

**POLITICAL UNIFICATION BEFORE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF KWAME NKRUMAH'S ARGUMENTS ON
THE UNITED STATES OF AFRICA**

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DECLARATION

I, Selamawit Tadesse Gudeta, declare that the dissertation entitled **Political unification before economic integration: A critical analysis of Kwame Nkrumah's arguments on the United States of Africa** is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

Signature

Date

ABSTRACT

Kwame Nkrumah was the first African leader to pursue the idea of Africa's continent-wide unity with fervour. Many thought that African unity will only be the pooling of poverty and that Nkrumah's dream was impossible. Nkrumah was known for his philosophy "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto it". He thought that political unity should precede economic unity, which would naturally follow. Even though the newly independent African states agreed on the necessity of unity, his philosophy was not welcomed when the Organisation of African Unity was established in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in 1963. Rather, delegates opted for incremental political integration leading to economic integration –an aspiration that Africa is still struggling to bring to fruition. This study demonstrates that Nkrumah's idea of political unity before economic integration was and still is valid for Africa's continent-wide unity. To this end, the study will use textual sources and use diachronic and integrative approaches as analytical tools.

Key terms: African unity, Nkrumah, political unity, colonialism, neo-colonialism, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Agenda 2063, sovereignty, Pan-Africanism, Casablanca and Monrovia groups, Africanness

DEDICATION

To my father, Tadesse Gudeta.
Had you been alive today, you would have been so proud of me.

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First, I thank the Almighty God who has given me everything I ever needed, including the time, perseverance and intellect to see this study through. I will always be thankful to Him for carrying me through when everything seemed bleak and futile.

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Genny. I'm done!!! You can look at me proudly now.

ACRONYMS

AEC	African Economic Community
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
GDP	gross domestic product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
RECs	regional economic communities
SADC	Southern African Development Community
TDCA	Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Kwame Nkrumah is widely known for his saying "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto it" (Nkrumah 1979d:4). He wanted the entire African continent to be free of colonial and neo-colonial bondage and to come together under the umbrella of a United States of Africa, with political unity preceding other kinds of unity. He wanted all the broken-up, arbitrarily divided, small and "unviable" new states to become one and be a force to be reckoned with. In his book *Africa Must Unite*, he argued that there would be no meaning to the national independence of Ghana unless it was linked with the African continent's total liberation from colonialism (Nkrumah 1963b:136). To this end, Nkrumah provided political and material support (in the form of funds, arms, etcetera) to many political organisations engaged in the struggle to free their countries from colonialism. The political and material support thus rendered were grounded in his political philosophy arguing for the establishment of the United States of Africa. He envisioned that through this union of African states, the gains of African independence could be secured and made beneficial to Africa in the context of global international relations.

Nkrumah's argument rested on four interrelated pillars:

- (1) Pan-Africanism
- (2) neo-colonialism (This is an important pillar because if independent African states permit their former colonial masters to retain economic power over them and control their economies, the goal of African unity cannot be achieved. Africa's economic independence is what makes its political independence meaningful.)
- (3) full or partial surrender of state sovereignty
- (4) the federation of the United States of Africa

For Nkrumah, Pan-Africanism meant that the peoples of Africa were historically one in terms of their cultural oneness and commonly shared experience of colonialism. This experience was tainted by situational differences and the specific orientation of the different colonisers. He included those living in the Diaspora, whose ancestors were rooted in Africa but were forced from the continent during the period of the slave trade. Pan-Africanism is thus characterised by recognition of the oneness of the African peoples. From this arises the need to act in solidarity in order to affirm the African peoples and their right to determine their own destiny.

The commonly shared experience of colonialism formed the basis of Nkrumah's argument against the new form of colonialism (namely, neo-colonialism) bequeathed to the independent African states by the former coloniser. The core idea and practice of neo-colonialism are that independent African states are reduced to the status of clients and servants of the former colonial powers. It uses the African state, through its leaders, as a means to protect and promote the economic benefits acquired during colonisation. Neo-colonialism prevents and obstructs the promotion of the well-being of the citizens of the neo-colonial state. In order to counter this, Nkrumah argued for African unity culminating in the construction of the United States of Africa. To this end, he and other African leaders established the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 –which was disbanded and replaced by the African Union (AU) in 2002.

Nkrumah's central argument regarding the construction of the United States of Africa was that the political unification of Africa had to precede economic integration and co-operation. An indispensable demand for the political unification of Africa was, according to Nkrumah, that the independent states of Africa had to be prepared to cede their sovereignty in full or in part. Hence, independent Ghana under Nkrumah made constitutional provision for the cession of its sovereignty as and when required for the construction of the United States of Africa. Since then, sovereignty remains one of the core underlying issues in the quest for African unity.

The purpose of this research is to give an exposition and critical analysis of Pan-Africanism, neo-colonialism, and the full or partial cession of sovereignty in light of Nkrumah's argument that the political unification of Africa had to precede economic integration and co-operation in the construction of the United States of Africa. The validity of Nkrumah's argument for the unification of the African continent on the basis of political unity is examined and this call is critically analysed. In other words, the study concerns whether the continent is on the right track to unity and development and the betterment of its peoples, or whether it has fallen in the quagmire of neo-colonialist relations against which Nkrumah warned.

Africa has seen many initiatives aimed at bettering the lives of the masses. Among these were the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and now the AU's Agenda 2063. In this study, I examine in detail what these initiatives were meant to achieve, what have been achieved, and whether or not the goals are or were achievable and beneficial to the masses of African peoples. I also examine if these initiatives have succeeded and have contributed to bringing Africa closer to continent-wide unity.

AIMS OF THE STUDY

The aim of this study is to critically examine the contending arguments on the appropriate means to adopt for the formation of the United States of Africa. The Casablanca and the Monrovia groups (see Section 1.8 of this chapter for an explanation of these groups) represented the contending arguments. This research is an investigation into the evolution of these arguments from the 1960s to the present day. The following are covered:

- a brief exposition of Pan-Africanism as understood by Nkrumah and the criticisms brought against it by scholars and statespersons
- a critical analysis of the concept of sovereignty in order to show why and how it can work as either a promoter or an inhibitor of African unity as envisaged by Nkrumah

- the identification of some legal institutional issues hindering the advancement of economic integration and co-operation in Africa

PROBLEM STATEMENT

This study is aimed at analysing the reasons behind Nkrumah's assertion that the political unification of Africa should precede economic integration and co-operation, as well as its relevance to the resolution of problems/challenges faced by the AU and its predecessor(the OAU) in the attainment of African unity.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Nkrumah's argument for the necessity of African unity is contained in his book *Africa Must Unite* and most of his speeches. This study focuses on the ideas of Nkrumah and his critics with regard to the necessity for African unity. Of the many African scholars, statespersons and politicians who wrote about this subject, Nkrumah can be regarded as a foremost thinker (Mutiso & Rohio 1975). His influence is also present in contemporary debates on African unity (Mazrui 2004:3). It is for this reason that he was chosen as the focal point of this study. Below are some reviews on Nkrumah's arguments and those of his critics.

The quest for African unity gained momentum since Ghana's independence. This ultimately resulted in the establishment of the OAU in 1963. When the OAU became the AU in 2002, African unity was again identified as one of its basic aims. The African diaspora was included as the Sixth Region of the AU, thereby expanding the continental meaning of African unity (*New African* 2012c:20). African unity is the living issue of contemporary African politics (*New African* 2012d:35).

In the 1960s, the issue of African unity revolved around two contending positions held by the Casablanca group and the Monrovia group respectively. Nkrumah was the leader of the Casablanca group and its members were described as progressive states (Boateng

2003:105 -106; Nkrumah 1963b:141). The group argued for political unification first as the means to attain African unity. Nkrumah argued the same with regard to the political independence of Ghana. His idea that the political kingdom must come first is well-known in African politics. He transferred this argument to the question for African unity. His argument posed a serious challenge to state sovereignty because he regarded the full or partial surrender of sovereignty as indispensable to the attainment of African unity. Once this had happened, he argued, economic integration could proceed (including establishing relevant institutions aimed at sustained development for the betterment and well-being of the African peoples). The Monrovia group, led by Léopold Senghor (the then president of Senegal), argued for gradual economic integration first. They did not support the ideal of a political federation (Boateng 2003:107;Nkrumah 1963b:145). The ongoing process of economic integration was supposed to eventually result in political unification. This line of argument put a high premium on understanding sovereignty as indivisible. The indivisibility of sovereignty meant that there was no need to surrender any portion of it.

The Monrovia and Casablanca groups represented two different and contending approaches to African unity. However, the two groups converged on the necessity for integration and co-operation in order to attain African unity. They argued that there was a need to adopt a theory and method to achieve integration and co-operation. The two contending positions continued to underlie the debates on the necessity for the political unification of Africa. They also determined the manner and pace of the practical implementation of measures aimed at African unity. Other than the two groups' arguments, the theory of functionalism was relevant (and is discussed in the next section).

The categorisation into the Monrovia group or Casablanca group appears to be alive in contemporary discourse on the question of African unity. For example, Forere (2012) argues that talk of the United States of Africa is premature because of the lack of OAU/AU legally-based economic integration among Africa's various regional economic communities (RECs). Because RECs are not legally bound to advance towards economic integration, the tendency is that such communities regard themselves as ends in

themselves and not as means to attain African unity. Using the extensive empirical study of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Forere (2012) argues that much still remains to be done within each regional community before there can be talk of substantial economic integration. She concludes that as long as the RECs are not building blocks of African unity by law and deliberate intent, it is premature to talk of the United States of Africa (Forere 2012:50–54). This line of argument places Forere in the Monrovia school.

Salami (2011) looks at Africa's integration from a different point of view. His comparative study of the OAU/AU and the European Union (EU) does not, at first glance, fall into either of the two categories. Part of the reason for this is because he concentrates on the legal aspects of the OAU/AU and the EU and focuses predominantly on their negative impact on economic integration. Since Salami adopts the historical perspective in his comparative study, he is able to identify legal similarities and differences and to clarify their respective impact. He then proceeds to make proposals for specific legal reforms in order to promote economic integration. It is only at the end that Salami couches himself in the Monrovia school by regarding the RECs as building blocks of economic integration:

The overall success of the AU/AEC [African Economic Community] agenda, depends on the success of the RECs [Regional Economic Communities]. Despite the crucial relation of the regional economic communities to the AEC, the AEC's six-stage plan of a single currency and an African central bank is falling behind schedule. This can be attributed largely to the legal and institutional problems the regional economic communities have, resulting in their failure to attain their own sub-regional objectives within the allotted time (Salami 2011:681).

Nkrumah's argument for the necessity of African unity was based on the first three of the four interrelated pillars mentioned above. Pan-Africanism was Nkrumah's major point of departure in elaborating on the imperative for African unity. As espoused by Nkrumah, it means that the historical-political boundary of continental Africa extends beyond the continent itself, thereby including peoples of African origin in the diaspora. Pan-Africanism also has a geographic meaning in that it refers restrictively to Africa as a continent. Nkrumah espoused this dual meaning of Pan-Africanism and was an innovative inheritor

of Pan-Africanism traceable to its progenitor, Edward W. Blyden. Blyden conceived of Pan-Africanism “not as a provoked black racism to oppose the arrogant white racism”, but rather as opposition to any form of “racial prejudice and social chauvinism” and a channel to constructive solidarity among all Africans “to form a “dynamic political philosophy” and a guide of action for the Africans of Africa who were beginning to make the first bold bases for the movement of national liberation” (Masolo 1994:12). Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism was opposed to any form of racial prejudice. It called for “constructive solidarity” among all Africans, as his writings testify. He advocated for active support for many of the liberation organisations of Africa and even espoused a “dynamic political philosophy” (Masolo 1994:12) as a guide to liberation.

In present-day African politics, Thabo Mbeki may be viewed as a contemporary Pan-Africanist. In his essay *The African Union at 10 Years Old: A Dream Deferred*, he does what many statespersons prefer not to do while in office and what few statespersons have done once out of office: he takes responsibility for the failures of the AU and shares in the glory of its achievements. His criticism of the AU is couched in terms of “our”, thus he neither excludes nor exonerates himself from the failures he identifies (Mbeki 2012:10). His “our” position is ethically commendable. In addition, he counterbalances the “failures” of the AU with its “achievements” (Mbeki 2012:11). He reaffirms sovereignty as elemental to formerly colonised Africans’ quest for domestic emancipation from economic bondage. He extends this to Africa’s relations with the rest of the world, especially the “capitalist” West. The reaffirmation of external sovereignty comes out clearly in his identification of the AU’s failure to ensure the right and duty of Africans in order to find solutions to African problems (Mbeki 2012:13). He re-emphasises this point thus:

All this is surely what we thought of our future as we engaged in countless struggles throughout our continent, for many centuries, to reclaim our right to be ourselves, free to decide for ourselves, to exercise our right to determine our collective destiny, not relying on any permission from anybody (Mbeki 2012:15).

This short survey of Pan-Africanism confirms Nkrumah’s insightful and correct argument that the doctrine of sovereignty is very important in the quest for African unity. Article IV

of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU Charter) and Article 29(1) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union confirm this.

In addition to Pan-Africanism, Nkrumah considered whether or not other factors were conducive to the attainment of African unity. He referred to the argument that African unity could not be attained because three ingredients were lacking, namely “a common race, culture and language” (Nkrumah 1963b:132). He did not advance a strong argument against this, but suggested that the forces favouring African unity weighed much heavier than those dividing Africans. For him, it was the “sense of one-ness in that we are Africans” (Nkrumah 1963b:132) that was most important. Julius Nyerere echoed Nkrumah on this point by replacing the “one-ness” with “African-ness”: “What the outside world recognises about us is our African-ness” (*New African* 2012d:35). Cheikh Anta Diop (1978) stood in sharp contrast to Nkrumah and Nyerere in that he argued quite explicitly that there was a cultural and economic basis for the establishment of the Federal United States of Africa. With particular reference to “linguistic” unity, he argued that unity based on any foreign language was a “cultural abortion”. It would kill the original culture of the continent, making the intellectual and spiritual lives of the citizens duplicates of other cultures and resulting in them missing the opportunity to realise their historic mission. Choosing an indigenous language to be the language of the continent that any foreigner would have to learn in order to communicate with the citizens of the continent would make communication with the outside world much easier (Diop 1978:12 & 14).

Nkrumah was against “a loose confederation of economic co-operation” (in Obeng 1979:134) as the primary means for attaining African unity. For this reason, it is important to understand the difference between a confederation and a federation. Rodee, Anderson and Christol (1967) draw an insightful and useful distinction between a confederation and a federation. The crux of their distinction is that states which exist as independent entities may voluntarily come together and retain their full sovereignty but commit to act unanimously on all major issues (including amending basic law), thus forming a confederation. In contrast, a federal union is established when independent states come together voluntarily and commit to cede part of their sovereignty in exchange for the

advantages to be gained from such a union (Rodee *et al.* 1967:56). The theory and practice of federalism are known to Africa as exemplified by the former Federation of Nyasaland and Southern and Northern Rhodesia. Furthermore, Ethiopia moved through several transitions from empire to federation (Kinfu 2001). The legal system of Ethiopia adapted with these transitions (Jembere & Woldemelak 2011:160–205). The same is true of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Ogene 2001).

Nkrumah discussed models (Nkrumah 1963b:157) of economic “co-operation” (Nkrumah 1963b:160) and “integration” (Nkrumah 1963b:150). With regard to these models, he reminded people of the absence of a universal development pattern compatible with all African conditions. He further argued that European economic theories originate from Europe’s own experience and are not guides to economic development everywhere in the world (Nkrumah 1963b:166–167). However, he was careful to state that this did not mean that Africans could not learn from such models. Nkrumah stated that only through the total integration of their economies could African states achieve the level of industrialised countries. Moreover, for any kind of holistic development to take place, the unity of African countries “is an indispensable precondition” (Nkrumah 1963b:163–164). This would be advantageous for the continent as a whole and for the individual countries comprising the union. From this idea of linking “together in union”, it is inferred that Nkrumah had functionalism in mind even though he did not state this expressly. The basic principle of this theory maintains that international cooperation along with economic cooperation will soften antagonism in the international environment. I therefore give a brief exposition of functionalism in order to highlight the federal character of Nkrumah’s envisioned United States of Africa.

Scholars and ordinary people alike have criticised and revered Nkrumah for both his failures and achievements. Scholars and intellectuals such as Biney (2011:1) call Nkrumah “one of twentieth-century Africa’s most important nationalist leaders”. Others, such as Cooper, say that Nkrumah was more than a political leader; he was a “prophet of independence, of anti-imperialism, of Pan-Africanism” (Cooper 2002:161). This is proven by Nkrumah’s many independence and unity projects and ideas. His anti-

imperialistic teachings are also evident in his book *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Capitalism*.

According to Biney (2011), African leaders such as Sam Nujoma, Kenneth Kaunda and Amílcar Cabral held Nkrumah in high esteem. Nujoma said that Ghana's fight for independence was an inspiration as well as an influence in Namibia's fight for freedom. Ghana's achievements were an important factor in many African countries' political awareness, and motivated them to do more to bring about their independence instead of merely petitioning the UN for it. Biney (2011:3) affirms that Kaunda agrees that Nkrumah was an inspiration for many Africans in the fight for independence and that he was a great supporter of Southern Africa's liberation from racism. However, scholars like Mazrui (2004:54) argue that Nkrumah started his leadership as a democrat and finished it as a dictator. Omari (1970), Lacouture (1970) and Pobee (1988) call Nkrumah a tyrannical megalomaniac.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Pan-Africanism, functionalism and sovereignty form the theoretical framework of this study. Pan-Africanism is an ideology and movement that support the solidarity of the peoples of African origin – specifically the indigenous peoples of the continent, some of whom were conquered in the unjust wars of colonisation and their kin forcibly uprooted from Africa as part of the slave trade worldwide. The aim is to “unify and uplift people of African descent” (Frick 2006:235). This aim supports and inspires the belief that the unity of these peoples is vital to the economic, social and political progress of Africa (including the second homes into which other Africans were implanted owing to the slave trade). Understood in this way, Pan-Africanism is “a belief that African peoples, both on the continent and in the Diaspora, share not merely a common history, but a common destiny” (Makalani 2011). Pan-Africanism is relevant to the present study because it has already been concretised in two ways, namely:

- (1) the voluntary migration of peoples of African origin back to Africa,

(2) the AU's recognition of the African diaspora as its Sixth Region (*New African* 2012c:20).

Pan-Africanism demands an answer to the question regarding the doctrine of sovereignty. Sovereignty is a political and legal concept with particular reference to the concept of state. In terms of the search for African unity in the context of the AU, it is imperative to recognise that “[m]ember states must be prepared to make the necessary sacrifice in terms of surrender of sovereignty, a *sine qua non* of the effective functioning of supranational organisations” (Thompson 1993:744).

It is important to note that Article IV of the OAU Charter states that “each independent sovereign African state shall be entitled to become a member of the Organisation”. The AU is the successor of the OAU and Article 29(1) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU 2000) states that “[a]ny African state may, at any time after entry into force of this Act, notify the Chairman of the Commission of its intention to accede to this Act and to be admitted as a member of the Union”. It is evident that the term “sovereign” is excluded here, in contrast to Article IV of the OAU Charter.

The omission, however, does not detract from the conceptual understanding of the state as the bearer of sovereignty. Furthermore, Article 3(b) states that one of the objectives of the AU is to “defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Member States”. It follows then that even in the context of the AU, the doctrine of sovereignty is retained. Sovereignty is, therefore, elemental and fundamental to the examination of the quest for African unity as originally conceived by Nkrumah and as currently pursued in the context of the AU. It is fundamental to the project of the United States of Africa.

This research focuses on sovereignty in order to first illustrate why and how it remains one of the enduring obstacles to and at the same time a potential promoter of Africa's unification. The major theme in this context is federalism. The aim is to show that the burden of economic bondage to the former colonial masters as well as to other rich states continues to hamper African countries' full exercise of sovereignty. Nkrumah argued that

economic emancipation was a vital ingredient for the meaningful emancipation of Africa. Without such emancipation, independent African states would remain trapped in neo-colonialism. For as long as they remained in neo-colonialism, independent African states could not exercise their sovereignty in full. Neo-colonialism is one of the core issues in the present study on the search for African unity. The pressures on sovereignty brought about by the contemporary “human rights culture” and economic globalisation will also be studied, particularly in the context of the AU’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

The political theorist David Mitrany was one of the earliest exponents of the theory of functionalism. The basic principle of this theory is that cooperation is the best means of softening antagonism in the international environment. His exposition of this theory focused on integration and co-operation among sovereign states. This applied to “the first European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952” (Laursen2012:10) and the European Economic Community (EEC), which later became the EU. It was an argument for federalism as the basis of the EEC (Laursen 2012:3–24, 265–271). Since the legal framework of the OAU has been shown to be inspired by that of the EEC, it is pertinent to focus on functionalism as expounded by Mitrany and his successors. The aim is to show that a critical exposition of this theory will assist in identifying the strengths and weaknesses of integration and co-operation in the quest for African unity.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology used for this study is qualitative. This means that an inquiry is undertaken into why and how arguments are made in support of or against a particular position. For the purpose of completeness, the inquirer must also focus on the type of argument that is advanced and consider where and when the argument is or was made. With reference to the present research, this means focusing on Nkrumah’s arguments for African unity and critics’ responses to those arguments. For the purpose of this research, a study of texts will be sufficient and no interviews will be conducted. By studying Nkrumah’s ideas on the United States of Africa from a qualitative point of view, I bring to

the fore the many different truths and realities that were prevalent during his time and are still pertinent in contemporary African and world politics, “what is out there in its context, with all its complexity” (Badenhorst 2008:93). This implies a diachronic approach in examining Nkrumah’s works and their influence over time. A diachronic approach involves analysing the evolution of an idea or phenomena overtime, allowing one to assess how something changes in history. It is used to analyse the effects of variable change on something, thus allowing the suggestion of why a certain state was borne from a prior state or why a certain state progressed to some future state (Babbie 1973:63–68). This approach leads to the integrative review understood as “[a] common type of review in which [information is presented and summarised in] the current state of knowledge...highlighting agreements and disagreements within it” (Neuman 2011:125). By studying Nkrumah’s arguments on African unity, and their refinements and modifications by other scholars, it is possible to show his contribution to the understanding and knowledge of African politics. I analyse why and how Nkrumah’s argument that the political unification of Africa should precede economic integration and co-operation is relevant to the resolution of problems and overcoming challenges that the OAU faced, and the AU now faces, in terms of attaining African unity.

In view of the above clarification of the diachronic and integrative approaches, it follows that the methodology used for this study follows a philosophical critique in the sense of the clarification of thought and not the building of a theory (Howell 2012:213). The clarification of thought refers to actual critical analysis of the texts connected to the debates on the necessity of African unity. This means that the research methodology for this study is also philosophical.

LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS

The scope and depth of the research are limited to critical exposition. This is consistent with the requirements for this level of study. This research is also limited due to the specificity of its focus on the question of African unity, which means that only Nkrumah’s writings and other texts related to this focus are studied here.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

African unity: African unity is taken to mean African continent-wide integration. According to Nkrumah, it is integration based on political and economic integration and not a loose federation of states united only for the sake of economic opportunities, with their sovereignties intact. It means that the states involved in African unity will have a common domestic and foreign policy, and will be subject to one central government (Nkrumah 1963b:148).

African Union: Since the establishment in 1963 of the OAU (Brownlie 1971:1–2) as its forerunner, the principal reason for the AU's establishment was and remains the attainment of African unity. Its purpose is to consolidate the independence of African states and engage in global international politics as a united force to defend and promote the development of the entire African continent. As such, the AU positions itself as the guardian of the well-being of African peoples, including those in the diaspora.

United States of Africa: This refers to the unification of African states as a federation, with one central government and as one country (Nkrumah 1963b:148).

Sovereignty: In Political Science, sovereignty refers to an entity vested with original power, especially the power to make laws, and with no other power above or superior to it (Laski 1963:50). Sovereignty is the status of states as legal equals under international law, according to which they are supreme internally and subject to no higher external authority. State sovereignty has four aspects: territory, population, authority and recognition (Biersteker & Weber 1996:46). This succinct definition of sovereignty agrees with the intention to conduct the present study as a philosophical project. It is not a historical project aimed at studying the evolution of sovereignty in Western political thought by focusing on theorists such as Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes (Sabine 1961:411).

Casablanca group: This group, which was led by Nkrumah, wanted a federation consisting of all the African countries. Aside from Ghana, it comprised Algeria, Guinea, Morocco, Egypt, Mali and Libya. It was founded in 1961 and its members were described as progressive states (Boateng 2003:105–106; Nkrumah 1963b:147).

Monrovia group: This group, which was led by Senghor, argued that unity should be achieved gradually through economic cooperation. It did not support the notion of a political federation. Senegal, Nigeria, Liberia, Ethiopia and most of the former French colonies were members of this group (Boateng 2003:106–107; Nkrumah 1963b:146).

Neo-colonialism: The practice of countries to control or influence former colonised territories. Despite decolonisation, relations between wealthy countries and the least developed countries remain unequal, with the rich still able to exploit the poor (Mansbach & Rafferty 2008:580).

STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

This study has five chapters:

- Chapter 1 is the general introduction to the study and contains the research topic, problem statement, and aims and purpose of the study. A brief literature review and the research methodology for the study, together with its limitations and delimitations, are also presented in this chapter.
- In Chapter 2, Nkrumah's call for Pan-African unity is contextualised from a specific historical-political point of view. This chapter focuses on issues of sovereignty, but without losing sight of Nkrumah's Pan-African ideas, and contains an explanation of the theoretical framework and research methodology used for the study. The conceptual analysis lays the ground for understanding the quest for African unity in the form of the federation of the United States of Africa.
- Chapter 3 flows from Chapter 2 and focuses on the analysis of the concept of sovereignty in practice. This is done in the context of neo-colonialism, since the

state created through colonisation plays a significant role in state practice related to the quest for African unity.

- In Chapter 4, the achievements made so far in achieving Pan-African unity are discussed. This entails critically analysing the differences between what Nkrumah envisaged and what ultimately became the accepted content of Pan-African unity. Various RECs and their successes and failures are examined.
- Chapter 5 is a summary of the research findings. Proposals for further study are included.

CHAPTER 2

NKRUMAH'S CALL FOR PAN-AFRICAN UNITY

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, Nkrumah's call for African unity is critically examined. Nkrumah is recognised widely as one of the foremost advocates of the unification of African states. Colonisation gave birth to the new states of Africa and decolonisation continued the existence of these states by preserving the political paradigm of the concept of state. Sovereignty is one of the essential features of this paradigm of state. The decolonised independent states of Africa openly declared themselves "sovereign states" according to the political paradigm of their former colonisers. The concept of sovereignty is considered specifically in this chapter for two reasons. One is that it is stated expressly in the constitutions defining the political and legal characters of individual independent African states. The same concept is carried over – without fundamental change of meaning – to the basic political-legal documents on African affairs. The other reason why sovereignty is the subject of special attention in this chapter is that Nkrumah identified it as one of the basic issues to be considered in any movement towards Pan-African unity. His reasons for doing so are critically examined in this chapter.

Specific issues relating to sovereignty that are important in the movement towards Pan-African unity are the following:

- (1) The concept of **Pan-African unity** focuses on the unification of the peoples of the continent of Africa. One of the problems in this regard is that the posterity of the colonial conqueror is also found on the continent. Does the call for the unification of the peoples of Africa include them? Although this is an important and relevant question that requires special attention, it is not addressed specifically in this chapter or elsewhere in this dissertation because its complex nature requires an in-depth and extended discussion for which there is no space here. However, Nkrumah – who is the specific subject of this study – did not address this issue amply in relation to the question of Pan-African unity. This

unity includes the peoples of African origin who were forcibly removed from Africa and now live as natives and citizens of countries outside Africa. These are Africans in the diaspora and Nkrumah interacted with some of the peoples in the diaspora. His Pan-Africanism was deeply, but not exclusively, inspired by them. He addressed them poignantly in relation to the question of Pan-African unity. Africans in the diaspora are therefore specially considered in this chapter.

- (2) **Neo-colonialism** is another issue of importance. It relates to sovereignty insofar as it functions as a brake or hindrance to the exercise of full sovereignty.
- (3) **Functionalism** is pertinent because it tends to protect sovereignty by enabling flexible co-operation between states without yielding to federalism, which demands the partial or full surrender of sovereignty. In this chapter, the primary focus is on sovereignty but without losing sight of the related issues mentioned here. Nkrumah made his call for Pan-African unity within a specific historical-political context. This is the subject of the next section, where Nkrumah's call for Pan-African unity is contextualised.

CONTEXTUALISING NKRUMAH'S CALL FOR PAN-AFRICAN UNITY

Nkrumah's approach to Pan-African unity departed from the viewpoint that African politics relates to the dynamics of the international political system. In his time, African politics had to deal with the reality that many African countries were still colonised. The liberation of these countries was a major problem in African politics and the solution was linked to the dynamics of the international political system. On this basis, Wallerstein (1969:237) argued that the quest for Pan-African unity had the internal aspect of changing the political and economic conditions of Africa. It also had the complementary external aspect of bringing about change in the international political system.

The Cold War and the Non-Aligned Movement were prominent features of the international political system during Nkrumah's time. The Cold War had two aspects: one was the struggle for hegemony that had to be achieved through the total elimination of either liberal capitalism or scientific socialism; the other was the arms race, particularly

with regard to nuclear weapons. The Non-Aligned Movement emerged in this context as the assertion of the right of member states to choose their ideological affiliation without being forced into opting for either liberal capitalism or scientific socialism. The exercise of this right meant that neutrality was an option. It also meant that even “African socialism” in its varied perspectives and interpretations was an option (Davidson 1984:332).

Nkrumah called for African unity at a time when many African countries were under the yoke of colonial domination. This condition encouraged and, in some cases, manifested as solidarity among the already independent African countries. This was consistent with Nkrumah’s understanding of Pan-Africanism as far as it advocated “constructive solidarity” among all Africans. Colonial racism and domination imposed the necessity for prioritisation, in the sense that the imperative to liberate all African countries from the bondage of colonial racism received comparatively more attention than the quest for African unity in other areas. Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia also called on the African peoples to persevere and continue the struggle for the liberation of African states still dominated by colonialism and racism (Haile Selassie 1963:2–3).

The primacy of liberating the remaining colonised countries of Africa was evidently a theme present in the minds of most of the founding fathers of the OAU. They reaffirmed the prioritisation of the liberation of the states still under the yoke of colonialism. This prioritisation did not exclude paying attention to other areas, especially economic development. For example, former prime minister of the Republic of Sudan Farik Abboud declared that while the liberation of parts of Africa still under colonialism was very important, it was also important to fight other challenges like “reconstruction, combating vestiges of economic and social backwardness, and readapting foreign system of Government to suit our national temperament and traditions” (Abboud 1963:1). He further stated that the peoples of Africa needed a broad perspective on the problems “in the midst of ideological conflicts and foreign interests that threaten Africa” (Abboud 1963:3). It is clear from Abboud’s speech that giving primacy to the liberation of colonised areas of Africa did not mean being blind to other areas deserving attention in the quest for African

unity. Thus, the meaning and understanding of African unity were definitely broader and more comprehensive than liberation.

The prioritisation of liberating the colonised parts of Africa must be qualified by the observation that it did not cancel “constructive solidarity” among African countries. On the contrary, it promoted it – albeit with tremendous difficulty (Wallerstein 1969:68). In line with the first priority, Nkrumah advocated for and actively supported many of the liberation organisations of Africa. It is submitted that the practice of “constructive solidarity” at the time was already emphasised by functionalism. (Functionalism is the subject of extended critical discussion later in this chapter.)

Nkrumah called for African unity in his native independent Ghana, which appears to have attained independence based on government succession (Ramose 2003:486–487). Government succession with particular reference to a new political dispensation in a state means that the incoming government takes over the benefits as well as the burdens of the previous government. Thus, change refers to the new political order but without abolishing or disturbing the benefits and burdens that existed in the old order. The problem with this mode of succession is that it transfers to the new government the burdens and benefits of the previous government. This kind of transfer can function as a brake on the policies and actions of the incoming government. Of particular significance here is that independent Ghana inherited the liabilities of the British colonial Gold Coast – in the form of foreign debt. This meant that Ghana, like all other African countries which attained independence from colonial rule, did not have its own economy but was sunk into economic bondage because of the foreign debt burden (Makonnen 1983:133). This was a problem and Nkrumah declared at the UN on 23 September 1960 that the tide of African nationalism was “a challenge to the colonial powers to make a just restitution for the years of injustice and crime committed against our continent” (Nkrumah 1979b:162). This challenge was treated with indifference then and the same indifference continues to this day. The economic enslavement of Africa, especially by the West, is one of the living problems today carried over from the time when political independence was granted to the formerly colonised countries of Africa. According to Wallerstein (1969:247), this is the

second of the three characteristics common to all colonised African countries at the attainment of independence, namely “the non-existence of a national economy”. This had, and still has, serious implications for the development of Africa. It means that Africa’s development trajectory could be pursued mainly on the provision of aid (a euphemism for loans) from outside the continent. In the name of aid, African states continue to maintain comparatively burdensome economic links with their former colonial masters and other rich states such as the United States of America (USA) (Moyo 2009:3–28). Nkrumah (1979:62–63) identified neo-colonialism as one of the major problems for post-colonial Africa. The publication of his book *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* resulted in the USA withdrawing the “aid” it had promised independent Ghana under Nkrumah (Panaf Great Lives 1974:105).

The ill-fated structural adjustment programmes testify to the problematic character of the loans, especially as the method of keeping Africa perpetually in the bondage of debt (Moyo 2009:3–28). One of the results of this condition is that Africa cannot readily provide employment to her growing population. According to Wallerstein, this is the third common characteristic of colonised African countries at the attainment of independence. The social stratification system which came about through expanding educational opportunities resulted in a number of individuals with middle-class aspirations. These individuals’ expectations far exceeded the ability of the underdeveloped economies to offer jobs and status deemed appropriate to their expectations (Wallerstein 1969:248). Four decades later, Africa has been warned that if its economic conditions do not improve fast enough to provide jobs to the unemployed youth, the continent will face serious difficulties – especially political instability (Jere 2012:14). This warning raises afresh the question of how African unity is to be pursued in the face of economic bondage and deepening poverty and unemployment especially affecting the youth.

Related to this question is the fact that the AU, as the successor of the OAU in pursuit of African unity, does not have the necessary capital to make this possible. The contributions of member states amount to only 40% of the AU’s budget. Non-paying members have “the annoying habit of letting contributions lapse into arrears”, which leaves the AU

vulnerable to “Western donor support dictates” by depending on donations from the West (Jere 2012:14). This condition of economic bondage and dependency surely serves as a restraint on African governments in pursuit of African unity.

Another pertinent problem to be considered in the quest for African unity is the increasing desertification of the continent. Africa’s deserts are slowly but surely increasing in size and her population is also increasing. Africa did not always have the deserts she has; they grew over time. One inference is that in the distant past, African peoples shared the same territorial area – rivers and lakes notwithstanding – even though geography separated them. Interaction took place among these peoples. The result was discernible “unities of thought and attitude among African peoples now living far apart and apparently in total isolation from each other” (Davidson 1984:28). The apparent total isolation from each other is the geographic separation caused by desertification; however, it did not destroy the persistence of “unities of thought and attitude among African peoples”. This is not to deny that the geographic separation brought about modifications to thought and attitude in the process of adapting to new existential conditions (Davidson 1984:36). Thus, there are cultural differences among African peoples. The differences speak to a family relationship sustaining the idea of the oneness of the African peoples since ancient times (Nkrumah 1963b:132). Nkrumah made this point rather strongly in his argument for Pan-African unity: “The Sahara no longer divides us; it is no longer a physical or a political barrier between us” (Nkrumah 1979:132). This stands in sharp contrast to his earlier view that such oneness did not yet exist because three ingredients were lacking, namely: “a common race, culture and language” (Nkrumah 1963b:132).

Nyerere echoed Nkrumah on this point but replaced the oneness with Africanness by saying that “[w]hat the outside world recognises about us is our African-ness” (*New African*2012d:35). Diop stood in sharp contrast to Nkrumah and Nyerere in that he argued quite explicitly that there was a cultural and economic basis for the establishment of the United States of Africa. He maintained that linguistic unity based on a foreign language was “cultural abortion”. It robbed Africa of the opportunity to express herself authentically based on the intellectual and spiritual aspects of her culture. This deprivation turned Africa

into a mimic without “a historical mission”. Diop argued that in order to ensure that Africa was not actually reduced to this condition, one indigenous African language had to be selected and elevated to the status of continental language. Foreigners would have to learn the language to communicate with Africans. According to Diop, this would simplify the continent’s interaction with the outside world (Diop 1978:12 & 14).

The idea of the Africanness of the peoples of African origin was elaborated on before Nyerere’s statement. At the OAU’s founding conference, Senghor first acknowledged that the common experience of the colonisation of the African peoples was indeed an indispensable element of the quest for African unity. He argued, however, that the oneness of the peoples of African origin was in fact the prior bonding force establishing relatedness among them and this made the quest for African unity a meaningful political imperative. What must bring the people of Africa together, he argued, lay deeper than being formerly colonised underdeveloped countries. For him, the African peoples are rooted in the continent from time immemorial. They are bound together by a common history and a shared culture. Their civilisations predate the colonisation of Africa. This is what Senghor (1963:2) meant by Africanness embodying “the sum total of African civilised values”. In this way, Senghor reaffirmed what Diop argued with regard to the quest for the United States of Africa. It also supported Nkrumah and Nyerere’s respective but mutually reinforcing ideas of African oneness and Africanness (Mazrui 1967:42–58). The twin experiences of African oneness and colonialism made it possible that when the OAU became the AU, African unity was again identified as one of its basic aims. In this sense, the “African Diaspora was included as the Sixth Region of the African Union, thereby expanding the continental meaning of African unity” (*New African* 2012c:20).

Furthermore, merely declaring African oneness, as Nkrumah did, does not negate the fact that geography divides the African peoples. The division is, as it were, overcome at the intellectual level by affirming the oneness of the African peoples and using the affirmation as a means to remove barriers to the political unification of African peoples under the banner of Pan-Africanism. Pursuing this objective requires that a balance be struck, without conflict among African states, between the continuing desertification of

Africa and its increasing population on a continent-wide scale. The importance of this point may be illustrated by referring to the Sahara region in the history of ancient Africa. Initially, the region was verdurous, providing for a vibrant way of life capable of producing culture and civilisation (Davidson 1984:24). This changed. The desertification of the Sahara region forced its inhabitants to move to liveable land. “Earlier even than 2000 BC the Sahara began to lose rainfall, rivers and rich pastures, and its capacity for supporting large stable populations. There occurred a steady movement of Saharan peoples into more favourable lands nearby” (Davidson 1984:29). Unliveable desert territory forces people to migrate to liveable land. This may result in conflict if the liveable land is in the territory of another African sovereign state. Does the migration imposed by nature give migrants the right to disrespect the territorial boundaries of another country? This question speaks to the necessity to strike the correct balance, without resulting in conflict among African states, between the increased desertification and increased population of Africa. It is a pertinent factor in the quest for African unity under the banner of Pan-Africanism.

Another relevant factor in the pursuit of African unity is the persistence of inter-Africa wars. This is one of the reasons why the OAU initially established the Central Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Cilliers 2008:39). The AU subsequently added more substance to this mechanism through the establishment of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) (Cilliers 2008:38). This underlines that Nkrumah called for African unity at a time when war was no longer a meaningful option for the two superpowers of the Cold War and their allies because of nuclear weapons. Understanding the futility of war from this point of view, he repudiated France’s testing of nuclear weapons on African soil (Nkrumah 1979:178). His argument was that armaments are a threat to the future of humanity; they do not provide answers that promote human well-being. In view of this, nuclear disarmament is necessary (Nkrumah 1979:176). Against this background, Nkrumah argued that Africa should be a nuclear weapons free zone (Nkrumah 1979:52). The Pelindaba Treaty, aimed at making Africa a nuclear weapons free zone, is a tribute to Nkrumah’s insightful argument.

The irony here is that the futility of war as understood by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact military alliances had the practical effect of transferring conventional and even guerrilla warfare to countries outside these regions, including Africa. As a result, the first two decades of African independence were generally characterised by one *coup d'état* after another as well as intra-ethnic wars. The deposition and subsequent killing of Patrice Lumumba, the first prime minister of the independent Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), (Nkrumah 1967:97–98) and the involvement of Cuban troops in the struggle for the independence of Angola are good examples. In contemporary times, political instability caused by war in Mali, the eastern DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR) shows the importance of establishing the CEWS in the interest of African unity. Although proxy wars appear to have stopped, neo-colonialism complemented by neo-liberalism are the worms gnawing into Africa's independence in a manner that obstructs the quest for African unity. Nkrumah advocated Pan-African unity under these historical-political conditions.

In the next section, the historical-intellectual evolution of Nkrumah's call for Pan-African unity is discussed. I commence with a brief biography of Nkrumah.

Amamoo (2007:71) describes Nkrumah as "impatient by temperament and fast in speech". He uses these character traits to explain why Nkrumah was prepared to drag his people into independence even though they were not prepared for it. Amamoo (2007:82) emphasises this as follows: "To achieve these twin objectives he felt compelled and justifiable to remove from his path all things, living or non-living, that he considered as major stumbling blocks in his path to his destination: first the independence and unity of the whole of Africa, and second, the industrial development of Ghana." He uses the same character traits to explain Nkrumah's cautious approach in his dealings with former Eastern Bloc countries (Amamoo 2007:88–89). However, the cautious approach does not correspond with the "impatient by temperament" assertion. It affirms, instead, that "his life was ascetic, a disciplined routine of work and exercise" (Panaf Great Lives 1974:220). This contrast in explanation is even sharper when it comes from the same interpreter, in this case Amamoo (2007:90–91). It shows that problems of interpretation do arise with

regard to interpretation based on the character traits of a particular figure. However, this is not to say that such interpretations are irrelevant and futile. On the contrary, it reveals the complex nature of the different approaches to scientific explanation. It is shown in this chapter that Nkrumah's initial commitment to regionalism, later substituted by his option for federalism under the auspices of an "All Union Government of Africa" is a reflection of this problem of scientific explanation based on the character traits of a particular figure.

HISTORICAL-INTELLECTUAL EVOLUTION OF NKROMAH'S CALL FOR PAN AFRICAN UNITY

Pan-Africanism is an ideology and movement that supports the solidarity of the peoples of African origin, specifically the indigenous peoples of the continent who have been here from time immemorial (some of whom were conquered in the unjust wars of colonisation). It includes the kith and kin of these peoples forcibly uprooted from Africa owing to the slave trade worldwide. The aim is to "unify and uplift people of African descent" (Frick 2006:235). This starting point of Pan-Africanism evidently disregards the contending theories concerning the claim that Africa is the cradle of humanity (Chazan 1995:229–240). The result of this is that from the moment of colonisation and the trans-Atlantic slave trade, Africa is taken as the point of departure for Pan-Africanist thought.

For some, including Nkrumah, adopting this point of departure requires the political exclusion of the "indigenous" posterity of the colonial conquerors from the agents of Pan-Africanist thought (Nkrumah 1979:175). The agents are only those who are objectively at the receiving end of the oppression and exploitation experienced at the initial moment of colonial conquest and continue to go through this experience as it is perpetuated by the "indigenous" posterity of the colonial conquerors. The fact that the conquered peoples of Africa were mainly black and the conquerors white does not necessarily make Pan-Africanism racist. One of the reasons for this is that its preferred point of departure is not arbitrary. It reflects a concrete historical experience which cannot be erased through learned discourse. Lived experience is not transferable. In this sense, it is unique and

even exclusive. In view of this, Pan-Africanist thought is exclusivist but without being racist.

Furthermore, the Pan-Africanist point of departure became a significant rallying point for solidarity among politically independent African countries (Francis 2006:5–6). The solidarity was and remains necessary to mobilise collective action in the continuing struggle for Africa's economic independence.

The point of departure of Pan-Africanist thought is related to a particular aim, namely to unify the peoples of African origin on and outside the continent in order to achieve political and economic independence. The achievement of this aim is vital for the protection and advancement of the well-being of African peoples. Different "Pan-Africanisms" have emerged in pursuit of this aim. The differences occur in terms of emphasis and perspective.

Nkrumah found the concept of Pan-Africanism already in use. According to Arifalo (1982:127), it is thought that Henry Sylvester Williams (a West Indian who lived in Britain for a while) coined the term. Nkrumah's inspiration for Pan-African unity spans over a period. It was inspired by diverse influences and his own reflections. Concerning the former, the following observations may be made. Pan-Africanism was one of the elements underlying Nkrumah's quest for African unity. It is intercontinental in origin because it involved the participation of "both Africa and the New World" (Mazrui 1969:182). George Padmore and W.E.B. Du Bois may be regarded as its founding fathers (Mazrui 1969:182; Davidson 2007:41). According to Davidson (1984:331), "the essential thought behind Pan-Africanism, in its new and African guise, was that African countries must unite their energies and policies, or else forfeit even the slender freedoms of action they had gained from political independence". In the course of changing the African and world politics of his time, Nkrumah emerged as the standard-bearer and defender of Pan-Africanism in Africa (Davidson 1984:331). He qualified Pan-Africanism based on his own philosophical reflections and political analysis.

In the USA, Pan-Negroism focused primarily on the meaning of the experience of slavery shared by black people. The relationship between black people as slaves and white people as slave masters was perceived as the basic problem. In this sense, Pan-Negroism focused on interracial relations. By contrast, the intercontinental character of Pan-Africanism directed its focus to international relations (Mazrui 1969:178). The pre-eminence of race relations in Pan-Negroism was subsequently refined by recognising the historical bond between the peoples of Africa and the black peoples of the Americas, including the West Indies. Seen from this perspective, “Pan-Africanism was born out of Pan-Negroism” (Mazrui 1969:182).

On close examination of Mazrui’s reasoning, his claim that “Pan-Africanism was born out of Pan-Negroism” leads to a number of problems.

- First, the claim accords Pan-Negroism temporal precedence over Pan-Africanism. The problem here is that he does not provide historical evidence to substantiate his claim.
- Second, he implies a vertical relationship between Pan-Africanism and Pan-Negroism. The latter is accorded superiority over the former. There are two problems concerning the supposed superiority of Pan-Negroism over Pan-Africanism. One is that Mazrui does not provide historical evidence to support this claim. Unlike Mazrui, Kinfe points to historical evidence to show that he agrees only partially with Mazrui. The rest of his historical argument contradicts Mazrui’s claim that Pan-Negroism is superior to Pan-Africanism: “The fourth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester on October 15, 1945 also brought together Anglophone and Francophone Africans...[I]t was the first conference where Africans played a prominent role and West Indians a subsidiary role” (Kinfe 2003:27). Arifalo, referring to the same fourth Pan-African congress, concurs with Kinfe: “The complexion of Pan-Africanism had changed forever. From now on, it is going to be African-based. African nationalism would replace Negro nationalism” (Arifalo 1982:133). However, he differs from Mazrui in that he construes the Negro question from the perspective of “nation” (nationalism), whereas Mazrui sees it in terms of “race”. The difference between these

interpretations is significant. The significance of Kiefe and Arifalo's arguments is that the relationship between Pan-Negroism and Pan-Africanism should be posited in terms of temporal sequence and not vertically. Another problem is that Mazrui becomes incoherent by blending together two contrasting foci, as he himself describes them. Pan-Negroism focuses on interracial relations and Pan-Africanism on international relations. It should be noted that relations concerned with race cannot conceptually be the same as relations focused on a nation. The concept of race as explained by Davidson (1978:188–189) differs in meaning from nation as explained by Kiefe (2003:36–37) and Shillington (1989:408). Blending the two removes the conceptual difference between them. It is, therefore, incoherent and inconsistent.

- Third, the imagery of birth suggests a causal relationship between Pan-Negroism and Pan-Africanism. It means that Pan-Negroism caused Pan-Africanism. Mazrui is not alone on this point. Masolo also describes Blyden as “the progenitor of Pan-Africanism” (Masolo 1994:12). Both Mazrui and Masolo do not provide historical evidence for their claim that Pan-Negroism caused Pan-Africanism. Kiefe's argument referred to in the previous paragraph shows that this claim is arbitrary.

Even if it is accepted that Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism was influenced by his personal and intellectual contact with some Pan-Negroists, this does not warrant the conclusion that “Pan-Africanism was born out of Pan-Negroism”. To clarify this point, it is crucial to consider that the African experience of colonialism on African soil was the seedbed from which Pan-Africanism germinated in Africa. By contrast, the African peoples in the USA were compelled to “forget you are African, remember you are Black” (Mazrui 1986:110). This experience, which Mazrui describes as “disAfricanisation” and “blackening”, was the seedbed for the growth of Pan-Negroism. The two experiences (namely colonialism in Africa and blackness in the USA) are not the same, especially with regard to their points of departure and emphasis. Mazrui himself appears to acknowledge this:

That form of Pan-Africanism which was based on colour owes a good deal of its original impetus to the Western world's racism. It was partly because of this that

Pan-Africanism as a movement was for so long led by diaspora Blacks. In many ways these exported Africans had had to face the challenge of racism more frontally, from being captured as slaves to being lynched as 'niggers...It is in this sense that Pan-Africanism as a movement of Black consciousness was in part created by the racists who aroused Black anger... (Mazrui 1986:106).

It should be noted that in the texts Mazrui cited with regard to this discussion, he appears to use "Pan-Negroism" and "Pan-Africanism" interchangeably as if they are synonyms – but they are not. The two problems raised here might not have arisen if Mazrui remained consistent in his presentation and interpretation of history in the two texts. Upholding consistency could have resulted in the view that Pan-Negroism ultimately became a Pan-Africanism of its own kind without necessarily being the progenitor of Pan-Africanism in Africa. It may, therefore, be argued that Pan-Africanism in Africa evolved independently of Pan-Africanism born of Pan-Negroism in the USA. This does not deny the USA's intellectual impact on Nkrumah during his stay in that country. It does not disregard the great influence Du Bois and Padmore had on the intellectual development of his own version of Pan-Africanism (Davidson 2007:41–43). However, there is a point of convergence between Pan-Negroism and Pan-Africanism from the very moment of their intellectual conception. This point is that for Africa, the intellectual force was "Remember your kin in the diaspora". For the African-American, the intellectual force was the command "Remember Africa". Thus, historical memory is the bond that ties the two brands of Pan-Africanism together. It does not make them the same. It is the seedbed of interaction and mutual influence between the two (Davidson 1984:331). To illustrate this, let us turn to a critical analysis of Blyden's espousal of Pan-Africanism.

Blyden was born in 1832 in a family of free, educated black people on the Caribbean island of St Thomas. The prevailing racial discrimination in the USA prevented him from entering university to study theology. On account of this experience, Blyden (considering himself a "returning exile from the West") decided to go to the "negro" republic of Liberia in 1850 (VanHensbroek1998:49). The indigenous population of Liberia comprised different groups. The introduction of Christianity, together with an alien paradigm of political organisation, brought about tensions between the "returning exiles from the West"

and the indigenous population (Van Hensbroek 1998:32). Blyden was to deal with these problems.

Blyden believed that black people in the USA could never be equal with white Americans because each group belonged to a different race and culture. For him, race and culture revealed the distinctiveness of each group. The only way to protect and preserve the distinctiveness of each group was to uphold the exclusion or separation of one group from the other. In this way, no group could be superior to another in terms of a vertical relationship. Blyden therefore concluded that the principle of equality could not be applied to the condition of race and cultural distinctiveness ordained by nature. The result was that he overturned “the structure of racist discourse by replacing a *hierarchical order* of races with an *order of difference*” (Van Hensbroek 1998:58). In doing this, Blyden did not escape racism; he simply provided another lens with which to look at it (Masolo1994:12).

NKRUMAH’S APPROACH TO PAN-AFRICANISM

This section concerns first the approach that Nkrumah adopted in arguing for his vision of Pan-Africanism and then his Pan-Africanism. The core question is: What to do with sovereignty? In other words, must it be surrendered partially or totally? Nkrumah argued for the full surrender of sovereignty under an African federal government. This brought him into conflict with other African states which preferred functionalism because of its incompatibility with federalism. The question of sovereignty in relation to federalism and functionalism was central to Pan-Africanism in Nkrumah’s time; and it is still the core issue at the AU. In view of this, the discussion focuses on sovereignty, federalism and functionalism as political theories pertinent to the arguments for Pan-Africanism.

Nkrumah used a philosophical approach in arguing for African unity, as his book *Consciencism* illustrates. He complemented and combined it with appropriate practical programmes. Among these was his contribution to the establishment of the OAU.

Pan-Africanism as espoused by Nkrumah meant that Africans were the original indigenous owners of the territorial expanse of continental Africa (Masolo 1994:12). It includes the original indigenous African peoples who were forcibly uprooted from Africa and carried off to foreign lands during the Transatlantic and Arab slave trades (the African diaspora). Nkrumah advocated this dual meaning of Pan-Africanism (Nkrumah 1963b:148–149), which appears to separate pre-colonial indigenous Africans and their descendants in the diaspora from other peoples of the world. It also appears to rest on the principle of mutual exclusion based on Blyden's "order of difference".

This gives rise to the question of whether Pan-Africanism is a political philosophy based on race and thus discriminating against other peoples of the world. This is an important question since the Africa that Nkrumah called to unite included the posterity of the colonial conquerors and was inhabited by peoples from divergent ethnic-cultural backgrounds. The colonial powers have left a permanent obstacle to African unity by way of creating and magnifying ethnic based differences that have turned into a huge conundrum. Ethnicity is an enduring problem in African politics (Ake 1993:1, 12). The philosophical significance of this problem is that ethnicity tends to appeal to culture as the reason to erect boundaries between human beings, including states (Ake 1993:3–5). Such boundaries have been used, for example, as one of the reasons for the establishment of federal states. They have also been used as the basis for demanding – in unitary states – constitutional guarantees for the protection, promotion and exercise of cultural rights (Berman 1998:323–325). Underlying these two recourses to federation and the constitutional guarantees for the protection, promotion and exercise of cultural rights is the idea that the boundaries erected must be impermeable. Impermeable boundaries are a source of potential interethnic and interstate conflict because good fences do not necessarily make good neighbours. However, permeable boundaries may be erected since they make provision for a symbiotic relationship between ethnic groups and among states (Kifleyesus 2004:35–41).

The above distinction between impermeable and permeable boundaries applies to Nkrumah's argument for African unity. First, he argued explicitly against the continuation

of territorial and “cultural” boundaries erected through colonialism (Davidson 2007:42). At the founding conference of the OAU, he stated that almost every African state had border problems with their neighbours and that what had been inherited from the colonial past of the continent would lead these states into war when they developed and grew industrially. However, the attainment of African unity would bring about free movement across territorial boundaries. The result would be diminished or there would be no border disputes between African states (Nkrumah 1979:48).

Nkrumah’s argument was based on what he understood as African humanism. His definition of “consciencism” included African humanism. According to him, consciencism was an intellectual map for the disposition of forces enabling African societies to assimilate Christian, Islamic and Western elements so that they would fit the African personality, which was full of humanist principles that were the basis of African societies. For Nkrumah, the humanist principles were based on the ethical principle that every human being is an end in himself/herself. Therefore, no human being may be treated merely as a means to an end (Nkrumah 1964:95).

In the domain of politics, this ethical principle ramifies into:

- (1) recognition of and respect for the dignity of another human being
- (2) protection and promotion of the dignity of another human being

Suitable political institutions must be established to ensure the practical implementation of these principles (Nkrumah 1964:98).

Another question concerns the manner in which Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism may be used as a means to achieve African unity. Nkrumah’s call for African unity also concerned the reality of African culture, especially the problem of ethnicity alluded to earlier. Related to this was the historical reality of African cultures of governance, in general manifested by royal or kingly rule. In his native Ghana, Nkrumah had to contend with “the chiefs” during the struggle for independence (Rathbone 2000). It is important to understand that the struggle with the chiefs actually was a struggle of contending paradigms of governance,

one Western and the other African. In general, the constitutional dispensations of independent African states subordinated the indigenous African paradigm of governance to the Western paradigm. The first Constitution of the Republic of Ghana is an example of this. This privileging of the Western paradigm of governance continues to be a source of tension in many African countries today. It is a pertinent element in the conception and pursuit of African unity (Mkhwanazi 2012:25–26).

Nkrumah used gendered language, for example “each man as an end in himself”. This may be construed as ambiguous and, from a feminist standpoint, as sexist and patriarchal. Although this may be accepted on theoretical grounds, there is no doubt that it does not reflect Nkrumah’s practice and treatment of women – especially during the struggle for the independence of Ghana (Nkrumah 1963b:116, 118 & 201). In this regard, it should be noted that Nkrumah was the first sub-Saharan president to appoint a woman in his cabinet. Furthermore, Nkrumah’s ethics as espoused in *Consciencism* is against racism in theory and practice. For this reason, the answer to the question of whether his Pan-Africanism was racist is a definite NO (Nkrumah 1979:64–67, Amamoo 2007:84).

reflections on African unity, Nkrumah adopted a “dynamic political philosophy” as a guide to liberation. This is the meaning of his book *Consciencism*. He also wrote his famous treatise *Africa Must Unite* and delivered many speeches on African unity. The crown of his commitment to African unity was the inclusion in independent Ghana’s constitution of the provision for the partial or full surrender of the country’s sovereignty for the sake of African unity. Article 2 (Realisation of African unity) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1960 (page 6) reads as follows:

In the confident expectation of an early surrender of sovereignty to a union of African States and territories, the People now confer on Parliament the power to provide for the surrender of the whole or any part of the sovereignty of Ghana: [p]rovided that the sovereignty of Ghana shall not be surrendered or diminished on any grounds other than the furtherance of African unity.

Nkrumah also had contact with other Pan-Africanist thinkers like Padmore and Du Bois. “To these historic figures Ghana opened her doors on attainment of independence. They

died citizens of Ghana” (Mazrui 1969:61). In *Africa Must Unite*, especially Chapter 15, Nkrumah mentioned these figures and admitted their influence on his intellectual development with regard to Pan-Africanism.

Nkrumah’s faced serious challenges to his Pan-Africanism. Some of these challenges persist and others have even intensified. The persistence of these challenges illustrates the relevance of Nkrumah’s political philosophy to contemporary African and world politics (Mazrui 2004:3). Biney argues that the OAU’s transformation into the AU was aimed at arresting Africa’s increasing powerlessness in the harsh economic environment, which was a rekindling of Nkrumah’s ambitions for greater political and economic unity. Despite the differences on the ways of attaining unity and integration, “Nkrumah’s economic, political, and cultural thought continues to have a contemporary relevance to a new generation of politicians, scholars, and African people” (Biney 2011:9).

Having contextualised Nkrumah’s call for African unity, the question that arises is: On which theory did Nkrumah rely to ground and guide his call? Nkrumah’s political philosophy was complex. It was inspired, for example, by his African heritage, Christianity, Islam, Western civilisation, Marxism and Pan-Africanism. For the present purpose, Pan-Africanism is selected as the relevant theory that provided the grounding and served as an intellectual guide to Nkrumah’s pursuit of African unity.

The traditional concept of Pan-Africanism calls for solidarity among African peoples, culturally and politically (Chrisman 1973:2). Here the emphasis is on the oneness of the African peoples in terms of culture and politics. With regard to culture, there is a problem because Africa does not have a monolithic culture. The multitude of cultures of Africa has “family affinities” but they are different. Thus, the call for African cultural solidarity is an appeal to these multiple cultures to work together towards the construction of a future common African culture. The same is true with regard to political solidarity among the peoples of Africa. Nkrumah expressed a similar view when he showed the link between sports and African unity. According to him, sports had to take Africans (especially the youth) from one African country to another. This could teach them that “all Africans are

brothers with a common destiny” (Nkrumah 1979:31). This lesson could assist in creating a common African culture in the name of African unity.

Pan-Africanism is also conceived as a strategy. This understanding of Pan-Africanism construes it as a means to achieve African unity. The ultimate goal is to achieve the political and economic independence of Africa as a continent (Ofuately-Kodjoe 1986:17). At this point, the exclusivist aspect of Pan-Africanism can be shed. Nkrumah also accepted this kind of Pan-Africanism. He argued that “it is only when full political unity has been achieved that we will be able to declare the triumphant end of the Pan-Africanist struggle and the African liberation movements” (Nkrumah 2007:140).

It is apparent from the above paragraphs that Pan-Africanism is relevant to the present study because it has already been made concrete in ways that show the voluntary emigration of peoples of African origin back to Africa (especially to Ghana and Angola) and the AU's recognition of the African diaspora as its Sixth Region (*New African* 2012c:20).

The question arising from this is: By what path or means can Pan-Africanism achieve the unity of the African peoples as the vehicle for the betterment of their lives? One of the points to ponder in attempting to answer this question is that it is the independent sovereign African states which are the prime movers of the quest for African unity. All African states describe themselves constitutionally as sovereign. In practice, they carry over this specific feature of their self-description into their mutual relations with states in and outside Africa. For this and other reasons already stated above, the discussion on sovereignty follows.

SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty is a political and legal concept of state. Exercising the right to sovereignty does impact the economic and social spheres of any state. Here the focus on sovereignty is intended to illustrate why and how it remains one of the enduring obstacles to and at

the same time a potential promoter of Africa's unification. Nkrumah's argument for the full surrender of sovereignty is particularly important in this regard. It also shows that the burden of economic bondage to the former colonial masters and other rich states continues to be a brake on the full exercise of sovereignty by African countries, and identifies the pressures on sovereignty brought about by the contemporary "human rights culture" and economic globalisation. As such, it is particularly relevant to the question of how African unity can be achieved under the auspices of Pan-Africanism.

As stated previously, in Political Science, sovereignty refers to an entity vested with original power (especially the power to make laws) that has no other power above or superior to it (Laski 1963:50). Sovereignty is the status of states as legal equals under international law, according to which they are supreme internally and subject to no higher external authority. State sovereignty has four aspects: territory, population, authority and recognition (Biersteker & Weber 1996:46). This definition of sovereignty agrees with the intention to conduct the present study as a philosophical project. It is thus not a historical project aimed at studying the evolution of sovereignty in Western political thought or to engage with the theories on sovereignty emanating from Western thought (Sabine 1961:405–411, 467–472). Suffice to state that by adopting the Western paradigm of sovereignty and describing themselves in its terms, African states became part of the Western heritage in respect of their political philosophy. There is no doubt that the African accession to this heritage has subsequently been the subject of criticism. However, even this is not the specific point or focus of the current study. The focus of this study is limited to how African accession to the Western paradigm of sovereignty continues to play a role in African politics in general and Pan-Africanism in particular.

With reference to the search for African unity in the context of the AU, it is imperative to recognise that "member states must be prepared to make the necessary sacrifice in terms of surrender of sovereignty a *sine qua non* of the effective functioning of supranational organizations" (Thompson 1993:744). In this, Thompson echoes Nyerere, who stated that the constituent parts of Africa should cease to have power in certain vital matters given over to an "all-African body" in achieving the objectives of unity. There must only be one

authority in Africa in relation to the outside world (Nyerere 1975:329). It is crucial to emphasise that Nyerere argued for the cession of sovereignty with regard to “vital” matters.

Nkrumah argued that the surrender of sovereignty in whole or in part was a basic question in the quest for African unity. This question was crucial at the OAU’s founding conference. Haile Selassie argued that in the pursuit of African unity, the different histories, diverse cultures and different political systems of African states had to be recognised. He also argued that the struggle for African unity could not succeed without agreement on the extent to which state sovereignty should be surrendered. For him, debate over these issues did not have to stand in the way of progress towards African unity in the name of Pan-Africanism (Haile Selassie 1963:4–5).

The then prime minister of Uganda, Milton Obote, argued in favour of the need for the partial surrender of sovereignty at the founding conference of the OAU. He stated that he held “the view that however nice one may feel as complete master of one's own house” (Obote 1963:3). Acknowledging the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another sovereign state, he conceded that it was time to create a supranational organisation, “an African Central Legislature and Executive body” with power specific to actions that were undesirable if control was divided among states, asserting that the principle of non-interference was not absolute. He suggested setting up the African Common Market, economic planning on a continental basis, collective defence, a common foreign policy, a common development bank and a common monetary zone (Obote 1963:3). He said the list was not limited to these enumerations but he hoped that a committee of experts would be appointed at the conference to investigate ways on how to achieve closer economic and political union among the independent African states and produce a report for the heads of state (Obote 1963:4).

It is important to note that Article IV of the OAU Charter states that “each independent sovereign African state shall be entitled to become a member of the Organisation” (OAU Charter 1963:3). Article 29(1) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU 2000) states that “any African state may, at any time after entry into force of this Act, notify the

Chairman of the Commission of its intention to accede to this Act and to be admitted as a member of the Union” (OAU Charter 1963:10). It is evident that the term “sovereign” is excluded here, in contrast to Article IV of the OAU Charter. The omission, however, does not detract from the conceptual understanding of the state as the bearer of sovereignty. Furthermore, Article 3(b) expressly states that one of the union’s objectives is to “defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states” (OAU Charter 1963:4). It follows then that even in the context of the AU, the doctrine of sovereignty is retained. Sovereignty is, therefore, elemental and fundamental to the examination of the quest for African unity as originally conceived by Nkrumah and as currently pursued in the context of the AU.

For Nkrumah, sovereignty included the right to exercise effective control over the natural and mineral resources of a state. It also included the right to exercise jurisdiction over the airspace of a state as well as over its oceans. The unhindered (here meaning lack of questionable interference by other states) exercise of this right is vital for the economic development of a state. Against this background, Nkrumah argued that economic emancipation was a vital ingredient for the meaningful liberation of Africa. Without such emancipation, independent African states would remain trapped in neo-colonialism. For as long as they remain in neo-colonialism, independent African states could not exercise their sovereignty in full (Nkrumah 1979:139–140).

The pressures on sovereignty brought about by the contemporary “human rights culture” and economic globalisation are studied here particularly in the context of neo-colonialism. The problem of neo-colonialism was recognised quite explicitly at the founding conference of the OAU. Former president of Tunisia Habib Bourguiba stated during his address:

...decolonization implies not only the end of all forms of colonial domination, but also the elimination of all those consequences which tend to perpetuate the influence of colonialism and to encourage its aims, avowed or clandestine. It often occurs that when, political emancipation is won, there is no clear-cut frontier between dependence and freedom (Bourguiba 1963:2).

Neo-colonialism and neo-liberalism are the visible features of the contemporary African state. These features provide soft landing for the human rights culture driven by the West.

With regard to human rights, it is very important to note that it is exactly these rights that inspired and motivated the liberation struggles in all of Africa. These struggles were based on the African peoples' understanding of human dignity, a concept that is indispensable to any discourse on human rights. The vocabulary of human rights was already present at the founding conference of the OAU. For example, former president of Cameroon Ahmadou Ahidjo argued that the oppressive situation in Southern Africa was "a challenge to human rights" (Ahidjo 1963:3). His explicit reference to human rights is significant for three reasons. First, it was consistent with one of the purposes of Article II of the OAU Charter, which was "to promote international cooperation, having regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". Second, it dispelled the delusion that the "culture of human rights was new to Africa's struggle for independence. Third, the recognition and respect for human rights found concrete expression in Africa when the exercise of the right to sovereignty was challenged. The core of the challenge pertains to the interpretation of Article III, numbers 2 and 3 of the "Principles", of the OAU Charter (1963:4): "Non-interference in the internal affairs of States" (Principle 2) and "Respect for the sovereignty and integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence" (Principle 3).

A strict interpretation of these two principles means absolute prohibition of interference in the internal affairs of one state by one or more states. The implication is that the good and the bad that prevail within a particular state are matters that fall exclusively within its jurisdiction. Thus, human rights violations within a state must leave other states paralysed despite the immorality of the violations. This strict interpretation was challenged when former president of Uganda Idi Amin violated the human rights of his own citizens. The OAU seemed paralysed by the strict interpretation of the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. Nyerere (as the president of Tanzania) decided that such "gross violation of human rights" could not go unchallenged and therefore authorised military intervention, without the approval of the OAU (Ramosé 2000:197–

216). It is clear that Nyerere could have been charged with violating Principles 2 and 3 of Article III of the OAU Charter. It is equally clear that he could have invoked Article II of the OAU Charter and relied in his defence on the purpose “to promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. Would this situation have placed the OAU in a stalemate or instant paralysis? Nyerere’s successful challenge of the OAU shows that the strict interpretation of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state may not be upheld, especially when it comes to the violation of human rights. The difficult question in this context is: Does mere violation of human rights justify intervention in the internal affairs of another state or is it only “gross violation” that permits intervention?

Exercising the right to sovereignty has played and continues to play a role in the quest for African unity. It shows that the human rights culture brought about by economic globalisation has intensified the challenge to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another state. The technological revolution, especially in the area of communications, has made the challenge even more difficult. Thus, contemporary economic globalisation has brought new questions about the meaning of sovereignty. It has not, however, obliterated it. Instead, it has brought about a new phase in the interpretation of nations (Camilleri & Falk 1992:44–55). Against this background, the focus is now turned to the state as a sovereign entity in the search for African unity through federalism.

FEDERALISM

States are normally the main entities in a federal or confederal constitution. However, in some cases, ethnic or cultural groups may be the main actors in a federal or confederal constitution. Examples of these are the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Ogene 2001), the Federal Republic of Germany, the Swiss Confederation and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Ethiopia has moved through several transitions from empire to federation (Kinfe 2001). From these examples, it can be seen that Africa has experienced federal constitutionalism. Africa can thus learn from her own experiences and even

borrow from the experiences outside the continent. The debate around federalism in the context of the quest for African unity is backed by a wealth of experience that can result in a proper judgement on the desirability of either a unitary or a federal constitution for an all-Africa union government.

As stated previously, Rodee *et al.* (1967) differentiate between a confederation and a federation. The crux of their distinction is that states which exist as independent entities may voluntarily come together and retain their full sovereignty but commit to act unanimously on all major issues (including amending basic law), thus forming a confederation. In contrast, a federal union is established when independent state entities come together voluntarily and commit to cede part of their sovereignty in exchange for the advantages to be gained from such union (Rodee *et al.* 1967:56).

Mitrany (1965:129) states that the “federal system rests on a settled balance of power; any addition to the central functions alters that balance, and with cumulative and permanent effect”. According to Mitrany, a federation unites but it also has restricting characteristics. It is based on a “rigid division of powers and functions between territorial authorities” that have equal status and the division is “usually and necessarily laid down in a written constitution, provided with an armoury of safeguards against its being easily tampered with” (Mitrany 1966:153). His evaluation of a federation as defined is that even if a federation has many virtues, it is nevertheless “a combination of rigidities” with regard to its form and functioning (Mitrany 1966:155–156). By virtue of its character as “a combination of rigidities”, a federation tends to demand binding loyalty and submission to restricted action. The constitutional approach inherent in federalism emphasises “the individual index of power”, while the functional approach emphasises “the common index of need” (Mitrany 1966:159). In this way, a federation assures cohesion and unity. Such unity and cohesion were rejected explicitly by the advocates of regionalism present at the founding conference of the OAU: “Yet, the Malagasy are very attached to their new and hard-won independence; I would not have the support of my fellow-country men were I to approve any project of association, federal or even merely confederal” (Tsiranana 1963:5).

Former Cameroonian president Ahidjo (1963:4) reaffirmed the rejection of either a federation or confederation as follows: “It seems to us that any rigid form of institution would be premature at this stage. And so, for the moment, let us have neither Federation nor Confederation. In our opinion, this will involve making a complete break with everything presently existing.” It is interesting that despite such explicit rejection (especially from the Maghreb and Francophone Africa) and given their apparent numerical majority at the founding conference, the OAU was ultimately established and the OAU Charter came into force on 13 September 1963. However, this did not lay to rest the tension between the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups on the best method to achieve African unity.

The Monrovia group argued that unity should be achieved gradually, through economic cooperation. It did not support the ideal of a political federation (Boateng 2003:107; Nkrumah 1963b:141–149). This line of argument put a high premium on understanding state sovereignty as indivisible, which meant there was no need to surrender any portion of it. The Casablanca school argued for political unification first as the means to attain African unity (Nkrumah 1963b:143). This is not surprising with regard to Nkrumah because he argued the same when speaking about the political independence of Ghana. His thesis emphasising the importance of first attaining the political kingdom (Nkrumah 1979d:4) is well-known in African politics. He transferred this argument to the question of African unity. His argument was a big challenge to state sovereignty because he regarded the surrender of full or partial sovereignty as indispensable to the attainment of African unity (Nkrumah 1963b:148–149). Once this had happened, economic integration could proceed (Nkrumah 1963b:172).

The Monrovia and Casablanca groups represented two different and contending approaches to African unity. However, the two groups converged on the necessity for integration and co-operation in order to attain African unity (Nkrumah 1963b:146–147).

The argument of the Monrovia group fitted well into the design of the Western powers, namely regionalism in Africa. The colonial powers (for example France) thought that the unity of specific clusters of states of Africa as one region was preferable to the unity of the entire continent (Davidson 2007:120–121). France's official view on this preference was contained in the Jeanneney Report of 1963. "On the key question of unity, the Jeanneney Report is quite clear. The report is in favour of it, provided it is not all-African unity" (Wallerstein 1969:132–133). However, Pan-African unity (which Nkrumah advocated) is an argument for the unity of all African states acting and speaking as one voice in the international political arena. In his speech to Ghana's National Assembly on 6 August 1960, Nkrumah emphasised unity in action and speech:

The African struggle for independence and unity must begin with political union. A loose confederation of economic co-operation is deceptively time-delaying. It is only a political union that will ensure a uniformity in our foreign policy projecting the African personality and presenting Africa as a force important to be reckoned with. ...A political union envisages a common foreign and defence policy, and rapid, social, economic and industrial developments (Nkrumah 1979:134).

This kind of African unity is what "France, the United States of America and their Western allies have feared from the very beginning of the movement for an All-African unity, and continue to resist" (Wallerstein 1969:135). The West's fear and resistance to an all-Africa unity stems from their understanding that if the quest for African unity succeeds, the global political system shall be transformed against their will to preserve it as the system that is beneficial to them (Wallerstein 1969:249; Meredith 2005:386–387).

Part of the reason for the enduring tension is the formal institutionalisation of the specialised commissions provided for in the OAU Charter. In practice, the commissions could function better on a small-scale (that is, regional basis) as opposed to embarking on all-Africa projects. However, this does not mean that it is theoretically impossible to conceive of the contrary. One of the major problems of this theoretical conception is that the paralysing poverty of most African countries carrying the heavy burden of foreign debt means that financial participation in an all-Africa project is at present a remote possibility. Thus, RECs appear to be a viable option for the time being.

Wallerstein (1969) described the tension that existed between the two groups, and his insights are applicable to the contemporary quest for African unity. According to him, the difference between the two groups boiled down to those who viewed unity as an alliance and those who regarded it as a movement. The core element of the concept of unity as alliance is the wisdom “never to commit oneself beyond recall”, whereas the concept of unity as a movement demands that a choice once made should be binding so that it may “not be altered with ease lest the ardour of the supporters be dissipated” (Wallerstein 1969:112–113). This distinction has played and continues to play a crucial role in the quest for African unity (Wallerstein 1969:113–128).

Interestingly, the same distinction underpinned and continues to underpin both the evolution and the debate on the establishment of the EU. The history of the EU spans a long period, beginning with the Treaty of Rome which established the EEC. This, however, is not the specific point of discussion here. Rather, the focus is the problem of whether or not to surrender sovereignty. Laursen (2011:12) explains it thus:

Some of the founding fathers of the European Communities were inspired by the idea of dividing sovereignty. They did not believe in intergovernmental cooperation. They created a new system in Europe with the ‘pooling and delegation’ of sovereignty to common supranational institutions. ...Since, the beginning, in the early 1950s, integration in Europe has expanded its functional scope. ...Despite the relative success of European integration, federalism has remained a controversial concept. Nationalists do not believe in sharing sovereignty. Whenever the term ‘federalism’ has been used it has elicited strong opposition, especially in the UK.

It is significant that Laursen refers to the “functional scope”, implying functionalism as the approach adopted in establishing the EU. It is noteworthy that he underlines some EU member states’ resentment of federalism. Brexit, the United Kingdom's (UK) impending exit from the EU, is a case in point.

The continuing tension may be illustrated by the following example. Forere (2012) argues that talk of the United States of Africa is premature due to the lack of OAU/AU legally-based economic integration among the various RECs in Africa. As RECs are not legally

bound to advance towards economic integration; the tendency is that such communities regard themselves as ends in themselves and not as means for attaining African unity. She shows, with reference to the extensive empirical study of ECOWAS and SADC, that much still has to be done within each REC before there can be talk of substantial economic integration. She concludes by saying that for as long as the RECs are not building blocks of African unity by law and deliberate intent, talk of the United States of Africa is premature (Forere 2012:50–54). This line of argument places Forere in the Monrovia school.

Salami (2011) participates in this debate and does not, at first sight, fall into either the Monrovia group or the Casablanca group. Part of the reason for this is because he is focused on the legal aspects of the OAU and the AU, showing especially their negative impact on economic integration. This he does through an explicit comparative study of the OAU/AU and the EU. Because of the historical perspective he adopts in the comparative study, he is able to identify legal similarities and differences and to clarify their respective impact. He then makes proposals for specific legal reforms in order to promote economic integration. It is only at the end that Salami (2011) couches himself in the Monrovia group by regarding the RECs as building blocks of economic integration. He states:

the AEC aims to achieve by 2028, an African central bank and a single currency in six stages. As the RECs are building blocks of the AU/AEC, they are pivotal to this process according to the agenda, success of the RECs would ultimately determine the overall success of the AU/AEC agenda. However, it appears the AEC plan is lagging far behind schedule. ...This is, indeed, a far cry from what obtains at the moment, and the attainment of this in six stages, based on the current pace of integration, is inconceivable. This is largely due to the deep legal and institutional challenges facing the RECs, which have resulted in their failure to achieve their own sub-regional objectives within the time frame set for them (Salami2011:681).

Thus, it follows that from the outset, the federalist and functionalist approaches differed in terms of their quest for African unity. The reluctance of some African states to cede part of their sovereignty for the sake of achieving African unity inclined them to the functionalist approach.

FUNCTIONALISM

As stated earlier, Mitrany (1966) was one of the earliest advocates of functionalism. His exposition of this theory focused on integration and co-operation among sovereign states, such as the establishment of the EEC– which later became the EU. Since the legal framework of the OAU (now the AU) has been shown to have been inspired by that of the EEC (Salami 2011:669), the unfolding debate of the EU on the doctrine of sovereignty deserves special attention (Kiiver 2010:578–588; Murkens 2010:530–550). It is thus pertinent to focus on functionalism as expounded by Mitrany and his successors. The aim is to show that a critical exposition of this theory will assist in identifying the strengths and weaknesses of integration and co-operation in the quest for African unity.

Mitrany introduced the contest between federalism and functionalism by defining federalism as a political theory arguing for the retention of a “substantial separate identity” in bringing together provinces or countries for a common purpose. He explains that in a federation, there is usually “a degree of close kinship or historical relationship, and a will to unity...Hitherto federation has indeed merely created a new and larger political unit which in the process did bring peace within the group, but it has not been proved that its creation necessarily contributed also to peace between it and other groups” (Mitrany 1966:152). With this argument, Mitrany (1966:162) constructed the basis for the paradigmatic contention between federalism and functionalism. The demise of the three initial federations of post-colonial Africa (namely, French North Africa, French West Africa and British East Africa) at the dawn of African independence lent support to Mitrany’s argument that it was yet to be proved that the creation of a federation necessarily contributed to peace between it and other groups. It also brought to the fore the need for an alternative to a federation. Functionalism is deemed to satisfy such a need because of its potential to promote integration leading to unity.

Mitrany explained the essential difference between the federalist and functionalist approaches by defining and evaluating federalism (as done in the previous paragraphs). He identified the following as the main features of the functionalist approach:

- (1) Complementarity, in the sense that in functionalism the schemes devised arise from a need and the pursuit of the need involves helping one another (Mitrany 1966:162).
- (2) Because of the focus on need, functionalist schemes can be independent of one another in the sense that they can have “an autonomous existence” and pursue “an autonomous development” (Mitrany 1966:162).
- (3) The opt-out possibility is the third feature of functionalist schemes. Any member of a scheme may opt out at any time – in accordance with the rules, of course – as they deem fit. Conversely, new members may be admitted at any time in accordance with the rules (Mitrany 1966:162).
- (4) Interest-oriented choice is possible in functionalist arrangements. This means that a country can “take part only in activities in which they have interest...Functional ‘neutrality’ is possible; political ‘neutrality’ is not” (Mitrany 1966:162).
- (5) The mitigation of “the obstinate problem of equal sovereignty” (Mitrany 1966:163).

It is evident that these characteristics fall within the meaning of unity as an alliance (referred to above). These five features of the functionalist approach cumulatively define functionalism. The main idea in this definition is the principle of allowing sovereignty free reign to respond to the satisfaction of its needs and pursue its interests together with other sovereigns without binding it to a virtually irrevocable constraint and restriction of its activity. This is the essential difference between functionalism and federalism (Mitrany 1966:164).

Mitrany (1966:205) evaluated functionalism and posited:

the functional approach does not offend the sentiment of nationality or the pride of sovereignty. Instead of a fictitious formal equality, it offers even to the weakest

countries the assurance of non-domination and of an equality of opportunity in the working benefits of any functional activity in which it participates...functional arrangements have the patent virtue of technical self-determination.

Coming to the relevance of the preceding discussion on federalism and functionalism to Nkrumah's thinking in order to assess whether or not he was a functionalist, we must take into account the distinction already made between unity as an alliance and unity as a movement. The distinction is important background for understanding the position Nkrumah espoused.

Nkrumah (1979:190) stated:

African states must either federate and survive or disintegrate and perish i.e. selling themselves to their former colonial masters or to some other foreign powers. I believe that a Union of the independent African states is not only necessary but vital to the maintenance of our independence and sovereignty. It is only if we are united that we can develop our resources and potentialities to our mutual benefit. We can also use our united strength to plead the cause of peace and secure the common objectives which we all seek.

It is significant that Nkrumah used the term "federate". This evidently commits him to the preference for federalism as the means to attain African unity. This interpretation is supported by the following observation of Wallerstein (1969:112):

even Nkrumah, later considered one of the foremost advocates of *all-Africa* unity, at one time showed the same uncertainty. He wrote in 1962: 'Twenty years ago my ideas on African unity, important as I considered them even at that time, were limited to the West African unity. Today...I see the wider horizon of the immense possibilities open to Africans-the only guarantee in fact, for survival-in a total continental political union of Africa'

Although it is true that Nkrumah changed his mind about federalism, his reconsideration is problematic. The problem lies in the fact that even before 1962, he expressed his preference for functionalism without actually using the word. In his speech "Positive action conference for peace and security in Africa" which he delivered in Accra on 7 April 1960, he declared:

believe[s] that ...independent African states should be able, even before actual political union takes place, to enter into an African treaty organisation whereby experts can work out details of the measures and the fields in which co-operation can take place immediately, and the elimination of waste through harmful competition can be realised first in the economic and social fields and later in others (Nkrumah 1979:55).

Here, Nkrumah spoke the language of co-operation based on unity of alliance as defined above. He spoke the language of functionalism even if his scope might have been limited to West Africa. Here “political union” is placed second in the sense that it will be the result of economic and social co-operation in specified areas. This is the process of integration underpinned by functionalism (Mitrany 1965:135).

Four months later, after expanding his scope of Africa beyond West Africa to embrace the whole of the African continent, Nkrumah (1979:134) declared:

[T]he African struggle for independence and unity must begin with political union. A loose confederation of economic co-operation is deceptively time-delaying. It is only a political union that will ensure a uniformity in our foreign policy projecting the African personality and presenting Africa as a force important to be reckoned with. I repeat, a loose economic co-operation means a screen behind which detractors, imperialist and colonialist protagonists and African puppet leaders hide to operate and weaken the concept of any effort to realise African unity and independence. A political union envisages a common foreign and defence policy, and rapid social, economic and industrial developments.

Here Nkrumah elevated political union to number one status, thus positing the thesis of political unification first as the means of attaining African unity.

Nkrumah’s prioritisation of political union over economic and social co-operation commits him to federalism, “a combination of rigidities” under a written constitution. His emphatic rejection of “a loose confederation” underlines his choice of federalism. Yet, this contradicts his choice of economic co-operation even before the formation of a political union. This contradiction between federalism and functionalism reveals Nkrumah’s vacillation between the two theories on integration leading to unification. It also underscores the contestation and tension between the two theories. Finally, it shows the

difficulty of labelling Nkrumah unambiguously either as a federalist or as a functionalist. This ambiguity is manifested in the practical pursuit of African unity.

Nkrumah's expansion of the scope of African unity from West Africa to include the entire continent of Africa was a direct challenge to France. France demanded that African unity be restricted to African regions connected to the French monetary zone, especially West Africa (Wallerstein 1969:132–133). This demand was not peculiar to France; it was the basic position of “all the Western countries” (Wallerstein 1969:135). This underlines that the logic and intention of decolonisation were to retain and continue the colonial powers' economic power, which had been acquired unjustly in the first place (Ramose 2003:466–467). The West remains resolutely determined to preserve this *status quo*. In view of this, Nkrumah's advocacy for all-Africa unity cannot be construed but as an African call to revolution aimed at the radical transformation of the dominant global economic system for the betterment of the lives of Africans and humankind as a whole (Wallerstein 1969:249–253). This was one of the fundamental points made at the founding conference of the OAU, with Abboud (1963:3) stating:

...through preparing to undertake this constructive role, we believe that the rest of the world will be impelled to fulfil its obligations towards us. We do not ask the big powers merely to refrain from interfering in our affairs or to desist from meddling in our inter-African relations. We demand that these powers undertake and fulfil their responsibilities towards bridging the gulf which separates the haves from the have-nots. We demand fair returns for our primary products in world markets, returns which are commensurate with our efforts and which cannot be achieved by fluctuating prices. If they are truly desirous of world peace, we believe that these same powers should devote more of their technical resources to enable us to industrialize our raw materials in order to raise the economic and social standard of our peoples.

The necessity of African unity, as understood by Nkrumah, was fundamentally the call for an African revolution – which was also understood and advocated by Fanon. Like Nkrumah, Fanon placed primacy on African unification over “loose confederations”. He argued that Africa

...must understand that it is no longer possible to advance by regions, that, like a great body that refuses any mutilation, she must advance in totality, that there will

not be one Africa that fights against colonialism and another that attempts to make arrangements with colonialism. Africa, that is to say the Africans, must understand that there is never any greatness in procrastination and that there is never any dishonour in saying what one is and what one wants and that in reality the cleverness of the colonized can in the last analysis only be his courage, the lucid consciousness of his objectives and his alliances, the tenacity that he brings to his liberation (Fanon 1967:192–193).

While underlining his choice of federalism in the above way, Fanon at the same time emphasised the necessity to act with courage, lucidity of purpose and tenacity in bringing about Africa's liberation. To these he added a vital warning:

Our mistake, the mistake we Africans made, was to have forgotten that the enemy never withdraws sincerely. He never understands. He capitulates, but he does not become converted. Our mistake is to have believed that the enemy had lost his combativeness and harmfulness. If Lumumba is in the way, Lumumba disappears. Hesitation in murder has never characterised imperialism (Fanon 1967:196).

In light of the above, it is important to acknowledge the difficulty of placing Nkrumah squarely and unequivocally among federalist or functionalist thinkers. It is, however, reasonable to suggest that given his revolutionary position and the impetus he gave to the project of African unity, Nkrumah was ultimately a federalist. This can also be seen by the federation attempts he initiated with Ghana's neighbours and Western Africa, also later on with the argument he put forward to the free African States' leaders at the founding of the OAU. Yet he conceded to the constitutional structure of the OAU despite his convictions. According to this structure, the heads of state and government remain – even with the OAU becoming the AU – the ultimate collective decision makers determining direction and policy. They do so without conceding any part of their sovereignty. From this point of view, the OAU was structurally as functionalist as the AU is today. The road to African unity is functionalist, while its basic inspiration is revolutionary. Does this mean the revolution is lost? I attempt to provide an answer to this important question in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.

CONCLUSION

This chapter focused on contextualising Nkrumah's philosophical argument for the necessity of African unity. Pan-Africanism was shown to be the basic philosophical statement on African unity. Since sovereign states are deemed major actors in the pursuit of African unity, their sovereign character was discussed. This was extended to a critical discussion of both federalism and functionalism as options for sovereign action leading to African unity. In this context, the enduring tension between the Casablanca and Monrovia groups was discussed. This was followed by a discussion on the question of whether Nkrumah was a federalist or a functionalist. It was concluded that ultimately Nkrumah can best be described as a federalist because of his commitment to the African revolution. The next chapter focuses on sovereignty, the colonial state and Pan-African unity.

CHAPTER 3

SOVEREIGNTY, THE COLONIAL STATE AND PAN-AFRICAN UNITY

INTRODUCTION

The issues of sovereignty, the colonial state and Pan-African unity are examined in this chapter. Sovereignty is discussed in order to identify its Westphalian character and to establish whether the Westphalian understanding of sovereignty is relevant to African politics since independence. The problems arising from the territorial boundaries established through colonialism are also discussed, especially in light of the quest for Pan-African unity. Furthermore, the extent to which the colonial borders and the sovereignty principle have retarded the economic and cultural development of the continent is examined. Africa's independence from colonialism and how independence was received by the sovereign states and their former colonial masters are also discussed.

I show how even after independence the newly-minted states remained colonial states and how this is still a problem prevalent in the contemporary politics of the continent. In order to make use of its vast natural resources for the betterment of its peoples, to survive in the new world order, and to have a voice in global affairs, Africa has to unite. For this objective to come to fruition, different approaches were put forward. These debates and Africa's conundrum in terms of the mode of unity are discussed. I refer to contemporary Pan-Africanists and deliberate on the current state of affairs and how the unity project is practiced and accepted.

STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE PLAGUE OF COLONIAL BORDERS

In Nkrumah's view, Africa's colonial borders stood in the way of continental unity. The arbitrary carving up of the continent according to the whims of the colonial powers, with no consideration afforded to the peoples of Africa, created a rift between people and cultures and ultimately led to never-ending conflict. Even though African states endorsed

these random borders, at the founding meeting of the OAU in 1963, Nkrumah expressed his strong belief that Africa had to unite (“stand together”) or fall. To this effect, “his” Ghana made concessions in its constitution for the partial or full surrender of its sovereignty.

Sovereignty continues to be understood as a quality of the state. It means that the state has the original and sole authority to make its own laws for its territorial area, including its airspace and the sea under its control. According to this understanding, the boundaries of a state must be fixed. Until the second half of the twentieth century, international boundaries were subject to change arising from diplomatic agreements and military conflict. Following World War II, there was international consensus on the territorial integrity norm – a principle that in order to prevent armed conflict, the existing boundaries of states should be treated as unchangeable. While this led to the preservation of colonial era boundaries that retarded economic and cultural development in Africa, the frequency of wars over territory has declined (Rodrigue 2015). Furthermore, the understanding that the state has the original and sole authority to make its own laws is extended to its relations with other states. This means that the state has the right to determine its relations with other states without recognising any other state as its superior (Laski 1963:46–47).

The above definition of sovereignty is consistent with the one characterising the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. Parkinson (1977:44) states:

[T]he Treaty of Westphalia laid the formal basis of the new international order. It provided a watershed in at least three senses. First, it terminated the wars of religion occasioned by the Reformation; second, it finally reduced Pope and Emperor to the status of mere princes on a footing of equality; and, third, it legitimised an international order based on the existence of independent, sovereign states.

Upon the achievement of political independence, African states invariably adopted this Westphalian understanding of sovereignty. Therefore, the postcolonial state is the Westphalian state in that independence meant overhauling the concept of the state but in a colonial make-up. This can be shown with reference to the Constitutive Act of the

African Union. It must be borne in mind that the provisions referred to here are the continuation of similar provisions contained in the 1963 OAU Charter. The OAU formally and explicitly proclaimed the new doctrine, according to which existing borders had to be accepted, in 1963 (Touval 1967:102). In this way, continuity was preserved from the moment of political independence.

Article II (1) (c) of the OAU Charter states that one of the purposes of the organisation is “to defend” the “sovereignty”, “territorial integrity” and “independence” of member states. There is a logical and substantive connection between the three concepts in successive order. The underlying argument is that the sovereign must have title to a specific territory with recognised boundaries (including a population) and that independence is an inherent competence of the sovereign. Article III (3) of the OAU Charter reinforces this understanding. It affirms the principle of “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence” (OAU Charter 1963:4). Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union substantially repeats and reaffirms this argument. The only difference is that the words “inalienable right to independent existence” are omitted.

In addition, Article 4(b) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union retains the concept of fixed territorial boundaries. It provides for “respect of borders existing on achievement of independence” (AU 2000). This recognises the boundaries erected through colonialism and is committed to their preservation. Nkrumah argued against this “curse of Berlin” (Adebajo 2010). This means that “the beneficiaries of decolonisation thereby Africanised the European partition, preoccupation with consolidating their individual power-bases was already taking precedence over attempts to create more effective regional centres of economic or political power” (Hargreaves 1988:203).

Furthermore, both the OAU Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union establish the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states in Articles III, 2 and 4(g), respectively. The principle of non-interference reaffirms that the sovereign may not have any political-legal authority above itself. The conclusion drawn from the

foregoing characterisation of sovereignty and Africa's assimilation of the same features is that at political independence, the postcolonial state was established in Africa through the adoption and preservation of the Westphalian concept of sovereignty. It is the enduring model for conducting politics in and outside Africa. The "post" here refers to the "yet-to-end exploitation and denigration of African humanity...the unfulfilled dreams of the independence achievements of the 1960s" (Eze 1997:14). The bottom line is that colonial borders should be maintained, which altered the history of the continent irrevocably. – With a few exceptions (the Eritrean and Sudanese secessions), the borders of African states today remain the same as they were at the time of the Berlin Conference. As Mazrui (1986:282) acutely points out, Africa "recapture[d] its sovereignty" but not without problems.

One of the problems is that the arbitrary erection of territorial boundaries through colonialism divided peoples and communities while at the same time bringing together peoples and communities that did not belong together culturally and historically (Shillington 1989:408). The result was that at independence, many African states had to deal with the problem of building a nation from different cultural communities sometimes maintaining hostility to one another. Africa's boundaries are one of the problems inherited at the time of political independence (Davidson 1978:206). Her boundaries remained unconsolidated, with the extension of state jurisdiction to border areas being frustrated and the state's capacity weakened, producing social instability and irredentism (Ikome 2012:2). Africa's colonial borders have been a major factor in many African states' inability to institutionalise governmental efficiency and create meaningful national consolidation. Ikome (2012:2–3) states:

[T]he arbitrariness and ill-defined character of Africa's borders and the controversy over the associated policy of border status quo maintained by Africa's governing elite since the 1960s have been emotive and sentimental. The reality of the situation is that, on the one hand, it has been practically impossible to have sustainable stability and long-term peace and security within and among many African states and, on the other, the porous and unviable African borders have resulted in the regionalisation of instability and conflict, producing chaos and even anarchy.

Another problem is that in order for the AU to function effectively, sovereign states must be prepared to surrender at least part of their sovereignty to the union (Thompson 1993:774). This is yet to happen despite Nkrumah's arguments for such surrender. This problem may be illustrated with the following example. As already stated, Article 4(g) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union prohibits interference in the internal affairs of a member state. It is, however, qualified by section (h) which makes provision for "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" (AU 2000). This provision can serve as the basis of support, even by the AU (Kagame 2011:28), for the growing international consensus regarding the responsibility/right to protect. This is the third problem concerning the Westphalian concept of sovereignty adopted and practised by African states.

Weinert (2006:151–152) explains the right to protect by resorting to his concept of democratic sovereignty. According to him, democratic sovereignty rests on two pillars: the ethical and the political. The ethical pillar is concerned with permissible conduct within and outside the state in relation to justice and the political pillar is open to consider "the construction and regulation of sovereignty as an exercise of power" (Weinert 2006:152). The point of departure of these two arms of democratic sovereignty is the fact that

...individuals require certain basic goods to live self-determined, fulfilling, productive lives and, in their pursuit of such goods, they must be free from cruelty – acts designed to terrorize and cause anguish and fear – and suffering. Cruelty and suffering curtail, even abolish, liberty and freedom, and often generate worsening conditions that devolve into breaches of international peace and security (Weinert 2006:146).

If this condition prevails in a particular state, the international community (other states) are justified to intervene in order to terminate the cruelty and suffering (also referred to as "gross violation of human rights" or "crimes against humanity"). The international community invoked the right to protect in order to justify intervention in Libya under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. The AU was divided on this matter, as the voting on UN Resolution 1973 testified. "The African members of the Security Council voted for this Resolution of the Security Council. This was contrary to what the Africa Peace and

Security Council had decided in Addis Ababa recently” (Museveni 2011:27). The AU seemed paralysed to act of its own accord and was subsequently overtaken by the UN, resulting in military attacks on Libya (Museveni 2011:23). The military strikes eventually allowed rebels to overthrow Gaddafi. The question that arises is: Could the situation have been different if, in the name of Pan-African unity as advocated by Nkrumah, a Central Command for the Defence of Africa had been established and effective? This is an important question because it shows the need for at least the partial surrender of sovereignty in order to build and promote African unity. Only when this is done will African leaders learn that they should take “care of their security” (Akomolafe 2011:34).

A further problem is that the advances in information technology challenge the political-legal understanding of sovereignty as stated above. The opportunity for the rapid exchange of visual, auditory and digital information between people within their own country and with people in other countries is a challenge to boundaries as a key element of the concept of sovereignty. Tunisia is an example of this, with the Tunisian Revolution of December 2010 leading to what became known as the Arab Spring. Some states have responded to this challenge by either blocking some information or controlling the flow and content of information through their boundaries. The fact that this is happening shows that sovereignty should now be understood in a different way (that is, it may no longer be understood as absolute and inviolable). However, this does not mean the end of sovereignty. On the contrary, it is a reaffirmation that

[t]he word “sovereign” for the highest, supreme power in a given legal order may have been a product of the feudal age, but the notion it represents had forced itself upon the human mind ever since men began to establish independent political groups, and that goes back to the dawn of time. It cannot be emphasised enough that there was sovereignty and there were sovereigns long before these terms were coined (Van Kleffens 1953:11–12).

No wonder then that even today states do not, in the name of sovereignty, submit to settlements delivered by international law unless they have given their prior consent to do so (Hartmann 1967:119).

The final problem regarding the sovereignty of Africa at independence concerns Hargreaves' thesis that decolonisation implies that the colonisers of Africa had only "the intention to terminate formal political control over specific colonial territories, and to replace it by some new relationship. This did not necessarily mean independence...to substitute collaboration for force... (Hargreaves 1988:2).

If this were not true, Nkrumah would have had no basis to be critical of neo-colonialism to the point of writing a book about it. The result of the intention to grant only political independence is that one of the characteristics of independent African states is "the non-existence of a national economy" (Wallerstein 1969:247).

In his own words, Nkrumah (1965:ix-x) described neo-colonialism thus:

The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside...The neo-colonial State may be obliged to take the manufactured products...to the exclusion of competing products from elsewhere. Control over government policy in the neo-colonial State may be secured by payments towards the cost of running the State, by the provision of civil servants in positions where they can dictate policy, and by monetary control over foreign exchange through the imposition of a banking system controlled by the imperial power.

Neo-colonialism consigned Africa to the bondage of economic dependency and debt (Makonnen 1983:133). To date, this is the condition from which Africa is yet to be liberated (Dlamini-Zuma 2013:27). To underline the vital importance of the ethical and political obligation to achieve the economic liberation of Africa, it is necessary to consider the meaning of the observation (released after more than four decades of Africa's political independence) that "famous statistic is that the whole of sub-Saharan Africa has an economy about the size of Belgium's" (Collier 2008:164). Part of the reason for this is to be found in the retention of the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and its practical application in conducting both intra-African politics and African international politics. Practice indicates that Pan-African unity cannot be achieved without the willingness of African states to surrender at least part of their sovereignty and even to consent to voluntary dissolution of statehood. The latter is particularly relevant to small states in

terms of population and poverty in natural resources that can be converted to make such countries economically viable. Nkrumah argued for this as though predicting Collier's argument that "around 30 percent of Africa's population lives in landlocked, resource-scarce countries. A reasonable case can be made that such places never should have become countries. However, the deed is done: these countries exist and will continue to do so" (Collier 2008:57).

The balkanisation of Africa into small unviable states weaken the peoples of Africa and their states. "By far the greatest wrong which the departing colonialists inflicted on us, and which we now continue to inflict on ourselves in our present state of disunity, was to leave us divided into economically unviable states which bear no possibility of real development..." (Nkrumah 1964:2). From the perspective of Pan-African unity, the continued existence of such countries and the insistence of leaders to keep their sovereignty are detrimental to achieving unity and the betterment of African people.

AFRICA'S INDEPENDENCE AND THE COLONIAL STATE: NKRUMAH'S PAN-AFRICANISM AS A SOLUTION

Africa's independence from colonialism lay very close to Nkrumah's heart. However, political independence on its own did not satisfy him. He wanted the twentieth century to be one of "colonial emancipation" which would "witness the total liberation of Africa from colonial rule and imperialist exploitation" (Nkrumah 1963b:x). He was not naive to think that independence alone would solve Africa's problems, which was why he proposed that all the independent states had to come together under one roof of political unity and tackle these problems together. This, he argued, would be the "securest safeguard of [their] hard-won freedom and the soundest foundation of [their] individual, no less than [their] common, economic, social and cultural advancement" (Nkrumah 1963b:xi, xvi).

Independence for most African states came abruptly. Most did not properly plan for the post-independence period. Successful transfer of power was actively sabotaged by European administrations, signifying their lack of commitment to African independence.

“The colonial masters continued what they called development politics for the ex-colonies, based on their intention to secure the control of resources, the economy and politics of the ex-colonies” (Monar, in Alemazung 2010:71). The colonial administrative systems were not democratic, but merely aimed at controlling the population and ensuring the continuous exploitation of natural resources. “The colonisers ruled without the consent of the people. They deposed and executed traditional rulers, when the latter failed to implement the instruction of colonial administrators or failed to serve the need of the colonial government” (Shillington 1989:356). They only put in place those who could be controlled and do their bidding.

After the formalisation of the Scramble for Africa, Africa became the main supplier of raw materials to the colonising powers. In place of the numerous pre-existing independent clan and lineage groups, empires and kingdoms, without any clearly marked boundaries, new states with fixed boundaries were established. The colonisers put together ethnic groups that were incompatible and had no history of mutual aid or support. Economic or political relationships existed for administrative purposes. “Ethnic division is one of the leading legacies of colonialism which one always comes across when assessing the colonial impacts on the continent” (Alemazung 2010:65).

The colonisers played one ethnic group off against the other to control the local populace, and everything seemed to be working fine on the outside. According to Shillington (1989:356), the colonial masters emphasised the distinction between the different ethnic groups, strengthening tribal differences and rivalries between these groups and preventing them from forming a united opposition against the colonisers. This trick of playing one group off against the other did not stop in individual countries.

According to Nkrumah (1963b:187–188), the enemies of African unity would multiply their endeavours to sidetrack the African people from their course. They would create discord and distrust to drive a wedge between Africans, play on their vanities and magnify their individual importance at the expense of one another. Suggestions would be made that certain African countries were ready to “swallow up” their neighbours, appealing to

personal ambitions. They would tell the leaders that a union of African states would have room only for one prime minister and a single cabinet would represent all of Africa at the UN. Hints would be given that some countries, due to their sheer size and the magnitude of their population, were more qualified than others to play a leadership role in Africa and to be its mouthpiece. African people need to understand that what is envisaged in the United States of Africa is the free merging of peoples with a common history and common destiny, and that the choice of the union's leadership would not depend on the size and resources of countries joining the union.

Even after the colonial administration had left, Africa remained a colonial state. “[T]he different cultural and economic associations which colonialism has forced between erstwhile European masters and Africa subjects...is creating client states, which it manipulates from the distance” (Nkrumah 1963b:xvi). The colonial powers could not leave Africa to its own devices as the continent was the source of raw materials for their factories. They thus continued to strengthen their hold over the new states, thereby creating new “colonies” they could exploit. This is still a prevalent fact in contemporary African politics. “The selfish and exploitative character of the master–colony relationship that reigned in the colonial time continued in different forms even after colonialism was long gone, and continues to impact contemporary African politics” (Alemazung 2010:65).

Nkrumah (1966) indicates that a state essentially has independence, but outside forces manipulate its economy and its political policy. This may manifest through the direct presence of the colonial powers' troops in the territory of the “independent” state or through control of its economy. For Eko(2003:98), a policy of assimilation may also exist, which implies a social process is applied by the colonial powers to absorb the cultural entities existing in their colonies and transform them to think, behave and live like the people in the metropole. These manipulations can manifest in other ways but for the purpose of this study, the focus is on economic and political factors.

Even after independence, African leaders were not politically and economically strong enough to serve their people. They were still in the clutches of the colonising powers

against which they had fought. “[T]he big Western powers could not afford to keep their hands completely off their colonies, thus they continued to influence politics and developments in these regions where their political and economic relationship was based on their colonial ties on multilateral relations and engagements” (Alemazung 2010:64). In the years after independence, they worked to shape the cultural, political and economic character of their ex-colonies.

Some of these leaders fought against continuing the inherited cultures and political dominance of the European powers, but most worked with these powers to protect their personal interests and serve as the powers’ henchmen for economic and political resources. According to Nkrumah (1963b:174), neo-colonialism in Africa takes many features: “It acts covertly, manoeuvring men and governments, free of the stigma attached to political rule. It creates client states, independent in name but in point of fact pawns of the very colonial power which is supposed to have given them independence”. He further stated that the “European power forces the conclusion of pacts with the balkanised states which give control of their foreign policy to the former” (Nkrumah 1963b:174).

Despite the fact that formal European political control had given way to African “self-rule”, the cultural and political legacy of European dominance remained evident in the national borders, political infrastructures, educational systems, national languages, economies and trade networks of each state. “The impact of colonialism, and the subsequent relationship and exchange between Africa and the West has seen the continent moved from post-independent political and economic hope for prosperity to despair and dependence on the West” (Alemazung 2010:64).

When Africa gained independence, African people had hoped that the new native governments would bring peace and prosperity. However, this failed to materialise. The colonial powers left and in their place instituted governments that were sympathetic to them and which they could control and manipulate. Obi-Ani (2005:276) elucidates the situation:

Most African leaders have remained, to the disgust of their people, western lackeys. Because most of the ruling elite in Africa depended on their ex-colonial masters for survival in offices, they lack the courage to chart a new course different from the dictates of their imperialist overlords. It is in the interest of the Western capitalists that these antagonistic groups are held together so that their economic exploitation would remain unhindered.

Nkrumah acknowledged this and admitted that many leaders of post-independent African states found themselves in positions where they were dependent on “foreign contributions” to maintain their government machinery. He stated that “[m]any of them have deliberately been made so weak economically, by being carved up into many separate countries, that they are not able to sustain out of their own resources the machinery of independent government”(Nkrumah 1963b:184). Knowing the intentions of the colonial powers and their arbitrary division and exploitation of Africa, it is indeed very distressing to see that since independence, the artificially created African states have not adjusted their boundaries nor held any kind of referendum or plebiscite.

Instead, the OAU put in its charter the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the newly-minted states. The AU endorsed this. “The beneficiaries of decolonisation thereby Africanised the European partition: pre-occupation with consolidating their individual power-bases was already taking precedence over attempts to create more effective regional centres of economic or political power” (Hargreaves 1988:203). Despite decrying the various pitfalls of colonisation, African elites that succeeded to the vacated seats of the colonisers readily defended this division: “It seems...many of the new African states cling to their new-found sovereignty as something more precious than the total well-being of Africa” (Nkrumah 1963b:158).

At independence, each of the new African states adopted the political system of the departing colonial overlord. “Unfortunately, they inherited even the autocratic style and privileges which these foreign rulers had exercised in their various dominions. The new African rulers became dictatorial, highhanded and tyrannical” (Obi-Ani 2005:277). Ndulu and O’Connell (1999:47) expound on this:

Africa's formal political institutions were young at independence, and most countries lacked a tradition of mass political participation...Political constitutions at the time of independence were modelled on their European counterparts, with British colonies inheriting parliamentary systems and French colonies republican ones with stronger executive positions...By 1975...nearly all African political regimes had cast off the trappings of pluralism and replaced them with authoritarian structures.

After more than 50 years of independence, colonial states still exist in Africa. At independence, African countries lost many social and economic institutions, their economy drained of natural resources with little opportunity to diversify the colonial export of cash crops. Suffering through famine and drought, Africa struggled to industrialise its poverty-stricken workforce within sufficient funds. To feed, educate and modernise its masses, Africa borrowed large sums from various nations, banks and companies. In return, lenders often required borrowing countries to devalue their currencies and attempted to exert political influence in them. The borrowed funds did not rehabilitate the devastated economies, but were squandered through mismanagement and corrupt dictators.

Besides the financial requirements to rebuild their battered nations, post-independent governments were often responsible for economic failures due to mismanagement and leadership flaws. The bad governance of tyrants and autocrats led to continued economic corruption and increasing poverty levels (Alemazung 2010:72). Decolonisation and the African elites' acceptance of colonial borders brought about political instability, border disputes, economic ruin and massive debt. The dependence on former colonial masters and outside aid became a reality, colonising former colonies in another form of colonisation – neo-colonisation. “[N]eo-colonialism is based upon the control of nominally independent states by giant financial interests. These interests often act through or on behalf of a particular capitalist state, but they are quite capable of acting on their own and forcing those imperial countries in which they have a dominant interest to follow their lead” (Nkrumah 1966:22).

In order to combat these neo-colonialist traits and the kleptomaniac and corrupt African elites, and affect the long-awaited African unity, there is a need for a second decolonisation driven by the actualisation of Pan-African unity. Because of the support elites receive from their former colonial masters, they negotiate their political future and stay in power with the help of outside forces instead of negotiating with their own citizens. This contributes to alienating citizens from forming a people's government to ensure that it serves their common interest. It also robs citizens of the possibility of holding their government accountable for its failures (Bates 1999:88). Africa needs a second decolonisation from the elites and economic independence from the former colonial masters to be able to make its own foreign and domestic policies without undue influence and coercion from outside forces. A new configuration of sovereignty based on Pan-African principles is also needed.

Pan-African principles are based on the struggle for social and political equality and freedom from economic exploitation and racial discrimination (Murithi 2007:2). It promotes the unity and common purpose of the African peoples (including those in the diaspora), celebrates the Africanness of the African peoples, encourages and advocates the struggle against the exploitation and oppression of Africans, and opposes any ideology of racial superiority. Murithi (2007:3) explains the purpose of Pan-Africanism as follows:

Pan-Africanism is a recognition of the fragmented nature of the existence of Africans, their marginalisation and alienation whether in their own continent or in the Diaspora...[and] seeks to respond to Africa's underdevelopment. Africa has been exploited and a culture of dependency on external assistance unfortunately still prevails on the continent.

Pan-Africanism was not just an intellectual exercise for Nkrumah. It was the ideology to liberate Africa from the clutches of oppression and exploitation. For Nkrumah, the situation in which Africa remained the richest continent while its people were counted among the poorest was unacceptable. He stated: "Africa, it is frequently maintained, is poor. Yet it is widely acknowledged that its potentials provide tremendous possibilities for the wealthy growth of the continent, already known to contain vast mineral and power resources" (Nkrumah 1963b:150). He thought that African unity was not just a sentiment

arising from a common colonial experience, but an indispensable precondition for the speediest and fullest development of the continent and the individual countries coming together in the union (Nkrumah 1963b:165). He saw Pan-Africanism defined loosely as the ideology and activism of Africans everywhere united in the battle against their underdevelopment as a redeeming force.

The African peoples have become so dependent on humanitarian and financial assistance from their former colonial masters and other Western countries that they have almost given up on trying to better their lot. If such a situation becomes the norm, then they do not strive to rely on their own capacity (Murithi 2007:2). African people are constantly competing among themselves, deprived of true ownership of their own resources, hampered by outside influences concerning what to do and how to do things, often depending on the paternalistic relations they have developed with neo-colonialist powers disguised as a benevolent hand helping them.

In truth, however, this relationship is aimed at maintaining a master–servant relationship and does not instil genuine empowerment and independence. According to Nkrumah, Pan-Africanism is the antidote to this perilous state of affairs. It is “recognition that the only way out of this existential, social, political crisis is by promoting greater solidarity among Africans” (Murithi 2007:4). Nkrumah asserted: “If we are to remain free, if we are to enjoy the full benefits of Africa’s rich resources, we must unite to plan for our total defence and the full exploitation of our material and human means, in the full interest of all our peoples” (Nkrumah 1963b:xvii).

Africans should consider Pan-Africanism as a mobilising ideology and a development blueprint. Pan-African unity will enable the continent to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing world, giving Africa better bargaining power globally. “A Union of African States must strengthen our influence on the international scene, as all Africa will speak with one concerted voice...A Union of African States will raise the dignity of Africa and strengthen its impact on world affairs” (Nkrumah 1963b:193). Unity will also enable Africa to resist Western influence and give her the ability to restrict the acceptance of measures that are

not in her interest. “But it is only when full political unity has been achieved that we will be able to declare the triumphant end of the Pan-African struggle and the African liberation movements” (Nkrumah 1963b:140).

AFRICA’S STRUGGLE FOR PAN-AFRICAN UNITY: A DIVIDED HOUSE

African unity is essential for the survival of the continent and its constituent members in the contemporary world, and to make meaningful use of the continent’s resources for the benefit of its masses. In 1963, Nkrumah put forward this idea to the African heads of state in 1963 at their first summit which culminated in the formation of the OAU. He did not merely advocate for unity that resembled African unity but for political unity in particular. He believed that political unity was the key to solving the myriad of problems that beset the continent during his time as well as those that were to come:

The unity of our continent, no less than our separate independence, will be delayed if, indeed, we do not lose it, by hobnobbing with colonialism. African Unity is, above all, a political kingdom which can only be gained by political means. The social and economic development of Africa will come only within the political kingdom, not the other way around...By creating a true political union of all the independent States of Africa, we can tackle hopefully every emergency, every enemy and every complexity (Nkrumah 1963a:2 & 7–8).

Although there is consensus on the necessity of African unity to tackle global challenges, contemporary debate on the issue centres on the mode of unification that should be adopted to achieve continental unity. “First, there were those who proposed the method of gradualism, the step-by-step integration through cooperation and collaboration among African States. Second, there were those who preferred the method of using a political decision to create a Union which will give central political direction to continental collective efforts for economic development, stability, peace and security and foreign affairs” (AU 2013:1). This debate divided and continues to divide African leaders from the OAU’s inception in 1963. “[T]here is lack of consensus in the AU on when and where should Pan-African unity begin and how it should be administered” (Okhonmina 2009:86).

During the formative days of the African unity debate, African leaders unanimously agreed on the necessity of unity but disagreed on the method of obtaining this. Nkrumah advocated for speedy unity, while other African leaders believed an incremental approach had to be taken. The latter were infatuated with their colonially inspired newly “independent” states. In fact, by the end of the summit that culminated in the OAU’s establishment, most leaders advocated for an incremental approach to continent-wide integration, believing that Nkrumah’s approach was unrealistic and impractical. “The gradualists who preferred the first [step-by-step] option carried the day. The Unionist[s], led by Nkrumah, had to sign a Charter which they considered far below their expectation” (AU 2013:1).

Chachage (2009) argues that it was Nyerere who frustrated Nkrumah when he pushed through a resolution urging the OAU to accept the colonial borders as permanent. He further states that Nyerere admitted in 1992, and later in 1997, being responsible for the resolution which was carried by a simple majority at the 1964 OAU Summit in Cairo (Chachage 2009:2). “The Cairo Summit is remembered mainly for the declaration of the heads of state of independent Africa to respect the borders inherited from colonialism. The principle of non-interference in internal affairs of member states of the OAU had been enshrined in the Charter itself” (Nyerere, in Touray 2015:1). Thus they defeated the purpose of unity before it started.

African leaders still aspire to African unity today but, like their predecessors, they continue to debate whether to follow an immediate approach or an incremental approach. However, it seems that the incremental approach continues to hold sway. Contemporary leaders seem no more ready for continent-wide unity than the fathers of the OAU did, since they are unwilling to surrender any part of their sovereignty. Prominent contemporary Pan-Africanists include former Libyan president Arab Jamahiriya, late Libyan president Gaddafi and former South African president Mbeki.

Gaddafi advanced the idea of a United States of Africa at two regional African summits: in June 2007 in Guinea and in February 2009 in Ethiopia (BBC News 2009). He believed

that only a true Pan-African state could provide stability and prosperity to Africa. According to the BBC, when he became the chairperson of the AU in 2009, he told the assembled heads of state that he would continue to insist that the sovereign countries should work to achieve the “United States of Africa”. He even suggested that Africa should have a single currency to challenge the dominance of the US Dollar and the Euro, a single passport for Africans to move freely around the continent and a single military force. It was reported that he said that the federation may extend as far west as the Caribbean to include a large number of the African diaspora (*The Guardian* 2009). Gaddafi was a long-time supporter of uniting the distinct African countries into a cohesive political and economic force that would advocate for fairer trade agreements with Western countries and integrate globalisation in Africa on African terms. Like Nkrumah, he wanted a fast-tracked unity option rather than an incremental approach.

York (2011) wrote: “Col. Gadhafi (sic) was the last major global leader who promoted the dream of Pan-African unity.” He went on to say that even if there was little chance that his proposal would work in a “highly divided” continent and there was practically little support for his ideas from the AU, he kept on forwarding his idea of a United States of Africa and the dream that Africa would overcome its differences and find unity. Gaddafi was one of the wealthiest leaders of the continent. He used to cover 15% of the AU’s membership dues and helped to pay for peacekeeping missions, infrastructure projects and humanitarian aid for other African states which were in need of it. A good example is the aid he poured into Sudan (Darfur) and Somalia.

Gaddafi was opposed to neo-colonialism and blamed the former colonialist powers for their merciless exploitation of Africa and its resources. According to Al Jazeera (2011), when he visited the USA for his first appearance at the UN General Assembly in September 2009, he “accused the Security Council of being a terrorist body similar to al-Qaeda, and demanded \$7.7 trillion in compensation to be paid to Africa by its past colonial rulers”. The West was not in favour of Gaddafi’s United States of Africa idea. They tried to disrupt its possible realisation by dividing the African continent into Arab Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. “The EU first tried...to create the Union for the Mediterranean (UPM).

North Africa somehow had to be cut off from the rest of Africa, using the old tired racist clichés of the 18th and 19th centuries, which claimed that Africans of Arab origin were more evolved and civilised than the rest of the continent” (Pougala 2011:3). The EU proposed this union without informing the AU, inviting only a “handful” of African countries while the entire EU members were present. Fortunately, it failed before it started. However, the West did not stop trying to propagate African disunity with this. They wanted to destroy the man behind the idea of continent-wide unity. They thought that the continental unity of Africa would change the power equation of the world and threaten Western hegemony. Because of Gaddafi’s undertakings in many African countries, and continental unity, he was a threat to the neo-colonialists’ interests. The West agreed that “Gaddafi must go”. Thus began the bombing and destruction of Libya, spearheaded by the USA and NATO. They eventually succeeded in killing Gaddafi. His elimination meant that their influence and the neo-colonialists’ continued stranglehold on Africa would continue, which is a massive setback for the entire continent.

Mbeki is an advocate of incrementalism. He advanced the idea of African unity but, as he said in Addis Ababa in 2007, “before you put a roof on a house, you need to build the foundation” (*The Independent* 2007). In short, Mbeki has a contemporary outlook on African unity. He is a firm believer in the philosophy of African Renaissance which calls for the end of the violence, elitism, corruption and poverty plaguing the African continent and replacing them with a more just and equitable order. Mbeki proposed doing this by encouraging education and the reversal of the brain drain of African intellectuals. He urged Africans to take pride in their heritage and to take charge of their lives (Bongma 2004). According to Mbeki, the project to unite and free Africa requires a shared minimum common cause and without such a shared vision, it is impossible to sustain an African unity project. This means the making of Africa requires the prior making of the African.

In speaking about what has actually been achieved since the establishment of OAU in 1963, Mbeki (2013) says that African leaders have not done much in realising continent-wide integration and African unity. He says:

Centrally, our collective African history over the last 57 years since the independence of Sudan, communicates the unequivocal message that we have failed to build the cohesive and critical Pan African movement to which Kwame Nkrumah referred when he spoke about “*the popular and progressive forces and movement within Africa*”. Practically, objectively and in strategic terms, it is not possible to achieve the strategic goal of meaningful African unity, and therefore the continent-wide transformation of Africa, its Renaissance, in the absence of, and without the leadership of these forces and movements (Mbeki 2013:17).

Mbeki’s call for African unity, renewal and development with an approach that calls for regional integration resonated throughout the continent. His approach was to try to integrate African countries at the regional level and then expand it to the continental level. He was convinced that such unity cannot be driven from above and he helped to create a number of institutional mechanisms to strengthen such continental unity, including the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) whose aim is to develop an integrated socio-economic development framework for Africa and the APRM, which was originally designed to encourage African countries “to consider seriously the impact of domestic policies, not only on internal political stability and economic growth, but also on neighbouring countries” (Summary of NEPAD action plan 2002:17). He thought that every country should work with its neighbour because whatever happens in one country affects the other. Nevertheless, his African peers did not like the idea of any sort of review of their political performance and Mbeki did not pursue it further.

Mbeki was one of the driving forces behind the OAU becoming the AU. He even lobbied for South Africa to host the launch of the AU in Durban in July 2002. “As a Pan-Africanist, Mbeki’s key strategy is obviously to get the rest of Africa behind him as he moves forward” (Olivier 2003:822). Even after the end of his presidential term, he has assumed the role of elder statesperson of the African continent and has spearheaded various peacekeeping mediations around the continent. He calls for African states to strengthen democracy and respect for human rights, to commit to the resolution of African problems with African solutions, and to strengthen their organisation (the AU) in order to achieve genuine African unity and solidarity.

Common ground can be found between the former and current Pan-African unionists in that both believe that the syndrome of a divided house is pervasive. Nkrumah opposed the idea of breaking Africa up into small, weak states – which he warned was the major instrument of neo-colonialism. He called this “the balkanisation” of Africa (Nkrumah 1963b:173). He said that the creation of several weak and unstable states would ensure continued dependence on the former colonial powers for economic aid and impede African unity; and must therefore it had to be avoided at all costs(Nkrumah 1963b:173). Thus was born Nkrumah’s lifelong passion against balkanisation and for African unity, which he pursued single-mindedly until the end of his life (Legume 1965:32–33). Speaking at the 40th independence anniversary of Ghana in 1997, Nyerere admitted that his generation of nationalist leaders had failed to realise the objective of African unity even though they had a genuine desire to move Africa towards greater unity. Speaking about the reason for the failure to achieve unity and about Nkrumah, he said:

Kwame Nkrumah was the greatest crusader for African unity. He wanted the Accra summit of 1965 to establish a Union Government for the whole of independent Africa. But we failed. The one minor reason is that Kwame, like all great believers, underestimated the degree of suspicion and animosity which his crusading passion had created among a substantial number of his fellow Heads of States. The major reason was linked to the first: already too many of us had a vested interest in keeping Africa divided. Once you multiply national anthems, national flags and national passports, seats at the United Nations, and individuals entitled to 21 guns salute, not to speak of a host of ministers, Prime Ministers, and envoys, you would have a whole army of powerful people with vested interests in keeping Africa balkanised (New African 2012d:33).

Nyerere stressed that local stakes are barriers to African unity. Nkrumah also said that local stakes were allied with the interests of the West to keep Africa balkanised. He was aware that any form of unity was not necessarily a step towards a greater unification. Economic co-operation or economic associations may act as obstacles rather than facilitate political unification. In fact, Nkrumah challenged the argument that economic association should precede political unification. In 1963, he wrote: “I lay even greater stress on the vital importance to Africa’s survival of a political unification of the entire continent. Regional economic groupings retard rather than promote the unification

process” (Nkrumah 1963b:14). Nyerere remembered him saying that “regionalisation was balkanisation” but at a larger scale.

At present, African states are competitive and incompatible with one another, thus exhibiting uneven development. The result is that in an economic association, some countries are bound to be in a disadvantageous position, giving rise to perpetual acrimony and unsolvable contradictions (Nnoli, in Shivji 2009:202). With independence, the “sovereign” states set out on very different trajectories, each wanting to maximise its advantage and with multiple memberships in different economic associations. The economic contradiction of associations and the underlying competition among member states to get aid and investment from Western donors is a formidable barrier to unity. The only way to overcome this is by a deliberate act of political will.

In contemporary times, neo-colonialism has a new face. There are military coups, dictatorships and one-party governments. Structural adjustment programmes are imposed, which in effect signify the loss of political self-determination in the making of economic decisions. African nationalism, even of its territorial variety, is discredited because of globalisation. African states which had in fact “hardly departed from the policy prescriptions” of the international financial institutions are made the “villains of the piece” – corrupt, inefficient, patrimonial and undemocratic. New prescriptions on good governance, human rights, transparency, multiparty systems, democracy, etcetera are handed down. Structural adjustment programmes have moved from economics to politics, from policy to ideology, from adjusting economies to accommodating Western economies (Shivji 2009:203–205).

African leaders understand that the continent is becoming increasingly powerless in a harsh global economic environment. “Africa has been on the periphery of international economic events for a considerable time and has struggled with unfavourable international terms of trade” (Lundahl 2004:12). They acknowledge that unless they speak with one voice and act with greater cohesion, the continent will continue to be powerless and marginalised by the richer countries. Many leaders fear that they will lose their

regional influence (for example Nigeria in West Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa), sovereignty and independence. Nkrumah (1963:148) warned against this, saying: "...the insistence on not wanting to cede certain functions to a central unifying political authority in which all members will have an equal voice is unrealistic and unfounded".

African trade is mostly with the outside world. Because of their strong trade relationships with the West Nkrumah (1963b:162) argued that African countries "will be compelled to betray the cause of African freedom (and unity) by the support they will be obliged to give the imperialist suppression of the emancipation struggle in Africa...they will have sold their African birthright". Kah (2012:32) echoes this: "...as long as individual African states engage in trade with the (West), the more they will be exposed to their unfair trading practices and exploitation of their human and natural resources with no sure successful way of resisting it". The point that is made here is that Africa's problems cannot be solved in an isolated manner.

I believe that continental unity should not be seen as a threat to national sovereignty but rather as an opportunity to face up to the real threats to sovereignty. This unity should be a political unity based on Pan-Africanist ideologies, which gives primacy to politics that inspires, mobilises and unites all Africans in the struggle for true and meaningful liberation. This ideology should be pro-people and separate itself from arguments that globalisation offers opportunities for Africans. "The fact that in your struggle, you may wrench the master's weapon and turn it against him does not mean that the master has given you an opportunity to do so. Globalisation...is a process of further intensification of imperialist exploitation through deepening the integration of the world economy in the interest of international finance capital" (Shivji 2009:205).

Pan-Africanists need to broaden their perspectives and think continentally rather than regionally. Nyerere argued that regional unification would help in the process of continental unity because there would be less units to unite if the ultimate vision is continental unity. However, Africa has witnessed that this did not materialise. As long as such processes are led by states, the very vision of larger unity "tends to disappear" as

state leaders get “embroiled in the pragmatism of power politics” (Shivji 2009:206). Regional integrations have shown that regional hegemony like Nigeria and South Africa move towards looking after their own national interests rather than regional integration. “...South Africa entered into a Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU without proper consultation with SACU member states, thereby appears to be furthering its own development agendas at the expense of the collective interest” (Francis, Jazbhay, Molete & Motlhoki 2013:182).

The above is testament to the fact that Africa still consists of colonial states. A new kind of Pan-Africanism has to evolve to deal with this development so that Pan-Africanism is not defeated by the ambitions of stronger African states. The people – instead of governments, states or political parties who are too concerned with power and not with continental unity and the betterment of the African people – must lead it.

African leaders need to implement the vision Nkrumah spoke about in his closing speech at the first African heads of states summit in Addis Ababa in 1963: “We shall from now on think, plan and work together for the progress and development of our great continent. In this way, we shall eliminate completely the handicaps, setbacks and humiliation we have suffered under colonialism and imperialism” (Nkrumah 1963a:1). Leaders must work and plan together for the betterment of their peoples’ lives, and continental unity. It is time for Africa’s leaders to rise above individualism and build a better Africa for their citizens. They will do well to implement Nkrumah’s “prophetic” words which today, more than ever, seem to be the solution to solving the hellish existence of many in Africa.

If present leaders fail to learn from the failures of their predecessors, Africa will once more be left behind to stagnate while the rest of the world moves forward. I advocate for the solution that entails African leaders coming together under the umbrella of a United States of Africa with a single political leader while the others serve as regional governors. “A continental government will eschew pettiness like regionalism and nepotism for more challenging political issues like good governance, decentralisation, collaboration between (regional) leaders and the president of Africa as well as the maintenance of sustainable

peace” (Kah 2012:35). Since the formal “demise” of colonialism, experience has shown that Africans must chart their own future towards unity and the survival of the continent. Africans should stand for Africa; solve their problems themselves; reap the rewards of their labour; and stand tall, united as one, and become a force to be reckoned with.

AFRICA’S IMPASSE AND THE COLONIAL QUESTION

At present, Africa is at a juncture where it cannot move forward without the consent of the West. Thanks to its corrupt and kleptomaniac leaders, Africa is still a colonial state. “The foundation for failure was laid in Africa during colonialism and is sustained through colonial legacies with the accomplice of African elite leaders” (Alemazung 2010:62). Africa’s leadership – mired in corruption and the mismanagement of state and public assets, embezzlement, injustice, nepotism and dictatorship among others – put Africa in its present unfavourable predicament. Due to this, there is socio-political turmoil in countries which drains their scarce economic resources even further because of the effort made to control revolts. Their inherited boundaries do not making things easier. There are intra-state conflicts usually caused by the need or desire to control ethnicity and resources. “Many of the current conflicts are said to have resulted from the imprecise nature of the boundaries inherited from colonialism” (Mbembe 2000:262).

Africa is deep in debt and ravaged by hunger, diseases, illiteracy and civil strife. Many believe that the conditions of Africa have worsened since independence, which may well be the case. However, colonialism was very bad for the people. Its effects still linger. Colonialism is not gone; it just evolved into a new form called neo-colonialism. Moreover, neo-colonialism flourishes because the West “had established a dependent economic and political structure on the continent which was inherited and never changed by the new leaders” (Alemazung 2010:69). The same Western countries pretending to support poor African countries through institutions like the World Bank and the World Trade Organization have ensnared Africa to depend on Western economies for subsistence. Nkrumah (1965) stated that in most cases, neo-colonialism is manifested through economic and monetary measures. He explained that neo-colonialism resulted in the

exploitation of African states, such that the foreign capital entering the states promoted underdevelopment instead of development (Nkrumah 1975:415).

The inability of African economies to develop after independence led many African countries to seek foreign aid provided with conditions that usually directly serve the interest of the aid provider (Hayter 1971). By accepting loans from the West, given at very high and exorbitant interest rates, they reinforced their ties to their former colonial masters. The repayment of these loans has contributed to the underdevelopment of African economies because the collection of interest ultimately impoverishes African peoples – which is ironic because the loans were supposed to alleviate economic hardships in the first place. “Even foreign aid with conditions for Africa which according to the West should help steer Africa off poverty and underdevelopment has produce(sic) the opposite due to the economic interest of the West behind it and the accomplice-ship of tyrant and selfish African leaders” (Alemazung 2010:64). African governments spend huge chunks of their annual revenue just to service loans – money that could have gone to developing their economies. Basic infrastructure in most African countries is dilapidated; economic growth is minimal; access to basics like food, health and education is sparse and expensive; arid areas are spreading into previously arable land; and many other problems can be mentioned.

There are still some leaders who think that Africa’s problems can be solved from outside the continent. This is evident in the prevalence of their strong paternalistic relationships and reliance on their former colonial masters. It is as if they do not “have an independent mind of their own” (Kah 2012:31). They stick to the limited identity created by the colonialists that is not African and have very little compatibility with the real African personality for which Nkrumah advocated. They prefer to identify themselves with the West rather than with their African brothers and sisters, and prefer to trade with the rest of the world rather than with their African compatriots. They would rather have economic ties with the neo-colonisers, the West, rather than trading and co-operating with other African states. “As long as African leaders and policy makers look towards the West for solutions to their problems, the continent will remain backward, divided and exploited with

impunity” (Kah 2012:31). The colonial legacy has stripped Africa and Africans of their personality and their pride in being Africans.

The rest of the African populace is not doing much to change the situation either. Globalisation has stripped them of whatever vestige of culture and pride that remained. According to Obi-Ani (2005:274), contemporary Africans are “brainwashed” Africans:

The most pernicious damage was inflicted in the sphere of the denigration of our political institutions, and cultures and the consequent psychological effects have created a people who are not proud of their cultures and only feel fulfilled in the life when they ape the west. These brainwashed Africans copy Western political institutions, economic systems, languages, fashions, music, religion, technology, architectural designs, even as far as skin bleaching, dual citizenship for their children, stashing away looted public funds in foreign banks.

Thus, legitimate pride in their own cultures and their countries’ successes has continued to elude African nations.

Most African leaders remain Western lackeys. Because they depend on their former colonial masters to remain in office, they do not take a different course than what is laid out for them by their masters. Their masters do not disappoint them either. In some cases, they have gone as far as to send their troops into their former colonies to control or support the government which they had put in place. A recent case in point is the French interference in the conflict in CAR. They have precedence of the same sort where in 1996 in the same CAR, according to the New York Times, they fired at national soldiers angry against the government for not paying them their salaries. The French have been present in this country and their other former colonies long after the independence of the colonies.

For show and to appear like democracies, the elite rulers hold elections which they rig and win in the end. “Elections are smokescreens because they are aimed at maintaining the big man in office” (Taylor 2006:35). The consequence of neo-colonialism is the paternalistic relationship between the elite ruling governments and the ex-colonial masters. This makes African states permanently dependent as resource-based economies, unable or unwilling to develop their nations.

The West maintains their considerable hold on African affairs under the guise of spreading democratic ideals. However, regardless of their professed support for democratisation, transparency, the rule of law and observing human rights, they have not lost their primary interest in Africa: their economic interest. Thus, they continue to preserve their good relations with tyrant leaders of the continent. For show, the West gives conditional aid that is supposed to be used for democratisation processes and reforms in good governance. Unfortunately, this has the reverse effect. The leaders carry out the minimum reforms mentioned in the aid package that will allow them to keep the aid, such as “allowing opposition parties to compete, but not win; permitting an independent press to operate, but not freely; allowing civic groups to function, but not effectively; and consenting that election be held, but not replace the ruling party” (Brown 2005:184). Instead of making circumstances better, aid has strengthened tyranny and autocracy, bad governance and underdevelopment in Africa. The West continues to work through dictators to sustain their economic control and maintain relations with African states. The result is the upholding and consolidation of dictatorial regimes and the implantation of autocracy that squashes opposing opinions (Alemazung 2010:75). In instances where there is a democratically elected leader who works for the common good of his/her people, it is more than likely that his/her policies oppose the economic benefits of the West. Therefore, it is preferable for the West to keep on supporting and ignoring the atrocities committed by dictators. The established economic structure supported by autocracy, which requires political systems to rely on natural resources, “renders the citizens irrelevant” in policy and decision making (Bates 1999:88).

Most African states still rely on the primary production of goods and import manufactured goods from the West; they rely on a limited number of export commodities which make them vulnerable to changing market conditions and falling prices in the world market for these commodities. Obi-Ani (2005:280) states that Africans “produce what [they] do not consume and consume what [they] do not produce...[their] economic goals [are] determined by the needs of Western industrial complexes”.

African governments lack political will to implement decisions taken at meetings and conferences of the AU (Kah 2012:32). The AU itself is weak, with no hold over independent African governments to implement its decisions unless the governments themselves are willing to do so. Nkrumah advocated the political and continent-wide unity of Africa; the regional groupings that the AU is advocating as a means of integration are not working. Most African countries have overlapping memberships of several regional groupings, with a multitude of mandates and structures, and this leads to inadequate financing of the integration process and misuse of resources (Okhonmina 2009:94). There is no organisational harmony and vision, which may undermine the objective of unity.

As Alemazung (2010) aptly puts it, "Africa's relationship with the West which took off with colonialism has seen the continent move from traditional self-governed societies on its way to self-directed development in according (sic) with the social and natural settings of the African people and based on the need of the African people to today's poorest and underdeveloped continent" (Alemazung 2010:78). Colonialism has destroyed the democratic and people-centred leadership that was the African way of leadership and substituted it with tyranny and autocracy. False sovereignties based on arbitrary boundaries define African states and create artificial ethnic divisions. Africa's problems are mostly based on the legacies of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Will Africa escape the colonial designs? Is Pan-African unity possible despite the colonial question and the still prevalent colonial state? Is the colonial impasse surmountable in view of the need for continental integration? What Africa needs to solve these problems is political unity as Nkrumah recommended so that the continent can have a fighting chance of getting out of poverty and work towards prosperity. "The unity of our continent, no less than our separate independence, will be delayed if, indeed, we do not lose it, by hobnobbing with colonialism. African Unity is, above all, a political kingdom which can only be gained by political means. The social and economic development of Africa will come only within the political kingdom, not the other way around" (Nkrumah 1963a:2). Will Africa heed one of her sons? Will the leaders of Africa wake up to the reality of the real needs of their people and work towards continent-wide integration?

CONCLUSION

In Nkrumah's view, Africa's colonial borders are detrimental to continent-wide unity. The arbitrary delineation of borders with no regard for the peoples of Africa during colonisation created a rift dividing the peoples and cultures, bringing together peoples who had no cultural or historical affinity and ultimately creating never-ending conflict between countries with communities hostile to one another. Oddly enough, upon achieving independence, African states adopted the borders created by the colonisers and the Westphalian discernment of sovereignty, thus making the postcolonial “independent” states another form of the colonial states, with no real sovereignty and independence. The result was the balkanisation of Africa into small unviable states (which weakened the peoples of Africa and their states) and neo-colonialism (which consigned Africa to economic dependence and debt, throwing the continent into disunity).

After African states became independent and the colonial powers “left”, Africa remained a colonial state because most leaders worked with the same colonial powers for personal gain and the colonial powers would not leave Africa to its own devices since the continent was the source of raw materials for their industries. African states were made dependent on “foreign contributions” to maintain a semblance of being “free”. For these and many other reasons, there is urgent need for a second decolonisation driven by the actualisation of Pan-African unity. Africans should consider Pan-Africanism as a mobilising ideology and development blueprint. Only unity will enable Africa to resist Western influence. Continental unity is an opportunity to face up to the real threats to sovereignty.

In the next chapter, the state of Africa and African unity at present are discussed.

CHAPTER 4

TOWARDS PAN-AFRICAN UNITY?

FROM MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS TO AGENDA 2063

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the achievements made towards achieving Pan-Africa unity are discussed. This entails critically analysing the difference between what Nkrumah envisaged and what ultimately became the accepted content of Pan-African unity. The achievements and shortcomings of the various continental regional groupings are discussed. Even though Nkrumah opposed the idea of regional integration preceding African continental-wide unity, leaders of the newly independent African countries chose incremental integration as the preferred means to achieve unity, thus the establishment of regional blocs. The successes and failures of these blocs are therefore examined further in this chapter.

Since African countries adopted the MDGs, the content of these goals, the successes and failures of African countries in achieving these goals, whether the MDGs were set in ways fairly reflecting the achievements of the different regions of the world (especially Africa) and the different opinions put forward regarding Africa's achievements are also examined. More importantly for the purposes of this study, I critically analyse the role of the MDGs in promoting or prohibiting the African unity initiative.

As an integral part of achieving the stated aims of this chapter, I analyse Agenda 2063, Africa's new Pan-African unity and development agenda. Inherent in Agenda 2063 is the continent's plan for transformation, prosperity and unity driven by its citizens. The different aspirations of the agenda, the set timelines, and the declarations of both the continent's leaders and citizens are reviewed. I seek to answer the following questions: What does Agenda 2063 stand for? What are its objectives? How is it to be achieved and how is it to be translated by the ordinary citizens of Africa? Will Agenda 2063 lead the way to the realisation of the long elusive African unity?

AFRICA OF THE FUTURE: WHAT ARE THE CONCRETE STEPS TOWARDS PAN AFRICAN UNITY?

Nkrumah advocated for an Africa that was “a political kingdom”, united and strong, with a powerful voice in world politics. For this, he strongly argued for the breaking down of colonial borders and liberation from colonialism’s socio-economic and political designs. The kind of continental union Nkrumah envisaged was one that would, among other things, resolve border conflicts and improve the lives of Africans, bringing about the dignity and unification of the African peoples.

However, he admitted that there may be differences between the newly independent African states. He said: “We have frontier troubles, and a host of other inter-territorial problems which can only be resolved within the context of African unity” (Nkrumah 1963b:148). He stated that some states may initially be attracted to the colonial ideas of independence and sovereignty, and may even oppose the idea of Pan-African unity to hold onto their “independence”. Nyerere (1963:2) concurred with this idea: “The new pride in national independence, the new consciousness of national sovereignty...must not be allowed to deflect us from our purposes”. Nkrumah further understood that some leaders may even be against the idea of surrendering a portion of their sovereignty for the purposes of achieving greater political unity whereby each African country, regardless of territorial prowess, would have equal say in the administration of the continent. Nkrumah (1963b:148) expounded on this as follows:

In the early flush of independence, some of the new African states are jealous of their sovereignty and tend to exaggerate their separatism in a historical period that demands Africa’s unity in order that their independence may be safeguarded. I cannot envisage an African union in which all the members, large or small, heavily or thinly populated, do not enjoy legal equality under a constitution to which all have laid their hand. But the insistence on not wanting to cede certain functions to a central unifying political authority in which all the members will have an equal voice is unrealistic and unfounded...[and] an association of a confederate or even looser nature which does not give effective powers to a central authority and determine those to be left to the sovereign states can leave the way open for the domination of the smaller and weaker members by larger and stronger ones.

He wanted African unity along federal lines, with every state equal regardless of its size. In order for this envisaged unity to materialise, African states were meant to surrender some aspects of their sovereign rights to a central body – which never occurred. Save for Nkrumah's Ghana and four other independent states, albeit not in the manner that Ghana did it, no other African state wanted to make this crucial concession. The failure to take this critical step towards greater political continental unity still haunts Africa today.

Nkrumah contended that if Africa failed to unite, neo-colonialism would have a free hand to “play upon the latent fears of burgeoning nationalism and...fan the fires of sectional interests, of personal greed and ambition among leaders and contesting aspirants to power” (Nkrumah 1963b:xvi). He believed that the West would use all available means to disrupt the growing determination among “the vast masses of Africa's population” for unity, which would make it easier for the West to exploit Africa's resources. “We in Africa can only meet them effectively by presenting a unified front and a continental purpose” (Nkrumah 1963b:xvi). He argued that Africa's safety against the multifaceted neo-colonialism lay in political unity:

If we are to remain free, if we are to enjoy the full benefits of Africa's rich resources, we must unite to plan for our total defence and the full exploitation of our material and human means, in the full interests of all our peoples. ‘To go it alone’ will limit our horizons, curtail our expectations, and threaten our liberty (Nkrumah 1963b: xvii).

African leaders did not heed his warnings. They continued on their destructive paths, without much hope for meaningful development, thereby remaining bound to their former colonisers. The colonisers took maximum advantage of this lack of commitment and unity. “The African resisters were quickly crushed and the political face of Africa restructured to the convenience of the colonial powers” (Obi-Ani 2005:274). This colonised mindset continues to haunt the continent, with most African leaders continuing to look towards Western countries for solutions to their problems. Their former masters continue to propagate the colonial idea of unity being an impediment to their sovereignty, making them mere spectators of others ascending to and controlling power.

On several occasions, Nkrumah warned against colonial tactics to no avail. Most contemporary African leaders are steeped in corruption, maladministration and warfare. Many leaders siphon off large amounts of money from their countries for the colonial metropolis and Western financial institutions, “stashing away looted public funds in foreign banks” (Obi-Ani 2005:274), buying property in their former colonisers’ countries and suppressing anyone who dares to call them to account for the misappropriation of funds. Africa can resist the West's pressures better if there is continent-wide and complete unity. “I can see no security for African states unless African leaders, like ourselves, have realised beyond all doubt that salvation for Africa lies in unity...for in unity lies strength, and as I see it, African states must unite or sell themselves out to imperialists and colonialist exploiters...or disintegrate individually” (Nkrumah 1963b:145).

In *Africa Must Unite*, Nkrumah wrote that colonial partitioning had to end and the African peoples had to unite and integrate politically and economically. Nkrumah wrote that the political union of African states was “the securest safeguard of our hard-won freedom and the soundest foundation for our individual, no less than our common, economic, social and cultural advancement” (Nkrumah1963b:xi). The peoples of Africa must unite for their collective wellbeing and growth. “For the sake of all African states, large and small, African unity must come and it must be real unity. Our goal must be a United States of Africa” (Nyerere 1963:1).

Nkrumah warned against the prevalence of colonialism in its new form of neo-colonialism. Because of their interest in African resources, the former colonising powers have their hold on African states by controlling their economies; their internal policies; and their cultural, educational and military sovereignty. He warned that colonialism in its many disguises would create client states and governments which would be loyal to the former colonialists rather than to the peoples whose lives they were supposed to improve and who they had to serve. “Unless we meet this obvious and very powerful threat with a unified African front, based upon a common economic and defence policy, the strategy will be to pick us off and destroy us one by one” (Nkrumah 1963b:xvii).

African peoples must have the right to move freely, to settle and work wherever they want, and surmount the artificial impasse of the colonial borders. We must have the freedom to move to or live in a healthy environment. In effect, Africans must overcome the balkanisation imposed on them by the colonial powers. It is imperative to overcome the different forms of division (such as the partitioning of states and peoples; racism; ethnic divisions; and religious, territorial, gender and sexual borders) and work towards a united Africa in all its facets. Nkrumah believed that disintegration of the continent into smaller states would leave them vulnerable and incapable of defending their integrity and viability, with no means to establish their own economies. He explained this in terms of neo-colonialist interests:

Neo-colonialism is based upon the principle of breaking up former large united colonial territories into a number of small non-viable states which are incapable of independent development and must rely upon the former imperial power for defence and even internal security. Their economic and financial systems are linked, as in colonial days, with those of the former colonial ruler (Nkrumah 1965:xiii).

Their connection with their former colonial masters may seem advantageous to them. Access to Western markets to sell their primary commodities may seem like an attractive proposition to develop their deeply impoverished states after decades of European colonialism and slavery. However, the nature of Western capitalism means that the market dictates the prices and terms of trade, thereby putting African countries at a disadvantage by making them reliant on neo-colonial trading systems. “Africans became producers of raw material and perishable goods which the West bought at giveaway prices, and thereafter these commodities are refined into finished products to be sold to Africans at exorbitant prices” (Obi-Ani 2005:280).

Neo-colonialism, which now occurs through indirect economic pressures, forces African countries to be perpetual producers of primary goods without much chance of industrialising, thereby depriving them of independence and foreign policies. “This is a solution that can only lead backwards, not forwards. The forward solution is for the African

states to stand together politically, to have a united foreign policy, a common defence plan, and a fully integrated economic programme for the development of the whole continent” (Nkrumah 1963b:177). According to Nkrumah, this is the only way that neo-colonialism can be held at bay. Only then can Africa trade with the West as equal partners, starting a new phase of trade and partnership. “Any form of economic union negotiated singly between the fully industrialised states of Europe and the newly emergent countries of Africa is bound to retard the industrialisation and, therefore, the prosperity and the general economic and cultural development of these countries” (Nkrumah 1963b:181).

For continent-wide unity and transformation, Nkrumah campaigned for a fully integrated transport system in terms of road, rail, river, air and sea systems which would promote inter-African trade and development. He also advocated for the extraction and use of Africa’s resources such as minerals that are mined, power resources, coal and iron, and others. “The economic potentialities of Africa [are] immense” (Nkrumah 1963b:152). However, he wanted all the planning to happen centrally:

The cost of making [transport systems and exploiting Africa’s potential] is high, and the building of a continent-wide system would have to be centrally planned and financed...Such a vast scheme would...take time to complete and priorities would certainly be necessary to secure speedier fulfilment at point of development vital to the corporate progress of the continent (Nkrumah 1963b:155).

African states must not compete against one another for markets, be it local or global. Africa will be a big enough market to absorb the productions of any part of the continent and by uniting their export and production policies and setting up a common market with a common currency, they can even overcome the “undercutting tactics” of Western buyers. The monies earned through this type of concerted efforts pooled centrally can be used for all the states’ mutual development and this will give Africa a status that can rival that of the industrialised countries.

It may be argued that the pooling of resources of poor African states will be like pooling poverty. I posit that this will not be the case. The pooling will result in the coordination of the existing resources and improve production to assist in wider capital development. It

will also help to reduce the “identical forms of primary trading economies and provide for the erection of a complementary pattern of development” (Nkrumah 1963b:168).

Nkrumah contended that Africans should not be under any illusion that the road to continent-wide unity would be easy but they had to persist in aiming for the achievement of the desired unity. “I am convinced that the forces making for unity far outweigh those which divide us...our common background and basic common interest [draw] us together” (Nkrumah 1963b:132–137). With unity, people living and working towards the same goal of development will give meaning to the concept of human brotherhood and will be an example to the rest of the world. “The ultimate goal of a United States of Africa must be kept constantly in sight amidst all the perplexities, pressures and cajoleries with which we shall find ourselves confronted, so that we do not permit ourselves to be distracted or discouraged by the difficulties and pitfalls which undoubtedly lie ahead” (Nkrumah 1963b:143). The African peoples should push forward for the unity of their continent and bring about dignity for Africa in order to have a meaningful impact on the world stage.


The question that has to be asked at this stage is what progress has been made in terms of African unity. It seems that instead of uniting as one union, Africa is breaking up into even smaller units. Two sectors (Eritrea and South Sudan) seceded from their former “mother” country, pushing the number of fully recognised independent African states to 54. The “divided house” syndrome persists.

When the OAU was established, it was not what Nkrumah wanted. It was a total failure from his perspective. Even the modalities of setting up the OAU were not what he envisaged for Africa. He advocated for a continent-wide political unity, with one government and a common foreign policy, common citizenship and one capital city. The majority of the leaders of the new independent states at the time advocated for gradual integration that focused more on economic integration and a loose organisation which gave its members the right to renounce their membership whenever they wanted (Derso 2013:2). Nkrumah was against forming regional integration blocs, believing that these were merely bigger forms of balkanisation. He said that uniting Africa would solve its

border problems. Instead, the organisation that was established gave him clauses of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and a commission of mediation in case of transgression.

Nevertheless, the majority of the leaders advocated for gradual integration, arguing that it was first necessary to integrate within regions and then to move towards continent-wide integration. "Our goal must remain firm, and nothing short of a United States of Africa should be accepted as our ultimate destiny. This does not mean that we must – or that we could – achieve the goal tomorrow, in one step. We must progress towards it...by steps towards unity in different areas of Africa" (Nyerere 1963:3). However, this only achieved in terms of keeping despotic leaders in power in small unviable states. Nkrumah wanted a continental economic and industrial scheme that would cater for a common market, common communications systems, a common monetary zone with a central bank and common currency, a common defence force; however, the OAU (now the AU) could only set up commissions to look into these matters "gradually".

Forming regional blocs and achieving regional integration was intended to assist African countries to overcome the problem of their small economies since this was perceived as an obstacle to effective industrialisation (Bohwasi 2006:1). The states in the regional blocs were supposed to develop a common market, which would facilitate intra-national trade and this in turn would facilitate the structural transformation and economic development of these states. However, the regional blocs have not achieved what they set out to achieve (that is, regional integration). If anything, the member states of these regional blocs seem to desire membership of more than one regional bloc. This results in replication of efforts, wastage of resources and animosity among members. Yang and Gupta's (2005) table below is a good example of this duplication and wastage. They call it "The African Galaxy".



(Source: Yang & Gupta 2005:11)

Still African leaders look towards the West for ways of achieving integration. Their regional integration blocs are modelled on the EU which was established more for economic than political reasons, as is evident in recent EU affairs. The correct approach they should have followed was complete political integration similar to what Nkrumah advocated for, not unrealistic and unrealisable gradual unity through regional groupings.

Does this mean that Africa has not made any progress towards African unity? The transformation of the OAU to the AU, from a principle of “non-interference” to a principle of “non-indifference”, is a good start. “Historically the OAU's record indicates that the policy of non-intervention was applied to the extreme: African nation states oppressed their own people with impunity and did little or nothing to prevent massive human rights abuses...” (Murithi 2008:72). The AU, through its Peace and Security Council, can interfere in

member states to “promote peace and protect democracy”, including deploying a military force in situations where genocide and crimes against humanity are committed (AU 2000:5). Looking at the organisation itself, new decision-making and implementation structures such as the AU Assembly and the Executive Council, judicial and representative structures such as the Pan-African Parliament, and governance monitoring mechanism such as the APRM were established (Derso 2013:3). The APRM is unique in that individual member states agreed to be assessed by a team of experts drawn from other states in a manner that promotes democracy and good governance.

The APRM was meant to foster the adoption of policies and practices to ensure political stability, growth and sustainable development; facilitate regional and continental integration through the reinforcement of successful and best practices; and identify shortcomings and needs for capacity building (APRM 2003:1). It is an agreed upon instrument for self-monitoring by the participating member governments, which are 35 at present. The idea was that instead of always being criticised and getting suggestions from the West and their institutions (such as the World Bank and Amnesty International) Africa could do its own assessments, with a better chance that proposed changes would be implemented. This would have been a good initiative if the leaders were amenable to it and it was not too comprehensive and ambitious from the beginning.

To begin with, the APRM has many layers. First, a bulky questionnaire has to be filled in by the country assessing itself before the APRM panel of experts comes and looks for itself. Then the report is sent back to the country for its response. Afterwards it is presented to the heads of state and the report is published six months later (APRM 2003:3–4). At AU summits, the heads of state of the APRM meet to discuss the progress made and the peer-reviewed countries are expected to implement the APRM’s recommendations. The biggest flaw is that the lack of enforcement mechanisms makes the APRM weak.

Researchers such as Jeggan Grey-Johnson of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa state that the current heads of states are to blame for the mechanism’s failure.

Grey-Johnson asserts that when the APRM is headed by heads of state, it tends to flourish in a particular country, like in South Africa during Mbeki's time, and not very well during Zuma's time (in Du Plessis 2016:3). He also states that African leaders are learning from one another but they are learning the wrong things, a trend where “peers” look at the worst practices they can adopt to entrench themselves in power which can be evidenced by the current trends of African heads of states (in Du Plessis 2016:4). Simple examples are in Rwanda where President Paul Kagame called a referendum to get acquiescence to run for a third term despite this being against the countries laws; in the DRC where President Joseph Kabila is doing everything in his power to postpone the elections indefinitely to stay in power; and in Burundi where President Pierre Nkurunziza has made a court grant him an extension of his term in power. Heads of state loot, plunder and murder to stay in power.

So, how can the APRM be viewed as a success story? It is African and meant to tackle African problems, even though it is not doing what it has been set up to do. However, there is still hope. If Africa were to unite and be led by a union government, all these governance issues will be easy to solve because the governing policies of all the states will be harmonised; with the right enforcement mechanisms in place, there will be no margin for errors like these. There will be a checks and balances system that can monitor the branches of governments and governance. All the answers lie in Africa's political unity.

Africa has also shown progress with respect to peace and security. The AU has made several contributions in settling and minimising conflict in war-prone areas like Burundi and resolving post-election conflict in Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya (Lisk 2012:1). Even if the country has regrettably regressed into conflict and undemocratic practices, the AU mission in Burundi was successful in that it created conditions for peace building and paved the way for the UN's peace operations even though the UN was reluctant to enter a situation with potential to relapse into conflict. By the end, the mission “succeeded in establishing relative peace to most provinces in Burundi” (Murithi 2008:75). Although the AU's intervention created a conducive environment for peace and stability in Burundi, Africa's long-standing malady of its leaders' need to stay in power struck again. This

miscalculated need, coupled with the incompetent leadership in Burundi, belittled the AU's efforts. However, had Burundi been left alone to deal with its conflict and had the AU not intervened, the conflict – and its victims – would definitely have been greater.

The AU's mandate in South Sudan was not very strong; it was only to “monitor the humanitarian crisis effectively and to coordinate efforts to advance the cause for peace” (Murithi 2008:74), so it could not be very effective in terms of peace-building initiatives and implementations. In addition, the AU did not have the funds to finance the peace-building operations (Murithi 2008:74). The situation is still volatile and conflicts seem to be easy to ignite, but the AU succeeded in at least bringing relative peace to the country.

AU observer missions are now sent all over Africa to cover elections in member states. Some 26 African countries have signed the historic Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement, believed to facilitate the creation of Africa's largest free-trade zone. This is a solidification of the former Cape to Cairo initiative. The agreement will remove trade barriers on most goods, making them cheaper and stimulating “US\$1 trillion worth of economic activity” across Africa (*Agence France Presse* 2015). The agreement was signed in Cairo on 10 June 2015; however, signing it is only the first step. Before it can be realised, the agreement must be approved by each of the 26 member states' parliaments. This is supposed to happen by the end of 2017. It is hoped that the agreement will realise the dream of having one free trade zone that will enable the integration of African economies and be more cost effective than multiple trade regimes. It will also have a positive effect on the failing regional economic blocs hindering African unity.

Despite these promising strides towards unity, Africa is not fulfilling Nkrumah's vision even though goals have been set and institutions have been created to help achieve the goals. The MDGs (even though they were an initiative of the West), were supposed to be achieved by 2015 and Agenda 2063 forecasts African unity by 2063, 100 years after the formation of the OAU. The main idea behind both these initiatives was continent-wide Pan-African unity. These initiatives are critically examined in the following sections.

PAN-AFRICAN UNITY AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS

The MDGs were eight international development goals that were established following the UN summit in 2000. All 189 member states at the time and a number of international organisations pledged to help achieve the goals by 2015. These development goals, as stipulated on the UN MDG website (<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals>), were:

- (1) To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- (2) To achieve universal primary education
- (3) To promote gender equality and empower women
- (4) To reduce child mortality
- (5) To improve maternal health
- (6) To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- (7) To ensure environmental sustainability
- (8) To develop a global partnership for development

Each goal had specific targets and timelines for achieving the targets. Nevertheless, progress towards achieving the goals was uneven. Some countries achieved many goals, while others were not on track to realise any. The MDGs had 21 targets (UNMDG website 2015) and a series of measurable health and economic indicators for each target (MDG Monitor). Some targets were:

- **Goal 1:** Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, and halve the proportion of people whose income is less than US\$1 per day; achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people; and halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger between the years 1990 and 2015.
- **Goal 2:** Ensure that children everywhere will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.
- **Goal 3:** Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education.
- **Goal 4:** Reduce the under five years old mortality rate.

- **Goal 5:** Achieve universal access to reproductive health and reduce the maternal mortality ratio by three quarters.
- **Goal 6:** Halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and provide universal access to treatment for those who need it; and halt and reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.
- **Goal 7:** Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; and reverse the loss of biodiversity and environmental resources, achieving improvement in the lives of slum dwellers.
- **Goal 8:** Develop an open, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory trading and financial system with commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction nationally and internationally; and address the special needs of the least developed countries by facilitating tariff and quote free access for the exports of the least developed countries, enhanced programme of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries, cancellation of official bilateral debt and more development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction.

To accelerate the progress, the G8 finance ministers agreed to provide enough funds to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the African Development Bank to cancel US\$40 billion to US\$55 billion in debt owed by members of the heavily indebted poor countries to allow them to redirect resources to programmes for improving health and education and for alleviating poverty (Lawson & Green 2005:5; G8 2005:28–29). The G8 even dedicated an entire section of their communiqué in 2005 to the endeavour and called it “a historic opportunity” (G8 2005:15). They pledged to assist Africa in attaining all the parts of the MDGs.

Trying to achieve these goals by seeking assistance from institutions whose policies perpetuate inequality, poverty and destitution should not have been the way to go about achieving the MDGs. The “pledge” of assistance was not to be taken lightly as well-intentioned largesse on the part of the West. This assistance programme was, as Nkrumah warned, only one of the faces of neo-colonialism. Providing aid in the form of

assistance to achieve the MDGs, or any kind of aid for that matter, had “the effect of reinforcing the view that the development of Africa, and indeed of all Third World nations, can only be induced through the assistance of Western experts...which underlined the colonial legacy ...” (El-Tom 1994:2).

This “assistance” does not come free; indeed, it has many strings attached. The “aided” are subject to the authority, dictatorship and control of the “aider”, who impose harsh economic conditions and structural adjustment programmes. The “aider” is not accountable for the relatively weak economic and political situations of the “aided” and may do whatever it pleases, even if there is resistance from the population. As Mubita (2016) aptly puts it, “aid has become a carrot on a stick, dangled in our faces to accept recolonisation, or be whipped into submission”.

The West wants things to be done in a way that leaves Africa vulnerable to neo-colonisation and to their demands to exploit Africa's resources. Africa and its leaders cannot produce their own policies for their particular scenarios for fear of losing the backing and funds they receive from the West. “This is clearly evident if one considers the number of alternative policies that have been proposed by African countries over the last few decades, but which were successfully replaced by other policy packages engineered by these Bretton Woods Institutions” (El-Tom 1994:6).

A good example of this is the Lagos Plan of Action, which was a research output of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and other intergovernmental sectors in the 1980s. African ministers participated in the preparation of this plan of action designed to fit Africa's needs. However, the World Bank came up with its own messy idea of a plan entitled “Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action”. After it was accepted and put into effect, it created an even greater mess than what the World Bank and IMF had previously prescribed and launched (El-Tom 1991:20–21). These institutions insist that their programmes have worked without a glitch. However, they have been detrimental to Africa’s growth and economic self-sustainability. The West’s aid has made Africa dependent on them. Even if it is meant for “good”, Africa must break out of

this cycle of dependence and destruction. Since their purpose is to serve their own interests, African leaders should ignore them and set their own policies and agendas.

Africa's debt problem, which the West is supposedly helping Africa to overcome, can also be explained with reference to the above discussion. It all starts with the notion that the Global South must import capital for investment and development. When a country borrows from the IMF or World Bank, these institutions decide where and how the funds are to be invested. "The conditionality in the International Monetary Fund refers to the policies that members are expected to meet or follow when using the funds" (Brau, Williams, Keller & Nowak 1983:16). It is time for Africa to stop subjecting its economies to the dictates of the West and stand on its own feet.

The MDGs sounded very good and seemed well organised. Some critics, however, believe that they were not well thought out, and lacked strong objectives and indicators for intra-country equality despite differences between developing countries. According to the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (2015), "the major limitation of the MDGs by 2015 was the lack of political will to implement due to the lack of ownership of the MDGs by the most affected constituencies". MDG 1 was criticised for lack of consideration of proper measurement (Easterly 2009:28); MDG 2 was considered to have a negative effect on secondary and post-secondary education (Waage *et al.* 2010:998); MDG 3 was thought not to place enough emphasis on tracking gender inequalities in poverty reduction and employment as there were only gender goals relating to health, education and political representation (Heyzer 2005:10); and MDGs 4 and 5 were criticised in that their "one size fits all" approach did not address, for example, the individual healthcare needs of countries (Subramanian, Naimoli, Matsubayashi & Peters. 2011:2).

According to the UN Millennium Development Goals Report 2015, Africa failed miserably in achieving the goals. "By 2011, all developing regions, except sub-Saharan Africa, had met the target of halving the proportion of people who live in extreme poverty... In contrast, sub-Saharan Africa's poverty rate did not fall below its 1990 level until after 2002. Even

though the decline of poverty has accelerated in the past decade, the region continues to lag behind” (MDG Report 2015:15). Even before the end of the 2015 timeframe for the achievement of the MDGs, the World Bank, the Blair Commission, the IMF and even the UN predicted that Africa would not achieve the goals. They asserted that Africa was the only continent not on track to meet any of the goals of the Millennium Declaration by 2015; “Sub-Saharan Africa... at current trends will fall short of all the goals” (World Bank and International Monetary Fund 2005:2); “...at the mid-point of the Millennium Development Goals, sub-Saharan Africa is the only region which, at current rates, will meet none of the MDG targets by 2015” (Communiqué, follow up to Blair Commission for Africa in Easterly 2009:26). It seems that Africa was doomed to fail regardless of any progress it made towards the realisation of these goals since those who had conjured up this plan failed to consider the unfair standards they had set for achievement and the unjust monitoring tools they had put in place.

The first problem with the MDGs was that they did not take into account the level of poverty in Africa or the size of its population. According to Easterly (2009:28), the goals were unfair to Africa. For example: The measurements that were put in place to determine whether a country was on course to achieve the MDGs were impractical. Putting everything in percentages meant that the population proportion was not taken into consideration, thus creating the perception that Africa had not done anything to attain the MDGs. When a country's poverty rate is very high despite a high economic growth rate, it makes it harder to reduce the poverty rate because the base per capita income (which is used to calculate the growth rate of a country) is low. Easterly (2009:28) explains this phenomenon as follows:

If Latin America (hypothetically) halves poverty rates from 10% to 5%, is that to be preferred to Africa cutting poverty from 50% to 35%? The absolute change (and hence the percent of the population affected) is three times greater in Africa in this hypothetical example, but the proportional cut is less. ...The goal of a proportional reduction in poverty (cutting poverty rates in half) does not recognise that the percentage reduction in poverty is a highly nonlinear function of per capita income (or, closely related, the initial poverty rate).

This means that more median income growth is required for impoverished African countries to achieve the same percentage reduction in poverty than it would a country with high per capita income. Regardless of what international organisations say on this matter, I believe that given African countries' high poverty rate, even reducing the poverty rate by 1% is a greater achievement than that of countries in other parts of the world that achieved greater percentages with their initial lesser poverty rates. According to the Africa Progress Panel (2007), Africa had a 5.4% annual growth rate, which would be “in the top fifth of GDP decade growth rates recorded across all 4 decades and all countries from 1965–2005” (Easterly 2009:29). However, in order to achieve MDG 1, Africa was required to achieve a very unrealistic and pretentious 7% sustained annual growth rate.

In the same manner, MDG 2 had been set in an unrealistic way which meant that Africa continues to lag behind. Despite these unrealistic goals, the continent had made meaningful strides in achieving primary school enrolment; however, in order to achieve the second goal, Africa had to attain 100% elementary enrolment. Clemens (2004:12) says of this:

Those changes in enrolments have indeed been staggering and heartening...massive increases in school enrolments among developing countries over the last few decades, a revolution that continues to occur at rates much, much faster than it occurred in what are today's rich countries during their own development process. Goals have come and gone, and failure has been repeatedly declared, just as developing countries have been moving hundreds of millions of children into the classroom at collectively unprecedented speed.

As MDG 2 was set at 100% primary completion, the tremendous progress Africa made would never have been enough to meet the goal even though it was a huge achievement for Africa.

MDG 3, at least the first part setting out the elimination of gender disparity in primary and secondary education, seemed to follow from MDG 2. It is obvious that if Africa failed to attain MDG 2, it would not achieve this goal either. It should be kept in mind that this is also a 100% goal. However, unlike the other goals, this goal can be a centrepiece for achieving the other goals. By empowering women and achieving gender equality, the

continent can reduce poverty and hunger, improve health and educational outcomes in the community as well as in the family, and ensure environmental sustainability (MDG Report 2015:15). Women's participation in the political arena, in the community and in national parliaments, has increased significantly. The number of women in gainful employment has also increased but the structures of African countries have made closing the gender gap difficult. Even if Africa lags behind in most areas, it has still made great improvement.

In terms of MGD 4, child mortality has been reduced all over the world (including in Africa). However, Africa was still “the region with the highest proportion of (under the age of 5 mortality rate) globally, accounting for 1 in 9 child deaths before the age of five” (MDG Report 2015:25), and setting the goal in proportional terms did not help. Easterly (2005:31)states:

It all depends on how you state the goal - a goal of proportional reduction is more likely to be met by initially low mortality countries, while a goal of absolute reduction in the child mortality rate would be more likely to be met in the initially high mortality countries. Since the goal was stated in proportional terms and Africa was the highest mortality region, the goal as stated was less likely to be met in Africa.

At the end of the timeline for the achievement of the goals in 2015, the ECA reported that Africa was not on track to achieve MDG 4. However, great strides had been made in reducing the infant mortality rate. African countries should be commended and this should serve as encouragement to achieve even more.

The same applies to MDG 5 and MDG 6. Despite starting out to achieve these goals with a high maternal mortality rate and an even higher rate of HIV/AIDS prevalence, Africa managed to reduce the percentages for both. Although limited access to skilled healthcare personnel resulted in the continent not achieving these goals, HIV prevalence among adults in Africa decreased and AIDS-related deaths decreased by 40% (MDG Report 2015:39). Despite these good trends in improving maternal health and combating HIV/AIDS, Africa was reported to be off track on both goals. Yet the MDG Report of 2015 states that by 2013, Africa had 289 maternal deaths per 100000 live births and since

2000, a downward trend was observed in the incidence, prevalence and death rates associated with HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.

Africa also failed to achieve MDG 7. Forest cover on the continent declined, no significant improvement was made in the percentage of people with access to improved sources of drinking water and the proportion of people with access to clean sanitation did not improve significantly. There were, however, minor improvements in protected terrestrial and marine areas. The use of ozone depleting substances was also reduced (MDG Report 2015:80). The argument that the units of measurement for the MDGs were impractical applied here as well.

MDG 8 was concerned more with developed countries than with African countries. Official development assistance given by developed countries increased significantly. Furthermore, duty-free imports from developing countries to developed countries showed an upward movement. In Africa, the gap between MDG 8 targets and delivery was wide (MDG Report 2015:51). Protectionist policies and non-tariff barriers, as well as subsidies, were harmful to Africa's trade. Inter-Africa trade was and still is at a low point.

Despite these gloomy reports and non-achievement in respect of the MDGs, the continent made huge improvement towards improving the lives of its peoples. The arbitrary manner in which the goals had been set up made it highly unlikely that they would be achieved, thus generating a negative picture that made any successes look like failures and demoralising the continent. It fanned the mistaken idea that Africa always fails. "Although more efforts need to be made, the detailed review of the eight goals has highlighted that Africa has achieved great progress across the board" (MDG Report 2015:79). For Pan-Africanist and Africa-centred development and progress, Africa has to continue its efforts and commitment to achieve and progress further.

The continent should also adopt an approach that emphasises addressing the root causes of underdevelopment rather than attempting a band-aid treatment in order to achieve certain goals. Africa should improve its healthcare institutions so that it can

combat any kind of crisis that may arise (like the Ebola crisis in West Africa) and can reverse development gains. It should also invest in its people, promote rural development, enhance agriculture and productivity, prioritise social protection, and support small and medium-sized enterprises (MDG Report 2015:80–81). Women empowerment and gender-informed policy interventions are also necessary for the achievement of social development. These can be in the areas of poverty reduction, inequality and unemployment, et cetera. Africa should also preserve its natural assets, such as forests and marine resources (MDG Report 2015:81–83).

Endeavours to achieve the MDGs have made a profound difference in Africa and the rest of the world. Global poverty was halved five years ahead of the 2015 timeline and almost 90% of children in developing countries were provided with primary education, with narrowed disparities in the number of boys versus girls. Remarkable gains were also been made in fighting HIV/AIDS, and malaria and tuberculosis. These achievements have given a tremendous hope to Africa's peoples. Nevertheless, more needs to be done to address the challenges in the post-2015 world. African unity and integration is slow. Achieving some of the MDGs depended on the largesse of the aid-giving countries and this became impossible due to the 2008 global financial crisis. As a result, African governments were unable to fully provide the finances required for growth and meeting the MDGs.

African countries are still not trading sufficiently with one another. Infrastructure that is meant to facilitate the movement of people and goods between countries and boost efforts towards the realisation of continent-wide unity are lagging behind schedule. This means that the continent needs another framework to make possible the unity and the betterment of its people. This framework is known as Agenda 2063.

PAN-AFRICAN UNITY AND AGENDA 2063

Agenda 2063 is the AU's plan for Africa's transformation with the vision of "an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic

force in the global arena” (AU 2015:1). It is meant as a continuation of the Pan-African drive for growth, development, freedom, self-determination and the overall prosperity of Africa and its peoples. Agenda 2063 is supported by a strong knowledge management system and implementation mechanisms that promote African best practices and experiences, and allow for participation of its various stakeholders in different arenas. It is meant to “galvanise” and unite Africans and the African diaspora with a common vision of a “peaceful, integrated and prosperous Africa, driven by its citizens and taking its rightful place in the world” (AU 2014:8).

Agenda 2063 shares many elements with the MDGs. Taking past lessons and achievements into account in its conception, it is aimed at achieving the vision of a poverty-free Africa akin to MDG1, thus providing the citizens of Africa with affordable and quality healthcare services; ridding it of all kinds of tropical, communicable and infectious diseases (similar to MDG6); making universal access to quality education available at all levels (MDG2); creating an environmentally sustainable Africa (MDG7); ensuring that women and the youth have guarantees of freedoms and leadership roles (MDG3); etcetera. It is fair to say that the MDGs have informed the way forward for a considerable amount of the aims of Agenda 2063.

The agenda is based on the eight priority areas of the AU’s 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration agreed upon at the AU’s Golden Jubilee celebration on May 2013. These areas are (AU 2014:8):

- (1) African identity and Renaissance
- (2) The struggle against colonialism and the right to self-determination
- (3) The integration agenda
- (4) Agenda for social and economic development
- (5) Peace and security agenda
- (6) Democratic governance
- (7) Determining Africa's destiny
- (8) Africa's place in the world

This agenda also details African aspirations for 2063. There are seven aspirations that reflect the desires of the African people for shared prosperity and well-being, unity, et cetera. The seven aspirations are (AU 2015:2):

- (1) A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development
- (2) An integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance
- (3) An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law
- (4) A peaceful and secure Africa
- (5) An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values and ethics
- (6) An Africa whose development is people driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children
- (7) Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner

Aspiration 1

Agenda 2063 envisions Africa as one of the best performers in terms of quality of life by 2063. Its GDP should be high and proportional to its resources, human and natural alike. Food and nutrition securities will be achieved, and poverty will be eradicated fully from Africa. All of Africa's citizens will be free from fear and want, they will have affordable social security and all vulnerable sections of society will have social protection. There will be universal access to quality education at all levels and incomes will rise because of higher investments in human capital developments. Millions of Africans will be trained, educated and skilled; and they will not migrate to the West to look for opportunities (the brain drain of the continent will cease). The diaspora will return and infuse African economies with talent, energy and finances. Africa will get back her former glory and will again become the centre of convergence like in the ancient times of Timbuktu (AU 2015:2–4; AU 2014:10–15).

African citizens will have full access to affordable and quality healthcare services, with a life expectancy of above 75 years, and will be rid of all tropical diseases, HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, etcetera. The cities will be well planned, with modern mass transit systems, and the rural areas will also be well connected. Decent housing will be available for everyone, and so too clean water, sanitation, transport and other services. Africa will be dominant in the global markets on natural resources and the rents from its natural resources will be equitably redistributed. Africa will be a continent respectful of its environment, ecologically conscious with a well-established green economy and green energy (AU 2014:15).

This aspiration is in line with what Nkrumah advocated when he put forward the notion of African unity. He posited that with unity, Africa and its people would prosper beyond imagination (as is the essence of Aspiration 1). As is also indicated in this aspiration, he contended that African unity was the speediest and fullest development (Nkrumah 1963b:163). The agenda's aspirations will come to fruition only upon the achievement of political unity, whereby the continent can collectively pool together its resources to achieve the aspiration of food and nutrition security to better the lives of its peoples and free them from diseases and any kind of want, eradicating poverty, providing them with decent housing and sanitation, etcetera.

Aspiration 2

This aspiration is about having an integrated continent that is politically united based on Pan-African ideals, which was Nkrumah's first and foremost argument. According to the agenda, Africa will fulfil the dream of becoming one, a United States of Africa, a union of well-governed and democratic African states. This should be the very first aspiration as without unity, nothing of that Africa is supposed to achieve will come true. According to Agenda 2063, there will be an African citizenship and passport, a union anthem and a flag. Key economic institutions and frameworks like the African Common Market, African Monetary Union and Africa Free Trade Areas will be established as part of the governance structure (AU 2015:4–5). Regional, national and local government structures will be

appropriately reformed. A continental high speed rail freeway, with adjacent highways and pipelines for gas, oil, water, and ICT broadband cables connecting all the major cities of the continent will be in place (AU 2015:5). Nkrumah thought along the same lines as Aspiration 2. He declared: “What Africa really requires is a fully integrated transport system for the continent, properly planned by a central organisation, which will examine the relative potentials and economics of road, rail, river, air and sea systems in correlation with an over-all plan for inter-African trade and progressive economic and social development” (Nkrumah 1963b:154).

Intra-state trade will mushroom and Africa will have increased mobility of labour, capital and skills, and free movement of people. The political union realised, coupled with improved connectivity and free movement of people, goods and services, will spur intra-Africa trade to unprecedented levels and strengthen Africa's place in global trade (AU 2014:16). The late Libyan president Gaddafi challenged African leaders “...to unite across common purpose and chart their destiny unshackled by the West. His vision then was for an increase in trade amongst Africans, the creation of common continental institutions including a federal government and the free flow of persons across borders” (Wapmuk 2009:662). Yet intra-African trade is negligible compared to Africa's trade with the West, its former colonial masters and the rest of the world. Free movement of people does not seem to be achievable in the very near future. However, the agenda has almost 50 years to go, so things will be better once the targets start rolling in.

Aspiration 3

Africa will be characterised by good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law. Africa will be a continent of democratic values and practices, with a political culture as provided for in the African Governance Architecture. Its countries will endeavour to conduct free and fair elections and have multiparty systems, politically competitive processes, educated electorates and promote Pan-Africanism, equality, diversity, excellence and solidarity. It will adhere to human rights principles, justice and the rule of law. The population will have access to independent courts and a judiciary that

delivers justice without fear or favour, which will be affordable and timely without corruption and impunity. Africa's institutions will serve its people, enhancing the participation of people in development, economic and governance management. The continent will have democratic and developmental states (AU 2015:5–6; AU 2014:16–17).

If African leaders do not change the way they function at present, this aspiration will not be more than an aspiration. As seen in previous parts of this chapter, what Africa's leaders seem to be learning from each other is how to rig elections, steal public funds, and find means and ways of staying in power. This is not good governance and democracy. There are mechanisms in the agenda and others like the APRM to guard against this. According to NEPAD, and the Mo Ibrahim Index on governance, Africa is showing improvements in governance. "Authoritarian military and single party forms of governance, which hitherto dominated the continental political and governance landscape, have been replaced with multi-party political systems and the organisation of regular elections" (Blueprint for an integrated approach to implement Agenda 2063:9). It is important that Africa ensures that democracy and democratic governance go together with delivering socio-economic benefits to its peoples and understanding that democracy, development and service delivery are mutually reinforcing.

Aspiration 4

By 2063, Africa will be a peaceful and secure continent, conflict free and comprising harmonious communities. Mechanisms will be in place to prevent and immediately resolve any kind of intercommunity conflict, organised crime and any form of criminal networks. A culture of peace will be nurtured among Africa's children by integrating peace education in all school curricula. There will be full civilian control of the uniformed services, but Africa's interests will be secured in a peaceful way. Africa will possess military prowess with strong security and a common defence and security strategy and policy in order to defend itself. There will be fully operational land, air and sea forces that will be

under the authority of the AU; and a cyber-security system will be in place to protect and defend Africa's interests in the e-world (AU 2015:6–7).

This is in line with Nkrumah's vision:

"...we should aim at the establishment of a unified military and defence strategy. ...If we in Africa set up a unified economic planning organisation and a unified military and defence strategy, it will be necessary for us to adopt a unified foreign policy and diplomacy to give political direction to our joint efforts for the protection and economic development of our continent" (Nkrumah 1963b:219–220).

He believed that setting up the defence forces centrally was essential not only defence purposes but also for economic ones – as is indicated in the agenda. It agrees with what Nkrumah, and Gaddafi after him, argued for – a common defence force with one national anthem (which in the agenda is described as under one union government). Therefore, we can say that assuming that Agenda 2063 will be achieved, Africa is moving in the direction Nkrumah advocated for regarding the security of the continent.

Aspiration 5

According to Agenda 2063 (AU 2015), Africa's cultural identity, values and ethics will be strengthened by 2063. African people will be so infused with their cultural unity that they will have an African identity and a Pan-African consciousness. Pan-African ideals will be inculcated in the curricula and cultural assets like music, films and theatre will contribute to world culture and Africa's GDP. Creative arts, folklore, national languages and literatures will flourish and contribute to the growth and preservation of national cultures. By 2063, all Africa's cultural treasures will have been retrieved (AU 2015:7–8; AU 2014:18–19). Regarding Africa's cultures and traditions, Nkrumah posited that what was already seen as a norm – the English and French textbooks teaching about English and French cultures and history, geography and their ways of living – had to change. He thought it was "...vital that we should nurture our own culture and history if we are to develop that African personality which must provide the educational and intellectual foundations of our Pan-African future" (Nkrumah 1963b:49).

It is evident that the agenda is still in its infancy and the date at which to fully achieve it is still a long way away. However, at present, despite signing and “adopting” the agenda, African states are not doing much to include it in their national education policies and curricula. Since the AU spearheads Agenda 2063, it must take the initiative and educate the educators who are supposed to educate others. These educators must make the agenda compulsory reading in their courses. They must also do whatever they can to promote, preserve and inculcate African languages and cultures in their students.

Aspiration 6

In 2063, Africa will see women's transformation recognised and children and the youth fully empowered. All forms of violence and discrimination against women and girls, including harmful social practices, will be eliminated. Women will have equal economic rights, including the right to own and inherit property, and women living in the rural areas will have access to productive assets (including land, credit and financial services). Youth unemployment will be eliminated and they will be trained in health services and recreational and cultural activities; they will be inventors of new businesses/start-ups. “All forms of illegal migration of youth would have ended, with travels to the outside world undertaken mainly for cultural and recreational purposes and not as a search for opportunities” (AU 2015:8–9; AU 2014:19–20).

This part of the agenda should be achievable in the indicated timelines, as there are already many initiatives in place. It was part of the MDGs and despite the reports by the neo-colonialist institutions like the IMF and World Bank, Africa has done very well in working towards achieving the goal concerned with women’s empowerment and youth employment.

There are still some structural constraints regarding women’s effective participation and access to economic activities and gains for women, like customary and religious laws. In some parts of the continent, young girls are abducted and sold into marriage (for example

by Boko Haram). Nevertheless, the continent is moving towards abolishing these kinds of practices. There are also prominent African women who are influencing the continent and the world at large as leaders, entrepreneurs, producers, employers and consumers. Example are President Joyce Banda of Malawi; President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia; Nigerian Minister of Finance Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala; and Nigerian oil tycoon, fashion designer and philanthropist Folorunsho Alakija (Africa Up Close 2015:3).

Nkrumah believed in empowering women and thought that women played a vital role in Africa's unity and development. In a speech delivered on 18 July 1960 at the Baden Powell Memorial Hall in Accra, he emphasised that a great deal of responsibility rested on the shoulders of women in achieving the unity of the continent. He addressed Ghanaian women and other women of African descent as follows:

Your role in this direction is of great importance. Not only can you carry back this message to the men of your respective countries, but, if you are convinced that unity is the right answer, you can also bring your feminine influence to bear in persuading your brothers, husbands and friends of the importance of African unity as the only salvation for Africa. For my part, I stand resolutely and inexorably by this conviction and will work with unrelenting determination for its attainment (Nkrumah 1979e:118).

He also believed that it was up to the women of Africa and women of African descent to answer the call of Africa for unity, for halting colonialism and its expansion in the continent, for projecting the "African personality" (Nkrumah 1979e:119). As in this aspiration of the Agenda, Nkrumah believed that women had to take a central role in the quest for continent-wide unity.

African governments are encouraging their youth to tap into the growing digital revolution on the continent, which is stimulating the minds of the youth to create innovations such as mobile application development, establishing business start-ups, addressing pertinent societal needs and filling the unemployment gap (Africa Up Close 2015:3).

Aspiration 7

By 2063, Africa will be a major partner in global affairs and will peacefully co-exist with the rest of the global community. It will take full responsibility for financing its own development. The continent envisages having a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and a strong presence in forums like the IMF and World Bank. It will implement the right policies, and establish competent systems and financial institutions so that it can position the continent to engage in world affairs and be independent of external benefactors. By 2063, Africa will be fully responsible for financing its own development and will not be donor dependent. Africa will be in control of its resources and will be in such a good position economically that it will be able to finance explorations and initiatives like the African Space Agency and the Arctic and Antarctic Explorations and Oceanography Agency. By 2063, Africa will be able to strategically manage opportunities and risks formed through the re-alignment of economic and political power in the world.

However, seeking inclusion in these neo-colonial institutions that structurally keep the continent in a subservient position should not be viewed as an aspiration. It should focus more on Africa taking its proper place in world affairs, being strong and able to manage opportunities to its advantage. Africa and Africans must beware of entering into alliances with their enemies, who in the end want Africa weak and divided. As Nkrumah proposed, “a Union of African States must strengthen our influence on the international scene, as all Africa will speak with one concerted voice...will raise the dignity of Africa and strengthen its impact on world affairs” (Nkrumah 1963b:193). Africa must unite and bring about the prosperity of its lands and its peoples. That is what Africa must aspire for, not a seat at the table of its former oppressors and colonisers.

Various implementation mechanisms have been put in place to achieve the aspirations. Leadership is to be identified, and roles and responsibilities are to be assigned to them; AU structures and processes are to be reviewed and items that are in line with the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the agenda are to be accepted; annual stakeholders’ platforms are to be held to review the progress and implementation of the agenda; and the outcomes of these deliberations are to be presented when giving the State of the Union Report at the AU. There are also different timelines for achieving

certain initiatives, such as establishing the African Free Trade Area by 2017, abolishing visa requirements for all African citizens by 2018, resolving all conflicts and all forms of social exclusions by 2020, eliminating all sorts of food insecurity and hunger by 2025, and increasing intra-African trade to 50% by 2045 (AU 2015).

If the aims of Agenda 2063 can be achieved, it will make meaningful strides in improving the lived experiences of the citizens of the continent. It can address Africa's poverty; its seemingly never-ending conflicts, its use of its own resources for the enrichment of the continent and its peoples, and its voice in world affairs among other perennial challenges that continue to plague the continent. It has even come back to what Nkrumah has been arguing all along (a political unity), albeit in a very roundabout way. It lays great emphasis on the importance of rekindling Pan-Africanism and advancing the continent's development.

However, many questions arise from Agenda 2063. Questions about its practicalities and effect on the sovereignties of member countries in terms of their political and economic policies (which were major obstacles to the initial vision of Nkrumah) remain. Furthermore, strategic plans should be put in place to manage the changing economic power balances across the continent. If existing powers are left as is, this could result in an increase in the already existing unhealthy competition among states in RECs. RECs are said to be key role players in the achievement of Agenda 2063, but how are these communities to be governed?

According to the agenda, Africa's borders are to be open to the citizens of Africa and there should be free movement of people, capital and goods between borders. Recent experiences of xenophobia in countries such as South Africa (a country that is supposed to make bigger strides in the way of continental unity because of its economic superiority and influence in continental politics) and Tanzania (a country once led by one of the fathers of the OAU, Nyerere) make it hard to believe that the peoples of Africa are ready for continent-wide integration. People cling to "their" country, their artificially demarcated colonial borders and their artificial sovereignties.

What is very sad is that in xenophobic attacks, Africans are brutal to their own kin and kith. They do not seem to have problems submitting to their former masters but when it comes to their fellow Africans, they have many justifications for why he/she should not be there. Africans have also become racist so that they segregate from other Africans based on their colour. Examples are what happened in Sudan, with the “white Arab” Sudanese of the north discriminating against and killing the “black African” Sudanese of the south. This eventually led to the cessation of the south to become South Sudan, thereby further fragmenting the continent. Africa has to educate its peoples against these bad practices. It has to educate its peoples that Africa is one and that it is to the benefit of every African if the continent is united. People have to know and believe that in unity there is strength and betterment of life.

When coming to Africa's relations with the rest of the world, how are her relationships with her former colonial masters and the neo-colonialists to be governed? The continent must put the needs and interests of her peoples first and prohibit external efforts to divide, dominate and rule while at the same time ensuring diversity that goes beyond its former relationships with the colonisers and the West. Strengthening relationships with the outside world should come naturally and should not be automatically taken as a threat. If Africa manages to achieve Agenda 2063, the continent will achieve what Nkrumah had argued for: continental unity that will make Africa and Africans great so that they can take their proper place in the world.

THE FUTURE AS A POLITICAL MIRAGE

African politics is at an impasse. It is difficult to imagine a continent free of war and poverty taking into consideration the tight grip of the neo-colonialist powers and how they actively work to destabilise and leverage their economic prowess on the continent. Nevertheless, progress has been made in overcoming the challenges of the continent. The establishment of the OAU was a step towards overcoming these challenges and creating one, united Africa without trade and political barriers. As the OAU's successor, the AU

has the same goals. Economic integration is seen as one of the most important building blocks to continent-wide unity. Regarding political integration, some hopeful signs are evident, such as establishing the AU's Peace and Security Council (Louw-Vaudran 2015:2), issuing of one African passport (even if it is currently issued only to statespersons) and launching the Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement (even if it must still be ratified by states). This is in line with the aspirations of Agenda 2063.

At present, Africa is at an impasse due to the misdemeanours of its leaders, and the negative influence of neo-colonialists who continue to possess a stranglehold over African leaders. Africa still remains at the mercy of global institutions which entrench unequal terms of trade. These and other factors have stunted Africa's growth, political maturity and economic development (Rupiya 2007:126–129). Africa's poverty rate, even if has been reduced due to pressure to meet the MDGs, is still very high. What is remarkable is that so much of its resources are leaving the continent. “The logic is that keeping these resources in Africa would have produced higher rates of investment, allowing African countries to invest in productivity enhancing sectors...creating jobs, and raising incomes” (Nkurunziza 2012:17). These resources have to be remobilised and invested in schemes that will reduce poverty and eventually be sources of greater economic development.

African countries adopted the MDGs as they held the promise of a world that was difficult to resist, a world where there would be no unnecessary children and women mortality, where everyone would have access to clean drinking water, where there would be less hunger, where education would reach everyone, where preventable diseases would not claim lives, where women and the youth would be gainfully and strategically employed, etcetera. African countries worked hard to achieve the goals despite adverse conditions, which were largely due to the framework established for measuring the success of each country. The continent showed an amazing 7% growth rate, the highest of all the continents (Edjang 2013:3). The MDGs helped to improve the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. They showed how much can be achieved when specific targets are set and matched with good political leadership, proper allocation of resources, and a unified and collaborative spirit. Even though the deadline for the MDGs has passed,

progress should continue until the entire continent is out of its present poverty stricken and conflict-ridden state. This is the goal of Agenda 2063

When Agenda 2063 was established in 2013, it was an ambitious vision and action plan to drive the continent's change, development and transformation for the next 50 years. "In many senses Agenda 2063 is rooted in a different development philosophy than that of the MDGs, finding its inspiration in the Lagos Plan of Action, the Abuja Treaty and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)" (Turner, Cilliers & Hughes 2014:1). It is meant to provide direction for Africa's economic growth, social prosperity and unity. Critical success factors of Agenda 2063 include the participation of multiple stakeholders in all states, a results-based approach with measurable objectives and "inculcating the right set of African values in line with the African Renaissance which suggests the transformation of attitudes, values, and mindsets" (AUC 2015). Agenda 2063 challenges Africans to think hard about Africa's future across generations in terms of political unity and development.

Acknowledging past successes and challenges, African heads of state and government "pledged their commitment to progress in eight key priority areas" (DeGhetto, Gray & Kiggundu 2016:95) previously mentioned in this chapter. Agenda 2063 is detailed, with specific challenging but achievable goals and priorities relevant to Africa's emerging specific needs. These help to monitor and evaluate progress on the aspirations across the regions and countries of the continent. To effectively implement the agenda, the appropriate political and economic institutions must be in place. However, even with these institutions – and despite the emphasis on unity – Africa is extremely diverse, which challenges the successful implementation of Agenda 2063. As can be seen in the current political situations on the continent, African countries do not seem to sing from the same hymn sheet when it comes to understanding and implementing Agenda 2063. There are significant differences in meaning, interpretation and responses of the citizenry, which may complicate the processes of monitoring, evaluating and implementing the agenda's action plans.

Another issue that has to be addressed is how African states, as a whole and as individual states, leverage their

"...cost advantages, values, and natural and human resources to successfully integrate into the global value chain? Do they have a common understanding and shared roadmap? The challenge...is for ordinary citizens to imagine a more positive future while reconciling with past misdeeds and atrocities and...coping with the hardship realities of the present...particularly for former settler economies [like] Zimbabwe [and] Kenya...conflict and post conflict states [like] DRC [and] the Sudan, and countries with long-serving regimes [like] Eritrea [and] Uganda (DeGhetto et al. 2016:96).

Even if the agenda may not be a pressing matter for African citizens, who have more pressing matters such as surviving in a harsh economic and social condition, education is critical to the success of the aspirations. Although the MDGs have led to some successes in this regard, education should not only stop at the primary level but rather all citizens should receive secondary education so that their awareness level can improve and they can handle the stakeholder questionnaires of the agenda. The agenda's documents should be prepared in all the major African languages so that there may not be any miscommunication. Considering the masses across the continent, it is vital to develop shared goals on what the continent and the different institutions stand for and where they intend to go (Albert, Ashforth & Dutton 2000:13–14). This will help Africa to figure out how to manage the diverse identities throughout the continent, and help African leaders to persuade their citizens to identify with the agenda. This is key to the success of Agenda 2063.

Unity is critical to the success of Africa. However, it requires that African leaders have the same ideology and vision. The peoples of Africa should move past their violent past and realise a better future through unity in the form of continental political integration. Africa has endured corruption and bribery due to government officials and a small minority of elites and military officials siphoning away millions of dollars to themselves. This has resulted in poor infrastructure and school systems with no proper maintenance. Corruption has led to citizens distrusting their governments and leaders, and strong feelings of resentment and lack of trust in the system. Thus the African continent is riddled

with endless wars which eat away at resources that could have been put to constructive use.

The MDGs mobilised Africa onto the correct developmental path, despite the gloomy reports of the West. Thanks to Agenda 2063, Africans have a hopeful future to look forward to. Even though many Africans continue to face serious financial problems, their overall attitude regarding the future is positive. They are hopeful and optimistic that their children will be better off than their parents. African women and youth, with their innovative minds in the contemporary African economy, represent a powerful source of inclusive and sustainable socio-economic growth (Africa Up Close 2015:4). The participation of women in all spheres of government is increasing. Countries such as Liberia have a woman president (although this will change in November 2017). Africa's youth are creating new job opportunities in agriculture by developing unique agricultural software which applies mobile phone technology to smart urban farming. This enhances the efficiency and productivity of Africa's economy (Africa Up Close 2015:2), in line with both the MDGs and Agenda 2063.

If Agenda 2063 is properly implemented and its goals are achieved, most of Africa will be technologically advanced, wealthier and more urban. These will lead to the development of more fundamental political transformation. More educated, wealthier and more informed citizens will be better placed to demand transparent and accountable governments. Technocratic and kleptomaniac leaders and the influences of foreign powers will be a thing of the past, resulting in Africa's politics being more concerned with meaningful issues such as the political and economic well-being of citizens rather than their ethnicity. This will be a long and complex path since the meaning and significance of ethnic identities are hardwired into the politics of many countries and are sustained by a range of cultural, social and political practices. Ethnic rivalries will spell the end of the aspirations contained in Agenda 2063 and therefore must be resisted. Ethnic differences, although existing for hundreds of years, were rarely a source of division and destruction until European settlers arrived and used it to dominate and control the continent.

Developing, implementing and monitoring Agenda 2063 may seem an intimidating task for Africa. However, it is worth fighting for the implementation of its aspirations. If it is successful, it will enable Africa to take its rightful place on the global stage. The advance towards economic transformation and unity is the reality of our times. The African continent, although free from direct colonisation and subordination, continues to fight poverty and underdevelopment. Agenda 2063 contains all the correct ingredients to restore the dignity and spirit of Africa and its peoples.

African leaders must understand that they have to move from a union of states to a union of peoples. This means that the success of the United States of Africa depends on putting Africa and its people at the centre of the project. The guiding vision for Agenda 2063 is the AU's vision "[t]o see an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in international arenas". As such, Africans should realise that integration and unity are the only way for Africa to leverage its competitive advantage. Inter-Africa trade must be encouraged; a balance should be struck between market forces and strong accountable developmental states; and institutions must be built that are able to drive infrastructure, the provision of social services, industrialisation and economic integration. The agenda— as it is anchored in Pan-Africanism – promotes the values of solidarity, self-belief, non-sexism and self-reliance, and it celebrates Africa's diversity. It should be interpreted and implemented as such. While the MDGs were a mobilising force to put Africa's peoples in gear to come together and work towards improving their quality of life, Agenda 2063 gives the people and the continent a vision and direction for a better, prosperous and unified future.

CONCLUSION

For Nkrumah, African unity was an achievable vision despite his detractors' vehement opposition. It was a necessary precondition for the survival, development and prosperity of the African peoples. He envisaged total political integration, a continental union with three main objectives: (1) planning on a continental basis to increase the industrial and economic power of Africa; (2) a unified land, sea, air, military and defence strategy; and

(3) a unified foreign policy and diplomacy to give political direction for the joint efforts of the protection and economic development of the continent. However, Africa remains a divided continent.

African leaders still cling to their independent and weak states; they want to work towards unity by regionally integrating – which Nkrumah was against, saying that it was another form of balkanisation. Regional integration in the form of regional blocs was meant to assist African countries overcome the problem of being small economies and to develop a common market for the facilitation of intra-national trade and economic development. However, these regional blocs have not achieved the integration goal.

This does not mean Africa has not made any progress towards achieving unity. The AU's Peace and Security Council was established to “promote peace and protect democracy” and the APRM is a governance monitoring mechanism. Africa has made promising strides toward unity in the form of signing an agreement to form the largest free-trade zone solidifying the Cape to Cairo initiative. This agreement, when each member has signed it, will remove trade barriers on most goods, to enable Africans to trade more efficiently with one another and improve inter-African trade.

Even though the West initiated the MDGs, pledging to assist Africa in its endeavours to achieve the goals, Africa participated. As always, the West pushed aside the achievements Africa made and in their reports were very harsh on her successes and failures in achieving the goals. To begin with, the levels of poverty in Africa, the size of her population and the state of her peoples were not taken into account. At the end of the time set for the achievement of the goals, Africa was reported to have failed at achieving every goal by all the institutions involved in assessing the MDGs.

Despite the bad reports, the continent did make progress in achieving the goals and improving the lives of its peoples. The arbitrary manner in which the goals were set up made it highly unlikely for them to be achieved, thus generating a negative picture that made any successes look like failures and demoralising the continent. Most importantly,

it fanned the mistaken idea that Africa always fails. Nevertheless, Africa should continue its efforts and commitment to achieve more, and adopt an approach addressing the root causes of underdevelopment.

Africa devised a plan for the integration and transformation of the continent – Agenda 2063. The agenda is very much in line with Nkrumah's ideas for a Pan-African, continent-wide unity. It can safely be said that the continent is slowly realising that the path it has followed for more than 50 years is unsuitable and it must pursue what Nkrumah advocated for: political unity. Even though the agenda is futuristic in nature, it has all the makings of a successful unifying plan. What is needed is the conviction of African leaders and peoples to work towards unity, keep the set timelines and be motivated.

At present, there are obstacles that have to be overcome such as Africa's persistent unfavourable relations with its former colonisers, xenophobia, and the agenda's practicalities and its effect on the sovereignties of countries in terms of political and economic policies. In addition, the changing balance of economic power across the continent and RECs' powers need to be managed. Africa has to educate its peoples to stand against bad practices and that a united continent is to the benefit of every African. People have to know and believe that in unity there is strength and betterment of life. The continent must put the needs and interests of its peoples first, and prohibit any external effort to divide, dominate and rule while at the same time ensuring the kind of diversity that goes beyond its former relations with the West.

The future of the African continent is at an impasse due to the continued negative influences of colonialism and some of the political elites that emerged from it. Leaders are not accountable to their people and are siphoning away resources from the continent. This has stunted Africa's growth and development. In spite of this, Africa is making progress on the unity front. Some hopeful signs are being seen with regards to political integration.

The MDGs have helped to improve the everyday lives of African people. They have shown how much can be achieved when specific targets are set and matched with good political leadership, proper allocation of resources, and a unified and collaborative spirit. African countries have worked hard and made progress in realising the goals, even if they were not properly conceived for the African context. It is hoped that Agenda 2063 will carry the continent towards full realisation of the MDGs, since its success factors are based on the participation of multiple stakeholder groups in all the states and a results-based approach with measurable objectives. If Agenda 2063 is successful, it will enable Africa to proper status and take its rightful place on the global stage.

The peoples of Africa should move past their unsavoury past and realise a better future through unity in the form of the political integration of the continent. African leaders have to agree on common interests to work towards achieving this and must collectively buy into the ideas contained in Agenda 2063. They need to understand that they must move from a union of states to a union of peoples. The success of African unity depends on putting Africa and its people at the centre of the unity project.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION TO THE STUDY

In this study, I analysed Nkrumah's argument for the necessity of African unity along political, rather than economic, lines. Nkrumah's understanding of this unity is embodied in the following statement: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto it" (Nkrumah 1979d:4). This does not mean that he believed that economic integration was less important than political unity. Rather, he advocated that political unity should come first and economic unity would fall into place once the former was firmly established. Nkrumah (1963b:221) stated:

The survival of free Africa, the extending independence of this continent, and the development towards that bright future on which our hopes and endeavours are pinned, depend upon political unity. Under a major political union of Africa there could emerge a United Africa, great and powerful...working for the complete and total mobilization of the economic planning organisation under a unified political direction.

He asserted that Africa needs a common political basis for the integration of policies, for economic planning and execution, and for any kind of diplomatic relation it may have with the rest of the world. Based on this political unity, strategies and plans could be developed for the advancement of Africa and its peoples. Pan-Africanism was found to be the basic philosophical statement to achieve African unity. Nkrumah advocated for Pan-African unity, which is continent-wide unity that will enable African states to act and speak as one voice in the international political sphere. He declared that "it is only when full political unity has been achieved that we will be able to declare the triumphant end of the Pan-

Africanist struggle and the African liberation movements” (Nkrumah 2007:140). Pan-Africanism calls for cultural and political solidarity among African peoples. Nkrumah called for African unity at a time when many African countries still suffered under colonial rule. This condition encouraged and in some cases manifested as solidarity among the already independent African countries. This was consistent with his understanding of Pan-Africanism as it advocated constructive solidarity among all Africans.

The Pan-Africanist point of departure became a significant rallying point for solidarity among politically independent African countries after independence and still is to date. The solidarity was and remains necessary to mobilise collective action in the continuing struggle for Africa's economic independence and the unity project. Nkrumah used the philosophical approach of Pan-Africanism to argue for African unity. For him, Pan-Africanism meant that Africans are the original indigenous owners of the territorial expanse of continental Africa even though they were often uprooted and forcibly removed from Africa (Masolo 1994:12). He argued against territorial and cultural boundaries erected through colonialism, which brought only border problems to states and would only become worse once these states developed industrially. African unity would bring about free movement across territorial boundaries, resulting in diminished or no border disputes.

Pan-African unity was articulated from the era of decolonisation. It was articulated in two different yet related ways: the Casablanca and Monrovia schools of thought. The Casablanca group (comprising of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, the Congo and Tanzania) was convinced that political unity should come first, and plans for the development of the economic and social spheres could be worked out afterwards. The Monrovia group (consisting of Nigeria, Liberia and most of the French-speaking African countries) opposed the position of the Casablanca group, arguing that unity should be achieved gradually through economic cooperation. The argument of the Monrovia group fitted well with the designs of the Western powers, which was regionalism in Africa. The new states got the “support” of their former colonial masters to pursue this line of “integration” so that it was adopted by the OAU at its establishment. This kind of union has not worked. At the time, Nkrumah (1960c:134) called it “deceptively time

delaying”. Through Pan-African unity, he envisaged a political union with a common foreign and defence policy, and rapid social, economic and industrial development.

Nkrumah's (1963b) central argument for the construction of the United States of Africa was that the political unification of Africa should precede economic integration and co-operation. An indispensable demand for political unification was the partial or full ceding of the sovereignty of African states. Ghana, under Nkrumah, was prepared to lead by example and cede part or all of her sovereignty for the achievement of African unity. In his speech delivered at the founding conference of the OAU, Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie also recognised that there must be a surrender of sovereignty for the sake of African unity. He argued that in the pursuit of African unity, the different histories, diverse cultures and different political systems of the post-independence era African states had to be recognised, and stated that the struggle for African unity could not succeed without agreement on the extent to which state sovereignty had to be surrendered (Haile Selassie 1963:4–5).

Nkrumah called for African unity when many African countries were still suffering under colonisation. This condition encouraged and sometimes manifested solidarity among African countries. The states that had achieved independence earlier than others were keen to help their fellow Africans to be free from the yoke of colonialism. This was consistent with Nkrumah's understanding of Pan-Africanism in that it advocated solidarity among all Africans. Such were the minds of most of the founding fathers of the OAU when the organisation was established. However, not all of them could agree on the modalities of unity. Some supported Nkrumah's idea of a political union while many others (the majority) wanted gradual and incremental union. The idea of gradual integration was eventually preferred. As Nyerere (1963:3) put it at that time, “our goal must remain firm, and nothing short of a United States of Africa should be accepted as our ultimate destiny. This does not mean that we must – or that we could – achieve the goal tomorrow, in one step. We must progress towards it...by steps towards unity in different areas of Africa”. Contemporary leaders seem no more ready for continent-wide unity than the fathers of the OAU did, since they are still unwilling to surrender any part of their sovereignty.

Former South African president Mbeki said, “before you put a roof on a house, you need to build the foundation” (*The Independent* 2007). This seems to reflect the collective mentality of the present leaders.

Attempts at unity have been made in the form of RECs or regional blocs, but they have not worked out as it was thought they would. Forming these blocs was supposed to assist with regional integration, thus making continent-wide integration easier by bringing forward the already integrated blocs. The blocs were supposed to help African countries overcome the problems associated with their small economies, as the states in the blocs were supposed to develop a common market to facilitate intra-national trade and then structural transformation that would lead to the economic development of the states. However, the regional blocs have not achieved regional integration. The member states prefer to belong to more than one bloc, which replicate efforts and results in wastage of resources, causing animosity among members. Forere (2012:50–54) states that as long as the RECs are not building blocks of African unity by law and deliberate intent, talk of the United States of Africa is premature. Nkrumah was against this kind of integration, the coming together in small units or blocs and trying to be united from there. He said that it was just another form of disunity and that the blocs were merely bigger forms of balkanisation. He wanted continent-wide political unity, which should have been the case had the new small “independent” states not been so jealous of their newfound “unviable” sovereignty.

For Nkrumah, African unity was an achievable vision despite his detractors vehemently opposing him. It was a necessary precondition for the survival, development and prosperity of the African peoples. He envisaged total political integration, a continental union. He wanted Africa to unite under the same flag, the same anthem, one defence force and one currency.

Having separate military forces did not make sense for Nkrumah. He thought that Africa should move towards establishing a common military and defence strategy. He asserted that if Africa did not “unite and combine our military resources for common defence, the

individual states, out of a sense of insecurity, may be drawn into making defence pacts with foreign powers which may endanger the security of us all” (Nkrumah 1963b:220). In addition to being easy targets for Western influence, maintaining multiple defence forces would be a wasteful practice and an unnecessary drain on African states. One defence force could respond to any threat that may present itself would be practical and economical. It would be better for Africa to have “one over-all (land, sea and air) Defence Command” (Nkrumah 1963b:220).

One of the principal objectives of a common market is to eliminate competition. Setting up an African common market eliminates the existing competition between African states because of their different allegiances with their former colonial masters. However, by “uniting our policy, we can beat the undercutting tactics of the buyers who set us one against the other... A common currency, free of links with outside currency zones, would enable us to reserve the foreign exchange made from our export trade for essential imports” (Nkrumah 1963b:163). By having a common currency, transactions and financial activities between African states will be facilitated, and strengthening financial ties with the establishment of a central bank will re-adjust the financial systems and place them out of the reach of the West.

Colonialism and neo-colonialism have destroyed the democratic and people-centred leadership that was the African way of leadership and substituted it with tyranny and autocracy. False sovereignties based on arbitrary boundaries define African states and create artificial ethnic divisions. Nkrumah emphasised that the objectives of Africa and its former colonial masters and neo-colonialists were direct opposites. Africa’s strength lies in unity, whereas the strength of the neo-colonialists lies in Africa's disunity. Nkrumah (1965:259) asserted that “African unity...would destroy neo-colonialism in Africa”. He believed that African unity was within the grasp of African people and the only way to break out of the grasp of neo-colonialism was to act on a “Pan-African basis” and through a “Union Government”. Should all the peoples of Africa unite, the neo-colonialists would adjust themselves to accommodate the new power balance. He said that African unity

was “above all, a political kingdom that can only be gained by political means” (Nkrumah 1963b:2). He went on to stress that the unity had to begin with political union:

African struggle for independence and unity must begin with political union. A loose confederation of economic co-operation is deceptively time-delaying. It is only a political union that will ensure a uniformity in our foreign policy projecting the African personality and presenting Africa as a force important to be reckoned with...A political union envisages a common foreign and defence policy, and rapid, social, economic and industrial developments (Nkrumah 1979:134).

However, Africa remained a colonial state because after independence, most leaders worked with the same colonial powers for personal gain and the colonial powers would not leave Africa to its own devices as the continent was the source of raw materials for their industries. African states were forced to depend on “foreign contributions” to maintain a semblance of being “free” governments. Most African countries which attained independence from colonial rule did not have their own economies and were sunk into economic bondage because of the foreign debt burden. Many scholars believe that the conditions of Africa worsened after independence. The economic enslavement of Africa, especially to the West, is one of the living problems carried over from the time of granting political independence.

Neo-colonialism consigned Africa to the bondage of economic dependency and debt. The colonial powers could not afford to keep their hands completely off their former colonies and continue to influence politics and developments in these regions. Some of the leaders fought against the challenges of continuing with the inherited culture but most of the African leaders worked with the former colonisers in order to protect their personal interests and served as their henchmen to acquire economic and political resources. This was evidenced in the national borders, political infrastructure, educational systems, national languages, economies and trade networks of each state. Thus, many leaders of post-independent African states find themselves dependent on “foreign contributions” to maintain the machinery of their governments. These rulers became dictatorial, highhanded and tyrannical. This is why after more than 50 years of independence, African countries still exist as colonial states. Had the leaders of the newly independent African

states heeded and opted for Pan-African unity at the establishment of the OAU, the picture would have been different. Neo-colonialism would have been stopped in its tracks, the former colonial powers would not have indirectly held onto their former colonies, Africa would have had one governing body with Pan-Africa principles, and it would have been strong and been a force to be reckoned with. Instead, the leaders put their trust in the West and their aid.

Moyo (2009) point out that Africa's development trajectory could be pursued mainly on the provision of aid from outside the continent. The inability of African economies to develop after independence led many African countries to seek foreign aid. In the name of aid, African countries continue to maintain burdensome economic links with the West. They accept loans, which are meant for their economic development, at very high rates but the repayment of these loans traps them in a vicious circle of poverty, underdevelopment and aid dependence. The West uses this underdevelopment and aid dependency to its advantage, controlling the internal policies and foreign relations of the country and making the country vulnerable to its suggestions and manipulations. Nkrumah identified this problem as neo-colonialism and warned against it.

To combat these neo-colonialist traits, a second decolonisation which is driven by the actualisation of Pan-African unity is needed. Africans should consider Pan-Africanism as a mobilising ideology for unity and a development blueprint. Unity, as Nkrumah argued, will also enable Africa to resist Western influence and measures that are not in its interest. African leaders should stop to look to the West and neo-colonialists for directions and assistance whenever they face obstacles. They should look inward to their African contemporaries for solutions. Western assistance always comes with political conditions meant to ensure that African countries never attain meaningful development, independence and sovereignty. Africans and their leaders must ensure that whatever their relationship with the West, it should be on an equal footing and not a master–servant relationship or patronage of any sort.

In recent years, Africa seems to be warming to the idea of political unity – as can be seen from its new unity project, Agenda 2063. Agenda 2063 is a plan for Africa's transformation with the vision of “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena” (AU 2015:1). Although it is very early to say whether the agenda is Pan-African in nature, it supports the Pan-African idea of unity and mostly agrees with Nkrumah's argument of a political basis for the unity of Africa. Agenda 2063 supports Nkrumah's ideas in that it is aimed at integration, continent-wide unity, and the betterment of Africa and its peoples. The agenda has seven aspirations with different timelines to achieve initiatives, among which are establishing the African Free Trade Area by 2017, abolishing visa requirements for all African citizens by 2018, resolving all conflicts and all forms of social exclusions by 2020, eliminating food insecurities by 2025 and increasing intra-African trade to 50% by 2045. The agenda is being implemented to achieve what Nkrumah put forward as the three main objectives needed for continental-wide integration: (1) continental planning, which the agenda is all about; (2) a unified defence system, which is also a major subject of the agenda; and (3) a common foreign policy, which is what will be achieved if the agenda comes to fruition.

The agenda seems to be futuristic in nature and raises some pertinent questions, like: Is Africa already working concretely to give effect to the ideas proposed by the agenda? Is Africa willing to shed the colonial state designs to which it still clings and where power politics are still the boiling point? Even if policies and timelines have been set, the dynamics of African politics at the present suggest that Africa is not ready for unity. The AU launched the common passport in Kigali (Rwanda) and is issuing passports in accordance with the aspirations of Agenda 2063. Yet most African countries enforce very strict immigration policies against fellow Africans and are not so welcoming to Africans. Some are even violent towards immigrants. An example is the ever-present xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Africa is supposed to increase intra-Africa trade by establishing free trade areas. How this can come into fruition is a riddle because the regional blocs that have been set up are not working and most countries have overlapping memberships of these blocs. If the free trade areas are set up and they work, it could set countries on the path of transformation from being dependent on the export of commodities to

manufacturing products. In any case, the continent is doing all it can to make the biggest free trade zone a reality by October 2016.

Many issues need to be resolved before African unity can be achieved. African unity has to be re-articulated and reaffirmed at all levels, especially at the level of political leadership. Political leaders should have greater conviction of their political ideologies and sustainable political commitment. “[A]ll leaders of Africa should pursue unselfishly, honestly and with singleness of purpose, the twin tasks of making their territories genuinely free and unfettered from foreign domination and seek the greater strength which can only come through union...” (Nkrumah 1979:104). In order to move forward with continent-wide unity, political leaders must first have the conviction and political will to carry out the vision embedded in Agenda 2063. Leaders’ unwillingness to surrender certain aspects of their states’ sovereignty will cause doubt among the peoples and raise concerns about the benefits to be gained. “I can see no security for African states unless African leaders...have realised beyond all doubt that salvation for Africa lies in unity...for in unity lies strength” (Nkrumah 1963b:145). The solution for Africa is Pan-African, continent-wide unity. Surrendering certain aspects of their states’ sovereignty is imperative.

Africa must have the means for political and economic integration before committing to any kind of integration. The most appropriate form of integration for Africa is political rather than economic. The AU must mobilise its member states to pursue political unity based on Pan-African principles and overcome the challenges associated with it. Steps that should be taken include reinvigorating ideological conviction for the unification process, not only among the political leadership of the continent but also among the wider public, through meticulous expression of African unity as the only way for development and transformation.

At the establishment of the OAU, African heads of states resolved that strengthening educational and cultural ties between African peoples is a necessary and indispensable step towards achieving unity. They believed that “once...co-operation in the educational

and cultural fields amongst African states has been organised, co-ordinated and harmonised and fully implemented, it will pave the way to the final goal, namely African Unity” (OAU 1963:11). In order to educate society and constituencies for African unity and changing the framework of African unity from “we the heads of state and government” to “we the peoples of Africa”, African leaders must play their roles in bringing about political unity but African men and women must also play their part in the unity process. They should not leave everything to their leaders and others to decide on their behalf. A new kind of Pan-Africanism must evolve and must be led by the people instead of governments, states or political parties too concerned with power than with continental unity and the betterment of the African peoples.

Pan-African unity will enable the continent to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing world, giving Africa better bargaining power globally. “A Union of African States must strengthen our influence on the international scene, as all Africa will speak with one concerted voice...A Union of African States will raise the dignity of Africa and strengthen its impact on world affairs” (Nkrumah 1963b:193). Africa needs the actualisation of the Pan-Africanist ideology to stand for Africa, solve their problems themselves, reap the rewards of their labour, and stand tall and united as one to become a force to be reckoned with. “But it is only when full political unity has been achieved that we will be able to declare the triumphant end of the Pan-African struggle and the African liberation movements” (Nkrumah 1963b:140). Only unity will enable Africa to resist Western influence. Continental unity is an opportunity to face the real threats to sovereignty. Steering away from xenophobic tendencies and educating its people that Africa is one, and that it is to the benefit of every African that the continent be united, people will know and believe that in unity there is strength and betterment of life.

Africa has never failed in planning. There are marvellous plans and resolutions in archives gathering dust, being used as references for studies to get better solutions, honing the previous solutions to perfection but not being implemented. It looks like Africans are good at talking about their problems and finding solutions to them. However, they are very bad at implementing the solutions that they come up with unless they get the go ahead from

the West, which they will never get since it is against the interests of the West for Africa to be united.

In this study, I have attempted to show that Nkrumah's argument that political unity must precede economic integrity is valid and can work in realising Africa's continent-wide unity. What is needed for its realisation is to find ways of implementing decisions and resolutions without the interference of neo-colonialists and the West. It is my view that future researchers should look into ways of implementing the decisions, resolutions and solutions regarding the unification of the continent and the betterment of its peoples. An in-depth analysis should be made on how to break free of the constant and persistent influence of the West in every aspect of governing African states. Nkrumah (1963b:xv) contended:

...Our problems are made more vexed by the devices of neo-colonialists. And when we attempt to deal with them in ways which, having regard to all the facts that are known to us, seem most appropriate in the endeavour to maintain the internal unity upon which our viability and progress depend, we are misrepresented to the outside world to the point of distortion.

Neo-colonialists and their influences are ever present in the policy-making processes of African states. Not because the West is concerned about our well-being and the democratisation of our "undemocratic" ways of government but because they have very big interests in Africa's resources. In order to secure their access to these resources, they instigate *coup d'états* to put in place puppets that can dance to their every string pull, start ethnic wars between previously peaceful ethnicities and (like with NATO's invasion of Libya and Gaddafi's assassination) start "shadow wars" against leaders who want to use the continent's resources for the people of the continent, work towards continent-wide unity and cut the neo-colonialists off from their resource-sucking endeavours. Neo-colonialists use Africans against Africans. We Africans oblige them by jumping to dance to their tunes. Why is this? Are we so hungry and impoverished that we would kill our brothers for resources that can be used by all? Future researchers should find out why Africans are so susceptible to rise against one another at the behest of the neo-colonial powers and will not look for other African ways of cooperation and growth. Governments

should be elected instead of coming to power through the constant vicious cycle of *coup d'états* and starting everything from scratch, never building on the good policies and work of previous regimes.

It is by breaking free of the neo-colonial ties that Africa has come to depend on so desperately that African unity can be realised. Unless there is strong resistance to Western influence in the internal and foreign policies of Africa, Africa will continue on its self-destructive path, brother killing brother in civil wars that they were coaxed into by the West. Governments will continue to rise and fall based on *coup d'états* and once in power, they will do absolutely everything to stay there (including killing the very people they are supposed to protect, lead and better the lives of). Unless Africa can resist the neo-colonialists, the West will – as it is already doing – “fan the fires of sectional interests, of personal greed and ambition among leaders and contesting aspirants to power...Our freedom stands open to danger...as long as the independent states of Africa remain apart” (Nkrumah 1963b: xvi–xvii).

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
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Map of Africa before Colonisation



Africa before the colonial partition, c. 1870

(Source: <https://gibaulthistory.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/africa-before-the-colonial-partition-c-1870.jpg?w=720>)

Appendix B: Map of Africa during the Scramble for Africa



(Source: <http://www.ramsey.k12.nj.us/cms/lib3/NJ01000326/Centricity/Domain/331/africa%20colonization%20map.jpg>)

Appendix C: Map of Contemporary Africa



(Source: http://www.africaguide.com/image/maps/africa_map.png)