

Land reform in Zimbabwe: A Development Perspective

BY

WILSON PAULO

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SUPERVISOR PROF H. SWANEPOEL

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Declaration.....	4
Chapter One.....	5
1 Introduction.....	5
1.1 Research Background.....	5
1.2 Research Objective.....	6
1.3 Literature Review.....	6
1.4 Importance of study.....	9
1.5 Research methodology.....	12
1.5.1 Design.....	12
1.5.2 Sampling.....	12
1.5.3 Data Collection.....	12
1.5.4 Data Analysis.....	13
1.6 Time Frame.....	14
1.7 Chapter layout.....	15
Chapter Two.....	16
Literature Review.....	16
2.1 The Historical And Evolution Of Land Reform In Zimbabwe....	16
2.2 Introduction.....	16
2.3 Pre-independence Experiences.....	18
2.3 Key Land Reform Experiences Since Independence.....	23
2.4 Lancaster House “Mistake”.....	24
2.5 Radical Policy Era.....	32
2.6 The Third Chimurenga.....	38
2.7 Conclusion.....	46
Chapter Three.....	48
Government’s Position On Land Reform.....	48
3.1 Introduction.....	48
3.2 Policy Framework.....	51
3.3 Emerging Views From The ‘fast track’ Land Reform.....	54
3.3.1 Policy On Former Farm Workers.....	58
3.3.2 Production Services Policy.....	60
3.3.3 Financial Sector Partnerships.....	63
3.3.4 Viability Considerations.....	64
3.4 Conclusion.....	66
Chapter four.....	69
Field Research.....	69
4.1 Introduction.....	69
4.2 Sampling.....	70
4.3 Data Collection.....	71
4.4 Data Analysis.....	72

4.5 Focus Group Discussion.....	74
4.6 Results.....	75
4.6.1 Household Resilience.....	75
4.6.2 Asset Creation.....	76
4.6.3 Social Linkages.....	76
4.6.4 Economic Activities.....	76
4.6.5 Health.....	77
4.6.6 Opinion.....	77
Table 1.....	78
Graph 1.....	78
Chapter Five.....	81
Discussion Of Results.....	81
5 Introduction.....	81
5.1 Household Resilience.....	82
5.2 Asset Creation.....	85
5.3 Social Linkages.....	87
5.4 Economic Activities.....	88
5.5 Health.....	89
6.6 General Opinion.....	90
6.7 Conclusion.....	92
Chapter Six.....	95
Conclusion.....	95
Bibliography.....	100
Appendix.....	106
Questionnaire.....	106
Minutes of focus group discussion.....	116
List of Households.....	123
Excel Results.....	127

DECLARATION

Wilson Paulo declare that Land Reform in Zimbabwe: A Development Perspective is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

Signed.....Date.....

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Back ground

The Zimbabwean experience in land reform is a mixed one with both successes and failures. There was an over-negative assessment of the exercise, which was politically driven (Masilela and Weiner, 1996). Little was known about the performance of the resettled farmers in Zimbabwe known as ‘new farmers’ due to the closure of the country to international and private media. The government-controlled media reported success stories of the new farmers but surprisingly the country once a breadbasket of the SADC region had a serious food deficit during the same period when other regional neighbours who were perennial food importers had surplus, (Harold-Barry, 2004). There were indications that agriculture has gone down among the ‘new farmers’ despite the statements from the Government. The Utete land audit put in place by the President’s office was viewed as a diplomatic way to accept that the land reform had gone wrong.

Did the ‘new farmers’ improve or got worse under the fast track land reform? The question needs to be answered and this study has taken a step in establishing a response to the question.

What parameters should one use to determine that the land reform was successful? Can it be the process of redistributing land to address the unequal tenure or the economic

repercussions? The land reform-Zimbabwe style needs to be analysed as a development perspective to assess its impact on livelihoods of people of Zimbabwe.

1.2 Research Objective

The research investigated the relationship between the fast track land reform (Zimbabwe style land reform) and the increased poverty faced by the 'new farmers'. Poverty was assessed through all its various attributes that include household income, asset base, household resilience, social linkages, food security and health (Chamber, 1983). The study also investigated the driving force among the 'new farmers' in taking part in an exercise which was widely condemned by many as the reason affecting the economy.

1.3 Literature Review

Zimbabwe had unequal land tenure as a result of the Land Apportionment Act of 1890 instituted at colonization. By 1983 6700 white farmers controlled 47% of all agricultural land (prime land) compared to 700 000 black farmers who held marginal lands (Moyo, 1995, 78). The willing seller willing buyer system of land acquisition was underway at a slow pace since independence in line with the Lancaster House Agreement (The agreement led to Zimbabwe gaining its independence after a protracted war). The exercise was halted when the country's constitution was changed in 1987 giving way to compulsory land acquisition (Moyo, 1995, 86). There was little done under compulsory land acquisition except isolated resettlements until year 2000 when the government lost a referendum to change the constitution to create an executive President. Ruling party

supporters, sympathizers and ex-combatants of the 1970s war of independence embarked into accelerated land seizures. The land seizures were supported by the government through coining the exercise fast track land reform and known in political circles as the Third *Chimurenga* meaning the third war of independence (Zunga, 2003). The ultimate aim was to address the unequal land tenure caused by the Land Apportionment Act of 1890.

The process of land reform brought with it mixed results including unexpected outcomes. The country successfully addressed the unequal land tenure. There were questions on the processes followed, the shifting of policies and the haphazard manner in which it was applied (Zunga 2003, 66). The country however turned into small pockets of unproductive rural areas, which led to reduced food production (Zunga 2003, 83). A view strongly resisted by the government, as there were campaigns that land is the economy and the economy is land (Zunga 2003, 83). The economy of the country nose-dived such that the country made a first in accelerated decline in a none war situation and soaring inflation in a situation where there is virtually a shortage of all basic commodities including local bank notes. The country used bearer cheques to address the shortage of bank note and to reduce the bulk involved in carrying bank notes, which are of lower denomination. Inflation pushed prices up such that more note are required to make purchases of even smaller items. According to the evolutionary theory of land rights the process of land reform should evolve not to be fast-tracked (Toulmin and Quan 2000). However Zimbabwe chose to go against the theory at its own peril. The country's situation as expected attracted a lot of interest from political, social, economic and

spiritual sectors of the international community but none of the fields came up with a conclusive theory to explain the scenario (Christodoulou, 1989, 84). The land reform affected all the sectors of life in a short period such that there was no single way of explaining the situation in the country. For example the economic situation required more than economic principles to turn it around one had to touch on the political fabric of the country to make a conclusive statement.

On a micro scale the shortages had adverse effects on economic well being of the society such that the country faced an accelerated decline of the middle class with detrimental effects to the social well being of society in the form of breakdown of extended family structure. This has had a serious impact on social linkages, which are a form of livelihood as they form a safety net in times of shortages. The scenario affected both the urban and rural areas, as the rural areas are dependant on urban income earners. The urban and rural populace was affected to varying extents according to economic activities but generally they all were reduced to food aid recipients with the urban populace having the least priority.

The farmers who benefited from the fast track land reform were moved (in some cases forced wholesale movement by the land reform) into areas that do not have basic social services like sanitation, education and health. There was a general shortage of farming inputs, displaced commercial farmers took some of their facilities and those left in most cases were not suited to serve large numbers of people introduced over a short period. Infrastructure development and economic growth did not accompany the process; as a

result the process left the farmers worse off. There is a theory that states reallocation of any resources needs to be supported by economic growth as the resource might lose value and leave the beneficiaries worse off (Dorner 1972). The case has happened in Zimbabwe where land has become valueless such that it cannot be used as collateral for loan application. There is lack of security and the uncertainty associated with land has led to the financial world deciding to take a back seat (Zunga 2003, 67). There is no bank prepared to be associated with the process. In political circles the exercise was and is still being castigated by all organizations who hold a different view to the ruling party such that the corporate and NGO world decided not to inject any support to the resettlement areas (Moyo, 1991,10). Besides initiatives by government agencies associated with input provision there were no development initiatives by any NGOs in the fast track resettlement areas.

1.4 Importance Of Study

The government of Zimbabwe embarked into the ‘fast tract’ land reform on the 15th of July in 2000 against a background of land occupation by landless people, absence of international support, rejection of 2000 Draft Constitution in a referendum and continued legal challenges by white commercial farmers. Land is the economy and the economy is land is the slogan encouraging land reform in Zimbabwe (Mugabe, 2001). The land reform in Zimbabwe was organised in line with that slogan and had the following basic elements of speed, which made it to be known as the ‘fast track’ land reform.

- Speeding up the identification for compulsory acquisition of not less than 5million hectares of land for resettlement:

- Accelerating the planning and demarcation of acquired land and settler emplacement:
- Simultaneous resettlement in all provinces to ensure the reform was comprehensive and evenly implemented:
- Provision of secondary infrastructure as soon as resources become available (Utete, 1, 2003,).

If the above are the basic norm elements of the fast track land reform any other assessment of the success of the programme will be based on those elements. The Government's hard-line stance that the land reform is a success must have been drawn from such an analysis with no regard to other factors like impact on economy and livelihoods of the common people. The media which is state controlled was awash with the purported success of the land reform. The belief that the land is the economy and the economy is land has been fulfilled with a deliberate strategy to benefit the blacks at the expense of their white counterparts. That mission was completed.

However another school of thought brings-in a new dimension to the land reform. In modern economic theory land is no longer the basis of an economy, it is no longer a factor of production it was replaced by intellectual property and good environment (health, governance and economic policies) (Zunga, 2003). That explains why countries with the least amount of land are the most developed in the world, United Kingdom and Japan being good examples.

Farming land in Zimbabwe become a worthless resource economically and was not marketable because of the insecurity brought by the invasions, which has brought uncertainty to land ownership. Land cannot be the economy and the economy cannot be land because to make a living requires many years of hard work with a stable source of income to sustain it (Zunga, 2003). Existing rural homes are a clear example of that balance with absentee household heads who work in towns to send their income to rural homes so that children can go to school get a job and be able to send part of their income to the rural homes.

Most of the people who went into the farms were aiming to expand their rural homes and were not sure whether that was a good thing and did not trust the Government. Some just did not like whites and had found an opportunity to take revenge (Zunga, 2003). The farmers had no resources to get into commercial farming; one agricultural expert described the situation in the following way, “we are destroying the country, agriculture and the economy” (Zunga, 2003).

That brings a deadlock, which makes it difficult to find a moral way of assessing the fast track land reform. The study took into account the gap between the political perspective to the land reform and the social reality, which takes into account the livelihoods of the resettled farmers. The study formed a platform for further research on land reform in Zimbabwe and identified lessons learnt.

A conclusive statement is made based on the findings and related to the problem statement and the research hypothesis on the effect of land reform on poverty and livelihoods. A conclusion on the livelihood parameters to employ in defining success of the land reform exercise is also made based on the findings from the farming communities.

The research encourages further research on the economic, political and social morality of a land reform programme.

1.5 Research Methodology

1.5.1 Design

A literature review was carried out to establish the theoretical framework to the land reform. The review was done through publications on land reform in Zimbabwe and other countries the world over. An analysis of the land reform process in Zimbabwe was made in literature starting with a historical review and then ending with the 'fast track' land reform. The literature study shows the historical review and land reform experiences in Zimbabwe since independence to the fast track land reform era. The literature review also established the Government of Zimbabwe's position on land reform.

1.5.2 Sampling

Random sampling method was employed to identify 40 households to administer the questionnaire on. The research administered a total of 40 questionnaires. Farmer register maintained by farm committees was used for sampling purposes. Number corresponding to the house on the register was used to make a random sample on the computer by use of Lotus 123 package.

1.5.3 Data Collection

Questionnaires were filled-in at household level and name of each household entered. The questionnaire was designed in English but translated to Shona the vernacular language. The questionnaire investigated changes in livelihoods between the communal area and the 'new farm'. Information on the following aspects of livelihoods was collected household resilience, asset creation, health situation and non-agricultural economic activities (Chambers, 1983). A question to determine general opinion on life at new farm was asked to determine attitude of the farmers.

At the end of administering questionnaire and data analysis focus group discussions were held to share the findings and to make some corrections or obtain additional information. Leaders of the 'new farm' and some members of farm community selected by the leaders formed the focus group. The leaders were mostly war veterans and influential members of the community (Zunga 2003).

1.5.4 Data Analysis

The data collected was analysed for the following attributes of livelihood, social linkages, asset creation, economic activities and household resilience as indicators of the dynamics of poverty (Chambers, 1983). A computer package lotus 123 data analysis tool was employed to make statistical data analysis. Data was analysed in filters to enable an independent analysis of each livelihood aspect mentioned above. The statistical information was explained to make up a profile of the community. An analysis of general opinion was made to help establish the success of the land reform from the responses of the beneficiaries.

1.6 Time Frame

Activity	Period	Time of Year
Submit final research proposal	2 months	November 2003
Literature review	3months	November 2003
Submission of theoretical chapter	-	December 2003
Draft Questionnaire submission	1month	January 2003
Pre-test questionnaire	1week	March 2004
Conduct Household surveys	1month	July 2004
Conduct focus group discussion	2weeks	August 2004
Submission of field research data	-	August 2004
Carry out Data analysis	3 weeks	September 2004
Submission of field work conclusion	-	September 2004
Consolidating research write up	4weeks	September2004

Corrections and final submission	3weeks	October 2004
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1.7 Layout of Dissertation

The final write-up comprises of the following chapters:

1. Introduction
2. Literature review
3. Government's position on land reform
4. Field research data
5. Discussion of results
6. Conclusion
7. Bibliography
8. Appendix

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE

2.1 Introduction

Zimbabwe is on record as having been involved in a controversial land reform exercise that created mixed feelings the world over. The land reform in Zimbabwe cannot be really understood unless one understands the origins of the land imbalances that sparked the reform process. It is therefore paramount for one not to overlook the events of the then Rhodesia at colonisation through to the independent Zimbabwe at the farm invasion stage.

This chapter will look at the evolution of land reform processes in Zimbabwe making reference to some legislation instituted to justify some processes by the government of the then Rhodesia and by the government of Zimbabwe. The land reform experience is looked at as the Rhodesian experience and then the Zimbabwean experience. The later

experience is classified into three eras, which are the Lancaster House “mistake”(Moyo, 1995), the radical policy era and the Third *Chimurenga* era. The Lancaster House “mistake” was an episode entered into to end the war in the then Rhodesia (Surplus People Project, 1992). The radical policy era aimed to make changes to the Lancaster House agreement in terms of legislation and practical action and marked a significant change in policy (Moyo, 1995). The Third *Chimurenga*, which is a fairly short period compared to the other two eras, was characterized by warlike farm invasions (Zunga, 2003).

Personal opinion on some processes is expressed to help clarify some issues in literature. There is a deliberate effort to highlight some political issues that might have been disguised as social or political processes in real life or literature to help understand their motives.

Reference is made to universal literature to obtain an independent view on the land reform exercise in Zimbabwe and the then Rhodesia. Government legislation is also looked at to help establish the premise for some action in the land reform process since colonisation. Emerging views from the Third *Chimurenga* (which forms the highlight of land reform in Zimbabwe) are briefly discussed with some policy issues that might have been overlooked. Viability considerations are mentioned leading to a conclusion of the chapter which is a form of advise that change can also be brought by publicly recognizing ones own culpability not remaining stiff-necked when things are visibly going wrong (Pierce, 1984).

2.2 Pre-independence experiences

There has always been a political and economic struggle for land between blacks and whites in the pre and post-independent Zimbabwe. The question of land redistribution has been central to Zimbabwe's national political discourse before and after independence (Masilela and Weiner, 1996). Colonialists moved into the then Southern Rhodesia in 1890 with the hope of prospecting for minerals but it emerged the area did not match the Second Rand (Now South Africa) so the settlers turned to agriculture (Sullins, 1991). The Rudd Concession of 1888 fraudulently obtained from Ndebele King Lobengula became the vehicle through which colonialists obtained mineral rights. The Concession provided the colonialist with the impetus to obtain a Royal charter in 1889 which among other things granted the British South Africa Company (BSAC) authority to administer and govern the region that encompasses the present day Zimbabwe (Utete, 1, 2003, 1).

In 1894 the settlers established Native Reserves to contain the Ndebele and the Shona. The reserves served basically two purposes, which were:

- 1) To suppress blacks after the Ndebele and the Shona uprisings;
- 2) To provide the white farmers with a source of labour for mining and farming (Sullins, 1991).

Historical records of the period 1896 to 1897 depict a sorry picture of a systematic violation of the rights and dignity of the indigenous people under white domination (Utete.1, 2003,1). A war was waged during the period known as *Chimurenga/Imfazwe* (war of liberation); the war was basically a struggle to recover lost land and dignity. By 1910 the whites had claimed approximately 23% of land while allocating only 26% to blacks as native reserves (Herbst 1987). The other land was left as national reserves or retained for unborn children. The situation developed with the colonial government establishing more than 104 separate native reserves ranging in size from 2 100 to 625 000 hectares (Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1988). The pre-1920 period can thus be summed as the land alienation period, which was characterised by expropriation of land and mining rights (Masilela and Weiner, 1996).

The white agriculturists pressured the Government to draw separate land purchase areas for blacks and whites to further segregate the two races and to protect their agricultural interests from black competition (Sullins, 1991). The response to the pressure was the Morris Carter Land Commission of 1925, which created Native Purchase Areas for 'Master Farmer' graduates with sufficient resources to purchase land on freehold title (Sullins, 1991). 'Master Farmer' is a training programme for rural communities conducted by the department of agriculture research and extension of the Ministry of Agriculture and results in certificates issued to those who complete the course by passing written examinations. The Morris Carter land Commission successfully enforced European agronomy practises with [population densification and farm extension (Masilela and Weiner, 1996).

In 1930 the Land Apportionment Act was instituted to wade off pressure from some blacks that had resources. The Act restricted blacks in Purchase Areas (PAs) and prohibited purchases outside the areas. The Act in a way legalised the separation of the two races (Moyana, 1984). By the time the Act came into way the white settlers had appropriated about 50% of the land and the black farmers allocated 30%. (Herbst, 1987) The Act divided land as follows: 8.8 million hectares held in Native Reserves; 3 million hectares held in Native Purchase Areas; 19.9 million hectares reserved for white farming and urban areas and 7.2 million hectares of unallocated land (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia {PCA}, 1980)

Faced with a restrictive agricultural system in terms of land the black farmers left farming to work for wages in mines and commercial farms. Overcrowding and overstocking meant the farmers could not meet their expenses from grain and cattle in the native reserves (Moyana, 1984). Production was also made to be unsustainable with the institution of restrictive Acts like the Maize Control Act and the Cattle Levy Act (PCA, 1980). The Maize Control Act made sure that the blacks had limited marketing outlets and the Cattle Levy Act was basically to reduce numbers of cattle owned by an individual, as they would attract a higher tax amount (Masilela and Weiner, 1996). Communal farmers had to keep few cattle to avoid paying higher taxes, so tax was used to restrict communal area agriculture production.

The overcrowding led to severe land degradation of the native areas resulting in the institution of The African Land Husbandry Act of 1951 (Sullins1991). The act was an attempt to arrest land degradation based on the misguided understanding that indigenous practices were the cause and not overcrowding. The Act aimed at changing the traditional tenure system into a private landholding system so as to provide control on the land and application of conservation works. The attempt failed because landholding was too small to promote the desired practices and the government provided insufficient staff and services to the process (Moyana, 1984). Land degradation continued at the same pace as the pressure on the land itself, more children were being born and some maturing requiring their own land. The colonial government responded by enacting the Tribal Trust Land Act, which ran for the whole decade from 1969 to 1970. The Act achieved nothing but to rename native reserves to tribal trust lands (TTLs) where traditional authority regained power to allocate land (Masilela and Weiner, 1996). The segregation led to increased racial and political tension leading to early nationalistic activities (Utete.1, 2003, 3).

The Tribal Trust Land Act was instituted in 1969 to enact stricter prohibitions of land claims in white settler areas by blacks. The Act legally defined races as European and Africans and divided the whole country into two halves for the two races (Sullins, 1991). The Act however was short sighted in that the two races did not constitute equal proportions of the population. The whites were 5% whilst the blacks were 95% of the total population (PCA, 1980). The racialisation of land by the Act was softened by The

Land Tenure Amendment Act of 1977 that later became The Land Tenure Repeal Act of 1978, which led to the rural resettlement policy at Independence in 1980 (PCA, 1980).

By 1983 6700 white farmers controlled 47% of all agricultural land (prime land) compared to 700 000 black farmers who held marginal lands, (Moyo, 1995). Other authorities claim that when Zimbabwe won its independence 1% of farmers who were white held nearly half of the available agricultural land and the bulk of fertile land (Toulmin & Quan, 2000). This has been a strategy of the colonial government to facilitate indirect control of the new Zimbabwe by taking control of a large share of the factor of production, which is land (Moyo, 1991).

Land reform originated from the process that created unequal land tenure and social classes, which is colonisation. Control over land was a key to the exercise of colonial domination (Christodoulou, 1990) Authority of colonial masters over title of land was a powerful tool used to punish those who were hostile to the colonial regime or to reward those who cooperated with the regime (Christodoulou, 1990,). There is no prize for guessing who constituted the hostile group and who was rewarded. This brings a new perspective to the land issue at that time which is the racialisation of the process of control. Land as a weapon of control ensured those who owned it social and political power. Land ownership enabled influence into financial, agricultural and even cultural interests of the society (Christodoulou, 1990,) In Ecuador for example a landowner carried out functions which were a preserve of the state like inflicting fines, adjudicating over family or neighbours differences or enforcing religious practices (Christoudoulou, 1990). In countries like the Philippines legislative leaders were landlords. The former

President Marcos and his cronies had considerable wealth in the form of land; he was later deposed by Aquino who also came from the same background of wealth in land (Christodoulou, 1990). In Zimbabwe the colonial master who was the landowner had the same influence.

Issues related to land led to countries like Algeria, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe fighting prolonged wars of liberation against the European governments or settler communities. Portugal's 1974 revolution was a direct result of the struggle of colonial people who could not be subdued (Christodoulou, 1990). That explains the protracted war of independence fought within Zimbabwe leading to attainment of independence in 1980. The war was based on reclaiming land lost by colonisation. The war is affectionately known as the second *Chimurenga* named after the first uprisings of the 1890s identified earlier on in this chapter.

2.3 Key land reform experiences since independence

The land reform experience in post-independent Zimbabwe is far more interesting than the pre-independence era. The period is only 24 years long but so much has happened to arouse interest from various disciplines in life. The land reform programme in Zimbabwe can be summarised as a question of transferring land from a minority white large scale commercial farming group to blacks based on their presumed historical and social entitlement to land access (Moyo, 1995). It has to be noted that there are three eras in the

post independence history of Zimbabwe, which had different experiences, and these are the 1980 to 1989 era, the 1990-2000 era and the post 2000 era. These eras I would like to call them the Lancaster House “mistake”, the Radical Land Policy era and the Third Chimurenga era.

2.3.1 The Lancaster House “Mistake”

Zimbabwe’s independence was negotiated at Lancaster House in Britain by the Rhodesian (former name of Zimbabwe) government, United African National Congress (UANC), Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and Zimbabwe African Peoples Union Patriotic Front (ZAPU PF) (Moyo, 1995, 86). The talks majored on ending the war in the country and coming up with a negotiated settlement and drawing up a constitution (Surplus People Project, 1992). A constitution was drawn which was praised by most people as a sign of mature leadership whilst a few felt it was not radical enough (Moyo, 1995) The Lancaster House agreement was a compromise in that the liberation movement had to soften its stance for the country to gain independence.

The talks were a serious mistake in the sense that they included groups who were not well informed about the situation in the country. The liberation movements and the British government were all not clear about issues affecting sectors of the country they were not in direct contact with. The Rhodesian government and the United African National

Congress went to the conference in bad faith (Surplus People Project, 1992). They had a hidden agenda to consolidate a relationship, which had the aim to dignify the formation of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, which was born at unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). The constitution drawn at the talks was to handicap the land reform programme. Chapter 3 Section 16 of the Lancaster House drawn constitution had the following clause:

No property of any description or interest or right therein shall be compulsorily acquired except under the authority that:

- Requires the acquiring authority to give reasonable notice of the intention to acquire the property, interest or right to any person owning the property or having any interest or right therein that would be affected by such acquisition;

- Requires that the acquisition is reasonably necessary in the interest of public safety, order, morality, health, town and country planning, the utilization of that or any other property for a purpose beneficial to the public generally or to any section thereof, in the case of land that is under-utilised, the settlement of land for agricultural purposes;

- Requires the acquiring authority to pay promptly adequate compensation for acquisition;

- Requires the acquiring authority, if the acquisition is contested, to apply to the General division or some other court before or not later than thirty days after the acquisition for an order confirming the acquisition; and

- Enables any claimant for compensation to apply to the General Division or some other court for the prompt return of the property if the court does not confirm the acquisition and for the determination of any questions relating to compensation and to appeal to the Appellate Division.

The agreement meant that the government could not expropriate land. The first clause meant it could only buy it from those who were willing to sell (Surplus People Project, 1992). That was one restriction of the Lancaster House agreement, which led to the whole era being a mistake. The second mistake was the Government had to pay the full market price for the land, making it expensive for a new government taking over from a war economy which was under sanctions to get the good land owned by the whites (Surplus People Project 1992). The payment was to be made promptly as required by the constitution. The logic behind the clause was to protect the white farmers because the land was not bought in the first instance but it has a price tag on returning it to the original owners. That school of thought however can be challenged based on the notion that no one owns Zimbabwe except the original inhabitants of Africa who have been archeologically proven to be the Pygmies (Zunga, 2003). The constitution also allowed white farm owners to object to any acquisition as there was need to provide adequate

notice (which was 30 days by the government) and there was room to object in writing to the acquisition (Moyo, 1991).

There was however a positive element within the constitution to allow blacks to obtain land within white farming areas (Moyo, 1995). This was a relaxation of the Land Tenure Act of 1969 and it turned a league of aspirant blacks into an elite middle class (Moyo, 1995, 89). Many rural people who supported the liberation struggle on the understanding that they will get back the land lost to colonialists did not take this lightly. The then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe even promised to “re-establish justice and equality in the ownership of land” (Surplus People Project, 1992). The situation was corrected by the introduction of land control through elected District Councils in 1982 (Moyo, 1995). This was just a treatment of the symptoms as it meant stripping traditional leaders of their powers, which were enforced by the Tribal Trust Land Act (Sullins, 1991).

The land laws were modified in 1986 to allow the government to take the first option to buy land on offer and to acquire land deemed to be under-utilised (Moyo, 1995). That was just a rhetoric. There was no clearly defined criterion of measurement of under-utilisation.

The Lancaster House agreement was just put in place to protect the interest of the white farmer within the country and to put off-track the nationalist movement. This was arrived at after considering lessons from the Mozambican “catastrophe”(Moyo, 1995). All whites left Mozambique in haste soon after independence but first they destroyed buildings and

other infrastructure. The negotiations were not 'practical' negotiations in the sense that there were negotiation tactics employed to influence a decision reached hence the era is called the Lancaster House "mistake". Some of the tactics employed were:

- Speedy attempts to bulldoze certain issues with insufficient data on the part of the liberation movement;
- The threat to remove sanctions as to accept Muzorewa's UANC constituency;
- Promises of financial and technical support to the resettlement;
- An appeal to the liberation movement not to rush for land redistribution (Moyo, 1991)

The British government made some of the pledges to support the resettlement process, which were not honoured. The American 'Kissinger Million' was stillborn and never to be mentioned soon after the Lancaster House agreement (Moyo, 1991). It is also on record that the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government prior to the actual negotiations was implementing radical agrarian reforms. A co-option process where land in white areas and finances to purchase were made open to interested blacks in 1978 and 1979 and staple food for the blacks was subsidized by the government (Moyo, 1995). There was massive resettlement effort in the UDI period with some settlers' farms taken as well as previously uninhabited land opened up for peasant settlers, notable examples are Gokwe

in the midlands province and Kariba in Mashonaland West province which were not habitable because of tsetse infestation (Masilela and Weiner, 1996). So the modification of the land laws in 1986 indicated above was in a way redressing a process started prior to the talks. The talks were a rubber-stamping process.

The objectives of the Lancaster House “mistake” era were to:

- Alleviate population pressure in communal areas;
- Extend and improve the base for productive agriculture in the rural farming sector through both individuals and cooperatives;
- Improve the standard of living of the largest and poorest sector of the population;
- Ameliorate the plight of people who were adversely affected by the war;
- Provide at the lower end of the scale, opportunities for the landless, unemployed and destitute;
- Bring abandoned or under-utilised land into full production;

- Expand or improve the infrastructure and services needed to promote the well-being and economic productivity of rural inhabitants; and
- Achieve national stability and progress in a country that has only recently emerged from the turmoil of war (Zimbabwe National Farmer's Union, 1987:1)

The objectives were well spelt out, but because of the hidden agenda of the Lancaster House agreement there was little success realised in the period save for a few growth points, which were established in selected rural areas.

The government had set a target to settle 162 000 families on 9 million hectares of land by 1985 but by 1990 only 51 000 had been resettled on 3 million hectares of land (Surplus people Project, 1992) In the early years it needs to be noted that the targets set by the government were based on perceptions of amount of land available for purchase. Actual demand for land was not formally computed; registers at rural district councils who were required to compute the demands questionable due to incompetence and political patronage (Moyo, 1995). So the actual figures are not known.

The government of Zimbabwe needs to be applauded for instituting a populist programme of agricultural resettlement amid the challenges. The programme was designed to appeal to the needs of the least resourced segments of the society-the

landless. The programme conceptualised the framework of rural worker-peasants as an undesirable legacy of colonialism and aimed at setting up a stable peasant class. The settlement programme operationalised four settlement models which are A, B, C and D (Masilela and Weiner, 1996). Model A was for family resettlement, model B for producer cooperatives, model C was for family settlements on core state-owned land and model D was for cattle based schemes.

The Lancaster House ‘mistake’ made sure the good process will be slow and will be overtaken by population growth until its benefits are meaningless. Inherited over-bureaucratized state machinery was also instrumental in causing the delays even in already acquired farm (Masilela and Weiner, 1996). Even the government admitted that the resettlement programme was a dismal failure (Surplus People Project, 1992). The programme was meant to fail from the onset because the Lancaster House constitution was so drafted to disallow land redistribution (Chiviya, 1982). It succeeded in choking and stalling the land redistribution exercise for the whole decade (Utete.1, 2003).

The era is in keeping with the Nelson approach in dealing with agrarian conflict. The Nelson theory postulates that governments rarely see ‘problems’ unless they can be labelled acts of God or the result of outside interference. They normally view difficult problems with the telescope to the blind eye. The problem is rarely known in its entirety or true nature. Everyone seeks a comfortable conclusion that provides for no action. Ignored, obscured by sophisticated analysis or postponed by unending investigations, the

problem rarely goes away but festers to persist as an endemic pathological condition (Christodoulou, 1990).

The failures together with the expiry of Lancaster House agreement ushered a new era, which is the Radical Policy era.

2.3.2 The Radical Policy Era

The Radical Policy era runs from 1990 to 2000, which is incidentally a whole decade, like the previous era. The difference between the two is that the Radical Policy era was characterised by major changes in the land policy that were driving towards taking more practical action. Like any other country the land question in Zimbabwe went through ideological, political and economic processes. Ideologically the trend was to change previous understandings of the land question and policies to resolve the then current problems of emerging market economy (Moyo, 2000). The government had to renege from the wartime promises of land to all and face the realities of the process as the previous decade had failed. At the same time the economy had to be revamped with the introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) spearheaded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

So the country had to resolve the land question in a way that did not destabilise existing national employment, production and investor confidence (Moyo, 2000). The economy of the country was and is largely agro-based. Land reform and associated institutions have an immediate and direct bearing on the requirements of development and reform. The requirements are economical: increased productivity, better incomes, employment creation and agricultural surpluses, politically the establishment of full economic and political citizenship for the excluded masses (Dorner, 1972).

The Radical Policy era had its first announcement with the new land policy in 1990 followed by the Land Acquisition Act of 1992. The policy and the Act were reactions to the Lancaster House ‘mistake’. These had well laid out principles and procedures to be followed in land acquisition. The Land Acquisition Act of 1985 was repealed and gave the government powers to repossess land owned by the whites (Moyo, 1995). This Act meant that the government could repossess land, pay in local currency for the developments on the land and it could repossess both under-utilized and utilized land. The government had the ‘right of first refusal’ on all land sales and through the Derelict Lands Board could acquire derelict land with no compensation (Moyo, 1995). These indicate enhanced state powers over land reform in the country.

The land policy introduced in 1990 focused on 5 primary issues, which were:

- To resettle 110 000 households in newly acquired 5 million hectares;

- To review land tenure situation in communal, resettlement and small scale commercial farming areas;

- To review selection of settlers and land use models with emphasis on economic rather than social or subsistence criteria;

- To promote blacks in capitalist farming through training and agricultural support services;

- To introduce land tax.

(Moyo, 1995).

The policy shift had its own justifications which include employment creation for black Zimbabweans, resolution of land imbalances, increased access to prime land, improved efficiency of prime land utilisation and restricted speculative valuation by land owners (Moyo, 1993). This is an indication of how serious the government was on resolving the land issue. Three years after announcing the new land policy the government had designated 90 and acquired 13 farms (Moyo, 1995). Worth noting is Churu farms in the outskirts of Harare that was acquired over its conversion from farming purposes to use as residential land. The acquisition led to heated political debate as the farm belonged to an

opposition party leader the late Ndabaningi Sithole (Zunga, 2003). (Paradoxically the farm was eventually used for residential purposes in the next phase as explained later on).

The Radical Policy era also incorporated some form of consultation in the process of land reform. This was a reaction to failure to realise tangible results from the process over a period of five years. The government had realised the benefits of having landowners take part as actors and not as beneficiaries or casualties (Toulmin & Quan, 2000). Of significance was the 1994 Commission of Inquiry into Appropriate Agricultural Land Tenure in Zimbabwe, which was led by Professor Mandivamba Rukuni from the faculty of agriculture at the University of Zimbabwe. The recommendations of the commission were shared in a commission report to the President of Zimbabwe but no follow up action was done. Instead politicians reacted to the inquiry by seeking political gain at the expense of social rationality resulting in a diversion towards processes that supported their political survival (Toulmin & Quan, 2000). The leader of the commission who indicated that Zimbabwean bureaucracy was generally sceptical about the commission's report mainly because it required more work to be done and that some central ministerial departments did not want to give up powers over budgets echoed the view (Toulmin & Quan, 2000).

There was very little achievement within the era besides Government rhetoric, which fuelled frustration among the landless, and the white landowners. Rhetorical reports by the Parliamentary Land Commission of 1992 and Land Tenure Commission of 1994 are examples (Zunga, 2003). These made some pronouncements some of which were

adopted but not implemented and some were kept in abeyance (Moyo, 2000). The Land donor conference of September 1998 in Harare had its recommendations, which went no further than the conference itself (Zunga, 2003). The conference agreed to set-up a task force of major donors to work out modalities for a 2-year inception phase, the precursor of phase II of a donor supported land reform during which several alternatives of land redistribution would be tested and tried in 118 farms on offer. Britain refused to join the task force and insisted that a consulting firm undertakes an initial economic returns analysis of the programme. These dilatory tactics effectively killed the inception phase before it took off (Utete, 2003).

The elite black class was content over the issue of land but not over exclusion from high value agriculture production mainly export production. The main reasons for the discontent were the delays in the process and lack of transparency in land designation. Leading the bandwagon of discontent was the Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union (ICFU), which complained over the process as it was seen to be undermining existing productive capacity in large-scale commercial farms (Moyo, 1995). Designated land was concentrated in the southern part of the country from which a low proportion of the country's output is derived. More productive land in the prime land of the watershed was avoided for instance only 6% of the 886 051 uncropped hectares in Mashonaland was designated and this was peripheral (Moyo, 1995).

There were some interesting results that were obtained from examination of socio-political aspects surrounding the relationship between land ownership and land

designation. Among 100 farms designated 6 individuals owned about 30% of total land designated. That indicates how unfair land was distributed. The designation process did not do anything better because it created its own version of unfairness which was centred along political affiliation.

Of the 17 black farms designated opposition party members owned 12%. On the other hand black ZANU PF stalwarts owned 2% of the designated farms. The statistics sustain the argument that the government was using land to settle political scores (Moyo, 1995). Some derelict and under-utilised land owned by some cabinet ministers escaped designation, a situation viewed to be the result of political influence. (Moyo, 1995) This aspect however needs further study as some architects of the UDI; Ian Smith in particular remained farming in the country.

The government went under pressure over its slow pace of implementing land reform. There were a number of tactical and political differences within the government itself based on whether or not to meet demands for speedy land distribution (Moyo, 1995). Worth noting was the changing positive aggregate response to export performance of large scale commercial farms in response to Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) whilst their black counter parts viewed the ESAP as a demon (Moyo, 2000). Hence ESAP was viewed as a failure and done away with leading to the view of many within the country that foreign donors (mainly IMF and the World Bank) have an aim to block radical land reform rather than encourage it. The actual issue is ESAP concentrated benefits to one sector of agricultural production thereby increasing racial and class

conflicts within agriculture (Moyo, 1993). That made questionable the legitimacy of the state as an arbiter and protector of the land rights of the poor. That is the last situation the government wanted because the war of liberation was based on the land so failing to address the issue of land meant the state had failed on its mandate.

The concrete result of the 1990s radical policy era was about 50 000 hectares of land acquired and 2 000 families settled each year. This made the British ODA proposal to acquire 250 000 hectares on a free market basis to settle 3 500 families per year appear more progressive. The government remained stiff-necked and decided to go it alone without donor funding, donor dictating and paying for land expropriated by colonialists as a politically moral stance (Moyo, 2000). That continued up to 1999 when the government took over the process of drawing up a new constitution from the constitutional commission with a spin-doctored constitution, which was rejected by people in the referendum of 1999. The Nelson theory again was proved correct. That ushered in a new phase the third *Chimurenga* or ‘fast track’ land reform.

2.3.3 The Third *Chimurenga*

‘The third *Chimurenga*’ so named after the first and second wars of independence, which are affectionately known, as *Chimurenga* a name derived from *Murenga Sororenzou* a leader of the 1890s uprising against occupation of the country by the Pioneer column. Whether the whole country regards the phase as a *Chimurenga* still needs to be investigated but the government and ZANU PF have so named the phase.

Sometime around 1998 the civic society-churches association of academics, students, labour and many others formed a grouping known as the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) to push for constitutional reforms (Zunga, 2003). The process was to consult widely, collate data and draw up a new constitution that would control the next President. The government responded by forming a heavy-handed team The Constitutional Commission that comprised of patronizing professionals and members of parliament. The commission started its own processes with massive campaigns to rubber stamp its constitution at the same time damning the NCA process.

Views from most people did not find their way into the constitution instead the same 'politically moral' stance to taking more farms with no compensation and retention of excessive powers by the President were issues to be voted for by the people in the referendum of February 2000 (Zunga 2003). The draft constitution was rejected and the President suspiciously accepted the result only to fire the Minister of Information over negative statements relating to the process and replacing him with one of the commissioners who became a propaganda minister (Megabuck, 2000). The government of Zimbabwe believes the rejection of the draft constitution was partly a result of British influenced political opposition.

Land occupation by an impatient small group of a rural community of *Svosve* in *Wedza* communal lands, absence of international support and continued legal challenges by white commercial farmers led to a new way of land reform which is unique to Zimbabwe

(Megabuck, 2000) The programme known as the ‘Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme’ was launched on 15 July 2000 and designed to be undertaken in an accelerated manner with reliance on domestic resources (Utete.1, 2003). The programme was a fundamental departure from previous philosophy, practices and procedures of acquiring land and resettling people (Utete.2, 2003). Some lessons drawn from experiences elsewhere in the world appear to have been put into the programme, there are similarities to the 1976 Nicaraguan land grabbing by frustrated peasant (Surplus People Project, 1992). For fear of the electorate from commercial farms after failing on the referendum because of that constituency ZANU PF decided to weaken that sector of the electorate through dispersing the farm workers and introducing ruling party sympathisers (Megabuck, 2000). Weakening that sector of the electorate would also fulfil the government’s fantasy of the 1980s, which was to establish a one-party state.

The government came with a six-point plan to ensure that ZANU PF wins the parliamentary elections in 2000 and Presidential elections in 2001 which was to:

- Destroy the farm workers constituency and replace it with ZANU PF’s own people.
- Re-group a few war veterans to invade the farms, provide money for recruiting youths to swell the numbers of the so-called war veterans.
- Drive the farm workers community off the farms and stop all work, command them to political meetings to educate them.
- Keep the war veterans on the farms to stop the farm workers from regrouping or reorganizing politically.

- Harass and chase the farmer away as well.
- Find a reason for invading the farms.

(Zunga, 2003)

Another way in which rural people get land during land reform programmes is by land grabs. These are not seen as expropriation and are usually outside the law (Surplus People Project 1992). In 1976 workers in Nicaragua carried out land seizures to express demand for land but were chased away by the military called-in by landowners. Two years later they invaded the land again this time with arms from Sandinistas to defend themselves and they successfully took the land (Surplus People Project, 1992). In some instances the government would be in a weak position and would not want to anger its opponents by supporting land invasions, which are outside the law, so they had to be quashed to avoid serious political tension as what happened in Chile (Surplus People Project, 1992).

What makes the Zimbabwe situations unique is that a plan was carefully knitted on what to call the seemingly spontaneous and indiscriminate farm seizures and who to blame for the actions and what to tell the people (Zunga, 2003). So the process is in a way outside the Surplus People Project theoretical framework as witnessed in Nicaragua and Chile. The case in Zimbabwe is that the chaos was state controlled for political benefits. The farm invasions were a demonstration by war veterans who are said to have felt let down by the failed constitutional change. For almost a year there was no comment from the government or responses from the President. Comments made by Government ministers

lacked any substance and the farm invaders were above the law, even the police could not act (Megabuck. 2000). The soft line taken by the government and its overt support of the invasion cost the country a lot of good will. The government disregarding that the world is now a global village went ahead and that affected even regional neighbours.

The farm invasions were carried out with vicious authority with the war veterans leading the occupation of white owned farms. That gave an indication of the political drive to the process as the war veterans were sympathisers of the ruling party (Zunga, 2003). This happened without any supporting legislation yet no police action to protect property on the farms was taken. Any resistance by the farmers or their workers would attract police interference with arrests of the farmers and their workers (Zunga, 2003). It is not clear whether the authorities in Zimbabwe were aware that by confronting the systems and structures of their own country there was no guarantee that violence will not occur and by stooping to violence then they would have lost more than the war on land but their integrity as well (Alinsky, 1969). The whole world condemned the action including the British thereby completing the blame equation. The country's rulers perceived their hold on power slipping and they judged that foreigners were largely responsible and that perception became open hostility to the outside world or at least the world outside Africa (Harold-Barry, 2004). The government of Zimbabwe had now a premise to blame the western governments on supposed sinister plans to oppose land distribution, to demonise Zimbabwe and a conspiracy to topple its government (Zunga, 2003). Taking that position the Zimbabwe government justified its action with a political dimension of protecting its

sovereignty. That led to the following norm elements of the “fast track land reform” exercise, which are:

- Speeding up the identification for compulsory acquisition of not less than 5 million hectares of land for resettlement;
- Accelerating the planning and demarcation of acquired land and settler emplacement on this land;
- The provision of limited basic infrastructure and farmer support services;
- Simultaneous resettlement in all provinces to ensure that the reform programme was comprehensive and evenly implemented;
- The provision of secondary infrastructure such as schools clinics and rural service centres as soon as resources became available

(Utete.1, 2003).

It defies common sense to suggest speeding up a number of initiatives at the same time when the economy is on a downward trend. In this case service provision even when all resources are available cannot match land distribution when speeded up. The idea to evenly spread land allocation was a politically motivated suggestion far divorced from economic and agricultural production interests because needs and availability of land are not uniform through out the country.

There are 9 areas of oversight in the fast track reform, which are:

1. No Legislation- there was no suitable legislation to handle the land distribution
2. No identification of beneficiaries- there was no preparation or prior identification of the people to be settled.

3. No mandate was called for-the government did not obtain authority to carry out such an exercise from the people it represents.
4. No parliamentary approval was sought-the issue was not debated in parliament and was thus viewed as whip from an angry president
5. No regional integration made, the issue was not consulted with other regional leaders to assess impact on the region.
6. Wrong assumption made- a wrong assumption was made that the soil in Zimbabwe belongs to blacks and they own every corner of the country.
7. No financial resource provided, the exercise was not adequately funded and the government was bankrupt after awarding war veterans hefty compensations. Redistribution of any resource unaccompanied by economic growth will leave the beneficiaries worse off than before the redistribution.
8. Title deeds- most farms were mortgaged, banks were sitting with huge bad debts a situation that would threaten the banking sector.
9. Survey of the Land- the country had a huge shortage of surveyors resulting in crippling an extension function of the ministry of agriculture to survey land (Zunga, 2003).

Some beneficiaries to the exercise had no intention to farm but were looking for residential land and that was a factor that contributed to the demise of Zimbabwean agriculture (Zunga, 2003). These people had no interest in agriculture to warranty giving up productive land to. In addition most beneficiaries were not trained farmers and some did not stay on the plots and employed people to look after the land. The distribution

ignored trained or experienced farmers some of whom worked for the white farmers (Zunga, 2003). Studies in Zambia have shown that agriculture is complex such that any change in its development does not produce positive returns immediately (Fenichel and Smith, 1992). Research has shown that a majority of new land settlement cases across the world have had mixed fortunes and the time taken to show positive results is usually longer (de Wet, 1997).

Political allocations bordered on fraud of the highest order, which could not be condoned in any democracy (Zunga, 2003). The ZANU PF echelons of power were taking over farms with high value crops growing simply to come and harvest and some took more than one farm as witnessed by the land audit of 2003 (Bhuka, 2003). The President even issued an ultimatum to top ZANU PF officials to relinquish fraudulently obtained and multiple farms within two weeks (The Herald, 31 July 2003). This ultimatum was issued in line with the One-Person-One-Farm policy of the land reform programme. This is no surprise because it is known that settlement aspects of land reform raise a number of potential areas of conflict (de Wet, 1997)

The new farmers had no inputs and production went down, the farmers were waiting to borrow from a government that is technically bankrupt because there was very little agricultural input into industry, a situation that dried-up foreign currency (Zunga, 2003). The ultimate result was a seriously challenged food security with hunger overwhelming the country. Over half of the population including the urban populace depended on food aid by international organisations because the government could not afford to provide for

its people (Zunga, 2003). The government declared the food situation a national disaster in May 2003 (The Daily News, 15 May 2003).

2.4 Conclusion

Land reform in Zimbabwe is a long standing process dating to the 1890s when the country was colonised forming Rhodesia, which later changed its name to Zimbabwe at independence. There was unfair racial allocation of land in the then Rhodesia that form a justification for land reform in the independent Zimbabwe. The unfair land allocation led to uprisings from the natives, which also date way back to the 1890s and are known as *Chimurenga* (Moyo, 1995). The colonial government consolidated its hold on land with laws such as the Land Apportionment Act and the Cattle Levy Act, which were meant to disenfranchise the black majority (Sullins, 1991).

At independence in 1980 the Lancaster House agreement did no support any change to the unequal land distribution. It kept the hands of the new government of Zimbabwe tied for a decade (Moyo, 1991). The government of Zimbabwe was faced with a dilemma of reconciling Marxist ideological preferences for a drastic transformation with respect to land ownership and existing reality of a capitalistic system put in place by the Rhodesian government, which was supported by the constitution (Chiviya, 1982). The willing seller-willing buyer agreement allowed by the Lancaster House drawn constitution made the process slow and strained the patience of the government.

When the Lancaster House agreement expired in 1990 the Government announced radical policy changes in terms of land reform marking the beginning of the Radical Policy era. The era was a 10-year period of rhetoric with no significant change in land reform (Toulmin & Quan, 2000). The only notable change was the change in policy to a more aggressive position, which was marked by the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 (Moyo 2000). There were some changes in land distribution as witnessed by Agricultural Rural Development Authority's model A, B, C and D resettlement schemes which resettled people during the period (Bratton, 1991).

Two decades of no tangible benefits to the people who waged a 17-year long war of independence led to frustration among the people (Zunga 2003). Land was used as a way of gaining political popularity by a government, which was faced by challenging parliamentary elections (Bratton, 1991). The 'fast track' land reform or Third *Chimurenga* was launched and Championed by former freedom fighters that were aligned to the ruling party (Zunga, 2003). At this stage the position of ZANU PF the ruling party was to ensure political survival by use of land reform processes but the Government's position was initially not clear (Chiviya, 1982). It was assumed the position of the government was the same as that of ZANU PF as there is no clear distinction between the two.

The next chapter explores the position of the government on land reform by way of looking at policies put in place as well as looking into emerging issues of the fast track land reform.

CHAPTER THREE

GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON LAND REFORM

3.1 Introduction

Zimbabwe has been under the rule of one President and party since independence and has at one time in the 1990s flirted with the idea of creating a one party state out of Zimbabwe, which was won through multi-party elections. The long serving President and ruling party as well as the idea of a one party state has made it difficult to differentiate the Government from the ruling party which is ZANU PF. There is a very thin line between which has been concealed for years such that sometimes one can refer to the ruling party as the Government.

The government of Zimbabwe initially did not make any statements that identified its position on land during the land invasion by war veterans. The non-response of security systems to protect private property suggested the government was in support of the land grab. Statements from the President and other Government ministers who were ZANU PF members were inferred to represent the Government's position. Eventually the

Government came out clear by coining the land invasion the 'fast track' land reform (Zunga, 2003).

This section explores the government's position by use of looking at policies taken and some emerging issues, which were indicative of support to the land invasion.

The government did not want to accept that the land reform programme, which went wrong, was the cause of the demise of a once vibrant agricultural economy. This view is supported by views from the land audit given later in this chapter. This is evident in the propaganda sent through state controlled media that 'land is the economy and the economy is land.' Songs after songs were made to make people celebrate the distribution of land and encourage them to bear the hardships. The government had forgotten the principle that land can only be the economy when its value has not been eroded, in this case the value of the land was eroded by distributing against a receding economy which led to it losing value and leaving recipients worse off (Dorner, 1972). The argument supported by Adelman 1975 in stating that growth and equitable distribution policies cannot be separated. In countries where sluggish growth followed asset redistribution, the value of redistributed assets declined leaving the poor no better off (Rondinelli, 1993, 83). No investor could put money to Zimbabwean land with the insecurity it was associated with after the farm invasions. A new development paradigm postulates that poverty can be confronted if access of people to land is done at the same time as water other natural resources as well as equitable credit, market and appropriate technology (Mazur and Titilola, 1992). That just explains how flouted the Zimbabwe process was, it ignored universally acceptable economic and development principles.

The “fast track” land reform was based on a policy framework of poverty eradication and faster economic development with agriculture as the cornerstone of the country’s economy. Land was therefore viewed as the engine for economic growth as per the popular slogan “land is the economy and the economy is land.” (Zunga, 2003) In modern economic theory land is no longer the basis of an economy contrary to Zimbabwean thinking. Land is no longer a factor of production but intellectual property and good environment (Zunga, 2003). That explains why smaller countries like Japan and the United Kingdom are rich yet they have small lands. Africa has a lot of land but no development because of the wrong focus. Modern economy is about a product and what a country has competitive advantage on (Zunga, 2003).

The ‘fast track’ land reform exercise received policy direction from the Cabinet Committee On Resettlement and Rural Development (CRRD). The committee was chaired by the Vice President and comprised of relevant Cabinet Ministers. The Land Identification Committee (LIC) also chaired by the Vice President co-coordinated land identification (Utete.1, 2003).

The government in the ‘fast track’ land resettlement adopted two resettlement models. These were model A1 and model A2. The former was intended to decongest communal lands with land identified by provincial and district land identification committees (Utete.1, 2003). The later model was aimed at creating a cadre of black commercial farmers and based on the concept of full cost recovery from the beneficiaries. Settler selection was based on applications.

3.2 Policy framework

“Can your conscience blame the African, if eking out a tenuous existence from the poor soil in an overcrowded Reserve, he is swayed by subversive propaganda, when close besides him there lie hundreds of thousands of hectares of fertile soil which he may not cultivate, not occupy, not grace because although it lies unused and unattended, it belongs to some individual or group of individuals who perhaps do not use the land in the hope of profit from speculation” (Mugabe 2001). The statement is purportedly to have originated from the Catholic Church in June 1959 protesting against the unfair land allocation in the then Southern Rhodesia.

Donald Raymond Lamont a Catholic devout made his indignation of the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 by use a biblical verse as follows:

“Woe unto those who decree unrighteous decrees/ Who right misfortune/Which they have prescribed/To rob the needy of justice/And to take what is right from the poor of My People/That widows may be their prey/And that they may rob the fatherless (Isaiah 10:1-

2), (Mugabe, 2001). These are historical justifications of the current land reform based on the war started by the church against land grabbing.

Despite appreciating that the war on land commenced much earlier than the year independence was attained. The government still accepts that 21 years in independence it faces an ever mounting, insistent but legitimate expectation from the people for substantial deliverables of independence (Mugabe, 2001). The government in 2001 realised that the land reform was one area presenting urgent political and legislative challenges, (Mugabe, 2001). The Government realised that implementation of resettlement programmes alone cannot be panacea of communal area problems (Rukuni & Eicher 1994, 305). That further strengthened the need to reorganise land.

The background above supported a new land policy of the third *Chimurenga* period. The policy can best be summarized as land came from the white dominated commercial sector where it was held unfairly in speculation to the landless black majority, the end result will be a de-racialised one-farmer-one-farm outcome (Mugabe, 2001). Within the new policy law protected the landless people occupying commercial farms until the government completed acquisition and subsequent settler placements (Mugabe, 2001). The policy was in the same league with the South African policy of accessibility of rights in land, which abolishes racially based restrictions on land (Republic of South Africa, 1991). However the Zimbabwe policy had a loophole that protects farm invaders.

The policy had all the ingredients of logic but for some unknown reasons did not yield its results. There were other processes at play one of which was personal enrichment and lack of prudence by those in power (Chiviya, 1982). The land audit of 2003 is testimony to the argument. There were concerns from would-be beneficiaries who were still awaiting resettlement as promised. Some A2 farmers were yet to be informed whether farms they were allocated and irregularly taken over by other powerful persons or controversially “delisted” would be given to them or replacement plots would be made available (Bhuka, 2003). That was a bit out of touch because the land reform programme was said to be successfully completed.

At the beginning of December 2001 the Supreme Court made a landmark judgment, which was to speed up the land acquisition and speed up the land reform programme (Mugabe, 2001). The ruling made it possible for the government to push through acquisition orders without a land reform policy framework. The ‘fast track’ land reform exercise or third *Chimurenga* managed to acquire 4 million hectares of land for 100 000 households in one year (Mugabe, 2001).

Although expressed in a positive manner there was widespread opposition to the exercise with many sectors and countries describing it as chaotic. A fact also echoed by the President in the 38th session of the central committee of ZANU PF held in Harare by saying ‘most of international community now accept it as just and reasonable’ (Mugabe, 2001). That indicates that the President acknowledges the international community once opposed the process. Interesting enough members of the international community cited as

having a change of view were the SADC and the African Union (AU). The two regional groupings have decided to remain quiet on developments in Zimbabwe and that is regarded as support. Comments in support of the programme have been made by member states like Malawi and Namibia but they do not represent the position of the groupings.

3.2 Emerging views from the ‘fast track’ land reform.

Representatives of farmers unions, financial sector and agro-business generally viewed land reform as vital for political stability and economic development but had reservations over the failure to place agriculture on a properly planned and adequately resourced basis. (Utete, 2003).

The Presidential Land review committee however had a different finding. The committee cited a serious contradiction between the 1992 Land Acquisition Act as amended, which provides for compulsory land acquisition and the constitution, which requires such acquisition to be confirmed by the administrative court (Utete, 2003). A recommendation was made to remove the contradiction. If a constitution has such a serious contradiction one can imagine the amount of contradictions an exercise supported by such a constitution will create.

Making land available to more people is the beginning of the whole challenge of economic transformation (Mugabe, 2001). That marks the origin of the concept of 'Land is the economy and the economy is land', which was the government's thrust in land reform. The thrust was developed on the assumption that newfound access to land translates to increased self-employment, agricultural productivity and general economic development (Mugabe, 2001). That explains why the 'fast-track' land reform was said to be successful and is the best thing to happen to the country. There were a lot of propaganda songs and advertisements praising the fast track land reform despite lack of tangible benefits as a result of the drought, agriculture input shortage and the chaos in farms.

Ministers and other Government officials wholly supported the land reform programme expressing successful implementation in the face of formidable odds (Utete, 2003). The government sought to ignore legal logic just to acquire and redistribute land. One case in point is the controversy on ownership of moveable property and assets such as houses in the case of farmers hurriedly moved out by war veterans with minimal time to pack.

The fast-track land reform needs to be carried out with other supporting processes speeded up. Economic development fast tracked itself in the negative direction thereby failing to support the land reform making land a valueless commodity in the country. This is in keeping with the Peter Dorner theory explained earlier on. The deeds and companies office was not prepared for the fast track reform and that was the first sign of inadequacy in planning for the process (Mugabe, 2001).

The land audit sums up the arguments above in a clear way. The land reform programme was adversely affected by many factors among them a hostile external political environment, national macro-economic instability, and adverse weather conditions (Bhuka, 2003). The limited financial and administrative difficulties encountered by an overstretched bureaucratic apparatus suddenly called upon to implement the programme in great haste opened up the whole process to exploitation by some through unauthorised unilateral interventions (Moyo, 2000). This is evidenced by the rise to prominence by self-styled commanders of farm invasions from among war veteran groups (Zunga 2003). The land audit expressed this fact as a view from the Vice President that the land reform programme has been concluded satisfactorily but experience has demonstrated that implementation was in some instances at variance with agreed policies and procedures. As a matter of fact there are 367 unofficially settled farms countrywide (Utete.1, 2003).

The Vice President, Ministers and War Veterans expressed their satisfaction over the conclusion of the implementation of the programme. They also noted that the programme had corrected past colonial imbalances in land distribution and proved an effective tool in empowering a racially disadvantaged sector of society (Utete.1, 2003). That statement really needed to have come from an independent party not parties who benefited the exercise. It still needs to be proven whether the process was effective and really empowered the poor. Infact all groups which appeared before the land audit said something in praise of the 'fast track' land reform except the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) which stated that the land policy combined with lack of security and lack of collateral base for credit had a negative effect on the production of most commodities by

both existing and 'New farmers' (Utete.1, 2003). The view makes sense taking into account the fact that land in Zimbabwe lost its value and was no longer secure to be used as collateral security against any loan. Agriculture because of the chaotic land reform has become a risky business that bankers do not fund. Land reform should not just address issues of equity but also productivity unless the major objective of the land reform is political ideology (Bowyer-Bowyer, 2000).

It has to be noted that the take up rate by beneficiaries of plots allocated under the A1 model was much higher than the A2 model (97% for the former and 66% for the later) (Utete.1, 2003). The low up-take was a surprise because there was a long waiting list for A2 farms. Investigations by the land audit indicates the fast track land reform exercise instead created a lot of idle land, which in itself requires designation contrary to the aims of the exercise. That should be no problem but an opportunity for the government to recognize the pivotal role of women in the struggle for independence and all aspects of agriculture and try to strike a gender balance in access to land. The gender dimension of the agrarian reform was not so clear and here is an opportunity to incorporate gender balance into the fast track reform exercise but unfortunately the government of Zimbabwe failed to grab the opportunity.

The havoc being created by HIV and AIDS among the rural communities leave women at the receiving end as they are the primary caregivers in most families and traditionally they have no right to land ownership (Poverty Reduction Forum, 2003, 96). Throwing that puzzle into the equation the stability and survival of growing numbers of female-

headed households is affected if the gender context is not enforced. According to Mandivamba Rukuni the agrarian reform constitutes an important vehicle for economically empowering and social integration of women (Bowyer-Bowyer, 2000, 187).

A number of officials and beneficiaries indicated that land acquired for settlement is insufficient and very few people were resettled and there was no significant impact on decongestion due to the fact that most people who benefited were not from adjacent communal areas, some were from urban areas and some families did not relocate due to lack of infrastructure in the new farming areas (Utete.2, 2003). The same officials and traditional leaders expressed concern over the destruction of the environment through cutting down of trees for firewood, for sell or clearing new fields. In areas where wildlife is available a lot of poaching went on uncurbed. Illegal gold panning was observed along the country's major rivers (Zunga, 2003). Surprisingly the government did not see things in this way despite the view being included in a government report on land by a Presidential commissioned committee.

The 'fast track' land reform programme overlooked some important issues, which led to some of the challenges highlighted above. Some of the issues overlooked include:

- Policy on former farm workers
- Production services policy
- Financial sector partnerships
- Viability considerations

3.3.1 Policy on former farm workers

Farm workers were not considered in the planning for the land reform. Infact they were not supposed to be planned for basing on the argument that they represented a constituency that was supporting the opposition and would challenge ZANU PF's stay in power during elections (Zunga, 2003). The truth of the matter is they were important in the 'fast track' land reform process as the beneficiaries because the process was bringing a new definition to the scope of their livelihood (Utete.2, 2003). The employment status of farm workers is important in assessing the impact of the land reform programme. Losses in jobs change to low paying jobs and change in status from workers to new farmers were encountered during the land reform programme. In a well-planned process a policy for the former farm workers would have been one that results in re-employment by new A2 farmers with maintenance of job position and employment status or change in status to A2 farmers. A new agricultural employment structure emerged with new farmer and workers hired from distant places; some of these were members of extended family. The situation showed the success of the political agenda, which was to disperse farm workers and weaken the opposition party's stronghold in the commercial farming community

There were a number of reasons given for non-engagement of the existing farm workers. Some of the reasons included the perceived image of farm workers as opponents of the land reform as they opposed the programme in cases where land was forcibly taken. There were reports of farm workers turning into militias to wade-off invasion of farms by

war veterans. An example is of farm workers from Sansegal farm in Mazowe who were chased overnight and had their houses burnt by a group of farm invaders after they had resisted the invasion in the day (The Daily News, 12 February 2002). There was fear of engaging the workers because they knew labour laws and would challenge ill treatment and low wages by new farmers (Utete.2, 2003).

In Zimbabwe most farm workers were of foreign origin with a large number from Malawi. The reform programme inconvenienced migrant workers there is no doubt. Some were not sure of their citizen status after having been in the country for a long period of time, some were second or third generation citizens (Utete.2, 2003). The government instituted a new citizenship law, which made all people of foreign origin to lose their Zimbabwean citizenship unless they renounce any link with their countries of origin by taking an oath with the registrars office together with the payment of an administration fee of Z\$100 000 (The Herald, 25 January 2002). That was a case of the right hand not knowing what the left was doing.

3.3.2 Production services policy

There was no policy strategy on agricultural input market, machinery and tillage services. The 'fast track' land reform programme saw a significant drop in seed production in the face of increased demand. (Utete.2, 2003). The increase in demand was attributed to government beneficiary grants, drought recovery programme, and Model A2 new

farmers. The reduced seed production was a result of acquisition of seed production farms (The Standard, 10 October 2004). The government reacted by taking all the seed at seed houses for redistribution to newly resettled farmers to ensure the land reform programme succeeds. However there was a challenge to meet the gap between supply and demand. The only alternative was to use carryover stock as seed. The drop in seed production represented a reduction in crop acreage of close to 4 000hectres (Bhuka, 2003). That further increased the area under-utilised thereby reversing the gains of the land reform exercise.

The situation was exacerbated by the electricity power cuts experienced as a measure to shed the load on the national electricity grid. The power cuts meant that fertilizer production was lowered and irrigation for seed production was affected (Utete.2, 2003,15). Irrigated production of seed was further affected by erratic diesel supplies due to shortage of foreign currency within the country. Zimbabwe had the capacity to produce enough fertilizer to meet its demands but this time the country failed. The main reasons for the failure to supply was summed up as:

1. Shortage of foreign currency to import sufficient quantities of fertilizer ingredients,
2. The pricing structure for fertilizers and raw materials (Utete.2, 2003,15).

The low prices of fertilizer was a strategy to ensure that the new farmers could afford it without any financial support from the government or any other institution, indicating a financial policy oversight discussed later in this chapter.

The stockfeed industry was not spared from the list of shortages. There was a shortage of stock feed resulting from shortages in grain production as a result of the drought and the reorganization in agriculture (fast track land reform) (Bhuka, 2003). The shortages meant that grain and other ingredients like vitamins had to be imported. Importing in a condition of foreign currency shortage made the stock feed expensive for the local market. Viability under conditions of controlled producer prices and no subsidy is a tall order especially when production involves imported raw materials (Moyo, 1995).

The District Development Fund (DDF), which was meant to provide free tillage to new farmers, had serious challenges with 45% of its fleet out of operation due to shortage of spare parts and foreign currency to import the needed spare parts (The Sunday Mail, 10 October 2004). There was no proper system of accounting for DDF operations in terms of time and consumables like fuel, which made the exercise expensive for the government (Utete, 2003). The delayed commencement of the free tillage programme and the challenges mentioned created a bottleneck in production.

The Government of Zimbabwe should have foreseen the situation given that the country was in a drought situation and should have been prepared by importing open pollinated varieties to cushion farmers and the land reform programme. The government should have prioritised agro-input manufacturing and import sector in foreign currency allocation by the Reserve bank of Zimbabwe (Bowyer-Bowyer, 2000). The same priority should have been given to supporting industries like National Oil Company of Zimbabwe

and the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority. Seed production farms should have been spared from designation to ensure enough supply of seed.

The whole scenario indicates the state failed to maintain a food policy and there was a policy gap between politicians and the government ministries resulting in the process going ahead as a political process without expert advise (Hassan, 1988).

3.3.3 Financial sector partnerships

The agriculture industry had several sources of funding from various agencies, which include, government contribution through the Ministry of agriculture, private sector finance, agro-bills from commercial banks and lease finance. These met a number of challenges during the ‘fast track’ land reform. Notable was the restructuring of the Ministry of Agriculture in response to the land reform resulting in creation of a number of departments that swallowed up the whole budget (Utete.2, 2003). It is important to note that the financial systems need to have central coordination and liaison between institutions offering them has to be compulsory (Currie, 1981). In Zimbabwe this was not the case, there were few institutions operating. The few institutions that were there were doing what ever they wanted in total disregard to another institution with the same concern. This type of chaos could be seen in the position of ARDA, which operated as both a beneficiary and administrator of land reform. ARDA expanded its farms in the land reform process as well as making use of DDF free tillage units at the same time coordinating farm acquisitions and input distribution. GMB at that very time was

distributing inputs to some farmers as well as buying grain. That indicates how poorly coordinated the exercise was.

The fast track farm invasion took away security attached to land and that meant land could not be used as collateral in the access to a loan. That meant that the state could not avail funds in the form of loans to 'new farmers'. The government responded to this challenge by nationalising all acquired land so that the farmer obtain long leases from the government which would enable them to utilise and as a form of collateral security (The Herald 5 June 2004). The process now comes back to its original state with state land held on long lease by individuals the difference this time is most of the individuals are black.

3.3.4 Viability Considerations

The government maintained old model-A schemes in small-scale land redistribution within the 'fast track' land reform but at significantly reduced plot sizes. Households were allocated 5 hectares in wet regions and 10 hectares in dry areas. That created a variation in land holding structure and related benefits. The reduced land holding meant a household was left with an area, which did not make sense for sustainable agriculture. The farm size allocation was a divergence from the pronounced policy (Utete. 2, 2003).

The change created an impression that the 'fast track' land reform programme was creating social agriculture instead of commercial agriculture (Clayton, 1964).

The reduced plot sizes did not take into account the nature of existing infrastructure and their utilisation. Productive farm facilities like processing units, curing barns, grading sheds, dams and dip tanks are critical for farm viability but not being put into use in the new resettlement programme (Bhuka, 2003). Land redistribution meant there was varying access to these facilities. This created uneven access to facilities and raised some policy concerns. The fast track land reform had an aim to create even access. That already created viability problems in high value crop production like tobacco. For example one tobacco farmer who was not so lucky to be allocated a plot with no curing barn had challenges in curing the tobacco unless bailed out by the other or constructs one. The scenario encouraged some form of formal or informal contractual agreements on rights of use to property on individual farms (Currie, 1981).

That could be the reason behind the state deciding to nationalise all land especially acquired land to ensure the new farmer do not have absolute ownership of the land and the developments there-in (The Herald 5 June 2004). That way the state had control in ensuring that disadvantaged farmers are not totally disenfranchised. That being a good idea it also showed how insecure the new farmers were on the newfound land. According to Rukuni the nationalisation was self-defeating in the sense that economic, political and social power as well as status are assured under a condition of exclusive land rights (Bowyer-Bowyer, 2000, 187). This is true because full productive potential of resettled

land is released only when small farmers feel that the land is truly theirs. This was not the case in Zimbabwe.

3.4 Conclusion

Land is the basis of the economy of Zimbabwe a fact seen by the colonists as early as the 1890s (Sullins, 1991). From a moral standpoint land was unfairly taken from its original owners at colonisation by use of the fraudulently drawn Ruud Concession (Utete, 2003). However archeologically none has a right to land in Zimbabwe but the Pygmies who are the original inhabitants (Zunga, 2003). Be that as it may land belongs to Zimbabweans who were found working on it and they have a legitimate right to it. Several Acts were passed to justify and sustain the unfair allocation of land (Christodoulou, 1990).

Zimbabwe is justified in going through the land reform programme to address the colonial imbalances. Access to land is one way to create employment and generate broad-based income; land may be the only productive asset for rural communities (Lele and Adu-Nyako, 1992). However the government took time to address the imbalances, which later turned into a crisis. The government went through a whole decade of changing policies with no tangible action. The government soon after independence despite the

shortcomings of the Lancaster House agreement took a nap and was content with maintaining what was won. That led to a somewhat disorderly sporadic farm invasion period, which the government graced by calling it the Third *Chimurenga*. The point of departure between the justified need and the farm invasion was the political standpoint, which had total disregard to social and economic principles leading to a number of emerging issues. Some of the emerging issues had serious implications on the economy of the country.

Despite widely seen dents on the economy the process was said to be successful and any challenge to the process would be viewed as an unpatriotic way of trying to promote foreign interests (Zunga, 2003). A state controlled newspaper expressed the same attitude, “The anger and deliberate distortion is not about food but about land. The angry voices do not want the land reform programme to succeed” (The Sunday Mail, 13 June 2004). Several government publications including the land commission made the same findings but for political survival of the ruling party the recommendations of the finding were ignored save for a few arrests of leaders who owned more than one farm (The Herald, 5 June 2004).

The land reform in Zimbabwe although a social and economically justified process was diverted to achieve political mileage by the ruling party leading to the process going wrong as political logic was employed at the expense of the principles of economics and social sustainability. That is understandable because the lust for power, need for prestige dominate all individual and corporate relationships (Linthicum, 1991). The land reform

exercise in Zimbabwe was a policy that showed solidarity with the landless blacks to the total exclusion of the whites and such a policy exacerbated tension, competition and contributed to continuing separation and even conflicts (Myers, 1999). That was the reality in Zimbabwe and the situation was not conducive for nation building.

The bold thing to do is to publicly recognizing ones own culpability not remaining stiff-necked when things are visibly going wrong (Pierce, 1984). That way the international community will support an otherwise good cause.

‘Our land is more valuable than your money’ is a dangerous principle to live by. (Harold-Barry, 2004). The land grab has done disastrous economic and environmental damage. How will historians judge the actions of the generation that invaded the farms and destroyed the ‘Bread-Basket’ of Southern Africa?

CHAPTER FOUR

FIELD RESEARCH

4 Introduction

The objective of the study was to investigate the relationship between the fast track land reform and the increased poverty faced by the new farmers. The study tried to establish the driving force for the process among the new farmers.

The field research was started off with preparatory work in the office prior to the actual field exercise. The office exercise involved designing a questionnaire and pre-testing the questionnaire to try and establish the clarity of the questions (Holland and Blackburn, 1998). A list of 200 households was punched into the computer to enable the computer to select a random sample of 40 households. The computer programme initially selected a sample of 40 with 6 households repeated. Another random sample of 6 was selected to come up with a sample of 40 different households.

Data collection was done by means of administering the questionnaire to the 40 households. The information collected was verified by means of a focus group

discussion, which was attended by 6 farm leaders, 6 elders and 1 youth leader from among the new farmers' community. The focus group meeting acted as a form of triangulation of information collection (Mouton, 1996).

Data analysis was done by statistical means through assessment of frequency of responses to questions within the questionnaire. The questions were focussing on livelihood aspects, which are asset creation, health, economic activities, social linkages and household resilience (Chambers, 1983). Statistical filtration of data according to gender of respondents and household head was done to help in explaining some findings of the research. The research was not based on gender comparison.

The result were summarised and shared with the community in the focus group meeting, the same results are summarised at the end of this chapter.

4.1 Farm Selection and Sampling

One farm where people were resettled was used for the study. The farm is Chizororo farm 15km south of Harare along Manyame River. The farm used to be a mixed farm, which grew tobacco, maize as well as raise livestock and now accommodates about 60 families of former farm workers and 'New Farmers', all totalling to 200. The settlement pattern is haphazard but a list of settlers is maintained at the farm by a chairperson of the settlement committee who is a war veteran. It could not be established whether the other committee members were war veterans but it was established that committee members were supporters of the ruling party. The farm was selected because it shows a major change in land use with part of the land along the road showing signs of being idle for the past two seasons.

The list of 200 farmers who occupied the farm was obtained from the chairman of the farm committee and entered into the computer to make an excel spreadsheet where each name corresponds to a number in left hand column. The list formed the database for the research, which was maintained as an excel database. The first left column in the list formed the record of the database that was attached to a number that identifies the household whilst the other columns were livelihood aspects investigated which are health, household resilience, asset creation, health, economic activities and social linkages as well as opinion on the new farm.

A sample of 40 farmers was selected from the database using the sampling analysis tool of the Lotus 1.2.3 Data Analysis Package. The numbers identifying households (or first left column) were used since the program could only select figures. Initially the sampling program picked 40 numbers but it repeated six numbers (the numbers are shown in data analysis sheet in appendix). To avoid interviewing the same household twice and to make the sample 40 the program was rerun to randomly select 6 additional households (these are also shown on the same data analysis sheet). The figures were used to identify the name of the household. These names were shared with the farm committees who helped in identifying the physical location of the farm and homestead.

4.2 Data Collection

An initial visit was made to the farm to create a relationship with the leadership of the farm and to seek for a meeting. An informal entry meeting was held with the farm leaders to explain the purpose of the research and the format of the research (Holland and

Blackburn, 1998). The meeting had a purpose of enabling the farm committee to support the research process and farming community to built trust in the researcher and open up to questions since invaded farms are sensitive areas within the country (Harold-Barry, 2004).

A questionnaire was designed in English and translated to Shona the vernacular language. (Copy of the English version is attached as appendix). 40 questionnaires were filled-in at household level by researcher and name of each household and gender of respondent at each household was identified as well as the database (ID). The exercise took a total of 8 days with a total of 5 questionnaires filled per day. Data collection was not affected by absence of household head but anyone available could be a respondent for that household as long as the person consented to provide responses. This was done on the basis that prior mobilisation was carried out and everyone was aware. Only five households had no respondents and had to be returned to at the end of the exercise.

A focus group discussion was carried out to validate data collected. The focus group discussion had a specific role to triangulate the information collection exercise and to make the process trustworthy (Holland and Blackburn, 1998). The farm leadership committee and some elders attended the meeting. The researcher took advantage of a meeting organised by the farm committee to discuss findings of the research.

4.3 Data Analysis

Data analysis was done by statistical means through assessment of frequency of responses to questions within the questionnaire. The questions were focussing on livelihood aspects, which are asset creation, health, economic activities, social linkages and household resilience (Chambers, 1983).

The result were summarised and shared with the community in the focus group meeting.

The data on questionnaires was entered onto an excel spread which was an extension of the household list. The data was analysed for attributes of livelihoods, which are social linkages, asset creation, health, economic activities and household resilience (food security) as indicators of the dynamics of poverty (Chambers, 1983). These formed the columns of results database , which is attached in appendix. Statistical filtration of data according to all the livelihood aspects forming the labels of the columns was done so as to establish statistics under each aspect independent of the other.

Lotus 123 data analysis tool was used to assess for frequency of responses which were expressed as percentages in sample community and that made data analysis easy to explain on comparative basis. On distances to local health centre an analysis of households furthest from this service was done and coping mechanisms were also looked at. The study employed deductive and inductive reasoning (Mouton, 1996). Some issues were observed and a deduction made.

Lastly a frequency and average worksheet function of the statistical package was used to rank the most occurring challenge after the land reform in relation to the livelihood

indicators given above. This was expressed as opinion by the farmers and is shown graphically.

All the work done in data analysis is provided in the appendix and the results are summarized in the section under results.

4.4 Focus Group Discussion

After completing the data analysis a focus group discussions was held to validate some findings of the research. The group comprised of 6 members of the committee 1 youth leader and 6 elders from the farm community (all were new farmers). The focus group discussion was done through a meeting, which was already organised by the farmers since the researcher had a difficulty in bringing people together to a meeting.

The focus groups meeting was held at the farm's meeting place. Minutes of the group discussion are attached in the appendix.

The researcher provided feedback on the draft research findings. Each aspect investigated had its result presented. Field size, food availability, field ownership by women and social linkages were explained as percentages of changes between the communal areas and the new farm whilst asset creation was presented in actual figures of loss or gain. An

explanation of general changes in terms of effect of diseases and economic activities was also given.

The new farmers making the focus group provided clarification on some issues. Issues clarified include identification of main driving force for moving to the new farms, food shortages asset loss and the nature of non-farm economic activities. The focus group also shared the motivation of the new farmers on the new farm.

4.5 Summary of Results

The results are summarised in the way they are structured in the questionnaire. There is a summary of household resilience, asset creation, social linkages, economic activities, and opinion of farmers. These aspects of livelihood were analysed independent of each other hence summarised separately below. A table and a graph are used to show some percentages of the results as summarised from entries of the excel worksheet in appendix.

4.5.1 Household resilience

All the households covered in the survey have experienced an increase in field size since moving to the new farm. There was a 100% response to increased field size. 65% of the sample indicated women received their own fields at the new farm.

62.5% of the sample indicated an increase in yield since moving to the new farm compared to 37.5% who indicated they did not experience an increase in yield since moving to the new farm.

45% of the households in the sample sold livestock to address immediate food requirements and 55% did not sell any livestock to buy food at the new farm. 42.5% sold agricultural equipment for the purpose of raising money to sell food.

Table 1 below shows the summary of the results and the actual results are attached in excel spreadsheet in appendix.

4.5.2 Asset Creation

The results show losses in livestock with an average of 3 cattle lost per household since moving to the new farm. These losses do not include livestock sales to buy food but losses in transit or through theft. The survey also shows an average loss of 2 chickens per each household in the sample. There were insignificant changes in bicycles and radios owned by the sampled households since moving to new farm and these two items were identified as luxury items for those with money or in urban areas. There was no change in ploughs owned since moving to new farm.

4.5.3 Social linkages

Results show 77.5% of the households being closer to neighbours whilst 22.5% of the households are far from their households. 65% of the households indicated that they are closer to their neighbours. The survey indicated that 85% are invited to social gatherings whilst 15% are not invited. The results show 72.5% of the women having realised more decision making power since moving to the new farm. These results are summarised in table 1 and Excel spreadsheet in appendix shows the data.

4.5.4 Economic activities

The results shows that 95% of the sampled households were involved in off farm income generation activities in communal area compared to 5% that were not. In the new farm the survey showed only 35% involved in off farm income generation activities and 65% is not involved in any income generation activities. The survey indicate 52.5 of the households with women involved in other income generation activities for women only whilst 47.5 have no women income generation activities.

85% of the sampled households indicated that agriculture is their major source of income. These results are also summarised in table 1 and the actual field results are in excel spreadsheet attached in appendix.

4.5.5 Health

The two common diseases identified in the survey are malaria and diarrhoea with one death recorded from malaria. The diseases affect an average of 3 people per household.

Effects to the households identified include labour shortage and reduced agricultural production.

27.5% of the households in the survey were less than 5 km from the nearest health centre.

10% of the sample travel over 10km to the health centre and the rest who account for 62.5 % travel distances between 5km and 10km to the health centre.

These results are summarised in table 1 and the field results are included in excel spreadsheet attached in appendix.


4.5.6 Opinion

There were various expressions of opinion among the households interviewed as expressed in graph 1. Among some opinions expressed include, an expression of life being tough on the farm, a concern about absence of services, optimistic thinking, and varying comments on food availability such as ‘there is enough food as long as one works hard’ ‘and there is no enough food at the new farm’.

Table 1

Livelihood aspect	Measured attributes	Responses YES	Responses NO
Household resilience	Increased field %	100	0
	Increased yield %	62.5	37.5
	Livestock sale %	45	55
	Equipment sale	42.5	57.5
	Female owners	65	35
Asset creation		Averages	
	(Avg #) Cattle loss	2.5	
	(Avg #) Goat loss	0.76	
	(Avg #) Plough loss	0	
	Avg # Chicken loss	2.4	
	(Avg #) Bicycle loss	0.04	
	(Avg #) Radio loss	0.1	
Social Linkages		Responded YES	Responded NO
	Neighbours close %	77.5	22.5
	Relatives close	65	35
	Cultural activity	75	25
	Social gatherings	85	15
	Women power	72.5	27.5
Economic activities	Off-farm activities	95	5
	Still involved	35	65
	Women IGAs	52.5	47.5
	Highest income	85	15
Health	Diseases	Diarhoea & Malaria	
	(Avg #) affected	2.52	
	Household 5km to RHC	27.5	
	Household over10km to RHC	10	
	Emergency response	Walking, cycling, Scotch cart &	

Graph 1



4.6 Conclusion

The objective of the study was to investigate the relationship between the fast track land reform and the increased poverty faced by the new farmers. The study aimed at establishing the driving force of the fast track land reform among the new farmers. The questionnaire administered focused on livelihood aspects that would help to define poverty among the farmers. The aspects used were household resilience, economic activities, social linkages and health. The questionnaire although structured it was open at the end and the farmers gave their own opinion, which helped in establishing their attitude to the fast track land reform and understanding their situation at the time of the research.

The objective of the research was met as witnessed by the results obtained (which are indicated in this chapter); this enabled the interpretation in the next chapter with minimal

shortcomings. The use of focus group discussions was a resourceful research tool as it helped to explain some findings in the results making interpretation easy.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

5. Introduction

This chapter interprets the results in chapter four and makes a link between the results and the conclusion which ultimately explains land reform in Zimbabwe as a development perspective. The aspects covered in the interpretation are household resilience, asset creation, social linkages, economic activities and health. These are used to define poverty within the farming community involved in the study. Attitude on the new farm expressed as opinion of the farmers is also discussed.

The study makes a link between the results and the conclusion by means of relating the results to some theoretical frameworks identified in the literature review. The discussion led to a conclusion, which follows this chapter.

This chapter also identifies some learning points identified under each section and these are also shown in the conclusion.

5.1 Household Resilience

There is a general acceptance to increase in field size at the new farm with 100% of the farmers indicating a positive change in field size. This was further confirmed by the focus group discussion, which stressed that if there was no increase in field size then there was no basis for moving to the new farm. The meeting stressed that those who did not obtain larger fields are not on the farm, indicating land was really the attraction. If availing land for farming was the only motive for land reform then it was successful as confirmed by a foreword in the report of the Presidential Land Review Committee (Utete.1, 2003). Unfortunately availing land was not the only motive there are other issues like increased productivity and economic growth of the country, which are yet to be investigated. The committee went further to state that it was impressed by the findings, however the results of this study under this aspect where all farmers expressed satisfaction on increased field size and an optimistic attitudes does more than just impressing, it ushers-in a new thinking of how a Government policy can encourage a new concept 'farm bias' instead of urban bias (Chambers, 1983). Could this be Zimbabwe's answer to urbanisation? Further work needs to be done in that area to ascertain that phenomenon. The voter roll in Zimbabwe indicated that the rural areas in the country are more heavily populated than urban areas. Could this be a result of the land reform? Further research in that area needs to be done to ascertain that suggestion.

62.5% of the household surveyed experienced an increase in yield compared to 35 who indicated reduced yield. The Land Review Committee echoes the general increase in yield, it indicates that there is evidence gathered from across the country, which indicates

that new farmers realised significant yields in the 2002-2003 agricultural season. This statement was however proven wrong by the increase in food aid within the country. The Central Statistical Office also shows a declining production pattern for maize (Utete, 2003). The area covered by the study as witnessed by the results showed an increase in yield whilst the rest of the country experienced shortages. The area lies in the watershed area around Harare, which is the prime maize producing area of the country. That explains a general yield increase but the produce because of strict rules by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) never reaches other consumers in the country. There is a law forbidding the movement of grain into urban areas.

Although there was an increase in yield in all cases the difference according to gender needs to be explained. It is very likely that women as a marginalised group of the Zimbabwean society might have been marginalised in land allocation resulting in them getting land that was not as fertile as their male counterparts. Women in many countries including Zimbabwe are treated as legal minors regarding ownership of land and property (Narayan 2000). Further study on this aspect need to be carried out for one to conclude with certainty. The issue of marginalisation cannot be ruled out, as it is evident in the absence of a mere mention in the Land Review Committee recommendations. Access to land is constrained by a complex set of customary practises that restrict land rights based on cultural, ethnic, or gender issues as well as political factors (Lele and Adu-Nyako, 1992). The fast track land reform exercise was a dog-eat-dog affair and the strong ones benefited women as weak members of society lost out (Swanepoel and De Beer, 1997).

Alternatively this aspect can be looked at from a labour point of view and the result from the study might suggest towards shortage of labour among female headed household leading to reduced yield an aspect which can be acceptable with debate taking into account the fact that women provide most of agricultural labour in Zimbabwe as men work in urban areas.

The study shows that movement into new farms introduced to the farmers food shortages, which led to 45% of the farmers selling livestock and 42.5 % selling productive agricultural implements. The movement instead of improving the farmers it further worsened their situation and they became trapped even further into the poverty they thought they are addressing (Chambers, 1983). Livestock are a form of liquid asset for rural communities and are sometimes liquidated as a recovery measure. In this case the fast track land reform is confirmed as a shock as evidenced by sale in livestock.

Livestock sale coupled with sale of productive equipment indicate low resilience to a shock being experienced (Narayan, 2000) The study shows 90% of male headed households having sold productive equipment an indication of inability to withstand the shock of moving to new farms. This scenario is interesting taking into account the fact that 80% of this group indicated increased yield. This scenario brings-in a new explanation, if the figures for yield and sale of productive equipment are considered. A likely explanation is confusion between yield and total harvest. It is likely that the new farmer took increase in harvest resulting from increase hectarage as an increase in yield yet yield is productivity per unit area. This aspect could be the issue causing concern

between the Zimbabwe Government and Food Aid organisation including the WFP. The Government believes there is enough food in the country as confirmed by aerial surveys done by the Minister of Agriculture yet the NGO sector indicates a food shortage looming in the country (The Standard, August 15 2004 and Utete, 2003). The fast track land reform has one positive outcome so far which is increased field size to the new farmers.

The study indicates over 60% of all respondents agreeing to female ownership of fields within the 'new farms' even though they might not be registered landowners. This study was done to assess the element of marginalisation of female members at household given the fact that land was no longer a limiting factor. The result however indicates a general acceptance of the role of women in Zimbabwean agriculture.

5.2 Asset creation

The study looked at various assets that one can acquire from agricultural proceeds. The analysis was done to establish relative poverty levels within the community and to indicate whether there is a surplus in income as evidenced by asset creation (Narayan, 2000). The study as evidenced by household survey results and focus group discussion strongly rejected the use of a radio and bicycle as a measure of wealth. This is interesting though considering the latter is indicated as a form of transport to the rural health centre. The insignificant losses of these items indicate their absence within the community. A

likely explanation is that the economy of the country is currently in a bad shape such that things that are normally for everyone are now a privy of the elite within the society. The bicycle in Zimbabwe is now an important means of transport among the urban poor and that has made it very expensive for the rural poor. This fact is confirmed by the presentation of the 2001 national budget where the bicycle was one of the items that had their price reduced (The Sunday Mail, 29 April, 2001). This was unfortunately the government's arrangement for that year only.

There has been no livestock bought in the new farms instead the study reveals losses, which could be attributed to the movement to the new farms. Cattle losses averaging to two per household surveyed really show a sign of a problem considering that cattle are important in determining social status. So the fast track land reform was just one sided in availing land yet ignoring some aspects of social status like livestock. It is important to highlight that during the period livestock theft increased as some cattle rustler and even new farmers pounced on livestock owned by the white farmers as the process was disorderly and there was a breakdown of the law in some areas. Livestock figures especially for cattle could have been incorrect because some farmers own stolen cattle and cannot report upon these. There is need to carry out a further study to establish the current status of the national herd and changes the herd went through in the fast-track land reform process. The study needs to define the effect of the land reform exercise to previously laid out land use plans and production aspects like the export market.

5.3 Social Linkages

The land reform process at national level was disorderly organised but maintenance of social linkages as evidenced by the study 77.5% of household kept close contact with neighbours and 65% kept contact with relatives indicating that at grassroot level the people were organised and moved into farms according to social groupings. Social linkages are an asset to rural communities and they help to cushion households from major shocks (Nankam, unpublished). This finding indicates that fewer household were isolated from the others and that made sure they were not socially deprived as postulated by Chambers (Chambers, 1983). Isolated households under normally cases get deprived of many social rights like the right to be heard and even services and that normally worsens the poverty situation of the household. The social networks enable the farmers to access additional resources for everyday needs (Narayan, 2000). Social linkages are a form of livelihood. The social linkages are interesting taking into account the fact that the fast track land reform process was said to be sporadic and disorderly (Zunga 2003). The invasions at a grassroot level were orderly and carefully planned if the study results are anything to go by. The maintenance of social linkages shows a careful planning which ended up drawing people according to their kinships. This aspect can suggest that the process was a political statement where a group with a common political alignment though being blood related organised and took up action. The land reform process at national level had no plan at all and was disorderly implemented as widely observed (The Herald 27 February 2003).

The aspect of women obtaining increased decision-making power on the new farm was confirmed by the study, which showed 65% of the household agreeing to that fact. This is commendable taking into account the fact that women are the main food producers in the country (Bothomani, 1991).

5.4 Economic activities

Off-farm economic activities have drastically reduced on the new farm as shown by the result of the study. 95% of households were involved in off farm economic activities in rural areas but only 35% were involved in off-farm activities at the new farm. A decrease of 60% is significant considering the economy of the country has been going down and production from agriculture which has been highlighted by the research as the major source of income has been going down. There has not been significant increase in returns from agriculture since the country undertook the fast track land reform. The land reform programme can thus be interpreted as an economically disempowering process. The study indicates that women have time for income-generating activities with 52.5% of households surveyed expressing that finding.

Farming was however stated as the main source of income for the new farmers but none identified their other sources of income with a few identifying selling firewood and gold panning. The focus group identified another source of income, which is selling of an illicit brew known as *kachasu* along the Manyame River. The fact that other sources of income were somewhat hidden indicates that there is something happening unknown and

not to be said for fear of something. It is common knowledge that everyone on the farm is there for agricultural activities and that is an impression maintained otherwise the third *Chimurenga* would have failed. That is a common position taken by everyone from the government officials to the new farmers although it is known some people on the farm are not farmers at all (Zunga 2003). Most people fear that if their true economic status is known it will damage the honour and respect of the family within the community and hurt the future chances of their children (Narayan. 2000).

5.5 Health

The two diseases identified by farmers in the study are malaria and diarrhoea and an average of 3 people per household affected by the diseases. The farmers could articulate the effect of the diseases on their livelihood citing effects like labour shortage for agriculture. A large number of male-headed households reside over 10 km from the health centre. This suggests that farm selection was based on some characteristics, which are not necessarily availability of services. This fact is also proven in opinion question.

The study shows that to a great extent illness plunges a family into destitution as a result of lack of health care and loss of livelihood (Narayan, 2000). This is evidenced by the measures employed in coping to the illness, which include use of a bicycle. Taking into cognisance the fact that the study has already established that a bicycle is not an important asset for the farm community because very few can afford it. Walking, use of

scotch carts, calling on neighbours, and use of traditional healers are some measures identified which express extent of desperation.

The state of ones health contributes to the deprivation trap in the sense that physical weakness is directly related to ill health. Ill health can lead to weak labour as indicated in the study resulting in low productivity and can also disable carrying harder work to overcome a crisis. Sickness can sustain isolation, as one has no time to attend social gatherings and leads to powerlessness, as one has no energy to protest an unfair decision (Chambers, 1983). The study has established the community is challenged in terms of health delivery and response to major illnesses.

5.6 General opinion

There was a wide range of responses to life on the new farm; interestingly there was a higher percentage 20% with an optimistic attitude about life on the new farm. This is a characteristic synonymous with die hard supporters of a particular political party and is evident in the encouragements by *rambai makashinga* jingles on the local media advising people to hold on to the farms on the promise that things will get better. 17.5% of the farmers sampled indicated life on the farm was very tough in terms of food shortage and absence of services but for some reason they remained on then new farms. Perhaps they understood that new land settlements have mixed fortunes and that even successful cases take years to attain self-sufficiency (de Wet, 1997). 15% was clear that there were no social services on the farm such as health, education and grocery shops. 2.5% was

explicit in identifying shortage of clean water as the major problem affecting the farm community. This is evident in the identification of diarrhoea as a major disease affecting the community.

5% of those interviewed regretted having moved to the farm because there was no benefit besides making a statement that has benefited other people somewhere a position also echoed by 7.5 % which described the process as disastrous. The surprising thing however is they all remained on the farm. That can only be explained by the fact that people have a perception that their rulers alone have a right, born of the liberation struggle to occupy the political space and permanently rule the country without any challenge (Harold-Barry, 2004).

There were mixed responses relating to food with some indicating enough food 15% whilst 2.5% indicating food shortage. That can be described as a micro level standoff similar to the one between the government and food aid agencies on availability of food in the country. Although focus group discussions attributed the standoff to laziness time remains the only solution to this standoff.

Interestingly theft was identified as a problem that indicates different motives of moving to the new farms and confirms that miscreant individuals moved with genuine farmers to the new farms.

10% decided to give no opinion on life at the new farm.

Maintaining the appearance of prosperity is vital to maintaining the social connection that enables one to secure goods and services (Narayan, 2000). The government once issued free seed to new farmers and this can be treated as a token for making a statement. Some optimistic opinion is a clear indication that poverty is difficult to accept especially when one has spent productive working life on an issue that has no results (Narayan, 2000). This aspect is confirmed by focus group discussions, which indicated that the first years were not so good, and attribute the failure to the poor rain season. Surprisingly that was a problem in the country alone as it ended up importing food from neighbours such as Zambia who are not known for producing surplus grain (VOA, Studio7, 10 September 2004). This is a clear indication that the state failed to maintain a clear food policy and embarked into a programme that affected food supply causing a crisis and not ready to accept the consequences (Hassan 1988).

5.7 Conclusion

There has been an interpretation of results along the aspects of livelihood that formed the areas of investigation within the study, which are household resilience, asset creation, social linkages, economic activities and health.

The study has indicated a decline in household resilience as witness by the sell in livestock and other productive assets to address immediate food requirements (Berck & Bigman, 1993). This indicates that a household has lost the ability to withstand shocks that can befall it. There was though a positive result from the land reform, which was to

increase field size; productivity was not increased leading to the land reform addressing the issue of equity alone suggesting a political ideology (Bowyer-Bowyer, 2000).

Asset creation is an indicator of success with surplus, which are in turn reinvested into assets (Currie, 1981). So whenever there is asset creation there is prior success in terms of production and profits. The study shows losses in assets instead of gain prompting the question whether taking up new farm was a wise move after all. Livestock in Zimbabwe are source of draft power and are a status symbol such that losing them is a cause of concern.

The new farmers as indicated by participation in social activities kept social linkages. This is considered as an asset to poor households, which is used to cushion them in times of difficulty. That maintenance of social linkages in an environment of a depressed economy suggests the households are facing a shock, which they cannot withstand because if they could they would have broken any social linkages to avoid being turned into an informal community charity institution.

There has been a significant decline in economic activities by all households surveyed suggesting a complete modification of production. This confirms the theory that land reform through dismantling large scale commercial farm affects choice of commodity and technology adopted leading to change in market institutions thereby modifying forms of rural farmers and functions of rural institutions (Kawagoe, 1999).

The farmers though expressing mixed opinion to the land reform most of them have shown a general optimistic attitude to the program. A few have described it as disastrous.

The interpretation led to a conclusion given in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

6. CONCLUSION

Each person assesses poverty relative to the lives they used to enjoy or depending on the context relative to the lives around them (Narayan, 2000). This is exactly the fact with new farmers and former farm workers in Zimbabwe. Assessing their situation in terms of land ownership they regard themselves as people who are now rich and judging the extent to which they regard land. An asset, which sent them to war for 25 years any hardships, is nothing compared to the effort put in obtaining it. The land reform is a success because land was given or taken by landless blacks. The premise for taking land was a response to poverty and is a coping strategy on its own among the poor communities in Zimbabwe because it enables self-provisioning of food (Narayan, 2000).

From an economic point of view land became available but lost its value as an economic asset. The meaning of its ownership means one is a true Zimbabwean, son of the soil to borrow a phrase commonly used. Production is assumed even though it contributes negatively to national economy as evidenced by the failure by the government to provide basic services like clean water, health services, and education. This is in line with the theory that politically motivated land reform may hamper growth of agriculture because the welfare among farmers and efficiency are of agriculture are often contradictory policy targets (Kawagoe, 1999). Land is not the economy and the economy is not land, but considering the aspect of subsistence food production as indicated by the study results

it reduces expenditure on food, easing up on life for the poor. At a micro scale the notion of equating land to the economy makes sense but the case is not the same at a macro scale where the national economy is put into jeopardy by disturbing an agricultural system. In Zimbabwe's case the micro scale is not doing any better to improve the national economy despite the smart sanction because there is no significant contribution from agriculture to the economy the study has shown. Property rights now determine macro economy. Good governance and comparative advantage in production (Zunga, 2003). This explains why smaller countries like Japan are among the richest in the world. Increased harvests are totally different from increased yield, the later measures productivity (production per unit area) and the former output. The land reform in Zimbabwe has impacted largely on productivity such that at that level of production the country would need the whole area of Southern Africa to meet the production level of the 1980s (Bothomani, 1991). The whole country has been turned into small pockets of unproductive land because the process of land reform was politically motivated and it turned into a social process instead of being both social and economic.

The study confirms the classification of the community as a poor community as evidence by the social linkages observed in the study. These act as safety nets to cushion the community from potentially devastating shocks (Narayan, 2000). These attributes are not necessary in an affluent community, as they tend to erode family savings. The failure to withstand the social shock of moving to the new farm resulting in sale of assets, livestock in particular and failure to save indicates a community is poor (Berck and Bigman, 1993). This is surprising because one would expect a change in status from poor to rich with the

change over from rural area to new farm. The process therefore did very little to help the poor and the landless because they still carry the same status of poverty if not worse off (Rondinelli, 1993).

The land reform in Zimbabwe is a development perspective on its own as evidenced by the efforts to hide poverty at household and policy level. Admitting to poverty makes an already untenable situation even worse. The land reform opens up a number of areas of study because the programme brings-in an interestingly strong political perspective to development. Considering that Zimbabwe in the 1980s focussed on rural development now getting to new farms.

Basing on the results and the discussion as well as the literature review in the study, a conclusion that the fast track land reform is a politically motivated process, which was undertaken without wider consultation resulting in land redistribution but not necessarily reform as the state still owns the land. The program assumes a dramatic change in production structure from peasant mode to commercial mode. This was not so instead the fast track land reform further worsened the poverty situation of the rural communities who moved to new farms and with its effects on the economy has put a larger proportion of the population to a lifestyle that is far below the international poverty datum line.

The study having established that the land reform in Zimbabwe is not economically feasible the big question still remains 'For how long will Zimbabwean treat the land issue as a political agenda at the expense of their economy and livelihoods?' Further study in

this area is necessary to determine the ultimate impact of the fast track land reform on the agro-based economy of Zimbabwe.

Agricultural productivity of Zimbabwe needs further study considering the modification in production since moving to new farms. There is need for further studies to investigate the cause of food shortage even after increased land holding brought by the land reform in a country known for high maize grain off-take from communal farmers.

The Zimbabwe government has made a land audit and a land review these are commendable steps in assessing the progress of the fast track land reform. It is important for further independent studies to be made to ascertain the impact of the fast track land reform to the national cattle herd especially expensive stud breeds which were imported into the country some years back considering that some cattle were left unattended by fast exit of the farmers.

The results of the research have led to the conclusion given above. From a personal point of view the fast track land reform in Zimbabwe is an agrarian black empowerment process, which did not benefit the country at all but instead brought suffering even to the urban populace, which had nothing to do with agriculture. The process was an economic self-destructive move, which led to a sudden fall in industrial production a situation, which is not ideal to a developing country like Zimbabwe. Politically the fast track land reform fast tracked the loss of popularity for the ruling party from within and outside the country. Internationally the country was condemned by the west and obtained pariah state status, which led to reduction in foreign aid.

The fast track land reform had more disadvantages than advantages and is therefore not worthy embarking into and should not be recommended to any country challenged by unequal land tenure as was the case in Zimbabwe.

The following studies need to be done to further validate the recommendations above, a study of the impact of the agrarian reform to agricultural productivity and ultimately to the economy with an assessment on gross domestic product. Farm workers were left out in the process due to political reasons further studies on the effect of the process to their livelihoods need to be done so as to assess the success of the process from an apolitical point of view.

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APPENDIX 1

Research Questionnaire

W. PAULO DISSERTATION 736-X RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

1.0 HOUSEHOLD IDENTIFICATION

This section to be completed for each household visited

1.1 Farm Name _____

1.2 Household Name: _____

1.3 Household head's Name _____ Gender [M] [F]

1.3 Name of respondent _____ Signature _____

1.4 Gender of respondent [Male] [Female]

1.5 Position in family _____

1.6 Number of people in family Males _____ Females _____

1.8 Date of interview _____

1.9 Time interview Commenced _____ Ended _____

1.10 Do you agree to take the interview? [YES] [NO] tick

1.11 If no, provide reason _____

1.12 Household record number _____ (*from database*)



2.0 HOUSEHOLD RESILIENCE

This section needs to be answered by household head or any other responsible family member

comments

2.1 Did the family obtain a field larger on the new farm than one at communal

Area farm?

YES 1

NO 2

2.2 Did you realise an increased crop yield from the new farm

such that you have food all year round?

YES 1

NO 2

2.3 Since moving to the new farm did your family sell off livestock to buy food?

YES 1

NO 2

2.4 Since moving to the farm did your family sell productive equipments (agricultural tools, sewing machines etc)?

YES 1

NO 2

2.5 Did female members of family obtain their own field on the new farm?

YES 1

NO 2

3.0 ASSET CREATION

In this section use negatives for losses/sales

3.1 What quantity of the following assets did your family acquire since becoming a new farmer?

	Cattle (3.1)	Goats (3.2)	Ploughs (3.3)	Chicken (3.4)	Bicycle (3.5)	Radio (3.6)
Rural area						
New farm						
Losses*						
Difference						

** This implies losses during translocation from rural area to new farm or losses as a result of failure to transport the asset.*

4.0 SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY

comments

4.1 How far is the closest neighbour from your new homestead?

Below 10km 1

10- 20 km 2

Over 20km 3

4.2 Did any of your close relatives move with you to the new farm?

YES 1

NO 2

4.3 Do you have any one you call upon for cultural/ traditional activities within the farm?

YES 1

NO 2

Comments

4.4 Are you invited to local social gatherings/ meetings where you are asked to make contributions?

YES 1

NO 2

4.5 Did women obtain more decision making power since moving to the new farm?

YES 1

NO 2

5.0 ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

5.1 Prior to moving to the new farm were you involved in off-farm income

comments

generation?


YES 1

NO 2

5.2 If yes are you still involved in the income generating activities?

YES 1

NO 2



comments

5.3 Do women have time for Income generating activities on the new farm?

YES **1**

NO **2**

5.5 Where does your family obtain its highest income in a year?

Farming **1**

Other non-agricultural activity **2**

5.6 If not farming what activity is it? _____

6.0 HEALTH

6.1 What new diseases did you experience since coming to the new farm?

6.2 How many family members have suffered from the disease? _____

6.3 How far is the nearest health facility from the farm?

Less than 5km 1

5-10 km 2

Over 10km 3

6.4 How do you deal with emergencies? _____

6.5 How has the disease affected your farming or income generating activities?

APPENDIX 2

Minutes of meeting held at Chizororo farm on 21 August 2004

Present

W Paulo	Researcher
T A Paulo	Researcher's spouse-scribe
J Dombo	Chairman- Chairing proceedings
T Saraure	Vice Chairman
R Tumbare	Treasure
I Kadenge	PC
C Maganda	Women's Chairperson
G Kwane	Resident
V Soko	Youth chairperson
S Bhera	Resident
T Kubare	Resident
S Matutu	Resident
F Dafa	Resident
J Mususa	Resident

Opening Prayer

Mrs G Kwane gave an opening prayer.

Introductions

Mr J Dombo introduced Mr and Mrs Paulo and allowed everyone present to introduce themselves with the positions held in the farm. He also gave a background of the meeting indicating it is Mr and Mrs Paulo's return to the farm after conducting household surveys, which he had allowed to go ahead.

The floor was given to Mr Paulo to explain the purpose of the meeting.

Background

Mr Paulo thanked the parents for allowing him and his wife to take time in their meeting. He also explained that he could not have called for the meeting had it not been for the Chairperson who told there was going to be a meeting on the very day. He went ahead to explain the purpose of the meeting as a platform to report back to the leaders of Chizororo farm community on the findings from the survey and to seek further clarification on some issues that were picked from individual houses visited in the month of July. He explained he would however not identify the households to the meeting.

Findings

Findings were presented as follows:

Fields and yields

There is a general indication that all people obtained larger fields compared to the field they owned in rural areas but however there are different responses on the yields realised from the fields. 80% of male-headed households indicated an increased yield supported

by 50% of the female-headed households. Analysis by respondents also showed percentages less than 50.

Food availability

There was a general food shortage explained in the farm when people moved into the farm as indicated by the following statistics 60% of male headed households sold cattle and 90% of them sold productive equipment. Whilst 83.3% of female headed households sold cattle and 16.6% sold productive equipments like ploughs and hoes.

Women ownership of fields

90% of male-headed households indicated that women had fields of their own whilst 83.3% supported the same finding.

Asset loss

Average figures show losses about 2 cattle from both male and female-headed households with a maximum average of 3 from female respondents. However highest losses cattle were totalling to 9 per household and goats to 13. There were high figures of chicken lost at household level reaching up to but sample averages were about 2. Ploughs do not indicate much although some 2 ploughs were lost. Most households did not have ploughs. Radio and Bicycle do not indicate any picture as well very few households interviewed owned the two items.

Social linkages

Most households have maintained social linkages with over 50 % in all categories being closer to relatives, taking part in cultural activities and invited to social gatherings. Over 50% of all categories indicated women have realised increased decision-making power since moving to the farm

Economic activities

There is an indication of marked decline in off-farm economic activity as indicated by all four categories used to analyse data collected and most households confirm by indicating most of their income comes from farming. Gold panning and firewood collection were identified as some economic activities.

Diseases

Most common diseases in the area are malaria and diarrhoea with one death recorded from malaria.

Opinion

People expressed different opinion with a number being optimistic whilst some being negative and even wishing to go back. There was a general agreement on life being hard at the farm.

After that presentation Mr Paulo sought for some clarification, which was given as follows:

- Fields were the main driving force for moving to the farm and everyone got a field. Those who did not get field are not in the farm register and have no business staying at the farm they can come as visitors. Women if they so wished could have their own fields because there was no selection on who owns the farms. The process was open to everyone.
- Yields were not all that good at the farm due to the poor rains received when the people moved to the farm. However there were problems also that effected production the major ones being delays by the DDF tillage unit and shortage of diesel in the country which led to tillage games selling fuel to vehicle owners at to make personal profits. Farm was later asked to provide diesel for their fields to be plough yet the commodity was not available. Seed was provided by the government for the first season to those who moved-in early but there was no fertiliser.
- There was a shortage of food and the whole country was affected but here it was better than in the urban areas. People used to come to the farm and look for food and the lucky thing is prices for cattle and goats were good so people sold these to buy food. There was no death as a result of food shortage.
- Most assets were lost indeed, the main reason is some people failed to bring their livestock to the farm and some sold them to raise money to move to the farm. Manyame River was there is beer brewing.
- Radios are luxuries because they are very expensive and very few households own them. Children are more valuable than radios; counting number of children was much better. Bicycles although important are still an item of luxury since

they are expensive. Most people in town are going to work on bicycles, which have made them very expensive to obtain.

- Manyame River forms the basis of livelihood for other especially the lazy one. They spend time fishing and gold panning instead of working. The river is a source of malaria affecting most people at the farm. It is a source of drinking water and the people are making the water dirty resulting in an increase in diarrhoea as observed.
- A distance said to be longer to a health centre is any distance longer than 3km. That distance makes it difficult to carry an adult on the back to seek medical attention.
- Noone would want to go back to the rural areas; things will get better at the farm. It is a matter of time agriculture has never been an overnight success.
- The decision of coming to the farm was a response to a government initiative there was no way the government was to force people out of rural areas and such an exercise might never come. That was a reward for standing by the government of the people.
- Services indeed are not there and something needs to be done that is the only thing making life here to be hard. But that is the sacrifice as encourage by the government. Going back now will create a bad picture to outsiders and people left at home.

After narrating their ideas and reasoning Mr Paulo thanked everyone for participating in the exercise and returned the floor to the chairman who acknowledged and excused Mr and Mrs Paulo to leave as the committee continued with another meeting.

APPENDIX 3

List farmers maintained by committee showing sampled households to the right (NB this is an excel document copied to word)

Number	Name	Sex				
1	Dombo John	M	94	Initial random selection of 40		
2	Saraure Tendai	M	151	6	Zororo Peter	M
3	Rufaro Tumbare	M	55	15	Mutandwa Chris	M
4	Taingei Clever	M	98	18	Chireya Zvataida	M
5	Tozivei Rugare	M	190	27	Makore Petros	M
6	Zororo Peter	M	117	31	Mutohwe Onias	M
7	Duri Andrew	M	27	31	Mutohwe Onias	M
8	Tanda Kudakwashe	M	66	34	Kaunda Price	M
9	Moyo Zabeth	M	191	34	Kaunda Price	M
10	Kadenge Israel	M	85	42	Nkomo Cite	M
11	Kundiona James	M	34	42	Nkomo Cite	M
12	Mbudzana Frank	M	154	55	Kure Steven	M
13	Maganda Claris	F	196	59	Dzukwa Douglas	M
14	Makwembere Regina	M	71	62	Zivai Glenda	F
15	Mutandwa Chris	M	196	63	Mapundu Owen	M
16	Furamera Moses	M	42	64	Mapundu Diamond	M
17	Murombo Jenifer	F	98	66	Fushai Shadreck	M
18	Chireya Zvataida	M	104	71	Bere Gaudencia	F
19	Soko Victor	M	129	79	Karanda Zadzisai	M
20	Udinge Montrose	M	59	85	Muduku Gloria	F
21	Kuenda Frank	M	31	94	Mbembesi Bonface	M
22	Mhofu Jockonia	M	165	95	Muswe Edmore	M
23	Mutare Clever	M	99	98	Muswe Simon	M
24	Munda Sentry	M	15	98	Muswe Simon	M
25	Mudonhi Zivei	M	64	99	Kodzai Anotida	M
26	Shamu Terence	M	159	103	Dungwe Thomas	M
27	Makore Petros	M	103	104	Tavarera Nhamo	M
28	Makore Trust	M	157	117	Mutendi Abraham	M
29	Mandimika Mufaro	M	18	129	Makonese Munyaradzi	M
39	Mutandawa Janet	F	31	135	Ranganai Clever	M
31	Mutohwe Onias	M	95	135	Ranganai Clever	M
32	Mhene Grace	F	135	137	Dehwa Tonderayi	M
33	Kadendere Musa	M	135	151	Tokwe Widson	M
34	Kaunda Price	M	6	154	Mharapara Sylvester	M
35	Murenga John	M	62	157	Bhamu Oliver	M
35	Mudungwe Mudungwe	M	137	159	Mukweza Marita	M
37	Macheka Savious	M	79	165	Tungamirai Shadreck	M
38	Zisengwe Clerk	M	42	190	Matutu Solomon	M
39	Manyongo Albert	M	63	191	Chaduka Morrison	M
40	Nenzou Mutandwa	M	34	196	Tendekai Nicholas	M
41	Zvanaka Dudzai	F		196	Tendekai Nicholas	M
42	Nkomo Cite	M				
43	Danha Andrew	M		2nd random sample to make up for repeats		
44	Murefu Deliah	F		2	Saraure Tendai	
45	Dongo Smart	M		75	Gambiza Gambiza	

46	Chedu Moses	M	197	Chingwaru Stonard
47	Pachada Stephen	M	106	Kazhinyu Collen
48	Mukwada Solomon	M	23	Mutare Clever
49	Kwane Gloria	F	151	Tokwe Widson
50	Feresu Daniel	M		
51	Gandanzara Kainos	M		
52	Mapepa Trevor	M		
53	Mberi Method	M		
54	Dudzai Christmas	M		
55	Dudzai Solo	M		
56	Kure Steven	M		
57	Mutami Brenda	F		
58	Chingapa Benard	M		
59	Dzukwa Douglas	M		
60	Kwerere Trust	M		
61	Maita Besa	M		
62	Zivai Glenda	F		
63	Mapundu Owen	M		
64	Mapundu Diamond	M		
65	Svorai Tendekai	M		
66	Fushai Shadreck	M		
67	Fushai Anthony	M		
68	Fushai Farai	M		
68	Rutendo Shepherd	M		
70	Mupani Simon	M		
71	Bere Gaudencia	F		
72	Chivende Tinos	M		
73	Mawere Patrick	M		
74	Mupepereki Denis	M		
75	Gambiza Gambiza	M		
76	Kwari Majority	M		
77	Kwangari Francis	M		
78	Chipara Wilson	M		
79	Karanda Zadzisai	M		
80	Gapara Severino	M		
81	Gororo Benard	M		
82	Derere Anselem	M		
83	Meck Dorothy	F		
84	Muduku Agnes	F		
85	Muduku Gloria	F		
86	Vengarai Nicholas	M		
87	Somerai Willard	M		
88	Somanje Naison	M		
89	Kadondo Martin	M		
90	Kudakwashe Stranger	M		
91	Chiwira Boy	M		
92	Tsoro Shingirai	M		
93	Shiri Trymore	M		
94	Mbembesi Bonface	M		
95	Muswe Edmore	M		

96	Muswe Frank	M			
97	Muswe Fidelis	M			
98	Muswe Simon	M	149	Muchada Titos	M
99	Kodzai Anotida	M	150	Gavanga Jabulani	M
100	Beura Krainos	M	151	Tokwe Widson	M
101	Mushayi Strive	M	152	Mapani Charles	M
102	Dendere Norman	M	153	Tonoona Onias	M
103	Dungwe Thomas	M	154	Mharapara Sylvester	M
104	Tavarera Nhamo	M	155	Devure Stanmore	M
105	Goba Faranando	M	156	Mutimutema Kezias	F
106	Kazhinyu Collen	M	157	Bhamu Oliver	M
107	Goredema Innocent	M	158	Musasa Julius	M
108	Hurudza Ananias	M	159	Mukweza Marita	M
109	Takavarasha Smart	M	160	Choto Godwin	M
110	Hungwe Charles	M	161	Mauta Collet	M
112	Ndlovu Tendai	M	162	Chitiyo Golden	M
113	Tumbare Ratidzai	F	163	Mukonga Noah	M
114	Nyanga Rufaro	F	164	Tinapi Shingirayi	M
115	Marange Ezekiel	M	165	Tungamirai Shadreck	M
116	Murungu Jackson	M	166	Mbongoro Petros	M
117	Mutendi Abraham	M	167	Matendere Elias	M
118	Chiweda Gift	M	168	Hove Aleck	M
119	Mherekumombe Issac	M	169	Panashe Monitor	M
120	Kubare Taurai	M	170	Manyanga Oliver	M
121	Dare Twoboy	M	171	Mukabeta Lawrence	M
122	Chipunza Gideon	M	172	Tungwarara Peter	M
123	Chabikwa Stanford	M	173	Mhizha Simon	M
124	Checheche Shakey	M	174	Buzuzi Milton	M
125	Chakanyuka Tendai	M	175	Matondo Matthew	M
126	Muchecheti Justin	M	176	Kurerwa Denis	M
127	Munyongani Fungai	M	177	Gumunyu Bothwell	M
128	Muchenje Austin	M	178	Gore Patrick	M
129	Makonese Munyaradzi	M	179	Hondo Shakeman	M
130	Rangwa Observer	M	180	Hurungwe Emmanuel	M
131	Mutorogodo Muranda	M	181	Gutu Elbert	M
132	Mawere Patrick	M	182	Muponda Makemore	M
133	Gwenhere Zivanai	M	183	Kadani Takesure	M
134	Vilakati Sammy	M	184	Kwekweze Edmore	M
135	Ranganai Clever	M	185	Jekenya Levy	M
136	Musaurwa Joel	M	186	Mutede Victor	M
137	Dehwa Tonderayi	M	187	Mabhiza Herbert	M
138	Mukundi Anthony	M	188	Muzvarwa Albert	M
139	Bhera Stanford	M	189	Zvenyika Shorai	M
140	Moyo Nkululeko	M	190	Matutu Solomon	M
141	Banda Kennedy	M	191	Chaduka Morrison	M
142	Marata Francisca	F	192	Nemangwe Tongai	M
143	Kusemwa Dereck	M	193	Dafa Francis	M
144	Zvomuya Bright	M	194	Matope Evans	M
145	Siringwani Attempt	M	195	Shuvai Michael	M
146	Nyamakupe Arnold	M	196	Tendekai Nicholas	M

147	Ndondo Clever	M	197	Chingwaru Stonard	M
148	Kuremba James	M	198	Murehwa Denford	M
	199	Chibi Arnold	M		
	200	Mhosva Mufori	M		
	201	Chilimanzi Calvin	M		