
by

BHEKITHEMBA RICHARD MNGOMEZULU

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SUPERVISOR: MR J G N YOH

JOINT SUPERVISOR: DR C J NAPIER

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I declare that AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY POLITICAL LEADERS, NATIONALISM AND SUB-NATIONALISMS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND COLLAPSE OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, 1960-1977 is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

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SIGNATURE                     DATE
(DR B R MNGOMEZULU)
ABSTRACT

By

Bhekithemba Richard Mngomezulu

The process which culminated in the establishment of the East African Community (EAC) in 1967 started in the early 1920s. The idea was first conceived in Britain. Initially, East Africans vehemently opposed this idea fearing that it would sustain British hegemony in the region, but their resentment did not prevent the establishment of the East African High Commission (EAHC) in January 1948.

It was only in the 1950s and 1960s that East African leaders embraced the idea due to political and economic reasons. In 1961 they converted the EAHC into the East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO) and in 1967 they established the EAC.

Nationalism and sub-nationalisms in the region cast a spell on the EAC. The coup, which took place in Uganda in 1971, strained relations between Idi Amin and Presidents Nyerere and Kenyatta thus making it impossible to hold regional meetings. Eventually, the EAC collapsed in June 1977.

Key terms:

Colonialism; Community; East Africa; Federation; Independence; Integration; Nationalism; Politics; Regionalism; Relationships.
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However, I still remain solely responsible for any omissions, errors or any other weaknesses that could be found in this dissertation.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACHPR</td>
<td>African Charter on Human and People’s Rights</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CACEU</td>
<td>Central African Customs and Economic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLA</td>
<td>Central Legislative Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Common Market</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for East and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAA</td>
<td>East African Airways</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EACSO</td>
<td>East African Common Services Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAHC</td>
<td>East African High Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPZ</td>
<td>Joint Prosperity Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KADU</td>
<td>Kenya African Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African national Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNA</td>
<td>Kenya National Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MADAL</td>
<td>Mediation Agreement for the Division of Assets and Liabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAFMECSA</td>
<td>Pan African Freedom Movement of East Central ad Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan African Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QAC</td>
<td>Quinquennial Advisory Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTC</td>
<td>Royal Technical College</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UEA</td>
<td>University of East Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UON</td>
<td>University of Nairobi</td>
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<td>WAEC</td>
<td>West African Economic Community</td>
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Voll (1973:1) once made the observation that “in recent years the subject of regional integration has received considerable attention, both in theoretical terms and in studies of specific experiences.” He went on to say that in regional integration not only are the more concrete factors such as cohesion and communications important, but that the psychological function of the ideal of regional unity itself must be considered. In other words, one has to establish the commitment of political leaders on the ideal of regional unity as well as their willingness to push it through. Implicit in Voll’s utterances was that the decision to agitate for regional integration must be grounded on concrete and tangible reasons amongst potential member states and their communities, in part because there is more public interest in regional activities and their envisaged benefits.

It has become fashionable in the historiography on regional integration to over-emphasize the economic factor as the driving force behind bringing together different countries in a specific region. The general argument made by proponents of this trajectory is that countries with ailing economies are more prone to embrace the idea of regional integration so as to boost their regional economy – something they cannot achieve if they continue to operate as separate political entities (Agyeman, 1997; Thomas, 1996; Kirkhood, 1965). But it should also be noted that in certain instances some strong economies would be more willing to
invest their time and effort in promoting regional integration so that they could subsequently dominate the regional markets thereby gaining political influence too in that particular region.

The view that small economies are more prone to support regional integration is also held with regards to the East African case study discussed in this dissertation. There is vast literature in this regard (Gappert, 1968; Robson, 1967; Söderbaum, 2002; Tanganyika Standard, 6 June 1963; The People, 2 December 1967; Uganda Argus, 2 December 1967, Report by the Conference on British Caribbean Federation. Cmn.9733, 1956; Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 172, Cols.351-353, to name but a few).

In a way, the view that the economic factor plays an instrumental role in regional integration cannot be refuted out of hand. However, other commentators see politics as the salient factor behind regional integration (Churchill, 1908; Mazrui, 1967; Southall, 1974; Bell, 1986; Mngomezulu, 2004a and 2004b). They argue that smaller countries in a region sometimes decide to rally behind one another in order to secure political independence from a foreign dominant power. According to Rothchild (1968:3) for example, the latter view can be sustained because inter-territorial organizations “are political in their inception, termination, and basic arrangements even if the conflict factor is minimized in their daily operations.” In other words, while there is general consensus that the economic factor is crucial in discussing regional integration, there is an acknowledgement of the fact that the
picture of politics also looms large in any discussion on this subject, both at the local (regional) and international levels. It is in this context therefore that regional integration is sometimes seen as “a major process and a key factor of evolution in internal and international politics” (Bach, 1999:1). Thus, it would be a very big mistake to ignore the importance of the political factor in regional integration.

To be sure, both these trajectories cannot be summarily dismissed since there is a plethora of evidence to buttress them as demonstrated by the few sources provided above. However, the aim of this dissertation is not to make a case for either of these evidently antithetical positions. Instead, the dissertation discusses both trajectories under the rubric of a totally different premise: the role played by personal relationships amongst the East African leadership in the rise and subsequent demise of the East African Community (EAC) and how nationalism and sub-nationalisms influenced some of the important decisions they took on regional matters. The phrase personal relationships in this regard, refers to the relationships the East African leadership had both at national and regional levels. The argument is that positive or negative relationships amongst East African leaders (mainly Presidents Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, Milton Obote and, later, Idi Amin) determined how they related to one another and that this had an impact on the establishment and survival of regional institutions like the EAC.

The dissertation argues that to have a better understanding of regional integration in East Africa one needs to do a close analysis of these relationships because they
shaped both the thinking and actions of different East African leaders at different political moments over many years. For example, it was through personal and political relationships (especially in the 1950s and early 1960s) that East African leaders embraced the idea of regional integration to which they had been opposed for more than two decades. Later, changes in these relationships amongst certain leaders, coupled with personal and nationalists interests (the rise of sub-nationalisms) culminated in the eventual collapse of the EAC in 1977. For that reason, it is imperative to analyze these relationships and establish their efficacy in the rich history of East Africa’s regional politics up to the late 1970s. The resurgence of new regionalism since the late 1980s and the revival of the EAC in January 2001 make the need for such a study even more expedient.

Some of the existing literature argues that the history of East African co-operation started with the construction of the Uganda Railway Line, which was completed in 1901.\footnote{Delupis (1969) mistakenly states that this railway line was constructed in 1902.} This view is premised on the fact that the railway line which went up to Kisumu near Lake Victoria was built in order to serve as a link between Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (Mnjama, 1998; EAC Handbook, 1972). But this was an early experiment. Britain had only been in East Africa for about six years at this time and there was already a realization that the area of 1.8 million square kilometers called East Africa had to be brought together somehow.

In a nutshell, the history of the EAC could be divided into three main phases. The initial phase started in earnest in the 1920s when the idea of uniting East Africa
was conceived, or at least publicly articulated by British authorities. In 1917, there was a Customs Union between Kenya and Uganda. Tanganyika joined this Union in 1927. During this time, the idea of bringing the three territories closer to one another was still a colonial strategy geared towards continued European domination, more specifically Britain’s domination over East Africa. The primary goal was to centralize administration thus making the lives of British appointees in the region (especially the Governors) easier. The exit point of this phase was the establishment of the East African High Commission (EAHC) in January 1948.

The second phase covers the 1950s and 1960s when the East African leadership embraced the idea of regional integration for a variety of reasons and goes all the way to the official constitution of the first\(^2\) EAC in December 1967. Some may argue that, in fact, the period from 1948 to 1961 constituted a separate phase whereby the three East African territories operated under the EAHC and consider the period from 1961 to 1967 as a separate phase whereby the East African region operated under the rubric of the East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO). But in this study, both periods are considered as one phase because unlike the first phase, by this time East Africans demonstrated an overt interest in regional integration and made concerted efforts to ensure that it became a reality.

The third and last phase is the period from 1967 to 1977, which marks the lifespan of the EAC. In June 1977, a confluence of factors necessitated the disintegration

\(^2\) It is imperative to stress that this was the first EAC because there is currently a new East African Community that is operational in East Africa. It was revived by former Presidents Daniel arap Moi and Benjamin Mkapa together with the current President Yoweri Museveni in 2001.
of the EAC, as shall be seen later in this dissertation. From that date onwards, East African territories operated as separate and independent political entities. Following the collapse of the EAC, all the three Member States subsequently negotiated a Mediation Agreement for the Division of Assets and Liabilities. They eventually signed this Agreement in 1984 (http://www.eac.int/history.htm).

But what is a little bit unsettling in treating the decade from 1967 to 1977 as a separate phase in itself is that, in fact, the EAC started falling apart as it was being constituted. In other words, by the time this regional organisation was officially constituted at the end of 1967, more cracks were already discernible. Therefore, it was a foregone conclusion that the EAC would not last. The question is: what caused those cracks? This question is addressed in the present study.

1.1 Problem Statement

The establishment of the EAC is one of the most important episodes in the history of East Africa. However, there are still a few lingering questions regarding the eventful history of this organization. The two questions to which the present study seeks to find answers are the following: (1) Who should be credited for the establishment of the first EAC in December 1967 and who is to blame for its subsequent demise in 1977? (2) What role did personal relationships amongst the East African leadership, as well as nationalism and sub-nationalisms play in the rise and fall of the EAC? Finding answers to these questions will make it possible to extrapolate on the future of the current EAC.
1.2 Literature Review

The literature on regional integration on the African continent in general, and on East Africa in particular can be divided between pessimists – those who argue that earlier attempts to bring certain African countries together failed and therefore any similar attempt is bound to fail – and optimists, that is, those who identify specific factors that led to the failure of earlier attempts and thus argue that if those factors are addressed there would still be a chance for regional institutions to survive. Others simply write about this subject in a descriptive narrative form. Their aim is to provide factual information on how the process unfolded without necessarily doing any in-depth analysis.

There is vast literature by both African and Africanist scholars which paints a dark picture about the prospects of getting it right in terms bringing together different countries in a specific region in Africa. Dieter (1997:7), for example, writes: “In Africa, attempts to create regional integration projects have a long, albeit discouraging history.” Odhiambo (1981:139), writing specifically about East Africa, shares the same view by arguing that: “When it comes to the question of African attempts at territorial politics, the experience is one of failure, or alternatively of inability.” There are a few other scholars who concur with this trajectory (Bell, 1986; Boahen, 1990). Hentz (2005:4) writes:

Thus, schemes in Africa such as the Economic Community of West African States and the East African Community (EAC) adopted a blueprint from a very different place and time, and, like other such schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa, they failed.
These views are credible and can be substantiated with facts. For example, West and Central African states tried to form regional organizations soon after gaining their political independence from European colonizers but all those attempts failed. The French colonies of Mali and Senegal formed a Federation. But a few months later, Senegal seceded from the Federation and declared itself as the Republic of Senegal. In September 1960, Mali declared itself as another Republic. In another example, Ivory Coast, Dahomey and Niger formed the Council of the Intente but this too collapsed (Melady, 1961). Patrice Lumumba of present-day Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Kwame Nkrumah once contemplated combining Congo and Ghana (Agyeman, 1997), an idea that never materialized. Some of the post-independence regional organisations include the West African Economic Community (WAEC) and the Central African Customs and Economic Union (CACEU), which were established in the 1960s but later disintegrated too. Even the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) did not survive due to ideological differences amongst African leaders and their excitement about their newly found freedom from colonial rule. Thus, the argument by the pessimists is tenable and can be substantiated.

Interestingly, in spite of all these failures, the spirit of regional integration did not die out amongst Africans. Consequently, when East African territories gained their political independence in the early 1960s, they also tried to follow the same route by establishing the EAC. Unfortunately, like its predecessor organizations, the EAC’s life was also ephemeral as it collapsed only after a single decade. It is
in this context therefore that the view expressed by those scholars who state that the African experience with regional organization or territorial politics is one of failure cannot be summarily refuted.

However, it would be wrong to over-generalize and argue that all attempts to establish regional institutions in post-colonial Africa failed because some of those regional organizations are still operational even today. Amongst those that have survived to-date is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which was established in 1976 combining the former French and British territories. Although ECOWAS is primarily an economic regional body, it also tackles political issues whenever such a need arises. For example, ECOWAS got involved in the political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire when it became clear that the gulf between President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Charles Banny had widened significantly in 2006.

It is remarkable that despite their many failures Africans have been indefatigable in their attempts to establish regional institutions. This serves as an indication that African politicians fervently believe that they could achieve a lot by working closely with one another than they would if they operated as separate political entities. This view is given substance by the fact that although earlier attempts to bring Africa (or its regions) together failed, some of them survived. Besides ECOWAS, the African continent still boasts about the existence of other regional institutions such as: Southern African Development Community (SADC), which
was established in 1992, changing from what used to be called the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) that was established in 1980, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), to name but a few.

In February 2007, Nigeria, Togo and Benin signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the establishment of a Joint Prosperity Zone (JPZ). The aim was to work towards a joint economic platform that would harmonize the national economic policies of the three countries. Even the EAC, which was defunct for more than two decades, was revived in 2001. Building on these regional institutions, African leaders have proceeded to establish continental bodies such as the African Union (AU), which was initiated by the Lusaka Treaty of 2001 and was subsequently inaugurated on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa.

One of the most intriguing questions is the following: why did Africans insist on forming regional institutions? Schraeder (2007:169-70) provides two reasons for that. First, he states that African leaders have a firm belief that there is strength in numbers. Second, he writes: “inspired by the success of the European Union (EU) and encouraged by the UN-sponsored Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the first generation of African leaders sought to create regional entities capable of promoting regional cooperation and integration.” This explains the Africans’ obsession with regional organizations.
With regards to East Africa and the EAC, the literature can be divided into two groups. First, there are those authors who mention the EAC in passing without necessarily having it as their primary focus. Second, there are those who have the EAC as their focus. Within this group are authors who present a descriptive chronological account on how the EAC was established and how it functioned as well as those who simply summarize different views by other authors on why the EAC collapsed.

*Those who mention the EAC in passing*

There are a number of African and Africanist scholars whose works make reference to regional integration in East Africa in general and the EAC in particular but without providing further details. For example, Hunter’s work (1963) focused on the examination of educational opportunities that were available for East African students in the early 1960s. This book is an assessment of manpower requirements in East Africa. Thus, Hunter discussed regional integration in East Africa from an educational point of view. He argued that all three East African territories needed educational facilities that would produce the necessary manpower needed in development projects throughout the East African region. But Hunter’s study does not go beyond 1964 and therefore only address regional integration in general, not the EAC, which had not yet been established.
Leys and Robson’s edited work *Federation in East Africa* (1965) has a promising title but it covers different themes without necessarily focusing on the EAC in particular. The authors covered in that book discussed integration from a theoretical point of view (Peter Newman’s chapter), from a legal point of view (S. A. De Smith’s chapter) or addressed one regional integration institution such as the Central Bank (B. van Arkadie’s chapter). Therefore, although this source provides valuable information on regional integration in East Africa, it covers a wide scope both in terms of themes and time but does not provide a detailed analysis of the factors that were responsible for the establishment and subsequent dissolution of the EAC in 1967 and 1977 respectively. There is conspicuous silence on agency in this history. For example, one of the big gaps is that nothing is said about the role played by personal relationships amongst East African leaders in the history of the EAC. Furthermore, the role played by nationalism is only mentioned in passing without providing any specific focus and detail.

Southall (1974) discussed regional integration in East Africa but with a specific focus on higher education. He analyzed the politics behind the rise and fall of the Federal University of East Africa (UEA), which was established in June 1963 as part of the regional integration project and had campuses in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The university was dissolved at the end of June in 1970 and gave birth to the first three national universities in East Africa (University of Nairobi in Kenya, University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, and Makerere University in Uganda). In chapter 1 of his work, Southall only covered the steps leading to the
formation of the EAC. This is good background information but does not help the reader who wants to know a detailed history of the EAC and the intricacies that were involved in the process of its establishment. The fact that Southall’s book does not discuss the politics that characterized the ten years of the EAC’s existence means that it limits our understanding of some of the key themes and episodes in the eventful history of the EAC.

Furley and Watson (1978) discuss regional integration in East Africa and include the EAC in their discussion. However, these authors discuss regional integration in East Africa specifically in the educational context. They look at what regional integration meant for the education sector and do not necessarily have the EAC as their primary focus. But it should be mentioned that this bias towards education had no sinister move except that there was a clear relationship between regional integration in education (especially higher education) and other forms of integration such as economic and political integration as discussed later in this dissertation. Iliffe (1998) too, writes about East African doctors and he mentions the EAC or discusses regional integration in East Africa in that context. Therefore, his work provides some contextual information about regional integration in general and the EAC in particular but is very thin on substance.

There is also information about the East African Federation in Julius Nyerere’s speeches and writings. *Freedom and Unity* (1967) and *Freedom and Socialism* (1968) have a number of these speeches. Although they provide useful pointers
regarding the genesis, problems, and prospects for regional integration in East Africa, these speeches only give the reader a tantalizing view on why the EAC collapsed but lack the necessary detail. This is due in part to the fact that they are short. Moreover, they are written in a narrative form and do not provide an in-depth analysis of the events that happened in the history of the EAC.

Jomo Kenyatta, in his work *Suffering Without Bitterness* (1968) stressed the need for African Unity and saw the EAC as a means to that end. However, he, too, did not elaborate on the role played by personal relationships between himself and his Ugandan and Tanzanian counterparts in the history of the EAC. Neither did he address the role played by nationalism and sub-nationalisms in this history. Kenyatta’s earlier work, *Facing Mount Kenya*, first published in 1938 and reprinted in 1965, was his attempt to demonstrate to Kenyans that although he was living abroad, he had not forgotten about his roots. He still remembered what Mount Kenya meant to him. Although the book “remains one of the most important works on the impact of European influence in Africa from an African perspective” (Wiseman, 1991:109), it focuses on Kenya as a country, not East Africa as a region and is therefore limited in scope although there are some few references to the need for people to work as a unit.

*Those who focus on the EAC*

The authors who address the EAC or regional integration in East Africa directly focus on specific themes or use different approaches to document that history. For
example, Rothchild (1967) provides a wide range of documents about regional integration in East Africa taken from the archives located both in East Africa and London. The sources he uses include *inter alia* newspapers, commission reports, parliamentary debates in each of the three East African countries, debates that took place at the inter-territorial East Africa Central Legislative Assembly, inter-departmental correspondence and dispatches in Britain as well as correspondence between the British government and its appointees in East Africa such as Governors like Philip Mitchell, Edward Griggs and Donald Cameron. By using these documents the reader gets a glimpse of some of the intricacies involved in the history of the EAC.

Another author who provides a similar kind of material is Low (1971). His work comprises excerpts wherein the Baganda pushed sub-nationalism and expressed their resentment to regional integration in East Africa, in part because they strongly felt that their Kingdom was protected by the Buganda Agreement of 1900, which was signed between the Baganda and British Government. By reading these excerpts, one is able hear the voices of different stakeholders in Buganda and get an understanding of how they responded to the idea of regional integration or the proposed EAC.

Indeed, these two types of sources are very useful to anyone who is interested in the history of regional integration in East Africa. However they say very little about the collapse of the EAC, nor do they directly address the role played by
personal relationships amongst the East African leadership and by nationalism and sub-nationalisms in the history of the EAC. In fact, most of the archival sources contained in these works provide background information on the establishment of the EAC but say nothing about what happened soon after the independence of the three East African territories and Zanzibar between 1960 and 1963 and between 1967 and 1977 when the EAC was in existence.

There are also authors who use the above-mentioned sources and other types of information to write the history of the EAC directly. Sometimes they differ in their approaches. One such author is Delupis (1969). Her entire book is about the EAC and the Common Market. The approach she uses is that of a descriptive narrative. She describes how the EAC and its institutions operated. This is the strength of the book. However, its major weakness is that it is too shallow. Key episodes are mentioned in just one paragraph or in a few sentences. This is the case for example with the Kampala Agreement. Therefore, although the book covers the history of the EAC from 1900 right up to its disintegration in 1977, it only provides snapshots of each phase.

The work edited by Potholm and Fredland (1980) titled Integration and Disintegration in East Africa covers a wide range of themes regarding the history of the EAC. As the title suggests, it addresses both the rise and fall of the EAC. For example, Springer’s chapter [Community Chronology] provides the historical perspective of the EAC. On the other hand the chapters by Fredland [Who Killed
the East African Community?] and Mazzeo [Problems of Regional Cooperation in East Africa] address the factors that led to the demise of the EAC. In that sense, the book is a useful source. However, the fact that each chapter covers a specific aspect of the EAC means that there is no systematic and consistent analysis of the EAC. It is here that the present study will make a contribution.

Bethwell Ogot, one of East Africa’s prolific historians, has written on a wide range of topics, including the EAC. In his autobiography *My Footprints on the Sands of Time* (2003) Ogot dedicates a chapter to the EAC in which he regrets that this institution had to be dissolved in 1977. Although Ogot provides an inside account on the politics behind the demise of the EAC, his chapter has some shortfalls. For example, he only begins his discussion from 1975, not 1967 when the EAC was established. This leaves out most valuable background information that would be useful to the reader who is not acquainted with regional integration politics in East Africa. The present study seeks to fill this lacuna. It will begin by providing background information about the EAC and go on to demonstrate what the transition from colonial rule to independence meant to the three East African territories and how personal and national sentiments impacted upon the EAC and how all of that pre-determined the future of the EAC.

There have also been some good articles in which authors argue why the EAC collapsed. Mugomba (1978:262) addressed this question by arguing that: “Part of the explanation lies in the fact that Tanzania has progressively ‘drifted’
Southwards as the conflict in Southern Africa intensified.” Here, he was referring to the independence of Mozambique, arguing that it urged President Nyerere to work with other Frontline States to liberate more African countries such as Zimbabwe and Namibia. In his view, President Nyerere felt that his political interests would be best served by going to the South than investing his time and effort in sustaining the EAC. However, Mugomba does not see this as the only reason. For example, he also refers to the following factors: long-harboured fears of domination by one or the other partners; resentment by Kenya over the need to ‘carry’ the poorer members; long-strained relations between Uganda and Tanzania over Nyerere’s refusal to recognize Amin’s military regime; different foreign policy concerns and approaches; and the concentration of foreign capital in the industrial and commercial ‘core’ [Kenya] (Mugomba, 1978:263). Such information illuminates our understanding of the EAC.

Potholm (1979) read the different arguments presented by other authors as the reasons behind the collapse of the EAC and then summarized them under the following six perspectives:

(i) Ideology influenced the outcome (Kenya followed the Africanised version of international capitalism; Tanzania followed *ujamaa*; while Uganda on the other hand moved from a mixed to a proto-socialist economy);

(ii) The critical failure of political leadership (proponents of this view blame Presidents Nyerere, Kenyatta and Amin for being pre-occupied with their individual and/or national matters thus failing to address EAC problems);
(iii) Economic realities (Kenya was the wealthiest of the three countries);
(iv) Exogenous forces destroyed the EAC (here the blame is put on the United States of America, Great Britain, various multinational corporations, Western capitalism, or some combination of these factors);
(v) Changing times undercut the EAC (the argument is about incrementalism. It is argued that various factors accumulated over time and eventually brought the EAC to its knees); and
(vi) Sub-national politics proved too powerful (this refers to in-fighting within each national government which affected the EAC negatively) (Potholm, 1979:46-53).

As shown above, various attempts have been made in the past to document the history of the EAC. But what is clear from the literature discussed thus far is that each group of sources has a particular focus in terms of themes or phase in the history of the EAC. None of the authors discussed above provides a consistent and chronological analysis of the development of events around the EAC. Some (like Delupis) simply present a descriptive narrative, not a detailed analysis of the various events. It is this void that the present study aims to fill. The relationships amongst the East African leadership – which are mentioned in passing in some of the sources – will receive specific attention, together with the role played by nationalism and sub-nationalisms in the history of the EAC.
To be sure, the utilitarian function of this study cannot be concealed. Analyzing personal relationships amongst the East African leadership and the role played by nationalism and sub-nationalisms will enable current East African leaders to do things differently and deal with the factors that led to the disintegration of the first EAC. In other words, by discussing the factors that led to the demise of the EAC, the study will provide the current East African leadership something they could use as a source of reference in their resolve to take their region forward. Mugomba (1978:272) was on target when he stated the following: “Certainly, the hard lessons of this unsuccessful venture will need to be borne in mind in any future attempt at further regional unity and economic integration in Africa.” Former President Daniel arap Moi was guided by the same thinking when he told his two colleagues from Uganda and Tanzania that “we must be careful enough to avoid the pitfalls that led to the demise of the original EAC in 1977” (Daily Nation, 25 April 2001). About a year later, Moi opined: “those who understand their past have confidence to face the future.” (Kenya Times, 21 October 2002). It is in this context that the current study is considered important for East Africa as a region and for the African continent in general.

1.3 Research Aims

The conventional practice in the research community is that each and every study is guided by specific aims and objectives that give it both the direction and focus. In the same vein, the present study is guided by the following aims:
• To investigate the role played by personal relationships amongst the East African leadership in the establishment of the EAC in 1967 and its subsequent collapse in 1977.

• To establish how nationalism and sub-nationalisms shaped the nature of those relationships before and after the EAC was officially constituted.

1.4 Significance of the Study

This study does not only have historical significance. On the contrary, it is timely for East Africans as they revive and expand the membership of the new EAC. By analyzing the role played by personal relationships amongst the East African leadership in the 1960s and 70s, the study will make current leaders vigilant and ensure that they are better prepared to preempt some possible schisms and act accordingly before history repeats itself. Also, the study provides African leaders with a source of reference in their relentless efforts to nurture the African Union (AU). To a large extent, the survival of the AU depends on the viability of regional institutions like the EAC. Therefore it is important to ensure that these regional institutions are kept intact. Lastly, students of African political economy stand to benefit from this study as they analyze the current EAC and try to understand the functioning of the AU. With that knowledge, they will better understand similar institutions that exist in other continents such as the European Union (EU).
1.5 Limitations of the study

One of the limitations of this study is that it did not use interviews for practical reasons. First, for this research method to be effective one would have to interview informants in all three East African countries; that would need more time and financial resources. Also, most of the key role players in the history of the EAC are now dead – this includes the former presidents of the three East African countries who signed the Declaration for joint co-operation in East Africa in 1963 and the treaty that established the EAC in 1967. But the archival material used in this study will fill that void. The voices of potential informants were captured and retained in parliamentary debates (both at the national Assemblies of individual countries in East Africa and at the East Africa Central Legislative Assembly), correspondence documents and newspapers. All these sources were accessed and interrogated for the purpose of this study.

1.6 Hypothesis

The hypothesis guiding this study is that personal relationships amongst the East African leadership played a pivotal role in the establishment and subsequent collapse of the EAC; nationalism and sub-nationalisms shaped the nature of those relationships thus making it a foregone conclusion that the life of the EAC – once established – would be ephemeral.
1.7 Research Method

This study used the qualitative research method. Although Neuman (1997) states that qualitative and quantitative research methods complement each other, he goes on to say that there are conspicuous differences between the two. For example, he writes: “Qualitative social research relies largely on the interpretive and critical approaches to social sciences” (Neuman, 1997:329). The rationale for using the qualitative research method in this study was that its emphasis is on the interpretation of qualitative data from a variety of sources, not just a dispassionate presentation of statistical data as would have been the case with the quantitative research method.

Data collection

Most of the data used in this study was drawn largely from archival sources housed at the Kenya National Archives (KNA) and at the library archives housed at Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library at the University of Nairobi (UON) in Kenya. The researcher consulted reports of parliamentary debates that took place at the National Assemblies of the three East African territories of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and those that took place at the East Africa Central Legislative Assembly, a regional parliament of East Africa. Moreover, the study drew from information contained in newspapers published in the three East African countries. Correspondence documents between British officials based in East Africa and those stationed in Britain were also used to extract information for this study.
Regarding parliamentary debates that took place both in the House of Commons and in the House of Lords in Britain, the researcher consulted British parliamentary papers. Further information was drawn from secondary sources such as books, journals and academic papers that deal with the subject which is the focus of this study. Secondary sources in the form of books, articles as well as seminar and conference papers were also consulted to enrich the study.

Data analysis

Following Neuman’s (1997) observation that qualitative researchers organize data into categories on the basis of themes and concepts, information extracted from the different sources mentioned above was analyzed and discussed thematically.

1.8 Organization of the study

The present study is divided into seven chapters, five main chapters as well as the introductory and concluding chapters. The content of each chapter is as follows:

CHAPTER 1: This is the introductory chapter. It sets the scene and introduces the entire dissertation. The chapter comprises the statement of the problem, literature review, aims of the study, research methodology, hypothesis, significance and limitations of the study.

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3 I had access to these papers while I was working on a separate research project in America. Rice University Library in Texas has a huge collection of these papers, including the current ones.
CHAPTER 2: It is imperative to provide the theoretical framework within which the study is located so that it would be much easier for the reader to follow the discussion. Chapter 2 thus focuses specifically on this area. It provides a broader understanding of the key concepts used in the dissertation and demonstrates how different theorists have used such terms at different moments. It also provides the context in which each term is used in this dissertation.

CHAPTER 3: This chapter provides a succinct overview of British agency in regional integration in East Africa from the early 1920s up until 1 January 1948 when the EAHC was officially established to oversee a host of regional activities and institutions in East Africa. Such background information is very crucial in the analysis of what happened once the leadership of the three East African territories resolved to embrace the colonial idea of regional integration in the 1950s and 1960s.

CHAPTER 4: The main purpose of this chapter is to establish the role played by personal relationships amongst East African leaders in the establishment of the EAC. After a quick recap of the events that unfolded soon after the establishment of the EAHC in 1948, the entrance point of this chapter is Tanganyika’s self-rule in 1960 and the exit point is December 1967 when the EAC was officially constituted in Arusha, Tanzania.
CHAPTER 5: This chapter focuses on the demise of the EAC. It analyzes the actions and utterances of different East African leaders as a way of demonstrating how personal interests, nationalism and sub-nationalisms sounded the death knells for the EAC. The relationship between President Obote and the Kabaka in Uganda is used to illustrate this point. Also, the relationship between Amin (after the 1971 coup) and Presidents Nyerere and Kenyatta is given close attention to illustrate the point about the role played by personal and national interests in the demise of the EAC. Amin’s relationship with President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia is also addressed to demonstrate that personal relationships even reduced the prospects of expanding the EAC to include other Eastern African countries. Other discussion points are derived from an analysis of parliamentary debates that took place both at territorial and inter-territorial levels, as well as those that took place in Britain in the two Houses of Parliament.

CHAPTER 6: This chapter builds on chapter 5. It demonstrates the difficulty of trying to sustain the life of the EAC after the dissolution of the UEA in June 1970, which had been part of the regional integration project. The chapter argues that there was a direct link between the EAC and the UEA in that they were both regional institutions. It then advances the view that it would have been impossible to salvage the life of the EAC after the collapse of the UEA because the same factors that necessitated the dissolution of the UEA also haunted the EAC. The exit point of this chapter is June 1977 when the EAC was formally dissolved thus
allowing each of the three East African countries to operate as separate political entities.

CHAPTER 7: This is the concluding chapter. It pulls together the entire dissertation by stressing the key points discussed in the previous chapters. Most importantly, this chapter provides a quick analysis of the current EAC and the nature of the relationship amongst its member states and then makes specific recommendations on what the current East African leadership needs to do in order to avoid the repeat of the past experience.
CHAPTER 2
Theoretical Framework

0. Introduction

It is common practice in academic circles to begin a study by first providing a theoretical framework within which such a study is located. Although this could be perceived as a conventional practice followed by researchers simply as a matter of routine, the practice stems from the fact that people’s understanding of a particular concept or list of concepts is not always the same. Therefore, presenting the theory or theories about each of the key concepts used in the study provides the reader with a clear context within which such concepts are to be understood.

However, not everyone likes theories as a matter of principle – be they social science theories or any other type. Among the reasons for this stance is that theory is one of the least understood concepts in academia, especially for students in the social sciences. Neuman (1997: 37) defines ‘social theory’ as “a system of interconnected abstractions or ideas that condenses and organizes knowledge about the social world.” He sees social theory as the compact way of thinking about the social world. The fact that social theory is associated with abstractions makes those who do not have a grip on abstract ideas detest it. Another difficulty with this concept is that not all theories are generally accepted as good – not even by those researchers who like to use them when conducting research and when presenting their findings. Therefore, whatever phenomena social science theories seek to explain and whatever forms they take, “they almost invariably attract
criticism for being deficient in important respects” (Nugent, 2003:485). Some of the deficiencies associated with social science theories include the following: focusing on only part of the phenomena under examination, being too general in scope and/or formulation, being excessively time-bound to allow generalization of the theory being presented, and being insufficiently empirically grounded.

But the criticism leveled against social science theories does not necessarily mean that the word ‘theory’ should be discarded altogether from the list of concepts associated with research. For certain researchers, theory is indispensable and they use it for different types of research projects in order to meet specific objectives. One reason why researchers use theory with tenacity for example is because the general practice in the scientific community is to recognize theory as essential for clarifying and building scientific knowledge. It is unlike ideology, which the scientific community condemns as illegitimate obfuscation that is antithetical to science. Thus, the relationship between the word ‘theory’ and ‘data’ – which researchers always work with – is that in simple terms, “researchers interweave a story about the operation of the social world (the theory) with what they observe when they examine it systematically (the data)” (Neuman, 1997:37).

Nugent (2003) makes the argument that concepts and theories as well as different methodological approaches based on them should be judged not only on their deficiencies but also on what they can contribute to knowledge. After all, it would be foolhardy to throw away the baby with the bathwater by dismissing theory off-
hand. If an existing theory has deficiencies, the most prudent thing to do is to identify those deficiencies and then strive towards improving such a theory so that it could produce better results, that is, a better understanding of a concept or phenomenon being used at any given moment.

Political theorists specify the objectives of the concept or phenomenon they are using so that these could serve as the criteria against which political action could be evaluated (Morrow, 1998). In fact, it should be noted that not all theories are complex, even to first-time users. Simple theories only have two variables, one dependent and one independent. Ideally it would be better to use such theories than the complex ones that contain more than two variables at a time with multiple independent, intervening, and dependent variables and thus confuse the reader.

It is against this backdrop, therefore, that the present chapter discusses theories about some of the specific concepts associated with the EAC at different stages of its development over the years. To be sure, it would be too ambitious to think that the discussion of theories could be exhausted in a single chapter. The aim here is simply to provide a broad theoretical understanding of different concepts used in the dissertation, highlighting the ways in which various scholars have used each concept in the field and how such a concept is used in the present study. The concepts to which the present chapter will pay particular attention are the following:
(i) Integration

(ii) Regionalism

(iii) Community

(iv) Nationalism and

(v) Sub-nationalisms

2.1 Integration

In a very broad sense, the term ‘integration’ refers to the process of bringing together different elements or institutions for a particular purpose. Integration is driven by specific aims and objectives of all the stakeholders involved. This could be a temporal or permanent arrangement depending on whether the aim is short-term or long-term. In other words, institutions (political, economic etc) do not just integrate unless there is a driving motive behind such integration. Before even contemplating the idea, there must be something they hope to achieve by embarking on this process. In that context, we talk about the utilitarian function of integration. Sometimes global, regional and domestic factors determine the sustainability of regional integration projects (Pere, 2004:103).

When discussing this concept, there is a general tendency among scholars to talk about economic and political integration either as separate entities or as two phases in the chronology. According to economic integration theory, there are four distinct stages in the movement towards full economic integration as the
ultimate end. These are: the agreement among prospective members to set up a Free Trade Area (FTA), the move towards a Customs Union (CU), the establishment of a Common Market (CM) and the eventual creation of a full Economic Union (EU) (Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005: 28-29).

In essence, according to the economic theory, integration is not an event as such but a process. For example, the European Union (EU) started as the European Economic Community (EEC). Its primary aim was to create a Common Market in Europe, but its overall aim was to move towards a closer union amongst different member states. That aim was achieved a few years later when the current EU was established. This shows that the process of integration could sometimes be long and tedious. It usually depends on the understanding and political will of all the parties involved. As shall be seen in the next chapter, in the case of East Africa, attempts to integrate East African territories took a very long time; it started in the 1920s, during the inter-war period, but the EAHC only came into being after the Second World War on 1 January 1948. The EAC was not officially inaugurated until 1 December 1967. In both instances the delay was caused in large part by lack of a political will amongst different constituencies.

The question could be phrased as follows: what is the relationship between economic integration and political integration? One of the international theories on integration states that economic integration is, in fact, a precursor to political integration. In other words, even if a region wants to form a political unit, it starts
by forming an economic unit before proceeding to establish a political unit. It was in line with this theory that the EEC followed the political ambition for political integration through economic integration. The same thinking determined the route East African politicians could follow in their quest for integration in that region. They had to strive for other forms of integration (including economic integration) before the envisaged political integration of East African states as the ultimate goal could be achieved. It follows from this theory that political integration is more difficult to achieve than economic integration, hence this chronology. As other theorists state, “close political co-operation comes in at a rather late stage in the integration process” (Ofstand et al, 1986:115).

When it comes to East Africa, both the British and East African politicians had specific aims in mind for proposing that the three countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania be integrated. To a large extent, the British promoted integration in East Africa mainly for economic and administrative purposes. They wanted to facilitate easy administration in the region and to ensure that the economies of these countries were linked. The actions of the East African leadership on the other hand were driven primarily by the political motive, although the economic motive was also there. They believed that integration was the best means through which they could get rid of Britain and run their affairs as East Africans. It should be mentioned that although the main driving force was politics, the economic factor also played a pivotal role in that the East African leadership wanted to
consolidate their regional economies so that they could compete better in the international markets while at the same time making Britain dispensable.

In this context, a combination of economic and political factors necessitated the integration of the three East African territories. As argued in the last chapter of this dissertation, the same factors contributed to the resurrection of the current EAC in 2001. The phrase ‘regional integration’ in this study refers to the integration of the East African region. Although the ultimate goal was to have political regional integration, East Africans, like all other regions in Africa and abroad, started by focusing on economic regional integration.

2.2. Regionalism

In its broader sense, regionalism covers quite a significant number of phenomena to be useful as an analytical tool and therefore needs to be broken down into specific categories (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998). But despite this weakness, regionalism is still one of the key concepts in understanding inter-state and inter-regional relations, not only in Africa but globally. The intensification of these relations is referred to as regionalisation, which is said to lie somewhere between globalization and localization (Love, 2005). Regionalism and regionalisation interact with other processes such as globalisation, nation-/state-building and disintegration (Söderbaum, 1998). Regionalism “cannot be understood as a distinct alternative to national interest and nationalism, but is often better explained as an instrument to supplement, enhance or protect the role of the state
and the power of the government in an interdependent world” (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998:9).

Theorists perceive regionalism as a cognitive or state-centric project and see regionalization as a process that needs to be followed in order to successfully complete the project of regionalism (Grant and Söderbaum, 2003). These theorists usually argue that regionalization is not an incentive to the disappearance of existing boundary-lines or network of trans-state. Instead, it contributes to their formal preservation. It is also argued that regionalization entails the creation of a regional system or network in a specific geographical area or regional social space, either issue-specific or more general in scope. As a matter of principle, authors argue that there is no single model of regionalism, nor one predominant theoretical framework for the analysis of this concept (regionalism). This trajectory is premised on the understanding that regionalism is perceived in three senses or at least operates at three levels:

a) It can be seen as a mechanism through which states and other groupings attempt to manage their involvement in the international arena.

b) At another level, it can be seen as a means by which authority is transferred away from states and other groupings to regional bodies that are perceived to be better able to manage the problems that confront them.
Lastly, regionalism appears either as a contributor or an obstacle to world order and the management of the changing international arena (Smith, 2001:71).

Implicit in the third level is the view that regionalism could be perceived as a building block or a stumbling block to world order depending on the prevailing circumstances at each moment and place. Similarly, it could be seen both as a force for integration and also as a force for disintegration in international politics. Regionalism could promote and dissolve statehood depending on how it is used.

As a result of these different levels of operation, regionalism is sometimes seen as a unitary force and sometimes it is perceived as a divisive factor. In this context, some scholars define this concept as “the awareness of togetherness among a people of a relatively large area within a state” (Jackson and Jackson, 1997:37). Others argue that it “refers specifically to the idea, ideology, policies and goals that seek to transform a geographical area into a clearly identified social space” (Grant and Soderbaum, 2003:22). It is due to these reasons that regionalism is said to be both divisive and uniting in its operation.

What makes regionalism divisive is that it removes one area from the rest of the state and tries to develop it separately from the core – in this case, the state. However, it is uniting in the sense that the part that has been removed from the rest of the different units that form a political entity such as the state is kept intact as a single unit. Here, regionalism encourages the inhabitants of a particular
territory to demand a change in the political, economic and cultural relations between their region and the central powers within the larger state in which they are located. This was the case in Nigeria in the mid-1960s, an incident that culminated in the Biafran War of 1967. Here, different regions wanted to develop independently from the central government. The kind of regionalism they promoted was the divisive one but as a unit, they perceived themselves to be propagating the unitary form of regionalism.

Other authors see regionalism as a generic term. They argue that in a narrow operational sense the term represents the body of ideas, values and concrete objectives that are aimed at transforming a geographical area into a clearly identified regional social space. They see it as an urge by any set of actors to re-organize along regional lines in any given issue or area (Grant and Söderbaum, 2003:7). The fact that regionalism is a generic term means that it might be open to abuse by leaders who want to pursue their own political agendas.

Existing theories of regionalism show that it has a history and has been more dominant at certain times and places than in others. When it seemed to have disappeared from the public eye a few decades ago, it miraculously re-emerged at a later date due to a number of factors.\(^4\) Grant and Söderbaum (2003) state that regionalism is by no means a new phenomenon. They argue that cross-national and cross-community interactions as well as interdependencies have existed as far back as the earliest historical recordings. For White, Little and Smith (2001),

\(^4\) Some of these factors are discussed later in this section.
regionalism has been the focus of study and political action since the beginning of the twentieth century. In discussing the history of regionalism, scholars tap into the agents of this concept and build their arguments around that. For example, there is a view that nineteenth-century imperialism and white settler governance both forged regional coherence among formerly demarcated colonies in Africa, focusing more particularly on the political and economic domains (Love, 2005:45). This is true. As shall be seen in chapter 3 of this dissertation, the idea of uniting East African colonies and dependencies in East Africa first came from British authorities, not the East African leadership. It was part of the overall British colonial plan about its Empire, according to which the colonies had to be brought together to ensure easy administration.

Even in the broader African context, the unitary version of regionalism is not new. As discussed in the next chapter of this dissertation, attempts to unite East Africa started in the 1920s although East Africans only fully embraced the idea after the EAHC had been established in 1948. In West Africa, a number of regional integration initiatives were tried at different moments although for a long time these initiatives generally tended to be the exclusive affairs of competing, self-interested European styled states founded by colonial powers. From the 1960s to the late 1980s, their regional organizations promoted collective self-reliance in economic development, especially in the area of industrialization (Iheduru, 2003).
There are scholars of regionalism who discuss it by looking at the reasons for the establishment of regional organizations. Simon (2003) for example, argues that the original impetus to the formation of regional trading blocks after the Second World War derived from a mixture of economic and political-security issues framed by cold war rhetoric and strategic concerns. He argues that this form of regionalism was very state-centric; it was driven by and focused overwhelmingly on official inter-state relations and mechanisms for channeling private investment and trade.

For unexplained reasons, regionalism seems to have lost its fame over the years. However, it made a resurgence in the 1990s. This was due in part to the fact that it is often linked strongly with regional organizations and institutions. As old regional organizations re-surfaced and new ones emerged, regionalism received new impetus around this time. But one of the main reasons for the notable surge of interest and activity in regionalism was the envisaged possibility of regional co-operation and institution-building. This was influenced by both local (African) and global developments. For example, there was an increased tendency in the global scene to search for some mechanisms of co-operation in the political and security fields with the hope of maintaining world peace. Another reason that is cited for this upsurge of interest in regions and regionalism in the 1990s is the fall of Russia as a super-power, the collapse of socialism and the emergence of many new states and new potential focuses for conflict and co-operation. All these
factors combined to make regionalism relevant once again. The revival of the EAC in 2001 should therefore be understood in this broader context.

As a result of these new developments, Grant and Söderbaum noted that the study of regionalism and its many facets is enjoying a renaissance of sorts within the larger, overlapping context of international relations (IR) and international political economy (IPE). These authors maintain that in the past the theoretical orthodoxy when discussing regionalism has tended to focus on formal and interstate regional frameworks in Europe and, more recently, on North America and Asia-Pacific. According to their observation Africa has, to a very large extent, been neglected in the general debate on this concept. According to mainstream perspectives this is due to the fact that regionalism in Africa is still primitive and is characterized mainly by failed or weak regional organizations as well as a superficial degree of regional economic integration.

Theorists have coined the phrase ‘new regionalism’ as a theory-building strategy in order to distinguish between old and new regionalism. They perceive new regionalism as a phenomenon still in the making and argue that it emerged in the mid-1980s. They contrast it with old regionalism that began in the 1950s and faded away in the 1970s (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998). But the phrase “new regionalism” is problematic because even though differences exist between old and new regionalism, there are often strong continuities and similarities between these two forms of regionalism. This makes the distinction artificial and almost
irrelevant. One argument states that regions anywhere in the world are not formed in a vacuum; they are influenced by a wide range of factors, both local and global. In that sense, new regionalism theories are obliged to acknowledge the external dimension and the existing close relationship between globalization and regionalism. In other words, global developments have a direct impact on what happens in a region. This has been the case in the past and is still the case today – it is a reality that is hard to refute.

In the case of East Africa, the ‘new regionalism’ that emerged in the 1990s only has relevance to the new EAC. As hinted above, the first EAC emerged under a different context; it was largely a product of the colonial legacy and was proposed by the British, not the East African leadership. In the broader African context, regional economic bodies failed to survive in the past. But what is important is not the fact that they failed but the fact that they ever existed in the first place. This shows that regionalism is not a new phenomenon in independent Africa, or even more particularly in East Africa. Sustaining current regional bodies like the EAC depends on understanding the factors that led to the disintegration of earlier regional organizations. That is the educative role of history in any given society.

The question that arises is the following: is regionalism, in its broad sense, a good or a bad thing? To be sure, there is no single answer to this question. The reason is that regionalism has its own advantages but also has some challenges. For example, there is a view that regions and regionalism can act as a ‘lens’ through
which central issues of world politics are retracted and given particular shape. Another argument in favor of regionalism is that it contributes to the broader development of global order, and in the economic sense that it can be seen as a reflection of globalization (Smith, 2003). The argument here is that by entering into regional agreements and organizations, states may be in a better position to achieve their national objectives – be it on prosperity or security.

Theorists argue that regionalism manifests itself in different spheres of life including: economic, cultural, military, environmental and political domains. This, in part, provides the reason(s) why different countries form regional bodies. Bennet and Oliver (2002:237-238) provide the following reasons why regional organizations are formed:

- There is a natural tendency towards regionalism based on the homogeneity of interests, traditions, and values within small groups of neighbouring states;
- Political, economic, and social integration is more easily attained among a lesser number of states within a limited geographic area than on a global basis;
- Regional economic co-operation provides more efficient economic units than smaller states and these larger units can compete successfully in world markets;
• Local threats to peace are more willingly and promptly dealt with by the governments of that area than by disinterested states at greater distances from the scene of conflict;
• By combining states into regional groupings, a global balance of power will be maintained and world peace and security will be promoted;
• Regionalism is the first step in gaining experience and building areas of consensus toward eventual intergovernmental coordination or integration; and
• Universalists fail to take into account the heterogeneity of political, economic, social, and geographical factors throughout the world that militate against global unity. These differences can be more easily accommodated within a regional framework.

Most of the points made here are relevant to the East African case study. For example, East African countries perceived themselves as a homogeneous geographical entity. The fact that they all used kiSwahili as a language of communication gave more impetus to the perceived homogeneity in the region. Point two above is also applicable to East Africa in that one of the reasons why the East African leadership wanted to bring their region together was because of their weak economies. They hoped that by integrating their national economies they would compete better in the global market if they moved forward as a region, not national compartments. Most importantly, when the East African leadership formed the first EAC, they argued that they were not opposed to the idea of a
united Africa propagated by nationalist leaders like Kwame Nkrumah. Their argument was that as a regional organization, the EAC was, in fact, a contribution to the broad idea of a united Africa. They continuously and assiduously argued that regional organizations in Africa had to precede continental unity because the latter could not just emerge from nowhere. As far as they were concerned, it would be easier for different regions to come together to form the envisaged continental body than simply expecting national states to surrender their sovereignty to a bigger body. The logic behind this argument was that national governments had to first get used to the idea of operating within a body whose jurisdiction goes beyond national boundaries before forming part of African Unity.

However, theorists of regionalism argue that this concept has many challenges, which are then perceived to be its disadvantages. Some theorists emphasize this side of regionalism. For example, they argue that the processes of co-operation and integration are easier to carry out at the regional level but that regional conflicts can sometimes have a peculiar intensity and violence than a broader one. Another argument is that there are also instances when regionalism acts against globalization. According to this view, regional groupings do not always operate in a broad sense, they can become introspective and protectionist in their leanings, closing themselves off from the world economy. This view leads to the argument that: “perhaps the most significant problem posed by regionalism in world politics
centers on the linkage between intra-regional relations and the broader world arena” (Smith, 2003:62).

According to Bennet and Oliver (2002:238), universalists challenge regionalists and attack regionalism on the basis of the following:

- World interdependence has created an increasing number of problems that require global solutions. Political, economic, and social problems reach across regional boundaries;
- Regional resources are often inadequate to resolve the problems of states within the region;
- Since peace is indivisible only a world organization can deal effectively with threats to the peace that may, if unchecked, spread beyond local or regional limits;
- Only a universal organization can provide an adequate check on the power of a large state that can often dominate the other members of a regional arrangement;
- Sanctions against an aggressor are usually ineffective if applied on a regional basis because of sources of aid to the aggressor from outside the region;
- Regions are imprecise and impermanent. No agreement can be reached on a system of regions into which the globe can be conveniently divided;
• Regional alliances provide the basis for rivalries and competition for military supremacy among regions leading to greater possibilities for major wars; and
• The existence of numerous, moderately successful universal organizations demonstrates the desire of governments and peoples to co-operate on a global basis without the necessity of first using regional organizations as laboratories for gradually developing enlarged areas of consensus or community.

The fact that each individual country has a responsibility to address the needs of its people while at the same time upholding the norms of the regional body to which it belongs means that there is a constant tension between the demands of statehood and the pressures for collective (regional) action. This tension manifests itself in different ways and creates three sets of problems: the problem of inter-regional relations; the problem of relations between regionalism and globalism; and the problem of relations between regional orders and world order.

When the EAC was established at the end of 1967 it was not immune to these challenges. According to current indicators, the newly revived EAC is also not totally immune to these challenges – except that the current leadership in East Africa is new and the political environment under which the present EAC is operating is a bit different from that of the 1960s and 70s. These factors have reconfigured the context thus making it slightly different from the one that
preceded it. But there is no doubt that regionalism remains an important issue now as it was some few decades ago. Smith shares the same view: “Inter-regional competition and collaboration between regions was an important dynamic in the world politics of the 1990s, and remain one into the new millennium” (Smith, 2003:65). Therefore, regionalism remains a key concept in modern African politics as much as it was a few decades ago. It is in this context that a study on the EAC remains so relevant for a general historical understanding and in preparation for the continent’s future.

2.3. Community

Implicit in the concept ‘community’ is the idea of togetherness. Theorists of this concept usually associate it with another concept, ‘nation’, arguing that a nation is a deep, horizontal comradeship – an imagined community. This is because both concepts instill a sense of belonging, a sense of togetherness premised on shared values and practices. Theorists see a nation as being primarily a community, that is, a definite community of people living in a specific geographical area that separates them from other communities. They argue that in a world divided into particular communities, the general practice is that national identity tends to be associated and confounded with a community’s sense of uniqueness and the qualities that contribute to it (Greenfeld, 1979. Cited in Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:166).
A community is assumed to have its own mode of thought which makes it distinct from others. Communities are generally thought to possess common cultures. Integration within a culture is perceived to be a prerequisite for any meaningful conception of what could be referred to as moral autonomy. Language is considered to be the property of that community because anyone who speaks such a language is automatically associated with that community and is accepted as one of its members. Similarly, dress, architecture, customs, ceremonial songs and law distinguish one community from the other thus making each of them distinct.

In a way, ‘community’ is an abstract concept. It is arguably the sum total of the modes of expression listed above. The irony is that although the community is associated with togetherness, not all members of a given community know one another and yet they still perceive themselves as a single entity. Benedict Anderson (1991), one of the widely quoted scholars on community and nationalism, talks about an “imagined community”. This stems from the fact that even if people do not necessarily live together or know one another, as long as they share the practices mentioned above they see or imagine themselves as a community.

Therefore, “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are falsity, they are imagined” (Anderson, 1991:6). Anderson makes the example that Javanese villagers have always known that they
are connected to people they never saw but they imagined themselves as one community with those people based on the practices they shared.

Anderson draws a distinction between classical and modern communities. He argues that classical communities conceived of themselves as cosmically central through the medium of a sacred language, which was linked to an order of power. Unlike modern imagined communities, they had confidence in the unique sacred language which determined who was admitted into the community and who was left out. In a way, communities generally unite and divide people at the same time – depending on whether one is considered to be part of that community or not.

Theorists of community argue that there are different types of communities and that each type is determined by one of the three factors:

- The purpose for which the community has been established and the aspect of life it aims to focus on as its first priority. This type includes the following: religious communities, economic communities, political communities, cultural communities and religio-political communities.
- The scope of their operation. Here we can mention territorial communities, national communities and regional communities. Each of these differs from the rest with regard to its scope.
- The period in which a community was established. This group includes: historical or traditional communities (sometimes communities of biological descent form part of this group) and modern communities.
Although these are presented as different types of communities, there is in fact a relationship that exists amongst them. For example, a political community can be forced to start by working within a specific territorial homeland and then operate at a regional level at a later stage when the situation allows it to do so. Moreover, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, an economic community could be a precursor to a political community. With regards to the religious community, it could operate at the territorial, national and regional levels at the same time or move from one level to the next as it expands. The *imagined religious community* that Anderson talks about was determined by the pilgrimage people made. All those who made a pilgrimage to a particular place of religious importance automatically perceived themselves and were perceived by others as constituting a distinct religious community.

In that context, we could add to the list of communities mentioned above a continental and an inter-continental community because people who make a pilgrimage to a religious site do not necessarily come from one country but from different parts of the world. The Muslims who make a pilgrimage to Mecca is one good example of a religious community. The bottom line here is that one type of community has a potential to change into another both in terms of scope and focus. Hechter and Levi (1979. Cited by Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:190) wrote:

> The preservation of rituals from the past promotes a sense of community not only for people whose social structural roles make them feel marginal within society as a whole, but also for those who wish to change the
allocation of societal resources. This sense of community can consequently become the basis for collective action of a political sort.

The decision by the leaders from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to establish the EAC was premised on the general understanding that they together constituted a community, an East African community. This perception was based on a number of factors, the most important of which was their geographical location – all three countries share political borders and are all linked to Lake Victoria. The fact that they all speak kiSwahili made their case for a community even stronger. In other words, as far as East African politicians were concerned, establishing the EAC was simply a matter of making official a community that already existed naturally. But as discussed later in this dissertation the idea of an encompassing EAC was put into question when nationalism took center-stage.

2.4. Nationalism

Nationalism has played a more prominent role over the years in shaping the face of the modern world than any other doctrine one can think of. As a result, it would be difficult to come up with a general theory of nationalism since there is no shortage of theories of this concept in the literature. In the same vain, a universal definition of nationalism is not possible although people may have a common understanding of some of the characteristic features of a ‘nation’, the term associated with nationalism. Hobsbaum (1990) argues that nationalism comes before nations and that nations do not make states and nationalism but the other way round. Hobsbaum’s view (1990:9) that “concepts, of course, are not part of
free-floating philosophical discourse, but socially, historically and locally rooted, and must be explained in terms of these realities” reduces the chances of ever formulating a standard definition of nationalism even further.

However, this is not to say the battle for defining and theorizing nationalism has been totally lost in academia. There are different versions of the definition and theories of this term. Attempts will always be made both to define and theorize this concept for different reasons, in different times, different contexts as well as different places. This is what the scholars of nationalism such as Gellner (1983), Hobsbaum (1990), Hutchinson and Smith (1994), Ozkirimli (2000), Said (2001), White and Little (2001) and many others have been doing over the years and some still continue to do so today. They do not necessarily have to agree on everything as far as this concept is concerned. However, they share a few broad ideas about nationalism and moving from that they come up with their individual definitions and theories.

Gellner (1983:1) sees nationalism as “a theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones.” In his view, nationalism is first and foremost a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. This is not the view to which all theorists of nationalism subscribe. According to Jackson and Jackson (1997:36) the term nationalism in its modern sense is defined as “the collective action of a politically conscious group or nation in pursuit of increased territorial autonomy
or sovereignty.” This conception of nationalism is applicable to the present case study of East Africa in that East African politicians wanted to have territorial autonomy.

The three East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania did not establish the EAC by default. They took a conscious decision to pursue increased territorial autonomy and sovereignty from British domination. That is why they resolved to embrace the idea of regional integration in the 1950s and 1960s – something they had vehemently opposed for many decades. They were well aware of the fact that nationalism has, in the past, been successfully used to justify economic expansion, protectionism and imperialism; to espouse supremacy of certain nations and/or peoples; and to justify the quest for emancipation from colonial rule. In other words, they acknowledged the fact that nationalism is not just a neutral term but can sometimes be perceived to be the highest form of allegiance, above church, class, tribe, or any other social group in society to the extent that some people could even be prepared to sacrifice their lives defending it.

There is general consensus amongst theorists of nationalism that national feeling and the very idea of nationalism is basically a European invention and that the history of nationalism is relatively new; dating back to only about two centuries ago. According to this view, nationalism as an ideology and discourse became prevalent in North America and Western Europe in the latter half of the eighteenth century. In Europe, there was a conjunction of national identity
discourse with imperialism. As a result thereof, there was a very elaborate set of distinctions between Europeans and those referred to as Negroes, and between Europeans and Semites (Said, 2001). Shortly thereafter, nationalism then emerged in Latin America. However, the concept was not taken seriously by the social scientists immediately after its emergence in world politics. In line with this view, Hutchinson and Smith (1994:3) maintain:

As an ideology and movement, nationalism exerted a strong influence in the American and French Revolutions, yet it did not become the subject of historical enquiry until the middle of the nineteenth century, nor of social scientific analysis until the early twentieth century. Sustained investigation of nationalism had to wait until after the First World War, and it is really only since the 1960s, after the spate of anti-colonial and ethnic nationalisms, that the subject has begun to be thoroughly investigated by scholars from several disciplines.

Theorists argue that it was the injection of racism that brought nationalism to its mid-twentieth-century apogee. Authors such as Hobsbaum (1990) hold the view that nationalism underwent changes and transformations towards the end of the nineteenth century. He argues for example that the nationalism of 1880-1914 differed from that of the previous years in three respects: (i) it abandoned the ‘threshold principle,’ which was central during the liberal era. From that time onwards, all the people considering themselves as ‘a nation’ claimed the right to self-determination, which meant the right to a separate sovereign independent state for their territory; (ii) as a result of this change, ethnicity and language then became central, increasingly the decisive or even the only criteria of potential nationhood; and (iii) a sharp shift to the political right of nations and flag for which the term ‘nationalism’ was actually invented in the last decades of the
nineteenth century. To illustrate his point about the shift in the conceptualization of nationalism, Hobsbaum stated that in Ireland the number of ‘national’ or ‘nationalist’ newspapers rose from one in 1871 through 13 in 1881 to 33 in 1891.

For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries liberals and Marxists alike regarded nationalism as just a passing phase. According to this trajectory, it was only in the 1920s and 1930s that nationalism became a subject of sustained academic inquiry. Ozkirimli (2000) presents four stages, which, in his view, nationalism passed through. These are:

(i) The eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries when the idea of nationalism was born;
(ii) The years 1918-1945 when nationalism became a subject of economic inquiry;
(iii) The period from 1945 to the 1980s when the debate on nationalism became more diversified with the participation of sociologists and political scientists; and
(iv) The late 1980s to the present whereby there are now different attempts to transcend the classical debate and propose new dimensions in addressing this concept.

There is a view that by 1914 mass nationalism triumphed against class-based socialism in world politics (Hobsbaum, 2000). As far as this view is concerned,
the years 1918 to 1950 marked the apogee or the climax of nationalism. It argues that few Third World anti-imperial ‘national’ movements coincided with a political or ethnic entity, which pre-dates the coming of the imperialists to these Third World countries. Thus, the development of nationalism in the nineteenth-century European sense of the word occurred largely since de-colonization, that is, mainly since the end of the Second World War in 1945. After this period, colonial subjects rose against their colonial masters and demanded freedom. The independence of India in 1947 and the subsequent independence of many African states in the 1960s saw an unprecedented upsurge of nationalism.

According to Ozkirimli, the 1980s marked a turning point in the whole history of nationalism in part because it was during this time that the debate on nationalism completed its adolescence. A new stage in theoretical debate started. He argues that during this period, the theories of nationalism became more sophisticated than had been the case before and then accounts for this change as follows: “The rise of new theories was precipitated by a more general transformation in social sciences, which in turn reflected the developments in the real world, notably the rise of a women’s movement, the writing of alternative histories which deny the homogeneity of national cultures and the changing nature of Western societies as a result of increasing migration” (Ozkirimli, 2000:191).

The point about gender is that during this time, gender-blind, Eurocentric character of the mainstream literature was suddenly criticized. There was more
emphasis put on internal (within nations) and external (among nations) hierarchies of power. Moreover, the interaction of the studies of nationalism with such developing fields as migration, race, multiculturalism, diasporas and the like increased significantly. For the first time special emphasis was now put on the inter-disciplinary nature of nationalism as a subject of investigation (Smith, 1998: xiii). During this time, feminist scholars tried all they could to bring to an end the conspicuous marginalization of women in the discussions on nationalism and in society in general. They called for the creation of an inclusive society. Therefore, it would be fair to argue that one of the key changes that took place in the development of nationalism at this time was that various social groups were brought on board in nationalist projects. This marked a departure from past practices.

Snyder (1954) presented a rather slightly different chronological typology of nationalism. Not only did he provide the dates when certain developments took place as far as nationalism was concerned, he also described the nature of nationalism that operated during each period. In the end, he came up with the following phases:

1. Integrative nationalism (1815-1871) when nationalism was a unifying force that helped to consolidate states.
2. Disruptive nationalism (1871-1890) whereby the success of nationalism in uniting Germany and Italy aroused the enthusiasm of subject or oppressed
nationalities in other countries of the world (minorities in the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary as well as other conglomerate states) to sought to break out of their oppression.

3. Aggressive nationalism (1900-1945), which was marked by the collision of opposing national interests and the explosive impact of the Second World War.

4. Contemporary nationalism (1945 to-date) whereby nationalism has extended to a global framework.

What is common between this and the previous typology is the fact that they both do not see nationalism as static; they demonstrate that it changed over time. Both typologies provide dates that serve as signpost in the development of nationalism, in other words showing when certain changes took place. Hayes (1955) presented his own typology but did not provide consistent dates when certain changes took place in the development of nationalism. Instead, he argued that there were six forms of nationalism that existed at different historical moments:

1. Humanitarian nationalism, whose doctrines were based on natural law and was presented as inevitable and therefore a desirable step in human progress.

2. Jacobin nationalism, which was based in theory on the humanitarian democratic nationalism of Rousseau. He argues that this form of nationalism was developed to safeguard and extend the principles of the French Revolution.
3. Traditional nationalism, which was aristocratic and evolutionary. The proponents of this form of nationalism focused on history and tradition, not ‘reason’ or ‘revolution’.

4. Liberal nationalism. This one fell somewhere between Jacobin and traditional forms of nationalism.

5. Integral nationalism, which was characterized by its hostility towards the internationalism of humanitarians and liberals. It put national interest above individual interests and those of humanity, refusing co-operation with other nations.

6. Economic nationalism behind which political considerations initially lay, but then a tendency developed to regard the state as an economic as well as a political unit. In fact, Hayes maintains that economic nationalism merged with imperialism and became one of the driving forces of contemporary history.

This is a fascinating chronology in that it presents different forms of nationalism. But like the ones mentioned before, it also maintains that nationalism has never been a static concept; it has been changing over the years.

Gellner (1983) did not focus on nationalism and its typology per se, but confined himself to the phases associated with the development of national movements. He presented the following phases:
1. During the nineteenth century Europe was purely cultural, literary and folkloric with no particular political or national implications.

2. A body of pioneers and militants of ‘the national idea’ and the beginnings of political campaigning for this idea emerged.

3. Nationalist programs acquired mass support, or at least some of the mass support that nationalists always claim they represent.

Gellner argued that the transition from phase B to C was a very crucial moment in the chronology and the rise of national movements since more people got involved and the conception of nationalism was, in a way, reconfigured.

The theories of nationalism discussed thus far are intriguing in many ways. Not only do they illustrate how nationalism evolved over time, they also present its different typologies. One of the most renowned authors who theorize on nationalism is Anderson (1991). He draws a link between the development of nationalism and two other concepts: technology and capitalism. According to Anderson, capitalism played a significant role in making nations popular especially through book publishing. According to this theory, as nations became popular, a sense of pride was instilled in their subjects and this promoted nationalism. Addressing this point and discussing nationalism in the global context, Anderson argues that print languages laid the bases for national consciousness in three very distinct ways:
• They created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above spoken vernaculars. For the first time ever, people who spoke different versions of a language were now capable of understanding one another via print and paper. In the process, they gradually became aware of the hundreds of thousands, or millions of people in their specific language field and that these were the only people with whom they belonged together.

• Print capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation.

• Print capitalism created languages-of-power of a kind different from the older administrative vernaculars in that certain dialects dominated over others and thus featured in the final written form of the language. Members of each language group saw themselves as one. That instilled the idea of nationalism (Anderson, 1991:37-45).

In a way, Anderson is not just imagining what might have happened in the past with regard to the formation of nations and the emergence of nationalism. Hobsbaum (1990:10) concurs that nations exist in the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development. He continues to say that most students today will agree that standard national languages – both spoken and written – could not emerge before printing and subsequently mass schooling. In
that sense the two authors concur with each other that there is a direct relationship between nationalism and technology.

Anderson’s conception of ‘imagined national communities’ concurs with Hobsbaum’s (1990) argument that nationalism resides in the mind and requires too much belief in what is patently not so. Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:64-65) advance the same view: “Nationalism is not what it seems, and above all it is not what it seems to itself. The cultures it claims to defend and revive are often its own inventions, or are modified out of all recognition.” According to Smith (1991), nationalism is based on a number of assumptions: that the world is divided into nations; that the nation is the source of all political and social power and loyalty to the nation overrides all other allegiances; that human beings must identify with a nation if they want to be free and realize themselves; and that the nations must be free and secure if peace and justice are to prevail at all.

In the theories of nationalism, the relationship between nationalism and ethnicity is said to be very complex because most people carry multiple identities. For example, if two people belong to different ethnic groups, are they one in the same way that people from the same ethnic group are? In other words, under nationalism, are certain people ‘more national’ than others? These are crucial questions to which there are no simple answers.
But the most intriguing question is the following: is nationalism a good or a bad thing? All theories considered, there is not single answer to this question. Moderate and reasonable nationalism could be judged as good, but immoderate and excessive nationalism is both unhealthy and dangerous because it could create animosity amongst people. When W.E.B. Du Bois wrote his book *The Souls of Black Folk*, he warned against indiscriminate nationalism and reverse racism, the insistence upon careful analysis and comprehensive understanding rather than either wholesale condemnation of whites or futile attempts to emulate some of their methods. He wrote: “In other words, awareness of nationalism from within the anti-imperialist camp requires that the whole matter of interpretation itself be raised” (Cited in Said, 2001:426).

One of the disadvantages of nationalism is that it insists on imposing homogeneity on those populations that are unfortunate enough to fall under the sway of authorities possessed by the nationalist ideology. Another disadvantage is that most cultures as well as potential national groups enter the age of nationalism without even the feeblest effort to benefit from it themselves (Gellner, 1983:45).

But on the positive side, nationalism is responsible for the general ordering of the political life of mankind. For example, in East Africa, regional nationalism organized different countries into a single entity. Later, sub-nationalisms united members of each nation against others and, in the case of Uganda, distinguished the people of Buganda Kingdom from those of Uganda Protectorate. In both
instances there was a political ordering of mankind. Gellner (1983:49) captures the complex nature of nationalism elegantly when he writes: “Nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into actions, sometimes invests them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one.” This is one of the realities about nationalism.

2.5 Sub-nationalism

Generally speaking, the term ‘sub-nationalism’ refers to a form of nationalism that is less encompassing than conventional nationalism as discussed above. It is a practice of uniting a smaller section of a nation so that it could develop as a separate entity. In other words, sub-nationalism is characterized by parochialism. In this dissertation, the term ‘sub-nationalism’ is used in two senses. First, the national consciousness of the people of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania after independence is considered as sub-nationalism in the sense that it deviated from regional/territorial nationalism which had united the people of East Africa against their colonial rulers (the British). Second, the parochialism of the Kingdom of Buganda represents another form of sub-nationalism whereby the Kabaka of Buganda and some leaders from other parts of the Kingdom of Buganda did not perceive themselves as part of Uganda but as a separate political entity.
Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to present the theoretical framework within which the present study is located. The chapter began by providing a justification for using theory in a research project and argued why theory is necessary for this study in particular. The chapter then went on to summarise existing theories on some of the key concepts used in this study as a way of presenting the broader context and framework within which the concepts should be understood. But most importantly, the chapter prepared the reader’s mind-set as far as the usage of these concepts in the East African case study is concerned.

One of the key contributions of this chapter is that it provided the history of each of the concepts mentioned above. By so doing, the chapter demonstrated that each of the concepts has a history behind it and that this history is not static but has been changing over the past few decades and should be considered in the analysis of the EAC. The concepts defined in this chapter allude to the fact that in general, countries or territories come together for a specific reason or set of reasons, both economic and political. In the same vein (as discussed in the next chapter), the integration of the three East African territories of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania was triggered by a number of factors, which had both economic and political derivation. There is a direct link between the two factors in that they impact on each other regarding the consolidation and weakening of regional integration in certain regions.
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that although most of the key terms used in this dissertation have been defined above, the terminology used in official or correspondence documents in the East African case study is sometimes confusing to the reader. This confusion derives mainly from the fact that some documents and pronouncements by key role-players use certain terms interchangeably while others see those same concepts as separate entities that mean different things. For example, the terms: ‘closer union’, ‘integration’ and ‘federation’ are sometimes used interchangeably. However, in other instances the phrase ‘closer union’ is used to refer to the coming together of the three East African territories and then the other two terms refer to the type of closer union these territories would form. It is the latter line of thought that will be followed in this study.

Another source of the confusion is the fact that at one point the East African leadership dreamt of establishing a single East Africa that would have one government and one president. But as discussions continued about closer union, they realized that this would be very hard to achieve. They then talked about ‘regional co-operation’ as opposed to ‘regional integration’ or ‘federation’. As demonstrated in the next two chapters, when the EAC was constituted in 1967, more emphasis was put on regional co-operation amongst the three East African governments. However, there was a general agreement that there would be an integration of regional services in different fields. It was in this context that the idea of the Federal University of East Africa was conceived. The aim was to have regional integration in higher education. The EAC would then promote both
economic and, later, political integration. It was envisaged that integration in all three areas (economy, education and politics) would ensure complete unity in the East African region.

The next two chapters specifically discuss the politics behind the history of regional integration in East Africa from the 1920s up to 1967 when the EAC was officially constituted. The chapters consider the role played by both whites and (East) Africans in this regard as a demonstration that agency in the rise of the EAC cannot be attributed solely to one racial group.
CHAPTER 3
The EAC: Historical Background, 1924-1948

0. Introduction

There is an acknowledgement by different scholars that each and every era in history confronts its distinctive social and political dramas, which distinguish it from other eras (Inkeles and Smith, 1974). In East Africa, the period from the 1920s to 1948 was full of its own dramas, the most important of which was the beginning of a long and tedious journey that would lead to the establishment of the EAHC in January 1948. But as stated in the introductory chapter above, this was not the first time that East African territories worked together under colonial rule. Territorial co-operation has deep roots in East Africa that date back to the advent of colonialism (Conover, 1960, Banfield, 1963). Before the onset of the colonial rule, East Africa was largely both politically and economically divided (Lonsdale, 1999). However, with the advent of colonialism some uncoordinated attempts were made to bring the territories of this region closer to one another.

When Britain took over the administration of East Africa in the mid-1890s, the idea of a united East Africa was conceived. Kiano (1959:13) wrote:

The federation of the East African territories of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika with the possible inclusion of the Central African territories of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, has for many years been a goal constantly sought by the white settlers of these regions and the British Colonial Office.
British authorities wanted to bring the different East African territories into a single political unit to ensure easy administration. They felt that East African territories could benefit greatly from continuing and regular contact with one another and from the common administration of certain services than would have been the case if they continued operating as separate entities (Banfield, 1963; Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa, 1929). In fact, writing in ‘The Rise of Our East African Empire’ as far back as 1898, Lord Lugard assumed that the entire East African region would be treated as a single unit (cited in Hughes, 1963:213). He subsequently proposed that a Governor should be appointed for East Africa and be stationed in Nairobi. According to his plan Commissioners would then be appointed in Uganda and Zanzibar.

In 1899 Sir Harry Johnson was appointed as a Special Commissioner to Uganda. He left England with the instruction that he should bear in mind the possibility of amalgamating the East African territories. When he returned to Britain in 1901 he told his superiors that having been to East Africa, he was totally convinced that not only Uganda or the two East African Protectorates of Uganda and Kenya but also Zanzibar and British Somaliland had to be placed under one administration (Legum, 1967). In his proposed administrative structure there would be a capital with a central Supreme Court as well as military and administrative headquarters sited in the highlands (in Kenya). Moreover, there would be a single budgetary control for the whole East African region.
Sir Harry Johnson’s successors found his vision interesting and reasonable both in the economic and political sense. Therefore, when Sir Charles Elliot retired as Commissioner for the East African Protectorate in 1905 he wrote that it was generally agreed that it would be advisable to amalgamate the two Protectorates, “and if this is to be done it certainly should be done soon, for the longer they remain apart the more they tend to become different in administrative systems and regulations” (cited in Hughes, 1963:214). In line with this thought, a Customs Union comprising Uganda and Kenya was established in 1917 with the aim of bringing a semblance of synergy in the regional economies (Tanganyika joined this Union in 1927).

By the time the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1919 officially ending the First World War, nothing tangible had been achieved yet. However, discussions were continuing at different levels and serious thinking was going on in the minds of different individuals who had vested interests in a federation project that would ease administration by bringing together three administrative offices in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. This project was also deemed to have great economic advantages in two ways. First, if the plan materialized, the British government would then pay one administrator instead of three. Second, it was envisaged that the three countries would be more economically viable if they worked together because they would complement one another instead of operating individually and competing with one another.
Britain also felt that through the envisaged federation of these territories, she would be better able to coordinate her policies in all three East African territories. This thinking instilled a great sense of optimism amongst British authorities at the time. For example, in 1922 Winston Churchill, British Colonial Secretary of State, dreamt of ‘a great East African federation, almost an Empire.’ This vision shows that the economic ties being forged amongst East African territories also had a political agenda, which was not always overtly articulated. Bringing these territories together would strengthen the British Empire in East Africa and thus enhance Britain’s political image in the global scene by demonstrating that Britain was able to run its Empire in East Africa as a unit.

It should be stated that although Britain wanted to see all East African territories coming closer to one another, she did not accord them the same status. For example, Hatch (1976:117) writes:

> To be frank, neither the Colonial Office nor British members of parliament were really concerned with Tanganyika. It was a very poor country, with few British settlers and no prospect of becoming important to any aspect of British policy. Thus much of their policy discussions on the territory concerned not the future of Tanganyika itself, but its effects on other territories which interested them more.

As British authorities became so enthusiastic about the prospects of regional integration in East Africa, white settlers in the region and the black majority viewed the whole project from a rather totally different angle; they were opposed to the whole idea for a number of reasons that revolved around power dynamics.
The white community feared that such a move “would bring increased Colonial Office control, particularly over native policies” (Hughes, 1963:214). They found this disturbing because it would tamper with the already existing power relations between East Africans and white settlers whereby the latter had a dominant voice. In other words, white settlers in East Africa were specifically concerned about their power that would be eroded when the British government imposed its policies that would govern East Africa as a region.

In Uganda and Tanganyika, white settlement was not as pronounced as in Kenya, which was a settler colony. Thus, Africans in the latter two territories feared that such a move would increase British hegemony in the region and interfere with their freedom (Kiano, 1959; Hughes, 1963; Low, 1971; Odhiambo, 1981). In fact, East African leaders such as President Nyerere had opposed the Central African Federation for the same reason. Nyerere had opposed the idea, not because of any antipathy towards federation as a concept but simply because the proposed federation was designed to perpetuate white domination (Hatch, 1976:129). The same thinking guided President Nyerere and other East African leaders on how to react to the proposed East African federation to which they were not direct participants. The federation issue was much more relevant to Tanganyika. The concept of federation in East Africa had been prejudiced by the efforts made by Europeans, especially those from Kenya, to form some kind of federation which would have entrenched white power before the Africans could even mobilize their potential.
Just like their white counterparts, the comments made by these East Africans were characterized by egotism. In a nutshell, both white settlers and East Africans did not embrace the idea of bringing the three East African territories together. It was in this context therefore that even though the idea was not necessarily new in the 1920s, a thorough investigation into the possibility of establishing regional integration in the region became expedient.

3.1 Regional Integration in East Africa from 1924 to 1926

The first phase in the process of regional integration in East Africa began in July 1924 when the British Colonial Office in London decided to appoint a four-member Commission and tasked it to look into the matter very closely and make concrete recommendations that would take the process forward. The chairman of this Commission was the Hon. W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore, a Conservative M.P. in the British Parliament. Other members of the Ormsby-Gore or the East Africa Commission were: Major A. G. Church (Labour MP), Mr. F.C. Linfield (Liberal MP) and Mr. J. A. Cadler who represented the British Colonial Office, and also served as the Commission’s secretary.

The Commission was tasked to consider and report, amongst other things, on the measures to be taken in order to accelerate the general economic development of the British East African Dependencies and the means of securing closer co-ordination of policy on a variety of services in the region. The East Africa
Commission left England on 15 August 1924. On arrival in East Africa, it conducted a number of lengthy interviews with different constituencies in the region and returned to Britain on 23 December the same year. The Commission presented its report to the Colonial Office in 1925. Amongst other observations, the Commission reported: “we found little, if any support in East Africa for the idea of federation and in some quarters we found definite hostility” (Report of the East Africa Commission, 1925). Furthermore, the Commission reported that Africans in Uganda, European settlers in Kenya, everyone in Zanzibar and the majority of the Indian community in the East African region were all opposed to the idea of regional integration for a variety of reasons already mentioned above.

However, the Commission did not totally rule out the possibility of proceeding with the regional integration project in future. Consequently, it recommended a gradual process of regional integration whereby there would be periodic conferences of Governors and the officers of the various departments from all three East African territories. One of the main observations made by the East Africa Commission was that as long as the idea of amalgamating different territories in East Africa came from outside, the entire enterprise was doomed to fail because it would be perceived as an imposition on the local people and British settlers by the central government in Britain. Thus, the Commission stated that they were satisfied that any further development in the direction of federation “will come, if it comes at all, as a result of local discussion of local needs and common problems. Federation cannot be imposed from without” (Report of the
East Africa Commission; Hughes, 1963:214). Implicit in the Commission’s recommendation was that local Governors would spearhead the process of amalgamation, not by merely implementing policies drawn up in Britain, but by assessing the local situation to which they were familiar and acting intuitively and advisedly.

The tone of the report showed that the envisaged amalgamation was going to be a bottom-up as opposed to a top-down process which would make no sense locally. It would be bottom-up in the sense that the Governors of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika – not British administrators in London – would drive the process.

Indeed, there was a move towards the implementation of the recommendations of the East Africa Commission. One of the major steps was that the Conference of East African Governors (chaired by Kenya) was officially instituted in 1926 as an advisory body. It brought together the three Governors of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, as well as the British Resident of Zanzibar. Its aim was to provide a platform where matters of mutual regional concern could be discussed at a regional level. Amongst the various issues addressed at these conferences were the following: customs tariffs, railway rates, and scientific research activities. It was agreed that the Conference of East African Governors would meet once a year and that its meetings would rotate amongst all member states in order to maintain the Conference’s regional context. In each case, the Governor of the hosting territory would automatically chair the meeting.
Apart from directing the work of the East African Meteorological service, the Statistical Department, the East African Inter-territorial Language (Swahili) Committee, the Conference of East African Governors convened a number of technical and scientific conferences in the region. It also kept in touch with the work done in the neighbouring countries in fields such as legal procedure and railway development so as to see if different stakeholders in the region could benefit from one another in future as far as these and other areas were concerned.

As stated above, the first Conference of East African Governors was held in Kenya in 1926. It was dubbed as the first step taken towards securing better cooperation between the administrations of territories “whose boundaries are in the main the result of historical accident rather than the expression of ethnological and geographical facts” (Report. Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa. Cmd.2904, 1927:4). In attendance at this Governors’ Conference were the Governors of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Nyasaland (now Malawi) and the British Resident from Zanzibar.

What could be discerned from this representation is the short-term and long-term vision of British authorities. If amalgamating Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar was an immediate goal, Britain’s long-term goal was to unite eastern Africa but could only move in phases, hence the decision to start off by working towards the amalgamation Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. It is also worth
mentioning at this juncture that initially British authorities were talking about co-operation, not federation and not integration. By the 1940s these concepts were either used interchangeably in official documents, or certain individuals preferred one concept over others. As shall be seen later in this dissertation, when Africans joined the debate in earnest in the 1950s and 1960s, this lack of consistency in the terminology continued.

By the time the first Governors’ Conference was held in 1926, Edward Griggs had been appointed Governor of Kenya and he had a good working relationship with British settlers in Kenya. In fact, he played an instrumental role in persuading these white settlers to embrace the idea of uniting the East African territories. The colonial report published soon after the first Governors’ Conference noted that His Majesty’s Government considered, as a result of discussions between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Representatives of the territories in British Central and East Africa who attended the first Colonial Conference, that “some form of closer union between the territories of Central and Eastern Africa appears desirable….“ (Report. Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa. Cmnd. 2904, 1927:6)

It is evident from the discussion thus far that the first Governors’ Conference of 1926 marked a new epoch in the very long history of regional integration in East Africa. Certain areas of co-operation were identified. These would be used as a starting point. If successful, other areas of co-operation would be added and more
countries in Eastern Africa would then be included. Subsequent developments that took place from 1927 onwards built on this solid foundation. For this reason, the year 1927 remains one of the major signposts in the long history of regional integration in East Africa.

3.2 Attempts at Closer Union, 1927-1948

By 1927 the quest for regional integration in East Africa was starting to gain momentum. Following the recommendations of the East Africa Commission that regional integration should be initiated locally the British government reluctantly conceded and allowed its Governors in the region to play a somewhat leading role. However, it still could not give them total freedom to do as they deemed fit. In 1927 the British government issued a White Paper in which it stressed the importance of closer union in East Africa. The paper called for more investigation on how to practically proceed with the process of bringing together these East African countries. Therefore, in December of that year the British Government appointed another Commission of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir Hilton Young. The terms of this Commission were stated as follows:

- To make recommendations as to whether, either by federation or some other form of closer union, more effective co-operation between the different Governments in Central and Eastern Africa could be secured, more particularly, in regard to development of transport and
communications, customs tariffs and customs administration, scientific research and defense;

- To consider which territories could either now or at some future time be brought within any such closer union;
- To make recommendations in regard to possible changes in the powers and composition of the various Legislative Councils of the several territories;
- To suggest how the Dual Policy recommended by the Conference of East African Governors (i.e. the complementary development of native and non-native communities) can best be progressively applied in the political as well as the economic sphere;
- To make recommendations as to what improvements may be required in the internal communications between the various territories so as to facilitate the working of federation; and
- To report more particularly on the financial aspects of any proposals which they may make under any of the above headings (Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa. Cmnd. 3234, 1929:5-6).

A close analysis of the terms of the Hilton Young Commission shows that at this stage nothing was final yet. For example, it was still not clear as to the kind of union that would be feasible for the region. Secondly, there was still uncertainty about the countries that would form part of the envisaged union. But what is even
more important is the fact that there was no doubt that some form of closer union would be found. The problem area was simply on the logistics. This is what the Hilton Young Commission was tasked to make recommendations on.

When the Commission presented its report in 1929 it drew three conclusions:

- There was an urgent need for the co-ordination of policy on ‘native affairs’ and all matters concerning the relations between natives and immigrants;
- There was a need for the co-ordination, and, as far as possible, central direction, of specific services of common interest to the three territories;
- Some arrangement of the constitutional position in Kenya was immediately desirable.

The tone of these conclusions suggests that the Hilton Young Commission worked from the premise that it was looking at the possibility of bringing together three territories in East Africa, that is, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. This narrowed the focus a bit and gave some direction to the entire process. Therefore, this Commission moved the regional integration process one step forward.

Amongst the recommendations of the Hilton Young Commission was the creation of a Central Authority for Eastern Africa. This Central Authority would supervise and co-ordinate policy for all the dependencies on matters affecting the relations between the communities and to ensure that the scales of justice were held even
between them. It would also secure imperial interests and the proper discharge of the responsibilities of His Majesty’s Government (Report of the Commission on Closer Union, 1929:107). Although in favour of a Legislative Council in which all three East African territories were represented, the Commission felt that this was not an opportune time to transfer all legislative powers from the territories to a central body. Just like the East Africa Commission, it proposed a gradual process. The Commission recommended that for the time being the Governor-General with full executive powers would have to preside over Joint Advisory Councils for different services.

In a way, the Hilton Young Commission reiterated some of the recommendations made by the East Africa Commission. Both Commissions agreed that there was a need to move towards a closer union of the three East African territories. They also agreed that it would be foolhardy to rush the process because any change that came in such haste could not be sustained. It was in this context that they proposed a gradual process.

In 1929, L. S. Amery, the Colonial Secretary of State, dispatched Sir Samuel Wilson to East Africa with an instruction to report on the practical possibilities for closer union arising from the report of the Hilton Young Commission. Wilson embarked on this trip and did as tasked by the Colonial Secretary of State. When presenting his report later, Wilson confirmed the idea of appointing a High Commissioner whose duties would include legislating on customs, railways, posts
and telegraphs, research and defense in the East African region as a whole. These were the areas in which the colonial authorities had interest at the time.

As the issue of federation was under discussion there was a change of government in Britain; the Labour Party won the general elections. However, this new development did not affect the process of uniting East African territories. Lord Passfield, a Member of the new government issued a White Paper on Closer Union in which he emphasized the need for a High Commissioner who would exercise control over African Affairs in the various territories. To test the waters, the Labour Government appointed a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament and tasked it to investigate the issue of closer union of the three East African territories and submit recommendations to parliament for consideration.

The Joint Select Committee toured East Africa collecting submissions and conducting interviews with different stakeholders in the region. It then submitted its report to the government in 1931 in which it recommended that there should be no radical move towards political federation – or even economic union for that matter. This recommendation was informed by the opposition of African respondents from Tanganyika and Uganda to closer association with Kenya – which was dominated by white settlers – and the general feeling of Africans in the region against the perceived intrusion of any further authority between them and the British Government (Report of Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, 1931; see also Hughes, 1963:218 and Low, 1971:87-98).
But overall, the Committee did not totally rule out the possibility of closer co-operation amongst the East African territories. For example, it proposed an extension of the cohesion already begun by the Governors’ Conference in 1926. Thus, “for the next few years the Governors’ Conferences and the meetings of officials provided a useful means of achieving practical co-ordination” (Hughes, 1963:219).

This is how the situation remained in East Africa until 1939. It should be mentioned that by this time East African Governors were still trying hard to identify some of the areas where regional co-operation could be attempted. In doing so, they had to preempt some problems that were likely to arise and try to circumvent them as much as they could. According to the minutes of the Governors’ Conference held in Dar es Salaam in June 1939 an agreement was reached to the effect that steps should be taken to co-ordinate the air survey requirements of the East African territories “with a view to placing at the disposal of the Governments equipment available for use in various territories as and when required” (Confidential Minutes of the Conference of Governors of British East African Territories, 23 and 24 June 1939). In the same meeting it was agreed that the East African Veterinary Research Institute was to be established at Kabete (Kenya) on the first of September 1939. It was further agreed that the governments of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda would all make contributions to the funding of this regional institute.
In previous meetings, other areas of co-operation had been identified by the Conference. For example, one of the conclusions of the Fourth Meeting of the Governors in June 1938 was that a Joint East African Examining Board in Veterinary Science would be formed, comprising the Directors of Veterinary Services of Uganda, Tanganyika and Kenya, as well as the principal of the Veterinary College at Entebbe and a representative of the Uganda Department of Education. However, it was the outbreak of the Second World War that presented the East African Governors with a golden opportunity to test the prospects of regional co-operation in these few areas.

3.2.1 Regional Co-operation and WW II
The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 had a direct impact on regional integration in East Africa. It created an opportunity for regional co-operation, which subsequently revived hopes for regional integration by demonstrating that a lot could be achieved if the three East African colonies worked jointly. Germany’s demand for the return of Tanganyika (which had been taken away from Germany as punishment for starting the First World War and was made a trusteeship territory of the League of Nations during the Peace Treaty of Paris signed in 1919) encouraged white settlers in Kenya to increasingly embrace the idea of closer union with the other two territories. One of their fears of these white settlers was that if Tanganyika became a German colony once again that would bring Germany closer to them thus threatening their freedom. In fact, there was no
guarantee that once Germany had taken full control of Tanganyika she would not want to expand her sphere of influence to the other two neighbouring territories. Thus, Kenya’s settlers decided to kill the plant before it blossomed. They fostered the concept of a white British dominion of Eastern Africa because “they were infuriated by German insistence that Tanganyika’s mandate status should not be endangered by closer association with the British Colony and Protectorates” (Hughes, 1963:219).

East Africa was one of the discussion points in the British Parliament during this time. Mr. Lewis, one of the British MPs, asked Mr. George Hall, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, with a view to the more efficient co-ordination of defense in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika he would consider appointing a Governor-General with executive powers over the three East African territories for the duration of the war. Mr. Hall responded by stating that the conference of East African Governors had been reconstituted for the duration of the war. He also mentioned that the Governor of Kenya had been appointed as the Chairman of the Conference and that Sir Philip Mitchell relinquished his position as Governor of Uganda to become the deputy-chairman. He concluded by stating that it was felt within the British Government that efficient co-ordination would be secured by such arrangements (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (UK), Vol.364, Col.1145).
As the war progressed in 1940, the Governors of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland agreed to establish a Joint Economic Council with its own secretariat. The envisioned Council, they thought, would adapt the different territories to the idea of being a community. The guiding assumption was that the entrenchment of economic integration would then pave way for political integration, which was the ultimate goal. The conference resolved to establish inter-territorial boards whose task was to deal with such matters as manpower, wartime production, industrial management, and price control. Subsequently, the following ad-hoc regional institutions were set up: East African War Supplies Council, East African Research and Development Board, and East African Refugee Administration.

What is evident from the discussion thus far is that British authorities in Britain and their representatives in East Africa (especially the Governors) had no intention whatsoever to involve the local East African leadership in the discussions. As mentioned above, even in 1931 when the Joint Select Committee on Closer Union went to East Africa, it only interviewed East Africans as ‘outsiders’ in the process. In fact, this was the case until the establishment of the EAHC in 1948. As stated in the introduction above, East Africans started taking an active part in the discussions in the 1950s when they were preparing for their political independence from Britain.
In 1942, Harold Macmillan, another MP in the British parliament, reminded the House of Commons about the state of affairs in East Africa, telling them that the Governors’ Conference was, in his view, doing a fantastic job under the prevailing circumstances. He continued to say that the Conference Secretariat was the focus where the common East African war effort was coordinated. Macmillan buttressed this assertion by pointing out that the Conference Secretariat conducted the affairs of the East African War Supplies Board and the Civil Supplies Board and that these Supply Boards exercised general control over the dispatch of East African produce to the Middle East (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (UK), Vol.380, Col. 2012).

Macmillan’s only concern was that whatever functions the Governors’ Conference in both East and West Africa may have performed up to that point were not suitable for war purposes because “they are not in a position to make decisions on the spot, because they have no statutory or executive powers or responsibilities” (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (UK), Vol.380, Col.2012). In a way, the war shifted the focus of the integration plan somewhat. But it should be noted that at the same time the war presented British authorities a golden opportunity to see if regional projects that brought together Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika could in fact work. For this reason, it could be argued that the Second World War assisted Britain in sustaining plans for regional integration – even if by default.
Towards the end of the Second World War the question of the East African region became even more popular in Britain. Questions about the state of affairs in East Africa became common in both Houses of the British Parliament. Mr. Donner, one of the MPs, asked Mr. George Hall, Secretary of State for the Colonies, if he was in a position to make a statement on the subject of the inter-territorial co-ordination in East Africa. In part, the Squadron-leader wanted to know the prospects of inter-territorial co-ordination in East Africa once the war had ended. Hall answered by stating that after consultation with the Governors of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika His Majesty’s Government decided to issue proposals for the future management of the inter-territorial services in east Africa as a basis for public discussion. He reminded the House that the existing organization of the East African Governors’ Conference had already grown up gradually over a period of years to meet the growing need for co-ordination of policy between Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika in peacetime, and that it had recently enabled the territories to make their maximum contribution to the war effort. However, he regretted that there was still no permanent constitutional basis for the common services and no effective means of securing the backing of public opinion for their operation (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (UK), Vol.417, Col. 568).

When the war ended in 1945 the focus shifted from mobilization to finding a standard formula to be followed by the different East African territories when demobilizing the African corps that had participated in the war against Germany. Subsequently, the Labour government took precautions not to give the Governors
too much freedom. Creech Jones, who had now become the new Colonial Secretary, issued Colonial Paper No. 191 of 1945 in which he stressed the need for inter-territorial co-operation. While recognizing the work done by the Governors’ Conference, he insisted that they could not take decisions independently but in consultation with their national government.\(^5\) It was in this context that the British government – after consulting its Governors – issued ‘Proposals for the future management of the inter-territorial services in East Africa’. One of the proposals contained in that document was the creation by an Order-in-Council of a permanent body, a single executive authority, the EAHC. This Commission was to be assisted by inter-territorial advisory boards and advised by a Central Legislative Assembly (CLA) with the power to administer certain specified common services on a regional basis (Banfield, 1963). These proposals were further discussed amongst British authorities both within and outside Britain.

In 1946, Creech Jones, the Secretary of State for the Colonies toured East Africa to familiarize himself with the area and to see things for himself. Like his predecessor, Winston Churchill, he dreamt of a united East Africa under the British control. He thought about establishing an East Africa High Commission that would ensure that the region was run as a single unit, thus easing Britain’s administration and serving her money and personnel as stated above. By this time East Africa had caught the attention of many people. It was in this context that one of the East African Commissioners unabashedly stated that “whatever the

\(^5\) Pressure from Kenya’s white settlers forced him to change his tone. Subsequently a different version of his views appeared in Paper No. 210 giving more powers to the Governors to make certain decisions on regional matters.
reason, there can be no question that the present degree of interest in East Africa is without parallel in the past” (Report by Creech Jones, 1947:1). In March 1947 some amendments were made to the initial proposal and subsequently the EAHC was officially established on 1 January 1948. This marked a watershed in the long drawn out struggle for the establishment of a regional institution in East Africa.

The Headquarters of the EAHC were located in Nairobi, Kenya. The High Commission’s Secretariat comprised the Administrator, a Commissioner for Transport, a Postmaster General, and a Legal Secretary. Its legislative powers were stated as follows:

- Appropriations providing for expenditure on those services for which it was responsible
- Customs and excise, general provisions and administration
- Income tax, general provisions and administration
- Defense, including the East African Navy
- Railways and Harbours
- Civil Aviation
- Research
- Posts and Telegraphs
- Telephone and Radio Communications
- Staff Matters and
- Makerere College
The picture painted by these legislative powers is that the EAHC was a complete
federation. But in fact, at this stage it would be hard to consider this a fully-
fledged federation because basic political and administrative powers still
remained with each of the territorial governments. Moreover, the EAHC still did
not have a police force of its own, nor did it have its own courts. For that reason,
it could not enforce its laws; its powers were limited and its operation somewhat
contained.

But despite all these limitations the EAHC still managed to register a few
achievements soon after its formation. For example: (i) it amalgamated two rail
systems; (ii) it firmly established the East African Airways Corporation; (iii) it
also succeeded in making the Posts and Telecommunications Department both
commercial and independent; and (iv) it established research services where
medical, agricultural, and veterinary research would be conducted. Another
important development was that the East African Currency Board and the Court
of Appeal for Eastern Africa were both linked to the East African High
Commission by interlocking members of their Boards. Therefore, although the
EAHC faced many challenges, its formation was a significant moment in the
history of regional integration in East Africa. It marked the completion of one
phase in that history.
Chapter Summary

This chapter has outlined the early stages in the history of regional integration in East Africa, starting from the early 1920s when British authorities conceived the idea and ending in 1948 when the first regional institution, the EAHC, was established on 1 January 1948. As shown in this chapter, the establishment of the EAHC was the culmination of quite a number of processes that began with the appointment of the East Africa Commission in July 1924. The main point made in this chapter is that the EAHC that was established in 1948 was the brainchild of the British Government and its representatives in East Africa. Although there were power dynamics between the center (Britain) and the periphery (East Africa), they all shared the idea that East African territories had to be brought closer to one another somehow. The chapter has demonstrated that at this stage, the East African leadership and the general public did not embrace the idea at all. They feared that through the envisaged regional integration project (economic or political), Britain wanted to sustain her hegemony in the East African region.

An attempt has also been made in this chapter to demonstrate the role played by the Second World War in facilitating regional integration in East Africa by default. The war presented British representatives in East Africa (especially the Governors) an opportunity to test the possibility of making the territories they were based in work together as a unit. They had to plan their role in the war as a region, not as separate political entities. When the war ended, they had to come up with a regional strategy on how they would disband the soldiers who had been
participating in the war. Therefore, although this was not part of the initial plan, the Second World War contributed to the regional integration cause. The analysis of British parliamentary debates illustrates this point elegantly.

Another point worth reiterating at this juncture is that the integration process that was discussed between the 1920s and 1948 was mainly dominated by British authorities in Britain and the Governors based in East Africa who were brought on board at a later stage. Personal relationships within the East African leadership had not yet become evident at this stage. As discussed above, the Report of the Joint Select Committee appointed in 1931 stated that those East Africans who were interviewed were opposed to any form of closer union, cooperation, or integration in East Africa mainly because they were concerned about the potential sustenance of British hegemony in East Africa. But even this resistance was not yet coordinated as would be the case much later.

The question then could be phrased as follows: why did the East African leadership have a change of heart and embrace the idea of regional integration in the 1950s and 1960s? Also, to what extent did personal relationships between East African leaders shape the developments that took place in the region soon after the establishment of the EAHC in 1948? The following chapter addressed these questions directly.
CHAPTER 4

The East African Leadership and the Establishment of the EAC, 1950s-1967

0. Introduction

The 1950s witnessed a change of mind by the East African leadership. Although they had vehemently opposed any form of closer union in their region fearing that it would extend and sustain British hegemony, they now embraced the idea. The main reason for this change of mind was the fact that Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Uganda were moving towards independence. Although Kenya was still lagging behind in this regard, the prospects of gaining independence in the near future were already discernible. Therefore, East Africans felt that time was ripe for them to pursue the idea of regional integration. They felt that they could integrate on their own terms and make Britain dispensable. President Nyerere was the first to appreciate this change. He was very conscious of the fact that the chances of having real development in East Africa would almost certainly be retarded if each of the four territories set up its own state apparatus and formulated separate economic policies (Hatch, 1976; Delupis, 1969; Mugomba, 1978). The EAHC provided a platform from which East Africans could plan their future.

But by the 1950s, British white settlers were still in control of East African affairs through the EAHC where their interests were highly represented. Although everything was done to ensure that East Africans also had representatives in this
regional institution (Delupis, 1969) they were few in number to make any impact. For this reason, they could not lead the EAHC to the direction they wanted. Some of the white settlers who were the founding members of the EAHC in 1948 were still heavily involved in its affairs in the 1950s. In 1952, Sir Philip Mitchell, one of the East African Governors, recalled that he had presided at the inaugural meeting of the Assembly on the 6th of April, 1948 but did not know at the time that he would have another privilege of presiding at the same forum four years later. He then contextualized his joy by stating that he regarded the Assembly as being of the greatest possible importance for the future of East Africa (EAHC. Proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly, Official Report, 1953, Col. 6).

To a large degree, the EAHC still paid allegiance to the British Government as a result of white settler dominance in the leadership positions. This can be deduced from the opening message written by the chairman of the EAHC and read by Mr. Scott, an EAHC executive member who served as the chairman of the meeting in 1952. The message read thus:

The members of the East African Central Legislative Assembly, meeting for the first time in its second term, present their humble duty to His Majesty the King and desire to assure His Majesty that they are fully sensible of the responsibilities imposed on them, and gladly accepted, in continuing to promote the well-being of all three East African Territories and all His Majesty’s subjects in them. They are resolved to direct all their activities, in so far as it lies within their powers, to the fulfillment of this trust (EAHC. Proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly, Official Report, 1953, Col.4).

But East Africans were already calling for changes in the composition of the EAHC, especially in the leadership positions. The end of the Second World War
in 1945 had ushered in a new political phase in Africa in general, including East Africa. The spirit of nationalism rose in an unprecedented manner and the call for political independence from colonial rule became louder across the entire African continent. As this happened the association of the EAHC with Britain and its domination by white British settlers became unsettling to the majority of East Africans who constantly questioned this state of affairs. Not only did the East African leadership call for the Africanisation of the EAHC so that it could reflect the views and aspirations of the African people, they also expressed their determination to achieve economic and political independence through regional integration.

The unfolding of events at this time consolidated the relationship amongst African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah from Ghana and Kenneth Kaunda from Zambia. In East Africa, Presidents Kenyatta, Nyerere and Obote came even closer to one another. This close relationship was demonstrated by the fact that they invited one another to address the East African masses on the need for joint effort against Britain. Whenever they felt that Britain was being unjust in treating one territory, they supported one another and criticized the British Government openly. Personal relationships within the East African leadership – both at the national and regional levels – increased the prospects of regional integration.

The political relationship that existed between President Nkrumah and the East African leadership inspired the latter to follow on Ghana’s footsteps in seeking
their political independence from Britain. Many other African countries did the same, hence the view that: “during the 1960’s Africa was chaotic because these were the years when many nations ‘rushed’ into independence” (Marah, 1989: v).

In East Africa, Tanganyika got self-rule in 1960, followed by full independence in December 1961. Uganda followed-suit and achieved her independence on 9 October 1962. Then Kenya and Zanzibar completed the process in 1963. On 25 April 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar agreed to merge and form Tanzania, following a revolution that had taken place in Zanzibar in January of that year (1964) and intense secret negotiations between Presidents Nyerere and Abeid Karume of Zanzibar (Nyerere, 1967; Smith, 1973). Personal relationships between the two politicians accelerated the pace of uniting their two territories and this in turn contributed to the integration of East Africa as a region.

A close analysis of the sequence of events from 1960 paints a better picture on how personal relationships amongst the East African leadership changed the face of that region in the political scene. But a good starting point would be to look at the changes that took place in the EAHC during this time and how those changes brought East Africans closer to one another and inspired them to embrace the idea of regional integration to which they had been opposed for so long.

### 4.1 The Formation of EACSO

As mentioned above, Presidents Nyerere, Obote, Kenyatta and other East African leaders were not happy about the composition of the EAHC because it did not
reflect the African outlook and did not have African interests at the top of its agenda. They then decided to Africanize the EAHC. Because the three leaders had a good working relationship amongst themselves, they found it easier to speak in one voice on how the EAHC could be revamped. The pressure they exerted on their white counterparts resulted in the replacement in December 1961 of the EAHC by a new East African regional institution called EACSO. This change occurred despite the fact that the EAHC had already registered quite a few achievements within just a single decade by putting in place regional services in different fields.

Commenting on the replacement of the EAHC by the EACSO, the report of the EAC (Vol. xiv, No.2, 1962:344) pointed out that it was a paradox that the achievement made by this institution was in part responsible for its anticipated demise at the end of 1961. However, the report perceived the new organization as symbolizing the desire of the peoples of East Africa for more popular representation in the administration of the common services that would fall under its ambit. It was not surprising therefore that the new Legislature would bear almost the same name as the previous one. The High Commission had no doubt whatsoever that the traditions which members of the EAHC had evolved so well over the years would be welcomed and adopted by the new East African legislature.
Before changing the EAHC, the East African leadership held discussions with their British counterparts in London and eventually reached an agreement that the EAHC should change its name and be expanded and Africanized. Indeed, after working out the logistics, the EAHC was changed to EACSO. The agreement for this change over was subsequently published as General Notice No.10 of 1962 in the EACSO Gazette dated 1 January 1962. The report of the London discussion was published as Colonial Command Paper Number 1433, ‘The Future of the EAHC Services’ (EACSO Annual Report, 1962:1). Prime Minister Nyerere, addressed the Tanganyika National Assembly after the paper had been published moving that it be resolved that the House welcomed the proposals contained in Command Paper 1433 and invite the Tanganyikan Government to enter into an agreement with the Government of Kenya and Uganda along the lines proposed in the Command Paper as soon as possible after Tanganyika became independent. In his view, it would be folly to break up the unity of these common services, which could in fact be run more economically and efficiently as a whole than as separate entities (Assembly Debates (Hansard) Tanganyika National Assembly, Official Report, 1961, Cols 30-31).

Nyerere told the House that it was on the basis of these considerations that he and his colleagues from East Africa went to London in June 1960 to discuss the future of their region after the independence of Tanganyika. He concluded by saying that these talks were distinguished by the cordial and co-operative atmosphere in which they were conducted, emphasizing that they were in complete agreement in
the way in which general regional interests could best be served by different stakeholders once Tanganyika was independent. As events unfolded, the East African leadership strengthened their relationships by speaking in one voice on many issues when dealing with Britain.

The EACSO was larger in scope than its predecessor organization, the EAHC and was therefore more representative than the former regional body. In addition to the services rendered by the EAHC, EACSO took charge of the currency, customs regulations, tariffs, and taxes for the entire East African region thus maintaining its regional outlook. In her analysis of the differences that existed between the two organizations, Banfield (1963) made a few observations which could be summarized as follows:

1. Unlike the High Commission (EAHC), the EACSO was not a creature of the British government but was created by the terms of an agreement entered into by the three East African governments and was therefore called into being at their request.

2. The EACSO constitution provided for a local executive responsible not to an overseas or foreign government as were the Governors, but to the three governments.

3. The constitution could be amended by local arrangement and, as a result, EACSO was able to meet changed and changing political situations and needs.
4. EACSO continued to control the policy of and administer the common services which for many years had proved to the satisfaction of the East African governments, to be valuable, efficient and useful and which notwithstanding the attainment of independence by the three East African sovereign states, were better administered by the common authority [the Regional Legislative Assembly] rather than three.

4.2 De-colonisation and the New Central Legislative Assembly

As it became evident that the national flags in East Africa would eventually replace the Union Jack, the citizens of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda talked about freedom and federation at the same time (Stabler, 1979:33-4). They invested their time and effort in reconfiguring regional politics, more especially with regards to continuing to work closer with one another after independence. Subsequently, the Central Legislative Assembly of East Africa changed its outlook significantly, with more East Africans coming on board and occupying leadership positions. The East African leadership cited the pre-colonial African way of life as their guiding principle in whatever they were doing. They stated that unity was part of the social fabric amongst Africans and therefore had to be demonstrated and sustained through regional institutions. When President Kenyatta wrote his book Facing Mount Kenya, he argued that to the Europeans, individuality is the ideal of life but to the Africans the ideal is the right regulations with, and behavior to, other people (Kenyatta, 1965; Government of Kenya. The National Assembly, House of Representatives, Official Report, 1963, Col. 418).
East African leaders were in constant touch with one another planning how they would move their region forward once they were in charge of their destiny. During the meeting of the first Central Legislative Assembly under the EACSO convened on 22 May 1962, the East African brotherhood was even more evident. The address by Kenyatta captures the mood elegantly and therefore will be quoted at length. He stated:

Mr. Speaker, honorable Members, on behalf of the Authority I bid you welcome to this, the first meeting of the Central Legislative Assembly set up in terms of the East African Common Services Organization Constitution. My colleagues on the Authority, the Prime Minister of Tanganyika, Mr. Kawawa, and the Prime Minister of Uganda, Mr. Obote, join with me in extending to all of you our congratulations on your appointment to this Assembly whose membership can now be said to reflect public opinion throughout Africa. We welcome this fact and look forward to your expression of opinion which will be ventilated here on the major issues which now confront East Africa as a whole. From the very outset this will require from you a sense of statesmanship, in as much as you will need to look at the problems from an East African point of view and not from the point of view only of what is best for your own Territory.

I want to emphasize that this Assembly is a completely new body. It is true that there was a former legislature which had very nearly the same name, but in fact there is really no connection between that former legislature and this one. On the other hand, I say to you, profit from the experience gained in the former legislature but do not be afraid to introduce into this one your own customs and procedures where it would be right to do so (EAHC. Proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly, Official Report, 1962, Col.3).

Implicit in this address was that initially East Africans had a very little voice in the EAHC and thus had no full interest in it. Furthermore, there were certain customary practices that were not accommodated under the old order. In the new

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6 Rachidi Mfaume Kawawa was appointed by Nyerere to become Tanganyika’s Prime Minister on 22 January 1962 when Nyerere himself resigned from that position as a tactical political strategy. See Nyerere (1967:157-158).
Central Legislative Assembly, such customary practices were welcome because East Africans were the custodians of this organization. By this time there was no doubt that the East African leadership was united and all the regional leaders were determined to take charge of their own affairs. The existing personal and political relationship accelerated the development of events in East Africa during this time. For example, the good relationship that Kawawa had with Nyerere and Kenyatta created a conducive atmosphere for regional integration to take place. Kawawa “cooperated closely with the TANU and entered a long-term partnership with Julius Nyerere” (Wiseman, 1991:106).

As seen above in the case of Tanganyika’s willingness to delay its independence for the sake of Kenya and Uganda and as shall be seen later in this chapter, the political understanding and personal relationships amongst East African leaders continued unabated even after Uganda had achieved its political independence in October 1962. The two countries put more weight behind Kenya so that the process leading to the latter’s independence too could be accelerated. The Kenya African National Union (KANU) expressed its willingness to ask for a meeting of East African leaders shortly after the elections to discuss plans for the future of an independent East Africa. KANU had a stern belief that after the elections the way would be clear for Kenya to enter into meaningful discussions with its two counterparts with a view to creating closer economic and political relations in the East African region (The Sunday Post, 5 May 1963).
Political and economic developments in East Africa in the 1960s shaped, and were in turn shaped by personal relationships amongst East African leaders. The *Sunday Chronicle* (31 July 1960) commented about the relationship that existed between Nyerere and Kenyatta, stating that once Nyerere became Tanganyika’s Prime Minister and once Kenyatta was released from prison, they would both work towards the East African federation. The only problem at this stage was that the independence of these East African countries would not come at the same time. The writing was already on the wall that Tanganyika would achieve its political freedom earlier than Uganda and Kenya. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, East African national governments, colonial Governors in the region, and the British government generally felt that this would have serious repercussions for the envisaged regional integration, hence the meeting that was held in London. It was at this meeting that preliminary plans for the post-independence era were made.

In fact, this was a major concern even before the London conference. Once Tanganyika obtained self-rule in 1960, a need arose to make further plans for the region. To this effect, the British Colonial Office in London convened a constitutional conference in Dar es Salaam from 27 to 29 March 1961 to discuss the procedure that would be followed to usher in Tanganyika’s independence from Britain. At the end of the conference it was agreed that 28 December 1961 would be the date for Tanganyika’s independence. The prospects of Tanganyika getting self-rule in 1960 and independence in 1961 had limited the chances of
ever achieving regional integration in East Africa without any glitches. The confirmation of the date when Tanganyika’s independence would begin made the fears of being unable to secure regional integration even more real. As an independent state, Tanganyika would enjoy certain rights that Kenya and Uganda did not have at the time because they were not yet free from British domination. Hughes (1963:225) recalled this moment by stating that the possibility of ever achieving federation in the future hung in the balance as a result of Tanganyika’s pending independence from Britain. There was a possibility that the whole pattern of practical inter-territorial cooperation might be destroyed if Britain failed to take all the necessary precautionary measures (see also Southall, 1974:15).

However, as a result of the good relationship that existed between Nyerere and his counterparts from Kenya and Uganda, the former expressed his preparedness to delay Tanganyika’s independence if Britain presented a clear timetable for the other two countries’ independence. Nyerere stated:

If the British Government is willing to amend their timetable for the constitutional changes of the other territories and then those territories expressed a desire for federation, I would be willing to ask the people of Tanganyika to join that Federation with the others (Nyerere, 1964:40; Nyerere, 1967:86; Hatch, 1976:130).

Certainly, no greedy and egoistic politician would have made such an offer. Also, if Nyerere was not in good terms with Obote and Kenyatta he would have proceeded with the plans to secure Tanganyika’s independence without thinking about what that would mean to Uganda and Kenya and, therefore, to the plans for regional integration. There was confirmation from Nyerere that in a situation
whereby Tanganyika achieved independence before its two counterparts, regional brotherhood would still be maintained. During the constitutional conference referred to above, Tanganyika’s politicians expressed their desire to continue participating in the EACSO even after their country had achieved its full political independence from Britain.

The East African leadership from all three territories (and Zanzibar) expressed their willingness to resolve the question of regional integration, bearing in mind Tanganyika’s envisaged independence. From 19 to 27 June 1961, the Secretary of State for the Colonies convened a meeting in London to address some of the salient issues. Delegates at the meeting came from Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, the EAHC, and from the British Colonial Office. In addition to delegates from these countries, other delegates came from Zanzibar. The latter attended the meeting as observers. It was agreed at that meeting that although Tanganyika was entitled to her independence, it would be in the interest of all the territories in the region to ensure that whatever constitutional changes might take place in the future in East Africa, the already existing common services in the region should continue to be provided (Report of the London Conference, Cmnd.1433, 1961:4).

Therefore, the independence of Tanganyika in 1961 did not in any way derail the regional integration process as had been anticipated. East African leaders remained close to one another.
4.3 The Raisman Commission

Although there was general consensus on what needed to be done to accelerate the process, it was still felt necessary to map up a clear programme of action. To this effect, East African leaders asked Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies to appoint a Commission of Enquiry that would examine certain aspects of the arrangements already in force in East Africa at the time for a common market area and economic co-ordination between the territories. Macleod accepted the request and appointed a three-member Commission in July 1960, chaired by Jeremy Raisman. The other two members of this Commission were: A. J. Brown and R. C. Tress. The Raisman Commission or the East Africa Economic and Fiscal Commission was guided by the following terms:

(a) To examine arrangements at present in force in East Africa for a common market area, for economic co-ordination between Territories and for fiscal uniformity with regard to measures now taken –

(i) To facilitate inter-territorial trade in products of local agriculture and manufacturing industries and to develop such industries in East Africa.

(ii) To secure uniformity in fiscal and financial matters including methods used to allocate yields from customs, excise and income taxes between territories.

(iii) To provide the East Africa High Commission with revenue necessary to meet the costs of services administered by the
Commission for the benefit of the Territories and to apportion the cost of such services between the Territories.

(b) To consider the advantages and disadvantages generally of the present arrangements and whether or not these arrangements are economic and are fair to the interests of each of the individual Territories; and to make recommendations for any necessary adjustments, additions or modifications to them (Report of the East Africa Economic and Fiscal Commission, 1961:1, par.1).

The Commission conducted its work as tasked and presented its report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in January 1961. The latter presented the report to the British Parliament in February 1961 as Command Paper 1279. There was simultaneous publication of the report in East Africa.

The Commission reiterated the need to administer regional services centrally so as to ensure quality and reduce all unnecessary expenses. For example, paragraph 105 recommended that the addition of commercial legislation to the schedule of matters with respect to which the Central Legislative Assembly may pass laws should be considered by the Governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika and by the High Commission.

The report of the Raisman Commission was discussed at length in the East Africa Legislative Assembly. Mr. Pandya, one of the Members of the East African
Central Legislative Assembly, commented that the report had brought out the importance of the economic co-ordination which East African territories had had since the last 12 years and that it had, after examining its function, come to the conclusion that the common market, the arrangements for economic co-ordination and joint services – “should not only be continued but should be further strengthened in the interests of East Africa as a whole” (EAHC. Proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly, Official Report, 1961, Col. 237). The acceptance of the major recommendation of the Raisman Commission, that is, its emphasis on the need to do things in the regional context, augured well for the future of East Africa. It was thus another significant episode in the regional integration process (EAHC. Proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly, Official Report, 1962, Col. 344).

4.4 Declaration of Federation

By the middle of 1963 all seemed to be going according to plan. There were very strong sentiments amongst the three East African countries for both economic and political federation. This was to be finalized at the end of the year when Kenya achieved her independence, at which point a regional constitution would then be drafted. These sentiments brought East African politicians even closer to one another more than ever before. On 5 June 1963, Presidents Kenyatta, Nyerere and Obote amicably agreed to sign a historic Declaration in Nairobi through which they made a commitment to one another on a number of issues. They vowed to work together as a region as soon as they were all free to decide the fate of their
respective countries. In fact, one of the major aims of the Declaration was to accelerate Kenya’s independence in the spirit of East African brotherhood (Southall, 1974:16). The Declaration of Federation remains one of the key documents in the entire history of regional integration in East Africa because it cemented the personal relationships that already existed amongst East African leaders while at the same time mapping up the way forward. For that reason we shall quote the Declaration at length. On that date (5 June 1963), the three Presidents agreed as follows:

We, the leaders of the people and Governments of East Africa assembled in Nairobi on 5 June 1963, pledged ourselves to the political Federation of East Africa.

Our meeting today is motivated by the spirit of Pan-Africanism and not by mere selfish regional interests. We are nationalists and reject tribalism, racialism, or inward-looking policies. We believe that the day of decision has come, and to all our people we say there is no more room for slogans and words. This is our day of action in the cause of the ideals that we believe in and the unity and freedom for which we have suffered and sacrificed so much.

Within this spirit of Pan-Africanism and following the declaration of African unity at the recent Addis Ababa conference, practical steps should be taken wherever possible to accelerate the achievement of our common goal.

We believe that the East African Federation can be a practical step towards the goal of Pan-African unity. We hope that our action will help to accelerate the efforts already being made by our brothers throughout the continent to achieve Pan-African unity.

We share a common past and are convinced of our common destinies. We have a common history, culture, and customs which make our unity both logical and natural. Our futures are inevitably bound together by the identical aspirations and hopes of our peoples and the need for similar efforts in facing the tasks that lie ahead of each of our free nations.
In the past century the hand of imperialism grasped the whole continent and in this part of Africa our people found themselves included together in what the colonialists styled ‘The British sphere of influence.’ Now that we are once again free or are on the point of regaining our freedom we believe the time has come to consolidate our unity and provide it with constitutional basis (Kenya News. Press Handout No.525, 5 June 1963, Kenya National Archives).

These leaders touched on a wide range of issues. They recalled previous attempts by leaders like President Nkrumah of Ghana to unite Africa. They then stated that KANU’s victory in Kenya gave them an opportunity to work together as three East African governments to promote African nationalism and Pan-African unity by first establishing a regional body that would later form part of African unity. President Nyerere stated: “We cannot create a continental government overnight, but we can start in East Africa” (Cited in Smith, 1973:88). The three leaders applauded the people of East Africa for resisting imperialist attempts to impose political federation on them since the 1920s. In their view, political federation at that time would have resulted to white domination because colonial authorities had their own agenda (to sustain their hegemony) that was different from that of the African leadership. Now that they were all independent territories, they felt that time was ripe to form a federation. Interestingly, they talked about both economic and political federation simultaneously. The kind of federation they aspired to have was not divorced from the broad idea of African unity that President Nkrumah dreamt about. This was captured in the last paragraph of the Declaration, which stated the following:

We reiterate that our plans for the Federation of East Africa is the logical promotion of the spirit of Pan-African unity and wish to make it, therefore,
clear that any of our neighbors may in future join this federation (Kenya News. Press Handout No.525, 5 June 1963, Kenya National Archives).

In this Declaration, East African leaders made their intentions clear. Some of their short-term and long-term goals could be gauged from the joint statement they released to the media afterwards, in which they stated, *inter alia* that their meeting on that day had been motivated by the spirit of Pan-Africanism and not by mere selfish regional interests. They continued by saying that: “We are nationalists and reject tribalism, racialism or inward-looking politics” (*Daily Nation*, 6 June 1963; see also: *Daily Nation*, 5 June 1963; *Uganda Argus*, 5 June 1963 and *Tanganyika Standard*, 24 January 1964). These passionate pronouncements meant that the East African leadership would henceforth play an active and leading role in the regional integration process, something they had been vehemently opposed to for about four decades. It also meant that they would work jointly in ensuring that the process succeeded.

The signing of the Declaration was considered to be one of the milestones in the history of East Africa. It became the focal point in the National Assemblies of the different East African states. Mr. Bataringaya, a Ugandan opposition MP had the following to say about the Declaration:

Mr. Speaker, I beg to move that this House do note with approval the declaration by the Heads of the East African Governments to form a political federation of East African territories this year…The purpose of my moving this motion from this side of the House is simple and that is, to show to Uganda, to East Africa and Africa that the Opposition in Uganda is meaningful and plays its role of construction and not destruction” (National Assembly Debates (Uganda), Official Report, 1963:858).
Mr. Ronald Ngala, an MP in the Kenyan parliament, proposed a similar motion in Kenya’s National Assembly.

The British Government welcomed the news with warm hands because, as mentioned in chapter 3, they were the ones who initiated the process of bringing East African territories closer to one another. Duncan Sandy, Secretary of State for the Colonies during this time, reminded the House of Commons that the British Government had long believed that federation would do much to promote both the stability and prosperity of East Africa. Therefore, he stated that his government warmly welcomed the announcement by the President of Tanganyika and the Prime Ministers of Uganda and Kenya of their intention to establish a federation embracing their three countries and to invite the Government of Zanzibar, after its anticipated elections, to also participate in the preparatory discussions. He insisted that the decision had been made by the East African Governments themselves but that they could surely count on the fullest support and co-operation of the British Government in their efforts to bring the federation into being without any further delay in the process (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (UK), Report, Vol.679, No.127, 1963, Col. 1638).

But as mentioned in the previous two chapters, official documents were not always specific on what they meant by certain terms. For example, in the above quotation, the Secretary of State for the Colonies did not specify what ‘stability’ entailed. Whether he meant security as the British had intended, or economic
stability remained unclear. The same applies to ‘prosperity’. But one could justifiably conclude that the vision that the British Government had about East Africa was to create a region that would have both economic and political stability, a region that would be prosperous in economic terms. East African leaders adopted this vision and nurtured it on their terms.

The signing of the Declaration in June 1963, important as it was, only marked the beginning of a long journey towards regional integration. The next important challenge was to draft a federal constitution that would be different from the previous ones that were drafted and implemented by successive colonial administrators. If East Africans were indeed free from British colonial rule, they had to take charge of their own affairs in all spheres of life. Under the heading: ‘Federal Constitution’, the *East African Standard* ran an article on this subject:

> Legal assistance is being obtained for the drafting of a constitution suitable to the projected East African federation. With the speed of political developments, there is no time to lose in getting all this preparatory work done. Colonial Legal experts have drafted all previous constitutions for the East African territories. When the sovereign Governments get together to form a federation, the responsibility for seeing the federal constitution properly drawn up will be theirs alone. Naturally, there is intense public interest in the kind of constitution to come. The notion of a loose confederation seems to have been rejected in favour of a fully fledged federation. This closely knit political and economic union is much more appropriate (*East African Standard*, 28 June 1963).

The signing of the Declaration revived the spirit of East African brotherhood. Dr. J. G. Kiano, Kenya’s Minister of Commerce and Industry, gleefully reflected on the events that had unfolded up to that time stating that the spirit of unity amongst
East Africans was stronger than ever before. He continued to say that: “We have embarked upon our ambitious plan….We are moving closer everyday” (Mombasa Times, 7 August 1964). Mr. Kiwanuka alluded to the long-term consequences of working together with other East African leaders, arguing: “we would be better served by one voice at the United Nations than the present three (Mombasa Times, 26 August 1964). This reminds us of the conventional principles of co-operation guiding colonial subjects in general. In a nutshell, these principles could be summarized as follows:

- Members join as human beings and not as capitalists, which involves an important feature, namely distribution of profits (…) according to business done.

- They meet on a basis of equality, which involves another important feature, one man one vote.

- The act of association is voluntary.

- They join to promote the economic interests or advantage of members, not of non-members.

In this sense, co-operation is seen as a method by which people are enabled to do things for themselves (Campbell, Memorandum on Co-operation in the Colonies, Kenya National Archives, K325.31CAM).
Presidents Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote worked indefatigably finalizing any outstanding issues before the anticipated federation treaty could be signed. They also entered into negotiations with other Eastern African leaders to whom they sold the idea of a federation. Even if the other countries could not join immediately, the aim was to create a space so that if they wanted to join at a later stage they could feel free to do so. In doing that, they were guided in part by the position African leaders had taken in Addis Ababa in 1962, stating that the many complex problems confronting the African people in their efforts to advance themselves socially, politically, and economically would in fact be solved by Africans themselves (Sunday Chronicle, 25 February 1962; Daily Nation, 5 June 1963).

On 31 July 1963 the Kenyan cabinet read a paper [CAB (63) 54] written by the Justice Minister in which he reported on the progress already made regarding the East African Federation talks. The cabinet noted progress made by the Working Party set up to draft the constitution for the East Africa Federation (Memorandum by the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs and Minister of State, CAB (63) 81. GO/3/2/78, 13 August 1963:1. KNA). The brief to the Working Party “was not to decide on whether there should be a federation, they were specially instructed to produce a constitution for an East African Federation” (Working Party on Federation. GO/3/2/78. KNA).
By the mid-1960s the level of optimism about the establishment of a regional institution in East Africa had risen. As mentioned above, Dr. Kiano noted that the spirit of unity among East Africans had become stronger than ever before. He concluded: “the fact that we have not signed a Federal Constitution does not mean that we are moving apart. We are moving closer everyday” (*Mombasa Times*, 7 August 1964). East African leaders made sure that they stressed the existence of strong ties amongst themselves whenever an opportunity presented itself. For example, when the backbenchers from Kenya and Tanzania met President Nyerere to ask him and his two counterparts from Uganda and Kenya to accelerate the process of finalizing the East African federation, President Nyerere assured them that there was a strong bond between himself and Presidents Kenyatta and Obote. He concluded his address by stating the following: “if Mzee Kenyatta decides to call a meeting to discuss the action proposed in your resolution, I shall certainly attend” (Nyerere, 1967:297)

Mr. Mwai Kibaki from the Kenyan Parliament (later elected as President of Kenya in 2002), spoke after a conference of East African countries held in Addis Ababa and was optimistic about the prospects of regional integration. This optimism derived from the fact that seven out of twelve African countries had signed articles of association (*The Standard Tanzania*, 7 May 1966). In his view, if African leaders were prepared to unite at the continental level, East Africans had no excuse for not uniting regionally. After all, East Africans saw their regional integration project as a contribution to African unity.
4.5 The Treaty of East African Co-operation

On 10 August 1965, President Nyerere addressed the Central Legislative Assembly in Dar es Salaam. One of the aims of his address was to quell the rumor that co-operation in East Africa was in danger. He stressed the already existing personal relationship between himself and his two counterparts from Uganda and Kenya as well as their individual countries as follows: “Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda are as united in their objectives as they have ever been, and as determined to work together for the benefit of all the peoples in East Africa” (Nyerere, 1968:60-61). Although some differences of opinion had already emerged here and there, President Nyerere did not see this as an anomaly. He conceded that there had, of course, been differences of opinion between their three sovereign nations in the past few months and insisted that it would be surprising if there had not. However, he added: “But there is no reason at all to believe that East African co-operation is about to collapse. It is sustained by our overwhelming will for unity” (Nyerere, 1968: 61).

Soon after the meeting the three Presidents met in Mombasa where they decided to appoint a Commission that would work out new machinery of regional co-operation. Indeed, in 1966 the three East African leaders appointed a Commission under the chairmanship of Professor Kjeld Philip who was Denmark’s former Minister of Trade and Finance. They tasked the Commission to draft the treaty. Professor Philip and his colleagues did as requested and presented the treaty to the

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7 It should be mentioned that although Professor Philip was a European working for the United Nations, the Treaty did not lose its African flavor. He worked following a brief by East African leaders who later studied the final draft before adopting it.
East African leaders who in turn accepted it. Subsequently, the Treaty of East African Co-operation was signed in Kampala, Uganda on 6 June 1967. The Uganda Argus (7 June 1967) reported: “the presidents were smiling broadly at the signing, obviously happy with the achievement of the treaty, which was described by observers as a historic occasion for East Africa” (see also: Report of the Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa, 30 January 1969, par.1).

It was this treaty that heralded the EAC, as reflected in Article 1, which stated: “By this Treaty the contracting parties establish among themselves an East African Community and, as an integral part of such Community, an East African Common Market.” One of the aims of the EAC contained in Article 2 was to strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial and other relations of the Partner States “to the end that there shall be accelerated, harmonious and balanced development and sustained expansion of economic activities the benefits whereof shall be equally shared” (The Treaty of East African Co-operation, 1967).

Coincidentally, the treaty was signed in June, the same month in which the Declaration had been signed in 1963. This coincidence did not elude the media (Daily Nation, 6 June 1967). The signing of the treaty was a very huge event. National and regional newspapers reported about this key moment in different ways. Headings included headings such as this one: ‘Treaty brings pleasure and relief’. According to one newspaper, the signing ceremony was the final triumph at the close of massive studies started by the Philip Commission which was
assigned to the task of finding ways and means of putting more muscle into the East African partnership (*Daily Nation*, 7 June 1967). Philip stated that the three East African countries had, in the past, shown a tendency to break apart but that the treaty changed this to a tendency of close co-operation.

By signing this treaty, the three East African Presidents were committing themselves to a legally sanctioned transnational community. They put what had been a colonially inspired arrangement at first on the firmest footing ever dreamt of in East African history. The very people who had once expressed their strong resentment to regional integration had now worked tirelessly to ensure that the EAC became a reality, of course establishing it in their own terms. Wittingly or unwittingly, they subscribed to the notion that no matter how well-motivated a programme may be it cannot be effective in the 1960s as long as the inspiration comes primarily from outside the continent (Rothchild, 1968, Hatch, 1976). The EAC was propelled by East African politicians, they were its custodians.

There were still technical issues to be attended to. For example, after the signing of the treaty, the Kenyan Government drafted The Treaty of East African Cooperation Bill, 1967, whose aim was to explain the changes that would subsequently take place. One of those changes was that the Common Services Authority’s property would go to the EAC when it was officially constituted on 1 December 1967. Workers of EACSO would automatically become workers of the

By November 1967 the writing was already on the wall that something big was about to happen. East African leaders were even much closer to one another than ever before as they worked out the final details. Newspapers were already reporting about the ‘End of an era for East Africa’. On 30 November 1967 the three East African Presidents met Mr. Dunstan Omari, EACSO Secretary-General in what the media described as ‘the somber setting’. The purpose of the meeting was to formalize arrangements for the organization’s historic conversion into the EAC. “If the setting was solemn”, observed one journalist, “the three Presidents appeared to be extremely pleased and looking forward to the official Community inauguration ceremonies in Arusha tomorrow”. Even the Presidents were over the moon to the extent that sometimes they made interesting jokes with journalists. For example, President Obote joked with a cameraman, saying: “You’re always taking pictures…but we never see them. One day I expect to get a complete set of complementaries from you…” (Daily Nation, 30 November 1967).

On 1 December 1967 the process of regional integration in East Africa reached its zenith when an estimated crowd of 8,000 and no less than 500 delegates came to Arusha to witness the historic and colorful occasion of inaugurating the EAC. This institution was said to be the only one of its kind in Africa (Daily Nation, 2 December 1967; Grace and Laffin, 1991:103). Presidents Nyerere, Kenyatta and
Obote, the ‘trio’ or ‘the Big Three’ as they were affectionately known, came down to the crowd to officially change EACSO to East African Economic Community (EAEC). This was later changed to EAC as is commonly known.

Addressing the masses, Mr. David Scott, a representative of the British Government at the inauguration ceremony, expressed his government’s confidence that the establishment of the EAC would be a milestone in the development of fruitful co-operation between the partner states and of the prosperity of the East African region as a whole. In his ten-minute address, President Nyerere, the host, officially launched the EAC while his two friends and colleagues (Presidents Kenyatta and Obote) looked on. President Nyerere’s speech was constantly interrupted by big cheers from the crowd.

Special events had been organized to mark the establishment of the EAC. One of them was the issuing of a special commemorative postage stamp, bearing the national emblems of the three nations in 22 carat gold. Another important arrangement was that 1 December 1967 was declared a public holiday throughout East Africa (Daily Nation, 7 June 1967; Daily Nation, 1 December 1967; Uganda Argus, 1 December 1967). At long last, the long-anticipated day had arrived.

The significance of the treaty was reflected in Mwai Kibaki’s luncheon address in Nairobi. Speaking in his capacity as a cabinet member, Kibaki acknowledged the fact that personal relationships amongst the three East African leaders had played
a huge role in the process of bringing East Africa together. He then stated: “East African countries no longer depend on a gentleman’s agreement, but on law” (Daily Nation, 12 July 1967). The treaty was seen as the culmination of official and individual efforts, since 1901, to bring about a greater social and political integration in the East African region (Iconoclastes [Bethwell Ogot], 1968:5).

Personal relationships amongst East African leaders within and between territories played a huge role in the formation of the EAC. At the fore-front was the relationship amongst Presidents Nyerere, Obote and Kenyatta but these were not the only East African leaders whose good relations fast-tracked the successful establishment of the EAC. The relationship between Zanzibar’s President Karume and President Nyerere made it possible for Zanzibar and Tanganyika to unite and form Tanzania in April 1964. This was just one of the steps leading to regional integration. When President Karume was assassinated in 1972, Aboud Jumbe, his successor, strengthened the links between Zanzibar and the mainland. The good working relationship between Kenyan leaders like Thomas Joseph Mboya and President Nyerere and the working relationship Mboya had with President Kenyatta facilitated the process leading to the establishment of the EAC (Wiseman, 1991).

But to what extent was the EAC different from predecessor organizations like EACSO and the EAHC? President Kenyatta’s speech in the Kenya National Assembly provides a tantalizing glimpse to the answer to this question. He
opined: “We inherited a useful instrument, but as yet, it did not represent the conscious work of the three states” (Kenya News, Handout No. 178, 14 June 1967). Rothchild provides a pointed answer to this question, stating that even though there were wild rumours of a drastic institutional overhaul at the time Philip’s commission carried on its discussions, the Treaty as it finally emerged “reflects an emphasis upon continuity with the past rather than discontinuity” (Rothchild, 1967:12). The opinions expressed here are antithetical to each other, thus leading to the view that there are different possible conclusions to be drawn from the treaty that gave birth to the EAC.

What is clear though is that unlike other regional institutions in Africa and in Europe, the EAC had both the economic and political elements at the same time. The *East African Standard* (8 June 1967) noted that the official name of the European Common Market is the European Economic Community. It then went on to ask what significance could be read into the omission of the word ‘economic’ from the East African version. “Surely”, it stated, “it must be evident that there is to be a wider application in East Africa than plain economics, essential though this is as the bedrock for development.” Whether the EAC was similar to or different from other regional organizations is open to debate. But what is important to note is that the good working relationship between East African resulted into the establishment of the EAC in December 1967.
Chapter summary

The main purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate African agency in the establishment of the EAC. It showed how the East African leadership embraced the idea of regional integration and which practical steps they took to ensure that this idea became a reality in the end. One of the key arguments is that existing personal and political relationships amongst East African leaders within and between territories played an instrumental role in facilitating the success of regional integration in East Africa. Although East Africans in general had been opposed to regional integration at first, by the mid to the late 1950s they realized that in fact they stood to gain both economically and politically through joint effort. It was in this context that they revisited their initial position and embraced the idea of regional integration. What facilitated this change of mind was the fact that East African territories were now moving towards independence and would therefore integrate on their terms; they would not be dictated to by Britain.

The achievement of self-government by Tanganyika in 1961 marked a watershed in East African politics. This event left East Africans convinced that the freedom that had eluded them for so many decades was not a mirage. The sympathetic gesture demonstrated by President Nyerere and his people that they were prepared to delay their independence for the sake of the region brought East Africans even closer than ever before. They realized that through joint effort the whole of East Africa would eventually be free from British domination under which they had languished for many years. The Declaration signed in June 1963 should be
understood in this context. At independence, the East African leadership appropriated what had been a colonial initiative and used it to determine their fate as a region. The decision to sign the Declaration in Kenya and the 1967 treaty in Tanzania is reflective of the serious thinking by East African politicians about the importance of demonstrating their eagerness to maintain inter-territoriality. Uganda was equally active in ensuring that the regional integration project succeeded but as shall be seen in the next chapter, the relationship between Obote and the Kabaka of Buganda did not make Uganda a suitable place for the hosting of most of the regional events and institutions.

In conclusion, the establishment of the EAC in 1967 was made possible by the existing good relationships that existed amongst East African leaders, which was demonstrated in part by the Declaration they signed on 5 June 1963. But the questions that arise are the following: why did the EAC collapse in 1977, just ten years after it was constituted? What happened to the good inter-personal relationships that had sustained inter-territorial ties for so long between and within territories? These questions are addressed in the next two chapters.
CHAPTER 5

Personal Interests, Sub-nationalisms and the Collapse of the EAC

0. Introduction

It is a truism that all marriages have their ups and downs. So, “the East African Community, the marriage of convenience between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, is no exception” (Weekly Review, 15 February 1975:6). In the previous chapter we saw how personal relationships between East African leaders paved the way for the establishment of the EAC in 1967. The present chapter demonstrates how personal interests and sub-nationalisms sounded the death knells for the EAC even long before it was officially constituted. Some of the problems that led to the demise of the EAC could have been avoided by the parties involved. However, others were so complex and almost inevitable because they were deeply ingrained in regional institutions in general (Report of the Commission on Closer Union, 1929. Cmd.3234:234). It should be mentioned upfront that the EAC started falling apart as it was being constituted. The present chapter develops this submission by tracing personal interests and sub-nationalisms from the initial stages of regional integration endeavours in the 1920s and 1930s right up to 1977 when the EAC was finally dissolved. In other words, the argument here is that the EAC died a slow death over a long period of time. When new challenges emerged the EAC was easily shaken because it did not have a solid foundation.
Suffice to say personal interests and sub-nationalisms were bound to emerge in East Africa given the differences that existed amongst different territories. Mr. Campbell, one of the British appointees at the Colonial Office, once alluded to this problem in a broader context when he stated that the conditions in different colonies varied widely to the extent that it was even difficult to predict the way in which co-operation amongst those colonies could be harnessed for their improvement. However, he remained optimistic and argued: “There exist in many of our colonial territories customs of considerable antiquity which contain a definitely co-operative element” (Campbell, Memorandum on Co-operation in the Colonies, KNA.K325.31 CAM, pars. 5 and 7). Campbell reminded all parties concerned that co-operation is a long-term investment. In his view, co-operation would prevent unnecessary competition amongst different territories but could not in any way produce spectacular results instantly. The entire process had to be allowed to run its course.

5.1 Sub-nationalisms and Regional Integration, 1930s-1950s

Sub-nationalism is characterized by parochialism. This phenomenon looms large in regional integration in East Africa. For example, a native Ugandan owed his or her first loyalty to the kingdom before any other political unit. Uganda had four prominent kingdoms: Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro. The most powerful of these was the Kingdom of Buganda (Allen, 2004). When Sir Andrew Cohen was appointed as the Governor of Uganda in 1952, one of the questions he faced was what to do with the kingdoms? This was a vexing problem to which there was no
simple answer. Dismantling them would have culminated in administrative chaos. Retaining them on the other hand meant that they could not be integrated into the Uganda protectorate.

The Kingdom of Buganda was one of the earliest threats to the life of the EAC. As the territory of Uganda strived for independence from Britain, King Mutesa II, the last Kabaka of Buganda, did not see himself as part of Uganda. In his view, Buganda was a separate political entity that had nothing to do with the Uganda Protectorate. In 1953, he clashed with Cohen over the latter’s plan to unite Uganda. Consequently, King Mutesa II was sent into exile in England for two years. Wiseman (1991:154) sums up this episode in the following manner:

In the colonial period Buganda had enjoyed a semi-autonomous status and Mutesa began campaigning for his Kingdom to become a separate independent state and not part of Uganda. He was exiled for a time in Britain in the 1950s because of his opposition to the inclusion of Buganda in Uganda, but eventually a compromise solution, whereby his Kingdom would have a degree of autonomy in the independent state of Uganda, was agreed.

Relations between King Mutesa II and Obote deteriorated. In 1966, the King ordered Obote to totally withdraw from Buganda. The latter responded by instructing the commander of his army, Amin to storm and shell the Royal Palace. King Mutesa II escaped and went into exile in Britain where he died in 1969.

This sub-nationalism threatened the life of the EAC even before it came into being. Cohen was not the only one who was worried about Buganda, “Milton Obote, a Langi tribesman and leader of the independence movement, saw the
influence of Buganda in Ugandan politics as a potential obstacle to his own rise to power” (Allen, 2004:12). The Kingdom of Buganda was not only a threat to Obote but also to the regional integration project he aspired to promote. The personal relationships between the Kabaka and Obote were not good and this contributed in part to the former opposing regional integration. As far as the Baganda were concerned, if any benefits accrued from this venture, it would benefit the Uganda Protectorate, not the Kingdom of Buganda. To this effect, the Kabaka wrote a letter to W. Ormsby-Gore, the chair of the East Africa Commission, articulating his views and those of the Baganda – not of Ugandans in general. The Kabaka stated in the letter:

I now pass on to the burning question of the federation. It is true no definite proposals have as yet been formulated upon which such federation would be based. It is feared, however, and quite naturally, that whatever form the proposed federation will ultimately take, there is no possible hope of any benefit accruing therefrom to the Baganda and the constitution of this kingdom (Kabaka of Buganda to Mr. W. Ormsby-Gore, 1927, par.81).

This is one example of how sub-nationalism played itself out. Amongst the reasons he provided was the fact that the Buganda Kingdom was very small and that it was overshadowed by the Uganda Protectorate, which some of the Baganda did not consider themselves to be part of. The Kabaka dug the history of Buganda demonstrating that it deserved more recognition than it was receiving at the time. He argued that Buganda had to occupy the most important place amongst the native tribes in the Protectorate. He feared that if the proposed federation of the British East African dependencies was effected as contemplated, the importance of Buganda would proportionately be diminished even if this was not what the
British Government deliberately planned to do. The Kabaka continued to say that any attempt to bring several smaller tribes under a federation would inevitably reduce Buganda’s status. He argued that such an attempt would nullify the Uganda Agreement of 1900, through which the British government recognized the Kingdom of Buganda (Kabaka of Buganda to Mr. W. Ormsby-Gore, 1927, pars.81-82). In a nutshell, although the Kabaka was convinced that forming the federation was not intended to destroy his kingdom, the reality was that there was no way of implementing this plan and still keep his kingdom intact.

When the Joint Select Committee conducted its investigation in East Africa in 1931, it became evident that East African leaders were thinking in personal and nationalist terms and did not demonstrate East African brotherhood that regional integration instilled in them. Serwano Kulubuya, Kosiya K. Labwoni, Chief Yekoniya Zirabamuzale and Samusoni Bazongere made a submission on behalf of their specific district, Busoga. Chief Zirabamuzale reminded the Committee that the people of Busoga had made a submission to the Hilton Young Commission in 1928, and through a memorandum addressed to the Committee that they, together with other districts, were not in favour of any closer union. He continued by stating that the people of Busoga feared that if Uganda Protectorate was joined together with Kenya and Tanganyika “European settlers may come into Busoga and take away our land from us. Busoga is a small country, and there is room only for its inhabitants and the government officials.” (Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, 1931, Cols. 550-553).
In essence, Chief Zirabamuzale addressed the idea of regional integration at three levels. First, he argued that it would not benefit Uganda to join the proposed union. Second, even if Uganda joined as a territory that would not mean that the Kingdom of Buganda should also join because he did not consider it to be part of Uganda territory. Third, and most importantly, he was particularly concerned about what Busoga would gain in all of this. In the 1960s and 1970s these sub-nationalisms became more serious and contributed to the collapse of the EAC.

Tanganyika was not immune to nationalist sentiments that were antithetical to regional interests. This became evident when Tanganyika made its submission to the Joint Select Committee. Chief Makwaia, K. M. Mwami, Francis Lwamugira and Hugh Martin Kayamba presented Tanganyika’s position. Chief Makwaia told the Committee that the people of Tanganyika spent a significant amount of time thinking about the possible consequences of a closer union amongst East African territories but could not see any possible benefits that would accrue to Tanganyika as a nation. He argued that they considered the developments that had taken place in Tanganyika since Governor Sir Donald Cameron took the reigns and concluded that they were better off under him than they would be in the envisaged regional institution comprising Tanganyika and the other two territories of Kenya, Uganda and the Zanzibar Island. Chief Makwaia summarized the sentiments of his people in the following manner:

While all this is going on, they fear union with other countries. In their society every tribe has its own system of rule; and they fear that the same
applies to governments; and that, if they are joined with Uganda or Kenya, the rule of Uganda or Kenya will be imposed upon them, and that will bring difficulties to them….the fear of the Tanganyika people is because, for all purposes in so far as they comprehend them, the administration which has been established over them in Tanganyika suffices for all their needs (Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, 1931, Col.476).

As shown in this submission, Tanganyika was not thinking in regional terms, but in nationalist terms. The same happened with Kenya. Chief F. Koinange Mbiu, James Mutua and Ezekiel Apindi presented Kenya’s case to the Joint Select Committee. Their primary concern was the interest of the natives in Kenya. They argued that regional integration was not a priority for them. Instead, they called for the inclusion of the natives in the Legislative Councils so that they could have a voice on the issues that concerned them. As long as regional integration had no immediate benefits to Kenyans, it could not receive first priority. It follows from these submissions that even if East Africans could manage to suppress their sub-nationalisms or territorial interests and at a later stage establish a regional institution, these sentiments would re-emerge at a certain point and threaten the life of that regional institution. Indeed, this is what happened in the 1960s and 1970s.

As the British continued with the process of bringing East African territories closer to one another, it became clear that cracks were already emerging amongst them. About two years before the establishment of the EAHC, East African authorities were very careful about what they said and how they said it because they were mindful of the different interests that existed in the region. Towards the
end of June in 1946 for example, S.W.P. Forster, Kenya’s Attorney General, responded to some proposals made by the Governor of Uganda on regional issues by stating that he agreed with the view that the concession, contended for by the Governor of Uganda, was more likely to result in a movement into Kenya from other East African territories than a movement from Kenya. However, he argued that it would make sense to accept the proposal in principle because the East African colonies would soon be unified anyway (Response from Kenya’s Attorney General, 26 June 1946, KNA.CS/2/6/3).

Personal interests and sub-nationalisms continued to be the timed bomb in East Africa even in the 1950s when the East African leadership had already embraced the idea of regional integration. Territorial and inter-territorial interests were always in contention. At times this became evident during the sitting of the East Africa Central Legislative Assembly where Members of the House would advance national as opposed to regional interests. For example in 1957, Mr. Mulondo, a Member of the House from Uganda, focused his address largely on Uganda’s interests and identified specific areas where Uganda would be prepared to cooperate with other territories because it stood to benefit from such cooperation. He asked Members of the Assembly to rest assured that all Ugandan residents were very much interested in the regional services because they were affected by all the human problems of disease and the other demands that could best be addressed at the regional level. For example, he stated that Ugandan residents were interested in the East African Railways and Harbours because of
their cotton, minerals (copper), hides, skins and other products. Moreover, it was only by the East African Railways and Harbours that they could transport their produce and themselves to and from Uganda (EAHC. Proceedings of the East Africa Central Legislative Assembly. Official Report, Vol.X, No.1, 1957. Cols. 441-442).

Some people in Uganda were suspicious that regional integration was a British strategy to deprive them of part of their land. Africans from the Eastern Province suspected that Her Majesty’s Government wanted to remove the entire Eastern Province from Uganda and add it to Kenya, which was already dominated by white settlers. Of course, this suspicion was unfounded but the fact that it existed meant that when the EAC was finally constituted such national consciousness would keep re-emerging at certain moments.

The competition between national and regional interests continued unabated in the 1950s. In 1959, for example, Mr. Hinchey, the Financial Secretary of the EAHC had an exchange of words with Mr. Mntambo, one of the East African Members regarding the location of the regional research organizations. The latter was not impressed by the fact that these organizations benefited the country where they were located (in this case, Kenya) more than the other two counterparts. Mr. Hinchey on the other hand argued that distributing the research organizations territorially was not an option because they had been sited with a view to securing their maximum administrative efficiency. He concluded: “so far as I am aware
they are placed where it is felt that they will do the best work and where the maximum value will be derived from their services” (EAHC. Proceedings of the East Africa Central Legislative Assembly. Official Report, Vol. Xii, No.1, 1959. Col.94). These pronouncements did not augur well for regional integration.

In fact, when the East African leadership decided to join hands with other states, they were mostly interested in what they would gain for their respective countries. President Kenyatta told Kenyans that if their country was to prosper, they had to create a sense of togetherness, a sense of national familyhood. He then “sought to strengthen Kenya’s economic position by joining with Tanzania and Uganda in a Federation of East Africa” (Archer, 1969:154). Therefore personal and national interests were the guiding principles in the discussions that preceded independence and the formation of the EAC.

5.2 Personal Interests and Sub-nationalisms After Independence

When African countries achieved their independence in the 1960s they wasted no time in outlining the negative effects of the partition of the African continent by European powers. However, they “were reluctant, if not totally unwilling, to support policies likely to restrain state sovereignty and, consequently, their power” (Bach, 1999:2). In other words they accepted the fact that they were sovereign states operating independently of one another. Almost forty years after independence, most of the boundary-lines inherited from colonial governments remained unchanged in many parts of the African continent in spite of the fact
that they intermittently induced intractable problems. In fact, African leaders fought hard to retain these artificial boundaries. While acknowledging the value of regional integration, these African leaders were particularly interested in ensuring that their personal political ambitions were fulfilled and national interests and sovereignty guaranteed. Bach (1999:4) cites the case of the Tuaregs of Niger, Mali or Mauritania and argues that it is worth noting in this respect because: “despite ways of life which carry a strong regional component, they have always expressed their political demands within their respective national contexts.”

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the year 1960 is a significant signpost in East African political history. This is because that is when Tanganyika got self-government. What is interesting is that even at this time when East African brotherhood had been entrenched, personal and nationalist interests were still in contention with each other as reflected in different forums. For example, during the Council Debates in Tanganyika, the Attorney General made a revealing statement that one way of achieving uniformity in East Africa was for Tanganyika to make her laws outstandingly good such that they could then be imitated or adopted by the other two territories. He concluded by saying that this was the policy Tanganyika would follow (Council Debates (Hansard) Tanganyika Legislative Council. Official Report, 1960. Col.355). Implicit in the utterances was the view that while determined to sustain regional unity, Tanganyika was still
vulnerable to nationalist sentiments and there was no guarantee that such sentiments would dissipate after the establishment of the EAC.

At the beginning of 1961, just a few months before Tanganyika officially became independent, nationalist sentiments dominated the House. By this time East Africans were already talking in regional terms but some politicians in the National Assemblies of different East African territories alluded to the fact that no regional institution could overpower national interests. Mr. Tumbo, a Member of the House in Tanganyika, asked the Minister of Communications, Power and Works if he would urge the High Commissioner to stop the inter-territorial transfer of skilled railway staff and employ only Tanganyikans in all of Tanganyika’s branches of the East Africa Railways and Harbours. In response to this question the Minister stated that East African Railways and Harbours was an Inter-territorial service and that employees “are not normally transferred away from their country of origin unless it is for their personal benefit in the matter of promotion, which is not available to them in their home country” (Council Debates (Hansard) Tanganyika Legislative Council. Official Report, 1961. Col.23).

By this time (the early 1960s), President Nyerere had already sounded a warning that the feeling of unity sweeping across East Africa could be whittled away almost instantly if each country got independence separately and became open to the temptations of nationhood and the intrigues of those who find their strength in
the weakness of small nations. Therefore the fact that each of the East African countries achieved independence separately meant that personal and nationalist feelings would dominate over regional sentiments (see chapter 6 below).

One of the issues that would later cause disintegration in East Africa was the manner in which some politicians perceived the interests of their leaders and those of their respective countries. Dr. Kiano, referred to earlier in this study, was not impressed by what he called ‘cheap politics’ practiced by some of his fellow East Africans. He reminded them that when President Kenyatta called for a one-party system he was informed by the fact that Tanganyika had a one-party democracy and therefore wanted to bring synergy in the region. But he also continued to say that it was not up to Kenya alone to make the final decision as some seemed to believe. He continued to say that these people seemed to forget that Tanganyika had a parliament and Uganda too had a parliament and that both these two neighbours were independent sovereign states. He warned: “The date for the federation can only be decided upon by all the three sovereign states, just like the date of marriage must be agreed upon by both the bride and bridegroom” (Mombasa Times, 7 August 1964). In his view, formulating a federal constitution was necessary, but what was even more important was a meeting of the minds of all the people of East Africa, regarding the basic policies and principles as well as the ideologies that would govern the political system of the envisaged unity.
It is not an exaggeration to say that from the moment the idea of regional integration was conceived up to the establishment of the EAC, East Africans did not share the same view on certain issues. For example, Benedicto Kiwanuka, Uganda’s former Prime Minister and President of the Opposition, traveled to London in the second half of 1964. While he was there he criticized Mr. Onama, another Ugandan Minister, for being pessimistic about the East African Federation. Kiwanuka maintained that Onama’s view was totally wrong and expressed his determination to rectify it as soon as he returned to East Africa. Kiwanuka went on to discuss the dangers caused by nationalist feelings to the regional integration project. He lamented that there was a lack of a true common objective. During that time it seemed as if each state wanted to get as much out of federation as possible for itself. He opined: “We do not want a federation and continue to be known as Kenyans or Ugandans or Tanzanians. My idea of federation is to make us into one new nation” (*Mombasa Times*, 26 August 1964). To be sure, not all East Africans had this conception of federation. These differences were bound to re-emerge later in the regional integration process.

The comparison between economic federation and political federation was one of the factors that caused divisions in East Africa. Some leaders perceived economic integration as the means towards political integration. Others saw the two as separate issues with no relationship to each other. In Uganda, the Buganda Lukiiko or Council rejected political federation that would combine them with Uganda Protectorate as well as with Kenya and Tanganyika. However, the
Council supported economic co-operation in principle because it felt that this would benefit the Baganda.

At the beginning of 1963, during the National Assembly Debates in Uganda, Mr. V. K. Rwamwaro asked Prime Minister Obote if he had received any formal letter(s) rejecting the idea of a political federation. In response, the Prime Minister indicated that there had been supporters on either side of the divide. He then concluded: “The government intends to co-operate fully with the other two East African countries in pursuit of whatever project is to the good of East Africa, provided such projects are not to the detriment of Uganda” (National Assembly Debates (Uganda). Official Report, Vol.6, 1963. Col.141). This meant that even after the EAC had been established these sub-nationalisms would re-surface intermittently. In the latter case, for example, what would be detrimental to Uganda was not clearly spelt out but this clause was crucial for Ugandans. Therefore, there was always the danger of having certain individuals who would argue that Uganda’s interests were not met in the federation and call for its dissolution, as it eventually happened.

Uganda’s role in the demise of the EAC in the 1970s has been discussed elsewhere (Mngomezulu, 2003). A very quick analysis of Uganda’s behaviour from the outset demonstrates that personal and national interests prevailed over regional interests thus paving the way for the EAC’s collapse. Towards the end of 1963 there were speculations that only Kenya and Tanganyika could form the
proposed federation and that Uganda might join later on. Joseph Murumbi, Kenya’s Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office, confirmed this speculation, stating: “I don’t know whether we will succeed in bringing about an East African Federation, but I think we will at least bring about a federation of Tanganyika and Kenya, and Uganda might come in at a later stage” (Uganda Argus, 25 October 1963. See also the telegram sent by Kenyatta to Obote, 29 October 1963. KNA; Uganda Argus, 30 October 1963). In the telegram, President Kenyatta tried to convince President Obote about the need for the three East African territories to work together. Uganda’s politicians feared being swallowed overnight by the proposed federation. The independence euphoria had weakened relations between East African politicians who were now focusing their attention on national projects.

As argued in chapter 4, the signing of the Declaration in June 1963 demonstrated the commitment by the East African leadership to advance regional interests. However, that did not prevent personal interests and sub-nationalisms. In Kenya, Ronald Ngala, leader of the opposition party, Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) wrote a letter to President Kenyatta. Amongst other things, he warned him about the dangers of leaving out the opposition party when signing agreements that would approve the establishment of the East African federation. His fear was that such agreements would not survive unless they received the blessings of all parties involved. Ngala concluded his letter by stating: “I am sure
I can rely on you to avoid binding decisions on this matter until you have had time to consider and act upon this letter” (The Sunday Post, 9 June 1963).

Ngala also reminded President Kenyatta about sub-nationalism in Uganda where the Kingdom of Buganda was expected to demand an equal place in the federation as the price for agreeing to the scheme. In fact there were rumours that the Kabaka would be given the first presidency of the East African Federation to prevent him from becoming a stumbling block to the regional integration cause. On 29 June 1963, Presidents Kenyatta, Nyerere and Obote were scheduled to leave for Buganda to hold a meeting with the Kabaka to resolve outstanding issues (The Sunday Post, 16 June 1963). This was done with the understanding that unless Buganda’s sub-nationalism decreased and the Kabaka’s personal interests were met the future of regional integration in East Africa remained in limbo.

Therefore, although the Declaration to work together had been signed on 5 June 1963, personal and nationalist sentiments were still sustained. Mr. Muliro, a Member of the Kenya National Assembly, argued that to create the envisaged federation East Africans had to accept the already established traditions in the region. He stated boldly that he would hate to see a federation in which the Kingdom of Uganda would be muffled by a regional institution. Muliro’s other concern was that Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar had national laws which might appear repugnant to some territories. These, he argued, had to be re-
examined for the sake of regional integration (Government of Kenya. The National Assembly, House of Representatives. Official Report, 1963. Col.410). But for how long would each country be prepared to compromise its laws for the sake of regional integration? This remained a lingering question throughout the lifespan of the EAC once it was constituted.

The conflict of opinion derived from personal and national interests continued to cast a cloud over regional integration in East Africa. The leadership articulated their views in the National Assemblies of each country and did the same at the East African Central Legislative Assembly. Others were published in national newspapers of each country. In Tanganyika, for example, P. K. Mushi, one of the newspaper readers, wrote to the Tanganyika Standard (8 January 1964) expressing his concerns about the long-term effects of some of the developments that had taken place up to that point. He supported the idea of uniting East Africa in principle but was worried about some technicalities, which, he thought, were the recipe for failure. He argued that bringing together people of different traditions and political outlook very hurriedly would create some difficulties. Mushi reminded his fellow East Africans that Tanganyika was a one-party state de facto if not de jure, and that there was the Detention Act, 1962 in that country. Kenya on the other hand had regionalism underlain with some sectional feelings while Uganda, which had strong traditional feelings, had a ceremonial President and the Kabaka of Buganda. His main concern was that it was not clear as to how all these issues would be addressed without creating problems.
It must be acknowledged that despite the many similarities that existed, the three East African countries differed in many respects. Achieving independence at different dates compounded the problem because, as Nyerere had anticipated, it meant that national interests would take precedence over regional interests. One area in which this happened was in the economic sector. Economic disagreements between Kenya and Tanzania were amongst the principal causes of the collapse of the EAC (Davidson, 1964). To be sure, this view cannot be summarily refuted. However, it would be too simplistic to confine our analysis of the collapse of the EAC solely to the economic factors, important as they were. As seen above, and as shall be seen below, a combination of factors derived from personal and national interests brought the EAC to the ground. This dissertation seeks to identify those factors and demonstrate how each of them contributed to the demise of the EAC.

One of the many issues that triggered national sentiments was the fact that not all three East African territories would get an equal piece of the cake. This became evident with the location of regional institutions. While the Kabaka of Buganda has thus far been singled out as someone who pushed personal interests whenever regional matters were discussed, Uganda as a whole was very much concerned that as the smallest nation in the region, it would have the least representational strength. Tanganyika, too, was beginning to have doubts about the federation. It felt strongly that Kenya, as the most economically developed country, braced by
heavy British investments, “would tend to dominate the others….” (Perl, 1973:142). This skepticism inflicted a fatal wound on regional integration. In the mid-1940s Kenya had opposed the idea of amalgamating regional services under a Central Legislative Assembly fearing competition from Uganda and Tanganyika (Orwa, 1989:230). In the 1960s it was the latter that expressed fears about the impact of such a union.

Contrary to the generally held view that in developing countries economic factors have a unifying role more than political factors, economic federation failed to unite East Africans. For example, the East African Common Market did not appeal to everyone. Uganda and Tanganyika argued that the whole enterprise was benefiting Kenya alone because Nairobi was the nerve center of economic and communication activities in the region – linking the whole of East Africa with metropolitan Europe and North America. In a way, this complaint had substance. The location in Kenya of most headquarters of the Common Services – although deemed largely desirable by some for administrative reasons – gave rise to the feeling that Kenya was getting a lion’s share. Indeed, Kenya was well advanced in industrial manufactures. Also, more Kenyans, compared to Ugandans and Tanzanians, were getting employment. Moreover, foreign investors tended to prefer Kenya to all East African territories, in part because it was home to white settlers. But this was Britain’s fault, not Kenya.
Such realities weakened relations between East Africans. As the international community hailed President Kenyatta the national hero for elevating his country’s status, Presidents Nyerere and Obote felt ignored and belittled. They were concerned about Tanzania and Uganda becoming the peripheries that supplied raw materials to be used by different industries based in Kenya. Orwa (1989:234) made the observation that: “Ideological differences that emerged among the East African states at the beginning of the second half of the 1960s can partly be explained by the failure to redress the economic imbalance.” This observation is true. As mentioned in the introduction, economic imbalances were amongst the factors that played a key role in the EAC’s demise.

According to the terms of EACSO, goods between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were not charged duty fees in line with the spirit of East African brotherhood. Each of the three countries was also obliged to sell goods to its neighbours. There was a feeling from Uganda and Tanzania that Kenya had an upper hand because she allegedly sold goods to Uganda and Tanzania at higher prices than they would have paid if they imported such goods from outside the region (Perl, 1973). Had it not been for the binding terms of the EACSO agreement, the two countries would have considered importing goods from other countries at a much cheaper price than they were paying. In that way they would be saving a lot of money.

What also made things even tougher for the two economically weaker countries at a later stage were the terms of the Treaty for East African Co-operation. Chapter
III, article 9(1) of the Treaty stated that partner states agreed that where customs duty had been charged and collected on any goods imported into a Partner State from a foreign country then such goods would not be liable for further customs duty on transfer to any other Partner State provided that where the rate of customs duty applicable to such goods in the receiving state exceeded that charged and collected in the importing state (Treaty for East African Co-operation, 1967; *Kenya Gazette Supplement Bills 1967:397*).

These treaties meant that Uganda and Tanzania lost the revenue from customs duties that they would have been collecting from foreign imports had the agreements not been signed. In his assessment of regional economic co-operation in East Africa, Roe (1967:14) stated that Tanzania and Uganda had sustained some losses as the result of the Common Market arrangements because the imports which they would have purchased from abroad in the absence of these arrangements would have earned import duty revenues, “while the replacement imports from Kenya enter the country duty free.” As a result of this uneven share of the cake, Tanzania threatened to pull out of the regional institution. Obviously, East African politicians were aware of these problems but were more concerned about nurturing regional integration than anything else. However, as these concerns became persistent, they felt that something had to be done to address the situation before it escalated and caused more damage to the region.
Under these circumstances, East Africans had to either break up the Common Services arrangements or else try to devise a way of economic co-operation that would be acceptable to all three partners. Therefore, one of the terms of reference of the Raisman Commission mentioned earlier in this dissertation was to address this very sensitive issue. However, in its report, the Commission advised against ending both the customs Union and the Common Services but responded to Tanganyika and Uganda’s concerns by recommending that there should be fiscal compensation from Kenya to her two counterparts. This recommendation only pacified the two countries but failed to uproot the problem in its entirety.

5.3 The Kampala Agreement

As a result of continued dissatisfaction by Tanganyika and Uganda, the leaders of the three countries convened in Uganda in 1963 to deliberate on this issue with the hope of finding a lasting solution. Subsequently the Kampala Agreement was signed and came into full force in 1965. This Agreement suggested five methods that could assist in addressing the imbalances that existed amongst East African countries. These methods could be summarized as follows:

1. Immediate action, with certain inter-territorially connected firm to increase production in a deficit country and thereby reduce imports from a surplus country;

2. Agreement as to the immediate allocation of certain major industries;
3. The application of a system of quotas and suspended quotas whereby exports from surplus countries would be progressively reduced, and local production increased in the deficit countries according to the building up of the productive capacity of the deficit country;

4. Increased sales from a country in a deficit to a country in surplus; and

5. Early agreement within the East African Common Market on a system of inducements and allocations of industry in order to secure the equitable distribution of industrial development as between the three countries (the Kampala Agreement, 1965).

Obviously, more thinking went into these suggested methods. But there was negligence in implementing them. For example, on many occasions there was evident failure to notify other member states before an action was taken on a specific issue (EACSO. Proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly Debates. Official Report, Vol. IV, No.3, 1965. Cols. 1057-1064). Under these circumstances the conflict of interests persisted and the relations within the East African leadership weakened.

The Kampala Agreement went a long way towards addressing some of the nationalist interests that were putting the regional integration project in limbo, but not before some squabbles erupted. Tanzania complained that Kenya did not want to ratify the Agreement thus raising questions about its legitimacy. This did not go down well with the Tanzanian leadership who felt cheated. They expressed their
frustrations by stating that Tanzania could not force Kenya to ratify the Agreement if she did not wish to do so and yet the Agreement imposed obligations and rights on all participants. In a way, this frustration was quite understandable. For a period of 19 months the Tanzanian Government had been acting as if it was bound by an Agreement which did not exist in any legal form. It had been accepting the obligations and restrictions of the Kampala Agreement without receiving any benefits from it. The main question was how much longer could Tanzania afford to adhere to an Agreement which Kenya did not honour (Nationalist, 2 December 1965).

In a way, the Kampala Agreement seemed to be adding more problems than providing solutions to the pre-existing ones. Eventually Kenya ratified the Agreement, which provided that new industries for the East African Market should be developed in Uganda and Tanganyika and that companies with branches in all three countries should discontinue their operation in Kenya, thus shifting employment opportunities and commercial advantages to the other two partner states. From 1965, firms, which manufactured goods such as beer, cigarettes and footwear relocated to Uganda and Tanzania. The Kampala Agreement also permitted an EACSO country with a larger trade deficit to restrict the intake of goods from another EACSO country (Delupis, 1969; Robson, 1967; Mungai, 1967; Perl, 1973; and Mugumba, 1978). It was felt that these measures would try to ease the tensions.
On paper, at least, this Agreement looked impressive but there is no doubt that not everybody was impressed by it. Naturally, Kenya was not happy because she had to make most (if not all) of the compromises although she was also aware of the fact that she had been gaining more at the expense of her two counterparts. But despite the inevitable challenges the Kampala Agreement succeeded in addressing some of the issues that were making East African politicians drift apart thus threatening the life of the EAC.

The Agreement decentralized EACSO in many ways and addressed some of the national concerns. Except for the East African Railways and the air transport services, the rest of the regional services were removed from Nairobi. Postal and telecommunication operations and the Central Development Bank were relocated in Kampala. The control of harbours and shipping moved to Dar es Salaam. The EAC administrative headquarters were established in Arusha in the northern part of Tanzania. As mentioned above, according to a new trade agreement, an EAC country with a large deficit could now restrict goods from a sister country and could impose a transfer tax, which was previously prohibited.

These new arrangements meant that Uganda and Tanganyika could now develop their own industries and sell their products domestically. In the mid-1960s Tanganyika resorted to unilateral import restrictions against Kenya (Robson, 1967). As each of the three East African countries used this opportunity to redirect its economy, the idea of regional integration somewhat gave way to
nationalist sentiments. Subsequently, Tanganyika moved towards agrarian socialism; Uganda moved towards revolutionary Africanization of its business sector; and Kenya on the other hand moved towards what was dubbed ‘gradual Kenyanization’ of its economy (Perl, 1973). Garba (1987:125) recalls that the rivalry, especially between Tanzania and Kenya played a key role in the collapse of the EAC. He states that this rivalry grew from the ideological orientation of the two. Tanzanians, with their ascetic and philosophical acceptance of the virtues of socialist development, “were usually contemptuous of Kenyans whose enthusiasm for free enterprise and capitalist development contrasted sharply with the Tanzania experiment.” Therefore, the Kampala Agreement did not provide a lasting solution to the East African problems with regional integration.

5.4 Dissolution of the East African Currency Board

During the budget speeches delivered in June 1965, the Finance Ministers of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda made an announcement that their respective governments had taken a decision to end the East African Currency Board and start preparing for the establishment of separate central banks and national currencies in each country. These developments brought to the open the national interests people had been speculating about for some time and the weakening relationship in the East African leadership. The report of the East African Currency Board argued that the root cause of the failure stood out clearly. Overall, each had wanted to preserve the benefits of a common currency however there had been no collective and unqualified acceptance of what a currency union
required in terms of the sharing of sovereignty over a wide range of matters and in terms of the limitations which this sharing might impose on national economic policies and ambitions (Report of the East African Currency Board, 1965).

Therefore, although, to some, the decision taken in 1965 was both disappointing and regrettable, it was a welcome decision because it addressed the realities East Africa was faced with at the time and ended a long period of wishful thinking and speculation. The decision exposed the danger of trying to operate a very loose system of central banking in the region when it was evident that national interests dominated over regional interests. These were some of the early signs that the envisaged EAC would not survive.

In 1965, Professor W.T. Newlyn published an article in *Transition* (Vol.5(i), No.24, 1965) in which he commented about Tanzania’s legislation on the establishment of a National Bank of Tanzania. Subsequently, A. H. Jamal, Tanzania’s Minister of Finance published a letter in the same journal responding to Newlyn’s comments. Amongst other things he argued that the problem of finding the optimum rate of credit expansion is difficult for any country; but that in the case of East Africa the difficulty was compounded by the fact that there was no such country as East Africa. Instead, there were three countries, i.e. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Therefore, in his view, even if the Currency Board had decided to adopt a more positive monetary policy, this would have not worked given the political set-up in the East African region.
It should be reiterated that nationalist sentiments destroyed the EAC even before it was officially constituted. As discussed in chapter 3, the EAC was inaugurated in December 1967, following an agreement signed in June of that year. However, by the first quarter of 1967 the cracks amongst East Africans were already evident. Attempts to conceal or address them proved to be unsuccessful

As shown above, East African Ministers of Finance resolved to dissolve the Currency Board and establish national banks. Tanzania was more instrumental in this regard. This was in part because of her socialist principles which could not be successfully implemented as long as the country remained a Member of the East African Currency Board. At one of the Press Conferences held around this time, journalists asked President Nyerere to comment on these new developments and wanted to know from him why Tanzania was reneging on her previous promise to promote regional interests. President Nyerere responded rather emotionally:

You have already heard what is being said that now Tanzania is hammering the last blow on East African co-operation. Why? Why should East African co-operation be endangered because we own our banks! If the fact that we own our banks makes East African co-operation totter, then it totters only one-third. When Uganda will own her banks, it will totter two-thirds and when Kenya will own her banks, it will completely break up! If East African co-operation depends on not owning our banks, then we are saying we have interfered with it only 33 per cent, and 66 percent is still there. But it is all rubbish! (Nationalist, 6 March 1967).

The tone in President Nyerere’s response clearly shows that he was not impressed by the accusations leveled against him and his nation. As far as he was concerned, regional interests were important for the sake of African unity but national
interests were even more important and, therefore, had to receive first priority whenever regional issues were discussed. In his view, if he did not do this he would have failed his people as their head of state.

Personal interests and sub-nationalisms dominated the debate sessions during the sitting of the East Africa Central Legislative Assembly as evidenced in the sitting of mid-1965. During that sitting, Mr. Makame, one of the Members of the House from Kenya, referred to a comment made by Mulira of Uganda during his address on the previous Friday whereby the former complained about the concentration of EACSO services in Nairobi. Mulira had referred specifically to the civil aviation services, arguing that it was not fair for Ugandan pilots to travel all the way from Uganda to obtain a license from Kenya. Mulira had concluded his address by suggesting that every effort be made to distribute EACSO services equally among the three member states to avoid conflicts emanating from national interests. In his view, this state of affairs was unfortunate and accidental.

Makame sympathized with his colleague from Uganda, stating that these national sentiments were bound to arise since Nairobi was the headquarters of the EACSO secretariat. However, for him politicians from Kenya were not to blame for that. He posed the question: ‘who is to blame for this concentration of services?’ His answer was that colonialists, not Kenyans, were to blame. He qualified his assertion by reminding the House that the reason why colonialists did this was because they lived under the false impression that they would never leave East
Africa and thus concentrated these EACSO services in Nairobi because that was going to be the center of their activities. That was why, he argued, Nakuru, one of the village townships in Kenya, had a new better railway station than Dar es Salaam, although the latter was a capital city (EACSO. Proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly Debates. Official Report, Vol. IV, No.4, 1965. Cols. 158-159).

The nationalist sentiments discussed thus far lead to the conclusion that both political and economic regional integration had more problems than its proponents wanted to believe. As shown above, these problems presented themselves in many ways and at different moments. However, other problems were suppressed by those who wanted to see East African integration become a reality. In their talks, they gave the impression that everything was going according to plan when in fact the opposite was true. Kiwanuka, Uganda’s opposition leader was one of these optimists. He once argued that the question of where the regional capital was to be located once political federation had been completed or who would take what “would be of no immediate concern but matters of detail” (*Mombasa Times*, 26 August 1964). But did Kiwanuka really believe what he said or was he just expressing his wishes? Evidence points to the latter. As shall be seen in the next chapter, when the Federal University of East Africa was established the question of the site was one of the key issues that raised national sentiments above regional plans. In fact, had the question of the site not been a major issue in regional plans, there would have been no need to
relocate EACSO headquarters and businesses from Kenya to Uganda and Tanzania as recommended by the Kampala Agreement.

Banfield (1963) reflected on some of the problems the East African leadership wrestled with in the 1960s. Her views could be summarized as follows:

- Territorial governments were reluctant to second their able men and women to service outside their own respective governments;
- Young graduates were unwilling to forgo prestige and salaries offered by their own countries for a service with EACSO, which could not offer the permanency and status of the territorial services;
- It was difficult to attract staff from all the territories in equal measure and to encourage those already employed to accept postings in other parts of East Africa; and
- The great majority of the African staff headquarters were from Kenya but they were likely to be superceded when staff from the other two territories were promoted ahead of them, to rectify the existing imbalance.

Schraeder (in Gordon and Gordon, 1996:142-143) argued that the problems were caused by:

- The polarization of national development and the perception of unequal gains;
• Inadequacy of compensatory and corrective measures – a decision taken to rectify the situation mentioned above;

• Ideological differences and the rise of economic nationalism;

• The impact of foreign influence – Kenya was assisted by the Western bloc; Tanzania by the Eastern bloc; and Uganda was assisted specifically by the Soviet Union (see also Potholm (1979).

Given this wide range of issues that faced East Africans at the time, it would indeed be impossible to envisage problem-free regional integration in East Africa, be it economic or political integration. In fact, it was not unexpected that national sentiments would arise at different moments in this regional integration process. President Nyerere alluded to this submission in one of his speeches delivered in the Tanzanian National Assembly when he argued that each of the three East Africa governments was answerable to the people of its own country and that each of them was beset with the urgent needs of one part of the total East African area. He maintained that in authority meetings, each member could look at the interests of East Africa as a whole only to the extent that such interests did not conflict fundamentally with the requirements of his nation’s immediate needs. President Nyerere then concluded by stating the following: “Ultimately we are not in fact ‘East African’ leaders, but leaders of states in East Africa; and regional loyalty has sometimes to come second to our national responsibilities (Proceedings. East Africa Central Legislative Assembly, 1965. See also, Iconoclastes [Bethwel Ogot] (1968:5).
Implicit in President Nyerere’s address was that no matter how hard East African leaders tried to forge unity, there were limits beyond which such unity could not go. In theory, they could say that East Africa was a single unit but in reality people still recognized the pre-existing geographical boundaries that constituted Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. It was to these clearly marked political institutions and geographical spaces that East African leaders were answerable first and foremost. Ogot (1968) shared Nyerere’s sentiments, arguing that they were not, in fact, East Africans, but citizens of different states in a geographical space called East Africa. Ogot argued that those who appealed to history to support the unity of East Africa were starting from a wrong premise because historically, East Africa had never been united. Instead, during the pre-colonial era, East Africa consisted of separate ethnic groups.

However, as discussed in chapter 4, East Africans fought indefatigably until they managed to establish the EAC in 1967. But the official signing of the Treaty did not miraculously end all pre-existing national interests. Writing his book two years later, President Kenyatta provided an elegant analysis of what the Treaty meant for East Africa and what it did not mean. He reasoned:

Together with our brothers in Tanzania and Uganda, we in the Republic of Kenya have now allied ourselves within a new East African Treaty of cooperation. This instrument implicitly acknowledges that whether or not there might be political differences as between these states, or distinct national interests springing from historical background or contemporary realities, yet there will always remain issues on which a common front can carry us most swiftly over common ground. Completion of this Treaty
derives from the strength of our belief that human need must ultimately triumph over all else (Kenyatta, 1968:xii).

Unfortunately, like earlier attempts before it, the EAC was overwhelmed by problems derived from both personal relationships and national interests. Some of the problems experienced in the 1960s were not new. But those related to nationalism, which had not taken a good shape in the 1920s and 1930s, took center-stage in the 1960s following the achievement of political independence by all three East African countries and Zanzibar.

5.5 Personal Relations Amongst East African Politicians in the 1970s

Developments at the beginning of the 1970s did not augur well for the survival of the EAC. By the end of 1970, relations between President Obote and his army General, Idi Amin Dada, had become sour, as the two leaders no longer trusted each other (Wiseman, 1991). The overthrow of President Obote by General Amin in 1971 brought the issue of personal relationships back into the limelight (Weekly Review, 15 February 1975). Mugomba (1978:268) shares this view: “The East African Community has tottered on the brink of collapse ever since the military coup that brought Idi Amin to power.” This incident sounded the death knells for the EAC in many ways. First of all, Amin was not a signatory of the Declaration of intent signed in June 1963. Second, he was also not part of the negotiations that led to the formation of the EAC in 1967. Although the treaty bound Uganda as a state, he did not feel obliged to abide by it. Moreover, Amin did not become
president through the normal electoral process. Therefore, there was no guarantee
that he would be accountable to the Ugandans who had not voted him into office.

To make matters worse, the Baganda supported Amin when he ascended to power
even though he had shelled them in 1966 on Obote’s instruction during the civil
war. Amin claimed that his fourth wife, Medina, was a gift from the Baganda.
This meant that Amin could count on their support should he decide not to
embrace the EAC.

As the Baganda rejoiced, “African leaders outside Uganda, such as Tanzania’s
President Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, had no such illusions”
(Allen, 2004:37). As a result of the 1971 coup, Amin’s relations with his two
counterparts further deteriorated, more especially his relations with President
Nyerere who had close ties with President Obote. These sour relations had a direct
impact on the EAC. In January 1971, President Nyerere refused to recognize the
regime of General Amin in Uganda, because it was a Government that had come
to power by force. He blocked Amin’s appointment to top EAC positions and
refused to convene the East African Authority as long as Amin was in power in
Uganda. The effect of this refusal and the asylum given to ex-President Obote in
Tanzania after the Ugandan coup, disrupted the whole East African Community
for the better part of a year, and allowed a series of petty incidents on the
Tanzania-Uganda border (Van Rensburg, 1981; Springer in Potholm, 1980). This
Major-General Joe Garba who served in different capacities in the Nigerian government recalled in his book titled *Diplomatic Soldiering* that one of the major causes of the breaking-up of the EAC was “the personality clash between Nyerere and Idi Amin” (Garba, 1987:124). Moreover, following his overthrow, President Obote went into exile in Tanzania and stayed there until 1979 when Tanzanian soldiers crossed the border into Uganda to fight Amin’s forces and reinstate him as President. These events led to the deterioration in relations between Uganda and Tanzania.

The fact that Amin had strained relations with the people he was supposed to work with in the EAC meant that the days of this regional institution were numbered. Garba captures the mood succinctly when he states that the idea of sitting down with Amin “was personally revolting to Nyerere, who occasionally used unprintable language to describe his Ugandan counterpart. Amin himself did not help matters, using equally rude language to describe Nyerere” (Garba, 1987:125).

The way in which events unfolded did not come as a surprise. Presidents Nyerere, Obote and Kenyatta had established strong relationships over a long period of time. It would not have been easy for the two Presidents to abandon President Obote so easily and accept Amin as a colleague now that President Obote had been removed from office. Had he been removed through the ballot box, perhaps
the situation would have been a bit different. But under these circumstances chances of having good relations with Amin were very minimal. This state of affairs put into question the wisdom in retaining the EAC.

It should be noted that President Nyerere was not the only one who had sour relations with Amin. President Kenyatta too, turned his back on Uganda when Amin ousted President Obote. In fact, so intense was the antipathy between the two countries during Amin’s years in office that the EAC, the strongest grouping in Black Africa at the time, broke up and “there were constant political squabbles between Kampala and Nairobi and also armed border confrontations” (van Rensburg, 1981:178). Furthermore, the coup ruined the hope of expanding the EAC by admitting other Eastern African countries like Zambia. When the OAU Summit held in Uganda in 1975 recognized Amin as President of Uganda, Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere boycotted subsequent meetings (Allen, 1972).

From the discussion thus far there is no doubt that regional integration in East Africa was built on a shaky foundation; it was sitting on a timed-bomb. One of the problems emanating from personal relationships, according to E.M.K. Mulira from the Uganda National Assembly, was that Presidents Kenyatta, Nyerere, and Obote forged East African unity around their personal relationships and infused it to the masses. In his view, East Africans tried to build unity from the top. “We have aimed at building unity from the top”, he argued. “This is typical of Africans – to build from the top. If we try to build a federation this way it is bound to fail.
We cannot put on a roof without first laying the foundation” (*The Standard Tanzania*, 20 May 1966). Although Mulira did not specify what that foundation entailed, it is evident that he was opposed to high politics taking a casual approach to pertinent issues like regional integration whereby the future of national sovereignty was at stake. Also implicit in his comment was that Presidents Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote were blinded by their good relationships and overlooked the fact that future leaders in all three territories might not have such relations. Indeed, when Amin came into the picture, the whole EAC project was put into question.

5.6 The final phase

By the mid-1970s the writing was already on the wall that the days of the EAC were numbered. At this time nationalist interests made it almost impossible to run regional institutions. The East African Airways (EAA) had been in operation for almost 30 years. The Kenyan government started demanding more money from the Airline (200 million shillings) for hosting it and servicing its planes. To make matters worse, British and American manufacturers wanted their aircrafts back unless they were paid the big sums of money they demanded. Kenya seemed willing to allow the Airline to close down. As far as Tanzania was concerned, this would benefit Kenya more than her two counterparts in the regions because even if the planes were to be divided amongst the three states, only Kenya could service them (*Weekly Review*, 7 February 1977:19-20). In the end, the EAA
collapsed. Tanzanian employees working for the EAA in Kenya were not allowed to leave; they were caught up in the political battles between their leaders.

Hilary Ng’weno, one of the vocal Kenyans on regional integration issues followed the developments with a keen interest and wrote an article on some of these issues. Ng’weno reminded his audience that he had used the same columns to predict the eventual collapse of the EAC and that the time had come. He advised that the EAC should be dismantled as soon as possible, not only because of the recent collapse of EAA which proved that there was no common will to keep the Community going, but because in his view “a speedy process of dismantling what remains of the community is the only way of minimizing the human suffering and bitterness which are bound to follow the final demise of the community” (Weekly Review, 14 February 1977:4).

According to Ng’weno, the collapse of the EAA was only a symptom of more serious problems that haunted the EAC. He advised the three governments to refrain from running around frantically trying to cure the symptoms through ineffectual meetings. Instead, he argued, they had to face the facts and deal with them directly. For him the facts were clear, national and personal interests had made it evident that no one seemed to care about the fate of the EAC. Ng’weno reminded his readers about speculations that in fact Kenya had wanted the EAA to disintegrate so that she could establish a national airline. According to Kenyans, Tanzania was doing the same thing rather surreptitiously. The fact that
the grounding of the EAA coincided with the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Arusha Declaration did not make things any better. Tanzania believed that this was Kenya’s well orchestrated plan. The media in Tanzania reported that the EAA had died because of ‘nyang’au’ [hyenas] in Kenya whose primary goal was to set up private airlines.

For its part, Tanzania refused Kenya’s heavy transport to use its highways thus bringing business operation into a halt. Also, Tanzania imposed a ban on Kenyan tourists unless they could abide by the changed (and still changing) regulations drawn by the Tanzanian government. Unlike in the past, all tourists intending to visit Tanzania from Kenya had to fly into Kilimanjaro or Dar es Salaam; they were not allowed to drive into the country using Kenya-based safari vehicles. As one magazine put it, tourists “will now do their touring of the great Serengeti and Ngorongoro game areas from bases in Arusha where the standards of hotels are much lower than those in Nairobi” (Weekly Review, 21 February 1977:1).

When Tanzanian authorities decided to close their borders, they impounded about 30 Kenyan trucks owned by the quasi-governmental company called Kenatco, 60 other vehicles belonging to tour companies and 30 aircrafts belonging to Nairobi-based firms. A Tanzania-Kenya meeting was convened in Kisumu, Kenya’s Western province, to try and resolve some of these issues. Geoffrey Kariithi, Principal Secretary (PS) in the Office of the President, chaired this meeting, which, unfortunately, did not produce any positive results (Weekly Review, 11
April 1977:10). Tanzania tried to sell the idea that their actions were necessitated by economic reasons – which were not clearly stated. Meanwhile, there was growing suspicion amongst Kenyan officials that “the real motives behind the Tanzanian government’s permanent closure of the country’s border with Kenya have more to do with politics than economics” (*Weekly Review*, 25 April 1977:3).

In Uganda, Amin announced that he was going to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union, in terms of which Uganda would get assistance from the Russians to establish the largest military base on the African continent. In addition, Soviet assistance would enable Uganda to establish the most modern nuclear reactor (*Weekly Review*, 23 May 1977). These are some of the exogenous forces referred to by Potholm (1979).

It is not an exaggeration to say that of the three East African countries, Kenya was the only one happy to see the EAC going down to the ground because there were prospects for her to reap some benefits from this collapse. The same could not be said for Uganda and Tanzania. In June 1977, Kenya recalled her citizens who were performing their regional obligations in Tanzania. The reason provided was that the EAC’s Finance Council had failed to agree on a venue for a meeting to discuss the budget for the next financial year of the general funds services, which included the secretariat of the EAC. Kenya also complained about Tanzania’s decision to impound her vehicles and to close her border. It should be mentioned that Kenya was the first country to admit that the EAC had collapsed while the
other two were still contemplating ways in which the life of this regional institution could be salvaged. The *Weekly Review* (11 July 1977) illustrated this point explicitly by recalling that there had been mud-slinging, name-calling, and confrontation politics for a long time, all of which were signs that things were not going well with the EAC. It then reported that the three East African states, which had been partners in what was regarded as Africa’s star example of regional cooperation, had eventually faced the reality and resolved to end the EAC.

The EAC died a slow death. The nature of the relationships within the East African leadership had resulted into the establishment of the EAC but as personal and nationalist interests kicked in, and as strained relations developed amongst East African leaders, the future of this regional institution hung in the balance. All attempts to salvage the life of the EAC failed and eventually East African leaders conceded that the only remaining option was to dissolve it in 1977. Ojo (1985:159-171), one of the experts on regional integration attributes the collapse of the EAC to the following four factors:

- The polarization of national development and the perception of unequal gains whereby Kenya’s share of intra-community trade increased from 63 percent in 1968 to 77 percent in 1974 whereas Uganda’s share decreased from 26 to 6 percent during the same period.
- Inadequacy of compensatory and corrective measures.
- Ideological differences and the rise of economic nationalism.
- The impact of foreign influences as a result of the Cold War.
Chapter Summary

From the discussion in this chapter, it is clear that the collapse of the EAC was inevitable, either because East Africans tried to build unity from the top as Mulira intimated, or simply because from the very beginning the three East African territories had never been a single unit. As long as national interests predominated over regional interests the EAC was bound to fail. The Ugandan delegation had sounded a warning earlier on, arguing that bringing different states together was a new experiment for East Africa and that “every problem should be approached with an open mind, all possibilities being explored so that the working solution for our circumstances could be evolved for our peoples” (Comments by the Uganda Delegation. KNA. GO/3/2/78). Seemingly this did not happen. Pearl (1973) saw East African territories as dissimilar developing nations, each trying to define its present and map out its future. She continued by recalling that even the hope for a cooperative and constructive sharing in the post-independence years, based on common problems, proved to be a mockery.

The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate that although East African leaders were so determined to work together as a unit, national interests, and sometimes egotism, took precedence over regional interests. In the end, nationalism and sub-nationalisms determined the fate of the EAC. The East African leadership felt that they were answerable to their nations first and foremost before they were answerable to their region. It was in this context that the location of a number of factories in Nairobi, Kenya, caused divisions within the region. As Nyerere had
anticipated, the achievement of political independence by these East African territories on different dates sounded the death knells for both economic and political integration in the region. The different economic paths taken by each country at independence compounded the problem even further.

It is not an exaggeration to say that personal relationships amongst East African leaders played an instrumental role in the establishment of the EAC. Similarly, sour relations amongst these leaders, caused by ideological differences adopted by each country after independence, the overthrow of President Obote by Amin in January 1971, and other factors outlined by Potholm (1979), combined to bring the EAC to its knees.

The sequence of events discussed in this chapter has shown how it was almost impossible to sustain the life of the EAC as much as it had been difficult to establish it in the first place. But so far the discussion has revolved around economic and political integration. Equally important in our analysis is the education sector. One of the reasons why the EAC was dismantled in 1977 was because regional integration in higher education had already failed when the UEA was dissolved in June 1970. The next chapter demonstrates the challenge of trying to sustain regional integration in other areas when it had already proved unsuccessful in higher education with the dissolution of the federal university.
Chapter 6
Mission Impossible: The EAC and the Collapse of the Federal University\textsuperscript{8}

0. Introduction
There is a direct link between the UEA and the EAC. Both institutions were established under similar conditions; they were part of the regional integration project in East Africa. Moreover, the political factor was the key driving motive behind the establishment of both of these institutions. As with the EAC, the initial idea of establishing a regional university came from British authorities who feared that if no such institution existed in East Africa students would be forced to travel abroad to further their studies. The possible negative impact of these travels was that the students might be exposed to political agitation and cause problems when they returned home after completing their studies in foreign countries.

A District Commissioner in Lango, Uganda, was more explicit on this issue when he warned British education officers based in Uganda against sending the native abroad for further education. He confided that he not happy about the native going to a more advanced course abroad: “Certainly I feel that the political intrigues would be most…unfortunate for him and I feel that probably you would feel the results when he returned” (Cited in Okello-Oculi, 1967:15). The Governor anticipated that the students would come home with good qualifications and get

\textsuperscript{8} Most of the information used in this chapter was taken from my PhD thesis but was revised to suit the context of this dissertation. See Bhekithemba Richard Mngomezulu. 2004. ‘A Political History of Higher Education in East Africa. The Rise and Fall of the University of East Africa, 1937-1970.’ PhD Thesis, Rice University, especially Chapter 5.
frustrated when they realized that certain jobs were reserved for whites, at which point they might cause political instability in the region. As a preventative measure, the idea of establishing a regional university was conceived.

These were the political factors that led to the establishment of the UEA. As shall be seen later in this chapter, the reasons that led to the disintegration of both institutions were similar. Therefore, when the Federal University disbanded in 1970, it was a foregone conclusion that the EAC would also not survive. In a way, the collapse of the EAC in 1977 did not come as a surprise. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the similarities between the two institutions and to show that the demise of the federal University sounded the death knells for the EAC.

6.1 The Establishment of the University of East Africa

Although discussions about the development of higher education in East Africa started in the early 1920s, the actual process of establishing the UEA began in with the appointment of the De la Warr Commission by W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore, Secretary of State for the Colonies on 28 May 1936. The Commission was tasked:

1) To examine and report upon the organization and working of Makerere College [located in Uganda] and of the institutions or other agencies for advanced vocational training connected with it in relation to (i) the society which they were intended to serve, and (ii) the educational systems of the territories from which the students were drawn; 2) To make recommendations for the development and administrative control of Makerere College and its allied institutions to this end;
and 3) In making such recommendations to consider: (a) the effect of the development of the College upon educational organization of the territories concerned; (b) the general interest and needs of the communities from which students were, or might in future be drawn, and (c) the educational needs of women (De la Warr Commission Report, 1937).

On 2 September 1937 the Commission presented its report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Amongst its key recommendations were the following:

We are proposing the establishment of a University College in the near future, and of a University at no very distant date. We are aware of the present very flimsy foundations of primary and secondary education upon which such institutions will need to be based, and realize the possible risks of too rapid advance and of top-heavy structure. Nevertheless we are convinced that the material needs of the country and the intellectual needs of its people require that such risks as they may be should be taken (De la Warr Commission Report, 1937, Chapter 10, pars. 118-119).

The process of upgrading Makerere College began in 1938. An Inter-territorial Conference was held at Makerere from 21 to 24 May 1938. Its aim was to examine the practical steps that had to be followed in order to implement the recommendations of the Makerere Commission [De la Warr Commission] with regards to the proposed Higher College. Discussions about the envisaged Higher College were held both in East Africa and in Britain. During the sitting of the House of Commons, Mr. Barr, an MP, asked Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether he would make any statement on the proposals for the establishment of a Higher College for East Africa as a whole. He also wanted to know if the inter-territorial conference resulted in any constructive proposals.
MacDonald responded: “I am glad to be able to state that the proposals for the establishment of the higher college have now reached an advanced stage, and the answer to the second part of your questions is in the affirmative” (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons. Official Report, Vol. 337, Col. 1061). In November 1938, the first Makerere Ordinance was drafted and scheduled to come to effect in 1939. The Ugandan administration handed over the college to a Representative Council consisting of members from all three East African territories thus demonstrating that the college was a regional asset.

Subsequent events included the Channon Memorandum of 1940, which contained proposals for a network of colonial universities that would train the leadership required for self-rule by British colonies – including those in East Africa. This was followed by the appointment of the Asquith Commission in 1943 which was mandated to consider the principles which would guide the promotion of higher education, learning and research and the development of universities in the colonies; and to explore the means whereby universities and other appropriate bodies in the United Kingdom might be able to co-operate with institutions of higher education in the colonies in order to give effect to these principles. (Asquith Report). The Commission submitted its report in 1945 recommending the establishment of University colleges that would have a relationship with the University of London.
In July 1955, Allan T. Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, appointed the First Working Party under the chairmanship of Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, then Director of the London School of Economics. The Working Party was instructed: (i) To bring under review the existing provision for all post-secondary education in East Africa taking into consideration the plan in view for the development of the existing higher education institutions; (ii) To bring under review the estimated requirements of higher education in East Africa for the next ten years; and (iii) To make recommendations arising out of paragraph (i) and (ii) (Report of the Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa, July/August 1955). The Working Party submitted its report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in January 1956, recommending that drastic steps be taken to accelerate the pace towards the establishment of the UEA.

By this time the three East African governments had realized the urgent need to have a regional institution of higher education. They articulated their views in the White Paper on Higher Education in East Africa (1958). Subsequent to that paper they approached the Secretary of State for the Colonies and asked him to appoint another Working Party that would examine the proposals contained in the White Paper. This resulted in the appointment of a six-member Working Party under Dr. John F. Lockwood, Master of Birkbeck College and Vice-Chancellor of the University of London. This Working Party was mandated: (i) To examine and advise on the proposals for the creation of new institutions of higher education in East Africa and to advise on their desirability and scope and on the timing of their
establishment; (ii) To examine and advise on the pattern of future development of higher education in East Africa, and to examine the desirability and practicability of carrying out any such development within the scope of a single university or University College of East Africa of which all colleges situated in the region would be constituent units and (iii) To examine and advise on the additional facilities (if any) for higher technological as well as professional training required in East Africa (Report of the Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa, July/August 1958).

The Working Party submitted its report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 26 November 1958. It confirmed the need for the establishment of a regional university that would best serve the interests of East African people on higher education. Some of the key recommendations of the Working Party are captured in paragraph 89, which states that:

All the colleges should be interterritorial wherever they are located. The principle of interterritoriality is fundamental to our recommendations. It is not only that the financial support needed from Governments should be obtained from all the Governments – important as that is. There are other reasons for our emphasis. Unless the colleges are inter-territorial, there is bound to be needless and expensive duplication. It will be a long time, for example, before a second college will need or will be able to afford another medical school. Mulago can adequately serve all the territories. The college in Nairobi will be the centre for higher engineering courses in East Africa for some time to come. Apart from this, however, it is important that students all over East Africa should have a measure of choice as to the college at which they wish to study. Each college will develop individual characteristics; even in common faculties there will be difference of emphasis. A college in a territory other than the student’s own may suit his needs better. There is yet another reason for our emphasis. Both the senior and junior members of the college will profit by the wider and more varied outlook which interterritoriality involves. East college will be concerned with the needs of East Africa as a whole.
Reflecting on these recommendations, one newspaper had the following to say: “In general, the recommendations may be described as bold, imaginative and practical, for they clear away much that has tended to clog progress and development, and point to great potentialities” (East African Standard, 26 February 1959). The implementation process of the recommendations contained in the Working Party began soon after the three East African governments and the EAHC had studied and accepted the report. One such step was the drafting of the Royal College, Nairobi Bill, 1960 by the East Africa Legislative Assembly. The estimated date for the establishment of a similar College in Tanganyika was 1965/1966, or as soon thereafter as possible. However, for reasons to be discussed later in this chapter the anticipated college came into existence on 25 October 1961. It started operating in a four-storey building used by President Nyerere’s Party, TANU.

The last phases in the long and protracted struggle for the establishment of a regional university included the appointment by the East African Governors of the Quinquennial Advisory Committee in 1960 whose mandate was to study the Lockwood Report and give specific advice on the financial implications of its recommendations. The Committee had “to consider the proposals for, and the estimated cost of Higher Education in East Africa in the five years from 1961 to 1966” (Report of the Quinquennial Advisory Committee, 1960, par.1). The Committee submitted the report on 28 July 1960. Paragraph 6 of the report stated
explicitly that there were very strong educational reasons for the establishment of a central university in East Africa with an inter-territorial college in each of the three East African territories, serving students on a regional basis.

After further deliberations in East Africa and in Britain the Provisional Council of the University of East Africa was established in 1961. By the end of March 1962 it was almost a certainty that the UEA would indeed be established in the middle of 1963 (Draft Letter. Provisional Council Minutes, 29 March 1962. University of Nairobi Archives. PUEA/IA/54).

As part of its mandate the Provisional Council had to look into the manpower needs of East Africa. To this effect, it tasked Mr. Guy Hunter, a researcher on education and manpower requirements in East Africa, to conduct a manpower study in the region. Assisted by Professor Frederick Harbison, a European scholar who was linked to the United Nations research projects in Africa, Hunter carried out the study in 1962 and produced a report titled: ‘High-Level Manpower in East Africa: A preliminary Assessment’. The report was never published but was used in other studies (see Hunter, 1963).

During the second half of 1962, the Provisional Coouncil appointed a Committee with the mandate to review the needs and priorities of higher education in the three East African University Colleges, “in view of new circumstances which have arisen since the Report of the Quinquennial Advisory Committee, of the
intention to establish a University College of East Africa” (Report of the Committee on Needs and Priorities, 1963). In 1962, the Governors-General of Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda – after getting advice and consent from the East African Central Legislative Assembly – enacted the University of East Africa Act. The Act stated *inter alia* that: “There shall be established, upon a day to be appointed by the Authority by notice in the Gazette, a university to be known as the University of East Africa, hereinafter referred to as ‘the University’” (EACSO Gazettes, 1963: 320-321). The Act officially set up the UEA with three constituent colleges: Makerere University College in Uganda; Royal College, Nairobi in Kenya and The University College, Dar es Salaam in Tanganyika. The UEA was inaugurated on 28 June 1963 at University College, Nairobi in Kenya with President Nyerere as its first Chancellor and Sir Bernard de Bunsen as its Vice-Chancellor. This marked the completion of a long and tedious process.

Ogot (1999:254) divides the history of the UEA into three phases, which he states as follows: (i) the period from 1938 when the concept of a unitary University of East Africa considered in the context of other types of inter-territorial cooperation, was still the colonial ideal; (ii) the period of the federal University of East Africa which started when the University was inaugurated in June 1963 and ended on 30 June 1970 when the Federal University eventually collapsed; and (iii) the period when each of the three independent states in East Africa had a national university but still co-operated within the context of the EAC.
But if the UEA came into being after such a long process of negotiation and re-negotiation, why did it collapse? Secondly, what did its demise mean to the EAC? Lastly, what role did the East African leadership, nationalism and sub-nationalisms play in this process? These key questions addressed below.

6.2 Problems Experienced by the UEA and Their Impact on the EAC

The collapse of the UEA in June 1970 was the climax of a number of problems that had haunted the University even before it was officially constituted in 1963. Ideological differences within the East African leadership pre-determined the future of the Federal University. Looking at the issue of the University from a broader perspective, the Asquith Report had anticipated that the great distance between the constituent colleges would mean that the UEA would only be a machine for conducting examinations and subsequently granting degrees to those who had passed; it would not be a community. The Report further argued that the Federal University would have no personality of its own. Instead, the colleges would influence both the character and outlook of the students, with each college having its distinct features.

Indeed, when the university was established it experienced these problems. This became clear from the early stages when the heraldic device of the university was designed. It was not easy to decide what to include and what to leave out because the primary aim was to satisfy all three partners (Todd, ‘General Comments’. UON Archives, UEA University Council. PUEA/IA/8). The distance between the
constituent colleges presented another problem as the Asquith Report had rightly anticipated. James (1970:3) commented on this issue, stating that while it would certainly be difficult to prove that the physics of geography was the critical over-riding factor in the eventual decentralization of the university, “there is data from the social sciences that suggests that physical distance affects formation of social systems in a far more subtle and pervasive sense than is commonly understood.”

The UEA, like the EAC, died a slow death. There were endemic problems which saw the UEA disintegrating as it was being constituted. It would therefore be very useful to identify and discuss some of these problems so that we could have a better understanding of what each one of them meant to the EAC.

6.2.1 Inequality Between The Constituent Colleges

The mere fact that Makerere College was established long before the other two constituent colleges were even contemplated predetermined the fate of any regional co-operation in higher education in the region. National and regional interests were always in constant competition thus testing personal relationships between East African leaders. These inter-territorial tensions became evident soon after the publication of the De la Warr Commission Report in 1937. In 1938, the Chief Secretary in Kenya wrote a letter to the Acting Chief Secretary in Uganda stating that although some officials in Kenya were willing and prepared to vote for some money to be sent to Uganda to assist in the construction of Makerere, “it is not at all certain that they will be prepared to vote any considerable sums
towards a building which they have never seen and whose nature they imperfectly understand” (Chief Secretary, Kenya to Acting Chief Secretary, Uganda. KNA. ED.52/4/6/1).

In 1949, Makerere became the only University College in East Africa and was already looking forward to becoming a full university for the region (Lonsdale, in Brown and Luis (eds) 1999). When the Royal Technical College (RTC) was established in Kenya, some commentators saw it as different from Makerere and therefore argued that the two should be kept apart not only because they would provide different educational services to the region but also because they were at different stages of development (Keir, 1954). When the RTC opened its doors to the students in 1956 it ended Makerere’s preeminence as the only institute of higher education in East Africa. But the two institutions could not compete.

The second Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa captured this problem when it presented its report in 1958. It stated that one of the dilemmas facing East Africa at the time was the fact that in comparison with Makerere, no other college in East Africa could by 1966 be in a position to assume similar powers. Therefore, this inequality of stature meant two things. First, it meant that Makerere College had to wait for a greater measure of academic autonomy longer than would otherwise be necessary. Second, Makerere had to become the sole college working for East African degrees at a time when other colleges in the same area were working for University of London degrees in special relationship.

After the Second Working Party had presented its report, Makerere University Council stated that all the East African territories had a major role to play in the provision of higher education in the region. However, it continued, it would be wrong in principle to develop any College at the expense of another, as this would be harmful to the whole pattern of higher education. The Council stated it boldly that “it must be remembered that the newer Colleges will not be able for years to undertake certain work which Makerere is now able to do” (Response by Makerere College Council. UON Archives. UEA Makerere University College, 3 (iv). PUEA/12/18).

National interests superceded regional interests. This applied to both the academic and political leadership alike. What would have been acceptable to Makerere University Council and to the Uganda Government would be for the other two colleges to become constituent colleges of Makerere while the latter took University status. Obote articulated these views boldly when he addressed the Uganda Legislative Council on 13 November 1959. He argued that Makerere should be allowed to progress to university status and that London University should continue to guarantee Makerere degrees. With regards to the Nairobi College, his view was that it should either become a university College affiliated to Makerere or be a University College of London University. He was not
Naturally, Kenya and, later, Tanganyika, could not accept these proposals. They wanted Makerere College to wait for them until they reached the same level of development and then merge as equal partners to form the UEA. It should be remembered that similar debates ensued with regards to the EAC when Tanganyika and Uganda argued that Kenya should wait for them to develop before all three countries could join hands and form the EAC. Dinwiddy and Twaddle (in Hansen and Twaddle, eds, 1988:195) concluded that the relationship between the three inter-territorial Colleges based in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika was in fact “a somewhat frustrating relationship for Makerere, because it had to mark time while the two newer colleges forged ahead in Kenya and Tanganyika.”

One of the ramifications of this problem of inequality was the issue of the site where the proposed UEA would be located. As shown in the previous chapters, a number of the regional institutions were located in Nairobi. This did not go down well with the Ugandan and Tanzanian leadership. Similarly, given Makerere’s advanced status of development, it was an open secret that the central offices of
the proposed UEA would be based in Uganda, to the dissatisfaction of the other two sister countries.

The Asquith Report anticipated this problem and discussed it broadly. Amongst its many observations regarding the choice of the site for a regional university was that the area must be of sufficient extent, not just in terms of size or population, but the capacity to supply an adequate flow of students able to profit from higher education. It then predicted that difficulties and even conflict would inevitably arise when the issue of the site was discussed and continued to state that as a result of legitimate local patriotism or proper educational ambition, each territory would end up establishing its own university. The Report maintained that the only instance where the territories might be willing to embrace the idea of a regional university would be when such a university would not be located in any individual territory (Asquith Report:13).

Another ramification of the problems faced by the UEA was the distribution of funds. Here, too, unequal distribution of funds was inevitable given Makerere’s advanced status. A significant number of buildings were already in place in Uganda while the two constituent colleges in Kenya and Tanzania needed more construction. Also, Makerere had been able to build an endowment fund over a long period of time. The same was not true with the other two colleges. The Nicol Report, which was submitted to the Provisional Council of the University of East Africa in 1962 demonstrated its awareness of this problem when it recommended
that large sums of money be diverted from Makerere to Dar es Salaam – the least
developed of the three colleges – and also to the Royal College in Nairobi.
Obviously, Makerere was not impressed by these recommendations. Excerpts
from a letter written by Frazer Murray, one of the administrators from Dar es
Salaam to Donald MacGillifray, Chairman of the Provisional Council of the UEA
speak directly to this issue. Murray expressed his feelings thus:

I feel I should convey to you my disappointment, and indeed my dismay,
over the Mitchell Hall episode. I believe that a grave error in University
planning has occurred, the effect of which will be greatly to prolong, if not
perpetuate, the imbalance between the colleges. This was consciously and
deliberately done after the urgency of the need to bring the colleges to a
state of approximate parity had been recognized and affirmed by those
responsible….” (Frazer Murray to Donald MacGillifray. UON Archives.
UEA. Minutes of the Provisional Council. PUEA/IA/58, Vol.3).

Similar sentiments came from the Tanganyikan government side. El Haj A. S.
Fundikira, Tanganyika’s Minister of Justice at the time, articulated the views of
his government by saying that the Tanganyika Government greatly regreted that
at a time of serious capital shortage and after the decision had been endorsed that
there should be rapid development of the University College, Dar-es-Salaam, that
another college should proceed to build a Hall of Residence “which in East
African terms was a project of very low priority” (Statement by El Haj A. S.
Fundikira. UON Archives. UEA. Minutes of the Provisional Council.
PUEA/IA/58, Vol.3). There were many such debates which emerged in different
forums. But inequality was not the only problem casting a spell on the UEA; there
were other problems too. One of those problems was the issue of the University
calendar, which all the Constituent Colleges would have to follow.
6.2.2 The University Calendar

The question of the University calendar tested the working relationship within the East African leadership. Before the proposed merger, each country followed its own academic calendar. When these institutions were brought together there was no agreement as to when the terms should start and end. The Working Parties, especially the second one, noted that the academic years of Makerere College and the RTC did not coincide. Whereas Makerere’s academic year ran from July to April, that of the RTC ran from October to June. The Working Party proposed that this issue be addressed because it made regional planning very difficult.

When the joint Government/University Committee met in Nairobi on 30 December 1963 under the chairmanship of de Bunsen, it realized that the issue of the calendar could not be resolved easily. The RTC could not agree to a long vacation starting from April to June. Its argument was that the long rains during that time made it impossible for students to do fieldwork. The period was also said to be unsuitable for family holidays and travel (Memorandum on Proposals by the Joint Committee. UON Archives. UEA Academic Board. PUEA/3/10 (i)).

According to Mr. T. W. Gee, Permanent Secretary in the Uganda Ministry of Education, his government rejected the proposed University calendar for three reasons: (i) the proposals conflicted with the government machinery in that the school year was geared to the local government financial year in each country; (ii) the proposals would create chaos in the school system. If the proposed change
was implemented pupils not in school would wait for the whole year before they were admitted to the University and this would create an unmanageable backlog of pupils; and (iii) the proposed calendar would create a two-term gap between finishing school and joining university. One fear was that some students could get bursaries and travel abroad to further their education (UEA File. PUEA/2B/5, UON Archives). The fact that Britain controlled secondary school examination compounded the problem in that East African Colleges had to fit their calendar to that of British institutions like the University of London, to which they affiliated.

As late as the mid-1960s the calendar problem still lingered on and caused confusion. On 20 April 1966, representatives from the Head Office of the UEA met with the Tanzanian government to try and resolve the issue of the calendar. Tanzania was prepared to make compromises only if Kenya did the same. So, the calendar problem accompanied the UEA to the grave as shown below:

Table 1: Calendar for the last session of the UEA, 1969/70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College</th>
<th>Term 1</th>
<th>Term 2</th>
<th>Term 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: UEA Calendar, 1969/70
6.2.3 Student Population

The student population presented two sets of problems. Initially, there were fewer students to fill the three constituent colleges. Later, there were more students than the colleges could absorb. The first problem saw the colleges competing for students. The second problem meant that each country had to provide higher education facilities for its own students. In both instances continued integration of East African institutions of higher learning became questionable.

6.2.3 (a) Small Student Population

This problem presented itself during the early stages of the establishment of the UEA. Keir anticipated this problem even before the RTC admitted its first students in 1956. Writing in his report in 1954 he stated that the target of a total of 1,500 students at the RTC would take a long time to reach due to the shortage of students. A few years later, J. M. Hyslop, the College’s principal, talked about “the likelihood of unfilled places for the next few years in Makerere College and in the Royal College, Nairobi” (Memorandum by J. M. Hyslop, 6 March 1962. UON Archives. UEA University Council. PUEA/IA/53). When the Provisional Council of the UEA announced that there would be space for more than 250 students at the UEA’s three constituent colleges, Ng’weno, editor of The Nation newspaper in Kenya, wrote: “These places are expected to remain unfilled for at least two years due to lack of properly qualified students” (Daily Nation, 20 April 1963). Hyslop conceded in 1963 that indeed this was a problem (J. M. Hyslop to the Prime Minister of Kenya, 1 August 1963. KNA. KA/2/17).
This problem was compounded by divergent views in the region regarding entrance requirements. The University raised the bar in this regard. Its entrance requirements were higher than those of Western universities (Confidential Memorandum by R. C. Pratt, 5 December 1961. UON Archives. UEA University Council. PUEA/IA/53). The issue of entrance requirements was debated in the different legislatures of the three East African governments. While certain politicians argued strongly for raising the bar in this regard, others felt that time was not ripe for such an exercise in East Africa.

National interests presented themselves on the issue of student admission at tertiary level. Those who felt that their students could gain more in overseas institutions and be of better service to their countries when they returned home, went ahead and sent those students abroad, sometimes breaking regional agreements. This caused tensions in the region and tested the relationship amongst East African leaders. Initially, the argument was that students were being sent away because there were no higher education facilities in East Africa. In a way, this was true. However, even after the UEA had been established individual countries continued to send their students abroad, especially the brighter ones. The table below shows the number of East African students who traveled abroad between the 1950s and 1966 to further their studies.
Table 2: East African Students Studying Abroad Between the 1950s and 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1237</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>1448</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Kenya was only second to Nigeria which had 1,861 students

Source: Jacpz (1967:49)

6.2.3 (b) Increase in the student population

It was a foregone conclusion that at some point the student population would increase in East Africa. It was also an open secret that when that time came, national interests would take precedence over regional interests and that once more the relationship amongst East Africans would be put to the test. East African territories developed faster than had been anticipated and therefore this problem came earlier than previously thought. Each country’s manpower needs proved to be more than the University could handle. In the meantime, there was increasing political pressure to provide places for all students who qualified (Court, in Thompson et al., 1977). Presenting his Annual Report for the academic year 1965/66, the Principal of University College, Nairobi stated: “In 1964, enrollment at the college was 625. In 1965/66 it was 921 and in the last year of the triennium,
numbers are expected to reach 1, 179 – an increase throughout the triennium of about 86%” (UEA. University College, Nairobi, Annual Report 1965/66).

In 1965, President Obote told BBC in London that proposals were already being examined for the creation of separate universities in East Africa. When a Nigerian student studying in Britain asked him why Uganda wanted to break Makerere away from the Federal University, he responded by saying that the assessment of the East African situation was not fair and blamed those who failed to interpret the situation correctly. He then stated that he had been asking himself as to how long a University College should take before it becomes a University – five, 10 or 20 years? As he continued with his conversation, he regretted that East Africa had 27, 000, 000 people, with only one university. He then disclosed that the East African leadership had been re-examining the problem, and the general feeling was that each of the East African colleges should in 1967 become universities so that the number of tertiary institutions could be increased. He concluded: “We are thinking in terms of 50, 000 – not 5, 000 – students” (Uganda Argus, 2 July 1965).

President Obote’s statement was not without substance. By 20 May 1966, of the 1, 994 applicants for the 1966/77 academic year, about 711 students had not yet been admitted to any of the three constituent colleges of the UEA. General population increase in East Africa had a direct impact on the student population. As student numbers soared, personal relationships within the East African leadership gave way to national sentiments.
Under these circumstances, each country started its plans for national development, some of which contradicted regional plans. This was caused in part by the fact that each college did not get the amount it had asked for from the central office of the Federal University. As these problems continued, questions started emerging on why it was still necessary to sustain the life of the UEA. In response, the East African Authority appointed a Working Party in 1968 in view of: (a) the increasing needs for expansion of facilities for higher education within East Africa; (b) the likelihood that at some time after the next triennium planning period (ending in mid-1970) this would lead to the natural growth of three or more separate universities in place of the present three constituent colleges of the Federal University of East Africa; and (c) the desirability of maintaining some types of co-operation between the three constituent colleges as they develop into separate universities in special matters of interest to the people of East Africa. The Working Party was chaired by Professor George D. Stoddard one of the renowned European scholars and began its work on 16 September 1968. It submitted its report to the East African Heads of States on 31 January 1969.

Three of the Working Party’s recommendations were the following: (i) Each of the three University Colleges had to become a University on its own right; (ii) An inter-University Committee for East Africa had to be established by the East African Community to maintain co-operation among existing and future East African universities; and (iii) Each country had to constitute an independent ad
hoc University Grants committee to examine the existing financial needs of each university in the region and advise the national government accordingly.

A few issues frustrated the East African leadership. For example, in 1969, the University College, Nairobi, informed both the University Council and the Senate that it would be compelled by shortage of accommodation to restrict student entry into the common faculties. There was also a Ministerial Policy regarding the distribution of students into Common Faculties in terms of which the three University Colleges were expected to have a more or less equal number of students. Benard Onyango, the University Registrar, looked at this situation and stated that the main question was whether the East African governments still wished the UEA to take in all qualified East Africans “in which case if Nairobi is compelled to restrict admission, whether Makerere and Dar es Salaam will be allowed to admit students in excess of the figures stipulated in the Ministerial Formula” (Bernard Onyango to the Permanent Secretaries of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania (Ref. No. A. 4/15) 14 March 1969. UON Archives. Executive Senate Committee. PUEA/2A/16).

By this time the student population in East Africa had increased significantly. It became obvious that the East African brotherhood that had kept them going for decades had reached a cal-de-sac. But although the writing was already on the wall that the life of the UEA was hanging in the balance, it was the spirit of local nationalism that put a stop to the regional plans. This point is developed below.
6.2.4 Nationalism

As discussed in chapter two of this study, nationalism is, by definition, self-centered. Members of a nation aspire to have all the good things, usually at the expense of other nations. In Africa, when many countries achieved their political independence in the 1960s they soon took charge of a number of institutions. They regarded national universities and airlines as status symbols which no independent country could afford not to have (Ngara, 1995). East Africa is no exception in this regard. As the spirit of nationalism swept through the region, each of the three countries began to make its national plans for both education and manpower. Each state made higher education plans without consulting the Federal University. In the midst of all that, the future of the UEA was left hanging in the balance as each state became suspicious of every action by another sister country.

Nationalism played a dual role in East Africa. On the one hand, broadly defined nationalism on which East African brotherhood was premised united the different territories against Britain. However, once independence was achieved, each state reverted to parochialism or narrowly defined nationalism. Suddenly, the Federal University ceased to be a unifying force it had been assumed to be in the past and became a stumbling block to national sovereignty and development as much as the EAC was later purported to be. Like all other independent African states at this time, each of the three East African countries wanted to control its national university so as to make it more responsive to its national development plans (Ajayi, Goma and Johnson, 1996).
The fact that most African universities were (as they still are) heavily funded by the state made it more difficult to separate the two institutions from each other (Hyder, 1970). Solomon Eliufoo, Tanzania’s Education Minister, captured this reality during his address at the conference on the UEA held in Nairobi. He argued that University planning in a developing country is part of national planning and that his government was therefore justified in thinking along these lines. In his view, the government’s involvement in university affairs was not tantamount to the dictation of university policy. He believed that the government was operating within its official mandate (Eliufoo, 1967).

Implicit in Eliufoo’s statement was that it would be inappropriate for the Tanzanian government to draft and implement national policies only to find that the University had its own plans, some of which contradicted national plans. A chronological analysis of the role played by nationalism in the disintegration of the UEA will assist our discussion and provide the context in which the demise of both the UEA and the EAC should be understood.

6.2.4 (a) Nationalism and the UEA, 1961-1963

To understand the role played by nationalism in the collapse of the UEA and, by extension, the EAC, we need to take a closer look at the independence period in East Africa, that is, the period from 1961 to 1963. This is the time when national sentiments became more evident. Initially, the Second Working Party had proposed that a University College in Dar es Salaam should start operating during
the 1965/1966 academic year. However, driven by the new spirit of nationalism, Tanganyika pressed for an earlier date. Even the compromise date proposed by Britain (1964) was seen to be too far away by the Tanganyikans who wanted to celebrate their independence and the establishment of a University College almost simultaneously. It was in this context that the University College opened in 1961, the same year that Tanganyika achieved its independence from Britain. This move was considered to be ‘educationally sound’ because the University College was going to produce lawyers desperately needed by the national governments (Pratt, 1961). TANU hosted the University College in its new headquarters located in Lumumba Street in Dar es Salaam. This was a bad omen for the UEA and for the EAC. Southall (1974:55) concurs by stating that the opening of the Dar es Salaam College some three years earlier than the Quinquennial Advisory Committee had allowed for, “naturally called into question concurrent developments in Kampala and Nairobi, given the scarce resources available for higher education.”

Tanganyika’s national sentiments became clear in the actions of politicians who pleaded with their countrymen serving in different parts of East Africa to return home to build their own nation. It was in this context that Wilbert Chagula, already earmarked for being the first African professor of Anatomy at Makerere University College was asked by his fellow Tanzanians to return home and serve as Registrar at the University College of Dar es Salaam, a request he accepted.
Earlier, Tanganyika had agreed to support the idea of a Veterinary School based in Kenya. But soon after achieving independence the government of Tanganyika reversed this position. Instead, it told the Provisional Council of the UEA that it would rather send its veterinarians abroad for training. Later, it turned out that the reason for this change of position was necessitated by the fact that the Rockefeller Foundation had promised to fund the UEA with a sum of $500,000 to maintain the Veterinary School. Tanganyika was also receiving funding from the same institution and feared that the Foundation could be over-stretched and fail to meet Tanganyika’s financial needs. It was only after McGillivray, the Chairman of the Provisional Council, intervened that the issue was resolved – but not before cracks emerged in the East African academic and political leadership.

Another incident was Tanganyika’s decision to open a medical school at the former Medical Training Center in Dar es Salaam where students with school certificate qualifications would be admitted. This was despite the fact that a similar inter-territorial school existed in Uganda. The government of Tanganyika stated that the proposed school would award diplomas, not degrees as the institution in Uganda was doing. Also, it was going to produce Assistant Medical Officers and therefore would not compete with the old school (Rankin, 1968. See also, Iliffe, 1998 and Tanganyika Standard 30 December 1961). But not everyone believed this defense mechanism.
Uganda achieved its independence in October 1962 and had its own national agenda, which did not always embrace regional plans. Dr Luyimbazi-Zake, Uganda’s Education Minister, was vocal on many educational issues during this time – he even challenged the recommendation of the Nicol Report regarding the development of higher education in Kenya and Tanganyika while Uganda waited. Even Obote’s government opposed the University Development Plan for the 1963-1967 triennium.

Thus, when 1963 began there was already a duplication of educational facilities in the region. This did not augur well for the sustainability of the UEA. Subsequent tensions emerged at the East Africa Legislative Assembly. Mr. Semei, a Member of the House, expressed his disappointment about the emergence of many faculties in the University Colleges whereas there had been an agreement that each would specialize in one area. In response, Chief Fundikira from Tanganyika stated that he was dismayed to note in the Hon. Member’s speech that he felt that there was this duplication: “This is not duplication, Sir, because the needs of the peoples of East Africa with regard to the basic faculties could not be met by Makerere alone” (EACSO. Proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol.11, May 1963. Cols. 96-98 and 119-120).

In Kenya, Njoroge Mungai, who had just been appointed Minister of Health, reversed policy almost overnight (Iliffe, 1998). Without even bothering to consult the University authorities, he approached the World Health Organization (WHO)
and asked for all necessary assistance to open an undergraduate Medical School in Nairobi not later than 1966. This action put more pressure on Uganda, whose leadership was already showing a certain degree of uneasiness about sustaining the life of the Federal University to take further action geared towards ending its life almost instantly. All these developments reminded Nathan Mnjama (1988:7) about the following: “it has been argued that the collapse of regional co-operation in East Africa began soon after Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika gained independence.” By this time, East Africans’ vested interests in sovereignty had – as President Nyerere had anticipated they would – become well entrenched. Kenyan lecturers teaching at Makerere were persuaded to return home to build their university. It was at this point that academics like Dr. S. H. Ominde and, later, Bethwell Ogot returned to Kenya from Uganda (Ogot, 2003; Legum, 1967). Therefore, the achievement of political independence before the UEA and the EAC were established meant that both institutions were established on a very weak foundation. It was inevitable that they would both collapse.

6.2.4 (b) Nationalism and the UEA, 1964-1966

By 1964 it was already evident that the independence spirit had caused a huge dent on East African brotherhood in almost all fields. A commentary in the *East Africa Journal* (1964:27) stated that: “National aspirations have to be reconciled with the interests of the whole University, and all the numerous problems which normally characterize any federal set-up.” Naturally, federal institutions have problems. But what made the East African case even more complicated was the
fact that each of the three countries was a sovereign state. President Obote tacitly conceded that forging unity in East Africa after each country had achieved national independence was bound to fail. He reasoned: “our problems are different….Our political structure [in Uganda] is completely different to the political structures of Kenya and Tanganyika” (The People, 27 June 1964). Thus, it was obvious that adversarial views would bring the university to its knees.

In 1965, Uganda decided to upgrade Kampala Technical College to offer English courses. Students from the other two countries were also welcome to join the institution but it was meant specifically for Uganda. Through the publication of Sessional Paper No10 on African socialism (Kenya Government, May, 1965), Kenya put it beyond any doubt that her national needs would henceforth determine the expansion of higher education in the Republic of Kenya; this included upgrading the University College, Nairobi. On 20 May 1965, Dr. Luyimbazi-Zake presented a Memorandum during the sitting of the University Council whereby he argued strongly that lately, the UEA had worked to the disadvantage of Makerere because it literally retarded the College’s development while at the same time promoting the other two sister Colleges.

The Memorandum stated *inter alia* that “we cannot avoid the fact that each of the three constituent colleges of the University will have to be an autonomous University on its own sooner or later” (Luyimbazi-Zake, Memorandum laid before the University Council, 20 May 1965. UON Archives, UEA.
PUEA/IA/49). Ugandan authorities argued that since the priorities of each territory varied and the needs of each state were bound to be different, a federal University could not veto any government project. If it did, that would be tantamount to the limitation of political sovereignty (Amayo, 1977).

As regional talks continued regarding the future of the UEA, Uganda’s position remained unclear on many issues regarding the University. Dr. Luyimbazi-Zake kept saying that he preferred not to make any decision on the subject because the Heads of States were looking into the matter. He could not even endorse the decision to appoint a Working Party to look into the future of the UEA (Minutes of the Special [Seventh] Confidential Meeting of the Council of the University of East Africa, 1965. UON Archives, UEA. PUEA/IA/49). By the time the meeting ended, the position was still almost the same as before it started; the future of the University remained undecided and was referred to the Heads of States for further deliberation (Southall, 1972). For people like Dr. Luyimbazi-Zake, the split of the UEA was practical, constructive and progressive (Uganda Argus, 6 July 1965; National Assembly Debates [Uganda], Vol. 49, 1965. Col.2732). By this time, the writing was already on the wall that very little (if anything at all) could be done to salvage the life of the UEA.

For authors like Bell (1986) the situation outlined above is not surprising at all if we look at the general trend in the African experience with regional integration in general. Since independence, he argues, the ability of African states to act
collectively has proved to be difficult, if not impossible. His diagnosis of the problem is that political immaturity and internal disunity derived from different sources frustrated all attempts at national integration. This failure to unite at a national level reduced chances for supra-national or inter-territorial co-operation. The period from 1967 to 1970 finally put the issue of the University to rest.

6.2.4 (c) Nationalism and the UEA, 1967-1970

By 1967 there was no going back; all the signs were already showing that the UEA was on the verge of its collapse and nothing could stop that. The period from 1967-1970 was characterized by contradictions. For example, while still hoping to sustain the life of the UEA, The University College, Dar es Salaam opened the faculties of Medicine and Agriculture in 1968 and 1969, respectively. This was done through the incorporation of the Old Dar es Salaam School of Medicine and Morogoro Agricultural College. The implication was that Makerere University College could no longer be the only specialist in these fields.

In 1968, the Working Party under Stoddard was appointed with the mandate to study the nature of the relationship between the three constituent Colleges of the Federal University following the achievement of political independence. It also looked at the possible implications of dissolving the UEA given the politics of the time. Making his submission to the Working Party, Wilbert Chagula said the following in a statement: “No rigid arrangement can be made to compel three independent universities and countries to follow comparable or unified standards
in regard to any of the items listed in the Terms of Reference” (Report of the Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa, 30 January 1969: 40). The Working Party concluded that there was no reason to try to sustain the life of the UEA at the end of the second triennium ending in 1970 given the prevailing circumstances. This view was later endorsed by the East African Authority, which was the administrative body of the EAC. It realized that trying to rescue the University at this point would be a futile exercise.

One observer stated: “Now that each of the three East African university colleges is able to offer most of the wide range of degree subjects required in modern East Africa, it is expected that they will become separate national universities in 1970” (Mhina, cited in Tanzania Notes and Records, 1970:179). Indeed, in June 1970, the East Africa Authority took a decision to dissolve the UEA and allowed each country to take full control of and give shape to its own university according to its national interests (Mkude and Cookey, in Teferra and Altbach, 2003). Thus, nationalism triumphed over East African brotherhood that had seen Presidents Nyerere, Obote, Kenyatta and many other East African leaders working together. If the UEA and the EAC were established under similar circumstances – as demonstrated above – what did the demise of the UEA mean to the EAC?

6.3 The Impact of the Demise of the UEA on the EAC

As argued on many occasions in this dissertation, the EAC started disintegrating as it was being constituted. We also saw that a combination of factors were
responsible for this disintegration, the most important of which was the changing personal relationships in the wake of nationalism. But for some time there were East Africans who had a stern belief that their region could still work together. However, to a large extent, the demise of the UEA in 1970 dashed all those hopes. It became clear that if East Africans could not sustain a regional university due to varying national priorities, it would be impossible to prolong the life of the EAC, which had been established on both economic and political grounds – these being largely more sensitive than education, important as it was.

The disintegration of the UEA meant that Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania could each plan higher education in line with national manpower needs. Role-players like Dr. Luyimbazi-Zake who had been agitating for the prioritization of national needs could now go ahead and shape the curriculum in the manner that would be compatible with those needs. While this was good in national terms, it raised questions about the EAC. The reality was that not only the educational needs of each country were unique but the economic and political needs too. Therefore, addressing educational needs of the country without also responding to national political and economic needs did not make sense. For example, a country could train its students locally or abroad in order to boost the economy but as long as such an economy was tied to regional economies, the results could not be felt by the country in question. It became necessary, therefore, to dismantle the EAC once the Federal university had disintegrated so that national economic and
educational planning could take place concurrently. In a nutshell, the dissolution of the UEA heralded the demise of the EAC.

For these reasons, there was a direct link between the collapse of the UEA in 1970 and the disintegration of the EAC in 1977. It would have been impossible to sustain the life of the EAC after the collapse of the UEA because both these institutions had been created under similar conditions and were guided by the same philosophy, that is, to bring East African people together. In fact, East Africans should be applauded for trying hard to salvage the life of the EAC for seven more years after the collapse of the UEA. The mission was impossible. So, it did not come as a surprise when the EAC eventually collapsed in 1977.

**Chapter Summary**

The purpose of this chapter was mainly to draw a link between the Federal University and the EAC. It began by demonstrating that both of these institutions were established under similar circumstances. The main argument is that in both cases the achievement of political independence by the three East African countries before the two institutions were constituted was a bad starting point. National sentiments tested the personal relationships that had kept East African politicians closer to one another.

The chapter also demonstrated the role played by each of the three East African countries in putting national before regional interests. As shown above, these
national interests came in different forms and at different moments. The site of the University, the University calendar and the funding of the three constituent colleges were used as examples to show how national sentiments prevailed over regional plans. Although the EAC survived for at least seven more years after the collapse of the UEA, this Chapter has argued that the mission was indeed an impossible one. Even these last seven years of the EAC’s life were not happy moments; they were characterized by protracted struggles which then culminated in the collapse of the EAC in June 1977.
Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions: Learning From The Past

0. Introduction

A lot has been said in this dissertation in the preceding chapters. This concluding chapter has a dual purpose. First, it pulls together a few threads that are running through the discussion and reiterates the key points. Second, the chapter assesses the current EAC using the history of the first one as a source of reference. Based on the understanding of the first EAC, it extrapolates on the prospects of the current EAC, bearing in mind the changed and still changing political, social and economic environment. To be sure, a lot has changed in world politics (including East African politics) since the 1960s but there are continuities in certain areas and these need to be factored into the discussion.

This exercise is very crucial because it achieves two objectives: (i) it helps us appreciate the value of history in the political analysis of our present situation; (ii) it enables us to make well informed extrapolations and thereby avoid repeating some of the mistakes made by our predecessors. Mugomba (1978:272) had this mind when he argued that the hard lessons of this unsuccessful venture “will need to be borne in mind in any future attempt at further regional unity and economic integration in Africa.” The survival of the current EAC depends on how the present East African leadership uses past experiences to avert and/or address the problems that led to the collapse of the first EAC in 1977.
7.1 Summary of the key points

The first point that needs to be emphasized is that agency in the history of regional integration in East Africa cannot be confined to any single group or individual. As demonstrated in the preceding chapters, there were many role-players, both black and white. The idea about regional integration in East Africa was first conceived by British authorities in London in the early 1920s. Their primary aim was to ensure easy administration of the East African territories. This phase reached its apogee in 1948 with the inauguration of the EAHC. Suffice to say throughout this period East Africans vehemently opposed any form of closer union in the region, fearing that such a union would increase British hegemony in the region. In other words, they did not want any form of closer union amongst East African territories to which they would have no say. That is why a few years later, when they were assured that their voice would be heard, they embraced it.

The 1950s and 1960s marked a watershed in the history of regional integration in East Africa. During this time, East Africans welcomed the idea of regional integration with the hope that it would accelerate their political and economic emancipation. It is in this context that economic and political factors are accorded a similar status in this dissertation. What is evident about British authorities and East African politicians is that the actions of both constituencies were triggered by the anticipated outcomes of bringing the three east African territories closer to one another. Although the general picture painted by Britain was that of altruism, in actual fact, egotism was the driving force behind the actions of both parties.
Another point that needs to be reiterated is that the entire regional integration project was characterized by sustained tensions amongst different stakeholders. The locus of these tensions was mainly on the mode of operation to be followed and uncertainty on who would do what. First and foremost, British authorities in London clashed with their appointees in East Africa, especially the Governors. As British authorities based in London claimed to have a mandate to decide the fate of East Africa, Governors argued that they were close to the reality and therefore were better positioned to decide on what needed to be done and how. The second locus of the tensions was between colonial representatives and East Africans. The latter wanted to determine their destiny independent of British influence. Within East Africa, there were tensions between individual territories and amongst different stakeholders within each territory. Politicians, academics, whites, blacks, men, women, students etc. did not always agree on issues related to regional integration projects. Such disagreements were more pronounced at certain times than others. This is reflected in parliamentary debates at each National Assembly and at the East Africa Legislative Assembly.

What has also become evident in this dissertation is the fact that some role-players contemplated different forms of regional integration while others saw each form as just constituting one phase in the whole scheme of things. They toyed with the idea of economic integration, political integration and integration in higher education. It is in the latter context that the establishment of the UEA in 1963 is considered as part of the broader regional integration project. As argued in
chapter 6, there was a direct link between regional integration in higher education and regional integration in the other spheres (economy and politics).

In many instances, other role-players simply talked about East African Federation in a much broader sense. As a result thereof (a point discussed in chapter 2), the terminology used in written documents is sometimes confusing. But the common denominator in all different conceptions of certain terms is that there was general consensus that all East African territories had to be brought together somehow. This aim was then fulfilled in 1967 when the EAC was officially inaugurated.

Chapter two demonstrated the complexities associated with each of the concepts discussed there. For example, the economic integration theorists identify four stages that must be followed before reaching full economic integration (Free Trade Area, Customs Union, Common Market and Economic Union). But what is even more important about chapter two is the close relationship it draws between economic and political integration. The view that economic integration is a precursor to political integration is at the core of the history of the EAC and of other regional organizations in different parts of Africa. The East African leadership saw economic integration as a means to an end, not an end in itself. They believed that once they had integrated their regional economies they would eventually strive for political integration.
But what is clear is that if there are problems with economic integration, the process towards political integration is either delayed or stalled. As a result of the disintegration of the EAC, political integration in East Africa did not materialize. ECOWAS was established as an economic union but as discussed in this dissertation, sometimes it tackles political matters without necessarily saying that there should be political integration of members of this institution. That dream would be difficult to realize. During the second week of February 2007, Nigeria, Togo and Benin signed a Memorandum of Understanding focusing specifically on economic integration (This Day, 8 February 2007). This is a demonstration that economic integration is easy to forge that political integration.

The complexity of the term ‘regionalism’ was demonstrated in chapter two. The fact that regionalism can be a contributor or an obstacle to world order attests to the submission that it is indeed a complex concept whose effect varies from one situation to the other. Even the distinction between old and new regionalism is in a way an artificial distinction because there are remnants of old regionalism in what is purported to be new. But despite all the complexities outlined here, what is important to know is that regionalism is a mechanism through which states or groupings manage their environment. East Africans were determined to manage their geographical space and therefore perceived themselves as people of a specific region within the African continent.
The discussion on nationalism was revealing in many respects. First, it addressed the questions why and how people organize themselves into ‘a nation’. By addressing the different types of nationalism and the various stages or phases nationalism went through over the years, this dissertation has demonstrated that nationalism is not just a static concept that has always been there and therefore has a fixed meaning. It is clear from our discussion that the term ‘nationalism’ performs different functions. It unites and divides people at the same time. The fact that nationalism imposes homogeneity amongst individuals and polities while also ordering the political life of mankind means that it has both disadvantages and advantages at the same time. For example, the spirit of nationalism united East Africans against the British. This was black nationalism. However, territorial nationalism and different forms of sub-nationalisms left East Africa divided.

Another theoretical concept discussed here is ‘community’, which is at the core of any discussion on the EAC. East Africans saw themselves as a Community. It was this mind-set that made them ignore any differences that might have existed amongst them. As Anderson (1991) maintains, communities imagine themselves as such even if they do not know one another. Thus, ‘community’ is an abstract concept and it refers to quite a number of things in different contexts. Sometimes the classical and modern usage of the term impacts on how it is construed. But regardless of how this concept is perceived, there is general consensus that it refers to togetherness or oneness. As far as East Africans were concerned they were a unit – a community. That is how the East African Community came about.
The disintegration of the EAC in 1977 ushered in a new phase in regional politics in East Africa. It meant that each of the three East African countries would henceforth follow its national programmes without being bound by any regional agreements. However, the subsequent revival of the EAC in January 2001 was an acknowledgement of the fact that despite previous failures, East Africans still had a stern belief that a lot could be achieved through regional co-operation, even if they did not form a single political unit immediately. But will the current EAC survive? Why or why not? These questions are addressed below.

7.2 Prospects for the new EAC

The survival of the current EAC depends on the political will amongst East African leaders to sustain its life. One way in which they could do that would be by ensuring that regional institutions and structures are kept intact and that leaders from all member states partake. The change of the leadership in Uganda was one of the key factors that resulted to the dissolution of the first EAC. The replacement of President Obote by Idi Amin meant that EAC meetings could no longer be held due to the sour relations that existed not only between President Nyerere and Amin but also between Amin and President Kenyatta. Amin’s coup also reduced the chances of expanding the EAC by creating sour relations with President Kaunda. The current leaders in East Africa are working together to sustain the EAC but there is no guarantee that their successors will do the same. This remains one of the key challenges regarding the future of the new EAC.
As a preventative measure, these leaders should ensure that the spirit of East African brotherhood is instilled amongst the people, not just the leadership. If future leaders embrace this spirit of East African brotherhood now, they are more likely to sustain it when they replace the current leaders. One of the concerns about the first EAC for example (as reflected in the parliamentary debates) was that it was built from the top. East Africans should be vigilant and ensure that the same thing does not happen with regards to the current EAC.

The inequality of East African economies contributed to the demise of the first EAC. Kenya was the richest of the three territories and appeared to be dominating the EAC in part because it hosted a number of regional institutions. This meant that more Kenyans got employment compared to the other two countries. To a large degree, the situation remains the same today; Kenya’s economy is still the strongest in the region and this does not augur well for the EAC. In March 2004, the three East African countries signed a Treaty setting up a Customs Union for their region. The Treaty came into effect on 1 January 2005. According to this Treaty, only Kenya will pay duty on its goods entering Uganda and Tanzania at least until 2010 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_African_Community). Should Kenya feel that all three countries should be treated in the same manner the life of the EAC will be at risk. In this regard, East Africans should draw lessons from the EU on how it tackles this question.
Exogenous forces were highlighted as some of the causes of the collapse of the EAC. This is not as crucial now as it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Communism and its socialist principles collapsed in 1989. This ended the Cold War. Such developments augur well for the EAC. In the absence of socialism and the fight between the Eastern and Western blocs, the three East African countries are more likely to stick together. Furthermore, the fact that Africa now has the Pan African Parliament (PAP) and the fact that African leaders are currently pushing for the introduction of a single currency for the continent are good signs that regional integration will be encouraged throughout Africa. It is through regional integration that the unification of the African continent will be realized.

However, East African leaders should read the face of history very well to ensure that they do not repeat the mistakes of the past. From the 1960s, the East African leadership rushed regional integration in order to oust Britain and faced the reality of unresolved issues afterwards. It would be a mistake for the current leadership to rush the process of bringing together regional institutions simply to accelerate AU and PAP programmes. Regional integration involves compromises by all parties and this should be taken into consideration throughout the process.

Internal and external factors brought the first EAC to its knees. The current leadership should be vigilant at all times. Religious differences between Muslims and Christians pose a huge challenge. Only astute leadership can sustain the EAC.
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