

**SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CONSUMERS AT RETAIL STORES IN
THE GAUTENG PROVINCE: AN ASSESMENT OF SECURITY
MEASURES**

by

MAHAMBANE MISAVENI ABEL

Submitted in accordance with the requirements
for the degree of

MAGISTER TECHNOLOGIAE
in
SECURITY MANAGEMENT

at the

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

PROMOTER: PROF D. GOVENDER

DECEMBER 2017

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

The rights are mutually held in reserve by the University of South Africa (UNISA) and Mr Misaveni Abel Mahambane. According to the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, no share of this material may be duplicated, kept in any retrieval system, be communicated in any form or be printed, redeployed or vetted by any means (mechanical, electronically photocopying, recording or else) without preceding written consent from Mr Misaveni Abel Mahambane and the University of South Africa. Though, consent to use in these ways any material in this work that is resulting from other sources must be obtained from the original source. For that reason, original information may be used and referred to for research and academic purposes as long as it is referenced properly and recognized.

© UNISA 2017

STATEMENT

Misaveni Abel Mahambane with student number 37027123 hereby state that the dissertation on: SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CONSUMERS AT RETAIL STORES IN THE GAUTENG PROVINCE: AN ASSESMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES is my own effort and that all the sources that I have utilised have been specified and recognized by means of comprehensive references and that this work has not been succumbed in the past for any other degree at any academic establishment.



18/01/2018

SIGNATURE

(MR MAHAMBANE MA)

DATE

DEDICATION

The dissertation is devoted to my late parents: Mr Ndengeza Wilson (Spider) Mahambane (Xitsavi-Baloyi) and Mrs Maria Zondeka Masingi-Mahambane.

To my late grandfathers: Mr Mphahlela Xitsavi-Baloyi, Mr Xirhami Jacob wa Mzilikazi Masingi and late grandmothers: Mrs Nwa-Jani Makhawukani Golela-Baloyi and Mrs Makhanani Makhubele-Masingi.

To my late father's late two brothers: Makasani Johannes Xitsavi-Baloyi, Mafemani Jackson Xitsavi-Baloyi and Magezi Xitsavi-Baloyi. Ndziri etlelani hi ku rhula Maharimani ya mbulwa.

Hina loko hi ti phata hiri: Hi va ka Xitsavi, hi Maharimani ya mbulwa, hi vanyayi, hi va ka Khalanga, hi valozwi, hi va ka mthondolovhani, hi va ka ncila ava ololi-loko wo wu lola wa tshoveka, hi timbhurhi ta ntshava (maribye), hi khandziya murhi hi nsinya hi chika hi rhavi. Hi vanhu va malwandla-vo chava ku teka swa vanhu. Ndziri etlelani hi ku rhula nwina timintsu ta mina.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, and the foremost, I would like to acknowledge the almighty God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Ghost in lieu of providing me with wisdom, power and the ability to go on with my studies successfully no matter what challenges I encountered during my journey. I will always remember Proverbs 3: 5 - 6, which reads as follows: - “Trust in the Lord with all your heart. Never rely on what you think you know. Remember the Lord in everything you do, and he will show you the right way”. Through these words, they gave me intrinsic motivation all the way through my journey up to the completion of my research.

Secondly, I would like to thank my late parents (Mr Ndengeza Wilson (Spider) Mahambane (Xitsavi-Baloyi) and Mrs Maria Zondeka Masingi-Mahambane) for giving life to me. I would also like to thank my late parents for raising and nurturing me to be what I am today. I want to show my gratefulness and sincere gratitude to my beloved wife Rirhandzu Agnes Makhubele-Mahambane, lovely daughter Anita Mahambane and lovely son Anhlulo Adley Mahambane for their endless support and understanding of my continuous absence from home during my study. My earnest thanks go to my siblings: Thomas, Miliyoni Jeffrey, Hlupheka Ernest, Masaswivona Donald Mahambane and (sister) Tsakani Joyce Mahambane-Hlungwane for their support and inspiration during my journey and I could not have done it without them. Therefore, thanks to my entire family for everything and may the Mighty Living God provide you all the greatest in return.

Thirdly, my heartfelt appreciation to my promoter Professor Doraval Govender for the incessant support for my Mtech studies, his persistence, inspiration, eagerness, and vast knowledge. Your supervision helped me during my research and writing of this dissertation. At times, I felt blown away by his comments and thought he was a difficult supervisor and for that, I salute you my supervisor.

Fourthly, my earnest acknowledgments further go to Dr John Kole (Senior Lecturer) who continuously gave me determination and guidance that one day I will finish this

challenging journey. Thank you for not disregarding my emails and calls. You were always there for me when I needed you most. Whatever cul-de-sac I faced during my journey, you turned it into a freeway and for that, I salute you. Furthermore, thanks to the following colleagues and friends (Mr Tinyiko David Ngoveni, Mr Lesiba Motsepa and Ms Nolubabalo Mbotshelwa) for their patience and understanding when I needed a shoulder to lean on, guys you were always there for me no matter what.

Lastly, my deepest thanks go to all the participants that contributed in this study. If it were not your contribution, I would not have attained the goals of this study. Not forgetting to thank the Unisa library services staff who assisted me in information search. Thanks to the University for the entire backing that I received throughout my studies.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Retail stores rely on consumers to maintain their businesses and growth. Much of their success depends on the safety and security of consumers. The more people come and buy the products, the more profitable the stores become. If the safety and security of consumers (or their perceptions thereof) at a shopping centre where a retail store is sited is in question, consumers may well stop frequenting such centres and do their shopping at other retail centres at which they perceive to be more safe and secure to do their shopping.

Consumers' 'peace-of-mind' plays a vital role in their selection of which retail store(s) to frequent and will often determine whether a repeat visit will occur. The extent of incidents of crime of whatever nature at a particular shopping centre will also impact negatively on shoppers' perceptions of 'how safe it is to shop' at particular centres.

Security measures differ from one retail store to another and also between the size and layout, as well as the location of the retail store. The rate at which criminal offences take place at retail stores is currently vague or unknown. Therefore, it is vital that specific risks confronting these retail stores should be identified and analysed with the intention of recommending specific security measures.

Business crime and violence present significant threats to consumers' safety and security in South Africa. High levels of business associated crimes have compelled communities and business bodies such as retail stores to provide their own security for the protection of their assets, as well as consumers.

Effective security measures are a prerequisite at retail stores to ensure the safety and security of consumers whilst visiting retail stores. Precaution ought to be taken when dealing with any crime problem that affects consumers at any business environment, in this study more precisely: retail stores.

The study explored the existing security measures at retail stores for the protection of consumers. The researcher employed qualitative methods: one-on-one interviews with participants and site observations at selected retail stores. There were 30 participants (20 consumers and 10 security officers).

The study found the following:

- Retail stores were exposed to security risks such as theft; shoplifting; common robbery; armed robbery; fraud; arson and assaults (grievous bodily harm) and burglary.
- The security measures that are currently in place are not adequate to protect retail stores. These security measures differ from one retail store to the next.
- In order to improve safety and security at retail stores there should be a security standard that is applicable to the retail stores.

Based on the findings, some of the recommendations were as follows:

- Retail stores should be protected in line with the level of risk of the area where the retail store is situated: low risk; medium risk; and high risk.
- Security managers should conduct security awareness regularly.
- Threat assessments should be conducted regularly as well.
- Consumers are encouraged to report to the Security manager at the retail store any suspicious actions; persons; objects; and vehicles.

Key Terms:

Access control, Consumers, Retailers, Retail store, Security, Security manager, Security risks, Security screening/ Vetting, Security measures, Security survey, Vulnerability.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIC:	Australian Institute of Criminology
AS:	Australian Standards
CG:	Corporate Governance
CCTV:	Closed Circuit Television
CGCSA:	Consumer Goods Council of South Africa
CPTED:	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CSSA:	Crime Statistics South Africa
GBH:	Grievous Bodily Harm
GP:	Gauteng Province
IAS:	Intruder Alarm Systems
ISO:	International Standard Organisation
ISS:	Institute of Security Studies
IT:	Information Technology
JMPD:	Johannesburg Metro Police
MoU:	Memorandum of Understanding
OSAC:	Overseas Security Advisory Council
PEK:	Personal Experience Knowledge
PSIRA:	Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority
RAT:	Routine Activities Theory
SA:	South Africa
SAPS:	South African Police Service
SCPT:	Situational Crime Prevention Theory
SLA:	Service Level Agreement
SOC:	Security Operation Centres
SRCM:	Security Risk Control Measures
SRM:	Security Risk Management
SRMM:	Security Risk Management Model
QG:	Queensland Government
UNISA:	University of South Africa
URMM:	Unisa Risk Management Model

CONFIRMATION OF LANGUAGE EDITING

I, Berdine Smit, hereby state that I have edited the master's dissertation entitled:

“SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CONSUMERS AT RETAIL STORES IN THE GAUTENG PROVINCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES” by Misaveni Abel Mahambane.

An editing certificate has been attached to validate the expert editing and checking of this dissertation. See Annexure I.

17/01/2018

Date

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	VI
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION.....	1
1.1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY	1
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM	3
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	3
1.5 RESEARCH AIM.....	3
1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES	4
1.7 KEY CONCEPTS.....	4
1.8 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION.....	6
1.9 CONCLUSION	7
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	8
2.1 INTRODUCTION.....	8
2.2 THE RESEARCH APPROACH	8
2.3 THE RESEARCH DESIGN	9
2.4 POPULATION AND SAMPLING	10
2.5 DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND INSTRUMENTS.....	12
2.5.1 <i>Design and development of data collection instruments</i>	13
2.5.2 <i>Piloting</i>	14
2.6 COLLECTION OF DATA	14
2.6.1 <i>Interviews</i>	15
2.6.2 <i>Observation</i>	18
2.6.3 <i>Personal Experience Knowledge</i>	20
2.7 MANAGING OF DATA.....	21
2.7.1 <i>Coding and categorising the data</i>	22
2.7.2 <i>Reflecting on the codes and categories</i>	23
2.7.3 <i>Identifying themes and emerging explanations</i>	23
2.7.4 <i>Develop a story</i>	24
2.7.5 <i>Presenting the data</i>	24
2.8 LITERATURE STUDY	25
2.9 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY	26
2.9.1 <i>Validity</i>	26

2.9.2	<i>Reliability</i>	29
2.10	ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS	29
2.11	VALUE OF THE STUDY	30
2.11.1	<i>Value to retail stores officials</i>	30
2.11.2	<i>Value to the community</i>	30
2.11.3	<i>Value to the academia</i>	30
2.12	LIMITATIONS	31
2.13	CONCLUSION.....	34
CHAPTER 3: SECURITY MEASURES AT RETAIL STORES		35
3.1	INTRODUCTION	35
3.2	RESEARCH OBJECTIVES	35
3.3	THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY	36
3.3.1	<i>Routine Activities Theory</i>	39
3.3.2	<i>Situational Crime Prevention Theory</i>	40
3.3.3	<i>Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)</i>	42
3.4	RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL ISO 31000: 2009	45
3.4.1	<i>King III Report on risk management and corporate governance</i>	46
3.5.	THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF SECURITY MEASURES AT RETAIL STORES	50
3.5.1	<i>Australia</i>	50
3.5.2	<i>United States of America</i>	52
3.5.3	<i>Kenya</i>	54
3.6	THE SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE OF SECURITY MEASURES AT RETAIL STORES	56
3.7	THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SPECIFIC CRIMES AFFECTING RETAIL STORES IN SOUTH AFRICA	61
3.8	THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE ISSUES AFFECTING RETAIL STORES IN SOUTH AFRICA	66
3.8.1	<i>Policy violation</i>	67
3.8.2	<i>Non-reporting of criminal matters</i>	68
3.9	BEST PRACTICES USED INTERNATIONALLY AND NATIONALLY TO TREAT RISKS AT RETAIL STORES	69
3.10	CONCLUSION.....	72
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION AND DEDUCTIONS.....		73
4.1	INTRODUCTION	73

4.2	DATA ANALYSIS AND ADMINISTRATION	73
4.3	SECTION A: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION	74
4.3.1	<i>Participants</i>	74
4.4	SECTION B: SECURITY MEASURES	79
4.4.1	<i>Are you familiar with security measures in the retail store? (See Annexure “A” Question 5).</i>	79
4.4.2	<i>If yes, what are the security measures that are in place to protect the retail store? [You may tick more than one option] (See Annexure “A” Question 6).</i>	80
4.4.3	<i>Are these security measures adequate? (See Annexure “A” Question 7).</i>	81
4.4.4	<i>Are these security measures effective for the protection of the retail store? (See Annexure “A” Question 8)</i>	82
4.4.5	<i>On a scale of 1 to 10 how do you rate the effectiveness of these security measures? [With one being very poor and 10 being excellent] (See Annexure “A” Question 9)</i>	84
4.4.6	<i>Did you ever experience any incident or witness any incident in the retail stores? (See Annexure “A” Question 10)</i>	85
4.4.7	<i>If yes, give a brief explanation of the incident? (See Annexure “A” Question 11).</i>	86
4.5	SECTION C: SECURITY RISKS CONFRONTING RETAIL STORES.....	87
4.5.1	<i>What security risks do you think confront retail stores in this area? (See Annexure “A” Question 12).</i>	87
4.5.2	<i>Do you feel safe and secure when visiting the retail store? (See Annexure “A” Question 13).</i>	88
4.6	SECTION D: IMPROVEMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES AT RETAIL STORES.....	91
4.6.1	<i>What is it that you think can be done to improve security measures at retail store? (See Annexure “A” Question 14).</i>	91
4.7	SECTION E: GENERAL (SEE ANNEXURE “A” QUESTION 15)	93
4.8	OBSERVATION (SEE ANNEXURE “B”).....	94
4.9	CONCLUSION.....	95
	CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	97
5.1	INTRODUCTION	97
5.2	RESEARCH OVERVIEW	97
5.3	FINDINGS RELATED TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS	98
5.3.1	<i>Findings of research question 1</i>	98
5.3.2	<i>Findings of research question 2</i>	101
5.3.3	<i>Findings of research question 3</i>	104
5.4	RECOMMENDATIONS	106

5.4.1	<i>Recommendations in terms of findings on research question 1:</i>	106
5.4.2	<i>Recommendations in terms of findings on research question 2:</i>	109
5.4.3	<i>Recommendations in terms of findings on research question 3:</i>	109
5.5	FURTHER RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS	110
5.6	CONCLUSION	111
	LIST OF REFERENCES	112
	ANNEXURES	125

LIST OF CASE STUDIES

CASE STUDY 1:.....	36
CASE STUDY 2:.....	37
CASE STUDY 3:.....	38
CASE STUDY AUS 1:	51
CASE STUDY AUS 2:	51
CASE STUDY USA 1:	53
CASE STUDY USA 2:	53
CASE STUDY USA 3:	54
CASE STUDY KE 1:	55
CASE STUDY 4:.....	61
CASE STUDY 5:.....	61
CASE STUDY 6:.....	62
CASE STUDY 7:.....	62
CASE STUDY 8:.....	62
CASE STUDY 9:.....	62
CASE STUDY 10:.....	63
CASE STUDY 11:.....	63
CASE STUDY 12:.....	63
CASE STUDY 13:.....	64
CASE STUDY 14:.....	64

LIST OF ANNEXURES

ANNEXURE A: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE	125
ANNEXURE B: OBSERVATION CHECKLIST	130
ANNEXURE C: ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE	134
ANNEXURE D: PERMISSION LETTER TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS IN MAKRO (DECLINED)	135
ANNEXURE E: FEEDBACK FROM MAKRO	137
ANNEXURE F: INFORMED CONSENT LETTER TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS.....	141
ANNEXURE G: PERMISSION LETTER TO CONDUCT DOCKET ANALYSIS AT SAPS (DECINED)	143
ANNEXURE H: FEEDBACK FROM SAPS.....	145
ANNEXURE I: EDITING CERTIFICATE	146

LIST OF DIAGRAMS

DIAGRAM 4.1: GENDER OF PARTICIPANTS	75
DIAGRAM 4.2: AGE OF PARTICIPANTS	76
DIAGRAM 4.3: PARTICIPANTS' MARITAL STATUS	77
DIAGRAM 4.4: EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION OF PARTICIPANTS	78
DIAGRAM 4.5: EXTENT TO WHICH PARTICIPANTS ARE FAMILIAR WITH SECURITY MEASURES IN THE RETAIL STORES	79
DIAGRAM 4.6: TYPES OF SECURITY MEASURES IN PLACE TO PROTECT RETAIL STORES.....	80
DIAGRAM 4.7: IS SECURITY MEASURES IN PLACE ADEQUATE	82
DIAGRAM 4.8: EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE RETAIL STORES	83
DIAGRAM 4.9: RATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY MEASURES	84
DIAGRAM 4.10: EXPERIENCE OF ANY INCIDENT OR WITNESSING ANY INCIDENT IN THE RETAIL STORES	85
DIAGRAM 4.11: TYPES OF SECURITY RISKS CONFRONTING RETAIL STORES	88

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 2.1: POPULATION AND SAMPLE MATRIX	12
TABLE 3.1: CRIME STATISTICS	59
TABLE 3.2 RESEARCHERS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE.....	68
TABLE 5.1 SECURITY MEASURES AT RETAIL STORES	99
TABLE 5.2 RISKS FACING THE RETAIL STORES.....	102
TABLE 5.3 RECOMMENDED SECURITY MEASURES ACCORDING TO THE LEVEL OF RISK OF THE AREA.....	107

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Retail stores rely on consumers to maintain their business and growth. Their success depends on the safety and security of consumers. If the safety and security of consumers in a retail store is compromised, the store's reputation might be tarnished. Consumers' peace of mind plays a vital role in selecting a retail store and to determine a revisit. Retail stores may experience threats that might be contributed to by the nature of their business, as consumers move freely during shopping hours. In big and prestigious retail stores, there are several egress and access control points. Consumers may access and leave the retail store without being noticed because of a high number of visitors to the retail stores. According to Institute of Security Studies (2015:1), a high level of business crimes undermines investor confidence and has a negative impact on all sectors of society. Security measures differ from one retail store to another and between the size and layout as well as the location of the retail store. Some consumers visit these retail stores just to do window shopping or to see specials on some of the merchandise. The rate at which criminal offences take place at retail stores is currently vague or unknown. Therefore, it is vital that specific risks confronting these retail stores should be identified and analysed with the intention of recommending specific security measures. This study on the safety and security of consumers at retail stores in the Gauteng Province will help to enhance security measures at retail stores.

This chapter discusses the rationale for the study, research problem, research questions, the aim, research objectives, key concepts, and provides an outline of the chapters.

1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

The study is on the safety and security of consumers at retail stores in the Gauteng Province. An assessment of security measures is important as it will improve security

measures at retail stores. The study will contribute to the scientific body of knowledge in the discipline of Security Management regarding the vulnerabilities at retail stores. The location of retail stores adjacent to highways makes them vulnerable to crimes such as business robberies and other types of violent crimes, which affect the safety and security of consumers (Rantao & Bailey, 2011).

For the period of 2014/15, there were 19,170 robberies at businesses in South Africa and an overall increase of 337 per cent over the past 10 years as compared to 18,615 armed attacks on businesses in 2013/14. This type of crime has regularly increased in the past eight years. It is 461 per cent higher today than it was in 2004/05 (Institute of Security Studies, 2015a: np).

Delivery trucks at retail stores remain an overlooked area for potential attacks against the retail store, employees and consumers (Kimiecik, 1995:178). According to Jones (1990: 80), the merchandise receiving area must not be treated like a passage or a meeting place for staff members who have no permission to be there, other than to collect delivered merchandise for their own area of work. The statistics shows that truck hijackings increased by 5.1% from 943 incidents in 2012/13 to 991 incidents in 2013/14 (Institute of Security Studies, 2015b: np). These trucks are hijacked whilst being in the process of delivering commodities to the retail stores in Gauteng Province, which leaves the safety and security of these retail stores and consumers compromised (Institute of Security Studies, 2015b: np).

Unvetted security companies and security guards rendering security services at retail stores, pose a threat or risk (as informers to possible criminals) (Purpura, 2013:136). According to Greggo (2011:20), in order to prevent loss of assets, individuals should be screened before they enter the organisation and it is during this time where those who are likely not to be reliable are identified. The unguarded merchandise, such as camping tents and trailers at retail stores sites, pose a risk of theft (Kimiecik, 1995:89). Poor security measures create opportunities for business robberies and security breaches (Kashiefa, 2014:1).

According to Greggo (2011: 35), security measures that should be put in place for the protection of retail stores should normally be as extensive as the value of the assets to be protected. Whenever retail stores want to implement security measures to protect their assets and consumers, they should conduct a security risk assessment on the assets to know the nature and extent of the risks confronting the assets.

1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM

Crime and violence against businesses present a significant threat to the peace and fiscal stability in South Africa. It erodes the societal fabric of societies and the nation as a whole and put in danger the health of both consumers and retailers. Violence disturbs the delivery of basic services and destroys respect for human rights (De Klerk, 2014). The research problem is the safety and security of consumers at retail stores in the Gauteng Province. Retail stores are confronted by crime and security breaches that occur regularly whereby assets such as money and merchandise are forcefully stolen. The criminal elements do not hesitate to use violence to steal assets from these stores.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The researcher used the following research questions for this study:

1. What security measures are currently being implemented at retail stores in the Gauteng Province?
2. What are the different types of security risks confronting retail stores in the Gauteng Province?
3. What needs to be done to improve security measures at retail stores in the Gauteng Province?

1.5 RESEARCH AIM

The aim of this study is to assess the existing security measures at retail stores in the Gauteng Province so that security measures may be improved.

1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

To achieve the research aim, the study accomplished the under-mentioned objectives:

1. Established the existing security measures at retail stores in the Gauteng Province;
2. Identified the different types of security risks confronting retail stores in the Gauteng Province;
3. Establish what needs to be done on identified security measures for the improvement of security at retail stores in the Gauteng Province.

1.7 KEY CONCEPTS

Access control is defined as the means by which people are granted or denied access to restricted areas, such as office suites, storage facilities or parking garages. Office buildings can either house individual tenants and companies in a multi-use property or be owned and occupied by a single company. Varying degrees of access are required depending on use. Administration of access control for personnel can be distributed among several individuals (Enterprise Solutions, 2009: 62). The above concept is further defined as the controlling of movement into, and from, and within a designated building or area (Fay, 2010:161).

Consumers are defined as an individual or a business that purchases the goods or services produced by a business (Investopedia, 2017).

Retail store is defined as a store that combines a department supply and a grocery supermarket. Retail stores offer a large range of merchandises such as appliances, outfits and foodstuffs (Investopedia, 2014:1).

The above concept is also defined as the huge self-service warehouse-cum-retail outlet that combines the features of a hypermarket, department store, discount store and specialty store in one site, which is also known or called hypermart (Business Dictionary, 2014:1).

Security, according to Purpura (2011:5), is defined as the state of being safe from risk, fear or anxiety. Purpura (2011:262) further defines physical security as protection of people, property and facilities by making use of security forces, security systems and security procedures. Physical security is also defined by Rouse (2014:np) as the protection of personnel, hardware, programs, networks and data from physical circumstances and events that could cause serious losses or damage to an enterprise, agency or institution. The above-mentioned physical circumstances comprise protection from fire, natural catastrophes, break-in, theft, vandalism and violence.

Security risks, according to Kole (2015:12), is defined as the “likelihood of suffering harm or loss, exposure to the possibility of loss or harm, a component of insecurity, or the likelihood that effects an act that may not be reliable with the intended or anticipated results”.

Security screening/Vetting is defined as the orderly process of investigation followed in determining a person's security capability (MyHR, 2014:np). Security screening is defined as the checking of the past and background of positive interviewees and existing workforces. Security screening for most positions consists of a criminal record check, that is, a search for previous convictions, penalties and outstanding charges (South Africa, 2008:1).

Security measures denote all the security measures that must be applied to prevent, restrict and recover security-related losses. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, it will include human security; technological security aids; security procedures; security policy; and physical security aids (Nkwana, 2015:8).

Security survey according to Fennelly (2013:23), a security survey is “defined as a critical on-site inspection and study of an industrial plant, business, home, or public or private institution to in order to establish the current security status, identify deficiencies or excesses, determine the protection needed, and make recommendations to improve the overall security”.

In addition, Dempsey (2008:61) defines a security survey as an instrument used to physically study premises and assessments of all security systems and procedures in order to find any weaknesses. It is further used to lessen risks.

Vulnerability is defined as the degree to which persons, property, resources, systems, and cultural, economic, environmental, and social activity is prone to harm, degradation, or destruction on being exposed to an aggressive factor, e.g. an asset like money might be unprotected against a security risk such as theft. Furthermore, vulnerability denotes a non-existence of security measures relative to security risk facing the asset (Business Dictionary, 2015:1). Govender (2012:18) further explains vulnerability as a vulnerable ability or a gullible security weakness or absence at a facility of security interest.

1.8 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

The dissertation outline is structured into five chapters.

Chapter 1 introduces and motivates for the study by providing the rationale for the study, research problem, research questions, research aim, research objectives and key concepts.

Chapter 2 discusses the research methodology, highlighting the research approach, design, data collection instruments, data collection, data analysis and research challenges.

Chapter 3 discusses the literature study. The literature study will focus on key theoretical areas, namely security at retail stores, vulnerabilities, security risks and security measures.

Chapter 4 discusses how the data was collected, analysed and interpreted and managed.

Chapter 5 presents the research findings and recommendations.

1.9 CONCLUSION

Safety and security of consumers at retail stores is essential to ensure its growth and sustainability. There is a crucial need in South Africa (SA), if not worldwide, not only to reduce but to prevent crime and violence against businesses, consumers and to create an environment that is safe and secure for consumers to do their shopping without any fear of being the victim of crimes. In this chapter, the rationale for the study, problem statement, research questions, aim, research objectives, key concepts and outline of the chapters were discussed. This will form the basis for this study.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the research methodology the researcher followed. It unpacks the research approach, research design, population and sampling, data collection methods and instruments that covers interviews, observations, personal experience knowledge and the analysis of data which covers the following aspects: coding and categorising of data, reflecting on the codes and categories, identifying themes and emerging explanations, developing storyline, presenting the data and literature study. Furthermore, this chapter deals with the following aspects: validity and reliability, validity covers four aspects, namely: content validity, criterion validity, face-validity and construct validity. It further covers ethical considerations, value of the study as well as the limitations. Retail stores in the Gauteng Province are the central focus of this study because they are centred on provision of goods and commodities to consumers.

2.2 THE RESEARCH APPROACH

In this study, the researcher utilised the qualitative research approach, reason being that it is concerned with how the world's social facets are interpreted, understood, experienced or produced (Mason, 2017:4). Furthermore, the research approach aided the researcher to comprehend certain facets on the safety and security of consumers whilst at retail stores in Gauteng Province. In addition, a qualitative research approach is described as methodology that provide a detailed and a holistic clarification of complex social world (Mason, 1996:4). Also, through the application of the qualitative research approach, the researcher could look for an understanding as well as clarifications from the point of view of the participants. According to Fouché and Delport (2011:65), a qualitative approach gives the researcher the liberty to utilise more than one way of data collection instruments instead of depending on a one method.

Therefore, in this case the researcher utilised both interviews and observation as methods for collecting data for this study. The researcher went to the site (retail stores) where the actual fieldwork took place in order to participate in the research process and as result, the research approach utilised in this study created an opportunity for establishing a mutual association between the researcher and the participants. In addition, the unstructured and flexible nature of the research approach permitted the researcher to revise the processes of the research and further permitted the researcher to appraise the effectiveness of security measures applied by retail stores in order to ensure effective safety and security of consumers whilst visiting retail stores. Therefore, the qualitative approach is applicable for the current study as the researcher sought to obtain descriptive and detailed information from the participants. In this way, the researcher obtained information from the participants regarding important key aspects such as consumers, security technological aids, physical security measures and current security challenges.

2.3 THE RESEARCH DESIGN

For the researcher to complete this study successfully it was important to establish a feasible plan, which is a research design. The plan answered mostly the shared five W's, that is who, what, where, when and why and then the H, which is the how part of investigation (Dantzker & Hunter, 2012:96).

Research design is defined as a plan that the researcher has followed or applied to collect data during the research (Mistry, Minnaar, Patel & Rustin, 2003:60). Furthermore, it designates what the researcher is going to do with the participants, through an understanding of attainment of deduction about the research problem. This study used a qualitative (one-on-one interviews, literature review, observations, case study analysis) approach. In this approach, one-on-one interviews were conducted with the participants. Participants were security officers (who were off duty) and consumers from retail stores in Gauteng. There are quite a number of retail sites in Gauteng. The benefit of utilising a qualitative approach (interviews) is that the researcher could prompt further questions from the participants when interesting themes came up.

In addition, the researcher used a semi-structured interview schedule to conduct one-on-one interviews. The interview schedule is attached as Annexure A. Furthermore, the researcher used observations checklist to observe some of the security measures currently utilised by retail stores. The observations checklist is attached as Annexure B. In-depth data was collected by means of open-ended questions that conveyed straightforward quotations, with the interviewer as a central part of the study. The procedure was clear and as result, allowed the researcher to record unexpected events and practices in a field note book. Therefore, the approach permitted the researcher to construct a holistic understanding and clarification of the issues that causes ineffectiveness of security measures at retail stores.

According to Fouché and Delport (2011:101), case study design helps in comprehending the uniqueness and the characteristics of a specific case in all its complexity. The researcher studied security measures at four retail stores in Gauteng Province. Therefore, the instrumental case study design suited the study as the focus was to test the application of the security measures, the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) and other legislative frameworks, and more especially critically testing the present security measures, to enhance the safety and security of consumers at retail stores in Gauteng Province. Furthermore, in this study the researcher was assisted by case study design to ensure reliability and validity.

2.4 POPULATION AND SAMPLING

Dantzker and Hunter (2012:66) state that population refers to people, institutions or organisations from which the data is to be collected. According to Sarantakos (2002:139), sampling is the way of selecting the units of analysis of the targeted population which are to be included in the research study.

Probability sampling and non-probability sampling are the two major groups of sampling procedures used in social science research (Strydom & Delport, 2011:390). For the purpose of this study, non-probability sampling was applied. Probability sampling is based

on the premise that every single member of a population has a known and equivalent opportunity of being chosen to participate in the study, for example, if the researcher had a population of 100 people, every person would have chance of 1 out of 100 of being selected, whilst in non-probability sampling, sampling is done without randomisation and population does not stand the same opportunity of being chosen into the sample (Strydom, 2011:222).

According to Strydom and Delpont (2011:391), in relation to qualitative approach, there are no procedures for sample size. What the researcher wants to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what is at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility and what can be done with the available time and resources determines the sample size. Qualitative research sampling is described as limited, based on saturation, not representative, the size not statistically determined, and involving low cost and less time. It can thus be inferred that in qualitative investigations, non-probability sampling is used almost without exception. When non-probability sampling is applied, the probabilities of selecting a particular individual are not known, the reason being that the researcher does not know the population size or the number of the population. Taking into consideration the information herein, non-probability sampling was used for this proposed study. From the population of retail stores in Gauteng Province, the researcher wrote all the retail stores known to the researcher (such as Pick n Pay Hyper, Checkers Hyper, Game retail store, President Hyper, Africa Cash and Carry, Makro, Sunshine Retail Store etc.) down and put them in a hat. The researcher then shook the hat so that there would be a real mix of papers in the hat. The researcher then selected four (4) papers with the names of retail stores – which were used to participate in the study. From the population, simple random sampling was applied, meaning that every store had equal opportunity to be selected into the study. Then the researcher decided to name the four identified retail stores A, B, C and D. The reason for not mentioning the real names of the identified retail stores was to maintain their anonymity according to the consensus. For this study, the researcher selected his sample from four (4) retail stores, namely; two (2) from Pretoria area and two (2) from Johannesburg area. These retail stores deal with the retail of commodities to

consumers. The researcher conducted research in four retail stores in Gauteng Province using the purposive sampling technique.

Sarantakos (2002:152) indicates that the purposive sampling method is also recognized as judgmental sampling, the researchers purposely select subjects who, in their view, are supposed to be relevant to the research topic. Therefore, in this instance, the decision of the researcher is more significant than obtaining a probability sample. Purposive sampling takes into consideration the involvement of using experts purposefully to choose samples to be applied for a specific purpose. Specific for the study, the researcher applied purposive sampling as a non-probability sampling technique, aimed to identify and purposively interview ten (10) security officers with experience in the protection of retail store sites (Mistry et al., 2003:111). The researcher conducted five (5) semi-structured interviews on the chosen consumers per retail store. Furthermore, the researcher interviewed twenty (20) consumers in total. Table 2.1 reflect the population and sample observed:

Table 2.1: Population and sample matrix

ENTITY	POPULATION	SAMPLE
Retail store A, B, C, D	Security officers	Ten (10)
Retail store A	Consumers	Five (5)
Retail store B	Consumers	Five (5)
Retail store C	Consumers	Five (5)
Retail store D	Consumers	Five (5)

2.5 DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND INSTRUMENTS

According to Sarantakos (2002:174), data collection is the procedure of collecting and measuring data on variables of interest, in an established methodical manner that enables the researcher to answer stated research questions and assess results. Data collection plays a significant role in any research project. Data for this study was collected by using one-on-one interviews, literature review, observation checklist, case study analysis and tape recorder as tools for data collection.

2.5.1 Design and development of data collection instruments

The researcher used a semi-structured interview schedule as data collection instrument. The interview schedule consisted of 15 questions. The semi-structured interview schedule is attached as Annexure A. The researcher developed an interview schedule that consists of open and closed-ended questions. The researcher prepared open and closed-ended questions for the semi-structured interviews. These questions were put in a sequence format.

In addition, the researcher ensured that questions were formulated in such a way that they do not go beyond the time of interview according to researcher's estimation. As part of the research processes, a few of main questions with which to start and lead the discussion with the interviewee has been prepared. During the interviews, the researcher probed on some of the main questions. When the responses lacked sufficient details, depth or clarity, the researcher clarified the questions and used technique of probing. Thereafter the questions were asked with the purpose of pursuing the implication of answers to the key inquiries. With the purpose of ensuring understanding to positively meet the research objectives, the researcher formulated the various questions in a language that the all identified research participants understood (Greef, 2011:341). The researcher developed an observation checklist to conduct observation on the existing security measures, such as the alarm system, personnel security, closed-circuit television (CCTV) and perimeter security measures (these aspects were chosen because they form part of the security measures normally applied to provide protection for consumers and retail stores) (Strydom & Delport, 2011:376). In this study, the researcher developed an observation checklist and managed it throughout the study. The checklist was used for collection of data from retail stores for this study. The observation checklist is attached as Annexure B and included thirty-six (36) aspects to be observed.

2.5.2 Piloting

A pilot study is defined as a process through which the researcher test and authenticate a tool by administering it to a small group of participants from the future test population (Barker, 2003:327). Furthermore, piloting means testing of the researcher's instruments, namely semi-structured interview questionnaires and observation checklist that have been designed for the study (Mistry et al., 2003:138). Therefore, before beginning with the fieldwork, the researcher ensured the validity and reliability of the research instrument mentioned above. To experiment the instrument, the researcher tested the said instrument with a target group consisting of five (5) consumers. Additionally, the researcher interviewed consumers that were available and willing to participate in the interview during the researcher's visit to the retail store. Pilot study participants were not interviewed during the interview of the main study. Thereafter, the researcher scrutinised the finalised and evaluated each part, glitches and noted questions that wanted to be revised of the interview schedule. Furthermore, the researcher studied whether the questions produced the type of answers the researcher was hoping for.

However, as far as the observation is concerned, the researcher observed physical and technological security measures available and visible to the researcher during the researcher's visit to the retail store that was used as a pilot study. An observation of the existing security measures used for the protection of retail stores and consumers was conducted utilising an observation checklist. This observation was then examined for its relevance to the study. The sample that was utilised for the pilot study was not utilised in the main study project. Therefore, the researcher managed to make changes to the data collection instruments before conducting the main fieldwork.

2.6 COLLECTION OF DATA

Data is the basic material which the researcher depends on regarding the information sought when conducting the research (Blanche, Durrheim & Painter, 2006:51). Furthermore, it is derived from observation and interviews and as result, it can take the

form of language (qualitative data). Mouton (1996:67) indicates that the collection of data in the study includes applying the measuring instrument to the sample that has been selected for the study. It yields new information about the world that needs further processing. According to Fouché and Schurink (2011:309), when conducting the study, data collection plays a significant role as it aids the researcher to come to reliable conclusions. Data collection is the methodical collecting of data relevant to the research sub-problems, using methodologies such as interviews, observation and focus group discussions and questionnaires. The researcher developed an interview schedule for consumers and an observation checklist for the researcher to observe the security measures applicable at retail stores for safety and security of consumers at retail stores. Below are more details on the data collection methods that were used to collect data.

2.6.1 Interviews

According to De Vos, Strydom, Fouché and Delpont (2011: 342), interviews are defined as the predominant way of data gathering in qualitative research. The researcher acquires data through direct contact with participants or groups that are known or expected to possess the knowledge that the researcher seeks to uncover. Furthermore, an interview is a societal liaison intended to exchange information amongst the participant and the researcher. Therefore, the quality and quantity of information exchanged solely depend on how judicious and creative the researcher is at understanding and managing the relationship. Additionally, qualitative interviews try to comprehend the world from the participants' point of view, to unfold the meaning of people's experiences and to also expose their subsisted world prior to scientific explanations.

It is also useful in accessing societies' meanings, insights, descriptions, circumstances and construction of reality. The semi-structured interview is often described as non-directive as it allows the interviewee to respond in a manner that he or she is comfortable with, using his or her own words and expressions (De Vos et al., 2011:292).

Therefore, the researcher collected data through semi-structured interview as method of gathering data. The researcher obtained ethical clearance from University of South Africa (UNISA) to conduct field work before starting with the collection of data. The ethical clearance certificate is attached as Annexure C. The researcher did apply for permission to conduct research at one of the retail stores and permission was not granted. See attached request letter for permission attached as Annexure D and feedback from the retail store attached as Annexure E. As a result, due to lack of permission the researcher interviewed consumers of identified retail stores in Gauteng Province and security officers who have knowledge in the protection of retail stores, and the researcher does not require permission from a retail store to interview consumers. The researcher booked a UNISA vehicle on the 16th of February 2017 as per reference number 27547 to be used for transport during the field work, which was conducted from 20th to 28th of February 2017. One-on-one interviews with consumers were held at the parking areas of identified retail stores, for security officers some interviews were held at the researcher's office, some at the security officer's place of residence and some at a neutral venue agreed on by both the researcher and the security officers during the period mentioned above. Furthermore, the interviews helped the researcher with precise information needed for this study.

On the 20th of February 2017 at about 14h00, the researcher drove to retail store B and parked the vehicle in the parking area and waited for consumers exiting from the store. On this day, the researcher interviewed five (5) consumers and two (2) security officers at retail store B. Before the researcher commenced with the interview, the researcher explained to the participants the aim of the interview as well as the terms and circumstances of privacy. The researcher further discussed with the participants the time that the interview would take to avoid participants being impatient.

Then the researcher explained to the participant the content of the informed consent letter and after briefing them, gave them the informed consent letter to affix their signature in order to acknowledge the content thereof. The informed consent letter is attached as Annexure F. The researcher continued with the research on the 21st of February 2017, when the researcher drove to retail store B at around 10h00 in the morning. The

researcher interviewed five (5) consumers and two (2) security officers in the parking area of the store. The same process (explaining the aim of the research as well as informed consent aspects) applied to participants of retail store A was repeated by the researcher to the participants of retail store B. On the 22nd of February 2017 at about 09h00 in the morning, the researcher arrived at retail store D and interviewed five (5) consumers in the parking area of the store and also interviewed two (2) security officers. The same process (explaining the aim of the research as well as informed consent aspects) applied to participants of retail store A and B was repeated by the researcher to the participants of retail store C. On the 23rd of February 2017 at about 11h00 in the morning, the researcher arrived at retail store C and interviewed five (5) consumers in the parking area of the store and also interviewed one (1) security officer. The same process (explaining the aim of the research as well as informed consent aspects) applied to participants of retail store A, B and D was repeated by the researcher to the participants of retail store C. On the 25th of February 2017 at about 12h30 in the afternoon, the researcher interviewed one (1) security officer at a neutral place around Johannesburg agreed on by both the security officer and the researcher. The researcher repeated the process applied to participants in retail store A to D before commencing with the interview. On the 27th of February 2017 at about 09h30 in the morning, the researcher interviewed one (1) security officer at the researcher's office. The researcher repeated the process applied to participants in retail store A to D before commencing with the interview. On the 28th of February 2017 at about 11h30 in the morning, the researcher interviewed one (1) security officer at the security officer's place of residence. The researcher repeated the process applied to participants in retail store A to D before commencing with the interview.

By using semi-structured, open-ended questions and closed-ended questions, the researcher (interviewer) was able to obtain in-depth information from participants (Mistry et al., 2003:140). The researcher chose this type of interview because it is focused and broad and allows the researcher and participants to explore the research topic (Greef, 2011:341). The researcher considered questions in preparation for the semi-structured interview as follows:

- Main questions: The researcher prepared a number of main questions with which to begin and guide the dialogue based on the literature review.
- Probe: When the answers lacked sufficient detail, depth or clarity, the researcher clarified the answer.
- Follow-up questions: These pursued the implications of answers to the main questions (Greef, 2011: 341).

The researcher further made use of a field journal to write notes and also used a tape recorder to record the participant's responses during the interviews, the reason for this being that the researcher needed the resources for supplementing the researcher's memory when transcribing the data.

2.6.2 Observation

According to May (2011:162), observation is the favoured method for data gathering when a researcher wants to study the behaviour that happens in a specific setting in detail. De Vos et al. (2011:328) describe field observation as being fundamental to all approaches of research. Observation as a method of gathering information is applied as extensively as possible in order to gather the richest possible data and it implies an unstructured element. Silverman (2011:17) states that observation, as part of information gathering, may take place using two research methods, namely: non-participant observation and participant observation. In the non-participant observation, the researcher observes the subjects from a distance without interacting with the participants. Non-participant researcher is not interested in investigating the symbolic sphere, and during the process makes sure that it does not influence the participant's behaviour. According to De Vos et al. (2011:329), participant observation is viewed as a research process that is distinctive of the qualitative paradigm, which means that data cannot be actually condensed to numbers. In participant observation, the researcher is involved by way of interacting with participants under observation e.g. by asking why things are done in the manner that they are done.

The researcher collected data through observation in the following manner (as indicated earlier the researcher did not obtain permission to conduct field work at the identified retail stores): The researcher visited the retail store like any other consumer who visits the retail store and as result the researcher did not require permission as the researcher only observed security measures that are visible to every consumer who visits the store. On the 20th of February 2017 at about 14h00, the researcher visited retail store B. As the researcher arrived at the retail store, the researcher was able to observe the security measures indicated in the observation checklist. With the help of his security experience, the researcher was able to see the security measures available outside the retail store such as the perimeter fence, security lights, cameras, car guards in the parking area and the location where the cameras are placed. The researcher further proceeded to the inside of the store and moved around the store and observed security measures available inside the retail store, such as security officers, cameras etc. as well the location where they are placed and the type of cameras that are in place. The researcher completed the observation checklist as he was moving around the retail store. After observing, the researcher left the retail store. On the 21st of February 2017 at around 10h00, the researcher went to retail store A and repeated the process applied in observing security measures at retail store B. On the 22 of February 2017 at around 09h00, the researcher went to retail store D and repeated the process applied in observing security measures at retail store A and B. On the 23rd of February 2017 at around 11h00, the researcher went to retail store C and repeated the process applied in observing security measures at retail store A, B and D. The researcher noted that there are some differences in terms of security measures applicable from retail store A to D due to the size, location and the layout of the retail stores.

The researcher conducted an observation of the present security measures used for the security of consumers and retail store sites in Gauteng province using an observation checklist. The researcher also checked the availability of physical and technological security measures. The notes of all information composed through observations were gathered and documented in a field book. Data was analysed and interpreted to arrive at the findings and recommendations.

2.6.3 Personal Experience Knowledge

Kraska and Neuman (2008:42) describe Personal Experience Knowledge (PEK) as a foundation of knowledge in which we depend on in our own subsisted experiences. Furthermore, PEK has a resilient and lifelong influence. PEK is also a powerful foundation of knowledge, for example: one's academic research interest can sometimes be founded on one's work experiences, educational experiences, lived experiences and childhood experiences. Additionally, experience is an indispensable building block of our authenticity. Therefore, the researcher's experiences were relevant to the study in the following ways:

The researcher has 16 years of experience in security field. The researcher is currently employed by the University of South Africa (from 1st of August 2012) as Lecturer in the College of Law, School of Criminal Justice (SCHCJ), Department of Criminology and Security Science, Programme Security Management, lecturing Security Management modules. The safety and security of consumers at retail store sites was one of the researcher's responsibilities during his tenure at Honeydew SAPS as police officer, as the researcher used to respond to incidents reported by retail stores. The researcher has the necessary information and expertise relevant to the research topic and research questions. Additionally, the researcher worked for a private security company (Bosasa Operations) and government departments such as the South African Police Services (SAPS), Department of Correctional Services (DCS) and the Department of Public Works (DPW). The researcher attained excessive knowledge in security management that encompasses the physical protection of assets and people. Thus, the researcher has the required expertise and information on the safety and security of consumers at retail stores.

According to the relevant training and development, the researcher is a dedicated worker and holds numerous programmes certificates, including PSIRA Security Officers Certificate Grade "A", Armed Response Certificate, Security Officers Instructor's Course Certificate, SAPS First Phase of Basic Training, SAPS Tactical Policing: Level 1, SAPS

Field Training Course, DCS Correction Science Course: NQF Level 4, Microsoft Power-Point 2010: Level 1, Microsoft Word 2010: Level 1, Outcome-Based Assessment In Higher Education & Open Distance Learning: NQF Level 7, Preliminary Investigation: NQF Level 4, Emergency Evacuation Procedures, First Aid: Level I, OHS Representatives, OHS Act, Fire Fighting: Level I, National Key Point certificate, B-Tech degree in Policing, B-Tech degree in Security Risk Management (SRM), National Diploma in Security Risk Management and Secondary Teachers' Diploma. Through this experience in the security sector, the researcher managed to gain access to various sources such as security legislation and procedures, security manuals, security report and newspaper articles on security matters. The information that was acquired from these sources assisted the researcher to generate findings and recommendations for this study. In addition to the researcher's previous experiences, the researcher's current experience as a Lecturer in the Programme Security Management at the University of South Africa, also helped the researcher in many ways: e.g. the researcher had written some of the study guides that deal with the investigation of criminal incidents in business sites, including retail stores. The experience also assisted the researcher during the search for information, defining key concepts etc. because the researcher is familiar with the security terminology as a result of achieving security management as qualification. This assisted the researcher to relate the study to his work experience as well as educational experience, which in turn helped to enrich the study with subsisted knowledge from the researcher. The relevant experience also assisted the researcher during observation because it made easy for the researcher to see or identify the security measures that are currently implemented by retail stores for safety and security of consumers whilst visiting these facilities. Furthermore, the experience also assisted the researcher during the interviews, because the researcher was able to come up with follow-up questions without wasting any time for the benefit of both the researcher and the participants.

2.7 MANAGING OF DATA

Schurink, Fouché and De Vos (2011:397) state that qualitative analysis converts data into outcomes. This encompasses lessening the capacity of raw information, fluctuating

significance from trivialities, recognising important configurations and building context for communicating the essence of what the information reveals. Data collected was analysed as follows:

2.7.1 Coding and categorising the data

Data was transcribed and alienated down into subjects and pieces for examination by coding and grouping the data. Furthermore, the researcher recognised the noticeable, grounded groupings of meaning held by the study's participants in the setting. This involves decreasing the data to a practicable set of subjects to write into the final storyline (Schurink et al., 2011:397). The shared aims in the subjects recognised within the data were regarded by the researcher. The similar subjects were clustered together. The researcher operated with a single cluster of subjects at an interval. Grouping is said to be if the subjects are clustered together (Tesch, 1992:138). The data collected during observation, the literature review and interviews was categorised according to the subsequent main hypothetical concepts:

- Access control
- Consumers
- Security
- Retail store
- Security risks
- Screening/ Vetting
- Security measures
- Security survey
- Vulnerability

The data categorisation was prepared by means of a filing system by opening a file for each key theoretic concept, and information under each classification was filed rationally.

2.7.2 Reflecting on the codes and categories

The data was perused several times to get a sense of what they contain as a whole. Notes, transcripts, tape recordings and texts were continuously reflected upon, with comments and reflections being added in the margins alongside the raw data. Reflections helped enrich the data with new thinking as the analysis progressed. This process helped with other possible categorisation and interpretations (Schurink et al., 2011:397).

The researcher, as per Tesch (2013:145), focused more on the real content identified and therefore summarised the content for each category. Furthermore, the researcher looked for shared aims in content, uniqueness in content, confusions and inconsistencies in content and missing data regarding the research question. Additionally, information was compared with categories in order to identify variants and comparable idea. Information gathered was analysed regularly and comparable information as well as variants was classified together and where there was a need for information, it was easily recognised, acquired and then fully classified.

2.7.3 Identifying themes and emerging explanations

The establishment of uniformities among the identified and classified elements and the establishing of acquaintances was emphasised by Tesch (2013:84). The same established outlines were conducted and the evolving recurring varieties and interaction between the groups and elements were acknowledged in order to create a straight and orderly methodology when analysing the data. Information gathered was then transformed into suitable transcript components and was manually analysed. The information recorded by technical media was interpreted through transcription. The tapes were repeatedly listened to several times so that the researcher could get a sense of what they contain as a whole. The researcher took his time when listening to all tapes and wrote down significant records. Documented data was changed into raw data. The raw data was then analysed and interpreted to come to conclusions and make recommendations.

2.7.4 Develop a storyline

The researcher developed an organising system that creates a meaningful combination of information pieces (Tesch, 2013:141).

Furthermore, the researcher combined the following sources from which the organising system was derived: - research questions; research instruments; concepts that have been used by other writers in earlier interrelated research and the data itself. When the study encompasses an instrument for data collection, such as an interview schedule, the questions regularly offer convenient classes and accepted concepts that other researchers have established, which seems to be safe (Tesch, 2013:142). The researcher developed an organising system and concepts adopted by other researchers, since it has already been in existence and was feasible to those researchers. In addition, the researcher highlighted his understanding of the meaning of text or actions through the discovery of themes and through interpretation, as was stressed by Tesch (2013:78).

The researcher integrated and summarised data after reflecting on the data. A storyline that provided details on the themes and relationships in the identified data was developed. Thereafter, the data was interpreted into comprehensible meaning. The data was then reduced into a slight and controllable set of themes (Schurink et al., 2011:397). In conclusion, the data was then analysed and interpreted in order to arrive at findings and recommendations.

2.7.5 Presenting the data

Data was presented by means of tables to record the subjects, collection, analysis and interpretation of the information gathered on the safety and security of consumers at retail stores in the Gauteng Province. The raw information that was collected from the researcher's transcribed transcripts was analysed and presented in a tabular format (Schurink et al., 2011:397).

2.8 LITERATURE STUDY

A literature review is defined as the appraisal of the current body of knowledge that aids the researcher to find out what other researchers have already researched on, and their interested research problem (De Vos et al., 2011: 302).

In this study, the literature review assisted the researcher to describe what data and which studies have been conducted in the area on which the researcher was conducting the research. The key purpose of literature was to familiarise the researcher with the newest developments in the area of the research.

A literature study was done on books relevant to the study, conference papers, newspaper articles, journal articles, theses and dissertations, government publications, course materials, literature on the internet, government policies and legislations on the safety and security of consumers whilst at retail stores in Gauteng Province. The researcher relied on the rationale and research questions to serve as guidelines in finding relevant literature information to accomplish the research purpose. The conducted literature review, as part of information gathering, provided more information in relation to the security risks control measures implemented by retail stores in Gauteng Province in South Africa for the safety and security of consumers. Problems that the researcher came across during the literature review study were dealt with as and when they were encountered in order to overcome them to ensure that the study, as per the study topic, was completed successfully.

The information that was acquired during the literature study helped the researcher to make findings and recommendations. The researcher also used literature to figure out to what extent the literature itself agreed with the outcomes of the fieldwork research. Where there were similarities or differences, the research provided a suitable explanation.

2.9 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

2.9.1 Validity

Sarantakos (2002:78) defines validity as the ability to produce results that agree with theoretical or conceptual values; in other words, to produce precise results and to measure what is supposed to be measured. A valid measure yields true results that reflect the true situation and conditions of the environment it is supposed to study, whereas Delport and Roestenburg (2011:171-205) refer validity to the truthfulness, accuracy, authenticity, genuineness and soundness as synonyms for validity and stresses the fact that these terms describe what validity is all about.

All data that was collected through the application of interviews, and observation has been validated:

- Interviews were considered valid because the researcher questioned consumers with an interview schedule based on the research purpose and questions. The purpose of writing all questions on the interview schedule was precisely so that the researcher was able to ask the same question in the same manner to all participants. This aided consistency, even in the manner in which participants responded to the question.
- The following sources: security publications, books relevant to the study, conference papers, journal articles, prior theses and studies, course materials, literature on internet, and legislations relevant to the research questions and purpose of the study has been consulted to ensure that data collected through literature review is valid.
- Observations at four (4) identified retail stores was conducted to validate the data in order to establish compliance by retail stores on relevant security legislations, taking into consideration the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) as the main regulator.

The above mentioned assessing instruments aided the researcher to quantify what was assumed to be measured.

2.9.1.1 *Content validity*

According to Kraska and Neuman (2008:190), content validity is a measurement validity that necessitates that a measure represents all the facets of the conceptual delineation of a construct. An example of content validity is a delineation of feminism as a person's commitment to a set of philosophies, making full equality between men and women in areas of arts, intellectual quests, politics, work, family and authority relations. The knowledge and abilities of retail store consumers and security officers were tested by the researcher through semi-structured interview in order to confirm if they have any knowledge or awareness in terms of security measures and risks confronting them while visiting retail stores.

Content validity was confirmed by the degree of reliability on how retail store consumers answered the questions. The abovementioned information gathering techniques helped the researcher to examine the understanding and abilities of retail store consumers. Through observations, a literature review and interviews as the selected information gathering techniques, the researcher managed to find out the expert knowledge and abilities of retail store consumers. Furthermore, the assessing tools assisted the researcher to quantify whatever was thought to be measured. Confirmation were established through equating the diverse categories of information gathered during site observations and interviews in order to establish if they are mutual or interrelated.

2.9.1.2 *Face validity*

Face validity is a type of validity in which an indicator makes sense as a measure of a construct in the judgement of others, especially in the scientific community (Kraska & Neuman, 2008:190). The study was conducted with some selected retail store consumers and security officers who were provided with an opportunity to participate in the research study. All participants were provided with a suitable platform so that all had an equal chance to answer to the questions tested. All participants were asked equal, straightforward questions as they participated in the schedule and questions.

Furthermore, during interviews the researcher was objective with all participants and this was done to ensure fairness.

2.9.1.3 *Criterion validity*

Kraska and Neuman (2008:191) indicate that standard rationality applies some standard or criterion to accurately specify a hypothesis.

Therefore, an indicator's validity is confirmed by comparing it with another previously established measure of a similar construct in which the researcher has confidence. During the time, the researcher met with each individual consumer of the retail stores, and the same norm was applied to ensure that they are grouped together. The same interview schedule was used when questions were asked of all the participants. Similar site observations and documentary variables were verified at all the various places (retail stores). Likewise, the researcher used the same technique of ease, and pursuing questions were asked for more clarity and a better understanding.

2.9.1.4 *Construct validity*

The findings through interviews was tested by conducting specific visits to the retail stores and through the observations to validate the findings. The researcher managed to observe security measures that are visible to any consumer visiting the retail stores. The information gathered through the application of interviews was valid because the researcher endorsed the availability of the security measures that were implemented during the time of the study. Hypothesis validity entails that every item that are within the measurement tool measured a similar contrast and not something else (Delpont & Roestenburg, 2011:17). The same site observations and written variables gathered were tested at all the locations and they measured what was supposed to be measured.

2.9.2 Reliability

Sarantakos (2002:83) states that reliability denotes the ability of a tool to produce reliable results; reliability is equal to consistency. Furthermore, Kraska and Neuman (2008:191) define reliability as a dependability or consistency. Therefore, a method is reliable if it produces the same results whenever it is repeated, even by other researchers. Retail store consumers were used as the target for this research because they visit the retail stores regularly. The researcher depended more on retail store consumers as the main sources of information for this study. Furthermore, retail store consumers who were available, were interviewed. Nevertheless, the researcher never cued the retail store consumers to respond in a particular way, hence not guiding them to a particular answer. However, the style in which respondents responded to the study's questions without withholding some information, indicated to the researcher that respondents stayed trustworthy. The researcher ensured reliability when appropriate data was collected during observations and literature review. Data collected during interviews, observations and the literature review assisted the researcher to arrive at conclusions and commendations.

2.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Champion (2000:102) states that ethics are the values of professional organisations, the normative behaviours of right and wrong. Ethics include the prescription of an ethical code of conduct that is normatively obligatory for the members of a professional organisation. This outlines the ethical concerns according to the University of South Africa Research Policy (2007:11). Therefore, in this study, respondents were perceived as vital and commendable associates. For that reason, countless rights were displayed by the researcher. The researcher also safeguarded the privileges and interests of respondents at every single phase of the project. Respondents had an opportunity to indicate if they were willing to participate on the study or not as part of their rights. Permission on a common favourable agreement was obtained from respondents.

Participants were systematically notified in advance about the probable effect of the study and therefore, participants had the chance to choose if they wanted to withdraw from the study or not. Information that was gathered from respondents was preserved as trusted by the researcher. Access to the raw information was limited by storing it in a lockable steel filing cabinet. Furthermore, data kept on the laptop was secured with a password in an encrypted file. Therefore, no-one without permission had a right access the raw information. Finally, the raw information was examined and deduced to create conclusions and commendations. A University of South Africa ethical authorisation certificate is attached as per Annexure marked "C". No participant was exposed to any risk. No children or animals were involved in the study in terms of ethics.

2.11 VALUE OF THE STUDY

This study was important and applicable to retail stores because it addresses the concerns of safety and security of consumers. Therefore, the study also added significance to knowledge, procedure, strategies and it created a central point for application of such strategies and security values. The outcome of this research will be a lifelong advantage to retail store officials, with consumers and academia as beneficiaries.

The study also contributes to the scientific body of information in the discipline of security administration regarding the exposure of consumers and retail stores and the potential risks of crime in relation to the location retail stores. A transitory conversation with the shareholders to benefit from this study is delineated underneath:

2.11.1 Value to retail stores officials

Personnel who deal with protection of retail stores on their daily basis will feel secured as the retail stores will be protected as prescribed and promote professionalism in the field.

2.11.2 Value to the community

With the appropriate security risk control measures for the protection of retail stores, information will not get into the wrong hands for illegal activities, causing disruption to safety and security of consumers. Consumers will therefore benefit from a safe and secure environment.

2.11.3 Value to the academia

Research results will be incorporated, hopefully into the study guides of the Security Management programme to enhance the significance of the current information.

2.12 LIMITATIONS

The greatest limitation the researcher experienced was when the researcher was denied permission to conduct research in one of the retail stores that the researcher identified as part of the case study for this study. The researcher sent an email on the 13th of April 2016 to the retail store risk and compliance manager requesting permission to conduct research in their organisation. The request for permission letter is attached as Annexure D. The risk and compliance manager did not reply to the researcher's application and as a result, the researcher sent a follow-up email to the risk and compliance manager on the 16th of May 2016.

After the follow-up email, the risk and compliance manager forwarded the researcher's request to one of their operational managers on the 16th of May 2016 for further handling. On the 27th of May 2016, the researcher sent a follow-up email to the operational manager enquiring about the status of the request for permission to conduct research in their organisation. However, the operational manager responded to the researcher's follow-up on the 27th of May 2016 at about 19h00 indicating to the researcher that their request had been forwarded to the regional operations executive of their organisation for further handling and assured the researcher that the regional operations executive will

contact the researcher very soon. On the 9th of June 2016, the researcher sent a follow-up email to the regional operations executive asking about progress regarding the researcher's request for permission. Surprisingly, the regional operations executive did not respond to the researcher's request. On the 14th of June 2016, the researcher had a meeting with their supervisor seeking intervention regarding securing permission to conduct the research at retail store in question.

During the meeting, the researcher was asked to change data collection techniques to newspaper articles, participant observation and customer interviews, while awaiting approval for permission. On the 15th of June 2017, the researcher's supervisor forwarded a follow-up email on the application for permission to conduct research to the regional operations executive of the retail store in question. The regional operations executive did not respond to the email of the researcher's supervisor. A series of telephone calls were made by the researcher to the office of the regional operations executive and all attempts to reach him failed dismally because the researcher was sent from pillar to post. On the 31st of January 2017, one of the researcher's colleagues intervened and sent an email on behalf of the researcher to the retail store Group Risk manager requesting permission to conduct research. On the 15th of February 2017, the Group Risk manager responded to the researcher's request for permission indicating that the researcher's request has been declined due to the fact that their organisation does not make its operations available to research for several reasons that the Group Risk manager could not disclose to the researcher and that the Group Risk manager could not go into detail. The feedback letter is attached as per Annexure E.

Another major limitation the researcher encountered during the study is when the researcher was denied permission to conduct docket analysis at SAPS. See the attached request permission letter attached as Annexure G. On the 17th of October 2016, the researcher sent an email to SAPS Divisional Commissioner: Research Provincial Office requesting permission to conduct research in the identified police station in Gauteng Province. However, on the 17th of October 2016 the researcher's application for consent to do docket analysis was sent to SAPS National Head Office for registration and further

handling. On the 8th of December 2016, the researcher received a feedback from the Divisional Commissioner indicating to the researcher that their request had been declined due to the fact that the researcher's research proposal does not meet the requirements (not indicating which requirements he referred to). See attached feedback letter from SAPS National commissioner's office attached as Annexure H.

Furthermore, on the 12th of December 2016, the researcher sent an email to the supervisor for noting, advice and to determine the way forward. The researcher was advised to request a follow-up meeting with the SAPS Divisional Commissioner in order to get clarity regarding the feedback as well as to find a solution to the challenge the researcher was facing in order to secure permission. The researcher sent an email to the Divisional Commissioner on the 9th of January 2017 and further spoke to the Divisional Commissioner telephonically, emphasising the gist of the meeting and the request. The Divisional Commissioner indicated that he was still going to follow-up with his supervisor and the research team and would come back to the researcher as matter of urgency. The Divisional Commissioner did not reply to the researcher's application for a meeting and on follow-up telephonically, the researcher was being send from pillar to post. As result, the researcher abandoned the application of docket analysis as data collection instrument in the study, which in turn limited the researcher from data collection from one of the key role players in combating crime, as well as ensuring safety and security of people in South Africa.

Furthermore, our country South Africa is comprised of nine (9) provinces, namely, Eastern Cape Province, Free State Province, Gauteng Province, Limpopo Province, Mpumalanga Province, Northern Cape Province, North West Province and Western Cape Province. For manageability, the study was restricted to the Gauteng Province only. Given the fact that all the participants were from the Gauteng Province, this affected the generalisation of the study. Nevertheless, in overall terms, the safety and security standards of consumers are universal in nature. Consequently, the overall results and practices have worldwide application. Some participants did not answer all the questions whilst others

did answer all the open-ended questions, therefore making it problematic for the researcher to make informed judgments on the aspects.

2.13 CONCLUSION

It emerged that the research methodology, validity and reliability of the information gathered, the value of the conducted research, ethical considerations and the limitations of the study were discussed in this chapter. It was imperative for the confidentiality of collected data to be preserved amongst the researcher and the participants. As part of this requirement, the University of South Africa ethical policy was followed. Altogether, consumers who partook in the research were not forced but offered their consent. They were offered the opportunity to participate willingly without any influences. As part of information gathering, interviews were done in a proficient way that give rise to respondents being satisfied at the interview completion. The researcher's goal was to attain the purposes of the study.

CHAPTER 3

SECURITY MEASURES AT RETAIL STORES

3.1 INTRODUCTION

To share a light on the security measures that are in place at retail stores in the Gauteng Province, a literature study was conducted. This allowed the researcher to get a sense of the level of security at retail stores in Gauteng. Case studies regarding criminal incidents affecting the retail stores were also looked at. This was specifically with a view of looking at the criminal attacks against the security measures that are put in place at retail stores. This also helped the researcher to uncover the profile of perpetrators and their modus operandi in attacking the retail stores.

This chapter starts with an outline of the research objectives and an explanation of theories that are relevant to safety and security at retail stores. Then it advances further to Risk Management Model ISO 31000: 2009. The researcher proceeds on to deliberate on the international perspective of security measures at retail stores so as to draw a comparison to the South African perspective of security measures at retail stores. The nature and extent of specific crimes affecting retail stores in South Africa are explained. The nature and extent of non-compliance issues affecting retail stores in South Africa are also discussed.

Lastly, the chapter discusses the best practices used internationally and nationally to address risks at retail stores.

3.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

As already discussed in Chapter 1, the study's research objectives were to:

1. Look at existing security measures for the protection of consumers at retail stores in the Gauteng Province.

2. To look at different types of security risks confronting consumers at retail stores in the Gauteng Province.
3. To investigate the improvement of security at retail stores in the Gauteng Province in order to ensure the safety and security of consumers whilst visiting retail stores.

These objectives were also uncovered by the literature review in this chapter in line with the theoretical framework of the study as outlined below.

3.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY

During the process, the research pinpointed risks and vulnerabilities, assessed the present physical security systems and tried to create recommendations for the execution of effective security risk control measures at retail stores.

Schmallegger (1996:15) explains theory as a sequence of correlated proposals that endeavour to define, enlighten, forecast and finally to control some class of events. A theory provides descriptive power from integral rational consistency and is “verified” by how well it defines and predicts reality. Hagan (2011:92) on the other hand defines theory as credible explanation of reality, a reasonable and informed guess as to why things are as they appear. Hagan (2011:92) further states that theory is an effort to describe or comprehend crime causation. Interestingly, there is another definition by Walsh and Hemans (2011: 9) that it is “a rationally interconnected various group of proposals about experiential truth”. The common factor within the three definitions is that they all strive to the concept ‘reality’ that the researcher should achieve at the end of the study. In this study, the main purpose of the theories is to guide the research and also assist in comprehending why criminals commit crimes as if it is a hobby to them. For example:

Case Study 1

On the 10th of November 2014, the SAPS received a tip-off that there were two suspects who were intending to rob the Makro retail store in Alberton. The SAPS investigators were accompanied by a member of the Johannesburg Metro Police (JMPD). SAPS members

from the West Rand Organised Crime Unit were also invited for support. The two males who matched the description were spotted by the police. The police then searched the vehicle of the suspects. The police found a laptop that had access to the internet, whereby a router would be used to link the laptop to the Makro computer system. The suspects also had 284 Makro gift vouchers in their possession. The police also uncovered that the suspects loaded each card with R25 000.00. It was estimated that had this scam succeeded, Makro would have lost R7 million in a short space of time. It was also uncovered that one of the suspects worked in the IT department of Makro, and the other suspect was a well-known cybercrime criminal (SAPS, 2014).

Case Study 2

On the 21st of April 2016, Makro Carnival opened. Between six and 12 vehicles were stolen from Makro's surroundings. Some of the stolen vehicles were white GWM bakkies; two silver Volkswagen Polos; white Toyota Hilux bakkies; a silver Toyota Corolla and a white Ford Laser. Some of the vehicles were recovered as follows: a Toyota Hilux was recovered at Leondale; and one Polo was found in Windmill Park. According to the Corporate Brand Manager at Makro, Lesego Moagi, these incidents did not happen at the actual Makro facility, but around the facility (Brakpan Herald, 2016).

Case Study 3

The Mall of Africa is situated at Midrand in the Gauteng Province, South Africa. Within a week of its opening, two people were shot and killed and three were shot and wounded right at the entrance of the mall as a result of taxi association's fighting for routes. These incidents simply denote that during the design stage of the mall, as required by CPTED, the issue of public transport was overlooked. As a result, taxi associations were not brought on board in order to prevent these unfortunate circumstances (Pitjeng, 2016).

Analysis of case studies

From Case Study 1, it can be observed that sometimes crime that is taking place at retail stores is as result of an inside job (contributed to by members of staff). This points to a lack of effective screening mechanisms in place whereby employees should be screened

before being employed for essential jobs such as Information Technology (IT) in the organisation. It can also be seen that there is collusion between members of staff and outsiders. It can also be observed that it is easy for people to bypass the security systems in place at retail stores as it is evident that 'Makro gift vouchers' were found in possession of criminals. In terms of risks, the assets, being Makro gift cards, were used as a mechanism for the retail store to lose huge amounts of money as it can be observed that the estimated financial loss was R7 million.

From Case Study 2, it is evident that newly opening retail stores have its own challenges that are different from retail stores that are already operating. Furthermore, it can be observed that at newly opening retail stores, the vehicles of consumers are targeted. This can be ascribed to the fact that many consumers will haste to the opening of the retail stores for shopping as prices will be reduced in most cases.

From Case Study 3 it can be derived that even though taxi violence does not necessarily affect the retail stores directly, it affects the safety and security of consumers using public and private transport to access the retail store. In addition, it can be observed that unrelated issues may affect the retail stores at times. This is based on the fact that what happens in the immediate vicinity of the retail stores, is seen by consumers to have impact on the retail stores itself, whether negative or positive. This is a challenge to a security specialist at retail stores, who need to think out of the box when identifying risks that retail stores and consumers will be exposed to in terms of safety and security. Therefore, this means that it will be ideal to develop a security plan in line with the interior of the retail stores, the exterior of the retail stores and the areas surrounding the retail stores.

It can be said that all crimes detailed in the case studies appear to have been committed by well organised criminals. Burke (2014:60) indicates that there are 16 criminological theories applicable to motivate the offender to commit crime, which is: rational choice theory, routine activity theory, biological theory, psychological positivism theory, sociological positivism theory labelling theory, conflict and radical theory, gendered criminal theory, critical race theory, sociobiological theory, environmental theory, social

control theory, situational action theory, desistance theory, left realist theory and southern theory. However, for the purpose of this study, three theories could be considered by retail stores in Gauteng Province with the aim of decreasing crime at retail stores. The three theories are as follows:

3.3.1 Routine Activities theory (RAT)

3.3.2 Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) theory and

3.3.3 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) theory.

3.3.1 Routine Activities Theory

Schmallegger (1996:482) states that for the RAT to apply, the following things should happen at the same place at any given time: target; lack of protection around the target; and committed (motivated) offender. Theory is used to help researchers to solve complex crime matters as well as everyday problems experienced by our society. As per the study purpose and in order to point out the relevance of this theory to assist retail stores to solve crime problems, the above case studies will be used.

Reference of routine theory to Case Study 1:

- Makro gift vouchers were targeted. These vouchers would ultimately generate R7 million in terms of monetary value to criminals.
- There is also a lack of effective security around the gift vouchers because it managed to leave the Makro premises unnoticed.
- There are motivated offenders (e.g. employee of Makro and other outside criminals).

To use this theory to determine a solution that could help to improve the crime problem at retail stores, the following should be considered:

- Continuous risk assessment should be conducted at retail stores in order to identify assets of value that could be targeted by criminals.
- Security measures (e.g. security officers, CCTV surveillance systems, alarm systems, informers etc.) should be positioned in place, aimed in improving security around the

assets (consumers, employees, equipment, money, etc.) of importance to the retail stores.

- Discourage the presence of motivated offenders at retail stores by for example the vetting of all potential employees before recruitment and to have security officers who are always on the lookout for robbers and who knows what to do in case of robbery, as evident in Case Study 1.

In short, when one removes one of the important aspects of routine theory, one already comes closer to deterring criminals. Security should always be proactive and not reactive. That is the why the researcher suggested the above steps as outlined in the theory to solve typical crime problems.

3.3.2 Situational Crime Prevention Theory

The SCPT seeks to increase the effort, increase the risk, decrease the rewards, decrease provocations, remove excuses and make it difficult for criminals to commit an offence (Schmallegger, 1996:483). In order to achieve this goal, Newburn (2013:296) is of the opinion that situational crime prevention should include measures directed at highly specific forms of crime that involve the management, plan or manipulation of the instant environment in as orderly and permanent way as possible. The probability of criminal activity can be reduced by changing the features of a given social situation.

In the context of security, this includes the use of situation strategies such as cheque-guarantee cards, the control of alcohol sales, vandal resistant materials and designs, defensible space, architecture, improved lighting, CCTV surveillance etc. as effective crime preventative additions to specific situations – which all might lower the likelihood of criminal victimisation in given instances. For example, the relevance of Case Study 1 comes to the fore. The criminals were caught uploading Makro gift cards with money. According to Newburn (2013:296), Situational Crime Prevention Theory builds on rational choice and routine activity theory and it's not a discrete theoretical perspective. Furthermore, it was found in this study that RAT and SCPT have common premises.

These premises are evident in all case studies previously mentioned. Firstly, crime seems to be the effect of a contact between a person who is prepared to commit a crime and an advantageous situation. Furthermore, whenever crime is committed, the reason behind the commission of crime is to benefit the criminal. Additionally, the essential casual suppositions about crime are simple and obvious.

Therefore, criminological theory and crime policy need to pay attention to the dissimilarities between every specific type of crime. As result, crime is not merely an event, but it is a series of events. Finally, crime can be condensed efficiently and effectively by changing situations rather than trying to change temperaments.

3.3.2.1 *Defensible space*

According to Williams (2012:315), defensible space is defined as a model for built-up environments that inhibits crime by creating the physical appearance of a societal fabric that defends itself. Defensible space is a term that encompasses the variety of mechanisms such as real and symbolic barriers, areas of influence and improved opportunities for surveillance that combine to get an environment under the control of its occupants (Newburn, 2013:296). Newburn (2013:296) further states that sense of ownership of spaces is important to their safety and that public spaces need to be visible and used in order for social control to flourish. Furthermore, Newburn (2013:297) identified four key areas of design that would inspire the expansion of societal control and therefore are likely to reduce crime. These four key areas include: Territoriality, which means defining space in particular ways so as to inspire occupants to safeguard their areas, to indicate authority and dishearten outsiders from entering, Surveillance, which means designing buildings in such a way that observation of territorial areas are easy and effective, to inspire occupants to do so, Image, which means designing buildings and areas in such a way that it assists in evading stigma and proposition of vulnerability and finally, Environment, which means putting public housing with safe zones in adjacent areas.

Therefore, defensible space is applicable to this study in the sense that when retail stores are erected, the concept “defensible space” should be taken into consideration and applied from the initial stage in order to ensure that the four key areas of design, as outlined above, are noted and put in place for the safety and security of retail stores and consumers.

3.3.3 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

Raton (2003:341) explains Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) as the correct plan and effective use of the constructed environment that can lead to a decrease in the threat and occurrence of crime and an enhancement of the quality of people’s life. In addition, this theory is based on the suggestion that the proper plan and use of the building and nearby environment can advance the quality of peoples’ life by preventing crime and lessening the fear of crime (Ortmeier, 2013:174). It ties in very well with the two theories previously mentioned, hence the researcher chose these three theories because they are interrelated. Furthermore, the above delineation provides a holistic perspective of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. This theory enfolds the criminal perception concerning an environment and the danger of getting caught when committing crime and the societal dynamics and sense of proprietorship of the environment and their related defensive actions by people who work, live or cross the environment and route to another destination (Lutchminarain, 2015:57). According to Raton (2003:341), security and crime prevention practitioners must have a thorough understanding of CPTED concepts and applications in order to work more effectively with local crime prevention officers, security professionals, building design authorities, architects and design professionals and others when designing new or renovating existing retail stores.

As indicated in Case Study 3 (The Mall of Africa), within a week on its opening, two people who were shot and killed and three were shot and wounded right at the entrance of the mall as results of taxi associations violently fighting for routes. These incidents simply denote that during the design stage of the mall, as required by CPTED, the issue of public

transport was overlooked and as result, taxi associations were not brought on board in order to prevent these unfortunate circumstances (Pitjeng, 2016).

Raton (2003:342) states that for security professionals, CPTED is a set of management tools concentrating on the firstly, the physical environment such as a building, park or office space. Therefore, the physical environment can be manipulated to produce behavioural effects that will reduce the fear and incidence of certain types of criminal acts. Secondly, it concentrates on the behaviour of people in relationship to their physical environment. Some locations seem to create, promote, or allow criminal activity or unruly behaviour, whilst other environments elicit compliant and law-abiding conducts, and finally, it focusses on redesigning or using existing space more effectively to encourage desirable behaviours and discourage crime and related undesirable conduct. As such, CPTED practices suggest that crime and loss are by-products of human functions that are not functioning properly.

In addition to the above set of management tools, in general, there are three classifications of CPTED that can be used by retail stores. These classifications include: Firstly, mechanical measures – these measures are also referred to as target hardening. It includes the use of technological aided security measures (such as biometric systems, CCTV, alarms systems) and physical security measures (such as perimeter fence, security lightning, walls, doors, locks, safes) that are set in place, aimed at providing a security system that is well-incorporated. Secondly, human or organisational measures – which denotes that safety and security awareness needs to be conducted on a regular basis to ensure that security staff know exactly what is expected of them in terms of safety and security at retail stores and finally, natural resources – which states that the space in the environment should be specifically used for the purpose for which it was intended for, whilst at the same time deterring crime (Kole, 2015:111).

Taking into consideration all three of the case studies above in relation to how criminal incidents were committed, it is clear that CPTED plays an important role in reducing crime at retail stores. In order to strengthen the case of CPTED, should there have been

effective physical or technological security (mechanical) or regular security awareness (human or organisational measures) and to some extent, the immediate surrounding with all sorts of items that might obstruct the view of security officers, such as vegetation, lakes, rivers (natural resources – which from the case studies did not feature), the situation could have been improved.

The common point is that there should be less or no security measures in place to be able to attack a hyperstore. All three theories address this point adequately. For example, besides, the three CPTED classifications, there are several key concepts that allow for CPTED to be implemented in order to contribute to crime reduction. These key concepts include the following: firstly, natural access control, which is achieved by using barriers such as fences, locks, shrubs and other man-made and natural obstacles in order to limit access to a building or defined space, for example to deter burglars from entering. A choice can be made between installing an alarm system or installing locking devices. This should be done in terms of the risks associated with that particular retail store. One should not lose sight of the view that criminals employ cybercrime to attack the retail stores, as happened in the Case Study 1. Secondly, natural surveillance, which is attained by increasing visibility by occupants and casual observers such as police, security officers and others in order to increase detection of trespassers or misconduct within the retail stores. The use of a perimeter fence that allows unobstructed viewing of the area by passers-by or workers will probably discourage criminals. It depends on whether the Security Manager will choose to be proactive or reactive. For examples, refer to the three case studies above. Lastly, natural territorial reinforcement, which means that property owners or building occupants have to see to it that security procedures are put in place, which in turn would contribute to assist them in identifying a security breach in their retail stores (Crowe & Zahm, 2013:22). It can be concluded that these elements appear to be lacking in all three case studies.

According to Cozens (2008:163), management and looking after and activity supporting are the two elements of CPTED in addition to the three classic principles. Therefore, the management and maintenance of retail store security and surroundings should be taken

care of at all times according to the industry standards in order to ensure that the space looks well and free from crime (for example address security lights not working, holes in the perimeter fence, damaged ceilings, broken gates, maintenance of parking areas). As such, the “broken window” theory will be maintained in order to avoid trivial things attracting people to commit crime against the retail stores.

Kole (2015:112) points out that it is the owners’ duty to keep their property in a serviceable state. Legitimate activity support - for crime prevention program to be effective at retail stores, the lawful owners of the property must effectively participate in activities that were intended by the architecture and function of the space or building in order to increase the risk of arresting criminals should a crime be committed whilst at the same time making it difficult for criminals to commit crime until they abandon their evil intentions of committing crime (Kole, 2015:113).

Criminals, in view of security measures at retail stores that are inadequate or lax, assume that their criminal conducts at retail stores will be lucrative.

3.4 RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL ISO 31000: 2009

According to British Standards Institute (BSI) Excellerator Research (2011), the International Standards Organisation (ISO) for risk management standards published ISO 31000:2009 on the 13th of November 2009. This standard address risk management, principles, guidelines and processes when dealing with risk in the area of risk management. This standard helps organisations with their risk analysis and risk assessment and it applies to most business activities including planning, management operations and communication processes. Furthermore, ISO 31000 has been cited endlessly and also impacted on the concepts and language used by respected people such as business board members and politicians. ISO 31000:2009 is comprised of five (5) clauses of standards, which deals with the scope, terms and definitions, the principles, framework and processes applicable to managing a particular risk that any organisation must apply when dealing with risk.

Risk is defined as the general value judgement made by a person of appropriate status within the organisation as to which of the possible outcomes to a decision situation are acceptable (Breurs, 2000:7) whereas according to Snyman (2015), risk is defined as the effect of uncertainty on objectives.

In addition, Lark (2015:13) defines risk as the effect of uncertainty on objectives. Furthermore, Schoeman (2011:8) state that the residue of the risk that remains after implementation of crime reduction measures constitutes the risk. In ISO 31000:2009, risk is impartial whilst the consequences related to a risk can enrich the attainment of objectives or can boundary the attainment of objectives in a business. Management of risk can be simplified by grouping risks according to their pertinent business activities such as crime related risks, finance related risks etc., which will allow for them to be effectively managed (Lark, 2015:13). According to Lark (2015:14), the management of risk with optimistic consequences is separate from the management of risks with damaging consequences in many organisations. It is clear that the risk management process is the same for risks, regardless of the nature of their consequences in ISO 31000:2009.

In the three case studies above, there were elements of risks that could have been prevented, controlled and managed. As a result of the intended crimes, huge amounts of money were going to be lost (R7 million), lives of consumers could have been lost, consumers could have been injured and vehicles of consumers could have been lost or stolen. That is why management boards should ensure that there are risk management plans in place in order to mitigate risks facing retail stores, as clearly pointed out in King III to follow.

3.4.1 King III Report on risk management and corporate governance

The King III Report received considerable attention in both private and public sectors. Additionally, misperception has industrialised over its meaning and how it relates to risk management, governance, protection and efforts applied to the challenges of threats

(Purpura, 2013:322). The King III Report is defined as an endorsed code of business conduct produced under the umbrellas of the Institute of Directors of Southern Africa (IDSA) for use by registered companies, banks, insurance companies and public enterprise (Hendrikse & Heifer-Hendrikse, 2012:498).

According to Hendrikse and Heifer-Hendrikse (2012:183), the King III Report was compiled to be used by all business individuals, whether private or public businesses, sole proprietors and partners as well as government owned enterprises. Furthermore, the King III Report is an inclusive document that provides rules for corporate governance in South Africa (Mallin, 2010:72). The King III Report further indicates that an inclusive approach is fundamental for the operation of business in South Africa. Therefore, retail stores, as private businesses, need to apply the King III report to its business relations in terms of risk management and corporate governance. Furthermore, the existence of the King III report is merely founded on its fundamental purpose that is to update the King Code of Governance Principles in terms of the new companies Act No. 71 of 2008. In addition, its purpose is to update the international governance developments and events such as increased demands by governments and social responsibility institutions for both the public, government-owned enterprises as well as private enterprises. Furthermore, it encourages these enterprises to take seriously their societal, ethical and environment accountability and yields sustainability reports.

According to Mallin (2010:319), the King III report identifies seven (7) characteristics of good corporate governance, namely: social responsibility, fairness, responsibility, accountability, independence, transparency and discipline. Additionally, the King III Report and Code of Governance Principles adopt an optimistic position in terms of position and philosophy. In terms of philosophy, it highlights three (3) crucial facets, namely; corporate citizenship, sustainability and strategic and ethical leadership that retail stores must adopt in their governance.

Let us now consider Risk Management in terms of the King III report. Risk is defined as uncertain forthcoming events that could influence the business, both in negative and

positive ways, and the attainment of business's objectives. Furthermore, it is an amalgamation of the likelihood of an event and its consequences. Purpura (2013:25) states that risk is the dimension of the frequency, possibility and harshness of losses from exposure or dangers whereas risk management is defined as the processes aimed at reducing risk and defending the business from conceivable negative occurrences (Hendrikse & Heifer-Hendrikse, 2012:354).

According to Purpura (2013:325), risk management is the basis of resilience, business continuity planning, emergency management, critical organisation protection and additional efforts put in place to the challenges of risks and threats. The Queensland Government (QG) (2012:6) defines risk management as synchronised activities to direct and control an organisation with regards to risk. Additionally, risk management assist in estimating future risks and also provide organisations with strategies and necessary tools to be used as a departure point from which comprehensive action (such as resilience, business continuity planning etc.) can be taken.

According Hendrikse and Heifer-Hendrikse (2012:352) and the King III report, all businesses, comparative to the business sector and industry in which it functions, has its own set of risks. Examples of this statement can be observed in the retail stores mentioned in Case Study 1, 2 and 3. Therefore, it is essential as part of the strategic and operational management of retail stores to identify these risks and develop internal control measures in order to manage and reduce these risks. Furthermore, the King III Report indicates that businesses, such as retail stores, have various ways they can apply to categorise the risks confronting them. In addition, there are four (4) types of principal risks affecting the safety and security of consumers whilst at retail stores, which include external exposure risks that refers to safety risks (e.g. insufficient safety measures that affect consumers at retail stores), internal risks, which refers to risks associated with the nature of the retail stores business (e.g. risk of consumer's safety or employee's safety), fraud risk (which refers to thefts at retail stores, consumers' assets and fraudulent transactions against retail stores or consumers) and finally, compliance risk (which refers to non-compliance to relevant legislation by retail stores that will result in legal liability

against the retail stores, with regard to matters affecting safety and security of consumers).

Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2014:151) indicates that Corporate Governance (CG) encompasses a set of relations amongst a retail stores' management, board members, shareholders and stakeholders such as consumers. Furthermore, Corporate Governance provides the structure through which the objectives of the retail stores are set and the ways of achieving those objectives and checking performance. Purpura (2013:318) describes governance as the procedure by which the board sets the goals for an organisation and administers development towards those goals. In terms of governance, the King III report identifies nine (9) principles that are connected to the governance of risks that retail stores can apply in their environment in order to manage risks effectively.

The boards of retail stores have only four (4) basic choices in the Risk Management Process (RMP) that they can apply, namely: accepting the risk (e.g. by undertaking certain risky activities which should produce shareholder/stakeholder value. It is the decision to acknowledge and endure the consequences if a risk event occurs); secondly, mitigating the risk (e.g. by undertaking operational risk through preventative and detective control measures. It is the process of taking specific action to reduce the probability and reduce impact of risks); thirdly, transferring the risk (e.g. by outsourcing some services such as security services and taking out insurance cover. Furthermore, it implies shifting responsibility or consequences for a given risk to a third party) and lastly, avoiding the risk (e.g. by choosing not to undertake some risky activities, selecting a lower risk option or alternative approach that represents a risk avoidance decision) (Pritchard, 2010:49).

Additionally, for retail stores to fulfil its risk governance responsibilities, the board of directors must make sure that the retail stores have put in place an operational Risk Management Program (RMP) that is compatible with the fundamental strategic and risk appetite choices. Furthermore, the board must make sure that there are effective processes in place for identifying, assessing and handling of all categories of risk, for example business risk and operational risk (Crouhy et al., 2014:158).

3.5. THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF SECURITY MEASURES AT RETAIL STORES

Under this sub-heading, the researcher discusses the international perspective of security measures at retail stores of the following two international countries, namely: Australia and the United States of America. The researcher further discusses the perspective of security measures of two African countries, namely Kenya and Nigeria.

3.5.1 Australia

Felson (1996, as cited by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC), 2004:15) lists the following crimes against general businesses in Australia that affect the safety and security of consumers: burglary; malicious damage to property; motor vehicle theft; theft; employee fraud; employee fraud; robbery; workplace violence; and blackmail/extortion/corruption. According to Security Industry Australian Standards (AS) (2011), Australian retail stores apply the following standards for intruder alarm systems (IAS) and Closed-Circuit Television, namely:

Intruder alarm systems

An alarm system is important because it serves a very important purpose in the security function. It comes in different formats: panic buttons (under the desk for easy access in case of emergency) and mobile panic buttons. Alarm systems should also be in line with the following standards: design of client' premises, installation, commissioning and maintenance, monitoring centres, detection devices for internal use, wire-free systems installed in client's premises and alarm transmission systems (Security Industry Australian Standards, 2011).

Closed-circuit television (CCTV)

A CCTV system can play a very important role in crime prevention at retail stores. This system can enable the operators to observe suspicious behaviour, suspicious people, suspicious vehicles and suspicious objects. There should also be standards such as:

management and operation; application guidelines; pal signal timings and levels; and remote video (Security Industry Australian Standards, 2011).

The Australian security industry applies or is regulated by the following legislation and standards, which are applied by Australian retail stores in the provision of security services to ensure the safety and security of consumers and businesses, namely: AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 Fact Sheet, Security Industry Act 1997, Security Industry Act 2003, Surveillance Devices Act 1999 – AustLII, Private Security Act 2004 - AustLII and Security Providers Act 1993 - Queensland Legislation. In addition, the nature and extent of specific crimes affecting Australian business communities, especially those taking place at the retail stores, are best illustrated in the following real case scenarios, selected from many incidents:

Case Study AUS 1

Two young boys, 12 and 13, vandalised and robbed the food court of a Melbourne shopping centre - with dozens of shoppers just watching and doing NOTHING to stop the attack. Other boys were sitting in the shopping centre food court when they were attacked. The occurred after a boy, 14, was assaulted and robbed at the same shopping centre. Disturbing footage emerged of two young boys being attacked and robbed at a Melbourne mall as shoppers looked on but did nothing to help. The video shows two boys aged 12 and 13, sitting in the food court at Highpoint Shopping Centre in Maribyrnong as they are approached by two young males. The pair are seen confronting the boys, punching one and pushing him to the ground before demanding a mobile phone, in front of dozens of shoppers (Devlin: 2017).

Case Study AUS 2

Officers from the Victoria Police Homicide Squad arrested a 27-year-old man from Greenvale, in Melbourne's North. According to police, a man was sitting in a car off Sydney Road in Campbellfield at about 3:30pm on a Monday when a gunman approached and fired several shots. The victim, a 24-year-old Southbank man, was taken to Royal Melbourne Hospital with life-threatening injuries but died overnight. No-one else

was injured. Terrified consumers took shelter inside shops during the ordeal. A witness, who did not want to be named, said a woman carrying a baby ran inside the shop and told staff there was a man with a gun (Hancock: 2016).

Considering the above two (2) case scenarios, one can clearly see the nature and extent of crime to which consumers in Australia are exposed to during their visit to retail stores. The occurrence of crime indicates that the safety and security of consumers are questionable when visiting retail stores, because when looking at scenario A1, the victims were assaulted and robbed in front of other consumers and no one attempted to help them during the attack. In scenario A3, a male consumer was shot while sitting in his car and as a result, he died at the hospital because of gunshot injuries.

3.5.2 United States of America

Given the limited literature with specific reference to retail stores in the United States of America, the researcher decided to look at the retail industry (under which retail stores fall) as a whole because this is how it is dealt with in the literature. In the United States of America, there were about 23 million jobs in the retail sector in the year 2008, and this made the retail industry to be the second largest employer in the USA (Cardone & Hayes, 2012). From crimes which were experienced by the retail industry, employee theft and shoplifting amounted to 75 percent with an estimated financial loss of 165 billion Rands (Cardone & Hayes, 2012).

Furthermore, Davis (2008) states that the nature of retail stores makes them vulnerable, the reason for being that great numbers of people, many carrying sizeable parcels, come and go through several entrances and exits and this makes it easy for a shooter to blend in with the crowds. Furthermore, overseas open-air street markets, the world's original malls, have similar risk factors. Natural disasters, such as fires, tornados and earthquakes, pose many of the same security issues for retail stores as well as consumers. Nevertheless, and regardless of the event, natural disaster or attack through automatic weapon, bomb, or chemical or biological agent results in casualties (of

consumers) in retail stores being high. According to Davis (2008) retail stores in the United States of America apply the following security measures for the protection of retail stores as well as for the safety and security of consumers: closed-circuit television systems which is used to monitor real time of events as they happen at the retail stores, passive barriers or bollards which are used to prevent vehicles from breaching the entrance and patrol security officers in order to increase security officers' visibility during shopping ours.

Retail stores in the United States of America are confronted by the following security risk factors that undermines the safety and security of consumers whilst visiting these retail stores: shootings in retail stores as result of committing crime and terrorist attacks, natural disaster, bomb, chemical and biological agent. To illustrate, let consider the following case studies:

Case Study USA 1

The shootings in an Omaha shopping mall in December 2007 which left nine consumers dead and five injured, confirm what security experts have known for decades: retail stores are "soft targets". Based on surveys of private retail stores' security directors and State Homeland Security officials, researchers reported in 2006 that USA retail stores had received "too little attention" from security officials as potential sites for terrorist and other attacks (Davis:2008).

Case Study USA 2

A 14-year old boy was caught shoplifting at a Walmart retail store in Easley, South Carolina. When a loss-prevention officer chased him out of a store, along with a couple of consumers, the boy opened fire on those other shoppers with a 9-mm handgun. Luckily, no one was hurt. Officers were already on the scene and arrested the boy (Odinson, 2014a).

Case Study USA 3

A couple and their young son were going back to their car in the parking lot of a Walmart store in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Upon reaching their car, two men drove up, blocking them in, and waved a gun at them and then robbed them. As the men fled, one of them fired at the family and hit their car (Odinson, 2014b).

Looking at the above three scenarios, one can clearly see the nature and extent of crime to which consumers in USA are subjected to during their visit to the retail stores. Therefore, these evident crimes simply denote that the safety and security of consumers are at stake while visiting these retail stores. Bearing in mind the crimes that took place in Scenario 1 (nine consumers were shot dead and five were left injured as a result of violent crime at retail stores), Scenario 2 (when a shoplifter was being chased by consumers after shoplifting, the criminal opened fire to the consumers who were chasing him. Luckily, no one was injured by the gunshots, but the action of the shoplifter posed a serious risk to the life of consumers in general) and Scenario 3 (a couple and their son was robbed in the parking area at gun point and when the criminals left the scene of crime, they fired shots at the consumers and hit their car. No-one was injured but the trauma they were subjected to due to the actions of the perpetrator is questionable in terms of their safety and security whilst visiting the retail stores).

3.5.3 Kenya

According to the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) (2016) Kenya remains unfavourably rated for both crime and terrorism, even though thousands of tourists visit Kenya safely every year. Therefore, Kenya remains a prospective terrorist threat aimed at Western, and Kenyan interests, including in the Nairobi area and the coastal areas including Mombasa. Extremist acts could comprise suicide actions, bomb and grenade attacks, kidnappings, attacks on civil aviation, and attacks on maritime vessels in Kenyan docks. The aforementioned threats to the safety and security of consumers is best manifested in the September 2013 terrorist attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, which shocked the entire world. Kenya's main cities, particularly in Nairobi, are affected by most

common crimes, of which violent car hi-jacking of consumers is one example. In addition, criminals use weapons during the commission of these crimes. Furthermore, these criminals, when committing these crimes, don't hesitate to shoot consumers who are uncooperative or who may seem to hesitate before obeying their attackers. Yet, if consumers are totally cooperative, they are only robbed of their belongings and released unhurt.

Additionally, fierce and deadly criminal attacks against consumers in Kenyan retail stores include armed car hi-jacking's, robberies and abductions that take place at any time and in any location, especially in retail stores in Nairobi. Furthermore, consumers are subjected to other crimes of opportunity, pickpockets and criminals repeatedly commit "snatch-and-grab" attacks on city' retail stores, congested areas and from idle vehicles in traffic.

Mbuvi (2015:35) states that Kenyan consumers were beaten, mugged and in some circumstances murdered while carrying out their business. Furthermore, Mbuvi (2015) indicated that the uncertainty levels have increased because of a large number of unlicensed guns in the control of criminals. Criminals utilise these unlicensed firearms to commit violent crimes against the consumers, which in turn affect the safety and security of consumers whilst visiting retail stores. Additionally, the situation is perpetuated by the incapability of the state to combat the increasing crime levels and as result, businesses and consumers have been coerced to move towards making use of private security for their protection. The nature and extent of specific crimes affecting the Kenyan business communities, specifically those happening at the retail stores, are best illustrated with the following real case scenarios, selected from many incidents:

Case Study KE 1

On Saturday 21 September 2013, an armed attack, albeit by alleged terrorists, at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, killed 67 people and injured more than 175 people. This attack on a shopping mall highlighted existing vulnerabilities of shopping centres. Upon subsequent investigation and analysis of this specific attack, it was found and

emphasised that it is relatively easy to carry out any such armed attacks on a shopping centre. It was also found that the law enforcement response (by the Kenyan Police, backed up later by the Kenyan Armed Forces) was chaotic, disorganised and uncoordinated, to say the least. The response had been further hampered by a lack of communication and poor response/reaction planning (Breaking News: 2013).

Considering this scenario, one can clearly see the nature and extent of crime to which consumers in Kenya are subjected to during their visit to the retail stores. Consequently, this example simply indicates that the safety and security of consumers is at stake while visiting these retail stores. The crimes that occurred in the mentioned scenario included the murder of consumers and the attempted murder of consumers etc. (67 consumers killed, and more than 175 consumers injured as results of violent crime at retail stores). The nature and extent of violent crime against consumers denotes shortcomings and vulnerabilities in terms of security procedures that are in place for the security of retail stores as well as consumers (Breaking News: 2013).

3.6 THE SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE OF SECURITY MEASURES AT RETAIL STORES

Poor security management in most business sectors is a devastating concern where past lessons are infrequently engrossed. Therefore, the response to the spate of violent crime affecting businesses is commonly reactive instead of consisting of proactively preventative security measures. However, the dire lack of security at retail stores links to a lack of concern for public safety by structures which don't have the capability to put in adequate security measures. As a result, there is usually a lot of finger-pointing to avoid personal responsibility for protracted inaction by risk and compliance managers at retail stores, followed by heightened security window dressing for a few weeks until the incidents vanish from the public newscast. Then it's back to the usual careless, crime friendly condition. Retail stores in Gauteng should perhaps employ and train their own security personnel to deploy at vulnerable points rather than contracting incompetent and unaccountable private security companies to which they can later pass the buck of blame.

The proactive manner of increased security measures at retail stores after incidents had occurred is indicative of typical poor management in South Africa. Therefore, proficient risk and compliance managers at retail stores should be continuously assessing the security systems on their premises and upgrading them where necessary before criminals detect vulnerability in order to guarantee the safety and security of consumers (Venter, 2014:np).

According to Schoeman (2011:7), Rogers developed the Security Risk Management Model (SRMM), building on the efforts of other security specialists and academics but also tailoring it to an elementary Risk Management Model to the safety environment. Furthermore, Rogers referred to the Security Risk Management Model as a model, utilised to resolve any security problem at an organisation or business, as and when the need of the application of the Security Risk Management Model arises. Therefore, retail stores in Gauteng Province as the central focus point of this study can apply the Security Risk Management Model if the need arises in order to resolve any security related problems that might confront their business operation. For retail stores to implement and apply the Security Risk Management Model in their security operations, they must understand what must be done and knowledge of implementation when a safety plan is applied in an establishment or business. Additionally, Rogers in his development of the Security Risk Management Model, indicated that every time safety procedures are put in place, criminals will continuously attempt by all means to circumvent these safety procedures. Rogers further stated that in reality, lawbreakers are likely to be successful if they are competent to feat the weaknesses or observed opportunities to accomplish their unlawful activities. In other words, criminal's responses or assaults on the safety scheme is equivalent to or exceeded the act practical to the safety structure (Schoeman, 2011: 12).

According to Schoeman (2011:13), Rogers developed nine (9) basics steps of the Security Risk Management Model that need to be followed in its application. The steps that he developed are as follows, in their chronological order: aspects instigating crime, safety procedure and mandate, orientation stage, threat examination exercise, safety

survey, safety risk control measures, return-on-investment (ROI), security risk management report, and execution and appraisal of security measures. Rogers's Security Risk Management Model was later revised by Olckers in his Unisa MTech in Security Management in 200, where he added a tenth step to the model, namely: maintenance and upgrade, which should be applied after step 9: Execution and appraisal of security measures of the original Security Risk Management Model by Rogers. In addition, stage 10 is significant for prolonging the long-term operation ability and also intensification of the life cycle of the security system.

In other words, it denotes that the maintenance of the security system has to be conducted on a consistent basis. In the year 2010, both Roger's and Olcker's models was revised by Kole, who added an additional step that is the step 7 of the current Unisa Security Risk Management Model (USRMM), which is Service Level Agreements (SLA). The Unisa Security Risk Management Model currently has 11 steps that retail stores can apply in order to ensure the optimum security and safety of consumers and their business (Kole, 2010:20).

According to Crime Stats South Africa (CSSA) (2017), business crime statistics in Gauteng Province for the period of March to April 2013/2014 to March to April 2015/2017 showed an increase in some crimes at various retail stores but also a slight decrease in other crimes. Devoted consideration is given to the crimes that are directly related to crimes happening at retail stores, e.g. murder, attempted murder, assault GBH, robbery aggravating circumstances, malicious damage to property, burglary in business premises, theft of motor vehicle and motor cycle, theft out of motor vehicle, commercial crime, shoplifting and business robbery. The table below depicts an example of statistics of crimes that take place at different retailers.

Table 3.1: Crime statistics in Gauteng Province from April to March: 2013/2014 - 2016/2016

Type of Crime	April 2013 March 2014	April 2014 – March 2015	April 2015 – March 2016	April 2016 – March 2017	Total
Murder	2 968	3 286	3 671	3 842	13 767
Attempted murder	3 594	3 879	4 202	4 574	16 249
Assault GBH	40 591	41 326	41 830	42 790	166 537
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	35 785	42 535	47 362	49 792	175 474
Malicious damage to property	35 867	35 119	34 805	34 320	140 111
Burglary in business premises	15 560	16 439	16 983	16 412	65 394
Theft of motor vehicle and motor cycle	27 522	27 372	27 147	26 646	108 687
Theft out of motor vehicle	42 064	42 635	44 809	42 111	171 619
Commercial crime	30 745	27 678	23 836	23 680	105 966
Shoplifting	22 149	22 054	22 562	22 157	88 922
Business robbery	4 993	6 007	6 239	6 910	24 149

Source: Crime Statistics SA (2013/2014 – 2015/2016)

One can see from Table 3.5.1 that these precise crimes have revealed an increasing and decreasing tendency over the reporting period. However, crime in some years might depict reduction in relations of statistics but rise in relations of effect. The above crimes are analysed in the following section:

- **Murder:** This crime has been increasing consistently. The reason for this may be that murder occurs as a result of committing other crimes, such as armed robberies.
- **Attempted murder:** Attempted murder, like murder, has been increasing consistently over the years. Criminals at times feel like sending a very strong message to their victims by injuring them seriously such as shooting with the intent to gain control of the situation.

- **Assault with grievously bodily harm:** Assault with grievously bodily harm is also proving to be one of the violent crimes that continue to increase gradually. Like attempted murder, this is a crime that is committed when criminals want to send a message to the victims that they have to listen and if they do not the victims will suffer the consequences.
- **Robbery with aggravating circumstances:** This crime has been increasing gradually over a 4-year period. This crime happens under certain circumstances e.g. when criminals see that they can easily get away with the crime.
- **Malicious damage to property:** Of all the violent crimes experienced by the retail stores, this is the only crime that showed a decrease over the previous 4-year period. This may be connected to the fact that the retailers are improving their security systems that deter criminals from committing this crime.
- **Burglary to business premises:** This crime increasing consistently over the previous three years. It was only during the previous reporting period that this crime decreased. The reason may be that the retailers came up with effective countermeasures.
- **Theft of motor vehicle and motor cycle:** Though this crime is also high, it has been showing a gradual decrease over the past four years.
- **Theft out of motor vehicle:** This crime had been increasing over the last three years. It was only in the previous year that it experienced decline. This can be connected to the improved security measures at the retail stores or improved security features of the vehicles.
- **Commercial crime:** This crime has been showing a gradual decrease over a 4-year period. It may be connected to the change in the way the security departments at retail stores operate.
- **Shoplifting:** This crime has been increasing and decreasing over the previous 4-year period. This is the crime that mainly bothers the retailers because it has to do with stealing of items from the shelves. As a result of this crime, retailers suffer severe financial loss.
- **Business robbery:** Business robbery, like robbery with aggravating circumstances and others above, has been experiencing a gradual increase over a 4-year period.

3.7 THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SPECIFIC CRIMES AFFECTING RETAIL STORES IN SOUTH AFRICA

The category of crime retail businesses face is comprised of issues most of us are acquainted with. The said reality is that business crime is cumulative, with Gauteng Province leading the way with the most robberies (Seldon, 2015:21). Furthermore, the nature and extent of specific crimes affecting the business communities, especially those taking place at the retail stores, are best described with actual case scenarios. The following actual case scenarios were selected from incidents:

Case Study 4

A man was killed, and five consumers were injured when an armed gang of robbers attempted to rob a retail store in Bosmont near Westbury, in Johannesburg. According to police, several armed men stormed the retail store in a bid to rob it. The robbery plan was foiled as the owner, assisted by his security guard, exchanged fire with the attackers. Three suspects were seriously wounded while one died at the scene. One firearm was recovered at the scene of the incident. An unconfirmed number of suspects also fled the scene. The shop owner and security guard also sustained serious injuries. A case of attempted murder and attempted robbery was opened against the suspects (Bambalele, 2016).

Case Study 5

A gang of six robbers first robbed a consumer of R90 000.00, and then tried to rob security guards who came out of a retail store at the Lynwood Ridge mall with a trolley full of cash. The robbers hijacked a car while fleeing from the second robbery. Guards from SBV fired shots when they noticed the first robbery, fired shots at the robbers during the second robbery and also gave chase when the robbers fled from the scene. Three of the robbers were shot during the gun battle that ensued between the guards and the robbers (De Lange, 2016).

Case Study 6

Consumers are often on the receiving end of card cloning scams and bad service. Card cloning has become a favourite of criminals who target unsuspecting consumers at hyperstores and other places. Criminals seem to be changing their modus operandi, even though consumers monitor their cards when paying for merchandises and services. For example, a consumer bought goods and paid with her card, only to be told that the transaction didn't go through and that she had to pay again. When the consumer indicated to the cashier that she received an SMS confirming the payment, she was told by the cashier that she had to pay again as the transaction had not gone through due to the retail store faulty machine (Diale, 2013).

Case Study 7

A Metro police officer was shot dead at Rosettenville Junction Mall in Johannesburg. The thugs had just robbed the Pick n Pay hyperstore and were making off with the money box when the officer happened to walk into the store. Consumers believed the thugs panicked and shot the officer (Luhanga & Mpana, 2015).

Case Study 8

There had been 14 mall robberies in Gauteng, a shootout in Centurion and an assault in Pretoria within a two-day period. Two cell phone providers in Centurion malls were robbed within two hours of each other. The Vodashop store at Centurion mall was hit by gang of six armed robbers and less than two hours later, a Telkom mobile store at Irene mall was hit by three armed robbers. During the first robbery, armed men forced staff to pack phones in bags before locking them and consumers in an office. Two suspects were wounded, and four suspects were taken into custody. Electronic goods worth more than R1 million were stolen during these incidents (Dodds, Dolley & Makhetha, 2014).

Case Study 9

Gauteng police were concerned about the increasing number of violent armed robberies in the province and called for the public to assist them with information about planned robberies. The concerns were raised after the province experienced several violent armed

robberies targeting businesses. Two malls in Johannesburg were target of such robberies. Both incidents happened at about 9am, one at the Maponya mall in Soweto and the other at Northgate mall. Police were looking for six suspects who robbed two security guards of bags of money they were holding after collecting it from one of the retailers, by accosting them with a firearm inside the mall. The suspects fled the scene in a grey car with an unknown registration (Mashego & SAPA, 2014).

Case Study 10

One of the major criminal incidents reported in Honeydew SAPS on 25 June 2006 was an incident where four police officials were shot and killed at Jeppe's' Town (Johannesburg) following a robbery at the Pick 'n Pay Hyperstore, which is located at Honeydew Northgate shopping mall, of an undisclosed amount of cash. Police followed the suspects to Jeppe's' Town, and one of the suspect was apprehended after the crime was committed (Ndaba, 2008).

Case Study 11

A six-year-old boy was hit by stray bullet during a shoot-out between security guards and suspected robbers near the Centurion Lifestyle Centre. This occurred a few days after the launch of the festive season operations at malls, shopping centres, highways and other areas by the Gauteng Provincial Commissioner. The shooting happened after a woman, who was driving a Range Rover, was robbed of her jewellery by three unknown suspects wearing balaclavas (Madisha, 2016).

Case Study 12

Shopping at The Grove Mall came to standstill when a gang of would-be robbers and a jewellery shop owner exchanged gunfire. Shortly after the thugs stormed into the store, finding two female employees inside, consumers were sent diving for cover as a Wild West movie unfolded in front of their eyes. Five gang members informed the store employees that it was a business robbery and ordered them to open cabinets where they kept their merchandise. The owner of the store watched the gang on CCTV for some time

and realised that something was wrong when he saw them pushing one of the consumers (Ngoepe, 2013).

Case Study 13

A would-be hero was injured during the robbery of Scoin shop at Brooklyn Mall. According to the police's spokesperson, a member of the public was injured when he tried to stop three robbers trying to get away from the coin shop in the mall. According to the police's spokesperson, the three suspects went into Brooklyn Mall at midday. Two of the suspects went to the Scoin shop, a coin and medallion retail chain store, while one of the men kept watch outside the store. The suspects are said to have taken coins and money with an estimated value of up to R1 million. When the suspects attempted to flee, a member of the public tried to intervene but was shot in the upper body by robbers. The trio shot the man and robbed him of his firearm. Police were investigating a case of armed robbery, business robbery and attempted murder. One retail employee who asked not to be named said she heard two shots fired. She saw consumers outside the store running frantically around, looking for cover (Tlhabye, 2016).

Case Study 14

A woman wondered why the four men were coming towards her as she was walking out of the Dischem store at Centurion Mall, were holding boxes of electronic goods half-covered by blankets. She shrugged it off.

The two men passed close to her, and she noticed that they were carrying large firearms – AK47s, she thought. Seconds later, multiple gunshots rang out. Frightened she ran into the nearby Telkom shop – which had been robbed twice in the past month. She and the other mall customers were shocked at the audacious robbery the Apple iStore. The employees at the Telkom shop were reliving their own nightmare. They knew exactly what to do. They shut the door and ordered all the customers to get onto the floor. Police said the robbers shot their way out of the mall, escaping with R1 million worth of goods (Ajam, 2014).

Based on the above case studies, the following are examples of crimes affecting safety and security of consumers at retail stores in South Africa:

- Fraud: this is evident in Case Study 1 and 6 where several financial losses were going to be felt by retail stores and consumers.
- Theft: the theft of stock (as explained below by the researcher) and also explained in Case Study 2 (where motor vehicles were stolen) and Case Study 5 (where a consumer's car was hijacked by criminals).
- Murder: as outlined in Case Study 3 (two people were shot and killed), Case Study 4 (man killed), Case Study 7 (Metro police officer shot dead), Case Study 10 (4 police officers shot dead and several criminals killed during the Jeppe massacre),
- Attempted murder: as outlined in Case Study 3 (3 people were shot and wounded), Case Study 4 (5 consumers injured during armed robbery), Case Study 11 (a six-year boy hit by stray bullet), Case Study 12 (consumers diving to avoid bullets) and Case Study 13 (consumer who tried to stop armed robbery was shot and wounded).
- Attempted armed robbery: it is evident in Case Study 4 (armed gang attempted to rob a retail store at Bosmont) and Case Study 5 (6 robbers tried to rob a security guard trolley full of cash).
- Armed robbery: this type of crime is evident in Case Study 5 (consumer robbed R90 000.00), Case Study 8 (14 mall robbery in GP), Case Study 9 (2 security guards robbed bags of money), Case Study 12 (jewellery retail store robbed), Case Study 13 (coin shop at Brooklyn mall robbed coins' medallions and money estimated at the value of R1 million), and Case Study 14 (Apple iStore robbed goods to the estimated value of R1 million).

According to ISS (2015:np), a high level of business crimes undermines investor confidence and has a negative impact on all sectors of society and this includes retail stores. Security measures differ from one retail store to another and also between the size and layout as well as the location of the retail store. The criminal element finds the retail chain industry lax in their practices by allowing consumers to visit the premises frequently (Sethusa, 2014). Some consumers just visit these retail stores to do window shopping or to see specials on some of the merchandise. The rate at which criminal

offences takes place at retail stores is currently vague or unknown. Therefore, it is vital that specific risks confronting these retail stores and consumers should be identified and analysed with the intention of recommending specific security measures. For the period of 2014/15, there were 19,170 robberies against businesses in South Africa and an overall increase of 337 per cent over the past 10 years as compared to 18, 615 armed attacks on businesses in 2013/14. This type of crime has regularly increased in the previous eight years. It is 461 per cent higher today than it was in 2004/05 (Institute of Security Studies, 2015: np).

Considering the way the above crimes are carried out, one can clearly deduce that criminals have no consideration for consumer's safety and security at retail stores because these crimes happens whilst consumers are enjoying their shopping with their loved ones.

3.8 THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE ISSUES AFFECTING RETAIL STORES IN SOUTH AFRICA

Non-compliance is defined as failure to practically follow the organisation's strategies, policies, procedures, regulations and agreements (Hendrikse & Heifer-Hendrikse, 2012: 489).

According to Govender (2015:291), management of security incidents is one of the crucial functions of an in-house or private security service provider. Furthermore, Govender (2015) defines incidents as accidental to a violation of law or company policy. Additionally, organisations from the different sectors handle security incidents in a routine manner and as result, if security service providers are not managing security incidents according to an operational framework required, it will lead to non-compliance issues, which affect retail stores in South Africa. South African literature on the nature and extent of non-compliance issues affecting retail stores, such as policy violation and non-reporting of criminal matters, is limited. Therefore, the nature and extent of non-compliance issues

affecting retail stores in South Africa are two-fold, namely: Policy violation and Non-reporting of criminal matters.

3.8.1 Policy violation

For the purpose of this study, policy violation is referred to as failure by security service providers to comply with the organisations procedures and legislative framework (such as Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority Act No 56 of 2001 (PSIRA), Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) No 51 of 1977, The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 governing the industry under which they fall. The South African security industry is regulated by Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA), and one of its main objectives is to ensure that compliance with current legislation by security service providers is being promoted and controlled through a process of lively checking and examination of the activities of security service providers. Therefore, the aforementioned objective of PSIRA simply indicates that PSIRA has a duty to combat non-compliance by security service providers and impose compliance by security service providers (PSIRA, 2001). However, retail stores in South Africa are faced with the challenge of non-compliance to Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority. For example, retail store parking areas are guarded by car guards who are non-South African citizens or who do not have permanent citizenship and are also not registered with the PSIRA as required by the act. The act states clearly that a person to be registered as a security officer must be eighteen years and older and be a South African citizen or have permanent citizenship if he or she is a non-South African (PSIRA, 2001).

Therefore, the aforementioned practical example indicates that retail stores are not compliant with PSIRA, which in turn constitutes non-compliance issues affecting retail stores. Therefore, consumers, while visiting retail stores, are compelled to entrust their vehicles with people whom the retail stores cannot regulate or do background checks on. Therefore, this non-compliance issue poses a serious threat to the safety and security of consumers whilst visiting these facilities. According to the PSIRA annual report 2015/2016, the Gauteng Province is ranked number two when compared to the other

eight provinces with 8 per cent and Northern Cape being the highest with 14 per cent with regards to the number of businesses deploying unregistered security officers and number of businesses deploying untrained security officers (PSIRA, 2015/2016:28).

At an organisational level, retail stores have security departments that ensure that safety strategies and measures are developed in order to curb crime at retail facilities. All security officers at the site should understand these policies and procedures because they need to know what they should do and how they should do it. These security policies and procedures should be reviewed regularly to see if they are still relevant, given the dynamic nature of the security environment.

3.8.2 Non-reporting of criminal matters

In South Africa, it is required by law that all criminal incidents are reported to the SAPS for criminal investigations and for statistical purposes (Govender, 2015:291). It is on that note that failure to report these criminal incidents by security service providers (whether contract or in-house security) constitute a non-compliance issue affecting retail stores in South Africa. One of the practical examples that the researcher witnessed during his tenure at the SAPS as a police officer is described below:

Table 3.2: Researcher's personal experience

<p>The researcher received a complaint of theft in one of the retail stores at the sector in which the researcher was posted for crime prevention duties. On arrival at the scene of the incident at the retail store, the researcher found that one of the loyal bulk customers bought stock for his retail business only to find that when he exited the retail store, the security officer who was at the exit (egress control point) failed to stamp the receipt/invoice of the bulk customer to confirm that the stock had been taken out. As a result, the bulk customer took the stock to his bakkie, which was parked in the parking area, and thereafter went back to the shop with the same receipt and collected the same items that he took out a second time. When he was about to exit the retail</p>

store, the security officer realised that the bulk customer already took out the stock and on investigation, the security found the same stock on the bakkie of the bulk customer and the customer couldn't produce the receipt of the stock on the bakkie. As a result, the security officer called the police in order to report the matter.

On arrival at the scene, the researcher found the security officer together with the retail store manager, who then informed the researcher (police officer at the time) that the security officer should have not called the police or reported the matter. The reason for this being that the retail store manager knows the bulk customer who is loyal to the retail store and for that reason he asked the bulk customer to return the stock to the retail store and go home.

(Researcher's personal experience)

By looking at the above practical example, one can clearly see that the retail store manager wanted nothing to do with the police or reporting the case for further investigation. All he wanted was the stock to be returned to the retail store. As a result, his action (which is failure to report crime or non-reporting of criminal matter) constitutes a non-compliance issue to the retail store procedure and legislative framework such as Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) 51 of 1977. Therefore, this leaves many questions unanswered, such as how many crime incidents are committed against the retail store are not reported to the authorities.

3.9 BEST PRACTICES USED INTERNATIONALLY AND NATIONALLY TO TREAT RISKS AT RETAIL STORES

Moritz and Kelly (2006:27) states that if retail store security managers cannot effectively manage the rising capacity of security events affecting their business safety and security, it means that one cannot secure their business. Therefore, retail stores need to develop a Security Operation Centres (SOC) which will offer a real-time observation of what is happening in the retail store in terms of safety and security. In addition, this will make a hands-on approach to security reality through automatic alerts, comprehensive reports

and remediation. Furthermore, the SOC manages and monitors all aspects of retail store security in real-time, from a single, centralised location and it will further discover and prioritise what is happening in the retail store, determines the level of risk as well as the assets that are affected (Moritz & Kelly, 2006:28).

According to Moritz and Kelly (2006:29), both internationally and nationally retail stores have their own specific security requirements that they need to put in place in order to meet business operations requirements, therefore retail stores apply the following best practices to treat risks, namely:

Reducing risk and downtime: An important requirement for retail stores is to ensure that they keep their network running at an acceptable risk level with no downtime period in order to ensure that any loss occurring event that is likely to affect the retail store, is noted and dealt with effectively.

Treat, control and prevention: Retail stores treat risks by ensuring that threats are always prevented or controlled by putting in place the necessary control measures, such as conducting a routine check on the security control measures to ensure its functionality and by reporting any defects before damage is done to the retail store.

Easing administrative overhead: Retail stores receive millions of alerts created by different systems such as alarms, access control, CCTV etc., therefore retail stores are challenged to source staff with the relevant skill sets to monitor these systems and as a result, for retail stores to treat risks related to these systems, they have to empower a number of administrators with the best expertise to enable swift responses to any threat that may arise at any given time.

People and responsibilities: Retail stores share trust and administrative control across the business units and partner organisations in relation to crime risks. Additionally, retail stores treat risk by leveraging the organisation's security policies and outlining duties as well as stating who is answerable for particular tasks and allocating accountability for response and the control of business unit.

Escalation path: Retail stores treat risk by clearly communicating the how and when to escalate an event. Audit and compliance support is one of the critical business needs that help retail stores in complying with the corporate governance, industry regulations such as PSIRA, The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and government policies when dealing with risk treatment.

Incidents response recovery: Retail stores further treat risk by being continuously prepared to respond as efficiently as possible in order to minimise the loss and determine the root causes of the risk.

Meet technical operations requirements: Retail stores must focus on the fundamental technical components and purposes needed to deliver on the treatment of risk.

Device and system coverage: Retail stores treat risk by having a continuous connection in terms of network coverage in order to avoid dangerous blind spots in the network.

24 hours uptime: By having high-availability support needed to meet the always-on requirement that is provided by security information management tools.

According to Berg (2010), risk is not a new phenomenon and one of the international standards that are used to treat risks is ISO 31 000. The reason that Berg (2010) gives is that this standard is has the following important aspects, namely terminology; standards for requirements; guidelines; technical specifications; and safety and security for systems.

Apart from ordinary risks that have faced businesses, Berg (2010) goes further to highlight the new international challenge facing businesses being integrated risk management. According to Berg (2010), integrated risk management is defined as “a continuous, proactive and systematic process to understand, manage and communicate risk from an organisation’s perspective” that needs regular assessment.

3.10 CONCLUSION

Despite available theories and business models around business security, the literature review highlighted that minimal attention is given to retail stores' security aspect. Based on the intensive search and survey of key literature on the topic, it was found that there is less published information, scientific journals and books than unpublished data, particularly in newspapers. The review explicitly established how environmental design and a risk management model is interconnected to provide security to retail stores. The state of knowledge of retail stores security continues to be a concern and "remains an open question" within business communities. The researcher integrated different sources of information.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION AND DEDUCTIONS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with data analysis, interpretation and deductions and the researcher discusses how the data was collected in this chapter. The researcher collected data through semi-structured interviews, observations and a literature review. Data was scrutinised and interpreted to come up with conclusions.

The primary data collected for this study was from twenty (20) consumers and ten (10) security officers who work in different retail stores in Gauteng Province in South Africa. The researcher used a semi-structured interviews schedule with fifteen open-ended and closed questions to attain information on the safety and security of consumers at retail stores. Interviews were recorded and written down to enable effective coding and examination of the collected data. The researcher further conducted observation in four (4) retail stores in Gauteng Province. For the purpose of interpretation and reaching a conclusion, the researcher analysed the information from interviews, observations and the literature review. The researcher explained differences and similarities that were identified. This process was incorporated in the data analysis stage.

4.2 DATA ANALYSIS AND ADMINISTRATION

The researcher collected information for this research project by means of semi-structured interviews conducted with twenty (20) consumers who visit the retail stores on a daily basis for the purpose of buying commodities for their household usage. Furthermore, the researcher collected data from ten (10) security personnel who deals with the safety and security of consumers whilst at retail stores through semi-structured interviews. The researcher recorded interviews by making use of a tape recorder.

The researcher transcribed data on daily basis after the interviews were conducted while the memory of the researcher was still fresh. Adding to that, the researcher further recorded the interviews in a field notebook in case the recording system did not work due to unforeseen circumstances such as the recording machine's battery going flat without the researcher noticing. In addition, the researcher further conducted observations as per the observation checklist at four (4) identified retail stores by visiting these retail stores. The researchers' visits to the four identified retail stores assisted the researcher to confirm what the participants said during the interviews. Additionally, the researcher analysed and interpreted the collected data in order to come up with conclusions. The researcher then presented the analysed data from the interviews by means of a pie chart diagram, followed by interpretations and deductions. Consequently, data from the observations were analysed and discussed with interpretations and deductions.

4.3 SECTION A: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION


This section covers the results of analysis of the biographical information.

4.3.1 Participants

Twenty (20) consumers and ten (10) security officers participated in this study.

4.3.1.1 *Gender of participants (see Annexure "A" Question 1)*

Steffensmeier and Allan (1996,15) describe gender as socially created activities, attributes, roles and behaviours. Furthermore, the following words, namely female, feminine, male and masculine, means gender. Diagram 4.1 outlines the gender of participants who participated in this study.




Pie chart diagram 4.1: Gender of participants

In Diagram 4.1, it is evident that 53 percent (n=16) of the 30 participants who contributed in the study were females. Of the 30 participants, 47 percent (n=14) were males. Therefore, the question around the gender of participants was intended to determine representation of gender amongst the participants in the study. As a result, female participants were overrepresented whilst male participants were under-represented because most consumers who do the shopping are females as compared to the male consumers. The other reason may be that women are mainly concerned with the wellbeing of their households as they have to buy food for the family or clothes for the children.

In this study, the researcher established that most of the consumers found in retail stores were females of the middle-aged group. The reason for this being that males hate to do shopping whilst female like or love it (Geldenhuys, 2015:10).

4.3.1.2 Age of participants (see Annexure “A” Question 2)

The ages of the participants matter in research. Diagram 4.2 deals with the ages of the participants:




Pie chart diagram 4.2: Age of participants

The participants' age group were categorised into eight (8) groups between 18-53 years or more. Therefore, from Diagram 4.2 it is clear that there were no participants from the age group 18-22 years and 53+. The age groups 23-27 and 28-32 years were represented by 7 percent (n=2) each of the 30 participants. The age group 33-37 years were represented by 27 percent (n=8) of the 30 participants. In addition, the majority of participants who participated in this study were in the age group of 38-42 years who were represented by 36 percent (n=11) of the 30 participants. The age group 43-47 years were represented by 20 percent (n=6) of the 30 participants. The age group 48-52 years were represented by 3 percent (n=1) of the 30 participants.

4.3.1.3 Marital status of participants (see Annexure “A” Question 3)

The researcher also sought to know the marital status of all participants as reflected in Diagram 4.3:




Pie chart diagram 4.3: Marital status of participants

According to Diagram 4.3, the participants' marital status could be divided into five categories. Furthermore, the table showed that 45 percent (n=9) of the 20 participants, the majority of the participants in the study, were single in terms of their marital status. The table further depicted that 30 percent (n=6) of the 20 participants were married. Ten percent (10%) (n=2) of the 20 participants were either divorced or never married. Whilst 5 percent (n=1) of the 20 participants in the study were widowed. Hence, the marital status of ten (10) of the participants of study population (which is 30) is unknown.

4.3.1.4 Educational qualification of participants (see Annexure “A” Question 3)

There is a reciprocal relationship between illiteracy levels and academic achievements as indicated in the field of human and behavioural sciences studies. Moolman and Kgosimore (1998:38) state that low levels of education influence an individual's bias to act instinctively. Therefore, it is clear that educational qualifications can have influence on how participants contribute to the study. Educational qualifications of the participants are explained in Diagram 4.4:



Pie chart diagram 4.4: Educational qualifications of participants


The participant's educational qualifications as depicted in Diagram 4.4 were divided into six (6) categories. It is clear from Diagram 4.4 that the majority of participants, 37 percent (n=11), have a 3-year diploma, with at least 3 percent (n=1) of them having other qualifications. The diagram further indicates that 23 percent (n=7) of the 30 participants who participated in the study have degree qualifications, whilst 10 percent (n=3) of the 30 participants have advanced diplomas and certificates. Participants with only Grade 12 encompasses 17 percent (n=5) of the 30 participants in the study.

It is therefore likely that the majority of the participants understand the aspects affecting the safety and security of consumers at retail stores as well as the risk confronting them whilst at retail stores. As a result, these participants may provide recommendations that may be put in place by retail stores to address the security risk factors that is affecting them when visiting these retail stores.

4.4 SECTION B: SECURITY MEASURES

4.4.1 Are you familiar with security measures in the retail store? (See Annexure “A” Question 5).

In establishing if the participants were familiar with the security measures at retail stores, the above question was asked. Diagram 4.5 consists of responses:



Pie chart diagram 4.5: Extent to which participants are familiar with security measures in the retail stores (N=30)


Retail stores implement a range of security measures in order to ensure the safety and security of their consumers, personnel and commodities. Therefore, some of these

security measures are evident to the consumers, whilst some of them are covert (Lutchminarain, 2015:47).

The purpose of this question was to establish whether the participants in this study were acquainted with the security measures that are currently in place in the retail stores. From Diagram 4.5, it is evident that 90 percent (n=27) of the 30 participants in this study indicated that they are familiar with the security measures in the retail store whilst 10 percent (n=3) of the 30 participants indicated that they are not familiar with the security measures applicable at retail stores.

4.4.2 If yes, what are the security measures that are in place to protect the retail store? [You may tick more than one option] (See Annexure “A” Question 6).

In an attempt to find out what security measures participants knew of, the above question was asked. Diagram 4.6 consists of responses:




Pie chart diagram 4.6: Types of Security measures in place to protect retail stores (N=139)

In this question, the participants were asked to tick more than one option in terms of security measures that are available at retail stores. From Diagram 4.6, it is evident that the question on security measures that are in place in the retail stores were divided into fourteen (14) categories. Diagram 4.6 further depicts that 17 percent (n=23) of the participants in this study indicated that unarmed security officers are the most prevalent security measures applicable at retail stores for the safety and security of consumers. It is followed by 16 percent (n=22) of the participants who indicated that alarm systems are in place at retail stores to ensure protection. Of the participants, 15 percent (n=21) indicated that CCTV cameras exist at retail stores for the safety and security of either consumers or the retail stores itself. Armed security officers were indicated by 9 percent (n=13) of the 30 participants, followed by 9 percent (n=12) of the 30 participants who indicated the presence of perimeter fence at retail stores. Furthermore, 8 percent (n=11) of the 30 participants indicated that boom gates are present at retail stores. Of the 30 participants, 7 percent (n=10) indicated that security lights are in place at retail stores. Of the participants, 6 percent (n=8) indicated that razor wire exists at retail stores, as well as one of the security measures. In addition, 5 percent (n=7) of the 30 participants indicated that retail stores have security procedures as one of their security measures for the protection of retail stores, and 4 per cent (n=) of the 30 participants indicated that retail stores have metal detectors in place as their security measures. Of the 30 participants, 2 percent (n=3) indicated that a biometric system is in place as one of the retail stores' security measures. Lastly, 1 percent (n=2) of the 30 participants indicated that x-ray machines are available at retail stores as one of the security measures and 1 percent (n=1) of the 30 participants indicated that a perimeter wall is one of the security measures applied by retail stores for their protection.

4.4.3 Are these security measures adequate? (See Annexure "A" Question 7)

In establishing the adequacy of the security measures at retail stores, the above questions were asked and Diagram 4.7 details the responses:




Pie chart diagram 4.7: Is Security measures in place adequate (N=30)

As evident in Diagram 4.6, the study indicated that 63 per cent (n=19) of the 30 participants (which represents the majority) found the existing security measures at the retail stores to be adequate, whilst 37 percent (n=11) of the 30 participants found the security measures at the retail stores to be inadequate.

**4.4.4 Are these security measures effective for the protection of the retail store?
(See Annexure “A” Question 8)**

Appropriate and effective security measures make consumers feel safe at retail stores, yet unobstructed to go into a retail stores to do their errands safely. Therefore, this needs a stability amongst noticeable security measures and consumers trusting that they are safe (Lutchminarain, 2015:47).

Therefore, in establishing the effectiveness of the security measures at retail stores, the above question was asked and Diagram 4.8 details the responses:




Pie chart diagram 4.8: Effectiveness of security measures for the protection of the retail stores (N=29)

It is clear from Diagram 4.7 that the study showed that 52 percent (n=15) of the 29 participants (which represents a majority) found the existing security measures in the retail stores to be effective, whilst 48 percent (n=14) of the 29 participants found the security measures in the retail stores to be ineffective. It should be noted that one of the participants did not answer this particular question. The reason why 52 percent (n=15) of the participants indicated that the security measures are effective is because they have not experienced or witnessed crime whilst visiting a retail store, whilst 48 percent (n=14) of the participants indicated that the security measures are inadequate because they have witnessed and experienced crime during their visit to a retail stores. For example, one of the participants indicated that he left his vehicle in the parking area locked but he came back only to find that his vehicle has been broken into and that his personal belongings were missing.

4.4.5 On a scale of 1 to 10 how do you rate the effectiveness of these security measures? [With one being very poor and 10 being excellent] (See Annexure “A” Question 9)

In establishing how effective the security measures at retail stores are, the researcher asked participants to rate the security measures as per the question above. Diagram 4.9 details the responses:



Pie chart diagram 4.9: Rating the effectiveness of security measures (N=30)

In terms of rating the effectiveness of security measures, there were 30 valid answers. According to Diagram 4.8, 30 percent (n=9), which represents the majority of the participants, rated the security measures at the scale of 7. In addition, 23 percent (n=7) of the participants rated the security measures at the scale of 4, 13 percent (n=4) of the participants rated the security measures at the scale of six, 10 percent (n=3) of the participants rated the security measures at the scale of five, 7 percent (n=2) of the participants rated the security measures at the scale of 3, 8 and 10. Finally, 3 percent (n=1) of the participants rated the security measures at the scale of one. As a result, only 48 percent (n=14) of the total participants indicated the security measures to be effective.

4.4.6 Did you ever experience any incident or witness any incident in the retail stores? (See Annexure “A” Question 10)

In uncovering the experience of respondents in terms of incidents at retail stores, the above question was asked and Diagram 4.10 details the responses:



Pie chart diagram 4.10: Experience of any incident or witnessing any incident in the retail stores (N=30)

It is evident from Diagram 4.8 that the majority, which is 57 percent (n=17) of the 30 participants indicated that they have not yet experienced or witness any incident of crime whilst visiting the retail stores. In addition, the study also indicated that 43 percent (n=13) of the 30 participants have experienced and witnessed incidents of crime during their visits to the retail stores. The reason why the “No” percentage is at 57 percent (n=17) is that some of the participants indicated no because they do not want to talk about what had happened to them in the past as it will bring bad memories to them which in turn will affect their choice of whether to continue with the interview or not.

4.4.7 If yes, give a brief explanation of the incident?

(See Annexure “A” Question 11).

The researcher sought to give respondents an opportunity to explain their experiences by asking the above question. The following are responses¹:

Of the 30 participants, or 43 percent (n=13), who answered “Yes” on question 4.4.6 following incidents that they have witnessed and experienced during their visits to the retail stores:

- Participant 1: “I witnessed theft of motor vehicle, theft-out-of-motor vehicle and a private person (not employee of the retail stores) printing retail vouchers in the parking area. I experienced fraud (his RCS card was cloned)”.
- Participant 2: “I witnessed a black guy driving 325i BMW with four passengers wearing leather jackets. These guys went into the retail store and held cashiers at gunpoint and took the money, as they were driving away, they short an unarmed guard who was on the vicinity area”.
- Participant 3: “I witnessed common robbery where a black guy grabbed a lady’s handy and run away with it”.
- Participant 4: “An old white man found his vehicle missing in the parking area after doing his shopping”.
- Participant 5: “Criminals using car-jamming device jammed his car”.
- Participant 6: “I witnessed armed robbery in progress”.
- Participant 7: “I was robbed my cell phones at knifepoint in the bathroom area by two black males”.
- Participant 8: “I witnessed pickpocket and bag snatching by criminals to the consumers while I was on duty. I saw the criminals through CCTV cameras as I was on duty”.

¹ In the interest of authenticity, all responses are quoted verbatim and no significant changes were made to grammar or language.


- Participant 9: “I saw a white woman (consumer) being robbed off her personal belongings at gunpoint in the parking area as she was putting her goods in her vehicle”.
- Participant 10: “My vehicle was bumped and the passenger front door lock was damaged to show that someone was trying to force it open”.
- Participant 11: “I saw one of the consumer being robbed money at the till point by two black males. I saw consumers fighting for commodities during one of the black-Friday”.
- Participant 12: “My friend’s vehicle was broken-into whilst they were in the retail store doing shopping”.
- Participant 13: “My friend left her handbag and a laptop in the boot of her car. When she came back from the store, her handbag and the laptop were missing but the car’s boot was not broken”.

When looking at the above explanations of incidents experienced and witnessed by participants during their visits to retail stores, it is evident that different types of security risk factors (violent crimes and non-violent crimes) confront consumers whilst visiting retail stores. As a result, consumers’ safety and security remains a challenge because they do not know where and when the criminals will attack.

4.5 SECTION C: SECURITY RISKS CONFRONTING A RETAIL STORES

4.5.1 What security risks do you think confront retail stores in this area? (See Annexure “A” Question 12)

In establishing what security risks are confronting the retail stores, the above question was asked, and Diagram 4.11 below details the responses:



Pie chart diagram 4.11: Types of security risks confronting retail stores (N=98)

In terms of the types of security risks confronting retail stores, there were 98 valid answers. According to Diagram 4.9, the study showed that common robbery seems to be rife at retail stores as it is at 23 percent (n=22) as indicated by majority of the participants. Theft was found to be the second risk confronting retail stores at 21 percent (n=20). In addition, armed robbery and fraud is indicated at 12 percent (n=12) each as shown by Diagram 4.9. The study further indicated that assault is also one of the risks confronting retail stores at 11 percent (n=11). Burglary was found to be at 7 percent (n=7) in confronting retail stores. Furthermore, espionage was found to be at 6 percent (n=6) as indicated by Diagram 4.9. The study further showed that natural disaster is at 5 percent (n=5) at confronting retail stores in terms of risks. Lastly, arson was found to be the lowest at 3 percent (n=3) in confronting retail stores' security and stability.

**4.5.2 Do you feel safe and secure when visiting the retail store?
(See Annexure “A” Question 13).**

In establishing how the respondents felt about their safety and security at retail stores, the above question was asked.

In terms of how consumers feel when visiting retail stores in terms of safety, the study showed that the 44 percent of the 30 participants indicated that they don't feel safe when visiting retail stores and cited a number of reasons, which are outlined below:

- Participant 1: said that, "Everywhere people are not safe".
- Participant 2: said that, "I don't feel safe because criminals can attack you at any time".
- Participant 3: said that, "Because you have to be cautious".
- Participant 4: said that, "Due to high crime rate in our store where we shop cars are being broken into, others stolen and burglaries occurring on our stores makes us feel unsafe".
- Participant 5: said that, "Due to high crime rate in the country, car guards who guard my vehicle can call their friends to come and take my vehicle. No positive identification card from car guards".
- Participant 6: said that, "There is a high rate of stolen cars or breaking in the cars".
- Participant 7: said that, "Because I can be mugged at any time or my car can be hijacked or broken –into".
- Participant 8: said that, "I do not feel safe because criminals are terrorising the community during broad day light, so you will never know what might happen to you".
- Participant 9: said that, "Because you can be robbed at any time, you can also be assaulted by pic-pocketers".
- Participant 10: said that, "I do not feel safe because you can be attacked or mugged at any time".
- Participant 11, 12 and 13: only indicated that they are not safe, and no further reasons were given in support of their answer.

The study showed that 33 percent of the 30 participants indicated that they felt safe when visiting retail stores because:

- Participant 14: "I have not yet experienced any criminal act".
- Participant 15: "I need to be careful and alert whenever one goes. People steal even children".
- Participant 16: "Ever since I witnessed the car jammed incident, I always double check if the car is locked".

- Participant 17: “if you do not carry money and use a debit card to pay”.
- Participant 18: “When coming to security is more than safe, because there is a well-trained security inside and outside the retail store. SAPS visit more often”.
- Participant 19: “I have not yet experienced security risks”.
- Participant 20: “Security personnel are visible at retail store”.
- Participant 21: “As I never experienced any story of robbery or any related crime in the retail store”.
- Participant 22 and 23: did not provide a supporting statement for their choice.

The study showed that the 20 percent of the 30 participants indicated that they are in-between (meaning that they are they are not sure whether they are safe or not) safe and not safe when visiting retail stores and cited a number or reasons, which are outlined below:

- Participant 24, 25, 26 and 27: indicated that they feel safe “But not all the time” and Participant 28: indicated that “I only feel safe partially”.
- Participant 29: said, “I feel safe only while inside but when I come out of the store there is a lot of criminals rooming around. So, it is not easy to see who is about to attack you in the parking area”.

Finally, the study showed that 3.3 percent of the 30 participants, which is participant number 30, did not answer this question (4.5.2).

Therefore, when looking at how participants answered this question, one can clearly see the mixed feelings with regard to how consumers feel when visiting retail stores. The study revealed that the majority, which is 44 percent (n=13) of the participants, indicated that they do not feel safe while 33 percent (n=10) of the 30 participants indicated that they feel safe.

In addition, 20 percent (n=6) of the 30 participants indicated they are in-between feeling safe and not feeling safe when visiting retail stores.

Contrary to the majority and in support of the 33 percent of the participants who indicated that they do not feel safe at retail stores, Hosken (2006) state that one of the consumers said that she did not feel safe when shopping at retail stores, especially during the festive season, because you never know if you are going to make it home alive.

4.6 SECTION D: IMPROVEMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES AT RETAIL STORES

4.6.1 What is it that you think can be done to improve security measures at retail store? (See Annexure “A” Question 14).

The researcher asked this question in order to determine what participants think needs to be done in order to improve the retail stores’ security measures. Participants indicated that retail stores need to do the following:

- Participant 1: said that, “Security officers must be in full uniform and visible. Security officers need to be posted at ATM machines at all times”.
- Participant 2: said that, “Retail stores must hire more security guards”.
- Participant 3: - said that, “more security officers to be posted on the site especially in the parking area”.
- Participant 4: said that, “Retail stores must employ people with relevant security qualifications and contracting reputable security service providers. Retail stores must do background checks on security officers before they can be employed”.
- Participant 5: said that, “Retail stores must increase the number of armed security officers. Increase number of security officers working in the control room and make available safe for consumers to book in their firearms”.
- Participant 6: said that, “Police visibility and security visibility must be high during shopping hours”.
- Participant 7: said that, “Cameras must be installed everywhere. Consumers must not be told to go and open case before security officer can view CCTV if consumers have lost their goods inside the store”.
- Participant 8 and 9: said that, “Retail stores must install cameras”.
- Participant 10, 11 and 12: said that, “retail stores must ensure that security guards are identifiable at all times”.

- Participant 13, 14 and 15: said that, “Retail store to put in place extra visible security measures such as CCTV, security officers”.
- Participant 16: said that, “Retail store must install cameras outside the store”.
- Participants 17: said that, “Security officers to be visible at the parking area”.
- Participants 18: said that, “Police visibility during shopping hours. Erection of razor wire on the perimeter of the premises. Increase of registered security personnel around parking area and adding more security cameras in the parking area. Store manager needs to conduct crime awareness during weekend and school holidays on consumers”.
- Participant 19: said that retail stores must put “Razor wire, beams, clocking point for security officers on patrol, constant radio test, and vehicle barrier such as spikes at the access point, more cameras to be installed outside the store and vehicle humps”
- Participant 20: said that retail stores must ensure “Police and private security availability, entrance point to be manned by security officers in order to control vehicle access by checking vehicle ignition and keys when exiting”.
- Participant 21 and 22: said that retail stores must ensure that there are “Security officers patrolling the premises without wearing uniform (undercover security) in order for people not to recognise them”.
- Participant 23: said that retail stores need to “More training for new technology and other new systems”.
- Participant 24: said that retail stores must ensure “Security officers are visible inside the store rather than standing at the exit control point”.
- Participant 25: said that the retail store must ensure “Security officers’ visibility are increased at all times and the parking area must be patrolled by uniformed security guard”.
- Participant 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30: indicated that there is nothing that they think retail stores can do to improve security measures.

Looking at the above suggestions by participants to the retail stores in terms of improving the security measures, it is evident that consumers’ safety and security whilst at the retail store remains a challenge. It should therefore be noted that retail stores’ security

measures need to be assessed regularly by risk compliance managers by getting the views of consumers in terms of security matters when visiting these retail stores. This exercise will give direction to the risk compliance managers as to implementing the correct security measures in order to continuously improve the state of safety and security at retail stores.

4.7 SECTION E: GENERAL (See Annexure “A” Question 15)

The study indicated that the majority, which is 57 percent (n=17) of the participants, answered this question and 43 percent (n=13) of the 30 participants did not answer this question. Therefore, in terms of anything that participants wanted to add to assist further with this study, 57 percent (n=17) of the participants added the following:

- Car guards at the parking area must not be used to replace physical security officers.
- Risk compliance managers (loss control managers) must take consumers seriously when they are reporting crime/incidents.
- Parking security must be priority, the reason for this being that consumers are experiencing criminal brutality in this area. Parking areas at retail stores must be equipped with anti-car jamming devices in order to prevent vehicle theft and theft of personal belongings by criminals.
- Perimeter fence of retail stores to be patrolled by armed security officers.
- More security officers to be employed as well as more cameras to be placed all over the retail stores, especially in the parking areas in order to ensure safety and security of consumers.
- CCTV camera screens must be visible to consumers in order to ensure that criminals see that they are being watched.

By looking at the above additional information as provided by the participants, one can clearly conclude and realize that there is a strong need for retail stores to create a platform for communication between consumers and the retail stores in order to address some of the consumers' concerns, ensure the safety and security of consumers when visiting these retail stores as well as reinforcing their choice of revisiting the retail store or not.

4.8 OBSERVATION (See Annexure “B”)

The researcher conducted observations (See Annexure B) at four retail stores from the 20th to 23rd of February 2017. The researcher visited the stores on the said dates during shopping hours in order observe security measures that are currently applied by retail stores for the safety and security of consumers as well as the retail stores. The researcher’s observation checklist was divided into five categories to observe, namely: security personnel, physical and technological aids (CCTV cameras, perimeter security fencing, security lighting and access control). The researcher observed that all four retail stores have security measures in place for the safety and security of consumers. Nevertheless, the researcher discovered that there is no uniformity in terms of security measures. The researcher also found that security measures differ from one retail store to another due the size, layout and the location of the retail store.

Security measures that are applied most frequently for the safety and security of consumers are security officers, CCTV cameras, fence, security lighting and gates.

Additionally, during the observations that the researcher conducted on the 20th to 23rd of February 2016, it was found that the following security measures were present at the retail stores:

- **Security officers** – there were a number of security officers (posted in various areas of the retail stores such as egress control point, receiving and dispatch, inside the retail store etc.) and car guards (only responsible for the parking area) were available at all retail stores. Security officers and car guards were not armed but were equipped with two-way radios and they were also uniformed.
- **CCTV cameras** – at all these retail stores, cameras were placed on common positions such as the front, back and side elevation of the retail stores as well as at the tills, fridges and egress control point. The cameras are not the same. The types of cameras in place are dome cameras, known as PTZ (Pan Tilt and Zoom), and static cameras (such as bullet cameras).

- **Fence** – all retail stores' perimeter was surrounded by palisade fence and only one retail store (retail store B) used both palisade and a clear view fence. It was not clear as to why retail stores were using different types of fences as opposed to a specific fence as a standard. The condition of the palisades was good and firmly planted upright.
- **Security lighting** – there was security lighting at the retail stores. The challenge was to confirm whether they are adequate or not, because the researcher conducted the observation during shopping hours as he never had permission to visit the retail stores during the night. The lights are not protected against damage. The researcher was unable to establish what types of security lighting are in place.
- **Gates** – the number of gates available at the retail stores differ from one retail store to another based on the size, layout and the location of the retail store. Some retail stores have one to four gates but only one or two are in operation. These gates are not manned by security officers, only at retail store C the gate was manned by one security officer who was unarmed. As result, there is no security officer to check the key on the consumer's vehicle when they leave the premises. Consumer's vehicle egress control points are not fitted with barriers such as bollards, rising wedges, cable beams or any related barriers.

From the observations made, it was difficult for the researcher to determine whether some of the security measures were in place or not, such as security policies and procedures and to which extent they were effective in the protection of consumers and the retail stores. However, Case Study 1, 2 and 3 could prove that there were some shortfalls in these policies and procedures.

4.9 CONCLUSION

The study's objectives were to assess the effectiveness of existing security measures at retail stores, to identify the different types of security risks confronting retail stores and to identify security measures for the protection of retail stores. The researcher used a qualitative methodology to conduct a literature review, observation and one-on-one

interviews with 30 participants (that is 20 consumers and 10 security officers). Consumers and security officers were from the four selected retail stores in Gauteng Province. The participants were from both genders (male and female). After the collection of data was concluded, the researcher examined the collected information. Information from the observation checklist, semi-structured interviews were examined, construed and conclusions were made in terms of the study's objectives. The study's outcomes helped the researcher to arrive at conclusions that will be debated in the following chapter by way of findings and recommendations.

CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the research findings and recommendations. The findings emanate from the analysed data that the researcher collected for the study. Based on the findings, recommendations were formulated. The purpose of this study was to assess the existing security measures at retail stores in the Gauteng Province and to establish the appropriate security measures where necessary in order to adequately protect retail stores. Data collection in this study was done by way of a literature review, one-on-one interviews and observations. The data was then analysed and interpreted in Chapter 4 in order to arrive at the findings and recommendations as presented in this chapter.

5.2 RESEARCH OVERVIEW

The researcher experienced the greatest limitation when the researcher was denied permission to conduct research in four of the retail stores that the researcher identified as the case study for this study. In addition, the SAPS denied the researcher permission to conduct docket analysis. As a result, the researcher had to pursue the route of interviewing consumers and off-duty security officials. Thirty (30) one-on-one interviews were conducted with consumers and security officials from four identified retail stores in Gauteng Province. The researcher also conducted observations of security measures in all identified retail stores. The researcher visited the stores like any other consumer who does not need permission to visit the stores. Furthermore, the researcher observed the security measures as the researcher drove into the perimeter of the stores by observing in the parking areas as well as inside the stores. The data was then qualitatively analysed and interpreted by the researcher.

By interviewing consumers and security officers, the aim of this study was to conduct an assessment of the existing security measures at retail stores in the Gauteng Province so

that security measures may be improved in order to ensure the safety and security of consumers when visiting retail stores. The results of this study resulted in the recommendations made for the retail stores security departments. The study rationale, research problem, research questions, aim and research objectives were evaluated with the understanding of putting together findings and recommendations.

5.3 FINDINGS RELATED TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following are the findings from the data that was collected through one-on-one interviews that were conducted by the researcher. Section A deals with the biographical data of the participants and Section B deals with security measures and security risks at retail stores.

In this study, there were 30 participants. In terms of gender, 14 were males and 16 were females. It was further recognised that the majority of the participants were between the age group of 38 and 42 years. Additionally, the study indicated that the majority of the participants were single in terms of their marital status. In relation to the participants' highest qualifications attained, the study indicated that the majority of the participants have diploma qualifications.

5.3.1 Findings of research question 1

In order to establish the security measures at retail stores, the following research question was asked:

Research question 1: What security measures are currently implemented at retail stores in the Gauteng Province?

In response to the question, it was found that participants ranked the following security measures in order of their popularity as indicated in the table below:

Table 5.1 Security measures at retail stores

SECURITY MEASURE	RANK
Alarm systems	1
Armed security	2
Biometric security	3
Boom gates	4
CCTV surveillance system	5
Metal detector	6
Perimeter fence	7
Perimeter wall	8
Razor wire	9
Security lighting	10
Security procedures	11
Security policy	12
Unarmed security officers	13
X-ray machines	14

- **Alarm systems:** The reason why the majority of the participants ranked alarm system number one may be connected to the fact that alarm systems come in different forms: mobile panic buttons, fixed buttons or movement detection (sensors), among others. In other words, alarm systems may achieve their objective in different ways and this makes the system itself to be very effective in protecting the retail stores.
- **Armed security:** Armed security was ranked number two. These trained security officers are competent to operate with a firearm. In most cases, they also carry the firearms that they were trained for. For a security officer to be allowed to carry a firearm at retail store it depends on the level of risk in the area. Risks will always be different from one place to the other.
- **Biometric security:** Biometric security was ranked number three. The reason why it was popular may be that, like alarm systems above, it has many ways of achieving its objectives. Biometric security is mainly in the form of human characteristics: iris

scanner, retina scanner, fingerprint, voice and facial. This type of security measure is preferred by people because of its uniqueness in terms of security of personnel.

- **Boom gates:** It was not surprising to see boom gates ranked number four by the participants. Boom gates form a significant part of any security system in controlling access into and out of the retail store. The advantage of this security measure is that the boom will only open if the access ticket is obtained from the system or allow exit if the ticket was paid for and the system can verify that. In this way, it will be able to deny exit without proper channels. Motorists visiting retail stores are mainly benefitting from this security measure.
- **CCTV surveillance systems:** CCTV system was ranked number five. It was surprising because this is the most common security measure that people thought about when they were attacked at retail stores. It is a dynamic technology with many benefits. Footage can be monitored on-site or off-site, depending on the requirement of the client. It is presented in different ways as well. It can be a black and white option or colour option. The benefits are that recorded information can be stored for a certain period ranging from a week to two weeks, depending on the capacity of the system. Camera systems operate very well in a well-lit area. Recording at times differs. If set up, it can only record when movement is detected. However, the only disadvantage is that the camera cannot arrest a suspect. A human element is required to complement this security measure.
- **Metal detector:** Metal detector was ranked number six. This was not surprising because this security measure is not normally applicable to the low risk areas where the retail store is situated. It mainly serves a purpose where risks are high and security officers need to know if the clients are armed or not armed. It is ideal for security officers to know before clients enters the store so that they can prevent anticipated crime if possible.
- **Perimeter fence:** This security measure was ranked number seven. This was not surprising because it is on the outer layer of protecting the retail store. It mainly channels the movement of people into and out of the retail store. Some people do not give adequate attention to the fence of the retail store as they mainly concentrate on getting to the inside of the retail store.

- **Perimeter wall:** This security measure was ranked number eight. Like a perimeter fence, it was not surprising that it was ranked as such because it depends on the area where retailers will either opt for the perimeter fence or perimeter wall. Perimeter wall also falls under the outer layer of protection of the retail store.
- **Razor wire:** This security measure was ranked number nine. Like the two security measures previously mentioned, razor wire form part of the outer layer of protection of retail store. It is effective. At times, this security measure is coupled with the perimeter fence or perimeter wall.
- **Security lighting:** Security lighting was ranked number 10. This is again not surprising because retail stores are well lit at all times at all critical areas such as the parking area or the inside of the store.
- **Security procedures:** Security procedures were ranked number 11. This ranking was not surprising because the consumers will not normally know of this. Only security officers will have a knowledge of this. Security procedures may be viewed to be a cheap mechanism for crime prevention at retail stores.
- **Security policy:** Participants ranked security policy number 12. Like security procedure, the ranking was not surprising because consumers will not know of this, only security officers will know of this. Security policy normally informs the security procedure in terms of how to carry out crime prevention initiatives.
- **Unarmed security officers:** This security aspect was ranked number 13. The ranking was not surprising because most security officers are only seen at the exit points of retail stores themselves where they verify the till slips against the goods that are bought by the consumers. Again, it depends on the security plan of the retail store.
- **X-ray machines:** This security measure was ranked number 14. It is not mainly used at all retail stores. The level of risk in the area determine the use of this security measure at retail stores.

5.3.2 Findings of research question 2

In order to know what risks are facing retail stores the researcher asked the question below:

Research question 2: What are the different types of security risks confronting retail stores in the Gauteng Province?

In responding to the above question, it was found that participants ranked the following security risks in order of their popularity as indicated in the table below:

Table 5.2 Risks facing the retail stores

Risks facing the retail stores	RANK
Arson	1
Assault	2
Armed robbery	3
Burglary	4
Common robbery	5
Espionage	6
Fraud	7
Theft	8
Natural disaster	9

- **Arson:** This risk necessitates retailers to have insurance to cover the store and its contents, including consumers that might be affected by this risk. Should there be lack of insurance and fire erupts, the retailer goes out of business immediately, if they do not have adequate cash. Therefore, this risk was ranked number one by the participants.
- **Assault:** This risk was ranked number two. The reason why it was ranked as such may be that assault is a crime that can be committed in line with other crimes (e.g. armed robbery, common robbery, rape, or murder) at retail stores. As such, assault is committed when criminals want to send a clear warning to the victims (consumers) that if they do not comply they may experience the worst. This will be a compelling act from the criminals.
- **Armed robbery:** This risk was ranked number three. This ranking is not surprising because criminals mainly use firearms to carry out their attacks against retail stores. This is so because the criminals need to get what they want quickly, which is cash in most cases, and leave before police are called.

- **Burglary:** This risk was ranked number four. This is not surprising because when the store is not operating, e.g. at night or on holidays, criminals take advantage of that and launch their attacks against the retail store.
- **Common robbery:** This risk is ranked number five. It is not surprising because at the retail store consumers came with the intention to do shopping. This makes them vulnerable and criminals can quickly attack consumers and do away with it.
- **Espionage:** This risk was ranked number six. Retail stores are in business and competitors need to know how their counterparts are running their businesses or how they become successful.
- **Fraud:** Fraud was ranked number seven. It is not surprising because retail business uses different types of payments methods ranging from cash, electronic transfer, cheques or vouchers. These methods make retail stores and consumers vulnerable to fraud.
- **Theft:** Theft was ranked number eight. The reason why it appears as one of the risks is that some consumers may take advantage of lack of security in the retail store and conceal retail items in order to leave the store with the items. Theft also affect consumers when their personal belongings are stolen from their vehicles in the parking area.
- **Natural disaster:** This risk was ranked number nine. It was not surprising because there is no one who can guarantee acts of God, and when it could happen. For example: strong hurricanes or earthquakes.

In addition, confirming the security risks confronting retail stores as indicated above, the study revealed that the majority of security officers indicated that they witnessed the different types of crimes listed whilst at work at retail stores. A security officer indicated that he witnessed the theft of a motor vehicle, theft-out-of-motor-vehicle and a private person (not employee of the retail stores) printing retail vouchers in the parking area. Furthermore, he experienced fraud (his RCS card was cloned). The study further revealed that one of the security officers indicated that he witnessed four black males committing armed robbery at till point and proceeded to shoot an unarmed security guard who was in the vicinity they fled the scene. The findings revealed that a security officer witnessed

a consumer being robbed of her handbag by a black male who grabbed it and ran away. The findings of the study further revealed that a security officer was robbed of his cell phone at knifepoint whilst in the bathroom by two black males. Furthermore, the study revealed that a security officer witnessed pickpocketing and bag snatching by criminals while he was on duty through CCTV cameras. The study further indicated that a security officer found his vehicle bumped into and a passenger's front door lock damaged showing that someone was trying to force fully open the door. A security officer indicated that his friend's vehicle was broken into whilst they were in the retail store doing the shopping.

In addition, the findings of the study, in confirmation of the security risks confronting retail stores as outlined above, revealed that consumers witnessed the various crimes whereby one of the consumers found his vehicle missing from the parking area after doing his shopping. One consumer indicated that he witnessed criminals using a car-jamming device to jam his car in the parking area. Another consumer witnessed an armed robbery in progress. A consumer indicated that she saw a white woman being robbed of her personal belonging in the parking area as she was busy putting her goods in the vehicle. The study further revealed that a consumer witnessed another consumer being robbed of money at a till point by two black males and further witnessed consumers fighting for commodities during one of the black-Friday specials. Finally, the study revealed that one of the consumers witnessed her friend leaving her handbag and laptop in the boot of her vehicle, only to find that when she came back, the laptop and the handbag were missing.

5.3.3 Findings of research question 3

In order to uncover what should be done to improve existing security measures, the researcher asked the question below:

Research question 3: What needs to be done to improve security measures at retail stores in the Gauteng Province?

In answering the above research question, the findings of the study revealed that most of the participants managed to propose some improvement suggestions for the security

measures at retail stores. The summary of participants' suggestions in relation to what security officers and consumers think can be done to improve security measures at retail stores are as follows:

- The study revealed that the majority of security officers went on to indicate that retail stores need to employ security officers with relevant security qualifications and contracting reputable security service providers.
- Retail stores must do background checks (vetting) on security officers before they are employed.
- Erect razor wire on the perimeter of the premises, beams, a clocking point for security officers on patrol, constant radio testing, and vehicle barriers such as spikes at the access point, more cameras to be installed outside the store and vehicle humps.
- Increase registered security personnel around parking area and adding more security cameras in the parking area.
- Store manager needs to conduct crime awareness during weekends and school holidays to consumers.
- Furthermore, the findings revealed that security officers indicated that retail stores must install anti-car jamming devices at retail stores parking areas in order to prevent vehicle theft and theft of consumer's personal belongings by criminals.
- Police visibility and security visibility must be high during shopping hours.
- Security officers indicated that retail store must make use of security officers patrolling the premises without wearing uniform (undercover security) in order for criminals not to recognise them.
- More training for new technology and other new systems on the part of security officers.
- Increase security officer's visibility at all times and uniformed security guard must patrol the parking area.

Additionally, the findings of the study revealed that the majority of consumers went on to point out that retail stores need to ensure that security officers are in full uniform and visible, and security officers need to be posted at ATM machines at all times. Retail stores must employ more security officers to be posted on the site, especially in the parking

area. Furthermore, it was found that consumers indicated that retail stores must ensure that security officers are visible at the parking area. Consumers further indicated that additional cameras must be installed everywhere at the retail stores (inside and outside the store). It was found that consumers must not be told to go and open a case with the SAPS before the relevant security officer consult the CCTV system if consumers have lost their goods inside the store. In addition, it was found that consumers indicated that retail stores must ensure that security guards are identifiable at all times by wearing PSIRA nametags. It was found that retail stores need to put in place extra visible security measures such as CCTV, security officers and it was found that security officers must be visible inside the store rather than standing at the exit control point.

Therefore, in support of the improvement of security measures at retail stores Gerz (Nd) states that retail store security officers must continuously be considering new systems in order to improve their security plans. As a result, it is always challenging for retail store security to observe the security and safety of consumers from a central point, and therefore, planning is essential to understand where resources will be needed in future in order to improve service to consumers. Furthermore, retail stores security officers need to stay informed of the unpredictable environments that arise at retail stores. In addition, this will help retail store security to deal with the countless incidents that they encounter in order to ensure the safety and security of consumers.

5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the research findings the following recommendations are made:

5.4.1 Recommendations in terms of findings on research question 1:

Based on the research findings of research question 1 the following recommendations are made:

- Given that retail stores vary according to their locations and some retail stores have some security measures while some retail stores do not have. It is recommended that

the following basic standard for effective protection of people and assets be used by retail stores as outlined in the table below:

Table 5.3 Recommended security measures according to the level of risk of the area

Security measure	Low risk area where retail store is situated	Medium risk area where retail store is situated	High risk area where retail store is situated
Alarm systems	√	√	√
CCTV systems	√	√	√
Security guards	√	√	√
Armed guards		√	√
Biometric security			√
Boom gates		√	√
Security lighting	√	√	√
Metal detectors			√
Perimeter fence	√	√	√
X-ray machines			√
Undercover Security Officers			√
Security Policies	√	√	√
Security Procedures	√	√	√
Access control systems		√	√
Clock systems			√
Armed response			√
Doors	√	√	√
Windows	√	√	√
Money safe	√	√	√
Firearm safe	√	√	√

In Table 5.3, recommendations of security measures are arranged in accordance with areas of different levels of risks such as low risk areas, medium risk areas and high-risk areas:

Low risk areas

According to the findings, the following security measures may be applicable if the retail store is situated in a low risk area: alarm system, CCTV system, security guards, security lightning, perimeter fence, security policies, security procedures, doors, windows, money safe and fire arm safe.

Medium risk areas

According to the findings, the following security measures may be applicable if the retail store is situated in a medium risk area: alarm system, CCTV system, security guards, armed guards, boom gates, security lightning, perimeter fence, security policies, security procedures, access control system, doors, windows, money safe and fire arm safe.

High-risk areas

According to the findings, the following security measures may be applicable if the retail store is situated in a high risk area: alarm system, CCTV system, security guards, armed guards, biometric system, boom gates, security lightning, metal detectors, perimeter fence, x-ray machines, under cover security officers, security policies, security procedures, access control system, clock system, armed response, doors, windows, money safe and fire arm safe.

Therefore, some of the security measures may be applicable in all three-risk areas, namely low risk areas, medium risk areas and high-risk areas whereas some security measures may only be applicable in one or two risk areas. In addition, these security measures are not one size fit all. The reason for this is due to the location in which the retail store is situated, the size and the layout of the retail store. The security measures may also be influenced by the nature and the extent of security risks confronting each retail store.

These recommendations may be used to serve as a baseline of the security measures that can be used according to the level of risk in the area where retail store is situated. It is not exhaustive and cast in stone. It may change to suit the area.

When designing the security plan of the retail store, the security manager should take into consideration the different security layers e.g. outer security layer, middle security layer and inner security layer. All these are catered for in Table 5.3.

5.4.2 Recommendations in terms of findings on research question 2

Based on the findings of research question 2, the following recommendations are made:

- If consumers have to withdraw money from the ATM, they have to desist from getting assistance from strangers but rather get help from uniformed security officers in order to prevent common robbery and fraud. Furthermore, they must desist from forcing their ATM cards into the ATM slot if there are signs of a blockade on the ATM slot, because criminals might be the cause of such blockage and they may wait around to rob consumers.
- Consumers must at all times ensure that they do not leave their valuables unattended whilst enjoying their shopping and must rather put all their valuables such as handbags, laptops, cell phones, radio face etc. in the boot of their cars or underneath the car seats. The rationale behind this, is to prevent theft from motor vehicles and malicious damage to property, which is their vehicle, and to deter criminals from launching their attacks on consumers.
- Consumers should always ensure that they double check their vehicle doors by checking if they are locked before they leave the parking area.
- CCTV surveillance system: Even though there were CCTV systems in place at retail stores, it is recommended that well trained and competent control room operators monitor the system in order to detect any security breach at the right time and dispatch a roving patroller for further investigation.

5.4.3 Recommendations in terms of findings on research question 3

Based on the findings of research question 3, the following recommendations are made:

- Retail stores need to employ security officers with the relevant security training grades and qualifications.

- Retail stores need to conduct vetting on security officers as well as retail store members of staff before employment. This should be applied even at post-employment, because people may still commit crimes after being employed.
- Retail stores need to utilise the services of PSIRA registered security officers in the parking area and install more CCTV cameras.
- Retail stores should put more emphasis on the training of security officers to ensure that they train their employees on how to protect consumers and the retail store. If all security officers acquire the appropriate skills and knowledge on how to protect consumers and retail stores, the risks confronting retail stores as well as the protection of consumers will benefit.
- Security managers should regularly conduct crime awareness campaigns at every retail stores: e.g. after every incident, or quarterly if there is no incident or when they are requested to do so. This should involve the members of staff and the consumers.
- Retail stores must install anti-car jamming devices in the parking areas in order to prevent criminals from jamming consumer's vehicles in the parking areas in order to steal their personal belongings, as highlighted in findings.
- Security officers must always wear their identification cards such as PSIRA ID cards in order for consumers to be able to identify themselves.
- Car guards should be regulated by PSIRA in order to enable vetting on them as well.
- Retail stores need to ensure that there is a high police visibility as well as security visibility around the retail store premises, especially during shopping hours. This can be achieved by having a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between retail stores and the SAPS sector managers servicing the sector where the retail store is situated.
- Retail stores need to post only uniformed security officers around the ATM's at all times.
- Retail stores needs to ensure that victims (consumers) of crime have access to CCTV footage before are referred to the SAPS to open a case docket.

5.5 FURTHER RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS

The researcher recommends that further research be done on the following:

- Car-jamming devices that are currently used by criminals in the parking areas to terrorise consumers at retail stores.
- The fitness of car guards in protecting vehicles of the consumers at parking areas of retail stores, given that most of the car guards at retail stores are foreign nationals.
- Incidents of theft out of motor vehicles in parking areas at retail stores.

5.6 CONCLUSION

The study revealed that the security measures that are currently implemented by retail stores for the safety and security of consumers are effective. However, consumers continue to be confronted with different types of crime, whether violent or non-violent crimes when visiting retail stores despite their effectiveness. Therefore, consumers need to be protected by retail stores whilst visiting them. It is the accountability of every retail store to make sure that security risk control measures are functional in full for the protection of consumers in order to ensure the healthy growth and sustainability of retail stores. In this study, the researcher's findings and recommendations considered the answers of participants, observations and a literature review to ensure the reliability and validity. The discussed recommendations in this chapter may hopefully assist retail stores in improving the safety and security of consumers in order to ensure their optimum protection whilst visiting retail stores.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Ajam, K. (2014). *DA woman tells of nightmares as Pretoria iStore is robbed*. Saturday Star, 23 August. (Online) Available at: <http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/samedia/Image3/201410/13/1520145280.pdf> (Accessed on: 19 April 2017).

Australian Government (2010). *AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009: Risk Management – Principles and Guidelines*. Available at: https://www.finance.gov.au/sites/default/files/COV_216905_Risk_Management_FactSheet_FA3_23082010_0.pdf (Accessed on: 26 April 2017).

Australian Institute of Criminology (2004). *Crimes Against Business: A Review of Victimization, Predictors and Prevention*. Australian Government: Australian Institute of Criminology.

May, T. (2011). *Social research: issues, method and process*. 4th edition. Maidenhead, Berkshire: Open University Press.

Bambalele, P. (2016). *Business owner, security guard shoot down robbers, killing one*. Sowetan, 11 May. Available at: http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/samedia//2016/05/SOWET20160511/SOWET201605115_517.pdf (Accessed on: 19 April 2017).

Barker, R.L. (2003). *The social work dictionary*. 5th edition. Washington, DC: NASW Press.

Berg, H. (2010). Risk Management: Procedure, Methods and Experiences. *RT & A*, 2(17):79-95.

Blanche, M.T., Durrheim, K.D. & Painter, D. (2006). *Research in Practice*. 2nd edition. Cape Town: UCT Press.

Brakpan Herald. (2016). *Makro comments on vehicle theft*. Available at: <http://www.saps.gov.za/newsroom/selnewsdetails.php?nid=147> (Accessed on: 20 September 2016).

Breaking News. (2013). *Nairobi mall attack*. 21 September. Available at: <http://www.breakingnews.com/topic/nairobi-shopping-center-attack-sep-21-2013/> (Accessed on: 27 March 2017).

Breurs, S. (2000). *The development of an integrated model of risk*. Unpublished thesis. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

British Standards Institute Excellerator Research. (2011). *ISO 31000 Risk Management*. Available at: <http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/iso-31000-risk-management/> (Accessed on: 24 November 2016).

Burke, R.H. (2014). *An Introduction to Criminological Theory*. 4th edition. Oxon: Routledge. Available at: https://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ysNiAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=criminological+theory&ots=KlorMvyyrP&sig=7AwnSNK0q4RTIRs25tJj063nBEM&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=criminological%20theory&f=false (Accessed on: 03 February 2017).

Business Dictionary. (2014). *PnP Online Shopping. Hypermarket*. Available from: <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/hypermarket.html> (Accessed on: 17 November 2014).

Business Dictionary. (2015). *Vulnerability*. Available from: <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/vulnerability.html> (Accessed on: 24 November 2015).

Cardone, C. & Hayes, R. (2012). Shoplifters Perceptions of Store Environments: An Analysis of How Physical Cues in the Retail Interior Shape Shoplifters Behaviour. *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 7(1):22 – 58.

Champion, D.J. (2000). *Research Methods for Criminal Justice and Criminology*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Cozens, P. (2008). Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: (Pp. 153 – 171). In: R. Wortley & L. Mazerolle, (Eds). (2011). *Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis*. 2nd edition. New York: Routledge. Available at: <https://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bjKo1sjd4mIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA153&dq=crime+prevention+through+environmental+design&ots=0PNvR-D7TX&sig=VNdEB3X2gprf0hoigCN4L5eJ1XY#v=onepage&q=crime%20prevention%20through%20environmental%20design&f=false> (Accessed on: 25 April 2017).

Crime Statistics South Africa. (2015). Available at: <http://www.crimestatssa.com/province.php?ShowProvince=Gauteng> (Accessed on: 07 February 2017).

Crowe, T.D. & Zahm, D.L. (2013). *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*. (Online) Available at: http://www.popcenter.org/Responses/closing_streets/PDFs/Crowe_Zahm_1994.pdf (Accessed on: 15 September 2016).

Crouhy, M., Galai, D. & Mark, R. (2014). *The Essentials of Risk Management*. 2nd edition. United States of America: McGraw-Hill Education.

Dantzker, M.L. & Hunter, R.D. (2012). *Research Methods for Criminology and Criminal Justice*. United State of America: Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC.

Davis, R.C. (2008). Shopping Malls: Are They Prepared to Prevent and Respond to Attack? *National Institute of Justice Journal*, 259(March)14-17. (Online) Available at: <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/221503.pdf> (Accessed on: 11 March 2017).

De Lange, I. (2016). Wounded thief loses appeal. *The Citizen*, 26 May. Available at: http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/samedia//2016/05/CITIZ20160526/CITIZ201605268_44.pdf (Accessed on: 19 April 2017).

Delpont, C.S.L. & Roestenburg, W.J.H. (2011). Quantitative data-collection methods: questionnaires, checklist, structured observation and structured interview schedules (Pp.171-205). In: A.S. De Vos, H. Strydom, C.B. Fouché, & C.S.L Delpont (Eds). (2011). *Research at grass roots*. 4th edition. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

De Klerk, N. (2014). Shoot-out during heist at Gauteng mall. *News24*. 23 May. np. Available from: <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Shoot-out-during-heist-at-Gauteng-mall-20140523> (Accessed on: 30 August 2014).

Dempsey, J.S. (2008). *Introduction to private security*. Belmont: Thomas Wadsworth.

Department of Justice, South Africa. (1977). *Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977*. Available at: <http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1977-051.pdf> (Accessed on: 19 April 2017).

Department of Justice, South Africa. (1996). *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No 108 of 1996*. Available at: <http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/images/a108-96.pdf> (Accessed on: 19 April 2017).

De Vos, A.S. Strydom, H. Fouché, C.B. & Delpont, C.S.L. (Eds). (2011). *Research at grass roots*. 4th edition. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Devlin, P. (2017). *Daily Mail Australia*, 25 January. Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4154484/Two-boys-bashed-robbed-Melbourne-shopping-centre.html> (Accessed on: 26 March 2017).

Diale, L. (2013). Of card cloning and rotten service. *The New Age*, 29 July. Available at: <http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/samedia/Image3/201308/4/0820135584.pdf> (Accessed on: 15 February 2017).

Dodds, C., Dolley, C. & Makhetha, T. (2014). Mall attacks continue, despite police head's claims. *Saturday Star*, 18 October. Available at: <http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/samedia/Image3/201413/4/1520146844.pdf> (Accessed on: 15 February 2017).

Enterprise Solutions. (2009). Integration is the future. *Hi-Tech Security Solutions*, 15(8): 60-63. Available from: <http://www.securitysa.com/article.aspx?pkIarticleid=5742> (Accessed on: 01 September 2015).

Fay, J.J. 2010. *Contemporary Security Management*. United States of America: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Fennelly, L.J. (2013). *Effective physical security*. Amsterdam: Elsevier: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Fouché, C.B. & Delport, C.S.L. (2011). In-depth review of literature (Pp133-140). In: A.S. De Vos, H. Strydom, C.B. Fouché, & C.S.L Delport, (Eds). (2011). *Research at grass roots*. 4th edition. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Fouché, C.B. & Schurink, W. (2011). Qualitative research design. (Pp307-327). In: A.S. De Vos, H. Strydom, C.B. Fouché, & C.S.L Delport, (Eds). (2011). *Research at grass roots*. 4th edition. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Geldenhuis, K. (2015). Shopping Mall Robberies – a concerning reality. *Servamus*, 10 December. Available at: http://journals.co.za/docserver/fulltext/servamus/108/12/servamus_v108_n12_a5.pdf?expires=1495186242&id=id&accname=58010&checksum=8C0D84F2FA6EB756CEAB5D547D567B5D (Accessed on: 18th May 2017).

Gerz, J. (nd). *How to Improve Mall Security*. Available at: http://www.ehow.com/how_5852341_improve-mall-security.html (Accessed on: 01 August 2017).

Govender, D. (2012). *Management of security Information in the security industry*. Unpublished Thesis, Pretoria: University of South Africa.

Govender, D. (2015). The management of security incidents by private security. *African Security Review Journal*, 24(3), September: 291-306.

Greef, M. (2011). Information collection: interviewing (Pp. 341-375). In: A.S. De Vos, H. Strydom, C.B. Fouché, & C.S.L Delpont, (Eds). (2011). *Research at grass roots*. 4th edition. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Greggo, A. (2011). *Retail Security and Loss Prevention Solutions*. United States of America: Auerbach Publications.

Hagan, F.E. (2011). *Introduction to Criminology. Theories, Methods and Criminal Behaviour*. Canada: SAGE Publications, Inc.

Hancock, J. (2016). Man arrested after fatal shooting outside Melbourne shopping centre. *ABC News*, 27 September. Available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-27/man-arrested-over-campbellfield-shooting/7879558> (Accessed on: 26 March 2017).

Hendrikse, J.W. & Heifer-Hendrikse, L. (2012). *Corporate Governance Handbook: Principles and Practices*. 2nd edition. Cape Town: Juta and Company Ltd.

Hosken, G. (2006). *Shoppers unfazed by risk of mall cash heists*. Available from: <https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/shoppers-unfazed-by-risk-of-mall-cash-heists-303261> (Accessed on: 15 November 2017).

Institute of Security Studies. (2014). *Crime Hub-Institute of security studies*. Available from: www.Issafrica.org/crimehub (Accessed on: 20 November 2014).

Institute of Security Studies. (2015a). *Crime Hub-Institute of security studies*. Available from: <https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-south-africas-official-crime-statistics-for-201314/> (Accessed on: 13 November 2015).

Institute of Security Studies. (2015b). *Crime Hub-Institute of security studies*. (Online) Available at: <https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-south-africas-official-crime-statistics-for-201314/> (Accessed on: 6 April 2016).

Investopedia. (2014). *Hypermarket*. Available from: <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hypermarket.asp> (Accessed on: 25 August 2015).

Jones, P.H. (1990). *Retail Loss Control*. Great Britain: Butterworth & Co.

Kashiefa, A. (2014). iStore robbery was a nightmare. *iOL News*. 23 August. np. Available from: <http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/istore-robbery-was-a-nightmare-1.1739875> (Accessed on: 22 August 2015).

Kimieck, R.C. (1995). *Loss Prevention Guide for Retail Businesses*. United States of America: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Kole, O.J. (2010). An examination of security measures for the protection of petrol stations: an analysis of case studies in Gauteng. Unpublished Dissertation. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

Kole, O.J. (2015). Partnership Policing between the South African Police Services and Private Security Industry in reducing crime in South Africa. Unpublished Thesis. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

Kraska, P.B & Neuman, W.L. (2008). *Criminal Justice and Criminology: Research Methods*. United States of Africa: Pearson Education, Inc.

Lark, J. (2015). *A Practical Guide for SMEs*. ISO 31000 Risk Management. Switzerland: ISO copyright office. Available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_31000_for_smes.pdf (Accessed on: 24 November 2016).

Luhanga, E. & Mpana, S. (2015). Killed in the line of duty. *Daily Sun*, 30 July. Available at: http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/samedia/2015/07/DAILY20150730/DAILY201507304_009.pdf (Accessed on: 15 February 2017).

Lutchminarain, N. (2015). Safety as a priority at shopping centres in Gauteng: An assessment of existing security measures. Unpublished Dissertation. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

Mallin, C.A. (2010). *Corporate Governance*. 3rd edition. Great Britain: Oxford University Press.

Madisha, K. (2016). Child hit by stray bullet. *The New Age*, 05 December. Available at: http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/samedia/2016/12/NEWAG20161205/NEWAG201612053_14.pdf (Accessed on: 15 February 2017).

Mashego, A & SAPA. (2014). Police seek inside info. *The New Age*, 02 September. Available at: <http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/samedia/Image3/201411/13/1520145779.pdf> (Accessed on: 15 February 2017).

Mason, J. (2017). 3rd edition. *Qualitative Researching*. London: SAGE Publications.

Mbuvi, C. (2015). The Development and Growth of the Kenyan Private Security Sector: Its Role and Impact on Safety and Security. Unpublished Dissertation. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

Mistry, D., Minnaar, A., Patel, C. & Rustin, C. (2003). *Criminal Justice Research Methodology*. Pretoria: Technikon SA.

Moritz, R. & Kelly, D. (2006). Best Practices for building a security operations centre. *Information Systems Security*, 14(6), December: 27 – 32. Available at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1201/1086.1065898X/45782.14.6.20060101/91856.6> (Accessed on: 14 March 2017).

Moolman, D. & Kgosimore, C.J. (1998). Taxi violence in South Africa. *Acta Criminologica, Southern African Journal of Criminology*, 11(1):33 – 42.

Mouton, J. (1996). *Understanding Social Research*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

MyHR. (2014). Human Resources for the B.C. Public Service. Available from: http://www2.gov.bc.ca/myhr/content_hub.page?ContentID=ea3328ba-7d38-5d2c-2818-f4fd2a64db33 (Accessed on: 17 November 2014).

Ndaba, B. (2008). Jeppe massacre was like a war zone. Available at: <http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/jeppe-massacre-was-like-a-war-zone-423041> (Accessed on: 28 February 2017).

Newburn, T. (2013). *Criminology*. 2nd edition. New York: Routledge.

New South Wales Consolidated Acts. (1997). *Security industry Act 1997*. Available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/sia1997255/ (Accessed on: 26 April 2017).

Ngoepe, K. (2013). Mall robbery drama. *Pretoria News*, 14 March. Available at: <http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/samedia/Image3/201315/10/1520137832.pdf> (Accessed on: 15 February 2017).

Nkwana, M.J. (2015). Protection of Security Information within governments departments in South Africa. Unpublished Dissertation. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

Odinson, B. (2014a). *Teenage shoplifter opens fire on shoppers at South Carolina Walmart*. Available at: <http://walmartshootings.blogspot.co.za/2014/03/teenage-shoplifter-opens-fire-on.html> (Accessed on: 26 March 2017).

Odinson, B. (2014b). *Robbers fire at couple and young son at Tennessee Walmart*. Available at: <http://walmartshootings.blogspot.co.za/2014/11/robbers-fire-at-couple-and-young-son-at.html> (Accessed on: 26 March 2017).

Ortmeier, P.J. (2013). *Introduction to Security Operations and Management*. 4th edition. United State of America: Pearson Education LTD.

Overseas Security Advisory Council. (2016). *Kenya 2016 Crime & Safety Report*. Available at: <https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=15605> (Accessed on: 27 March 2017).

Pitjeng, R. (2016). Mall of Africa shooting claims two lives. *Eye Witness News*, 4 May. np. Available at: <http://ewn.co.za/2016/07/04/Mall-of-Africa-shooting-claims-2-lives> (Accessed on: 10 September 2016).

Pritchard, C.L. (2010). *Risk Management: Concepts and Guidance*. 4th edition. United States of America: ESI International.

Private Security Act. (2004). Available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/psa2004217/ (Accessed on: 15 April 2017).

Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority Act No. 56 of 2001. Available at: <http://www.psira.co.za/psira/dmdocuments/2014%20PSIRA%20ACT.pdf> (Accessed on: 23 March 2017).

Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority. (2015/2016). *Annual Report*. Available at: http://www.psira.co.za/psira/images/Documents/Publications/Annual_Reports/PSIRAAAnnualReport2015-16.pdf (Accessed on: 01 March 2017).

Purpura, P.P. (2013). *Security and Loss Prevention: An Introduction*. United States of America: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Purpura, P.P. (2013). *Security and Loss Prevention: An Introduction*. 6th edition. United States of America: Elsevier.

Purpura, P.P. (2011). *Security: An Introduction*. United States of America: CRC Press.

Queensland Government. (2012). *Queensland Health: Protocol for closed Circuit Television Systems*. 1(1), December, 1 - 7. Available at: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.353.1071&rep=rep1&type=pdf> (Accessed on: 04 February 2017).

Rantao, J. & Bailey, C. (2011). Bheki Cele's recipe for the fight against crime. *The Star*, 15th September. np. Available from: <http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/bheki-cele-s-receipe-for-the-fight-against-crime-1.1137942> (Accessed on: 03 November 2015).

Raton, B. (2003). *Asset Protection and Security Management Handbook*. United State of America: POA Publishing LLC.

Researcher's Personal Experience. (2004). Honeydew SAPS: During the researcher's tenure as police officer.

Rouse, M. (2014). *Physical Security*. Available at: <http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/physical-security> (Accessed on: 17 November 2014).

SAPS. (2014). *SAPS cybercrime team nets cyber criminals*. Available at: <http://www.saps.gov.za/newsroom/selnewsdetails.php?nid=147> (Accessed on: 20 September 2016).

Sarantakos, S. (2002). *Social Research*. 2nd edition. New York: Palgrave Publishers.

Schmallegger, F. (1996). *Criminology Today*. United State of America: Prentice-Hall Inc.

Schoeman, J.H. (2011). *Applied Security Risk Management: Only Study Guide for SEP3701*. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

Schurink, W., Fouché, C.B. & De Vos, A.S. (2011). Qualitative data analysis and interpretation (Pp. 397-423). In: A.S. De Vos, H. Strydom, C.B. Fouché, & C.S.L. Delpont, (Eds). (2011). *Research at grass roots*. 4th edition. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Security Industry Australian Standards. (2011). Available at: <http://www.sure.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Security-Industry-Australian-Standards.pdf> (Accessed on: 14 March 2017).

Security Industry Act. (2003). Available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/act/consol_act/sia2003255/ (Accessed on: 26 April 2017).

Security Providers Act. (1993). Available at: <https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/S/SecurityProvA93.pdf> (Accessed on: 26 April 2017).

Seldon, A. (2015). Securing the retail environment. *Hi-Tech Security Solutions*, 21(3): 21-22. Available at: <http://print.securitysa.com/digital/1061/index.html#22> (Accessed on: 09 February 2017).

Sethusa, P. (2014). Security far too lax at shopping malls-cops. *Citizen*, 10 September. Available at: <http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/samedia/Image3/201410/11/1520145775.pdf> (Accessed on: 18 February 2017).

Silverman, D. (2011). *Interpreting data: a guide to the principles of qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Snyman, N. (2015). *Module 1: Introduction (ISO 73:2009) and Risk Management (ISO 31000:2009)*. Sandton: Crest Advisory Africa.

Steffensmeier, D. & Allan, E. (1996). Gender and Crime: Towards a gendered theory of female offending. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 22:459 – 487.

Strydom, H. (2011). Sampling in the quantitative paradigm (Pp.222-235). In: A.S. De Vos, H. Strydom, C.B. Fouché, & C.S.L. Delpont (Eds). (2011). *Research at grass roots*. 4th edition. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Strydom, H. & Delpont, C.S.L. (2011). Information collection: document study and secondary analysis (Pp. 376-389). In: A.S. De Vos, H. Strydom, C.B. Fouché & C.S.L. Delpont, (Eds). (2011). *Research at grass roots*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Strydom, H. & Delpont, C.S.L. 2011. Sampling and pilot study in Quantitative research, pp. 390-396. In De Vos, A.S., Strydom, H., Fouché, C.B. & Delpont, C.S.L. 2011. *Research at grass roots*. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers.

Strydom, H. (2011). Information collection: participant observation (Pp. 328-340). In: A.S. De Vos, H. Strydom, C.B. Fouché & C.S.L. Delport, (Eds). (2011). *Research at grass roots*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Surveillance Device Act. (1999). Available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/sda1999210/ (Accessed on: 15 February 2017).

Tesch, R. (2013). *Qualitative Research. Analysis Types & Software Tools*. New York: Routledge.

Tihabye, G. (2016). Man trying to prevent mall robbery shot. *Pretoria News, 08 July*. Available at: http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/samedia//2016/07/PNEWS20160708/PNEWS201607081_528.pdf (Accessed on: 15 February 2017).

University of South Africa (UNISA). (2007). *Policy on research ethics*. Available at: https://my.unisa.ac.za/tool/a87dd927a9e04b5900125ab7d72ca660/contents/colleges/coll_grad_studies/docs/Policy_research_ethics_21September2007.pdf (Accessed on: 23 May 2016).

Venter, B. (2014). Call to shop for capable security structures against robberies. *Star, 15 September*. Available at: <http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/samedia/Image3/201410/18/1520145844.pdf> (Accessed on: 15 February 2017).

Walsh, A. & Hemmens, C. (2011). *Introduction to Criminology: A Text Reader*. 2nd Edition. Boiste State University: SAGE Publications, Inc. Available at: https://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=GTYOlrbyUQAC&oi=fnd&pg=PR1&dq=bachman+and+schutt+2011&ots=yjr4a_AU4y&sig=QI0APB_haywkP-LP0cnwWlzh0WY#v=onepage&q&f=false (Accessed on: 24 March 2017).

Williams, K.S. (2012). *Textbook on Criminology*. 7th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ANNEXURES

ANNEXURE A: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CONSUMERS AT RETAIL STORES IN THE GAUTENG PROVINCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES

Instructions
Please answer all the questions as honestly as possible. The information collected in this study will be collated and analysed in order to form an accurate picture of this research project. It will assist the researcher to make findings and propose recommendations. You do not need to identify yourself and, similarly, the researcher will uphold anonymity in that there will be no possibility of any respondent being identified or linked in any way to the research findings in the final research report.

SECTION A: (Demographic details)

The following questions are for statistical purposes only.

Gender:

Male	1	
Female	2	

Age:

18-22 years	1	
23-27 years	2	
28-32 years	3	
33-37 years	4	
38-42 years	5	
43-47 years	6	
48-52 years	7	
53 +	8	

Marital status

Single	1	
Married	2	
Unknown	3	
Divorced	4	
Widowed	5	

Educational qualification:

Degree	1	
Advanced diploma	2	
Diploma (3 years)	3	
Certificate	4	
Standard 10/Grade 12	5	
Other	6	

SECTION B: (Security measures)

5. Are you familiar with security measures in the retail store?

Yes	No
1	2

6. If yes, what are these security measures that are in place to protect the retail store?

[You may tick more than one option]

SECURITY MEASURES		
Alarm systems	1	
Armed security officers	2	
Biometric system	3	
Boom gates	4	
CCTV / Surveillance cameras	5	
Metal detectors	6	

Perimeter fence	7	
Perimeter wall	8	
Razor wire	9	
Security Lighting	10	
Security Procedures	11	
Unarmed security officers	12	
X-ray machines	13	
Other [name them below]	14	

7. Are these security measures adequate?

Yes		No	
1		2	

Are these security measures effective for the protection of the retail store?

.....

.....

.....

.....

9. On a scale of 1 to 10 how do you rate the effectiveness of these security measures?
[With one being very poor and 10 being excellent]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

10. Did you ever experience any incident or witness any incident in the retail stores?

Yes		No	
1		2	

11. If yes, give a brief explanation of the incident?

.....

.....

.....

.....

Section C: (Security risks confronting a retail store)

12. What security risks do you think confront retail stores in this area?

SECURITY RISKS		
Arson	1	
Assault	2	
Armed robbery	3	
Burglary	4	
Common robbery	5	
Espionage	6	
Fraud	7	
Theft	8	
Natural disasters	9	
Other [name them below]		

13. Do you feel safe and secured when visiting the retail store?

.....

.....

.....

.....

ANNEXURE B: OBSERVATION CHECKLIST

OBSERVATION CHECKLIST

TITLE: SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CONSUMERS AT RETAIL STORES IN THE GAUTENG PROVINCE: AN ASSESMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES

Research questions

The researcher tested the following research question during the observation:

What security measures are currently being implemented at retail stores in the Gauteng Province?

CHECKLIST

Retail store number:			
Date of Survey:			
SECURITY PERSONNEL			
ASPECTS OBSERVED	Yes	No	Comments
Is there security personnel posted on the retail store?			
Are the security personnel uniformed or not?			
Is security personnel armed or not?			
Are security personnel in position of two-way radio for communication purpose?			
Are the security personnel always visible at the site?			
Any comment:			
PHYSICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL SECURITY MEASURES			
CCTV CAMERAS			

	Yes	No	Comments
Are there CCTV cameras in the retail store?			
How many were spotted?			
Where are the camera placed?			
Are cameras in the store the same?			
Are these CCTV cameras visible to consumers?			
CCTV CAMERAS OUTSIDE THE STORE			
	Yes	No	
Are here CCTV cameras outside the store?			
How many cameras are there?			
Are all cameras the same?			
Where are the cameras placed?			
PERIMETER SECURITY FENCING			
	Yes	No	Comments
Is the retail store perimeter protected by a fence, palisade or a wall?			
Is the fence or palisade or wall 2.4m high?			
Is "Y" fencing provided over 2.4m?			
Fence condition			
19. Is the palisades panel or mesh badly rusted?			
20. Are all uprights firmly planted?			
Non-lethal electric fencing			
21. Are there alarm warning notices on the perimeter?			

Fence environment			
22. Are there "No trespassing" notices in place?			
23. Are goods stacked near the fence/wall?			
24. Is there dense vegetation nearby or near the fence?			
SECURITY LIGHTING			
	Yes	No	Comments
25. Are there security lights around the facility?			
26. Is lighting adequate around the facility?			
27. Are lights protected against damage?			
28. What type of security lights are there?			
Any comment:			
ACCESS CONTROL			
	Yes	No	Comments
29. Is there more than one access control point?			
30. How many gates were there?			
31. Is the access control manned by security officers?			
32. If access control is manned by more than one security officer, how many security officers were there?			
33. Are security officers manning access control armed?			

34. Are there security technological aids at the access control points aiding security officers in their performance of duties?			
35. Is vehicle access control point fitted with vehicle barriers such as rising bollards, rising wedges, cable beams, or any related barriers?			
36. Do security officers check keys of vehicle on the ignition when customers exit the premises?			

ANNEXURE C: ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE



Ref: CLAW 2015 ST 12

Applicant: M A Mahambane

COLLEGE OF LAW RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE

2015/02/10

Dear M A Mahambane


ETHICAL CLEARANCE APPLICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY MEASURES AT HYPERSTORES: A CASE STUDY OF CENTURION MAKRO, GAUTENG

Thank you for the application for research ethics clearance by the College of Law Research Ethics Review Committee for the above mentioned research project. The ethical clearance application for the above mentioned research project has been approved.

The proposed research may now commence with the proviso that:

- 1) *The researcher/s will ensure that the research project adheres to the values and principles expressed in the UNISA Policy on Research Ethics, which can be found at the following website: http://www.unisa.ac.za/cmsys/staff/contents/departments/res_policies/docs/Policy_Research%20Ethics_rev%20app%20Council_22.06.2012.pdf*
- 2) *Any adverse circumstance arising in the undertaking of the research project that is relevant to the ethicality of the study, as well as changes in the methodology, should be communicated in writing to the Chair of the College of Law's Research Ethics Review Committee. An amended application could be requested if there are substantial changes from the existing proposal, especially if those changes affect any of the study-related risks for the research participants.*
- 3) *The researcher will ensure that the research project adheres to any applicable national legislation, professional codes of conduct, institutional guidelines and scientific standards relevant to the specific field of study.*

Yours Faithfully,


Dr B Haerle
Chairperson Research Ethics Review Committee
College of Law


Prof R Songca
Executive Dean
College of Law



University of South Africa
Pretter Street, Muckleneuk Ridge, City of Tshwane
PO Box 392 UNISA 0003 South Africa
Telephone: +27 12 429 3111 Facsimile: +27 12 429 4150

ANNEXURE D: PERMISSION LETTER TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS IN MAKRO
(DECLINED)



SECURITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME DEPT. OF CRIMINOLOGY & SECURITY SCIENCE SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLEGE OF LAW <i>Prof. D Govender</i> Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 9482 Cell: 0828174111 Email: govendl@unisa.ac.za F0-81 Brooklyn House, 337 Veale St, Brooklyn.	<u>Muckleneuk Campus</u> Preller St Muckleneuk Ridge, Pretoria PO Box 392 UNISA 0003 City of Tshwane Gauteng, South Africa
--	--

08 April 2016

The Manager
Makro Stores Head Office
21 Peltier Dr, Sandton

Dear Sir / Madam

RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO UNDERTAKE RESEARCH WITH MEMBERS OF MAKRO STORES SECURITY SERVICES

Mr Mahambane (**Student Number: 37027123**) is currently a Masters student in the Department of Criminology and Security Science (Programme Security Management), School of Criminal Justice, College of Law at the University of South Africa (UNISA), and is busy with his research study title : **“Safety and security at hyperstores in the Gauteng Province: An assessment of security measures”**.

I would like to request formal permission for Mr Mahambane to undertake fieldwork research with members of Makro stores security services.

The research seeks to assess the effectiveness of security measures at hyperstores in the Gauteng province in ensuring safety and security at hyperstores. The key objectives of this research project are:

1. Establish the existing security measures at hyperstores in the Gauteng Province.
2. Identify the different types of security risks confronting hyperstores in the Gauteng Province?
3. Identify security measures for the protection of hyperstores in the Gauteng Province.

The researcher will develop specific interview questions to inform the three key objectives of the research study. The researcher would like to interview a limited number of staff that has direct or indirect relationship with the Makro stores security services in safety and security activities. These interviews will focus on safety and security activities at hyperstores. Follow-up interviews or telephone interviews will be done if necessary.

Once permission is granted to Mr Mahambane to undertake the research with your members please inform him accordingly. Mr Mahambane will then be in touch directly with you or a representative of your organisation for the scheduling of any



University of South Africa
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge, City of Tshwane
PO Box 392, Unisa, 0003, South Africa
www.unisa.ac.za/law

appointments for interviews or administering of the research questions with relevant employees in the organisation.

Mr Mahambane can be directly contacted at the following:

Cell: 0836867591 / (012) 433 9476
Email: mahamma@unisa.ac.za

In his research the researcher will endeavour to take into account all relevant ethical considerations, especially in relation to the freedom from physical or psychological harm; disclosure about the nature of the research; and privacy. Participation in the research interviews will also be on a voluntary basis. All the information that is received from the participants or respondents will be treated with the utmost confidentiality (i.e. respondents will remain anonymous and no reference will be made in the research report to their identity or name of the company/organisation for which they work).

The final dissertation (research report) once accepted will be placed in the UNISA library and therefore in the public domain and can be accessed by interested parties.

If any confirmation or other information is needed I can be personally contacted at the above telephone cell number and e-mail address.

Attached for your further information is the research proposal, together with a set of interview questions.

Thanking you
Regards



Prof D Govender
Programme: Security Risk Management
Department of Criminology & Security Science
School of Criminal Justice, College of Law

APPROVED/ NOT APPROVED

Makro Stores Manager

Date:



ANNEXURE E: FEEDBACK FROM MAKRO

Good morning Mr Mahambane

Please note the response from Mr J Coetsee, The Group Risk Manager for Makro Stores.

He is the highest authority in this regard and has the final say on the matter.

Kind regards

Dr Leon du Plessis

Lecturer

Department of Criminology and Security Science

School of Criminal Justice

College of Law

Brooklyn House 1-68

337 Veale Street

Brooklyn, Pretoria

Tel: +27 12 433 9477

Cell phone: 084 261 1956

dplesl2@unisa.ac.za

From: Jannie Coetsee [mailto:Jannie.Coetsee@makro.co.za]
Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2017 1:34 PM
To: Du Plessis, Leon
Subject: RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AT SELECTED MAKRO STORES

Good afternoon Mr. Du Plessis,

Thank you for the correspondence received.

Unfortunately, Makro does not make its operations available for research for a number of reasons, which I am not going to go into detail. I rather suggest that the researcher do make contact with the SA Consumer Goods Council Crime Initiative Department, from where a holistic view can be obtained into the crime prevention initiatives in the retail sector.

Regards

J Coetsee

From: Du Plessis, Leon [mailto:dplesl2@unisa.ac.za]
Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2017 12:31 PM
To: Jannie Coetsee <Jannie.Coetsee@makro.co.za>
Cc: Yolande Smith <yolande.smith@makro.co.za>; Mahambane, Abel <mahamma@unisa.ac.za>
Subject: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AT SELECTED MAKRO STORES

Good day Mr Coetsee

Sir,

This communication serves to seek authority to conduct research at a number of the MAKRO branches. The University of South Africa, Department of Criminology and

Security Science has embarked on a research initiative to assess the effectiveness of security measures at hyperstores in Gauteng. Confidentiality of the research findings is guaranteed.

The key objectives of the research are to:

- Establish the existing security measures at hyperstores in Gauteng.
- Identify the different types of security risks confronting hyperstores in Gauteng.
Identify security measures for the protection of hyperstores in the Gauteng province.

The research approach will consist mainly of observations by the researcher as well as conducting of interviews with selected security staff (your assistance to identify the relevant staff is required) at the identified stores.

Although the research population and sample consists of MAKRO stores, the results of the research will be to the benefit of retail stores at large.

Mr Abel Mahambane, lecturer at UNISA Department of Criminology and Security Science will conduct the research.

If you agree in principle that the research be conducted, more detailed information can be provided by Mr Mahambane, for e.g. the time table of the research can be negotiated, interview schedule and questions to be asked can be discussed. If need be, we can visit your office, or person designated for that purpose to discuss the terms and conditions. The research will not have any cost implication for MAKRO.

For your kind consideration, please.

Dr Leon du Plessis
Lecturer
Advanced Security Risk Management
Department of Criminology and Security Science
School of Criminal Justice

College of Law
Brooklyn House 1-68
337 Veale Street
Brooklyn, Pretoria
Tel: +27 12 433 9477
Cell phone: 084 261 1956 dplesl2@unisa.ac.za



ANNEXURE F: INFORMED CONSENT LETTER TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS

INFORMED CONSENT

Department of Criminology & Security Science – University of South Africa

TITLE: SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CONSUMERS AT RETAIL STORES IN THE GAUTENG PROVINCE: AN ASSESMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES

Purpose of the research study:

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing security measures at retail stores, Gauteng Province in an effort to identify the security risks associated to retail stores in order to make recommendations on security measures.

Your participation will assist in determining the following:

What security measures are currently being implemented by a retail stores in Gauteng Province?

What are the different types of security risks confronting a retail stores in Gauteng Province?

What should be done to improve the security measures at retail stores in Gauteng Province?

Procedures:

The researcher will ask you a series of questions. Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You can choose whether or not you would like to be interviewed. You can also withdraw from the research study at any time up to the point when the findings will be published. The information you provide will be treated with confidentiality. The researcher and his supervisor (Prof. Doraval Govender) will be the only people to have access to the raw interview data. Your name or any other form of identification will not be printed on any other document. There will be no remuneration should you decide to participate in the study.

You are welcome to contact the researcher on (012) 433 9476 or cell no. 083 6867591 should you have any enquiries.

I.....(name and surname) hereby agree and give permission to be interviewed as part of the research study as explained above. The purpose of the research has been explained to me. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I can withdraw from the interview at any time if I so wish (up to the point of publication). I understand that my identity will not be revealed in the study and will not be published. I have read and understand the above and all my questions have been answered and I therefore agree to:

1. Participate in the interview: YES/NO
2. Be audio taped: YES/NO
3. Agree that the information I provide might be used in the research report: YES/NO

Signature of Participant..... Date:..... Place:.....

Signature of Researcher..... Date..... Place.....

ANNEXURE G: PERMISSION LETTER TO CONDUCT DOCKET ANALYSIS AT SAPS (DECINED)



SECURITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME DEPT. OF CRIMINOLOGY & SECURITY SCIENCE SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLEGE OF LAW <i>Prof. D Govender</i> Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 9482 Cell: 0828174111 Email: govendl@unisa.ac.za F0-81 Brooklyn House, 337 Veale St, Brooklyn.	<u>Muckleneuk Campus</u> Preller St Muckleneuk Ridge, Pretoria PO Box 392 UNISA 0003 City of Tshwane Gauteng, South Africa
--	--

10 October 2016

The Provincial Commissioner
Gauteng

Dear Sir / Madam

RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO UNDERTAKE RESEARCH AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE

Mr Mahabane (**Student Number: 37027123**) is currently a Masters student in the Department of Criminology and Security Science (Programme Security Management), School of Criminal Justice, College of Law at the University of South Africa (UNISA), and is busy with his research study title: "**Safety and security at hyperstores in the Gauteng Province: An assessment of security measures**".

I would like to request formal permission for Mr Mahabane to undertake fieldwork research (case docket analysis) at the following police stations:

- Bedfordview SAPS
- Johannesburg central SAPS
- Honeydew SAPS
- Sandton SAPS
- Littleton SAPS
- Sinoville SAPS

The research seeks to assess the effectiveness of security measures at hyperstores in the Gauteng province to enhance safety and security. The key objectives of this research project is to:

1. Establish the existing security measures at hyperstores in the Gauteng Province.
2. Identify the different types of security risks confronting hyperstores in the Gauteng Province?
3. Identify security measures for the protection of hyperstores in the Gauteng Province.

The researcher will develop a docket analysis checklist to inform the three key objectives of the research study. The researcher would like to do docket analysis for cases reported specifically by Makro stores.



University of South Africa
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge, City of Tshwane
PO Box 392, Unisa, 0003, South Africa
www.unisa.ac.za/law

Once permission is granted to Mr Mahambane to undertake the research at your police stations, kindly inform him accordingly. Mr Mahambane will then be in touch directly with you or a representative of your organisation for the scheduling of any appointments.

Mr Mahambane can be directly contacted at the following:

Cell: 0836867591 / (012) 433 9476
Email: mahamma@unisa.ac.za

In his research the researcher will endeavour to take into account all relevant ethical considerations, disclosure about the nature of the research; and privacy. All the information that is received from the participating stations will be treated with the utmost confidentiality (i.e. stations will remain anonymous and no reference will be made in the research report to their identity or name).

The final dissertation (research report) once accepted will be placed in the UNISA library and therefore in the public domain and can be accessed by interested parties.

If any confirmation or other information is needed I can be personally contacted at the above telephone number and e-mail address.

Attached for your further information is the research proposal, together with the docket analysis checklist.

Thanking you
Regards



Prof D Govender
Programme: Security Management
Department of Criminology & Security Science
School of Criminal Justice, College of Law

20161010

APPROVED/ NOT APPROVED

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICES

Date:



ANNEXURE H: FEEDBACK FROM SAPS



Privaatsak Private Bag X94	Pretoria 0001	Faks No. Fax No.	(012) 393 2616
Your reference/U verwysing:		THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONER	
My reference/My verwysing: 3/34/2		SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE	
Enquiries/Navrae: Lt Col Joubert		PRETORIA	
	Intern Mahamba	0001	
Tel:	(012) 393 3118		
	(012) 393 2423/4370		
Email:	JoubertG@saps.gov.za		
	MahambaS@saps.gov.za		

MA Mahambane
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN SAPS: THE EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY MEASURES AT HYPERSTORES: A CASE STUDY OF CENTURION MAKRO, GAUTENG: MASTERS DEGREE: UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA: RESEARCHER: MA MAHAMBANE

1. Your application to conduct a research study in the South African Police Service on the above mentioned topic refers.
2. Your application was perused and considered by the office of the Divisional Commissioner: Research.
3. Your request to access dockets registered in respect of hyper stores at Bedfordview SAPS, Johannesburg Central SAPS, Honeydew SAPS, Sandton SAPS, Littleton SAPS and Sinoville SAPS, has been evaluated.
4. This office of the opinion that the relevant information can be obtained from Makro, as their Loss Management Division should have record of cases reported and the outcomes. The information can therefore be obtained from the entities.
5. You are hereby informed that your application was declined, due to the fact that the research proposal does not meet the requirements.


LIEUTENANT GENERAL
DIVISIONAL COMMISSIONER: RESEARCH
DR BM ZULU

DATE: 2016/12/07.

ANNEXURE I: EDITING CERTIFICATE

Date: 17 January 2018

I, Berdine Smit, ID 7712190011083, hereby certify that the MAGISTER TECHNOLOGIAE dissertation by Misaveni Abel Mahambane


“SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CONSUMERS AT RETAIL STORES IN THE GAUTENG PROVINCE: AN ASSESMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES”.

has been edited by me according to the Harvard Author-date System.



BERDINE SMIT

BA. Publishing (UPE)



BLUE BIRD CREATIVE COPY



berdine.smit@gmail.com



+(27) 82 882 9534

Final examination

ORIGINALITY REPORT

%**21**

SIMILARITY INDEX

%**15**

INTERNET SOURCES

%**6**

PUBLICATIONS

%**12**

STUDENT PAPERS
