

Colonialism, Peace and Sustainable Social Cohesion in the Barents Region

*- Creating Theoretical and Conceptual Platforms for Peace Building and
Restorative Action*

by

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I declare that "Colonialism, peace and sustainable social cohesion in the Barents Region: Creating theoretical and conceptual platforms for peace building and restorative action" is my own work and that all sources used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Are Johan Rasmussen'.

Are Johan Rasmussen

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Abstract

This study presents a conceptual and theoretical framework for peace building and restorative action in the Arctic Barents Region where the Sami of the Scandinavian region live. Based on Johan Galtung's theory of peace, the study approaches the issue of peace building and restorative action by considering the history of colonialism and the meaningful lessons drawn from it as a pedagogic field and with human development as the goal. Central to this imperative is the issue of cognitive justice. The study explores the peace potential in including indigenous knowledge systems and the ethics embedded in them in the developmental discourse going forward.

The word "ethics" is explored within this imperative, with the study arguing that developing an ethical rationality compatible with the goal of peace and human development in this context is not primarily about the mastering of rules and principles or adjusting to modernity's mores but about something far more fundamental, namely, the work of re-establishing the esteem for the Other – the very fundamental condition of human community – in a context in which respect for the intrinsic value, dignity and individual autonomy of others and therein their active participation in the world, are under severe strain. The remote space that is devoted to this fundamental relation with the Other in today's leading moral-philosophical discourse thus stresses the need to open up new "cognitive spaces" so that wisdom may emanate more freely from non-western traditions in order to expand the range of ethical rationality.

This argument is supported by hermeneutical theory, especially that of Gadamer, the core of which is that communicative acknowledgement of the Other must be based exclusively on the Other's premises, where the world of the Other is prioritised as the key for understanding oneself. The arbitrariness of hermeneutics is that true comprehension is not possible by evading the Other. It is at this point that Levinas' analysis of the "face" becomes central: The Other is experienced "face-to-face", meaning "without horizons" and refers to an experience before my will and freedom and which implies that I transcend myself when I acknowledge my responsibility for my Self as the responsibility for the Other. The study concludes that building peace by restoring indigenous systems of trust and hospitality is vital in any attempt to cope with current difficulties and for moving forward in a restorative paradigm.

Key words: social cohesion, peace building, human development, colonialism, cultural violence, restorative action, cognitive justice, indigenous knowledge systems, hermeneutics, fundamental ethics.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The Barents Region and the Sami people

This study focuses on a geographical area in the north, the Barents Region or the Euro-Arctic region. The Barents cooperation was established in terms of the Kirkenes Declaration of 1993 and consists of the northernmost areas of Norway, Russia, Finland and Sweden. It includes thirteen counties and other regional entities, all of which are represented on the Barents Regional Council and which include Norway (Nordland, Troms and Finnmark), Russia (Murmansk, Karelia, Arkhangelsk, Komi and Nenets), Finland (Lapland, Oulu and Kainuu) and Sweden (Västerbotten and Norrbotten) (BarentsObserver, 2012).

The Kirkenes Declaration was signed by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the Commission of the European Communities and was based on the conviction that expanded cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region would contribute significantly to stability and progress in the area and in Europe as a whole. The confrontation and division that had characterised the past would be replaced by cooperation and partnership with such cooperation contributing to international peace and security. The signatories to the Kirkenes Declaration saw the Barents cooperation as part of the process of the evolution of European cooperation and integration. The participants also affirmed their commitment to strengthening the indigenous communities in the region (Statsministerens Kontor, 2013).

The Barents cooperation takes place at two political levels, namely, intergovernmental cooperation under the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), which includes Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the European Commission, and interregional cooperation under the Barents Regional Council. The Barents Region has a population of almost six million and covers an area of 1.75 million square kilometres (about five times the size of mainland Norway) (op. cit.).

The Barents Region is perhaps the richest territory in northern Europe. It is characterised by remarkable biological diversity and vast natural resources, especially forests, minerals, oil, natural gas and enormous fishery resources, which are important to Europe as a whole. Nevertheless, it is not possible for many people there to survive without economic compensation, with the contradiction between

"resources rich and economically poor" calling for urgent attention (Gupta, 1999¹). I will now briefly discuss the history of this region in order to clarify the events which have culminated in this contradiction.

The Nenets, also known as the Samoyeds, the Vepsian and the Sami,² are the indigenous peoples of the Barents Region, where they have lived since approximately 8000 BC (Charta 79, 1982). The Sami have occupied the Scandinavian Peninsula and eastward over the Russian Kola Peninsula long before the current national boundaries were proclaimed, utilising the land, sharing resources and settling disputes thorough a complex *siida* system of extended families who lived and utilised the natural resources together. The leader of a *siida* group was often the oldest women or man and controlled the daily life of the group. The leader decided where to and when the group would move and which members would fish in the various lakes. Different *siida* groups also held joint consultations in which their elders discussed common problems (Niemi, 1996).

In pre-modern times the Sami frequently traded with their neighbours. The surrounding peoples eventually discovered the riches in the *Saamidaen*, the Sami land, in the form of animals with fur and fish. The great rivers that flow into the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Bothnia contain plenty of salmon in the summer months. Trade contacts to the east, toward what is now Russia, were established relatively early. Approximately two thousand years ago the Sami began trading with people from present day Norway, Russia and Sweden in an East-West and then in a North-South direction (op. cit.). The Norwegian coastline, with open water throughout the year, was a particularly suitable trade route, while the major rivers of northern Finland and Sweden were also suitable pathways for trade. The various nation-states gradually began to claim exclusive rights to this trading and also to the lands where groups of traders or robbers had previously travelled (op. cit.).

During the Middle Ages, the newly created nation states of Denmark/Norway, Sweden/Finland and Russia began vying for control of the Sami territories. In 1751

¹ The notion of "resource rich and economically poor" was first presented by Anil Gupta at the World Trade Forum. Bern. August 27-29th 1999.

² The name "Sami" (also known as Sámi or Saami) is derived from the Sami designation of themselves as "Samit" or "sápmelacat", a name of which the original meaning has been lost. Consequently, the name Sami appears in the Bibliography as Sami, Sámi and Saami. To be consistent, the name is presented in the in-text as "Sami".

Norway and Sweden established the borders of their kingdoms (Hirsti, 1974). The treaty included a “Lapp Codicil”, which gave the Sami the right to cross these borders freely on their seasonal migrations while paying taxes to one kingdom only, which continues to be a source of conflict as the various nations retain the right to exploit the resources by mining, logging, building dams for hydroelectricity, building fish farms, and suchlike in the traditional Sami reindeer herding and fishing areas.

The pre-modern Sami were primarily reindeer keepers, fishermen, hunters and anglers. In view of the fact that reindeers are migratory animals, a major group in the Sami society evolved naturally into reindeer “herding”, adapting their lives to the reindeers’ yearly cycle which takes them to the high mountain fells in the summer and back to the lowlands in the winter. While only 10 per cent of the present Sami population herd reindeer today, this custom remains central to the Sami cultural identity. *Eallu*, the Sami word for the reindeer herd, means “livelihood” (Lundbohm, 1910). Reindeers require peace, especially during the critical October rut, when herders must ensure the animals are not disturbed. Disruptions to the rut, and poor pastures at that particular time, are likely to reduce the number of pregnancies and also introduce irregularities in the timing of spring calving (Paine, 1982). Therefore, industry and other physical barriers constitute a major threat to the Sami because they hinder the natural path of the reindeer herds, thus threatening their livelihood (Paine, 1982). This issue is essential to understanding why the Sami were so easily oppressed when other nations claimed their land and resources.

The Sami pre-Christian religion was an animistic, polytheistic nature religion, reflecting their intense dependence on nature. In contrast to the majority of religions today, the Sami religion was a practical religion, meaning that there was no sacred book or liturgy, no theology or any hierarchic organisation demanding adherence. Instead, the religion was exerted and maintained by a series of actions, myths, stories, and material expressions. Despite the fact that the Sami shamans – the *noaidis* – played a central role in upholding the rituals they were not the only ones who were allowed to perform the rituals. Instead the rituals could be performed by anyone, thus rendering the religion dynamic and open for individual interpretations (Hansen and Olsen, 2004).

Nature was a living entity to the Sami people and its powers were called upon to help them in times of need. “Beaivi”, the sun, was central, a primeval cosmic being

spreading its rays over the world. The wind was also important with the Sami believing that they were the children of the sun and wind (Valkeapää, 1988³). The Samis still today follow the old custom of greeting their camping place when they reach it with “Greetings Mother and Living Place!”

"Noaidi" is the Sami word for the “shaman”, or spiritual leader. Essentially a healer, the noaidi used the drum and the yoik – a Sami song – to awaken to other levels of reality in order to cure illness – especially “soul-sickness” –, find the right path during migrations and help the community in times of crisis (Hansen and Olsen, 2004). The noaidi was the mediator between the spirit world and the physical world. By using the drum as well as animal helping spirits he/she was able to discern the spirit world’s intentions and learn what offerings or sacrifices were demanded. The noaidis were denounced by the Christian missionaries as “devil worshippers” and were harshly persecuted in the 17th and 18th centuries, their drums confiscated and destroyed. Many were burned at stake after being tried for “witchcraft”. Hundreds of confiscated Sami drums were brought to Copenhagen. All of them were destroyed in the fires that ravaged the city in 1728 and 1793 (Hansen and Olsen, 2004).

Juoigan, Sami folk music, has long and rich traditions. The *Yoik* is a type of chanting which is unique in Europe as the chanter actually “sings” a place or person, rather than singing about them. *Luodit*, the “songs”, are descriptive rhythmic melodies, and the lyrics often have subtle double meanings that served to maintain the Sami identity in the face of outside pressures. An important use of the yoik was to perpetuate the myths and stories of the past by performing them as lengthy yoik songs. Juoigan was an important aspect of the pre-Christian religion although this particular repertoire is now extinct. Like the drum, juoigan was condemned by the missionaries as pagan music and, in 1619, the yoik was outlawed by the Danish King, who controlled Norway at the time (Eythorsson, 2008).

In the late 19th century boarding schools were established to educate the Sami children. During the 20th century, a law was passed in both Sweden and Norway that prohibited the Sami children from speaking the Sami language at school in order to promote their assimilation into Swedish and Norwegian society. In addition, Sami art

³ For the work, *Beaivi, áhčážan* (The Sun, My Father), Nils-Aslak Valkeapää won the Nordic Council Literature Prize. Valkeapää was a leading figure in the Sami cultural movement, fighting for legal rights and cultural acceptance.

and music were prohibited, and the children who spoke Sami or yoiked were punished at school. The prohibition lasted up until the 1960s (Eythorsson, 2008). Many Sami immigrated to America at this time to escape the oppressive conditions at home.

The conversion of the Sami people to Christianity was an efficient method which the nation-states employed to claim sovereignty over Sami territory (Hirsti, 1974). The *noaidi* – the spiritual leaders and healers of the Sami and the force that held their communities together – were persecuted. They were compelled to renounce their old religion and surrender their sacred drums (Paine, 1982). In 1902, to encourage Norwegianisation, the Norwegian Parliament passed legislation that established that only those who could read and write in Norwegian and who used this language daily, could become land-owners in the north of Norway (Charta 79, 1982). Although not enforced after the Second World War, this statute remained until it was revoked in 1959 in response to a thinly veiled reproach from South Africa when Norway criticised South Africa's laws under the racially based apartheid system (Howitt, 2002).

The Swedish government used a similar tactic by encouraging farmers to move north. Those who settled in the land of the Sami were exempted from taxes as well as from military service for a time (Jebens, 2010). However, neither the missionaries nor conversion to Christianity changed the lives of the Sami totally. The significant changes took place during the late 19th century and the early 20th century with the industrialisation which meant that the surrounding nation-states needed the region's natural resources: metal ore, hydroelectric power and timber (Hirsti, 1974).

The Sami have never had standing armies or a warrior tradition and they are an essentially nonviolent people (Hansen and Olsen, 2004). Living among reindeer – a nervous animal that is easily startled by loud noises – the Sami were forced to settle their disputes quietly.

The contrast between "resource rich, but economically poor" may be explained by exploring the history of the Sami people which shows a red thread of colonialism. For the purposes of this study colonialism refers to the entire process that has reduced, and is still reducing, the Sami people to a "conquered" group.

Today there are only about 70 000 Sami in the old *Saamidaen* (Sami territory) – Norway (Sami population approximately 40 000), Sweden (approximately 17 000), Finland (approximately 4000) and Russia's Kola Peninsula (approximately 4000) (Cramér, 1994). Of these, about 7000 only are reindeer pastoralists – an occupation that often used to characterise the Sami tradition. In addition, four of the original twelve Sami languages are extinct while all the remaining Sami languages are characterised on UNESCO's endangerment scale as "severely endangered", "critically endangered" or "definitely endangered"⁴ (Moseley, 2010). "Linguicide", the killing or death of language, is described by the Israeli linguist, Ghil'ad Zuckermann (2009), as "the death of a soul, the beginning of the death of culture".

If the present policy is not changed the Sami culture, territory and resources will continue to be exploited, their languages will become extinct and their culture will be further eroded until it remains only in the form exotic artefacts items in museums and for exhibitions. What is the current generation going to do about the past and the future of social justice in the Barents Region and beyond that, throughout the world? The Euro-Arctic community is real, it is a living community.

1.2 Rivers of conflict and transformation

There are several rivers in the Barents Region of which some unfold important images of what colonialism means in the context in which I see it. The following section will discuss three rivers, each of which demonstrate different dimensions of the problem of colonialism as well as dimensions of peace and transformation.

1.2.1 *The Alta River*

The hydroelectric potential of Norway's northern wild rivers has long been seen as an important economic resource by the Norwegian government. By 1972, sixty of

⁴ UNESCO language endangerment scale distinguishes between *Vulnerable*: Most children speak the language, but it may be restricted to certain domains (e.g., home); *Definitely endangered*: Children no longer learn the language as the mother tongue in their home; *Severely endangered*: Language is spoken by grandparents and older generations while the parent generation may understand it but they do not speak it to their children or among themselves; *Critically endangered*: The youngest speakers are grandparents and older people, and they speak the language partially and infrequently.

Norway's rivers had been regulated by Norway's *Norges vassdrags- og elektrisitetsvesen* (NVE) to harness their hydroelectric potential. This had a significant impact on the Sami people (Kleivan, 1978). In the 1970s the Sami were caught in a struggle over the Alta-Kautokeino River, which was to serve as a source for hydroelectricity⁵. The Alta-Kautokeino River is the second largest river in Finnmark – the northernmost county in Norway. It is 170 km long and flows through the most populated districts of the region – through the heart of the Sami population – and is vitally important to the local environment, the daily life of the inhabited districts, and as a resort and recreation area. In addition, the wilderness plays an essential role in the Sami' reindeer husbandry, berry picking, and fishing (Stormo and Solem, 1981; Borring et al., 1981; Simonsen, 1985). In its first permutation in the late 1960s, NVE proposed to regulate the Alta River. This involved not only a 100-metre high dam on the Alta River between the towns of Alta and Kautokeino but also the regulation of two large lakes and the tributaries of the Tana River to the east on the Norwegian-Finnish border. In this configuration the project would have substantially boosted Norway's power supplies, but it would also have flooded the important Sami community of Masi, disrupted reindeer herding over a wide area, interfered with salmon fisheries and significantly disrupted agricultural systems (Howitt, 2002).

The environmental implications of the proposal triggered a major social protest. When it also was announced that the small Sami village of Masi would be flooded, the protest turned into a fight for Sami rights. The protesters were drawn from an alliance between Sami, environmentalists, fishermen, farmers and others affected by the project. The Alta-Kautokeino protest evolved into the largest civil disobedience campaign in Norway and resulted in the largest post-war mobilisation of the Norwegian police in action against the protesters on the project site. Thousands protested under the slogan "Let the river live!". The Sami protesters embarked on several hunger strikes, demanding "that no further work proceeded until Sami rights to land and water were settled" (Borring, 1981). Seven Sami also established a protest camp outside the Parliament building in Oslo in a traditional Sami *lavvo* (tent) and this became a symbol of Sami identity and self-determination, and a turning point for Sami politics.

⁵ The basic facts of the dispute are described chronologically in: Kleivan, 1978. For valuable "inside" perspectives on the dispute, see also: Hætta, 2002; Bjørklund, 1982, 1999; Bjørklund and Brantenberg, 1981; Brantenberg et al., 1995; Mikkelsen, 1971, 1980; Jentoft et al., 2003.

The Sami's legal argument against the Alta Dam was principally a political argument. However, their opposition had to be advocated in the Norwegian courts in terms of a legal system, which steadfastly refused to acknowledge that the collective, indigenous rights of the Sami people had any basis at all in Norwegian law (Bjerkli and Selle, 2003). The Supreme Court was bound to consider the dispute in terms of the law that had played a role in the process of Sami fragmentation, dispossession, marginalisation and Norwegianisation. In addition, the Supreme Court was, ultimately, an instrument of the state. Despite the fact that the legal argument against the Alta Dam did not hold sway, the court did recognise shortcomings in the process leading up to the decision. By taking up land rights in principle, the ecological analysis, the issue of culture viability as well as referring to international law, the Sami widened the scope of legal argumentation (Bjerkli and Selle, 2003; Paine, 1982; Stormo and Solem, 1981). The many "unusual" arguments and perspectives presented by Sami in court during the Alta Dam dispute challenged the existing paradigm of the law. In court, when accused of illegal demonstration, one Sami stated that the part of the river in question was "part of him", "part of his home" (Næss, 1973, p. 8). This type of spontaneous answer is not uncommon among indigenous people such as the Sami. It is important to acknowledge that the word "home" encompasses more than the physical or the biological alone. The river plays a vital role in the people's livelihood with this livelihood being intimately integrated into the people's worldview as well as their collective and individual image of "self" (Hoppers, 2009).

Although the small Sami village was saved, the Norwegian Parliament ultimately approved the construction of the Alta Dam by a substantial majority and the Sami people lost the battle over the Alta River. Nevertheless, the Alta case did provide the Sami people with an important victory. Protests over the decision and its subsequent confirmation by Norwegian Parliament and the Norwegian Courts mobilised and politicised both Sami and non-Sami in Norway, with far-reaching consequences. The title of John Gustavsen's⁶ book of 1980 *Samer tier ikke lenger* (Sami are no longer silent), which focuses on the lack of freedom of speech for the Sami during the Alta Dam dispute, describes the beginning of a major indigenous "comeback". Indigenous people were suddenly at the centre of national attention and at the very centre of

⁶ John Gustavsen was a member of a new generation of Sami that mobilised intellectual resistance to the oppressive conditions in Sápmi.

national consciousness. From that point on, the Sami began to reclaim their power and influence in the society.

In the wake of the dispute the Sami did make some extraordinary gains in terms of public recognition, administrative reform, and promises of constitutional, legal and political change (Howitt, 2002). In 1980, the Sami Rights Commission and the Sami Cultural Commission were established to examine the legal rights of the Sami in relation to land, water and other resources, and to promote the constitutional recognition of Sami, including the possibility of establishing a Sami assembly (Torp, 1992). In 1984 the Sami Rights Commission recommended a codicil to the Norwegian constitution which would safeguard the legal status of the Sami; a special Sami Act pertaining to their legal situation and the creation of an elected Sami Parliament. These recommendations were accepted and, in 1987, the Norwegian Parliament decided to establish a Sami Parliament. In 1990, Gro Harlem Brundtland, the Norwegian Prime Minister, who had come to power at the height of this conflict, and whose government had persisted in the construction of the Alta Dam, finally concluded that the Alta Dam should never have been constructed: "It is now apparent that the development of the Alta River way was an error of judgement. But this is something one can only say in hindsight" (Gro Harlem Brundtland, 25 August 1990, quoted in Howitt, 2002, p. 294). At the 10th year anniversary ceremony of the Sami Parliament in 1997, King Harald V (1937-), the descendant of the Norwegian king, Olav V (1903-1991), made the following apology:

"The Norwegian state is founded on the territory of two people; Norwegians and Sami. Today we must regret the injustice being brought on to the Sami people by the Norwegian state through a harsh Norwegianisation policy." (H.M. King Harald V, 1997)

The Alta River case was a revelation for many Norwegians and it became a symbol of a deeper movement against the oppression of indigenous people in Norway and elsewhere in Scandinavia. The Alta River dispute also laid the foundation for the establishment of the Sami parliaments in Sweden in 1993 and in Finland in 1996.

1.2.2 The Tornedal River

There is a river in Tornedalen, a valley situated in the centre of the Barents Region. This river has been used to demarcate the border between Sweden and Finland.⁷ The governments of these two countries regard the river as just a line. However, the citizens in Tornedalen regard the river as a *meeting point* which provides a connection between the various communities along the same border. The river may, for example, be used as a location for weddings or other festivities. These celebrations take place on large floats with the river symbolising the fruitful relationship between the various indigenous communities (Pohjanen, 2006). According to the former perception of the government, the river is perceived as a limitation or obstacle and, as a border, it *separates* people. However, according to the latter perception, the border is transformed into a place-in-between, a “third space”, which embraces something which is qualitatively new and thus the river is *unifying* and indicates a greater degree of coexistence.

1.2.3 The Pasvik River

"The further north you go the better the East-West relationship get", stated Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, when he visited Kirkenes in the summer of 2008. He also commented that the cooperation in the Barents Region provided an example of the way in which Russia wished to cooperate with its neighbouring countries (Staalesen, 2010). The Norwegian border zone is the most quiet and stable zone along the entire Russian border. It is therefore not a coincidence that the Russians named the Pasvik River "Mir", which means *peace*.

It is important to understand the history behind the peaceful relations between Russia and Norway in the north in order to understand the political cooperation project of the Barents Region.

Until 1986, Arkhangelsk was a closed town for foreigners. However, when Mikhail Gorbachev was elected as the President of the Soviet Union, the Norwegian ship “Pauline” received permission by the Soviet authorities to sail eastward to Kvitsjøen. On their arrival in Arkhangelsk, the Norwegian crew was welcomed with great honour

⁷ Culturally, Tornedalen includes the Swedish, Finnish and Sami speaking municipalities of Gällivare, Kiruna, Pajala, Övertorneå and Haparanda.

and enthusiasm. Subsequent to this event, the connections gradually expanded and, in 1993, Thorvald Stoltenberg, a former prime minister of Norway, launched the plan for a political collaboration-region, namely, the Barents Region cooperation.

There has, however, been very little interest in the Barents Region from the inception of the plan. Even if the situation is changing rapidly today, I think it is fair to say that, for the last 20 years, Thorvald Stoltenberg's political idea was not taken seriously by the political authorities. For example, if one looks at the various projects financed through the Barents Secretariat, it is immediately obvious that the successful projects have all been very small-scale with nothing of national importance. On the other hand, the number and extent of small cross-border projects does provide evidence of intense activity at the grassroot level (Rossvær, 2007).

One basic condition of the formalisation of the Barents Region in 1993 was that the fisheries should not be included and thus the Barents Region project excluded the fish in the Barents Sea. Oil and gas were also excluded (Rossvær, 2007). Moreover, the region appears to lack institutions that could make it an autonomous centre of commerce.

Why, then, is the Barents Region so important? The main resource of the region is neither oil nor gas but the vital remnants of a trans-national culture that had been frozen for more than 40 years. The Barents Region project could be seen as a positive attempt to reanimate long overlooked connections, namely, a friendship that is more than a thousand years old with its roots long before the Russian Revolution and the Cold War. The friendship re-emerged as a result of perestroika as the product of this historically important defreeze (Nielsen and Opeide, 1994). In other words, the Barents Region cooperation is a product of an old relationship of peace.

What this tells us then is that the central resources of the Barents Region are not the minerals and the oil and gas but the divergent border cultures of the people who live together in these northern areas – not in one nation, not in one country – but in *peace*.

One example of such cooperation is that between Norway and Russia in building seven power plants along the Pasvik River, two Norwegian and three Russian. These peaceful border installations were planned and constructed by both Norway and Russia and built during the 1960s, in the middle of the Cold War! In addition, two

Finnish power plans were constructed on the upper part of the river, a river that, in some places, is more than one kilometre broad (Rossvær, 2007).

It is no accident that the Pasvik River is referred to by the Russian word for peace, "Mir" as, in essence, this resource of peaceful dispute and activity constitutes the Barents Region's most important and most *lasting* resource. Nevertheless, the river still functions as a border and, in spite of the cooperation in respect of tourism, electricity and research, it is still forbidden physically to cross the river.

The departure point of this research study is these three rivers with the radically different outlooks they embody in terms of the socio-political, geopolitical and philosophical dimensions. The study analyses, both conceptually and theoretically, the problems of peace building in the Barents Region and the opportunities for change from the perspective of the region, according to Gupta 1999, as "resource rich, and economically poor".

1.3 The problem statement

The general aim of this study is to contribute to the immense task of promoting a culture(s) of peace and human development in the Barents Region. Firstly, this task depends on the capacity to confront the forces of colonialism and to put an end to the oppression of both the Sami people and other marginalised people in the Barents Region. I am of the belief that the issues with the colonisation of the Sami people are symptomatic of deep problems in our civilization – our cultural and philosophical heritage – with this belief highlighting the effort required to solve these fundamental problems and not just a remodelling of current policies so as to be in line with modern mores. Secondly, the divergent trans border crossing of the people living together in these northern areas reveals a peaceful way of life and cooperation almost unknown in Europe and which, if enlarged by "fair" conceptual frameworks, could become a resource for peace building and human development in both Europe and elsewhere in the world. The long-lasting tradition of friendship and cooperation across borders serves both as a positive contrast to the problems of violence and as building blocks for the healing, reconciliation and peace between future generations.

1.3.1 Research questions

Based on the above problem statement in respect of the research topic, the following research questions are formulated:

- What are the decisive mechanisms/thinking corresponding to the conquest and colonisation of the Barents Region in particular?
- What characterises the ethics that sustain these mechanisms?
- How is “the Other”⁸ perceived in the ethical systems prevailing in the Barents Region?
- What distinguishes the peaceful perception of the Other from the violent perception of the Other?
- What theoretical and conceptual framework may serve as a robust alternative to current thinking and practice (negative peace) while also offering conceptual and theoretical platforms for peace building and restorative action in the Barents Region (positive peace)?

1.4 Aims of the study

This study explores how, in spite of colonialism, peace and social cohesion have been maintained in the Barents Region where the Sami of the Scandinavian region live.

Using the conceptual and analytical tools developed in peace and conflict studies, indigenous knowledge systems, political philosophy, philosophical hermeneutics, phenomenology and ethics, the study attempts to;

⁸ The terms “the Other” and “the Constitutive Other” originate from phenomenology and identify the other human being, in their differences from the Self, as being a cumulative, constituting factor in the self-image of a person; as their acknowledgement of being real; hence, the Other is dissimilar to and the opposite of the Self, of Us, and of the Same (Honderich, 1995, p. 637). Edmund Husserl (1936) identified the Other as one of the conceptual basis of intersubjectivity, of the relations among people.

- 1) Explore decisive mechanisms/thinking at a discursive level that reduced the Sami to a "conquered" group in the Barents Region;
- 2) Explore the philosophical origin of these mechanisms/thinking;
- 3) Offer a theoretical antithesis to the political and discursive mechanisms using the peace, ethics and indigenous knowledge approach (Galtung, 1996; Levinas, 1991a; Hoppers, 2002);
- 4) Demonstrate how indigenous culture and knowledge, if enlarged by "fair" conceptual frameworks, may function as a response/resistance to colonialism and serve as a resource for peace building and human development; and, finally;
- 5) Work out robust alternatives to current thinking and practice globally; and explore a framework for pragmatic responses as a component of healing and restorative action by asking: Is ethics without hermeneutics blind while hermeneutics without ethics empty?

1.5 Objectives of the study

The more specific objectives of the study include the following:

- a. Explore the historical antecedents of colonialism in the Barents Region and the effects of colonialism on the Sami people.
- b. Investigate the concepts of peace and violence as they apply to the Barents Region.
- c. Offer alternatives to the notion of colonialism as anchored in the concept of sustainable social cohesion.
- d. Formulate recommendations for the way in which inclusive regional collaborations may be worked out in order to bring about sustainable social cohesion globally.

1.6 Limitations of the study

A first limitation of this study relates to the choice of focusing on a geographical region and not, for example, on a country. This is a deliberate choice as part of the effort to: (i) recognise the limitations and obstacles that national borders and other "boundaries" represent for indigenous people and others residing together in a region that was previously "without borders"; (ii) draw attention to the peace potential of the border-crossing culture, the tireless effort among people (including indigenous people) to maintain social cohesion despite such borders and boundaries; and (iii) discuss how this enduring effort to create regional collaboration may be of value to restorative action and reconciliation in Europe and other parts of the world.

A second limitation has to do with the choice of vantage point. The choice of anchoring this study, which addresses problems related to the marginalisation of indigenous people *in* Europe by using perspectives from the Global South sets the tone for a somewhat different North–South relationship in which the concept of “cognitive justice” (Visvanathan, 2009) and the indigenous knowledge approach (Hoppers, 2002) is applied in an attempt to mirror Europe from “within”. Using this southern perspective, the North is the issue in question and with intractable problems, whereas the South provides clues and hints to reveal and overcome these problems and not in reverse, as is usually the case.

The persistent claim for inclusivity inborn in the SARCHI Methodology Framework (Hoppers, 2009) addresses an ongoing hermeneutical challenge and a troubling reminder for the interpreter/researcher, but also constitutes a source of cognitive playfulness that penetrates and, ultimately, affects all the arenas involved in this transdisciplinary study. The approach used to interpret the North using the methodology of the SARCHI Chair may, therefore, be seen as an attempt to bring about a hermeneutic situation in order to confront the deterrent prejudices that cloud the "horizon" of the historical and scientific tradition of which I am part of by bringing *in* what has been previously omitted from that tradition.

The choice of using local stories, experiences and phenomenological perspectives at the grass root level as philosophical vantage points was part of that effort – the effort to create a hermeneutic situation suited to the task of embracing the indigenous voice. This particular outlook may be seen as a counterweight to the mainstream and

as a rejection of the scientific trends that endeavour to keep the *human* dimension out of its current contact with the world.

1.7 Summary of chapters

Following this introduction in Chapter 1, which describes the Barents Region and outlines the situation of the Sami people, the problem of colonisation and also sources of peace building, Chapter 2 discusses methodology and outlines the basic thinking on the science of philosophy underpinning this research study. Chapter 3 presents a theoretical and conceptual framework for the study while Chapter 4 traces the problem of colonialism in the Barents Region and its effects on the Sami people. Chapter 5 explores the philosophical origin of the mechanisms/thinking corresponding to the colonial conquest and interrogates what the identification of the link between science and the history of colonialism implies for the understanding of ethics in the Barents Region today.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 deal with the issues of peace building and restorative action in the Barents Region from a more positive peace perspective and what the response to colonialism may look like when the voices of the previously excluded are included and expanded upon, namely, a region transformed from historical domination to a region of dignity, peace and restorative action. While Chapter 6 discusses this potential in light of the notion of social cohesion from a political-philosophical perspective, Chapter 7 explores the value of including and expanding indigenous knowledge systems as part of peace building and restorative action. Drawing on the inspiration provided by the development of perspectives of positive peace presented in Chapters 6 and 7, Chapter 8 returns to the limitations/problems of the dominant ethical system as outlined in Chapter 5 and explores alternatives to this system/thinking by entering into a dialogue between hermeneutical theory (Heidegger, 1927; Buber, 1970; Sartre, 1943; Gadamer, 1975; Arendt, 1963; Levinas, 1991) and the possibility of including and enlarging Modernity's Other (Hoppers and Richards, 2011). Chapter 9 presents a short summary of and conclusion to the study, a review of the argumentation leading to the results presented in Chapters 1 to 8, and a final reflection on how the proposed alternatives, both theoretically and pragmatically, may contribute to the immense task of promoting cultures of peace and human development *globally*.

Chapter 2: Methodology

The aim of this chapter is to discuss important methodological strategies corresponding to the problem formulation and the challenges that arose within this particular research focus area and to outline the basic scientific tradition that underpinned this research study. Simply stated the main question in respect of the methodology used in this study is: What are the main challenges in this research study and how may I methodologically address the challenges I am facing as a researcher asking questions about peace and human development in a region conditioned by the impact of colonialism and historical violence? It was in this way I tried to think pragmatically about methodology.

2.1 The problem of occlusion

The main challenge related to the specific research focus area and problem formulation articulated in Chapter 1 revolves around the historical occlusion and silencing of the indigenous voice.

Approaching the study from “the underside of history”, as Elise Boulding (1976) entitled her work on the invisibility of women in world history, points to a significant revival of the silenced voice and one that has resulted in major transformations in the world. Similarly, the historical comeback of the indigenous voice as well as the indigenous peoples’ claim to history and their perspective to history, have led, and are increasingly leading to, a further ground-breaking renewal of history characterised by transformation and change. The appeal to embrace this comeback scientifically brings with it both a major epistemological challenge as well as an immense revolutionary or transformative potential. The tension between the problem of occlusion as part of both past and present reality and the opportunity for change and transformation arising from the possibility of including the previously excluded and silenced in the current plural and inclusive paradigm constitutes the essential methodological contemplation underpinning this study.

The next sub-sections focus on the four problems of occlusion and the implications of these problems for this research study. In an effort to clarify the implications of these problems for this particular research context I pose the following questions:

- What are the epistemological and ethical implications of exclusion and how may these be tackled methodologically?
- What does the problem of the representation and history of obsolescence imply for the study of peace and human development in the Barents Region today?
- Once the voice of the silenced and the marginalised has been heard again, how would it be possible to embrace this comeback in the framework of cognitive justice, healing and restorative action?

2.1.1 Exclusion

The biggest obstacle to the challenge of bringing in what modernity has left out in this study is related to the fact that the history of the Sami People has been excluded from history books and the curriculum at schools. It must be clearly stated that the history of the Sami people had no place in the disciplinary field of history before the 1970s. The famous Norwegian historian, Ernst Sars, claimed in *Udsigt over den Norske historien* (A view of the Norwegian history), published between 1873-1891 that “the Sami could not be considered in the writings of the national history of the Nordic empires” (Hansen and Olsen, 2004, p. 10).

Historians distinguish between people “with” and people “without” history. The scientific hold of Social Darwinism, nationalism and the race discourse later declared that history was reserved for certain, primarily, Western people as these people had proven their dynamic ability to evolve. Other peoples were considered to lack these abilities and had therefore remained primitive and static (Hansen and Olsen, 2004). A type of academic nationalism which was endeavouring to find “the right roots of the people” evolved out of this distinction between people “with” and people “without” history. In an analysis of Ernst Sars’ work *Udsigt over den Norske Historien*, the historian Narve Fulsås (1999) explains the exclusion of the Sami in history books as follows:

“The race, i.e. the Sami, was the absolute opposite of the nation, and therefore it had to be eliminated so that the nation could be identical with itself. The alternative was, as Sars premises, to say that Norway

never could have become a nation because the country enclosed two “races”.⁹ (Fulsås, 1999, p. 12)

The distinction between people “with” and “without” history became the reason for the consideration of the Sami as ethnographic rather than historical subjects. Ethnographic people were considered to be primitive and static. They had “stopped” and stagnated at an earlier stage of development and were considered to be a type of “debris” from the past. The Sami were considered to be ethnographic objects in the discipline that grew out of the study of non-European, “primitive” cultures and, in some cases, were also equated with “non-human”.

Already in the 18th century, historians believed that the Sami was the indigenous population of Norway. The historian P.A. Munch wrote: “Sami has lived and worked from the county of Finnmark in the North to Agder in the South, but we can hardly call these settlements. The buildings are only Norwegian” (Hermanstrand, 2014, para. 12).

The historian, geographer and director of the ethnographic museum, Yngvar Nielsen, was strongly influenced by the racial theories that had acceptance in the late 19th century, wrote about the Røros Lapps (South Sami) in 1879, claiming that “they were inferior, even for Lapps to be” (Hermanstrand, 2014, para. 13). Nielsen played a pivotal role in refining the notion of a “Sami-clean” South Norway. In 1889 he gave a lecture at The Norwegian Geographical Society in which he claimed that the Sami had been recent immigrants to the areas of Røros and Femunden after 1742. Nielsen's theory, known as “*framrykkingsteorien*”, has subsequently been used, and is still used today, in litigation between the landowners and reindeer herders in this region. Many Sàmi have lost their livelihoods because of this historical argument. The theory has also been used as the rationale for not interpreting Sami place names, dialects and archaeological findings because, according to Nielsen's theory, this would have been impossible (Hermanstrand, 2008) As late as 1981, in a dispute over the right to practise reindeer herding in this region, the Supreme Court's ruling that the Sami in Trollheimen were not entitled to herd reindeer in the region was based on Nielsen's theory. The verdict stated that: “(..) And it must be removed from all doubt that – even with a substantial research effort – it will be impossible to detect such a Sami folk element in this area” (Hermanstrand, 2014, para. 7).

⁹ Translated from Norwegian by the author.

However, as Hermanstrand points out, such a folk element *is* found in this area, and even further south. In the Aursjøen lake in the Lesja municipality archaeologists have found Sami settlements from the 8th century, thus shedding new light on the famous Norwegian story of Harald Hårfagre's encounter with the Sami woman, Snøfrid Dovre. Niensens' theory has definitely been disproved.

In addition, when the historians, Hermanstrand and Kosmo (2009), were investigating local and regional historical sources they found not only traces of Sami settlements, but also traces of a rich interaction/cooperation culture between the Sami and non-Sami in these areas. On closer examination the historical documentation shows that the Sami is excluded only in the great national narrative, with the local and regional documentation revealing something else. However, despite the new knowledge and counter stories proving this influence, the South Sami element has not yet been included.

For example, in the South Sami area on the Norwegian side, there are two university colleges, one university and one science museum. However, none of these institutions offers studies in South Sami history, academic degrees or scientific production revealing, for example, the linguistic and cultural influence between the South Sami and Norwegian in this area.

The examples above demonstrate how the remnants of historical exclusion impact on the academic environment and set the tone for the development of the academic environment. By operating primarily in a position free from interference from the voices of the excluded and, thereby, preventing the possibility of any real confrontation or protestation against this exclusion, the academic discourses that have emerged have created what Hoppers (2009) terms as an "epistemological gridlock" between the West and the "others". Consequently, indigenous knowledge systems were omitted from schools and universities throughout the region, resulting in a *cognitive injustice* on a massive scale. The cost in social, cultural, moral, and material terms of the continued exclusion of such a vital body of knowledge is massive. In addition, when seen from the perspective of cognitive justice, we also face the problem that it pre-empts the building of pluralities of insights, approaches and world views, and thus the consideration of the *polysemy* of history, its many meanings, its possibilities and its ambiguities, thus destroying the basis for the recognition of diversity (Hoppers, 2009).

The historical exclusion of the Sami people from the writings of the national narratives of the Scandinavian countries has forced the Sami people into oblivion, as victims of non-history. The problem related to exclusion is deep and complicated, not only because of the victims it produces but also because of the silences and emptiness it creates. These silences pre-empt the democratic potential of those countries that carry the burden of this exclusion.

2.1.2 Representation

The problem of exclusion is accompanied by the problem of representation. Hansen and Olsen (2004) assert that the historical representation of the so-called “nature people” happened only indirectly through the history of another people. If the Sami did appear in the writing of history, it was merely as “extras” and they were not considered as being relevant in the historical plots. The literacy scientist, Edward Said, made a pertinent point in an analogy of the servants in 18th century English novels which also describes the ambulant role of the Sami in history books: “They were there, but ignored beyond being a useful part of the setting” (Hansen and Olsen, 2004, p. 11).

Firstly, it is essential that attention is drawn to the fact that this form of representation has created false and incomplete images of the indigenous figure and what the indigenous voice represented, and still represents, in this region. The image was false in the sense that the Sami point of view and narrative were replaced by what the colonisers *imagined* it to be, and it was incomplete in the sense that the image represented only the particular occupation of reindeer herding that also was stereotypically “Sami” in the eyes of many Norwegians. As a result, it is only in relation to reindeer herding that there has been any legal recognition of a special Sami identity. However, the legal protection of this particular Sami identity has had the effect of entrenching and strengthening negative stereotypes. In the case of the rest of the Sami, such as the Sea Sami culture, this distinction of reindeer herding as the archetypal “Sami” lifestyle emphasised the social and cultural distance between their own lives and those of the archetypal Sami (Hansen and Olsen, 2004). In many ways, the construction of state-endorsed caricatures of the multifaceted Sami culture further marginalised the Sami both from mainstream Norwegian culture and various

aspects of the Sami identity. Today, this problem continues to underpin the essence of the struggle of what may be termed “indigenous”.

Secondly, in view of the fact that the history of the Sami was written mainly by the colonisers themselves, and the “victim's narrative” has not found a place in that story, it has been difficult to identify and understand the violences at work. In fact, without the victim's narrative, the conflict itself becomes invisible, even for the parties involved. It is in this way that the problem of representation becomes an obstacle to what Freire (1970) terms “conscientisation” – the process of becoming part of a conflict, true actors to a conflict (see Chapter 3).

Another important acknowledgement when the problem of occlusion in this way is confronted is that it presents us with the notion that we (as citizens of the Scandinavian Region) are operating with false or incomplete narratives. For Hermanstrand, the awareness of the exclusion of Sami in the national narrative implies that the entire Norwegian history needs to be rewritten:

“We must open for Sami influence and Sami history must be entered again. It is important because it concerns both individuals and a nation's right to be who we are. It's about academic integrity, knowledge and openness. We need to heal old wounds. Disarticulation only gets old sediments to seep out elsewhere.”
(Hermanstrand, 2014, para. 10)

The dimension which Hermanstrand highlights touches upon the centrality of what the problem of occlusion communicates in this study. According to the medical definition, “occlusion” means “the complete obstruction of the breath passage in the articulation of a speech sound”. This implies that it is part of a diagnosis which is linked to both prognosis (what will happen if the problem of occlusion continues) and therapy (a prescription for healing). If we use the diagnosis-prognosis-therapy approach to the problem of the occlusion of the indigenous voice, then we could argue that, once the problem of historical occlusion has been articulated and analysed (diagnosed), as oppose to the silence and the pain related to disarticulation, we are, in fact, being confronted with the choice of either being more inclusive, i.e. embracing the opportunity to become more open, honest, truthful, diverse and democratic, or continuing in the same direction, primarily at the cost of

the dignity of the marginalised, but also at the cost of the community as a whole. This emphasises the transformative potential that comes with the project of confronting academia with the fact of occlusion as part of restorative action. In this light, the project of including the excluded is not only about academic integrity, but also about becoming more open and honest about whom we really are. How are we to imagine ourselves? This question is important because the answer will decide what we think we are able to do. In this context, inclusivity is about healing broken relationships that have remained broken because the society is not including the voice of the excluded with authenticity. In addition, as Hermanstrand points out, the University is to some extent standing in the way.

This delay – the resistance or hesitation to embrace the indigenous comeback – is seen as a serious impediment to reconciliation between the Sami and non-Sami in the Scandinavian region. Hermanstrand calls for a re-imagined national narrative, a different narrative: “We cannot ignore the fact that we have been living with indigenous people, that they have influenced us, been an important part of how this nation came to be” (Hermanstrand, 2014, para. 12). In other words, a future built on the continuation of the present narrative will lead us away from realising whom we really are. In addition, it will lead us away from healing and reconciliation and away from the possibility of a re-imagined narrative. In this sense, inclusion becomes all about authenticity – Sami authenticity, non-Sami authenticity and Sami and non-Sami authenticity being shared in some way. The challenge, however, is to embrace a language that is capable of expressing this authenticity. In addition, by embracing that authenticity we will, perhaps, as John Ralston Saul writes in *A Fair Country: Telling Truths about Canada*, “feel a great release. We will discover a remarkable power to act and to do so in such a way that we will feel we are true to ourselves” (Ralston Saul, 2008, p. 4).

2.1.3 Development and the "irrelevance of the marginalised"

The third dimension of the problem of occlusion relates to geopolitical relations and the way they have conditioned the *interpretation* of the indigenous voice. The first concern is the remnants of development and globalisation – the “homogenised, technologically controlled, and hierarchised world re-packaged as “needing development”” (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 17). According to Hoppers and

Richards (2011), this notion of development stems from "a genealogy that was imported to the colonies from the time of Adam Smith and reinforced by President Truman in 1949 when he asserted that the majority of the world's people were "underdeveloped" and therefore needed "development"" (p. 18). In declaring this nomenclature of underdevelopment, "two billion people were, in their diversity, transmogrified into an inverted mirror of others' reality. It was a mirror that belittled them and sent them off to the end of the queue, a mirror that defined their new identity from that of a heterogeneous and diverse majority; it jaundiced their identity simply in terms of a homogenizing minority" (op. cit.).

In line with Hoppers' view, this notion of the world was "wired with sets of cryptic binaries such as the modern and the primitive; the secular and the non-secular; the expert and the layman; the scientific and the unscientific; the employed and the unemployed, the normal and the abnormal; the developed and the underdeveloped, that now occupied extreme ends of a spectrum whose reconciliation could only be possible using the evolutionary trajectory of one society – the western one" (Hoppers, 2016, p. 32). Such binaries have imperceptibly infected thinking on a large scale – my own included – and made it almost impossible to study anything associated with indigenous culture using an alternative framework or trajectory. The correlating problem is that these elements, which could, most appropriately, provide a fresh and aspiring perspective on discussing peace and human development in the region, are dismissed, reduced to "nostalgia" and labelled "out of date" or "unfashionable".

2.1.4 The centre-periphery gradient

The fourth dimension relates to the fact that the Barents Region long has been defined as a fringe. The north of Norway has been perceived as a periphery in Norway in the way in which Norway has been understood as a periphery in Europe with the same applying for Sweden, Finland and Russia. Moreover, a fringe is defined as a deficiency, thus implying that it lacks what the centre has. The image of the north of Norway as an "exotic periphery", for example, is part of a prevailing myth that dominates public opinion. Consequently, the region shares all the peripheral "hallmarks" that dominate the collective imagination within each country. The prejudices facing the periphery are insurmountable. In the beginning, everything I

saw and read about the High North was conditioned by my own centre-perspective. I then realised that the challenge involved asking the question: How to approach someone and something I so easily tend to displace, undervalue, misinterpret and misunderstand?

I have come to believe that I would be able to understand the periphery differently only if I were called to see it differently. Thus, the centre-periphery problem invokes the need for hermeneutics. We may already apply to the challenge what the philosopher, Gadamer, terms “*wirkungsgeschichte*”: Silence over whose normative heritage is being transmitted (Gadamer, 1975). Gadamer’s (1975) concern reflects the key question of truth and method: How should one read or appropriate the works of other philosophers or cultural artefacts more generally, up to and including the entire spiritual heritage of the West (and now, one may add, of the world at large)?

By questioning the researchers’ interpretation itself as part of occlusion and holding it up against the problem formulation and research questions, it soon becomes evident that all the research questions formulated in Chapter one ultimately depend on the same hermeneutical principle which I proclaim. If Gadamer is correct in claiming that I am always part of the reality which I seek to analyse and understand but, at the same time, take in consideration the realisation that my already established way of understanding is also part of the problem I want to overcome, then this awareness highlights both the need for self-reflexivity as well as the need to penetrate more deeply and more broadly into the decisive mechanisms that control/influence current thinking and practice in order to be able understand the indigenous voice in a *different* way. Accordingly, what is needed is a methodology that could help to formulate questions that could examine the role and status of the indigenous voice; that could help to challenge the rules of the game; and that could open up alternative or complementary plots to the drama.

2.2 The methodological response

What type of methodology could be used to reverse the problem of the occlusion of the indigenous voice? Since its implementation in 2008, the DST/NRF SARCHI Chair in Development Education has developed a number of methodologies as a response to its research focus areas, and which is of great help in the quest to overcome the obstacles described here. All the focal areas informing the research of the Chair "aim

at *restorative action* by using Indigenous Knowledge Systems as an approach for opening the gridlock in epistemology between the West and the 'Others' going forward" (Hoppers, 2009, p. 1). Central to this aim is the concept of restorative justice, which consolidates transdisciplinarity as an approach to discourse, practice and thought. The central aim of the SARCHI Chair is to foster methodologies for systems transformation (Hoppers, 2009). The SARCHI Chair calls for "rethinking thinking" which represents an approach to making a constructive difference in the universities and science councils by drawing direct attention to their core activity: "If thinking can plausibly be identified as something central to what universities are about, it can also be identified at this point in history as something in need of rethinking" (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 3). However, it requires both major reconsideration and a change in the way "justice" is addressed within the science and technology framework. Hoppers (2009) outlines the concept based on:

1. the value of humanism when transposed onto science e.g. the African philosophy of ubuntu (the ethical imperative)
2. the principle of cognitive justice and diversity (the democratic imperative), and
3. the need for co-experimentation linking local and academic knowledges (the livelihood imperative).
4. It requests from science and technology special attention on the process of understanding and knowledge mediation between knowledges with different epistemologies and makes specific proposals to strengthen such ethical mediation capacities (the pragmatic imperative).

2.2.1 Transformation by enlargement

The methodology of transformation by enlargement was developed by the SARCHI Chair in Development Education as a response both to the problems related to modernity and to that which modernity has omitted from the knowledge-producing arenas. By offering a schema that cuts across all sectors and fields, in particular, the universities and the disciplines they offer, this methodology seeks to expand or enlarge that which was previously omitted in the current plural and inclusive paradigm (Hoppers, 2009).

Transformation by enlargement is thus a direct response to the obstacle of occlusion. It challenges this problem by cutting across the different spheres which are characterised by exclusion and then populating each discipline or field with the codes that modernity left out (Hoppers, 2009). In this sense, then, transformation is seen as distinct from reform and restructuring. The agenda of transformation is given to the default drive of the academic system itself with this system transformation process requiring an intense focus on the rule-making and value coding systems:

“Experience tells us that transformation (i.e. the change from one form into another) at the level of systems, practices and epistemology; or attaining strategic reversals of ubiquitous dominating constructs such as the colonial constructs; or even realizing the vision of working in the service of humanity will remain surface unless focussed attention is made at the deeper levels of the actual rule-making and value coding systems. In other words, deep scrutiny needs to be accorded to what has become established and routinized as "common-sense"!”
(Hoppers, 2009, p. 3)

By applying the SARCHI methodology of transformation by enlargement, this study attempted to reverse the problem of occlusion by giving the silenced and the marginalised a voice. For example, the methodology implies that codes, such as indigenous knowledge systems, are brought into the various discourses that lay claim to the truth and question these truths by drawing attention to *the basic cultural structures* within which our systems of thought have been constructed across all the disciplinary domains (Hoppers, 2016); thus becoming a tool for transforming these systems as part of restorative action.

2.2.2 Cognitive justice

The concept of "cognitive justice" was coined by Shiv Visvanathan (1997). It addresses the diversity of knowledges. Cognitive justice combines with the methodological approach of transformation by enlargement in providing a framework for the plurality of knowledges to co-exist without duress (Hoppers, 2009) and thus it becomes a central aspect of the methodological framework formulated in order to reverse the problem of the occlusion of the indigenous voice in the Barents Region.

Cognitive justice is a rubric for the realisation of opening up new moral and cognitive spaces within which constructive dialogue between people, and between knowledge systems, may take place (Hoppers, 2002). In a world where the greater part of peoples' knowledges are not recognised as valid, Hoppers argues that the integration of indigenous knowledge systems and scientific knowledges may be seen as a matter of cognitive justice (Hoppers, 2002; Visvanathan, 1997, 2002). Visvanathan (2009) argues that "democracy as a theory of difference has to recognise not the universal validity of science but the *plural* availability of knowledges, that no form of knowledge can be forcibly museumized and that memory and innovation intrinsically go together", and that this plurality

... "needs to go beyond tolerance or liberalism to an active recognition of the need for diversity. It demands recognition of knowledges, not only as methods but as ways of life. This presupposes that knowledge is embedded in the ecology of knowledges where each knowledge has its place, its claim to a cosmology, its sense as a form of life. In this sense knowledge is not something to be abstracted from a culture as a life form; it is connected to livelihood, a life cycle, a lifestyle; it determines life chances." (Visvanathan, 2009, para. 19)

The notion of diversity is fundamental for cognitive justice in that it is seen not only as a cultural mode of survival but also as an "axiomatic of differences that makes democracy possible. A diversity of knowledges, unmuseumized and dialogic, becomes an anchor for an inventive democratic imagination" (Visvanathan, 2009, para. 21). By understanding both knowledge and the different knowledge systems from the point of diversity and democracy, Visvanathan goes on to say that we also "reframe the axiomatics of knowledge based on hospitality, community, non-violence, humility and a multiple idea of time, where the citizen, as trustee and inventor, visualises and creates a new self-reflexive idea of democracy around actual communities of practice" (Visvanathan, 2009, para. 23).

In this way, the notion of cognitive justice prepares the way for deeper explorations into the interface between epistemology, diversity and democracy, and the potentials for true exchange. It takes us beyond equality into a method of dialogue across cultures through the need for different knowledge systems to coexist without duress and thus to the democratisation of democracy (Hoppers, 2009).

2.2.3 Second-level indigenisation

Second-level indigenisation differs from the post-independence indigenisation attempts in that while the first focused on the inclusion of black people into the game or the drama, second-level indigenisation questions the rules of the game, and offers alternative or complementary plots to the drama. It engages the paradigmatic frames; the apparatus for value coding; and the constitutive (i.e. not the regulatory) rules of systems (Hoppers, 2009).

2.2.4 Transdisciplinarity

It is not possible to address the issues of peace and human development in the Barents Region adequately from the perspectives of individual disciplines. Instead, these issues should be addressed using transdisciplinary methodologies.

The need for transdisciplinarity was recognised by Manfred Max Neef (Max Neef et al., 1991; Max Neef, 2005) through the realisation that the complexity of the problems we face today (the nature of the crisis) is no longer that of “economics”, “politics”, or “culture” per se, but one in which there is a peculiar convergence of all these factors which, together, form an entirety exceeding the sum of its parts. The problems once solved by experts qualified in narrow disciplines have since mutated into more complex problems and the challenge is therefore to move beyond strict (isolated) disciplines to interdisciplinary approaches that enable the perception of the *relation* between elements and, ultimately, to a transdisciplinary stance that requires a personal *immersion* that surpasses disciplinary frontiers (Max-Neef et al., 1991). This encompasses the recognition that simultaneous modes of reasoning exist, both the rational and the relational. The recognition of the relational aspect, in terms of which knowledge is imparted through histories and myths, challenges the primacy of rational thought over the relational and opens up the possibility of restoring the lost faculties and sentiments that facilitate our understanding of Nature from within (Max Neef, 2005). From the perspective on relational reasoning the search for ingredients from various fields and disciplines is seen as a supplementing value and not an obstacle.

In aiming at transformative human development and restorative action, transdisciplinarity becomes an important component of the methodology of the

SARCHI Chair as it “addresses the transformation of the disciplines, in terms of the knowledge that will be produced, and confronts the structures of the disciplines in terms of its exclusiveness/inclusiveness of the concerns of cognitive justice and plural knowledge systems” (Hoppers, 2009, p. 3).

In the context of this study, transdisciplinarity is seen in this light, namely, as codes and conduct to go more deeply and more broadly into the realms of reality, to access the deeper levels of the actual rule-making and value coding systems that control current thinking and to address the transformation of this thinking based on the concerns of cognitive justice and plural knowledge systems. This study aims at such transformation by enlargement by using the triangular approach of peace (Galtung, 1996); ethics (Levinas, 1991a); and the indigenous knowledge approach (Hoppers, 2002), and by setting it up against the backdrop of colonialism and the challenge of healing and restorative action in the Barents Region.

In view of the fact that all three of these approaches are integrative to begin with, we may also assume that the link between them may be explored in a variety of ways. For example, although both restorative action and peace studies are transdisciplinary activities, we could also, as Nabudere shows, understand peace studies as a restorative activity. In doing so, “we can bring peace studies into the ambit of exploring indigenous knowledge systems of conflict resolution and peace building as part of restorative action” (Hoppers, 2009, citing Nabudere). In this context, the issues of peace and human development and restorative justice become part of an area-cluster that consolidates transdisciplinarity as an approach to discourse, practice and thought while also challenging the gridlock in epistemology that characterises the relation between Western science and indigenous knowledge systems.

2.3 The philosophy of the response: hermeneutics

The problem of occlusion has serious implication for the interpreter/researcher in which the very basis for understanding is at stake. The problem of occlusion in this sense constitutes a set of obstacles that, in different ways, all sustain the continuation of one particular perspective of history, one particular epistemology and one particular value system and ethics while, at the same time, blocking any serious recognition of the voice of the omitted “others” and their contributions to take part.

How would it be possible to retrieve a position for understanding that does not do violence to the omitted "others" and thus challenges my own, seemingly persistently frozen, one? This question brings us to hermeneutics – the art of understanding the understanding. Only an "implicit" theory, the intention of which is to uncover perceptions' own tendency to close for insight and understanding, could be trusted to confront the problem of exclusion which is inbuilt and justified within the particular cultural and scientific heritage of which I am part. The tradition of philosophical hermeneutics is brought in at this point to help to address the challenge of reversing this problem and, thereby, constitute the main philosophy of science underpinning this study.

The philosophical tradition of hermeneutics is mentioned here primarily with reference to the theory of knowledge formulated by Martin Heidegger in his *Being and Time* (1927) and developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his *Truth and Method* (1975). From its original appliance of interpretation, or "exegesis", of scripture, philosophical hermeneutics evolved through the work of these philosophers into a more substantial theory of knowledge. Heidegger's philosophical hermeneutics shifts to a more existential understanding, a non-mediated – and thus a more authentic – way of being in the world that goes beyond hermeneutics as a "way of knowing" (Heidegger, 1927). Heidegger places the "understanding" (interpretation) at the centre of human life, not as a "method", a construction of consciousness but, rather, as a way of being-in-the-world, of being-in-life, of being-in-time and of being-in-history. Thus, Heidegger signals a significant shift in the history of philosophy the main focus of which, up to that point, had been the "consciousness" a la the Cartesian "cogito".

2.3.1 Truth and method

Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics represent a development of Heidegger's work. The core of Gadamer's philosophy is a striving to understanding human beings as historically understanding beings. Gadamer argued that "truth" and "methods" are at odds with one another. He asserted that methodological contemplation (developed through positivism) is opposite to experience and reflection. He was therefore critical of the tendency in the modern approaches to human sciences to develop "methods" in questions regarding human beings and their cultural creation. Gadamer linked this

tendency to the positivistic ideal and the unfortunate attempt to imitate the natural sciences which sought simply to "objectively" observe and analyse text and art. Accordingly, Gadamer refuses to give advice on questions regarding methods without first clarifying what permits human understanding. Hermeneutics is regarded by Gadamer, not as a methodology, but as a more substantial horizon of understanding that could be applied across different methods and sciences (Gadamer, 1975). His work *Truth and Method* was intended by Gadamer as a "description of what we always do when we interpret things (even if we do not know it): My real concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing" (Gadamer, 1975, p. XXVIII). Thus, according to Gadamer, hermeneutics is not a process whereby the interpreter acquires a particular meaning but it is, instead, a "philosophical effort to account for understanding as an ontological – the ontological – process of man" (Palmer, 1969, p. 163). Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics does not offer a prescriptive method on how to understand but, instead, is a philosophical examination of how understanding is rendered possible at all.

2.3.2 *The hermeneutic circle*

The complexity of the knowledge production is, according to Gadamer, a result of the relationship between the "whole" and the "part", between explanation and understanding (Gustavsson, 2003). "Everything is connected to everything", states Gadamer. The whole must be understood based on the interpretation of the parts and the parts will then illuminate the whole. This is the hermeneutic rule: We always seek to grasp the whole based on the details. This happens in concentric circles or spirals, namely, hermeneutic spirals. Hence, the existence of the classic hermeneutic concepts such as "pre-understanding/prejudice", "understanding", "interpretation", "horizon" and "explanation". The pre-understanding is a premise for interpretation but is never neutral. In this way the pre-understanding may be an advantage but also a deterrent; a prejudice. In addition, the spiral will not produce new knowledge but works as a reproduction of own prejudice (Gustavsson, 2003). Explanation is inextricably connected with the understanding of a given phenomenon because all interpretations build on explanations.

The composition of this constitute a horizon with Gadamer emphasising that both the research object and the researcher develop and change the horizon of understanding upon encountering each other. By enabling a contact between the researcher and the research object through a "common context", the hermeneutic spiral produces an understanding of how horizons can be expanded. This expansion is described by Gadamer as a "fusion of horizons" (*horizontverschmelzung*). In this fusion of horizons it is no longer possible to distinguish between subject and object. It implies that the new meaning which occurs is conditional to both the "researcher" (for example, his/her intention) and the "research object" (for example, a historical text) losing their governing authority. The hermeneutic spiral renders possible the understanding that knowledge occurs in the *relation*, resulting in the rejection of both objectivism and absolute knowledge, according to which universal history is articulated within a *single horizon* (Palmer, 1993).

According to Gadamer, dialogue is central for the hermeneutic circle or spiral and it should therefore play a key role in the development of the human sciences. Through dialogue it is possible to gain insight into the human being and his/her cultural creation. Dialogue is central in the hermeneutic circle as it provides "a conversation with the situation". Gadamer explains the type of knowledge required to attain the hermeneutic determination and reflection in dialogue by discussing Aristotle's concept of phronesis, namely, the wise application of practical knowledge. By the wise application of practical knowledge Gadamer is emphasising both transparency and responsiveness, and the ability to use one's *collective* knowledge in specific situations and relations. These are the properties implied by the term phronesis as discussed by Gadamer. He emphasises the importance of not perceiving knowledge as a closed circle and as something final where there is a final peak of knowledge to be climbed. This notion disturbs the hermeneutic situation, rendering it static and thus endangering the entire production of knowledge. Gadamer writes:

"Understanding is not, in fact, understanding better, either in the sense of superior knowledge of the subject because of clearer ideas or in the sense of fundamental superiority of conscious over unconscious production. It is enough to say that we understand in a *different way, if we understand at all.*" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 296)

The hermeneutic situation, is according to Gadamer, best represented in the practices of "games" and he uses "game" and "play" as metaphors for the interpretational back and forth movement central in any knowledge formation. Gadamer (1975) states that "the understanding of texts by a historian is not so very different from the experience of art". Gadamer wants us to see *reality* as a play, a "horizon of still undecided possibilities, of unfulfilled expectations, of contingency" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 298). In such cases in which reality is understood as a play, there emerges the reality of what play is, which we call the play of art. As such, art *is* a realisation: "By means of it everyone recognises that that is how things are." Reality, in this viewpoint, is what has *not* been transformed while art is seen as "the raising up of this reality to its truth" (op. cit.).

According to Gadamer, what one sees in the play of art "is not technique, which is of secondary interest; our attention is directed towards how true it is and to what extent one knows and recognises it and oneself" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 299). However, Gadamer reiterates that this recognition "is no mere certification of previous knowledge. Rather, more becomes known than is already known. As such, recognition involves new knowledge, gained through the illuminating agency of art" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 299). Thus, art, for Gadamer, has truly become philosophy.

Gadamer further states that "the attitude of the player or participant in such a game is not one of subjectivity – of trying to overcome or destroy another position – "since it is, rather, the game itself that plays, in that it draws the player into itself and thus itself becomes the actual subjectum of playing" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 446). For Gadamer, play has a medial function, an ability to recover or deliver *knowledge out of ourselves*. This highlights a certain fundamental belief in "one's already being in truth which we have forgotten and yet is recoverable, possible to reawake, or, better, awaken the memory of the hope of its recovery". Recognition in this sense, he continues, means some sort of shock of illumination whereby what is recognised seems, somehow, to be familiar. However, this recognition has an aspect of immediacy – almost as if we were carried out of ourselves, losing our ordinary attachment to appearance in order to obtain even greater insight into truth. In a sense, states Gadamer (2003), one must lose oneself in order to find oneself. He maintains that people who are not able to "play" this way forfeit their chances.

Gadamer's example of the hermeneutic situation described as a "play of art" illustrates the important point that horizons are always developing and transforming. This transformation is, however, unavailable unless we make conscious the prejudices governing our own understanding. Foregrounding (abhegen) a prejudice, Gadamer writes "requires suspending its validity for us. For as long as a mind is influenced by a prejudice, we do not consider it a judgment" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 298). How then may we foreground it? For Gadamer, it is important to acknowledge that it is impossible to make ourselves aware of a prejudice while it is constantly operating unnoticed. It is possible only when the prejudice is *provoked*:

"For what leads to understanding must be something that has already asserted itself in its *own separate validity*. Understanding begins when something addresses us. This is the first condition of hermeneutics, the fundamental suspension of our own prejudices. But all suspension of judgments and hence, a fortiori, of prejudices, has the logical structure of a *question*." (Gadamer, 1975, p. 198, own italics)

For Gadamer, the essence of the question is to open up possibilities and *keep* them open. In fact, Gadamer continues, "our own prejudice is properly brought into play by being put at risk: Only by being given full play is it able to experience the other's claim to truth and make it possible for him to have full play himself" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 199).

If we assume Gadamer is correct in arguing that the first condition of hermeneutics is the fundamental suspension of own prejudices, and that this suspension depends on something that already has asserted itself in its own separate validity, then the problem of occlusion and the marginalisation of the indigenous voice (Modernity's Other), its separate validity and possibility of having what Gadamer describes as "full play" in the many knowledge-producing arenas of modernity, certainly calls into question the hermeneutic range and capability of challenging own prejudice, that is, the first condition of hermeneutics. The basic hermeneutic problem confronting modernity is its' historic relation with Modernity's Other (Hoppers and Richards, 2011). In fact, by using Gadamer's terminology, it may be argued that this relation (between modernity and Modernity's Other), which is characterised by exclusion and epistemological disenfranchisement, produces an epistemological vacuum that hinders the undertaking of hermeneutic reflection. According to Gadamer, by blindly

trusting the fact that the procedure is methodical, science forgets its own historicity. The exclusion of the indigenous voice in the many epistemic masks of modernity therefore indicates a poorly understood historical thinking that should be replaced by one that may perform the task of understanding in a more authentic way. Real historical thinking, Gadamer argues, must take account of its own historicity (Gadamer, 1975). An adequate hermeneutics to the subject matter which we are facing in the Barents Region would have to demonstrate the reality and efficacy of history within the context of understanding itself. This will further be discussed in the next section in relation to what Gadamer refers to as "wirkungsgeschichte" (history of effect).

2.3.3 The history of effect

Taking the lead from Heidegger's analysis of human existence, Gadamer argues in *Truth and Method* (1975) that people have a historically effected consciousness (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein*), and that they always are embedded in the particular history and culture that have shaped them. All the products of a tradition stand within that tradition and thus we are never able to step outside of our tradition and all we may do is try to understand it:

“If we are trying to understand a historical phenomenon from the historical distance that is characteristic of our hermeneutical situation, we are always already affected by history. It determines in advance both what seems to us worth inquiring about and what will appear as an object of investigation, and we more or less forget half of what is really there – in fact, we miss the whole truth of the phenomenon – when we take its immediate appearance as the whole truth.”
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 300)

Gadamer is not suggesting that the history of effect should be developed as a new independent discipline secondary to the human sciences but, rather, "that we should learn to understand ourselves better and recognise that, in all understanding, whether we are expressly aware of it or not, the efficacy of history is at work" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 200).

He further argues that “the power of effective history does not depend on it being recognised. This, precisely, is the power of history over finite human consciousness, namely, that it prevails even where faith in method leads one to deny one's own historicity. Our need to become conscious of effective history is urgent because it is necessary for scientific consciousness” (Gadamer, 1975, p. 302). Gadamer emphasises that this does not mean that the effective history can ever be absolutely fulfilled, as, for example, Hegel's notion of absolute knowledge in which history would become completely transparent to itself and, hence, be raised to the level of a concept. Instead, historically effected consciousness is an element in the act of understanding itself and is already effectual in *finding the right questions to ask*. For Gadamer (1975), the consciousness of being affected by history is similar to the consciousness of the hermeneutical situation:

“To acquire an awareness of a situation is, however, always a task of peculiar difficulty. The very idea of a situation means that we are not standing outside it and, hence, are unable to have any objective knowledge of it. We always find ourselves within a situation, and throwing light on it is a task that is never entirely finished. This is also true of the hermeneutic situation – i.e., the situation in which we find ourselves with regard to the tradition that we are trying to understand. The illumination of this situation – reflection on effective history – can never be completely achieved; yet the fact that it cannot be completed is due not to a deficiency in reflection but to the essence of the historical being that we are. To be historical means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete. All self-knowledge arises from what is historically pregiven, what with Hegel we call “substance,” because it underlies all subjective intentions and actions and, hence, both prescribes and limits every possibility for understanding any tradition whatsoever in its historical alterity. This almost defines the aim of philosophical hermeneutics: its task is to retrace the path of Hegel's phenomenology of mind until we discover in all that is subjective the substantiality that determines it.” (Gadamer, 1975, p. 301)

The historical consciousness of Gadamer is not an object over and against our existence but, instead, it is a “stream in which we move and participate, in everyday acts of understanding” (Palmer, 1993, p. 117). We do not come to any given context

without a preunderstanding rooted in the historical stream of which we are part. Therefore, the interpreter carries with him/her the *prejudice* established within this tradition and this affects how the interpreter will make his/her interpretation. According to Gadamer (1975), these prejudices are not mere obstacles but are the natural and necessary part of the basis of our being that enables us to understand history at all. Understanding is always about a concretisation of the historical consciousness. Gadamer (1975) writes:

“Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of “situation” by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence essential part of the concept of situation is the concept of “horizon”. The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point ... A person who has no horizon is a man who does not see far enough and hence overvalues what is nearest to him. On the other hand, “to have an horizon” means not being limited by what is nearby, but to being able to see beyond it ... Working out of the hermeneutical situation means the achievement of the right horizon of inquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition.” (Gadamer, 1975, p. 302)

Accordingly, the hermeneutic reflection of one's life interpretation relies on the unfolding of one's "effective-historical" consciousness. This means that, whatever our personal approach to reality, history is still at work. This brings us back to the issue of overcoming the centre-periphery gradient which is perceived as a hermeneutical challenge. It is not possible to evade the fact that the historical transmission is part of us. Understanding is always about participation in a *common context*.

For Gadamer (1975), time is not primarily an abyss that we have to cross because it separates and keeps us at a distance. On the contrary, it is the constituting foundation for the series of events in which the simultaneous interpretation is rooted:

“In fact, the important thing is to recognise temporal distance as a positive and productive condition enabling understanding. It is not a yawning abyss but is filled with the continuity of custom and tradition,

in the light of which everything handed down presents itself to us.”
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 297)

The time interval between past and present is therefore not something that must be overcome in line with, for example, certain assumptions of historicism that we “must transpose ourselves into the spirit of the age, think with its ideas and its thoughts, not with our own, and thus advance toward historical objectivity” (Gadamer, 1975, p. 296). The hermeneutic productivity of temporal distance, Gadamer (1975) argues, “is a dimension of the hermeneutical problem that only could be understood when the aporias of historicism came to light and led finally to the fundamentally new development to which Heidegger gave the decisive impetus by giving understanding an ontological orientation by interpreting it as ‘existential’” (Gadamer, 1975, p. 297).

Gadamer's thoughts on the history of effect were heavily inspired by a work Heidegger wrote on Aristotle in 1922, entitled *Phenomenological interpretations with respect to Aristotle: Indications of the hermeneutic situation*.¹⁰ Heidegger's persistent claim in this essay is that philosophy *is* life, that is, the self-articulation of life from out of itself.¹¹ Since any attempt to understand philosophy or theology starts with a certain interpretation, Heidegger argues, the work of retrieval consists in investigating that which is “not said” within that interpretedness, that which is so “obvious” about it (what is not discussed about it, what is assumed not to require any further clarification). In fact, it what is not said that motivates that which is said and thus the unsaid needs to be said. This need to say the unsaid motivates speaking and it does so through concern because the retrieval of the negative dimension, the unsaid, is what authenticates the interpretedness of what is handed down by opening it up to the concerned speaking of radical questioning. In other words, the unsaid is that which both conceals the world and uncovers it (Heidegger, 1922, p. 250).

We may therefore conclude that the problem of the occlusion of the indigenous voice is a problem that calls for hermeneutic reflection. The works of both Heidegger and Gadamer provide a framework for approaching this problem that pervades this particular research focal area. However, before we proceed, it must be stated

¹⁰ Gadamer reports that he laboured over virtually every line of this text and found it full of ingenious insights that have not become superfluous through the recent publication of Heidegger's early courses.

¹¹ This is the reason why Heidegger claims that genuine philosophy is fundamentally aesthetic.

reminded that hermeneutics do not claim to be a universally valid science by using a universally valid method such as, for example, the positivist doctrine proclaims. We should never confuse hermeneutics with the positivist illusion in terms of which science is regarded as a set of rules for processing data to produce knowledge in which science is identified with the knowledge produced using the method, or with the method itself.

Following on Heidegger and Gadamer, the principle of hermeneutics is that being determines epistemology and epistemology does not determine being. In other words, what *is* determines method and not the other way around. In view of the fact that factual structures already exist within a field of research, it is incumbent on every researcher to make his/her own way through what he/she does. Researchers must ask their own questions. Hermeneutics is a science for understanding and its claim is that understanding is something that prevents our control while the central hermeneutic task is to ensure that it stays that way. Keeping the question open means keeping the hermeneutic circle open. According to hermeneutic theory this is the basic premise of understanding. It is also in this light that we should embrace the historically effected consciousness. For Gadamer, the historically effected consciousness is effectual in finding *the right questions to ask*, thus ensuring that history remains open for new interpretations, or better still, new *voices*.

In facing the problem of occlusion in contexts conditioned by the impact of colonialism (such as the Barents Region), the historically effected consciousness carries implications for the interpretation of the role of epistemology in such contexts and thus it delineates hermeneutics as playing a key role in opening these epistemologies for new interpretations, that is, the interpretations made available from a peace and violence perspective. A peace and violence perspective stresses above all else that the historical context between modernity and Modernity's Other is certainly not violence-free.

When we include this problem of historical violence in the discussion of occlusion and hermeneutics as part of the methodological response in order to address the problem of occlusion, this leads to the realisation that, even if hermeneutics encourages me to think about and discuss my concerns, helps me to understand or, more specifically, open the situation I wish to understand by emphasising the relevance of factual life and the history of effect, I am already part of the reality, part

of a tradition, part of the history I seek to analyse and that its major concern is that of *understanding* and ensuring that I also attain any form of the change and transformation that a methodology of "diagnosis-prognosis-therapy" stresses. By bringing in the critical issues of peace, human development and restorative action, the hermeneutical approach is confronted with a missing transformative or emancipative component. I have already stated that hermeneutics constituted the scientific basis of this study. However, when occlusion is identified as linking to a diagnosis, as something to be healed, one asks more of hermeneutics than what it, on the surface, at least, seems to offer.

One way to solve this dilemma would be to stay true to hermeneutics and the task of understanding without exploring the framework for making any form of change and transformation (remedy). A second approach would be to replace hermeneutics with a critical theory approach which sees knowledge and interest, value and fact, as closely interconnected and thus encourages, or rather, *empowers* individuals to produce and transform any given form of social life but, at the same time, relegate the "history of effect" and the art of unfolding the "unsaid" to the background. A third option, which is made available through transdisciplinary research, would be to retain both approaches in the synthesis and use the confrontation between them as a source of new insights. I chose this third option for my research endeavour.

In order to sum up this chapter, and to set the tone for the problems to be explored in the following chapters, the following questions are posed in order to pinpoint the essence of the confrontation between the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer and the problems of historical occlusion and silencing of the indigenous voice from a peace and violence perspective:

- Assuming that Gadamer is correct in arguing that understanding tradition requires a historical horizon; that everything contained in historical consciousness is embraced by a single historical horizon; and that our own past and that "other past" toward which our historical consciousness is directed enables the moving horizon in which human life always lives and which determines it as heritage and tradition but, at the same time, take into consideration that the voice of those representing that "other past" (in this case) has been either completely omitted from or wrongly represented in that tradition, then would not a more fair and honest inclusion of the voice

previously omitted mean provoking, transforming the horizon of that tradition, that is, recapturing a hermeneutic situation which is necessary for that tradition to evolve – to understand differently?

- If so, are we not also implying then that the methodological framework of transformation by enlargement, cognitive justice and second-level indigenisation set up by the SARCHI Chair in Development Education would help to create a hermeneutic situation in which the constitutive rules sustaining the epistemic gridlock between modernity and Modernity's Other are called into play?
- If Gadamer is correct in arguing that understanding involves participation in a common context but, at the same time, takes in consideration the violence and atrocities which indigenous people have suffered throughout the world and which constitute their inherited "place" in the common context established between themselves and modernity, what is the ethical responsibilities of hermeneutics in addressing these atrocities that are, indeed, also part of our common historical context?
- Against the background of the Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and the SARCHI methodology, what may be said about the moral philosophical heritage accompanying modernity from a peace and violence perspective if we take in consideration Europe's colonial history and the historical occlusion of the indigenous voice – Modernity's Other – in the heritage and tradition in question?
- Would the enabling of the questions above imply that the history of effect, as part of hermeneutic reflection, opens up a space for reviving hermeneutics ethically and opens hermeneutics (comprehension) up in respect of its ethical dimension, thereby conferring on hermeneutics an obligation that exceeds its traditional calling?
- Is the consequence that the understanding itself, when challenged by the dimension of history of effect in its encounter with the voice of the previously occluded, then results in an ethical responsibility to get the story right – the moral obligation to repair broken relations in the community that remain

broken because of both historical exclusion and the silencing of the indigenous voice?

- If hermeneutics could be “charged” ethically, then is a hermeneutic without an ethical obligation in our context therefore "empty"?

2.4 Research methods

The challenge of occlusion in the context of this study is addressed by a methodological framework anchored in the SARCHI Chair's claim for inclusivity and transformation by enlargement. This call for inclusivity which, in light of Gadamer, may be perceived as a way in which to construct a hermeneutic situation at the junction between modernity and Modernity's Other, is decisive in relation to the choice of methods to use and the literature to consult. The call to include the Sami voice is therefore pivotal and permeates the methodological approach.

The main research methods used in this transdisciplinary study includes theoretical analysis and synthesis. On the basis of the SARCHI methodology, different aspects from various fields and disciplines, such as peace and conflict studies, indigenous knowledge, sociology, philosophical hermeneutics, political philosophy and ethics, have been filtered. These theoretical perspectives are supplemented by relevant literature (especially that of Dostoyevsky) as a way of interpreting the philosophy (especially that of Levinas) and in order to link this thinking to the region and the problem area in question.

The interaction of the researcher with highly critically conscious scholars, IKS practitioners and elders from the Global South at several retreats and other working sessions arranged by the SARCHI Chair in Development Education¹² as well as from

¹²The SARCHI Chair has organised nine Retreats since it began in 2008:
Setting the Framework and Strategy of the SARCHI Chair in Development Education (November 2008)
Democracy, Human Rights and Social Justice in a New Global Dispensation. Challenges and Transformations (January 2010).
Human Development and the Transformation of the Academy. An Intellectual, Strategic and Pragmatic Response from Development Education (November 2010).
Development Education and Systems Transformation. Transformation by Enlargement: From Africa to Humanity! (November 2011)
Cognitive Justice and the African and Global Commons (November 2012)

the North has been an important source of information, courage and insights. The researcher travelled to the Barents Region with the philosophers, Viggo Rossvær and Holger Anders Hole, held informal meeting with key persons in the Barents Secretariat, writers, journalists, teachers and other local citizens, opened up in-depth dialogues with local people and contributed to a deeper insight into the border region and the unique way of life in the north.

Establishing the Discourse and Protocols for Innovations from below as Restorative Action to the Communities (November 2013).

Healing and Restorative Citizenship Education as the First Principle in the Philosophy of Higher Education (November 2014).

Bringing Cognitive Justice and Restorative Action into Public Policy Making (1st Joint Retreat DST/HSRC/SARCHI Chair in Development Education) 27th November 2015.

Song for Humility: Against the Apartheid of Knowledges (November 3–4 December 2016).

Chapter 3: Conceptual framework

This chapter discusses insights into conceptual frameworks and the terminology used. It is anticipated that these theoretical perspectives may be helpful in the task of exploring decisive mechanisms/thinking that correspond to the conquering or colonisation of the Barents Region and for creating theoretical and conceptual platforms for peace building and restorative action.

The most important pair of concepts that requires comprehensive clarification is *peace* and *violence*. Although they are explored in terms of how they stand in relation to each other, and that dissecting them may also lead us away from the holistic picture, the extent and complexity requires a more systematic review of each concept respectively. The chapter starts by discussing the concept of violence. It is hoped that the insight this would bring would then form a background for the discussion on the concept of peace. The concept of peace is thus discussed both in terms of its negative and positive dimension, and also from the perspective of peaceful conflict resolution theory. The last section of the chapter explains and discusses important conceptual descriptors related to the distinction between modernity and Modernity's Other.

3.1 The concept of violence

3.1.1 *Violence according to Galtung*

According to Johan Galtung's definition, "violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisations" (Galtung, 1975, p. 111). The words "actual" and "potential" are keywords in Galtung's definition, placing violence as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been, and what is. Violence is that which increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance. The potential level of realisation is linked to a given level of insight and resources. However, if these "insights and resources are monopolised by a group or class, then the actual level falls below the potential level, and violence is present in the system" (Galtung, 1975, p. 111).

Galtung's definition of violence breaks with a widely spread notion of violence according to which violence is defined only as the somatic incapacitation, or deprivation of health alone, at the hands of an actor who also intends this to be the consequence. However, if this is all violence is about, Galtung responds that "then too little violence is rejected when peace is held up as an ideal" (Galtung, 1975, p. 111). A peace concept built on this notion would, for example, involve overlooking highly unacceptable social orders. In other words, a narrow concept of violence builds a weak concept of peace. If peace is the ideal, then the challenge is to operate within the context of a concept of peace that functions as the negation of all types of violence, and not just the particular orchestration of violence known as war.

Galtung distinguishes between three main types of violence, namely, direct-actor, indirect-structural, and cultural violence. However, whatever the type, violence opposes basic human needs such as survival and wellness, identity and freedom.

Direct violence, physical and/or verbal, is visible as behaviour. Actor or direct violence is defined in person, social, and world spaces and is *intended* by individuals acting singly or collectively. It is only when there is a sender, an actor who intends the consequences of violence, that we may talk about direct violence and, if not, we refer to indirect, structural violence (Galtung, 1996).

Structural violence is widely defined by Galtung (1996) as "the systematic ways in which a given social structure or social institution harms people by preventing them from meeting their basic human needs and achieving their full potential" (p. 175). Structural violence is *unintended* and, in other words, it is not exerted wilfully by a person but by a structure which is created and perpetuated by a custom or a law. Structural violence is built into the person, social and world spaces while the central underpinning is inequality, especially the inequality in the distribution of power (Galtung, 1969, p. 175). Structural violence comes from the social structure itself – between human beings, between societies and between sets of societies (alliances, regions) in the world. The violence that is built into the structure gives the citizens unequal power and life chances (Galtung, 1996). Structural violence may be divided into *political* (repressive) violence and *economic* (exploitative) violence and; supported by structural penetration, segmentation, fragmentation and marginalisation. According to Galtung, using such "protective accompaniment" strategies renders the dominant group capable of "implanting the top dog inside the underdog ... giving the

underdog only a very partial view of what goes on ... keeping the underdogs on the outside ... keeping the underdogs away from each other" (Galtung, 1996, p. 199). We may also refer to structural violence in the case of deaths that occur in the lower classes because medical and sanitary resources are concentrated in the upper classes. A structure of violence not only leaves its marks on the human body, it also impacts on both the mind and the soul (op. cit.).

Cultural violence is behind both structural and direct violence with all of it being symbolic of the function to legitimise direct or structural violence. Cultural violence may also be divided by content, namely, *religion, law and ideology, language, art, empirical/formal science and cosmology (deep culture)* and by carriers, namely, *schools, universities and, media*. Cultural violence may be epistemic in the sense that it violates the cognitive space while providing a knowledge base for legitimising the other violences. As a way of strengthening structural violence, "the culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us into seeing exploitation and/or repression as normal and natural, or into not seeing them" (Galtung, 1996, p. 198). Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence either looking or feeling "right" or, at least, not wrong (Galtung, 1996, p. 196). Cultural violence is a constituent part of structural violence in that it strengthens the components contained within the structure while it manifests itself in the dispositions of people, offering language and telling those who wield power that they have a right to do so, even a duty, for example, because the victims of direct and/or structural power are seen as pagans, savages, atheists, kulaks, or communists (Galtung, 1996). function is also to prevent either awareness and the mobilisation of such awareness, which are two of the preconditions required for the fight against structural violence to be successful. In this way, cultural violence deprives people of their human identity and freedom and reduces the victims to passive acceptors of oppression. Cultural violence is therefore a product, but also a source and maintainer, of structural and direct violence. Galtung: "With the violent structure *institutionalised* and the violent culture *internalised*, direct violence also tends to become institutionalised, repetitive, ritualistic, almost like a vendetta" (Galtung, 1996, p. 208).

It must be emphasised that cultural violence refers to those *aspects* of culture that may be used to justify or legitimise direct or structural violence, and not entire cultures themselves. Entire cultures may rarely, if ever, be classified as violent. We may assume that all cultures have aspects of violence, but also of peace. The

empirical or potential legitimation of violence is the key to understanding cultural violence.

Direct, structural and cultural violence form a violence triangle of causality:




Figure 1.1: The Vicious Violence Triangle

(Galtung, 1996)

The point of causality (cause and effect) is that the various types of violence are interrelated and they form casual chains and cycles that mutually strengthen each other. There is also a difference in the time relation of the three forms of violence. Direct violence is an *event*; structural violence is a *process* while cultural violence is the most *permanent* or *invariant* of the three forms of violence, remaining essentially the same for long periods of time given the slow transformations of the basic cultural structure. Cultural violence is a source of both structural and direct violence because oppressive contexts produce dispositions that accept and support direct and structural violence and also a product of both because the very existence of structural and direct violence requires the embodiment of the culture necessary for these types of violence to play such an important role (Haavelsrud, 2010).

Violence may start at any corner of the triangle and is easily transmitted to the other corners although the time relation of the different forms of violence ensures that the major causal direction for violence is usually cultural via structural (politics and economics) to direct violence. Cultural violence serves as a steady flow nurturing the rhythms of structural violence with patterns of exploitation being built up, worn out or torn down with the protective accompaniment of penetration-segmentation preventing consciousness formation and fragmentation-marginalisation, thus preventing organisation against exploitation and repression. At the surface, finally

visible is the direct violence perpetrated by human beings against each other, and against other forms of life and nature in general. All types of violence breed violence of any kind. Cultural and structural violence are indicated as invisible roots: a culture of violence (heroic, patriotic, patriarchal, etc.), and a structure that, itself, by virtue of being too repressive, exploitative or alienating; too tight or too loose for the comfort of people (Galtung, 1996).

This means the rejection of the popular misunderstanding that “violence is in human nature”. However, the potential for violence, like love, is intrinsic in human nature although circumstances condition the realisation of this potential. Galtung understands the concept of violence as *avoidable* insults to basic human needs and, more generally, to *life*, lowering the level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible. By looking at violence as an insult on the levels of both basic human needs and life as a whole, the distinction between direct violence and structural violence may be perceived as insults which may be divided into four groups of basic human needs:

Table 1.2: Violence and Basic Needs

	Survival needs	Well-being needs	Identity needs	Freedom needs
Direct violence	Killing	Maiming, siege, sanctions, misery	Desocialisation, resocialisation, secondary citizen	Repression, detention, expulsion
Structural violence	Exploitation A (strong)	Exploitation B (weak)	Penetration, segmentation	Marginalisation, fragmentation

(Galtung, 1996).

The outcome of this classification is eight types of violence, which may be easily identified in the case of direct violence but which are more complex for structural violence.

The first category, ***killing*** and ***maiming*** together, constitute what is commonly referred to as "casualties", and used in assessing the magnitude of war (Galtung, 1996, p. 44). War is, however, only one particular form of violence which leaves out important relations between other forms of violence. Maiming would also include, for example, insults to human needs brought about by siege/blockage and sanctions, thus resulting in slow killing because of a lack of medical attention and malnutrition

affecting the weakest first, namely, the children, the elderly, the poor and the women (Galtung, 1996, p. 44). By making the casual chain longer, Galtung continues, the actor avoids facing violence directly. He/she even gives "the victims a chance", usually to submit, although this may mean a loss of freedom and identity instead of a loss of life and limbs, trading the last two for the first two types of direct violence. With the exception of the Kautokeino Uprising (see Chapter 4), killing has not been identified in relation to the colonisation of the Sami people, thus implying that the direct violence in this case constitutes mainly opposing well-being needs, identity needs and freedom needs.

Alienation is defined by Galtung in terms of socialisation, which includes both the aspect of being *desocialised away* from own culture and the aspect of being *resocialised into* another culture, for example, the prohibition and imposition of languages. These aspects of alienation often come together in the category of *secondary citizen*, where the subjected group is forced to express the dominant culture and not its own (Galtung, 1996). This is the type of violence that the Norwegian and Swedish education systems acted out when they created boarding schools for Sami children and forbade to speak the Sami language and Joik (Sami singing) at school. In view of the fact that the teachers who taught at these institutions spoke Norwegian and Swedish only, many Sami children also became illiterate in the sense that they neither learned how to write Sami or the Norwegian/Swedish language (see Chapter 4). In this sense the Sami children were not only desocialised away from own culture, but they were also given little opportunity to resocialise into another culture.

Repression is defined by Galtung in terms a double definition, namely, the "freedom from" and the "freedom to" of the International Bill of Human Rights. The categories of *detention*, referring to locking people up in prisons or concentration camps, and *expulsion*, referring to locking people out by banishing them abroad or to distant parts of the country, have been added because of their significance as concomitants of the other forms of violence. This violence is illustrated in the Barents Region as the sustained, combined and conscious efforts of the surrounding nations to prevent the Sami peoples from mobilise any type of formation needed to affirm their right to land and freedom. Another variant of repression is illustrated by the heavily subsidised re-settlement of people in this region, concentrating them in so-called centres of development and small areas with a town at the centre. This process may

also be seen as a form of repression: “By reward amplify those who go in for consumption based on the promise of euphoria, while not positively rewarding those who do not, the consumer’s society narrows down the range of action” (Galtung, 1975, p. 113). Although this form of repression is, perhaps, better than a system that limits the range of action in terms of giving pleasure rather than pain it is, however, worse in terms of being more manipulatory and less overt.

Exploitation represents the main component of an archetypical violence structure. It refers simply to a situation in which some people, namely, those at the top, draw substantially more profit from the interaction taking place within this structure than the others, the underdogs. Thus, exploitation means unequal exchange and is, in fact, a euphemism. In case of the underdogs being so disadvantaged that they die (starve, waste away from diseases) we refer to exploitation A while being left in a permanent, unwanted state of misery, usually including malnutrition and illness, is exploitation B. By using such strategies, the dominant group is capable of implanting the top dog inside the underdog either as a mentality or as discourses (**penetration**), thus giving the underdog a very partial view only of what is happening (**segmentation**) and keeping the underdogs on the outside (**marginalisation**) and also away from each other (**fragmentation**) (Galtung, 1996, p. 199). All these sub-terms of violence function by impeding consciousness formation and mobilisation – two preconditions for the effective struggle against exploitation. For Galtung, these four sub-terms of violence should be seen as structural violence in their own right and as variations of structurally built-in repression (op. cit.).

Consequently, all four forms of structural violence have to be overcome in order to be able to approach, creatively, the basic issues of repression and exploitation. Both direct and structural violence create need-deficits. When this happens to an individual suddenly we talk about trauma. However, in the case of a group, a collectivity, we have the (less recognised) collective trauma that may sink into the collective sub-consciousness of a people. The underlying assumption linking violence and basic needs is simple: “Violence breeds violence; violence is needs-deprivation; need deprivation is serious; one reaction is direct violence, the efforts to get out of the structural iron cage, and counter violence to keep the cage intact, but there could also be a feeling of hopelessness, a deprivation or frustration syndrome that shows up on the inside as self-directed aggression and on the outside as apathy and withdrawal” (Galtung, 1996). Based on this notion, the deprivation or frustration

syndrome is seen as a *symptom* (not the disease) of the deeper, more invisible and often unintended mechanisms of violence and thus it brings to the inquiry not only the importance of recognising the atrocities that have affected the Sami population, but the need for a profound examination of it using an analytical approach that could span the whole bottom stratum of the violence-triangle.

3.1.2 Bourdieu and Passeron on symbolic violence

Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) have contributed to the aspiring pool of analytical concepts that serve to bring structural and cultural violence out of obscurity. By the term "symbolic violence", Bourdieu and Passeron developed an understanding of the complex sociological mechanisms that accompany the form of cultural violence that forces subordinated groups not just to internalise the dominant culture but also to proactively support the illegitimacy of own cultures.

According to Bourdieu and Passeron, symbolic violence is epitomised by what they refer to as *genesis amnesia*, which finds expression in the collective and individual genesis disposition that we tend to perceive as "natural" and "normal". *Genesis amnesia* is at work when we accept the naive notion that things have always been as they are. It is part of the cultural violence which prevents people from identifying violent relations in the society as products of history but, instead, naturalise and eternalise violence by suppressing it below the level of cultural consciousness. Once this link has been buried in the social structure and internalised as normal and natural, the misrecognition of reality and truths is then imposed on the dominated group by the positing of the ideology of the dominant culture as the only authentic or universal culture. The purpose of this imposition is to make the dominated groups internalise the disciplines and censorships that best serve the material and symbolic interests of the dominant groups. The imposition of another culture is also accompanied by the imposition of the legitimacy of the dominant culture and by the illegitimacy of the dominated culture through *inculcation* or *exclusion*. This is decisive in ensuring that the dominated group proactively recognise the illegitimacy of their own cultural situation and they are persuaded both to recognise the new definition of "legitimate knowledge", and to devalue the knowledge and values they effectively command (such as complex, indigenous social relations, ethical systems and laws, technology, art and language).

The techniques that are in play when symbolic violence is imposed and sustained are multi-faceted. The most important of these techniques include the following:

- concealment of the actual power relations
- concealment of the truth of the contents being inculcated
- concealment of the truths of its nature
- conferring some form of "legitimacy" on itself
- infusing altruism as a device in such concealment;
- delegation of the crude functions to agents and institutions
- establishing durable training to establish an amenable and fresh repository/conservatory of traditions that are more pliant and amenable, on the one hand, and to ensure radical conversion in the long term, on the other (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977, cited in Hoppers, 1998, p. 53).

For Bourdieu and Passeron, every power that manages to impose meanings and, in addition, to impose these meanings as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the foundation of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations. In such an instance, education, in its broadest sense, becomes a key instrument. The various pedagogical agents mediate the effects of the domination by objectively or indirectly collaborating in the dominating function of the dominant group. Bourdieu and Passeron point out that the pedagogic authority, as a power of symbolic violence, continues without protestation and therefore it succeeds in reproducing itself because the arbitrary power, which renders the imposition possible, is *never seen in its full truth* (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Hoppers, 1998, p. 54). In other words, the dominant culture uses the pedagogic field to inculcate the cultural arbitrary of own culture by presenting a content that is never seen in its full truth.

Entrenched in this "authority" to exert symbolic violence is a power which manifests itself in the form of a right to impose legitimately, and which reinforces the arbitrary power which establishes it, and which it conceals. Bourdieu and Passeron point out that the recognition of the legitimacy of a domination always constitutes a force which

strengthens the established balance of power because, by obstructing the identification of power relations as power relations, this force prevents the dominated groups from identifying and mobilising their own strength that is needed to fight against domination. This form of symbolic violence therefore makes it extremely difficult to locate the essence of violence. The social significance of pedagogic action is camouflaged by techniques that conceal power relations under the guise of an altruistic or purely psychological relationship. At the same time, the system of authority employs techniques that hinder the agents shaped by this form of imposition from realising their arbitrary character. This guise is sustained because the agents or institutions function as the delegated holders of the right to exercise symbolic violence. The task of the agents is to initiate a process of inculcation which must last long enough to ensure durable training (i.e. the internalisation of the principles of the cultural arbitrary to the extent that it is capable of perpetuating itself after the pedagogic action has ceased) (Hoppers, 1998, p. 54). Once the project of inculcation is complete, that is, the complete substitution of one habitus¹³ by another, or the primary habitus confirmed, the pedagogic action has fulfilled its role as a "conservatory of inherited traditions" (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977, cited in Hoppers, 1998).

3.1.3 Lindner's theory of humiliation

Lindner (2006) introduces the theory of humiliation into the issue of how to understand violence and, thereby, takes us one step further in understanding how violence may be transformed constructively. Traditionally, humiliation was "a universally accepted and honourable tool" which was used to maintain the stability, law and order which was the order of "vertically ranking human value and essence" (Lindner, 2006, p. 34). In a society characterised by verticality, each hierarchical level

¹³ The concept "habitus" refers to Bourdieu's description of "the socially informed body". Bourdieu defines habitus as "a system of lasting and transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions", or a set of historical relations deposited within individual bodies in the form of the mental and corporeal schemata of perceptions, appreciations, and actions. Agents who have internalised the specific necessity of a field in the form of habitus would become active reproducers (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 105). Habitus is not "an object to be studied in relation to culture" but is "the existential ground of culture". Emotion is an inseparable aspect of the "spontaneous" religious behaviour enacted in a "behavioural environment much broader than any single event" (Bourdieu, 1984, p 20).

is characterised by its own sense of honour. Underlings may be assisted by what may be called "voluntary self-humiliation," concealed in various definitions of honour (Lindner, 2006, p. 34). In such situations, anguish and pain were valued as *honourable medicine* rather than as something which is unfortunate. Lindner labelled the humiliation practised in hierarchical honour societies *honour humiliation*.

The opposite of honour humiliation is an understanding of humiliation in a human rights context, which Lindner labels *dignity humiliation*. Individuals may not define themselves as victims unless they make the long mental and emotional journey from honour humiliation to dignity humiliation. When people are given the opportunity to compare themselves with others, expectations of equal dignity and opportunity arise from the ruins of honour humiliation while the unawareness of absolute deprivation may be replaced by an awareness of relative deprivation with what used to be accepted as "normal" and "natural" being rejected as inequalities.

In short, Lindner (2006, p. 31-32) describes the following three possible outcomes of the effects of humiliation:

- Acquiescence, or depression and apathy.
- Antagonism, anger, rage, and the violent pursuit of change. Often hierarchy is not abolished but merely reversed.
- Antagonism, anger, rage, and the non-violent pursuit of change, including forgiveness and reconciliation, and the dismantling of hierarchy in favour of human rights based system of equal dignity for all.

In outcome (1) the victims of humiliation turn their rage inwards, transforming it into a state of apathy or frustration. Nothing changes. In outcome (2) the humiliation is reversed by inflicting humiliation on the supposed humiliators and bringing about yet another cycle of humiliation. The third outcome, however, adds non-violence and systems of forgiveness and reconciliation together with the rejection of the hierarchy – the root causes of the humiliation itself (op. cit.).

3.1.4 Violence and deep culture

A central presupposition in this study was that the colonisation problem is linked to cultural violence, namely, to intended or unintended ways of justifying direct and structural violence. One approach to dealing with cultural violence would be to identify various cultural aspects, for example, in religious and ideological thought, in language and art, in empirical and formal science, all of them serving to justify the violence. There is also the approach which involves exploring the substratum of the culture to find its deep culture. In so doing we look at the roots of the roots, so to speak: the cultural genetic code that generates cultural elements and reproduces itself through these elements (Galtung, 1996, p. 211). However, what exactly is meant by deep culture and how is this concept relevant to the discussion on peace and development in this context?

The concepts of peace and development depend on the way in which collectivities behave and act. In this sense collectivity means a collectivity, as in a shared civilisation with a civilization being conceived of as a macro-culture, extended in space and time. Culture may be conceived of as the symbolic aspect of the human condition, *informing us* what is true and false, good and bad, right and wrong, beautiful and ugly, sacred and profane, etc (Galtung, 1996, p. 211). In other words, culture offers a code, "a world view on nature, humans, society, world, time, the beyond, and how to come to grips with all that" (Galtung, 2008a, p. 206). At a deeper level, a culture informs us not only about what is true or good, but *why* it is either true or good. Thus, deep culture, also the collective sub-consciousness, in a given civilisation, comprises the shared deep assumptions about reality, about what *is*, in the sense of being *true*, the case. In other words, it refers to the collectively held subconscious ideas about what constitutes normal and natural reality (Galtung, 1996, p. 211). However, despite the fact that the deep culture is shared and obvious, it is not necessarily conscious and, hence, it belongs to the subconscious. They refer to those assumptions about reality that are available on recall. These assumptions are present in everybody – like a cultural "reflex" navigating individuals more or less in the same direction – are shared to the point that everybody assumes that others harbour the same assumptions (Galtung, 1996).

In the case of the Barents Region, there are cultural aspects legitimising the imposition of the majority culture on the minority culture because the imposing

culture sees itself as "higher", more "civilised" than the minority culture (Chapter 4). Thus, there is violence built into that culture, in other words, cultural violence. Consequently, a central task of this study was to explore the cultural violence revealed in the way in which the colonisers/oppressors "see the Other". This ultimately touches upon certain aspects of the deep culture within the culture in question.

However, the purpose of including the concept of deep culture in this study was not to portray a complete list of codes but, rather, to serve as a tool for *enlargement*. For example, from the notion of deep culture there emerges the possibility of exploring the sphere of moral philosophy from a peace and violence perspective by drawing attention to the basic cultural structure of the tradition in question, for example, by examining how the Other is located and perceived within the ethical systems prevailing in the Barents Region (see Chapters 5 and 8). The notion of deep culture also opens up the possibility introducing "space mentalities" as an alternative approach to discuss the framework for promoting peace and human development in the Barents Region (see Chapter 7).

3.2 The concepts of peace and human development

Based on the understanding of violence perceived as insults to basic human needs and life in general, the implication for the challenge of peace building and human development in the Barents Region must involve the challenge of reducing violence, analysing its forms, causes and effects, making predictions in order to prevent it, and then taking preventive and curative action. Striving for peace based on the definition of peace as the negation of violence would mean mobilise resistance to, and not the acceptance of, violence in the context in question. This mobilisation process relies on the ability to reveal structural and cultural violence, which often escapes deep scrutiny when all eyes are fixed on the surface of violence (Galtung, 1996, p 2). Clearly, the task of confronting the extensive scale of the atrocities which took place requires a profound analysis of violence. However, it is as important to note the urgent need for something peaceful to replace the violence. Accordingly, the following key question arises: How to construct the best possible conceptual platform to prevent violence while, at the same time, fostering the restorative antidotes that

bring about the prosperity required for mediation, forgiveness, healing and reparation?

3.2.1 *Galtung's theory of peace*

Galtung has worked with the question of peace for more than sixty years. He formulated the essence of his theory of peace (2013) in the following, very brief formula:

$$\text{Peace} = \frac{\text{equity x empathy}^{14}}{\text{trauma x conflict}}$$

This formula addresses four tasks. The numerator denotes equity multiplied with empathy and which is divided by the threats to peace, namely, trauma multiplied with conflict. Positive peace is understood as a relationship between equity and harmony whereas negative peace is the relationship between the presence of unsolved conflicts and unreconciled traumas.

Equity may be defined as cooperation for mutual and equal benefit. Galtung (2013) emphasises that it is not sufficient to speak just about cooperation and the important point is *equal* benefit.

Empathy is related to harmony. Empathy means understanding the other as the other understands himself/herself. However, it does not mean agreeing or disagreeing, sympathy or antipathy. Instead, it simply means being "inside the other". Empathy establishes harmony. Harmony means feeling the sorrow of the other, feeling the joy of the other, sharing sorrow, sharing joy and emotional resonance. For example, we imagine the case of two persons and these two persons have managed their cooperation, often termed partnership, for their mutual and equal benefit. At the same time they have a deep understanding of each other, knowing what causes sadness and what causes for joy but, more than that, feeling the sadness of the other and feeling the joy of the other. This may sound good but there are two factors


¹⁴ Galtung (2013) originally used the concept of harmony. However, I follow his practice in his recent Antwerp lecture (Galtung, 2016) when he replaced the concept of harmony with the concept of empathy.

lurking in the denominator of the fraction, namely, unreconciled trauma and unsolved conflict.

Traumas are the residues of the violence of the past. Traumas may be reconciled by clearing the past and creating a future through conciliation which wishes the violence undone and proposing future cooperative joint projects.

Conflict is not violence although it may lead to violence. A conflict has three dimensions. The first dimension is behaviour, which is observed at the manifest, empirical, overt level and which is represented by the letter *B*. There is evidently something underneath the behaviour in all cases, something hidden, which is referred to as assumptions (cognitions), and as attitudes (emotions), wrapped up together by the letter *A*. There is also the content, a contradiction, which refers to incompatible goals in a goal-seeking system. The only systems that are acceptable as goal seeking are living systems which are capable of experiencing the realisation of a goal as happiness and deprivation as suffering. Consequently, we may never assume that a gender, a generation, a race, a class, a nation, a region, a state etc have own goals as these are all abstractions. Both the happiness derived from goal-fulfilment and the suffering derived from goal-deprivation presuppose a *subject*. Conflict is therefore about life, pointing to contradiction as both life-creative and life-destructive. In other words, *conflict = A (attitudes/assumptions) + B (behaviour) + C (contradiction/content)*. The conflict is a triadic construct as illustrated in Figure 3.2 below.

Figure 3.2: The Conflict Triangle



(Galtung, 1996)¹⁵

The conflict triangle (ABC) is the figure above is depicted as an iceberg, where ten per cent of the conflict, the behaviour, only appears on the surface. The remaining ninety per cent, the A (attitude/assumptions) and the C (contradiction/content) corners are, hidden below the surface of the water and are less accessible to both the conflict parties and others not directly involved in the conflict. The A-corner represents the conflict actor's knowledge about and emotions towards the conflict and conflict parties. It also includes the stamina and volition of the conflict actors. The C-corner relates to the issue of what the conflict is all about. When goals collide, a conflict arises. Thus, something has happened *between* people. Attitudes and behaviour are seen as reactions to the contradiction. The transcend method of conflict transformation is based on a change in all three corners and thus it involves the task of revealing what is hidden in corner A and C in order to transform the conflict constructively (Galtung, 2000).

Galtung emphasises that conflict resolution restricted to the A and B corners without taking into account the contradiction itself would be a dangerous undertaking in that it may lead to the pacification of the victims and/or the witnesses of the direct, structural and cultural violence in the reality in question (Haavelsrud, 2010). All corners must be dealt with to transform the conflict constructively. In addition to ABC there are also often deep attitudes, deep behaviour and deep contradictions. Peace may be defined in relation to the conflict triangle as “the ability to handle conflicts with

¹⁵ Model designed by Melv er and Lien for SABONA, TRANSCEND Peace University 2008.

empathy (attitude/assumptions), non-violence (behaviour) and creativity (contradiction/content) (Galtung, 2000). However, it is important to note that conflict is not, in itself, violence, but that the incompatible goals may lead to violence. The solution to a conflict involves rendering these incompatible goals compatible. This requires creativity. The point of such creativity is to ask whether there is something we are able to do with the context and whether there are some aspects of a new reality that we may bring in so that the goals become compatible?

Galtung's peace formula distinguishes between a positive dimension (equity x empathy) and a negative dimension (trauma x conflict). The relationship between the positive and the negative is a dynamic process in which the building of positive peace is seen in relation to the healing of traumas and the transformation of conflicts. I agree with Haavelsrud (2016) who concludes that, to build peace according to Galtung's formula, means to increase the equity and empathy and to decrease the negative energy rooted in the unhealed traumas and in the conflicts that have been hidden from view.

From the perspectives of the violence triangle, negative peace would involve the reduction of direct, structural, and cultural violence. Negative peace has a long history. It appears predominantly in the common-sense definitions of peace. The absence of war, and/or any other forms of organised physical violence, appears to be easy to define. However, as mentioned earlier, the concept of negative peace is more fruitful if such negative peace includes the absence of violence in general and at all levels and not just the absence of war. Nevertheless, the absence of violence should not be confused with the absence of conflict as violence may occur without conflict while conflict may be resolved non-violently (Galtung, 1996, p. 223). A negative peace relation between, for example, two nations would involve no violence but no other form of interaction either and is probably best characterised "coexistence" (Galtung, 1996). The positive definition of peace, then, highlights the *presence* of patterns of cooperation and integration at all levels.

Table 1.3: Violence and Peace: Direct, Structural and Cultural Violence

Violence	Direct = harming, hurting	Structural = harming, hurting	Cultural = justifying violence
Negative peace	(1) Absence of = ceasefire	(2) Absence of = no exploitation; or structure = anomie	(3) Absence of = no justification; or culture = anomie
Positive peace	(4) Presence of = cooperation	(5) Presence of = equity, equality	(6) Presence of = culture of peace, and dialogue
Peace	Negative + positive	Negative + positive	Negative + positive

(Galtung, 2008a, p. 130)

When drawing from the concept of nonviolence, the dimension of positive peace could be embedded as a substitute of violence. The triangular syndrome of violence could then be contrasted with a triangular syndrome of peace in which cultural peace (cultural nonviolence) engenders structural peace (structural nonviolence), with symbiotic, equitable relations among diverse partners, and direct peace (direct nonviolence) with acts of cooperation, partnership, friendliness, and love (Galtung, 2008a).

We arrive then at a *virtuous*, rather than the vicious violence triangle, which also reinforces and forms causal waves of peace, thus generating the following typology:

Direct positive peace consists of verbal and physical kindness, it is good to the body, mind and spirit of Self and Other and it addresses to all basic needs, survival, well-being, freedom and identity. Love is the epitome of this direct positive peace as a union of bodies, minds and spirits. Direct positive peace would involve the use of nonviolent techniques to influence conflicts without the use of violence, for example, by confronting all the decisions, laws and systems that do not treat all humans equally. The struggle for the abolition of slavery, decolonisation, removal of patriarchal structures as well as resistance against wars and imperialistic policies are all examples of this type of peace (Galtung, 2008a).

Structural positive peace substitutes *freedom* for repression and *equity* for exploitation, and then reinforces this with *dialogue* instead of penetration, *integration* instead of segmentation, *solidarity* instead of fragmentation, and *participation* instead of marginalisation. Structural positive peace would, for example, consist of those structures in our society that promote cooperation, reconciliation, openness, equality and peaceful actions in conflict situations. In the case of the unequal distribution of basic needs, resources, freedoms, and rights a nonviolent structure provides the people with the opportunity to address such conflicts using peaceful means. In this case, “peaceful” involves more than just the tools of direct nonviolence. In fact, it includes several types of mediation, conflict transformation, and reconciliation as well (Galtung, 2008a).

Cultural positive peace substitutes the legitimisation of peace for the legitimisation of violence in religion, law, and ideology; in language; in art and science; in schools, in universities, and in the media; building a positive *peace culture*. According to Galtung, in the inner space of the Self, this means to open oneself up several human inclinations and capabilities and not repress them (Galtung, 1996). Cultural positive peace points to those aspects of our culture that transmit traditions of nonviolent behaviour and which commemorate and honour nonviolent values and qualities. It is worth noticing that, among indigenous people, many of these nonviolent values, techniques and ethics are continuing to play a dominant role in their communities.

As does violence breed violence, so does peace of any kind also breed peace of any kind. Galtung (1996) maintains that positive peace always offers the best protection against violence. In addition, unlike in violence, where there is a lower limit in terms of death, the dimension of positive peace is totally open with the sky as the limit as there is no upper limit to the degree of harmony between people. If working for peace means reducing violence and, consequently, helping to build peace using peaceful means, then we could argue that research into peace should also include the study of the most peaceful cases of conflict transformation. Despite violent clashes, the ability to cooperate has marked human history since early days. Human societies could not have developed without a strong force of cooperation and the capacity to solve conflicts without the use of violence. However, a major problem for those who search for the peaceful roots in our cultures is that the majority of the peaceful cases of conflict resolution (nonviolent behaviours) are not even remarked upon with most of the large databases on conflicts only noting cases where the numbers killed are

high. The media pays the most attention to acts of violence and the consequences of such actions. Is there a valid reason why not academia, in general, and peace researchers, in particular, should also focus on the most peaceful cases?

The approach to peace in this study involves the dual combination of negative + positive peace. In the context of the Barents Region I find it especially relevant to explore the positive peace dimension, identifying elements of cooperation, equity, equality, culture of peace and dialogue. The search for alternatives to the notion of colonialism anchored in the concept of sustainable social cohesion and the work of recognising and enlarging indigenous knowledge systems are both components of this positive peace approach.

Moreover, the notion that peace may be brought about by people, in fact, by *all* people, and not just governments and the elites of governments, opens up a conceptual possibility of exploring the cultural resources for peace in remote areas of the world such as the Barents Region. The search for positive peace in this study mainly involved the work of enlarging the peace competence related to the people-to-people cooperation culture in the Barents Region (including indigenous people) which, despite various physical and psychological barriers, has managed to maintain peaceful social cohesion in the border-zone between western and eastern part of Europe.

3.2.2 Freire's concept of conscientisation

Each corner in the conflict triangle has a story to tell, a story to be *articulated*. In the case of all corners being disarticulated, this would mean attitudes are dying out, behaviour patterns are receding into oblivion and contradiction is dissolving. What is needed, however, is the opposite, namely, a complete and fully articulated conflict. This process requires lifting the attitude/assumption (A-corner) and contradiction/content (C-corner) up into the daylight, thus making it manifest. This requires consciousness about where the incompatibility is located and what attitudes are at work. According to Paulo Freire (1970), the process of lifting A and C to above the surface, partly even from the unconscious, may be referred to as *conscientisation*. Freire's use of "conscience" rather than "consciousness" points to volition and emotion and not just to cognition. The process of conscientisation is basic to any conflict transformation for how would it be possible for a conflict to be

consciously transformed unless the parties to a conflict are conscious subjects and true actors?

Conscientisation leads to *praxis*, which integrates both reflection and action, i.e. both the A and B corners in the conflict triangle. This reflection is not only about A and B respectively, but also about A and B in relation to C. In fact, we may argue that C is always present in both A and B (Haavelsrud, 2010). Praxis differs from the practice of daily habitual behaviour without reflection. In addition, it also different from intellectual reflection without action. Freire understands praxis as a powerful process which is developed in a dialogical encounter in a constant interplay between reflection and action. This means that the process is not limited to a study of violence and its causes but that it extends into a project that seeks to transform it into a vision of less violence. We may therefore talk about praxis when action is combined with an understanding and confrontation of violence, an understanding of a vision of a future society and also an understanding of the actions required for bridging the gap between the violent present and the future vision (Haavelsrud, 2010). Freire emphasises that this transformation is not limited to the world separate from the human being but that it includes the transformation of self in the world.

Conscientisation and praxis describe the process required to transform the interests in a conflict into consciously held values and to transform a non-organised, non-crystallised party (to a structural conflict) into an actor (in a conflict). Otherwise, the conflict will transform the actors as objects, as parties to the conflict, and not the other way around. According to Galtung (1996), transformation will occur anyhow but, with conscientisation added, the actor will be able to steer the transformation as "the driver presiding over the process, not only a passenger taken for a ride". Peaceful conflict resolution depends on both conscientisation and praxis. Using praxis as a point of departure change in any corner of the ABC triangle depends upon both reflection and action. It is therefore necessary to focus on to the behavioural component (B-corner). Only after behaviour change in harmony with peaceful dispositions and the creation of peaceful structures may we talk about a praxis in which all three corners of the conflict triangle are involved at the same time (Haavelsrud, 2010) Conscientisation and praxis are, therefore, seen as basic in any development of peaceful conflict behaviour with sufficient power to resist oppression, intolerance and the violation of human rights.

3.2.3 Bourdieu's concept of dispositions

The French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, developed a great insight into the understanding of how the dispositions of the human being to think, feel, and act is a product of the societal conditions in which the human being has been socialised: The dispositions of the human being are influenced by both the material and the objective conditions in which these dispositions have been developed (Bourdieu, 1984). Thus, societies which are characterised by peaceful relations in the macro are also likely to be characterised by peaceful dispositions whereas societies with a high level of violence in their institutions at the macro level would be characterised by high levels of violent dispositions (Haavelsrud, 2010).

Bourdieu (1984) argues that the dispositions of the human being and objective reality seek harmony. If we assume that Bourdieu (1984) is correct, then two main approaches to peaceful conflict resolution become evident. The first approach is to change objective reality while the second approach is to change the dispositions. However, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive. It is therefore reasonable to start from both sides in order to meet somewhere in between. This implies that support for peaceful conflict resolution is established in all three corners of the conflict triangle. Haavelsrud (2010) argues that such a synchronised attack would be the most efficient in that both dispositions and objective reality are transformed concurrently. He points out that, in some cases, there is an almost immediate structural change in the behaviour of people, e.g. it did not take long for Norwegians to learn not to smoke in restaurants after a new law had taken effect on 1 June 2004. However, in other cases, it may take longer for dispositions to adapt to the new contextual conditions, for example, in the transition from apartheid to civil rights for all in South Africa (Haavelsrud, 2010).

Despite the fact that Bourdieu is neither outspoken about conscientisation nor does he go into the process leading to the resistance of contextual conditions, his concept of dispositions relates to thinking, feeling and acting and therefore it covers both the A and B corners of the conflict triangle. Assuming that Bourdieu is correct in arguing that the dispositions of the human being and objective reality seek harmony, this would have significant consequences for any transformation process, including the peaceful resolution of conflicts. It is, for example, expected that conflict behaviour contributing to a change in oppressive reality would have to demonstrate some form

of opposition to the dominant forces sustaining the volume and quality of the violence. For example, it would have been disastrous for the black people of the United States and South Africa if the conflict resolution programmes had resulted in the pacification of Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela. This would have implied that they had adapted to the existing racist contextual conditions (Haavelsrud, 2010). However, the harmony cited in the examples above was established by a change in the contextual conditions as a result of people's resistance and opposition to the violent conditions.

Resistance is characterised by the refusal to tolerate violent conditions and is an illustration of the force to which Bourdieu is referring, namely, the force of harmony between individual disposition and objective reality. Bourdieu asserts that harmony between objective reality and dispositions may be brought about by a change in any one of them, simultaneously or not, because they tend to seek harmony. Thus, if the existing conditions are stronger than the dispositions, the latter would have to adapt to the existing reality. However, the resistance itself would not be sufficient unless we also analyse the C-corner in the conflict triangle and it is only by analysing the C-corner that we may arrive at an understanding of what to do and how to act.

3.2.4 The conflict triangle and the Sami people

The conflict(s) between the Sami people and the surrounding nations is not mapped according to Galtung's conflict triangle. The ability to reveal the two "invisible" corners of the violence triangle (structural and cultural violence) is, in this case, deceived by the fact that the major aspect of the problem of the colonisation of the Sami lies beneath the surface, i.e. the impeding problem of occlusion. It is only the behaviour that is manifested at the visible level and it is not sufficiently linked to the attitudes at work and to the contradiction itself.

It is essential that both the violence triangle and the conflict triangle are *fully articulated* in order to effectively address the problems of the (1) *resolution* of the underlying, root conflict; (2) *reconstruction* after violence: rehabilitation after direct violence; restructuring after structural violence; restoration after cultural damage and, finally; (3) *reconciliation* between the conflict parties involved (Haavelsrud, 2000). All these problems have to be addressed. To do this, Galtung suggests a synchronic approach, namely, an all-at-the-same-time rather than a diachronic, linear, one-after-

the-other approach. In fact, "if you do only one of these three without the other two you will not even get that one", states Galtung (2002, p. 60). He is then even more explicit: "We could, for example, see Hegel's position as an attempt at arguing reconciliation between master and servant, without resolution; Marx argues resolution without any reconciliation; reconstruction without removing the causes of violence will lead to its reproduction" (Galtung, 2002, p. 63). In other words, theory and practice which addresses all three of the problems indicated above is needed in order to create peaceful solutions which all the actors involved in the conflict find acceptable and which are sustainable by the actors.

This point also highlights both the need to recognise the challenge of *synchronism* as well as the need to develop common discourses which combine the cultural and structural approach to peace.

I do not have either a formula or an infallible strategy which may be used to drag the A and C corners of the conflict above the surface (conscientisation) although a heightened awareness of the hitherto concealed relations of structural and cultural violence (cause of violence) as well as an increased consciousness of the particular wounds inflicted (effects of violence) would be an important step towards a more complete articulation of the conflict. A profound recognition of the historical atrocities is important, mainly because it helps in understanding and identifying the trauma which is the residue of the violence of the past. In addition, this insight may create an opportunity to learn more about the nature of the colonisation problem which would ultimately mean that we (the citizens of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia) would have to recognise that we are, in some way, part of the problem and thus we must be part of the solution (conscientisation). Without conscientisation, we will not be able to transform the wounds of disenfranchisement, self-hate and self-blame into a virtuous cycle of empowerment, self-respect and dignity. Without conscientisation, we will not be able to transform the conflict with empathy, non-violence and creativity. Without conscientisation, we will be not the drivers presiding over the process but, instead, we will be passengers being taken for a ride. At the same time, the challenge of promoting peace and human development may also start at the positive peace end by posing the questions: What is the cause of peace? What is the effect of peace? This would be an equally important step in articulation as the recognition of the positive peace dimension may prove to be even more valuable to the immense task of building peace.

3.3 SARCHI Chair on peace and human development

The choice of insistently adding the prefix "human" to the concept of development throughout this thesis is deliberate and refers to the SARCHI Framework and Strategy document which also add the prefix "human" in an attempt to

“... rescue “development” from its toxic associations with serial displacements, linearity, epistemological disenfranchisement, and the logic of consumption, accumulation and “progress. Although the prefix “human” does not completely save “development” from its inherent baggage, introducing “human” to it introduces a multidimensional approach to social change, in which “human-ness” linked to livelihood as a chain of being connects life with life-cycle, life worlds and cosmology.” (Hoppers, 2009, p. 3, quoting Visvanathan, 2008)

Drawing on the contributions of Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, and the United Nation Development Programme, the SARCHI Chair endorses a philosophy of *human* development. *Human* refers to the entire human species and to every culture. Adding the prefix "human" to development involves the refusal to identify with what development stands for in relation to economic growth (Hoppers and Richards, 2011). The pitfall of development, Hoppers argues, "lies not only in the fact that it defines the principal social objectives of all countries as consumption and accumulation. In its unquestioned link with colonialism and the reductionist ethos in science, it has made it next to impossible to study inter-subjective grounds of human action – i.e. socially shared and instituted meanings through which people live" (Hoppers, 2008, p. 3). The SARCHI Chair stresses that the attempt to release development from its inherent baggage is particularly important in both Africa and in other parts of the global South:

“... Africa cannot develop the way the West did – sequentially, linearly according to the idea of progress where the tribal and the peasant evolved into an industrial system with the associated violence explained as “necessary”. Africa must develop synchronically in a model in which the tribe, the peasant, the rural and industry must co-evolve.” (Hoppers, 2017, p. 4)

Thus, staking out a path for development which is compatible with Africa as a civilisation in its own right – meaning, a notion of development detached from colonial discourses – requires a separation from the notion of development based on a notion of progress which is understood only in terms of economic growth.

However, if we also consider that the notion of progress, which is understood as economic growth, is firmly rooted in Occidental cosmology and that Western civilisation understands itself as the universal civilisation, and universalises its history as the development history for others, thus implying that development is understood as Western development and thus modernisation and economic growth, then any attempt to define development in another key would, ultimately, be a struggle at the level of deep culture. In this light, the attempt to stake out a different path for development which is more compatible with the cosmology and livelihood of Africa, for example, should be seen as an essential aspect of building a peace culture in that context. Galtung (1996) explains this point as follows:

“If development is seen as the unfolding of culture, an endogenous process, the realisation of the code and cosmology of that culture, then if one civilisation imposes its definition of development on another, then we are dealing with a major case of cultural violence, of grafting another cultural code onto another people's culture, thereby legitimising what may have been illegitimate and vice versa. At best this may leave an entire people confused, at worst expose them to culturocide, the killing of their own culture, leading to gross alienation and, possibly, to physical individual and collective suicide.” (Galtung, 1996, p. 201)

It is clear from the above quotation that, when promoting human development in contexts where development has been imposed from the outside, from another culture or civilization, the key challenge of such development is to replace what is alien with a notion which is more compatible with the code of development embraced by that civilization and livelihood. In other words, by adding the prefix "human" to the concept of development, the most important brick has already been added to the theoretical and conceptual platform for promoting peace building and restorative action in the Barents Region.

3.3.1 *Modernity's Other – according to Hoppers and Richards*

The basis of transformation by enlargement rests on the challenge of “bringing in what modernity has left out”. The term “Modernity's Other” is applied in this text and refers to the particular account presented by Hoppers and Richards in their work *Rethinking Thinking: Modernity's Other and the Transformation of the University* (2011). This particular account holds important clues for understanding what exactly is at stake when the issue of peace building is subjected to transformation by enlargement and the work of bringing in that which modernity has left out.

In order to define modernity and Modernity's Other, Hoppers and Richards enter into a dialogue with various scholars, of whom the most important is Max Weber (1864-1920).¹⁶ Following Weber, modernity implies the progressive economic and administrative rationalisation and differentiation of the social world. By differentiation is meant, for example, the separation of fact from value, of the ethical from the theoretical spheres. According to German sociological theory, in which Weber played an extremely influential role, these were the processes that brought into being the modern capitalist industrial state. For Weber, modernity is therefore understood as capitalism and bureaucracy (*Gesellschaft*), while Modernity's Other is community (*Gemeinschaft*). What Weber refers to as *Gemeinschaftshandeln* (community-oriented conduct) is human action in general. It is conduct which is oriented towards the *meaningful* actions of other human beings. Accordingly, Hoppers and Richards argue that the study of Modernity's Other (*Gemeinschaft*) is therefore “the general study of human beings. It is the wider lens. It is the more inclusive paradigm” (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 52).

For Weber, modernity is distinguished from Modernity's Other by its rationality, by what he terms systematic and full rationality (*Zweckrationalität*). This rationality,

¹⁶ Hoppers and Richards also mention other contributors and perspectives that are complementary to Weber, such as Alain Touraine, who emphasises that modernity consists, both in terms of rationality and of freeing the subjects, where the latter is seen as more important for the future of modernity; Jürgen Habermas, who argues that modernity is instrumental rationality (system world) dethroning tradition (lifeworld), where the solution for modernity is to develop a rationality as communicative action; Anthony Giddens, who emphasises that modernity's rationality consists of the components of surveillance, industrialism, capitalism and military power; Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, who make a distinction (as Hoppers and Richards do) “between *sociétés pollysegmentées* organised by kinship, and modern societies organised by the division of labour made possible by markets” (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 53).

Weber argues, permeates the West and distinguishes it from other societies. At the heart of this is the most fateful power of our modern life, namely, capitalism. It is capitalism that defines for the modern West what it means to be rational. Hoppers and Richards then emphasise that "modern rational business enterprise cannot function without a rational structure of law and government. Rational calculation in business is impossible without a rational jurisprudence. Therefore, modernity is basically Western" (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 54).

In order to formulate their own explanation of what modernity is, Hoppers and Richards (2011, p. 54) then make the following corrections to Weber's account:

- The motives for the typically modern behaviour consisting of investing for the sake of accumulating wealth may (some of the time) be *religious* as Weber famously claims, but the constitutive rules that make it possible to do so are *legal*.
- Weber's stories about superior European rationality in field after field are not plausible. His claim that a modern-type jurisprudence makes possible the business calculations that orient modern western economic rationality *is* plausible.

After making these important corrections, what remains as the difference between Weber and the account of Hoppers and Richards is that, while Weber emphasises a certain type of rationality (*Zweckrationalität*) which is identified with modernity both in its capitalist and in its bureaucratic form, Hoppers and Richards emphasise the *basic cultural structure*. They both identify that the *Zweckrationalität* is possible only in the type of legal and normative framework which Hoppers and Richards identify as "constituting modernity".

Hoppers and Richards then take us one step further by arguing: "the modern legal framework not only makes capital accumulation *possible*. It also makes it necessary" (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 55). In other words, once the system is in place the system drives us more than we drive it:

"Once one lives in a system where livelihood depends on sales (contracts) and production is for the sake of sales, it becomes imperative to maintain the confidence in profitability that keeps such a

system moving. The dynamics of a global economy constituted by civil and commercial law derived largely from Roman traditions are dynamics generated by rules, not by persons. The world system drives us more than we drive it." (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 55)

In other words, the "box of law" generates the dynamic. Government, Hoppers and Richards argue, "is limited in its capacity to cope with intractable problems, or with any problems, *because Roman concepts of property and contract precede its formation*. They frame its context, and limit its powers" (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 55). Thus, Hoppers and Richards conclude that, if, today, we find ourselves run more *by* the global economy than running the global economy, this is because the world system, once constituted, does what it wants. It will not, until we rethink thinking so as to become smarter than we are now, do what we want (op. cit.).

3.3.2 *Bringing in the excluded but aspiring voice*

To add the prefix "human" means to add to the discourse of development that which has been excluded by modernity. In order to provide an account of transformation by enlargement, Hoppers and Richards (2011) draw attention to the geopolitical word play that appeared in relation to the concepts of the "First", "Second" and "Third" Worlds, and where the main contestation was about the exact meaning of "Third" in this context.

Hoppers and Richards assert that when Alfred Sauvy first used the term "Third World" in an article published in 1952, it was not the work of a single intellectual, but echoed the reality of the continents that had been excluded from power in the world by the other two, namely, the First (the West) and Second (the East) Worlds "whose conflict had monopolised the spotlight in history" (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 14). Sauvy's notion of the Third World as excluded, but *aspiring* to a role in history independent of the superpowers and the conflict between them, also carried with it the notion of a great revolutionary potential for the continents that had been excluded from power in the world. According to Hoppers and Richards, the term has, over time, come to express the idea that this very exclusion "has generated common characteristics in the historical experience of the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East: reactions of *unrest, struggle and resistance*" (op. cit.).

Before Sauvy coined the term "Third", the vocabulary used in this context was very different. "Words such as 'backward', 'primitive', 'savage', 'uncivilised', even 'barbarian' abounded and expressed both the tradition of western superiority, whether a racist or paternalist version; and the inferiority of all else. Inbuilt in this string of concepts is a hierarchy of human beings and an objective for the improvement of these inferior societies, usually to imitate the West (Hoppers, 1998, p. 17).

Hoppers and Richards explain that in Sauvy's notion, the term "Third" was not understood as third in a hierarchy but as in different from the other two, for example, a third social and economic system which was different from the capitalism and socialism of the first and second worlds. More importantly, Sauvy's term suggested that the Third World is in fact a world of ideas and culture that despite being ignored and despised, also has aspirations and wants to contribute to the world (Hoppers and Richards, 1998, p. 17).

It is this notion of "Third" as an excluded but aspiring world of ideas and culture that is used as a premise for discussing the peace potential of including Modernity's Other in the Barents Region – a region which is, in fact, a zone which borders on the following three worlds at the same time: West European cultural heritage and tradition (Norway, Finland, Sweden), East European cultural heritage and tradition (Russia), and the Third World (a label made to describe the Sami culture by the Norwegian authorities in the 19th and 20th century) (Edvardsen, 1997).

3.3.3 Restorative action

Restorative action emanates from the theory of "restorative justice", which focuses on crime and wrongdoing with the aim of *repairing* the damage that results when a crime or wrongdoing has occurred. The purpose of "restorative action" is to restore the broken relations in the community by using peaceful approaches to human relations. Restorative justice posits a new epistemological framework, which represents an alternative to the old epistemological system of retributive justice. According to Nabudere and Velthuizen (2013), the old paradigm of retributive justice poses three questions, namely, (i) What laws have been broken? (ii) Who committed the crimes? and (iii) What is the appropriate punishment? However, the new paradigm of restorative justice poses the following questions: (i) Who has been hurt?

(ii) Who is responsible? (iii) What was the root (underlying) cause? and (iv) How can the damage be repaired? (Nabudere and Velthuisen, 2013).

Restorative justice has developed out of a range of alternative dispute resolution practices such as the use of indigenous courts and systems of justice; juvenile justice programmes around the world which address wrongdoing among children and young people and many other forms of disputes. These practices are all centred around the notion that justice means restoring a lost balance and that prosecution is not the best way in which to achieve reconciliation. Restorative justice proposes that the victims, perpetrators and the broader community should engage in a dialogue that aims at identifying and addressing the *underlying* social and political causes of the crimes and wrongdoing (Nabudere and Velthuisen, 2013).

From a peace perspective, restorative justice precedes retributive and transitional justice because restorative justice benefits both the victim and offender as both are able to take responsibility in making right the wrong inflicted on them by repairing the harm caused. This is also reflected in the way in which some elements of restorative justice have entered into the human rights instruments and agreements, including the restoration of human dignity, injury to person or health, damage to human relations, damage to relations in communities and emotional restoration. Some other notions proposed include concepts such as the restoration of freedom, compassion, care, peace, empowerment, self-determination, sense of duty as a citizen and values of mercy and of forgiveness (Nabudere and Velthuisen, 2013).

Nabudere and Velthuisen (2013) found that the objective of restorative justice in the majority of societies (including African societies) is to restore the social relations in society and establish balances. The restoration of social relations enables people in the communities to regain control over their lives on the basis of acceptance with the perpetrators taking responsibility for their wrongful actions ("crimes") as well as for reparation and reconciliation. In other words, it means restoring a sense of security, dignity, harmony and a feeling of justice that enables society to formulate rules for social relations with which everybody is comfortable. However, attaining this objective requires resources that are always in abundance, human knowledge and strategic instruments that are shaped in such a way as to transform knowledge *into action* towards the innovation of society as a whole (Hoppers 2009, p. 11, citing Nabudere, 2008).

A common objection to restorative justice is that the traditional systems of justice are local in their coverage and conception. However, Nabudere responds to this objection by arguing: "All human cultures have some inherent deep-seated restorative traditions. At the same time, there is no culture without retributive traditions of justice" (Nabudere and Velthuisen, 2013, p. 5). He further points out that, previously, retributive justice had survival value for cultures in terms of the legitimation of fighting back against aggressors. Modern dominant cultures, however, tend to place more emphasis on retributive systems because risk analysis is placed above all other considerations. Nevertheless, as Archbishop Desmond Tutu points out, restorative justice is a very ancient and, yet, a desperately needed truth (Nabudere and Velthuisen, 2013). Nabudere illustrates this point by referring to the ancient African-Egyptian philosophy of *Ma'at* as being the basis of African systems of reconnection through memory. According to the text of the Middle Kingdom, *Ma'at* was a way of establishing a connection between doing-something-for-another and the human capacity for recollection, which emphasises the temporal dimension of the connectivity of human action. Nabudere writes:

"Memory and mutual supportive action belong together; one is a condition for the other. Memory creates the space in which social action can unfold, while forgetting is synonymous with inability to act, or in the Egyptian language, with "sloth/inertia". Without the past there is no action. Without memory there can be no conscience, no responsibility." (Nabudere and Velthuisen, 2013, p. 155)

Thus, in this sense restorative action means to value the systems of "reconnecting through memory", as a means to enabling an understanding of the need for restorative justice as an ancient practice but which is being revisited. The tradition of restorative justice may be found in all the world's great cultures. This implies that, although it is culturally diverse, it accommodates a rich plurality of mechanisms of justice in pursuit of the truths. However, the severe impact brought on restorative justice of modernity and the process of globalisation also has a place in to the discourse of restorative justice:

"Modernity imposed from Europe has led to some of these traditions being side-lined and put under attack during the past two centuries. Everywhere in the world, restorative ideals have suffered serious

setbacks of the globalisation of the idea of a Westphalian style of a centralised state that takes control of justice and rationalises it into a punitive legal regime. Modern polities strengthened themselves by taking control of the legal process. They coupled it with a punishment regime as part of the socialisation of the people within the centralised nation-state systems and strengthened the power and legitimacy of modern rules. Modern institutions such as the police, the courts and the prisons became an essential part of the system (...) The key elements of the European and North Atlantic criminal justice that have globalised almost totally during the past two centuries is the idea that crimes are committed against the state, which has the power to punish the infringers. This undermined the older ideas that crimes were committed against God or against the victims in the community, implying the need for reparations.” (Nabudere and Velthuisen, 2013, p. 6)

Hence, restoring systems of restorative justice marginalised by modernity corresponds to the transformation by enlargement that aims at "bringing in what modernity has left out".

Thus, when we bring the concept of restorative justice into the mainstream ethical discourse on modernity, what we highlight is the importance of adding to that discourse an "ethics of memory" (that is contrary to the "forgetting" i.e. the Egyptian philosophy of *Ma'at*) and that enables us to recollect the human capacity for reconciliation, healing and reparation as an ancient practice, which is being revisited. As an alternative to the penal system of punishment, restorative action highlights the need to revitalise and strengthen local communities through an alternative way of dealing with conflict resolution, thus making possible reconciliation and reparation between the conflict parties. In this way restorative action may become a rubric for the realisation of peace and human development in the Barents Region with this rubric making possible the revisiting and enlargement of traditions of restorative justice in the Barents Region. This enlargement will serve to expand the ethical parameters linked to retributive justice – an expansion that is essential for fighting the residue of colonialism and for restoring or building a peace culture both in the region and in the Scandinavian countries at large.

3.4 Methodological and conceptual confrontations: a SortingMat perspective

Thus far, this chapter has discussed both a concept of violence which is categorised into direct, structural and cultural violence and a concept of peace which is based on a positive and negative definition of the concept. Working for peace in terms of the negative definition means reducing or preventing violence of any kind, whereas working for peace in terms of the positive definition means replacing violence with patterns of cooperation and integration at all levels. From the perspective of cognitive justice, the work of recognising, promoting, protecting and integrating IKS is not only about preventing the continuation of the epistemological disenfranchisement, epistemological silencing and cultural demise of the Other (negative peace), but also about restoring or creating a possibility for dialogue, reconciliation and diversity by democratising democracy (positive peace) (Hoppers, 2009). The aim of promoting cultures of peace and human development in the Barents Region clearly entails both the positive and negative approach to peace with the need for articulation as a common denominator underlying both. Taking in consideration that there is, in all likelihood, a good *reason* for this lack of articulation, the following questions arise: What are the main barriers hindering insight into and the articulation of what is missing in order to successfully approach the project of reconciliation and peaceful conflict resolution between the conflict parties? and How may this articulation be unlocked from its historical gloom in order to successfully promote the project of peace building and human development in a region conditioned by the impact of historical violence and humiliation, without merely (re-) producing another vicious cycle of violence and humiliation?

In order to avoid too much repetition of the concepts already outlined in this chapter, we will answer this question and revisit the region by investigating the four dimensions that are always present in the human existence, namely, future and past, good and bad. If we cross the two dimensions, past – future and negative – positive, the result is the four squares as illustrated in Figure 1.3 below.




Figure 1.3: The SortingMat (SABONA, 2011)

The theory behind “The SortingMat” is a method of conducting a dialogue with conflict parties that has been used and developed over the last 30 years by Johan Galtung.¹⁷ The concept was named the SortingMat because it provides an opportunity to sort out thoughts, feelings and perceptions as a result of the possibility of focusing on one square at the time. We will use this model to sort out and reflect upon some of the challenges we are facing in this study in light of the conceptual framework presented in this chapter. In the case of the Barents Region, something has clearly happened in the past, and there will be a tomorrow. How would we like this future to be?

3.4.1 The wounds

There is a negative past (field 2) – a violent history, a wound – and what is needed is a deeper recognition of what has happened and what the problem is about. An important challenge in this study is developing a greater understanding of the wound and the situation of the wounded in order both to discern and then improve the quality of the prognosis, to create the best possible conditions to prevent the continuation of the violence inflicting these wounds, thus steering away from the

¹⁷ The concept is developed further by Johan Galtung and SABONA to be integrated in peace education in schools.

realisation of the negative prognosis. Galtung's typology of violence provides a framework for addressing this. From this perspective, it is important both to recognise and to articulate the negative past as this enables the analysis of violence which is necessary for rejecting it as a basis for an ongoing relationship in the future. In line with Galtung's theory, effective methods of change depend upon a detailed analysis of the causes of past and present violence. The violence-triangle serves a reminder that it is necessary to understand both how direct, structural and cultural violence is interlinked as well as the volume of violence. Is cultural violence limited to that which legitimates direct and structural violence after the fact or is cultural violence, in itself, the source of direct and structural violence?

It is also in the understanding of these causes of violence that we look to Bourdieu's insight that the dispositions in the human being seek harmony with contextual conditions. If, for example, the source of discrimination, intolerance and/or racism is located in the contextual conditions then the strategies implemented to remove such violent attitudes would also have to take into account change in the contextual conditions. Leaving problematic contextual conditions unquestioned may contribute to pacification instead of conscientisation and resistance to oppression. This may mean that conflict resolution initiatives may contribute to strengthening the contextual conditions which had originally caused the violence. In such a case we would be contributing to the perpetuation of violence instead of resisting it by targeting the source of the violence.

Galtung's typology of violence covers much of this challenge of analysing the violence in order to ascertain what needs to be changed although there is also the need to extend the approach by developing an understanding of the wounds inflicted both from the perspective of Lindner's theory of humiliation and from the perspective of restorative justice. The latter highlights the challenge of capturing the victim's narrative. Visvanathan emphasises this point when writing that,

“... an atrocity cannot be understood in the usual opposition of academic sociology between functional and conflict theory. To understand an atrocity we should not merely study the sociology of a conflict, but also attempt to understand evil and phenomenology of humiliation, which standard sociology has so far not captured. An atrocity as *victim's narrative* often falls afoul of the expert because the

victim's testimony is often in discordance with the expert's assessment. Calibrating an atrocity with standard sociological tools often leads to surreal results. In other words, an atrocity cannot be domesticated as a mere human rights violation. There has to be a theory of freedom, where literature and political theory combine in a new way. This is because freedom precedes rights, and goes beyond equality as a measure. Each new act of freedom is a new beginning.” (Visvanathan, 2001, cited in Hoppers, 2009, p. 8)

It is thus clear that the victim's narrative must be the starting point for the expert and not the expert's assessment the starting point for the victim's narrative. In this approach the wounds decide the analysis of violence and not the other way around. In other words, the wounds must first be *felt* (empathy) then diagnosed (intellectual work). The wounds are important in order to ascertain what needs to be changed in order to make possible a future of hope and peaceful coexistence in the Barents Region. At the same time, it is vital not to cling to the negative past for too long unless we want to walk "backwards" into the future.

3.4.2 *The good in the bad*

There is also a positive past (field 3). What has been positive in the past, positive about the other part? This is also a field of energy capable of increasing the motivation to rebuild, or create, positive relations. Restorative action is about restoring broken relationships by committing to a healing process of dialogue and reconciliation. However, this restoration requires access to this dimension of the past. In the Sami culture, knowledge is principally oral and is passed down the generations through stories. Storytellers are the main carriers of this memory, this dimension. However, the almost complete elimination of Sami storytellers through the persecution of *noiadis* (the shamans or spiritual leaders) and destruction of their drums, has left the Sami people with what Nouwen (1972) describes as a situation of "wounded healers". The problem of the wounded healer represents a challenge that basic sociological peace theory has, thus far, not been able to overcome and, hence, the urgent need to take up the traditions of healing and restorative justice within these cultures. However, if this is to succeed, there must be what Visvanathan terms

an “ethics of memory” which may protect both the storyteller and the story and ensure that they both survive the violence (Visvanathan, 2015).

A successful articulation of field 3 is therefore complicated by the problem of occlusion (methodology) in the sense that it constitutes an obstacle to the work of articulation. A successful articulation of field 3 is therefore deeply intertwined with the methodology used and the work of overcoming the problem of occlusion described in Chapter 2. Challenges in the pursuit of a clear positive past perspective also emerge. For example, there are the potential dangers of what Hoppers describes as the "vortex" syndrome, which is "inherent in societies emerging out of trauma, in which the power of that trauma can work adversely to continually suck all analyses back only to the traumatic episode, thereby blocking the possibility for generating the comparative and diachronic analyses so essential to making new or fresh propositions" (Hoppers, 2009, p. 3). This point emphasises the potential danger in contexts which are characterised by historical violence and where the trauma and the negative past tend to foreshadow for the valuable contributions to be found not only within the positive past, but also in the positive future, and therefore blocking the massive potential of restorative action.

3.4.3 *The bad in the good*

Field 4 addresses the prognosis of the negative future. What will happen if the violence continues and if we do not change the current situation and the route of present policy and thinking? The value of this dimension is that it communicates a *crisis* – visible at the tip of the iceberg (see figure 3.2) as “linguicide” – which demands urgent attention. It communicates the need for a profound examination of the problem of violence and the mechanisms legitimising such violence, which substantiates both the prognosis and the need to explore the alternatives to current thinking and practice that make available possibilities for change and transformation.

3.4.4 *The dreams*

It is important to include the positive future (field 1) as we want to anchor the solution in the energy fields of goals, dreams, and visions. It is, of course, possible to understand the positive future as the negation of the negative future, and then use

the energy field of goals, dreams and visions to create alternatives to the prognosis. However, this approach would entail the risk of becoming unrealistic in the sense that such an approach is out of touch with both the reality of the victims of past humiliation and the processes in which a structure of violence impacts on the mind and soul. Freire (1970) describes the psychology of the oppressed as split in the sense that the oppressor has, for so long and with such force, told the oppressed whom they were, that the oppressed have come to accept this definition as their own. This form of cultural violence, which Bourdieu and Passeron describe as symbolic violence, involves the process of ensuring that subordinated groups not merely internalise, but also proactively endorse, the illegitimacy of their own cultures.

In post-colonialism contexts, where people have been the victims of structural violence for centuries, where the culture underpinning the violence has been transferred to its citizens through cultural violence in the sense that the institutions of society legitimise such violence, and where the oppressed group has gradually become accustomed to accepting an "imposed" self-image, a "new habitus ex nihilo" (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977) and has accepted a situation in which the citizens are given unequal power and life chances (structural violence) by adopting a culture of violence necessary for survival. It is not inevitable, although highly possible, that their dreams and visions also are tied to the adjustment process and constrained by the colonised mindset that the contextual conditions produce. In other words, the contextual conditions should not be overlooked when approaching this field, or any other field, because historically, these conditions have pre-empted and demeaned the dreams and wounded the dreamers in the oppressed group in a way that prevents them from believing in their own culture and reaching for the goals and visions that could enable them to realise their full potential. The SARCHI Chair is highly aware of both his major problem and the challenge of liberation from colonial rule and the colonial mind-set that haunts the knowledge producing arenas themselves. SARCHI's response is a "pedagogy of hope":

“Putting hope at the centre of our epistemology prevents ‘the limits of reality to reign supreme’ and the forfeiture of the ‘very essence of our being: to be hopeful’. Hope is not idle desire and wishful expectation. Hope probes the future and thereby illuminates the possibilities of the present, hope tells us that our present existence is not ultimate and

that there is an alternative. It is a vision of a possibility that might be realised.” (Hoppers, 2009, p. 9)

Inbuilt in this pedagogy of hope is also the notion that liberation is not sufficient. It must be accompanied by *emancipation* with emancipation aiming to eradicate oppression, both in the everyday sense and in terms of the global regimes (Hoppers, 2016).

Despite the fact that this field of dreams, goals and visions is proposed by Galtung as a way in which to overcome an overemphasised, violence-oriented approach to conflict, as a way to move beyond the limiting psychology of violence and as a way to overcome the polarising black and white perspective and be able to imagine a better future, it is vital that a successful approach to this field not overlook the psychology of the oppressed, especially in view of Bourdieu's description of the major sociologically reproductive factor underpinning this psychology (*habitus*) and passing on from one generation of the oppressed to the next. However, although it is deemed important to include the contextual conditions, it must be noted that what Bourdieu is saying is *not* that we are just robots programmed by internalising social norms, but that insight into these contextual conditions is crucial in order to be able to successfully transform them peacefully, in other words, by peaceful means.

Presented in this way, for the Sami people, all four of the dimensions represented in the SortingMat are, in different ways, constrained by the problems related to occlusion and the silencing techniques accompanying colonialism. In fact, it is clear that the problem of occlusion hinders the articulation of what is necessary for the recognition of the violences related to the wounds; the recognition of the positive past which is important in order to heal from these wounds and rebuild broken relationships between the conflict parties; the realisation that, unless the route is changed, the violences will continue and the re-enactment of the dreams and visions required to create a better future together. This acknowledgement calls for more articulation and disclosure in respect of all four dimensions. In other words, when asking how the previously colonised could become participants in a moral and cognitive venture against oppression, we are being confronted with not only the need for a pedagogy of hope, but the need for a pedagogy of the “unsaid”.

If we take in consideration that a successful approach to peaceful conflict resolution requires that the conflict parties involved make transparent these four dimensions and, at the same time, acknowledge that the problem of occlusion impedes such transparency, then the project of including the indigenous voice should be seen as a vital aspect of the peace building process in general. Also, if we agree with Galtung that peace is about handling conflicts with empathy, creativity and non-violence (A-B-C-triangle); that, in order to address conflicts and transform them constructively, we first need to be true actors to the conflict (conscientisation) and that the continued exclusion of the Sami perspectives of history hinders the conscientisation required to transform the conflict constructively, then the project of including Sami history and Sami perspectives in history should be seen as an attempt to catch up with the processes of repairing old wounds, of reconciliation between the conflict parties and of peaceful conflict transformation in general. This almost exposes the core of the claim for inclusivity in this study.

By including both positive memories (positive past) and dreams (positive future) as a constructive counterweight to the painful wounds located in the negative past and the hopelessness related to a prognosis based on the continuity of a negative past, this model creates a useful way of thinking that encourages both reflection and action. The key challenge in this reflection is to move between these fields and maintain a dynamic approach in order to deal better with the many problems related to being "stuck" in one field for too long, but also to address the tendency to not focus sufficiently on one field at the time. As I see it, the awareness of the four squares and the urge to move between fields open up the way to creativity and create cognitive possibilities that may help to illuminate the great dynamism of this region.

Using these theoretical tools, I shall proceed to trace and identify the process in history that has served to constrain the life and policy space of the Sami people in the Barents Region. The insights gained will then serve as a background to a broader view of the dominant position in the current moral philosophical landscape. The leading question revolves around the ethics of restorative action, what is at stake in the limitation of the dominant ethical rationality at work and the challenge of building an ethical rationality which is more compatible with the challenge of peace building and restorative action. This platform is explored by bringing in alternatives to the mainstream ethical tradition. The search for alternatives is inspired by both hermeneutical theory and the possibility of including and enlarging Modernity's Other.

Chapter 4: The wounds: colonialism and the Sami people

As pointed out in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, when addressing the issue of peace building and human development in the Barents Region, it is not possible to dodge the component of trauma and unresolved conflict, the most pungent of which are the residues of colonialism. Furthermore, by discussing the problem of the occlusion of the indigenous voice as a constraint to this challenge, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 identified the need to include the excluded voice – the missing piece. This inclusion is seen as vital for the process of engaging with colonialism in a manner that produces a programme for its dislocation (negative peace) but also as a way in which to expand the discourse on positive peace by articulating the silent components in the relations of peace already established.

This chapter addresses the aim of exploring, at a discursive level, the decisive mechanisms/thinking that have reduced the Sami to a "conquered" group in the Barents Region. The main objective of this chapter is to discuss the historical antecedence of colonialism in the Barents Region and its effects on the Sami people. This involves investigating the concepts of peace and violence presented in Chapter 3 as they link to the Barents Region.

What will happen if the history of colonialism is our main focus? What will emerge when this story is articulated with reference to the conceptual framework and when the Sami perspective is included?

4.1 Imposing empire mythologies

In the fifteenth century, based on the traditions of the Roman Empire, the Roman Catholic Church conceived of itself as the custodian of a universal world order. The particular interpretation of Christianity within the West Roman Empire, which defined itself as "civilised", enforced the understanding that, to be civilized, was to be Christian (TRC, 2015).

In 1493 Pope Alexander VI of Valencia issued the first of four orders, *Inter caetera*, often referred to as "papal bulls", which was to serve as legitimation of colonialism and imperialism for centuries to come. The Papal Bull starts by praising the "very dear son-daughter in Christ", *los reyes catòlicos*, King Ferdinand and Queen Isabelle

of Spain (the Crowns of Castile and Aragon) for spreading Catholic faith and Christian religion and “that barbarous nations be overthrown and brought to the faith itself” (Pope Alexander VI, 1493). Then he becomes specific:

“as witnessed – with so much glory to the Divine Name in your recovery of the kingdom of Granada from the yoke of the Saracens. ... you – chose our beloved son, Christopher Columbus – to make diligent quest for these remote and unknown mainlands and islands through the sea, where hitherto none had sailed; and – discovered certain very remote islands and even mainlands that hitherto had not been discovered – wherein dwell very many peoples living in peace – going unclothed and not eating flesh – disposed to embrace the Catholic faith and be trained in good morals. ... Christopher Columbus has built a fortress fairly equipped, wherein he has stationed as garrison certain Christians, companions of his, who are to make search for other remote and unknown islands and mainlands. In the islands and countries already discovered are found gold, spices, and very many other precious things – bring under your sway the said mainlands and islands with their residents and inhabitants and – bring them to the Catholic faith”.

And he ends with assigning:

“to you and your heirs and successors, kings of Castille and Leon, forever-all rights, jurisdictions, and appurtenances, all islands and mainlands, found and to be found, discovered and to be discovered.(...) we appoint you lords of them with full and free power *and jurisdiction of every kind*” (own italics). ... Let no one, therefore, infringe, or with rash boldness contravene, this our recommendation, exhortation, requisition, gift, grant, assignment, constitution, deputation, decree, mandate, prohibition and will. Should anyone presume to attempt this, be it known to him that he will incur the wrath of Almighty God and of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul” (Pope Alexander VI, cited in Galtung, 2013, p. 14).

This order helped to shape the legal and political arguments that have come to be referred to as the “Doctrine of Discovery” and which was used to justify the colonisation of the Americas in the sixteenth century (TRC, 2015). In return, the Spanish were expected to convert the indigenous peoples of the Americas to Christianity. This Doctrine of Discovery was linked to a second notion, namely, that the lands being claimed were *terra nullius* (no man’s land) and therefore open to claim (Pagden, 2003; Elliott, 2006).

On the basis of *terra nullius*, the British government laid claim to the entire Australian continent. Using this doctrine, the colonists argued that “the presence of indigenous people did not void a claim of *terra nullius*, since the indigenous people simply occupied, rather than owned, the land. True ownership, they claimed, could come only with European-style agriculture. Underlying these arguments was the belief that the colonisers were bringing civilisation to savage people who could never civilise themselves. The “civilising mission” rested on a belief of racial and cultural superiority (TRC, 2015). The canonical jurisprudence of the time made the Christian monarchs of Europe rulers of all nations “wherever they might be found and whatever creed they might embrace” (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 86). Thus, from the fifteenth century the indigenous peoples of the world were the objects of a strategy of spiritual and cultural conquest that had its origins in Europe.

Under these doctrines, the European empires laid claim to most of the earth’s surface and controlled the seas. A series of arguments were formulated to justify such massive interventions into the lands and lives of other peoples. These were primarily elaborations on the two basic concepts already made clear by Pope Alexander VI:

- 1) The Christian god had given the Christian nations the right to colonise the lands they “discovered” as long as they converted the indigenous populations; and
- 2) The Europeans were bringing the benefits of civilisation (a concept that was intertwined with Christianity) to the “heathen” (TRC, 2015, p. 50).

In short, the colonial project was based on the belief that people were being colonised for their *own benefit*, either in this world or the next. Some imperialists claimed that the Europeans had reached the pinnacle of civilisation through a long and arduous process while the other peoples in the world had been held back by

such factors as climate, geography, and migration (TRC, 2015). However, through a civilising process, the Europeans could elevate the people of the world to their level. This view was given credence in the nineteenth century by a racism anchored in the language of science and according to which the peoples of the world had differing abilities. Some argued that the “less-developed” people did not possess the genetic disposition to improve unless they were in contact with superior races. These notions helped to shape global policies towards indigenous peoples (TRC, 2015).

The conquest of the Sami people may best be understood in the context of these imperial expansions in the relationship between the growth of the European empires¹⁸ and the Christian churches. Already during the Middle Ages the various nations had begun vying for control of the Sami territories (Jebens, 2000). The main goal of the colonists was to establish the borders in the north which were still vague in the middle of the 18th century. There were still several “grey zones”, and Denmark-Norway, Sweden and the Tsar Russia were competing rivals to take control. An area of what is now Finnmark was part of a "common territory", to which both Sweden and Denmark/Norway laid claim until 1751. According to these countries, these "grey zones" were also a religious border area as they were located on Christianity's´ border against the “infidel, schismatic Russians” (Hansen and Olsen, 2004, p. 319). For Norway/Denmark and Sweden then, it was important that the old Sami region became part of a “clean”, civilised and Christian Denmark/Norway and Sweden where the people were orthodox Lutherans and where they would gradually learn to speak, think and feel Norwegian/Danish and Swedish.

4.1.1 Christianity

The priesthood was first assigned this task. It was a difficult task if we are to believe the central authorities in that field. Andreas Gjølme, the chief rector in Varanger, wrote to the Church department: “The Lapp people is a childish people in more than one way. They represent the child’s immediate, naïve and undeveloped point of view. It is the purpose of assimilation to raise them into maturity, if that even is possible”

¹⁸ The modern term "empire" and the related words "emperor", "imperialism," etc., all derive, significantly, from the Latin word *imperium*, which, in ancient Rome indicated supreme power involving both command in war and the magistrate's right to execute the law. The term has therefore linked the history of European imperialism very closely to the legacy of the Roman Empire (Pagden, 2003, p. xxii).

(Hirsti, 1994, p. 21). The rector's view of the Sami was predominant among both priests and educators with the clergy espousing highly patriarchal attitudes to the Sami as their "flocks" (Pollan, 2007). Sami views and experiences were not deemed to be important. This patriarchal attitude would colour and shape the non-Sami relations with the Sami for a long time.

When the proposal for building a Sami school was voiced, the Church and the school authorities responded with great scepticism. The headman of schools in Finnmark, Chr. Brygfjel, wrote to the minister of the Church in 1923:

"The Lapps have neither will nor ability to use their language as written language. They have no ability to transcend to a higher level of culture unless they learn Norwegian language and culture. The few individuals that are left from the original Lapp tribe are now so degenerated and hopeless that there are small chances for improvement. They are hopeless and belong to the most reduced and ignoble population, and they produce the greatest contingent for psychiatric asylums and schools for mentally retarded in this region."¹⁹

(Hirsti, 1994, p. 22)

According to Brygfjeld, the Norwegianisation of the Sami was an indisputable civilising task for the Norwegian state as a natural consequence of the racial superiority of the Norwegians (Lund, 2005). Brygfjeld's statement expressed the dominant view of the Sami at the time. They were considered to be primitive souls who lived in a cultural backwater. The Church and the clergymen were appointed not only to Christianise, but to civilise and Norwegianise the Sami and make sure that they became loyal and low-abiding citizens. In 1715 a college was established to speed up the process while the clergyman, Thomas von Westen, suggested an offensive missionary plan to increase the efficiency of the Christianisation process. He later appointed himself as the headman of the project and showed great dedication and efficiency in carrying out his task. He was highly impatient and wanted instant results, Christianising hundreds of Sami in a very short time. He would, for example, lecture the Sami for a few hours, although they did not understand any Norwegian, and then baptise and enrol them into the Church book. In addition, this process did *not* happen without coercion. A local historian from the

¹⁹ Translated from Norwegian by the author.

Rana district in Finnmark, Ola Grotnes, mentioned that Thomas von Westen Christianised "all the Lapps in Ranen by a dictation" (Hirsti, 1994, p. 27). The bailiff confiscated their spiritual drums and they then had to build their own church as payment for which they received "two barrels of liquor for board by the Church ministry" (Hirsti, 1994, p. 28).

In terms of his lifelong missionary work, Tomas von Westen fulfilled his dream of conquering the dark polar land for "Kvitekrist"²⁰ and for the royal crown in Copenhagen. Tomas von Westen's offensive missionary plan also succeeded as an effective occupation strategy. The support from the royal crown in Denmark transformed Westen's missionary plans into royal and therefore divine will. The charters and patents anchored in the principle of "effective occupation" and the "duty" to civilise the "savages" laid the moral and juridical foundations for the colonisation of the Sami people. From this point, any protests against these acts of "good" would be considered to be an act against God and the King himself. With this powerful moral and juridical jurisdiction, the way was prepared for structural violence.

Tomas von Westen became a pioneer and an ideal for many priests and missionaries in the Sami territory. "The entire Sami kin is covered with pagan fog", the famous priest and writer, Petter Dass, wrote (Blix Hagen, 2007, p. 3). He admitted that pure threats were not sufficient and that, in order to convert the Sami people, the priests had to learn Sami language (Blix Hagen, 2007). Höem's doctoral thesis (1972) concluded that the bishops and priests who prioritised God would lecture the Gospel in Sami, while those giving priority to the King wished to do so in Danish. In 1774, the Episcopal residence was taken over by the Danish priest, Markus Frederik Bang, who was an irreconcilable opponent of the Sami language and who declared that "God does not understand prayers in Sami" (Blix Hagen, 2007, p. 31). He ensured that the Seminar "Lapponicum" was closed down by royal decree in 1774 and enforced "the royal Writ that Sami youth are compelled to learn their Christianity in Norwegian (Lund, 2005, p. 204). Bang's successor, Johan Christian Schønheyder, was equally unforgiving towards the Sami language. In a report sent to the King the 18th of December 1790 he wrote:

²⁰ Kvitekrist, the old Norwegian name for Jesus Christ, directly translated as "white Christ", where the colour "white", was linked to purity, and was intended to separate the Christian faith from the supposedly evil teachings of Sami mythology.

“As the Royal Rescript of November 3rd 1774, whereby Seminarium Lapponicum was abolished, it is and should be passed, that it is lost and futile work to teach the Lapps Christianity and thereby associated worship practised in their own language. As the language in itself is completely unutilised and unaccustomed to spiritual ideas, reduced to the perceptible and few things in which these uncivil people in their limited use of nature and the powers of humanity, make use of.”
(Lund, 2005, p. 205)

Schønheyder blamed the “despised language”, which for keeping the people away from the worship and religious teaching away and he criticised the priests for “of forgivable vanity to have developed love for the Lappish (Sami) language” (Lund, 2005). The discussion on language was part of the beginning of the Norwegianisation Policy and marked a more concentrated and systematically executed policy of economic, social and spiritual oppression.

The fact that there were low numbers of Sami people and they were dispersed throughout the Sami territory, with no collective institutions to protect their vital political, economic and cultural interests and demands, rendered them especially vulnerable and defenceless. In addition, the majority of the Sami people were not able either to speak or write Norwegian and they were easily overrun by local administrators. Neither did the Sami fit into the lifestyle required by the southern model of administration. They were often away from the administrative centre, fishing or hiking with reindeers in the vast mountains and thus were easily excluded from local political decision making. Neither did they have any organised religious community or church which could fight for their spiritual independency and inviolability. In essence the officers controlled everything, and, like most colonists everywhere in the world, they used liquor as an important means of trade (Hansen and Olsen, 2004).

As a result, the Sami spiritual leaders and healers, the *noaidis*, went into hiding. The confiscation of the spiritual drums, which played a vital role in the ritual and spiritual lives of the Sami, was so all encompassing that the Norwegian national museum had subsequently to travel to Sweden and Germany to find an exemplar for an exhibition. In addition, the yoik, the Sami singing, was prohibited. Every reminder of heathenism

had to be eliminated with many Sami family names also being replaced by Norwegian/Danish names (Johansen, 2008).

The replacement of the Sami religion with Christianity created a significant vacuum in Sami society. It was not easy to replace thousands of years of belief with laconic promises at the church floor. The Sami gradually lost faith in the old gods and became rootless with no religious and ethical foundation to sustain their moral norms. This vacuum was exacerbated by the use of liquor, which was made accessible by the church throughout the Sami territory. It was a common practice of the priests to sell alcohol to supplement their remuneration. In Karesuando, a Sami town in the north of Sweden, the churchwarden even sold liquor at the church entrance (Hirsti, 1994). Alcohol had been unknown in the old Sami culture, and now many the Sami became addicted to it. Some of the most serious addicts sacrificed their entire reindeer herds to buy alcohol with alcoholism dividing families and leading to poverty and moral decay. This made it possible for the colonisers to proclaim with finality that the Sami were “a social pariah class that no decent, cultivated person could respect” (Hirsti, 1994, p. 37). Those who wanted to test that theory could just take a quick look at the slum of the Sami population. Their only chance for survival was to be lifted up to the modern and civilized world. It was not easy to be Sami under these conditions and, at the same time, to maintain a sense of self-respect and dignity.

4.1.2 Racism and social Darwinism

These attitudes were soon nurtured and justified by social Darwinism, according to which indigenous people were inferior from both a racial and an evolutionary point of view. Herbert Spencer soon corrupted Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, presented in the *Origin of Species* (1859) into a crude ideology, filled with strange leaps of logic to serve a populist political ideology of evolution.

The Darwinian conception of natural selection was distorted to fit into an idea system that sought to legitimate the "survival of the fittest" on both the societal and the national levels. This distortion of Darwinian thought brought a biological dimension to the ideology of dominance. Spencer felt vindicated by the work of evolutionists and defended it at length. A pioneer in the field of genetics, Sir Francis Galton, published a number of works on heredity between 1869 and 1906, where he attempted to

demonstrate the genetic inequality of human beings. Simply stated, he believed that specific abilities in, for example, mathematics, art, political leadership etc were inherited, thus implying that excellence was born rather than made. In addition, Galton argued that the principle of genetic inequality could be applied to groups and races – a position that resulted in his advocating *eugenics*, namely, that the biologically and morally superior should be encouraged to procreate while the mentally and socially inferior should be prevented from procreating. And Herbert Spencer expressed precise views on how this might be realised.

Spencer wed his belief in a biological basis for the triumph of the fittest with the assumption that the natural state of society is one of hierarchy. Even before Darwin had published his *Origin of Species*, Spencer held that society, as a whole, should be conceived as a special organism evolving toward higher states of perfection:

“Over time, conquest produces the massing of tribes, with governing and dominant functions passing to stronger individuals and groups. Ruling authorities, both secular and sacred, then evolve into complex hierarchies supported by their organization and a growing world of custom.” (Perdue, 1886, p. 60, citing Spencer)

Society, Spencer argued, is *superorganic*. This is to say that it is organised as a social entity in the same way in which the body is organised as a biological entity. Each grows and matures and, if unfit, will decay. Based on this belief, Spencer argued that the conflict inherent in the struggle for existence evolves into a more complex organisational structure, namely, militarism and industrialism. Militarism shapes the human character, behaviour and social organisation into a fitness for warfare. In addition, through compulsory cooperation, it further consolidates differing individuals, groups and societies into larger and larger entities and, through this process, contributes to increasing social integration. With its growing efficiency or organisation, militarism makes it possible for an increasingly larger segment of the population to engage in industry and to remain at peace. However, the transition from militarism to industrialism and peace is not possible until "all nations and races have evolved into a more perfect state of equilibrium" (Perdue, 1886, p. 60). This meant that, for evolution to be progressive, the principle of self-sufficiency must be obeyed. To intervene in the natural evolutionary process and to artificially impair the

role of self-sufficiency in the necessary struggle for existence would be to impede progress toward human perfection:

“If supply and demand are allowed free play in the intellectual sphere as in the economic sphere ... it must follow that the children of the superior will be advantaged: the thrifty parents, the energetic, and those with a high sense of responsibility, will buy education for their children to a greater extent than the improvident and the idle. And, if character is inherited, then the average result must be that the children of the superior will prosper and increase more than the children of the inferior. There will be a multiplication of the fittest instead of the multiplication of the unfittest.” (Perdue, 1986, p. 60, citing Spencer)

In line of this thinking, Spencer qualified the concept of evolutionary progress by noting that some societies may be inherently weak and subject to dissolution. If some individuals are unfit or less fit, it follows that some societies may also be unfit or less fit. In other words, societal evolution may be retarded through the mixing of the races which, he believed, were differently endowed.

In common with Spencer, the Yale professor, William Graham Sumner (1840-1910), held, as did Hobbes, a view of the competitive struggle for domination. Sumner held that the natural order of society arose from “an unfettered competition” and interruption therein could only produce a “declining civilization”. Sumner envisaged an organism evolving through a social form of natural selection. He believed that society evolves through its own evolutionary nature, in accordance with its own lawful properties, toward an ever-improving ideal state. Interference in this process would be irrational and futile, if not dangerous. In 1883, under the influence of Spencer's principle of non-interference, Sumner wrote that social classes (especially the successful) “owe not a thing to others” (Perdue, 1986, p. 64, citing Sumner).

For Sumner, the organic evolution of society was absolute and the opposing conditions of the fit and the unfit do not call for intervention with every single individual earning his/her station in life. Also implied in Sumner's position is the belief that private wealth is the measure of worth. Private wealth, Sumner argued, “is the only suitable means by which the services that give an advantage (such as

education) should be provided" (Perdue, 1986, p. 65, citing Sumner). A question then arises regarding either the inheritance or the social disadvantages that come with one's birth? For Sumner, those born to wealth are fit by definition. In terms of Sumner's principle, the wealthy are valued over the poor, the healthy over the sick and, by implication, men over women, whites over nonwhites, and colonists over the colonised. In short, this thinking transformed inequality into a natural *law*.

Accordingly, under the banner of these crude ideologies, whatever was done by those capable of power was seen as the manifestation of scientific destiny with scientific destiny, somehow, meaning that these changes were intentional. In another extraordinary leap of logic, Darwin's study showing how an insect's wing had altered by a fraction of a millimetre over thousands of years was equated with the immediate political destiny of empires and the racial superiority of those who controlled these empires. In other words, the colonial victories of the European armies somehow signalled that the winners were carriers of Darwinian destiny. Ralston Saul quotes Richard Atleo who eloquently describes and analyses how Darwin was used against indigenous peoples: "The Darwinian theory of evolution and its interpretations created, for colonisers, a view of differences between people that was and is characterised by superiority and inferiority" (Ralston Saul, 2015, p. 11, quoting Atleo).

Thus, in Ralston Saul's view, this intellectual tool justified whatever the Western empires wanted to do: "Natural selection became a reason for colonial wars. Evolutionary biology became an excuse for any kind of organised and institutionalised racism. The preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life was an explanation for empire". Racism, Ralston Saul writes, "was all about white people, pink people, at the top. This was God's team, with Darwinian determinism and the machinery of modernism on its side" (Ralston Saul, 2015, p. 11).

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Scandinavian countries espoused social Darwinism with all the Scandinavian Sami policies being adversely impacted upon by this creed and so becoming a creature of its own. The results were devastating. The cocksureness about races at different stages led to the downgrading of minority languages and lifestyles. The compact and unidirectional understanding of cultures at higher and lower levels led many academic disciplines and scientists astray. Christian and Alette Schreiner's anthropological studies of the

Sami in Tysfjord in 1914 and 1918 were an expression of this. Social Darwinism had its most ardent followers in the medical science. In an article published in *Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologiforening (Journal of Norwegian Psychology Association)*, Sigmund Elgarøy and Petter Aaslestad (2010) reveal how Norwegian psychiatric institutions referred to Sami patients as "physically and mentally retarded", while nomads were referred to as "drunkards" and Sea Samis as "less gifted". According to Elgarøy and Aaslestad (2010), the colonial policy led to a systematic ethnic denigration of patients.

The period from 1890 to 1940 was dominated by eugenics and what was known as "lappologi", the study of "primitive" peoples. Norwegian scientists and officials set out to measure the circumference of Sami heads, opening Sami graves and robbing skeletons in a desperate attempt to prove the racial inferiority of the Sami people (Kyllingstad, 2004). "Such insults are hard to forget, and that memory is part of the Sami community today", a member of the Sami Council, Henrik Olsen, commented (Fugelsnes, 2016, p. 6).

Social Darwinism led to a brutal stigmatisation of the Sami and Finnish culture, especially in the region bordering Sweden and Finland. From a social Darwinist perspective, farmers were seen as key for social development while reindeer husbandry as such was doomed. Sami peoples could only be "saved" by becoming fully integrated into the Norwegian population. According to social Darwinist thinking, the Sami people did not possess the characteristics that would enable them to cope in a modern society. A more social oriented vision dictated that they had to learn Norwegian and the cultural skills required to cope in society and to ensure better living conditions. Poverty was linked to the Norwegian's image of the "authentic" Sami. Accordingly, to be "caught" as Sami in public was conceived of as a significant personal defeat. Sustainable counter images were first established only during the Alta River dispute in the 1970s, which laid the foundation for a deeper understanding of Sami culture and identity. For many Sami, the future was perceived as a choice between the Sami culture and identity and an acceptable standard of living (Pedersen and Høgmo, 2012). For almost a century the destructive power of racism resulted in many Samis blending into the population and being rewarded for being Norwegian. These choices could not have been easy to make and they were the outcome of a concerted effort to demean the Sami people.

4.1.3 Roman law

The law played a crucial role in the colonisation of the Sami people, both as a way in which to legitimise it and as an instrument with which to organise it. The law conferred on the colonisers the power to define legal entities and to claim the Sami territory on the basis that the Sami had no legal papers proving their rights to the land.

According to Hoppers and Richards (2011), the law, which in this case was used against the Sami people, has its roots in a specific and particular system of property and contract that was structured on the Seven Hills of Rome in the 8th century before Christ, and which spread from there to classical Rome, from there to the Byzantine Eastern Empire, and from there to Scandinavia and the rest of the world (Hoppers and Richards, 2011).

The basic principle of this law was the notion of property. In early Roman law and under the Republic, property was expressed as *dominus*, or, in English, "dominates". In early Rome, land was divided between the heads of families according to the necessities of agricultural economy, and was composed of *gents*, all belonging to a grouping of *familia*, which was ruled by the sovereignty of the *paterfamilias*. Property was thus dominated by the *paterfamilias*. The *paterfamilias* was expected to rule its members and possessions, not for personal gain but as a patrimony to be maintained intact and passed on to the next generation. Originally the *paterfamilias* ruled the *familia* which included persons and possessions, namely, women, children, slaves, animals and land. The *paterfamilias* only was a juridical subject, capable of owning property and capable of being a party to an agreement. In other words, "property began as *dominus*, what was dominated, what was conquered" (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 48).

The Roman law was not about relationships within households but relationships between households. Legally, the *paterfamilias* were entitled to do what they wished to their members. They were supreme and unchecked subjects within their own *familias*. The law focused on what the magistrate would enforce with the backing of public arms when one *paterfamilias* complained of another. This was organised by contracts. People entitled to property could not coerce others (with property) because this would violate their sovereignty and neither could anything else, such as a public policy or custom, interfere with their business.

Hoppers and Richards explain that the law originated in Rome from military motives: "It was about peace in a limited sense of the word. It was about public power used to avoid mini-warfare between the mini king of one mini-state and another mini-king of another mini-state. It was about settling disputes without civil wars what would have divided Rome against itself, and therefore made it vulnerable to enemy attack" (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 48-49). To a large degree this was a success. It contributed to the survival and expansion of the people from the "within group". Consequently, the belief in the law as an institution intensified: "The law was part of the success of Rome's conquest, while the existence of landless citizens who wanted land was part and parcel of the *motivation* of those conquests" (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 49).

Originally, the Roman law included mores prescribing that everybody was included: "There could be no class of landless labourers because each individual was part of a family and each family had access to land. There could be no homeless" (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 46). In other words, ancient Roman law was based on a system that was typical of the indigenous peoples around the world such as the Sami society. At the beginning of the Republic (510 BC), however, exclusion began – a problem that was to fuel social struggles for a thousand years until its fall. However, a problem arose with the unexpected appearance of people who belonged to no *gens* (the plebeians) and people who had no property (the proletarians). In this sense, the Roman legal system grew to resemble a system that unlike, for example, African indigenous systems, which were based on status (not contracts), *excluded* in terms of defining who did not possess property and who did not belong to any tribe or clan. In short, the Roman system of law differs from other systems of law which are based on the principle of contracts. Without a contract there is no obligation (Hoppers and Richards, 2011).

To return to the 18th century Arctic. Jebens' study (1999) shows that, before the mid-eighteenth century, there was a shared understanding that the Sami had the right to the land in which they lived and to the natural resources which they used in order to live. This understanding was based on customary law which applied both to the individual and the group. In Sweden there existed what was termed *Lappskattfjell* (*Lapp tax land*) and *Lappskaffefjell* (*Lapp tax mountains*), areas in which Sami occupied a strong position with regard both to the local authorities and to other people in the area. On the Norwegian side of the border there were a few traces of a

similar type of system although there were collective civil rights for the inhabitants of so-called *lappbyer* (*Lapp towns*). There was no clearly defined national boundary in the Sami areas before the border Treaty of Strømstad in 1751. According to Jebens' study (1999), the rights to the common territory were based on the Sami conception of justice. Based on court documents, there is no doubt that there existed among the inhabitants of the Sami towns in the common territory a strong sense of broad and exclusive civil rights within the towns' borders, and that these rights were held collectively by the inhabitants. In addition, within the common territory, the population's understanding of the law was upheld by the courts (Markussen, 2013).

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Sami were not considered as the owners of the land they were using because they were defined as nomadic people. It would thus seem that the very concept of ownership presupposes settlement. While the Sami were considered to have the right to use their land, they did not have the right to own it: "The government's attitude has been that the Sami were nomads and therefore according to governmental understanding, could not acquire property rights to this land" (Markussen, 2013, para. 5).

After the Lapp Codicil (border treaty) was signed in 1751, the previous common territories of Norway and Sweden became subject to ecclesiastical and secular sovereignty. Jebens' study (2010) shows that the Sami did not lose their right to ownership because of this legislation, nor in terms of later regulations, which were principally a matter of public administrative law and not of civil law. However, this was not the understanding of the court system at the time. The Samis had neither representatives nor organs that could protect their former rights against the Norwegian authorities and, over the next 250 years, the territory became increasingly regarded as 'the king's land' (Jebens, 2010).

This decision was in agreement with both Roman law and *terra nullius*. These charters and patents laid the juridical foundation for the colonisation of the Sami people. As the Sami peoples had no written contracts, they were, per definition, without property and, hence, their land was "open to claim".

4.1.4 *The Kautokeino uprising*

In the autumn of 1852 Norway closed its border with Finland/Russia, thus preventing the Sami reindeer herders from accessing the winter pastures in Finland. This was the final provocation in a long series of abuses by corrupt Norwegian officials and a group of Laestadians organised a rebellion. A riot in the city of Kautokeino resulted in the death of a Norwegian liquor merchant and the local sheriff. The “Kautokeino uprising” was soon suppressed and many Sami leaders were placed on trial. Fourteen were sentenced to life in prison while two leaders were sentenced to death by the Supreme Court. Their crime was to “with violence and force have worked to eliminate all natural barriers between themselves and the Superiors and that way enforce an equality, which would have destroyed all Civilization”. Without the consent of their relatives, their skulls were brought to the University of Oslo for “scientific studies of lower races” and were not given back for burial until 150 years later (Zorgdrager, 1997, p. 375).

In many ways the Kautokeino uprising offers an insight into the ideological machinery of colonialism at the time. While the colonisers insisted on a hierarchy – a relation between domination and subordination – the Sami people insisted on equality. In many ways, the Kautokeino uprising revealed the truth about the ethical and moral basis of the dominant group. In addition, the basis for the verdicts points back to the mythological tool of rank racism. The Kautokeino uprising highlighted the moral and ethical basis of colonialism and, in so doing, exposed some of its fragility.

The obvious racist element underlying science at that time – a clear case of cultural/epistemic violence – was, however, not the main topic of the discussion leading up to the skulls being returned in 1997. The public debate at the time revolved mainly around the legal perspective and whether or not the Sami people had the right to have these skulls returned with the most important issues, namely, the epistemic internalisation of deep-rooted European-style racism that was central to the late nineteenth-century narrative, not coming under real scrutiny. Few have any real sense of how powerful and truly international these myths of civilisational truth and destiny were at the time. Today's mythologies of globalisation and economic determinism are insignificant and regional when compared with these crude ideologies (Ralston Saul, 2015). The Kautokeino uprising clearly reveals that Norway was in the middle of that European nightmare – a nightmare that only a few

years later would result in Hitler's murderous racial theories and a continental civil war which lasted thirty-two years and which was fought over European theories of race and governance. The violence, the inhumanity and the tragedy are well documented. However, it has become clear today that the theories underpinning it were simply nonsense. It was, as Ralston Saul writes, "clinically delusional behaviour, the outcome of four centuries of European determinism" (Ralston Saul, 2015, p. 11). However, the British, American and French empires were built on the same European determinism while countries such as Norway had, as demonstrated by the Kautokeino uprising, already espoused this determinism.

This misled many Norwegian scientists. As Nergård points out, "some of them have had their settlements with the past. Others have not" (Nergård, 2016, para. 8). Nergård's concern brings us back to the challenge of building a peace culture, that is, the transformation from violent cultures to cultures that reject violence. Surely the Kautokeino Uprising provided the Norwegian society with an opportunity to better understand what was going on and *why*. The return of the skulls in 1997 provided another such opportunity. Zorgdrager's doctoral thesis (1997) was part of this process. In short, the insight into the deeper mechanisms at work is important for the successful transformation of whatever stands in the way of a genuine and full recovery of our relationship today.

For the Sami people, the Kautokeino Uprising planted a seed of emancipation that had lasting value for the Sami society. The autumn of 1852 marked the first time that the Sami had protested against Norwegian policy. After the burial of the skulls in 1997, Ole Henrik Magga, the former Sami President and former chairman of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, commented that: "There are limits for how long one can step on a people before they speak up", drawing a parallel between the Kautokeino Uprising and today's Sami Parliament and Sami codetermination (Magga, 2008, para. 4).

4.2 Nation building

At the time of the Kautokeino Uprising, Norway was a young nation which was struggling to develop and consolidate an identity of its own. The nation building project must be seen in conjunction with the border issues in the north. Both the fear of the Soviet Union (the "Red danger") and Finland (the "Finnish danger") were an

important motivation for speeding up the Norwegianisation process. The Norwegian authorities suspected that an independent Finland was of special interest to both the Sami and the Finns and thus the Norwegian government embarked on a surveillance of these groups, especially in the border areas in the eastern region of Finnmark (Eriksen and Niemi, 1981). When the first radio transmitter was installed in Oslo in 1933, the army made sure that every Sami and Kven in the border area received a radio for free. The border posts had to be manned by Norwegians while the Norwegian officials and merchants, such as the postal service, were instructed told not to use either Sami or Finnish unless it was "strictly necessary" (Høgmo, 1986).

In fact, the entire administrative apparatus in the north served the interests of Norwegianisation. From the late 19th century the region was strongly influenced by nation builders disguised as what Edmund Edvardsen (1997) called "cultural educators".

As an approach to understanding this process, Edvardsen (1997) distinguishes between two concepts of culture, namely, the *analytical* and the *historical*. The analytical concept understands cultural differences as variations without rank and points to what Edvardsen classifies as *equal* cultural interactions. The historical concept, which Edvardsen terms the "hierarchical" cultural concept, represents what he classifies as *unequal* cultural interactions. A typical hierarchical concept of culture is found in the tense relationship between master and servant, educator and citizen and, in this case, in the tense relationship between the cultural educators and the natives in the north of Norway.

According to Edvardsen (1997), the carriers of the hierarchic concept of culture see differences mainly as cultural differences and all from the perspective that being cultivated, educated, civilized and enlightened etc. is reserved for a privileged few in the society – the few who have the power to define, in this case, what Norway is and what Norway should become. This circle of the privileged few, who also sent representatives to the north of Norway, upheld the notion that cultural change had to move forward in the "right" direction and not "backwards" but, instead, proceed as the natural consequence of the persistent work which cultural educators had performed with clerical and profane power.

According to Edvardsen (1997), the European self-assumption is clearly rooted in the hierarchical concept of culture. Out of the unification between the hierarchical

concept of culture and the tendency of the central authorities to educate the “non-enlightened” and “non-cultivated” emerges “culture pedagogies” with “cultural educators” to mentor these pedagogies. Underpinning this self-assumption is also the notion that the historical wheel spins with inspiration from the centre, from the capitals of Oslo, Stockholm, Helsinki, and Moscow, from Central Europe and from Europe to the rest of the world. Behind this concept is also a theory of development that sees science as travelling from the centre to the periphery, the metropolis to the countryside, where the primitive shall be replaced by the advanced while the outposts shall be contaminated by the city and the working class by the upper class in order to become middle class.

The manifestation of the hierarchical concept of culture is represented in the selection of national symbol figures in Norway with the northern fishermen, coast culture and the multi-occupational, the combination-farmer and the small-scale farmer being overlooked in favour of the successful specialised farmer with extensive fields of corn who then was linked with what Berggren (1989) describes as the Central European ideal:

“Culture lent its refined concept to the farmers, and the farmers offered their cultural characteristics as fuel so that a cultural heritage could be constructed” (p. 218).

According to Berggren, this constructed a mental space in which Norwegian self-identification could develop. Berggren then refers to the Norwegian national hero, Henrik Wergeland, in order to visualise the one-dimensional cultural concept that characterised the nation building at that time. Wergeland belonged to the enlightened upper class and his political message was that the lower classes had to assign the attitudes, but not the material standard of the upper classes. The lower classes had to be frugal, to know their place and be content with "inner values" (Berggren, 1989, p. 57).

Armed with a hierarchical concept of culture, the 20th century nation builders and “cultural educators” carried out the civilisation mission initiated by the Church. However, while the Christianisation process aimed at neutralising indigenous religion and belief, the nation builders targeted the wide and diverse concept of culture. The educational trajectory pointed not only towards Sami culture, but also towards

northern Norway in general. It was in the 20th century when Norwegian nation building strove to accomplish the modern project of “social hygiene”, that is, the project of coupling up with what Schmidt and Kristensen (1986) terms “the Western civilisation’s maniacal desire for order” (p. 53). This process, which was similar to the nation building process, had self-identification and the reduction of differences at its programme, all from the perspective of the discipliners.

In order to complete the aim of melting together of the cultural variations and regional differences into one nation, and to manage the process, the central authority used various “disciplinary characters” (Edvardsen, 1997). The central authority remained at the centre, in the capitals and in the cultural and scientific centres, defining “proper” the mores and pulling the strategic strings. The circle of the central authority regarded themselves to be the most enlightened in that country and appointed themselves as the judges of what was best for the nation. In order to achieve national disciplining, they needed the Church, the law (including the police) and the institutions of health and education. Thus, the common task of all these institutions was the national reduction of differences and control.

It was in duty, in “the field”, in the daily scenes of everyday life that the uniformed transmitters of these ideas, such as teachers, doctors, priests, police etc., met the local citizen, the educational object. It was in the local communities in the north and along the coast and fjords that these representatives attacked what was deemed to be unkempt, untidy and inappropriate and tried to eliminate public variations. The non-disciplinary, non-educated, non-civilised and non-cultivated had to be erased in favour of discipline, education, civilisation and Culture (with capital C). Inherent in this notion was the belief that, the further away from the centre, and the further out towards the coastline, the worst «non» exemplars could be found. For the central authority, the north of Norway was regarded a messy backyard in the coming nation. This region was described as a “Third World country” within the country where disobedience and godlessness ruled; the untidy and imprudent ruled and immorality and the insanitary ruled. Education was strategically used to “cure” that condition and the people who were holding Norway back from becoming a “real” nation (Edvardsen, 1997).

4.2.1 *The imaginary indigenous figure*

The national "disciplining" anchored in the nation-building project in the north of Norway serves an example of the way in which the colonists constructed their own version of the indigenous. Similar to the British and French colonists in Canada, they constructed, to employ Francis's (1992) terminology, an "imaginary indigenous figure" without reference to either the indigenous culture or the indigenous reality. In Canada, Francis (1992) argues, this imaginary figure became the subject for politics and civilisational upbringing in a pact with the hierarchical concept of culture which the Europeans had brought from home and to "over there". This imaginary image of the indigenous is based on an image of the Other stripped of his/her soul, dehumanised and successfully converted into an "it", deprived of all humanhood, and thus prepared to serve the image maker's purposes. This image then becomes imposed on the indigenous by means of humiliation with this image being exported back to Europe to further control the non-Western people. This image is also used to self-impose a reflection of their desired self-image by using "otherness" as an image of contrast. Francis (1992) points out that the colonists required this image of the Other as a mirror for self-identification when they travelled to foreign countries and, for example, in order to identify themselves as Canadians in "The New World" (Francis, 1992, p. 5). The imaginary indigenous figure (the colonist's Other) – was forced into an image that was to represent what the colonist was not in order to craft a certain image of Europe.

According to Francis (1992), the hopeful fantasy about The New World is a place which is imagined to be like the "Garden of Eden" with colonists imagining the "Indian" as harmless angels, the natural people living naively and innocently in pact with nature and relieved of the destructive burden of civilisation: "If America was The Garden of Eden, the "Indian" had to be its' sacred children" (p. 8). According to Francis (1992), this image actualised the European concern about deficiencies in their own civilisation. However, in his more realistic image of the New World, where the Europeans were seen as intruders in foreign countries who needed land with the indigenous having to be driven out, the "Indian" was considered to be an enemy, an opponent who was hateful, evil, uncultured, uncivilised, inferior, even fearsome and bloodthirsty. In short, in order to conquer an already occupied land, the conqueror needed the image of the inferior, beastly and primitive "Indian" who was not worthy own land.

While the first image of the “Indian” is described as a saving angel, a mirror that describes the shortcomings of the own civilisation, the second image represents the dark side of the prize, the one that mirrored the advantage of European civilisation. While the fanaticism about oneself needed the first image, the fight for possession of land needed the second. In other words, the “Indian” became partly something for which the Euro-Canadian strived, that is to say something he/she admired about the “Indian” and despised about himself, and partly something he/she despised about the “Indian” and admired about him/herself. In other words, the imaginary Other became the measuring rod for what was better and what was worse (Francis, 1992).

Similarly, the Norwegian cultural educators operated using an imaginary indigenous figure. The literature scientist, Edward Said, contributed to the understanding of this process in *Orientalism* (1978), the Western study of the Eastern world that describes the way in which how Westerners perceive and represent Orientals. Said (1978) highlights the European imperialists’ opinion of people in their colony, and how the political culture of imperialists shaped that of the colony through this imposed self-image. Similarly, the cultural educators operated using the framework of understanding of the majority culture and imported an outsider perspective of the North. While the first image of the North was characterised by romanticism, an exotic periphery without any significance for the national cultural common cause, the second image mirrored the superiority of the majority culture with the indigenous being seen as simpleminded, immoral, superstitious and unhygienic (Edvardsen, 1997). Consequently, the imposed imaginary figure became both the *outer* and the *inner* enemy, not only of the cultural educator specifically, but also an enemy of the nation and for the very sake of Norway. The cultural educator therefore "grafts" onto the indigenous by means of humiliation, which is inserted in the tension between a "standard", which is to be sought and a "condition", which represents a level below the standard. This is a figure who, "under the pressure of power, adopted the others' image of himself, the discouraging picture of himself, of his body, of his home and of his way of life" (Edvardsen, 1997, p. 57).

In force of humiliation, *he/she* becomes both the outer and the inner enemy of *herself/himself* – an enemy who, for many reasons, has been integrated into the DNA of the Sami identity up to the present. The "imaginary other" represents a mental gall in the complex character of the Sami and other northerners, a constant reminder of the humiliated and inferior self.

4.2.2 *The boarding schools*

He grew up alone
he liked birds
the first spot thawed bare in spring delighted him
He learned to be alone
to play his own games
real games
For hours he waited for trout
Time was different
The days got their own length
no one was like the other
He learned to imitate birds
scream like a rough-legged buzzard
and a plover
For him that was not unusual
But there were well-meaning people
who knew to tell
how different he was

He happily travelled
to school

He got to regret that
A foreign language was spoken
and there was no trout lake
(...)

He had to reside in a boarding school
He had never seen such a big house
He was afraid he'd get lost there

He longed for the tundra
he felt suffocated among the pines
Became more and more different

At night he wet his bed
Secretly
cried under the hay in a barn
(...)

The others commenced their terror
Made a circle around him
pushed the school bully on him
helped the bully
get the odd one down
And if you want to be beaten some more
it will be a pleasure

And they sneaked around in the dark rooms
of the boarding school
they attacked him as a group
and felt him
But his young man's tool hadn't yet
the instinct to stand

The mothers gathered with their worries
It can't be normal
that a person just reads
keeps to himself
Our kids always make mischief
and have to take their punishment
But even that is better
Such a loner
that cannot be normal

They whispered about such things
But so loud that it had to be heard

And he heard

even though he was reading
even though he pretended not to hear
Heard

One day in school
they learned
about short human beings
primitive people
who exist
even in our country
and are called
Lapps

Nils-Aslak Väelkepää, Trekways of the Wind, 1984

The boarding school initiative quickly became a central element in the Norwegianisation policy. As soon as 1851, the Norwegian Parliament had allocated funds to the education of Sami and Kven children. A total of four language directives were passed to prohibit the Sami language in school (1862, 1870, 1880 and 1898) with the directive of 1880 stipulating that the Norwegian language should be the only language of instruction and that the Sami language and Finnish were to be used only as auxiliary languages. An appendix to the directive of 1880 states that: "No teacher will receive a bonus unless he complies the directive with punctuality and suspicion" (Lund, 2005). In 1898, a Lapp and Kven codicil was established to accelerate the Norwegianisation process.

In 1899, after returning from an inspection in Finnmark, the school director, Aas, stated that the Norwegianisation process had deadlocked and that, in some places "even in reverse". He wanted instant results and in his report, he suggested that the Sami children be removed from their families and be placed with Norwegian families. He also suggested that the salaries of the teachers who lectured in Norwegian were to be increased. A law was later passed prohibiting the Sami language in schools. This law remained in force until 1959 when the Norwegian Parliament dealt with the proposal from the Sami committee (Lund, 2005). Aas's report laid the basis for the building of boarding schools in Finnmark (Grenersen, 2011). When the first boarding school in Kautokeino was finished in 1907, Brage Høyem, a pastor in Kautokeino

from 1902 to 1907, wrote in a letter to the school director in Finnmark: "Thank you for your energetic work! If we may continue, we will make a Norwegian village of Kautokeino" (Grenersen, 2011, p. 6).

Up until 1950, 51 boarding schools were built. They were attended by 35 per cent of the children in Finnmark lived with 90 per cent of the students being Sami while 66 per cent of these children had understood only Sami when they entered first grade (Bråstad Jensen, 1991). In the beginning most of the teachers who had taught at these schools had spoken only Norwegian and thus they were not able to communicate with the Sami children.

In a series of reports NRK Sápmi recently requested former Sami boarding school students and teachers to share their experiences. Harrowing stories were told – stories of children who were sent away far from their parents and who were victims of physical violence and mental abuse from their teachers, other care managers and peers. They spoke of abandonment and helplessness and of long term effects such as depression and anxiety. These stories provided an insight into how the Sami boarding students live with feelings of inadequacy and failure (Andersen, 2016).

The survivors have said of the schools that it was "not a school for Samis, but a Norwegian boarding school for South Sami children" (Jonassen, 2012). A former boarding school student, Ole Henrik Magga, said: "The first four years at school I could not understand a word of what the teacher was saying" (Brekke, 2013, para. 6). Maggia, who is now a professor of the Sami language, points out that many of the boarding school children became illiterate in the sense that they did not learn to write Sami or the Norwegian language. Solgbjørg Valia, another former boarding school student, stated:

"The main lesson at the boarding school was to learn obedience and the inferiority of Sami culture. I was always afraid for Norwegians in authority positions. Also, in my adult life I have been afraid to raise my own needs. That fear comes from my adolescence at the boarding school where we learnt to be inferior." (Brekke, 2013, para. 4)

Although Sami inferiority was, perhaps, not the official, explicit goal of the Norwegian State, Norwegianisation had been the overarching goal since the beginning of the 20th century and Sami children had to stop speaking Sami language and begin to

see themselves as Norwegians (Bråstad Jensen, 1991). Westfjell reports about another survivor in *Lund* (2005):

“It was strictly forbidden for us to speak Southern Sami both in school and in our leisure time. We had to sneak away to speak our mother tongue and, if we were "caught" speaking Sami, we were to expect a harsh reprimand. A typical punishment would be for the teachers to starve us. They also dressed up boys with girl clothes. In that way they became an easy target for bullying.” (p. 231)

By making schooling compulsory, the Norwegian authorities engineered the demise of Sami languages. As Jens Ivar Nergård (Nergård, 2016) points out, the Norwegianisation policy was executed with the Sami and Kven children in a powerless situation. By making schooling compulsory, the children could be shaped in the image desired by the Norwegian state. This is the main reason why the boarding schools were such an important initiative because a boarding school system gave the state, through the churches, *total* control over future generations Sami. By hiding behind the progressive mask of education and using the central mechanisms of civilisation – language, culture and all things spiritual – Norway was able to launch a direct attack on the Sami.

"The boarding school system was a system made of orphans and childless parents. By isolating small children from their families – and parents from their children – child neglect was institutionalised", the boarding school survivor, Magne Ove Varsi, said in an interview with Sami Broadcasting (Varsi, 2016, para. 2). By establishing boarding schools for the Sami children, the Norwegian government also, essentially, declared the Samis to be unfit parents. In a sense, they were considered to be indifferent to the future of their children. However, this conclusion is contradicted by the fact that parents often kept their children out of schools because they saw these schools, quite accurately, as harmful and insensitive institutions that would raise their children in unfamiliar ways.

While the political dimension of the Norwegianisation process is well documented, less attention has been paid to its causes and effects. Minde (Lund, 2005) points out that, while Norwegian literature contains numerous descriptions of child abuse from the perspective of class, little attention has been paid to what happened in the Sami

and Kven settlements. In fact, historical and social research focusing on the social-psychological *consequences* of the Norwegianisation process of the Sami and also the Kvens is largely missing (Lund, 2005). Minde concludes: "It is important – in any case by time – to learn about its causes and effects. Only through this double track combination, we might consider what happened, both from the perspective of power and powerlessness – from those who introduced the process and from those who carried the burden of the Norwegianisation pressure" (Lund, 2005, p. 211).

However, as Jens Ivar Nergård has pointed out, a major challenge in opposing this is that the assault of the boarding school has produced silence. He highlights that guilt and shame silenced the victims of the Norwegianisation policy:

"In a cunning and sneaky way the Norwegian authorities turned the damage into something personal, intimate and private, meaning that it has been up to each and one to find solution to a structural abuse staged by the government. This is why most of the victims of the Norwegianization policy are not demanding an investigation into the circumstances Sami pupils have lived under in the Norwegian school."
(Nergård, 2016, para. 4)

Nergård believes that the subject of the dormitory life of many thousand children still is taboo and that many of these children were damaged for life. He states: "The situation is that we strictly do not know properly what the consequences are, and how it has affected those who have lived in the residential schools. But we know that the wounds exist – also beyond what is considered to be Sami today – for those who had their language and identity stolen" (Nergård, 2016, para. 5).

As early as 1981 Per Fugelli was to alert us that the boarding school system had seriously damaged the health of the Sami population. Fugelli, who worked as a municipal doctor in Porsanger at the time (a municipality in Finnmark), conducted one of the most extensive health studies among Samis and concluded that the Norwegian State "has inflicted serious health damages on a major part of the Sami population" (Fugelli, 1981, p. 62). Fugelli points out that the most important precondition for good health is not omega 3 and vitamin C but confidence in yourself and love for yourself, your roots, your thoughts and feelings, your language, your

songs and stories. According to Fugelli, the boarding school system worked effectively to prevent this (Fugelli, 1981).

It is clear today that the boarding schools impacted not only on those who had attended the schools but that the schools had also affected the survivors' partners, their children and their grandchildren, their extended families, and their communities. Many of the children who were abused in the schools also went on to abuse others (Tjelle, 2002; Meløy, 1980). A survivor, Varsi, commented: "It is like a veil over a family tree where boarding school time reproduces itself from one generation to another in some way" (Varsi, 2016, para. 4). Tore Johnsen, the general secretary of the Sami Church Council, reported at the international conference held in Trondheim in June 2016, "Reconciliation Processes and Indigenous Peoples: Truth, Healing and Transformation", that "Indigenous youth all over the world talk about inherited grief – today we know that historical traumas transfer to new generations if they are not worked out individually or collectively". Johnsen continues by saying: "When we talked about the need for reconciliation between Sami and non-Sami, many Sami communities met us with scepticism. I believe this is due to the fact that all talk about reconciliation easily means that one has to make compromises with the truth. Any reconciliation must start by getting to the truth about the wrongdoings that have occurred" (Nystad, 2016, para. 5).

The NRK Sápmi reports that many of the former boarding school students they interviewed have developed addictions as a means of coping. Children who are exposed to strict and regimented discipline and a restricted life more like life in a prison than in a family sometimes found it difficult to become loving parents (Nystad, 2016). This implies that the effects of the boarding school experience extend far beyond the close, private quarters. Much of the individual and collective harm have not yet been redressed and Norwegian authorities have, up to this point, not been willing to shed light on this situation.

4.2.3 Standing in the way of healing and reconciliation

What are the damages? Who is responsible? How to repair the damages? The Sami community is now asking these questions. In April 2015 the seminar at the Árran Lule Sami Center for Norwegianisation and Health, in collaboration with SANKS (Sami Competence Centre for Mental Health), concluded that there is still much to be

done and much to be revealed in Sápmi. In her opening address at the international conference "Reconciliation Processes and Indigenous Peoples: Truth, Healing and Transformation" in Trondheim 2016. Aili Keskitalo, the President of the Sami Parliament, stated that:

“The wounds cannot be healed behind closed doors. They must be brought out in the public space so that the society can contribute to the healing process. Reconciliation requires that truth be established and documented ... Today, we still live with the heritage of the oppression. It is about shame; about lack of respect; lack of language; about mental health; about invisibilization; about taboos ... In Sápmi today we have seen an increase in cases of sexual abuse. We must never excuse sexual abuses committed against children – the guilt is on the perpetrators. But to deal with the silence that characterises parts of our society in dealing with these cases, we need to try to understand what has led to this situation. We need to explore several possible explanations, and keep an open mind to what may have caused such seriously offending behaviour amongst our people...What is happening in Canada is very inspiring. The work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is about to change the national discourse.” (Keskitalo, 2016, para. 3)

According to Keskitalo, with the inspiration from countries such as South Africa, Greenland and Canada, the Sami Parliaments of Norway, Sweden and Finland are working to establish a joint commission to promote parallel truth and reconciliation processes (Keskitalo, 2016). “We are still waiting for the grand settlement of the brutal and protracted Norwegianisation policy”, Per Lars Tonstad writes, calling on all of us to support this proposal to establish a joint commission by the Sami Parliament. He goes on saying that:

“The Norwegian King Harald’s apology in 1997 is therefore not enough, although it was seen as important. Norwegian authorities must act to rectify the asymmetry that still exists between people’s right to their own language and culture in this country and the on-going invisibilisation of Sami language and culture in the Norwegian public space. What we need is a truth and reconciliation commission

that can dig deep and wide, to examine what really happened. Then we will get a vault of knowledge, a more solid foundation for two people to rebuild trust and respect." (Tonstad, 2016, para. 8)

Jens Ivar Nergård believes that the Canadian project should act as a standard of what one does in the wake of such a situation and that the Canadian way of doing it would be the best for Norway and the Scandinavian countries, in other words, for the Arctic region as a whole (Nergård, 2016).

The members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Canada (TRC) spent six years travelling to all parts of Canada to hear from the Aboriginal people, who had been taken from their families as children, forcibly, if necessary, and placed for much of their childhoods in residential schools. They heard from more than 6000 witnesses who had survived the experience of living in the schools as students: "Children were abused, physically and sexually, and they died in the schools in numbers that would not have been tolerated in any school system anywhere in the country, or in the world" (TRC, 2015, p. VI).

The final report from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Canada, *Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future* (2015) concludes that the residential schools "were a crime against humanity". The analysis and the terminology applied in the report are relentless and place the Norwegian excuses and the trivialisation of the Norwegianisation process in a new light. Nergård argues that the hesitation to commit to a process of truth and reconciliation contributes involuntarily to reinforcing the victims' fate through a trivialisation of the atrocities they have suffered (Nergård, 2016). He argues: "It is important that the Norwegian authorities enter the scene and take responsibility for identifying and remedying the abuses that have been committed against the Sami people through history. The majority of the people must gain knowledge about what has happened" (Nergård, 2016, para. 12).

The TRC (2015) concluded that "getting to the truth was hard, but getting to reconciliation will be harder". Reconciliation, the report continues,

"... requires that the paternalistic and racist foundations of the residential school system be rejected as the basis for an ongoing relationship. Reconciliation requires that a new vision, based on a commitment to mutual respect, be developed. It also requires an

understanding that the most harmful impacts of residential schools have been the loss of pride and self-respect of Aboriginal people, and the lack of respect that non-Aboriginal people have been raised to have for their Aboriginal neighbours. Reconciliation is not an Aboriginal problem; it is a Canadian one. Virtually all aspects of Canadian society may need to be reconsidered." (TRC, 2015, p. V)

Kathryn Tenesse, chair of the Ktunaxa Nation Council in Canada, explained that the first step in reconciliation between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals is "recognition and acknowledgement. Then we can work at our relationship one step at a time – and gradually – find things we can do together" (Ralston Saul, 2015, p. 16, citing Tenesse). Reconciliation is thus not an apology, although an apology is necessary; it is a process which involves both parties. As Tenesse points out, "for any reconciliation to take place, the party who was hurt must take part" (Ralston Saul, 2015, p. 16, citing Tenesse).

In other words, the Sami community is in the process to find out the truth and of healing old wounds through a process of reconciliation and of rebuilding broken relationships. However, the Norwegian government has, thus far, refused to take this proposal seriously and has denounced it as appearing "as loosely formed thoughts and irrelevant to implement" (Schanche and Idivuoma, 2017, para. 4). In other words, the Norwegian government is standing in the way of the reconciliation process.

In 2013, the Norwegian Parliament accepted the proposal by the Sami Council for a revised educational plan for primary and secondary schools and one which commits all Norwegian school children to learning about the Norwegianisation process. Until this point, this story has not been part of the curriculums at schools. The former boarding school student, Laila Somby Sandvik, commented on this decision in an interview with NRK Sápmi: "I hope that this will improve the understanding of us (Sami) in the Norwegian society. At last, maybe we will not be perceived as exotic and strange, but as fellow citizens" (Idivuoma, 2013, para. 12). I believe Sandvik highlighted a very central point in all of this, namely, that discovering the truth and making it known is not about sympathy or guilt, failure, revenge or retribution, it is not about a romantic view of the past or about old ways versus new ways and it is not about propping up people who are not able to survive on their own, instead, it is about citizens' rights that are still being denied to indigenous people and therefore

also non-indigenous people, namely, the right to be fellow citizens. Reconciliation will mean something only if it starts from the position of *restitution*. I have never heard of the Sami peoples seeking to be categorised as victims. In other words, the problem of reconciliation is not a Sami problem; it is a Norwegian problem. It is a question of correcting the story and about rebuilding relationships that are central to the creation of Norway and the Scandinavian region as a whole and, equally important, to its continued existence. It is essential that these relationships are rectified because they carry the potential of offering a more creative and accurate way of imagining ourselves – a different narrative.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter has briefly discussed aspects of the historical antecedent of colonialism in the Barents Region and its effects on the Sami people. Even before the illegal inclusion of the Sami people's territories into the four countries of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, the culture of the Sami people had been systematically destroyed by the surrounding nations. Even without the use of military power, superior means of violence were used to impose Christianity, eradicate the Sami people's cultures and languages, destroy their traditional communities, exploit their natural resources, discredit their identity, utilize the population as labour force and prevent any organised resistance to what was happening.

The central theory here is that the colonisation of the Sami people was undertaken to satisfy the needs of the imperial powers. The main purpose of establishing colonies was to exploit these colonies economically. The justification (cultural violence) offered for this process was the necessity to bring Christianity and civilisation to the indigenous peoples of the world. As a whole, the legitimization of the colonial process relied exclusively on the absolute presumption of spreading a specific set of European beliefs and values by proclaiming them to be universal values and imposing them on the peoples of the world. This universalising of European values, which was so central to the colonial mission, was extended to the Scandinavian region and was used as the primary justification and rationale for the colonisation of the Sami people.

The term "cultural genocide", also referred to as "culturocide" or "ethnocide", appeared in the 1994 draft of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of

Indigenous Peoples (it was later replaced by the term "genocide"). It means "the destruction of those structures and practices that allow the group to continue as a group. States that engage in cultural genocide set out to destroy the political and social institutions of the targeted group. Land is seized and languages are banned. Spiritual leaders are persecuted, spiritual practices are forbidden, and objects of spiritual value are confiscated and destroyed. And, most significantly to the issue at hand, families are disrupted to prevent the transmission of cultural values and identity from one generation to the next." (United Nations, 1994, Article 7)

In their dealings with the Sami people, the surrounding nations did all this. They asserted control over Sami land; ignored Sami rights and eliminated Sami governments (the "siida" system); outlawed Sami spiritual practices; jailed and persecuted Sami spiritual leaders (the "noadis") and confiscated their sacred drums. They also denigrated and suppressed the Sami language by forbidding Sami children to speak the Sami languages and to yoik (Sami singing) at school. They also separated Sami children from their parents, sending them to boarding schools, and, as a result, severing their link to their culture and identity.

In Norway, the overall purpose of The Norwegianisation Policy of 1879-1940 was to ensure that the Sami people ceased to exist as a distinct legal, social, cultural, religious and racial entity in Norway. The boarding school system played a central role in this campaign as it gave the dominant group total control over future Sami generations. This control of education meant that the dominant group was able to implant the top dog inside the underdog, both as a mentality and as a discourse (penetration), grant the underdog only a very partial view of what was happening (segmentation), keep the underdogs on the outside (marginalisation), and keep the underdogs away from each other (fragmentation).

Even if the situation has changed significantly since the Kautokeino Uprising in 1852, the remnants of colonialism remain an ongoing issue, shaping both the structure and the quality of the relationship between Sami and non-Sami. In addition, the exploitations are continuing on in all four Scandinavian countries and the Sami people

are not being heard when they claim their rights to territory, granted them according to ILO convention 169.²¹

Unless the trajectory of the current policy and practice is changed the prognosis is that the Sami culture, territory and resources will continue to be exploited and their culture will be further eroded and end up as exotic items in museums and exhibitions. How to create a future that is different from the one that lies ahead?

In the main restorative action involves asking the following four questions: (1) Who has been hurt? (2) Who is responsible? (3) What is the root/underlying cause? (4) How may the damage be repaired? (Nabudere and Velthuisen, 2013, p. 3). In their responses to their wrongdoing, the surrounding nations have asked only questions (1) and (2). From a restorative action perspective, a genuine recovery requires that the root/underlying causes, as well as the issues of reparation and healing, are explored at length.

It is part of the conviction in this thesis that the problem of colonialism is a symptom of a deep problem in our civilization, namely, our cultural and philosophical heritage, and that this belief requires that an effort be made to solve these fundamental problems. In other words, a swift change of policy alone may not be effective, at least in the long run, unless the deeper mechanisms are brought to the fore and, to some point, altered. In addition, the endless possibilities inherent in the dimension of positive peace, which is already reflected in the Barents Region through the rich cross border cooperation tradition and which points to a more advanced form of coexistence, are an invitation to explore the positive peace approaches anchored in the notion of sustainable social cohesion. As will be explored in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, this work of articulation calls for an enlarged way of thinking – an expanded conceptual framework of ethical discourse and language that incorporates what the modern parameters of ethics do not incorporate. However, in order to proceed with these two approaches (negative+positive peace), we need to continue with both the pedagogy of hope and the pedagogy of the “unsaid”.

²¹ Only Norway has recognised the Sami people as an indigenous people (1990 according to ILO Convention 169) and, hence, according to international law, the Sami (in Norway) are entitled to special protection and rights.

Chapter 5: Ethics and the demise of the Other

Chapter 4 discussed some of the historical antecedents of colonialism in the Barents Region and their effects on the Sami people. The process entailed the meting out of various forms of violence, in terms of which the main impediments to healing and reconciliation include humiliation, the exclusion and the invisibilisation of Sami culture and knowledge. The chapter also highlighted the role of science in this process which, through the discourses on the exclusion, epistemological silencing and cultural demise of the Other, has contributed to marginalising the participation and influence of indigenous people.

In addition, the unresolved issue of colonial and the neo-colonial subjugation of both indigenous people and indigenous knowledge systems underpins the assertion that the problem of colonialism is deeply rooted in our cultural and civilisational heritage. The chapter cited a strong link between the episteme of modernity and the problem of the continuity of colonial relations. The chapter concludes that a genuine recovery from the effects of colonialism requires transformation. However, that transformation will remain superficial unless there is focused attention on the deeper levels of the *value coding* systems. This brings us to ethics – the theory of human action.

5.1 Ethics and the challenge of getting it out of the box

According to Hoppers and Richards (2011), the paradigm of modernity may be said to rest on four boxes; "Law protects the property; science valorises a mechanistic worldview over holistic cosmologies; economics upholds a metaphysics that justifies survival of the fittest over the metaphysics of sharing that governs a large majority of livelihoods in the world; education refuses to recognise and build on the knowledge that children from non-western systems of thought have" (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 45). Parallel to these boxes that constitute modernity is also a tradition of ethics which springs the same supply.

The paradigm of modernity is, according to Hoppers and Richards (2011) marked by intractable problems²², a clear sign that new paradigms are needed. In addition, the resolution of these intractable problems within the framework of modern society is not possible from within the paradigm and as long as the lenses through which we see these are modern lenses. Instead, resolving these problems requires going outside the box by including Modernity's Other (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 36). Thus, the main questions in relation to ethics include the following: "What is the box?" and "How may we get ethics out of it?" As will be explored, the proposed answers include that the box comprises the conviction that ethics must start with rules and that the only solution to defective rules is either to adjust or to replace these rules with better ones while attempt to get ethics out of the box must start by rejecting this premise of ethics and trying to perceive ethics differently by including alternative systems genuinely.

5.2 The constitutive rules

The Polish writer, Aleksander Wat, once noticed that whatever is said about music, poetry and art, the most important things remain unsaid. This supposition may also apply to morality. We often experience the feeling that there is something either beneath the surface or behind the scenes. By stressing the problem of colonialism and the theory of cultural violence, this chapter aims to incorporate *some* of the backstage drama of modern ethics. Central is the attempt to expose some of the constitutive rules and norms that dominate this thinking or rationality by focusing on factors that are not traditionally part of the discourse of moral philosophy but which, nonetheless, influence it. A central hypothesis in this study is that the problem of colonialism, ultimately, points back to a specific conception of the Other and thus that the conception of the Other constitutes a point of reference in examining ethics in relation to this concern.

What are the starting points of those philosophies that were the most prevalent in earlier or contemporary meditations on morality? A possible starting point is the

²² Some of the intractable problems of modernity are listed in Rethinking Thinking (2011): A series of financial crises; unchecked population growth; the destruction of the biosphere, ethnic violence, typically fuelled by historic humiliation and deep mass resentment; poverty, including homelessness and hunger; water shortages; air pollution; exhausting of fossil fuels; terrorism; alienated youth; unemployment, precarious employment, and low wages. A complete list is found in Judge (1994-5).

universality of (1) the moral *law*: the great Kantian notion. For Kant, it was a matter of reattaching ethics to a rational principle with the universality of the maxim of action as the criterion of moral value. Or one may depart from the notion of (2) *utility*, positing that “what is good is that which is useful or advantageous to me”. For both (1) and (2), the self-reference is the anchoring point for behaviour towards others. The basic premise of the ethical budget is what will, ultimately, benefit me, in other words, the meta-norm is ego-centred: “Do unto others what you want others to do to you”, or the same with negations. Based on this principle there are ethical doctrines, which are, on the surface, at least, totally sublime, for example, egoism understood properly would lead to altruism. In fact, from this angle one also reconnects with the notion of universality: the sharing certainly imposes sacrifices in which the advantage “to myself” decreases but, in which it is no longer contested by the Other who has a share there.

Starting points (1) and (2) are an essential (almost indispensable) component of the Western moral discourse. The rules view has been endorsed, paradoxically some might say, by both the Western Church and Western Enlightenment thinkers – by the former on the authority of the Bible and by the latter according to a self-engendered rationality, with the tradition from Hobbes and Locke to Kant and Habermas proposing a moral autonomy based on the use of principles and rules. The two main tracks in modern ethics (utilitarianism and Kantian moral philosophy) represent fundamental positions that recur in today’s moral philosophical debate in many different guises and varieties – a thinking that also dominates the sphere of ethical reasoning in the Barents Region today. The universality of rules and principles have gained almost automatic acceptance, not only by Western audiences but also by those who have been colonised, thus indicating a clear favouring of a Western perspective.

5.2.1 *Two competing myths of origin – according to Bauman*

The Polish sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman (2004b), argues that the prevailing view of morality today has always perceived itself as a treatment for a second view. These views and their relationship may be described by referring to two biblical myths. The first tradition is the tradition that presumes that to be moral is equivalent with not, under no circumstances, deviating from the narrow road, either in thought or in

action. The other tradition presumes that being a moral subject is to face the choice between the good and the bad, and to *know* that there is a choice. These two traditions are discussed briefly below.

The first myth refers to the legislation on the Sinai Mountain: “When the crowd of people saw how it thundered and lightened, when they heard the sound of bassoons and saw the smoke from the mountain, they shivered and kept distance” (Bauman, 2004b, p. 87). They shivered because they feared that “if God spoke to us, we will die”. When Moses instructed the people to follow the law that the Lord had given them through him, they accepted everything: “Everything the Lord has imposed, we will obey”. Furthermore, the Lord continued to explain in detail what they should and what they should not do. If they did what they should do, they were good while, if they did what the Lord had prohibited them to do, they were evil. They would be rewarded for the former and punished for the latter. Thus, in order to live a moral life they had to follow God’s words and obey the rules of a God who is too mighty to speak directly to His people, and who is too frightening to be seen face to face. It is clear from this myth how they became moral people (Bauman, 2004b, p. 88).

The second myth refers to the banishment from the Garden of Eden. When Adam was banished from paradise, he was committed to “serve his bread in his face’s twirls” and “grow the soil he was taken from” (Bauman, 2004b, p. 90). From that point on he was forced to fight to survive and to decide and choose. The choices could be more or less reasonable, better or worse. Before they were banished from paradise, Adam and Eve did not know that things or actions could be good or bad. They did not know that they were naked. The words “good” and “not-good” existed only in the thinking of God when He spoke to Himself when He thought critically about His own creation. Now, these words became part of Adam’s and Eve’s vocabulary. The knowledge they received was divine. However, unlike God they lacked universal power and knowledge, unlike God they could make mistakes and do wrong and unlike God they could choose to do the good or the bad. It is clear from this myth how Adam and Eve became moral persons (Bauman, 2004, p. 92).

The first myth presents morality as obedience to the laws and rules and as a set of instructions for a problem-free life. The second myth presents morality as a difficult dilemma and as an eternal endeavour.

The majority of ethical theories follow the path of the first myth as, as such, they are loyal to the social practice that is based on the assumption that people must be *introduced* to morality. Firstly, there must be written rules which inculcate respect for the word and the force of the law and which enables one to become both a moral person and to be relieved at the same time. If morality, according to the second biblical myth, is the drama of the choice, then the legislation tradition attempts either to reduce the ambivalence of the choice or to remove it completely. The first tradition seeks one thing only, namely, to take *control* of the choice's drama while, on the other hand, the second tradition feeds on the dilemma, perceiving the dilemma as a resource – a necessity.

Bauman (2004b) argues that the proponents of the first myth have always perceived themselves and their understanding of ethics as a remedy for the instability and the problems evolving from the second myth. They also, subsequently, declared war on the type of moral dilemma that the second myth generated and, ultimately, on the type of person (or culture) the second tradition would foster. For Bauman, this social practice and the theories supporting it have risked not only clarity, but also the moral conflict, for the sake of control. They perceive the perfect moral life as the *absence of moral conflict*. In addition, they trust that, when there is one single Law, and only this one Law, they will find the Promised Land and be rewarded with contentment and self-contentment in a conflict-free situation. To fight for such a law-monopoly is perceived as necessary for a moral life, either under the *one God* and the *individual truth-paradigm's* banner, or for the single independent state, the one true rationality, the one true philosophy, the one true science, the one true law or the one true economy. Conversely, in each case and on every occasion, the fight for this monopoly was directed against the people who challenged this monopoly of the law – the totality – against the Godless or disbelieving “mentally ill” who refused to obey the law. In all practical situations the war was rooted in the moral life's fundamental belief, generic binding and competition – exempted ethical system – and always, either with deliberate purpose or the lack of any other reason, fought in the name of conformity to the law and against any form of disagreement with the law.

In the story of Antigone, Sophocles provided the archetype of moral dilemmas from the point of view of the Sinai Mountain proponents. Even 2500 years later, there is a strong tendency to think of moral conflicts as an obstacle to conformity and as an obstacle to the guarantee of justice. From the point of view of the Sinai Mountain

story, the only moral conflict arises from a collision between two authorities which each had equal rights to establish a principle but which contradicted each other. If people had listened to God's commandment, "You shall not have other Gods than me", there would have been no moral dilemmas and neither would there have been the difficulty of moral dilemmas as a subject in itself.

The second myth, however, describes a human being who is beset by doubt, scruples, the uncertainty of knowing, and agony. This person is moral because he/she lives through experiences with no obvious and ambiguous choice. One reason for this is, firstly, that the connection between action and its consequences evades him/her and, secondly, because he/ she has to look for the *good* him/herself. These are far from infallible prescriptions where they are abandoned to depend on their endurance and dissatisfaction with self. This act was moral because Adam and Eve could never have hoped that the good that they had done ever would be proven or acknowledged beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, it belonged to the infinite.

5.3 Ethics and its historical relations with Europe

The split belief and interpretation of morality is also, somehow, characteristic of Europe. The overall presupposition is that there are, principally, two competing traditions of ethics in Europe, and which correspond to two different philosophies of the self. This section will examine how these two traditions originated historically and grew structurally. I will try to outline the dual-topic characteristic and to explain. A possible starting point is a broad and general, but also very important, question: What is Europe?

5.3.1 A split Christianity

The fact that Europe uses two different alphabets (the Latin and the Cyrillic) highlights the fact that two different churches Christianised Europe and thus goes back to a split in Christianity itself. Historically this split happened in 395 when the Roman Empire was divided into two parts with the Catholic part becoming the West Roman Empire and the Orthodox part becoming the East Roman Empire. Thus, one empire was divided into two civilisations. "Catholic" means *universal* whereas "orthodox" means *correct faith*. This split therefore constituted the first division of

European culture, namely, between the areas of influence of the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches. We may, of course, also mention the secularised, humanistic ideals or Marxism that speak against a sole European Christian character. However, these thoughts and ideals depend, both philosophically and historically, on Christian ideas and perceptions and it is only Christianity that results in our speaking about *one* European culture.

We may, therefore, easily presuppose that the split, which has shaped the European continent, is also intimately connected with Christianity and therefore that it relates to one of Christianity's main characters, namely, Jesus Christ himself. Jesus Christ is perceived as both God and human in *one*. Theologically, this character unifies the absolute contradiction between *heaven* and *earth* while, philosophically, the contradiction is perceived as *thought* versus *will* and, more commonly, as a contradiction between *death* and *life*. However, Jesus is often interpreted very ambiguously. While the Roman Catholic Church has emphasised Christ's human-like nature, the Eastern Church has emphasised his God-like nature. The split identity that characterises modern Europe of today, both historically and thematically, points back to the twofold interpretation of the core idea of Christianity and, subsequently, Europe. In the west, God has taken on a human shape and, in the East, the human is divinised (Waage, 1988). If Europe's double-creature is not taken into consideration, their historic fault line and dispute, we may be reluctant to consider Europe's Eastern region and we may think that the West alone represents the European culture.

However, the West also embraces a non-Christian component, namely, the Arabic influence. The Arabic worldview builds not only on the Koran, but also on Greek philosophy, in particular, Aristotle's concept *techne*, which was developed by the West into what we today term the technological-scientific culture. The renaissance characters symbolise, to use Sigrid Hunke's terminology, "the final victory of Arabic thinking over the old European" (Waage, 1988, p. 20). The contact with the Islamic world preceded development in a secularised way, namely, a path that had already been staked out by emphasising Christ's human-like nature.

Underpinning the ideas of liberation, individualism, secularisation, progress, science and technology is the dominant feature of Christ's human-like nature. If we assume that all human-made products have also existed as thoughts, then technology is also

a child of philosophy. In addition, if the consequences of thoughts are fatal, then we may study death as an essential process in Western philosophy. Paulo Freire (1970) asserted that Western thought suffers from a manic attraction to dead things. For Freire, the experience of death and lifelessness accounts not only for the fruit of Western culture, technology, but also for what mainly constitutes the nerve in the West, namely, philosophy (Freire, 1970). This attraction to dead things finds expression in the painting, *The Body of the Dead Christ in the Tomb*, by Hans Holbein. Dostoyevsky (2002) saw this picture and described it as follows in his book, *The Idiot*:

“And oddly enough, if we consider this corpse that has been tortured to death, it throws up the question: how could all his disciples, who were destined to become his most important apostles, and the women who had followed him and thrown themselves down crying at the foot of the cross, and all of the believers of his right as the son of God – how could they look upon this corpse (and this, precisely, it must have been seen as) and at the same time have faith in his resurrection ... With this image in mind, nature must surely appear a great, merciless and mute monster or, perhaps, more accurately, as a giant, modern work of machinery that purposelessly seizes this glorious, invaluable being and grinds its body down by its wheels of steel; this being whose value alone exceeds nature itself and all its laws, even earth itself – the very earth perhaps created solely for this being’s evolvment!” (p. 476)

When the West emphasised Christ’s human-like nature, they also sketched out the path for individualism. In Freudian terms, individualism even involves (moral) superegos controlling the id, the body and, sometimes, the other way around; the “ideational” and the “sensate” as the Russian philosopher, Sorokin, refers to in *Social and cultural dynamics* (Sorokin, 1962). The common element is the sense of *ownership* of the body and the superego. From this derive two important aspects of the Western perception of ethics, namely, the sacredness of the individual body, and the spirit of the individual. Kant terminates this position in his three main Critiques: *The critique of pure reason*, *The critique of practical reason*, and *The critique of judgment*.

There are, of course, competing interpretations of the role of imagination and reason in the overall architecture of Kant's Critiques. Some, for example, Cassirer, are concerned about getting Kant "right" while others, such as Heidegger, are less faithful to the text of Kant itself. This split interpretation of Kant's work points back to the same split in European philosophy. While Western philosophers have used Kant to terminate the Western position, Eastern thinkers have used Kant to offer criticism. Kant spent his whole life in the border-city of Königsberg with its outlook to both the East and the West and is therefore himself an interesting study of European border crossing or "borderology" (Rossvær and Sergeev, 2015). The Russian philosopher Tsjaadejev, claimed that Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* demonstrated the impotence of the isolated, individual reason. According to Tsjaadejev, what Kant noted as "pure reason" was merely the individual *self-isolated* reason claiming its autonomy (Waage, 1988). Kant's trust in the power of ethical law rested on the conviction that there are arguments of reason which every reasonable person, as a reasonable person, must accept and that the passage from ethical law to ethical action results from sole rational thought. In order to smooth this passage one needs to focus on the non-contradictory rationality of the law only, counting for the fact that it rests on the endemic rational faculties of moral actors. Tsjaadejev argued that according to Kant's claim, the individual autonomy refused to release its antinomies or capture the highest truths because it imposed a *sole ratio* to which the logic of science would accord a self-imposing and unquestionably authority.

From the Old Russian point of view, Kant's individual autonomy was irreconcilable because it attempted an *individual* approach to the truth. The Slavophil philosophers even used the term "the individual hybris" (human ignorance and blindness for life). According to the Slavophil, it was only through collective knowledge and through participation in a collective consciousness that transcends the individuals that one is able to capture the *higher* truths. The Old Russian problems with the Kantian Self and the fallacy that a human is a pure, rational and reasonable creature, finds expression in Dostoyevsky's *Notes from Underground* (1864). One of his critiques, among others was that, if we consider humans beings as exclusively rational beings and use arithmetic, "Euclid" measurement on its' actions and dignity, we end up as moral monsters filled with misanthropy. This culminates in the murder, the *reasonable* murder, of, in one's own conception, the "less-worthy", and deleterious, or inutile human.

The Slavophil philosophers also rejected the notion that thinking could not change the world in any positive way as both the “nihilists” in Russia and the “positivists” in the West argued. They criticised the isolating principle, the manner of focusing on, defining and dividing a given whole, the “primal force of division”, or the “Urteilskraft”, as it is termed in the German language, which is manifested in the Western adoration of the individual; in societies by the demarcation of rank and class; and in knowledge by atomisation, differentiation and specialisation.

In the church to which Dostoyevsky belonged it was not primarily Jesus’ suffering and death, but the deity’s resurrection that was the central happening. The Eastern Church gives weight on Christ’s *divine* nature. This may, in fact, be the reason why the Eastern Church, throughout history, never has made clear distinctions between theological and philosophical schools. While the West developed along the axes of science, rationality, individualism and progress, the Eastern dogmas developed along the axes of feelings and religion.

A further important point is the distinction between retributive and restorative justice. Kant argued in *Die Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre* (1797) that retribution is the only possible justification for punishing lawbreakers. Underpinning Kant's conviction is the *Lex talionis*,²³ the law of retaliation which, for example, forms the basis of the Roman Dutch and English Common law systems introduced by colonialism. In *Crime and Punishment* (1859) Dostoyevsky highlights that the old Russians never called a crime for a crime but, instead, a *misfortune*, and never a criminal a criminal, but an *unlucky*. This simple, but very essential, difference emphasises a rarely mentioned point regarding ethics in Europe and which points back to a distinction between the two different philosophies of the Self. While the Western Church advocated an individual form of justice, focusing on a single person, namely, the wrongdoer, and making him/her suffer by the public condemnation of her/his conduct; the Eastern Church advocated a community-oriented and restorative form of justice. For Dostoyevsky (1859), the retributive justice system did not seek to heal the victim or restore what was broken in the community but exploited the crime in order to gain increasing *control*. Arnulf Øverland (2011), a Norwegian novelist, shared Dostoyevsky’s concern:

²³ Lex talionis, or "the law (lex) of retaliation." The lex talionis is a law of equal and direct retribution: in the words of the Hebrew scriptures, "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, an arm for an arm, a life for a life".

“Despite the fact that the church and its priests are supposed to be the spokesmen for the poor and the oppressed, we continuously see them participating in the class-struggle crusade against this group, side by side with the capitalists. We also observe how they join in the excesses of nationalism that stirs up wars and praises weaponry. In 1914 the priests were participating in the imperialist propaganda in all the areas of society. And this despite the notion that the church could have stopped the World War by joining forces with the peace movement! ... Once upon a time, a small group of poor and homeless people created Christianity for their own purpose: to find consolation in their state of misery. Ever since, the powers to be have reshaped it to suit their own needs: to repress the poor.” (Øverland, 2011, p. 45)²⁴

Fyodor Dostoyevsky wanted to present to the world the initial Christianity that was constructed by the poor, the homeless and the vagabonds. He maintains that this initial Christianity is a Christianity that the world never has seen before. This thinking towards the Other, which is represented by the poor, the vagabonds and the slaves, is an unknown aspect of European culture – a restorative philosophy and way of life – that is hidden for the world.

5.3.2 *The Hobbesian Other*

The rules view has been propounded with great intellectual force throughout history. In 1651, at the beginning of what later came to be known as the modern era, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) approved the verdict that was to guide the thought and action of modern legislators, educators and moral preachers:

“... men have no pleasure (but, on the contrary, a great deal of grief) in keeping company where there is no power to overawe them all ... And upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from its condemners, by

²⁴ Translated from Norwegian by the author. For this lecture he was prosecuted using the blasphemy paragraph.

dommage ... Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which we called Warre: and such a warre, as if of every man, against every man.” (Hobbes, 1651, quoted in Bauman, 1996, p. 3)

Hobbes’ message is clear and straightforward: “If you wish men to be moral, you must force them to be so. Only under the threat of pain will human being stop hurting each other. To stop fearing each other, human being must fear a power superior to them all” (Bauman, 1996, p. 3). The consequence of this was another message: “You cannot build on people’s impulses, inclinations and predispositions. Their passions (that is, all passions except the passion for better life, the one passion that lends itself to logic and reason) must instead be rooted out or stifled. Instead of following feelings, people should be trained, and strained if needed – to calculate” (Baumann, 1996, p. 4).

For Hobbes, the moral world is a world in which only the voice of reason should be heard, thus implying that a world in which only the voice of reason is heard is a moral world. From this statement arose the great divide, which assured the prevalence of morality through following rules and which was to establish the trademark of modern living, namely, the split between *reason* and *emotion*. This split was taken as a substance and the foundation of all life-and-death choices, for example, between order and chaos, civilisation and the war of all against all. If as, according to Hobbes’ definition there is for every problem only one true, reason-dictated solution, but an infinite variety of wrong ones, then where reason does not rule, anything could happen and the situation is totally out of control. Anarchy as a lawless state of nature would mean that the only legitimate authority would come from the power of some individuals to ruthlessly subjugate others. Or, as Hobbes pointed out, the weakest person is also perfectly capable of killing the strongest person. For Hobbes, political coercion was the sole alternative to the worst imaginable jungle:

“In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and, consequently, no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the

earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” (Perdue, 1986, p. 30, quoting Hobbes)

For Hobbes, the moral world can only be regular and orderly, and moral persons can be guided only by laws, rules and norms (principles clearly indicating what one should do and not do in a given situation). Morality, as the rest of social life, must be founded on Law and there must therefore be an ethical code behind morality, consisting of prescriptions and prohibitions.

For Hobbes, in order to create a moral world one (the most reasonable), people would have to be taught or coerced to become moral by making them obey that ethical code. In other words, based on this reasoning, becoming moral is equivalent to learning, memorising and following the rules derived from the most reasonable (meaning the most "enlightened").

Modernity has devised two great institutions to inherit this special position from the Church, namely, bureaucracy and business. Although these two are not the same, they do agree on a basic theme – the abolition of emotions or, at least, ensuring that they are kept off limit. In view of the fact that emotions are considered to be the enemies of affection, both bureaucracy and business has been embraced as they express the incarnation of rationality and rationalisation. For Max Weber, bureaucracy was the typically modern (and advanced) way of doing things (Hoppers and Richards, 2011).

Hobbes believed that, once compacts had transferred the institutions necessary to maintain order they take precedence over private rights. No matter what the form of government, Hobbes argued that its necessary powers are absolute and grounded in the "strength of the sword". Necessary powers include any and all force and influence required to maintain peace and order. The members of the commonwealth authorise sovereign rule. In reality, this means the absence of legal restraint, the will to make law, the authority to decide on war and peace, and the power to determine the conditions of property ownership.

In line with with Hobbes' conception of morality, spreading business and bureaucracy and teaching the non-enlightened the moral code and rules derived from Western

jurisprudence, establishes a moral world. In addition, Hobbes believed that science, in conjunction with its mathematical and philosophical logic, would bring to pass such a world of reason (peace and harmony). In other words, a moral world is a world that is *fully controlled* by the West. The Other, the absolute Other who acts according to totally other rules, is therefore a threat to the moral world order and thus a threat to peace and security.

5.3.3 The utilitarian Other

With the rise of the more complex modern society, the rule-rationality of Hobbes, which played an important role in establishing the moral justification of colonialism and imperialism at the time, was later replaced by less tactile moral guidelines. In *A Fragment of Government* (1891) Jeremy Bentham formulated the utilitarian principle that was to guide the thought and action of the new generation of modernity, namely, *“To produce the greatest amount of happiness to the greatest amount of beings”*.

What does “to produce the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount of beings” actually mean? According to Bentham’s (1891) theory, it means to produce more lust than pain. The utilitarian principle is (in accordance with basically all forms of modern ethics) therefore a hedonistic principle and the implications must be: 1) the amount of happiness produced from different action strategies may be measured; 2) the amount of pain may simultaneously be measured and 3) the sum of pain may be subtracted from the sum of lust and happiness from each alternative and, from that calculation, one may decide which alternative is the most right. The majority of utilitarian theories are based on a principle of measuring the consequences of all available actions based on the criteria of *total* satisfaction where only the sum of utility, and not its distribution, is considered significant.

According to Bentham (1891), one may only judge ethical right action based on the standard of the greatest amount of happiness for oneself. However, if lust is the ultimate measurement for what is good, then the happiness of others must be equally important as my own happiness. According to Bentham (1989), the duty to “most people” involves all the members of a society. However, there is one important gap in this idea. In an ideal utilitarian position, where most people in a society enjoy the most amount of happiness, there is no foundation on which to condemn violence against the people who do not “fit” the description. In this way, utilitarianism would

always fail the divergent members of a society as long as the action in question produces welfare and happiness for “most” people. This highlights the essence of the problem, namely, the moral danger when everything is reduced to a utilitarian argument over interests; that is, self-interest, in which the interest of, in this case, four million apparently selfish (non-Sami) people are to be weighed against – that is, opposed to – those of less than eighty thousand apparently selfish (Sami) people.

Modern utilitarianism may be distinguished, however, from classic utilitarianism (Bentham, Mill, etc. who operate with happiness as a mental condition) in that it defines “satisfaction” in a way that is guaranteed to satisfy the busy, modern self. The philosopher, Hjørdis Nerheim (1991), asserts that utilitarianism offers a shortcut to modernity’s man, the egoistic calculator of rational choice theory. Modern utilitarianism articulates itself through well-known patterns of behaviour that easily match our modern figure of speech. It is, to quote Nerheim, “the prototype of a rationality that finds its resonance in our *assigned* concepts of the modern man’s self-interests in a complex society” (Nerheim, 1991, p. 18). The hedonistic principle of utilitarianism works as a basis for the almost obsessive modern striving towards conformity: “The modern man is almost obligated to a ‘keep smiling’ which unscrupulous presses through clinched teeth, blindly trusting the utilitarian recipe for a problem-free life and a problem-free society” (Nerheim, 1991, p. 19).

The rationality of utilitarianism works hand in hand with modernity’s concept of progress based on economic growth where the calculation of utility plays a central role. In this context, thinking correlates to calculating, calculating to economics, economics to capitalism, and capitalism to happiness (at least for those who are successful). By making the condition of happiness measurable, modern utilitarianism interprets happiness as equivalent with the realisation of self-interest. Each individual is personally responsible for his/her own happiness. This is achieved by adjusting to modernity’s mores of what shapes us into sovereign consumers. Utilitarianism is therefore the perfect moral for capitalists.

The model behind the utilitarian calculation is “neutral”, thus implying that individuals face each other as strangers without the consciousness of any “over-individual” community. In this way the utilitarianist “disconnects human fellowship in the name of humanity” (Nerheim, 1991, p. 20). In other words, the very model institutionalises a loneliness that summons the agents’ egoistic strategies, at least if they want to be

considered rational. Thus, if your moral action is judged in compliance with your actual careful considerations for the Other, isolated from the world of the Other, then morality is not perceived as a space of mutual vulnerability.

For Dostoyevsky (1873), the utilitarian principle of “what is good for me is also necessary good for others” was at the core of what he termed “the Western propaganda”. For him, this principle formed the mainspring of all forms of colonialism. The main character in *Crime and Punishment*, the law student, Raskolnikov, is driven by utilitarianism. In *Crime and Punishment*, the utilitarian principal is used to legitimise war crime(s). Dostoyevsky raises an important question in this novel: How much violence may we accept and still emerge on the plus side of the ethical budget? Within the perimeter of the ethical rationality of Raskolnikov, much is acceptable, even murder. Raskolnikov represented a warning against the evasive human subject – a person who in the name of rationality, ends up in the “reasonable” murder.

5.3.4 The case of Eichmann

Dostoyevsky's warning signs reached the shared public consciousness in the wake of the monstrous and unprecedented events which took place during the 20th century. The mass destruction of two World Wars, the development of nuclear weapons that threatened the world with total annihilation, the rise of totalitarianism, and the murder of millions in the Nazi death camps and Stalin's purges shattered the standards for moral and political judgement. In her famous portrait of Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), Hannah Arendt, an important interpreter of the ethical accomplishments and neglects of the modern era, controversially used the phrase “the banality of evil” to characterise Eichmann's action as the chief architect and executioner of Hitler's genocidal “final solution” (*Endlösung*) to the “Jewish problem.” Arendt's description of Eichmann's actions as “banal” was, however, not meant to position them as ordinary. On the contrary, the case of Eichmann introduced a new form of crime that generated highly valuable moral philosophical questions.

We could, of course, understand Eichmann within the context of the laws of Nazi-Germany and therefore eradicate his guilt or we could understand him on the basis of the consequences of his actions and portray him as a demonic person who deliberately committed evil actions, alternatively as a “crazy” person who was not

capable of realising what he was actually doing. However, if we understand Eichmann as extremely rule-oriented, as a demon with a delight in murder or as “crazy” person, we overlook the essence, namely, his absent sense of reality. It is exactly this aspect of his personality that holds the key to understanding the case of Eichmann. It is not possible to judge Eichmann using normal legal and ethical norms as there are no legal and ethical laws upon which he may be judged. The reason for this is that all legal and ethical laws are grounded in an abstract rule-understanding which fails to place Eichmann’s understanding of the situation as the problem. For Arendt, the actual challenge is not to judge Eichmann, but to *understand* him. Arendt argues that the challenge of understanding Eichmann (which is the premise of judging him) is to present him as a human being (Arendt, 1963). This means not to dismiss him as an inhuman moral monster or as a “crazy” person. However, the challenge then becomes even greater because we lack the juridical and moral concepts that would cover the nature of the crimes for which he is responsible. However, if we judge him without trying to understand him, we also forego the opportunity to learn from “history” – the human action – and we lose, according to Arendt, the contact with the world as a *home*.

Could we identify ourselves with Eichmann? *That* is the challenge! If we actually look at Eichmann and try to take seriously what he is saying about himself, his sense of bureaucratic commitment then we discover what Arendt described as the “banal Eichmann”. Eichmann is like one of us, general and indifferent but, more than most people, a divided person because his heart is not at work. He feels no sympathy for the people whose destiny he decides with his signature: Thus, he keeps his heart at home while his public occupation encompasses no responsive sensibility that is triggered by the victims in the death camps. In other words, the bureaucratic Eichmann and the emotional and careful Eichmann do not appear to be united in a whole and integrated personality. His public life is restricted to the emptiness of compliance with a “diluted” rule-understanding and he operates unthinkingly, following orders and carrying them out efficiently, with no thought of their effects upon those he targeted.

Arendt found that Eichmann was the ultimate product of the modern world – the result of everyday isolation from training systems that would have exercised his capacity of thinking, of having an internal dialogue with himself which would have permitted an awareness of the evil nature of his deeds. Arendt therefore saw

Holocaust as deeply tied to modernity and its order-making efforts: Technical rationality, the division of labour into smaller and smaller tasks, the taxonomic categorisation of different species, and the tendency to view rule-following as morally good all played their role in the Holocaust coming to pass. Arendt saw the final solution as an extreme example of the attempts made by societies to excise the uncomfortable and indeterminate elements existing within them (Arendt, 1982). And this is exactly the reason why modern societies have not fully taken on board the lessons of the Holocaust; it is generally viewed – to use Bauman's metaphor – "like a picture hanging on a wall, offering few lessons" (Bauman, 1989, p. 53).

Arendt's image of Eichmann, in common with Dostoyevsky's portrait of Raskolnikov, is a warning sign of the morally and politically *evasive* human being, the horror scenario of the moral *indifference* to the Other. For Arendt, the phenomenon of "Auschwitz" was the closing proof that it is not possible for "pure" theoretical knowledge alone to create the foundation for ethics.

5.4 Conclusion

To reiterate then, how may the acute lessons of the history of development help in the articulation of limitations/obstacles in the ethical landscape of modernity and thus help to build an ethical rationality which is more compatible with the project of healing and restorative action? Firstly, one of the problems arises from the restriction on the many attempts of arguing an individual into "being moral". This is problematic because morality is not some exterior sphere that we must enter or place ourselves over or against. Our first or original position as individuals is not a location which is external to morality, interpreted as the authenticity comprising the weal and woe of vulnerable humans. Any argument is unskilled in reaching us outside of morality and in pulling us inside of it. This is impossible simply because we are not positioned exterior to the sphere of morality in the beginning. Being moral is not an alternative and thus morality and moral activity are not disconnected entities to be fetched as one. We simply are not before we are moral. Given the fact that we do not start existing in any pre-moral sphere, the difficulty in how to fetch the *change* for a moral order is a fiction.

This fiction is, however, represented with magnificent intellectual self-assurance through, for example, the social contract theory and taking the lead from Hobbes'

Leviathan (1651). Proponents of the contract theory see human subjects as creatures who may be converted into being moral. Hence, the gap between “man as he is” and “man as he will turn out if or when he becomes moral” becomes a significant paradox. From the Hobbesian perspective, ethics is only a façade, an exterior capacity “raising” us to become civilised moral persons. The notion of “gap” and the justification of the various strategies which aim to fill in the gap, that is, to educate, develop, civilise and refit that which does not fit, transforms the old Hobbesian view into a cognitive weapon in the battle for Western superiority.

Given the Western notion of *centralism*, with the West as the causal centre of the world; *universalism*, with the idea that what is good for the West is good for the rest; and a *good/evil dichotomy*, which marginalises evil, trying to beat evil with crusades or neutralise it with bombs, the Western top/down and moral/immoral distinction melts together (Galtung, 1999). The combination centralism-universalism-good/evil-moral/immoral dichotomy confers on the Western perspective increasing legitimacy and helps to justify both the Western cultural dominance over other societies and the need for those societies to ape Western practices and institutions (Huntington, 1996). This leads to steeper institutional hierarchies within these societies and increased classification in terms of rank, class, race, age, gender etc, more fragmentation and alienation (Galtung, 1999).

It is also crucial to acknowledge that the overall moral architecture of the West springs from the point of view of the “I”, thus clearly favouring cultures of strong individualism. Thus, strong individualism may be less problematic within strong modern I-cultures, such as the British or the American cultures, but to the strong We-cultures it is more problematic. In the African philosophy and worldview (*Weltanschauung*), known as *ubuntu* in the Nguni group of languages, or *botho* in the Sotho languages, being human means “I am because I belong, I participate, I share, I am because you are” (Tutu, 1999, p. 34). Ubuntu is the essence of being human. A person is said to have *ubuntu* if he/she is caring, generous, hospitable and compassionate. It means that one person’s humanity is caught up and inextricably bound to that of another. In other words, we belong to a bundle of life and a person is a person through other people. It is not “I think therefore I am”, but rather “I am human because I belong” (Hoppers, 2013, p. 72). In this way ubuntu expresses a deep incompatibility with the individualistic position. Unlike the Kantian and Utilitarian tradition, African philosophy establishes the notion that ethics arises *in the relation to*

the other person and not instantly by a reference to the universality of a law. Seen from that position, the “I” philosophy promotes a strategy for approaching ethical reflection based on individual rational thinking, that is, a position hidden from the Other and with a safe distance to dialogue. In the I-position the Other is reduced to a theoretical shadow, a disturbing bug in modern man’s striving towards ethical clarity.

The West has received significant intellectual support to protect the legacy of the rule-based composition of ethics but, simultaneously, also the legacy of colonialism. By labelling indigenous knowledge systems as “pre-scientific”, “unscientific” or “non-knowledge”, endogenous and bottom-up development as “ineffective”, immanent ethics as irrational or simply “impossible” because of the universality claim, the non-Western societies and the ethics that sustained them are often considered to be obsolete. Such “labelling” expresses the tradition of Western superiority, whether it is in the racist or the paternalistic version, and the imperative of that tradition to create objectives for the improvement of the inferior societies, usually to imitate the West (Huntington, 1996). In the rush towards progress the voices of those who have been marginalised have not been heard. Consequently, only Western rationality has real credence in the moral discourse of today. However, the abuse of “expertise”, the most pungent is the age of colonialism and imperialism, has betrayed the claims of legitimacy (Hoppers, 2002). Instead of contributing to development, peace and belonging, the system imposed has shaped a view of differences between people that was and is characterised by superiority and inferiority.

However, if it is not possible for an ethical language exerted from “pure reason” to guarantee the work of building peace in this context, what is the alternative? An attempt to find such an alternative is proposed in Chapters 6 to 8. To start with, an honest clarification of ethics in terms of the “perception of the Other” appears to be an important parameter in a peace and violence perspective.

However, before we embark on this, is it possible to extract a more positive aspect from the following lessons? Firstly, when the Roman Empire was divided in 395, a border was drawn between the West Roman Church and the East Roman Church and this border is more or less the same today. Galtung (2016) argued in his Antwerp lecture that this is the main reason why Europe is not united. It is interesting to note that this border runs through Europe and up to the Barents Region and, ultimately, the Pasvik River – a river the Russians call “Mir”, which means peace. It is

also this border that Europe has struggled to cross since 395 and it is this border that the people in the Barents Region cross every day.

Secondly, colonialism took place exclusively from the West. If colonialism is a product of Western Europe and the problem of Europe is unification, then colonialism may be explained as part of the problem of East and West evolving on its own free from a healthy interference from its counterpart. The unification of God and Human is possibly an underlying goal that Europe is striving to realise in its culture and that it wishes to see represented in its character. To an open reader, the "third Christianity", as described by Dostoyevsky, not only offers positive alternatives to modernity, but it also evokes curiosity as to how the excluded voices could voice critical questions to civilised Europe and challenge the scientific, cognitive understanding of the world.

However, the establishment of a Western monopoly position which decides for the rest of the world how value is perceived, hinders the fruitful realisation that other ways of thinking, other models of development and other cultures may exist and that modernisation may take place without Westernisation. What is more important, it also impedes the search for alternatives beyond the axes of the old dichotomy between the former East and the West. The almost total exclusion of indigenous perspectives is therefore a serious impediment to the healthy realisation that other models not only work but that they may be as valid as the European model and that they may even have real advantages over the European model. And although ultimate ideas of ethics may be shared across these models, how you get there, in other words, the use of violence and non-violence, and how you relate to the environment, to mention a few examples only, may be very different.

If we assume Galtung is correct in claiming that the border that was drawn in 395 is almost the same today and that the future of Europe is interaction, dialogue, reconciliation and unification; then it would appear relevant to take heed of the cross-border collaboration initiatives that are alive today, for example, the Barents region collaboration. If we accept that vision, and agree to strive towards a more open and attentive Europe (rather than building walls around it), then what is the role and status that we should assign the excluded "other", such as the Sami people, in that process?

Chapter 6: Social cohesion and regional capacities for peace building

“The world is dominated by borders and people residing within these borders. The border is a trend in the world. Us border writers are, at our most efficient, creating a philosophy of the borders. The border is a space, not a line.” (Pohjanen, 2006, p. 1)²⁵

The major theme discussed in Chapter 5 revolved around the attempt to unravel some of the ethical system/thinking underlying the cultural violence that worked in conjunction with colonialism. The point made is that a fair response to the problem of colonialism ultimately requires an examination of the constitutive rules that control current thinking and practice. While Chapter 5 questioned the role of the dominant ethical thinking of today and demonstrated how this thinking, empirically and potentially, works in harmony with the cultural violence that underpins colonialism, this chapter focuses on the positive peace dimension and, as such, it discusses the capacities for peace building and restorative action anchored in the concept of sustainable social cohesion.

The history of the Barents Region reveals a history of colonialism, domination and marginalisation but also a history of cooperation and unity between the neighbouring communities. The main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how this cooperation and unity could work as an alternative to the notion of colonialism and serve as a resource for peace building and human development both in the region and elsewhere. This project of enlarging social cohesion in the Barents Region, as part of the peace building and restorative action, revolves around what the philosopher Viggo Rossvær (2007) describes as the borderology of Immanuel Kant.

6.1 The Barents Region cooperation

The Barents Region Cooperation was established on the basis that the confrontation and division that had characterised the relationship during the Cold War had to be

²⁵ Translated from Swedish by the author.

replaced by partnership and cooperation. The parties believed that such cooperation would contribute to international peace and security. In addition, they saw the Barents cooperation as part of the process of evolving European cooperation and integration. The rights of the indigenous peoples in the north were an issue of immense concern and the members expressed their commitment to the strengthening of the indigenous of the region (Statsministerens Kontor, 2013).

In 2003, again in Kirkenes, the heads of the six governments and a representative of the European Commission declared the Barents Cooperation to be a unique undertaking that confirmed the value of close *interaction* between intergovernmental cooperation, cooperation between country administrations and direct people-to-people cooperation. They undertook to develop our societies in line with internationally recognised principles for ensuring sustainable development (Statsministerens Kontor, 2013).

Twenty years later, at the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation anniversary, the Prime Ministers and other high-level representatives of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council concluded that the cooperation had been highly successful and reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of the Kirkenes Declaration. They stated that "significant achievements have been made in the Barents Euro-Arctic region. This is due to the important role the Barents Cooperation has played in strengthening mutual trust, stability and security in Europe, by joint efforts in northern Europe based on the shared commitment to indivisible and comprehensive security. Likewise, it has contributed to a balanced integration of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development in the region." (Statsministerens Kontor, 2013, p. 1)

The treaty between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean of 15 September 2010 is one of the Barents Cooperation's proudest achievements with the parties emphasising the decisive role played by the trust that had been established in this treaty and in creating new opportunities for cooperation: "Mutual trust built through the Barents Cooperation can thus serve as a model for others on how neighbouring countries can resolve differences peacefully through dialogue and negotiations, and thus help release the huge potential of the regional and European integration" (Statsministerens Kontor, 2013, p. 1).

Another achievement was the agreement on establishing a visa-free zone in the border area between Sør-Varanger in Norway and Pechenga Nickel in Russia. This visa-free zone was opened in May 2012 and extends for approximately for 30 kilometres on either side of the border, thus enabling both Russians and Norwegians to move freely using their own ID cards in the border zone.

On closer examination, it becomes clear that the achievements of these 20 years of cooperation are primarily the result of both local and regional initiatives and activities undertaken by various communities and civil society. The members of the BRC conclude that it is the *peoples of the region* who have made the most significant contributions.

Since its establishment in 1993, the Barents Region Cooperation Project has also expanded in terms of taking the form of an academic network. Several cross-border cooperation projects between various universities have been implemented, for example, the Barents Institute in Kirkenes, owned by the University of Tromsø and, in the border zone, the Bakhtin/Kant Institute, owned by the Murmansk State Humanistic University and the University of Nordland (Rossvær and Sergeev, 2015). Two avenues of cooperation have already emerged; one in research and the other in education.

However, on the national level, the politicians do not recognise the regional sense of identity as anything but disturbing and they are by no means loyal to its existence. The regional identity is often based on art, music, old history and common vital interests of today, knit together and maintained by local centres. However, these centres, cities of approximately 100 000 multicultural inhabitants, have little impact at the national level and in the national capitals.

Nevertheless, locally the folk diplomacy is flourishing. The region cooperates independently of their national governments and is contributing to a strengthening of the region's collective and trans-national identity. In addition, the cooperation in these border regions is contributing to a type of soft security for the whole area, it is inhibiting new outbreaks of violence and is offering significant challenges to the study of borderology.

6.2 Two types of political approach

The concept "borderology" was first used by the former leader of the Barents Secretariat, Rune Rafaelsen and has since been developed as an independent field of study by the philosopher Viggo Rossvær. It is defined as "research on resources and cooperation in border regions". Rossvær makes it clear that the study of borderology differ from social anthropology and history in that its main focus is the *peace-processes*. This implies that it also includes references to political theory and philosophy (Rossvær 2007).

According to Rossvær (2007), it is possible to distinguish between two main lines of approach to the political, one originating from Hobbes and the other from Kant.

6.2.1 Hobbes' frontierology

The main theme in Hobbes' philosophy is that one must never rely on one's neighbour. Accordingly, one must, together with others, relinquish a part of one's freedom to the Superior in order to survive in a community with other human beings.

Rossvær (2007) argues that, today, what is known as international politics sees international cooperation as frozen in a Hobbesian perspective where the right is with the strongest. Ethics has meaning only within your own borders. Thus, the main strategy to use in finding solutions is the following: Let the strongest nations come together to create peace. This is the traditional solution which is associated with the work of Thomas Hobbes (Rossvær, 2007).

In the Hobbesian tradition of neo-realism (Waltz, 1979) and in the classical form of political realism (Morgenthau, 1948) which is still thriving, international relations must be seen as attempts to bring order to anarchy. Each state has, as its first duty, the protection of its own inhabitants against this danger from abroad.

According to this view, it is not possible for a state to have moral connections to other states. Thus, moral matters concern only relations within the particular state. For the political realist moral concern for others means poor leadership in that the security of the state's own inhabitant is placed at risk.

6.2.2 Kant's borderology

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who spent his entire life in the border city of Königsberg – now Kaliningrad – made a valuable contribution to the study of border in his concept of cosmopolitan rights in *To Perpetual Peace*. The philosopher, Viggo Rossvær, argues that “borderology”, as a field of study, has roots in the philosophy of Kant (Rossvær and Sergeev, 2015). According to Rossvær, Kant’s importance as a political thinker stems from his reintroduction of stoic philosophy and its cosmopolitan perspective on the European political stage as a resource for political theory in the age of the enlightenment. The philosophers of the stoic tradition conceived the world as a whole or even the whole cosmos as the only genuine setting for the understanding of human political activity. A nation is only a part of cosmos (Rossvær, 2007). Thus, the cosmopolitan perspective transcends the limited national perspective.

Kant’s concept of moral world order is based on laws that focus on persons and their relations and not on states. It is only the open human community which permits other people to cross your border that provides the proper context for developing a society with a surplus of vitality and meaning.

The basic Kantian notion is that law (Recht) leads to peace. To secure human right internationally is to bring about international peace. For the first time Kant made it possible to see the basic human rights as the basis for peace between nations. Thus, according to Kant, the correct way in which to secure right and peace is to introduce cosmopolitan laws to underpin the laws of the particular national states. The right of the world citizen does not stop at the various national border but transcends the limits of his/her national state (Rossvær, 2007).

Now, what does this cosmopolitanism mean? Does it simply mean that, in our civilised times, ethics must rule over power politics? However, if this is its only meaning then Kant’s political theory is inadequate. Accepting a foreigner and giving him/her a place of refuge and asylum is no longer based on good will but on the foreigner’s own rights as a human being.

Understanding the political force of the stoic notion of cosmopolitanism is, according to Kant, the realisation that it transforms the border regions into trans-national

institutions that do not separate nations but which, on the contrary, function as peace keepers on the road to a more fully cosmopolitan world.

However, this Kantian ideal is rejected by the Hobbesian notion of international politics. In the Barents Region, county leaders in Norway are able to solve some of their most taxing and sensitive problems by visiting Murmansk. According to the Hobbesian notion, the relationship between the neighbouring towns of Kirkenes and Murmansk in the north, where the political leaders in Kirkenes and Murmansk listen to one another for advice and consult with each other, is totally dependent on and therefore also in respect of objective reality, also steered and locked by the more important relationship between Oslo and Moscow.

This dominant relation between Oslo and Moscow is, in turn, dependent on other relations and interests in the world of politics, for example, the interests of the United States and the European Union. Thus, what is portrayed here is a picture of human possibilities in the Barents Region that is characteristic of the Hobbesian way of studying international politics.

Nevertheless, the Barents Region, which represents the grass-roots cross-border cooperation in the far north, does not possess any self-produced and autonomous push that may make itself felt in this international fight for influence and it may, in fact, appear as devoid of meaning and initiative as it is vast in extent. According to the Hobbesian notion, the assumption that the bilateral meeting in the North may create peace is not very probable.

According to Kant's political theory, however, the various public cross-border movements in border regions may reveal a trans-national community *beneath* the national frontiers. The institutions to be established in order to secure a cosmopolitan peace are therefore not national but are primarily of a trans-national nature. To embark on the study of this regionally established cosmopolitan bridge into a peaceful future is to embark on borderology (Rossvær, 2007).

6.2.3 Borders as bridges

Until the 1990s the notion of cooperation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Region was based on what we may term "frontierology", that is, on a central national perspective generated in the Norwegian and Russian capitals and more or less

indifferent to historical roots, indigenous knowledge and the importance of cultural cross-border contact between the Russian and the Norwegian local populations.

Let us now concretise the difference between Hobbesian (dominant) and Kantian (alternative) thinking and compare "border" with "frontier". In one sense, the meaning of these two words is the same but, in another sense, they are totally different. We are familiar with a frontier such as the Western frontier, the European expansion in North America. The expansion from the European perspective is described as an advance into an empty land but, from the perspective of the natives, it is described as the invasion that destroyed both a complete cultural space as well as several small nations.

Simply stated, a frontier is either a region in front or a region at the front. In other words, frontiers draw separating lines on the planet, dividing homeland from enemy territory. As frontiers the border regions are regions for either defence or attack and thus it is not possible for them to become a resource for a new type of international contact. In frontierology the border is seen as an outer limit. This form of observation is performed from a fixed point with binoculars, always looking out for anything that is not under the control of the central authorities in the capital (Rossvær, 2007).

Living in Königsberg, a region in many ways similar to the Barents-region, Kant clearly saw, long before the last wave of globalisation struck Europe, that people on both sides of a border could be knit together by a trans-national community (or fight against each other within the same borders, in spite of national unity). Kant also realized that the Hobbesian philosophy, by overlooking the regional aspect, was not able to discern the productive cosmopolitical effect in the ruins caused by the forces of globalisation (Rossvær and Sergeev, 2015).

Kant saw the cosmopolitan right as a right to visit others. In other words, a cosmopolitan citizen has the right to cross the border with peaceful intentions and be met as a visitor, not an enemy, in other countries. According to the interpretation of Rossvær (2007), Kant's peace philosophy highlights the principle of subsidiarity, which Kant links to the notion of political power and right as legitimised from below, starting with the individual citizen and smaller constellations of society. The principle of subsidiarity acts as a counterweight to the principle of state sovereignty. For Kant, the power is not vested in a sovereign king, but in a "kingly people" while, in a just state one needs the principle of subsidiarity as a necessary supplement to the

principle of sovereignty. Kant probably realised that no perpetual peace and no kingly people would be possible if society were organised according to the principle of sovereignty.

What Kant did see from his position on the rim of the German-speaking world, was a break up of Europe into multi-national societies which did not, however, signal the end to European unity. Nevertheless, the cosmopolitan unity between different national states, does not, necessarily, mean the realisation of one single imperium. Kant categorically denied the possibility of a peaceful community being created with the limits of the same borders and in one world state (Rossvær, 2007).

Kant firmly believed that to make the world into one super-state would lead to tyranny. According to Kant, the coexistence of different nations with different legal systems, in a loosely knit federal unity, serves as a constant reminder of the ethical foundation of human life and is the first premise for peace (Kant, 2003). According to this argument, the Hobbesian notion should recede and the weak folk diplomacy should be understood in its true importance as a cosmopolitan workshop. It is only the weak folk diplomacy that has the potential to support the new types of trans-national state.

In his *On Perpetual Peace*, Kant insists that the best way in which to promote peace in the world is to allow independent states to knit loosely together in some type of federal unity, but without losing their juridical independence, and not by establishing a world state. It should come as no surprise therefore that Kant's theory of perpetual peace, by implication, culminates in according the border regions an extremely important role in securing world peace for the future (Rossvær, 2007).

From a Kantian perspective the lifting of the Iron Curtain did not only imply chaos, but also an entirely new opportunity for many local regions to participate in new trans-national identities. The rich historical and, sometimes, common roots that are evident on the many borders dividing the EU, from Russia to Turkey, are providing these regions with a boundless world of new opportunities.

Several responsible persons are, however, taken back by Kant's cosmopolitan interest in people's diplomacy and local identity and the importance of regional, cross-border institutions with some asking: "Did you forget the world court, Professor Kant?"

However, Kant's political philosophy is not a study of courts and the principles based on international books of rules but, instead, it is a study on the mapping of regional solutions (Rossvær, 2007). In this sense borderology may be developed as a new type of regional knowledge that perceives that human beings, as citizens, are potentially carrying the trans-cosmopolitan universality that may be established only by actively embarking on this type of regional effort.

6.2.4 Kant's borderology – according to Habermas

Kant's ideas in "*On Perpetual Peace*" are being challenged in several ways today. The notion of the independency and inner sovereignty of all member-states in a modern cosmopolitan system appear to be problematic and difficult to accept for many political theorists.

Would the relation between the local and the more universal identities, in particular, the relation between particular national communities and the more supreme cosmopolitan community, not exclude each another? Would the national order not threaten the cosmopolitan order?

Habermas is one of the interpreters who sees an inconsistency in Kant's notion of a federation of independent states. His argument is that human rights must be institutionalised by means of a world tribunal in ways that are binding on the various individual governments (Habermas, 1997). If this is the option, then there is no need for the sovereignty of the individual states and no place for regional independence.

One suggestion is that Kant is, perhaps, not being inconsistent at all but that, empirically and methodically, his notion is more sophisticated than much modern political theory. It may be that Habermas is overlooking the fact that Kant's philosophy opens up new conceptual possibilities with his political philosophy seeking the universal in man in the context of regional border experiences. This implies a significant change in the traditional concept of a border.

I agree with Rossvær who argues that Kant's main point is that it is not possible to reconstruct human identity in accordance with the old frontier model whereby our land within the border is the realm of reason and humanity but that it must be approached in an abductive manner to form a concept of man that has its origin in modern trans-border experiences.

From this point of view, it would no longer be surprising that Kant, in his cosmopolitanism, is not only permitting, but clearly insisting that many independent local and regional identities exist in their own right. For Kant the global citizen is a creature who belongs to a limited region but who is struggling to find a wider, cosmopolitan identity. However, this cosmopolitan identity does not exclude him/her from remaining a member of his/her region.

It is not possible to define the situation in which we are acting as responsible world citizens in terms of frontierology as if it has clear conceptual borders. Kant's theoretical acceptance of conflicting juridical systems does not reveal that Kant has no clear concept of a human right but, on the contrary, that universal human beings may be seen as having conflicting commitments. Their commitments to regional and local practice may not be overruled by resorting to some higher court. However, Kant's vision admits that people have a multi-layered identity in the sense that they are, themselves, the meeting points of many borders.

In his political theory Kant opens up a new vision of man. There is place for a new type of knowledge where the borders run through people between the empirical studies of man and the ideal world tribunal. The justification of borderology as a type of regional knowledge is that the border we are investigating is in man himself.

This type of knowledge is not, however, consistent with the traditional Greek view of the human condition, namely, that outside of our known border are only the barbarians – a view that has been influencing European thinking deeply since antiquity.

Kant is sceptical of this Greek conception of identity that has shadowed Western political theory. The Greek notion of an independent person, which influenced Thomas Hobbes, is a piece of frontierology which encompasses an implicit declaration of war on those human beings who do not happen to meet the national criteria.

Kant's mature notions of ideas realising that it is not possible for man ever to be made fully transparent come close to Dostoevsky's picture of the modern man. The distinction between good and bad is no longer a distinction between us and them with the most difficult borders lying within man him/herself as the potential for good and bad has its roots in the same border-transcending personality.

6.2.5 *The cosmopolitan self – according to Ulrich Beck*

It is vital that the international research on peace and peace takes into account the seemingly boundless world that opens up in the border regions of today. When the old world disappears, new landscapes with new borders opening up. In these boundless regions also lies the hope of rediscovering peace as something more than just a cease-fire. In an effort to demonstrate the actuality of borderology in the Kantian sense of re-establishing the regional world as a new centre, I will end by referring to the concept of modernity as it appears in Ulrich Beck's theory of globalisation (Beck, 1995). His social concept of modernity is characterised by a break away from the Western European notion of people belonging within fixed nationalities.

For Ulrich Beck the so-called container model of the national state, with its roots in the work of Thomas Hobbes, is a "zombie" concept. In this model, death is turned artificially alive while the state is in control of the total space of society. Such concepts still live on in our own heads even if they are totally dead. Beck's main argument is that the old industrial society is giving way to another society. This does not, however, give us the option of relinquishing our involvement in the old society altogether. Although the borders lying hidden in modern man are breaking up, our way out is to try to find a balance, thus enabling the old and the new to live together in a balanced individual. It would appear that Beck follows up the Kantian notion that, in our actions and maxims, we always have to consider ourselves as outsiders living outside of the borders of a constantly extending home culture (Beck, 1995).

This type of break up does not only take place on the geographical border-lines but it is also everywhere as a result of the modern organisation of labour (Beck, 2004). The process of globalisation in this context is defeating the workers' cherished belief that they have a fixed personality with the organisation of labour itself speaking to each worker all the time to convince him/her about his/her multi-layered self.

Ulrich Beck's notions of reflexive modernisation imply that the responsible individual must take steps to break out of the industrial society in which he/she is mentally caught up in and turn his/her back on society in order to create a new life for him/herself, thus creating his/her own biography. The break with the industrial society consists of discovering the new rationality hidden under the laws of the industrial society. For Rossvær, reflexivity in this context means that one discovers for oneself

that one is a different person to the person that one had thought (Rossvær, 2007). This discovery is realised by one's dependency on one's old concepts and illustrates how the Kantian revolution in the interest of perpetual peace uses our cultural heritage to transform our outlook.

6.3 The Pomor zone

In the establishment of the rich network of contacts that, today, characterise the cooperation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Region and especially in the mobilisation of a historical argument for this cooperation, there is one term that keeps recurring and which has become a symbolic expression for the openness that prevails in the north today: *pomor*.²⁶ It is the "pomor people" (*po more*, "by the sea"), which means "people by the sea", or the people whose source of livelihood is the sea, who link the north of Norway and the north of Russia together, today, as well as in previous times. The earliest known pomor settlements were first mentioned in an Arabic source from 1130 with the pomor people being described as "a sea people that are always going to and returning from the sea" (Niemi, 1992, p. 12). The term "pomor" is also linked to the maritime Russian culture.

The term is, however, often associated with the particular *pomor-trade* that took place between the north of Russia and north of Norway for more than two hundred years. Niemi (1992) describes this trade as a "true blessing for the population". It resulted in both a felt community across borders and cultural differences. In addition, it also resulted in a pidgin trading language, "Moja på tvija" or "Russian-Norwegian", which was used as a medium of communication between the Norwegians, who imagined that they were speaking Russian, and the Russians, who imagined that they were speaking Norwegian, when they were trading using this language. This trade, which consisted primarily in trading Russian flour for Norwegian fish, was particularly important during the Napoleonic Wars, which despite the English blockade and invasion of the Kola Peninsula, still reached the north of Norway (Niemi, 1992).

²⁶ Today, different cultural institutions and organisations on both the Russian and the Norwegian sides take on the name of "pomor". Examples are "pomor"-dance group, "pomor"-orchestre, "pomor"-choir, "pomor"-crafts, "pomor"-restaurants, "pomor-exhibitions", just to mention a few. When the university college in Arkhangelsk changed its status to that of a university in 1991, it changed its name to "The Pomor University" (Niemi, 1992, p. 12).

When the trade ended at the time of the October Revolution in 1917, this was the result of either a lack of regional or local interest, but rather because of increased political pressure from both sides. For Norway, it became important to focus trade towards south and west while, for Russia, the pomor trade was considered to impeding modern economic development in the north of Russia. The Revolution and the regime change finally terminated the pomor trade. For the north of Norway, the consequences were strongly felt, especially for the coastal Sami communities which were still largely based on a household economy.

Today, one of the most notable achievements of the Barents Region Cooperation has been the establishment of a “Pomor zone”, connecting the Jarlfjord area east of Kirkenes with the Petschenga fjord in Western Russia (Johnsen, 2006).

This project has transformed the notion of the mix of languages arising from the pomor trade into the notion of mixed geographical areas in order to create a new type of border region, a “grey zone” on land. The use of the word “grey”, however, does not prevent that this enclave, a mix of two small regions, Jarlfjord and Petschenga, being thought of as a very colourful mix of three cultures, namely, the Russian, the Norwegian and the Sami cultures (Johnsen, 2006).

The notion of a future national and regional cooperation between Norway and Russia in the North is intended to provide the various international firms operating in the oil and gas business in the Barents Sea with an industrial and economic zone in which to build and operate the various land-based production units. By offering easier regulations in respect of crossing the borders as well as new types of tax regulations, the enclave will be a new type of experiment in border-crossing cooperation (Johnsen, 2006).

Although this enclave offers natural resources such as harbours and infrastructure for the various new installations, it also has a cultural dimension. The creation of this new world in the Jarlfjord-Petchenga enclave may prove to be more important as an indispensable Norwegian-Russian cultural basis for the common and sustainable organisation of the various fisheries in the Barents Sea than it will be as an instrument for the oil and gas industry.

This enclave represents a thought-provoking concept of cross-border operation. In all its simplicity and in spite of all the uncertainty surrounding its future, it may, if the

regional dimension is kept alive, become an example of the way in which regional, cross-border cultures such as the Barents Region may enhance the peace potentials of today.

6.4 Who are the carriers of peace strategies?

Who are the carriers of peace strategies? Although in principle everyone is, there is a problem associated with the state system as a carrier of peace because of the tendency to transform the system or, at least, the image of it, so that the means at one's disposal become relevant or, at least, appear to be relevant, thus resulting in sticks, as referring to violence, rewards and negotiating elites. However, there are also problems associated with the non-state system as a carrier of peace strategies. People are not always peaceful and, even when they are, what they have at their disposal is primarily cultural power, not the "carrots and sticks" of the economic and military power used by the state system. Non-state systems will also tend to see the world as a nail even if their hammer is considerably softer in terms of persuasion by word and by example.

In the face of the two potential major errors, peace may be made only by elites, or only by non-elites, the challenge is to commit neither errors and to endeavour to use both tracks.

The end of the Cold War serves as an example where crucial steps were taken by the state system, particularly in relation to the Helsinki process. However, even more crucial were the steps taken by the non-state system – the dissident movements in the East who had made the illegitimacy of post-Stalinism crystal clear and the peace movement in the East and West which did the same for nuclearism (Galtung, 1996, p. 8). The two trends (peace from below and peace from above) were united in the person and actions of Mikhail Gorbachev and culminated in a happy ending in the autumn of 1989. Three years after Mikhail Gorbachev's famous speech in Murmansk on 1 October 1987, the Norwegian prime minister at the time, Gro Harlem Brundtland, stated that: "The 40 years Cold War between Norway and the communist ruled Moscow is the exception in a thousand-year long history of peaceful and good neighbourly relations. The relationship could now enter into a track that both states could reap the benefits of" (Gustavsen, 2016, para. 6). The Barents Region Cooperation Project was established a few years later.

6.5 Conclusion

The study of border as a philosophical exercise brought a valuable dimension to this study. According to Kant, there is no privileged central position, no central court, from which to overlook and conceptualise the world. It is vital that we realise, in all humility, that we, in our regional wisdom, must always be fighting for a foothold and always learning from cultures different to those of our own and therefore that in our various local struggles for universal peace we may bring with us our regionality.

The main lesson derived from Rossvær's (2007) highly original and attractive interpretation of Kant's political philosophy is that we, as peace researchers, should listen more carefully to the people themselves and learn from our local identity in our search for peace. A central notion behind the concept of borderology is that borders may be changed merely because they play a role in the lives of the people concerned. The point of departure is thus that borders are written into people's narratives. We saw (in the introduction to this study) that a border not only exists on a map but that its many and complex properties are due to the fact that it runs through people. The same also applies to rivers as borders also run through rivers, thus transforming some rivers into extremely interesting cultural neighbours. The Alta-Kautokeino River, the Tornedal River and the Pasvik River are all examples of this. Borderology is an invitation to understand these rivers as a playground for exploring peace content by drawing on people's narratives. The establishment of the "Pomo zone" in the Barents Region today is another such example.

Chapter 7: Indigenous resources for peace building and restorative action

Not until now have they realised
that the people who lived here
ten thousand years ago
melted to become the Sami

That is a long time
The wanderings of the Egyptian Pharaohs
The riches of the Roman empire
The glory of the Greek culture
short moments if you compare

Nils-Aslak Valkeapää, Trekways of the Wind

Chapter 6 discussed the challenge of peace building and human development in the Barents Region from a political philosophical perspective. By focusing on social cohesion and the efforts of the civil society to maintain shared lives, and by expanding these efforts in the light of Rossvær's borderology (2007), Chapter 6 demonstrated how people in the border zone play important roles in building peace between nations. The struggle to maintain social cohesion serves both as a counterweight to colonialism (negative peace) and as building blocks for expanded cooperation and dialogue across national borders as well as across the East-West border that demarcates Europe as a whole. Thus, there are significant lessons – peace lessons – to learn by investigating the human dimension in the Barents Region or, as Dostoyevsky (1957) suggested, by asking the people first.

As has been made clear, it is part of the conviction in this thesis that the issue of peace building in the Barents Region revolves around the challenge of dealing with both unresolved conflicts and unreconciled traumas (negative peace) and the challenge of building relations of equity and harmony (positive peace). The first challenge includes asking the question about social justice and healing from colonial wounds and oppression, whereas the latter challenge includes expanding the current relations of equity and harmony in the region. Both tasks stress the issue of

inclusion. In the case of the Barents Region, the challenge of dealing with negative peace is obstructed by factors related to the silencing of the indigenous voice. This slur is, to some extent, conceptualised and protected by the dominant epistemic discourses. To this end, this slur will not be revealed by referring to the contemporary academic and policy imperatives rooted in Western canons as it requires a more complete and authentic inclusion of Modernity's Other, their voice, their version of the story, their knowledge system, metaphysics and ethics.

What will happen if we highlight and honestly recognise the previously excluded and how could the transition from marginalisation to participation contribute to the immense task of promoting peace and human development in the Barents Region, in Europe as a whole and even in the world at large?

This chapter takes the lead from the questions cited above. It continues in the same direction, that is, exploring the framework for peace and human development in the Barents Region by using the basic methodological approach of inclusivity and enlargement. However, the chapter focuses specifically on the indigenous dimension and the lessons that may be made by bringing the indigenous voice into the ambit of exploring the framework of peace building and restorative action. The chapter seeks to demonstrate how indigenous culture and knowledge, if enlarged by "fair" conceptual frameworks, could work as a response/resistance to colonialism and serve as a resource for peace building and human development. It discusses this value in light of four challenges with each assuming different dimensions of the issue of peace building in the Barents Region.

7.1 Getting the word 'peace' right

There is a mainstream narrative of peace starting with the problem: There are dangerous and unruly classes and countries and, if they are let loose, life becomes brutish, nasty and short for all. The remedy is: Economic-military-political-cultural rule from above which, if sufficiently vertical, results in *pax* by rule of force, balance and law. Underpinning this narrative is a theory of conflict, also mainstream, which defines the main problem: There are evil forces in the world waiting for their time. When this time comes their evil is articulated as violence. The remedy is: Sufficient strength to deter evil and to crush, it needed. If strong enough there is a gift: Security. The mainstream security approach is based on the notion of an evil party,

with strong capability and evil intention and a clear and present danger of violence, real or potential. However, sufficient strength to deter or defeat the evil party, will, in turn, create security – the best approach to "peace" (Galtung, 2010).

The terms for exploring the peace value of integrating indigenous knowledge systems by following the security approach to peace are presented as rather poor. In fact, for the marginalised in the world, for those who in, one way or another, for whatever reason or another, have been excluded from the game, what the word "peace" stands for in the mainstream narrative is not necessarily associated with a relation of equity. Taking in consideration the indelible memory of being the recipient of historical systems of structural and cultural violence, the most pungent of which is the age of colonialism and imperialism and, at the same time, recognise the reluctance in many of the former colonising countries to address the questions of social justice and commit themselves to the challenge of healing the wounds and tensions caused by colonial oppression, peace in terms of the mainstream security approach may be conceived as somewhat superficial. This ambivalence in the state of affairs has had a negative impact on those attempting to bring about peace and development in many of the former colonised countries and other regions which have been conditioned by the imprint of colonialism. This ambivalence may also explain the scepticism and unforgiving attitude of many people whenever the word "peace" is used in relation to establishing balance, law and security in many remote areas of the world.

Galtung's theory of peace challenges the mainstream narrative and argues an alternative narrative: The problem is: There is an endless agenda of traumas and conflicts to be mediated. There is an endless agenda of peace(s) to be built. The remedy is: Solve the conflicts equitably and negative peace will result. Build equitable projects with harmony and positive peace will result. For Galtung (2010), peace is a relation of equity and it is those relations that peace may be built. By using the word "endless", peace is seen as a process that is never finished. In other words, peace implies that we are always in a process of *learning*: trying and failing, and trying again to live together in peace. In addition, Galtung anchors peace horizontally, thus implying that peace may be made by everyone (including governments). In other words, peace is perceived as a common task – a task we all *share*. The work of building, rebuilding and preserving relations of equity is immensely challenging and demands much. There are conflicts all around us and

they come every day. This shared responsibility to create peace necessitates a high level of participation, with the quest for a high level of participation highlighting issues of democracy and inclusion and finally, the issue of cognitive justice and the integration of indigenous knowledge systems. It is thus possible to discuss the project of building peace within the framework of cognitive justice. Seen from this perspective, the conditions for integrating indigenous knowledge systems as part of the conceptual platform for peace building improve radically.

Cognitive justice highlights the need for democracy to recognise not only the universal validity of science but the plural availability of knowledges, but also different knowledges, not merely as methods but as ways of life. Cognitive justice moves beyond tolerance as a measure to an *active* recognition of the need for diversity (Visvanathan, 2009). Visvanathan (2009) argues that diversity is crucial for cognitive justice, first in itself. In this sense, "cognitive justice goes back to scientists like Thomas Wallace and J.B.S. Haldane who emphasised that evolution sought not the capitalist survival of the fittest but *diversity*" (Visvanathan, 2009, para. 27). Visvanathan (2009) points out that diversity is a mode of being in and for itself with this being the metaphor that Visvanathan brings to the notion of culture. In a cultural sense, he writes that, "diversity has a bigger rationale, not just as a mode of survival but as an axiomatic of difference that makes democracy possible. A diversity of knowledges, unmuseumised and dialogic, becomes an anchor for an inventive democratic imagination" (Visvanathan, 2009, para. 28).

If we choose to understand "diversity" as a strength in the interests of democracy and, at the same time, take in consideration the problem of the occlusion of the indigenous voice and the role of science in that occlusion, then the appeal to honestly highlight and recognise the existence of indigenous knowledge systems today makes an appeal to science (including peace experts) to "listen" more responsibly, "to step in humility down off their pedestals, and sit down, listen and learn" (Hoppers, 2002, p. 16). In essence, the challenge of peace building stresses the need to bring the silenced traditions of conflict resolution, such as the indigenous systems of healing and restorative action, into the playground of exploring peace content because, in our *common* endeavours of learning how to live together in peace, we may not reject any possibility of gaining new insights in relation to that important task.

7.2 Getting the story right

John Ralston Saul began his work, *A Fair Country* (2008), by stating that Canada is a nation of Aboriginal inspiration organised around a concept of peace, fairness and good government. This, he says, is what lies at the heart of the Canadian story and at the heart of Canadian mythology, whether francophone or anglophone. One of Ralston Saul's (2008) leading arguments in this book is to show that Canadians have accepted a language that expresses neither their true selves nor their true mythologies. He maintains that this is to disarm our civilisation and continues by saying:

“It is to cripple our capacity to talk and to act in a way that reflects both our collective unconscious and our ethical standards ... We have shrink-wrapped ourselves into a very particular description of our civilization and how it came to be. We have wrapped ourselves so tight within that description that it has become a straitjacket that expresses the history of another people, a history that would have produced a very different civilisation than the one we have.” (Ralston Saul, 2008, p. xii)

Ralston Saul's (2008) concern strikes squarely in the centre of the challenge of addressing the history of exclusion and obsolescence, as well as the extent of the question as to why it is so important to get the story right. I will use two examples from the Barents Region to help us to get the story right.

7.2.1 Case one: *Eilert Sundt*

Eilert Sundt (1817-1875), a famous Norwegian sociologist, was also a cultural educator and nation builder in every way. Sundt was a member of the distinguished group of cultural elite and acquired valuable knowledge from his extensive travels in the High North in his endeavour to map the "non-enlightened" condition which the national upbringing was intended to cure. His initial, prejudgemental view of the Sami people and other natives was much in line with the prevailing view which regarded the Sami as both primitive and inferior. In common with many others he started to lecture within the hierarchical "Wergeland perspective" and, initially, found much of which to be ashamed.

The early Sundt was, therefore, competing at the level of his contemporary Canadian "image makers" who had deprived the natives of their soul and their sense of their own world. The early Sundt was a diligent contributor to the creation of the imaginary indigenous figure that the Norwegian self-identification required in the service of the nation building project.

However, Sundt is, not without reason, considered to be the first competent Norwegian social scientist as he eventually achieved a new perspective; also of the people he was intended to reform. He also became increasingly uncertain about pointing his cultural finger and was challenged as a scientist. In 1862 Sundt wrote:

“After returning home from London in 1862, I arrived in the northern lands' and Finnmark's deserted stretches. It struck me to see how people lived in these mountainous shorelines, how they fought against the rough nature and still knew how to maintain such a civilised condition and such a happily social life ... Previous to this travel I walked with stranger concepts and foreign rules. But now I have learned to see more with the indigenous mind and sense.” (Berggren, 1989, p. 14)²⁷

Sundt's culture-hierarchical understanding faced opposition as he confronted himself with doubts and self-reflection. His internal epistemological and moral discord came to expression in a report he wrote after visiting the Samis during their seasonal assembling of the reindeer herds:

“As we hiked for several days into the highlands without anything happening and the Samis were only seemingly glancing pointlessly around, I was in despair and strongly in doubt of their methods, but once we reached the herd and the animals surrounded us only to such confusion, the Samis knew exactly what to do and demonstrated knowledge that greatly impressed me” (Sundt, 1975, p. 54).²⁸

Another example is provided by Sundt going out to explore the insanitary and unhygienic conditions in the indigenous society but then ending up writing about

²⁷ Translated from Norwegian by the author.

²⁸ Translated from Norwegian by the author.

sanitary and care (Edvardsen, 1997). The later Sundt came to doubt himself as an "image maker" as he discovered "sanitary" and "care" where he had previously found insanitary and imprudence. He gradually transformed the endogenous understanding into a fair opponent of the exogenous understanding he had previously advocated thus coming close to discovering the sub-Norway that was excluded or misrepresented in the national showcase which the nation builders wanted to present. The early Sundt and the tradition of which he was part needed this "sub-Norway", among other things, a northern Norway, a second-rate and a third-rate Norway. This group of distinguished people "needed people in need", someone who needed to be tightened up and corrected but never at the expense of the hierarchy. Any attempt at resistance against this hierarchy of epistemological and cultural uniformity anywhere within this sub-region was taken as a proof of the need to increase the level of disciplining.

Edvardsen refers to Cohen's (1982) work which emphasises that it is through cultural interaction only that the carrier of culture becomes aware of both his/her own culture and the culture of others. Potentially, these interactions enhance the possibility of discovering differences that break up the components of cultural "home blindness" and one discovers not only oneself and others and the difference, but the others' deeper values (Edvardsen, 1997).

Thus, we may say that Sundt's many travels provided him with an opportunity to discover cultural variations and to learn from "cultural confrontations" during which his cultural "home-blindness" was challenged. He became less and less willing to define the northern region of Norway from a hierarchical perspective and started to acquire an analytical perspective – working to understand the cultures and knowledge of others from their perspectives. It is thus possible to say the scientist Sundt fought a battle against the Sundt as a carrier of culture. According to Edvardsen, this confrontation signified that Sundt had advanced from the position of a relatively non-enlightened researcher to that of an enlightened researcher (Edvardsen, 1997). He came to understand different knowledges not merely as different statements of methods, but as different ways of life. His own resignation was not a weakness but rather a source of reflection that eventually expanded his cognitive "horizon".

By allowing himself to be enlightened by the people whom he was meant to reform, Sundt realised that his main role as a scientist involved “getting sense of the common sense”. This realisation made it possible for him to perceive the natives of the northern region of Norway as "sane and knowledgeable people who knew their world" (Edvardsen, 1997, p. 53).

7.2.2 Case two: Fridtjof Nansen

Norwegians are proud of many things, some of which have been used to shape the perception of what being Norwegian entails and strengthen the Norwegian identity. The most important Norwegian pole explorers include Fridtjof Nansen and Roald Amundsen.

Nansen and Amundsen were important symbols in the Norwegian struggle for independence and for the new nation-state after 1905. Under the auspices of the Norwegian Geographical Company, Nansen’s expedition over Greenland in 1888 was described as providing proof of the strength of the Norwegian mountain farmer – the lonely ski hero. The fact that Amundsen also used skis during his expedition was used to strengthen the image of Norway as a forceful ski nation.

According to a researcher at the Norwegian Polar Institute in Tromsø, Harald Dag Jølle, Roald Amundsen’s South Pole expedition in 1911 was a powerful demonstration of polar knowledge and efficiency (Tromsø Museum, 2011). The concept “snowhow” – the art of mastering the ice, both at sea and land – was the foundation of Norwegian polar research. In addition, "snowhow" includes knowledge of food, clothing, dog sledges and kayaks. Words such as "quajaq" and "anoraaq" are Inuit words that have been integrated into the Norwegian language as well as into other languages. However, the association in research to the indigenous often stops here.

The fact that Fridtjof Nansen came to know the Inuits and the Inuit culture when he spent the winter of 1888/1889 in Greenland is not included in Nansen’s story. He learned to dress like them, in a leather anorak (later in wool), he learned to cook like them, and he learned to paddle kayak – something that was extremely important for hunting along the coast. Not least did he learn how to dog sledge, which later became the main factor in Amundsen’s South Pole triumph. Amundsen was also an

apprentice at the Netsilik Inuits when he sailed the Northwest Passage in 1903. In addition, a knowledge of diet was very important. These expeditions took place before vitamin C had been “discovered” and scurvy was a major problem on long expeditions during which there was no access to fresh food. The Inuits, however, did not suffer from scurvy and thus Nansen and Amundsen simply followed their diet of fat, protein and omega 3. Amundsen, for example, took cloudberry to the South Pole and this played an important role in his success (Tromsø Museum, 2011).

However, all this happened with no mention of either who provided him with the requisite knowledge or the help he received from the indigenous people. It was a distorted account which also conflicted with Amundsen and Nansen’s own diaries. In their diaries, both emphasised their dependency on the indigenous knowledge provided by the Inuits and the Sami. However, this appeared to have been lost during the national editing process of their story. Indigenous knowledge systems had no place in the areas of knowledge that grew in conjunction with colonialism and science at that time. The nation builders wanted a national icon that was compatible with the civilised world and did not want it to be infused with “primitive” associations.

If one looks at the story of Nansen and Amundsen from the indigenous perspective, the Norwegian treatment of the history of Nansen and Amundsen’s expeditions may be said to represent an act of theft. Not only did the Norwegians unscrupulously take all the credit for their success but science also made the exclusion and misrecognition of the indigenous contribution appear “right” or, at least, not wrong. The silence about to whom the knowledge belonged, the silence about the lessons learnt and, perhaps more importantly, the silence about what had made these lessons possible in the first place, blocked any chance of seeing indigenous culture as part of the Norwegian cultural heritage and identity. This is only one example out of many which reveal how Western science worked in conjunction with colonialism and discredited indigenous people and indigenous knowledge around the world.

Nansen himself was surprised not only to learn about the working of colonialism, but also that he had been part of it. Prior to the Greenland expedition he had delivered two keynote addresses in Bergen during which he had referred to the Sami as “small, dirty and helpless” (Tromsø Museum, 2011, para. 4). However, after returning from the expedition he had major reversal of this view, not only in relation to himself but also to the whole European view of indigenous people. His book *Eskimoliv* (1891), is

a biting critique of colonialism throughout the world not only of Denmark's government of Greenland and Norway's government in Sápmi.

The South Pole race between Roald Amundsen and Robert Falcon Scott is an interesting study on the role of indigenous knowledge in relation to Western science. Scott's expedition, *Terra Nova*, was intended to be a voyage of scientific discovery and a heroic exploration of the "last unconquered wilderness". Although both Scott and Amundsen reached the South Pole, Scott and his four companions died on the return journey. While Amundsen had used the indigenous method of travelling using skis, Arctic dogs and sledges Scott had brought ponies all the way from England. However, not unsurprisingly, the ponies were found to be ill suited to snow and ice with their small hooves sinking into anything other than very firm snow and ice. There was, however, ample evidence that dogs would succeed. Nansen, who had used the opportunity to learn from the Inuits, strongly advised Scott to "take dogs, dogs, and more dogs", but Scott ignored the advice. The "expert" view in England was that dogs were a doubtful means transportation in the Antarctic. In addition, while Amundsen relied on indigenous knowledge, Scott systematically ignored it. He trusted the Western way as if his primary goal were to demonstrate the greatness of his homeland and his civilisation. Scott even took with him hundreds of books on the expedition in order to "stay civilised" (Scott, 1912).

However, Scott was no exemption in this. In the north of Canada, it is reported that one of the principal causes of death among the British and U.S. explorers was their refusal to dress, act or eat like *savages*. From the 1830s on, they deliberately chose to ignore both the example and the advice of the Métis and the Inuits. This refusal to absorb the advice and example of the Métis and the Inuit continued until the late nineteenth century when they finally came to accept their own inferiority in certain issues (Ralston Saul, 2009). According to Ralston Saul, what it finally took "was one naval officer breaking ranks to spend the winter with the Inuit: He came back to the ship in the spring – healthy, happy, well fed – to find the usual collection of sick shipmates and the usual roll call of dead" (Ralston Saul, 2009, p. 140). The fundamental difference, Ralston Saul points out, was "the refusal of *civilised* Englishmen to eat raw meat, which contained the necessary vitamins. Unlike the *savages*, "they boiled theirs until everything healthy had been removed" (Ralston Saul, 2009, p. 140).

The story of Scott's voyage has been retold in the European interpretation as a drama – a human tragedy – with no mention of the stupidity displayed. Yet, if we consider that each culture requires appropriate clothing to cope with its environment and that the capacity to adapt to reality is a sign of intelligence in any civilisation, the civilisational overconfidence, which, in the case of Scott and the British and US explorers in Canada, resulted in an almost tragic-comic self-absorption, is a sign of civilisational stupidity. These stories are important because they highlight our insistence on seeing our countries through the eyes of these explorers rather than through the eyes of those who already lived there.

The story of the two different explorers (Scott and Nansen) and their different approaches to knowledge may serve as an image of contrast reflecting key challenges in the relationship between Western science and indigenous knowledge today. In fact, the contrast highlights what is really at stake when asking why the integration of IKS is important. While Nansen and Amundsen opened up dialogue with the indigenous people, Scott and his men arrogantly refused to do this. In Scott's case, the refusal to engage in dialogue ended in tragedy while, for Nansen, the dialogue led to new knowledge. He learned to adapt to reality in order to survive. But more crucial, he also learned the importance of learning to adapt by listening to the advice given by people who already lived in the Arctic, people with long experience and wisdom in terms of how to adapt to the environment. For Nansen, the learning process demanded a process of critical self-examination – a journey of personal transformation. He was radically challenged as a scientist and returned with a completely different worldview. We may say that, for Nansen, the whole notion of "primitive" was turned upside down in the sense that he came to realise that the "primitive" in question could no longer be associated with the indigenous, with those who already knew, but with the scientific paradigm that did not recognise this. For Nansen, this realisation literally saved his life.

In the context of the Barents Region, an important aspect of the problem of colonialism, but also a key to its deconstruction, is evident in the stories of Eilert Sundt and Fridtjof Nansen. Both scientists had travelled to the High North with a specific notion of the natives and returned with another. In both cases, we must acknowledge the radical personal transformation that took place as the result of the time spent with the natives. In both cases, the transformation involved both an epistemological and an ethical reorientation. The new perceptions of both Nansen

and Sundt also represented a clear break with the prevailing views at the time – a lesson which involved asking critical questions about themselves and their own science, culture and civilisation. By using Nansen and Sundt as an image of contrast, it is possible to perceive the contrast between colonialism and the way out as a personal drama. In order to understand this drama, it appears to be of relevance to ask: What distinguished Sundt I and Nansen I from Sundt and Nansen II? What characterises and distinguishes their different views of knowledge and what was the cause of the change from one state to another?

Taking the lead from hermeneutics, the assumption is that the key to transformation is found not in already established knowledge but by questioning such knowledge. This questioning is enabled by being allowed, or better, by being invited to understand the Other from the “inside”, from within the world of the Other. This invitation, or hospitality, generates a hermeneutic situation. Sundt and Nansen eventually realised the history of effect – what was not said and inaccessible at first but then emerging out of the increased status of their “non-knowledge”. They then began questioning their own framework of understanding, their own tradition and heritage. In other words, they established a hermeneutic situation by allowing the history of effect “speak” against the backdrop of their understanding and the basis of that understanding. For Sundt, this transformation represented his major breakthrough as a researcher while Nansen received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1922. Both Nansen and Sundt are lauded for their work. They are national icons. However, the searching national question today is: Are we ready to absorb the advice and example – to listen and learn – as Sundt and Nansen eventually did and, more importantly, to tell the truth about the lessons we learn, include and credit what has been excluded, redesign the icons, and create a different, more inclusive, narrative which is more compatible with whom we really are?

7.3 Getting the civilisational puzzle right

There are many ways of exploring the possibilities of bringing indigenous knowledge systems into the ambit of exploring peace content. As already pointed out, indigenous knowledge systems collide with Western scientific knowledge in many ways and at different levels. It is important to emphasise that these different knowledge systems are not merely different statements of methods and techniques

but refer to particular worldviews. So, if we are to understand how indigenous systems and Eurocentric worldviews clash, and what such a clash implies for the issue of peace, we need to understand how the philosophy, values and customs of indigenous cultures differ from those of Eurocentric cultures. This forms part of the belief that becoming better acquainted with this relationship at various levels would help to identify the root causes of the obstacle to committing to a process of healing and restorative action. The following subsections examine the Barents Region from the perspective of space mentalities and explores these mentalities from both a peace and a violence perspective and in relation to the problem of colonialism, the issue of cognitive justice and the integration of indigenous knowledge systems.

7.3.1 Colonialism and the challenge of “jagged worldviews”

Before the seventeenth century, indigenous knowledge systems were, to a large extent, shared by the different people inhabiting the Barents Region. Up to that point, the various people who arrived in the region quickly came to accept and adopt of the many indigenous ways of doing things. These indigenous ways were adopted by the newcomers because they made sense as a way in which to survive. Newcomers were thus dependent on the indigenous people and also *partners* with them (Hansen and Olsen, 2004). In other words, the relation between the Sami and the non-Sami began with dialogue with both cultures adopting practices from each other and learning from each other without duress.

However, then came the advent of the colonial model which put a stop to this mutual exchange and opened the doors to a number of negative possibilities. The colonial model attempted to destroy the indigenous worldview – but failed. However, although the more than three hundred years of colonial oppression overruled living in harmony – it did not destroy it. Nevertheless, it did leave many indigenous peoples with a disconnected worldview.

Leroy Little Bear, an Aboriginal philosopher, argues that this disconnection has left Aboriginal peoples with “a heritage of jagged world views” “A random puzzle, a jigsaw puzzle”, thus implying that, although they no longer have an indigenous worldview, neither have they adopted the Eurocentric model. Thus, their consciousness becomes “a puzzle, a jigsaw puzzle” that people have to attempt to understand (Ralston Saul, 2015, p. 168, quoting Leroy Little Bear).

What about the non-indigenous people? Leroy Little Bear writes that

“all colonial people, both coloniser and colonised, have shared or collective views of the world embedded in their languages, stories, or narratives. It is collective because it is shared among a family or group. However, this shared worldview is always contested, and this paradox is part of what means to be colonised. Everyone tries to understand these different ways of viewing the world and to make choices about how to live his or her life. No one has a pure worldview that is 100 per cent indigenous or Eurocentric; rather, everyone has an integrated mind, a fluxing and ambidextrous consciousness, a pre-colonised consciousness that flows into a colonised consciousness and back again. It is this clash of worldviews that is at the heart of the many current difficulties with effective means of social control. It is also this clash that suppresses diversity in choices and denies indigenous people harmony in their daily lives.” (Ralston Saul, 2015, p. 168, quoting Leroy Little Bear)

Thus, Leroy Little Bear makes the point that, while non-indigenous people also possess this form of complexity, it is only indigenous people who have a *conscious sense* of this complexity. A careful analysis thus reveals that reconciliation between the non-Sami and Sami today, to a large extent, revolves around raising the level of consciousness in relation to this complexity. By going to the historic roots, contradictions between Sami and non-Sami may be reduced. However, the challenge is to identify the mechanisms that have worked to destroy this relationship and to reject them as a basis for an ongoing relationship.

7.3.2 *Space mentalities in the Barents Region*

In an article published in the report, *Den menneskelige dimensjon i nordområdene (The human dimension in the North)*, the Russian historian and philosopher, Nikolay Terebikhin (1994), adopts a highly unusual, but suggestive, approach to the issue of human development in the Barents Region. Unlike most of the contributors to this report, who focused mainly on the economical dimension, Terebikhin’s approach was to look at the different “space mentalities”.

According to Terebikhin, the most important task in today's arctic "culturology" – the science of human culture – is to explore the decisive mechanisms that correspond to the conquest or colonisation of the arctic territory, compare them and set up a typology of them. The aim of this task is, ultimately, to distinguish the type of "domestication" typical of the arctic territory and the characteristics of the "languages" the arctic people use to define their national-spatial "habitus" (Terebikhin, 1994). According to Terebikhin, it is not merely the concrete geography (nature) or the ethnic apparatus that determines the space-mentality, but the national language of space that defines the nature of their spatial mentality – or, to be more exact, there is a correlation between the external area of the natural environment and the inner space of the group's conception of the world (their *spatial mentality*).

Terebikhin argues that there are three main mentalities to be found in the euro-arctic territory: (i) the Norwegian; (ii) the North-Russian (pomoric); and (iii) the Shamanic space-language represented by the Samoyeds (Nenets and Vepsians) and the Sami people. I will discuss these three briefly below:

(i) The Norwegian space-mentality carries with it European cultural traditions and thus it is possible to apply the following characteristics of the west-European space-mentality that N.A. Berdyaev presents: "The west-European man feels foiled by the earth's minimal spatial dimension, and also equally by the limited space that prevails in the spirit of the soul. The west-European man is accustomed to trust the intense energy and activity it exuberates. His soul lives in close quarters, and not spacious, whereto everything is calculated and classified as it should be" (Berdyaev, 1990, p. 12). For Terebikhin (1994), this space is the type of secularised and rational space that we find in the external world, a position that has been subject to an intense process of conquering. The process aimed to place the euro-arctic territory under *control*. This thinking possesses the "old" European, generic universalism, the enclosed micro cosmos which Terebikhin entitles the "fjord-culture" (Terebikhin, 1994). The most prominent leading representative of this mentality is a character who is individualistic and secular, a personality who trusts no one and feels entirely self-sufficient. According to Terebikhin, such a personality is embodied in the epitomical Norwegian national figure, Fridtjof Nansen. This icon, the charismatic leader, the spiritual leader and the prophet, is a type of "cultural hero" and guiding force, indicating the direction for the yet unidentified land (*terra incognita*) and therefore paving the way for the Chosen People (Terebikhin, 1994).

(ii) The north-Russian (pomoric) space-mentality is a strengthened dialect of the Russian spatial language. The Russian peoples' charismatic leaders and icons were mainly people who had attained the highest level of spirituality. These spiritual and selfless characters devoted themselves fully to transforming the Nordic territory into a Nordic Thebais, a holy place. These people are the leading and fundamental figures representing the north-Russian space-mentality (Terebikhin, 1994). The north-Russian conquest of the euro-arctic territory has a religious and spiritual character and an attitude that did not set forth any utilitarian goals. The concept "conquering" is therefore not adequate. In fact, in this context it is more correct to speak of an adjustment to the arctic space, an agency characterised by the pilgrimage of the seekers of the good and sacred.

The outstanding hero in the north-Russian conquest is the ambulant Russian pilgrim, a figure who is tormented by spiritual thirst after finding the Promised Land. However, the Promised Land is not a concrete place such as, for example, the Islamic Mecca. The Russian pilgrim wanders for the sake of the wandering. This wandering does not involve the struggle to create a comfortable and cosy room and, therein, lies the characteristic of the Russian life in Arctic, namely, the absence of comfortable living conditions (*bezbytnost*). The north-Russian intrusion into the euro-arctic territory is primarily a *spiritual intervention*. The opinion of the Russian philosopher, Nicolas A. Berdayayev, was that the boundless Russian space was not an external but an inner fate of the Russian people because everything external is a symbol of the inner world (Berdayayev, 1990). Berdyayev's statement reflects the basic view of Russian philosophers which criticises the position of materialistic determinism and affirms the personalistic conception of freedom within the spatial mentality of an *ethnos*. In this case, *ethnos* is perceived as a distinct group of persons that may be characterised according to the multiplicity of their souls and characters ("symphony persons").

(iii) The Shamanic spatial language of the Samojodis (nenetsis) and the Samis are akin to the Russian pilgrim's mentality. The Shaman is the charismatic leader, in a leading position, who knows and abides by the spatial organisation of "the world". He/she is the most prominent explorer and cultural hero. For the Shamanic spatial-dimension, there has never existed any objective reality other than the eternal and absolute reality of his/her cosmology – a reality that does not possess any outer conquering characteristics. In this case, the conquest is limited to a visible, concrete grip with the mythological geography of the cosmos constituting the Arctic's real

geography (Terebikhin, 1994). The euro-arctic spatial geography has become their cosmography. Within this area, they display themselves, living the mythical and ritual life that these reindeer-keepers, hunters and anglers live. There is no innate notion of expansion in their spatial language with the exception of the notion of expanded friendships with the neighbouring communities (Terebikhin, 1994).

A brief recapitulation confines the notion of conquering domestication within these three legislative bodies, or spatial habituses. There is an outgoing striving for control, of which the main purpose is exploitation and which is conveyed by the “fjord-mentality”. There is a spiritual implementation in terms of which the normative trust and character are linked to both the mentality of the Russian Pilgrim and to the Shamanic spatial language which is represented by the indigenous peoples of the region and which centres around “belonging”. These different modes of thinking characterise the cultural landscape of the Barents Region today.

It is possible to discern that Terebikhin's term "space mentality", in fact, camouflages a far deeper concern; a problem that corresponds to contradictions at the level of deep culture or cosmology. The agents who have internalised the specific necessity of these codes in the form of habitus have become strong carriers and reproducers of certain deep-seated codes and beliefs. According to Terebikhin, you would find, in the west-European cultural heritage, certain tenets of belief paving the way for the establishment of a spatial mentality that appeals to the notions of conquest and expansionism and which is internalised in the habitus of the national icon, Fridtjof Nansen. Nansen represents a mentality that is limited to the aim of placing the Barents Region under control by using utility as the guiding principle.

For Terebikhin, however, it is important to emphasise that these basic mentalities are mixed among the arctic people and that a sharp dichotomy between the different cultures would therefore be somewhat inadequate. According to Terebikhin, the Norwegian mentality, for example, encompasses, in addition to the “fjord-mentality”, also an “ocean-culture”. This mentality involves an outlook on life that is open. In Finnmark, the northernmost county of Norway, you will find houses built along the coast boldly facing the great ocean with the windows wide open towards the macro cosmos! Thus, Norwegian space-mentality envisions two different worlds at the same time. The openness in relation to others and the unidentified world that Terebikhin (1994) identifies in Finnmark constitutes the "common field" that brings the

Norwegian and Russian cultures closer together and establishes a kinship between them (Terebikhin, 1994). This provides a glimpse of this cultural resource that builds friendship and contributes to peace and belonging in the north.

Using Terebikhin's analysis, one could interpret Finnmark as a cultural hybrid, a mix between west-European, indigenous and north Russian (pomoric) cultural traditions and values. A hybrid is a personal interpretation and the result of a playful indifference to codes. However, this playful indifference creates the possibility of a common ground, a "third space", and thus a meeting-point for different worlds. It is therefore tempting to describe Finnmark as a bridge and thus a mediating and peace building resource. From a borderology perspective, the openness in Finnmark takes Norway beyond what the centre believes Norway is able to do. Finnmark, the most "peripheral", marginalised, obsolete, in fact, mistrusted and monitored county in Norway, is, in this sense, an important national resource for peace. In line with Rossvær's argument, we may choose to understand this "common field" in terms of Finnmark's openness as a result of the cosmopolitan endeavours that Kant addressed. These cosmopolitan endeavours are rooted in the regional identity but transform into something else in terms of the openness to and curiosity for others. Finnmark may also be seen as a product of this form of cultural visit – the openness to others – and an example of how the civil society in the border regions creates "common grounds" through the people themselves. Hence, the people are not merely the product of dialogue but *are* the dialogue itself.

Despite the intense geopolitical pressure to abolish this form of positive contact during the Cold War, the people on both sides of the border managed to preserve this openness to the "other". Thus, the Cold War did not end this friendship, it only anticipated it.

The notion of borderology reveals that dialogue and the unification of the split Europe is rendered possible through the cosmopolitan border identity. In view of the fact that the East-West border that divides Europe also runs through people and when people transcend their personal "borders" by "going visiting", this softens the polarisation that supports the split. In this way, border people may represent important resources for peace. The border that divides Europe in two – a fault line that, according to Galtung, has remained more or less the same since the Roman Empire was divided in two in 395 – could be studied in this way. This was also the conclusion reached in

Chapter 6. This would usually be satisfactory but, then again, the major methodological concern is the history of exclusion and obsolescence and the challenge of giving the silenced and the marginalised to have a voice. Where are the Sami peoples in this? What role and status do we assign the indigenous society and its worldview?

7.3.3 The *siida*-system and peaceful conflict resolution

The Sami communities were organised in a complex *siida* system. The *siidas* was a form of practical cooperation between several family groups of reindeer herders (Niemi, 1996). The Samis made use of the land on which they lived together and which was available for everyone. The *siidas* moved in a circulatory way and not in the linear way; that would have constituted migration. Their nomadic cycles resulted in their encountering other *siida* groups but they developed a tradition for handling conflicts which arose. For the pre-modern Sami, there was no concept of ownership of the land. The reindeer herders had ownership of the reindeers but not of the land they traversed. The concept of ownership of land first arises when one becomes resident on the land. The indigenous tradition of peaceful dispute – a model of handling conflicts – developed over thousands of years.

It is important to understand that, from an indigenous perspective, people belong to the land, the land does not belong to the people. We already know this from the Alta River dispute when the Sami was accused of illegal demonstration in court and answered that the river was "part of him, part of his "home". This outlook finds expression in Vålkeapää's *Trekways of the Wind*:

I see our fjelds
the places we live
and hear my heart beat
all this is my home
and I carry it
within me
in my heart

All of this is my home
these fjords rivers lakes

the cold the sunlight the storms
The night and day of the fjelds
happiness and sorrow
sister and brother
All of this is my home
and I carry it in my heart

For the Sami, the Arctic is merely "home". They *belong* to it ("carry it in my heart"). In Sami philosophy, existence consists of energy. All things are imbued with spirit, and in constant motion. Animism and shamanism were important components of the religious belief-system – a cosmology and worldview in terms of which human beings, animals and nature fitted together and coexisted in a mutually beneficial universe. In this realm of energy and spirit, interrelationships between all entities are of vital importance with the most important being space. The general idea is that all things float, are in constant motion and circulate. The cosmology of the Sami is not that different from the way in which the reindeers migrate. Things move in circular patterns as a result of how the seasons change. Time is a part of this constant movement although it goes nowhere. Time just is. The Sami philosophy is holistic and integrative, cyclical and repetitive. In addition, it is process-oriented and firmly grounded in a particular place – it is restricted to the Euro-Arctic geography. Several aspects of this cosmology are expressed in Væelkepää's *Trekways of the Wind*:

For me everything spins

The wind travel the tundra
Fall undresses the heart
drops the leaves

(...)

Life
is it not all this
all the sounds

yesterday today and tomorrow
happiness and sorrow
that which is and that which is not

And me
am I not part of it

Väelkepää (1985) is clearly showing how human beings are seen as part of the whole and not elevated above the place and its other inhabitants. The Samis view the world in which we live as an integrated whole. They see themselves from within existence and do not gaze down upon it from above.

The example of the Tornedal River discussed in the introduction to this thesis may serve as an example of the citizens refusing to see the river as a line but, instead, seeing it as a space in between. What does this decision actually mean? To draw a sharp line in an area is to make a compromise, namely, “I want something and you want something, you take away half of what you want and I take half of what I want and we meet somewhere in between”. A shared ground, however, goes further: “I want something and you want something and we both get what we want”. In addition, shared ground adds something qualitatively new in terms of bringing the different communities involved together. Thus, in this sense a shared ground means the possibility of shared lives.

If sharing the land instead of dividing it by making a sharp line sounds familiar to the people in the region the reason for this is because this idea is not new. Sharing the land is not a modern idea but, instead, an indigenous idea. The *siida* system was organised around this idea with people making use of the land together. This practice is different from the European concept of ownership – a great deal of control with very little responsibility – and changes how things are conceived of and therefore how things could be done. Belonging to the land and the knowledge of sharing it establish a tradition of *shared* responsibilities for the land. These responsibilities are tied not to power relationships, but rather to the obligations of shared belonging. And this form of thinking has passed down the generations for more than ten thousand years. Integrated in this heritage is knowledge. To make use of this knowledge is a

peace advantage. And Scandinavians are particularly lucky because this knowledge represents a powerful tool for the way many Scandinavians imagine their country.

7.3.4 Marginality, epistemic violence and cognitive justice

Terebikhin (1994) argues in his article that the basic challenge of human development revolves around broadening the conceptual interpretation of the problem of marginality. The need to expand this conception arises from a number of reasons. Firstly, there is the need to recognise that the geographical dimension of the Barents Region is a marginal contact zone comprising different political, ethnical and ethical worlds in the north of Europe. Secondly, the northern provinces of these countries (Norway, Russia, Sweden and Finland) have been included in a type of common marginal zone situated at the border or periphery of the national cultural space. Thus, the category of marginality applies not only to geography, class or ethnicity, but also to the gnosiology – the philosophy of knowledge and the faculties for learning – itself. Terebikhin argues that a determined attempt to overcome the problem of marginalisation presupposes that the conceptual foundation of the approach used should be extended beyond the limits of ethno-semiotics. The category “marginality”, he argues, has to be joined to such fundamental categories as “modernity”, “regionality”, “ethnicity”, “religion”, “ethics” and “domestication of space” (Terebikhin, 1994). Thus, Terebikhin (1994) points the problem-seeking arrow back to science and the principles upon which science is organised. If we assume that Terebikhin is correct in arguing that the conception of marginality belongs to the scientific disciplines and that the important point is to do something about this, then it becomes possible to bring in the concept of cultural or epistemic violence as an approach for transformation.

Cognitive justice frames another approach for transformation. Cognitive justice is a hypothesis, a theory of peace originating in science and in the problematic relationship between science and the series of suppressed "others". Visvanathan eschews the notion that science is value neutral, universal, and has nothing to do with politics. To him, science is both politics and government: "It creates its own "microphysics of power", its own capillaries by determining discourses, by pre-empting the ways one thinks" (Visvanathan, cited in Hoppers, 2002, p. 44-45). It is thus vital that an ethic for science to move beyond the language of restraint into a

language of diversity, starting in the celebration of plurality and coming from a deep recognition of the need for diversity. In addition, epistemology must be rethought in this way so that it becomes an engagement *across* differences (Visvanathan, 2009).

Thus, there are two possible approaches to exploring the link between science, marginality and the broader issue of colonialism in the Barents region, namely, epistemic/cultural violence as the negative peace approach and cognitive justice as the positive peace approach, i.e. Galtung's peace fraction (see section 3.2.1). This dual peace approach would open up the possibility of rethinking the role of the universities with regard to the issue of the integration of indigenous knowledge systems. For example:

- In line with Gupta (1999), the Barents region may be affirmed as resource rich, but economically poor.
- In line with Terebikhin (1994), the Barents Region, both geographically and historically, is situated at the border or periphery of the European cultural space.
- In line with Niemi (1994), the exogenous perspective (not the endogenous perspective such as indigenous knowledge systems) dominates science and research in the Barents Region today.
- The broad conception of marginality, together with the recognition that the region is seen as an epistemological periphery or void precisely because of the history of colonialism, pose a challenge for the scientific community.
- Acknowledging that indigenous models of fishing, farming and hunting as well as methods of conflict resolution, restorative justice and healing may embody different notions of community and science, and that such frameworks may be alternative and complementary paradigms to the current modes of science.

Bringing cognitive justice into the ambit of exploring resources for peace building in the Barents Region may result in important questions emerging with such questions addressing the universities directly. For example: "How to contribute in transforming the region from an epistemological periphery or void to an alternative list of possibilities and epistemologies?" Including cognitive justice in the agenda in the

north would, ultimately, demand the cultivation and assertion of reverse, but empowering, discourses in many domains.

If we also come to the realisation that development is, essentially, endogenous, meaning, thus implying that the people are the *subject* "because endogenous development begins at the point where people start to pride themselves as worthy human beings inferior to none; and where such pride is lost, development begins at the point at which this pride is restored and history recovered" (Hoppers, 2002, p. 15); then we must also realise that it is precisely the holders of these systems of knowledge, this "informal community of expertise", that are the key to transformation and change.

If development is essentially endogenous, then the epistemologies that work preventively in terms of development should yield to epistemologies that serve to increase it. In this understanding, knowledges from the laboratory of life suddenly become significantly more central, with actual people, their lived life and their experiences making far more sense than previously. At this point, phenomenology becomes important. It not only serves as a contrast to and, to some point, brings to enquiry more discipline-rooted perspectives but these descriptions explicitly challenge the "outsider description", and question its claims. Articulation at this level would involve participation in the Freirean project of creation and recreation, namely, of "participating in naming the World" (Freire, 1998, 2000).

In other words, if we agree that actual people and their lived stories potentially constitute valuable resistance to colonialism and also sustain the possibility of maintaining unity and peace in the north but, at the same time, recognise that these voices have been largely omitted and subjugated epistemologically, then it may be suggested that science (in the service of human development) must return to the storyteller with a humble approach that will ensure that both the story and the storyteller survive the violence to which they have been subjected. This return, Visvanathan explains, is not about getting the theory right but about getting the *story* right (Visvanathan, 2015).

7.4 Upgrading the level of co-existence

The term multiculturalism describes the existence of multiple cultures within an area of jurisdiction. The type of relationship between these cultures may be classified according to four stages. The first phase is *intolerance*, which we have witnessed much in Sápmi, with Sami culture and language being killed or marginalised and the identity of the Sami, their affiliation and right to land, geographically, materially and spiritually, being discredited.

The Alta River dispute eventually challenged this first phase of intolerance and ushered in the second phase, namely, *tolerance* – “I tolerate your existence, but I have nothing to learn from you, and you should be discreet and not invite yourself. It is ok that you exist, but preferably “over there””. The establishment of both a Sami Parliament; and the Sami University College of Applied Sciences in Tromsø and Kautokeino;²⁹ the Finnmark Act (Finnmarksloven) of 2005, which gives the residents (not only Sami) of the Finnmark County exclusive rights to land and resources;³⁰ the establishment of Sami broadcasting;³¹ and the Action Plan for the Sami Languages³²

²⁹ The Sami University Collage offers studies that play an important role in protecting and developing Sami Society, for example, Sami Linguistics, Law, History, Journalism, Reindeer Husbandry, Indigenous Knowledge and Philosophy, Traditional Knowledge, Duodji (traditional Sami handicraft), design, Sami teacher programmes etc. The indigenous perspective is pivotal in all the subject areas as well as in research. (Sami University College Strategic Plan 2012-2016).

³⁰ The basis of the Finnmark Act is that "the Samis, through protracted traditional use of the land and water areas, have acquired individual and/or collective ownership and right to use lands and waters in Finnmark County. A commission with a strong Sami representation judges' disputes concerning the right to land and water (Finnmarksloven 2005).

³¹ Norway, Sweden and Finland have their own Sami broadcasters (NRK Sápmi, SR Sameradion, SVT Sápmi og YLE Sápmi, respectively) but the privately owned Sami radio on the Kola Peninsula in Russia has been closed down.

³² In the White Paper No. 28 of 2008, the Norwegian Government launched a plan of action to preserve the Sami languages. The principal objectives of the plan of action include the following: The Sami languages of Northern Sami, Lule Sami and Southern Sami shall be developed and survive as living languages in the future; the Sami languages shall be promoted and made visible; every individual shall have the right to learn the Sami languages; Sami linguistic rights shall be promoted and made known; the three Sami languages, Northern Sami, Lule Sami and Southern Sami, shall be given equal opportunities to develop; public institutions shall become conscious of using the Sami languages (Northern Sami, Lule Sami and Southern Sami); and knowledge of the Sami languages in Norway shall be developed and preserved for the future.

– all the products of tolerance. However, one important question has not yet been asked, namely, what can we (non-Sami) learn from Sami?³³

Posing this question and repeating it would lead into the third phase, namely, *dialogue*. Dialogue refers to a deep interest in and respect and curiosity about the “other”. There is no doubt that the Sami have respected and been curious about the Norwegian, Finnish, Swedish and/or Russian cultures, mainly because they have been forced into this position but also because they were driven to it out of necessity. However, the opposite, curiosity and admiration for Sami culture and knowledge systems on the part of Norway, has not been evident. The point of this third phase is that it is symmetrical. In other words, the respect and curiosity must be mutual – it must go both ways. For example, the establishment of the Sami University Collage in Tromsø and Kautokeino may represent indigenous knowledge systems but this model of inclusion does not imply dialogue. A dialogue implies not merely the creation of a side track of indigenous knowledge to the main track. Instead, a level of dialogue requires the *integration* of different knowledge systems. In addition, as Hoppers points out, integration means more than just finding an aggregate position or middle ground upon which one may have an ahistorical exchange; it means introducing a power and knowledge critique of the mainstream knowledges in terms of their silencing effects, paying attention to their nature, potentials, omissions and consequences (Hoppers, 2002).

At the regional level, however, the situation is different. As was demonstrated in Chapter 6, the regional cooperation in the area is marked by a mutual curiosity and respect. But, even more than that, the dialogue is a form of cosmopolitanism, i.e. Rossvær's borderology leads into the fourth stage, namely, *mutual learning*. During this phase the different cultures start sliding together – they learn from each other without even noticing. Mutual learning implies a transition from a multicultural society to multicultural persons, thus opens up for the *active* coexistence of more than one culture inside one person and not only inside a society (Galtung, 2008b). In other words, at this stage it is possible to speak of a dynamic, more advanced form of coexistence, namely, a bridging culture.

³³ Aili Keskitalo, the President of the Sami parliament, asked the following question at the Agenda Nord-Norge 2014: Why do we not see the Sami as a resource?

What the brief discussion illustrates is that the regional level of multiculturalism precedes the national level. Moreover, inter-regional cooperation precedes inter-governmental cooperation. Regionally, the reality is characterised by dialogue and mutual learning. The renewed Kirkenes Declaration of 2013 stressed the importance of inclusion in all areas and declared that, "Indigenous peoples, with their invaluable traditional knowledge, must continue to play an active role in the development of the region. We support a further strengthening of indigenous peoples' representation in the Barents cooperation" (Statsministerens Kontor, 2013). Regionally, the holders of indigenous and traditional forms of knowledge are seen as key actors in and pivotal for the future development of the Barents Region. In short, at the regional level, diversity is not perceived as a burden but as a strength.

As has been mentioned, several universities and other learning institutions in the Barents Region are now involved in this stream of fruitful exchange. A central aim of this cooperation has been to discuss the development of cross border culture from an academic point of view. However, as Rossvær and Sergeev (2015) conclude: "The idea of studying cross border culture has proven to be challenging" (p. 5). Sverre Jervell, a senior member of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, made this challenge explicit in a seminar paper published for the Barents Secretariat (2015) by asking: "in view of the enormous reserves of oil and gas at the bottom of the Barents Sea, did we forget the cultural dimension?" (Rossvær and Sergeev, 2015, p. 5).

If we also consider that the Barents Region may be affirmed as "resource rich but economically poor", the question posed by Jervell shows the question's relevance and actuality in many ways. In view of the present situation where it would appear that the interest in exploiting the oil resources under the Barents Sea also is slowly dissipating, combined with the recognition of the tireless efforts among the people to maintain social cohesion by embracing cultural diversity and otherness, it is, undoubtedly, the right time to pose questions about cognitive justice, the integration of knowledge systems, human development and peace as part of a cluster for rethinking the role of the universities in this region. For example, if we consider that,

- Indigenous knowledge is poorly protected by national intellectual property regulations.
- the integration of indigenous knowledge systems in the higher education system in the region is largely missing.

- the main purpose of any university is to serve the region in which it is located and it must therefore adapt to the reality of the region;
- the Barents Region is characterised by a diversity of cultures and knowledges (including indigenous knowledge systems);
- the citizens embrace this diversity and see it as a strength; and
- this strength has become a resource for improving the relationships between all four countries and is an inspiration for Europe as a whole.

What is actually at stake is that it is impossible to build an effective society and promote peace, human development and a way of approaching life and livelihood using a knowledge base that is seriously incomplete and is not representative of the cultural diversity in the region.

In short, in respect of developing a culture of dialogue and mutual learning, the situation is simple: In terms of inclusion and the level of cooperation, the regional cooperation is ahead of the higher education institutions in the same area. If the aim is to catch up with the reality, then it is incumbent on the higher education institutions to make a serious commitment to the issue of cognitive justice and the integration of knowledge systems. In view of the fact that indigenous knowledge systems still play a central role for people in the Barents Region today, the universities should strive, at a deep level, for the recognition, promotion, development, protection and affirmation of indigenous knowledge systems. By making a serious commitment to inclusion and the integration of knowledge systems, the higher education institutions would not only be reflecting the present reality but they would also become part of a peace initiative and help that peace initiative to come to fruition in terms of creating a space for transformative human development, peace and restorative action.

7.5 Conclusion

Based on the four levels of multiculturalism, it is argued that Norway is at the beginning of the end of stage two (tolerance). However, in order to advance to a more sophisticated form of co-existence, at least three things must happen: (1) A more honest and inclusive narrative, built upon the centrality of the indigenous people's past, present and future, must be reinstalled; (2) and the policy of the

Scandinavian countries must reflect that inclusiveness and centrality, both conceptually and financially and, finally; (3) the academy should not be standing in the way but, instead, it should be helping the reconceptualising of the public space so that indigenous ways come back into the core of how we do things and what we do. This would be the more democratic, the more honest, the fairer and the more peaceful thing to do.

Some of this is, however, already happening, at least at the regional level. The Barents Region cooperation is an outstanding example of the way in which to conceptualise an inclusive policy platform which promotes collaborations for mutual and equal benefit and with the indigenous playing a central part. In the 2013 anniversary report, the members of the Barents Region essentially concluded that inclusion works, it unites people and it builds peace (Statsministerens Kontor, 2013). Several universities in the region and elsewhere are being drawn into it and the intellectual, cross-border collaboration is expanding. As I see it, the key challenge is cognitive justice and the integration of indigenous knowledge systems. At the level of epistemology, the core strategy should be to seek the best of both Western knowledge systems and IKS. Both systems represent national resources and to see them as complementary may generate forms of creativity that will benefit and empower all. To embrace both systems is to demonstrate strength. Everyone benefits.

Chapter 8: Ethics and the restoration of the Other

If I don't vouch for myself,
then who vouches for me?
But if I only vouch for myself, -
then am I still me?

The Babylon Talmud, Tractate Aboth 6A

This chapter asks: What theory of human action (ethics) may help to shape a paradigm of restorative action thus transform the Barents Region from an area of historical domination into a region of peace and dignity?

The phenomenon of "Auschwitz" proves that it is not possible for "pure" theoretical knowledge to create the foundation for ethics (Arendt, 1963). All of modernity's artificial substitutes for spontaneous moral impulses and the individual responsibility for the Other have failed, or worse, resulted in disarming the ethical safeguards against the danger of the human thrust towards control and mastery and thus resulting in their degeneration into inhuman cruelty and oppression. The violence with which these artificial substitutes withstand renders ethics derisory. This is an issue of serious concern. Everyone will readily agree that it is of the utmost importance to find out whether we are not being duped by morality.

Post-modernists, such as Foucault, have showed that a discourse is also a product of power, that power needs "truth" and that it invents the truth it requires by generating a discourse. However, a discourse needs a myth, a narrative, a story and a science to adorn it. It is clear from reading Foucault and other post-modern authors, that the discourse of traditional modern ethics emerges as a hypocritical farce (Hoppers and Richards, 2011).

However, the post-modernists have not replaced any of these myths, stories, and narratives with any robust alternatives and, instead of the old colonist view that the thinking of indigenous people was worth nothing with the vacuum to be filled by Western thinking, post-modernists have left us with the disturbing realisation that the West is also a vacuum, that everywhere is "empty" and that morality is eventually a

wasteland. However, a world without ethics and ideologies leaves power without a rationale. Ultimately thus what remains is the logic of war (Hoppers and Richards, 2011). Nevertheless, this does not make ethics any less important. Instead, when old ideologies wane, ethics, of necessity, become *more* important. Every problem is a problem of human action and therefore an ethical problem. However, whereas in the past we could base our ethics on what we believed were solid foundations, on certainty, such as the Church, tradition or faith in a utopia, today ethics have become far less certain and far more complex. In other words, all we are left with is the lesson that ethics is not accompanied by any certainty.

Nevertheless, as will be explored in this chapter, this is not weakness but strength. Firstly, it is strength because we are more intelligent than we were before we read post-modern authors, such as Foucault, in the sense that we have come to realise where such sources are more *unlikely* to be found and that moral responsibility is not necessarily assured by blindly following the rules. In fact, it may often require us to disregard the rules or to act in a way not warranted by the rules. Secondly, it is strength because we are now able to move swiftly from a philosophy that seeks to fight uncertainty to one that seeks to preserve it. Thirdly, as the West no longer has any monopoly in defining what ethics is, and thus it is no longer possible for us define ethics as a Western tradition and we must define it as a human capacity, we may now, with full jurisdiction, include previously the excluded alternatives rooted in non-Western traditions such as indigenous knowledge systems.

8.1 Ethics in a hermeneutical perspective

It is against the background of these three points that we seek advice from the tradition of hermeneutics, or the art of understanding the understanding. Only an “implicit” theory, the intention of which is to unfold our own tendency to prescribe certainties about moral life, could be trusted in order to re-open the lost ethical conceptions of the world. Hermeneutics paves the way for such a process by indicating that the rejection of any previously stated rules and theories must be the starting point for the work of acknowledging the Other as a person, and that the consciousness of the presence of the Other is the prototype for all authentic communication between human beings.

We will now examine some of these perspectives that, despite the fact that they seem to be somewhat apart from the main ethical tradition, do still appear to represent reflections of our time, thereby actualising the discussion of *our* moral duty – including our problematic relationship with the modern tradition of ethics – when confronted with the problem of colonialism and the challenge of making possible a genuine long-term recovery from it.

8.1.1 Heidegger and Buber

Heidegger exhibited a strong resistance to the abstract epistemological position that neither utilitarian nor Kantian ethics completely managed to extricate itself from namely, the Cartesian grounded, cogito-experience "I-think", the subject of which is without residence in the human "life world"³⁴ (Heidegger, 1927). Heidegger's critique of the Cartesian subject who is removed from its life world supports our own critique of both utilitarianism and Kantian ethics which, in the name of rationality, shorten our moral engagement to a uniquely "freely floating" knowingness. Heidegger's assertion is that the principle for understanding human beings as moral creatures must be sought in the structure of care ("Sorge"). This structure existed prior to the scientific conception of the world which merely defines things as in relation to the person who *uses* these things. However, it is not possible to understand human beings "things" as such a vision abbreviates the distinctiveness of the human being-in-the-world: Man is an object itself and, to quote Kant, has "inner" dignity and value, which is not measurable by referring to something outside of Man himself. In addition, according to Heidegger, this dignity may be uncovered only through a consciousness of the lifeworld which human beings "inhabit".

Kant claimed that the dignity of Man comprises primarily his humanity: You shall never treat the Other as a means, for example, by indoctrinating him with your own affiliations but by respecting the Other's integrity. Heidegger's concern is that our modern scientification of the human life world represents a serious threat to the relationship to the Other, and emphasises that each person is responsible for searching for the meaning of life in the unfolding of their own particular behaviour. According to Heidegger (1927), our technological rationality *reifies* Man and

³⁴ The word "lifeworld" is translated from Edmund Husserl's original; "lebenswelt" from *Die Krise der Europäischen Wissenschaften* (1936). It became a key word for later phenomenologist such as Heidegger and Habermas.

displaces the consciousness of our own freedom. This model of explanation applies particularly within modern institutions, with Heidegger (1927) seeming to imply that our own cultural institutions totally alienate Man from himself. From this perspective ethical attitudes today would comprise becoming aware of our civilisation's alienating pressure that systematically demolishes both authentic life form as well as the relationship existing between people at the pre-scientific, non-objectifying level of reality.

Martin Buber (1965, 1970) alludes to Heidegger's (1927) moral concern related to the scientification of our life world. Buber's I-Thou philosophy is based on the notion that the I-Thou relation is substantially different from the I-It relation. The self establishes an I-It relationship with non-human things and, within this relationship, one "decays" to a pure scientific controlling mastery of the human life world. The problem is, however, that the I-It relationship transmits into the structure of concrete interpersonal relations with the Thou becomes an "It". The self's superior constituting of its surroundings as objects through an I-It-relation reaches its limits when faced with the other person as a Thou. The alternative is, according to Buber (1970), to oppose this objectification by replacing monologue relationships with *dialogue* relationships.

8.1.2 Sartre and the return to the stream of life

Against this background, a dialogue with Sartre is possible insofar as the uncompromising experience of Man's freedom also plays a central role in Sartre's ethical position (Sartre, 1943). According to Sartre, there is a fundamental difference between things that "rest" in themselves and are without "flaws", without "absence" thus without non-being. Things are being-in-itself ("l'être-en-soi") in direct contrast with the human being-for-itself ("pour soi"). Thus, Sartre stresses that the particularity of the human being-in-the-world exists in terms of the "imaginary", that is, what is *not*. It is this way that we live through expectation, longing and "draft", thus implying that our life project consists in relating to various phenomena that may be characterised in terms of their "negativity" or "absence" (Nerheim, 1991).

It is exactly at this point that non-being presents itself on the horizon of the human expectation. By refusing to accept and constantly going beyond the given or factual circumstances (transcendence), one imbues *nothingness* (a deficiency, an absence)

within the frame of what is. Man is not a totality but is always in the process of totalisation. In this way, Sartre establishes a space for human action where we relate to ourselves by transcending our factual given circumstances. According to Sartre, by doing so my actual self belongs to the past and, thereby, to something to which no longer is. I relate to myself in my very being-to-myself, thus implying that the very existence of being human consists in *consciousness*. Thus, we are able to see that the being-for-itself becomes being simply by negating being by separating itself from and placing itself away from it. The for-itself is therefore a being of nothingness and nothingness constitutes its very essence (Sartre, 1943, p. 18). In other words, I am not only what I am, but I relate constantly to this existence in terms of a *distance*. Being is therefore *freedom*, states Sartre. Freedom is provided by man's relation to him/herself and thus freedom is factuality. To be a conscious subject means to be placed constantly before a future.

This means that the consequence of existence comes before essence. Consequently, man creates him/herself and carries the full responsibility for his/her existence. The ambiguity of the situation in which man exists is a result of the play between transcendence and the factuality, thus implying that man is capable of *choosing* oneself, but also becomes a victim of a fundamental self-deception (*mauvaise foi*). According to Sartre (1943), the central context for our fundamental moral position is the "incompleteness" related to choice and decision, and thus action in the *situation*.

In this way, Sartre's analysis of the gaze of others contributes to the establishment of an ethics of situation. This analysis reveals that others have the capacity to negate my existence, for example, through their eyes. Sartre found that, through his eyes, the other person makes me an object and, thus, I may bring myself to become ashamed of my previously helpless action: I blush under the gaze of others. At the same time, this objectification from the other person is necessary to make me aware of my own humanity, and to accept myself as a creature capable of experiencing shame and guilt.

Both Heidegger and Sartre stress the importance of making authenticity fundamental to moral freedom. Even if Heidegger tends to overlook the social aspect of the moral community, both he and Sartre communicate the importance of identifying a personal

momentum of fervent exploration that cannot be diminished by sociality and therefore liberates man from the clutches of human predicament.

8.1.3 Hannah Arendt and the hermeneutics of political judgement

Hannah Arendt (1951) was later to contribute to the building of a hermeneutical moral subject. Her focus was on the challenge of political judgement in a world where the steady foundation of experiential and institutional worlds that had previously provided a committed setting in which human beings could organise their political life had dissolved. For Arendt, this aporia of political judgement reached a crisis point in the 20th century under the repeated impact of the monstrous and unprecedented events of this century. Arendt writes that "the European tradition lies in shattered fragments around us and the very framework within which understanding and judging could arise is gone" (Arendt, 1982, p. 385). It appeared thus that the shared bases of understanding, handed down to us in our tradition, were irretrievably lost.

Arendt saw in this the last hope of morality and, for her, the only realistic, however tenuous, strategy to recover for morality the ground from which it had been exiled. She believed "that human beings be capable of telling right from wrong even if all they have to guide them is their own judgement, which, moreover, happens to be completely at odds with what they must regard as the unanimous opinion of all around them..." (Arendt, 1963, p. 27). In doing this, she wrote, "there are no rules to abide by ... as there are no rules for the unprecedented" (op. cit.). This means, she concluded, "that no one else but the moral persons themselves must take responsibility for their own moral responsibility" (op. cit.).

It is thus at this point that Arendt (1951) turns to hermeneutics and the premise that the basis of any judgment consists in bringing the new, the unexpected and the unanticipated into the world. To emphasise this hermeneutic quality of action means to open up the horizon of judgement by constantly threatening its validity and, by doing so, exceed our existing categories of understanding or judgement – precedents and rules cannot help us judge properly what is unprecedented and new. Therefore, for Arendt, our categories and standards of thought are always beset by their potential *inadequacy* with respect to that upon which they are called to judge.

"Determinate judgement", judgement that subsumes particulars under a universal or rule that already exists, is therefore a fiction that must be challenged. If we are to judge then, she states, "it must now be without preconceived categories and without the set of customary rules which is morality; it must be "thinking without a banister" (Arendt, 2018). At this point, Arendt alludes to Kant's account of reflective judgement, namely, the judgement of a particular for which no rule or precedent exists but for which some judgement must, nevertheless, be arrived at. Arendt (1982) was convinced that, when we judge, we experience the world as common to all of us because the prerequisite for judging is imagination and imagination helps to develop representative thinking, a "broadened way of thinking" or "enlarged mentality". This is opposite to "solitary thinking" and its ethical implications (the exemplary story of what can happen if one does not think) is, in Arendt's view, Adolf Eichmann (Arendt, 1963).

For Arendt, this enlarged mentality may best be captured by story-telling. She believed that story-telling nourishes our faculty of imagination in terms of preparing us to "go visiting", by bridging time and space, thereby exercising our ability to view from a position different from our own (Arendt, 1982). Going visiting means to exercise one's own ethical imagination capacities by always embracing the new and unexpected in the world. Thus, stories, she concludes, will not only expand our own view, they will also nourish our need of feeling at *home in the world*, thereby counteracting the threat of world alienation (Arendt, 1951).

8.1.4 Hermeneutics and the perception problem

By abstracting from the works of Heidegger, Buber, Sartre and Arendt, ethics is subjected to the basic hermeneutical concern, namely, the rejection of any precedents, rules and principles must be the starting point of any contact and communication between human beings. Hermeneutics thus contests modernity's reason-guided society and re-establishes the *relation* to the other person as the fundamental position for all contact and communication between human beings. Based on the premise of hermeneutics, we may not reduce our moral engagement one-sidedly to "free" or abstract knowledge as in the example suggested by Kant. It is not possible to understand or manipulate human beings as "things": Such a vision abbreviates the distinctiveness of the human being-in-the-world. Human beings

possess intrinsic value – a value that is not measurable by referring to something outside of human beings themselves. This omission may be disguised only by the near consciousness of the life worlds which human beings “inhabit” (Heidegger, 1927).

It is exactly at this point, in the dawn of uncertainty of what we may possibly know, that hermeneutics becomes a tool for releasing the gridlock in which our moral capacity is trapped. Hermeneutics defines uncertainty not as a temporary nuisance, which may be banished by either learning the rules, surrendering to expert advice, or just doing what others do. Instead, hermeneutics defines uncertainty as a permanent condition of life. It is the very soil in which the moral self takes root and grows. Choices are, indeed, choices and this means each choice is, to some extent, arbitrary and that uncertainty as to its propriety is likely to linger long after the choice has been made. It is only such a decision of responsibility that transforms the citizen into a basis on which may be built a human community which is sufficiently resourceful and thoughtful to cope with the present challenges. Hermeneutics thus confronts us with an important indispensability, namely, that ethical reflection is possible only on the premise that you *have* a world (Arendt, 1958). Ethics without hermeneutics runs the danger of proving to blind.

8.2 The Other – according to Levinas

“The other is hell”, says the character Garcin towards the end of the play *Behind Closed Doors* by Jean-Paul Sartre. This statement echoes Sartre’s philosophical conclusion in his opus magnum, *Being and Nothingness*, from 1943. However, according to the Lithuanian philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, Sartre draws his conclusion too early. The Other is the greatest gift to the Self, and not what threatens to annul it. Jacques Derrida alludes to Levinas’ motif when, in his work, *Violence and Metaphysics* (1963), he proposes that Levinas gives us not an ethics but “an Ethics of ethics” (p. III). An ethics of ethics retains a certain distance to the mastery of moral principles and the inculcation of virtues.

Unlike the Kantian and Utilitarian traditions, but in line with, for example, the African philosophy of *ubuntu*, Levinas expresses the notion that ethics arises in *the relation to the other person* and not by a reference to the universality of a law. For Levinas, the “relation” to the other man as unique – and in this way, precisely, as absolutely

other – would be, here, the first significance of the meaningful” (Levinas, 2001, p. 1). Then, the importance of the relation to the other man as the incomparable, as emptied of all “social role” and who thus “in his nudity – his destitution, his morality – straightaway imposes himself upon my responsibility: goodness, mercy, or charity. This nudity, which is a call, – an appeal but also, an *imperative* – Levinas names *face* (Robbins 2001, p. 115). The face expresses nudity and vulnerability. The occupation of the face, the signification of the face of the Other, is signification in itself. The face is immediately ethical! Thus, ethics begins in the silent challenge of the Other and in my dedicated, yet selfless, responsibility. In this decision of subjectivity, the “I” always has one responsibility more than all others. In an interview with Francois Poirié, Levinas stated:

“One must yield to the Other the first place in everything. From the “après vous” before the open door right up to the disposition – hardly possible, but holiness demands it – to die for the Other. In this attitude of holiness, there is a reversal of the normal order of things, the natural order of things, the persistence in being.” (Robbins, 2001, p. 1)

According to Levinas, I am responsible for a total responsibility, which answers for all the others and for all in the others, even for their responsibility. This message springs out of famous sentence in Dostoyevsky’s *The Brothers Karamazov*: “We are all guilty for all and for all men before all, and I more than the others” (Dostoyevsky, 1957, p. 146). The Russian novelists unquestionably represent sound preparation for Levinas. In Dostoyevsky’s *Crime and Punishment*, we are introduced to this ethical orientation by the character Sonia (Sofya Semyonovna Marmeladov).

For Levinas, Sonia’s orientation indicates a trust outside of self toward the other than self. Sonia’s orientation is a “*movement of the Same toward the Other that never returns to the Same*”, and becomes, to employ Levinas’ terminology, *infinity* (Levinas, 2003, p. 26). Raskolnikov (the utilitarian agent) here represents the opposite orientation, the “*movement of the Same toward the Other that always returns to the Same*” (Levinas, 2003, p. 27). According to Levinas, this philosophy “still follows the path of Ulysses whose adventure in the world was nothing but a return to his native island – self-complacency, complacency in the Same, misunderstanding of the Other” (op. cit.), and it becomes what Levinas terms a *totality*.

Dostoyevsky (1985) described this totality – the belief that man may be made fully transparent – the “Western propaganda”. The allergy towards the Other or, more precisely, restricted “Otherness”³⁵, of which Raskolnikov is the image here, is according to Levinas, a violent core of Western philosophy that the West never has managed to de-disguise. Levinas (2003) states:

“The Work thought all the way through demands a radical generosity of movement which in the Same goes toward the Other. It demands, consequently, ingratitude from the Other. Because gratitude would, in fact, be the return of the movement to its origin. The Work is a relation with the Other who is reached without showing that he is touched. It is traced outside the “morose delectation” in failure and consolations by which Nietzsche defines Christianity.” (p. 27)

This highlights an essential point in Levinas’ philosophy. To be *for* a time that would be without me, *for* a time after my time, is not a banal strophe in our thinking that extrapolates our own duration and, instead, it is a passage to the time of the Other (Levinas, 2003, p. 28). This transition, from the self who thinks that the world is for him, to a self that is *for* a time after his time, is also a sacrifice.

8.2.1 *Desire for the invisible*

Levinas’ concept of the Other shows that ethics, understood as responsibility for the Other, stand prior to all philosophy’s search for knowledge. Ethics should not be grounded ontologically as, for example, Heidegger proposes but, instead, ontology should be grounded ethically (Levinas, 2003, p. 17). Levinas’ decision of responsibility to the Other is pre-ontological, prior to every meeting with beings in the world, even prior to the self’s freedom and therefore also prior to all decisions, promises and choices one may make. Levinas places favour before dialogue, care prior to philosophy. By focusing on the Other, he claims an ethical imperative. His

³⁵ The term “Otherness” is to describe the characteristics of the Other, the state of being different from and alien to the social identity of a person and to the identity of the Self. The condition of Otherness is also understood as the condition of disenfranchisement (political exclusion), effected either by the State or by the social institutions invested with the corresponding socio-political power (Bullock et.al., 1999, p. 620).

thoughts bear testimony to a world that is enriched ethically. When Levinas speaks about what defines our relation to others, he starts with the experience of the face of the Other. The Other appears to us as a face. This access to the face of the Other is immediately ethical. But what does this actually mean?

We may start by explaining what Levinas describes as the “Being’s other”. The event of being, the *esse*, the essence, passes in Levinas’ philosophy over to what is other than being. It is the transcendence that is passing over to the being’s other, other than Being.³⁶ This does not mean to be otherwise but, instead, otherwise than being.³⁷ The meeting with the face of the Other as an aesthetical “touch”, the “touch-ability” of the face of the Other, has nothing to do with causality or sign systems; the face is “traces” beyond Being (Levinas, 1993a, p. 159).³⁸ The responsibility for the Other, is according to Levinas (1993a), “the locus in which is situated the null-site of subjectivity, where the privilege of the question “Where?” no longer holds. The face is without context” (p. 100). However, the “touch-ability” of the face has significance in itself. For Levinas, the experience of the face is anarchical, prior to or beyond essence, and appears like the responsibility for the Other.³⁹ According to Levinas, the responsibility for the Other cannot have begun in my obligation, in my choice. Levinas writes: “The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself comes from the hither side of my freedom, from a prior to every memory, an ulterior to every accomplishment, from the non-present par excellence” (Levinas, 1991, p. 3).

8.2.2 The curvature of intersubjective space

In contrast to the majority ethicists, who fixate on the notion of symmetry in the interpersonal space, Levinas describes an asymmetric, non-mutual, grounded responsibility. For Levinas, it is important to break with the notion of symmetry as the ultimate virtue of how to position us in relation to others. The asymmetric decision of ethical responsibility predates an ethics where the Other has precedence, priority of

³⁶ Levinas insists that “transcendence” indicates a movement of crossing over (*trans*), but also of ascent (*scando*). See E. Levinas, *Alterity and Transcendence*, (1999), p. ix.

³⁷ The humanity in historical and objective being, the very breakthrough of the subjective, of the human psychism in its original vigilance or sobering up, is being which undoes its condition of being: dis-inter-*estedness*.

³⁸ This is Plato’s classical transcendence statement; “epikeina tesousias”. It should not be forced into Heidegger’s interpretation of “being as transcending the being”.

³⁹ This is subjectivity’s first, decisive and fundamental structure.

self and precedence to the being-for-my-self. This asymmetric responsibility already occurs in the mother-child relation. The mother gives and cares without any demand for retribution. Levinas claims that the Self's ethical responsibility for the Other may never rely on others for retribution. To claim such a return as a premise for responsibility means leaving responsibility to some sort of negotiation or bargaining. This would endanger responsibility and make it relative to something else other than what it is. Levinas claims that responsibility is something that is absolute, free of terms and often without any yields. The logic of retribution forces the Other to act in a certain manner, to trip it into betrayal, not for the sake of others but for the sake of oneself. In this sense, it is limited by the limits of the "I". Hence, it is "closed". Levinas' Self is not in nominative, but in accusative, as the "prosecuted" part, prosecuted by the Other prior to every chance of allowing the Other. Levinas states:

"No one can take my place when I am the one responsible: I cannot shrink before the other man, I am / by way of that uniqueness. I am / as if I had been chosen." (Levinas, 1993b, p. 35)

This means that the Other has chosen me before I can describe it. I am bound to it prior to any connection. The Other takes command of me before he is recognised by me. The Other takes the role of the speaker, prosecuting me from the podium understood as need, nakedness and vulnerability. I am the passive audience (Vetlesen, 1996, p. 35). This asymmetry is, at large, an ethical storytelling. The subject is not in itself active, because it has no access to the decision of releasing itself from prosecution. Thus, when the Self is understood as the Other's hostage, the meaning of the Self is: Here I am, I am responsible for everything and everyone, and me more than anyone else. I am responsible for a *total* responsibility, which answers for all the others and for all in the others, even for their responsibility. The "I" always has one responsibility more than all the others (Levinas, 1991). In this relation with others, peace operates instead of violence, trust instead of mistrust. The face expresses non-violence, because, instead of assaulting my liberty, it calls for my freedom to take responsibility, to give it a task and reflect upon it.

Furthermore, Levinas points out that, when we understand something based on ourselves, we take it into the *totality* we have created of the world. Just when I think that I have understood the Other, I make it my own, dress it/him/her in my clothes,

manipulate it to something I am in position to and can *control* (Levinas, 1991).⁴⁰ In Levinas' critique of totality there is a reference to the history of philosophy. According to Levinas, the history of thought "appears as a movement going forth from a world that is familiar to us, whatever be the yet unknown lands that bound it or that it hides from view, from an "at home" which we inhabit, toward an alien outside-of-oneself, toward a yonder" (Levinas, 1991, p. 33). For Levinas, this history may be understood as "an attempt at universal synthesis, a reduction of all experience, of all that is reasonable, to a totality wherein consciousness embraces the world, leaves nothing beside itself outside, and thus becomes absolute though. The consciousness of self is at the same time the consciousness of the whole" (op. cit.).

There have been few protests in the history of philosophy against this totalisation. Levinas argued that it is precisely this outwardly directed but self-centred totalistic thinking that organises men and things into power systems and gives us control over nature and people. Hence, it has dominated the course of human history (Levinas, 1991). In fact, it represents the entire trend of Western philosophy, culminating in the philosophy of, for example, Hegel's system *The Phenomenology of Mind* (1910), which, for very good reasons, may appear as the culmination of philosophy itself (Levinas, 2003). From this point, only the neutral and impersonal, *Being*, for example, are important. "What is it?" is the most basic question that requires an answer in terms of a context, a *system*. Levinas recognises this nostalgia for totality everywhere in Western philosophy, where the spiritual and the reasonable always reside in knowledge. "It is as if the totality had been lost, and that this loss was the sin of the mind" (Levinas, 1991, p. 6). Ontologically, "You" are "You", and "I" am "I". We may possibly live with each other, whereupon the word "with" marks both distance and proximity. Ontologically, we are reduced to the Same, striving monads on our own.

8.2.3 The difference between need and desire

According to Levinas, the irreducible and ultimate experience of relationship appears, in fact, to be elsewhere than in knowledge: not in synthesis, but in the face to face of humans, in sociality, in its moral signification. Levinas speaks of "a desire without

⁴⁰ Levinas is here including Gadamer's hermeneutical concepts of prejudgement and pre-understanding as the expression of the intentional subject.

deficiency”, and refers it to Plato’s analysis of pure pleasures, where he finds aspiration conditioned by no prior need. Levinas’ breach with the ego-centred Self relates to his reflections on the difference between need and desire. He writes,

“To a subject turned in on itself and characterised, according to the Stoicist expression, by (oupun) or the tendency to persist in its being or, according to Heidegger’s formulation, “one whose existence is an issue for that existence itself”, to a subject who so defines himself by concern for self and who, in happiness, fulfils his *for-himself*, we oppose the Desire of the Other that proceeds from a being already satisfied and, in that sense, independent, and who does not desire for himself. Need of someone who has no more needs, recognized in the need of an Other who is Others, who is no (as in Hobbes and Hegel) my enemy, and not my “complement” as he remains in Plato’s *Republic*, constituted because something is lacking in the subsistence of each individual.” (Levinas, 2003, p. 29)

In the Levinasian turn, “the Desire for Others sociality arises in a being who lacks nothing or, more exactly, arises beyond all that could be lacking or satisfying in him” (Levinas, 2003, p. 29). I emphasise that Levinas’ concept of desire refers to an *insatiable* desire or compassion, not an *inexhaustible* desire. He states: “The Desirable does not satisfy my Desire, it hollows me, nourishing me somehow with new hungers”. Again, the link to Dostoyevsky is indulgent. In *Crime and Punishment*, where Dostoyevsky describes Sonia Marmeladova looking with “insatiable compassion” at Raskolnikov in his despair. Raskolnikov does not say “inexhaustible compassion”. As if the compassion that goes from Sonia to Raskolnikov were a hunger that Raskolnikov’s presence nourished beyond all saturation, by increasing that hunger, infinitely (Levinas, 2003, p. 30).

According to Levinas (2003), the desire for others, which we feel in the most common social experience, is fundamental movement, pure transport, absolute orientation, sense. This desire is never satisfied; it is insatiable, and it feeds on itself.

Levinas therefore posits metaphysics as desire. He describes desire as “the ‘measure’ of the infinite which no term, no satisfaction arrests (Desire opposed to Need)” (Levinas, 2003, p. 30). In positing metaphysics as desire, the production of

being is goodness and goes beyond happiness; Levinas interprets the production of being as "being for the Other". However, the "face to face is not a modality of coexistence nor even of the knowledge one term can have of another but is the primordial production of being on which all the possible collocations of the term are founded" (op. cit.).

According to Levinas (1991) only an "I" may respond to the injunction of a face because "the "I" is conserved in goodness, without its resistance to system manifesting itself as the egoist cry of the subjectivity, still concerned for happiness or salvation, as in Kierkegaard. To posit being as Desire is to decline the ontology of *isolated subjectivity* and the ontology of impersonal reason realising itself in history".

As I understand it, the fundamental difference between the totalisers and the infinitisers is therefore between the modes of thought. The former tries to gather all things around the mind, or self, of the thinker, while the latter is an externally oriented mode that attempts to penetrate into that which is radically other than the mind that is thinking it. This difference emerges with peculiar clarity in the case of my meeting with the other person. I may either decide to remain within myself, assimilating the other person and trying to speak and to give to him/her or I may satisfy my needs more adequately by keeping to myself and the members of the in-group with which I am identified, thus fulfilling a *need*. However, it is not the expression of a *desire* for that which transcends my self-centred categories and me (Levinas, 1991).

To the infinitisers, however, the totalisation appears to be like a partial and biased doctrine. Levinas (1991) writes:

"Systematic thinking, no doubt, has its place. It is required for the establishment of those power structures that satisfy necessary needs. But when absolutised and applied to free men, it constitutes violence, which is not merely found in temporary and accidental displays of armed force, but in the permanent tyranny of power systems that free men should resist." (p. 6)

Slavery and colonialism are the neutral, the impersonal over the active and personal. Levinas (1991):

“In a living dialogue and even in a written monologue of many volumes it is often more important to find out who is speaking and why, than merely to know what is said. We do not need to know the other person as he is in himself, and we shall never know him apart from acting with him (he-she-it or just it, perhaps, neutral and universal). But unless we desire this, and go on trying, we will never escape from the subjectivism of our systems and the objects that they bring before us to categorise and manipulate. We do not get rid of our thoughts and feelings by ignoring them or by any other means. But we may seek to *transcend* them.” (p. 7)

8.2.4 The ethical relation and time

Levinas uses two histories to emphasise the contrast between totality and infinity, need and desire. The first is the history of Odysseus who, during his journeys is all the time driven back to his native island, Ithaca. Levinas also uses the story of Abraham as a contrast. Abraham leaves his native land for a yet unidentified land, and even forbids his servants to bring his son when the journey starts (Levinas, 2008). These narratives refer to the two different philosophies of the Self, Odysseus the first, and Abraham the second. Odysseus represents the totalisers, whereas Abraham represents the infinitisers. Levinas’ example of Odysseus represents a main critique with which Levinas confronts Western philosophy. This Self that always turns back to the Same, circles around its narrow self, compliance and self-compliance but, also in a more fundamental way, as the alienation of the Self’s identity. Levinas (2003) clarifies that:

“Sense as the liturgical orientation of the work does not proceed from need. Need opens onto a world that is for me; it returns to self. Even when it is sublime, like the need for salvation, it is still nostalgia, homesickness. Need is precisely *return*, the Ego’s anxiety for self, egoism, the original form of identification, assimilation of the world in view of coincidence with self, in view of happiness.” (p. 29)

This philosophy of the Self, which Odysseus presents, is, according to Levinas, egoism. It describes the old Hobbesian system, every person for himself.

Fundamentally this is a critique of Western thinking and culture and a structure which the West never has transcended. Abraham, on the other hand, represents a different image, that is, the other philosophy of the Self. Levinas is here referring to Descartes' notion of infinity, namely, a thought, which thinks more than a thought, a self that transcends itself (Levinas, 2003). One's desire of the Being's other, the insurgency in the consciousness of the Other's other, "overflows" the Self. The Self is being deluged by the other in the Other. Levinas is, however, not able to explain responsibility. When responsibility occurs, the Self moves outside what is thinkable, outside its own entrepreneurial logic of existence.⁴¹ Just when I think I am able to explain responsibility, it ceases to be what it is. This transcendence is in the picture of Abraham.

This may also be considered as a question of trust. To turn back to the Same means divesting one's responsibility for the Other. However, by "trust", Levinas is not referring to self-confidence but to having confidence in the Other. The latter is more fundamental than the self-confidence. The nature of selflessness – diametrically opposite to selfishness – becomes particularly apparent in its effect on others and, most frequently, in our culture, in the effect the "unselfish" mother has on her children (Levinas, 2003). She believes that by her unselfishness her children will experience what it means to be loved and to learn, in turn, what it means to love. The transcendence that Abraham represents is therefore clearly illustrated with the child – the way in which the child lays his/her life in the hand of the Other (Løgstrup, 1958). To be future-oriented in this context means to be open towards, to completely trust the Other.

The ethical challenge is always the lack of openness, prejudgment, and insusceptibility. As I understand, the ethical dimension becomes more accessible when we try to see *the other in the Other*. The other in the Other is something different, unique, something inaccessible in the Other but also something we should try to include. It is vulnerable, strange and defenceless. The other in the Other expresses: "Do not kill me!" This is the resistance of what has no resistance – the ethical resistance! The grasp, or desire for the other in the Other, is, in this sense, a deep recognition of diversity. It makes possible the pluralism of society. However, it must be understood that morality comes not as secondary layer, above an abstract

⁴¹ This may be Plato's *epekeina nou*, beyond thought, from Plato's *Parmenides*.

reflection on the totality and its dangers, as morality has an independent and preliminary range. Ethics is 1. philosophy.

8.3 Hospitality and fundamental ethics

What presents itself in Levinas' phenomenological analysis is an alternative to mainstream thinking that does not depend on accepting Western traditions. For Levinas, ethics is something that appears when standing face-to-face with another human being. Levinas calls this meeting with the other an "event", a fundamental event and, therein, the term "fundamental ethics". It is the "fundamental" about the event that makes it possible to speak of it as an "event". And, the fundamental about this event is deeply human, bringing us in touch with our humanity. For Levinas, being human means being-for (not merely being-aside or even being-with) the other person. In addition, this being-for is unconditional (that is, if it is to be moral, not merely contractual) – it does not depend on what the other person is, or does, whether s/he deserves my care or repays in kind (Levinas, 1991).

As opposed to today's dominant ethics, the face of the Other mobilises neither a dialogue nor a Me-You-relationship. Instead, the face connects me more radically to the Other in a pre-dialogical, pre-ontological relationship, which is, according to Levinas, the actual foundation for justice. It is only through such an aesthetical-ethical experience, that I may grasp individuality prior to Being, which places ethics as 1. Philosophy. In this decision, care runs prior to understanding and ethics before hermeneutics. In this decision, understanding is given a preliminary task, namely, a task that requires of hermeneutics to be more than what it is, to go beyond its epistemic horizon, to take responsibility. By entering into the philosophy of Levinas, we may conclude that hermeneutics without ethics is empty.

8.3.1 *Ubuntu and Sami hospitality*

Derrida (1978) speaks of Levinas' ethics as an "ethics of hospitality". It is the hospitality that enables us to "visit" others. The hospitality states: "Welcome in!" Using an image from Greek mythology, we could say that it was the hospitality that protected Odysseus on his journey back to Ithaca (Kapusinsky, 2006).

One of the meanings of *ubuntu* in the African language is "free", thus meaning "given without charge". In other words, one receives something without paying for it or one gives something without being paid. It is in the story of the English explorer, David Livingstone, that he travelled across Africa without starving because everywhere he went the people gave him food. This was an expression of hospitality and with such hospitality being an expression *ubuntu*. Hospitality was a natural part of the *ubuntu* custom and the people treated Livingstone in the same way in which they treated everyone else. The ethics of hospitality was integrated into their basic cultural structure and they simply assimilated the traveller into their already existing. This *ubuntu* structure organised their livelihoods (Hoppers and Richards, 2011).

The *ubuntu* philosophy is useful in understanding the Sami tradition of ethics. In Anders Larsen's book, *Om Sjøsamene (About the Sea Sami)* we come to know the Sea Sami customs in respect of openness and hospitality. For example, there were customs related to the fact that Samis left their houses unlocked. It was common to carry out practical jokes by visiting each other's houses while they were not there, rearranging items or leaving gifts to be discovered at strange places in the house (Larsen, 2014).

The example may be witty but it presents a positive image of Sami hospitality with unlocked doors as an expression of openness and a sincere trust in the other person. The door was never locked and the Other was trusted. An open home was a statement to the Other. This hospitality is an image of the Other in Sami culture.

This could also be seen in the *siida* system – the complex sharing of the reindeer pasture districts. The *siida* system also had a spiritual dimension in the sense that each *siida* (a family or a group of families) saw themselves as knit together by an invisible "net". Each person was a stitch in the net and each *siida* was a knot in the net. Each decision and every movement of the *siida*, every individual action within the *siida* group, had an impact on the net. Every person was connected to each other person through this "hidden" moral codex. As I understand it, this hidden area upon which the *siida*-culture was established points to a deeper understanding of the Other as "the Other in me" with the Other in me representing the "silence", the hidden world of morality on which the *siida*-culture was grounded. To the extent that one was able to access this dimension, it was silent.

For Levinas, the metaphysics of hospitality consists in being "an other for the Other". This was also a point made by Gadamer: "We need to experience the Other as the other in ourselves to be able to take part in each others' lives" (Gadamer, 1991, p. 48). Gadamer (1991) developed this point with a reference to the classical Greek language which does not distinguish between "the one and the other" (me and the other) but insists on "the other and the other" (the other's other). The same applies in the Sami language.

Thus, what is being suggested here is that the ethics of hospitality organised the basic cultural structure of the old Sami people. They had a system in place. This system was based on trust with the old Sami people cooperating for mutual and equal benefit. The metaphysics of hospitality establishes a deep culture of the unity of human beings and a deep culture of partnership with nature, thus leading to harmony. In addition, a high level of harmony allows an ethics of hospitality. It was, of course, not a world without conflicts, arguments, disagreements, violent means and feuds, but there were never any wars. The impairment of the battlefield was minimal. The impairment of the environment was minimal. The Sami had developed a tradition of solving conflicts non-violently and thus the level of violence and trauma was kept at a minimum and there was nothing that could not be repaired, healed and/or rebalanced. The siida system ensured that everybody was included. In other words, the ethics at work served as cultural peace.

8.3.2 Sami hospitality and colonialism

However, the moment that one is not an other for the Other, then hospitality runs out. The system of trust breaks down and thus the net no longer functions and is unbalanced. This is also the truth about the metaphysics of hospitality. The ethics of hospitality is therefore very vulnerable. In fact, it consists through vulnerability. Accordingly, if the ethics of hospitality were pivotal for the basic cultural structure of the Sami culture, then it was the ethics of the Sami peoples that made them vulnerable to newcomers – outsiders who arrived with no understanding of the ethical systems already in place. Væelkeapää portrays this in his book *Nu guhkkinn dat mii lahka (So far the near)* from 1994:

we have lived here,
from generation to generation

[...]
but when

they
come
they find
this land, us
[...]
and they walk through us
without seeing, like you see

The net is overlooked. The world of the Other is suddenly no longer important. The indigenous way is disregarded. The hospitality is under severe strain. The net is unbalanced. One is no longer an other for the Other. This loss of hospitality leads to worry and doubt – one is no longer welcome. The other person has betrayed your trust.

This is one way in which to understand colonialism. In this context, colonialism means to understand the Other from the position of Self and thus it may mean to misread the Other, to abuse and take advantage of the hospitality of the Other. This is not a banal problem. The entire apparatus of the Sami culture depends on resolving this problem of distrust. It requires that the metaphysics of hospitality be restored. How to get the other person, the outsider – who even sees himself as possessing the power, authority and right to administer the “right” understanding of the situation and who even sees himself as possessing the power to decide what is right and wrong – to view the situation from the perspective of the indigenous? This is the unresolved issue here, as well as in Væelkepää's *Trekways of the Wind*:

How can I explain
that I can not live in just one place
and still live
when I live
among all these tundras
You are standing in my bed
my privy is behind the bushes

the sun is my lamp
the lake my wash bowl

How can I explain
that my heart is my home
that it moves with me
How can I explain
that others live there too
my brothers and sisters

What shall I say sister
what shall I say brother

My home is in my heart
it migrates with me

You know it brother
you understand sister
but what do I say to strangers
who spread out everywhere
how shall I answer their questions
that come from a different world

They come to me
and show me books
Law books
that they have written themselves
This is the law and it applies to you too
See here

But I do not see brother
I do not see sister
I cannot
I say nothing
I only show them the tundra

This poem highlights some of the difficulties – what the outsiders found so difficult to understand – namely, the migrative sense of belonging which is not restricted to one place only, but to the entire area. All of this is part of Sami notion of *home*. However, it is the coloniser him/herself who decides the premise on which the situation is to be understood. It is the colonisers' own model that is used as a basis for understanding the Other. The voice of the writer tries to persuade his/her own people to realise that what they believe in and that the way in which they think is reasonable.

The attempts to explain fall short and communication breaks down. The arguments go nowhere. The newcomer will not understand. The cultural collision is a fact. Both the poems cited above portray the same communicative failure and the same hurtful undertone with the representative of the indigenous society having given up the right to land but still insisting on cultural and linguistic freedom.

However, at last, in a final attempt to explain, the Sami chooses not to speak. This is a crucial point in the work of interpretation. Are we not trying to understand the silence of the indigenous voice? Unlike the Norwegian tradition, in terms of which to remain silent denotes consent, the Sami tradition of silence denotes strong protest or disagreement ("I say nothing"). This protest is then followed up by a gesture only to underscore the main point, namely, the right to the land – "only show them the tundra". Thus, the invitation to "look" at the tundra involves more than merely pointing out that the tundra is there, instead it means to understand how important it is for the indigenous people – for their survival, affiliation, belonging and identity. In other words, what at first glance seems to be resignation and a defeat of a voice, is, in fact, actually strong opposition. Unlike words, it is not possible to turn around and manipulate the speech of silence.

If silence, inescapably, is a form of speech and that speech emerges as opposition, then this implies that the hermeneutics (the theory of understanding) at work also encapsulate a hidden world of resistance. This is little more than a purely epistemic exercise. A protest signifies that something is wrong. It is a clear statement, a pure appeal for change and transformation. The significance of silence as "protest" or "resistance" is an appeal to make wrongs *right*. This appeal begs hermeneutical reflection to become *praxis*.

8.3.3 Restoring the Other

When Levinas was asked to comment on the Israel-Palestine conflict, he said something strange, namely, that the solution to the conflict consisted in "releasing the hospitality of the placed". For a Sami reader, this would make perfect sense. For the reindeer herders, it was crucial to "accommodate the hospitality of the place". The tundra was filled with mythical and sacred places. The Sami followed signs in nature and made "sacrifices" at these sacred places (the "siedis"), for example, by leaving reindeer antlers or special rocks in prayer for good weather and good pastures. Today, there are still many taboos associated with these sites in nature. For example, one is not to speak aloud, not mention the name of the mountain and so on. Once again, the metaphysical codex is present with the experience of the sacred at stake. Nature is seen as something that has the sacred incarnated in it (Bäckmann, 1975). In common with, for example the Ancient Greeks, nature is seen as persons and persons as nature. In order to understand the sacred, one needs to understand what it means to be a guest (in nature or with another person). In other words, is important to accommodate the hospitality of the place.

This understanding of hospitality has been a central element in the ethics of the Euro-Arctic region for the last ten thousand years and reflects the basic function of Sami values and ethics, namely, to maintain the relationships that hold creation together. Even today, if you are fortunate enough to experience the tundra, you will realise that the custom is a living tradition. It may be misused and subjugated but it is *alive*. For the Sami people therefore healing from the colonial wounds and tensions may revolve around the process of restoration. From an ethical perspective, healing is the work of restoring the Other, restoring hospitality, restoring ethics, balancing the net and fixing broken relationships. The work of overcoming colonialism is, in the Sami sense, and, perhaps, also in the deepest sense, the struggle to be an other for the Other. In this context, although I hope at this point it would also make sense to, for example, an African reader, restorative action ultimately revolves around the restoration of the Other.

As I understand it, the struggle to maintain shared lives in the Barents Region is, in essence, the struggle to restore systems of trust and openness. The strength of this unity may be explained by examining ancient Sami systems of hospitality. By going to the roots, one may come to understand the entire Barents Region cooperation as

an initiative of restoring the indigenous systems of hospitality and trust. Recognising and appreciating this inspiration would help to rebuild broken relationships: Sami relationships, Non-Sami relationships, Sami and non-Sami relationships which are shared in some way. It is vital to heal these relations because they are a key to a more unified Barents Region and a more unified Europe and thus a more unified world.

8.4 Conclusion

The legacy of colonialism is complex, both for the colonised and the coloniser. However, it is imperative that this complexity, as a puzzle, is solved. Even without killing and physically injuring, the colonial war includes violence that annihilates persons by interrupting their continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer recognise themselves, making them betray not only their commitments but their own substance and making them carrying out actions that will destroy the possibility for action. Not only colonial violence but every violence employs arms that, ultimately, turn against those who wield them, establishing or reproducing a vertical order from which no one is able to keep his/her distance. Colonialism does not manifest exteriority and the Other as other, instead it distorts the identity of the Self. The peace of empires resulting from war rests on war. It does not restore to the alienated beings their lost identity.

How to restore the Other? On what alternative grounds may peace be achieved? There may be important clues to be found in the philosophy of, for example, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. However, the main ethical challenge within this particular context and problem area is not utilitarian, but something far more fundamental, namely, the work of re-establishing the esteem for the Other – the very basic condition of human community – in a context in which the respect for the others' intrinsic value, their dignity, their individual autonomy and, therein, their active participation in the world are under severe strain. In order to re-establish the esteem for the Other a primordial and original relation with being is needed.

The remote space that is devoted to this fundamental relation with the Other in the leading moral-philosophical discourse of today stresses the need to open up new “cognitive spaces” so that wisdom may flow more freely from the non-western traditions and make way for multi-directional flows of knowledge, thus expanding the

range of ethical rationality. It is at this point that we seek advice from hermeneutical theory and the art of understanding the understanding. Within this context, the priority of hermeneutics is to respond to the occlusion of the indigenous voice – a hermeneutics born out of pain but which, simultaneously, seeks to overcome that pain. By making a serious commitment to the work of inclusion and enlargement, one may bring forth new perspectives as a source of inspiration and creativity that will benefit us all.

In this thesis, there follows from this commitment the realisation that thinking and systems of thought organise social relationships and that to deny a people their own thinking is to undermine the social cohesion of these people. The ethics of healing and restorative action should therefore be marked by both a profound respect for the metaphysics of others and also the realisation that metaphysics is the matrix of both epistemology and ethics. This realisation would be an important step in the direction of re-opening the possibility of establishing an authentic space in which morality may evolve.

Chapter 9: Summary of conclusions and pathways to the future

9.1 Summary of conclusions

This study has explored conceptual and theoretical platforms for peace building and restorative action in the Barents Region by using development and the lessons drawn from it as a pedagogic field and human development as the goal. Based on Galtung's theory of peace, the study has approached the issue of peace building and restorative action by using the indigenous knowledge approach both as a way of uncovering the deeper mechanisms impeding for the task of decreasing negative peace energies (unsolved conflicts and unreconciled trauma) and as a way of expanding the positive peace energies (equity and empathy).

The study has taken as its point of departure the perception that the central negative peace energy at play is the historical antecedents of colonialism and the oppression of the Sami people, whereas the central positive peace energy is the historical antecedents of sustainable regional collaborations in the region. The study has presented a conceptual framework for approaching Galtung's four peace tasks by drawing particular attention to the pitfalls of development and therefore by necessity, the obligation to genuinely include the occluded voice in this process in the future.

After the introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 discussed the methodology best suited to the problem of the historical occlusion and silencing of the indigenous voice and concluded that the most appropriate strategy is a transdisciplinary outlook which includes the concept of peace and violence in combination with the methodology proposed of the SARCHI Chair and the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer. Chapter 3 outlined basic conceptual tools such as peace and violence, human development and restorative action. It consequently concluded that, by taking into consideration the methodological concerns that an in-depth diagnosis of the wounds and tensions arising from the traumatic experiences suffered as a result of the colonial conquest, by listening to the victims' narrative, is much needed in order to overcome the obstacles blocking the implementation of a far-reaching peace-building project. Chapter 4 explored these wounds by examining the history of colonialism in the Barents Region and concluding that, given the nature of the wrongdoings in this

Region, and its roots in imperial myths which are valorised and protected by certain scientific paradigms, the healing process would remain superficial unless the link between science and the series of oppressed “others” is brought to the fore and, to some extent, altered by scientific frameworks more significant to the peace process. In view of the history of colonialism and the unresolved issue of social justice and healing, this imperative also generates the need to revisit the moral-philosophical heritage accompanying modernity and examine, by closely investigating the constitutive rules, how to overcome the seated, and thus more invisible errors of thought blocking such a peace building process. Chapter 5 addressed this task by examining the philosophical origin of the mechanisms/thinking corresponding to the colonial conquest and concluded both that the moral-philosophical landscape is more stuck in the old Hobbesian system than what we would like it to be and that Western epistemic and ethical centrism must be rejected as a basis for an ongoing relationship in the Barents Region today.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 dealt with the issues of peace building and restorative action in the Barents Region from a more positive peace perspective by outlining what the response to colonialism could be when the voices of the previously excluded are included and expanded, namely, a region transformed from historical domination to a region of dignity, peace and restorative action. Chapter 6 discussed what the concept of sustainable social cohesion could signify from a peace and violence perspective in light of the borderology of Kant (Rossvær, 2007). The argument proves that the spectre of Hobbes, in this case his “frontierology”, still haunts international relations more than what we would like it to do and that this thinking represents a weak form of peace that may be strengthened by endorsing a borderology that sees the people in the border-region as the main peace-resource, capable of designing peaceful international policies, and not the other way around.

Chapter 7 explored the value of including and expanding indigenous knowledge systems as part of peace building and restorative action by suggesting four tasks that are central to the issue of development and, more generally, to the imperative of learning how to live together in peace and harmony. Firstly, it is important to operate with a concept of peace that makes *sense* to the marginalised members of the world. The word “peace” has little value unless it rejects the historical systems of structural and cultural violences while also offering a programme for addressing the issues of social justice and healing the wounds and tensions caused by colonial oppression.

Both these are central to Galtung's peace formula. This formula also opens up the possibility of introducing the issues of IKS and cognitive justice. By holding tight to these concepts, the chapter argued that a successful approach to building peace in this context is dependent on "getting the story right" and also the "civilisational puzzle right". This would help the building of a new, more honest and therefore more accurate and fruitful national narrative that would help us both to enhance our relationship and to improve the level of co-existence in the Nordic countries. The chapter concluded that the work of increasing positive peace and decreasing negative peace in this context is highly dependent upon the degree to which the indigenous epistemologies are integrated into what is regarded as valid knowledge in academic settings.

Taking into account the development of the perspectives of positive peace, as outlined in Chapters 6 to 7, Chapter 8 revisited the limitations/problems of the dominant ethical system presented in Chapter 5 and presented alternatives to this system/thinking by entering into a dialogue between hermeneutical theory (Heidegger, 1927; Buber, 1970; Sartre, 1943; Gadamer, 1975; Arendt, 1963; Levinas, 1991) and the possibility of including and enlarging Modernity's Other (Hoppers and Richards, 2011). The chapter established a link between the fundamental ethics of Levinas and indigenous systems of ethics rooted in *ubuntu* and the Sami traditions of hospitality.

This link serves as an alternative ground upon which peace may be established. This rests on the belief that the main challenge in this particular context and problem area does not revolve around mastering rules and principles but, instead, it involves something far more fundamental, namely, the work of restoring the esteem of the Other – the most fundamental condition of human community – from a world in urgent need of reparation and human dignity. In order to help with that re-orientation, the chapter concluded that we need to recapture a *radical* hermeneutics – a hermeneutics born out of pain and suffering but which, simultaneously, seeks to overcome such pain and suffering by using peaceful means of transformation and healing. In addition, in order to increase that recovering energy, the chapter proposes operationalising systems such as the Sami traditions of hospitality and healing and placing the issue of *humility* at the centre of our Scandinavian, collective experience in the future while remaining aware that it is not possible to dialogue with other knowledge systems from a premise of arrogance. This argument represents the main

ethical imperative, namely, the value of humanism when transposed onto science (Hoppers, 2017).

9.2 Pathways to the future

What is the situation and how do we go forward? Despite the coercive measures that the Norwegian government has implemented, it has failed to achieve its policy goals. Also, despite the fact the Sami peoples and their cultures have been severely damaged, they continue to exist. The Norwegianisation Policy project had the cumulative effect of profoundly dislocating Sami cultural reference points by borrowing from a development paradigm that turned billions of the world's population "into an inverted mirror of another's reality – a mirror that belittled them and sent them to the back of the queue" (Hoppers and Richards, 2011, p. 18). Academic disciplines that have accepted the validity of these paradigms have left intact the framework of violence, violation and fundamental injustice inherent in colonialism. Many of them were at a loss about what to do when the native came to town, or when the "savage" became an active, knowing participant on equal terms (Hoppers, 2009). I believe Ralston Saul (2008) who argued that our challenge is to learn how to recognize what we have trained ourselves not to see and that we must remove the imaginative and historical veils that we have used to obscure the fact that indigenous peoples are already there, at the core of our civilization:

"You wanted land. The land belonged to somebody else. You took it. You despise the actual owner. You believe that you are pure and unique. You believe that you are exempt from the ethical principles. You wish every day that the original owner would die soon or perish faster, but she/he doesn't quite die. Then you impose a legal system complete with lawyers and judges to defend that historical act of theft. The last thing you want is the actual voice of such a person to enter the chorus. It is not only about fear of embracing that "other". It is about how a theory of demise (triage) of a given people almost succeeded, but failed to reach its natural conclusion – not for lack of trying. It is an awkward moment." (p. 61)

Too many Scandinavians today still know little or nothing about the deep historical roots of this conflict. This has serious consequences for both Samis and for the Nordic countries as a whole. In governmental circles, it results in poor public policy decisions while, in the public realm, it reinforces racist attitudes and fuels civic distrust between indigenous people and other Scandinavians. Too many Scandinavians are still unaware of the history of Sami peoples' contribution to the birth of these countries. However, when studying these issues, it is important to remember that all imperial systems are designed to divide those who are to be dominated. A central key in the healing process is therefore to trace the division back to its origin. Few of us have any real sense of how international the myths of racial superiority, Darwinian destiny really were. It was grand theory. Global. All-inclusive. Thus, to recover from this is therefore a shared task and we must not to embark on such a recovery process without learning from each other as global citizens.

A Truth and Reconciliation Commission would help in such recovery. In Canada, the thousands of survivors who publicly shared their residential school experiences at the TRC have launched a much-needed *dialogue* about what is required for their healing as well as that of their families, their communities, and the nation. TRC also states that Canadians have much to gain from listening to the voices, experiences and wisdom of survivors, elders and traditional knowledge keepers and much more to learn about reconciliation. The TRC has stated unequivocally that the aboriginal peoples have an important contribution to make to reconciliation. Their knowledge systems, oral histories, laws, and connections to the land have vitally informed the reconciliation process to date and are essential to its ongoing progress (TRC, 2015, p. 8).

At a Traditional Knowledge Keepers Forum, sponsored by the TRC, Anishinaabe Elder Mary Deleary stated,

“I’m so filled with belief and hope because when I hear your voices at the table, I hear and know that the responsibilities that our ancestors carried ... are still being carried ... even through all of the struggles, even though all of what has been disrupted ... we can still hear the voice of the land. We can hear the care and love for the children. We can hear about our law. We can hear about our stories, our governance, our feasts, [and] our medicines ... We have work to do.

That work we are [already] doing as [Aboriginal] peoples. Our relatives who have come from across the water [non-Aboriginal people], you still have work to do on your road ... The land is made up of the dust of our ancestors' bones. And, so, to reconcile with this land and everything that has happened, there is much work to be done ... in order to create balance." (TRC, 2015, p. 9)

At the Victoria Regional Event in 2012, Survivor Archie Little stated:

"[For] me reconciliation is righting a wrong. And how do we do that? All these people in this room, a lot of non-Aboriginals, a lot of Aboriginals that probably didn't go to residential school; we need to work together ... My mother had a high standing in our cultural ways. We lost that. It was taken away ... And I think it's time for you non-Aboriginals ... to go to your politicians and tell them that we have to take responsibility for what happened. We have to work together." (TRC, 2015, p. 10)

The Reverend Stan McKay of the United Church, who is also a survivor, commented,

"[There must be] a change in perspective about the way in which Aboriginal peoples would be engaged with Canadian society in the quest for reconciliation ... [We cannot] perpetuate the paternalistic concept that only Aboriginal peoples are in need of healing ... The perpetrators are wounded and marked by history in ways that are different from the victims, but both groups require healing ... How can a conversation about reconciliation take place if all involved do not adopt an attitude of *humility* and respect? ... We all have stories to tell and, in order to grow in tolerance and understanding, we must listen to the stories of others." (TRC, 2015, p. 9, own italics)

According to Ralston Saul, the situation is very simple: "Aboriginals have made and will continue to make a remarkable comeback. They cannot be stopped. Non-Aboriginals have a choice to make. We can continue to stand in the way so that the comeback is slowed and surrounded by bitterness. Or we can be supportive and part of a new narrative" (Ralston Saul, 2015, p. 5). Similarly, non-Sami have a choice. We

may continue to allow our governments, power systems and corporations to slow or attempt to stop or distort this return of the indigenous people to their proper place or we may learn to listen and to understand what is happening in order to ensure that we do not continue to be the problem.

In order to be supportive, it is important to ensure that the Academy learns from the epistemologies and ethics existing in Modernity's Other, in which memories of the brutal past are still present, coupled with a need for healing from the suffering inflicted in the past. One way in which to approach this would be for the Academy to relate to Modernity's Other by enlargement. Such a development programme would mean an Academy where praxis would be valued in a science that saw its mandate as not only including guidelines for, but also enacting ways and means, for the transformation of society based on ethics.

For this to be realistic the Academy would have to ensure that grassroots voices were heard for once and engage with the public by a listening grounded in ethics. Science, it is as now practiced, tends to hegemonise other forms of knowledges either by museumising them into "ghettoes", or by treating them as "occult", "oriental", or "primitive superstition" (Hoppers, 2017). Standardised knowledge leads to standardised citizenship (Visvanathan, 2009).

Thus, the challenge is to move swiftly towards a methodology that enables us to see other forms of knowledges not as developmental brakes but as a platform of innovation. Thus, the new indigenisation requires both a conversation and a language for this conversation that transcends the colonial residue and its cryptic binaries. Moreover, it requires not only the formal mechanisms of participation but also an intellectual environment in which citizens are encouraged to bring their knowledge and skills to bear on the resolution of common problems (Hoppers, 2017). I agree with Hoppers (2017) that we, as scientists and global citizens, have to "endorse the multi-directional flows of knowledge across civilisations and aim at creating a global history of science based on genuine epistemological egalitarianism" (p. 8).

One way of doing this would be by raising the issue of cognitive justice as an experiment of positive peace by allowing plural knowledges to coexist without duress. Cognitive justice posits a challenge to scientists in that it introduces the imperative to understand and come to terms with the more complex and advanced

ethically sound ways of thinking that characterise many indigenous and non-western ways of living (Hoppers, 2017). The SARChi Report (Hoppers, 2017) proposes to bring to the fore the issue of “humility” as a way of fostering dialogues between knowledge systems: “Humility necessitates openness, emergence, which invokes both difference and solidarity. Humble knowledges are plural knowledges that refuse to seek hegemony. We have to join hands in seeking the humility of non-violence in a world where peace consists of ethical repair, of reconciliation, where the notion of “society” exceeds “contract”, to healing, restoration” (Hoppers, 2017, p. 10, citing Visvanathan, 2016). If IKS were to become a recognised and protected peace resource, it should be placed at the service of both the present and future generations.

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