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CHAPTER ONE:

Rationale for redressing colonial injustice
Introduction

Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the notion of service delivery especially to the previously disadvantaged black majority has been on top of the agenda of the new regime under the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) (Muthahaba, Baguma & Halfani, 1993). This has led the government to adopt a series of policies and strategies that include Private-public partnership in attempting to make the poverty alleviation programme a reality in the poverty stricken communities (Mc Lennan, 2008).

This record is intended to contribute to the poverty alleviation discourse and also to give a scrutiny to the relevance of some of the poverty alleviation strategy such as private-public partnership that has been adopted by the government.

Nonetheless, the government began to grapple with the question of poverty in different ways. Some strategies were criticised for being unsustainable, while others were applauded. Despite some shortcomings to the government interventions but they have been refined in the last decade. It’s worth highlighting, the manner in which the government attenuated the role of civil society in the preceding period, this was clear by the manner it handled the civil society, as it is known that just before achieving gaining power and immediately afterwards, the ANC had involved civil society in the drafting of policies and legislation for a democratic rule. The culture of inclusivity became central in formulating all related policies and legislation of which became the need for radically addressing the country’s poverty (Noyoo, 2006).
Despite the repeal of some of the past policies and laws that had entrenched social inequities that had specifically blocked Africans from advancing in areas like business, education and employment but other views argue that some key members of civil society were co-opted into the ranks of the oppressor. Nevertheless, Noyoo (2006) argues that this situation would drastically change when the government begins to isolate civil society in various decision-making processes. In addition, this has started to emerge in government’s ambiguous position in this regard especially when it comes to poverty reduction interventions that are guided by its ideological ambivalence sorely created by the pursuit of neo-liberalism and an abdication of certain ideals of the liberation struggle. So this manifested itself at the onset, as most of poverty reduction interventions were guided by an ambitious programme for social reconstruction known as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (Noyoo, 2006:6).

So, the RDP was seen to be more egalitarian as it attempted to tackle the idea of wealth redistribution focusing on four broad areas namely: meeting basic needs, building the economy, democratising the state and society, and developing human resources and nation-building (African National Congress, 1994). Key underlying objectives of the RDP were to deal with social legacies of apartheid (Manuel, 2004). However, a dramatic change, by government in 1996 when it unilaterally adopted the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) macro economic framework, which would in effect frustrate the fate of poor people as it essentially, alienated them from the country’s economy.
Furthermore, GEAR sought after the economy has gain some stability through *inta alia*: an attraction of foreign direct investment, higher domestic savings, industrial competitiveness and tighter fiscal policy, moderation of wage increases and major expansion of private investment (Government of the Republic of South Africa, 1996), at the expense of poverty reduction. Initially, expectations of employment creation were high but GEAR tended to be delivering the opposite, i.e. the mass retrenchment of employees in the first year of implementation in 1996 that resulted in the economy losing 71,000 and 42,000 in the first quarter of 1997 (Noyoo, 2006:8).

**A pledge to access to basic services: a rationale behind the private-public partnership strategy**

The government’s ability to grow the economy, compete globally and meet local demands. On the other hand, it is a redistributive route to development for those previously denied the rights of citizenship, education and employment.

The approaches introduced by the democratic South African government to expand and improve service delivery combine global ‘good practice’ trends with local context and practice. Mc Lennan (2008) argues that there are three approaches that can be considered towards improvement of service delivery, as they emerged at different periods, thought they continue to co-exist. However, it’s worth highlighting that at some point, these approaches tend to be self-contradictory, as global best practice is introduced without due consideration for established norms, institutions and capacity (ibid.).
Consequently, these approaches tend to disrupt delivery processes and undermine policy expectations. In addition, each of these approaches redefines the state-society relationship in accomplishing delivery of required services.

Nevertheless, when we look critically in the first approach of which emphasizes on reconstruction through expanded access, where the state plays the role of being a provider and citizens become beneficiary (McLennan, 2008). In the second approach that focused on the delivery through modernisation of which is realized by the manner in which the state limits its role to oversee, enable the market to provide and create customers and clients. While on the third approach, the development is achieved through state protection, as it attempts to protect citizens through partnership and regulation in the name of social justice. In addition, each of these approaches utilise a specific public administration tools and techniques. However, all these approaches contain embedded contradictions of delivery in unequal contexts and the ever-constant tension between the institutionalised inequalities engraved by apartheid and the promises of democracy (ibid, p.6).

Partnerships between the public and private sectors had always been recognised as "important development drivers" for the delivery of a wide variety of services in South Africa. The strategy, an initiative of the South African Government that is aimed at turning underdeveloped rural South Africa into economically viable and socially stable areas (Makaringe, 2003). For example, the renewal of a joint venture that was initiated 1994 and later
implemented in 1996 of which was intended to unlock agricultural production and economic development through two parties that attempted to provide extension of services to more than 45,000 small-scale sugarcane growers in rural KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa and this tended to endorse the effectiveness and impact public-private partnerships that can have on service delivery. Furthermore, the South African Sugar Association (SASA) has renewed its joint venture agreement with the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs, to continue unfold agricultural production and economic development potential in the province (ibid.). Additionally, it is of crucial importance that effective, economically viable and sustainable agricultural projects are implemented to tackle the challenges of poverty.

So, joint ventures are regarded as an important catalyst. Although are they not based on any proven model, the joint venture between the two established institutions with different backgrounds and missions of which made remarkable strides in building an effective and well co-ordinated extension service in areas such as KwaZulu-Natal’s impoverished rural areas (ibid.). In spite of the fact that no such private-public partnership model existed before, the joint venture went on to win international acclaim in later years. In a topical independent evaluation, the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Programme (FAO) highlighted the "great strides" that the joint venture had taken in "meeting the objective of delivering effective extension services to the small-scale rural farmers over a relatively short space of time" (Makaringe, 2003).

In addition, public funding has not kept pace with the growth in spending.
Subsequently, much of the increase has been financed from private sources (out-of-pocket payments and private insurance), while the share funded publicly (by tax revenue and national insurance) declined by 6 percent between 1977 and 1997 (ibid.). Therefore, constraints on public funding, combined with rising costs, have forced other public institutions such as hospitals to cut costs wherever possible while still endeavoring to guarantee universal (and often free) access to public patients (ibid.).

**Background**

In order to have a clear understanding of the impact of intervention strategy such as private-public partnership towards redressing the past injustices e, it will be significant to briefly look at some key historical development parameters that led to the adoption of such policy in the post apartheid era. So, the struggle against full proletarisation of the indigenes gave some strength through balance of family responsibilities and generation of income via informal trade (Edward, 1996:103).

In the apartheid era, in South Africa’s welfare policies were targeted at entrenching advantageous socio-economic privileges for the white community in line with the operating political doctrine of apartheid that sought to differentiate races on various criteria (ibid.). The operating procedures of the welfare policy were also fragmented along racial and ethnic lines, with relevant welfare departments meeting the needs of each race or ethnic group (Department of Social Welfare, 1997).
Consequently, basic services were distributed unevenly along the racial lines, inappropriate, inaccessible, and discriminatory to the vast majority of South Africans. Although apartheid regime was abolished in 1994 which came along the paradigm shift in the welfare a way that is seen as equal and just. However there are still serious transformative challenges still facing the welfare sector such as moving various beneficiaries (previously advantaged and disadvantaged grouping) from dependency to empowerment as well as institutional incapacities. Although government has adopted various efforts to improve the welfare system especially to the previously economically excluded people, but the major challenge of non accessibility to welfare net by many people remains as a stumbling block (Noyoo, 2006:11).

In order to have a clear understanding of the contemporary social change in the ‘new’ South Africa that seems to be reflecting major changes amongst urban African but still concerned with elite formation than redressing daily challenges of the informal settlement communities of which remain as a concern(Edward,1996:105). Perhaps, in this regard it will be significant to revisit what Bourquin\(^1\) said in 1959 on the status of African in relation to poverty as he emphasis that:

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\(^1\) Mr Sighart (S.B.) Bourquin was a Director of Bantu Administration and controlled the forced removals of Africans in the 1950s in what came to be known as Durban by western colonialist settlers after it was called Shumbamusha during the reign of King Mutota of Ngoni nation under the auspices of Monomotapa Empire (1425 AD), and later it was named eThekwini by King Shandu of the amaThuli (Fuze, 1922:170; Jackson, A. 2006. Cato Manor. - http://www.fad.co.za/Resources/Cato/cato.htm).
The poverty of urban Bantu; the discrepancy between his earning capacity and his cost of living; his ability to meet the demands of modern times in a city modelled on the Western way of life; his inability even to meet the barest necessity of life, to feed, clothe, educate and house himself and his family”(ibid.).

Furthermore, Edward (1996) argues that informal settlements are not just composed of urban marginal’s with an anarchic social structure but it is structured in a specific and much gendered ways. In addition, informal settlements are not just urban left wing militants but they are active especially during the time of immediate settlement and when confronted with threats to their existence. Therefore, it vital to note that power lies in the hands of those predominately made, who control residential resources that bind informal dwellers to the outside world especially the state through agencies such as for repression and violence ultimately demolition of clientilism and patronage (ibid, p.107).

Since, this study focuses on the scrutiny of contemporary development policy that is applied in the informal settlement; it will be significant to briefly look at related organisations in the apartheid era. Therefore, the Cato Manor Welfare and Development Board (CMWDB) in the 1950s responded to some of the community challenges by represent residents in discussion with municipality through their self elected leadership (Edward, 1996:108). Although they were accused of looking for their own economic interests and failing to bring about real development in the informal settlement area, but the informal settlement traders and informal settlement leaders viewed themselves as natural leaders of the community (ibid.).
Subsequently, the board was determined that the municipality would assent to their demand for provision of improved urban facilities such as: roads, schools, crèche, clinic, electricity and water and permanent residences (Edward, 1996:110). Since, the modern social setting failed to meet the highly acclaimed promise of making things to be better by selling of labour power. So, this raised a contention of trading and challenge of failure of people to return to the undeveloped rural location and the demand to reside on land that can be held under a freehold tenure and as well as the right to trade in the informal settlement with a view of attempting to achieve what they viewed as the way in which:

“Natives who are unable to support families – widows, old age and those in ill health but who have a little capital will be allowed to invest in a form which gives them relatively high returns and which prevents them from becoming a burden on the community as a whole” (ibid.).

However, Edward(1996) argued that this approach tended to viewed as the “smokescreen approach” that is common in the informal settlement development in other parts of Africa, as the original ideal of individual informal settlement ownership quickly becomes lost in a confusing array between the shack lord and a renter arrangement. Due to the fact they tend to focus more on securing their position and shack lord continuously affirm radical politics or some politics and assure municipality of their loyalty (ibid.). In addition, it’s worth highlighting that normally shack lords are clients looking for state support in exchange of securing political peace.
However, paternalism, a determinedly intervention state and urban capitalism are a persuasive jumble although apartheid regime sought legitimation amongst South Africa urban masses. Edward (1996) view argues that the state sought to make alliances, by isolating and co-opt some factions of leadership as a strategy to control hostile social mass. This confirmed by the fact that the 1950s housing policy shows that the apartheid state had a desire to gain legitimacy from urban African masses (ibid. p.114).

In arguing further, Evans highlights that the overtly oppressive profile of the South African state, potentially obscures a development that was geared for the expansion of administrative law in African affairs after 1948. So, the transition to apartheid was exacerbated by the routinisation of oppression through “native policy” into distinctly administrative concerns. It will be significant to look at the origins of the policy that relates to the administrative regulations issued accordance with the Urban Areas Act in 1924 that was implemented in 1948.

Consequently, according to Evans (1987) this tended to prepare the emergence of what is defined as *le droit administratif* that affected intrastate relations in two significant ways: 1) Administrative regulations that were acted on much more frequently than during segregation era; and 2) Regulations that were accompanied by restrictions specifically prevented the courts from intervening with jury that was willing to apply apartheid laws as liberally as possible. In addition, changes fashioned in the wake of these modifications were sometimes important in obscuring from public view the
extent of invasion into the liberties of Africans and subordinating local to the dictates of the central state (Evans, 1987).

To this effect administration regulations tended to provide much greater scope for the department to fashion policies on the basis of experimentations that enabled officials to champion development along those parameters (Evans, 1987). So, it’s significant to understand the bases in which development and service delivery in the areas identified as for the utilisation by black majority, the policy such as the notorious Durban systems is amongst such policies that significant in this regard. It’s the administration policy in which the indigenous were administered and also became a model for ruling class domination and exploitation of African people especially in urban centres throughout Southern Africa (ibid.). In addition, this policy was used to excel the Stallardist doctrine\(^2\) of which was achieved through various forms of urban control mechanisms that were also applied in the areas as far afield as Uganda and Sudan (La Hausse, 1984: 33). In addition, this doctrine helped in the constant attempt to keep social costs of African people low together with entrenchment through establishment of the repressive conditions under which the resistance of African population against the forced reduction in living conditions standards could be contained (ibid., p. 34).

Therefore, various strategies were adopted by the illegitimate settler colonialist regime as an attempt to entrench the segregation policy through marginalisation and manipulation of pre-industrial cultural institutions in

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\(^2\) The policy that enforced racial segregation through the control of movement of indigenes in the areas designated for administering white colonialist needs.
order to institute a cultural monopoly (La Hausse, 1984). Thus, it’s vital to understand what does term ‘culture’ entails especially when trying gain more understanding of the basis in which South African government social development policies and some of the interventions especially those that relate to service delivery in the pre and post 1994 eras. So, a term such as ‘culture’ tends to provide subjugated populace some form of advantage such as the means of survival in the organisation of their daily livelihoods (ibid.). In addition, La Hausse (1984) highlights that Genovese noted that the manner people cooks their food and the kinds of food they cook, it reveal a good deal about its spirit.

However, Raymond Williams defined culture as the study of relationships between elements in a whole way of life (La Hausse, 1984). In arguing further, La Hausse (1984) highlighted that the extent of the definition of culture tends to provide a significant response to those who use the term in particular to refer on issues that viewed as fictitious, artistic products and too broad for analytical purposes. So, this term “culture” is more useful when understood as the means whereby social groups deal with their lived experience of the surrounding social conditions of existence to produce an expression and representation of these conditions in a variety of attitude, values, symbols and practices (ibid., p. 36).

Furthermore, in any society especially in the dominant classes which rule colonised groups attempt to achieve what Gramsci defined as the ‘hegemony’ which refers to the process whereby one concept of reality is diffused throughout society over all social classes (ibid.). In addition, it also refers to the monopoly of the dominant class through their involvement in
facilitation of ‘spontaneous’ consent of subjugated populace and that combined with measures that foster forms of consciousness which accept a position of subjugation. Furthermore, hegemony refers to the way in which the subjugated populace assimilate the dominant ideology as ‘common sense’.

Therefore, in the contemporary capitalist society, there is also ambiguous correspondence between the diffusion of hegemony throughout society and the way in which the dominant culture is assimilated as ‘common sense’ by subjugated populace. Thus, the subjugated populace tend to view hegemony with its highly complex internal structures which have to be continually reviewed, recreated and defended instead of viewing it, as the terrain to launch their cultural revolution (ibid.). In addition, this also add to the contradictions that emanate between popular conception of the world and the dominant culture that advocate the ideals borrowed from dominant class ideologies and those spontaneously generated through the experience of subjugated populace sharing their material conditions of survival in these popular conceptions themselves. Thus, issues such as the ideas, symbols, practices and attitudes that express the oppressive material conditions are inclined to offer means whereby subjugated populace deal with these conditions (ibid.).

According to La Hause (1984), this also raises a concern about reliability of the notion such as the popular culture especially when it comes to the total emancipation of the land dispossessed African majority in South Africa. So, this concept is characterised by acquiescence that can also assume a potentially oppositional character that often instil the dependency syndrome
on conscious leadership and organisation at a particular time (ibid.). In addition, since the dominant groups have an indistinct stake in this philosophy of popular culture that is used as the basis of a critical focus of struggle between the dominant group and subjugated populace. This is emphasised by Johnson when highlights that:

“Working class culture is the form in which labour reproduced . . . reproduction. . . is always a contested transformation, working class culture is formed in the struggle between capital’s demand for particular forms of labour power and the search for secure location within this relation of dependency” (La Hausse, 1984: 36).

Furthermore, it's worth highlighting that in the genesis of capitalism, it creates conditions of its existence that are lived and experienced along segregational lines and thus the possibilities for the emergence and prevailing of the ‘class culture’ (La Hausse, 1984). Since capitalism has a stake in the culture of the popular classes it secures that through a constitution of a new social order that evolve around capitals that require a more or less continuous ‘process of re-education’ (ibid.).

Thus, the transformation of ‘traditional’ ways of life is the core of this process. Inevitably, the popular culture is neither in a “pure” sense the popular traditions of resistance to these processes nor is it the forms which are superimposed on and over them. However, this argument remains as a contested terrain in which transformation emerges (La Hausse, 1984: 37). So, with this background that enables us to have a better understanding of the contemporary intervention approaches that are implemented at this juncture in South Africa (ibid.). In addition, it is argued that the way poverty
is tackled in post-apartheid South Africa should be informed by the way it is measured. Accordingly, various views suggest that this will contribute towards reaching a rigorous distinction between the conceptualisation of definition and measurement of poverty in the country. In addition, strategies against poverty would be informed by a theoretical position and despite the role of CSOs in poverty reduction of which is still disputed after a decade into democracy (ibid.).

Perhaps, it will be significant to revisit the notion of democracy as most popular political fronts tend to be striving for the entrenchment of the supreme values and will of mankind over Creator (Manzo, 1991). Democratisation process entails the institutionalization of the regime that means primarily to the ordered structure of access to power and rules to form and operate government, in other words, government mediate the relationship between the state and regime. Thus, in reality, is to give two abstract political dimensions concrete form and life and democratic regime is established. In order for this process to be complete, the state must possess power capability to employ guidelines in the form of policies (Malloy, 1991:39).

Furthermore, according to this approach to development tend to suggests that it is also imperative to recognise that government alone cannot fight poverty but it should lead and stimulate other organs of society such as the civil society’s efforts. Nevertheless, various actors in civil society on the other hand should also not expect the government to inspire them into action. It has been pointed out that many organs in civil society face enormous challenges, when it comes to their failure to respond to the
challenges of poverty of which is accompanied the lack internal capacity (ibid.). Kotze (2003) refers to this incapacity as the catalyst towards inability by most CSOs to move from discourse to action. In addition, the post-1994 era I viewed as the crisis years as far as civil society activities are concerned.

According to Noyoo (2006) argues that many such organisations highlighted various reasons for their inability to achieve their political and intellectual initiatives/edge to the bureaucratic demands of donors and government driven “development” agendas. Furthermore, NGO staff participated in many workshops and meetings, both amongst themselves and with government and donors. In addition, it is argued that the discourse rapidly changed along with the radical shift in economic priorities and policies of which entrenched face saving broadly approach that casted a familiar terminology of “development” and poverty alleviation that is subtle in nature (ibid, p.11).

However, many commentators have highlighted the manner civil society has been grouping behind the scene in the post-apartheid. South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) contended that one area that contributed to this problem was related to the theoretical grounding of civil society in this era of which does not mean civil society formations has been passive (ibid.). Nevertheless, they have been instrumental in various significant initiatives such as the “speak out against poverty” campaign that was championed by the SANGOCO (ibid.).
Theoretical framework

So, in order to have a clear understanding of interventions that get adopted by the government as the means of redressing the past injustices and as well as dealing with poverty especially amongst the marginalised populace, it will vital to scrutinise concepts such as livelihood. Therefore, it will be significant to note that the concept of livelihoods has been accepted in various scholastic circles as the valuable means of understanding factors that influence people’s lives and their well-being, especially those of the vulnerable strata in the developing world (Duphey, 2012). When we look at some of the definitions in this regard, UNDP(2010) refers to the definition of Chamber and Conroy (1991) that argues that a livelihood is composed of issues such as the competence, assets that include both material and social resources and as well as activities that a necessity for achieving a living.

In addition, it argues that a livelihood is sustainable when it can survive the challenges encountered and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or advance its competence and assets at present and in the future at the same time respecting the natural resources foundation. Furthermore, DFID (2007) argues that the livelihood strategies are useful especially when attempting to achieve livelihood effects that advance in interaction with a context of vulnerability and transforming institutions.
Figure 1: Theoretical framework

Therefore, according to the above illustration, DFID (2007) distinguish between three groups of components in the livelihood framework: (1) the asset portfolio shape the central part of livelihood, (2) the vulnerability context and policy, institutions and processes, and (3) the sphere that links livelihood strategies and livelihood outcome.

However, the vulnerability context of livelihoods focuses on the shocks, trends and seasonality with their prospective impact on people's livelihoods, whilst policies, institutions and processes on the other side are composed of the context of the political and institutional factors and forces in government and the private and the civil sectors that affect livelihoods (ibid.).

Furthermore, DFID emphasizes that descriptive nature of framework is to provide a structure and focus for thinking and as well as adjusting the
framework flexibly to the necessities of the real situation under analysis and underlines the need to respect and follow the guiding principles in application. Nevertheless, it is argued that poverty oriented development should be people-centred, flexible, responsive and participatory (ibid.). However, they should be seen as a multi-level intervention and be conducted in partnership with both the public and private sectors. Furthermore, they should strive to reach equilibrium between major scopes of sustainability and recognise the vibrant nature of livelihood strategies (ibid.).

Profile of area(s) under study

Inanda is the oldest area, having been established in the mid-19th century as a reserve for African labour and in 1936 it was declared an 'African' area. Due to forced removals and the implementation of influx control in other parts of Durban increased the population of Inanda during the apartheid era. Political violence of the 1980s of which was characterized by warlords and by various conflicts over control of the area. The poverty alleviation and urban investments aspects of the Urban Renewal Programme (URP) may be relatively easy to measure in terms of its impact on the economic conditions in the nodes over time; however, realities of the relationship between changes in economic conditions and levels of inequality and safety will be some of the key tests of the overall urban renewal model (Rauch, 2007).

So, in order for us to assess the viability of the already mentioned development programme, it will be vital to look at its impact in one of the previously and still disadvantaged community based in Bhambayi informal
Bhambayi settlement which lies in the North Central Substructure of eThekwini Municipality. This area is regarded as the poorest community based at Inanda area that is situated on the north bound of about twenty five Km from Durban city centre. Bhambayi comprises of three distinct areas, namely: the Phoenix Settlement Trust Area, the New Farm area of private land holdings and a portion of the Phoenix Buffer Strip owned by the Durban Metropolitan Council (Mathabela, 1999:47). It’s worth highlighting that this area in the early twentieth century was amongst the areas that when once regarded as outside of Durban Municipality parameters, as it formed part of the areas that were seen as available space for African people “in pursuing material ends” (Maylam, 1983:4). It is situated between Phoenix settlement and New Farm. This settlement is located along Main Road 93. This settlement is surrounded by KwaMashu, Ntuzuma townships and Shembe's Village. It is also situated near the economic activities of the Phoenix industrial area (see figure 1) (Mathabela, 1999).
Figure 2: Area under study locality plan

Source: Mathabela (1999)

Furthermore, historically this land was amongst areas that were forcefully taken away from African by the white colonisers under the tutelage of Mr Marshal and later sold to Indian merchants and a lawyer (ibid, p.9). It’s also worth highlighting that municipality took advantage of legislation (i.e. the
1913 Land Act and the 1923 Urban Areas Act) that limited access of Africans in the urban areas, as it adopted a benevolent paternalist approach in diffusing African popular discontent (ibid, p.17).

However, during 1980 to 1990 this area experienced a political violence that left a high score of people lost their lives, relatives, friends, property and the likes. It’s also significant to highlight that this area was amongst that were used by different social African indigenous Ngoni groups such as Zulu, AmaXhosa, Sotho and as well migrant workers from areas such as Malawi, Botswana, Zimbabwe and other parts of the southern region of the continent of Africa. So, Mthembu (2011) argues that the composition of various social groupings in the area was later exploited by the colonisers to institute violent agenda in the form of black-on-black violence in order to entrench its hegemony.

Nevertheless, in the post apartheid era this area is still vibrant with various activities especially those that relates to redressing the past injustices when it comes to unequal access to basic services from different stakeholders especially those emanates from the community structures. In order to effect such programmes, community collectively form their organisations that will take such mammoth task, so Bhambayi community also followed the same pattern of social development, as they formed the Reconstruction and Development Committee (BRDC).

According to BRDC, this area consists of more than 10000 households (Simpson & Raniga, 2010:150). The area serves as the melting pot of various ethical groupings of South Africa and neighbouring countries such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe that converge in the area due to in
migration. The area in highly affected by the high rate of unemployment, overcrowding, no proper sanitation system and high HIV/AIDS infection rate (ibid.).

**Research methodology**

In this study a descriptive approach was adopted in collection of data at Bhambayi area with a view to ascertain new conditions that describe the status of the community. So, between February and March 2009, the local structure and various school representatives participated in-depth and focus group interviews that were conducted to ascertain the present status of the community in relation to development of the area.

A study that is conducted within the descriptive context is significant especially when attempting to provide knowledge about which populations or subgroups that are most or least affected by a situation. This approach also help in identifying descriptive characteristics which frequently constitutes an important first step in the search for determinants or risk factors that can be altered or eliminated to reduce or prevent a situation (Simpson, 2007). Additionally, a case series are collections of individual case reports which may occur within a fairly short period of time and aggregated into one publication.

Interviewing participants in their respective environment help in observation of their concerns such as challenges in meeting in speeding up service delivery to their community. This observation helped in gaining more understanding of the participants’ experiences in this regard. Normally, interviews take about one and half hour and two hours to discuss their
various inputs towards the development in the community (ibid.). This type of approach is referred to as “grand tour”, as it help in obtaining broader information regarding the involvement of the participants in their development (ibid. p.66).

Reviewed literature

For one to have a better understanding of the rationale behind the adoption of private-public partnership strategy as part of meeting some of the challenges that affected mostly previously disadvantaged black majority in the country. It will be vital to start by looking at some of the key terms and debated that relate to this strategy geared towards addressing some of the injustices of the apartheid era.

Therefore, ‘partnership’ is defined as a voluntary agreement between stakeholders (international organisations, governments, businesses, NGOs, research institutes) who work towards a common goal and therefore share the risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits (Capacity, 2007:2). However, there is much of rhetoric when it comes to issue of partnerships. For example, in the development context, the term is often used as a synonym for the wish to maintain equitable relationships between donors and recipients, concealing the very real power differences between them (ibid.). Partnerships can lead to more effective and efficient use of financial resources that may otherwise be spread over different organisations with little coordination and a minimal effect. At the local level, such organisations include local governments, deconcentrated line
ministries, NGOs, faith based organisations and grassroots self-help groups (Ubels and Greijn, 2007).

Though public service delivery is commonly understood to mean the provision of public goods or social (education, health), economic (grants) or infrastructural (water, electricity) services to those who need (or demand) them (ibid.). In South Africa, given apartheid, the provision of services by government is linked to the larger task of redistribution, social justice, poverty alleviation and economic growth. In this way, the delivery process is strongly associated with development and the notion of the developmental state is associated with the capacity to provide social justice (Mc Lennan, 2008).

Since delivery is associated with redistribution, the stakes of non-delivery are politically high. Most state-driven delivery processes, while apparently technical or managerial, are political, as they define a power relationship between the state, its citizens and the economy. They are essentially about who gets what, when, in what ways and for what reasons. In South Africa, defining access denied by apartheid is central to this process, given that apartheid was explicitly about limiting public services and economic opportunities to a select group (Mc Lennan, 2008: 4). In South Africa where service delivery is so highly politicised because it represents some of the contradictions of the transition from apartheid to democracy in a global context.

To this effect Manzo (1991) argues that this can be clearly illustrated by the fact that in the early 1990s, community scholars concluded that
development in the developing countries bear a resemblance to 1960s. The era of the sixties began with a pervasive sense of optimism as it was presented as a new and modernizing nation such as Asia, Africa and Latin America, as the process of enlightenment and democratization as the inevitable way but produced increasingly to disillusionment and lack of theoretical direction. Therefore, experiences in the developing countries raise a need to reevaluate the concept and theories that relates to the existing “modernization” parameters (ibid, p.4). Manzo (1991) argues that during the 1960s scholars viewed developing countries as focused less on their “traditional attitudes” and they were more injudicious mixing of political participation with institutional weakness. In addition, political participation continued as a complimentary objective and more emphasis on the liberal “modernization” on western form of democracy as the final point of development.

Consequently, such experience also encouraged the need for more fundamental challenges to the whole paradigm of developmentalism. However, despite the submission of alternative by estranged scholars through their Marxist approach in literature that came to be referred to as the dependency school that also failed to achieve the same level of theoretical and political unity of earlier developmentalists (Manzo, 1991). Nevertheless, the empiricist social scientist influence towards the “measure” of the concept of dependence. In addition, the popularity of dependency was accompanied by its adherents to offer a clear explanation regarding the social conditions and proposition to solve them became degenerated. Nonetheless, the theoretical dissatisfaction
revealed itself in two ways: through linkage of Weberian style of rapid industrialization to the “entrepreneurial spirit” and its dissatisfaction with its increasing pervasiveness (ibid, p.5).

Therefore, the era of Christendom pave the way to a new epoch that is identified by the success of the secular nation-state over the universal Church and a “modern” way of thinking and being (Manzo, 1991:6). Social theorists argue that it is the major influence on modern attitudes toward Creator\(^3\), man, nature and authority (ibid.). So, various events influenced development in the medieval Europe such as the Reformation that rebuffed the traditional role of the Church as the mediator between man and Creator.

Whilst the Enlightenment challenged ecclesiastical authority via the instruments of reason and scientific rationality of which was championed by Francis Bacon who dichotomized facts and values, mind and matter and a secular and spiritual. This exacerbated the fact that text upon which Divine Providence was written, then world became an uncompleted unit that need to be perfected and placed at the service of humanity (ibid.).

However, at the end of the eighteenth century, the modern discourse produced a character of a reasoning man who can achieve total knowledge, total autonomy, and a total power through the usage of reason that would enable him to himself not Creator, as the source of

\(^3\) Also referred to as Jehovah/God.
language, the maker of history, and the origin of meaning in the universe (Manzo, 1991). Hence, the expansion of scientific knowledge of which was viewed as correct reasoning possible and to enable movement along the path of political enlightenment and progress. In other words it is an attempt for man to replace Creator as sovereign being in the universe.

In addition, the liberalist in their modernist approach viewed that privileged individual has the ultimate site of sovereignty, but the state, the community, the class, creed, or people have also been summoned as the providers of such site. In each instance, reasoning man is assimilated into a larger agency through a social contract between reasoning man and the state which itself becomes an invariable presence, an originary voice, a foundational source of truth and meaning (ibid, p.7). Thus, the manifestation of modernist procedure that Derrida (1978) preferred to term it as logocentrism. Manzo argues that this term illustrate nature of d hierarchy when encountering familiar and uncritically accepted dichotomies between West and East, North and South, modern and traditional, core and periphery, rational and emotional, and male and female.

Furthermore, the distinguish factors is the recollection for origins, for the basis of source of truth and meaning that is pure, innocent, natural and normal and for a position and standard that supposedly independent of interpretation and political practice. However, the term in such oppositional sphere is envisaged as higher reality, belonging to the realm of logos or pure and invariable presence that does not need any
explanation (ibid.). In addition, this term is also defined as solely in relation to the first, the sovereign subject, as an inferior or derived type. It can be simply put it as the demand for the East to become more like the West and the South to be like the North, the traditional to be like the modern.

Manzo (1991) argues that it is significant to note that Derrida highlighted that irrespective whether the radically anti-ethnocentric discourse may reveal logocentrism rationale. For example, though Claude Levi-Straus disputed the distinction between historical societies and societies without history – the culture/nature of which composed what is termed as “Native people” as a model of original and natural goodness, of pure innocence of which got disturbed by the invasion of the West.

Furthermore, the conception of logocentrism is significant for two reasons: it illustrate that the most radically critically discourse easily get succumbed into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulation of precisely what is contending. The pervasiveness of logocentrism thinking in the field of development studies explain the rationale behind the subversive counter-discourse are not considered seriously, as it argues that any rejection of the logic of autonomy and growth as the developmental goal is viewed as privileging their opposition, dependency and stagnation and seen as “crazy” (ibid, p.9).

Therefore, “post-modern” social theory view modernity on a lower note as the era with a clear beginning or end and more as the paradigm or
set of attitudes which from its origins has had to strive from within against attitudes of counter-modernity. In addition, it is within this context of these broad theoretical critiques of modernist discourse, that dependency’s challenge to the developmentalism at least it can be seen as the partly counter-modernist (ibid.).
CHAPTER TWO:

Approach towards redressing past colonial injustice
Government approach and strategies towards development

The post-independence Africa introduced large scale development programmes to establish new democracies and generate economic (Muthahaba, Baguma & Halfani, 1993). These programmes, like Roosevelt’s New Deal, were administered through large bureaucratic systems which provided jobs, but also universal access to all franchised citizens. Democratic South Africa was no different from other newly independent states in asserting the promise of services for all as a commitment to future development and a means of improving the legitimacy of the new government (ANC, 1994).

The first strategy of the newly elected government post 1994 was building a new society (ANC, 1994). With the principles and policies of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in mind, almost every aspect of public and social service delivery was subjected to review and revision (Mc Lennan, 2008:7). So, service delivery was expanded and improved by rebuilding and reorienting the established apartheid bureaucracy to facilitate an expansion in the delivery of services. The attempt to improve education (and other social services) delivery combined two strategies. The first focused on expanded access and was addressed through a strategic political policy process in which the broader aims of a just education system were formally established in legislation and departmental policy at all levels of the new system.
On this level, all people were guaranteed equal access to and participation in basic education (‘free’ and compulsory) regardless of their race, age, gender or creed (Department of Education, 1995 & 1996a). In addition, the second strategy improved delivery process through institutional change. This involved the formation of one national and nine provincial education departments from the 21 apartheid education departments which cut across the new provincial boundaries. Systems were rationalised, personnel from old departments absorbed into new and assets and physical resources were transferred.

Prior to and following the 1999 elections, the government introduced new strategies to improve delivery drawn largely from the New Public Management (NPM) toolbox. These were phased in just as developed countries were beginning to deal with some of the negative consequences of this approach (Peters & Savoie, 1998). New Public Management globally represented a new delivery orthodoxy focused on limiting state expenditure while improving provision, following the global economic crisis in the late 1970s. There was a growing recognition that state-led development in its various forms had failed. New approaches were adopted to address the apparent failure of states to sustain welfare or expanded access (ibid.).

In addition, many of these strategies were premised on a general faith in markets and business or management leadership. In developed countries, this was evident in the rise of large scale public sector reform programmes (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993; Peters & Savoie, 1998). In many African countries it took the form of structural adjustment programmes - SAPs
(Mutahaba, Baguma & Halfani, 1993). The intention was to redirect governments away from a concept of universal service delivery, provided by bureaucratic forms of administration, to a concept of demand-driven delivery, facilitated by management.

Service delivery strategies drawn from business practice became more technical and performance oriented. Techniques include customer service orientation, decentralisation, letting managers manage, contracting out, privatisation, partnerships and resource management. Peters and Savoie (1998) noted that corporatist type structures, agencies or public managers, make decisions about delivery on the basis of politically neutral technical, professional or efficiency criteria (Mc Lennan, 2008). This approach is linked to attempts to “modernise” public administration practices to make delivery more efficient and effective. It is weighted towards economic and internal efficiency considerations, but also emphasises responsiveness to citizens. NPM redefines the state-society relationship in two ways. Firstly, essentially political decisions about the distribution of resources are recast as technical management decisions. Secondly, defining citizens as customers changes the nature of engagement from state provision to user-based market principles (ibid.).

However, Albo, Langille and Panatich (1993) argue that impoverished or marginalised communities have little leverage and find it difficult to negotiate access to government services (Mc Lennan, 2008:11). A shift away from the RDP to a combination of strategies aimed at building the economy rapidly, improving productivity, creating jobs, redistributing income and opportunities, providing social services and securing working
and living environments outlined in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Policy (GEAR) (Department of Finance, 1996). Delivery strategies reflected a growing emphasis on decentralisation, performance contracts and professionalism. They were linked, as part of GEAR, to attempts to minimise state expenditure and limit state administration (Mc Lennan, 2008).

Furthermore, the overall result of these changes was the decentralisation of organisational structuring and human resource practices to departments and provinces. This led to the widespread adoption of different practices to the organisation of work, the structuring of departments and the management of human resources (ibid.). In addition to providing the space for managers to manage their departments and for Executive Authorities to exercise a level of control over the implementation process, the changes were directed towards enhancing the level of responsiveness of the administration to policy changes and to the public in general.

Citizens are referred to as customers and clients and engaged with on these terms. An example is the Batho Pele (People First) programme that sought to introduce a new framework for delivery, which treated citizens as customers and enabled citizens to hold public servants accountable. In an attempt to further influence performance and service delivery, the DPSA reintroduced Batho Pele in a simpler and more accessible form in 2003. Nevertheless, one of the challenges confronting Batho Pele is that many managers continue to operate within a rule-based culture which disregards Batho Pele values (Levin, 2004). In addition, citizens continues to struggle to access services with the unintended consequence that perpetuates class
differences and patronage rather than citizenship are normally the defining routes to services (ibid, p.12).

Another strategy that has been considered by governments to meet service, is the shifting of financial obligations from general tax revenue to payroll-financed national health insurance, narrowing the basic package of services available to all citizens, linking hospital funding to outputs and efficiency, autonomy and incentives for management, governments have also turned to private-public partnership to bring private sector efficiency. Public funding has not kept pace with the i.e. - In Australia federal and state governments have introduced private participation in more than 50 hospitals through several different mechanisms (ibid.).

So, mechanisms such as build-own-leaseback arrangements in which a transactions where private firm builds, owns, and operates a public hospital, conversions in which a hospital is sold to a private operator as a going concern, transactions that involves private management of a public hospital (in which government continues to own, within or beside a public hospital). However, these initiatives were driven by a need for new capital, a professed need to transfer operational risk, and a desire to increase efficiency (Taylor & Blair, 2002:2). Nonetheless, governments in many countries are failing to provide adequate public services, especially for poor communities. Although, some may recognise the significance of non-state providers to fill the gaps, and the need to work in partnership in order to improve services, but the debate would be how far governments create a supportive environment in which partnerships can succeed (Batley, 2007).
Subsequently, concessions, where the government maintains the ownership of assets, of which has remained the most common feature of private participation in sector such as airport infrastructure in developing countries (Andrew & Dochia, 2006). For example, they accounted for more than 40 percent of airport contracts and 60 percent of investment commitments in 1990–2005. In addition, towards development in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, the concession model is increasingly used in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and in South Asia. Furthermore, the transactions in Hungary and Turkey in 2005 and in India in 2006 all used this model (ibid, p.3).
Table 1: Options for public partnership in health sector - hospitals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Private sector responsibility</th>
<th>Public sector responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colocation of private wing within</td>
<td>Operates private wing (for private patients). May provide only accommodation services or clinical</td>
<td>Manages public hospital for public patients and contracts with private wing for sharing joint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or beside public hospital</td>
<td>services as well.</td>
<td>costs, staff, and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outsourcing nonclinical support</td>
<td>Provides nonclinical services (cleaning, catering, laundry, security, building maintenance) and</td>
<td>Provides all clinical services (and staff) and hospital management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>services</td>
<td>employs staff for these services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outsourcing clinical support</td>
<td>Provides clinical support services such as radiology and laboratory services.</td>
<td>Manages hospital and provides clinical services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outsourcing specialized clinical</td>
<td>Provides specialized clinical services (such as lithotripsy) or routine procedures (cataract</td>
<td>Manages hospital and provides most clinical services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>services</td>
<td>removal).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private management of public</td>
<td>Manages public hospital under contract with government or public insurance fund and provides</td>
<td>Contracts with private firm for provision of public hospital services, pays private operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hospital</td>
<td>clinical and nonclinical services. May employ all staff. May also be responsible for new</td>
<td>for services provided, and monitors and regulates services and contract compliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>capital investment, depending on terms of contract.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private financing, construction,</td>
<td>Finances, constructs, and owns new public hospital and leases it back to government.</td>
<td>Manages hospital and makes phased lease payments to private developer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and leaseback of new public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private financing, construction,</td>
<td>Finances, constructs, and operates new public hospital and provides nonclinical or clinical</td>
<td>Reimburses operator annually for capital costs and recurrent costs for services provided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and operation of new public</td>
<td>services, or both.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of public hospital as going</td>
<td>Purchases facility and continues to operate it as public hospital under contract.</td>
<td>Pays operator for clinical services and monitors and regulates services and contract compliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concern</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of public hospital for</td>
<td>Purchases facility and converts it for alternative use, depending on sales agreement.</td>
<td>Monitors conversion to ensure adherence to contractual obligations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alternative use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Taylor and Blair (2002)

When looking at how these concessions can be made by the government, it’s worth highlighting that public-private partnerships can be presented in various forms that are identified individually with a different level of private sector liability and risk as illustrated in Table 1 above. So these variations are mostly critical as they tend to determine whether the private firm manages medical services, owns or leases the facility, employs the staff, and finances and manages capital investments (Taylor & Blair, 2002).
Therefore, a government’s decision on the relevant option will depend on the hospital’s needs and circumstances, the government’s capability to regulate and effectively control the quality standard of care, and as well as the public agreement on the need for reform (ibid.). Though many of these options have been established in infrastructure, hospital services of which have unique characteristics that enable policymakers a broader variety of options for private participation such as:

- Governments can conduct a private participation in a limited number of small hospitals without focusing on the whole network.

- Hospitals provide various clinical services that can be distributed for private provision. For example, governments can outsource complicated and costly clinical services at the same time leaving hospital management and standard clinical services under the public sector.

- Hospital functions include profit making and non-profit companies. Thus a large portion of non-profit companies were established on the basis of charitable mission though they operate run on commercial principles. In addition, governments frequently choose to contract with non-profit operators because they are more acceptable to the local community (ibid.).

So, this tends to highlight a cautious attention to policy design, regulatory issues, and management of concessions that continue to be vital in ensuring that private participation delivers efficient and effective relevant infrastructural services (Andrew & Dochia, 2006). For example, in the
The private sector has played a growing role in airport infrastructure over the past two decades, in countries such as the United Kingdom launched initiated the trend with the privatisation of BAA in 1987. Subsequently, Australia, Austria (Vienna), Denmark (Copenhagen), Germany (Frankfurt, Hamburg), Italy (Naples, Rome), and New Zealand followed (ibid.). So, the developing countries have also been active, for example in 1990–2005, 38 low- and middle-income countries entered into more than 100 airport contracts ranging from short-term management contracts to long-term build-operate-transfer (BOT) arrangements, concessions and divestitures (ibid.).

Furthermore, micro loans are provided for phone shops or other related retailers as part of rendering support to retail services extension as well as encouraging network utilization and existing operators that can set up schemes to help finance diverse retail activities (World Bank, 2005). However, the precondition is that the regulatory regime must not forbid reselling of services. So, the traditional approach of franchising a telephone line to private individuals or small businesses and to pay a certain percentage of commission to the franchisee (ibid.). In this way, operators can secure higher revenues than from a public phone as the private incentive tends to keep lines working well utilising small loans that may be granted to set up operation or to enhance services to include other services such as fax or Internet (ibid, p.24).
Community participation in the government structures

The notion of community participation has become a desirable strategy especially when it comes to effective service delivery especially in the developing countries such as South Africa (Mathabela, 1999). Since political change has been ushered in South Africa of which come along with demand for equitable development policies, as a result the new regime embraced the community participation approach in area such as Bhambayi (ibid.).

Another observable fact of community participation has widely been accepted as an equitable development policy (ibid, p.1). For instance, international agency such as World Bank also insists on community participation. Despite the widely acceptance of the community participation but its practical discrepancy on implementation remain arguable. Although, the objectives of the community participation has been regarded as the ideal for rendering service delivery in particular in marginalised communities but the international experience shows that there is some limitations on the implementation(ibid.).

Perhaps, it will be vital to explore different views on the notion of community participation. One view suggests that community participation subsist “on paper not in practice” especially when it comes to rendering service delivery on issues such as housing policy (Mathabela, 1999:3). In addition, it is also argued that this notion of community participation is advanced by the contemporary political dispensation in the country. Furthermore, another view argues that government does not hold up to the
principle of community participation strategy but is used as the means to gain support from broader society (ibid.). Lastly, since participation approach is not producing the aspired outcomes, so this raises concern of whether people in general have authority through participation or there is some unknown force somewhere that really demands community participation.

Therefore, the notion of ‘participatory governance’ is described as ‘a regulatory framework in which the task of running public affairs is not solely entrusted to government and the public administration, but involves co-operation between state institutions and civil society groups (Friedman, 2006). Similarly, when it comes to the ‘co-operative governance’ of which is almost the same idea of usage of different terminology that has been defined as ‘the interlocking of the state and societal groups in a mix of public-private policy networks in the formulation and implementation of public policy’. Both definitions envisage arrangements in which governments include organized citizens’ groups in making and implementing policy (ibid. p.4).

Therefore, governments recognize that their goals cannot be achieved without organized private constituencies whose acquiescence to or active support for government objectives is essential. In order to secure such co-operation, it engages the representatives of the relevant constituencies to partake in making policy and overseeing its implementation (Friedman, 2006; Mathabela, 1999:2). Conversely, the implicit or explicit expectation is that the organizations invited to participate will support decisions taken and they will bind their constituents to concordats reached. Generally, these
arrangements, often justified as vehicles for enhancing values such as ‘social partnership’ and co-operation in the common interest are pragmatic devices to prevent resistance by, and induce co-operation from, organized interest groups (ibid.).

However, this variety of participation is classically defined as corporatism⁴ or ‘concertation’ and a viable strategy especially in the tripartite government-labour-business setting (Friedman, 2006, Von Holdt, 1993). However, Von Holdt argues that this approach tend to exacerbate the co-optation of labour or community movement in acceptance of economic perspective of capital (Von Holdt, 1993:48). Nonetheless, participants are offered a role in governance in this model and are viewed as a platform as they are organized and have one. Additionally, they are, rather, offered an opportunity to express their demands directly to the government and other key interests in officially sanctioned conduit and in the manner that give them a guaranteed as the policy claim. The intent is not to broaden and deepen democracy but to ensure smoother government. The second rationale for participatory governance is that it broadens and deepens democracy by expanding the range of citizens engaged in making or influencing government decisions (Mathabela, 1999).

Furthermore, a stated or an implied rationale is that democracy is, in essence, an expression of popular sovereignty in which all members of the political community are entitled to an equal say in public affairs (Friedman, 2006). However, casting a ballot is not a sufficient guarantor of participation

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⁴ Von Holdt defines corporatism as the institutional framework which incorporates the labour movement in the economic and social decision-making of society (1993:48).
because a ballot for a particular party cannot be automatically interpreted as support for any of its policy positions, thus the rationale behind the demand for democracies are required to maximize opportunities for participation between elections. Furthermore, participation is viewed as the means of giving voice, of hearing citizens who would otherwise be ignored (ibid, p.4).

Conversely, the neat division tends not to be hardly impermeable, as the two views are not mutually exclusive (Friedman, 2006). Accordingly some adherents of corporatism believe that it broadens decision making by bringing more parties to the policy-making table. In addition, many normative adherents of participatory governance also stress its utility as a development tool (though there is an important difference between corporatism’s concern to include organized groups in decisions in order that they can commit their constituency to them and the affirmation that people need to be heard so that their requirements will be known to planners and policy-makers, so by doing as such as they will be advancing the efficiency of policy) (ibid.). Thus participatory governance has been preferred on the basis that is viewed as the instrument for efficient public administration and as well as the prerequisite for resilient and sustainable development’ (ibid. p.5).

Therefore, one view has already suggested that phases of the domestic anti-apartheid struggle included demands for popular participation in decisions. However, this second view was more favourable to ensure that calls for popular participation had greater reverberation than they might have had if they had not been an important feature of the fight against
apartheid (Friedman, 2006). Nonetheless, this affected the design of South Africa’s experiment in ‘classic’ corporatism, such as NEDLAC, which includes constituencies which cannot be expected to conclude binding compromises but whose voices, presumed they need to be heard (ibid.).

Furthermore, it could be argued, that the South African approach is a prime example of the fallacy that is scrutinised in this juncture, as it has tendency to confuse the need to accommodate the organized populace who are capable of ‘delivering’ constituencies with the desire to deepen democracy (Friedman, 2006; Mathabela, 1999:3). Whilst the rhetoric and normative framework in which participation is practiced tends to place emphasises on ‘deepening democracy’ (ibid.). Thus the choice of participants and the expectations are placed on the processes of which suggest assumptions more appropriate to a corporatist mechanism. Furthermore, participatory governance mechanisms in South Africa will inevitably be restricted and favourable to organizations which are already articulating policy positions, rather than the less visible network of associations in low-income townships and informal settlements (ibid.p.6).

However, participatory mechanisms are frequently used to establish presumed willingness to comply with particular development choices as if those present had both the support and the extent of organization to commit citizens to agreed approaches (Friedman, 2006:6). For example, the South Africa’s participatory governance mechanisms have not offered citizens an effective voice in policy making. This can be illustrated by examining two case studies, local participatory governance and Community
Police Forums\textsuperscript{5} (CPFs), and then by analysing perhaps the most important weakness of these mechanisms, their failure to offer the poor a voice (ibid, p.8).

Although at the establishment of CPFs, the ethos which underpinned early efforts at participatory governance of which were the desire to turn away from the apartheid-era approach to policing that ignored human rights norms that were insulated from civilian examination (i.e. the staff of the national police ministry under apartheid was provided by the police organs) (Friedman, 2006:10). Therefore, this guaranteed anxiety for effective civilian oversight of policing and for ‘community policing’ that is defined as a strategy in which local communities develop to guarantee the rendering of humane and effective service (ibid.). So, this step was viewed as a strategy to ‘transform the security services into a transparent and accountable service.

In order to ensure such transformation legislation that ensures the establishment of such forums highlighted that each police station must be ‘broadly represented’ and to include the community which the station serves (Friedman, 2006). Furthermore, this legislation was passed as a strategy to guarantee communication between the security services (such as the police) and the community’ and as well as co-operation between the two social strata’s in fulfilling the needs of the community regarding policing. However, the two trends have tended to prevent CPFs from rendering their expected role in this regard (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{5} Community-police forums (CPFs) were mooted in 1993, before constitutional negotiations were concluded and established in 1995(Friedman, 2006).
Nevertheless, the first has been viewed as a progressive transformation from citizen watchdogs to police helpers (Friedman, 2006). Subsequently one view, suggests that CPFs were initially intended as lapse bodies of which began life as the means for building relations between the police and the community. In addition, in two years later they were altered by a departmental policy document into ‘problem solving “partnerships”’. Furthermore, one year later, a national government issued a White Paper directed towards co-operation with local government, community organisation against crime and other social crime prevention activities. Consequently in 2001, the national police ministry endorsed the integration of CPFs with the liaison structures of other government departments as part of ensuring community participation. Nonetheless, this tends to illustrate a clear progression from citizen voice to police support group, for example, CPFs in the Western Cape Province tended to provide provincial government with people to perform security work in exchange for earnings (ibid.).

Nevertheless, this tend to represent of what was not citizens were hoping for, as the study of attitudes towards CPFs published in 2002 found that, some of the minority of citizens who were aware of their functions and also the majority group that believed that their purpose was to ‘ensure that police know community needs’(Friedman, 2006). In addition, the study also revealed that none of the people who served on CPFs ‘mentioned representing community needs to the police as one of their main activities’. In addition, very few CPF participants indicated that ‘they played a role in determining local priorities to the police’. Furthermore, they were, engaged
in various activities such as the ‘crime prevention projects, community awareness campaigns and as well as assisting to resource the police.

Therefore, CPFs tended to be too preoccupied with assisting police to enable citizen participation. So, the second trend has been the limited effects of CPFs to act as representatives of citizens (Friedman, 2006). Thus the data from the same study revealed that irresistible evidence that the forums ‘cannot be viewed as representative of the communities in which they function’. In addition, it summed up that they had ‘not been effective in realizing the core goals of the community policing policy’ (ibid, p.11). Furthermore, they had not ensured ‘wide-ranging input on community needs and priorities, improving police responsiveness to community needs and developing a joint responsibility and capacity for addressing crime’ (ibid.).

Perhaps, in order to have a better position to understand the dynamics of private-public partnership strategy, it will be significant look at the definition of participatory governance. So, Friedman, (2006) argues that participatory governance tended to focuses on a controlled system by the government that include participation of various community stakeholders in public administration in cooperation with state institutions and other civil society organisations. However, “co-operative governance’ tends to vary on terminology that has been described as ‘the interlocking of the state and societal groups in a mix of public-private policy networks in the formulation and implementation of public policy’ (ibid.). However, both definitions foresee arrangements in which governments include organized citizens’ groups in making and implementing policy (ibid, p.4).
Furthermore, participatory governance’s rationale is either to bind organized constituencies to agreed policy outcomes or to offer voice to the voiceless. Neither effective governance nor enhanced voices are served by the conflation (Mathabela, 1999:4). When we look at the South African approach, post-apartheid formulations have tended to stress the second rationale for participatory governance mechanisms – extending voice (Friedman, 2006:6).

Furthermore, other view has already been implied that the later stages of the domestic anti-apartheid struggle included demands for popular participation in decisions (Friedman, 2006). However, this context in which these were raised left some vagueness as to whether the demand was a call for an end to the white monopoly of decision-making or whether it also sought popular participation (ibid.). Nevertheless the second view was significant to ensure that calls for popular participation had greater resonance than they might have had if they had not been an important feature of the fight against apartheid (ibid.). In addition, a study of youth policy found that grassroots youth groups did not participate in the National Youth Development Forum in the 1990s because they did not believe it was available to groups like them (ibid. p.6).

Since the democratic government has adopted an incremental approach in provision of service delivery on issues such as housing that is based centred on the community participation. Though incremental approach is viewed as aspired approach towards assurance of service delivery but both community and incremental approach are at peril of various factors
(Mathabela, 1999:4). So, this raises a concern whether community acknowledges the incremental approach or they like to partake in the project or not. Despite some agreement on the significance of community participation but there is no clear required level of community participation. Thus, community inclusiveness is ultimately achieved through various means. Then a major concern becomes the exclusion of the beneficiary populace in decision making, especially when it comes to the devising of approach that is in line with community participation in bringing about service delivery (ibid.).

However, developers and communities tend to depart from different positions; for instance, normally developers tend to illustrate approach to be followed in meeting needs of that particular community (Mathabela, 1999). Subsequently, this approach tends to exclude members of the community who cannot present their aspiration. Then the concern of who really partake in a particular community, as some members of the community become “passive” partakers instead of being active partakers in the own development. In addition, there is also a limit in this approach, as it is normally shortcoming when it comes to consultation with committee that is genuinely representative of the community, as some members of the community are not represented, though they are the beneficiary of the development in their area. In other words some community members become beneficiary of a particular development without their approval (ibid, p.5).

Furthermore, to this concern is the division of community based on stratified social structures that characterised by rich that highly privileged
citizens within a community who participate significantly in the creation and instituting of development programme. So, it is significant to highlight the politicisation of development programmes in the informal settlement especially in South Africa, as normally politicians from the dominant political parties a particular area tend to influence the improvement of development and in return the majority of unaffiliated populace are left aside. Consequently, the some members of the community become marginalised or excluded, as they are not affiliates of the dominant political parties. Thus, Skinner (1983) argues “that public symbols, such as teachers who know better about their communities are normally selected for partaking in the development programmes, thus discrimination against other community members becomes a reality.

Therefore, it is argued that community participation in service delivery with incremental approach becomes a game of the selected few members of the community. In addition, this tends to contribute to partiality form of community participation and indirectly furthering widening inequality gap with a particular community and also decrease the power of the large segment of the community (Mathabela, 1999:6). Nevertheless, it’s worth highlighting that the goal of community participation can be accomplished when the whole community is actively participating in all proceedings of their development. Thus, the limits of vague standards of community participation negatively impacts on service delivery in general (ibid, p.6). So, Bhambayi experience will assist in shedding light on realities of community participation at a practical level.
In fulfillment of the governments’ *ubuntu* principle in bringing service delivery to the broader community, this has manifested itself in governments usage of *izimbizo*, an ‘open-ended community meetings in church halls and township meeting places in which the president or ministers listen to community concerns and engage with their interlocutors, explaining policies, promising interventions and assigning officials to effect follow-up’ (ibid.). Moreover, this is modeled on mechanisms used by traditional leaders to consult their constituencies of are frequently used by national and provincial governments. For example, outcomes of *izimbizo* have been utilised by the President in his State of the Nation address to Parliament and they are seen as a reliable means of testing public preferences. Nevertheless, whether they allow the unorganized to acquire a voice, though, it depends on the selection process which determines attendance that has no related empirical study in this regard. In case where participants are selected by a random method such as the advertisement of gatherings and admitting people on a ‘first come, first served’ basis of which also attempts to deepen democracy and as well as open to serious uncertainties, of which contribute to the establishment of popular support for any preference expressed at the gathering.

Nevertheless, officially participatory public policy formulation is the result of contest between opposing positions which is resolved either by a compromise between them or the ability of one view to gather majority support. In addition, there is no space for processes of this sort at *izimbizo* (Friedman, 2006). However, it can be viewed as the means (of understanding relevance) for assessing grassroots views and not mechanisms for participation.
Therefore, participatory mechanisms are normally utilised to establish presumed willingness to comply with particular development options as if those present had both the support and the degree of organization to bind citizens to agreed approaches (ibid.). Thus, during the 1990s, participation processes were viewed by development planners to have established the amount which local residents were willing to pay for water. Subsequently, after 1994 they were used to elicit approval for development projects. Whilst in school governing bodies was viewed as the vital formal governance functions that included the allocation of priorities despite the fact that at least one of their constituent parties, parents, are not organized (ibid, p.7).

The notion of civil society

So, the usage of the term “civil society” that has become ubiquitous in activist or academic spheres, and tended to have gained some popularity especially towards the end of the last century (Noyoo, 2006). Nevertheless, such views are not out of context if the profound and far-reaching transformations that transpired around the world, before the turn of the twenty-first century are considered (ibid.). In addition, most of these changes can be ascribed to civil society. Indeed, prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there had already been popular struggles in Latin America against military dictatorships in the 1960s and 1970s of which was boosted by civil society organs (ibid, p.12). Moreover, at same time, the rise of democratic organs in Africa, which led to the demise of tyrannical governments, went on to highlight the fact that there was really a
burgeoning civil society around the globe that could bring about fundamental transformations (ibid.).

Nevertheless, what is poignant in the present epoch is the centrality of civil society in the development debate and how it is perceived as an agent of change, or gatekeeper of democratic processes. Opening up of spaces that were hitherto restricted by overbearing and oppressive political systems for contestation has now become the hallmark of civil society. Khilnani (2001:17) warned against the restrictive position when it comes to civil society and also against its perceived novelty by stressing that “restrictions on historical perspectives have promoted confusion in contemporary understanding, which intuitively tended to define civil society in opposition to the state and to propose a zero-sum game between the two (Noyoo, 2006:13). Furthermore, there is a surfeit of definitions of the term civil society, of which emanate from various organs of knowledge, as well as spanning various disciplines and ideological traditions (ibid.).

Therefore, Noyoo (2006:13) prefers to define civil society as a value free exercise and dependent on one’s ideological orientation or philosophical leaning. Therefore, it is important to bear in mind that the way in which civil society is defined will ultimately influence its perceived utility and roles. Anheier (2004) highlighted that according to analysts like Helmut Anheier argues that albeit various definitions of civil society but it is the fact that there is a relative absence of systematic empirical analysis of what civil society really is and what are its forms. He argues that social scientists, policymakers and practitioners alike, have not yet found the conceptual and methodological repertoire that is adequate for discussing civil society in
ways similar to how they would debate the state of the economy or the performance of government for example (Anheier, 2004:3).

Furthermore, over centuries this terrain has been heavily contested with Hegel, Marx and Engels stressing its material dimensions, de Tocqueville and Ferguson laying emphasis on its organisational aspects and Gramsci delineating its ideological qualities (Anheier, 2004). Thus, the history of political philosophy has suggested that dimensions of its norm-setting role are numerous and the empirical applications broader if we concentrate on only one aspect of civil society (Harbeson, 1994; Nkwanchuku, 2003). Whilst the Centre for Civil Society, at the London School of Economics (2004) opts to define civil society as the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values.

However, in theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often vast, indistinct and negotiated (Harbeson, 1994; Nkwanchuku, 2003). Therefore, civil society regularly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Furthermore, civil societies are often characterised by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy group (Noyoo, 2006:14).
In the last decade, the phenomenon of *global civil society* has also become prominent, especially when it comes to the globalisation is brought into sharp focus. Undoubtedly, civil society organisations have transcended national boundaries and now confront issues (once perceived in the past as local) at a global level. It is not uncommon these days for civil society networks, from different countries, to work in unison around issues of global concern for example, the rights of indigenous peoples, environment protection or debt cancellation for the developing world. These coalitions are best exemplified by the current waves of anti-globalisation campaigns, which are visible at, for instance, meetings of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Noyoo, 2006:14).

The rise of global civil society has been encouraged by a multiplicity of factors as Keane (2005:1-2) describes:

“These unfamiliar words ‘global civil society’ – a neologism of the 1990s – are fast becoming fashionable. They are born at the confluence of seven overlapping streams of concern among publicly-minded intellectuals at the end of the 1980s: the revival of the old language of civil society, especially in central-eastern Europe, after the military crushing of the Prague Spring; a heightening appreciation of the revolutionary effects of the new galaxy of satellite/computer-mediated communications (captured in Marshall Mcluhan’s famous neologism, ‘the global village’); the new awareness, stimulated by the peace and ecological movements, of ourselves as members of a fragile and potentially self-destructive world system; the widespread perception that the implosion of Soviet-type communist systems implied a new global order; the world-wide growth spurt of neo-liberal
economies and market capitalist economies; the disillusionment with broken and unfulfilled promises of post-colonial states; and the rising concerns about the dangerous and misery producing vacuums opened up by the collapse of empires and states and the outbreak of uncivil wars”.

Therefore, theoretical foundations of global civil society are quite heterogeneous and varied (Keane, 2005) Thus, Drezner (2005) highlights that in most literature, scholars argue that the multiple components of global civil society are organised as networks characterised by “voluntary”, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange of information. In this case, therefore, different nodes of network must be able to exchange information for this type of organizations to be effective. Networks are of critical importance when it comes to the efficacy of global civil society; the denser the network, the more effective non-state actors can be (Drezner, 2005; Noyoo, 2006:15).

**African experience to civil society**

When it comes to the civil society in Africa, there are different views in this regard as it has been described as budding in reference to the fact that it is still a emerging phenomenon on the continent (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996; Aiyede, 2003). There are also several contending views regarding civil society in Africa, although many seem to converge under the state - civil society divide (see for example Harberson, Rothchild, & Chazan, 1994). In many instances, civil society is frequently linked to the popular democratisation processes unfolding across the continent and seen as
countervailing the excesses of a predatory African state (Bayart, 1986; Gyimah-Boadi, 1996).

However, it should not be mistakenly held that African civil society is always the proponent of democracy, or is ever-knowing, benign and rational. It can also take on primordial identities and can also be destructive. Fatton (1999) paints a grim but realistic picture of civil society in Africa in the last century, and argues that it was conflict-ridden and prone to Hobbesian wars against all and was the prime repository of “invented” ethnic hierarchies, conflicting class visions, patriarchal domination, and irredentist identities fueling deadly conflicts in many areas of the continent and the world in general (Noyoo, 2006:17).

Furthermore, Abé (2005) argues that civil society in Africa are still experiencing “teething” problems which make it a “self debilitating” actor in development (ibid.). The first choices made by civil society in Africa upon its “revival” was to co-habit or collaborate with the public sector, thus creating a situation whereby two types of civil society emerge: one structured on the basis of purely private initiatives of social actors engaged in the fight for profound change, and another that is more prominent as it is financed by the established order, created and supported by the state (Noyoo, 2006:17).

Thus, raises serious questions regarding the autonomy of civil society, especially when we look at the broader picture of western donor agencies funding parts of civil society such as Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), in order to drive specific agendas in Africa. In a research covering
three African countries by Hearn, (1999), namely: Ghana, Uganda, and South Africa, it was deciphered that the most popular civil society actors (in terms of donor funding or democracy assistance) were formal, urban-based, professional, elite advocacy NGOs. Added to this scenario, donor support was also accompanied with a certain understanding of civil society that meant the strengthening of the strategic position of this arena in relation to the state (Hearn, 1999). So, the implication is that the setting of the development agenda becomes the determinant of donors, due to their financial influence.

Nkwanchuku (2003) postulates that the “conventional” understanding of civil society overlooks much of what it constitutes in Africa because of its segregation of the constitutive elements of civil society into “civic and non civic”, “traditional”, and “modern” organisations. Despite an existence of varying definitions of civil society, Noyoo (2006:18) observes that one seems to be dominating the others. He asserts that this notion is “rooted in the Anglo-American tradition of liberal democratic theory, which identifies civic institutions and political activity as an vital component of the emergence of a particular type of political society based on the principles of citizenship, rights, democratic representation and the rules of law. Western donors and intellectuals have popularised this notion and many international civil society organisations tend to operate on its basis. Consequently some scholars describe it as the ‘conventional’ notion of civil society” (ibid.).

Furthermore, Noyoo, (2006) argues that many organisations in African social formations do not meet the above criteria, some scholars and
international civil society organisations assume there is no civil society organisation in Africa or that at best; they are in the formative stages. Therefore, conventional idea of civil society is critiqued on the following: 

First, it is normatively tendentious, carrying the assumption that all societies – no matter how diverse in cultural, social and political orientation – are destined to follow a specific path of political organisation – liberalism. 

Second, this notion of civil society when applied to the analysis of actual civil societies, it may lead one into an invidious and empirically difficult exercise of deciding which civic organisations are truly ‘civil’ as opposed to those which may be dismissed as ‘pre-civil’, ‘uncivil’, ‘anti-civil’. 

Third, many African social formations do not meet the ‘civility’ criteria set by this notion; it excludes most part of Africa’s rich associational life from the civil society. 

Fourth, the civil society must institutionalise their functions in order to secure autonomy from their members and from the state may not be realistic in Africa (ibid.). In addition, it is important not to follow a deterministic and reductionist route when we apply our minds to civil society in Africa (ibid, p.18).

It is argued that most African governments have failed time after time to acquire civil society formations into viable and effective partnerships for the development of the continent. This can be witnessed in the conceptualisation and crystallization of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) by governments, without civil society’s involvement (Noyoo, 2006:19). The rise of civil society in South Africa is inextricably bound up with the anti-apartheid struggle whose primary objective was to seize power from an oppressive, racist and illegitimate minority regime; and many studies have explored this phenomenon (see Friedman, 1991;
Noyoo, 2000). Thus, various progressive forces with the same vision of liberating South Africa inevitably gravitated under the anti-apartheid agenda. This sweep encompassed labour, women’s, civic, student, youth, human rights, church, legal, health, education, media, community advice, housing, land and other groups. Many of them functioned as “institutional” organised bases of resistance and provided much of the oppositional momentum that led to South Africa’s negotiated settlement (Marais, 1998:199).

Whilst at the wheel of the liberation struggle where the African National Congress (ANC) and its allied partner the South African Communist Party (SACP) and other liberation forces such as the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the struggles of civil society organs was viewed purely on instrumental terms and became incorporated into the external assault against the apartheid state (ibid.). In addition, their utility was expected to dissolve once power was won (Marais, 1998). However, due to the past association of civil society with the ANC in the anti-apartheid struggle, autonomy became a contentious issue post-1994 as the ANC expected all formations that were opposed to apartheid to fold up and be incorporated into its structures (Noyoo, 2006:22).

Moreover, Noyoo (2006) argues that when attempting to gain more understanding about South African civil society, simple categorisations of the phenomenon should be avoided by all means, because it is also a complex issue. South African civil society has long been deemed an area for contestation, not amenable to the traditional definitions, such as the non-market sphere of organisational life lying between the family and the
state. Invariably, South African politics and ideology overwhelm the typical institutional and functional considerations that are common within international civil society debates (ibid, p.22).

Therefore, to commemorate civil society’s plurality, as a point of departure, as it has become a central aspect that should infuse various understandings, especially, especially when it comes to the state-civil society relations in contemporary South Africa (ibid.). Because of such state-civil society relations will reflect this plurality. Some relationships between civil society actors and state institutions will be adversarial and conflictual, while others will be more collaborative and collegiate (Noyoo, 2006). So, the state of affairs should not be viewed negatively but it should be celebrated as it represents the political maturing of the South African society (ibid.). However, under apartheid regime, the adversarial-collaborative divide largely took a racial form with the bulk of “white civil society” entrenching sophomoric relations with the state, and the majority of “black civil society” adopting a conflictual mode of engagement (Ibid.). Nevertheless, such racial divide began to crumble in the transition period as significant segments of “white civil society” began to partly distance themselves from the apartheid regime principles (ibid, p. 23).

Moreover, Noyoo (2006) argues that a number of writers such as Bond (2004) and Buhlungu (2004) refer to the emerging on civil society organisations at present in South Africa as a resurgent or awakening of civil society. In addition, new protests movements emerged around issues of service delivery or their non deliverance, especially at the local government level. These emerging social movements seem to be more organically
driven and are grassroots oriented. They also gravitate and converge around immediate issues of basic needs for poor communities. So, these scenes of the new protests tend to a set-back to apartheid-era pro-democracy demonstration that South Africa has not witnessed in years. One problem area underlined by the demonstrations is the feeling that the democratic order has failed them (Noyoo, 2006:23). These protests have been acknowledged by the South African president as she cites that the protests: “reflect and seek to exploit the class and nationality fault lines that were inherited from apartheid past, which, if ever they took root, gaining genuine popular support, would pose a threat to the stability of democratic South Africa” (ibid.).

Other view suggest that civil society formations have to continue playing their role of “watchdogs”, by keeping the government accountable to its various commitments, either locally or globally, for example, at global level through international protocols of the United Nations Organisation (UN). Also, by making sure that government respects its promises during elections or follows through its election manifesto. However, civil society organisations should not work in opposition to government, but must support structures that promote service delivery. In addition, civil society formations were not political parties and should not engage in political acrimonies, rather they should ensure that civil liberties and the rights of citizens are protected (ibid.). Furthermore, it was expected that these organisations to work in tandem with government (ibid, p.25). There is no denying the fact that civil society’s role in poverty reduction remains pivotal in post-apartheid South Africa (ibid.).
CHAPTER THREE:

*The haunt of colonial agenda*
Historical context

The context in which South African civil society has been operating under the post-apartheid government needed no convincing of the virtues of participatory governance mechanisms. The significance of channels to enable citizens’ organizations to communicate with government has been a centre government focus in the post apartheid era, as it has strong origins in the apartheid struggles. In the apartheid’s exclusion of the majority from decision-making, activists demanded ‘people’s power’, a slogan which could mean many things, but which certainly included the notion of popular participation in governance (Friedman, 2006).

However, mobilization played a significant role in achieving change; for example, South African negotiated transition was unevenly mass-driven (ibid.). (M) ass-driven features included: factors that are both driving forward the process and in laying down the foundations for a relatively durable democracy’. Nevertheless the balance of power between the resistance and the apartheid regime increasingly saw the need for negotiation between civic organizations representing disenfranchised black city-dwellers and the white communities, and so the participatory local forum became a key instrument of the fight for majority rule. It’s worth highlighting that during the negotiation period of the early 1990s, a heart concern of the ‘liberation’ movement was to prevent the minority government from taking unilateral decisions which would bind the new democracy (Friedman, 2006).
So, the forums tendency to assume a false social and economic community of interest among the black majority and the consequences due to the assumption that entire ‘communities’ could be represented at forums by a single organization(ibid.). Thus, popular participation tended to be associated with forums at which ‘community organizations’ would participate in decisions making on behalf of whole particular ‘communities’ though a surfacing evidence reveals that the majority of the residents were not represented by these groups. However, historical development guaranteed that that formal system of participation became a significant factor of post-apartheid governance. Nevertheless, structures such as National, Economic, Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) were established in 1995 as a conventional tripartite bargaining council that comprised of business, labour and government who negotiated in three chambers that dealt with economic policy (Ibid, p.2).

Consequently, some government critics put emphasis that the ethos of participation has withered as post-apartheid governance increasingly depended on management technique, for instance, when the government respond to HIV/AIDS, the notion of participatory influenced its thinking (ibid.). Again, in 2005, a series of grassroots protest against municipal councils were demanding the strengthening of ward committees in addition to the same demand espoused by other government representatives. Whilst civil servants and politicians remain enthusiastic adherent of public participation in government of which they argue to be vibrantly pursued (ibid.).
Therefore, the debate of formal mechanisms that enable citizens to partake in South African government structures, a model of participatory governance, in which citizens have generous opportunity to shape decisions which affect their lives (ibid.). However, it is argued that the participation mechanisms tended not enhancing participation, as poverty remains a daunting challenge in South Africa after twelve years of ushering of democratic rule (ibid, p. 3). Additionally, this is illustrated by the significant number of South Africans still survive on the peripheries of the country’s modern economy in appalling conditions. Furthermore, marginalisation and vulnerability remain a daily experience of many communities, as they continue to be haunted by the challenges of sustaining their livelihood in a country that is regarded as almost “First World” by many on the African continent (Noyoo, 2006:4).

So, during the transition and subsequent post-election era a wide range of civil society organisations, such as the media and the public at large were energetically engaged in policy argument over defense of other related issues (Cawthra, 2004:8). Different societal structures such as civil society organisations and academics played an important role in the post-apartheid policy formation, due to governmental capacity. However, their influence tended to have waned over the last few years, even as their research capabilities have grown of which is confirmed by the substantial research output from the International Security Studies (ISS) and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) (ibid, p.11).

South African civil society activities, included a range of activities aimed at raising awareness within South Africa about the situation in Zimbabwe,
expressing solidarity with Zimbabweans, and attempting to influence South African policy. Some of the activities include awareness raising meetings and press conferences, where specific positions have been agreed upon and made public; direct interactions with government officials; and support to solidarity actions undertaken by its member organizations (Smith & Tadesse, 2011:8).

Since, South Africa has a specific history which is intertwined with the current poverty situation in the country. It is significant to note that such history is guided by an ideology of inequality and differences between the races. This “reality” of racial exclusion was made possible through policies and legislation that in turn informed perspectives on poverty among the different races and classes in South Africa (Magasela, 2005). So in 1994, South Africa instituted a democratic rule and was for the first time led by an African government. So, these changes also brought the humongous task of addressing and redressing apartheid’s legacy of poverty and inequality began. In order to achieve this mammoth task that would take on a combined approach from both the new government and civil society formations. Therefore, civil society’s role in poverty reduction in a post-apartheid South Africa became a defining feature for its close association with the new government that was genuinely searching for solutions to the dilemma of poverty. Nevertheless, civil society encountered some challenges as it took on the responsibility of uplifting communities out of poverty in a democratic state. Although at this moment, some segments of civil society seem to have reached a *cul-de-sac* in their poverty reduction campaigns, due to a number of variables (Noyoo, 2006:2).
Noyoo (2006) highlights that South Africa’s poverty narrative would be incomplete if mention was not made of the land question. Because landlessness of the majority Africans can be traced back to the *Natives Land Act of 1913* that legitimised the dispossession of land from the indigenous people by concerted efforts of the settler European forces via the Union of South Africa. Additionally, it should be noted that this legislation was a culmination of antecedent violent acts of conquest by Europeans aimed at driving Africans off their land for several centuries. After passing the Act, millions of black people were forced to leave their ancestral lands and resettle in what quickly became over-crowded and environmentally degraded reserves (Noyoo, 2006:5).

The above mentioned highlights how poverty situation is intertwined with the country’s inequality levels that continue to be a strong feature of post-apartheid South Africa. Inequality remains crucial in the debate of poverty reduction and should not be glossed over by both civil society, and government in strategies for intervention. When focusing on prevailing trends and future policy options, Noyoo (2006:3) highlights that inequality and poverty should not be treated as one thing. It further observes that in “public discourse the two issues - poverty and inequality - are normally linked and treated as an expression of the same problem. In reality, they are very different. These differences have important public policy consequences.

Therefore, the aforementioned differences hinge on the fact that inequality is reflected by the Gini coefficient – which measures the distribution of a country’s national income. For instance, in a perfectly equal society, 10 per
cent of the population will receive 10 per cent of the income; 20 per cent of the population will receive 20 per cent of income, and so on. The Gini coefficient varies between 0 and 1 - the closer to 1, the more unequal a society; the closer to 0, the more equal a society (Noyoo, 2006:6).

Nevertheless, according to South Africa country report revealed that various research studies have revealed that levels of inequality have not declined substantially in South Africa, as it continues to have high income inequality when measured in terms of its Gini coefficient. Notwithstanding all efforts by the government to alleviate income disparities, the Gini coefficient increased from 0.67 in 1994 to 0.68 in 2006 (South Africa Country Report).

**Challenges facing public-private partnership**

The utilization of private-public partnership resulted in applying fiscal responsible mechanisms in health care reforms – effectively, economically and equitable (4Es) and trends in the new public management (NPM) movement inspired a shift towards business-like reforms and saw PPP as a mechanism that improved efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery (Schoeman, 2007).

- *Relations between governments and non-state*

During the colonial period Christian missions set up hospitals and schools for the indigenous population, while the colonial administration provided health and other services for the elite.
After independence, many new governments took over public water supply and sanitation systems. They also expropriated private and faith-based schools, i.e. Bangladesh, Nigeria, Pakistan or incorporated them through state funding, i.e. Malawi.

In the 1980s public services deteriorated as state funding declined, forcing users to look elsewhere. A new sector of private, community or NGO providers emerged to fill the gaps.

Since the 1990s many governments have at least formally recognised the case for partnerships’ with NGOs and the private sector, backed by donors. In Nigeria and Malawi churches may re-adopt and fund schools and hospitals. Whilst in Pakistan, some schools have been handed back to their former owners and faith-based organisations are being encouraged to take on new roles as service providers (Batley, 2007).

-Types of contract systems related to public private partnership

In all countries, the types of contracts or agreements that are relevant to all service sectors tend to range from loose to tight, from hierarchical to collaborative, in which the non-state provider may be financially autonomous or dependent although the positive experiences are rather scarce.
• *Loose but hierarchical arrangements*, where the government contracts a non-state provider under unclear terms. These have sometimes led to cheaper, improved services, but without adequate oversight.

• *Loose, collaborative agreements*, where the roles of the government and non-state providers are supposedly complementary, but their obligations are unclear. These tend to engender mistrust and instability in service provision.

• *Tight contractual agreements*, which formalise the obligations and responsibilities of government and other providers. These can work if there is mutual trust between the partners, and sufficient monitoring capacity.

• *Collaborative partnerships*, where the government and non-state providers are equal partners, with clearly assigned roles, and make separately funded contributions to service provision. These may take the form of joint ventures, based on formal agreements (a memorandum of understanding or contract) between organisations, or coproduction arrangements, based on informal agreements between service providers and communities. Such partnerships are most likely to be sustainable, since they can be scaled up and replicated by additional collaborative partnerships, rather than creating new organisations (Batley, 2007:5).
CHAPTER FOUR:

Research findings
Active organisations in alleviating poverty in the area

-Community initiated programmes

The study revealed that the active organisation in alleviating poverty in the area is the Bhambayi Reconstruction and Development Forum (BRDF), Chairperson of this organisation in his interview highlighted that community initiated this organisation of which was active in bringing about peace and stability in the area especially in times of political violence in the late 1980s to early 1990s. This organisation was transformed later from being a Peace Facilitation entity to BRDF to focus on issues of reconstruction and development in the area (Interview: 18 February 2009).

Another key player in the poverty alleviation programme in the area is the Gandhi Trust and this was highlight by Ndaba in his interview when he said that: “our organisation provides service of supporting communities on various issues such as land provision for housing and trade (as currently the present informal settlements are build on the land of the Trust and small area to conduct informal trade). People come individually if they have a problem to highlight their concern and then after the Board of the trust consider that concern and give that individual a response. I can say people come to seek in various ways to our organisation at least one person a week” (Interview: 20 March 2009). Another service that Trust provides to the community is the training such as teaching people about democratic values through workshops. These workshops are conducted as part of the awareness rising amongst the community members.
Therefore, Trust also work with other stakeholders such as Participatory Development Initiative (PDI) in conducting workshops that take place normally five days in the community. However, these workshops are characterised by the poor attendance of the community members despite the fact that the workshop was free of charge.

Furthermore, other services to the community include the donation of land by the Trust where school – (Kasturba Gandhi junior primary) is built for the community; hiring of premises to the local community churches i.e. Wesley, Methodist and Zionist churches to conduct their services on Sundays at free of charge.

Other income proposed generation strategies that our Trust is embarking on is the opening of the Durban Tourism Reception with Art and Craft Garden in conjunction with Gandhi/Luthuli Trust. Another proposed initiative is the opening of business and tourism education school to help children in the area for free of charge. This initiative has members that include: Inanda, Newtown and Kwa Mashu – INK, eThekwini Municipality, Shembe village, Dube village, Ebuheni village, Inanda Seminary, Gandhi Trust and Waterfall. INK project such as the September month as it serves as the culture and traditional month where tourists are brought to the community.

Other service to the community include conducting Sunday Music School that conducts Indian dance classes that was stared in 2007 of which is directed by Ustad Foundation for Classical Indian Music to local youth at free of charge. Class attendance is good as about four youth come from
the community jointly with other youths that come from the Indian community.

The Trust do presentations to the community and invite various stakeholders from the community such as the Bhambayi Development and Reconstruction Forum – BDRF and other organisation and encourage them to come up with programmes such as Mazaziwe Anti-crime Campaign within the Bhambayi community. This campaign helps police as they get advice from the community policing forum.

Another organisation that is active in the area is the intervention from the government through its Health Department via Community Clinic based in the area under study. The Community Clinic gets support from Health Department of which is - the government entity and renders various services to the community it serves and some of those activities include: HIV Counseling Services, Home Based Care Services to HIV infected people, Soup Kitchen to HIV orphans, vulnerable community members, and lower primary school pupil.

Data revealed that there are other government oriented organisations such as the institutions of higher learning within the province of KwaZulu-Natal through their various departments such as Social Work Department of which managed to establish a long standing partner for its involvement and working towards the poverty alleviation programmes in this area for some time.
Data shows that community members participate in various school programmes that include support structure, sport committee, school governing body, art and music and newsletter. For example, one of the Principal from one of the surrounding schools, she revealed that: “normally our school work with community bodies such as School Governing Body on the weekends and sometimes attend to community activities such as meeting when invited. Again, when the school reviews its programmes in each quarter of the year, through various activities includes parental class visits and briefing session from the class teacher about the progress of their children. The parent’s visits are normally conducted four times a year and community members are always positive and this depends on the approach one adopts when dealing with community members. However, the school also monitor parents participation in the school programmes through attendance register of which mostly shows that a good attendance from the parents, as the school registered about 1023 students and the parents attendance always more than 90%” (Mrs Mpande interview: 25 March 2009).

-Other observable active organisations in the area

Some of the noticeable organisations that are known for their contribution in alleviating poverty in the area are those in the communication sector, i.e. Cell C, MTN and Vodacom and other many others. These service providers can be identified in various strategic positions along the main road or street with their different logos competing for recognition and invitation for customers.
Although these different role players attempt in their various programme to contribute in fighting poverty, unemployment, time and space but their community development agenda remain bleak or not visible at all especially when it comes to sustainable development of the poverty stricken majority (Chiumbu, 2012:194). For instance, these multinational corporate tended to exploit the plight for the disadvantaged community to ensure their profit margins. This is guaranteed by utilisation of cheap infrastructure such as unused/ expired containers of which have become the emblem of the mobile phone companies especially in the areas of the previously and remain disadvantaged populace such as township and informal settlement. Through the usage of such business strategy to boost profit margins and give false high hopes to the marginalised community members, as most marginalised individuals attempt to venture in this business trap by investing their last savings of which mostly come from either retrenchment package or retirement funds. Most of the participants in this business trap invest their last few rands (estimated to be about R25 -30 000 for a franchise) with high hopes of becoming a successful capitalist some day but in reality such dream get shuttered within few months or weeks of their commencement of their business operation.

Besides that, this type of business tends to guarantee the income and profit of the service provider before the owners of the newly established business opens the doors of business as usual, as they buy all air time that is sold in their phone shops. So, in case there is something that negatively affects the operations of the business, the challenge will be left with the burden.

Furthermore, when it comes to the infrastructure development, these service providers tended to provide temporal shelter through expired
container of which will remain temporal and not permanent. Thus, means the type of development that is brought by agencies such as MTN, Vodacom and the likes is nothing more than just a face saving exercise and not bringing lasting structure such as building that can be used later in case the phone shop approach becomes not viable. Then after, this type of investment tends to continue on the same old approach to development in the urban areas that are utilised by the marginalised communities.

**Challenges encountered by service providers**

- *Community health services*

This clinic is the governmental project that was started in 2001 as part of dealing poverty and bringing development to the vulnerable communities. The centre is managed by the retired nurse who is employed by the Health Department and was recalled back to work in this centre because of her performance prior to her retirement. Although the interview was granted but the word of caution was highlighted because normally before the interview is granted, there must be arrangements with the Department of Health to authorize the interview before it takes place. Therefore, the respondent opted to partake in the study but with limited input as she noted that some of the guiding principle is that there is certain information that she is not allowed to divulge to outsiders.

My organisation provide cooked food and food parcels to vulnerable community members such as HIV/AIDS infected members, unemployed, orphans and school children. Community accesses the clinic every day and
come in their big numbers and that is proven by the attendance of community members who came to the clinic for various needs i.e. counseling, H.I.V. test, collect their medical treatment and home based care (Ms Mvemve interview, 25 March 2009).

Challenges that affect our organisation is the involvement of community members to partake in projects that are meant to fundraise programmes i.e. beadwork initiative and people cite reasons such as that the project take a long time to start making money or profit to enable people to get something they can take home for their families. Our organisation provide some employment to some members of the community as they partake in home based care services to the sickly people by paying visit in their respective homes. The home based care providers get some stipend that is not more than R500, 00 per month. Training is offered to home based cared workers and awareness campaign is conducted through pamphlet and advices that are given to people who visit the clinic.

Another way of helping the community members to partake in service delivery and development of their community as they work as the service providers and the organisation employed about 10 of them but that number got reduced as there is no income that goes with it. The organisation evaluates its programme through monitoring its progress from time to time. However, the challenge that our organisation is facing is the lack of funding to sustain our programmes and the lack of sport fields for the children to play (Mvemve interview: 20 March 2009.)

Some of the challenges that face the Community Clinic are the fears of people (old and young alike) as they tend to be shy when it comes to collection of their ration and one of the major reason that was forwarded is the stigma that is associated with HIV infection. Another challenge that faces the clinic is low income that is given to volunteers who work as Home Care Givers as it equals to R500.00 monthly.

-Participation in the decision making

Another challenge that was highlighted by the Project Manager in her interview was the unhappiness of the community because of the fact that government refused the idea of accommodating orphans to Care Centre as the government cited the rationale that suggest that those youth need to be given a chance with their family member in order for them they can learn their respective cultural norms (Interview: 18 February 2009).

Land and housing ownership

The study revealed that despite the land has been “formally” dedicated to the Mahatma Gandhi family but the issues ownership remain debatable especially as the government of the day adopted various policies that were intended to redress the past injustices including the land redistribution. This manifested itself when the delivery of the housing reached the area, as Mr Ndaba highlighted that the land that was used to build the first Phase of the construction of RDP houses as they are referred to in the township, belongs to Gandhi Trust of which is managed by his grand-daughters(Interview: 18 February 2009).
The lack of houses in the area has been exacerbated by the land (belonged to *Phoenix Settlement Trust* which bought it from the colonialist Marshal Family) invasion by the community members in 1985 during apartheid regime violence in the country. This violence led to the establishment of Bhambayi consolidation of the informal settlement in the Gandhi settlement that was started in 1903 and got destroyed after premises were left into ruins and more people came into the area after the doing away of legislations that controlled the movement of the people from the rural to the urban. This happen as people came in their huge numbers to the city to seek employment and they did not have shelters and this area helped them to get open area to build their temporal shelter or others renting a room to the early occupiers.

Additionally, Ndaba highlighted further that: “*this has led to the lack of land to develop the area as the Trust has plans to bring some development in the area, as there is no solution to land occupation by the residence. This also led to some enmity amongst the residents especially those who work for the Trust and community members in 2001, as one of the employees of the Trust was banned from being part of the community as he was seen to be siding or defending the Trust that bought land from the ‘thieves’- Marshal family. However, this was resolved through the intervention of the local Councilor who helped in reinstating the banished Trust employees and also by the visits of the former President Thabo Mbeki and current President Mr Jacob Zuma who came to explain the importance of the settlement*” (Ndaba, interview: 18 February 2009).

The study also revealed that that local community member do not participate in the decision making of the Phoenix Settlement Trust
members that consists of Working Committee that is composed of the eThekwini Municipality Councilor, Pietermaritzburg Municipality and other individual members from another areas. This was confirmed by Ndaba when he revealed “that community members participate in the meetings of the Trust through BDRF when is invited and other related reason is that there is no local community member because the community they never submit application to participate. Another reason for lacking direct community participation is that the Trust do not go around advertising itself, since it is a private institution and not governmental organisation” (Ndaba, interview: 18 February 2009).

It transpired that Trust evaluates its activities in every six months through a performance of its workers of which are the Tourist Guide and Security Officer through interaction and Interval reports to local government parliament since tourist project in this area belong to government. Although the Phase 1 for housing is finished and the next challenge for the next programme for land allocation for community needs such as the children play ground and church building in the land is scarce. The area mostly accommodates working people from the low categories of proletarised people doing jobs such as painting, security officers and others partake in other activities such as selling of marijuana herbs.

This was also confirmed by the Secretary and Chairperson of Bhambayi Reconstruction and Development Forum (BRDF), as they noted that the First Phase of the housing project is finished and preparing to launch a second phase. New houses in the first phase were provided with metered tap and currently communities are not paying for water. Stand pipe taps are
still visible as some members of the community where they have not yet build up their houses (Chairperson and the Secretary Interview, 18 February 2009).

The second phase of the building project is experiencing some problems such as private land ownership and the lack of relevant documents i.e. title deeds despite the fact that the owners of those plots really own those plots. Debates concerning eviction of the occupants of the land continue remains high. Another problem that affect these phase is the land shortage to build houses for all community members.

-Criteria for allocation houses between the old and new community members

The development into the area was brought about and facilitated by the involvement of community organisations such as BRDF and other organisations in the area. So, the housing development was initially suggested by the BRDF and then later the government- Housing Department was approached to assist with building materials. Then houses are built by the construction company that has a proven track record and has gone firstly through a tender process through the Housing Department. Then after community members participate through sub-letting subcontracting within the construction company that won the tender process.

Data shows that in order to guarantees equal benefits to the community in terms of time frame, each family has occupied in the area and fair housing
allocation to broader community. So, it also revealed that there is a set procedure that is followed of which is in line with the criterion for allocation that has been discussed first by the relevant stakeholders and then allocation takes place. The criteria used in allocation of houses to the members of the community was based “on the own unwritten records history [oral history of the community”]. When BRDF Secretary was asked to explain what she meant by this – she said “we use our knowledge of knowing community members in terms of who was the original members that were in the area based on the chronological occupation of individual family in the area” (Secretary Interview, 18 February 2009). For example, community leaders used special criteria in selecting community members who were going to occupy the about 1800 newly built houses near Verulam\(^6\). Whilst the criterion for selecting new members in the area and those who did not fall in the category were transferred to their respective locations structures after a collective community discussion and after consensus has been reached.

**Education level**

Another challenge is that the area does not have educated people such as social workers, doctors and teachers from the area and no joint programme to offer bursaries to poor children to further their education with institutions of higher learning such as the University of KwaZulu-Natal. The community raised their concern regarding the type of intervention that is brought by various stakeholders such as the university that are active in the area.

\(^6\) A town that is situated about 25Km north of the Bhambayi area.
Although some of institutions of higher learning such as UKZN attempted to close this gap but its impact remain far below the required level to be realized by the community members. This manifested in one of the in-depth interviews, for example, Ndaba highlighted that: “despite the long period of intervention to the community by the institution of higher learning, i.e. UKZN, of which have been intervening in this community since 1998 and used this area as the training site to ‘thousand’ of graduates or scholars who gained their academic achievements through various studies that were conducted in the area but never plough back where have attained their studies or involve in programmes such as organising youth or old age programmes that are intended to assist them to deal with problems they encounter in meeting their daily livelihoods” (Interview: 20 February 2009).

**Challenges faced by the community**

*Access to the social benefits/services*

In some instances community request assistance from other social partner such as the UKZN -Social Work Department to deal with BDRF request on the assistance on the ways of using research findings of the study that was conducted in the area to advance their developmental programme such as getting identity cards for its members and accessing social grants benefits to old age pensioners.

The study revealed that a number of people are sick in their homes and are not taken care and that was stressed by Ndaba in his interview when he
highlighted that: “currently, some Bhambayi community members are sick in their homes and there is no one taking care for them, that is why there is a need to establish community centres that will be helpful to the community at large” (Interview: 20 March 2009).

Data shows that poverty alleviation programmes such accessing grants are exacerbated by the lack relevant government document such as identity document and birth certificate. Mrs Mpande emphasized that in her interview as she highlighted that: “other problems that are related to poverty is the failure to make claim due to some members don’t have identity documents and other children don’t have birth certificate” (Interview: 20 March 2009).

Challenges are that government should provide services to the communities without charge as most community members are unemployed and don’t have to pay for those services. The land take-over by the local community members remain a challenge as the Trust don’t want to use violence and other community members are renting or out letting some of the rooms in the area to other people (Ndaba interview: 20 February 2009).

-Different approach in bringing about basic services to the community

Although community in the area experience high level of poverty, high rates of pregnancy amongst young school going women, drug abuse and high number of children who are not attending schooling due to lack of relevant support such as funding. Nevertheless, community formulates different
strategies that suit the manner of meeting the desired need and this is demonstrated in the following data.

-Feeding scheme programme

Data shows that major problem in the surrounding community is the unemployment and poverty of which goes along with lack of food that leads to malnutrition and T.B. to children. This was stressed by Mrs Sibuko in her interview as she noted that: “unemployment, poverty, birth rate (especially amongst young girls) and abuse of children are at high school level. The community also experiences a number of youth being idle and that also contribute to drug abuse” (Interview: 25 March 2009).

Local schools played a significant role in the provision of school accessories such as uniform and food parcels to the vulnerable pupils within their respective school. This was confirmed by one teacher in her interview when she cited that: “our school provides uniform to vulnerable children especially the orphans and they also get sponsorship and as well as the donations from former students after they left the school. Those students who leave school are encouraged to donate uniform to the school in order to help other students. The school also provides food parcels and that is made possible by South African Social Security Agency – SASSA donations. Although the food parcel was distributed but that was just like a drop in the ocean because the school has about 500 orphans and only about 30 children that managed to get food parcel each” (Mrs Mpande interview: 25 March 2009).
Data exposed some of the challenges that community encounter when it comes to the provision of services to the community. For example, “some of the challenges are that are encountered by our community is the lack of sponsors for food parcel/ soup kitchen and this has led the school to start planning a talk to other stakeholders in this regard. Another challenge is the lack of children who collect food in the clinic due to fear of stigma that is associated with HIV/AIDS as soup kitchen is normally associated with people affected by the disease” (Mvemve interview: 25 March 2009).

Data revealed that the failure of pupils to collect their ration has impacted negatively to the relationship between parents and the teachers. This emanated in the interview of the respondent when she noted that: “the school received complaints from the parents highlighting that their children are starving. As the attempt to address the fear associated with stigma and complaints from the parents, the school opted the establishment of separate soup kitchen but that was not welcome by some community members. However, this unwelcome gesture was seen as a signal from the individuals who head soup kitchen as the protest to protect their family bread as they saw the establishment of other soup kitchen in the same area as the duplication of the same programme. This has also led to exclusion of the school delegation in attending some of the meetings in the area. Nevertheless, the relationship with community is still intact and other community programmes such as Inanda, Ntuzuma and Kwa Mashu- (INK)” (Mrs Mpande, Interview: 25 March 2009).

Although there is a feeding scheme facilitated by the Community Clinic in the area but there is a view that suggest the need for the opening of another one in the same area but this should school based. This was
highlighted in the interview of the teacher - Mrs. Mpande who noted that: “there was a need to establish feeding scheme/soup kitchen for pupil that are based in the school, since there is a low number of students who attend soup kitchen that is organized by the clinic. In addition, due to some of the complains that are brought forward by a number of the pupil, as some of them end up not collecting their rations to fear of stigma that is associated with HIV/AIDS, since the soup kitchen in the Community Clinic is organised for the vulnerable community members such as the sickly and orphans” (Interview: 18 February 2009).

-Provision of food parcels

The school had to take some initiatives as some of its pupils were getting food from their respective homes before they come to school and their performance in their studies was affected somehow and that led the need to respond to this challenge. In responding to this failure (that is associated with HIV/AIDS stigma) of collection ration from the Community Clinic that led the school to start organising food parcels for pupil. Additionally, Mrs Mpande highlighted also in her interview that: “the response from pupil was enormous as almost all of them came to collect their food parcels”.

There is support of schools in the area in this regard, school conduct of the related activities in their programmes. This transpired in the interview of Mrs Sibuko when she highlighted that: “our school conduct awareness programme to the children and also work with other community organisation such as Bhambayi Clinic of which helps in running the feeding scheme/soup kitchen which caters for about 100 pupils that belongs to the school” (Interview: 25 March 2009).
School has established sound relations with the community. This was manifested in the interview of Mrs Sibuko who noted that: “there is a smooth relation with community members as there are no problems and community members give sufficient support in all activities. The school also has counseling for children and community member, as sometimes some community members come to seek counseling after they have been referred to by other community member”(Interview: 25 March 2009).

-Lack of career guidance in local schools

Although community attempts to address some of the challenges they encounter but some of the challenges they seems to be beyond their capabilities of the community in general. For example, “some of the challenges faced by the community is the number of students who complete their Matric (Grade 12) studies but they could go further on their education and some of the reasons that are cited include lack of the proper guidance in case when one needs to further his/her studies. This is also seen as the contributory factor that normally leads the youth to end up going astray in terms of doing wrong things that they were not suppose to be doing, i.e. in some cases girls get pregnant and boys engage in criminal activities. Community highlighted their plight and seeks some help in this regard” (Focus group interview: 18 February 2009).

The teacher also highlighted there was a need to organise career guidance for the children as most children end up not furthering their studies due to lack of relevant information to get support for funding. This will assist
children to decide their future based on the informed position (Mpande interview: 25 March 2009). Again this concern was also raised in the interview by another teacher-Mrs Sibuko from the surrounding school, when she highlighted that: “there is the need to convene a career guidance event especially for the high school students and they needed to consult various stakeholders such as the Department of Education, UKZN and other relevant parties to partake in the proposed event. This event will assist students to start making up their minds on what they wish to do in studying further as their career” (Interview: 18 February 2009).

- Unemployment, safety, crime and neglect of aged and the young

Data collected revealed that people interviewed tended to confirm that there are major problems that are experienced by communities in Bhambayi vary. This was manifested in the interview of the Head of Community Clinic when she highlighted that: “some of the problems that ravage the community of Bhambayi include family violence (of which is rife), alcohol and drug abuse (also high), children not going/attending school (it high rate), TB and HIV/AIDS infections, high unemployment rate, teenage pregnancy, hunger (extremely high), mental illness (very few cases), physical disability, neglect/abuse of elderly people, illiteracy (high rate), behavior problems among the youth (is high especially from 21h00 at night when parents are sleeping) and the other problem is the child rape. The rape of young children is often hidden especially by the ‘educated’ parents and it happens mostly amongst the children in the junior primary levels. Lastly, there is also a lack of transport, lack of police security and
poor policing forum in the area, as people get robbed and sometimes get killed” (Mvemve, interview: 20 March 2009).

Mrs Maluti who heads the pre-school that accommodates 75 pupils concurred with what is said above when she noted that: “problems that are identified in the area do prevail and the most disturbing problem is the teenage pregnancy as they are mostly left alone during the day when parents are at work and this has some contribution to the escalation of this problem” (Interview: 14 May 2009).

Lack of relevant infrastructure and resources development

The lack of infrastructure has a negative impact towards progress of the school as there is no administration block and the school has adopted various options such as letter writing as part of putting pressure to the Education Department. Another strategy includes adoption of second option that includes the private sector of which is expected to sponsor other activities such as food security or provision of services (Mrs Sibuko - interview: 25 March 2009).

Another problem that the school faces is the lack of uniform and this problem is partly resolved by the Learner Teacher Support Material- LTSM a programme that is pioneered by the Department of Education and it helps in providing in providing uniform to pupil that cannot afford. Other organisation such as Telkom and schools i.e. Morningside Primary School help in provision of food as part of dealing with poverty and sport gear. Since school is located in the area that is regarded as part of Phoenix and
that helps getting sponsorship from the former white schools such as Morningside Primary School as it normally sponsors our school with material such as sport gear (Mrs Sibuko, interview: 25 March 2009).

Some of the challenges that our school face is the lack of infrastructure such as the lack of classrooms and sports stadium and that forces the school to take its pupil to nearby school to utilize sport ground. Other challenge is the failure of the government to provide services such as infrastructure and despite a series of letter written in that regard. Other reasons that are forwarded by the government include that of prioritizing as there are a huge number of schools that have no class room at all when compared with schools that have at least some classroom (Mrs Sibuko interview: 25 March 2009).

To highlight what is missing in the community is very hard to say since we come to school and don’t know what is happening in the surroundings community except to say lack of proper housing for the community (Mrs Mpande interview: 25 March 2009).

The crèche do help (with the programme that started in 2007) sometimes especially children that come from the poor family who does not have milk powder, napkins and those are identified through lack of necessities. This programme gets assistance from the sponsors such as the church outside from this community of Bhambayi and other organisations such as UKZN-Social Work Department (Mrs Maluti interview: 14 May 2009).
CHAPTER FIVE:

Data analysis and recommendations
DISCUSSION

The study revealed the weaknesses and the strength of the private-public partnership strategy when it comes to the service delivery and sustainable development especially to the marginalized communities in the post-apartheid era.

Potential of bringing about instability due to differing interests of varying stakeholders in the development in the community if it so carefully monitored this is seen in the debate between service providers of the soup kitchen to the vulnerable community members.

The strategy is open to abuse by any organisation or individual that happens to be in power at that particular time, as the study revealed that those partnerships are unequal in terms of command of relevant resources such as finance and land in this regard to accomplish their mission. This tends to confirm a dilemma of each actor’s potential for highest gain based on opportunistic and manipulation (Brocklehurst & Janssens, 2004:9).

Although the strategy has been implemented for some time but what is noticeable is that development remains lagging behind, due to failure or delays in the structural bureaucracy, for example, debate between the land provisions between service providers. This study helped in confirming the fact that despite government policies are oriented towards improving service to the poor, backed with funds for both consumption and connection subsidies, but there are certain flaws in the way the government targets and delivers these subsidies. Additionally, the constraints and inequities are prevalent more than before (World Bank, 2005).
This study tended to give clear unfolding of the development scenario within poor community of which happens to subscribe to the submissions of the “prisoner’s dilemma”, a well-known problem in game theory as Brocklehurst and Janssens (2004) argued. For example, the community occupies a land that is earmarked for development but the ‘owner’ of the land is not willing to give up his land for development on terms that he get his payment first for his land from the government. So, the failure of cooperation amongst the stakeholder put them back in the first place where development is not implemented and everybody suffers to the failure to speed up the required service delivery (Mc Lennan, 2008:12).

Again what was observable in the area under study is the type of infrastructural development in the area tended to be container-based businesses. Although container based business are ‘good’ as the starting point of infrastructural development but time frame of their utilization need to be set at the beginning of the project (Schoeman, 2007). Though, the infrastructural development of this nature tended to be used as the permanent solution to infrastructural shortage such as building but this tends to revive the old apartheid practices such as unequal access to services, proper infrastructure distribution and giving false hope towards the development of the marginalized community (Makaringe, 2003; Mc Lennan, 2008).

The strategy attempt to involve community members in their development and it also help in gaining better understanding about the needs and aspirations of that particular community. It also helped in exposing the power struggle (between capital and Batho Pele principles) for survival and recognition between different stakeholders in the area (Levin, 2004). The
study confirms the fact that affected communities define alternative strategies to address the most frequent causes of stress (World Bank, 2005b). For example, service providers for the Soup kitchen formulated an alternative after they realize the failure of school pupil to collect their ration at the clinic due to some reasons associated with HIV/AIDS and TB stigma (ibid.).

This study revealed that local different stakeholders such as the community members and faith based organisation have followed the suit in bringing about service delivery in the marginalized communities like in Nigeria and Malawi were they re-adopt and fund schools and hospitals (Batley, 2007; Ubels & Greijn, 2007). This tended to manifests itself in the manner the community sustained their local crèche when they experience lack of funding.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The study revealed that the state policy on development of advantaged communities seems to be following the circular approach, as data shows that tangible or sustainable in the area under study (Welsing, 1991). Therefore, the following are recommended:

- The need to conduct a further study on the role that can be played by service providers such as Vodacom and MTN to be bring about sustainable development besides the expired container development approach (Reck and Wood, 2003);
- A need to consider the adoption of going beyond the *Afrocentric*\(^7\) approach (to enable the *Batho pele* policy to become a reality not a paper slogan/just political rhetoric to settle scores) by government, as a strategy of meeting its poverty eradication programme and redressing the past injustices;

- To formulate a strategy that will facilitate the usage of all stakeholders as the means to fight poverty, for land redistribution policies, unemployment and crime by creating activities that will enable vulnerable communities to gain income and become beneficiaries of the business venture;

- To revisit of the container development when it comes to development of the building infrastructure, as the container approach tends to creates more hardship to the vulnerable populace instead of being a relief;

- A need to revisit neo liberal agenda, related policies and its obstacles in decolonising South Africa by government;

- The need to revisit the total destruction of labour reserves (labour reserves, township and informal settlement) and land redistribution, as a the means to foster self reliance, fight against poverty, diseases, unemployment and crime;

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\(^7\) A beyond Afrocentric approach also better known as Ethiopianism that emanates from the term Ethiopia that refers to Kush or Cush the ancient name of African continent and also enhanced the ancient independent faith Kingdom of ancient Ethiopia defeated the Italy at Battle of Adwa in 1896. The word therefore represents Africa’s dignity and place in the divine dispensation and provided a platform for free African churches and nations of the future (Doniger, 1999).
- The need to start considering the introduction of same developmental patterns to all communities without partiality towards any race as part of guaranteeing equality within the country.

There is a need for a government to create and ensure favourable environment to enable the proletarised Black majority to be in a position to fight vicious and inhuman cycles of poverty, reach self revitalisation and to experience the highly celebrated social change in the country. Finally, the continuous adoption of neo-liberal policies will tantamount to nothing more than what Welsing (1991) defines as the circular approach to problem solution instead of reaching out to linear approach that guarantees the clear pattern of change from bad situation (in this case the land dispossession and forced selling of labour power) to healthier environment (return of the land to rightful owners - indigenes of the land to achieve self-reliance/revitalisation).
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3. Mr Shiceka and Mrs Zibula.


*NB. – All names that are used are not true names of persons.