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Chapter Title	Post-apartheid South Africa: A United or a Divided Nation?	
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Corresponding Author	Family Name	Bornman
	Particle	
	Given Name	Elirea
	Suffix	
	Organization	University of South Africa
	Address	Pretoria, 0002, South Africa
	Email	bornme@unisa.ac.za

Abstract	<p>Since the advent of a new political dispensation, the popular Rainbow Nation metaphor have come to symbolize the hopes of South Africans and the international community of various ethnic and racial groups living harmoniously in a new united and democratic state. Uniting the highly diverse and deeply divided South African society has however posed a formidable challenge. A strong drive towards nation building has been regarded as a necessary step to create a common South Africa identity and sense of nationhood. New national symbols and a changed symbolic landscape have had to play a pivotal role in this regard. Symbolic tension and conflict on various levels indicate however that divisions in South Africa society have not only remained, but in some cases have even become more profound. There are firstly indications that the new national symbols have not succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of all South African groups. Memories of different groups are furthermore still hanging from different branches as is reflected in the altered symbolic landscape of the capital city of Pretoria. The juxtaposition of the Voortrekker Monument versus Freedom Park and concomitant walls of remembrance are some examples. The chapter concludes with recommendations for creating a symbolic landscape that will represent a true reflection of the Rainbow Nation idealism and the deep diversity of South African society.</p>
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Post-apartheid South Africa: A United or a Divided Nation?

Elirea Bornman

Introduction

The 1990s witnessed one of the most startling and dramatic social and political transformations in recent history. These transformations culminated in the advent of a new political dispensation in South Africa (Coombes, 2003). On 27 April 1994, the “new” South Africa was born. That day also heralded the formal demise of the apartheid system.

During apartheid, the South African state enforced and reified subgroup identities, racial identities in particular, through rigid processes of spatial, political, social and cultural engineering (Eaton, 2002; Ramsamy, 2007). The power of the White Afrikaner government was consolidated through creating separate territorial, social, cultural and political spaces for Blacks, Coloureds, Indians and Whites. To the most extreme these policies led to the establishment of separate ethnic “homelands”. The fact that groups lived their lives in separate “homelands” and residential areas resulted in limited social and cultural interaction. Furthermore, there was little overlap in the symbolic spaces and historical narratives of the various groups constituting South African society.

The geographic unity of South Africa was reinstated with the reintegration of the former “independent” homelands in 1994 (Ramsamy, 2007). All forms of legal racial segregation were erased from the law books. However, the arduous task of creating a new social, cultural and symbolic infrastructure for the newly created South African nation had just begun (Coombes, 2003). The tensions and discrepancies involved in these processes provided a glimpse on the fault lines of a society, as well as changing conceptualizations of the “nation”, “group” and “community”, during a process of large-scale social and political transformation.

E. Bornman (✉)

University of South Africa, Pretoria 0002, South Africa
e-mail: bornme@unisa.ac.za

28 **Nation Building and the State of the Nation**

29 Despite the fact that the territorial unity of South Africa was re-established in 1994
30 and that racial segregation was abolished, it was widely believed that South Africans
31 lacked a cohesive, commonly accepted and overarching national identity and a
32 sense of nationhood (Eaton, 2002). Heribert Adam commented, “A South African
33 nation has yet to be born. South Africa at present constitutes an economic and political
34 entity, but not an emotional one” (Adam, 1995, p. 46).

35 Therefore, a process of nation building was regarded by many as the logical step
36 to fill the void left by the apartheid system and to forge a united and harmonious
37 South African nation (Eaton, 2002). Political rhetoric on nation building soon
38 became prevalent and various symbols and events were employed. The South
39 African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) adopted the slogan “Simunye—we are
40 one!” The triumph of the South African rugby team in the 1995 Rugby World Cup
41 was widely proclaimed not only to be a sports victory, but also a victory for nation
42 building. In fact, the picture of former President Nelson Mandela waving to the
43 crowds, dressed in a Springbok rugby jersey, became a symbol of the birth of a
44 “new” South African nation. Similarly, South Africa’s participation in the Olympic
45 Games since 1996, as well as the 2010 FIFA World Cup, was employed to bolster
46 patriotism and nation building. However, nothing surpassed the popularity of the
47 metaphor of the Rainbow Nation, first coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu (Eaton,
48 2002). Both in South Africa as well as abroad, it has become an important symbol
49 of the hopes and ideals that a new nation, united in its diversity, has been born on the
50 southern tip of Africa.

51 However, nation building in South Africa has also been controversial. During the
52 first years of democracy, two strategies were discerned (Ramsamy, 2007). The dom-
53 inant ethos during these first years was the ideology of non-racialism, based on the
54 idea that a common South African identity should replace various sub-national
55 identities such as racial and ethnic identities. It is epitomized in the words of Nelson
56 Mandela, “We have no Whites; we have no Blacks. We only have South Africans”
57 (cited in Ramsamy, 2007, p. 471).

58 The embracement of the Rainbow Nation metaphor, in which the colours of the
59 rainbow reflect the various ethnic and racial groupings in South Africa, could be
60 interpreted as a deviation from the staunch stance of non-racialism. According to
61 Ramsamy (2007), the metaphor represents a compromise between the ANC’s com-
62 mitment to non-racialism and attempts to deal with the continued existence and also
63 politicization of cultural, ethnic and racial identities in post-apartheid South Africa.
64 However, the overall aim of nation building has remained the forging of a united
65 nation and a single overarching national identity (Blaser, 2004).

66 The advent of the Mbeki-era heralded an important shift, an African shift in the
67 nation-building discourse (Blaser, 2004; Eaton, 2002; Herwitz, 2011). This shift is
68 epitomized in the words of former President Thabo Mbeki (African National
69 Council [ANC], 1997, para 44):

70 But it is critical that the overarching identity of being South African is promoted among
71 all those who are indeed South African, as part of a process of building an African nation

on the southern tip of the continent. The affirmation of our Africanness as a nation ... is 72
recognition of a geographic reality and the awakening of a consciousness which colonial- 73
ism suppressed. 74

The ideology of Africanism is also embodied in terms such as “an African century” and the “African Renaissance” (Herwitz, 2011). Blaser (2004) points out that 75
this shift is not an entirely new phenomenon as an Africanist nationalist current has 76
had a constant presence in all anti-colonial movements in Africa. Rather, it implies 77
a return to an imaginary precolonial past which not only becomes the source of 78
myths about the South African nation but also, eventually, culminates in policies on 79
various levels including in the symbolic realm (Herwitz, 2011). In propagating the 80
ideas of an African Renaissance, Mbeki refers to the great African monuments of 81
the past—at Timbuktu, at Axum—in Zimbabwe and at Aswan, to bolster the idea of 82
a glorious precolonial past. In this distant past, where colonialism and apartheid do 83
not figure, Black and indigenous Africa are proclaimed as a source of virtue and 84
value. In essence, it implies the triumph of pan-Africanism (Blaser, 2004; 85
Labuschagne, 2010). Africanism has become the new ideology for nation building 86
(Herwitz, 2011). However, it has deepened the controversies in the nation-building 87
discourse (Blaser, 2004). The nation is no longer culturally neutral; it is defined in 88
terms of an African culture. The aim of nation building becomes the creation of a 89
single nation with a dominant African identity, which should become the primary 90
identity of all South Africans. Furthermore, it holds that an overarching national 91
identity should include and reflect African culture. As a result, cultural hegemony is 92
exerted in an essentially multicultural and multilingual society (Blaser, 2004). 93
94

[AU1] Nation building in South Africa has been criticized on various fronts. Degenaar 95
(1994) warns that a term such as nation building should not be mentioned in a coun- 96
try such as South Africa. Instead of propagating nation building, diversity should be 97
respected and valued. The greatest opposition to nation building has, however, been 98
reality itself. Although it is undoubtedly true that ethnic, racial and regional identi- 99
ties have been manipulated and reified during apartheid, South African society has 100
remained fractured despite strong nation-building efforts. Various research studies 101
indicate that although a strong South African identity has indeed taken hold among 102
many South Africans, the majority of South Africans identify in some cases equally 103
as strongly and other cases even more strongly, with their respective racial and eth- 104
nic or language groups (see Bornman, 2010, 2013). 105

Coombes (2003) poses the question whether the main fault line in South African 106
society remains the juxtaposition of Black against White. She answers this question 107
herself by denying a simplistic binary opposition between the two largest racial 108
groups. It is indeed the case that the struggle against apartheid has commonly been 109
typified as a struggle between two dominant racial groups (Black and White). 110
However, it is often not taken into account that neither Blacks nor Whites are 111
homogeneous groups. The White society consists of at least two major ethnocul- 112
tural groups, namely, English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking Whites (also known 113
as Afrikaners). Similar to the ethnic and language differences among Whites, there 114
are also nine Black language groups associated with distinct Black ethnic identities. 115

116 As most Black ethnic groups have strong ties with certain regions in South Africa,
117 Black ethnicity also corresponds with regional identities. The province of KwaZulu-
118 Natal is, for example, commonly regarded as the homeland of the Zulu nation. The
119 presence of the group known as Coloreds—a group of mixed racial descent—as
120 well as the largest Indian community outside of India, are often not taken into
121 account. Venter (1999) points out that it is not simply a case of Black against White,
122 but historical processes have also brought two civilizational paradigms in contact
123 in South Africa: the African and Western civilizations.

124 The conclusion can be drawn that South African society has remained highly and
125 complexly heterogeneous. Furthermore, the unity of the South African nation is still
126 not a given almost two decades after the advent of a new political dispensation and
127 nation building remains controversial and contested. Symbols, monuments and his-
128 torical narratives play an important role not only in attempts towards nation building
129 and creating national unity, but also in the construction, maintenance and strength-
130 ening of sub-national identities.

131 According to Harrison (1995), all political actions are associated with expressive
132 action in the form of the deployment of symbols. The new South African regime is
133 no exception. Not only has it brought about sociopolitical change in the country, but
134 it has also transformed South Africa symbolically in terms of a new identity, a new
135 set of values reflective of a postcolonial society and a new set of goals for a new
136 nation (Labuschagne, 2010). Overall, the aim of nation building and the creation of
137 an overarching national identity are claimed as the founding principles for changes
138 to the symbolic landscape. In the process, various forms of symbolic politics as
139 identified by Harrison (1995) and Mac Ginty (2001) have been implemented to
140 reconstruct and to transform South Africa symbolically.

141 **New National Symbols for a “New” Nation**

142 The adoption of a set of national symbols has become a common practice among all
143 nations of the world. According to Cerulo (1989), this practice stems from a long
144 history in which ruling houses or groups used to make use of banners, crests and
145 fanfares for purposes of announcement and identification. Thus, national symbols
146 have become modern totems to identify and characterize a particular nation state.

147 Similar to other newly independent and newly democratic states, the new politi-
148 cal elite in South Africa saw the need for a set of new symbols to identify and char-
149 acterize the new state and the new nation. New national symbols were carefully
150 designed to symbolize the altered nature of the new democratic state and to rein-
151 force the political transition (Mac Ginty, 2001). Once again, nation building, the
152 forging of a united South African nation and an overarching South African identity
153 were forwarded as the most important reasons in the design of new symbols
154 (Bornman, 2006).

The National Anthem

155

In line with the reconciliatory mood of the transitional period, a proclamation issued on 20 April 1994 by the President Nelson Mandela, stated that South Africa would have two national anthems (“National symbols”, n.d.), namely, *Die Stem van Suid-Afrika* (*The Voice of South Africa*) and *Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika* (*God Bless Africa*). *Die Stem* was the national anthem during the previous dispensation. It was first written in Afrikaans, but later translated into English. From 1952, it was sung both in Afrikaans and English. At first, the patriotic song had three verses referring to elements of the South African landscape, historical elements such as the Great Trek, as well as commitment to the fatherland. On request of the government, a fourth verse with a religious theme was added later (“Die Stem van Suid-Afrika”, n.d.).

Black South Africans generally disliked *Die Stem* and during the early 1990s when the dismantling of apartheid was already on the table, the ANC decided that it would not be sung at sports events. However, an instrumental version was played during a rugby match between South Africa and New Zealand in 1992 and the crowd sang along.

Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika was written and composed by Enoch Sontonga, a Methodist mission school teacher (“National symbols”, n.d.). The first stanza was originally written in Xhosa as a Christian hymn in which God is asked, as the title suggests, to bless the children of Africa. Seven additional verses were later added in Xhosa by the poet Samuel Mqhayi. It soon became popular as a church hymn. The first verse would usually be sung in Xhosa or Zulu followed by the Sesotho version. As no official translations of the song exist, the words vary from place to place and from occasion to occasion.

However, *Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika* did not remain a religious hymn, but soon became politicized. During apartheid, it became a symbol of defiance against the apartheid government and also a pan-African liberation song (“Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika”, n.d.). The strong pan-African connotations are reflected in the fact that it is currently the national anthem of Zambia and Tanzania. It furthermore became the official song of the ANC during apartheid and was widely regarded as the non-official anthem of South Africa.

It came as no surprise that *Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika* was selected as national anthem for the democratic South Africa. Despite its ties with apartheid, *Die Stem* retained official status together with *Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika* (“Die Stem van Suid-Afrika”, n.d.). At the final match of the 1994 Rugby World Cup, *Die Stem* was sung by a Black choir and both songs were sung at the inauguration of Nelson Mandela in 1994.

However, the practicalities involved in singing two national anthems proved to be too cumbersome (“Die Stem van Suid-Afrika”, n.d.). In 1997, following the adoption of the South African Constitution in 1996, a new hybrid version was adopted as the official anthem of South Africa. This version combines not only *Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika* and part of a stanza of *Die Stem*, but also a newly composed last stanza in English based on the melody of *Die Stem*. Five of the languages mostly

198 spoken in South Africa are combined in the new anthem. The first two lines of the
199 first stanza of *Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika* are in Xhosa; the last two lines of the first stanza
200 in Zulu; the second stanza in Sesotho; the third stanza taken from *Die Stem* in
201 Afrikaans; and the fourth in English (“*Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika*”, n.d.).

202 *The South African Flag*

203 Similar to the selection of a new anthem, the choice of a new flag formed part of the
204 negotiation processes (“*Flag of South Africa*”, n.d.). The pre-1994 flag reflects the
205 unification of the four former British colonies—the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and
206 Orange Free State—to form the South African Union. The idea of adopting a unique
207 flag for the Union of South Africa was met with great resistance among English-
208 speaking Whites as it was perceived as an attempt to remove British symbols.
209 Therefore, the flag, which was first hoisted on 31 May 1928, represented a compro-
210 mise between British and Afrikaner interests. It was based on the white, blue and
211 orange Van Riebeeck flag—the so-called *Prinsevlag* (Prince’s flag), which used to
212 be the Dutch flag when Van Riebeeck landed in the Cape in 1652 and was the first
213 flag believed to be hoisted in South Africa. In the centre, on a white band, are the
214 flags of the various colonies that were unified in 1910, namely, the British Union
215 Jack (Cape and Natal) as well as the flags of the Transvaal and the Orange Free
216 State. Although this flag contained elements of British colonialism, it was closely
217 associated with Afrikaner interests and in later years, it was typified as the “apar-
218 theid flag” by opponents of the previous dispensation.

219 It was consequently decided to invent a completely new flag for the new demo-
220 cratic South Africa. In 1993, a countrywide competition was held in which the
221 public was invited to suggest the design (“*Flag of South Africa*”, n.d.). Although the
222 then National Symbols Commission received more than 7,000 designs, none of the
223 six finalists received sufficient support. In the end, a design of the State Herald, F. J.
224 Brownell, was selected to be used as interim national flag for the April 1994 elec-
225 tions and the inauguration of Nelson Mandela. Although it was stated in the Interim
226 Constitution that this flag would be used for a probationary period of 5 years after
227 which another round of discussions on the flag would be held, its acceptance was so
228 positive that it was proclaimed as the official national flag in the 1996 Constitution.

229 The flag has a horizontal red and blue band of equal width at the top and the bot-
230 tom (see Fig. 1—“*Flag of South Africa*”, n.d.). In the centre is a horizontal green
231 band which splits into a Y-shape, of which the arms end in the two corners of the
232 hoist side. The top of the Y-shape embraces a black isosceles triangle of which the
233 two sides of equal length are separated from the green stripe by yellow stripes. The
234 red and blue stripes are furthermore separated from the green stripe by narrow white
235 stripes.

236 A governmental source holds that the individual colours or colour combinations
237 could have different meanings for different people and groups and no universal



Fig. 1 The new South African flag

symbolism could be ascribed to any of them (“[National symbols](#)”, n.d.). However, 238
the three dominant colours—green, black and yellow—are commonly associated 239
with the ANC. The other three—red, white and blue—are used in the flag of the old 240
Transvaal republic, the flag of the Netherlands and the flag of the United Kingdom. 241
According to F. W. De Klerk in his autobiography, *The Last Trek: A New Beginning*, 242
(1998) chili red is used instead of plain red (which English-speaking Whites would 243
prefer) or orange (which would reflect the Dutch heritage of Afrikaners). The centre 244
Y-design is interpreted as the convergence of diverse elements in South African 245
society heading into the future in unity, a reflection of the former and current motto 246
of the South African coats of arms (see the next section). 247

Coat of Arms

248

A new South African coat of arms was also introduced on Freedom Day, 27 April 249
2000. This replaced the former coat of arms that was in use since unification in 250
1910. The design process started in 1999 when the Department of Arts, Culture, 251
Science and Technology, once more, invited ideas from the public (“[Coat of arms of](#) 252
[South Africa](#)”, n.d.). Based on the ideas received as well as input from the cabinet, 253
a brief for designers was prepared and Design South Africa (an umbrella company 254
for design companies all over the country) was requested to brief ten of the top 255
South African designers. The design of Iaan Bekker was chosen in the end (see 256
Fig. 2). 257



Fig. 2 The new coat of arms of South Africa

258 The design comprises a series of elements organized in a symmetric oval shape.
 259 Some of the most important elements are the following:

- 260 • The most conspicuous element in the lower part of the oval is the motto—*!ke*
 261 *e:/xarra/ke*—a phrase in the language of the Khoisan language of the Xam peo-
 262 ple meaning “diverse people unite”.
- 263 • In the centre are two Khoisan (or Bushmen) figures which are derived from the
 264 Linton stone, one of the most famous examples of Khoisan rock art which is cur-
 265 rently housed in the South African Museum in Cape Town. The fact that a depic-
 266 tion of the oldest inhabitants of South Africa and probably in the world has been
 267 used is said to be symbolic of belonging to the nation that is extended to larger
 268 humanity.
- 269 • On top of the shield with the two human figures are depictions of two African
 270 traditional weapons, namely, a spear and a knobkierie, serving as symbols of
 271 defence and authority.

- The oval shape of ascendance consists of various elements indicative of the South African landscape, namely, the king protea, the secretary bird and the rising sun. The king protea—the South African national flower—is said to signify, among others, the beauty of the flora of the country. The powerful secretary bird is regarded as the equivalent of the lion on earth. It is depicted in flight symbolizing growth and speed and is perceived to be a symbol of the protection of the nation against its enemies as well as the ascendance of the South African nation. It is depicted in gold which signifies its association with the sun and the highest power. The rising sun serves as symbol of brightness, splendor and the supreme source of energy, life and wholeness. Furthermore, it symbolizes the promise of rebirth as well as intellectual faculties such as knowledge, reflection, good judgment and willpower.

According to a governmental source, the combined egg-shaped structure of the coat of arms suggests the rebirth of the spirit of the heroic South African nation (“National coat of arms”, n.d.). The motto of the previous coat of arms—*Ex unitate vires*—was written in Latin, as is commonly the practice in European countries. The meaning of the current motto is not much different. It is however written in one of the oldest indigenous languages spoken on the African continent. Furthermore, the use of African figures is conspicuous and all the other elements are those that typically emphasize Africa, the African landscape and African culture.

Role and Impact of the New National Symbols 292

Various strategies related to symbolic politics can be discerned in the selection and adoption of new national symbols for South Africa (Harrison, 1995; Mac Ginty, 2001). Firstly, expansionism is reflected in the fact that an almost entirely new set of symbols has replaced the array of symbols associated with the previous dispensation. The majority of the old symbols, apart from a small section of *Die Stem*, have been removed and replaced by the invention of new symbols. In the case of the national anthem, re-ranking has taken place in the sense that the song that strongly reflects pan-Africanism and the liberation struggle, *Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika*, has not only been placed alongside the former *Die Stem*, but is also sung before *Die Stem* (commonly associated with Afrikaner interests).

Whereas the symbols of the previous dispensation were predominantly Eurocentric in nature, the newly invented symbols sharply differentiate the current dispensation and government from the previous regime. A predominant tendency towards Africanism characterizes the new symbols, a reflection of pan-Africanism even before an Africanist turn in the nation-building discourse has been identified (Blaser, 2004; Eaton, 2002). The dominant colours of the new national flag are commonly associated with the ANC. The colours associated with Afrikaner and British interests have been removed and replaced by a newly invented colour—chili red. The first and dominant stanzas of the national anthem are a song written in Black

312 languages associated with the liberation struggle and pan-Africanism. Furthermore,
313 prominent in the new coat of arms is the displacement of European elements such
314 as the motto in Latin with almost the same words written in an ancient African lan-
315 guage. All the other elements of the coat of arms are reflective of either African
316 culture or the African landscape. The presence and influence of European and Asian
317 cultures are almost completely absent.

318 Despite the predominant African contents and the fact that only limited recogni-
319 tion is given to other South African cultures, the new symbols were apparently well
320 received by the South African public. According to Heribert Adam (1995), they
321 have been successful in creating reconciliation, unity and new forms of nationalism.
322 The new multicoloured flag has been “banalized” by being painted on faces at sport
323 events such as soccer, rugby and cricket and printed and displayed on all kinds of
324 curios and consumer items. Overall, the impression has been created that national
325 pride, as reflected in the new symbols, has surged to levels formerly unknown
326 (Bornman, 2006).

327 However, research indicates that the new symbols have not been accepted as
328 widely as is often assumed. Bornman (2006) found that Blacks attached signifi-
329 cantly more value to the new symbols than did Coloreds, Indians and Whites, who
330 are further removed from the seat of power. The lowest importance ratings were
331 recorded for Afrikaners. In fact, the ratings for this group were so low that they can
332 be interpreted as a lack of identification with or alienation from the current national
333 symbols. The influence of sub-national identities, in contrast to an overarching
334 South African identity, can be discerned in the fact that people who identified more
335 strongly with a community or group distinguished by a distinctive culture, identified
336 significantly less with the new symbols.

337 Mac Ginty (2001) also notes indicators that the roots of the new South African
338 symbols might be rather shallow, in particular among certain groups. During the
339 transitional years, the acceptance of the new flag was lukewarm among some groups
340 and the old flag was often waved at sport events. These attempts have been publicly
341 denounced as offensive and the previous flag typified as the “apartheid” flag. Even
342 today, debates flame up every now and then on the use of the old flag and the rights
343 of Afrikaners to display this flag. In a recent letter to an Afrikaans newspaper, a
344 reader asks why the English are allowed to freely wave the Union Jack associated
345 with imperialism, while Afrikaners are not allowed to use the old flag (Van der
346 Merwe, 2013). This is but one indication of the close ties between Afrikaner iden-
347 tity, the old flag and the other symbols associated with the previous dispensation.

348 *The Economist* (in Mac Ginty, 2001) also notes that none of the members of the
349 national rugby team who visited England in 1994 knew the words of the new
350 national anthem. In recent times, the members of most sport teams have been forced
351 to learn the words of the national anthem. Furthermore, it is often noticed at sport
352 events that Whites remain silent while *Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika* is sung and only join
353 in the singing once the words of *Die Stem* start. The fault lines in South African
354 society also became clear in a symbolic clash at a recent public meeting organized
355 by the municipality of Pretoria in order to discuss the proposed name change of the
356 city to Tshwane (Versluis, 2013). The atmosphere between supporters of the name

change (mainly Black) and those opposed to the idea (mainly White) was tense. 357
White attendees demonstrated their opposition by standing on attention and singing 358
the full pre-1994 version of *Die Stem*. Black attendees immediately reacted by sing- 359
ing *Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika*. Yearning for the old symbols is furthermore reflected in 360
the fact that Theuns Jordaan, a popular singer representing a new young generation 361
of Afrikaner artists, sings *Die Stem* as a popular song on one of his albums. In a 362
prelude, he announces that this song would be “dear to our hearts”. Thus, the old 363
symbols have not vanished completely from the minds of the members of the pub- 364
lic; it is rather the case that they have remained part of the historical and cultural 365
legacy of groups such as Afrikaners. 366

Although the new South African national symbols are said to have been invented 367
to promote post-apartheid healing, reconciliation, nation building and unity, indica- 368
tions are that they are meeting with mixed success (Mac Ginty, 2001). In some 369
instances, such as the case of the flag, White people might be associating it with the 370
ANC due to the dominant black, green and gold colours. The strong African ele- 371
ments in all the symbols could also serve to alienate Whites. The absence of strongly 372
recognizable elements rooted in the historical legacies of Whites and other groups 373
(Afrikaners in particular) is probably the reason for a degree of apathy towards the 374
new symbols. People could nevertheless have grown accustomed to the new flag and 375
coat of arms due to their pervasive presence. The new anthem, however, appears to 376
be divisive, especially in situations of heightened intergroup tension. People tend to 377
sing only the parts that they can identify with. However, given the fact that Blacks 378
form an overall majority in South Africa, the predominance of African elements 379
implies that opposition comes from minority groups and is mostly deafened by the 380
majority. 381

However, the main danger is that the state and its symbols are being manipulated 382
and appropriated by one group and one political party at the expense of others 383
(Harrison, 1995). Mac Ginty (2001) draws the conclusion that the mixed reaction to 384
the new South African national symbols illustrates the difficulty of establishing 385
symbols that are commonly accepted and truly unifying in a divided nation with 386
widely divergent historical and cultural legacies. Moreover, it highlights the pitfalls 387
associated with nation building in a deeply heterogeneous and multicultural 388
society. 389

The Politics of Memory and Heritage 390

National symbols are not the only elements in the symbolic inventory of a country 391
or group. Statues, monuments, museums, memorials and other heritage sites rep- 392
resent another integral component. These reflect the human faculty of remember- 393
ing and memory, our relationship with the past and the way in which the past has 394
shaped our identities and our experiences in the present (Mare, 2007). Political 395
transformation in South Africa has also been characterized by concerted efforts to 396
transform the heritage landscape (Herwitz, 2011; Marschall, 2005; Ross, 2007). 397

398 In fact, since 1994, heritage symbolism has become a prominent focus of discourse
399 in the political arena and a site for the renegotiating of issues related to memory,
400 cultural identity and citizenship (Marschall, 2010).

401 State involvement in the preservation of memory and heritage dates back to the
402 Bushman Relics Protection Act of 1911, which aimed to protect the country's pre-
403 colonial and prehistoric heritage (Delmont, 2004). The 1934 Historical Monuments
404 Commission had the task of protecting the built environment of settlers and colo-
405 nists, while the National Monuments Act of 1969 was employed to bolster Afrikaner
406 identity and later, the concomitant ideologies of Afrikaner nationalism and separate
407 development. The consequence was that the new political dispensation inherited a
408 highly skewed heritage landscape where 98 % of approximately 4,000 monuments
409 represented colonial and settler history, while the remainder was associated with
410 natural heritage, archaeological, paleontological, geological and rock art sites.

411 Since the advent of democracy, various initiatives have been launched for the
412 country to come to grips with its tumultuous history, of which the memories have
413 often been smothered, silenced or ignored (Coombes, 2003; Delmont, 2004;
414 Labuschagne, 2012; Ross, 2007). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC;
415 chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu), which had the task of investigating gross
416 human rights violations from 1960 to 1994, inspired these initiatives, in particular.
417 In its final report, entitled *Living with the Issue of Reconciliation*, the TRC states its
418 intent to leave a permanent legacy that will foster reconciliation and peace building
419 and outlines a number of recommendations to concretely reflect and heal the wrongs
420 of the past. One of the recommended strategies is that museums should be erected
421 and maintained to celebrate different aspects of the past, to balance the past, to fur-
422 ther justice and to foster reconciliation on various levels.

423 The necessity of reflecting a more balanced picture of the country's history was
424 taken further by the National Heritage Resources Act of 1999 (Delmont, 2004). The
425 Act proclaims heritage protection to be an important founding stone for the nation-
426 building project. Following the proclamation of the Act, the Department of Arts and
427 Culture identified and initiated a number of the so-called Presidential Legacy
428 Projects in the various provinces. The result has been sweeping changes to the sym-
429 bolic landscape with the development of numerous new monuments, statues, muse-
430 ums and heritage sites (Bakker & Müller, 2010, p. 48—see also Delmont, 2004;
431 Herwitz, 2011; Mare, 2007; Ross, 2007).

432 Symbolic imbalance during apartheid has probably been nowhere more conspic-
433 uous than in the capital city of Pretoria (Labuschagne, 2010). In 1999 (5 years after
434 the political transition), there were 14 monuments within the boundaries of the city
435 which represented White and Afrikaner interests, with only three commemorating
436 the plight of Blacks who died during World War I and the liberation struggle. It is
437 therefore almost inevitable that Pretoria has become an important focus for sym-
438 bolic reparation—a process which has served to bring tensions between divergent
439 historical legacies to the forefront. Some of the characteristics of, and changes to,
440 symbolism in Pretoria are discussed in the following sections.

The Voortrekker Monument

441

The Voortrekker Monument is one of the most well-known landmarks in Pretoria and probably one of the most controversial and scrutinized historical symbols associated with the previous dispensation (Coombes, 2003; Grundlingh, 2001; Moeschberger, 2010; Ross, 2007). The gigantic granite structure is prominently situated on a hill at the southern entrance of Pretoria. The monument commemorates the Great Trek, that is, the migration of Afrikaans-speaking White settlers from the Cape colonies to the interior of South Africa during the second quarter of the nineteenth century (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007). This migration closely resembled American westward expansion and was characterized by a number of violent conflicts with indigenous groups. Important events during the Great Trek are portrayed on 27 large marble friezes on the ground floor of the monument, a display reported to be one of the largest and most impressive of its kind (Grundlingh, 2001).

However, the real inspiration for the building of the Voortrekker Monument comes from a later historical event, the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). Herwitz (2011) proclaims that if there were no Anglo-Boer War, there probably would have been no Afrikaner nationalism and no Voortrekker Monument. The Anglo-Boer War between Great Britain and the two independent republics in the interior established by the Voortrekkers, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, featured one of the first instances of concentration camps in world history. The British commander, Lord Kitchener, infuriated by the stubborn resistance of ragtag groups of Boer farmers, burned their farms so that nothing could be produced and placed the women and children in concentration camps where thousands died of disease. The war left the Voortrekker descendants demoralized and impoverished. Their freedom was taken away and they were once more victims of the alien political culture of British imperialism (Grundlingh, 2001, p. 98). As large numbers had to move from devastated farms to the growing cities, they felt the debilitating effects of the 1931 Depression, which had reduced them to the ranks of poor Whites within unfamiliar urban environments.

The centenary of the Great Trek was celebrated in 1938 by a symbolic trek of nine ox-wagons from the Cape to the North (Grundlingh, 2001). The reception of the ox-wagons in cities and towns on the way resulted in unsurpassed cultural and political theatre. Frenetic crowds dressed in traditional Voortrekker clothes welcomed the wagons; couples were married; babies were baptized; memorials were unveiled and streets were named after Voortrekker heroes. Although this second trek was deliberately orchestrated to mobilize Afrikaners, even cultural and political leaders were surprised by the reaction. The reasons for the unsurpassed frenzy can be found in the fact that the trials and tribulations of the Voortrekkers resonated with the problems that Afrikaners, especially those living in cities, experienced at that time. At the root of the enthusiasm were beliefs that only coordinated and unified cultural and political mobilization could lead to a better future. Therefore, the 1938 centenary celebration served as a powerful binding agent for Afrikaner nationalism.

483 These aspirations were cemented 11 years later by the inauguration of the
484 Voortrekker Monument on 16 December 1949 (Grundlingh, 2001). The date of 16
485 December marks one of the most notorious events during the Great Trek, namely,
486 the Battle of Blood River (Ncome), when the Voortrekkers succeeded in defending
487 themselves successfully against an onslaught of the Zulu army of King Dingane. It
488 is significant that the lower level, which is regarded by many as the most sacred
489 level, contains a burning flame known as the flame of civilization and a cenotaph
490 with the words "We for thee South Africa". At 12:00 on 16 December, the sun
491 shines directly on these words through a small round window in the dome.

492 The fact that the inauguration of the Voortrekker Monument happened only
493 1 year after Afrikaners come to power in 1948 means that it is irrevocably associ-
494 ated with White Afrikaner political power and domination and also with apartheid
495 (Coombes, 2003; Ross, 2007). Furthermore, it is often assumed that Afrikaners
496 "cannot escape from the 'spell' of the monument"; they "are trapped by racism, by
497 religion, by their myths and by their history" (Grundlingh, 2001, p. 97).

498 However, Grundlingh (2001) points out that Afrikaner identity and its relation-
499 ship with the monument have changed since 1949. One of the most important rea-
500 sons is a demographic revolution among Afrikaners. Under National Party rule,
501 Afrikaners urbanized even faster than before. Protectionist policies gave large num-
502 bers access to full-time work opportunities. Many climbed the occupational and
503 economic ladder to achieve middle and upper class status, while they gained a
504 prominent presence in professional occupations. Apart from control over the agri-
505 cultural sector, their control over private enterprise also grew strongly. By the 1970s,
506 Afrikaner bourgeoisie had established themselves. Economic success has exposed
507 Afrikaners to the lure of a global consumer culture that loosened the ties that bind
508 them to the country, group and culture. Many have emigrated to countries such as
509 Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Although 1994 did not represent a deathblow
510 for Afrikaner identity and ethnicity, those who stayed in South Africa have discov-
511 ered alternative ways of cultural expression such as annual cultural festivals, of
512 which the Klein Karoo Nasionale Kunstefees (KKNK) is one example.

513 Despite changes to their economic prospects, the Voortrekker Monument has
514 remained an important symbol for Afrikaners of their identity, role and place in
515 South Africa. Fears for the future of the monument under Black government led to
516 a decision by a consortium of Afrikaner cultural organizations to form a non-profit
517 company in 2000. The company took ownership of the monument and its extended
518 site. According to the first chairperson of the Voortrekker Monument Company,
519 Christo Kuhn, this was done to preserve Afrikaner heritage and to keep the monu-
520 ment from becoming a political toy. Although it protested, albeit demurely, the
521 ANC nevertheless declared the monument a national heritage site and has continued
522 to support it financially. However, these contributions have declined steadily in
523 recent years (Rademeyer, 2011).

524 The new management realized the need to change the public image of the monu-
525 ment in order to make it more acceptable within the changed political environment
526 (Grundlingh, 2001; Ross, 2007). The culture of Afrikaners had to be detached from
527 apartheid. In speeches at the monument on the Day of Reconciliation (formerly the

Day of the Covenant), the religious significance of the day—instead of a political connotation—is emphasized. Furthermore, much has been done to emphasize the monument as a cultural facility and a historical resource centre and to make it attractive for local visitors, families and tourists. An exhibition of artefacts depicting life on the Great Trek was moved from the restaurant to the cellar of the monument. The extended terrain contains an amphitheatre for open air concerts, facilities for antique and traditional food markets, the Fort Schanskop Museum (one of the forts built to defend Pretoria against the British in the Anglo-Boer War), walking and bicycle trails as well as a nature reserve containing a number of wildlife species. A historical resource centre and archive for important Afrikaner documents have been recently added.

These attempts have apparently been relatively successful. According to its website, the Voortrekker Monument is currently the most visited heritage site in the province of Gauteng and one of the top ten historical cultural visitor attractions in South Africa (“Voortrekker Monument”, n.d). The growing tourist industry in South Africa is one of the major reasons that the Voortrekker Monument is not staying all alone on its hill—becoming a sealed off rather than a living past—as many analysts have prophesied (Grundlingh, 2001).

However, an important question is not only how Afrikaners and tourists feel about the Voortrekker Monument, but also how South Africans from other groups perceive it. This is a pertinent question as the friezes in the entrance hall predominantly depict Blacks as savages who ruthlessly attacked the Voortrekkers (Grundlingh, 2001; Ross, 2007). According to Grundlingh, Black responses vary from extreme discomfort to indifference. Some Blacks who took the trouble to visit the monument found the site insensitive and offensive. Others saw it merely as a historical monument depicting a particular epoch in South African history. A Black guide at the monument remarks, “To me the monument tells the history of the Voortrekkers and how they got the land in the interior. Nothing else” (in Grundlingh, 2001, p. 103).

Perhaps the most telling reaction came from the black singer, Abigail Kubeka, when she performed at the monument in April 2000. Kubeka remarked that “... the last inch of the country is now part of the nation” (in Grundlingh, 2001, p. 104). This remark probably says it all: Blacks are currently governing the country as a whole and that means that they also have control over the soil on which the Voortrekker Monument is built. That implies that they can afford to be indifferent or even ignore its significance; they can choose not to take heed of whatever it symbolizes.

The privatization of the Voortrekker Monument has also not stopped speculations on what should be done about and with it after the advent of a new dispensation (Coombes, 2003; Grundlingh, 2001; Ross, 2007). Apart from talks that it should be torn down as a symbol of the destruction of apartheid, there have also been suggestions that it should be painted pink and transformed into a gay nightclub. In a satirical mode, it has been described as a “pop-up toaster”, a “1940 art deco radio”, “an Andy Warhol drawing, a somewhat absurd, even kitsch symbol” (Grundlingh, 2001, p. 101).

573 Ross (2007) makes some suggestions on how the symbolic significance of the
574 Voortrekker Monument can be transformed in order to promote a more complex
575 narrative of South African history. He suggests that comparisons should be drawn
576 between narratives regarding the struggle of Afrikaners against British imperialism
577 and the struggle of Blacks against apartheid. Therefore, a degree of convergence
578 around metaphors of resistance and liberation can be emphasized. Although
579 Afrikaners have begun to acknowledge the role that slaves and Blacks played in the
580 Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War, Blacks are portrayed in a predominantly nega-
581 tive way as aggressors and savages on the ground floor friezes. These images are set
582 in stone and cannot be changed. However, Ross feels that some bold steps need to
583 be taken to change the values attached to these images. Therefore, it needs to be
584 acknowledged openly that Blacks attacked the Voortrekkers as they perceived them
585 as conquerors. As many Black tribes were afraid of the military power of Afrikaners
586 (they had guns which the indigenous tribes did not have), so they launched surprise
587 attacks on the Voortrekkers (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007). The one-sided view
588 should therefore be changed to a more multifaceted view of the events. Another
589 possibility, according to Ross (2007), is to convey a strong message to school groups
590 and other visitors of “never again” referring to the country’s racialized past as
591 reflected in some of the friezes of the monument. Although it needs to be taken into
592 account that the Voortrekker Monument depicts Afrikaner historical legacy and
593 does not pretend to be anything else, the embeddedness of Afrikaners within the
594 larger South African nation and relations of coexistence and co-operation with other
595 South African groups can also be emphasized.

596 When the ANC came to power in 1994, there were talks to appropriate the lower
597 level of the Voortrekker Monument for an exhibition related to the liberation strug-
598 gle (Labuschagne, 2010). Mare (2007) holds that this would have implied that the
599 ANC appropriated for themselves exactly the thing that that they opposed, namely,
600 White domination. It would have meant the coexistence of the spaces of Afrikaner
601 and Black struggles in one symbolic structure, while the hegemony of neither of
602 them would have been resolved. However, these intentions came to naught, proba-
603 bly due to the privatization of the monument. Therefore, despite much speculation,
604 the Voortrekker Monument is still standing on its hill at the entrance to Pretoria.
605 Instead of removing or changing the monument, ANC expansionism has taken the
606 form of the addition of a number of heritage sites as discussed in the next sections.

607 *Freedom Park*

608 One of the most important projects to transform the symbolic landscape of Pretoria
609 has been the erection of Freedom Park. This park, the most ambitious of the
610 Presidential Legacy Projects, was launched on 16 June 2000 (Baines, 2009;
611 Labuschagne, 2010). It has been fully funded by government with an initial budget
612 in excess of R700 million. The official website indicates its erection is a direct
613 response to the call of the TRC for symbolic reparation (“[Freedom Park: a heritage](#)

destination”, n.d.). According to the initial mission statement, the park is committed to the nation-building project:

Provide a pioneering and empowering heritage destination in order to mobilise for reconciliation and nation building in our country; reflect upon our past; improving our present and building our future as a united nation; contribute continentally and internationally to the formation of better human understanding among nations and peoples (Freedom Park Trust 2004–2009 in Baines, 2009, p. 334).

Freedom Park is located on a 52-ha site on Salvo-kop (the name indicates the heavy artillery fire that came from the hill during the Anglo-Boer War), yet another hill at the southern entrance of Pretoria. As such, it is directly facing the Voortrekker Monument. Labuschagne (2010) holds that it was a strategic decision on the part of the ANC-government to build the park on the particular site. Salvo-kop is not of particular historical or religious value for the majority of South Africans and, in particular, not for Blacks. Anthropological evidence suggests that migratory Black tribes stayed for too short of a time in the eastern and southern parts of Pretoria to establish permanent sites with significant historic and symbolic meaning. However, there is a site in the northeast of Pretoria, the area surrounding the *Wonderboom* (Wonder Tree—an extraordinarily large wild fig tree), that holds symbolic value as for centuries migrating Blacks used the site to perform religious rituals. This area has a much stronger historical, cultural, anthropological and religious link with pre-colonial history which could underpin the values to which Freedom Park subscribes. However, the choice of Salvo-kop bypassed the heritage and symbolic status of the *Wonderboom* area in favour of a site that has a much stronger link with colonial history—the history of the Transvaal Republic founded by the Voortrekkers and the British occupation of Pretoria.

Therefore, although Freedom Park invites visitors to walk where their ancestors walked, no substantive anthropological or historical links with the past exist at the site. There are no “footprints in the sands of time” which the visitor can follow as proclaimed in an official pamphlet, at least no footprints from precolonial times. The history portrayed by the park is in reality an “invented history” (Labuschagne, 2010, p. 122). The fact of the matter is that the site on Salvo-kop was chosen for political reasons and has no nexus of symbolic links with the ancestors of the majority of South Africans.

Salvo-kop was chosen in order to situate Freedom Park at the centre of a nexus of historical sites associated with Voortrekker history, namely, the Voortrekker Monument and the Fort Schanskop and Fort Klapperkop museums. The latter are two fortifications erected and used to defend Pretoria against the British during the Anglo-Boer War. In doing so, the Black ANC government has, in accordance with the theory of symbolic conflict of Harrison (1995), appropriated a space in the symbolic realm of Pretoria and has put its stamp on the entrance of the city and thus also on the city itself. Another motivation, according to Labuschagne (2010, p. 117) was to perform “a visual amputation of the historical link between the cultural dimension (Voortrekker Monument) and Afrikaner control of political power, practically manifested by its supporters occupying the offices of the Union Buildings”.

658 At the highest point in Freedom Park, the visitor has a spectacular view of the
659 Voortrekker Monument, the Union Buildings and both forts. However, in the archi-
660 tectural design of Freedom Park, no allowance has been made for a visual link with
661 the other sites in the vicinity. Therefore, the Salvo-kop side does not provide a sym-
662 bolic centre point and does not establish a historical and symbolic link with the
663 historical legacies of other groups residing within the Pretoria area.

664 The choice of the particular site created a “bizarre triangle” which elicited con-
[AU2]665 flicting responses from various sides of the political spectrum. Synagogues
666 (Labuschagne, 2010), for example, depicted the new visual and symbolic environ-
667 ment as confrontation between democracy (the Union Buildings), freedom (Freedom
668 Park) and White domination (Voortrekker Monument). Mare (2007) ascribes the
669 placement of the park to the postcolonial ethos that a monument should be in the
670 vicinity of a colonial monument. This was done in a deliberate effort to counterbal-
671 ance the values and motives represented by the other monuments in the area as well
672 as to share the entrance to the capital city. Ross (2007) also interprets the erection of
673 the park as a counter move to the symbolism of the Voortrekker Monument and an
674 attempt to “correct” the Voortrekker narratives. He does not, however, regard the
675 placement of the park directly facing the Voortrekker Monument as confrontational.
676 In following the strategy of addition, as identified by Harrison (1995), rather than
677 removal or appropriation, Ross feels that a spirit of pluralism is fostered.

678 In contrast to the gigantic structure of the Voortrekker Monument, Freedom Park
679 does not protrude from the landscape and displays a more modern, open and envi-
680 ronmentally friendly architecture. It has been designed to gently blend into the
681 topography of rolling hills of the highveld (“Freedom Park: a heritage destination”,
682 n.d.; Labuschagne, 2010). According to Labuschagne (2010), aerial photography
683 shows a remarkable resemblance with the Great Zimbabwe Ruins near Masvingo.
684 Its network of walls and buildings, as well as the way in which it gently nestles in
685 the slopes of the hill, provides a visual link to the Great Enclosure Complex at the
686 ruins. Most visible from the city of Pretoria is the surrounding stone wall which
687 serves to re-emphasize the visual link with the outer wall of the Zimbabwe Ruins.
688 This link probably serves to emphasize not only precolonial history, but also South
689 Africa’s link to Africa. Along the ridge is a line of poles with blue lights which are
690 said to resemble freedom. However, the lights are not visible during the day and
691 give the park a porcupine appearance which distracts from its simplistic beauty.
692 Furthermore, they do not carry any symbolic substance.

693 The symbolic space contains several elements, each serving a particular purpose
694 with a symbolic link, which determine its placement (Labuschagne, 2010). One of
695 the most important of these is called the *Isivivane*, the so-called resting place of the
696 spirits of those who died in struggles for humanity and freedom. Another important
697 element, the *S’khumbuto*, represents a memorial for the various conflicts that have
698 shaped South Africa. It contains an eternal flame to remember unknown soldiers, a
699 sanctuary (a serene environment where ceremonies in remembrance of victims can
700 be conducted), an amphitheatre that can seat 2,000 people and the Wall of
701 Remembrance with the names of those who died in eight conflicts in which South
702 Africans was involved (see the next section). Planned future projects entail
703 the *llhlapo* (a live exhibition of cultural and historical subjects that can handled,

discussed and used so that visitors would not only be spectators, but also participants), a facility for the storage of documents on freedom struggles (the Pan-African Archives), and the *Vhuawelo* (a peaceful garden for meditation, healing and spiritual contemplation).

Analysts have been markedly silent on the symbolism of Freedom Park. During a visit to the park in March 2013, the current author was struck by the predominant occupation with elements of death and African ancestry worship such as the honouring of the “spirits of those who died” (“[Isivivane](#)”, n.d.). Not only does this emphasis place the park firmly within the realm of Africanism and African religion and culture, but it also creates the aura of seriousness associated with a graveyard rather than a site providing inspiration for the living and the future. The one aspect of the park that should be offering a lived experience, the *//hlapo*, was still absent at that time. The exhibition space contained large banners with pictures of a number of Black African leaders, leader figures of the struggle as well as leaders of other African countries (presumably these assisted Blacks during the liberation struggle). No leaders of other South African groups who also played a prominent role in the liberation struggle were portrayed. Furthermore, it was difficult to see the relevance of a banner with the photo of Che Chuevera for South Africans.

Labuschagne (2010) points out that the emphasis on links with Africanism and Pan-Africanism results in exclusiveness and can serve to alienate non-Black visitors. This is further aggravated by the exclusion of the names of former defence force soldiers who died in the Border War during apartheid (see next section). Therefore, despite the promises on official pamphlets and website, Freedom Park does not really promote reconciliation and nation building and does not provide any clear links with the historical legacies of other groups in order to unite the South African nation. Furthermore, it does not acknowledge and give a voice to the variety of groups and cultures that constitute the Rainbow Nation. Despite the good intentions voiced in the mission statement, official website and advertising material, it is often experienced as an exclusively Black heritage site. The result has been apathy and a lack of enthusiasm and participation from the South African public which is reflected in visitor figures. During June 2010, the period when the FIFA World Cup was held in South Africa, Freedom Park had a mere 3,000 visitors in contrast to the approximately 17,000 people who visited the Voortrekker Monument.

Labuschagne (2010) concludes that although the placement of Freedom Park was done to restore balance in reconstructing the past, its erection was not done in a way that reflects historical sensitivity, good planning, architectural imagination and a sensitivity for the heterogeneity of the Rainbow Nation. Therefore, despite its enormous price tag, the park has failed to fulfil its promises to build bridges between the diverse groups and cultures of South Africa and to unite the South African nation.

Two Walls of Remembrance: Two Historical Legacies 743

Instead of uniting the Rainbow Nation, the erection of the Wall of Names in Freedom Park has served to ignite tension and contestation between various legacies of 744
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746 memory, heritage and belonging (Baines, 2009; Labuschagne, 2010). The contro-
747 versy relates to the “Border War” that was waged by the South African Defence
748 Force on the borders between Angola and Namibia during the last decades of the
749 apartheid regime (Baines, 2009). Soldiers of the South African Defence Force
750 (SADF) fought against Cubans, the armies of the frontline states, and other “terror-
751 ist” insurgents. From 1967 to 1992, approximately 600,000 young White males
752 were sent to the border of Namibia. Analysts such as Steenkamp (2007) regard the
753 struggle against apartheid (also known as the liberation struggle) and the Border
754 War as two separate struggles. Baines (2009), on the other hand, believes that the
755 Border War was a mere extension of the low-intensity civil war associated with the
756 anti-apartheid struggle. However, different historical narratives about this war
757 imply that White soldiers believe that they fought against “terrorists” and “com-
758 munists”, while Blacks believe the participants in this war to have been “freedom
759 fighters”.

760 During apartheid, a monument—a twice-life-size statue of an infantryman—was
761 erected at Fort Klapperkop to remember those who lost their lives in armed conflicts
762 (Baines, 2009). The site also embodies a series of walls with the names of South
763 African soldiers who died in the Korean and World Wars as well as some of those
764 who died in the Border War. However, the names on these walls are not complete
765 and have not been updated since 1994. The Fort Klapperkop site is also not a well-
766 visited site and has not become a place of mourning and remembrance for the fami-
767 lies and friends of those who died in the Border War. Instead, it has become an
768 “overlooked memorial to an undeclared war” (Baines, 2009, p. 334). Since the
769 advent of democracy, this site has been eclipsed by the much more impressive
770 Freedom Park on the nearby Salvo-kop.

771 As already discussed, in the *S'khumboto* (isiSiswati for “those who have passed
772 on”) in Freedom Park, a Wall of Names was erected to commemorate all those who
773 died during conflicts that shaped present-day South Africa (Baines, 2009). The con-
774 flicts identified are precolonial wars, genocide, slavery, wars of resistance, the South
775 African wars (first and second Anglo-Boer War), World War I and II and the libera-
776 tion struggle. The Freedom Park Trust made an appeal for organizations to nomi-
777 nate names for inclusion on the Wall of Names. However, when veteran organizations
778 submitted the names of SADF soldiers who fell during the Border War, these sub-
779 missions were rejected, while the names of Cuban soldiers who died on African soil
780 in the same war were included.

781 The perceived slight elicited an outcry from the public and SADF veterans and
782 the issues were taken up by Afrikaner lobby groups such as Solidariteit and Afriforum
783 on behalf of veteran organizations (Baines, 2009). In 2007, Afriforum made addi-
784 tional submissions to the Freedom Park Trust and not only requested that the names
785 of soldiers who fell in the Border War be included, but also those of civilians and
786 security force members who died in various forms of violence, the so-called “terror-
787 ist” violence, during the liberation struggle. Afriforum objected to the inclusion of
788 the names of Cuban soldiers on the basis that they were fighting for communist
789 world domination. The Freedom Park Trust agreed to include the names of victims
790 of “terror”. However, it stood firm that the names of SADF soldiers did not deserve

inclusion. The reasons forwarded were that these soldiers were defending apartheid in order to defeat the liberation struggle. 791
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Some SADF veterans reacted vehemently by erecting an alternative wall at the access to Freedom Park on 16 January 2007 (Baines, 2009). The popular Afrikaans singer, Steve Hofmeyer, played a leading role in the erection of a plaque with the following explanation (poorly translated into English): 793
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This triangular monument's various sides symbolise the fact that history is not one-sided. It is erected to ensure that those who will, as a result of Freedom Park's one sided usage of history, are not being honoured, will get the recognition they deserve. Even though this monument does not cost the R716 million that Freedom Park cost, it is a sincere effort to pay homage to those who died in conflicts. (as cited in Baines, 2009, p. 336) 797
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Various meetings of Afrikaner lobby groups followed. The end of the story is that a more permanent alternative wall, the South African Defence Force Wall of Remembrance, was erected at the Voortrekker Monument to commemorate the SADF soldiers who died in the Namibian/Angolan conflict (Baines, 2009). There are now two walls, each representing different branches of memories and historical legacy, different historical traditions, different groups and identities and perhaps also different civilizations. 802
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The politics of memory consequently became the source of an ideological contest with the Border War as focus (Baines, 2009). On the one hand, Afrikaner groups felt that the Freedom Park Trust had not been consistent in terms of the principle of inclusivity when remembering those who died in past conflicts. They pointed out that soldiers who fought on both sides of the Anglo-Boer War were honoured. However, the same principle was not applied in the case of the liberation struggle and the border war. Therefore, the well-respected Afrikaner historian, Hermann Giliomee (Anonymous, 2007), branded Freedom Park an ANC monument, while Jaap Steyn (Anonymous, 2007), a language rights activist, states that Freedom Park reinforces divisions rather than promoting reconciliation. This oversight has served to fuel perceptions among Afrikaners that they are being victimized in the new dispensation. 809
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Analysts outside the Afrikaner community hold opposing viewpoints. Peter Stiff (in Baines, 2009) agrees that the exclusion of the names of SAFD soldiers is indeed inconsistent with the fact that names of soldiers of both sides of other South African conflicts were included. Military correspondent, Willem Steenkamp (2007), on the other hand, feels that SADF soldiers do not deserve to be included as they were conscripted by the apartheid government and were benefiting from apartheid. 821
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However, Baines (2009) believes that if the Freedom Park project is really committed to reconciliation, nation building and the unification of the South African nation, historical consensus is a prerequisite to achieving these goals. It implies that the Freedom Park Trust should go out of its way to accommodate those who feel that the current Wall of Names discriminate against their war heroes. In the end, all sectors of the South African public should feel that they can relate to the names of those included on the Wall of Names. It would indeed be appropriate to include the names of those who died in the liberation struggle alongside the names of SADF soldiers. 827
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836 Freedom Park is depicted as a “living monument” and the chief executive officer
837 of the Freedom Park Trust, Wally Serote, still believes in processes of consultation
838 about forms of memorialization and their purpose as well as the commemoration of
839 South Africa’s divisive past and the contested meanings attached to particular
840 events. However, Baines (2009) poses the question of whether it is really possible to
841 erect an all-encompassing memorial site, as Freedom Park claims to be, in a divided
842 society. It appears to be even more difficult in the case of recent conflicts where the
843 memories are still very raw. There are also a few examples of war memorials that
844 represent both sides of a conflict. Most war memorials are sectarian in nature and
845 memory cultures are seldom national in scope. Baines also regards it as debatable
846 whether it is necessary that some kind of national consensus be reached before
847 people can live peacefully alongside one another. Rather, differences of opinion
848 could be seen as a hallmark of a robust democratic culture where differences are not
849 only tolerated, but also cherished.

850 What is nevertheless at stake is whose interpretation of history will become insti-
851 tutionalized in the end (Baines, 2009). It is usually the case that the winners write
852 the history, while the losers are relegated to the margins of society as the official
853 history propagated by the political elite and cultural brokers become hegemonic. In
854 divided societies, such hegemonic historical narratives are almost always contested.
855 This also applies to the liberation struggle and the border war. Baines holds that it is
856 important that the ANC government should not have the last or only say on how the
857 country’s divisive history is remembered. Furthermore, processes of contestation
858 should not be smothered or hindered. Such contestation should be valued as part and
859 parcel of the practice of democracy, while institutions and structures should be
860 developed to manage conflict.

861 Conclusions

862 There can be little doubt that South Africa has undergone an “iconoclastic” revolu-
863 tion since the advent of a new dispensation in 1994 (Bakker & Müller, 2010, p. 48).
864 Not only has a complete set of new symbols been introduced to replace the symbols
865 widely associated with the apartheid state but on the terrain of the politics of mem-
866 ory and heritage, far-reaching changes have also taken place.

867 Various strategies associated with symbolic politics and competition can be dis-
868 cerned in transforming South Africa’s symbolic landscape (Harrison, 1995; Mac
869 Ginty, 2001). Invention was the dominant strategy in the establishment of a new set
870 of national symbols such as the new flag and coat of arms. In the case of the national
871 anthem, both expansion and re-ranking can be detected as a new song, *Nkosi Sikelel’*
872 *iAfrika*, was not only added, but it is also sung first, while the *Stem van Suid-Afrika*
873 (*Voice of South Africa*) has been modified and shortened to make the anthem more
874 compact.

875 It is indisputable that there also existed a dire need to rectify the heavily skewed
876 heritage landscape inherited from apartheid (Ross, 2007). Expansionism in adding

numerous new sites has been the dominant strategy in addressing discrepancies and giving a voice to suppressed historical narratives (Harrison, 1995; Mac Ginty, 2001; Ross, 2007). Instead of fostering complex narratives between sites representing the historical legacies of diverse groups, a layered approach has been followed in which new layers of suppressed or misrepresented history have been added (Bakker & Müller, 2010). No linkages have been established to integrate the historical narratives of diverse groups, for example, in the Voortrekker Monument and Freedom Park and the City Hall statues (Labuschagne, 2010). Moreover, alternative narratives have been ignored and suppressed as in the case of the Wall of Names in Freedom Park. The placing of new symbols directly facing or in the close vicinity of existing symbols can be interpreted by some communities as hostile, confrontational and threatening (Labuschagne, 2010; Mare, 2007; Marschall, 2005, 2010). The experience of symbolic threat and the desire to protect valued symbols and the concomitant identities can, be discerned in counter expansionary moves such as the privatization of the Voortrekker Monument and the erection of the alternative Wall of Remembrance within the premises of this monument (Harrison, 1995). Furthermore, an expansionist strategy by the current government can be discerned in the fact that a hegemonic African voice, in line with the ideology of pan-Africanism and the African shift in the nation-building ideology, has become dominant and has largely replaced or obscured alternative South African voices (Bakker & Müller, 2010; Harrison, 1995; Labuschagne, 2010, 2012). The predominance of African elements in the new national symbols and the resemblance of Freedom Park to the Zimbabwe ruins not only serve to emphasize links with precolonial Africa, but also proclaim African dominance.

Therefore, although nation building has been proclaimed to be the driving force behind symbolic transformation, the impact has often been divisionary rather than bridging societal divisions. One of the most important reasons is the fact that symbolic reforms do not reflect the diverse and multicultural nature of the South African nation. Thus, the multicoloured nature of the South African Rainbow Nation is often obscured by a one-dimensional emphasis on only one colour.

The current symbolic politics indicates that South African society has remained divided despite strong nation-building efforts since 1994. It also emphasizes the difficulty, as already discussed, of establishing common symbols in a heterogeneous society and the futility of attempting to dissolve diverse ethnic, cultural and religious legacies within a single overarching national identity (Mac Ginty, 2001). Unity in South Africa can probably best be promoted by acknowledging and valuing diversity. Thus, instead of aiming to establish a single dominant (African) identity, the existence of different groups, cultures, identities and historical legacies—the many colours and flavours of the Rainbow Nation—should be fully recognized, treasured and supported, also in the symbolic realm. A singular hegemonic voice should also not be allowed to drown out diverse historical narratives. The symbols representing the identities and cultures of diverse groups should not be abhorred, but rather acknowledged and accommodated. One step in this direction could be to tolerate group symbols alongside national symbols. Instead of confrontation, robust debate on controversial issues should be fostered. In order to prepare the way for a

922 common future, complex discourses providing linkages between varied historical
 923 narratives should also be promoted. In doing so, intergroup empathy and under-
 924 standing can be fostered in order to ensure the peaceful coexistence of the many and
 925 diverse groups constituting the South African Rainbow Nation.

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Author Queries

Chapter No.: 9 0002109638

Queries	Details Required	Author's Response
AU1	"Degenaar (1994)" is cited in text but not given in the reference list. Please provide details in the list or delete the citation from the text.	
AU2	Please check the spelling of the word "Synagues".	
AU3	Please note that reference Brown and Macginty (2003) is given in references list but not cited in text. Please provide text citation or delete it from list.	

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