

**IN QUEST FOR AN ETHICAL AND IDEAL POST- COLONIAL AFRICAN
DEMOCRATIC STATE: THE CASES OF NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA**

by

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ABSTRACT

This study examines why post-colonial African states are not able to institutionalise the ideal ethical and democratic societies, given their access to international best practices and the abundance of human and natural resources; why the future of democracy in Africa remains uncertain despite the current efforts at democratisation; if western democracy can be implemented in Africa; why the West is able to produce better systems of governance; why leaders and managers find it daunting to create the kind of society that is inspiring, ethical, immune to bureaucracy, and that possesses excellent economic performance; how leaders, members of the community, bureaucrats, corporate executives and managers can contribute to the realisation of the ethical and ideal African state; and the options for alternative democratic order for the African continent.

The inability of post-colonial African states to institute systems and strategies that adequately address the needs and expectations of their citizens has created chaos and anarchy that in some states can be likened to Hobbes state of nature where the weak is at the mercy of the strong and life is nasty, brutish and short. While the West has been largely blamed for playing a significant role in Africa's inability to effectively manage itself, other theorists criticise African leaders and the community members for their inability to conduct themselves ethically and to implement a constructive and effective system of governance. It is imperative that African states devise adequate means of ethically administering their territories in a manner that meets societal expectations and needs, and in order to avoid intractable socio-political and economic complications.

OPSOMMING

Hierdie studie ondersoek die redes waarom postkoloniale Afrika-lande nie die ideale etiese en demokratiese samelewings instabiliseer nie, gegewe hul toegang tot internasionale beste praktyke en die oorvloed van menslike en natuurlike hulpbronne; waarom die toekoms van demokrasie in Afrika onduidelik bly ten spyte van die huidige pogings vir demokratisering; as westerse demokrasie in Afrika geïmplementeer kan word; waarom die Weste beter stelsels van bestuur kan lewer; hoekom leiers en bestuurders dit skrikwekkend vind om die soort samelewing wat inspirerend, eties, immuun vir burokrasie is, te skep en wat uitstekende ekonomiese prestasie besit; hoe leiers, lede van die gemeenskap, burokrate, korporatiewe bestuurders en bestuurders kan bydra tot die verwesenliking van die etiese en ideale Afrika-staat; en die opsies vir alternatiewe demokratiese orde vir die Afrika-kontinent.

Die onvermoë van post-koloniale Afrika-state om stelsels en strategieë in te stel wat die behoeftes en verwagtinge van hul burgers voldoende aanspreek, het chaos en anargie geskep wat in sommige state vergelykbaar kan wees met Hobbes se toestand van die natuur, waar die swakeling aan die genade van die wat sterk is afhanklik is en die lewe 'n nare, brutaal en kort lewe is. Terwyl die Weste grotendeels die blaam kry in terme van hul groot bydra in Afrika se onvermoë om homself doeltreffend te bestuur, kritiseer ander teoretici Afrika-leiers en die gemeenskapslede vir hul eie onvermoë om eties op te tree en om 'n konstruktiewe en effektiewe bestuurstelsel te implementeer. Dit is noodsaaklik dat Afrika-state voldoende middele voorsien om hul gebiede eties te administreer op 'n wyse wat voldoen aan maatskaplike verwagtinge en behoeftes, en om onwikkelbare sosio-politieke en ekonomiese komplikasies te vermy.

NORTHERN SOTHO TRANSLATION

Thuto ye e lekola mabaka a gore ke eng dinaga tša ka morago ga bokoloneale di sa kgone go hloma dipeakanyo tša maswanedi tša maitshwaro le ditšhaba tša temokrasi, tšeo di filwego phihlelelo go ditiro tše kaonekaone tša boditšhabatšhaba le bontši bja methopo ya semotho le tlhago: ke ka lebaka la eng Bodikela bo kgona go tšweletša mekgwa ye kaone ya pušo; ke ka lebaka la eng baetapele le balaodi ba hwetša go le boima go hlama mokgwa wa setšhaba seo se nago le mafolofolo, maitshwaro, se sa huetšwego ke mokgwa wa pušo wo o diphetho di tšewago ke bahlanka ba mmušo bao ba sa kgethwago, gomme ba na le tiro ye kgahlišago ka ikonomi; ka moo baetapele, maloko a setšhaba, batšeasephetho ba mmušo ba sa kgethwago, malokopharephare a dikoporasi le balaodi ba ka aba mo go phihlelelong ya maitshwaro le naga ya maswanedi ya Afrika; le go dikgetho tša peakanyo ye e hlatlolanago ya temokrasi mo kontinenteng ya Afrika.

Go se kgone ga dinaga tša ka morago ga bokoloneale go hlama mekgwa le maano ao a maleba a go bolela ka ga dinyakwa le ditetelo tša baagi ba bona di hlotše tlhakatlhakano le tlhokapušo yeo mo go dinaga tše dingwe e ka bapetšwago le naga ya Hobbes ka tlhago moo mofokodi a lego ka fase ga yo maatla gomme bophelo bo se bose, bo le šoro le go ba bjo bokopana. Mola Bodikela bo pharwa molato kudu mo go bapaleng karolo ye e tšweletšego mo go se kgonego ga Afrika go itaola ka tshwanelo, borateori ba bangwe ba solago baetapele ba Afrika le maloko a setšhaba mo go se kgonego go itshwara gabotse le go phethagatša mokgwa wo hlamilwego gabotse wo o šomago wa pušo. A bonagala gore dinaga tša Afrika di loga maano a makaone a go laola ka tshwanelo dinagadilete tša bona ka mokgwa wo o tla fihlelelago ditetelo tša setšhaba le dinyakwa, le gore go thibelwe go se boelemorago ga dipolotiki tša selegae le tlhakatlhakano ya ikonomi.

DECLARATION

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Title of Thesis: In Quest for an Ethical and Ideal Post-Colonial African Democratic State: The cases of Nigeria and South Africa

I declare that the above thesis is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

SIGNATURE

DATE

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DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my parents Magdalene and Emmanuel Akor, and to all those who strive to promote a just and ethical society.

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KEY TERMS

- Ideal African states
- Good governance in Africa
- Indigenous African societies
- Post-colonial African states
- Colonialism in Africa
- Ethics and politics in Africa
- Failure of African states
- Corruption in Africa
- Land question in South Africa
- African leadership challenges

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALTRUISM	Love of others / Benevolence
ANC	African National Congress
ARETAI	Excellence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
EUDAIMONIA	Happiness / Flourishing / Fulfilment / Doing well
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NE	Nichomachean Ethics
POLIS	State
FACULTY	Reason
TELOS	End goal or Purpose
PHRONESIS	Intellectual Virtue
SOPHIA	Philosophical Wisdom
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America

CHAPTER ONE

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

This study examines the state of democracy on the African continent and attempts to construct what the ideal African state should be in our post-colonial era, taking into consideration the views of Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Rawls and Wiredu, among other philosophers. While there are different approaches to the definition of democracy, it is generally understood as relating to good governance, popular participation, and respect for human rights. The core principles of a democratic system are found in the historical understanding of democracy as 'rule of the people' in the sense of popular control, political equality and sovereignty. Some of the other basic principles relate to inclusive citizenship, majority rule, pluralism, freedom, competition, consensus and constitutional rule (Senghore (2013: 164-165). With the end of colonialism and the emergence of democracy in Africa, a number of its leaders have attempted to institutionalise refined or reconstructed systems of democratic governance. As a result, most African states are leaning towards western liberal democracy (Senghore, 2013: 182) that is concerned with the market economy and hence a developed system of capitalist production. However, it is poorly implemented, and appears unsuitable for the post-colonial African society.

Most African states have largely failed to successfully implement the principles that promote ethical leadership, integrity, accountability and care for the people. They have failed to institute efficient and effective democratic norms and standards that adequately address the socio-economic needs of their citizens, despite the vast human and natural resources at their disposal, and despite their abilities to formulate admirable policies and laws. Some of the socio-economic challenges confronting these states include poverty, lack of service delivery, homelessness, high cost of owning a property, unemployment, illiteracy, drugs and health challenges. While most of them are able to develop enviable policies and laws, they have not been able to implement them successfully. Although countries such as South Africa and Nigeria provide constitutional protection for the rights of their citizens to social and economic

benefits, it does not appear as though these provisions are capable of promoting socioeconomic equality (Christiansen, 2008: 371). Even though these countries are blessed with vast hectares of land, many of their citizens cannot afford them. As a result, many people in South Africa have resorted to or agitate for land grab. It is baffling that land cannot be made available to all citizens who need it at affordable rates.

The inability of post-colonial African states to institute systems and strategies that adequately address the needs and expectations of their citizens has created chaos and anarchy that in some states can be likened to Hobbes' state of nature where the weak is at the mercy of the strong and life is nasty, brutish and short. A few examples include the Rwandan genocide, the insurgents and militants in Nigeria, the destructions in Libya, and the protracted protests in South Africa. For Hobbes, human nature is innately materialistic, selfish, aggressive, violent, and lacks much consideration for a universal appeal to morality. He considers the shortage of material resources as resulting in power struggle among competing individuals, while the inability of members of a community to adhere to the principles of peaceful coexistence and good governance in a commonwealth leads to violence and death (Hobbes, 1968: 186).

In the Rwandan genocide, the Hutu majority attempted to annihilate the Tutsis and the moderate Hutus over the control of the State and its resources as they were not prepared for peaceful coexistence. In the Northern region of Nigeria, the menace of the Boko Haram insurgents has led to the killing, maiming and displacement of thousands of people. In the South-East region, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Ogoni People agitates for a greater share of their region's oil wealth. In the South-South and South-East regions, the Movement for the Restoration of the Sovereign State of Biafra clamours for the creation of an independent state, not minding that the same region was at war between 1967 and 1970 for the same cause and lost over a million of their people as a result. The chaos in Libya led to the destruction of the country's developed infrastructure, the death of thousands of the population and of the country's leader Muammar Gaddafi. The intermittent youth unrest and protests in South Africa results from their agitation for adequate basic services, employment opportunities and free or affordable education. This often results in the destruction of

infrastructure and transferred aggression on foreign nationals. In all these wars and violence, peoples' lives, livelihood, resources and limited infrastructure are destroyed; and many people are displaced, giving rise to further problems. These events in the main, result from citizens' disillusionment at the inability of their leaders to create a better life for them. The events further reveal that post-colonial African states have failed to institute the ideal society.

African states are further confronted by the search for external financial assistance, and additional external pressure from the West, the international financial institutions and the donor agencies who are demanding restoration of democracy or democratic reform as a prerequisite for foreign aid and support. It appears also that Western influence in Africa is doing more harm than good by not propelling Africa to greater heights. For instance, the Structural Adjustment Programmes that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided in the form of loans to countries experiencing economic crisis and the accelerated rate of globalisation played a significant role in weakening the African state both socially, politically and economically. While post-colonial Africa started off in the 1960s and 1970s as deliberately interventionist, the pressures from the World Bank and the IMF from the 1980s rendered them timid to such a degree that they became disorganised and began to retreat in a manner that allowed these financial institutions' market fundamentalism to be entrenched (Idowu, 2012: 150 & 158).

Wiredu considers the extent of conflicts on the African continent and the failure of post-colonial African democracy as resulting from its harmful political experiences and the adversarial and competitive nature of Western model of multiparty democracy, which Africa copies. He does not consider Western multiparty democracy as suitable for post-colonial Africa. Rather, he proffers democracy by consensus as better placed to bring harmony and progress to Africa (Ani, 2014a: 311).

Although the West has played a significant role in the inability of post-colonial African states to effectively manage their states, African states also appear generally incapable of taking charge of their territories and implementing a constructive and effective system of governance that can turn them into model States. While significant progress has been made in the process of bringing Africa into the democratic line

through the present attempt at democratisation, the future of democracy in Africa remains uncertain. The efforts do not seem capable of resolving the problems hindering enduring democratic consolidation in Africa. Democratic consolidation is the process of deepening and strengthening democracy and assessing its authenticity and survival prospects. It is a dominant yardstick for evaluating the prospects of new democracies (Friedman, 2011: 27-29). The following criteria will be used in the thesis to evaluate the extent to which post-colonial African states, especially South Africa and Nigeria have consolidated the gains of democracy: affluence, economic performance, access to land, favourable international climate, and service delivery.

The study will examine why Africa fails to make significant progress in its democratisation effort, even though it has access to best practice policies, governance systems and theories. It will examine if Western democracy as propounded by philosophers can be implemented in Africa; and why the West is able to largely produce better governments when Africa itself is exposed to a similar mode of governance. The study will consider the role of ethical leadership in fostering the ideal state; and the options for alternative democratic order in post-colonial African states, bearing in mind that the alternatives previously practiced in the West, including communism and socialism did not bear sustained impact.

The study considers the moral character of leadership, which largely appears questionable; why leaders and managers find it daunting to create the kind of organisations, and by extension, society that is inspiring, ethical, immune to bureaucracy, and that possess excellent economic performance. The study will also examine the role that integrity and three philosophies of leadership, namely: political, directive and values driven leadership can play in enhancing the realisation of the ideal society.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Governments and bureaucrats in post-colonial African states are generally not able to deliver on their mandates. They fail to ensure the realisation of society where justice, fairness, and socio economic benefits are dispensed to the advantage of all members of society, bearing in mind economic constraints. These failures make it seem as

though it is impossible to seek the ideal. The failure of politicians and bureaucrats to deliver on their mandates, to effect democratic consolidation, and to seek the ideal results largely from ignorance, lack of moral courage, lack of will to be effective, efficient, ethical and to act with integrity.

The problem to be examined, therefore, is why African countries continue to fail in institutionalising ideal ethical and democratic states, given their access to international best practices and abundance of human and natural resources.

1.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

African countries continue to fail in implementing the kind of democratic systems that adequately address the myriad of challenges confronting them in an ethical manner. Through the study I hope to contribute innovative ways of ethically administering a state in a manner that meets societal expectations and needs. I am keen to explore options that will bring about meaningful changes in the way leaders govern and administer their countries.

1.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

1.4.1 Aims of the Study

The aims of the study are:

- To understand why African states are not able to govern well, given their exposure to international governance trends.
- To examine why the future of democracy in Africa remains uncertain despite the current efforts at democratisation.
- To establish how leaders, members of the community, bureaucrats, corporate executives and managers can contribute to the realisation of the ethical and ideal African state.

1.4.2 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are:

- To expose how African democracies differ from the ideal state as propounded by philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato and Hobbes.

- To establish if Western democracy can be implemented in Africa.
- To investigate the role of ethical leadership in fostering a result oriented system of governance and the ideal African state.
- To examine the options for an alternative democratic order in Africa, bearing in mind that the alternatives previously practiced in the West, including communism and socialism, did not bear sustained impact.

1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

1.5.1 Research Methodology

This study employs the qualitative research method, an approach used in comprehending the meaning given to a human or social problem. Qualitative research is a rigorous, careful and methodical analytical process of theorizing, understanding, interpreting and drawing conclusions from data. It is a kind of scientific investigation used in obtaining specific information about behaviours, values, opinions and social contexts of specific individuals or communities. It attempts to find answers to a question, to systematically use specific procedures to answer the question; to collect data; produce findings that were not predetermined; and to establish findings that can be applied even outside the confines of the research. Qualitative research can provide complex textual descriptions of the manner in which people experience the matter under investigation. It is also effective in identifying intangible factors, whose role in the study may not be immediately obvious, such as ethnicity, socio-economic status, social norms, gender roles, and religion (Mack, 2005: 1-2).

Qualitative research is usually an unstructured approach to inquiry, which unlike the structured quantitative method, gives room for flexibility in the manner in which the researcher proceeds with all aspects of the research process, including the objectives, sample, design and the questions that the researcher intends to ask the respondents (Kumar, 2005: 12).

My qualitative research adopts the inductive approach because it will look for a pattern of meaning based on collected data by moving from the specific to the general. The inductive approach enables the researcher to briefly summarise raw data, to derive clear links between the objectives of the research and the summary of the research

findings. The inductive approach provides a set of procedures that can be easily used in data analysis and leads to valid and reliable findings. It also enables the researcher to derive straightforward results (Thomas, 2006: 237).

1.5.2 Research Strategy

The cases of ethical and democratic failures in South Africa and Nigeria will be the point of departure of this research. It appears as though the policy provisions of these countries do not adequately assist them in addressing their social, political and economic challenges. In South Africa, the failure to implement a number of strategic policies such as on the provision of basic services, poverty reduction and property rights through its land redistribution strategy remain focal. The Freedom Charter provides that land shall be shared by the people. This has not been extensively implemented. The cost of land and housing in the country is so high and beyond the reach of both the poor and many in the middle class. Those who have benefited from the land redistribution programme have mostly underutilised the lands given to them.

Nigeria and South Africa are the largest economies on the African continent. Despite its large natural and human potential, Nigeria remains largely underdeveloped, even after 50 years of independence, while South Africa can be described as a first and a third world. The two countries are the main leaders on the African continent. While Nigeria has a highly educated population, there is nothing significant to show for it as poverty, unemployment, corruption and underdevelopment remain prevalent. It is baffling that while these countries have immense potential for growth and development, while the tools needed for progress are readily available and accessible, they seem either unwilling or unable to take the necessary steps to bring about the ideal ethical and democratic state in their respective countries.

1.5.3 Research Setting

This study will be set within the South African and Nigerian environments. South Africa can be described as two economies, a highly developed and a highly undeveloped economy, with a high rate of social and economic disparities. Prior to the new democratic dispensation in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) committed itself to providing the citizens, especially the indigents with free education, housing, water and electricity. The current reality, however, is contrary to these undertakings

(Seekings, 2013: 4). Instead of delivering on the promises, the government is understandably in view of the global economic challenges, not able to fulfil most of its pledges. What, however, remains incomprehensible is why the government allows some of its structures to deepen the social and economic crisis that the poor people are experiencing, such as Eskom's continued increment of electricity tariffs, which automatically leads to increase in other costs of living and even unemployment.

Nigeria is the largest economy on the African continent and the largest in terms of population. The wealth of the country has not translated to meaningful social, political and economic growth. The government does not do much to improve the living conditions of its citizens, unlike in South Africa where despite its challenges better steps are taken in its governance arrangements. The Nigerian state is highly mismanaged and there is lack of accountability.

1.5.4 Sampling

This study will employ the purposive or selective method of qualitative sampling. Purposive sampling method clusters participants on the basis of pre-selected criteria that are relevant to a specific research question. It is selected in cases where the number of participants is more of an approximate target rather than a strict quota requirement. It is not necessary, even if it were possible, to collect data from all members of a community in order to establish valid findings. As a result, qualitative research selects only a sample of a population for a specific investigation. The objects of study as well as the numbers of people to select are determined by the objectives of the research and by the characteristics of the population under study (Mack, 2005: 5)

1.5.5 Data Collection Methods

The data will be sourced mainly from books, academic journals, online sources, research reports and newspaper articles. Qualitative descriptive studies, like other qualitative research approaches, are generally characterised by simultaneous data collection and analysis. Data collection of qualitative descriptive studies is about understanding the nature of the particular events under investigation. Therefore, data collection may involve observations and examination of records, photographs, reports,

documents and minimal to moderately structured, open-ended, individual or focus group interviews.

1.5.6 Data Analysis

The analytic induction method of data analysis will be applied in this study. In this process the researcher will examine events and develop a hypothetical statement of what transpired and how they occurred. Another similar case will be examined to see if it fits the hypothesis. If it does not, then the hypothesis will be revised. In this case the specific governance challenges in South Africa and Nigeria will be examined. Exceptions to the hypothesis will be examined, such as a model post-colonial African state. Eventually the researcher will develop a hypothesis that accounts for all observed cases.

1.5.7 Strategies Employed to Ensure Quality Data

The data will be effectively managed to prevent errors, gaps and inaccuracies in the scholarly record. Documentation is important in validating published results and to prevent the kind of errors that could lead to retractions (Coates, 2014). The data will be evaluated, checked and rechecked to ensure the validity of interpretations. The results will also be submitted for peer review to screen for quality and relevance, to confirm the soundness of the findings, and to ensure that professional standards have been maintained in the collection and analysis of data.

1.5.8 Research Design

The study will employ both the descriptive and case study design. The qualitative case study method provides the researcher with the tools to investigate, explore or describe phenomena within their contexts, using various sources of data, and supports the deconstruction and subsequent reconstruction of the matter under investigation. The flexible and rigorous nature of the case study method is valuable in enabling the development of theory, evaluation of programmes and the development of interventions. A correct application of the case study method is vital in the development of theory, to assess programmes and to proffer options (Baxter & Jack, 2008: 544).

Descriptive qualitative research aims to comprehensively summarise specific events as experienced by individuals or groups of people. It is less interpretive because the researcher is not obliged to move either far away or too close to the data, and does not require very abstract exposition of the data. Qualitative descriptive study tends towards a naturalistic inquiry which supports the investigation of phenomenon in its natural state as much as is possible within the context of the research arena. Any purposeful method of sampling can be used in a qualitative descriptive design since the goal of any qualitative research design is to obtain cases that are rich in information (Lambert & Lambert, 2012: 255).

1.6 ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS

There are seven chapters in this study. Chapter one is the introduction; It gives an overview of the whole study. Chapter two is the literature review. Chapter three considers the philosophic ideal state. Chapter four examines ethics and governance in traditional African societies. Chapter five looks at the ethical and governance failures in post-colonial African states. Chapter six proffers options for the ideal African society. Chapter seven provides the conclusion for the whole study. It summarises the salient points of note in the research.

In chapter two, ethics and its basis for moral conduct are examined. The chapter explores virtue ethics' exposition of the primary good for human beings, its implications, how human beings should live, what the good life is, and what are proper family and social values? Ethics is premised on the consideration of the interests of others and doing what is right. One of the main concerns in ethics is the need to establish the basis of moral principles or standards. (While some theorists posit that morality and the arguments for moral standards are contextually determined, other theorists infer from this that there are no objective moral principles or ethical standards, and that we are directed to either perspectivism, scepticism or relativism). Alasdair MacIntyre, however, denies these assumptions, claiming that this is largely a result of the inability of these proponents to arrive at rational criteria for securing moral consensus (Sweet, 2000: 220-221).

Virtue ethics is mostly associated with Aristotle, whose theories are largely found in the *Nicomachean Ethics* - a collection of his writings. His theory of virtues is based

on the belief that morality is a necessary condition for human beings, a precondition for human dignity. For Aristotle, immoral people are debased and have lost their purpose in life. Morality for Aristotle manifests in human character and the development of character hinges on the cultivation of virtues (Rossouw, 2002: 45-46), such as goodness, courage, prudence, temperance, justice, and benevolence.

The fundamental question in Aristotle's (Nicomachean) Ethics is what the ultimate goal of human life is. He refers to the same ultimate goal as the human good, the highest good, the good, the best thing, or the practically attainable good. In his investigation of the highest good, or of what it means to do well in life, he considers various possible answers, by examining various human virtues and their characteristic actions, and concludes with a definite judgement that the ultimate goal is what we prefer most in life and that to which we focus all our other endeavours, and which once achieved we do not seek anything else. To achieve this ultimate goal is to have achieved happiness (eudemonia) (Pakaluk, 2005: 2). Eudamonia, also known as flourishing and wellbeing, for Aristotle, is "activity of the soul in accordance with excellence (virtue) in a complete life....This definition sets the agenda of Aristotle's Ethics, which develops into a complex theory of human aretai or excellences, that is, those qualities that make for a good human being" (Echenique, 2012: 1).

Plato, like Aristotle, understands virtue in the sense of excellence (or *arête* in Greek). Good things, for Plato, are good only when there is virtue in them. In other words, things are good not in terms of their quantities, power or pleasantness; but in terms of their excellence. Nietzsche, for instance, rejects the hedonistic idea that pleasure is intrinsically good (Gardiner, 2005: 179). For Plato, to be virtuous is to aspire towards godliness and to shun the things of the world. Other virtue theorists, then, enjoin people to discover their human nature with the view to transcending it. Based on this theory, attaining the good life does not hinge on fulfilling our human nature, but on seeking a divine form of existence (Gardiner, 2005: 11-12).

Swanton (2003: 8) criticises Aristotle's conception of virtues, claiming that it does not sufficiently explain the relationship between the flourishing of the man of virtues and the demands of this world. He observes that instead of giving a comprehensive account of what he (Aristotle) means by flourishing, Aristotle provides a narrow

reflective equilibrium which gives rise to conflicting moral intuitions, considered judgements, and the beliefs of the wise or of the many regarding the matter under focus. This is, however, done without taking into account the background theories that assist in resolving conflicts among the beliefs of the wise or of the many. These background theories, in a naturalistic ethical theory, are theories about human nature. Aristotle provides a background theory of human nature, as one of human flourishing which plays the role of justifying claims about virtue.

Chapter three examines elements of the philosophic ideal state as propounded by philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes; and their contributions to shaping government's policy positions on meeting the needs of community members. Hobbes (Missner, 2000: 1-5) attempts to establish why human beings seem not able to peacefully coexist, but to fight and make peace. He concludes that this results from human fundamental characteristics, which inclines them to reject cooperation with each other. He considers people's natural condition, otherwise known as state of nature, as innately aggressive and violent, and filled with fear. He illustrates this belief with the hypothetical image of people's natural state before the advent of government, as one of continuous fear, aggression, war and death. With the limitation of resources power struggle results when a number of people want the same thing. In the absence of human cooperation and other consensus building factors, human beings would be living in a perpetual state of war. Therefore, he concludes that if human beings continue to live in such state of nature, then all lives would be solitary, nasty, brutish and short. He therefore proposes his Leviathan – his ideal state, claiming that for men to live in peace and harmony they must enter into a social contract in a commonwealth ruled by a sovereign head. He claims that even an oppressive government is better than living under the threat of war (Missner, 2000: 1-5; Hobbes, 1968: 186).

For Plato and Aristotle, the goal of the ideal state is to be ethical by promoting justice. The state and the person, according to Plato, are one since they both possess three parts by nature, which derive their balance from the application of justice. For Aristotle, the city state exists for the sake of the good life. Plato classifies citizens into guardians, auxiliaries and artisans. The guardians are the rulers, the auxiliaries are the warriors and the artisans are the workers (Lull & Mico, 2011: 5; Wright, 2016: 11-12).

While Plato proposes the abolition of the family and for children to be raised by the state so as to ensure more unity and less disharmonies, Aristotle proposes that the family is the foundation of the state, and biological parents must therefore continue to take care of their biological children. While Plato prescribes a collective ownership of property, Aristotle proffers both individual and collective ownership of property, which does not condone excessive ownership of property, and citizens are to utilise their limited resources to promote the common good. Aristotle proposes a best life and the kind of state that would make that vision of the best life possible. Yet his treatise on the utopian (ideal) state is not widely regarded as the originator of utopian thought like Plato, essentially because he starts his treatise with a conception of the best life, while most utopian theorists begin their treatises with a conception of what constitutes the best regimes, the most productive economy, or social justice, and derive what constitutes the best life from it. Instead, Aristotle conceives the ideal state as that in which only those who are able to do so live the best life. In the long-run, however, Aristotle, just as Plato, systematically outlines what constitutes the best life and the ideal state, with the city state existing for the sake of the good life (Jackson, 2001: 1-4).

Aristotle posits that the good for human life involves members of the community relating well with one another (Smith, 2003: 14). He conceives the ideal state as constituting everything human. It consists of various communities coming together to form the best form of human association and comprises all parts of human life, including the family, religion, economy and society. He outlines what constitutes citizenship, types of governments, political stability and justice, and submits that existing constitutions are not adequate, although lessons can be drawn from them about what is right or wrong. Constitutions should provide for ideal but possible, practical and achievable requirements, he claims (Jackson, 2001: 2-3).

Jeremy Bentham is probably the first systematic exponent of utilitarianism, although the concept dates back to Aristotle and Plato. For Bentham, in considering the rightness or wrongness of human action, one must take into account the impact of the action on all the people affected by that action. In other words, the measure of right and wrong is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For Mill's utility or the greatest happiness principle, "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote

happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (McGee, 2004: 91).

Mill’s theory of Justice attempts to shape policy positions on issues such as property rights, education, welfare, and government interventions. For him, justice requires that all members of the community must see the state as just. Therefore, the state must ensure that the principles of justice consider the interests of the citizens and evolve with changing dynamics in dealing with the developments in social institutions and individual interests. The fairness of policies and the resolution of conflicts and competing interests must also be based on objective standards of justice. In other words, a well-designed liberal theory of justice requires objective consideration of the interests of all members of the community, as well as a subjective standard that supports the rules and regulations of concerned social institutions (Clark & Elliot, 2001: 471).

Mill posits that since the end goal of justice is to promote the long term maximisation of utility, it therefore follows that the interests of citizens must be promoted in a way that the citizens receive the potential for future personal development. The standards of justice must regulate the pursuit of personal interests so that citizens do not encroach on the rights of others. While taking cognizance of the conflicting value commitments that human beings face, as well as the complexity of human existence, Mill posits that properly constituted institutions must educate and guide their citizens around the issues of justice, because the effectiveness of public policies and laws depends on the extent to which the citizens have been capacitated. Therefore, before the state embarks on far-reaching institutional reforms, the consciousness of the citizens must first be changed. Mill condemns capitalism for creating class conflict, insufficient opportunities for personal growth, selfishness, restricting personal development, and reducing most of the population to second-class citizens. Capitalism further encourages the pursuit of personal wealth and turns the quest for riches and fame into the goal of human life. This quest breeds individualism that turns a man’s feelings and sympathies only towards himself and his immediate family (Clark & Elliot, 2001: 486-488).

One of the weaknesses of utilitarianism as evident in many African countries is its seeming support for the marginalisation of minorities or individuals in its promotion of the general good (Riordan & Ibana, 1991: 29). The affirmative action policy of the South African government readily comes to mind. This is the government's intervention aimed at reversing the inequalities that were perpetrated by the apartheid regime in the pre-democratic era against the previously disadvantaged citizens of the country. Many people have termed this reverse discrimination. When this policy is not implemented with moral sensitivity for others, it can divide or demoralise the workforce and the citizens (Rossouw, 2002: 94).

Bentham's utilitarianism is criticised for not providing an acceptable theory of justice for liberal societies prone to endemic conflicts of interest. Rather, his definition of rights has become an object of debate, disagreement, political contestation and polarisation of class interests. In societies dominated by conflicts of interests, the citizens will constantly compete with each other. Therefore an adequate liberal theory of justice must be able to take the interests of its whole population into account, while not overlooking the community's rules and regulations (Clark & Elliot, 2001: 471).

Chapter four explores the systems of politics, governance and the conception of moral life in precolonial African society. It also examines how they differ from the liberal democracy of the West, and their role in reaching just decisions and actions. The understanding of ethics as the moral ideal of the good can be associated with all societies throughout the ages, including precolonial and post-colonial eras. Most interactions among people are rooted in ethics, values, principles and standards, even though human thoughts, actions and words are not always ethical (Sindjoun, 2009: 24). African morality can be understood from the importance placed on familial relations. A high value is placed on family structure as the bedrock of morality and the best institution for moral education. The extended family is seen as a true representation of what an African community means. Family is valued in itself as it plays a fundamental role in the individual's development, progress and well-being (Metz & Gaie, 2010: 276; Molefe, 2016: 4-12).

In the traditional African definition and concept of moral behaviour and good character, God is seen as the ultimate custodian of ethical and moral codes, and of law and order.

Although Africans strongly perceive God as the ultimate arbiter, they also have a traditional view that is very humanistic to such a degree that their conception of morality is anchored on the promotion of the welfare of members of society. According to Wiredu for instance, “what is morally good is what befits a human being; it is what is decent for man – what brings dignity, respect, contentment, prosperity, joy, to man and his community. And what is morally bad is what brings misery, misfortune, and disgrace” (Borishade, 2007: 261). In African ethics, a person who either harms, exploits or deceives or is unfaithful to others, who is selfish, unkind or uncaring or who does not relate well with others is considered inhuman or lacking in personhood and likened to animals (Metz & Gaie, 2010: 275). In the Yoruba culture, morality is associated with good character. The possession of good character for the Yoruba people makes life joyful. As a result, a person’s life is expected to be dominated by the qualities of a good character. A person therefore is good when

he shows in his life and personal relations with others the right qualities of a person. The opposite description is ‘He is not a person, he merely assumes the skin of a person’. That means that the person is socially unworthy; in consequence of his character he is not fit to be called a person, even though he goes about in the semblance of one (Borishade, 2007: 265).

In traditional African society, actions are considered right when they promote harmonious co-existence among members of the community or by respecting communal relationships. Sub-Saharan African morality subscribes to the belief that a human being derives his humanity through other people. In fact, traditional African worldviews, including the contemporary era, believe in the interrelatedness and interdependence of human beings as essential for living a moral life, for the direction that their lives take, and for their survival (Metz & Gaie, 2010: 273-275; Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, 2014: 39-40).

Traditional African societies and worldviews believe that the interconnectedness of all beings implies that the flourishing of one entity affects the flourishing of the others. They believe that community members have a moral obligation to help each other; to be always considerate and sympathetic towards other people’s conditions; and to protect nature and the environment for the benefit of all. African moral philosophy also posits that

one has a moral obligation to think of oneself as bound up with others, that is, to define oneself as a member of a common group and to participate in its practices. One also has a duty to identify with others. Community of harmony is the combination of both solidarity and identity, so construed.....Every member is expected to consider him/herself an integral part of the whole and to play an appropriate role towards achieving the good of all.....Harmony is achieved through close and sympathetic social relations within the group.....The fundamental meaning of community is the sharing of an overall way of life, inspired by the notion of the common good (Metz & Gaie, 2010: 276).

The concept of Ubuntu denotes communal coexistence of human beings with the ancestors and future generations. The former, though dead are believed to exist in the spiritual realm which has direct connection with the human world. Communal and harmonious coexistence with the ancestors requires that human beings take better care of their land. Communal coexistence with future generations requires that the present generation live in a sustainable manner by protecting and preserving the natural resources for generations yet unborn (Murove, 2010: 383). By attuning oneself to these fundamental value-laden assumptions on identity, personhood and humanness, human beings are able to strive for that ultimate goal of becoming a genuine, full and authentic being (Metz & Gaie, 2010: 273-275).

However, the African view of morality differs in a number of ways from the Western conceptions of ethics. Firstly, African morality, unlike the Western approach, lays substantial emphasis on good relations among members of the community as the only means of cultivating one's humanity. Secondly, African ethics also differs from Western moral philosophy, including Aristotelian ethics, in the way it considers what constitutes good relationships with others as depending on communal coexistence. Unlike the western moral philosophy in which positive relationship among community members does not depend on maximising general welfare, giving people what they deserve, political participation, or respect for people's rights; in most, if not all of pre-colonial Africa, the desirable way of relating to each other hinges on peaceful and harmonious co-existence. The search or need for peaceful coexistence among Africans does not solely rest on obeying the rules of one's constituency or the wishes of the majority as the West subscribes. Rather, African societies consider harmonious and peaceful community the kind of interaction that is objectively desirable and that

should guide constituted norms and the expectations of the majority (Metz & Gaie, 2010: 274- 276; Udokang, 2014: 268).

In the West, justice is dispensed mainly through law enforcement agencies and judicial systems that lawyers and judges preside over; and through retribution and deterrence, unlike in the African society where reconciliation is given more priority. While the rationale for deterrence lies in the belief that punishment is better served by instilling fear in the offender so that he does not commit any other offence in future, retributive justice holds that punishment is the appropriate response to a crime or an offence. While these two approaches are also found in the traditional African society, a third element is found in the way African societies conduct themselves, namely reconciliation which is geared towards the restoration of broken relationships (Metz & Gaie, 2010: 278; Ajayi & Buhari, 2014: 153).

A number of Westerners, such as Leo Frobenius and Lord Lugard regarded Africans as people without moral heritage. Lord Lugard specifically regarded the Southern people of Nigeria as devoid of principles of conduct and systems of ethics. The word 'morality', for Basden lacks any significance in the vocabulary of the Igbo people; and in areas where the traditional Igbo people have not been affected by external influence there is nothing that accurately corresponds with the social evil of European life. Other theorists such as Correia, however admit that the Igbos do have a moral heritage, though at the lowest level of moral consciousness (Oguejiofor & Onah, 2005: 321; Dolamo, 2014: 6; Udokang, 2014: 266).

The negative views of these western theorists regarding the moral heritage or moral consciousness of Africans in general and the Igbos in particular cannot be correct. This is because a close examination of traditional Africans, as exposed above, reveals a people rooted in ethics and moral consciousness, which shows in the way they relate to one another. It shows in the way they carry out their daily activities and governance processes. It also manifests in their cultures which are embedded in various beliefs and customs which all members of society are required to comply with in order to prevent punishments and other calamities that could befall them for noncompliance (Oguejiofor & Onah, 2005: 321; Idang, 2015: 104). These negative perceptions could have emanated during this period, from the critics' inability to appreciate the influence

of cultural relativity on the way of life of the traditional African people, “as well as a seeming lack of understanding of the participatory and perspective nature of what we generally consider as truth, or something worthwhile, as proper, allowed, approved or legitimate” (Oguejiofor & Onah, 2005: 321).

The preceding discussions on the Afro-communitarian moral views do not represent the beliefs of all Africans concerning the right way of life, since there were and still are those Africans who are immoral and who do not subscribe to the same principles of moral conduct. Rather, they are a reflection of common traits among many pre-colonial Africans, including those in East, West and Southern Africa. It is however logical to conclude that all precolonial African states must have had aversions for unethical conducts such a theft, cruelty, murder and wickedness in general.

Precolonial African societies were infused with political and democratic tendencies. In pre-colonial Central Africa, for instance, its lineage system of government was characterised by radical Republicanism. In centralised kingdoms were found prominent fora that citizens could utilise to challenge the bureaucrats and the royals. In other societies, commoners were appointed to the office of the Prime Minister, while yet in other societies, the council of commoners provided a check on the public administration. The masses held strong bargaining powers. Although there was inequality in pre-colonial African states, the people that occupied privileged positions were required to commit themselves to ensuring that state benefits were dispensed to the generality of their community members (Bates, 2010: 1134). In fact, African traditional democracy for Claude Ake (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005: 20), lies in the commitment of community members to collectively participate in the affairs of their communities in determining common goals and the means of realising them, so as to secure their rights and benefits.

In traditional African societies, consensus, for Wiredu (Matolino, 2009: 35) was noticeable in all adult social relations and at all levels of government. All political and social engagements, decision-making processes, discussions and interactions among members of society were channelled towards achieving consensus. Murove (2010: 383-385) also believes that traditional African democracy is based on consensual democratic decision making that seeks all sorts of agreements on most major

decisions that impact on citizens. This is in contrast with western democracy that promotes adversarial competition among various political parties in a majoritarian system. Conflicts and disagreements in most sub-Saharan pre-colonial African societies were resolved through seeking the opinion of all adult members of the community until they came to an agreement. This, in line with the sharing notion of Ubuntu, also relates to sharing political power in a manner that ensures that decisions are not only to the benefit of the majority, but that every one's interest is taken into account. In pre-colonial Burundi, for instance, a king did not unilaterally determine policy directions. Rather, the task belonged to both the king and the group of appointed elders to resolve societal issues in a way that is to the benefit of everyone.

In the pre-colonial Akan society and system of politics, for Wiredu, the leader and head of its political structure, was a chief who though having obtained his position through heredity, did not command absolute authority, but managed the affairs of his community in conjunction with members of council. The final decision on matters before the council did not proceed from the chief. Rather, his pronouncements were a reflection of the collective decision of all members of council. The position of the chief was also considered both political and religious as he is seen as the link between the ancestors and community members (Matolino, 2009: 35). The chief may be relieved of his position if he attempted to either overrule or dominate the council or its proceedings. Representatives from various clans within the community constituted the council, and through them, the concerns of their specific constituencies were relayed to the council. The decisions of the council on matters under discussion were arrived at through dialogue. Although voting was not a criterion for arriving at a decision (this became a determining factor only after its imposition by the colonialists), the decisions reached through logical persuasiveness were owned by all, even if some of the participants were not in agreement with them (Matolino, 2013: 140).

Democracy by consensus, for Wiredu (Matolino, 2013: 138), provides a political system that is not defined by competition for dominance and power among political parties. It avoids the conferment of power on winners based on majority votes. This is different from the western majoritarian democracy, which thrives on competition and confers political power on the party that got majority votes in an election, while relegating the losers to opposition. Wiredu's preference for democracy by consensus

over majoritarian democracy attempts to develop an understanding of a state where the majority party does not exercise political power while overlooking the opposition and minority parties. He notes that such slanted appropriation of power has been a source of problems in Africa since the end of the colonial era and the emergence of majoritarian democracy. Wiredu's arguments in favour of democracy by consensus also attempt to find solutions to the myriad of challenges confronting post-colonial Africa (Matolino, 2013: 138). Consensus for Wiredu does not mean that all aggrieved parties are in full agreement. Rather, it appreciates diverse points of view and utilises dialogue to bring about results that are acceptable to all concerned individuals and groups. When concerned individuals and parties are willing to reach agreement, dialogue can motivate the stakeholders to suspend their disputes (Matolino, 2009: 35).

A number of conceptual factors play a significant role in Wiredu's conception of democracy by consensus. Firstly, in his assessment of human nature, he claims that the differences among human beings proceed from a mistaken belief or the failure to understand and correctly judge their actual interests. When disagreements arise, the parties to the dispute should rather take cognisance of the fact that ultimately they share an identity of interests (Matolino, 2013: 140). In other words, consensus hinges on the belief that the interests of all community members are ultimately the same, even though their initial understanding of those interests may differ. Wiredu believes that human beings are able to work through their differences until they arrive at a similar comprehension of their interests through rational dialogue and debate (Matolino, 2009: 35).

Since Wiredu interprets the traditional pre-colonial Akan system of politics as essentially consensual, he notes the potential of democracy by consensus to enhance the realisation of contemporary Africa's search for ideal democratic order. As a result, he advocates the adoption of a modified version of its ideals of good governance for contemporary systems of governance and administration in Africa. He adamantly criticizes the multi-party electoral processes characteristic of modern oligarchies (e.g., the UK and US models) as too expensive and distracting from development agendas so critical to modern African citizens' welfare all over the continent (Lauer, 2012: 41-43).

A number of theorists such as Eze (Lauer, 2012: 43), argue against Wiredu's ideas on democracy by consensus, claiming that such proposals could derail the new African democracies. They contend that the adoption of democracy by consensus could lead to a resurgence of one party autocratic states that were prevalent during the earliest periods of independence from colonial rule. Eze further rejects Wiredu's proposals on the grounds that "formal reinforcement of chieftaincy structures and loyalties undermines the development of sufficiently strong and progressive state apparatus to make these capable of fulfilling even the most basic of modern democratic ideals" (Lauer, 2012: 43).

While Wiredu promotes non-party politics in Africa, Eze promotes multi-party politics. Wiredu's non-party consensual politics are essentially utilitarian, though he has not been able to provide practical processes for its implementation, capable of replacing multi-party rule in a large society. Nonetheless Wiredu and Eze are in agreement on a number of areas such as promoting freedom of speech and opinion, discouraging autocracy, and encouraging political contestation. They both discourage the lust for power, wasteful, extravagant and reckless lifestyle, which seem to be prevalent in the political life of many oligarchic democracies. They both believe that African societies can derive immense benefits from systems of rule that have not been perverted by the worse forms of capitalism. However, they both disagree on the feasibility of a reformed form of democracy by consensus as an alternative to the excesses of Western democratic practices (Lauer, 2012: 54).

Eze disagrees with the manner in which Wiredu portrays the identity of human interests, wondering if such an identity is realistic and, assuming that it were, members of the community may not be positively inclined towards it. It is unrealistic for instance, to conceive of the possibility of an identity of interests where there are little or no commonalities among warring parties. The case of shareholders in Shell Oil Corporation in Ogoniland comes to mind, where the exploitation of the natural resources of the community makes it impossible for the two stakeholders to share an identity of interests (Matolino, 2013: 140).

Eze criticises Wiredu's treatise of the traditional centrepiece of pre-colonial Africa's system of governance, as an excessive rationalisation and a misleading

romanticisation. He condemns it as a non-party system of politics which can serve the purpose of defending the early nationalists' single party system of politics in which their total control of political power did not encourage democratic freedoms. The concerns raised by Eze gains support from a number of contemporary African political analysts, who suspect that the kind of consensus building processes that Wiredu alludes to can undermine the egalitarian ideals and inclusiveness of contemporary representative democracy and become a means of hiding authoritarianism, as well as a useful hegemonic instrument for side-lining opposition (Lauer, 2012: 41- 43).

Various theorists disagree among themselves on the political legitimacy of traditional African system of rule and their relevance to contemporary democracy. However, a substantial aspect of the indigenous African system of rule and its intrinsic value remains undiluted, effective and relevant for centuries, despite colonial interference and the corruption of the local traditional authority (Lauer, 2012: 54). Democracy in Africa was not imported, but has always been an inherent feature of rule in pre-colonial African society, with distinctive advantages over majoritarian rule (Matolino, 2013: 139).

Chapter five considers the failure of post-colonial African states in regards to ethics and good governance. It examines the contributing factors to the inability of post-colonial African states to govern effectively and to adequately attend to the needs of their community members, given their access to best practices and resources. There is a general pessimism that pervades post-colonial African states as a result of the underdevelopment of the continent. It is over fifty years since African states such as Ghana and Nigeria received independence, while in South Africa, Apartheid ended over twenty years ago. Many of these states are still struggling to resolve their economic, social and political challenges. While Nigeria seems unable to effectively govern its territory, South Africa seems to be losing its grip on consolidating the gains of democracy. The failures of post-colonial African states have been attributed to various factors, such as the negative impact of colonialism and globalisation; the failure of citizens to play their part in creating the desired state; and the incompetence and unethical conduct of the leaders, politicians, and other officials who have managed and administered African states since independence (Ogbogbo, 2011: 1).

Since independence, developments in African states appear to have stagnated, while there is little or no hope that these failures will be resolved. Although Africa is a rich continent, it is also the poorest as a result of its inability to harness its wealth optimally. Instead, the continent exposes itself to foreign exploitation. It is increasingly becoming apparent that Africa may implode if nothing substantially concrete is done to turn its cracking structures around. Most institutions in

African states have either collapsed or are collapsing. Instability in all spheres and structures of the modern African states has become part of their characterisation. Most of these have manifested in the form of economic and political instability. Whether in Algeria, Lybia, Egypt, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra-Lone, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Congo, Mali, etc, the story is the same. The instabilities have produced cycles of violence across the African continent, making it the highest producer of refugees and the greatest receiver of aids. The debt burden, the streams of migrants out of the continent, the dilapidating infrastructural facilities, the unprecedented elevation of corruption as part of statecraft and the concomitant socio-cultural decay epitomised by professionalization of fraud as a means of livelihood are some of the manifestations of the current African crises (Ogbogbo, 2011: 2-3).

As most African countries got closer to independence between the late 1950s and 1960s, the departing colonialists hastily assembled institutions and democratic constitutions that did not include sufficient input from the local population (Cheeseman et al., 2013: 404). On the broadest terms, African states received their independence without endeavouring to transform or reconstruct the states they received from the colonialists. They continued to administer their independent states in the same authoritarian manner as the colonialists did (Harbeson, 2013: 84). During the transition period, which involved a change of leaders, the dominant elite employed a strategy of predatory rule, which enabled them to manipulate the system to suit their selfish agendas. Post-colonial countries such as Nigeria were divided into ethnicities. This racial divide also confined the citizens to indigenes and settlers for those who chose to reside outside their allotted ethnic areas. This system of predatory and bifurcated rule has enabled the privileged elite to consolidate their power base since its notion of indigene and settler created a fragmented and antagonistic group of citizens at the national, state and local levels of government. In the long run, the

system of bifurcation enabled the postcolonial state to indulge in wide scale corruption, service delivery failures and underdevelopment (Aiyede, 2009: 262).

In the transition period, the power that was transferred to the post-colonial African state was supported by the rules of Western sovereignty. Political players in post-colonial Africa who felt overlooked in the affairs of the new state either through electoral processes or through autocracy were not prepared to comply with established norms and standards. Rather, they either resorted to armed conflict or to dirty politics. Efforts to resolve through political means their differences and divergent claims regarding the shape and how to administer the new state were not successful. Military and political competition became the norm in countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe where liberation movements and insurgencies became widespread (Dorman, 2006: 1085).

As reform insurgencies and liberation movements successfully took control of their respective countries, this led to political practices that produced negative and undemocratic results. The ideologies that the revolutionary movements acquired during the struggle period, the prolonged period of struggle for liberation, the link with arms dealers and external supports, the brutality and hardships experienced, and the hierarchies developed through the long period of struggle, continue to influence the manner in which they relate to the civilian population and their style of governance. Although many of the post-colonial African states embraced liberal constitutions, the tensions between the legacies of the liberation struggle and the liberal underpinnings of the state have emerged. In attempting to resolve the competing paradigmatic challenges around rights and democracy, structures and institutions, the leadership agitation to bring control and stability overrides the concern for democracy or liberation, thereby giving rise to higher levels of exclusivist and authoritarian politics (Dorman, 2006: 1086).

Furthermore, political rivalries along ethnic lines, weak state institutions, and lack of commitment to and experience with governance processes and democratic procedures by the elite in the main, resulted in partial entrenchment of democracy and its disruptions through coups, counter-coups, wars and dissent. Democratic governments were soon replaced by autocratic and military regimes. During the cold

war when super power rivalry was at its peak, the Western states, especially France, the United States and the United Kingdom paid little attention to Africa's internal governance processes, including human rights abuses, corruption and other excesses. Their focus was mainly geared towards Africa's foreign policies and ensuring that their African allies did not fall into the hands of the Soviet Union (Cheeseman et al., 2013: 404).

These factors also led to their weaknesses as shown by the coups and counter coups that followed. What resulted from this was the entrenchment of authoritarian rulers over weak postcolonial African states. The disarray that resulted from the political and development failures created the opportunity for international financial institutions and funding bodies to influence the economic and political agendas of post-colonial African states. As a result of the debt crisis that developing nations experienced in the 1980s, most bilateral donors and international funding institutions contributed to the sharp decline in the ability of African states to effectively steer the development of their economies by their conditional development assistance (Harbeson, 2013: 84-85), when they pronounced between 1989 and 1990 that

future aid allocations would depend on the extent to which recipient countries had democratised. They used a combination of carrot (increased development assistance) and stick (aid sanctions) to promote democratisation in African countries. This connection of aid flows to domestic modes of governance is generally referred to as political conditionality (Cheeseman *et al.*, 2013: 406).

Most post-colonial African states have failed to institute adequate and effective democratic norms and standards that adequately address the socio-economic needs of their citizens, despite the vast human and natural resources at their disposal. African countries such as South Africa and Nigeria provide constitutional protection for socioeconomic rights. But one wonders if the governments' policies around the provision of basic amenities such as healthcare, welfare, education and housing can promote socioeconomic equality (Christiansen, 2008: 371). The South African Freedom charter (1955: 1), a statement of core principles and visions of alternative society, for instance, provides that unused land and housing space shall be given to those who need it. It appears as though such provision does not adequately assist the country in addressing its social, political and economic challenges. For instance, while

many citizens agitate for land grab from the former colonialists to be redistributed to the citizens whose lands were forcibly taken away, the South African government adopts a careful process of land restoration. This strategy hopes to avoid the situation in Zimbabwe, where the expropriation of land from the white farmers, led to the collapse of the country's economy.

By the time Nigeria attained independence in 1960, the mainstay of its economy derived mainly from the exportation of agricultural products such as cotton, cocoa, groundnuts and rubber. These products accounted for about 64 percent of national output, while oil only accounted for about 15 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) output. With the discovery of enormous oil reserves in Nigeria, agricultural outputs decreased dramatically, despite the government's clarion call for a revival of agricultural production through programmes such as back to land, green revolution and structural adjustment schemes. Although the Nigerian state derives huge income from oil revenue, the funds are largely mismanaged with large chunks of it stolen by public officials. The oil revenue has not been directed towards the development of other sectors of the economy. Rather the Nigerian state has found itself moving from the prospects of rapid development in the 1970s to one of deindustrialisation in the 21st century (Aiyede, 2009: 254). All the states in Nigeria depend largely on the proceeds of oil that mainly come from the South-South geopolitical zone for their sustenance. This has had a devastating impact as "the oil producing communities have suffered extensive environmental damages and economic retardation due to the destruction of their age-old industries of fishing and farming by oil exploration activities" (Abolurin, 2008: 14).

The extent of corruption in Nigeria is startling. For instance, between 1960 and 1999, more than \$380 billion was stolen from the public coffers by public officials. From 1985 to 1993 when General Ibrahim Babangida was the head of state, about \$12 billion disappeared from the oil revenue. During the four years administration of General Abacha, he was believed to have stolen between one and three billion dollars. 16 billion dollars that was allocated for power generation between 2006 and 2007 was squandered by the government of Obasanjo without any substantial contribution to the national integrated power projects. Unspent budget allocations are in most cases not returned to government coffers, but shared by government officials. When the

government began to insist on the return of unspent budgetary allocations, about four billion dollars was returned to the fiscus in the 2007 financial year alone (Aiyede, 2009: 256). Nigeria's economy relies mainly on oil revenue. This puts the country in a precarious situation, because a drastic fall in the price of oil on the international market would result in less money accruing to the fiscus and more hardship for the citizens.

The underdevelopment of most African countries in areas such as economic growth, poverty reduction, literacy, healthcare, income inequality and life expectancy has been attributed by some scholars to the low quality of their public institutions. However, the quality of public service delivery and the contributions by the private sector are essential for the development of the state and for the benefit of the entire population (Gustavson, 2014: 1-2). Therefore, what Africa needs in its quest to resolve the current crisis are both strongmen and strong institutions in order to strengthen its democratisation processes. African states also need a critical, politically conscious and enlightened population that are prepared to sacrifice for the realisation of the desired change. They must be ready and willing to challenge the inadequacies and excesses of the leaders and bureaucrats whose failures have kept the African states in their perpetual state of failure (Ogbogbo, 2011: 1-2)

Chapter six searches for a new frontier in promoting the ethical and ideal post-colonial African state. It provides guidance on how leaders, community members, bureaucrats and all stakeholders can contribute to the realisation of the needs and expectations of the ideal state for contemporary and future African society. In that regard, the chapter begins by drawing from Rawls' attempts to define perfectly just institutions. It briefly brings together the salient elements in the previous chapters that touch on good and bad governance practices. It brings out the elements of the ideal society as propounded by various philosophers. It then proceeds to consider the role of ethical leadership, in the realisation of good governance; the kinds of leadership that contemporary African states require; how leaders can manage conflicts; how to ensure democratic consolidation; and options for alternative systems of governance for the continent in view of the failures of the current systems of governance.

Rawls theory of justice marks a return to an exploration of the kinds of principles, ideals or preferences that should be advocated at the level of political and social

organisations, which the philosophers in the previous half century departed from to rather focus on mere analysis of principles and ethical ideals. The application of these principles, he posits, are such that in concrete cases, it leads to intuitively sound judgements. Rawls' contractarian approach presents an alternative answer to the question of what is the desirable kind of social and political arrangements in the state. In considering the kind of socio-political arrangements that the citizens would make if they were given the opportunity to choose among alternative arrangements, he claims that their interests must lie in the choices they would make under a veil of ignorance, otherwise known as the original position of the contract. Rawls outlines two principles of justice that constitute justice as fairness and which parties in the original position must choose. He considers the principles to be the result of rational choice that the agents make under controlled conditions. In these principles, which primarily apply to the society's basic structure, social goods such as wealth, income, opportunity and liberty, must be equally distributed, unless unequal distribution of any of these goods benefits the least favoured. In his just society, the government can only restrict citizens' liberty in order to uphold security and public order (Kukathas & Pettit, 1990: 6, 19, 44, 48-49; Rawls, 1972: 60-61).

Rawls' transcendental institutionalism, which sets out to define perfectly just institutions is criticised by Sen, who claims that since it is not possible to define anything perfect, human beings should desist from the pursuit of perfect institutions. Instead, he advocates the comparative approach to justice, which concentrates on the elimination of observed injustices in place of the transcendental search for a perfectly just society (Sen, 2009: 96-102; Clare & Horn, 2010: 75).

The issues that this research addresses reveals the centrality of good leadership in bringing harmony and development to the state. All political philosophers, including moral philosophers, recognise the centrality of good leadership in the attainment of national development, irrespective of the system of governance in place, be it capitalism, communism, socialism, feudalism, constitutionalism or liberalism. The differing factor among them is that while some of them place leadership in absolute individuals, others place leadership in the hands of citizens, in institutional development or in constitutionalism. In Hobbes treatise on the state of nature, he shows how solitary, nasty, brutish and short human life is until the adoption of the

Leviathan (absolute leader) through a social contract, which in turn brings order, development and progress to the state.

Plato emphasises the role of good leadership in the realisation of the just state. He notes the deficiencies in the city of Athens, and as a result calls for its revitalisation with the help of philosopher Kings whom he considers the beacon of societal growth and progress. For Machiavelli, the importance of leadership is so vital that it must be treated with cleverness, boldness and even with deception if and when the situation demands. Internal and external problems must be handled with both hard and soft power, or tricky diplomacy and coercive force. He considers such policy measures as capable of enabling the leader to eliminate his detractors and to attract friends (Agbelengor, 2012: 2-3). While some of Machiavelli's pronouncements are extreme, there are occasions when some of them, such as the use of coercive force, become necessary when members of the state act irrationally and constitute a threat to law and order.

The kind of transformation that post-colonial African states require is such that necessitates responsible leaders and citizens. Leaders and corporate executives have a big role to play in creating the kind of ideal state that post-colonial African societies require. But they have not always lived up to that expectation. The only guarantee for good leadership and by implication, the realisation of the ethical and ideal state is that leaders, managers, corporate executives and members of a state conduct themselves with integrity and professionalism, and abide by the principles of virtue. Creating the ideal state does not need extraordinary strategy. Rather, it is no harder to build something great than it is to build something good. It might be statistically more rare to attain greatness, but "it does not require more suffering than perpetuating mediocrity" (Collins, 2001: 205). Human beings will be on the way to achieving the ideal state once they have the inner disposition to do so and as Aristotle says, once they possess or acquire the traits of character that will assist them to attain their goals.

1.7 SUMMARY

This study sets out to investigate the reasons for the inability of postcolonial African states to implement the ideal ethical and democratic societies, which are able to

adequately provide for the needs and expectations of their citizens, despite the immense human and natural endowments at their disposal and their exposure to international best practices. The study further considers the contributions that leaders, politicians, members of society and other stakeholders can make to the realisation of the ethical and ideal postcolonial African state.

The extent of incompetence and immorality among many leaders, managers, public officials and the public at large which results in a disorganised, unproductive and conflict-ridden society filled with injustices and inhuman conduct gives the impression that the task of constructing a desirable society is beyond human comprehension and ability. This is not entirely the case because human beings can transcend their current nature if they are willing and committed to being ethical and to conduct themselves in accordance with virtues.

CHAPTER TWO

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the concept of ethics and the moral theories that provide guidance on right and wrong actions. It examines the understanding of ethics in general and virtue ethics in particular, drawing its point of departure from Aristotle's theory of virtues. The chapter examines the ultimate goal of human life, and the application of the theory of virtues in the contemporary era.

Ethics is understood as the study of morality; or the examination of the morality of human actions, behaviours and their consequences. Various philosophers distinguish between ethics and morality, claiming that while ethics relates to the examination or critique of specific moralities, morality relates to virtues, principles or systems of rules (Paulo, 2016: 11-12). However, ethics and morality are often used interchangeably in ordinary language (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2015: 2).

There are various ethical theories that provide guidance on right and wrong conducts, notably deontology, utilitarianism and virtues ethics. There is lack of consensus among these theories on the determination of morality. While deontology prioritises the adherence to duties, utilitarianism lays emphasis on the greatest happiness principle, while virtue ethics hinges on the importance of good character in producing right actions (Sim, 2010: 195-196). The conflicting nature of their emphasis makes it difficult to have a sole measurement of right and wrong. It is however noted that our moral judgements tend to be largely measured in line with the utilitarian provisions (Sheskin & Baumard, 2016: 2).

In his consideration of the ultimate goal of human life, Aristotle (Polansky, 2014: 14; Guseynov, 2016: 486) notes that human beings generally consider happiness to be the highest good. However, they do not have a general consensus on what constitutes happiness. While some see honour as the ultimate goal, others consider it to be either wealth, glory or pleasure. However, Aristotle posits that these cannot be the main objective of all human endeavours because they are very shallow. Rather, he

considers true happiness (eudemonia) as consisting of a life of contemplation, while a life of virtue plays a central role in the realisation of true happiness.

One of the major points of note in this chapter relates to Aristotle's claims that human beings have natural virtues and are therefore naturally able to act virtuously (Winter, 2012: 101). If this is the case, then why do many people, including politicians, bureaucrats and leaders find it daunting to act and behave ethically, but instead engage in all forms of unethical conduct that bring harm to their people and societies? These challenges will be examined in the next chapters.

2.2 WHAT IS ETHICS

When most philosophers refer to ethics, they, according to Paulo, (2016: 13) are considering human actions and behaviours from a moral perspective and their impacts on others in line with rules and moral principles. Ethics, according to Thiroux & Krasemann (2015: 1-2) is the study of morality; and its concerns relate to what is wrong or right in the conduct and behaviour of human beings. A number of academic philosophers place a distinction between ethics and morality,

such that morality is a certain system of rules, principles, values, or virtues, whereas ethics is moral philosophy, that is, the theory of morality. According to this view, ethics has to do with the examination, justification, or critique of particular moralities. This understanding of morality is very wide, for it includes not only the traditional moralities based on Aristotelian virtues, on the Kantian categorical imperative, or versions of consequentialism, but also less elaborated forms of normative systems that regulate human conduct (Paulo, 2016: 11-12).

In ordinary language, however, ethics and morality are frequently used interchangeably in the sense of referring to a person or an action as ethical or moral; as unethical or immoral (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2015: 2). If there is any distinction that is made between ethics and morality in ordinary language, this lies in the connotation, whereby

Morality sometimes has a more traditional, oftentimes religious, conservative, or outdated, doctrinal ring to it; the connotation of ethics is, in contrast, more neutral and modern. It is, thus, not surprising to see that the practical approaches to right or wrong human conduct in medicine,

business, or environmental issues have been called applied ethics rather than applied morality (Paulo, 2016: 12).

In other instances in ordinary language, the terms morality or immorality are associated with issues relating to sexuality, while the terms ethical and unethical are used in discussions that relate to the conduct of professional communities and business towards the public or their members. However, these words are no longer commonly used as often as the terms right, wrong, good or bad are currently used (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2015: 2). The kinds of questions that ethics poses include:

what constitutes any person or action being good, bad, right, or wrong and how do we know (epistemology)? What part does self-interest or the interests of others play in the making of moral decisions and judgements? What theories of conduct are valid or invalid and why? Should we use principles or rules or laws as the basis for our choices, or should we let each situation decide our morality? Are killing, lying, cheating, stealing, and certain kinds of sexual acts right or wrong, and why or why not? (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2015: 2).

A large proportion of all the theoretical problems that have preoccupied the thoughts of philosophers from the advent of the history of philosophy concern ethical problems. Both the Nicomachean Ethics and the various platonic dialogues have been largely dominated by the issues of justice, virtue and other related questions. In other cases, ethical problems directly concern human daily lives, and require that actions be taken by individuals, groups or organisations (Kucuradi, 2016: 63-64).

The field of ethics, according to Inwood (2014: 2) was founded by Aristotle as a discipline. He is not claiming here that no other theorist or philosopher has contributed immensely to the field of ethics prior to Aristotle. Rather, he is claiming that the first clear boundaries to the discipline of ethics was set by Aristotle, who identified distinctive high level principles that define the field of ethics; provided a framework for working with the principles, and postulated precise, vital and lasting treatises on ethics. He recognises Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics as "the most consistently studied treatise in the history of ethics; it has done more than any other text to give the field whatever unity and cohesion it has" (Inwood, 2014: 3).

This study wonders what the need is for ethics when there are clearly defined rules and regulations that ought to hold people accountable for their actions and behaviour. Most people concede that there are differences between ethics and law. This variation is seen in the fact that

Law is a highly institutionalised system, strictly regulating human conduct and consisting of largely contingent rules that every individual has – under the threat of coercion – to follow. Ethics in contrast, is primarily a personal matter, allowing for ad hoc reasoning and demanding existential decisions (Paulo, 2016: 11).

This study notes that this is a very critical distinction between ethics and law because when we consider human actions and behaviours, it can be noted in many cases that many people obey the law not because they sincerely want to do that, but out of fear of reprisals. In many instances, such people would not do the right thing if they realise that their intended actions and behaviour would not be exposed. There are various standards of right and wrong as will be noted in the following sections. These variations are problematic for good human relations and for issues of justice and fairness when people hold on to different conceptions of morality. Therefore,

There is a sense of urgency built into the nature of ethics. As regards the proper standards of conduct, many have been afraid that unless such standards can be delivered, we are left vulnerable to relativism, amoralism and general disorder. No matter whether philosophers look at ethics as something divine, as a social contract, as standards we are bound to through our rationality, or a system built upon certain moral sentiments, they seem to agree on one thing: we need ethics. Certain normative guidelines are necessary for proper living – especially for living together with others (Martela, 2017: 59).

2.3 MORAL THEORIES THAT PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON RIGHT AND WRONG ACTIONS

Various schools of thought, including virtue ethics, utilitarianism and deontology provide opposing standards or moral theories that over the ages have become dominant in the determination of right and wrong actions (Chappell, 2009: 206; Sim, 2010: 195). These three theories, “disagree about the measure of morality, prioritising virtues, social utility or duty” (Sim, 2010: 195).

According to Thiroux and Krasemann (2015: 30), the consequentialist (utilitarianism and ethical egoism) and the non-consequentialists (deontology) are the two major moral positions that have emerged in the history of ethics. The consequentialist, which refers to the consequences of individual behaviour and actions as the determinant of right actions is traditionally referred to as teleological. Nonconsequentialism does not concern itself with consequences. According to Gawronski et al., (2017: 343), the distinction between these two moral positions has shaped research on moral dilemma judgements. In most cases, virtue ethics has mostly

been defined against other ethical theories like utilitarianism and deontology. Whereas virtue ethics emphasises the virtues of character to measure right actions, utilitarianism emphasises the adherence to the greatest happiness principle and deontology emphasises the adherence to duties to produce moral actions [...]. Non-virtue ethical theories like utilitarianism and deontology are said to differ from virtue ethics in their reliance on general rules or principles for prescriptions about moral actions, as well as universal laws or principles for the assessment of moral actions (Sim, 2010: 195).

Chappell (2009: 207-208) disagrees with the manner in which these moral theories tend to wrongly base everything on a specific determinant of right and wrong, good or bad in all cases. This tendency, according to Gawronski et al., (2017: 343) creates a potential conflict among these theories, which are two principles that play a fundamental role in research on moral judgement. This conflict according to Dougherty (2011: 527) creates lack of consensus on what constitutes right and wrong actions. For instance, he claims that if deontologists believe that killing must be avoided at all times, then they will disagree with the view of the consequentialists - utilitarians - that human beings are morally obligated to reduce the extent or number of bad things that occur in the world. A deontologist would say that it is wrong to kill anyone since killing is an action that must be avoided at all costs. The prevention of other killings is not a sufficient reason according to the deontologist to kill other people.

2.3.1 Deontological Ethics

The word Deontology was created by Jeremy Bentham and represents the science of duties or what is proper for a person to do. Deontology is that branch of knowledge that concerns itself with moral obligations. Bentham's deontology is utilitarian in contrast to Kant's deontology. In a broad original sense, any ethical system that prescribes concrete actions is deontological. Bentham's deontology appears not to be enjoying any interest among contemporary moral philosophers who consider deontology as a form of ethical theory that is not utilitarian or teleological (Timmermann, 2015: 76-77).

Kant's moral philosophy, and indeed, deontological ethics as a whole, is generally viewed as an ethics of duty. Deontological ethics is characterised by fulfilment of duties, a focus on what human beings should do, and rightness of actions (Jing, 2013: 451). His deontology hinges on the prioritisation of duties over consequences (Thomas, 2015: 3). The proponents of deontology (nonconsequentialists) posit that

consequences do not, and in fact should not, enter into judging whether actions or people are moral or immoral. Actions are to be judged solely on whether they are right and people solely on whether they are good, based on some other (many nonconsequentialists would say 'higher') standards of morality. That is, acts or people are to be judged moral or immoral regardless of the consequences of actions (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2015: 46).

The Divine Command theory, according to Thiroux and Krasemann (2015: 46) is the most obvious example of this deontological theory. It provides that if an individual believes in the existence of a supernatural being, such as God, gods, or goddesses who have instituted a number of moral commands, then he or she will be considered good, and their actions right only on condition that these commands are obeyed irrespective of their consequences. For Kant (Thomas, 2015: 3) true freedom derives from voluntary, informed obedience to the provisions of moral law, no matter what the consequences may be. Kant's (Yudanin, 2015: 595) treatise derives from the moral philosophy that traditionally considers two types of duties, namely those that prohibit certain actions and those that command certain actions, since it is difficult to imagine a moral standard that only prohibits specific kinds of actions without also commanding people to be helpful towards those in need.

Kant (Yudanin, 2015: 597) associates the ultimate goal of human actions with the categorical imperative. His Categorical Imperative, which requires human beings to treat each other in the same manner that they would like to be treated, and that human beings treat each other as ends and not as means,

imposes universal moral duties that will not only stabilise social expectations, but also help to protect individuals from potentially destructive acts committed by others. But the categorical Imperative also resembles an agreement between persons on a basic set of guidelines that will ensure individual freedom, civil order and the rule of law [...] (Thomas, 2015: 3).

A human being, though rational, according to Kant (Jing, 2013: 459), is a limited entity who, throughout his lifetime, is constantly confronted with two struggling parties, the one being the inclinations that emanate from the empirical appetite, while the other is the duty according to the moral law. Virtue, which he considers to be primarily some form of self-control, is the strength of will that enables the person to carry out and fulfil his duty.

One of the major criticisms of the Kantian deontology is that it is implausibly rigoristic as well as hopelessly insensitive to moral complexity while exhibiting righteous absurdity and committing to a set of perfect duties without exception that expect human beings to always keep their promises and to never tell lies, among other obligatory requirements. Although some Kantians reject these objections, claiming that the Kantian moral philosophy does acknowledge exceptions to perfect duties, this acknowledgement fails to indicate when and how such exceptions should be made (Cholbi, 2013: 439).

Kant (Dierksmeier, 2013: 598) is criticised on the one hand, as purely a deontological thinker, who is not sensitive towards the preconditions and effects of ethical conduct. His critics therefore propose that his theory needs to be revised and complemented by the theories of virtue ethics. On the other hand, Kant's scholars disagree with these criticisms, claiming that Kant's moral philosophy already contains these considerations and already culminates in virtue ethics. Many scholars, according to Jing (2013: 451), believe that virtue plays a vital role in Kant's moral philosophy, while some other contemporary theorists criticise Kant's virtue theory as not real virtue but as largely

comparable with the Aristotelian strength of will (continence) when confronted by contrary emotions and appetites. Jing, however, argues that Kant's conception of virtue as strength is not the same as Aristotle's conception of continence, and that Kant's virtue as strength resides at the much higher level of the inner state of freedom and the mental attitude of the soul of a person.

2.3.2 Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism and ethical egoism, which are the two main ethical theories of consequentialism concur that human beings should conduct themselves in a manner that results in good consequences. However, they lack consensus on the beneficiaries of the results. While utilitarians posit that human beings should act in the interest of all stakeholders, the ethical egoists claim that individuals should always act in their self-interest. However, they argue that this does not mean that they are necessarily promoting selfishness (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2015: 30-32).

The term utilitarianism means utility or usefulness. Its main proponents are Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. For utilitarians, an act is moral or right if it is able to lead to the realisation of a good or desirable end. They posit that human beings are required to conduct themselves or to adhere to moral rules in a manner that will ensure the realisation of happiness or the greatest good for all relevant stakeholders (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2015: 37). Put differently, the utilitarian theory posits that an action should only be undertaken if its outcome produces a level of wellbeing (happiness) that is higher than the end result of an alternative action (Reichlin, 2016: 1-2).

For Mill, (1965: 281), "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain or the deprivation of pleasure". According to Reichlin (2016: 1-2), well-being or happiness for 'classical' utilitarianism also relates impartiality in the consideration of individual benefits. These components of wellbeing or happiness for Mill (Kreider, 2010: 54-55; Reichlin, 2016: 1-2), are the only desirable ends; and anything desirable should be sought either for the pleasures that they hold or as a means to promote pleasure and to prevent pain. Mill (Loizides, 2014: 3) distinguishes two senses of happiness: the humble and the

higher senses of happiness. He argues that the humble element of happiness reduces all aspects of happiness to basic feelings of pleasure and pain, while the higher sense of happiness relates to the happy life, which human beings who possess highly developed faculties wish for.

Utilitarianism is criticised, according to Thiroux and Krasemann (2015: 37) for supporting ethical egoism because it is not always feasible to determine the factors that will produce good consequences for other people. Part of the difficulties inherent in the process of ascertaining the consequences of the actions that a person wants to take is the inability to establish what will be acceptable to others, right or good for them. Moreover, what an individual considers to be a good consequence “may not be equally, or at all, good for another; and how are you to tell unless you can ask other people what would be good for them? Very often, of course, there is no time to ask anyone anything; we simply must act in the best way we can” (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2015: 37).

This study notes that it cannot be right or acceptable that many actions and decisions are taken quickly as a result of insufficient time to ask questions or to do adequate investigations. This singular factor can create unfair decisions and treatments if in-depth investigations are not conducted before decisions are made. It may even result in wrong judgements and the maltreatment of the innocent who may have been wrongly accused. It is therefore suggested that no decision must be taken until the truth of the issues under focus has been thoroughly ascertained.

Kreider (2010: 53) disagrees with the critics who term Mill’s Utilitarianism hedonistic, claiming instead that although Mill continuously used hedonistic languages, he rejects hedonism in its entirety, while characterising happiness to a greater extent in the Aristotelian eudemonic terms. Like Aristotle, Mill notes both the fact that the higher human rational faculties are the most important part of human happiness, as well as the intrinsic value of developing and exercising human higher rationality. On the other hand, Kreider also notes an important variation in Aristotle’s and Mill’s conception of happiness in the sense that “Mill places more importance on practical reasoning than on theoretical reasoning to happiness than does Aristotle” (Kreider, 2010: 54).

In reaction to his critics, who consider his moral theory hedonistic for portraying pleasure (happiness) as the only intrinsic good, Mill (Kreider, 2010: 55) posits that pleasure refers not only to brutish physical pleasures, but also to all kinds of pleasure, including emotional, physical, and aesthetic pleasures. Eventually his use of hedonistic terms and of the word pleasure begins to wane in view of his realisation that with much tranquillity or inner peace, many people will be satisfied with minimal pleasure. He further asserts that it is better to remain a dissatisfied person than a satisfied pig.

Moral decisions, according to Sheskin and Baumard (2016: 1), appear consistent with the theory of utilitarianism for tending towards the maximisation of the general welfare of the population in the sense of increasing benefits and minimising harms. An example of this involves the runaway train that is switched to another track where the number of casualties will as a result be reduced to a few or to just one fatality. Many people appear to agree that it is better to preserve the lives of many people at the expense of one person. Many behavioural studies tend to appeal to this kind of judgement (of preserving the lives of many) in their motivations for an increase in the welfare of others.

Sheskin and Baumard (2016: 2) note, however, that there are other judgements that do not support the maximisation of general welfare and as such run contrary to this utilitarian theory and the idea of increasing general welfare. Such judgements manifest themselves in cases where the attempt to maximise general welfare conflicts with the different notions of justice or fairness. For instance, in a process of deciding on peoples' healthcare, most people will not agree to decrease the level and quality of treatment that one group receives in order to increase the level of cure that a larger group of people will receive even though such decision would maximise welfare. Research reveals that moral behaviour can be influenced by a number of other influences besides utilitarianism. These include the desire for honest behaviour, respect for property, constraints from reciprocity, and self-interest. However, the utilitarian mode of thought is often employed as a means of measuring our moral judgements to such an extent that acting in contrast to it is conceived as biased. Another example where efforts to increase the general welfare conflicts with various

conceptions of justice and fairness, as will be noted in chapter five, relates to the imbalances in the distribution of land and other benefits in South Africa.

This study notes that the manner in which Mill arrives at his universal principle of happiness through logical deductions appears fallacious because the fact that all people want happiness does not necessarily mean that they would want that happiness to be extended to others. As will be noted in chapters four and five, human beings exist in society as social, communal and individual beings. However, they tend to be more individualistic than communal in their way of life. If they were placed in a community devoid of rules and regulations, the tendency is that most of them would resort to individualism, only caring about themselves and their immediate family members. In this kind of society, most members would probably be kind, caring and compassionate only towards those they love or those that their inner being gravitates towards. Although there are exceptions to the rule since there are individuals who will abide with this universal principle without being compelled to do so, one tends to believe that the rule of law, coupled with the cultivation of virtues and values play a significant role in people's willingness and ability to be ethical.

2.3.3 Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics, according to Paulo (2016: 14), is a great rival of the standard view of ethics because while the standard view of ethics is characterised by actions, their consequences and the reference to rules and moral principles, virtue ethics "emphasises the virtues of character to measure right actions" (Sim, 2010: 195).

According to Aristotle (Wong, 2011: 71) "virtues signify excellence of character or admirable traits by which moral goodness can be achieved". Put differently, virtue for him, is "a habit, a tendency of character to act in accordance with practical reason towards worthy ends" (Stedman, 2010: 59). He considers virtues as playing a fundamental role in the pursuit of a good life (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2015: 61); and he posits that "a good life is a virtuous life hence virtues ought to constitute a significant part of an ethical life" (Wong, 2011: 71). Every virtue or excellence, according to Aristotle (1962: 41), "renders good the thing itself [...], and causes it to perform its functions well". In Aristotle's account of character traits, he asserts that virtuous people perform virtuous acts without internal conflict because they feel and reason rightly,

while continent people are only able to perform virtuous acts once they have overcome bad desires or passions (Curzer, 2012: 3).

Virtue significantly tends, according to Audi (Winter, 2012: 13) “to influence conduct and supplies its possessor both with a normative reason indicating what sort of thing should be done in a wide range of contexts and with motivation to do such things for an appropriate kind of reason”. Virtues, according to Aquinas (Hause & Murphy, 2010: xviii-xx) are those habits that enable the faculty to properly execute its functions, while the habits that prevent the faculty from performing its functions well are called vices. Furthermore, he posits that virtue also enables us to carry out our rational activity in a manner that leads to happiness. However, we need to submit ourselves to discipline in order to have any chance of being happy, by directing our sensory appetites towards right reason so that we are able to act rationally; we need to go beyond narrow self-interest.

Aristotle (Stedman, 2010: 59-60) considers virtue as the ability to strike at a balance between extremes of excess and deficiency. He calls this balance the ‘golden mean’. The first concern of an individual who aims to achieve the golden mean, according to Aristotle (1962: 50), is “to avoid the extreme which is more opposed to it”. He claims that

Prudence is [...], an intellectual habit (virtue) enabling the person to deliberate properly in order to choose the virtuous course, the right means of action in any here and now situation [...]. Temperance is the habit of moderation in the use of pleasurable things. Fortitude enables a person to stand firm against and endure the hardships of life, to restrain fear, or to moderate fear in the face of danger, all done in accordance with reason (Stedman, 2010: 60).

Aristotle (Solopova, 2016: 522-523) classifies the virtues into intellectual and moral virtues. He considers the difference between them as lying in the fact that while the objective of moral action is to derive the good, the aim of thought is to attain the truth. He considers intellectual virtues as primarily associated with the rational or reasoning part of the soul, with thinking or can be realised by means of instruction and teaching. Moral virtues for him, concern the part of the soul that cannot reason on its own, but

is only capable of following the thought patterns, and they find expression through passions and actions or through habituation or habit (Bykova, 2016: 451)

While Aristotle (Solopova, 2016: 523-524) posits that as a quality of human mind, intellectual virtue is related to human functions and decision-making, he asserts that moral virtue “enables an individual to make rational choices and good decisions...Further, moral virtue is also regarded as that which enables a person to be prudent in decision-making and in his or her actions; it is considered as practical wisdom (phronesis)” (Koenane & Mangena, 2017: 66). While he considers intellectual virtues to include wisdom, intelligence, understanding and prudence, he classifies moral virtues into temperance and liberality (Solopova, 2016: 522-523).

Aquinas (Hause & Murphy, 2010: xviii) differentiates between intellectual and appetitive virtues. Intellectual virtues, for him, result from the acquisition of various elements of scientific knowledge such as geometry and physics. Appetitive virtues, on the other hand, lead our appetites to good ends, turning them into good tools of reason. They include temperance, which enables humans to avoid the temptations that come from drinks, food and sex; and patience, which enables us to be calm and controlled when confronted by challenges and unfair or unjust treatment. He considers these virtues important as they make our moral and intellectual activities easier.

Human beings according to Aquinas (Hause & Murphy, 2010: xvi) assume a higher state in the universe with their gift of rational faculties, which separates them from other living things. Reason, for him, “is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason somewhat, but in various ways” (Aquinas, 1947: 1898). He posits that reason, which is the highest part of human rational faculties possesses both contemplative and practical functions. While the contemplative aspect enables human beings to derive greater level of cognitive understanding of things than the senses do by enabling us to conceptualise and master ideas, the practical function enables us to establish the best means of performing our activities and spending our time. These rational faculties, according to Aquinas, give human life a considerable measure of open-endedness or indeterminacy while at the same time are subject to rational control, unlike other animals. For instance, the sheep reacts instinctively by trying to run away when they

are confronted with danger. When they see a wolf, they do not take the time to consider if running away would be the best option in their own interest. Unlike the animals, it is the prerogative of human beings to determine what course of action to take in a given situation. These faculties can be trained rationally to respond and act in more determinate ways and by extension to develop habits (Hause & Murphy, 2010: xvi).

Aristotle (Winter, 2012: 100-102) makes two central points, namely: that human beings possess natural virtues and are naturally able to recognise virtuous acts. While he recognises that human beings have the internal disposition to recognise right from wrong behaviours and actions when they see them, he also acknowledges that in certain cases, the rightness or wrongness of certain acts may be difficult to ascertain. He claims that every person has uncultivated and undeveloped natural virtues, which are inclined towards doing the right thing. Even the young child is naturally inclined towards behaving in the right manner, and when this is properly cultivated and nurtured in a conducive environment, the disposition towards, for instance, generosity or honesty or any other right thing, can transform into virtues such as generosity and honesty. On the other hand, bad influences or wrong environment can obstruct the individual's dispositions to being virtuous or to doing the right thing.

Aristotle (Winter, 2012: 100) does not believe that all the virtues can be found in one person, because this may imply the existence of a completely virtuous person whom other people can emulate. Rather,

Virtue in Aristotle's theory is acquired through practice. Put differently, by repetition of virtuous actions, virtue is a disposition which becomes second nature or habit. Accordingly, an Aristotelian would argue that an individual becomes what he or she does repeatedly. This further suggests that actions define individuals' dispositions (Koenane & Mangena, 2017: 67).

Aristotle (Winter, 2012: 100-102) further posits that virtues can be acquired by emulating the wise person in whom at least most of the virtues reside. In so doing, human beings can for instance, learn about generosity by learning from a generous person; they can learn about temperance by learning from the way temperate persons conduct themselves; and they can learn how to practice the other virtues by looking at

the manner in which the virtuous people live their lives. He further provides that in cases where human beings are not sure of what to do, they should consult the practically wise persons for advice and guidance.

It is unique, according to Bykova (2016: 451) that Aristotle associates the acquisition of virtues with engaging in specific activities moderately, at the right amount and possessing the right level of specific passions; while virtues are lost as a result of excessiveness and defect. He wonders how possible it is for human beings to determine the required or acceptable level of actions or feelings, taking into consideration their unique and relative nature. Aristotle's response to this kind of question is that virtue requires that extremes in actions, passions and desires be stabilised by the 'golden mean'. But Bykova contends that it is not easy to attain the golden mean since it requires that human beings make huge effort. Nonetheless, the golden mean is considered by Bykova (2016: 452) as "the highest wisdom, and this becomes especially clear in the context of the ancient philosophers' discussion of diverse opinions on proper behaviour".

Virtue ethics is often criticised for failing to outline how human beings should conduct themselves morally in ambiguous or confusing instances. Instead of laying emphasis on the actions of the individual and question their rightness through an appeal to universal laws, its focus lies on the character of the individual and virtue for various situations, which cannot be subjected to general rules. As a result, of this tendency, the critics contend that virtue ethics, in contrast to its rivals, fails to give priority attention to actions in its evaluation of morality (Sim, 2010: 195-197). Furthermore,

because of the intimate connection between social justice and human rights practices to universal laws which express our duties and obligations, critics of virtue ethics maintain that the absence of universal laws and the lack of deontic concepts and their practices like 'duty' and 'right', make social justice and human rights practices challenging for virtue ethics (Sim, 2010: 195-196).

Paulo (2016: 14) also finds virtue ethics unjustifiable without some form of appeal to norms. He wonders for instance how an individual can "know what actually fulfils the virtue of justice without knowing which norms determine what is just [...]. It would thus

be much harder to gain any insight into reasoning within virtue ethics from a comparison to legal reasoning” (Paulo, 2016: 14).

Sim (2010: 198) responds to these criticisms of virtue ethics by claiming that while Aristotle does not provide that human beings can become moral by merely adhering to laws, he however considers laws to play a significant role in the ability of human beings to become virtuous. The legislator, whose function is to make laws, according to Aristotle, must enact laws and put mechanisms in place that enable citizens to understand what is required of them to become virtuous individuals. Aristotle posits that in order to become virtuous human beings must develop all the moral virtues and desist from bad actions. He considers a just person as the law abiding citizen. This means, for this research, that to be virtuous, the individual needs to conduct him or herself on the basis of established laws, guided by values and virtues; going beyond the norms while appealing to the human inner disposition to live a moral life.

Virtue ethics, according to Thiroux & Krasemann (2015: 68) attempts to create not just good regulations or procedure, or impulsive individuals, but to create habitually and consistently virtuous or good people. Despite these ethical provisions and the prevalence of ethical codes, moral systems and laws, many virtue ethicists are challenged by the absence of (many) virtuous or ethical people. These theorists believe that

until we create ethical or virtuous people, our chances of creating a moral society will remain minimal. After all, they say, we have had rules, laws, and regulations for at least several millennia and have even more nowadays, but still badness, immorality, viciousness, cruelty, and vice seem to be getting worse rather than better. It is generally agreed that virtues are beneficial to individuals and the community (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2015: 68).

The importance of good character is generally recognised around the world. In Britain for instance, there is a growing consensus that “the virtues that contribute to good character are part of the solution to many of the challenges facing modern society” (Arthur *et al.*, 2014: 5).

While virtue ethics is acknowledged for its potential to develop an ethical person internally as well as externally, many people do not consider it as more convincing than deontology and utilitarianism. The unsatisfactory nature of these moral theories creates a vacuum in the search for the absolute moral theory and raises the question of problem of choice from among them. As a result, more benefits will be derived from synthesising the best of the various moral frameworks and paying less attention to the worst of them (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2015: 73).

For this study, a crucial question that needs to be posed concerns, which of these moral systems will be acceptable to most people since human beings remain largely independent in their worldviews? It is suggested that the kind of moral framework that combines adherence to rules and appeal to inner goodness be emphasised and promoted as this would have closed the gaps between being ethical because the law provides for it and because we believe that it is better and in the best interests of everyone to willingly act ethically.

2.4 THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF HUMAN LIFE

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (Guseynov, 2016: 486) examines what the ultimate goal of human life is, and he concludes that happiness (eudaimonia) is the highest good and the ultimate goal of human endeavours. To be happy, according to Kant (1997: 23) “is necessarily the demand of every rational but finite being and therefore an unavoidable determining ground of its faculty of desire”. Aristotle (Polansky, 2014: 14) posits that while most people consider eudaimonia (happiness) as the best of all practical goods, as what they prefer most in life, they do not seem to have a consensus on what constitutes eudaimonia. While some people consider the highest good to be pleasure, others consider it to be honour or wealth. However, Aristotle observes that these considerations are very shallow and do not offer human beings true happiness.

Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that happiness is not any kind of feeling, although most people tend to associate happiness with feelings of elation or pleasure (Hause and Murphy, 2010: xviii). Aquinas (Desan, 2016: 5) makes a distinction between happiness and enjoyment. For him, enjoyment relates to physical pleasures and earthly possessions, which do not last. He claims that:

It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, [...] natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things salable (Aquinas, 1947: 1314).

Aquinas (Desan, 2016: 5) believes that human beings will remain unhappy even if they experience all their earthly desires and every possible pleasure because the nagging feeling that something is still missing remains. In defence of his claim, he alludes to the experience of many celebrities and rich people in the contemporary era, who despite their worldly possessions, family and friends,

many of them remain deeply unhappy, even spiralling into the misery of drugs and suicide. Aquinas would explain this as follows: when every enjoyment is felt, the soul begins to crave for something more than mere enjoyment. But if one has no knowledge of this 'something more' or doesn't know how to go about finding it, the enjoyment turns to pain and suffering. This also explains why we see a lot of billionaires suddenly change towards the middle or end of their lives: that nagging feeling that there is something more results in charitable work or an orientation to a higher purpose in life (Desan, 2016: 5).

In view of Aristotle's realisation that wealth, pleasure and honour do not bring true happiness, he concludes that true happiness (eudaimonia) can only result from a contemplative life, which he considers as the highest good because it is something that cannot be easily taken away from the owner (Polansky, 2014: 14). For Aquinas, rationality is the essence of human nature and the source of human happiness, and human beings become happier the more they readily, consistently, and accurately participate in this rational activity (Hause & Murphy, 2010: xviii).

Aristotle (Echenique, 2012: 1) believes that eudaimonia (happiness, flourishing or well-being) will be achieved through the application of virtues, since it is the "virtues that represent man's path to happiness" (Guseynov, 2016: 486). MacIntyre (2007: 184) proceeds with this line of thought in his claim that the "exercise of the virtues is itself a crucial component of the good life for man" (MacIntyre, 2007: 184). Aquinas (Hause & Murphy, 2010: xviii) agrees with Aristotle that happiness is the most fulfilling type of

activity for human beings, and that human beings will never be happy without virtue. Eudemonia (happiness), for Aristotle (1962: 22; Echenique, 2012: 1), is the “activity of the soul in accordance with excellence (virtue) in a complete life [...]”. He believes that

in any situation, there is always the right thing to do. To determine which, one needs practical intelligence that is nothing else but an intellectual quality of a good human being. Hence, Aristotle’s main ethical task is to give an account of a good man living a good life and also describe a way to become one [...]. We achieve the good life by rationally developing our human virtues (Bykova, 2016: 450).

Aquinas distinguishes between perfect and imperfect happiness. He believes that human beings cannot attain perfect happiness in this lifetime because the world is highly submerged in unsatisfied desires that prevent human beings from achieving the ultimate good that they look for in nature. However, Aquinas believes that human beings can attain a measure of imperfect happiness in our earthly life. He appears to have been influenced by Aristotle in reaching such a conclusion since Aristotle posits that the attainment of happiness hinges on the ability of humans to actualise their natural faculties, notably reason. In other words, human beings can attain happiness on earth in proportion to the measure of truth that is accessible to reason (Desan, 2016: 2-3).

Aquinas (Hause and Murphy, 2010: xix) adopts a part of Aristotle’s account of happiness by claiming that human beings can in a way live earthly lives that are happy in the form of imperfect happiness. Based on Aristotle’s teachings, Aquinas distinguishes two levels of imperfect happiness:

The higher tier consists in the virtuous activity of rational contemplation. We will be happiest if we contemplate God, since he is the noblest of objects, though even contemplation of the various branches of knowledge will make us happy as well. The lower tier consists in the virtuous activity of practical reason, directing our life’s many actions and passions [...], those who enjoy this-worldly contemplative happiness will also have moral virtues, on the grounds that moral virtue is required for the sort of self-control and tranquillity of mind needed for that kind of contemplative activity (Hause & Murphy, 2010: xix).

This study observes that Aristotle and Aquinas associate contemplation or rationality and virtues as indispensable to the realisation of virtues. It appears as though they are

saying that human beings can only engage in rationality or contemplation, and by inference pursue happiness on the basis of their virtues. In other words, if human beings are not virtuous they cannot have the capacity or willingness to pursue a happy life. This makes sense because to be truly happy is not about pleasure or acquiring worldly possessions as shown above. It is, however, recognised that human beings need some external goods in order to be happy. According to Aristotle (1962: 293). “if it is not possible for a man to be supremely happy without external goods, we must not think that his needs will be great and many in order to be happy, for self-sufficiency and moral action do not consist in an excess (of possessions)”. True happiness does not depend on pleasure or excessive wealth. Rather, it is about living a good life, and this can be achieved when human beings continue to engage in introspection with the view to being the best individuals possible.

2.5 APPLICATION OF VIRTUES THEORY IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA

Aristotle and Aquinas, as shown in this chapter, allude to the central role that reasoning plays in promoting a life of virtue, even if they have done so with different emphases. Nonetheless, one tends to agree with them that the function of man is to reason well. This research notes that the reason why many things go wrong in the world can be traced to the failure of people to reason well. Sometimes such people deliberately choose to ignore logic while others are not able to reason well.

Obstacles to clear thinking, according to van den Berg (2010: 10-13), can result either from fallacies or from preconceived ideas. A fallacy subtle and as a result, more deceptive because it is an unsound mode of reasoning which can deceptively persuade us illegitimately. At first glance, the errors, unreasonableness or falseness of the fallacy may not be apparent since the statement has the appearance of truth or reasonableness. Preconceived ideas on the other hand, are socially conditioned and societally ingrained. Such ideas are rarely subjected to logical reasoning or critical reflection and many people make far-reaching decisions based on such notions, with attendant negative or unintended consequences. This study recommends that human beings should endeavour to always avoid such obstacles in all aspects of their daily lives in order to avoid all or most of the problems that confront the world at large and Africa in particular; especially racism, discrimination, inequality, inequity, lack of justice and fairness, conflicts and wars.

The level of corruption in Nigeria and South Africa, as will be espoused in chapter five, where officials embezzle substantial amounts of public funds without consideration for the interests of the citizens, lend credence to the negative implications of the obstacles to clear thinking. The recurrent spate of service delivery protests in South Africa and the consequent destruction of public property further espouses the unfavourable consequences of the obstacles to clear thinking. The protesters take action without thinking through the real causes of their grievances and the consequences of their intended actions. In the face of the tough economic climate that many governments find themselves, where the government in South Africa is struggling to find sufficient resources to meet the needs of the country, the protesters are destroying properties that may take ages to replace or that may not even be replaced or replaceable. Reasoning well enables people to discern good from bad judgements, actions, decisions and choices. According to Aristotle (Stedman, 2010: 59), human beings will live well if they reason well; and happiness consists in reasoning well over the course of a person's life.

As shown in this chapter, human beings do everything for the sake of being happy, although they tend to associate happiness mostly with the realisation of external goods and desires. Aristotle (Halim, 2012: 111) also believes that a happy life needs some measure of material goods since it is not easy or possible to engage in good activities without external goods. However, as shown in this chapter, he posits that happiness goes deeper than the possession of material goods and fame, because most of the things that human beings seek in order to be happy do not really bring them true happiness. This being the case, this research submits that true happiness consists mainly in the realisation of inner peace.

This study notes that the challenges that currently confront the world can derail a person's quest, willingness or ability to be ethical. For instance, in cases where one's rights are trampled upon, or injustice and lack of fairness is rife in the work place and social settings, it may be difficult for the victim to maintain his integrity. This observation is not in any way condoning immorality as a result of the circumstances in which human beings may find themselves. According to Audi (Winter, 2012: 14), virtue may not always be able to give rise to the most desirable conduct. However, the

virtuous person will always wish to do the right thing. Having robust character traits is a sufficient condition to guarantee that the owner of the traits will be positively disposed to acting with integrity when and where it is proper to do so, even in the face of difficulties.

Aristotle (Winter, 2012: 101) claims that human beings have natural virtues and are naturally capable of virtuous acts. If we agree that at best most people have the innate tendency to be virtuous, then one wonders why politicians, bureaucrats, technocrats are not able to govern and administer their countries and organisations properly as seen in the myriad of governance challenges and corporate failures? The reasons as will be revealed in chapter five include selfishness, greed, corruption, temptations, and widespread immorality.

Becoming a better or ethical person depends on factors such as self-awareness. A substantial amount of empirical research, according to Ashley and Reiter-Palmon (2012: 2), suggests that self-awareness plays a fundamental role in becoming successful people and leaders, and successful leadership development. It entails an inwardly focused process of self-evaluation in which the concerned individuals or leaders with a higher sense of self-introspection derive better results than those with lower degree of self-awareness. They posit that human beings have a unique

capacity to contemplate not only their status quo, but also their ideal status quo. This capacity is underpinned by the ability to imagine a future that is better than the past, evaluate alternatives, identify problems, and a yearning to progress toward an ideal. Intertwined are processes of self-reflexive thought, self-examination, and introspection. All of the above broadly circumscribe the construct of self-awareness, and although conceptualisation of self-awareness does vary, at its core is an ability to focus attention inward and study oneself as though looking in a mirror (Ashley & Reiter-Palmon, 2012: 2).

Authenticity in human beings and leadership, according to Berkovich (2014: 246), is a requisite condition in any genuine effort aimed at becoming the best human being possible. Proponents of authentic leadership claim that key features of authentic leadership involve being aware of one's true self, and self-regulation. Authentic leaders employ introspective reflection in becoming aware of their identity, core values, and goals, while the process of authentic self-regulation includes the elements

of relational transparency, internalised regulatory system that proceeds from the leader's intrinsic self, actions that reflect the individual's core values, and the processing of information relating to the person in unbiased manner. The theory assumes that human beings have the capacity to discover and develop their innate authentic potentials in a manner that combines self-awareness and self-narration.

Critics of the authentic leadership theory, however, do not agree with these positive propositions, claiming that authentic leadership theory overlooks the political and practical aspects of leadership in institutions. Numerous shortcomings have been noticed in the authentic leadership approach, notably among which are that

authentic leadership theory conceptualises leaders' authenticity as an essentialist entity. Thus, it is suggested that leaders' authenticity has common features that can be objectively observed and identified [...]. As against this perception, Price [...], argues that most leaders can be said to support the values of authentic leadership. They disagree widely, however, on the specific demands of honesty, loyalty, and fairness as well as on what constitutes justice, equality, and human rights. Moreover, the assumption of a coherent and consistent self is seriously questioned because in everyday life individuals play different and even opposing social roles [...]. Thus, the conceptualisation of authenticity as a fundamental and realistic human characteristic seems at best problematic (Berkovich, 2014: 246).

Leadership, according to Benjamin and O'Reilly (2011: 453), depends on the capability of the person concerned since it relates to who the person is, his thoughts and actions. Although acquiring these leadership skills may be partly dispositional, the greater part of the development process results from experience and learning. From this perspective, the process of improving leadership development can be enhanced "by better understanding what aspects of 'doing' leaders struggle with and why. Understanding the early 'doing' challenges will likely produce significant insight into other aspects of leadership as well" (Benjamin & O'Reilly, 2011: 453).

2.6 SUMMARY

This chapter has examined ethics in general and virtue ethics in particular, using the thoughts of Aristotle as its point of departure, while also examining the views of other philosophers such Aquinas on the constitutive elements of virtue ethics and the impact of virtues on human conduct. The chapter has considered the moral theories that

provide guidance on right and wrong actions, especially deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. The ultimate goal of human life from the perspectives of Aristotle and Aquinas was espoused, while the import of virtue ethics for the contemporary era has also been considered.

While some philosophers consider ethics and morality to mean the same thing, others apply different meanings to them, claiming that while ethics is a theory of morality, morality connotes virtues, values or certain system of rules. Morality in many cases is associated with religious, traditional or outdated notions of human conduct; while ethics is associated with contemporary notions of right and wrong. In ordinary language, however, morality and ethics are often used interchangeably. The chapter reveals that ethics is about knowing what is right; acting or behaving in the right manner; a consideration of the interest of all stakeholders; and the evaluation of the morality of human conduct and its consequences.

Deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics are the main ethical theories that provide standards for the determination of right and wrong behaviour. However, they disagree on the measure of morality. For deontology, the consequences of people's actions do not determine their morality. Rather, morality results from adherence to duties. For utilitarianism, actions are right when they result in happiness for most of the people who are affected by those actions. Happiness in this case means pleasure, the absence of pain, and impartiality in the dispersal of rights and benefits. In opposition to these theories that base the measure of morality on actions, their consequences, rules and moral principles, virtue ethics emphasises the virtue of character as the determinant of morally right actions.

Deontology is criticised for not concerning itself with the consequences of individual actions and behaviours on others. The critics suggest that this theory should be complemented by the virtues theory. The deontologists reject this criticism, claiming that virtues play a crucial role in Kant's moral theory. However, the critics of deontology do not consider Kant's virtue theory as authentic.

A number of the critics of utilitarianism posit that the utilitarian philosophy that considers happiness or pleasure as the only intrinsic good is hedonistic. In reaction to

this criticism, Mill asserts that the pleasure that he refers to does not apply mainly to brutish physical pleasures, but also to pleasures such as physical, emotional and aesthetic pleasures. He further asserts that many people can be satisfied with minimal pleasure if and when they attain the state of inner peace and tranquillity.

Virtue ethics is often criticised for failing (unlike deontology and utilitarianism) to prioritise actions in its determination of morality; for failing to indicate how human beings can be moral; for instead of establishing the rightness of actions through appeal to universal laws, it questions the individual's character and virtue for different situations. Sim responds to the critics of virtue ethics, claiming that Aristotle does recognise the importance of rules in enabling human beings to be virtuous because he posits that people must avoid wrong actions and be law abiding in order to become virtuous.

Aristotle posits that happiness (eudemonia) is the ultimate goal of all human endeavours. He asserts that while all human beings recognise happiness as the main goal of human life, they do not have a common understanding of what it means. While some people see it as pleasure, others believe it is honour, fame, or glory. However, Aristotle posits that these elements do not really bring human beings true happiness. Aquinas concurs with Aristotle in this regard, claiming that most rich, famous and powerful individuals have not found happiness through their status. They both consider a life of rational contemplation and living in accordance with virtues as the true sources of happiness.

One of the critical contributions that Aristotle makes to virtue ethics is his assertion that human beings possess natural virtues and are able to naturally recognise virtuous acts. The problems in this assertion for the contemporary era is that so many challenges are facing the world at large and Africa in particular as a result of the failure of leaders, managers and society members at large to behave ethically and to contribute positively to the development of their countries, to peace, security and welfare of their citizens. As Aristotle notes, all the virtues cannot be found in one person since no one is perfect. However, he believes that human beings can acquire these virtues through practice, by emulating or consulting wise and virtuous individuals, and through learning.

Human beings can also become virtuous through self-awareness and self-introspection. Empirical research suggests that many people and leaders have become successful through self-awareness, which enables them to not only evaluate their present situation, but also their ideal expectations in life. Self-awareness further enables the individual to contemplate a future that is better than the present or past; identify the challenges; consider possible options; and hope for advancing towards the ideal state.

CHAPTER THREE

3 THE PHILOSOPHIC IDEAL STATE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The objectives of this chapter are to examine the features of the philosophic ideal state as propounded by Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes; and the commonalities and divergences in their views regarding the constitutive elements of a good political society. While Plato (Lull & Mico, 2011: 8) considers the foundation of the ideal state as resting on well-defined division of labour, Aristotle (Gordley, 2015: 201) considers the city state as existing for the purpose of promoting the good life, in just relationships, and in the distribution of goods and services based on merit. Hobbes (1968: 186) considers human natural conditions as intrinsically aggressive, and filled with fear; and he concludes that if human beings continue to live in a state of nature, then all lives would be solitary, nasty, brutish and short. Based on these observations, Hobbes (1968: 223-224) asserts that peaceful coexistence among human beings can only be guaranteed when they enter into a social contract in a commonwealth ruled by a sovereign head.

One of the salient features that emanate from this chapter which holds far-reaching implications for contemporary systems of governance is Aristotle's (Gordley, 2015: 201) rejection of Plato's communism of property for its propensity to generate disagreements, discontent and civil unrest among the citizens when they are not rewarded in proportion to their contributions. The challenge that this research notes here is that over the ages various governments and institutions have practiced either communism or private ownership of properties without either of these systems having the requisite ability to meet the needs and aspirations of community members. The research therefore posits that it is imperative that a satisfactory system is conceived and successfully implemented to the satisfaction of all stakeholders. This demands that the right kind of leaders be elected. The onus lies on such leaders to be cognisant of their values, capacities and capabilities; and to engage in a renewed quest for ethical governance.

3.2 DESIRABLE ENDS OF THE IDEAL STATE

Hobbes (1968: 186) considers the human natural condition, otherwise known as the state of nature, as innately aggressive, troublesome, chaotic, violent, and filled with fear. He illustrates this belief with the hypothetical image of people's natural condition prior to the advent of a formal state, as one of continuous fear, antagonism, and exposure to misery, aggression and death. He notes that with the limitation of resources a power struggle results when two people want the same thing. Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 1) submits that the quarrelsome nature of human beings makes it impossible for them to peacefully coexist in the absence of a greater authority. He points to three main causes of quarrels namely: diffidence, competition and glory; and he also considers the main objectives of human beings as safety, gain and reputation. For Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 1), human happiness resides in their ability to be better off in comparison with others; and they are constantly competing for dignity, honour and glory. As a result, he concludes that these contestations or competition among human beings lead to hatred, envy and ultimately war.

Hobbes (Lloyd, 2013: 4) asserts that as a result of the conflicting nature of human beings, the natural inclination for self-preservation, happiness and felicity, on the one hand, and the need for interdependence, on the other, it is rational for human beings to seek cooperation with each other. Therefore, Hobbes (1968: 223-224) proposes his Leviathan – the Ideal State, claiming that for men to live in peace and harmony without having to rely on individual strengths as a means of protection, they must enter into a social contract in a commonwealth ruled by a sovereign head.

The establishment of the *Leviathan* through a covenant, for Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 1) is voluntary, necessary and rational because it is the only means of avoiding the lawlessness that characterises the state of nature, the troublesome characteristics of human nature, the probability of human beings flouting the laws of nature, and to ensure security and peace for everyone. He claims that, even an oppressive government is better than living under the threat of war. This study notes that there may be merit in the claim that even an oppressive government is better than living under the threat of war. However, this research also notes that an oppressive government can also lead to unrest among the citizens and eventually war, as

reflected in the recent destructive developments in various parts of the world. For instance, the regime of Gaddafi, the former Libyan leader “was characterised by bad governance and corruption [...]. Gaddafi reinforced his authoritarian rule by granting economic privileges [...], to various tribes or by threatening punishment” (NATO-Harvard Project, 2013: 12).

Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 1) outlines a number of natural laws which he considers to be general rules that proceed from reason, which discourage human beings from self-destructive tendencies, and which he believes are able to improve human life if they were consistently adhered to. These include the need to search for peace and covenants and to defend oneself if necessary. However, he observes that it is difficult for human beings to adhere to these rules, which are able to guide them towards self-preservation in the absence of a sovereign head since they run contrary to human nature. For Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 1) “the only way to erect the common power needed to maintain peace and security is through a covenant, in which men give their power to one man and submit their wills to his will and their judgement to his judgement”.

Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 1) agrees with those who contend that members of a state are to a greater extent not happy under a powerful sovereign. However, he argues that it is not possible for human beings to be totally happy in any case and since unhappiness can lead to civil war. Civil war and absence of powerful sovereignty exacerbate the level of suffering that accompanies such chaos. He believes that community members will live in consensus once they become part of the commonwealth since the accompanying contract is binding. He considers the rights of the sovereign to be the same irrespective of how he came to power; and his powers can neither be usurped nor transferred to someone else without his consent. Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 1) posits that the sovereign may neither relinquish his power nor be accused by his subjects of abusing his power. Moreover, his subjects cannot reprimand him since he is the judge of doctrines and of what is necessary for peace.

According to Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 1-2), the sovereign is the ultimate judge and he is above the law; since he acts on behalf of his subjects, his actions are effectively the actions of the members of his state; and he cannot harm his subjects since no one

can inflict injury on oneself. He considers the best form of administration as residing in the most powerful government made of an absolute monarch with unlimited rights. He posits that the commonwealth should be administered indefinitely by a sovereign with unrestricted powers because human beings are fundamentally flawed and in order to avert the resurgence of the state of nature. He prefers the monarchical form of government to other forms of governance such as aristocracy and democracy, as more superior because it accords the sovereign head maximum power with no constraints. He considers democracies governed by representatives and Aristocracies ruled by a part of the population as weaker than a monarchy for their inability to guarantee a substantial level of peace and security.

This study disagrees with the idea of according the sovereign head unlimited powers because that would be excessive. Rather, it is suggested that a competent sovereign head who rules his state with justice and fairness and who successfully provides for the needs of all members of his state should be allowed to continue administering the state until he is no longer able to perform his duties satisfactorily. This suggestion is made on the basis that there is no point in replacing a good leader when he is still effectively discharging his duties. Furthermore, it is recommended that leaders vacate their office between the age of 65 and 68 years; the leaders must put proper succession plans in place to ensure that worthy successors are prepared to take over the reins of power when the incumbents vacate their positions.

This study considers the level of faith that Hobbes (as shown above) places on the sovereign head as excessive and capable of causing more harm than good for the state. His consideration of the sovereign as a perfect leader who is not capable of doing wrong, runs contrary to what obtains in reality, because there is no leader who has ruled his state to the ultimate satisfaction of his subjects. It is further noted that the conferment of excessive power in the hands of one ruler without the oversight of constituted authorities can lead to dangerous developments if the ruler is unethical. The fact that no normal person would consciously inflict harm upon himself as Hobbes claims above, does not mean that he is not capable of inflicting harm on others for selfish reasons.

Aristotle (Nitsch, 2009: 12) disagrees with Hobbes' assertion that the concern of a political scientist should be on how to constitute the best regime. Rather, he posits that such concern should also be on how to improve existing governments; how current governments came into being; how to sustain them; and which model regimes exist that most other governments can emulate. A true ruler, for Aristotle (1962: 130), "is the guardian of what is just, and as such he is also the guardian of equality and fairness [...]. His labour is, therefore, for the benefit of others, and for this reason justice is called another's good [...]"

The best form of rule for Aristotle (Nitsch, 2009: 12-22) is a mixed regime which tends to be more stable than unmixed regime where claims about injustice result in conflicts, factionalism and revolutions. He considers Democracy and Oligarchy as holding specific beliefs regarding the nature of political justice. He asserts that based on the philosophy of the democrats the people should rule, equality becomes the fundamental basis for deciding who rules, while political rule must be equally shared among the citizens since they are all equally free. He further posits that Oligarchs, on the other hand, believe that inequality of property should be the determining factor in deciding who rules in the sense that the rich should rule because they have wealth and property and by implication would not be tempted to misrule or divert public funds for personal use. Aristotle (Nitsch, 2009: 22) is not convinced of the efficacy of either forms of governance because adherence to either of them would lead to unfortunate consequences.

Aristotle (Nitsch, 2009: 18) considers his Polity to be the best kind of democratic regime since it indicates how best to constitute a regime that is institutionally mixed. The polity, for him, can be a combination of individual laws that democracies and oligarchies typically practice. For instance, while democracies tend to make financial assistance available to poor citizens to take part in political life, oligarchies on the other hand tend to do the same for richer citizens. The two principles can be combined by a polity, according to Aristotle (Nitsch, 2009: 18-19)

by using both at the same time, encouraging all citizens to participate. Second, a polity might draw on both democracy and oligarchy by trying to find a mean between each of their characteristic approaches. Again, regarding financial incentives for political participation, for example, a polity

might provide a middling amount of financial incentive for poorer citizens to participate not so much as would be typical of a democracy, but more than would be typical of an oligarchy [...]. Finally, Aristotle indicates, a polity can combine the principles of oligarchy and democracy by taking some elements from one, and some from the other (Nitsch, 2009: 18-19).

This study recommends that countries, which witness rampant lawlessness and instability, such as South Africa and Nigeria, as will be exposed in chapter five, should opt for the monarchical system of governance if the sovereign head were just, fair and possessed sufficient wisdom. It is noted, that the extent of lawlessness that obtains in these democracies is disconcerting. In the case of South Africa, many disgruntled individuals and groups, according to Nembambula (2015: 47) engage in violent protests over issues such as corruption and inadequate provision of basic services. In the process they often engage in the destruction of public goods, property and private businesses. It is observed in the Nigerian case that there are groups such as the violent Boko Haram who are attempting to Islamise a section of the northern region (Arendas, 2016: 40). This study notes that it seems as though democratic principles are not able to employ ultimate firmness to quash such agitations that could otherwise be expressed through peaceful means. These are cases where the monarch could employ drastic measures, including the use of force to quench such dissents and to serve as a deterrent.

Wolfenden (2010: 1-2) considers Hobbes arguments as mostly valid, though consisting of a number of deficiencies. He finds Hobbes' theoretical explanation for the formation of government as not capable of practical application. For instance, while Hobbes (1968: 223-224) posits that all governments are formed on the basis of a covenant, Wolfenden (2010: 1-2) contends that there are a number of cases where governments are imposed on an unwilling population. However, Hobbes (Wolfenden, 2010: 2) defends his position, claiming that all people acting rationally would prefer to associate with the commonwealth since the alternative in the form of a state of nature is not appealing, and it is inconceivable that rational beings would prefer to choose the state of nature.

Wolfenden (2010: 2) criticises Hobbes for placing excessive levels of faith in his absolute and benevolent sovereign; for making a number of implausible assumptions,

including that the sovereign is prepared to work solely in the interests of his subjects without allowing his personal interest to cloud his judgements. This is considered an unlikely tendency, because most rulers do not always consider the interests of community members in their actions and decisions. Wolfenden (2010: 2) further criticises Hobbes for contradicting himself by also claiming that although the sovereign may be selfish, he is at the same time able to take into account the interests of his community members. History has, however, often revealed that, according to Wolfenden (2010: 2),

absolute power corrupts absolutely, that when leaders are allowed to act however they wish they more often than not take what they want at the expense of the state and their citizens. Hobbes reliance on a monarch who would somehow be able to ignore his personal desires for the good of the country makes his political regime seem much less practical.

This study notes that it does not appear as though there is one absolute form of governance that is sufficient to guarantee a well ordered society in which the needs and aspirations of all community members are fulfilled. It is observed that while the monarchical form of governance may be preferable for applying tough measures on those who flout the rules and values of society, it is better to subscribe to a system of rule that holds the absolute monarch accountable if he fails to be ethical, just and fair in administering the state. This would include elements of a mixed regime as Aristotle (Nitsch, 2009) suggests. However, this study submits that the mixed regime must have the monarchical system as one part of it.

3.3 FEATURES OF A GOOD POLITICAL SOCIETY FOR PLATO

This section gives consideration to Plato's treatise on a good political society because one of the main objectives of this research is to come up with ideas that can contribute to a transformed post-colonial African society. Allen (2010: 4), among other theorists recognises Plato as the world's first systematic political philosopher. He considers Plato the Western world's first critical activist who wrote among other things, to effect change in societies that were in ethical, social, economic and political turmoil. He is also recognised for his contributions to the transformation of his society's politics and culture. Plato's era, according to Wright (2016: 11) witnessed immense anarchy, violence, instability, internal and external negative influences which he realised would

lead to the loss of the state's social, ethical and cultural values. As a result, he attempted to comprehend the reasons for such a level of moral laxity, as well as to seek means of rectifying the problems identified. He concluded that the claims of the state must take precedence over those of the individual, and he laid emphasis on homogeneity and order.

Beever (2013: 37) recognises Plato as the West's recognised first great philosopher for his immense contributions to ethics and political philosophy in his two major treatises: the Republic and the Laws, (as well as in other works namely Apology, Gorgias, Crito and Statesman), in which he addresses the question of how societies should be governed. In the Republic and the Laws (written in the form of dialogue), especially in the Laws, Plato (Beever, 2013: 37-39) blames the disasters that occurred in the Greek world South of Macedonia, including his city Athens, Sparta and their allies, on the cities' inadequate political systems. In the Republic and the Laws, therefore, he searches for an ideal alternative system of politics, as well as how political office bearers in such systems ought to discharge their duties. This study observes that many of the factors that created upheavals many centuries ago in the Greek world and in other parts of the globe are still largely responsible for the socio-political and economic confusion that seem to characterise the contemporary world, notably post-colonial African states.

Allen (2010: 4) notes that although Plato was a political leader or politician as his writings show, he did not take an active part in the political affairs of his city. This research considers it wrong that Plato did not actively participate in the Affairs of his city-state, because it is not enough to propound ideas without taking an active part in their implementation. Those who conceive policy proposals are supposed to understand why they came up with the ideas in the first place. As a result, they should be fully or partially involved in their development and implementation. If the originator of the ideas does not want to take active part in their implementation, he should endeavour to play advisory and or monitoring roles to ensure that the ideas come to purposeful fruition. This study notes that a number of the reasons for the failure of post-colonial African states can be attributed to the failures of intellectuals to be active participants in the running of the state as opposed to sitting in their 'ivory towers', making comments and analysis that may not be seriously considered. One wonders

what is responsible for such reluctance on their part to actively engage in governance processes, because “post-independence leadership styles in Africa have hitherto remained [...] incompetent in both public and private organisations” (Kuada, 2010: 15).

3.3.1 Plato’s Ideal State

In the *Republic*, Plato (Lull & Mico, 2011: 9) considers the Aristocratic state as the best, and as such, the most just type of government. He considers the other forms of government, such as oligarchy, democracy, timocracy and tyranny as a degeneration of aristocracy. He posits that rebellion is the only measure that could lead to the disintegration of a state, and therefore, could never be justified. The characteristics of these forms of government are described in the third chapter of the *Republic*, according to Lull and Mico (2011: 9):

Aristocracy is a state governed by the best. Timocracy is the government of the ambitious who believe themselves to be superior because they are good huntsmen, sportsmen, or soldiers and who are, in the end, men of action, who own properties and get rich in secret. Oligarchy represents the government of a small group of wealthy citizens who hold power. In democracy there are neither criteria, nor ideals of law and order, as truth itself is not believed in, only subjective personal appetites, depending on who governs the city. It is only the ideal form of government in appearance, where no one is in command, with no coercion, where equality is shared out equally. Tyranny is the degeneration of democracy and arises when freedom concludes in licentiousness and the people need a leader to settle internal conflicts produced by private desires and selfishness.

Plato (Bruchmüller, 2011: 44-46) asserts that in view of the decadent nature of the city states in his era, it was impossible to heal any state without a favourable destiny and a miraculous intervention of statesmen and philosophers in a collaborative effort. In other words, the process of implementing the best state for Plato hinges on human destiny, which depends on the providence of the gods, as well as on the efforts of human beings to establish the connection. The role or will of the gods in the realisation of the best state for Plato (Bruchmüller, 2011: 46) lies in the influence they have on human actions and thoughts, on occurrences in the state, as well as on divine inspiration. He considers the realisation of the best state as depending on the possibility of finding powerful men who are able to acquire philosophic knowledge and ability, or who are prepared to be educated in true philosophy; and he stresses that

the only means of attaining happiness on earth is by connecting with the realm of ideas with commitment.

3.3.2 Elements and Structure of Plato's Ideal State

According to Plato (Lull & Mico, 2011: 8), his social order (Republic) is not founded on the principles of inheritance in which for instance, certain positions are passed from father to son. Rather, he claims that it is structured around a meticulously planned division of labour, in which a person is given a social responsibility on the basis of his combined qualities of maturity and good education that links up with elements such as virtue and temperance.

Plato (Lull & Mico, 2011: 5) considers the objectives of the state to include being in control of power, attending to interior and exterior matters, including the economy, labour, material things and social order. In order to realise these objectives, he structures the population into three parts with clearly differentiated intellectual and social objectives, namely: the magistrates, rulers and philosophers; the guardians; and the workers. These structures, according to Plato (Wright, 2016: 11-12), correspond to the three parts of the soul. He posits that the philosophers should govern the city; the guardians will protect the city; and the producers, who are the lowest class, consist of farmers, artisans and general workers.

Plato (Jonas, 2016: 205) notes that knowledge plays a fundamental role in the early stages of the moral growth of young adults. He posits that knowledge must be accompanied by a stringent process of habituation and imitation. He believes that one can only become virtuous by practising the virtues with the guidance of virtuous role models. Aristotle (Jonas, 2016: 205) agrees with this manner of acquiring virtues. He provides that a list of specific virtues should be given to students to practice in order for them to acquire good character, happiness, good reputation and wealth. He further posits that adults should also embody these virtues, and be made to practice them every day. Plato and Socrates (Jonas, 2016: 205) on the other hand, recommend only one virtue, namely justice as sufficient to enable human beings to be ethical, just and fulfilled. Furthermore, "the Platonic approach dispenses with the need to practice doing virtuous acts and instead focuses on helping students develop their knowledge of the

good, which, when achieved, guarantees that they will choose the good.” (Jonas, 2016: 205).

Jonas (2016: 206) criticises Plato’s treatise above, claiming that while Plato believes that one must have a clear understanding of virtues in order to be virtuous, he does not emphasise the importance of practical approaches to the development of character in the cultivation of virtues. Therefore, he concludes that this failure by Plato to emphasise the importance of affective and volitional aspects of moral development, while also failing to emphasise the relevance of educating people in the kinds of behaviour required to promote the affective and volitional, makes his theory for educational theorists unattractive.

This study finds it problematic that Plato overlooks the relevance of practical applications in guaranteeing effective absorption of virtues, because it is not enough to acquire knowledge without making any effort to put them into practice. This chapter notes that it is possible that Plato could have reasoned that having a clear understanding of issues or expectations would automatically translate to applying them in our daily lives. But history has shown that many people who are knowledgeable in various disciplines do not in many cases apply them. This matter will be considered further in chapter five, where the failure of postcolonial African states will be extensively linked to the inability of leaders and community members to be ethical and just in their conducts and approach to governance processes, even when they understand their duties and obligations.

3.3.2.1 The Magistrates, Rulers and Philosopher Kings

The first layer, from which the leaders of a state will be chosen, according to Plato (Lull & Mico, 2011: 5), consists of magistrates, who are both rulers and philosopher kings. He posits that the only solution to the problems of any state and the human race is that its rulers must be the best. In other words, they should be philosophers devoted to the contemplation of knowledge and the search for goodness. He believes that the idea of the Good is something that only philosophers are familiar with.

In his political theory, Plato (Beever, 2013: 41) recommends that the ruling class receive the kind of education that enables them to govern impartially and with

disinterest. While he concedes that education alone may not be a sufficient means of producing the required kind of rulers, he adds that rulers must pursue the kind of lifestyle that enables them to always consider the interests of their citizens. He made this provision as a result of what obtained in his era, where the oligarchs disbursed favours and political powers on wealthy individuals.

This study notes that the manner in which political offices and privileges were disbursed in Plato's era is similar to what obtains currently in many parts of the world, including Africa as will be shown in chapter five, where powers and favours are distributed impartially, through favouritism and nepotism. The solution that Plato advances in this regard is to, according to Beever (2013: 41-42)

regulate the lifestyle of the rulers so that such conflicts of interest cannot arise. It is as radical as we might now expect. He stipulates that the guardians are to hold no private property and are to have no families [...]; the rule is not that guardians are prohibited from procreating. It is that they are not entitled to have spouses or to act as parents. Instead, they are to copulate during state-run mating festivals and their children are to be raised by a state-run organisation in ignorance of their biological parents. Moreover, as Plato holds that physical and moral traits are hereditary, he maintains that the state must adopt a programme of eugenics.

This study contends that Plato must have thought that eugenics would enable society to produce well-ordered human beings by ensuring that people with undesirable traits are not allowed to have children since they might produce like-minded children who would constitute hindrances to the process of realising a well ordered and ethical society. It is possible that eugenics might be a good way of improving society. However, this study argues that it could also become a means of brainwashing people from childhood to act and behave in a certain manner. It is noted here that a society that sincerely aims at becoming ethical and just may use such a process to its advantage, by teaching and directing people from infancy to knowledge of the good life, to how to live a life that secures happiness, love, respect, peace and tolerance for everyone. A society, on the other hand, whose main objective is to cause chaos and illegalities can use such a programme to create a more unstable world.

For Plato (Beever, 2013: 41), leaders must possess the character of Philosopher Kings. He does not mean that philosophers must be given political power. Neither does

he mean that political power should be given to a select group of people such as the Aristocracy, nor that power should be given to selfish people whose main goal is the acquisition of pleasure and wealth. Rather, he means that political power should be given to those whose main focus in life is the discovery of truth because disinterested rulers are more likely to be incorruptible. Plato (Beever, 2013: 41-43) believes that philosophers who are more concerned with contemplating the world, who do not really seek political power, but who are prepared to actively participate in political affairs and governance out of a sense of duty, are more likely to rule disinterestedly. While he posits that the state must be governed on the basis of justice, he considers philosophers as the only people who are in the position of discovering what justice entails as their focus lies on the form of the good. The potential to realise the ideal state for Plato and Socrates (Buchmüller, 2011: 54), depends on the ability of philosophers to rule the state. In this regard, they outline the characteristics of the true philosopher as one who ought to love all wisdom, who loves to learn and pursue all parts of knowledge whole heartedly. The realm of truth or wisdom, according to Plato and Socrates (Buchmüller, 2011: 54)

is a structured whole with a considerable number of different parts, each of which the lover of wisdom has to investigate. Therefore, he needs intellectual capacity [...], which is indispensable for philosophy must be directed toward the right things within the ontological structured whole [...]; it is pointless to know everything if one is unable to perceive how everything hangs together and incapable of organising the manifold objects of knowledge on a higher ontological order.

The contemplative ideal for Plato (McKeen, 2010: 198) is the kind of life that is mostly associated with the natural character of the philosopher; this is the kind of life that brings the greatest happiness to the philosopher. He considers the happiness or the dominant factor in the happiness of the philosopher is philosophical contemplation. His contemplative ideal relates to those who possess philosophical character, who possess good memories, who are critical thinkers, broadminded, naturally curious, persistent, and tend to engage in abstract thinking. Accordingly, he expects the philosopher to organise his life in a manner that prioritises philosophical contemplation. In order to attain such a philosophical ideal, he expects the philosopher to devote marginal time to non-intellectual and bodily matters.

Socrates in McKeen (2010: 198), agrees with Plato's characterisation of the philosopher as he posits in the *Phaedo*, that philosophers must seek wisdom above other things; and wisdom will be derived from philosophical contemplation. The philosopher who seeks the contemplative ideal, according to Plato (McKeen, 2010: 198), should only engage in partial community and political activities especially in communities that he is very familiar with; rather, he should prefer a state (Polis) or community in which he can have unlimited space to engage in philosophical contemplation to the highest level permissible by nature. The individuals who possess natural philosophic characteristics in the ideal state, according to Plato (McKeen, 2010: 198) "will be identified, nurtured, and groomed through a long programme of education and training. At the end of this long road, these developed philosophers will serve in key roles governing the state".

This study finds it questionable that Plato expects natural philosophers to abstain from political activities, while he expects those in the city who have inherent philosophical potentials to participate in state affairs once they have been sufficiently trained. One wonders what use it would be for the natural philosophers to only engage in philosophical contemplation when they could use their good knowledge to improve the conditions in their countries. This study recommends that the natural philosophers be actively engaged in the administration of the state, so that their knowledge can be fully utilised for the development of their society.

3.3.2.2 The Guardians and Warriors

The second layer of citizens in the ideal state, according to Plato (Lull & Mico, 2011: 6), consists of the guardians whose role is mainly to protect the state from lawlessness, internal and external threat. He recommends that they receive the kinds of education that will ensure that they do not become tyrants or protectors of unjust individuals and rulers; but that will prepare them for possible assumption of leadership roles, and enable them to comprehend the ideas of Truth and the Good. Such education must include, according to Plato (Lull & Mico, 2011: 6-7):

fables and stories showing the gods as beings who only perform good, fair, and true deeds. Their instruction must avoid sentimental and emotional literature, and should include a certain type of gymnastics and music. The

demand that the same tasks and training be applied to both women and men is again a revolutionary proposition for his time.

Although Plato (Beever, 2013: 39) recognises the importance of the role of the guardians, he also realises that since power corrupts, they could constitute a danger to members of society as a result of their physical dominance which could make them naturally aggressive towards the citizens. In modern democracies, according to Beever (2013: 39) this kind of threat is contained by ensuring that guardians are under the control of a civilian authority who controls the armed forces, who are elected by the citizens and accountable to them. However, Plato (Beever, 2013: 39-41) responds differently, claiming that the way to eliminate the aggression of guardians is through adequate education that ensures that their minds do not tend towards aggressive behaviour. He considers the development of virtuous citizens as the main objective of education because it is the only means of ensuring the realisation of a just society. While he supports the admission of women into the group of guardians, he posits that the men and women must receive the same education, and be chosen solely on merit.

3.3.2.3 The Workers and Peasants

Plato (Lull & Mico, 2011: 6) conceives the workers, labourers, craftsmen and peasants as the third and final layer of citizens in his ideal state, with the role of providing society's basic needs and services. In line with his plan, members in this group are not qualified to rule the state. Rather, he assigns this function solely to philosophers who are sufficiently equipped with the rational knowledge of the Good, and therefore, can fulfil the mandate of ensuring a just society. The other members of the state are required to acquire the virtue of temperance as this will enable them to accept their societal roles, and to recognise the rulers' authority. This recognition does not result from fear, but from the belief that, according to Plato (Lull & Mico, 2011: 6-7) "the rulers are the most capable of the task intellectually and that their decisions will always be guided by the pursuit of the common good and never for private profit. Only the ignorant would act against order, justice, and good".

3.3.3 Plato's Idea of Justice

Justice, for Plato (Wright, 2016: 10) relates to fulfilling one's duties and achieving one's potentials without infringing on other people's rights or doing something that is contrary

to one's nature. He assigns this position to both the just person and the just state. In the just state, he posits that everyone and each class is accorded specific roles and obligations which when fulfilled would create a harmonious whole; each person is rewarded for fulfilling assigned duties; and each person would be punished for failing to fulfil assigned functions. He considers deficiencies and excesses as unjust. For instance, a doctor who deliberately refuses to cure his patient is unjust, and a thief is unjust for taking what belongs to another. A murderer is unjust for taking another person's life, while a state is unjust when it fails to successfully implement its functions such as enabling the citizens access to shelter, food, clothing, and to seek the Good.

In his treatise on the state, Plato (Wright, 2016: 10) believes that all aspects of nature are hierarchical, including the just state. He considers all aspects of nature to be harmonious, while all organisms perform specific roles. Furthermore, he claims that "anarchy is a supreme vice, the most unnatural and unjust state of affairs [...]; individuals are ranked according to their aptitudes, and definitively placed in the social hierarchy" (Wright, 2016: 10).

In his discussion on the just state, Plato (Wright, 2016: 11) clarifies the nature of the just soul because he considers both of them to be analogous, claiming that the divisions of both the state and the soul correspond to each other. Justice for Plato (1988: 1), is "the central value in both the unity of human societies and the harmony of individual souls". The individual soul, according to Plato (Bruchmüller, 2011: 46) is hierarchical in the sense that the rational part is superior to both the appetitive and the spirited parts, while the appetitive part of the soul is inferior to the spirited part; despite this, each part of the soul performs a crucial role. He asserts that while a person should be governed by reason, the appetites must also be considered so as to maintain a harmonious soul that is not in conflict with itself. He further posits that a moderate and ordered state of affairs will be maintained when every part of the soul fulfils its functions.

Plato (Wright, 2016: 10) considers the soul of the virtuous person to be well ordered because he knows what justice entails and behaves in accordance with the knowledge that he has. The virtuous individual, according to Plato (Wright, 2016: 10) "knows his place in the state; he knows what his aptitudes are; and he puts them into practice. He

also adheres to the dictates of reason, doing everything in moderation”. In his treatise on the best state, Plato (Bruchmüller, 2011: 46) assigns the soul a crucial role. He connects the soul to the concept of justice, claiming that justice relates to the order in human soul, and not necessarily with human possessions and actions. He believes that every part shall get what is due to it and that no one part of the soul may interfere in the affairs of another part. He concludes that when this rule is maintained, each person rules himself, orders his life, lives in harmony with others and with each part of the soul (Bruchmüller, 2011: 46).

Plato (Beever, 2013: 46) argues in the Republic that justice requires the establishment of a specific type of system of politics, which has to have the ability for adequate governance. He does not, however, give in-depth exposition of the kinds of policies that will enable the rulers to govern effectively, other than his treatise on the lifestyle and education of philosopher kings and his conviction that such a level of lifestyle and education would ensure that the rulers govern in a just manner and implement just laws.

Wright (2016: 11) notes that although there are similarities between Plato’s and the contemporary era’s conceptions of justice, fundamental differences exist. He observes that in the contemporary era, justice relates to individual freedom and the priority that a person enjoys over the community; non-adherence to the laws are sometimes condoned in cases where they violate an intuition of individual rights. On the other hand, Plato (Wright, 2016: 11), posits that justice proceeds from his belief that the community as a whole takes precedence over an individual; human beings are expected to fit into a cosmic order; while duty to an extent, and virtue take precedence over rights. This study notes the similarities between Plato’s thoughts on the central role of the community and the traditional African concept of ethics and morality in which “community of life or communitarianism ranked over and above individualism” (Udokang, 2014: 268). This humanised African ethics will be considered further in chapter four.

The just or ideal individual, for Plato (Wright, 2016: 11), is a philosopher whose appetites and passions are governed by his rational faculty, thereby ensuring that they are moderate in all their actions and words; and his wisdom results in total harmony

of the soul with itself. The just person understands his society and himself; he is always in control of himself; he knows what it means to be virtuous; and possesses considerable level of equanimity. On the other hand, the unjust person for Plato (Wright, 2016: 11), is in conflict with himself; struggles between his appetites and passions; and lacks regard for reason which is capable of unifying his soul.

Wright (2016: 11) posits that the current liberal democratic society's idea of the ideal person bears similarities with Plato's idea of virtue. However, he contends that the modern world conceives virtue as more of treating others well and less of having a healthy relationship in the community. In other words, the modern conception of the ideal person dwells on being respectful and civil to each other, and not so much on promoting the cultivation of good character. This study observes that these claims regarding the insincerity with which many people relate to each other currently contain elements of validity. It is noted that many people pretend to care about others when in reality they do not mean it. Some people treat others well out of a sense of societal obligation, and not because they truly believe in being good to others. This manner of pretention has enormous negative consequences that could lead to violence and intimidation when the real intention in people's minds takes over their pretentious façade.

3.3.4 Critique of Plato's Ideal State

Popper (Wright, 2016: 10) condemns Plato's ideal state as extreme, petty, immoral, the kind of life that obtains in a totalitarian regime, a crass promotion of a Spartan-like regimentation of social life. He opposes Plato's ideal state for lacking diversity; for limiting freedom of expression; for encouraging repression; for proposing that members of the state should only engage in the occupation for which they are best suited; for making no distinction between what is public and private; and for permitting neither poverty nor wealth because he considers both as leading to vice. His views on women and children are considered by the average liberal as alarming, for arguing through Socrates (Wright, 2016: 12) that:

the traditional form of the family should be done away with. Men should have women and children in common, such that no man knows who his children are or has excessive love for one woman in particular. Even

mothers are not allowed to know who their children are. Their children are taken from them at birth, and they are given other children to suckle as long as they have milk. Plato's breeding principles sound ominously like the Nazi idea, and Spartan practice, of killing weak and deformed infants.

Popper (Beever, 2013: 39) criticises Plato's *Republic* as responsible for many of the totalitarian movements that caused upheavals in the world in Popper's time. He termed the *Republic* disastrous, claiming that its main failure is that as a result of its power of vision and persuasiveness, it projects the idea that a political society whose justice hinges on the virtue of its leaders can be developed, while the only means of realising such justice is by relying on the rulers' virtues. Popper (Beever, 2013: 39) insists that such claim fails to recognise what is obvious to contemporary humans that power corrupts. Therefore, he concludes that it is not possible for human beings to have excessive faith that powerful individuals will be virtuous.

There are other theorists however, according to Wright (2016: 10), who note elements of democracy in Plato's proposals such as in the egalitarianism that surrounds some elements of his programme of education. Although Beever (2013: 43) admits that Plato was wrong about many claims, he considers him neither wrong nor naïve about the corruptive nature of power, because this recognition of the corruptive nature of power motivated his contributions to his system of politics. While Beever (2013: 43) concedes from the foregoing that Popper's criticism of the *Republic* is questionable since Plato was aware that power corrupts (as already noted), he contends that Plato's responses to many issues are difficult to accept and unacceptably authoritarian in contemporary terms. Beever (2013: 43) criticises Plato, claiming that his ideas on:

Censorship, the abolition (for the guardians) of private property, of the family, eugenics, and the (admittedly purportedly meritocratic) authoritarian rule of the Philosopher Kings is too much for even the most utopian modern thinker to stomach [...]. In fact, not only is Plato's position authoritarian, it is recognisably totalitarian, as Popper sensed (though not for his reasons). This is because running through the whole of the *Republic* is the idea that the individual is merely a means to the community's ends (Beever, 2013: 43).

Many scholars, according to Caccia (2012: 19) assume different positions on Plato's comments on gender equality. For instance, while Rickman (Caccia, 2012: 19) refers to Plato's proposals for equal opportunities and education as emancipation, Annas

(Caccia, 2012: 19) does not consider Plato as the first feminist. Rather, he finds his arguments unacceptable to a feminist and his proposals on gender and communal ownership irrelevant to contemporary debate. For Caccia (2012: 19-20), Plato's proposals appear dogmatic, while he fails to explicate the potential implications of his communal proposals. However, he notes that it was Plato's realisation that he was not able to clarify the consequences of communal ownership that led him to conclude that his rule was sufficient rather than great.

Lull and Mico (2011: 8-10) consider the manner in which Plato allocates duties and responsibilities in his Republic to be most appropriate and fairest since everyone assumes his place in society based on the provisions of the best leaders (philosophers) who take into cognisance the abilities, strengths and weaknesses of each person and supports them with the appropriate form of education. However, they note a contradiction between Plato's respect for ideas that are pronounced in a caste system that all children should acquire knowledge from the earliest possible age, and his idea of justice that partly implies that everyone should do what their nature allows them to do best. This implies the potential in everyone to seek any position in the community. However, Plato (Lull & Mico, 2011: 10) clarifies his position by claiming that indeed everyone is free to seek any position, not on the basis of caste endogamy or hereditary wealth, but on the basis of their skills, innate aptitudes and good qualities.

Wright (2016: 10) considers Plato's worldviews as irreconcilable with what obtains in contemporary liberal democratic societies where human beings are not ranked on the basis of their value to society or their intrinsic value; where rigid hierarchical structures or ideas that promote a caste system are deemphasised, while instead dynamism, freedom and chaos are often the case. According to Wright (2016: 10-11) modern society neither considers the world a harmony nor really cares about analogies between society and nature. He claims that although order is preferred, it is not seen as a core value; driven and ambitious people are admired much more than those who do things in moderation or who seek internal peace. Moreover, contemporary cultures in general appear to censure the kinds of behaviours that impede the pursuit of happiness by others, instead of widely promoting good values. Plato, according to Wright (2016: 11), would have considered such contemporary systems anarchical, decadent and unjust.

Beever (2013: 45) posits that while Plato's treatise in the *Republic* is largely rejected by modern political philosophers for its regulatory structure of individuals in the state, it is on the other hand, the basis of modern political philosophy, especially as a result of the consensus between Plato and modern political philosophers that the concern of justice relates to the relationship between all members of a community, and probably including external stakeholders. This reflects in Plato's claim that each person counts equally, that justice has to do with taking the interests of all citizens into account. Beever (2013: 45) considers this contradictory to Plato's acceptance of slavery on the one hand, and his rejection of slaves as citizens of a city state. The implication here for Beever (2013: 45), is that this equality does not apply to slaves; Plato does not consider all humans as equals in the modern sense going by his consideration of Philosopher Kings as better suited to rule. Nonetheless justice for Plato (Beever, 2013: 45), is distributive because it takes into account the interests of the entire community and by extension of those he considers as persons.

3.3.5 Evaluation of Plato's Political Society

It has been noted in this chapter that various philosophers, such as Popper and Wright (Wright, 2016: 10-12), find Plato's ideal state unrealistic; though there are those theorists, such as Lull and Mico (2011: 8-10) who find elements of good democratic practice in Plato's treatise. While it is recognised that most of these proposals are difficult to attain, this study concedes that the contemporary era needs such a radical reform process if it is serious about curtailing the excessive unethical conduct and bad governance that pervades African societies in particular, and the world at large. These include, erosion of values, cultures and traditions (The Saylor Foundation, 2012: 1); ineffective and unethical leadership (Ogbogbo, 2011: 1); and poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and drug abuse (The Saylor Foundation, 2012: 2). These challenges will be exposed in detail in chapter five.

Plato (Wright, 2016: 10-12) makes the far reaching proposal that children be disengaged from their parents and brought up by philosopher kings. This study believes that this would be a good way of indoctrinating children in the right way if it were feasible; if they are inculcated with strong moral foundations at a young age, the

tendency is for them to grow up knowing what is right and what is wrong, and doing the right thing most of the time, if not always. It is argued here that it will be easier to realise the ideal state if contemporary societies can be restructured into small manageable societies, because it will make it easier for politicians and bureaucrats to pay detailed attention to their subjects and make more progress.

Plato (Wright, 2016: 11-12) realised that some of his more radical proposals may not be favourably considered. However, he would have appreciated their institutionalisation in order to curtail the decadent conditions prevalent in many societies. Given this realisation, the question that this research poses is how can Plato's ideal state become functional in the current world order? This study submits that the best the philosopher king can do in the contemporary era is to choose workable aspects of Plato's theory; ensure that the right candidates in terms of education, experience and moral disposition are appointed to positions; and values must be institutionalised in all structures of society.

3.4 CONCEPT OF JUSTICE IN THE ARISTOTELIAN IDEAL STATE

The issues of justice and fairness, according to Velasquez *et al.*, (2014: 1) have long been linked to ethics and morality in Western civilisation to such an extent that all treatises on ethics have conceived justice as a fundamental aspect of morality. For Aristotle (Wielsch, 2013: 191), justice is the most perfect virtue since it is displayed towards other people. It is considered other-regarding or beneficial to others because, according to Bloomfield (2011: 46), "it is only the character trait of being a just person which reliably keeps us from taking advantage of others when we can get away with it". Aristotle (1962: 111) considers justice as that characteristics which enable human beings to perform just actions, to act in a just manner and to wish for what is just.

According to Swanson (2011: 1377), Aristotle recognises various forms of justice, including distributive, economic, punitive and reciprocal justice. He considers distributive justice as relating not only to the distribution of money, but also to the dispensing of honour and offices; to decisions on how to distribute political authority; and on who should be given the right to govern. Punitive, criminal or corrective justice

for Aristotle (Swanson, 2011: 1377) performs a rectifying role in human affairs and interrelationships.

A number of philosophers and immoralists such as Nietzsche, Machiavelli and Thrasymachus, according to Bloomfield (2011: 47), disagree with the Aristotelian idea of justice. They posit that human beings cannot be fair to everyone; that everyone does not deserve equal consideration; and that the stronger are more entitled to justice. This study notes that negative as these theorists may sound, the reality that confronts the world today is that everyone does not receive equal consideration in the dispensation of benefits and burdens; and this is one of the reasons for so much unrest in various countries. In reaction to the claims of the immoralists, Bloomfield (2011: 47) asserts that although it is widely recognised that justice entails being fair to other people, there is no generally accepted view of what it entails to be fair to ourselves and the implications thereof. However, irrespective of what justice entails, he contends that

it cannot be the case that it is fully present in cases where people fail, with more or less regularity, to be fair to themselves, because of self-aggrandising arrogance or self-abnegating servility. Being fair to oneself requires that one be fair to others: one cannot know what is fair for oneself without basing this in part on knowledge of what is fair for others. I can only know what is fair for me by seeing myself for who I am, through making fair self-assessments, just as I must make fair assessments of others in order to know how to treat them fairly (Bloomfield, 2011:47-48).

The self unregarding point in this case, according to Bloemfield (2011: 48) is that the inability or failure of individuals to indulge in fair self-assessment negatively impacts on their self-respect. Justice in this case, for Brickhouse (2014: 204) would require the just person to perform just acts; but when people fail to perform just acts, there are consequences for such indiscretions. He asserts that this is where corrective justice comes into focus. Aristotle (Brickhouse (2014: 204) assigns corrective justice a prominent role in his theory of justice when he posits that the objective of corrective justice is to rectify injustices or to equalise inequalities that proceed from interactions among people.

While Brickhouse (2014: 204) agrees that the objective of corrective justice is to bring about equality or to correct injustices, he also believes that corrective justice also produces occasions of proportional reciprocity, namely the desire to accept goods for provided goods and the desire to repay evil for evil. These are considered necessary for the realisation of a stable political society. He notes that in non-ideal societies that frequently witness occasions of injustice,

if there is to be proportional reciprocity and the stability that comes with it, the community must be prepared to rectify through the courts. If this is right way to understand the relationship between corrective justice and proportional reciprocity, while it is proportional reciprocity, and the satisfaction of basic desires regarding communal life, it brings, that actually holds the city together, in all but ideal communities the adhesive power of proportional reciprocity is only as strong as the community's commitment to corrective justice (Brickhouse, 2014: 204).

In other words, Brickhouse (2014: 201-204), is claiming that if community members are not committed to corrective justice, then it would be impossible to achieve it. He contends that a society that does not recognise the vitality of corrective justice and the proportional reciprocity that accompanies it will eventually be confronted by loss of support, open conflict or revolt by the community members. These include those who were denied restitution after suffering injustice, as well as other individuals who may see this as a sign that they might also not receive restitution if and when they become victims of injustice.

Reciprocal justice, for Aristotle (Gallagher, 2012: 698) shows that justice does not relate to comparing what each person owns because a society consists of incomparable persons. For instance, Gallagher (2012: 698) contends that it is unlikely that a professional in one field would succeed in every other endeavour that he decides to choose; a medical doctor may not succeed as an engineer; and a rich man who has no expertise in shoemaking or designing may not succeed in these endeavours, even if he tried. What Aristotle (Gallagher, 2012: 698) does here by basing his idea of reciprocal justice on an incomparability and incommensurability of sharers is to apply unconditional worth to every person and to show that justice cannot be quantified. Gallagher (2012: 698) believes that in reality, incommensurables cannot be quantified in terms of each other. However, he claims that a person can subscribe to the principle

of need in order to reverse conventional quantitative measures in the process of preserving a community; and Aristotle (Gallagher, 2012: 698) attempted to do exactly that with his diagonal pairing.

In his treatise on reciprocal justice, Aristotle (Gallagher, 2012: 698) proceeds from the view that human beings exist in two complimentary realities in the sense that while human beings are unequal and different, they are on the basis of their differences able to contribute things to others which other people actually need. Moreover, he considers the differences in human beings to mean that no one is self-sufficient and as a result, human beings need to associate with others in order to meet their individual needs. This, for him, makes human beings civilised; and he suggests in his theory of reciprocal justice that civilisation proceeds from the perennial interrelationship among unequal and different people.

Gallagher (2012: 698) finds this position contrary to the contemporary conception of right and justice, whereby human beings seek protection for members of the community on the basis of the principle of equality for every person, which they see as resulting from the same nature that human beings possess. However, for Aristotle (Gallagher, 2012: 698:-699)

it is not an equality derived from an assumed sameness that protects the weak, but the recognition of one's difference that protects the individual from marginalisation, or elimination, and grants one rights within the community. For the community needs each incommensurable other in order to function and survive. Therefore, the community acts collectively to satisfy the needs of each sharer, whatever one's condition may be... Thus, surprisingly, it is through inequality that the rights of the individual are protected. So, justice for the individual lies not in equality, but in difference, in, as it were, inequality.

Each person, according to Aristotle (Gordley, 2015: 201), should be rewarded or should ideally receive a share of goods and services based on merit or on contributions; while equal shares should be given to equals. The assertion that equals should be treated equally while unequals should receive unequal treatment, according to Velasquez *et al.*, (2014: 2) is the most fundamental principle of justice that has received global recognition since its first postulation by Aristotle. In the current era, however, this principle is expressed: "Individuals should be treated the same, unless

they differ in ways that are relevant to the situation in which they are involved” (Velasquez *et al.*, 2014: 2).

Gordley (2015: 201) argues against the Aristotelian idea of rewarding individuals on the basis of merit, claiming that there is no single criterion for measuring merit. Rather, he contends that Aristotle and Aquinas (Gordley, 2015: 201) refer to two different and conflicting principles for appraising merit, both of which have some values. One of the principles provides that everyone should receive equal share. The principle of distributive justice provides that a larger share of societal resources should be given to those with superior virtue. Writers in the Aristotelian tradition, according to Gordley (2015: 201-202) consider such principles as ideals, claiming that the wealth of individuals should not be confiscated in a democracy and redistributed among others because doing so would lead to protracted disagreements and loss of incentive by individuals to work or to protect public property.

Private property, according to Aristotle (Aloyo, 2008: 4-5) “is better than public ownership of all goods, but [...] some private property should be used in common to varying degrees”. Aristotle (Gordley, 2015: 201) criticises Plato’s communal ownership of property from which individuals can take what they need, claiming that communal ownership of property would lead to quarrels among people over the quantity that each person should receive. He also contends that this might lead to laziness among those who do not want to work hard, while benefiting them at the expense of the hard workers. Aristotelian scholars, according to Gordley (2015: 201) appear to agree that the objective of institutionalising private rights to property was to eliminate disagreements and to afford individuals the opportunity to work and to take good care of resources.

This study notes that Aristotle’s position on the ownership of property and wealth is very relevant to the social and economic challenges that confront post-colonial African states in particular, and the world in general. In Nigeria and South Africa, for instance, as will be considered in chapter five, there are perpetual agitations and unrest, especially among the youth and the unemployed as a result of their disillusionment with the level of poverty and inequality in the country; the inability of their governments to provide them with sustainable means of livelihood and better living conditions

(Danjibo, 2011: 127-128); (Cilliers & Aucoin, 2016: 5); and their agitation for the expropriation of land without compensation (Mfaise, 2018: 1).

It is noted in this study that any effort to apply the Aristotelian concept of property ownership in these countries and in Africa at large will require that the rich are allowed to keep substantial portions of their properties, while some of their wealth will have to be shared among the less privileged. It is suggested that African states in particular and the world in general should embrace a combination of private and communal ownership of property because it will produce the kind of outcomes that protect the interests of most, if not all their citizens. It is recommended that the state should make communal provisions for the less privileged so that even if they fail to harness the opportunities given to them by the state, they will continue to have access to basic services and amenities throughout the course of their lives.

3.5 SUMMARY

This chapter set out to examine elements of the philosophic ideal state from the perspectives of Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes. They all believe in the central role that the state plays or should play in bringing about stability, peace and development, although they do not seem to agree on a common means of realising that. A foundational imperative among these philosophers is the centrality of justice in the realisation of a good political society.

Hobbes considers human nature as innately aggressive, chaotic, troublesome, violent and filled with fear. He contends that the troublesome pattern of human existence makes it impossible for people to live together in harmony. He therefore, concludes that if human beings do not refrain from living in this state of nature, then all lives would be nasty, brutish and short. Based on the troublesome pattern of human existence, on the conflicting nature of human beings to seek interdependence on the one hand, and to seek self-preservation, happiness and felicity on the other, Hobbes posits that the rational choice is for human beings to seek cooperation with each other by entering into a social contract under the authority of a sovereign head.

The best system of governance for Hobbes resides with the absolute monarch who is the most powerful government, and should administer the commonwealth indefinitely with unrestricted powers in order to prevent lawlessness, chaos and anarchy. When Hobbes is confronted with the fact that members of the state are not mostly happy with the rules of a sovereign, he counters their argument, claiming that it is not possible in any case for everyone to be completely happy; and since unhappiness could lead to conflicts and chaos, this would bring more suffering to the people. He claims that becoming part of the commonwealth in a social contract would ensure that people live in harmony with each other.

Hobbes is criticised for placing unlimited powers in one ruler. The excessive level of faith and trust that he places in the sovereign head has the potential to create discontent and chaos in the state. This study notes that it is risky to confer so much power on one individual without the control of oversight bodies in case the leader becomes unethical or despotic. In contrast to Hobbes, Aristotle considers a mixed regime as the best form of government for being more stable, unlike unmixed regimes where factionalism, conflicts and revolution are witnessed as a result of claims of injustice. He sees his polity as representing an institutionally mixed regime, in which the various laws that oligarchies and democracies typically practice are combined.

Plato and Aristotle agree on the need for an ideal state. They both hold that the goal of the ideal state is to promote justice. However, they do not agree on some of the elements of such a state. While Aristotle provides a list of virtues that human beings need to live by in order to be virtuous, Plato submits that only the virtue of justice is required for human beings to be virtuous. For Aristotle, students will need to continuously practice these virtues in order to develop good character. Plato on the other hand believes that it is not necessary to practice doing virtuous acts; rather, students should be trained to develop their knowledge of the good, which once achieved would ensure that they choose the good.

Plato believes that the best state is one, which is governed by wise leaders. He subscribes to a radical reform by philosophers of everything that goes wrong in the state, including the people and their characters in order to create a constitutional and ethical state. A number of modern theorists such as Popper criticise Plato's conception

of the just state as petty, immoral and totalitarian for encouraging repression and suppressing freedom of expression; for not promoting diversity; for not making a distinction between public and private property; and for not promoting either wealth or poverty since he considered both of them as resulting in vice. Plato's ideal state is further criticised as unrealistic as his reform process consists of complicated programmes that are not achievable. Plato is also aware of the challenges inherent in his proposals and therefore submits that the ideal state he envisions may also not be realistic, though he would have wished for them to be implemented.

This study submits that although Plato's proposals may be complicated and almost unrealistic, a radical overhaul of the system of governance in the world in general, and in post-colonial Africa in particular, is imperative. For instance, the magnitude of immorality in the world is overwhelming. This projects a bleak future and requires the intervention of renewed ethical consciousness in order to avert future negative complications.

Aristotle promotes ownership of property and the use of some private property in common. This is in opposition to Plato's preference for total communal ownership of property, which Aristotle considers unjust, impractical and causing dissatisfaction and division among people and for its potential to result in civil unrest when people are not rewarded in line with their contributions. His supporters accept that private ownership of property will promote harmony and commitment to hard work. This study subscribes partially to this position, because private ownership of large resources will promote inequality, poverty and discrimination. On the other hand, ownership of private property is given some measure of consideration on condition that no one is allowed to own excessive wealth while the majority of the citizens are wallowing in poverty

Some of the issues emerging from this chapter, which hold far-reaching implications for the realisation of the ideal state concern the communism of property that Aristotle rejects. The question that needs to be examined is which system of governance is most feasible since this study notes that there is no political and economic system that appears capable of satisfactorily resolving the concerns of society members.

Plato believes in the rule of law and in societal stability. While he considers individuals with the qualities of philosopher kings as the right people to rule the state, this study notes that in the contemporary era, those appointed to most top positions either as politicians or bureaucrats are not qualified or competent enough to successfully execute their mandates. The impact of these challenges can be felt in the myriad of ethical, social, economic and religious challenges that the contemporary world faces. It is imperative that a satisfactory system is galvanised for the betterment of countries and their people.

CHAPTER FOUR

4 ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE IN INDIGENOUS AFRICAN CONTEXT

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will examine ethics, morality and the system of politics and governance in traditional African societies; and their roles in promoting a moral, just and fair traditional African society. Though the concepts of ethics and morality are not exactly the same, they nevertheless will be used interchangeably in this research and will approximately be taken to refer to the same thing. The chapter will begin with an exposition of the Western prejudice towards African traditional ethics, and then proceed with an exposition of African ethics and morality, as well as its understanding in the precolonial African context. In doing so, the question of identity, individual and communal responsibility and their impact on the wellbeing of all the community members will be examined as a further extension of African traditional moral practice. Put differently, the chapter will further consider the humanistic nature of traditional African ethics, with particular reference to the moral theory of Ubuntu as the foundation for the traditional democratic practices in Africa.

Regardless of whether scholars generally agree that the indigenous African societies are considered radically opposed to western styled ethics and politics or not, the fact remains that African societies are generally ethically conscious and inherently democratic, and therefore different. There are many scholarly testimonies to this fact (Udokang, 2014: 267-268; Bates, 2010: 1134). This is reflected in their various (African) practices that promote human relations, such as the humanity with which they relate to each other and a sense of duty (not necessarily in Kantian sense) channelled towards communal responsibility.

One of the unending debates regarding the intellectual viability of African thought is in connection with the status of the individual amidst the alleged overarching community. Although Aristotle had earlier argued that a man is a man only within the context of society, many Western-style scholars argue that the individual should be completely free because, in their opinion, any freedom hindered is a freedom denied. In addition, democracy is nothing but the ability to achieve social cooperation in spite of

individuality. Therefore, an ideally practical democratic society is one in which individuality is protected while social cooperation is ensured. In this connection, though African societies are generally believed to be communalistic in orientation, the truth also is that traditional Africans understand morality in terms of the character of individuals, in their conceptions of right and wrong, in acceptable social relations, in individual attitudes and in the forms of behaviour that the society considers as enhancing harmonious and cooperative existence, justice and fairness (Anderson, 2013: 164; Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, 2014: 37).

While the early westerners initially denied the existence of ethics and morality in traditional African societies as a result of their ignorance of their cultures and traditions, some of them eventually realised that there existed well constituted standards of morality, a contravention of which attracted severe punishment (Udokang, 2014: 266; Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, 2014: 34). While some theorists consider religion or rational thinking as the source of traditional African morality, others consider morality a product of society (Anderson, 2013: 165-166; Kazeem, 2011: 265-272). One may add that morality is a by-product of both religion and society; and there was no clear distinction between religion and moral laws in most traditional African societies.

African worldviews believe that all beings are interconnected, interrelated and interdependent in such a way that their existence and flourishing are dependent on each other's success. In fact, human beings, animals, vegetation or the supernatural realm are considered to either derive or lose strength from each other (Adedutan, 2014: 44). As a result, the communal nature of traditional Africans hinges on them taking into account the interests of all community members. Their moral obligation is to live together in harmony as members of one community, deriving personal fulfilment without being selfish, and showing care and concern for each other's quality of life. Their moral responsibilities also include identifying with each other, showing solidarity with each other, respecting all existents, and most of all, human rights. Ubuntu as representative of the African communalism relates to the forgoing, and generally to the humanism with which human beings are expected to relate to each other.

Like modern democracy, social cooperation plays a fundamental role in the governance of African traditional societies. However, unlike the Western style, it is not

defined by competition for power and dominance among political parties, and unlike the Western majoritarian system which does not give adequate concern to minority and opposition parties and which permits adversarial competition among them, the emphasis is on going through a far more rigorous process of attaining consensus.

The principle of communal responsibility was embedded in the relations among traditional Africans in a way that holds the whole community responsible for the actions of individuals. This principle has, however, been condemned by various theorists as detrimental to self-individuation and as responsible for many of the challenges that confront African societies. The fact however remains that the same principle was and still is responsible for ensuring the protection of communal and minority welfare. It is worth noting that this chapter will expose the manner in which traditional African ethical and democratic practices enabled the precolonial eras to derive more humanity among community members than what obtains in the contemporary era where individualism and lack of much consideration for the interest of the generality of the people is prevalent.

In sum, this chapter is to describe the core features of the African democratic system, previously cynically denied to exist or snubbed for no critical reasons, based on ignorance of its features. This chapter therefore defends the view that the indigenous democratic governance in Africa is founded on a unique morality established on the metaphysical principle, which sees the individual as a unique and irreplaceable part of a universal community.

4.2 WESTERN CYNICISM TOWARDS AFRICAN ETHICS AND MORALITY

The existence of African traditional ethics has been called into question by various early westerners coming to the African continent, such as the missionaries, colonialists and anthropologists. They dismissed ethics and morality as non-existent in traditional African societies; they did not consider any of the indigenous African practices and belief systems as good or useful (Dolamo, 2014: 6); and they “ignored and even denigrated indigenous African cultures for hundreds of years” (Bell & Metz, 2012: 81). They termed Africa a dark continent; and traditional Africans as lost souls, primitive, uncivilised, irrational, pagans and backward. As a result, they set out to correct all their observations by any means they considered necessary. Their approach resulted in the

destruction of substantial aspects of African tradition, social life, and family values, which were structured on a moral, religious and communal basis (Dolamo, 2014: 6). Nadel (Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, 2014: 34), considered the Nupes of Nigeria as lacking any ethical principle or religious doctrine that promote rights, condemns wrong and that promises rewards for an exemplary way of life. He perceived their religion and other precepts as silent on ethical matters and the consequences of immoral behaviour. A number of the early Europeans were sceptical about the existence of religion in traditional African society. Emil Ludwig (Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, 2014: 34) and his counterparts projected the theory that traditional Africans lacked any knowledge of God because they were considered inferior, unable to display any cognitive capacity and as a result could not conceptualise the ideas of God. Many like-minded westerners concluded, therefore, that there was no foundation for morality in precolonial African societies.

Basden displayed his prejudice and ignorance of traditional Africans when, in contrast to his earlier assertion that the word morality had no significance in the vocabulary of precolonial Ibos in Nigeria, he later concedes that there are theoretically well-defined standards of morality among the Ibo communities (Udokang, 2014: 266), a contravention of which attracted severe punishment. He gave instances where unfaithful wives and their accomplices were punished by torture or killed (Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, 2014: 34). Noting that transgressors were punished signifies the practical nature of the traditional Africans' and specifically, the Igbo moral code. These wrong observations of ethics, morality and religion by the early westerners were used to justify their negative perceptions of the moral and psychological characters of traditional Africans, whom they considered as crude and ignorant of the differences between right and wrong (Udokang, 2014: 266). Perhaps the early westerners held their early negative views as a result of their ignorance of the cultures and traditions of the traditional African societies (Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, 2014: 34).

4.3 INTERROGATING ETHICS AND MORALITY IN TRADITIONAL AFRICAN SOCIETIES

The understanding of ethics as the moral ideal of the good can be associated with all societies throughout the ages, including precolonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. Variations exist in the manner in which philosophers over the ages conceive ethics.

For instance, Plato considers ethics as concerning a pure idea of the good. Levinas considers ethics as the search for perfection. Benedict Spinoza associates ethics with the power of critical thinking. Despite the variations, ethics can be seen as generally linked with an appeal to the idea of the good, of perfection, while it is strongly rooted in the domain of ideas, principles and values. Most interactions among people are rooted in ethics, values, principles and standards, even though human thoughts, actions and words are not always ethical. However, they are always assessed on the basis of ethics, according to the argument of ethical ubiquity (Sindjoun, 2009: 23- 24).

Ethics in traditional African context relates to the norms, values, principles and moral standards that regulate the behaviour of community members (Udokang, 2014: 267). It provides the measures of right and wrong conduct for every member of the community. The traditional African society considers ethics and morality as relating to goodness of character. An individual is considered good if he refrains from bad actions and thoughts such as stealing, adultery and cruelty to others. Goodness of character also entails the cultivation of virtues such as respect, kindness, compassion, justice and obedience to constituted authority (Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, 2014: 37). Gyekye (Anderson, 2013: 164) considers morality as constituted by social rules and standards aimed at regulating the behaviours of community members. These social rules and norms, according to him, result from what the people consider as constituting good and bad character, right and wrong. He considers morality as social and emanating from human relations, which concern themselves with the sense of duty to promote and realise cooperative and harmonious coexistence. Bujo (in Dolamo, 2014: 3-4) considers the humanity with which individuals relate to each other in society as the bedrock of morality. He opines that African ethics neither conceives the individual as ontological act or as self-realisation. Rather, it conceives the person as a process of coming into being in the reciprocal relatedness of society and the person. A person can, therefore, not be ethical or moral if he fails to relate well to other community members.

While some theorists posit that African ethics does not proceed from religion, others claim that ethics in the traditional African society cannot be separated from traditional African religion because most moral precepts have a religious or metaphysical undertone, while African ethics hinges on reference to God. As a result, African

morality relates to the kinds of expected behaviour that would enable humans to avert the wrath of the deities, to be upright and blameless before God, and to attract blessings and favours from God (Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, 2014: 37-38). This debate on the source of African morality will be examined further in the chapter.

An enquiry into the moral language of most traditional and even contemporary African peoples and cultures, including the Akan people of Ghana, the Yoruba and Ibo people of Nigeria and the Sotho and Shona peoples of Southern Africa, reveals that ethics and morality is expressed and understood in terms of the character of the members of a community, their connection to the common good and the ethics of duty. The ethics of traditional and contemporary African societies is

embedded in the ideas and beliefs about what is right or wrong, what is a good or bad character; it is also entrenched in the conceptions of satisfactory social relations and attitudes held by the members of the society; it is implanted furthermore, in the forms or patterns of behaviour that are considered by the members of the society to bring about social harmony and cooperative living, justice, and fairness (Obasola, 2014: 120).

A number of African theorists posit that a clearly outlined and well-ordered system of ethics and morality can be found in traditional as well as contemporary African societies. Prior to the advent of colonialism and missionaries in Africa, the lives of community members were regulated by a properly outlined and regulated system of African moral codes and ethical principles. Precolonial African societies possess a deep sense of wrong and right, and this has given rise to traditions, taboos, rules, laws and customs, which are observable in each society. This singular factor reveals the prevalence of African traditional ethics prior to the advent of Europeans to Africa, and shows, that the idea of morality in Africa is not merely the creation of Christian missionaries and Europeans (Udokang, 2014: 267-268) contrary to what Basden, Nadel and other like-minds would want to portray.

The cultures of traditional African societies were subsumed in different customs and beliefs which every member of society was expected to adhere to in order to prevent curses that could befall them and others for contravening laid down precepts and so as to have a long life. The moral precepts of these societies discouraged all forms of unethical conduct, including theft and adultery. They also forbade community

members from causing harm or injuries to others, including foreigners, unless the person was guilty of immoral conduct (Idang, 2015: 104). Mbiti (Udokang, 2014: 104) posits that a breach of the moral precepts of each society was considered bad, wrong or evil for distorting communally accepted peace and social order. Perpetrators were punished accordingly or even ostracised. In cases where a suspect denies the charge levelled against him, custom demands that he prove his innocence by either taking an oath or being taken to a soothsayer for spiritual divination. For instance, a popular means of detecting crime in the Ibibio community was ukang (ordeal). The process entailed the boiling of water by the specialist soothsayer, who then throws a stone into the hot water and requests the suspect to take the stone out of the boiling water. The innocent suspect would retrieve the stone with his bare hand from the boiling water without getting hurt or feeling any pain. However, as soon as the guilty suspect attempts to remove the stone, the water boils over in a terrifying manner. Such deterrents played a significant role in maintaining a crime-free community as no one would want to be subjected to such public ridicule, or to being stripped naked and paraded around the community (Idang, 2015: 104).

The system of ethics and morals of each community were preserved in their customs and traditions, and therefore in tandem with the overall metaphysics and worldview of the people. Each pre-colonial African society maintained its solidarity and social order through the laws, taboos, customs and prescribed forms of behaviour, which became their moral code. Tempels (Udokang, 2014: 267) notes that the social dimensions of morality were well-known to Africans in such a manner that any serious contravention of the moral code had serious social implications. All evil acts were considered anti-social in nature and as a result, had ramifications for the society at large. African theorists, such as Kalu and Nwosu concur with Tempels' observations, when they claim that the willingness of community members to be guided by the dominant norms and values played significant roles in ensuring peace and stability, in promoting the welfare of community members and in enhancing the correct functioning of society. A violation of ethical norms and standards was also considered a violation of the cosmic order, and this would require individual or communal atonement through appropriate rituals and good deeds. In the Igbo ethics, for instance, the Igbo people of Nigeria enforced conformity to their traditions through their customs (which are referred to in Igbo language as omenala).

Omenala is one of the moral precepts in Igboland that symbolise the moral traditions of the Igbo people (Okpalike, 2015: 7). In the Igbo customs and traditions, social rules are measured through omenala (customs). Omenala is also the measure through which the youth are socialised and through which the societal values are extended from generation to generation (Udokang, 2014: 267). By adhering to these socialised customs and traditions, community members understand their rights and obligations to one another. All moral precepts in traditional African societies appeared mostly in the form of prohibitions, which the ancestral spirits and deities have sanctioned or are invoked to sanction (Udokang, 2014: 268). The pre-colonial Nigerian society, according to Imhonopi and Iruonagbe (2013: 114) was firmly rooted in polytheism. The people believed the various deities and gods that they worshiped would protect them from all sorts of harm and evil as well as make them prosper. These understandings, for Udokang (2014: 268) seem to be the reason why a number of scholars posit that traditional religion is the source of African ethics and morality. The Igbos accord Omenala (custom) unquestioned obedience because they conceive it as proceeding from the goddess of the earth and sanctioned by the ancestors. While it fulfils cultural, moral and social functions, Omenala is also religious in nature as the spiritual power of the community proceeds from the power of the ancestors and the earth's goddess (Udokang, 2014: 268).

Ala (which means earth in Igbo language) is the custodian of morality and the physical manifestation of common humanity. It represents fertility and motherhood, and portrays that the fundamental principle of morality in Igbo land requires humans to be diligent, cautious, intelligent, respectful, tactful and gracious, among other requirements. The Igbos conceive the earth (Ala) as mysterious and therefore a spirit, a phenomenon that gives life and the finality of morality. The Igbos deify the earth and work towards preserving and sanctifying it so that it can protect as well as provide for their daily needs and desires. The Igbos consider Ala to be what the good life represents since the good life for them entails ensuring the realisation of the spiritual, social and environmental well-being of their communities. The absence of the good life for them would result in misery for all members of their communities (Okpalike, 2015: 7).

This metaphysical conception of the origin of Igbo ethics and morality can be attached to other traditional African societies where morality was conceived as having a close relationship with the ontological order of the world. A violation of this order was equated with a violation of the order of the universe and resulted in a physical disorder through which the fault is revealed. There was no clear distinction between moral and religious laws in traditional African societies. Moral and religious values were the same. The society rejected what religion forbade, and sanctioned what religion approved. The Yoruba tribes of Nigeria do not distinguish between moral and religious values, since doing so would lead to negative consequences. In essence, traditional African societies conceive the universe as held together by a worldview that binds ethics and religion together in a manner that conceives morality as based on the commandment of the deity. Anyone that contravened the moral codes is, as a result punished by the Supreme Being, the deities and ancestral spirits (Udokang, 2014: 268).

A number of theorists do not support the notion of religion as the source of morality. According to Anderson (2013: 165-166), Gyekye and Wiredu are some of the prominent scholars who have denied the role of religion in moral development. Rather, they argue that the morality of a group or community is determined by society and the traditions of the people. While Gyekye agrees that religion plays a crucial role in the development of *the* moral life of the Akan people of Ghana, he posits that society and not religion shapes morality. In other words, he claims that in the system of morality of traditional Africans generally, and of the Akans in particular, the consequences of human actions on the society and people determine their morality. By this Gyekye means that African morality does not proceed from divine pronouncements, but from taking into account the interests and welfare of human beings. He further posits that actions are good when they promote the interest and welfare of human beings, while the actions that do not consider the interest and welfare of people are bad.

Wiredu neither considers religion or God as the source of morality, nor morality as dependent on divine instruction and revelation. He posits that religion was not the source of morality for the Akan people of Ghana (Udokang, 2014: 268), claiming that although human beings may act ethically in order to avert punishment from the deities, this does not confer on them the sense of moral obligation. For instance, he claims

that a robber may refuse to commit an offence for fear of arrest; but he would not have thought of committing the crime in the first place if he had any sense of morality (Anderson, 2013: 166). Wiredu (in Udokang, 2014: 268) considers rational thinking on what is best for human welfare as the basis of morality. For Wiredu, the Akan people did not consider doing good as dependent on God's directive since they did not have a belief in a revealed religion. They never had a set of moral precepts that they believed to have proceeded from God to the human race. Consequently, the Akan people did not have any inclination of a religious or revealed morality. Wiredu's treatise in this regard amounts to saying that

African ethics is humanised. It is essentially interpersonal and social, with a basis in human welfare and well-being. This is why the African man is essentially his brother's keeper and is ultimately concerned about his welfare. Community of life or communalism ranked over and above individualism; hence the stress on communal solidarity. The African man's concern for the well-being of his brother and neighbour is at the heart of traditional ethics and morality (Udokang, 2014: 268).

For Wiredu (Kazeem, 2011: 265), morality is the motivated quest for sympathetic impartiality. In other words, human behaviour and conduct should always show consideration for the interests of other people. A person is said to have shown due concern for the interest of others when in the process of thinking about the consequences of his actions on other peoples' interests, he hypothetically puts himself in their shoes. For Wiredu, the principle of sympathetic impartiality is a human universal that is applicable to the moral conduct of all the non-brutish human race. In other words, he claims that sympathetic impartiality has a universal appeal since all societies that prefer nonviolence would subscribe to it. Oruka (Kazeem, 2011: 271) disagrees with Wiredu's moral notion of sympathetic impartiality, claiming that sympathetic impartiality may not be necessary because Rawls' principle of rational egoism, which entails calculating impartiality, is a sufficient conceptualisation of morality. Rather, he claims that human beings lack sympathetic impartiality in Rawls state of nature, while they also fail to acquire it in a civil state, because if they did, there would be less need for prisons, class wars and the police force. Although human beings remain self-centred, they are still rational; and that is why society has not completely degenerated into chaos.

Kazeem (2011: 272) believes that contrary to Wiredu's position, morality is not necessarily universal in all communities and is not solely based on the principle of sympathetic impartiality. Rather morality may also result from Rawls' principle of calculating impartiality. In Rawls's theory of justice (Jacobs, 2014: 547) which examines how to ensure impartiality in a state in the distribution of social goods in view of various moral doctrines competing for prominence, Rawls posits that citizens must abstract themselves from their obligations, worldviews, knowledge, moral commitments, community affiliations, and any other personal characteristics that allow them to be guided by their prejudices. This process would result in an impartial or egalitarian distribution of rights, obligations and benefits, and as a result, receive the approval of all the citizens. Rawls' theory of justice will be given more consideration in chapter six.

What Kazeem is saying in essence here is that since morality connotes both the good and the bad, a universal moral doctrine should be constituted by both sympathetic impartiality and calculating impartiality, which together account for the constitutive elements of morality. He considers Wiredu's position as problematic for undermining and underestimating the true nature of human beings in the community as rational, egotistic, irrational, selfish, altruistic and loving. Morality actually unites these diverse human characteristics in order to promote societal good. Therefore, morality for Kazeem, attempts to unite the characteristics of human beings for the betterment of the society at large (Kazeem, 2011: 272).

In contrast with Wiredu's notion of sympathetic impartiality, Molefe (2016: 4-12) argues that ethics or morality in the African context should be considered as partial in nature, because impartiality is not consistent with the level of commitment that various aspects of African tradition are subjected to. In defence of his claim, he alludes to three aspects that are subsumed in partiality, namely the high value placed on family structure, ancestral worship and the idea of personhood; and the high regard that a number of theorists place on various aspects of African tradition. These include Wiredu and Appiah's consideration of the family as the best institution for moral education; Oruka's consideration of the family as the best model for the African community; and Ramose's argument for the prioritisation of Ubuntu towards a family member before according the same privilege to others. He notes that the African tradition of ancestral worship

occurs mainly within a family blood-line or extended relations; while in cases where the whole community participates in the celebration, some aspects of the ritual are performed in private. He further observes that in the concept of personhood, the individual “must prioritise one’s project of self-perfection, achieving moral virtue, and one must work hard to take care, firstly of one’s family and then, if possible, the wider community” (Molefe, 2016: 16). The point Molefe makes here is that this evidence negates the notion of sympathetic impartiality that Wiredu advances because the manner in which Africans attend to these issues are subjective and partial and therefore a reflection of the moral framework of Africans.

Molefe makes a critical and valid point regarding the partial outlook of African moral thought in the sense that Africans in particular and other races in general are largely partial in the manner in which they relate to others. However, the fact remains that such moral framework cannot be promoted as the sole basis of African morality, especially in view of the extent of atrocities and unethical behaviour that result from a partial moral worldview. These include the dispossession of land from the South African black population during the apartheid era, as will be considered in chapter five. While human beings are selfish by nature, the only means of ensuring a just and ethical society is by promoting an objective and impartial approach to all aspects of existence.

Anderson (2013: 165-166) disagrees with Wiredu and Gyekye’s claim that religion is not the source of morality. He reasons that by arguing in the manner they did, Gyekye and Wiredu are in essence claiming the existence of religious free society in Ghana. However, Anderson does not believe that there is any community in Ghana that lacks religious influence. Rather, he claims that almost all the traditional societies in Ghana, including the Akan societies have religious imports and thrive on religion. In fact, Anderson believes that the influence of religion in the Ghanaian societies is so prevalent that it permeates every aspect of their life, including the government, the dress mode of the people, their speeches and even their food.

Wiredu makes a valid point in rejecting religion as the source of morality. However, this is also contestable depending on the perspective from which it is viewed. It is true that a person may be ethical or moral not because he is religious, but because he

believes in doing the right thing and because he would prefer not to be harmed by others. This makes the sense of morality universal since all rational beings would always want the best for themselves and rationality should prevail on them to treat people in the same manner that they would want to be treated. The problem in this case is that human beings are naturally selfish. Many people only want the best for themselves without caring about the interests of others or about the consequences of their words, thoughts and actions on other people. It makes sense to believe that a person can be ethical without being religious, while another person can be moral as a result of the influence of religion in his or her life. It is logical to submit here that human beings can become ethical as a result of religious, rational and societal influence, because they believe in treating people in the same manner that they would expect to be treated, and or as a result of their personal convictions.

4.3.1 The Principles of Individuality and Communal Responsibility

In the traditional African context, human beings are considered social beings since they are members of a community or group. This is a view, which much later in Western thought has been attributed to Aristotle. Whether the Afro-apologists or their opponents are correct, the relationship between community members in the African thought system, as well as its associated rights, binds a community together. Earthly existence requires that everyone lives together as equal and interrelated members in a community. It requires relationships of friendships or fraternity with others, especially among those that reside in the same region. The community land is considered a measure that guarantees the value of everyone in the community, and not merely a symbol of individual fecundity, happiness or prosperity. The realistic and just nature of this vision becomes more apparent when in considering the development of the contemporary era one notes that while wealth can be a collective or an individual acquisition, happiness remains a collective phenomenon. The happiness of an individual is mostly attained through collective effort. Furthermore, the realisation of prosperity is also connected with the requirement for an ethical and peaceful society in the interest of the whole community (Kouassi, 2008: 237-238).

In the traditional African community, the members, according to Onyedinma and Kanayo (2013: 64-65), assume collective responsibility in providing for the needs of

the less privileged, the old and the weak. In the Igbo community for instance, they note that the entire community makes contributions towards providing for the material needs of the less privileged. The community would also combine their physical efforts in assisting their kinsmen to build their houses or to cultivate their farmlands. Such functions are performed happily since participants recognise that they would also be assisted by other community members should the need arise. Interdependence is a paramount ideology among the Igbo race. The Igbo principle of interdependence recognises the enormous strength that proceeds from a united front. This promotes discipline, humanises relations and reduces crime. In the traditional African perspective,

what is crucial to the individual in terms of identity and personal satisfaction, are not the things that he possesses or even his position, but the warmth and security he enjoys because he belongs to and feels secure within his village and society. As a result, Africans would not want to opt out of the community by violating the norms of the community because that would amount to breaking the integral human relations that hold the community together (Onyedinma & Kanayo 2013: 65).

Wiredu (2009: 15-16) opines that it can be anthropologically established that communalism is the operative ethic in the traditional African society. The communalism that permeates Africa is the type of social formation in which kinship plays a fundamental role. Individuals are developed right from childhood to cultivate the feeling of affinity with all members of their family and extended family. This kind of unity begins from the immediate family and transcends to the other relations and eventually to the community at large. The individual conceives this kind of close association to mean that his or her responsibilities extend to others as well, while the other relatives are also expected to accord him the same rights and obligations. The sense of connectedness that individuals developed resulted from the reciprocal nature of interrelationships, and this seems to be largely absent in the manner in which the current era relates with each other, the consequences of which are often unfavourable for the well-being of individuals and communities. Wiredu, however, adds that this idea of human connectedness goes beyond a mere idea of connection based on kinship and rather, fundamentally involves a sense of connection rooted in humanity. This shows in the societal ethic that provides for the pursuit of the interests of not only one's relations, but the interests of the community at large. The scope of this practice

transcends the imperatives of pure morality which does not require human beings to mutually support each other in the pursuit of their private interests such as agriculture. The nature of traditional communalism was however, such that members of the community supported each other's private pursuits. What traditional morality however prescribes, according to Wiredu, is that human beings should act in the same manner that they expect to be treated (Ochieng-Odhiambo, 2010: 171-174). It is worth noting at least in passing that this line of thought coincides with what in Western philosophy is considered to be the core of Kantianism, namely his categorical imperative (Thomas, 2015: 3), but which in Africa is widespread common knowledge, even in precolonial Africa. The manner in which precolonial African societies were able to take care of each other's needs and recognise everyone as members of the same extended family seems to be one of the major reasons why Nyerere (Ochieng-Odhiambo, 2010: 174) believes that socialism was a constitutive element of precolonial African societies.

The kind of kinship connection that Wiredu refers to can also be found in the Nigerian context. Almost all the tribes in Nigeria, if not all of them, continue to hold the same values of kinship as was the case in the past. Almost everything they do, including traditional and western marriage, burial or naming ceremonies, would involve the invitation of close and extended families and community members for support and commiseration. Failure to follow this primordial custom is tantamount to rejection of one's people and this could have unfavourable consequences such as animosity and retaliation. This practice is so embedded in the African, and specifically the Nigerian culture, that it has become second nature to them.

In traditional African society, the individual and the society need each other for survival. This fact is buttressed by a number of sayings across the African continent. The Acholi of northern Uganda, for instance, would say 'two hands are better than one'. This means that greater success is achieved when people collaborate than when one works alone. Another saying is 'unity is strength'; meaning that an individual derives his strength from the happy, cooperative, collaborative and united association with others. As a result, the individual suffers when he ignores his society. The traditional African society holds that actions which are taken to promote either individual or communal interests are ethically right, otherwise morally evil or unethical.

This ethical foundation gives rise to a number of ethical principles, such as principles of individual and community responsibilities, which guide the behaviour of traditional African community members (Lajul, 2013: 117-118).

The principle of individual responsibility states that a person and his immediate family members, not the whole community, are responsible for the actions that the individual takes either against other community members or even against themselves (Lajul, 2013: 121). This principle is in line with the Kantian theory, which holds that the individual must assume responsibility for the possible consequences of his actions, and not transfer the consequences to someone or something else (Urbanovic & Tauginiene, 2013: 72). Some of the possible reasons why individuals should be held responsible and accountable for their actions could be because each person possesses personal values, which are guided by different factors through the course of their lives. While each community or entity also has values which shape the cultures or way of life of its members, it is each person through his or her conduct that determines if the values, which the community seeks to emulate are in reality actualised (ICAS, 2015: 6).

The principle of communal responsibility posits that the actions of an individual impact on the community as a whole, while communal actions impact on individual members of the community. In other words, the principle holds that an action is right or wrong based on its effect on the community (Lajul, 2013: 119). The individual is defined in relation to a larger ethnic or social group which covers the living, the dead, the unborn and the spirits. The individual is attached to the social or ethnic group in a manner that confers his primary responsibility to the clan or his community (Kochalumchuvattil, 2010: 112). This arrangement has been seen as detrimental to self-individuation. This lack of subjectivity has been termed the primary cause of large numbers of the challenges and complications that African countries continue to experience (Kochalumchuvattil, 2010: 112), such as intertribal conflicts and wars.

Intertribal conflicts result, in many cases, from disagreement among people of different communities. The aggrieved community reacts on the basis of communal responsibility. They turn the offending community into a target for retaliation since they are all considered as responsible for the actions of their members. This kind of

retaliation often results in large scale displacement of the offending communities. In the traditional African societies, communal responsibility was acceptable. In the contemporary era, however, it is unethical to hold the whole community responsible for the actions of an individual or of a few community members. Nevertheless, there are currently many parts of Africa where the principle of communal responsibility is still the norm. In the Rwandan genocide, for instance, the Hutu tribe attempted to eliminate all Tutsis in revenge for the killing of a Hutu leader; In Uganda, the year 1966 witnessed the repression of the supporters of Kabaka Mutesa II. During the reign of Idi Amin between 1971 and 1979, the Langi and the Acholi tribes were persecuted (Lajul, 2013: 119). This principle holds negative consequences for how people conceive right and wrong and for accepting that it is right to seek revenge for deliberate murder of any community member. It is also morally right for the community to prevent any danger that could result from the actions of an individual through reconciliation with the victims before further damage results. Lajul observes that during conflicts or unrest in the contemporary period, Africans quickly resort to the communal principle. In the process they tend to forget their communal obligations to encourage unity and solidarity among the dissenting groups and to rectify the factors that could potentially lead to conflict (Lajul, 2013: 119-120).

There are many cynics who reject the idea of communal responsibility. Examples include a number of people and movements in Western thought, such as the social deviants and the anarchists who perceive society as a clog or an impediment to the realisation of individual happiness. They assume a rebellious lifestyle against society and its values. One may attribute such negative attitude towards the community as emanating from the apparent individualism that characterises a substantial aspect of Western life. The loss of faith in community life becomes entrenched in environments where the individuals are no longer able to enjoy the social equilibrium that they had become used to, which offered them the space to construe themselves as autonomous, supreme and self-governing. In cases where such individuals are not able to adequately deal with the problems that confront them, they become worried. They develop a sense of abandonment by society and conclude that their world is obstructive and an impediment to their happiness. Contrary to these negative sentiments, it is unlikely that Africans would succumb entirely to this kind of absolutist individualism since they believe that the life of an individual only acquires meaning in

the community. In other words, the individual can only realise his wellbeing and social aspirations by mutually interacting with other community members (Agulana, 2010: 287- 288).

Although the principle of communal responsibility is responsible for a myriad of challenges that confront the African continent, such as corruption, revenge, rampant violence, collective condemnation of specific ethnic groups, and ethnic cleansing, its negative aspects must be discouraged and eliminated where possible if there is to be any hope of developing the African countries into strong and desirable nation states. On the other hand, it is imperative to encourage the positive aspects of the principle of communal responsibility, by dissuading tribalism and ethnic affiliations, by embracing all members of a given community without any discriminatory practices (Lajul, 2013: 120-121).

4.4 THE HUMANISTIC NATURE OF TRADITIONAL AFRICAN ETHICS

African traditional ethics, according to Ekeopara and Ogbonnaya, (2014: 39-40) is not ideologically individualistic, but communal in nature because it takes into account the existence and interest of the individual and other people. It recognises that an individual cannot exist alone, but in communion with other human beings. As a result, an individual recognises that his existence is not for the purpose of satisfying only his personal interest. Rather, he must also ensure that he does not infringe on the interests of other people. In view of this recognition, African traditional society is also communal in nature. This communalism becomes the foundation of the concern that the African person shows for the welfare of his neighbour. The traditional African society therefore condemns self-centredness and individualism and promotes solidarity as a major virtue on the contrary.

The African traditional ethics promotes humanism as it considers all human beings as existing together while rendering complimentary assistance to each other (Ekeopara & Ogbonnaya, 2014: 40). African worldviews, according to Murove (2010: 383) believe in the interrelatedness, interdependency and interconnectedness of all beings in a manner that the flourishing of one entity affects the flourishing of the others. They also consider it the duty of human beings to protect nature and the environment for the benefit of all. Adedutan (2014: 44) further claims that entities

whether human, divine, animal or vegetal, operate within a principle termed general laws of vital causality. In this system, a being, by virtue of the strength of its force, can either harvest more strength from another being, or, in contrast, lose some strength to a stronger being. Man, as a being, for example, can either strengthen or weaken the being of another man; the being of man can also affect the subordinate being of animal or plant.

4.4.1 The Moral Theory of Ubuntu

In contemporary Southern African languages, the term Ubuntu or Hunhu denotes humanism towards fellow beings. It emphasises the interdependence and common humanity of human beings, and the responsibility that proceeds from human interconnection (Letseka, 2012: 54). The moral theory of Hunhu or Ubuntu “is not only a dialogical African moral theory; it is also a way of life. This means that hunhu/ubuntu does not only evaluate and justify moral acts in African settings but it is also a world view for the Africans” (Mangena, 2012: 11). As a constitutive element of African ethics, Ubuntu is founded on culture and religion. It relates to the dignity and integrity required of individuals; it represents what makes an individual human and the elements that promote the attainment of individual and communal fulfilment (Dolamo, 2013: 1-3). This moral worldview of traditional Southern African communities considers human nature as having worth. Pre-eminence is placed on according each other mutual moral responsibilities such as collective responsibility, cooperation, solidarity, compassion, respect, loyalty, harmony, reciprocity, dignity, care and humanity towards each other (Letseka, 2014: 547).

The moral theory of Ubuntu, according to Bell and Metz (2012: 81) shares a number of common features with the Chinese moral tradition known as Confucianism. Both moral philosophical thoughts recognise the interrelatedness of all beings as well as the “the role that ancestors should play in our ethical lives...the value of harmony in thinking about our proper relationships to one another, to animals, and to the natural environment (Bell & Metz, 2012: 81). All proponents of the communitarian ethics of humanness or Ubuntu believe that the humanity of an individual is premised on his acceptance of fellow human beings in their differences and uniqueness. This core principle affirms that the identity of a person depends on the community both metaphysically as well as causally, while an individual is duty-bound to contribute to

the well-being and progress of the community. This communitarian ethics which exposes human beings as normative and relational is gender-neutral because it applies to community members irrespective of their gender and accords everyone consensual democracy in line with the values of Ubuntu (Oyowe & Yurkivska, 2014: 86).

Ubuntu also signifies that human beings should attach sacred and premium value to human life. In other words, the ultimate goal of a person in life should be to aspire for a genuine or authentic lifestyle. By claiming that a person can derive Ubuntu through others, one implies that a person has the moral obligation to be the best human being possible, living together in harmony as members of one community, and deriving personal fulfilment without being selfish. In the traditional Southern African society, an individual who failed to relate communally with others or who showed a negative or antisocial attitude towards others was considered to be inhuman or an animal. The society considered individual actions to be right or as conferring humanness on others when members of a community share the same way of life, show care and concern for each other's quality of life, identify with each other and show solidarity with each other. The dignity of a person results from his capacity to be friendly, to live harmoniously together and to respect human rights (Metz, 2011: 537 - 559).

Although Ubuntu is mostly associated with communalism and interdependency, it is not anti-individualistic because the respect that Ubuntu has for the personhood of other people also means respect for one self or for individuality. Since a person assumes his personhood as a result of his relationship with others, a human being is therefore human through others (Letseka, 2014: 548). While the Igbos, for instance are known to have strong communal dispositions or attachments, they are also known to possess high level of individualism. Scholars have termed this seeming sense of contradiction the antinomy of providing a balance between the high level of individualism among the Igbos tribes with their strong loyalty to their community. The high level of loyalty that the Igbos have towards their community does not take away their unique individuality. Neither does it totally submerge them in their communities nor does it discourage self-reliance, personal initiatives, or the development of their individualities (Agulana, 2010: 293).

Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 198) contend that the promotion of the moral theory of Ubuntu in South Africa in particular and in Africa in general ought to come to an end. They argue that the ideology of Ubuntu “is not well rooted in the ethical experiences of modern people qua moral beings; and [...] that Ubuntu as a conceived ethical solution lacks both the capacity and the context to be an ethical inspiration or code of ethics in the present context” (Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013: 198). They consider Ubuntu stagnated as an ethical theory and a way of life, as a result, of its complex principles and failure “to transform itself from a descriptive worldview to a prescriptive construct adequate for modern extraction of subjectivity” (Chimakonam, 2016b: 225). Matolino and Kwindingwi, according to Chimakonam (2016b: 227) find the rapid decline in the influence of Ubuntu on the moral conduct of contemporary Africans to be expected because the socio-cultural context within which Ubuntu was accepted as a way of life in the past is no longer the same for the contemporary (South) African communities.

Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 197) argue that the aggressive manner in which Ubuntu is promoted in post-apartheid South Africa by the new black elite is aimed at the creation of a black identity and the restoration of the dignity of the black people. They question the need for “Ubuntu as a mark/guide of the spirit of the nation...the disjunct that exists between the metaphysical conditions necessary for the attainment of Ubuntu and the stark ontological and ethical crisis facing the new elite and our people” (Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013: 197). According to Metz (2014: 65), Matolino and Kwindingwi argue that the conditions in present day South Africa as well as in many other parts of the African continent negate any appeal to the moral theory of Ubuntu. They contend that the political elites and others

who have most influentially invoked Ubuntu have done so in ways that serve nefarious social functions, such as unreasonably narrowing discourse about how best to live, while, philosophically, these authors contend that the moral ideals of Ubuntu are appropriate only for a bygone pre-modern age. Since there is nothing ethically promising about Ubuntu for a modern society, and since appealing to it serves unwelcome purposes there, Matolino and Kwindingwi conclude that Ubuntu in academic and political circles has reached its end (Metz, 2014: 65).

The most problematic aspect of Ubuntu theory, according to Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 204), which further negates its relevance and existence as understood in the academic and political arenas, is

its failure to strike a coherent balance between its central claims of authenticity as a lived-out mode of being and what the circumstances of Africans are as moral beings living in the here and now. Its yearning for the restoration of a pristine mode of being is disjoined from the reality of ordinary people. Although the elite may have political interests in defending the project, its efficacy on the broad and general level will never be realised.

For Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 264), Matolino and Kwindingwi seem to have been influenced to reach this conclusion on the basis of an event that occurred in South Africa in 2012 (which the latter authors alluded to in their paper), in which a taxi_driver knocked down a pedestrian, got out of his vehicle and savagely attacked him. They note that the ethical issues that Matolino and Kwindingwi want to portray dwell on the immoral actions of the taxi driver, which are contrary to the moral import of Ubuntu, the failure of the bystanders to intervene in the attack, and the Police Minister's clarion call to the public to behave in a manner that befits Ubuntu.

In their critique of Ubuntu, Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 198 & 201) claim that while Ubuntu could have been the dominant ethic, one of the issues that must be examined before it can be considered to be an authentic mode of being African relates to the disadvantages of what they term revivalism. By this they refer to the 'narrative of return' which they consider as the quest by academics, political leaders and others to identify past values which they believe are capable of revitalising an obsolete way of life and inspiring a better society. They question the revivalists' articulation of everything African as having proceeded from the perfect pre-slavery and pre-colonial Africa and they posit that not all Africans, including sub-Saharan Africans have the same conception of what it means to be an African. For instance, they refer to the Police Minister's criticism of the lack of Ubuntu in the case of the barbaric taxi driver, and wonder if the various tribes who reside in the area where this act occurred have a common understanding of Ubuntu and subscribe to it in their daily lives? They conclude that these people probably hold competing values that cannot be interpreted because of Ubuntu, and that the philosophy of Ubuntu can only be effective in small

and undeveloped homogenous communities. They further claim that through mutual interdependence and recognition

members of these communities foster the necessary feelings of solidarity that enable the spirit of Ubuntu to flourish [...]. Without the existence of such communities the notion of Ubuntu becomes only but an appendage to the political desires, wills and manipulations of the elite in the attempt to coerce society towards the same ideology reminiscent of the aforesaid earlier attempts by some political leaders on the continent (Matolino & Kwindingwi 2013: 202).

Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 202-203) criticise the belief that the 'narrative of return' reflects the best desirable interpretation of reality as not always the case. They disagree with the belief that everyone can easily understand this narrative and naturally desire to act in line with its provisions and that anyone who tends to act in contrast with its dictates is inhuman or un-African. Rather, they posit that the narrative cannot be naturally apparent to everyone since such a claim can be interpreted to mean that the narrative proceeds naturally from Africans through a supernatural force. No one on earth, they claim, is metaphysically inclined to possess any moral quality, to be communal, social, antisocial or selfless. Rather, they believe that such qualities are motivated by specific objectives and result from specific conditions.

Metz (2014: 65) challenges Matolino and Kwindingwi's contentions that the current state of affairs in contemporary South Africa and in most parts of the African continent does not justify any appeal to the moral theory of Ubuntu. Rather, he claims that scholarly research into Ubuntu and the political application thereof has only commenced. He considers their arguments as insufficient basis for their conclusions, and asserts that the ethical theory of Ubuntu has a significant role to play in the development of the morality of people and organisations. Metz, according to Matolino (2015: 214), supports his position by trying to show that Ubuntu can be defended as both a way of life and as an ethical theory, and reasons that Ubuntu can play a significant role in how contemporary (South) Africans conduct themselves. For Metz (2014: 71),

Ubuntu, when interpreted as an ethical theory, is well understood to prescribe honouring relationships of sharing a way of life and caring for others' quality of life. Sharing a way of life is roughly a matter of enjoying a

sense of togetherness and engaging in joint projects, while caring for others' quality of life consists of doing what is likely to make others better off for their sake and typically consequent to sympathy with them.

Matolino (2015: 214-219) responds to Metz's objections, claiming that Metz's defence of Ubuntu is unphilosophical, weak, indefensible and dogmatic. He condemns what he terms Metz's utopian propagation of Ubuntu, as neither new, nor holding any promises for Africans. He defends his response by alluding to the failures of the earlier revivalists of precolonial African values in his claim that the philosophical flirtations that the first wave of African philosopher kings, such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor and Kenneth Kaunda, introduced to Africans have only resulted in disastrous consequences for post-colonial African states. For instance, he refers to the failures of one-party dictatorial governments, which were founded on the need to revive the true African identity.

For Chimakonam (2016b: 224-225) the claims by Matolino and Kwindigwi that Ubuntu has become obsolete for contemporary patterns of thought processes and not capable of future development should not be considered a mere statement of fact, but a problematic assertion, the import of which holds far reaching implications for both the theory of Ubuntu and the entire sphere of African philosophy. He posits that their claims regarding the end of Ubuntu raise a number of fundamental questions such as: Is it possible for philosophy to close the door on itself? Can philosophical inquiry lose its dynamism? And is it no longer possible to raise new questions in philosophy? He suggests that Matolino and Kwindigwi's assertions in relation to the first question can be interpreted to mean that philosophy has closed its own doors. But he rejects this as incorrect since the doors of philosophy are always open. He asserts that the implication of their conclusion with regards to the second question is that the theory of Ubuntu can no longer generate philosophical questions. However, he believes that this cannot be the case since philosophical inquiries are always dynamic, always generating further questions, some of which may not be the right questions to ask. The concern here for him, is to ensure that the right questions are posed. Furthermore, the third question for him may be interpreted to mean that by announcing the end of Ubuntu, Matolino and Kwindigwi are implying that appropriate questions are yet to be posed in African philosophy.

For Chimakonam (2016b: 225-227), the significance of Matolino and Kwindingwi's conclusion regarding the end of Ubuntu lies in its methodical and philosophical import as opposed to its validity. It is neither advisable to dismiss their claims, as Metz does, nor to accept their conclusions as dogmatic truth. Rather, Chimakonam proffers that their claims be considered a philosophical problem or a conundrum that needs to be critically examined. He claims that one of the means of adequately evaluating the value of Matolino, Kwindingwi and Metz's arguments is to establish their various notions of Ubuntu. He considers these theorists' conception of Ubuntu as confined to what can be referred to as 'worldview Ubuntu', which is "an ethnographic description of the precolonial/premodern sub-Saharan African outlook to life. This is something akin to what Kwasi Wiredu tags 'community thought'. Matolino appropriately christens it narrative of return" (Chimakonam, 2016b: 227).

In their reactions to Matolino and Kwindingwi's critique of the philosophy of Ubuntu, Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 274) concede that unethical conduct, violence and crime cannot be justified, and that moral persons who possess Ubuntu will abhor wrong actions and behaviour. However, they believe that there is no justification for the agitation for the end of Ubuntu. Rather, they believe that the moral crisis that confronts contemporary African states makes a stronger case for human beings to uphold the moral theory of Ubuntu.

Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 275) agree with Metz's position that Matolino and Kwindingwi have not been able to advance valid arguments for the abolition of the moral theory of Ubuntu. They further consider their claim pessimistic, an attitude that Africans ought to dissuade from their consciousness. Koenane and Olatunji, (2017: 264) consider Matolino and Kwindingwi's main criticism of Ubuntu as resting on a wrong notion of what Ubuntu means. While they interpret Ubuntu as only a narrative of return, they conclude that there is nothing fundamentally African about it; that it has become obsolete; that since Ubuntu promotes conformity or collectivism, it automatically rejects any other frame of mind / values. In other words, Matolino and Kwindingwi contend that as a result of prioritising conformity at the expense of freedom Ubuntu encourages conflict and tension.

Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 265) disagree with Matolino and Kwindingwi's line of thought, claiming that by contending that Ubuntu promotes conformity, which eventually leads to conflict and tension since the communities that subscribe to the principles of Ubuntu are among other things, known to be intolerant of other races and views, Matolino and Kwindingwi are by inference claiming that Ubuntu communities do not appreciate the values of other cultures. For Koenane and Olatunji, this further amounts to saying that the recent xenophobic incidents in South Africa resulted from the adherence by Ubuntu communities to the promotion of conformity. They reject Matolino and Kwindingwi's arguments as invalid because they are comparable to erroneously stating that capitalism should be abrogated for resulting in violence, terrorism, crime and heightened economic competition; or to claiming that the collapse of communist countries invalidates the theory of communism.

In opposition to Matolino and Kwindingwi's criticism of Ubuntu, Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 263) posit that Ubuntu "is still alive, relevant and can play a vital role in civil society". Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 263) consider Ubuntu to be an all-inclusive worldview, which represents the universalised values of humanness such as respect, compassion, honesty, empathy and tolerance and which various cultures have in common. They subscribe to Metz's article in which he claims that Ubuntu is just beginning. Contrary to Matolino and Kwindingwi's misrepresentation of the complete notion of Ubuntu, Koenane and Olatunji posit that

Ubuntu is an ethic of becoming: it promotes a certain attitude towards a relationship an individual should have in order to live harmoniously with others. As an ethic of becoming, the Ubuntu ethic or Ubuntu conduct is a continuous process of developing morality and should be promoted (Koenane & Olatunji, 2017: 275).

This study submits that it is indisputable that the world at large and Africa in particular are confronted by a deep moral crisis. The challenge here is to seek adequate means of confronting them. The solutions advanced by Metz, which Matolino terms dogmatic, do not render them less effective in resolving ethical challenges. Perhaps, the world needs to embrace elements of dogmatism and deemphasise some aspects of rights and freedom in its quest for an ethical society because it appears as though many

people employ the principles of rights, equality and freedom to indulge in unethical conduct.

4.5 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN INDIGENOUS AFRICAN CONTEXT

Traditional African societies, according to Bates (2010: 1134) were infused with democratic culture. For instance, in centralised kingdoms were found prominent fora that citizens could utilise to challenge the bureaucrats and the royals. In other societies, commoners were appointed to the office of the prime minister, while yet in other societies, the council of commoners provided a check on the public administration. The masses held strong bargaining powers. Although there was inequality in pre-colonial African states, the people that occupied privileged positions were required to commit themselves to ensuring that state benefits were dispersed to the generality of their community members.

The African traditional system of governance differs from the postcolonial and western systems in the sense that while modern elected rulers are elected and vacate the office at the end of their terms, traditional African ruler-ship is a life-long appointment to remain accountable to both their subjects and their ancestors,

to serve all the needs and concerns of their communities and of future generations. Political power and leadership of this kind is not obtained through the votes. It cannot be assessed accurately by the standards that apply to the exercise of multi-party electoral politics in late capitalist societies, as exist in the US and UK (Lauer, 2012: 44).

The system of governance in traditional African context, and in particular, in the precolonial Akan society, hinged on a non-party politics, and the choice of the head_of a royal family who is supported by an advisory council of elders in life-long service. In some traditional African societies, the position of the chief in itself, confers absolute authority and dictatorship over his community. This kind of African democracy has evolved since the origin of civilization. Decision-making was consensual and entailed the consideration of the views of all members (Lauer, 2012: 41-44). In the precolonial Akan society, the chief as the leader and head of the political structure obtained his position through heredity. However, he did not command absolute authority. The final decision on matters before the council did not proceed from the chief. Rather, his

pronouncements were a reflection of the collective decision of all members of council. The position of the chief was also considered both political and religious as he is seen as the link between the ancestors and members of the community (Matolino, 2009: 35). Representatives from various clans within the community constituted the council, and through them, the concerns of their specific constituencies were relayed to the council. The decisions of the council on matters under discussion were arrived at through dialogue. Although voting was not a criterion for arriving at a decision (this became a determining factor only after its imposition by the colonialists), the decisions reached through logical persuasiveness were owned by all, even if they were not all in agreement with it (Matolino, 2013: 140).

It may be erroneous to conclude that traditional African system of governance and democracy is undemocratic just because the chief was not elected into office. However, in many precolonial African contexts, such as the Akan, the chief neither rules in line with his independent discretion nor at will, but always according to the advice of the elders of his community. He may also be removed from office should he allow his personal choices or his personality to influence the style of administration or if he attempts to dominate council proceedings. In the West African system of democracy by consensus therefore, the council of elders command an authoritative position in policy formation and decision making. This system of governance remains a common feature in many contemporary African tribes such as the Igbos, Yorubas, Hausas, Akan, Ewe and Dagbon. In most cases these systems are run in parallel with the adopted western system of governance, and they are recognised by the national governments (Lauer, 2012: 45).

The Akan system of governance is similar to what obtained in the traditional Nigerian context and it is still much applicable in the contemporary era. The differences in the two contexts however, lie in the fact that in the Nigerian context, and specifically with the Yoruba and Igbo races, among others, while the council members contribute to decision making through debates, the chief's pronouncements resulting from the discussion and agreements are final. Though the chief cannot ordinarily be removed for making decisions that are contrary to that of his council members, he can however, be unseated if he continuously does so or takes decisions that bring harm to the generality of his people without making efforts to reverse them.

In traditional African societies, consensus, for Wiredu, was noticeably evident in most adult social relations. Most political and social engagements, decision making processes, discussions and interactions among members of society were channelled towards achieving consensus. Democracy by consensus for Wiredu entails reaching a decision having considered not only the views of the majority, but the will of the minority as well (Matolino, 2009: 35). In political terms consensus becomes democratic since all stakeholders are expected to physically or by representation participate in the decisions that may possibly impact on them. The dual representative nature of consensual democracy made it participatory and inclusive of minority groups (Ani, 2014b: 344). Democracy by consensus, for Wiredu (Matolino, 2013: 138) provides a political system that is not defined by competition for dominance and power among political parties. It avoids conferment of power on winners based on majority votes. Moreover, consensus “cannot be obtained at all unless the individuals concerned have the relevant habits of mind: belief in dialogue, respect for others, patience, freedom from overweening ambitions for power, and so on” (Wiredu, 2007: 169).

This differs from the Western majoritarian democracy, which is primarily concerned with protecting the interests of the majority as well as consolidating their power, which is easier to achieve than seeking consensual outcomes (Matolino, 2009: 35). It is also in contrast with the Western approach where democracy is conceived as adversarial competition among various political parties in a majoritarian system, and which confers political power on the party that got majority votes in an election and relegates the losers to opposition. He further defends democracy by consensus, because it provides the electorate with maximal representation, while the minority may be marginalised if the majority party is accorded maximum authority (Matolino, 2013: 138). In most sub-Saharan precolonial African states, conflicts were resolved by seeking the opinions of all adult members of the community until they would come to an agreement. This, in line with the sharing notion of Ubuntu, also relates to sharing political power in a manner that ensures that decisions are not only to the benefit of the majority, but that they also take cognisance of everyone’s interests. In precolonial Burundi, for instance, a king did not unilaterally determine policy directions. Rather, the task belonged to both the king and the group of appointed elders to resolve conflicts in a way that was to the benefit of everyone (Murove, 2010: 384).

Wiredu (in Ani, 2014a: 311) anchors the process of consensual decision making on the spirit of cooperation that was common in the communal structure of these societies. Although he concedes that consensus was not necessarily a common feature in all precolonial African societies, the practice was widespread. According to Wiredu (in Ani, 2014b: 342-343) considerable evidence abounds that African deliberations ended with decisions by consensus most of the time. The evidence he refers to is Kenneth Kaunda's claim that issues in traditional African societies were concluded by consensus through a process whereby discussions were held in solemn conclaves until all participants in the discussions reached agreements. For Wiredu, deliberations in this era were not subjected to voting. Consensus was considered self-evident for joint action and was an inherent or immanent approach to relationships among people. The import of this immanence for him could be seen in people reconciling not for the sake of avoiding punishments and revenge, but the genuine nature of dispute resolutions, as opposed to what largely obtains in the current era, where disputes are resolved without consequent genuine reconciliation. Ani (2014b: 345-346) objects to the manner in which Wiredu attached the doctrine of immanence to consensus. Although Ani accepts the merits of consensus as a social and political theory, he believes that the idea of immanence can only be attached to human beings in general and not only to Africans, because such classification plays no helpful role in dispelling or in discouraging other negative biases such as that Whites are inherently superior in intelligence to other races.

A number of conceptual factors play a significant role in Wiredu's conception of democracy by consensus. Firstly, in his assessment of human nature, he claims that the differences among human beings proceed from a mistaken belief or the failure to understand and correctly judge their actual interests. When disagreements arise, the parties to the dispute should rather take cognisance of the fact that ultimately they share an identity of interests (Matolino, 2013: 140). In other words, consensus hinged on the belief that the interests of all members of a community are ultimately the same, even though their initial understanding of those interests may not be the same. He uses the example of an art motif. In the Akan culture, the Art motif portrays a crocodile with two heads but one stomach fighting over food and forgetting that the food is destined for the same stomach. Wiredu considers this symbol as capturing the basic

problem of ethics as well as its solution. The problem that it captures is that while all human beings have their specific legitimate interests as depicted by the different heads, they can however, lead them to forgetting that their interests are the same, specifically their common well-being, which the same stomach symbolises. The root cause of disagreements and conflicts result from losing that notion of common interest, “and its restoration should facilitate that agreement on the sharing of assets which recognises the interest of all parties concerned” (Wiredu, 2009: 10).

Wiredu believes that human beings are able to work through their differences until they arrive at a similar comprehension of their interests through rational dialogue and debate. He also believes that consensus can be achieved by people or parties with different interests if they are prepared to overlook their views in favour of a persuasive alternative view. Participants will be able to notice the persuasiveness of an idea if they are willing and prepared to suspend their views in favour of a convincing alternative view, and if they are committed to attaining consensus (Matolino, 2013: 141-142).

Consensus for Wiredu does not mean that all aggrieved parties are in full agreement. Rather, consensus presupposes and appreciates diversity and diverse points of view and utilises dialogue to bring about results that are acceptable to all concerned individuals and groups, giving rise to the willingness to suspend disagreement. This will enable them to agree on what will be done, while retaining their personal views about what is true or false and about what should be done, despite their differences in ethical and intellectual belief. In this case rational people who need to make joint efforts and decisions agree to curtail their reservations in order to avoid stalemates (Ani, 2014b: 343). The fundamental basis of the traditional Akan politics, for Wiredu, lies in the ability of the elder council members to reach agreements (the will to consensus). Those among the elders holding different opinions can maintain the integrity of their opinions while at the same time be willing to make compromises that will promote the realisation of a plan of action (Lauer, 2012: 46). The residual minority are usually those who suspend their disagreements in favour of

the view of the majority which prevails not over, but upon, this minority to accept the proposal in question – not just to live with it, which is the basic

plight of minorities under majoritarian democracy. Wiredu emphasises that all this is made possible by the will to consensus. The feasibility of this depends not only on the patience and persuasiveness of the right people but also on the fact that African traditional systems of the consensual type were not such as to place any one group of persons consistently in the position of minority (Ani, 2014b: 343-344).

Wiredu makes a distinction here between decisional and concessional compromise. Decisional compromise requires, as noted above, that we collectively determine the course of actions to take in attending to the needs of affected individuals by reaching practical compromise. It requires that participants in the discussions or the decision making process do not relinquish their personal beliefs and values. Although the elders in council can make compromises in the process of determining the course of action to take, they are however, not obligated to abandon their personal convictions on what is wrong or right or on what should be done. Concessional compromise on the other hand relates to abandoning personal beliefs and surrendering one's values to a coercive opposition. This process of decision-making requires compromises by concerned individuals and communities, though not with the view to suppressing their different values and beliefs. Wiredu's idea of the procedure for concessional decision making in traditional African politics does not significantly differ from Eze's concerns. While Eze posits that certain mechanisms should be established to minimise the negative implications of suppressing individual beliefs and views in a democratic dispensation, Wiredu posits that the fundamental objective of communitarian practice in the traditional Akan society lies in giving priority attention to the needs and rights of members of the community. Consensual decision making then entails that the council equally recognise and accommodate the various interests of members of the community (Lauer, 2012: 47).

Wiredu's preference for democracy by consensus over majoritarian democracy attempts to develop an understanding of a state where the majority party does not exercise political power while overlooking the opposition and minority parties. He notes that such slanted appropriation of power has been a source of problems in Africa since the end of the colonial era and the emergence of majoritarian democracy. Wiredu's arguments in favour of consensual democracy also attempt to find solutions to the myriad of challenges confronting post-colonial Africa (Matolino, 2013: 138). He adamantly criticizes the multi-party electoral processes characteristic of modern

oligarchies (e.g., the UK and US models) as too expensive and distracting from development agendas so critical to modern African citizens' welfare all over the continent (Lauer, 2012: 42-43).

Wiredu (in Lauer, 2012: 43), believes in the potential of democracy by consensus to enhance the realisation of contemporary Africa's search for ideal democratic order. He advocates the adoption of a modified version of its ideals of good governance for contemporary systems of governance and administration in Africa. He notes that in "those African countries where consensus was the basis of politics in pre-colonial times, that kind of polity was, in fact, an epiphenomenon of a general culture of consensus in interpersonal relations" (Wiredu, 2007: 170). However, he asserts that as a result of the various challenges that currently confront post-colonial African states, "we need to re-learn the ways of consensus, both conceptually and existentially" (Wiredu, 2007: 170).

Eze (Matolino, 2013: 140) disagrees with the manner in which Wiredu portrays the identity of human interests, wondering if such an identity is realistic and, assuming that it were; members of the community may not be positively inclined towards it. It is unrealistic for instance, to conceive of the possibility of an identity of interests where there are little or no commonalities among warring parties. The case of shareholders in Shell Oil Corporation in Ogoniland comes to mind, where the exploitation of the natural resources of the community makes it impossible for the two stakeholders to share an identity of interests. Eze's position does not sound very plausible, because the fact that the two parties are in disagreement does not mean that they cannot have a commonality of interests. Indeed they can share similar interest in the sense of both parties assisting each other to achieve their individual objectives of growth and development. The duty of Shell in this case would be to extract the oil in a safe and humane manner without destroying the environment, share the resources equitably with the Ogoni people, as well as contribute to corporate social responsibility in Ogoniland.

Matolino objects to Wiredu's idea of democracy by consensus as not different from what obtains in a one-party state. Even though it is not Wiredu's intention to advocate for a one party state, Matolino considers Wiredu's position as tending towards a

dangerous form of a benevolent one party state (Matolino, 2013: 149). Eze criticises Wiredu's treatise of the Akans' system of governance and the manner in which he ascribes political legitimacy to it as an excessive rationalisation, a misleading romanticisation, and a non-party system of politics which can serve the purpose of defending the early nationalists' single party system of politics in which their total control of political power did not encourage democratic freedom. In the precolonial African politics, the indigenous council of elders also showed signs that deter democratic inclusion (Lauer, 2012: 41-43).

Wiredu (Matolino, 2009: 36) conceives the legitimacy of the chief as residing in the eldest member who possessed the desired quality of the power of persuasion and critical thinking that guaranteed the attainment of consensus through dialogue. Contrary to this position, Eze believes that political power derives its legitimacy from other factors that enable consensus building, such as religion and other beliefs since they are able to influence the kinds of choices that people make. He does not see logical persuasion as a sufficient guarantee for political power since the exercise of public power also depends on cultural, social and religious fantasies, myths, the party, progress, liberation and freedom, which demand more than logic in getting people to cooperate and understand each other.

Eze (Lauer, 2012: 49-50) argues that it is inconceivable and impossible to concede to the effectiveness of consensual politics in the traditional Akan society on the basis that all members of the society shared a rational understanding of the power of reason, believed in the persuasive strength of ideas and recognised the commonality of their interests. He reasons that the deliberations of the elders were tolerated as a result, of the mystical powers associated with the rituals of governance which ensured that the people naively believed that they were bound together by a mystical force. He further posits that such institutions would not be able to function in the contemporary era since Africans are no longer naïve. The concerns raised by Eze gain support from a number of contemporary African political analysts such as Kojo Amanor and Kwame Ninsin; and contributors to American anarchist studies such as Mark Lance and Daniel Levine (Lauer, 2012: 42-43), who suspect that Wiredu's consensus politics can undermine the egalitarian ideals and inclusiveness of contemporary representative democracy and become a means of hiding authoritarianism, and a very useful hegemonic

instrument for side-lining opposition. Since the eighteenth century, for instance, the deliberative process has been controlled by elites who by means of rationalistic standards disqualify the ideas of subordinate individuals and groups as subjective and emotional. In the process, the elite render their ideas and demands illegitimate, insignificant, and inappropriate for public consideration (Lauer, 2012: 42-50).

Eze cannot be totally right in his views on the ineffectiveness of traditional institutions in the postcolonial era because there are many contemporary African societies that still believe in the potency of mystical powers in governance processes. In the current day Nigeria for instance, most tribes including the Igbos, Yorubas and Hausas believe strongly in the powers of the deities and in their ability to inflict both blessings and curses on people as a result of their conduct. While contemporary African societies have been enmeshed in development and globalisation, the fact remains that traditional beliefs are still upheld by many individuals and societies.

The Akan system of politics in Ghana is similar to the Igbo system of traditional governance in Nigeria as this system has not substantially deviated from its precolonial practice. Looking at most traditional African modes of governance will reveal similar traits. In the Igbo traditional system of politics, including the contemporary case, members of the council are usually older men who have passed the stage of youthful exuberance. One of the shortfalls of this system is that almost all members of the council, especially in the Igbo case, are men. The age of westernisation has not been able to influence the practice. One of the main reasons for this trend is probably the fact that men in the traditional Igbo culture do not consider it appropriate to include women in the council. Women may send representatives to the council if so desired.

Wiredu and other philosophers who support democracy by consensus posit that traditional African societies were inherently democratic; they outline the process of consensus in the traditional African societies and deduce its desirability as a preferable type of democracy in contemporary African political systems. Wiredu's main treatise on African politics proceeds from his evaluation of the traditional Akan philosophy and culture, from which he has been able to produce a modern philosophy in the form of democracy by consensus that is applicable to contemporary African society. Wiredu posits that based on merits and in continuation of the good traditional African

democratic practices of the Akan and other commendable African societies, such as the Igbos, democracy by consensus is a better option than majoritarian democracy. He appeals to a return to democracy by consensus because democracy in Africa was not imported, but has always been an inherent feature of rule in pre-colonial African society, with distinctive advantages over majoritarian rule (Matolino, 2013: 139).

There have been various disagreements among theorists on the political legitimacy of the traditional African system of rule and its relevance to contemporary democracy. The traditional African system of consensus politics which Wiredu alludes to has survived for centuries despite colonial interference and the corruption of the local traditional authority. While Wiredu promotes non-party politics, Eze promotes multi-party politics in Africa. Wiredu's non-party consensual politics is essentially utilitarian, though he has not been able to provide practical processes for its implementation, capable of replacing multi-party rule in a large society. Nonetheless, Wiredu and Eze are in agreement on a number of areas such as promoting freedom of speech and opinion, discouraging autocracy, and encouraging political contestation. They both discourage the lust for power, wasteful, extravagant and reckless lifestyles which seem to be prevalent in the political life of many oligarchic democracies. They both believe that African societies can derive immense benefits from systems of rule that have not been perverted by the worst forms of capitalism. However, they both disagree on the feasibility of a reformed kind of democracy by consensus as an alternative to the excesses of western democratic practices. A substantial aspect of the indigenous African system of rule has remained undiluted and effective even throughout the colonial era and up to the contemporary period as its intrinsic values portray (Lauer, 2012: 54).

4.6 SUMMARY

This chapter has explored the conception of ethics and moral life, and the system of politics and governance in precolonial African societies. The concepts of ethics and morality have been used interchangeably in the research as they are taken to refer to the same thing. Traditional African societies consider ethics as a measure of right and wrong and as relating to goodness of character. Goodness of character proceeds from an individual's development of virtues such as mutual respect, honesty, kindness, compassion and justice. A number of theorists do not agree with the notion that African

ethics originates from religion. There are other philosophers however, who posit that ethics and religion are inseparable because most African moral notions have religious underpinnings, which compel traditional Africans to be ethical in order not to incur the wrath of the gods, the deities, ancestral spirits, and in order to attract divine blessings and favours.

The early westerners to the African continent denied the existence of ethics and morality among traditional African societies. They also considered their traditional practices and beliefs irrelevant, since they were deemed primitive, irrational, uncivilised and pagan. The quest to correct their erroneous conceptions resulted in the destruction of substantial aspects of traditional Africans' social life, culture, traditions, and family values, which were founded on communal, ethical and religious principles. However many of these westerners eventually realised their prejudice and ignorance of the true nature of traditional Africans' cultural belief systems and admitted to the existence of well outlined standards of morality in Africa. There are well-defined systems of morality according to various African theorists and philosophers, which played a significant role in regulating the lives of community members. However, the source of traditional African ethics has been contested by various theorists. While some theorists consider religion as the source of African morality, others do not share the same notion. As earlier mentioned in this chapter, Wiredu and Gyekye (in Udokang, 2014: 268; Anderson, 2013: 165-166; Kazeem, 2011: 265-271) for instance, claim that society and rational thinking, and not religion, shape the morality of individuals. They argue that African morality results from occasions when people take into consideration the impact of their thoughts, words and actions on others, and not as a result of metaphysical intervention. This is what Wiredu terms the motivated quest for sympathetic impartiality; he claims that an individual is ethical when he shows due concern for the welfare of other people and hypothetically puts himself in their shoes.

Contrary to Wiredu's position, Kazeem claims that morality is not necessarily universal in all communities, and neither is it solely based on the principle of sympathetic impartiality. He posits that morality is a product of both sympathetic impartiality and Rawls' principle of rational egoism (calculating impartiality), in which the process of determining an impartial principle of justice, which creates an egalitarian and impartial distribution of benefits, rights and obligations would require that participants abstract

themselves from all the factors that allow them to make decisions on the basis of their prejudices. Anderson disagrees with Gyekye and Wiredu's position, arguing that to lend credence to their views would create the impression of the existence of any religious free-society in Ghana, or in Africa as a whole. He submits that all societies are influenced by religion, perhaps at different levels. He claims that religious influences permeate all strata of human social life, including their dress mode, their food and even their speech. Although the debate around the source of morality may persist, morality can be said to proceed from either religion, society, or from both. Many societies do not distinguish between religious and moral laws. These societies rejected what religion denounced and accepted what religion sanctioned. What matters in essence, is that human beings should conduct themselves ethically and professionally if there is any hope of realising a just and fair society.

African worldviews believe in the interrelatedness, interdependency and interconnectedness of all beings in a manner that the flourishing of one entity affects the flourishing of the others. They also consider it the duty of human beings to help each other and to protect nature and the environment for the benefit of all. The communal nature of traditional African ethics hinges on taking into account the interests of all community members. It recognises that human beings can only exist in communion with others. As a result, the individual recognises that the purpose of his or her existence is to take care of both his interests as well as the interests of other community members. African traditional ethics promotes humanism, which in the sense of Ubuntu as propagated by Southern African communities, describes the well-being of a person as causally dependent on other people. It believes that a person has the moral obligation to be the best human being possible, to live together in harmony as members of one community, and to derive personal fulfilment without being selfish. African humanism further promotes care and concern for each other's quality of life, identifying with each other, showing solidarity with each other, and respecting human rights.

African traditional societies promote communal responsibility for the welfare of others. In this regard, they collectively assist their neighbours to meet their needs, such as farming or building of houses. The principle of communal responsibility holds that the actions of a person can affect the community as a whole. This culture is often criticised

as detrimental to self-individuation. It has been blamed for the myriad of problems that African countries, which subscribe to this philosophy confront, such as intertribal wars and conflicts, where an individual or group or community is held responsible for the actions of their members. An example of such cases includes the Rwandan genocide. Many cynics condemn the principle of communal responsibility, claiming that it places an impediment on the realisation of individual happiness. While there are negative implications of communal responsibility, there are also positive aspects to it such as lack of discriminatory practices, and consideration for the interests and welfare of all members of the community. It is therefore recommended that the negative aspects be curtailed, while the positive aspects should be encouraged.

Traditional African societies are considered inherently democratic and always seeking all sorts of agreements on most major decisions that impact on citizens. In most sub-Saharan precolonial African states, conflicts were resolved by seeking the opinions of all adult members of the community until they come to an agreement. Political powers were also dispersed in a manner that ensured that decisions made were to the benefit of both the majority and the minority. Specific attention is paid to consensus as essential in reaching just decisions. Democracy by consensus, for Wiredu provides a political system that is not defined by competition for dominance and power among political parties. It avoids conferment of power on winners based on majority votes. Wiredu, further defends democracy by consensus, because it provides the electorate with maximal representation, while the minority may be marginalised if the majority party is accorded maximum authority. This is in contrast with the Western approach where democracy is conceived as adversarial competition among various political parties in a majoritarian system, and which confers political power on the party that gets majority votes in an election and relegates the losers to the opposition.

The African traditional system of governance differs from postcolonial and western systems in the sense that while modern rulers are elected and vacate office at the end of their terms, traditional African ruler-ship is a life-long appointment to remain accountable to both their subjects and their ancestors. In some traditional African societies, the position of the chief in itself confers absolute authority and dictatorship over his community. In other societies such as the Akan society, the chief does not

command absolute authority. Rather, his final decision is a reflection of the collective decision of all members of council.

As noted in this chapter, Matolino criticises Wiredu's idea democracy by consensus as capable of leading to the entrenchment of one party politics. Eze further considers Wiredu's system of governance as a misleading romanticisation, excessive rationalisation and a non-party system of politics, which can be used to justify the single system of party politics of the early nationalists which discouraged democratic freedom as a result of their complete control of political power (Lauer, 2012: 41-43). In the traditional African system of governance, the council of elders also displayed tendencies of democratic exclusion. A number of philosophers concur with Eze's concerns, claiming that Wiredu's consensus building processes could become a useful hegemonic means of sidelining opposition, an instrument of camouflaging authoritarianism, and a means of undermining the egalitarian inclusiveness and ideals of contemporary representative democracy.

Wiredu appears to have preferred democracy by consensus over Western majoritarian democracy as he subscribes to the kind of political system, which does not promote a winner takes it all philosophy, but which equally provides for the needs of all society members, irrespective of their political affiliations. This is the kind of system that should be encouraged in Africa, since history shows that the majority party tends to take a scornful approach to the contributions of the minority or opposition parties. The latter also tends to largely employ an adversarial outlook to the implementation of policies by the ruling party. This contentious approach does not make the political climate in most cases conducive for effective management and administration of the state. Therefore, while it is noted that there are merits in the views of Matolino and Eze, the benefits of democracy by consensus should be further explored so as to guarantee the realisation of the kind of state that all its members desire, a state free of favouritism and bias and, which is structured on the disposition towards a just and reasonable treatment of all community members.

This chapter has shown that the system of ethics and politics in the indigenous African context largely differs from what obtains in the contemporary era, where almost every

facet of life seems to be characterised by moral laxity, including rivalry, contestations, individualism and secularisation. As noted in this chapter, a number of theorists, such as Matolino and Kwindigwi have assumed a defeatist attitude towards the myriad of ethical challenges that the current era faces. They have called for the end of Ubuntu, claiming that as an ethical solution, it does not possess the context and the capacity to represent an ethical inspiration or moral code in the contemporary era. Despite their disillusionment, their claims, as Chimakonam proffers, should be considered a conundrum that needs to be critically analysed with the view to redressing noted challenges. Koenane and Olatunji also submit that while moral laxity cannot be condoned, there is no justification to call for the end of Ubuntu; rather, the moral crisis that Africa faces is an impetus for human beings to uphold the principles of Ubuntu. These suggestions must be given comprehensive consideration if there is any hope of realising a desirable ethical and ideal postcolonial African state.

CHAPTER FIVE

5 FAILURE OF POST COLONIAL AFRICAN STATES

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, I have examined the inextricable nexus between the indigenous system of politics and governance in traditional African societies, and how ethics, though an autonomous concept, has in practice permeated all aspects of the indigenous system in Africa. In that chapter, some theorists have argued attractively that Africans are naturally religious, because many scholars wrongly or rightly seem to believe that morality is an aspect of religion. Without making any judgement of the relationship between religion and morality, the chapter concentrated on carefully tracing the link between the indigenous political system of Africa and morality as a way to prepare the mind towards appreciating the scholarly position to be canvassed in this chapter (five). This position is that the failure of post-colonial political system in Africa is a necessary fallout of the extrication between the 'modern' political system and the naturally moral African society. The chapter examines the moral status of post-colonial African leadership, which appears largely questionable. That is, examining why leaders and managers find it overwhelmingly unattainable to create the kind of organisations, and by extension, society that is inspiring, ethical, immune to bureaucracy, and capable of excellent economic performance.

5.2 CONCEPTUALISATION OF A FAILED STATE

The challenges confronting post-colonial African states include erosion of African values, cultures and traditions, which had hitherto been founded on the type of morality which scholars have described as communalistic in nature. This has resulted in decline in the efficacy of traditional African authority; customs and traditions, and consequently enthroned deterioration of African politics; social, political and economic difficulties such as poverty; unemployment; underdevelopment; homelessness; illiteracy; diseases; famine; wars; individualism; economic mismanagement; bad leadership; the negative impact of colonialism; the threat of globalisation; and the failure of individuals and groups to play their part in creating an ethical and just state. The endemic problems that confront post-colonial African states render the future of democracy in Africa uncertain despite the current efforts at democratisation, unless adequate

measures are implemented for the realisation of the desired state. In sum, the situation has resulted in seemingly failed states on the continent of Africa.

There are a number of understandings of what a failed state means. Bah (2012: 71-72) makes a distinction between state failure and state decay, arguing that state decay is not state failure, but a precursor to and the root cause of state failure. He considers a failing or failed state as characterised by civil war and or political instability that result from social, political and economic challenges that undermine the stability of the state. He considers state decay as a process of decline in the material well-being of the citizens, and a reduction in political and civil liberties. This process of decline leads to the citizens' social, economic and political dissatisfaction and eventually turns to political violence that makes it impossible for the state to fulfil its duties.

The comparative approach to identifying failed states differs from Bah's characterisation of such countries. For Hill (2009: 41), failed state analysts who subscribe to the comparative approach consider failed states as those that the international community recognise as sovereign but which are not able to provide their citizens with necessities such as good governance, security, law and order. While Jackson considers failed states as those that are not able to guarantee basic civil conditions for their population, Rotberg (Hill, 2009: 41) considers failed states as dangerous, highly conflicted, tense and associated with bitter contestations among the warring parties. For Gros (Hill, 2009: 41), failed states are associated with societies where the governments do not fulfil their part of the social contract; and Zartman (Hill, 2009: 41) considers failed states as those that are no longer able to exercise the basic functions of the state. Each of these conceptions of a failed state is underpinned by an understanding of the functions of a state, of what constitutes a successful state, and the areas where the state has failed to perform as expected.

This study does not share Bah's notion of a failed state. Rather, it subscribes to the comparative conception of a failing or failed state, and argues here that failing or failed states are those that derelict their constitutional obligations, or that have not been able to govern their territories in a manner that meets the needs and aspirations of their citizens. These are states that despite all the human and natural resources at their disposal, have failed to use them optimally for the benefit, welfare and development

of their population and countries. States where corruption and moral laxity have negatively impacted on their ability to promote a better life, equity, justice and fairness are failed states. War is not the only manifestation of state failure, because there are countries in Africa and in other continents (such as Sudan, Somalia, Libya, Syria and Iraq), where the impact of the level of poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, diseases, illiteracy and marginalisation, among other ills, on the lives of their citizens, is comparable to what obtains in a state of war. When the conditions in a state have degenerated to the extent that some of their citizens ransack the dustbins for food, even though this could be avoided if the government conducted its affairs differently, it is a failed state.

5.3 CHALLENGES CONFRONTING POST COLONIAL AFRICAN STATES

As has been mentioned above, and as the examples of South Africa and Nigeria will show, post-colonial African states suffer many challenges and setbacks. The challenges in question are arguably applicable to each of the countries in Africa. These, according to the Saylor Foundation (2012: 1), include erosion of African values, cultures and traditions, socio economic crisis, leadership failures, corruption, authoritarianism and military intervention. For Ogbogbo (2011: 1), the challenges include the negative impact of colonialism, ineffective and unethical leadership, globalisation and failure of citizens to play their part in creating the desired state. Mann (2012: 2) considers these challenges to include poverty, homelessness, the high cost of owning a property, unemployment, illiteracy, drugs, health challenges, low levels of education and literacy, low access to clean running water, high famine rates, and which are generally at the lowest in terms of development in comparison with other parts of the world. These countries are further confronted by wars, diseases, individualism, economic mismanagement, greedy and politically ambitious individuals and leaders who inflict harm on their citizens as a result, of their selfish interests. The following sections will specifically examine some of these challenges.

5.3.1 Erosion of African Values, Cultures and Traditions

The activities of westerners in Africa have been blamed by a number of theorists, including Wiredu, Dolamo, Igboin, Chimakonam, Ezenweke and Nwadiakor, as largely responsible for the large scale distortion and erosion of the value that Africans attached to human life, to identity and the originally-held sense of humanism among Africans. This sense of humanism or Ubuntu is reflected, according to Shutte (2009: 98), in the manner in which human beings value others in the same way that they value themselves and in their embodiment of the wholeness of character. This all-inclusive worldview according to Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 263) “stands for universalised humanness (ubuntu/botho) values, which are shared across all cultures, and which include care, respect, tolerance, honesty, hospitality, compassion and empathy”. This African moral theory, according to Metz (2009: 342) “prohibits people not only from isolating themselves from others...but also from not caring about others”. Though there are a few theorists such as Matolino and Kwindigwi, as noted in the previous chapter, who oppose this very idea, their arguments are not very tenable because they are mostly based on selected events or judged on the logic of Western rationality. However, other theorists such as Igboin, Idang, Wahab, Mabovula, Omale and Amana contend that there are other factors as well which contribute to the things that have gone wrong in Africa. Their views will be considered in this section. Let us proceed by firstly considering the views of those who contend that colonialism and western influences are largely responsible for the distortion of African values, cultures and traditions.

For Dolamo (2014: 5-6), the westerners were bent on transforming all aspects of African life to their own conception of what human identity, proper practices and beliefs should be. This included religious practices, intellectual orientation and the replacement of traditional African names with their western imports. Their influence has dramatically affected and eroded the communal orientation of traditional Africans and replaced it with the kind of individualism that permeates almost every aspect of human life, including the social life, family orientations, values and the mode of worship, which were initially based on moral, religious and communal structures.

Ezenweke and Nwadiolor (2013: 61-62) also observe the negative implications of the erosion of African communalism and its replacement by individualism. They posit that while the African cultural belief systems and way of life in general were largely anchored on the sense of community, on a chain of societal interrelationships, more than individualism, and on the understanding of the individual as existing in communion with others, the westerners ignored these tenets and instead proceeded to implement their own conceptions of a proper society. The Western ideology portrays the person as existing for himself, as autonomous and who in the process of realising the self, may choose to have relationships with others.

Chimakonam *et al.*, (2014: 145-146) contend that the individualistic orientation of western liberal democracy, which Africa subscribes to is not suitable for the largely communal nature of African societies. They posit that the individualistic ontology that the West propagates, which places the individual ahead of the community, is in contrast with the African ontology, which while not denying the individualistic nature of the person, places the community ahead of the individual. The consequences of the western individualistic ideology, for Ezenweke and Nwadiolor (2013: 61), are problematic for the human race because if the “individual is prior to society, and if society emerges through the voluntary contact of individuals trying to maximise their self-interests, the survival of both the individual and the society becomes problematic” (Ezenweke & Nwadiolor, 2013: 61). Some of such unfavourable consequences manifest themselves in the extent of selfishness, greed, corruption and war that Africa in particular and the world at large contend with.

Igboin (2011: 101) notes that colonialism impacts negatively on the traditional moral practice of Africans through its destructive influences. The colonial intervention paganised the African values and depersonalised the African person. Colonialism also dislodged the African political value and replaced it with their imported ideas. Ezenweke and Nwadiolor (2013: 62) condemn the negative influences of colonialism in their observation that the African family and social life were fractured by the processes of urbanisation and industrialisation and its consequent detribalisation, while the African way of life, religion and morality became secularised. These westerners failed to acknowledge that there were specific networks of relations and value systems that had to be respected. Rather they suppressed the indigenous

modes of human relations, including traditional forms of education and literature. While Igboin (2011: 101) observes that they promoted their values and morals as better than those of Africans, Dolamo (2014: 5-6) further notes that they fashioned their education in a manner that portrayed the westerners as superior to Africans through the process that enabled the colonised Africans to willingly devalue their own beliefs and to freely adopt the western culture since many of them had also come to accept that the authenticity of a person depended on rejecting the African way of life and adopting the colonisers' mentality.

The negative impact of colonialism, for Igboin (2011: 101-102) resulted in the neglect or abandonment of African values by many Africans. The cherished values have deteriorated to such a length that they have been largely replaced by lack of integrity. He observes that the importation of foreign ideas has turned most Africans into double personalities who on the one hand are Africans by nature and westerners by ideas, mentality and skill. The kinds of changes that colonial rule and westernisation as a whole instigated on African values, cultures and traditions have resulted in oppression, discrimination, capitalism and corruption. Igboin (2011: 102) further notes that globalisation is eroding the African values that were cherished in the past and replacing them with insatiable appetites for worldly materials, with greed and loss of community orientation. The erosion of values has also infiltrated governmental departments, parastatals and the private sector in such a manner that their activities have come to be largely characterised by corruption, dishonesty, inefficiency, bribery, organised crime, harassment, favouritism and cronyism.

Western influence in Africa through globalisation, for Chimakonam (2016a: 1-9) poses a number of challenges to the conception of and the relationship between human beings. He notes that globalisation seems to constitute the world into a global village, promotes a sense of belonging, social and cultural integration of individuals and nations, and harmonious relationship among human beings and cooperation. However, he further observes that the expected global consciousness produces intended and unintended states of discrimination or biases in the human conception of and attitudes towards other races and cultures. This results in the perpetuation of tensions in human relations. As a result, globalisation has failed in some of its objectives because human beings and cultures, according to the phenomenon of

concealment are inadvertently or intentionally, perpetually in conflict with each other in their daily quests. The collapse of cultural boundaries as a result, of globalisation has not been able to dissuade individuals from their prejudices or from intentionally or unintentionally judging other cultures from their individual cultural orientations. In their associations with other people, rather, they tend to always prioritise their personal, group or racial interests. This tension results in the erosion of the individual's ability to correctly understand and relate well with other people.

The phenomenon of concealment adequately encapsulates what obtains in reality, whereby human beings are naturally biased towards those they are not familiar with. This tendency is largely responsible for the discriminatory attitudes of some people towards other races and cultures that in some cases lead to violence and war. It is noted that western influence has inflicted much harm on most aspects of African life. However, it has also contributed to Africa's minute progress in areas of development, although it appears that most Africans seem to have excessively imbibed these external influences to the detriment of their wellbeing and a desirable society. A question that one may pose here is how could Africans have allowed themselves to be so corrupted by westernisation to the point of losing their identity and values? There must have been those among them that resisted such invasion of their values and beliefs. Many of them however, would have been unable to withstand the western threat since the colonisers were prepared to use any means necessary to achieve their objectives, including threats and violence.

While the scholars examined above largely consider colonialism and western influence as responsible for the erosion of African values, cultures and traditions, various scholars disagree with this trend of thought. Rather, they argue, as will be exposed in the following section, that Africans have largely contributed to this development in ways such as their leadership styles, embracing of foreign products and lifestyles, and in the lack of humanity towards other people.

Igboin (2011: 101) notes that colonialism and western imports cannot be solely responsible for everything that has gone wrong in African societies because colonialism has produced some positive changes for African states, while there are those traditional Africans who did not always adhere to their values prior to the advent

of colonialism. While the early westerners to the African continent are blamed for most of the negatives influences that characterise contemporary Africans, he claims that it is worth asking if there are other factors such as internal revolution that could have negatively affected the values of Africans. It is not feasible to conclusively posit that such a revolution would have occurred as a matter of certainty. However, since life is dynamic and the only thing constant in life is change, he concludes that it is safe to proffer the possibility of changes taking place in Africa at varied speed and magnitude.

Omale and Amana (2014: 3) contend that the examples set by African leaders indicate that Africans are personally responsible for the challenges that confront their societies, including the erosion of African values, cultures and traditions because most of these leaders do not lead by example. They describe the leadership styles in larger part of the African continent as

that of personal politics, personality politics and politics by leadership [...], the centralisation of all political power in the executive [...]. In Nigeria, for example, the personalised nature of the political arena is evident in the domination by a powerful 'godfather' at the apex of a vast patronage network at federal, state and local level (Omale & Amana, 2014: 3).

The phenomenon of 'god-fatherism', according to Olarinmoye (2008: 70) is so highly entrenched in the Nigerian society that in most cases the 'godfathers' determine who occupies the most strategic positions in Nigeria, including the presidency. As a result of the level of control that he has over the party's structure, "he becomes the sponsor of politicians...He uses his control of party machinery to impose his clients as party candidates for elective office and ensures their electoral success through activities which have been characterised as electoral corruption" (Olarinmoye, 2008: 70). This political 'kingmaker' referred to as godfather in Nigeria "has created a lot of problems in the Nigerian democratic process. It is one of the biggest dangers to democracy in Nigeria" (Ebegbulem, 2012: 226). With this kind of political configuration, it is not surprising that such a society cannot produce credible election results and public office holders who will be committed to putting the interests of their country first. The kinds of values, cultures and traditions that will emerge in such a country can only be unsuitable for the realisation of an ethical and just state.

Idang (2015: 107) attributes the factors that are responsible for the erosion of African values, cultures and traditions, not necessarily to western influence or colonialism, but to the “intentional borrowing of cultural traits from other societies with which the beneficiary comes in contact, or an imposition of cultural traits on one society by a stronger society intending to assimilate the weaker society” (Idang, 2015: 107). Wahab, Odunsi and Ajiboye link the erosion to the

ease and frequency with which people move around the world, and improvements in communications and the global marketing of styles, places and images...People are no longer confined to developing identity based upon the place in which they live, but can choose from a wide range of different identities. They now adopt clothes, ways of speaking, values, and lifestyles of any group of their choice (Wahab *et al.*, 2012: 6).

The difficulty for most contemporary Africans as a result of the embracing of western cultures and values is that they “find it difficult to adjust between their primitive beliefs in certain aspects of their culture and the supposedly modern mode of accepted behaviour” (Idang, 2015: 107) and way of life. This is further complicated as a result of the lack of adequate measures, programmes and systems to bridge this gap so as to produce a balance between the conflicted western and African orientations. In order to preserve the African identity, Africans cannot afford to lose their values, cultures and traditions. Therefore, adequate steps must be implemented by various African societies to preserve their uniqueness. While it is acknowledged that it may be difficult to ignore the external influences, conscious effort is required on the part of Africans, especially the parents, teachers and leaders, to preserve those aspects of their values, cultures and traditions that promote authentic existence.

While the erosion of African values, customs and traditions by westernisation is acknowledged, it is however, noted that some of the traditional African values, customs and traditions have been violated by Africans themselves in a manner that has impacted negatively on various aspects of their lives. For instance, part of the African worldview is to care for the environment, respect it, and protect it. This belief, according to Idang (2015: 108),

had a way of preserving and conserving nature...the society was guaranteed an increase in agricultural productivity, which was the mainstay

of the traditional economy. Today, with the violation of these customs and myths, we suffer low agricultural productivity [...], because the traditional values that safeguarded the land, have been watered-down and we do not have the technological know-how to replace these beliefs that have been abandoned (Idang, 2015: 108).

Mabovula (2011: 39) delves into the manner in which traditional Africans, both in the past and currently, rallied around each other with the view to finding solutions to emerging problems and to promoting peace and wellbeing. She notes that the erosion of the traditional African sense of humanism by Africans has resulted in unstable societies as members of society no longer trust each other, while aggression, violence and crime are no longer condemned in the strongest terms.

It is glaring from the philosophers examined here that both Africans and the westerners have contributed in certain measures to the erosion of African values, customs and traditions. Ezenweke and Nwadiolor (2013: 62) observe that despite the attempts by the westerners to erode everything African, their efforts were not totally successful since African traditional value systems and way of life have to some extent continued to thrive in most contemporary African societies. Despite Ezenweke and Nwadiolor's claims, it cannot be denied that substantial damage has been effected in this regard as shown by the myriad of problems confronting the African continent as a whole. Contemporary Africans cannot continue to blame western influence for their problems. Rather, they need to be sincerely committed to rectifying the negative implications of colonial influences in their societies, and to take corrective actions in reducing to the barest minimum, their personal contributions to the problems that confront their societies.

5.3.2 Decline in the Efficacy of Traditional African Authority, Customs and Traditions

Africans, according to Eze (Lauer, 2012: 48-50), generally no longer believe in their common identity as a result of the predatory, migratory and culturally challenging way of life that they confront. He claims that Africans no longer value the sacred powers of the chiefs, which were believed to have proceeded from the ancestors and which as a result, legitimised the chiefs' authority. He posits that the traditional African system of governance is no longer relevant to the contemporary era because the traditional

bases of consensual politics are no longer valid as a result of factors such as religious proliferation and secularism. Eze claims that Africans currently have a varied understanding of themselves and of the conflicts that confront them, different from the way they understood these factors during the precolonial era. He sees post-colonial Africans as enlightened and prepared to fight for theirs and other human rights issues that confront their communities.

Lauer (2012: 50) disagrees with Eze's analysis in this regard, claiming that the historians and political analysts who examined the decline of chieftaincy noticed that traditional rulers in West Africa, for instance, lost the confidence and respect of their community members as a result of the worsening economic conditions of the population. The traditional elites were corrupted and pauperised when they colluded with the colonisers to dispossess the inhabitants of their resources. Furthermore, people who lacked ancestral or historical lineage to traditional authorities were installed as chiefs.

Wiredu (in Ani, 2014b: 342-344) further disagrees with Eze's reasons for the erosion and irrelevance of the traditional African system of governance in the contemporary era. Rather, he considers the currently conventional majoritarian democracy as largely responsible for the incessant conflicts that pervade African states, for the political instabilities in many contemporary African societies and for making it impossible for some minority groups to assume political power. He finds multiparty democracy divisive, aggressive and adversarial, resulting in competitive struggle for power, eventually causing harm to the people. He refers to the political nature of the United States of America (USA) as an example of where the checks and balances may not produce the envisaged balance and where opposition often makes it impossible or difficult for the government to implement its policy proposals. This situation tends to lead to the disenfranchisement of large sections of society since both the supporters of the government and the opposition are many. He therefore condemns it as promoting disharmony, incompatible with the aspirations of communalism and characterised by the colonial mentality. In his search for an alternative paradigm, he peruses the African traditional past and argues in favour of democracy by consensus which he considers as not based on political party organisation.

Wiredu, according to Matolino (2013: 142-143) neither subscribes to multi-party politics nor to a one-party system of governance which he considers as not promoting human rights. He does not believe that one-party politics originates from the traditional African society, especially not from the Akan system, which was also neither multi-party nor a one-party rule. He condemns the one party state, which the first post-colonial African leaders such as Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah and Kenneth Kaunda endorsed in one form or the other under the banner or pretext of returning to various forms of pre-colonial African traditional systems of governance. These leaders argue that their reformed systems of governance brought unity to the fragmented African societies that were divided along racial, religious, regional and political lines, while remaining loyal to the traditional set up of society. A superficial consideration of their reasons reveals a measure of merit. However, the implementation process became corrupted by authoritarian rulers and politicians who were more interested in furthering their personal quests for power and self-enrichment. Consequently, a one-party system became the dominant form of governance for specific individuals and groups who were opportuned to take charge of the highest echelons of political office and wanted to remain in power for as long as they possibly could.

Eze (Lauer, 2012: 47), does not see any fundamental difference between Wiredu's rejection of early multi-party politics and the ideological defence of one-party democracy by the early African nationalists. He considers Wiredu as belonging to the camp of the early nationalists such as Nkrumah, Senghor, Nyerere, Kenyatta, Toure, and Cabral, who criticised electoral politics as un-African and multiparty democracy as a camouflage intended to gain popular support and to discourage or prevent opposition politics, while supporting communalism in order to promote their selfish interests. These nationalists

proposed the resurrection of African identity and depended upon themselves to lead a return to the essential, original African harmony and unity that had been trampled by colonialism. And since history shows that the myth of lost African unity was used as a rhetorical justification to suppress political association and press freedom, critics regard both models as equally dangerous vehicles of tyranny through the exclusion of individuals or groups who fail to embody the essence of the community (Lauer, 2012: 47-48).

The reasons given by Eze, Lauer and Wiredu for the decline in the efficacy of traditional African authority and the conflicts in postcolonial African states are not individually sufficient. Rather all their reasons can be said to be collectively responsible for the complications that confront Africa currently. The decline can be attributed to the impact of modernity, the western liberal democratic system of governance, as well as the loss of confidence in traditional authority. While the efficacy of traditional African authority may not be as strong as it was in the precolonial era, its role in the current era cannot be underestimated, because the institution of traditional leaders is still very much in place in most contemporary African societies, where the prominent ones are recognised by their governments and are accorded the social, political and material benefits that accompany their office.

Koenane (2017b: 1-3) gives credence to the continued relevance of the system of traditional authorities in Africa generally and in South Africa in particular in his claim that the institution of traditional leadership remains valuable in South Africa and can make positive contributions to the development of the country as a whole and the development of rural communities in particular. He notes that over the years debates on the relevance of traditional authorities in contemporary South African society have persisted. Those who consider traditional authority as irrelevant in the contemporary era argue that its structure is not democratic. However, those who consider the institutions of traditional leadership relevant in the contemporary era, especially those who dwell in these areas, believe that it is unlike the municipal system of governance, which is both ineffective and corrupt. Koenane considers the traditional system of governance to be more accountable, based on the kind of consensus that defines ethics and politics in indigenous African societies, more tolerant and consequently more effective than contemporary systems of liberal democracy, which are intolerant of the views of opposition parties.

5.3.3 Deteriorating African Politics

A number of reasons have been alluded to by various theorists and institutions as responsible for the deteriorating condition of politics in contemporary African societies. The Saylor Foundation (2012: 1) notes that as most African countries got closer to independence between the 1950s and 1960s, the African leaders who led the agitation for independence neither gave comprehensive thought to the post-independence period, nor put comprehensive plans in place to manage the governance processes. On the other hand, the departing colonisers did not properly prepare the African states for post-independence. Rather, according to Cheeseman *et al.*, (2013: 404), they hastily assembled institutions and democratic constitutions that did not include sufficient input from the local population. France and Britain, according to The Saylor Foundation (2012: 1), appear to be the only ones that made attempts to put in place the kinds of skills and institutions necessary for successful self-governance. Aiyede (2009: 262) further observes that during the transition period, which involved a change of leaders, the dominant elite employed a strategy of predatory rule, which enabled them to manipulate the system to suit their selfish agendas.

The independence of African states attracted immense celebration and hope for a better life among the citizens. Contrary to these expectations, The Saylor Foundation (2012: 1) notes that their hopes were however, short lived as the social, economic and political changes did not materialise. Instead, the political leadership soon realised the enormous challenges they faced in the areas of state consolidation and socio-economic development. The interplay of these challenges, political unrest and selfish ambitions gave rise to a worsening state of African politics. The African governments became increasingly authoritarian just as the colonialists were, and unable to maintain the system of democratic politics.

The racial division of postcolonial African states, such as Nigeria, into ethnicities, according to Aiyede (2009: 262), served the intended and unintended consequence of confining the citizens into indigenes and settlers for those who choose to reside outside their allotted ethnic areas. This system of predatory and bifurcated rule has enabled the privileged elite to consolidate their power base since its notion of indigene and settler created a fragmented and antagonistic group of citizens at the national, provincial and local levels of government. In the end, the system of bifurcation enabled

the postcolonial state to indulge in wide scale corruption, service delivery failures and underdevelopment.

On the broadest terms, African states, according to Harbeson (2013: 84) received their independence without making any significant effort to transform or reconstruct the states they received from the colonialists. This seems to partly explain the reasons why they have not been able to make significant change in the conditions of their countries. They were more interested in their selfish ambitions to consolidate their powers and to derive undue benefits from state resources. Ogbogbo (2011: 1) takes this line of thought as well when he posits that a major factor for the perpetual crisis in Africa can be attributed to “the failures of those who have superintended over the affairs of African countries and peoples since independence”. Cheeseman *et al.*, (2013: 404) further comment that political rivalries along ethnic lines, weak state institutions, and lack of commitment to and experience with governance processes and democratic procedures by the elite in the main, resulted in partial entrenchment of democracy and its disruptions through coups, counter-coups, wars and dissent. Democratic governments were soon replaced by autocratic and military regimes. During the cold war when super power rivalry was at its peak, the western states, especially France, the United States and the United Kingdom paid little attention to Africa’s internal governance processes, including human rights abuses, corruption and other excesses. Their focus was mainly geared towards Africa’s foreign policies and ensuring that their African allies did not fall into the hands of the Soviet Union.

While there are merits in some of Cheeseman’s, Anderson’s and Scheibler’s claims, their reference to the inability of the former colonialists to watch over the governance processes in post-colonial African states cannot be considered to be an explanation for the failure of the independent states. Since African countries agitated for their independence and they eventually received it, they should have adequately prepared and equipped themselves to handle their own internal affairs. A person who seeks freedom should do so because he believes that his current situation is not the best that it can be and that given the desired independence he would be able to optimally conduct his affairs. Therefore, the former colonialists should not be blamed for the inability of African states to effectively govern themselves. Moreover, African states are endowed with well-educated individuals who know and or should know what is

right, but fail to conduct themselves ethically and in other appropriate manners. African leaders have been very unethical and unprofessional in their conduct and approach to public office. The question is why are the citizens not doing much to hold them accountable as in the case of Nigeria and many other African countries? These leaders have been able to behave in such a destructive manner largely as a result, of

a relative lack of democracy (or to Single party dominance) in Africa. There has been little bottom-up pressure on leadership to make better choices, although there has been encouraging growth in civil society in parts of the continent [...]. This apparent passivity of the populace in the face of bad leadership must, at least in part, be attributed to a neo-patrimonial culture. In that culture, the 'big man' rules and dispenses favours. He uses all the tools to bolster his rule – from traditional governance structures and kinship ties to witchcraft and the church (Mills, 2010: 4).

The negative influence of both 'god-fatherism' and the 'big-man' syndrome on the realisation of an ethical and just African society has been noted in this chapter. This phenomenon poses a huge impediment to the citizens of affected countries and for democratic consolidation in Africa. It appears as though South Africans may be able to demand better accountability from their government, as a result of their militant approach to holding their government accountable (though the extent of their protest actions are often extreme), than Nigerians who are more passive in their demand for better governance.

5.4 DEMOCRATIC FAILURES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND NIGERIAN CONTEXTS

Although all the social, political and economic challenges identified in the previous sections are largely linked to ethics and morality, this section looks at specific ethical challenges confronting South Africa and Nigeria. While it is noted that all the challenges examined in this section are applicable to both countries, some of the issues which seem to be at the forefront of the complications confronting each country will be considered. In the South African context, the agitation for land will be examined, while the issues of corruption and underdevelopment will be given further attention in the Nigerian context. However, it is noted that corruption is also a source of concern in South Africa as both the private and public sectors are largely affected.

5.4.1 The Land Question, Political Instability and Underdevelopment in South Africa

One of the major challenges confronting post-apartheid South Africa that emanate from the injustices of the apartheid government, according to Kloppers and Piennar (2014: 677), is how to redress the imbalances in the unequal distribution of land. It is a source of concern because while South Africa is endowed with considerable landmass, sufficient to guarantee every citizen plots of land, a large percentage of the population neither have access to it nor are able to afford it. The cost of land and property is so exorbitant that one wonders how property owners could be so insensitive to the plight of the less privileged. The “state owns some 22% of the land in the country, including land in the former homelands, most of which is occupied by black subsistence farmers [...]. This leaves around 78% of land in private hands [...]” (South African Institute of Race Relations, 2016: 5). One wonders why the owners are so interested in maximising profit at the expense of the poor.

Land ownership in the country, according to the South African Human rights Commission (SAHRC, 2013: 5) has generated disharmony for a long time among the victims of land dispossession, of racially skewed distribution, and of forced removals. A number of declarations as well as legislation have been adopted in the country with the view to redressing this historical injustice. The Freedom Charter (African national Congress, 1955: 1), a statement of core principles and visions of the kind of new society envisaged for the country, for instance, provides that unused land and housing space shall be given to those who need it. According to the Freedom Charter (1955: 1), “Restriction of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger...All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they chose”. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996, 25(7)) further provides that: “A person or community dispossessed of property after June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress”.

Kloppers and Piennar (2014: 677) note that the South African government has committed itself to rectifying the historical injustices and inequalities and has been making every effort to implement a comprehensive programme of land reform based

on legislative provisions. However, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC, 2013: 5) notes that despite the various attempts made by the government to adhere to these legislative provisions; such as the settlement of land claims by cash payments, the more complex cases, such as the restitution of land and other property that was forcibly dispossessed from the rightful owners through discriminatory laws remains unresolved.

The slow pace of the land reform programme, according to Kloppers and Piennar (2014: 678), is one of the challenges that confronts the programme. Anseeuw and Alden (2011: 28) posit that the slow pace of the land reform programme has created the kind of discontent among the affected and underprivileged South Africans, that many of them have resorted to violence against the white farming community. Many of the white farmers and their families have been murdered with increased frequency since 1994. They are apprehensive that the constitutionally negotiated process of 'willing buyer willing seller' that the government committed itself to is no longer acceptable to both the blacks and the government. Rather, the government has recently adopted "the resolution for expropriation of land without compensation, despite its lack of clarity [...]" (Mfaise, 2018: 1). Although it is not established that the ruling party - the African National Congress (ANC) - is complicit in these crimes,

many in the white rural community remain convinced that there is an ANC-led plot to drive them from the land [...]. Moreover even if the motives of these attacks are diverse, their importance as an indication of the breakdown of the social order in rural South Africa is evident (Anseeuw & Alden, 2011: 28-29).

The other problem that the land reform programmes face, according to Kloppers and Piennar (2014: 678) is that more than 90% of the agricultural lands that were distributed to a number of the previously disadvantaged groups and individuals have not been optimally utilised. The implications of this development included threat to food security, increasing levels of unemployment and poverty. These difficulties are further compounded by the recent pronouncements of some politicians, in which they incite landless South Africans to illegally occupy any land of their choice that belongs to white farmers.

While it is necessary for the government to fast-track land redistribution in the country, one wonders if it is in the best interest of the country and its citizens to embark on the process of land expropriation without compensation. According to Mfaise, (2018: 3),

Expropriation without compensation may make much sense politically. However, whether sacrificing existing and protected constitutional rights to property, to achieve political expediency and political gain, is justifiable in an open democratic country founded on the values of human dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights and freedom remains to be seen and possibly determined by the courts.

It is acknowledged that the imbalances in the distribution of land in the country impede the social and economic growth of the affected citizens and the country's ability to generate more resources for the development of the country. However, this research submits that the expropriation of land without compensation is not the most viable route to take in the quest to redistribute the land because this kind of process could be unfavourable for the economic development of the country in the sense that the whites may garner international support that can negatively impact the economy of the country. This could lead to the devaluation of the country's currency, prevention of foreign direct investment, loss of employment opportunities and capital outflows. It appears that the expropriation of land without compensation hinges on the appeasement of the previously disadvantaged individuals, without taking into consideration the long term impact on the development of the country. All affected stakeholders need to seek amicable means of resolving this challenge.

Gibson (2008: 277) notes that in South Africa land grabbing has become a source of concern as many poor people who move from other towns and rural areas to the big cities are not able to afford decent accommodation, and thus resort to land grabbing, taking over any piece of vacant land they come across and erecting squatter camps in the process. The lands in question belong to either the government or private individuals. While land grabbing poses a serious ethical dilemma for the government, the landowners and the homeless, he notes that it also

presents intriguing theoretical issues because it so clearly pits alternative conceptions of justice against each other. On the one hand, the sanctity of private (or state-owned) property may justify removing the squatters from their perches. On the other hand, the dire need of the squatters may make

land grabbing fair, especially in the context of the historical injustices of apartheid and colonialism, and to evict people from their newly constructed homes is to consign them to live on the streets or worse. Squatting is classically an example of a clash of values [...], a clash of judgements of what is fair (Gibson, 2008: 700).

In the South African context, distributive justice, for instance would require that the government take possession of all the country's resources and share it among the population, especially the needy. Retributive justice would demand that the government expropriate all the resources and land that the minority acquired during the colonial era without compensation and share it among the citizens, especially the disadvantaged groups and individuals. The application of these theories of justice in this manner raises further ethical questions and dilemmas regarding the justifiability of such action. The minority landowners could claim that they or their ancestors acquired these lands many years ago when there were no indigenous people dwelling on many of them. They could also claim that they had invested human and material resources on the land and that they legitimately acquired the said properties. The actions that the government takes in this regard would have to be carefully considered in order to avoid any unintended negative consequences, such as the collapse of the economy.

What do philosophers say about property rights and how do we reconcile that with the ethical dilemma of collecting lands from the whites and giving them to the homeless people, or of collecting large tracks of lands that the descendants of the former colonial masters took from the blacks and returning them to the original owners? What are the consequences of land restitution for food security and sustainability of the national economy, bearing in mind that most of the blacks to whom lands were returned have not been able to turn them into profitable ventures, while most of them remain unused?

John Locke's theory of property, according to Widerquist (2010: 3-5), though subject to various interpretations as a result of its ambiguities, is relevant to contemporary philosophical debates on freedom, property rights, equality, and the legitimacy of government's powers of regulation, taxation and redistribution. Despite the ambiguities in Locke's theory of property, he is widely acknowledged and recognised for his idea of unilateral appropriation, in which he posits that there is something that

a person can do on his own to secure rights over natural resources,, which other human beings are morally obligated to respect.

Locke (1967: 100), justifies his theory of property on ethical grounds, based on his argument that the rights of human beings to natural resources proceeds from God's directives in the scriptures, from human rationality and from the basic natural law of self-preservation. In other words, Locke posits that natural resources were originally meant to be held communally. However, Lockean theorists fail to adequately explain why communal ownership of property has been largely replaced by private ownership of property. Rather, they contend that "every man has a property in his own person so that the labour of his body and the work of his hands are his" (Locke, 1967: 100). The other options that Locke provides on property rights are partial communalism, nationalisation or redistributive taxation. He posits that the only requirement for the implementation of either of these options is an agreement among majority of the citizens. He believes that this kind of legislation will be binding even if most of the properties are owned by the minority (Locke, 1967: 104).

Various theories have been developed in response to Locke's proposition. Locke's theory is considered by a number of scholars as either inconsistent or ambiguous. Others who have attempted to clarify his theory have produced irreconcilable interpretations. For instance, according to Widerquist, (2010: 5), C.B. Macpherson interprets Locke's theory as the foundation for class-based capitalism; Richard Ashcraft terms it a revolutionary theory; and a number of right-libertarians consider it liberal individualism with a strong focus on natural rights to property. Matthew Kramer considers it communitarian; John Dunn interprets it as property rights with a strong obligation to charity; and Leo Strauss does not associate it with any appeal to natural law. Other scholars attach limited and regulated rights to property; and James Tully interprets it as dependent on the extent of rights to property that a society chose to give.

Looking across the world in general and Africa in particular, one is bound to note elements of these interpretations in how property rights are dispensed. In the South African context, unilateral appropriation can be interpreted to mean that one can secure a property for himself without taking into account the concerns and interests of

others who might be affected by the acquisition. This appears to be the strategy that the apartheid era applied in dispossessing the indigenes of their land. While it is acknowledged in this research that it is unethical and immoral for a few groups of people to own most of the country's resources, it is imperative that the government implements a redistribution strategy that would not result in the collapse of the economy of the country. All affected stakeholders need to ensure that resources are not merely redistributed for the sake of redressing the injustices of the past, but to ensure that beneficiaries of the resources are equipped to use them for the progress and development of the country.

The South African government has a primary role to play in ensuring that its citizens have access to this basic requirement of human existence, by ensuring that there is enough land available at affordable prices. If the private sector owns most of the land, the government should play a role in ensuring that the cost of the land is low, either through subsidisation or to buy them from the owners and sell them at affordable rates to the people. The land that is currently fully utilised for agricultural purposes should not be taken away from the minority white. Rather, the government should facilitate a contract that ensures that the original owners receive between ten and twenty percent of the profit after tax annually.

5.4.2 Corruption and Underdevelopment in Nigeria

Corruption is one of the major ethical ills confronting the Nigerian state from the time of its independence. Corruption, for Omenka (2013: 40) manifests itself in various forms such as fraud, inflation of government contracts, bribery, pervasion of justice, fabrication of accounts, collusion and smuggling. It relates to actions and behaviours which violate moral and legal standards, which are contrary to public interest, which negatively affect the economy and policy implementation. In consequence, these factors inflict direct or indirect harm on relevant stakeholders, on society and on the development of the country. Atakpa (2017: 163) construes corruption as the lack of integrity through moral laxity, favouritism, and betrayal of trust. It involves the process of wrong transactions, which alters the moral course of events and negatively impacts on positions of trust and judgement. For Koenane (2017: 9), "corruption does

undermine many other aspects of governance, especially in cases where those involved are people entrusted with public trust and public resources”.

According to Omenka (2013: 39), corruption undermines the integrity of public and private institutions. It is so endemic in all sectors of the Nigerian society, including the churches, the family and traditional systems, that one can almost conclude that it has become a way of life. Oluwaniyi (2011: 187) observes that Nigeria appears to be one of the few countries in the world where the government and the citizens are largely not concerned about the source of an individual's wealth. Once an individual is able to give out a substantial amount of money indiscriminately, he secures free access to the leaders of the country, he is rewarded with chieftaincy titles, and the churches reward him with prayers. This appears to send a public message to the poor and less privileged that it is okay to acquire wealth irrespective of the means employed.

Some of the causes of corruption in Nigeria according to Atakpa (2017: 164) include dishonest leadership, poor government control of the economy, internal and external pressure and influence, lack of commitment or political will to curb corruption and irregular payment or non-payment of salaries. Other causes of corruption for Omenka (2013: 39 & 41) are weak institutions of government, failure of government to fight corruption, poverty, distorted values and cultural beliefs of the people. He observes that while all the successive coups in Nigeria were blamed on government corruption, the military governments themselves cannot be absolved from the same malaise as they also engaged in large scale corruption through the looting of public coffers, their unethical conduct and bad governance. Danjibo (2011: 127) criticises the style of leadership of all successive governments in Nigeria, claiming that while the eras of military dictatorship were marred by human rights abuses and failures to contribute positively to the growth of the country, the civilian governments' performance was not impressive either.

The Nigerian civil service, which is responsible for the implementation of government policies is confronted by the challenges of corruption and other ethical ills, some of which according to Adebayo (2014: 410) include indiscipline among government workers, unprofessional attitudes to work, mismanagement of public resources, a lazy attitude to work. Beetseh and Kohol (2013: 19) observe that theorists such as Ake,

Hembe and Balewa posit that while the Nigerian state was created by the British imperialists, the Nigerian civil service is also a creation of the British colonialists. As a consequence,, they note that other scholars such as Agishi, Adebayo and Edoh concur that the corruption, lack of accountability and other unethical conduct that pervade the Nigerian civil service originate mainly from the society's colonial experience. Moreover, the problems of ethics and accountability have widened in scope as a result, of the lack of concrete efforts by successive governments to cleanse the polity of this malaise.

Omenka (2013: 41) considers most governmental institutions in Nigeria to be weak in the manner in which they enforce control measures. This creates opportunities for corruption to thrive when the rules are not enforced as stipulated. Rather many public and even private officials would rather provide avenues for clients to circumvent the rules in exchange for bribes. The culture of the society appears to generally condone corrupt practices. Atakpa (2017: 164) argues in the same line when he claims that all successive governments in Nigeria have largely been unethical in their leadership and management roles. Most of them have either appropriated national wealth that they are not entitled to, or have placed personal interest above the national interest. The economy of the country, which is largely managed and dominated by the government has not been adequately handled by those given the responsibility to do so. Rather, many of them have treated these as their personal fiefdom to be used as they deem fit without stringent accountability measures in place. He further notes the impact of communalism on corruption in his claim that the communal and extended family system has not been eroded by westernisation. As a result, public and private officials are often either under pressure or influence to favour their families and friends even when they are not qualified to receive such benefits. Such pressure exacerbates the ills of corruption. Many of the public officials, including the executive, legislature, judiciary and security forces do not display a high level of commitment to fighting corruption. Their nonchalant attitude fuels the flames of corruption and their reluctance to thoroughly fight cases of corruption, especially those involving influential people, results in the failure of the government to record much success in their anticorruption efforts.

Aiyede (2009: 256) gives instances of the recklessness with which Nigerian government officials embezzle public coffers. For instance, he notes that between 1960 and 1999, more than \$380 billion was stolen from the public coffers by public officials. From 1985 to 1993, when General Ibrahim Babangida was the head of state, about \$12 billion disappeared from the oil revenue. During the four years administration of General Abacha, he was believed to have stolen between one and three billion dollars. 16 billion dollars that was allocated for power generation by the Government of Olusegun Obasanjo was squandered without any substantial contribution to the national integrated power projects. Unspent budget allocations are in most cases not returned to government coffers, but shared by government officials. When the government began to insist on the return of unspent budgetary allocations, only a fraction of it was returned to the fiscus. The Nigerian state is rich in oil resources, while all the states in Nigeria, according to Abolurin (2008: 14), depend largely on the proceeds of oil that mainly come from the South-South geopolitical zone for their sustenance. Although the Nigerian state derives huge income from oil revenue, Aiyede (2009: 254) observes that the funds have not been channelled towards the development of the country. Rather the Nigerian state has found itself moving from the prospects of rapid development in the 1970s to one of deindustrialisation in the 21st century.

The moral laxity that permeates every part of the Nigerian life has, according to Ogechukwu (2013: 38) also impacted on the police force and the financial sector, including the commercial banks. He notes that the public at large and the clients in particular are of the view that the bank staff, insiders and some customers, connive to perpetrate dishonesty and bank fraud. The public is gradually losing confidence in the Nigerian banking system as a result, of widespread unprofessional and unethical conduct among all levels of bank officials. Oluwaniyi (2011: 187-194) suggests that the responsibilities of the police to, among other things, enforce the law, protect lives and property, and prevent crime are afflicted by corrupt activities and motives, which further exacerbate the insecurity and threat to human life and property. The unfavourable conditions of service in the police force, their low salaries, poor management, lack of access to weapons, and their use by some politicians to harm their enemies and opponents have also contributed to the high level of corruption in the country.

While many theorists claim that the high level of corruption in Nigeria can be attributed to the influence of colonialism, it is over 50 years since the country attained its independence. Therefore, it would be fruitless to blame external factors for the lack of ethics and integrity in Nigeria, because this has to do with individual dispositions to do right or wrong. Each person is responsible and accountable for his conduct. Therefore, it is claimed here that the lack of ethics and integrity in the Nigerian society is as a result, of individuals not willing to do the right thing. Until the individual recognises his or her obligations to be ethical, to engage in renewed moral imagination, the problem of immorality will persist.

The impact of corruption in Nigeria can be seen in the inability of the government to contribute meaningfully to the welfare of its citizens. For Omenka (2013: 39), corruption impedes the development of the country as shown by the inability of successive governments to complete many of the programmes and projects they embark upon which could have contributed to alleviating poverty in the country. Danjibo (2011: 127-128) notes that the lack of development in Nigeria also reflects in, among other things, the lack of progressive and sustained economic growth; poverty; unemployment; inadequate provision of basic amenities such water, electricity, healthcare and good roads. The inability of the country to provide adequate and sustained water and electricity makes any prospect of sustainable development impossible. Moreover, the resources that have accrued to the country's coffers since its independence is so vast that the government has no excuse for failing to deliver good governance to its citizens.

It is noted that the non-payment of worker salaries contributes in large measures to the scourge of corruption because such affected workers seek other ethical or unethical means to fulfil their human needs. For many decades in Nigeria, both the state and federal governments have failed to pay workers their salaries regularly. Some workers are not even paid for many consecutive months as a result, of the misappropriation of funds or embezzlement. The suffering that these workers go through is unimaginable. One wonders how any government official responsible for ensuring that workers get their wages can fail to fulfil this mandate, especially when the funds are available, and not be concerned about the plight of the workers. This is

the height of inhumanity of man to man and it is condemned in the strongest terms. Morality, according to Bujo (in Dolamo, 2014: 3-4), relates to the humanity with which human beings treat each other. Koenane and Mangena, (2017: 61-68) consider democracy, accountability and ethics as inseparable and as the foundations of good governance. In this case accountability relates the duty that public officials have to report on how they have exercised the powers and responsibilities given to them; taking responsibilities for their failures and making amends; and the obligation to resign in the face of gross misconduct. Based on the foregoing, it is submitted here that the insensitive manner in which affected Nigerian leaders treat their workers shows their lack of ethics and morals. Therefore, they should either resign or be relieved of their positions.

Successive governments in Nigeria have embarked on numerous anticorruption programmes. However, most of these processes have been largely unsuccessful perhaps as a result of the insincerity of many of the officials and bodies involved in the initiatives or because it is proving largely difficult to repatriate the huge sums of money that corrupt government officials hide in different bank and offshore accounts. Many of these corrupt individuals use part of the money stolen from the national fiscus to fund their defence in the courts. These measures often prolong the cases while the culprits continue to enjoy the ill-gotten loot and perhaps look for other means of hiding them. The accountability of the government that embarks on recovery of public funds also comes into question because it appears as though the public is not given sufficient information on the recovered amounts and what they are used for eventually. Omenka (2013: 43) observes that in Nigeria, it appears as though corruption has defied all the mechanisms employed to combat it because many of the individuals tasked with combating corruption are also corrupt. Most of the anticorruption strategies of successive governments in Nigeria have not been executed honestly, including the 1966 Public officers' Investigation of Assets Decree, the Corrupt Practices Decree of 1975, the Ethical Revolution of the 1980s, the War against Indiscipline of the 1980s, and the current legislation on Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences.

While the various anticorruption measures that were established by successive governments in Nigeria did not achieve much success, Ngwube and Okoli (2013: 101-

104) posit that the government of Olusegun Obasanjo made the anti-corruption campaign one of his administration's priority objectives. In that regard, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was instituted with the objectives of enforcing anticorruption regulation, preventing, investigating, prosecuting and penalising corrupt individuals and entities, among others functions. The commission has recorded a number of successes, including the identification, seizure and freezing of the proceeds of terrorism; conviction of pipeline vandals and their beneficiaries in the Niger delta region; and the recovery of some of the proceeds of fraud and theft. The successes recorded by the EFCC have made the country an attractive business destination. However, while the effectiveness of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in discharging its functions in Nigeria cannot be overlooked, many people perceive the Commission as a tool for the government to persecute its perceived enemies and opponents. The Commission is also accused of contravening the law in the exercise of its functions.

There are merits in this perception because there are individuals in the past and current leadership of the country who are accused of corruption but who remain in power. One would expect the presidents who appointed such persons to openly take steps to investigate the allegations in order to be seen as just and fair. The Buhari-led government should have been the most successful regime in the anticorruption programmes, bearing in mind that he was widely accepted as the leader that would bring corruption to a halt, going by his previous reputation as a military ruler who was intolerant towards corruption and indiscipline. However, it has emerged that being a military ruler is different from being a civilian ruler. As a military dictator, he was feared for his tough stance against misdemeanours and he would have used the military might to enforce ethical behaviour. However, as a civilian ruler there are so many bottlenecks in place, such as the courts, that he could not arbitrarily enforce his rules. His current term in office has so far failed in making economic progress. Rather the inflation rate in the country is very high and so many people are suffering as a result of the impact of economic meltdown. While various reasons may be advanced for the current sorry state of the economy, such as the fall in price of crude oil in the international market, and perhaps the unattractiveness of Nigerian oil to international buyers, the fact is that many Nigerians are disillusioned. The kind of state that Nigerians desire appears to be currently far from their reach.

5.4.3 Africa in Sum

Post-colonial African states generally seem unable to properly govern, manage and administer their territories, despite the vast human and material resources at their disposal, and despite their abilities to formulate admirable policies and laws. Most of them adopt the Western liberal democratic style of governance. However, they have largely failed to successfully implement the principles that promote ethical leadership, integrity, accountability and care for the people. The leaders, according to Mkandawire (2015: 5), seem unable to implement sound economic policies that have been successfully embraced by other successful parts of the world. Rather, they have implemented policies that impoverish their population. This has resulted in chronic economic failures.

Since independence, according to Ogbogbo (2011: 2), development in African states appear to have stagnated, while there is little or no hope that these failures will be resolved. Although Africa is a rich continent, it is also the poorest as a result of its inability to optimally harness its wealth. Instead, the continent exposes itself to foreign exploitation. Chimakonam *et al.*, (2014: 146) also delve into the impact of western influence on the African continent in their contention that the combination of western democracy and individualistic capitalism that was unleashed on Africa through Globalisation has resulted in the kind of political and economic system that is detrimental to post-colonial African states. African states are currently governed and administered by unethical leaders who use their powers to marginalise their subjects. Mkandawire (2015: 5) further alludes to the immorality of leaders, who in many African states, act on behalf of factions such as ethnic groups, social classes and military cliques. They often involve themselves in the distribution of national wealth among the rich to the detriment of the less privileged members of society and economic growth. This conduct discredits the governments' conviction that they are agents of public interest.

Chimakonam *et al.*, (2014: 146-148) submit that while the western system of capitalism is dominant in African states, it is full of injustices. They consider this a contradiction to what capitalism and liberal democracy represent since capitalism is the economic demonstration of the principles of equality and liberty that the democratic

system of governance projects. They contend that both western liberal democracy and capitalism have failed the majority of Africans and Africa as a whole for promoting individualism, marginalisation, class segregation and injustice, in opposition to the dominant political, social and economic systems in Africa, which in Nigeria's Igboland for instance, promote consensus, deliberation, consultation, egalitarianism, equality and communalism.

Tilley (2016: 745) lashes into the injustices associated with capitalist tendencies in his assertion that the economic and political systems that characterised colonialism disrupted the lives and livelihoods of Africans, and resulted in sustained inequalities that created the foundation for more damage. For instance, their export economies in areas such as mining, agriculture or infrastructural projects led to increased migration of labourers, while it did not in many cases put adequate protective mechanisms in place for the workers. Many workers in Southern Africa succumbed to diseases such as tuberculosis and waterborne infections as a result of the altered environments. In reaction to the atrocities associated with capitalism and liberal democracy, Mann (2012: 1), posits that in the past poor families were not able to give their children quality education. This was mainly the preserve of the rich and powerful families. However, people of various backgrounds are currently able to access education, even though many of them are not able to secure meaningful jobs after their education. Many of those who are able to find work are paid low wages, while many African countries do not have the market for professional or highly skilled labour. This has contributed to a brain-drain as many of these unemployed seek greener pastures either in larger cities or in other countries.

The implications of the foregoing include the fact that western liberal democracy is causing more harm than good to Africans by promoting a system of governance that lacks consideration for the interests of others. This is almost like going back the Hobbesian state of nature where the weak is always at the mercy of the strong and life is nasty, brutish and short (Hobbes, 1968: 186). The manner in which governments and bureaucrats in post-colonial African states is generally neither able to deliver on their mandates nor able to ensure the realisation of a society where justice, fairness, and socio economic benefits are dispersed to the advantage of all members of society, makes it seem as though it is impossible to seek the ideal. While it is noted that it might

be difficult to have a perfect world, it is possible to implement a functional state if the leaders and their agents are willing and committed to doing so.

The inability of post-colonial African states to institute systems and strategies that adequately address the needs and expectations of their citizens has created chaos and anarchy that in a number of African countries could be likened to the Hobbesian state of nature. In the Rwandan genocide, for instance, the Hutu majority attempted to annihilate the Tutsis. In Nigeria, the menace of the Boko Haram insurgents has led to the killing, maiming and displacement, of thousands of people in the Northern region (Arendas, 2016: 40). The Movement for the Restoration of the Sovereign State of Biafra continues to agitate for self-determination, for the creation of an independent state, not minding that the same region was at war between 1967 and 1970 for the same cause and lost over a million of their people as a result (Julius-Adeoye, 2017: 15-16). The chaos in Libya led to the destruction of the country's developed infrastructure, "and the outbreaks of violence within the country and spilling over from its borders into neighbouring, and similarly fragile, North African states" (Sharqieh, 2013: 1), to the death of thousands of the population and of the country's leader Muammar Gaddafi. The intermittent unrest in South Africa results from the decline in the country's "rank of governance effectiveness and control of corruption since 1996" (Cilliers & Aucoin, 2016: 5), the agitation for better condition of life, such as provision of adequate basic services, employment opportunities, free and affordable education.

Since Sudan's independence in 1956, the country has been struggling to come to terms with the colonial policies that divided the country along ethnic line. The policies that its government implements since this period have been to the detriment and dissatisfaction of Southern Sudan. Unbalanced projects were pursued by the state in favour of the North (Tawil, 2011:1). Successive Sudanese governments attribute their misfortunes to their colonial history. However, the leaders have had sufficient time since the country's independence to use their diversity to the advantage of their country in terms of development and cultural harmony. Rather, successive regimes be they socialist, democratic, theocratic or dictatorial, failed to do that. The diversity was almost destroyed, while the hegemony of the minority northern population was imposed over the other sections of the country (El-Tom, 2009: 1). The partition of Sudan into two states as a result, of the conflicts and wars that have persisted for over

half a century has not succeeded in resolving their internal problems. Rather, disagreements, lawlessness, revolutionary protests, difficulties in maintaining internal control and the rule of law, poverty, spiralling inflation, and a proxy war within and between the regions have persisted (Verhoeven, 2012: 1-2).

In all these wars and violence, peoples' lives, livelihood, resources and infrastructure are destroyed; and many people are displaced, giving rise to further problems. Successive governments and their stakeholders are unwilling or unable to resolve their differences with viable methods of conflict resolution. Ajayi and Buhari (2014: 153-154) note that in the precolonial era, conflicts were largely resolved through peaceful means. However, the advent of colonialists corrupted, adulterated, or even in some places eliminated the traditional African means of managing, preventing, monitoring and resolving conflicts, thus hindering peace and confidence building processes. Nonetheless, many contemporary African societies still employ such methods of conflict resolution on a limited scale. Conflicts in the contemporary world are largely resolved through structures such as the law enforcement agencies, local and international courts. These measures do not in real terms result in sincere restoration of peace and forgiveness. Dialogue among aggrieved parties has been replaced in many cases by fighting, while the elders' mediatory roles and other peace-making structures such as the age-grades have been replaced by protracted court processes and military interventions. These have contributed to underdevelopment and instability.

Ogbogbo, (2011: 2-3) notes that it is becoming increasingly apparent that Africa may implode if nothing substantially concrete is done to turn its cracking structures around. The majority of the structures, institutions and spheres of governance in contemporary African countries are either malfunctioning or non-functional. The social, political and economic instability, which has resulted consequently, of this collapse has further contributed to cycles of violence in many African countries, and in the process, turning the African continent to the highest producer of refugees as well as the top receiver of foreign financial and technical assistance.

African states, according to Idowu (2012: 150-158) are not only confronted by the search for external financial assistance, they are also challenged by additional

external pressure from the West, the international financial institutions and the donor agencies who are demanding restoration of democracy or democratic reform as a prerequisite for foreign aid and support. A question that needs to be asked here is whether African states need foreign aid and support. It is not apparent that foreign aid contributes to humanitarian assistance or the development of the recipient countries. While

some authors argue that aid leads to growth [...]. A second group of authors argues that aid's ability to engender growth is conditional on some key feature; for instance, aid works if it is provided to countries that implement good policies [...], or if the climatic environment is appropriate [...]. A third group argues that aid is counterproductive...Some authors argue that aid should be stopped altogether (Pedrosa-Garcia, 2017: 2).

Currently, the general consensus among many scholars is that "aid is underused and badly targeted. There is too little aid and too much of what is provided is weakly linked to human development" (Njoroge, 2014: 66). It is further observed that foreign aid does not usually go to countries that implement good policies or countries whose environments allow for the proper implementation of good policies (Njoroge, 2014: 64).

As a result, of these observations, it appears that the lack of effective policy environments and the corrupt nature of politicians account in large measure for the failure of the aid recipient countries to effectively utilise these funds for the development of their countries. This study submits that most of the countries that receive foreign aid do not need such assistance if they judiciously utilise their national resources for the development of their countries. Perhaps these countries may accept technical support from the West to enable them to implement good policies and initiatives.

Although the West has played a significant role in Africa's inability to effectively manage its territories, Friedman (2011: 27-29) criticises African states for appearing largely incapable of taking charge of their countries and implementing a constructive and effective system of governance that can turn them into model states. While significant progress has been made in the process of bringing Africa into the democratic line through the present attempt at democratisation, he considers the

future of democracy in Africa to be uncertain because the efforts do not seem capable of resolving the problems hindering enduring democratic consolidation in Africa.

5.5 SUMMARY

This chapter has examined the failure of post-colonial African states from the ethical, social, political and economic perspectives; the factors responsible for the inability of post-colonial African states to effectively govern their territories and provide for the needs of their citizens, given the vast human and material resources and international best practices at their disposal. The chapter has examined the moral character of leaders: why their conduct is largely questionable and unethical, resulting in their inability to fulfil their constitutional obligations. The chapter has also considered why the future of democracy in Africa remains uncertain despite the current efforts at democratisation.

There are numerous challenges confronting postcolonial African states. These include erosion of African values, cultures and traditions; decline in the efficacy of traditional African authority, customs and traditions; deterioration of African politics; and social, political and economic difficulties. The other challenges are poverty; unemployment; underdevelopment; homelessness; illiteracy; diseases; famine; wars; individualism; economic mismanagement; bad leadership; the negative impact of colonialism; the threat of globalisation; and the failure of citizens to play their part in creating the desired state.

The colonial influence has been blamed for the large-scale erosion of African values, cultures and traditions. It has negatively affected the communal orientation of traditional Africans and replaced it with the kind of individualism that permeates almost every aspect of human life. While the African cultural belief systems and way of life in general were largely anchored on the sense of community, and place the community ahead of the individual, the western ideology places the individual ahead of the community. The western ideology also portrays the person as existing for himself, and who may choose to relate with other human beings if he so desires. The implications of this western ideology are unfavourable when individuals are given the sole liberty to determine how to relate with others because it gives rise to selfishness, lack of

consideration for the well-being of others, corruption and war, among other ethical problems.

Globalisation assumes some of its benefits to be the promotion of a sense of belonging, harmonious relationships, social and cultural integration. The reality however, is that it fails to achieve some of these objectives because human beings according to the phenomenon of concealment are naturally in conflict with each other. They are also naturally biased in their conceptions of others and this often leads to discrimination among various races. The collapse of cultural boundaries as a result of globalisation has failed to dissuade individuals from their prejudices towards other cultures. In their associations with other people, human beings mostly prioritise their personal, racial or group interests.

Theorists such as Igboin reject the idea that colonialism is solely responsible for all the challenges that confront post-colonial African states because there are some benefits that result from western influence. They claim that other factors such as internal revolutions could have contributed to the erosion of African values. They therefore suggest the need for internal reflection, to establish root causes of current challenges and how to resolve them. It is also noted that despite the negative impact of westernisation on African values, customs and morality, these have continued to thrive in most African societies, though at various speeds.

The decline in the efficacy of traditional African authority, customs and traditions is considered one of the contributory factors to the failure of post-colonial African states. Eze posits that Africans no longer have strong faith in their common identity or in the sacred powers and authority of the traditional leaders because the traditional foundation of consensual politics has been lost to religious proliferation and secularism. Lauer however, disagrees with Eze's contention, claiming that traditional leaders especially in West Africa lost their authority for colluding with the westerners to dispossess their people of their property. In the process the leaders became corrupt and eventually lost most of their wealth and influence. It is however noted that the reasons given by various philosophers in this regard are not in themselves sufficient for the decline in the efficacy of the traditional system of leadership. Rather all the reasons should be considered collectively. While it is acknowledged that the traditional

system of governance has lost a measure of its efficacy, it is however, noted that this system continues to thrive in many African countries for the role it plays in enabling the delivery of basic services to the rural population.

The deteriorating state of African politics has played a major role in the failure of postcolonial African states. The process of decline commenced during the transition from colonial to postcolonial rule because the African leaders who led the agitation for independence did not put adequate mechanisms in place that would guarantee successful post-independence rule. They failed to make any significant effort in transforming the states that the colonialists handed over to them. Rather, they were more interested in installing mechanisms that would enable them to manipulate the governance structures to suit their selfish agendas. The social, political and economic challenges confronting post-colonial African states result from the inability of the leaders to implement sound policies based on best practices and honesty. Instead the policies that they implement have impoverished their countries and resulted in economic failures. Furthermore, the combination of western democracy and individualistic capitalism negatively impacts on African states' social, political and economic systems in promoting individualism, discrimination, and marginalisation, in contrast to the dominant socio-political and economic system in Africa, which promotes consensus, communalism, deliberation, equality and egalitarianism.

In consideration of specific cases of democratic failures in Africa, this chapter has examined the ethical problems associated with the uneven distribution of land in South Africa and corruption and underdevelopment in Nigeria. However, it is noted that corruption is also a source of concern in South Africa. One of the major challenges that South Africa faces is how to redress the imbalances in the unequal distribution of land, which results from the apartheid era's racially skewed distribution of land and forced removals. Despite the various attempts made by the government through regulations to address these imbalances, the land reform programme remains largely unresolved. While this research notes that it is unethical for few members of the country to own most of the land irrespective of how they acquired it, it is imperative that the process of land redistribution does not compromise the peace, security and sustainability of the country.

Corruption is so endemic in all sectors of the Nigerian society that one can almost conclude that it has become a way of life. The country appears to be one of the few places in the world where the citizens are largely not concerned about the sources of an individual's wealth. All successive governments in Nigeria have largely been unethical in their leadership and management roles. Most of them have either misappropriated the national wealth or have placed their selfish interests above the national interest. Most institutions of government in Nigeria are weak in their enforcement of accountability measures. This creates opportunities for corruption to thrive. Corruption impedes the development of the country as revealed by the inability of successive governments to successfully implement developmental projects and to enhance the welfare of their citizens.

While all the successive governments' anticorruption strategies have been mostly unsuccessful as a result of the insincerity of many of the officials and bodies involved in the initiatives, the current Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has recorded a number of successes, including the identification, seizure and freezing of the proceeds of crime. The successes recorded by the commission have lifted the image of the country and made it an attractive business destination. However, while the effectiveness of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission is noted, it is perceived by large sections of the population as a government's means of victimising its perceived opponents. While there are merits in this perception, the onus lies with the presidency to transparently investigate all allegations of corruption and other unethical conduct in order to prove its objectivity, sincerity and commitment to justice and fairness.

In consideration of why the future of democracy in Africa remains uncertain despite the current efforts at democratisation, the chapter notes that it will be impossible for African states to realise a just and fair society if its leaders continue to engage in all forms of bad governance and unethical conduct such as corruption, greed and moral laxity. While the leaders must tread the path of morals, the other members of society must also conduct themselves ethically. In this way, all members of society would be playing their part in the realisation of a good society.

CHAPTER SIX

6 A NEW FRONTIER IN PROMOTING THE ETHICAL AND IDEAL POST-COLONIAL AFRICAN STATE

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter dealt with the failure of postcolonial African states. It found that most institutions in these states have either collapsed or are collapsing. Most of their systems and structures are characterised by social, political and economic instability. These have produced cycles of violence, conflicts, wars, corruption, debt burdens, underdevelopment and erosion of values, customs and traditions, among other challenges. These failures are largely attributed to the shortcomings of the leaders and managers who have superintended over the management and administration of these states. Based on these difficulties therefore, this study posits that the perpetuation of bad governance and immorality will hinder the realisation of an ethical and ideal democratic African continent.

This chapter will establish how leaders, bureaucrats, corporate executives, managers and community members can contribute to the realisation of the ideal state, which is able to meet the needs and expectations of postcolonial African societies. In that regard, the chapter will consider Rawls' attempts to define perfectly just institutions; and the role of ethical leadership in fostering a more result-oriented system of governance. The chapter will examine the kind of leadership that Africa requires; especially political, directive and values-driven leadership will be considered; the role of leadership in conflict management; and how to consolidate the gains of democracy. The chapter will further consider the options for alternative democratic order for the African continent, bearing in mind that previous and current political systems, including capitalism, communism and socialism have not yielded expected results in changing the lives of African people for the better. According to Rawls:

fundamental to justice, is the concept of fairness which relates to right dealing between persons who are cooperating with or competing against one another [...]. The question of fairness arises when free persons, who have no authority over one another, are engaging in a joint activity and among themselves settling or acknowledging the rules which define it and which determine the respective shares in its benefits and burdens. A practice will strike the parties as fair if none feels that, by participating in it,

they or any of the others are taken advantage of, or forced to give in to claims, which they do not regard as legitimate (Rawls, 1999: 59).

The above statement relates to the need for an arbitrator or authority of some sort since competing parties cannot fairly rule against each other. This is to avoid what Thomas Hobbes calls the state of nature. Further, for Rawls (2001: 39), “justice as fairness is framed for democratic institutions”. In other words, a democratic state must place justice as fairness at the centre of its management and administration. Rawls also posits that one of the practical objectives of justice as fairness is:

to provide an acceptable philosophical and moral basis for democratic institutions and thus to address the questions of how the claims of liberty and equality are to be understood. To this end, we look to the public political culture of a democratic society, and to the traditions of interpretation of its constitution and basic laws, for certain familiar ideas that can be worked up into a conception of political justice (Rawls, 2001: 5).

The primary subject of political justice for Rawls is “the basic structure of society, that is, its main political and social institutions and how they fit together into one unified system of cooperation” (Rawls, 2001: 39-40). The most fundamental idea in Rawls’ understanding of justice as fairness, in which the other ideas are systematically linked is his explication of society as a system of fair social cooperation among citizens across the epochs (Rawls, 1993: 15; 2001: 5). In this conception of justice, he combines the idea of members of society cooperating with each other as free and equal individuals with the idea of a society that is well ordered and adequately guided by a public idea of justice (Rawls, 2001: 5). He argues that for citizens to be able to make proper judgements about basic rights and liberties, they must acquire and comprehend the meaning of the common good, political justice and the policies and institutions that promote these political views (Rawls, 2007: 5).

Since Rawls considers the ideal society as a system of fair cooperation among equal and free citizens, he outlines the principles that will provide solutions to the economic and social inequalities that negatively affect their chances of living fulfilled lives (Rawls, 2001: 41). For Rawls (in Bird-Pollan, 2013: 723-729), the veil of ignorance, the original position, and the principles of justice are fundamental elements of determining the just state. The principles of justice, according to Rawls (Berkey, 2016: 707), provide social

institutions with the modalities for distributing fundamental rights and obligations, benefits and burdens. Consequently, he posits that the principles of justice expects institutions of the basic structure of society to make provisions for the protection of fundamental human rights.

Sen (2009: 96-102) criticises Rawls' transcendental institutionalism which sets out to define perfectly just institutions, claiming that human beings should not pursue perfect institutions since it is not possible to define anything perfect. Rather, he proposes the comparative approach to justice which instead of restricting its analysis to a transcendental quest for a perfectly just society, seeks to identify and abrogate observed injustices.

The role of leadership, irrespective of the kind of system of governance that prevails in each country in the realisation of a developmental, harmonious and ethical postcolonial African society is noted. Despite the fact that members of society generally perceive most political leaders in a negative light, they are however, expected to be authentic, strong, ethical, transformational, decisive, and to strive to rise above the shortcomings associated with political office (Kenny & Pearce, 2014: 122-124).

This study recognises that there are various forms of leadership in the world. However, it considers political, directive and values-driven leadership as styles that postcolonial African states must adopt over and above any other forms of leadership that they may prefer. This will enable them to derive a balance between soft and hard power, to achieve specified goals and to ensure that human behaviour and governance processes are underpinned by good values and morals.

The inability of contemporary African states to effectively and efficiently govern their territories calls into question the need to seek alternative systems of governance. Wiredu (2009: 10) notes that African states have so far not been able to devise appropriate systems of rule that are suitable for the African people and their way of life. He therefore urges African states to examine the precolonial African systems of governance with the view to extracting aspects that can be translated into adequate

forms of rule, especially those that are democratic and consensual, in their processes of decision-making.

This study contends that the failure of post-colonial African states to attain democratic consolidation after several years of independence has resulted in their inability to protect their democratic systems of governance in a manner that leads to the realisation of their constitutional objectives such as economic, social and political development. Therefore, the following factors will be examined with the view to enhancing a consolidated system of rule: the quality of public institutions, affluence, economic performance, access to land and a favourable international climate.

6.2 RAWLS CONTRACTIAN THEORY OF JUSTICE

A number of factors have been alluded to in this research, especially in chapter five, as responsible for the failure of post-colonial African states to effectively govern their territories and turn themselves into desirable states despite their exposure to international best standards. These include erosion of values, selfishness, greed, corruption, impact of globalisation, individualism, and tribalism. These failures can be categorised as largely relating to lack of justice and fairness in the governance and administration of the state, in the dispersal of benefits and burdens, in the manner in which societal members interact with each other and in the discharge of the constitutional mandate.

This section begins with a consideration of Rawls' determination of the nature of the just state, with the view to extricating useful insights that can be applied in the quest for the realisation of the ideal post-colonial African state. His quest for solutions to the problems of justice in the state gives rise to his idea of justice as fairness, from which emanates his principles of justice (Rawls, 1993: 5). He considers justice as mainly pertaining to the virtue of social institutions, and he refers to this kind of justice as political justice in a democratic society (Rawls, 1999: 47).

Rawls poses the following fundamental question that concerns political justice in a democratic state: "how is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?" (Rawls, 1993: 4). This question results from his

realisation that there has not been any democratic thought in history (including Locke's property rights and Rousseau's value of public life) that has found lasting solutions to societal challenges (Rawls, 1993: 4-5).

This study agrees with Rawls' concerns above, because all the challenges that have been examined in this thesis, including the current complications in the Nigerian and South African states have not been adequately resolved in most cases, as noted in chapter five, as a result of factors similar to the ones posed by Rawls, such as divisions and racism. Therefore, Rawls' fundamental questions remain valid even for the contemporary world at large and for postcolonial African states in particular. In response to these questions, he posits that "justice as fairness tries to adjudicate between these contending traditions, first by proposing two principles of justice to serve as guidelines for how basic institutions are to realise the values of liberty and equality" (Rawls, 1993: 5). The fundamental elements of his political philosophy in ensuring a just society are the veil of ignorance, the original position, and the two principles of justice. He first espoused the veil of ignorance and the original position in his work the *Theory of Justice*, while in his later work *Justice as Fairness*, he extends and clarifies his thoughts (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 723-729).

6.2.1 The Veil of Ignorance and the Original Position

Rawls (Praxent, 2017: 1) suggests that since all human beings are biased as a result, of the situations in which they find themselves, all treatises in political philosophy are primarily concerned with the fact that individual assessments of justice will be influenced by the condition in which an individual finds himself or herself in society. He therefore suggests that discussions and assessments of justice should be held behind a veil of ignorance (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 725), in which "they do not know how the various alternatives will affect their particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations" (Rawls, 1972: 136-137). He posits that the reason why the original position with the features that he refers to as the veil of ignorance must not be influenced by societal contingencies is because

the conditions for a fair agreement on the principles of political justice between free and equal persons must eliminate the bargaining advantages that inevitably arise within the background institutions of any society from cumulative social, historical, and natural tendencies. These contingent

advantages and accidental influences from the past should not affect an agreement on the principles that are to regulate the institutions of the basic structure itself from the present into the future (Rawls, 1993: 23).

Put differently, the only means of securing agreement on a 'social contract' to govern how society or the world should function is for human beings to imagine that they are sitting behind a veil of ignorance, which prevents them from knowing their true identity and personal circumstances (Praxent, 2017: 1). According to Rawls, people under the veil of ignorance know neither the generation in which they belong nor the demographics of their society (Muldoon *et al.*, 2014: 379). Rather they only possess basic knowledge of physics, economics, biology, and other well-established scientific knowledge. As a result, the veil of ignorance obstructs the possibility of people understanding specific interests that could influence their judgements in their discussions on society's basic structure. The veil of ignorance ensures that moral decision-making processes are not influenced by unnecessary moral ideas. It ensures that our reasoning is not influenced by our self-interests.

The original position for Rawls (1972: 17) "is the appropriate initial status quo which insures that the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair. This fact yields the name justice as fairness". In other words, the original position for him, guarantees fair conditions that enable representatives of the citizens to reach consensus on the terms of social cooperation that are considered fair (Rawls, 2001: 80). Rawls (Praxent, 2017: 1) views the original position as relating to the point of view of the person who hides behind the veil of ignorance. He posits that as a result of being ignorant of who we are and our circumstances, our conceptions of justice will not be influenced by the different inequalities that are caused by historical accidents (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 726); and we will be able to establish what true justice is and more objectively determine how society should operate (Praxent, 2017: 1). According to Rawls (1972: 19),

the parties in the original position are equal. That is, all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles; each can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on. Obviously the purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice.

The veil of ignorance or the original position, according to Bird-Pollan (2013: 725) is a fundamental component of Rawls understanding of equality of opportunity and the just distribution of societal goods because behind the veil of ignorance is also hidden the individual's economic conditions, his gender, race, educational background and geographic location. He posits that the justice inherent in any process of sharing wealth and other qualities that are beneficial to members of a community has to be assessed prior to a person understanding his place in a particular community. This is a means of ensuring that all members of society, including the least advantaged person will have a position that receives the acceptance of other members of society. Rawls (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 725-726) posits that it is possible for human beings to employ critical thinking in arriving at objective and informed decisions about what constitutes a just social structure when they are not influenced by prejudices stemming from their individual conditions in life. In the original position, everyone is equal and they develop fair rules no matter the kinds of conditions that they face in their individual lives. These are the same rules that each person would choose no matter what else they would have preferred in the world. From the original position, Rawls proceeds to formulate a social structure that complies with what justice entails. The title of his last work, *Justice as Fairness*, proceeds from this process (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 725-726).

6.2.2 The Principles of Justice

The principles of justice for Rawls (2001: 41) are aimed at clarifying the nature of the just society, how citizens can be considered equal and to regulate the economic and social inequalities that confront members of society. The question that the principles attempt to address is

once we view a democratic society as a fair system of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, what principles are most appropriate to it? Alternatively: which principles are most appropriate for a democratic society that not only professes but wants to take seriously the idea that citizens are free and equal, and tries to realise that idea in its main institutions? (Rawls, 2001: 39).

The two principles of justice, for Rawls (2001: 42-43), are the liberty and the difference principles, which he describes as follows:

First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all (Rawls, 1972: 60).

Rawls (Praxent, 2017: 1) supplements his 'veil of ignorance' with these primary principles of justice. He claims that these principles of justice for a political society that represent the notion of freedom emanate from the discussions around fairness in society that take place behind the veil of ignorance. Therefore, he asserts that they "should be standards that its individual members would choose behind a veil of ignorance for their advantages, disadvantages, and the specific contents of their life goals" (Miller, 2012: 297). These principles, for Rawls:

are designed to form the social world in which our character and our conception of ourselves as persons, as well as our comprehensive views and their conceptions of the good, are first acquired, and in which our moral powers must be realised, if they are to be realised at all. These principles must give priority to those basic freedoms and opportunities in background institutions of civil society that enable us to become free and equal citizens in the first place, and to understand our role as persons with that status (Rawls, 1993: 41)

For Rawls (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 727-728), the kinds of social structure that constitute a just system are founded mainly on the two principles. The first principle of justice relates to the equal liberty that a person must derive from his society for it to be considered just. All members of society must enjoy this same liberty regardless of whatever condition they may face in life. The liberty principle, according to Rawls (Praxent, 2017: 1), provides that the social contract must ensure that every individual is given the maximum liberty possible, while at the same time ensuring that the freedom of others is not infringed upon. In the first principle, Rawls (Sen, 2009: 59) prioritises equal personal liberty for everyone over the demands of the second principle for the equality of some general opportunities and for equity, not equality, in the distribution of general goods and services.

The second principle of justice permits economic and social inequalities in a just society, according to Rawls (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 729) "only to the extent that the positions with which the inequalities are associated are open to all and the inequalities

are such that they improve the position of the least well off". The difference principle, for Rawls (Praxent, 2017: 1) provides that the social contract must ensure that everyone is given an equal opportunity to prosper, while everyone should be given the opportunity to derive any advantages that exist in the social contract. This is what Rawls means by fair equality of opportunities which "require not merely that public offices and social positions be open in the formal sense, but that all should have a fair chance to attain them" (Rawls, 2001: 43). He believes that the application of these principles through a veil of ignorance would enable society to justly attend to tough issues in deciding more fairly the best ways to structure the rules of society.

Rawls (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 724) supports equality of opportunity, as opposed to an equality. In other words, he endorses the equality of societal members from the beginning, and not if there exists unequal distribution of societal assets at any other period. This distinction has a lot of implications. For instance, in order to ensure that goods and services are equally distributed to members of a society, an egalitarian may require a continuous redistribution process. However, an equality of opportunity theory would not require such redistribution. If the distribution of economic and non-economic assets was sufficiently equal from the beginning so as to enable everyone to achieve success, then there would be no need for redistribution later. Any uneven distribution that results later would be considered to have emanated from the variations that individual efforts produced. The theory of equal opportunity would not request alterations since every member of society commenced from the same position. The equal opportunity proposal proceeds from the principle that every member of society is equally valuable. If the principle of the equal worth of everyone is the belief of all societal members, then every individual's choices and aspirations should also receive equal value. However, the proposal for equal opportunity does not require that a person's choices be rewarded equally throughout the course of his life regardless of the value that the market attaches to such choice. Rather,

the equal worth of all individuals is reflected by the assurance of equal opportunities and the freedom to engage in those opportunities for all individuals from the beginning [...]; an individual will not be restrained from acting in accordance with her wishes. That kind of negative freedom does not ensure any true opportunity if the individual in question has significantly fewer material goods than other individuals. Instead, material resources must be made available to all individuals in approximately equal amounts

before it can be said that true equality of opportunity has been attained (Bird-Pollan, 2013: 724-725).

This study notes that the theory of equal opportunity for everyone sounds like a perfect means of ensuring a just society. The reality however, is that even if all individuals are given the equalised opportunities from the beginning to succeed, many of them will not succeed since human beings do not possess equal capacities and capabilities to succeed at equal rates. Some people would squander the opportunities that they get, while others out of sheer laziness, lack of commitment to work hard and lackadaisical attitude would not make any meaningful effort. This would in the end result in burdens placed on the state to assist unsuccessful individuals materially, physically and even psychologically.

6.2.3 The Rawlsian Transcendental Institutionalism

One of the most influential claims that Rawls makes about justice, termed institutionalism, is that the principles of justice for institutions do not directly apply to the behaviour of individuals in specific circumstances. Rather, they only apply to the institutions of the society's basic structure (Berkey, 2016: 707). In other words, "the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation" (Rawls, 1972: 7). Rawls summarises the basic structure of society as the arrangement of major societal institutions into one systematic plan of cooperation (Melenovsky, 2013: 600). By major social institutions he refers to

the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements. Thus the legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means of production, and the monogamous family are examples of major social institutions. Taken together as one scheme, the major institutions define men's rights and duties and influence their life-prospects, what they can expect to be and how well they can hope to do. The basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present from the start (Rawls, 1972: 7).

Rawls posits that the principles of justice prescribe objectives "that must guide the process of structuring the institutions of the basic structure, as well as the policies and

practices of those institutions. They are not, however, aims that individuals must directly promote in their personal conduct” (Berkey, 2016: 707). Furthermore, Rawls (Berkey, 2016: 707) asserts that these principles determine the manner in which fundamental rights and obligations should be distributed by societal institutions. The principles of justice therefore, require that institutions of the basic structure of society are organised in a manner that ensures the protection of specific fundamental human rights and that the distribution of benefits such as wealth and income are in accordance with the provisions of the principles. In view of the claim that the principles of justice are not directly applicable to individual conduct, wealthy individuals are not required to share possessions with the less privileged. As a result, the institutionalists’ position here is that the onus lies more directly with institutions, and not individuals, to ensure that justice is dispersed.

Berkey (2016: 708) notes that while a number of philosophers consider institutionalism plausible for partly not putting any direct obligations on the rich in societies constituted by an unjust basic structure and societies that condone inequalities and marginalisation, to share their wealth with the less privileged; other philosophers reject the conception of justice that institutionalists commit themselves to. Murphy (Berkey, 2016: 708) claims that while Rawlsian institutionalism has gained widespread acceptance in contemporary political philosophy since the Rawls’ *Theory of Justice* was published, the view appears indefensible for a number of reasons such as what the responsibilities of wealthy people in unjust societies with unjust basic structural institutions should be. For Berkey, the motivations offered by Rawls and others for institutionalism do not provide compelling basis for the acceptance of institutionalism partly because their positions on institutionalism appear to have a wrong conception of what the fundamental concern for justice relates to (Berkey, 2016: 708).

Melenovsky (2013: 600) criticises Rawls’ description of the basic structure of society for not resolving a number of important issues, and for relying on intuitive ideas of social institutions and of which of these institutions are paramount. Cohen (Melenovsky, 2013: 600) further disagrees with Rawls’ conception of the basic structure of society, claiming that a major fracture in the Rawlsian methodology leads to a dilemma for Rawls position on justice from which it might not be possible to extricate itself. This fracture becomes obvious when in the process of explaining what

constitutes the basic structure of society, Rawls is not able to give a satisfactory answer without contradicting other aspects of his theory. Cohen contends that limiting the basic structure of society to the coercive legal framework can only be carried out in a random or inconsistent demarcation process. It would also result in the disregard of other areas of society that have a deep and widespread impact on our lives. However, if the basic structure of society is not limited to the coercive legal structure, then it would not be possible to exclude the personal choices of each person from the basic structure's scope. This result would be in contrast with the position taken by Rawls that personal decisions are not affected by the principles of justice. Cohen, therefore, contends that the basic structure of society cannot be explained in a principled manner since there are complications associated with either way of resolving the issue (Melenovsky, 2013: 600).

Rawls (Hsieh, 2009: 400) does not consider any conception of the good as a basis for evaluating law, rules or economic institutions. Rather, he posits that in the process of formulating legislation and policies, the liberal state has to remain neutral in regards to various conceptions of the good. In other words, no particular idea of the good must influence the state in its decisions. This is a tough position that Rawls has taken if no specific conception of morality forms the basis of state policies and rules. The question becomes: on what basis will the liberal state make its decisions? Rawls replies that "the reasons given for an institutional requirement or policy must be public - that is, they must appeal to citizens' free status as free and equal persons and cannot depend, for their acceptance, upon a belief in some conception of the good" (Hsieh, 2009: 400).

Rawls appears to have been convinced by some of the views of his critics in such a manner that in *The Laws of Peoples*, he proceeds to propound rules of international law and practice that could bring about a world community of decent and liberal individuals. His proposals here are considered to be a realisable utopia for combining justice and wisdom with conditions that could enable citizens to attain their primary desires and for extending what was considered as the limits of practical political philosophy. In the proposals which he hopes would galvanise the attainment of his realistic utopia, Rawls modifies his original position and provides the following eight principles of justice for democratic and free people:

- Human beings are independent and free, while their independence and freedom must be respected by others;
- Undertakings and treaties must be observed by people;
- Human beings are equal, and they must uphold promulgated rules and legislation;
- Human beings have an obligation of non-interference in the affairs of others;
- Human beings are entitled to the right of self-defence, but they do not have the right to cause violence or war except on the account of self-defence;
- Everyone is duty bound to respect human rights;
- Everyone must comply with specified restrictions in times of war;
- Human beings have an obligation to assist others whose unfavourable conditions make it impossible for them to derive a decent or just social and political society (Corlett *et al.*, 2010: 460-461).

The eighth principle of justice which obligates human beings to assist others contrasts with Rawls earlier claim that the principles of justice apply directly to the institutions of the basic structure of society, and not to the conduct of people in a manner that obligates them to promote it in the way they conduct themselves. This claim is considered by the critics of Rawlsian institutionalism, such as Berkey, as having a wrong notion of what the fundamental concern of justice should be (Berkey, 2016: 707-708). However, Rawls seems to have taken the views of his critics into account in finally conceding that human beings should be of assistance to the less privileged.

6.2.4 The Comparativist Critique of Transcendental Institutionalism

Sen (2009: 96-102) outlines a pragmatist view of social justice that questions Rawls quest for a perfectly just society. While Rawls sets out to define the ideal state or to define perfectly just institutions, Sen terms it problematic, claiming that as humans we are unlikely to ever define anything perfect. Therefore, human beings should not pursue perfect institutions. Rather, they should have mechanisms for identifying gross injustice and addressing the injustice when it arises. These mechanisms may not be perfect but we would have eliminated those injustices in a very pragmatic sense.

Sen (Clare and Horn, 2010: 74) makes a distinction between two schools of thought on social justice that emanated from the Enlightenment period, namely transcendental institutionalism and comparative justice. Sen terms the social contract theory transcendental institutionalism - an arrangement-focused approach that proceeds from theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Rawls. Sen further claims that this school of thought has become the dominant paradigm of contemporary political philosophy. Their primary objective is to establish what ideal institutional arrangements should be rather than looking into actual societies and people (Labude & Pogge, 2010: 609). Their approach aims to examine the ideal locations of institutions and rules, and to develop an ideal state, which as a result, of its effectiveness, results in the realisation of 'pure' justice (Biondo, 2012: 557). The transcendental approach for Sen, consists of two elements:

First, it concentrates its attention on what it identifies as perfect justice, rather than on relative comparisons of justice and injustice. It tries only to identify social characteristics that cannot be transcended in terms of justice, and its focus is thus not on comparing feasible societies, all of which may fall short of the ideals of perfections. The inquiry is aimed at identifying the nature of 'the just', rather than finding some criteria for an alternative being 'less unjust' than another. Second, in searching for perfection, transcendental institutionalism concentrates primarily on getting the institutions right, and it is not directly focused on the actual societies that would ultimately emerge (Biondo, 2012: 556).

Sen (in Clare & Horn, 2010: 75) rejects Rawls' transcendental institutionalism. Rather, he proposes the comparative approach to justice, which instead of restricting its analysis to a transcendental quest for a perfectly just society, is rather, realisation-focused, and aims at eliminating observed injustices from the world (Clare & Horn, 2010: 75). He criticises what he considers as Rawls' institutional approach and posits that the conditions in which people find themselves must be a fundamental concern for a theory of justice (Maffetone, 2011: 119). For Sen, the foundational difference between Rawls ideas and his approach is that while Rawls' approach is transcendental, his approach is comparative as it concentrates on comparing feasible social alternatives without necessarily attempting to pronounce on what the ideally just society should be. As a comparativist, Sen associates himself with the tradition of thinkers such as Adam Smith, Marx and Condorcet, all of whom instead of limiting their investigations to the transcendental quest for a perfectly just society as the

Rawlsians did, rather engaged in comparing already existing societies or such societies that could emerge (Labude & Pogge, 2010: 609). The primary interests of the philosophers that concentrated on realisation-focused comparisons are to eliminate observed injustice that they observe in the world. They concentrate on the means of achieving justice. In that regard, they lay emphasis on the practical achievements of these objectives in the society under focus, and not only on rules and institutions (Biondo, 2012: 556-557).

Although Sen (in Clare and Horn, 2010: 75) notes a number of common features between transcendental institutionalism and comparative justice, he further makes distinctions between them, while also claiming that transcendental institutionalism is inadequate for guiding reasoned choices of institutions, policies and strategies. For Sen,

Transcendentalism simply addresses a different question from those of comparative assessment – a question that may be of considerable intellectual interest, but which is of no direct relevance to the problem of choice that has to be faced. What is needed instead is an agreement, based on public reasoning, on rankings of alternatives that can be realised (Sen, 2009: 17).

Sen (in Weale, 2013: 17) argues that in the process of locating a theory of justice around a hypothetical contract, the Rawlsian approach lays excessive emphasis on the idea of an ideally just society and less focus on the comparative analysis of the extent to which various societies are able to attain justice. Sen (in Labude and Pogge, 2010: 609) notes that the process of clarifying some of the assumptions of the transcendental approach reveals inherent fundamental errors. He refers to one such flaw as the indeterminate ideal problem. He contends that contrary to Rawls' original position, it is likely that no reasoned agreement may be reached even in the face of open-minded scrutiny and under strict conditions of impartiality on the form of the just society. Furthermore, the ideal contractualist fails to consider that disagreements could take place in the original position since participants could have different opinions and as a result arrive at varied principles of justice. As a result, of this factor, the requirements of justice could only be evaluated by means of public reasoning.

Sen (in Weale, 2013: 17) further claims that although democracy and justice are closely related, the foundation of our account of justice should proceed from the practice of democracy rather than using the original position as a means or designing economic and political institutions. From this perspective, he posits that the high level of abstraction contained in the hypothetical theory of social contract as opposed to what happens in the actual realm of deliberative democracy makes a satisfactory discourse on justice impossible. It also does not contribute anything to deliberative accounts of democracy. Therefore, the idea of a social contract is not a prerequisite for comprehending justice. Rather, what are needed are the practices of deliberative democracy (Weale, 2013: 17). In Rawls' theory, it is assumed that:

in a hypothetical situation, such as in the 'original position', the participants would agree to a unique set of principles of justice with a lexicographic order. As a result, there is only one kind of impartial argument that satisfies 'the demands of fairness', shorn of vested interests. But according to Sen, this is a mistake, since there can be other principles of distribution than can be justified on the same impartial grounds. It is implausible to think that different possible reasons 'would allow one unique set of principles of justice to emerge in the original position. However, it is undeniable that by accepting the possibility of rational disagreement about a set of principles of justice, the institutional arrangement provided by a transcendental approach is doomed to indeterminacy (Biondo, 2012: 557-558).

Sen (in Biondo, 2012: 558) is convinced that it may not be possible to have a perfectly just social arrangement, which is capable of producing impartial agreement. Rather he posits that one problem or issue may have a number of different solutions. He finds the transcendental approach not feasible, and redundant, because there is no need to identify a very just social arrangement in order for a theory of justice to guide reasoned choices of institutions, strategies and policies. However, he submits that it may be possible to establish a 'conglomerate theory' that simultaneously provides a transcendental identification and comparative assessment among alternatives. However, it is not possible that this theory will be able to resolve the dilemma of choosing among non-transcendental alternatives. He claims that in the process of determining one pure just alternative, the likelihood is that this may have various dimensions which are all morally relevant, such as equality of resources, protecting individual rights and exercise of basic capabilities; all of which cover the distance between the real and ideal alternative. As a result, even in cases where it is possible

to reach consensus on the nature of the ideal society, the challenge of determining the various distances from the real to the ideal society remains. It is not clear, for instance, according to Sen (in Biondo, 2012: 558-559),

how to measure the distance from the ideal society in the presence of multiple violations of liberties, or when diverse distributive principles are not respected, as is usually the case. The conclusion is disheartening. Transcendentalism is of no assistance in our everyday life. It does not indicate the best choice among the alternatives we face in our non-ideal existence, since the choices really available to us are different from what the ideal theory provides. Furthermore, it does not give us guidance as to how to enhance justice, since transcendentalism provides us with an account of an ideally just society, though it does not tell us how to reach this goal from a non-ideal situation (Biondo, 2012: 558-559).

Alternatively, Sen (in Clare & Horn, 2010: 75-76) proffers that comparative justice in the state requires that consensus be reached based on the ranking of achievable options and on public reasoning. He divides his theory of comparative justice into two areas, namely: the materials or objects of justice and the process of comparative evaluation of justice in public discourse. The capabilities or materials of justice have to outline the relevant informational focus on the society, while the process of comparative assessment, otherwise referred to as open impartial deliberation, has to outline objective means of evaluating the materials of justice. Sen defends capabilities as the proper features of the world we need to focus on in the process of judging a community or evaluating justice and injustice. The main point Sen makes here is not whether a particular approach is able to compare two options, but whether it is able to make appropriately directed and well thought out comparisons. The capabilities of human beings relate to their inherent freedoms to choose the way of life that they prefer, and what they can do and become. It dwells on the actual opportunities at a person's disposal to enable him to achieve his objectives. This capability approach, for Sen, is merely a general approach for comparing individual advantages, and not for proposing specific socio political designs.

Clare and Horn (2010: 74-76) criticise Sen's capability approach for instead of giving a concrete explication of the core capabilities, he offers what he terms open impartial deliberation, as a means of establishing the content of capabilities. These authors find Sen's open impartiality too open. Instead, they proffer a less open process irrespective

of the means of execution as more effective. They further criticise Sen for arguing against the possibility of reaching contractarian agreement as undermining his own effort to find solutions to the question of justice. Weale (2013: 17) partly rejects Sen's critique of the Rawlsian social contract theory, claiming that although Sen could be correct about the disadvantages associated with the hypothetical social contract, it is not plausible to simply substitute the ideas of political discussions and public reasoning for a social contract. Democratic processes, deliberations or political negotiations can either occur in contexts, which could be conducive or not favourable to justice. For Weale, (2013: 17), the

crucial distinction is not that between those theories of justice that make political deliberation and negotiation foundational and those that do not. Rather, it is between those theories in which deliberation and negotiation take place in circumstances of unequal power and advantage over the other.

According to Biondo (2012: 555), Sen offers a limited exposition of Rawls theory as a result of his rhetorical strategy that portrays Rawls theory as more transcendental than is really the case. Secondly, Biondo contends that the distinction that Sen makes between the transcendental and comparative approaches to the issue of justice appears misleading in a number of aspects since elements of both transcendentalism and comparative approaches are required in any plausible moral theory. Moreover, transcendental elements become necessary in order to avoid the kind of confusion that may arise in the process of accepting a principle, norm or value, and its justification. A comparative position, for Biondo (2012: 555),

highlights the conditions of application of the doctrine to the real world, taking into account the possibility of moral dilemmas, evaluative disagreements and limited resources, while proposing possible provisos and caveats to the risk of the doctrine being self-defeating. Third, although the transcendental approach is useful, it is argued that in elaborating this dichotomy Sen overlooks the merits of the third way between comparative and transcendental doctrines, what he calls 'conglomerate theory', and also the possibility that his doctrine (the capability approach) might be considered as an example of such a theory.

From the forgoing, Biondo (2012: 555) concludes that the aim of the conglomerate theory is not to produce a complete moral framework, but to generate a weak

transcendentalism in the form of a comparative approach that includes transcendental elements.

This Study contends that Sen's ideas are a bit limiting, slightly ambitious and difficult to comprehend or implement on some practical levels but it may be possible to partially implement some of them in the post-colonial African contexts. This study also notes that Rawls' veil of ignorance brings to mind the prejudice that exist in the world, which continue to largely determine the manner in which states and individuals relate to others in every aspect of life. A vital point that post-colonial African states can draw from the veil of ignorance is the extent of injustices that individuals, groups and governments perpetrate on others on the basis of biases, prejudice and assumptions. This also manifests itself as shown in the previous chapter, in discriminatory practices against others; in the unequal distribution of resources; and in the corruption and land problems in South Africa and Nigeria, in other parts of the African continent and the world at large. This prejudice has resulted in immense harm, immorality and injustice in the world. The veil of ignorance is very critical to ensuring that the states and their citizens treat each other well, with respect and objectivity; in the appointment of leaders and workers, not based on subjectivity, but based on merit. Employing this veil in decision-making will ultimately result in growth, development and better relations among individuals, community members and nations.

One of the thought-provoking insights in Rawls' principles of justice is the provision that the rich are not obligated to direct some of their resources for the benefit of the less privileged. Many people have more resources than they can ever need in their lifetime. Some of them use part of it to assist the disadvantaged members of society to lift them out of poverty. Many others do not care about using part of their wealth for the benefit of others. It is encouraged that the privileged use part of their wealth for the benefit of others because this will contribute to alleviating many of the societal ills which contribute to the destruction of societal values, security and wellbeing.

Rawls' principles of justice does not place direct obligations on individual conduct. Rather, it places the distribution of rights and benefits in the sphere of the major social institutions. This does not mean that individuals do not have a central role to play in the wellbeing of society. Rather, all societal institutions have to be organised in a

manner that ensures their efficiency and effectiveness. It means that the right people in terms of competence and morality, who are not concerned with self-enrichment, but who care more for the development and welfare of their societies, are appointed to critical and sensitive positions. This will ensure that justice and fairness become the hallmark of each state.

6.3 THE ROLE OF ETHICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE

A number of challenges are noted in this study, especially in chapters four and five, which make the future of democracy in Africa uncertain. This chapter posits that leaders, managers and members of society have a central role to play in bringing harmony, development and contributing to the realisation of ethical and ideal post-colonial African states. All political philosophers, including moral philosophers, according to Agbelengor (2012: 2-3) recognise the centrality of good leadership in the attainment of national development, irrespective of the form of governance in place, be it capitalism, communism, socialism, feudalism, constitutionalism or liberalism. The differing factor among them is that while some of them place leadership in absolute individuals, others confer leadership on citizens, in institutional development or in constitutionalism. He observes that in Hobbes' treatise on the state of nature, (as also noted in chapter three), Hobbes (1968: 186) shows how solitary, nasty, brutish and short human life is until the adoption of the Leviathan through a social contract. This in turn brings order, development and progress to the state. Agbelengor (2012: 3) further observes that Plato recommends philosopher Kings whom he considers to be beacons of societal growth and progress, and capable of providing the kind of leadership that will lead to the realisation of the just state.

Machiavelli (in Agbelengor, 2012: 3) also realises the importance of good leadership for the development of the state. As a result, he outlines the measures that a good leader should embrace to ensure success. He considers the importance of leadership so vital that leaders must apply cleverness, boldness and even deception if and when the situation demands. Internal and external problems, for him must be handled with both hard and soft power, or tricky diplomacy and coercive force. He considers such

policy measures as capable of enabling the leader to eliminate his detractors and to attract friends. He posits that a leader,

“so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, from which follow murders and robberies [...]” (Machiavelli, 1958: 91).

This study concedes that there are merits in Machiavelli’s expose on leadership. However, it finds some of his pronouncements to be extreme, especially his reference to deceptive leadership. Good leadership does not require deception and liars. Rather, a good leader should always act in an honest and trustworthy manner by always telling the truth no matter how hard it can be, and being transparent in his leadership and personal commitments. Failure to act in this manner will only attract loss of faith in the leader.

A key feature of political leadership, according to Helms (2014: 264) pertains to the relationship that it has with power. While some theorists such as Ikenberry (Helms, 2014: 264) associate leadership with power, there is a wider agreement among various theorists such as James MacGregor Burns (Helms, 2014: 264) that although leadership relates to power, all power relationships do not signify leadership. In this regard, a distinction is made

between hard and soft power, which eases the conceptual tension between leadership and power. Whereas hard power relies heavily on the possibility of coercing people, soft power co-opts people rather than coerces them [...], and its use effectively involves a change from power over others to power with others [...]. In such a relationship, domination and coercion are being replaced by attraction and persuasion (Helms, 2014: 264-265).

This study contends that soft power alone is not suitable for the African continent, where many people only comply with set norms and standards out of fear of reprisals and not because they believe in doing the right thing. Omotoso (2014: 134) notes that the Ghanaian public service is more effective than the Nigerian civil service despite the fact that they share similar colonial experience. The social, political and economic condition in Ghana was previously very bad. However, the country has made significant improvement, mainly because of the intervention of Jerry Rawlings, a

military ruler who eventually became the civilian president. He was known to have “deliberately wiped out the majority of the supposedly corrupt elites in the country and instituted reforms to engender good governance, which successive governments have continued to build upon; this is how impunity was banished in the country” (Omotoso, 2014: 134).

This study notes that while Rawlings was able to transform his country’s socio-political and economic conditions using hard power, it is questionable whether he had to go as far as eliminating all the top politicians and bureaucrats that contributed to the collapse of his country’s economy in order to achieve his objectives. This study agrees that it is better to remove all corrupt and ineffective leaders and civil servants and replace them with ethical individuals in order to purge the political system of bad influences. It is recommended that all African states should follow the example set by Rawlings in order to ensure the realisation of a better state, not by killing the culprits, but by sending them to jail and recovering all the country’s resources that they have misappropriated. While preference is not given to suppression, coercion or domination, it is recommended that both hard and soft power should be the norm.

While most politicians are perceived in a negative light, the citizens in the current era demand authentic, decisive, transformational and strong political leaders who are able to overcome the limitations and compromises of politics. They expect these leaders to understand the concerns of their people and respond accordingly. On the other hand they also require the leaders to be ruthless in their decision making process when the situation demands, to be totally in control of their governments, parties, cabinets and colleagues. This means that for the world at large, and Africa in particular to attain the kind of transformation that it hopes for, leaders and the citizens are expected to be accountable and responsive to the needs and expectations of their stakeholders (Kenny & Pearce, 2014: 122-124).

The pertinence of directive leadership, according to (Gosling & Sutherland, 2012: 40-41) is recognised by various leaders and heads of departments. They note that many leaders realise the importance of employing leadership styles such as coaching and mentoring which are channelled towards extracting the innate capabilities of workers; to make them more discerning; to support and encourage team members; to

encourage the delegation of authority; and the allowance of individual autonomy. However, these leaders also realise that in order to attain specific short-term goals, it is imperative to employ the directive method of leadership, which is more controlling and compels workers to execute leadership instructions as directed. The Americans, among other nations are particular about this form of leadership, and it has brought their systems of governance and enterprise immense success (Gosling & Sutherland, 2012: 41).

This study subscribes to the directive form of leadership for the African continent because many community members and workers tend not to take their duties very seriously when they are given the freedom to use their initiatives. Although the importance of individual initiatives and the coaching or mentoring styles of leadership are acknowledged, it is proposed that state institutions must prioritise the directive leadership style. This is because this form of leadership requires “a concentrated level of detailed hands-on focus, personal control, clear direction and daily monitoring to provide precise evidence of what was going on in every aspect of the business” (Gosling & Sutherland, 2012: 41). Moreover, since directive leadership contributes immensely to the success of the American system of enterprise and governance, it should also enable African states to be more successful in their mandates.

Values-driven leadership, according to Evans and Hargreaves (2010: 42-46), relates to having a clear understanding of one’s values and being true to them always. It realises that behaviours are underpinned by values, that human instincts on wrong and right conduct are driven by values and that a harmonious and successful society results from subscribing to these values. The value of trust is critical to the success and well-being of any society and organisation, and it relates to keeping one’s words and promises, and being consistent.

Blakey (2016: 43) considers the three pillars that inspire trust as ability, benevolence and integrity. Ability for him refers to the professional competence of officials to successfully execute assigned responsibilities, while frequent failure to fulfil such responsibilities will negatively influence one’s trustworthiness. He considers benevolence as showing concern for the welfare of other people by being kind, caring and generous. Integrity, according to Cohen (2010: 11) “means doing the right thing

regardless of the circumstances or inconvenience to the leader or the organisation". While leaders are expected to conduct themselves with integrity, it is the responsibility of both leaders, employees and members of society to consistently act with integrity. The promotion of integrity in organisations:

involves developing and maintaining a professional and respectful workplace. It involves ethical leadership, active management and supervision, the right people, effective processes and confident professional reporting [...]; is about creating a workplace that demonstrates the values of the organisation (Office of Police Integrity, 2009: 4)

This study considers ethics and integrity as interrelated in the sense that it is one's integrity that enables her or him to be ethical and to comply with rules and regulations sincerely, not because one is compelled to do so, but because one believes that it is the right thing to do. For Choi *et al.*, (2015: 356), the level of morality within an organisation is affected by the ethical practices of that organisation. They further note as follows:

ethical leader empowers employees to make democratic/participative decisions in which they prioritise morality, social values, and the collective interest of the company. In this regard, ethical leaders encourage employees to suggest creative and ethical solutions to the problems encountered in the decision-making process to reach the organisational goal effectively and ethically. Such leader behaviours also encourage employees to follow ethical practices in performing their work and thereby strengthen the moral base from which employees operate (Choi *et al.*, 2015: 356)

In order for post-colonial African states to successfully transform, this study recommends that they embrace the political, directive and values-driven forms of leadership, over and above any other styles of leadership that they may subscribe to. They should also employ both hard and soft power to ensure balance in the manner in which they execute their functions.

6.4 THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

This study notes that the extent of the conflicts on the African continent currently can derail the realisation of an ethical and just society. In that regard, leadership has a fundamental role to play in seeking adequate means of managing such conflicts.

Western countries largely employ law enforcement agencies, judicial systems presided over by judges and lawyers to detect crime, for settlement of disputes and dispensation of justice; whereas traditional African societies relied mostly on divination, oath taking, people's assemblies, king's courts and the council of elders (Ajayi & Buhari, 2014: 153). Chiefs, prominent leaders, respected and morally upright persons, performed conflict management, because they were considered trustworthy (Tafese, 2016: 22).

In traditional African societies, the objectives of conflict resolution were to understand and eliminate the root causes of disagreements and conflicts; to genuinely reconcile the aggrieved parties; and to create happiness, harmony and peace among the disputants. Conflict management was also channelled towards the promotion of good governance, development, security, collective well-being and conducive social relationships (Ajayi & Buhari, 2014: 154). A number of principles guided the resolution of interpersonal and inter-communal conflicts. These include the requirement that the aggrieved individuals or groups must trust and have confidence in the structure mandated to resolve the conflict. A major factor in dispute resolution, according to Ajayi and Buhari (2014: 142), is for the aggrieved parties to be completely truthful as this is confirmation to the disputants that the process would be impartial and fair. The sincerity of the mediator or the judge must be beyond reproach; and "they should have both worldly and esoteric social wisdom" (Kouassi, 2008: 240).

In the current era, according to Werner and Bagrain (2016: 332), conflict management is also the role of leaders, managers and affected stakeholders. They are all expected to understand how to manage conflict in their environments, to realise set objectives and in a manner that it becomes a driving force for change; and they all require emotional intelligence in order to effectively manage conflict. Leaders and managers who possess a high degree of emotional intelligence have the capacity to keep their emotions in check, comprehend others' emotions, "and react appropriately to them. They are able to understand the different perspectives that people bring to a situation and can therefore facilitate the search for common ground" (Werner & Bagrain, 2016: 332-333).

This study notes that a number of lessons can be learned from the manner in which conflicts were resolved in the precolonial era where the methods employed resulted in sincere resolution of disagreements, unlike in the contemporary era, where conflict resolutions do not in many instances influence the willingness of affected individuals to readily forgo the bitterness that they continue to carry around with them. The system of conflict management in traditional African societies played a significant role in creating societies that valued their members by ensuring that individuals took extra care in respecting the rights of other people. The system made the most of the people more sincerely than is the case with contemporary societies where lack of genuine care and respect for others has become more prevalent. The set-up of the traditional communities instilled the value of consideration for others into people. It is recommended that contemporary leaders and managers examine the manner in which conflicts were resolved in the pre-colonial era with the view to adopting those elements that can contribute to genuine conflict resolution.

The myriad of conflicts and wars that confront African countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to Wani (2014: 8) impedes the continent's prospects of development, peace and unity. He suggests that while the continent embarks on the search for tolerance, unity and peace,

Africa has to learn lessons from its past mistakes [...]. Our efforts towards the promotion of African unity will not achieve the intended results unless they are supported by a culture of peace and tolerance. It's crucial to work even more sedulously at promoting inter cultural communication and civic educations, schools, as basis on which to build a culture of peace and cooperation (Wani, 2014: 8-9).

Wani (2014: 10) further adds that the extent of the conflict on the African continent can be drastically minimised if every community in Africa is treated with justice and fairness; and if the majority members of the community respect the minorities. This research adds that it is also incumbent on the minority to respect the majority and to treat them in a just and fair manner.

6.5 OPTIONS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE DEMOCRATIC ORDER

The failure of the democratic system of governance in post-colonial African states, as noted in the previous chapter, raises the question of what system of governance will work best in contemporary African societies. For instance, various theorists, such as Cupido and de Kadt, (2016:17) have called the strength of democracy in South Africa into question. They contend that “Ordinary citizens are growing increasingly dissatisfied with political leadership and government performance and this has negatively affected perceptions of democracy” (Cupido & de Kadt, 2016: 17).

As a result, of the political challenges confronting post-colonial African states, Wiredu (2009: 10) contends that it is “impossible to reflect on the African political scene without developing the suspicion that we have not yet found the system of governance most suited to our culture”. He argues that there must be something in the traditional African culture, which post-colonial Africans are failing to notice in their political endeavours, probably as a result ,of western influence; but which is conducive to good governance. He concludes that contemporary Africans can derive a number of lessons from the traditional and non-technological era because technological advancement does not necessarily improve ethical wisdom (Wiredu, 2009: 10).

Wiredu (in Matolino, 2009: 34) further claims “the adversarial nature of western democratic practices along party political lines may not be well suited for African politics”. As a result of the harmful political experiences, which emanate from the Western system of multiparty democracy, Wiredu (in Ani, 2014a: 311) proposes that post-colonial African states reconsider specific elements of the traditional African system of governance which are consensual and democratic in their decision making processes. He argues:

this system (the multiparty democracy) is malfunctioning elsewhere (he uses gridlock to imply the United States experience) and must thus be responsible for the spate of conflicts on the African continent [...]. This leads him to reject the competitive and adversarial outcomes of the multiparty democracy as too premature for the nascent transition to democracy in Africa (Ani, 2014a: 311).

Wiredu (in Matolino, 2013: 143), notes that all the evils associated with party politics proceed from the powers of the winning parties who proceed to form the government.

The evils of party politics contribute to the life and death struggles of general elections among parties taking part in the election. He therefore considers it necessary to abrogate political parties so that power struggles and mutual hostilities among contending parties can abate or minimise and in order that political leaders can be properly sensitised, while political discussions can take place in a more civil manner. He observes that the disappearance of political parties will not discourage the citizens from participating in party politics, unless the state were totalitarian. Rather this will only curb the fanaticism and the irrational exuberance that people often exhibit in party political activities. He further notes that the elimination of political parties will not have any negative impact on condition that the affairs of the community are presented in an objective manner; addressing the specific needs and concerns of the citizens; and giving the citizens the opportunity to participate and or contribute to local government affairs (Matolino, 2013: 143).

While Wiredu proposes the adoption of a modified version of the ideals of consensual democracy, Eze and other theorists disagree on its feasibility as an alternative to the excesses of western democratic practices, as alluded to in chapter four. Nonetheless, Wiredu and Eze are in agreement on a number of areas such as promoting freedom of speech and opinion, discouraging autocracy, and encouraging political contestation. They both discourage the lust for power, wasteful, extravagant and reckless lifestyles which seem to be prevalent in the political life of many oligarchic democracies. They both believe that African societies can derive immense benefits from systems of rule that have not been perverted by the worst forms of capitalism (Lauer, 2012: 54).

This study agrees with Wiredu's contention that post-colonial African states need to find a system of governance that best suits their unique conditions since all the systems of governance that contemporary African states practice have failed to deliver good governance that meets the expectations of the citizens. It is proposed here that Africans need to embrace the good aspects of both the Western and traditional African systems of governance, guided by values, objectivity and a genuine intention to serve their citizens in honesty, fairness and integrity.

This study recommends that only the elite and individuals with tertiary qualifications be allowed to vote in the election of leaders and their representatives in government. This proposal is made on the basis that most of the people who are elected by the population at large are not usually the most competent in terms of qualifications, experience and values. The least educated members of society tend to elect public officials on the basis of prejudice and emotion; these are usually officials that they believe they can better relate with and who can best understand their conditions. They seem to find the more educated and more qualified people unapproachable or out of touch with their reality. This results in the occupation of public office by people who are incapable of delivering good quality service to the generality of the people and ultimately in the failure of postcolonial African states. Furthermore, the masses tend to agitate for unsustainable and unjustifiable things such as the expropriation of land without compensation, which could become a source of conflict in a country, if not managed with utmost sensitivity to the concerns of all relevant stakeholders.

This study acknowledges that many of the more educated and more qualified individuals often make bad choices, act irrationally, and even choose leaders and bureaucrats not on the basis of their values and competence, but on the basis of subjective and selfish considerations. Many of their actions and behaviours are wrong, biased and internally driven. However, many of them are better equipped to deliver better service than the least qualified members of society. These people are supposed to know and act better as a result, of their level of education and experience in governance, management and administration.

6.6 PROPOSALS FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN AFRICA

Democratic Consolidation implies that the inauguration of democracy does not automatically result in consolidation. Rather this is achieved as a result, of the deliberate efforts of leaders and the governed to “protect democracy, and to nurture it until it firmly becomes rooted and eventually matures to the point where it is able to withstand whatever shocks may come about” (Ngòma, 2016: 109). This research submits that all the factors responsible for the failure of postcolonial African states as referred to in chapter five are also some of the reasons for the inability of African states to proceed to the level of democratic consolidation, especially their failures to

engender economic, social and political development. For instance, Isumonah (2012: 65) posits that the politics of survival which most African leaders preoccupy themselves with prevents them from giving in-depth consideration to consolidating their countries' hard won democracy, from resuscitating their economies and turning them into fruitful ventures capable of changing the conditions of their citizens. The following measures are proposed for enhancing democratic consolidation in post-colonial African states: improved quality of public institutions; overcoming inequality; enhancing economic performance; easy access to land; and promoting a favourable international climate.

Strong or adequate institutions for Gustavson (2014: 1-2) refer among other things to different institutional arrangements such as rules and code of conduct, good quality of public service and administration, independent judiciary and secure property rights. He submits that consistently good and sound societal institutions have over the ages proved to be the catalyst for the development of the state. He further notes that the quality of public service delivery is also essential for the development of the state, for economic growth, for the benefit of the entire population, for the reduction in income inequality, poverty alleviation, improved health among the population, higher quality of education, higher life expectancy and reduced infant mortality. Some scholars attribute the underdevelopment of most African countries in areas such as poverty reduction, literacy, health, income inequality and life expectancy to the low quality of public institutions.

The former president of the United States of America, Barak Obama (Ogbogbo, 2011: 1-2), posits that as a result of the underdevelopment that pervades post-colonial African states, what Africa needs is not strong men but strong institutions. Ogbogbo (2011: 2) contends that contrary to Obama's position, a critical evaluation of the current crisis reveals that what Africa needs in its quest to resolve its challenges and to strengthen its democratisation processes are strong men; strong institutions; a critical, politically conscious and enlightened population that are prepared to sacrifice for the realisation of the desired change. He further submits that Africans must be ready and willing to challenge the inadequacies and excesses of the leaders and bureaucrats whose failures have kept the African states in their perpetual state of failure.

This study concedes that Obama makes a valid point in noting the importance that strong institutions' structural designs and effective policy agendas bring to the promotion of a better condition for the population. However, it is argued here that Ogbogbo's position, which includes both strong institutions and strong men brings more certainty to effective and efficient implementation of government's mandates in the sense that leaders can adopt not only soft power, but also hard power in ensuring that their objectives are properly achieved. As noted in this chapter, other philosophers such as Machiavelli also note the need for boldness and coercive force in leaders. However, the concern here is that leaders should ensure that they do not abuse their powers.

The level of inequality in Africa is a concern for the promotion of justice and fairness. While the continent, according to Odusola (2017: 1) "had six out of the ten fastest growing economies in the world during the first decade of the 2000s and seven of the ten projected fastest growing economies between 2011 and 2015 [...], income inequality [...] is very high in Africa". In South Africa, "inequality has increased over the post-apartheid period, both on aggregate and within each racial group" (Leibbrandt *et al.*, 2012: 19). In Nigeria, "inequality in its various dimensions, has been rising [...] since the 1990s" (Aigbokhan, 2017: 15). It is recommended that the gap between the wages of top and lower level public and private officials be bridged by reducing the wages of top executives and leaders, and increasing the income of disadvantaged workers. A large portion of national income should be channelled towards uplifting the welfare of the disadvantaged members of society and towards other corporate social responsibility projects.

The level of economic growth that Africa has had in the past two decades has not translated into meaningful change in the lives of the people as alluded to in chapter five, even though "Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a stellar economic growth over the past decade. The resounding economic growth performance made it the second fastest growing region in the world [...]" (Odusola, 2017: 1). The government should take full control of its natural resources and lease them out to the private sectors for effective management and development. Alternatively, those individuals who have been opportuned over the decades to own vast resources and have made substantial

profit from them should either relinquish these properties to their governments, or enter into partnerships with their governments. Greater share of the proceeds should go to government coffers for the betterment of the country. This research submits that it is immoral for individuals to own so much wealth while most of the population is poor. The governments should put adequate control mechanisms in place to ensure that the national wealth is channelled towards developing their countries for the benefit of all members of society.

In the South African context, the land question continues to be a source of disagreement and agitation among the previously disadvantaged groups and the colonial beneficiaries, as alluded to in chapter five. The South African government needs to intervene in finding solutions to this matter in a manner that does not compromise the security, economic development and sustainability of the country. It is proposed that the white beneficiaries of the land under the colonial and apartheid regime should not be dispossessed of the land that they are using for agricultural and other business developments in order not to compromise food security and other economic and social growth. Rather, the government should enter into partnership with them, which will ensure that seventy percent of the profit that the businesses generate goes into the government coffers both for the benefit of the previous owners of the land and the country at large. The government should ensure that some of the unused land in the country is channelled towards developmental projects that will ensure that the cost of food in the country is lowered. Every citizen who desires a piece of land and is able to develop it either for business purposes or as a private home should be given a piece of land at affordable rates.

The negative influence of westernisation, globalisation and capitalism on post-colonial African states, such as that of inequality, individualism, and lack of concern for the welfare of others, have been noted in chapter five. However, Africa is part of the global community and cannot successfully transform itself by overlooking international trends and developments. Deloitte Africa (2017: 15) notes that African governments, especially of those countries that are resource-endowed are failing to productively utilise the past decades growth prospects for sustainable development and the distribution of wealth in their societies at large. It is therefore proposed that African governments need to play a major role in ensuring that their countries' rules are

favourable to both local and international investors, so that the wealth of their countries can be harnessed for the betterment of their people.

6.7 FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

It has been noted in chapters five and six that African states in general, and South Africa and Nigeria in particular, are confronted with leadership failures. However, leaders and managers have a fundamental role to play in enhancing ethical organisations and society. In this regard, they need to ensure that the cultures that exist in their communities and in organisations are explicit on what acceptable and unacceptable behaviours entail. These leaders must ensure that their members are trained in societal and organisational values, in the code of conduct and expected behaviour. All structures of the state must make ethics and integrity critical aspects of personal and organisational behaviour; and management must be capacitated with people management skills. Leaders and managers need to act in consistency with what they say, and discipline perpetrators of unethical conduct. Ethics must become a standing item on divisional meetings since the extent to which organisational and societal members discuss ethics constitutes an acceptable indicator of ethical behaviour (Dessler, 2011: 500 - 502).

In order for government institutions to be able to meet their constitutional obligations and to operate based on accountability and ethics, they must be managed and administered, according to Beetseh and Kohol, (2013. 22) by “visionary, committed, focused, disciplined, purposeful, responsible, selfless and mentally resourceful leadership”. Koenane (2017: 9-10) proposes that politicians should be held accountable for their conduct, while moral development should form a core aspect of their formal programme. He recommends that “in order for South Africa to have a sustainable moral fibre, strategies must be put in place wherein politicians of all political structures must be formally educated towards understanding the role of morality in society” Koenane (2017: 10). The Success of the democratic system of governance for post-colonial African states requires, according to Olu-Adeyemi (2012: 171) that “the citizens must be politically educated and mature. This would enable future leaders to make ethical decisions and for the people to begin to make political office holders accountable while within and outside office”.

For Omenka (2013: 43), since the family is society's micro unit, value reorientation should begin from there. He exhorts parents to endeavour to teach their children and wards the importance of honesty, uprightness and dedication. For Koenane (2017: 9-10), if South Africa is serious about establishing a sensible moral culture that can be universalised, then it is imperative to establish a system of moral formation at all tiers of education. This study contends that it is not enough to have a programme of ethics in all schools. Rather, it posits as Plato and Aristotle note in chapter three, that knowing what is good or right must be accompanied by a process of habituation or practicing the virtues learnt every day (Jonas, 2016: 205-206).

Omenka (2013: 43) submits that "honesty and transparency should be publicly rewarded. This will serve as an encouragement to the society and the upcoming generation that it pays to be honest". While this study agrees with the need to reward good behaviour, it is worth adding that non-reward of ethical conduct is not a justification for anyone to indulge in wrong actions and behaviour because everyone must be held accountable for their actions.

As a result of the impact of westernisation and globalisation, as referred to in chapter five, which has largely eroded the values and morals of contemporary Africans, the restoration of morals, stability, and social order requires, according to Udokang (2014: 269), "an urgent need to revive our cultural values, traditional ethical principles and institutions. There is the need to re-establish them as the guiding principles of our daily life and living".

This study posits that Africans also need to play their part in restoring their values, cultures and traditions because they have also contributed to their erosion. Post-colonial African states are endowed with the natural and human potential to become great nations "if the politicians (and the people) can change their mind-sets and learn to play ethical politics that adds good value to the system" (Olu-Adeyemi, 2012: 171).

6.8 SUMMARY

This chapter has examined the roles of leaders, managers, societal members, bureaucrats, and corporate executives in the promotion of an ethical, just, and ideal

post-colonial African society that places the needs of its community members at the forefront of the governance, management and administration of the state. In that regard, Rawls' theory of justice has been examined, especially in view of the import of his transcendental institutionalism for the realisation of perfectly just institutions. The chapter considered the role of ethical leadership in the realisation of the ideal society; and the other kinds of leadership that are able to provide a just and ethical society, especially political, directive and values-driven leadership. The chapter further examined how to pursue democratic consolidation; and the options for an alternative democratic order since the political systems that African countries have embraced so far have not contributed substantially to their development.

In Rawls' transcendental institutionalism, he accords just institutions the role of dispensing powers and positions, the dispersal of obligations and duties, and the distribution of benefits and burdens among societal members. For Rawls, the kinds of social structures that constitute a just system are based on two principles of justice, namely: the principle of equal liberty that each individual is entitled to irrespective of the condition that the person may be subjected to; and the principle that permits social and economic inequalities on condition that everyone is given equal opportunity to prosper and to derive any advantages that the social contract provides. Sen criticises Rawls transcendental institutionalism on the basis that since it is not possible to define anything perfect, human beings should therefore not pursue perfect institutions. Rather, he recommends the comparative approach to justice which instead of focusing more on searching for a perfectly just society, seeks to eliminate noticed injustices.

It has been noted in the chapter that ethical leadership plays a fundamental role in the ability of post-colonial African states to realise a transformed, harmonious and developmental society. The chapter has noted a pervasiveness of conflict within the African continent and its impact on the ability of African states to realise their objectives of good governance. In that regard the fundamental role that leadership, management and individuals play in conflict resolution is noted. The relevance of the conflict resolution methods that traditional African societies employed has been considered and noted as measures that postcolonial African states can draw from for their ability to genuinely resolve disagreements and conflicts. These traditional modes of conflict management were also able to promote forgiveness, unity and peaceful coexistence,

in contrast with the western system of conflict resolution, which in most cases, does not really engender sincerity of purpose and forgiveness.

The citizens generally view politicians with suspicion. However, the latter are expected to transcend the trappings of political office, to be ethical, decisive and authentic leaders who care about the conditions of their citizens. They are further expected to be in complete control of their government, to be decisive, accountable and responsive to the needs and expectations of their people.

The chapter has considered political, directive and values leadership as styles that postcolonial African states must include in their governance processes irrespective of any other kind of leadership style that they may subscribe to. These forms of leadership incorporate both soft and hard power; they ensure a balanced system of rule that produces fairness, and that enables the execution of duties and responsibilities on schedule and as required. They also enhance the abilities of leaders and societal members to conduct themselves ethically.

There is need to consider alternative systems of governance for contemporary African states as a result of their failures to effectively administer their territories in a way that promotes justice, fairness, and equal opportunity for everyone. Wiredu submits that in view of the failure of African states to implement systems of governance that are conducive to the African way of life, it is necessary to consider the best aspects of the traditional system of governance as alternatives, especially a modified version of democracy by consensus. Other philosophers such as Eze however, do not believe in the feasibility of such an alternative. However, they agree with Wiredu on a number of other aspects. These include discouraging autocracy, and promoting political contestation, freedom of thought and speech; discouraging reckless, wasteful and extravagant lifestyle, and lust for power, which appear to be well instituted in the politics of various oligarchic states. They further agree that post-colonial African states can attain substantial rewards by adopting forms of governance that have not been bastardised by extreme capitalist tendencies.

This chapter has noted that one of the major factors responsible for the failure of post-colonial African states is their inability to attain democratic consolidation. Most African

leaders have failed to make concise efforts to protect and nurture their democracies in a manner that enables them to adequately respond to complications that may emerge. The politics of survival which most African politicians, leaders, managers and bureaucrats adopt makes it impossible for them to ethically and objectively attend to their constitutional obligations, including making adequate provisions for their citizens, and engineering their economies for sustainable development. As a result, the chapter proposes a number of measures that will enable post-colonial African states to consolidate their democracies, including the enhancement of the quality of public institutions, economic performance, affluence, access to land, and a more favourable international climate.

The chapter has proposed a number of other measures as well, which will enable post-colonial African states to operate ethically. These include, as Koenane posits, ensuring that politicians are adequately educated on the role of morality in the state; that leaders and others with any form of responsibility are accountable for their actions and behaviours; that ethics and morals become critical aspects of the education of students at all levels of study. Parents are further expected to assume the role of teaching their children about ethics, morals, values and responsibility.

While the public seems to generally view politicians negatively, this research submits that it is necessary to seek a new breed of selfless leaders who are more interested in sincerely attending to the needs of their population, and whose judgements are not clouded by selfish interests.

CHAPTER SEVEN

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This study set out to examine the inability of post-colonial African states to implement ethical and good governance processes that are able to adequately address the needs and expectations of their citizens despite their access to vast natural and human resources and exposure to international best practices. The study considered the questionable ethical framework of the leaders, politicians, bureaucrats, officials in the public and private sectors and the citizens at large; why leaders find it daunting to institute commendable ethical systems and strategies that result in excellent economic performance; and why the western countries are largely able to derive better systems of governance. The study examined why the future of democracy in Africa remains uncertain despite the current strategies to institutionalise democratic systems of governance; the possibility of implementing western democracy in Africa; the role of ethical leadership in the attainment of the ideal society. The study further considered the contributions that all stakeholders, including leaders, politicians, managers, employees and community members can make to the realisation of the ideal society; while recommendations for an alternative system of governance for the African continent have been proffered.

Most African states are failing to implement adequate systems and strategies capable of alleviating the socio-political and economic challenges that confront their citizens, despite their competencies in formulating excellent laws and policies. They are either unwilling and or unable to successfully promote ethical and good leadership, nor are they able to ensure accountability, integrity and care for the people. The failure of post-colonial African states to adequately address the numerous challenges that confront their societies has led to conflicts, instability and even wars, with devastating consequences, which are comparable to Hobbes state of nature where the weak are at the mercy of the strong and life is nasty, brutish and short. The manner in which postcolonial African states fail to properly address their numerous challenges gives the wrong impression that these are insurmountable obstacles.

In chapter two, the concept of ethics and the moral theories that provide a framework for right and wrong, good and bad conduct and behaviour were examined, notably deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. The chapter espoused what philosophers such as Aristotle and Aquinas consider to be the ultimate goal of human life, while the relevance of the virtues theory for the contemporary era was also considered.

Ethics is the study of morality. It is about understanding what is right; conducting oneself in the right manner; and a consideration of the morality of individual behaviour, actions and their consequences. The kinds of questions that ethics interrogates are: What factors determine right and wrong conduct? What is the role of self-interest in moral judgements and decisions? Are laws, principles, rules or each situation the right determinant of individual choices and morality? Which conducts are right and which acts are wrong, and why? This study considers ethics as always taking the interest of all societal members into account in the governance of the state and in the fair distribution of privileges, benefits and burdens.

A number of philosophers place a distinction between ethics and morality. For some of them, ethics is the evaluation of morality, while morality relates to systems of rules, principles, values or virtues. In many instances, ethics is applied to the contemporary idea of good and bad, right and wrong, while morality is linked to indigenous, religious or obsolete conceptions of acceptable conduct. Other philosophers do not see any difference between ethics and morality. In ordinary language, these terms generally refer to the same thing. In this study, ethics and morality is used interchangeably.

There are various ethical theories such as deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics that provide the framework for right and wrong actions, good or bad conduct. However, these theories disagree on the measure of morality. While deontology priorities duty over consequences, utilitarianism emphasises social utility, and virtue ethics lays emphasis on the virtues of character in the determination of right actions. Their lack of consensus on the measure of morality eliminates the possibility of deriving a universally recognised measure of right and wrong. However, the utilitarian moral theory appears to be the most recognised and accepted measure of moral judgements.

For deontology, morality depends not on the consequences of actions, but on the fulfilment of duties, and the ability of human beings to act in the right manner. In other words, actions are moral based on their rightness and the goodness of a person, based on a higher level of individual morality. Kant's deontology associates the ultimate goal of human actions with the Categorical Imperative; this requires that human beings should relate to others in the same way that they expect others to treat them. This imperative is seen as providing universal moral duties that will bring stability and peace to communities; that will promote adherence to rules, civil order and individual freedom.

Deontology is criticised for being insensitive to the consequences of actions on the affected individuals or stakeholders. The critics suggest that such insensitivity can be ameliorated by complementing the deontological moral theory with the virtues theory. While this criticism is rejected by the deontologists on the basis that the virtues theory already assumes a significant position in Kant's moral theory, the critics of deontology consider Kant's virtue theory as inadequate. Deontology is further criticised for being insensitive to moral complexities; for advocating perfect duties and obligatory requirements; for expecting human beings to always fulfil their promises; and for not condoning exceptions or deviations.

Actions are right, according to utilitarianism, when they lead to happiness for the majority of those affected. Happiness in this case refers to a lack of suffering or pain, and the absence of partiality. The only desirable goals, for Mill, are these elements of happiness, and human desires can only be pursued in order to derive their inherent pleasures or in order to prevent pain and promote pleasure.

Utilitarianism is criticised for promoting hedonism in its consideration of happiness or pleasure as the ultimate good. However, Mill disagrees with the critics in this regard, claiming that the kinds of pleasure that he concerns himself with are not only physical pleasures, but aesthetic and emotional pleasures as well. He believes that the attainment of a state of tranquillity and inner peace will limit the level of physical pleasures that human beings will pursue. He classifies happiness into the humble and the higher types. The humble sense of happiness for him consists of the feelings of

pleasure and pain, while the higher element of happiness leads to a happy life and this is the kind of happiness that individuals with highly developed faculties aspire to.

For virtue ethics, morally right actions are determined by the virtue of character. For Aristotle, virtue is the excellence of character; the human potential to avoid extreme behaviour and conduct; and a habit or admirable traits, which enable the achievement of moral goodness, the pursuit of a good life and the attainment of worthy goals. A good life for him is a virtuous life, and virtuous people act and behave ethically without inhibitions. While Kant sees virtues as some kind of self-control and the strength of will that propels the person to properly execute his functions, Aquinas considers virtues as those habits that assist human beings in carrying out their duties appropriately and in a manner that leads to happiness. This for him can only be achieved when human beings conduct themselves in a disciplined manner, by acting rationally and avoiding selfishness.

While Aristotle distinguishes between intellectual and moral virtues, Aquinas differentiates between intellectual and appetitive virtues. Aristotle posits that while intellectual virtue is associated with thinking and the rational part of the soul and can be acquired through teaching and instruction, moral virtue does not reason on its own, but is able to follow thought patterns. For Aquinas, intellectual virtues are acquired through various forms of scientific knowledge, and appetitive virtues enable human appetites to be rational. However, this form of virtues for Aquinas, enables human beings to engage in proper intellectual and moral activities.

Virtue ethics is criticised for examining the virtue and character of human beings instead of establishing the ways and means of becoming moral through an appeal to universal laws. It is criticised for not recognising the importance of rules in the development of virtues, and for not putting actions first in its determination of morality as is the case with deontology and utilitarianism. This criticism is rejected by philosophers such as Sim, who claim that the central role that rules play in the acquisition of virtues is recognised by Aristotle when he asserts that the acquisition of virtues is possible when human beings are law-abiding and desist from wrong behaviours and actions.

Aristotle posits that there is no one person in whom all the virtues can be found. However, he believes that these virtues can be acquired through practice and learning, and by consulting or emulating virtuous and wise people. The other means of becoming ethical or virtuous include self-introspection and self-awareness. Self-awareness gives human beings insight into their current situation and what they ideally prefer; it enables individuals to identify the challenges that confront them, and to determine alternatives that will enable them to progress towards the ideal moral state.

Virtue ethics is recognised and acknowledged for its attempt to develop not only good rules and regulations, but also consistently good or virtuous people. However, many virtue ethicists are disappointed that their moral theory has not been able to eliminate all the unethical conduct and behaviours in the world. Rather, what they notice is the increase in the number of unethical people and the prevalence of all manners of immorality in the world. They believe that it will be impossible to create an ethical and just society unless human beings become moral or virtuous.

Although the importance of virtue ethics in developing good human beings is recognised, its critics do not consider its proposals more convincing than the other ethical theories. Moreover, the inability of either of these theories to create a universally acceptable moral system creates a dilemma in the choice for an absolute moral theory. It is suggested that the only means of eliminating the problem of choice among them is to synthesise the best of these moral theories and overlook the worse among them.

This study believes that there are good and useful elements in all these moral theories. Therefore, it is recommended that some of their elements be combined. The categorical imperative that requires human beings to treat the other in the same manner that they would like to be treated provides a universal moral requirement that can lead to respect for rules, individual freedom, peace and stability in the world. This should be combined with the virtues theory that requires human beings to possess good character, to avoid extreme conduct and behaviour, to always strive for the golden mean, and to pursue worthy objectives, moral goodness and the good life. These two theories can also be combined with the utilitarian principle that promotes physical, aesthetic and emotional happiness, the avoidance of pain, and the realisation

of inner peace which eliminates the human urge for excessive physical pleasure. This study advocates this combination of moral theories because jointly, they promote the adherence to rules and the appeal to the inner goodness of human beings. This combination will close the gap between acting ethically based on the requirements of the law, and because human beings believe that it is the right thing to do.

Aristotle believes that the ultimate goal of human life is happiness (eudaimonia). He notes that while all human beings consider happiness as that which they seek in all their endeavours, they have different understandings of its constitutive elements. For some people happiness consists in the acquisition of immense wealth, while others consider it as derivable from honour, glory or other worldly achievements. While Aristotle believes that human beings need a measure of worldly goods to be happy, he believes that true happiness cannot be derived from such a shallow medium, but can only be attained through a life of contemplation and a life of virtue.

Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that worldly acquisitions do not result in true happiness. In support of his position, he refers to the life of the rich and famous, who have not realised happiness through all their worldly acquisitions, but who at various periods in their lives have realised the vanity of worldly possessions and as a result have resorted to a life of service to humanity through various corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship endeavours. He agrees with Aristotle that true happiness will be derived from a life of contemplation and living in accordance with the virtues.

One of the salient points that Aristotle makes is that human beings possess natural virtues and have the natural ability to act virtuously. The challenge in this assertion for the contemporary era is that if Aristotle's claims are true, why is the world filled with unethical people, leaders, politicians, public and private officials, who are unable or unwilling to be ethical and just in their actions and behaviours? The factors responsible for these challenges and the proposed solutions have been addressed in this research and will be referred to in the next sections.

Chapter three examined the features of the ideal state from the views of Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes. There is consensus among these philosophers that the state plays a fundamental role in ensuring development, stability and peace. However, they

disagree on the modalities for realising the ideal state, though they all concur that justice plays a fundamental role in the institutionalisation of a good political society.

In order to ensure the realisation of a constitutional and ethical state, Plato advocates a radical overhaul of every malfunctioning aspect of the state apparatus by philosopher kings. This reform covers both the systems and structures of the state, including human beings and their characters. For Plato, the ideal state is one that is managed and administered by wise leaders or philosopher kings, and is structured on a carefully organised division of labour, in which the roles and responsibilities of an individual will depend on his or her good qualifications, maturity, and values or virtues. He classifies his envisioned state into the guardians, or philosopher kings; the auxiliaries or soldiers; and the producers or workers. For Aristotle, the desired state must promote just interrelationships and the good life, and ensure that benefits are dispersed only on the basis of merit.

Plato believes that the moral development of individuals, especially the youth must be accompanied by adequate education, imitation and habituation. A person can only become virtuous, for him, by practising the virtues and with the help of virtuous role models. Aristotle agrees with this process of acquiring virtues. However, while Plato believes that only one virtue (justice) is sufficient to turn human beings into moral, just and fulfilled individuals, Aristotle outlines a number of virtues that a person must acquire and practice every day in order to develop good character, good image, wealth and happiness. Plato does not believe that an individual can practice virtuous acts. Rather, he believes that when students are assisted to acquire knowledge of the good, they will in turn choose the good.

The Aristocratic state, for Plato, is the best form of government because it is the kind of state that is administered and managed by the best individuals in terms of their knowledge, experience and values. He believes that the best state can only be attained if individuals who have the capacity to acquire philosophic knowledge are identified and adequately capacitated with the right knowledge to fulfil the function of managing and administering the state. Happiness for him can only be realised if and when human beings are committed to connecting with the real or philosophic ideas. He considers the other forms of rule such as democracy, oligarchy, tyranny and

timocracy as bastardisations of aristocracy. Plato considers the stability of the state and the rule of law as non-negotiable. He condemns anarchy, rebellion and chaos as unjustifiable for their potential to destroy the state.

Plato's reform programmes for his ideal state are seen as consisting of complicated programmes that are not achievable. Critics such as Popper find Plato's expose of the just state to be unethical, petty and totalitarian for its suppression of the freedom of speech, for considering both poverty and wealth as leading to vice and therefore not encouraged; for promoting communal ownership of property; and for rejecting diversity.

The best people to govern the state for Plato are those with the qualities of philosopher kings. However, the reality in various countries as shown in this research is that most of the leaders, politicians, public and private sector employees and management are either unwilling or unable to successfully perform their roles. The consequences of these failures manifest themselves in the problems that confront the current era. An effective and transforming socio-political and economic system must be conceived and implemented as a solution.

Plato realises the enormous challenges that his reform programmes pose. As a result, he concedes that his envisioned state may be unrealistic. However, he hopes that some of these programmes are favourably considered. This study agrees with Plato that although many of his proposals may be unrealistic, given human shortcomings, it is necessary that the systems of governance in Africa in particular, and the world in general are overhauled. This is because the current social, political and economic realities in the world are not sustainable. If drastic steps are not taken, including renewed and conscious ethical determination by affected stakeholders to put conditions in place that are able to positively address the current challenges, postcolonial African states in particular, and the world at large, may revert to the Hobbesian state of nature.

While Plato considers rulers with the characteristics of philosopher kings as the best leaders, Hobbes promotes absolute monarchy, and Aristotle considers a mixed regime as the best kind of government because it is more stable and combines elements of

the laws that are practiced in democracies and oligarchies. This is unlike unmixed systems that are characterised by conflicts, factionalism and revolution, as a result, of inherent injustices.

While Plato promotes complete communal ownership of property, Aristotle believes that communal ownership can result in disagreements. He considers communal ownership of property to be impractical and unjust, and could result in conflict when goods, and services and benefits are not dispersed in accordance with individual contributions. Aristotle supports private ownership of property and allows for the partial use of some private property in common. A number of philosophers agree with Aristotle that private ownership of property will enhance commitment to hard work as well as promote peaceful coexistence.

This study notes that one of the challenges that results from Plato and Aristotle's positions on the ownership of property is that both systems of property have over the ages failed to satisfactorily meet the needs and aspirations of the citizens. While it is necessary to devise the right economic system that takes the needs of all societal members into account, this cannot be achieved without the right kind of leaders in terms of education, values and selfless commitment to advancing the rights of all stakeholders. This study rejects communal ownership of property. It recommends private ownership of property, on condition that no one is allowed to own excessive wealth while the majority of the population wallows in poverty as the cases of Nigeria and South Africa, among other countries, reveal. Most of the resources of a country must be used for the upliftment of the community members and the development of the state.

The most perfect virtue for Aristotle is justice because it is a fundamental aspect of morality that is displayed towards others, and the character trait that prevents human beings from the maltreatment of others. He distinguishes between distributive, reciprocal, economic and punitive justice. Various philosophers and immoralists such as Machavelli, Nietzsche and Thrasymachus, criticise Aristotle's justice, claiming that it is not possible for human beings to be fair to everyone, that the more powerful individuals are more deserving of justice, and that all human beings cannot be given equal consideration. This study observes that although the assertions of these critics

are distressing, inequality is institutionalised around the world either overtly or covertly. This factor is responsible for the various problems that the world confronts, including unrest, conflicts, divisions and wars.

For Hobbes, the fearful, troublesome, aggressive and conflicting nature of human beings results in disharmony among individuals. He posits, therefore, that if human beings do not seek peaceful means of resolving these challenges but continue to coexist in such a state of nature, then all lives will be solitary, nasty, brutish and short. As a result, he asserts that the citizens must rationally enter into a social contract and be governed by an absolute sovereign in a commonwealth. Hobbes believes that the absolute monarch is the best ruler and therefore should be accorded unrestricted powers to govern the state indefinitely in order to avert anarchy, chaos and lawlessness.

The sovereign for Hobbes, cannot be held accountable by the law because he is the supreme ruler and judge and, therefore, above the law. He considers the conduct of the sovereign as automatically the actions of the members of the state because he acts on their behalf. Hobbes believes that the kind of absolute monarch that he refers to is the one that operates the best form of government. He accords him unlimited powers and rights because human beings are inherently imperfect and in order to prevent the re-emergence of the state of nature. He believes that the sovereign cannot inflict harm on the citizens because no rational being can harm himself. For Hobbes, the monarchical type of government is the best form of rule because it gives the absolute monarch unrestricted powers to govern the state as he considers fit. He criticises the aristocratic and representative forms of governance for their inability to ensure maximum peace and security.

Critics of Hobbes contend that the citizens are generally not appreciative of the rules of an absolute monarch since such a level of absolute authority often turns such rulers into tyrants, selfish and insensitive. Hobbes disagrees with these critics, claiming that it is not possible for the citizens to be totally happy in any case. This study also disagrees with the level of faith and trust that Hobbes confers on the absolute monarch because it is excessive and can lead to discontent, conflict or chaos in the state; it can also turn the sovereign into a reckless ruler who may not often consider the interests

of the citizens in the decisions that affect their lives. Rather, a ruler with such a level of power must be controlled by oversight bodies in order to ensure that he or she does not become a tyrant. One may agree with Hobbes that rational persons cannot inflict harm on themselves. However, they can maltreat and abuse others for their own selfish interests.

This study recommends that instead of according the absolute monarch unlimited powers as Hobbes posits, a good, ethical and competent ruler should be allowed to continue administering the state on condition that he governs on the basis of equity, justice and fairness and to the satisfaction of all or the majority of his subjects. However, such rulers must vacate their office or be removed from office if and when they are no longer able to perform their duties well. It is further recommended that the rulers vacate their office between the age of sixty five and sixty eight years, even if they are still performing their duties excellently. The reason for this proposal is that at this age, human beings are no longer strong enough to engage in the stressful nature of politics and governance. Rather, they can remain advisers to the new rulers. In order to avoid possible leadership vacuum, it is imperative that the current leader institute a succession plan, which grooms potential leaders intellectually, experientially and ethically.

Chapter four examined ethics and the system of governance in the indigenous African context and their roles in the enhancement of ethical and just traditional African societies. In the indigenous African societies, ethics is understood as relating to the goodness of character which results from a person's ability to develop good values and virtues. These societies understand morality as the measure of right and wrong in the attitude of human beings, in desirable social relations, and in the kinds of actions and behaviours that promotes peaceful and happy coexistence.

The first westerners to the African continent refuted the existence of ethics and morality among the indigenous Africans. They found their traditional belief systems and values to be irrational, primitive, archaic and irrelevant. In their attempts to rectify the deficiencies that they perceived in these societies, they destroyed valuable elements of the traditions, cultures, values and social life of the indigenous African people, which were structured on ethical, religious and communal principles.

Eventually, the true nature of the traditional African societies dawned on these westerners when they realised that contrary to their earlier prejudice and ignorance of the indigenous way of life, traditional African societies were in reality surrounded by well-structured standards of morality which significantly influenced their actions and behaviours, and the contravention of which attracted severe punishment.

A number of philosophers contend that African ethics proceeds from religion; that most African moral thoughts have religious undertones; and therefore, the two cannot be separated. Other theorists do not agree with this notion, claiming that religion is a product of society. For Wiredu and Gyekye, the morality of human beings is shaped by the society and rational thoughts, and not by religion. They contend that African morality proceeds not from metaphysical interventions, but from human ability to consider the impact of their actions and behaviours on affected stakeholders. Wiredu calls it the motivated quest for sympathetic impartiality, claiming that the morality of an individual proceeds from his ability to be considerate towards the well-being of others.

Anderson rejects Wiredu and Gyekye's arguments on the basis that all African societies are influenced by religion, though on different scales; and this can be noticed in all aspects of their existence, including their food, the way they talk, and even in their way of dressing. While various philosophers lack consensus on the origin of African ethics, this study notes that African morality proceeds from society and religion in most instances. While the debate on the source of African ethics continues, it is important to state that in order to correct all the things that have gone wrong in the world human beings must conduct themselves ethically.

In the traditional as well as contemporary African societies (though to a lesser extent in the latter), all beings, including vegetation, humans, animals and the supernatural beings, are interdependent, interrelated and interconnected in a sense that the flourishing of one hinges on the wellbeing of others. The communal and moral responsibilities of indigenous Africans require that they coexist in harmony, respect each other, consider each other's interests, caring for each other and upholding the rights of others. Consequently, indigenous African ethics promotes humanism or the Southern African concept of Ubuntu, which provides that the welfare of humans is interdependent and that human beings must respect each other and uphold human

rights. While Ubuntu is mostly associated with interdependency and communalism, it also upholds individualism in the sense that while human beings are expected to uphold the dignity of others, they are also expected to respect their individuality, and ensure a balance between their individualism and their loyalty to their community. In other words, the degree of loyalty that they have towards their community must neither rob them of their individuality nor discourage individual initiatives and self-reliance.

In African communalism, for Wiredu, human beings are inducted from childhood to be aware of the importance of developing a feeling of understanding, closeness and unity with their immediate and extended family members and ultimately with the community as a whole. The community members conceive this affinity as extending their responsibilities to each other. This notion of human connectedness, for Wiredu, involves the sense of kinship and is rooted in humanity. This is manifested in the communal belief that advocates consideration for everyone and the community. This traditional morality, which is common knowledge in African societies, also coincides with Kant's categorical imperative, which provides that human beings must treat each other in the same manner that they expect to be treated.

In the traditional African society, riches or wealth can be acquired either individually or collectively. However, the society believes that happiness can only be realised collectively and within an ethical and peaceful society. It should therefore, not be surprising that South Africa is not a happy society. The actions and behaviours of an individual, according to the principle of communal responsibility, can affect the entire community. Many scholars criticise the principle of communal responsibility that indigenous African societies observe for holding the entire community accountable for individual actions and behaviours. While this principle is condemned by various scholars, there are other theorists, however, who encourage it for ensuring that the wellbeing of the minority and the community at large is protected; for discouraging discrimination and taking into account the wellbeing of all community members.

It is observed that the kind of affinity that traditional African societies had is currently missing in the way many people all over the world relate to each other and this has created unfavourable consequences for individuals and communities. This study proposes that the principle of communal responsibility should not be discarded.

Rather, it is recommended that the unfavourable implications of the principle be discouraged, while the beneficial aspects should be upheld.

Matolino and Kwindingwi condemn the moral theory of Ubuntu, which emphasises common humanity, interrelationship and interdependence of human beings, claiming that as a propagated ethical solution for the current era, Ubuntu has stagnated, lacks the context and capacity to inspire moral conduct, and as a result is no longer relevant to contemporary African society. They contend that the rapid decline in the influence of Ubuntu on the behaviour of Africans in the current era is not surprising because the factors that enabled indigenous Africans to uphold Ubuntu as a way of life have changed for current (South) Africans. They argue that the yearnings of the moral theory of Ubuntu for the restoration of the past's moral way of life cannot be reconciled with the current conditions that present themselves to members of society.

Metz rejects Matolino and Kwindingwi's contentions that the conditions in contemporary African societies are not sufficient to appeal to the ethics of Ubuntu. He finds their contentions insufficient to uphold their conclusions. Instead, he posits that the moral theory of Ubuntu has a fundamental role to play in the promotion of human and organisational ethics.

The import of the conclusion that Matolino and Kwindingwi draw in terms of the end of Ubuntu, for Chimakonam, dwells not in its validity, but in its philosophical and methodical import. He suggests that their arguments should neither be dismissed nor accepted as incontestable. Rather, he posits that their contention is a conundrum that has to be subjected to critical analysis. Koenane and Olatunji disagree with Matolino and Kwindingwi's declaration of the end of Ubuntu, claiming that the relevance of Ubuntu cannot be denied because it has a crucial role to play in society. They further contend that Ubuntu is an all-inclusive worldview that encapsulates the universalised values of humanness; it is in a constant process of developing ethical conduct and behaviour and as a result must be promoted so as to encourage harmonious relationships.

The traditional African system of governance, for African philosophers is founded on a unique morality that hinges on the metaphysical principle, which considers human

beings as unique and irreplaceable components of society. They find politics and governance in indigenous African societies to be democratic. The decisions that were taken during the precolonial era in traditional African societies were made in a manner that took the interests of all members of society into account. During this era, most major decisions entailed seeking the input and consent of community members, and the process of conflict resolution also entailed considering the views of all adult members of society.

The system of governance in indigenous African societies differs from the western style in the sense that while the indigenous rulers were appointed to rule for life and to be accountable to their ancestors and their subjects, contemporary leaders are expected to vacate their office when their terms expire. While in some indigenous African societies the rulers did not possess absolute authority, since their decisions reflect the collective pronouncements of the members of council or the council of elders, in other traditional African societies, the rulers were accorded absolute authority and dictatorial powers.

Wiredu posits that in indigenous African societies almost all social and political engagements, interactions, deliberations and decision-making processes among community members were aimed at reaching consensus. He considers democracy by consensus as the process of making decisions having taken into account the opinions of both the majority and the minority. The kind of political system that democracy by consensus provides, for Wiredu, neither confers power on winners on the basis of majority votes, nor is characterised by competition for power and domination among rival political organisations as is the case in western majoritarian democracy.

A number of philosophers, including Matolino and Eze criticise Wiredu's treatise on democracy by consensus. Matolino contends that consensual democracy can result in the institutionalisation of one party politics. Eze further argues that Wiredu's ideas in this regard are excessive rationalisation and a misleading romanticisation that can serve the purpose of justifying the early westerners' single party politics that assumed total control of political power and as a consequence, discouraged democratic freedom. Other theorists agree with Eze's position on the grounds that democracy by

consensus as propounded by Wiredu can become a tool for hiding authoritarianism, for undermining the opposition, and for undermining the principle of equal rights and opportunities that representative democracy projects.

It seems that Wiredu prefers democracy by consensus to other systems of western democracy because he believes that the kind of political system that can adequately address the needs and aspirations of Africans, despite the political parties they are affiliated to, is one that does not subscribe to the philosophy of winner takes it all. This study recommends democracy by consensus for African countries on condition that its deficiencies as noted by Matolino and Eze are critically examined with the view to eliminating elements that could jeopardise the effectiveness of democracy by consensus. It is noted that over the ages, the majority party tends to disregard opposition parties and their contributions. On the other hand, the minority parties tend to adopt distrust in and disdain towards the policies and programmes of the ruling party. Such an adversarial approach by these parties tends to heighten tension in the body politic and by implication impacts negatively on effective management and administration of the state. While the negative aspects of democracy by consensus are noted, it is suggested that a further exploration of its pros and cons be considered in order to strive for the realisation of the kind of ideal society that ethical citizens desire, in which prejudice and favouritism are rejected, but in which integrity, justice and fairness are promoted.

This study proposes that the traditional understanding of democracy as 'rule of the people' should not be construed as giving all adult members of society the right to vote in elections. Rather, it is recommended that only individuals with some form of tertiary education be eligible to choose the leaders and other public representatives. This is because the majority of the masses tend to elect unqualified individuals into office. This in turn contributes to service delivery failures, to other unethical challenges noted in chapter five and eventually to the failure of post-colonial African states. It is recognised that many of the elite and educated individuals perform dismally in their roles. However, there are others who are capable of acting ethically, making good decisions on behalf of the population, and ultimately contributing to the realisation of the ideal African society.

Chapter five investigated the failure of postcolonial African states to govern their territories effectively from ethical, economic, political and social considerations, despite their access to substantial natural and human capital, and best practices. The questionable moral character of African leaders, managers and the citizens at large, has been examined, while the reasons for their inability to contribute to the realisation of organisations and societies that are ethical, efficient and effective are also considered. The reasons why the future of democracy on the African continent remains vague, despite the various attempts by successive governments on the continent to democratise, have also been interrogated.

It has been noted that postcolonial African states are confronted by numerous challenges such as the distortion and loss of African values, traditions and customs; the declining state of African politics; decrease in the effectiveness of African traditional leadership; bad leadership generally; economic, social and political problems; underdevelopment; poverty; unemployment; diseases; famine; homelessness; illiteracy; economic mismanagement; negative colonial influences; the negative impact of globalisation; and the inability or unwillingness of members of society to behave and act ethically for the good of society.

Many scholars, including Wiredu, Dolamo and Igboin posit that westerners are largely responsible for the erosion or loss of African customs, traditions and the value that Africans placed on identity, on humanism and on the sanctity of human life. In their bid to change all dimensions of African life to what they consider to be the right beliefs, identity and practices, including intellectual and religious orientations, the African communalism was compromised and replaced by the kind of individualistic orientation that subsumes all areas of human existence, including the family, social and religious orientations. These westerners overlooked the cultural belief systems of Africans that hinged on a conception of the person as existing in communion with others. Instead, they propagated their individualistic ideology that conceives the person as an autonomous being who exists for himself or herself, and who may choose to associate with others if he or she so wishes.

There are those theorists, such as Eze, who refute the claim that colonialists and western imports are responsible for the large scale distortion of African values,

customs and traditions. They contend that the erosion of indigenous African customs, values and systems of governance in the current era, the lack of appreciation for the sacredly held powers of traditional rulers, and their contributions to the failure of postcolonial African states, can be attributed to secularism and religious proliferation which have distorted the traditional foundation of African consensual politics. The excessive extent of embracement of western values and culture by contemporary Africans is considered another reason for the erosion of the traditional African way of life. For Eze, the migratory, predatory and multi-cultural way of life that Africans are exposed to, has negatively affected their belief in a common identity. He claims that contemporary Africans have embraced enlightenment and are willing to challenge the complications that confront them, including human rights abuses; they conceive themselves and their challenges differently from the way indigenous Africans understood themselves in the precolonial period.

Lauer disagrees with Eze's arguments, claiming that the economic difficulties that the community members suffered resulted in their losing faith in the influence of traditional leadership and their inability to protect their interests. Furthermore, the traditional leaders also lost their influence because they became poor and corrupt for colluding with the westerners to economically disadvantage their people, while many individuals who were not genetically linked with the families of traditional leaders were elected to chieftaincy positions.

The reasons given by Wiredu for the erosion of African traditional authority, values, customs and traditions differ from Eze's allusions. For Wiredu, most, if not all the challenges that confront postcolonial African states, including conflicts, political instabilities and the marginalisation of minority groups and parties are attributable to the conventional majoritarian democracy that African states largely subscribe to. He condemns multiparty democracy for bringing immense harm to the people as a result of its adversarial, divisive and aggressive nature; and for negating African communalism. In its place, he proposes the adoption of democracy by consensus which indigenous African societies practiced, and because it is not founded on party politics.

Various philosophers and theorists pose different reasons for the loss of African values, cultures and traditions and the decline in the authority of traditional rulers. However, this study notes that instead of considering the reasons given by these theorists separately, they are to be collectively held responsible for these challenges. This study believes that contrary to the condemnation of traditional authority's influence, contemporary African societies cannot abandon or overlook their relevance in the current era. Although the system of traditional governance is not as effective as it was in the past, a number of theorists believe that traditional authorities in most African countries are still relevant and continue to thrive. Koenane posits that traditional authority remains valuable for the contributions that they can make to the development of their country, especially the rural communities where the municipal administration remains corrupt and unable to deliver adequate services. He maintains that the traditional system of governance, unlike western democracy, which does not appreciate the contributions of other parties, is more accountable, more tolerant and more effective, based on the understanding of ethics and governance, in traditional African societies.

The study notes that while modernity may have contributed to progress and development, it has also contributed to the loss of values and morals among Africans in particular and the world at large. This can be seen for instance, in the lack of care and concern for the welfare of others, and in the lack of respect among people, especially by the youth for their seniors on the pretext of their entitlement to the protection of fundamental human rights. This study is not against development and westernisation. Rather, it believes that traditional values, customs and traditions must be preserved in order to continue to build a humane society.

A number of reasons are alluded to as contributing to the worsening state of African politics in contemporary African states. These include the fact that while the parting colonisers did not make sufficient efforts to prepare the forefathers of African politics for the task of running a state, the latter did not prepare themselves adequately to effectively manage and administer the post-independence states that they inherited. Rather, the dominant elite were more interested in seeking measures to consolidate their power base and to suit their selfish plans. The hopes of the people who agitated for their independence were dashed as their social, political and economic

expectations were not fulfilled. These factors, as well as corruption, political rivalries, racism, tribalism, selfish ambitions, lack of commitment to and experience of state administration, underdevelopment, weak state institutions, implementation of bad policies, service delivery failures and socio-political and economic conflicts, resulted in the deterioration of the African political landscape and disruptions through coups, counter-coups, conflicts and wars. The post-independence African leaders were no longer able to properly manage the political system; they also became authoritarian. The main contributory factor to the incessant complications on the African continent for a number of theorists, is the incompetence and unwillingness of the leaders, managers and bureaucrats, to manage and administer their countries and organisations as is constitutionally required of them.

This study notes that while it may be acceptable to hold the former colonialists partially responsible for the failure of post-colonial African states, their inability to monitor the governance processes during the transition and post-independence periods is not a justification for the failure of African leaders to properly superintend over the affairs of their territories. Rather, the African elite who spearheaded the agitation for independence should have prepared themselves adequately to assume leadership positions, because it is illogical to expect the colonialists, who were not wanted in the African territories, to freely and willing prepare the agitators for state administration, unless they had some benefits to derive from it. Since post-colonial African states are endowed with extensive human resources, these should be harnessed for the development of their countries.

The western liberal democracy that Africa subscribes to appears to be inflicting more problems than good outcomes for the contemporary African states for advocating a system of governance that does not prioritise the welfare of the citizens at large. Some of the negative influences of westernisation on contemporary African states, which Chimakonam notes, result from the combination of western democracy and individualistic capitalism that globalisation imposed on Africa, and which in turn has created unhealthy political and economic systems in Africa. Chimakonam finds the western liberal democratic system of governance, which most African states subscribe to, as full of injustices for promoting inequality, class differentiation, individualism, and

marginalisation. This contrasts with the dominant African socio-political and economic system that promotes communalism, consultation, consensus and egalitarianism.

Many theorists observe that postcolonial African states may be riddled with a worsened crisis if significant efforts are not made by relevant stakeholders to rectify possible and potential risks. Consider South Africa, for instance: corruption, service delivery protests, unemployment and the agitation for land restitution, which emanates from the apartheid era's forced removals of citizens from their land, and the racially skewed allocation of land are some of the major ethical challenges confronting the post-apartheid state. Although the South African government attempts through regulations to rectify these imbalances in land ownership, it has not been very successful in its land reform programme.

The agitation for land restitution by the previously disadvantaged individuals and groups creates a dilemma for the different understandings of justice. Distributive justice in this case may require that the government repossess all the contested land from the previously advantaged groups with some measure of compensation and share it among all the citizens. Retributive justice may require the expropriation of land by the government from the previously advantaged individuals and groups without compensation and its redistribution among all the citizens.

The application of these theories of justice can result in confusion around their justification as the advantaged individuals and groups can argue that the land they occupy was legitimately acquired in the past by their ancestors, and that they have invested substantially in these properties. As events in this regard have shown already, it will be difficult for the government to resolve this challenge to the satisfaction of all stakeholders. The decisions and actions that the government takes in this regard have consequences for the stability and sustainability of the country and its economy. Therefore all stakeholders must be consulted with the view to reaching decisions that are beneficial to all concerned groups and individuals.

In the Nigerian context, corruption and underdevelopment are so endemic that it has almost become a way of life. Many of the leaders in Nigeria since independence have stolen public funds and placed their personal interests above the interests of the

country and its citizens. Corruption thrives in Nigeria because most of the institutions in the country, from the national to state and local levels, are weak and are not accountable. The extent of corruption in the country impedes the country's social, political and economic development. All successive governments have failed to utilise the national resources for the promotion of the citizens' well-being and to successfully complete commissioned capital projects.

Although various governments in Nigeria have implemented strategies aimed at eliminating corruption in the country, these efforts have largely failed to reduce or eliminate the malaise because most of the officials tasked with these responsibilities are themselves corrupt. However, the current Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has succeeded substantially in its anticorruption endeavours. Nonetheless, the level of corruption in the country remains high. Despite its effectiveness and successes, the EFCC is perceived by many people in the country as an instrument that the government employs to victimise its perceived enemies while many of the criminals who are on the side of the government remain unaccountable. This study recommends that in order for the government to be just and fair, it must investigate and prosecute all cases of corruption objectively, without fear or favour.

It is noted that the protracted challenges that postcolonial African states continue to grapple with, which are referred to in this study, will compromise the realisation of good governance on the continent, and by implication the realisation of the ideal state, despite the current efforts at democratic consolidation. However, the ideal state will only become a possibility if those who superintend over the management and administration of the state, and the other members of the community, apply ethical wisdom to their behaviour, avoid moral laxity, and engage in renewed moral imagination.

In chapter six, a number of recommendations are outlined on how the challenges that confront postcolonial African states can be resolved with a view to realising a state which is able to meet the needs and aspirations of its citizens. In that regard, the chapter draws from Rawls' efforts to define perfectly just institutions. The chapter considers the role of ethical leadership in the realisation of a good society and in managing conflicts; the other forms of leadership that can contribute to the realisation

of the desirable African state; how to pursue democratic consolidation; and options for alternative system of democratic governance for post-colonial African states in view of the failures of the current political systems.

Rawls proposes that the desirable system of governance should be one that is implemented under a veil of ignorance and the principles of justice since these are fundamental elements for determining the just state. In his transcendental institutionalism, he posits that the principles of justice equip social institutions with the mechanisms to satisfactorily dispense fundamental rights and obligations, benefits and burdens; while further ensuring that all spheres of the state promote and enforce the protection of fundamental human rights.

The first principle of justice promotes equality for all human beings, by according each person the maximum liberty possible regardless of what their personal circumstances in life may be, and without compromising the freedom of others. In the second principle of justice he subscribes to social and economic inequalities in a just state on condition that each person is initially given equal opportunities to succeed. If the person fails to make the best of the opportunities that he is presented with, then he believes that the state cannot be held responsible for the individual's failure and the consequent inequality. Rawls believes that by applying these principles, through a veil of ignorance, the state will be able to justly determine the best means of implementing societal regulations.

In his treatise on the veil of ignorance, Rawls posits that all human beings are biased as a result of the conditions in the environments in which they were born or in which they find themselves. As a result, their assessment of justice is influenced by these conditions. Based on the foregoing he proposes that all determinations of what constitutes justice or on how the state should operate should be exercised in a hypothetical state of ignorance, in which individuals do not know their true identity, personal circumstances, and societal demographics. The veil of ignorance ensures that a person's reasoning is not influenced by selfish interests that will cloud his objectivity. It also ensures that their decisions are not distorted by wrong moral ideas. The only knowledge that human beings can possess in this case is well- founded scientific knowledge.

Sen criticises Rawls' transcendental institutionalism as not feasible and redundant, because it is not possible for any country to be so perfectly organised in a manner that eliminates the possibility of biased agreements. Instead, he is convinced that it is likely to have a number of solutions to one problem; that it is possible to institute a 'conglomerate theory' that can at the same time provide both a transcendental identification and a comparative evaluation of various options. He is convinced that a society does not have to be perfectly organised before a theory of justice can become an inherent feature of its management and administration. Alternatively, he suggests that the state can reach consensus on the basis of public rationality, and by ranking achievable options.

Although Sen criticises Rawls' transcendental institutionalism that defines perfectly just institutions, as improbable, since it is not possible for human beings to define anything perfect, this study considers the Rawlsian proposal as suitable because the system of governance in postcolonial African states is largely operated on the basis of partiality, prejudice, factionalism, discrimination, intolerance, selfishness, greed, corruption and the other unethical practices that have been exposed in this study. The veil of ignorance will produce objectivity, justice and fairness since leaders and the other members of society will be able to treat each other not on the basis of favouritism or bias, but on the basis of equality, equity, justice and fairness.

This study notes that while the principle of equal opportunity appears to be a good means of administering a just state, many people will not be able to successfully utilise the opportunities that the state presents, either as a result of laziness or unwillingness to work hard. As a result, many of them will remain poor and become a burden to the state. It is proposed, given this reality, that the onus lies on the state to implement welfare programmes that provide at least a minimum level of assistance to the disadvantaged members of society.

While the veil of ignorance is hypothetical, this study submits that human beings can apply it by being objective, treating each other in the same manner that they want to be treated, as Kant's categorical imperative requires, by applying humanism in all their

actions and behaviours, as the moral theory of Ubuntu enjoins in keeping with the spirit of communalism, without necessarily abandoning one's individuality.

It is recognised that there are various forms of leadership. However, this study recommends political, directive and values-driven leadership styles for postcolonial African states as a result of the capability of their combined qualities to employ hard and soft power, to attain desired objectives and to ensure that the administration of the state and the behaviour of the citizens are founded on ethics and values.

A fundamental element of political leadership concerns its application of soft and hard power. While hard power concerns the coercion of community members in order to realise government's objectives, soft power does not coerce people. Rather, it persuades and encourages citizens to act and behave in line with the requirements of the government.

Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes and Machiavelli, as alluded to in this research, recognise the central role that good leadership plays in the attainment of the desirable, stable, developmental and harmonious state, though they differ on the kind of leaders that can execute this objective. Some of Machiavelli's ideas in this regard are extreme, especially his support for deceptive leadership style. This study posits that good leaders cannot be a deceptive or liars. Instead, they ought to be transparent, and consistently act and behave honestly, no matter the situation that may confront them, so as to maintain their credibility.

This study posits that soft power alone is not suitable for postcolonial Africans because many of them will not comply with the law freely and willingly unless they are compelled to do so. Therefore, this study supports Machiavelli's proposal for the use of hard and soft power and force to resolve internal and external problems, especially in cases where the antagonists of the aggrieved parties and individuals are acting or behaving irrationally, such as in the South African case where protesters resort to the destruction of public and private properties. In such a case, the government should employ coercive force to prevent the escalation of the crisis and to serve as a deterrent to others who may want to embark on such violent protests in future. By subscribing to a combination of hard and soft power, postcolonial African states will also be able to

ensure a balance between encouraging citizens to uphold the laws and punishing those that break the rules. Although most citizens view their leaders with suspicion, they nonetheless expect them to be the best leaders possible, by being authentic, decisive, strong, transformative, by not succumbing to the temptations of party politics, and by conducting themselves in a consistently ethical manner.

Directive leadership is specifically channelled towards the realisation of identified objectives. It is more controlling and compelling than other forms of leadership as it expects workers and community members to adhere to instructions without excuse. Although this study recognises the importance of the other forms of leadership and personal initiatives, it recommends directive leadership for its ability to spearhead clear direction, clear focus, personal control, monitoring and evaluation of all aspects of a business or state administration.

This study further recommends directive leadership for postcolonial African states since public officials generally do not apply the greatest measure of commitment to their work when they are given the freedom to use their initiatives. Many of the problems associated with inadequate service delivery across the continent partly result from this lax attitude to work. Although the relevance of personal initiatives is not ruled out in the delivery of good service, a directive leadership style must be employed in addition to the use of personal initiatives and discretion.

Values-driven leadership plays a fundamental role in the realisation of good governance and by extension, the desirable state. The values that individuals hold shape their characters, and a community becomes successful and peaceful by adhering to good values. Through this kind of leadership style, leaders will be very clear about the meaning of their values and remain committed to them. The value of trust is considered paramount for the wellbeing of the society as a whole. Therefore, leaders and other members of society are expected to be trustworthy by acting and behaving in a consistently ethical manner, and by keeping their word and promises. Trustworthy individuals are competent in their jobs since failure to deliver good results will compromise their integrity; they are generous, kind and caring; and they do what is right despite the circumstances that may confront them.

The political, directive and values-driven leadership styles that this study recommends incorporate both hard and soft power. They will enable postcolonial African states to be fair and just, and to professionally and successfully execute their functions to the benefit of their communities. Furthermore, they will enable the leaders and all members of society to conduct themselves ethically and, by implication, work towards the realisation of the ideal society.

The pervasiveness of conflicts on the African continent and their destructive impact on the lives and wellbeing of its inhabitants have been noted in this study. In that regard, management, leadership, politicians and all stakeholders have a crucial role to play in conflict resolution. It is recommended that postcolonial African states critically examine the manner in which conflicts were resolved in indigenous African societies; and draw from the strategies that enabled them to genuinely resolve conflicts and restore peace and unity, unlike the current era where most conflict resolutions do not result in genuine forgiveness. The level of conflict in the current era can also be resolved, minimised or even eliminated if governments and their citizens treat everyone with justice and fairness, and if both the majority and the minority treat each other fairly and with respect and dignity.

A reflection on the systems of governance in Africa and the challenges and failures associated with them reveals, as Wiredu notes, that these systems are failing to adequately meet the expectations of Africans; and they are also not suitable for the African context. Therefore, postcolonial African states need to search for alternative democratic systems that will be able to adequately address their specific challenges. He contends that there are admirable and relevant features of good governance in the traditional African society which contemporary Africans are failing to notice, probably as a result of their adherence to western influence and culture. He asserts that a number of western orientations, such as the technological developments, do not necessarily improve an individual's ethical wisdom. He therefore, proposes that African societies draw good lessons from the traditional and non-technological mode of governance, which resulted in a better way of life in the past than what currently obtains in postcolonial African states. In this case, he proposes the adoption of specific aspects of the traditional African system of rule, specifically democracy by consensus,

which he considers to be non-adversarial, unlike the western multiparty democracy, but which is consensual and democratic.

Wiredu proposes the abrogation of political parties in Africa in order to eliminate the fanaticism and irrational conduct of many party members, mutual hostilities, power struggles among opposition parties, and to ensure that political engagements occur within a conducive and peaceful atmosphere. He notes that citizens will continue to participate in political affairs even if political parties are eliminated. He believes that the abrogation of political parties will not impact negatively on the community members if community affairs are handled impartially, if consideration is given to the needs of society and if community members are given a platform to contribute to public affairs.

A number of philosophers such as Eze, as alluded to in chapter four, disagree with Wiredu's proposal for the adoption of a modified version of democracy by consensus in Africa. However, they agree that any alternative democratic system for postcolonial African states cannot be autocratic; rather, it must encourage political contestation and freedom of speech. They both agree that such government cannot condone lust for power, undignified conduct, waste of state resources and extravagant lifestyles, which seem to define the current era. They also agree that contemporary African states must draw good lessons from countries around the world that are not corrupted by the worse forms of capitalism.

This study recommends the points of agreements, as noted above, between Wiredu and Eze. It is also recommended that postcolonial African states must seek the kind of governance system that suits their African contexts and that will be able to address the needs of their members. This new system can draw from the good elements of Wiredu's democracy by consensus, based on humanism as the moral principles of Ubuntu provide; on communalism; and on the principle of individual responsibility, since it is unjust to hold others responsible for the actions of another person or group. Of course, as Koenane and Olatunji argues, Ubuntu does not exclude individual responsibility. It is just that it is founded in communalism as opposed to individualism. This study is not discarding western liberal democratic system in its entirety. Rather, it is recommended that postcolonial African states embrace its good elements, guided by ethics, integrity, values, objectivity and honesty.

The failures of postcolonial African states that are noted in this study negate their ability to attain democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation means that the entrenchment of democracy in a country results from the willingness of the leaders and members of society to nourish and protect democracy until it solidifies in such a manner that it cannot be easily derailed by all sorts of complications. It is recommended that in order for postcolonial African states to consolidate the gains of their hard won democratic freedom, the following elements of good governance must be enhanced: quality of public institutions, economic performance, affluence, a conducive international climate and access to land for all members of the state.

The low quality of public institutions is considered by many theorists as responsible for the underdevelopment of most countries in Africa. The quality of public institutions can only be improved, as Gustavson posits, when the government ensures that it implements sound laws and regulations; quality public service and administration; the security of property rights; and an independent judiciary. The development of African states will become a reality when consistently good and sound social institutions are implemented. In South Africa currently, protest actions have become very frequent as a result of the protesters' dissatisfaction with the inadequate level of service that they receive. The lack of service delivery is also a source of concern in all other African states. Therefore, the law-makers and the government functionaries need to make concerted efforts to address this shortcoming since the quality of the services that is provided is vital for economic growth, poverty alleviation, for bridging the gap in income inequality, for quality health care and education, and for the overall development of the country. In order to ensure improvements in the quality of public institutions, postcolonial African states will need to utilise the expertise of strong men, strong institutions, and an enlightened and politically conscious population who are willing to sacrifice some of their comforts for the realisation of the greater good in the form of a transformed and ethical society. The shortcomings of leaders, public and private officials, must be challenged by the citizens, though without violence or destruction of property, in order to prevent their countries from remaining in their perennial state of failure.

The level of income inequality on the African continent is so high that it needs to be rectified in order to promote justice and fairness. Therefore, it is recommended that the governments reduce the wage gaps between the earnings of senior and lower level officials. The government must also consult with the private sector with a view to ensuring that the salaries of lower ranking employees are increased. A greater share of the national income should be utilised for improving the wellbeing of the citizens as well as creating employment opportunities for them.

This study notes that it is not just and fair for a few individuals to own most of the resources of a country. Although it is not the intention here to advocate for communism or socialism, it is recommended that post-colonial African governments must institute proper structures that allow for the channelling of the national resources for the benefit of the entire population. In that regard, all the national resources must be taken over by the government and used in line with Rawlsian transcendental institutionalism, for enabling all the citizens equal opportunities to succeed and prosper. The government can lease some of these properties to the private sector for better returns. Moreover, the private properties that are in the hands of a few individuals, which are in optimal utilisation, should be taken over by the government and leased back to them, while the profits should be shared, with the greater percentage accruing to the government for the development of the country.

In view of the tension that the agitation for land in South Africa continues to cause, the government must ensure that every citizen has access to at least a piece of land at affordable rates if they so desire, and if they can develop it for business purposes or for private homes, because there is sufficient land in the country for everyone. The very poor cannot afford anything anymore in South Africa.

While the challenges posed by exposure to western systems are noted in this study, including individualism, inequality and lack of care and concern for others, postcolonial African states cannot remove themselves from international trends and developments since they are part of the global village. Therefore, it is recommended that since African states need a measure of international opportunities such as technological advancement and international trade, African governments need to implement conducive strategies, rules and local conditions that will attract international

investment and cooperation for the development of their countries, without compromising their sovereignty in the process.

The shortcomings of those who superintended over the management and administration of post-colonial African states are recognised as a major contributor to the failures of these countries. It is therefore recommended that those who are made leaders be committed, disciplined, responsible, selfless, focused and mentally resourceful visionaries. Politicians and leaders must be made to account for their actions and behaviours, and a core aspect of their leadership formation must consist of programmes in moral development.

The leaders must be consistent in their ethical conduct and ensure that perpetrators of wrong actions and behaviour are disciplined. They must ensure that organisational and societal cultures are very clear about what is acceptable and what is not condoned; that leaders and managers are equipped with people management skills; that all stakeholders are capacitated with behavioural requirements, organisational and societal values and codes of conduct; that ethics becomes a regular feature in meetings; and that ethics and integrity become part and parcel of their daily lives and business.

As the foundation of society, parents should begin in their families to teach their children the importance of values, such as honesty, respect, trust, fairness, courtesy, commitment, dedication and uprightness. All levels of education must institute programmes in moral development, and the students must, as Plato and Aristotle suggest, accompany what they learn in school with a process of habituation and the practicing of virtues daily.

It is recommended that society at all levels needs to publicly reward good behaviour, such as honesty and compassion. This will encourage more people to act and behave ethically and to understand that it is rewarding to be ethical. Although it is desirable to reward good conduct, in cases where good behaviour is not rewarded, community members must continue to act and behave ethically because they are responsible and accountable for their actions and behaviour.

In order to ensure the restoration of the good African way of life that brought peace, stability and happiness in the past, there is an urgent need for contemporary Africans to invest in the revival of their indigenous ethical principles, values, cultures and traditions; and re-establish them as their guiding principles going forward. Plato acknowledges that it might be impossible to realise the ideal state and therefore proposes the implementation of practicable aspects of his theories. However, this study believes that it is possible for the world at large and for post-colonial African states in particular to work towards the realisation of the ideal society if leaders, managers and community members are willing to act and behave ethically, and with consideration for the welfare and happiness of other human beings.

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