

**STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT IN THE SOUTH  
AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE**

**by**

**SAZI LIVINGSTON VELDTMAN**

**Submitted in accordance with the requirements of the degree  
of**

**DOCTORATE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

**at the**

**UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA**

**PROMOTOR: PROFESSOR GERA FERREIRA**

**JOINT PROMOTOR: PROFESSOR SINVAL KAHN**

**Date: 2018**

# DECLARATION

I declare that “STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE” is my own work and that all sources that I have quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

---

**Signature**

---

**Date**

## **SUMMARY**

This study investigated strategic change management in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) during the period 1994 until 2014. Theoretical perspectives on strategic management, institutional culture, leadership and strategic change management in the SANDF were discussed. In addition, a historical perspective on the evolution of South African military culture was given. The study found that a transactional leadership approach was used to transform the SANDF. This transactional leadership approach is commensurate with the preservation of the status quo without radically transforming the institution. On the contrary, the transactional leadership approach fits in well in transforming an institution with a view to bring about a new composite institutional culture, drawn from the integrated institutions. The strategic change management as applied in the SANDF has not succeeded in creating a unified inclusive military culture of the seven former armed forces, from 1994 until 2014. The research has also shown that the institutional culture of the SANDF does not reflect the shared assumptions, beliefs and values of all integrated armed forces.

However, the study concluded that transformation in the SANDF as a planned strategic change intervention has not been managed adequately between 1994 and 2014, to achieve the desired results.

**KEY TERMS:** strategic management, change management, leadership, transactional leadership, military culture, institutional culture

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

My sincere gratitude to my promotors, Professors Gera Ferreira and Sinval Kahn, for their sterling guidance in my completing this study. Their companionship, trust and confidence kept me 'doing it right' when I wanted to settle for less, and motivated me to challenge myself to become better.

I am indebted to my family, in particular, my wife Phumla, my father Malamlela, my siblings Mbulelo and Thandeka, and my children, Buntu, Phathiswa, Toivo and Phumela from whom valuable time was 'borrowed' to accomplish this thesis, forfeiting my attention as father and friend.

To my aunts, Nondili Tengimfene and the late Vuyelwa Pringane, whose determination in life is a source of inspiration to me – you instilled in me the value of education, discipline and an ambition to succeed in life. I am truly indebted.

I am grateful to my colleagues and friends, Temba (TT) Matanzima, Sipho and Matsotso Vuso who kept a 'watching brief' on this study. Their persistent questions about the progress and their encouragement to complete this study against all odds, kept me going and kept me keeping on.

Finally, I owe special thanks to Dr. Gerhard Kamffer, Johan Kruger, Wilna Brooks, Babalwa Matiwane, Mlungisi Khona, Nyabane Maswanganyi, Quinton Derbyshire, Michelle Buthelezi and Nickelwa Tengimfene for their unwavering support.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
DECLARATION	ii
SUMMARY	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
LIST OF FIGURES	xiii
LIST OF TABLES	xv
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	xvi
<b>1. CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW</b>	
1.1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.2 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE	1
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT	5
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES	5
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS	6
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY	6
1.7 TERMINOLOGICAL CLARIFICATION	7
1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	9
1.8.1 Literature review	9
1.8.2 Survey questionnaires	11
1.8.3 Interviews	13
1.9 EXPOSITION OF CHAPTERS	14
1.10 SUMMARY	15
<b>2 CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT</b>	
2.1 INTRODUCTION	16

2.2	THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT	16
2.2.1	Strategic change management	16
2.3	SOURCES OF CHANGE	22
2.3.1	External change	22
2.3.2	Internal change	23
2.4	FIRST AND SECOND-ORDER CHANGE AS AN APPROACH	24
2.5	CHANGE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES	25
2.5.1	Strategic change	26
2.5.2	Cultural change	26
2.5.3	Structural change	27
2.5.4	Changing attitudes and skills	28
2.6	APPROACHES TO MANAGING CHANGE	28
2.6.1	Lewin's three-step model	28
2.6.2	Action research	29
2.6.2.1	Definition of action research	29
2.6.2.2	Features of action research	30
2.6.3	Management of transformation approach	31
2.6.4	Organisational development	32
2.6.4.1	Definition of organisational development	32
2.6.4.2	Organisational development's five stages	32
2.7	SYSTEMS APPROACH TO MANAGING CHANGE	35
2.8	RESISTANCE TO CHANGE	37
2.8.1	Systemic level	38
2.8.2	Individual Factors	38
2.9	METHODS TO OVERCOME RESISTANCE TO CHANGE	39
2.10	SUMMARY	41

<b>3</b>	<b>CHAPTER 3: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK AND PROCESS</b>	
3.1	INTRODUCTION	42
3.2	THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT	42
3.2.1	Strategy in context	42
3.2.1.1	Strategy defined	42
3.3	STRATEGIC PLANNING	46
3.3.1	Defining Strategic Planning	46
3.4	STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PROCESS	48
3.4.1	Definition of Strategic Management	48
3.4.2	Basic activities of Strategic Management	50
3.4.2.1	Strategic analysis	51
3.4.2.1.1	Assessing macro-environment (External environment)	51
3.4.2.1.2	Assessing micro-environment (Internal environment)	53
3.4.3	Formulation of Vision and Mission statement	54
3.4.3.1	Formulating vision	54
3.4.3.2	Mission statement	55
3.4.4	Strategy formulation	55
3.4.5	Strategy implementation	58
3.4.6	Strategy monitoring (evaluation / control)	59
3.5	SUMMARY	61
<b>4</b>	<b>CHAPTER 4: INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE</b>	
4.1	INTRODUCTION	64
4.2	THEORETICAL POSITIONING: THE BASIC NATURE OF INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE	64
4.2.1	Defining institutional culture	64
4.2.2	Levels of culture	65

4.2.2.1	Artefacts	66
4.2.2.2	Values	66
4.2.2.3	Basic assumptions	67
4.2.3	Surface components of institutional culture	67
4.3	TYPES OF ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE	69
4.3.1	Power culture	69
4.3.2	Role culture	70
4.3.3	Task culture	70
4.3.4	Person culture	71
4.4	INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE: STRONG AND WEAK	71
4.5	MILITARY CULTURE	73
4.5.1	Etymology regarding military	73
4.5.2	Military culture defined	74
4.5.3	Elements of military culture	75
4.6	SUMMARY	78
<b>5</b>	<b>CHAPTER 5: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY CULTURE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE</b>	
5.1	INTRODUCTION	81
5.2	A COMPENDIUM OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY PRIOR TO 1912	82
5.2.1	The Portuguese and Dutch against Khoikhoi and San	82
5.2.2	The Boers and British settlers against AmaXhosa	83
5.2.3	The Boers and British settlers against Zulus	84
5.2.4	Anglo-Boer war: 1822–1902	85
5.3	HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY: 1912–2014	85
5.3.1	Union Defence Force: 1912–1947	86



5.3.2	South African Defence Force (SANDF): 1948–1993	90
5.3.2.1	Total strategy and the SANDF's role	93
5.3.2.2	The State Security Council (SSC) and the National Security Management System (NSMS)	94
5.3.3	THE ROLE OF THE TRANSKEI, BOPHUTHATSWANA, CISCHEI AND VENDA (TBVC)	96
5.3.4	EMERGENCY OF LIBERATION FORCES: UMKHONTO WE SIZWE (MK) AND THE AZANIAN PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY (APLA)	97
5.3.4.1	A synoptic overview of the history of UmKhonto weSizwe (MK)	97
5.3.4.2	Historical overview of the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA)	100
5.4	CREATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE (SANDF) AND THE NEW INCLUSIVE MILITARY CULTURE	101
5.4.1	The creation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)	102
5.4.2	INCLUSIVE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY CULTURE	104
5.4.3	The new role of the SANDF as mandated by the South African government	105
5.5	SUMMARY	105
<b>6 CHAPTER 6: LEADERSHIP</b>		
6.1	INTRODUCTION	108
6.2	LEADERSHIP DEFINED	108
6.3	LEADERSHIP VERSUS MANAGEMENT	110
6.4	TRANSACTIONAL AND TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP APPROACH	111
6.4.1	Transactional leadership	111
6.4.2	Transformational leadership	111
6.4.3	Military leadership	112

6.4.4	Military leadership defined	113
6.4.5	Leadership approaches prevalent in the military	114
6.4.6	Command and control	117
6.5	STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT IN THE SANDF	119
6.5.1	Structure and functions of the SANDF	119
6.5.2	Strategic change management in the SANDF	122
6.5.2.1	Regulatory framework	122
6.5.2.2	Transformation in the SANDF	123
6.6	SUMMARY	125
<b>7 CHAPTER 7: INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE</b>		
7.1	INTRODUCTION	127
7.2	RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	127
7.3	RESEARCH DESIGN	128
7.4	METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION	129
7.4.1	Quantitative research method	129
7.4.2	Qualitative research method	130
7.5	POPULATION AND SAMPLE	131
7.6	DATA COLLECTION	133
7.6.1	Interviews	133
7.6.2	Questionnaires	135
7.6.3	Documents	137
7.7	ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS	137
7.7.1	Confidentiality and anonymity	138
7.7.2	Informed consent	138
7.8	DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS	139
7.9	SUMMARY	139

<b>8.</b>	<b>CHAPTER 8: RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS</b>	
8.1	INTRODUCTION	141
8.2	ANALYSIS OF THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY	141
8.2.1	Institutional culture	142
8.2.2	Change management	148
8.2.3	Leadership	160
8.3	ANALYSIS OF THE QUALITATIVE STUDY	166
8.3.1	Strategic change management	166
8.3.2	Institutional culture	167
8.3.3	Change management	168
8.3.4	Leadership	169
8.4	SUMMARY	170
<b>9.</b>	<b>CHAPTER 9: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS</b>	
9.1	INTRODUCTION	172
9.2	RESEARCH PURPOSE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE	172
9.3	SYNTHESIS OF CHAPTERS	172
9.4	RESEARCH FINDINGS	174
9.4.1	Strategic change management	174
9.4.2	Institutional culture	175
9.4.3	Change management	176
9.4.4	Leadership	178
9.5	RECOMMENDATIONS	179
9.5.1	Strategic change management	179
9.5.2	Institutional culture	180
9.5.3	Change management	180
9.5.4	Leadership	181

9.6	PROPOSED STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT MODEL	181
9.6.1	Leadership	182
9.6.2	Strategy	183
9.6.3	Culture	184
9.6.4	Strategic change management	184
9.6.5	Change management	185
9.7	CONCLUSION	186
9.8	LIMITATIONS TO THE STUDY	187
9.9	FUTURE RESEARCH	187
<b>10</b>	<b>REFERENCES</b>	<b>188</b>

## **APPENDICES**

APPENDIX A – SECTION A: QUESTIONNAIRE ON ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE OF INCLUSIVENESS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE	224
APPENDIX A – SECTION B: QUESTIONNAIRE ON LEADERSHIP APPROACH IN THE SANDF	226
APPENDIX A – SECTION C: PERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE OF THE SANDF	229
APPENDIX B – QUESTIONNAIRE ON INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE	232
APPENDIX C – QUESTIONNAIRE ON LEADERSHIP	233

## LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
1.1 Stages of strategic change in the SANDF (1994–2014)	4
2.1 Five stages of organisational development	33
3.1 Basic strategic management process	50
3.2 Five-step strategic control process	60
6.1 Institutional structure of the South African National Defence Force	119
8.1 I accept military values and norms as a way of life	142
8.2 The current regimental ceremonies are the same as my previous armed force	143
8.3 The institutional culture and climate is supportive of designated groups	144
8.4 Artefacts, rituals, ceremonies and regimental system of my former defence or armed force have been incorporated and are currently being practiced in the SANDF	145
8.5 The institutional culture of the SANDF has changed over the last 10 years (since 2004)	146
8.6 Will the future institutional culture of the SANDF reflect cultural practices of your former armed force?	147
8.7 Gender representation of the respondents	148
8.8 Length of Service in the SANDF	149
8.9 Candidates are selected for senior management positions based on their competency and qualification	150
8.10 The command group of my unit does not respect my culture	152
8.11 The team spirit in the section where I work is good	153
8.12 The SANDF has a culture of non-racialism	154
8.13 The SANDF's culture promotes non-discrimination on the gender basis	155
8.14 My supervisor treats all his/her subordinates equally	156

8.15 I regularly socialise with my colleagues in the unit, department, division and Service	157
8.16 The SANDF's human resource practices and policies make provision for my cultural obligations	158
8.17 In your opinion, what does the appointment suffix in your force number PE means?	159
8.18 What was the predominant leadership approach of your former armed force?	161
8.19 What is the current predominant leadership approach being practiced in the SANDF?	162
8.20 What is your style of leadership?	163
8.21 Are men better leaders than women?	164
8.22 Transactional leadership approach has been adopted by the SANDF	165

## LIST OF TABLES

	Page
2.1 Seven steps in transformational change	19
2.2 Characteristics of first and second order change	24
6.1 Functions of the services and divisions	120
6.3 Racial representation	124
7.1 Population and sample	132

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

**AA** – affirmative action

**ACF** – Active Citizen Force

**ANC** – African National Congress

**ANNC** – African Native National Conference

**APLA** – Azanian People’s Liberation Army

**AR** – Active Reserve

**AU** – African Union

**CDTM** – Chief Directorate Transformation Management

**CODESA** – Convention for a Democratic South Africa

**COEs** – centres of excellence

**DOD** – Department of Defence

**DPSA** – Department of Public Service and Administration

**EO** – equal opportunities

**FAPLA** – Armed Forces for People’s Liberation of Angola

**GDP** – gross domestic product

**HR** – human resources

**HRM** – human resource management

**IDASA** – Institution for Democratic Alternative in South Africa

**JMCC** – Joint Military Co-ordinating Council

**MEM** – mobility exit mechanism

**MK** – uMkhonto we Sizwe

**NIS** – National Intelligence Service

**NP** – National Party

**NSF** – non-statutory force



**NSMA** – National Security Management System

**OD** – organisational development

**PAC** – Pan Africanist Congress

**PE** – Permanent European

**PF** – Permanent Force

**PSC** – Public Service Commission

**RDP** – Reconstruction and Development Programme

**RSA** – Republic of South Africa

**SA** – South Africa

**SADF** – South African Defence Force

**SANDF** – South African National Defence Force

**SAP** – South African Police

**SCD** – Sub-Council on Defence

**SF** – statutory force

**SMS** – Senior Management Service

**SSC** – State Security Council

**SWAPO** – South West African People’s Organisation

**TBVC** – Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei

**TDF** – Transkei Defence Force

**TEC** – Transitional Executive Council

**TQM** – total quality management

**UDF** – Union Defence Force

**UNITA** – Movement for the Total Independence of Angola

**US** – United States of America

**ZANLA** – Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army

**ZANU** – Zimbabwean African National Union

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **OVERVIEW**

#### **1.1 INTRODUCTION**

The ushering in of democracy in South Africa has brought about stimulating debates, analyses and research interests in the field of organisational development, in particular strategic change management. Central to these developments is attention to theory and practice of strategic change management in the South African public sector. This study sought to evaluate how strategic change in the form of transformation was managed in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) during the period 1994 to 2014. This is an evaluation whose recommendations for improvement of strategic change in the SANDF will be made. Finally, this research sought to contribute towards placing the strategic change management discourse on the agenda for public service officials and academics.

This chapter provides the background to and rationale for the study, an outline of the problem statement, study objectives, study demarcation study period, clarification of terminology, the research methodology, literature review, and an outline of the chapters.

The next section discusses the background to and rationale for the study.

#### **1.2 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE**

The institutionalisation of apartheid in 1948 through various laws (Jamison, 2004:75) saw blacks, Africans in particular, including women of all races and people living with disabilities marginalised from full participation in the socio-economic and political affairs of South Africa. Because of this, the then South African government lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the larger South African and international populace. This legacy bequeathed from the apartheid era policies has opened considerable challenges for the new democratic government in South Africa. The democratic governance system that became operational on 27 April 1994 necessitated the transition from an apartheid system of government to a

democratic one (Muchie, 2014:1). These regime changes accentuated, through legislative provisions, that the public service system should be embedded in democratic principles.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 hereafter referred to the (the Constitution), as the point of reference for change, provided the framework for transformation. Further legislations flowing from this enabling framework are, among others, the White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service (1995), the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, the White Paper on Defence (1996), and the White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service (1998). Therefore, the constitutional and legislative injunctions require public institutions to transform and reposition themselves so that their functioning is within the context of the new dispensation.

Against this background, the public service found itself in a cycle of change that compels it to adapt systematically and pragmatically to the changing policies. The Department of Defence (DOD), in particular the SANDF, as one of public service institutions has to adapt and reposition itself by complying with transformation imperatives.

With this in mind and in line with all state departments, since 1994, the DOD has undergone transformation. According to Cilliers, Schutte, Liebenberg and Sass (1997:260), this transformation in the SANDF comprises separate actions and policy documents:


- the South African White Paper on Defence 1996 and the Defence Review 1998;
- the integration of seven armed forces into one single national Defence Force;
- affirmative action and equal opportunity programmes;
- rationalisation of personnel to achieve a core professional force;
- activities aimed at improving and perpetuating the effective and efficient functioning of the DOD; and
- ensuring the institutionalisation of civil control over the military institution.

The above meant that the SANDF had to undergo fundamental strategic changes in structures, institutional culture and management styles as well as a mind shift of all managers involved. This called for a new management approach and a paradigm shift to manage the strategic changes that were required successfully.

Figure 1.1 below provides a schematic presentation of the research. The first stage reflected in the figure relates to the constituent armed forces that integrated to form the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Such armed forces were non-statutory force, such as Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) and Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), and the statutory forces, such as the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the TBVC (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) defence forces (Le Roux, 2005:240). These forces had their unique military cultures.

The second stage reflects strategic change management by changing strategy, structure, culture and attitudes and skills of members of the SANDF. The last stage involves the maintenance of the achievements attained in stage two.

Figure 1.1 Stages of strategic change in the SANDF (1994–2014)



**Sources:** Adapted from Baker (2007:13), Evison (2014:1), Le Roux (2005:240) and Robbins, Millet, Cacioppe and Waters-Marsh (2003:411).

It is in the light of these explications that the present study sought to evaluate how strategic change in the form of transformation was managed in the SANDF during the period 1994 to 2014.

The next section explains the problem statement.

### **1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT**

The transformation of the South African society has its initiation in the Congress for Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which took place in 1993 (Maharaj, 2008:26).

Concomitant with these political negotiations were deliberations by members of Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC) on how the different constituent South African military components could be integrated into one national defence force. Such constituent forces are MK, APLA, SADF and TBVC defence forces (Le Roux, 2005:240).

Consequent to such integration was the need to transform the SANDF into a single non-racial and non-sexist institution.

The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) and the Public Service Commission (PSC) primarily drive such transformation process in the broader South African public service including the DOD. The SANDF as a component of the DOD is expected to align itself with this process.

The primary research question to be addressed, therefore, was:

Has transformation in the SANDF as a planned strategic change intervention been managed adequately (from 1994 to 2014) to achieve the desired results?

The next section will discuss the objectives of this study.

### **1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES**

The purpose of this study was to provide an evaluation of the theory and practice of transformation as a strategic change intervention in the SANDF during the period 1994 to 2014. The following is a summary of the study objectives, namely the study sought to—

- investigate the theories and concepts of strategic change management;
- explore the institutional culture of the SANDF;
- examine the effects of strategic change management in the transformation of the SANDF; and
- explore the leadership approach that is necessary for transformation in the SANDF.

## 1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Research questions that guided the research were the following:

- What are the theories and concepts of strategic change management?
- What is the institutional culture of the SANDF?
- What are the effects of strategic change management in the transformation of the SANDF?
- Which leadership approach is necessary for transformation in the SANDF?

## 1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The time that was covered in this study was the period 1994 to 2014. This period was the first two decades of the new democratic government under the African National Congress (ANC) government. The choice for this period can be justified by the following reasons:

The choice of 1994 as *terminus a quo* of the transformation process as a strategic change intervention in the SANDF, is that 1994 was a historical landmark in that a regime change from apartheid to the new democratic government under the ANC took place in April 1994. The year also marked the integration of seven different and former adversarial armed forces into the present SANDF.

The year 2014 was chosen as the *terminus ad quem* for the study locus as it marked the end of the fourth term of the ANC-led government and the end of the second decade of democracy in South Africa.

The first five years of the period 1994–2014 are seen as the period of legislative and policy metamorphosis to form the building blocks for transformational change.



Public institutions underwent fundamental structural, cultural and behavioural changes that were in line with constitutional democracy. The remaining fifteen years can be viewed as the beginning of service delivery by government. It is fitting, therefore, to evaluate strategic change management in the SANDF as a subject of study in the field of organisational development and discipline of Public Administration during the above-mentioned period.

The next section clarifies terminologies used in this study.

## 1.7 TERMINOLOGICAL CLARIFICATION

Although some of the constructs and related phenomena germane to this thesis are explained in Chapter two, brief definitions are given for the purpose of clarity and common understanding. The following terms are defined briefly within the context of the South African situation:

- **Blacks** as defined in the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, is a generic term that refers to African, coloured and Indian people in South Africa. The view of the researcher is that these terms are relevant for the period of correcting the imbalances of the past. They are only used to identify the victims of the past injustices caused by the apartheid system. There comes a time where everyone will be seen as South African and where no colour or race identification will be used.
- **Change**, according to Bloisi, Cook and Hunsaker (2003:707), can be defined as the coping process of moving from the present state to a desired state, which individuals, groups and institutions undertake in response to dynamic internal and external factors that alter current realities.
- **Change agents**, according to Smit and Cronje (2003:221), “are those people in the institution who make change happen”. In concert with this definition, Nixon (2004:11) explicates that change agents are “a group of people who act as catalysts within the organisation”. He further asserts that change agents “may come from within the institution, such as managers

and/or employees, or they may come from outside in the form of consultants”. The change agents are, therefore, crucial for the success in managing institutional change. They are the ones who translate new strategies formulated by top management into a workable and practical reality. Perhaps, most of all, these change agents are the people who get the results when they are needed most.

- **Change management**, according to Meyer and Botha (2000:224), is “the process of mobilising resources through the planning, coordination and implementation of activities and initiatives to bring about desired change”. This is seen as human intervention in managing strategic change.
- **Historically disadvantaged groups/designated groups** are those groups identified as having been unfairly discriminated against on the basis of past (in particular, during the apartheid era) legislation, policies, prejudice and stereotypes. Such discrimination has resulted in deprivation of rights, career opportunities, education, training or job advancement or who might have received less beneficial schooling, fewer benefits, less beneficial conditions of service than any other person or groups on the grounds of race, gender and disability (White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service, 1998).
- **Representativeness** is defined in the Public Service Regulation of 1999, as “the extent to which employment in an organisation broadly reflects composition of the South African population, according to race, gender and disability”.
- Davies (2001:104) defines **transformation** as a fundamental, complete and drastic ‘make-over’ process where the desired result is totally different from the current situation. Therefore, transformation according to Davies is not about fixing what is beyond repair; it is a drastic and complete make-over from the previous state.

## **1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

According to Babbie and Mouton (2002:75), research methodology entails the methodical, methodological and precise execution of the research design. However, a particular research method is informed by study objectives, the aim of the research and the researcher's expectations (Breakwell, Smith & Wright, 2012:9). In this research, both qualitative and quantitative techniques were applied. Therefore, the research problem was steered by an analytical plan that was the research methodology.

This study focused on assessing whether transformation as a strategic change intervention was well conceptualised and properly implemented and whether it managed to achieve the desired end state.

Research methods employed for data collection comprised both secondary sources and empirical research. Therefore, research tools that were utilised were content and discourse analyses of documents, reports, policy and relevant regulatory framework documents, a literature study on strategic change management, institutional culture and administering survey questionnaires and interviews. The following is a summary of how some of these tools were employed.

### **1.8.1 Literature review**

Change management, as a subject of study cannot be comprehended fully without conceptualising it within organisational development. Boonstra (2004:25) defines organisational development as a "system-wide process of applying behavioural science knowledge to the planned change and development of the strategies, design components, and processes that enable organisations to be effective". He further contends that organisational development deals with relationships between a system and its environment as well as among the different components that constitute the design of a system. Concurring with this definition, Paton and McCalman (2000:163) assert that organisational development is about changing the organisation from one situation, which is

regarded as unsatisfactory, to another by means of social science techniques for change.

These definitions reflect that the field of organisational development encompasses a complexity of methods and concepts that can be applied in changing institutions. In addition, organisational development is largely concerned with the process of managing change in an organisation. Based on these assertions, the researcher used organisational development as a body of knowledge in evaluating transformation as a strategic change management intervention in the SANDF.

It was hoped that the intervention and changes would help to solve problems that might have become evident through this study. However, the effectiveness of any given human intervention is a matter subject to study. Thus, the theory-to-action research continuum relates to the conduct of evaluation to test the effectiveness of specific solutions and human interventions. The researcher scrutinised literature pertaining to the evaluation of strategic change management in the SANDF. The literature lacks focus on managing strategic change in SANDF. The dearth of research in this topic was the reason for initiation of this study. Wimmer and Dominick (1987:24, 260) assert that a study that does not further the solution of problems and provides answers, has little value. In addition, Adler and Clark (2003:15) contend that applied research “aims to have practical results and produce work that is intended to be useful in the immediate future and to suggest action”.

The literature was used to set the scene for the research. Theory on strategic change management, institutional culture and the evolution of South African military culture was studied to create a framework for evaluation and analysis.

In order to assess conceptualisation and to evaluate implementation and management of transformation as a strategic change intervention to realise the desired end-state, annual reports and other strategic information regarding the processes and progress on the transformation of the SANDF were examined. In fact, content and discourse analysis of these documents was done using the

theoretical framework of analysis that was established. Documentations mentioned in the foregoing were analysed to develop an understanding of their contents relating to transformation and strategic change management in the SANDF.

Literature analyses and reviews on strategic change management and the transformation process were consulted to develop a theoretical framework for analysis. Sources for such analyses and reviews were mainly books, journals and articles.

The theoretical framework was utilised to conduct content and discourse analyses of the feedback on survey questionnaires, interviews, official policies and legislation carefully. This, therefore, means that the theory that undergirds transformation, strategic change management and institutional culture was the main analytical instrument for the evaluation of management of transformation as a change intervention. Concomitant with this was close observation of the transformation process as it unfolded within the period of study.

Afterwards, the gathered primary data was processed through a computer system and interpreted. Thereafter, findings, relevant conclusions were drawn and recommendations were made.

### **1.8.2 Survey questionnaires**

The SANDF units, as components of the whole population of military personnel, are geographically dispersed in all provinces of the country, more recently also across the borders of South Africa to conduct peace operations. For logistical reasons and turnaround time, it was not feasible to make appointments with individual change agents in these provinces to conduct interviews.

The questionnaires were then used to solicit change agents' opinions, knowledge and experiences regarding how transformation as strategic change intervention was managed in the SANDF.

Questionnaires were used to gather information about large numbers of respondents (populations) and from small groups (samples). The course

attendants from centres of excellence (COEs) were used as samples as they represented different arms of services, that is, from the South African (SA) Army, SA Navy, SA Air Force and SA Military Health Services. Centres of excellence used were the South African Defence College and the South African War College.

The researcher then drew inferences about the population from the sample data. Careful planning and construction of the survey questionnaire were therefore critical steps in this research.

A reason for choosing the survey questionnaire technique is that such questionnaire is flexible (Moore, 2000:108). It can be custom-designed to meet the objectives of the study. Survey questionnaires can be designed to gather information from any group of respondents. They can be administered face to face, over the telephone, by mail, and by using computer networks. Usually, respondents' answers are easy to code and tabulate. Respondents will have time to think about the answers to questions in the questionnaire. Moreover, a large number of respondents distributed over a large geographical area can be reached.

Both close-ended and open-ended questions were utilised. A close-ended question limits the respondents to predetermined alternative answers given by the designer of the questionnaire. In other words, respondents are provided with a uniform frame of reference. Scale ranking of the respondents' preferred answers was used by means of a Likert-type scale. This type of question format was used for middle-level management who were seen as change agents in this research. Open-ended questions also allow the respondents to answer in their own choice of words. Open-ended questions were utilised for participants who were representatives of former forces integrated into the SANDF.

The questionnaires were structured to make it possible that descriptive and explanatory data could be collected for use in drawing conclusions and making findings regarding how transformation as strategic change intervention was managed in the SANDF.

### **1.8.3 Interviews**

In the view of the researcher, middle-level managers in the SANDF are regarded as the change leaders in that they are supposed to enthuse their subordinates to start the process of change that will result in the realisation of the desired end state. For this reason, face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted with the middle management of the SANDF, that is, in the rank groups of brigadier generals/rear admirals (junior grade), colonels/captains, lieutenant colonels/commanders and majors/lieutenant commanders including the Chief of the SANDF.

Senior management of the SANDF was identified as those members who were service and divisional chiefs. These members constitute the majority of the strategic and corporate management bodies of the SANDF. These interviews were conducted with the rank group of major generals and lieutenant generals and in some cases with the brigadier generals. It was also seen fitting to interview the Secretary for Defence as the director general and accounting officer of the DOD. Depending on agreement, interviews were recorded on tape and scribed. Afterwards, the gathered primary data was processed. Thereafter, relevant conclusions were drawn and recommendations were made.

The study approach was predominantly descriptive and analytical in nature. The study analysed the theoretical base, nature and scope of change management, and its practical implementation in the transformation process should highlight knowledge relevancy in translating theory to practice. Unravelling complexities of strategic change management may help improve methods for future application in the SANDF. Furthermore, the inhibiting factors in successfully managing strategic change in the SANDF as the public service institution were examined. Finally, solutions on how these factors can be managed are also discussed as reference for future application.

Therefore, this study may provide some useful insight to this process of strategic change management in the SANDF and suggest recommendations for the solution of problems encountered.

The next section will give an exposition of the chapters.

## **1.9 EXPOSITION OF CHAPTERS**

This thesis is divided into nine chapters. The summary of each chapter is as follows:

**Chapter One** comprises the study that was discussed with specific reference to background and rationale, an outline of the problem statement, study objectives, study demarcation period, terminological clarification, research methodology, literature review, and finally an outline of the chapters.

**Chapter Two** focuses on the strategic management framework with specific reference to theoretical perspectives on strategic management, strategic planning and the strategic management process. The discussion on strategic management process pays attention to strategic analysis, strategy formulation, strategy implementation and strategy evaluation.

**Chapter Three** comprises a discussion on the strategic management framework with focus on theoretical perspectives on strategic management, strategic planning and the strategic management process. The strategic management process is discussed, focusing on strategic analysis, strategy formulation, strategy implementation and strategy evaluation and monitoring.

**Chapter Four** is centred on institutional culture. Special focus is on the theoretical positioning on the basic nature of institutional culture, types of institutional culture, strong and weak institutional cultures, military culture and military leadership.

**Chapter Five** presents a perspective on the history of the evolution of South African military culture. In doing so, this chapter gives a summary of the South African military prior to 1912, the formation of the Union Defence Force (UDF) and the political context and historical overview of UDF (1912–1947). It also discusses the South African Defence Force (SADF) during the period 1948 until 1994, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) from 1994 until 2014; the political prelude to 1994 military integration, integration of armed forces and their military cultures and the resultant military culture from 1994 to 2014.



**Chapter Six** discusses leadership approaches in general and specifically leadership approaches that are dominant in military institutions. In addition, in Chapter six, strategic change management in the SANDF is discussed and evaluated against the government prescripts.

**Chapter Seven** provides a description of the research methodology that was employed in the research. The content of the research methodology comprises the research design, methods of data collection, research setting and participants, population and sample, data collection and ethical considerations.

**Chapter Eight** comprises the presentation of qualitative and quantitative data analysis. Quantitative data was translated into descriptive statistics and is presented in the form of bar graphs. In addition, qualitative data that was collected through interviews and documents analysis is presented in the form of narratives.

**Chapter Nine** provides the summary of the research into findings, recommendations and conclusions.

## **1.10 SUMMARY**

The problem statement given in this chapter, refers to the need to transform the SANDF into a single non-racial and non-sexist institution. This need to transform arises from the integration of APLA, MK, SADF and the TBVC defence forces. Research objectives and related research questions were stated. In addition, the research methodology explaining the suitable research design to guide the study was discussed.

The next chapter discusses the strategic management framework.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT**

#### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

In Chapter one, the researcher discussed, with specific reference to the background and rationale, an outline of the problem statement, study objectives, study demarcation period, terminological clarification, research methodology, literature review, and finally an outline of the chapters.

Management, whether in a public or private institution, is faced with an enormous challenge of managing change. Based on the study of practice and experience, the mainstream management literature has witnessed an expansion in the number of attempts to develop theoretical frameworks for guiding the management of change. In this chapter, attempts to discuss the strategic change management from a theoretical perspective are reflected. In pursuing this aim, the discussion informs the theoretical framework for analysis.

#### **2.2 THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT**

The common understanding of concepts, which formed the crux of this research, will help simplify and clarify many questions, which might result from different interpretations and perceptions. In this section on the nature and scope of strategic change, the researcher endeavours to alleviate such concerns by defining and discussing related concepts.

##### **2.2.1 Strategic change management**

The terms 'change' and 'transformation' are often used interchangeably in literature without giving a clear definition of either term. Therefore, as a point of departure, a clarification of these terms should be presented. Before venturing on to the understanding of these terms, it may be necessary to give a brief definition of the term 'strategy'.

Historically, the term 'strategy' was adopted from the military and adapted for business use to define strategy as the pattern or a unified, comprehensive and

integrated plan that integrates the major goals, policies and actions of an institution into a cohesive whole to ensure that the basic objectives of the institution are achieved (Nickols, 2012:2).

In addition, Baker (2007:17) avers that strategy is the product of some form of planning, and above all, it is the organised process for predicting and acting in the future to ensure the achievement of the mission of the organisation. Furthermore, within the military context, according to Gray (1999:17–23), strategy is the bridge that relates military power to political purpose, and this definition is divided into three categories: people and politics, preparation for war, and war proper. These categories are selected because they encompass most of what contributes to the development and implementation of strategy.

The above definitions point to the fact that, at the core of each strategy, the decision is located (Pfeffenbruck, 2005:27). This means that strategy is about making decisions to effect institutional development.

However, in defining strategic management, Ehlers and Lazenby (2007:2) refer to it as the process whereby all the institutional functions and resources are integrated and coordinated to implement formulated strategies. Such strategies are aligned with the environment, in order to achieve the long-term objectives of the institution and therefore gain a competitive advantage. In this regard, strategic management and institutional change go hand in hand. A positive culture of change would increase the positive acceptance of new ideas and strategies. In addition, David (2009:36–37) and Kevair (2007:1) define strategic management as the art and science of formulating, implementing and evaluating cross-functional decisions that enable an institution to realise its objectives.

The necessity and importance of change are echoed in different ways by many researchers and writers on change management. Change, therefore, demands that leaders and managers have foresight and an analytical mind to unravel complex management challenges. The development of management itself as a science must be in concert with rapid institutional change. Change can therefore best be defined as the coping process of moving from the present state to a

desired state (Bloisi, Cook & Hunsaker, 2003:707). Change in an institution is initiated in order to move from a current state to a desired future state, where performance is qualitatively better than it had been before (Creasey, 2009:1). This means that the new state of things is different from the old state (Meyer & Botha, 2000:223). This may mean that the desired end state in an institution must be improved qualitatively from the old state of things, which means taking the institution to greater heights in terms of performance.

Finally, Nelson and Quick (2005:3) define change as the qualitative change of an organisation. In terms of change, they further suggest the following categories:

- **Incremental change** is small, but continuous changes to make improvements within the institution. Dunphy, Griffiths and Benn (2007:230) note that incremental change does not affect fundamental changes in the strategy, structure, capability or institutional re-alignment of the institution. To put it differently, this may mean that the entire institution remains intact, because the change does not affect the basic structure, culture and defining values fundamentally or radically. Rather, Dunphy *et al.* (2007:230) view incremental change as concerning changes in the way people work (job redesign, teamwork), change to the business unit processes of an institution, and changes in reward systems, information systems and technologies. This type of change is similar in definition to what is called 'developmental change', which represents the improvement of an existing skill, method, performance standard, or condition which for some reason does not measure up to current or future needs. Such improvements are motivated by the goal to do qualitatively better, than just to do more (Anderson & Anderson 2010:52).
- **Strategic change** is larger-scale change to move from an old state to a defined new state in a series of stages. In addition, Denhardt, Denhardt and Aristigueta (2013:383) contend that strategic change refers to those choices by the senior management of an institution, or consultants involved, in

planning activities leading to changes that are both broad range and long term.

- **Transformational change:** Transformation, according to Anderson and Anderson (2010:60), is a radical shift of strategy, structure, systems, processes or technology, so significant that it requires a shift of culture, behaviour, and a mind-set to implement transformation successfully and sustain it overtime.

Based on the above explication, transformational change, therefore, means that institutions move to a radically different and even unknown state with the most identifying feature being the changes to mission, vision and leadership.

Baker (2007:12–13), in congruence with this view, asserts that transformation as a type of change is about fundamental improvement of an institution. This transformation necessitates strategy development, planning and commitment throughout the entire institution.

Table 2.1 below gives a summary of seven steps in transformational change. Steps 1 to 7 give a broad chronological sequence of actions that senior management needs to follow in implementing change.

**Table 2.1 Seven steps in transformational change**

Step 1	<b>Define the change strategy</b>	The institution assesses the need for change and its preparedness for it, the most likely change configuration and how the process of change will be managed and controlled.
Step 2	<b>Gain management commitment</b>	The change manager will need to create 'ownership' within the management, developing a shared strategic vision that drives the change and provides a focus for the management teams, both individually and collectively.
Step 3	<b>Create change strategy</b>	The change manager will need to develop a strategy for making the change pertinent and relevant to all the staff, especially through a coherent communication strategy.
Step 4	<b>Build commitment from</b>	Potential resistance to change will need to be identified and a rationale for persuading staff of the

	<b>the workforce</b>	need for and benefits of will need to be determined.
Step 5	<b>Develop a new culture</b>	New values will have to be created and new behaviours that are supportive of the new vision for the institution, encouraged.
Step 6	<b>Reconfigure the institution</b>	Roles will be redesigned, competencies developed, structure created and appointments made.
Step 7	<b>Manage performance</b>	Performance measures will be developed that are in alignment with overall and individual objectives.

**Source:** Adapted from Anderson and Anderson (2001:60) and Baker (2007:13)

Central to these seven steps in transformational change is the individuals within an institution, devising change strategy and managing institutional culture and institutional structure adaptation. Concomitant with these is the need to address resistance to change by individuals.

During his inauguration speech in January 2009, United States (US) President, Barak Obama said, “The world is changing and we must change with it.” In addition, Porras and Silver (1991:51–78) assert that change in an institution is triggered by an environmental shift which, when sensed by an institution, leads to a deliberately planned response. This epitomises the change of an environment, which directly affects societies, communities, institutions and individuals, thereby forcing them to adapt. This change within institutions is brought about through some form of transformation process. It may be conducted in a planned or unplanned way. At times, it may appear to be taking place in a natural or organic way (Baker 2007:2).

Managing change, according to Gonçalves (2007:52), revolves around three dimensions, which need to be aligned and developed in a balanced way, namely:

- **Business dimension**, which focuses on making sense of the strategic context, defines a compelling picture of the future, and which engages people’s hearts and minds, shaping and developing strategies and objectives to make the vision a reality.
- **Process dimension**, focuses on optimising the business process, which develops and delivers services and products, and ensures a robust and

aligned management process, which provides direction, support and challenge for employees.

- **Social dimension**, which has to focus on creating a culture in which individuals and teams are willing to deliver excellent results, ensuring that employees have the required skills to be successful and that the organisational structure supports the employees in carrying out what needs to be done.

The three dimensions on which change management hinges, emphasise giving strategic direction and changing the hearts and minds of individuals within an institution and processes that affect the management of change in institutional culture and structure.

Baker (2007:16) defines change management as the “process, tools, and techniques to manage the human-side of the change processes meant to achieve the required outcomes”. Such a change management, according to Baker (2007:1) –

[S]hould be underpinned by an overarching strategy that provides a rationale for change, vision of the future state, when the changes have to be made, an indication of how the changes are to be made, over what time period, and by whom.

In addition, Prosci (2014:3) defines change management as “[the application of] the set of tools, processes, skills and principles for managing the people-side of change to achieve the required outcomes of a change project or initiative”. Therefore, strategic planning during change management becomes paramount.

From the above definitions, it can be deduced that, in order then to develop the most effective and efficient strategy, it is important to analyse the organisation internally and externally. Focus on internal analysis means looking closely at the resources, capabilities and core competencies of the institution, in order to have an informed understanding of its current situation. This means that institutions have to adapt quite rapidly to change, and that they have to focus on their primary goals (Ehlers & Lazenby 2007:10). In this section the researcher discussed and

defined the concepts 'change', 'strategy', 'change management' and 'strategic management'. In the next section, sources of change will be discussed.

## **2.3 SOURCES OF CHANGE**

Having discussed and defined the concepts 'strategic change' and 'change management' in the previous section, the focus in this section is on identifying and discussing the sources of change in context. An institution does not operate in a vacuum. The environment in which it operates can have an influence on it. Such environment could, on the one hand, be different forces external to the institution compelling it to change, and on the other hand, compelling sources of change can be internal to or from within the institution (Swanepoel, Erasmus, Van Wyk & Schenk, 1998:727).

### **2.3.1 External change**

In the South African context, the extra-institutional factors influencing change in an institution are mainly political, economic and social changes (Swanepoel *et al.*, 1998:727). What remains significant is that these types of changes may be either totally unforeseen or, if they are anticipated, it is their tempo and duration that become a concern to an organisation. It is for this reason that many institutions find themselves unprepared and unable to cope with and manage such changes effectively and efficiently.

Section of 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, as the point of reference for change, provided the framework for transformation in South Africa. Further pieces of legislation and official documentation flowing from this enabling framework are, among others:

- the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service of 1995;
- the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998;
- the White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa 1996
- the White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service of 1998; and
- the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.



The constitutional and legislative injunctions require public institutions to transform and reposition themselves so that their functioning is within the context of the new political dispensation.

### **2.3.2 Internal change**

Swanepoel *et al.* (1998:727) contend that changes occurring within institutions can be necessitated by internal forces, such as the redesign of core structures and processes. In addition, Sutevski (2009:1) avers that internal sources of institutional changes are forces, which appear inside the institution. The institution as a system consists of the following aspects.

- **People** – the ones who run the institution by carrying out activities for the survival of the institution. People as employees must take initiatives to change their workplaces or tasks for better service delivery or more efficient and effective performance in an institution.
- **Structure** provides for mutual relationships of people and processes in an institution. Structure defines the place of employees within an institution according to hierarchy and their roles through rules, norms and procedures.
- **Processes** represent all the activities in an institution to transform input to output, which will provide value to clients (Sutevski, 2009:1).

The influence of external and internal factors is inescapable for institutions. It becomes imperative, therefore, for institutions to conduct strategic planning sessions, which will serve as introspection of themselves and to conduct environmental analyses to confirm how they function in relation to their wider environment.

To determine the choice of approach to managing change processes in an institution, first- and second-order change is compared in the next section.

## 2.4 FIRST- AND SECOND-ORDER CHANGE AS AN APPROACH

The previous section showed the influence of external and internal factors in institutional change. To help understand this concept of change further, one needs to have an idea of what the difference is between first- and second-order changes. The literature, which the researcher consulted, suggested a clear distinction between these respective approaches to managing change processes.

The characteristics of first- and second-order change as described by French and Bell (1995:3), Smit and Cronje (2003:218), Robbins *et al.* (2003:406) and Iles and Sutherland (2001:14) can be summarised as in Table 2.2 below.

**Table 2.2 Characteristics of first and second-order change**

	FIRST-ORDER CHANGE	SECOND-ORDER CHANGE
A	Evolutionary, slow, linear, ongoing, incremental and gradual.	Revolutionary, fast, infrequent, episodic, fundamental and radical.
B	A change on one or a few levels (individual and group level).	Multilevel changes (individuals, groups and the whole organisation).
C	A change in one or a few dimensions, components or aspects.	Multi-dimensional, multi-component and multi-aspectual.
E	A change in content.	A change in context.
F	The institution as a whole remains intact.	Affects the entire organisation.
G	Continuous improvements and development in the same direction.	Discontinuous and taking a new direction.

**Sources:** Adapted from French and Bell (1995:3), Smit and Cronje (2003:218), Robbins *et al.* (2003:406) and Iles and Sutherland (2001:14)

The characteristics of first- and second-order changes reflected in Table 2.2 stand in stark contrast to each other. In first-order change, the basic issue is to change behaviour within a prevailing system without affecting the basic structure, culture or defining values of the system (Esterhuysen, 2003:2). This is further explained by Van Tonder's (2004:20) analysis of first-order change, namely "... change is a steady state, incremental, sequential change which evolves over an extended period of time, does not have an influence on the system and is generally perceived to be within the control of the system or organisation".

In addition, Esterhuysen (2003:2) contends that in first-order change, the system itself, including its basic structure, culture and defining values is not altered. This category of change, according to Esterhuysen (2003:2), is usually referred to as “adaptation, renovation, adjustment, incremental change or peace-meal engineering”. Change is, moreover, regarded as an evolutionary process. Therefore, change, in such situation, is cosmetic in that the fundamentals are not changed, but only peripheral issues are changed. First-order change can be seen as being restricted in both content and process.

Second-order change is more radical in nature. Its primary objective is to transform the basic structure, culture and defining values fundamentally, including the overall form of an institution. In concert with this view, Baker (2007:14) asserts that when “fundamental change is required, a full-scale approach is more likely to bring the desired ‘turn around’ than a piecemeal approach”.

Therefore, first- and second-order changes principally differ in context, content and process. Understood in this context, transformation as second-order change means a new institution, a new structure, a new culture, new core values and a new direction for the institution.

Institutions in South Africa received inputs as the legislative framework to transform themselves to make them better placed to deliver quality outputs. Because institutions are strongly influenced by their surroundings or environment, they are then referred to as “open systems” (Bastedo, 2004:1). It is for this reason that the researcher discusses open systems as an approach to change management in the next section.

## **2.5 CHANGE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES**

Mabey and Salaman (1995:85) identify three broad change management strategies that receive support from different sources of literature.

- The **first strategy** identified “argues that until the culture of an institution is reoriented, little else will change, except at a cosmetic level and over a limited period of time” (Mabey & Salaman, 1995:85).

- A **second strategy** comprises “behavioural change and enhanced institutional performance flow – primarily from the way the institution is structured with regard to its strategy” (Mabey & Salaman, 1995:85).
- Finally, the **third strategy** relates to “the importance of the style of change management” (Mabey & Salaman, 1995:85).

To effect change, managers could focus on various change targets. In other words, they could change the strategy, culture, structure or attitudes and skills of the people in the institution.

### **2.5.1 Strategic change**

Strategic change is defined by Fiss and Zajac (2006:1173) as an alteration in the alignment of an institution with its external environment, and frequently involves symbolic struggles over the purpose and direction of an institution. However, Worley, Hutchin and Ross (1996:16) opine that strategic change involves deciding what to change, how to change and when to change specific elements of the strategic orientation of an institution. In this case, strategic orientation involves a change in mission and the identity or the outside image of the institution (Beckhard & Prichard, 1992:37). According to Mabey and Salaman (1995:87), the mission of the institution entails its purpose statement, accompanied by a strategy outlining the activities, standards and behaviours required to fulfil the mission, as well as mission success factors. Strategic change may then subsequently require other institutional changes, for instance, in the institution, structure and culture (Smith & Cronje, 2003:223).

### **2.5.2 Cultural change**

Institutional culture, according to Baker (2007:31), is referred to as “the way we do things around here” and is an important factor in facilitating or inhibiting the achievement of change in an organisation. In addition, according to McCalman and Potter (2015:19), cultural change is a fundamental change that cultural members attribute their values and assumptions to, which leads to a shift in the nature of the cultural themes in use and the expressive content of the cultural

paradigm. This means that the employees of an institution will then have a common understanding on how things are done in the institution where they work. Culture, therefore, is the driving force for expected behaviour from the members of an institution.

There is also the perception that if the acceptance of key values and norms is strong, then that can be translated to mean the existence of a strong culture. Such a strong culture, according to Baker (2007:31), is associated with employee commitment and organisational performance. Cultural change is also influenced by strategic change in an institution. This means a change in the shared values and aims of the institution (Dessler, 1995:511). In addition, Smith and Cronje (2003:223) contend that it also entails changing the corporate culture of the institution. A change in the strategy of the institution may necessitate a change in the beliefs, values and attitudes of the people in the institution.

This therefore means that if the corporate culture of an institution has a negative influence on the strategies and performance of the institution, these may have to be changed.

### **2.5.3 Structural change**

Dessler (1995:511) argues that restructuring or reinstitution of an institution involves a redesign of the structure of an institution, that is, a change in the department, coordination, span of control, reporting relationships or centralisation of decision-making in an institution. Reorganisation is seen to be a relatively direct and quick method for change an institution. Smith and Cronje (2003:223) elucidate this point further in their assertion that changes in structure normally result or can be influenced by a change in strategy of an institution. This in turn may mean that the strategy of an institution comes before the change in structure. Change in strategy may also involve changes in management levels, the span of control, a relook into delegations to all or certain levels, or even deciding on devolution of decision-making powers.

## **2.5.4 Changing attitudes and skills**

Employees within an institution that is undergoing change have to change their own attitudes, values and behaviour. A variety of techniques are used to change the people in the institution. The techniques vary in the extent to which they involve in-depth emotional involvement of the employees. The aim here, according to Dessler (1995:512–513), is often to encourage employees to develop a more open, supportive, organic type of institution. Therefore, the change in employees' attitudes, values and behaviour must be within the context of the changing institution and in concert with the strategic direction of the institution. The strategic direction of an institution may influence and necessitate change in structural outlook, but because an institution consists of employees, their attitudes and skills must complement the changing institution.

In the next section, the researcher focuses on a discussion of approaches to manage change.

## **2.6 APPROACHES TO MANAGING CHANGE**

There are several popular approaches to managing change. Lewin's classic three-step model of the change process, action research (AR), management of transformation approach and organisational development, are discussed in the next sections.

### **2.6.1 Lewin's three-step model**

According to Robbins *et al.* (2003:411) and Evison (2014:1), Kurt Lewin (1951) argues that successful change in institutions should follow three steps, namely:

#### **(i) Unfreezing the status quo**

Managers create a need for change by:

- creating a good relationship with the people involved;
- helping people realise that present behaviour is not effective; and
- minimising resistance to change.

The unfreezing step is important because it ensures the readiness of the institution to ensure success for change management.

## **(ii) Movement to a new state/changing**

Managers must implement change by:

- identifying more effective behaviour;
- choosing appropriate changes in tasks, culture, technology and structure; and
- taking action.

Lewin warns that many managers enter this changing phase too early and, as a result, end up creating resistance to change and even a total failure in implementing change.

## **(iii) Refreezing the new change to make it permanent**

Managers must stabilise the change by:

- creating acceptance and continuity for the new behaviour;
- providing support; and
- using performance-contingent rewards and positive reinforcement.

Concomitant with this step should be monitoring, evaluation and feedback. Adjustments or modifications should be made where necessary.

### **2.6.2 Action research**

AR is one of the change models that can be applied in altering an institution. In discussing this model, the focus is on the definition, the features and the principles of AR.

#### **2.6.2.1 Definition of action research**

Reason and Bradbury (2006:1) define AR as:

A participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes, grounded in a participatory worldview which we believe is emerging at this historical moment. It seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others, in the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of pressing concerns to people.

It is for this reason that the process is viewed as a participatory and democratic process concerned with developing practical solutions to practical problems.

### 2.6.2.2 Features of AR

Koshy (2005:10) identifies the following features of AR, namely that AR:

- involves researching your own practice – it is not about people outside the organisation;
- is emergent;
- is participatory;
- constructs theory from practice;
- is situation-based;
- can be useful in real problem solving;
- deals with individuals or groups with a common purpose of improving practice;
- is about improvement;
- involves analysis, reflection and evaluation; and
- facilitates changes through enquiry.

However, according to Reason and Bradbury (2001:2), AR is a set of practices that respond to people's desire to act creatively in the face of practical and often pressing issues in their lives in organisations and communities. AR:

- calls for an engagement with people in collaborative relationships, opening new communicative spaces in which dialogue and development can flourish;
- draws on many ways of knowing, both in the evidence that is generated by inquiry and is expressed in diverse forms of presentation as we share our learning with wider audiences;
- is value-orientated, seeking to address issues of significance concerning the flourishing of people, their communities, and the wider ecology in which we participate; and
- is a living, emergent process that cannot be pre-determined, but keeps on changing and developing as those engaged deepen their understanding of the issues to be addressed. This also has the advantage of developing the capacity of the clients and researchers as co-inquirers, both individually



and collectively.

These features can be seen as the summary of the descriptions given in defining AR.

### **2.6.3 Management of transformation approach**

Williams (2001:1) identifies four major transformation 'clusters' that can be determined within the management of any transformation process (be this in the public sector, private sector or civil society) and these are particularly relevant to the transformation of the military.

- **Cultural transformation** of the military entails transformation of the leadership, management and administrative ethos, the value system and the traditions upon which the military are predicated.
- **Human transformation** entails the transformation of the composition of the military with regard to its racial, ethnic, regional and gender composition and its human resource (HR) practices. This component of the transformation process must be consistent with the broader policies of the organisation.
- **Political transformation** strives to ensure that the conduct and character of the military conform to the political features of democracy within which they are located, an acknowledgement of the principle of civil supremacy, institution of appropriate mechanisms of oversight, control and adherence to the principles, and practices of accountability and transparency.
- **Organisational transformation** constitutes a more technocratic process within which the military will be right-sized, its management practices and its diverse organisational processes made cost-effective and its ability to provide services that are rendered efficiently in accordance with the broader principles which have governed the transformation of the military to date.

During the process of managing the transformation processes, it is critical to ensure that the key areas of intervention are managed in such a manner that

these interventions are strategically coherent and practically based. The restructuring of the South African military since 1994 was inextricably determined by the specific context within which such initiatives occurred. Although one can formulate a general strategy for the transformation of the military regarding unit names, their institutional peculiarities and their local character will demand an approach that is flexible and context-derived.

#### **2.6.4 Organisational development**

Organisational development (OD) helps institutions deliver sustainable performance improvements through people. Practitioners who practice OD are likely to have a strong humanistic and democratic approach to institutional change (Foster, 2013:1).

OD is discussed focusing mainly on its operational aspect. However, the researcher first must define OD to create a common understanding.


##### **2.6.4.1 Definition of organisational development**

Brown (2011:34) opines that OD is the application of an institution-wide approach to the functional, structural, technical and personal relationships in institutions. In support, Mullins (2011:448) avers that OD is a generic term that embraces a range of intervention strategies into the social process of an institution and such strategies are meant to develop individuals, groups and the institution as a system.

In an OD programme, the emphasis is on a combination of individual, team and institutional relationships. It is a continuous process of long-term institutional improvement consisting of a series of stages. It is out of these explications that OD as an intervention is seen fitting in second-order change.

##### **2.6.4.2 Five stages of organisational development**

The five stages of organisational development are reflected in Figure 2.1 below and are discussed individually.



**Figure 2.1: Five stages of organisational development**

**Source:** Adapted from Brown (2011:35)

Central and critical features of OD are organisational culture and organisational change (Mullins, 2011:448). The OD therefore is a means for realising change in the cooperate culture and OD includes diagnosing the institutions' performance, planning for improvement, mobilising resources to effect the plans and evaluating the effects (Kipkelwon & Chepkuto, 2011:30).

In further elucidating this definition, a five-stage model is identified and each stage is said to be dependent on the preceding one, while successful change is more probable when each of these stages is considered in a logical sequence (Brown, 2011:35):

### **Stage 1 Anticipate a need for change**

Implementation of change programmes presupposes that the organisation must anticipate the need for change. The first step is the leadership's perception that the organisation is somehow in a state of disequilibrium or needs improvement. This state of disequilibrium may stem from the growth or decline of the institution or from competitive, technological, legal or social changes in the external environment (Brown, 2011:35).

### **Stage 2 Develop the practitioner–client relationship**

After an institution had recognised a need for change and an OD practitioner had entered the system, a relationship begins to develop between the practitioner and the client system. The client is a person or an institution that is being assisted to find a solution to the problem experienced (Brown, 2011:35). This relationship is crucial for the survival of an OD programme in that it determines the success or failure of the OD programme. It is advisable that the OD practitioner during the process attempts to establish a pattern of open communication, a relationship of trust, and an atmosphere of shared responsibility. Issues dealing with responsibility, rewards, and objectives must be clarified, defined or worked through at this point (Brown, 2011:35).

### **Stage 3 The diagnostic process**

The realisation of stage two, which is the development of a working relationship between the client and the OD practitioner, paves the way for the diagnostic process.

At this stage, the practitioner and the client begin to gather data about the system. The collection of data is an important activity providing the institution and the practitioner with a better understanding of client's system problems, also called the diagnosis (Brown, 2011:35). Furthermore, the collected data will then be analysed by both the practitioner and the client to identify problem areas and causal relationships. The diagnostic phase is then used for the determination of the exact problem that needs a particular solution, to identify the forces causing

the situation, and helps to provide a basis for selecting effective change strategies and techniques (Brown, 2011:35).

#### **Stage 4 Action plans, strategies and techniques**

The diagnostic phase leads to a series of interventions, activities or programmes aimed at resolving problems and increasing institutional effectiveness. These programmes apply to such OD techniques as total quality management (TQM), job design, role analysis, goal setting, team building, and intergroup development to the causes specified in the diagnostic phase. In all likelihood, more time will be spent on this fourth stage than on any of the other stages of an OD programme (Brown, 2011:35).

#### **Stage 5 Self-renewal, monitoring and stabilisation**

The logical step after implementation of the action programme is to monitor the results and stabilise the desired changes. This stage assesses the effectiveness of change strategies in attaining stated objectives. The results stemming from assessment inform clients whether they ought to modify, continue or discontinue the activities (Brown, 2011:35). Once a problem has been corrected and a change programme is implemented and monitored, it means that clients must be devised to make sure that the new behaviour is stabilised and internalised (Brown, 2011:35). If this is not done, the system will regress to previous ineffective modes or states. The ideal OD programme will create a client system that has a self-renewal capability that can maintain innovation without outside support (Brown, 2011:35). The explications advanced on each approach to the management of change give an array of options that can be utilised by different change managers in particular situations.

### **2.7 SYSTEMS APPROACH TO MANAGING CHANGE**

Brown (2011:58) avers that a systems approach to managing change views the institution as a unified system composed of interrelated units. In understanding this approach, it is important to define what a system is. In support of this view, Montuori (2000:63) contends that a system comprises related and interdependent

parts, so that “any system must be viewed as a whole, and that a system cannot be considered in isolation from its environment.” In addition, Brown (2011:58) views a system as a set of interrelated parts unified by design to achieve some purpose or goal.

There are two fundamental types of systems: open and closed. To place systems thinking in context, a distinction should be made between open and closed systems, which categorises systems thinking (Brown, 2011:59). Closed systems are completely autonomous, independent and in isolation from their environment whereas open systems exchange materials, energy and information with their environment (Brown, 2011:59). An open system is based on the assumption that all inputs can be identified and that all possible variables are usually built into the system (Brown, 2011:59). Proponents of the open system see organisations as comprising a number of interrelated sub-systems, and this system is one that considers outside factors (environment), which can have an influence on the design process (Nadler, 1981:6). This implies, therefore, that any activity within an open system is the result of influence of one element on another and in continual interaction with its environment. Within an institutional perspective, the systems approach takes into cognisance and focuses on the effect of managerial functions and the interrelationship between sub-elements of the organisation (Brown, 2011:58). According to this perspective, the institution is viewed as a set of flows of information, personnel and materials. There are three basic elements of a system: inputs, processes and outputs (Brown, 2011:58–59).

- **Inputs** are the resources that are applied to the processing function. The inputs like materials, people, and energy, are converted by the institutions into services needed by the public (Brown, 2011:58). Interaction takes place between the institution and the environment, in that the institution receives feedback from the environment. These inputs are then transformed by the institution and become improved services that are channelled back to the environment (Brown, 2011:59).
- **Processes** are the activities and functions that are performed to produce goods and services.

- **Outputs** are the products and services produced by the institution.

Furthermore, systems thinking, according to Montuori (2000:64), enables a dynamic, holistic examination of an institution, including changes as they unfold as a means of ensuring that the changes made are within the context and in concert with environmental changes. Within this institutional context, open systems thinking, therefore suggests that issues, events, forces and incidents should not be viewed as isolated phenomena but rather be seen as interconnected, interdependent components of a complex unit (Brown, 2011:58–59).

Flowing from the above explications, it seems that open systems are the systems of interest in managing change, because elements within an institution influence one another resulting in an activity where issues, events, forces and incidents as elements of a complex unit are interconnected to and interdependent on one another. To understand resistance to change, the researcher focuses in the next section on the discussion of this concept and how systemic and individual factors play a role in resisting change.

## **2.8 RESISTANCE TO CHANGE**

In trying to simplify the complex understanding of change, Baker (2007:2) postulates that change is not, in itself, inherently good or bad. It is a common phenomenon that impending change in an institution always invokes feelings of anxiety and fears and may result in resistance to change. People and institutions to which they belong resist transformation for various reasons, be it for the defence of the status quo or just fear of the unknown (Esterhuyse, 2003). Resistance then becomes a management challenge that cannot be ignored, but needs to be planned and managed accordingly. Esterhuyse (2003:5) asserts that resistance to change usually occurs at two distinctive levels: the systemic level and the individual level.

### 2.8.1 Systemic level

Systemic factors are built into the institution. Some of the factors, identified by Esterhuysen (2003:5), which most institutions have experienced as change resistors, are the following:

- a hierarchical institutional structure and the concomitant obsession to maintain existing relations of power and control. This is of interest to the military because the military by its very nature is hierarchical in structure to effect command and control;
- non-participative decision-making procedure (one-man rule);
- an obsession with short-term gain/profit and task-orientated behaviour; and
- the question of survival, and remaining in business, while retaining stability.

The fundamental change that involves a change in structure, decision-making processes and leadership approaches will then have to be given priority to ensure that these systemic factors are eliminated in advance. In addition, when embarking on a planned programme of transformation it is therefore imperative to consider the built-in factors, which adversely affect change.

### 2.8.2 Individual factors

A wide variety of individual factors play a role. The following are some of those individual factors as identified by Esterhuysen (2003:5):

- **Perceived self-interest** relates to conflicts of interests between those of the individual and those of the institution. The institution sees the need to change and the individual has his/her perceived vested interest in the institution. Such interests may have a negative influence on the individual to support the intended change.
- **Feeling of fear and uncertainty** is the natural way of responding to the unknown future and concomitant feeling of insecurity.
- **Conservatism** manifests itself when change is perceived as a threat to acquired skills and knowledge. There is always the tendency to protect and



justify the status quo so that the intended change is not effected and individuals stay in their comfort zones.

These perceived individual threats need to be addressed as part of managing change in an institution. There are methods that can be applied to overcome resistance to change. In the next section, the researcher discusses such methods. Constant communication is one of the methods, and to clarify every step of the change process is a must to alleviate the negative perceptions.

## **2.9 METHODS TO OVERCOME RESISTANCE TO CHANGE**

Managing resistance to change is a critical factor in any change exercise. The resistance may stem from various sources, including a preference for habitual ways of doing things, fear of the unknown or a feeling of power or security that is at stake. However, Dessler (1995:528) suggests that whatever the source is, resistance to change must be addressed and managed. Kotter and Schlesinger (2008:7), Bryant, Coombs and Pazio (2014:1) and Baldwin, Bommer and Rubin (2014:524–525) suggest the following general strategies for overcoming resistance to change:

- **Communication** requires that the desired changes in an institution be communicated with employees. Employees should be informed about change initiatives and their progress. It is therefore necessary to plan for ways to communicate that are varied and tailored to different stakeholders in the institution.
- **Participation** refers to the need to involve potential resisters in designing and implementing change. Allowing participation has the benefit of enhancing the feeling of understanding and a feeling of control and ownership for the employees. This also reduces uncertainty.
- **Facilitation** strategy is concerned with providing skills training and emotional support to employees.

- **Negotiation** is used when confronted with powerful resisters, and management needs to make specific exchanges and offer incentives for making the change.
- **Coercion** refers to the use of authority and the threat of punishment or even loss of job or promotion opportunities for those who resist change.

Although these strategies appear independent of each other, they can be applied in combined ways depending on the prevailing situation. The key to application of these strategies is the understanding of situational factors at play.

## **2.10 SUMMARY**

In the introduction to this chapter the researcher indicated that the intention was to discuss strategic change management from a theoretical perspective. To pursue this, the discussion sought to inform the theoretical framework for analysis and later an evaluation of strategic change management in the SANDF. The nature and concept of strategic change management was discussed by first providing a definition and discussion of the concept and those who are connected with it, namely strategy, change, management and change management. A distinction was established between first- and second-order change by identifying and discussing their different characteristics. It was explained that first- and second-order change principally differ in context, content and process.

The open systems approach was selected as appropriate for discussing change management in this thesis. This is based on the fact that the systems thinking enables a dynamic holistic examination of an institution, including changes, thereby suggesting that issues, events, forces and incidents should not be viewed in isolation but should be seen as interconnected, interdependent components of a complex entity. Resistance to change was also discussed as a management challenge, and the levels at which it occurs, as well as the methods to overcome this challenge were identified and discussed. Different approaches to managing change – which include Lewin's three-step model, action research and organisational development were discussed briefly.

Finally, it was concluded that the 'people' or 'human' dimensions of strategic change management are in all probability one of the most complex issues that will confront military leaders in managing the strategic realignment of any military organisation. The ability of military leadership to respond strategically to changing conditions is determined largely by the human factors involved. The so-called 'people issues' relate to changing paradigms of management, establishing learning organisations, having to deal with organisational politics, re-skilling of staff, emotional intelligence, stress management and resistance to change that collectively translate into complexity in the strategic alignment of an organisation within its turbulent environment.

In the next chapter, the researcher focuses on strategic change management.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK AND PROCESS**

#### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

In Chapter Two, strategic change management was discussed from a theoretical perspective. The discussion focused on transformational change as a type of change, among other sub-topics. In this chapter, the focus of discussion is on the strategic management framework with specific reference to theoretical perspectives regarding strategic management, strategic planning and the strategic management process. The discussion of the strategic management process hinges on strategic analysis, strategy formulation, strategy implementation and strategy evaluation.

#### **3.2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT**

To clarify the terms used in this chapter, in this section, the researcher considers strategy in context by defining what is meant by 'strategy'. The meaning of strategy in a business management and a military context is discussed.

##### **3.2.1 Strategy in context**

The term 'strategy' was adopted from the military and adapted for use in the business context (Nickols, 2012:2). For the purposes of clarifying the concept of strategy and placing it in context, the definition of strategy is explored and models of strategy, dimensions of strategy and levels of strategy is discussed.

##### **3.2.1.1 Strategy defined**

In the military, strategy may be intended as a manoeuvre to outwit an opposing force by using an artful plan (Grattan, 2011:14). In concert with this definition, Nickols (2012:2) postulates that strategy often refers to the manoeuvring (that is deployment) of troops into positions before the opposing force is actually engaged, and that once the opposing force is engaged, the focus changes to tactics. In this situation, the employment of forces becomes central in engaging the opposing forces. Therefore, strategy in a military sense is about a well-considered and clever plan to outmanoeuvre and engage the opposing forces.

According to Karami (2007:3), in business and management, the concept of strategy is analogous to that in the military. In a business and management context, 'strategy' is defined by Robson (1997:5) as the pattern of resource allocation decisions made throughout an institution. A more expanded view is shared by Deffner (2003:2), who contends that strategy is the means and methods required to satisfy the conditions necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of a system. Sharing a similar view, Veetil (2008:35) sees strategy as the direction and scope of an institution over the long term, which achieves an advantage in a changing environment through its configuration of resources and competencies with the aim of fulfilling stakeholders' expectations.

However, an expanded definition is that offered by Bryson (2004:183), who posits strategy as a pattern of purposes, policies, programmes, actions, decisions and resource allocations that defines what an institution is, what it does, and why it does it. Strategy, therefore, is pattern of deliberate actions that an institution undertakes to out-perform its rivals (Ehlers & Lazenby, 2005:2). However, it is imperative to note that to create a pattern of deliberate actions, strategy should be applied consciously and consistently over time (Nillson, Olve & Parment, 2011:14).

In the same vein, De Kluyver and Pearce (2012:2) contend that strategy is about positioning an institution to gain a competitive advantage, and involves making choices about industries in which to participate and which products and services to offer, and making decisions regarding the allocation of resources. In concert with these definitions, strategy is said to be the art and science of planning and marshalling resources for their most efficient and effective use (Maalu & Wekesa, 2012:176).

The above definitions and explications have two common essential characteristics (Karami, 2007:4), namely:

- they are made in advance of the actions to which they apply; and
- they are developed consciously and purposefully.

It is important to note that in the above definitions, the emphasis is on making

decisions about resource allocation that is providing the means for realising the vision, and achieving the goals and objectives of the institution. Therefore, stemming from these explications is the fact that strategy is about planning and defining goals and objectives and ensuring that resources are allocated to realise the plans. In addition, strategy provides guidance to institutions on how to achieve their vision and strategic goals.

Furthermore, Mintzberg *et al.* (2003:3) identified five interrelated definitions of strategy as plan, ploy, pattern, position, and perspective.

- **Strategy as plan** is viewed as a consciously intended course of action, and a guide to deal with a situation (Karami, 2007:4). This definition, according to Mintzberg *et al.* (2003:4), can be dissected into two essential characteristics. First, the plan is a conscious and purposeful effort, and secondly, it is prepared in advance, that is, before the action takes place. However, it is interesting to note that 'strategy' is often considered interchangeable with 'plan' since both are consciously intended courses of action (Karami, 2007:4). Strategy as a plan is some sort of intended course of action or a set of guidelines to deal with a situation and shows an institution how to reach its intended position from its current state (Veetil, 2008:35). A plan, therefore, is a deliberately and carefully crafted path that an institution follows in order to improve its status to reach its intended situation.
- **Strategy as ploy:** Mintzberg *et al.* (2003:4) argue that the plan itself might be meant to achieve a specific purpose, or it might be just a general approach to solve general challenges. Mintzberg *et al.* (2003:4) further postulate that plan to achieve a specific purpose is called a **ploy**, and a ploy can be used to outmanoeuvre the opposing forces in war or outwit competitors in business. In concert with this definition, Veetil (2008:35) contends that a ploy could be a specific manoeuvre intended to outwit an opponent or competitor so that the competitive scenario changes in the favour of the manoeuvre. A ploy, therefore, is a specific move designed to

outsmart the opposing force, or in the business sense, to gain an advantage over competitors.

- **Strategy as pattern** is linked to the resultant behaviour once the planned strategy is employed in an institution. When resultant behaviour is seen to be consistent, it can be called a **pattern**, hence, strategy as a pattern (Mintzberg *et al.*, 2003:4). In addition, strategy as a pattern refers to patterns in a stream of actions and by this definition, strategy is consistency in behaviour whether or not intended (Veetil, 2008:35). This means that a pattern is the degree of consistency in the strategic actions of an institution. However, the challenge that can emanate from this consistency is predictability, which a competitor or opposing force can use to predict which course of action will be taken (Grattan, 2011:14).
- **Strategy as position** is seen as a means of locating an organisation within the larger outside environment (Karami, 2007:4). In other words, the organisation must be able to define its reason for existence within the context of what is happening in the broader business environment (Mintzberg *et al.*, 2003:6). Sharing the same view, Veetil (2008: 35) posits that strategy as a position is a means of locating an institution in an environment and by this definition, strategy becomes a mediating force between institution and environment. In business terms, this means finding a niche in a market where the available resources could be concentrated to the best advantage. Practically, the niche and the decisive point have to be discovered by the strategist and are not always obvious (Grattan, 2011:14). Stemming from this definition, 'strategy', therefore, is a means of locating an institution in the environment, and matching the institution to its environment relative to its competitors or the opposition.
- **Strategy as perspective** refers to an ingrained way of seeing the world from an institutional point of view (Mintzberg *et al.*, 2003:7). This refers to the world outlook according to the institution. In this case, the institution is represented by its executives, and strategy is the perspective shared by

the members of the institution through their intentions and/or by their actions (Karami, 2007:4). This definition looks inside the institution. In this respect, strategy is to the institution what personality is to the individual (Veetttil, 2008:35). The definition of strategy as a perspective, suggests that strategy is a concept (Veetttil, 2008:35). Strategy then arises from the institution paradigm: how members of an institution think the world looks and works (Grattan, 2011:14).

In this section, the definition of strategy was discussed and it was found that strategy provides the means for realising the vision and achieving the goals and objectives of an institution. Above all, strategy is concerned with planning and defining goals and objectives and with ensuring that resources are allocated to realise the objectives as enshrined in the plans. Finally, strategy is not a panacea for all the ills of an institution but rather guidance to institutions on how to realise their vision and strategic goals. Added to the discussion of the definition of strategy were five interrelated definitions of strategy, namely as plan, ploy, pattern, position, and perspective.

In the next section, the researcher provides a brief discussion of what strategic planning is and what it entails.

### **3.3 STRATEGIC PLANNING**

In the previous section, the researcher dealt with the definition of strategy, thereby laying the foundation for a discussion of strategic planning. In this section, the researcher gives a summary of the definition of strategic planning.

#### **3.3.1 Defining strategic planning**

Strategic planning starts with the full understanding by the firm of the business in which it operates (Zimmerman & Blythe, 2013:37). This understanding of business is followed by strategic planning, which is a process of developing and maintaining consistency between the objectives and resources of the organisation and its changing opportunities (Robson, 1997:17). In addition, strategic planning is defined by Bryson (1988, cited in Poister & Streib, 1999:309) as “a disciplined



effort to produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an institution is, what it does, and why it does it”.

To expand on these definitions, Bryson (2004:15–16) posits that strategic planning is about clarifying the mission, mandates, vision, goals and the nature of the common good and public value to be achieved. In tandem with this definition, Belcourt and Bohlander (2011:44) assert that strategic planning involves a set of procedures for making decisions about the long-term goals and strategies of the institution.

Furthermore, strategic planning is used to manage institutions effectively and to enhance their performance. Strategic planning is seen as a rational, top-down process through which management can programme future success and decision-making responsibilities. In this situation, strategic planners are expected to provide careful analyses of internal and external data (Rothaermel, 2013:39). Thereafter, executives tie the allocation of resources to the strategic plan and constantly monitor the ongoing performance accordingly. In this process, the strategy formulation is separated from the strategy implementation (Rothaermel, 2013:39).

Strategic planning, according to Poister and Streib (1999:309), is a “big picture” approach that –

- is concerned with identifying the most fundamental issues facing an institution and responding to them;
- addresses the subjective question of purpose and the often competing values that influence mission and strategies;
- emphasises the importance of external trends and forces as they are likely to affect the agency and its mission;
- attempts to be politically realistic by taking into account the concerns and preferences of internal, and especially external, stakeholders;
- relies heavily on the active involvement of senior-level managers and sometimes elected officials, assisted by support staff where needed;
- requires the candid confrontation of critical issues by key participants to

- build commitment to plans;
- is action-orientated and emphasises the importance of developing plans for implementing strategies; and
- focuses on implementing decisions now to position the institution favourably for the future.

In this section, strategic planning was described as a disciplined effort to produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an institution is all about. It is during strategic planning that the mission, mandates, vision and goals are clarified so that everyone in the institution works towards the achievement of these. Participation in the process of strategic planning is dominated by management, meaning that it is a top-down approach.

In the next section, the strategic management process is discussed.

### **3.4 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PROCESS**

In this section, the researcher discusses the strategic management process by first defining what strategic management is. Then the focus shifts to the discussion of strategic analysis, the formulation of vision and mission statements, strategy formulation, strategy implementation, and strategy evaluation and control.

#### **3.4.1 Definition of strategic management**

The strategic management process can be described as an objective, systematic approach for making major decisions in a business enterprise (Fredrickson, 1990:40). In addition, according to Robson (1997:6), strategic management is the process whereby all the institutional functions and resources are integrated and coordinated to implement existing and agreed-upon strategies. Such strategies are aligned with the environment, with the aim of achieving the long-term objectives of the institution. Secondly, Kamara (2007:12) defines strategic management as the art and science of formulating, implementing and evaluating cross-functional decisions that enable an institution to achieve its objectives. Analysing and considering this definition further, Kamara (2007:12) asserts that strategic management is a broad activity that encompasses mapping out strategy, putting

strategy into action, and modifying strategy or its implementation to ensure that the desired outcomes are reached. Agreeing with this definition, Barney and Hesterly (2010:4) define the strategic management process as a sequential set of analyses and choices that could increase the likelihood that an institution would choose a good strategy. Furthermore, Coultier (2013:5) defines strategic management as a process of analysing the current situation, developing appropriate strategies, put these strategies into action and evaluating and changing those strategies where the need arises.

Strategic management as a process, then entails specifying the mission, vision and objectives of the institution, developing policies and plans which are designed to achieve these objectives, and then to allocate resources to implement the policies and plans that result in projects and programmes (Jagdish, 2013:19). Finally, Chemingich (2013:3) views strategic management as a process by which top management determines the long-term direction and performance of the institution by ensuring that careful formulation, effective implementation and continuous evaluation of strategy take place. This implies that strategic management is the process of coordinating and integrating the management function in a structured manner to achieve institutional goals and objectives.

Permeating throughout the above definitions are characteristics pertinent to strategic management as identified by Coulter (2013:5), such as that strategic management:

- is interdisciplinary, encompassing all functional areas;
- has an external focus, which involves interaction with its environment; and
- has an internal focus, which involves assessing the resources and capabilities of the institution.

In addition, the process of strategic management is the domain of the analysis of top management of the environment in which the institution operates prior to formulating a strategy, as well as the plan for the implementation and control of the strategy (Parnell, 2014:2). It can also be argued that the environmental analysis of top management is the reflection of their own perceptions about the


environment (Parnell, 2014:2).

It can therefore be concluded that the strategic management of an institution entails three ongoing processes, as identified by Dess, Lumpkin and Taylor (2005:2).

- An **analysis** of strategic goals such as vision, mission and strategic objectives. This is done simultaneously with the analysis of the internal and external environments of the institution. Based on this analysis, leaders should make strategic decisions.
- Such **decisions** by leaders address two fundamental questions:
  - Which industries should the institution compete in?
  - How should the institution compete in those industries?
- **Actions** that should be taken to implement the strategies.

### 3.4.2 Basic activities of strategic management

The basic activities of the process of strategic management, as reflected in Figure 3.1, are discussed below.



**Figure 3.1 The basic strategic management process**

**Source:** Adapted from Coultier (2013:5)

### **3.4.2.1 Strategic analysis**

Strategic analysis, also known as 'environmental scanning' (Bohlander & Snell, 2007:52), is the systematic monitoring of the major external forces influencing the institution. By scanning the environment for changes that have a possibility to affect an institution, managers can anticipate the effect of these changes and make adjustments early (Bohlander & Snell, 2007:52). In addition, strategic analysis plays an important role in the strategic thinking process, and is used to derive correlations, identify and evaluate trends, patterns and performance gaps (Tovstiga, 2010:74–75).

Internal strengths (S) and weaknesses (W) concern resources, capabilities and competences. External opportunities (O) and threats (T) come from the general environment of the institution. The analysis of the above environments is referred to as a SWOT analysis (Rothaermel, 2013:105–106). The gathering of information for a SWOT analysis allows managers to link internal factors (strengths and weakness) to external factors (opportunities and threats). Managers need to consider additional resources and capabilities and mitigate threats. Considering these issues allows managers to balance current and future resources and capabilities with the external environment (Rothaermel, 2013:105–106).

#### **3.4.2.1.1 Assessing the macro environment (external environment)**

In their quest to consider alternative strategies, it is paramount for managers in institutions to consider events and potential changes in the environment. This is called a macro-environmental analysis, which helps to identify opportunities (O) and threats (T) outside the institution (Bowhill, 2008:331–332). The external environment consists of all the physical and social factors outside of the boundaries of an institution. Some of these elements provide an institution with potentially favourable (positive) conditions and are called opportunities. Other elements provide potentially unfavourable (negative) conditions and are labelled threats (Stewart & Brown, 2011:41). The understanding of both favourable and unfavourable conditions is critical for effective strategy formulation. Effective strategy formulation thus begins with information about threats and opportunities

outside an institution (Stewart & Brown, 2011:42).

Supporting this definition, Hill and Jones (2008:8) aver that the essential purpose of the external analysis is to identify strategic opportunities and threats in the operating environment of the institution that will affect how it pursues its mission. For example, a favourable economic situation of the country might be an opportunity for the SANDF to get an increased defence budget, whereas a threat might be an increase of terror attacks in neighbouring states. The SANDF therefore has to plan strategically to utilise or take advantage of the opportunity and eliminate the threat.

The macro-environment can be divided into six sub-environments: the economic environment, the political and legal environment, the technological environment, the social environment, the physical and ecological environment, and the global environment (Goldman, Maritz, Nienaber, Pretorius, Priilaid & Williams, 2010:7).

- **Macro-economic forces**, according to Parnell (2014:54) have a direct influence on institutional operations. According to Jones and Hill (2013:71), macroeconomic forces affect the general health and well-being of a nation which, in turn, affect the ability of the institution to be economically viable and sustainable (Jones & Hill, 2013:71). This refers, among others, to the growth or a decline in the gross domestic product (GDP) and the status of the economic indicators, such as inflation, interest rates and exchange rates. Coupled with these factors are hikes in energy prices and the cost of health-care and access to labour.

In addition, South Africa is considered an emerging economy and as such, it is associated with threats rather than opportunities. In addition, as an emerging economy, South Africa cannot compete with economic greats like the United States of America and China with respect to sales volumes and prices. This requires, therefore, South African institutions to select the niche markets carefully (Goldman *et al.*, 2010:7).

- **Political and legal forces** are composed of variables such as trade agreements (Goldman *et al.*, 2010:8), the outcomes of elections, legislation

and judicial court decisions, as well as the decisions stemming from various commissions and agencies at different tiers of government (Parnell, 2014:54). Jones and Hill (2013:74) agree and aver that political and legal forces are a result of changes in the laws and regulations of a country and consequently affect managers and institutions. Such laws are shaped by political processes and are constraints on the operations of institutions and managers, and thus create both opportunities and threats for the institutions.

- **Social forces** refer to the degree to which changing social mores and values affect an institution (Hill & Jones, 2013:73). Analysed and explained by Parnell (2014:79), social forces include societal values, trends, traditions, and religious practices. Societal values, in turn, refer to concepts and beliefs that the members of society hold in high regard. Furthermore, social forces include societal concerns such as childcare, care for the elderly, the environment, and educational priorities (Belcourt *et al.*, 2011:47).
- **Technological forces** comprise information technology, innovations and automation (Belcourt *et al.*, 2011:47). In addition, Parnell (2014:91) postulates that the pace of adoption of technological change is difficult to predict and can even be influenced by competing technologies.

Furthermore, accelerated technological change has unleashed a process that has been called a “perennial gale of creative destruction” (Hill & Jones, 2013:73).

This implies that technological change can make already established products obsolete overnight, and concomitantly create new product possibilities. Thus, technological change can be both an opportunity and a threat (Hill & Jones, 2013:73).

#### **3.4.2.1.2 Assessing the micro-environment (internal environment)**

An internal analysis serves to identify the strengths (S) and weaknesses (W) of an institution, such as identifying the quantity and quality of the resources and

capabilities of an institution and finding ways of building unique skills. Hill and Jones (2003:9) assert that the strengths of an institution lead to superior performance whereas weaknesses of an institution translate into inferior performance. Areas of high capabilities are labelled 'strengths' and low capabilities are called 'weaknesses' (Stewart & Brown, 2011:42). This means that strength is something that is advantageous to the institution or something at which the institution is good, whereas weakness is considered something an institution lacks or where it is outperformed by rivalries (Bowhill, 2008:398). The ultimate objective of internal assessment is to equip decision-makers to be able to identify the primary strengths and weaknesses of an organisation and to find a way to capitalise on the strengths and improve or minimise the weaknesses (Mello, 2011:105).

In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of the formulation of the vision and mission statements.

### **3.4.3 The formulation of vision and mission statements**

Vision and mission statement formulation is part of strategic management. In this subsection, vision and mission are defined and discussed.

#### **3.4.3.1 Formulating vision**

A vision describes aspirations for the future, without specifying the means that will be used to achieve those desired ends (Miller, 1998:41). In addition, the vision statement answers the question 'what do we want to become?' and serves as the road map for the institution. The vision statement focuses on a desirable future, and is often referred to as an 'enduring promise' (Ehlers & Lazenby, 2005:48). Such a vision statement, according to Belcourt and Bohlander (2011:45), portrays the future business scope of an institution and provides a perspective on where the institution is going or what it could become in the future, in other words, it clarifies the long-term direction of the institution and its strategic intent. Furthermore, within the context of strategic management, 'vision' refers to the category of intensions that are broad, all inclusive, and forward-looking in terms of thinking. In content, vision statements are generally less detailed and formal than



strategic plans, but can still guide managers at all levels in their day-to-day decision-making (Mello, 2011:107). Vision statements reflect the perception of management of what the organisation should be (Zimmerman & Blythe, 2013:37).

After conceptualising the vision statement of the institution in achievable terms, an outline plan is formulated specifying actions that need to be taken and when, in order to achieve that vision. This outline plan creates a framework of priorities and budget constraints, and establishes specific and measurable objectives. In many institutions, the vision and objectives and the master plan for achieving them are combined into a single deliverable called the “strategy plan” (Robson, 1997:18).

However, it needs to be noted that a lack of a vision statement does not necessarily mean that there is no vision. This is much more relevant in situations where characteristics of an institution can be very clear to its members without having anything at all specified in official writing (Zimmerman & Blythe, 2013:37).

#### **3.4.3.2 Mission statement**

In defining ‘mission statement’, Ehlers and Lazenby (2005:51) aver that a mission statement embodies the philosophy, identity and character of an institution and also the image the institution wants to project. It is a statement of intent, attitude, outlook and orientation, and typically describes the business and purpose of the institution (Hough, Thompson, Strickland & Gamble, 2011:5). In other words, the mission statement explains the purpose and reason for the existence of the institution (Mello, 2011:103), and the mission statement helps legitimise the function of the institution in society (Robson, 1997:18).

Furthermore, taking the explication further, Hill and Jones (2008:8) argue that such a mission statement provides the framework or context within which strategies are formulated. It is for this reason, that the researcher discusses the strategy formulation stage in the next section.

#### **3.4.4 Strategy formulation**

In the previous section, the researcher dealt with the formulation of the vision and mission statements. Under discussion in this section is the strategy formulation

process. After managers have used a SWOT analysis (see 3.4.2.1) to examine the internal strengths and weaknesses of the institution, as well as the external opportunities and threats, they have the information they need to formulate strategies (Snell & Bohlander, 2007:65). Strategy formulation is about developing and choosing appropriate strategies derived from identifying the competitive strengths and weaknesses of an institution, determining the external opportunities and threats of the institution, and establishing operational goals aligned with value creation, developing and analysing alternative strategic paths, and selecting among them the appropriate and effective ones for the institution (Fredrickson, 1990:40). In addition, strategy formulation, according to Thompson and Strickland (1998:25), is the entire direction-setting management function of conceptualisation of the mission, setting performance objectives, and developing a strategy.

In addition, Bowhill (2008:317) avers that strategy formulation is the process of determining appropriate courses of action for achieving institutional objectives and accomplishing organisational purpose. During this strategy formulation process, an institution adopts institutional policies and practices that are consistent with its own strategy (Barney & Hesterly, 2010:10).

The end product of strategy formulation, according to Thompson and Strickland (1998:25), is a strategic plan, with appropriate strategies such as the following:

- **Functional-level strategies (operational strategies)** are composed of goal-directed plans and actions of the functional areas (Fredrickson, 1990:40) of the institution. In addition, strategic priorities are translated into functional areas of the institution (Snell & Bohlander, 2007:70). Furthermore, the functional-level strategy is directed at improving the effectiveness of operations within an institution (Hill & Jones, 2008:9).
- **Business-level strategies** are the goal-directed plans and actions concerned with how an institution competes in a specific business or industry. The goal-directed plans and actions are focused on how the company will compete against rival institutions in order to create value for customers (Snell & Bohlander, 2007:68). In concert with this view, Hill and

Jones (2008:9) posit that a business strategy encompasses the way an institution positions itself in the broad field against rival competitors. A business strategy defines how institutions compete (Verweire, 2014:17).

- A **global strategy** is about addressing how to expand operations of an institution outside the home country, to grow and prosper in a world where a competitive advantage is determined at the global level (Hill & Jones, 2008:9).
- **Corporate strategy** defines where institutions compete (Verweire, 2014:17). In addition, corporate strategy addresses the following:
  - The business or businesses that the institutions should be in order to maximise their long-run profitability and the profit growth of the institution.
  - Concerns about how institutions should enter and increase their presence in these businesses to gain a competitive advantage. The set of strategies identified through the SWOT analysis should be implemented effectively (Hill & Jones, 2008:9).
  - Guiding the institutions regarding which business(es) to be in, what to do with those businesses, and where and how they will compete (Coulter, 2013:7). Corporate strategy, therefore, focuses on domain selection (Snell & Bohlander, 2007:67).

Stemming from the above explications, strategy formulation, according to Jagdish (2013:22), is a combination of the following processes:

- performing a situation analysis, self-evaluation and competition analysis, both internal and external, and both at the micro-environmental and the macro-environmental; and
- concurrent with this assessment, objectives are set. These objectives should be on a time-line. This involves developing vision statements, mission statements, overall corporate objectives, strategic business unit objectives and tactical objectives.

Top managers, as the developers of strategy, always bear the responsibility for

the ramifications of strategy formulation decisions: This reflects their authority to commit resources of the institution to the implementation of strategy (Karami, 2007:16).

It can, therefore, be concluded from the above explications of the definition of strategy formulation, that it is the process of developing appropriate courses of action, meant for the realisation of the objectives and institutional purpose of the institution. Concomitant to this process of strategy formulation, is an adoption of institutional policies and practices that are consistent with its own strategy. In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of strategy implementation.

### **3.4.5 Strategy implementation**

The logical step that follows after strategy formulation is strategy implementation. In this section, therefore, strategy implementation is discussed.

Strategy implementation, according to Thompson and Strickland (1998:25), is about putting the chosen strategy into practice, supervising it, and achieving the desired objectives. Sharing a similar view, Sage (2010:1) suggests that strategy implementation is the process that turns strategies and plans into actions in order to reach strategic objectives and goals. Concomitant with this action, is the allocation of roles and responsibilities among managers, through the design of institutional structures, allocating resources, setting short-term objectives, and designing the control and reward system of the institution (Hill & Jones, 2008:7). Institutional structures should be appropriate for the efficient performance of the required tasks and relationships, permitting coordination of subdivided activities (De Wet & Meyer, 2004:73). Such institutional structures are seen by Snell and Bohlander (2007:71–73) as the framework within which the activities of the institution are co-ordinated to fulfil expected results.

Once structures are in place, what follows is the establishment of systems and processes. These include formal and informal procedures that guide and govern daily institutional activities. Re-engineering and process redesign to implement new strategies, need to be in place (Snell & Bohlander, 2007:71–73). Sharing a similar view, Karami (2007:16) postulates that implementing strategy is achieved

by developing a strategy-supportive culture, creating an effective institutional structure, and motivating individuals to learn new ways of contributing to improved performance. This means that strategy implementation requires the enterprise to devise policies, common values and incentives to motivate employees and to allow identified strategies to be pursued successfully (Fredrickson, 1990:40). Coupled with these explications on strategy implementation, is the fact that leadership is important and sometimes decisive for the success of the implementation of strategy (De Wet & Meyer, 2004:73).

For the purpose of this study, strategy implementation was defined as a process that converts institutional strategies and plans into pragmatic actions and making decisions regarding the allocation of resources for the realisation of strategic objectives and goals. Coupled with this, are the distribution of roles and responsibilities, and the establishment of systems and processes. In addition, the success of the process of strategy implementation is said to be dependent on leadership. In a different context, it is important to note that, according to Grattan (2011:11–14), there is a formulation–implementation dichotomy, on the grounds that those who developed the strategy are not the ones who implement it.


Once the strategy is implemented, strategy evaluation and control mechanisms must be in place. In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of strategy evaluation and control.

#### **3.4.6 Strategy monitoring (evaluation/control)**

For the purpose of this section, the terms ‘monitoring’, ‘evaluation’ and ‘control’ are used interchangeably. The attached meaning, therefore, is to reflect the extent to which the strategies of the institution are realised in attaining its goals and objectives (Pernell, 2014:327). In order to do strategy monitoring of their performance, institutions need to establish a set of parameters that focus on the ‘desired outcomes’ of strategic planning, as well as the metrics they will use to monitor how well the institution delivers against those desired outcomes (Belcourt *et al.*, 2011:75–76). In tandem with this view, Karami (2007:16) postulates that realistic strategy evaluation of the performance of the institution presupposes the

development of performance indicators linked to key improvement factors of institutional performance. Such performance indicators are meant to ensure that the institution achieves what it planned to realise as set out during the strategy formulation and implementation process. Strategy evaluation involves evaluating both the outcomes of the strategies and how they have been implemented (Coulter, 2013:8). This process of monitoring is underpinned by the ultimate aim of the institution to create a competitive advantage by evaluating its performance against other institutions. Among other ways of doing it, this comparison can be done by 'benchmarking'. Benchmarking is defined as the process of identifying best practices in a particular area. Among others, it can be productivity, logistics, brand management or training. Then management compare the practices and performance their institution to those of other institutions in the same business (Belcourt *et al.*, 2011:75–76).

Parnell (2014:329) identifies a five-step strategic monitoring process that can be employed to facilitate this process.



**Figure 3.2** Five-step strategic control process

**Source:** (Parnell, 2014:329).

A five-step strategic control process, as depicted in Figure 3.2, can be employed as follows.

1. In this process, it is the function of top management to determine the focus of control. This is done by identifying internal factors that can serve as effective measures for the effectiveness of strategy, as well as outside factors that could trigger responses from the institution.
2. Establish standards (benchmarks) for internal factors with which the actual performance of the institution can be compared after the implementation of the strategy.
3. Management evaluates the actual performance of the institution by using quantitative and qualitative methods.
4. Performance evaluations are then compared with the previously established standards.
5. If performance is below the expected standards, then corrective steps are taken. However, if performance is above standards, there is no need for corrective action.

Therefore, strategy monitoring helps top management to diagnose the flaws in the implementation of their strategies. The five-step approach to monitor strategy is a guide that informs top management how to follow a logical approach in monitoring their institution. This can be a tedious process, in that time and again, management will be forced to go back to the drawing board to rectify the implementation plan or even to review the formulated strategy.

The process of strategic management is the area of responsibility for the top management of an institution. It is vital for the environmental analysis prior to the formulation of strategy, as well as the strategy implementation plan and for monitoring of strategy.

### **3.5 SUMMARY**

In this chapter, the definition of strategy was discussed within the context of business and the military. In business and public institutions, strategy is defined as the means for realising the vision, achieving the goals and objectives of an

institution, and concomitantly ensuring that resources are allocated to realise the achievement of objectives as enshrined in the plans. In the military context, however, strategy is seen as a well-considered plan to outsmart and engage the opposing forces. However, strategy should be taken as guidance by institutions regarding how to realise their vision and strategic goals.

Following the discussion of strategy was strategic planning which, in summary, was described as a disciplined effort to produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an institution is all about. In addition, in pursuance of the definition of strategic management, it was found that strategic management is the process of coordinating and integrating the management function in a structured manner to achieve institutional goals and objectives. This process was categorised in stages for its successful realisation (see 3.4.2).

The first stage of strategic management is strategic analysis, also known as 'environmental scanning', which is the systematic monitoring of the major external forces influencing the institution. Within this analytical stage of strategic management, vision and mission statements were discussed.

The second stage of strategic management is called 'strategy formulation'. This is regarded as the process of determining appropriate courses of action for achieving the objectives of the institution, and accomplishing institutional purpose. It is during this strategy formulation process, that an institution adopts institutional policies and practices that are consistent with its own strategy. The ultimate resultant product of this stage is a strategic plan with appropriate strategies.

The third stage of strategic management as discussed in this chapter, is strategy implementation, which is defined as the process that converts institutional strategies and plans into pragmatic actions, and making decisions regarding the allocation of resources for realisation of strategic objectives and goals. Concomitant with this process is the distribution of roles and responsibilities and the establishment of systems and processes. In addition, associated with the process of strategy implementation is the development of a strategy-supportive culture, creating an effective institutional structure, and motivating individuals to



learn new ways of contributing to improved performance. Coupled with these explications on strategy implementation, is the fact that leadership is important and sometimes decisive in the success of the implementation of strategy.

The last stage of strategic management is strategy evaluation, which involves evaluating both the outcomes of the strategies, and how they have been implemented.

In the next chapter, the researcher provides a discussion of the institutional culture.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE**

#### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

In Chapter 3, the discussion focused on the strategic change management framework, with specific reference to theoretical perspectives on strategic management, strategic planning and the strategic management process. The discussion of the strategic management process was dissected into strategic formulation, strategy implementation and strategy evaluation.

To put the topic in context, in this chapter the researcher discusses theoretical positioning on the basic nature of institutional culture, types of institutional cultures, strong and weak institutional cultures, military culture and military leadership. Finally, the researcher draws a conclusion on the basis of the above topics.

#### **4.2 THEORETICAL POSITIONING: THE NATURE OF INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE**

Every institution has a unique culture, different from all other organisations. However, the nature of institutional culture needs to be understood before any attempt can be made to deal with issues of changing and managing culture. In trying to untangle the complex nature of institutional culture, in this section the researcher endeavours to define culture in its institutional context, discusses the characteristics of institutional culture, and defines types of institutional culture.

##### **4.2.1 Defining institutional culture**

In order to understand institutional culture as a concept, it is imperative first to define what culture is. Meyer and Botha (2000:112) assert that culture represents the relatively enduring set of values that underlie a social system. Secondly, Cooper (1995:57) defines culture as that which characterises an established social group and denotes a moral framework and shared language, carrying key values, beliefs and assumptions that guide behaviour.

In addition, Meyer and Botha (2000:112), and Nel, Werner, Haasbroek, Poisat, Sono and Schultz (2008:17) share the view that culture represents what is metaphorically called the self-image or personality of the institution. This serves as the distinguishing features of an institution. This means, therefore, that to change the manner in which things are done, is to tamper with the existing culture of the organisation.

Furthermore, according to Meyer and Botha (2000:112), underlying values and norms are a “meaning system”. This meaning system allows members of the organisation to attribute meaning and value to the external and internal events that they experience. In addition, Cameron (2004:3) contends that culture is a socially constructed attribute of institutions, which serves as the “social glue” which binds an institution.

In concert with this view, Stippler, Moore, Rosenthal and Doerffer (2011:88) aver that culture is the set of learned beliefs, values, symbols, rules, traditions and behaviours of a group of people.

Common to these definitions is the notion of values and norms that are embraced by society. These values and norms are then regarded as the guiding principles for observable and actual behaviour. The practical behaviour is measured against the accepted norms and values over a long period until it is the accepted way of doing things. What is now defined as culture can be categorised into different levels, which the researcher discusses in the next section.

#### **4.2.2 Levels of culture**

Scheel and Crous (2007:29) note three levels of culture. In congruence with these views, Stippler *et al.* (2011:78) similarly suggest that culture is composed of levels such as artefacts and climate, espoused values and perceived ‘culture’ as well as tacit basic assumptions that are taken for granted. However, Phillips and Gully (2012:482–483) add norms in looking at values, and further differentiate between espoused and enacted values.

#### **4.2.2.1 Artefacts**

Refer to the physical and social environment of the institution (Scheel & Crous, 2007:29). Artefacts are visible symbols of culture such as, in the military, the uniform, the habit of saluting, language usage and so on (Richardson, 2011:59–61).

Artefacts also include physical space and layout, technological output, written and spoken language and the overt behaviour of members of the organisation (Mullins, 2008:465). Artefacts are the most visible aspect of culture and as such can be experienced best through dialogue and observation (Linstead *et al.* 2009:157). The definition by Phillips and Gully (2012:482) is congruent with the above explications, namely that artefacts are physical manifestations of the culture. These artefacts also include the myths and stories told about the organisation, awards, ceremonies and rituals, decorations, office space allocation, the dress code, how people address each other, among others (Phillips and Gully, 2012:482).

#### **4.2.2.2 Values**

Are those principles that are valued by employees (Scheel & Crous, 2007:29). To expand on the definition of culture, McKee (2010:458) defines culture as ideas that a person or a group believes to be right, wrong or bad, attractive or undesirable. Values are not visible, but members of a society or the organisation are made aware of these values (Linstead *et al.*, 2009:157). Phillips and Gully (2012:482–483), add norms when looking at values and further identified that values are subdivided into two parts: espoused and enacted values. Espoused values are said to be explicitly stated and articulated by an institution and guide institutional members on what ought to be (Richardson, 2011:59–60). Enacted values, on the other hand, are said to be exhibited by employees based on what they observe as opposed to what is actually happening in an institution (Phillips & Gully, 2012:482–483).

#### 4.2.2.3 Basic Assumptions

Are the underlying cognitive structures that determine how group members perceive, think and feel (Scheel & Crous, 2007:29). Such assumptions are taken for granted, and are not visible, preconscious and easily accessible (Linstead *et al.*, 2009:157). In addition, Richardson (2011:59–60), in propounding a similar view, avers that basic assumptions evolve from a continuous application of a problem solution that has been used before and have been successfully applied and unconsciously become the taken-for-granted solution for similar problems. However, Phillips and Gully (2012:482–483) opine that assumptions become so taken for granted that they become the core of the culture of the institution and may become highly resistant to change.

However, in looking at the cultures in different institutions, there are common characteristics that permeate all. In the next section, the researcher discusses such components.

#### 4.2.3 Surface components of institutional culture

Within the levels of culture, there are certain observable components that characterise a particular culture. Schermerhorn (2004:132) identifies the following components of institutional culture as observable culture, which helps employees share and reinforce the uniqueness or own 'personality' of an institution.

- **Ceremonies** are special events in which institution employees celebrate the myths, heroes and symbols of their institution (Schermerhorn, 2004:132; Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2010:284).
- **Rites and rituals** are the ceremonial activities and meetings, planned or spontaneous, meant to communicate specific ideas or accomplish particular purposes. These may be meant to celebrate important occasions and activities that were achieved by the institution in the past. To reinforce cultural norms and values these may be repeated over time (Schermerhorn, 2004:132; Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2010:284).

- **Stories** represent oral histories and tales of past events that illustrate and transmit deeper cultural norms and values. These are told repeatedly among employees of an institution about good and bad incidents in the life of the institution (Schermerhorn, 2004:132; Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2010:284).
- **Myths** are fictional stories that help explain activities or events that might otherwise be puzzling to the employees of an institution and beyond (Schermerhorn, 2004:132; Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2010:284). In addition, Peters and Waterman (1982:83), aver that myths have certain characteristics:
  - they have an imperative feature, and they are composed of expressions which are defined by intent rather than by content;
  - they reflect an innocent vision, natural reality and ignore the complexity of the encountered situations;
  - myths are both tradition and an ending, and are not far from arbitrary or false;
  - the relationship between 'consumers' and myths is settled in real terms; and
  - myths turn historical personalities in archetypes and make permanent use of tautological formulas.
- **Heroes** are successful people singled out for special attention and they embody the values and character of the institution and its culture. Their accomplishments are recognised with praise and admiration among employees of the institution. These heroes may include founders and role models (Schermerhorn, 2004:132; Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2010:284).
- **Symbols** offer common meanings or understandings. Cultural symbols could be objects, actions or events used to communicate important themes of institutional life or they might serve as instruments for delivering a message with specific significance within the institution. Philosophies and values, ideals, beliefs and shared expectations are transmitted through cultural symbols (Schermerhorn, 2004:132). The special use of language

and non-verbal expressions help employees of the institution to exchange complex ideas and emotional messages (Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2010:284).

- **Language** is a collection of verbal symbols that often reflect the particular culture of the institution. There is always common, understandable and agreed-upon meaning of the verbal symbols by the employees of an institution (Schermerhorn, 2004:132; Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2010:284).

Although the list of common characteristics is not exhaustive, the above characteristics may appear common, but the content of each characteristic differs from institution to institution. The different contents could also result in different types of institutional culture meant to give a particular 'personality'. In the next section, such types of institutional cultures are discussed.

### **4.3 TYPES OF ORGANISATIONAL CULTURES**

There are a number of ways in which to classify different types of institutional cultures. Developing from the original ideas of Handy (1978:37), four main types of institutional cultures, namely power culture, role culture, task culture and person culture can be identified.

#### **4.3.1 Power culture**

Power culture depends on a central power source, with rays of influence from the central figure throughout the institution (Mullins, 2008:465). In this type of culture, decisions are reached swiftly. Control is exercised from the centre by a selection of key individuals. There are few rules, procedures and bureaucracy (Riley, 2012:1).

However, when it comes to rewards and sanctions in this cultural type, there is a strong bias towards power figures (Linstead *et al.*, 2009:165). Employees who show support towards power figures are rewarded. In addition, mistakes and misdemeanours are punished if they threaten power figures. However, in this cultural type of culture, power figures are immune from punishment if they happen to break the rules and regulations (Linstead *et al.*, 2009:165).

### **4.3.2 Role culture**

Role culture is sometimes viewed as a bureaucracy and is known to work by logic and rationality (Mullins, 2008:465). Role culture rests on the strength of strong institutional 'pillars': the functions of specialists, for example in a military context, infantry, armour and artillery (Mullins, 2008:465). The work of and interaction between the pillars is controlled by procedures and rules, and coordinated by a small band of commanders (Riley, 2012:1). Role culture is characterised by the fact that rewards are given, among others, for high task performance and project leadership. Secondly, focus is on low task performances or differences of expert opinions. Thirdly, rejection from the elite group or cancellation of a project is possible. Fourthly, problem solving is achieved through technical expertise. Finally, senior management in this role culture can be challenged on technical grounds (Linstead *et al.*, 2009:165; Riley, 2012:1).

In a role culture, incentives are offered for adhering to existing rules, regulations and procedures (Linstead *et al.*, 2009:165). However, punishment is meted out for working outside role requirements or breaking rules, procedures or communication patterns. Behaviour in keeping with defined authority, relationships, rules, procedures or communication patterns is encouraged (Riley, 2012:1). This type of culture is dominant in military institutions, albeit not the only cultural type.

### **4.3.3 Task culture**

Task culture is job-oriented or project-oriented. In terms of structure, task culture can be likened to a net, some strands of which are stronger than others, and with much of the power and influence at the interstices (Mullins, 2008:465). Task culture seeks to bring together the right resources and people, and utilises the unifying power of the group (Mullins, 2008:465). Influence is widely spread and is based on expert power, rather than on position or personal power (Riley, 2012:1).



#### **4.3.4 Person culture**

Person culture refers to situations where the individual is the central focus and any structure exists to serve the individuals within it (Mullins, 2008:465). When a group of people decide that it is in their own interests to band together to carry out their specialisation and share office space, equipment or clerical assistance, then the resulting institution would have a person culture (Mullins, 2008:465). Examples are groups of air force pilots, anti-air defence specialists and military planners. Management hierarchies and control mechanisms are possible only by mutual consent. Individuals have almost complete autonomy and any influence over them is likely to be on the basis of personal power (Mullins, 2008:465). However, Linstead *et al.* (2009:165) aver that person culture within a group is enhanced by acceptance by peers, and any deviation from group norms is threatened with expulsion from the group.

In summary, most large institutions are likely to be something of a mixture of different types of cultures, with some examples of each of the four types in different areas of the institution. This means, therefore, that types of institutional cultures cannot by themselves or in isolation from other types of cultures, be utilised to assess an institution as applying a particular type of culture. Finally, it needs to be noted that different people enjoy working under different types of institutional cultures, and these people are more likely to be happy and satisfied at work if their attributes and personalities are consistent with the culture of that part of the institution.

#### **4.4 INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE: STRONG AND WEAK**

The above explications on certain types of organisational cultures supply a basis for comparison of strong and weak cultures. The culture of an institution is considered strong where the majority of the employees share the same types of beliefs and values with regard to the institution where they are working (Shahzad, Luqman, Khan & Shabir, 2012:977). This means, therefore, that most employees of an institution are fully aligned, and that they believe in and accept the dominant core values of the institution. In concert with this definition, McKee (2010:469)

avers that in a strong culture, central values and norms are shared and strongly upheld by most employees of the institution. Sharing this, Robbins and Judge (2013:548) assert that in a strong culture, the core values of the institution are both intensely held and widely shared. Also congruent with this definition, Riley (201:21) avers that a strong culture is one which is deeply embedded into the ways a business or institution does things.

A strong culture has the benefit of creating an internal climate of high behavioural control and further builds cohesiveness, loyalty of members and institutional commitment (Stephen, 2005:216–217). Furthermore, Robbins and Judge (2013:548), in support of this view, argue that the more employees accept the core values and the greater their commitment, the stronger the culture and the greater its influence on employees' behaviour, because the high degree of 'sharedness' and intensity creates a climate of high behavioural control. This strong culture, according to McKee (2010:469), empowers employees to perform at a high level because they are committed and self-confident. Another benefit of a strong culture is that it reduces employee turnover, because a strong culture demonstrates high agreement about what the institution represents (Robbins & Judge, 2013:549).

Conversely, a weak culture exists when there is little alignment between the employees of the institution and the institutional values and the culture of the institution (Addis, 2012:1). In addition, in a weak culture, the core values of the organisation are not widely held or intensely felt (Stephen, 2005:216–217). Further clarity on this definition comes from McKee (2010:471), who says a weak culture is one where the values and norms are shared by a limited number of people. Furthermore, a weak culture has little influence on employees' behaviour and the institution needs more detailed policies and regulations to guide the behaviour of members (Addis, 2012:1).

Leaders in an organisation, more especially at a senior level, need to bear in mind the importance of the culture in their institutions. The analysis and management of the culture in institutions is the duty of the leaders in institutions.

The above explications on institutional culture give a broad understanding that can now be used as a framework to discuss further what military culture is. In the next section, military culture is discussed within the context of institutional culture.

## **4.5 MILITARY CULTURE**

Every nation or society has its own culture, which in turn is composed of sub-cultures. The constitution of a particular country, for example, is an embodiment of what the culture of that society should be. The military culture as a sub-culture of society, and therefore it has to reflect and function within the context of the culture of the particular society. The military, as a component of society, refers to its own culture 'the military culture'. Therefore, military culture should be seen to be functioning within the context of the culture of the broader society, in which the military finds itself. It is important to give an etymology with regard to the military, comprising of a definition of the elements of military culture and finally military leadership.

### **4.5.1 Etymology regarding the military**

The military cannot exist without the most important component called the soldier. But what is a soldier? Historically, a soldier was a warrior whose justification for existence was based on the family's need at the given time to protect the territory and possessions physically (Dunivin, 1997:2). This physical protection was against the greedy and envious neighbouring communities or societies. They were what today are still known as 'infantrymen' (Dunivin, 1997:2). They used rudimentary weapons, such as clubs, spears and daggers, javelins, slings and short bows (Dunivin, 1997:2). Similar to what the modern armies call 'reserves', such armies were not full-time soldiers. However, they were called together when the need to engage in battles in defence of their belongings arose (Dunivin, 1997:2). Above all, soldiering was viewed, in the main, as a masculine function because combat has generally been defined as a male domain (Keegan 1986:11). This perception is still dominant in the military. Hence, there is a need to transform and to allow women to be recruited into combat roles.

Based on the above explications, the core business or activity of the military (that is, its reason for existence) is combat, and soldiers as the HR component of the military, are crucial to conduct combat on behalf of their own countries. In addition, in order for the military to function well, it must rely on a carefully structured hierarchy of leadership. In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of the definition of the term 'military culture'.

#### **4.5.2 Military culture defined**

The military as an institution is one of the oldest and traditionally most prominent examples of a formal institution that has attracted considerable attention from social research scientists (Heng, 2013:6). In an attempt to define the term military, Hull (2005:97) asserts that militaries, as institutions, develop cultures in somewhat more specific ways than do cultures at large. Military institutions, according to Keegan (1986:43–49), are particularly rich in symbolic expressions of institutional culture, and Keegan points out that such expressions manifest themselves in military uniform, drill, military training, customs, military courtesy, hand salute and traditions. Hull (2005:93) defines military culture as a way of understanding why an army acts as it does in war. This perspective focuses on practices during war. By practice, Hull refers to the actions that result consciously from applied doctrine and training. Furthermore, Hall (2012:137) avers that military culture is a “symbolic toolkit” of rituals, ceremonies, assumptions and beliefs that grow out of and guide a military force. However, Murray (1999:27) avers that the military represents the ethos and professional attributes, both in terms of experience and intellectual study, that contribute to a common core of understanding of the nature of war within military institutions.

This explanation is confined to a narrow sense of the military in that it only focuses on the officer corps. It does not take into consideration the role of the rest of the soldiers in exhibiting the common culture of the military institution.

According to Hull (2005:97), military institutions produce a strong institutional culture because they:

- are led by long-serving professionals (officers);

- aspire to be total institutions that control their charges around the clock, even off duty;
- devote tremendous resources to training and indoctrination;
- consciously inculcate values (of strict obedience, indifference to danger, use of violence, for example) at odds with those of the surrounding society; and
- attempt extreme regulation via printed rules, and so forth.

In striving for a strong military culture, military institutions have to make sure that in their strategic planning, the qualities listed above are planned for and executed to yield a strong military culture as a result. The qualities listed above can be universal in strong cultures. Values, traditions and philosophical underpinnings can be seen to be the dominating factors in military cultures, but the contents differ from country to country.

In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of the elements of a military culture.

#### **4.5.3 Elements of military culture**

The most formative aspect of a military culture is clearly the general task of exercising violence on a mass, systematic scale to satisfy the national interests (Hull, 2005:98). This is the reason for the existence of a military institution in society. Analysing and discussing what the elements of culture are, will help to clarify further what is meant by culture in a military institution.

As identified by Collins, Ulmer and Jacobs (2000:8), and Heng (2013:6), military culture is composed of four elements, namely discipline, professional ethos, ceremony and etiquette, and cohesion and *esprit de corps*. These elements are discussed below.

- **Discipline**, in the military sense, relates to the extent of compliance with rules, the acceptance of orders and authority, and the way the institution deals with disobedience through overt punishment (Australian Defence Force, 2007:2–4). In support of this view, Arvey and Jones (1985:370–371)

contend that discipline operates as a direct behavioural control mechanism. In addition, Hall (2012:138–139) argues that discipline is an essential element meant to alleviate confusion and disintegrative consequences during battle by imposing order. This view is enhanced by ritualisation in the form of repetitive drills and “provides rules on and when military personnel can violate the usual social prohibition on killing and violence” (Asch & Hosek, 2004:10). During battles, discipline, among other factors, determines success. It is the quality that enables military units to operate under extreme combat situations. According to Dorn *et al.* (2000:8), discipline emanates from unit cohesion and the examples set by inspiring military leaders. Furthermore, Hall (2012:138–139) asserts that discipline is the orderly conduct of military personnel perfected through repetitive drill that makes the desired action a matter of habit. The military in effecting its time-honoured approach, uses discipline techniques to ensure that its forces survive during military operations (Australian Defence Force, 2007:2–4).

- **Professional ethos** centres on the imperative of combat. It is characterised by the willingness to engage an armed opposing force, to sacrifice yourself, and to display physical and moral courage, and discipline (Dorn *et al.*, 2000:8). Supporting this view, Hall (2012:138) defines military ethos as “a corporate identity based on expert knowledge of and control over means of violence with a commitment that presumes personal willingness to kill and accepts the risk of being killed.” This, according to Asch and Hosek (2004:10), defines the code of conduct for soldiers. A code of conduct helps to guide soldiers in their behaviour, be it internally, or towards the members of society, and further instils patriotism (Asch & Hosek (2004:10).
- **Ceremony and etiquette** refers to salutes, uniforms, ribbons and medals, which are meant to acknowledge lawful authority or control, or to mask anxiety, affirm solidarity, and celebrate the unit or the individual (Collins,

Ulmer & Jacobs, 2000:8). Ceremonies are seen to be catalysts for forging a common identity among soldiers, and when performed in public, ceremonies have a positive influence in strengthening the essential bond between the armed forces and civilian society (Collins, Ulmer & Jacobs, 2000:8). Sharing this view, Hall (2012:138) argues that the most important purpose of military ceremonies is to “connect the burdens of military service with larger society ... and to convey the full meaning of military service to show how central military service is to the life and well-being of the country”.

- ***Cohesion and esprit de corps*** can be defined separately as follows:

Cohesion is the shared sense of sacrifice and identity that glues members of the military together with their fellow men and women in arms (Collins, Ulmer & Jacobs 2000:8). On the other hand, ‘military cohesion’ refers to the feeling of identity and comradeship that soldiers hold for their colleagues in the same immediate unit (Collins, Ulmer & Jacobs, 2000:8), while *esprit de corps* refers to the commitment and pride soldiers take in the larger military establishment to which their immediate unit belongs (Hall, 2012:139). Both cohesion and *esprit de corps* address the issue of unit morale and willingness of members of the unit to execute the unit’s given mission (Asch & Hosek, 2004:10). Cohesion and *esprit de corps* are the results of patriotism and ideological commitments to the state (Collins, Ulmer & Jacobs, 2000:8).

Adding to the differences between military and civilian institutions, Caforio, (2006:240–246) identifies three specific aspects that characterise the military.

- **The ‘communal’ character of life in uniform** relates to the degree to which the control of the institution extends to various aspects and stages of personal life, much more than in an ordinary institution.
- **A hierarchical structure**, which may even lead to a certain authoritarian leadership approach.
- **A chain of command**, postulating a downward flow of directives. This chain of command simply aims at the execution of orders, hence introducing command and control.

The difference between military culture and institutional culture in general is further argued by Goodale, Abb and Moyer (2012:15–19) to be that:

- the demands of military life create a unique set of pressures on soldiers and their families;
- military life offers a sense of community and camaraderie with defined rules and expectations;
- soldiers and their families share a unique bond, professional ethic, ethos, and value system;
- military culture fosters a warrior ethos that rewards physical and emotional prowess;
- the military defends the constitution;
- military leaders at all levels are given widespread authority over their soldiers' personal affairs and are held personally responsible to resolve any issues that have the potential to affect the performance of their duties; and
- military families endure many of the same restrictions as their military partners.

These explications of the elements of military culture are clear evidence of the uniqueness of a military culture, compared to other institutional cultures. Although the elements, discipline, professional ethos, ceremony and etiquette, cohesion and *esprit de corps* can be used to analyse culture in other institutions, it is worth noting the context within which they are used. However, the difference between a military culture and an institutional culture in general lies in the clear distinguishing features, which are deliberately perpetuated to preserve military culture. These elements and characteristics should be in agreement with the notion of military leadership, and military leadership styles applied in the context of a particular situation.

#### **4.6 SUMMARY**

In this chapter, theoretical positioning of the basic nature of institutional culture, types of institutional cultures, strong and weak institutional cultures, and military



culture were discussed. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn on the basis of the above discussions.

In discussing the nature of institutional cultures, various definitions of 'culture' were provided. It was found that values and norms are regarded as the cornerstones for observable and actual behaviour in institutions. The practical behaviour of members of an institution is therefore measured against the acceptable norms and values of that particular institution. In addition, culture is found to be composed of four levels, which help to identify and analyse the culture of an institution. Furthermore, such levels of culture can also show the intensity or the strength of each level in an institution.

However, in looking at the cultures in different institutions, there are common characteristics that permeate all, but the content of each characteristic differs from institution to institution. The different contents can also result in different types of institutional culture meant to give a unique 'personality' to the institution.

Also in this chapter, different types of culture, such as power, role, task and person culture were discussed. Interesting to note is that most institutions are likely to be something of a mixture of different types of culture with some examples given for each of the four types in different areas of the institution. This means, therefore, that types of institutional culture cannot be singled out or stand in isolation from other types of cultures.

In addition, military culture was discussed, and found to be unique from the cultures of other institutions. To expound on this, military culture is seen to be universal internationally, and what makes the difference between countries is the societal culture of that particular country. In most countries, such societal culture is enshrined in the constitution of the country. This means, therefore, that values, traditions and philosophical underpinnings can be seen to be the dominating factors in military cultures, but the contents is specific to the country.

Also noted was the fact that elements of military culture show the uniqueness of military culture in terms of other institutional cultures. The elements, such as discipline, professional ethos, ceremony and etiquette, and cohesion and *esprit de*

*corps*, can be used to analyse culture in institutions within the context where such institutions are operating. Furthermore, the characteristics, such as the communal character of life in uniform, the hierarchical structure and the chain of command, are unique to the military and can be used in tandem with the elements of culture to analyse culture in military institutions.

In the next chapter, the researcher gives a historical perspective on the evolution of the South African military culture.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY CULTURE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 4, the theoretical positioning of the nature of institutional culture, types of institutional culture, strong and weak institutional cultures and military culture were discussed.

In this chapter, the researcher gives a historical perspective of the evolution of the South African military culture. In doing so, the researcher gives a summary of:

- the South African military prior to 1912;
- the formation of the Union Defence Force (UDF) and the political context;
- a historical overview of the UDF (1912–1947);
- the South African Defence Force (SADF) during the period 1948 until 1994; and
- the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) from 1994 until 2014, including:
  - the political prelude to the 1994 military integration;
  - the integration of armed forces and their military cultures; and
  - a discussion of the military culture from 1994 to 2014.

To be able to analyse the current manifestation of the military culture prevailing in the SANDF, it is imperative to examine the evolution of the South African military. To unravel the complex evolution of the military culture in South Africa between 1910 and 2014, it is necessary to look at three important epoch-making events in the history of the armed forces in South Africa. The first of these events took place in 1912, when the colonial forces of the four colonies comprising South Africa came together to form the Union Defence Force (UDF) of the new Union of South Africa, which was created in 1910.

The second event followed the 1948 election, which heralded the accession to power of the National Party (NP) and the transformation of UDF into the South

African Defence Force (SADF). The third event followed the first, broad-based, democratic elections in 1994, which led to the formation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) (Vreÿ, Esterhuyse & Mandrup, 2013:181–182). Thus, the crux of this chapter is to reflect the evolution of military culture in South Africa during the different historical periods under different statutory governments.

In this study, the analysis of the military cultures of the statutory forces after the integration of the forces was done to look at the influence that the government in power has on shaping the military culture.

## **5.2 A COMPENDIUM OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY PRIOR TO 1912**

A variety of military institutions of varying sizes, capabilities and traditions and military cultures existed within the borders of what is now known as Republic of South Africa (Williams, 2000:1).

In this section, the researcher endeavours to give a synopsis of the experiences of wars, albeit not exhaustively, of land dispossession by European settlers and of resistance by indigenous African people.

### **5.2.1 The Portuguese and Dutch against the Khoikhoi and San**

The first chapter in the chronicles of the military history of South Africa was the encounter in 1510 between Dom Francisco d'Almeida and his men, and the Khoina clan of the Cape (Steenkamp, 2012:1-2). D'Almeida from Portugal landed with about 150 men who were well armed with swords, lances and crossbows (Steenkamp, 2012:3). The local clan, the Khoina, had no real weapons except fire-hardened spears and poisoned arrows. The Portuguese were defeated by the Khoina and D'Almeida himself was killed, as well as more than 50 of his men. Lessons learnt out of this clash have drawn the interest of military historians (Steenkamp, 2012:1–4).

Subsequent to this clash there were wars of resistance that were fought by the Khoikhoi against the Dutch during 1657 and 1673, and an ongoing ten-year guerrilla campaign led by Chief Gonnema before he was finally driven into the mountains (Williams, 2006:10). In addition, the San also offered fierce resistance

from the 1770s on the north-eastern frontier of the Cape Colony when the Trekboers encroached on their land (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:73). The battles of 1770 to 1810 between burghers and the San were merciless (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:73). However, all those wars ended, ultimately, in the defeat of the Khoikhoi and the San people (Williams, 2006:10).

### **5.2.2 The Boers and British Settlers against the amaXhosa**

The period between 1799 and 1836 was characterised by the three so-called frontier wars between the amaXhosa and the frontier Boers, followed by the Fourth War (1811–1812), the Fifth War (1819–1820). The Sixth War took place from 1834 to 1835 and was known to the amaXhosa as Maqoma's War or the War of Hintsá (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:81). On the amaXhosa side, this war was led by Chief Maqoma and Chief Tyhali who were angry about the loss of their land and the ongoing raids conducted against them by the colonial forces (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:81). The Seventh War followed in 1846 and ended in 1847, while the Eighth War raged from 1850–1851 (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:81). The so-called Eighth Frontier War or the War of Mlanjeni broke out in December 1850 (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:81). Common to all these wars of resistance by amaXhosa chiefs was discontent concerning their land losses. Chief Maqoma (1798–1873) was a renowned military leader of the nineteenth century frontier wars (Stapleton, 1994:9). His guerrilla campaign in the mountains, forests and the valleys of the Waterkloof were successful and through his ingenuity, he managed to outmanoeuvre and destroy the British forces (Stapleton, 1994:10). Regarded as intelligent and brave, Chief Maqoma, the Rharhabe chief was a capable guerrilla leader who is still regarded as the greatest fighting general ever produced by the amaXhosa. He was banished to Robben Island in 1857 and died there in 1873 (Uys, 1992:146).

Concomitant with these wars of resistance against the Boers and British was the movement of many Dutch Boers further inland to areas to the northwest and northeast of the Cape areas in 1835. This was due to Dutch Boers being indignant about the possibility of being swallowed up by the British community as second-

class citizens. These Dutch Boers (later known as Afrikaners or Voortrekkers) conquered the land of the indigenous blacks and established autonomous Boer Republics (Jamison, 2004:76).

### **5.2.3 The Boers and British Settlers against Zulus**

The first military encounter between the British and the amaZulu was in 1879 when Cetshwayo kaMpande (1826–1884) was king of the Zulu kingdom (1872 to 1879). The British gave Cetshwayo an unreasonably short ultimatum to relinquish power and to dissolve his army (Guy, 1975:130). This he resisted vehemently. This was a sequel to the War of Isandlwana in 1879, which was the first major encounter in the Anglo–Zulu War between the British Empire and the Zulu kingdom (Guy 1975:132). The battle was a crushing victory for the Zulus and a humiliating defeat of the British in their invasion of kwaZulu territory. The defeat was humiliating in the sense that the British Army was technologically superior to the indigenous Zulu force, but still lost (Hasting, 2014:1). Another encounter between the British and the amaZulu was the Bambatha Rebellion, which was a Zulu revolt against British colonisation and the introduction of taxation in Natal, South Africa, in 1906 (Thompson, 2004:43). The revolt was led by Bambatha who was killed and beheaded during the battle (Hasting, 2014:1).

This means that the defeat of the Khoikhoi, San, amaXhosa, Zulus and the rest of the South African indigenous people by the British meant that all these groups were landless and that they had to endure subjugation to the British rule for years. This started a new chapter in African military history in that the foreign militaries dominated in the conquered territories and the indigenous militaries were destroyed.

Furthermore, the wars of resistance fought prior to 1912 were planned and executed meticulously by all who were involved, be they Khoikhoi, San, amaXhosa, Zulus, amaNdebele and other African leaders in defence of their land and the Boers and British forces on the other side. The experience and strategic planning capability of the African groups were recorded less in the military history of South Africa and as a result much of the experience and military strategies

have been lost. During the integration of forces for the creation of the UDF the wealth of experience of the black commanders was ignored because they were not integrated into the UDF. The defeated and subjugated black military commanders and leaders were never part of the integration process of the armed forces.

In the next subsection, the researcher provides a synopsis of the war between the British and the Boers.

#### **5.2.4 Anglo-Boer War: 1899–1902**

According to Giliomee and Mbenga (2008:206–223), the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, was provoked by British imperial aggression and its expansionist policies, which were coupled with heavy taxation on the Boers without the Boers enjoying political rights. This Boer War was an anti-colonial struggle based on the need of the Boer Republics for independence to govern themselves as modern states and legal sovereign entities and to manage their political affairs according to their own constitutional and political requirements (Williams, 2006:6). Significant about this war was that it marked the end of an arduous and protracted process of British conquest of South African societies, both black and white (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:206–223).

In the next section, the researcher reflects on the different governments and their relationships with the UDF, SADF and SANDF. Particular focus is on the influence of the government on shaping the military culture.

### **5.3 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY: 1912–2014**

The universal goal of colonialism, as practised by the European colonisers in Africa, was to extract economic benefits for their own countries. The British, among others, wanted to exploit resources and create an environment that would be conducive to achieving profitability for its own settler communities (Fenwick, 2009:2). Furthermore, the British imposed direct or indirect rule, limiting rights of the African peoples, and established a complementary economy based on

exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods. Concomitant with this was the introduction of the European culture and enforced teaching of their own history (Fenwick, 2009:3–4).

To understand the influence of British traditions in the military system one needs to understand the British cultural dominance in South Africa. English economic dominance led to British cultural dominance among the white, coloured and African elite (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:190). In 1865, the government of the Cape Colony decided that all future instruction in government schools had to be given in English (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:190). The few top schools attended by children of the white elite became bastions of the British cultural influence (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:190). Almost all education for coloureds and blacks were in the hands of churches and missionary stations. In amaXhosa areas, there were several mission stations spreading British culture, the gospel of work and individual respectability (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:190–191). By 1887, more than 2 000 blacks had received a missionary education in Lovedale alone (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:190–191). Furthermore, colonisation of South Africa since 1652 was effected through a litany of bloody and violent military actions (Fokkens, 2006:iii). It was the Boer commandos and the British regiments and volunteer regiments that were directly involved in wars of dispossession of land of the indigenous black population (Fokkens, 2006:iii).

In the next section, the researcher reports on the establishment of the UDF in 1912 and its relationship with the Union Government.

### **5.3.1 Union Defence Force: 1912–1947**

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Britain had the ambition to dominate southern and central Africa (Ashton, 2008:13). Such British supremacy in South Africa entailed merging the four provinces into one united or federated state, which would be more advantageous to Britain and white South Africans in case of war, than four separately governed colonies. This idea was exacerbated by race relations after 1905, which made many whites in South Africa support the unification of four colonies into one (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:229). As a



consequence, the South African Act was passed and endorsed by the British parliament on 20 September 1909 with the intention to merge the four colonies of the Cape, Natal, Orange River colony and Transvaal into the Union of South Africa, a dominion within the British Commonwealth (Alvarez-Rivera, 2014:1). Finally, the South African Act, a piece of foreign legislation, created an artificial macro-state in Southern Africa, called the Union of South Africa. The Union of South Africa came into being on 31 May 1910 with the political union of the four colonies (Ashton, 2008:13).

This South African Act cobbled together an artificial mega-state structure, which brought diverse peoples together (Southall, 2014:2). This guaranteed the triumph of British capital and granted sovereignty to the white minority at the expense of indigenous black majority (Southall, 2014:2). However, the exclusion of most blacks from political arrangements, such as franchise rights, raised the mass-based urban resistance to racial segregation (Williams, 2006:7). Blacks felt bitter and betrayed by their exclusion from their political rights and formed the African Native National Congress (ANNC), the forerunner of the African National Congress (ANC) (Gillings, 2008:1). Furthermore, the Union of South Africa had a constitution just like any statutory government. However, this constitution had distinct features in that it did not have a Bill of Rights, probably due to the following factors as identified by Nthai (1998:148):

- the constitutional process was influenced by the British constitutional system; and
- the main role-players, such as Smuts and Merriman, were in favour of the British system, which was based on the sovereignty of Parliament.

A further development was the establishment of a powerful South African Defence Force, which was necessitated by the Bhambhatha Rebellion of 1906. This rebellion was seen as the largest and most violent manifestation of racial conflict since the Anglo–Zulu War of 1879 (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:229). Finally, the UDF was created in 1912, sanctioned by the Defence Act of 1912, following the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 (Stott, 2002:4). The

philosophical basis of the Defence Act of 1912 hinged on the principle of personal service, that is, the defence of the Union was the responsibility of every individual citizen (Stott, 2002:4). However, it is ironical that the Act in its provision pronounced that every male European citizen between the ages of 16 and 17 years was required to undergo military training, and persons of non-European origin were not liable to render personal military service (Dorning, 1987:2). This was a clear exclusion of the indigenous people of South Africa. Their wealth of experience amassed in fighting wars of resistance was ignored.

Of interest was also the fact that the UDF was built on a different military tradition. The white soldiers who were integrated into the UDF were divided along English and Afrikaner military traditions and as such were recognised and catered for in the integrated UDF. An example of this was that whilst part of the same army, the majority of Afrikaans-speaking soldiers from the *platteland* (the countryside) were only allowed to serve in mounted units, and the English-speaking town dwellers in the infantry (Mills & Wood, 1993:1). The appointment of the high command of the UDF was a conundrum that even resulted in the whole force being placed under a divided command to protect sectarian interests (Van der Waag, 2008:187). The two most important positions were filled by Brigadier-General HT Lukin, the former commander of the Cape Colonial Forces, and the republican former Boer general, CF Beyers. These two men were then expected to create an atmosphere in the UDF that was congenial to both English- and Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans. Many high-ranking officers provided institutionally for their clients and political followers. For example, General Beyers purged the volunteer regiments of the Citizen Force of their more 'British' officers. As a consequence, the establishment of these institutional fiefdoms and biases stifled institutional development and denied the UDF an opportunity to employ officers with the appropriate military training and education (Van der Waag, 2008:187).

Furthermore, the first leadership of the UDF was composed of South Africans who enjoyed a multi-layered identity, with transnational linkages. This leadership was a mixture of British and South African generals. A number of colonial-born South Africans attained general or flag rank in the British armed forces, and served as

general officers of the British Armed Forces (Dix-Peek, 2007:1). Some of the officers attended courses in Britain between the two world wars (Van der Waag, 2008:189). It is not surprising, therefore, that this cross-pollination had a profound influence on the military culture of the UDF. That is, the military procedures and even training and doctrine were influenced by the British (Van der Waag, 2008:189).

Another example is that of the Israelites, who were a religious group that squatted at Ntabelanga in Queenstown, and who created a tabernacle and built some huts without registering themselves and paying taxes (Fokkens, 2006:iii). Using the military and the police, the Smuts government crushed this group, killed 180 people and wounded 100 (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2008:247). Concomitant with these military actions was the suppression by the government of the militant Afrikaner uprisings during the First World War and the Second World War (Fokkens, 2006:iii). Evident in this historical background of the UDF is the fact that the military was used by the government to quell any political dissent against the state, and working class struggles waged against the employers, violently. In addition, the military culture dominant during the existence of the UDF was that of the British. The motivating factors, among others, were that the British were the dominant component in the UDF, they had trained most of the senior officers, and this translated into the new military culture being British.

Furthermore, in terms of the relationship between the military and the government, the military was supposed to be subordinate to civil authority. However, this relationship was to be guarded against abuse by the civil authority. In examining this relationship between the UDF and Union of South African government, it was evident that the UDF was used by the government in the suppression of strikes and uprisings against the Union of South Africa.

In the next section, the researcher focuses on the relationship between the military and the state during the period from 1948 until 1993.

### **5.3.2 South African Defence Force (SADF): 1948–1993**

In 1948, the Afrikaner-based Nationalist Party and its allies came to power as the majority party during the whites-only elections and implemented its racially based policy of separate development (apartheid). In other words, apartheid began as the governmental system after the elections of 1948 (Jamison, 2004:75). The civil service, including the military, underwent cultural change through adoption of Afrikanerisation of government institutions. Concerning the military, transformation took another turn during this new dispensation. The newly appointed Minister of Defence, FC Erasmus, demonstrated from the onset his commitment to transform the military from a British to an Afrikaner military culture. In pursuance of this ideal, he introduced what he called the “national” characteristics of the defence force (Jamison, 2004:75).

The then Minister of Defence introduced a programme of renaming the existing Active Citizen Force (ACF) regiments after Nationalist heroes, which begun in the early 1950s. This was meant to dispose the UDF of their colonial origins and emblematic connections with British regiments. To kick-start this process, in 1951, the 2nd Battalion of the Botha regiment, named after the Union’s first premier, became Regiment Christiaan Beyers (Van der Waag, 2008:190–191). Another example was the re-naming of the Die Middellandse Regiment, after Gideon Scheepers. Die Regiment Gideon Scheepers was in the 1960s renamed by the Minister of Defence, JJ Fouche, as Regiment Groot Karoo (Boulter, 1997:95).

In addition, the spirit of the commando was revived as they were historically viewed as the custodians of traditions and history of Afrikanerdom. In addition, the armed forces now had two tasks identified. The first of these was to prevent internal unrest and, where this arose, to protect people and property. Lastly, the armed forces were to guard against external attacks (Van der Waag, 2008:190–191).

Furthermore, due to difficulties stemming from recruiting, there were insufficient volunteers to swell the ranks of the ACF in the post-war period and this led to the introduction of the ballot system of conscription for young white male South

Africans in 1953. This decision was based on the 1912 Defence Act whose implementation was delayed (Dorning, 1987:16).

At the political level, two years after the Congress of the People in 1955, the Congress Movement organised a general strike on the eve of the parliamentary elections, and the military was placed on alert (Bamber, 2001:1). This was an indication that, if the police failed to suppress resistance, the military was ready to take action against the civil society. Moreover, the new Defence Act was introduced and the UDF was renamed the South African Defence Force (SADF) (Bamber, 2001:1). This is the same Defence Act, albeit amended, that is still in use in the current SANDF.

To sum up, the decade of the 1950s marked a further polarisation of the South African society along racial lines. The segregation policies of the National Party were given meaning by getting the police and the military to enforce and defend these policies. Any dissensions or challenges to these policies were met with brutal force. The decade of the 1950s displayed all the ingredients of a climacteric eruption in South Africa. However, the political situation hardened the attitudes of the black majority and resorting to an armed struggle against the government was seen as the only justified option.

Testimony to the fact that the military was undergoing transformational changes since the mid-1950s and that it was used as the tool to suppress opposition to government is borne out in a statement made by the then Minister of Defence JJ Fouche on 21 March 1960, the day on which 69 Africans were killed by police in the Sharpeville massacre (Fouche, 1960, cited in Cawthra, 1986:12–13):

It is the defence policy of the Union first of all to concentrate its defence organisations upon the implementation of internal security tasks. The task of the Army and the Air Force is to take action for internal security as soon as disturbances have reached a degree where the police are unable to control them. The reorganisation which was started some years ago, has been completed and the changes are starting to take shape. Greater mobility, armoured protection and increased striking power in the form of Saracens have been given to twelve of the infantry units at strategic places.

This statement reflects the role of the military as prescribed by the government in that there was a shift from strategic preparation of forces against foreign aggression to internal security tasks. The desperation shown is that the strategic deployment of the military internally was seen to be the only solution to quell internal unrest.

In addition, in 1960, as the result of a referendum, the government declared South Africa a republic, which meant a complete break from colonial control of the British (Van der Waag, 2008:191). Concomitantly, black consciousness and Pan-Africanism as an ideology grew side by side among the black people, partly in response to the consolidation of Afrikaner political and military power (Van der Waag, 2008:192). This period of the 1960s also witnessed the banning of political parties, such as the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the African National Congress (ANC). This brought about the birth of the military wings of these liberation movements (Stott, 2002:4). The armed military wings of liberation movements using their liberated neighbouring countries as springboards to launch their attacks, fought an interconnected series of wars in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), in the then Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola, and in the northern part of the territory of South West Africa (now Namibia), combined with an armed struggle against South Africa itself (Van der Waag, 2008:191–192). To counter this situation, the South African government provided military support to white colonial governments of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Mozambique and Angola. However, the situation changed after the liberation of these countries. The SADF was forced to find ways to defend the country, and hence members of the SADF were regularly engaged in a number of “low intensity” military deployments, incursions and cross-border raids against MK and frontline states (Stott, 2002:4). For example, during the 1970s and 1980s, the SADF operated extensively in Angola and Namibia where they fought against the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), in support of the Movement for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and against the Armed Forces of Angola (FAPLA), which were supported by Cuban and Soviet Union forces (Le Roux, 2005:243). The counter-insurgency forces were operating internally against the

liberation movement led by the ANC and its armed wing umKhonto weSizwe (MK) (Le Roux, 2005:243).

To sum up, the beginning of the 1960s saw a shift in how the South African government was dealing with its political opponents. The muzzling of political parties that were fighting against the government forced political organisations to find alternative ways of struggle. A turning point was the brutal suppression and killing of protesters. The birth of military wings like the ANC's umKhonto weSizwe and PAC's Azanian People's Liberation Army heightened the military involvement in fighting political opponents. The heavy-handed approach to fighting political opponents was justified by what was perceived by the government as the "total onslaught" pursued by the communist bloc (O'Malley, 1986:1). As a result, a counterstrategy called 'total strategy' was conceived and launched by the South African government.

In the next section, the researcher provides a discussion of total strategy as a counterstrategy to the perceived total onslaught strategy, and the role played by the South African Defence Force.

### **5.3.2.1 Total strategy and the role of the SADF**

As a result of the precarious situation in which South Africa found herself in 1979, a situational analysis was made (Geldenhys, 1981:3). According to the then Minister of Defence P.W. Botha, the Republic of South Africa was a target for international communism and had been singled out as a special target for the by-product of their ideologies which were seen as black radicalism, exaggerated individual freedom, one man one vote, and a host of other slogans employed against the country (Geldenhys, 1981:3).

In 1979, in pursuit of this total strategy, the security agency chiefs of South Africa, such as senior police, defence force and intelligence officers, convened in the Western Cape for the formulation and implementation of a plan, and to decide who would take responsibility for the security of specific geographic areas (O'Malley, 1986:1). The outcome of this conference of security chiefs was the allocation of specific tasks, areas of responsibility defined and a broad outline

given of the tactics to be employed, and the SADF was chosen as the primary vehicle for the destabilisation of those neighbouring countries which were not friendly to apartheid South Africa. Both the South African Police (SAP) and the SADF would be the leading agencies for counter-revolutionary efforts supported by the National Intelligence Service and the Department of Foreign Affairs playing the supporting roles (Sweegers, 1996:163).

In the next section, the researcher discusses the structural arrangements for and roles in the total strategy.

### **5.3.2.2 The State Security Council (SSC) and the National Security Management System (NSMS)**

The 'total strategy' also involved the development of an intricate politico-security infrastructure that was to stretch from the highest echelons of government down to remote rural communities (Ellis, 2000:62). Structurally, at the apex of the total strategy was the State Security Council (SSC) whose role was elevated to that of central policy-making function (Ellis, 2000:62). This SSC, according to Swilling and Phillips (1989:143), was seen as a highly centralised bureaucratic cum military structure authorised to coordinate and oversee the implementation of both security and political policies, and also having responsibility for the strategy formulation. This bureaucracy was structured in what was known as the National Security Management System (NSMS) with a network of Joint Management Centres (JMCs) as its operational arm. The Secretariat of the SSC was composed of members of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the SADF (Sweegers, 1996:166). In other words, the NSMS provided the infrastructure for the implementation of 'total strategy', encompassing both "hard war" methods that are meant for "eliminating revolutionaries" and "maintaining law and order", and a "soft war programme" designed to win black community support through socio-economic upgrading schemes (Swilling & Phillips, 1989:145).

Furthermore, the NSMS and the Inter-departmental Committee on Security were meant to provide the SSC with the necessary national security profile in order to take decisions at both national and local levels (Coleman, 1998:21).



The SSC, therefore, functioned as the national command centre of the NSMS, whose function was to evaluate current intelligence, formulate policy, and direct a nation-wide organisational network dedicated to implementing the total strategy in terms of security measures, while concomitantly endeavouring to “winning the hearts and minds” of the black communities by pseudo socio-economic upgrading (Coleman, 1998:21).

The SADF was also used by the government domestic security arrangements, specifically in the townships (Stott, 2002:15). In addition, the SADF was central in influencing the foreign relations of the country, particularly in neighbouring states, and was increasingly involved in domestic security arrangements, in terms of “traditional” law and order responsibilities, and also in other arenas as diverse as education, labour and health (Stott, 2002:15). In 1985 alone, for example, some 35 500 troops were used in the townships to evict rent defaulters, occupy classrooms, identify the injured seeking treatment in health clinics, break up strikes and murder by “death squads”, as well as making prominent anti-apartheid activists disappear (Stott, 2002:15).

However, Cock (1990:88) avers that the degree to which the SADF and the SAP were linked during this period, in suppressing black resistance, was an important indicator both of the level of violent conflict and the role of the SADF within that conflict.

Subsequently, in November 1989, the new South African government under President De Klerk eventually announced the abolishment of the NSMS and its replacement by the National Coordinating Mechanism, which was under civilian control (Magubane, 2006:91).

Stemming from the above discussions, it would seem that the ushering in of the total strategy gave more freedom of action to the SADF to run the programmes of the apartheid government. The danger of this was that limitations were placed on politicians to say or decide about anything because of fear of the military. Also giving more powers to the military was tantamount to a silent coup by the military

with no accountability to civil authority. This can be summed up to mean that the military around this period lacked professionalism as part of a military culture.

In the following section, the researcher discusses the role of the homeland governments in South Africa during the apartheid era.

### **5.3.3 THE ROLE OF THE TRANSKEI, BOPHUTHATSWANA, CISKEI AND VENDA (TBVC)**

The South African government developed the concept of the independent 'black homelands' which were identified and demarcated as Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC). By 1984, these homelands were granted 'independence', but were not recognised by the international community except by South Africa itself, and were established with the same doctrine as the SADF to police the activities of the homeland (Rupiya, 2005:258). Furthermore, these TBVC defence forces were seen to be nominally independent, albeit effectively under SADF control (Stott, 2002:4). This means, therefore, that they were little more than an extension of the SADF, and were responsible for regime security in their respective homelands (Le Roux, 2005:245).

Common to all these homelands is that they were marred by military coups by their own armies (Williams, 2000:11). For example, in 1987, the Transkei Defence Force (TDF) officers ousted the Stella Sigcau administration and expelled the former Rhodesian officers who dominated the TDF. These events ushered in an intriguing period in the history of the Transkei in the Eastern Cape. The other homelands followed suit, which resulted in two *coups d'état* by both the Ciskei and Venda defence forces against their respective administrations and an abortive coup by the Bophuthatswana Defence Force against the Mangope administration (Williams, 2000:11).

Therefore, the fact that all TBVC defence forces were directly involved in politics and military coups was a cause for concern with respect to the professionalism of the military. The security of people was of little concern. Rather, regime protection was the main reason for the existence of these homeland defence forces. There

was, therefore, no military culture that was distinct from the maternal culture of the SADF.

In the next section the researcher presents a discussion of the emergence of liberation forces and their identity in terms of a military culture.

#### **5.3.4 EMERGENCE OF LIBERATION FORCES: UMKHONTO WESIZWE (MK) AND THE AZANIAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (APLA)**

This section presents the history of the military wing of the ANC, umKhonto weSizwe (MK) and the military wing of the PAC, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA). Various factors influenced the inception of the armed struggle in South Africa. The most significant catalysts for the establishment of the armed struggle were, first, the general failure of the ANC-directed campaigns of the 1950s to persuade the government to pay heed to political aspirations of black people, and secondly, the Sharpeville Massacre on 21 March 1960, which was another testimony to the heavy-handed response of the state to peaceful demonstrations, and lastly, the banning of political opposition (Ellis, 2011:3). This, and the radical nature of the policy of apartheid of the National Party more generally, caused some opponents of the government to wonder whether organised violence may not emerge as a real option within the foreseeable future (Ellis, 2011:4).

In the next subsections the researcher gives a synopsis of MK and APLA.

##### **5.3.4.1 A synoptic overview of the history of umKhonto weSizwe (MK)**

On 16 December 1961, MK was pronounced the armed wing of the ANC. This pronouncement was accompanied by a series of explosions, which rocked all major cities on 16 December 1961 (Williams, 2000:2). The creation of MK represented the creation of a modern guerrilla army with its mission being the pursuit of a guerrilla war against the armed forces of the state in support of the political programme of the ANC (Williams, 2000:2). However, a pamphlet issued

by the command of MK (Legassik, 2002:7; Maharaj, 2008:7) emphasised the objective at the time and openness to negotiate change in the following statement:

We of UmKhonto weSizwe have always sought – as the liberation movement has sought – to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We do so still. We hope – even at this late hour – that our first actions will awaken everyone to a realisation of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy is leading. We hope that we will bring the government and its supporters to their senses before it is too late, so that both the government and its policies can be changed before matters reach the desperate state of civil war.

In addition, the founding manifesto that was published on the same day as the launch of MK on 16 December 1961 echoed its reasons for existence and stated their subordination to the national liberation movement as lead by the ANC (1961:1):

UmKhonto weSizwe will carry on the struggle for freedom and democracy by methods, which are necessary to complement the actions of the established national liberation organizations. Umkhonto weSizwe fully supports the national liberation movement and calls on members, jointly and individually to place themselves under the overall political guidance of the movement.

Furthermore, MK had a military code to guide its members, and this code stated that MK was the army of volunteers drawn from the revolutionary sections of the people. In addition, the code stipulated that by joining MK, combatants were committing themselves to the solemn and noble duty of serving the suffering and dispossessed people in the struggle that will continue until victory or death (ANC, 1985:1).

Most MK cadres received training in the Soviet Union during the 1960s and early 1970s. This means that their military culture was influenced by Soviet military practices and traditions, such as drill, instruction, officer training and weapons (Williams, 2000:3). Added to this military culture influence, were classic guerrilla army traditions, such as minimum rank structure and an emphasis on self-sufficiency, innovation and mission-oriented command once deployed (Williams, 2000:3).

Williams (2001:4) identifies three key cultural features that characterised the birth of the new guerrilla army, MK.

- First, the activities of MK were situated solidly within the tradition of subservience to the political and civil authority of the ANC. MK was from its nascent stages the instrument of the ANC, and its military strategy was drawn from the political policy and strategy of the ANC. This was amplified in the Morogoro document (Williams, 2000:3), where the conference also recognised the primacy of the political leadership as unchallenged and supreme and that all revolutionary formations and levels were to be subordinated to the political leadership.
- Secondly, a strong element of moral restraint characterised the initial MK campaigns. This restraint was based, among others, on the realisation that the population had to be politically and psychologically prepared to support an armed struggle.
- Lastly, the distinguishing feature of MK was its non-racial character drawn from the ideology of non-racialism of the ANC. This was reflected in the multi-racial and multi-ethnic nature of the hierarchy of the MK echelons and its rank-and-file membership. Furthermore, unparalleled with any other military formation at the time, MK displayed itself as the microcosm of the diverse population of South Africa in both its institutional make-up and in its culture and traditions.

However, it needs to be noted that MK had political education, and this was formalised in April 1969 at Morogoro in Tanzania at a conference under the auspices of the ANC (Ngculu, 2011:242). The need to emphasise the political education of its members was born out of the realisation that more members joining the ANC, and in particular its military wing MK, were ill equipped with the politics of the ANC as an organisation (Ngculu, 2011:242).

To sum up, it needs to be noted that subservience to the political leadership of the ANC was a building block for future civil–military relations in South Africa after 1994. Lastly, reflected on MK, was its non-racial character drawn from the

ideology of non-racialism of the ANC. In a way, this characterised the future diverse South African society.

In the next sub-section, the researcher presents a historical overview of the Azanian People's Liberation Army.

#### **5.3.4.2 Historical overview of the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA)**

The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) was formed in 1959 with its long-term goal reflected in the phrase 'Africa for Africans' (kaPlaatjie, 2006:704). In a nutshell, this slogan epitomised the political goal of the PAC of a government 'of the Africans by the Africans'. The ideal South Africa, as the PAC conceived it, would be one where there was no guarantee of minority rights and a guarantee of individual liberties was seen as the highest guarantee necessary (kaPlaatjie, 2006:705).

The repressive action of the government against peaceful Sharpeville demonstrations and killings in 1960 also influenced the PAC to adopt a militant stance of resistance and this culminated in the establishment of Poqo, a paramilitary wing of the PAC in 1960 (Le Roux, 2005:248). Poqo was organised into cells as an underground paramilitary movement, operating within South Africa after the banning of the PAC whose *raison d'être* was to hit back at the regime. As from 1962, Poqo went through a process of metamorphosis, to form the military wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA). APLA received training in Zaire, Ghana, China and Yugoslavia (Le Roux, 2005:248).

Field commanders and political commissars had a dual authority and APLA's military commission, which was the PAC's sub-committee, was composed of nine members, some of whom were from the PAC civilian leadership (kaPlaatjie, 2006:730). This arrangement was a display of subordination of the armed wing to civilian leadership authority.

Furthermore, between 1971 and 1975, APLA had a problem with infiltration into South Africa for its guerrilla insurgency. In its endeavour to infiltrate into South

Africa, APLA arranged for passage through Botswana and SWAPO through the Caprivi Strip. However, after the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) victory in Mozambique in 1975, APLA insurgency activities increased along the South African–Swaziland border (kaPlaatjie, 2006:726–735). Rural resistance against tribal authorities in Northern Natal was leveraged for the advantage of APLA guerrilla activities to provide a potential base for APLA activities (kaPlaatjie, 2006:726–735).

The PAC had strong links with the People’s Republic of China, where most of their APLA cadres were trained (Williams, 2001:6). Strong links also existed between the PAC and the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU), led by Mugabe, and the two armies, APLA and the Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) respectively. Common to both PAC and ZANU was their political focus on building strong power bases amongst the rural peasantry (Williams, 2001:6).

Therefore, the 1960s signalled an important watershed in the struggle in South Africa against apartheid. The liberation movements realised that the aftermath of the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, ushered in the beginning of a far more brutal and intensive phase of state repression. In response, the ANC and the PAC resorted to armed struggles, hence the establishment of their military wings, MK and APLA respectively.

#### **5.4 CREATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE (SANDF) AND THE NEW INCLUSIVE MILITARY CULTURE**

In 1994, South Africa became the model country in the world for having negotiated a democratic settlement without the intervention of outside countries. Simultaneously, the military leaders managed to sit around the table to create a defence force that became credible and respected not only in Africa, but also in the rest of the world. In this section, the researcher gives a synoptic analysis of how the SANDF came into being and developed an inclusive military culture as influenced by the constitution of the country.

#### **5.4.1 The creation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)**

The negotiated settlement in South Africa had its nascent stage as far back as May 1990 when the Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa (IDASA) took a delegation to meet the ANC in Zambia. The delegation was an amalgamation of retired and serving officers of the SADF, military analysts, researchers and officers from the Transkei, Ciskei and Venda Defence Forces. It was out of this meeting that commitment to the negotiated settlement was born. The sequel was the integration of the armed forces (Ngculu, 2011:247).

Formal negotiations started in December 1991 under the umbrella body of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) with a follow-up structure called the Multi-Party Process (Maharaj, 2008:26). The belligerent parties had to make compromises to reach amicable solutions. In addition, the compromise between the apartheid regime as led by the Nationalist Party (NP) and the liberation movements, as led by the ANC, was a solid foundation upon which the South African political transition from apartheid authoritarian rule to a democratic system of governance was based (Stott, 2002:24). The view of Stott (2002:24) is that in situations of compromise, a negotiated settlement is possible. Furthermore, Berdal and Keen (1997:813) elucidate this view by emphasising the fact that in these situations of compromise, the achievement of 'lasting peace' and the viability of a formally agreed peace accord are directly tied to the future of the armed forces and the reform of the security sector. It is for this reason that the military as an institution of the state was seen to be pivotal in the political transition of the South African society. A new national defence force that reflected all the militaries of the contending political parties was a reality not to be ignored.

The establishment of the SANDF was provided for in sections 224–228 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 1993 (the interim Constitution) and further ratified in the final Constitution of 1996. Specifically, section 224(3) was significant to the establishment of the National Defence Force.

Save for the National Defence Force, no other armed force or armed organisation or service may be established in or for the Republic other than –



- a. as provided for in this Constitution;
- b. a force established by or under an Act of Parliament for the protection of public property or the environment; or
- c. a service established by or under law for the protection of persons or property.

As a sequel to the establishment of the new South African National Defence Force, the Sub-Council on Defence (SCD) was set up and given the task to promote the preparation for and transition to a democratic order in South Africa (Le Roux, 2005:240). The regulatory framework, which gave credence to establishment of the SCD was the Transitional Executive Council Act 151 of 1993 which was also the source for the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), which was composed of representatives of the political parties set up to conduct the main political negotiations between the contending parties in South Africa. To give muscle to the SCD, the Joint Military Coordinating Council (JMCC) was created to assist and advise the SCD (Le Roux, 2005:240). This JMCC was further mandated by the TEC to develop provisional policies for the establishment of a new Ministry of Defence and to address the issues of integration and a future defence policy. Among the guidelines given was that such a ministry “was to be governed by the principles of transparency, accountability, separation of powers and legality” (Le Roux, 2005:240). In addition, the JMCC was to help create the solid foundation on which the SANDF was to be established (Le Roux, 2005:240).

The main contending forces during the deliberations of the JMCC were the SADF and MK with mandates from the NP and the ANC respectively. However, the resultant force design of the new SANDF was seen to be dominantly based on that of the former SADF and the strategies, doctrines and procedures remained unaltered (Le Roux, 2005:240).

In summary, the structural arrangements for the smooth running of the negotiation process gained legitimacy from all participants because of their fair and inclusive manner. In addition, the regulatory framework set up helped to channel and expedite the process. In the next section, the researcher reports on the nature of the inclusive culture that was created within the SANDF since 1994.

#### **5.4.2 INCLUSIVE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY CULTURE**

Creating an inclusive institutional culture posed a challenge for the SANDF from the inception of the integration of former forces into the SANDF. The integration included five statutory forces (the SADF, the TBVC, and the two non-statutory forces, MK and APLA (Andrews & Mead, 2009:20). McShane and Von Glinow (2005:487–488) agree, stating that integration involves the combining of two or more cultures into a new composite culture that preserves the best features of the previous cultures. As no culture is inferior or superior to another (Thiart 1996:26), the new institutional culture of the SANDF had to reflect the shared assumptions, beliefs, traditions and values of all former forces (McShane & Von Glinow, 2007:255).

Strategies were developed to inculcate the new institutional culture in the SANDF with a purpose of instilling among members respect for the values of the democratic society as enshrined in the Constitution. Such programmes are the civic education programme, a new code of conduct, the example set by leadership, name changes, equal opportunities and affirmative programmes. This was done to achieve the following objectives, namely to:

- ensure that the functioning of the Department of Defence is consistent with constitutional principles, democratic values and the law;
- ensure that military personnel treat each other and members of the public with respect and dignity;
- maintain and enhance military professionalism;
- build public confidence and pride in the SANDF; and
- build patriotism, loyalty, unity, discipline, morale and combat readiness within the SANDF.

In this sense, there is continuity in change since South Africa is building an inclusive military culture with the best values and traditions of all the constituent forces, through a mutual learning process. It is also important to note that since 1994, the state influenced the development of a democratic constitution, which laid a firm base for the military culture to be shaped within the context of the

values of the country. However, the vestiges of the British culture within the SANDF are still visible. These are reflected in symbols, celebrations of past British achievements and traditions, and the dress code still reflects the British origin.

#### **5.4.2.3 New role of the SANDF as mandated by the South African government**

Since 1994, the South African government has set policies and accepted international obligations that promote peace, safety, security, stability and cooperation (DOD, 2007–2008:88). The SANDF is actively involved in the promotion of these obligations through the employment of its mission-trained forces in Africa. In the period after 1994, the SANDF actively supported peace, security and stability missions in Africa by giving peace support and general military assistance to operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Burundi, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Uganda, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Comoros and Mozambique. For the first time, the SANDF deployed personnel outside the continent when five military observers were deployed in support of the UN mission in Nepal (Operation Induli). In the DRC, the SANDF continued to support the ongoing peace operations. In addition, the SANDF contingent deployed in Sudan under the African Union, where the AU helped to stabilise the fragile peace process in the Darfur region (DOD, 2007–2008:88). Internally, several missions in support of other government departments were conducted (DOD, 2007–2008:88).

The involvement of the SANDF in international obligations under the auspices of the government, has helped the country to gain legitimacy and recognition throughout the continent and the world at large. These international obligations have eased the volatile situation in Africa. Therefore, the image of South Africa has been boosted as the SANDF is contributing to the international relations of the country and cooperation with the international community.

### **5.5 SUMMARY**

In any historical situation, if people want to move forward, they need to have a firm understanding of the perspectives of the past. The South African military

history is rich and diverse and involves all communities of South Africa. The experience of guerrilla wars of resistance as led by African indigenous people and Boer armies is a basis for the future building of a legitimate defence force.

However, this African experience was lost for years in South Africa. This was due to the exclusion of the African militaries in the integration of forces during the formation of the UDF in 1912 and the change of government in 1948. This resulted in low levels of legitimacy in the eyes of those who were excluded. It is worth noting, though, that the integration of the Boer armies and the traditions of the British colonial regiments afforded the UDF a strategic, cultural and doctrinal base from which to draw its subsequent campaigns.

In addition, although the militaries of the liberation organisations had little influence on the doctrine of the SANDF, they nonetheless had a significant influence on the civil–military relations culture of the DOD and on the achievement of popular support for the defence force during the nascent years. Furthermore, the overwhelming influence of the SADF officers in the formation of the SANDF led to the dominance of SADF doctrine, and very few, if any, of the guerrilla traditions of South Africa were codified and reflected in the national defence strategy of South Africa.

In the three epoch-making events, such as the military integration and transformation of 1912, 1948 and 1994 (see 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.2.1), is that military units historically were loyal to and served the elected government of the day and did not cease to exist at the change of political leadership. By implication, therefore, units were not created every time there was a change in political leadership. Military units had strong bonds to the community, albeit selectively in this situation, and provided a sense of continuity and security in their very existence. The Constitution provides not only a firm base for the military culture to be shaped within the context of values of South Africa, but also for active participation in peace missions on the continent.

Military traditions are not a negative phenomenon, but are there to boost morale, pride, continuity, *esprit de corps* and a feeling of belonging. Traditions in

themselves are not fixed, but evolve according to the dictates of the time and space. The traditions that lie within units remain the building blocks for an evolved common culture in the greater institution.

It is important also to note that since 1994, the influence of the state on developing a democratic constitution, laid a firm base for the military culture to be shaped within the context of the values of the country. However, the vestiges of the British culture within the SANDF are still visible. These are reflected in symbols, celebrations of past British achievements and traditions, as well as the dress code, which still reflects its British origin.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **LEADERSHIP**

#### **6.1 INTRODUCTION**

In the preceding chapter, a historical perspective on the evolution of South African military culture was explored. In doing so, the chapter gave a compendium of the South African military prior to 1912, the formation of the Union Defence Force (UDF) and the political context, the historical overview of UDF (1912–1947), the South African Defence Force (SADF) during the period 1948 until 1994, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) from 1994 until 2014. This includes political prelude to the 1994 military integration, the integration of armed forces and their military cultures and the resultant inclusive military culture from 1994 to 2014. The crux of Chapter Five was to trace the evolution of military culture in South Africa in the different historical periods under different statutory governments.

In this chapter, the researcher discusses leadership approaches in general and specifically those that are prevalent in military institutions. Furthermore, strategic change management in the SANDF is discussed and evaluated against the government prescripts.

In the next section, the researcher discusses the definition of leadership.

#### **6.2 LEADERSHIP DEFINED**

McShane and Von Glinow (2015:342) aver that leadership is about influencing, motivating, and enabling others to contribute toward the effectiveness. The successful leader is an “individual who understands him/herself, the institution, and the environment in which they operate and the people they are privileged to lead” (Defence Leadership Centre, 2004:2). The goal of leadership then, is to ‘transform’ people and institutions. This means that leadership must be able to work with the minds and hearts of the people, and bring about permanent change within institutions, based on the compelling changes within the environment.

Changing an institution involves changing the corporate culture, which in turn will then guide the desired behaviour of the individuals. The leadership's role then becomes crucial in clarifying the vision and ensuring that the desired behaviour is consistent with the corporate culture, that is, beliefs, principles, or values (Baker, 2007:105). In addition, Kotter (2001:4) suggests that leadership involves coping with change. That is, leaders should chart the direction by developing a futuristic vision for the institution along with strategies for achieving the envisaged changes to achieve the vision. Furthermore, leadership is the art and the application of personal knowledge, skill and behaviour to influence and inspire subordinates to achieve the aim at hand (Fielder, 2011:17).

At strategic level, leadership is identified as the top management of an organisation. Denis *et al.* (2001:809) view strategic leadership as a:

- **collective phenomenon** to which different individuals make a contribution in different ways;
- **processual phenomenon** in which the focus is on the actions of people in leadership positions rather than on demographics, personality or cognition;
- **dynamic phenomenon** in which participants, roles and influences evolve over time; and
- **supra-organisational phenomenon** in which leadership roles and influences on them can extend beyond institutional boundaries.

The role of leadership in strategy implementation and change management cannot be over emphasised. In order to steer strategy implementation and efforts in the right direction, institutions make use of several strategy implementation drivers: leadership, institutional culture, reward systems, institutional structure and resource allocation (Denis *et al.* 2001:809). Leadership drives strategic change, and strong leadership is perhaps the most important 'tool' that a strategist could have in the implementation and change management toolkit to give direction and purpose to integrated strategy formulation, strategic change management, implementation and control. In addition, strategic leadership

involves managing through others and influencing human behaviour in order to achieve goals (Ehlers & Lazenby, 2007:217).

In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of the differences between leadership and management.

### **6.3 LEADERSHIP VERSUS MANAGEMENT**

The distinction between a leader and a manager is espoused by Mullins (2011:256–267), who postulates that management is viewed as getting things done through other people in order to achieve stated institutional objectives, whereas the emphasis regarding leadership is on interpersonal behaviour in the broader context and is associated with the willing and enthusiastic behaviour of followers.

In describing a leader, Baker (2007:104) avers that at times, the leader will work behind employees, putting them in the forefront, allowing them freedom of action and giving them a sense of ownership. Furthermore, Haines (2000:16) asserts that in order to steer an institution through second-order change, one must be willing to act as a visionary and leader of change with the skills of a coach, trainer and facilitator. Such leaders must show:

- willingness and ability to take difficult decisions, however unpopular those may be;
- the ability to engage in strategy and strategic thinking; and
- his or her focus on the people aspect of change and management.

Above all, leaders must be able to confront and solve problems, weaknesses and dangers facing the institution in the context of paradoxes and challenges that confront the broader public sector (Baker, 2007:105).

Therefore, the function of leading is important in managing change. The leader's role then becomes crucial in nurturing and developing employees, and giving them latitude to be innovative and encourage them to take initiative, while at the same time instilling a sense of commitment to their work and institution.



## **6.4 TRANSACTIONAL AND TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP APPROACH**

The leadership approach (transactional and transformational) is crucial in shaping perceptions that will support cultural values and institutional strategy.

### **6.4.1 Transactional leadership**

Transactional leadership is about 'managing', helping institutions achieve their current objectives effectively (Adair, 2003:23–24). Transactional leadership occurs in areas where change primarily takes place via relatively short-term reciprocity between people and groups (Adair, 2003:23–24). Transactional leadership focuses on fine-tuning and maintaining the status quo of the institution rather than on fundamental change (Tucker & Russell, 2004:103). It is effective when the new institution undertakes short-term projects to increase production (Reggio & Murphy, 2002:106–107). Transactional leadership, according to Derungs (2011:52), is not concerned about transformation of the institutional performance and nor is it concerned about the orientation of individuals within the institution.

### **6.4.2 Transformational leadership**

Esterhuysen (2003:7) argues, "transformational leadership is more important than orthodox management when one has a second-order change in mind". Transformation as a process, which should lead to a new structure, culture and defining values, requires visionary leadership (Esterhuysen, 2003:7).

Transformational leadership pays attention to the fundamental concerns and the developmental needs of the followers and it encourages the followers to look at old problems with new solutions. Avolio (1999:22) argues –

[T]ransformational leadership is defined relative to the leader's effect on his or her followers in which the latter feel trust, admiration, loyalty, and respect toward the former and followers are motivated to do more than they were originally expected to do.

According to Hall *et al.* (2012:1–2), there are four components of transformational leadership, namely:

- **Idealised influence** involves inspiring visions, sharing risks and hardships, and earning trust and confidence from subordinates. Leaders who exert idealised influence behave in ways that demonstrate high standards of ethical and moral conduct.
- **Inspirational motivation** involves showing enthusiasm and optimism in ways that motivate those around one by providing meaning and challenges.
- **Intellectual stimulation** entails stimulating efforts to find new ideas and creative solutions to problems, encouraging innovation and creativity, and new approaches. Such leaders solicit new ideas and innovative solutions from followers, and they encourage followers to present ideas that are different from their own.
- **Individualised consideration** is about recognising that subordinates have different needs and desires, and acting as coach in order to develop the full potential of all subordinates. Leaders who express individualised consideration facilitate the growth of their followers by assigning tasks that are appropriate to each person's competencies and skills.

Overall research evidence indicated that transformational leadership is strongly correlated with lower turnover rates, higher productivity, and higher employee satisfaction than under other circumstances. Change often brings with it a feeling of uncertainty if not well communicated to the stakeholders.

### **6.4.3 Military leadership**

In the previous section, the researcher considered the elements of military culture. However, it is important to define and discuss military leadership in general. Hunt and Blair (1985:121) aver that leadership generally means to influence another to behave in a way intended by the first person. Leadership, according to Mills (2005:11), is a process by which one person influences the thoughts, attitudes and behaviour of another. Leadership is further about setting direction, developing a vision for the future and strategies for achieving the vision. In fulfilling this role, leaders, according to Haines (2000:16), should be:

- willing and able to take difficult decisions however unpopular they may be;
- able to engage in strategy and strategic thinking; and
- able to focus on the people aspect of change and management.

To expand, Baker (2007:105) concurs with this view by further asserting that leaders should be able to confront and solve problems, and deal with weaknesses and dangers facing the organisation in the context of paradoxes and challenges that confront the broader public sector institutions. Furthermore, Barrington (1984:285) postulates that leadership involves intellectual and moral content in order to analyse what needs to be done, and then to act on that analysis, Fielder (2011:17) propounds a similar postulation by asserting that leadership is the art and the application of personal knowledge, skill and behaviour to influence and inspire others in order to achieve the aim. However, for the purpose of this study, leadership was contextualised within the military. Hence, the next section the researcher will focus on military leadership.

#### **6.4.4 Military leadership**

As a subject, military leadership has been an intriguing as well as beguiling subject for military professionals and scholars (Buck & Korb, 1981:7). Military leadership is defined by Nye (2002:28) as “a process by which soldiers influence others to accomplish the mission”. In addition, Hannah and Avolio (2010:3) argue that leadership in the military context is about the human element, focusing on guiding the social interaction between soldiers fighting wars with the purpose of winning such wars. In the South African context, military leadership is defined as the art or process of influencing and directing people to an assigned goal in such a manner as to command obedience, confidence, respect and loyalty (DOD, 2009c:B5). However, Kahn and Naidoo (2011:75) argue that military leaders should, in addition to their training in military warfare, also be knowledgeable about political, social, business, technical and communication dimensions.

#### 6.4.5 Leadership approaches prevalent in the military

Associated with the characteristics of the military culture are commensurate military leadership styles. Wepman (2013:1) identifies authoritarian, democratic and laissez-faire leadership styles as being dominant leadership styles in the military. However, Yeakey (2002:4) suggests that situational leadership has been used by the military for years in training and development. Therefore, the two leadership styles mentioned before (see 6.4.1 and 6.4.2) are used in the military as follows:

- **Authoritarian leadership**, also known as an **autocratic leadership style**, describes a leader who makes decisions without consulting or soliciting any inputs from the subordinates (Graf, Hemmasi & Winchell, 1992:62; Haberfeld, 2006:96; Murray, 2013:3). In addition, leaders applying an autocratic leadership style have complete control over their people while such people and staff have little opportunity to make suggestions (Murray, 2013:3). According to Graf *et al.* (1992:62), history dictates that leadership behaviour in the military has been generally autocratic, especially under battle conditions. Kahn and Naidoo (2011:73) postulate that the autocratic leadership style applied in the military does not allow soldiers to question orders and commands. This is because autocratic leadership is very directive and does not allow any participation from soldiers (Luthans, 2005:548). Therefore, the autocratic leadership style can be used in critical mission times where debating orders may result in mission failure (Wepman, 2013:1). Furthermore, the autocratic leadership style, according to Cherry (2014:1), works well when there is no need for inputs from subordinates, when the decision would not change as a result of inputs, and where the motivation to carry out subsequent action would not be affected by participation or non-participation in decision-making (International Association of Administrative Professionals, 2009:22). Autocratic leadership is often used in a crisis when decisions must be made quickly and no dissent is expected (Murray, 2013:3). In this case,

commanders are responsible for making decisions and the troops can then focus on carrying out the allocated tasks.

- The **democratic (participative) leadership style** is based on involving subordinates in decision-making. The final decision may resort to the leader after having facilitated consensus among the subordinates. The democratic decision-making process is usually appreciated by subordinates (International Association of Administrative Professionals, 2009:23). This style is used by most military teams to promote *esprit de corps* among the recruits after training (Wepman, 2013:1). Democratic leadership, according to Mullins (2011:264) is associated with increased follower productivity, satisfaction, involvement and commitment.
- A **laissez-faire (delegative) leadership style** is characterised by the leader's non-involvement in decision-making (Mullins, 2011:264). Furthermore, such leaders give complete freedom to subordinates to do their work and set their own targets and deadlines (Mullins, 2011:264). These leaders provide support with resources and guidance in the form of advice, if needed, but otherwise do not get involved (Murray, 2013:3). This style works well when subordinates are capable of making their own decisions and when there is no requirement for central coordination (International Association of Administrative Professionals, 2009:24). Military leaders frequently use a delegative style of leadership to delegate jobs to non-commissioned and other subordinates in the military to empower them. In some cases, the reason for delegation may be that subordinates or team members know more about a particular job than the leader (Wepman, 2013:1).
- **Situational leadership style** involves what Bolden, Gosling, Marturano and Dennison (2003:6) call a leadership style that is specific to the situation in which it is being exercised and there may be differences in required leadership styles at different levels in the same organisation (Wepman, 2013:1). A leader needs to fit his or her leadership to the requirement of a

specific situation. Peng-Hsian Kao, Hsin Kao and Thun-Yun Kao (2007:565–567) postulate that the leader’s behaviour should be contingent on the situation. Leaders are not limited to one leadership style in a given situation and, with the nature of the battlefield today and tomorrow, being able to adapt appropriately, the styles will influence soldiers’ success (Yeakey, 2002:1). A leader should correctly evaluate situational factors and select the most appropriate and effective leadership style for a given situation (Peng-Hsian *et al.*, 2007:563).

Mullins (2011:354) postulates that situational leadership styles are divided into four categories:

- **A directing/telling style** is found where the leader provides specific directions about roles and goals and closely tracks the followers’ performance in order to provide frequent feedback on results (Mwai, 2011:6). Within this style, a leader will specifically instruct subordinates what to do and how to do it. This style is often used within the law enforcement and military communities, as well as on manufacturing assembly lines. This style provides a means of managing a diverse group of people that span a wide range of experience and maturity levels (May, 2014:2).
- The **coaching/selling style** is found where the leader explains why, solicits suggestions, praises behaviours that are approximately right and continues to direct task accomplishment (Mwai, 2011:7). Information and direction will still be provided by the manager in this style of leadership, but there is also more two-way communication with subordinates. Within this role, leaders “sell” their message to get employees on board, persuading them to work toward the common goal (May, 2014:2).
- According to a **supporting/participating style**, the leader and the follower make decisions together. The role of the leader is to facilitate, listen, encourage and support the follower, for example with

participation. Leaders can focus more on relationships and less on direction (Mwai, 2011:7). This style is often used by middle-level commanders (colonels) who are attempting to influence senior commanders (generals) towards developing a new policy for which there is no proven history or established practice (May, 2014:2).

- **Delegating** occurs when the leader empowers the employee to act independently with the appropriate resources to get the job done (Mwai, 2011:8). The leader shares responsibility for the goal setting and is available, but does not interfere with the followers' work (Mwai, 2011:8). Although the leader will still monitor task and institution progress, he or she will delegate much of the responsibility for the execution and work groups. Delegating allows the leader to be involved with decisions, and he or she is therefore able to focus on the work and achievements of subordinates (May, 2014:2).

The leadership styles pertinent to the military are no different from any other institution. The above leadership styles associated with the military might not be a panacea for all situations where leadership is tested, but can be used as the situation dictates. Different combinations or a combination of all for different exigencies can be applied. What needs to be noted, though, is the application of these leadership styles within the military context. Congruent with this explication is the view espoused by May (2014:2) propounding that there is no single best approach to leadership that will work well in every situation.

In addition to these leadership styles, there is a leadership style that is unique to the military, and that is command and control, which is an element of military leadership (Van Dyk & George, 2006:777). In the next section, the researcher will discuss command and control as the leadership style within the military.

#### **6.4.6 Command and control**

The term 'command' is seen as a rigid concept without much space for interpretations (McWilliams, 2004:1). Unravelling the complex nature of command as a concept used in the military, Coakley (1992:36) contends that command is

strategic, that is, it is concerned with the bigger picture. In addition, Fielder (2011:17) concurs that 'command' within the military context is defined as the power or authority earned by rank, position, experience or expertise, which places a person in charge of whatever happens.

The South African Department of Defence (DOD), in support of this definition, avers that command is the authority that the commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment (DOD, 2009a:B5). Therefore, command, according to McWilliams (2004:1), is to:

- have authority or jurisdiction over subordinates;
- give order(s);
- direct with authority;
- exercise power or authority;
- be in control;
- act as commander; and
- have power to control or dominate.

Nye (1986:28–29) adds another dimension to the definition by asserting that to command calls for a creative act, confidence and courage to interpret rules and orders, and that command is associated with the need for taking intellectual and moral responsibility in the performance of one's military duties.

Furthermore, Kahn and Naidoo (2011:74) postulate that in a military context, military leadership and command are inseparable. In support of this assertion, the Defence Leadership Centre (2004:6) avers that leadership and management are two sides of the coin of command. This means that command, as a leadership style, is composed of leadership and management, and Fielder (2011:18) coins this in a formula, namely:

Command = leadership + management

Lastly, command in the military is used together with the term 'control', hence the reference to command and control. Control as used in command and control is tactical or operational and focused on immediate management of forces (Coakley, 1992:36). However, command and control, according to Gill (2010:1), is:



Command and control is a style of leadership that uses standards, procedures, and output statistics to regulate the institution. Furthermore, command and control approach to leadership is authoritative in nature and uses a top down approach, which fits well in bureaucratic institution.

In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of strategic change management in the SANDF.


## 6.5 STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT IN THE SANDF

In this section, the researcher presents an analysis and interpretation of the structure of the SANDF. Thereafter, strategic change management as applied in the defence force human resources is discussed.

### 6.5.1 Structure and functions of the SANDF

Following the strategy to create the culture of inclusiveness by the political leadership of the defence force, the institutional structure of the SANDF was set up after 1994 as a firm basis for commanding and giving strategic direction for the defence operations. This structure also provides command and control in the daily functioning of the SANDF.

The institutional structure of the SANDF is delineated in Figure 6.1 below.



**Figure 6.1 Institutional structure of the South African National Defence Force**

**Source:** Adapted from DOD (2015:27)

The SANDF is under the command of the chief of the SANDF, who is charged with giving strategic direction and orders/instructions to ensure the execution of constitutional mandate of the SANDF, as reflected in section 200(2) of the Constitution, 1996. With respect to its composition, the SANDF, as depicted in Figure 6.1, comprises the four arms of service (hereafter referred as to the Services) and Divisions. The Services are the:

- South African (SA) Army;
- SA Air Force;
- SA Navy; and
- SA Military Health Services.

The Divisions are:

- Joint Operations;
- Defence Intelligence;
- Corporate Staff;
- Defence Inspectorate;
- Human Resources (Chief Directorate Transformation Management is a sub-division of Human Resources Division);
- Defence Legal;
- Military Policy and Strategy;
- Defence Reserves;
- Logistics;
- Military Police; and
- Command and Management Information Systems (DOD, 2015).

The purposes that these Services and Divisions serve are depicted in Table 6.1 below.

**Table 6.1 Functions of the Services and Divisions**

Serial no.	Service or division	Purpose
1	SA Army	To provide prepared and supported landward defence capabilities for the defence and protection of South Africa.

Serial no.	Service or division	Purpose
2	SA Air Force	To provide prepared and supported air defence capabilities for the defence and protection of South Africa.
3	SA Navy	To provide prepared and supported maritime defence capabilities for the defence and protection of South Africa.
4	SA Military Health Services	To provide prepared and supported health capabilities and services for the defence and protection of South Africa.
5	Joint Operations	To provide and employ defence capabilities, including an operational capability, to conduct all operations successfully, as well as joint, interdepartmental, interagency and multinational military exercises.
6	Defence Intelligence	To provide defence intelligence and counter-intelligence capability.
7	Corporate Staff	To advise on military policy matters and to co-ordinate the military strategic direction process. This process includes developing policy, formulating strategies and plans, monitoring the execution of plans and the reporting thereof.
8	Defence Inspectorate	To provide the independent and objective internal and closing-down audits, inspections, perception surveys, anti-corruption and fraud prevention services, added value and improved DOD operations.
9	Human Resources	To provide full HR support services to the DOD.
10	Defence Legal	To provide professional, legitimate and deployable defence legal services and support commensurate with the needs of the DOD.
11	Religious Services	To provide a chaplain service that cares for all DOD members and their dependants and promotes spiritual growth, social support and ethical conduct.
12	Defence Reserves	To direct the development and maintenance of the reserve system, to provide specialist advise on reserve matters and to promote/market the reserves and the volunteer reserve system.
13	Logistics	To provide ongoing general support capabilities and services.
14	Military Police	To provide a military policing capability to the department.
15 and 16	Command and Management Information Systems Military, Policy, Strategy, Strategy and Planning	To provide the department with key information and communication systems. To advise on military policy matters and to co-ordinate the military strategic direction process. This process includes developing policy, formulating strategies and plans, monitoring the execution of plans and the reporting thereof.

**Source:** Adapted from DOD (2015:41–54)

The structure of the SANDF clearly demarcates and divides the responsibilities that need to be carried out to fulfil the constitutional mandate of the SANDF. This

also delineates the command and control with clear responsibilities that do not overlap nor require boundary management.

## **6.5.2 Change management in the SANDF**

This section deals with the strategic change as envisaged by the political and defence leadership of the DOD after the integration of the armed forces.

### **6.5.2.1 Regulatory framework**

The strategic plan of the SANDF finds its basis in section 200(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (RSA 1996a:113), and in section 10 of the White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (RSA 1996b:4). The core aim of this White Paper is the formulation of the government's new policy on defence and the transformation of the DOD (RSA 1996b:4). It is for this reason that the researcher focused on the progress made with respect to the transformation of the DOD, with particular reference to the SANDF. In addition, the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, (RSA 1995:16) stipulates that the SANDF must formulate policies regarding equality, which include equal opportunities and affirmative action, to achieve representivity and equity within the SANDF. Furthermore, Chapter 10 of the South African Defence Review, 1998 (RSA 1998:17), reiterates that affirmative action and equal opportunities are fundamental principles for transformation of the SANDF.

In concert with the above explications, the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 stipulates that affirmative action measures must include the following:

- measures to identify and eliminate barriers, including unfair discrimination, which adversely affect people from designated groups;
- measures meant to further diversify in the workplace based on dignity of and respect for all people;
- making reasonable accommodation for people from designated groups in order to ensure that they enjoy equal opportunities and are equitably represented in the work force; and

- measures to retain and develop people from the designated groups and implement appropriate training measures for skills development.

This therefore requires a concerted effort to draw up an employment equity plan with realisable goals to achieve progress in terms of transformation.

#### **6.5.2.2 Transformation in the SANDF**

The process of transformation in the SANDF was started by conceptualising a Chief Directorate Equal Opportunities and Affirmative Actions in 1997 (which was renamed in 2006 'Chief Directorate Transformation Management'). The main responsibility of this directorate (as stated in Chapter 10 of the Defence Review of 1998) was to oversee, and manage equal opportunity and affirmative action training, implementation and monitoring, and to resolve cases of discrimination. To facilitate and realise this responsibility of ensuring balanced representation of the South African population in the SANDF, various policies such as Department of Defence Fast Tracking Policy (DOD 1999:6) and the Human Resource Strategy of 2010 (DOD, 2010) were promulgated. To realise this transformation, the SANDF further developed a process called the Plan and Guidelines for the Staffing of the Military Component of the Transformed Department of Defence (SANDF DS/502/8, dated 11 November 1998) followed by the Revised Staffing Strategy (SANDF C PERS/DMPU/R/101/1/B, dated 15 May 2001) (SANDF 1998:5–6). Concomitant with the above-mentioned policy was a need to pronounce the appropriate leadership approach to advance the transformation of the SANDF. A transactional leadership approach was adopted by the SANDF as the official leadership approach (DOD, 2009a:D1-1). This leadership approach is contrary to that of the second-order change, which is transformation. According to Anderson and Anderson (2010:60), such transformation is a radical shift of strategy, structure, systems, processes or technology, so significant that it requires a shift of culture and behaviour and a mind-set to implement the transformation successfully and to sustain it over time. Therefore, transformational leadership is more appropriate than orthodox management when one has a second-order change in mind (Esterhuysen, 2003:7).

Since the integration of forces from 1994 to 2014 (Kubu, 2009:30), the status of racial representation in the SANDF reflects a skewed representation of race and gender. The racial composition of the SANDF in 1998 revealed that there was an over-representation of whites, with blacks (Africans, Asians and coloureds) under-represented. Africans (38.36%), Asians (1.02%), coloureds (15.96%) and whites (44.66%) made up the total personnel strength of 84 052 (Kubu, 2009:30–31). Due to this lack of representivity, the SANDF in its endeavour to guide an improved the situation, drafted a strategic human resource policy. Furthermore, the Department of Defence’s Human Resource Strategy 2010 (DOD, 2003:51) instructed Services of the SANDF to reflect on racial representation imbalances at various levels. These Services were then expected to suggest ways and means to address the identified gaps. Prevalent to all Services was the problem of over-representation of blacks at entry level and under-representation of blacks at senior management level. This was true in reverse for whites in the SANDF. Whites were over-represented at senior management level and under-represented at entry level.

**Table 6.3 Racial representation in the SANDF**

Group/Year	Approved target	1998	2005	2013
<b>Africans</b>	64.6%	38%	64%	71.8%
<b>Asians</b>	0.75%	1%	1%	1.1%
<b>Coloureds</b>	10.2%	16%	11%	12.7%
<b>Whites</b>	24.3%	45%	23%	14.2%

**Source:** Adapted from Department of Defence Annual Report Financial Year 2013/14

However, the racial representation situation as it was in June 2005 suggested that there was an improvement, which was in line with the approved targets. As cited by Kubu (2009:32), out of total strength of uniformed personnel of 61 660, there were 40 001 Africans (64.6%), 882 Asians (0.75%), 6 965 coloureds (10.2%), and 13 812 whites (24.3%).

Further statistics as reflected in the Department of Defence Annual Report Financial Year 2012/13 (DOD, 2013:17) suggest that in terms of employment equity, the percentage of Africans was 71.8%, Asians 1.1%, coloureds 12.7% and whites 14.2%. Racial representation for Africans was improved by 7.8%, and this surpassed the Defence Review target of 64.6%. The representation of Asians had improved by 0.1%. Racial representation of coloureds had improved by 1.7% and surpassed the Defence Review target of 10.2%. Whites were down by 8.8% and were still under-represented and below the target of 24.3%.

However, it needs to be noted that according to the Mid-Year Population Estimates for South Africa (RSA, 2014:3), the South African demographics showed Africans at 80.2%, Asians at 2.5% coloureds at 8.8% and whites at 8.4% of the population. Therefore, since population statistics are used for determining racial ratios, the racial targets as given in the Defence Review of 1998 (Kubu, 2009:30–31), are no longer relevant, because population statistics have changed.

In summary, a combination of efforts played a role in the overall improvement of the racial representation in the SANDF. First, a regulatory framework was created by the South African government to charter the direction for the DOD, in particular the SANDF. Firstly, a planned approach in implementing the government transformation imperatives by creating a transformation management directive was adopted. Lastly, monitoring and evaluation of the progress by the Transformation Management Chief Directorate helped the Services to focus on the transformation agenda of the SANDF. However, racial and gender transformation requires transformational leadership that would bring about real change in the SANDF, such as the SANDF reflecting the demographics of South Africa and the achievement of gender equality.

## **6.6 SUMMARY**

In this chapter, leadership was defined and the distinction between a leader and a manager was given. In addition, the leadership approach (transactional and transformational) was discussed. Both transactional and transformational

leadership are crucial in moulding perceptions that are needed to support institutional culture and strategy.

The content of transactional leadership is about assisting institutions to achieve their current objectives and is most suitable for fine-tuning and maintaining the status quo of the institution. It is best suitable for an evolutionary change.

Transformational leadership is about fundamentally changing the strategies and culture of an institution. This leadership approach fits in well with revolutionary change, which is the second-order change.

In addition, leadership styles that are common to civilian and military institutions were identified and discussed. Authoritarian, democratic and laissez-faire leadership styles are the dominant leadership styles in the military. The leadership approach applied by the SANDF during its strategic change management was transactional. Command and control as a unique leadership style was also discussed. However, a transformational leadership approach was found to be appropriate for the fundamental change in the SANDF.

In the next chapter, the researcher provides a discussion of the research design and methodology for this research.



## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

#### **7.1 INTRODUCTION**

In the preceding chapter, leadership approaches in general and specifically leadership approaches that are dominant in military institutions were discussed. In addition, in Chapter Six, the strategic change management in the SANDF was discussed and evaluated against the government prescripts.

In this chapter, the researcher provides a description of the research methodology that was used in the research. The research methodology comprises the research design, methods of data collection, the research setting and participants, population and sample, and ethical considerations.

#### **7.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

According to Brynard and Hanekom (1997:28), the research methodology concentrates on the procedure of research and the decisions that the researcher has to take to carry out the research assignment.

The present research was about strategic change management in the SANDF. To do this research, it was necessary to conduct it with unambiguous and delineated parameters guiding the process of research. The component steps in the research process and the tools and objective procedures are described and discussed. Hence, this research methodology focuses on the research processes and the kinds of tools and procedures that were used (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:75). Breakwell *et al.* (2012:9) contend that the nature of the research question implicates a particular research method as the most suitable one for a particular study. Similarly, the selection of the research methodology and its application are informed by the aims and objectives of the research, the nature of the phenomenon being studied, and the expectations of the investigator (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:xxiv–xxv). Therefore, flowing from the above explications, it is clear

that the research methodology is a logical plan that dictates how the research problem is to be solved.

In the next section, the researcher discusses the research design used in this research.

### **7.3 RESEARCH DESIGN**

According to Ghauri and Gronhaug (2005:56), the research design is the overall plan for the relationship between the practical relevancy of the conceptualised problem and the empirical investigation. The research design is drawn and used as a map, blueprint or plan to help answer the research problem (Mouton, 2008:55). Gravetter and Forzano (2012:205) suggest that a survey should be conducted to obtain descriptive information about a particular group of individuals. Therefore, this plan gives a conceptual framework, which guides how the research is conducted.

The present research endeavoured to determine whether transformation in the SANDF, as a planned strategic change intervention, has been managed adequately between 1994 and 2014 to achieve the desired results. This research problem informed the type of evidence to address during the research. It is often the type of research question that determines a particular research method as the most suitable one for that study (Breakwell *et al.*, 2012:9).

In addition, a descriptive research method was employed during the research. That is, information about variables as they exist naturally was gathered (Gravetter & Forzano, 2012:196). This approach is supported by Fabe (2012:3), who contends that the descriptive method of research is about gathering information on the existing condition. The emphasis is on describing rather than on judging or interpreting. This method is used to describe the nature of a situation as it exists at the time of the research, and to explore the causes of a particular phenomenon. As part of the descriptive research method, survey research design was relevant in the present research because it assisted the researcher to obtain some characteristics or opinions (Gravetter & Forzano, 2012:205) about members of the SANDF at the middle management level.

Therefore, survey research was used to obtain data from the respondents in a sample that was drawn from a population. This data was analysed and interpreted to formulate rational and sound findings and recommendations stemming from the research (May, 2011:98).

In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of the methods of data collection.

## **7.4 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION**

The research was conducted using both qualitative and quantitative research methods, as combined research strategies. In this section, the researcher presents a discussion of the reason for using both methods in this research for data collection and analysis.

### **7.4.1 Quantitative research method**

Quantitative research, according to Moore (2000:121), aims to show what is happening and explains phenomena through the collection of numerical information that is analysed with the use of mathematical methods. Supporting this definition, McNabb (2008:13), avers that quantitative methods or strategies are statistical designs that may be exploratory, descriptive or casual.

Positivist researchers, according to McNabb (2008:9), are of the view that a quantitative or measurement strategy is a suitable approach to employ when studying problems in the public and non-profit sectors. In explaining quantitative research, Robson (2011:18), asserts that a quantitative research method is characterised by a deductive logic where pre-existing theoretical ideas or concepts are tested. A generalisation of findings is inferred (Moore, 2000:104). Furthermore, (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2010:8–9) identified the following in describing quantitative research:

- the purpose is to evaluate objective data, which is composed of numbers;
- quantitative researchers use a process of analysis to confirm or disprove a hypothesis;

- quantitative research deals with an abstraction of reality;
- quantitative research tries to understand research facts from an outsider's point of view.

This emphasises the fact that to keep the research free from bias, the researcher should be detached and have an objective view of the facts as they unfold (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2010:8–9). Furthermore, the investigation and structure of the research are controlled by the researcher to identify and isolate the variables, and specific measurements are employed for data collection (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2010:8–9).

In the next section, the researcher presents an outline and explanation of the qualitative research method.

#### **7.4.2 Qualitative research method**

Qualitative strategies or methods, according to McNabb (2008:13), involve mainstream social science research methods, such as ethnography, phenomenology and case studies, and is presented in language instead of numbers. It is further based on flexible and explorative methods, because it enables the researcher to change the data progressively so that a deeper understanding of what is being investigated can be achieved (McNabb, 2008:13). In further expatiating the definition of qualitative methods, Lowe (2007:14) avers that qualitative methods investigate behaviour as it occurs in a natural environment and there is no manipulation of settings. In addition, Wisker (2011:1) posits that qualitative research is best employed when the researcher wishes to enquire about meanings, and it endeavours to observe, describe and understand the subjects' experiences, ideas, beliefs and values. Agreeing with this view, Sivasubramaniyan (2012:6) argues that qualitative research refers to inductive logic, holistic, subjective and process-oriented methods used to interpret, understand, describe and develop a theory of a phenomenon or patterns, and themes are developed.

Stemming from the above explications on the qualitative research method, it can be concluded that this method is subject to changes and refinement of research ideas as the research progresses, which implies that qualitative data gathering tools are flexible. In this method, there is no manipulation of the research setting necessary. Furthermore, contrary to the quantitative method, this research method evokes a realistic feeling of the research setting.

In view of the preceding explications, both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection were used for the analytical study. In the next section, the researcher presents a discussion of the population and the sample.

## **7.5 POPULATION AND SAMPLE**

Sapsford and Jupp (2006:27) describe a population as a total collection of elements available for sampling, and it consists of individuals or elements, which could be persons or events. It could be anything at all of research interest. In addition, Robson (2011:270) argues that 'population' refers to all the cases. It is unusual to be able to deal with the whole population in a survey. Hence, a sample is taken from the population.

'Sample', on the other hand, is described by Sapsford and Jupp (2006:26) as a set of elements selected from a population and that it is used to save time and effort, but also to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates of the population status in terms of whatever is being researched. A similar description is that of Moore (2000:104) who avers that a sample is taken from a large group whose characteristics can be inferred from the large group. It therefore means a sample is a microcosm of the population. In addition, Robson (2011:271) argues that while probability samples allow a researcher to generalise from the sample to the population, such generalisations depend on the accuracy of the probability. A large sample has the advantage of a lower degree of error in generalising (Moore, 2000:105).

Based on the above explications, a sample from a population of SANDF middle management officers, with rank levels of major/lieutenant commander to brigadier general/rear admiral (junior grade), was studied and the findings was generalised

to the population. In this research, objectivity was paramount and the distance between the researcher and the participants was maintained.

To produce a more representative and accurate sample from the mentioned rank levels of the SANDF, stratified sampling was applied (De Vaus, 1994:65). An added advantage of stratified sampling is that each unit in the population had a known chance of being selected (Bryman, 2001:85).

In this research, as reflected in Table 7.1, the population comprised 5 901 members from the SANDF. The stratification was done by means of rank levels from major/lieutenant commander to brigadier general/rear admirals (junior grade).

In Table 7.1 below the researcher illustrates how the population was stratified.

**Table 7.1 Population and sample**

SANDF SERVICES							
RANK	SA ARMY	SA AIR FORCE	SA NAVY	SA MEDICAL HEALTH SERVICE (SAMHS)	TOTAL	SAMPLE SIZE	PERCENTAGE
BRIGADIER GENERAL/REAR ADMIRAL	96	29	24	27	176	9	16.7
COLONEL/ CAPTAIN (SAN)	425	186	132	137	880	7	12.9
LIEUTENANT COLONEL/ COMMANDER	1 169	536	158	398	2 261	13	24.1
MAJOR/ LIEUTENANT COMMANDER	1 323	520	133	608	2 584	25	46.3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3 013</b>	<b>1 271</b>	<b>447</b>	<b>1 170</b>	<b>5 901</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>100</b>

In Table 7.1, the researcher illustrates that members of the SANDF (SA Army, SA Air Force, SA Navy and SAMHS) from the same population were grouped together according to ranks. This means that a specific number from each stratum was selected, thus making the final sample of 54 members.

In the next section, the researcher deals with the procedure of data collection.

## 7.6 DATA COLLECTION

Two types of data collection techniques were employed in this research, that is, primary and secondary data. The content of the primary data comprised the answers provided by respondents during the interviews and in the questionnaires. The responses to the interviews and questionnaires during the survey process were obtained from the sample of members of the SANDF. In addition, the secondary data comprised the information sourced from the published documents and literature that were relevant to the research questionnaire (Fabe, 2012:5).

According to McMillan and Schumacher (1993:40), there are six ways to collect data, namely observations, questionnaires, interviews, documents, tests and unobtrusive measures. The most commonly used data collection methods are interviews and questionnaires (MANCOSA, 2015:87). However, for the purpose of this research, the instruments that were employed for data collection were interviews, a questionnaire and documents.

### 7.6.1 Interviews

An interview is regarded by De Vos, Schuring, Strydom, Fouche and Poggenpoel (2001:298) as a pipeline for extracting and transmitting information from an interviewee to the interviewer. Furthermore, Welman *et al.* (2005:165–166) dissect interviews into three categories.

- **Structured interviews.** This instrument relies on a previously prepared or compiled questionnaire, which is then presented by the interviewer to the respondent. The interviewer records the responses of the respondent with

no deviation from the original one. This means that the response to each question is recorded on a standardised schedule.

- **Unstructured in-depth interviews.** Such interviews are informal and have no pre-determined questions to be answered. They are used to explore general areas of interest in depth.
- **Semi-structured interviews.** Such interviews are used where the interviewer depends on an established list of themes and questions to follow when interviewing. These themes and questions may vary from one interview to the next.

Interviews in general assist the interviewees to elaborate freely on the topic under discussion as they wish, and relate their particular experiences. Based on the above discussion, the structured interview was used in this research. This implied that the researcher applied face-to-face interviews to gain insight into the meaning and significance about the research question. To assist the interviewer in recording the interview accurately, with the consent of interviewees an audio-recorder was used, and the interviews were subsequently transcribed.

In addition to structured interviews, face-to-face interviews were conducted with the major generals, brigadier generals and colonels of the SANDF to gain insight into the leadership and culture of the former forces that were integrated into the SANDF. The reason for choosing face-to-face interviews was that they have the highest response rates and permit longer interview durations (Neuman, 2011:301). These interviewees represented the different former forces, and the purpose of the interviewing on leadership was to find the predominant leadership style of former defence force/armed force leaders and to establish whether the style of leadership in former forces was in agreement with the current leadership style as adopted by the SANDF. The second part of the questionnaire dealt with the institutional culture of the former forces and the current culture as practised in the SANDF. In doing so, the focus was on the predominant culture of the former defence or armed force to:



- establish which artefacts, rituals, ceremonies and regimental systems of the former defence or armed forces have been incorporated into the SANDF and were being practiced at the time of this research;
- determine the difference between the culture of the former defence or armed forces and the SANDF;
- solicit opinions of the current culture in the SANDF; and
- establish whether the SANDF culture had changed over the previous 10 years (1994 - 2014).

Interviewees were asked to complete consent forms, and it was indicated to them that their participation was voluntary and that confidentiality and anonymity would be maintained and honoured. They were given an option to withdraw at any time during the interview if they so wished.

### 7.6.2 Questionnaire

Questionnaires are easy to administer and they can be used to collect data under different circumstances (Moore, 2000:109). In addition, the questions can be open-ended or closed-ended. An **open-ended** question, according to Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2005:174), is one in which the researcher poses questions without the option for the respondent to choose from expected answers or a previous list of answers. This means that respondents are free to formulate their own responses to questions. In a **closed-ended** question, the respondent is offered a range of answers from which to select. Checklists or rating scales are useful in closed-ended questions and ratings because they simplify and quantify responses (Du Plooy-Cilliers, Davis & Bezuidenhout, 2014:152). Furthermore, a self-completed questionnaire is one in which the respondent is required to tick appropriate boxes out of a range of answers (Welman et al., 2005:174). In this research permission was granted by interviewees to use their names in the report. Likert-type scales are mostly used in closed-ended questionnaires. A Likert-type scale requires respondents to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement with a variety of statements related to an attitude or object, and that evaluation mostly use a five-point scale (Du Plooy-Cilliers *et al.*, 2014:159). Further

clarification by May (2011:111) suggests that a Likert-type scale places people's answers on an attitude continuum. Statements are devised to measure a particular aspect in which the researcher is interested, and the respondent is normally invited to agree, strongly agree, be neutral, disagree and disagree strongly with these statements.

For the purpose of this research, the researcher chose closed-ended questions where respondents were offered a range of answers from which to choose.

This research used a questionnaire (see Appendix A) that comprised of three sections.

- **Section A** covered the demographic information of the respondents, such as race, the arm of service (Service), rank, length of service and academic qualifications.
- **Section B** explored the leadership approaches in the SANDF. There were five scales for the respondents to choose from, namely autocratic approach, transactional leadership, situational leadership, democratic leadership and transformational leadership.
- **Section C** dealt with the views of the respondents regarding the institutional culture of the SANDF. In the questionnaire, there were five choices for every question or statement: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree and strongly disagree. The choice represented the degree of agreement each respondent had with regard to the given question.

Therefore, a structured questionnaire was used in this research to collect data from 54 respondents.

In addition, an open-ended questionnaire (Appendix B) was used for the interviews to get respondents to formulate their own responses. The questionnaire was divided into the institutional culture and leadership.

The researcher tested the feasibility and validity of the questionnaire with four respondents: one from each of the rank groups (brigadier general, colonel, lieutenant colonel and major), some of whom were already researchers or

students of research in the SANDF. These members used during pilot testing, and their responses did not form part of the sample although they were part of the population of interest to the researcher. Their comments and suggestions were used to rectify any flaws in the questionnaire.

Once the questionnaires had been rectified, the researcher delivered the questionnaires to the selected sample for completion and the questionnaires were again collected after completion. The respondents were situated in Pretoria at institutions of learning around the same period. This had the advantage of low costs and little time taken to do the research.

In this section, the researcher discussed the interviews and questionnaire. In the next section, the researcher discusses secondary sources such as documents.

### **7.6.3 Documents**

Documents, in the context of this research, refer to the institutional policies, implementation instructions and procedures, which are designed to give direction to the rest of the DOD to reach its long-term goals of strategic change. These documents ensure that strategic decisions of the executive are translated into actions that will result into measurable outcomes.

The researcher consulted policies of the DOD relevant to the research. In addition, with regard to classified information about the DOD, the researcher sought permission from the Defence Intelligence Division to have access to information and conduct the study. In turn, the researcher made sure that the image of the institution was not harmed and that confidentiality was maintained throughout the research.

## **7.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Researchers work with an ethical-moral dimension that needs to be taken into consideration when they design a study so that sound ethical practise is built into the study design. Babbie and Mouton (2002:520) is associated with ethics and morality as both dealing with matters of right or wrong. Ethics define what is or is

not legitimate to do. The ethical issues are the concerns, dilemmas and conflicts that arise in terms of the proper way to conduct research (Neuman, 2011:129).

In the following discussion, the researcher reports on the core of research ethics.

### **7.7.1 Confidentiality and anonymity**

**Confidentiality** is regarded as the ethical protection of those who are the subjects of study by holding research data in confidence, so that there are no links between specific individuals and specific responses (Moore, 2000:120). This is done by presenting data only in an aggregate form (Neuman, 2011:139). In addition, the information that matches the participants' identity to their responses will be known to the researcher only and will be made available to no one else (Du Plooy-Cilliers *et al.*, 2014:267–268). During a confidential survey, the researcher will therefore promise the respondents not to divulge their identity in public if they so wish.

**Anonymity** refers to the ethical protection that participants remain unknown and that their identity is concealed from public disclosure (Neuman, 2011:139). This means that a respondent is anonymous when the research cannot identify a participant or attach a given response to a given respondent (Du Plooy-Cilliers *et al.*, 2014:267). Therefore, the researcher should ensure that the rights of respondents to remain anonymous be observed. However, this is mainly possible during the survey questionnaire, but not during interviews because the interviewer gathers information from identifiable interviewees (Babbie & Mouton, 2002:523).

Based on the above theoretical explications, the researcher informed the respondents that no one would be forced to participate in the research and that participation was voluntary. They were also informed about confidentiality and anonymity.

### **7.7.2 Informed consent**

As is the norm in research, participants were informed that they were taking part in research and that they would be informed of what would be required of them during their involvement in the research, whether and how their identities would

be protected, and how the results of the research will be used (Du Plooy-Cilliers *et al.*, 2014:264). During the research, participants were formally informed about the aim of the research/investigation (Moore, 2000:120), and that they were the ones to give consent for their participation (Du Plooy-Cilliers *et al.*, 2014:264). In addition, the participants were informed that participation was voluntary and that they had a right to withdraw at any time of the research if they so wished.

## **7.8 DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS**

On completion of collecting the data, the researcher started to analyse and interpret the data to determine the results of the research. A descriptive data analysis method was employed for the analysis and interpretation. Statistics Programme Software System (SPSS, a computer program) was used to do the data analysis. For qualitative data, the interview summary form, which was completed after every interview, was analysed.

With regard to the quantitative data, the completed questionnaires from the respondents are tabulated in Chapter 8. After analysis and the findings had been stated on the basis of qualitative and quantitative analyses, the findings were counter-checked to identify errors of measurement, unfairness and faults that could have affected the research negatively.

## **7.9 SUMMARY**

In this chapter, the researcher provided a description of the research methodology that was used during the research. In doing so, the research methodology was described as comprising the research design, methods of data collection, research setting and participants, population and sample, data collection and ethical considerations. Paramount in the explications under these topics was the identification of a descriptive method of research to gather information. In addition, qualitative and quantitative designs were described as methods that would be used to collect data, and such collection of data was to be drawn from both the primary (interviews and questionnaire) and secondary (institutional documents and scholarly) sources.

The population of the research was identified as members of the SANDF with the rank levels of brigadier general, colonel, lieutenant colonel and major. A sample was drawn from this population, and this sample assisted the researcher to draw conclusions regarding the behaviour of the larger population.

In the next chapter, the researcher focuses on the analysis and interpretation of the research.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS**

#### **8.1 INTRODUCTION**

In the preceding chapter the researcher gave an outline of the research methodology used for data collection. The researcher discussed the primary and secondary sources that were used for the collection of data during the present research. The primary sources were based on interviews and the administering of questionnaires, while secondary sources were obtained from the literature. The researcher also described the sampling method used for questionnaires and interviews in this study. In this chapter, the researcher brings together the literature and empirical findings and presents an interpretation of the data analysis.

#### **8.2 ANALYSIS OF THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY**

In this section, the researcher deals with the quantitative analysis of data and an interpretation of the findings. The researcher presents primary data that was of importance to the research. This data was derived from the questionnaires.

The questionnaire consisted of four sections: biographical information, leadership approaches, change management, and the institutional culture of the SANDF. Concomitant with this approach, a five-point Likert-type rating scale (May, 2011:111) was employed to evaluate the respondents' perceptions. The respondents were to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statements by ticking 'Strongly Agree', 'Agree', 'Neutral', 'Disagree', or 'Strongly Disagree'. The positive responses 'Strongly Agree' and 'Agree' were grouped together and the same was done with the negative responses of 'Strongly Disagree' and 'Disagree'. The 'Neutral' statement remained the same.

In addition, the analysis and interpretation were based on primary data (questionnaires and interviews) and secondary data (the literature review). The

questionnaire was administered to 95 respondents (66 men and 29 women) and 11 interviews were conducted.


The analysis of data is categorised according to the four objectives, namely to:

- investigate the theories and concepts of strategic change management;
- explore the institutional culture of the SANDF;
- examine the effects of change management in the transformation of the SANDF; and
- explore the leadership approach that is necessary for transformation in the SANDF.

The analysis as per objective is given below.

### 8.2.1 Institutional culture

The purpose of this objective was to establish the current institutional culture of the SANDF. This objective dealt with respondents' responses to military values, norms and traditions.




**Figure 8.1 I accept military values and norms as a way of life**

Figure 8.1 reveals that an overwhelming 94.4% of respondents agreed that military values and norms are a way of life, while 3.7% disagreed and 1.9%



remained neutral. The results compared favourably with those from previous research conducted by Van Rensburg (2001:151), which identified a high level (93.4%) of respondents with military values.




**Figure 8.2 The current regimental ceremonies are the same as in my previous armed force**

Figure 8.2 shows that 45.2% of respondents did not agree that the current regimental ceremonies were the same as in their previous armed force, whereas 32.1% agreed and 22.6% were neutral on the research question. Interviewees (Mofokeng, 2011; Yam, 2011) reinforced the perception that the regimental ceremonies of their former armed forces (MK and APLA) were not part of the military culture of the SANDF. Research conducted by Van Rensburg (2001:153) suggests that there is culturally nothing holistic, unified or reminiscent of national pride that reflects the new SANDF. The SANDF therefore, has failed to incorporate regimental ceremonies of some of the previous armed forces into the new SANDF, thereby not contributing to the establishment of the composite culture.

The dominant military culture is that of the SADF, although the integrated armed forces are responsible for establishing a new institutional culture that evolves over time (Andrews & Mead, 2009:20–21; McShane & Von Glinow, 2005:487–488). The integrated armed forces are equally responsible to establish the new

composite culture that preserves the best features of the previous cultures (Andrews & Mead, 2009:20–21). There is no culture that is inferior or superior to another (Thiart, 1996:26); therefore, the new institutional culture of the SANDF needs to reflect the ceremonies and traditions of all integrated armed forces.




**Figure 8.3 The institutional culture and climate are supportive of designated groups**

Figure 8.3 shows that 11.3% of respondents disagreed that the institutional culture and climate are supportive of designated groups, whereas only 39.6% agreed and 45.3% were neutral. This shows that there is a common thread that runs through all defence forces, which among others, includes discipline, *esprit de corps* and respect. These bind soldiers and make it possible for them to work together with fellow soldiers from other countries in joint peacekeeping mission and combat operations (Mofokeng, 2011; Yam, 2011).


The line managers are responsible (RSA, 1997b:10) for ensuring that strategic change in the SANDF is taking place in a changed HR culture (RSA, 1997b:10)

and an enabling institutional environment (RSA, 1997a:11–12). HR policies, such as affirmative action, gender equity and equal opportunities, have been instituted and significant gains have been realised as indicated in 8.2.3.




**Figure 8.4 Artefacts, rituals, ceremonies and the regimental system of my former defence or armed force have been incorporated and are currently being practiced in the SANDF**

In response to the statement, “Artefacts, rituals, ceremonies and regimental systems of my former force have been incorporated and are currently practised in the SANDF”, 30.2% of respondents agreed, while an equal 30.2% disagreed. This reflected a challenge because the majority of respondents at 39.6% remained neutral. This concurred with research conducted by Kahn and Louw (2013:80), which also came to the conclusion from similar results that the beliefs, traditions and values of the TBVC and NSFs were excluded from the new military institutional culture of the SANDF. APLA had its own unique march and drill style, which they felt could have been used in the SANDF (Mofokeng, 2011; Motlounge, 2011). Research shows that the organisational culture of the SANDF is largely a replica of the former SADF (Kahn, 2005:243; Rudman, 2011; Yam, 2011).



**Figure 8.5 The institutional culture of the SANDF has changed over the last 10 years (since 2004)**

The majority of respondents (67.9%) agreed that the institutional culture of the SANDF had changed over the previous 10 years (2004–2014), whereas 7.6% disagreed and 24.5% were neutral. Members of the SANDF are challenged to adapt their lifestyle, attitudes and behaviour to a specific military culture, and the present research suggests that they are shifting in the right direction albeit towards the culture adopted from the former SADF. The SANDF will have to transform to an acceptable military culture in which all members, irrespective of their own culture, can coexist and in which operational readiness can be assured (DOD Defence Review, 1998: Para 63).



**Figure 8.6 Will the future institutional culture of the SANDF reflect cultural practices of your former armed force?**


Figure 8.6 reflects respondents' perceptions regarding whether the military culture of the SANDF will evolve to include the shared beliefs, norms and traditions of all constituent forces. The figure reveals that 28.3% of respondents agreed that the future institutional culture of the SANDF would reflect the cultural practices of their former forces, while 20.8% disagreed and 50.9% remained neutral. The results show that 50.9% of the middle officers were uncertain of whether the cultural practices of their former forces would be incorporated in the future organisational culture of the SANDF, which is cause for concern. Since the culture of the SANDF is still developing towards a culture of inclusiveness, it can be assumed that the cultural practices of former forces will be assimilated into the new culture. In their research, Kahn and Louw (2013:80) find that the culture of the SANDF could be learnt and inculcated during formal and informal training, military ceremonies, exercises and operations. However, the qualitative research showed that between 1994 and the time of the interviews in 2011, not much had changed in respect of cultural inclusiveness.

In summary, the research objective was to explore the institutional culture of the SANDF and especially to confirm whether the culture of the SANDF was reflective

of the good cultural norms and traditions of the constituent forces. It clearly shows that, at the time of this research, the new institutional culture of the SANDF was not inclusive of the TBVC and NSFs. It means that the SANDF still has a long way to go to reflect the constituent forces.

### 8.2.2 Change management

The purpose of this objective was to establish the extent to which the change management had effected transformation in the SANDF. At the time of this research, the SANDF was still engaged in change management to transform itself in terms of cultural and human capital. Since its inception in 1998, the Transformation Management Chief Directorate has been involved in ensuring and monitoring progress with affirmative action and equal opportunity programmes in the SANDF, as guided by Section 11 of the White Paper on Defence, 1998 (RSA 1996:6).




**Figure 8.7 Gender representation of the respondents**

The purpose of this question was to establish progress with respect to human transformation in the SANDF. Figure 8.7 shows that, of the respondents, 68.5% were men compared to 31.5% women. This gender representation almost reflects the corporate workforce of the SANDF, which in 2014 was 71% men and 29%

women (DOD Annual Report for the Financial Year 2013/14:106). This shows that the SANDF is predominantly a male-oriented environment, which is probably why mostly male officers participated in the research. As mentioned by Monethi (2013:49), the representivity targets issued by the Public Service Commission (2008) were that, by 2009, government institutions had to comprise:

- 75% blacks;
- 50% women in senior management services and
- 2% people with disabilities.


However, by 2009, women in senior management services stood at 34.87% in the public service (Kahn & Motsoeneng, 2014:1066) and 11.98% in the SANDF (Kahn & Louw 2013:78). This clearly shows that the SANDF had not achieved its goal of 50% women in SMSs.



**Figure 8.8 Length of service in the SANDF**

Figure 8.8 reflects that 98.1% members have more than 11 years of service in the SANDF. According to Hull (2005:97), military institutions produce a strong institutional culture, because they are led by long-serving officials. Figure 8.8 reveals that 98% of respondents had a length of service that spanned from 11 to 20 years. Therefore, it can be expected that these members had an institutional memory, a fair knowledge about the culture, norms and traditions of the SANDF. Long service also ensures that the military leadership could be firmly grounded in

the military culture of the SANDF. These long-serving members in the SANDF could be utilised to advance culture, because they could influence behaviour of newcomers through 'showing-by-doing'.



**Figure 8.9 Candidates are selected for senior management positions based on their competency and qualifications**

The figure illustrates that 66.5% of respondents did not agree that the selection of candidates for senior management positions was based on their competency and qualifications, whereas only 7.5% agreed and 24.1% were neutral on this issue. Therefore, the SANDF has a problem in ensuring that members in senior management positions were promoted based on their competencies and qualifications.

The Department of Public Service and Administration's (DPSA) Senior Management Service Handbook (RSA, 2003:9) claims that selection on merit is



fundamental to ensure that public service institutions recruit and promote people of the highest calibre. They must ensure that the person selected is the best applicant and is best suited on the basis of:

- skills;
- experience;
- abilities;
- personal attributes;
- competencies; and
- the need to achieve a representative and diverse workforce.


In addition, job-related selection should be taken into account, such as:

- competencies acquired through past experience;
- training received;
- learning potential; and
- education should not be the sole determinant of suitability.

Furthermore, the White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public Service (1997) says that selection criteria for appointment or promotion should be based on the inherent requirements of the position to be filled only and should be based on competencies. This White Paper further says that such merit must be defined within the context of employment equity.


The promotion policy of the SA Army, for example, pronounces the importance of appropriate qualifications, relevant experience, demonstrated capabilities, proficiency, as well as the potential and capacity to function at the next, higher level as the criteria to be used for promotion, irrespective of race or gender (South African Army, 2015:9). The promotion is primarily coupled to specific institutional requirements, for example the institution might require a member to be promoted into a post where his/her skills and knowledge are required for institutional effectiveness. The institution could also take into account the needs of the individual, for example the member might feel comfortable and prefer to work in deployment areas outside his or her own province and country (South African

Army, 2015:9). However, the qualitative research found that the SANDF overlooks the guidelines of the DPSA and the White Paper on Human Resource Management for Public Service when promoting staff.



**Figure 8.10 The command group of my unit does not respect my culture**


In response to the statement “The command group of my unit does not respect my culture”, 47.1% of the respondents did not agree, while 18.9% agreed and 34% remained neutral. This shows that respondents indicated that, at the time of this research (2011), there was respect for cultural differences. These results are underscored by previous research conducted by Van Rensburg (2001:152), who revealed that 26.1% agreed while 56.3% disagreed that there was respect for cultural differences. These results show that there is a need for inter-cultural socialisation, because it not only allows employees to learn each other’s culture, but also allows managers to deal with subordinates’ misconceptions and to encourage them to have trust in management (Higgs, 2011; Mdlulwa, 2011; Motlounge, 2011).



**Figure 8.11 The team spirit in the section where I work is good**

Figure 8.11 shows that, according to the respondents, there was a degree of cross-cultural interaction between different former armed forces regarding an understanding of commitment and pride in the SANDF. The majority of respondents (61.6%) agreed that the team spirit in their sections was good, whereas 24.5% disagreed and 11.3% were neutral. This is a positive development that needs to be nurtured.


Members of the SANDF have a shared sense of sacrifice and identity that binds them together with their fellow soldiers (Dorn *et al.*, 2000:8). In addition, they have a sense of identity and comradeship with their colleagues in the same unit.



**Figure 8.12 The SANDF has a culture of non-racialism**

Figure 8.12 reflects that, at the time of this research, 39.7% of the respondents did not agree that the SANDF had a culture of non-racialism, whereas 32.0% agreed and 24.5% were neutral. These results are consistent with those from previous research conducted by Van Rensburg (2001:153), which revealed that 34.9% of respondents agreed that the DOD had a culture of non-racialism, while 38.6% disagreed.

Therefore, at the time of this research, it was clear that the SANDF had not yet succeeded in creating a culture of non-racialism. The SANDF has a hegemonic male-dominated culture and, according to Kilduff and Mehra (1996:119–120), hegemonic male cultures are frequently rife with racism. The principle of defence in a democracy as derived from the Constitution (1996), mandates that the SANDF should develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture. However, in reality the opposite seems to be true.




**Figure 8.13 The culture of the SANDF promotes non-discrimination on the gender basis**

The research showed that 47.1% of the respondents agreed that the culture of the SANDF promotes non-discrimination on the basis of gender, while 30.2% disagreed and 20.8% remained neutral. These results were not consistent with that from previous research conducted by Van Rensburg (2001:153), which revealed that 34.9% of respondents agreed that the DOD had a culture of non-gender discrimination whereas 38.6% disagreed.

Hegemonic male cultures constrain the entry and progress of women and minorities in institutions (Metz & Kulik, 2008:370), these cultures are frequently rife with sexism and racism (Kilduff & Mehra 1996:119–120), and women are not considered as equals (Eccles, 1996:87–88). The SANDF tends to be a male hegemonic institution, because its primary positions (riflemen) are prototypically associated with masculine attributes (strength, authority and power) (Dlulane, 2011; Rudman, 2011).


The SANDF has also adapted the 50% women in SMS positions (of the government) to 40% representation in senior management decision-making bodies and/or committees (Kahn, 2014:1066). The SANDF has failed to reach this target. The SANDF culture does not promote non-discrimination on the basis of gender.



**Figure 8.14 My supervisor treats all his/her subordinates equally**

Figure 8.14 depicts that 37.7% of respondents said that their superiors did not treat them equally with a very close percentage of 35.8% feeling that their supervisors treated them equally, whereas 22.6% were neutral. No matter how little the difference between those who felt that they were being treated equally and those who did not, this is cause for concern. A new integrated institutional culture evolves over time (Andrews & Mead, 2009:20–21). However, between 1994 and 2014, the SANDF did not manage to establish equal treatment for men and women as well as treatment of juniors by seniors.


The Code of Conduct, as derived from the White Paper on Defence 1998 (RSA 1998:9) and the Constitution (1996), states that the SANDF shall respect the rights and dignity of its members within the normal constraints of military discipline and training. The Code of Conduct helps to guide soldiers' behaviour, be it internally or towards the members of society, and to instil patriotism (Asch & Hosek, 2004:9). However, the qualitative research revealed that the SANDF does not treat its members equally.



**Figure 8.15 I regularly socialise with my colleagues in the unit, department, division and service**

As illustrated in Figure 8.15, the researcher found that 69.9% of respondents agreed that they regularly socialised with their colleagues in their respective units, departments, divisions and services, while 22.7% disagreed and 7.5% were neutral. However, interviewees stated that they engaged in formal social events or activities with their rank group colleagues (officers), but were not allowed to fraternise with lower ranks (non-commissioned officers) (Higgs, 2011; Kula, 2011). This is meant to instil respect for the seniority of ranks and command and control. Furthermore, interviews with Xundu (2011) and Dibetso (2011) revealed that during formal military socialisation, former forces seem to gather rather than to


interact with other former forces. Part of the military culture is military socialisation, inter-cultural learning and commemoration of military events (Kahn & Louw, 2013:78).



**Figure 8.16 The SANDF's human resource practices and policies make provision for my cultural obligations**

The quantitative research revealed that 43.4% of the respondents agreed that the HR practices and policies of the SANDF make provision for their cultural obligations, compared to 30.2% who disagreed and 26.4% who were neutral. Contrary to this response, the interviewees (Kula, 2011; Mdlulwa, 2011) stated that their cultural beliefs were not catered for by the HR practices and policies. Kahn and Louw (2013:87) found that the leave policy did not make provision for soldiers to travel to the place of an accident or site of death to collect the spirit of the deceased.





**Figure 8.17 In your opinion, what does the appointment suffix in your force number PE mean?**

When respondents were asked the question “In your opinion, what does your appointment suffix PE mean?”, 3.8% of the respondents incorrectly indicated ‘permanent force’ (PF), while 11.3% responded correctly and 60.4% answers were invalid (spoilt). It is clear that the respondents did not know what the appointment suffix ‘PE’ means. It is obvious that they were indoctrinated to believe that ‘Permanent European’ (PE) means ‘permanent force’ (PF), which is inaccurate. It is clear that most of the respondents were not aware of the racial connotation attached to PE, and it shows that former forces do not know each other’s history. The interviewees brought another perspective to the research. The respondents assumed that PE means ‘permanent force’ (PF) and never asked what PE really means. When the meaning of PE and its relatedness to apartheid were explained to the interviewees, they categorically stated that they would prefer an appointment suffix that is neutral. Interviewees stated that their former


forces had no appointment suffixes (Dlulane, 2011; Makgae, 2011). This explains why the TBVC and NSFs never questioned the appointment suffix. It is obvious that a small minority of former SADF members were aware of the meaning of the suffix PE.

In summary, the qualitative research revealed that the SANDF was found lacking in ensuring that members of the SANDF respect each other's cultural differences, instilling a culture of non-racialism, and ensuring that HR practices and policies address the cultural differences of all constituent forces. It showed that the new institutional culture of the SANDF is a replica of the former SADF, which nullifies an inclusive institutional culture.

### **8.2.3 Leadership**

Objective four (refer to 1.4) sought to establish the official leadership approach that the SANDF adopted to guide transformation. During the administration of the questionnaire, the different leadership approaches were explained to respondents. Respondents were then asked to indicate the leadership approaches in the SANDF by choosing from amongst the following options:


- Autocratic leadership
- Transactional leadership
- Situational leadership
- Democratic leadership
- Transformational leadership.



**Figure 8.18 What was the predominant leadership approach of your former armed force?**

Figure 8.18 shows that 40.2% of respondents expressed that the predominant leadership approach of their former armed forces (MK, APLA, SADF and TBVC forces) was autocratic, 16.7% indicated democratic, 13.0% situational, 11.1% transactional and 5.6% transformational leadership. Of the answers, 7.4% were invalid. Interviewees from the constituent forces (Dlulane, 2011; Fongoqa, 2011; Gagiano, 2011; Kula, 2011; Motloun, 2011) endorsed the view expressed by the majority of respondents that an autocratic leadership approach was predominant in their former forces.

An autocratic leadership approach is seen to be designed to stifle debate and avoid soldiers questioning orders and commands (Kahn & Naidoo, 2011:73). All militaries are inclined to adopt an autocratic leadership approach. This is more evident during combat (Graf *et al.*, 1992:1).




**Figure 8.19 What is the current predominant leadership approach being practiced in the SANDF?**

Figure 8.19 depicts that –

- 26% of the respondents were of the view that an autocratic leadership approach was being practised in the SANDF;
- 22% indicated that a democratic leadership approach had been adopted;
- 19% said it was transformational;
- another 19% were of the view that it was situational; and
- 9% revealed it to be a transactional leadership approach; while
- 5% did not commit to an answer.

Interviewees (Dibetso, 2011; Fongoqa, 2011) also highlighted that they were not aware of the officially adopted leadership approach for transformation in the SANDF. This shows that middle management officers were not aware that a


transactional leadership approach was adopted by the SANDF as the official leadership approach (DOD, 2009a:D1-1). The failure to know the official leadership approach can be ascribed not only to a lack of knowledge in reading policies and doctrine, but also in communicating these to the members of the SANDF.



**Figure 8.20 What is your style of leadership?**

Figure 8.20 shows that the majority of respondents (35.1%) preferred to apply a transformational style of leadership, compared to 27.8% respondents who desired a democratic leadership style, whereas 22.2% respondents favoured to use a situational leadership style. This might be because the respondents had been taught different leadership styles during training. Therefore, they were conversant with the mentioned leadership styles and when they were applicable. For example, autocratic leadership is used in combat, while transactional leadership was used for promotions prior to 1994, situational for peace missions and a


democratic leadership is especially relevant for internal institutional functioning. It is worth noting that situational, democratic and transformational leadership styles are dominant among the respondents as the leadership style preferred by the middle management in the SANDF.



**Figure 8.21 Are men better leaders than women?**

Figure 8.21 reflects respondents' answers on whether men and women enjoy equal leadership opportunities, which is in line with the government imperative of equal opportunities. Figure 8.21 depicts that a slight majority of respondents (35.1%) felt that men are not better leaders than women, although 33.4% disagreed. There was a small margin of 1.8% difference between these responses. Interviewees (Debetso, 2011; Mothlabane, 2011) shared the view that men are not better leaders than women. Therefore, both men and women should receive equal leadership development opportunities to fill senior management positions. Pounder and Coleman, (2002:127) argue that the debate about gender

and leadership is inconsequential because it is the results of work performance that count regardless of gender. This is underscored by the findings by the Pew Research Centre (2015:1) that there is little difference between men and women in terms of several of leadership traits.



**Figure 8.22 Transactional leadership approach has been adopted by the SANDF**

Figure 8.22 shows that 41% of respondents disagreed that a transactional leadership approach had been adopted by the SANDF compared to 25.9% who agree and 32% who were neutral. This confirms that, at the time of this research, middle management officers were not aware of the official transactional leadership approach that the SANDF had adopted (DOD 2009a:D1-1). These results show a need for clear and decisive communication of important doctrine and policies as well as a need for including such important doctrinal and policy decisions in leadership training and development manuals.

In summary, a transactional leadership approach was officially adopted by the SANDF for transformation instead of a transformational leadership approach. According to Esterhuysen (2003:7), the transformational leadership approach is especially important when one has a second-order change in mind, that is, the revolutionary and fundamental change of an institution. As a result of adopting the transactional leadership in the SANDF, the status quo has remained unaltered. Furthermore, there also seems to be no communication to members about this leadership approach.

### **8.3 ANALYSIS OF THE QUALITATIVE STUDY**

In this section, the researcher deals with the qualitative analysis of literature and the interpretation of the findings. The analysis is grouped under similar headings as the quantitative analysis.

#### **8.3.1 Strategic change management**

In this section, the researcher deals with the first objective (refer to 1.4), which was to investigate the theories and concepts of strategic change management. The research on strategic change management in the SANDF paid attention to cultural and human capital transformation. Cultural transformation, according to Williams (2001:1), is concerned with the radical change of the military culture, the leadership, management and the administration ethos, the value system and the traditions, which are the bedrock of the military.

The SANDF is the result of the integration of five statutory forces (the SADF, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) and two non-statutory forces (MK and APLA). The view expressed by Andrews and Mead (2009:21), is that these constituent forces are supposed to be responsible for establishing a new culture that evolves over time. In essence, a new composite culture should be created which preserves the best features of the previous cultures of the integrated armed forces into the SANDF.

In the current SANDF, there seems to be a lack of evidence that the best features of the previous cultures of the constituent forces were considered in creating the



new composite culture (Mofokeng, 2011; Yam, 2011). The leadership of the SANDF has failed to establish an inclusive military culture, which is their responsibility (McShane & Von Glinow, 2005:490). The dominant culture in the SANDF is a replica of the former SADF with a few new structural designs (Fongoqa, 2011; Kahn, 2005:243; Xundu, 2011).

Human capital transformation involves radically changing the racial, gender and ethnic composition of the SANDF and its HR practices (Williams, 2001:1). Section 195(1)(h) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (RSA, 1996a:111) gives guidance that good Human Resource Management (HRM) and the optimal development of human potential (RSA, 1996b:107) should take place in a transformed institutional culture and changed HR environment (RSA, 1997a:11–12). The institutional culture of the SANDF reflects that the racial and gender composition has not yet transformed although some of the HR policies, guidelines and practices have changed.

The HR strategic goal of the SANDF determines the racial and gender ratios, which should reflect the demographics of South Africa as prescribed in the Defence Review of 1998 (Kubu, 2009:57). The SANDF endeavoured to achieve the HR goals through instituting affirmative action, gender equity and racial goals. Racial targets took centre stage rather than the transformation of human resources, namely development and empowerment of the workforce of the SANDF. To comply with racial targets of 1998 meant that members were promoted without the necessary experience and military qualifications and without their optimal human potential being developed. Hence, a perception exists that the most suitable and competent members were not appointed to the appropriate posts.

### **8.3.2 Institutional culture**

The integration into the SANDF in 1994 included five statutory forces (SADF and TBVC) and the two non-statutory forces (MK and APLA). The non-statutory and statutory forces integrated into the SANDF have a responsibility to establish a new composite institutional culture that preserves the best features of the

previous cultures. Such a new composite culture evolves over time (Andrews & Mead 2009:20–21). However, twenty years later, the new institutional culture of SANDF does not reflect the shared assumptions, beliefs, traditions and values of all former forces (McShane & Von Glinow, 2007:255). None of the current regimental ceremonies of the SANDF is from the previous armed forces, except the SADF (Mofokeng, 2011; Rudman, 2011; Yam, 2011; also see Figure 8.2). Since no culture among the integrated forces is inferior or superior to another (Thiart 1996:26), the new institutional culture of the SANDF should have been inclusive of all integrated armed forces.

### **8.3.3 Change management**

Strong institutional cultures have inclusive properties that create internal consensus and cohesiveness, but dysfunctional cultures exclude as well as include (Metz & Kulik, 2008:370). It can then be concluded that the SANDF has a dysfunctional culture, which constrains the advancement of people who are different in terms of race (see Figure 8.12) or gender from the dominant culture. Furthermore, to be considered is the fact that the SANDF as a male hegemonic culture can be seen as rife with sexism (Kilduff & Mehra, 1996:119–120), and women are not seen as equal to men (Eccles, 1996:87–88). Soni (2000:399), who claims that the dominant group, the former SADF, is not supportive of diversity in the SANDF, underscores this. Therefore, it is expected that efforts by HR practitioners of the SANDF to make the culture more inclusive are likely to be met with considerable resistance because members of dysfunctional cultures have a vested interest in maintaining the exclusivity of the institution. Leaders and managers in those cultures are unlikely to be trained to implement diversity policies, and would receive little support from colleagues for implementing them. Wilson (2000:299) supports this view, stating that HR policies alone are insufficient to overcome a “cultural devaluing of difference”.

The opposite is true as institutional cultural changes begin to take place.

Although cultural change is a process that takes years to undo traditions, assumptions, values and norms that have become part of employees’ lifestyle

(Thompson & Strickland, 2003:378–379), after 20 years (1994–2014), the SANDF has not changed the perceived dominant culture of the SADF fundamentally (see Figure 8.2). Cultural change in the SANDF is supposed to be implemented in a changing environment. The main elements are a change in management and work environment, including regulations, policies and practices (RSA, 1997a:11–12). A change in the work environment will allow members of the SANDF to adapt to the culture of the institution. The management of the SANDF should first embrace change and then create an enabling institutional environment that allows for cultural change (Luthans, 2005:119). The workforce should be encouraged and motivated to follow the new trends set by management (Thompson & Strickland, 2003:378–379).

#### **8.3.4 Leadership**

Transactional leadership is about helping institutions achieve their current objectives more effectively (Adair, 2003:23–24), without fundamentally changing everything. It is effective when the new institution undertakes short-term projects to increase production (Reggio & Murphy, 2002:106–107). It focuses on fine-tuning and maintaining the status quo (Tucker & Russell, 2004:103). It is clear that transactional leadership is designed to accomplish short-term goals, which is in contradiction with section 199(2) of the Constitution, 1996, which mandates the SANDF as the only defence force of the Republic of South Africa. This implies that the transformation of the SANDF is a long-term goal, which requires a transformational leadership approach (RSA, 1997a:11–12).

The qualitative research (see Figures 8.8 and 8.10) revealed that the institutional culture of the SANDF at the time of this research (i.e. 2011) is a replica of the former SADF. It showed that the status quo, preserved by transactional leadership, would benefit the predominant culture, namely the former SADF, its policies, practices, norms and traditions. This raises the following questions.

- How could the SANDF incorporate and merge the transformational goals and objectives when being guided by apartheid practices and policies?
- How could the SANDF institute transactional leadership?

- How could the SANDF persuade and get the acceptance of its officers to implement transformational leadership?
- How could black officers benefit from transformational leadership?

It needs to be acknowledged that the leadership of the SANDF erred in terms of leadership approach by adopting a transactional leadership approach instead of transformational leadership that is in line with the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (RSA, 1997a:11–12) and the spirit of the Constitution, 1996 (RSA, 1996b:111). However, the quantitative evidence (see Figure 8.20) suggests that the majority of respondents at middle management level preferred to apply transformational leadership, which is commensurate with managing second-order change in institutions (Esterhuysen, 2003:7).

The qualitative research showed that the transactional leadership approach reinforced the assumptions, beliefs, traditions and values of the former SADF in the new institutional culture of the SANDF. It therefore failed to transform the culture of the SANDF to one of inclusiveness. Thus, the status quo remained. A transformational leadership approach would achieve cultural inclusiveness in the SANDF (Morgan, Green, Shinn & Robinson, 2008:301–302; Van Wart, 2008:80). The application of the transformational leadership approach would benefit black officers, in that they would be represented at all levels of the military hierarchy. The SANDF has not yet managed to lead by example, treating subordinates equally (see Figure 8.14) with dignity and respect, showing a keen interest in their well-being and career advancement without favour (Dlulane 2011; Higgs 2011; McShane & Von Glinow, 2007:260).

#### **8.4 SUMMARY**

In this chapter, the theory and questionnaire were interpreted according to the primary research question stated in Chapter 1, namely:

Has transformation in the SANDF as a planned strategic change intervention been adequately managed (from 1994 to 2014) to achieve the desired results?

Furthermore, the purpose of this study, which was to provide an evaluation of the theory and practice of transformation and strategic change management in the SANDF, was considered during the analysis and interpretation of data.

It can be concluded from the quantitative and qualitative research that the institutional culture of the SANDF does not reflect shared assumptions, beliefs, traditions and values of all the integrated former armed forces. The current culture seems to reflect the culture of the former SADF. Therefore, there is no visible inclusive military culture in the SANDF. This means that there was no effort to take the best features of the previous cultures of the constituent forces into consideration when creating the new composite culture.

Furthermore, quantitative and qualitative research shows that promotion and placement of members without the necessary experience and without their human potential being optimally developed have allowed the SANDF to miss the opportunity to place the right member in the right post. The change management process resulted in the most competent members not being appointed in the most appropriate positions. It also failed to reflect the African culture in institutional policies and practices.

Furthermore, the research found that a transactional leadership approach, which is not commensurate with a transforming institution because it preserves the status quo, was officially adopted as the leadership approach to be applied for transformation. This is contrary to the transformational leadership approach, which fits well in transforming institutions. The quantitative research revealed that the middle management level of leadership of the SANDF prefers the transformational leadership approach, which is commensurate with managing second-order change in institutions.

The next chapter, based on the analysis given, the researcher reports the findings of the research, gives recommendations to rectify shortcomings, and presents the conclusions.

## **CHAPTER NINE**

### **FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS**

#### **9.1 INTRODUCTION**

The previous chapter focused on the data analysis and qualitative interpretation of the research. Based on the analysis and findings reported in the previous chapter, in this chapter, a synthesis of all chapters of this thesis identify findings are identified, and make recommendations and present conclusions are given.

#### **9.2 RESEARCH PURPOSE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES**

The purpose of this study was to determine the strategic change management in the SANDF (1994–2014). To address the stated purpose of the study, the following research objectives, as mentioned in Chapter One, were formulated to guide the study:

- to investigate the theories and concepts of strategic change management;
- to explore the institutional culture of the SANDF;
- to examine the effects of strategic change management in the transformation of the SANDF; and
- to explore the leadership approach that is necessary for transformation in the SANDF.

#### **9.3 SYNTHESIS OF CHAPTERS**

In an attempt to investigate strategic change management in the SANDF, the proposal for the study was discussed in Chapter One with specific reference to the background and rationale for the study, an outline of the problem statement, study objectives, study demarcation period, terminological clarification, research methodology, literature review, and finally an outline of the chapters.

In Chapter Two, the researcher dealt with the institutional context of strategic change management from a theoretical perspective. The discussion focused on transformational change as a type of change.

In Chapter Three, the researcher focused on a discussion of a strategic management framework with the focus on theoretical perspectives of strategic management, strategic planning and the strategic management process. Strategic management was defined as the process of coordinating the management function in a structured manner to achieve institutional objectives. This process was underpinned by three stages. The first was the environmental scanning where systematic monitoring of external forces was influencing the institution. The second stage was the strategy formulation and was regarded as the process of determining appropriate courses of action for the accomplishment of the objectives of the institution. The third stage was the strategy implementation whereby institutional strategies were converted into pragmatic actions. It was during this stage that decisions about allocation of resources were made.

In Chapter Four, the researcher discussed different definitions of institutional culture and the different levels that characterise it. Here the focus was especially on the theoretical positioning of the basic nature of an institutional culture. Types of institutional cultures, strong and weak institutional cultures and an overview of military culture were discussed.

In Chapter Five, the evolution of the military culture in South Africa was discussed. Highlighted in this chapter was the exclusion of the indigenous African militaries and their military cultures in the integration of forces during the formation of the UDF in 1912, and the military culture transformation in 1948 and 1994. These were coupled with changes in government. However, it was noted that the militaries were serving the governments of the day and did not cease to exist when a new government came to power. Also elucidated in this chapter, was the dominance of British military culture vestiges in the UDF, SADF and SANDF.

In Chapter Six, two main leadership approaches, transactional and transformational leadership, were discussed, and five leadership styles associated with military institutions were discussed, namely authoritarian, democratic, laissez-faire, situational, and command and control. It was concluded that

leadership approaches are common to all institutions except command and control, which can only be applied in military institutions.

In Chapter Seven, the researcher provided a description of the research methodology that was used in the research. The research methodology dealt with the research design, methods of data collection, research setting and participants, population and sampling, data collection and ethical considerations.

In Chapter Eight, the researcher presented the qualitative and quantitative data of the research. Quantitative data was translated into descriptive statistics and presented in the form of bar graphs. In addition, qualitative data that was collected through interviews and the document analysis was presented in the form of narratives.

In the current chapter, Chapter Nine, the researcher presents the research findings, recommendations and conclusions.

## **9.4 RESEARCH FINDINGS**

In this section, the researcher provides the findings stemming from the literature review, Chapters Two to Six, and the empirical analysis of this study reported on in Chapter Eight.

### **9.4.1 Strategic change management**

In this section, the researcher deals with the first objective to investigate the theories that was mentioned in Chapter One. Quantitative and qualitative research found the following with respect to strategic change management.

The management of the SANDF was unsuccessful in establishing an inclusive military culture, because they have failed to consider the best features of the previous cultures of the constituent armed forces (MK, APLA, TBVC and SADF) to create the new composite culture of the SANDF. The dominant culture in the SANDF is that of the former SADF with certain additions, a new structure and hierarchal design.

The SANDF strategic goal of human capital transformation as adopted from the 1998 Defence Review remained constant without adjusting it according to the



2001 and 2011 population censuses, as well as the 2014 Mid-Year Population Estimates of South Africa.

Therefore, the SANDF has not kept pace with strategic change management, because it still adheres to the race targets as stipulated in the Defence Review of 1998, which does not correlate with the 2014 population estimates.

The SANDF is struggling to fulfil section 9 of the 1996 Constitution, which deals with gender equality. Therefore, the SANDF does not reflect the demographics of the South African population.

Certain units and regiments, among others the Natal Carbineers Regiment (established in 1855) and the Transvaal Scottish Regiment (established in 1905), of the SANDF still have colonial names that are linked to Britain. However, there has been a concerted effort to rename certain military units, especially in the South African Navy, that have African names (such as SS Masego, SS Mendi and SS Maxeke). This shows the gradual inroads that the SANDF has made to portray an African defence force.

By 2014, the SANDF was still honouring its members by bestowing former MK medals only on MK members. The same principle applies to APLA and TBVC forces. These medals distinguish members according to their former armed forces, and do not create unity and therefore do not contribute to an inclusive military culture.

#### **9.4.2 Institutional culture**

In this section, the researcher deals with the second objective that was mentioned in Chapter One. This objective attempted to establish whether the current institutional culture of the SANDF is the sum of all the good cultures taken from the constituent forces as mentioned in paragraph 1.4.

The quantitative research results showed that the majority of respondents disagreed (45.3%) that the current regimental ceremonies of the SANDF are inclusive of their former armed forces (see Figure 8.2), 32.1% agreed and 22.6% were neutral). This clearly shows that the SANDF has failed to incorporate

regimental ceremonies of the previous armed forces into the new SANDF. Therefore, both quantitative and qualitative research showed that the SANDF had failed to incorporate regimental ceremonies of the previous armed force into the SANDF to form a composite inclusive culture.

The quantitative research revealed that 49.1% of respondents disagreed that, at the time of this research, the institutional culture and climate were supportive of designated groups, whereas only 5.7% agreed, and 37.7% were neutral (see Figure 8.3).

The qualitative research showed that, at the time of the research, the organisational culture of the SANDF did not reflect the shared assumptions, beliefs, traditions and values of all integrated armed forces (Roos, 1997:56). However, the integrated armed forces were collectively responsible for establishing a new institutional culture that evolved over time (Andrews & Mead, 2009:20–21; McShane & Von Glinow, 2005:487–488; Thiart, 1996:26). Twenty years after 1994, the organisational culture of the SANDF was still largely a replica of the former SADF, except for a few design and structural changes (Kahn, 2005:243).

Rewarding bravery and good service, the new medal system continues the old order by bestowing medals of the former MK, APLA, TBVC and SADF on members in the new SANDF.

This shows that artefacts, rituals, ceremonies and regimental systems of integrated former armed forces, except the SADF, have not been incorporated and practised in the SANDF.

### **9.4.3 Change management**

In this section, the researcher addresses study objective 3 and identifies the quantitative and qualitative research findings. The quantitative research findings reflected that 39.7% of the respondents did not agree that the SANDF has a culture of non-racialism, whereas 34.0% agreed, 24.5% remained neutral and 1.9% of the answers were invalid (see Figure 8.12). In addition, the SANDF has a

hegemonic male culture (see Figure 8.7) and, according to Kilduff and Mehra (1996:119–120), hegemonic male cultures are frequently rife with racism and sexism. The SANDF tends to be a ‘male hegemonic’ institution because its primary positions (riflemen) are prototypically associated with masculine attributes (strength, authority and power) (Mdluli, 2011; Rudman 2011). Therefore, both the quantitative and qualitative research findings showed that the SANDF had failed in instituting change management strategies and interventions to bring about change.

The quantitative research showed that 47.1% of respondents agreed that the culture of the SANDF promotes non-discrimination on the basis of gender in contrast to 30.2% who disagree, 20.8% who remained neutral, and 1.9% invalid (spoilt papers) answers (see Figure 8.13). The principles of the White Paper on Defence (1996), termed ‘defence in a democracy’ as derived from section 1 of the Constitution, 1996, dictate that the SANDF should develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture. The qualitative and quantitative research however showed that the SANDF has not yet been able to promote non-discrimination on the basis of gender.

The quantitative research revealed that 66.7% of respondents did not agree that the selection of candidates for senior management positions was based on their competency and qualification (see 8.9 and 9.4.1).

Human resource development allows the SANDF to develop and train its employees for senior positions (Gomez-Mejia, Balkin & Cardy, 2010:167–178). An officer, for example at the rank of colonel spends approximately 16 years undergoing training and development. The qualitative research showed that public institutions must appoint and promote suitable candidates with high-calibre skills, experience, abilities, personal attributes and competencies and take the need to achieve a representative and diverse workforce into account (Department of Public Service and Administration 2003:9).

In the quantitative research, the researcher found that the new institutional culture of the SANDF does not reflect the shared assumptions, beliefs, traditions and values of all former forces. It is a replica of the former SADF (see Figure 8.4).

The quantitative research found that 37.7% of respondents felt that they were not treated equally by their superiors with a very close percentage of 35.8% feeling that their supervisors did treat them equally, 22.6% of respondents were neutral and 3.8% of the papers were invalid (see Figure 8.14). In addition, the Code of Conduct, as derived from the White Paper on Defence (1998) and the Constitution (1996), states that the SANDF shall respect the rights and dignity of its members within the normal constraints of military discipline and training. It helps to guide soldiers' behaviour, be it internally or towards members of society, and instil patriotism (Asch & Hosek, 2004:9).

The qualitative research revealed that, at the time of this research, the HR practices and policies of the SANDF did not make provision for different cultural obligations of the SANDF. The interviewees (Kula, 2011; Mdlulwa, 2011) also stated that their cultural beliefs were not being catered for by the HR practices and policies. For example, in their research, Kahn and Louw (2013:87) established that the leave policy of the SANDF did not make provision for soldiers to travel to the place of an accident or site of death to collect the spirit of the deceased.

Qualitative research revealed that the first two numbers in a force number reflect the year of enlisting, for example the force number 94668522PE identifies the member to have enlisted in 1994. These force numbers starting with 94 were only allocated to all integrating forces, except the SADF, as if SADF was never part of the integrated armed forces. This shows some form of discrimination against other integrated forces.

#### **9.4.4 Leadership**

The quantitative research results reflected that 26% of the respondents were of the view that an autocratic leadership approach was practised in the SANDF, while 22% indicated that a democratic leadership approach had been adopted,

19% showed it was transformational, another 19% were of the view that it was situational, 9%, revealed it to be a transactional leadership approach, with 5% not committing to an answer to the question (Figure 8.19).

Quantitative research reveals that 41% of respondents disagreed that the transactional leadership approach has been adopted by the SANDF compared to 25.9% who agreed, whereas 32% were neutral (Figure 8.22). This confirmed that the middle management officers were not aware of the official transactional leadership approach that the SANDF had adopted (DOD, 2009:D1-1). This clearly showed that there seems to be a lack of communication in the channels of command regarding policy and doctrinal matters to members.

The qualitative research showed that a transformational leadership approach plays a crucial role in transforming institutions that amalgamated to form a new institution (Tucker & Russell 2004:103–104).

Therefore, the quantitative and qualitative research revealed that the SANDF had adopted a transactional leadership approach, rather than a transformational leadership approach to transform the integrated SANDF.

## **9.5 RECOMMENDATIONS**

The recommendations discussed in this section are based on the findings discussed above.

### **9.5.1 Strategic change management**

It is suggested that the HR policies and practices of the SANDF should be adjusted to accommodate the uniquely African beliefs, traditions and values that exist among the members of the institution, for example, to introduce a suffix that has no racial undertones or any reminder of apartheid.

The SANDF, in consultation with the DPSA, should subject its racial ratio policy in consultation with Statistics South Africa on an annual basis. This will enable the SANDF to resemble the racial and gender demographics of the South African population.

In addition, it is proposed that the units and regiments of the SANDF that have colonial names should change to names that reflect South African history and heroes. Furthermore, the medals that are designed and issued to former armed forces should be done away with and be replaced with medals that reflect the new SANDF while recognising past successes.

### **9.5.2 Institutional culture**

It is suggested that the current leadership of the SANDF should agree on the best culturally and politically correct artefacts, rituals, ceremonies and regimental systems of former defence or armed forces that can be incorporated into the new institutional culture of the SANDF. Care should be taken to avoid ceremonies that hinge on tribe, religion, race and gender denigration. It is proposed that a committee that is representative of all the former armed forces be set up to do the deliberations, make recommendations and presentations to the Military Command Council and finally to the Council on Defence for ratification.

### **9.5.3 Change management**

It is suggested that the SANDF HR policies on selection of senior members incorporate the guidelines as given by the Department of Public Service and Administration's (DPSA) Senior Management Service Handbook (DPSA, 2003:9)

It is suggested that the SANDF non-racialism should not only be captured in policy statements, but should also punish racism to ensure that non-racialism is practiced. Discrimination on the basis of race should be discouraged and be reported via a separate channel, for example the military ombudsperson.

The HR racial and gender equity goals should not only form part of commanders' directives, but should also be included as their performance agreements and/or goals.

The leadership of the SANDF should show non-racialism by correct behaviour and lead by example to influence the behaviour of subordinates positively.

Part of promoting non-discrimination on the basis of gender should be equal access to training and development opportunities. Promotion on merit and experience should be applied, irrespective of gender.

Furthermore, internal communication methods, such as leaflets, intranet, billboards in units and noticeboards should be used to disseminate information.

Added to these, the actions and behaviour of senior members of the SANDF should reflect gender non-discrimination.

It is proposed that the leadership of the SANDF internalise the cultural changes they envisage and reflect the expected behaviour in their deeds and behaviour. The leadership should lead by example, treating subordinates with dignity and respect, and showing a keen interest in their well-being and career advancements.

It is suggested that the suffix Permanent European (PE) be replaced with Permanent Member (PM). Coupled with this change should be a randomly selected eight-digit force number that does not reflect the year of enlistment into the SANDF. Members who integrated in 1994 are identified by their force numbers starting with 94 and those from the SADF have force numbers starting with numbers up to 93. This identification is open to discrimination.

#### **9.5.4 Leadership**

It is recommended that transactional leadership be replaced with transformational leadership. Furthermore, the SANDF should ensure that the theory of a transformational leadership approach be translated into action so that members can feel it and identify with it. The practical understanding and behaviour about transformational leadership should be encouraged through incentivising good behaviour.

### **9.6 PROPOSED STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT MODEL**

The SANDF should therefore follow the adapted change management model as depicted in Figure 9.1. The model was adapted from Lewin's (1951) change management model. In using the model, it is important to start the transformation

process by ensuring a legal base is created (which the SANDF correctly created). Such a legal framework is the Constitution of South Africa (1996), the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service of 1995, the White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service of 1998, and the Labour Relations Act of 1996. During the unfreeze stage, the leadership of the SANDF should communicate with all members, informing them about reasons for instituting change in the institution and about how they would benefit from changes. This should ensure that members accept, own and support the initiated change. A transformational leadership approach should be applied at all stages.

Stage 1 should be to dismantle (unfreeze) (see 2.6.1) the 1994 status quo, which includes building commitment from the members and management of the SANDF. To achieve the best possible results, leaders should empower teams that can design, test and implement strategies through which change effectiveness can be assured (Ajmal, Faook, Sajid & Awan, 2013:115). The SANDF established the Transformation Management Chief Directorate (CDTM) as an institution to implement the Equal Opportunity (EO) and Affirmative Action (AA) programmes. The CDTM was mandated to promote representativeness and to ensure that the SANDF reflects an appropriate demographic composition (Monethi, 2013:56). Services and divisions of the SANDF should keep the CDTM updated on progress with respect to EO and AA.

The second stage corresponds with stage 2 in Figure 1.1, is also depicted in Figure 9.1, and involves the actual change (action) to be carried out. This stage involves change in strategy, culture, attitudes and skills. It is during this stage that policies are formulated and implemented to effect the changes (Evison, 2014:1; Robbins *et al.*, 2003:411).

### **9.6.1 Leadership**

The transformation process in an institution should be driven by leaders who are able to formulate strategies to take the institution forward by giving strategic direction (Evison, 2014:1). Such a transformation process should be guided by a particular leadership approach commensurate with it. To guide its transformation



process, the SANDF adopted the transactional leadership approach. The transformational leadership should rather have been adopted because it is the preferred leadership approach that cannot only transform institutions, but also empower employees to transcend above their own aspirations and goals to achieve institutional strategic goals (Senior,C.,Martin, R.,Thomas,G.,Topakas.,A.,West,M.&Yeats,RM.2012.Development Stability and Leadership effectiveness. The Leadership Quarterly. 23(3):281-291

### **9.6.2 Strategy**

The SANDF, for example, adopted Human Resource Strategy 2010 (DOD 2003:5-6) whose objective was the rejuvenation of the military by recruiting more young soldiers and allowing those who are too old to leave the military. The Mobility Exit Mechanism (MEM) was introduced to facilitate the exit of those who are old and who can no longer make a positive contribution to the organisation. MEM was wrongly applied in that skilled and experienced members were allowed to exit the SANDF. This left a void in the SANDF. Concomitant with these strategies were programmes such as Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunities, which were the focus of transformation to correct gender and racial imbalances within the SANDF. These strategies and programmes were never fully realised as reflected in the findings (see 9.4). The rejuvenation of the SANDF is still a necessity and needs to be pursued, i.e. a new rejuvenation strategy needs to be adopted. Such a strategy should not be used to enhance race and gender transformation, but to appoint suitably qualified young men and women irrespective of their background. The MEM should be applied as an employer-initiated package, which does not allow members to apply as they wish to avoid the exodus of skilled members.

There must come a time when all members need to be seen only as South Africans, with no colour identification. This means that transformation efforts should have a target end date and not be seen as a perennial exercise.

### **9.6.3 Culture**

The SANDF inherited the culture of the SADF, which had a racial discrimination and gender insensitive character. Training and development opportunities were mostly reserved for white Afrikaner men. In addition, to change this culture, the SANDF used a transactional leadership approach instead of a transformational leadership approach. A new institutional culture within the context of transformational culture should be created by adopting good cultural aspects from the constituent armed forces.

### **9.6.4 Strategic change management**

This is where all the policies are formulated to institute change. The SANDF should establish ways to encourage and to incentivise behaviour that reflects a positive culture in the institution. The SANDF should develop a performance management and development system, a reward system that encourages the display of a positive culture. Training and development of members are crucial during this stage. However, the training and development opportunities for all races and both genders should be equal so that members enjoy the same opportunities for promotions.


Stage three (refreeze) (see Figure 9.1) is about consolidating the successes of stage two. This is where cultural changes, such as traditions, assumptions, values and norms have been successfully changed and accepted by members. The context of cultural change is a changed environment whose main elements are a change in management and work environment, including regulations, policies and practices. These main elements, once achieved, need to be guarded against abuse and negligence (Roos, 1997:56).

In this stage (stage three), the institution is reconfigured in terms of a new strategy and structure and setting out performance indicators so that the performance of the institution can be ready to be measured or evaluated (Anderson & Anderson, 2001:60).

### 9.6.5 Change management

This is the implementation of human resources established practices and policies that the SANDF would refreeze as good acceptable behaviour. Such policies, for example, are based on performance management, equal employment opportunities and equal training and development opportunities for all members, irrespective of gender and race.

Coaching, mentoring and modelling by the leadership of the SANDF should take place. The leaders at different levels of the SANDF should assimilate members into new ways of doing their work according to the new direction of the institution.



**Figure 9.1 Transformation model for the SANDF**

**Source:** Adapted from Robbins *et al.* (2003:411) and Evison (2014:1)

## 9.7 CONCLUSION

The research focused on strategic change management in the SANDF, in particular transformation of the institutional culture. The research firstly found that, after twenty-three years, the strategic change management as applied in the SANDF has not succeeded in creating a unified inclusive military culture from the seven former forces. The research has also shown that the SANDF is experiencing challenges with regard to gender representation, selection of members for senior management positions, and the institutional culture and climate support of designated groups. Thus, the new institutional culture of the SANDF does not reflect the shared assumptions, beliefs and values of all integrated armed forces.

Secondly, change management in the transformation of the SANDF has not succeeded in ensuring that members of the SANDF respect each other's cultures. The SANDF lacks the urge to enforce a culture of non-racialism and non-discrimination on the basis of gender.

Thirdly, a transactional leadership approach was adopted by the SANDF during strategic change management, contrary to prescriptions by the White Paper on Defence of 1986 and the Defence Review of 1998 to use a transformational leadership approach. A transactional leadership approach helped the SANDF to preserve the culture of the former SADF in the SANDF. The status quo was preserved without fundamental or revolutionary change in the culture of the SANDF. The transactional leadership approach adopted by the SANDF was further compounded by the view that middle management leadership was not aware of its adoption as the official leadership approach (see Figure 8.22). A transformational leadership approach could have helped the SANDF to transform the SANDF fundamentally to have an inclusive military culture. In addition, unity among the leadership in terms of strategic direction of the institution is paramount during transformation. Such unity must manifest itself in appropriate policies that would help the institution to achieve its desired goals.

However, it can be concluded that transformation in the SANDF as a planned strategic change intervention has not been managed adequately (1994 to 2014) to achieve desired results.

### **9.8 LIMITATIONS TO THE STUDY**

A limitation might be that the research focused only on one service of the security cluster, namely the SANDF.

### **9.9 FUTURE RESEARCH**

There are areas of research that could not be explored in this research as it was focused on strategic change management in the SANDF. However, the following research topics could be of interest to enhance human science:

- Research by other arms of the security cluster on strategic change management would enhance the general findings of this study.

South Africa is part of Africa. Therefore, a comparative study with another African country to determine to what extent the SANDF reflects an African culture, would be welcome.

## REFERENCE LIST

- Adair, J. 2003. *The inspirational leader*. London: Kogan-Page.
- Addis, A. 2012. *Strong vs weak cultures*. Retrieved from [beyondinsurance.wordpress.com/2012/09/04/strong-vs-weak-cultures](http://beyondinsurance.wordpress.com/2012/09/04/strong-vs-weak-cultures) [Assessed 9 January 2015].
- Adler, E.S. & Clark, R. 2003. *How it's done: An invitation to social research*. Second edition. Belmont, MA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.
- Ajmal, S., Farook, M.Z., Sajid, N. & Awan S. 2013. The role of leadership in change management process. *Abasyn Journal of Social Science*, 5(2):111-124.
- Akshaya, Bhatia, Wmortelm & Mansouri. 2008. *Change management*. Retrieved from [Toolbox.com](http://Toolbox.com) [Accessed 6 November 2013].
- Alvarez-Rivera, M. 2004. *Election resources on the internet: The Republic of South Africa electoral system*. Retrieved from [proquest.com](http://proquest.com) [Assessed 9 January 2015].
- ANC (African National Congress). 1961. *uMkhonto weSizwe (MK): The ANC and the armed struggle*. South African History Online. Retrieved from [www.sahistory.org.za/topic/umkhonto-weSizwe-mk](http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/umkhonto-weSizwe-mk) [Accessed 19 July 2017].
- ANC (African National Congress). 1985. *UmKhonto weSizwe Military Code*. ANC National Consultative Conference, Kabwe, June.

- Anderson, D. & Anderson, L. 2001. *Beyond change management: Advanced strategies for today's transformational leaders*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Anderson, D. & Anderson, L.A. 2010. *Beyond change management: How to achieve breakthrough results through conscious change leadership*. London: Wiley.
- Andrews, T.G. & Mead, R. 2009. *Cross-cultural management: Critical perspectives on business and management*. London: Routledge.
- Arvey, R.D. & Jones, A.P. 1985. The use of discipline in organizational settings: A framework for future research. L.L. Cummings & B.M. Staw (eds.). *Research in organizational behaviour* (Vol. 7). Greenwich, CT: JAI, 367–408.
- Asch, B.J. & Hosek, J.R. 2004. *Looking to the future: What does transformation mean for military man power and personnel policy?* Santa Monica, CA: Academia.edu.
- Ashton, E.M. 2008. The historiography of the formation of the Union of South Africa. Doctoral Dissertation, Coursework. Unpublished. Faculty of Humanities. Pretoria: University of Pretoria.
- Australian Defence Force. 2007. *Leadership in the Australian Defence Force*. Australian Defence Doctrine publication 00.6. Canberra Act 2600. Australian Government.
- Avolio, B.J. 1999. *Full leadership development: Building the vital forces in organisations*. London: Sage.

- Babbie, E. & Mouton, J. 2001. *The practice of social research*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
- Babbie, E. & Mouton, J. 2003. *The practice of social research*. 10<sup>th</sup> Edition. South African edition. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
- Baker, M.J. 2007. *Marketing strategy and management*. Fourth edition. London: Macmillan.
- Baldwin, T.T., Bommer, W.H. & Rubin, R.S. 2013. *Managing organisational behaviour: What great managers know and do*. Second edition. New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin.
- Bamber, G. 2001. *History of South Africa*. History World. Retrieved from [www.sahistory.org.za](http://www.sahistory.org.za). [Accessed 20 February 2015].
- Barney, J.B. & Hesterly, H.S. 2010. *Strategic management and competitive advantage: Concepts and cases*. Third edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Barrington, T.J. 1984. Leadership and the public service. *The Farrow*, 35(5):283–294.
- Beckhard, R. 1969. *Organization development: Strategies and models*. Addison-Wesley.
- Beckhard, R. & Prichard, W. 1992. *Changing the essence: The art of creating and leading fundamental change in organisations*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Belcourt, M., Bohlander, G. & Snell, S. 2011. *Managing human resources*. Sixth Canadian edition. Ontario: Nelson Education.
- Berdal, M. & Keen, D. 1997. Violence and economic agendas in civil wars: Some policy implications: *Millennium*, 26(3):785-818.



- Blackstad, M & Cooper, A. 1995. *The Communicating Organisation* Institute of Personnel and Development.
- Blahova, M. & Knapkova, A. 2010. *Effective strategic action: From formulation to implementation*. 2010 International Conference on Economics, Business and management, Manila. LACS IT Press.
- Blair, M., Sorensen, P. & Yaeger, T. 2002. OD practitioner. *Journal of the Organization Development Network*, 34(1):54-58. Retrieved from <http://www.odnetwork.org/odponline/vol34n1/fromtheeditors.html> [Assessed 14 February 2014].
- Bless, C. & Higson-Smith, C. 1997. *Fundamentals of social research methods: An African perspective*. Second edition. Kenwyn: Juta.
- Bloisi, W., Cook, C.W. & Hunsaker, P.I. 2003. *Management & organisational behaviour*. Berkshire: McGraw-Hill Education.
- Bohlander, G. & Snell, S. 2007. *Human resource management*. Edition 14 illustrated. Alexandria: Cengage Learning.
- Bolden, R., Gosling, J., Marturano, A. & Dennison, P. 2003. *A review of leadership theory and competency frameworks*. Edited version of a report for Chase Consulting and Management Centre. Exeter: Centre for Leadership Studies, University of Exeter.
- Boonstra, J. 2004. *Dynamics of organisational change and learning*. London: Wiley.
- Bopela, T. & Luthuli, D. 2005. *Umkhonto we Sizwe, Fighting for a divided people*. Alberton: Galago.

- Bouch, R.J. 1977. *Infantry in South Africa 1652–1976*. Pretoria: Documentation Service.
- Boulter, R.S. 1997. Erasmus and the politics of South African Defence, 1948–1959. Unpublished PhD thesis. Grahamstown: Rhodes University.
- Bowhill, B. 2008. *Business planning and control: Integrating accounting, strategy and people*. London: Wiley.
- Breakwell, G.M., Smith, J.A. & Wright, D.B. 2012. *Research methods in psychology*. Fourth edition. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Brown, D.R. 2011. *An experiential approach to organisation development*. English edition. Boston: Prentice-Hall.
- Bryant, P. Coombs, A. & Pazio, M. 2014. Are we having fun yet? Institutional resistance and the introduction of play and experimentation into learning innovation through social media. *Journal of Interactive Media in Education*, 2014(2) 4: 1–8.
- Brydon-Miller, M., Greenwood, D., Maguire, D. & Members of the Editorial Board of Action Research. 2003. Why action research? *Action Research*, 1(1):9–28.
- Bryman, A. 2001. *Social research methods*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Brynard, P.A. & Hanekom, S.X. 1997. *Introduction to research in public administration and related academic disciplines*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Bryson, J.M. 2004. *Strategic planning for public and non-profit organisations: A guide to strengthening and sustaining organisational achievement*. Third edition. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

- Buck, J.H. & Korb, L.J. 1981. *Military leadership*. California, CA: Sage.
- Burnes, B. 2004a. *Managing change: A strategic approach to organisational dynamics*. New York: Prentice Hall.
- Burnes, B. 2004b. Kurt Lewin and the planned approach to change: A re-appraisal. *Journal of Management Studies*, 41(6):977-1002.
- Caforio, G. 2006. *Handbook of the sociology of the military*. Norwell, MA: Springer.
- Cameron, K. 2004. A process of changing organisational culture. Driver, M. In *Handbook of organisational development*. Retrieved from [Accessed 29 November 2013].
- Cawthra, G. 1986. *Brutal force: The apartheid war machine*. London: International Defence Aid Fund for Southern Africa.
- Celliers, J., Schutte, C., Liebenberg, I. & Sass, B. 1997. Public attitudes regarding the image and future of the South African military and defence industry. *African Security Review*, 6(5):25–35.
- Chemengich, M.K. 2013. Managing strategic change in the public sector. *Standard Research Journal of Business Management*, 1(1):1–40.
- Cherry, K. 2014. *Lewin's leadership styles: Three major styles of leadership*. <http://psychology.about.com/od/leadership//a/leadstyles.htm>,2014. [Accessed 2 February 2014].
- Choi, S. 2007. Democratic leadership: The lessons of exemplary models for democratic governance. *International Journal of Leadership Studies* 2(3): 243-262.

- Coakley, T.P. 1992. *Command and control for war and peace*. Washington, DC: National Defence University Press.
- Cock, J. 1990. The role of violence in current state security strategies. In M. Swelling (ed.). *Views on the South African state*. (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1990), pp 85-108.
- Coleman, M. 1998. *A crime against humanity: Analysis of the repression of the apartheid state*. Braamfontein: Human Rights Commission of South Africa.
- Cooper, C. 1995. *Noises in the blood: Orality, gender, and the "vulgar" body of Jamaican popular Culture*. Chicago: Duke University Press.
- Cooper, D.R. & Emory, C.W. 1991. *Business research methods*. Boston: Richard D. Irwin. Inc.
- Coulter, M. 2013. *Strategic management*. Sixth edition. Boston: Pearson Education.
- Creasey, T. 2007. *Defining change management: Helping others understand change management in relation to project management and organisational change*. Retrieved from Prosci. Change management learning center (online) [Accessed 7 February 2014].
- Cummings, T.G & Worley, C.G. 2001. *Essentials of Organisational development and change*. South- Western College Publication.
- David, F. 2006. *Strategic management: Concepts and Cases*. Eleventh edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- David, F.R. 2009. *Strategic management: Concepts and cases*. Twelfth edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

- Davies, M. 2001. *Commanding change: War winning strategies for managing organisational change*. Santa Barbara: Praeger.
- Defence Leadership Centre. 2004. *Leadership in defence*. Swindon: Ministry of Defence.
- Deffner, H.W. 2003. *Strategic navigation: The Constraint Management Model*. Paper presented at the APICS International Conference, Las Vegas, NV.
- De Kluyver, C.A. & Pearce, J.A. II. 2012. *Strategy: A view from the top*. Fourth edition. Boston: Pearson Education.
- Denhardt, R.B., Denhardt, J.V. & Aristigueta. 2013. *Managing human behaviour in public and non-profit organisation*. Third edition. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Dennis, J.L, Lamothe, L & Langley, A. 2001. The dynamics of collective leadership and strategic change on pluralistic organisations. *The Academy of Management Journal*, 44(4):809–837.
- Derungs, I.M.H. 2011. *Trans-cultural leadership for transformation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dess, G.G., Lumpkin, G.T. & Taylor, M.L. 2005. *Strategic management*. Second edition. London: McGraw-Hill Irwin.
- Dessler, G. 1995. *Managing organisations in an era of change*. Fort Worth: Dryden Press.
- Desson, K. & Clouthier, J. 2010. Organisational culture: Why does it matter? Paper presented at the Symposium on International Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 3 November.
- De Vaus, D.A. 1994. *Surveys in social research*. London: UCL Press.

- De Vos, A.S., Schuring, E.W., Strydom, H., Fouché, C.B. & Poggenpoel, M. 2001. *Research at grassroots: A primer for the caring professions*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- De Wet, B. & Meyer, R. 2004. *Strategy. Process, content, context: An international perspective*. North Yorkshire: Thompson Learning.
- Dimon, R. 2013. *Enterprise management done right: An operating system for your organisation*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Wiley.
- Dix-Peek, R. 2007. *South Africans at the Battle of Jutland, 31 May 1916*. Pretoria: South African Military History Society.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 1996a. *Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 1996b. *White Paper on Defence*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 1998. *Defence Review 1998*. Government Printers.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 1999a. *Defence in a democracy*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 1999b. *Department of Defence Fast Tracking Policy*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 1999c. *DOD Instruction Pol & Plan 52/2001: DOD HR Strategy 2010*. Second edition. Pretoria: Government Printers.

- DoD (Department of Defence). 2001. *Human Resource Management Strategy 2010*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 2003. *Human Resource Strategy 2010 Strategic Implementation Plan*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 2008. *Annual report 2007–2008*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 2009a. *Report on Department of Defence Gender Conference: 26–28 August 2009*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 2009b. *Translation of former Non-Statutory Force members appointed on contract to the Long Term Service (LTS) component of the Flexible Service System (FSS)*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 2011. *Annual report financial year 2010/11*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 2012. *Annual report financial year 2011/12*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 2013. *Annual report financial year 2012/13*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 2014a. *Annual report financial year 2013/14*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- DoD (Department of Defence). 2014b. *Department of Defence annual report financial year 2013/14*. Pretoria: Government Printers.

- DoD (Department of Defence). 2015. *DoD planning instruments*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- Dorn, E., Graves, H.D., Collins, J.J., Jimer, W.F. & Jacobs, T.O. 2000. *American military culture – first century*. A report of the SCIS International Security Program. Washington, DC: SCIS Press.
- Dorning, W.A. 1987. A concise history of the South African National Defence Force (1912–1987). *Scientia Militaria*, 17(2). 1-23.
- DPSA (Department of Public Service and Administration). 2003. *Senior management service handbook*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- DPSA (Department of Public Service and Administration). 2015. *Annual report on employment equity in public service 2014/2015*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- Dunivin, K.O. 1997. *Military culture: A paradigm shift?* Alabama, AL: Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base.
- Dunphy, D., Griffiths, A. & Benn, S. 2007. *Organisational change for corporate sustainability: A guide for leaders and change agents for the future*. Second edition. London: Routledge.
- Du Plooy-Cilliers, F., Davis, G. & Bezuidenhout, R. 2014. *Research matters*. Cape Town: Juta.
- Ehlers, T. & Lazeby, K. 2005. *Strategic management: South African concepts and cases*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Ehlers, T. & Lazenby, K. 2007. *Strategic management: Southern African concepts and cases*. Second edition. Pretoria: Van Schaik.



- Ellis, S. 2000. *The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*. Report, Volume 1–5. Pretoria: Government Printers. October 1998. Transformation Issue 42. 57-72.
- Ellis, S. 2011. *The genesis of the ANC “Armed struggle in South Africa 1948 - 1961.”* Journal of Southern African Studies 37(4): 657-676.
- English, A.D. 2004. *Understanding military culture: A Canadian perspective*. McGill - Queen’s University Press.
- Esterhuysen, A. & Heineken, L. 2013. *Report on the military culture and institutional ethos of the South African Army*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- Esterhuysen, W.P. 2003. The challenge of transformation and breaking the barriers. *SA Journal of Business Management*, 34(2):1–8.
- Evison, A. 2014. *Lewin’s Change Management Model: Understanding the three stages of change*. Mindtools. Retrieved from [http://www.Mindtools.com/pages/article/newPPM\\_94.htm](http://www.Mindtools.com/pages/article/newPPM_94.htm). [Accessed 20 March 2014].
- Fabe, V. 2012. *Sample thesis: chapter 3 methodology on consumer behavior*. Retrieved from [http://askvicfabe.typepad.com/swot\\_analysis/2009/03/sample-thesis-chapter-3-methodology](http://askvicfabe.typepad.com/swot_analysis/2009/03/sample-thesis-chapter-3-methodology) [Assessed 8 February 2016].
- Febbraro, A.R., McKee, B. & Riedel, S.L. 2008. *Technical report findings: Multinational operations and intercultural factors*. RTO|NATO NATO RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANIZATION NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE (FRANCE); 2008 Nov.

- Fenwick, L. and Ukata, P., 2009. *British and French Styles of Influence in Colonial and Independent Africa: A Comparative Study of Kenya and Senegal. Honors Capstone, April, 23.*
- Fielder, D., 2011. *Defining command, leadership, and management success factors within stability operations.* Strategic Studies Institute. [http://www.globalsecurity.org/.../libray\\_report/2011/ssi\\_fielder.pdg](http://www.globalsecurity.org/.../libray_report/2011/ssi_fielder.pdg). [Accessed 25 November 2013].
- Fiss, P.C. & Zajac, E.J. 2006. The symbolic management of strategic change: Sense giving via framing and decoupling. *Academy of Management Journal*, 49(6):1173–1193.
- Flock, K., 2006. *Communication in organizational change.* Retrieved November, 3, p.2011.
- Fokkens, A.M. 2006. *The role and application of the Union Defence Force in the suppression of internal unrest, 1912–1945.* Retrieved from [https://scholar.sun.ac.za/.../173552/fokkens\\_role\\_2006.pdf?sequence=1.pdf](https://scholar.sun.ac.za/.../173552/fokkens_role_2006.pdf?sequence=1.pdf). [Accessed 22 February 2014].
- Foster, C. 2013. *Organisational development.* organisationaldevelopment.org [Accessed 22 February 2014].
- Fredrickson, J.W. 1990. *Perspectives on strategic management.* New York: Harper Business.
- French, W.L. & Bell C.H. Jr. 1995. *Organization development: Behavioral science interventions for organization improvement.* Fifth edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

- French, W.L., Bell, J.R., C.H. & Zawacki, R.A. 2005. *Organisational development and transformation: Managing effective change*. Sixth edition. London: McGraw-Hill.
- Geldenhys, D. 1981. *Some foreign policy implications of South Africa's "Total National Strategy" with particular reference to the 12 point plan*. Braamfontein: South African Institute for International Affairs.
- Ghuri, P. & Gronhaug, K. 2005. *Research methods in business studies: A practical guide*. Third edition. London: Prentice Hall Financial Times.
- Giliomee, H. & Mbenga, B. 2007. *New history of South Africa*. Cape Town: Tafelberg.
- Gill, S.J. 2010. *Command and control leadership vs. people-centred leadership*. The Performance Improvement Blog.
- Gillings, K. 2008. *The aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War*. South African Military History Society. Durban: Art Publishers.
- Goldman, A., Maritz, R., Nienaber, H., Pretorius, M., Prillaid, D. & Williams, D. 2010. *Strategic management: Supplement for South Africa*. Cape Town: Pearson Education.
- Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Balkin, D.B. & Cardy, R.L. 2005. *Management*. Second edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Gonçalves, M. 2007. *Change management: Concepts and practice*. New York: ASME Press.
- Goodale, R., Abb, W. R., & Moyer, B. A. (2014, September 20). Military culture 101:

- Not One culture but many cultures. Retrieved from Citizen Soldier Support:  
<http://www.citizensoldiersupport.org/lib/resources/ORNC%20Military%20Culture%20101%20Workshop%202014%20Sep%202012.pdf>. [Assessed 23 May 2015].
- Graf, L.A., Hemmasi, M. & Winchell, M.W. 1992. Effective leadership behaviour in the Desert Storm arena: An application of the Vroom-Yetton-Jago Model. *Developments in Business Simulation & Experiential Exercises*, 19.
- Grattan, R.F. 2011. *Strategic review: The process of strategy formulation in complex organisations*. London: Gower.
- Gravetter, F. & Forzano, L.B. 2012. *Research methods for the behavioural sciences*. Fourth edition. Wadsworth: Cengage Learning.
- Gray, C.S. 1999. *Modern strategy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Haberfeld, M.R. 2006. *Police leadership*. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall.
- Haines, A.M. 2000. Montessori in early childhood: Positive outcomes among social, moral, cognitive and emotional dimensions. *NAMTA Journal*, 25(2):27–59.
- Hall, L. K. 2012. The military lifestyle and the relationship. In More, B. A. (Ed), *Handbook of counselling military couples*. (pp 137-156). New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis.
- Hall, J., Johnson, S., Wysock, A. & Kepner, K. 2012. *Transformational leadership: Transformation of managers and associates*. University of Florida. Retrieved from [edis.ifas.ufl.edu](http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu) [Accessed 23 February 2014].

- Handy, C. 1985. *Understanding organizations*. Third edition. London: Penguin.
- Hannagan, T. 1998. *Management concepts and practices*. Second Edition. Johannesburg. Financial times management.
- Hannah, S.T and Avolio, B.J. 2010. *Ready or Not: How do we accelerate the developmental readiness of leaders*. John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Public Service Commission Targets 2008.
- Hannah, S.T. 2010. Leadership in the profession of arms. In M. Rumsey (ed.). *Oxford handbook of leadership*. New York: Oxford University Press, Retrieved  
FromDLE\_12032\_Hannah2010LeadershipintheProfessionofArms.pdf  
[Accessed 23 November 2013].
- Hartley, J. 2009. *Introduction to organisational development*. PowerPoint presentation. Retrieved from jhartleyconsulting.com [Accessed 22 February 2014].
- Heng, Z. 2013. *Characteristics of Chinese military culture: A historical perspective*. ASIA paper, April. Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy.
- Herold, D.M. & Fedor, D.B. 2008. *Change the way you lead change*. Stanford University Press.
- Hien, T.T.T. 2009. Why is action research suitable for education? *VNU Journal of Science, Foreign Languages*, 25:97–106.
- Hill, C.W.L. & Jones, G.R. 2008. *Essentials of strategic management*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

- Hough, J., Thompson, A.A. Jr., Strickland, A.J. III & Gamble, J.E. 2011. *Crafting and executing strategy*. Second edition. Glasgow: McGraw-Hill.
- Hull, I.V. 2005. *Absolute destruction: Military history and the practices of war in Imperial Germany*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Hunt, J.G. & Blair, J.D. 1985. *Leadership on the future battle field*. Sheperdstown: Pergamon-Brassey's.
- Iles, V. & Sutherland, K. 2001. *Organisational change: A review for health care managers, professionals and researchers*. London: National Co-ordinating Centre for NHS Service Delivery and Institution R&D. London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
- International Association of Administrative Professionals. 2009. *Leadership theories and styles*. Retrieved from [www.orgsites.com/co/iaap-denver/DENVERDIGESTAUGSEPT2009.pdf](http://www.orgsites.com/co/iaap-denver/DENVERDIGESTAUGSEPT2009.pdf) [Accessed 25 November 2013].
- Jagdish, P.N. 2013. *Business planning and strategic management: Cyber Tech*.
- Jamison, E.L. 2004. *The Nazi influence in the formation of apartheid in South Africa, Concord Review*. Retrieved from [www. Tcr.org/tcr](http://www.Tcr.org/tcr)
- Elisabeth Lee Jamison, *The Nazi Influence in the Formation of Apartheid in South Africa, Concord Review*
- Jones, G.R. & Hill, C.W.L. 2013. *Theory of strategic management*. Tenth edition. Ohio: South-Western.
- Kahn, S.B 2005. *Managing the South African National Defence Force towards productivity; a human resource management perspective*, unpublished

- dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Cape Town Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch.
- Kahn, S.B. 2009. Employment of women in the South African National Defence Force 1998–2008. *Journal of Public Administration*, 44(1):196–208.
- Kahn, S.B. & Louw, V.N. 2013. A leadership approach to the transformation of institutional culture: A case for the South African National Defence Force. *Administratio Publica*, 21(4):67-90.
- Kahn, S.B. & Motsoeneg, R.P. 2014. Gender equality in the South African public service: Ideal or reality. *Journal of Public Administration*, 49(4):1060-1082.
- Kahn, S.B. & Naidoo, G. 2011. Transformational leadership: Case of the South African National Defence Force. *Administratio Publica*, 19(3):73–96.
- kaPlaatjie, T. 2006. The PAC in exile. *The road to democracy in South Africa*, Volume 2 (1970–1980). Pretoria: South African Democracy Education Trust, University of South Africa.
- Karami, A. 2007. *Strategy formulation in entrepreneurial firms*. London: Ashgate.
- Katzenbach, J. & Oelschegel, C. 2016. 10 principles of organizational culture. *Organizations & People*. Retrieved from <https://www.slideshare.net/bencheeks/organizational-culture-change>. (Accessed 23 January 2017).
- Keegan, J. 1986. *The face of the battle*. Dorsel Pr. UK.
- Kevar, G. 2007. *Definition of strategic management*. Retrieved from Studymode.com [Accessed 12 November 2013].
- Kildrift, M. & Mehra, A. 1996. Hegemonic Masculinity among the elite. In Cheng, C(Ed), *Masculinities in Organisations* thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

- King, N. & Anderson, N. 2002. *Managing Innovation and Change. A critical guide to organisation.* London. Thomson, A Change Agent may be defined as a person who has been given explicit responsibility for overseeing the introduction of specific change within an institution.
- Knight, I. 1995. *The anatomy of the Zulu army from Shaka to Cetshwayo 1818–1879.* London: Greenhill Books.
- Koshy, L. 2005. *Action research for improving practice: A practical guide.* London: Paul Chapman.
- Kotter, J.P. 1996. *Leading change.* Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Kotter, J.P. 2001. What leaders really do? *Harvard Business Review*, December.
- Kotter, J.P. & Schlesinger, L.A. 2008. Choosing strategies for change. *Harvard Business Review*, July–August.
- Kruys, G. 2006. A viable South African Army Reserve Force. *ISSUP Bulletin* 6/2006. Pretoria: Defence Publications.
- Kubu, A.E. 2009. Career opportunities for black youth in the South African Navy. Unpublished MPA dissertation. Pretoria: University of South Africa.
- Latchigadu, C.M. 2016. Relationship between organizational culture and organizational commitment. Unpublished MCom dissertation. Pretoria: University of South Africa.
- Laurie, N. 2013. *Forging the post-apartheid military culture in South Africa: On military culture theory, practice and African armed forces.* Cape Town: UCT Press.
- Legassick, M. 2002. *Armed struggle and democracy: The case of South Africa.* Discussion paper 20. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Le Roux, L. 2005. *The post-apartheid South African military. Transforming with the Nation.* ISSafrica.org
- Linstead, S., Fulop, L. & Lilley, S. 2009. *Management and organisation: A critical text.* Second edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lodge, T. 1983. *Black politics in South Africa 1945.* Johannesburg: Raven Press.
- Lowe, M. 2007. *Beginning research: A guide for foundation degrees students.* London: Routledge Taylor.



- Luthans, F. 2005. *Organizational behaviour*. Tenth edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Maalu, J.K. & Wekesa, L.C. 2012. Firm strategy impact on performance of small and medium enterprises. *Prime Journal of Social Science*, 2(1):176–180.
- Mabey, C. & Salaman, G. 1995. *Strategic human resource management: A reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Magubane, B. 2006. From détente to the rise of the Garrison State. In *The road to democracy in South Africa*, Volume 2 (1970–1980). Pretoria: South African Democracy Education Trust, University of South Africa.
- Maharaj, M. 2008. *The ANC and South Africa's negotiated transition to democracy and peace*. Berghof Transition Series no. 2. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
- Makhanda, B. 1995. Rooted culture. *Salute*, 2(3).
- MANCOSA (Management College of Southern Africa). 2015. *Research methods*. MBA final-year study guide. Johannesburg.
- Mao Tsetung (1944) *The United Front in Cultural Work in selected works of Mao Tsetung* (1965) Peking. Foreign Language Press.
- May, R. 2014. *Basics of the situational leadership model*. Retrieved from Business Dictionary.com [Accessed 25 November 2013].
- May, T. 2011. *Social research: Issues, methods and process*. Fourth edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- McKee, L. 2010. Understanding the dynamics of organizational culture change: Creating safe places for patients and staff. Unpublished PhD dissertation. Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen.
- Mckeown, M.J. 2011. *The strategy book: How to think and act strategically to deliver outstanding results*: Financial Times.
- McLagan, P. 2002. *Change is everybody's business: Claim your change bower*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.
- McLean, G.N. 2005. *Organisational development: Principles, process, performance*: Berrett-Koehler.
- McMillan, J.H. & Schumacher, S. 1993. *Research in education: A conceptual*

- introduction*. New York: Harper Collins.
- McNabb, D.E. 2008. *Research methods in public administration and non-profit management: Qualitative and quantitative approaches*. New York: ME Sharpe.
- McShane, S.L. & Von Glinow, M. 2005. *Organizational behavior: Emerging realities for the workplace revolution*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- McShane, S.L. & Von Glinow, M. 2007. *Organizational behaviour: Essentials*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- McWilliams, S. 2004. Command and leadership. *Armchair General Magazine*, 7 June. Retrieved from [armchairgeneral.com/category/areading/page/24](http://armchairgeneral.com/category/areading/page/24) [Accessed 25 November 2013].
- Mello, J.A. 2011. *Strategic management of human resources*. Third edition. Alexandria VA. South-Western/Cengage Learning.
- Meyer, M. & Botha, E. 2000. *Organisation development and transformation in South Africa*. Durban: Butterworths.
- Mill, G. & Wood, G. 1993. Ethnicity, integration and the South African armed forces. *South African Defence Review*, (12).
- Miller, A. 1998. *Strategic management*. Third edition. Boston, MA: Irwin McGraw-Hill.
- Mills, D.Q. 2005. *Leadership: How to lead, how to live*. Retrieved from <https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=19569> [Accessed 7 February 2014].
- Mintzberg, H., Lampel, J.B., Quinn, J.B. & Ghoshal, S. 2003. *The strategy process: Concepts, contexts, cases*. Fourth edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Mkpado, M. 2013. *Action research principles and methods for identification and solving community problems*. Ekiti: Federal University Oye-Ekiti.
- Monenthi, D.C. 2013. Transformation in the SANDF: With specific reference to gender equity. Unpublished master's thesis. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University.

- Montuori, L.A. 2000. Organisational longevity: Integrating systems thinking, learning and conceptual complexity. *Journal of Organisational Change Management*, 13(1):63.
- Moore, B.A. 2012. *Handbook of counseling military couples*. New York: CRC Press. Routledge.
- Moore, N. 2000. How to do research: The Complete guide to designing and managing research projects, Third Edition. London. Library Association Publishing.
- Morgan, D.F., Green, R., Shinn, C.W. & Robinson, K.S. 2008. *The foundations of public service*. New York: ME Sharpe.
- Mouton, J. 2008. *How to succeed in your master's and doctoral studies*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Muchie, M. 2014. *Combining and constructing a research, knowledge and training African area*. Retrieved from [http://www.ieri.org.za/sites/default/files/outputs/Research\\_Knowledge\\_Training-Mammo\\_Muchie](http://www.ieri.org.za/sites/default/files/outputs/Research_Knowledge_Training-Mammo_Muchie) (Accessed 12 February 2016).
- Mujis, D. 2004. *Doing quantitative research in education with SPSS*. London: Sage.
- Mullins, L.J. 2008. *Essentials of organisational behaviour*. Second edition. London: Prentice Hall.
- Mullins, L.J. 2011. *Essentials of Organisational Behaviour*. Third Edition. London: Prentice Hall.
- Murray, A. 2013. *Leadership styles*. Adapted from "Wall Street Journal Guide to Management." New York: Harper Business,.
- Murray, W. 1999. The future of American military culture. Does military culture matter? *Orbis*, 43(1):27–42.
- Mwai, E. 2011. Creating effective leaders through situational leadership approach. Unpublished bachelor's thesis. JAMK University of Applied Sciences, 2011. Jyväskylä, Finland.
- Nadler, D.A. 1981. Managing organisational change: An integrative perspective. *Journal of Applied Behavioural Sciences*, 17(2):191–211.

- Nel, P., Werner, A., Haasbroek, G., Poisat, P., Sono, T. & Schultz, H. 2008. *Human resources management*. Seventh edition. Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa.
- Nelson, D.L. & Quick, J.C. 2005. *Understanding organisational behaviour*. Second edition. New York: Thompson South Western.
- Neuman, W.L. 2011. *Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches*. Sixth edition. Boston, MA: Pearson Education.
- Ngculu, L. 2011. *The honour to serve: Memories of the June 16 detachment*. Claremont: David Phillip.
- Nickols, F. 2012. *Strategy: Definitions and meanings*. Distance Consulting LLC. Retrieved from [www.nickols.us/strategy\\_definitions.pdf](http://www.nickols.us/strategy_definitions.pdf) [Accessed 3 March 2014].
- Nillson, F., Olve, N. & Parment, A. 2011. *Controlling for competitiveness: Strategy formulation and implementation through management control*. Copenhagen: Liber Copenhagen Business School Press.
- Nixon, N. 2004. *International businesses and the challenges of poverty in the developing world*. New York: Palgrave, Macmillan.
- Nothling, C.J. 1990. Chronicle of military service in South Africa. *South African Defence Force Review*.
- Nthai, S.A. 1998. *A Bill of Rights for South Africa: A historical overview*. Consultus, November.
- Nye, J. Jr. 2002. *The paradox of American power: Why the world's only superpower can't go it alone*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Nye, J.S. Jr. 1986. Farewell to arms control? *Foreign Affairs*, 65(1):1–12. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2004285> [Accessed 2 April 2016].
- Obama, B. 2009. *President Barack Obama's inaugural address*. Retrieved from [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html?pagewanted=all&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) [Accessed 22 April 2013].

- O'Brien, R. 1998. *An overview of the methodological approach of action research*. Faculty of Information Studies, University of Toronto. Retrieved from [web.net/~robrien/papers/arfinal.html](http://web.net/~robrien/papers/arfinal.html) [Assessed 6 November 2013].
- O'Malley, P. 1986. *UmKhonto weSizwe (MK) in exile*. South African History Online. Retrieved from [www.sahistoryonline.org.za/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk-exile](http://www.sahistoryonline.org.za/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk-exile) [Accessed 22 June 2016].
- O'Malley, P. 1996. *The Nationalist Party, apartheid and the anatomy of repression in South Africa, 1948–1994*. Johannesburg Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory.
- Parnell, J.A. 2014. *Strategic management: Theory and practice*. Fourth edition. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Parumasur, S.B. 2012. The effect of organisational context on organisational development (OD) interventions. *SA Journal of Industrial Psychology*, 38(1):1–12.
- Paton, R.A. & McCalman, J. 2000. *Change management: A guide to effective implementation*. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Kao, P. Kao, H. & Kao, T. 2007. *Situational leadership style identified for Taiwanese executives in mainland China*. National Kaohiung University of Applied Sciences.
- Peters, T. & Waterman. 1982. *In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best Run Companies*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Pew Research Center. 2015. *Women and leadership: Social and demographic trends*. New York: Mc Graw-Hill.
- Pfeffenbruck, J. 2005. *The role of CRM within corporate strategy: A general analysis*.
- Phillips, J.M. & Gully, S.M. 2012. *Organisational behaviour: Tools for success*. Asia Pacific.
- Poister, T.H. & Sterib, G.D. 1999. Strategic management in the public sector: Concepts, models and processes. *Public Productivity and Management Review*, 22(3):522-545.

- Porras, J.I. & Silver, R.C. 1991. Organisational development and transformation. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 42:51–78.
- Pounder, J.S. & Coleman, M. 2002. Women: Better leaders than men? In general and educational management, it still “all depends.” *Leadership and Organizational Development Journal*, 23(3/4):122.
- Prosci Advantage. 2014. *What is change management? Best practices report*. Retrieved from <https://www.prosci.com> [Accessed 12 January 2014].
- Prutula, M., Noona, B. & Hellsten, L. 2013. Towards instructional leadership: Principals’ perception of large-scale assessment in schools. *Canadian Journal of Educational Administration and Policy*, (140).
- Reggio, R.E. & Murphy, S.E. 2002. *Multiple intelligence and leadership*. London: LEA.
- Richardson, J.B. IV. 2011. *Real leaders and the U.S. Army: Overcoming a failure of imagination to conduct adaptive work*. New York The Letort Papers.
- Riley. L. 2012. *The political economy of urban food security in Blantyre, Malawi*. The African Institute Occasional Paper Series. Ontario: University of Western Ontar.
- Robbins, S.P. & Judge, T. 2013. *Essentials of organizational behaviour*. Global edition. Boston: Pearson Education.
- Robbins, S.P., Millet, B., Cacioppe, R. & Waters-Marsh, T. 2003. *Organisational behaviour: Leading and managing in Australia and New Zealand*. Third edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Roberts, C. 2008. Implementing educational technology in higher education: A strategic approach. *The Journal of Educators* online abstract, 5(1):1-6. Retrieved from <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ904044.pdf> [Accessed 11 March 2016].
- Robson, C. 2011. *Real world research: A resource for users of social research methods in applied settings*. Third edition. West Sussex: Wiley.
- Robson, W. 1997. *Strategic management and information system*. London: Prentice Hall.

- Roos, K. 1996. Culturally speaking: An intangible, yet ever present theme. *Salute*, 4(11).
- Rothaermel, F.T. 2013. *Strategic management concepts*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Irwin.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1993. *Transitional Executive Act 151 of 1993*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1995a. *The Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1995b. *The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1996a. *Constitution of RSA (Act 108 of 1996)*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1996b. *White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa: Defence in a Democracy*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1997a. *White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public Service*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1997b. *White Paper on Transforming the Public Service*. Retrieved from <http://www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1997/transforming.htm#1> [Accessed 20 March 2015].
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1998a. *Defence Review of 1998*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1998b. *Employment Equity Act (Act 55 of 1998)*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1998c. *The White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1999a. *Plan and guidelines for the staffing the military component of the DOD*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1999b. *Public Service Regulation of 1999*. Pretoria: Government Printers.

- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1999c. *Revised Staffing Strategy*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 2003. Department of Public Service & Administration: Senior Management Service Handbook. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 2010. *Public Service Commission (PSC) assessment review*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 2015a. *Policy on promotion of members of the South African Army*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 2015b. *South African Army, 2015: Policy on Promotion of members of the South African Army*. C Dir Army Corp SVC/DIR Army HR/R/105/15/P. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- RSA (Republic of South Africa). 2015c. *State Information and Technology Agency*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- Rupiya, M. 2005. *Evolutions of revolutions: A contemporary history of militaries in southern Africa*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- Sage, S. 2010. *Strategic implementation*. Retrieved from <https://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/53794...> [Accessed 14 September 2014].
- Sapsford, R. & Jupp, V. 2006. *Data collection and analysis*. Second edition. London: Sage.
- Scheel, R. & Crous, F. 2007. Leveraging organisational culture capital. *SA Journal of Industrial Psychology*, 33(1):29–37.
- Schein, E.H. 1985. *Organisational Culture and Leadership: A dynamic view*. San Francisco. Jossey Bass Wiley.
- Schermerhorn, J.R. 2004. *Core concepts of management*. San Francisco. : Wiley.
- Sebuyika-Mukasa, S.G. 2008. *Impact of culture on preferred leadership attributes: A Ugandan perspective*. Retrieved from <https://Core.ac.uk/display/13231345> [Accessed 23 July 2017].
- Seedat, R. & Saleh, R. 2009. *Men of dynamite: Pen portraits of MK Pioneers*. Johannesburg: Shareno Printers.



- Seegers, A. 1996. *The military and the making of modern South Africa*. London: IB Tauris.
- Serrat, O. 2009. *A primer on organisational culture*. Washington, DC: Asian Development Bank. Cornell University, ILR School. 11/2009.
- Shahzad, F., Luqman, R.A., Khan, A.R. & Shabbir, L. 2012. Impact of organisational culture on organisational performance: An overview. *Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business*, 3(9):1-28.
- Shriberg, A., Shriberg, D.L. & Kumari, R. 2005. *Practicing leadership: Principles and applications*. Third edition. San Francisco: Wiley.
- Simoës, P.M.M. & Esposito, M. 2013. *Improving change management: How communication nature influences resistance to change*. Vous Consultez.
- Sivasubramaniyan, P. 2012. *Research methodology: An introduction*. Retrieved from [www.limat.org/data](http://www.limat.org/data) [Assessed 22 December 2015].
- Smith, R.2001. *Australian political Culture*. Pearson Education.
- Smit, P.J. & De J. Cronje, G.J. 2003. *Management principles: A contemporary edition for Africa*. Cape Town: Juta.
- Snell, S. & Bohlander, G. 2007. *Human resource management*. Fourteenth edition. Alexandria, VA: Cengage Learning.
- South African Democracy Education Trust. 2006. *The road to democracy in South Africa, Volume 2 (1970–1980)*. Pretoria: University of South Africa.
- South African History Online. “*Kraals of guns” fortification in the wars of resistance and dispossession in the Eastern Cape. 1780–1894*. Retrieved from [www.sahistory.org.za](http://www.sahistory.org.za) [Accessed 16 February 2015].
- Southall, R., 2014. The African Middle Class in South Africa 1910–1994. *Economic History of Developing Regions*, 29(2):287-310.
- Stapleton, T. 1994. *Maqoma Xhosa resistance to colonial advance, 1798–1873*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.
- Steenkamp, W. 2012. *Assegais, drums & dragoons: A military social history of the Cape 1510–1806*. Cape Town: Jonathan Ball.
- Stephen, P.R. 2005. *Organisational behaviour*. Eleventh edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

- Stewart, G.L. & Brown, K.G. 2011. *Human resource management: Linking strategy to practice*. San , NJ: Wiley.
- Stippler, M., Moore, S., Rosenthals, S. & Dorffer, T. 2011. *Leadership approaches developments-trends*. Leadership Series. Byleveld: Hans Kock Buch- und Offset Druck GMB.
- Stolten, H.E. 2007. *History making and present day politics: The meaning of collective memory in South Africa*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Stott, N. 2002. *From the SADF to the SANDF: Safeguarding South Africa for a better life for all?* Violence and Transition Series, Vol. 7. Braamfontein
- Stroh, U.M. 2005. *Strategic management and change*. Pretoria: University of Pretoria.
- Susman, G.I. & Evered, R.D. 1978. An assessment of the scientific merits of action research. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 23(4):582–603.
- Sutevski, D. 2009. *Sources of organisational changes*. Genesis Framework.  
Retrieved from  
<http://www.entrepreneurshipinbox.com/9/organizational-change-source/> [Accessed 14 March 2014].
- Swanepoel, B., Erasmus, B., Van Wyk, M. & Schenk, H.W. 1998. *South African human resource management: Theory and practice*. Second edition. Cape Town: Juta.
- Swannepoel, B., Erasmus, B., Van Wyk, M. & Schenk, H. 2003. *South African human resource management: Theory and practice*. Kenwyn: Juta.
- Swilling, M. and Phillips, M., 1989. State power in the 1980s: From 'total strategy' to 'counter-revolutionary warfare'. *War and Society (Cape Town: David Philip)*.
- Thiart, G. 1996. Herein lies culture: An interview with Major General Masondo. *Salute*, 3(4):6-7.
- Thompson, A.A. & Strickland, A.J. 1998. *Crafting and implementing strategy: Text and reading*. Tenth edition. New York, NY: Irwin McGraw-Hill.
- Tovstiga, G. 2010. *Strategy in practice: A practitioner's guide to strategic thinking*. Second edition. New Jersey, NJ: Wiley.

- Tucker, B.A. & Russell, R.F. 2004. The influence of the transformational leader. *Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies*, 10(4):103–113.
- Uys, I. 1992. *South African who's who, 1452–1992*. Germiston: Fortress.
- Van der Waag, I. 2015. *A military history of modern South Africa*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.
- Van der Waag, I. & Visser, D. 2012. Between history, amnesia and selective memory: The South African armed forces, a century's perspective. *Scientia Militaria*, 40(3):1-12.
- Van Dyk, G.A.J. & George, S. 2004. The process of military leadership development for Africa: A theoretical discussion. *Journal of Public Administration*, 41(4):776–789.
- Van Eden, R. 2005. Group processes and dynamics in relation to transactional and transformational leadership. Unpublished PhD thesis. Pretoria: University of South Africa.
- Van Rensburg, W. 2001. Research report 2000: Attitude and opinion survey: Organisational culture in the South African National Defence Force. *Journal of Public Administration*, 36(2):145–168.
- Van Tonder, C.L. 2004. *Organisational change: Theory and practice*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Van Wart, M. 2008. *Leadership in public organizations: An introduction*. New York, NY: ME Sharpe.
- Veettil, N.M.K. 2008. Strategy formulation and implementation in manufacturing organisations: The impact on performance. Unpublished PhD thesis. London: Middlesex University Business School.
- Verissimo, J.M.C. & Lacerda, T.C. 2012. *Using transformational leadership to enhance the development of corporate strategy focused on a community's common interests*. Technical University of Lisbon. Retrieved from repository.utl.pt [Accessed 22 February 2014].
- Verweire, K. 2014. *Strategy implementation*. London: Routledge.
- Vinger, G. & Cilliers, F. 2006. Effective transformational leadership behaviors for managing change. *SA Journal of Human Resource Management*, 4(2):1–9.

- Vreÿ, F., Esterhuyse, A. & Mandrup, T. 2013. *Military culture, theory, practice and African armed forces*. Cape Town: UCT Press.
- Wagner, E. 2006. *Effective communication during planned change: An evaluation from the recipients perspective*. Unpublished PhD thesis. London: Business School, Oxford Brookes University.
- Wagner, J.A. III & Hollenbeck, J.R. 2010. *Organisational behaviour: Securing competitive advantage*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Wagner, M. 2006. *First steps in communication: A pragmatic analysis*. Langewiesen. Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen.
- Welman, C., Kruger, F. & Mitchell, B. 2005. *Research methodology*. Second edition. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
- Wepman, J. 2013. *Leadership styles in the military*. Retrieved from ehow.com [Accessed 25 November 2013].
- Whittington, R. 2001. *What is strategy, and does it matter?* Second edition. London: Pat Baton.
- Williams, R. 2000. The other armies: A brief historical overview of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), 1961–1964. *Military History Journal*, 11(5).
- Williams, R. 2001. *Completing the defence transformation process: The transformation of the South African Reserve Force System*. ISS occasional paper no. 54A.
- Williams, R. 2006. *South African guerrilla armies: The impact of guerrilla armies on the creation of South Africa's armed forces*. ISS monograph series no. 127.
- Williams, R.M. 1995. *South Africa's new Defence Force: Progress and prospects*. Notes number 170. Centre for Africa Strategic and International Studies.
- Wilson, P.H. 2008. Defining Military Culture. *Journal of Military History*. 1 January 2008. Military Culture is some form of Institutional Culture.
- Wilson, R.W. 2000. The many voices of Political Culture Assessing different approaches world politics, 52(2), pp 246-273.
- Wimmer, R.D. & Dominick, R.D. 1987. *Mass media research: An introduction*. Richmond: Wadsworth.

- Wisker, G. 2011. *Choosing appropriate research methodologies and methods*. Retrieved from <http://www.palgrave.com/skills4study/studentlife/postgraduate/choosing.asp> . [Accessed 8 February 2016].
- Yeakey, G.W. 2002. Situational leadership. *Military Review*, January–February. Retrieved from [journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1046496406291560](http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1046496406291560) [Accessed 4 February 2014].
- Zimmerman, A. & Blythe, J. 2013. *Business to business marketing management: A global perspective*. Second edition. London: Routledge.

## **INTERVIEWS**

- Dibetso, F. 2011. Brigadier General. Deputy Chief Army Corporate Services. SA Army Headquarters. 11 December.
- Fongoqa, Z. 2011. Colonel. Senior Staff Officer: Infantry Formation Human Resources. SA Army Headquarters. 11 December.
- Gagiano, 2011. Lieutenant General. Chief of the South African Air Force. SA Air Force Headquarters. September 2011.
- Xundu, T. T. 2011. Colonel. Senior Staff Officer Strategic Control at the South African Army Head Quarters Unit. 10 December.
- Yam, L. 2011. Major General. General Officer Commanding Infantry Formation at the SA Army Headquarters. 11 December.
- Higgs, R.W. 2011. Rear Admiral. Chief Naval Staff at the SA Navy Headquarters. September 2011.
- Kula, M. 2011. Brigadier General. 2011. Director Career Management. South African National Defence Force. 3 August.
- Mdlulwa, S. Colonel. 2011. Officer Commanding South African Army Head Quarters Unit. 6 December.
- Mothlabane, K.C. 2011. Brigadier General. Director Army Career Management. Army Head Quarters. November 2011.
- Mofokeng, S.T. 2011. Major General. Chief Director Defence Foreign Relations at Defence Intelligence Headquarters.

Soldaat, G. 2011. Colonel. Senior Staff Officer Human Resources at the Defence Headquarters. 15 March.

Dlulane, B.N. 2011. Major General. Chief Director Human Resources, South African National Defence Force. 27 September 2011.

Gagiano, 2011. Major General. Chief of the South African Air Force. September 2011.

Gildenhuys, B. C. 2010. Brigadier General. General Officer Commanding South African Armour Formation. 7 December.

Gqoboka, B. 2010. Colonel. Senior Staff Officer Peace Support Operations. South African Army. 3 August.

Kulu, 2010. Brigadier General. Director Career Management. South African National Defence Force. 3 August.

Mafheda, J. 2010. Colonel. Senior Staff Officer: Part-Time Forces, South African Army. 5 August.

Makgwe, RA. 2010. Colonel. Senior Staff Officer: South African Army Reserve, South African Army. 5 August.

Mdlulwa, S. 2010. Colonel. Officer Commanding South African Army Head Quarters Unit. 6 December.

Mofokeng, S.T. 2011. Major General. Officer Commanding Military Academic Saldana. 27 September 2011.

Nkone, N. M. 2010. Colonel. Senior Staff Officer Force Structure at the South African Army. 5 August.

Rudman, L. 2010. Major General. Chief Director Corporate Services at the South African Army Headquarters. 4 August.

Soldaat, G. 2010. Colonel. Senior Staff Officer Human Resources at the Defence Headquarters. 31 March.

Xundu, T. T. 2010. Colonel. Senior Staff Officer Strategic Control at the South African Army Head Quarters Unit. 7 December.

#### **INTERVIEWS – LIST – 25 August 2017**

Dibetso, F. Brigadier General. Deputy Chief Army Corporate Services. SA Army Headquarters. 11 December.

Dlulane, B.N. 2011. Major General. Chief Army Force Structure, South African National Defence Force. 27 September.

Fongoqa, Z. 2011. Colonel. Senior Staff Officer: Infantry Formation Human Resources. SA Army Headquarters. 11 December.

Gagiano, 2011. Lieutenant General. Chief of the South African Air Force. SA Air Force Headquarters. September.

Gildenhuis, B. C. 2010. Brigadier General. General Officer Commanding South African Armour Formation. 7 December.

Gqoboka, B. 2010. Colonel. Senior Staff Officer Peace Support Operations. South African Army. 3 August.

Higgs, R.W. 2011. Rear Admiral. Chief Naval Staff at the SA Navy Headquarters. September.

Kula, M 2011. Brigadier General. Director Career Management. South African National Defence Force. 3 August.

Mdlulwa, S. 2011. Colonel. Officer Commanding South African Army Head Quarters Unit. 6 December.

Mofokeng, S.T. 2011. Major General. Chief Director Defence Foreign Relations at Defence Intelligence Headquarters

Mothlabane, K.C. 2011. Brigadier General. Director Army Career Management. Army Head Quarters. November.

Rudman, L. 2010. Major General. Chief Army Corporate Services at the South African Army Headquarters. 4 August.



Soldaat, G. 2011. Colonel. Senior Staff Officer Human Resources at the Defence Headquarters. 15 March.

Xundu, T. T. 2011. Colonel. Senior Staff Officer Strategic Control at the South African Army Head Quarters Unit. 10 December.

Yam, L. 2011. Major General. General Officer Commanding Infantry Formation at the SA Army Headquarters. 11 December.

**APPENDIX A**

**Questionnaire on organisational culture of inclusiveness in the South African Defence Force**

**PLACE A CROSS (X) IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX OF YOUR CHOICE**

**SECTION A: ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS**

1. **Gender**

Male		Female	
------	--	--------	--

2. **Race**

African		Indian		Coloured		White		Other (Specify)	
---------	--	--------	--	----------	--	-------	--	--------------------	--

3. **Arm of service**

Army		Air Force		Navy		Medical Services			
------	--	--------------	--	------	--	---------------------	--	--	--

4. **Rank**

Maj		Lt Col		Col		Brig Gen			
-----	--	-----------	--	-----	--	-------------	--	--	--

5. **Length of service**

6–10 years	11– 14 years	15– 20 years	21– 25 years	25 years and more
---------------	--------------------	--------------------	--------------------	----------------------------

6. **Academic qualification**

Grade 12	Certificate	Diploma	Degree	Post- graduate
-------------	-------------	---------	--------	-------------------

**APPENDIX A**

**SECTION B: This section of the questionnaire explored the leadership approach in the SANDF**

**PLEASE CHOOSE AN APPROPRIATE ANSWER ON THE FOLLOWING SCALE**

- 1 = Autocratic leadership
- 2 = Transactional leadership
- 3 = Situational Leadership
- 4 = Democratic Leadership
- 5 = Transformational Leadership

No.	Statement	1	2	3	4	5
1	What was the predominant leadership approach of your former armed force?					
2	What is the current predominant leadership approach being practiced in the SANDF?					
3	What is your style of leadership?					
4	Which leadership approach has significantly impacted transformation in the SANDF?					

**PLEASE CHOOSE AN APPROPRIATE ANSWER ON THE FOLLOWING SCALE**

1 = Agree Completely

2 = Agree

3 = Neutral

4 = Disagree

5 = Disagree Completely

Nr	Statement	1	2	3	4	5
5	My line manager is competent; therefore, I have no reason to question his/her command or integrity					
6	Men are better military leaders than women					
7	I respect and treat women officers as my equal					
8	As a woman, I had the experience of being a combat commander					
9	I provide preferential treatment to my own race and gender					
10	Candidates are selected for senior management positions based on their competency and qualification					
11	As a woman, I envisage being a combat commander in the future					
12	Transactional leadership approach has been adopted by the SANDF					
13	I prefer an appointment suffix in my force number that reflects 'Africa'					
14	I accept military values and norms as a way of life					
15	As a woman officer, I am treated differently than men					
16	I execute commands from my seniors unconditionally					
17	My seniors respect my opinion/suggestions					

18	The moral standards of my supervisor are of a high standard					
19	As a woman officer, I do not enjoy the respect as my male counterparts					
20	My supervisor treats all his/her subordinates equally					
21	My country, South Africa is my first priority not my former force					
22	I respect seniors, colleagues and peers					
23	I am an advocate (supporter) of equal and just treatment of all					
24	The SANDF is the public institution of choice to work for					

## APPENDIX A

### SECTION C: This section explores your perceptions regarding the organisational culture of the SANDF

#### RATE YOUR RESPONSE USING THE FOLLOWING SCALE

1 = Agree completely

2 = Agree

3 = Disagree

4 = Disagree

5 = Disagree Completely

No.	Statement	1	2	3	4	5
1	I perceive the employment equity and affirmative action policy as successful					
2	The SANDF adequately communicates its affirmative action employment equity intentions					
3	In my experience, affirmative action and employment equity has been successfully implemented					
4	I perceive employment equity and affirmative action as promoting inequality in the workplace					
5	Employment equity and affirmative action brings about change at an acceptable pace					
6	My line manager is sincerely supportive of employment equity and affirmative action					
7	The current uniform in the SANDF is the same as my previous armed force					
8	I have experienced employment equity and affirmative action as a positive process					

9	The current regimental ceremonies are the same as my former armed force					
10	The institutional culture and climate is supportive of designated groups					
11	My line manager can manage diversity					
12	I regularly socialize with my colleagues in the unit, department, division and service					
13	The SANDF's Human resource practices and policies make provision for my cultural obligations					
14	I am optimally utilized according to my skills and competencies					
15	I am not promoted because I am categorized as a member of a designated group					
16	Artefacts, rituals, ceremonies, and regimental system of my former defence or armed force have been incorporated and are currently being practiced in the SANDF					
17	The organizational culture of the SANDF has changed over the last 10 years					
18	The prevailing norms and values have a positive influence on the transformation in the SANDF					
19	The former SADF culture prevails in the SANDF					
20	Will the future organizational culture of the SANDF reflect cultural practices of your former armed force					
21	Do ideology and patriotism inspire you					
22	The command group of my unit does not respect my culture					
23	The team spirit in the section where I work is good					
24	The SANDF has a culture of non-racialism					
25	The SANDF's culture promotes Non-discrimination on the					



	basis gender					
--	--------------	--	--	--	--	--

**GENERAL**

26. In your opinion, what does the appointment suffix in your force number PE mean?

<u>a</u> Permanent Force		<u>b</u> Port Elizabeth		<u>c</u> Permanent European		<u>d</u> Post Election		<u>e</u> ditto Executive	
--------------------------------	--	-------------------------------	--	-----------------------------------	--	------------------------------	--	--------------------------------	--

27. What future organizational culture and leadership changes would you like to see take place in the SANDF?

-----

-----

-----

**Thank you**

## **APPENDIX B**

### **QUESTIONNAIRE ON INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE**

1. Describe the predominant culture of your former defence or armed force?
2. What artefacts, culture, rituals, ceremonies and regimental system of your former Defence or armed forces has been incorporated into SANDF and being practiced currently?
3. What's the difference between the culture of your former defence or armed force and the SANDF?
4. How often do you socialize with your subordinates/ colleagues of your service, division, Department or unit?
5. What is your opinion on the current culture in the SANDF?
6. How has the SANDF culture changed over the last 10 years? Give example.
7. What are the driving forces (motivations) that make you come to work every day?
8. What is the relationship between you and colleagues/peers or former forces?
9. What is the prevailing value system in the SANDF?
10. What are the prevailing norms and values in the SANDF?
11. Are all the different cultures, races, and genders being treated equally?
12. Do the prevailing HRM policies and practice allow you to utilize your subordinates according to their abilities and competencies?
13. How often do you socialize with your colleagues/peers of your former defence/ armed Forces?
14. Do you think the current culture of the SANDF will change overtime?
  - a. What will this culture be like?

## **APPENDIX C**

### **QUESTIONNAIRE ON LEADERSHIP QUESTIONS**

1. What was the predominant leadership style of your former defence force/armed force?
2. What in your opinion are the qualities of good leaders?
3. What are some of the challenges that leaders face in your opinion?
4. What makes great leaders?
5. Name some great military leaders – past and present?
6. What made them great or what are the outstanding qualities of those leaders?
7. How can leaders influence their followers?
8. How can leaders overcome cultural biases?
9. Are there special qualities that military leaders should possess?
10. What is your relationship with your subordinates?
11. Do you distinguish between race and gender when rewarding your subordinates?
12. What is the predominant leadership style being practiced in the SANDF?
13. What is your style of leadership?
  - a. How does it compliment or differ from the prevailing style in the SANDF?
14. How does your style of leadership contribute to the effectiveness of your service?
15. Why should leaders do introspection and reflect on their decisions?
16. Do you utilize your subordinates according to their abilities and competencies?
17. Do you apply the same leadership style as your previous superior?
18. What do you expect from your superiors?
  - a. How do you go about meeting their expectations?
19. What do you expect from your subordinates?
  - a. How do you go about satisfying the expectations of your subordinates?
20. What is your take on transactional leadership? Do you think it will work in the SANDF?

21. There are two theories of command namely, Attrition and Maneuver which do you apply – one or both?