trace leadership actions to specific intrinsic or external stimuli and influences in a leader’s cognitive development.

In Chapter Three, I draw on philosophical, traditional and empirical concepts on leadership to guide my discussions on how personified leadership relates with governance and development. One key finding, with significant implications, is that social empowerment constitutes a threat to the interests of personified systems. This is because under personified dispositions, self-interested powerful national leaders usually use their positions to constrain, rather than empower, the masses. The latter is not helped by the blurred definition of the term ‘good governance’. The varied interpretations of good governance render it challenging to measure, and then use such measures to inform national policy processes. In addition, autocratic leaders exploit disparities in the definitions of good governance to rationalise their actions. The lack of conceptual clarity when it comes to ‘good governance’ poses a problem for the practical outcomes that development institutions and the like are trying to achieve. This significantly limits the ability to measure the causal relationship between governance and development outcomes. Accordingly, this study offers a solution to the effect that the concept of governance, whether good or bad, can actually be evaluated from the perspective of a leader. This breakthrough removes the ambiguity that has hitherto delinked governance actions from development outcomes.
In Chapter Four, I focused on the interplay of traditional concepts of African leadership with personified governance and development, as exemplified in contemporary models of leadership. The objective of this section was to identify a suite of strategies, if any, that citizens could apply to overcome personified leadership in East Africa. From the outset, this chapter pointed out that the spirit of reciprocity in traditional Africa, especially in sharing resources, traditionally empowered both the leader and followers in respectable measures. Thus, the exclusion of citizens from sharing the “national cake” has a ‘price’ – mass uprising, anarchy and popular revolts, as was the case in Kenya in 2007. In countries like Rwanda, strong ethnic disparities render issues pertaining to power sharing rather complex. This is because power sharing involves a delicate tripartite relationship between two disparate ethnic groups and a governing leader. In this instance, Rwanda failed the litmus test when the power-sharing Arusha Accord (1993), which was designed to avert the 1994 genocide, failed to mitigate violence because it lacked such necessary factors as an able and committed leadership. The lessons learnt in this regard is that, with better governance as is the case in Rwanda now, power sharing becomes a real possibility. On the other hand, Chapter Four highlighted the challenges of dealing with acquiesced citizens. For instance, the deep-rooted phenomenon of acquiescence in Kenya’s socio-political fabric has far-reaching influences, going into institutional systems such as the judiciary. Once the sanctity of the judiciary is compromised, the “unconnected” citizens are bound to suffer injustices, to the benefit of the personified interests of the national leader and their cronies. This is evident in Kenya, where corruption has undermined respect for human rights within the country because of personified governance.

As a response to combat acquiescence in personified systems, citizens have developed strategies to adapt to and learn from transformations, and to find sustainable alternatives to ensure a functioning community. Citizen resilience in times of crises highlights the enduring lessons from East Africa that local communities are not passive victims in the face of state failure. In extreme cases, citizens emancipate themselves through outright violence against personified rule. An example of the foregoing is the jolting effect of the Kenyan post-election violence of 2008, which stemmed directly from the nature of the existing constitution, which promoted a ‘winner takes all’ mentality and supported the unequal distribution of the
national wealth. Conversely, moderate voices can present an impediment to opportune drives for social or political emancipation, or even to resilience to bad governance. Instead of being catalytic, moderate citizens can easily dampen the high spirits of revolutionaries who want to change the status quo. This may lead to national discord, as was the case in Rwanda in 1993 where citizens failed to ally under a unified front to fight endemic personification, resulting in the minority Tutsi seeking solace in personal redemption, at whatever cost. Now there is a clear paradox emerging in Rwanda, where some citizens perceive strong-handed dictators as being the country’s solution to development. Even more puzzling is the level of rapid development associated with Rwanda’s current regime. This goes a long way to demonstrate that some citizens can put up with acquiesce to undemocratic methods of governance, as long as these yield development outcomes in the magnitude that Rwanda is registering.

5.7.1 Theoretical Implication

Whereas many persons have exhaustively studied the subject of personality in psychology, no explicit attempt has been made to link the formative behavioural stimuli in children to personified disposition in adult individuals subsisting in a defined socio-cultural system. Therefore, one significant contribution of this study to the body of literature is in tracing the root cause of an individual’s inclination to insinuate their personae into national systems and institutions, solely for their personal or sectarian gain. This study will enable the scientific analysis of the attitude-behavioural correlational construct, with respect to self-interest or egoistic tendencies.

Moreover, this study will also enable theorists to model possible singular or collective human actions in a given polity, based on the cognitive development and ecological influences of the leader in question. This study offers conceptual clarifications to theoretical ambiguities related to the underlying “problem” of singular or collective action, specifically on how to model social dilemma situations in the fields of governance and development that other theoretical predictions have not explained. Ultimately, the study will provide a theoretical basis for the empirical analysis of individual leadership impact on national governance and development policies.
This study has revealed that personification, as a behavioural paradigm, assumes two fundamentally incongruent dimensions. On the one hand, individuals exhibiting personified tendencies may demonstrate benevolent attributes, as in the case of Julius Nyerere, former President of the United Republic of Tanzania. Conversely, individuals exhibiting personified tendencies may demonstrate a malevolent disposition, as in the case of Jean Baptiste Bagaza, former President of Burundi. Accordingly, this thesis underscores the need for greater transparency in behavioural studies, which currently might be inhibiting the use of behavioural insights to understand the complex concept of leadership. Thus, the use of behavioural insights to understand the concept of leadership will potentially induce an explicit shift in the *modus operandi* of national governance, a factor that will ultimately stimulate national development.

In light of the above, an area that requires further research is the occurrence of personified tendencies in socio-cultural groupings, as in the case of the Tutsi and Hutu ethnicities that straddle the nations of Rwanda and Burundi. These ethnicities show a manifestation of personal behavioural inclinations that are sequestered in unique individuals who are motivated by a collective affinity to personify an entire national polity for their own sectarian benefit. Further research needs to be conducted on the impact of acquiescence on determining the courses of action available to citizens who are faced with personified governance and development.

### 5.7.2 Policy implication

Several attempts have been made to achieve sustainable governance and development in East Africa, without much success. Experts have adduced many explanations to rationalise endemic corruption, politically inspired murders, exclusions, deliberate marginalisation of citizens, and so forth. However, most accounts have fallen short due to the lack of credible evidence to validate the assertions. Accordingly, this study endeavoured to unravel the implications for public policy of the underlying factors that determine how leaders make governance and development decisions.

In this study, I have highlighted how personification restrains a given nation from reaching its full potential. My theory shows that, in addition to hampering national
development, personification permeates and cripples different levels of society. With an acquiesced citizenry unable to overcome personified systems, policy makers are faced with a challenge of how to develop sustainable and inclusive policies. A key implication in our context is that policy makers should understand how to navigate the policy cycle in personified countries, as in the case of East African nations. As this study highlights, the inclusion of citizens in national discourses through robust power-sharing arrangements, as in the case of Rwanda, is ideal for achieving sustainable national governance and development.

Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, this study explained the genesis of personified inclination, which ultimately concentrates power in the hands of individual leaders and their cronies. The rise of egocentrism, where powerful individuals impose their logic on those without any means or political backing to counter leadership excesses, is socio-economically debilitating. The net impact of the concentration of power is that certain segments of society are rendered ineffective, and thus economically unproductive. Therefore, countries that face personified governance need to pursue robust institutional reforms to disintegrate personified systems in order to achieve sustainable development across the board. The plausible policy implication is that there is unlikely to be significant progress in the incorporation of sustainability into national economic and development policymaking in the absence of a clearer understanding of personified leadership.

Finally, this study provides a basis for leaders, citizens and other relevant stakeholders to find common solutions that will advance sustainable development policy and governance strategies. As with the case of the well-documented subject of criminal profiling, I provide a basis for conceptualising a leadership style and possible policy actions associated with the subject individual. It provides decision-makers with an opportunity for including plurality from a scientific and development point of view, which has positive consequences in advancing institutional, societal and strategic political, economic and social resilience across the nation.

5.8 Recommendations

Without further research being conducted into the cognitive development of individuals who become national leaders, it will not be possible to decipher the direct
impact of those leaders on national governance and development. It is therefore most relevant to investigate scientifically how the holistic development of an individual from childhood to adulthood affects the individual’s perception of life, to the extent of manifesting personified inclinations. In light of the above, I make the recommendations set out below.

5.8.1 Governance and development policy

This study has compellingly illustrated that any national development effort in East Africa, which does not factor in the effects of personified governance, is bound to falter, right from the start. The study highlighted the point that the relationship between governance and development is more than correlational, it is causal: good governance makes development possible (Grindle, 2007:4). Most importantly, good governance itself depends on the integrity of the national leader. Where the leader has personified inclinations, these pose a danger of perverting the governance trajectory. Equally, the dynamics presented by citizens who acquiesce to, or even support, personified systems complicate the intricate link between governance and development. Yet, citizens comprise the ideal grouping to overcome any personified regime. Accordingly, I recommend the advancement of a model that capitalises on a shared national agenda to catalyse citizen-driven counter-action against personified governance and development. This will require equally strong direction to be given by effective, visionary leaders who can sustain the momentum to dislodge a personified regime, using non-violent, but compelling, national agenda.

To complement the above, East African regional governments should build strong judiciaries that act as the custodians of constitutionalism that is required to achieve sustainable development. The recent nullification of the 2017 presidential elections in Kenya accentuates the above recommendation. It was the first example in Africa in which a court nullified the re-election of an incumbent. Mr. David Maraga, the court’s chief justice, declared the result “invalid, null and void” after ruling for the opposition, which had argued that the vote had been electronically manipulated to assure a victory for President Uhuru Kenyatta (Kimiko de Freytas, 2017, writing in The New York Times). The New York Times maintained that the ruling also offered a potent display of judicial independence on a continent where courts often come under intense pressure from political leaders. In corroboration of the latter, contemporary
scholarship highlights the fact that the issue of whether a government has the means to bend the judiciary to its will depends not only on its appointment power, but also on variables such as the ability of the political branches to agree among themselves on how to deter or reverse interference with the judiciary. A hamstrung political actor poses little threat to a defiant judiciary (Ferejohn & Weingast; Spiller & Gely; Epstein & Knight, noted in Helmke & Rosenbluth, 2009:347).

Courts, like constitutions, may provide a focal point around which citizens can collaborate to protect their rights (Weingast, noted in Helmke & Rosenbluth, 2009:348). In dictatorships and in unstable democracies, where a culture of democratic norms may not exist, an independent judiciary committed to rights protection may provide an important substitute. Yet, [in dictatorships and in unstable democracies] judicial independence is likely to be the most fragile. Thus, although there may be situations in which authoritarian leaders use laws to govern, which we might term “rule by law” (or “rule of will”), in no case is “rule of law,” which entails non-arbitrariness, fully achieved (Helmke & Rosenbluth, 2009:348). I argue that the above observation highlights that impartial judiciaries can check personified regimes by bolstering the efforts of citizens to advance democracy. Therefore, I recommend that the establishment of a strong judicial system to complement the advancement of the model that capitalises on a shared national agenda to catalyse citizen-driven counter-action. Whether or not courts seem impotent in the face of personified regimes, stakeholders may nevertheless consult court records to search for ways to seek redress, long after the demise of the dictatorship.

5.8.2 Researchers

This thesis relied explicitly on a literature review to unravel the occurrence of personified reign in East Africa. During the course of the study, I found indications that personification possibly runs beyond national leadership. Accordingly, experts need to conduct a more detailed scientific study to understand how personification has permeated through different strata of society. This study surmises that years of cyclical personified rule across the region have yielded a societal generation that perceives personified tendencies as being “routine.” Accordingly, further research on the subject would help us to understand whether a major paradigm shift has occurred in socio-political behaviours in the region, resulting in a bias towards
personified reign. Confirmation of the latter would enable experts to formulate behavioural change interventions needed to salvage an acquiesced community from plunging irredeemably into accepting personified predispositions.

Furthermore, due to challenges cited in the limitation section above, this study did not exhaustively capture behavioural information on incumbent national leaders so as to unvaryingly identify their genesis to personified reign. I recommend that experts should conduct further methodological work on how to analyse robustly the cognitive development of leaders. This would enhance better scientific prediction of leaders’ inclinations to personified reign earlier in their careers. Stakeholders would also be able to predict accurately the possible personification predisposition of individuals who offer themselves for election to leadership offices.

5.9 Generalisation of the study beyond East Africa

Taking into consideration the critical implications of personified reign for governance and development, I suggest the scientific replication of this thesis beyond East Africa to determine whether my findings are generalizable within different contexts, populations and locations in Africa. This is important because the types of development challenges facing the East Africa region, such as high rates of maternal and child mortality, cyclical poverty and inequality, corruption and weak institutions, are similar to the challenges other countries in Africa are facing. Accordingly, a scientific replication would help to determine whether the same study would generate a different outcome under different social, economic, political and cultural conditions. The outcome would be particularly useful for informing social sciences, such as sociology, psychology, and economics. Ultimately, I envisage that the scientific replication would empirically support the results of my thesis, by clarifying my observations and extending their overall generalisability.
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