
By

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ABSTRACT

It is increasingly becoming apparent that elections, as component parts of democratic processes, do not always guarantee a smooth transfer of power and stable democratic cultures in many contemporary polities. Whenever election outcomes are disputed, Governments of National Unity (GNU) are presented as strategic conflict prevention and resolution models. Yet, the GNU’s ability to nurture democracy in situations where it remains weak or non-existent is extremely limited. This dissertation therefore uses Zimbabwe’s case study to examine how its recent internal political turmoil had overwhelming implications for its legitimacy and democracy. Through qualitative research, the study reveals that despite partially reconciling Zimbabwe’s political protagonists, the GNU neither permanently resolved the crisis nor addressed significant related issues; thus, creating a paradox of legitimacy for the country. The dissertation concludes with recommendations for further research on matters of legitimacy in power-sharing scenarios such as Zimbabwe’s.

Key Words: Government of National Unity, political legitimacy, free and fair elections, targeted sanctions, mediation, political transition, regime change, sovereignty.
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DECLARATION

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Title of Dissertation:

I declare that the above dissertation is my own work that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

[Signature] [19 July 2017]

SIGNATURE DATE
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Attorney General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
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<td>AISA</td>
<td>African Institute of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPAC</td>
<td>Constitutional Parliamentary Select Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>The Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECF-SADC</td>
<td>Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>Global Political Agreement</td>
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<td>GSDRC</td>
<td>Governance and Social Development Resource Centre</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOMIC</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBTI</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC-M</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change - Mutambara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC-T</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>NANGO</td>
<td>National Association of Nongovernmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Constitutional Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Constitutional Commission</td>
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<td>ODM</td>
<td>Orange Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>ONHRI</td>
<td>Organ of National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration</td>
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<td>PEMMO</td>
<td>Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNU</td>
<td>Party of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADC-PF</td>
<td>The Southern African Development Community - Parliamentary For</td>
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<tr>
<td>STERP</td>
<td>Short-Term Emergency Recovery Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIMB</td>
<td>Tobacco Industry Marketing Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNIP</td>
<td>The United National Independence Party</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>WOZA</td>
<td>Women of Zimbabwe Arise</td>
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<td>YAT</td>
<td>Youth Agenda Trust</td>
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<td>YIDEZ</td>
<td>Youth for Democracy in Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZBC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZCFU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZEC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Electoral Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZESN</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIDER</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIMRIGHTS</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Human Rights Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZLHR</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights</td>
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<td>ZPP</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Peace Project</td>
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<td>ZRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Renewal Act</td>
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<td>ZRP</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Republic Police</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Intrastate conflict mitigation endeavours have given birth to a recent political term, the Government of National Unity (GNU). Mapuva (2010:249) defines the GNU as a strategy for addressing conflict in which all the major political parties in a country are part of the governing coalition. According to Chigora and Guzura, (2011:24), “GNUs emerge out of hot political contestations, depicting high levels of violence and tense fragmentation of society”. In 2008, Zimbabwe was caught up in an electoral crisis following a hot political contestation of the March 2008 election results. Although the results were tilted in favour of the main opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) led by Morgan Tsvangirai, the general elections had no outright winner for the country’s top post, leading to the holding of a presidential election run-off on 29 June 2008. The run-off failed the intended objective, as the main contestant, Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew citing unprecedented political violence on the MDC-T electorate allegedly perpetrated by the governing party, ZANU-PF. On the other hand, President Robert Mugabe argued that Zimbabwe was a sovereign country that must be allowed to conduct its own elections according to its own laws and set standards. However, the 29 June 2008 presidential election run-off results indicated that although ZANU-PF claimed the presidency on technical grounds, it was difficult to form a legitimate government.

Eppel and Raftpoulos (2008:6) implicate that the state-led violence that preceded the presidential run-off was of such intensity that even Mugabe’s long-standing support in SADC and the AU could not endorse his election “victory”. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) as cited in Raftpoulos (2013:1), “ZANU-PF clung to power by violence but its legitimacy was completely eroded”. Mugabe’s failure to receive an endorsement in Africa combined with the long-standing condemnation he had received from the West, added to the pressure for the SADC mediation to find a political solution to the crisis. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki committed to resolving the Zimbabwean crisis after being appointed mediator in 2007 by SADC.
According to George (1991:4), the situation was further compounded by the international community, led by the US, Britain and her Western Allies who imposed targeted sanctions on the ZANU-PF leadership to pressure them into upholding principles of democracy and rule of law and or facilitate regime change. Munemo (2012:195), defines regime change agenda as “the strategies, schemes and tactics” that were hatched by the West to overthrow President Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF regime from power through the MDC. Against a context of a crashing economy, when the quality and accessibility of basic services such as education and primary health care had plummeted dramatically, a severe cholera outbreak and a sharp rise in cost of living, these factors contributed to ZANU-PF’s decision to accept negotiations when the country was battered by a humanitarian crisis. Further, Zimbabwe could not access funds from international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and donor institutions. The dire consequences of sanctions on the Zimbabwe economy and pressure from continental and regional groupings largely compelled ZANU-PF to accept negotiations through the SADC–led South African mediation.

The resultant unity government, consisted of three political formations, ZANU-PF, MDC-T and the Movement for Democratic Change - Mutambara (MDC-M), led by Professor Arthur Mutambara. On 21 July 2008, the three political parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). According to Bratton and Masunungure (2008:42), political leaders committed their parties to “creating a genuine, viable, permanent, and sustainable solution to the Zimbabwe situation.” The agreement also set out to achieve the immediate cessation of violence. Eventually, the conflicting political factions resolved to compromise and political accommodation. The ensuing negotiations resulted in the signing of a Global Political Agreement (GPA) (15 September 2008), ultimately leading to the establishment of a GNU in February 2009. Masunungure (2009:7) observed that Zimbabweans across the political divide, regional and international groupings, foreign governments, and civil society organisations eventually accepted the GNU as a legitimate government and engaged it.
However, unlike many conflicts in Africa that have an ethnic or religious undercurrent, Mutisi (2011:163) note that the Zimbabwean conflict was uniquely political in its orientation; and that the major point of difference between ZANU-PF and the MDC was not only ideological but also because the former was rural based and the latter urban based. Mutisi (2011:163), on one hand denotes ZANU-PF as a political party born out of the struggle against colonial rule, hence the reference to a “nationalist and revolutionary liberation party”. Chingono (2010:14) brands the ZANU-PF ideology as “redistributive” as the party sought to undo the impact of colonialism and imperialism by empowering Zimbabweans economically through land reform, while to the contrary, the MDC was driven by working class interests. According to Masunungure (2008:46), when it was established, the MDC branded itself as a labour party. The party emerged in the context of declining economic and living standards in Zimbabwe, rising unemployment rate, unstable economy, inequitable distribution of resources and corruption. The MDC demanded democratic change in governance amidst rising discontent and political impasse by the generality of Zimbabweans. Mutisi (2011:166) argues that the change agenda of the MDC can be understood given the context in which this political party was formed, where ZANU-PF was a political hegemony since the 1980 independence and the MDC was the first opposition party to pause serious challenge to ZANU-PF hegemony.

However, the 2008 Zimbabwe GNU case was not unique as this was not the first internal agreement whereby conflicting political elements come together to form a political agreement in the history of the country. According to Chigora and Guzura (2011:22) in 1979, the (Ian) Smith regime entered into an internal agreement with a party led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa to form the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government, while in 1987 ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) formed another internal agreement, the Unity Accord. Therefore, the 2009 GNU may not be the last in Zimbabwe.
1.2 Statement of the Problem

The disputed poll results of the Zimbabwe 2008 general elections degenerated into a political crisis. The SADC-led protracted negotiations by the former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, led to the signing of an agreement to establish a Government of National Unity (GNU) in September 2008 and, ultimately, the formation of the GNU in February 2009. The GPA set out to achieve a people-driven constitution, referendum, free media, respect for human rights and rule of law, depoliticisation of state institutions and resuscitation of the economy. Raftopoulos (2013:23) observed that the power-sharing process seemed to breakdown. On the one hand, according to Chigora and Guzura (2011:23), ZANU PF openly blamed the MDC for being a stumbling block in the path to democracy by failing to convince the West to lift up economic sanctions. On the other hand, the MDC accused ZANU PF of hampering progress by not honouring the letter and spirit of GPA. Chigora and Guzura (2011) argue that there was no consensus as to whether the GNU had fulfilled its mandate or had simply remained “a betrayal of the will of the people”. Further, Raftopoulos (2013:13) writes that in 2011, while the ZANU-PF Party wanted the nation to hold elections before the expiry of the tenure of the GNU, the MDC-T formations were opposed, arguing that the political environment in Zimbabwe was not yet conducive for the holding of free and fair elections. However, Mukuhlani (2014:170) and Ndakaripa, (2015:11) share the same views with Raftopoulos (2013:14) that the lifespan of the GNU was characterized by much controversy. Chigora and Guzura (2011:23) argue that a government of national unity was “antithetical to democracy.”

This dissertation therefore attempts to answer the question: “Is it a paradox that the GNU, an act of compromise, was a legitimate strategy to foster democracy in Zimbabwe?” In other words, was the GPA a democratic and hence a legitimate strategy in creating and promoting a genuine, viable, permanent, and sustainable solution to the Zimbabwe situation in a power-sharing set up? Further, this study endeavours to critically analyse the challenges and prospects of the GNU.
1.3 Purpose of the Study

The aim of the study is to assess whether or not the GNU as a conflict resolution strategy was successful in creating conditions necessary for fostering a sustainable culture of tolerance, peace and democracy in Zimbabwe. In particular, the study seeks to establish how useful or effective the GNU was as a tool for entrenching democracy in Zimbabwe given that it was a negotiated agreement that emerged from coercion. In pursuit of the set objectives, the study would attempt to answer the following pertinent questions:

(i) To what extent did the GNU promote sustainable peace, political stability, and economic development of the country?
(ii) To what extent did the GPA address issues of governance and legality and hence the legitimacy of the GNU?
(iii) Did the GPA as a conflict resolution and prevention strategy present a positive or negative impression of the legitimacy of the GNU?
(iv) What impact did sanctions have on the GNU processes (sanctions in relation to the ripeness theory)?
(v) Hence, was the GNU a success or a failure?

Further, the study assessed the extent to which the GNU has achieved or failed to achieve the set outcomes of the GPA. This will be done through an in-depth analysis of the various perceptions, conceptions, arguments and political thought on the GNU by both the Zimbabweans and the stakeholders. The study finally explores the means through which the GNU managed or failed to resolve the political crisis in Zimbabwe.

1.4 Significance of the Study

This study intends to contribute to the understanding of the resort to Governments of National Unity in the wake of disputed elections and electoral violence. The research is significant given the increasing incidence of political conflict on the African continent and the demand for effective and lasting conflict mitigation measures. This study is also designed to assess the assumption that in conflict situations, mediation can bring about political stability, promote democratic governance and enhance development and economic sustainability. Eppel and Raftopoulos (2008:6) argue that mediation
gives legitimacy to the resultant governing structure, in this case, the GNU. This research hence attempts to answer the question, “Was the GPA a democratic and hence legitimate strategy in creating and promoting a genuine, viable, permanent, and sustainable solution to the Zimbabwe situation in a power-sharing set up?”

The major assertion of this research is to establish if the GPA as a mediation tool effectively resolved conflicts or disputes among conflicting parties in Zimbabwe.

However, contrasting views, according to Masunungure (2009:15), are that mediation in general and GNUs in particular, “…give legitimacy to losers of elections/political power, thereby resulting in dysfunctional governance due to acrimony among political parties”. In the end, such governments do not deliver thereby perpetuating the problems that gave rise to the crisis. The study therefore, sought to establish whether these assertions were sustainable.

1.5 Definition of Key Terms

**Political Legitimacy**

According to Gilley (2006: 500), “Political legitimacy is the popular acceptance of an authority, usually a governing law or a regime. It is considered a basic condition for governing, without which a government will suffer legislative deadlock”. All governments therefore need legitimacy to survive. A government is not legitimate unless it is carried on with the consent of the governed. In the 2008 election crisis in Zimbabwe, the winning party ZANU-PF needed the popular legitimacy to form a new government, without which the two MDC formations and both the regional and international community would have maintained a standoff. According to Easton (1965:169), legitimacy can be regarded as an endorsement of the state by its citizens. It is “the core of political organization”, the basis of the creation of political community, the focal point of political science. Beetham (1991:41) called it “the central issue in social and political theory”; while Crick (1993:150) argues that, “it is the master question of politics”. 
**Targeted Sanctions**

George, (1991) defines targeted sanctions as specific restrictive measures which are imposed on leaders who are responsible for objectionable policies, including the threat to peace and security. Further, Smith-Höhn (2010:1-8) indicates that “smart sanctions,” also known as targeted sanctions are crafted in a manner that seeks to reduce collateral damage to the general population and are used by players in the international realm to peacefully apply pressure on the targeted entity. They have been utilised by Britain, the United States of America and Western allies on Zimbabwe. Sanctions are based on the position that effective diplomacy uses both inducements for cooperation as well as punishment for resistance. As such, targeted sanctions are often aimed at the elite, including political and military leaders. Davidsson (2002:6) argues that targeted sanctions fall under the rubric of “soft intervention” approaches because they are strong enough to have coercive effects, yet still humane enough not to alienate the civilian population. Chingono (2010:1) argues that when sanctions are used in international diplomacy, “they serve as both a carrot and stick”; an incentive to transform behaviours. Chingono (2010) further argues that in the Zimbabwe case, targeted sanctions were meant to present “a mutually hurting stalemate towards ripeness”. As a result of sanctions, Zimbabwe’s economic development stagnated leading to a humanitarian crisis. Hence, Chigora (2007:180) indicates that is the reason why former and current South African Presidents, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, respectively, who have been mediators to Zimbabwe’s three political parties, called for the removal of sanctions to facilitate the full implementation of the GPA.

**Global Political Agreement (GPA)**

The Global Political Agreement (GPA) was signed on 15 September 2008. The GPA is also commonly referred to as the Power Sharing Agreement between the ZANU-PF and the two formations of the MDC, on resolving political conflict arising from exclusion of key political players (the MDC formations) in structures and processes of national governance. It provided for a democratic transitional government, mandated, among other tasks, to end political and economic impasse in the country. Bratton and Masunungure (2008:41) assert that the purpose of the GPA was to lay down a foundation towards a new constitutional dispensation to prepare the country for free and fair elections through inclusivity. Chigora and Guzura (2011:24) further argue that
the logic behind the GPA was, “equitable participation will diminish the potential for conflict and enhance prospects for national stability, integration and development.”

**The Government of National Unity (GNU)**
The term refers to Zimbabwe's unity government that was formed on 13 February 2009 and lasted until 29 June 2013. It was generally accepted as an interim and transitional democratic process. The term GNU is used to refer to a case in which all the major political parties in a country are part of the governing body. According to Chigora and Guzura (2011:24), GNUs are “a fragile, bitter and usually transitional arrangement with a high risk of disintegrating at the slightest opportunity and further degenerating into conflict because parties have nothing at all in common when it comes to ideology”. Therefore, in this study, a GNU refers to a transitional government consisting of major contestants, arising from disputed elections.

**Violence**
As used in this study, the term refers to state-sponsored or state-perpetrated violence. While on one hand the term may refer to use of intimidation by those that control power and government, on the other hand it can also refer to incidents of attack and coercion perpetrated by citizens against others or even against the state or security apparatus. Chigora (2011:20) underscores the fact that violence was the basis of the MDC-T's withdrawal from the 2008 runoff presidential election and this raised the concern of the generality of Zimbabweans, regional and continental community and the West (USA and the EU). According to Eppel and Raftopoulos (2008:6), the main objective of the GPA was to achieve the immediate cessation of violence and the normalization of the political environment.

**Sovereignty**
According to one reliable source (Britannica.com), sovereignty in political theory can be defined as the ultimate authority in the decision-making process of the state and in the maintenance of order. However, the publication highlights that the concept of sovereignty is one of the most controversial concepts in political science and
international law but points out that the term is closely related to the concepts of state and government and; of independence and democracy. Further, it is explained that although the doctrine of sovereignty has had an important impact on developments within states, its greatest influence has been in the relations between states. The Britannica asserts that sovereign power is absolute and that in the international sphere, this condition has led to a perpetual state of war; one sovereign trying to impose his will by force on all other sovereigns. The publication notes that the situation has evolved over time, with sovereign states continuing to claim the right to be judges in their own arguments, to treat their own citizens in any way that suits them, with complete disregard for possible repercussions in other states.

**Regime Change Agenda**

According to Munemo (2012:195), these strategies, schemes and tactics were hatched by the West to overthrow Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF regime from power. Munemo (2012) argues that regime change is the West's foreign policy on governments that are against their interests. Mutisi (2011:181) defines regime change as “presented pejoratively by ZANU-PF to imply that the MDC sought to illegally and unconstitutionally oust it from power”.

**Democracy**

According to Dahl (1998:38), “democracy provides opportunities for effective participation, equality in voting, and exercising final control by the people over the agenda.” Further, the author argues that democracy depends largely on the extent to which “it recognizes and enforces civil and political rights”. On the same note, Zehra (1991:4) observes that in the Zimbabwean context, the parties sharing power perceived democracy differently. The opposition viewed democracy as the restoration of the rule of law, while the governing party perceived it more as an isolated compromise addressing the 2008 election outcome. This perception by the opposition was compounded by the International community and civil society’s view that inclusivity is achieved when opposition parties gain political space, (LeVan, 2011:11). However, it can be argued that indeed, the notion of power-sharing, which is the central pillar of the GPA, is necessarily tantamount to loss of some political power for ZANU-PF and significant gain for the MDC formations.
Governance
According to Frederickson and Smith (2003:222), governance is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s vast resources for development. It covers the institutional relations in administration, policy making and public management. Further, according to the same authors, democratic governance is the range of processes through which a society reaches consensus on and implements regulations, human rights, laws, policies and social structures in pursuit of justice and welfare protection. It is about society organising itself to ensure equality of opportunity and equity for all its citizens. The GPA has been appraised as being all-inclusive concerning substantive policy issues on democratic governance and human rights.

Free and fair elections
This study evaluates the view that elections validate political authority by legitimising it. According to the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (Revised 2015), Paragraph 2.2, “An election is “free and fair” when there are no unreasonable or arbitrary limitations imposed on the rights of adult citizens, in expressing their political will either as electoral candidates or voters. The notion of free and fair elections was the centre of the dispute in the post- election crises in Zimbabwe, sparking violence, necessitating the SADC mediation, and the subsequent GPA and GNU. The GPA set out a framework for an inclusive government that would create an environment conducive for free and fair elections. In the conduct of elections, it has become a global standard that independent election observers, participate using a standardised set of procedures or international best practices. However, according to Elklit and Svensson (1997:32), “Cooperation among different countries, organizations, and election authorities has been uneven”, making the concept of free and fair elections subjective.

1.6 Delimitation of the Study
The domain of this study is Zimbabwe, covering the period March 2008 harmonised elections to 29 June 2013 when the GNU came to an end. However, consideration is also made to the post GNU period, up to June 2016, to study the sustainability of
peace and democracy in the aftermath and; besides, the post GNU experience can inform future studies on the subject matter. The focus is on the Global Political Agreement (GPA) (2008), a historic power sharing agreement concluded by the incumbent Robert Mugabe of ZANU-PF, his major challenger Morgan Tsvangirai of the main formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC -T) and Arthur Mutambara of the smaller MDC-M faction. The GPA, a mediation product, was signed on 15 September 2008, establishing a framework for these parties to work together in an inclusive government.

1.7 Rationale/Justification of the Study

This research is imperative given the increasing incidence of political conflict on the African continent and the demand for effective conflict mitigation measures. According to LeVan (2011:1), “Power sharing agreements have been widely used in Africa as paths out of civil war”. Since 1990, a considerable number of African countries have been involved in political conflicts that have culminated in unity agreements. Among them Rwanda (1993 and 1994), Kenya (2008) and Zimbabwe (2008). The GNU concept has also manifested in jurisdictions outside of the African continent. However, contrary to GNUs, variants of peace settlements have also been concluded in jurisdictions in Africa and outside of the African continent. The arrangement of political agreements largely depends on obtaining scenarios, which differ from case to case.

The GNU phenomenon has prompted scholars and researchers to study these inclusive government frameworks that arise as a result of disputed election outcomes and lack of a clear winner in electoral processes. Recent years have witnessed an unprecedented upsurge, not only in political conflicts across the globe, but an equally abundance of literature on conflict management and resolution, political inclusion, democracy, governance and legitimacy from authors such as Abuya (2009); Bratton and Masunungure (2008); Chigora and Guzura (2011); Cohen (1997), Gilley (2006); Laws (2012); LeVan (2011); Mapuva (2010, 2013); Munemo (2012); Rupiya (2012); Spears (2000) and Zartman (1985, 1989, 1997, 2000), just to mention a few.
In 2008, Zimbabwe was caught up in such a situation where conflicting political parties had an obligation to establish a framework of working together in an inclusive government. Masunungure (2009), is of the view that accepting that the formation of such a government would have to be approached with great sensitivity, flexibility and willingness to compromise; recognising that the formation of such a government would express the hopes and aspirations of Zimbabweans. The outcome of this study might influence policy through research and thereby help the country and the region to identify problem solving mechanisms for local political problems.

1.8 Dissertation Structure
This section presents the structure of the dissertation.

Chapter One: Introduction
This chapter presents the contextual background to Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity (GNU) of September 2008. It illustrates the problem statement and the various factors contributing to the formation of the GNU. The Chapter highlights the role played by SADC under the mediation efforts of former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. The essence of this chapter is to outline the objectives, justification of the study, definition of key terms and the significance. The delimitation of the study and limitations are also discussed in this chapter. This chapter constitutes the basis of the whole study.

Chapter Two: Review of the Relevant Literature
The key aspect of this chapter is to review literature relating to the context of the GNU. The chapter discusses the concepts and principles underpinning the GNU and the relevance of elections as tools of democracy. It presents the theoretical framework and assumptions underlying the research, citing the significance and limitations of given theories. Theories explored are the ripeness theory; the elitist theory; the theory of targeted sanctions; the Global Political Agreement (GPA) theoretical framework and the preponderance of the incumbency theory. The chapter further examines and analyses the GNU concept and the implications thereof for democracy and political legitimacy.
Chapter Three: Research Methodology

This chapter outlines the overall research design in which qualitative, exploratory and case study approaches converge. The study employs desktop research, while the research design pursued is the exploratory case study of the Zimbabwe GNU. The study adopts an intensive document review and an in-depth content analysis of books, journals, policy documents, newspapers, communiqués, reports and academic research materials; reviewed published articles, various online sources and electronic media including radio and social media and all possible and credible sources. Historical primary and secondary documents such as the GPA and the Draft Constitution of Zimbabwe are explored. In addition, this study alludes to comparative study of specific cases of negotiated agreements elsewhere, such as the Kenyan case. The chapter concludes by discussing the research ethics and the limitations of the study.

Chapter Four: Research Findings

Chapter Four presents and analyses research findings. The chapter highlights the benchmarks used, as laid out in the GPA such as peace and stability, impartiality of state organs, freedom of expression and communication, freedom of assembly and association and targeted sanctions. The chapter examines constitutional benchmarks such as the independent bodies to foster democracy that include the Zimbabwe Media Commission and the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC). The chapter highlights mechanism put in place to ensure peaceful, free and fair elections. Finally, the Chapter concludes by highlighting that the GNU was largely a success bringing in relative peace, cooperation among conflicting parties, economic stability and growth. However, the chapter reveals GNU shortcomings that hampered prospects for integration and development.

Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations

Chapter five presents conclusions and recommendations based on the findings presented in the entire dissertation. This has been accomplished over the course of five chapters. The chapter concludes that the GNU demonstrates that inclusivity as a conflict prevention and management strategy remains the preferred and legitimate
approach to averting violent political uprisings and resolving electoral disputes. Finally, this chapter concludes by proposing areas of possible future research to expand on this study of inclusive governments in the theoretical realm of preventive diplomacy, specifically conflict resolution and management.

1.9 Conclusion
The introductory chapter has presented a broad overview of the subject matter. It has provided the critical definitions that will inform the analysis of the study in its endeavour to critically analyse the challenges and prospects of the GPA in promoting democratic legitimacy in a power sharing government as well as delineate the structure of the dissertation. The next chapter will expand on through a review of the relevant literature. This literature review will critically examine the Zimbabwean GNU and clearly state arguments for and against GNUs in general and thus revealing the paradoxical nature of legitimacy in power sharing arrangements of this nature.
CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE

2.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to review literature relating to the concept and nature of the government of national unity (GNU). The literature review will analyse selected in-context literature on factors that led to the signing of the GPA, its implementation and factors that gave legitimacy to the GNU. The literature review will also discuss the relevance of elections as tools of democracy including other issues surrounding GNUs.

2.2 Background

The previous chapter outlined the research agenda and the scope of the study. It further presented the case of Zimbabwe’s 2008 harmonised elections outcome that was refuted by political rivals, resulting in a stalemate. The chapter briefly highlighted the factors that compelled conflicting parties to the table.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (in Raftopoulos, 2013:12) observes that although the situation in Zimbabwe had not disintegrated into civil war, the pre-GNU period clearly denoted a dysfunctional state with the highest recorded inflation rate in history, a picture of complete economic and social collapse, a cholera epidemic, and a government sustained in power by coercion rather than the popular will. Chigora and Guzura (2011:20) are of the view that the dire political and economic straits forced conflicting parties to eventually resort to compromise and political accommodation in an agreement of national unity. Mediation efforts by the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki brought political opponents, ZANU-PF and MDC, to the negotiation table. The outcome was the GPA of 15 September 2008 which resulted in the GNU. The GNU signalled the resolution of a decade-long political crisis. According to the GPA (2008) Preamble, all principal players pledged to “work together to create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution…and chart a new
political direction for the country.” The immediate impact of the GPA was the halting of violence, which threatened to destabilise the country.

This study was conducted in the context of the growing resort to mediation as a tool for peaceful settlement of disputes or conflicts within and among states by regional and international bodies such as the AU and the UN. Review of relevant literature has helped the researcher to identify Kenya as a comparative case of election dispute in which the GNU was implemented as a conflict resolution strategy. Following the 2007 Kenyan Presidential elections, violence broke out in various parts of the country. According to the Report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2008), political violence in Kenya led to the death of 1220 people, 3600 injuries and internal displacement of 300 000 people. The former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, mediated in this conflict under the auspices of the AU. This mediation ended the conflict through a political agreement. The latter led to the formation of a GNU with Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) as President and Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) as Prime Minister of Kenya, respectively.

The GNU occurrence has prompted scholars and researchers such as Chigora and Guzura (2011); Mapuva, (2010, 2013); Masunungure (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014); Mukuhlani (2014); Mutisi (2011); Ndakaripa (2015); Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013); Raftopoulos (2013), and Rupiya (2012), to study this phenomenon, which also motivated this study.

2.3 The GNU Concept and Definition

The first chapter introduced a pertinent political phrase, the “Government of National Unity” (GNU), a phrase that arises from intrastate conflict mitigation endeavours. According to Laws (2012:32), GNUs as conflict resolution strategies are the subject of very few conceptual or analytical studies despite the fact that, in recent years, the institutional, political and/or economic crises in a number of countries have prompted the formation of transitional political arrangements that could be termed as GNUs.
LeVan (2011:31) argues that power-sharing agreements have been widely used in Africa “as paths out of civil war”.

Further, according to Ong‘ayo (2008), the concept of power-sharing has been used in many contexts that include ethnic conflicts and political differences over resource allocation and use; where no political party has won a parliamentary majority; or in post-conflict situations where multiple actors who represent diverse backgrounds seek to control state power.

Khan (2010) defines a GNU as the overall balance of power in society, adding that “it establishes basic rules governing economic relations and resource allocation” which he calls the “social order”. Further, Khan (2010) describes a GNU as a compatible, viable and sustainable combination of power and institutions. He describes how societies solve the problem of violence and achieve minimum political stability and economic performance through a political settlement such as a GNU.

Laws (2012:33), defines GNUs as formal institutional power-sharing arrangements that aim to provide security and political stability in fragile and/or conflict-affected countries. Further, according to Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, (GSDRC) (2009:1), GNUs are “broad coalition governments consisting of all parties (or all major parties) in the legislature”. They are typically formed “during a time of conflict or other national emergency as relatively brief arrangements”.

Kotzé (2002) cited by Laws (2012:33) has a narrow and functional definition of GNUs, stating, “a GNU is solely aimed at emphasising national unity and reconciliation in post-conflict situations”. According to Kotze (2002), “the overarching principle of any GNU is that it must be inclusive of all the political or politically relevant movements who can muster popular support ...”

According to Spears (2000:105), GNUs are a specific, formal institutional mode of power-sharing and political inclusion, “understood as a purposeful distribution of government posts among the most powerful political parties or groups”.

According to Mapuva (2010:249), a “GNU denotes a system where two political foes come to a consensus to bury the hatchet and work together.” Further, Mapuva (2010:250) argues that the GNU works best in countries polarised by political strife and that it unites people of different ethnic groups, tribes and political ideologies to work together for the common good of the nation.

Pursuant to the above, Chigora and Guzura (2011:24), also describe the GNU as a joint exercise of power by all the major political parties in a nation that are part of the governing coalition, “accommodating all participating political players in governmental structures”. Further, Chigora and Guzura (2011), argue that GNUs are fast becoming “attractive democratic models of conflict prevention, peace building and political transition”. This implies that power-sharing is seen as a strategy for resolving disputes over who should have the most powerful position in the social hierarchy. The assumption therefore is that the participation of other stakeholders will diminish the potential for conflict and enhance prospects for national stability, integration and development.

LeVan (2011:10) argues that in states with profound ethnic divisions and a history of conflict and fragility, a GNU may help to reduce the risk of violence associated with “winner takes-all” elections. He cites (ibid) the case of Burundi’s moments of comparative stability during the transition from civil war to peace saying it was the result of a “negotiated settlement with, at its core, a multi-layered and multi-faceted power-sharing arrangement that emerged after a lengthy peace process”. According to Spears (2000:7), “Power sharing is a reasonable alternative to the notion of a high-stakes, winner-takes-all scenario...,” as this promotes participatory democracy.

Barkan (2008:1-8) argues that power-sharing between the two major political parties in Kenya, the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), was a crucial component of the efforts to overcome the economic crisis and politically and ethnically motivated violence in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. Laws (2012:32) gives the example of the Transitional National Government formed between hostile Somali parties in early 2000. He argues that GNUs can alternatively be used by victorious parties to accommodate their defeated rivals; for example, the
Ugandan National Resistance Movement and the Rwandan Patriotic Front extended political accommodation to their opponents in the aftermath of their respective country’s civil wars.

Barnes (2009:3-4) argues that although the concept of “inclusivity” or GNU is a key feature of the literature on conflict resolution and is said to account in large part for the stability and legitimacy of states, it is defined typically by bargaining and compromise. Laws (2012:18), argues that GNUs are case-specific. He indicates political settlements and elite pacts are political arrangements that are local to specific countries and need to be locally legitimate. Further, Laws (2012) indicates that research is required to give an insight into how, and in what ways, the international community can support, broker or facilitate developmentally positive settlements and pacts without compromising national sovereignty, but remaining true to its normative goals.

2.4 Contextualising the GNU

According to the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) (2009:5), GNUs as conflict resolution strategies, have been used within the literature on peace-building, to account for political stability and the success (or otherwise) of transitions from war to peace. However, mediation and conflict resolutions should be defined as on-going political processes, of which power-sharing institutions in the aftermath of conflict may only be one part. Further, the GSDRC (2009:5) asserts that GNUs as components of conflict resolution help to resolve violent conflict and encourage developmental reform. Other than contributing to immediate peace, or handling national crises, they have also contributed to sustained growth and political stability in the medium term.

In that regard, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:6) are of the view that “mediation can prevent conflicts, settle disputes peacefully, and support peaceful transitions and that it nurtures reconciliation among warring parties as well as foster national unity”. In addition, Zartman (2000:229) asserts that “a negotiated solution is possible”, that a formula can be found that is “just and satisfactory to conflicting parties”. Further,
Zartman (1989:291) indicates that the key debate about mediation is centred on the ability to provide lasting solutions to the problems that led to the crisis in the first place.

Kotzé (2002) cites the case of the South African inclusive arrangement, that constituted a package of agreements, events and institutions that were included within an on-going mediation and conflict resolution aiming at creating unity, heal and end systematic violence.

Laws (2012:18), indicates that it is important to establish a link between the inclusivity of political settlements and the stability of states or countries. Laws (2012:18) cites the case of Nigeria arguing that formal power-sharing provisions have been a feature of the political settlement in Nigeria since 1979, whereby the “federal character” principle became a feature of the constitution, requiring that appointments to public service institutions reflect fairly the linguistic, ethnic, religious and geographic diversity of the country.

On the Zambian case of inclusivity, Lindemann (2011:1843-1869) considers the reasons behind Zambia’s avoidance of civil war since its independence in 1964, focusing on the inclusiveness of the country’s elite bargains. Zambia’s post-colonial government managed to accommodate social fragmentation and avoid civil war by creating a high level of political, economic and military power-sharing between the country’s major ethno-regional groups. Soon after independence in 1964, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) forged an inclusive elite bargain to achieve national unity. Lindemann (2011:66), further highlights that this was achieved through a policy of “tribal balancing”, which distributed access to positions of state power equally amongst the country’s five main language groups. This policy has successfully ensured relative political stability to the present day, in an otherwise highly unstable region.

According to Kotzé (2002) if a GNU is a coalition government formed of all the major political parties in a country, then it follows that GNUs are a particular type of “inclusive peace building agreement”, focused specifically on establishing shared governance through formal state institutions. By implication, GNUs are arrangements that seek to
manage conflict by bringing opposing parties together with the aim of quelling violence and establishing acceptable solutions to disputing parties.

To that, Kotzé (2002), is of the view that the GNUs that were formed in Sudan in the aftermath of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, in the DRC after the Pretoria Agreements in 2002, and in Burundi in the wake of the Arusha negotiations in 2002, are examples of transitional power-sharing arrangements that emerged from mediation and conflict resolution strategies.

Mapuva (2013:107) contextualises GNUs and argues that factors leading to power sharing agreements appear to be inescapably linked to election outcomes and the question of justice and or legitimacy. Mapuva (2013) further asserts that GNUs are a result of burning political contestations characterised by sheer violence and a crumbling society. GNUs are often a result of mediation efforts following grievances over election results. However, although there are differing perceptions of democracy, Bratton and Masunungure (2008:41-55) argue that free and fair elections are the cornerstone of any democratic system of government.

In that regard, Masunungure (2014:95) comments on the supremacy of elections and affirms that democracy’s core value is that only the governed should determine who shall govern them, and they do so via elections. Further Masunungure (2014) argues that “Elections have not yet found a universally acceptable rival as the procedural core of democracy”. He however, acknowledges that most regimes now embrace and conduct elections to choose their leaders, although their motives for doing so may differ.

Maphunye (2015) identifies “pathologies” (problems) afflicting elections accountability and the “social contract” in Africa. He cites incidents that beset Africa’s elections which include “fraud; vote rigging; gerrymandering of election boundaries; stuffing of ballots with fake ballot papers; threats and intimidation of opposition supporters and candidates; the use of security agencies to harass, torture, and imprison political opponents; staffing of Election Management Bodies with party cadres or loyalists, bribery, cheating and several types of dishonesty”. Maphunye (2015) continues to say
contend that such pathologies or ills dilute the general will of the electorate and promote tendencies such as “state-sponsored electoral violence, suppression of democratic rights, the use of food parcels and other material benefits”.

To that, Sachikonye (2003:133) observes that in the pre-MDC era ZANU-PF possessed a “dominant party” status. However, authoritarianism and intolerance grew, especially in the late 1990s, manifesting in a proliferation of civil society organisations that strove for greater democratisation. There was a sudden boom of human rights organisations, labour unions, student unions, women’s groups, media organisations and constitutional reform advocacy groups. Sachikonye (2003) notes a noticeable growth in the density of civil society organisations, which became “sites of resistance to the growing state authoritarianism and governing party arrogance and intolerance”.

Among the matters contested by the state and the governing party on the one hand and civil society on the other were deficiencies in the electoral system. Further Sachikonye (2003) observes that invitations to domestic and international observer groups were selective and arbitrary and that violence and intimidation were widespread during the election campaign and immediately afterwards.

Maphunye (2015) contends that electoral violence is one of the major democracy deficits confronting contemporary Africa, “very often dictators and single-party regimes use elections for the accreditation of their illegitimacy. It is only when the quality of the electoral process is observed that elections can assist in entrenching democracy”.

To support the above views, Masunungure (2014:96) observes that the now commonly used and agreed minimum condition for democratic elections is that they be “free and fair”, and that it is their quality, rather than their quantity that matters. On the same note, he affirms that only free and fair elections foster democratization, whereas elections on an uneven playing field are “an institutional recipe for disguised autocracy”. Maphunye, (2014:1-5) further cites the cases of Kenya’s 2007 and Zimbabwe’s 2008 violent elections as some of a number of examples where the general will of the electorate was undermined resulting in compromise mechanism that is used to contain violence, the government of national unity.
Maphunye (2015:16-39) cites the “manipulation of the electoral process” as a serious problem besetting African politics and further argues that such compromise tends to suspend the voters’ choice or will; and might even result in the suspension of the constitution that guarantees citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms, citing Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Lesotho as examples. These problems, he purports, are a serious blow to Africa’s attempts to consolidate democracy; improve accountability and strengthen the social contract through elections. To that, Abuya (2009:158) argues that Kenya’s 2007 election was marred by horrific attacks and violence that resulted in arson, murder, and criminal acts during the post-election flare-ups that engulfed the country. The normative framework aimed at promoting and entrenching democracy such as Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO), ECF-SADC (2003) will be examined under section 2.8.

**2.5 Critique of the GNU**

LeVan (2011:3) has reservations about the positive impact of institutional power sharing on the quality of democratic politics arguing that such arrangements often provide a formal channel through which electoral losers can re-negotiate their return to power, and they can legitimise exclusive elite bargains that alienate citizens from politicians. Further, LeVan (2011), argues that when power-sharing is the result of an “extra-constitutional agreement” via a pact brokered between elites, it constitutes a “democratic reversal” because it side-steps the need for broad-based popular support.

Laws (2012:33) indicates that critics of the power sharing agreements in Kenya and Zimbabwe, for example, have complained that instead of selecting leaders according to a democratic mandate, they resemble “arbitrary bargaining processes, where the rules of the game can be renegotiated to determine the winner, and losers may reasonably demand power”.

However, Bratton and Masunungure (2011:41-55) argue that the failure of developmental progress in Zimbabwe can largely be attributed to the fact that, at
certain critical junctures, leaders accepted power-sharing arrangements that were hastily negotiated, largely imposed on the country by international actors and government representatives of the Southern Africa region, and accepted only with great reluctance. Commenting on the same note, Chigora and Guzura (2011:24) label the arrangement a “marriage of convenience” because parties were forced to commit by circumstances on ground that were characterised by the then political and economic turbulence within the country. Masunungure, in his article “Zim’s (sic) trajectory and way forward” that (Masunungure, 12/07/2013), wrote “Though a quarrelsome marriage, the GNU, dubbed a three-headed monster by Mugabe and as dysfunctional by many, including MDC ministers, it scored some impressive victories on various fronts”.

Due to ideological differences and external interference, the life of the GNU was not that smooth. The GNU survived many incredible challenges of continuity as evidenced by the numerous occasions when the former Prime Minister Tsvangirai sought SADC assistance during deadlocks. Chigora and Guzura (2011:23) weigh in and argue that “a government of national unity elevates the state above the will of the people; it is antithetical to democracy.” According to Ong’ayo (2008), while Kenya and Zimbabwe cannot be described as deeply divided polities or as having experienced conflicts of a highly intense nature, enormous powers vested in the presidency have been used to “command monopolistic access to available resources and exclusion to safeguard interests”.

Making inferences, Mukuhlani (2014:170), cites the case of Kenya which by 2008, was governed by a GNU between the rival Party of National Unity of Mwai Kibaki and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) of Raila Odinga following the 2007 presidential election and subsequent violence. This was due to the ODM winning the majority of seats in the National Assembly, but controversially losing the presidential election by a margin that has since been called into question for its validity.

According to Chigora and Guzura (2011:23), the Zimbabwe GNU was formed from the major parties as a result of the economic and political crisis. The logic behind it was that equitable participation would diminish the potential for conflict and enhance
prospects of national stability, integration and development. Zimbabwe’s GNU was formed through an accord among the main political parties’ leaders only, of ZANU-PF, MDC M and MDC-T, leaving out civil society organizations and other leaders and lesser political parties. Its inclusivity was therefore objectionable.

2.6 Theoretical Framework and Assumptions Underlying the Research

2.6.1 Assumptions

Events unfolding in Zimbabwe suggested that the GNU was acceptable and therefore legitimate. Gilley (2006:502) defines legitimacy as an endorsement of the state by citizens. Given that political legitimacy is a major determination of both the structure and operation of states, the assumption is that the Zimbabwe power-sharing arrangement or GNU was a legitimate dispensation of governance, whose authority warranted public consent and was therefore democratic. However, Gilley (2006:500) has argued that force and coercion cannot breed a legitimate government and underscores that where it is legitimate; the state enjoys the support of citizens “not because of fear or favour, but in light of their considered views of what is best from a public perspective”. Gilley (2006:500) further argues that a state is more legitimate when it is treated by its citizens as “rightfully holding and exercising political power”, implying that states that lack legitimacy are vulnerable to being overthrown or collapse. It is assumed that the GNU, although a transitional arrangement, lasted because it had public endorsement.

This study aims at exploring the legitimacy or lack of it, of the GNU and how this is perceived along different dimensions of the implementation of the GPA, as well as on the whole. In other words, the legitimacy of a GNU should be based on the outcome of issues that it is meant to address.
2.6.2 Theoretical Framework

Reference to theory is important in a study of this nature hence the position by Wolcott (1994:43) that, “Theory can serve both analytically and interpretively… and provides a way to link our case studies with broader issues.”

In exploring and analysing the research problem, the literature review process helped in identifying five theories; the elitist theory, the theory of targeted sanctions and ripeness theory, the GPA as a theoretical framework and the incumbency theory. [Note that all these theoretical frameworks will be defined and explained in detail in sub-headings to 2.6.2.1, 2.6.2.4, 2.6.2.7, 2.6.2.10 and 2.6.2.13]. It can be argued that the GNU concept finds resonance with the elitist theory propagated by Dahl (1998:38) and Mills (1956:274), because of its tendency to accommodate opposing political contenders while disregarding the electorate. Further, the literature review process helped in identifying the ripeness theory (Zartman, 1985:237), as a conceptual framework, and in analysing the role of targeted sanctions in the signing of the GPA. Further review of the relevant literature identified the GPA (2008) itself as a framework for the three political parties to work together in resolving the country’s crisis. Finally, the review of literature identified the preponderance of the incumbency theory (Mapuva, 2013:105) whereby incumbent political leaders are able to manipulate the political terrain for political gain, and this can be equated to the Zimbabwean GNU scenario. The theoretical frameworks are explored below.

2.6.2.1 Elitist Theory

Elitism as a theoretical concept has been a key term in social science. However, for comparative purposes, the writer will also highlight the pluralist theory and explain the theories, major ideas and outstanding writers in both elitist and pluralist political power. Further, the study shall attempt to compare and contrast the elitist and pluralist accounts of political power, find any similarities and any differences in both elitism and pluralism. Finally, the writer shall attempt to draw on which theory is most relevant to the case study.
According to Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987:382), the elite theoretical view tends to link together the top leaders in government, civic organizations, business, cultural establishments and the mass media. They further assert that power elite can effectively dictate the main goals for all important government policy making and dominate the activities of the major mass media by virtue of their control over organizations in the country. Further, Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987:383) argue that the power elite do not really depend upon their ability to garner mass support through efforts to represent the interests of broader social groups. However, the writers observe that elitist theoreticians differ among themselves on how open the power elite is to new blood and the degree of genuine concern for public welfare that enters into their choices of public policy goals.

In his theory, Mills (1965:161) argues that government exemplifies the elite in that power is held by a small group of people. He argued that functionally, power lies in the hands of a few elites and groups spread across economic, political and military institutions. He claims that they govern and make decisions for everyone in a nation-state. Mills (1965:162) further argues that elites are deemed to know what is good and beneficial for the masses by virtue of their position and resources at their command; “Whereas the elites are informed, sensible and considerate, the masses by contrast are ill-informed, apathetic and intolerant”.

Contrary to the elite theory, according to Dahl (1998:38), he stresses the role in politics played by associations, groups, and organizations. He asserts that in pluralism, and in liberal democracies, power should be dispersed among a variety of economic and ideological pressure groups and should not be held by a single elite or group of elites. Pluralism assumes that diversity is beneficial to society and that autonomy should be enjoyed by different functional or cultural groups within a society, including religious groups, trade unions, professional organizations, and ethnic minorities.

Further on pluralism, Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987:382) indicate that it entails specific institutional arrangements for distributing and sharing governmental power, therefore, implying that distribution of power prevents tyranny. When power is concentrated to
one group, there will be dictatorial rule. Nevertheless, by diffusing power, a state will be open to the demands of the population and this is essential to the theory.

On similarities, the Elite and Pluralist theory does offer matches. A principal notion shared by the two theories is that there are various interest groups in society, but these are all somehow dominated by an elite at the top of the organisation; as Michels (1966:364) asserted “Who said organisation, said oligarchy.” Organisations then are led by elites, but they have to be receptive to the demands of the interest groups. This does I feel reconcile the two theories of pluralism and elitism, even though they are supposedly opposed.

On dissimilarities, Michels (1966:365) writes that elitism finds power concentrated in the hands of a minority, while in direct contrast, pluralism believes power is dispersed through society, and assumes a kind of equal playing field, as not one interest group in pluralist theory is supposed to be more important than the other. However, elitism identifies politics as taking place in a domain characterised by structured inequalities. Elites have the domination of resources, such as military, economic or political power in order to impose themselves upon the masses. Elitism identifies the common people as being incompetent.

To Michels (1966:365), organizations are the only means for the creation of a collective will and they work under the “Iron Law of Oligarchy”. He explicitly points out the indispensability of oligarchy from the organizations by saying that "It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over electors......... of the delegates over delegators, who says organization, says oligarchy". He asserts that leaders have a natural greed of power and the masses have apathy for guidance of their need. When governing elite establishes its control over its subjects by using force, it therefore, becomes evident that any organization which is set up for autocratic aims is oligarchic by nature.

Michels (1966:364), argued that leadership itself is not compatible with the most essential conjectures of democracy, but indicates that leadership is a necessary phenomenon in every form of society. He points out that leaders arise spontaneously,
however, they become professional leaders, and irremovable. Michels (1966:100) further stated that leaders also have personal qualities that make them successful as a ruling class, citing a reciprocal relationship between leadership functions and the organizational structure. He is of a view that a majority of leaders abuse organizational opportunities for their personal aims by using their personal qualities and by creating means, organizational process or principles like party discipline.

2.6.2.2 Significance of Elitism to the Current Study
Elitism applies to the Zimbabwean GNU because the Zimbabweans did not choose a GNU, neither were they consulted about the suitability of that form of government for their country. In the GNU, the voice of ordinary Zimbabweans did not seem to matter, and their participation was limited. As reiterated by Chigora and Guzura, (2011:24), the GNU also led to the pacification of the civil society including the media which is supposed to play a critical role as a watchdog over government activities. However, the validity of elitism in this case derives from the fact that the GNU was meant to end hostilities and politically motivated violence which affected more on the citizenry than the political elites did. Achieving peace and stability was ultimately for the greatest good of all Zimbabweans.

Whereas in general democratic terms the utility value of an action is determined by the number of people it benefits; on the contrary, however, Mills (1956:274) is of the view that one has to realise that “the masses in actual fact wield very little power; therefore, the rationality of an elitist action is more critical than the number of people benefiting from it”.

2.6.2.3 Critique of Elitism Theory
Be that as it may, the elitist theory explained here has limitations. Chigora and Guzura (2011:23) argue that unity is not just about accommodation of the interests of political elites but “for unity to succeed it must grow upwards, from the people on the ground, and it must deal with the structural barriers to people’s economic and political participation”. Further, Chigora and Guzura (2011) pinpoint the limitations of the GNU arrangement which ended conflict but “failed to build a true democracy based on
tolerance, peace, truth and justice’ and that “fundamentally, all of GNU processes failed to build durable peace”.

### 2.6.2.4 Ripeness Theory

This research also considered the relevance of the ripeness theory and its role in enhancing mediation processes and how that manifests in the Zimbabwe case and elsewhere. Zartman (1985:237) defines ripeness as a mutually hurting stalemate, a situation in which “neither party thinks it can win a given conflict without incurring excessive loss, and in which both are suffering from a continuation of fighting, but neither side wants to back down or accept loss either. The conflict is judged to have entered a period of ripeness, a favourable moment for third party mediation”.

The theory has been developed in the conflict resolution and negotiation to describe a psychological situation in which parties who are involved in severe conflict which is no longer sustainable, are ready to negotiate and resolve the conflict either bilaterally or through mediation. The theory is analysed in this study to examine the role of those factors that led to the signing of the GPA in Zimbabwe on 15 September 2008.

The core elements of the ripeness theory explain how mediators decide how to time their entry into conflicts. Objective elements of ripeness are defined by Zartman (2000:229) as “circumstances under which a well-informed, dispassionate, and rational decision maker would conclude that negotiation is appropriate”. Further, he specifies two conditions that are necessary for rational policy makers to be receptive to negotiation, a “mutually hurting stalemate” (MHS) and a mutually “perceived way out”, Zartman (2000).

While the core elements of the ripeness theory were developed by Zartman (1985:236-237), the concept was popularized by authors such as Druckman and Green (1995) and Pruitt (1997). They generally describe ripeness as a condition when parties realize that they can no longer continue with the conflict without incurring further costs. The ripeness framework portrays conflict as a phenomenon that goes through stages, and the ripeness stage is that point when negotiation becomes possible. Zartman (2000:230) indicates that a time comes when both sides realize they are in a costly
deadlock that they cannot escape by escalating the conflict. Such a stalemate is especially motivating if augmented by “a recent or impending catastrophe”. Ripeness creates opportunities for settlement.

### 2.6.2.5 Significance of the Ripeness Theory to the Current Study

In the Zimbabwean scenario, the trigger to negotiation was a serious socio-economic and political deceleration characterised by severe political violence, economic downturn, the acute cholera outbreak that claimed the lives of hundreds of Zimbabweans and political violence. Chiumbu and Musemwa (2012:xix) discuss the impact the crisis had on “ordinary people” terming it a “humanitarian crisis”. Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010:2) described Zimbabwe’s economy in 2007 as having “…all the indicators of a country in severe distress”. The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR, 2010:1) describes this phenomenon as “a crisis of governance”, whereas Rupiya (2012:169) underscores a “protracted internal political crisis”. According to the BBC (26/11/2008), Zimbabwe was facing humanitarian crisis in food security, health and water sanitation, in particular a serious cholera outbreak that had killed hundreds of people and a dismally performing economy under sanctions.

The 29 March 2008 general elections had no outright winner for the country’s top post, leading to the holding of a presidential election run-off on 29 June 2008. On the one hand, the run-off failed the intended objective, as the major contestant, the MDC-T withdrew citing unprecedented and unbearable political violence on its electorate allegedly perpetrated by the governing party, ZANU-PF. However, the 2008 harmonised elections results indicated that although ZANU-PF claimed the presidency on technical grounds, it was difficult to form a legitimate government. According to Raftopoulos (2013:1), “ZANU-PF clung to power by violence but its legitimacy was completely eroded”.

Eppel and Raftopoulos (2008:6) observed the factors that contributed to a “hurting stalemate”, namely the humanitarian crisis; the desperate mood of the public in view of the severe socio-economic crisis that had been fully conjoined with the political crisis; and the lack of legitimacy after either party failed to be the outright winner of the March 2008 elections, despite the June 2008 run-off elections that were boycotted by
MDC formations. Eppel and Raftopoulos (2008:6) describe the mediation that ensued as a response to an “electoral crisis”, a mutually hurting stalemate, and the subsequent GNU as a “way out”.

2.6.2.6 Limitations of Ripeness Theory
Although the ripeness theory is powerful and well-grounded in case material, it is not without criticism. Pruitt (1997:238) argues that the ripeness theory only seeks to explain entry into negotiation without taking into consideration important factors such as human and material resources into the negotiation, risks such as political exposure and the concessions towards achievement of an agreement.

2.6.2.7 The Theory of Targeted Sanctions
Targeted sanctions contributed to perceptions of a mutually hurting stalemate towards ripeness. Smith-Höhn (2010:1-8) defines targeted sanctions as restrictive measures to “target a select group of political elites whose behaviour the sanctions had intended to influence, without jeopardising the national economy or exerting a negative impact on the humanitarian situation of the greater population”.

According to Davidsson (2002:6), the implied theory of economic sanctions is that by crippling the economy, the authorities of that territory are prevented from satisfying popular needs such as the supply of commodities, services and employment. Further, he says massive shortages that ensue are supposed to cause popular discontent, which would translate into a call for the removal of the authorities or pressure on the authorities to comply with external demands. According to Davidsson (2002), the theory is “thus predicated on causing civilian pain to achieve a political gain”. As both a carrot and stick strategy, targeted sanctions forced the ZANU-PF regime to succumb to pressure as it finally agreed to negotiation with the MDC formations.

Chingono (2010:66) weighs in and describes sanctions as measures that “connote the exercise of pressure by one state or coalition of states to produce a change in the political behaviour of another state or group of states”. Further, Chingono (2010) argues that targeted sanctions often termed “smart sanctions” are usually targeted at a small circle within the ruling elite of a given country and were developed as an
alternative to comprehensive sanctions that had proven to have a more devastating impact on the broader population than on those whose behaviour the sanctions had intended to influence. By implication, therefore, targeted sanctions must not have a devastating humanitarian impact but only need to cause sufficient hardship and discomfort to motivate the targeted regime to enter a dialogue with the international community.


2.6.2.8 Significance of the Sanctions Theory to the GNU

Targeted sanctions were imposed on President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF regime since 2001. Targeted sanctions imposed included travel bans on Mugabe and his wife, the ZANU-PF elite, including particular individuals, ranging from government officials, politicians, representatives of non-state entities, civilians, security personnel as well as business affiliates (such as mining companies), asset freezes and restrictions on conducting business with the targeted individuals and their institutions.

Smith-Höhn (2010:6) asserts that the MDC, the US and EU maintained that sanctions on Zimbabwe were measures to persuade ZANU-PF to meet international standards of a civilised nation by observing human rights, democratic principles and respect for the rule of law. According to the report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2008) the ICG had since 2003 recommended that” targeted sanctions on the ZANU-PF regime be maintained or even be expanded until there is visible reform from the regime”.

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As already highlighted above, the issue of targeted sanctions remained a paramount factor during the lifespan of the GNU with two extreme conditions being prescribed by the opposing parties. According to Smith-Höhn (2010:2), while on one hand there was a desperate call by ZANU-PF for “unconditionally lifting all illegal sanctions”, on the other hand, those who had imposed the sanctions called for “maintaining all targeted sanctions until every outstanding issue surrounding the GPA was resolved”. This could be equated to a stick and carrot scenario. A middle ground had to be found between the two extremes.

According to Jones (2011:35), Zimbabwe was forsaken by international donors who suspended lending facilities. As a result, in 2000, the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) suspended lending programmes to Zimbabwe because of failure to service accelerating arrears on existing loans. Jones (2011) describes the situation and that by 2008, Zimbabwe’s debt was unsustainable, and that debt distress earned Zimbabwe a ‘pariah status.’

In view of the debt burden, Zimbabwe’s economic development stagnated. The situation became a humanitarian crisis prompting a period of ripeness, a favourable moment for third party mediation. Sanctions became powerful catalysts that provided the necessary structure of incentives for leaders to come to the negotiating table. The conflicting parties noted that neither side could realistically govern the country without the other. Therefore, a negotiated transition agreement became an immediate response to the humanitarian crisis.

The relevance of the sanctions theory can be illustrated by the 1993 Oslo negotiations that led to the establishment of the Palestinian Self-Government Authority. According to Pruitt (1997: 237-250), both sides were experiencing a stalemate. Israel could not reach the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was far away in Tunis, and “The PLO had been politically and economically weakened by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and by the Arab retaliation for the PLO’s support of Iraq during the Gulf Crisis, curtailing its capacity to continue an effective campaign against Israel.”
Further, Pruitt (1997) indicates that Israel was also experiencing severe costs and a sense of hopelessness in trying to contain the First Intifada, a Palestinian uprising and both sides were aware of an impending catastrophe in the rise of militant Islam. The growing Hamas movement threatened to unseat the PLO as leader of the Palestinians, which would have been a catastrophe for PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. Israel’s new Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin also feared this development and foresaw the possibility that a fundamentalist Palestinian leadership would make common cause against Israel with militant Iran or a revitalized Iraq.

Pursuant to that, Pruitt (1997) indicates that in view of a recent near catastrophe, Iraqi missile attacks during the 1991 Gulf War strengthened this concern. Rabin had won the election with the promise that he would negotiate a settlement with the Palestinians, and he quickly learned that this negotiation could be done only with PLO participation. Pruitt (1997) says in addition, optimism about finding a way out grew rapidly in a series of secret meetings between lower-level personnel. Those meetings occurred at Oslo before the formal negotiations started. Both sides came to see that the other side was serious about wanting to end the conflict, and preliminary concessions from both sides enhanced this impression.

However, Pruitt (1997) observes that what seemed like a breakthrough in September 1993, twenty years later in 2013, the peace accord fell apart as it became apparent that the Israeli leadership had never been ready to grant the Palestinians a sovereign state. However, it must also be acknowledged that on contrary, the Palestinians (at least radical elements such as Hamas) never completely let go of their sworn intention to annihilate the Israeli state. According to the Aljazeera (24/09/2013), “the mutual acceptance between Israel and the PLO in 1993 was unequal. Without a mutual acceptance of each other’s right to live as free people in two sovereign and equal states, no two-state solution is possible”. However, when the parliament in Iceland in 2011 endorsed the recognition of Palestine as a sovereign and independent state within the 1967 borders, it sent a signal to the international community to act, denouncing the occupation and approving the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The Oslo Accords so far have not achieved that”. It is apparent that this particular GNU has failed.
However, as a concluding remark, one can question whether, in view of the sanctions, the GNU was a legitimate arrangement after all. Can coercion breed a legitimate government? Smith-Höhn (2010:1-8) observes that while on one hand sanctions gave the opposition MDC international recognition and legitimacy, on the other hand they gave ZANU-PF legitimacy as it secured support from the SADC and the AU. Smith-Höhn argues that the EU-Africa Summit was an example of this show of support and solidarity. The Summit was scheduled to take place in Lisbon in 2003 but had to be postponed after several African Heads of State and Government boycotted the event because Mugabe was not invited to attend. However, some AU member states such as Gabon, Botswana, Liberia and Nigeria questioned the legitimacy of Robert Mugabe and the country’s right to participate in African forums.

2.6.2.9 Critique of the Theory of Targeted Sanctions

The theory of targeted sanctions has been criticised for having inadvertent outcomes. Chigora (2007:117) interrogates the concept of smartness, alleging that these sanctions have had a devastating effect on the economy, subsequently hurting civilians. He dismisses the whole notion of smart sanctions, arguing that targeted sanctions’ debilitating impact on the economy also has a negative impact on the weaker members of society. Chigora (2007) concludes that the targeted sanctions “had a net effect of increasing nationalistic tone, real and rhetoric on the part of Mugabe government and accusing Britain of interfering in internal affairs of Zimbabwe and overall planning to put in place a puppet government that is controlled by the metropolitan former colonial power.” The sanctions become a key public justification for ZANU-PF to stall the GPA process.

Further to the above, according to Chigora and Guzura (2011:21) since 2000, SADC member states empathised with ZANU-PF and took the Zimbabwean crisis as a redress of the colonial legacy on the land question and had provided regional solidarity for Mugabe in the face of criticisms from the West. In the same vein, while the international community called for smart sanctions against Mugabe and key government officials, the African Union (AU) was quiet.
The review of the relevant literature revealed that sanctions can have unintended consequences. George (1991) discusses the potential “boomerang effect” of coercive diplomacy when he suggests that Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbour, and the subsequent entry of the USA into World War 2 stemmed from economic sanctions. George argues that the oil embargo the USA imposed on Japan in July 1941 was so credible and so potent that it quickly provoked Japanese leaders into making a very difficult and desperate decision to initiate war rather than capitulate to Washington’s extreme demands that it gets out of China and gives up its aspirations for regional hegemony in Southeast Asia.

Similarly, Kreisburg (2003:169) explains that sanctions can widen the conflict, add to its destructiveness and sometimes prolong it. Further, Kreisburg (2003) argues that sanctions are destructive to the targeted societies and points out that the post-Cold War sanctions have contributed more deaths than weapons of mass destruction used throughout history. Further still, Kreisburg (2003) cites the 1991 to 2001 Iraq war and estimates that hundreds of thousands of children died as a result of sanctions. George (1991:2) further suggests that sanctions can increase domestic support for the targeted leader. The population under threat can unite behind its leader and become hostile to the international community as happened in Zimbabwe. Further, George (1991) argues that external pressure can be used by leaders to ignore domestic troubles, placing the blame for economic instability on outsider, and providing political cover to further repress domestic dissidents, while directing resentment toward those who impose the sanctions.

However, on further review of the relevant literature with regard to the South Sudan case, it can be questioned whether the threats of sanctions impeded or expedited the peace process and subsequent healing and reconciliation in South Sudan. It seems the human costs of sanctions are unacceptable to people of South Sudan who have experienced untold suffering during the course of their struggle. Commenting in an online publication, the SouthSudanNation.com, Aliap (2015) argues that one key lesson we can all learn from history is that “punitive action should not be taken by or associated with the peace mediator and the United States and its partners are not exceptions”. He declares that the path of punitive action which the United States and
its allies are currently pursuing in South Sudan will not silence the guns; saying it would rather retard conflict resolution mechanisms already put in place by the South Sudanese themselves.

Aliap (2015) is assertive that any sanctions against the government of South Sudan will likely make it more intransigent. Further, Aliap (2015) cites the Burundi case arguing that the sanctions imposed on Burundi after the coup led by Pierre Buyoya in 1996 emboldened Hutu hardliners, undermined Tutsi confidence in reconciliation and strengthened extremists’ positions within the army and minority community by heightening their sense of vulnerability and persecution.

Further to the above arguments, Smith-Höhn (2010:6) weighs in by arguing that smart sanctions cannot single-handedly promote a peaceful transition hence the need for other processes such as astute mediation that would promote negotiations between rivals. In that case, targeted sanctions are perceived as a complementary tool, a precipitant for conflict resolution, not as a cause of resolution. On the same note, Smith-Höhn (2010) observes that the imposition of targeted sanctions on ZANU-PF alone was less effective in fostering democracy or compelling the ruling elite to change their tactics or behaviour, and argues that there was therefore, little empirical reason to maintain them. Smith-Höhn (2010) further argues that given that the sanctions were inadvertently used as a propaganda tool by the ZANU-PF, they did the MDC more harm than good by providing its opponents with a justification for stalling the ongoing negotiations around the full implementation of the GPA.

Pursuant to that, Masunungure (2009:7) indicates that the AU at its Summit held on 1 July 2008 at Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt opted instead to call for the formation of a government of national unity. By so doing, the AU effectively endorsed Robert Mugabe’s legitimacy as the President of Zimbabwe. Such a development helps to illustrate that sanctions do not always achieve their intended objectives.

2.6.2.10 The GPA Theoretical Framework

The increasing incidence of political conflict on the African continent and elsewhere because of disputed election outcomes has witnessed a corresponding upsurge in the
demand for effective conflict mitigation measures. In conflict situations, mediation can bring about political stability, promote democratic governance and enhance development and economic sustainability, thereby giving legitimacy to governing structure.

Following the 2008 election dispute, SADC intervened to find lasting peace in Zimbabwe. The intervention, under the mediation efforts of the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki led to the political opponents, ZANU-PF and the MDC formations, coming to the negotiating table. This culminated in the signing of the GPA (2008). The GPA was essentially a power-sharing arrangement in terms of which a new Government of National Unity was subsequently created on 11 February 2009. According to Mapuva (2013:107), GNUs are quick fix strategies that are meant to be short term or transitional while a more permanent strategy is being sought. The GPA was to determine the course of the GNU as it laid out a framework for a new inclusive government, a new constitution and a roadmap for the GNU leading to free and fair elections. This process was supported and endorsed by SADC, the AU and other international organisations.

The effectiveness of the GNU could also be judged according to the framework that created it that was the GPA (2008). It is against this background that this Chapter analyses the GPA (2008) and the extent to which the GNU implemented it.

The Global Political Agreement (2008) consists of 25 Articles, whose aspects essential to this study are,

- Article 1 and Article 2, Definitions and Declaration of Commitment, respectively;
- Articles 3-19, the Policy Agenda;
- The governmental arrangements called “framework for a new government” in Article 20 of the Agreement;
- Articles 21 to 24 being the interim measures and implementation mechanisms,
- Article 25 that specifies when the Agreement takes effect.

According to Masunungure (2009:5), the GPA framework provided a solid building block for a transition to democratic governance. It addressed procedural and substantive dimensions of governance, including the Road Map to achieving the set
objectives. Masunungure (2009) asserts that the GPA set out a framework for an inclusive government that would create an environment conducive for free and fair elections. Chigora and Guzura (2011:24) argue that although the GPA had its limitations, it was nevertheless a potential solution to political and economic problems bedevilling Zimbabwe. While it provided a framework for success, it was not clear whether the GNU as an implementing agency could realise its vision and mission. The broad tenets of the GPA (2008) framework are outlined in a Table 2.1 below:

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<td>11</td>
<td>Rule of Law, Respect for the Constitution and Other Laws</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Freedom of Assembly and Association</td>
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21-24 | Interim Measures and Implementation Mechanisms:
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21 | Electoral Vacancies
22 | Implementation mechanisms
23 | Periodic review mechanism
24 | Interim Constitutional amendments
25 | Commencement of the Agreement

### 2.6.2.11 Significance of the GPA Theoretical Framework

The Zimbabwe power-sharing context offered checks and balances against abuse of power by political parties in the GNU. The GPA laid out a framework that addressed procedural and substantive dimensions of governance, including the grand plan of achieving the set objectives. Above all, the GPA set out a framework for an inclusive government that would create an environment conducive for free and fair elections. Accordingly, the researcher used the GPA framework to measure the legitimacy of the GNU based on the restructuring of government, composition of the GNU, the executive and unilateral executive appointments, the Indigenisation Bill, human rights and political violence, the security sector reform, the new Constitution making process and the economy. As a mediation tool, the GPA framework provides the basis for a critical analysis of the GNU based on the above highlighted parameters.

This study also reviews literature on the restructuring and composition of the GNU in an attempt to bring out the implications for legitimacy of the power sharing arrangement. Masunungure (2009:6) argues that the sharing of power is expressed in the governmental structure, and that the governmental structure outlined in the Agreement is a measure of how much power has been shared or not shared. Article 20 of the GPA (2008) stated that the parties acknowledged that they had an obligation to establish a framework of working together in an inclusive government. This implied express willingness by the parties to the GNU to compromise, recognising that the formation of such a government would express the hopes and aspirations of Zimbabweans. In light of this, the GNU was therefore supposed to create conditions for returning Zimbabwe to stability and prosperity.
Article 20 dealt with probably the most contentious aspect of the GPA (2008). Under Article 20, Mugabe retained the Executive Presidency (head of State and Government) and portfolios of Commander–in-Chief of the Defence forces and Chair of Cabinet. Tsvangirai (MDC-T) became Prime Minister while Mutambara (MDC-M) became Deputy Prime Minister. The GPA awarded 16 Cabinet positions to the two MDC formations and 15 to ZANU-PF. The executive powers of the GNU lay in the President, the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Further, Masunungure (2009:7) comments on the two organs created at the apex of executive power, the Cabinet and the Council of Ministers. The author notes that one organ had executive authority while the other was a non-executive organ. While the Cabinet was headed by the President and both the Cabinet and the President enjoyed executive authority, the Prime Minister chaired the Council of Ministers, but the Council was not invested with executive authority. Masunungure (2009) argues that the Council of Ministers was merely a symbolic structure that did not exercise real power.

Commenting on Semi-Presidentialism as power-sharing, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA, 2014) observes that in France, in instances where the Prime Minister and the President are from different political parties, the Prime Minister directs domestic policy while the president is in charge of foreign policy. Therefore, what emerges is a semi-presidential executive where both the President and the Prime Minister exercised executive powers. To the contrary, Masunungure (2009:12) observes that while the GPA provided that the Prime Minister shall have executive authority, there was no clear government function outlined as the executive preserve of the Prime Minister either in domestic or foreign policy. The Prime Minister headed and supervised a Council of Ministers which in essence did not differ significantly from Cabinet.

Chigora and Guzura (2011:20-26), pinpoint that amongst the concerns which the GNU had to grapple with was the judiciary and legislative branches of government that had become entangled in partisan politics. The executive refashioned the courts to conform to its dictates. Chigora and Guzura (2011), cites the example of the office of the Attorney General (AG), which is argued to have been using its prosecutorial
powers selectively. The fact that the AG was a Presidential appointee created an obvious conflict of interest which neither guaranteed impartiality nor independence in the execution of duties. To that, Masunungure (2009:10) claims that Zimbabwe was a typical case of patronage politics that breeds a patronage economy and a patronage society. “No significant state institution and even so-called private institutions were outside the orbit of the command and control of ZANU-PF”.

The GPA, in creating the GNU, necessitated the expansion of government that seemed to work for failure than for success. According to Masunungure (2009:7), apart from the two centres of executive power in the form of President and Prime Minister, the GPA also provided for a top heavy and bloated Cabinet. The Zimbabwean GNU comprised of 309 members. This enlarged government could not be sustained by the economy for long.

2.6.2.12 Critique of the GPA Theoretical Framework
Masunungure (2009:9) advances a major argument that acceptance of a power sharing government is a rather poor substitute for a legitimately elected government; “by compromising on a second-best solution, the democratic political forces may lose sight of the ultimate goal of a democratic transition”.

Pursuant to the above arguments, Chigora and Guzura (2011:4) argue that although the GNU concept has an advantage of bringing peace and cooperation, it is a threat to democracy as the basic ethos of democracy will be at worst ignored or put into abeyance. Chigora and Guzura (2011) purport that through the removal of a government in waiting, confinement to specific political parties, the exclusion of civil society and other new political players and critics of government policy in institutions promoting democracy; “the GNU is clearly a negation of democracy.”

In the same vein, Dziva et al. (2013:84) argue that in a GNU the casualty is democracy, when the ruling incumbent refuses to hand over power after defeat. In that regard, elections lose legitimacy as instruments of leadership selection and democracy. Dziva et al. (2013) argue that elections become arbitrary bargaining processes, “where the rules of the game can be renegotiated to determine the winner and losers reasonably
demand power”. Echoing the same sentiments, Mapuva (2013:106) asserts that despite the potential to curtail conflict, “GNUs are a fragile form of institutional arrangement that does not guarantee peace but harbours a high risk of disintegration”.

To that, Ndakaripa (2015:2) argues that power-sharing governments are less effective in promoting economic development because political groups which constitute them often formulate and implement policies to promote their interests at the expense of national interests. Further, Ndakaripa (2015) claims that power sharing governments often experience policy gridlocks and ineffective governance detrimental to economic development because state institutions and government departments which implement policies are often run on a partisan basis. The author concludes that although GNUs have short-term advantages of halting conflicts, this is at the expense of long-term objectives of establishing democracy, effective governance, political certainty and stability. Although the GNU is legitimate as a conflict resolution strategy, it is found wanting in implementation and sustainability.

2.6.2.13 The Preponderance of Incumbency Theory.
According to Mapuva (2013:105), there is a phenomenon in African politics called the preponderance of incumbency. The theory stipulates that it is difficult to defeat incumbent ruling elites in an election because they control the state institutions, which they can use to retain power. The theory maintains that incumbent political leaders are able to manipulate the political terrain for political gain. Generally, parties in power would hardly accept value systems that limit or take away their power, while minority or disempowered groups readily accept any value system that promises them power. This study will also examine the implications of the incumbency theory on the implementation of the GPA. Further, other important factors that might have direct or indirect implications on the pattern of politics and political conduct in the GNU are discussed. Mapuva (2013) asserts that factors such as “customs, norms, liberation war credentials and behavioural attributes of the leadership of political parties” have implications on the conduct of the GNU.
Significance of the Preponderance of Incumbency Theory

A review of the relevant literature enabled the researcher to seek to explain how and why the former governing party, ZANU-PF, was able to maintain its dominance and influence in the political landscape during the tenure of the GNU.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:15-16) asserts that, ZANU-PF’s legitimacy came not from elections but from the liberation struggle and that ZANU-PF’s historical legitimacy stood in direct contrast to the election results of 2008, hence the solidarity within Southern African national-liberation movements. This view is supported by Mutisi (2011:5) who argues that Zimbabwe’s GNU presented SADC leaders with a daunting task of supporting a Pan-African and liberation movement against a background of the international condemnation of the ZANU-PF regime. Mutisi (2011) further argues that Robert Mugabe is perceived within SADC “as a paragon of African nationalism” while to African leaders in the region favour of Mugabe as opposed to Tsvangirai was based on pragmatism. Supporting labour-based opposition politics in the SADC region would be tantamount to political suicide for many Southern African leaders who are afraid that the gesture would catalyse similar labour movements in their own countries.

The incumbency factor played to the advantage of ZANU-PF as it manifested itself in various forms during the GNU, among which were the implementation of the economic indigenisation Act and the land reform. Ndakaripa (2015:1-43) explains how ZANU-PF used its incumbency and structural advantage to marginalise the MDC parties in implementing the Indigenisation Act. To that assertion, Raftopoulos (2013:51) argues that under the GPA, the MDC formations were always at a disadvantage against a party that continued to control the coercive arms of the state and persistently blocked key reforms in the agreement.

To add to the incumbency argument, Mapuva (2013:105-116), asserts that during the rule of the GNU, Tsvangirai played a subservient role to Mugabe. During Mugabe’s absence on foreign trips, Tsvangirai played a secondary role to Vice President, Joice Mujuru. Robert Mugabe retained key ministries for ZANU-PF, the defence and security, police, foreign affairs, mining and media. Less powerful ministries such as
health and education were left to the MDC although the MDC was allocated Finance, a strategic resources allocation Ministry.

In view of the above, one can argue that ZANU-PF managed to use its incumbency position to its advantage during the tenure of the GNU thereby considerably regaining lost legitimacy in the process.

2.6.2.15 Critique of the Incumbency Theory

Electoral processes in Africa reveal that most incumbent leaders win the elections they contest. Political analysts of democratisation and transitions in Africa such as Masunungure (2008), Mapuva (2010) and Chigora and Guzura (2011) have suggested that elections are often meaningless because incumbents (usually win. However, the victory of the opposition candidate, Michael Sata, in the 2011 Zambian elections, was in defiance of the incumbency theory. In order to be relevant to African political change in the context of democratisation, the incumbency theory must articulate the nature of campaigning including the political strategies that parties employ to mobilise electoral support, and to local dynamics that are often critical to national outcomes. The incumbency theory does not provide clear explanation as to why this incumbency advantage exists in government formation.

2.7 The GNU and its Implications for Political Legitimacy

This dissertation seeks to explore the various conceptions covering discussions and broader debates on political legitimacy, specifically as they relate to the GNU. Further, the study endeavours to examine the paradox that the GNU, an act of compromise, was a democratic and legitimate conflict resolution strategy. Fraser (1974:117) underscores that GNUs in the aftermath of disputed elections only reclaim some measure of legitimacy and that reclaiming true legitimacy in such a situation can only be achieved through a fresh, free and fair election held in accordance with the law. Fraser (1974) argues that the mere fact that GNUs are based on disputed elections means that their legitimacy remains dented. A fully legitimate government is one in which legality (legally constituted) and legitimacy converge. “Such a convergence
cannot be found in the instance of a unity government founded on a disputed election outcome that remains unresolved, (Fraser, 1974:117).

The review of the literature has revealed views that acknowledge the logic behind the GNU that equitable participation will diminish the potential for conflict and enhance prospects of national stability, integration and development. To the contrary, however, are the views that GNUs negate democracy and promote the status quo and hence are not effective as they tend to prolong the problems they are meant to address.

Gilley (2006:500) defines political legitimacy as the popular acceptance of a governing authority or a regime. He argues that a government is not legitimate unless it is carried on with the consent of the governed and that legitimacy is considered a basic condition for governing, without which a government will suffer legislative deadlock.

Clark (2005:278), an international relations scholar, is of the view that legitimacy is what defines both “rightful conduct and rightful membership in society”. His main focus in terms of rightful conduct is on such practices as “sovereignty, nationalism, diplomacy, the balance of power, great power management, what constitute the actors and the rules of the game of international society”. Further, Clark (2005) argues that legitimacy is not to be discovered simply by straightforward application of other norms, such as legality and morality. Instead, he articulates that, “legitimacy is an inherently political condition”. By implication, what determines its attainability or not is as much the general political condition of international society at any one moment, as the conformity of its specific actions to set normative principles, (Clark, 2005).

Suchman (1995:571) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” He argues that legitimacy is a core value, which refers to effectiveness, efficiency, accountability and the control of power by checks and balances. Further, Suchman (1995) is of the view that legitimacy is depicted as an operational resource which is “conferred when stakeholders endorse and support an organization’s goals and activities.” This implies that legitimacy was a conferred status on the GNU. As such, it can be argued that
parties to the GNU had a strong interest in their actions being considered legitimate by their electorate and that acceptance of their actions as legitimate was a prerequisite for their performance in the GNU.

According to Masunungure (2009:6) legitimacy entails “citizens' attitudes toward the functioning of the GNU, while at the international level, it entails the recognition and acceptance of the government in place by other governments”. Cohen (1997:67-92) argues that talk about the common good is one thing and that sincere efforts to advance it are another. “There is certainly no guarantee that parties will operate ..., since there are no guarantees of anything in politics.” Further, Cohen (1997) argues that everyone has a fair opportunity to hold public office and to influence the outcome of political decisions; that “all citizens are to have an equal right to take part in, and to determine the outcome of, the constitutional process that establishes the laws with which they are to comply”.

Mapuva (2010:247-263) is also of the view that the paradox of the national unity governments is that they rarely produce national unity. Mapuva’s views are echoed by Clark (2005:278) who believes that, “What is legitimate is not always good.” These sentiments are attributed to the fact that although the GNU made some strides in institutionalising democracy, much ground was still to be covered. However, despite the shortcomings of the GNU, the positive developments that emerged during its tenure can be credited to all the parties involved. Mutisi (2011:3) indicates that the GPA brought about visible changes in Zimbabwe’s political and economic terrain, in particular, the establishment of fiscal sanity and the regression of hyperinflation. In that regard, the GNU scored a big success and gained legitimacy. The positive economic policy shifts and reform agenda during the short period following the formation of the GNU helped to transform and bring stability to an economy and the improved general standards of living of people in the country.

The following section examines the key framework for institutionalising democracy under the AU and SADC guidelines.
2.8 Institutionalising Democracy

The review of the relevant literature also enabled the researcher to explore regional and international guidelines and best practices on democracy, in particular the AU and SADC guidelines. Contributing to the debate on the most desirable form of democracy, Mapuva (2013:95) argues that a democratic set up must constitute essential features namely: a political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections, protection of human rights, the rule of law in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens and active participation of the people as citizens in politics and civic life.

Elklit and Svensson (1997:33) identify key principles for each electoral process that make up “free and fair, credible, and legitimate elections in a climate of peace and security.” Zimbabwe subscribes to the 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, (SADC, Revised, 2015); the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG, 2007) and; the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO, 2003). The PEMMO was spearheaded by civil society and the Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC (ECF-SADC) while the parliamentarians, (SADC-PF) developed the Norms and Standards for elections in the SADC Region.

Following an evaluation of the reports of SADC Election Observers, submitted over the years, which, in some instances, either reflected stakeholder concerns with electoral processes in the region; or pointed to the limitations of the 2004 regional framework, the regional bloc embarked on a three-year revision of the 2004 Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. The 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines were revised because they did not define concepts such as “free and fair” and how they were to be scientifically measured. These terms were understood differently by different stakeholders, including the media, and this created confusion about the validity of the outcome. Since the review of the 2004 Principles and Guidelines, SADC uses four different objective measures to gauge electoral integrity in addition to the traditional and often controversial notion of “free and fair”: These include “credible”, “peaceful” and “transparent”.

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The 2004 Principles and Guidelines did not have provisions on how observers were to be identified, trained or retrained. Further, the Short Term Observation (STO) as a methodology did not conform to global and continental trends in adopting comprehensive Long Term Observation as a technique that could contribute to early detection of triggers of conflict and to electoral integrity. Article 4 of the SADC Treaty of 1992 stipulates that “human rights, democracy and the rule of law” are principles guiding the acts of its members; and Article 5 commits the Member States to “promote common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions, which are democratic, legitimate and effective”. Taking all the factors and contributions into consideration, the revised SADC Principles and Guidelines were adopted by the Ministerial Committee of the Organ on 20 July 2015 at Pretoria, South Africa.

The revised Guidelines have been aligned with UN Treaty law, the AU’s Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, and electoral frameworks promoted by SADC PF and ECF-SADC. Further, the revised framework can help SADC streamline its conflict prevention and mediation structures. Zimbabwe has adopted the revised SADC Principles and Guidelines on Democratic Elections. Collectively these instruments postulate that democracy is more than periodic elections. These instruments provide member-states with broad guidelines or normative framework on democracy. Elections, therefore, play an important role in the larger project of democracy. Chiroro (2005:38) opines that democracy, however, should not be reduced to the process of elections only. The author argues that it is a mixed bag of elements that transcend the mere holding of election; they are nevertheless hailed as “the heart of the democratic order”, and “a hallmark of democracy”.

However, Mapuva (2013:107) argues that these frameworks cannot suffice unless member states create matching national institutions to cultivate democracy. To that, Mapuva (2013) is of the view that, for democracy to take root, it requires the creation of State institutions that ensure that there are free and fair electoral practices, accountability, inclusiveness, transparency, gender equality, tolerance and respect for diversity. AU and SADC member-states, including Zimbabwe, are obliged to
internalise these democratic principles and mainstream them in their national legislation.

Maphunye (2015:16-39), argues that although SADC member states seem to be united in attempts to ensure continental and international election management best practices and the promotion of democratic governance in many spheres of their countries, to the contrary he observes the lack of domestication of regional and continental instruments, and in particular the general electoral norms, standards and principles. He argues that this remains a key challenge in the SADC region’s road towards rapid electoral systems and processes. Further, although Maphunye (2015:16-39) acknowledges that the SADC region faces many challenges in implementing the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and regional instruments on elections, democracy and governance, he underscores that if member states are serious about addressing their socio-economic, political and development challenges, they should wholeheartedly address these implementation challenges. Maphunye (2015:16-39) concludes that much more needs to be done in terms of political will and resource allocation, to commit countries that have signed and ratified to the implementation of the Charter.

Therefore, the cumulative upshot of the above arguments by Maphunye (2015) is that, despite their justifications, the resort to GNUs in the aftermath of disputed elections is not a sufficient strategy in promoting sustainable peace and consolidated democracy. This presents a good cause to argue that strategies should be put in place to avert similar resorts in the future. At one level, the strategies should entail institutional reforms. In this regard, there must be consensus over the rules of the game, independent electoral bodies, independent judiciaries, and a range of other structures aimed at entrenching democratic ethos. If translated into practice, such reforms would guarantee free and fair elections.

Thus, for Zimbabwe, ZEC was then constituted to entrench and safeguard democracy in terms of Constitutional Amendment 19 (Act 1 of 2009). This was a result of the Global Political Agreement’s Road Map to free and fair elections. SADC pledged to assist Zimbabwe towards peaceful, free and fair elections by ensuring polls that are
held under SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. The GNU sought to make the electoral system more democratic and legitimate. Therefore, AU and SADC intervention in Zimbabwe should thus be seen against this backdrop of promoting good governance, social justice, rejection of unconstitutional changes of government, as well as protection of human rights. In a nutshell, AU/SADC intervention embraced prevention, mediation and peace-building.

The review of the relevant literature entailed further evaluation of the relevant public institutions in Zimbabwe to determine whether in their current state they were suitable for cultivating democracy during and after the GNU.

2.9 Conclusion

Power sharing transitional arrangements seek to create a legitimate, stable and inclusive political environment through which reforms can be implemented. One of the objectives of this chapter was to review the relevant literature to show a link between the broader process of democratisation and the specific aspects of the electoral process. In a functional democracy, competitive elections should perform a corrective and empowering function and serve to promote legitimate change and/or renewal of government. However, as highlighted above, the paradox of elections is that while they form the interstice of democratic governance, they are in fact the major cause of conflict in the African set up and Zimbabwe has not been spared. From the foregoing, it is arguable that the increasing incidence of political conflict on the African continent and elsewhere as a result of disputed election outcomes has witnessed a corresponding upsurge in the demand for effective conflict mitigation measures. The view that in conflict situations, mediation can bring about political stability and promote democratic governance thereby giving legitimacy to governing structures has influenced the conduct of this study.

The next chapter provides a detailed explanation of the methodological considerations of the research project.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to present the methods employed by the researcher in gathering and analysing data for this study. Wisker, (2008:67) defines methods as the vehicles and processes used to gather data. The research methodology employed in this study is the qualitative approach while the research design pursued is the case study (defined below). In addition, this study alludes to comparative study of specific cases of negotiated agreements elsewhere, such as Kenya.

Further, the Chapter analysed the quality of the research methods used as well as the research ethics involved and it concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the study. The researcher is of the view that this study will contribute to current and future debates on the legitimacy of GNUs as negotiated agreements, especially in Africa.

3.2 Description of the Overall Research Design

The researcher applied qualitative methods in data collection and analysis. This work adopts a library-based research methodology. In this respect, the study mainly involves the analytical study of documented works on the subject matter. Zimbabwe forms the case study of the work not least because it provides the most recent experience relevant to the study. According to Druckman et al. (1995:299) researchers use various ways of studying negotiations including laboratory experiments, simulations and games. Zartman (1997:3-19) presents quantitative and qualitative surveys, observations of actual negotiations and in-depth case studies as some of the various methods of studying negotiations. However, many studies on negotiated agreements are largely qualitative, making use of secondary data as well as subjective evidence from participants in the negotiations.

This dissertation is an interpretative (descriptive or explanatory) case study on the Zimbabwe GNU as it further disentangles the concept of GNUs as model of conflict resolution and prevention. The researcher employed desktop research for qualitative
data collection. According to Maree (2012:82) desk research is tracking down useful existing pre-published information (also known as secondary research). Due to the importance of the various perspectives from researchers on the GPA and the GNU, the researcher employed a qualitative research method of gathering data; an intensive document review and an in-depth content analysis of books, newspapers, reviewed published articles, various online sources and electronic media including radio and social media. Primary documents such as the GPA (2008) policy document were also explored.

3.3 Qualitative Research Methodology

Creswell (2007:250) defines qualitative study as “an inquiry process of understanding a social problem based on building a complex, holistic picture”. Durrheim (2006) argues that qualitative designs help researchers to uncover detailed insights about the phenomena being investigated as they unfold in real-world situations. To that, Leedy and Ormrod (2005:133) are of the view that all qualitative research focuses on phenomena that occur in natural settings; and studying those phenomena in all their complexity; while Flick (2006:33) argues that the qualitative approach is suitable for the study of social representations because it involves analysing everyday knowledge and processes with respect to the social construction of reality.

Further to the above views, Wisker (2008:75) articulates that qualitative research is carried out “to understand meanings, interpretations; describe and understand experience, ideas, beliefs and values”. Concurring with Leedy and Omrod (2005:133), Carson, et al. (2001:66), also argue that the goal of qualitative research is to gain an in-depth understanding of the factors related to a phenomenon and to uncover the deeper meaning of the lived experience”. Pursuant to that, Labuschagne (2003) is of the view that qualitative methods typically produce a wealth of detailed data about a much smaller number of people and cases. Further, it provides depth and detail through direct quotation and careful description of situations, events, interactions and observed behaviours. His emphasis is on real life experience and the meaning of the phenomena observed.
This study therefore, employs a qualitative research approach to the problem. Through qualitative research, the researcher could identify the perceptions and relevance of the elitist theory, the theory of targeted sanctions and the factors that propelled ripeness as well as the incumbency theory. Further, the qualitative research method enabled the researcher to disentangle the processes of the GNU framework as they relate to the concept of GNUs as models of conflict resolution.

### 3.4 A Case Study Approach

The procedure followed in this study is that of an exploratory single case study of the Zimbabwe GNU. Wisker (2011:216) defines a case study as a strategy for doing research which involves “an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context using multiple sources of evidence.” In other words, it focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings to gain insight into a situation, person or community. Creswell (2007:250) argues that a case study tries to illuminate on a decision or a set of decisions, why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what result. In this study, the researcher therefore tries to illuminate, investigate and explore the GNU in Zimbabwe as a legitimate strategy for establishing conditions favourable for democracy. Further, the intention is not to produce statistical data but to build a foundation of general ideas and tentative theories that can be explored later with more precise and complex research design.

Miles and Huberman (1994:25) define a case study as a phenomenon in a “bounded context, a unit of analysis in a qualitative study”. The implication is that a case study has the limitation of providing insight on one theme or idea and cannot be used to represent a wider population. Further, Flick (2006:141) pronounces that the term case study may refer to an individual, a community, an activity, an event, a programme, or an organisation. In this study, the GPA framework that formed the GNU represents a bounded system and therefore forms the subject of investigation. Of significance however, is the appreciation that the case study which is the Zimbabwean GNU in this instance does not represent a sample. Its goal is to expand and generalise theories and not to enumerate frequencies. In other words, the case study method generalises as opposed to particularising analysis. It is opposed to a quantitative research that
uses questionnaires whose responses can be counted, measured and statistically analysed. Berg (2009:318) argues that case studies allow the researcher to capture “nuances, patterns and more latent elements that other research approaches might overlook.” The case study research design is therefore, particularly suited to this exploratory study on the GNU.

### 3.5 Data Collection

The researcher employed desktop research, defined by Maree (2012:88) as the gathering and analysing of information, already available in print or published on the internet. The researcher also undertook intensive document analysis of books, newspapers, peer-reviewed articles and various online sources in collecting data on an identified select group. For the purpose of this study, media sources were categorised into the pro ZANU-PF and pro MDC. Findings show that state-controlled media or public media, such as ZBC radio and television, the Herald and Sunday Mail, among others, were sympathetic to the government, as they would report more on categories which make the Zimbabwean government look more efficient. The opposite obtained with regards to independent media or private media that carried the voice of the MDC-T and MDC, Nehanda Radio and Studio 7, The Standard, The Zimbabwe Situation, The Zimbabwe Independent, Sokwanele online news, New Zimbabwe and Newsday, among many.

The study identifies a select group viewed as the most appropriate for qualitative data collection. The select group consists of people or organisations that have knowledge or information and are familiar or actively involved in the political developments in Zimbabwe. They are selected mainly for their expertise and closeness to the subject of GNUs and democratic legitimacy regardless of being citizens or non-citizens and regardless of being situated in or outside the country. As such, data collection includes voices or verbatim quotations of ordinary Zimbabweans giving their views on the GNU/GPA; and the parties themselves narrating their experiences. This includes other members of the parties' different structures such as youth, women, and war veterans; representatives or members of the governments accused of seeking to effect a regime
change agenda in Zimbabwe; views from regional, continental and international organisations including former members of the South African mediation or negotiation team/s giving their own post-event reflection (even if they were doing so anonymously).

The print media has remarkably reported on some of the performances, successes and challenges/failures encountered during the implementation of the GPA during the period 2009 to 2013 (the tenure of the GNU) and the post GNU period up to June 2016. Some of the works so far published on the subject have been undertaken by a diversity of academics, political analysts and observers as well as social commentators and journalists. This study, therefore, considers this multiplicity and diversity of views, interpretations and opinions in synthesising the literature selected for this review. The selection process was also carried out by taking cognisance of political propaganda and political commentaries that often modified the existing interpretations in the literature. In this regard, only the resources that were most relevant to the subject matter were selected and used.

The conduct and argument of this research is guided by the view propounded by Stedman (1997:231), that in conflict situations, “mediation can bring about political stability, promote democratic governance and enhance development and economic sustainability, thereby giving legitimacy to governing structure(s)”. For this purpose, historical primary and secondary documents were analysed. The use of secondary data enabled the researcher to cross-check primary data, such as the GPA (2008) thereby enhancing content validity of data. The researcher analysed relevant legislative instruments and policy documents such as the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (SADC, 2004) revised in 2015, Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO,2003), Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC, 1992) and the COPAC Draft Constitution (2013). The documents were immensely useful on country reports, resolutions, declarations and communiqués on Zimbabwe from SADC and the African Union which provided insight into the role of African leaders in the negotiated settlement. The documents were useful in providing an informed analysis of the GPA. Further, secondary data was collected from sources in
the social sciences journals, documentation by political commentators, academics/researchers from organisations such as the Media Institute of Southern Africa Zimbabwe (MISA), Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Institute of Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), Mass Public Opinion Institute, Southern African Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust, and the UN Institute for War and Peace and examination of key policy documents on the implementation of the GPA during the GNU. Both state controlled and independent media publications were searched for appropriate data for this study.

3.6 Data Analysis

According to Blanche, et al. (2006:32), data analysis entails that the research findings be analysed and presented so that they can be meaningful to the end users. Data collected from the various media platforms on the Zimbabwe GNU includes the following dimensions:

- Whether the GNU was a threat or an opportunity;
- Whether the GNU proffered a conducive environment for a culture of democracy;
- The role of SADC in the GNU
- Whether Zimbabwe was ready for democratic changes.

Under the democracy factor, the researcher gathered views on the constitution making process, the security sector reforms, human rights violations and electoral reforms and processes.

The researcher therefore transformed collected data into meaningful form taking into account original research questions. The research utilized the qualitative content analysis method to analyse the findings. Krippendorff (1980:103) and Leedy and Ormrod (2005:142) concur in their definition of content analysis that it is a detailed and systematic examination of the contents of a particular body of material for the purpose of identifying patterns, themes or biases. The authors point out that content analysis need not necessarily be a stand-alone exercise, for example, it was possible to
establish, through the analysis of data collected, some correlations between the internal Road Map of the GNU on democratic reforms and the public/opposition/regional and international response in order to conclude whether the GNU was a success.

This study employed content analysis which was utilised in order to give the collected data scholarly interpretation of the GNU, taking into consideration that its implementation was a process taking place within a specific time frame. The researcher identified the presence of words or phrases within text, underlying political science concepts and principles, such as conflict management, conflict resolution, political inclusion, “free and fair elections”, human rights, legitimacy and democratic governance, which were highlighted to illustrate the legitimacy of the GNU. However, according to Chigora and Guzura (2011:22), in unpacking the paradox element of the GNU, the question that needs to be answered is to what extent have the democratic rights translated into meaningful and credible formation of government? In other words, data analysis helped the researcher to establish a relationship among the variables depicted from the GPA (2008) framework and the objectives it was set to achieve; and to critically analyse the extent to which the GPA, (an act of compromise), upheld democracy.

The researcher observed that the GNU was however, a much more complex process. Its performance was influenced by multiple factors external to the political parties and their internal institutional structures and processes. The researcher analysed data on an interplay of external factors such as the sanctions, the different party ideologies and socio-economic conditions, that influenced the GNU including the character and behaviour of political parties and eventually determining the course of the inclusive government. For example, data analysis attests that, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) in Raftopolulos (2013:13), regional concern was focused on the restoration of stability rather than regime change, and this in turn influenced the shape of the mediation. Further, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, (2013) asserts that the important liberation movement ties that secured ZANU-PF’s power and regional support are contrasted with the MDC’s regional isolation and the fact that it only succeeded in cultivating good relations with the West and the US. This is clearly the case in this research where the
three different political parties embraced divergent ideological platforms that significantly influenced the character, composition and behaviour of each political party but still brought them together in an inclusive government. Therefore, an objective analysis of data becomes a prerequisite to policy formulation and decision making with regards to negotiated agreements.

3.7 Research Ethics

Bryman and Bell (2007), state that a researcher must ensure credibility and dependability of data when evaluating qualitative research. To that, Christian (2005:140) attributes credibility and dependability to careful use, interpretation, examination and assessment of appropriate and relevant literature. This implies the need to justify the appropriateness of qualitative research methodologies employed in a study.

The researcher paid particular attention to these aspects in the execution of this study and ensured that data is accurate to avoid unethical fabrications and fraudulent materials. The researcher also avoided using language that is biased, for example owing to political affiliation and was sensitive in the use of vocabulary. Finally, the research complied with UNISA’s ethical practices and principles which include, among others, consent by respondents to participate in any study.

3.8 Limitations of the Research

Like many research studies, this one has its own limitations. The first of these arises from the time period in which the study took place. While the researcher would have focussed on the GNU tenure up to 2013 general elections, there has been consideration for the post 2013 period extending to June 2016. The second limitation arose from the research pattern. Given that qualitative research is subjective in nature, the findings could be disputed as complete objectivity is arguable. The views obtained from literature review cannot be representative of the entire Zimbabwean nation.
There is abundance of literature on the GNU in Zimbabwe, from various academics that include Chigora and Guzura (2011), Masunungure (2009), Mapuva (2010), Maunganidze (2009), Maphunye (2015), Mukoma (2008), Mukuhlani (2014), Munemo (2012), Mutisi (2011) Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013), Raftopoulos (2013), Rupiya (2012), just to mention a few. This makes data analysis and interpretation time consuming.

In addition, most of the literature available on the GNU was produced during the unfolding of political processes in Zimbabwe and hence may represent a myopic view of political processes bound by time frames and propaganda sentiments. It is worth noting that in this research, data collected largely presents official party positions which may be lacking in objectivity and independence. This may to some extent, compromise the reliability and in some cases validity of the findings and any inferences or conclusions drawn on the basis of the data available. One cannot safely rule out the fact that data may be unreliable depending on personal biases, political affiliation and idiosyncrasies of sources consulted.

However, the obtaining scenario may necessitate further research on the post-GNU period, since the outcomes of a political process may not necessarily be bound by time frames, in this case, beyond the GNU time frame to June 2016, when the study is concluded. Further, knowledge produced might not generalize to other settings, as findings may be unique to the Zimbabwean situation that may not necessarily be replicated elsewhere.

3.9 Summary

This chapter outlined the overall research design in which qualitative, exploratory and case study approaches converged. The research methods used in this study were described. The sampling strategy was discussed with reference to both primary and secondary sources that include policy documents, communiqués, reports, books, academic research materials, journals, newspapers, and all possible and credible sources. The data collection and data analysis methods were explained and the quality of the research design was assessed. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and analyses the research findings. An in-depth analysis of relevant literature was conducted over the GNU period and beyond (to June 2016), to find the views on the GNU of ordinary Zimbabweans, Members of Parliament of different political parties, political analysts, human rights groups and organisations such as the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA). An in-depth analysis was carried out on views on political violence, constitutional reforms and the Road Map to free, fair and credible elections, governance and inclusivity, accountability and transparency, democratic legitimacy and human rights issues, sanctions, security sector reforms, the role of SADC in the GNU and the role of the media. The data collection technique used in the study is content analysis. Leedy and Ormrod (2005:142) define content analysis as a “...detailed and systematic examination of the contents of a particular body of material for the purpose of identifying patterns, themes or biases”.

The researcher assessed the effectiveness of the GNU according to the policy agenda of the framework that created it, namely the GPA (2008). It was therefore possible to establish, through the analysis of data collected, some correlation between targets as set out in the GPA and the actual outcome (s) obtaining at the end of the inclusive government.

The researcher used the following benchmarks as laid out in the GPA, Global Political Agreement, (2008:2-9):

- Peace and stability;
• Economic recovery;
• The constitution;
• National healing;
• Rule of law and human rights;
• Security of persons and prevention of violence;
• Freedom of assembly and association;
• Freedom of expression and communication;
• Impartiality of the state organs;
• External interference and the unconditional removal of sanctions and measures; and the land question.

Further, data analysis of other pertinent factors and emerging patterns that could have largely influenced the trends of politics and political conduct in the GNU, such as targeted sanctions; liberation war credentials; behavioural and personal attributes of the leadership of political parties and cultural norms of the generality of Zimbabweans, were also analysed and their implications for legitimacy in the GNU. Data analysis also examined the emerging political patterns such as those attributed to the preponderance of incumbency theory and how such patterns could have influenced the implementation of the GPA. By so doing, the researcher therefore tried to reveal, in a detailed analysis, the perceived legitimacy of the inclusive government or lack of it.

This chapter serves as the basis for the recommendations and conclusions in Chapter Five. As mentioned in the introduction, the study sought to support or to refute the view that the Global Political Agreement (GPA) as a conflict resolution and prevention strategy, would give political legitimacy to the Government of National Unity (GNU) and that the GNU was indeed a viable option to conflict resolution.

4.2 Restatement of the Study’s Objectives and Research Questions for Analysis
In addressing the research questions outlined in Chapter 1, section 1.3, content analysis was conducted of relevant literature on the Zimbabwe GNU covering briefly
from the period in the run up to the signature of the GPA, on 28 September 2008, the GNU period that ended on 31 July 2013 and the post GNU period up to June 2016. The researcher also analysed the sequence of events in Zimbabwe during the GNU period, paying special attention to key milestones where resolutions were made in the implementation of the GNU framework.

4.3 Presentation of Findings

The next section presents the study findings starting with a section which benchmarks the GPA.

4.3.1 Benchmarking the GPA

During the study, data analysis was a continuous and simultaneous process whereby the processes of data collection and analysis, merged. The unit of analysis for benchmarking purposes was the theoretical framework of the GPA. As already highlighted, Masunungure (2009:6) has argued that the extent to which the GNU could effectively implement, manage and sustain the transitional setup hinged on two essential aspects: the policy agenda encapsulated in Articles 3-19 of the GPA; and the governmental arrangements that were the framework for a new government as spelt out in Article 20 of the Agreement. Variables such as peace, political stability, transparency, power-sharing, accountability and economic recovery, as they relate to the key research questions, were analysed. The findings were laid down on the overall impression conveyed of the GNU performance grouped under three broad dimensions of governance and legality, sanctions and preponderance of incumbency. Other pertinent sub-dimensions discussed in the literature review such as the role of the media were also analysed. For each dimension, the impressions of the GNU in general were clearly stated. Notable arguments were also highlighted to facilitate richer understanding and description.
Table 4.1: Factors That Set the Stage for Negotiation

**NB:** A detailed analysis of factors tabled below is given later in the Chapter.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Ripeness and Sanctions</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Land Reform Programme</td>
<td>• Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Programme: According to Moyo (1999:21) and Moyo (2000:14) “Land is at the root of the crisis in Zimbabwe”. He states that when Mugabe had called on Britain to pay compensation as stipulated in the Lancaster House agreement signed a year before the country’s independence in 1979; British Premier, Tony Blair, had responded in 1998 that such payments were conditional on the guarantee of the rule of law, transparency, sustainability and fairness of the land redistribution process. • Chitiyo (2000:16-22) further propounds that the relationship soured and in 2000, Blair’s administration imposed a full arms embargo on the government of Zimbabwe. Britain’s allies (Australia, USA, EU, New Zealand and Switzerland), followed suit in imposing arms embargo on Zimbabwe and other forms of sanctions.</td>
<td>- Deterioration of international relations; - Withdrawal of international funding and donors; - Imposition of sanctions and measures; - Leading to socio-economic decay and unsustainable debt in Zimbabwe. - According to SAPA-AP (8/12/2001), inflation in Zimbabwe surged to record 103.8 percent in 2001.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sanctions factor</td>
<td>• Imposition of targeted sanctions on Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF regime since 2001. Zimbabwe has been under United States and the European Union sanctions since 2001 and 2002 respectively.</td>
<td>- According to Masunungure (2009:1-15), ZANU-PF lost popularity, there was dramatic shift of public allegiance to the MDC;</td>
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The Financial Gazette (11/09/2009) gave the following reasons used to justify the sanctions regime in Zimbabwe: “Poor human rights record, white farm invasions, alleged election fraud, destruction of tens of thousands of low-income homes, Operation Murambatsvina (Clean up), harassment of opposition activists and lately, the alleged refusal by Mugabe and ZANU-PF to fully implement the provisions of the Global Political Agreement (GPA”).

Targeted sanctions defined: Smith-Höhn, (2010:1-8) defines targeted sanctions as restrictive measures to “target a select group of political elite whose behaviour the sanctions had intended to influence, without jeopardising the national economy or exerting a negative impact on the humanitarian situation of the greater population”.

By implication, targeted sanctions must not have devastating humanitarian impact but only need to cause sufficient hardship and discomfort to motivate the targeted regime to enter into a dialogue with the international community. In that regard, Smith-Höhn, (2010:1-8) indicates that the MDC, the US and EU maintained that sanctions on Zimbabwe are measures to persuade ZANU-PF to meet international

- ZANU-PF suffered massive erosion of legitimacy as it failed to deliver.
- The party suffered isolation in the sub-region, in Africa, and the West.
- Suspension of lending programmes to Zimbabwe by World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) in 2000 as a result of failure to service accelerating arrears on existing loans.
- Zimbabwe was forsaken by international donors who suspended lending facilities. According to Jones (2011:6), by 2008, Zimbabwe’s debt was unsustainable, and that debt “distress earned Zimbabwe a pariah status”.
- As a result of the debt burden, economic development stagnated. According to the report by
standards of a civilised nation by observing human rights, democratic principles and respect for the rule of law.

- Smith-Höhns (2010:1-8) states that the sanctions regime in Zimbabwe entailed among others, the Zimbabwe Democracy Recovery Act (ZIDERA) of 2001, United States Presidential Executive Orders, the Common Position on Restrictive Measures on Zimbabwe from the European Union, Special Economic Measures (Zimbabwe) Regulations from Canada, Banking (Foreign Exchange) Regulations on Sanctions against Zimbabwe from Australia and the Special Zimbabwe Residence Policy from New Zealand.

- **Examples of targeted sanctions imposed**
  - included travel bans on the President, particular individuals, ranging from government officials, politicians, representatives of non-state entities, civilians, security personnel as well as businesses (such as mining companies), asset freezes and restrictions on conducting business with the targeted individuals and their institutions.

  - Zartman (1985:236-237) defines a mutually hurting stalemate as a situation in which

  - the BBC News (26/11/2008), “the effects of a dismally performing economy under sanctions triggered a serious socio-economic deceleration and the cholera outbreak that claimed the lives of thousands of Zimbabweans”.

  - It became a humanitarian crisis manifesting in food insecurity, health and water sanitation.

  - Living standards of an ordinary Zimbabwean drastically plunged. According to ZIMSTATS (27/10/2012), a majority of Zimbabweans lived below the poverty datum.

  - Consequently, Zartman (1985:236-237) concludes that targeted sanctions contributed to perceptions of a mutually hurting stalemate towards ripeness.
“neither party thinks it can win a given conflict without incurring excessive loss, and in which both are suffering from a continuation of fighting, but neither side wants to back down or accept loss either. The conflict is judged to have entered a period of ripeness, a favourable moment for third party mediation”. This is characterised by the situation obtaining just before the signature of the GPA in 2008.

Factors that compelled ZANU-PF and the MDC formations to the negotiation table

- However, according to Masunungure and Mutasa (2011:134), despite the ideological differences, “both parties felt the mandate to revive the economy”.
- According to Mapuva (2010:253) the powerful catalysts that provided the necessary structure of incentives for leaders to come to the negotiating table were the humanitarian crisis and the desperate mood of the public in view of the severe socio-economic crisis that had been fully conjoined with the political crisis and;
- The lack of legitimacy after both parties failed to be the outright winner at the March 2008 elections, despite the June 2008 run-off elections that were boycotted by MDC formations.
- As a result, the conflicting parties noted that neither side could realistically govern the country without the other. Therefore, a negotiated transition agreement became

- According to Smith-Höhn (2010:1-8), sanctions remained an outstanding issue and one of the most contentious issues in the GNU. In fact, the disagreements threatened to derail the full implementation of the GPA.

- Political deadlock continued until 15 September 2008 when a power sharing deal was signed in Harare, paving the way for the establishment of an inclusive government between ZANU-PF and the two factions of the MDC. Because of its comprehensive nature, the power sharing deal became known as the Global Political Agreement.

- This was confirmed by the approval of the power-sharing agreement by the AU,
an immediate response to the humanitarian crisis.

- The obtaining dire situation therefore forced the conflicting parties into negotiation.

- The Zimbabwe Situation (15/09/2008) reported that in his speech during the signing of the power sharing ceremony in Harare on 15 September 2008, Tsvangirai said that party divisions and party brands no longer mattered to the people of Zimbabwe. “We must all unite to solve the problems facing the nation”.

- In the GPA, parties agreed to work towards economic transformation, constitutional reform, national healing and consultations on a proposed constitution for Zimbabwe, intended to be followed by a referendum and preparation for credible elections. Parties were fully cognisant that credible elections served the purpose of investing governments with political authority and legitimacy.

and the presence of the AU chairman and leaders from SADC countries during the signing of the power-sharing agreement.

- According to The Zimbabwe Independent (14/10/2010), the GPA gave legitimacy to the Government of National Unity.

- The Government of National Unity, which was sworn in on February 29th, 2009 was the major outcome of this negotiated agreement. Comprising of 25 Articles, the GPA provided the Road Map towards transition, democratic reform and economic recovery for Zimbabwe.

4.3.2 The GNU and Implications for Legitimacy

This section presents findings on substantive factors related to the key research questions as they relate to the Framework of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). These are:
- Whether or not the GNU accorded with constitutional rules and norms,
- Whether the GNU facilitated or hindered democratic mechanisms of public control and representation, and
- Whether or not GNU tended to govern effectively and generate popular policy outcomes, among other factors.

The Global Political Agreement signed by the three major political parties is the benchmark for this analysis.

### Table 4.2 Outline of the GNU and Implications for Legitimacy

**NB:** A substantiated analysis of tabulated factors is given later in the chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Factors for Legitimacy or Lack of it</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Election related violence and intimidation</td>
<td>- Further, the dossier alleged that the office of the Attorney General (AG) and the police had failed or were unwilling to implement the GPA provision to “apply the laws of the country fully and impartially in bringing all perpetrators of politically motivated violence to book.”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) Political prisoners - The perpetuation of the culture of impunity had seen people losing confidence in the justice system and political processes.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d) General consent of the GNU – to look for evidence of behavioural acts that reflect acceptance, such as voter registration and turnout for the referendum and 2013 harmonised elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e) Fears of political violence - that the next election could be a</td>
<td></td>
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rebirth of the violent 27 June 2008 presidential runoff.

f) Mass emigration and asylum seeking

g) Massive brain drain during the political and socio-economic crisis

h) Poor public service delivery,

i) Massive water and electricity shortages,

j) Poor waste management and poor sanitation resulting in a cholera outbreak

- A survey report by Ndoma, (2015:1-9) in the Afrobarometer Policy Paper of August 2015 reveals that the proportion of Zimbabweans who feared political intimidation or violence during election campaigns had declined during the GNU but was still alarmingly high – especially among supporters of the MDC-T.

- However, the July 2013 elections turned out to be peaceful and were characterised by a huge turnout for voter registration and casting of votes.

- On curbing effects of brain drain, the Country Brief on Zimbabwe by The African Development Bank (AfDB)/ (ADF) (2011-2013), has it that the GNU prioritised civil service capacity development and rehabilitating tertiary education institutions so that they could continue to produce quality technicians and professionals for the private and public sectors.

 Legal Factors

a) Constitutional issues:
   - The constitution Making Process;
   - The Electoral Commission;

- Chigora and Guzura (2011:20-26), state that the SADC facilitator was devoted to the reform agenda and ensured that the following
| - The referendum; and |
| - Holding of free and fair elections; |
| b) Bill of Rights. The right of every citizen of Zimbabwe to participate in peaceful political activity and the right to vote. It provides for rights such as the right to personal security, the right to life, equality and non-discrimination, the right to demonstrate and petition |
| c) Freedom of Association and of Assembly – the foundation to democracy and free and fair election. The two freedoms enable the formation of political parties, participation in the activities of political parties and the holding of campaign meetings and related activities. |
| d) The freedom of expression and freedom of the media - Requiring the state media to be impartial and afford space to divergent views |
| e) Right of access to information – but allowed restrictions to the right on the grounds of “the interests of defence, public security or professional confidentiality” |
| pre-conditions as provided for in the GPA were fulfilled before an election could be organised: |
| a) The New Constitution of Zimbabwe Government of Zimbabwe (2013): On 16 March 2013, Zimbabweans approved a new constitution in a referendum which was widely praised for its peaceful character; |
| b) Referendum: The New constitution was adopted after a successful referendum; |
| c) Election Commission: an independent and impartial body responsible for the running of elections was put in place in March 2010 – the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC); |
| d) Endorsement of Election: the election was endorsed by SADC, as the guarantor of the GPA; |
| - The draft constitution was signed into law on 22 May 2013 introducing some checks and balances, including: the right of the parliament to oust the president, the establishment of a Constitutional Court, and the requirement that parliament |
f) Rights of arrested and detained persons – the specific rights make it difficult to sustain random and politically motivated arrests and this is conducive to a free election environment.

g) Adherence to laws and regulations. Stakeholders’ views on human rights and rule of law and provision of civil liberties.

h) Effective institutions and the justice delivery system/legal frameworks.

Governance

e) Inclusivity of political parties/Executive Functions (Separation of Powers through Equal distribution of cabinet and key positions)

f) Promotion of transparency and accountability;

g) Effectiveness of political institutions

h) Agents of state administration: Conduct of police/uniformed forces, the intelligence and civil service

i) Institutional arrangements and conformity to ideals of democracy

- The GPA created two centres of executive power in the form of President and Prime-minister. However, according to Masunungure (2009:7) there is an asymmetrical distribution of powers and responsibilities in favour of the executive president who wields executive authority unlike the executive prime-minister who is mainly ceremonial.

- On agents of state administration, a survey report in the Afrobarometer Policy Paper by Ndoma (2015:1-9), states that the police and prosecutors were
j) Provision of policies aimed at improving public goods provision, human development, and economic growth. Public goods vital to economic and human development (national health-care programs, public education, and infrastructure such as roads and sanitation services).

k) Economic revival strategies/poverty reduction/debt management. Taking cognisance that good governance entails adequate legal frameworks and effective institutions.

l) Political trust and national healing

- Highly partisan and biased in their investigations and prosecution of acts of violence between supporters of the two parties.
- According to the AfDB Country Brief on Zimbabwe (2011-2013), the GNU implemented key reforms to address external indebtedness and improving the investment climate in areas such as property rights, indigenization and land reform. This led to improved macroeconomic conditions.
- The AfDB Country Brief on Zimbabwe (2011-2013), noted specific important elements that had been implemented under the GNU that included amendments to the Electoral Act, the appointment of independent Commissions to address Media, Human Rights and Election issues and the issuing of Print and Media Licenses. Furthermore, a Land Audit Commission and a National Economic Council were established.
- As mandated by Article VI of the GPA (15 September, 2008), a Constitutional Parliamentary
Select Committee (COPAC) was established in April 2009 to coordinate the consultative processes for constitutional reform.

- Transparency of Public Accounts: Parliament in 2009 passed the Audit Bill, which clarified the role of the Auditor General and created an Audit Office. Section 16.2 (2) of the Constitution stated that there must be mechanisms for the National Assembly to monitor, and control expenditure and the submission of regular reports by public officers and by the institutions. This was finally incorporated into the new Constitution.

4.4 Analysis of and Findings on the Framework of the GNU

4.4.1 The Rule of Law and Human Rights

Regarding the rule of law, MDC formations revealed, as reported by The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (2012), fact finding mission report:

- That there was state-sponsored violence on the MDC electorate;
- That defence forces were being deployed to carry out political campaigns for ZANU-PF;
- That the police force was partisan and that arrests were arbitrary in the wake of police ban of MDC-T rallies;
• That there was unequal sharing of power in the GNU as defence forces were not reporting to the Prime Minister, demonstrating that their allegiance was not to the Prime Minister but to the President; and
• That there was no freedom of association.

4.4.2 Analysis of Contentions of Human Rights Abuses by the MDC

The issue of security sector reform remained a thorny issue in the implementation of the GNU. The MDC formations maintained the view that the security sector had been politicized, as revealed in their (security forces) proclamations not to accept any leader without liberation war credentials. Raftopoulos (2013:190) offers an insight into how ZANU-PF was not prepared to carry out any reforms in the security sector. He cites the ZANU-PF Congress of December 2009 resolutions: “that as a Party of revolution and the people’s vanguard shall not allow the security forces to be the subject of any negotiation for a so-called security sector reform”. ZANU-PF argued that the security forces were a product of the liberation struggle and that calling for security sector reform violated Zimbabwean sovereignty. In response to the proclamations by ZANU-PF, the MDC formations vowed that general elections would not be held before security sector reforms were instituted.

Further, the MDC formations cited that the police, in a prejudicial manner, reportedly disrupted several MDC-organised preparatory constitutional reform meetings by beating up and arbitrarily arresting participants. As substantiated by Mutisi (2011:4) incidents of politically motivated violence were reported especially during the constitutional review process and since the announcement of possible elections in 2011. More so, during the constitutional reform process, political violence was incited as each party sought to influence the content of the constitution.

A Troika Summit of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) in Livingstone, Zambia (SADC, 2011), noted its ‘disappointment’ with, and expressed its “impatience” at, the slow pace of fundamental progress and the risk of the country plunging into political and economic uncertainty. During that Summit, ZANU-PF had denied allegations on state-sponsored violence for lack of evidence and said they were meant to undermine the security institutions of Zimbabwe.
Although all political parties had agreed that political violence be shunned, according to the Afrobarometer Survey Report by Ndome (2015:1-9), “a wave of violence gripped the MDC-T factions which became characteristic of MDC formations throughout the GNU era”. However, the MDC formations attributed the intra-party violence to ZANU-PF’s call for early elections, which had heightened political tensions. According to The Zimbabwean (16/04/2013), intra-party violence within the MDC-M faction had seen Arthur Mutambara losing his post as president of the party to Welshman Ncube, who was the MDC-M Secretary General.

According to the online Human Rights Watch News Release (28/10/2008), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) engagement in partisan politics which it said continued even after the signing of the GPA. Examples cited by the report include banning of MDC rallies, harassment of civil society leaders and activists. The human rights abuse issues were tabled before the meetings of the Troika Summit of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) in Livingstone, Zambia (2011) at which ZANU-PF reported that more than 90% of political meetings were sanctioned. It was explained that the procedure was to give prior notification to the police for security reasons. Some of the gatherings warranted the presence of the police. However, in some cases, meetings could not be sanctioned if they coincided with national gatherings. It was further reported during the same meetings that the government had taken steps to make security forces conversant with the Constitution of Zimbabwe and other laws related to Public Order and Security Act (POSA).

4.4.3 Issues of Legitimacy, Governance, Accountability and Transparency

According to Masunungure (2009:6) legitimacy entails “citizens’ attitudes toward the functioning of the GNU, while at the international level; it entails the recognition and acceptance of the government in place by other governments”. In this case, Britain and her Western allies, including some African countries such as Botswana, publicly declared they would not recognise a ZANU-PF government. Masunungure (2009), therefore argues that the power sharing agreement paved the way to the recognition
of Robert Mugabe as the President of Zimbabwe and the legitimacy of his government. However, academics and political commentators, analysts and ordinary Zimbabweans made their observations on the GNU. They were sceptical about the deal as will be highlighted below.

As already indicated, Mukuhlani (2014:170) and Masunungure (2009:4) qualified the GNU as a forced and undemocratic arrangement but both concur that it was a second-best solution, under the circumstances. Mapuva (2010:247-263) is of the view that the paradox of the national unity governments is that they rarely produce national unity and certainly will not do so in Zimbabwe, against the backdrop of popular dissatisfaction with the performance of the governing party. In his final analysis however, he argues, “Nevertheless, the options are so limited such that a GNU might be one of the fastest ways to a political solution out of the current quagmire”.

Chigora and Guzura (2011:21) observe that on the eve of the GNU, the socio-economic and political challenges that characterised the Zimbabwean landscape included lawlessness and corruption leading to socio-economic and political breakdown. The crisis of legitimacy had catastrophic consequences on the economy as participants in the economy seemed to take advantage of these crises in order to engage in a number of morally questionable practices. To that, Gono (2008:5) then Reserve Bank Governor, said “corruption and a slide into criminality characterised Zimbabwe’s economic landscape”.

Further to that Zhou (2012:152-161), asserts that the pronounced heavy-handed involvement of the central government in the running of the economy through, among others, the implementation of wholesale price controls and the land reform programme occasioned unprecedented levels of uncouth business practices as participants in the economy seemingly took advantage of such a chaotic situation. Further, Zhou (2012:152) states that the failure of the formal economy to meet the needs and wants of people led to the “vibrancy of the informal sector and a breed of black market traders who clandestinely sold the few locally produced commodities on the black market at exceptionally high prices”. Speculative pricing of commodities, black market trading, and general corruption in the economy summed the extent of the moral paralysis that
gripped Zimbabwe since the turn of the new millennium. Zhou, (2012) argues that political polarisation and apparently desperate economic policy shifts that were largely premised on political expediency rather than economic rationality ushered in a cocktail of economic and moral crises that dealt a heavy blow to Zimbabwe’s once promising economy. Therefore, it was prudent for any well-meaning political party to engage for the good of every Zimbabwean.

In addition to the above views, Zhou (2012:152-161), commends the GNU for taking bold steps to democratise the economy under the free market system, a market driven economy as opposed to the tightening of price controls and exchange restrictions that had accelerated the deterioration in business climate. According to the African Development Bank, African Development Fund, Zimbabwe Short-Term Strategy (2009), the GNU rapidly took several macroeconomic and supply-side policy actions in the fiscal, monetary, financial, and structural areas aimed at maintaining low inflation, halting and reversing the economic decline, and improving social conditions. These actions were articulated in the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Program (STERP), The IMF Country Report No: 09/139 (2009), of the GNU. STERP emphasised political stability, good governance, sound macro-economic management and growth. It also aimed at the revival of manufacturing, agriculture and tourism as key to a quick economic turnaround.

The economic decay that had characterised the pre-GNU period in Zimbabwe was reversed at the onset of the GNU. The GNU’s key endeavour to reform and democratise the political space and the market brought about, in the short term, the much-needed gradual resurgence of the economy and a renewed interest among investors to invest in the country.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2009) Country Report No. 09/139, several positive changes in the management of Zimbabwe’s economy gave some measure of confidence to otherwise highly cynical investors in the ability of the transitional arrangement to stop and reverse a decade long economic meltdown that was largely caused by flawed economic and political decisions by the government that was then in power. However, despite the positive economic and political changes
during the GNU, that did not instil significant confidence among key international investors. The GNU also sought to enhance measures to promote transparency and accountability in the constitution. According to the African Development Fund (2015), the decade of significant economic decline (1999-2008) severely compromised basic service delivery, infrastructure maintenance and investment climate for private sector, governance and accountability. This has also affected the institutional capacity of public oversight and accountability institutions such as Parliament, Auditor General’s Office and Civil Society Organisations.

The new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) expanded the core mandate of Parliament with the inclusion of clauses that strengthen its legislative, representative and oversight roles. In its Preamble, the Constitution recognises the need to entrench democratic, transparent and accountable governance as well as the rule of law. Transparency and accountability in debt management are ensured through the involvement of the parliament and publishing of reports on debt management.

Although many of the positive developments that emerged during the tenure of the GNU can be credited to all the parties involved, efforts by the MDC-T's Secretary General, Tendai Biti as then Finance Minister, assisted in bringing some level of stability on the economy. This was mostly done through the introduction of the multi-currency system in the form of the American Dollar, the Euro, the South African Rand and the Botswana Pula, among other currencies. Although political commentators such as Rotberg (2013) argue that Biti was successful in banning the Zimbabwe dollar therefore ending several years of dreadful inflation that was crippling the economy, the ZANU-PF government, prior to the GNU, had already crafted the short-term plan or economic blue print which was only implemented, almost wholesome by the Finance Minister, Tendai Biti.

Overall, the democratisation of the market helped in eradicating bottlenecks in the economy that in the past gave birth to a host of uncouth business practices in the economy such as corruption, bribery, black market trading and exploitative pricing. Such positive economic policy shifts and reform agenda during the short period following the formation of the GNU helped to transform and bring stability to an
economy that had suffered more than a decade of unprecedented meltdown. Availability of basic commodities on the local market, adoption of a stable hard currency, among other positive economic changes, improved the general standards of living of people in the country.

Briefly, Mutisi (2011:3) asserts that the GPA brought about visible changes in Zimbabwe’s political and economic terrain, in particular, the establishment of fiscal sanity and the regression of hyperinflation. In that regard, the GNU scored a big success and gained legitimacy.

4.4.4 Constitutional Reforms & the Road Map to Free, Fair & Credible Elections
This section gives an analysis of Zimbabwe’s constitutional reform process. The findings on the prospects of holding a referendum leading to democratic elections in the context of the GPA are also laid out here. The role played by SADC mediating team in facilitating the implementation of the political and constitutional reform provisions of the GPA was pivotal in conducting a legitimate referendum to adopt and legitimise the constitution before elections. The active and effective participation of citizens and stakeholders in the constitution outreach programme included the disabled and civil society organisations. The GPA’s public consultation process to gather people’s views and to ensure that the new constitution would be “owned” by the people began only in June 2010 and was acrimonious and long drawn out. The draft constitution was based on a list of agreed constitutional issues drawn by Constitutional Parliamentary Committee (COPAC) from a national report of people’s submissions.

It was highlighted in the previous chapters that elections serve the purpose of investing governments with political authority and legitimacy. The corollary to this fact is that where the 2008 elections were disputed and marred by violence, even if ZANU-PF had held on to power, it was lacking in political authority and legitimacy. The resort to a government of national unity following the 2008 elections, served as an institution for reclaiming legitimacy for ZANU-PF both at domestic and international levels. Hence Mesfin (2008:3) observation that, “the creation of a power-sharing arrangement has
the advantage of conferring some sort of legitimacy to the governing party without discrediting the opposition”.

This study contends that there is a link between free and fair elections and the enjoyment of human rights. It is important to appreciate what constitutes “free and fair” elections. As already highlighted, Elklit and Svensson (1997:32-46) argues that the concept of “free and fair” does not only mean that elections are acceptable. The concept refers to the assessment of the entire electoral process, an integrity-check by way of monitoring and assessing of referendums and elections, not just of the election-day events. This is done in order to identify any perceived problems.

While Matlosa (2011:6) argues that “elections are central to transforming conflict situations, establishing democratic regimes and achieving peace”, Maphunye (2015:16) upholds that political strife is usually triggered by substandard polls, whereby sitting governments breach the democratic path and fail to comply with recognised election standards. Maphunye (2015:16) contextualises the ACDEG (2007) which commits Member States to consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability. He therefore emphasises the significance of good governance, popular participation, the rule of law and human rights in electoral processes. The author further argues that in order for SADC countries to walk the desired democratic path, sitting governments must not only comply with internationally recognised standards but domesticate them. Further, Maphunye (2015) is of the view that not much is being done to domesticate and sensitise citizens about regional instruments and treaties as they come with numerous obligations, financial and other related expectations.

4.4.5 Political Violence

In her analysis of the challenges in the GNU, Mutisi (2011: 4) highlights that although levels of political violence in Zimbabwe had decreased since the signing of the GPA, incidents of politically motivated violence were reported, especially during the constitutional review process and since the announcement of possible elections in 2011. On the same note, Mutisi (2011:4) notes that the constitutional reform process was affected by incidence of political violence as each party sought to influence the
content of the constitution. The MDC formations cited that the police, in a prejudicial manner, reportedly disrupted several MDC-organised preparatory constitutional reform meetings by beating up and arbitrarily arresting participants.

Examples that were cited by the Human Rights Watch (January 2011) are that in February 2010, ZRP disrupted MDC-organised preparatory constitutional reform meetings, beat participants, and made arrests of “43 people in Binga, 48 in Masvingo and 52 in Mt Darwin”. Further, the report states that violence worsened in the capital city Harare and led to the suspension of 13 meetings in September 2010. Dzinesa, (2012:1-12) purports that the parties represented in the GNU, turned the drafting process into a battleground. He observed that the drafting process was deeply polarised and was characterised by mistrust between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations. In that regard, Dzinesa (2012) charged that the parties were bent on manipulating the constitution-writing process to ensure the incorporation of their positions and interests at the expense of reflecting the will of the people.

Dzinesa (2012) further argued that such incidents of political violence undermined the prospects of the production of a legitimate draft constitution representative of the will of the people. However, the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government held in Luanda, Angola, in June 2012, SADC (2012) urged Zimbabwean parties to the GPA “to finalise the constitution-making process and subject it to a referendum thereafter”.

Finally, Dzinesa (2012) noted that international media bias and propaganda could not be ruled out as he observed that media coverage of political violence in Zimbabwe, whenever they occurred, evoked an international outcry, not only from the governments of Britain, the European Union and the United States, but also from the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights.

4.4.6 Inclusivity
Under the auspices of the GPA an inclusive government was formed on 15 September 2008 and came into effect on 11 February 2009. Masunungure (2009:6) propounds that universally, the sharing of power is expressed in the governmental structure. As
such, the governmental structure outlined in the Agreement was a measure of how much power had been shared or not shared, to which he said distribution of powers and responsibilities were tilted in favour of the executive president. The GNU had retained Robert Mugabe as President while Morgan Tsvangirai became Prime Minister, with Arthur Mutambara as Deputy Prime Minister.

According to Chigora and Guzura (2011:21) the logic behind an inclusive government “is that equitable participation will diminish the potential for conflict and enhance prospects of national stability, integration and development”. The GNU was viewed by the AU and the SADC facilitators as an “African Solution to an African Problem”, (Chigora and Guzura, 2011:21), meant to propel and dictate how the government would operate and what it should have achieved. In short the GPA theory was predicated on the view that, an inclusive approach to governing and problem solving by the three major political parties represented in parliament, with the GPA as a guide, would result in the reduction of political instability, arrest of the economic free-fall, halt the humanitarian crisis, and institution of democratic reforms - generally providing an inclusive approach to the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis (Chigora and Guzura 2011).

Mukuhlani (2014:169-180), states that, “a GNU is a coalition government, designed specifically to accommodate all participating political players in governmental structures”. This ordinarily includes, the civil service, the cabinet, diplomatic posts, and the judiciary and in other instances, the security forces namely the army, air force, police and the intelligence arms. He argues that the logic behind this is that, equitable participation will diminish the potential for conflict and enhance prospects for national stability, integration and development.

As further compounded by Masunungure (2009:6), universally, the sharing of power is expressed in the governmental structure and that the assumption behind this logic is that conflict arises from mere exclusion of key political players in structures and processes of national governance. As such, the governmental structure outlined in the GPA was a measure of how much power was shared or not shared.
Mapuva (2010:253) underscores the sharp ideological differences between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations, where ZANU-PF’s ideology is hinged on its liberation war credentials and largely based on Marxism/Leninism while the MDC is more capitalist-oriented as it was formed on the premise of workers’ interests. However, according to Masunungure and Mutasa (2011:134), despite the ideological differences, “both parties felt the mandate to come together under the Inclusive Government in order to join hand in reviving the economy”.

On a different note, Mukuhlani (2014:169-180), has argued that Zimbabwe’s GNU brought to an end the active participation of civil society in the Zimbabwean political arena. He argues that the GNU was formed through an accord of only the main political parties, ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M leaving out civil society organizations and leaders of lesser political parties, whose voice plays a critical role in democratic reform of the country. However, although the power sharing deal had both positive and negative aspects, this dissertation is mainly deposed towards the legitimacy and the extent to which the GPA advanced as opposed to retarding – the progress towards democracy.

4.4.7 Minority rights
The Bill of Rights equally was of critical contestation within the inclusive government. According to an online publication by Zaba (22/06/2010) entitled, “Zimbabwe: New Constitution-Where ZANU-PF, MDC-T and NCA Diverge”, issues of contestation included abortion, homosexuality, sodomy and same-sex marriage. ZANU-PF’s position was opposed to legalising and entrenching abortion, homosexuality and sodomy and same-sex marriage in the constitution. Further, Zaba (2010) pointed out that the MDC-T maintained that issues of abortion, homosexuality and sodomy and same-sex marriage should be left for interpretation by the Supreme Court or any other court. Therefore, the writing of the new constitution from April 2009 meant that the issue of gay rights needed to be addressed as gays and lesbians in Zimbabwe felt discriminated against in the old constitution. However, the draft constitution prohibited gay marriages. During the constitution-making process, Galz had made a submission calling for the rights to equality, non-discrimination and privacy to be extended to all citizens. This submission signalled the challenges for a minority seeking to gain
recognition for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex people (LGBTI) in a partisan constitution-making process.

As reported in the New Zimbabwe (26/03/2010), Mugabe defiantly pronounced his stance on homosexuals calling the practice un-African and not cultural, that it destroys nationhood and that since it defies procreation laws, he would not allow it to happen in Zimbabwe. He described homosexuality as an “alien practise that is being exported into our country”. Tsvangirai also publicly denounced homosexuality.

ZANU-PF’s (2013) Election Manifesto proclaimed that the party “had been vigilant throughout the Constitution-making process to guard against treachery and to protect the process from being hijacked by foreign or regime change interests … specifically … to protect the values and dignity of the people against such evils as homosexuality”. In its party’s election campaign, ZANU-PF vilified the gay community at each and every rally. However, the MDC-T election manifesto was silent on the party’s stance on homosexuals. However, the researcher noted that both Mugabe and Tsvangirai had at one time spoken unanimously against homosexuals and had taken a position that they should not be included in the new Constitution. This was reported by the BBC News (26/03/2010) in an article “Zimbabwe PM Morgan Tsvangirai Rejects Gay Rights Move”. It probably proved the indecisiveness of Tsvangirai over the gay rights.

4.4.8 Implementation of the Agreed Positions of the GPA

The Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) was a committee which was constituted under Article XXII of the Global Political Agreement signed on 15 September 2008, by the ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations. The main objective of JOMIC was to monitor the implementation of agreed positions the GPA and also to ensure that that the Agreement was implemented to the fullest extent possible in letter and spirit. Above all, it sought to promote political tolerance among the above political players.

This dissertation sought to bring out the inclusivity of JOMIC activities and to establish the extent to which JOMIC was appreciated by stakeholders and the generality of Zimbabweans. JOMIC was composed of four senior members from ZANU- PF and
four senior members from each of the two MDC formations making a total of twelve (12). The committee was co-chaired by the members from the parties. JOMIC had full time secretariat at the national level comprising the national coordinator, the communication manager, one political liaison officer from each of the three political parties and the programs manager.

JOMIC later established provincial liaison Committees in all the ten provinces of the country. The committees were composed of four senior provincial leaders from each of the three political parties occupying the following positions, provincial chairperson, provincial chairlady, provincial youth chairperson and the provincial organizing secretary or commissar. There was also a full time JOMIC secretariat at provincial level comprising of the provincial administrator, two political liaison officers from each of the three political parties and the administrative assistant. In essence the body then worked with the aforementioned structures in a bid to deal with the cases of political violence, and hatred to foster unity and mutual tolerance.

Hlatywayo, et al. (2015:274-278) studied the extent to which JOMIC was appreciated and the inclusivity of its activities. The findings indicated that, to a large extent JOMIC was appreciated by political players and the public. The activities of JOMIC were also found to be largely inclusive. Despite noting critics’ concerns, the study generally concluded that JOMIC positively contributed to the promotion of political tolerance in Zimbabwe. However, the issue of non-prosecution powers by JOMIC was pointed out as having negatively affected JOMIC’s complete effectiveness. It was recommended that since JOMIC only existed during the life span of the GPA, from 2009 to 2013, the Government of Zimbabwe and all stakeholders must consider seriously the idea of having a permanent structure like JOMIC which must include all stakeholders such as government, political parties, civic society, religious leaders and traditional leaders. It was also established that such an organization must have structures from national right down to ward or village level. The organization should have its mandate also expanded to include issues of national healing, reconciliation and reparation. The organization should also be established by an Act of Parliament in order to give it more powers for dealing with those who violate its standing rules.
Parties undertook to channel all complaints, grievances, concerns and issues relating to compliance with the GPA through JOMIC. However, according to Hlatywayo, et al. (2015), from the onset, commitment to its task seemed doubtful given that JOMIC operations started off without any resources nor funding from the state. It did not even have an office or secretarial staff. JOMIC had no power of enforcement; only an authority of persuasion.

4.4.9 Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC)

A brief background to its establishment shows that ZEC was established amid concern that the Registrar-General, Mr Tobias Mudede, ran the country’s election process in a one man show. In terms of Section 238 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), ZEC was established to ensure that elections and referendums are conducted efficiently, freely, fairly, transparently and in accordance with the law. Further, Zimbabwe ascribes to Article 5 of the SADC Treaty (1992) that commits to “promote common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions, which are democratic, legitimate and effective”. The Constitution provides ZEC with a broader role in which the commission supervises the entire election process and whole environment in which elections take place. ZEC would also adhere to the standards set out in regional and continental guidelines on elections and referendums.

Writing on Continental Instruments, Democratic Elections and the Social Contract in Africa, Maphunye (2015:6), who is a political scientist and an expert in the area of democracy, elections and governance, identifies instruments that include individual country electoral laws, constitutions and other legal frameworks that support the consolidation of democracy. To that, it is notable that Zimbabwe ratified the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa (2002) and the SADC Principles and Guidelines on Election Management, Monitoring and Observation (Revised, 2015).

However, in view of the above, of particular interest are the recent comments passed by the MDC-T National Spokesperson, Obert Chaurura Gutu on the integrity of ZEC. The Newzimbabwevision (16/01/2016), reported Gutu expressing grave concern
about the impartiality and independence of ZEC, to which he asserts that if ZEC is placed in doubt, Zimbabwe can never hold free and fair elections that can pass the test of legitimacy.

In view of the above-stated concerns by the MDC-T, the researcher makes inference to the March 28, 1994 elections result for Uganda’s Constituent Assembly which was not declared “free and fair” after election observers discovered problems with the conduct of the elections. Elklit and Svensson (1997:32) query what constitutes a “free and fair” election. Does the phrase mean only that the election was “acceptable,” or does it imply something more? The authors, who are renowned election experts, noted an increased and intensified need for standardized assessment criteria to guide election monitors and observers.

Key changes in the revised SADC Principles and Guidelines to Democratic Elections have already been highlighted. However, it is important to note that the revised SADC Guidelines have been aligned with regional, continental and international electoral frameworks although implementation processes by member states are at various levels. On the same note, Elklit and Svensson (1997:33) have observed that the development of “checklists” for free, fair or acceptable elections has been hindered by disagreement over what should be included. In addition, cooperation among different countries, organizations, and election authorities has been uneven. The authors have nevertheless come to a conclusion that the standards for free and fair elections should be tested against specific criteria at each stage of the process, that is, before polling, on the poling day and afterwards.

Pursuant to the above, the SADC ECF/EISA, (2003:2), reports that in 2000, representatives of the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Electoral Commissions Forum, began drafting a document that outlined standards-based criteria for assessing each part of the electoral process, with particular reference to African regional instruments.
The principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO) (2003) identify key principles for each sub-part of the electoral process that, taken together, make up “free and fair, credible, and legitimate elections in a climate of “peace and security.” Some of the standards put forward by Elklit and Svensson (1997:33) include “a transparent electoral process, absence of impediments to standing for elections for both political parties and independent candidates, equal and universal suffrage, freedom of choice and equal access to the public media, a transparent electoral process and secrecy of the ballot, impartial protection of the polling station.” For example, the criteria for Constitutional and Legal Framework require the provision for the establishment of an independent and impartial electoral management body. This influenced the birth of ZEC, an independent electoral body in Zimbabwe under the GNU.

To that, ZEC was then constituted in terms of Constitutional Amendment 19 (Act 1 of 2009) which was a result of the Global Political Agreement’s Road Map to free and fair elections. SADC pledged to assist Zimbabwe towards peaceful, free and fair elections by ensuring polls that are held under SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections.

However, according to the online publication calling for electoral reforms, Newzimbabwevision (16/01/2016), whilst the MDC welcomed the moves to ensure and guarantee the holding of a free and fair plebiscite in 2018, “we should hasten to add that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) should always strive to be sincere, honest, transparent and accountable in all its activities”.

According to The Zimbabwe Independent (8/2/2013), parties to the GNU had reached a stalemate over the staffing of ZEC with the MDC-T calling for a complete dismissal of staff at the Commission on allegations that some of the staff was recruited from the security sector. However, arguments and counter-arguments were reported in the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), (2013:9) Print Media Report on 2013 Harmonised General Elections. The opposition parties alleged that the security forces were partisan and bent on pursuing the agenda of ZANU-PF. The police were described as applying law selectively. The Report noted that allegations made did not
touch on tangible activities taking place, but justification was based on past allegations. On the other hand, the public media representing ZANU-PF carried reports on the preparedness of the security forces to ensure a peaceful election. The army was presented as the “vanguard of the ideals of independence”. The independent press amplified the voice of other parties in calling for the reform of the security sector as a measure to ensure a peaceful election. The public media dismissed such calls as being pursued by enemies of the country who were bent on reversing the gains of independence. Examples of what has been going on in countries like Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya were used to illustrate this point. Security sector reforms were seen as one of the West’s instruments in pursuing a regime change agenda.

The conduct of business by ZEC remained under close surveillance by political parties. The NewsDay (26/04/2013) reported on disagreements arising over the activities that needed to be done prior to elections with the MDC-T calling for SADC and AU election monitors to be on the ground six months prior and post-election. However, Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO) (2003) allows the Monitoring Mission to decide the scope or mandate of their observation missions based on the findings of an assessment mission. The scope or mandate can include observation, which involves gathering information and making an informed judgement; and monitoring, which involves the authority to observe an election process and to intervene in that process if relevant laws or standard procedures are being violated or ignored. However, ZANU-PF observed that the regional and international elections guidelines allow for up to four weeks of observation as opposed to monitoring.

To that, Maphunye (2015:17) comments that “where observation is unavoidable, only experienced election officials and those working directly with elections should be deployed”. This follows observations that monitoring and election observation, a process which is meant to be an election quality assurance, is unsustainable as it usually seeks to “rubber-stamp even the most dubious election outcomes”, (Maphunye, 2015).
According to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Print Media Report on 2013 Harmonised General Elections (2013:26), during the last three weeks leading to the polling date, there was a spirited move to discredit the ZEC as incapable of conducting a free and fair election because of the problems encountered during the conduct of the special vote. There were reported logistical problems during the conduct of the special vote which emanated from the late conclusion of the court appeals that inevitably led to the late printing of ballots and problems encountered by the printers. The private media and MDC-T, together with civic organisations embarked on a spirited attack on the ZEC as incapable of organising the general election. The problems encountered were seen as the best justification for the postponement of the election date. The public media reporting on behalf of ZANU-PF blamed MDC-T on the problems encountered during the special vote. It was seen as an MDC-T ploy to sabotage the vote so as to buttress their call for the postponement of the election.

According to a publication by the Links International Journal on Social Renewal, Gwisai (2013) noted that the AU, SADC and all Observer Missions had endorsed the 2013 election process and results, and lauded the Zimbabwe elections as “free, fair and credible”. Gwisai (2013) further purports that it became difficult to sustain rigging as the main reason when the pro-opposition Western-funded local elections monitoring body, the Zimbabwe Elections Support Network (ZESN), that had 7000 observers nation-wide, observed that: “in 98% of polling stations there were no incidents of intimidation, at 98% of polling stations, no one attempted to intimidate or influence election officials during counting nor did anyone attempt to disrupt the counting process, and MDC-T agents signed the election results forms at 97% stations at which they were present”. The results were subsequently posted outside polling stations. Gwisai further argued that if there was blatant rigging, the MDC agents would not have signed the results forms. The private media together with the MDC-T downplayed the statements that elections were free, fair and credible and articulated those flaws indicated by the observers. They insisted that the country was not ready for elections; therefore, the elections were not free, fair and credible although agreeing that they were peaceful.
### 4.5 Other Important Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome of GNU

Table 4.3: Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome of GNU

NB: A substantiated analysis of tabulated factors is given later in the chapter.

| Factor                                | Characteristic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Outcome                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| The Preponderance of the incumbency    | a) An unbalanced government of national unity; unequal power distribution in the power sharing arrangement, with ZANU-PF wielding more power than the two MDCs combined.                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | According to Mapuva (2013:105-116), under the theory of the preponderance of incumbency, “incumbent political leaders are able to manipulate the political terrain for political gain because they control the coercive arms of the state, which they can use to retain power”. |
|                                        | - Chigora and Guzura (2011:2) commented that the capacity of ZANU-PF to run a state was far superior to the capacity of the two MDC factions combined.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | - In the power sharing agreement, the GNU retained Robert Mugabe as President while Morgan Tsvangirai became Prime Minister, implying that state power was vested in the hands of the head of state and the head of government, Robert Mugabe. The ultimate authority holding executive power remained with the president, Robert Mugabe. |
|                                        | b) Revolutionary/ liberation war credence, cultural and traditional considerations                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | - Mapuva (2013:105-116), observed that the distribution of powers and responsibilities were tilted in favour of the executive president where                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|                                        | c) ZANU-PF use of the sanctions and regime change agenda to dismiss the legitimacy of the MDC-T as a genuine home-grown party. That made it difficult for the MDC to be fully accepted as a political player in Zimbabwean politics. ZANU-PF believed by former liberation movements in the region.                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|                                        | d) On the use of state-controlled media, Zirima, (2013) attested                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
to allegations that the state-owned media apparatus facilitated ZANU-PF’s aggressive anti-sanctions campaign to convince the ordinary Zimbabweans who came to appreciate that they had suffered under comprehensive illegal economic sanctions.

e) ZANU-PF lobbied successfully against the legitimacy of the illegal sanctions in state-controlled print and electronic media in Zimbabwe, as well as social media, and successfully took the campaign to SADC at the regional level and the AU at the continental level.

- Tsvangirai played a subservient role to Mugabe.
- Further, during Mugabe’s absence on foreign trips, Tsvangirai played second fiddle to Mugabe’s Vice, Joice Mujuru.
- Mugabe retained key ministries for ZANU-PF, the defence and security, police, foreign affairs, mining and media. Less powerful ministries such as health and education were left to the MDC although MDC was allocated Finance, a strategic resources allocation Ministry.

Economic Empowerment and Indigenisation

- According to Ndakaripa (2015:9), ZANU-PF upheld that economic indigenisation programme and maintained that it rectified the imbalances that occurred during the colonial era. It insisted that black political independence without the control of the economy was meaningless.
- Further, Chigora et al. (2013:361) indicate that ZANU-PF capitalised on its outreach

- ZANU-PF strategically repositioned itself with respect to the issues of land, indigenization, economic empowerment and African nationalism; compelling companies to cede economic control to black Zimbabweans. Zimbabwean employees, communities and individuals own the nation’s land, mineral resources and corporations through Community Share
Ownership Schemes. Clinics, schools and roads built under share ownership schemes. Although economic indigenisation programme did not fully achieve its official objective of empowering the majority blacks; it achieved the unofficial objective of giving ZANU-PF an electoral advantage. ZANU-PF outperformed the MDC formations in the 31 July 2013 harmonised elections.

4.5.1 The Sanctions Factor
Zimbabwe provides an interesting case study because of the sanctions debate which has remained contentious throughout the GNU and after. Smith-Höhn (2010:1-8) is of the view that although the subject of targeted sanctions in Zimbabwe enjoyed widespread media and advocacy attention, there is a general paucity of academic literature on the fundamental constructs of sanctions, especially the influence of such measures on negotiations and peace processes in Zimbabwe. Mutisi (2011:1-7) asserts that the relentless use of targeted sanctions on the ZANU-PF regime provides the basis for a thorough and empirical examination of this foreign policy tool and form of conflict intervention.

As indicated earlier, Davidsson (2002:6), argues that the implied theory of economic sanctions is predicated on “causing civilian pain to achieve a political gain”. To that argument, the Watson Institute for International Affairs (2007), upholds that the objective of targeted sanctions in Zimbabwe was to apply coercive pressure on the
ZANU-PF leadership and the network of entities supporting them; forcing the ZANU-PF regime to succumb to pressure and the subsequent negotiation with MDC formations.

Ndakaripa (2013:31) argues that, the fact that the US/EU sanctions are targeted does not hold much water because they also target companies thereby affecting the country’s business operations and ultimately cause severe hardships on the livelihoods of ordinary people who are not the intended targets. Chiumbu and Musemwa (2012: xix) discuss the impact the crisis had on “ordinary people” terming it a “humanitarian crisis”. Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010:2) described Zimbabwe’s economic indicators during the period of high currency instability (hyperinflation) prior to the signing of the GPA in 2008 as pointing to a country in severe distress and on a nose-diving economic trajectory.

Article 4 of the GPA stipulates, among other things, “the parties hereby agree … that all forms of measures and sanctions against Zimbabwe be lifted in order to facilitate a sustainable solution to the challenges that are currently facing Zimbabwe”. It also notes a commitment to work together “in re-engaging the international community with a view to bringing to an end the country’s international isolation”.

The Pan-African News Wire (9/4/2009) reported that Mugabe was insistent that the MDC-T was a party that had the interests of the West at heart and thus supporting the continuous sanctions on Zimbabwe. He had therefore urged Zimbabweans from across the political spectrum, especially from the MDC-T, to speak with one voice against the unilateral and illegal sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by Britain, America and their allies.

The MDC-T, on the other hand, insisted that the responsibility for these sanctions rested squarely upon ZANU-PF, whose continued refusal to act in a democratic and accountable manner was to blame for the persistence of the sanctions regime. However, according to the ZBC News (1/03/2010) Mr Tsvangirai is on record calling for the removal of sanctions, for the success of the GNU. Mutisi (2011:1-7) observed that a middle ground had to be found between the two extremes of unconditionally
lifting all restrictive measures as called for by the ZANU-PF and its supporters and the other extreme of maintaining all targeted sanctions until every outstanding issue surrounding the GPA was resolved as called for by the MDC and its supporters.

In view of the above, in its Communiqué, the Troika of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, (2009:3), held in Maputo, Mozambique, SADC (2009) urged the international community “to lift all forms of sanctions on Zimbabwe”. In 2011, SADC subsequently commissioned a mission to the EU and USA to campaign for the uplifting of sanctions on Zimbabwe, a mission that showed confirmed solidarity of Member States. Zimbabwe continued to receive bilateral credits from member states, such as Angola and Namibia. As reported by a Namibian daily publication, The Namibian Sun (30/09/2013), the then President of Namibia, Dr Hifikepunye Pohamba, took the anti-sanctions campaign to the United Nations General Assembly in New York where he appealed for total removal of any form of sanctions on Zimbabwe. Earlier, when Zimbabwe launched its anti-sanctions campaign, Namibia was the first country in the region to accede by endorsing the campaign in Harare.

Further, Smith-Höhn (2010:1-8) observes that while sanctions gave the opposition MDC international recognition and legitimacy, they also had legitimacy significance for ZANU-PF. The writer observed the continued support received by Robert Mugabe from regional bodies and other states, such as SADC and the AU, and by some countries from the international community such as China, in calling for a removal of “any form of sanctions on Zimbabwe.” As already indicated, Smith-Höhn cites the EU-Africa Summit as a good example of this show of support and solidarity for Mugabe.

According to The Herald (3/3/2010), Tsvangirai acknowledged that sanctions had “devastating effects on the economic and social fabric of the nation”. Ndakaripa (2014:145) cites the Zimbabwe Europe Network that on 23 July 2012 the EU indicated that sanctions could be suspended if the country holds a credible referendum on the new constitution. Earlier, in a typical carrot and stick style, on 20 February 2012, the EU had removed and suspended a host of measures against selected individuals and companies. However, sanctions were not lifted on the President and his family as well as on key sectors of the Zimbabwean economy. The Herald (24/07/2012), reported
that this was not received positively by ZANU-PF which presented the matter to the Zimbabwean people as if the EU extended sanctions without any intention to remove them.

According to an online report by Smith-Höhn (2010:1-8), by describing the sanctions as “illegal”, Robert Mugabe had successfully taken hostage of these measures. ZANU-PF publicly blamed illegal sanctions for the country’s economic decline and blamed the MDC-T for not doing enough to lobby for the removal of sanctions. Mugabe did not spare any opportunity at his disposal to denounce the targeted sanctions as serving the cause of the imperialists and colonialists. In doing so, he transformed the external pressure into political capital in support of his anti-imperialist cause, discrediting anyone in favour of the sanctions as puppets of the West.

On the effectiveness of the sanctions, Ndakaripa (2013:135-149) concludes that “to a large extend, the targeted sanctions failed to achieve their mandate as ZANU-PF, instead used them to justify the devastation of the country’s economy and to lobby for domestic and bilateral support”. Further, he observed that ZANU-PF enjoyed good bilateral relations with China, and this buffered the potential impact of restrictive measures imposed by the West.

However, the future on sanctions was predictable that they were likely to remain in place throughout the GNU and beyond given the fact that some conditions for the lifting of sanctions had not been met, such as the reform of the military, police services, prison services, the state intelligence services and other critical arms of the security sector. That also gave the EU justification for the renewal of targeted sanctions.

### 4.5.2 The Preponderance of the Incumbency and Other Factors that Gave Legitimacy to ZANU-PF

This section attempts to establish tendencies that support the theory that ZANU-PF as the incumbent Party had an upper hand in the implementation of the GPA. The researcher also attempts to highlight how ZANU-PF used its indigenisation and economic empowerment policies to gain legitimacy. As already highlighted in previous
chapters, Mapuva (2013:105-116), asserts that there is a phenomenon in African politics called the “preponderance of incumbency” which asserts that incumbent political leaders are able to manipulate the political terrain for political gain. Further Mapuva (2013) observes that “generally, parties in power would hardly accept value systems that limit or take away their power, while minority or disempowered groups readily accept any value system that promises them power”.

Munemo (2012:3) is of the same view with Raftopoulos (2013) that, ZANU-PF’s legitimacy came not from elections but from the liberation struggle and that ZANU-PF’s historical legitimacy stood in direct contrast to the election results of 2008. Munemo (2012) asserts that ZANU—PF is led by a veteran of the liberation struggle whose liberation war credentials are not questionable and because of this ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe have been very popular since 1980. To that, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011:15) observes that “A post-liberation political formation like the MDC-T with its roots in civil society rather than in the liberation struggle had to contend with resilient pre and post-liberation subtexts of histories, of solidarity within Southern African national-liberation movements”.

The above fact has already been compounded by Mapuva (2013:105-116), that during the GNU, Tsvangirai served as Prime Minister but played a subservient role to Mugabe and Vice President, Joice Mujuru. To that assertion, Raftopoulos (2013:51) argues that, "Under the GPA, the MDC formations were always at a disadvantage against a party that continued to control the coercive arms of the state and persistently blocked key reforms in the agreement". The incumbency factor played to the advantage of ZANU-PF as it manifested itself in various forms during the GNU, among which were the implementation of the economic indigenisation Act and the land reform. Ndakaripa (2015:1-43) explains how ZANU-PF used its incumbency and structural advantage to marginalise the MDC parties in implementing the Indigenisation Act. Further, he observed that as a result of differences, the Indigenisation Act has since been a patchwork of amendments, depending on the circumstances and ZANU-PF’s political interests.
On the same note, the implementation of the land reform during the GNU was not smooth but ZANU-PF prevailed. The Chronicle (1/11/2011) reported that ZANU-PF sought to economically empower Zimbabweans and address its land reform under the Indigenisation Act of 2007 that was put into effect on 9 March 2008 before the formation of the GNU. The Herald (18/10/2011), reported in an article “No going back on empowerment”, that ZANU-PF argued that economic indigenisation would democratise the economy and ensure that Zimbabwean employees, communities and individuals own the nation’s land and mineral resources. However, the same newspaper, reported that although the MDC-T shifted its goal posts, as it argued that it was totally against the policy, on the other end it affirmed that the policy was noble but needed revision. The same was reported in The Standard (14/02/2011) in an article “PM orders revision of indigenisation law” that the MDC-T opposed economic indigenisation claiming that the timing and prioritisation was wrong.

In an online publication, Good Governance Africa, Zamchiya (1/12/2014) who is the former regional co-ordinator of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition and a research fellow at Oxford University observed that Mr Tsvangirai misread the popular mood by failing to tackle issues Mr Mugabe made paramount during his rule. According to Chigora et al. (2010: 361), the opposition MDC failed to fully come to terms with the moral economy of the peasantry where peasants need to be spoken to in a language they understand; a position capitalised on by ZANU-PF in its “the land is the economy, the economy is the land” sloganeering.

Chigora et al. (2010: 361), further observes that throughout the 2013 election campaign, Tsvangirai was conspicuous for largely neglecting the topics of indigenisation, sanctions and the legacy of the liberation war, all of which were central to ZANU-PF’s campaign, as he mistakenly “thought Zimbabweans were more concerned with day-to-day, bread-and-butter issues”. Further, Chigora, et al. (2010) argue that while the MDC managed to secure diplomatic, moral and material support from the West, the MDC failed to articulate its issues to the electorate. Instead, the electorate were interested in practical issues based on sound policies for their immediate and future gains. In the end, Zamchiya (1/12/14) concluded, “Mugabe
presented himself as the custodian of the revolutionary past and depicted Tsvangirai as being without history and so without the credibility to lead Zimbabwe.”

Critics of the MDC as reported by The Zimbabwe Situation (24/09/2015) are of the view that the MDC factions saw an opportunity to get into power and that “It was more of personal fame and popularity and never about rescuing the national situation”. Further, The Zimbabwe Situation (24/09/2015) purports that “ZANU-PF grabbed the GNU as a chance to revitalise and re-emerge and won a landslide victory to end the GNU. The opposition served to legitimate ZANU-PF”. Further still, the reporter observed that the split into factions, plagued with infighting in the opposition camp were an advantage for Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Despite its own internal succession problems, during the GNU, ZANU-PF stood together as one against MDC formations and presented itself to the electorate as the custodian of the revolutionary past, in contrast to Tsvangirai who depicted himself as being without history and without the credibility to lead Zimbabwe.

According to Chigora, et al. (2010:368-368), the post-1990 opposition movement drew its ideological strength from an emphasis on political, civic and human rights, pointing to the democratic deficit of the incumbent governing party and building on the cumulative popular frustration with ZANU-PF after nearly two decades of one-party dominance. In its quest for continued supremacy, and in order to extend its dominant economic and political objectives, the governing party employed “defensive radicalism”, using land as a key weapon to counter the MDC machinations. By so doing, ZANU-PF connected itself with the aspirations of the masses, thereby alienating the MDC.

Further, Chigora, et al. (2010), observe that the human rights question and democratic demands of the MDC were largely dismissed by the majority of rural electorate who perceived them as an extension of western intervention, with giving little relevance to the real issues of economic empowerment. The rural populace voiced that ‘they do not eat democracy and human rights’ but were content that “the land is the economy and the economy is the land”. The governing party capitalised on portraying the opposition as bent on returning the country to white colonial rule. Hence, as already
highlighted, the governing party had postured and portrayed itself as a vanguard nationalist home-grown party with its ideology firmly grounded in the people’s welfare.

Although critics of the GNU have accused Mr Mugabe of stealing the 2008 presidential election and hence labelling him an illegitimate leader, to the contrary, Chigora et al. (2010) have argued that the reality is simply that the governing party laid emphasis where it matters most; the rural constituencies, while MDC concentrated on the urbanites that are just a tiny component of the voting population.

Finally, Chigora et al. (2010) have argued that to gain a foothold into the political arena, the MDC should have been talking a language common to all Africans and former colonised countries. At regional level, the MDC should have been eloquent in talking of the struggle against neo-colonialism. At continental level, it should have supported the Pan-African agenda; and in the North-South divide; in support of the South’s clamour for democratisation of the international order. On the contrary, the MDC advocated for the sanctioning of the government and ZANU-PF leadership as well as supporting the re-emergence of civil society.

Other critics such as journalist Ray Ndlovu commenting in The Financial Gazette (18/12/2014) were of the view that the MDC were corrupt and incompetent and therefore unable to deliver the democratic changes the nation needed. The paper accused Tsvangirai and MDC as having betrayed the nation in failing to implement the critical reforms under the GNU. “The MDC lost political credibility with the splits, immature decisions and continued failure to dislodge ZANU-PF.

An analysis of the above shows that the MDC-T, as the main opposition political party played into the hands of ZANU-PF. Further, as demonstrated above, the MDC’s internal weaknesses contributed considerably to its limitations in Zimbabwe’s political terrain.

4.5.3 Revolutionary, Cultural and Traditional Considerations
In resonance with assertions made above by Chigora et al. (2010:368-368), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011:15-16) already indicated, articulates that, “A post-liberation political
formation like the MDC–T, with its roots in civil society rather than in the liberation
struggle, has had to contend with resilient solidarity within Southern African national-
liberation movements. These have favoured ZANU–PF as one of their own.” Further,
he argues, “the MDC, a new kid on the bloc was generally viewed with suspicion by
former liberation movements and was not readily welcome in the region”.

Further, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011:15-16) has commented that the situation in Zimbabwe
during the GNU made it difficult for the MDC-T to be fully accepted as a political player
in Zimbabwian politics. He observes that since its formation, Mugabe, senior leaders
of ZANU-PF and some sections of the media accused the MDC-T of being funded by
foreign organisations and governments to ensure the removal of Zimbabwe's political
leaders by force. Further, Smith-Höhn (2010:1-7) confirms that Britain provided
support to the opposition and civil society and that it was the Blair administration’s key
objectives to provide support to the opposition MDC. Hence, Ndlovu-Gatsheni
(2011):15-16) concludes that the regime change agenda has been utilised by the
revolutionary party ZANU-PF to dismiss the legitimacy of the MDC-T as a genuine
home-grown party and was worsened by the European Union and United States of
America openly supporting the opposition party. External forces raised human rights
violations concerns, an argument which was used to strengthen ZANU-PF’s claim of
persecution by Britain through sanctions and the support for MDC. Furthermore,
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011:15-16) indicates these arguments were accepted and believed
by governments in the regional body, the SADC, such as Namibia and Angola.

Generally, the Zimbabwean traditional and cultural set up does not embrace or
promote gay rights, as they are considered unbecoming and un-African. According to
The New Zimbabwe (26/3/2010), “in as much as the MDC had its supporters, the
majority of Zimbabweans do not embrace gay rights”. However, according to an online
publication by Zaba (2010), entitled, “Zimbabwe: New Constitution-Where ZANU-PF,
MDC-T and NCA Diverge” the writer observed that Human Rights groups asserted
that gay rights were human rights and accused ZANU-PF of perpetrating human rights
abuses on the freedom of gays in Zimbabwe. According to an online publication by
Samba (2013), reiterated Zaba by opining that the LGBTI rights were not embraced in
the new constitution. The DailyNews, (5/8/2013) quoted the Director of Gays and
Lesbians of Zimbabwe, Chesterfield Samba who said that he felt that a ZANU-PF victory held bleak prospects for LGBTI rights in the country.

4.5.4 Challenges Besetting the MDC-T

The MDC-T faced numerous challenges in the GNU and particularly in the run-up to the 2013 harmonised elections that had a direct impact on how they eventually performed. The challenges included:

The deterrent personal attributes of the main opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai

Smith-Höhn (2010:1-8) observed that there was a time prior to the GNU when Tsvangirai enjoyed popular support from civil society organisations, white commercial farmers and students. The violent farm invasions in 2000 were a windfall for the opposition leader. He spoke out strongly against the invasions, casting himself as a champion of liberal democracy. According to an online publication, Good Governance Africa (2014), in an article, “Whatever happened to the MDC?” Zamchiya purports that Tsvangirai “had the international community eating out of his hand”. The pinnacle of his rise came during the dramatic March 2008 presidential elections. In the first round of voting, Morgan Tsvangirai won more votes than Robert Mugabe, 47.9% to 43.2%, just short of the 50% or more necessary to prevent a second round of voting. Since then, Tsvangirai and the MDC have slid downhill. According to the findings of the Afrobarometer Survey Report by Ndoma (2015:1-9), “public approval ratings for Tsvangirai, while consistently higher than for Mugabe, declined between 2009 and 2012, while Mugabe’s approval ratings increased sharply”. The descent culminated in the 2013 poll, which was deemed free and fair by the African Union and the Southern African Development Community. Mugabe handed the MDC a resounding defeat, winning 61% of the vote to the MDC’s 33%.

According to Zamchiya (2014), “An MDC defeat had become predictable”. The publication makes reference to a poll held in mid-2012 sponsored by American think-tank, Freedom House, that showed a dramatic fall in MDC-T support from 38% to 19%, and that of ZANU-PF rising from 17% to 31%. Finally, the publication reports that after
its defeat, the MDC claimed it had compiled a dossier detailing the fraud, but it did not make it public nor submit it to election observers.

**Internal power struggles that weakened the official opposition**

Gwisai (2013) observed that different sections in the MDC-T were calling for the removal of Tsvangirai. He was accused of autocratic leadership, just like when the party split in 2005 with several high-profile MDC members such as Welshman Ncube and Arthur Mutambara accusing him of the same thing. When Tsvangirai was re-elected to another five-year term as party leader at the MDC’s congress in October 2013, Gwisai (2013) further noted that sections of the opposition referred Tsvangirai to a “tainted campaigner long past his prime is holding the MDC hostage”.

**Corruption charges against MDC-T legislators**

The MDC-T has been consistent in its criticism of corruption by Mr Mugabe and some leaders of ZANU-PF. However, since the GNU, there have been many instances where its elected members have been accused of delinquencies that they accused ZANU-PF of.

While ZANU-PF’s machinations are widely critiqued, the MDC groupings were not spared either. Raftopoulos (2013:57) observes the corruption charges against MDC-T urban councillors that damaged the MDC-T’s image as a party of “Change”. The cases cited include:

- A Chitungwiza land scandal which resulted in the party firing all its 23 councillors in 2010; the mismanagement and looting of Council land and resources by councillors in Bindura; the Kwekwe audit report findings of 2012 which unearthed serious financial irregularities involving the under-banking of collected revenue and the Marondera corruption case which resulted in the suspension of the mayor by his party in March 2012 for receiving kickbacks from companies and individuals in return for tenders. The corruption among the party’s representatives in local authorities, MDC parliamentarians and government officials, as the MDC leadership itself has admitted, has the
potential to cost the party dearly during the next elections. Raftopoulos (2013:57)

Gwisai (2013) points out that Tsvangirai’s original support base criticised him for enjoying the perks of power while not doing enough to push for political reforms. During the GNU, Tsvangirai moved into a $5m mansion in the posh Highlands suburb in Harare, which he still occupied well beyond the expiry of the tenure of the GNU in 2013.

Further, Chigora et al. (2010: 358-366), affirm that accountability and transparency play a key role in governance and democracy. The MDC had raised people’s expectations but their failure in accountability and transparency added to discontent among supporters. The authors further observe that there were a number of local councillors in different districts of the country that were fired from their posts for engaging in corruption. The damage done to the party by all these activities was immense and could have influenced the crushing loss of the MDC-T in the 2013 elections.

Lack of governance knowhow

Zamchiya (2014) observed that it was the first time MDC formations were in government. During the GNU, the MDC-T was found lacking in establishing more structures of the party especially in the rural areas of Zimbabwe where the ZANU-PF enjoyed more support. By the time the elections dates were announced, it was too late to try to reach the masses, which proved to be a limitation for the MDC-T.

However, various factors could be attributed to the outcome of the 2013 harmonised elections results. Zamchiya (2014) cites various factors that probably the electorate was not convinced to vote for the MDC-T in their majority or maybe memories and fear of the violence that had characterised the 2008 elections forced the electorate to vote for ZANU-PF. Coupled with the monopoly of the media and incumbency advantage, the electorate could have been swayed into voting for ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF as opposed to the MDC, had well established party structures in the rural areas where it drew much support. However, a further analysis of the outcome could also be the
result of the MDC-T proving to be its worst enemy over the years and thus playing into the hands of ZANU-PF. The participation of the MDC-T in the GNU proved to weaken the party and allowed ZANU-PF to outmanoeuvre it. Probably the MDC-T was a co-architect of its own poor performance.

In a bid to contextualise democratic legitimacy in Zimbabwe, in the broad context of the dissertation title, the researcher observes that the situation in Zimbabwe over the years has made it difficult for the MDC-T to be fully accepted as a political player in Zimbabwean politics. Since its formation, ZANU-PF and has accused the MDC-T of being funded by foreign organisations and governments to ensure the illegal removal of a legitimate government. As already highlighted earlier, the regime change agenda has been utilised by the revolutionary party ZANU-PF to dismiss the legitimacy of the MDC-T as a genuine home-grown party. By openly supporting the opposition party, the EU and the USA affirmed the ZANU-PF labelling of the MDC, that it was a puppet party fronting Western interests. On human rights violations concerns, ZANU-PF has over the years argued and strengthened its position and claims of persecution by Britain through sanctions and the support for MDC. The position by ZANU-PF has been accepted and believed by some members of the regional community, in particular former liberation movements such as SWAPO and ANC.

On the other hand, the MDC-T has demonstrated lack of a clear ideology and policies, thereby alienating itself from the support of many Zimbabweans. In the run up to elections, the MDC-T launched the Jobs, Upliftment, Investment, Capital and Environment (JUICE) platform which was heavily trumpeted during the election rallies. However, the party failed to sell JUICE to the people. Mukuhlani (2014:176) concludes that the MDC-T failed to sell its manifesto to the people, ultimately resulting in the loss to the ZANU-PF in the 2013 elections and that it has proved difficult for the MDC-T to establish itself as a home-grown institution that has the people's interest at heart.

### 4.5.5 Economic Empowerment and Indigenisation

According to The Herald (1/11/2011), in an article, “Entrepreneurship, Employment: Zimbabwe at Ideological Crossroads”, the move by ZANU-PF to indigenise the economy and empower Zimbabweans drew the sharp contrast between MDC-T and
ZANU-PF. The Zimbabwe Independent, (25/11/2010) in an article “Dialogue Displays Wide GNU Ideological Chasm”, alludes to the same by purporting that the nation was deeply polarised on the issue of economic indigenisation. Ndakaripa (2015:9) observed that the two major political parties had scholarly arguments to support their positions and ideological standing, and this created serious problems in implementing the Indigenisation Act.

According to an article in The Herald, (4/2/2011), “Independence not supported economically Meaningless”, ZANU-PF developed ideological and philosophical anchorage to support the economic indigenisation programme. According to Ndakaripa (2015:9), the Indigenisation Act is viewed by ZANU-PF as a noble legislation which “rectifies the imbalances that occurred during the colonial era”. As such, ZANU-PF insisted that black political independence without the control of the economy was meaningless. ZANU-PF is of the view that Zimbabwe has resources, educated and skilled people, who, through the policy of economic indigenisation, can set the country on course for industrialisation. To that, The Herald (18/10/2011) asserted that ZANU-PF’s economic indigenisation is premised on the conviction that indigenous Zimbabweans “must own and primarily benefit from the exploitation and utilisation of their God given resources”.

The paper further asserted that economic indigenisation would democratise the economy and ensure that Zimbabwean employees, communities and individuals own the nation’s land, mineral resources and corporations. As a result, in an article published by The Herald, (3//11/2011), “Economic Empowerment Revolution Irreversible”, revealed that this notion was regarded by ZANU-PF as the only way to guarantee socio-economic rights, development, prosperity, democracy, sustainable peace and security. Pursuant to that, an article in The Herald, (8//11/2011), “Indigenisation: Let’s Embrace Redistribution of our Heritage”, ZANU-PF in its election campaign, claimed that the indigenisation policy would enable Zimbabweans to determine their own destiny, without foreign interference. Ndakaripa (2015:10) therefore deduced that these notions reflected that ZANU-PF’s economic indigenisation programme had an ideological anchorage premised on economic nationalism with strong anti-colonial traits.
On the other hand, according to The Financial Gazette (5/11/2010), “Indigenisation: ZANU-PF Hijacking Government Programme”, the MDC-T showed that it was firmly opposed to the Indigenisation Act and advanced that it needed revision as it promoted the grabbing of company shares by those well connected to ZANU-PF at the expense of the poor, foreign direct investment and job creation. In a related article by The Financial Gazette (18/2/2010), “Genuine Indigenisation, Yes! Sceptics Fear Wholesale Expropriation of Assets”, the author confirmed the MDC-T’s fears. Further, The Zimbabwe Independent (1-7/4/2011) also published an article entitled “Accelerating Economic Demise” in which the MDC claimed that the Indigenisation Act was a populist policy which would delay economic recovery and at worst even ruin the country. The MDC-T posited that the nation faced de-investment, de-industrialisation and pauperisation if the indigenisation policy was pursued in its current form. Both the MDCs argued that instead of implementing redistributive populist policies such as economic indigenisation, the Zimbabwean government should restore investor confidence by respecting the rule of law. During the GNU period the economic indigenisation programme did not achieve its official objective of empowering the majority black Zimbabweans because of its nature and political conflicts. However, it achieved the unofficial objective of giving ZANU-PF an electoral advantage, as argued by The Standard (30/10/2011) that Community Share Ownership Schemes were a vote-buying gimmick by ZANU-PF.

4.5.6 The Media

According to Article 19d of the Global Political Agreement (2008), parties in the Inclusive Government agreed that the media should adhere to balanced and fair reportage on political activities. In a positive step, the Zimbabwe Media Commission was created in March 2010. The commission subsequently instituted media reforms with the licensing of print media publications and two commercial radio broadcasters. However, according to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Print Media Report on 2013 Harmonised General Elections (2013:3), the gazetting of SI 33 was a major development in providing guidelines in the conduct of the print media during an election period. SI 33 of 2008 provides for universally agreed professional principles and ethics of journalism and election reporting. Internationally, there are no statutory
guidelines governing the conduct of the print media except those ethical standards guiding the profession. However, name-calling, inflammatory and hate language, continued to characterise political coverage. While the public media carried the voice of ZANU-PF, the independent media carried that of MDC-T. The Report purports that at the end of the day, although not being the best media scenario an unintentional balance was achieved in the coverage of the two major political parties.

In an online article commenting on the period in the run-up to the 31 July 2013 elections, Zirima (2013:1) observed that a free, independent, diverse media remained elusive despite being an important ingredient in ensuring a credible, free and fair election. The writer further argues that the lack of political will to institute media reforms following commitments in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in 2008 and the subsequent Road Map in 2011 had limited media freedom, diversity and access to relevant information on elections by Zimbabweans.

Opposition political parties and civic groups continued to express dissatisfaction at the accelerated and unbalanced media coverage of political events by public broadcasters whose reportage was biased in favour of ZANU-PF. According to Zirima (2013:2) this led to media reform being placed high on the agenda of the SADC Special Summit on Zimbabwe held in Maputo on 15 June 2013. The facilitator’s report adopted by the Summit noted the need for a conducive media environment to ensure a free and fair election. Up to the end of the GNU, the Zimbabwe Media Commission was unable to reform the country’s media laws, such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Censorship and Entertainment Control Act. Parliament failed to conclude media legislation such as the Media Practitioners Bill and the Freedom of Information Bill that could foster the development of a diverse and pluralistic media environment in Zimbabwe.

According to Kachiko (2010:4), ZANU-PF complained of pirate radio stations that were used for propaganda purposes such as Studio 7 that was based in neighbouring countries. Against this backdrop, Kachiko (2010) further asserts that allegations of the harassment of journalists and artists perceived to be disloyal to ZANU-PF continued, which thwarted freedom of expression, a cornerstone of democracy.
Zirima (2013:3) attested to allegations that the state-owned media apparatus facilitated ZANU-PF’s aggressive anti-sanctions campaign to convince the ordinary Zimbabweans who came to appreciate that they had suffered under comprehensive illegal economic sanctions. ZANU-PF lobbied successfully against the legitimacy of the illegal sanctions in state-controlled print and electronic media in Zimbabwe, as well as social media, and successfully took the campaign to SADC at the regional level and the AU at the continental level.

The media polarisation regarding the outcome of the elections was so visible. The issue of the accreditation of foreign observers was carried by both public and private media presenting arguments for and against the invitation. The public media supported the extension of invitation to those groups and countries that were friendly to the country and were against countries and groups perceived to be enemies of the country through the imposition of sanctions. The public media’s position was that such groups were already biased as they had taken a stance against the country by virtue of the imposition of sanctions. The independent media, civic groups and other political parties wanted these groups to observe the elections for credibility purposes and that their approval of the election meant funding for various projects after the elections.

Allegations that the voters’ roll had been tempered with, alleged partisan nature of security forces and lack of implementation of reforms under the GNU were perceived as militating against the holding of free and fair elections. The researcher notes that there has not been objective and factual coverage of political issues by the media during the period covered by the GNU. The media has been operating like extended arms of respective political parties. The public media celebrated the victory by ZANU-PF while at the same time also celebrating the defeat of MDC-T. The public media carried statements by various groups and countries that endorsed the ZANU-PF win and described the elections as peaceful, free, fair and credible. On the other hand, the independent media continued to report that the elections were rigged by ZEC and ZANU-PF. According to the ZEC (2013) General Elections Report, “there were allegation carried by the independent media carrying the voice of other political parties and some civic organisations that an Israeli intelligence firm was hired to temper with
the voters’ roll as a way of rigging by the ZANU-PF. Their stance was that the elections were not credible although they did not dispute that the elections were peaceful.

The SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, SADC PGGDDE (2015); echoes in many ways the AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections and Governance in Africa (ACDEG, 2007). Besides upholding human rights, democracy and rule of law, the common electoral principles upheld by both AU and SADC are the acceptance and respect of election results proclaimed free and fair by competent national electoral authorities and by all political parties.

However, in postscript, while the 2013 Zimbabwe general election results were disputed by MDC, USA and EU, the AU and SADC to the contrary, accepted the outcome. The Reports of the SADC Election Observer Mission (SEOM) (2013); the African Union Commission (AUC) (2013) and the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) (2013), endorsed the elections as free, peaceful and indeed a sufficient expression of the will of the people of Zimbabwe.

4.6 Data Analysis and Results

The next section analyses the data and presents the findings of the study.

4.6.1 Acceptance of the GNU

This section discusses the findings of the study. The results of this research suggest foremost that the overall perceptions of the legitimacy of the Zimbabwe GNU generally positive. This dissertation has shown that Zimbabweans from across the board welcomed and embraced the GNU. There was immediate peace and an increase of Zimbabwe’s interactions with foreign countries within the region, the continent and international community. This meant the implementation of the GPA helped rebuild legitimacy, and the GNU became acceptable at home, in the region and in the international community. However, the specific concerns identified within the literature reviewed about the GNU’s performance, indicate perceived legitimacy deficits that will be highlighted below.
4.6.2 Constitution Making Process

The adoption of a new democratic constitution was central to the GPA’s goal of creating an environment conducive to a peaceful, free and fair election of a substantive government. The GPA recognised the inadequacy of the constitution that was produced at the 1979 Lancaster House Conference primarily to transfer power from the colonial authority to the people of Zimbabwe and made it imperative for the Zimbabwean people to make a constitution by themselves and for themselves. Specifically, article 6 of the GPA required the GNU comprising ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations to set up a select committee of parliament to produce a new constitution within 12 months of the government’s formation, a timeline requirement that was not met during that period.

The constitution making process became one of the most iconic acts in the GNU that demonstrated beyond doubt that the GNU was successful in resolving the political impasse in Zimbabwe as demonstrated below. At a political level, the GNU exposed the main political parties to several intense processes of negotiation that brought them together. Importantly, the GNU gave birth to several new mechanisms and institutions, including the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) and the new constitution. Working on developing these institutions helped former enemies to respect and treat one another as adversaries they had to learn to work with. The summary below demonstrates the unity of purpose by political parties regarding the constitution making process.

The new Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe (2013) was one of the major achievements of the GNU. On the constitution making process, according to the Global Political Agreement (2008:4), the parties agreed that it was the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make their own constitution and that the process was to be inclusive and democratic. The adoption of a new democratic constitution was central to the GPA’s goal of creating an environment conducive to a peaceful, free and fair election of a democratically elected government.

The new Constitution, (2013) redefined the relationship between the state and the individual. After Mugabe signed the Constitutional Bill into law, according to online
news of The Zimbabwe Independent (11/07/2013), Industry and Commerce Minister Welshman Ncube of the MDC-M faction, remarked: “We finally have a constitution that we can truly call our own … As we move forward to rebuild our Zimbabwe, let the challenge be of ensuring that our political and governance practices measure up to the letter and spirit of this supreme law.” This demonstrated unity of purpose and commitment.

In the preamble of the new Constitution, (2013), it is stated: “We, the people of Zimbabwe, are united in our diversity by our common desire for freedom, justice and equality, and our heroic resistance to colonialism, racism and all forms of domination and oppression.” These values, embedded in the new constitution, were created, not by one person or one party, but by many Zimbabweans for the benefit of all Zimbabweans. Again, that demonstrated unity of purpose by the political parties to the GNU.

The constitution-making process was characterised by several episodes that are worth noting. The Herald (24/10/2012), reported that the Second All-Stakeholders Conference on the Draft Constitution held from 22 October 2012 at the Rainbow Towers in Harare was a successful event. At the opening, President Robert Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai danced together to local singer Oliver Mtukudzi’s music. When the then Constitutional Affairs Minister Eric Matinenga opened The Second All-Stakeholders Conference, he stated that he felt “a sense of political tolerance” and argued that the Constitution Parliamentary Committee (COPAC) draft (finalised on 31 January 2013), was “a product of a collective effort”. Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara emphasised that the new constitution would be a matter of “posterity”. Again, that demonstrated oneness and unity of purpose at the highest level of political representation.

Further, during their official addresses at The Second All-Stakeholders Conference, Mr Mugabe and Mr Tsvangirai both called for peace. Mugabe stated that “Violence is primitive and here I would like to speak to ZANU-PF; Tsvangirai is your neighbour and to the MDC; Mugabe is your neighbour…let us shames our detractors who think
Zimbabweans cannot resolve their differences without resorting to violence.” Political leaders openly denounced violence showing total commitment at the highest level.

During the presentation of the COPAC Draft Constitution, COPAC co-chairs shared lighter moments. They called each other twins and remarked that the constitution-making process was a form of national healing. The fact is that COPAC forced political parties, as well as Zimbabweans, into an intense conversation about the country’s past, present and future. One would like to believe that this has not been in vain and that many of these negotiation processes have fostered a culture of compromise and dialogue.

The above highlighted moments throughout the COPAC processes stand out distinctly in stark contrast to the image of the violence that characterised Zimbabwe in 2008. According to the Mail & Guardian, (2011) Crisis Reports, political violence in Zimbabwe started to escalate in 2006 and peaked in 2007. Incidents of political violence began to decrease in 2008 reaching lowest levels in 2010 and 2011 before escalating again. Therefore, to an extent, the GPA succeeded in reducing the extent of politically-motivated violence through the constitution making process. However, although parties demonstrated unity of purpose, the constitution making process that was also supported by the West, revealed that the GNU was largely still fragile as it caused substantial tension within the inclusive government. Frequently, the negotiations reached stalemate and the MDC formations sought the intervention of the mediator.

The Draft Constitution was submitted to a referendum on 16 and 17 March 2013. Following the referendum in which people overwhelmingly voted in favour of the new constitution, Zimbabweans now had new lenses to judge one another’s conduct. The referendum was generally rated a resounding success.

4.6.3 The Land Reform
On land reform, although Parties to the GPA differed on the methodology of acquisition and redistribution of land, the Global Political Agreement (2008:3) affirmed that “parties acknowledged that compulsory acquisition and redistribution of land had taken
place under a land reform programme undertaken since 2000”. To that, all political parties agreed that the land reform was necessary and that any call to undo the process would result in anarchy. They however, differed on implementation mechanisms.

Further, parties took a unanimous stance on the need for the redistribution of land to the majority indigenous people of Zimbabwe since this was at the core of the liberation struggle. Despite MDC-T’s disgruntlement over the Indigenisation Act of 2007, parties accepted the inevitability and desirability of a comprehensive land reform programme that redresses the issues of historical land imbalances and injustices to address the issues of equity, productivity, and justice. Therefore, the GNU successfully legitimised the land reform programme.

4.6.4 Independent Commissions Supporting Democracy

In addition to a new constitution, the three parties to the GPA had made progress in setting up agreed impartial and independent bodies established to cultivate democracy. According to the COPAC Draft Constitution (2013), the Commissions included the Zimbabwe Media Commission; the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC), Judicial Services Commission (JSC), and the Zimbabwe Gender Commission (ZGC). The mandate of these democracy supporting bodies include among others; to support and entrench human rights and democracy; to protect the sovereignty and interests of the people; to promote constitutionalism; to promote transparency and accountability in public institutions; and to secure the observance of democratic values and principles by the State and all institutions and agencies of government and government-controlled entities. Essentially these bodies are supposed to be independent and are not subject to the direction or control of anyone. Their members are supposed to be non-partisan and impartial. However, their autonomy and impartiality has been found wanting as highlighted in the literature review. On the same note, the media reforms implemented resulted in more newspapers on the market than before. During the GNU era, Zimbabwe remained lagging behind in licensing electronic media due to outdated equipment.
4.6.5 Economic Stability and Growth

The GNU managed to rescue the country from an economic impasse, urgently addressing challenges of high inflation, interest rates and the exchange rate, issues of production, food security, poverty and unemployment. The economy stabilised partly as a result of dollarization, but also because of the formation of the GNU. The stabilization of the economy enabled the inclusive government to begin to rectify the economic and social crises. It signalled to businesses and investors that there was the potential for a more stable economic environment. According to the Government of Zimbabwe (2012), 2012-2013 Budget Statement, after years of economic stagnation, the Zimbabwean economy grew by more than 9% per year in 2010 to 2011 before it slowed down to 5% in 2012. Further, the African Development Bank, African Development Fund, Zimbabwe Country Brief (2011-2013) reported that both the health and education sectors were recovering but had not reached the desired levels. However, the Brief notes that Public service delivery improved with education and health services fees becoming more affordable to the public than before.

Agricultural productivity increased in a very decisive manner, especially tobacco production. According to the Tobacco Industry Marketing Board (TIMB) (2014:37) Annual Report, tobacco production, increased in terms of volumes from 58 million kg in 2008/09 to 124 million kg in 2009/10 marketing season, and exceeded 184 million kg in the successive GNU marketing seasons, surpassing volumes produced in previous years. Further, according to the Government of Zimbabwe Monthly Economic Review (2013:5), the country registered positive growth in wheat, cotton and sugar production and that despite successive drought spells experienced in the country, there was food security for the period under review.

The IMF Country Report No: 09/139 (2009) observed that at the implementation of economic turn-around strategy, STERP, the country’s economy had stabilized and realized a positive economic growth which reached 8% by the first quarter of 2011. The Report attributed this achievement to the rapid macroeconomic policy actions implemented at the onset of the GNU in the fiscal, monetary, financial, and structural areas that were aimed at maintaining low inflation, halting and reversing the economic
decline and improving social conditions. These had helped reverse the economic and moral paralysis that had characterised the pre-GNU period.

4.6.6 The Road Map to Free, Fair and Credible Elections
JOMIC assisted the political parties towards peaceful, free and fair elections by ensuring polls that were held under SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections; the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO) (2003) and the ACDEG (2007). Review of literature showed that Zimbabwe had already domesticated the guidelines into its electoral laws. It can therefore be argued that the GNU achieved one of its major mandates, holding of democratic elections under a peaceful environment.

On consent and acceptance of the GNU’s Road Map to free, fair and credible elections, the generality of Zimbabweans overwhelming turned out in their numbers for both the referendum and the harmonised elections. However, according to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Print Media Report on 2013 Harmonised General Elections (2013:26), observations on the voter registration exercise were that the people were mostly frustrated in their bid to be registered to be eligible to vote. The Voters Register had apparent errors which ZEC had acknowledged and that the Voters Register was continually being updated. However, an electronic copy of the Voters Register was not made available to all contesting parties before the election. Complaints were that the process was being carried out at a snail’s pace to dishearten would-be voters. Perceived shortcomings of the Voter Register and the registration exercise militated against free and fair elections. Further, the independent media reported on alleged partisan nature of security forces and lack of implementation of reforms under the GNU, as retrogressive factors to democratic elections.

4.6.7 Inclusivity
Literature review shows that the generality Zimbabweans felt they were not consulted on the processes leading to the GNU, arguing that the GNU was imposed on them. The GNU was formed through a settlement reached by the main political parties only, ZANU-PF, MDC M and MDC-T, leaving out civil society organizations and other leaders and lesser political parties. Its inclusivity was therefore objectionable.
The governmental structure of the GNU was designed specifically to accommodate all participating political players in governmental structures. These include the civil service, the cabinet, diplomatic posts, and the judiciary and in other instances, the security forces namely the army, air force, police and the intelligence arms. An analysis of relevant literature reveals shortcomings in equitable power sharing between President Mugabe and Prime Minister Tsvangirai; reappointment of provincial governors, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor, Attorney-General and permanent secretaries. However, a review of literature shows that equitable participation in that regard did not materialise in the GNU and that hampered prospects for integration and development.

The three parties had successfully set up a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) which was essentially a tool to oversee implementation of agreed positions of the GPA. Parties undertook to channel all complaints, grievances, concerns and issues relating to compliance with the GPA through JOMIC. The SADC Facilitation Team and JOMIC ensured the monitoring, evaluation and implementation of the GPA. Overall, the GNU did not fully embrace inclusivity of stakeholders.

4.6.8 National Healing

Article VII on Promotion of Equality, National Healing, Cohesion and Unity of the GPA allowed for the formation of the Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI), represented by members from the three political parties. The ONHRI was the GNU peace building strategy, a means of addressing and resolving politically motivated violence, attaining peace, truth, justice, tolerance and nonviolence paving way for the development of the country.

The ONHRI also promoted interparty dialogue to avoid relapse into conflict after peace building efforts had been put in place. The meaning and relevance of the healing and reconciliation process in the country’s development were not only visible in fostering the spirit of unity, harmony and forgiveness amongst the people of Zimbabwe but also in the peaceful way the constitution making process was carried out, and the peaceful manner in which the referendum and the 31 July 2013 harmonised elections were held.
4.6.9 Violence
On political violence, all political parties in Zimbabwe agreed that violence should be shunned. According to Ndora (2015:1-9), the political environment in the run-up to the 2013 harmonised elections was peaceful as opposed to the previous three elections that were marred by violence. Still on political violence, the same report noted that during the GNU era, mass emigration by Zimbabweans seeking political asylum in neighbouring countries and abroad had considerably reduced. This demonstrated that the political environment at home had stabilised and was generally accepted.

4.6.10 Sanctions and Regime Change Forces
Findings also reflect that measures and sanctions as well as the regime change agenda continued to effectively curtail reform in Zimbabwe during the GNU. On regime change, Carothers (2009:5) argues that the discourse of human rights has been constructed in a global context in which, since the 1990s, aid has been linked to the “good governance” agenda and political conditionality, in which the emphasis has been placed on elections and formal political and civic rights, rather than on social and economic rights. It can be deduced that through US state-funded organisations such as Freedom House, this dominant political perspective of democracy assistance and aid is targeted at key political institutions such as political parties and civic groups, with the hope of catalytic effects. Much of the human rights discourse and lobbying in Zimbabwe was constructed through this framework, with little or no analysis of political economy issues, such as the land reform, poverty alleviation, economic empowerment; and or the politics of regional dynamics in SADC.

However, an analysis of literature review reveals that the extent of the impact of sanctions during the GNU was limited. According to Pan-African News Wire (2011, evidence of this arose when ZANU-PF war veterans engaged in a countrywide anti-sanctions petition campaign in March 2011, which was arguably a success as they managed to get over 2 million signatures. Further, ZANU-PF earned support and solidarity from some countries in SADC, AU and the international community such as China. We see that Zimbabwe, though beset by an ailing economy, had shown...
resilience in times of hardships, hence the reason sanctions did not completely succeed in fostering reform in Zimbabwe.

Sanctions had largely contributed to the marginalizing of ZANU-PF from the international community and ultimately eroding the party’s alliance base. They contributed to the country’s economic haemorrhage, creating conditions of humanitarian catastrophe in Zimbabwe, leading to a legitimacy crisis for ZANU-PF and a level of desperation and urgency that compelled serious negotiations. This study has highlighted that the economic and political isolation of Zimbabwe by the UK, the EU, the USA and other sections of the International Community over and around issues of disputed elections, governance and differences over the land reform programme facilitated a hurting stalemate that spawned the GPA between ZANU-PF and the MDC.

However, according to the Final Report of the SADC Negotiators to the GPA, the Post-Maputo Interparty Dialogue (2010), the GPA parties committed “to work together in re-engaging the international community with a view to bringing to an end to the country’s international isolation”. Further, according to the Report of the negotiators on the post-Maputo Interparty Dialogue, it was also agreed that the GPA principals “should meet and consider the issuance of a statement and the convening of a press conference restating commitment to the GPA, and the removal of sanctions, and the implementation and execution of a consistent message on the question of sanctions”. According to the ZBC News (1 March 2010), Mr Tsvangirai is on record calling for the removal of sanctions, for the success of the GNU. Further, The Herald (21/07/2011), in an article entitled “Government Committed to the Removal of Sanctions, Tsvangirai tells House”, while addressing Parliament, Tsvangirai had informed the legislators that Government was committed to the removal of sanctions and that the Committee tasked with re-engaging the European Union and the United States would be guided by Government policy rather than political party views. This demonstrated a common understanding that sanctions were an impediment to the democratic implementation of the GNU.

In recognition of the GNU’s commitments and implementation of the GPA, the European Union removed and suspended a number of measures against some of the
top ZANU-PF officials and the regional bloc had committed to working with any government formed as a result of a free and fair election. However, sanctions were not lifted on the President and his family as well as on key sectors of the Zimbabwean economy. Yet, the future on sanctions was predictable that they were likely to remain in place after a ZANU-PF victory in the July 2013 general elections.

4.6.11 SADC Role

While SADC facilitated the formation of GNU, the extent of its role in ensuring smooth implementation of the GPA and ensuring a democratic transition remained elusive. A detailed analysis of relevant literature reveals that SADC’s role in the GNU was limited to facilitation and advisory as opposed to law enforcement and that the SADC was not be held responsible for the outcome of the GNU. However, through SADC facilitation, the GNU managed to implement certain aspects of the GPA while several pertinent issues remained unresolved. They included media reforms, security sector reforms and the issue of interment of heroes at the National Heroes Acre and the criteria thereof. Literature review shows that Thabo Mbeki in his role as facilitator and his foreign policy for the Zimbabwean situation was found wanting as he was criticised for being pro-ZANU-PF and anti-MDC.

As indicated under literature review, Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy was hinged on avoiding confrontation. Furthermore, he blocked any criticism or proposed actions against Zimbabwe in international forums citing that the Zimbabwe issue must be resolved by Zimbabweans. Critics argued that by failing to call Mugabe to order by way of asking him to relinquish power to the opposition leader Tsvangirai, Mbeki went contrary to principles of the AU Constitutive Act which discourage the usurp of power and violation of rights of citizens. However, an analysis of literature review shows that Mbeki’s facilitation happened to be the strongest under the Zimbabwean situation. It was essentially a containment strategy whose major preoccupation was to get belligerents to settle their differences by entering into a peace pact for the benefit of Zimbabweans rather than political contenders.

More than four years of the GNU have also permitted a level of cross-party communication and cooperation unthinkable in 2008. In some instances, the different
political parties demonstrated unity of purpose and spoke with one voice concerning pertinent issues such as sanctions, minority rights and the role of the SADC Facilitation Team. The parties unanimously agreed that it would be viable to invite the Facilitation Team only after the completion of a given milestone such as the constitution-drafting process, instead of having the team coming in at their own prescribed initiative. According to the BBC News (22/07/2013) in an article “South Africa’s Jacob Zuma Silences Lindiwe Zulu on Zimbabwe”, ZANU-PF had also complained that facilitators should remain aloof, non-partisan and objective and that mediation could not be resolved through mega diplomacy. On minority rights, both Mr Mugabe and Mr Tsvangirai had also at one time spoken unanimously against homosexuality, BBC News (26/03/2010); and The New Zimbabwe (26/032010). This demonstrated a significant level of unity of purpose implying that South African mediation was generally a success.

4.6.12 Role of Media

Media reportage remained biased and partisan throughout the GNU era and beyond. Hate language continued to characterise political coverage. While the public media carried the voice of ZANU-PF, the independent media carried that of MDC-T. As already indicated, Zirima (2013:1) argues that the lack of political will to institute media reforms following commitments in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in 2008 and the subsequent Road Map in 2011 had limited media freedom, diversity and access to relevant information on elections by Zimbabweans. On the whole, literature review has revealed that a free, independent, diverse media remained elusive despite being an important ingredient in ensuring a credible, free and fair election. Opposition political parties and civic groups continued to express dissatisfaction at the accelerated and unbalanced media coverage of political events by public broadcasters whose reportage was biased in favour of ZANU-PF.

4.7 Conclusion

From the preceding analysis of findings, the formation of the GNU in raised varied reactions. Although generally criticised as an imperfect political arrangement, the analysis has shown that the concept of the GNU in Zimbabwe was largely a success.
bringing in relative peace, cooperation among conflicting parties, less politically motivated violence and economic stability. There was a significant and dramatic improvement in the political atmosphere which previously was deeply polarised and characterised by politically-motivated violence. The major controversy since the inception of the GNU has been whether it had fulfilled its mandate of creating conditions favourable for democracy in Zimbabwe. The achievement of peace onto the Zimbabwean political arena was a major stepping-stone into building democracy through consensus. The political opponents in Zimbabwe worked together to build institutions that enhanced democratisation of the Zimbabwean state. Together the political leaders produced a framework for the promotion of the rule of law, accountability and transparency that reflected the needs of political leaders with diverse backgrounds. The generality of Zimbabweans, civic societies and churches, and the regional and international community embraced the GNU as a positive temporary stopgap measure, a significant political development that provided a Road Map to hopefully a better Zimbabwe.

However, from the literature review, this study reveals that credible election are important, together with acceptance of election results. There is a common view that elections are an integral part of democracy and that there can be no democracy without free and credible elections. However, dissenting views from the literature review conducted, shows there was no ample evidence that GNU had established essential conditions conducive for credible elections given that contentious issues such as security sector reform and sanctions remained outstanding. The next chapter will present conclusions and recommendations pertaining to the findings presented in the entire dissertation.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to first review the key findings of the study and to present conclusions and recommendations pertaining to the findings presented in the entire dissertation. This has been accomplished over the course of five chapters that have introduced the research theme; provided an overview of the historical background of the study; presented the research problem in context; and the theoretical framework that informs the study. The study further presented a review of the relevant literature, examined the research methodology, analysed research findings and came about with conclusions and recommendations. Finally, this chapter will conclude by proposing areas of possible future research to expand on this study of inclusive governments in the theoretical realm of preventive diplomacy, specifically conflict resolution and management.

Paradoxically, the existence of elections and successive parliaments in Zimbabwe was indicative of a high degree of democracy and legitimacy, yet they failed in the period in the run-up to the 2008 general elections, leading the country to political strife and discontent that degenerated into violence and instability. Chigora (2009:92-98), observes that Zimbabwe had held several multi-party elections and periodic multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections since the country’s independence in 1980. The GNU therefore, became a panacea for the country’s political and economic turmoil as political parties, the generality of Zimbabweans and the regional community endorsed it.

As observed throughout this study, inclusivity as a conflict prevention and management strategy remains the preferred and legitimate approach to averting violent political uprisings and resolving electoral disputes. Further, as observed, the immediate impact of the GNU was the halting of violence and ushering in of peace and stability. As a result, and in total contrast to the 2008 general elections that were characterised by escalated inter-political violence, the 2013 elections were held under a relatively peaceful environment. Reports of intimidation on the opposition, journalists
and human rights activists by state security were few and isolated. One can therefore conclude that the GNU redefined Zimbabwean politics and stabilised the political and socio-economic environment, as compromises by the political parties led to cessation of acute contradictions.

The implementation of the GPA prompted the researcher to analyse the relevant literature and the impressions thereof, of the legitimacy of a GNU in Zimbabwe and came out with the following findings.

5.2 Conclusions

The study has revealed that power-sharing is a legitimate conflict resolution strategy. The study has also demonstrated that although transitions are difficult, they are not impossible. The GNU in Zimbabwe remained delicate and vulnerable throughout the period under review. However, although political violence still existed in Zimbabwe during the GNU era, and beyond, the number of reported incidents of political violence and human rights abuse cases decreased after the implementation of the GPA, as indicated from the review of relevant literature. Hence the notion that mediation in political crises situations is worth the effort and should be considered the next best alternative.

According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003:23), politics of the human rights movement and regime change made Zimbabwe one of the most documented countries in this area on the continent. The vigilance of civic activists in the country scourged the Mugabe regime, providing a series of damning reports and advocacy interventions that helped to undermine the legitimacy of the regime. However, these forces suffered a huge blow at the hands of the GNU that gave legitimacy to the government of the day and restored legitimacy to ZANU-PF. Therefore, it can be concluded that the perceived regime change forces failed in Zimbabwe. Instead, the GNU gave ZANU-PF another mandate to go for a seventh term in office after its resounding victory in the 31 July 2013 general elections.
Although corruption slightly declined after the signing of the GPA, it remained prevalent throughout the lifespan of the GNU. The absence of institutional structures to curb corruption was the reason for its continuation after the signing of the GPA. One would assume that a genuine implementation of the GPA would mean that there would be better institutional structures to curb corruption, but this was not the case in Zimbabwe during the period under review. According to political analysts and journalists, such as Zamchiya (2014) and Ray Ndlovu, commenting in the online publication, Good Governance Africa (GGA) (2014), the MDC project disappointed its sponsors as some of its legislators proved to be grossly corrupt and incompetent, thereby failing to deliver on key deliverables. It can be concluded that the GNU failed on instituting structures that curb corruption and good governance.

The application of repressive laws continued during the GNU although incidents of such greatly decreased since the implementation of the GPA. The three parties to the GPA had made progress in setting up the agreed commissions namely the Zimbabwe Media Commission, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. The media reforms resulted in more newspapers appearing on the market than before. The introduction of new radio stations, news publications and upgrading of the mobile service providers have been positively noted as changes towards realising media plurality and diversity. However, the continued existence of restrictive laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Criminal Law Codification Act, hindered the exercise of civil and political liberties such as freedom of association and expression, both key components in the holding of democratic elections. These laws remained in place despite commitments by ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations to repeal them. POSA made it mandatory for political parties to seek police clearances before holding rallies which impacted on freedom of the media, of association and freedom of expression.

The dissertation has also revealed that despite the declaration of commitment to work together by parties in the GNU, power dichotomy remained prevalent throughout the existence of the GNU. It was apparently difficult for the government of the day to share power equally with a new and emerging party in a power-sharing arrangement. ZANU-
PF assumed a superior position and as deserving of control, because of its past merits and experience in running a government. Mapuva (2013:107) on the preponderance of incumbency theory as highlighted earlier, articulates that “incumbent political leaders are able to manipulate the political terrain for political gain because they control the state institutions, which they can use to retain power”. However, ZANU-PF had well established administrative and constitutional structures for efficient mobilisation of political support as opposed to their opponents.

Further, parties remained partisan and continued to perceive themselves different from each other. As a result, parties always discredited and badmouthed each other. This power dichotomy remained the key reason for the continued tension between the parties in the inclusive government. Masaka (2011:1) sums it all that the inclusive government was evidently “a forced union, a response to a crisis”. Therefore, power dichotomy remained a challenge throughout the GNU era.

During the period in the run up to elections, political parties tended to be more stable and unified more than at any other times as focus was more on strengthening of respective party position in preparation for Election Day. Comparatively, ZANU-PF showed more unity than other parties in the GNU. Despite sharp internal succession intra-party politics, there was unity of purpose in ZANU-PF under the leadership of Mr Mugabe. It can therefore be concluded that during the GNU, ZANU-PF proved to be an experienced electioneering party, with the capacity to strengthen its position towards the elections period better than any other party in Zimbabwe. It is yet to be seen if the same holds for the 2018 elections. However, as indicated earlier, the advantages that incumbent political parties generally enjoy in government inevitably enhance their re-election prospects. This pacifies the argument put forward by Mapuva (2013:1) that of the preponderance of incumbency theory which states that, “years of political dominance often lead to the development of legislation and systems that advantage the governing party. Using state resources at their disposal, ruling elites remain in power through manipulation of electoral processes”.

The GNU era was marked by the absence of the necessary institutional structures for promotion of political justice. There was urgent need to build an effective judicial
system to curb causes of conflict. The only action taken towards strengthening the judicial system was the drafting of a new constitution. However, the transitional government successfully promoted peace and stability by accommodating major political players in structures and processes of government in equitable sharing of power and functional positions.

The GNU processes were of high significance in that the deal promised considerable political dividends to Zimbabwe. According to Masunungure (2009:8), one of the dividends was the end to isolation which was becoming a real threat in the sub-region, in Africa, and the West. The Zimbabwe issue was dividing SADC, the African Union, the United Nations, the Commonwealth and even the European Union.

In the final analysis of the topic of this dissertation, the “paradox” element of political legitimacy of the GNU is drawn. In this case however, the overall analysis of the perceived legitimacy of the GNU leads one to question the extent of legitimacy in power-sharing deals. As indicated from the onset, this study sought to support or refute the view that the Global Political Agreement (GPA) as a conflict resolution and prevention strategy, gave political legitimacy to the GNU and that the GNU was indeed a viable option to conflict resolution. The paradox is that a GNU, which is basically an act of compromise, is meant to uphold democracy. It is a situation whereby negotiators endeavour to use compromised conflict resolution mediation strategies to bring about compromised but workable democracy.

As already indicated from the onset of this study, the GPA theory was premised on the view that, an inclusive governance approach, with the GPA as a guide, would generally provide a legitimate and an inclusive approach to the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis. The GPA was therefore pitched as a high-level solution to the political malaise that had become the order of the day in Zimbabwe. By own admission as cited in the GPA (2008) Article II (2), parties to the Inclusive Government made a commitment to "create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation...." Yet a quick review shows that the implementation of the GPA revealed lack of commitment by parties in specific key areas, as the paradox element is briefly demonstrated below.
Gilley (2007:47) talks of key features used to determine the legitimacy of a government, that include institutionalisation of democratic rights (rule of law/human rights), good governance, the efficiency in service delivery, the presence of anti-authoritarian attitudes, economically vibrant government, social trust and how the government is perceived by the citizens, regional, continental and international bodies such as SADC, AU and UN.

5.2.1 The Paradox Element of the GNU
The persistence of violent conflict, despite the formation of the GNU: During the period under review, intra-state political violence mutated and cascaded from inter-party to intra-party with the emerging factional party politics. The domestic strife continued to impact negatively on the economic performance of the GNU. The GNU failed to uphold sustainable peace and stability despite the perceived commitment by parties to the GPA. To support that observation, Raftopoulos (2013:51) argues that the peace-building strategy in Zimbabwe should not have just focused on ending violence but on studying the reasons violence existed in the first place. He argued this would have helped identify the factors to eliminate it.

5.2.2 Unequal distribution of power, in the signing of the power sharing deal
One would assume that under such an arrangement, power was equally distributed among political parties and that each party had the power to create structures that promote democracy and end violence. However, this was not the case in Zimbabwe: The capacity of ZANU-PF to run a state is far superior to the capacity of the two MDC factions combined. In the GNU, state power is vested in the hands of the head of state and the head of government, Robert Mugabe. Morgan Tsvangirai might be the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, but the ultimate authority holding executive power is still by the president, Robert Mugabe. The problem is that without any executive power, the MDC leadership will not really create effective structures which could ensure effective peace-building and end political oppression, (Chigora and Guzura 2011:2).
To that assertion, Raftopoulos (2013:51) further argues that, "Under the GPA, the MDC formations were always at a disadvantage against a party that continued to control the coercive arms of the state, the judiciary, security and defence as well as the media.

5.2.3 Zimbabwe: A Party-State
Further, Masunungure (2014:107-108) argues that Zimbabwe has since independence been a party-state, a politicised party state; “This is typical of patronage politics that breeds a patronage economy and a patronage society” as he contends that no significant state institution, or private institution, was outside the orbit of the command and control of ZANU-PF. This assertion implied that for the GNU to really work, it would be necessary to have a rigorous de-politicisation process of state organs and institutions, which, unfortunately was not possible during the tenure of the GNU. Further, Masunungure (2014:107-108) observed that despite clear provisions in Article (xiii) of the GPA which stipulates that “state organs and institutions do not belong to any political party and should be impartial in the discharge of their duties”. To that Masunungure observed that senior top ranked military personnel openly supported ZANU-PF while clothed in uniform and on official duty. All this was in contravention of GPA Article 13 which states that organs and institutions do not belong to any political party and should be impartial in the discharge of their duties. This led to the reversal of democratisation efforts of the GNU, hence the paradox of political legitimacy of the GNU.

5.2.4 Preponderance of Incumbency
As already indicated, Mapuva (2013:105-116) compounds the above argument that ZANU-PF maintained an upper hand in the implementation of the GPA. He argues that former opposition parties played second fiddle and eventually lost the post-GNU elections. Tendi, (2013) argues that in such cases, elections are but window-dressing. Once such political leaders have manipulated the political environment, it is easy for them to win elections against their opponents. He supports his argument by illustrating that the opposition in Africa has only won 14 elections out of 100, evidence that a multi-party election is ineffective in removing an authoritarian government, especially if it is linked to liberation from colonialism. Further, Tendi (2013) cites exceptional cases that it is only in Zambia, where sitting Presidents Kenneth Kaunda and Rupiah
Banda lost in the 1991 and 2011 elections, respectively. Therefore, the holding of post-GNU elections does not necessarily guarantee democratic processes, hence the paradox of the political legitimacy of the GNU.

This research however, concludes that following the peaceful nature and voter turnout for both the March constitutional referendum and the 31 July 2013 harmonised elections, there is a positive link between free and fair elections and the exercise of human rights and democracy. The political environment in the run-up to the 2013 elections was calm and peaceful as opposed to that of 2008 that was characterised by violence, intimidation and coercion, hence wide spread voter apathy.

**5.3 Recommendations and Suggestions for Further Research**

Zimbabwe has since its attainment of independence in 1980, held several multiparty elections and periodic multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections. Ordinarily, this is indicative of a high degree of legitimacy. However, from the research findings, the existence of elections and parliaments in Zimbabwe was not a guarantee to sustainable peace, stability and democratic governance. The violence that characterised the post 2008 election results showed that the ballot box had failed. Only after the conflicting parties had resorted to a Government of National Unity, that legitimacy was restored and the country was rescued from total disintegration. Therefore, a GNU is a recommendable option to democratic and legitimate governance and is an available alternative strategy to conflict resolution and management. The GNU successfully emerged to fill in the vacuum created as a result of loss of legitimacy by the previous government.

Although the Zimbabwean GNU has enjoyed widespread media and advocacy attention, and despite the numerous studies on the Zimbabwe case, there are few studies on the legitimacy dimensions of the GPA as a policy tool for conflict resolution and management. Legitimacy is at the core of mediation and conflict resolution. From research findings, political legitimacy is a major determinant of the structure of mediation strategies and their implementation. Its absence has profound implications for the way conflicting parties behave towards each other. In such a setup, it is
recommended therefore, that further research be conducted on building legitimacy for sustainable conflict management and resolution in inclusive governments.

Through targeted sanctions, although external parties played a key role in supporting and catalysing a political negotiation process in Zimbabwe, the international community needs to think beyond relying primarily on targeted sanctions and restrictive measures. Sanctions impacted negatively on ordinary citizens rather than those targeted.

While it is undoubted that targeted sanctions managed to ripen the negotiations leading to the signing and implementation of the GPA, ripeness theory does not however, adequately explain how agreements can be sustained and respected. The GPA acted only as a provisional resolution on the road to credible elections under a new constitution and supported by strengthened and independent governmental institutions, which was exactly what it was created to achieve. The challenges of moving the spirit and the agenda of the GPA forward not only draw attention to the limits of outside intervention in enforcing sustainable conflict resolution but it also points towards the limits of ripeness theory in predicting the implementation of a negotiated agreement.

Although the ripeness theoretical framework is useful in explaining the role of targeted sanctions in ripening conflict resolution, it is important to go beyond ripeness theory to examine how parties implement and sustain negotiated agreements. Despite the partial implementation of the negotiated GPA, the Zimbabwean case study presents a remarkable example of a negotiated agreement that was externally induced by targeted sanctions, which ultimately ended a decade-old violent conflict between the political protagonists. Both the challenges and opportunities of ripeness theory and targeted sanctions in negotiation generate useful lessons for improving the prospects for conflict resolution in similar cases in the future. It can therefore be concluded that while ripeness theory defines critical breaking point where conflicting parties have no choice but to negotiate, it falls short of predicting the success or failure of implementing a negotiated agreement.
While Zimbabwe witnessed a violent-free election in 2013, hate speech and name calling and character assassination continued to perpetuate during and beyond the GNU. Further, the formation of factions within political parties based on regionalism and tribalism have remained prevalent in the internal party politics of Zimbabwe. Allegations of unfair and unjustified arrests continue to be heard. This warrants further research on the GPA as a mediation strategy for sustained conflict resolution and peace building.

The resort to a Government of National Unity in the aftermath of a disputed election and electoral violence may rescue a country from disintegration, as it did in Zimbabwe, but it is not a guarantee to sustainable peace and democracy as findings of the study, even in the post GNU period, reveal. While it is justified on account of restoring political stability and reclaiming legitimacy, it can be argued that such a government is superficial as its merits are short-lived and do not last beyond the GNU as is evident in the post GNU Zimbabwe were intra party divisions have mutated to a new form of domestic instability that have continued to impact negatively of economic growth. Therefore, the peace that the GNU purports is temporary and the legitimacy it reclaims is diminutive given the polarity that already exist in the post GNU political realm in Zimbabwe.

Finally, the research presented here is necessarily quite limited in scope. Extending this sort of research over a longer time frame may prove interesting, given the resurfacing and perpetuation of similar problems in the post GNU period in Zimbabwe. This is not the first time Zimbabwe has had some form of internal political settlement and may not be the last time. A Government of National Unity may become a more familiar prospect in Zimbabwe given the current situation where internal politics is highly polarised. Therefore, to nurture a culture of political accommodation, it is recommended that Zimbabwe should consider having a constitutional provision that allows the option for a coalition Government of National Unity.
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