INAUGURAL LECTURE

PROFESSOR JO-ANSIE VAN WYK

24 MAY 2017

17:00
PROGRAMME
Entry of academic procession

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Prof Gugu Moche
Vice: Principal: Teaching, Learning, Community Engagement and Student Support

INTRODUCTION
Prof Andrew Phillips
Executive Dean: College of Human Sciences

INAUGURAL ADDRESS
Prof Jo-Ansie van Wyk
Department of Political Sciences, Unisa

RESPONSE
Prof Deon Geldenhuys
Professor: Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannesburg

CLOSURE
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Vice: Principal: Teaching, Learning, Community Engagement and Student Support

DEPARTURE OF ACADEMIC PROCESSION
Inaugural Lecture

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Wednesday, 24 May 2017


Baie dankie vir u vriendelike bekendstelling. I am deeply humbled by your introduction, and sincerely grateful for Unisa’s recognition of my scholarship, and my inauguration as a Full Professor, or Hooglereaar.

Thank you all for attending tonight, an event which signifies my rite of passage as an academic; a profession filled with rituals (Manning 2000: 1) such as my inauguration as an Installada. Surely, my inauguration is not as high profile as that of the investiture of our new Chancellor, Thabo Mbeki, in February 2017; but as a rite of passage is just as significant.

I am aware that an ever-greater task awaits me, a commitment I take on willingly, and grounded in my academic credo: integrity, excellence, relevance and freedom.

Rites or rituals are Janus-faced. It changes (transforms) and maintains (repeats, reinforces). Rituals are ordered events or processes, laden with regalia to distinguish the initiate from the rest. In fact, anthropologist Arnold von Gennep described rituals as a three-phased process including separation, transition and incorporation (Manning 2000: 5, 9). In following von Gennep, tonight marks my incorporation. Scholars subsequent to von Gennep have added a fourth element – departure or exit – to this process (Manning 2000: 9). Therefore, tonight also reminds me that my task ahead has a built-in expiry date, that my academic shelf life is limited, and only as good as my commitment to my self-proclaimed academic credo.

My credo has to survive amidst a ‘world-wide crisis in education’ (Nussbaum 2016: 2). We are keenly aware that students worldwide have become increasingly demanding, claiming their rights as ‘customers’ but forgetting their responsibilities. We are also keenly aware of the almost
impossible obligations imposed on professors. This is a global phenomenon and not just a limited to South Africa.

These are demanding – and emotional – times in our country and in higher education where calls for decoloniality, cleansing ceremonies, and social capital sound louder than calls for, and a commitment to, education of the highest standards and as envisaged in our Constitution (Act 108 of 1996). Our Bill of Rights, in Section 29(1), outlines this as a basic human right:

Everyone has the right

(a) to a basic education, including adult basic education, and
(b) To further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible (South Africa 1996).

Whereas universities elsewhere in South Africa have been severely affected by the Fallist or # Movements, Unisa has been relatively spared. Positioning itself as ‘the African university in the service of humanity’, Unisa has set itself a hard task. The recent decolonial turn at Unisa seems to follow from this. Unisa prides itself in making great strides in decolonising academia and curricula. I do not know what exactly decoloniality means, but what I do know is that it contributes to an uneasiness among some of my colleagues. In my mind, do we not run the risk of operationalising politicians and so-called public intellectuals’ unfulfilled political and ideological cri de coeurs and, in the process, sacrifice academic excellence? By decolonising Unisa, do we really serve humanity and do we really establish an African university? I am of the opinion that Unisa has always been an African university. Moreover, by decolonising, do we really prepare Unisa students to be innovative, internationally competitive, and prepared for the Fourth (not the current Third) Industrial Revolution which most of them will surely experience in their lifetime? These are not easy and popular questions to ask, and I ask them in all sincerity and as a plea to foster academic excellence at this university. Neither our country, nor Unisa can afford further social experiments.

This, as we all have experienced, is a tall order. Nevertheless, there is an instructive lesson from one of Africa’s greatest military commanders, who incidentally, was also one of Africa’s greatest colonisers, Hannibal Barca (247-183 BC), not to be confused with Hannibal Lecter. Hannibal Barca – not Lecter - was a Carthaginian (present-day Tunisia), who colonised large parts of North Africa, and present-day Spain, France and Italy. Hannibal famously crossed the Alps with African elephants en route to imperial Rome in mid-winter as is credited for stating
*Aut inveniam viam aut faciam.*

I shall either find a way or make one (Axelrod 2003: 215).

The higher education challenge that you and I face, have an *African* solution: find a way, or make one. Unisa has more than 140 years of finding and/or making ways. This is one of its greatest strengths, and one of the most important lessons for its students, including my parents who are Unisa alumni. I am one of the so-called Unisa Legacy Kids, by lack of a better description, *i.e.* the child of a Unisa student who has returned to Unisa.

One of the indelible images of my childhood is of my parents studying back-to-back in their small study in our home in a small rural village, Kamieskroon, in the Northern Cape. As Unisa students (my father, Law and Latin for non-degree purposes, and my mother with History and Psychology as majors) they would often “deurnag” (study right through the night) on Fridays and Saturdays. On some Monday mornings, they would rush to the little post office in our village to catch the “poslorrie” (the mail truck) before 6 am to mail their assignments to Unisa, in Pretoria.

On other occasions, my parents would travel to Cape Town for Group Discussions; an event that meant a special treat, such as a new toy or clothes, for my siblings and me. They returned with notes and lectures recorded on what now seemed to be an ancient tape recorder. Therefore, since age seven, my brother, sister and I joined our parents in listening to Unisa History and Law lectures on BASF tapes. These tapes were often shared with my parents’ fellow students elsewhere in our rural region. Therefore, it was not unusual (especially at the height of apartheid towards the late 1970s) to receive my parents’ fellow (so-called) Coloured students from Steinkopf, another small rural village on the edge of the Richtersveld, for informal discussion groups in our home in Kamieskroon.

Years later, President Nelson Mandela perfectly articulated these experiences I had as a young rural child, ‘Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world’. *Unisa* was *the* instrument that changed my family and that of my parents’ fellow (so-called Coloured) students’ rural world. My father, an auditor, passed away at 51 leaving me his Latin dictionary and his Unisa Latin notes. My mother, now aged 80 and my guest of honour tonight, retired at 75 having been a remedial teacher and a farmer (the latter she took up when she was 65). She enjoys good health as you may have seen, and keeps a keen interest in History, Psychology, and, of course, her *alma mater*, Unisa.
This was the Unisa I acquainted as a child, and the Unisa that attracted me to apply for a position at the university in 1996. I joined Unisa on 1 January 1997 as a Junior Lecturer. Almost two decades later, I still treasure the true value and meaning of Unisa that I learnt as a child: a place that fosters and enables personal and professional change wherever you are. A place to find a way, or make one.

Allow me, Ladies and Gentleman, to thank Unisa twice tonight: for my parents’ education, and the reason for our ritual tonight: my inauguration.

Please also allow me to also express my sincerest gratitude to significant others that have assisted me in finding a way, or making a way. Amongst Cambridge University’s alumni are two great South Africans, Jan Smuts and Deon Geldenhuys. One of them is with us tonight. No, Jannie is not with us, so we have to do with Deon!

I am sincerely grateful to have you, Professor Deon Geldenhuys, as my respondent. You have been my academic hero and my informal mentor since the publication of your doorstopper, *The diplomacy of isolation* (Geldenhuys 1984), a text I encountered as a first year student in 1987. You are, as the top rated (B1) Political Scientist in the country, the poster boy of IR scholarship in this country. Your *oeuvre* has consistently innovated our field of inquiry through conceptual innovations on isolated states (Geldenhuys 1990), *Contested States* (Geldenhuys 2009), and *Deviant Conduct in World Politics* (Geldenhuys 2004). Apart from your other achievements and qualities, your work has been one of the inspirations for this lecture. In *Contested States*, you admitted your academic interest in ‘the misfits in the world of states’ which you described as an ‘unorthodox topic’ (Geldenhuys 2009: 1). With *Deviant Conduct* (Geldenhuys 2004), in my view, you have, *inter alia* prefaced the emotional turn in IR by focusing on examples of states’ norm or rule-breaking behavior, and international responses to it. You went further and explored the impact of these states’ behaviour on the international community, and the study of IR.

Thank you, Deon, for inspiring generations of students and wannabee professors like me. May I also take this opportunity to congratulate you on your forthcoming birthday on May 27? I wish you health, wealth, and continued scholarship of the highest caliber.

With your permission, I would also like to express my sincerest gratitude to Professors Emeriti Murray Faure, Deon Fourie, Anton du Plessis, Willie Breytenbach, Pierre du Toit, and Hennie Kotzé. Die Afrikaanse digter W.E.G. Louw sou julle as “gietvorms van die jeug” beskryf. Ek bedank julle as die “gietvorms” van my jeug. To this group of distinguished professors, I would
also like to add - and honour - my colleague, Professor Susan Botha, who is also present tonight. Professor Susan Botha is the first-ever female Associate Professor in my home department since its establishment in 1946.

My sincerest gratitude also goes to Unisa’s librarians, many of whom are present tonight. I salute you as the modern incarnations of the dedicated librarians of the magnificent African libraries at Alexandria and Timbuktu. You have been exceptional colleagues and friends to Karlien and myself.

Finally, allow me to express my gratitude to my parents, Kobus† and Janet van Wyk, and my siblings, Abrie†, Maryke† and Stephanus, and Dr Paul and Mrs Lalie de Beer, my cousin Abé for your unconditional love and support in my trek across the Academic Alps. I dedicate this lecture in love and sincerest gratitude to you, Karlien, for enabling me to find, or make ways.

Now, to the substance of my rite of passage and the theme for my lecture: The age of anger: Angry states and emotions in contemporary international relations.

Another tall order but let me show you the way.

Let me preface it with an anecdote.

My colleague, Dr Everisto Benyera once shared with me an interaction between the great Zimbabwean political scientist Professor Masipule Sithole and a small girl. During the course of their interaction, the small girl asked Professor Sithole what kind of work he does.

‘I am a Professor’, Professor Sithole replied.

‘So, what do you profess?’ the girl retorted.

So, for the remainder of the evening, allow me to profess by presenting a panoptic and parochial view of international relations and its study.

By acknowledging the relatively recent ‘emotional turn’ in the Human and Social Sciences (Heaney 2011: 259), in general, and International Relations (IR), specifically, my thesis is that emotions affect contemporary international relations. More specifically, I suggest that anger is one of the prevailing and compelling emotions in contemporary international relations. I maintain that anger is not only evident at an individual or personal level, and between individuals or groups, but that states are angry too. In fact, some states demonstrate emotions
that characterise them as *Angry States*, a development that scholars and diplomats alike ‘neglect at our own peril’ (Crawford 2013: 121).

You may question my thesis and my proposal of yet another Adjective State such as deviant states, isolated states, and failed states and, dare I say it: Captured states? This is surely an ‘unorthodox topic’, similar to Professor Geldenhuys’ interests in ‘the misfits in the world of states’ (Geldenhuys 2009: 1). I distinguish angry states from, for example, deviant states. Whereas deviant states contravene international settled norms, angry states are not necessarily norm violators. Hence, I follow a Constructivist approach and propose that states *deliberately construct* their anger, and their response to anger and provocations. Therefore, I maintain that anger is no longer just an emotion but also an important deliberate and pre-mediated instrument in states’ international relations.

Whereas emotions in general is receiving more scholarly attention, specific emotions such as anger, humiliation, and fear as determinants and consequences of state behaviour remain under-researched. It is thus one of the objectives of my lecture to fill this gap.

Let us consider recent examples of state and non-state displays of emotions:

- The Battle of Seattle (international protests at a Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation in 1999);
- 9/11;
- The so-called Colour(ed) Revolutions in some of the former Soviet Union republics (since 2003);
- The growth in the international franchises of Al Qaeda (since 9/11);
- The Arab Spring (*ca.* 2011 onwards);
- The rise and rise of ISIS/ISIL;
- The Occupy Wall Street Movement (against capitalism) in the US;
- Canada’s trade minister, Chrystia Freeland’s walk-out of trade negotiations with the European Union (*The Guardian* 22 October 2016);
- The Dutch press referred to Bill Clinton ‘die Hilary’s adviseurs op hun donder geeft’, and Hilary Clinton being ‘pissig’, and ‘pisnijdig en woest’ towards her advisers during her presidential campaign in 2016 (*De Volkskrant* 14 April 2017);
European reaction against Brexit, the British referendum on the termination of Britain’s membership of the EU (Business Insider UK 11 February 2017);

The heated and ‘abruptly ended’ telephone conversation between Donald Trump and Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, on 1 February 2017 (The Washington Post 2 February 2017);

North Korea’s deputy UN ambassador, Kim In-ryong’s threat that a ‘thermonuclear war could break out at any moment’, and the US’ rebuttal that the ‘era of strategic patience [with North Korea] is over’ (The Guardian 18 April 2017); and


Recent expressions of resurgent populist anger on both sides of the left-right political spectrum have been ascribed to economic inequalities and the cultural backlash thesis, the latter a reaction against ‘progressive cultural change’ (Inglehart & Norris 2016: 2-3). To this I would add nationalistic rhetoric (‘America First’, ‘Make America Great Again’, and ‘Leave’ campaign), stereotyping (‘Angry Arabs’, ‘Ugly Americans’, and ‘Axis of Evil’), distrust in political leaders, corrupt elites, large scale immigration, and political alienation.

I will structure my lecture in four parts. In the first part, I define and explore emotions - anger, rage, fear, compassion, humiliation, sadness, joy, love, guilt, grief, pride, anxiety, shame, envy, and disgust – in international relations. I specifically focus on the appeal of emotions to IR and international relations.

I then proceed to focus on anger as an emotion sui generis. Here, I focus on its definition, manifestation, and political utility. In the third part of my lecture, I focus on angry states in international relations. Finally, I conclude with some observations on the age of anger.

Allow me to preface my lecture with a number of caveats. First, my doctor, Dr Franco Colin and some IR scholars disagree with the view that states can have and express emotions. For them, state behaviour cannot be explained by anthropomorphising the state. However, in following Lucile Eznack (2013: 554) and Alexander Wendt (2004: 291), amongst others, I argue that states have emotions ‘through the individuals that represent them and act for them’, and that ‘states are people too’ due to the ‘behaviour and discourse of the individual human beings who make them up’ (Wendt 2004: 289). I propose that state orientation and behaviour is the product of the filtration of popular and elite emotions. In turn, these popular and elite emotions distill from elite contestations, elite-mass contestations, national identity, national interests, a population’s
collective national memory, a state’s history; and the construction of emotions by, for lack of a
more elegant term, emotion entrepreneurs, or agénts provocateurs. All of this, then, results in
what Tedd Hall (2015: vii) termed the “emotionalization” of a state’s foreign policy and
diplomatic practice. Imagine, for a moment, the US foreign policy in the next five years based
on the following statement by Donald Trump

The world is a mess. The world is as angry as it gets. What, you think this is going to
cause a little more anger? The world is an angry place (Business Insider 26 January 2017).

Second, apart from following a state-centric approach, I will also refer to non-state motivations
for and expressions of emotions. There are several ways to discuss emotions as informing state
behavior. One is to assume—as much of IR does—that a state is a single actor, indeed, a person
(Wendt 2004). In this approach, there is no effort to distinguish among individuals and groups
that constitute the state apparatus; it is presupposed that the state speaks with a single voice.
Thus, we can talk about “Washington” deciding to sign a climate change treaty or that the
“United States” chose to invade Iraq. This method, though, does not provide explicit theorising
about the “state’s” emotions and so remains open to criticism that there is no way to know
whether emotions really do matter. A second way is to focus on individual state leaders as
representatives of the state, who make the decisions for the state. This is the primary
understanding of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) (see Hudson 2006). Here, we would focus on
the key decision makers and assume their personal characteristics guide state behavior:
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s belligerency brought Iran into more conflict with the West.
It is certainly useful to think of individual leaders and their emotions, and specific case studies
help advance our understanding of how emotions matter in IR.

Third, I use the abbreviation IR to refer to the discipline of International Relations.

The appeal of emotions for IR and international relations

So, what is an emotion, and why are emotions important to international relations? If we say
that one of the foci of IR is the study of war and conflict, then we cannot ignore anger;
considered to be the most ‘prominent and pervasive’ emotion in war and conflict (Van Kleef
2010: 545). Some scholars refer to anger as the foundation of hostility and, in its escalated form,
aggression (Spielberger & Reheiser 2010: 406). Anger also effects social perceptions of states
(Van Kleef 2010: 547).
Emotions also explain the unexpected outcomes of conflict (Roach 2016: 409), and international aggression is often regarded as the product of anger (Long & Brecke 2003: 27-28).

Emotions comprise at least three components, namely

- a feeling of displeasure related to a perception (a subjective component);
- an idea, or the judgement, that a particular material or immaterial objective is not met (an objective component); and
- Thus requires action to achieve this objective (an action component) (Ariffen 2016b: 211; Crawford 2000: 125).

Hence, emotions are stimuli that determine a state’s worldview, norms, actions, and orientations. In other words, emotions determine how a state reads, understands and behave in the world. Jonathan Mercer (in Coicaud 2014: 500) further explains the importance of emotions

> Emotion is necessary to rationality and intrinsic to choice. Emotion precedes choice (by ranking one’s preferences), emotion influences choice (because it directs one’s attention and is the source of action), and emotion follows choice (which determines how one feels about one’s choice and influences one’s preferences). [My emphasis.]

Allow me to illustrate this.

Since the end of the Korean War in the 1950s, North and South Korea have followed divergent political trajectories. Whereas North Korea, the masterclass in totalitarianism, has closed itself off from international society, South Korea has developed into one of the shining examples of Asian development. North Korea became increasingly isolated, whereas South Korea became a truly globalised state. North Korea’s isolation escalated due to its deviancy, a situation that strengthened the state to become more paranoid and fearful - thus more emotionally driven - of the international community. These emotions preceded its choice to for example, withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). For North Korea, withdrawing from the NPT meant that it could escalate its nuclear weapons ambitions to improve its sense of security, and develop these weapons without international interference and oversight. Emotions, therefore, also influenced the choice to escalate the development of nuclear weapons. Finally, once North Korea has taken these decisions, a more self-confident North Korea is evident. This has been clear in the increased sophistication of its weapons tests and its increased displays of confidence (military parades, angry diplomats, and tit-for-tats with President Trump.
of the US since his election). Thus, emotions (self-confidence and pride) followed the choices that were made.

Apart from this practical example, the appeal of emotions for IR scholars and international relations can be explained by at least three main factors, namely the

- Hitherto neglect of emotions in the study of international relations;
- the pervasiveness of emotions; and the
- Political usefulness of emotions.

First, the neglect of emotions in IR.

Studies on emotions have an impressive pedigree, ranging from Aristotle, Plato, Spinoza, Plutarch, Seneca, Darwin, and Freud (Spielberger & Reheiser 2010: 403). However, for a relatively young discipline that concerns itself with cooperation, peace, conflict, violence and war, IR has, until recently, paid scant attention to emotions as motivations for, for example, conflict, violence, war and cooperation. War, for example, has been described as ‘organised anger’ (Thurman 2006: 12). Emotions such as anger and hate are one explanatory variable in understanding and predicting state behaviour, inter-state relations and international relations.

The initial neglect of emotions in IR has been due to the assumption by, for example, Realists, Liberals and Neo-Marxists, that inter-state relations are pursued rationally and reflective of a state’s national interests (Ariffin 2016a: 1); and not reflecting a state’s emotions. This view has changed significantly (Crawford 2000; Roach & Hutchison 2008). Since 2014, SciencesPo offers a course, Emotions and International Relations. The United Nations University followed, as well as several international academic conferences on emotions in international relations.

The emotional turn in IR has already made significant contributions to the study of IR, and state behavior. First, attending to anger, for example, and its mechanisms can improve our explanatory and predictive faculties, analyses and policy advice to angry states, politicians, diplomats, negotiators and civil society.

Second, studying state emotions can also assist in the analysis and resolution of enduring international status conflicts such as the India-Pakistan, and United States (US)-Iran relations that defy materialistic explanations. Understanding the underlying state emotions that inspire and perpetuate the antagonistic collective identities of these states can explain the endurance of anger between these states (Wolf 2013: 15; Roach 2016: 401), and potentially contribute to resolve the impasse between them.
Apart from the explanatory power derived from studying emotions, and as research on the aftermath of 9/11, the Rwanda Genocide, and the Holocaust has shown, emotions also expose a state’s political memory and norms (Roach 2016: 405; Seidler 2013). Thus, in the third instance, as ‘perceptions of judgement’ (Roach 2016: 403), emotions reveal the values and norms of actors, thus revealing their identities and enabling them to interpret and act in the world. By showing anger, for example, a state signals that a ‘normative, salient issue’ it cares about has been violated (Hall 2015: 48).

**The second reason why emotions appeal to IR is the pervasiveness of emotions.**

‘All societies are full of emotions.’

This is the opening line of Martha Nussbaum’s (2013: 1) book, *Political emotions*. In fact, the etymology of the word emotion refers to a social moving, stirring, and agitation. Alternatively, in modern lexicon: emotions always cause a stir, and *vice versa*. This was evident in the international sympathetic reaction to the countries affected by the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in December 2004, and references to ‘angry Arabs’ (*New York Times*, 14 May 2015).

Early scholars between *individual* (pride, love, fear, anger etc.) and *political* emotions such as patriotism, political friendship and political love (Nussbaum 2013: 14; Coicaud 2016: 24). Neta Crawford (2013: 121), one of the first IR scholars to link emotions and IR.

Another reason why emotions are important to the study of IR is that when diplomats negotiate on behalf of their states, they tend to pay attention to both substantive issues and emotional cues. These cues, according to Wong (2016:144), include the choice of words, tone of speech, hand and body gestures conducting emotive information on how a situation is appraised.

**Third, the political utility of emotions and anger.**

First, emotions have a diagnostic function and dispel cognitive dissonance. An example of this, Ariffen (2016b: 214) suggests that the US may have questioned its earlier support of Iraq (ca. 2003) when it later accused the country (Iraq) of possessing weapons of mass destruction.

Emotions’ second function is prognostic and can improve a state’s confidence to follow a certain course of action. Emotions thus have performatory and mobilising power that facilitate, complicate and inhibit a state’s relations with other states. This, in turn, can stabilise, disrupt, restore or transform international relations (Ariffin 2016b: 214, 218).
Third, states display and employ emotions consciously and for strategic purposes, and thus regard emotions as a rational choice (the so-called ‘rationality of irrationality’) (Mercer 2006: 293).

Fourth, emotions sustains a state’s norms and norm compliance. More than mere intellectual and principled commitment, norms are also emotional commitments (Ross 2016: 317). Jonathan Mercer (2006: 298), for example, explains

> Emotion sustains norms and, of course, norm violations elicit emotional reactions. Whoever knowingly violates a norm should feel embarrassment, guilt or shame, while the observers should feel anger or indignation.

In the fifth instance, emotions are an important determinant of a state’s identity, status and prestige.

> The social constructivist research programme in IR (in its various strands) has impressively demonstrated that certain forms of social behaviour in international politics are not only rejected because they are functionally inefficient or threaten the physical survival of the group, but because they are socially constructed and non-compliance threatens the identity of a particular social construction of collective identity is heavily influenced by emotional categories such as disgust or shame (Koschut 2017: 8).

Sixth, emotions sustain and increase a state’s power through ‘the discursive use of group-specific verbal expressions, symbols and analogies’ (Koschut 2017: 11). Therefore, emotional knowledge, according to Simon Koschut (2017: 9)

> is part of the asymmetries of power and social identity in international politics strengthens cohesion of a group vis-a-vis outsiders.

This has been evident in, for example, the social construction of the Coalition of the Willing, the Axis of Evil, references to a ‘New Europe’, the articulation of an African Renaissance, and the introduction of the principle Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

**Danger: Anger’s trap**

Apart from dangers and risks, anger can have a moderating effect on a state’s behaviour (Garry 2014: 241). However, anger and displaying anger carries significant dangers and risks for a state. Among these, anger can
• Justify state behaviour. Subsequent to 9/11, a very angry US created a new geo-politics of anger with references to an Axis of Evil (North Korea, Iraq and Iran), an ‘arch of instability’, a coalition of the willing, a war on terror. Apart from this, the US’ emotional state in the wake of these events have resulted in emotions of anger and fear resulting in legal exceptions such as renditions, detaining ‘enemy combatants’ in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, and the reinforcement of ‘American exceptionalism’ (Ross 2016: 315-316). In other words, the US has emotionally legitimised its exceptionalism. In fact, Ross (2016: 317), referred to this as ‘affective exceptionalism’, an emotion state erupts periodically from the US;

• undermine trust between and confidence in states;

• Cloud states’ rationality (Hall 2015: 46). In the words of William Leogrande (2017: 105):

   Emotions may cloud the connection between means and ends, distort the importance of some causal connections over others, and skew cost-benefit analysis in ways that lead decision-makers to choices that are unlikely to succeed and entail disproportionate costs.

• lead a state to behave in a manner it would otherwise not have done (Hall 2015: 47);

• act as a motivation for belligerent behaviour (Hall 2015: 47);

• escalate should the target state remains defiant and continues to provoke (Hall 2015: 48);

• signal a state’s weakness and result in it being the target of reversed anger, if abandoned prematurely (Hall 2015: 48);

• Be costly in terms of a state’s international status and prestige (Hall 2015: 48); and

• Follow the logic of anger and result in escalation and ‘destructive aggression’ (Hall 2015: 46, 48).

Having explored emotions in general terms, and having outlined the utility of emotions for international relations and IR, I would like to proceed to the second part of my lecture: anger, and the age of anger.

For analytical purposes, I consider the beginning of the age of anger to a latter-day Tale of Two Cities, Manhattan (New York) and Berlin.

Thirty years ago, in 1987, Leonard Cohen recorded First we take Manhattan for his album (yes, vinyl) I’m your man (released in 1988). Cohen’s (1988) song in the dying days of the Cold War, the behemoth Soviet Union, and a divided Germany has remained an enduring social
commentary for the past thirty years. Apart from Cohen’s beautiful husky voice, we hear several other voices in the song: a prisoner, a lover, a politician, a loser, a winner, a believer, a fashionista, ordinary people, and a musician. Cohen sings about

- political and social Angst, alienation and disenchantment (‘sentenced me to twenty years of boredom/For trying to change the system from within…/…I told you, I told you, told you’);
- the inspiration for and rise of the counter-hero and the religious zealot (‘I’m guided by the signal in the heavens…/I’m guided by the beauty of our weapons’); and
- the rise of the underdog, the unlikely winner and asymmetrical conflict (‘I’m coming now…/…you loved me as a loser, but now you’re worried that I might just win’) (Cohen 1988).

References to political systems, governments, religious inspiration, capitalism, and the fashion and pharmaceutical industries also occur. However, the punch line of the song remains the line, ‘First we taken Manhattan, then we take Berlin’, which could be read as references to 9/11 (Al-Qaeda’s attack on the United States on 11 September 2001), and 11/9 (9 November 1989). The latter is Germany’s Schicksalstag (Day of Fate) when a GDR spokesperson, Guenter Schabowksi, unintentionally announced that East Germans could travel to West Germany with immediate effect resulting in what is now iconic images of German unification, and the “end” of the Cold War. Incidentally another 11/9 (1938) in Germany is Kristallnacht (Night of Broken Glass) when synagogues and Jewish property in Germany were burnt and/or confiscated.

Therefore, the age of anger (and its synonyms irate, furious, rage, rancorous, infuriated, perturbed, mad, indignant, exasperated, enraged, and caustic) I refer to is closely associated with the events of 11/9 and 9/11 in this contemporary Tale of Two Cities. I limit the age of anger in the title to the post-Cold War era, an era which Arjun Appadurai (2006: 10, 1) described as one characterised by a ‘surplus of rage’ and ‘superviolence’. However, surely, political aspirations and, more pertinent to this lecture, anger, are not recent phenomena. In fact, in Ancient Anger, Susanna Braund and Glen Most (2003) reminds us that this present age of anger is not new as history is both the cradle and graveyard of anger.
What is anger?

Not only one of the seven deadly sins, along with pride, envy, avarice, sloth, gluttony and lust, anger – along with denial, isolation, bargaining, depression and acceptance - is also one of the five stages of grief and death (Kübler-Ross 2014: 49).

Etymologically, the word anger derives from Old Norse and Middle English, angr and angr vex, meaning grief and sorrow. In Japanese, for example, the word ikari, depending on the kanji (or logographic character) used, can mean either anger or anchor. The Mandarin word for anger - shengqi – means generating qi, which is gas, air, breath, spirit, life force, or life energy. Russians have two words for anger, namely serditsia and zlitsia, referring respectively to anger against an individual, and anger against a political situation (Mair 2016). I can imagine Vladimir Putin getting serditsia and zlitsia against Donald Trump and the US during the latter’s presidential campaign!

Anger is a strong feeling of annoyance, displeasure or hostility. It is also a ‘reactive emotion, a response to a wrongful violation or insult by a blameworthy party’ (Hall 2015: 47), or a ‘strong feeling of distress or displeasure in response to a specific provocation’ (Frijda in Eznack 2013: 557). Moreover, actual or perceived insult, injustice, humiliation, betrayal, inequity, unfairness, the ‘incompetent actions of another’ and being the ‘target’ of verbal or physical aggression also elicit anger (Eznack 2013: 557).

So, why all this anger, or, as Leonard Cohen sings, why is everybody ‘wounded’ with grief and sorrow?

In The Age of Anger: A history of the present, Pankaj Mishra (2017) sketches a post-Cold War world full of rage, which, he predicts, has not seen its high-water mark, and which will end with dire apocalyptic consequences. Mishra (2017) prefaces his focus on contemporary anger with references to historical examples and attributes contemporary anger as flowing from history and to contemporary ressentiment, a French word with no English equivalent meaning projecting resentment on to an external enemy. For Mishra (2017), contemporary anger manifests in, amongst other examples, the ‘selfie-narcissism of Islamic State’; its rape of girls and the destruction of Palmyra, a World Heritage Site; and the rise of right-wing nationalism in Europe and the United States (US). The Economist (6 August 2016) warned of the existential Angst of the Arab youth
The evidence from around the world is that lots of young men are a recipe for instability. And Arab rulers, in fearing the youth and failing to help them, are creating conditions for the next explosion.

Progress and enlightenment, Mishra (2017) tells us, have failed us despite ‘turbo-capitalism’, the global export of democracy in all its shades, hyper-globalisation, and major technological advances. Too many are still left behind in a world that increasingly alienates them, resulting in resentment and anger. Despite some of the flaws in Mishra’s thesis, he has successfully reminded us of the emotional state (i.e. anger) of contemporary international society and its members, i.e. states, their leaders and populations.

I would like to propose additional and unprecedented characteristics of our age of anger.

One, new - and old - narratives of anger. In A brief history of anger, Michael Potegal and Raymond Novaco (2010) present anger as ‘one of the oldest recorded emotions affecting societies’ internal and external relations. They present examples of the anger of the ancient pantheons of gods, and that of the Biblical God. We read of divine anger such as the wrath of the Biblical God, and the anger of Roman, Greek and other gods. In both Greek and Roman mythology, the deities for anger were feminine, respectively Furor or Ira (the etymology of the word irate) and Lyssa.

Whereas anger remained the prerogative of deities showing their strength and power, human anger has been considered a taboo, a sign of madness and weakness, and a psychological affliction. More than 2 500 years ago, Plato defined anger as a negative emotion that should be tempered with reason (Spielberger & Reheiser 2010: 403). The founder of International Law, Hugo de Groot (Grotius), in 1625, referred to anger as a ‘destructive force’ (Linklater 2014: 575), and Spinoza referred to the inability to control emotions as a form of ‘bondage’ (Heaney 2011: 260).

However, in contrast to the anger taboo, Potegal and Novaco (2010) explain the sanctioned anger of ordinary humans, i.e. “Berserkers”, Viking warriors, and men running “amok” (‘murderous frenzy and rage’) who, in their seemingly uncontrolled anger, won conflicts and wars for the Norse and the Malay (Potegal & Novaco 2010: 14).

Our modern lexicon and culture remains littered with references to emotions and specifically, ancient anger. Afrikaans, a language less than a century old, has adopted both the words “berserk” and “amok” (woede, vernietiging). References to anger are evident in Afrikaaps that
defines “kwaai” (angry), *inter alia*, as cool, great, tasty or acceptable/in order, and David Kramer, in his song *Johnny Rankwaat*, refers to Johnny’s “kwaai kitaar” (noisy, but great, music).

The All Blacks continue to perform the traditional Maori *haka* (traditionally an ancestral war dance expressing anger and strength) before rugby games; and today is Wednesday, from old English (*Wōdnesdæg*), the day of Wodin/Odin, the Norse god of war and death.

**Two, the commercialisation of anger.** Culturally and institutionalised organised anger is evident in the commercialisation of anger. In fact, *angertainment* seems to be very popular. *Angry Birds*, for example, is a popular computer game and later a series of films of Finnish origin. Eight film sequences of *Fast & Furious* have been released, and that with an accompanying colouring book for kids and adults (Wilson 2017)! Disney cartoons aimed at child audiences are full of anger and violence. And social media is ‘all the rage’.

**Three, the industrialisation of anger.** Earlier, I referred to war as organised anger. War is also industrialised anger. In 2015, sales of arms and military services by the top 100 companies in that sector amounted to US$ 370.7 billion (SIPRI 2016). Ironically, anger management is a growing global industry. In the US, for example, this industry is worth US$ 16.5 million (2016) annually.

**Four, the narcissistic display of anger.** The term ‘narcissistic rage’ refers to the link between shame and humiliation, and aggressiveness and vengeance, and involves a spectrum of degrees of rage, which eventually culminates in ‘chronic narcissistic rage’ (Harkavy 2000: 356). Public hangings, online videos and live streaming of murders and road killings have been reported. Moreover, the release of classified documents such as the Panama Papers and the release of documents via WikiLeaks are additional examples where anger has been personified as the anger and narcissism of individuals and groups, such as Julian Assange, Anonymous, and others.

**Five, and linked to the narcissistic display of anger, anonymous anger.** The prevalence of so-called anonymous Troll Armies on internet generating fake news, fake support and anger for and against states, and other political actors is indicative of the increasing anonymity of anger. Examples of this includes Israel’s ‘hasbara’ (explanation), the Ukraine’s i-army.org, the Twitter Troops of the 77th Brigade in the UK, South Korea’s KakaoTalk directed against North Korea, and Turkey’s AK Trolls (*The Guardian*, 6 November 2016).
Six, sacred anger. The events of 9/11 is widely regarded as a global turning point in respect of religion. Since September 2016, ISIS’ online magazine *Rumiyah* (Arabic for Rome) has replaced previous online publications such as *Dabiq* and *Dar al-Islam*. Published online in English, Arabic, German, Turkish, French, Indonesian and Uyghur, *Rumiyah*’s reference to Rome is from a *hadith* containing Mohammed’s prophecy that Muslims will conquer Rome. The publication promotes ISIS and is intended to inspire its followers with statements such as ‘The Kafir’s [unbelievers] blood is halal to you, so shed it’ (Ingram 2016).

Seven, and linked to sacred anger, private political self-sacrifice. Whereas the kamikaze of the Second World War or soldiers in war represent state-endorsed political self-sacrifice, contemporary suicide bombing, suicide terrorism, hunger strikes by ‘enemy combatants’, and self-immolation are illustrative of recent expressions of anger (Fierke 2013). Moreover, this self-sacrifice expresses anger and suffering (martyrdom) on behalf of others.

Eight, the public normalisation and mobilisation effect of anger. Anger also features in public relations and military campaigns. During the Second World War, the British government launched its Anger Campaign, an internal propaganda campaign including slogans, posters, cartoons, and lampooning the enemy to motivate and inspire British citizens for the war effort (*BBC* 24 October 2016). In the wake of 9/11, US President George Bush (2001) articulated and communicated his country’s emotions

> Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.

More, recently, in November 2016, a US-supported offensive involving 30 000 soldiers to remove ISIS from Raqqa in Syria was called Operation Angry Euphrates (*NBC News* 7 November 2016). States and their representatives often strip words from their emotional connotation. In fact, states have introduced terms such as ethnic cleansing rather than genocide; collateral damage rather than the killing of innocent civilians, resulting in a completely different emotional impact (Koschut 2017: 7).

Nine, unresolved accumulated inter-generational humiliation and anger (Harkavy 2000: 357). This is evident in, for example, the Middle East (Fattah & Fierke 2009: 67-93). In his poem *ID Card*, Palestinian poet, Mahmoud Darwish, reminds us of the connection between unresolved anger and unfulfilled expectations

> Beware, beware of my starving
And my rage (Haaretz, 21 July 2016).

Ten, rage-craft (the diplomacy of anger) rather than statecraft. I will return to this aspect later.

How, then, does anger inform states’ behaviour?

I would like to propose three approaches to discuss anger as informing state behaviour (cf. Sasley 2011). First, to follow conventional IR and approach the state as a single indivisible actor, a person, or as Alexander Wendt (2004) observed, ‘States are people too’. Hence, we refer to Pyongyang, Washington, Harare or China, Iran or Russia.

A second approach is to follow the behaviour and emotions of individual state leaders as representatives and decision-makers of a state. Individual state leaders’ character and emotions thus guides state behaviour. Take The Donald, or President Donald Trump of the US. With just more than 100 days in office, Trump’s personality and character has already influenced international public perceptions about the US, and resulted in an increased anti-American sentiment elsewhere in the world.

A third approach to discuss anger as informing state behaviour is to regard the state as a group and, in following Sasley (2011: 454), follow the internal process by which group members’ (state decision makers’) cognitive and emotional practices represent, comprise, and reflect that of the group (state) and so determine state behaviour.

For the remainder of my lecture, I would like to introduce the concepts angry states and rage-craft.

State met gebalde vuiste: Attributes of angry states

Wie is die state met gebalde vuiste? Who, then, are contemporary angry states? One of the characteristics of anger is that it is always relational (Fattah & Fierke 2009: 70) – even intimate. Hence, an angry state is always in an emotional relationship with the target state. A review of international relations since 11/9 and 9/11, reveal two international geographies of anger. The first geography of anger is evident in Africa and some parts of Latin America where anger is directed internally in states. I will refer to these states as Internally Angry States. The second geography of anger reveals that some states have externally directed anger, i.e. anger against another state or states. I will refer to these as Externally Angry States (hereafter angry states), the focus of my lecture. States that seem to fall within this category include, for example, India and Pakistan; the US and North Korea; Arab states of the Middle East and Israel; China and
Japan; Russia and its former Soviet Republics, Libya, and the US and Cuba. Based on the literature on these states, I propose an analytical framework to study angry states as illustrative examples of the importance of emotions for the study of IR, the conduct of international relations and the practice of diplomacy.

The defining feature of angry states are obviously their anger and variations on their anger. The presence of other emotions of these states is acknowledged but discussed here only where particularly relevant to anger. Angry states do not belong to a formal multilateral organisation, they do not engage collectively as states with a disparate identity such as, for example, Small Island Developing States (SIDS), or are not internationally recognised as such. These states do not seek recognition like contested states or are necessarily under-developed or collapsed/failed states. They are *de jure* and *de facto* states, and are internationally active to varying degrees. Finally, they constitute a distinct – and under-researched – class of states in international relations.

The behaviour of states remains a central focus area for IR scholars. ‘Good’ behaviour by ‘good’ states often accounts for a peaceful and stable international system, whereas the ‘bad’ behaviour of ‘bad’ states accounts for instability and conflict. ‘Good’ states comply with international settled norms, and ‘bad’ states do not. Yet both types of states draw scholarly attention, and accrue some material or immaterial benefits from their behaviour.

So, what are the *sui generis* attributes of angry states? I would like to propose the following set of attributes.

**One, recognising emotions**

First, the so-called Spy Plane Incident illustrates this. On 1 April 2001, a US ER-3 surveillance plane and a Chinese F-8 jet fighter collided over the South China Sea. Whereas the US plane managed to make an unauthorised emergency landing in China, the Chinese plane crashed into the sea with the pilot presumed dead. China detained the US crew for eleven days; a period of escalating anger between these states and only subsided once the US apologised for being in China’s air space and the release of the American crew (Shepperd 2013: 115-144).

Second, since the Cuban Revolution of 1959 that brought Fidel Castro to power, the US and Cuba have maintained an anger posture towards each other. Castro’s strong anti-American rhetoric, the US’ humiliation (nationalisation of US assets, the Bay of Pigs debacle, and the
Cuban Missile Crisis) has maintained decades’ mutual anger (Leogrande 2017: 104-127), which only, somewhat, softened during the final days of Barack Obama’s presidential tenure.

We live in an emotional world. In fact, international politics have been described as a ‘clash of emotions’ (Fattah & Fierke 2009: 67). In 2015, for example, Amr Mousa, the former Secretary General of the Arab League, referred to the ‘Arab world’s humiliation by three non-Arab states – Iran, Israel and Turkey’ (New York Times, 14 May 2015).

According to Gallup’s 2015 Global Emotions report, which measured feelings and emotions in 148 states, respondents from Iraq and Iran seemed the angriest in the world. Respondents from Cambodia, Liberia, South Sudan, Uganda, Cyprus, Greece, Togo, Bolivia, and the Palestinian Territories also reported high levels of anger (Gallup 2015: 7-8). In Anti-Americanisms in World Politics, Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane (2007: 9-29) linked anti-Americanism to, amongst other elements, anger towards the US’ foreign policy that manifests in anti-American rhetoric, violence and mobilised radical anti-Americanism.

Emotional displays by states are not new. Recent examples of confession and guilt (Germany for the Holocaust), remorse and apology, for example, includes Russia’s 2010 apology to Poland for the Katyn massacre (Horelt 2014). In some instances, states such as Cuba, the former Soviet Union, and Libya, have expressed their anger towards the West as a collective and not necessarily always against one particular state. Angry states understand emotions, and are skillful in constructing and displaying anger. What makes states angry? Perceived humiliation, changes in social and moral status, and prestige, unresolved historical grievances, and the hegemonic behavior of other states. Emotions such as humiliation and betrayal contribute to the production of anger, violence and war (Fattah & Fierke 2009: 87).

Two, a unique state identity and status. A state’s identities and interests rest on two pillars, namely its political purpose and its international status. Political purpose includes beliefs about the appropriate political and economic governance of the state. In other words, it includes ideas about ‘what values, principles, traits, and symbols characterise the country and what values and principles should govern relations between countries. It also involves ideas about what the country’s national mission is’ (Clunan 2009: 29-30).

International status, refers to the rank and positioning of a state in an ‘imagined international hierarchy’ of political, military, social, and economic power which involves evaluations of the material power possessed by a state itself, and all other parties (Clunan 2009: 29-30). The value
of political purpose is that it informs the state about the in-groups to which it should belong. These in-groups are defined by material attributes such as power, wealth, political and economic governance, culture and tradition. A state’s political purpose, therefore, also indicates whether it is a status-seeker or a status-maintainer (Clunan 2009: 32).

States employ four identity management strategies that the state can employ, namely mobility, competition, creativity (Clunan 2009: 34-35), and, my contribution, emotions. Mobility (leaving one group to join another group) includes assimilation. In the latter case, one group dissolves into another and takes on the identity of the second group to acquire membership of a more satisfactory group. Competition involves social action to change prevailing conditions or a situation and social competition over status and prestige. Creativity aims to redefine or change the attractiveness of existing attributes of an actor. Emotions, as an identity management strategy, and thus emotions’ political utility, are discussed below.

**Three, the (socio-political) utility of anger.** For constructivists, anger between states is socially constructed due to the contestation on the meaning or understanding, and resolution of an event. Some scholars converge on the idea that ‘emotions are social because culture influences their experience and expression’, and that who and what states are and do, depend on their emotions (Linklater 2014: 574).

For states, anger is very useful. Controlled rage is useful to the development of social relations in a society, whereas uncontrolled rage (and thus a negative connotation) damages civil relations and societal stability (Wymer & Labbie 2004). It is simultaneously the emotion’s paradox (Hall 2015: 46). Anger can threaten relations between states and regional and international stability, and protect what a state values. It, therefore, shapes states’ incentives and risks in states’ acting on anger. Moreover, anger can be a sign of state strength and underlie a state’s resolve to protect its national interests and deter another state from acting against it (Hall 2015: 47).

Besides its stabilising, protective and motivational utility, anger also have a social function, which entails seeking redress from the target state. Redress, according to Hall (2015: 48), can include retribution, compensation, an apology, or a revalidation of the norms that were perceived to have been contravened.
Anger is ‘other-directed, intentional communicative acts that organise social interactions’ (Wong 2016: 150). In these interactions, a state’s anger communicates its intentions and provide insights into its possible future behaviour. According to Wong (2016: 152)

> Emotions provide negotiators with information not only about what is and is not acceptable, but also about each other’s “type.” An angry counterpart is perceived as tougher than one who is emotionless, and is more likely to extract concessions in subsequent rounds of bargaining.

A fifth utility of anger is that a state can frame, or construct, an issue as “emotional” or “explosive” (Hall 2015: 52). The US’ rallying, or construction, of its own anger as well as its ability to rally collective displays of anger with its Coalition of the Willing in the wake of 9/11 is an example of this. The US has been very successful in constructing and reinforcing the War on Terror beyond a mere US interest to a global War on Terror.

**Four, angry states often have angry leaders, and vice versa.** Another characteristic of this age of anger is the anger of state and political leaders, rather than diplomats expressing their states’ emotions. In fact, diplomacy does not seem to be the only anger management strategy available to states. Leaders’ anger is increasingly reported and tweeted. Whereas Barack Obama was the social media presidential campaigner, Donald Trump, or Twitter Trump, took to Twitter to get to the White House. A serial tweeter, Trump has repeatedly displayed his anger against opponents, including the media, Democrats, Russians, and North Korea (The Journal 29 April 2017).

**Five, rage-craft, or the diplomacy of anger.** How do we know that a state is angry? Often, its anger is expressed in a ‘discourse of accusation and blame’ (Hall 2015: 47), as well as a discourse humiliating or shaming another state. Furthermore, anger is expressed through, amongst others, strong-worded statements, the recalling of diplomats, embargoes, sanctions, and terminating diplomatic ties.

Anger does not constitute coercion. Although anger and coercion both put demands on the target state and have the potential to escalate to the use of force, anger and coercion differ in several aspects. Anger is often expressed through a particular discourse and rhetoric (see sequence earlier or below), whereas coercion does not necessarily follow the same sequence and logic. The logic of coercion entails making a demand, waiting for a response, and with failure to
meet the demand resulting in the threatened action, a different trajectory to anger that often 
ebbs and flows with strong statements, subsides and escalates again (Hall 2015: 51-52).

A state, therefore, strategically calculates the dangers and risks associated with its anger making 
the display of this emotion a calculated rational decision. Hence, Hall (2015: 49) describes the 
diplomacy of anger as a ‘deliberative, state-level effort to actively project an emotional image’. 
Here, state-level emotions can include the emotions of individual decision-makers.

Typically, anger’s trajectory begins when a state perceives an action to be wrong (Hall 2015: 47). 
Once states have chosen to display anger on the international stage, a sequence of three 
behavioral indicators, or the practice of diplomacy of anger, follow (Hall 2015: 49). The first 
indicator is discursive. Typically, a state issue one or more strong-worded emotionally laden 
statement/s referring to their outrage. Though strong-worded, these statements are, at best 
formulated within the confines of diplomatic convention but can also be un-diplomatic, 
derogatory, and provocative. More importantly, the discourse of anger that follows frames the 
trigger as a wrongful act or event that requires material or immaterial restoration, such as an 
apology or material compensation (Hall 2015: 49).

The second indicator in this sequence is expressive. At this stage, an individual such as the 
president, an ambassador, diplomat or official enters the stage and conveys official anger to the 
target state and/or international community. For this, several techniques of so-called emotional 
labour are available and require an individual to project official anger by being angry him-or 
herself through ‘surface’ or ‘deep’ acting, or authentic anger (Hall 2015: 22, 49).

Finally, the third behavioral indicator in this sequence of the diplomacy of anger is substantive 
gestures. A state may opt to express its anger through strong-worded statements and 
condemnation. However, real anger and rage are displayed by substantive gestures ranging 
from punitive actions (sanctions, recalling diplomats, terminating diplomatic relations) to major 
shows of force (military parades and military exercises), or even conflict and war (Hall 2015: 
50).

Six, the institutionalisation of anger

Rather, emotions are often institutionalised, incorporated, and eventually, deeply embedded in 
the processes and structures of world politics. The institutionalisation of emotions is perhaps 
the key thread that ties the agential aspects of emotions to the structures and processes of world 
politics. It is perhaps easiest to see the institutionalisation of emotion when new emotions have
been dramatically evoked and policies pivot in response. Consider the effects of fear and anger after the 9/11 attacks (Crawford 2013: 121-123). The country’s fear and anger have been institutionalised in, for example, the Patriot Act, the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, and its invasions in Afghanistan in September 2001, and the invasion it led into Iraq in March 2003. In Europe, the fear of an out-of-control Germany and Soviet Union, and its successor, Russia, resulted in the eventual establishment of the European Union.

**Conclusion**

Therefore, the significance of anger for IR is that it reveals what is important to a state. Apart from this *revelatory* characteristic of anger, it also has a *communicative* characteristic by communicating what a state regards as important. It is never about anger only. Anger is always also about other emotions such as humiliation, indignation, and fear (Hassner 2016: 352). A third characteristic of anger is that it has a *moral* component. In communicating its anger to another state, a state reveals that another state is behaving in contrast to its norms and interests, but it is also indicating how the receiving state should (just, fair or correct) have behaved (Hall 2015: 47).

Views on anger range from humans’ predisposition to anger and thus make anger unavoidable and uncontrollable, to the view that anger can, and should, be controlled (Thurman 2006: 4-6). This, notwithstanding, we are not free from what Spinoza called the ‘bondage’ of anger. Anger rages in French *banlieues* (outer inner cities), *Londonistan*, among Germany’s *‘Ausländer jihadis’* (Leiken 2012), in *madrasahs*, Wall Street, the White House, Luthuli House, Pretoria, and elsewhere.

I have attempted to explore emotions, specifically anger, and its appeal to ordinary citizens, states and scholars. I have provided examples of additional manifestations of, and explanations for, the current age of anger, state’s construction of useful anger, and the behaviour of angry states. We cannot ignore these emotions. We live in this world. Therefore, I call for more conversations and research on the topic. As Andrew Linklater (2014) reminds us

> We have not seen the end of anger in politics or, indeed, of the politics of anger.

Let us find, or make, a way.

In conclusion, ‘Attention, said Simone Weil, ‘is the rarest and purest form of generosity’ (Yakob 2015: 62).
Thank you for your generosity.
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