AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF RESTRUCTURING IN SADCC/SADC SINCE 1990

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AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF RESTRUCTURING IN
SADCC/SADC SINCE 1990

by

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SEPTEMBER 2005
Declaration

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I declare that

AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF RESTRUCTURING IN SADCC/SADC SINCE 1990

is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

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Signature
Hendrick Masemola

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Date
Acknowledgements

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Summary

This dissertation analyses and appraises factors that lead SADCC/SADC to restructure in 1992 and in 1999 respectively. Regime theory is used as an analytical tool of these factors throughout this study. The restructuring of regional organisation in the world is often associated with a decision that is taken by regional leaders, only to hide failures of these organisations to deliver. Studies of this phenomenon, however, frequently fail to research the underlying causes.

In the case of SADCC/SADC, apart from the fact that the organisation failed to achieve its intended objectives, such as regional integration, economic independence, regional security, and more, this study argues that there were a lot of elements that influenced the pace and the operations of SADCC/C in achieving regional integration and other objectives. The basic debate in this study thus revolves around the fact that the restructuring exercise in SADCC/SADC was a result of many factors and this argument is supported by the regime theory.
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### ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Agenda for Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African Caribbean and Pacific countries</td>
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<td>AEF</td>
<td>Equatorial Africa or Afrique Equatorial Francaise</td>
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<td>AGOA</td>
<td>African Growth and Opportunity Act</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOF</td>
<td>French West Africa or Afrique Occidentale Francaise</td>
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<td>ASAS</td>
<td>Association of Southern African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>Basutuland Congress Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLNS</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland</td>
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<td>CACM</td>
<td>Central American Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAC</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECAC</td>
<td>East and Central African Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>CET</td>
<td>Common External Tariff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMEA</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EACSO</td>
<td>East African Common Services Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECLA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Latin America</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African Countries</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Company</td>
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EEC European Economic Community
EU European Union
EU-ACP European Union-African Caribbean and Pacific countries
EUROATOM European Atomic Energy Community
FANR Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources
FLS Frontline States
FSTAU Food Security Technical Administrative Unit
GDCF Gross Domestic Capital Formation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNI Gross National Income
GNS Gross National Savings
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
HTCs High Commission Territories
ICM Integrated Committee of Ministers
IGAD Inter-governmental Authority on Development
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISDSC Interstate Defence and Security Committee
LAFTA Latin American Free Trade Area
LCD Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LPA Lagos Plan of Action
MERCOSUR (Mercado Comun del Sur) Southern American Market
MMA Multilateral Monetary Area
MVA Manufacturing Value Added
Nepad New Partnership for the Development of Africa
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
OAU Organization of African Unity
PA Programme of Action
PAC Pan Africanist Congress
PAFMECA Pan-African Movement for East and Central Africa
PAFMECSA Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa
PAP Pan African Parliament
PTA Preferential Trade Agreement
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>RI/C</td>
<td>Regional Integration or Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>RISDP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Rand Monetary Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACCAR</td>
<td>Southern African Center for Cooperation in Agricultural Research</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SATCC</td>
<td>Southern African Transport and Communications Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPA</td>
<td>SADC Programme of Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAU</td>
<td>Technical Advisory Unit</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td><em>Union Nacional Por La Independenciae Totale Do Angola</em></td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union Socialist Soviet Republics</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Chapter One

An Analysis and Appraisal of Restructuring in

SADCC/SADC since 1990

1.1 Introduction

Development of regional blocs and groupings as well as their restructuring or evolution, over the past years, has become a steadily progressive feature of post-1945 world politics. International relations theories such as realists and liberalists have explained such developments in terms of balancing against a hegemonic or ‘great’ power, protecting small or weak states against a large powerful neighbour, maintaining peaceful and co-operative political relationships and as transformations of global power and wealth structures (Butler 1997:412).

Generally, the emergence of regional blocs or any other organizational formation, presupposed the rising of a challenge to the existence of a problem crucial for the destiny of the parties or countries involved in particular regions. For example, the Andean Group was created in 1969 within the framework of the Latin American Association of Free Trade, with the sole mandate of facilitating economic development for its member countries by way of combining mineral and labour resources. The Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975, with the objective of developing economic collaboration of natural resources and equating regional economic levels among its member countries (Tabunov 1990:352-253).

In this study, ‘restructuring’ of SADCC/C refers to institutional re-organisations or re-arrangements of regional policies and institutional structures by SADC which consisted of 14 members including Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho, South Africa, Namibia, Mauritius, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, in order to achieve total regional integration or cooperation.
With regard to SADCC/C formation in 1980, Chikowore (1999:31) states that the above reasons were applicable to the establishment of SADCC like it was the case in other organizations. SADCC\textsuperscript{2} was instituted by the Lusaka Declaration in 1979 and was officially founded in 1980 to facilitate socio-economic development of member states by way of combining their economic potential, curbing economic dependence of member states on the then apartheid South Africa, instituting a balanced flow of commodities through commercial activities and the creation of free trade zones. The overall objective was to rise above the challenge of dependency on South Africa and international donors.

Since its formation in 1980, SADCC/C has restructured its institutions and operations twice in order to stay on course with its objectives or to continue existing. Due to regional and international pressures such as the Cold War, globalization, technological development, declining living standards within member states, increasing military destabilisation by South Africa, changing political situations in the region, and growing demands for multiparty democratic systems in member states, made it difficult for SADCC to execute its mandate. By 1992, SADCC decided to restructure its institutions and operations in order to accommodate or deal with the mentioned challenges to SADC.

When SADCC restructured into SADC in 1992, it found itself challenged by factors such as the aftermath of the Cold War, new regionalism especially in Latin America, integration of Eastern and Western Europe which meant less aid towards the third world countries of Africa, financial aid and conditions from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), growing demands by the United States of America for liberal democracy in SADC states, globalization, evolution of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) and its call for regional blocs to focus on economic challenges facing Africa, and its (AU) further call that SADC should act as a building bloc towards a united continent, served as great challenges. With the
above factors crippling, SADC leaders decided to restructure the organizational structures and operations to deal with these challenges in 1997. With this in mind, factors that had a role in the restructuring of SADCC/C are explored in the forthcoming chapters. This is done to determine the extent to which they influenced the pace of integration in the region and the restructuring of SADC (SADC 1997:4).

From the 1990s, new structures and objectives were adopted by a number of regional organizations to deal with the new challenges, as mentioned, within their respective geographical environments. In Latin America, for example, the Southern American Market (Mercosur) comprising Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay was formed in 1991 in order to deal with political and economic challenges facing member countries. New regionalism in the 1990s began to dominate the study of international relations in trying to deal with the new challenges after the Cold War (Mutschler 2001:137).

Due to changes and restructuring that were taking place in the regional organizations, analysis and appraisal of trends and factors forcing regional organizations to restructure became important. The Southern African region was no exception in these changes and challenges taking place globally.

The purpose of this study is therefore to analyse and appraise factors that lead SADCC/C to restructure. This will be done by analysing and appraising political and economic factors, as well as issues that may have played a role in the formation of SADCC in 1980 that ultimately lead to the restructuring in 1992 and 1999, by following the regime theory. The concept regime is relatively new, coming into common parlance in the 1970s. Regime theory's perspective on International Relations focuses on cooperation among actors, states or countries in a given area. An international regime, such as SADC, in view of this theory, is seen as a set of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and procedures around which countries' expectations converge in a particular area (Krasner 1983:45).

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2 SADCC countries from 1980 included: Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho, Namibia
There are many factors that contributed to the establishment and subsequent restructuring of SADCC/C such as economic, social and international factors, for example the evolution of international organizations like the United Nations and the European Union. Other factors include administrative problems with SADCC/C such as human resources, financial problems, skills and technical factors in the region. However, these factors will not be the focus of this study. But, on how political and to some extent economic factors influenced SADCC/C to restructure. This include factors such as: the end of the Cold War, political changes in South Africa and Namibia, political changes in the continent - especially the AU, donor conditions towards SADC countries, regional demand for democracy in member states and other general factors that affected SADC to consider restructuring its structures and operations in 1992 and 1999.

1.2 Comparative Perspectives on the Restructuring of the Regional Organizations: Europe and Latin America

The empirical focus of this study on Southern Africa was selected for several reasons. Firstly, SADC is the successful effort by a set of Third World countries, particularly in Africa, to significantly realign their economies and progress to this point. While a good deal has been written about the plans and the goals of the organization, considerably less has been done to assess the feasibility of its success and why it continues to consider restructuring as an important exercise to keep in touch with international and regional developmental trends.

The second reason is that the regional characteristics of Southern Africa provide an opportunity to explore in depth a set of dimensions that have not been previously focused on in research relating to Regional Integration or Cooperation (RI/C). These include the existence of explicit political, as well as economic goals, on the part of the regional organization and non-market factors affecting the success of the undertaking. These are the main factors

(only from 1990 to become the tenth member), Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe
that, if not achieved or dealt with, lead regional organizations to fade away or to restructure in order to survive or continue functioning.

With the above in mind, the basic aim of this section is to draw a comparative perspective on the evolutionary phases some regional organizations underwent, particularly in Europe and Latin America. The intent of this comparative discussion is to identify such evolutionary phases among other regional groupings, as it will be useful to analyse, appraise, and compare political factors that played a role in the restructuring of SADCC.

The logic of using the European and Latin American integration as examples is that the former success produced, both applied models of RI/C and a body of theory, which seeks to explain and justify different forms of political and economic interactions among nations. The other reason is that its success has been achieved through a series of organizational restructuring or evolution throughout decades. The latter is preferred because of similarities with the Southern African region. Both regions contain symptoms of dependency and both regions seem to respond to the same global challenges, such as globalization. Also, both depend on external aid and their economies are linked with Western economies. In Latin America, as in Southern Africa, regional integration is viewed as a basic form of survival towards counter marginalisation by the developed nations.

### 1.2.1 Integration efforts in Europe

The history of regional integration in Europe dates back to the early 1950s and culminated in the formation of the European Community (EC). The EC was formed in 1965 with the merger of the European Coal and Steel Company (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euroatom), and the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Paris established the ECSC in 1956, to plan and develop the coal and steel industry in Western Europe. Euroatom was established by the Treaty of Rome to encourage the development of the civil nuclear industry (Winters 2001:889).
The EEC was formed in 1958 under the Treaty of Rome, with three objectives. Firstly, it was formed to lay foundations for a closer union among European countries. Secondly, it was formed for the establishment of a common market through the elimination of trade barriers and lastly, it was formed to work towards improving the welfare of European citizens. The founding members of the EEC were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Germany. Later they were joined by Denmark, Ireland and Britain in 1973, Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1983 (Winters 2001:890).

There were several objectives that led to the formation of the EC, both political and economic. Politically a number of motivations existed. Firstly, there was a need to solve the conflict existing between France and Germany in the post-1945 period. Secondly, it was perceived that a unified Europe could better withstand any communist or Soviet military threat and thirdly, Europe had gone through two World Wars, and one way to ensure that this would not happen again was to form a regional cooperation body. The communication and mutual interdependence thus created was expected to become an outlet for conflict resolution and better understanding between the different European countries (Mokate 1986:66; African Development Forum III 2002:2-3).

On the economic side, the EEC was seen as a way of counterbalancing the economic dominance of the United States over Europe. Regional integration in Western Europe took place under conditions whereby there existed a modern industrial economy, economic growth and virtual full employment of modes of production. Thus, a major goal of regional integration was to attain better economic growth rates, encourage technological innovations and more efficient use of resources (Mokate 1986:66).

In 1992, the EC evolved or restructured to become the European Union (EU), adopted of a single currency (the Euro), a single market, a single parliament and other features. Prior to that, a Customs Union was established in 1968 and over time strong links were established until the EU was born, and that can be referred to as the evolutionary phase (Winters 2001:890).
Although the EU is largely regarded as the most successful regional grouping in the world, it had to follow similar evolutionary phases as those that took place in organizations such as SADCC/C. It began as a sole political project and evolved to be a pure economic driven project by introducing the Euro as a single currency in Europe in 2001. It also had to restructure to be in tune with other regional organizations as its competitors in the world market. The EEC evolved into EC and later into the EU in 1992. EU policy-makers had to take political and economic factors within and outside the region into consideration in order to derive good policies for European integration. Considerations were given to factors such as the Soviet military threat, the end of the Second World War, as well as globalization. The original objectives of the EEC were also modified when it evolved into the EC and again when it evolved into the EU. Additional institutions like the European Parliament were drafted in the EU to make it survive the challenges that modern states are faced with (Mokate 1986:68).

The African Development Forum III (2002:2) maintains that, although the EU is the most developed of regional organizations in the world, it is hard to draw wider lessons from its experience for ‘north-south’ or ‘south–south’ integration. However, the political institutions engaged in the EU process and its evolution are worthy of study because they can provide strategic direction for African integration. This is an approach that this study will pursue in that the EU will be used as an example where applicable. One of the most important lessons to be learnt from the success of the EU is the ability to evolve and adapt over time.

1.2.2 Integration efforts in Latin America

According to Mutschler (2001:136) regional integration in Latin America evolved under quite different circumstances and for different reasons than was the case in Europe. Regional integration efforts in Latin America began in 1960. Although the Economic Commission presented the idea for Latin America (ECLA) at that time, it actually began several years before, around
the 1950s. Support for the idea of regional integration within Latin America grew out of dissatisfaction with the poor level of progress made towards economic development. Regional integration was thus seen as a response to the historic problems of underdevelopment in Latin America. In addition, it was also viewed as a way of reducing dependency on the first world countries by diversifying the Latin American economies through industrialization. This aspect is similar to conditions in Southern Africa.

Regional integration in Latin American differed from West European integration in several ways. Firstly, unlike the case of Western Europe, none of the regional integration movements in Latin America [had] as a principle goal political integration, although political integration [was] part of all integration schemes. Secondly, whereas regional integration in Europe took place among countries with modern industrialized economies, full industrialization in Latin America was still a goal to be achieved rather than the status quo (Mutschler 2001:137).

The initial organizations formed were the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) and the Central American Common Market (CACM). The basic goal of these organizations was to increase economic growth by eliminating trade barriers. These efforts were unsuccessful because their regional integration processes facilitated transnational corporations and these organizations lacked political will and political commitment from member states (Mutschler 2001:137).

Both discussed regional organizations went though unique challenges in their respective regions. In Europe, after the Second World War, the greatest challenge to those countries was to reconstruct their political and economic systems, and to further resolve conflict that led to war. That required a lot of sacrifice and compromise concerning different ideological preferences among countries to help achieve these objectives. With the advancement of technology the organizations had to keep abreast of such developments and it had to maintain policies that help it deal with such changes. It is for this
reason that the EU went through name changes. This serves also as a sign and efforts taken by European leadership of keeping the organizations on top.

The establishment of regional organizations in Latin America was influenced by almost similar factors as in Southern Africa. These include dealing with globalization, market forces, neo-colonialism and similar domestic challenges such as democracy and economic stability. The evolution or the restructuring of Latin America has also been influenced by the similar aspects as in Southern Africa, for example the end of the Cold War and aid conditions from the Western countries, among others. The common factors that rise from the lessons drawn from both organizations for Africa are that regional organizations are always confronted with challenges that have to be responded to. Therefore, changes within regional organizations are an ongoing process. Reference to Latin America in this study will help in explaining the identified factors that led SADCC/C to restructure.

A comparative study on the origins of regional organizations in Africa will be discussed in chapter two.

1.3 Literature review

A lot has been written on the prospects of regional integration in Southern Africa. Scholars on this subject include Balassa (1961), Krause (1973), Lipsey (1970), Mazzeo (1984a), Mokate (1986) and many others. However, little focus had been given to the restructuring of regional organizations, particularly in Southern Africa. In contrast, there are many publications on economic integration and security prospects in the region. Among the many examples, specifically on regional security, are Cilliers (1996), Malan (1998), Solomon (1996; 1998), and Tsie (1998).

The core focus of these publications has been on the evolution of the concept security in international relations and its implications for Southern Africa. Most of the analyses have been on specific security issues in the region and the impact such issues might have on SADC and its members, for example, the
land crisis in Zimbabwe and its implication for the region as whole. The DRC crisis has also been another focus. Tsie (1998) focused on the Organ of Politics, as well as Defence and Security within SADC, particularly pertaining to how it could be utilised by regional leaders effectively to curb future conflicts within member states and among each other. The other focus on security has been on poverty, border crime, immigration, drug trafficking, terrorism and many other issues related to security. Little reference has been made by these publications that directly relates to the restructuring exercise. Basically, the focus has been on how SADC should deal with these issues or problems.

Other publications on SADC focussed on economic trade as the main driving force of market integration in the region. Among many scholars on this subject include Cheru (1992), Hebert (2003), Patel (2000), Roberts (2003), and van Schalkwyk (2003). Their main focus has been on tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in SADC. The other areas of focus include transportation obstacles to trade and regional integration in SADC, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, telecommunication, banking systems, customs, licensing and border procedures, agriculture and other subjects. The issue of restructuring is merely debated within the broad context of how SADC should utilise these issues in the region for integration or to the advantage of member states. Little emphasis is given to how these issues initiated efforts to restructure SADC and how these issues continue to influence the restructuring process.

Examples of the published literature that dealt with the SADC restructuring includes Schoeman (2002), SADC Barometer (2003) compiled by South African Institute of the International Affairs (SAIIA), and the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) researchers, Isaksen and Tjønneland (2002). Schoeman (2002:2) deals specifically with political factors such as the effects of the end of the Cold War on the region and the role played by the independence of Namibia from South Africa in 1990 to the SADCC restructuring in 1992. Schoeman (2002:4) also deals with political factors such as the end of apartheid in South Africa as aspects that had a role in the restructuring of SADC in 1999. Schoeman (2002:4) correctly points out why political factors played an important role in SADCC, and further recognizes the fact that the
1992 restructuring was mainly influenced by political factors rather than economic factors. Schoeman (2002:2) concedes that SADC was a politically inspired organization, and therefore, political factors tend to dominate the progress of the organizations.

Schoeman (2002:3) disagrees with the classical economic integration theory in Southern Africa as it emphasises regional integration as an economic process occurring largely as a result of greater interaction between neighbouring states, functioning almost like some kind of invisible hand. This theory, according to Schoeman, is based on the historical example of the development of the EU, yet it discounts the fact that the EU was foremost a political project. According to Schoeman, a lot should be done in Southern Africa to follow this route. Based on this debate, the classical economic integration theory downplayed the importance of politics in regional integration. Most studies of regional integration in Southern Africa used this theory to analyse SADC. As a result, political factors remained unimportant to the development of regional integration.

Isaksen and Tjønneland (2002) prepared a study on SADC restructuring entitled *Assessing the restructuring of SADC – positions, policies and progress*. Isaksen first did a study in 2001 on the same subject entitled *Restructuring SADC – progress and problems*. Both studies focus on the restructuring of SADC from 1999 only. No effort was made to look back at the factors that led SADCC to restructure to SADC in 1992, let alone factors that led to the formation of SADCC in 1980. Due to this, the reports contains no reference to the importance of the Cold War, emergence of democracy in Southern African states, the collapse of apartheid, the independence of Namibia - including factors leading to independence and how such factors continue to impact on SADC countries to date. The conclusion in their study was basically that the lack of administration and political will among member countries are the main reasons behind the restructuring of SADC.

The political and economic factors that led SADCC to restructure in 1992 have relevance to factors that led to SADC to restructure again in 1999.
Globalization, as a new factor, has its roots planted as far back as the end of the Cold War in 1989. The end of the Cold War led to the rise of the capitalist system in the world. As a result, developing countries, especially in Southern Africa, had to adopt the liberal systems in order to receive financial assistance from the Western countries. The end of the Cold War also meant that developing countries had to comply with Western countries’ conditions such as adopting democratic governments.

Both reports favour or support the restructuring exercise within SADC. The reports’ findings are that the restructuring mainly revolved around changing the roles and functions of the SADC secretariat. These include the establishment of SADC National Committees in member countries as well as the role of non-state actors. These factors are mainly the technical analysis of the restructuring exercise as compared to the report that basically looks at factors that necessitate the restructuring exercise. These factors are crucial in this study as they are an important reason why SADC restructured.

The little literature on SADC restructuring that is available, particularly by Isaksen and Tjønneland (2002), only focus on the technical factors SADC ought to adhere to in order to be successful. Together with the SAIIA publication on SADC restructuring, these are a few pieces of literature, if not the only bit of literature aimed at addressing the whole question of restructuring in SADC. The SAIIA publication on SADC restructuring was mainly on issues in the region that were seen to be important enough to consider restructuring. These included issues such as trade liberalisation, immigration laws in the region and organised crime. Due to the broad scope of this undertaking in SADC, these publications often fail to cover political aspects that have impacted the SADC restructuring.

1.4 The objectives and contribution of the study

After assessing the existing literature, this study has identified the following gaps that it believes need attention from a research point of view. This section also discusses the contribution this study will make to this vast topic.
The study on the restructuring of SADC mainly answers four questions. Firstly, why was SADCC formed? Secondly, why did SADCC restructure? As a result of this question, this study will state mainly the political factors that compelled such an exercise. In this instance, the study will examine political factors that may have had a role in SADC restructuring both in 1992 and 1999.

Some of the reviewed publications lack a clear focus on these factors. Rather, their focus is on the analysis of issues regarded as problems within SADC, such as security, poverty, crime, trade and other issues. The gaps that occurred in such analyses are that international trends on political issues are often missed, as if the SADC region was an island cut off from world events. In the end, the possibilities of drawing narrow conclusions on the restructuring of SADC are high. Some studies such as Isaksen (2002), Patel (2000), and Peter-Berries (2003), often regard the restructuring exercise as a result of poor leadership in the organizations. This might possibly be true, but it is normally not the full picture and these studies exclude the influence of regional and international events on SADC in general.

Thirdly, how was SADC restructured? Since most regional organizations are problem-driven (Young 1989), it is important to assess, analyse or to look at the structures or changes implemented by the organizations after their restructuring exercise. This gives depth to how organizations resolved to deal with challenges that confronted it prior to its restructuring exercise. Some of the reviewed publications on restructuring, specifically Schoeman (2002), managed to point out types of political factors that led SADCC to restructure to SADC in 1992, but failed to point out measures taken by SADC in responding to such factors. These include why the Organ of Politics, Defence, and Security was formed in 1996?

Fourthly, this study aims to determine the significance of the restructuring process. As mentioned earlier, restructuring exercise is often confused for or understood as a process, which regional organizations undertake to cover up failures of not reaching their objectives. However, what is normally overlooked
is the fact that such an exercise is necessary to physically or philosophically re-orientate organizational structures towards achievable objectives. This in turn helps regional organizations to audit their own progress. The exercise also helps organizations to remain in touch with domestic and international trends or challenges.

The transformation of the OAU into the AU (full discussion in chapter six) is one of many factors that required sub-regional organizations such as SADC to restructure their institutions to enable smoother relations and communication between it and sub-regional organizations in the continent. Under the AU Constitutive Act, SADC is expected to play an important role in as far as conflict resolution is concerned and in ensuring that the Peer Review Mechanism is implemented among member countries. This study is also aimed at exploring the impact of the AU in the restructuring of SADC.

1.5 Research methodology and theoretical approach

The restructuring of regional organizations has a political content and cannot be viewed as a neutral legal or economic exercise among member countries. Restructuring also has an ideological basis, as the end of the Cold War provided a single ideology for SADC members to adhere to, for example capitalism. The political nature of the restructuring of regional organizations is determined by a number of factors, amongst which are included in an ideology and culture, a country’s regional history and international criteria. The approach in this study is to describe, analyse and appraise factors that impacted or influenced SADC to restructure.

SADC can and has been studied from many different perspectives. This includes the economic perspective (Tsie 1998), trade perspective (Cheru 1992, Van Schalkwyk 2003), legal perspective (Liebonow 1982), political economic perspective (Schoeman 2002), social perspective (Williams 1998), and many more perspectives. As pointed out, the restructuring of SADC consists of many elements, for example the integration of the banking system in the region, SADC parliamentary forum, unification of nature reserves into
trans-frontier nature reserves in the region, cooperation of security forces of member states, and more. Basically, factors that influenced restructuring exercises in SADC covers broad factors and most are beyond the scope of this study. This study will mainly look at the restructuring of SADC from the political perspective.

Political and social research has been dominated by two broad methodological paradigms, namely the qualitative research method and the quantitative research method. Each of these methods is linked to meta-theoretical traditions, for example qualitative research has been linked with phenomenology that basically focuses on human consciousness, whereas quantitative research has been linked with positivism, emphasising that the social sciences should emulate the methodology or logic of natural sciences research (Babbie and Mouton 2001:49).

Quantitative research consists of a number of themes that includes an emphasis on the quantification of constructs. In most cases, quantitative researchers believe that the best way of measuring the properties of phenomena (for example, the attitudes of individuals towards certain topics) is through quantitative measurement that is, assigning numbers to the perceived qualities of things research. Quantitative research methods include surveys, statistics and experiments. Quantitative research is based on a specialized, standardized set of data analysis techniques. Analysis in quantitative research is highly developed and it is built on applied mathematics (Babbie and Mouton 2001:49; Neuman 1991:434).

The quantitative research method is convenient as far as summarizing results; assessing measurement reliability and validity; testing inferences from samples (statistical inference validity) and planning precise research designs with high internal validity are concerned (Dooley 1990:280). In this study, quantitative research is not enough to explain political factors that led SADC to restructure in 1992 and 1999.
This study is based on the descriptive and explanatory approaches to political factors that caused SADC to restructure. These approaches are best utilized in qualitative research because qualitative research refers to a generic research approach in social research according to which research takes the departure point as the insider perspective on social action. In this case the political restructuring of SADC could be regarded as that. Qualitative research also attempts to study human action from the insider’s perspective. The goal of research is defined as describing and understanding (Verstehen), rather than the explanation and prediction of a phenomenon (Babbie and Mouton 2001:49).

The emphasis in qualitative research is on methods of observation, interviewing and the analysis of documents. These include primary and secondary sources, such as books and newspapers (Babbie and Mouton 2001:49). Most written research on SADC used the qualitative method. This study has made use of SADC publications and interviews and prominent SADC personalities were also interviewed to help fulfil such research undertakings.

This study will make use of the qualitative research method, meaning that this study will rely mostly on primary sources (like SADC documents from the secretariat) and secondary sources such as literature from books, research articles on SADC mostly from the Africa Institute, Institute for Security Studies and newspaper clippings to analyse and appraise political factors that led SADC to restructure in 1992 and in 1999.

Using the abovementioned methodology in this study, theoretically speaking, regional integration can be political or economic. Politically, integration involves two schools of thought dealing with this perspective. They are the federalist and the functionalist schools of thought (Mazzeo 1984:3b). Federalism is a form of integration that requires that nations surrender all their sovereignty. Under a federation, sovereign states combine and give up some of their sovereignty to a higher authority. The nation states become unified politically, economically and socially. In the federalist approach, politics rule over economics (Mazzeo 1984:4b). However, functionalists argue that
integration should occur gradually and not totally. According to Mitrany (1968:61), functionalism involves seizing available opportunities to link together particular activities and interests one at a time as the need arises and is based on the acceptability of the arrangement to the parties involved. This is the approach SADCC was founded on in 1980.

Economically, the integration concept is derived from classical and neoclassical international trade theory, for example the movements of goods, services, people, capital, funds and moneys across natural and political frontiers are what inter-regional and international economic relations are about and all these movements are part and parcel of economic integration. In this framework, regional economic integration rests on concepts such as comparative advantage, free mobility of factors of production, equalisation of factor prices and more, found in international trade theory (Machlup 1977:43).

Within the realm of classical and neoclassical economics, RI/C is viewed as occurring in stages. These stages are outlined and defined by Balassa (1961:5), and are used by many other authors as a framework, for example Robson 1983, Lipsey 1973, Machlup 1977, and Mazzeo 1984 (a) use this framework. Each successive stage is considered to be a more complex and a higher level of integration. Balassa (1961:5) outlines these stages as (1) sectoral integration, (2) free trade area, (3) custom union, (4) common market, (5) economic union, and (6) total integration.

According to Haas (1970:6) integration may entail both, as is the case with SADC, because it is a process combining separate economies into larger political communities to the extent that the political and economic forces are inextricably intertwined.

As discussed previously, the federalist strategy approach claims that the best path to regional integration is to create a higher supranational authority, to which participating states surrender part of their sovereignty. This strategy was regarded by SADCC as too ambitious, as it requires member countries to part with some autonomy almost right away. The approach was never considered in Africa for fearing loosing sovereignty by leaders (Babarinde 1998:100).
At the polar end of the theoretical spectrum is the functionalist strategy. It refers to a mere functional cooperation by participating countries. Conceivably, this road to regional integration does not require member states to part with any of their autonomy. It entails and encourages inter-governmental cooperation (Lodge 1983:12-14). For the analysis and appraisal of SADC restructuring, this approach is not enough. Although this approach is the fundamental approach of SADC, it lacks analysis tools to investigate political factors that led to the restructuring exercise in 1992 and in 1999. It merely focuses on how regional integration can be achieved without going too deep into the analysis that propels member states to do so.

A third approach is the neo-functionalist approach. It contends that, while the federalist approach may be greedy by asking far too much too quickly, the functionalists appear to be noncommittal. Hence, a common ground is proposed. It posits that regional integration can best be achieved via the creation of specialized administrative institutions at the trans-national level, which will endeavour to demonstrate the relevance and worthiness of regional integration to member states (Lodge 1983 14-16 & Haas 1964; 1971).

The limitation of this approach is that, like the functionalist theory, it is not suitable for an analysis and appraisal of SADC restructuring. Its emphasis is on how to integrate a region. The neo-functionalist approach in this study offers little analysis of the political factors that played a role in SADC restructuring. This study is not on how SADC states can achieve integration but on why SADC restructured.

The other theory that has been applied in the study of regional integration is the theory of a Customs Union (CU). The customs union model of integration began to get much attention in the 1950s with the pioneering work of Jacob Viner. Viner’s (1950) analysis focused on whether the establishment of a CU would result in a change in a nation’s production which has the net effect of diverting purchases to lower or higher cost sources of production for (a) a particular member of the customs union, (b) the customs union as the whole, (c) non-customs union members and (d) the world as a whole. Without discussing the CU theory in detail, this theory is unsuitable to analyse the factors contributing to SADC restructuring for the simple fact that SADC is not
yet a CU. This is the stage SADC is yet to achieve. SADC still functions outside of the CU and it is difficult to apply this theory to investigate factors that led to the restructuring exercise.

The theoretical focus in this study is on the restructuring of SADC/C within the synthesis of integration and cooperation. This makes sense because the integration and cooperation theory belongs to the same genus of international relations theory. Neither the cooperation theory nor the integration theory explains how cooperation is institutionalised and more importantly, how countries restructure regional organizations to survive challenges confronting them. Both these theories are rationalist approaches that omit how countries or regional organizations are formed and how they evolve. Therefore, in a situation where regional organizations restructure, neither one of the mentioned theories or approaches explain why the exercise takes place (Keohane 1988:981).

Another weakness of a regional integration theory and regional cooperation theory is that they are unable to address the link between choosing to cooperate and the institutionalisation of cooperation. Both pay tribute to the importance of institutionalisation in cooperation or integration. That leaves a gap in looking at factors that lead regional organizations to restructure or cease to operate like the AEC (Keohane 1988:981).

1.5.1 Regime theory

Considering the abovementioned theories or approaches, this study will use regime theory in order to analyse and appraise political and to some extant economic factors that led to the restructuring exercises in SADCC/C. However, other theories such as the functionalist, neo-functionalist, classical, and neo-classical as mentioned before will be considered, to compliment the shortcoming of the regime theory in analysing and appraising SADCC/C restructuring.

This section will also refer to the strengths of regime theory, as well as some of its most significant shortcoming. Regime theory like all theories offer valuable
insights but in referring to its shortcoming, reference will be made to alternative theories as mentioned.

Regime theory is basically a perspective in International Relations that focuses on cooperation among actors, states or countries in a given area. An international regime is viewed as a set of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and procedures around which countries’ expectations converge in a particular area (Krasner 1983:45). In subsequent work, Krasner (Little 2001:303) elaborates on the four defining elements of a regime. These four elements will be applied to both SADCC/C restructuring processes in the subsequent chapters. However, at this stage it is important to introduce these elements.

Firstly, Krasner refers to principles as represented by coherent bodies of theoretical statements about the international order. Secondly, he refers to norms, which specify the general standards of behaviour, as well as identifying the rights and obligations of states. These norms and principles form the foundation of the character of a regime and can only be changed by transforming the nature of the regime. Thirdly, the defining element of a regime is the rules it operates according to. These rules are mainly designed to resolve conflicts, which may arise among members and their interpretation of principles and norms. Lastly, a decision-making procedure underlies a regime. These procedures identify specific prescriptions for behaviour, the system of voting and for implementing these decisions.

During the 1970s, Southern Africa as elsewhere globally, also responded to the formation of regimes. SADCC formation in 1980 reflects characteristics of an international regime. The FLS members were concerned with the security threats South Africa was posing in the region, and they were further concerned with the economic position of the member countries in the region and as well as globally. These concerns became an issue area, which SADCC aimed to address.

The interest of international regimes as a new study in the 1970s was rooted in neo-functionalism. In contrast to the theory of realism, regime theory assumes that states have separate interests in different issue areas and does not have
a stable hierarchy of interests with security at its top. Opportunities for cooperation depends on a particular situation in a given issue area. The main difference between the regime theory and neo-functionalism is primarily that the former lacked attention to interest groups. Secondly, there is the lack of a specialisation of issue areas. `Even though it has a lot of inspiration from regional integration, the regime theory is an attempt to explain cooperation within a general framework. This divides it from neo-functionalism (Krasner 1983:4).

Basically, regime theory, in the study of International Relations and particularly regional organizations, deals with how and under what conditions different types of governing conditions emerge or regional organizations emerge and how they consolidate and become hegemonic. Lastly, it deals with how they develop and transform or restructure to keep up with regional and international developmental trends (Anttiroika and Kainulainen 1998:4).

The studies of regimes are mainly addressed from two broad perspectives, that is, liberalism and realism. Both approaches share the following common assumptions with regard to the analysis of regimes: (1) that states operate in an anarchic international system, (2) that they are rational and unitary actors and responsible for establishing regimes and (3) that regimes are established by way of international cooperation to promote international order (Little 2001:301).

Having outlined these common assumptions in order to differentiate between the liberal and realist approaches of regimes, the following comparative assumptions outline the differences in these approaches. In this regard refer to table one. This study prefers the realist assumption of the analysis of regime behaviour on the basis that regimes are mainly established to coordinate activities as opposed to collaboration as emphasised by the liberals.

**Table 1: Liberalists and Realists comparative assumptions of the analysis of regimes behaviour.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberalist</th>
<th>Realist</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Enhances collaboration among states</td>
<td>• Enables states to co-ordinate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Promotes common interest</td>
<td>• Generates differential benefits for states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develops and functions optimally when promoted, maintained and led by a benign hegemon</td>
<td>• Power is the dominant characteristic emanating from the relations between states and hence determines the type of regime established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Promotes globalization and liberal world order</td>
<td>• Supports the notion that the international order is based on the underlying principles and norms of regimes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source**: Little (2001:301)

According to Stoker (1995:54) regime theory holds substantial promise for understanding a variety of responses to regional organizational change or restructuring. It emphasises the interdependence of regional and non-regional forces in meeting economic, political and social challenges within a geo-regional area of regional organizations.

Regarding the issue of regime change, transformation or restructuring, Young (1982:45), Puchala & Hopkins (1982:23) and Young (1983:33), approach the idea from two basic viewpoints with similar objectives. Examples of these will be discussed in the next chapters. Because of the dynamic nature of regimes and the ways in which regimes may restructure or change, this is particularly salient. Young (1982:45) maintains, “Contradictions within the regime framework may lead to serious pressure for alterations”. Such contradictions according to Young (1982:45) “may be from a dynamic point of view and capable of becoming an element that may push regimes to fall apart or to be
useless”. The affiliation of some SADC member states to other organizations consisting of objectives on regional integration in Southern Africa is one example. Another example is the EAC, which was regularly wracked by internal crises and conflicts over the distribution of economic gains. Despite various negotiations and measures adopted to address these problems, it disintegrated in 1977.

Young (1982:45) also mentions that the other view regarding regime change could be a dialectical point of view, which looks holistically at social entities searching for dialectical laws pertaining to change. Thus, from the holistic or dialectical point of view the regime may evolve or transform itself without disintegration, for example the evolution of the EU from EEC.

Puchala and Hopkins (1982:8) mentions the same two approaches but label the concept of regime disintegration as ‘revolutionary change’ and the concept of regime adaptation as ‘evolutionary change’. Evolutionary change, or Young’s idea of holistic change, according to Puchala and Hopkins (1982), “may involve a regime changing substantively by preserving norms and changing principles”. In most cases, this would usually occur because of shifts in knowledge, information or in changes with regard to challenges and pressures facing particular regimes. Regime adaptation or evolutionary change, as explained is particularly relevant to the restructuring of SADCC/C as it was mainly aimed at aligning it so that it could adapt to present time and space. The detailed discussion on SADCC/C restructuring phases will support why the exercises were mainly aimed at re-aligning the organization to relevant required mandate.

Based on the above, regime theory in this study will shed light on the following core questions discussed below. Furthermore, the study applies the realist approach (as outlined above) to the analysis of regimes. In classifying regimes this study applies the vertical dimension, which highlights the formality of the regime established by SADCC/C as it was mainly aimed at aligning it so that it could adapt to present time and space. This refers to the formalised treaties, namely the Lusaka Declaration for SADCC and the Windhoek Treaty for SADC.
Typically, the regime research agenda concerns itself with some of the following core theoretical questions: (1) what accounts for the rise of rule-based cooperation in the international system? (2) How do international institutions such as regimes shape the behaviour of states and non-state actors in the issue areas for which they have been designed? (3) Which factors, within and outside a regime, determine its success and coherence? (4) How can we explain the particular institutional architecture of a specific regime? (5) What is the nature of bargaining within a regime framework (Krasner 1983:4)?

As indicated previously in this chapter, the purpose of this study is to analyse and appraise political/economic factors and issues that may have played a role in the restructuring processes. In order to do this, this study will address the following questions:

- What political conditions led to the formation of SADCC in 1980? This refers to the specific political conditions prevalent globally as well as regionally at this time. These conditions also refer to the underlying norms of states' behaviour in the region.

- What were the implications of such conditions on SADCC/C functioning after its formation? The significance of these conditions is that states in the region converged on, as Krasner (1983:2) states “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures” in order to achieve various political objectives.

- How has SADCC/C coped or dealt with such political conditions or how has it consolidated them? This question will be addressed by focussing on SADCC/C founding principles, established norms and operational rules, and its decision-making procedures. Reference will also be made to treaties, statements, communiqués, agreements and the SADCC/C restructuring process.

- How has SADCC/C evolved or restructured? As will be indicated in chapter two, conditions in the region changed by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. One such an example is the transition
in South Africa – one of the main issues SADCC wanted to address. In order to adapt to new conditions, new members, and new issues facing the region, decision makers soon realised the need for restructuring the organization. These restructuring processes took on various forms and produced specific outcomes as will be addressed in subsequent chapters.

- Finally, against the background of the regime established by SADCC/C the study will conclude with an analysis and appraisal of these restructuring processes. It must be said though that SADC’s future in terms of NEPAD and the AU can only be discussed in preliminary terms, as the latter organization has not become fully operational during the period covered by the study. However, the issue will be provisionally addressed in the concluding chapter of the study.

Regime theory has been the dominant approach in international co-operation. It recognizes the importance of both self-interested behaviors and institutional factors in determining outcomes and focuses on the role of ideas, principles and norms in a sociological account of international relations (Williams 1998). However, depending on the school of thought, different emphasis was attached to different aspects, for example power (by neo-realists), interests (neo-liberals) or ideas and discourses (by constructionists) Young (2002b).

As for international co-operation concerning the environment, regime-centric approaches have predominantly looked at the effectiveness of institutional performance rather than environmental outcomes (Kütting 2000). Only a few authors (the Fridjof Nansen Institute) have focused on environmental effectiveness and have considered the environmental problem necessitating the agreement. Young (1993), who in his study of regime formation, has developed a model of institutional bargaining, more recently held that environmental institutions should be designed to fit the properties of the ecosystems with which they interact. He found mismatches between institutions and ecosystems and identified a number of mechanisms that can produce misfits as well as corrective measures (Young 2002a).
Young (2002a) stresses the need for bridging the gap between bottom-up studies, that is, small-scale local systems, and top-down studies, such as the international or global regimes of environmental problems. Case study methods are recommended but are somewhat neglected by international regime theory for collective-action problems at the international level (Young 2002b). The shortcomings are addressed in Miles et al. (2001) after gathering over a decade of case studies on international environmental regimes.

Within regime theory, which tends to emphasize processes and holds state-centric views, there was a late acknowledgement that governments have lost control over their territory, that is, governments have become dispersed and can no longer govern, and this can only be done by governments having the authority over a single territory (Held et al. 2001). In addition, regime theory acknowledges an increase in the role of non-state actors such as non-government organizations (NGOs), experts and business, but only if relative to that of national governments. In reality, however, the distinction between state and non-state actors may become increasingly irrelevant in this study, even though there remain some crucial differences in terms of legitimacy, availability of resources, and capacity (Krasner 1983:17).

While this study examines regime theory, its main purpose is not to trace in detail the process of negotiation and implementation of international regimes, their formation and different types of regime theory like the urban regime theory, environmental regime theory, security regime theories and more, but rather to analyze the role of political factors in the formation and restructuring of SADCC/C specifically.

Regime theory has mostly been used to study urban politics and urban societies, especially in the United States of America and in the United Kingdom. This limits regime theory to develop as far as it should. Regime theory has also been criticized for downplaying the importance of internal politics within a given region. Its focus has been on the operational aspects of the regime rather than the conditions regional organizations are expected to operate from. Krasner (1983:19) maintains that due to this, regime theory has
failed to explain and predict the formation and the discontinuations of regimes. Instead, regime theory has maintained that regimes are a result of a cause and are also a factor in the formation, maintenance, and the discontinuation of regional organizations.

Despite minor setbacks regarding regime theory (Stoker 1995), this study maintains that the regime theory will enable one to discuss political factors that led to the formation and the restructuring of SADCC in 1992 and 1999.

1.6 Conceptual clarification

There are five general levels of regional economic integration: (1) reduction of tariffs on products granted to other countries subsequent to the granting of most favoured nation status to a country which also automatically applies to the most favoured country, (2) the next level of regional integration which is the free trade zone area and implies the trading of goods and services among member states at zero tariffs, (3) the custom union which, in addition to being a free trade arrangement, typically involves the adoption of a common external tariff (CET) vis-à-vis third countries, (4) the common market which basically permits both the free movement of goods and services among member states and the free movement of the factors of production and entrepreneurs and (5) the last level of regional integration which is the creation of an economic and political union and is regarded as the ultimate goal of regional integration as it goes beyond the elimination of real and perceived barriers to facilitate mobility and the movement of goods and services (Babarinde 1998:101). In order to achieve the objectives stated by SADCC members, as well as to fulfil some of the requirements mentioned above, SADCC underwent a series of restructuring, which is the focus of this study. It is worthwhile to point out that SADC is still within the first stage in terms of regional integration levels or stages as discussed above. It is where the two restructuring exercises (1992 and 1999) take place. An example of regional integration that has achieved regional integration according to the mentioned levels is the EU.

This section will not adopt particular definitions for the concepts ‘region’, ‘regime’, ‘regionalism’, ‘regionalisation’, ‘regional integration and cooperation’,
'analysis', 'appraisal', and 'restructuring', but merely provide brief descriptions of each to clarify the analysis in the coming chapters. It should be noted that, particularly in the case of the concept 'region', there is an extensive body of literature dealing with the problems of defining a region (Evans and Newnham 1998a: 472-473).

At this stage it is important to clarify the main concepts relevant to the study. Some of these include the concepts analysis, appraisal, region, regionalism, regionalisation, restructuring and regime.

**Regime:** despite various definitions of this concept offered by scholars such as Hasenclever et al (1997), Keohane (1984) and Rittberger (1993), this study prefers the definition offered by Krasner (1983:45). Krasner views regimes as a perspective in International Relations that focuses on cooperation among actors, states or countries in a given area. An international regime is thus viewed as a set of implicit and explicit principles; norms, rules and procedures around which countries’ expectations converge in a particular area.

**Analysis:** the Collins English dictionary (1995:55) defines analysis as a process of considering something carefully or using statistical methods in order to understand or explain it. Analysis may also refer to the scientific process of examining something in order to find out what it consists of. In this study, analysis will simply refer to an explanation or description of political factors and actors that led SADCC/C to restructure.

**Appraisal:** the Collins English dictionary (1995:71) defines appraisal as an official or formal evaluation of the strengths and weakness of someone or something. It often involves observation or some kind of testing. In this study, appraisal will be used to evaluate the successes and/or failures of the SADCC/C restructuring.

**Region:** is regarded as a part or segment of the world that consists of more than two states within physical proximity of each other that consciously share patterns of interaction at various levels, the territorial totality of which is
considered a recognizable entity by other entities that form part of the region and also by the external environment. Such an entity though, is not a given and in terms of its borders can contract or expand over time. Its shared patterns of interaction can be characterised either by patterns of amity or enmity (Schoeman 2002:1). For the purposes of this study the concept region will be applied by using SADCC/C as the object of analysis. This implies that the region consists of the member states of SADCC/C. Table 2 below contains the member states of SADCC and SADC.

Table 2: Members of SADCC/C and other Regional Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>*FLS</th>
<th>SADCC</th>
<th>SADC</th>
<th>SACU</th>
<th>COMESA</th>
<th>RIFF</th>
<th>IOC</th>
<th>EAC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>Mauritius</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>*Withdrew</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>Seychelles*</td>
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<td>DRC*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Isaksen and Tjønneland (2001:50)

*DRC was part of the FLS when it was known as Zaire and Mobutu attended meetings from 1973.

*Seychelles cancelled its SADC membership in July 2004.

*FLS dissolved on 30 July 1994, and became the political and security wing of SADC in 1996.

*RIFF: Regional Integration Facility Forum for Eastern and Southern Africa.

*EAC: East African Community

*IOC: Indian Ocean Commission
Due to a number of definitions associated with the concept ‘region’ this study will refer to a region as provided by this definition.

**Regionalism:** whereas ‘region’ denotes space and place, regionalism denotes an aim or objective, and the term has both a normative and descriptive connotation. The normative understanding relates to the aims, goals and driving forces that underlie and determine the conscious efforts by members of a region to increase and/or control various forms of interaction and cooperation (Gibb 1997:3). In the Southern African region, the destabilization efforts of the apartheid South Africa became an underlying force in the formation of SADC by the FLS.

Evans and Newnham (1998b: 474) regard regionalism as a complex combination of attitudes, loyalties and ideas that concentrates the minds of people/s upon what they perceive to be their ‘region’. Regionalism then becomes a political project when cross-border transactions and the perceived need for closer cooperation are recognized by the member states, when governments react to these internal and external forces by means of attempting to find a transnational level of governance (Lipietz 1990:8).

Based on the mentioned definitions, this study will regard regionalism as relating to aims by states in a region to cooperate in order to deal with common problems or challenges.

**Regionalisation:** although often used as synonymous with ‘regionalism’, regionalisation refers to the process/es through which ‘regioness’ is increased (Schoeman 2002:3). The idea does not express an evolutionary logic, but a logic that depends on what the aims and goals of regionalisation are and one that indicates levels of complexity in terms of regional interaction. Regionalisation is often treated as largely a political phenomenon – a process initiated by states and stimulated or driven by the global economic demands and challenges of the spread of economic liberalism. This view is based on the influential market integration theory articulated by authors such as Viner and Balassa (1961).
This study concurs with the definition of regionalisation as defined by Hurrell (1995). Hurrell regards regionalisation as the growth of societal integration within a given region, including the undirected processes of social, political and economic interaction among units or member countries in a region. As a dynamic process, it can be understood as a continuing process of forming regions as geopolitical units as organized political cooperation within a particular group of states or as regional communities such as pluralistic security communities.

**Regional Integration and Cooperation:** RI/C is the most central concept in this study and has been defined in a number of ways. At times it has been defined essentially as an economic activity with social and political dimensions, for example Schoeman (2002:3) states that a regional economy “is not integrated unless all avenues are open to everybody and the remunerations paid for (the same) productive services are equal regardless of racial, social and cultural difference.”

Balassa (1961:3), on the other hand, views social integration as the gaining of importance only as the unification of national economies proceeds. Social integration is not considered necessary for lower forms of integration, such as the removal of trade barriers, as opposed to the equalisation of factor prices. Basically, RI/C is viewed as the ultimate goal that countries in the same region strive to achieve by coordinating their economies and harmonising their political policies in order to uplift their social needs.

**Restructuring:** is another central concept in this study. The concept restructuring has not enjoyed much academic attention. Instead, political actors have used the concept loosely and business figures to emphasise changes planned to be introduced to a particular organization or business structure. Mainly such move is aimed at improving a particular structure of the organization or business entity if seen not meeting required standards or not performing well to produce desired targets. Restructuring relates strongly to the concept of a regime. As conditions in the region changed, so did the
principles, norms and rules governing SADCC. Restructuring was regarded by
decision-makers as the next logical development of the organization and thus
changed some of the fundamental aspects of the regime governing structures.

For the purposes of this study, Kotye’s (1997:50) definition of the concept is
accepted in that it is seen as ‘a process in which status quo (existing)
institutions and/or practices are transformed into new ones that are radically
different from the old ones, with the view of democratising or decentralising the
situation if it was undemocratic or centralised.’ The Collins English dictionary
(1995:1419) defines restructuring or to restructure organizations or systems as
a means to change the way it is organized, usually in order to make it work
more effectively.

In the case of SADCC/C, as an illustration of the concept restructuring, upon
its establishment in 1980, stated as its objectives to create institutions to co-
ordinate its activities. When it restructured for the first time in 1992 as well as
its subsequent restructuring to be discussed, the membership increased as
indicated table two, objectives were reviewed, more institutions were added
and sectors of responsibility increased – all of which were based on new
decision-making procedures. Therefore, the concept “restructuring of SADC”
in this study will simply refer to changes that were introduced within SADCC/C
in order to operate effectively.

It can thus be said that the restructuring of SADCC/C will be appraised and
analysed by applying the theoretical framework outlined above.

1.7 Scope and limitation of the study

This study will mainly focus on the restructuring of SADCC/C, particularly in
1992 and 1999. However, for historical background, this study will resume
with efforts of regional integration in Africa from the late 1800s in order to level
the understanding concerning this vast field. In terms of SADC, the study will
focus on the early 1990s up to 2002 when the first restructuring occurred. The
second restructuring resumed in 1996 and was officially announced in 1999,
but continued beyond 2002, which was the estimated period of its finalisation. Due to that, this study will assemble and analyse the data pertaining to the restructuring of SADCC/C up to 2002, and to large extent, focus on the influence of the OAU’s transformation into the AU.

1.8 Organization of the thesis

The first chapter serves as an introduction to the study. This includes the research problem and study methodology. Chapter one also looks at concepts that are central to this study.

Chapter two addresses factors that led to the formation of SADCC in 1980 and two will serve as a historical background of SADCC. This will include an analysis of its institutions and its founding objectives.

Chapter three analyses and appraises political factors that led SADCC to convert to SADC in 1992. It also focuses on how SADC restructured by looking at the institutions and measures that were introduced in the new organizations.

Chapter four looks at the political factors that led SADC to consider restructuring in 1999. The chapter will examine the political factors from 1996 up to 2003 and will look at the new institutions that were introduced and phased out as a result of restructuring.

Chapter five makes some general conclusions concerning the restructuring of SADCC/C since the early 1990s.

Chapter six serves as a general conclusion and contains the recommendations of the study.
Chapter Two

The Formation of SADCC

2.1 Introduction

Chapter one presented an overview of the study. The focus was mainly on the justification of the problem at hand, and the methodology that will be followed in analysing and appraising or discussing the problem. Chapter one also discussed the literature that has been written on Southern Africa and prospects of regional integration. Observations were made regarding gaps existing in SADCC/C related literature and how existing literature will be integrated into this study.

Chapter two is aimed at discussing why was SADCC formed, by discussing factors that led to the formation of the region in Southern Africa, and by discussing the history of regional organizations in Africa as a comparative study? This is the first research question of the study as stated in chapter one. Theoretically this question relates to the realist perspective of regime formation as indicated in chapter one. As pointed out, the liberalist view of regime formation is a result of states’ endeavour to overcome the pressure to compete under conditions of anarchy. This assumption is relevant to the formation of SADCC in 1980, because the underlying factor was to oppose the apartheid South African government control in the region. Be that as it may, SADCC however, tried to focus further than South Africa’s economic threat by also looking at the international economic threat. In terms of regime formation, however, realists argue that regimes are formed in a situation when uncoordinated strategies in a given area or region can interact to produce suboptimum outcomes (Little 2001:302).

The above question in this study will be answered by looking firstly at the historical and political factors and processes in the region that led to the
formation of the region in Southern Africa, as mentioned above. The role of the Frontline States (FLS) and the apartheid South Africa will also be discussed. Secondly, SADCC’s underlying principles, norms, rules, operational structures and decision-making procedures will be addressed. This study’s theoretical framework and aspects relating to its restructuring such as conditions and justifications will be analysed and appraised in chapter three.

As indicated in the previous chapter, Anttiroika and Kainulainen (1998:4) argue that regime theory in the study of International Relations, and particularly regional organizations, deals with how and under what conditions different types of governing conditions emerge or regional organizations emerge and how they consolidate and become hegemonic. Lastly, it looks at how they develop and transform or restructure to keep up with regional and international developmental trends. Based on this definition, the analysis and appraisal in this chapter will be on how and under what conditions SADCC emerged prior to 1980. By doing this, it is hoped that in the subsequent chapters it will be easier to analyse and appraise why SADCC restructured in 1992, after having discussed factors under which it was formed at first.

2.2 The origins of regional integration in Africa

RI/C in Sub-Saharan Africa has occurred under different circumstances than in Europe and Latin America. In fact, one can discern two quite different phases in the process of RI/C. The first phase was the formation of RI/C by colonial powers. These regional groups were designed to coordinate and promote the economic interest of the metropolitan countries. Many of these were carried over to the post-colonial era. The regional bodies that were formed during the colonial period include French West Africa or Afrique Occidental Francais (AOF) formed in 1895 by the French government to coordinate and control the governments in the various French territories, French Equatorial Africa or Afrique Equitorial Francaise (AEF), and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), among others (Mokate 1983:9).
According to Tostesen (1982:111) regional bodies that were formed by newly independent nations were characterized by the fact that members constituted their starting point and arguably also the aim as perceived by the early initiators, a collection of disarticulated economies with former linkages to their metro poles than between themselves. The colonial legacy meant that from a regional integration perspective, the countries involved lacked complementarities in production structure and product range. They produced, broadly speaking, the same agricultural produce or minerals which could not be refined or minerals which could not be refined or processed locally.

According to Mokate (1986:10) the challenges that were facing African countries after independence not only contained economic challenges but political and social challenges that governments in the continent had to deal with after colonialism. The formation of the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) in 1963 was the first effort designed by African governments to deal with these challenges. The formation of regional bodies after independence, such as the East African Community (EAC in 1967 and revived in 1999), ECOWAS (1975), SADCC (1980) and others were designed to cater for member countries with new systems to enhance their economies.

At the regional level, the 1970s witnessed a remarkable growth of the economic organizations, which can be regarded as central to Africa’s economic growth. The World Bank’s Accelerated Development in Africa, An Agenda for Action (AA), the OAU and the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) provided a starting point for African thinking and articulation. The LPA and its update, the Abuja Economic Union of 1991, presented a blend of two approaches. They envisaged a pan-African Economic Union (the United States of Africa) and the consolidation of sub-regional units like SADC, COMESA, and ECOWAS. These regional integration schemes were referred to as building blocs for a continental union as subsequently envisaged and included in the African Union Constitutive Act (Patel 2000:4; Hoff 2000:1; AU Constitutive Act 2002).
According to Hoff (2000:1) Africa is by far the most prolific continent, with probably more than 200 regional groupings and agreements covering a wide variety of arrangements and issues. Some of these schemes have developed significantly and the Western and Central African countries of the CFA zone have jointly established a central bank for each region and adopted identical banking regulations. However, the overall progress was dismally slow, and there were incidences of retrogressive development, the most prominent being the collapse of the EAC in 1977.

Regional integration was seen as a strategy for overcoming Africa’s colonial heritage of political fragmentation, underdevelopment and dependency on advanced capitalist countries dominated the thinking of policy-makers since the early days of decolonization. Since the 1960s, efforts to promote continental and regional unity have sought to enhance Africa’s collective political and economic bargaining power internationally and minimize marginalization in the global division of labour (Shaw 1975:673).

Given the post-colonial state’s limited resource base, Lewis (1978:48) argued that the tendency was to accept the channels of cooperation that might give greater leverage to regional community institutions existing at independence, or some version of them. In East Africa, the functional strategy system was pursued, in the Caribbean, where non-contiguous character of the archipelago could not sustain the institutions of federation, a similar system was initiated, and in the older States of Latin America, the Central American market came into existence with US encouragement. For states like those of French-speaking Africa, which did not break monetary and financial institutional arrangements with the metropolitan country, the terms of relations offered by the EEC were an equal inducement to maintain or create regional forms of cooperation (Lewis 1978:61-62).

The African Development Forum III (2002:13) maintains that there are a number of powerful factors that militate against effective regional integration in Africa. The most significant of these is the lack of a dominant political-economic power on the continent that can form the core of the regionalization
Most African countries are exporters of raw materials, especially agricultural and mineral products, and compete with one another for markets. Industrial production is concentrated in a relatively small number of countries, and is not significant on the global scale.

The African Development Forum III (2002:14) further maintains that, throughout Africa, there is a fear of the development of hegemonic sub-regional states. Whenever one of the continent’s powerful countries (South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt) appears to be taking an active interest in sub-regional affairs, many of its smaller neighbours will try to combine to counterbalance what they see as excessive power.

The majority of regional organizations in Africa came into being in an era marked by inward-looking concepts of development, mainly industrial development based on import substitution. The goal of self-reliance and collective self-sufficiency was to be pursued by creating sub-regional markets with a view to eventually establishing a Pan-African Community (Hoff 2000:4).

However, the life span of regional organizations in Africa had its own problems and challenges. In brief, some of the regional organizations had to restructure in order to continue functioning as credible bodies, for example, after independence the structure of AOF changed substantially. Some of the countries that were part of the union withdrew from it, including Guinea. Eventually in 1961, the former countries of the AOF formed a custom union called the West African Customs Union. The union included all AOF countries except Guinea and Togo. When this union failed, another union, namely the Union of West African states, was formed in 1966, which failed too, in 1969. Another attempt by AOF members was made in 1973 with the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (CEAO). Among the many reasons behind the failure of these unions are problems of technical, administrative, political, and economic factors (Robson 1983:34).

Another example is the EAC. It originated during the colonial era as a measure for coordinating administration, infrastructural development and
economic policy in the region. By 1960, the problems that were to eventually lead to the break up of the EAC were evident. This included the growing resentment in Uganda and Tanganyika of what was perceived to be disproportionate benefits accruing to Kenya under the exiting system. In 1961, the EAC structure called the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO) was restructured to meet the needs of the newly independent nations. However, problems began to emerge and they included competing priorities arising from regional demands versus internal national development demands, the problems of distribution in favour of Kenya, and many others (Springer 1980:14).

Many lessons for Southern Africa can be derived from the above encounters, including factors that the abovementioned bodies had to respond to. These responses took different forms. In some cases, regional bodies had to reformulate regional policies in order to deal with such demands, and in other cases, regional bodies had to abort their structures and to some extent cease functioning as regional bodies when failing to respond to the challenges. Restructuring processes or such an undertaking by regional organizations is aimed at keeping an organization in touch with its immediate regional realities, whether these realities are political, social or economical. 

An analysis into the evolution of regional groupings in Africa has downplayed the role of politics as the important factor in the progress or existence of regional organizations. The background on the origin of regional integration schemes in Africa is hoped to serve as important background information on regional integration politics in Africa with relevance to SADC.

2.3 Regional formation in Southern Africa

Realist theories on regime formation argue that, the reason why states choose to form or observe a regime is because they realise that they operate in co-ordination and they are normally confronted by the same challenges. Therefore, the risk of not co-ordinating becomes higher and may move them into a less advantageous position. With that in mind, states then form regimes
consisting of rules, norms, principles and acquired convictions, and decision-
-making processes to help them deal with problems and thus create
opportunities for their regions or areas (Little 2001:303).

The abovementioned analysis can be applied to the formation of SADCC. As
will be indicated in this chapter, regional leaders were influenced to form
SADCC in order to counter South Africa’s hegemonic position (economic,
military and political). They realized that the price of not co-operating
outweighed their interest, as that would have allowed South Africa to have
more influence in the region.

The formation of regional organizations in Southern Africa was very complex
and most of the literature and debates on the topics, some of which were
referred to in the literature review; trace it from the colonial era. What follows
is a brief descriptive presentation of the formation of a regional political unit
-SADCC. This section also refers to the political processes within and among
states. It should be taken into account that the region emerged when SADCC
was formed by largely former British and Portuguese colonial powers. One of
the major features of the region during this period was South Africa’s
hegemonic position.

The discovery of diamonds (1870s) and gold (1880s) produced a decisive
shift in the importance of regional formation in Southern Africa. The
transformations engendered by the discovery of gold were of such seismic
proportions that they engulfed virtually the whole of the sub-continent. In the
process it created a complex structure of interdependent relations, which were
to endure into the future with profound implications for the wider political
economy of the entire region (Minter 1986:5; Blumenfeld 1991:8).

Minter (1986:18) maintains that the mineral wealth of Southern Africa was not
confined to the Union of South Africa. There were gold deposits north of the
Limpopo River (not referring to the province in South Africa), coal in Southern
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and copper in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). The
discovery of minerals necessitated an extension of the railway system further
into the interior. The production of diamonds and gold for export shaped transport the network of railways and ports that built the sub-continent into a regional unity.

According to Blumenfeld (1991:18) the location of the mineral discoveries and transport routes in the Transvaal and the Cape were instrumental in determining the nature of development within South Africa. The pursuit of mineral wealth gave rise to similar social and economic processes in the rest of the region. Thus, the phenomenon of rapid urban development witnessed on the Witwatersrand was repeated on a similar scale in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and, somewhat later, in the Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) copper belt. Similarly, other socio-economic consequences, including the determination of the economic and physical infrastructures, the geographic and spatial structure and distribution of economic development, and the generation of racial inequalities in relative living standards were all repeated elsewhere in the region.

After the discovery of minerals, foreign capital flooded into the region. Britain's control over markets of Southern Africa was contested by other rising international powers, as the region became an increasingly important asset. At the same time there were growing struggles between settlers (Afrikaners) and British colonial officials over the revenues derived from trade with the interior (John 1993:7).

British victory in the Anglo-Boer war was followed in 1967 by the establishment of a Southern African Custom Union (SACU) comprising of the Cape, Natal, Transvaal, Orange River Colony, Southern Rhodesia and Bachuanaland (now Botswana). When the union of South Africa was formed in 1910, it was with the expectation that the Rhodesians and the High Commission Territories (HTCs) of Basutoland (now Lesotho), Bachuanaland and Swaziland would be joined. Provisions were made in the Act of the Union for incorporation (Hyam 1972:71).
The vision of a Greater South Africa was certainly not limited to Southern Rhodesia and the three HTCs, although these were obvious and concrete objectives. Hyam (1972:73) maintains that, due to inheriting expansionist concepts of security and opportunity from local heroes as well as from offices of the British government, from Kruger and Rhodes, as well as from Milner and Selborne, the Union had designs on German South West Africa, and took up the legacy of the old Transvaal’s urge to the sea, particularly in the direction of Delagoa Bay and its port, Lourenco Marques. Smuts looked beyond the Union to an economic and political hegemony in the North, extending far beyond the frontiers of South Africa into equatorial regions.

According Martin (1990:15), “after the pact government came to power in 1924 and the development of secondary industry got under way in South Africa. The 1925 Tariff Act secured protection for infant industries. Through this act, South Africa adopted protectionist measures to promote the accelerated development of its industries. The free trade that had existed in the region was destroyed and other states of the region found themselves facing higher commodity prices. Protected by the resilience of its gold mining sector, South Africa escaped the worst effects of global recession and by 1933 industrialisation was well established. What became obvious during the interwar period was that increasingly unequal and interdependent relationships were being established across the region”.

Furthermore, Martin (1990:15) maintains that, “at the turn of the century, the whole of Southern Africa comprised both a zone of primary production and an area marked by a high degree of free flow commodities, labour and capital across territorial boundaries. The end of World War Two dramatically transformed this in that South Africa was increasingly industrialising power, while the free trade zone assiduously worked according to colonial and apartheid regime powers of the previous half-century. This caused the emergence of centre-hinterland linkages across the space of Southern Africa to be affected by a rapture of long-standing regional relationships rather than a simple strengthening of South African dominance. In this instance at least a “region” emerged not out of South-South cooperation, but out of the South
African state’s drive to escape the effects of participation in an open and common peripheral zone of the world economy”.

According to Butts and Thomas (1986:3-6) dependencies were established, especially in the fields of transport, trade and migrant labour. The region of Southern Africa was united by its transport infrastructure. Butts and Thomas (1986) refer to these phenomena as a functional region that is an area organised around a particular function. In the case of Southern Africa, they maintain that it is a transport network. Typically there exists a core area that serves as the hub for activities of the functional region that is united by lines of communication to lesser nodes of activity located in the hinterland. The core area (South Africa) generally dominates the hierarchy of needs.

The situation naturally nourished the quest for national independence in the various countries and for majority rule in South Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. Britain started to reduce her role in Southern Africa and political independence was granted to Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland during the 1960s without major confrontations. The imposed Central African Federation between Nyasaland (Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), that mainly benefited Southern Rhodesia, was broken up in 1963 after 10 years of existence. In 1965, the British descendants in Zimbabwe refused majority rule and proclaimed ‘Unilateral Declaration of Independence’ from Britain. Portugal showed no sign of giving up its overseas territories. In South Africa, repression was intensified after the massacre and the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress in 1960 (PAC). Namibia was still firmly in the South African grip, in spite of the local and international protests (Haarløv 1988: 13).

In the newly independent countries in the region, governments had to battle with continued economic dependence on South Africa and the West. In the remaining colonies and minority ruled states, armed struggles and other forms of resistance to the status quo grew steadily, leading to the independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1974 and 1975 and Zimbabwe in 1980 (Haarløv 1988:13).
Hyam (1972:33) explains that the basis of regional formation in Southern Africa rotated around other areas such as the following: (1) the micro-labour system which referred to the concentration of emigrates from neighbouring countries like Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Namibia to the gold mines in South Africa; (2) the political consideration of the FLS, in other words, the unification of the liberated countries in Southern Africa against the apartheid regime in South Africa had an effect in the formation of the region (to be discussed later); (3) the formation of the Customs Union as discussed had an effect on the shaping of the region; and (4) the Rand Commentary Area (RMA) between South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia had a huge impact in the formation of the region in Southern Africa.

These patterns of regional formation established relationships most frequently understood as dependent. As already stated, the mere aim of the historical overview on the formation of the Southern African region is to simply describe how dependency and inequality came about in the region and to form a platform as to why SADCC was considered.

### 2.4 SADCC historical background

According to Hoff (2000:4), SADCC was not established as an integration organization. Its objectives were mainly geared towards supporting the FLS, that is, those countries bordering on being an apartheid state, to cope with their precarious dependence upon South Africa. On this point, Schoeman (2002:2) further explain that, “to treat SADCC purely as an attempt at economic regionalism or development coordination and cooperation would be to miss much about the original driving forces behind the establishment of the organizations, though the OAU’s 1980 Lagos Plan did encourage the principle of sub-regional economic cooperation as building blocs for a continental economic union”.

SADCC was established in 1980 in terms of the ‘Lusaka Declaration’. It was a politically motivated response and defensive mechanism of the FLS to South Africa’s idea of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS). SADCC’s main objective was to reduce economic dependence on, and vulnerability to South Africa through building economic, and particularly infrastructural security, in the region. Although influenced by continental moves towards intensified regionalization, SADCC was established as economic pillar of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle in the region (SADC 2002:34).

The extent to which SADCC was a politically constituted region was obvious in its membership, and that is why political factors played a big role in the restructuring in 1992 and in 1999. Schoeman (2002:3) argues that, apart from the economic factors, the exclusion of South Africa made no sense. The (then) Zaire was also excluded, despite the fact that in geographical terms, at least, it made more sense to include it rather that Tanzania. However, Tanzania had been a part of FLS since its inception, had harboured South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) dissidents for many years and it had been active in the liberation struggle waged against the white regimes in South Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa. From a regional-economic perspective, though, Tanzania historically formed part of the EAC (together with Uganda and Kenya) – a customs union that disintegrated in the 1970s due to conflict amongst its members over the distribution of resources and gain. Zaire was basically excluded from SADCC membership because of its support for and cooperation with South Africa, as well as its open sympathy with and support for the Union Nacional Por La Independenciae Totale Do Angola (UNITA), the former rebel movement in Angola.

SADCC adopted a Programme of Action (PA) that identified and defined economic activities and development projects to be pursued. The PA was based on the project approach or sectoral approach with each member taking responsibility for a particular sector (for example, Angola for energy, Mozambique for transport, and Swaziland for human resources development). This approach resulted in a highly decentralised organizational structure with a small secretariat in Botswana and in a highly uneven distribution of efficiency
and effectiveness within various sectors. Ostergaard (1990:58) adds, “SADCC was conceived as a service organization rather than a leader of countries that constituted it.”

Politically though, such an approach had its benefits. It underscored the basic principle of equality amongst members, regardless of size or relative power, fostering a sense of equal worth, and identity. Due to poverty and limited financial resources, of many SADCC states, certain sectors were neglected, particularly the human resources development sector coordinated by Swaziland. This was due to the fact that the organization was heavily dependent on donor funding, each sector procuring funds for projects in its own realm. Such an approach, apart from the dangers of unevenness and differences in approach and commitment inherit, also opened up the possibility that donors might have undue influence on certain sectors as they were dealing, by implication, with SADCC on a bilateral basis (SADC 1995:9).

The above changes point to the early awareness of SADCC members to the importance of the need to respond to international and regional political changes, as will later be illustrated in chapters three and five. These changes also show the extent to which SADCC was moving towards the acceptance of a conventional liberal economic doctrine on the importance of trade liberalisation, a trend encouraged by international financial institutions, such as the IMF through structural adjustment programmes. These changes within SADCC point to the evolution of a regionalism characterized by a sense of a shared destiny, member states increasingly articulating their needs, preferences and objectives in terms of their being part of the region and these aspects as being indivisible.

The transformation of SADCC to SADC through the 1992 Windhoek Treaty is a prime example of the extent to which the Southern African region has taken cognisance of change at various levels and has moved towards such change, using it in a positive way to promote and develop the well-being of the region. The transformation of SADCC into SADC was influenced by a number of external and internal factors. Externally, forces that influenced the change
were more economically oriented like the economic globalization with its emphasis on economic liberalisation and increased bloc formation. Internal factors include the change in international political landscape at the end of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid in South Africa. These factors shifted the international emphasis on traditional military-political security to a concentration on a much broader definition of security that included economic, environmental, and societal security (SADC 1995:9).

An analysis of SADC restructuring, as mentioned above, contains various aspects. Although regional integration schemes emphasise economic and market integration, this study seeks to analyse specific political factors that played a role in SADC restructuring in both phases. The Southern African region is a suitable unit of analysis for political factors that may have had influence on the existence or discontinuation of regional organizations.

### 2.5 The role of the FLS and apartheid South Africa in the formation of SADCC

Table two in chapter one included the members of the FLS. This alliance was formed from the remnants of the short-lived ‘Mulungushi Club’. Most of its members once belonged to the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA). PAFMECSA, in turn, emanated from a restructuring process that led to the establishment of the Pan-African Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), established in 1958, and changed its name and constitution in 1962 to accommodate newly independent countries outside its original Anglophone region. PAFMECA/PAFMECSA had a series of eight conferences before it was eventually usurped by the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 (ISS 1999:1).

At continental level, the OAU Liberation Committee took responsibility for much of the work that PAFMECSA had engaged in, but the feeling remained that this was too formal and broad for an institution to cater for the particular and special needs of the sub-region. As a result, and subsequent to the
dissolution of PAFMECSA, a series of Conferences on East and Central African Countries (CECAC) were initiated by Tanzania and Zambia to fill the vacuum left by PAFMECSA. Together with President Mobutu Sese Seko of the former Zaire, Nyerere and Kaunda were the most active in the region. As will be indicated later, SADC runs the risk of falling into same trap due to the Pan-African integration process (AU) that succeeded the OAU (ISS 1999:1).

For most of the time the region reflected an uncompromising commitment in support of the armed struggle as opposed to dialogue. Yet, the fifth CECAC issued the Lusaka Manifesto in 1969, which was later adopted by both the OAU and the UN and, for a limited period, provoked a debate on dialogue in Southern Africa. The seventh CECAC subsequently issued the Mogadishu Declaration that reassessed the situation and concluded that “white minority regimes in Southern Africa had not only rejected the Lusaka Manifesto, but were not amenable to negotiation”. The Lusaka Manifesto and the Mogadishu Declaration laid a basis for the future alternative strategies of independent Southern African countries. Dialogue and the peaceful settlement of Southern African conflicts were only to be revived by the Harare Declaration (1989) in a very different, post-Cold War context and at a time that both Namibia and Zimbabwe had joined the ranks of the FLS (ISS 1999:1).

The Mulungushi Club was the most short-lived of the groupings preceding the FLS and there was a degree of co-existence between CECAC and the Club. Operating approximately between 1970 and 1974, the Club was the immediate predecessor of the FLS alliance. Its original four members were Tanzania, Uganda (until Idi Amin replaced Milton Obote in a 1971 coup), Zaire (Mobutu attended meetings from 1973) and Zambia. Its name reflected its nature — that of an informal group of respected heads of state rather than an interstate institution. Like the previous groupings and others such as CECAC, the Club also had its focus on the liberation of Southern Africa. Its relatively small size allowed it to meet frequently and at short notice. Like all other regional and sub-regional groupings, leaders of active liberation movements in Southern Africa were being frequently invited to the Club summits. Most of these features were carried over to the FLS alliance (SADCC 1984:5).
Within a sub-regional context, the FLS was the most important and indeed most recognised structure to emerge in the mid-1970s, at a time when the anti-colonial struggle was the most important concern in the sub-region. The FLS was constituted as an informal forum for the discussion of mainly political and, to a lesser extent, military problems common among the liberation movements, and the problems faced by newly independent governments in Zambia, Mozambique and Angola. Security issues were discussed in the ISDSC, the informal substructure of the FLS. At summit level, the FLS was not only a club of national governments, but included representatives from the various liberation movements in its meetings and, for a time, the head of state of Nigeria as a type of informal associate. The heads of state of Botswana (Sir Seretse Khama), Tanzania (Julius Nyerere) and Zambia (Kenneth Kaunda) can be considered to be the founders of the FLS in 1975, together with Samora Machel of Mozambique. Angola joined in 1976, Zimbabwe in 1980 and Namibia in 1990. South Africa briefly joined in 1994 before the demise of the FLS later that same year. Lesotho was never a member of the FLS, although representatives of the government of Chief Leabua Jonathan attended a number of ISDSC meetings (SADCC 1994:5).

The FLS alliance played its most important role in the final years leading up to the end of white rule in the former Rhodesia and the creation of Zimbabwe in 1980. Thereafter, the alliance lost a degree of impact, compounded by economic decline among its members and South Africa’s aggressive destabilisation policies. Economic issues loomed as the next primary challenge for the region and, as a result, SADCC was founded in 1980, resulting in the further erosion of the influence of the FLS (ISS 1999:3).

The role of apartheid South Africa prior to the formation of SADCC could be seen as a reason why the FLS was formed and formalised their relationship in a form of SADCC. Apartheid South Africa was basically playing a destabilizing role in the region, especially on countries that were known to support South African liberation movements.
2.6 The formation of SADCC

In previous sections, the historical conditions in the region prior to the 1980s were discussed. Reference was also made to the integration efforts in the region. This section introduces the formation of SADCC as an organization (including its structure), as well as the political role played by influential leaders such as Sir Seretse Khama (Botswana), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), and Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe). By the time the idea of an organization such as SADCC was mooted, specific conditions in the region needs to be referred to. Leading countries such as Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia had already gained independence. Towards the end of the 1970s South West Africa/Namibia was still under the political management of South Africa. Furthermore, most of the region, in one way or another was a battleground for the Cold War. In addition to this, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe had not gained independence. Emerging as the political leader of independent Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe received significant support from leaders in the region. In an effort, inter alia to establish Zimbabwe as a political force in the region, Robert Mugabe played an important role in unifying the region to minimize its dependence on South Africa.

By 1977, a series of consultations among the FLS took place under the leadership of the president of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama (Hanlon 1989:4). One of the outcomes of these consultations was the FLS’ commissioning of various sectoral studies on the regional economy, with a view to assessing the feasibility of creating a regional economic organization among the independent majority-ruled states of Southern Africa. These sectored studies became the basis of SADCC’s Program of Action for coordinated regional development and disengagement from the Republic of South Africa.

Subsequent to these studies were two significant gatherings. Firstly, an exploratory meeting of the FLS Finance Ministers took place in May 1979. A second gathering took place in Arusha that following July to discuss the possibility of establishing SADCC. The latter, attended by the Foreign ministers of Botswana, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (Nsekela
1981: viiii; Leys and Tostensen 1982:53-54), adopted a Declaration of Intent to proceed with the establishment of SADCC. At the Arusha Conference on economic cooperation, Sir Seretse Khama noted “what we are trying to achieve is the ability to exercise some degree of choice which insures us against domination by one powerful partner.” He further maintained “many countries in the region had already won political independence but their colonial past ensured that they continued to depend on others for economic survival. As a result, economic dependence made political independence meaningless, particularly when one takes into account the fact that some of the countries on which some SADCC countries depended for economic survival did not share the human ideals on which it was founded, particularly apartheid South Africa then” (cited in Thompson 1985: 258).

Although the Arusha conference had been limited to the FLS only, by April 1980, the latter had agreed to extend SADCC membership “to all independent Southern African states and. Also cooperate where feasible with the Liberation Movements in preparing for economic independence after political liberation” (Nsekela 1981: xv). The FLS not only felt that a broader membership would strengthen the organization, but also believed that inclusion of states such as Lesotho and Swaziland, the so-called “hostage states” and Malawi, which openly collaborated with South Africa, would reinforce a Pan-Africanist political cohesion among the nine and promote the effective isolation of Pretoria. On 1 April 1980, the summit meeting of the nine founding member states of SADCC adopted the Lusaka Declaration, Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation, which together with the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Heads of State and Government of the founding members in July 1981, remained the legal binding documents of the organization to date (Nsekela 1981: xv-7). These nine founding members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and the newly independent state of Zimbabwe. However, the Lusaka Declaration granted observer status to the liberation movements, specifically, the South West People’s Liberation Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia, the African National Congress (ANC) and
the Pan African Congress (PAC) of South Africa. On attaining its independence in March 1990, Namibia became the tenth member of SADCC.

Von der Ropp (2000:2) maintains that, it is often overlooked that the founding of the SADCC was due largely to the initiative of Claude Cheyson, at the time the EU’s commissioner in charge of co-operation with ACP countries. He held the view that, as a result of South Africa’s apartheid policy, South Africa would probably be destroyed by civil war as its land-locked neighbours needed to develop new trade routes to sea. Consequently, members of SADCC concentrated on developing their own infrastructure so that their dependence on the South African powerhouse could be lessened. In the years that followed, SADCC collected the necessary capital, mostly from Western donors, and particularly from the EU members, to establish the greater independence. SADCC at its inception, found itself developing along the lines of the EU.

Though membership was extended to all the Southern African states and the liberation movements, SADCC declined membership to Zaire. Mobutu’s close ties with the South African and US-backed UNITA against Angola’s ruling party, the Marxist-inspired MPLA, might have ruled out Zaire’s admission (Johnson and Martin 1986: 74-88, Schoeman 2002:4).

Legum (1988:93) notes that Mobutu’s relations with the FLS, which he had dismissed in 1977 as “a restricted club, where hypocrisy is the only slogan,” were far from cordial. The inclusion of Tanzania, that is geographically and economically not part of the subsystem, underlined that the political alliance over the decolonization of Southern Africa was central in determining membership. Nyerere’s critical role in supporting the independence struggles of Southern Africa and the formation of the FLS made Tanzania’s membership natural. Despite its collaboration with South Africa, Malawi’s admission might have been determined by its geographical position and a history of economic interactions with other SADCC states, particularly during the Central African Federation.
The founding members of SADCC did not require members to renounce their economic ties with other states, including South Africa. The BLS countries could retain their membership in the South African-dominated customs union, SACU, and the RMA that gave Pretoria decision-making powers over the currencies of Lesotho and Swaziland (Cobbe 1991:67).

Zimbabwe, SADCC’s most powerful partner, retained its Preferential Trade Agreement with Pretoria. With the exception of Botswana, Angola and Namibia, SADCC countries also belonged to the PTA. SADCC’s flexible and pragmatic approach was a response to the varying degrees of dependence that the individual states had with South Africa and the need to maintain political unity (Green 1981:14).

Before proceeding to a discussion of the structure of SADCC, reference is made to its founding principles and objectives outlined in the Harare Declaration. These are:

- the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;
- the forging of links to create genuine and equitable regional integration;
- the mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies; and
- concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of a strategy for economic liberation (SADCC Treaty 1980:2).

### 2.6.1 SADCC founding structure in 1980

Figure one refers to SADCC’s founding structure. As noted earlier, Botswana played an important role in the process leading up to the establishment of SADCC. This Position of leadership continued at its inception as Botswana chaired both the Summit and the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, Botswana is also the location of the SADCC Secretariat.
SADCC was formed as a highly decentralized organizational structure and its operational procedures reflected the members’ original intent to prevent the development of a huge supra-national bureaucracy. Above all, the decentralization was designed to guarantee direct involvement in the planning and execution of the regional programs of all member states that retain equal rights and duties in the decision-making process. The organization placed tremendous emphasis on its policy coordination role (amongst the sectors included in table 4) and decision-making by consensus. Voluntarism, flexibility and the primacy of national sovereignty influenced the institutional character of SADCC. As will be indicated in subsequent chapters, SADCC’s original structure soon indicated some of its shortcomings, which resulted in the process of restructuring (SADCC 1981:8).

In chapter one, regime analysis was identified as the preferred analytical framework of this study. The rest of this section will apply this framework with regards to SADCC’s founding structure, guiding principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures.

**Figure 1: SADCC founding structure in 1980**
Gwaradzimba (1993:89) stated that, ‘during 1980 to 1990 the organization consisted of small, loose institutional structures, closely linked to the national bureaucracies of the member states. The Summit, consisting of the heads of state and government of the ten member countries, was the highest authority of SADCC. Its overall role was to guide policy, maintain political and ideological cohesion of the organization and ensure that the objectives of the organization were met. The summit met once a year and in general endorsed the decisions recommended by the Council of Ministers, including the appointment of the Executive Secretary of Secretariat’.

The most important decision-making body in SADCC was the Council of Ministers that comprised the Ministers of Finance of the member countries and was responsible “for the overall policy of SADCC, its general coordination, the supervision of its institutions and the supervision of the execution of its programs.” The Council met twice a year prior to the summit.

Source: SADCC Treaty (1980)

To assist the Council of Ministers in policy formulation was the Standing Committee of Officials that oversaw the formulation of SADCC projects at the national level and maintained liaison with the national government ministries and SADCC’s SCUs. This body consisted of regular government officials in the Ministry of Finance or the President's office in member countries, which were designated as SADCC national contact points. They formed the backbone in coordinating members’ participation in SADCC projects and the representation of their governments at all SADCC meetings. Any national project earmarked for SADCC funding was submitted to national contact points before being considered by the SCUs (SADCC Handbook 1984:56; Lee 1989:163-180; Hanlon 1989: 6-8).

Apart from the above functions, national contact points also reviewed all sectoral project proposals and recommended policies to ministers who were members of the Council of Ministers. Ad hoc technical bodies could assist the Standing Committee of officials, but essentially they carried out dual roles as they also had regular duties within the national civil service. Due to the fact that national contact points had these dual roles, they were overburdened and often failed to visit projects or adequately prepare for SADCC meetings (SADCC Handbook 1984:59).

To address the above problem and ensure continuity the Secretariat, in 1989, decided to develop guidelines for the national contact points and to urge member states to appoint permanent senior level personnel who can make binding decisions at SADCC meetings. When SADCC was formed, the Heads of State mandated member countries to create SCU within their respective ministries to oversee the coordination of their sectoral responsibilities. Table 4 contains these SCUs and member states responsible for it. The SCUs are SADCC’s sectoral administrative units attached to the corresponding sectoral ministry of each member government. The SCUs formed the backbone of SADCC’s sectoral regional programs since regional
projects and development strategies originated here. The body worked closely with the Secretariat and the national contact points. The Food Security Technical Administrative Unit (FSTAU) within Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Agriculture, the Energy Sector Technical Advisory Unit (TAU) in Angola’s Ministry of Energy and the Industry and Trade Coordination Unit in Tanzania’s Ministry of Industry are examples of SADCC’s ten SCUs (see table 3) (SADCC Handbook 1984:60).

Table 3: SADCC Member Countries Sectoral Responsibilities 1980-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Security Coordination of Food and Agriculture</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Research; Livestock and Animal Disease Control</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and Trade</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism, Soil and Water Conservation</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Fisheries</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In priority sectors such as transport, communications and agricultural research, SADCC created autonomous Sectoral Commissions with “an independent legal status” to coordinate program activities. The Southern African Transport and Communication Commission (SATCC) in Maputo and the Southern African Center for Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR) in Gaborone were the only two sectoral Commissions that SADCC Heads of State sanctioned (Hanlon 1989:6; SADCC Handbook 1984). From
the outset, the SADCC member states made transport and communications a priority section noting that "without the establishment of an adequate regional transport and communications system, other areas of cooperation become impractical" (Lusaka Declaration 1980:2). With six of the member states landlocked (Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Malawi) especially the BLS whose only outlets to the sea are historically through South Africa, regional transport and communication links represented an area where dependence of the nine was high. To this end, the Harare Summit of July 1981 approved the establishment of SATCC in Maputo, Mozambique, to oversee the development of viable alternative routes (Convention on the Establishment of The Southern African Transport and Communications, Harare, July, 1981). The transport development strategy would hinge upon five corridors, specifically, Beira, Nacala, Limpopo, Lobito and Dar-es-Salaam, making Mozambique's ability to coordinate this sector critical to SADCC's overall Program of Action.

While sectoral commissions had an autonomous status and their own budgets, sectoral coordinators who planned and coordinated regional sectoral development strategies on a full-time basis, but remained salaried civil servants of their respective governments staffed the SCUs. Though the Sectoral Coordinators worked exclusively on SADCC sectoral programs, they fell under the authority and administrative structure of their Ministers (SADCC Handbook 1984:78).

Mandaza (1987:219-22) warned that, while the above views might reflect the official intent of SADCC's founding members and had economic advantages, it was also true that there were hidden costs and disadvantages in a decentralized institutional structure. Relying on national bureaucrats meant that the pace of program implementation was subject to the dynamism or inefficiency of the individual member states. In areas where skills were in short supply, this arrangement led to heavier reliance on external experts to implement the regional development programs without advantages of an overarching national policy framework to guide the work of foreign short-term
experts. These aspects were inter alia contributing factors to the need for restructuring.

The Secretariat based in Gaborone, Botswana, formed the fifth tier of SADCC’s organizational structure. The Executive Secretary of SADCC headed the small secretariat of a dozen staff members that answered directly to the Summit through the Council of Ministers. The secretariat had no decision-making powers but it essentially existed to coordinate the sectoral activities of the member countries, mobilize resources on behalf of SADCC, and liaises with member states and donors and lastly, to service the organization administratively (SADCC 1984:5).

The secretariat’s job was to assess all the activities of all sector contact points and to ensure that those activities were concentrated on as agreed upon by the member countries. Beyond that, the Secretariat had to think forward as to where the organization was going, and what problems the organization was facing and attempt to seek solutions, together with the member countries and not in isolation, in order to solve such problems as unemployment and industrialization. Those were concerns that most probably were much wider than each sector could handle and as a result, the Secretariat acted as a think tank. In addition to that, it mobilized resources for almost all the projects, and for that reason it carried out periodic briefing missions to international cooperating partners to discuss SADCC needs (Gwaradzimba 1993:123).

In keeping with its objective to mobilize international assistance to achieve its goals, SADCC developed a regular mechanism for liaising with donors. Between January and February, member states alternated in hosting the Annual Consultative Conference which was attended by bilateral an international donors, or in SADCC parlance, cooperating partners, SADCC officials and representatives of the Member countries. The Annual Consultative conference was organized by the Secretariat and was an occasion during which invited donors were updated on progress in regional cooperation, projects and studies were presented for funding and bottlenecks
were ironed out. Donors made financial pledges to SADCC projects at the Annual Consultative Conferences and, as evidenced by the size of the 1988 Arusha conference that was attended by 1000 delegates, the gatherings became donor conferences rather than simply policy consultative fora (SADCC Handbook 1984: 6).

In general, its architects’ past experiences with supra-national regional integration schemes have heavily influenced SADCC’s institutional framework. It has been largely designed to allow for consensus in decision-making and, above all, to protect the sovereignty and autonomy of its constituent members. Throughout the decade under review, SADCC sought to improve this decentralized organizational framework without eroding the spirit of sovereign equality and the problematic issue of equitable distribution of the benefits of regional cooperation among asymmetrical states.

2.7 Other forms of regional integration efforts in Southern Africa

Apart from regional integration efforts as espoused by SADCC, similar initiatives were instituted prior to SADCC. This section introduces a short background on the nature of selected regional integration schemes such as SACU and COMESA. Following the realist approach of regime analysis, it is imperative to refer to the power politics and competition among these organizations. In table 2 in chapter one, references were made to overlapping memberships of regional organizations. It was further emphasised that competing interests, principles, rules, norms and decision-making processes, often challenge states in most cases. Another intervening aspect is the fact that some of these organizations have progressed further in the process of regional integration as referred to above in the context of the levels of integration.

As an illustration of some of these aspects, the mentioned regional organizations will be briefly discussed in a descriptive manner. Three aspects need to be mentioned, though, regarding the analysis of these organizations. Firstly, this is not a detailed discussion as these organizations are not the
focus of this study. Secondly, as these selected organizations (SACU and COMESA) have undergone their own restructuring, this study seeks to find lessons from their experiences. This will be referred to in the final conclusion of this study. Thirdly, both SACU and COMESA have a strong commitment to economic integration. The discussion on the FLS will highlight the mainly political focus of its integration effort as a precursor to establishment of SADCC.

2.7.1 The Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

The SACU agreement was drawn up in 1969. The main tenet of this agreement was that customs and excise revenues of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS countries) would be collected by South Africa and paid into a common pool. This would later be distributed to member countries according to a formula that was loaded 42 percent, later changed to between 62 and 70 percent in favour of the BLNS countries with South Africa keeping the remainder plus interest accrued. This loading was for compensating the BLNS countries for loss of sovereignty in determining their own customs policies (Monyai 1997:41).

Problems that have been encountered with SACU are that the Board of Trade and Tariffs responsible for setting tariffs, was accountable only to the South African government. BLNS countries were not represented on it. South Africa unilaterally introduced a number of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, trading standards and conditions that were beyond the capacities of BLNS countries. These made BLNS countries virtual captive markets for South Africa (Monyai 1997:41-42).

Although there was much improvement in SACU, it is important to note that, prior to the formation of SADCC in 1980 and COMESA in 1981; it was morally difficult for other countries beside the BLNS to join SACU. The reason then was that, except for the already dependent BLNS states to the South African economy, other countries such as Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe saw a need to assist the liberation movements, and the way to do that was to
boycott SACU and form an alternative regional structure. The FLS became such an alternative structure (Haarløv 1988: 13).

Functioning alongside SACU was the Multilateral Monetary Area (MMA) involving the same countries. The MMA was established in 1974 as the Rand Monetary Area, and in 1975 Botswana withdrew to follow her own monetary and fiscal policies. Lesotho and Swaziland were compensated for having the Rand circulating in their countries but their currencies were not allowed to circulate in South Africa. In 1986, with the introduction of the present MMA of the Rand Monetary Area, the Rand was stopped from being legal tender in Swaziland and the free movement of currency between South Africa and Swaziland was restrained. With independence in 1990, Namibia gained the right to issue its own currency (Monyai 1997: 43).

2.7.2 The Common Market of Southern and Eastern Africa (COMESA)

COMESA was established in 1981 as the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA). The principal aim of the PTA was promotion of trade within the sub-region, by removing the barriers to trade through the granting of preferential tariffs on selected goods, and improving payments arrangements. Since 1994, the organization has changed to COMESA and is aiming at moving towards a common market.

Monyai (1997: 43) points out several constraints that have hampered this process. They include: (1) the process involving the removal of trade barriers and non-trade barriers was hampered by high budget deficits, foreign debt service costs, low foreign reserves, overloaded currencies, lack of trade finance and dependence on customs revenue as a source of income; (2) the second problem was the lack of a compensation mechanism - COMESA was and still is characterised by wide disparities in the economies of member states, with Kenya and Zimbabwe dominating the scene. While member states were expected to remove tariffs there was no mechanism in place to compensate the weaker economies for the loss of their important source of revenue; (3) the third problem was that the COMESA members represented
minor markets for each other as destinations for exports or sources of imports. The intra-regional trade in 1989 accounted for only 5 percent (Adedeji 1991:50).

There were many shortfalls in COMESA pointed out by other scholars that could have contributed to a lack of success in the organization thus far. Tikarambude (1993:154) notes “COMESA is characterised by the lack of political will among its members. As a result that has contributed to the limited implementation of treaty agreements in COMESA.” The problems caused by the lack of political will were further exacerbated by the fact that a number of countries in COMESA held overlapping and competing memberships with other regional institutions such as SADCC and others (Adedeji 1991:50).

2.8 Preliminary indications of structural changes

This section will address some of the early indications of the limitations of SADCC’s founding structure. Apart from these structural limitations, operations of SADCC were further impeded by states’ unwillingness to surrender their sovereignty.

The 1981 summit was held in Blantyre, Malawi, where it adopted a Program of Action for SADCC, and identified and assigned a total of nine sectoral responsibilities to each of the founding member states (as outlined in table 4). The assignment of these responsibilities did not occur without any controversy as states attempted to capitalize on these sectors to support their national interests. One case in point is the allocation of the Fisheries SCU. Malawi refused to relinquish fisheries to Namibia. This resulted, in 1990, in the Fisheries SCU splitting into two SCUs wherein Malawi retained inland fisheries and Namibia was given responsibility for marine fishing (Southern African Economist, March-April 1990).

Though Mozambique and Zimbabwe had demonstrated experience in the transport and food security sectors, the allocation of sectoral responsibilities were primarily assigned according to members’ interests and did not seem to
have been decided upon on the basis of proven capability or resource endowment (Lee 1989:176; Green and Thompson 1985: 265).

That came from the fact that, though SADCC specified its objectives, it lacked a clearly articulated regional development strategy. In keeping with the policy of primacy of national interests, decentralization and the assignment of the coordination and implementation of the Program of Action to member states, the national development plans of the constituent members were defined as the source of all regional projects. The only criterion was that these projects be regional in nature, that is, address a regional problem, or involve more than one country. By 1985, SADCC was being heavily criticized for embracing a “shopping list” strategy whose only development criteria was to obtain funding from the donors for essentially nationalist projects (Lee 1989:178; Ndlela 1987:58).

Mandaza (1987:219-20) holds that, the need to maintain unity and avert disagreement and ensure that members not only plan but also coordinate and implement SADCC projects in their respective countries, explains the loose definition of regional capacity of the respective countries to undertake such responsibilities, as with the (politically expedient) need to ensure that each member state has at least been allocated something.

2.9 Summary

Realist’s approach to regime formation as argued in this chapter has basically been that power plays a crucial role as threat to discipline weaker states and it forces weaker states to seek co-ordination or co-operation. This chapter has indicated that SADCC emerged as a direct response to both the adverse position of African states in the international economy and the dangerous external environment, which the South African apartheid government posed. In seeking to restructure the historical patterns of asymmetrical economic relations with South Africa, member states hoped to create and legitimate an alternative regional economic order, which reflected an ideology of liberation. Previous political and diplomatic cooperation within the FLS provided the
foundation for an organization, which would seek the coordination and harmonization of national policies to achieve economic autonomy.

Realist theories on regime formation also argued in this chapter that the reason why states choose to form or observe a regime is because they realise that they are operating in a co-ordination and they are normally confronted with the same challenges. Therefore, the risk of not co-ordinating moves them into less advantageous position. With that in mind, states therefore, form regimes consisting of rules, norms, principles and decision-making processes to help them deal with problems and thus create opportunities for their regions or areas. This is apparent when analysing the SADCC 1980 structure in that it was designed to co-ordinate developmental projects rather than design regional integration in the form of borderless region like in the case of the EU.

The other argument put forward by the realist approach on the nature of regimes is that a powerful state or a hegemon determines the shape of a regime around which states will co-ordinate their efforts. The power of South Africa and its force in the region determined the shape of SADCC. Drawing from this, SADCC member states deliberately opted for a decentralized decision making institutional framework and a micro or project approach to regional development, in order to retain sovereignty and to deal with developmental issues domestically. They also declared a security issue or security threats from South Africa as a regional problem. Sectoral Programming was thus a direct response to their varying levels of economic dependence on South Africa, and resource endowment and power capabilities of the member states. This chapter also described SADCC’s organizational structures and analyzed factors that might obstruct the organization’s operational efficiency, which emphasises the above.

As SADCC relied on members’ national decisions for every policy formulation and implementation, this brought members to a conflict of choice between regional objectives and national interests on one hand, and the need to balance donors’ influence and the level of economic dependence on South Africa on the other. These difficulties on which SADCC was founded had a
way of influencing its operations domestically and internationally. This resulted in the consideration of restructuring as will be demonstrated in the next chapter.

This chapter showed that the main reason behind the SADCC formation in 1980 was to co-ordinate development projects with the aim of countering South Africa’s dominance in the region and to deal with economic dependence that was created by decades of colonialism.

Chapter Three

The Restructuring of SADCC into SADC 1980-1992

3.1 Introduction

The realist approach to regime formation in chapter two helped to introduce the debate on why SADCC was formed and how it operated. This chapter seeks to answer the second research question this study has identified in chapter one, which is why SADCC restructured in the early 1990s after it was formed in 1980. Although the emphasis in this study is to appraise and analyse mainly the political factors that had a role in the restructuring of
SADCC, recognition of economic factors both regionally and internationally cannot be completely ignored. It is important to note that most economic factors have political implications, and vice versa.

Factors that led SADCC to restructure in 1992 will be discussed in terms of two levels in this study, namely regional and international. Regimes, as indicated in chapter one and emphasised in chapter two, are established to assist states in dealing with shared issues. SADCC was established to address issues of mutual concern. In this regard, the Lusaka Declaration (regarded as the founding document of SADCC) signed on 1 April 1980, highlights some of the mutual concerns SADCC states had at that time. It declares, inter alia, “... [O]ur commitment to pursue policies aimed at the economic liberation and integrated development of our national economies...” and minimising the economic dependence on South Africa (SADCC 1980:1).

SADCC is identified as a regime in this study. In chapter one, Krasner’s definition was identified as the preferred conceptualisation. In analysing SADCC’s restructuring, the defining elements of a regime will be looked at. During its various restructuring exercises, SADCC/C had to take cognisance of its principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. At the time SADCC was established, specific conditions prevailed in the region, such as the military attacks by South Africa on states in the region and economic dependencies. By the time of its first restructuring process, various other conditions prevailed. It is important to note that conditions and factors discussed in this chapter were conditions and factors SADCC was created to deal with. Such conditions and factors had an effect on SADCC’s operations. In return, SADCC was required to respond to or deal with such changes.

The Lusaka Declaration represents SADCC’s main principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. The most important principle for the organization was to improve economic conditions in the region by minimising dependence on apartheid South Africa. In a normative sense, the Lusaka
Declaration specifies general standards of behaviour, and identifies the rights and obligations of member states. It could also be regarded as the main framework that the regime was based on and was expected to operate according to. In brief, the Lusaka Declaration served as the guideline in which the regime (SADCC) was to operate to ensure co-ordination among states that were opposed to the apartheid regime of South Africa.

In this regard, an example of a basic norm specified is that of economic liberation and regional development co-ordination. The latter is an essential characteristic of SADCC as a regime. Co-ordination (even outlined in the name of the organization, Southern African Development Coordination Conference) can therefore not be changed in any sector without the transformation of the nature of the regime. However, this norm was transformed into one of development cooperation (evident in the new name of the organization) with the establishment of SADC (Southern African Development Community).

In terms of rules, the Lusaka Declaration identifies issues relating to the conflictual nature of prevailing political and economic conditions in the region vis-à-vis that of South Africa and the international arena. In fact, the Declaration states that rapid and effective development can be achieved if development takes place within the context of global cooperation. Furthermore, its states that “International bodies and states outside Southern Africa are therefore invited to co-operate in implementing programmes towards economic liberation and development in the region (SADCC 1980:1-6)”. With regards to the organization’s decision-making procedures, the Lusaka Declaration is silent. It only outlines the importance of regional co-operation and co-ordination without any reference to the structure with which to achieve these objectives. However, in subsequent documents, summit meetings and conferences on the structure of the organization and its decision-making procedures were outlined and implemented. The first structure of SADCC is presented in figure one in chapter two. Furthermore, references were made to its decision-making procedures.
This chapter outlines factors and conditions that contributed to SADCC's first restructuring, which is the establishment of SADC in 1992. The main focus will be on how these factors had an effect on SADCC as a regional structure and also as a regional or institutional regime as explained in the first chapter.

By the end of the 1980s, regional conditions (such as the end of apartheid) and international conditions (the end of the Cold War) changed. Within SADCC member countries were faced with various internal conditions such as those related to socio-economic conditions. One aspect related to this, is the fact that, a decade after its establishment, some of the founding objectives of SADCC were not achieved. In 1980, the Lusaka Declaration identified, in principle, four main development objectives to be achieved by the organization, as stated in chapter two.

By the late 1980s regional countries remained underdeveloped and were still dependent on South Africa. The regional economy according to Gibb (2001:79) was built upon the region's single dominant economy located in South Africa, for example migrant labour, mining, water, transport and increasing regional trade. The patterns and extent of the inequality among member countries led to some members getting into bilateral relations with South Africa despite the fact that it was perceived as an enemy then, for example Malawi under president Banda. The continuing inequalities and dependency of most member countries undermined SADCC's ability to develop and integrate the region. A call for an alternative organization or regional structure started to be inevitable. SADCC officials started to realize the need to restructure the organization in order to be able to deal with all the needs and challenges that prevailed in the region as discussed above.

The global changes mentioned in the preceding discussion all pointed to the fact that the value of foreign aid to Third World countries was dropping substantially by then. Summarized briefly, the reasons according to Kim (1992:98) for that were:
• with the ending of the Cold War, the superpowers were no longer interested in securing allies by providing economic and other assistance to others;

• events in Eastern Europe left those countries with scant resources to provide for their friends in the Third World while they became competitors for Western aid and investment;

• with the prospect of a common market in Europe, the EC became more inward-looking and was barely interested in events outside the Continent; and

• lack of success in the Third World in past decades contributed to a general ‘aid fatigue’ amongst donors.

Basically, due to the above mentioned factor as mentioned by Kim (1992), the effect on the countries in the SADCC region was devastating as most of these countries developed an excessive dependency on foreign aid, for example Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania.

Based on all the mentioned factors, SADCC was confronted with the huge challenge of representing and transforming the region into an investor friendly environment. This makes it apparent why SADCC had to consider restructuring or face the possibilities of perishing as a non-functioning regional body. It could be concluded that the formation of SADC in 1992 from SADCC was a product of the above factors. The above factors led SADCC countries to consider a new way of dealing with regional problems, and the restructuring of SADCC into SADC became an alternative.

On the issue of regime change, transformation or restructuring, Young (1982:45), Puchala & Hopkins (1982:23) and Krasner (1983:33), as pointed out in chapter one, approach the idea from two basic viewpoints. They maintain that because of the dynamic nature of regimes and the ways in which they may restructure or change, this is particularly salient. With that in mind, Young (1982:45) further maintained that contradictions within the regime
framework may lead to serious pressure for alterations. These contradictions may be from a dynamic point of view, and that can be an element that may push regimes to fall apart or to be useless. In this case, contradictions that existed within SADCC prior to restructuring was that, inasmuch as they opposed economic dependence in essence, particularly on South Africa, SADCC on its own depended on donor funding. Therefore the objective of economic independence lost substance.

In chapter one, Young (1982:45) also mentioned that the other view regarding regime change could be a dialectical point of view which looks holistically at social entities searching for dialectical laws pertaining to change. Thus, from the holistic or dialectical point of view the regime may evolve or transform itself without disintegration, for example the evolution of the EU from EEC. The restructuring of SADCC into SADC in 1992 emphasises the fact that despite all challenges and troubles or contradictions that existed in SADCC, it chose to restructure instead of disintegrating. This could be referred to as evolution of a regime, or Young’s idea of holistic change, which may involve a regime changing substantively by preserving norms and changing principles. This would usually occur because of shifts in knowledge, information or in changes with regard to challenges and pressures facing particular regimes. The impact of internal and external factors upon SADCC, such as the Cold War and drought are an example.

3.2 Internal factors

The internal conditions contributing to the restructuring of SADCC to SADC in 1992 are analysed and appraised below:

3.2.1 Development conditions in the region by the early 1990s

Weisfelder (1989:162-163) lists five factors that accentuated SADCC’s dependency not only on South Africa but on the Western countries as well. They include global recession, the decline of the South African economy, sustained drought, destabilisation as discussed and delays in implementing
SADCC projects. The most noteworthy consequences for SADCC countries then, according to Weisfelder includes the balance of payments deficits, foreign exchange shortages, skyrocketing debts, inflation and sharply reduced private investment.

During 1982-1984 environmental forces like drought combined with human-induced catastrophes intensified SADCC’s economic plight. Over $2 billion of crops and livestock were lost. Foreign exchange and scarce resources, which otherwise might have been expanded in development programs, had to be diverted to purchase food or transport relief supplies (Weisfelder 1989:162-163).

The continuing dependency of SADCC on aid and funding of its projects in a way contradicted its objectives of economic independence. The whole dependency syndrome of SADCC by fault or default, by the late 1980s, attracted more questions as to whether SADCC was the right organization for regional integration in Southern Africa (Lee 2000, Cilliers 1996, Weisfelder 1989).

By then SADCC was forced to reconsider its structures and operations in order to convince donors that it was the correct organization to integrate the region. SADCC had pressure also from the OAU to demonstrate if it had a regional vision that could serve as regional bloc for 2010 AEC objective of integrating the continent as spelt out in the Abuja Treaty of the OAU.

SADCC has in the evolutionary sense been conceived as a formation within which both economic cooperation and integration of the respective member countries had simultaneously gone through. Within the economic cooperation arrangement, it was envisaged that the industrial branches of the member countries would, in their diversity, interact or interplay on the basis of the specialized division of labour, with their respective enterprises systematically developing and consolidating socio-economic production linkages culminating in the creation of the commonly shared material wealth (Krusher 1990:39-40).
One example of the development disparities in the region relates to SADCC’s huge decline in agriculture. In the 1980s, with the exception of Swaziland, food production per capita declined in SADCC countries. The situation was attributed to drought and the prevalence of war, especially in Angola. SADCC, however, was equally challenged to further define its consolidation as an emerging regional bloc. All the below cardinal development indices characterised a fundamental decline in economic growth as well as development in the region. Trade also registered slightly below 5%. Exports levels within the SADCC region in the 1980-1990 decade averaged 3.9% with imports within the SADCC averaging 3.7% (Chikowore 1999:35).

Moreover, the period between 1980 and 1990 confirmed the mounting process of de-industrialisation, a gradual stagnation and strangulation of the economies within member states. At the end of the 1980s, SADCC could no longer afford to adhere to its general agreements (as outlined in its founding and subsequent declarations, agreements and protocols) in the normal way of conducting its affairs. It became evident that its institutions and objectives were unable to achieve results. Its development under-performance, displayed since 1980, was becoming apparent even to donors of the international community, which the Lusaka Declaration explicitly invited to assist in the achievement of these objectives (SADCC 1980:5; Bressand 1990:52-53).

Some empirical evidence of these socio-economic implications is included in table four which also indicates the slow economic performance of the SADCC countries between 1980 and 1990. This was a clear indication that although SADCC had a regional objective of improving member countries’ economic performances, it was still not achieving enough to satisfy the expectations of its members at the time of its establishment.

Table 4: Economic performance of the SADCC countries
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>6307</td>
<td>6112</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>1805</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>1455</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2414</td>
<td>2045</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>5138</td>
<td>6011</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>3885</td>
<td>4082</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>5355</td>
<td>7021</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGIONAL TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>26 176</strong></td>
<td><strong>29 710</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_{Source: Hawkins (1989:6)}_

Table five also demonstrates that SADCC’s objective of minimising its dependency on South Africa and other actors were failing as most members were still heavily reliant on external funding. Furthermore, the international debt of the organization, both collectively as well as in terms of individual countries, was increasing. Table five includes some indicators with regards to SADCC’s external debt.
Table 5: Total external debt of SADCC countries, including short term (current US$ million)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>1132</td>
<td>1363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2564</td>
<td>2690</td>
<td>2989</td>
<td>3405</td>
<td>3473</td>
<td>3879</td>
<td>4066</td>
<td>4335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>3253</td>
<td>3624</td>
<td>3705</td>
<td>3784</td>
<td>3847</td>
<td>4641</td>
<td>5625</td>
<td>6400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>1246</td>
<td>1842</td>
<td>2302</td>
<td>2067</td>
<td>2195</td>
<td>2340</td>
<td>2512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Davies (1990:69)

As table six indicates, SADCC countries also experienced a decrease in foreign direct investments towards the end of the 1980s.

Table 6: Net foreign investment in the SADCC countries (currency US$ million)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambiqu</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Davies (1990:3)

Another factor, which compounded the serious economic under-performance of SADCC member states, relates to South Africa. As indicated previously, SADCC was established, amongst other reasons, to decrease economic dependence on South Africa. However, towards the end of the 1980s very little was achieved in this regard. Instead of reducing economic dependency on South Africa and achieving equitable regional integration (as the objectives outlined in the Lusaka Declaration), SADCC countries were still financially dependent. In fact, in some cases economic dependency increased. South Africa’s policy of destabilisation contributed to this. As table seven indicates, SADCC countries experienced a considerable loss with regards to their GDP.

Table 7: Cost of destabilisation GDP loss 1980-1988 in the SADCC region (million $-1988 prices)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>4 500</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2 150</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>3 000</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1 300</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>8 000</td>
<td>1 350</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>62 450</td>
<td>10 605</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid - AWEPAA (1990:12)

The conditions that were imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank after the Cold War in Southern Africa led to the call of multiparty democracy. As a result, in Zambia, former President Chiluba - a former unionist, defeated the one party state under President Kaunda and Zimbabwe abandoned the socialist move. The move towards democracy in the SADCC region had implications on the future operations of the organization. In some cases this was due to the expectations from the
donors who expected SADCC as a regional body to pave the way for democracy in its member countries (Legum 2000:7).

The change of governments in the SADCC countries necessitated change in the regional leadership, especially the SADCC vision as a regional organization. New and younger leaders who did not participate much in the liberation struggle against colonialism replaced the founding fathers of SADCC. The new leadership however, had different aspirations and had a new vision for SADCC as a regional organization, especially in terms of the broader understanding of security, democracy, human rights and globalization in the region and in the world. At the top of the agenda was the fact that SADCC needed to consider the changing world environment and try to be competitive like other regional structures and move towards regional integration that enabled countries to trade more with each other and other countries around the world (Mutschler 2001:139-141).

Killick and Stevens (1991:694) argued that it was at known at the time that the patterns of aid provision were likely to change, and more disturbing than the prospect of dwindling aid resources was the fact that aid was increasingly being tied to political strings by the International Financial Institutions. Furthermore, the World Bank’s 1989 report placed good governance at the heart of the donor agenda. To that, the obvious way of increasing the effectiveness of development assistance by the World Bank was to concentrate more on governments that created an ‘enabling’ policy environment and had demonstrated the ability to put aid to productive use. This left governments that did not pass the test with little or no aid until they could persuade donors that they genuinely had mended their ways or were replaced by more effective regimes.

Killick and Stevens (1991:694) states that, the ‘enabling policy environment’ called for by the World Bank and others, required free-market economy, democracy and respect for human rights, and an open economy to the global market (that is, an export-oriented economy). Whatever the donors’ intentions were, political conditionality raised questions of national
sovereignty. With the realisation that aid resources were less forthcoming than before, Third World countries were compelled to make concessions they would not normally have made.

Another disturbing development for Third World nations as mentioned by Parfitt and Bullock (1990: 110) was that international donors began to coordinate their aid efforts. The EC, for example, introduced a form of conditionality - called 'policy dialogue' - in its Lomé aid packages. In line with its policy dialogue, the EC also began to work closely with the IMF and the World Bank. Under Lomé IV (1989-2000), any state undertaking IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), automatically qualified for support from the EC.

The implications of the conditions from the IMF and the World Bank not only had an impact on to the internal governing of SADCC member countries, but on SADCC as a regional organization in general. The conditions affected the operations and the functioning of SADCC by compelling the regional leaders to respond to the demands and expectations of the IMF and the World Bank especially that of good governance, respect of human rights and economic conditions. As mentioned earlier, these conditions saw a change of governments in the region. The implications also meant that SADCC as a regional body was compelled to oversee that the conditions, as spelt out by the IMF and the World Bank, were applied by member countries in the region, and that its institutions reflected exactly what was expected of it (Killick and Stevens 1991:694).

As indicated in previous tables in this chapter, SADCC countries’ economic decline continued gradually from its establishment. Previously, reference was made to the decline of foreign direct investment, the increase in external debt and the loss of GDP. Table eight below adds more empirical evidence supporting this decline. In table eight’s case, the dependence on development assistance is evident.
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**Sources:** AWEPAA (1990:25)

In conclusion, development conditions in the region, as well as South Africa’s economic dominance were major factors with regards to the need to address these issues more directly. However, these issues did not challenge the SADCC in a vacuum. Internationally, changes such as the end of the Cold War added other significant factors to deal with. As a result of that, SADCC was affected by the world events and it was expected to respond to such factors or challenges.

### 3.2.2 Political changes in South Africa
The aim of this section is not to discuss the role of South Africa in SADCC in general, but to discuss South Africa as a political factor that contributed to SADCC-SADC restructuring in 1992. The political changes that were evident in South Africa towards the early 1990s had a great effect on the restructuring of SADCC to SADC in 1992. In fact, Cleary (2001:87) confirmed agrees that “South Africa’s inclusion to the regional affairs led to the transformation of SADCC in 1992.”

According to Kongwa (1991:1) during the summit that was held in Arusha, Tanzania in the late 1980s, “SADCC leaders recognized that the most important factor in creating a good vision for regional integration in Southern Africa was to involve a democratic South Africa in the region and within the organization itself. In order to facilitate the process towards the envisaged relationship between South Africa and the SADCC countries, a regional joint planning committee was established, comprising representatives of SADCC member countries and the South African liberation movements. The committee’s main functions were: (1) to analyse and assess issues likely to impact future regional co-operation and effect relations between South Africa and SADCC members in the post-apartheid era; (2) to identify areas of possible co-operation; (3) to agree on options, strategies and institutional arrangements required for the development and management of such relations and (4) to ensure that SADCC co-operating partners liaised with the SADCC in order to achieve a co-ordinated and coherent approach towards the new regional set-up. This eventually had an impact on the restructuring in 1992”.

Kongwa (1991:1) and Lee (2000:121) maintained that “when the regional leadership realized that the then SADCC’s principal objective was ‘the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa,’ it became apparent that this view may not aid the process towards the envisaged new regional order and also, that this may not encourage South Africa to play a rightful regional role, let alone to join the organization. They decided that the organization should conduct a critical
review of its original mandate as represented in the four principal objectives of the Lusaka Declaration in 1980”. Leister (1992:3) further maintained, “Even SADCC spokespersons had on numerous occasions expressed the hope that an internationally accepted South Africa would replace the organization’s increasingly reluctant donors”.

According to Chipeta (1999:34), “political changes in South Africa towards majority rule in the late 1980s and early 1990s made donors seek more clarity on the future role of SADCC. Donors that believed SADCC would be irrelevant once apartheid was defeated, since its formation was to fight apartheid and lessen all the dependencies apartheid created in the region, mostly raised this question. They also believed that the end of apartheid would mean that the external threat (to the donors) that initially led to the establishment of SADCC no longer existed”.

In view of the changing situation in the region, the UK minister of state, foreign and commonwealth office, Linda Chalker responded on behalf of the UK and cooperating partners stating “the challenge for SADCC and its members is to provide a new framework for an open and liberal economy that will draw a newly-democratic South Africa into productive co-operation with her neighbours” (SAIIA 1991:79).

According to Weisfelder (1989:163) SADCC was offered a mainstay by these changes as most member countries could no longer sustain the destabilisation effects that were imposed by South Africa. The SADCC Secretariat estimated that damages that were caused by the destabilisation between 1980 and 1984 had cost member countries around $10 billion. Extrapolating through 1986 the total was estimated at $18.7 billion and by the late 1980s; SADCC estimated $30 billion - almost the annual gross domestic product of the entire region by then! The tangible components included direct war damage, extra defence expenditure, higher transport and energy costs, reduced production, lost exports and tourism, added costs of imports, lost investments and economic growth, and costs of caring for refugees.
Considering the above factors, Abbas (1999:38) acknowledged that the democratic South Africa offered SADCC a number of opportunities, for example, SADCC member countries' security improved. The political improvements in South Africa then contributed to the independence of Namibia, which, in a way became a factor as to why SADCC considered restructuring in 1992. Namibia offered SADCC countries new alternatives for trade especially in terms of access to the sea. The independence also served as a moral boost for SADCC to liberate the region from minority rule. Secondly, member countries could do business with a new South Africa freely. Thirdly, SADCC, in its efforts to achieve regional integration and economic independence in general, could use the economic and communication infrastructure South Africa had at its disposal then. The re-integration of South Africa into both global and regional economies generated hopes of positive offers for its neighbours of more rapid economic growth, and it also created for the first time the potential for regional economic integration initiatives to work. These changes demanded that SADCC restructure its organizational structure including its modus operandi. Lastly, since most SADCC member countries depended on aid, they had to keep abreast with the changes in South Africa, and SADCC indirectly was forced to react to or restructure in order to accommodate South Africa as a member and not as an enemy any more.

Considering the stated facts, it can be said that the restructuring of SADCC to SADC in 1992 was the consideration of South Africa as the factor. South Africa was expected to “fill the role of co-operating partners through the provision of aid and investment capital to SADCC member countries. This was as a result of donors hesitating to fund the SADCC Programme of Action due to the fact that SADCC could no longer be relevant once South Africa became independent. Another reason was the end of Cold War, which meant that Southern African countries were no longer strategic partners in fighting communism and the Soviet Union (Kongwa 1991:1).

3.3 External factors
The external conditions contributing to the restructuring of SADCC to SADC in 1992 are analysed and appraised below.

3.3.1 The end of the Cold War

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, symbolizing the end of the Cold War, was a major international political event. It also had a major effect on Southern Africa as a region. The end of the conflict was precipitated by the growing Soviet domestic economic crisis, which forced a relaxation of the grip on Eastern Europe. United States Department official, Francis Fukuyama, enthusiastically hailed the demise of the East-West conflict as the “end of history” (Baynham 1992:87).

According to Roberts (1990:509) the implication of Fukuyama’s assertion was that the international conflict was a thing of the past. The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a resurgence of idealism in some quarters. The idealists believed that the high degree of interdependence between countries, especially in the economic field, had ushered in a “new world order.” The two major components of the new order were multi-polarity and the declining importance of military/security issues in international relations. Roberts (1990) further emphasized that “a new world orders - based on international law, great power cooperation, and a greater role for international organizations - created a situation in which force is a declining utility”.

Based on the abovementioned scenarios, Ravenhill (1990:7311) believes, however, that “a relaxation in military competition among the major players did not strengthen the position of the Third World (as occurred during the period of superpower detente in the 1970s) because Third World countries were weaker and less unified”. Ravenhill (1990:7311) further asserted that, “the disintegration of the Soviet empire affected SADCC member countries in three important respects. Firstly, events in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union had a “domino effect” on unpopular governments elsewhere. Secondly, the socialist bloc could no longer provide economic or military
assistance to other governments and organizations. Finally, the successor
countries to the Soviet bloc became competitors for Western aid and
investment”.

According to the Daily News (17-01-1992), the toppling of authoritarian
regimes in Eastern Europe and the United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR)
put in motion an unparalleled global movement towards democratization, and
nowhere was that more evident than in Southern Africa which, according to
many, was experiencing its “second liberation.”

Decalo (1991:155) states that, as a result of the end of the Cold War, internal
pressures for greater accountability and political democracy in Africa
enmeshed with the changed international picture, brought pressures for
change in Africa, as elsewhere. The stunning and unequivocal collapse of
Marxism resulted in a unipolar world, wiping out the artificially enhanced
global value of the Third World.

A major consequence of the collapse of the socialist bloc, according to
Decalo (1991:156), was that it ended an alternative supply of material and
other support to the Southern African region. Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union provided a number of SADCC countries, such as Mozambique
and Angola, with aid. Due to its collapse, such aid was discontinued. Most
of this was military, but economic assistance also played a part.

In view of the above, Light (1991:269) maintained that, “the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) became defunct and the new
governments of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent
Countries (CIS) neither became the resources nor the inclination to provide
any form of assistance to Third World countries and other SADCC countries.
As a result, it became much more difficult to play donors off against each
other. The decline in military assistance was linked to a new international
attitude to regional conflicts”. The new thinking, which began with
Gorbachev’s rise to power in Russia in 1985, according to Decalo (1991:156)
meant, “The Third World was no longer an arena for zero-sum competition
and confrontation between the two superpowers." Hence, political settlements were advocated as the answer to regional conflicts. This had important repercussions in countries like Angola and Mozambique, and SADCC in general. Due to that, these countries, together with SADCC, had to accommodate such international changes in order to survive.

To add fuel to the fire, the new countries that were created in Europe became competitors for Western aid and investment. According to Kim (1992:8) this elicited a number of sets of responses from the developed countries. The first response called for a substantial injection of capital and aid into the former socialist bloc, arguing that it has long-term benefits for the West.

Sharp (1992:33) holds a view that as the Marshall Plan of the US helped Western Europe in the postwar, it was therefore regarded that aid to Eastern Europe would largely flow back to the West in terms of orders for equipment and consumer goods. It was also thought that if the East Europeans were successful in moving fairly rapidly into self-sustained growth that could augur a period of renewed growth and optimism in West Europe, and if they were unsuccessful, it was feared that could cause both East and West Europe to become politically and economically unstable.

However, the Financial Mail (26-07-1991) adds to the above by stating that despite certain reservations, especially concerning the European Community investing capital and aid in Eastern Europe and the CIS, the EC established the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to support private sector development in Eastern Europe and concluded a series of trade and cooperation agreements to link those economies more closely to their own. Significantly, the EC also negotiated association agreements that paved the way for an expanded Community. The impact of these developments on the Third World and on SADCC was consequential. Apart from being deprived of a considerable amount of foreign aid that was diverted to Eastern Europe and the CIS, SADCC found it increasingly marginalized as Western preoccupation with these former socialist countries deepened. The threat of marginalization was accentuated by fundamental
changes in the international economic and political systems (Chalker 1990:4).

In brief, the end of the Cold War in the region saw the following taking place: (1) the abandonment of socialism in Angola and Mozambique and by the ANC in South Africa as a liberation movement in exile; (2) the withdrawal of Cuban soldiers from Angola and the birth of the Namibian independence; (3) the introduction of ‘multiparty democracy’ in Southern Africa and (4) the end of apartheid in South Africa. These factors had a decisive role on SADCC as a regional body as whether it would continue or become obsolete. By the early 1990s, the imperative for SADCC to restructure in order to deal with these new conditions became more important. At the time, the debate focused on whether to restructure SADCC or to create a totally different organization. It was decided that SADCC should restructure to take note of these factors and try to deal with them.

3.3.2 Changes in the world economy

The changes in the world economy in the late 1980s and the early 1990s had an impact on SADCC countries and on SADCC in general. Changes in global politics were accompanied by changes in international economic relations. These changes promised to be even more forbidding for Third World developmental prospects. Technological changes, the rising tide of protectionism in the North and the prospect of dwindling flows of foreign aid and investment all combined to hinder Third World efforts at self-sustained growth and development, especially SADCC countries. The following economic factors could be seen as responsible for the changes in the world economy, and had an impact on what was in store for the SADCC countries:

3.3.3 Global technological changes

Sharp (1992:20) acknowledges that microelectronics and information technology became the most important new technologies in the world in the late 1980s. The application of micro-electronic technology revolutionized
several industries, including that of textiles. Third World countries that were wishing to undertake industrialization regarded the textile industry as the "locomotive" industry in the early phases of industrialization. What was occurring at the early 1990s was that production in the developed countries became competitive with production in the Third World.

Bello (1989:16-17) also argues that the changes in the production process effectively reduced the attractiveness of low wages in the Third World. Comparative advantage was shifting from production based on cheap labour to capital-intensive automated production processes. Moving to the Third World to take advantage of cheap wages became less attractive - and doubly so when protectionist barriers were enforced in the United States and Europe, the upshot being declining rates of foreign investment in manufacturing in some third world regions, if not the outright return of production processes to the developed countries.

The World Bank report (1991:26) acknowledges that, because most innovations originated in industrialized countries and its research focused on problems of local concern, technical advances systematically favoured industrial country producers and consumers. Industry studies suggested that new technology reduced competitive and disadvantaged industrial country manufacturers. Some firms in traditionally labour-intensive sub-sectors (for example, textiles, clothing and shoes) began to reopen operations in high-wage countries.

Due to this, SADCC was burdened with the declining attractiveness of cheap labour that was weakened by low demand for raw materials. Most substitutes were being developed in the North as new technological developments effectively undermined the comparative advantage, based on raw materials and cheap labour that the Third World had traditionally possessed vis-à-vis the industrialized world. The erosion of this comparative advantage consequently brought about diminishing rates of foreign investment in some SADCC countries like in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Sharp1992: 20).


3.3.4 Protectionism in the North: marginalization of the South

After 1945, international relations were characterized by the global hegemony of the USA and that gave the system a degree of stability and predictability. In view of this, Aho and Stokes (1991:160) state that, during the 1990s, US economic expansion came to a halt. Rising oil prices, a spreading capital shortage, tightening credit markets and the deadening burden of massive accumulated public and private debt took their toll.

Bello (1989:64-65) contends that the economic and technological competition between the United States and Japan was the central force in restructuring the world economy. The dominant trend was the passage of economic and technological primacy from United States to Japan. What was clearly transpiring was that with a defensive United States leading the way, the postwar free trade system was increasingly giving way to a system of international trade protectionism.

Fears of increasing protectionism in the industrialized countries were provoked by the imminent formation of a common market in Europe by December 1992. However, not everyone believed in the “Fortress Europe” theory - the term was used by those who believed that the formation of a common market will lead to a protectionist and inward-looking Europe. Bressand (1990), for example, believes that there were two reasons why the EC 1992 project reduced the capacity (if not the will) to implement protection: (1) the greater diversity of interests in any given sector between the different countries and (2) the element of due process with long discussion procedures involving a number of countries, was combined to make it more difficult to gain consensus for any protectionist measure. Most observers agree, though, that a united and self-sufficient EC was likely to become more inward-looking, especially if the Community was broadened to include East European countries (Morna 1990; Bello 1989; Bergsten 1990; Notzold and von der Ropp 1990; Bressand 1990:52-53).
With protectionist measures increasingly being adopted in the USA and EC, and with Japan following suit, the possibility of international trade warfare became real, especially since a tripolar system was inherently unstable. In that situation, each bloc felt the other two would link up against it and, therefore, adopted severe policies (Bergsten 1990:102).

Ironically, the end of the Cold War sharply heightened the prospect of a trade war. Throughout the postwar period, the overriding security imperative blunted trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific economic disputes. The United States and its allies, particularly West Germany, made economic concessions to avoid jeopardizing their global security structures. Cold War politics, in fact, sheltered the economic recoveries of Europe and Japan, and America’s support for them. The United States seldom employed its security leverage directly in pursuit of its economic goals, indeed, security and economic issues remained largely compartmentalized in all of the industrial democracies. Removal of the ‘security blanket’ could have eroded such support. In brief, there was an intimate interaction between the basic international political and economic transformations, thus, the removal of the security blanket increased the risk of economic conflict, which could have eroded security ties (Bergsten 1990:98).

The impact of protectionism on SADCC saw member countries forced from their present peripheral position in the international arena to a position of marginalization. Bello (1989:68) warned that the intensified economic and technological competition among the super blocs were likely to have contradictory effects on the Third World. Some regions, because of their proximity and availability of cheap labour, might be integrated, though in a fragile fashion, to the competing centers, but for most of the Third World, marginalization or exclusion was the likely future.

However, Ravenhill (1990:748) believes that increasing protectionism in the North might have increased competition among Third World countries. Ravenhill (1990) further argues that “even if trade wars were averted, the extension of free trade blocs in the North were likely to encourage Southern
countries to seek association arrangements with, or in some cases such as Mexico, actual membership of the blocs. To the extent that the motivation was to achieve an advantage over other Third World countries, the outcome was likely to be further divisive of Southern solidarity."

The increasing protectionism in the North had considerable implications for SADCC. As industrialised countries of the North attempted to adjust to global changes brought about by the end of the Cold War and rapid globalization, they turned increasingly towards protecting their own economic interests. Earlier, reference was made to the decreases in foreign direct investments and development assistance to the region as a result of developments in the North. Indirectly though, a need for a stronger and a legal regional grouping, as compared to SADCC, was gaining momentum as regional leaders were forced to confront marginalisation from the North.

3.4 Re-emergence of regionalism

The re-emergence of regionalism in the late 1980s was a major international political factor that had impact also in Southern Africa and on SADCC’s operations. Though regionalism remained on the international agenda throughout the Cold War, its scope and progress was not limited. In contrast, the late 1980s and the early 1990s marked a turning point in the fortunes of regionalism. The 1990s saw a striking reappearance of regionalist rhetoric as well as evidence of concrete progress in various parts of the world, with the proliferation of new regional groupings as well as the re-orientation and revival of older arrangements. The new waves of regionalism were clearly seen in Latin America. In 1991, it led to the establishment of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) comprising Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Bolivia and Chile joined the grouping in 1996 as associate members. The new wave of regionalism was also seen in the revival of the Andean integration project, which evolved or restructured into the Andean Community (Mutschler 2001:139).
Mutschler (2001:139-141) explains that there are many factors that contributed to the re-emergence of regionalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, such as:

- the impact of the Cold War on the transformation of regional groupings as already explained;

- aid conditions as imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to the developing countries through the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). (This point is discussed in the next section);

- global integration that started to go hand in hand with moves to secure preferential access to the markets of others. The US complemented its traditional multilateral commercial policy with a regional focus by concluding an FTA with Canada in 1988, which, with the incorporation of Mexico, became NAFTA in 1994; and

- another aspect that contributed to the re-emergence of regionalism was that by the late 1980s, it become harder to distinguish between economic and political regionalism.

Mutschler (2001:141) emphasises that “a distinct feature of the new regionalism was its multidimensional character. Many initially functionally specific groups were forced to broaden into more multi-purpose arrangements in terms of scope.” While SADCC’s founding motives were largely geopolitical and strategic, it infused the integration process in Southern Africa with more direct economic and development objectives. Conversely, the Andean Pact started out with a decided trade focus, and has, as the CAN, taken on a more political dimension. Recognising the interrelated nature of political, economic and security issues, most regional groupings around the world started to restructure to address these areas.
In view of the above, Mutschler (2001:142) concludes that SADCC had to restructure as it competed for the same benefits as other regional groupings around the world. As a result, it was forced to reconsider its strategies, structures, objectives and its operations in order to be able to meet new demands that were taking place internationally. In other words, SADCC leaders or SADCC countries could not afford to not consider restructuring the organization in order for it to be in line with new challenges in the world. As a result, the institutional arrangements of SADCC had to be modified or phased out to make way for the new approach in the world affairs. Other regional groupings like CAN, under similar circumstances, introduced better measures in order to attract new investments and aid to their regions.

Another political factor associated with the re-emergence of regionalism is the multiply membership of regional organizations. This is indicated in table two. In most cases, the objectives of organizations overlapped. By the late 1980s, as indicated in table two, the region consisted of three major organizations - the Preferential Trade Agreement for East and Southern Africa (PTA), SACU and SADCC. In order to address the issue of the duplication of its development objectives at the summit in January 1992, the PTA suggested a merger with SADCC. This was suggested against the background of the OAU’s aim of creating an African Economic Community (AEC), a Pan-African effort to address development issues. The PTA, as an older organization, had a much broader membership and covered a greater geographical area. If such a merger succeeded, it would have been tantamount to SADCC’S dissolution. The call by the OAU for the merger between the PTA and SADCC contributed in SADCC considering restructuring. The other fact that was a major blow for the organization and its member countries was the recognition of PTA by the OAU as a fifth official sub-regional organization, instead of SADCC. SADC then came into existence as the counter protest by the SADCC officials to the call by the OAU to abolish SADCC in favour of the PTA. SADCC officials sought to align SADC with the economic policies as it was envisaged by the AEC then (Abbas 1999:38). According to Kim (1992:9) at the SADCC summit in Windhoek in August 1992, the organization rejected this proposal and launched the restructured SADCC in the form of SADC.
Furthermore, SACU also created some confusion as it was centred on South Africa. As a result, concerns were raised as to whether South Africa would join SADCC? And if not, questions were asked as to what would happen to SADCC which was already showing signs of collapse due to financial problems from donor countries questioning its relevance without South Africa. Kim (1992) further explains that, “PTA and SADC had to find some way of rationalising their structures as there was a great deal of overlapping membership. Botswana and Namibia were the only two SADC members that did not belong to the PTA (Botswana opted for membership of SACU instead while Namibia applied to the PTA for membership)”. Accordingly, this led SADCC countries acknowledging the need for organizational restructuring. SADCC leaders stated that the membership in the three organizations was becoming increasingly unworkable, as the final destination of economic integration of Southern Africa was approached. They warned that SADCC member countries would ultimately need to seriously consider the viability of belonging to more than one regional integration organization (SADCC 1992:7).

3.5 Summary

The Lusaka Declaration that preceded the Windhoek Treaty, which established SADC in 1992, contained a brief overview and analysis of the then new opportunities and demands raised by change in the region and by the external environment. It also attempted to harness those changes or to use those changes as a justification and motivation for closer cooperation and community building purposes. External driving forces that informed the change from SADCC into SADC were much more economically oriented than political or security considerations that underlined earlier establishment of SADCC.

Economic globalization with its emphasis on economic liberalization, increased bloc formation and the globalization of finance and production played a major part in the decision to transform the organization into one that would, at least in theory, concentrate on regional integration, rather than
regional cooperation for the sake of strengthening and protecting individual member countries.

This chapter addressed why SADCC restructured in 1992. This is the second research question of the study raised in chapter one. The question was addressed by discussing factors and conditions which contributed to SADCC members' realisation that the organization established in 1980 is no longer equipped to deal with changes in the region as well as those external factors that impacted in the region.

The restructuring of SADCC into SADC through the 1992 Windhoek Treaty was a prime example of the extent to which the Southern African region took cognizance of change at various levels and moved towards as well as adjusted to such change, using it in a positive way to promote and develop the well-being of the region. Towards the 1990s, SADCC member states also concluded that their efforts to achieve the objectives outlined in the Lusaka Declaration yielded limited results. What follows is an appraisal of the development objectives of SADCC as outlined in the Lusaka Declaration (SADCC 1980:1).

SADCC did not achieve the reduction of economic dependence on South Africa and other actors. Secondly, the stated objective of forging links to create equitably regional integration also yielded limited results. This objective was, amongst others, hindered by the duplication of regional organizations, which aimed to achieve regional integration. Thirdly, SADCC as an organization consisting of sovereign states experienced difficulties in the implementation of regional policies. The issue of surrendering sovereignty to a supra-national organization remained an obstacle in this regard as states continued to enhance their national interests and national policies at the expense of regional integration. Fourthly, the stated objective of “concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of a strategy for economic liberation” also produced mixed results. The organization's efforts to secure cooperation manifested, contradictorily, in greater dependence on stronger economic actors, such as South Africa and
the international donor community. Furthermore, the objectives to achieve economic liberation were compromised due to increased dependence on these actors. Lastly, competing development agendas of its member states also compromised the organization. This aspect will be elaborated on in subsequent chapters. These competing agendas are, for example, evident in the economic indicators presented in the tables in this chapter. Moreover, scholars such as those referred to in the literature review of this study are in agreement that regional economic, political and development integration is most likely to succeeded when member states enjoy relatively equal levels of political and economic developments.

In applying regime theory it can be deduced that SADCC, at the end of the 1980s, still adhered to the same principles as those it stood for in 1980. These principles, as indicated, are contained in SADCC’s founding document, the Lusaka Declaration. Similarly, the organization’s norms remained the same. However, as some of the factors above indicate, the structure, rules and decision-making procedures of the organization became inadequate to address the region’s challenges.

The restructuring of SADCC into SADC represented an increased emphasis on responding to international trends through mobilization of the region’s own resources, potential and capacity. Furthermore, the changed international political landscape at the end of the Cold War, together with the demise of apartheid in South Africa, shifted international emphasis on traditional military political security to a concentration on a much broader definition of security that included economic, environmental and societal security. Economic growth and development within a distinctly neo-liberal economic paradigm became the new ideological driving force that governed decisions, also at regional level.

In brief it was not only development in the SADCC external environment that necessitated the change from SADCC to SADC but also the need for ‘mere’ regional coordination to become an attempt at regional integration. Within the Southern African region, major changes had taken place during the late 1980s
and the early 1990s, changing the political face of the region and raising
expectations of peace and security, and an opportunity for development.
Within the region, apartheid came to an end with the un-banning of the ANC
and the release of (South Africa’s former President) Nelson Mandela and
other liberation movement leaders in early 1990. At that point it was clear that
it was only a matter of time before South Africa would be politically acceptable
to its neighbours and therefore able to join a regional organization.

The underlying rationale for the establishment of SADCC had therefore fallen
away and with the prospect of the region’s biggest and strongest economy
joining its neighbours, the role and function of SADCC was revisited and a
new organization, taking the changed political nature of the region into
consideration, was formed in the form of SADC. SADC was therefore not only
a result of or response to changing international trends and demands, but also
a response to a changed political climate within the region. It was clear that
globalization, and in particular the neo-liberal economic paradigm that was
spread through this process, had a great impact on the way in which the
Southern African region perceived its own future in the early 1990s.

In view of the region’s history and under circumstances of economic hardship
and a host of problems ranging from internal political instability to food, health
and environmental insecurity, looking past and cooperating beyond immediate
national demands and needs, SADC was established in order to create the
enabling environment that would allow for such ‘deep integration.’ On the
other hand, an undeniable strength of the organization lay in its ability to learn
from its experiences and to adjust and change. The transformation of SADCC
into SADC was the prime example of this advantage.

Against this background, the next chapter addresses the restructuring of
SADCC into SADC.
Chapter Four

The Establishment of SADC in 1992

4.1 Introduction
By the early 1990s, as outlined in the previous chapter, SADCC experienced difficulties and constraints in its operations and implementation of its projects. These were caused, inter alia, by specific global and regional factors and conditions. Due to this, the imperative for SADCC’s adjustment, or restructuring, became more critical. In terms of the regime theory, the process could be referred as the reviewing or the restructuring of rules, norms, principles, and decision-making processes within a regional organization to enable it to deal with its challenges. By 1992, SADCC members decided that, in order to address the levels of underdevelopment in the region, new structures were needed. In addition to this, a democratic transition in South Africa became more evident (SADCC 1992:4; SADC 1994:37).

Chapter three discussed factors that led SADCC to restructure in 1992. This chapter addresses the establishment of SADC as a first exercise in the restructuring of the SADCC/C processes. Basically, this chapter addresses the third research question of the study, which is how SADC restructured. After having discussed why SADCC restructured (chapter three), it is important that this chapter focuses on the structure of SADC as proof of physical restructuring. In order to analyse and appraise SADC’s establishment in 1992, and its subsequent restructuring in 1999, this chapter will firstly address the structure, functions and the results SADC achieved. It will also be realised in this chapter that member states’ efforts to maximise their own national interests soon manifested in their different approaches to the restructuring process.

This chapter will specifically cover the period from 1992 to 1999 and the period after 1999 will be dealt with in chapter five. By 2004, various other pan-African integration processes (such as the establishment of the AU in 2002) and its development programme (Nepad), was already functioning, when SADC became confronted with a possible post-1999 restructuring process. This aspect will be addressed briefly in chapter six.

4.2 SADCC into SADC in Windhoek 1992
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the aim of this chapter is to discuss the restructuring of SADCC into SADC in 1992. This will cover the institutions and organizational structures that were introduced between 1992 and 1999. A precursor to the establishment of SADC, retrospectively, was a Summit of Heads of State and Government, which met in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1989. The outcome of this meeting was a decision that SADCC should be formalised to give it an appropriate legal status, thus taking into account the need to replace the Memorandum of Understanding with an Agreement, Charter or Treaty (SADCC 1989:29).

A second precursor was the 1992 annual Consultative Conference of SADCC held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 29-31 January, which adopted a policy document: *SADCC Towards Economic Integration*. The document provided a policy framework for discussion and subsequent action on the best methodology of promoting regional economic integration and strengthening co-operation. Furthermore it acknowledged the realities of the region, like the changes in economic management from pervasive state economic intervention and controls to market-oriented policies, democracies replacing single-party political systems and prospects that South Africa may become democratic and join SADCC. SADCC members agreed that the benefits of the above changes couldn’t be realized if the wide disparities and inequalities between member countries are allowed to continue. They recommended, “Policies, strategies and programmes of economic development should be restructured in such a way that all countries in the region have a fair share of opportunities for investment, production, trade, employment creation and other benefits. In addition, member countries were urged to consider seriously the wisdom and viability of belonging to one organization in the region” (existing regional organizations referred to were PTA to which most SADCC members belonged - Botswana and Namibia had observer status and the SACU composed of South Africa and the BLNS countries) (SADCC 1992:41).
By August 1992, a meeting of a larger SADCC took place in Windhoek. The Windhoek Treaty served as the founding document of SADC. The Windhoek Treaty is in some ways a major departure from the Lusaka Declaration; however, both documents underline the principles and norms relating to sustainable regional development and integration (SADCC 1992:42).

The structure of SADC as outlined in the Windhoek Treaty differs dramatically from SADCC’s. The difference is that the Windhoek Treaty proposed new principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures in a form of integration instead of the co-ordination of projects. However, some do not share this view. According to Moloi (1993/4:1) the change from development ‘co-ordination’ to ‘community’ in 1992 in the Windhoek Treaty, did not result in major structural changes. Moloi maintains, “It was merely a declaration of intent and a vision to work towards”. Moloi’s argument is based on the fact that SADC, upon its formation from SADCC in 1992, was filled with more institutions, protocols, declarations and objectives without any realistic approach or means on how such goals and protocols would be attained and managed. As the result, on paper SADC was different from SADCC, but in reality most SADC countries in the global markets remained low in terms of GDP. The region continued to be covered by instability in Angola and famine in countries like Zambia and other poor developments in the region.

However, Tjitendero (1994:7), the speaker of the National Assembly, Namibia, at the SADC Parliamentary Forum in Windhoek, contrary to Moloi’s view, maintained that “the signing of the Treaty in Windhoek in August 1992 was not simply a matter of transforming SADC from a loose regional grouping into a legal entity, but ushered in the spirit of the treaty establishing the African Economic Community, adopted by the OAU Heads of State meeting in Abuja, Nigeria in 1991, and changes from the co-ordination conference to the community was the best possible development for regional integration in Southern Africa”.

4.3 SADC’s objectives as outlined in the Windhoek Treaty
Whereas the Lusaka Declaration specifies four principal objectives (mentioned in previous chapters) the 1992 Treaty committed the new SADC to an expanded political, economic, development, integration and security agenda. The Windhoek Treaty outlines SADC’s objectives as:

- achieving development and economic growth for the people of Southern Africa through regional integration of development programmes. This was aimed at harmonising political and socio-economic policies and plans of member countries;
- encouraging people and institutions in the region to initiate economic, cultural and social ties across the region;
- creating appropriate institutions and mechanisms to mobilize resources for the implementation of SADC programmes;
- developing policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of capital, labour, goods, services and people throughout the region;
- promoting a coordinated regional human and development strategy;
- promoting the development and sharing of technology;
- improving economic management and performance through regional co-operation; and
- harmonising and coordinating international relations of member countries and securing international understanding and support in the mobilisation of financial resources in the region (SADCC 1992:42).

Article 5(2) embodied ten strategies and various projects in order to achieve the above. These ranged from harmonising political and socio-economic policies and plans of the member states, through cementing cultural ties across the region and human resources development, to improved management and coordination of the foreign relations of member states (SADCC 1992:43).

SADC’s stated principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures as outlined in chapter one, reflected the negotiated nature of the regime (as per
description provided by Young 1989:37 in chapter one), as well as its preoccupation with neo-functionalist concerns, primarily through the promotion of regional development and integration. The emphasis placed on the values of ‘balance, equity and benefit’ reflected not only regional realities, but also a philosophy securely anchored in national states as the principal agencies of the regime. This philosophy was reaffirmed in Article 6 of the Treaty that bound member states to the regime’s principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures (Du Pisani 2001:210).

The 1992 Treaty that established SADC expanded the former SADCC’s role and power of the Secretariat in three significant domains (SADCC 1992:42):

- SADC was given the responsibility for developing policies establishing a common market through the progressive elimination of barriers to the free movement of capital, labour, goods and services.
- SADC’s operational terms required it to be fully involved in the design and process of regional integration. Its institutional capacity was modestly strengthened, though it remained a decentralised regime with specific sector-coordinating functions allocated to member states.
- SADC’s concerns and agenda included post-Cold War issues such as good governance, human rights, gender and democratic practice – all issues of low politics.

As indicated in chapter one, this study is mainly influenced by the realist approach on regime or regional organization formation in the case of SADCC/C. According to Smith and Baylis (1997:4), world politics (or more accurately for realists in international politics) represents a struggle for power between states, each trying to maximize their own national interests. The formation of SADCC in 1980 displays this. The formation of SADCC was characterised by the intent to counter South Africa’s political power on its neighbours. At the same time SADCC members expected that through co-ordination, they would be able to maximise their national economic interests through collective efforts. This could be said to be one of the regime characters. The restructuring of SADCC norms, principles, rules and a
decision-making process in 1992 into SADC is part of regime evolutions. This process is undertaken by regional states on the SADC platform to safeguard the interest of the region against internal and external challenges as discussed in the previous chapter.

4.4 SADC’s 1992 structure

Apart from its expanded list of objectives, the new SADC changed its organizational structure and added sectoral responsibilities. With regards to the latter, two more sectors were added due to Namibia and South Africa’s memberships. SADC’s organizational structure established in 1992 will be addressed later (see figure 2). In a previous chapter (figure 1) SADCC’s structures and institutions were included.

SADCC differed from SADC in terms of regional economic development, which consisted of ministers, standing committees of officials, national contact points and sectoral committees of officials. On a structural level, it consisted of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) was established in 1996. It comprised Foreign Affairs Ministers, technical committees and a rotating Secretariat. This meant that by 1996, SADC was leaning on two main pillars, the development section or the economic section, and the security section. The Organ was aimed at defending the sovereign equality of all members, a commitment to democracy, solidarity, peace, security, rule of law, observance of human rights, military interventions as a last resort and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Van Aardt 1997:150, SADC 1996:19).

In this way SADC, and specifically the OPDS, confirmed regime theory’s claim that a regime such as SADC is based on shared principles, norms, values and a prescribed decision-making process and structure. Regime theory on restructuring maintains that the shared or agreed characters of the regime or organization are expected to change in order for the said regime to survive when challenges arise. The apparent change that resulted from restructuring was that from 1980 until 1992 SADCC focused on co-ordination.
of projects and the approach was more political. Hence, after 1992 the focus became more on integration thus taking an economic approach (Van Aardt 1997:150).

Figure 2: 1992 SADC organizational structures

What follows is a brief review of SADC’s structure and sub-structures as outlined in the Windhoek Treaty (SADC 1992:3). A final appraisal of these
will be offered in the conclusion of this study. This will include a discussion on each structure’s strengths and weaknesses. Before proceeding, it is important to indicate that the organization’s structures and procedures are a confirmation of sorts of the principles of regime theory.

- The Summit of Heads of State or Government consisted of the heads of state or government of all member countries and was the ultimate policy-making institution of the SADC. It was the supreme institution and responsible for the general direction and control of the functions of the SADC as well as the achievement of its objectives. It met at least once a year. The Summit was furthermore responsible for the creation of Commissions, other institutions, committees and organizations as the need arose. The Executive Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretary were also appointed by the Summit.

- The Council of Ministers consisted of ministers from each member state, usually those responsible for their country’s economic planning or finance. They were responsible for overseeing the functioning and development of SADC and ensuring that the policies were properly implemented. The Council advised the Summit on matters of overall policy and approved strategies and work programmes for the SADC. Another major task of the Council was to define sectoral areas of cooperation and their allocation to member countries for coordinating sectoral activities. The Council met at least once a year to review the progress and operations of its subordinate institutions.

- Sectoral Committees and Commissions were SADC instituted Commissions and Sectoral Committees which guided and coordinated cooperation and integration policies and programmes in designated sectorial areas. The sectors were allocated to individual member countries to coordinate and provide leadership. Sectoral Committees of Ministers supervised sectoral activities.

- The Standing Committee of Officials consisted of a Permanent Secretary or an official of equivalent rank of each member state. Usually the official came from a national ministry responsible for
economic planning or finance. The Standing Committee of Officials was a technical advisory committee to the Council of Ministers and also met at least once a year. Members thereof had a dual responsibility, as they were also National Contact Points.

- National Contact Points were located in the national ministry (usually the national department of Foreign Affairs) responsible for all SADC matters. Their responsibilities included regular consultation with and briefings of relevant government institutions, the enterprise community and media on matters relating to SADC.

- Sectoral Contact Points were all government Ministries with responsibilities for SADC sector(s) and worked closely with the respective Sector Coordinating Units in the preparation of sectoral policies and strategies, and the formulation of project proposals. Sectoral Contact Points attended and participated in sectoral meetings, and assisted Sector Coordinating Units in the monitoring of projects.

- The Secretariat was the principal executive institution of SADC and was responsible for the strategic planning and management of programmes of SADC, the implementation of decisions of the Summit and the Council. It was headed by the Executive Secretary, who was appointed by the Summit. It was also charged with the organization and management of SADC meetings, the financial and general administration, as well as the representation and promotion of SADC.

- A Tribunal was constituted to ensure adherence to and to ensure the proper interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate such disputes as may be referred to it. Decisions of the Tribunal were meant to be final and binding.

From the above exposition it was clear that SADC, compared to its antecedent, offered more space for bargaining and negotiating interaction. SADC, as a product of a restructuring process, indicates that regimes continuously transform themselves in order to act, interact and react vis-à-vis its external environment. Unlike the former SADCC, a Treaty and a specified
structure constituted SADC. SADC’s structures, as outlined above, created a more empowered Secretariat and Sectors, which were tasked to overlook decision-making and implementation. There were also provisions for imposing sanctions on any of the member states which persistently failed, without good reason, to fulfil obligations assumed under the Treaty or pursue policies which undermined SADC’s principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures (Article 33, 1-2). Sanctions were to be determined by the Summit on a case-by-case basis.

The decentralized nature of the Co-ordination Conference was continued with the new SADC. Each member state was allocated the responsibility for co-coordinating one or more sectors. This involved proposing policies, strategies and priorities, and processing projects for inclusion in the sector programme, monitoring progress and reporting to the Council of Ministers. After the restructuring in 1992, there were 21 sector co-coordinating units and commissions in twelve of the fourteen SADC countries. Commissions, assisted by Commission Secretariats, were regional institutions, approved by the Summit and supported by all member states. The Commission Secretariats had a regional staff and were funded directly by member states through separate contributions (SADC 1992:8).

The sector co-coordinating units were national institutions established in the appropriate line ministry by the member country responsible for co-coordinating the particular sector and staffed by civil servants of the particular country. Sectoral committees of ministers guided them. Only the DRC and the Seychelles were without sector responsibilities (SADC 1999:3).

Having outlined the main structures of SADC, this study now turns to how the organization performed in terms of its objectives and values and also how its structures enabled and/or disabled the organization’s performance.
4.5 Preliminary indications of structural changes

This section will briefly address some of the early indications of the limitations of SADC’s founding structure of 1992 to 1999. A detailed discussion of factors that led SADC to consider restructuring in 1999 will be discussed in chapter five.

The end of apartheid in South Africa led to the increase of SADC membership. It now consisted of eleven member states. Not only did SADC membership increase, but also South Africa’s role in the region ended the speculation on whether South Africa would join SADC or COMESA. At the time, it was believed that the security of SADC countries would improve. The role and objectives of SADC were also expected to change and accommodate new members (each with their own developmental needs and interests) such as South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles and the DRC.

The other structural challenge to the Windhoek Treaty caused by the entry of South Africa was the relevance of the FLS in the region. The discussions around this issue led to the establishment of the Organ for Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS). Zimbabwe was the first country to chair the OPDS. The next chapter will discuss political events that served as preliminary indications for structural change during this period.

4.5.1 The establishment of the OPDS

The establishment of the OPDS is a significant illustration of SADC’s reaction in order to address issues of regional concern. Figure three outlines the OPDS’ structure and how it relates to SADC.
The following guidelines pertaining to the institutional framework for the Organ were included in the communiqué of the 28 June 1996 Gaborone Summit:

**Source:** SADC (1996:4)
the Organ shall operate at the Summit level, and shall function independently of other SADC structures;
the Organ shall also operate at ministerial and technical levels;
the chairpersonship of the Organ shall rotate on an annual and on a troika basis;
the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee shall be one of the institutions of the Organ; and
the Organ may establish other structures as the need arises.

Malan (1996:4) and Steyn (1998:28) write that the rationale behind the Organ was twofold. Firstly, it was argued that the situations in SADC and in neighbouring states were far from stable and that a central organ could better respond to situations of conflict and tension. This argument gained strength with developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo (the former Zaire), Rwanda, Angola, Zambia and Central Africa. Secondly, it was argued that the actions of the United Nations (UN) on African soil were far from successful and had led to an increasing reluctance by the major powers to deploy troops in Africa. The financial crisis of the UN further hampered its peacekeeping actions. African countries and organizations were therefore advised to accept more responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution on the continent.

Article 21 of the SADC Treaty spells out a number of areas for cooperation, including politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security. In July 1994, a SADC workshop on democracy, peace and security set SADC on a course towards formal involvement in security, conflict and military issues. When the Frontline States dissolved in July 1994, it was decided that it should be transformed into the political and security wing of SADC. In March 1995 this was formalised in the Association of Southern African States (ASAS). However, ASAS never developed and was replaced in June 1996 when the SADC Organ on Security and Political Affairs was set up (SADC 1996:17).

According to SADC (1996:7), the 1996 summit defined sixteen substantive political, defence and security objectives to be pursued by the Organ. It also
decided on the institutional framework. The SADC Organ operated at Heads of State level, but also at ministerial and technical levels. It was independent of other SADC structures. Table nine outlines the main objectives of the OPDS. These objectives fall mainly within the spheres of military/defence, crime prevention, intelligence, foreign policy and human rights. Table nine also includes the specific objectives to be achieved in each of these spheres.

**Table 9: OPDS objectives**

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<tr>
<th>MILITARY/DEFENCE</th>
<th>CRIME PREVENTION</th>
<th>INTELLIGENCE</th>
<th>FOREIGN POLICY</th>
<th>HUMAN RIGHTS</th>
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<td>Protect against instability</td>
<td>Close Co-operation to deal with cross-border crime</td>
<td>Close Co-operation</td>
<td>Promote Co-operation and common political values and institutions to deal with cross-border crime</td>
<td>Develop democratic institutions and practices</td>
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<td>Develop a collective security capacity</td>
<td>Promote a community-based approach</td>
<td>Early warning</td>
<td>Develop common foreign policy</td>
<td>Encourage observance of universal human rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conclude Mutual Defence Pact</td>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict prevention, management and resolution</td>
<td></td>
<td>Encourage and monitor international human rights conventions and treaties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop a regional peacekeeping capacity</td>
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<td>Mediate in inter- and intra-state disputes</td>
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<td>Early warning</td>
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<td>Preventive diplomacy</td>
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Like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the SADC Organ was potentially an organization with a comprehensive approach to security and peace, based on military confidence, economic development, social justice, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and the rights of minorities. According to Cilliers (1999:5), “southern African region, despite these efforts, clearly still had a long way to go in this regard”. Furthermore, he states that “the active, ongoing and meaningful pursuit of such an inspiring list of objectives could not occur only at an annual meeting of Heads of State and Government and a system of ad hoc and informal arrangements, but required the regular engagement of member states at ministerial and technical levels”. In organizational terms, this was the major challenge for the structural development of the Organ.

The formation of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security in Gaborone on 28 June 1996, to fill the gap left by the Front Line States, could be regarded as one of the major restructuring moves taken by SADC prior to 1999. This was the first institution to be added to SADC after it restructured from SADCC in 1992. After 1992 SADC mainly focused on economic development, and the SADC Organ was thus established to create a special forum for political, defence and security cooperation with a focus on conflict management.

According to Wawa (1998:76) the 1996 Gaborone Communiqué provided for the SADC Organ to coordinate the region’s participation in international and regional peacekeeping operations. It also suggested that the region may be called to apply punitive measures to some of its member states, but specified
that this should only be done as a last resort once all diplomatic means had been exhausted and only with the approval of the SADC Summit and as agreed upon in the Protocol.

Malan (1996:4) further argues that from a policy perspective, the guidelines raised the need for a comprehensive policy framework in a number of areas. The first and most immediate were the needs of the Protocol itself. The objectives indicated that the Protocol must specify the procedures and broad guidelines under which SADC would undertake punitive action against its member states and, it seems, non-member states also.

States such as Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa were instrumental in the establishment of the OPDS. Despite consensus on the imperative to establish a security structure under SADC’s umbrella, tensions among member states started to surface. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe became a leading figure in the efforts to use the OPDS for the benefit of Zimbabwe. It was also threatened by the regional status of the new South Africa. In addition to this, Zimbabwe was alleged to have considerable economic interests in a war torn DRC, the unstable Great Lakes region and Angola. The above discussion is in line with the realist theory’s view on regimes that states enter into agreements and form regimes in order to advance their national interests, by diplomatically doing it collectively.

4.6 An appraisal of SADC’s performance 1992-1999

After its first restructuring in 1992, SADC failed to improve the economic and political conditions in the region – the very task it was established to address. In comparison to its predecessor, SADC had a much more detailed and widened scope of objectives. However, despite these, it was for example unable to address the conflict in Angola, which continued as if no restructuring took place. In essence SADC was, at least on paper, capable of addressing the Angolan conflict. In this case, SADC’s inaction severely compromised its principles and objectives.

Baregu (1999:23) maintains that the economic situation of member countries, particularly Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho, Namibia, Tanzania, Angola and
Swaziland to a large extent, continued to decline. By 1999 the aggregate economic growth rate was at 1.8 per cent. However, this figure was still below the growth target of 6.0 per cent as defined in the United Nations New Agenda for Development in Africa as the minimum growth rate required for sustainable economic development. To halve poverty in SADC by the year 2015, an average annual growth rate of almost 6.5 per cent was required for the region. South Africa, which is the largest economy, accounts for 75 per cent of the SADC GDP. The diversity among the fourteen SADC member states made it difficult to have an overall view of the economic performance in the region as it included economies ranging from the least developed to the more developed ones.

Significant variations in economic growth, which has been a characteristic throughout the 1990s continued despite efforts of restructuring in 1992. The major factors that influenced economic performance included the overall international economy, domestic economic policies, level of governance and the degree of political stability in member states and the region as a whole. Political instability included the conflicts within the DRC involving several SADC member states, and a UNITA military campaign in Angola. SADC had neither the capacity, nor the resources or political will to deal with these conflicts despite the change from Conference to Community in 1992. The realities in the region increasingly demanded a joint effort to resolve conflicts.

Chikowore (1999:333) further maintains that the inflation rate in SADC countries after 1992 became a trouble factor to the character of SADC and member countries. Inflation has continued to grow in some countries despite more focus by member states on policies that increased monetary discipline and a reduction of budget deficits. The inflation rate among members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), namely, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland grew by less than 10 per cent, the same as in Mauritius, Seychelles and Tanzania between 1992 and 1999. Mozambique experienced an increase in its inflation rate as a consequence of difficulties caused by floods, while in Malawi and Zambia the inflation rate exceeded 10 per cent. The level of inflation remained very high in countries affected by civil strife, namely, Angola and the DRC. In 2000, the inflation
rate exceeded 500 per cent in DRC. It was 325 per cent in Angola and 55 per cent in Zimbabwe.

The other key challenge that was facing SADC countries was the issue of external debt. According to the African Development Indicators for 2001, the total external debt of SADC stood at US$80,295 million at the end of 1999. The countries that recorded the highest debt levels, in nominal terms, were South Africa, the DRC, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. The following countries, namely Angola, the DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, were classified as severely indebted low-income countries, and were eligible for assistance under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative of the IMF. The debt overhang had an adverse impact on investment and economic growth in the region. Since the external debt was mainly owed by the state, debt service payments limited the ability of governments to invest in physical infrastructure and human resources as well as to increase growth-enhancing expenditure in education and health. These factors constituted major setbacks to the SADC aspiration of developing and integrating Southern Africa (Chikowore 1999:4).

SADC’s performance up to 1999 was influenced by the economic conditions mentioned above as well as its correlating political instability. The above situation left the SADC leadership with no option but to review all operations within the organization. Political crises within the region managed to test the viability of SADC in dealing with such pressing issues. The decision to undertake the restructuring exercise was influenced by such political situations within the region. This debate is discussed further in the next chapter.

### 4.7 Summary

This chapter is aimed at discussing how SADC restructured. The main theoretical base of the discussion on how it restructured was influenced by Young’s (1982) perspective on regime change or transformation. Young emphasises that one of the reasons regime change or transform takes place
is because of pressures that is exerted to the regime by its members or pressures that the regime itself is faced with. Young (1982) further maintains that when regimes are faced with such a challenge, alterations in their structures such as principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures are inevitable or could be expected. This chapter has discussed the structural changes in SADC in line with the regime theory as perceived by Young (1982).

SADC was created in 1992 with the twin goals of achieving economic development and political stability through regional trade liberalization and political and economic integration. SADC member states also expected to use the institution as a way of reducing their vulnerability on external financial shocks induced by fluctuations, political instability and uncertainty in the rest of the world. The SADC Treaty of 1992 called on its member states to promote peace and security, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the peace settlement of disputes. However, the Treaty gave prominence to SADC’s ministers of economic planning and finance in constituting its Council of Ministers, thus giving less priority to issues of politics, defence and security. In an effort to rectify the situation, the 1996 SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government met in Gaborone and launched the OPDS, which operated at summit, ministerial and technical levels, independently of other SADC structures.

Prior to the establishment of the OPDS, this chapter pointed out that South Africa’s entry into SADC added another dimension to the operation of the organization. Furthermore, the increase of membership after South Africa with the joining of Mauritius, Seychelles and the DRC added more responsibilities and expectations on SADC as a regional body. Despite the restructuring in 1992, this chapter argued that little changed in terms of achievements. Instead, SADC’s challenges regionally and internationally increased, thus, exerting pressure on the organization to respond to or cease to exist if it fails to survive. As early as 1996, preliminary signs of restructuring began to be evident, as discussed in this chapter, through the establishment
of the OPDS to enhance SADC to be in touch with regional challenges, especially the political challenges that were causing instability in the region.

As discussed in chapter one on the issue of regime change, transformation or restructuring according to Young (1982:45), Puchala & Hopkins (1982:23) and Krasner (1983:33), the same applies to SADC in 1992 while transforming itself from the SADCC. The mentioned scholars approach the idea from two basic viewpoints. Young (1982:45) states that contradictions within the regime framework may lead to serious pressure for alterations. These contradictions may be from dynamic point of views, and that can be an element that may push regimes to fall apart or to be useless. In this instance, this study could site the fact that although SADC established the OPDS, it failed to equip it enough, that instead of it being a “talk show” it would be an institution based on sanctions that were agreed upon as early as 1992 of good governance, democracy and respect for human rights. Instead of the leaders respecting the principles, norms, rules and decision-making processes of the organization and the Organ, they found themselves in conflict on how disputes ought to be solved in the region.

The Lesotho, Angola and the DRC conflicts are examples in this case. Young (1982:45) also mentions that the other view regarding regime change could be a dialectical proven point of view, which looks holistically at social entities searching for dialectical laws pertaining to change. Thus, from the holistic or dialectical point of view the regime may evolve or transform itself without disintegration, like the evolution of SADCC into SADC in 1992. Instead of SADCC continuing with irrelevant principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures it inherited in 1980 and in 1992, it decided to restructure and establish new institutions as from 1999.

Puchala and Hopkins (1982:8) mention the concept of regime disintegration as the ‘revolutionary change’ and the concept of regime adaptation as the ‘evolutionary change’. Evolutionary change, or Young’s idea of holistic change, may involve a regime changing substantively by preserving its principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures. As mentioned, this would usually occur because of shifts in knowledge, information or in changes with regard to challenges and pressures facing particular regimes. The regime
adaptation or evolutionary change in a regime is particularly relevant to the restructuring of SADCC to SADC because, the former was establish to operate in a period when South Africa was still regarded as an “enemy state”, while the latter was established to operate in a period when South Africa was regarded as a strategic ally to the integration of the region. The subsequent chapter discusses factors that led SADC to consider the second restructuring exercise from 1999.
Chapter Five

The Restructuring of SADC from 1999

5.1 Introduction

Chapter three introduced a debate on factors that led SADCC to consider restructuring in 1992. Chapter four discussed why SADC was formed and how it operated. This chapter will focus on why SADC began to restructure in the late 1990s after it first restructured in 1992. It will also discuss how SADC restructured from 1999. Although the emphasis in this study is to appraise and analyse mainly political factors that had a role in the restructuring of SADC as in previous chapters, recognition of economic factors both regionally and internationally will not be completely ignored. It is important to note that most economic factors had political implications, and vice versa.

These factors, as in previous chapters, will be discussed in terms of the two levels in this study, namely regional as well as international. Regimes, as indicated in chapter one, are established to assist states in dealing with shared issues. SADC was established in 1992 to address issues of mutual concern. In this regard, the Windhoek Treaty (regarded as the founding document of SADC) signed on 17 August 1992 declares inter alia “a mutual commitment by member states to deeper and more formal arrangements for cooperation and integration under the framework of a new organization” (SADC 1992:42).

SADC continues to be identified as a regime in this chapter. In chapter one, Krasner’s definition was identified as the preferred conceptualisation. In analysing SADC’s restructuring, the defining elements of a regime will be looked at. During its various restructuring exercises SADCC/C had to take cognisance of its principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. At the time SADC was established, specific conditions prevailed in the region. By the time of its second restructuring process various other
conditions prevailed. It is important to note that conditions and factors discussed in this chapter were the conditions and factors SADC was created to deal with in 1992. Such conditions and factors had an effect on SADC’s operations and in turn, required that it respond or react to such change.

The Windhoek Treaty represents SADC’s main principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. The most important principle for the organization was to improve economic conditions and deepen trade links among member states in the region. This was to be done by facilitating the free movement of goods, people and services; and by ensuring that the region enjoys political stability, by removing trade barriers to the flow of capital in the region. In a normative sense, the Windhoek Treaty specifies general standards of behaviour and identifies the rights and obligations of member states. In this regard, an example of a basic norm specified is that of trade liberalisation, peace and security as well as regional development community. The latter is an essential characteristic of SADC as a regime.

By the late 1990s, as discussed in chapter four, it was apparent that the region was still underdeveloped and SADC countries were still dependent on South Africa and more dependent on international donors. The regional economy, according to Gibb (2001:79), was built upon the region’s single dominant economy located in South Africa, for example migrant labour, mining, water, transport and increasing regional trade. The continuing inequalities and dependency of most member countries undermined SADC’s ability to develop and integrate the region. A call for an alternative organization or regional structure started to be inevitable. SADC officials started to realize the need to again restructure the organization in order to be able to deal with all the needs and challenges that prevailed in the region as discussed above.

Despite the restructuring of SADCC to SADC in 1992, by the mid 1990s SADC began to experience difficulties and constraints in its operations and implementation of its projects, such as SADC’s dependency on international donors by member countries, the decline of living standards in the region, the
decline of the rule of law, the increase of SADC projects with more of them having no regional benefit and more. SADC (1999:54) maintained that the situation was due to the fact that its secretariat lacked power, authority and resources required to facilitate regional integration. It also maintained that the situation led sector co-ordinating units in member countries to become highly uneven in their ability to pursue and implement policies. It further argued that its work plan lacked a clear regional focus despite the 1992 changes. Another constraint was that the SADC work plan covered too many areas, and the majority of projects were found to be mainly national.

In chapter three, Young (1982:45) maintains that contradictions within the regime framework may lead to serious pressure for alterations. These contradictions may be from a dynamic point of view, and can be an element that may push regimes to fall apart or to become obsolete. After 1992, contradictions that existed included the issue of multi-membership SADC members belonged to, as mentioned in chapter one. Others included to a large extent the dependency of SADC projects on donor funding, which further undermined commitment to economic liberation and commitment to total integration as proclaimed in the Windhoek Treaty. Young also warns that the persistence of contradictions within a regime can lead to serious pressures that could result in major alterations. By this, Young means changes within the regime’s norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures. This chapter outlines factors and conditions that contributed to SADC’s second restructuring, the 1999 restructuring process. The main focus will be on how these factors had an effect on SADC as a regional structure and also as a regional or institutional regime as explained in the first chapter.

5.2 Internal factors

The internal factors contributing to the restructuring of SADC in 1999 are analysed and appraised below:
5.2.1 The end of Apartheid in South Africa

As discussed in the previous chapters, the 1990s heralded a new era in Southern Africa. The 1992 restructuring exercise was influenced by the fact that South Africa might end apartheid, whereas the 1999 restructuring exercise was informed by the fact that apartheid had officially ended in South Africa in 1994. As discussed in the previous chapters, the release of South African (former) president, Nelson Mandela, in 1990, the independence of Namibia and peace processes in Angola and Mozambique brought much needed peace and stability to the region. These were signs for SADCC that it had to refocus itself. As pointed out in chapter three, SADCC therefore adopted the Windhoek Treaty at its 1992 summit, which led to the establishment of SADC. This meant a change in focus and objectives, from regional political cooperation to (economic) integration. Furthermore, SADC became a legal body and upgraded its central secretariat (SADC 1992:4).

In August 1994, South Africa joined SADC. Despite the major restructuring of its domestic, social, political and economic systems, re-establishing its relations with Southern African countries, and inheriting a very weak economy, it still joined SADC. South Africa is perceived by many third parties as the 'engine of growth' pulling the wagon of economic growth and political stability in the region. According to Cheru (1994: 5) the announcement by South Africa that it will join SADC resolved a long dragging speculation on whether South Africa would join the PTA or whether it would strengthen its ties with SACU.

South Africa’s accession increased SADC’s international credibility and made it a sought-after partner with which to dialogue and cooperate. However, SADC was still faced with some problems and difficulties. After joining SADC, Mandela placed emphasis on democracy, human rights and the rule of law throughout the region. This was perceived by some as South African ambition to dominate the rest of the region, both economically and politically (Roberts 2003:69).
According to Roberts (2003:76) this meant that SADC leaders had to consider these factors within their respective countries. This also meant that SADC, as a regional organization, was tasked with an obligation to oversee that such conditions were put into place by member countries. In addition to that, South Africa’s emphasis on democracy, rule of law and human rights became an issue also emphasised by international donors like the EU, the United States of America (USA) and the Nordic countries as a condition for funding SADC projects.

According to Cheru (1992:39) “another factor brought by South Africa into SADC was monetary harmonisation”. The World Bank and the African Development Bank, in view of the success of the CFA in Francophone West Africa, envisaged this. The absence of a common currency was a major impediment to intra-regional trade. The other contributions that South Africa made or was expected to make were to improve financial administration, customs administration and to contribute to domestic resource mobilisation and allocation. Lastly, South Africa was also expected to play a huge role in conflict resolution in the region and in the continent as a whole. That required a system with an institution in which this could be dealt with (Schoeman 1998:6).

These expectations and responsibilities that South Africa was expected to fulfil meant that SADC had to reposition its institution and its approach to integration. The inherited SADCC structure did not seem adequate to accommodate the expectations and global challenges that were taking place in the region. To state that South Africa initiated change in SADC’s principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures in 1999 could sum up the role it played after it joined SADC in 1994 (Schoeman 1998:6).

Cheru (1995:39) further maintains that the inclusion of South Africa into SADC gave SADC member countries, especially its neighbouring countries, stability because it meant that they did not have to worry about attacks from South Africa. It also meant that some SADC countries could start spending less on
defence, as South Africa became a non-hostile nation towards the regional countries after the end of apartheid. It also ended speculations that it might join COMESA.

5.2.2 The restructuring of the OPDS

The FLS had a very flexible approach to conflict prevention and security in Southern Africa. However, the transition to democracy in most Southern African countries and the adoption of the SADC Windhoek Treaty formalised the approach to conflict prevention. The formalisation of the approach towards security could also be regarded as the factor that triggered the need for SADC to restructure in 1999. For a detailed discussion on the formation of the OPDS, refer to chapter four (SADC 1996:6).

The formation of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security in Gaborone on 28 June 1996, to fill the gap left by the Front Line States, could be regarded as one of the major restructuring moves taken by SADC prior to 1999. This was the first institution to be added to SADC after it restructured from SADCC in 1992 or the alteration of a regime as Young might refer to it in chapters one and three. After 1992 SADC mainly focused on economic development, and the SADC Organ was thus established to create a special forum for political, defence and security cooperation with a specific focus on conflict management.

According to Wawa (1998:76) the 1996 Gaborone Communiqué provided for the SADC Organ to coordinate the region’s participation in international and regional peacekeeping operations. It also suggested that the region may be called to apply punitive measures to some of its member states, but specified that this should only be done as a last resort, once all diplomatic means had been exhausted and only with the approval of the SADC Summit and as agreed upon in the Protocol.

Malan (1996:4) further argues that from a policy perspective, the guidelines raised the need for a comprehensive policy framework in a number of areas.
The first and most immediate were the needs of the Protocol itself. The objectives indicated that the Protocol must specify the procedures and broad guidelines under which SADC would undertake punitive action against its member states and, it seems, non-member states also.

Due to the above, Van Tongeren (1998:71) maintains that the SADC Organ was never made fully operational due to a difference of opinion over whether the SADC Organ was meant to be an organ of SADC or an independent body. A fatal clause in the Communiqué that was released after the Gaborone Summit in 1996 approving the establishment of the SADC Organ, read that the Organ shall ‘function independently’ of other SADC structures. Zimbabwe, the Chair of the SADC Organ then, interpreted this to mean that the SADC Organ should function totally independently of SADC control. This led to a diplomatic conflict between South Africa and Zimbabwe. The realist theories on regimes might deem this as a power struggle between states with a specific region or area trying to maximise its own national interests at the expense of each other, as well as the region as a political unit.

The main thrust of the Zimbabwean argument was that SADC was a donor-funded economic development body, and that the sub-region could not entrust its political and security functions to it. South Africa, the former SADC Chair, argued that the clause referred to the intention that the SADC Organ should not function like the other SADC sectors (under SADC then, member states were each given responsibility to coordinate specific sectors, such as food, infrastructure, trade and others – refer to chapter 3). South Africa argued that conflict management was too important for it to be the responsibility of any one member, and that is why it should operate differently from the rest of the SADC functions (Van Tongeren 1998:71).

According to De Coning (1999:3) the SADC Organ impasse would have been little more than an embarrassing footnote in SADC’s history, if it was not directly responsible for SADC’s inability to respond to the conflicts in Angola, the DRC and Lesotho in a more cohesive manner. The vacuum created by the impasse resulted for instance, in a situation where some SADC countries
decided to intervene in the DRC under SADC auspices, whilst others preferred a diplomatic solution to the problem. Similarly, there were still questions over the mandate and decision-making processes that led to the SADC military intervention in Lesotho in September 1998. In both cases, SADC as a legal entity and its Executive Secretary and Secretariat, had no role or responsibility for these operations carried out under its auspices.

De Coning (1999:5) continues by saying that the misunderstanding concerning the independence and the role of the Organ between two elderly Head of States (former president Mandela of South Africa and president Mugabe of Zimbabwe) not only caused embarrassment, but also meant that SADC lacked the will and know-how to deal with integration issues in the region, and more importantly, security. SADC also lacked a diplomatic mechanism to deal with differences in its leadership and the approach to conflict in the region. The tussle in the SADC leadership and the Organ’s role cannot be ruled out as a factor that led SADC to take measures against such an embarrassment in future. What this meant was that SADC began to be pressured to re-investigate the role of the Organ, and furthermore, to come up with guidelines that would avoid another similar situation. Young (1982), in chapter one, refers to this as contradictions within the regime that pressures the regimes to implement major alterations. The Organ became one of the major issues affecting the restructuring in 1999. The impasse around the SADC Organ Chairperson, and the differences in approach to especially the DRC conflict, constituted the greatest challenge faced by SADC in its short history. In view of the abovementioned problems at the SADC level, the August 1999 Maputo Summit decided that all SADC institutions, including the SADC Organ, need to be reviewed within six months, thereby creating a sense of urgency and momentum.

In brief, this meant SADC began to realize again that it was not working. It also realized that it was gradually approaching a leadership crisis and that the ‘independence’ of the Organ from SADC contributed to slow the pace in solving regional conflict. The leadership crisis also reflected badly on SADC
from the investors’ point of view. For SADC to attract investors to the region, it needed to restructure the OPDS to ensure regional stability (SADC 2000:4).

In addition, Tsie (1998:23) maintains that the establishment of the Organ in 1996 marked an important era in SADC’s development. However, the turning point that led the Organ to be drawn into the whole restructuring exercise was the tussle between the leadership over the DRC and Lesotho conflicts. In brief, this meant was that SADC could no longer afford any misrepresentation, especially after the Cold War. The region wanted as much assistance as possible from the Western countries, which proved to focus on the Eastern European countries. The restructuring of the Organ and the whole organization was the least that could have been done to save face.

According to De Coning (1999:5) the failure of the OPDS to deal with conflict in the mentioned countries marked a major turning point in the life span of SADC as an organization. The conflicts tested the capability and viability of the organization. Moreover, these conflicts exposed the fact that SADC had no mechanism to deal with security issues though they claimed to have an Organ designed to overlook such situations. These conflicts further displayed that SADC was “toothless”. This could be referred to as regime failure.

5.2.3 Regional political crisis

Political factors in some way relate to OPDS’ failure in ensuring that regional political crises were contained. However, to emphasise factors per category, it was seen to be wiser if these crises were discussed separately from the OPDS as an institution, with SADC designed to overlook these factors. The political crisis in the region became another factor that led SADC to consider the restructuring exercise in 1999. The conflicts involved the Angolan crisis, the DRC crisis, the Swaziland political instability and the Lesotho crisis. Other political conflict included the succession issue in Zambia after the former president Chiluba proposed a third term for himself. The third term issue after became a regional issue and soon donor agencies insisted on clarity from the regional leaders that such considerations were not in the pipeline. The
question of liberal democracy became the issue of the day. Leaders such as the Namibian president Nujoma and the Zimbabwean president Mugabe became casualties of this debate. At SADC level this debate needed much clarity as to whether actions of tampering with constitutions continue in the region, or not. That resulted in a SADC parliamentary committee being formed to look at issues regarding the constitutional irregularities in the region (Schoeman 1998:6).

As discussed before, the DRC crisis saw the involvement of SADC countries in the conflict and that resulted in some diplomatic conflict among member states. According to Van Tongeren (1998:73), “the conflict led to confusion on whether SADC should intervene, and whether those countries that intervened (Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola), did so on their own or under the auspices of SADC. The diplomatic conflict, mainly between South Africa and Zimbabwe, saw the independence of the Organ reviewed as discussed, but most importantly, the diplomatic rift between the two elder state men, Mandela and Mugabe. This exposed SADC’s lack of capacity in dealing with conflict - especially among member countries in the region”.

According to Patel (2001:7) the Lesotho crisis was another factor that exposed the lack of SADC ability, and particularly the OPDS, in dealing with regional conflict. The crisis began in May 1998 when the Kingdom of Lesotho held a parliamentary election, the second one after military rule that had lasted from 1986 to 1993. Before these elections the political atmosphere was highly charged with the opposition parties, particularly the Basutuland Congress Party (BCP), questioning the legitimacy of the ruling party Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and representation in the legislature.

According to Baregu (1999:2) “the major issue of contention was how, in July 1997, the LCD had split from the BCP as a faction, declared on its own a party and formed a government on the basis of having a majority of members of parliament. This move was largely seen as a parliamentary coup and was strongly but unsuccessfully opposed by the opposition parties in the run up to the 1998 elections. In the event, the LCD won the elections with an
overwhelming majority taking 79 out of a total of 80 seats. The election was declared free and fair by local and international observers. The other political parties that claimed that the LCD had rigged the elections met the outcomes with dismay and anger. They began a protest campaign that included camping outside the King’s Palace and demanded that the King should dissolve Parliament, dismiss the LCD government and establish a government of national unity whose main task would be to make preparations for and organize another round of elections”.

The SADC military intervention in Lesotho led by South Africa and Botswana, just as its counterpart in the DRC that was led by Zimbabwe, evoked mixed reactions among SADC members, Africa and the world at large. Baregu (1999:2) maintains that one of the greatest shortcomings identified with regard to the SADC interventions in Lesotho and the DRC, was the lack of a coherent policy concerning decision-making processes which needed to be followed in order to approve a mission under SADC auspices, for example an Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) meeting of Defence Ministers (which was the level at which the DRC Mission was approved) or a SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security at the Foreign Minister level, or SADC Summit level (which was the level the Lesotho Mission was approved at) and more. They also had to determine how that decision should be taken, that is, should the appropriate body adopt a United Nations Security Council-type resolution that can become the mandate for the mission, and should that decision be made public and transparent?

According to Peter-Berriers (2003:2) SADC was confronted with some questions that needed immediate attention after these crises. Firstly, they needed to determine what kind of missions SADC should undertake and what kind of missions SADC have the capacity to undertake in terms of peacekeeping, military observers, civilian observers, human rights monitoring missions, peace enforcement, military interventions and SADC’s undertakings in the enforcement operations (as was the case most recently in Lesotho and the DRC). Secondly, would it seek prior authorisation from the UN Security Council as required under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and what is SADC’s
relationship with the AU in this regard? Should it at least inform the AU of its intentions prior to undertaking such an intervention? Lastly, SADC needed to answer how its Missions would be financed. If donor money was accepted, what should the principles be that govern the relationship between the donors and the SADC mission to ensure that only SADC will determine the mandate, objectives, duration, exit strategy and overall approach of the mission?

The above questions left the SADC leadership with no option but to review all the operations within the organization. Political crisis within the region tested the viability of SADC in dealing with such pressing issues. The decision to undertake the restructuring exercise was influenced by such political situations within the region. The abovementioned debate again is in agreement with Young’s theory of contradictions within a regime. An analysis based on Young’s theory means that SADC’s structure was not capable of dealing with regional issues although it was established to be a regional organization. SADC was mainly caught up in a situation where it indirectly violated or opposed its own principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures. In the above case this refers to the principles of good government and democracy that were under attack by SADC member countries, rather than foreign countries.

5.3 External factors

External factors contributing to the restructuring of SADC in 1999 are analysed and appraised below:

5.3.1 The restructuring of the EU

As mentioned in the previous chapters, SADC was established on the EU model. After the post Cold War period in 1989, the international environment brought about major changes in the EU. The enlargement of the East became an important point on the agenda and calls for changes in the structure, policies and institutional arrangements of the EU increased dramatically. With the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU
began to put greater emphasis on the political dimension of its external relations. These developments were expected to impact its future relations with the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (Graumans 1997:6).

The rational behind the EU relations with developing countries after the integration has changed. Security issues have started to receive renewed and increased emphasis. In the Green Paper, the EU stressed that its political dialogue with the ACP states would have its place in the common external policy (Graumans 1997b: 24).

In this respect the Communication to the Council (March 1996) on 'the EU and the issue of conflicts in Africa: peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond' is of interest. The EU stated that it wanted to play a facilitating and supportive role as it acknowledged that fostering peace, stability, democracy and human rights in conflict situations was nearly impossible (Graumans 1997c:1).

To forge relations with ACP states the EU envisaged three aspects through the Green Paper. Firstly, a mutual commitment on issues likes good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law - the so-called essential elements clause. Secondly, they needed to determine whether there was political dialogue and what it concerned. Issues included the geographic configuration (multilateral, bilateral or regional), the priorities of dialogue (national security, migration, illicit trafficking) and the level of dialogue (ministerial, technical working parties). Thirdly, the EU referred to the linkage between political and cooperation components. This was envisaged through increased selectiveness of aid and adjusting the practical modalities of cooperation in order to facilitate ownership of reforms by these countries (European Commission 1996:25, Graumans 1997, 1998:34).

In the Guidelines for the negotiation of new cooperation agreements with the ACP countries, written one year after the publication of the Green Paper, the EU stipulated how the EU-ACP partnership could be brought into the Union's foreign policy. It stated that more resources for conflict prevention, a political dialogue with greater depth and extended scope and an institutional basis for
more effective and open dialogue were envisaged in the future EU-ACP partnership (European Commission, 1997:14).

In the Mandate (June 1998), the essential elements clause was again stressed as an important part of the future agreement (European Commission, 1998:7). The mandate provided relatively clear definitions of what was understood by the concepts in the essential elements clause. It also reaffirmed the need for a deeper, flexible (geographically and in terms of levels of representation) and wider-ranging political dialogue to include all matters of common, general or regional interest. Other important elements that reinforced the political dimension of a future ACP-EU partnership, were the recognition that an active and organised civil society, equity and social development are an integral part of a secure and democratic political environment; the support of socially oriented market-based economic systems in the ACP; the importance of peace building policies and the prevention of violent conflict; the importance of developing post-conflict dialogue and strengthening the links between emergency aid, rehabilitation and development and dialogue on migration (European Commission 1998:9).

Graumans (1996:13) maintained that the implications of the EU Green Paper on SADC was that the organization had aligned its institutions and structures with the EU conditions, firstly as donor to SADC, and secondly as an influential and strategic partner for SADC if it wanted to achieve deeper integration as the EU had proved to be a leading organization in the world. The expansion of the EU not only meant that it was becoming one of the powerful organizations in the world, but it also meant that its focus, in terms of financial aid, were to be better channelled to new members, mostly from Eastern Europe, who would then become the largest beneficiaries of aid and tough competitors for SADC countries. The restructuring of SADC was also meant to strengthen the relations between the Southern Region and the EU as donor organizations. As a result SADC institutions began to accommodate and reflect the demands emphasised by donors such as the EU, for example the adherence to human rights, the rule of law, transparency and good governance.
5.3.2 Globalization

According to Mazrui (2000:1) “on the threshold of the twenty-first century, Africa’s capacity for development and to be part of the world economy was a question that ranked higher than ever on the agenda of international institutions, governments and researchers. As a new period of great changes in the world economy began, the staying behind of Africa probably confirmed the afro-pessimistic feeling that the continent will never be able to ‘adjust to the challenges of globalization’ and take a ‘normal’ place in international economic relations”.

Mazrui (2000:2) further emphasises that “globalization is not a very recent phenomenon as it began at least at the beginning of the nineteen century. What happened in the last decades was just a rapid acceleration of globalization. In a sense, Africa had also taken part in the ancient movement of globalization when the continent was the heart of the transatlantic slave trade and later when it was the butt of colonial expeditions. To date, globalization carries two interrelated consequences. On the one hand, homogenisation (making all of us look similar) and on the other hand, hegemonisation (making one of us the superior).

The dialectic of homogenisation/hegemonisation is especially relevant in the economic field as globalization is not simply the rapid development of trade and investment throughout the world which makes many people in most of the countries adopt quite similar ways of life and uniform patterns of behaviour. It also represents a more abstract process, according to which some economic ideas and theories are spreading from some specific countries or regions to a global context (Mazrui 2000:2).

Mazrui (2000:2) continues to say that “in this sense, one can argue that globalization is partly the translation of an ‘intellectual’ hegemonisation process on the part of a uniformising thought”. The world-wide transfer of those ideas and the content of those theories are highly controversial and
constitute one of the central debates regarding the compatibility of the globalization of the world economy, especially with regards to Africa’s economic efforts through the AU, Nepad and sub-regional organizations in individual countries on the continent.

Furthermore, Mazrui (2000:3) maintains, “Globalization, as conceived and practiced, denies poorer countries access to the processes and lessons of historical development. It erases the perspective of history”. Mazrui (2002:3) emphasizes this point by stating “we (Africans) do not ask for a turn at imperialist rule, but not one of the more advanced countries arrived at their present levels of development without state ownership and state intervention, without unilateral tariff regulation and protectionism, without unfettered powers of taxation and of state spending, at some time in their history”.

On this note, Piriheiro (1996:3) warns that “globalization is not only institutionalised in policies and programmes of the International Monetary Fund IMF and World Bank (Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), International Labour Organization (ILO), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), but is also powerfully and directly promoted by various private financial institutions which influence and control investments, as well as the movement of billions of US dollars around the world each day. Countries which do not privatise, intervene in the economies, raise taxes and do not cut spending, are given lower investment ratings by such private institutions”.

Lee (1997:218) noted that “SADC countries, with globalization increasing around the world, are handicapped in their efforts to promote economic integration, coordination of policies in agriculture, energy, the environment, education and training, food security, freer trade, and the movement of people, by their own differing levels of development. Current prolonged negotiations between South Africa and the EU, in the context of the Republics' obligations under the Customs Union and SADC, suggest though that not only do European Socialists become protectionist in Government, but they also show little interest in helping to resolve internal contradictions hampering our progress towards regionalism”.
According to Lee (2000:218) “global levels of economic challenges facing SADC include the process and effects of globalization which encompasses, among others, financial, trade and technological forces. The agenda of the WTO, The Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP as well as the USA’s Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) are all key challenges and opportunities for SADC. Therefore, SADC could not afford to be left behind or to be marginalised by these processes”. In acknowledging this, SADC (2002:4) maintained that its global development agenda of crucial importance was still being championed by the UN and was expressed in the Millennium Declaration and other United Nations led International Conventions through the Millennium Development Goals. Due to the above, SADC noted that it had to align its agenda and structures with such initiatives, and that the restructuring exercise was as a result of steps taken to counter such challenges as globalization.

5.3.3 External debt and financial aid

The issue of SADC members' dependency on financial aid and the ever-increasing debt to financial institutions became a factor that led SADC to consider the restructuring exercise. The dependency continued despite the restructuring of SADC in 1992 that promised to deal with the situation. Another blow to SADC was the fact that dependency continued despite the end of the Cold War with which it was hoped that SADC countries might be able to access the world market and be able to boost their profiles on the world stage (SADC 1992:43).

In several countries, the debt burden became extremely onerous. The stock of external debt in SADC stood at $69.12 billion in 2001. External debt in relation to GDP doubled in Angola, the DRC, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. On average, over the period 1992-2000, it represented 173 percent of GDP in Angola, 175 percent in DRC, 124 percent in Malawi, 116 percent in Tanzania, 202 percent in Zambia and 238 percent in Mozambique. However, in a few SADC member countries, notably Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, external debt remained stable at relatively low levels in relation to the GDP (SADC 2003:4).
SADC (2003:5) contended that due to SADC members’ debt positions, access to external sources of funds, other than official sources on terms of high concessions, remained limited. Resource-seeking FDI and project finance, associated with privatisation and public-private provision of infrastructural services, became the main means for filling the savings-investment gap in these countries. They remained highly dependent on ODA for this purpose though. Consistent with that outcome, aid dependence in SADC remained high at almost the same level in 1999 as in 1980 as measured in net ODA per capita. Given some of the countries’ aid-dependence and high debt-burdens, maintenance of sound macro-economic policies in these countries may, for the foreseeable future, depend heavily on massive debt write-downs and very large continued aid flows.

According to Isaksen (2002:16) the other factors that made the restructuring exercise necessary was that five of the SADC member countries became eligible for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). Two of these countries, namely Mozambique and Tanzania, reached the completion points, another two, Malawi and Zambia, reached the decision points and the DRC was being considered. This simply meant that SADC was not working, and to correct its mandate, it had to reconsider its structures and operations in order to deal with the situation. This also meant that somehow SADC was not doing enough to help other member countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania and Malawi to break away from the cycle of poverty.

This led to some questions as to whether SADC was viable as a regional body in Southern Africa, especially from international donors. The continuation of poverty within SADC members also highlighted that there was no trade balance. This further proved that SADC countries did not trade enough among each other as compared to the EU and NAFTA, despite the emphasis of the Windhoek Treaty in 1992 that established SADC from SADCC. From this point of view it became more necessary that SADC should try to turn the situation around and start to address the poverty cycle within the region.
According to Mr. Horst Brammer (Deputy Director Department of Foreign Affairs, South African government, at the SADC desk, interview 23 March 2002, Pretoria) the persistence of the above problem within SADC members meant that SADC’s principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures were not functioning properly. He further stated that this also meant that SADC was loosing touch with reality and it had to re-look its operations and institutions to address these problems. The dependency syndrome of most SADC members and the organization itself exposed that most members were not committed to the organization though in dependency. This was said to be happening in many channels, for example the lack of financial accountability, corruption, lack of democracy and lack of mechanisms of member states to collect tax revenues. Lastly, this exposed members’ lack of commitment concerning empowering the organization in fulfilling its mandate through paying membership fees. This issue also became a factor when the SADC mandate was reviewed.

5.3.4 External trade and trade policies
Foreign trade plays an important role in the economies of SADC member countries. Trade data of SADC countries reveals a number of features. Firstly, trade is a relatively more important component of GDP in small countries like Lesotho and Swaziland than in large countries like South Africa. Total merchandise trade of the SADC increased between 1991 and 1998 (SADC 1999:34).

The SADC Barometer (2003:4) points out that the export trade from Angola, Botswana, DRC, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia was dominated by oil or mineral exports. The oil and mining industry plays a significant role as major foreign exchange earners and are a source of input to industrial development. While oil and mining ventures are capital intensive, they still generate substantial employment opportunities directly and indirectly through linkages with other supply and input sectors. In other countries, agriculture commodities dominate export trade. The bulk of imports of SADC countries are intermediate and capital goods. Only South Africa and Zimbabwe have significant capacity to produce such goods.
Available data on the terms of trade show that most SADC member countries alongside with the majority of other African States have been experiencing a long-term decline in their terms of trade. This trend was particularly persistent between 1980 and 2000. Within Southern Africa, South Africa’s intra-regional trade was concentrated on the SACU countries due to the existence of a customs union and a common monetary area. Of South Africa’s exports to the Southern African region, which amounts to 19 percent of total exports, 13 percent go to other SACU member countries. Five out of 7 percent of South Africa’s imports from Southern Africa come from other SACU member countries (Van Schalkwyk 2003:23).

Among other Southern African countries, Tsie (1996:34) maintains that Lesotho is overwhelmingly dependent on South Africa for its export market. A significant proportion of Zimbabwe’s, and to some extent Malawi’s exports also finds markets in Southern Africa, mainly in South Africa. Otherwise, for the majority of the countries in Southern Africa, the OECD is the major export market. Asian export destinations are significant for Angola, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. The bulk of imports of SADC member countries originate in the OECD. For the DRC, Mauritius, Seychelles and Tanzania, Asian sources account for significant proportions of their imports, whilst for Angola and South Africa, NAFTA is a significant source of their imports.

According to Van Schalkwyk (2003:23) intra-regional trade in SADC is influenced by both the SADC Trade Protocol and bilateral trade agreements, which member countries negotiated prior to entry into force of the Trade Protocol. The Trade Protocol provides for the continuation of existing bilateral arrangements as long as they do not contradict the protocol. Intra-SADC trade was estimated at 24 percent, which means that the major share of trade is with the rest of the world.

5.4 Other factors that led to SADC restructuring
SADC (2002:61) states that other issues that it had to respond to or look at as a regional organization included good political and economic governance, entrenched in a culture of democracy, transparency and the respect for the rule of law as represented in the RISDP. There were several factors that facilitated the move towards restructuring in order to achieve deeper integration and poverty eradication.

SADC (2002:62) states the following as factors that were also behind the restructuring exercise:

- the intensifying spread of HIV and AIDS in the region;
- the need for gender mainstreaming and the empowerment of women;
- the need for rapid adoption and internalisation of Information Communication Technologies;
- the need for diversification of regional economies through, inter alia, industrial development and value addition;
- the need for trade liberalisation and development;
- the need for liberalisation in the movement of factors of production;
- the need for research, science and technology innovation, development and diffusion in the region;
- the need for the creation of an enabling institutional environment;
- the need for private sector development and involvement; and
- the need for the development of a balanced and socially equitable information and knowledge based society.

The above factors are interrelated and supportive of each other and none can meaningfully impact the integration and poverty eradication agenda if implemented in isolation.

According to SADC (2002:64) all were crucial for moving towards sustainable development and required careful sequencing and timing if they were to be effective as catalysts for deeper integration and poverty eradication after the
restructuring exercise. Other factors are highlighted below as listed by SADC:

(a) Population and Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
According to SADC (2003:56) in the year 2002, it had a combined population of approximately 210 million people with a total GDP of USD 226.1 billion. During the same year the GDP grew by about 3.2 per cent, which was above the population growth rate of approximately 2.1 per cent.

As shown in Figure four, the 2002 output in SADC was extremely uneven, reflecting mainly differences in resource endowment and economic size of the different member countries. South Africa is the largest economy in the region in terms of GDP.

Figure 4: SADC GDP 2002


The average regional GDP growth rate during the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s were significantly positive despite a slow start in 1990 to 1992. Strong signs of economic recovery in the region started showing in 1993 and gained momentum in 1996 with a SADC average GDP growth rate of 5 per cent. However, in the following years the growth pattern fluctuated
considerably from year to year and reached 3.2 in 2002 (see Figure five below).

Figure 5: Growth rates in SADC, 1999-2002

![Growth rates in SADC, 1999-2002](image)


According to SADC (2003:57) improvement in economic performance was largely attributed to positive political developments in the region as well as to the introduction of macroeconomic reforms in most member states, which occurred at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. However, economic performance on the whole remained fragile and most SADC countries continued to be exposed to natural disasters and adverse external shocks. This, according to SADC, was the situation that needed a lot of attention and improvement. The restructuring exercise was therefore aimed at addressing that.

(b) SADC Structure of Production

SADC (2003:57) further listed another factor that compelled the restructuring exercise, namely the fact that the structure of production of SADC countries was characteristic of a developing region where large shares of GDP originate in primary sectors of production such as agriculture and mining, whose total contribution was, on average, over 50 percent of the total GDP.

Statistics on SADC (2003:58) showed that only Mauritius and South Africa have sizeable manufacturing sectors at approximately 25 percent of GDP. The formerly sizeable manufacturing sector of Zimbabwe was not sustained due to several factors, including the influx of cheaper foreign goods, higher input costs and shortages of foreign exchange for importing inputs.
Zimbabwe instead, gradually became more reliant on services than before. The rest of the member countries have relatively small manufacturing sectors. They depend on services, agriculture or mining. In addition to having a small manufacturing sector, SADC maintained that its economies do not produce a diversified range of manufactured products. They produce a similar range of products such as foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, textiles, clothing and footwear, which are agricultural-resource based. South Africa and Zimbabwe have significant mineral-resource based manufacturing industries also, but vertical integration in the different structures of production is lacking (SADC 2003:57).

Manufactured goods contribute substantial proportions to the total formal merchandise exports in South Africa, Mauritius and Zimbabwe. Some of these countries’ export levels are higher than the 16 percent average ratio for Middle East and North Africa, but they were all below the world average ratio of 78 percent and the average ratios for all low and all high-income countries of 75 percent and 81 percent respectively in 1997 (SADC 2003:58).

In the mid 1990s, the average percentage of the labour force in industry in SADC was only slightly higher than 15 percent. The following countries had above average percentages: Mauritius, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. In the period 1991 to 1999, there was positive growth of manufacturing value added (MVA) in many SADC member countries. During this period, the un-weighted average rate of growth of MVA in the SADC was 5.2 percent. The un-weighted average rate of growth declined during the first five years of the decade as a few countries in the region experienced negative rates of growth of MVA (SADC 2003:58).

SADC (2002:49) admitted that the situation was no longer conducive for regional integration and that the whole restructuring exercise was aimed at dealing with these problems. It was hoped that, with better and improved SADC plans and institutional structures, these disappointing scenarios could be reversed.

(c) Per Capita Income

Another factor was SADC’s average level of per capita income, as measured by the Gross National Income (GNI), was said to be very low and has been
declining in most countries over the last three decades. In the year 2002, SADC average GNI per capita stood at USD 1,563. The Seychelles, a SADC country with approximately only 82,000 inhabitants, had the highest GNI per capita at US $6,530. Other high-income countries in the region included Mauritius (US $3,830), Botswana (US $3,100) and South Africa (US $2,820). The low per capita income countries in the SADC region, with income levels below USD $500, were the DRC (US $80), Malawi US $160), Mozambique (US $210), Tanzania (US $270), Zambia (US $320), and Zimbabwe (US $480) (SADC 2003:59).

According to Majaju (1997:89), if the region is to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the poverty level by 2015, GNI per capita must grow consistently over the next few years at rates of approximately 10 per cent. This is of particular relevance to the less developed countries in the region. GNI per capita growth should also be accompanied by appropriate policies of wealth distribution to achieve poverty reduction.

SADC (2003:59) maintained that the main contributing factors to the current level of per capita income included the distorted and underdeveloped structures of production, poor economic performance, problems in macro-economic management and unfavourable international economic environment.

(d) Inflation and Interest Rates
As compared to the 1980s, most SADC countries performed relatively well in stabilizing inflation rates, particularly since the early 1990s. In 2002 the average inflation rate in SADC was approximately 25 percent. Sound macroeconomic policies and inflation targeting pursued by most member countries were the underlying factors contributing to the lowering of inflation within the region. In analysing the overall SADC trend in inflation in the 1990s, it was important to observe that the average inflation rate was negatively influenced by high inflation rates experienced in those countries that were involved in prolonged political turmoil and/or civil wars and therefore, running essentially on war economies (SADC 2002:51).
Despite improvements in overall macroeconomic management, which impacted positively on inflation in the last decade as reflected in a significant decline in inflation rates, inflation remains one of the major challenges to national efforts for economic recovery and for regional cooperation and integration and poverty reduction. Interest rates remained high in all SADC member countries. There were wide variations between countries with single-digit inflation and interest rates mostly below 20 percent, and high inflation countries with interest rates ranging from about 40 percent to as high as over 100 per cent. One of the main reasons that accounted for high interest rates in the region was the tight monetary policy intended to reduce inflation. The restructuring exercise was aimed at dealing with this problem by eventually harmonising monetary policies within the region with the aim of creating deeper integration (SADC 2003:68).

(e) Savings and Investments

Savings and investments are central determinants of the rate and pattern of economic growth in SADC economies. By increasing domestic savings and using the resources in productive domestic investment, SADC economies
were expected to strengthen the region's prospects for accelerated economic growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development. Between 1980 and 2001 regional Gross National Savings (GNS) fell short of regional Gross Domestic Capital Formation (GDCF). In 2001 the average SADC GDCF was 16.75 percent of GDP against a regional GNS of 15.85 percent of GDP, leaving a resource gap of -0.9 percent. Among individual countries, there were wide disparities between saving and investment rates, with most countries recording negative resource balances (Van Schalkwyk 2003:11).

Van Schalkwyk (2003:16) states that as far as FDI is concerned, SADC as a Community, attracted on average only USD 691 million in the early 1990s, but FDI to the region quadrupled in the second half of the 1990s standing on average at USD 3061 million during 1995-98. This figure accounted for more than half (55 percent) of all FDI flows directed to the SSA region. Individual SADC countries appeared to have performed relatively well compared with other Sub-Saharan countries. Six SADC countries (South Africa, Angola, Zambia, Lesotho, Tanzania and Namibia) were among the top 10 recipients of FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa during the second half of the 1990s. As a result, Southern Africa emerged as a strong pole for attracting foreign investment to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). From 1995, more than 25 percent of FDI to the Sub-Saharan Africa region was directed to Southern Africa.

The outlook for investment in SADC would not be complete without bringing the cross-border regional dimension into the picture. South Africa, Mauritius and Zimbabwe are the main sources of cross-border investment into other SADC countries. Currently, intra-regional investments in the SADC-region are concentrated in the following sectors: mining, tourism, transport, finance, manufacturing, retail, telecommunications, agriculture and fisheries. The main avenues for FDI in SADC are privatisation and public-private provision of infrastructural services. Most countries are also attracting resource-seeking foreign investment flows. In general, efficiency and market-seeking investment flows remain proportionately small. This was identified as a problem in terms of integration by SADC, and the restructuring was aimed at dealing with it.
(f) Fiscal Balances
Despite efforts during 1990-2000 to bring negative fiscal balances to sustainable levels, most SADC countries continued to experience relatively high budget deficits. However, with only a few exceptions, all SADC member countries improved their fiscal positions during the 1990s. On average, budget deficits have been reduced in a significant number of SADC countries. The control of capital expenditures, tax reforms (including the improvement of tax collection and the broadening of the tax base) and privatisation of state-owned enterprises were said to have been the underlying reasons for these improvements. Further reductions in budget deficits have proved difficult to achieve, given SADC countries' commitment to eradicate poverty through increased public provision of health and education facilities and services (Van Schalkwyk (2003:19).

(g) Current Account Balance
According to SADC (2001:5), the overall annual average current account balance for the period 1990-2000 was negative 7.0 percent. However, an analysis of the underlying trends during this period revealed three categories of countries. The first category represented by Botswana, Namibia, and to a certain extent Mauritius, enjoyed rising current account surpluses throughout the period of analysis. The second category included South Africa, Swaziland, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe. According to SADC (2003) these countries experienced a modest level of current account deficits, which do not exceed, on average, 5 percent of GDP during the period of analysis. The third category of countries, with high and deteriorating current account deficits include Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.

The above situation had a negative reflection on the progress of regional integration in Southern Africa. Mostly, it had a negative reflection on the donors who began to see SADC as not working. Fears among the SADC leadership were that, if the situation persists or if nothing is done to the situation, COMESA could become a favourite destination of the international donors. In other words, the restructuring exercise was also aimed at dealing with this problem.

5.5 The restructured SADC: structures and objectives
The SADC Heads of State and Government convened an Extra-Ordinary Summit on 9 March 2001, in Windhoek, Namibia, at which they approved a Report on the Restructuring of SADC Institutions and which spells out the enhanced objectives and Common Agenda for SADC based on the objectives as outlined in Article 5 of the 1992 Windhoek Treaty.

Isaksen (2002:87) maintains that the report on the restructuring exercise articulates a more explicit Common Agenda, which takes into account a number of principles such as development orientation, subsidiary market integration and development, facilitation and promotion of trade and investment and variable geometry.

Based on the above principles, SADC’s Common Agenda is to include:

- the promotion of sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development that will ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective of its eradication;

- the promotion of common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate and effective; and

- consolidation and maintenance of democracy, peace and security.

In contrast to the country-based coordination of sectoral activities and programmes, SADC has adopted a more centralised approach through which the 21 Coordinating Units have been grouped into four clusters, namely Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment; Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources; Infrastructure and Services; and Social and Human Development and Special Programmes, instead of 21 sectors as it was previously.

### 5.5.1 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)

In line with the restructuring mandate and in order to provide strategic direction to the organization and to operationalise the SADC Common Agenda, the RISDP was established. The RISDP will be implemented in three phases over a 15-year period (SADC 2001:62).
According to SADC (2003:73) the RISDP reaffirmed the commitment of SADC member countries to good political, economic and corporate governance entrenched in a culture of democracy, full participation by civil society, transparency and respect for the rule of law. In this context, the African Union’s Nepad programme was embraced as a credible and relevant continental framework, and the RISDP as SADC’s regional expression and vehicle for achieving the ideals contained the rein. The RISDP emphasises that good political, economic and corporate governance are prerequisites for sustainable socio-economic development, and that SADC’s quest for poverty eradication and deeper levels of integration would not be realised if these were not in place.

The RISDP is said to be indicative in nature, merely outlining the necessary conditions that should be realised towards achieving these goals. In order to facilitate monitoring and the measurement of progress, it sets targets and time frames for goals in the various fields of cooperation. The purpose of the RISDP is to deepen regional integration in SADC. It provides SADC member countries with a consistent and comprehensive programme of long-term economic and social policies. It also provides the secretariat and other SADC institutions with a clear view of SADC’s approved economic and social policies and priorities (SADC 2002:7).

According to Isaksen and Tjønneland (2001:19) the RISDP is expected to deal with political crises in the region, thus fulfilling the mandate of the AU. Pressing issues involve the electoral and democratic issues in Zimbabwe in particular. The other big challenge the RISDP is expected to deal with is the involvement or the promotion of the civil society into government decision-making processes in the region. The Southern African region is regarded as performing badly when it comes to respect and consultation with civil groups. An exception is placed on South Africa, which seems to be a leading country together with Botswana when it comes to democracy in the region. Whether or not the RISDP will be successful remains to be seen.

5.6 New SADC structures and institutions

The new institutions that were added during the restructuring exercise that began in the late 1990s are mentioned below. It should be said that there is
not much to comment on in terms of these institutions with regard to the advantages and disadvantages, because they are still new, and nothing much has been seen or written about it as yet. Only time will tell whether they are functioning as they should or not. For the purpose of this study, only the description of these institutions will be mentioned and to a lesser extent, their
(a) Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM)

One of the institution that was added as the result of the restructuring exercise was the ICM that would ensure policy guidance, coordination and harmonisation of cross-sectoral activities. The ICM will comprise at least two Ministers from each member state.

(b) SADC National Committees

National Committees have been established in each SADC member country and their main function is to provide inputs at the national level in the formulation of regional policies, strategies, the SADC Programme of Action (SPA), as well as to coordinate and oversee the implementation of these programmes at the national level. Another major change as a result of the restructuring exercise is that the Heads of State and Government approved a radical restructuring of SADC institutions to 'squarely face the daunting regional and global challenges.' Following consultations over the past years at ministerial level, SADC proposed the restructuring and centralization of its functions, from 21 sectors based in 14 countries and dealing with a diverse range of development issue from health, environment and mining to trade, tourism and investment, to four clusters to be located at the SADC headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana. The Heads of State demanded that the SADC sectors be reduced into four Directorates or clusters, which are as follows: Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment; Infrastructure and Services; Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR); and Social and Human Development and Special Programmes. This was regarded as a major boost to SADC’s operational methods as it was felt that the organization had a lot of sectors, which caused the duplication of projects and as a result, wasted money. Some projects were regarded as having little regional value. The new set-up was said to eliminate these duplications (SADC 2002:43).

5.6.1 New SADC objectives

As compared to the Windhoek Treaty, SADC expanded its objectives but decreased the sectors from 21 to four clusters as mentioned. The objectives below are provided under Article 5 of the SADC Treaty:
• Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration.

• Evolve common political values, systems and institutions.

• Promote and defend peace and security.

• Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the inter-dependence of member countries.

• Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes.

• Promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the region.

• Achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment.

• Strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region.

To achieve its aim, SADC planned the following:

• Harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans of member countries.

• Mobilise the peoples of the region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop economic, social and cultural ties across the region, and to participate fully in the implementation of the programmes and projects of SADC.

• Create appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilisation of requisite resources for the implementation of programmes and operations of SADC and its institutions.

• Develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the peoples of the region generally among member countries.
• Promote the development of human resources.

• Promote the development, transfer and mastery of technology.

• Improve economic management and performance through regional cooperation.

• Promote the coordination and harmonisation of the international relations of member countries.

• Secure international understanding, cooperation and support, mobilise the inflow of public and private resources into the region.

• Develop such other activities as member countries may decide in furtherance of the objectives of SADC.

The signatories of the SADC Treaty agreed that under-development, exploitation, deprivation and backwardness in Southern Africa will only be overcome through economic cooperation and integration. The member countries also recognised that achieving regional economic integration in Southern Africa requires them to put their full support behind SADC to act on behalf of all Southern Africans for their common prosperity, peace and unity.

5.7 SADC justification of the 1999 restructuring exercise

The restructuring of SADC in 1999 can be traced back to the early 1990s when the membership increased from 10 to 14 members with the addition of South Africa in 1994, Mauritius in 1995, and the Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997. The increase required SADC to consider improved regional security and redefine its approach to regional security as was done with the increment of the European Union from 14 members to 25 members in 2004. As a result of the increment the SADC Programme of Action (SPA) was formulated. SPA covered cooperation in several economic and social sectors and implemented several infrastructure-related and other projects. SADC also developed protocols in a number of areas of co-operation, which provided the legal framework for co-operation among member countries (SADC 2000:54).
According to SADC (2000:55), the reason for restructuring in 1999 was due to constraints the organization was encountering within the secretariat which were basically administrative and regional. SADC stated the following reasons for the restructuring: (1) lack of institutional reforms for effective transformation from SADCC into SADC; (2) lack of synergy between the objectives of the Treaty on the one hand and the existing SPA and institutional framework on the other; and (3) lack of appropriate mechanisms capable of translating the high degree of political commitment into concrete programmes of community building and integration. The other point emphasised by SADC was that the decentralised system was costly and slow considering the fact that some members seldom paid their membership fees.

SADC further stated that the other element of complication in the restructuring exercise was that it was difficult within the decentralised system to distinguish which of the projects were those of SADC and which projects belonged to national governments. As a result donors would often negotiate with national governments for projects that undermined the SADC authority as a regional body. The approach further led member countries to compete and often create certain projects that in return had less regional interests. That led to a situation where the secretariat lost control of prioritising projects in terms of benefits in that member country’s interest to certain projects. SADC then felt that due to this situation, the decentralised system encouraged more inequality among members than integration per se (SADC 2001:5).

Due to the above factors or problems, Mr. Ajeo Bramdeo (Assistant Director, Department of Foreign Affairs Multilateral Desk SADC restructuring, interview 28 March 2001, Pretoria) explained that the objective of restructuring was to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its policies and programmes and to further implement a more coherent and better co-ordinated strategy to eliminate poverty in the region. In order to underline the restructuring of SADC institutions and provide a clear orientation for the policies and programmes of the organization (medium to long-term), the Extraordinary Summit also approved that the Secretariat prepare the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) which is guided by the vision of SADC.
Another element that was stated by Mr. Bramdeo (interview 28 March 2001, Pretoria) on the SADC restructuring exercise was that SADC wanted to bring the organization closer to the people and seek greater popular participation because the former SADCC was often accused of being an elitist organization functioning at the level of Heads of State. To correct this, SADC formulated Article 23 of the SADC Treaty, which states that the organization will seek to involve fully the peoples of the region and non-governmental organizations.

However, this is disputed by Tsie et al (1996:48) who state that, regarding the SADC article under discussion, with the exception of South Africa, the attitude of most governments towards the involvement of any non-governmental actors - NGOs, research organizations or academics - is generally hostile. Furthermore, trade unions were rare outside South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Mauritius. As a result, this cast doubts on whether the article would be viable in SADC after the restructuring.

Despite SADC’s attempts to adjust to the new context and to build on development in the region, the transformation from a political grouping to a bureaucracy aiming to integrate its member countries was still an ongoing process. SADC also envisaged that the loose structures did not facilitate enforcement of its Treaty. As a result, the findings of a major rationalisation study were presented in 1997. In the study, the conclusion was drawn that SADC should move from a project approach steered by cooperating partners, to the harmonisation of policies and procedures that will enhance integration. The main challenge for SADC was seen to be the effective achievement of the objectives set out in the Treaty. That demanded major restructuring (SADC 1999:34).

For SADC to address the above problems and other institutional problems, the Heads of State and Government approved the restructuring of SADC institutions at the Extraordinary Summit held in March 2001, in Windhoek. Under restructuring, the twenty-one sectors were grouped into clusters under four Directorates at the SADC Secretariat (to be discussed later). At the national level, SADC National Committees were to co-ordinate their respective
individual member states relating to SADC. At the regional level, an Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM) was created to co-ordinate the work of different clusters. The new structure also included the Troika system and the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security.

5.8 Summary

The restructuring exercise was never going to be an easy task. As in 1992, SADC had to restructure in terms of external as well as internal factors. Whether this initiative would eventually integrate the region to the desired level remains to be seen. However, the consideration to re-examine SADC structures and operations needs to be applauded considering the challenges mentioned in this chapter. SADC institutions and structures as designed in 1992 were based on the decentralised approach and would not have made the organization survive ultimately. Also, the goal of total integration would have remained a distant dream.

The Lusaka Declaration that preceded the Windhoek Treaty, which established the new organization (SADC) in 1992, contained a brief overview and analysis of the then new opportunities and demands raised by change in the region and in the external environment and attempted to harness those changes or to use those changes as a justification and motivation for closer cooperation and community building purposes. External driving forces that informed the change from SADCC into SADC were more economically oriented than the mainly political-security considerations that underlay the earlier establishment of SADCC. However, as chapter four pointed out, the change from Co-ordination to Community in 1992 was not enough to strengthen SADC as a regional organization aimed at integrating the region’s economy.

By the late 1990s, as was the case in the late 1980s during the SADCC tenure, factors such as economic globalization with its emphasis on economic liberalization, increased bloc formation and the globalization of finance and production, regional political crisis, debt crisis among member countries, the
restructuring of the EU and the inefficiency of the OPDS in dealing with security in the region, played major roles in the decision to transform the organization in 1999 into one that would, at least in theory, concentrate on regional economic integration, rather than regional cooperation for the sake of strengthening and protecting individual member countries.

This chapter addressed the factors and conditions which contributed to SADC members’ realisation that the organization established in 1992 was no longer equipped to deal with changes in the region as well as those external factors that impacted the region. The restructuring of SADC in 1999 is a prime example of the extent to which the Southern African region took cognizance of change at various levels and moved towards the adjustment to such change, using it in a positive way to promote and develop the well-being of the region. Towards the late 1990s, SADC member states also concluded that their efforts to achieve the objectives outlined in the Windhoek Treaty yielded limited results.

SADC did not achieve the reduction of economic dependence on international donors, nor did it achieve improved trade among member states. Although SADC aimed to promote solidarity, peace, security, human rights, democracy, rule of law, evolvement of common political values, systems, and institutions, it failed to deal with conflict in the region as war in the DRC remained unsolved. Instead the conflict seemed to be solved by South Africa as member not SADC as a regional body. SADC also seemed to fail to come up with policies that could deal with the situation in Zimbabwe and Swaziland. Secondly, SADC as an organization consisting of sovereign states experienced difficulties in implementing regional policies. The issue of surrendering sovereignty to supra-national organizations remained an obstacle in this regard as states continued to enhance their national interests and national policies at the expense of regional integration. Lastly, the organization continued to be compromised by competing development agendas of its member states. This aspect was elaborated on in the previous chapters. These competing agendas are, for example, evident in the economic indicators presented in the previous tables and economic
indicators in this chapter. Moreover, scholars such as those referred to in the literature review of this study are in agreement that regional economic, political and development integration is most likely to succeed when member states enjoy relatively equal levels of political and economic developments.

In applying regime theory it can be deduced that SADC, as in chapter three, by the mid-1990s was still adhering to the same principles as those it stood for in 1980 until 1992. These principles, as indicated, are contained in SADCC’s founding document, the Lusaka Declaration and the Windhoek Treaty. Similarly, the organizations’ norms remained the same, except for the fact that sectors increased and administrative institutions were added. However, as in the 1992 restructuring, some of the factors above indicated that the structure, rules and decision-making procedures of the organization by the late 1990s became inadequate to address the region’s challenges.

The restructuring of SADC in 1999 represented an increased emphasis on responding to international trends through mobilization of the region’s own resources, potential and capacity. Furthermore, the changed international political landscape at the end of the Cold War, globalization, and the demise of apartheid in South Africa, shifted international emphasis on traditional military political security to a concentration on a much broader definition of security that included economic, environmental and societal security. Economic growth and development within a distinctly neo-liberal economic paradigm became the new ideological driving force that governed decisions, also at regional level.

In brief it was not only the development in SADC external environments that necessitated the change in 1999 but also internal factors within the Southern African region, such as major changes that had taken place during the late 1990s which, in turn, changed the political face of the region and raised expectations of peace and security, and an opportunity for development. The underlying rationale for the establishment of SADCC had therefore fallen away and with the prospect of the region’s biggest and strongest economy joining its neighbours, the role and function of SADCC was revisited and a
new organization, taking the changed political nature of the region into consideration, was formed in the form of SADC. SADC was therefore not only a result of or response to changing international trends and demands, but also a response to a changed political climate within the region. It was clear that globalization, and in particular the neo-liberal economic paradigm that was spread through this process, had a great impact on the way in which the Southern African region perceived its own future in the 21st century.

In view of the region’s history and under circumstances of economic hardship and a host of problems ranging from internal political instability to food, health and environmental insecurity, looking past and cooperating beyond immediate national demands and needs, SADC was established in order to create an enabling environment that would allow for such ‘deep integration.’ On the other hand, an undeniable strength of the organization lay in its ability to learn from its experiences and to adjust and change. The restructuring of SADC from 1999 is the prime example of this advantage.
Chapter Six

Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

6.1 Introduction

The study on the analysis and appraisal of SADCC/C restructuring has provided an inside understanding of the factors underneath the restructuring processes. On both processes, namely, the 1992 and the 1997 restructuring, SADCC/C has shown that it mainly reacted to external factors as the main base of changing the operations of the organization. Regime theory in this study helped to identify four crucial research questions on restructuring of SADCC/C as a process. These include: why was SADCC formed? Why it restructured? How it restructured and what was the significant of the process? This study has managed to analyse and appraise factors behind SADCC/C restructuring.

This concluding chapter will provide a brief overview of the politics of the SADC restructuring as contained in this study and will highlight key points for future research. However, before this study can begin with an overall overview, it must be pointed out that, as indicated in chapter five, the restructuring of the OAU into the AU, and the introduction of the Nepad programme in the continent, had an impact on SADC. This is viewed as a possible restructuring SADC will adhere to in the future. In brief, this thesis foresees a possible restructuring with SADC as a result of the AU and Nepad. Since both programmes are at the continental level, SADC is expected to comply with their objectives. As noted in the previous chapters, regimes restructure to accommodate challenges as well as opportunities occurring within their areas. Therefore, it is expected of SADC to align its programmes with those of the AU and the Nepad programme.
This chapter will also discuss the impact of the mentioned programmes on SADC as the future possible restructuring in SADC as an organization. With these planned programmes at continental level, SADC as a sub-regional body, is expected to comply with them. Therefore, an analysis and appraisal of the AU and Nepad programmes and their relation to SADC will be covered as another foreseeable restructuring exercise within SADC in the near future. The discussion could also be viewed as a future research projects on SADC restructuring.

The main aim of this chapter, however, is to present concluding remarks based on the research questions raised in chapter one and discussed throughout. Finally, this chapter aims to present recommendations for future studies on this topic.

6.2 Concluding remarks and recommendations

In the introduction of this dissertation, this study emphasised the importance of regional organization and factors, which they are expected to deal with. The first chapter mainly introduced the problem of the study regarding the restructuring of SADCC/C. The research questions of this study were therefore summed up into four broad aspects in order to represent the problem of restructuring. A research question that was raised in chapter one was why regimes are formed? The second question was why regimes restructure? The third question was how regimes restructure? The last research question of the study was what is the significance of restructuring in SADCC/C?

The realist approach on regime formation in chapter two showed that power plays a crucial role as a threat to discipline weaker states and it forces weaker states to seek co-ordination. Chapter two in this study indicated that SADCC emerged as a direct response to both the adverse position of African states in the international economy and the dangerous external environment, which the South African apartheid government posed. In seeking to restructure the
historical patterns of asymmetrical economic relations with South Africa, the member states hoped to create and legitimize an alternative regional economic order which reflected an ideology of liberation. Previous political and diplomatic cooperation within the FLS provided the foundation for an organization which would seek the coordination and harmonization of national policies to achieve economic autonomy.

Realist theories on regime formation also argued in chapter two that the reason why states choose to form or observe a regime is because they realise that they are operating in a co-ordination and confronted with same challenges. The risk of not co-ordinating moves them into less advantageous terms. With that in mind, states therefore form regimes consisting of rules, norms, principles and decision-making processes to help them deal with problems and thus create opportunities for their regions or areas. This was apparent in chapter two when analysing the SADCC 1980 structure. The structure was designed to co-ordinate developmental projects rather than regional integration in the form of a borderless region as in the case of the EU.

Chapter three addressed why SADCC restructured in 1992. This was the second research question of the study raised in chapter one. The question was addressed by discussing factors and conditions which contributed to SADCC members' realisation that the organization established in 1980 was no longer equipped to deal with changes in the region as well as those external factors that impacted the region. The restructuring of SADCC into SADC through the 1992 Windhoek Treaty was a prime example of the extent to which the Southern African region took cognizance of change at various levels and moved towards an adjustment to such change, using it in a positive way to promote and develop the well-being of the region. Towards the 1990s, SADCC member states also concluded that their efforts to achieve the objectives outlined in the Lusaka Declaration yielded limited results. What follows is an appraisal of the development objectives of SADCC as outlined in the Lusaka Declaration (SADCC 1980:1).
Chapter three raised several factors as reasons behind the restructuring of SADCC to SADC in 1992. The first factor was the failure of SADCC to reduce economic dependence on South Africa and other actors. Secondly, the stated objective of forging links to create equitably regional integration also yielded limited results. This objective was, amongst others, hindered by the duplication of regional organizations, which aimed to achieve regional integration. Thirdly, SADCC as an organization, consisting of sovereign states, experienced difficulties in implementing regional policies. The issue of surrendering sovereignty to a supra-national organization remained an obstacle in this regard as states continued to enhance their national interest and national policies at the expense of regional integration. Fourthly, the stated objective of “concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of a strategy for economic liberation” also produced mixed results. The organization’s efforts to secure cooperation manifested, contradictorily, in greater dependence on stronger economic actors, such as South Africa and the international donor community. Furthermore, the objectives to achieve economic liberation were compromised due to increased dependence on these actors. Lastly, competing development agendas of its member states also compromised the organization. This aspect will be elaborated on in the summary of subsequent chapters. These competing agendas, for example, were evident in the economic indicators presented in the tables in this chapter. Moreover, scholars such as those referred to in the literature review of this study were in agreement that regional economic, political and development integration is most likely to succeeded when member states enjoy relatively equal levels of political and economic developments.

Chapter four discussed how SADC restructured. The main theoretical base of the discussion on how it restructured was influence by Young’s (1982) perspective on regime change or transformation. Young emphasised that one of the reasons regimes change or transform is because of pressures that are experienced by the regime because of its members or because of other pressures that the regime found itself faced with. Young (1982) further maintained that when regimes are faced with such a challenge, alterations in
their structures such as principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures are inevitable or could be expected. Chapter four pointed out that the emphasis on the creation of SADC structure in 1992 was more on economic integration as opposed to economic co-ordination as was the case with SADCC.

The structural analysis in chapter four revealed that SADC was created in 1992 with the twin goals of achieving economic development and political stability through regional trade liberalization and political and economic integration. SADC member states also expected to use the institution as a way of reducing their vulnerability to external financial shocks induced by fluctuations, political instability and uncertainty in the rest of the world. The SADC Treaty of 1992 called on its member states to promote peace and security, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the peace settlement of disputes. However, the Treaty gave prominence to SADC’s ministers of economic planning and finance in constituting its Council of Ministers, thus giving less priority to issues of politics, defence and security. In an effort to rectify the situation, the 1996 SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government met in Gaborone and launched the OPDS, which operated at Summit, Ministerial technical levels, independently of other SADC structures.

Chapter five, like chapter three, addressed factors and conditions which contributed to SADC members’ realisation that the organization established in 1992 was no longer equipped to deal with changes in the region as well as those external factors that impacted in the region. The restructuring of SADC from 1999 was presented as a prime example of the extent to which the Southern African region took cognizance of change at various levels and moved towards the adjustment to such change, using it in a positive way to promote and develop the well-being of the region. Towards the late1990s, SADC member states also concluded that their efforts to achieve the objectives outlined in the Windhoek Treaty yielded limited results.

The reason behind the restructuring in 1999 as described in chapter five were said to be because SADC did not achieve the reduction of economic
dependence on international donors, nor did it achieve improved trade among members states. Although SADC aimed to promote solidarity, peace, security, human rights, democracy, rule of law, evolvement of common political values, systems and institutions, it failed to deal with conflict in the region as war in the DRC remained unsolved. Instead the conflict seemed to be solved by South Africa as member rather than by SADC as a regional body.

SADC also seemed to fail to come up with policies that could deal with the situation in Zimbabwe and Swaziland. Secondly, SADC as an organization consisting of sovereign states, as mentioned before, experienced difficulties in implementing its own policies. The issue of surrendering sovereignty to supra-national body remained an obstacle in this regard as states continued to enhance their national interests and national policies at the expense of regional integration. Lastly, the organization continued to be compromised by competing development agendas of its member states. This aspect was elaborated on in the previous chapters. These competing agendas are, for example, evident in the economic indicators presented in the previous tables and economic indicators in this chapter. Moreover, scholars such as those referred to in the literature review of this study are in agreement that regional economic, political and development integration is most likely to succeeded when member states enjoy relatively equal levels of political and economic developments.

In chapter one, regime theory was referred to as a perspective in International Relations that focuses on cooperation among actors, states or countries in a given area, and as a set of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and procedures around which countries’ expectations converge in a particular area. Little (2001:303) maintained that regimes consist of four defining elements, which are: principles; norms; rules; and decision-making processes. Firstly, Krasner referred to principles as represented by coherent bodies of theoretical statements about the international order. Secondly, he referred to norms, which specify the general standards of behaviour, as well as identifying the rights and obligations of states. These norms and principles form the
foundation of the character of a regime and can only be changed by transforming the nature of the regime. Thirdly, the defining element of a regime in the study was identified as rules it operates according to. These rules are mainly designed to resolve conflicts, which may arise among members and their interpretation of principles and norms. Lastly, a decision-making procedure underlies a regime. These procedures identify specific prescriptions for behaviour, the system of voting and for implementing these decisions.

Regime theory in this study successfully analysed and appraised factors behind the restructuring of SADCC/C since its formation in 1980. Regime theory made it easy to identify SADCC/C as organization which is subject to survive depending on whether member countries adhere to their set rules, principles, norms, and decision-making processes. Regime theory has helped to identify the fact that failure by member countries to observe their own rules in this case SADCC/C Treaties as well as other protocols could lead a regime to failure or restructuring.

Regional integration is about much more than can be captured in economic models or bilateral trade statistics. Regionalism is a matter of economics only, but of politics, security concerns and intangibles such as perceptions. The experiences in Latin America and in the EU in this study showed that while it is imperative that regions offer conditions of democratic stability along with sustained macro-economic reform, little is achieved without concerted political leadership, vision and international persona. SADC so far is moving towards this direction, but it remains ahead as compared to other regional blocs in the continent.

As pointed out in the introduction, this study foresees possible restructuring due to the transformation of the OAU into AU and the drafting of the Nepad programme. Below, these factors are discussed as possible research fields on SADC restructuring.

6.3 The transformation of the OAU into the AU
In chapter one of this study, Stoker (1995:54) was quoted as stating that regime theory holds substantial promise for understanding a variety of responses to regional organizations changing or restructuring. It emphasises the interdependence of regional and non-regional forces in meeting economic, political and social challenges within a geo-regional area of regional organizations. In this case, continental developments cannot be ruled out as a major influence on SADC principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures.

When the OAU was established in 1963, there were fewer international and regional organizations in the continent. Their mandates and tasks were much more limited. In the intervening years, matters changed substantially. Within Africa, a range of sub-regional organizations had developed in response to specific challenges. These include SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and more. In addition, international organizations, especially the UN, have taken on larger and more complex mandates. During the birth of the AU one of the major challenges was how to relate to these other organizations.

After the transformation in 2001 there were immediate issues regarding linkages between the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). For historical reasons, there was no structural relationship between the OAU and the RECs. This was regarded as problematic given the peace and security mandate of the OAU, alongside the fact that the principal responsibilities for enforcing peace and security have been assumed by the RECs. According to Short (Deputy Director in the Multi-lateral desk at the Department of Foreign Affairs, South African government, interview 23 March 2002, Pretoria) an immediate question before and after the transformation was regarding the kind of interface required between the AU and the RECs such as SADC and others in the continent, or whether there should be several structures specific to the functions of RECs (for example one for peace and security, one for economic integration, and more) or was one single interface required?

According Short, deputy director in the Department of Foreign Affairs South Africa (interview 23 March 2002, Pretoria) another issue that SADC had to
consider was the AU’s objectives, which were the long-term issues of integration or cooperation between the AU and RECs. A longer term, strategic question was, does the AU propose to integrate RECs into its structure or to cooperate with them or would the RECs continue to exist as autonomous entities as the AU was established. Or was it envisaged that over time they would gradually be absorbed into the AU?

Short (interview 23 March 2002, Pretoria) continued that the other question was if the ‘integration’ or absorption scenario was followed, how would it have occurred? Furthermore if the ‘cooperation’ scenario was followed, which was the most realistic given the relative capacities of the organizations as they existed, mechanisms would have been required to promote and monitor consistency between RECs’ policies and their compatibility with the long-term aim of regional convergence. The stated scenario became a serious factor in which REC’s operations and existence into the new AU was to be looked and acted upon. This means that in the near future regional organizations like SADC have to align themselves to the proposed structures of the AU as emphasized above.

AU Constitutive Act (2000:3) states that another AU task is to promote good governance, democracy and human rights. Democratic decision-making within the AU is seen as a complex task and some clarifications of the principles are said to be required before structures are established and mandates are given. Just like in the European Union, theoretically, it operates on the principle of ‘subsidiarity’, whereby decision-making powers are delegated to the most devolved competent authority. But the tendency of disgruntled parties to appeal against lower-level decisions, leads to an upward drift in authority. Where roles are not clear, mandate disputes between different bodies can lead to paralysis of the decision-making machinery. Eventually, the SADC Organ will have to look at and adjust this issue.

Short (interview 23 March 2002, Pretoria) further maintained that in the African context, prior to the establishment of the AU, the challenges were likely to arise in the area of liaison between the African Parliament and
national and sub regional parliaments, such as the established East African Parliament. Another set of challenges rose in the field of the rule of law, and the extent to which regional instruments such as the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights are justifiable through regional mechanisms. In these respects it was important that the AU promotes existing regional organizations. The Zimbabwean land situation serves as an example for SADC’s attention through the AU structures or protocols on conflict resolution.

Masemola (2002:6) acknowledged that the transformation of the OAU into the AU played and will continue to play a huge role in transforming sub-regional organizations in the continent. As per AU Constitutive Act, sub-regional organizations were expected to reflect almost the same as institutions that were carried by the AU as a continental body. Due to the transformation at the continental level, by 1999, SADC began to restructure its institutional framework to comply with AU requirements. SADC began to introduce organs or structures that can be compared to the AU in its restructuring plan, like the Tribunal, the Council, the Integrated Committee of Ministers (IMC) and the SADC Parliamentary Forum (like the Pan African Parliament [PAP] in the AU). Basically, it can be said that changes that were taking place in the OAU-AU transformation had a bearing on the SADC outlook in terms of organizational structure and regional mandate. It is expected that once the AU is in full operation other changes are to be expected in the RECs, most importantly in SADC as a pilot project.

6.4 The drafting of the Nepad programme

The creation of Nepad in the continent by African leaders contributed to the SADC restructuring exercise. The linkage between Nepad and the SADC RISDP was adopted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance at their meeting in Blantyre on 13 September 2001, which came to the conclusion that, in terms of relationships, SADC is part of and feeds Nepad as the latter is premised on the RECs.

According to SADC (2001:3) the ministers recognized that Nepad is regarded as a major economic framework and process within the Union, in that SADC is
a recognized REC of the Union. It was therefore important to SADC that it aligned itself to the mandates as spelled out in the AU Constitutive Act. It was decided that the development of the RISDP and the SADC restructuring process should take Nepad into account, and where appropriate, the SADC and Nepad programmes should be harmonized. SADC should also take Nepad into account in the ongoing review of SADC programmes.

The mandate for the Nepad had its genesis at the OAU Extraordinary Summit held in Sirte, Libya during September 1999. The Summit mandated President Mbeki of South Africa and President Bouteflika of Algeria to engage Africa’s creditors on the total cancellation of Africa’s external debt. After the South Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77, held in Havana, Cuba during April 2000, President Mbeki of South Africa and President Obasanjo of Nigeria were mandated to convey the concerns of the South to the G-8 and the Bretton Woods institutions IMF and the World Bank.

The adoption of Nepad was considered as one of the most important developments of recent times for its conception of a development programme placing Africa at the apex of the global agenda by:

- creating an instrument for advancing a people-centred sustainable development in Africa based on democratic values;
- being premised on recognition that Africa has an abundance of natural resources and people who have the capacity to be agents for change and so holds the key to her own development; and
- providing the common African platform from which to engage the rest of the international community in a dynamic partnership that holds real prospects for creating a better life for all.

According to Nepad (2001:23) its primary objective is to eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development so as to halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalization process. At the core of the Nepad process is the African ownership, which must be retained and strongly promoted, so as to meet the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples. While the principle of
partnership with the rest of the world is equally vital to this process, such partnership is expected to be based on mutual respect, dignity, shared responsibility and mutual accountability. The expected outcomes are:

- economic growth and development and increased employment;
- reduction in poverty and inequality;
- diversification of productive activities;
- enhanced international competitiveness and increased exports and increased African integration.

According to Brammer (interview 23 March 2002, Pretoria) the founding of Nepad in the continent and the fact that the programme was to be implemented through regional organizations meant that SADC had to comply with its objectives and reflect types of institutions in which the programme could be easily implemented. Brammer further emphasised that the impact of Nepad had a lot of implications for the restructuring exercise. One of the reasons was that since the programme was mainly initiated by South Africa, the Southern African region through SADC was regarded as an example of the programme. Therefore, it made more sense to propose that SADC be one of the regional bodies to restructure and fall in with the Nepad vision of eradicating poverty throughout the continent by using the RECs as main building blocs and by contributing to the AU’s success.

Brammer (interview 23 March 2002, Pretoria) further maintained that the introduction of Nepad meant that SADC had to look at issues such as governance, human rights issues, democracy, economic trade with the continent and among regional members, the inclusion of civil society and Non-Governmental groups into government decision making processes, for example. This basically boiled down to the fact that SADC had to construct institutions that would deal with the issues that were ignored in the past.

6.5 Future areas of research
This study is not, and has not attempted to be the last word on the SADC restructuring or regional integration in Southern Africa. Rather, its focus has been on the factors that led SADC to restructure in 1992 and in 1999. Moreover, the issue of the SADC restructuring was approached through the theory of regimes as described by Young (1987). As such, there are areas of research in this dynamic field that are relatively unexplored and deserve the attention of the serious student or scholar. The most important of these include:

After assessing the existing literature, this study identified gaps in chapter one that it believes need attention from a research point of view. These included the following: most literature on regional integration in southern Africa has been on economic integration and how regional economic can be shaped to be in line with the EU. Other gaps included the fact that most literature focussed on the evolution of the concept security in southern Africa and how SADC should operationalise the concept in its projects. The work that focussed on SADC restructuring, however, failed to look at external factors that propelled the process. The study on the restructuring of SADC mainly answered four questions as mentioned in chapter one and in this chapter. For future research the following questions need attention:

- How do international trends such as globalization affect or shape structures and operations of regional organizations in this case SADC?
- What factors might be involved in understanding the dynamics, focus, and structure of different types of regional organization especially in southern Africa?
- Why might regional and sub-regional co-operation appear particularly significant for southern African countries?
- What might constitute the key challenges facing SADC and its member countries in the future?

This aimed at discussing political factors that contributed to SADCC/C restructuring. In both processes (1992 and 1999) these factors were successfully identified. However, it also appeared that most factors that propelled the restructuring exercise had economic and social symptoms.
Despite this, the study managed to explain that the restructuring exercises in SADCC/C were not as a result of the organization failing to deliver, but as a complex process that consisted of many factors.

6.6 The way forward for Southern African integration

With the above lessons learned through conducting research in this study, one could suggest two types of economic integration, which have been tried with varying degrees of success to be applied in the African context. One is a monetary union, which involves the coordination of macro-economic policies by regional economic blocs. This would ensure fiscal consistency in external payments and harmonize the exchange rate policies of the member states. The only impediment to it is the one of sovereignty as raised earlier. However, it is valuable because it stimulates the free movement of people, capital goods and services. This aspects needs to be considered further in the restructuring of SADC.

The other approach paramount to integration is one of creating a common market. This stimulates economic cooperation among states that want to maintain their sovereignty. The focus here is on the removal of tariff walls. Often, common markets are expected to lead to a monetary union and this is also the key roadblock to its acceptance. In SADC in particular there has been a slow move towards this direction. However, the problem that still remains is the question of sovereignty.

In the African context a major source of difficulty in terms of integration has been the size of both the population and economies of scale and the size of markets. One way of mitigating the effect of this problem is economic growth coupled with the diversification of exports that can improve the ability of small economies to lobby for the improvement of price regimes for primary products and by attracting foreign direct investment. Another strategy should be promoting and expanding trade, movement of capital, people, goods and
services. This is bound to assist the member states as benefit to all and will be more so if they can pool their resources together.

Collective efforts should also be made to improve the precondition for enhanced integration through joint efforts aimed at improving roads, telecommunication and large industries, which are unaffordable for the small states. Coupled with this, measures should be taken to remove tariff walls and encourage the division of labour, stimulate specialization in production and spur economies of scale. Equally crucial is improving the economic and political environment for technological innovation and development by providing incentives. Other measures include encouraging people to produce enough food through appropriate policy measures.

Another important factor is conflict resolution and the improvement of relations among people by capitalizing on cultural, educational and scientific cooperation. This in turn will reduce tension and assist efforts focused on confidence building measures. It will also absorb political tensions and improve the environment of dialogue and dispute settlement. It is also important to create awareness of the value of supra-national political organizations as a way of removing the fear of loss of sovereignty over macro-economic policies to a Monetary Union or a Common Market.

One effect of this is that expectations of unequal distribution of benefits and losses will subside. However, special attention should also be paid to the comparative advantage of the weaker states via specialization. An important measure is for continental organizations to provide active support and stimulation to small sub-regional economic blocs. They should show the complementary nature of the small blocs so that they support each another. Further, they play the role of harmonization and strategic linkage among small blocs so that they can coordinate their action when their common interests are at stake.

The efforts being made by the OAU in the context of the discussions on the future of LOMÉ (EU-ACP) is one exemplary illustration of how big
organizations like the OAU should conduct itself. The small economic blocs in turn, such as SADC should create mechanisms for preventing conflicts and promoting a culture of tolerance. One reason for this is that integration is best developed in a climate of trust and confidence among nations and their populations. One way of stimulating this ambiance of harmony is capitalizing on commonalties and promoting equality in diversity. Enlightened leadership is bound to lead the way in such efforts.

According to Axelrod (1984:78) and Gauher (1985:34) another way of encouraging integration is learning from the experience of other regions, which have achieved a measure of success. Europe has, for instance, rose from the ashes of a very destructive world war and achieved a common market and is now striving towards achieving monetary union at the end of this millennium. There are other less advanced success stories in North America and Asia that emulate this one. One should though, be fully cognisant and fully appreciative of inter- and intra-state economic collaborations as a way of mitigating political conflicts and reducing external interference because of the solid front which small nations present under a common cause and banner. Further it is important to:

- Promote joint and integrated planning.
- Map out policies on shared trans-boundary resources like international rivers, lakes, grazing areas,
- Develop common strategies of combating drought, natural and man-made mishaps, crime, and more.
- Jointly develop a common approach to combat environmental degradation and promote sustainable environmental development programs in the region.
- Strengthen bilateral links, which in turn provide a basis for multi-lateral cooperation.
- Make short-term compromises in the interest of long-term goals and benefits.
• Make provision for common security arrangements as a way of warding off external aggression and domestic strife.

• Ensure that the initial contributions to the benefits of economic blocs are equitably distributed to guarantee the continued interest of member states in the bloc.

• Harmonize relations among economic blocs by introducing division of activities and niches of specialization.

• To minimize duplication of activities and undesirable competition.

• Develop conflict prevention mechanisms through a sub-regional agenda of education and edification and mediate actively in conflict situations.

• Introduce a sub-regional food security strategy.

• Create a compensatory mechanism to ward off fluctuations caused by price instability.

• Stimulate the free movement of people, goods and services as appropriate.

The issue of restructuring in SADC has been one of the most difficult exercises ever taken on by the organization. In both instances, thus 1992 and in 1999, the organization was caught reacting more to external pressures than being proactive in setting trends initiated by the organization itself for the development of the region. Compared to the European Union, the restructuring exercises were initiated more as a proactive move towards integration rather than reactive measures in attaining regional security, as is the case with SADC.

The above is influenced by two major challenges identified by the SADCC in the 1980s, which were a threat of marginalisation at the international level and a transformation of regional relations in the shape of post-apartheid South Africa. As a result of that SADCC undertook a major change in direction in 1992. The then newly formed SADC began working on its explicit goal of
economic integration in the region. Regional economic integration was, at that stage, the perceived solution to the problems that plagued the organization since its inception in 1980 as it moved into the second decade. However, by the mid-1990s SADC was still confronted by the same challenges, that of economic dependency on Western countries. To make matters worse, SADC found itself confronted with more challenges than before, such as globalization, which poses a major threat to the organization survival in the global economy.

The restructuring of SADC institutions and operations will however not change the long-standing pattern of dependency and South African domination in the region. For this to occur, an active policy of restructuring is required. This will require a total commitment by member countries to democracy and compromise on sovereignty to allow the secretariat to implement policies. Furthermore, member states’ commitment and loyalty will be required in terms of membership payment and their total dedication to one regional body so as to avoid the duplication of membership with other regional organizations such as SACU, COMESA and others. That would bring about a sort of loyalty and sense of direction and urgency to the organization, thus avoiding a situation whereby member states can play regional organizations against each other in the region.

If SADC is to avoid future marginalisation, it has to counter the challenges presented in this study. This means that SADC has to have an early warning mechanism whereby such threats can be identified in time and be countered before they can pose a threat to the organization as experienced previously. This will require more political will from regional members than what SADC had in the past.

Despite all the pitfalls, SADC remains better regional organizations in Africa compared to ECOWAS, EAC and others as far as cooperation is concerned. This is one reason that the AU decided to use SADC as pilot project in integrating the continent. The AU in determining the relationship between the continental organization and the RECs will also use SADC. This is well
demonstrated by the confidence shown by the AU and the New Partnership for the Development of Africa in regarding SADC as one of their building blocs towards the total unification of the continent. The decrease of brutal conflicts in the region, as compared to East Africa and West Africa, is also a sign that the region is heading in the right direction, but it is important to note that a lot remains to be done in order to integrate the region.

At the time of completion of this study (August 2005), SADC member countries celebrated 25 years of the organization since it was founded in 1980. SADC leaders recognized the important contributions the organization made with regard to regional integration at political, economic, and social level. Although not all of the objectives outlined in the Windhoek Treaty were achieved in the past 25 years, some successes are noticeable such as:

- Since 1980, SADC countries have signed more than 23 protocols in areas such as energy; corruption; health; trade; extradition; education and training; fisheries; mining; politics, defence and security cooperation; tourism; forestry; mutual legal in criminal matters; and others.
- SADC has also signed declarations on gender and development; information and communications; productivity; and HIV/AIDS.
- In this period, SADC countries drafted a charter with regard to Regional Tourism Organization of Southern Africa. And also signed a charter on fundamental social rights within SADC region.
- Lastly, SADC thus far has signed Memorandums of Understanding on macroeconomic convergence, and also in taxation and related matters.

As indicated above, over the past 25 years, SADC members continued to institutionalise principles, norms, rules, and decision-making processes. Furthermore, SADC as a regional organization or as an institutionalised regime will continue to restructure in response to regional and global changes and challenges. Integration is, after all, a process not a single event.
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