

**THE ROLE OF THE ANGLICAN CHURCH IN MINISTRY TO BURUNDIAN REFUGEES  
IN TANZANIA WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONS OF HOPE AND  
HOMELAND**

**By**

**Théodore Mbazumutima**

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**Supervisor: Professor J. N. K. Mugambi**

**Joint Supervisor: Professor A. Van Schalkwyk**

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## DECLARATION

I declare that: **The role of the Anglican Church in Ministry to Burundian Refugees in Tanzania with Particular Reference to the notions of Hope and Homeland** is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

Théodore Mbazumutima

Date 06/01/2007

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

It would be an impossible task to name each and every person who inspired and helped me to carry out this research. However, I would like to single out some of them.

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The subject of the refugees' experience emerged from my own life experience as a refugee. I am well aware that, to enable me to work among these refugees, live a decent life, and work on this project, God used a number of people to stand up with my family and I. Rev. Dr. David Williams and Carlile College encouraged me by paying my fees at UNISA. My family was well looked after financially by the Eyre's and all the friends at Sharing Life Trust. The Russell's and the High Street Baptist Church financially supported and prayed for us constantly. You all deserve special thanks for your support. All our friends at All Nations Christian College (ANCC), Brockley Community Church and different friends throughout UK stood with us as a family ensuring we were not lonely despite being away from our home country.

Last, though by no means least, my wife Christine Ndayihimbaze who, despite her own academic obligations, amazingly remained a wonderful wife and mum and deserves abundant thanks. She remains the person behind the success of this work.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ANCC: All Nations Christian College

CNDD-FDD: Conseil National Pour la Defence de la Democratie –Front Pour la Defence de la Democratie

FRODEBU: Front pour la Democratie au Burundi

LWF: Lutheran World Federation

MNC: Mouvement Nationalist Congolais

MSF: Medecin Sans Frontieres

NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations

OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

PALIPEHU –FNL: Parti Pour le Liberation du Peuple Hutu – Front National de Liberation

PARENA: Parti pour le redressement National

PDC: Parti Democratic Chretien

PP: Parti du people

TANU: Tanganyika African National Union

TCRS: Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service

UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UPRONA: Union pour le Progres National

UUC: Ulyankulu Union of Church

All Biblical quotations and references have been taken from New Revised Standard Version

## **SUMMARY**

One of the consequences of the ethnic hatred between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi is that around 10% of Burundians were forced to flee to Tanzania for their safety. Three decades after the creation of Ulyankulu Settlement through the joint efforts of the Tanzanian government, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) it is assumed that these refugees are fully assimilated and feel at home. However, this dissertation argues that they do not feel at home and consequently long to return to their homeland. This study is an attempt to understand the experience of refugees in Ulyankulu Settlement and the contribution of this experience towards their craving for their homeland. It also explores the role played by Anglican Church in shaping these refugees' experience. Finally the study proposes ways of improving the church's ministry among these refugees.

## **KEY TERMS**

Hutu, Tutsi, Anglican Church, Homeland, Hope, refugee settlement, Burundi, Tanzania, genocide, church leaders, Ulyankulu, refugees

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**Figure 1:** Map of Africa, showing the geographic situation of the countries mentioned in the study in comparison with other African countries.

Source: [www.africaguide.com](http://www.africaguide.com)




**Figure 2: Map showing the Great Lakes region with countries that produce and host refugees.**  
Source: [www.reliefweb.com](http://www.reliefweb.com) (2000)

# BURUNDI


As of 31 May 2000

Burundian Refugees in Tanzania, Internally Displaced and Returnees in Burundi



**Figure 3: Map showing the geographic situation of refugee camps in Tanzania and where they came from in Burundi.**

Source: UNHCR website (2000)



**Figure 4: Map showing the geographic situation of all the refugee settlements (including the three Burundian refugee settlements referred to in this study).**  
 Source: Armstrong (1987) for TCRS copied from Malkki (1995)

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **1 INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background**

I will never forget my first experience as a refugee in the Tanzanian forests bordering Burundi in October 1993. We were in our thousands walking through the forests and villages of Gitanga and Heru-Ushingo in Western Tanzania searching for food and shelter with very little success. The UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) was not yet present and we were alone and suffering from all kinds of diseases including malaria, dysentery, skin complaints and other problems. I would think that the death rate in this place was even higher than that occasioned by the civil war in Burundi at the same time. We slept in the bush where rain and mosquitoes were our companions. We helped ourselves (not to say that we were stealing) from Tanzanian farmers' fields before starting to eat wild fruits and animals.

As a Christian, I started asking a lot of questions without finding any answers. Why did we have to go through all this? What does it mean to be a Christian in these circumstances? Is it possible for this to happen to God's people? Where is God and His Church at this time? The questions of the refugee community ranged from our past life in Burundi, our present nightmare in Tanzania, to our hopeless and dark future.

After some weeks, the Roman Catholic Church came to our rescue with some dry maize that we boiled and ate. Later MSF (Medecins Sans Frontieres), World Concern, and Oxfam arrived with medical help, food relief, and water assistance respectively. They later transferred us to Mtabila refugee camp where we received more assistance and many other organisations joined the relief effort. Although these international organisations worked hard to alleviate our suffering, life was extremely hard and our needs piled up day and night. Some of the reports given about our situation were false; others were half-truths, while few were true. The organisations serving refugees based their decisions on these reports and the situation continued to get worse with time. I longed for a situation when refugees would be able to tell their own story and propose a solution to their problems, but this was evidently not going to happen.

Of all the questions that I had, the most disturbing one related to the role of the church in this experience. And when I thought of the church, I had in mind the mighty mega churches around the world, and more specifically the churches in Tanzania and Burundi that were aware of some of our suffering. It seemed to me these churches were supposed to have come to our rescue long before the UNHCR and other organisations but the opposite happened.

Finally, I had a shift in my mind-set and I started to ask a slightly different question: what is the church in the refugee camp doing vis-à-vis this experience? Rather than seeing these refugees' experience as a challenge to the church outside the camp, I started thinking about the role of refugee Christians and refugee churches in trying to respond to this situation.

It is within this context that, after my training at Carlile College (Nairobi, Kenya), I went to work in Mtabila Camp and Ulyankulu Settlement (2001-2002) as a Church Army Evangelist. It was then that I first came in contact with refugees who had been living in Ulyankulu for 30 years. As I talked with them, they sounded as though they had just left Burundi with fresh memories about this beautiful country. They spoke of their suffering for the last 30 years in Ulyankulu settlement and most of them longed to go back to Burundi. Since a large number were born in the settlement I took it for granted that they would find Ulyankulu Settlement naturally their home but their feelings proved me wrong. My experiences first as a refugee and later as an evangelist in Tanzanian refugee camps have compelled me to write the following study.

After 2002, I left Tanzania for further studies at All Nations Christian College, near London until 2004. Since then I have been regularly visiting Ulyankulu and Mtabila refugee camps and I have been involved in different workshops with Church Leaders.

## **1.2 Rationale**

This study seeks to analyse the experience of Burundian refugees living in Tanzania and to consider the missiological aspects of the responses of the Anglican Church to this experience. The study investigates the religious, political, social, and economic life of refugees in Ulyankulu refugee settlement in order to explore the context within which these refugees are craving for a future life in Burundi, their homeland. The study also analyses the response of the Anglican Church in relation to this experience with a view to discerning some of the possible ways in which churches could serve these refugees more effectively.

## **1.3 Statement of the Problem**

After more than 30 years in Tanzanian camps (1972 to 2006), the Tripartite Agreement has been referred to as “one of the successful long term remedies” of the Burundian refugee problem<sup>1</sup>. So it has been assumed firstly, that after the handover of the three Burundian rural settlements

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<sup>1</sup> As Charles Gasarasi (1984:19-25) pointed it, the tripartite arrangement between the Tanzanian Government on behalf of the Tanzania Sovereign State, UNHCR as a non-operational Inter-Governmental Organisation (IGO), and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) through its local arm Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) which is a humanitarian Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) was to ensure that the three parties would work together towards the success of the settlement of the rural refugees.

(Ulyankulu, Katumba, and Mishamo) to the government of Tanzania, these refugees are living like other Tanzanian villagers, thus making the process of integration complete. Until, now there has been no study focusing on the experience of these rural refugees as a separate entity from their Tanzanian neighbours. In particular, these refugees have not had a chance to express to researchers their experience and feelings about their lives in these settlements<sup>2</sup>. This is the first problem this study is going to deal with.

The second assumption made about these Burundian refugees has been that these refugees were successfully permanently resettled and felt themselves at home in Tanzania. For example, the late President Julius Nyerere referred, in his speeches, to these refugees as "Resident Guests", a term, which implied that these refugees were treated and felt like other Tanzanians (Amnesty International 2005, <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR160082005>). Arising from this assumption, the second problem that this study is going to investigate is whether or not these refugees feel at home in their settlements. In particular, the study is investigating whether or not these refugees would like to return to Burundi. Finally, this study will attempt to explain the response of the Anglican Church to the refugees' experience.

#### **1.4 Hypotheses**

The study tests the following hypotheses:

- Difficult circumstances in the refugee settlements contribute to the refugees' craving for their homeland.
- The refugees' religious background contributes to this craving.
- The role of Churches in the camps is to guide refugees on what they need to do to get back to Burundi.

#### **1.5 Research Questions**

The study is seeking to provide answers to the following questions:

- What experience are refugees having in the settlements?
- What is the relationship between the experience of the refugees and the longing for their homeland?
- What is the role of the churches in the camps vis-à-vis the experience of refugees?

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<sup>2</sup> Liisa H. Malkki (1995:3) visited Mishamo refugee settlement and collected a lot of data that could serve as a good starting point towards understanding the experience of Burundian refugees in Tanzania. However, her primary concern was to carry out an ethnographic study. Second, Malkki visited the camp between October 1985 and October 1986 and ever since, many things have changed so that there is a need for re-looking into the refugees' experiences again. Liisa confessed this in her postscript that she wrote without having the firsthand information. One of this study's aims is an attempt to try to do this.

## **1.6 Objectives**

The objectives of this study are:

- To explore the experience of refugees in the camps
- To establish the connection between the experience of refugees and their longing for homeland
- To explore the role of the churches vis-à-vis the refugees' experience and to suggest some ways of enhancing the mission of the church towards the refugees

## **1.7 Significance of the study**

The study will contribute to the knowledge about the experience of Burundian refugees in Tanzania. The Government of Burundi and other Non Governmental Organisations will find interest in this study in their process of repatriation of refugees. Furthermore, the study may be valuable to governments, the UNHCR, and other humanitarian agencies working with refugees in the process of settlement of refugees in other countries and regions. The study will be of assistance to the churches operating in the camps and settlements, enabling them to re-examine their missionary outreach to the refugees. Finally the study will help to identify further aspects for research among the refugees.

## **1.8 Scope and Limitation of the study**

A study into the experience of all the Burundian refugees in Tanzania's refugee camps would be a major project requiring significant financial and human resource investment. Because of the constraint of funds, time and distance, this study has concentrated only on the Ulyankulu refugee settlement. There are ten Burundian refugee camps and settlements in Tanzania. Therefore, the outcome of this enquiry may not exactly reflect the situation in all these camps and settlements, and the conclusions drawn from the sampled population will be specific to the Ulyankulu settlement.

Furthermore, although it is imperative to explore other factors (like the elimination of the causes which forced these refugees out of the country) that contribute to the refugees' craving for their homeland, the scope of this study is to explore the contribution of the experience of these refugees towards this craving.


Finally, this study is not attempting to explore the role played by the churches worldwide or even in Tanzania in relation to the refugees' experience. The study is limited, in particular, to the Anglican Church in Ulyankulu settlement although some references will be made to other churches within this settlement.



### 1.9 Theoretical framework

This study uses the “*pastoral circle*” or the “*cycle of praxis*” as its method of study. Joe Holland and Peter Henriot (1983:7-9) first developed this method as they used it in their approach to social analysis. As they describe it, the pastoral circle comprises of four moments which are Insertion, Social Analysis, Theological Reflection, and Pastoral Planning. They argue that, in this pastoral circle, all the four moments are linked up and overlap.

The following is the diagram that they used to explain how the pastoral circle works:




**Figure 5: The Pastoral Circle**

In his exploration of the theme “Who do you say that I am? (Mark 8:29)” at the Council for World Mission (CWM) in Kuala Lumpur, J.N.J. Kritzinger (2002: 144) picks up the same method which he develops and calls the *Praxis cycle*. He understands this as a theological method that leads to action and that emerges from action - so that our theologising does not alienate us from people but rather connects us with them in organic ways.

As the author explains, this method helps us not only to hear the question as “who do you say I am?” but “what do you do... if this is who you say I am?” (: 147). He develops Holland and Henriot’s (1983) cycle to include five points, namely Involvement, Context Analysis, Theological Reflection, Spirituality, and Planning. In the author’s view, if praxis aims at answering adequately the question that Jesus asks, it has to be *collective* (a communal thing), *transformative* (aiming at bringing a change), and *holistic* (integrating all the five moments without which one ends up with “missiological shortcuts”). Therefore failing to integrate the five points will inevitably lead to “shortcuts” that can be described as “political activist” (when one neglects the theological reflection and spirituality), “ivory tower” (which ignores involvement and planning), “missionary activist”

(which leaves out the theological reflection and the social analysis), and “conversionist” (which tends to ignore the social analysis). (Kritzinger 2002: 149-151). Kritzinger’s diagram for his praxis cycle is reproduced below:



**Figure 6: The Praxis Cycle**

This study will use Holland and Henriot’s four point model as the basis for the development of the dissertation. Although Kritzinger suggests adding spirituality as a separate moment, this study considers spirituality to be running through the four moments so that one’s spirituality will be an invisible hand that influences the way one deliberates on issues throughout the pastoral circle. The pastoral cycle will be a particular focus of chapters four, five and six of the study. In addition it

should be stressed that this study is interdisciplinary. The data collection and analysis makes use of historical, sociological, anthropological, psychological, economic, and political ideas.

#### **1.10 Operational definitions of key terms**

**[Anglican Church:]** As Mugambi (1995:116-118) describes it, the Anglican Church's structure falls under the Episcopal model. The power to give spiritual and administrative guidance to the church in every diocese is vested to the Diocesan Bishop. The Anglican Church in Ulyankulu camp is under the Diocese of Tabora but it has significant independence in terms of deliberating on issues regarding refugees in this camp. The rural Dean who leads the Anglican Church in Ulyankulu is a refugee and he has power, through the Deanery Council, to take decisions on important issues raised in the settlement and inform the diocesan leadership afterwards (Cishahayo 2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May).

**[Refugee:]** According to the *African Research Bulletin*,

"In everyday speech, a refugee is someone who has been compelled to abandon his (*sic*) home. He (*sic*) is uprooted, homeless, diminished, in all his circumstances, the victim of events for which at least as an individual, he (*sic*) cannot be held responsible" (Anand 1993: 1).

The refugees who are the subject of discussion in this work are Hutu Burundians who fled their country to Tanzania mainly between 1972 and 1973 as a result of a civil war (which others would like to refer to as genocide of the Hutu) between the Hutu and Tutsi.

**[Refugee Settlement:]** A Refugee Settlement is a geographical space where these refugees were kept and rehabilitated. It is a settlement as opposed to a refugee camp because these refugees are no longer depending on the UNHCR assistance. They have been given land by the government of Tanzania to produce food for their own subsistence. This land was given with a view to settle them permanently in a second country - Tanzania, unlike those in refugee camps who are meant to be there for a short time before going back home.

**[Burundi:]** The Republic of Burundi is a country in Central Eastern Africa. It borders Rwanda to the north, the Democratic Republic of Congo to the west, and Tanzania to the south and east. Burundians are Burundi Nationals.

**[Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa:]** The Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa are the three ethnic communities that inhabit Burundi in proportions of 85%, 14%, and 1% respectively (Ndarubagiye 1996: xv). They also inhabit Rwanda in a similar ratio.

**[Hope:]** Hope in this work is being used to refer to the strong expectation and feeling that the Burundian refugees in Tanzania have, once they go back to their homeland, for a better situation than the one they are living in.

**[Homeland:]** The term homeland is used to mean a country of origin (Burundi in this case) for these refugees. This does not mean that these refugees were necessarily born in Burundi, as the majority were born in Tanzania. In particular, the concept of Homeland for these refugees is deeper than merely a country of origin. It expresses a sense of belonging, identity, security, and prosperity.

### **1.11 Organisation of the study**

This study comprises seven chapters. The first chapter covers the introductory information which includes the statement of the problem, the research question and objectives, the statement of hypotheses, the significance of the study, the theoretical framework, the operational definitions of key terms, and the methodology used in this study. The review of the literature related to this study is covered in the second chapter. This review is divided into the historical background of the refugee problem, the experience of refugees and other related documents, the churches' response to this experience, works on the Jewish exilic experience, and the theological methods used in the study. The third chapter deals with the historical background to the Burundian refugee crisis. This covers the pre-colonial, the colonial and the post-colonial period.

The analysis of these findings covers chapter four and five. Chapter four deals with the experience of Refugees in Ulyankulu Settlement while chapter five deals with the role of religion in shaping this experience. Chapter six proposes ways forward towards improving the mission of the church to these refugees. Chapter seven presents the summary, conclusions and recommendations.

### **1.12 Methodology**

#### **1.12.1 Research design**

The research used in this study is based on a survey conducted in Ulyankulu. Ulyankulu refugee settlement is large with a population of approximately 60,000 people, living in a settlement of 60 square kilometres. An attempt to cover all these people in such a large area would be impossible, so the survey covered a sample of the above population.

### 1.12.2 Targeted sample:

The sampling was done on the following basis:

**Age:** Both those who left Burundi when they were mature enough to understand what was going on and those who were born in the camp were included in the sample.

**Sex:** Women, being among the vulnerable groups, find it difficult to cope with new life in the camp especially if they have become head of families (Rogge 1994: 44). They also find it difficult to recover their properties after repatriation. Thus it is important that women's views are considered alongside men's.

**Profession:** church leaders, businessmen, farmers, and civil servants

**Political affiliation:** Those who sympathise both with CNDD–FDD (Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie –Force de la Défense de la Démocratie) (National Council for the Defence of Democracy), and with PALIPEHUTU –FNL (Parti Pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu – Front National Pour la Liberation) (Hutu People Liberation Party –Liberation National Front).<sup>3</sup>

**Procedure:** Questionnaires were distributed to two hundred and fifty refugees from Ulyankulu Settlement using the above criteria. 95% responded with completed questionnaires. From those, ten senior Church Leaders (Rural Dean, Canons, Pastors and other leaders) from the Anglican Church were identified and interviewed in order to give them an opportunity more extensively to express their personal views and the Anglican Church's views on the research problem.

### 1.12.3 Research instrument

In order to get the information needed, two hundred and fifty questionnaires were prepared and distributed to 250 people (For more Information please refer to Appendix 1 for the introductory letter and the questionnaire). The questionnaire was divided into three parts<sup>4</sup>:

The first part aimed at covering the experience of refugees. It contained 37 questions: 7 questions to cover the historical experience, 8 questions to cover the social experience, 14 questions

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<sup>3</sup> Please note that people would not identify themselves alongside parties for security reasons as refugees are not allowed to actively involve themselves in politics of their country of origin. So since the researcher has worked in Ulyankulu refugee settlement, and since he developed confidence with a good number of the refugees, they can feel free to verbally disclose information about their party affiliation so long as this information will not be shared with the Tanzanian authorities.

Both CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL have the same agenda: to politically and military fight against the oppressive Tutsi regime and Liberate Hutu who have been oppressed for decades. Whereas PALIPEHUTU-FNL has been characterised by a strong stand against Tutsi, CNDD-FDD is rather moderate towards Tutsi and would have Tutsi members within its ranks so long as they are opposed to the Tutsi injustice against Hutu. The two politico-military movements have their genesis and stronghold among the refugees although, with time, they are currently strong on the whole territory of Burundi with CNDD-FDD at the leadership of the country after the 2005 general elections.

<sup>4</sup> Please refer to Appendix 3 for the Swahili translation of the introductory letter, the questionnaire and the interview guide.

to cover the economic experience, and 8 questions to cover the political experience of those refugees<sup>5</sup>.

The second part had 9 questions that sought to cover information about repatriation while the third part comprised of 9 questions with the aim of assessing the involvement of the church in the experience of refugee.

The questionnaire was put together with the aim of testing the hypothesis. For more detailed information, an interview guide was prepared and given to ten senior church leaders from the Anglican Church with the aim of getting more information about the role played by the church in the experience of refugees.

Both the questionnaire and the interview guide were translated into Kiswahili, as most of the refugees found it easier to read and write this language. However, during the interview, it was clear that the interviewees preferred to mix both Kirundi and Kiswahili.

#### **1.12.4 Description of Data Collection**

The researcher distributed the questionnaire himself. As it was difficult to travel throughout the large area that the settlement covers, the researcher was based at “Barabara” 28 (Street Number 28), Mbeta Village which is the Anglican headquarters. Originally, the researcher had planned to stay at Street 13, which is a centre where most people in the camp come twice a week (Wednesdays and Saturdays) for shopping and socialisation. The choice of Street 13 enabled the researcher to distribute these questionnaires and collect them after they had been completed. However, it was felt that there was a need to stay at the Anglican mission headquarters because of transport, accommodation and restoration facilities that were being generously provided by the Rural Dean’s family. So the researcher travelled to churches and streets to distribute questionnaires to refugees and collect them at the same venues. Some church leaders from the Anglican Church helped in distributing and collecting questions after training aimed at orienting them to the criteria on which the questionnaires were to be distributed. Concerning the interview, the researcher conducted 9 of the interviews at Street Number 28 in the deanery offices and one at the home of the interviewee.

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<sup>5</sup> The first question about the age is intentionally specific for the following reasons:

Those above 52 left Burundi when they were 18 years and above, those between 52 and 41 are presumed to have dropped out of school by the time they left Burundi, those between 41 and 34 came in the camp before or just at the age of school and may have lost on their chance to go to school in Tanzania because they were caught up by the process of early settlement, while those below 34 were born in Ulyankulu refugee settlement.

#### **1.12.5 Data analysis**

For the questionnaire, the closed-ended questions were coded, tallied to obtain frequencies, then the percentages were calculated and conclusions made to test the hypothesis. Answers in open-ended questions and interviews were categorised, tallied to obtain frequencies and then percentages. The conclusions were drawn and discussed in the light of the proposed hypothesis.

## CHAPTER TWO

### 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

Very little has been written or published in relation to the experience and historical background of Burundian refugees in Tanzania. The limited information that is available is in the form of articles, although these articles<sup>6</sup> reinforce the sense that not many researchers have given this issue serious attention.

Literature review of the Burundian refugee crisis must start with the causes that led these refugees to leave their native country. Identifying the issues that led these Hutu refugees to leave their beloved country to a foreign land not only helps us to appreciate their present situation but also gives insight into their aspirations for the future.

#### 2.1 Burundi History

Ndarubagiye (1996: ix –xiv), a politician from the Tutsi ethnic groups, in his book *Burundi: The origins of the Hutu-Tutsi Conflict*, summarises the origins of Hutu – Tutsi conflict in this war-torn country. He is convinced that the Burundian problem is both ethnic and political. Contrary to what other people tend to believe, that the conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi have been mainly as a result of a calculated colonial system, Ndarubagiye argues that these conflicts are a result of hundreds of years of mismanagement of the country by the Tutsi ethnic group. He argues that Tutsi dominated the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial social, economic and political life of the country while Hutus were systematically kept out of it.

Ndarubagiye is unique in the way that he defines the causes of the current Hutu-Tutsi conflict. He blames the Tutsi community for this conflict, while he sees Hutu as the victims of Tutsi injustice. His argument is given weight by the fact that he is a Tutsi politician condemning his Tutsi community. As he argues, he speaks from a personal experience as somebody who has privileged access to information which is hidden to those who are not Tutsi<sup>7</sup>. However, Ndarubagiye seems to

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<sup>6</sup> For example, Pasteur Nshimirimana (1996: [www.arib.info](http://www.arib.info)), in his article *Genocide Hutu de 1972 : Jusqu'à quand le silence*, and René Lemarchand (2002: [www.arib.info](http://www.arib.info)) in his article *Le génocide de 1972 au Burundi: Les silences de l'Histoire*, argue that not many people are not interested in what is going on in Burundian and that very little is being written in this respect.

<sup>7</sup> Whenever there are conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi, these two communities divide themselves into two groups alongside these ethnic factions. Among the aims of this grouping are:

1. To share information about what should be done to protect one's ethnic group against the aggression of the enemy
2. To share the information about the strategies taken by the group leaders to hide evidences of the crimes done during fighting
3. To inform the group on how things are moving on the fighting field
4. To cheer up the group members to fight for their tribe.

Generally the sharing is frank and more so among the leaders and everybody can easily understand what is going on at that time. It is considered as an act of betrayal if any one member of the group dears to share this information with



systematically downplay the role played by colonial powers in this conflict. He may have deliberately chosen to just blame Tutsi for this conflict because he was, indirectly trying to justify the war that the then CNDD rebel movement (for which he was an influential leader until 2006 when he defected to CNDD-FDD) had raged against the Tutsi-monopolised army in Burundi at the time he was writing<sup>8</sup>.

Contrary to Ndarubagiye, Lemarchand (1995: 1-16) a University Professor who conducted extensive research on the history of Burundi does not situate the Hutu – Tutsi hostility in the pre-independence period. In his book *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide* he argues that during the pre-colonial period there was a clear distinction of political-economic power between the Ganwa<sup>9</sup> who assumed absolute divine political responsibilities while Tutsi and Hutus were herders and cultivators respectively. He argues that any political conflicts in the traditional Burundi were between the descendents of the two royal sub-clans: the Bezi and Batare, but not between Hutu and Tutsi.

According to Lemarchand, the feudal system of cows and land (which many people believe to have constituted the early Tutsi domination over Hutu) was rather a “game” of interest between different social classes and it was independent of ethnic polarisation. Lemarchand associates tribalism in Burundi widely with the changes brought by the colonial powers. He believes that with the coming of colonial masters, the Tutsi started to gradually take position in the colonial state system while the Ganwa continued to be kings and princes. The colonial instruments polarised the social classes in Burundi into two ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi. The Tutsi were privileged by the system while the Hutu continued to be systematically disempowered.

According to Lemarchand (burundi-sites.com), the Rwandan Hutu revolution in 1959 which brought the Hutu in Rwanda to power had an important role to play in the Hutu – Tutsi conflict in Burundi<sup>10</sup>. The Hutu in Burundi hoped to emulate the Rwandan model, while Tutsi were afraid to go through the same political nightmare as their counterparts in Rwanda.

The 1972 “genocide” made a huge difference in the way the Hutu – Tutsi conflict was interpreted. The concept of genocide became central to Hutu argument and the memories of the 1972 martyrdom reframed the social reconstruction of their identity. Furthermore the leadership of

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another member who is not of the same ethnic group. So Ndarubagiye is sharing from what he saw, heard and experienced as a Tutsi who could easily mix up with others members of this tribe and access information which would basically be denied to other Burundians who are not Tutsi.

<sup>8</sup> A detailed account on the origins of CNDD and CNDD-FDD is given in the following chapter.

<sup>9</sup> Although the majority of Burundian would take Ganwa as a clan within the Tutsi community, a number of Baganwa have been identifying themselves as a separate tribe alongside Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.

<sup>10</sup> This is one of the reasons why a few works on the Rwandan Hutu-Tutsi conflict will be reviewed.

the country by Tutsi since independence and the systematic exclusion of Hutu from all positions of power and responsibility explain Hutu frustrations and the constant struggle to be involved in the management of their country. On the other hand, for Tutsi who are the minority, the imperative of physical survival makes recourse to violence inevitable, even if not morally justifiable (Lemarchand 1995: xii).

Although European, Lemarchand does not try to cover up the European role in shaping the Hutu – Tutsi conflict in Burundi. His conclusions are based on research including tables on how posts in public jobs and admission into the learning institutions were distributed to Hutu and Tutsi. However, it is rather difficult to conceive how Lemarchand attributes all the Hutu – Tutsi conflict to the colonial and postcolonial periods. In particular, his argument that the feudal practices of “Ubugabire” and “Ubugererwa” should be understood merely as social class arrangement does not convey the whole truth about these practices. The other purpose of this feudal system, it seems, was an instrument used by Tutsi to dominate Hutu as Ndarubagiye has argued. Otherwise, how can Lemarchand account for the fact that in almost all cases, Tutsi were the beneficiaries of this system while Hutu suffered greatly under it?

Weinstein and Schrire (1976: 57-58) in their book *Political Conflict and Ethnical Strategies: A Case Study of Burundi* explain the Burundian ethnic problem as being about two-party ethnic conflict, where survival is the goal pursued by power-dominant but numerically inferior group. In what seems to be a reconciliation between Ndarubagiye and Lemarchand (although the authors did not have Ndarubagiye and Lemarchand in mind) the book explains that the conflict between the Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority moved from conflict over economic welfare and power to survival in the early 1960s. Tutsi adopted a defensive strategy for privileged positions in the political and economic life of the country. Hutu perceived this strategy as offensive since they had acquired legitimate power through a strong representation in the national Assembly.

In the years that led to the 1972 conflict, the “habit of ethnicity” and a vicious cycle of violence – repression – counter violence that is difficult to break was set in motion to such an extent that the elite lost control over it. This led to the inevitable killings of 1972, which widened the animosity between Hutu and Tutsi of this country (: 60).

Check (2005: 65-91), from a historical point of view, sought to establish a more comprehensive documentation of the causes of Hutu – Tutsi conflict in Burundi. In his unpublished thesis: *Conflict in the Great Lake Region of Africa: The Burundi Experience, 1993-2000*, he states that the causes of ethnic violence in Burundi have been argued with half - truths, because of wrong diagnosis and consequently inadequate solutions. He proposes that colonialism, institutional failure, privatisation of key state institutions including the military, judiciary, and educational system are at

the base of Burundian conflicts. He also believes that the “*de facto* immunity” granted to perpetrators of ethnic crimes in this country leads to an endless cycle of strife and violence<sup>11</sup>. In what he referred to as minor causes of the conflict, he points out the role played by the Roman Catholic Church in the Hutu-Tutsi Conflict, the enormous population pressure on the limited resources of the country, and the international support that oppressive Burundian governments enjoyed over the years<sup>12</sup>. Further, he also believes that the Burundian conflict has a regional dimension. In particular, he states that regional wars have accounted for the infiltration and proliferation of arms in Burundi.

Perhaps the most important contribution that Check brings to the understanding of the Hutu – Tutsi conflict in Burundi is his ability to combine different possible causes in a single volume. He does not just make a collection of possible causes from different sources, but does an extensive and convincing study of these causes. However, the author overplays the reconciling role played by the Baganwa between Hutu and Tutsi. Of course we cannot close our eyes to the role that monarchy played to keep the Hutu – Tutsi conflict as silent as possible, but this should not excuse us from realising that the kings who were Baganwa facilitated the feudal system which mainly served to elevate the social economic status of Tutsi at the expense of their Hutu counterparts. Indeed, generally Baganwa are considered a Tutsi sub clan and their support towards the Tutsi cause can be realised in the way King Mwambutsa, at the aftermath of independence, played politics that favoured the Tutsi.

## **2.2 The Rwandan Case**

Although Check refers to the role played by the Catholic Church in the Hutu – Tutsi conflict in Burundi as minor, Gatwa (2000:1-10) in his article: “Mission and Belgian Colonial Anthropology in Rwanda. Why the Churches Stood Accused in the 1994 Tragedy? What next?” is convinced that the church (both the Protestant and Catholic churches) played a central role in developing the racial ideology, thus putting a heavy responsibility on the church both in Rwanda and Burundi vis-à-vis the Hutu – Tutsi conflicts in those two countries. Studying the role played by the Church in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the article states that although ethnicity is God’s blessing, cultural identity

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<sup>11</sup> Although the post independence Burundian history was characterised by conflict between Hutu and Tutsi with major war crimes, the successive governments that led the country did not prosecute anybody for these crimes. Infact, it is believed that most of the government officials were involved in a number of crimes reason for which they benefited from impunity.

<sup>12</sup> The Roman Catholic Church was privileged by the colonial masters and was given the responsibility to oversee social facilities like schools and hospital. However this church did not take this opportunity to use her influence to challenge the divisive system that was established by Belgians in Burundi and Rwanda. Instead the church enrolled, in their schools, Tutsi sons at the expense of their Hutu counterparts.

and ethnic belonging have been exploited by political and ideological systems whose interest is not democracy, and this helped them to strengthen their monopoly on power by taking a group's identity as a foundation for forms of patriotism, which excludes the other. Unfortunately, as the author points out, the church fell into the same trap.

In Rwanda, Gatwa realises that the "Hamite supremacy" system in the pre-independent Rwanda and "the Rubanda Nyamwinshi" system in post colonial time were exploiting the peasant Munyarwanda, and are the root cause of the 1994 genocide. He is keen to show that the explorers and missionaries' literatures, which developed and propagated that Hamites (or Tutsi) were people with good features and inner qualities for domination and rule, were based on wrong assumptions and stereotypes. Consequently, the missionary and colonial schools decided to educate only Tutsi while they excluded Hutu and Twa sons because they believed that Tutsi were the only ones to lead the growing churches and to assume local administration and other activities reserved for the elite. Even in Burundi, which was reluctant to exclude Hutu and Twa sons, did later change to follow the Rwandan example.

In his article "The Cause of the 1994 Rwandan Civil War: Political Versus Structural Explanations", Lema (2000:373-376) dismisses the 1994 genocide causes identified by other scholars. Such arguments like ethnic manipulation, the assassination of the Burundian President Ndadaye, the abortion of the democratic process, population growth, falling coffee prices, and environmental problems given in other reports and articles are disqualified by Lema. Instead Lema believes that social prestige and "rank-disequilibrium" (frustration and aggression) are the key historical and structural element incarnated in the struggles throughout the time before genocide. According to him, the civil war was neither tribal nor ethnic. The problem, he argues, is that ethnicity has coincided with social strata.

Thus before independence, the Tutsi minority had the monopoly of social prestige while the Hutu majority had not yet reached this position. The Tutsi ranked higher in terms of political and economic power, ethnocultural and educational prestige while the Hutu ranked low in all these positions.

After independence, things changed and the Hutu gained power and prestige in all domains except the ethnocultural prestige, which was retained by the Tutsi because of the positive historical connotation associated with them. The problem here is that ethnicity has coincided with class, Lema observes. The Tutsi felt superior even if they were low-ranked politically, economically, and without educational rank. So they were in rank-disequilibrium, and those Tutsi elites who were, nevertheless, segregated against were the most frustrated. Consequently aggression became their only way to raise their social rank. Likewise, although Hutu were politically powerful and the

majority in Rwanda, their ethnocultural affinity did not give them social prestige. So they were in rank-disequilibrium and thus frustrated and aggressive.

Lema's thesis is inspirational and should be looked at with a great deal of interest. It is true that the problem of rank-disequilibrium can be observed among Hutu and Tutsi camps. However, Lema is exaggerating this problem by suggesting that it is the single cause of the 1994 genocide. If it were, then it is difficult to explain why Hutu extremists killed other moderate Hutu who are meant to fall under the same rank-disequilibrium. It is difficult for Lema to convince the reader that the problem of overpopulation in a poor country like Rwanda has nothing to do with the causes of genocide. The causes of the Rwandan genocide, like those of the Burundian tribal conflicts are numerous and complex. Lema seems not to see any correlation between the Hutu – Tutsi conflict in Burundi and Rwanda. However, what happened in Rwanda influenced what was to happen in Burundi and vice versa.

### **2.3 The Refugee Experience**

The Hutu – Tutsi conflicts in Burundi led to a departure of Burundian Hutu refugees to Tanzania. Although Tanzania has a large number of refugees who came in 1993 and 1994, the refugees referred to in this study arrived in Tanzania in 1972 and 1973. There is little literature written on these refugees, and the few articles that the researcher was able to source are reviewed below, beginning with a review of how these refugees were received when they arrived in Tanzania.

In his Research Report No 71, Gasarasi (1984: 1-14) shows that the burden of refugees in Africa is too heavy to be carried by any one single country in the continent. He discusses the problems generated by the flux of refugees in the host countries. The scarcity of resources in the host countries and the nature of the emergency created by the sudden influx of refugees make it difficult for host countries to respond effectively to the needs of refugees. The 1969 OAU (Organisation of African Unity) Convention on Refugees which stated the principles of “burden sharing”, whereby a member state with a big burden could appeal to another member state to lighten the refugee burden, did not work thus leaving every host country to carry its own cross.

Gasarasi (1984: 15-36) discusses how Tanzania tried to meet the need of refugees from the neighbouring countries including Rwanda, Mozambique, Burundi, South Africa, Malawi, Uganda, Kenya, Zaire, etc. In particular, the author discusses the procedure that this country used to settle refugees in what came to be known as rural refugee settlements. The idea was to settle refugees in different rural settlements, help them for some time until they were able to be self-sustaining and hand them over to the Tanzanian Government which would then manage them like other Tanzanian local populations. In order to succeed in this programme there was a “Tripartite arrangement”

between the Tanzanian Government, UNHCR, and Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS). In general, the agreement was done in the spirit of the 1951 refugee convention and the Tanzania laws.

Gasarasi (1984: 36-48) recognises that the tripartite agreement was successful and effective. However, he mentions some of the difficulties with regards to planning, inexperience in dealing with refugees, communication among the three parties or within one party, power sharing among the parties, refugees' involvement in the planning and implementations of the settlement project, etc. He, however, acknowledged that efforts to deal with these problems were deployed as time went by and as the parties gained experience; so much so that the later settlements project like Mishamo settlement were well executed.

After these refugees were settled, Malkki (1995:2) visited one of the rural refugee settlement, Mishamo, and the urban Burundian refugees living in Kigoma Township. In her book *Purity And Exile: Violence, Memory, And National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees In Tanzania*, she asserts that for the refugees living in Mishamo settlement, the years of their oppression and frustration by both the Tutsi and Tanzania authorities in charge of the settlement led them to acquire another identity: They viewed themselves as the true (pure) Hutu who were waiting to go back home triumphant after their enemies and foreigners, the Tutsi, had lost power. Through the stories that Malkki (1995:3) collected from this settlement, she realised that these refugees built the authenticity of their claim for the ownership of Burundi around the construction and reconstruction of their history which claims that they were the first inhabitants of Burundi while Tutsi came later<sup>13</sup>. In order to sustain such big hope of going back to Burundi, PALIPEHUTU (a political party with its strongholds in Mishamo) encouraged refugees not to go back to Burundi so that they are not killed. Instead, PALIPEHUTU had managed to convince Hutu in Mishamo that they would access the country by military power over the Tutsi enemies.

Things were not the same with refugees who lived in Kigoma Township, which Malkki (1995:3) visited after Mishamo. Instead, the refugees were losing their Hutu identity while at the same time being assimilated among the Tanzanians as they tried to do everything to look Tanzanian. They did not have a "mythico-history" to trace back their identity, as refugees in Mishamo did. It was a people *en route*, being disconnected from their past identity. No wonder then that they got married to Tanzanians, spoke Swahili, and did not want to go back to the refugee settlement, with some even receiving Tanzanian citizenship. So refugees in Kigoma were changing

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<sup>13</sup> Malkki (1995:20) herself believes that the claim that Hutu's lived in Burundi before Tutsi is "largely hypothetical due to paucity of reliable evidence". However, it is generally argued that the Twa, Hutu, then Tutsi arrived Burundi in this order.

easily between different identities depending on the context, and the urge to go back home was less important. As such, PALIPEHUTU did not have a great influence in the lives of Kigoma refugees.

Malkki's work should be strongly commended, as she was able to analyse the stories of refugees in Mishamo settlement and discover how they are strongly attracted to their homeland. The difference between refugees in the rural settlement of Mishamo and those in Kigoma Township is sufficient evidence to show that the context of each of the two groups of refugees greatly conditioned their future view of their homeland. However, it should not be taken for granted that refugees in Mishamo understood their colleagues in Kigoma as not pure Hutu. We have to remember that the town refugees are sons and daughters of the refugees in Mishamo and that more often than not they use the money that they get from town to sustain their families back in Mishamo. So the claims by Mishamo refugees that Kigoma refugees are not pure Hutu are to be primarily understood as a move to try to protect them from anybody who may try to discover their true identity and send them back to Mishamo.

Furthermore, Malkki's claim that the Kigoma refugees cared less about their homeland is another indication of misjudgement of these refugees' statements. They said these things to avoid being arrested and taken back to the settlement or forced back to Burundi. They wanted to sound Tanzanian so as to dodge the police. Otherwise, we know that these refugees were the ones supporting PALIPEHUTU's political and military efforts to take Hutus back home. Indeed, later on, they supported the CNDD-FDD war against the Burundian Government and a good number have returned home after the victory of CNDD-FDD.

Sommers (2001:57) also picked up the theme of Burundian urban refugees in his book *Fear in Bongoland: Burundi Refugees in Urban Tanzania*. He talks about a group of Burundian refugees who left the three settlements of Mishamo, Katumba, and Ulyankulu to establish themselves in Dar Es Salaam in the 1990s. His main concern relates to the fear that these refugees have as a result of living illegally in Dar Es Salaam. They also feared the Tutsi even though most of them had never seen a Tutsi, since either they were born in Tanzania or left Burundi when they were still too young to know much about Tutsi. Once in Dar Es Salaam, these refugees established a network of friendship so that they had a kind of "ethnic group" whose identity was very much rooted in their fellowship with the Pentecostal churches which shaped their hope and vision. Summers identifies another identity in these refugees: there were tensions between those Hutu who identified themselves as "Banyaruguru" (those who came from the highlands) and those from the lakeside "imbo" (called Ababo).

Life in Dar Es Salaam was not easy and these refugees had to use their brains ("Bongo") to be able to live in Bongoland and they had to be extremely wise to be able to live in the midst of all

these conflicting situations. Sommers' findings help us to realise how Burundian refugees are very much connected to their homeland. The issue of Banyaruguru and Ababo has a home background. Refugees' identities are shaped by their or their parents' place of origin back in Burundi. The second element was that these refugees were looking forward to going back to the land of their ancestors, so that the Ababo could not easily intermarry with the Banyaruguru for fear that there may be confusion on where to live once they go back home.

From the above two major works by Malkki and Sommers on Burundian refugees in Tanzania, it is clear that there are some indications that these refugees' hope is in returning home. But will it be home for them? Rogge (1994: 20-21) in his chapter, "Repatriation of Refugees: A not simple "optimum solution"" he discusses the issues surrounding the repatriation of refugees from the countries of exile to their countries of origin. Although he draws some of his example from cases in Asia, the issues discussed in this chapter are generally drawn from African experiences.

While many governments and other organisations assume that the most efficient and permanent solution to the question of refugees is repatriation, Rogge is at pains to show that repatriation, as it has been done in the recent years, has not always been an answer to the problems of refugees. In fact he argues that often, repatriations, if not done carefully, is but a starting point for new problems.

Rogge has been able to demystify the belief that repatriation is necessarily the end of refugee misery. In particular, he identifies some of the motives for repatriation that have nothing to do with the problems of refugees. The work that he did to identify different problems that await refugees upon repatriation is huge, as many agencies and people dealing with refugees do not give refugees an opportunity to decide their own destiny.

In the fourth chapter of his book *African Refugees: An Overview*, Anand (1993:56) explores durable solutions to refugeeism where he discusses three lasting solutions in their order of effectiveness.

The first is voluntary repatriation. He argues that for the voluntary repatriation to happen, three conditions must be fulfilled:

- i. The cause of flight must be eliminated so that there is political stability and order in the country of origin.
- ii. A valid amnesty must be given in a form of law to the returnees.
- iii. The refugees must be provided with proper settlement once they go back.

The second permanent solution is integration into the host country. This is done through settlement, and since most of the refugees in Africa are from the rural setting, they are settled in rural places. The settlement takes three phases: the emergency phase, the land settlement phase, and



the consolidation and integration phase. Apart from organised settlement, Anand (1993:63-64) also discusses spontaneous or self-settlement which normally depends on:

- i. Ethnic affinity between the refugees and the local people
- ii. Available land which could accommodate the refugees
- iii. Positive attitude on the part of the host government
- iv. Refugee settlements in regions far away from the sensitive border area.

The third alternative to refugeeism is resettlement in a third country. This is the least desired avenue and it is very expensive, according to the UNHCR. Resettlement is normally done for security and political reasons. Generally many refugees are resettled in Western Europe and North America, with two problems that tend to arise: first the refugees find it difficult to cope culturally, and secondly it creates a brain drain in Africa (: 75-76).

## **2.4 International and Legal Instruments for Refugees**

The UNHCR and host governments generally make their judgements on who is a genuine refugee based on the legal instruments that govern refugees. In his first chapter, of his book *African Refugees: An Overview*, Anand (1993:4-5) gives the international definition of a refugee. He first of all traces the origin of the refugee problem to the time after the First World War, which drove many people out of their home countries. As time went by, the task of defining a refugee protection system was left to the western block within the framework of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), as the eastern block had opted-out in 1949 during the Cold War. Thus, the convention relating to the status of refugees was formulated in 1951 within a specific post-World War context.

With new events which drove refugees from their homes across the world, the 1951 convention was amended in the 1967 protocol in particular, by removing both time and geographical limitations. Although the convention and the protocol remain the main legal instruments that deal with refugees, the author argues that they are limited in many ways as they leave out many groups of vulnerable refugees. No wonder then, Anand says, the African States who are normally hospitable to the refugee drafted the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa which includes an obligation on the part of the member states to “receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees” (: 11-12).

## **2.5 Theological Literature Review**

In order to be able to process the information in this study, there are some theological works that will help to process the data from a biblical perspective basing the argument on Israel’s exilic

experience, a selection of which are reviewed below: Christopher Wright's (1997: 3-4) in his book *God's People In God's Land: Family, Land and Property in the Old Testament* studies how Israel came to terms with socio-economic facts of life in the light of its distinctive historical traditions and theological self-understanding. In particular, the first part of this book was of relevance to this study. He starts by stressing the centrality of the family (extended to include several generations, slaves and other resident employees) in the social, economic and religious life of Israel.

During the Israel of the Old Testament, wealth was directly linked to land ownership. Thus to lose the family's land or to be driven out of it was the worst thing that could happen to an Israelite. No wonder, then, that one of the promises that God gives to Abraham is the promise of land. The exodus is seen as God's move towards fulfilling this promise while the laws and covenant are given with a view to life in the land. Thus Wright believes that three elements (the land was given by Yahweh in fulfilment of the promises, Yahweh was the ultimate owner of the land, and that Israel and its land are bound together) are central to land theology.

It is this relationship between Israel, land, and God that Davies (1978: 533-568) discusses in his article "La Dimension "Territoriale" du Judaïsme". He believes that the relationship between the land and Israel is not just economic. Instead, he bases his argument on the sacred Jewish texts like Tanakh, Mishnah, and Midrashim (: 534). He argues that, based on the promise that God gives first to the Israelites' ancestor Abraham; this relationship can be described as "the umbilical cord" between the Israelites and the land (: 536). This land was holy because the law was applicable to it. Consequently, the Jewish holiness was only completely possible in the holy land. The reason for this was that, outside the land, the only laws that could be observed were strictly personal laws such as moral and sexual law, Sabbath law, circumcision, food laws, etc. but not the laws related to the land (: 537). As the author argues, there is enough evidences to show that some Rabbis taught that the resurrection had to take part in the Promised Land; therefore it was important to die there. Some even suggested that the resurrection was not possible elsewhere (: 538).

These classical sources that testify about the relationship between God, land and Israel are reinforced by Jewish liturgy and other religious observances. Jews in their daily prayers reserved a deliberate interest in Jerusalem, the land of Israel, Zion and other holy places. Furthermore, a great deal of liturgy after 70 AD was focussed on remembering the destruction of the Temple (: 538-539). So there is no time when Israel gave up hope of recovering the Promised Land, renounced her right to the land, or ceased to reclaim it in her prayers and teachings.

The secondary sources are also pointing in the same direction: the history shows that the Jews in the Diaspora were not satisfied by their lives outside the land. During the second temple period, Jews made the pilgrimage to the temple in Jerusalem. After its destruction, the pilgrimage

focussed on the demolished walls of the temple and this was an opportunity for lamentation. So for Jewish history, the exile was not God's will. However, the return to the land, which was to happen at God's designated time, was part of his plan (: 541-546).

Ackroyd (1968: 39-48) in his book *Exile and Restoration*, concentrates his study on exploring the richness in thought of the exilic and restoration period. His study focuses more on the patterns of thought than on the events themselves; although he always studies these lines of thought in relation to the political context of that period, without attempting to draw the connection between the two. He discusses the events that led to the exile and the difficult situation during the exilic age both in Judah and Babylon. He classifies the reaction of the exiles to the exile situation in four groups: the return to the older cults, the acceptance of the religion of the conquerors, the recognition of Divine judgement, and the understanding, in the light of the exilic event, of the "day of Yahweh".

## **2.6 Literature on the theological methods that will be used in the study: Pastoral circle**

Bevans (2004:3) starts his book *Models of Contextual Theology* by stating clearly that there is no such a thing as theology; there is only contextual theology. For him, "pluralism in theology, as well as on every level of Christian life, must not only be tolerated; it must be positively encouraged and cultivated" (:15). He discusses six models of contextual theology in a very systematic and simple way; from the most conservative to the most radical in the following order: Countercultural Model, Translation Model, Synthetic Model, Praxis Model, Anthropological Model, and Transcendental Model.

The model that is more conservative considers scripture to be more important than context to theological development, while a more radical model will emphasise the cultural identity and its relevance to theology more than scripture. His method of analysing the models is easy to follow. Each model is discussed in its own chapter. Bevans (2004: 32) starts by describing and critiquing a model; he then critiques two theologians or a book which used or described the model, and he finally summarises the main features of each of the models. He states that the Translation Model emphasises that Christian identity is more important than contextual reality. The Translation Model does not, however, claim that context is not important to theology. Close to the Translation Model but more conservative is the Countercultural model, which always challenges the context from scripture. The Anthropological Model is the most radical, and emphasises the importance of cultural identity more than scripture and tradition. The Transcendental model focuses not on a content to be articulated, but on the subject who is articulating. Thus, one's authenticity in one's faith and one's being-in-the-world will be the basis for authentic contextualisation. The Praxis models focuses on

social change as faith is articulated. It is a correction from the temptation to engage in theological reflection that does not lead to action. The Synthetic model will attempt the extremely difficult task of keeping all the elements in perfect balance. As such this model recognises the particular and the shared. It is open to dialogue because every one person in a given culture can learn from every other person.

According to Bevans (2004:139-140), no one single model can be used exclusively without distorting the theological enterprise. He believes that there should be a healthy pluralism. Thus, he reminds the reader that some models function more adequately within a specific set of circumstances. For example, he mentions that the Praxis model may be preferred in a context where there is need for radical change, whereas Translation may be better to advocate for a *status quo*. So, in the final remarks, Bevans believe that only the context determines the best model to be used.

Bevans has done a commendable job by presenting in one volume all the six models. His works enables the reader to see clearly the advantages and disadvantages of each one of the six models in a specific context. Of all the above six models, I feel that the Praxis model can be helpful to this study.

Holland and Henriot (1983: xii-xxi) first discussed this theological method in the preface of *Social Analysis: Linking Faith and Justice*. Holland discusses the crisis of civilisation whose energies are pointed towards destroying the poor, justice, family and community, specious earth and human race. According to Holland, the classic ‘secular left’ fails to understand the spontaneity of religious energies, while the classic ‘religious right’ fails to understand the prophetic call of God for peace and justice. However, he adds that there is a need to realise that the material world is indeed spirit-filled. So he calls the local church and the religious orders, not to “leave the world” but to bond together in order to nourish the prophetic vocation of all Christians – for this is the only way for the social analysis to take on power.

The basic assumption for the need for social analysis is that the way we see the problem will determine how we respond to it. So this book was written in an attempt to describe the task of social analysis and its relevance to social justice action, to provide illustrations of analytical approaches to various problems, and to explore the suggestions and questions they raise for pastoral responses (: 4). Therefore, in their first chapter, Holland and Henriot (1983: 7) start by spelling out the difference between the two approaches of social analysis: the Academic and the Pastoral. Whereas the academic approach studies a social situation in a detached manner, the pastoral approach looks at reality from an involved, historically committed stance and discerns the appropriate action. They make it clear that their approach to social analysis in this book is pastoral. Thus the authors use the pastoral circle which comprises Insertion, Social Analysis, Theological Reflection, and Pastoral

Planning. So in this pastoral circle, all the four moments are linked up and overlap. It is clear that the study concentrates on social analysis but, every now and then, references are made to the three other moments of the pastoral circle (: 7-8).

## **2.7 Conclusion**

Firstly, it is clear that different people have different views on when the Hutu – Tutsi conflict in Burundi started. On the one hand some place the Hutu –Tutsi problem before colonialism, while others see colonialism as the starting point for this problem. I am of the view that, while the Hutu – Tutsi conflict was cultivated and popularised by colonialism, its roots lie well before the coming of Europeans. I am going to discuss this point further in the following chapter. Furthermore, events in Rwanda and Burundi influenced each other in shaping the Hutu – Tutsi conflicts. Consequently one cannot afford to discuss the Hutu – Tutsi historical experience in these countries in a sharply divorced manner, as some people have done. This is not, however, to suggest that the Hutu – Tutsi problems in Burundi and Rwanda are the same.

Secondly, it is clear that very little has been written on the experience of Hutu refugees in Tanzania. In particular, there is no religious, let alone missiological work, that seeks to understand the experiences of refugees and to improve the way to engage in mission amongst them. The place of religion in the experience of Burundian refugees has been ignored despite the fact that Hutu refugees are extremely religious, as we will see in Chapter Four. It is my impression that any study into the experience of Burundian refugees has to consider the role played by Christianity and the Burundian Traditional Religion. Burundian refugees' experience has been shaped by their religion and their theology has been shaped by their refugee experience. Finally the few reports carried out in relation to Hutu refugees' experiences were as a result of observation, with little input from refugees themselves<sup>14</sup>. Therefore I intentionally decided to listen to these refugees and let them speak about their experience, and their hope for the future.

Thirdly, the international and local legal instruments governing refugees have been elaborated by people who are not primarily refugees, and in many cases without seeking the mind of these refugees or involving them in this exercise. Consequently, some of the laws, especially local Tanzanian laws, are not flexible enough to allow refugees to decide their own destiny. Thus it may be possible to conclude that Hutu Burundian refugees have little chance to express their ideas, and their struggles are known by very few people especially in the academic and policy-making circles. The following study is an attempt to give some space to these refugees to express their thoughts about their experience.

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<sup>14</sup> As mentioned above, Liisa Malkki's work is an exception to this remark

## CHAPTER THREE

### 3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

Before looking in depth into the experience of refugees in Ulyankulu Settlement, it may be helpful to try to understand the circumstances under which these refugees left their country, Burundi in 1972 – 1973. This will also help to understand some of the reactions of refugees vis-à-vis their experiences as refugees. Furthermore, with a prior knowledge of their past experience in Burundi, it may be easier to make sense of the refugees' stories.

#### 3.1 The pre-colonial Hutu-Tutsi antagonism

Although Twa is the other ethnic community in Burundi, Hutu and Tutsi have dominated the recent Burundi political, economic, and social scene. The Twa's weaknesses numerically, politically, and economically consigned them to a minor role in the history of Burundi. This ethnic group is looked down on by Hutu and Tutsi alike, and is therefore sidelined from all major social contracts and always placed in the margins. Of recent, the Twa have been peacefully trying to persuade Tutsi and Hutu so that they may be associated to the political, social and economic management of the country but they have not managed to impose themselves as a third alternative ethnic force.

Moreover, many people with different motives have classified the Ganwa (pre- and colonial powerful political elites), as a different ethnic group from Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. With the political arrangements that follow the concept of "*deux familles politiques*" (two political families) in the division of all important posts in the government alongside agreed upon percentages between the two ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi), the claim that Ganwa is another ethnic family would be understood among some Hutu *milieu* as simply another way of getting more governmental posts for the Tutsi in the government (Kazima 2002, [www.arib.info](http://www.arib.info))<sup>15</sup>. So the motion of considering the Ganwa as a different ethnic group has not gained enough general support; ultimately because the Ganwa are understood to be a clan within the Tutsi ethnic group.

Thus the history of Burundi has been dominated by interplays, with major divisions, between Hutu and Tutsi. The 1930's records assert that Hutu were the majority with 85%, Tutsi came second in number with 14%, while Twa were the minority with 1%. That Hutu are the majority and Tutsi the minority is plausible, but the percentages above are unlikely to reflect the current position, as there has been no census since the 1930's; yet we know that there have been many social changes including mass killings of Hutu and others seeking refugee status in other countries (Lemarchand 1995:6). In the absence of any other documentation, the general opinion has

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<sup>15</sup> This means that Ganwa ethnic group would get their share, in addition to what Tutsi already have, in the division of the government posts.

been to take these percentages as true. But how divided were these two communities before the coming of the Germans and Belgian colonial masters?

Ndarubagiye (1996:17) notes that from the Burundi origins up to the arrival of the first Europeans, the “*Bami*” (kings) and their brothers and cousins “*Baganwa*” (princes) dominated the political, social and economic life of the country. The “*Bami*” were accepted by all the tribes in Burundi and were the “*sebarundi*” (the fathers of all Burundians). However, since many Burundians did not recognise the “*Baganwa*” as a distinct social group from Tutsi, the “*Bami*” have been generally classified as Tutsi. The fact that Kings in Burundi were classified together with other Tutsi clans under Tutsi community did not seem to have any effect on the stability of the monarchy. It is believed that this monarchy governed the country uninterruptedly for almost four centuries (from 1600 to 1966 when monarchism was abolished). Since the only sources of wealth were the cow and the land, Tutsi used them to dominate Hutu in a feudal exploitation known as “*Ubugererwa*” and “*Ubugabire*” which they (Tutsi) introduced. Given that all the land and other properties belonged to the King, he gave them to whoever he wanted, in most cases to Tutsi. Any resistance to the King’s decision would lead to capital punishment not only for the rebel but also for his/her whole extended family. In *Ubugererwa*, a Tutsi rented out a small piece of land to a Hutu whose land (if he had any) was too small to feed his family. In return for this land, the Hutu accepted to fulfil all kinds of household and field duties for his master’s family whenever requested to do so. “*Ubugabire*” means that the Tutsi would give a cow to a Hutu who would be expected to do all kinds of work for his master (:21).

In both cases (“*Ubugererwa*” and “*Ubugabire*”), the value of tasks fulfilled by the Hutu for his masters was far superior to the land or cow. So the “*Ubugabire*” and “*Ubugererwa*” systematically converted Hutu into slaves for Tutsi. In fact the very word Hutu means a servant (:20). Ndarubagiye is not the only one to advocate that the “*Ubugererwa*” and the “*Ubugabire*” are the early signs of the deterioration of Hutu - Tutsi relationship. Wingart (1974:22-23) believes that the introduction of a feudal system based on cows and land by the Tutsi gave them an upper hand over the Hutu majority. So what happened is that political power gave the minority Tutsi control over land and cows which they used to dominate the Hutu majority.

Lemarchand (1995:4) does not share the above idea. He does not even believe there were Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups prior to the coming of Europeans. His argument is that for Hutu and Tutsi to be two different ethnic groups, there should be cultural and physical distances between them. He argues that experience has shown that physical characteristics are very unreliable when differentiating a Hutu from a Tutsi (:7). So the claim that there were some incompatibilities between Hutu - Tutsi ancestors is simply a wrong myth that cannot describe two communities that spoke the

same language (Kirundi), lived peacefully side by side, and shared much of their social organisation (:4). What he believes is that the pre-colonial Hutu - Tutsi differences were centred on social classes, and that these differences were polarised alongside ethnic feelings by students of ethnicity who want “to reduce the inherent complexity of Burundi society to a set of greatly simplified and presumably irrefutable propositions about the roots and nature of social identities” (:5).

Ndarubagiye’s remarks about some of the origins of Hutu - Tutsi conflicts are worth considering. In particular, the feudal system had an ethnical inclination to it; so much so that the Lemarchand claims cannot hold water. It is true that the economic arrangements in the pre-colonial Burundi had inevitably to lead to the creation of social classes. In this way, the pre-colonial social classes have to be looked at as a consequence of the political, economic, and social bargain between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi elite leadership. Of course this bargain was by and large determined by the powerful monarchic system that was dominated by the Tutsi. Thus feudal system was a calculated instrument that the Tutsi used to dominate the Hutu. Consequently, this system resulted in a Tutsi-dominated monarchy and the creation of a Burundian social structure formed by the Tutsi at the top, followed by the Hutu and the Twa at the bottom (Hohensee 1977:19). In other words, ethnic belonging would almost always determine the social class.

Apart from a few instances where Hutus could be promoted to being a Tutsi in a process locally referred to as “Kwihutura”, the pre-colonial Burundian Hutu’s efforts to develop himself were constantly frustrated by this feudal system<sup>16</sup>. Even for these few Hutu who effectively became Tutsi, there was always an appeal for them to continue to sponsor this new acquired identity. The Hutu did this by constantly giving gifts to powerful Tutsi individuals who would in turn confer patronage. Thus a rich Hutu would not automatically move to the superior class and in the same way, a poor Tutsi would still enjoy social privileges. So it is difficult for anybody to contradict the influence of ethnicity in the creation of social classes in Burundi.

Politically, things were not different. A table given by Ndarubagiye (1996: 19) on the politico-administrative structure of pre-colonial Burundi says it all.

Tutsi occupied all posts from the King to the officers (King’s soldiers) though the Chiefs, the King’s Advisers, the Sub-chiefs, the Chief’s Advisers, the Judges of Royal and Chiefs’ Courts, and National and Local Notables. As such, tribalism and ethnic feelings in Burundi preceded social classes, and if these two ethnic communities lived together in peace, it was at the expense of

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<sup>16</sup> There are no known clear stages in the process of “Kwihutura” but some of the things that one was expected to do was to get an affluent Tutsi to introduce this Hutu to the Tutsi community, to be rich and to have a considerable number of cows, and to completely cut ties with the Hutu community in order to embrace Tutsi practices. Consequently this Hutu would almost only socialise with Tutsis.



the Hutu. It is this kind of society that the two colonial masters, Germany, and then Belgium, “inherited”.

### **3.2 Colonisation: The Hutu – Tutsi gap widened**

Germany was the first to colonise Burundi from 1890 until their defeat in 1916 during the First World War when they lost Burundi to Belgium, which colonised Burundi until 1962 when this country got independence. When the Germans arrived in Burundi, they found a very well organised kingdom, and they decided to rule through the existing local king and his aides in what is commonly known as ‘indirect rule’. This meant that Hutu survival continued to be at the mercy of the Tutsi whose leadership authority was reinforced by Germany. After the Germans, the Belgians did not change this style of leadership. The Hutu problems were far from being resolved, and like the Germans, the Belgians legalised the Tutsi rule; thus widening and complicating Hutu – Tutsi mistrusts and divisions.

The Europeans tried most irresponsibly to explain the Tutsi domination on the basis of biological and natural superiority (Kazima, [www.arib.info](http://www.arib.info)). Animated by the theory of evolution and influenced by a racist agenda, the colonial masters sought to re-interpret the origin of both Hutu and Tutsi. So Hutu and Tutsi’s origins had to take their place on the evolution line with the western civilisation at the top (Ndayongeje 2005, [www.arib.info](http://www.arib.info)). Thereby, if an African thing was found to be organised and well thought out, it was attributed to some kind of western influence (Ndayongeje, 2005, [www.arib.info](http://www.arib.info)). Therefore, upon finding that kingdoms in the great lake region were well organised by Tutsi kings, Europeans could not think how this could be possible, especially without the influence of an outside civilisation. It is at this juncture that the English explorer J.H. Speke, the colonial administrators like P. Rychmans, and even the Roman Catholic Church leaders like Bishop Gorju all adopted the lie that the Tutsi are Hamites who originated from a white *milieu* and that they were destined to rule over inferior races like the Hutu (Kazima, 2005, [www.arib.info](http://www.arib.info)). The claim went on to say that the Tutsi have a God-given right to rule over the Hutu, a concept reminiscent of the “theological” justification for the oppression of the black population by the white in America and South Africa. However, there are no historical facts to justify the white origin of Tutsi or even to successfully locate their origin from any of the African places like Somalia and Ethiopia which are often referred to.

Burundi was not the only case where Tutsi leadership over the Hutu was baptised as legal by virtue of their origin. Rwanda is another example where missionaries classified the Tutsi as a superior race, the “Hamites”; whereas the Hutu peasants were representatives of a supposed inferior

Bantu “race.” (De Heusch 1995: 4). This shows how the Germans and especially the Belgians were committed to elevate Tutsi over Hutu.

To sustain their wrong judgement, they decided to educate only the sons of Tutsi, while Hutu were believed to be best at cultivating the land. Lemarchand (2002, [www.burundi-sites.com](http://www.burundi-sites.com)) who strongly accused the colonial powers of being the perpetrators of Hutu - Tutsi ethnic hatred, visited the enrolment registers in Groupe Scolaire D’Astrida, one of the most prestigious schools in Rwanda. He found that a deliberate policy was taken to admit more Tutsi than Hutu from Rwanda and Burundi. The following table represents the ethnic admissions at Groupe Scolaire d’Astrida between 1946 – 1954 (my own translation) (Lemarchand 2002, [www.burundi-sites.com](http://www.burundi-sites.com)).

Year	Tutsi	Hutu – Rwanda	Hutu – Burundi
1946	44	1	8
1947	42	2	10
1948	85	2	11
1949	85	5	9
1953	68	3	16
1954	63	3	16

**Figure 7: Table showing ethnic admissions at Groupe Scolaire d’Astrida between 1946 – 1954**

It is then clear that the Belgian colonial masters were committed to systematically train Tutsi and prepare them for leadership. Meanwhile, Hutu were reserved for the tasks of building roads, carrying luggage for Whites, bringing stones and beams for reconstruction, building public edifices, cultivating the white man’s fields etc. Tutsi leaders who were in charge of recruiting workers in the above heavy and hard jobs could not recruit their brothers and cousins (Ndarubagiye 1996:23).

Likewise, high positions in the Government were given according to one’s ethnic group. In a way, this was a logical consequence of the educational policy that was dominated with ethnic inclination. For example in 1959, the Burundi “Conseil Travaux Publics Superieur du Pays” (the Country Superior Council for Public Works) was composed of 30 Tutsi against 3 Hutu, and the “ Conseil du Territoire du Pays” (the Country Territorial Council) was composed of 112 Tutsi against 26 Hutu (Lemarchand 2002 , [www.burundi-sites.com](http://www.burundi-sites.com)).

Even the Church did not manage to overcome the ethnic feelings and divisions in spite of Burundi and Rwanda being referred to as Christian Kingdoms. In particular, the Roman Catholic Church in Burundi, which counts more than 65% of the whole population, did not use her influence

to try and reverse this colonial injustice<sup>17</sup>. Instead there was a close collaboration between the Catholic Church and the Belgian government. So the Belgians handled or supported most the Roman Catholic Church's social projects like schools and hospitals (Pro Mundi Vita 1986: 40). On the whole, the Roman Catholic Church did not manage to give equal opportunities for Hutu and Tutsi to study, even though this church managed most of the schools.

The Protestant churches both in Rwanda and Burundi were largely influenced by what came to be known as the East African Revival. Although it is a non negotiable fact that the East African Revival has been a blessing to the church in East Africa and even beyond the African continent, Roger Bowen (1996:234) outlined some of the weaknesses of this revival. It emphasised personal salvation through Jesus Christ, but Jesus' lordship over the whole life was left out. Missionaries preached about individual sin but not corporate sin, and yet Africans needed the gospel to affect community life. Likewise, the message of the revival healed much personal hatred, but did not go deep enough to confront ethnic divisions. Finally, being involved in politics was seen as "unspiritual", while a blind obedience to the rulers was recommended. With this kind of theology, it was hard for the Protestant churches to efficiently and biblically resolve the Hutu – Tutsi conflicts. They opted for a *laissez-faire* approach.

Although the Belgian colonial system made it difficult for the Hutu in Burundi and Rwanda to study, a few of these Hutu were able to enrol in some Roman Catholic schools for a couple of reasons. Firstly, despite the fact that the Roman Catholic missionaries had instructions from Belgium to evangelise through Chiefs and local leaders (who were Tutsi), these leaders - especially the kings - resisted conversion in the early stages, and so the church was obliged to have Hutu for their parishioners (Linden 1977: 2-3)<sup>18</sup>. In this situation, they also found themselves forced to enrol some of these Hutu in school. Secondly, the arrival of social democratic priests (especially in Rwanda) from Europe after the Second World War, the pressure put on Belgians by the United Nation to instigate reforms, and visits by Hutu leaders to syndicalist circles in Belgium all increased demands for fundamental changes in Rwanda and consequently Burundi (:6-7). These changes enabled the Hutu to study and consequently to start campaigning for change.

In Rwanda, the changes brought in the 1959 Hutu Revolution, which led to the killings of Tutsi who tried to resist to this revolution. Rwandan Hutu took power in a violent revolution, but once again

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<sup>17</sup> I want to acknowledge significant efforts by the Roman Catholic Church social programs like "*Yagamukama*" (although they waited for many decades before they could start them) which ensured that people who had never been able to make it to school (most of them being Hutu) knew how to read and write. President Bagaza, a Tutsi, was very much opposed to these programs and so he closed them down a few years later.

<sup>18</sup> In Burundi, as in Rwanda, the King was both a religious and political figure. It is logical that conversion to Christianity would lead to the King losing half of his authority to the church, thus becoming only a political figure. So this explains why the kings did not embrace Christianity in the early years.

the Roman Catholic Church leadership in this country failed to agree on a stand to take vis-à-vis these killings. They were divided into two camps, each camp siding with either of the two ethnic groups. (:8). Rwanda became a killing field, and the Roman Catholic vision of Christian Kingdom turned out to be an illusion. The 1959 Rwandan revolution influenced the politics of Burundi. The accession to power by Rwandan Hutu created the same hopes in the their Hutu brothers in Burundi, while Tutsi in Burundi feared to go through the same nightmare as their Rwandan colleagues (Lemarchand 2002, [www.burundi-sites.com](http://www.burundi-sites.com)).

However, Hutu in Burundi did not take their Rwandan counterparts' route. Instead, they decided to work with their fellow Tutsi Burundians as they fought for independence from Belgium. Hutu like Paul Mirerekano, Joseph Banina, Pierre Ngandandumwe, etc. worked together with King Mwambutsa IV's son Louis Rwagasore under the umbrella of the UPRONA "*Union de Progres National*" (Union for National Progress) party to secure the independence of Burundi (Ndarubagiye 1996:27-28). It looked as though the fight for independence would be a reconciling denominator for both Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi. Rwagasore and his Hutu compatriots had managed to fly the national flag instead of their respective ethnic flags. This was the reason why UPRONA managed to win the 1961 election (Rukundo, [www.abarundi.org](http://www.abarundi.org): 2).

However, the Tutsi Bahima clan were always waiting for an opportunity to rebel against the royal leadership (Rukundo, [www.abarundi.org](http://www.abarundi.org): 2). For the Tutsi Bahima clan, it was time for the Baganwa clan to be removed from power on two grounds: initially the Baganwa monarchy had not involved the Bahima at the highest level of the country's management, and secondly the political marriage between the royal clan and the Hutu to fight for independence was a "big mistake" that should have been avoided at all costs<sup>19</sup>.

### **3.3 Decolonisation: a testing moment for the Hutu – Tutsi relationship's maturity**

The victory of UPRONA, and thus the independence of Burundi, was not just as a result of the Hutu and Tutsi nationalists' efforts. UPRONA also got enormous support from other freedom fighters like the Congolese Nationalist Movement (MNC) of Patrice Lumumba and TANU lead by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere of Tanganyika. In particular, a secret accord was concluded between TANU and UPRONA to create a federal state, and TANU gave massive financial support to UPRONA. Thus the current campaign for Burundi to be part of the East African Community is reminiscent of this old idea between President Nyerere and Prince Rwagasore. Hence Rwagasore and his Hutu counterparts' vision went far beyond national borders to a regional federation after

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<sup>19</sup> Both the Bahima and the Baganwa are clans within Tutsi tribe. The Bahima were despised by other Tutsi clans and thus kept away from influential leadership during the monarch that was largely dominated by the Baganwa clan.

independence (Ndarubagiye 1996: 28-29). On the 18<sup>th</sup> September 1961 UPRONA emerged victorious in a multiparty election with 58 out of 64 seats in Parliament (:29). It was known to all that UPRONA was going to lead the kingdom after independence, and that the Hutu – Tutsi antagonism was going to be history. With Hutu being the majority in parliament, with Prince Rwagasore holding the leadership of an ethnically balanced government, with the king as a national politically and religiously unifying figure, and with the federal state that was going to emerge from the treaty between UPRONA and TANU; everything was to combine together for a prosperous Burundi, free from ethnic polarisation.

However, before long something went wrong: two political parties that had emerged from the royal family (UPRONA led by Prince Rwagasore of the Bezi sub-clan and PDC led by Baranyanka of the Batare sub-clan) did not cohabit peacefully. The PDC (Parti Démocratique Chrétien) (Christian Democratic Party), which had lost the election to UPRONA plotted with Belgium and killed Prince Louis Rwagasore on 13<sup>th</sup> October 1961. Consequently, this led to a political crisis within the royal family and the long-awaited opportunity for the Tutsi Bahima clan to seize power finally arrived (Hatungimana and Musavyi 1996:3 [www.arib.info](http://www.arib.info)).

The assassination of Rwagasore weakened the reconciliatory political program that he had initiated, as the leadership of the party did not prove to have the same charisma as he had. To make matters worse, the Hutu who were influential in the party like Pierre Ngandandumwe and Joseph Bamina were all assassinated three years after independence. Furthermore, PDC elites who participated in the assassination of Rwagasore were all hanged in Gitega (Ndarubagiye 1996: 31), thereby leaving the royal family extremely weak. So the power was free for the Bahima to grab.

Meanwhile, the Hutu were very upset by the fact that they were being pushed away from power, since they were the majority in the parliament of 1961. In 1965, other elections were organised and once again Hutu were the majority in parliament i.e. 23 Hutu against 10 Tutsi (:32). UPRONA won with 23 seats and PP “Party du Peuple” (People’s Party) with 10 seats. It was evident that the Hutu had started to realise that UPRONA was very fast becoming a political weapon for the Tutsi to dominate the Country. No wonder PP was becoming popular among Hutu circles at the expense of UPRONA.

With this resounding Hutu representation in the parliament, it was apparent to everybody that the Prime Minister would be a Hutu. To the surprise of everybody, the King appointed Léopold Biha, a Tutsi from outside the two parties represented in parliament. In this way King Mwambutsa subverted the verdict of the polls and created further divisions between the two ethnic groups (:32). Furthermore, in the subsequent government composed by Léopold Biha all key ministries were given to Tutsi while Hutu were given the least important roles. The Hutu were becoming even more

frustrated as their efforts to get to power through democracy were now openly opposed by the Hima Tutsi clan who took advantage of the royal political crisis in general and the personal weakness of King Mwambutsa in particular.

As the democratic space for the Hutu was becoming almost non-existent, a number of them tried to mount a *coup*, but they could not match the mighty Tutsi army machinery that was available to the government. Consequent to this coup was the repression (against King Mwambutsa's will) leading to the killing of most Hutu elite politicians, including the Speaker of the Senate Joseph Bamina, the Speaker of Parliament Emile Bucumi, the Deputy Speaker of Parliament Paul Mirerekano, Hutu ministers, Hutu parliamentarians, Senators, and Hutu Army Officers (:33). Overcome by panic, King Mwambutsa chose to take exile in Europe but refused to relinquish power, a scenario that resolved itself in another coup organised by this Hima oligarchy - this time against the king. His older son Charles Ndizeye who was 19 by then replaced him, but it was evident that the powerful Hima politicians were the ones guiding him on what to do (Lemarchand 2002, [www.burundi-sites.com](http://www.burundi-sites.com)). The short time that King Charles Ndizeye led the country was characterised by enormous political mistakes; the most important one being the signing of a decree, under the influence of Captain Michael Micombero (Hima clan), instituting a single party regime with UPRONA as the only party. This decree left very little chance for Hutu survivors to hope for any democratic access to power, especially as they had no military power either. On 26<sup>th</sup> November, 1966 (after four months in office) another coup was organised against King Charles Ndizeye by the very Hima Tutsi clan that had deceitfully enthroned him under the cunning leadership of Michael Micombero who was the prime Minister by then (Ndarubagiye 1996:35)<sup>20</sup>.

Micombero abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the "republic" for which he was the first president. Hutu political aspirations were going to be silenced forever by a series of measures that followed the coup. A secret system was put in place to stop Hutu children from accessing secondary and university education, and even the few who managed to go through this harsh system were systematically banned from enrolling in key university faculties like law, military, and economics (Kazima 2002 [www.arib.info](http://www.arib.info)). Indeed it is common to find Tutsi elites in Burundi sharing the same names with a Hutu peasant simply because the certificate of a Hutu who had passed his/her national examination was secretly passed on to a Tutsi who originally had failed his

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<sup>20</sup> The young King took refuge in Belgium but Micombero's government in conspiracy with the Ugandan President Idi Amin Dada assassinated him on the 29 April 1972 in Gitega, Burundi. This same date ushered in the 1972 Hutu Genocide (RPA 2004).

examination<sup>21</sup>. As mentioned above, UPRONA was not only proclaimed the unique political party in Burundi, but the few Hutu elites around were also systematically excluded from the top leadership and the Hutu masses were burdened with heavy tax contributions to this party that was quickly turning into their oppressor.

In order to ensure protection against any apparent Hutu demand for rights, the Tutsi developed an incredible monotonous army. Being as powerful as they were, the Tutsi managed to dominate the political life as well. Those Hutu who were given ministerial jobs served as a shield to guard the interests of the Tutsi, and were therefore not able to criticise the government. Being a Tutsi was a social prestige while being a Hutu was a sign of social inferiority.

Perhaps the worst thing that Micombero's government did was to prune and fertilise this culture of superiority and inferiority that had been instigated by the colonial masters. During his leadership, another element of social exclusion was set in motion: regionalism became a real issue; so much so that coming from Bururi (southern Burundi) added some value to the Tutsi privilege. So in the spirit of regionalism, the three presidents who led Burundi for almost three decades, Captain Michael Micombero, Cornel Jean Baptist Bagaza, and Major Pierre Buyoya, were all from Bururi province, Rutovu commune (a local administrative unit similar to a district – several communes comprise a province) and even from the same neighbourhood. Thus the most powerful dignitaries in politics and the powerful officers in the army all came from the same province. In reality, Tutsi from other parts of Burundi were also discriminated against - although not at a level comparable to Hutu.

Subsequently there was a need for these governments to introduce a judicial system that was at the service of the oppressor. As mentioned earlier, the proscription of the Hutu from joining the law faculty at the only public university was observed strictly.

Economically, the Tutsi had all the privileges to access good and well paying jobs, loans from banks and other advantages that Hutu could not think of. The result of this system was that Tutsi ended up being wealthy and thereby powerful.

Frustrated by this unjust system, the Hutu attempted to overturn the Bahima government in different unsuccessful military coups in 1969 and then in 1972 (Sabindemyi 1996:7 [www.arib.info](http://www.arib.info)). All these coup attempts were followed by reprisals that largely targeted Hutu elites. The 1972 reprisal was so severe that the Belgian Prime Minister M. Gaston Eyknes qualified it as having the proportion of a "*veritable genocide*" (true genocide) (Le Soir 1972, [www.burundi-sites.com](http://www.burundi-sites.com)).

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<sup>21</sup> Mr. Petero Kayoya (not his really name for security purpose), a primary school Principal in Murore, Cankuzo (eastern Burundi) from before 1972 confessed having given to Tutsi students who had originally failed their exams Hutu students' certificates. I talked to one of those Hutu students (she was not happy for me to mention her name) and she told me that this is true.

### **3.4 The 1972 Hutu genocide**

It all started as a Hutu rebellion against the Micombero government on 29<sup>th</sup> April 1972. The rebellion was not experienced in the whole country, but basically in the region alongside Lake Tanganyika. Out of the 75 communes that were in Burundi, 6 were affected by the coup (Ndarubagiye 1996:38). Angry and frustrated Hutu, supported by some Congolese refugees established in Burundi, attacked military camps and basically killed any Tutsi that they came across in those communes. This rebellion was carried out in a very disorganised manner. Armed with guns, spears, and machetes, rebels believed in fetishes which would protect them against bullets and government military heavy machinery. Unfortunately for them, these fetishes did not help the rebels, who succumbed before the incredible military power of the Government of Burundi supported by the Congolese government (Lemarchand 2002, [www.burundi-sites.com](http://www.burundi-sites.com)).

The government planned a very elaborate killing campaign against every literate and semi-literate Hutu. Lemarchand (Lemarchand 2002, [www.burundi-sites.com](http://www.burundi-sites.com)) called this campaign a selective genocide to this group of Hutu. In fact every Hutu who was able to make a contribution towards the defence of the Hutu cause against Tutsi domination was killed if he did not manage to escape in good time. The Hutu-hunting was organised in every corner of the country. A whole generation of Hutu civil servants, soldiers, university and secondary school students, businessmen, and basically everybody who could read and write (Ndarubagiye 1996 :38) were all massacred without any trial. An estimated 300,000 Hutu were accused of plotting with the rebels to overturn the government and were then killed in a very humiliating operation. Consequently, a wave of Hutu crossed the border to Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Tanzania.

In the initial stages, the family members of those who were killed were not informed about their death. They were left to believe that their beloved ones were being taken to jail where they waited for a court verdict - whether or not they participated in the rebellion. The Tutsi controlled the media, especially the radio, and the Hutu masses were totally misled about what was taking place. Until today, there are people who are still waiting for their sons/daughters and husbands to come back from schools and prisons. Countries like France kept quiet about this genocide in a francophone country, probably because the military cooperation between France and Burundi was very well established at this time (Nshimirimana 2006 [www.arib.info](http://www.arib.info)). Since the Tutsi were controlling the diplomacy, they managed to escape international sanctions.

Inside the country, a series of methods were used to make sure that survivors could not react against what was going on. Orphans and widows were denounced as sons and wives of traitors of the nation “abana n’abagore b’abamenja”. Thus they were not even allowed to mourn for their



beloved ones, let alone to ask for justice to be done. Today, the bereaved still say that their beloved ones were killed by the 1972 events, without necessarily explaining what these events were. These orphans and widows saw their properties like cars, houses, and bank accounts sold or confiscated in the name of compensating the victims of their fathers'/husbands' rebellion (Nshimirimana 2006 [www.arib.info](http://www.arib.info)). Consequently most of these orphans never made it to school again because of poverty in their families. There was no way justice could be done for the Hutu, and from then on, anybody questioning the acts of the government would be considered a rebel and their lives would be in danger.

### **3.5 From 1972 onward: The Hutu – Tutsi conflicts redefined**

Looking back at what had happened, the power struggle between Hutu and Tutsi that had been going on from independence had created ethnic awareness on both sides to such an extent that their ethnic sentiments had reduced their shared cultural elements to almost nothing (Mbazumutima 2004: 5). An observation made by Horowitz (2000: 7-8) describes well what happened, “the permissive character of ethnic affiliation, by infusing so many sectors of social life, imparts a pervasive quality to ethnic conflict and raises sharply the stakes of ethnic politics”.

Four years after the 1972 genocide President Micombero was replaced by his cousin President Jean Baptist Bagaza in a bloodless coup in 1976. Bagaza, like Micombero, came from the same province, Bururi (south of the country). Apart from few decisions like doing away with “Ubugabire” and “Ubugererwa” which were meant to free Hutu from being squatters and servants of Tutsi, Bagaza’s government continued the politics of Hutu discrimination. The same President went ahead to give out the “Imbo” (costal) lands that belonged to Hutu refugees who had left their country as a result of 1972 genocide to top Tutsi civil servants and military officers. Today this is one of the biggest problems that the current government has to resolve before these refugees come back. Bagaza nominated only Tutsi in the government and top civil servant jobs, the army became mono-ethnic (Tutsi), his educational policy discriminated against the Hutu at primary, secondary, and especially university levels (Karibuhoye 1996:10 [www.arib.info](http://www.arib.info)).

In order to succeed in exercising full control over Hutu re-emergence, Bagaza sought to control the churches especially the Catholic Church because of her extensive social programs which benefited the Hutu (Ndikumana 2003: 41). The Roman Catholic Church resisted Bagaza’s decisions and he started to persecute them. He attempted to stop social and pastoral programs that were seen as contributing to the welfare of Hutu. Bagaza wanted the church to hear the following message, “just as, in the name of secularism the state refrains from interfering in religious affairs, thus the leading members of our church refrain from participating in those organisations of the country

which are strictly political” (Pro Mundi Vita 1986: 21). He extended this war even to protestant missionaries and a number of them were expelled from the country.

Hutu in the refugee settlements of Mishamo, Katumba, and Ulyankulu together with those living in Rwanda understood that they had to start a political and military struggle in order to go back home. They tried many things but the most tangible thing that they did was to start PALIPEHUTU (Parti pour le Liberation du Peuple Hutu), a party that gained popularity both in the refugee settlement and among Hutu milieu in Burundi.

The church-state crisis under Bagaza deteriorated into a diplomatic crisis. As the international community voiced its concern and Western countries threatened to review their technical assistance programme to Burundi, the Bagaza regime lost its international credibility and its national legitimacy eroded. Buyoya (also from Bururi) overthrew Bagaza on September 3, 1987 in yet another bloodless coup (Ndikumana 2003:44).

Buyoya’s regime was caught between the Hutu’s high expectations of finally being associated with the management of the political and social life of the country, and the Tutsi’s anxieties over losing power to the Hutu (Ndikumana 2003:119). It was clear that the failure to satisfy each camp would result in yet another ethnic war. The following year 1988, Hutu and Tutsi suspicions led to an ethnic crisis.

Following numerous provocations by the administration and the army of two communes, Ntega and Marangara populated at 90% by Hutu, these Hutu fought against the army. The army killed 25,000 from a population of 100,000 in these two communes (Ndarubagiye 1995:48). PALIPEHUTU intensified political and military campaign although it was clear to everybody that this party’s military force could not match the mighty government army. However, one thing was sure: the struggle for Hutu liberation had started and Buyoya could no longer keep silent about it.

Under international and national pressure, Buyoya introduced the multiparty system and initiated a program for National Reconciliation. Thus Hutu in Burundi revived their hope for a Burundi which could give equal opportunities to both Hutu and Tutsi. They sought to unite, as Hutu, to struggle for their political, economic and social rights. For these Hutu majority, it was unbelievable that the Tutsi minority continued to hold most key positions in the political, economic, and social life of the country, and that the Tutsi perpetrators of the 1972 genocide continued to enjoy freedom with impunity.

It is for this reason that they elected President Melchior Ndadaye in 1993 as the first democratically elected Hutu president. Hutu were hopeful that Ndadaye was going to liberate them from Tutsi oppression to such an extent that they did not see the need for PALIPEHUTU any more. This party lost a lot of support inside the country and, instead, Ndadaye’s party FRODEBU (Front

Pour le Democratie au Burundi) became popular. This joy did not last for long as the Army and Tutsi politicians moved in and killed Ndadaye after three months in office. Once more, Hutu's effort to accede power democratically were frustrated by this mono-ethnic Army. To speak with Lemarchand (1995: xiii), one can see in the above accumulated frustration a reason why Hutu stood together to avenge Ndadaye by killing their Tutsi neighbours. The pre-colonial feudal system that isolated Hutu from accessing land and power, the post independence political, economic, and social injustice against Hutu that culminated to the 1972 Hutu genocide, and the 1988 Ntega/Marangara ethnic crisis in which Hutu suffered greatly were some of the events that led to this accumulated Hutu frustration. These events are the background that can explain why Hutu started killing their Tutsi neighbours even if these ones were not responsible for the loss of President Ndadaye's life. An angry Tutsi army went through the villages killing Hutu to retaliate for their relatives who has been killed by these Hutu. It is estimated that more than 300,000 people died as a result of the 1993 crisis and more than 500,000 Burundians took refugee to the neighbouring countries especially Tanzania.

The international community put a lot of pressure on the Tutsi politicians to re-establish the democratic institutions that they had decapitated. As a result of this pressure, another Hutu President, Cyprien Ntaryamira was appointed and Hutu were hopeful that Ntaryamira would bring in them the same pride that they had with the election of Ndadaye. Unfortunately for them, President Ntaryamira was killed in the same plane with the Rwandan President Habyarimana after only two months in the office. It was this assassination of two presidents that prompted the 1994 Rwandan Tutsi genocide. As I carry out this research there has not been any meaningful inquiry to find out how President Ndadaye and Ntaryamira were killed, who killed them and why they were killed.

Once again the international and national pressure brought in President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, another Hutu from FRODEBU, to power. It was however clear that Ntibantunganya's government did not have the power to take decisions and stop the insecurity that was rampant in the country. Many politicians and civilians were assassinated and prominent FRODEBU politicians who had managed to leave the country because of insecurity were intensifying military campaign against the mono-ethnic army in Bujumbura. It is in this context that CNDD (Conseil National Pour la Defence de la Democratie) (National Council for the Defence of Democracy) was started under the leadership of Leonard Nyangoma. CNDD and PALIPEHUTU organised rebellions on two separate fronts and insecurity was generalised in the whole country.

After realising that it was no longer possible to govern, President Ntibantunganya took refuge in the US Embassy and Buyoya returned back to power in July 1996. It is this action that

prompted people to believe that Buyoya was the main character behind the assassination of Ndadaye and the general political and civil assassinations during Ntibantunganya's term (Ndarubagiye 1995:88).

Once again the International community forced Buyoya to open negotiations with the rebel movements. These negotiations between these two rival ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi, resulted in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (APRAB) on 28 August 2000. Meanwhile, CNDD had an internal crisis which led to the breaking up of the party into three movements the most powerful ones being CNDD and CNDD-FDD. These different movements signed separate peace accords with the government in 2003 and this peace process ended up into general elections that were won by CNDD-FDD in 2005 and Pierre Nkurunziza became the president. Later in 2006 PALIPEHUTU-FNL signed a peace agreement with the CNDD-FDD government, an action that gave hope to all Burundians that peace is progressively coming back.

However, the mistrust between the two ethnic trust is still a reality. This mistrust is built around myths developed over the years of ethnic conflicts by the two tribes. Basic to this myth-making is the experience, on both sides, of real or anticipated genocide (Lemarchand 1995: xii ). Thus for the Hutu, the incredible 1972 killing that aimed to annihilate every elite Hutu has built in the Hutu mind the possibility of another genocide of this kind; hence there is a sense of urgency to unite against this anticipated genocide by the Tutsi. On the other hand, the 1993 killings of many Tutsi across the whole country by Hutu, and the 1994 Rwandan genocide against Rwandan Tutsi, united Tutsi in Burundi to stand together and defend their physical existence as they anticipated a probable genocide by the Hutu (Mbazumutima 2004: 6).

Another dangerous theory was that of racial superiority: that the Tutsi are superior to the Hutu. This theory of superiority goes hand-in-hand with the theory of ancestry and physical differentiation between the two ethnic groups. On one hand, the Hutu decided to prove that they were not inferior to the Tutsi. They exploited the fact that they had come first to the country to argue that they owned the country, whilst the Tutsi were foreigners. On the other hand, the Tutsi saw in these theories of superiority a reason to stay in power. They were taught that they were superior and that they should always rule over the Hutu (Maleketi 2001:3 quoted in Institute for Justice and Reconciliation <http://www.ijir.org.za/papers/molek.html>). The infamous well-known "*Plan Simbananiye*" (Simbananiye plan) is one example of myth reconstruction of Tutsi superiority to ensure Tutsi domination.

In this plan, Mr. Artemon Simbananiye coined the so called myth of Hutu Peril which, as Tita (2003:41) summarised its agenda spelled the following:

- a. To sow hatred between ethnic groups by blackening some noted Hutu intellectuals and denouncing, on the basis of rumours, the Hutu for the replay of 1965, that is, the abortive Hutu-led uprising;
- b. To launch a repression against pre-selected targets among Hutu elites and to manifest such swiftness in eliminating the criminals so as to claim power as the ransom of Tutsi elites' zeal; and
- c. Apartheid will reign in Burundi and the Hutu peril will be forever destroyed.

Hutu like Mr. Martin Ndayahoze, a Hutu officer by then, denounced vehemently this so called Hutu Peril on December 3, 1967 but President Micombero did not take notice of this (:41).

Both Hutu and Tutsi have become prisoners to these theories and they have developed a new culture and way of life. Whereas logic tells us that we should congratulate people who do not take sides in inter-ethnic hatred, these people are now being referred to (by their ethnic groups) as “*ibihemu*” (Burundi) or “*Ibyitso*” (Rwanda) meaning betrayers. Ironically, defending the survival of your tribe earns one enormous respect (Maleketi 2001:3 Institute for Justice and Reconciliation website). So the consequences for not “defending” one’s ethnic tribe are indeed severe, as one may be killed. In most cases, people find themselves having to choose between being killed (sometimes together with the whole extended family) or fighting alongside one’s ethnic group. The fact that all the killings in 1972, 1993 (in Burundi) and 1994 (in Rwanda) happened without any intervention from the international community gives “legitimacy” to every group to build their own defensive mechanisms. So ethnic solidarity has become, to some extent, the only way for survival.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

The pre-colonial Hutu – Tutsi relationship was largely dominated by a feudal system which the Tutsi minority used to dominate the Hutu majority. The subsequent social groups reflected this injustice with Tutsi at the top and Hutu at the bottom. Thus the pre-colonial long-lasting peaceful cohabitation between the two ethnic communities should not be primarily interpreted to mean that the ethnic divisions in Burundi are a mere European creation. However, the Hutu – Tutsi conflicts as we see them today have been largely shaped and encouraged by colonial masters, missionaries, and explorers to a level that the above-mentioned feudal system could never have reached.

Although at the eve of independence courageous and nationalistic Tutsi and Hutu leaders united to fight for independence and finally united the two communities, some elements from the royal family collaborated with the Belgian government to undo all these achievements by killing the freedom hero Prince Louis Rwagasore. This was a starting point for yet another miserable political experience which culminated in a Hima and other Tutsi extremists’ “republic”. Hutu suffered under

this republic and their democratic gains were lost under the cruel Micombero government. In particular, the 1965 event and especially the 1972 one which started as a coup attempt by some Hutu elites to liberate themselves turned into dreadful political, social, and economic experiences for the Hutu. Tutsi reprisals saw Hutu elites and semi-elites killed in what many believe to be the first Hutu genocide in the Great Lake region.

The consequences of the 1972 Hutu genocide have been a great exodus of the remnants Hutu elites and the Hutu peasants to the neighbouring countries as refugees. Thirty four years later, most of these Hutu and their children still live in Ulyankulu, Katumba, and Mishamo settlements. We are now going to turn to their experiences in these settlements. As mentioned earlier, this study is going to concentrate on the refugees in Ulyankulu settlement.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### 4 BURUNDIAN REFUGEES IN ULYANKULU SETTLEMENT

My experience as a refugee, and my interactions with other refugees, convinced me about the pressing need to listen to the heart and mind of the refugees. The discussion in this chapter will be based on three problems: Firstly in the past there have been reports in the form of radio and television presentations, newspaper articles, and UNHCR, and NGOs articles on Burundian refugees in Tanzania. People who write these reports have either visited one or more Burundian camps, or they are working with these refugees. I would like to acknowledge the incredible contribution of such people like journalists and NGOs reporters, but I feel that there is a need to let refugees speak their heart and mind. At least I know of two books (one by Liisa L. Malkki and another one by Marc Sommers<sup>22</sup>) which reveal the exceptional efforts of these writers to let refugees talk about their experience. The Amnesty International (2005, <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR160082005>) report also shows evidence of an attempt to interview some refugees about their experience. This chapter is going to analyse the data that I collected in Ulyankulu settlement between May and June 2006. The aim of this data collection was to try as much as possible to get firsthand information from refugees on their experience for the last 34 years in the Ulyankulu camp.

Secondly, the Tanzanian Government, UNHCR and other Humanitarian organisations sit together to determine where and how these refugees will live. It is in this spirit that the Tanzanian Government, UNHCR and TCRS decided that all the 1972 refugees should live in a rural settlement without involving the refugees in these decisions. I will discuss, in this chapter, some of the problems generated by these decisions. In the first instance, I am going to argue that the procedure followed by the Tanzanian Government, UNHCR, and TCRS generated unnecessary suffering for refugees which could have been avoided by involving these refugees in planning and decision-making. Consequently, I will explore the level of influence that this suffering has on the refugee's wish to go back home.

The final problem, that needs to be given special consideration, is the influence of the Church in shaping and redefining the refugee's experience. During the survey, it was noted that more than around 98% of those who responded to my questionnaires go to church, for different reasons ranging from worship, socialisation, and leisure. It would be unfair for any social study or intervention to ignore this fact. However, I personally do not know of any effort done to try and

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<sup>22</sup> I referred to the contents of these two books in my literature review above

understand the role of the church with regard to the refugees experience in Ulyankulu Settlement. This chapter together with chapter five and six are going to discuss the findings on the role of the church i.e. the Anglican Church vis-à-vis the experience of Ulyankulu refugees. These chapters will follow the four moments in the pastoral circle. Chapter four is going to answer the first two questions Every subtitle (i.e. 4.1., 4.2., 4.3., and 4.4.) is going to answer the following simple questions 1. What is happening here?, 2. Why is it happening? (Wijsen, Heriot, Mejia 2005: Appendix 1), while chapters five and six will answer the last two questions in the circle: 3. How do we evaluate it? and 4. How do we respond? (: Appendix 1) respectively.

#### **4.1 General description of life in Ulyankulu Settlement**

Ulyankulu refugee settlement covers about 1,000 square kilometres and is situated about 75 km northeast of Tabora town in Urambo district (Malkki 1995 :38). With an estimated population of around 60,000 people (office of the Camp Commandant), this settlement is isolated and was purposely designed to be a rural refugee settlement with agriculture as the main activity for these refugees. This camp has existed since the early seventies (from 1973) due to the 1972 Hutu genocide in Burundi. Before being relocated to Ulyankulu settlement, many refugees settled on the Tanzanian side of the border (in Kigoma region).

A tripartite agreement between the Tanzanian Government, UNHCR and TCRS was concluded to rehabilitate Burundian refugees in rural settlements. Initially, all the refugees were settled in Ulyankulu refugee settlement before Katumba and Mishamo settlements were established in 1973 and 1978 respectively. UNHCR/TCRS played a pivotal role in moving the refugees from the border to Ulyankulu Settlement. In the initial stages, UNHCR/TCRS handled a lot of relief food distribution but this stopped in 1980 after these refugees were considered self reliable, and then handed over to the Tanzanian Government. UNCH/TCRS also helped to set up social infrastructures like schools, health facilities, roads, boreholes and offices. UNHCR was the main funding agency while TCRS was executing projects. The part played by the Tanzanian Government in moving people to the camp was to provide free land. Every family was given about three and half hectares (Anand 1993:72). The Government also provided security and administration personnel.

Since 1975 the organisation of refugee settlements was based on “Ujamaa” (village) Act of 1975 with 250 to 600 families constituting a settlement village. With the exception of post primary education and employment, refugees were meant to benefit from the Tanzanian Government with the same services as other neighbouring Tanzanian villages (Gasarasi 1984:21). In 1980, UNHCR, TCRS and the Tanzania Government considered Ulyankulu settlement as self-reliant and thus handed it over to the Tanzanian Government. This settlement was now to run without any help from



UNHCR/TCRS. Today, the population in Ulyankulu is generally young with the majority being born in the settlement. There are also a number of Tanzanian families living in the settlement as civil servants, religious workers, businessmen, and students. So the main languages spoken in this settlement are Kiswahili and Kirundi. The religious affiliation is mainly Christianity. There are also some Muslims and followers of traditional religion. Among the influential Christian denominations are the Roman Catholic Church, Pentecostals (mainly the Swedish Free Mission and the Assemblies of God), and the Anglican Church.

Ulyankulu has one of the main markets at street 13 (commonly called Barabara ya 13) that supplies food for the whole region. With tobacco as the main cash crop, refugees in Ulyankulu also produce rice, maize, cassava, beans, and sorghum. The road network is very poor with most of the villages completely inaccessible. Bicycles are the main means of transport within this large settlement. Ulyankulu is connected with the outside world by two main roads (the Urambo and the Tabora roads) which are generally in bad condition especially during the rainy seasons. Refugees who want to come out of the settlement have to get buses at “Barabara” 13 after cycling or walking as far as 30 kilometres.

The Celtel mobile network has recently enhanced communication, at least for those who can afford this facility. Ulyankulu has enough primary schools to cater for most of the educational needs of children but the fact that it has only one vocational school and one secondary school has left men and women of the 60,000 populated settlement without many chances to further their education beyond primary school. Ulyankulu is without one single hospital and the limited dispensaries that are available are under-resourced thus just able to offer First Aid services. This leads to high child and women mortality.

The Ulyankulu refugee settlement is under a settlement commandant who represents the Tanzanian Ministry of Home Affairs. He is the one who gives special permission for refugees who want to go outside the settlement, and he assumes an overall oversight on all matters in the settlement. Visiting Ulyankulu is not very easy, as one has to get a special permission from the Ministry of Home Affairs in Dar-Es-salaam. However, Tanzanian citizens can visit and stay in the settlement without any prior permission.

## **4.2 The experience of Burundian refugees in Tanzania**

### **4.2.1 Early days in Tanzania**

The 1972 Hutu genocide in Burundi generated an influx of Hutu refugees to Tanzania. It should be highlighted here that not all refugees left Burundi for the same reasons. The majority of them (52%) escaped death, 22% were brought by their parents and therefore did not choose to leave Burundi,

20 % heard from others that the Tutsi were coming to kill them and left Burundi for Tanzania, 4% followed others without being sure why they were leaving Burundi, while 2% joined their families in Tanzania (A4 Appendix 4). This is a clear indication that refugees in Ulyankulu did not necessarily make an informed personal decision to leave Burundi because many Burundians go with the communal decision so that individual decision is subject to the community's general feeling and judgment.

Upon arriving in Tanzania, refugees first settled at the border of Tanzania either because they had relatives (15%) or because they had land there (2%) (A5 Appendix 4). However, more than 42% settled at the border for a number of different reasons (A5 Appendix 4). The first reason was that these people were feeling a bit at home at the border where they could speak *Kiha*, a language which is similar to Kirundi (the refugee's mother tongue). The second, and maybe even the most important reason, is that these refugees did not expect to spend a long time in Tanzania. This is especially shown by the fact that 32% of these refugees were not taken to the settlement by UNHCR/TCRS but probably forced there by the Tanzanian Government (A6 Appendix 4). Even after they arrived in Ulyankulu camp, they spent a very long time without building long lasting houses. They always thought of going back home.

The same scenario was repeated with the "second wave" refugees (Amnesty international (2005, <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR160082005>)<sup>23</sup>). Many marriages were authorised by the couples' parents on the understanding that the groom's parents will pay the dowry to the bride's parents after they went back home. So it seems correct to conclude that the majority of Burundian refugees did not think that their stay in Tanzania was going to be for long. Although it is clear that refugees did not want to go far from the Burundian border, the Tanzanian Government had to take them away from the Burundian border. The 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa states that "For reasons of security, countries of asylum shall, as far as possible, settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin" (Article 2.6.). So the Tanzanian Government decided to take all the refugees to Ulyankulu and later to Katumba and Mishamo settlements which are situated hundreds of miles away from Burundi.

One thing that Tanzania did was to make sure every Burundian is protected and given an asylum. According the 1951 Convention on refugees, a refugee is every person who,

"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the

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<sup>23</sup> These are refugees who came to Tanzania from 1993 after the death of the democratically elected President Ndadaye Melchior.

Protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (Article 1 A (2))”.

Because of specific problems that apply to Africans, it was important to also give another complementary definition that could help more genuine African refugees to get protection. According to the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa

“the term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality” (Article 1.2.)”.

Although it is clear from these two complementary definitions that not all the Burundians at the border of Tanzania would have qualified to technically benefit the Tanzanian protection, Tanzania was generous enough to accept all of them (including those who were not sure why they had run away from Burundi). The whole group was being referred to as refugees and, with time, the reasons behind the crossing of borders mattered less, while the new identity “refugees” was to be embraced by everybody.

#### **4.2.2 The Settlement that never became home**

##### **4.2.2.1 Living with the unresolved psychological problems**

The general aim of Ulyankulu settlement was to try and assimilate or integrate these Burundian refugees. This decision was in agreement with the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa which states

“Member States of the OAU shall use their best endeavours consistent with their respective legislations to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees who, for well-founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin or nationality (Article 2.1.)”.

The tripartite arrangement was to help these refugees until they became self-sustaining. In the early stage of this project, Burundian refugees were given relief, land and instruments to exploit this land. The Government of Tanzania was very hospitable towards these refugees. This Government tried as much as possible, within what the local and international law allows, to rehabilitate these refugees.

However, although one of the recommendations given during the Conference on the African Refugee Problem held in Arusha, May 1979 was to avail counseling services to refugees (Eriksson,

Melander and Nobel 1979:57), UNHCR, TCRS, and the Tanzanian Government failed to consider the effect of the events that these Hutu refugees had just gone through. Memories were still fresh about their family members and friends who had been killed. Questions about why and how their beloved ones were killed were not answered, and these refugees had not had time to grieve for their people.

The world did not seem to be interested in finding out what had happened. Those who killed their family members were enjoying impunity. And these Hutu, victims affected by ethnic violence were forced to accept their misery as a matter of destiny (Check 2005: 65). With nobody ready to listen to them, the refugees had to suppress their anger and frustrations so that they could carry on with life. As we will see later, the church was their only source of comfort.

The term “*wakimbizi*” (Swahili word for refugees), was going to be used not to identify these Hutu Burundians from their fellow Tanzanian citizens but as an instrument of torture. Being a refugee in Tanzania was reminiscent of being a Hutu in Burundi. Rema<sup>24</sup> Ministries, a Burundian local charity working with refugees, organized in July 2006, a visit to Burundi by Burundian refugees from different camps and settlements in Tanzania, so that they might meet with their fellow Burundians who were left in the country.

The following words by a senior Pentecostal Pastor, Nathaniel Mazobe (2006, interviewed by the researcher in July), who spoke in this meeting, can reveal the level of trauma that this word *wakimbizi* infringes on refugees.

“I first lived in Ulyankulu Settlement and then had to move to Shinyanga town where I worked as a senior pastor. My ministry is very successful, I built big churches and schools, I have many Christians attending my church and humanly speaking I am considered a very successful person. However, it doesn’t matter what success you make so long as you are a refugee”.

Bishop Peter (not his real name for security purposes) also of Ulyankulu Settlement told us the following story:

“I was invited together with other Tanzanian Bishops to go and give advice to President Mkapa on a number of issues. When my turn to speak came, I stood and started to speak. Half way through my speech, I remembered that I am a refugee. With all my eloquence, I melted in front of the people and I had to cut short my speech for fear that it might be found out that I am a refugee”.

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<sup>24</sup> Not to be confused with Rhema. Rema is a Kirundi word which means “be conformed”.

Many refugees who were born in Ulyankulu find it difficult to cope with the fact that they are called “*wakimbizi*”. Eric Hezroni was complaining to me as he filled my questionnaire: “You know it is difficult to prosper when you are a refugee. Even us who were born here are told that *mtoto wa nyoka ni Nyoka* (the child of a snake is a snake)”. What Eric meant was that Tanzanians tell him that a child of a refugee is a refugee. It is exactly this psychological torture which pushed Eric to tell me “I am looking forward to this time when I will be back to my country” even if he had never been to Burundi. But why is it so bad and so traumatizing to be called a refugee? We may get more answers as we continue with our discussion.

#### **4.2.2.2 From oppression to oppression? Social Life in Ulyankulu**

It has been noted earlier in chapter three, that most Hutu who managed to escape the 1972 genocide were victims of a long term planned injustice in almost all sectors of life. Before leaving Burundi, education was a field that Hutu did not benefit from and so those who crossed over to Tanzania were generally peasant farmers with a few literate people who managed to escape the genocide. This is supported by this research which shows that 85% of those who left Burundi were farmers, 3% were farm employees, and 8% were businessmen, while only 4% were government employees (C.2 Appendix 4).

This year marks the 34<sup>th</sup> anniversary since these refugees left Burundi and 27% never made it to school, 61% finished primary school, 7% completed some sort of vocational training, and 5% were able to go through secondary school, while none of the people who live in the camp have gone to University (B1 Appendix 4). The Government of Tanzania provided refugees with free primary education. However, this is not the same with post primary education. One may be tempted here to think that those who went through university education are living outside the camp where they work. Yes, there have been a few university graduates who live outside the Settlement because they had to hide themselves in order to study. This is the same for secondary school children. The issue here is not that the Tanzanian Government would refuse them permission to study as refugees but that the Tanzanian legislation on post primary education is not giving Tanzanians and refugees the same admission opportunities.

Admission of refugee children to secondary school is governed by the non-citizen quota system of “2% of places available in Form one” (Gasarasi 1984:21). For the few refugees who manage to fulfil these requirements, they also have to pay for their fees, while Tanzanians are highly subsidised. The same happens at university. Technically, refugees who qualify for secondary and university education have to secure UNHCR scholarships which are channelled through the Ministry of Home affairs (:21) but this happens very rarely (not to say that it does not happen).

So the few refugees who managed to go through secondary school and especially university have to hide their identity. In the past it was found that some refugees studying at university were not Tanzanians and consequently discontinued until they paid full fees. As we will discuss this in the following subtitle, there would be no way economically that these students could continue to study. For this reason, students who were refugees did everything to hide their identity so that their studies would be subsidised by the Tanzanian Government.

Among the things that these refugees did was to never speak Kirundi, change their names to sound Tanzanian, study local tribal languages so that they might mix well with others of that tribe, never to mention that they were born anywhere near the settlement or the Burundian border so that they were not suspected. Some even tried not to visit their parents or have their parents visit them so often. This then makes it clear why being called a refugee is bad news. It may actually mean, as we discussed above, the end of one's educational career. This may give an impression that the Tanzanian Government is doing almost nothing to educate refugees in Ulyankulu. One thing that I wanted to find out was how refugees would compare the access to education before and after 1980, when the settlement was handed over to Tanzania by UNCHR and TCRS. 8% think that access to education when the camp was run by UNHCR/TCRS was excellent, 24% think it was good, 7% think it was satisfactory, while 61% think that the access to education was bad (B3 Appendix 4). Contrary to what one would expect, refugees think that after the handing over of the settlement to the Tanzanian Government, access to education became better. 27% of them thought that it is excellent, 21% think it is good, 14% think it is satisfactory, while 38% think it is still bad (B4 Appendix 4).

Some of the reasons why refugees think that the Tanzanian Government is doing better than UNHCR/TCRS are the building of more primary schools, one secondary and one vocational school in Ulyankulu by the Tanzanian Government. The credit to the Tanzanian Government over UNHCR and TCRS educational management of the Settlement should not be interpreted to mean that refugees are happy with the current educational system. Refugees only think that things are improving. Otherwise, it is very difficult to understand how one can be satisfied with just one secondary school and one vocational school for a population of over 60,000 and yet these two schools are hosting Tanzanian children as well.

Education is not the only point of concern in Ulyankulu camp. Healthcare and clean water is another area that needs some consideration. The general feeling is that healthcare and access to clean water before and after 1980 was bad. More than 50% are impressed by the possibility of access to healthcare and clean water (B5 and B6 Appendix 4). Ulyankulu has very poor dispensaries without any hospital or a medical doctor. I visited the biggest government-sponsored dispensary at

*Barabara ya 10* (street number 10) and had a talk with a nurse who was there. The services that are provided include child immunisation and general treatments for common diseases. This dispensary cannot handle any major operation or even a caesarean, although they can handle a normal delivery of a baby. I asked her what they do when there are complications with a delivery and she told me that the family of the mother has to hire a car and drive to either Urambo or Tabora (about 75 kilometres), on a very rough road for further help. If one manages to get a car (because there aren't many), it is hired at not less than \$150, which is far beyond what a normal refugee can afford. So mothers with birth complications stand little chance of survival. Anaemic children or injured people in accidents who are in need of blood transfusion, also have to go to seek medical help in Urambo or Tabora.

In Ulyankulu settlement, it is very difficult for people to know their HIV/AIDS state. With not a single dispensary with an HIV/AIDS testing kit<sup>25</sup>, young people who want to get married are left to trust that their partners are safe from the virus. Pregnant mothers have no means of knowing their HIV/AIDS status. This puts babies who are born of HIV positive mothers at unnecessary risk. So for people who may have contracted the virus, it is difficult to know for certain, and even those who manage to travel to Urambo or Tabora for a test may not have access to anti-retroviral medicines.

The scarcity of healthcare facilities in the settlement should not just be interpreted as a calculated negligence by the Government of Tanzania towards refugees. Tanzanian villages surrounding the settlement are living in just the same conditions as refugees. The only difference is that refugees have to get a special permit from the settlement commandant before going for treatment outside the settlement. Refugees need their photographs on these permits, and in most cases like emergencies related to sicknesses, refugees do not have these photos and even if they do, they may need to wait for the availability of the settlement commandant or his/her assistant especially if the emergency occurs at night. We will discuss more about the inconveniences of these permits later. It is evident that once more refugees have to pay a high cost whenever they want to go outside the settlement, a fact which logically reminds them of the inconveniences of losing a homeland.

#### **4.2.2.3 From Oppression to Oppression? Economical life in Ulyankulu settlement**

Chapter three included a significant discussion on the Hutu economic powerlessness as a result of a well-planned injustice by the Tutsi elites. So Hutu who crossed over to Tanzania were basically

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<sup>25</sup> The nurse at Street 10 dispensary told me that an HIV/AIDS testing kit was introduced to this dispensary but it only worked for a few days. Currently they do not have this facility.

poor, with just a handful of elites, most of them primary school teachers, medical technicians and nurses. 85% of those who left Burundi were farmers, 4% were employed in farms, and 3% by the government while 8% were doing small-scale business (C2 Appendix 4). Of those who crossed over to Tanzania only 3% consider that they were rich, 10% being able to feed their families and save some money for future use, 16% were able to get food and meet other needs like school fees but were not able to save any money, and 30% were just able to get food, while 41% were struggling to feed their families (C3 Appendix 4).

So the tripartite decision, to settle these refugees in the rural area and give them land to cultivate, looked proper and a great relief for these Hutu. The refugees worked hard on their land and within seven years, there were able to produce enough food for themselves and surplus for sale. By the time UNHCR/TCRS handed over the settlement to the Tanzanian Government, refugees had already some cash in their pocket. The 1980 crop income was estimated at US\$ 629,308 (Gasarasi 1984:39). Many people had started to be involved in business. Thus the number of farmers dropped from 85% in 1972/1973 to 40% in 1980 (compare C2 with C4). More people went into business, from 8% in 1972/1973 to 39% by 1980 (:39). Other refugees were employed either by the Government of Tanzania or by TCRS. It is clear that all the 3% employed by the Government of Burundi were absorbed by the Tanzanian Government (actually with an additional 1%) while a new 12% of the refugees got jobs with UNHCR/TCRS (C4). It is clear that by the time the settlement was handed over to the Tanzanian Government in 1980, refugees were prosperous.

However, the contribution of UNHCR/TCRS to this prosperity was of paramount consideration. 75% were able to comfortably live just on TCRS relief (C5 Appendix 4). So the farming, business, and other jobs came as supplements to TCRS relief. Every refugee identified the handing over of the settlement by UNHCR/TCRS to the Tanzanian Government in 1980 as the starting point for their economic problems. I basically do not believe that it would have been good to keep refugees on relief, especially after it was evident that they could produce enough from the land for their families. Although some of the economic problems are directly associated with this transition<sup>26</sup> of handing over the settlement to the management of the Tanzanian Government, these problems could have been avoided if this Government had encouraged the refugees' efforts with good measures to ensure the sustainability of those efforts. Instead, many measures that were taken discouraged meaningful economic growth.

With a very high birth rate, refugees grew in number but were not given additional land accordingly. Even the decision to create Mishamo settlement so as to accommodate surplus

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<sup>26</sup> With the transition, it is clear that refugees lost the relief assistance that they were getting from UNHCR/TCRS; also the 12% refugees who were employed by UNHC/TCRS lost their jobs.



population from Ulyankulu (Anand 1993:70) worked only for a few years. Related to this, the land became poorer and poorer because of repetitive exploitation. Poor rains and very little technological know-how have also led to poor production. Some refugees have decided to go further beyond the settlement, to look for some more land but this is opening a new conflict between the Tanzanian *Wasukuma* pastoralists and the refugees. Sometime, one does not necessarily need to go beyond the settlement limits for *Wasukuma* to graze their cows in the refugees' farm. They believe that refugees do not have ownership of land in a land of Tanzanians.

In an interview that I had with Rev. Cannon Abeli Bahutunze of the Anglican Church of Ulyankulu on the 20<sup>th</sup> May 2006, he said: “*Wasukuma* bring their cows and graze them in our farms. When we try to take them to court, there is no justice done to us. Anyway, what else do you expect? A refugee is a refugee and there is nothing you can do about it. These *Wasukuma* are the natives (*Ni bene agasi*)!” Once again, refugees associate the conflict between cattle keepers and agriculturalists with the fact that they are refugees.

Besides agriculture, business too had to decline considerably. The Tanzanian Government introduced taxes for all merchandises and business but this government did not improve the services for these refugees. Roads remained poor and badly repaired, which made the cost for business very expensive. 56% of the refugees think that transport facilities are bad (C12 Appendix 4).

Probably the most discouraging thing is that these refugees still need a special permit to leave the camp for business and this has been a big handicap for developing business. So it becomes very difficult for refugees to compete with Tanzanians who are free to move in the country. The consequences for this hard business environment have been that more and more refugees have left business to go into farming, even if farming is not a viable activity as we saw above. Thus the number of businessmen/women dropped from 39% before 1980 to only 8% today, while farmers increased from 40% before 1980 to 87% today (compare C4 and C7 Appendix 4). As to the question about the possibility of refugees carrying out their business activities inside and outside the settlement, 12% think that it is impossible, 71% believe that it is not easy, and 13% say it is easy, while only 2% think it is very easy (C10 Appendix 4). Harsh business conditions are not the only reason why people went back to farming. Tobacco, as almost the only reliable cash crop in the camp, has attracted many people. However, powerful protestant churches especially the Swedish Free Mission, have vehemently opposed tobacco growing. So the majority of the refugees are today poor with 69% struggling to feed their families, 27% being able to get food and other needs but without any surplus, 4% being able to meet their needs and save some money, and nobody saying that he/she is rich (C8 Appendix 4).

The situation is not different for those refugees who try to look for jobs upon completion of their secondary training. 22 % of refugees think that refugees who complete some kind of training cannot get jobs, and 72% think that it is not easy to get a job while only 6% believe a trained refugee can get a job. Part of the reason why refugees do not easily get jobs upon completion of their studies is because they have to get work permits and many employers are not ready to go through the bureaucratic systems looking for these permits, especially when there are many Tanzanians who are ready to offer the same services. The other reason is that there is a big competition in the job market, and since the system does not favour refugees to climb higher in their studies, they find it difficult to compete with their fellow Tanzanian citizens.

Once again, it is quite clear that “refugeeism”<sup>27</sup> is a major barrier (at least in Ulyankulu settlement) to any meaningful economic success.

#### **4.2.2.4 A country within another country?**

The 1951 Convention on Refugees states that: “Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken for the maintenance of public order” (Article 2.). It is perhaps this article that the Tanzanian Government uses to make sure that the movement of refugees is limited to such an extent that one is forced to think of settlements and camps as states within the Tanzanian state. What the Tanzanian Government managed to do is to make refugees in Ulyankulu always feel that they are in another country. Even those refugees who were born in Tanzania would feel as if they have just crossed the Burundi – Tanzanian borders.

In the name of maintaining order and security for both Tanzanians and refugees, the Tanzanian Government took strict measures to make sure refugees are restricted to remain within the settlement borders. Of course I have to mention here, that in a number of events, refugees were involved in crimes and some times with violence. Some of the refugees, especially the “second wave” refugees have committed serious crimes including killing and rape of women. One common fact for almost all refugees is that they have experienced extreme violation of human rights, so much so that they are affected psychologically. Consequently, some have developed great fear and yet others became violent. As discussed before, very little assistance, if any, was given to these refugees to try to rehabilitate them from their past horrible experiences back in Burundi. Instead, every refugee is taken as a de facto “dangerous element” in the society. It seems as if they continue to be treated as “dangerous” regardless of their level of integration in the local society. Of course

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<sup>27</sup> The term is used by Anand Renu to mean the state of being a refugee.

everybody should understand the need to take security measures to protect Tanzanian nationals, but it seems to me as if the extent to which these measures are taken leaves one with many questions.

At this juncture, it may be helpful to come back to the aim of setting up settlements. Unlike camps which are temporary, settlements are established as a long term solution to refugees who, for well founded reasons, are not willing to go back home. After more than three decades in Ulyankulu, more than half of these refugees were born in Tanzania, many of them speak Kiswahili (Tanzania's national language) as their first language, their culture reflects a great deal of Tanzanian cultural elements, and most of them do not know of any other better home than Tanzania.

However, moving from Ulyankulu settlement to other parts of the country is like moving from one country to another. When I leave Burundi to go to Tanzania, I need a stamp (visa) in my passport with the specific days that I will stay and a specific reason for my visit. Upon arriving on Tanzanian soil, I have to report to the Immigration Office so that they can take notes of my details and know what I am doing and my exact contacts in case I am needed. If for any reason, I need to extend my stay in Tanzania beyond the days originally given to me, I have to apply for the extension of my visa and the officer in charge can choose to reject my application, in which case I will have to go back to my country of origin. Upon arriving on the Burundian soil I will need an entry stamp. These are more or less the arrangements that have to be made for any visit from one state to another.

For refugees living in Ulyankulu, they have to go through the same exercise whenever they want to go outside the settlement. They have to go to the settlement commandant and get a special pass with the motive of their visit, the exact number of days that they are allowed to stay outside the camp and the exact place they are visiting. Upon arriving at their destination they have to report to the competent authority representing the Ministry of Home Affairs so that he may take all their details and should they want to extend their stay, they have to apply for it. When their time of stay expires, they go back to the settlement and upon arriving in the settlement; they have to report to the settlement commandant.

Should any refugee be found not fulfilling the above requirements, she/he would be charged in court where she/he may be jailed or repatriated against his/her wish. Although Article 16. 2. of the 1951 Convention for Refugees states that "A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his habitual residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access to the courts, including legal assistance and exemption from *cautio judicatum solvi*". Most refugees are not given a lawyer to assist them. In case he/she is imprisoned, her/his family members have to struggle to take food to him/her until the end of his/her sentence. They too need a special pass allowing them to visit their relative in prison. In the past, many refugee "offenders" who were

repatriated were then killed or imprisoned in Burundi. If released, they were given no assistance and they had to struggle to know how to live in the society that they had run away from many years ago.

Amnesty International (2005, <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR160082005>) found the same thing happening in other Burundian camps and settlements:

“Refugees found to be in violation of the movement restrictions are often considered irregular migrants and charged under immigration law, which carries much harsher punishments than violations of the Refugee Act. As a result, refugees may be detained for periods of up to three years and/or incur substantial fines. Some have reportedly been deported to Burundi during or at the conclusion of their detention rather than being returned to the camps. A Catholic nun in Kibondo reported that sometimes when she went to visit a detainee, she would discover that he had already been expelled to Burundi”.

The special pass is not only needed for refugees who want to go outside the settlement, it is equally needed for anybody who wishes to visit the settlement with the exception of Tanzanians. When one needs to visit the settlement, she/he has to get a permit from the Ministry of Home Affairs. A visa to Tanzania is not enough to let someone visit the settlement. This lengthy bureaucracy has discouraged many people from making beneficial visits to the refugees.

Thus Ulyankulu becomes a very isolated place, set apart to keep refugees away from the rest of the world. Evangelist Erasto Emmanuel (2006, interviewed by researcher on 22 May) of the Anglican Church in Ulyankulu has the impression that Ulyankulu Settlement is “*a large prison*”.

All the ten Anglican Church leaders that I interviewed identified the problem of the permit to and from the camp as the most common concern for every refugee living in Ulyankulu. So, many refugees see in the Tanzanian authorities the image of the oppressive Tutsi power. For example Migwiza (2006, interviewed by researcher on 22 May) mentioned to me that the number one problem in Ulyankulu Settlement is the restriction on the refugees’ freedom.

The lack of freedom is not just limited to movement in and out of the settlement. 35% of the refugees think that refugees in Ulyankulu have no freedom of association and speech, 23% believe the freedom is limited in many different ways while 42% are happy about the situation (D2 Appendix 4). With regard to the freedom to access information, 47% think that it is non-existent, 28% think that the situation should be improved, while 25% are happy about the situation (D3 Appendix 4).

What I realised was that the elites and semi-elites in the camp are less satisfied by the freedom of speech, association and access to information while the rest of the refugees are more or less happy about the way the Tanzanian Government handles the situation. Some of the respondents to my questionnaire did not think they needed any freedom beyond religious association. They

thought that the Government was doing well in letting them worship God and they did not think they needed more than this. Probably this is an indication that the political and social responsibility of the church is less emphasised at the local church level in the camp.

Among the Burundians and Rwandans, people are just happy not to question what the leaders are doing or saying. In fact this is one of the reasons that explain why people followed the orders of their leaders and killed their neighbours in the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Bowen 1995:6). This sort of obedience is found even in Church. However, I was surprised by the fact that half of the refugees in Ulyankulu were very much dissatisfied with the freedom space that is offered to them by the Government. The cultural trend would be that all the refugees would be expected just to put up with whatever freedom the government gives them.

In the settlement, there are no associations for human rights to advocate for the powerless in the society. The representatives of the Tanzanian Government take every important decision affecting refugees and these refugees are expected to comply. 85% of refugees believe that decision-making is entirely done by the government. The local leaders like village and street chairmen are selected from refugees, but their role is basically the one of executing orders from the Settlement Commandant.

#### **4.2.3 Home politics, a right or an offence?**

What is interesting is that, although the Tanzania Government takes the overall responsibility to make decisions that affect refugees, there are other powerful external political influences. Politics at home is a power of influence, and a silent arm that influences refugees' behaviour. Monitoring and getting involved in changing the direction of Home politics was one way for refugees to ensure that they will free themselves from the Tanzanian Government's "oppression".

Only 3% of refugees categorically think that the politics in Burundi do not affect refugees. The rest (97%) believe that, in one way or another, politics in Burundi would influence them (D5 Appendix 4). In 2001, François Nitunga, Thierry Bahizi and I visited Ulyankulu settlement for a seminar with Church leaders, when some of them asked which party we belonged to. We knew that they were all members of PALIPEHUTU – FNL which was one of the active rebel politico – movements at that time. It was clear that this seminar would stop if we did not show some sort of sympathy towards this rebel movement.

People in Ulyankulu are divided along party lines. This phenomenon is shared with other settlements and refugees. In Mtabila Burundian refugee camp, many people died in battles between the followers of two rival politico-military parties. This is a strong point to prove that refugees find

in home politics some sorts of hope for a better future even if they may not agree on the details of how to go about it.

The paradox revealed in this research is that even if 93% believe that Burundi politics have an influence on refugees, 71% of the refugees would choose to say that Burundian political parties do not have any influence on them (D7 Appendix 4). Furthermore, they refused to accept that the political information that they receive comes from the camp representative of Burundian political parties (D6 Appendix 4). However, political parties are very active in the camps even if refugees choose to negate this fact (at least on paper). The reason for this negation lies in the fact that these refugees want to protect themselves from any arrest by the Government of Tanzania for participating in home politics that may threaten security in Burundi.

Indeed the 1951 Convention on Refugees does not give the right of association for political activities. Only non-political and non-profit making association are granted:

“As regards non-political and non-profit-making associations and trade unions the Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country, in the same circumstances” (Article 15).

The past experience for refugees who involved themselves in political activities has been not easy. The classic example is the assassination of Rémi Gahutu, the leader and founder of PALIPEHUTU, in a Tanzanian prison on 17<sup>th</sup> August 1990 by what most refugees believe to be a conspiracy between the Burundian and Tanzanian Government. Official reports suspected poor conditions in prison or a heart attack, but the popular view among the refugees indicates that in a calculated move, a government doctor injected him with a poisonous product which killed him (Malkki 1995:273).

Although Gahutu Rémi lived in Mishamo settlement, it was clear that he was taken to be the “saviour” of Burundian refugees in particular and all Hutu in general. Refugees had a very high expectation that soon Gahutu Rémi and PALIPEHUTU were going to return Hutu refugees to Burundi in a triumphant victory over the Tutsi dominated army.

The death of Rémi Gahutu had two main consequences on refugees in Ulyankulu and other settlements. On one side, it became clear that any political activity in the refugee settlements would be a highly clandestine activity and, on the other side, refugees became more determined to make sure that one day they would go back to their homeland. Although the Tanzanian authorities would understand it as a crime for refugees to actively be involved in home politics, refugees still believe that this is their right. So for refugees, Tanzania became a Tutsi ally, an additional reason why they

wanted to leave this country and go back home. But what were refugees doing to achieve this big mission?

#### **4.2.4 Efforts to resist exploitation and search for a new home**

The social, economic, and political problems that refugees in Ulyankulu went through shaped them, so much so that their search for a meaningful homeland became their first priority. They started to reinterpret Nyerere's (Amnesty International 2005,

<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR160082005>) famous welcoming slogan extended to the "first wave" Burundian refugees<sup>28</sup> as "resident guests" as a Tanzanian political move to exploit these refugees. The message that Nyerere was passing across was that these refugees are welcome to stay in Tanzania not as refugees but as brothers and sisters to their fellow Tanzanian citizens. So it was up to refugees to feel at home and be fully integrated and even take up citizenship. Refugees thought that this was just a "*sweet tongue*" and that the real aim for Nyerere and Tanzanians at large was to make sure these refugees are exploited to the maximum:

Firstly, refugees believe that by being called "resident guests" they lost their advantages that other refugees get. Ulyankulu refugees came up with this decision after recognising the advantages given to the "second wave" refugees. Upon arriving in the country, these refugees benefited from UNHCR advantages including relief and healthcare and were not taxed on small-scale business.

Another attractive advantage is education. The second wave refugees benefited from primary and secondary education in a way that cannot be compared to the first wave refugees. For example, there are more than five secondary schools in Mtabila camp with a slightly bigger population than Ulyankulu, while the latter has just one secondary school. Furthermore a number of these second wave refugees got UNHCR scholarships to enrol in universities, but none of these scholarships were given to the 1972 refugees.

Furthermore there has been resettlement of the second wave refugees in the western countries, mainly in North America. Hundreds of families were given asylum in Canada and USA and this has been an attractive advantage of being a "refugee" rather than a "resident guest". Although Anand (1993:76) believes that resettlement in a third country, especially in the West, should be the least desirable because it creates a brain drain in Africa and leads to cultural adjustment problems for refugees, these ones especially the ones in Ulyankulu think of western countries as the most adequate places to live. Thus refugees in Ulyankulu view the "malicious"

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<sup>28</sup> Amnesty International (2005, <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR160082005>) referred to the 1972 refugees as the first wave refugees and the 1993 refugees as the second wave refugees.

invitation by the Tanzanian Government to feel at home, as only a way to rob them of advantages that other refugees enjoy.

Secondly, these refugees believe that the Tanzanian Government wants them to become their slaves. Malkki (1996: 207) visited Mishamo and had a very interesting conversation with refugees in Mishamo settlement who said,

“They try to make us immigrants quite simply. We cultivate, we are taxed, like immigrants. They get a lot of benefit and money from us. Yes they want us to be “integrated” because we are beneficial to them. But this is only on the economical level, not otherwise. We could be “economic citizens...”.

Refugees argue that experience is the best teacher for them. If Tanzanians did not give the citizen rights to the 1959 Rwandan Tutsi Refugees who were nationalised, how can we be cheated that we will be integrated and given citizenship? They asked (: 207).

“The Tanzanians invite us to nationalise ourselves. We refuse! Yes! With this really... they are not happy. They want us to stay as their slaves like.... Have we come here uniquely to have ourselves nationalised?! Did we not have our own country?...once we accept the nationality of here, we will be like what? One will oblige us like one obliges their dogs or cats, or no matter what domestic animal” (: 207-208).

Refugees in Ulyankulu did not seem to be different when I visited them this year. In fact, they had even more evidence that the Tanzanian Government did not want them but that they wanted to exploit them and dump them after. The recent incidence in which the Tanzanian Government in collaboration with the Rwandan government repatriated Rwandan refugees by force convinced Ulyankulu refugees that they may go through the same experience one day.

In 1996 around 700,000 Hutu Rwandan Refugees, who had crossed the Rwandan borders to Tanzania as a result of the 1994 genocide, were forced to go back to their Country, Rwanda. The Rwandan and Tanzanian security forces dismantled all the Rwandan refugee camps and forced refugees to leave Tanzania for Rwanda. I talked to Nsabimana (2004, interviewed by researcher 27 August) who was one of these refugees and he told me that the Tanzanian police took everything that these refugees had and left them to go empty handed. Upon arriving in Rwanda, a good number of these refugees were imprisoned for allegedly having participated in genocide. Those who managed to escape the hand of the police, walked for long miles through the bushes of Biharamuro under a fierce search by the police who used all means, including helicopters. These refugees somehow managed to come to Kenya, and I have been serving with most of these Nairobi refugees in a Rwandan and Burundian Christian Fellowship which I help to lead. They are traumatised by what they went through in Tanzania. “*The way of the cross*” is how these refugees refer to this



experience, in which some people lost their children in the Tanzanian bushes (Bahimba 2006, interviewed by Researcher on 17<sup>th</sup> January).

Refugees in Ulyankulu are now convinced that there is no way out but to go back home. They are very suspicious of the Tanzanian goodwill to integrate them.

It seems as if the Tanzanian Government has also started to realise that these refugees do not want to stay in Tanzania. Amnesty International

(2005, <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR160082005>) observed the following:

“In recent years, Tanzania has witnessed a marked swing in attitude towards refugees. The Government of Tanzania shifted its policy from tolerating local integration to promoting repatriation and the idea of "safe havens" inside Burundi, where individuals would be nationally protected rather than receiving international protection as refugees”.

Refugees believe that Tanzania has not changed their mind, as Amnesty International would say. They only believe that it is because the Tanzanian Government realised that these refugees are not ready to become their “slaves” (Ndimubandi 2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May).

Everything indicates that these refugees are not willing to remain in Ulyankulu despite the claims made by many writers like Anand, Rogge, Gasarasi and the claims made by the Tanzanian former President Nyerere that these refugees have been fully integrated in Tanzania. The majority of refugees see going home as the only alternative. The reasons for wanting to go back home range from being tired of being called a refugee (59%), Children’s education (14%), recuperation of their land (10%), lack of freedom in the settlement (9%), difficult life in the settlement (5%), to God’s timing (4%) (D 2.3. Appendix 4). Of all these reasons, it is clear that refugees do not primarily want to go back home only because of the changes that are happening in Burundi, but also and more importantly, because of the experience that they are going through. But why are they still waiting to go home especially now that the Governments in Burundi and Tanzania, and UNHCR are encouraging refugees? The point below is going to attempt to give the answer to this question.

#### **4.2.5 The uncertainties surrounding repatriation**

John R. Rogge (1994: 20-21) observed that,

While in most cases repatriation clearly remain the most preferable option, it is all too often taken for granted that the return of refugee to their country of origin is a “natural” and thus “problem-free” process. It is undoubtedly one of the most misleading myths surrounding the process of repatriation.

Refugees in Ulyankulu understand that home is surrounded by many uncertainties and problems. So even if they are looking forward to going back to Burundi, there are issues they would like to have been dealt with first.

#### **4.2.5.1. Land**

Since these refugees crossed the Burundian borders to Tanzania in 1972, the successive governments in Burundi especially those of Presidents Michel Micombero, Jean Baptist Bagaza and Pierre Buyoya did everything to discourage these refugees from coming back home. Most refugees never made any visit to Burundi and it was taken for granted by these Burundian governments that they would never come back. Amnesty International (2005,

<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR160082005>) reports “in the UNHCR-funded survey of “first wave” settlements, 79% of respondents had not returned to their homeland since becoming refugees”. Thus these refugees land was redistributed to powerful army officers and Tutsi politicians and other high-class Tutsi members. As I carry out this study, many of these Tutsi are not willing to give up these lands. This situation makes the return of these refugees dangerous because they fear that they may be eliminated so they do not ask to go back to their lands. Since what Ulyankulu refugees know best is agriculture, land means life for them<sup>29</sup>.

Those who did not lose their land to either Tutsi who got legally or illegally or to members of the refugees’ families who inherited them and who have been exploiting them for all the years when these refugees were away. Now these Tutsi and the refugees’ relatives have big families on these small pieces of lands, which make the return of the refugees from Ulyankulu bad news. Some of them would wish that these refugees, although members of their families, never make it back to Burundi. Amnesty International (2005, <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR160082005>) also reports the same problem;

“Returnees who fled Burundi in 1972 face the gravest challenges in regaining or claiming land. In most cases, their land was seized and redistributed by the Burundian government several years after they left the country. Furthermore, many of the 1972 refugees were small children when they left or were indeed born in exile to refugee parents. Some of them lost their parents at a young age and, as a result, lack precise details as to where their family’s land is located, making it even more difficult for them to assert a claim. Their need for land in order to support themselves is however no less dire”.

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<sup>29</sup> The Tanzanian and UNHCR policy was to keep these refugees in rural settlement reason as they do not have many other life skills on top of agriculture.

Many refugees in Ulyankulu said that land is one of the most difficult problems yet to be resolved. Once they go back to Burundi, 44% of them have a problem of getting back their land because of different complications, 35% think that they may get the land but not easily, 8% think that there shouldn't be a major problem in getting back their land, and only 13% are sure to get their land back without any problem (D5, Appendix 4). So this leads us to the conclusion that land is playing a major role in deciding whether or not refugees in Ulyankulu, and indeed other settlements, can return to their home today.

There are other fixed assets, like houses which are still occupied by those who grabbed them from these Hutu refugees, but they do not want to return them to their original owners. Of course the issues surrounding land and property ownership in Burundi are much more complex than thinking that people are just refusing to give them back to their original owners. Some of the land and properties were sold several times to different people, so that it becomes difficult to give them back to the returnees. Furthermore, some of the people who were resettled in these lands belonging to refugees do not have other land elsewhere. So evicting them means that they would become landless and the decision may lead to more conflicts. Although the current government has put in place the land and other properties commission, to deal with all problems related to land and property ownership, with a view to anticipate resolving the returnees' complaints, it is clear that refugees in Ulyankulu have little knowledge about the legal procedures to get their complaints to this commission, while others simply are not even aware of its existence.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that only 30% of refugees in Ulyankulu are ready to accept any other land given by the Government, 33% would, to a larger extent, want to get back their land, while 37% are not ready to accept any alternative to their original land (2.6. Appendix 4). So it is clear that many refugees in Ulyankulu want their original land even if it has been relocated to others. Even for those who are ready to be allocated other land, it is doubtful whether the Government of Burundi will be able to get free land in one of the most populated countries in Africa. It is very difficult to get free land in Burundi, a situation which may force the Government to re-distribute land, a position which is likely to raise more problems than solutions. As discussed before in this chapter, the refugees' deep conviction to get back their ancestral land is rooted in the Burundian Traditional religion. So it is very important that any viable solution to the land problem needs to have a religious dimension, a concept that many parties interested in resolving the questions of these refugees seem to ignore.

#### **4.2.5.2. Security**

Burundi has been experiencing a series of conflicts from Independence to date, the major ones in 1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, 1991, and 1993 – September 2006. In 1993 there were great hopes of lasting peace after the election of President Ndadaye Melchior, the first president democratically elected. Some refugees from Ulyankulu and other settlements left all they had in Tanzania and returned to Burundi. The mono-ethnic army killed President Ndadaye when he was only three months in office and a major civil war broke throughout the country. Some of the returnees from Ulyankulu and other settlements were killed, while the rest returned back empty-handed to start afresh life in the settlement.

Although the situation improved in Burundi with the signing of a peace agreement between the Government and all rebel movements in 1998, 2003 and 2006, and the building of integrated forces of security comprising of 50% Hutu and 50% Tutsi, refugees in Ulyankulu still fear that once they go back, they may go through the same experience as their colleagues in 1993. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (APRAB) signed on 28 August 2000 and the subsequent different ceasefires concluded between the Government and different rebel fighting groups also proposed, on top of the integrated security forces, a political re-arrangement based on ethnic quotas between the two tribes<sup>30</sup>.

However, the Hutu in Ulyankulu are not necessarily informed (at least officially) about all these developments. So more than 50% of these refugees are not aware about security improvements in their country (2.4. appendix 4). Of course, it is not only the lack of official information that is at the base of this fear, but also there is a place played by the church and especially through “prophecy” in determining the exact time for people to go home in safety.

#### **4.2.5.3. Transfer of Assets**

Refugees in Ulyankulu have many items which they would like to return with to Burundi. All the Anglican Church leaders that I interviewed identified assets transfer as one of the biggest problems they are facing. “We need to go home but the Government of Tanzania should allow us to take our possession and there is a need for a good program to help us to transport them” (Bahutunze 2006, interviewed by researcher on 20 May). Refugees who go back home are allowed to carry luggage weighing 40 kg per person. Considering that these refugees have been leaving in Ulyankulu for more than three decades, they have so many things that they would like to take with them. So these refugees have to make a difficult choice whether to forgo what they have attained and start a new

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<sup>30</sup> The copy of the APRAB can be obtained on the United States Institute of Peace, [www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org)

life in Burundi, or to resist repatriation and continue to leave a restricted life in the settlement and keep their possessions<sup>31</sup>.

#### **4.2.5.4. Level of integration in Tanzania**

Although it was discussed earlier that the experience of the refugees in Ulyankulu is one of the major reasons why they want to go back home, the length of time that these refugees have stayed in Tanzania poses a number of problems to them. After more than a generation in exile, half of these refugees do not have a command of Kirundi language, which is spoken in Burundi. Their first language is Swahili and their culture is a hybrid between Burundian culture and Tanzanian culture. Those who were fortunate enough to study were instructed in Swahili and English, while Kirundi and French are the languages used in Burundi. It wouldn't therefore be easy for them to get a job if they went back to Burundi. Parents with children in schools and colleges, also have a practical problem concerning how these children will continue with their education once they go back home.

The Government had decided that the 2005-2006 academic year would start with teaching both English and Swahili as additional languages on the one hand, to ease the reintegration of refugees once they come back and on the other hand to prepare the country for the regional integration especially in the East African Community. Although this programme is very good, its practicability may not be easy. It is very difficult for students to study four languages i.e. Kirundi, English, Swahili, and French, but also this programme is very expensive both in terms of personnel and money. Burundi being the third poorest country only ranking number three from the bottom, this may seem to be a very ambitious project especially as the free education initiated by this government is still lacking in many areas.

Finally, a big number of refugees were simply born in Ulyankulu and have never been to Burundi. They know very little about Burundi apart from the stories that they hear from their parents. The only life they know how to live is the life in the settlement. They find themselves in a serious dilemma on whether their home is Ulyankulu or Burundi. It is only when they are in a crisis (maybe when they are restricted to travel outside the camp) that they feel they would like to go home. Even then, they find themselves without adequate connections with Burundi, a reason which makes it not easy to decide to return to Burundi.

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<sup>31</sup> John Rogge (1994:35) makes a similar point while discussing the economic issues that refugees who want to go home encounter.

### **4.3. Conclusion**

This chapter dealt with the findings about the current situation of refugees in Ulyankulu camps. The attempt to integrate these refugees was only a success in so far as refugees were able to get food without help from UNHCR and the Tanzanian Government. But to a large extent these refugees are traumatised and live in material and spiritual poverty. It was realised that the Tanzanian laws restricting refugees from movements outside the settlement made these refugees vulnerable economically, and socially. Therefore, they are left with the option of going back home but they have questions about land, security, culture, and transfer of their assets that need to be answered before they can decide to join their mother land.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **5. THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN SHAPING THE REFUGEE EXPERIENCE**

Both African Traditional Religion (ATR) and the Church participated in shaping the refugee experience in Ulyankulu. In particular, the refugees' craving for going home was catalysed by their roots in ATR and Christianity. The following discussion is going to consider the religious dimension of the Burundian refugee's experience. In particular, the discussion will be based on the role of religion in the craving for a homeland and the hope that religion has given to the refugees in this regard. To be able to process this, reference will be made to the exilic Israelites experience.

My interaction with Ulyankulu refugees revealed that they get a great deal of inspiration from the experience of the Israelites and it would be unfair to discuss the religious experience of these refugees in isolation from the Israelites experience.

#### **5.1. Religious life in the Ulyankulu: A general overview**

A quick view of the religious life of refugees in Ulyankulu show that 98% would call themselves Christians while the rest is divided between Muslims and African Traditional religion (3.1. Appendix 4). Although the majority of refugees identified themselves with Christianity, a close observation reveals that Churches consciously or unconsciously borrow a great deal of the Burundian Traditional Religion elements within their teachings and beliefs. The major Church denominations represented are the Roman Catholic, the Pentecostal Swedish Free Mission, the Anglican Church, Moravian Church, the Assemblies of God, and other small Pentecostal Churches (Cishahayo 2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May).

As mentioned earlier, this research looked in particular at the contribution of the Anglican Church towards the shaping and orientation of the experience of refugees. However it should be mentioned that the questionnaires were distributed to Anglicans and non-Anglicans alike, so as to get a balanced representation of the experience of refugees. Only the interview was aimed primarily at understanding the response of the Anglican Church vis-à-vis the issues facing refugees in Ulyankulu.

The Anglican Church in Ulyankulu is not very big considering the size of the Roman Catholic Church (10.000) and the Pentecostal Swedish Free Mission (15000) which are the biggest denominations in the settlement. With a current registered membership of 1600, the Anglican Church currently has three ordained ministers and one retired minister, leading four parishes. The

four parishes are under a Rural Dean who is also the vicar of Mbeta Parish, the deanery<sup>32</sup> headquarters. The three vicars in office were all trained for three years (a course organised in Swahili to train evangelists for ordained ministry) and none of them attended post-primary education. Even though, the Anglican Church is one of the best churches in terms of trained leaders just coming second after the Roman Catholic Church (Cishahayo 2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May).

The diocese of Tabora, under which Ulyankulu deanery falls, helps oversee the administrative and pastoral issues in the deanery. The diocese mainly helps to train pastors and the diocesan Bishop confirms new Christians. The deanery contributes to the general fund of the diocese and pastors report directly to the Bishop (Cishahayo 2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May).

The Rural Dean is the local administrator on behalf of the Bishop and together with the church leadership in Ulyankulu has reasonable freedom to deliberate and take decisions on a number of issues, so long as these decisions do not contradict the general guidelines given at the diocesan level (Cishahayo 2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May).

Although, the membership of the Anglican Church is small, its influence on the life of the refugees is big. The Rural Dean, together with the Roman Catholic vicar in charge co-lead the Ulyankulu Union of Churches (UUC), which is the largest single church forum which gives direction on different issues regarding refugees in the settlement. The Anglican Church is also co-chairing the UUC secretariat with the Tanzanian Lutheran Church (KKKT). This Union of churches is a body that is recognised by the settlement commander and he involves them in the implementation of different decisions taken by the Government and, to a limited extent, involves them in decision-making (Cishahayo 2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May).

Apart from being heavily involved in the UUC, the Anglican Church leadership have been involved in different bodies like chairing Ulyankulu Cooperative, Village chairmanship (Bahutunze 2006, interviewed by researcher on 20 May), and sitting on the educational boards (Ndimubandi 2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May). The Anglican Church in Ulyankulu, through the diocese of Tabora and the Church of the Province of Tanzania has also had the opportunity to influence the Government decisions on different levels. The rural Dean sits in all diocesan meetings and the Diocese of Tabora enjoys the influence that it has in the Tabora region, together with the

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<sup>32</sup> In the diocese of Tabora under which Ulyankulu deanery falls, deaneries are the biggest administrative entities which form the diocese. They can be compared to Archdeaconries in countries like Kenya and Burundi. Rural deans are the advisors of the diocesan Bishop in all matters of administration.



Moravian and Roman Catholic Church, as they can use their position to influence decision-making (Cishahayo 2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May).

The Anglican Church pioneered the idea of taking refugees to visit Burundi so that they could see for themselves the changes since they left the country 34 years ago. After the visits, the refugees are in a position to take informed decisions. So in May-June 2006, the Ulyankulu Anglican Church in partnership with Rema Ministries sent four pastors on a fact-finding journey to Burundi (Cishahayo 2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May). It is this influence that the Anglican Church has on the life of refugees in Ulyankulu that motivated me to engage in a closer research on it's role vis-à-vis the experience of refugees in Ulyankulu.

## **5.2. Wounded but not dead: the church leadership in Ulyankulu**

Being a pastor and a leader in Ulyankulu settlement is an overwhelming and difficult task. From 1972 it seemed as if there was no hope whatsoever to do something about the situation that refugees found themselves in. As discussed above, the problems among the refugees were so many that they felt incapacitated to do anything. The loss of their home land and experiencing dehumanisation of all kinds both in Burundi and in Tanzania left the refugees emotionally unstable, economically poor, politically segregated, and without enough social infrastructures. Maybe the best way to describe what losing one's land feels like is to quote words from Erich Gruen's book. Here Gruen (2002: 233-234), using Philo's idea is expressing the traditional view on how the Jewish exile felt:

...banishment far exceeds death as the most feared penalty. Death at least puts an end to one's misery; exile perpetrates it, the equivalent of a thousand deaths". He continues, "No solace lies in adjustment. There seems nothing worth adjusting to. Only a single goal can keep flickering hopes alive: the expectation, however distant, of returning from exile and regaining a place in the Promised Land (: 234).

Refugees in Ulyankulu, it seems, felt the same way. They felt they could not do much to make sense out of their misery and that, as mentioned earlier; the only hope was in going back home. However, it seems, refugees did not know how to achieve this and nobody was willing to help them. The waiting was too long, and the Tanzanian Government together with UNHCR sought to help them get established in a place hundred of miles from their home country. UNHCR/TCRS and the Tanzanian Government, worked together to help these refugees get enough to continue to live in Ulyankulu and the other settlements. Their emotional, pastoral problems, and their spiritual needs were not highlighted in any of the programmes run by UNHCR, other agencies and the Tanzanian Government.

Refugees did not leave Burundi with any Anglican Church leader to help them during this difficult time<sup>33</sup>, and the Tanzanian churches while they were very well established to offer such services, seemed to have limited awareness of the refugee problems. Since refugees were isolated in rural settlements, and communication was difficult, it seemed quite impossible to raise this awareness. In such a difficult time, many refugees started worshipping in their houses and in small fellowships under trees. Consequently, spontaneous church leadership was developed, but these new leaders were not equipped in any meaningful way to lead this church in Diaspora with all the numerous challenges (Bahutunze 2006, interviewed by researcher on 20 May). The church leadership was wounded and it looked as if spiritual death was imminent but these courageous refugees refused to die.

Rev. Canon Abeli Bahutunze (an Evangelist by then) started picking up the pieces two years after what could be compared with wandering in the wilderness. With very limited resources, a team of leadership was developed and later the Anglican Diocese of Western Tanganyika agreed to offer some pastoral support to the team (Bahutunze 2006, interviewed by researcher on 20 May). However, the headquarters of the diocese was situated more than 600km away and since all the powers were centralised and invested in the office of the Bishop, it was difficult even impossible to bring enough assistance to the young church leadership in Ulyankulu. But the determination of these refugees to build a church, and their determination to worship God, could not be easily challenged. The Anglican Church leadership today is stable and independent in the way they discharge their pastoral duties.

A question was asked to understand how the church leadership in Ulyankulu feels about their duties, and I realised that a typical church leader in Ulyankulu does much work far beyond my expectation. As Taylor (1983: 7-9) observed the biblical view on the pastoral work is:

1. Guiding his flock to good pastures and safe resting places (Isa.40: 11)
2. Feeding and providing for the needs of his flock (Ps.23)
3. Guarding his flocks and protecting it from wild animals, or thieves, or other dangers, even when this involves danger to himself (1. Sam.17: 34).
4. Searching for any sheep that strays or gets lost, until he finds it, even if this means for him to go through dangerous places (Matt.18: 12).

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<sup>33</sup> All the Anglican Church Leadership in Ulyankulu was developed in the settlement. Apart from Rev. Cannon Abeli Bahutunze who left Burundi when he was already an evangelist, the current church leaders were just ordinary Christians when they arrived in Ulyankulu Settlement. Furthermore because of the political context which would not encourage relationship between refugees and Burundians left at home, it has been difficult to establish any formal relationship between the Anglican Church in Burundi and the one in Ulyankulu settlement. As such it was impossible for the Anglican Church in Ulyankulu to get assistance from the “mother Church” in Burundi so that new leaders would be raised to team up with Abeli Bahutunze (Bahutunze 2006).

5. Knowing the names of each sheep individually, so that they too know his voice and follow when he calls (John 10: 1-4)
6. Carefully tending any sheep that are sick or weakly, and taking special care of the nursing ewes and young babies (Gen. 33:13).

There may not be enough space to discuss the importance of the Anglican Church leadership in the lives of refugees in Ulyankulu, but their work is very commendable. My interview with the Anglican Church pastors revealed that they are shepherds in the above-described manner.

A church leader in Ulyankulu can also be described first as a social worker. They have to be involved in all the social problems and they have to be available for help. For example, Rev. Canon Benjamin Cishahayo told me that his motorbike is used almost weekly to transport sick people to hospital, and in most cases refugees are not even able to pay for the fuel (Cishahayo 2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May). The Anglican Church has also taken the issue of HIV/AIDS seriously as they engage in care for the affected, and create awareness among the refugees (Cishahayo 2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May).

Secondly, Church leaders are counsellors. Dealing with refugees is a very challenging task. Church leaders help with counselling in this community, which is emotionally unstable especially in regard to family matters (Nyandwi 2006, interviewed by researcher on 22 May).

Thirdly, church leaders are judges. Many cases between Christians are dealt with in churches not in a court of law. Most of these cases are domestic cases, while other cases are between the refugee agriculturalists and local Tanzanian pastoralists (Bahutunze 2006, interviewed by researcher on 20 May).

Fourthly, Church leaders are bankers<sup>34</sup>. In a situation where there are no banks, Christians bring their money to be kept by pastors and withdraw it whenever they need it. Ndimubandi (2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May) mentioned that Christians trust them so much that they give them their money to be kept in the pastor's houses.

Finally, church leaders are administrators. They are involved in a number of administrative works including keeping the accounts for the church, giving reports to the diocese, and officiating at marriages on behalf of the Tanzanian Government (Cishahayo 2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May).

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<sup>34</sup> The word banker should not be taken in its strict meaning. In the refugee settlements and camps, it is common that a person can decide to put their money or any other valuable under the care of the pastor or any other person with integrity so that she/he may get it back when she/he needs it. This is not one of the job descriptions of the pastor thus not every Christian has to take their money to the Pastor. It is only those Christians who may feel that if they keep this money themselves, they may use it for other purposes other than what they had originally thought of. Because this is done out of trust and in confidentiality, it really causes no problem.

The paradoxical situation is that these church leaders are doing far too much work but they are not equipped to do it because they did not get opportunities for quality training. They have to use their own judgement in many ways and they do not always get it right. They feel overwhelmed by the work because, as refugees, they also have many personal problems. Like other refugees, church leaders decided, in their mission, to pursue the idea of repatriation as the alternative to the devastating situation that refugees are in. Creating hope out of the refugee situation in Ulyankulu is put alongside creating a conducive environment for refugees to go home. Therefore it seems to me that any theologising in Ulyankulu is done in relation to the great land of the refugees' ancestors.

### **5.3. The land of our ancestors: the legitimacy behind the craving for going back home**

The pre-colonial Burundian King was both a religious, economic and political figure. As “*Sebarundi*” (the father of all Burundian) he gave them direction in every sector of life. It was believed that the king's power was received directly from God and nobody could ever dare to challenge his authority. The King owned the whole land which he distributed to whosoever he wanted. Unfortunately, as discussed in the third chapter, most of the land was given to Tutsi while most Hutu became their squatters. Even the unoccupied land belonged to the King or his representatives who were mostly Tutsi. However, the situation in Burundi should be understood in its context. Very few people were landless. The biggest problem was that many Hutu had either small or/and infertile land, so that they had to rent some more land from Tutsi landlords.

When President Bagaza came to power in 1976 he abolished both the “*Ubugabire*” and the “*ubugererwa*”, a decision that at least helped Hutu to own the land that they were allocated as squatters<sup>35</sup>. The decision further helped Hutu whose land was no longer fertile to occupy and own virgin lands. Hutu, however, especially those in settlements, do not think that they were owed the kind decision of the kings or President Bagaza to own the land in Burundi. Refugees claim the ownership of the land of Burundi and believe that Tutsi are just foreigners who invaded their country. According to Malkki (1995:54), refugees reconstructed their history in what she called “mythico-History”. She does not refer to the Burundian refugees' stories as mythico-History to simply mean that they are false or made up “but the fact that it was concerned with order in a fundamental, cosmological sense...” – that is “it was concerned with the ordering and re-ordering of social and political categories, with the defining of self in distinction to other, with good and evil” (: 55).

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<sup>35</sup> The terms “*ubugabire*” and “*ubugererwa*” were discussed in chapter three. The *ubugabire* and the *Ubugarerwa* were two forms of feudal exploitation based on cow and land respectively.

After the Hutu found themselves in a crisis – that is after they lost their homeland, they were in need to go back to their history and myths as a people, so that they could affirm and reaffirm their identity. In this Hutu mythico-history (or reinterpretation of history and myths as I would like to call it), Hutu found a good foundation for the claim of their land, Burundi.

The issue of who were the original, primordial occupants of the land now known as Burundi was [and still is] central to the Hutu claim to rightful moral and historical precedence over the Tutsi, and to the Hutu people's status as "the true members" of the primordial nation, the aboriginal homeland (Malkki 1995: 59).

So the fact that the Hutu were the first inhabitants of the land that was later called Burundi (after the name of the first Hutu ancestor) one hundred years before Jesus Christ, gives them an incontestable ownership of the country (Malkki 1995: 60-61). The existence of this Hutu ancestor by the name of Burundi<sup>36</sup> has not been established by any historian. However, the oral tradition has it that Twa were the first inhabitant of Burundi, followed by Hutu and later Tutsi joined the two communities. So the issue here is that Burundi is a mythical figure and the choice of his name has been influenced by the need for refugees to assert their ownership of the Burundi land. Refugees believe that the Tutsi who are of Nilotic origin and who came four hundred years ago from Somalia, stole the country and all that was in it from the Hutu (: 67) and they used the feudal system to assert their authority over the Hutu before chasing them to Tanzania (: 68-9). So the claim to ownership of Burundi is tied up with the achievements of the Hutu ancestors. Whether this claim is valid or not does not matter very much. The point in focus is that the refugees are convinced that their ancestors were the first inhabitants of Burundi, while the Tutsi are just foreigners who came and dominated them.

The fact that Hutu ownership of the Burundi land is traced back to their ancestors has a lot of weight especially when it touches on the traditional religious system. Land was passed on from the father to the son, an act that justified the legitimacy of the son's ownership of the land. This implies that Hutu got the right to land ownership from their ancestor Burundi. As such, it would not be proper for one to sell or abandon the ancestral land, as he/she would need to pass this land over to his child as inheritance. So, one's identity is very much tied up with the land. Consequently, losing the claim to the ancestral land makes one a stranger in his/her home place. Likewise, dying outside one's ancestral land is the most painful experience among the refugees. "*Twaje kugwa ino*" (we came to die here) is a common saying among the refugees to show how much they detest dying in the settlement.

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<sup>36</sup> Please note that Burundi in this case refers to the name of the Hutu ancestor and not to the country.

Asked what he thinks about going back home, Rev. Bahutunze (2006, interviewed by researcher on 20 May) answered: “Even if I am old, I do not want to die here”. Refugees do not want to go back merely for economic, social, and political purposes. Religion has a big part to play here. Although most refugees in Ulyankulu go to church, it is clear that their belief is influenced by elements from the Burundian Traditional Religion. So the traditional religion has influenced the way the churches and especially the Anglican Church has interpreted and understood the experience of the refugees in the light of the Bible. The following will be an attempt to understand this phenomenon.

#### **5.4. Re-evaluating the past**

It was the 1972 events in Burundi and the subsequent difficult time in Ulyankulu that served as the context for the missionary enterprise of the Anglican Church of Ulyankulu. Refugees in Ulyankulu had to recall the reasons why they lost their country and the Anglican Church leadership tried to provide an answer to this difficult and complex situation. In my interaction with the top Anglican leadership in Ulyankulu in May 2006, it was suggested that the answer lies in the past. It was the way the Church in Burundi handled issues of Hutu –Tutsi relationship that led to the deterioration of these relationships (Ndayiragije 2006, interviewed by researcher on 23 May).

The Anglican Church leaders believe that the church leadership in Burundi did not do enough to avert the 1972 catastrophe. The blame is largely directed at the Tutsi, who had power to talk to their brothers in political leadership to stop killing innocent Hutu. They give numerous incidences of Tutsi church leaders who even participated in the 1972 Hutu genocide, or who grabbed the properties belonging to Hutu who had left the country for Tanzania. One of the famous examples that they gave me is the killing of students who were studying at the Ecole Normale de Kiremba (a school owned by the Pentecostal Church Swedish Free Mission) without the church leadership trying to stop the killing of these students. They also gave the example of a number of pastors who currently live in land and houses belonging to refugees who left Burundi in 1972 (Bahutunze 2006, interviewed by researcher on 20 May).

As was the case with the neighbouring countries,<sup>37</sup> it is true that those near the leadership in the country, largely influenced the church leadership in the Anglican Church in Burundi as in other

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<sup>37</sup> In Rwanda, the Cardinal Lavigerie had insisted that the White Fathers should evangelise through chiefs (Linden 1977:2-3). White Fathers were Belgians Roman Catholic Missionaries who first planted the Catholic Church in Rwanda. They had a dream of converting the Rwandan Kingdom into a Christian Kingdom. It appeared to them that the only way to do this was by evangelising through the Rwandan Kings and chiefs. This decision elevated those in political leadership into big leadership positions in the church. In Tanzania, the post independent church leadership in Bukoba district which is at the Rwandan – Ugandan border, was largely assumed by members of the aristocracy (Larsson 2000: 389).

churches. However, it would be an exaggeration to say that Hutu did not have some important places in the Anglican Church. For example the first Bishop of the Anglican Church in Burundi was a Hutu by the name of Nkuzumwami. I then tried to get an answer to the question as to why they do not blame the Hutu church leadership for the 1972 Hutu genocide. Hutu, they replied, were running away for their safety. “How can a victim help another victim?” They turned the question back to me (Cishahayo 2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May).

The point of concern in the claims of church leaders in Ulyankulu is not whether or not their stories and accusations towards their Tutsi counterparts are true. What is important is that they blame the past for the current crisis. All the 10 Anglican Church leaders in Ulyankulu that I interviewed told me that Hutu in Ulyankulu are like Israelites in Babylon. Nyandwi (2006, interviewed by researcher on 22 May), the vicar of Usigara Parish claimed, “We are like Israelites so going home is a guarantee”. Although, there is a great deal of misinterpreting the events that led to the Babylonian exile, church leaders in Ulyankulu are inspired by the Israelite story. How did the Israelites themselves interpret the causes for their exile experience?

As Samuel Pagan (1988: 318) observed, “one of the challenges for religious leaders [in Israel] was to reinterpret the national catastrophe in relation to the traditional theological self-understanding of Israel and Judah”. In particular, the main task was to establish a relationship between the special loves for Palestine, the special sense of security related with the Jerusalem temple and the special intimacy between Israelites and Yahweh on one hand and the realities of the exile on the other hand (:319). It was difficult to understand why God would permit Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon, God’s servant, to overturn Judah (Jeremiah 27:6). As Harry Wendt (1994: Section Three page 7) says, a casual observer of history may conclude that Judah was devastated by Babylon because it constituted a national aspiration to Babylon, but the prophets had a different view. The crisis in Judah was the will of God who marched the Babylonian army against his people because they had neglected the covenant which God cherished and took seriously. So Exile became a teaching experience for the Israelites and a time to reflect on the future. “The lessons of the past were assessed and their spiritual power was harnessed to a new cause” (Drane 1987:156).

Although Ulyankulu Anglican Church leaders believed that disobedience to God’s law was the cause of the 1972 disaster that led them to exile, they did not think that Hutu are guilty of this disobedience. Instead, Tutsi are guilty and any study and therefore reinterpretation of the past constantly gives them hope for the future – that is if God is just, he will definitely give us our ancestral land in the eyes of our Tutsi enemies. So as such, Hutu refugees are just victims of a sinful social group (Tutsi). This gave refugees in Ulyankulu a legitimacy to appeal to God as the

choir group in Ikonongo village (Ulyankulu) did on an audiocassette that they recorded in 2001. What is interesting is that although these songs are not popular outside the settlement, they are very much liked in Ulyankulu, and it is not easy to get a copy. The choir sung in Kirundi, even if the majority would have been more conversant with Swahili, a sign of acknowledging their Burundi identity. In their second song side B of this audiocassette, these refugees have this to say: “it was in 1972 when our tribe was killed innocently. Our ancestral land is inherited by foreigners, so God, we are very sad about it.” And this gave them the courage to then appeal to God’s help: “Our case, oh God is very heavy, please fulfil your promises. We are crying, we are crying, with sorrow and anguish for our country”.

So the study into the past proved that Hutu refugees are victims of Tutsi injustice and failure to adhere to God’s law. In a different mode from the Babylonian exiles who blamed their suffering on their failure to walk in the way of the covenant, refugees in Ulyankulu blame Tutsi for their animosity towards them while praising their ancestors for leaving behind them a land, a name, and an identity that these refugees are craving for. However, understanding the past of the Hutu refugees was needed not just for the purposes of information but for the sake of the present. Worship and faithfulness to God would ensure the recovery of the lost land. At least this is what the “prophets” and the church leaders have to say to the refugees.

### **5.5. Prophecies and promises**

Church leaders presented God as the only solution to the problems of the refugees. Consequently, worshipping him was mandatory for every Burundian if he/she was to go back home. The claim that going back home is God’s work was supported by the “prophecies”. Prophecies in Ulyankulu are very common among many churches, as most of them give more light on what God requires of refugees before going home. More than 79% of refugees in Ulyankulu have heard the Church communicating about going back home through prophecies (3.5. Appendix 4).

Prophecies are given through special people with special gifts to prophesy. These prophecies managed to fill in the gap that the Church leaders were not able to fill with their teachings. There is a need for fresh promises from God so that people could refer to them and keep hope for the future. It is exactly the need for these promises that prophecies tend to satisfy.

In Ulyankulu prophecies are words given to the congregation through one gifted member, generally during a big worship meeting. In most cases, the person with the gift to prophecy would stand up and start speaking in tongues. After a few minutes, the person would start speaking in a language (generally Kirundi or Swahili) that the congregation can understand. The prophecies would claim when and how refugees will go home, by giving signs that would lead to repatriation.



Likewise prophecies would give terms and conditions to people who are to go back home. The person prophesying will then finish with such words as were used by God's Israelite prophets, "niko uhoraho agize" (*thus says the Lord*).

Most of the terms and conditions that are given to the refugees are generally in a form of calling people to repent and change their behaviour. Prophecies do not see the settlement as place of suffering but a place of training and perfection. As in other forms of training, people have to pass tests for them to complete the training. So the daily sufferings that refugees go through are the tests that they have to pass if they are to inherit God's promises to take them home. Failure to live a holy life in the midst of this terrifying life experience will condemn refugees to eternal separation from their homeland.

### **5.6. The traditional background to the understanding of Prophecy**

Although prophecies in Ulyankulu are strongly rooted in Biblical ethos, they also have some of their roots in the Burundian Traditional Religion. Traditionally when Burundians wanted to ask God something, they would first go through the mediator between them and God. His name is *Kiranga* and nobody knew very well *Kiranga's* origins. There are no known descendants of *Kiranga* and the best way to understand him is that he is a mythical person although Burundians tend to believe that *Kiranga* lived at some point in history. *Kiranga* has his priests throughout the country who are human beings but they do not have any blood connection with him. These priests are called *Ibishegu* and these are the people that the worshipper had to speak to. The work of these *Ibishegu* (or traditional priest) is to listen to the people's prayers, take their sacrifices and give responses on behalf of *Kiranga* who represents God himself. They also give people directions on what to do in order to get what they need from God.

While performing normal activities on a normal day, the *Ibishegu* are normal human beings like other citizens. While performing their religious functions, the physical appearance of the *Ibishegu* is very different from other Burundians. Their faces are painted in white and black, a sign that, incidentally, has some similarities with the white and black robes that most of the Anglican priests puts on during worship. While communicating with the worshipper, the *ibishegu* have a different voice, because the spirit possesses them. At this time they are set apart from other normal activities and ready to perform their religious activities. The worshipper is then ready to listen to the *Ibishegu* and to take their advices seriously – they were not speaking their own words but *Kiranga's* and consequently God's.

### **5.7. The Ulyankulu interpretation of Prophecies compared to the Biblical understanding of Prophecy**

It is this traditional respect that Burundians had for the traditional priest that is transferred towards the prophets and their words. The preliminary session that the “church prophets” perform is the speaking in tongues, a sign that they are now set apart for a different function. Like the *ibishegu* their voices change and they start speaking not on their behalf, but on behalf of God. The promises from these prophecies are taken seriously and most of the time are given the weight of scripture.

Their prophetic function is not just foretelling the future but they engage with the immediate needs of the people i.e. their exilic experience. Church leaders play the role of cross-referencing prophecies with the Bible in order to determine their authenticity. The analysis of most the prophetic messages reveal that the central message is about going back to Burundi.

For example, Anglican Church leaders shared with me that one of the prophecies that they are eagerly waiting for is the completion of the Pentecostal church building in Katumba Settlement, which will mark the end of their exilic time in Tanzania (Nyandwi 2006, interviewed by researcher on 22 May). Although this church does not belong to the Anglican Church, it is generally believed that its completion would mark the end of the exilic suffering. According to the prophecy, this Church building would serve as a sign to the nations that in this camp there has been a community that worshipped God. Although the original prophecy of the completion of such a church was given to refugees in Katumba Settlement, refugees in Ulyankulu believed that the prophecy is theirs as well. So they went ahead and built a similar (though smaller in size) church as a living testimony to worship activities in Ulyankulu settlement (please see the photo of one side of the church in Appendix 5).

In a settlement with enormous economic hardship, it is logically inconceivable to think that refugees managed to raise enough money for this church building. However, the unquenchable love for their homeland constituted enough reason for them to do all they could to complete this building if indeed this would hasten their repatriation. Coincidentally, these two buildings (one in Katumba and one in Ulyankulu) are now completed and the repatriation process (at least for the second wave refugees) has started (this may not be the best reason to justify the authenticity of the prophecy though). So refugees are full of confidence that this time around things are going to move faster for them to go home.

It is God’s promises that kept the Babylonian exiles hope for the future. God’s covenant with Israel and especially the promise of an everlasting Davidic Kingdom has been an incredible source of hope for exiles for a better and prosperous life in Jerusalem. Ezekiel 17 is allegorically referring to the Davidic Kingdom which will be superior to all other earthly kingdoms. The right

king to bring about this Davidic kingdom is presented by Ezekiel in chapter 34:11-31 as a good shepherd, a message which is reminiscent of Jesus' words in John 10: 1-17 (Kraiser 1978: 241).

Unlike the refugees' hope for restoration, which coincides with their historical return to Burundi, the liberating act of God's people had a more far reaching significance than the historical return to Judah. In particular, there is no doubt that the Jewish hope was directly tied up with the coming of the messiah. As Ezekiel (34:16) presented it, the oppressed flock was to be relieved from the oppressive shepherds. So the full consummation of God's liberation was still a matter of eschatology, although the historical event was a real motivation for exiles to keep their faith in God.

It would take Jesus Christ for them to be liberated not only from physical bondage but also from spiritual bondage (Luke 4:18-20). Even though Christ's counterpart, the devil, continued to manifest himself as anti messiah so that "history was not a contest between mere mortals; it was simultaneously a supernatural battle for dominion, and Satan has his own succession of tyrants corresponding to God's Davidic line as well as his climactic person, the tyrant of all tyrants" (Kraiser 1978: 240). Thus this culminates in the conclusion that, the whole consummation of God's liberation of his people is yet to come although the presence of God's Kingdom can be still felt.

Thus liberation as it is presented by the Anglican Church in Ulyankulu is under pressure to answer in precise terms two fundamental questions:

1. What is the hope of those who will never make it to Burundi?
2. What is the meaning of repatriation in case Burundi does not become "as heavenly" as they project it?

Repatriation is a very imperative exercise for any meaningful empowerment of refugees, it is not, in itself, an answer to the real problems of refugees. If organised well, it is the most important step on a journey towards transformation of the lives of refugees. However, if not organised, repatriation may ruin even more the lives and dignity of refugees.

One may imagine what kind of failure that Nehemiah would have incurred during his project of rebuilding the walls of Jerusalem if he chose to "trust God" and forget about making necessary arrangement with King Artaxerxes (Nehemiah 2:1-10). The unsympathetic welcome that he received from Tobiah and Sanballat (Nehemiah 2:10) would have translated his faith in God into a utopian idea. The experience at the site in Jerusalem proved difficult to all Jews who were coming from Babylon. Repatriation answered some question i.e. getting back to their homeland, but it created new ones i.e. starting to build their community around new social, economic, political and religious realities.

Likewise, repatriation may guarantee refugees a freedom to move around freely, to participate in politics, to have the same opportunity with others with regards to healthcare,

education, and economic activities. However, refugees will start living a kind of life that they never thought of. They will start to learn how to live with their former enemies (Tutsi), they will have to learn how to share the small former land with those who are currently living in them, they will have to adjust to a new Burundian culture. In brief, they will start a new life in a new context and this may prove even more tiring than refugees may think.

Church leaders in Ulyankulu did not just rely on prophecy and sit down to wait for the fulfilment of the promises. They are working hard to ensure they play their role of leading refugees to see their home country. The following point is going to discuss how these church leaders are influencing politics in Burundi.

### **5.8. The church's influence on the way politics are done**

Perhaps the power of the Anglican Church (and other churches) in Ulyankulu resides in the way they managed to influence settlements' and camps' politics. Two politico military groups that emerged from the refugee camps and settlements were largely influenced by the religious convictions that God was behind their military campaign against the mono-ethnic army in Burundi. PALIPEHUTU – FNL and CNDD – FDD, the main Hutu political and military players in Burundi, followed a broad pre-established politico-religious programme in terms of prophecies. The above rebel movements attacked Tutsi dominated military camps and other places singing religious choruses. One famous chorus that they sung during such attacks was “*Turi Ingabo za yesu Koko*” (we are Jesus' Army indeed). Before attacking, they had a time of preparation, asking God to give them permission to attack and asking him to protect them. This is reminiscent of the Israelites conquest stories e.g. Joshua 6: 1-21.

As I conduct this research, one of these two former rebel groups won the 2005 general elections and President Pierre Nkurunziza has repeatedly mentioned that he was elected to execute God's mission and that he knew about his victory, from prophecies, way back before his election. One of the most interesting chorus that the president himself likes singing is *warakoze Mana integuro yawe ni nziza*” (you did well God, your plans are good). I mentioned earlier that the experience of the Israelites in Babylon is a source of inspiration for the way refugees and the Anglican Church does theology. The church leaders insist on the fact that Hutu refugees are like the Israelites and see in what happened to the Israelites as a reason to shape the refugees' destiny accordingly. Thus much of the Friday afternoon prayers that I attended at Mbeta Anglican Church in Ulyankulu, were beseeching God to elect leaders in Burundi who are after God's own heart. This is not just a phenomenon which is unique to Ulyankulu settlement. In a Burundian and Rwandans

Christian Fellowship which is situated at Riara Road-Nairobi, refugees have a core Prayer point to ask God to give Burundi and Rwanda presidents who are saved .

With the death of Gahutu Rémi who was considered by many Hutu as God's appointed Hutu liberator, it was very difficult for Hutu to imagine another leader who can do the same<sup>38</sup>. President Ndadaye also came with high hopes for the Hutu but was killed after only three months in office. So the coming of Peter Nkurunziza is seen by most Anglican Church leaders in Ulyankulu as a possible alternative to Gahutu Rémi. At large, Church leaders in the camps believe that since CNDD-FDD under the leadership of Peter Nkurunziza have been able (to some extent) to dismantle the mono-ethnic army and that PALIPEHUTU is soon joining the army, then the liberation process is at hand.

Even if there is no doubt that the church leaders believe that behind all these events is God himself, it feels as if they want God to act in a certain way. They expect the new age in the history of Burundi to be marked by reformation in the army. Erasto Emmanuel (2006, interviewed by researcher on 22 May), the evangelist at Keza Parish mentioned, "We are only waiting for the army to be reorganised. We are not very much satisfied with the 50% Hutu and 50% Tutsi in the army. Surely, Hutu are 85% of the whole population how can we have just a 50% representation in the Army?". It implies from this that the kind of liberation envisaged by the church in Ulyankulu is a political arrangement that would take into account the needs of Hutu victims of the Tutsi oppression. Israelites ideas were not different.

According to Ezekiel 37:15-28, the northern and southern kingdom would be united together under a new David on that day of national resurrection (Kraiser 1978: 243). This may not have sounded well with the Babylonian exiles because they considered themselves pure Children of Israel, and therefore the only inheritants of God's blessing. However, God's message was even more far reaching: Isaiah of Babylon believes that God's love was reaching far beyond Israel boundaries. This is at least the sense of Isaiah 49: 6: "It is too light a thing that you should be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the survivors of Israel; I will give you as a light to the nations that my salvation may reach to the end of the earth" ( Drane 1987: 174).

Whereas Ulyankulu Anglican church leaders feel that there should be a Hutu military liberator liberating Hutu from Tutsi oppressors, and restoring back their land, the Isaiah of Babylon preached that the way to the world's salvation would be the way of suffering and service [Isaiah 52: 13-53:12] (Drane 1987:175). Consequently the house of the Lord will be called "a house of prayer for all nations" (Isaiah 56:7). Israel re-existence was not to be an end in itself, but as it was

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<sup>38</sup> I mentioned Gahutu Rémy earlier. He is the founder of PALIPEHUTU and he played a big role in shaping the thinking of Hutu refugees. He particularly believed that, Hutu will get back their country in a military conquest over the Tutsi dominated Army.

even before the Babylonian exile, “one reason for Israel’s existence is that creation is under curse for disobedience, and Yahweh insistently wills that the whole world should be brought to blessing” (Brueggemann 1997: 431-432). So the exile was to shape the understanding of Israel with regard to their mission to the non-elect. While at Babylon, Israel rediscovered her role of being a blessing to other nations as she was told to seek the peace and prosperity of the Babylonian city (Jeremiah 29:7).

Therefore, the vision that Hutu refugees have is short sighted. A vision that does not look beyond their ethnic group, a vision that puts God in a box to act as though he was the God of the Hutu but not of the Tutsi as well. However, the mystery of God’s love is that it commands the Hutu to pray for the Tutsi who persecute them (Matthew 5: 44-45). But because Hutus in Ulyankulu misunderstood this, they went ahead and preserved Hutu distinctiveness over and above their points of contact with Tutsi and other tribes around them.

### **5.9. Maintenance of Hutu identity**

Malkki, studying refugees in Mishamo settlement found that the Hutu in Mishamo settlement were busy working against the “danger” of being assimilated so that she entitled her book *Purity and Exile*. Church leaders especially the leaders of the Anglican Church contributed a lot to this concept of keeping Hutu refugees pure<sup>39</sup>. My last question on my interview guide wanted to find out what the Anglican Church leaders thought of the idea of the refugees being given Tanzanian nationality. It is worth here going through two of the answers that these church leaders gave. The 67 old Rev. Canon Abeli Bahutunze (2006, interviewed by researcher on 20 May) had this to say, “I do not want to be given Tanzanian fake citizenship. I am a Burundian; it is impossible for me to become something else. I want to die in Burundi”. And the 43 years old Rev. Tito Ndimubandi (2006, interviewed by researcher on 21 May) said, “NO! It is a lie! How many people were given [Tanzanian Citizenship] and lost it later to the same government? Even if I were a billionaire, I would not pursue this idea. In fact I do not want even my children to become Tanzanians”.

These church leaders believe that any move to give citizenship to Burundian refugees is not in the interest of these refugees. The most probable reason for this is to keep ties with the land of their ancestors. Once again, the issue of dying in Burundi and being buried together with the parents and grandparents is taking a central place. The other reason is that these church leaders do not trust Tanzanian officials to give them genuine citizenship. Consequently, they do not even want their children to ever become Tanzanians.

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<sup>39</sup> The concept of keeping the Hutu identity pure has something to do with Hutu not mixing themselves with other tribes or nations by marrying them or borrowing from their cultures. In many ways this identity is very much connected to the homeland, Burundi.

Thus their teaching in church and in the community are shaped by an anti assimilation tendency. Thus these church leaders discourage inter-marriages between Tanzanians and Burundians. During my conversation with Rev. Abeli Bahutunze (2006, interviewed by researcher on 20 May), he mentioned that his daughter had recently married a Tanzanian man and that this was the biggest crisis that had befallen his family.

Malkki (1995: 202-203), in her 37<sup>th</sup> panel with refugees in Mishamo settlement found the same reaction. “It is not good to marry with Tanzanians. To mix with Tanzanians is equal to mixing with Tutsi. One does not do it. If this ever happens, there is not even a religious ceremony, nothing. Remember writings of the Bible. Remember Samson, a good Israelite...”. As this quotation shows, refugees equate mixing with Tanzanian with mixing with Tutsi, a stand that gained sympathy among Burundian refugees all over in Tanzania.

The Babylonian exiles went through the same experience. When Nehemiah came back to Jerusalem, he found that the Jews who had remained in Jerusalem had integrated almost entirely with the rest of the Palestinian society. They had a good business relationship with the people of Samaria and they had married people from other races (Drane 1987: 179). However, the Jews in Babylon had remained “pure” and when Nehemiah saw all that was going on in Jerusalem he was categorically opposed to it, challenged it and he invested in developing a separate Jewish community and identity inside the walls of Jerusalem (:180). Likewise, Ezra read and explained the law to the Jews in Jerusalem, forcing those who had intermarried with women from other nations to divorce them (Ezra 10:11-12).

So Ezra and Nehemiah founded a community of Jews based on racial and religious exclusivist (Drane 1987:188). Consequently, the gap between the Jews and the people of Samaria widened because the Samaritans realised that they would never be allowed to worship in Jerusalem. This may have been the reason why they later built their own temple on Mt. Gerizim, thus making a schism between the people who were believed to have a common ancestry (: 188-189).

Like Ezra and Nehemiah, the Deuteronomist believed that there was no room for the Israelites to make any treaty with other nations (Deuteronomy 7: 1-4). We observe the same attitude during the conquests where Israelites believed that they were the instruments that God used to judge other nations (Joshua 6:2).

However, in the midst of all this exclusivism, the truth of the universal salvation remained. For example, Rahab and her family were not killed and they lived with Israelites (6:25), and the third generation offspring of Edomites and Egyptians could be admitted into the assembly of the Lord (Deuteronomy 23:8) (Senior 1991:98). Furthermore, Ruth, the Moabite believed in Yahweh (Ruth 1:16) and she is mentioned in the genealogy of Jesus (Matthew 1:5) (Payne 1962: 191).

Finally the book of Jonah “served to heap ridicule upon nationalistic exclusivism” as Jonah went to preach to the Assyrians who turned to Yahweh (: 190).

It seems as if the argument behind Hutu purity in exile remains shaky when looked at from the Biblical perspective. What may have been the case in Ulyankulu may again be found in the cultural belief system which values highly the ancestral land. One of the biggest dangers, it seems, would be that an intercultural marriage might complicate the return to the native land. Homeland is to refugees what water is to fish. Refugees tend to believe that life outside their home country is impossible.

#### **5.10. Conclusion**

This chapter discussed the role played by religion i.e. Christianity and ATR in shaping the life of refugees in Ulyankulu. In particular the Anglican Church leadership in this Settlement worked hard to ensue that they give hope to these refugees. The discussion in this chapter insisted that the Anglican Church ties this hope with the historical repatriation of these refugees back to the land of their ancestors. The fact that the Hutu ancestors owned the land in Burundi gives refugees the right of ownership of this land and, according to them, God who is just will definitely give them back that which belongs to them and punish Tutsi who wrongly chased them away from Burundi. Accordingly prophecies call upon refugees to trust God and obey His commandments if they are to inherit their ancestor’s land. It is this belief in purity before God that is influencing the way most of the Hutu politics are done. In order to make sure refugees’ eyes are kept on their homeland, Church leaders and “prophets” insisted that purity is kept i.e. refugees should not mix themselves with other nations.



## CHAPTER SIX

### 6. SOME WAYS FORWARD

If one were to define the status of Ulyankulu refugees, it would be proper to call them poor. Although material poverty is an everyday reality, one should not understand that material poverty is the only aspect in focus here. As Bosch (1991:436) has mentioned, Luke's society understood the poor to be "an all-embracing category for those who were the victims of society". He goes on to say that this hermeneutic follows the one by the Liberation theology interpretations of poor<sup>40</sup> which says

"The poor are the marginalized, those who lack every active or even passive participation in society; it is a marginality that comprises all spheres of life and is often so extensive that people feel that they have no resources to do anything about it (Müller 1978:80) (Bosch: 436-7)".

As discussed earlier, in this chapter, refugees in Ulyankulu are poor in many ways. They are socially, politically, and economically discriminated. Refugees in Ulyankulu lived with injustice for a very long time and they are now walking with wounds in their hearts which lead to emotional instability.

In trying to look for a way forward, I would like to borrow from Bryant L. Myers (1999:87). understanding of poverty as a result of broken relationships affected by sin within ourselves, with the community, with those we call "other", with the environment, and with God. Consequently, the cause of poverty is fundamentally spiritual (: 88). So He believes that any response to poverty must be spiritual and must aim at restoring the broken relationship. He believes that "to move towards a better human future we must encourage and develop relationships that work, relationships that are just, peaceful, and harmonious" (: 120). It is worth emphasising that the aim of this fourth moment in this pastoral circle is not to undermine the effort made by local churches in Ulyankulu. Furthermore, this is not an effort to undo the coping strategies developed by refugees themselves. The aim is to reflect on what the Anglican Church and other refugees have been doing towards the restoration of these broken relationship and seek to shed more light on other opportunities that may enhance this relationship.

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<sup>40</sup> For convenience purposes, I choose Müller's interpretation and left out others.

### 6.1. The self

Myers(1999: 87-8) states that the poor do not know who they are and the reason for their existence, a situation which leads them to believe that “they are less than human, without the brains, strength, and personhood to contribute to their own well -being or that of others, their understanding of who they are is marred”. Refugees in Ulyankulu are really in this situation. They believe that they cannot improve their status and identity while in the settlement, a reason that contributes enormously towards their longing for homeland. The discussion in the second moment of this pastoral circle revealed that many refugees want to go back home because they are tired of being called refugees. “*Mkimbizi*” (Swahili word for a refugee) denotes the meaning of a second hand citizen at the best and a criminal or a stupid person at the worst. It is used to psychologically torture refugees and remind them that, after more than three decades in Tanzania, they haven’t qualified to be at the same level as local Tanzanians. The hope for a rebirth of these refugees has been focused on the historical repatriation, and the regaining of their identity as people of Burundi. The Anglican Church gives the same message to the refugees. Their trust in God will redeem them from this misery that they were innocently condemned to live in.

However, this hope is limited. It is difficult to know exactly when this repatriation is happening. Refugees have lived with an identity frustration for the last 34 years and it may be that they will have to wait for a few more years before they can go back home. This implies that most refugees will spend more than half of their lifetime in Ulyankulu. Some will spend all their lifetime in Ulyankulu and a good number have died in Ulyankulu already. So the refugees’ hope has to be alive in the settlement, so that they do not sacrifice the longest part of their lives unnecessarily. Yes repatriation is undoubtedly an incontrovertible reality that will put to rest some of troubles that refugees go through. However, as they wait for repatriation, life has to continue in the settlement and they have to live it abundantly (John10: 10). In other words the kingdom of God should not be understood in the light of the historical repatriation, it has to be experienced in the settlement as well. Refugees in Ulyankulu need to live Jesus’ words “The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God has come near; repent, and believe in the good news” (Mark 1:15). So Jesus has good news for refugees “for it is clear that he did not come to help angels, but the descendents of Abraham” (Hebrews 2: 16). So he gives refugees a new identity so that they are now his brothers and sisters (Hebrews 2:17), “holy partners in a heavenly calling” (Hebrews 3:1).

This new identity, that we get not from men but from our brother Jesus, should be the starting point for the refugees adequate self-esteem – for “Transforming people begins with helping discover that “ their human dignity and identity are intrinsically related to God in Christ through his

redemptive purpose in salvation history”” (Myer 1999:116)<sup>41</sup>. Myers (1999:117) convincingly argues that the rediscovery of one’s identity leads to the development of character that seeks to be “life-enhancing for all”. Consequently, transformation takes off so that,

“If poverty is the world trying to tell the poor they are god-forsaken, then transformation is the declaration that they are made in God’s image, that God allowed his son to die for them, and that God has given gifts to the poor so that they can fulfil God’s creation mandate that they too may be fruitful and productive” (: 117)

In other words, once they have discovered their identity and built up their character, then refugees will not see themselves as the beneficiaries of the world’s merciful actions towards them, but as active contributors to the welfare of God’s creation. Consequently, refugees will no longer be understood as a “burden” to the host country and other humanitarian agents but as a blessing and agents of change. So repatriation will no longer be seen as encompassing the concept of salvation but as a step in God’s salvation history in which Jesus is available in the present situation in Ulyankulu and which will be fully consummated with the Parousia. The result of this understanding will be that the concept of SHALOM will be an experience in Ulyankulu not a projected thought in the world that is coming with repatriation.

I am convinced that, in this endeavour to rediscover refugees identity, many parties like Governments and other Non Governmental Organisations have a role to play, but the Anglican Church, like other churches in Ulyankulu, holds the vision that goes beyond Government’s and other agencies advocating for human rights because she (the Anglican Church) should see the bigger picture that God is offering. Thus to borrow Bosch’s idea (1991: 1), the current refugee crisis in Ulyankulu bears within itself the danger and the opportunity for mission. The danger is that the Anglican Church may be overwhelmed by the suffering of refugees and continue to preach a future “heaven” in Burundi and encourage refugees to helplessly endure their sufferings. The opportunity, which this study is advocating for, is to engage with the transformation of identity, character and attitude that refugees have towards their current state and to turn the harsh situation into a chance for the manifestation of the Gospel of Christ in the lives of refugees, and therefore use God’s gifts invested in refugees to bless the community around them.

The transformation of the lives of the refugees in Ulyankulu will start with themselves developing an adequate self-esteem and refusing to accept the world of politicians and humanitarian agencies to determine their identity.

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<sup>41</sup> Myers is himself quoting Nkwame Bediako’s words.

## **6.2. One's community**

Myers (1999: 119) believes that change can only be achieved if the community is working together. Since the community is composed of the poor and the non-poor, he proposed that there is a need for a healing process which has to help the poor recover their true identity and vocation and the non-poor to deal with their god-complexes that they accepted to justify their privileged position in relation to the poor. As Myers(1999: 89) explained, "God hates idolatry, injustice, and the fact that some people attempt to play God's rightful role in the lives of others". Yet, he continues to argue, this is how a good number of the non-poor behave. They play the role of God in the lives of the poor.

Although it was argued above that transformation has to start with self, as the poor work on their own identity and character crisis, it has to be argued that they cannot do it alone. The welfare of refugees in Ulyankulu also depends on the community in which they live. The Burundian and Tanzanian Governments, the Tanzanian citizens, and the international community have always played a central role in the determination of the refugee's destiny.

The chapter on the historical background discusses how the succession of irresponsible governments in Burundi led to an influx of refugees from Burundi to Tanzania. This chapter also discussed how the properties of these refugees were lost to individuals who were favoured by the government in Burundi. To a larger extent, the government in Burundi and especially the Tutsi elite behaved as though their privileged position was not only God-given as most missionaries and explorers argued, but that they played the role of God himself. They condemned most Hutu to poverty, ignorance, psychological and physical torture, death, and exile. For a long time there haven't been any significant efforts to welcome refugees back home or to restore back refugees' property. The prophetic voice of the church in Burundi has been silenced because of fear, ignorance, or a laissez-faire attitude that this church has adopted.

In many cases as argued earlier in this chapter, the Tanzanian Government and UNHCR did play major roles in setting up structures which worked to demoralise the refugees if not to dehumanise them. Confining refugees in Ulyankulu settlement, refusing them the access to adequate social facilities, limiting their full participation in social and economic affairs in and outside the settlement, and more importantly limiting their circulation outside the settlement cannot just be understood as a move to protect the interests of Tanzanian citizens, but basically as a structural sin that condemned these refugees to total or partial dependency. The government of Tanzania and UNHCR determine where refugees will live, how they will live, and which kind of activities they are allowed to do. Generally speaking, the very settlement is designed for agricultural activities. So it is not surprising that the kind of education that is made available to refugees is just

primary education. One would think an intellectual leave has been imposed on refugees for the last 34 years.

The only option left for these refugees was to accept the course of nature and patiently wait for a time when God would hear their cry and take them back home even if they know that home is already occupied by others who are less sympathetic to their misery. And once again the Anglican Church played her role by encouraging refugees to wait for the day that God has set to take them home. However, we are confronted by the same question that was asked earlier. Can't the local and international community assist refugees live a God-glorifying life even before they go back to Burundi? It is exactly the fact that both the poor and non-poor were created in the image of God that serves as a basis for the poor to be given dignity and the non-poor a humble spirit in order to administer justice to the poor. This should be the mandate not only of the church in Ulyankulu but of the whole church worldwide. As President Nyerere (1997: 111) advised,

“unless the church, Participate actively in the rebellion against those social structures and economic organisations which condemn men to poverty, humiliation and degradation, then the church will become irrelevant to man and the Christian religion will degenerate into a set of superstitions accepted by the fearful”.

To borrow Nyerere's words (1997: 111), if man was created in the image of God, it is difficult to imagine “a God who is poor, ignorant, superstitious, fearful, oppressed, and wretched” – which is the situation with Ulyankulu refugees. Thus in their present condition refugees are “creatures not of God but of their fellow men” who play the role of God. The Tanzanian Government has the mandate to allow refugees use their God-given gifts to fully enjoy their humanity. The structures governing settlement and refugee camps should be reviewed and refugees should be involved in the conception of new laws governing refugee camps and settlements. Indeed, if ever needed, camps and settlements should not be a place to isolate “criminal” refugees away from the natives, but a place to rehabilitate vulnerable refugees so that they may fully be integrated in the life and development of their host country.

The international community and UNHCR should assist them to live a dignified life but not to cripple them by creating in them a bad precedent of dependence. Rather than taking our poor refugees to “heavens” in America and Canada as has been done of late, refugees should be assisted to get better legislations that would allow them to live with dignity in Tanzania before they can go back home. Furthermore, more efforts should be deployed to urge and assist the current Burundian Government to do more in trying to create a home for these refugees. Indeed as discussed earlier, these refugees want to go to the home of their ancestors not to America and Canada where the cultural differences and way of life will definitely bring more frustrations to these illiterate and

semi-illiterate refugees. The myth that going to America and Canada marks the end of one's misery should be demystified. Refugees need to be empowered to improve their life in Tanzania and later in Burundi. The contrary is a mirage of a good life out there.

### 6.3. The “other”

For the community to be strong, there is a need to build trust and reconciliation among its members with broken relationships. Myers (1999: 119) says that what makes reconciliation very hard is that the frequent reason for declaring someone or a group of people “others” is that they have done harm to you or your community. The Ulyankulu refugees are in the same position. They feel that Tutsi, the former Burundian governments, the Tanzanian Government, and even the International Community have done them harm over the years. Consequently the identity developed among the refugees involving both an assertion of a collective self (in this case refugees as the oppressed) and the negation of collective other/s (the oppressor), creating a world of asymmetrical “we-them” (Eldelman 1996: 25-26).

On the one side, the Hutu and Tutsi of Burundi built walls of hostility between themselves so that, as PALIPEHUTU (a Hutu party) and PARENA (Parti pour le redressement National) (a Tutsi party) have been advocating, Burundi is developing into a country with “*deux peuples une nation*” (two people one nation)<sup>42</sup>. Life in Burundi is organised alongside ethnic groups so that the concept of “*deux familles politiques*” (two political families) originally known as G7 (for Hutu) and G10 (for Tutsi) would influence, within the Arusha Peace Accord climate, every political, economic, and social decision in this country (Mbazumutima 2004: 1).

On the other side, the Tanzanian Government and the International Community are perceived as the oppressor of refugees in Ulyankulu. To a big extent the Tanzanian authorities are seen as symbolising the extended Tutsi domination over the Hutu. So according to refugees in Ulyankulu, they suffered under the Tutsi oppressive power in Burundi and they are suffering under the Tanzanian Government without the International Community saying a word.

The Anglican Church responded to this by encouraging the maintenance of a pure Hutu identity thus putting refugees on guard against any sort of inter-marriage between the refugees and the “other”. However, for the community fabric to be strong, there is a need for reconciliation based on true love, repentance and justice.

Reconciliation is only possible when the two parties are willing to repent and accept the work of Christ on the cross – “for he is our peace; in his flesh he has made both groups into one and

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<sup>42</sup> Whereas PALIPEHUTU is generally understood to be a Hutu extremist party, PARENA is understood to be a Tutsi extremist party.

has broken down the dividing wall, that is the hostility between us” (Ephesians 2:14). Ndikumana (2002:28) argues that the message of the cross brings transformation not only to the oppressor but also to the oppressed.

The consequence of the message of the cross is evident. It should prompt repentance so that, like Zacchaeus, Tutsi should say, “look, half of my possessions, Lord, I will give to the poor; and if I have defrauded anyone of anything, I will pay back four times as much ” (Luke 19:8). Likewise, Hutu should not declare themselves righteous victims of the Tutsi oppression or else they may be asked, “Why do you see the speck in your neighbour’s eye, but do not notice the log in your own eye?” (Matthew 7:3). This ought to be the message of the Anglican Church and the consequence of this message could lead to a strong national feeling between the Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi.

The Tanzanian and Burundian governments, and the International Community should administer justice to refugees in Ulyankulu, and refugees have to accept it with humility. Refugees needs their fundamental rights to be respected and they need to be primarily understood as human beings made in God’s image. It is exactly at this stage that the church in Tanzania, Burundi, in Ulyankulu, and even worldwide, has to play her prophetic role.

#### **6.4. The environment**

The 2004 Nobel Peace laureate Honourable Professor Wangari Mathai (2006) once said, “if you destroy nature, nature will destroy you. Nature is so unforgiving!”. The rebuilding of relationships between the refugees and God, refugees and community, and the refugees and the “other” should be harmonious with nature. The bad relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi has left nature in a detestable situation. In Burundi, the war between the Hutu rebels and the Government left the country’s environment at its worst. President Buyoya’s Government set most trees and natural forest on fire in search of the Hutu rebel hideouts. Consequently, Burundi has gone through the worst droughts leaving hundreds of Burundians dead and others malnourished. Hydroelectric power was considerably diminished and therefore not able to cover the internal electric power demands, and there has been a weak economy. In addition to the destruction of forests, houses were burnt and animals killed. In Tanzanian, refugees crossed the border in big numbers, cutting down the trees for firewood and building, therefore leaving the country’s forests in need of replanting.

There is a need to protect the environment given the connection between environment degradation, drought and low soil productivity, which can in turn lead to more flight or conflicts (Amnesty International 2005, <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR160082005>). This has already happened in Burundi where people left the country for Tanzania because of drought. Planting of trees and taking care of wildlife is a necessary exercise – for human dignity and the search for a

decent life has to be balanced with environmental care. This is a responsibility which God gave to man when he told him/her to care of the creation. Indeed this responsibility applies even in times of wars– for without the environment, he/she would have no food (Genesis 1: 28-30). So as Myers (1999: 120) has said, “We need to transform our metaphor for our relationship with nature from one of masters of nature to the idea of being stewards of God’s creation”. Thus Burundians have the responsibility, given by God, to care for the environment.

#### **6.5. Centrality of God: “you shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free”**

Myers (1999: 88) observes that the cause of broken relationships is sin and that only God can deal with sin, so that transformation takes place only because God wants it and enables it (: 121). Consequently, the restoration of the broken relationship will entirely depend on whether or not we accept the solution that Jesus provides. This will compel the church to tell the truth to illuminate the darkness of lies and promote justice.

The truth must be discovered about the way poor contribute to their own poverty, and the truth must be discovered about how poverty is created by the God-complexes of the non-poor, inadequacies of worldview, and deception by the principalities and powers (Myers 1999: 123).

In other words, the Anglican Church in Ulyankulu can no longer afford to blame all the misery to the “others” and appeal to God to come to the rescue of the weak righteous refugees. Her mission must also include the insistence on the fact that refugees have to work on the damaged “self”. Thus the truth will liberate the refugees from the oppression imposed on them, for as John preached, “You will know the truth, and the truth will make you free” (John 8:32).

First, if refugees in Ulyankulu have to be liberated then the truth about their past experience has to be known. History has to be re-written and the truth about who took the property belonging to these refugees has to be plainly said. The Commission on Truth and Reconciliation that was agreed upon during the Arusha Peace Accord in 1998 has to do their work. In a way, this is a big shame for the church in Burundi: The politicians thought about the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation before the church did. The truth about the past has to be known if refugees in Ulyankulu will ever come out of the traumatic experience of losing their family members in 1972 in circumstances that they still ignore. They need to be given the opportunity to know where their fathers and grandfathers were buried. If I can propose it, being able to bury one’s family member and especially the head of the family is a fundamental human right in many African communities, including Burundians. However, there is the need for more than the Hutu Liberation. We need



reconciliation and if this is to happen, the truth about the Tutsi who died in the coastal part of Burundi like Nyanza-Lac and Rumonge in 1972 has to be known.

Secondly, if refugees have to be free, then the truth about their current experience has to be re-said. The economic, social, and political misery has to be understood and changed by those who are in position to change them. The truth about the identity of refugees has to be known and their humanity has to be redefined.

Finally, if refugees have to be free, the myth about repatriation has to be demystified. Repatriation is but a step in the right direction but it is not the final goal on the journey to freedom. There will be more to be done even after repatriation. There is more to learn and there is more to change if the Hutu and the Tutsi have to live in one country as one people, so that never again we will hear being said “*deux peuples, une nation*” (two people one nation).

Men and women in the Church in Ulyankulu and Burundi who believe in the triune God, who is love and loves justice, can achieve the mission outlined above. As such the mission of the Anglican Church in Ulyankulu may need to be revisited from sentimental prophecies to correctly reading and interpreting the current context in the light of the Word of God.

## **6.6. Conclusion**

Poverty among the refugees in Ulyankulu is as a result of broken relationship among refugees themselves, refugees and the community in which they live, refugees and the “other”, refugees and God, and refugees and nature. These broken relationships led to the current socio-economic and emotional misery in Ulyankulu settlement. Being unable to change this situation, the refugees under the leadership of their church leaders who often did not interpret the Israelite’s experience correctly, put their hope in the event of repatriation so that life in the settlement is simply a matter of enduring suffering. While acknowledging the central part that repatriation will play in the transformation of the refugees’ life, this chapter proposed that refugees need to live an abundant life even in the settlement. It is therefore clear that there is a need to rebuild the broken relationship so that the kingdom of God may be a reality in Ulyankulu.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **7 IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

A study into the experience of refugees in Ulyankulu is very complex and what the dissertation tried to do was to shed some light on some of the major issues facing refugees. In this chapter, I am going to summarise the main points discussed in this study and to then propose other areas that, I think, could be of interest to other researchers.

#### **7.1. Circumstances leading to refugee problem**

Before discussing the experience of refugees in Ulyankulu Settlement, this study had a look at the circumstances that compelled these refugees to run away from their country, Burundi. The study argued that the pre – colonial Burundian society was not free from ethnic conflicts. In particular, the feudal system that was introduced by the monarchy divided Burundians into social classes that were shaped with ethnic feeling as the background for social, economic, and political differences which placed the Tutsi at the top and the Hutu at the bottom.

What the colonial masters (Germany and especially Belgium) did was to widen and redefine with wrong evidence the differences between Hutu and Tutsi. Thus the colonial rule privileged the Tutsi in education and consequently the sons of Tutsi were employed in different sectors of public life, while the Hutu mainly cultivated the land.

The church, especially the white missionaries, actively supported the colonial policies that privileged the Tutsi and oppressed the Hutu. In order to justify their policies, both the missionaries, colonial masters and explorers advocated for a theory that supported that Tutsi had a God-given right to rule over the Hutu.

The fight for independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s under the leadership of Rwagasore appeared to be a unifying factor between the Hutu and Tutsi but his assassination ushered in a new dimension in Hutu-Tutsi post-Independence conflicts. The democratic gains that Hutu had acquired during the multiparty election ahead of Independence were lost to the Tutsi Hima oligarchy generally from the South of the country. The efforts by the Hutu to come back to power through elections did not yield any fruits and their attempts to come to power by force were responded to with the major elimination of the Hutu elites and the 1972 genocide by the Tutsi-led Government against the Hutu. It is this genocide that led to the influx of refugees from Burundi to the neighbouring country, hence the refugees in Ulyankulu. Meanwhile, their properties were distributed to individuals who were close to the Government.

## **7.2. Experience of refugees**

This study focused on the experience that these refugees have been through for the last 34 years. Refugees had not anticipated spending much time in Tanzania. However, as the report by Gasarasi (1984:36-48) indicated the Government of Tanzania, UNHCR and TCRS decided to move them to Ulyankulu Settlement which was meant to settle them permanently. Although the Ulyankulu refugee settlement and other Burundian refugee rural settlements have been understood to be the most successful settlement projects (:49), the findings, in this study, were that this is not true in every detail.

## **7.3. Emotional trauma**

First, this integration process did not take care of the emotional struggles that these refugees had gone through back home as they experienced the death of their family members and the loss of their properties and homeland. Instead the new identity that these refugees acquired i.e. “Wakimbizi” (stateless people running away) was an additional dehumanising experience thus bringing down their self-esteem even more.

## **7.4. Social Infrastructure**

Secondly, the social infrastructures in the settlement especially the access to education, health facilities and clean water have been a constant struggle for refugees. The lack of opportunities for post primary education has limited the opportunity for these refugees to become marketable in this 21<sup>st</sup> century world. The inadequate health facilities has caused many unnecessary deaths especially among children and mothers. Worse still is the absence of an HIV/AIDS testing kit in this settlement, a situation that has condemned men and women in Ulyankulu to live in the darkness of ignorance, and therefore being exposed to the risk of contracting the virus.

## **7.5. Economy**

Finally, the economy in Ulyankulu has gone down because refugees are not given the same opportunity as locals to carry out their activities freely. The land given to these refugees 34 years ago is going through a lot of pressure from a population that has increased and has been repetitively exploited over the years. Consequently food security is threatened, so that refugees are no longer sure of getting their daily bread. Furthermore the laws prohibiting refugees to go out of the settlement to carry out businesses and other economic activities put these refugees in a vulnerable situation. For those refugees who managed to study and try to look for jobs, they find it difficult to be employed because they need a work permit.

### **7.6. Strategies to return home**

These difficult circumstances contributed to the refugee's craving for their homeland – for they did not feel at home in Ulyankulu Settlement. The first avenue that they wanted to explore was to be actively involved in home politics so that they could go back after a military victory over the Tutsi dominated politico-military structure, but the Tanzanian Government strongly opposed this idea. As a result, the founder and leader of the then prominent leader of PALIPEHUTU, a party that pioneered this patriotism among the refugees, died in prison where he was detained. Refugees accused the Tanzanian Government, of conspiracy with the Burundian Government of this assassination, although the official claims from the Tanzanian Government claimed an illness in prison as the source of this death. Thus refugees in Ulyankulu doubted the Government of Tanzania's goodwill to genuinely help them, which gave them more determination to search for a way to go back home. In principle, refugees were opposed to any attempt to integrate them, claiming that this was a way to turn them into slaves for the Tanzanians.

### **7.7. Obstacles**

However, going home is not necessarily an easy option because there are still many more obstacles to be surmounted. Firstly, refugees lost their land and other properties to others, especially the Tutsi and the refugees' relatives who are not willing to give them back. Since the only skill they were given in Ulyankulu Settlement is to cultivate the land, they can't imagine life in Burundi without land.

Secondly, the past repatriation experiences, as a result of some peaceful moments like during President Ndadaye's time left a bad precedent. Those who went back home were either killed or had to run away again after Ndadaye's assassination. So most of the refugees would like to wait and assess the degree to which peace has come to Burundi before they can take a decision to go back to Burundi.

Thirdly, after 34 years in exile, refugees would like to transfer some of their assets but UNHCR offers to take not more than 40Kgs per person, a situation that discourages these refugees. Furthermore, there is no clear guideline from the Tanzanian Government as to what and how much these refugees are able to take home, a situation which creates doubts among the refugees about whether they can be allowed to take their assets.

Finally, these refugees have lost connectivity with home because they were not encouraged to continue to visit their country. Furthermore, the long time that they stayed in Tanzania has, to some extent, shaped the refugees' culture into a hybrid between the Burundian and Tanzanian culture. Consequently, these refugees may not find in Burundi the kind of home they have been

thinking. They may find themselves strangers in their own country. So taking a decision to go back to Burundi becomes a tricky affair.

## **7.8. Recommendations**

### **7.8.1. Repatriation, not just refugees' Liberation**

It is at this moment of total dilemma that the church comes in. Influenced by the traditional worldview of ancestral land, the church leaders teach that refugees have a God-given right to inherit the land of their ancestors. So, living in the settlement is a matter of time as God prepares to fulfil his promises to refugees and take them back home. They blame the 1972 Hutu genocide on the failure of Tutsi leadership in the church to prophetically challenge the political system which was Tutsi dominated. Consequently the Hutu are victims of a political and social injustice and an indifferent position of the church in Burundi vis-à-vis this injustice. If God is just, they claim, he cannot accept that Hutu refugees will be oppressed by Tutsi, Tanzanian authorities and the International Community forever. Thus refugees are encouraged to be faithful to the Lord as the solution for them to get back their lost homeland. The call for trusting and listening to what God is saying was extended even to political leaders especially those leading the rebel movement so that, like in the Biblical conquest stories, they had to pray and consult the will of God before attacking the military camps in Burundi.

As such, the option of remaining in the camp and the possibility of getting a Tanzanian nationality is not acceptable to church leaders. It is for this reason that, in a tone similar to the biblical prophetic message, they encouraged the refugees to remain pure by not mixing themselves with Tanzanians.

In the same line of thought, prophecies go ahead and give directions on what to do ahead of repatriation. Basically they understand the refugees experience in Ulyankulu as a time for training and perfection not as a time of suffering as many refugees would want to understand. Therefore they call the refugees to repent and be ready for repatriation.

In my view, the Anglican Church, and even other churches, has done a lot in giving hope to these refugees who seemed to be confused by the whole situation. They needed something to look up to and the Church provided it: God is interested in taking refugees back home; they only need to trust in him. This message is convenient and sincerely speaking, the Anglican Church and other churches' ministry deserves recognition. However, I feel that the approach of the Anglican Church to the refugee experience is lacking. In particular, I feel that this church focuses entirely on repatriation, as if repatriation alone will bring about refugees' liberation. This approach implies that

there is neither, nor can there be good news in the entire refugee experience. I argued that as it is, the church's approach does not give any hope for those who will never make it to Burundi i.e. those who are dying in the settlement. Furthermore, I believe that repatriation may not be a wonderful answer to all their problems. If it is well prepared (which is not the case today), it may provide some answers. However, it will definitely also bring about various problems which will need solutions.

Without dismissing the reality that repatriation is a major event in resolving the current problems of refugees, the challenge which this study poses to the mission of the church in Ulyankulu is that it is still possible to speak of good news even in the settlement. Indeed Jesus' message on the Kingdom of God being within us is for refugees in Ulyankulu as well. Jesus has to be fully worshipped in Ulyankulu and within the circumstances that refugees find themselves in.

Using Bryant Myers' approach to poverty, I propose that the liberation of refugees has to be based on the rebuilding of the broken relationships between refugees and the community, refugees and the "other", refugees and God, refugees and the environment, and refugees and self. This rebuilding of broken relationships will usher in a new era, of refugees living in the settlement with dignity as children made in the image of God. Making sure that refugees can live a transformed life so that they are not the object of mercy but rather the source of blessings to others, should be the mission of the Anglican church as well. For this to be possible, the church and other stakeholders should not focus only on repatriation and forget to work on the issues that matter to refugees in the settlement. They need to live in dignity and they need to be empowered for this reason.

With regard to repatriation, the Anglican Church should realistically help refugees to come to terms with the various changes that have taken place in Burundi from the time when they left the country. Refugees in Ulyankulu have an image of the 1972 Burundi setting with little awareness of the kind of political, social, and economic changes that have taken place. I propose that refugees have the right to know that while there are many good developments that happened in Burundi the successive wars that have been ravaging this country left it in a pathetic economic, social, and political state. Giving refugees the right information instead of wrong hopes about a Burundi flowing with milk and honey will help them to take an informed decision on whether this is the time for them to go back home or whether they should stay for some time in Tanzania as they negotiate for a more acceptable living environment in Burundi. In particular, I believe that nobody should take that decision on their behalf. Instead, they (refugees) should have access to different alternatives so that they may take informed decision. What may not be possible is the idea to completely stay in Tanzania as the Tanzanian government has clearly mentioned that these refugees have to go back home.

Burundians who remained in the country need to be prepared to receive and accept these refugees once they are repatriated. The Anglican Church in Ulyankulu may not be able to do this alone hence the need to cooperate with other churches in Burundi. This is not an easy task especially that there is no clear relationship between the Anglican Church in Burundi and the one in Ulyankulu but efforts should be made towards this partnership.

### **7.8.2. Issues around refugees' empowerment**

Although, the study proposed that there is the need for a mechanism to help refugees live a God-glorifying life in the settlement, I realise that there are other areas that need consideration if this is going to work. Maybe this study was just an eye opener for a rather big study that needs to be done. In particular, the question of genuinely empowering refugees to live in dignity is not an easy one. Refugees do not have the right of ownership of the most important asset, which is land. They own it for as long as the Tanzanian Government is still generous to them.

The logical thing would then seem to suggest that the economy in the settlement should move from being agriculture based to, let us say, industrial or service based. However, I doubt whether refugees have the technical capacity to do this. The only skill they have been given over the years is to cultivate the land and they may not have skills to do other things. Furthermore, even if refugees could be trained to do other things, it is difficult to believe whether different stakeholders are ready to provide enough resources for this expensive project especially when other communities around Ulyankulu settlement are basically agriculturalists. This would call for a harmonisation so that the project does not create an uneconomic balance between refugees and local communities around them.

In any case, if one was to take this route of trying to re-orientate the economy in this settlement, this exercise would certainly take a very long time. The temporal nature of the settlement, i.e. the possible imminent repatriation may not allow enough time to develop such a programme. Now that it is known that refugees want to definitely go back home, any programme has to be thought of in terms of the possibility of continuity between life in the settlement and life ahead of them in Burundi.

As such, the form that Ulyankulu refugees' empowerment has to take needs a careful study which this research project could not do. The same thing should be done with regard to freedom of movement, political freedom and the alike as this may conflict with security interests both in Tanzania and Burundi. Until recently with the election of Pierre Nkurunziza's Government, the Burundian Government was accusing the Tanzanian government to give freedom to refugees to go

back to Burundi and fight on the account of Hutu rebel movements which had their stronghold in the camps and settlements. On several occasions the Burundian Government threatened to attack Tanzania if refugees were not restricted to remain in the camps and settlements. The Tanzanian Government has always denied these accusations arguing that those refugees who may have gone to fight in Burundi escaped Tanzanian security forces or were not genuine refugees. On the side of Tanzania, the local authorities have constantly been complaining that refugees have been committing crimes especially robbery among Tanzanian villages. All these accusations that the Burundian Government and the local Tanzanian authorities levelled against refugees forced the Tanzania Government to take strict measures aiming at restricting refugees in Refugee and camps and settlements. However, there is no alternative to improving refugees living conditions and self-esteem. We cannot protect the interests of refugee host and producing countries at the expense of refugees' life and future. They are defenceless, powerless, and poor, which is the reason why the church needs to stand in solidarity with them.

Briefly, the study concluded that one of the major causes of the refugees' craving to go back home is the harsh conditions they live in. The study noted that the reason for these harsh conditions is the broken relationships affected by sin within refugees themselves, within the community in which they live, with those they call "other", with the environment, and with God. Thus helping refugees to live a decent life especially in giving them the opportunity to work and contribute to the wellbeing of their families and the host countries would be one of the strong solutions to refugeeism. Consequently, a decision to go home would not be forced by the conditions in the settlements and camps but it would be a well thought through commitment by refugees to return home and build their country with the skills acquired while in exile. In order to succeed in this mission, the study proposed that there is a need to rebuild these broken relationships. Consequently, the mission of the Church in Ulyankulu is to accompany repatriation efforts with clear measures geared towards helping refugees live a decent life in the settlement for the reason that the kingdom of God should be present even within settlements and camps.



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## **9. APPENDICES**

### **Appendix 1: Letter to the respondents and questionnaire**

University of South Africa

Department of Missiology

C/O

Carlile College School of Theology

PO BOX 72584 Nairobi,

00200 City Square

Kenya

24<sup>th</sup> February 2006

Dear Friends,

#### **RE: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR REFUGEES IN ULYANKULU SETTELEMT**

I am carrying out a research on the experience of Burundian refugees and the Church's response to this experience. By answering this questionnaire, you will be helping me to get firsthand information on how refugees should be served better.

The questionnaire has three parts and it can be answered in less than one hour. Please take some time and answer all the questions so that I may get complete information and hand the questionnaire back to the one who gave it to you.

I hope that you will find the questionnaire interesting and I wish to thank you in advance for considering feeling in this questionnaire.

With God's love,

Your Sincerely

Théodore Mbazumutima

## Questionnaire

### Part one: Experience of refugees

#### A. History

Please tick your age bracket

Above 52..... ☐

Between 52 and 41 ..... ☐

Between 41 and 34 ..... ☐

Below 34..... ☐

2. Please indicate your sex

Male..... ☐

Female..... ☐

3. Which year did you arrive in Ulyankulu camp?

Between 1972 and 1973..... ☐

After 1973..... ☐

4. What happened so that you had to leave Burundi?

I joined our family members who were already refugees..... ☐

I heard people saying Tutsi were coming to kill us..... ☐

I saw others fleeing and followed them because of fear..... ☐

I narrowly escaped death and I had to escape..... ☐

My parents came with me..... ☐

Others – please specify .....

5. Where did you first settle upon your first entry to Tanzania?

In a village on the Burundian and Tanzanian border..... ☐

In a land that we owned in Tanzania..... ☐

I stayed with my Tanzanian relatives..... ☐

In another temporally refugee camp..... ☐

In Ulyankulu settlement..... ☐

Other places –please specify .....

6. Why did you have to come to Ulyankulu settlement?

I decided myself to come here..... ☐

- The Government of Tanzania decided to bring me here..... ☐
- UNHCR/TCRS brought me here.....☐
- My parents brought me here..... ☐
- Other –please specify .....

7. Please list five events that changed life in this camp and give reasons for your choice

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

## B. Social life

1. Please indicate your level of formal education

- I did not attend school.....☐
- I completed primary school.....☐
- I completed secondary school..... ☐
- I completed a vocational college.....☐
- I completed college/University first degree.....☐
- Other – Please specify .....

2. Where and when did you have your education?

- Burundi before 1972..... ☐
- Tanzania before 1980.....☐
- Tanzania after 1980..... ☐
- Other place –Please specify .....

3. How would you assess the refugees' access to education before 1980?

- Excellent..... ☐
- Good..... ☐
- Satisfactory..... ☐
- Bad..... ☐

4. How would you assess the refugees' access to education after 1980?

- Excellent..... ☐
- Good.....☐
- Satisfactory.....☐
- Bad..... ☐

5. How would you assess the refugees' access to Health care and clean water before 1980?

- Excellent..... ☐
- Good..... ☐
- Satisfactory..... ☐
- Bad..... ☐

6. How would you assess the refugees' access to Health care and clean water after 1980?

- Excellent..... ☐
- Good..... ☐
- Satisfactory..... ☐
- Bad..... ☐

7. What do you do during your leisure time?

- We go for sport..... ☐
- We watch the video..... ☐
- We have a drink with others..... ☐
- We go to market..... ☐
- We just sit doing nothing..... ☐
- Other – please specify .....

8. How would you assess your relationships with Tanzanian nationals?

- Excellent..... ☐
- Good..... ☐
- Satisfactory..... ☐
- Bad..... ☐

## C. Economical life

1. How many members did your household/your immediate family comprise of before leaving Burundi?.....

2. What was your occupation before you left Burundi?

- Farming..... ☐
- I worked in somebody's farm for my daily bread..... ☐
- I worked for the Government/an organisation..... ☐
- I was a businessman..... ☐
- Other – Specify .....

3. How would you assess your/your family's economical life in Burundi?

- I/We was/were struggling to feed my/our family..... ☐
- I/We could just feed my/our family..... ☐



- I/We could feed my/our family and easily provide for other needs like education and health care but was/were not able to make any savings..... ☐
- I/We could meet all the needs for my/our family and save enough money for future use..... ☐
- I/We was/were wealthy..... ☐

4. What was your/your family's occupation before 1980?

- Farming..... ☐
- I worked in somebody's farm for my daily bread..... ☐
- I worked for the Tanzanian government..... ☐
- I worked for UNHCR/TCRS..... ☐
- Business..... ☐
- I was unemployed..... ☐
- Other – Specify.....

5. How would you assess your/your family's economical life before 1980?

- I/We depended on UNHCR/TCRS on everything..... ☐
- I/We was/were able to produce more on top of what UNHCR/TCRS gave me/us..... ☐
- I/We was/were able to sustain myself/ourselves..... ☐
- I/We was/were able to get a surplus for savings..... ☐
- I/We was/were wealthy..... ☐

6. How many members are in your household/your immediate family today?.....

7. What is your occupation here in Ulyankulu?

- Farming..... ☐
- I work in somebody's farm for my daily bread..... ☐
- I work for the Government/an organisation..... ☐
- Business..... ☐
- Other – Specify .....

8. How would you assess your/your family's economical life in Ulyankulu?

- I/We am/are struggling to feed my/our family..... ☐
- I/We can just feed my/our family..... ☐
- I/We can feed my/our family and easily provide for other needs like education and health care but not able to make any savings..... ☐
- I/We can meet all the needs for my/our family and save enough money for future use..... ☐
- I/we am/are wealthy..... ☐

9. How would you evaluate the possibility for qualified refugees to be employed in or outside the settlement?

- Very easy..... ☐
- Easy..... ☐
- Not easy..... ☐
- Impossible..... ☐

10. How would you evaluate the possibility for refugee businessmen to do their work in or outside the settlement?

- Very easy..... ☐
- Easy..... ☐
- Not easy..... ☐
- Impossible..... ☐

11. How would you evaluate the possibility for refugees to go outside the settlement for different economical activities?

- Very easy..... ☐
- Easy..... ☐
- Not Easy..... ☐
- Impossible..... ☐

12. How would you assess the roads and other transport facilities in and around the settlement?

- Excellent..... ☐
- Good..... ☐
- Satisfactory..... ☐
- Bad..... ☐

13. How would you assess the communication facilities in the settlement?

- Excellent..... ☐
- Good..... ☐
- Satisfactory..... ☐
- Bad..... ☐

14. Give five economical areas that should be improved.

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

#### **D. Political life**

1. In this settlement, who has the power to take decisions that affect refugees?

- Tanzanian government..... ☐
- Political parties in Burundi..... ☐
- Churches..... ☐
- Government of Burundi..... ☐
- Refugees themselves..... ☐
- Other – please specify .....

2. How would you assess the freedom of association and speech in this Settlement?

- Excellent..... ☐
- Good..... ☐
- Satisfactory..... ☐
- Non-existent..... ☐

3. How would you assess the freedom to have access to information and news from outside the settlement?

- Excellent..... ☐
- Good..... ☐
- Satisfactory..... ☐
- Non-existent..... ☐

4. How do you get information from outside the settlement?

- Radio..... ☐
- Newspaper/books..... ☐
- Church..... ☐
- Oral sources..... ☐
- Church notices..... ☐
- Meetings..... ☐

5. How far would you consent that Burundian politics affect refugees.

- Definitely yes..... ☐
- Yes to some extent..... ☐
- Doubtful..... ☐
- Definitely no..... ☐

6. How do you get political information from Burundi?

- Radio..... ☐
- Newspaper/books..... ☐
- Political party representatives..... ☐
- Oral sources..... ☐

Other – Please specify .....

7. Burundian political parties are active in this camp

Definitely yes..... ☐

Yes to some extent..... ☐

Doubtful..... ☐

No..... ☐

8. Please list five political rights that you think you need to get in this camp

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

## Part Two: Repatriation

1. How would you assess changes in Burundi in favour of repatriation?

Excellent..... ☐

Good..... ☐

Satisfactory..... ☐

Bad..... ☐

2. Would you like to go back to Burundi?

Definitely yes..... ☐

Yes to some extend..... ☐

Doubtful..... ☐

No ..... ☐

3. Listed bellow are some of the reasons why you want to go back home. Number 1 for the most important and so on until 6 for the least

Life is difficult in the camp..... ☐

I want my children to study..... ☐

I want to get back my land..... ☐

The time of God had come for me to go..... ☐

I want to be free from settlement restraint..... ☐

I am tired to be called a refugee ..... ☐

4. Listed bellow are some of the reasons why you are still not decided to go back home. Number 1 for the most important and so on until number 6 for the least important

I am still waiting for the concerned authorities to arrange repatriation..... ☐

I do not want to loose my possessions here..... ☐

- I do not know how to recover my possession in Burundi..... ☐
- I feel at home in Tanzania and do not want to leave..... ☐
- I am not sure there is enough security in Burundi..... ☐
- I am still waiting for my religious leader to give instructions..... ☐

5. Do you think the issue of land is likely to be a problem for you when you go back home?

- Definitely yes..... ☐
- Yes to some extend..... ☐
- Doubtful..... ☐
- No..... ☐

6. In case your land has been allocated to other people, will you be happy for the Burundian government to give you any other available land in any region of the country?

- Definitely yes..... ☐
- Yes to some extend..... ☐
- Doubtful..... ☐
- No..... ☐

7. In case your answer is no to the above question, why do you think you would not like to be given any other land?

.....

.....

8. Please assess your spoken Kirundi

- Excellent..... ☐
- Good..... ☐
- Satisfactory..... ☐
- Bad..... ☐

9. Please list five things that should be done for the repatriation to be successful

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

### Part Three: Church

1. Do you go to Church?

- Yes..... ☐
- No..... ☐

2. What is your denomination?.....

3. Please list five things that the church (even if you do not attend that church) has done to alleviate the suffering of refugees:

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

4. How would you assess the place of the church in guiding individual refugee's decisions?

Individuals always consult their spiritual leaders before taking major decisions..... ☐

Individuals would generally consult their spiritual leaders before taking major decisions..... ☐

Only in isolated cases would individuals consult their spiritual leaders before taking major decisions..... ☐

Individuals would never consult their spiritual leaders before taking major decisions..... ☐

5. I have heard the church talking about going back to Burundi in (please tick all those that apply to your case):

Prophecies..... ☐

Songs..... ☐

Sermons..... ☐

Visions..... ☐

Meetings..... ☐

Other – Please specify .....

6. List below five conditions given by the church on what should be done in order to go back to Burundi

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

7. Do you think that this is the time when God has allowed refugees to go back home?

Yes..... ☐

No..... ☐

8. Give five reasons why you think or do not think so

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

.....

9. Please list five things that your church is doing to prepare refugees to go home

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

10. Why do you think the church should be involved in preparing refugees ahead of repatriation?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

## Appendix 2: Interview guide

Date of interview.....

Time.....

Place of interview.....

### INTERVIEW GUIDE

Name.....

Age.....

Position in the church.....

1. How long have you been in the church leadership and which positions have you taken?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

2. What are the specific problems that refugees have brought to your attention?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

3. How did you attempt to resolve them?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

4. What is your position on repatriation and how do you think it should be organised?



.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

5. If at all you are preparing to go home, how do you think you will be able to recover your property especially the land?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

6. Upon arriving to Burundi, How do you think you will be intergraded back into the ministry and which role are you likely to play?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

7. How are you preparing your church members to go back to Burundi?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

8. What, if any, does the Bible say about repatriation?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

9. Do you think being given a Tanzanian nationality and thus not going back to Burundi should be a good thought to pursue?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

### Appendix 3: Swahili translation of introductory letter, questionnaire and interview guide

UNISA  
Department of Christian Spirituality,  
Church History and Missiology  
C/O Carlile College School of Theology  
P O Box 72584-00200  
Nairobi  
KENYA

24/02/2006

Marafiki wapendwa,

Orodha ya maswali kwa wakimbizi katika makaazi ya Ulyankulu

Ninafanya utafiti juu ya hali ambayo wakimbizi wa Burundi wamepitia, na hatua ambayo kanisa imechukua juu ya hali hiyo. Kwa kujibu orodha hii ya maswali, utanisaidia kupata habari sahihi juu ya vile wakimbizi wanaweza kuhudumiwa vyema.

Orodha hii ya maswali iko na sehemu tatu na inaweza kujibiwa kwa muda wa chini ya lisaa limoja. Tafadhali chukua muda fulani ujibu maswali yote na urudishie aliyekupa orodha hiyo ya maswali ili nipate habari kamili.

Natumai utafurahishwa na hii orodha ya maswali na ningependa kukushuru mapema kwa kuamua kujaza hii orodha ya maswali.

Na upendo wa Mungu,

Kwa ukweli,

Theodore Mbazumutima

#### ORODHA YA MASWALI

#### SEHEMU YA KWANZA: UJUZI YA WAKIMBIZI

##### A: HISTORIA

1. Tafadhali weka alama kwa kisanduku kilicho na umri wako

Zaidi ya 52..... ☐  
Kati ya 52 na 41..... ☐  
Kati ya 41 na 34..... ☐  
Chini ya 34..... ☐

2. Tafadhali onyesha jinsia yako

Mme..... ☐  
Mke..... ☐

3. Ni mwaka gani ulifika kambi ya Ulyankulu?

Kati ya 1972 na 1973..... ☐  
Baada ya 1973..... ☐

4. Ni nini kilicho kusababisha kutoka Burundi?.....

Niliungana na jamaa zangu waliokuwa wakimbizi tayari..... ☐  
Nilisikia watu wakisema Watutsi wanakuja kutuua..... ☐  
Niliona wengine wakitoroka nami nikawafuata kwa sababu ya hofu. ☐  
Niliponea kifo chupuchupu ikabidi nitoroke..... ☐  
Nilikuja na wazazi wangu..... ☐

Sababu zingine - tafadhali fafana

.....  
.....  
.....

.....  
.....

5. Ni wapi uliishi kwanza ulipoingia Tanzania mara ya kwanza?...

Katika kijiji mpakani mwa Burundi na Tanzania..... ☐

Katika shamba tuliyokuwa nayo Tanzania..... ☐

Nilikaa na jamaa zangu Watanzania..... ☐

Katika kambi nyingine ya wakimbizi ya muda..... ☐

Katika makaazi ya Ulyankulu..... ☐

Sehemu zingine - tafadhali fafania

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

6. Kwa nini ilibidi uje makaazi ya Ulyankuli?

Niliamua mwenyewe kuja hapa..... ☐

Serikali ya Tanzania iliamua kunileta hapa..... ☐

Nililetwa hapa na shirika la UNHCR/TCRS..... ☐

Wazazi wangu walinileta hapa..... ☐

Sababu nyingine - tafadhali fafania

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

7. Tafadhali orodhesha matukio matano yaliyobadilisha maisha katika kambi hii na utoe sababu za chaguo lako.

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

## MAISHA YA KIJAMII

1. Tafadhali onyesha kiwango chako cha elimu

Sikusoma..... ☐

Nilimaliza shule ya msingi..... ☐

Nilimaliza shule ya upili..... ☐

Nilimaliza chuo cha kiufundi..... ☐

Nilimaliza chuo/chuo kikuu Shahada ya kwanza ..... ☐

Vingine - tafadhali fafania

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

2. Ni wapi na ni lini ulipata elimu yako?

Burundi kabla ya 1972..... ☐

Tanzania kabla ya 1980..... ☐

Tanzania baada ya 1980..... ☐

Sehemu nyingine - tafadhali fafania

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

3. Uwezekano wa wakimbizi kupata elimu kabla ya 1980 kulingana na wewe ulikuwaje?

Bora ..... ☐

Mzuri..... ☐

Wa kuridhisha..... ☐

Mbaya..... ☐

4. Kulingana na wewe, uwezekano wa wakimbizi kupata elimu baada ya 1980 ulikuwaje?

Bora ..... ☐

Mzuri..... ☐

Wa kuridhisha..... ☐

Mbaya..... ☐

5. Kulingana na wewe uwezekano wa wakimbizi kupata matibabu na maji safi kabla ya 1980 ulikuwaje?

Bora ..... ☐

Mzuri..... ☐

Wa kuridhisha..... ☐

Mbaya..... ☐

6. Kulingana na wewe uwezekano wa wakimbizi kupata matibabu na maji safi baada ya 1980 ulikuwaje?

Bora ..... ☐

Mzuri..... ☐

Wa kuridhisha..... ☐

Mbaya..... ☐

7. Wewe hufanya nini wakati wako wa mapumziko?

Mimi huenda kucheza..... ☐

Mimi huangalia video..... ☐

Mimi hujiburidisha kwa vinywaji na wengine..... ☐

Mimi huenda sokoni..... ☐

Mimi hukaa bure..... ☐

Kitu kingine - tafadhali eleza ☐

.....

.....

.....

8. Kulingana na wewe uhusiano wako na wataanzania uko vipi?

Bora ..... ☐

Mzuri..... ☐

Wa kuridhisha..... ☐

Mbaya..... ☐

## MAISHA YA KIUCHUMI

1. Mlikuwa wangapi kwa nyumba yenu au kwa familia yenu kabla ya kutoka Burundi?

.....

.....

2. Ulikuwa unafanya kazi gani kabla ya kutoka Burundi?

Ukulima..... ☐

Nilifanya kazi katika shamba ya mtu ili kupata riziki..... ☐

Nilifanya kazi kwa serikali au shirika..... ☐

Nilifanya biashara..... ☐

Nyingine – eleza

.....

.....

.....

.....

3. Kulingana na wewe uchumi wa familia yako au yenu ulikuwaje?

Nilikuwa au tulikuwa tukisumbuka kulisha familia yetu au yangu... ☐

Nilikuwa au tulikuwa tukilisha familia yetu..... ☐

☐

Nilikuwa au tulikuwa tukilisha familia yetu na kuweza kwa urahisi

kulipia elimu na matibabu na hatukuweza kuweka akiba.....☐

Niliweza au tuliweza kushugulikia mahitaji yote ya familia yangu au yetu

na kuweka pesa ya kutosha kwa maisha ya baadaye..... ☐

Nilikuwa au tulikuwa tajiri au matajiri..... ☐

4. Familia yako au yenu ilifanya kazi gani kabla ya 1980?

Nilifanya kazi kwa shamba ya mtu kupata riziki..... ☐

Nilifanyia serikali ya Tanzania kazi..... ☐

Nilifanya kazi katika shirika la UNHCR au TCRS..... ☐

Biashara..... ☐

Sikuwa nimeajiriwa..... ☐

Nyingine - eleza

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

5. Kulingana na wewe uchumi wa familia yako au yenu ilikuwaje kabla ya 1980?

Nilitegemea au tulitegemea shirika la UNHCR au TCRS kwa kila kitu..... ☐

Niliweza au tuliweza kupata pesa kando ya msaada wa UNHCR au TCR... ☐

Niliweza au tuiliwea kujtosheleza..... ☐

Niliweza au tuliweza kuwa na mapato ya ziada na kuweka akiba ..... ☐

Nilikuwa au tulikuwa tajiri au matajiri..... ☐

6. Mko wangapi kwa nyumba yako au familia yako leo?

.....  
.....

.....  
.. ☐ .....

7. Unafanya kazi gani hapa Ulyankulu?

☐ ulima..... ☐

☐ hafanya kazi kwa shamba ya mtu kupata riziki..... ☐

Ninafanya kwa serikali au kwa shirika..... ☐

Biashara..... ☐

Nyingine - fafanua

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

8. Kulingana na wewe hali ya uchumi ya familia yako au yenu, Ulyankulu

ikoje?

Ninasumbuka au tunasumbuka kulisha familia yangu au yetu... ☐

Ninaweza au tunaweza kulisha familia yangu au yetu kwa urahisi

kulipia elimu na matibabu lakini hatupati ya kuweka akiba.....☐

Ninaweza au tunaweza kushugulikia mahitaji yote ya familia yangu au

yetu na kuweka pesa ya kutosha kwa maisha ya baadaye..... ☐

Mimi au sisi ni tajiri au matajiri..... ☐

9. Kulingana na wewe uwezekano wa wakimbizi waliohitimu kuajiriwa nje au ndani ya makaazi uko vipi? Jaza sanduku katika ukurasa unaofuata.

Rahisi sana..... ☐

Rahisi..... ☐

Sio rahisi..... ☐

Haiwezekani..... ☐

10. Kulingana na wewe uwezekano wa wafanyi biashara wakimbizi kufanya

kazi yao ndani au nje ya makaazi iko vipi?

Rahisi sana..... ☐

Rahisi..... ☐

Sio rahisi..... ☐

Haiwezekani..... ☐

11. Kulingana na wewe uwezekano ya wakimbizi kwenda nje ya makaazi kwa

shughuli tofauti za kiuchumi uko vipi?

Rahisi sana..... ☐

Rahisi..... ☐

Sio rahisi..... ☐

Haiwezekani..... ☐

12. Kulingana na wewe hali za barabara na vifaa vya usafiri viko vipi?

Bora..... ☐

Nzuri..... ☐

Ya kuridhisha..... ☐

Mbaya..... ☐

13. Kulingana na wewe vifaa vya mawasiliano viko vipi katika makaazi?

Bora..... ☐

Nzuri..... ☐

Ya kuridhisha..... ☐

Mbaya..... ☐

14. Peana sehemu tano za kiuchumi zinazopaswa kuboreshwa

.....  
 .....  
 .....  
 .....  
 .....  
 .....

## MAISHA YA KISIASA

1. Katika makaazi haya, ni nani mwenye uwezo wa kufanya uamuzi unaoathiri wakimbizi?

Serikali ya Tanzania..... ☐

Vyama vya siasa vilivyo Burundi..... ☐

Makanisa..... ☐

Serikali ya Burundi..... ☐

Wakimbizi wenyewe..... ☐

Mwingine, tafadhali eleza

.....  
 .....  
 .....  
 .....

2. Kulingana na wewe, uhuru wa kushirikiana na kujieleza katika makaazi haya uko vipi?

Bora..... ☐

Mzuri..... ☐

Wa kuridhisha..... ☐

Hakuna..... ☐

3. Kulingana na wewe uhuru wa kupata maelezo na habari kutoka nje ya makaazi uko vipi?

Bora..... ☐

Mzuri..... ☐

- Wa kuridhisha..... ☐
- Hakuna..... ☐
4. Wewe hupata habari vipi kutoka nje ya makaazi haya?
- Radio..... ☐
- Magazeti au vitabu..... ☐
- Kanisa..... ☐
- Kuelezwa na watu..... ☐
- Matangazo ya kanisa..... ☐
- Mikutano..... ☐
5. Kulingana na wewe, siasa za Burundi zaathiri wakimbizi?
- Kwa hakika ndio..... ☐
- Ndio kwa kiwango fulani..... ☐
- Sina uhakika..... ☐
- Hakuna kabisa..... ☐
6. Unapata vipi habari za kisiasa kutoka Burundi?
- Radio..... ☐
- Magazeti au vitabu..... ☐
- Waakilishi wa vyama vya kisiasa..... ☐
- Kuelezwa na watu..... ☐
- Kwingine tafadhali eleza.....
7. Vyama vya kisiasa vya Burundi viko na nguvu katika kambi hii?
- Kwa hakika ndio..... ☐
- Ndio kwa kiwango fulani..... ☐
- Sina uhakika..... ☐
- Hapana..... ☐

8. Tafadhali orodhesha haki tano za kisiasa ambazo unafikiri mnahitaji katika kambi hii.
- .....
- .....
- .....
- .....
- .....

## SEHEMU YA PILI: MAREJESHO

1. Kwa maoni yako, mabadiliko ya Burundi yako vipi kwa wakimbizi kurejea?
- Bora..... ☐
- Mazuri..... ☐
- Ya kuridhisha..... ☐
- Mabaya..... ☐
2. Ungependa kurudi Burundi?
- Kwa hakika ndio..... ☐
- Ndio kwa kiwango Fulani..... ☐
- Nina Shaka..... ☐
- Hapana..... ☐
3. Hapa chini zimeandikwa baadhi ya sababu zifanyazo utake kurudi nyumbani. Orodhesha moja kwanzia sababu iliyo na umuhimu zaidi hadi sita kwenye sababu iliyo na umuhimu kidogo
- Maisha ni magumu makazini..... ☐
- Nataka watoto wangu wasome..... ☐
- Nataka nikachukue ardhi yangu..... ☐
- Wakati wa Mungu umefika kwangu kuenda..... ☐



Nataka kuwa huru nje ya makaazi..... ☐

Nimechoka na kuitwa mkimbizi..... ☐

4. Zilizoorodheshwa hapa chini ni baadhi ya sababu ambazo zimekufanya, mpaka sasa usiamue kurudi nyumbani. Orodhesha moja kwanzia sababu iliyo na umuhimu zaidi hadi sita kwenye sababu iliyo na umuhimu kidogo

Bado ninangoja mamlaka inayohusika kupanga marejesho..... ☐

Sitaki kupoteza mali zangu hapa..... ☐

Sitaki kuondoka..... ☐

Sina uhakika kama kuna usalama wa kutosha Burundi..... ☐

Bado ninangoja kiongozi wangu wa kidini kutoa maagizo..... ☐

5. Je wafikiria swala la ardhi laweza kuwa tatizo kwako wakati utakapo rudi nyumbani?

Ndio kwa hakika..... ☐

Ndio kwa kiwango fulani..... ☐

Nina shaka..... ☐

La..... ☐

6. Ikiwa ardhi yako imepewa watu wengine, utafurahia kama serikali ya Burundi itakupa ardhi yoyote ilioko sehemu nyingine katika nchi?

Ndio, kwa hakika..... ☐

Ndio kwa kiwango fulani..... ☐

Nina shaka..... ☐

La..... ☐

7. Ikiwa jawabu lako ni la, kwa maswali ya hapo juu kwa nini unafikiria, usingependa kupewa ardhi nyingine yeyote?

.....  
.....

.....  
.....  
.....

8. Tafadhali onyesha uwezo wa usemi wako wakirundi

Bora..... ☐

Mzuri..... ☐

Wa kuridhisha..... ☐

Mbaya..... ☐

Tafadhali orodhesha mambo matano yapasayo kufanywa ili kufanikisha marejesho.

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

9. Tafadhali orodhesha mambo matano ambayo kanisa yako inafanya kutayarisha wakimbizi kurudi nyumbani.

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

10. Kwa nini unafirikia kanisa inapaswa kuhusika katika kutayarisha wakimbizi kabla ya kurejea kwao nyumbani?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

## SEHEMU YA TATU: KANISA

1. Je, wewe huenda kanisani?

Ndio..... ☐

La..... ☐

2. Dhehebu lako ni lipi?.....

3. Tafadhali orodhesha mambo matano ambayo kanisa (hata kama huendi kwa kanisa hilo) imefanya kuondoa mateso kwa wakimbizi.

4. Kwa maoni yako ni vipi kanisa inahusika katika kuelekeza uamuzi wa kibinafsi wa mkimbizi?

Watu binafsi huendea viongozi wao wa kiroho kwa ushauri kabla ya kufanya uamuzi muhimu..... ☐

Watu binafsi huuliza tu ushauri kutoka kwa viongozi wao wa kiroho kabla ya kufanya uamuzi muhimu..... ☐

Ni kwa maswala yaliyotengwa tu, ndipo watu binafsi hutafuta ushauri kutoka kwa viongozi wao wa kiroho, kabla ya kufanya uamuzi muhimu..... ☐

Kamwe watu binafsi hawatafuti ushauri kutoka kwa viongozi wao wa kiroho kabla ya kufanya uamuzi muhimu..... ☐

5. Nimesikia kanisa likisema juu ya kurudi Burundi, katika, (tafadhali weka alama kuonyesha vile ulivyosikia)

Unabii..... ☐

Nyimbo..... ☐

Mahubiri..... ☐

Maono..... ☐

Mikutano..... ☐

Nyingine tafadhali eleza

.....Orodhesha masharti matano ambayo kanisa imepeana kuhusu mambo yapasayo kufanywa ili wakimbizi warudi Burundi.

7. Je, wafikiria huu ndio wakati ambao Mungu ameruhusu wakimbizi kurudi nyumbani?

☐ Ndio..... ☐

La..... ☐

8. Toa sababu tano kwa nini unafikiria au kutofikiria hivyo.

9. Tafadhali orodhesha mambo matano yanayofanywa na kanisa lako kuandaa wakimbizi kurudi.

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

10. Kwa nini unafikiria kanisa lingepaswa kuandaa wakimbizi kabla ya kurejea nyumbani?

.....  
.....  
.....

### **APPENDIX 3**

#### **SEHEMU YA MAHOJIANO**

Tarehe ya mahojiano.....

Saa.....

Mahali pa mahojiano.....

#### **MWONGOZO WA MAHOJIANO**

Jina.....

Umri.....

Cheo kanisani.....

1. Umekuwa katika uongozi wa kanisa kwa muda gani na umekuwa na vyeo gani?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

2. Ni shida gani hasa ambazo wakimbizi wamekujulisha?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

3. Ulijaribuje kutatua shida hizo?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

4. Una msimamo gani juu ya wakimbizi kurudi Burundi na unafikiri inapaswa kupangwa vipi?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

5. Kama unajiandaa kuenda nyumbani, unafikiri utawezaje kupata mali yako huko hasa ardhi?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

6. Utakapofika Burundi unafikiri utarudishwa vipi kwa huduma na  
ni jukumu  
gani utatekeleza?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

7. Unatayarishaje washirika wako wa kanisa kurudi Burundi?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

8. Kuna jambo lolote ambalo biblia inazungumzia kuhusu marejeo?


.....  
.....  
.....  
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.....  
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9. Unafikiria kupewa uraia wa Tanzania ni wazo nzuri la kufuata ili usirudi  
Burundi?


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## Appendix 4: Data Analysis


A1



A2<sup>43</sup>



A3




<sup>43</sup> Please note that this was due to the fact that many women do not know how to read and write.


A4




A5



A6




B1 Education levels




**Key**

Did not attend	a
Completed PS	b
Completed SS	c
Complete VC	d
Completed Degree	e

**B2 Place and time of Education**




**B3 Access to Education before 1980**




#### B4 Education for Refugees after 1980



#### B5




#### B6







## B7 LEISURE TIME




## B8 Relationship to Tanzanians




## C2 Occupation of Burundians before they left Burundi



C3 Family Economics in Burundi




C4 Families Occupation before 1980.




**Key**

Farming	f
Farm Employment	fe
Government(TZ)	tg
UNHCR/TCRS	un
Business	b
Unemployed	u


C5 Economic life before 1980




**C7. Occupation at Ulyankulu.**




**C8. Families Economic life in Ulyankulu**




**C9 Employment for Qualified refugees.**




**C10 Possibility of refugees doing business.**




**C11. Possibility of Refugees Going Out For Economic Activities.**




**C12. Access to transport facilities**



**C13. Communication facilities.**




**D1 Power of Decision Making.**




- Tanzanian government **TG**
- Political parties in Burundi **PB**
- Churches **C**
- Government of Burundi **BG**
- Refugee themselves **R**


**D2 Freedom of Association and Speech**



D3. Freedom to Access information outside camp.




D4 Sources of Information outside the camp.



**Key**  
Radio  
Newspaper/books  
Church  
Oral sources  
Church notices  
Meetings

**R**  
**NB**  
**C**  
**OS**  
**CN**  
**M**


D6 Source of Political Information from Burundi.




**Key**  
Radio  
Newspaper/books  
Political party representatives  
Oral sources

**r**  
**nb**  
**ppr**  
**os**


**D7. Burundian Political party strengths in Camp.**




**2.1 Changes in Burundi in favour of repatriation.**



**2.2 Going Back to Burundi.**




### 2.3 Reasons for going back to Burundi




#### Key

- Life is difficult in the camp **a**
- Children Education **b**
- Burundi land **c**
- The time of God had come for me to go **d**
- I want to be free from settlement restraint **e**
- I am tired to be called a refugee **f**

### 2.5 Is land problem back home?




### 2.6 Would you accept any other land apart from yours?







## 2.7. Fluency in KIRUNDI.




## 3.1 Church Attendance




## 3.4 Place of the Church in guiding refugees Decisions.




3.5. How the church communicate on going to Burundi.



3.6 Is it Gods time to take Refugees Home?.



3.7 Denominational Affiliation



## **Appendix 5: The Church Built In Ulyankulu As Part Of Preparing Refugees For Repatriation**



## **Appendix 6: Political Benchmarks in Burundi History Between 1961 and 1972**

**(Lemarchand and Martin 1974: 26)<sup>44</sup>**

October 13, 1961:

Assassination of Crown Prince Louis Rwagasore, Prime Minister- Designate and leader of Parti de l'Union et du Progrès National (Uprona).

July 1, 1962:

Burundi becomes independent as a separate entity from Rwanda; the administrative unit born of the amalgamation of Rwanda and Burundi (the United Nations Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi) is formally dissolved.

January 15, 1965:

Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe (Hutu) assassinated by Tutsi refugee from Rwanda; succeeded by Joseph Bamina (Hutu).

May 10, 1965:

First post-independence elections to National Assembly resulting in Hutu majority.

September 13, 1965:

Leonard Biha (Ganwa) is appointed Prime Minister by the Court, in defiance of the Hutu majority in the National Assembly.

October 19, 1965:

Putsch by Hutu military personnel thwarted by army loyalists under Captain Michel Micombero; Prime Minister Biha seriously wounded by putschists; reprisals against Hutu follow.

November 2, 1965:

Mwami (King) Mwambutsa leaves for Europe, never to return.

March 24, 1966:

Mwami confers substantial powers on his son, Crown Prince Charles Ndzizeye.

July 8, 1966:

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<sup>44</sup> Quoted in Emmanuel Ndikumana 2003:71-73

Crown Prince deposes his absent father, dismisses the Biha government and suspends the constitution.

July 11, 1966:

Defence Minister Micombero forms government.

September 1, 1966:

Crown Prince installed as Mwami Ntare V.

November 28, 1966:

Micombero deposes Mwami, proclaims the Republic.

September 17, 1969:

Disclosure of a plan for a Hutu-led coup result in the arrest of about thirty Hutu leaders, all of whom are subsequently executed.

July 12, 1971:

Disclosure of an alleged plot of Banyaruguru elements (of Tutsi origins) against the Government, leading to the arrest and trial of several leading Tutsi personalities in the army and the Government.

October 20, 1971:

President Micombero set up the “Supreme Council of the Republic” (Conseil Suprême de la République), consisting of 27 officers; the functions of this junta-type organisation are to “counter all tendencies likely to endanger national unity and peace ... to give its opinion on the selection, maintenance in office or replacement of persons responsible for stewardship of public affairs and to insure discipline in all State organs”.

January 12, 1972:

Nine of the personalities brought to trial in connection with the anti-government plot of July 1971 are condemned to death; seven others receive life sentences.

March 30, 1972:

Ex-King Ntare returns (is brought back) to Bujumbura. He is immediately arrested and sent to Gitega.

April 29, 1972:

Micombero dismisses all members of his cabinet. A few hours later, between 8.00 and 9.00 pm, co-ordinated attacks by Hutu and Mulelists are reported in Bujumbura, Gitega, Bururi and Nyanza-Lac. Thousands of Tutsi are exterminated. In order to forestall a monarchist coup ex-King Ntare is executed in Gitega during the night of April 29-30.

May 3, 1972:

Zairian troops arrive in Bujumbura. The Burundi army, assisted by *jeunesses* (youth) groups, move into the countryside to conduct the repression.

May 6, 1972:

'War councils' meet in provincial centres to organise the repression. According to one observer, "through May and June the excavators were busy every night in Gitega and Bujumbura burying the dead in mass graves". An estimated 80,000 Hutu lost their lives during the repression.