

**SOCIAL POLICY OUTCOMES OF ZIMBABWE'S FAST TRACK LAND REFORM
PROGRAM (FTLRP): A CASE STUDY OF KWEKWE DISTRICT**

By

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The poor are not poor because they are poor but because they are socially deprived, that is, they can help themselves if someone somewhere in society can help them to do so.

Archie Mafeje (2003)

Student Number: 53318218

I declare that ***SOCIAL POLICY OUTCOMES OF ZIMBABWE'S FAST TRACK LAND REFORM PROGRAM (FTLRP): A CASE STUDY OF KWEKWE DISTRICT*** is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

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21 November, 2016

DEDICATION

To 'Dr. Winston',

An inscription that was curved on stones of the plains of Chiundura

As I was herding my grandfather's cattle

When I was young and pregnant of colossal aspiration.

ABSTRACT

Social policy outcomes of Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP): A case study of Kwekwe District

This thesis explores social policy outcomes of the FTLRP. The thesis comes from an appreciation that there has been a lot of attention that has been given to the process and outcomes of the FTLRP. Various and sometimes antagonistic analytical frameworks have been employed by different scholars who come from different epistemological standings resulting in academic polarity on the subject of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe. This thesis transcends all the analytical frameworks to provide a unique perspective of the extent to which the FTLRP achieved social policy outcomes. Some of the scholars who have written on this subject have grappled with some of the social policy outcomes without however a deliberate focus on social policy outcomes.

The main contribution of this thesis to the body of knowledge is its exploration of the extent to which the FTLRP has been a social policy tool that has achieved social policy outcomes. This is important because for a long time land reform has not been generally considered as a social policy tool in the main stream social policy literature. The reason for this is that social policy literature has been dominated by OECD scholars who naturally focused more on social policy tools that are more relevant to their contexts. In the process they have sought to transpose the tools that are more prevalent in their contexts to Africa. Consequently, social policy tools from the global south, such as land reform, have not featured in any significant way in mainstream social policy literature.

The thesis used the transformative social policy framework in both the research and analysis of the data. The conceptual framework identifies five functions of social policy namely redistribution, production, protection, reproduction and social cohesion. Using a mixed methods approach, the thesis interrogated the extent to which the five functions of social policy were realised by the FTLRP. Research findings have shown that the major outcome that was unequivocally realised was redistribution. This is so because the country's agrarian structure

dramatically changed from a bi-modal set up where 6000 white farmers owned more than 35 percent of the arable land to a new structure where about 180 000 households of diverse backgrounds, *inter alia* former farm workers, people from communal areas, civil servants, war veterans, pensioners, government senior civil servants and the unemployed, now work and live on the same land. The other four social policy functions were achieved to varying degrees. Lastly, the research looked at the human development outcomes of the FTLRP by focusing on the state of education in the resettled areas. The research observed that the FTLRP increased both primary (13%) and secondary (31%) education accessibility for the children of land beneficiaries. Due to the abrupt nature with which education services were on demand, the quality was compromised.

Key Words

Social Policy; land reform; transformative social policy; social policy outcomes; social cohesion; social protection; reproduction; redistribution; production; education.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION.....	iv
ABSTRACT v	
LIST OF TABLES	xii
LIST OF FIGURES	xiii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	xv
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Land reforms in a global context	2
1.3 Historical Background to land reform in Zimbabwe	3
1.4 Post-Independence Land Reform.....	5
1.5 Wedded To Monopoly-Finance Capital	7
1.6 Statement of the problem	11
1.7 Scope Of The Research	14
1.8 Research Questions	14
1.9 Research Objectives	15
1.9.1 Primary research objective.....	15
1.9.2 Secondary research objectives	15
1.10 Limitations To And Scope Of The Study	15
1.11 Importance Of The Study	15
1.12 Organisation Of The Thesis.....	16
1.13 Conclusion	24
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW	25
2.1 Introduction	25
2.2 Right of conquest justification for redistribution.....	25
2.3 The fast track land reform process.....	27
2.3.1 Organisation of the FTLRP.....	27
Table 2.1: Mode of land access for beneficiaries.....	31
2.4 Diction of ideological framing	32
2.5 Approaches To FTLRP Outcomes Debates	32
2.5.1 The neopatrimonial approach	33
2.5.2 The human rights approach.....	36
2.5.3 Right to development.....	39
2.6 The ‘Two Lefts’	39
2.6.1 The livelihoods approach.....	40
2.6.2 The political economy approach.....	47

2.7	Conclusion.....	48
CHAPTER 3: Conceptual framework: Transformative social policy		50
3.1	Introduction	50
3.2	Returning to the wider social policy vision	50
3.3	Transformative Social Policy Conceptual Framework.....	54
3.4	Development and Social Policy: A Nexus.....	56
3.4.1	Conceptualising Development.....	57
3.4.2	Social development indicators and social policy outcomes.....	60
3.5	Conclusion.....	65
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY		67
4.1	Introduction	67
4.2	Positivism	67
4.3	Interpretivism	69
4.4	Emic and etic approaches in research	71
4.5	Background information on research site- Kwekwe District.....	72
4.6	Kwekwe Demographics.....	74
4.7	Research design	75
4.7.1	Mixed methods approach.....	75
4.7.2	The ethnographic study of Kwekwe District	77
4.7.3	Study sample.....	79
4.8	Research techniques.....	81
4.8.1	In-depth interviews	81
4.8.2	Key informant interviews	82
4.8.3	Focus group discussions	83
4.8.4	Observation, interaction and informal questioning.....	85
4.9	Data analysis	86
4.10	Administration of the study	86
4.11	Ethical considerations	89
4.12	Conclusion	89
CHAPTER 5: IN THE YEAR 2008... ..		91
5.1	Introduction	91
5.2	First phase: 2000-2006	91
5.3	Second phase: 2007-2008	93
5.4	Sanctions	94
5.5	Historical inflation.....	97
5.6	Political polarity	99

5.7	Social policy in crisis times?	100
5.7.1	The Basic Commodities Supply Side Intervention (BACOSI)	100
5.7.2	Farm mechanization program	102
5.7.3	Interventions on the Cholera Outbreak	103
5.8	Phase 3: 2009 to current	104
5.8.1	Dollarization in 2009	104
5.9	Conclusion	106
CHAPTER 6: REDISTRIBUTIVE social policy OUTCOME OF THE FTLRP		108
6.1	Introduction	108
6.2	The redistributive function of social policy	109
6.3	The new agrarian structure	110
6.4	Land access in Kwekwe District	116
6.5	Profiles of land beneficiaries	120
6.6	Educational levels of land beneficiaries	123
6.7	Ages of land beneficiaries	124
6.8	Gender composition of land beneficiaries	125
6.9	Land ownership versus land access	127
6.10	Gender dynamics amongst farm workers on the resettled farms	128
6.11	The <i>tsewu</i>	129
6.12	Place of origin of Kwekwe land beneficiaries	131
6.13	Farm residency and homesteads	132
6.14	Conclusion	134
CHAPTER 7: PRODUCTION OUTCOME OF THE FTLRP		136
7.1	Introduction	136
7.2	Production and productivity- whose productivity?	136
7.4	Tobacco production	143
7.5	Maize production	145
7.6	Agricultural Inputs and financing	148
7.7	Livestock production patterns	151
7.8	Agricultural labour	152
7.9	Support services for production	156
7.10	Media and production	159
7.11	Agricultural markets	160
7.12	Non-farm income generating activities	163
7.13	Conclusion	166
CHAPTER 8: LAND REFORM AS AN <i>EX ANTE</i> SOCIAL PROTECTION TOOL		168

8.1	Introduction	168
8.2	Social protection conceptual handle	169
8.3	Land reform as a social protection tool.....	171
8.3.1	Shelter from vulnerability	172
8.3.2	Food	173
8.4	Beyond livelihood diversification to accumulation	175
8.6	Food sovereignty and social assistance.....	180
8.7	Conclusion.....	181
CHAPTER 9: SOCIAL COHESION.....		182
9.1	Introduction	183
9.2	What is social cohesion?	183
9.3	Social cohesion in the African context.....	185
9.4	Social organisation in the aftermath of the FTLRP	186
9.5	Strangers all around!	187
9.6	Witchcraft	189
9.7	Agency and norms of solidarity	190
9.7.1	The water project at Umlala farm	191
9.7.2	The secondary school project in Sherwood Farm.....	192
9.8	Horizontal agency in action.....	193
9.9	Whose water?.....	195
9.10	Social organisation and agency	196
9.10.1	The role of chiefs in social cohesion	198
9.10.2	Role of rural authorities in fostering horizontal cohesion	200
9.10.3	Churches and mutual aid societies.....	202
9.11	Conclusion	204
CHAPTER 10: EDUCATION OUTCOMES OF THE FTLRP		206
10.1	Introduction	206
10.2	Education as an <i>ex ante</i> social policy tool.....	207
10.3	Education in Zimbabwe	208
10.4	Education legislative framework in Zimbabwe	209
10.5	State of education in satellite schools.....	211
10.5.1	Availability	211
10.6	Accessibility	221
10.6.1	Distance to schools	223
10.6.2	Early childhood development education (ECD).....	224
10.6.3	The Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM)	226

10.7	Acceptability	228
10.7.1	Fluid curriculum	228
10.7.2	Language of instruction	230
10.7.3	What exposure? Whose exposure? Why exposure?	231
10.8	Adaptability	232
10.9	Conclusion	234
CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION		236
11.1	Introduction	236
11.2	Summary of the discussions	236
11.3	Contribution to debates and knowledge	244
11.3.1	Land reform as a social policy tool.....	244
11.3.2	From bi-modal to tri-modal agrarian structure	245
11.3.3	Reproduction in the resettlement areas	246
11.3.4	The concept of <i>musha</i>	247
11.3.5	Livestock as a safety net	247
11.3.6	Grain marketing board as a social protection tool	248
11.3.7	The symbiosis between economic and social policies	248
11.4	Policy Recommendations	249
11.4.1	Land audit	249
11.4.2	Land tenure security.....	249
11.4.3	Agricultural financing modalities	250
11.4.4	Strengthening agronomic services	250
11.4.5	Investment in irrigation services	251
11.4.6	Access to inputs and product markets.....	251
11.5	Conclusion	252
BIBLIOGRAPHY		253
Published and unpublished academic materials		253
Government Reports, Legislation and Policy Directives		287
NGO and Farmer Unions Reports		290
Newspaper and Internet Articles		290
Press Statements and Correspondence		291
ANNEXURES 292		
Annexure 1: Schedule of Interviews		292
Annexure 2: Schedule of the Focus Group Discussions		293
End Notes		294

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1	Mode of land access for the beneficiaries
Table 4.1	Summary of samples
Table 4.2	Disaggregation of in-depth interviews
Table 5.1	Foreign Currency market rates annual averages: Zimbabwe Dollars to one USD
Table 5.2	BACOSSI distribution total reach
Table 5.3	Farm Mechanisation program equipment distributed
Table 6.1	Kwekwe District Agrarian Structure
Table 6.2	Tri-modal Agrarian Structure
Table 6.3	The new national agrarian structure
Table 6.4	Redistribution patterns in selected provinces of Zimbabwe
Table 6.5	Professions of land beneficiaries in 6 districts surveyed by AIAS
Table 6.6	Education Levels for Kwekwe District FTLRP plot owners
Table 6.7	Place of origin for land beneficiaries
Table 6.8	Residency of plot owners in newly settled areas by settlement type
Table 7.1	National tobacco sales in 2013 and 2014
Table 7.2	Disaggregation of the distribution of tobacco growers 2014/2015 season
Table 7.3	Access to productive tools at national level for A2 model-2013
Table 7.4	Kwekwe District sources of agricultural credit for farmers in 2013
Table 7.5	Wage determination methods in Kwekwe District
Table 7.6	Marketing channels used by A2 farmers
Table 8.1	Household source of food by settlement type in Kwekwe District
Table 8.2	Source of household income by settlement type in Kwekwe District
Table 8.3	Livestock sale patterns in newly resettled and communal areas of Kwekwe District
Table 8.4	Number of households receiving food aid by settlement type in Kwekwe District
Table 10.1	Book to pupil ratio at Mupamombe Secondary School
Table 10.2	Sherwood Primary School catchment area

LIST OF FIGURES

- Figure 2.1 Sustainable rural livelihoods: A framework for analysis
- Figure 3.1 Transformative Social Policy Conceptual Framework
- Figure 4.1 Locating the mixed methods approach in research paradigms
- Figure 5.1 Phase 1 Agricultural performance
- Figure 5.2 Zimbabwe periodic loan inflows
- Figure 5.3 Trends on FDI flows since independence
- Figure 5.4 GDP trends for Zimbabwe
- Figure 5.5 Zimbabwe Growth rate 2009-2015
- Figure 6.1 Year of formal land allocation for newly resettled land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District
- Figure 6.2 Kwekwe District land holding for A1 beneficiaries
- Figure 6.3 Kwekwe District A2 land beneficiaries
- Figure 6.4 Age distribution of land beneficiaries in Sherwood Farm
- Figure 6.5 Gender disaggregation of land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District
- Figure 6.6 Farm residency trends in Kwekwe District
- Figure 7.1 Production trends for maize, tobacco and sorghum
- Figure 7.2 Land beneficiaries' crop production affected by drought
- Figure 7.3 Time series showing the extreme rainfall years in Zimbabwe
- Figure 7.4 Maize production for the first decade of the FTLRP
- Figure 7.5 Production grievances for Kwekwe District
- Figure 7.6 Bank loans by sector in 2014
- Figure 7.7 Cattle ownership in Umlala Farm
- Figure 7.8 Hiring of farm labour in Kwekwe District
- Figure 7.9 Kwekwe District farm workers perceptions of working conditions
- Figure 7.10 Contact with government agencies for resettled land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District
- Figure 7.11 Sources of agricultural information in newly resettled areas
- Figure 7.12 Involvement in non-farming income generating activities
- Figure 8.1 Land reform beneficiaries' residency on farms

- Figure 8.2 Number of meals consumed per day by settlement type in Kwekwe District
- Figure 9.1 Place of origin of land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District
- Figure 9.2 Cooperation among resettled households in Kwekwe District
- Figure 10.1 Number of schools between 1999 and 2015 in Kwekwe District
- Figure 10.2 National Budget Allocation to education in Zimbabwe, 2009-2015
- Figure 10.3 Ministry of Education, Sport, Art and Culture expenditure categories, 2010
- Figure 10.4 Gender dynamics at Sherwood Primary School enrolment, 2015
- Figure 10.5 Enrolment figures for Mupamombe Secondary School
- Figure 10.6 Bonstead Secondary School and national Ordinary Level pass rate comparison
- Figure 10.7 Sherwood Primary School Grade 7 Results
- Figure 10.8 Mupamombe Secondary School Pass Rate
- Figure 10.9 Bonstead Secondary School 2014 results.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AGRITEX	Agricultural Technical and Extension Services
AIAS	African Institute for Agrarian Studies
AIDS	Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome
ARDA	Agriculture and Rural Development Authority
AREX	Agricultural Rural Extension Services
ART	Anti-Retroviral Treatment
BEAM	Basic Education Assistance Module
BIPPA	Bilateral Promotion and Protection Agreement
CA	Communal Areas
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFSS	Commercial Farm Settlement Scheme
CFU	Commercial Farmers Union
CIO	Central intelligence Organisation
CSO	Central Statistical Office
Cottco	Cotton Company
DA	District Administrator
DAC	District Aids Committee
DAEO	District Agricultural Extension Officer
DCC	District Coordinating Committees
DDF	District Development Fund
DLARR	Department of Land Acquisition and Rural Resettlement
DLC	District Lands Committee,
DLIC	District Land Identification Committee
EMA	Environmental Management Agency
ETF	Education Transitional Fund
FCTZ	Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe
FLI	Farm Level Institutions
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Program
GAPWUZ	General Agriculture and Plantation Workers Union

GMB	Grain Marketing Board
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
GPA	Global Political Agreement
Ha	Hectare
HIV	Human Immuno Deficiency Virus
ICA	Intensive Conservation Area
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JAG	Justice for Agriculture
LSCF	Large Scale Commercial Farms
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MLRR	Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement
MP	Member of Parliament
NAC	National Aids Committee
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRA _s	Newly Resettled Areas
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PLIC	Provincial Land Identification Committee
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RDC	Rural District Council
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAFIRE	Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources
SIRDC	Scientific Industrial Research and Documentation Centre
TIMB	Tobacco Industry Marketing Board
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UZ	University of Zimbabwe
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
WAC	Ward Aids Committee
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
WB	World Bank
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

ZESA	Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Company
ZFU	Zimbabwe Farmers Union
ZIDERA	Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
ZIJRI	Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative
ZIMPLATS	Zimbabwe Platinum Mines
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZNFU	Zimbabwe National Farmers Union
ZNLWA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

There have been several land reforms that have happened around the world in the last century. Some of the most prominent ones were in Latin Americas, East Asia, India, and Ethiopia and most recently in Zimbabwe. The fast track land reform program that happened in Zimbabwe from around 2000 to 2004 has been a subject of immense academic curiosity (see for instance Kinsey, 2004; Moyo and Yeros, 2005b, 2007a, 2007b; Helliker, 2006; Sadomba, 2008a; Alexander, 2003; Moore, 2003; Murisa, 2010, Matondi, 2011; Munyuki-Hungwe, 2011; Scoones, 2011, 2015; Chiweshe, 2012; Mkodzongi, 2013). These scholars have been covering the subject using different ideological approaches. Some of the scholars such as Raftopolous (2003), Moore (2003), Kinsey (2004), and Zamchiya (2011) have used the neo patrimonial approach which emphasised the democratic deficits of the process. The other angle was the livelihoods approach which was used by scholars such as Scoones *et al.* (2010). Moyo and his counterparts have been instrumental in providing the political economy perspective of both the process and outcomes of the FTLRP (see Moyo and Yeros, 2005b; Moyo, 2004, 2005, 2011a, 2011b; AIAS, 2009, 2014).

In light of the voluminous literature available on the FTLRP, this study is concerned with the social policy outcomes of the process. Reading through the scholarly works, it can be argued that the land reform achieved some social policy goals. The purpose of this thesis is to create a self-conscious body of knowledge on the social policy outcomes of the FTLRP. The thesis will use transformative social policy framework. The framework is made up of five social policy functions namely production, redistribution, protection, reproduction and social cohesion.

The study uses primarily an emic approach where it places premium on the experiences of the farmers and their perspectives on the outcomes of the land reform. The thesis pays particular attention on what the land beneficiaries have reason to value, which many scholars have not given much attention to because of the etic approach they have used. The focus on beneficiaries' experiences and introspective interpretation of their new reality sheds more light

on the tangible outcomes of the land reform considering the fact that this research has been done fifteen years after the fast-track phase of land redistribution started. The aspect of looking at how the land reform has improved the beneficiaries' lives is coherent with social policy objectives, whose primary purpose is ensuring that each citizen in a given territory can have a life of dignity regardless of status, gender, ethnicity, age, etc. (Adesina 2009).

1.2 Land reforms in a global context

There have been several land reforms around the world prior to the FTLRP that took place in Zimbabwe. In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, land reforms preceded any significant industrialisation with 33.3%, 27.3%, and 26.9% of arable land being redistributed in the three countries respectively (Binswanger, *et al.*, 1995). The land reforms were a key ingredient to the subsequent success of the industrialisation that later took place (Kay, 2002). In Latin America the post-colonial states inherited highly unequal patterns of land ownership dominated by *latifundios* that were established in most situations through expropriation of indigenous community lands in Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Honduras (De Janvry, 1981). To correct the skewed agrarian structures, in El Salvador, 27.9% of the arable land was redistributed while Bolivia redistributed 32.3% and Mexico, 13.5% (Ibid). Besides inheriting a skewed agrarian structure, the other driver for land reforms Latin America were the high rates of rural poverty despite increased urbanisation of major cities in the region. Most of the land reforms therefore were led by the rural social movements in the spirit of claiming restitution of ancestral territories that had been annexed by the colonialists. A different allocation mechanism was employed in Brazil, Colombia and the Philippines. These countries used 'market-assisted' mechanisms which were brokered by the states (Borras, 2003; Deininger and Binswanger, 1999). In this variant of redistributive reform, land transactions between large landowners and aspiring smallholders took place (at least partly) through markets, facilitated by favourable loan programs offered by the government (Sikor *et al.*, 2009).

The land reforms did not have similar results. In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the land reforms helped improve productivity and set the stage for an impressive increase in non-agricultural development (Jeon and Kim, 2000). In the Philippines, the land reforms benefited more than half a million households and improved household welfare (Otsuka, 1991). The land reform also increased investment and human capital accumulation (Deininger and Olinto, 2001). In Latin America however, the land reforms distributed relatively large amounts of land but did

not manage to improve productivity of the land beneficiaries hence the reforms did not successfully assist in overcoming deep-rooted structural inequalities (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1989). In the context of Africa, countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia (see Rahmato, 1984) undertook their own land reforms. Most recently, South Africa has been embarking in the process using the restitution approach. The progress has not been as significant compared to Latin American countries, for instance. The most pronounced land reform process in the context of Africa has been in Zimbabwe. The proceeding section traces the historical land distribution imbalances in Zimbabwe.

1.3 Historical Background to land reform in Zimbabwe

Colonisation of Zimbabwe started around the 1890s when Cecil John Rhodes and the 'Pioneer Column' crossed the Limpopo River in search of gold fields. This movement by the early settlers toward the north of South Africa was driven by massive gold discoveries on the Rand—now Johannesburg around the 1870s (Lebert, 2003). In pursuit of this second rand (Nyandoro and Nyangoni, 1979), the white settlers' expectations were not met in Zimbabwe. They however started expropriating land as they deciphered that the climate was conducive for agriculture and most of the land was fertile for viable agriculture. The colonialists were coming from Europe where land ownership was a preserve of the aristocracy. They saw the opportunity to own land as a short cut into higher social classes to which they did not belong in their countries of origin. Land expropriation started with the British South Africa Company (BSAC) being granted the Royal Charter in 1889. Building on that, draconian laws such as the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 were then promulgated (ZANU, 1963, quoted in Nyandoro and Nyangoni, 1979). By 1910, the colonialists had annexed about 23% of all fertile land while allocating only 26% to blacks as native reserves (Herbst, 1987).

By 1920, more than 104 separate native reserves ranging in size from 2 100 to 625 000 hectares had been created (Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1988). Masilela and Weiner (1996) observed that the period prior to 1920 could be summed up as the land alienation period, which was characterised by expropriations of land and mining rights. The Land Apportionment Act 'allocated fixed Reserves—generally poor, remote and inadequate—to the people' (Douglas, 1984: 137). The alienated lands of Africans became 'European areas' (Elich, 2002). Kinsey (2004: 2) further noted that for some 90 years that the country was a settler colony, the adoption of

discriminatory agricultural policies and the alienation of most of the fertile, well-watered land to European settlers resulted in the oppression, marginalization and impoverishment of indigenous people (Cheater, 1988; Mamdani, 1986, Kinsey, 1999; Moyana, 2002).

The productive capacity for the blacks was curtailed through the promulgation of restrictive laws like the Maize Control Acts of 1931 and 1934 and the Cattle Levy Acts of 1931 and 1934 (PCA, 1980). The Maize Control Act was instituted to limit the marketing options for the indigenous population when they would have wanted to sell their produce. The Cattle Levy Act was introduced as a mechanism to expropriate the indigenous people's cattle (Masilela and Weiner, 1996). The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 was promulgated. The objective of this Act was:

To provide for the control of the utilisation and allocation of land occupied by natives, and to ensure its efficient use for agricultural purposes; and to require natives to perform labour for conserving natural resources and for promoting good husbandry.

The purpose of this law was to confer individual tenure rights to a specified parcel of grazing or arable land which contradicted the customary basis of African land tenure where the land and its resources belonged to the community of which every full member had an inalienable right of avail (Thomas, 1991). Further, in 1969, the Tribal Trust Land Act was put in place. This Act sought to provide stricter prohibitions of land claims in white settler areas by blacks. The Act legally defined races as European and Africans and divided the whole country into two halves for the two races (Sullins, 1991) despite the fact that whites were 5% of the total population (PCA, 1980).

Due to the lucrative prospects that were in Africa, the immigration of white settlers increased from 80 000 to 220 000 between 1945 and 1960 (Palmer & Birch, 1992). This engendered 'wholesale forced removal of African people to make room for white farming up to the 1950s' (Cliffe, 2000: 36). The indigenous black people continued to be forced from their land right up to the 1970s (McGreal, 2002).

The aforementioned legislative regime effectively created a bimodal agrarian structure involving large scale farms and marginal small capitalist and peasant farms was tied to industrial interests wholly owned by local white minority and foreign capital (Moyo, 2009). The agrarian structure which the colonial state created facilitated accumulation using large scale estate farming which were supported by the state through irrigation facilities, dams, rural

electrification and other infrastructure. The accumulation was meant to reduce importation of agricultural produce like sugar and wheat (Moyo, 2011). This import substitution and export led development agenda continued to serve a skewed socio political system where the white minority enjoyed a lion's share (Stoneman 1988).

The colonial state had grafted Zimbabwe into the world capitalist system albeit serving the interest of the white minority. The political system created unequal relations and a repressive agrarian structure which was the embodiment of the colonial state (Moyo, 2009). As has been postulated, the repression and inequality were structured through laws, land dispossessions, extra economic regulation, and taxes. Subsequently, these initiatives made Zimbabwe into a labour reserve economy (Amin 1972) for the minority white capitalists. The blacks found themselves compelled to work on the farms and mines for meagre wages so that they could meet the colonial state's demands of exorbitant taxes (Arrighi, 1973).

Consequently, the land became more emblematic of the national liberation struggle (Palmer, 1977; 1990). Nationalist leaders during the liberation struggle continued to remind people that the primary purpose of the liberation struggle was the restoration of the land expropriated by colonial settlers. Subsequently, a legitimate expectation was created in the masses at independence that there will be recovery of this significant resource from the colonial settlers. Mafeje (2003) noted that the issue of land was more than 'a physical solum', but was considered to be a social endowment that in principle was inalienable. The land was treated as a permanent part of human existence with inestimable value. It is against this background that communities sent their sons and daughters to fight a common enemy who had stripped them of their dignity and essence of their lives.

1.4 Post-Independence Land Reform

When Zimbabwe obtained its independence in 1980, the country 'inherited a highly skewed land distribution structure, with around 6,000 white commercial farmers and a number of large agro-industrial estates occupying more than a third of the country's land area' (Weiner 1988: 74). The remaining indigenous communal farmers — about 700,000 households — subsisted on 16.4 million hectares. This was less than half of the country's agricultural land. Of particular significance was that 75 per cent of the land owned by communal farmers was in agro-ecological regions 4 and 5, which are drier and less fertile. There was therefore a keenly felt sense of historical injustice and deprivation, focused on land (Sachikonye, 1992:20).

With this discrepancy, the post-colonial government wanted to execute its promise immediately of returning land to the black people by embarking on land reform program. The land reform was meant to redress historical settler-colonial land dispossession and the related racial and foreign domination, as well as the class-based agrarian inequalities which the colonial state promoted (Moyo, 2009). Unfortunately, there were constitutional provisions of the Lancaster House agreement that were a constraint (Chaumba *et al.*, 2003) to conducting land reform in a wholesale way.

Even though the land reform was not carried out in the way that was initially desired for the envisaged benefits noted above, the government invoked the ‘willing seller/ willing buyer basis’ that was enshrined in the Lancaster House Agreement and the constitution. The limitations with this approach meant that any resettlement was going to be slow and expensive since compensation was supposed to be paid in foreign currency (Moyo 2000). Also the approach did not produce much result as few settler farmers were willing sellers. The ‘willing seller’ principle ensured that whites only sold the land that had been abandoned during the War of Liberation, or else was of poor quality, thereby denying beneficiaries of the land reform the opportunity to establish a successful economic sector (Alexander, 1994: 343–344; Cliffe, 2000: 37; Munslow, 1985).

In pursuit of land reform, soon after independence, a target of 18,000 households was set. This was increased to 54,000 in 1982 and then to 162 000 households two years later (Moyo, 1995). Although the resettlement programme never achieved these more ambitious levels, it had some significant impact (Palmer and Birch, 1992). By 1989, the government had resettled some 52,000 households and had purchased 2.7 million hectares (around 16%, of commercial farmland). By 1996, a total of 71,000 families had been resettled (Moyo, 2000). The reasons for the stall in land redistribution in the mid-1980s were complex. Pressures to retain the Lancaster House principle of voluntarism came from the predominantly white Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), the civil service and foreign donors, including the British government and the World Bank (Alexander, 1994). By 1997, about 800 black commercial farmers holding about 10 % of the large scale commercial farmlands had emerged, against 4 000 whites holding about 10 million hectares (Moyo, 2001). The GoZ had expected to redistribute 50% of the white controlled land, but 5 million hectares of this remained to be transferred (*ibid*).

Be that as it may, the government saw the resettlement programme as necessary to 'neutralize a looming crisis of expectation on the part of a land hungry population' (Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1981: 124). Resettlement was seen as a political imperative that would create stability and also promote economic growth. As a result, the agricultural policy that was developed focused more on increasing smallholder participation in markets and diversifying the range and value of agrarian market (Moyo, 2000). Furthermore, the land reform was envisaged to promote national self-sufficiency, enhancing food security and general agricultural development. The agricultural policy also sought to boost labour intensive, small farmer production in order to optimize land productivity and returns on capital invested (Moyo, 1995). This strategy ensured positive macro-economic benefits including 'growth with equity', political reconciliation in a racially polarized society, and inclusivity for the marginalised in the economy of the country.

1.5 Wedded To Monopoly-Finance Capital

Zimbabwe introduced economic structural adjustment program (ESAP) between 1990 and 1995 (Sachikonye, 2003: 8). This was against the background of a decline in the country's Gross Domestic Product from 6.98 percent in 1990 to 0.15 percent in 1995. It is against such a background of poor economic performance that the government was compelled to seek World Bank and International Monetary Fund support towards economic revitalisation (Makoni, 2000). The key components of the ESAP were: a) trade liberalisation; b) fiscal and monetary policy reforms; c) public enterprise reforms; d) budget deficit reduction; and e) the de-regulation of investment, labour and prices. It was projected that the combination of these reforms would, over a five year period, lead to increased and sustainable levels of growth (Sachikonye, 2003: 10). Hardly a year after adoption of ESAP, import cover had literally fallen in 1991 (Kadenge, 1992). A general economic crisis was therefore looming and since the government had no alternative policy, it accepted market reforms that made the country to receive loans from IMF and the World Bank (Ibid).

The conventional wisdom of the World Bank at that time was that the agricultural sector was one of the victims of state-directed economic regimes riddled with an urban bias. The World Bank argued that indirect taxation depressed farming incomes resulting in poor performance for the agricultural sector. These 'distortions' influenced by the state were to be ameliorated by letting market forces determine product and input prices and the terms of trade between

agriculture and the rest of the economy (World Bank, 1989). According to the Bank (1989), these measures would restore agricultural export and growth while improving rural incomes and livelihoods. In the same breadth, cut backs in public expenditure outlays on agricultural input subsidies, marketing boards, and research and extension services were prescribed and justified on the premise that state expenditure needed to be substantially lowered and that the benefits were either being captured by large scale commercial farmers or being squandered by state officials (World Bank, 1989).

The new neoliberal wave eclipsed questions of race and class due to the demise of socialism as an ideology (Moyo, 2000a). The turning of a blind eye to unequal relations between black and white did not make the problem go away. It had to be addressed. In Zimbabwe, this policy advice was packaged as Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP). It did not pay attention to the challenges which small scale farmers faced such as land and financial markets that were skewed to benefit the minority, distorted water rights, and lack of access to essential infrastructure for more effective land use (Moyo, 2000b). ESAP did not invest in developing infrastructure as a way of increasing agricultural productivity and rural development. Its policy influences included incentives from currency depreciation, agricultural market liberalization, agricultural export market promotion subsidies, and trade liberalization benefits on lowered tariffs for imports of inputs and equipment, and labour deregulation (Moyo, 2000b).

In fact, the policy direction recommended minimal state involvement. In the context of land issues, the ESAP policy advice of the World Bank propounded that land reform should be community driven with communities developing local land reform plans and to identify the demand for and potential supply and price of land. This approach however was based on an underlying assumption that the communities had equal standing with the landholders to negotiate for the land. This arrangement could have worked if there were strong social movements with necessary back up. As a result, this policy advice did not yield substantial results but left the status quo unchanged where the landless masses were becoming restless due to the other effects of ESAP. As a result of the shift in policies, there was heightened land commodification from various newly formed indigenous black farmers' interest groups grew who were being affected by the pressure of the liberalization policies. Organizations such as the Smallholder Ostrich Corporation, the Zimbabwe Ostrich Producers' Association, and the

Indigenous Commercial Farmers' Union promoted new export land uses, which meant that the demand for land would increase (Moyo, 2000b).

As the adverse effects of liberalisation policy began to emerge, the country was hit by a devastating drought in 1992 (Sachikonye, 1992; Stoneman, 1992). This adversely affected food supplies in the country, notably between 1990 and 1994, with the general price index increasing by 168%; for food it increased by 225% (Sachikonye, 1992). This had a greater impact on the poor, as food represented a higher proportion of their expenditure (Gibbons, 1996: 380). This view is corroborated by Abalu *et al* (1999) when they observed that the household food security was compromised by the removal of subsidies for fertilisers and seeds and of rural credit and the erosion of agricultural marketing services, especially in remote areas. The World Bank itself acknowledged the failure of ESAP when they noted that:

Trade liberalisation and the rationalisation of tariff, tax and export incentive regimes need to be sequenced carefully. The failure in Zimbabwe to properly synchronise these measures and to establish the conditions for rapid expansion of exports early on, placed many domestic firms at a disadvantage and delayed the supply response.

Sachikonye (2003) corroborates the self-admission of the World Bank when he observed that:

For a program launched with such a huge political fanfare, the outcome of the ESAP was most unimpressive. First, growth was almost stagnant at less than an average rate of one per cent between 1990 and 1995. In particular, the volume of manufacturing output sank below the pre-adjustment period (ZCTU, 1996)... the combination of high interest rates, devaluation and low domestic demand hurt certain sub-sectors, especially the textile, clothing and metal sub-sectors. Exports plummeted. The value of exports in US Dollars, which had grown at an annual average of nine percent between 1985 and 1990, declined to an estimated three per cent average between 1990 and 1993. Statistics on the production volume in the first eight months of 1995 showed that half of the manufacturing sub-sectors has witnessed their volume fall to, or below, the levels recorded in 1980 (FMB, December 1995).

The above citation summarises the socio economic situation of ESAP. It is this situation which caused a lot of discontentment among the various classes and population groups. Some of the frustrations were expressed through food demonstrations and the labour movement became more prominent in mobilising its constituency against the government.

One of the groups that were adversely affected was the war veterans. The majority of the war veterans belonged to the poor class who bore the brunt of ESAP. In the late 1990s, sporadic land invasions started to happen as a result of the aforementioned frustrations and discontentment with the status quo. The Svosve people epitomised the invasions when they invaded large commercial farms in Mashonaland East and refused to move unless they received land (Moyo, 2000). The different pathways that were used to access land have been addressed in Chapter Six of this thesis.

In 1992 after the expiration of the Lancaster House agreement on land, the government amended the constitution to allow for compulsory acquisition of land through the Land Acquisition Act with 'little compensation and limited rights of appeal to the courts' (Palmer & Birch, 1992: 25). Some 1,471 farms were identified for acquisition on the basis of land under-use (including derelict land), multiple farm ownership, farmer absenteeism, contiguity to communal areas and oversized farms in terms of their agro-ecological potential (Moyo, 2005). There were several cases of multiple farm ownership. Moyo (2000) notes that of the 1471 farms that were initially identified, these belonged to 1103 owners. One would have expected 1471 owners for 1471 farms assuming that each farmer owned one farm. Instead, in some instances three of the landholders owned a total of fifteen farms, ranging from two to ten farms each, while 72 owners held between three and eleven farms each which accounted for approximately 1.2 million hectares - a massive 30 per cent of the total identified area (Moyo, 2000). This unequal distribution of resources meant that a white minority, large-scale farmers, controlled Zimbabwe's economy which was mainly agrarian. Such imbalances agitated some black people who had fought the war of liberation with the rural poor who constituted more than 60% of the rural population feeling the pinch of the liberalization policies. Moyo (2000, 2001, and 2005) argues that the land reform was catalysed by growth of poverty, unemployment and income disparities.

This was coupled with evidence of underutilized substantial parts of land and natural resources despite the continued significant growth in commercial agricultural production and tourism (Tekere, 2001). This narrative dislodges the neo patrimonial views (Kinsey, 2004; Zamchiya, 2011) which asserts that the land reform was an electioneering tool to retain support of the electorate which was dwindling because of the repercussions of the neo-liberal policies which

the government had promulgated in 1991. Having looked at the history of the land question in Zimbabwe, the next section will demonstrate the link between social policy and land reform. This is important especially for the global south because land reform as a social policy instrument is absent in conventional social policy literature.

1.6 Statement of the problem

Social policy has been defined as ‘collective interventions directly affecting transformation in social welfare, social institutions and social relations’ (Mkandawire, 2007; UNRISD, 2006). This definition is corroborated by Adesina (2007a: 1) when he also defines social policy as ‘the collective public efforts at affecting and protecting the social well-being of the people within a given territory’. Both of the aforementioned definitions presuppose the idea of a minimum permissible standard of living for every human being in a given context. Titmuss (1974:31) quotes Hagenbuch's definition of social policy where he noted that 'the mainspring of social policy may be said to be the desire to ensure every member of the community certain minimum standards and certain opportunities (Hagenbuch, 1958:205). This ‘minimum standard’ is ensured through ‘elements of social policy’ (UNRISD, 2006) such as direct government provision of social welfare through, for example, broad-based education and health services, subsidies and benefits, social security and pensions, labour market interventions, *land reform* [italics for emphasis], progressive taxation and other redistributive policies. At the core of social policy is the need to guarantee that every citizen in a certain ‘territory’ lives a life of dignity regardless of status, ethnicity, age, etc.

Adesina (2009) reinforced the case for land reform when he noted that the land reform program that had happened in Zimbabwe needed to be viewed also from a social policy perspective. Researches that have been done by the Moyo (2005, 2007, 2009, 2011), Scoones (2010), Mutopo (2011), Murisa (2010), Chiweshe (2014) have proven that the FTLRP achieved social policy outcomes. This body of literature does not necessarily make a deliberate effort of looking at the outcomes of FTLRP from a social policy perspective. It can be argued that even though the land reform program might not have been conducted with a full consciousness that it was addressing social policy outcomes, but a thorough interrogation of the aforementioned literature demonstrates that the five social policy functions namely production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and social cohesion have been realised to varying extents. The land reform provided the space for the beneficiaries to enhance their productive capacity, which

subsequently will protect them from the vagaries of the market (Moyo, 2009). The FTLRP also was redistributive in nature, though there have been debates on who benefited, there has been convincing empirical research that the land reform benefited all classes of society (Moyo, 2009; Scoones, 2010). Mutopo (2011; 2012) has been vocal in identifying the reproductive outcomes of the FTLRP. There has been also research on the extent to which social cohesion or nation building has been achieved in the resettled areas (Chiweshe, 2014). This research therefore intends to provide a self-conscious analysis of the FTLRP from the social policy perspective to understand the extent to which the five tasks of social policy have been achieved.

One of the reasons for the unavailability of self-conscious social policy take on the land reform has been the dominance of the literature on social policy by scholars from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, resulting in the literature having an OECD bias (Mkandawire 2007). Understandably, these scholars have written on the experiences and debates of social policy from their contexts. They have also endeavoured to write on social policy in developing countries albeit wearing their lenses hence unable to put premium on social policy instruments relevant to the developing world like the land reform. As a result, some of the social policy tools mentioned above, which are not dominant in the OECD contexts have not been given due consideration on how they have contributed to the well-being of the people. The UNRISD (2006)'s unpacking of social policy elements included land reform and yet there is little to no self-conscious literature that makes the connection between land reform and social policy, except for Gough (2004) and Chung (2014). While the former scholar made cursory reference to land reform as a social policy tool, Chung (2014) devoted a segment of his chapter to the land reform in South Korea as a specific case of social policy. Despite all the available disparate literature on social policy and land reform, there has not been literature that appreciates land reform as a social policy instrument save for the researches by Gough (2004); Huch-ju Kwon & Ilcheong Yi (2008); Nitya Rao (2014); Mark Alan Hughes & Peter M. Vandoren (1990) and Yi *et al* (2014).¹ This gap has been caused by focus on social safety nets or social assistance instead of the transformative role that social policy should have (Mkandawire, 2011). Mkandawire (2005:1) laments this shortcoming when he notes:

Social policy has always played redistributive, protective and transformative or developmental roles. Although these different roles always work in tandem and synergistically, the weight given to each of these elements of social policies has varied widely across countries and, within countries, over time. In the context of

development, there can be no doubt that the transformative role of social policy needs to receive greater attention than it is usually accorded in the developed countries and much more than it does in the current focus on ‘safety nets’.

Ben Fine (2009: 2) echoes the above observations when he notes that social policy has been flawed by ‘over-generalising across ideal types which are insufficiently sensitive both in method and empirically to the differences in context and content of different social policies within and between both countries and programmes’. It is this ‘thinness’ (Mackintosh and Tibandebage, 2005: 144) of the literature on social policy on the one hand and of land reform on the other, which this research intends to address by focusing on contextually relevant social policy elements like land reform in Zimbabwe.

Furthermore, some of the available literature consists of attempts to find *ad hoc* solutions to the social consequences of both economic decline and economic policy (Mkandawire, 2001). Subsequently, social policy is reduced to social assistance or social safety nets, (Holzman and Kozel, 2007) resulting in literature focusing more on *ex post* interventions not *ex ante* social policy tools (Adesina 2011). This ‘mono tasking’ (Mkandawire, 2005: 6) of social policy has reduced it to social protection as promulgated by scholars like Koehler (2011), and Sabates-Wheeler and Devereaux (2004). The proposed study intends to use the transformative social policy conceptual framework in appreciating the multiple tasks or functions of social policy, not only as a mechanism to be used on the vulnerable in society (Adesina, 2011) but as a conduit for development in its holistic sense.

As has been noted earlier, there has been a lot of literature that has been generated on land reform. Unfortunately, most of this literature has been produced using neopatrimonial narratives which reduce African politics and the state to endemic ‘corruption’, ‘patronage’, and ‘tribalism’ (see de Grassi, 2008; Olukoshi, 2011; Mustapha, 2002; Mkandawire, 2012), while overstating the virtues of neoliberal good governance (Richardson, 2005; Campbell, 2008; Bond, 2008). In this narrative, empirical researchers on land reform in Zimbabwe who found contrary evidence to the dominant narrative were labelled as partisan to the ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011; see also Hungwe, 2011; Chiweshe, 2012). Moyo (2012) argued that such literature suffer from ‘conceptual malaise’ and empirical deficiencies (Moyo *et al.*, 2012:18). Most literature on the FTLRP in Zimbabwe took a Manichean perspective where it gave attention to political party

struggles that were ensuing during the land reform without focusing much on the social struggles of the time. The available literature (Scarnecchia *et al.*, 2008; Marongwe, 2011; Zamchiya, 2011; Dekker and Kinsey, 2011; Cliffe *et al.*, 2011) also took a rights and governance approach building on this Manichean perspective to vilify land reform in Zimbabwe. There have been attempts however of producing empirical literature and these attempts have been primarily led by the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS) led by Moyo (2001, 2005, 2011, 2012). Scoones *et al* (2010); Matondi (2012); Hanlon *et al* (2013) have also demonstrated many of the positive outcomes of the land reform process.

1.7 Scope Of The Research

The research is premised on the understanding that social policy is indispensable for enhancing the quality of life of citizens in a given territory. Recent literature interrogating the outcomes of the land reform in Zimbabwe has ‘unwittingly’ shown that the FTLRP seem to demonstrate meeting the multiple functions of social policy namely production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and social cohesion. This research therefore brings a unique perspective of viewing land reform as a social policy tool that can facilitate the enhancement of welfare and wellbeing of the citizens. Land reform rarely features in the social policy literature, while consideration of the welfare impact of land reform within the land and agrarian reform literature is largely framed by the ‘livelihood’ discourse. This thesis therefore seeks to bridge that gap by using a transformative social policy conceptual framework to assess the social policy outcomes from the Fast Track Land Reform Program that was conducted in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2005.

1.8 Research Questions

The overall questions which the research sought to answer were the following:

1. To what extent did the FTLRP contribute to the welfare and wellbeing of its beneficiaries?
2. To what extent were the transformative social policy functions (production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and social cohesion) realised through the FTLRP?
3. What are the gender and other social relations that exist in the aftermath of the FTLRP?
4. What are the education outcomes of the FTLRP?

1.9 Research Objectives

1.9.1 Primary research objective

The primary objective of this study is to examine the FTLRP from a social policy perspective. The research is concerned with the extent to which the five principal tasks or functions of social policy, identified in the *Transformative Social Policy* conceptual framework (production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and social cohesion/nation-building) have been met through the FTLRP.

1.9.2 Secondary research objectives

1. To explore the socio-economic factors which characterise the new land owners, the agrarian structure and related struggles in relation to control of land, natural resources, production, assets, control of labour and as well as access to markets.
2. To identify the new social and agrarian relations that now exist in the resettled areas
3. To examine the character of land and agrarian change since 2000 within its historical context
4. To examine the education outcomes of the FTLRP on the lives of children who interfaced with it.

1.10 Limitations To And Scope Of The Study

The research looked at the FTLRP that took place between 2000 and 2005. The study only focused on Kwekwe District in Zimbabwe where 210 farms were distributed (Utete Land Commission, 2003: 69). The study focused on both A1 and A2 resettlement schemes. The A1 resettlement scheme is where the beneficiaries got 6 hectares of arable farming land and 30 hectares–50 hectares of common grazing lands (Mutopo, 2012). The A2 scheme is made up of medium commercial farms of between 20-250 or more hectares, which have replaced large-scale commercial farming that existed before fast track land reform (Mutopo, 2012). To appreciate the extent of the benefit from the land reform by the beneficiary households, the fieldwork was for eight months. The eight months gave me conceptual understanding on how the households cope with the different agricultural seasons.

1.11 Importance Of The Study

This research is important because it seeks to bridge the gap between land reform and social policy literatures. Except for Mark Alan Hughes & Peter M. Vandoren (1990); Huch-ju Kwon

& Ilcheong Yi (2008); Gough (2004); Nitya Rao (2014) and Chung (2014), there has not been self-conscious literature that provides insights on land reform as a social policy instrument. As a result, the land reform debate especially in Zimbabwe has been impoverished because it has not contextualised land reform as a social policy instrument with subsequent social policy outcomes. This research therefore provides a rare analysis of land reform as a conduit for engendering transformative social policy outcomes.

Another important dimension which this research brings is its scope. This research, through an ethnographic approach, provides micro level exploration of the social policy outcomes of the land reform. This perspective allows for the identification of both intrinsic and extrinsic value addition of the land reform to its beneficiaries. Most of the available literature on land reform does not use a social policy perspective in articulating this aspect. This means that the research recognises that despite the processes that were undertaken in the land reform program, there has to be an appreciation of the value addition from the rare perspective of the beneficiaries so that an empirical evaluation can be made of the outcomes, success and failures of the FTLRP.

1.12 Organisation Of The Thesis

After this first introductory chapter, the thesis is organised into the following chapters:

Chapter Two presents the theoretical underpinnings of this research. Chapter 2 presents an analysis of the polemical literature that has been produced on the FTLRP. The land reform process generated a lot of academic curiosity amongst various scholars. Inevitably, this created ideological polarity as the scholars analysed both the process and outcomes of land reform using their ideological lenses. I provide a critical analysis on the following analytical frameworks: the neopatrimonial approach; the human rights approach; the livelihoods approach and the political economy approach. While each scholar produced nuanced arguments anchored on their ideological grounding, I however made sure that the key strands of debates and submissions which the scholars made are the ones I used in providing a critique of the analytical framework which the scholars chose.

In chapter 3, I unpacked the conceptual framework that I used in writing this thesis. I used the transformative social policy framework to analyse the FTLRP as a social policy tool. The framework was designed by scholars such as Adesina (2007), Mkandawire (2011) and the

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (2011) to correct the social policy mono tasking (Mkandawire, 2005: 6) conceptual malaise as propagated mainly by OECD scholars. These OECD scholars reduced social policy to social assistance or social safety nets, (Holzman and Kozel, 2007) resulting in literature focusing more on *ex post* interventions not *ex ante* (Adesina, 2011). This mono tasking of social policy has reduced it to social protection as enunciated by scholars like Koehler (2011), and Sabates-Wheeler and Devereaux (2004). The transformative social policy conceptual framework therefore helps in conceptualising social policy in its broader tasks of production; protection; redistribution; reproduction and social cohesion.

In the chapter, I also provide a nexus between social policy and development. The reason for this is the realisation that social policy outcomes are measured using social development indicators. I demonstrate that social policy instruments are conduits for the achievement of social development in any society. I identify five areas of mutuality between development and social policy. First, there is a common interest in investing in human capabilities. Secondly, both social policy and development emphasise the inseparability of economic and social policies. Thirdly, both development and social policy put significance emphasis on social justice, which can be achieved amongst other means, through redistribution. Social capital is considered as a process and an outcome of development and social policy in view of Midgley's (2005) argument that communities with higher social cohesion have a high degree of social capital and economic well-being. Both social policy and development recognise the involvement of the state in achieving desired outcomes. I argue that social policy should ideally be considered as an element of development process and planning—along with economic policy. It is more than development because outside of deliberate development efforts, social policy like economic policy still subsists.

Chapter 4 discusses methodological issues of the thesis. In this chapter, I first tackle issues of research philosophy, giving attention to the paradigm wars that exist between interpretivists and positivists. I then give attention to the mixed methods approach, which is the research design for this thesis. I note that whilst the thesis uses the mixed methods approach, it has an inclination towards the qualitative mixed methods research design. The methods used for data collection include in-depth interviews with land beneficiaries, key informant interviews, focus

group discussions and systematic observation. I outline the pros and cons of using these tools in data collection. For quantitative data, I rely on the baseline studies that were conducted by AIAS in 2008-2009 and 2013-2014. The baselines covered six districts, including Kwekwe District. The baseline surveys primarily provide data on the production and redistribution functions of social policy. In the chapter, I chronicle the challenges that I experienced in data collection, especially in view of the fact that land reform is a highly polarised subject in Zimbabwe. I outline the ethical considerations I observed *inter alia*, confidentiality on the collected data, obtaining informed consent from the respondents, voluntary participation of the interviewees, and not exposing the research participants to any form of risk through the research.

In Chapter 5, I set the context for discussing the findings of the research. I argue that from the interactions and interviews with the farmers, I realised that there was a general assumption in literature that the period between the time when beneficiaries got land (2000-2001 mostly), the circumstances were similar therefore the outcomes of the FTLRP should be evident. I note that from my interacting with the land beneficiaries, there are three phases in which the land beneficiaries put their time after getting the land. The three phases are 2000-2006; 2007-2008 and 2009 to current. The chapter shows that in all the three phases, there were different dynamics with different implications for the situation that is prevailing on the farms right now. The first phase was characterised by farmers occupying the land and most of them enthusiastically working on the land. The production trends show that whilst productivity drastically dropped between 2001 and 2002, there was a gradual increase in productivity up to 2006. This was despite the 2002 drought which affected farmers' yields. The second phase of 2007 to 2008 was observed by the farmers as the one when they were taken back to the starting point. This phase was characterised by drought and hyperinflation. Due to the latter, the Grain Marketing Board could not pay farmers for the agricultural produce which they had sold to the marketing board in good faith. This meant that most farmers did not have capital to use for the season that followed, hence they had to start afresh. The third phase is linked to the second one. To salvage the hyper-inflationary environment, the government introduced a multicurrency system, with the US Dollar being the main currency. This compounded the situation for the farmers as they did not have means to get much needed capital to invest in the proceeding agricultural season. Hence, phase three is about farmers trying their own efforts without much help from the state. I argue therefore that understanding social policy outcomes of the FTLRP

has to be done in the context of these three phases in order to fully appreciate what is happening currently.

In Chapter 6, I interrogate the redistributive social policy outcomes of the FTLRP. In the chapter, I demonstrate that one of the major outcomes of the FTLRP has been the changed agrarian structure from a bi-modal to a tri-modal structure. The new agrarian structure has about 150 000 households settled under the A1 scheme and 30 000 under the A2 scheme with some transnational agro estates still operational around the country. The new agrarian structure has created a broad base for the peasantry in its variegated categories. I posit that the process had its own shortcomings since it was mostly a revolution from below. As a result women did not get access to land on equal footing as men. This was mainly pronounced in A2 resettlement scheme where in Sherwood Farm, no women received A2 plots. There is general consensus among scholars that between 13-22% of the land beneficiaries are women. The majority of the women then accessed land through their husbands, which reinforces the patriarchal nature of the society. I further argue that the land beneficiaries brought their cultural values in the way they relate to land. As a result, the allocated plots have been subdivided by the households to make provision for *tsewu* for the women and the main field for the household. I however observe that this increases the burden of labour on women as they are supposed to work on their *tsewu* at the same time contribute to the household plot.

In the chapter, I also provide detailed accounts of how the land beneficiaries accessed the land in Kwekwe District. Some of the beneficiaries got the land during informal farm occupations, which were mainly orchestrated by the war veterans as similar to other districts studied by scholars such as Scoones *et al* (2010), Murisa (2007, 2010), Sadomba (2011) and Mkodzongi (2013). The majority of the land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District got the land through formal allocation by the government. Concerning the profiles of land beneficiaries, the data I collected and that of AIAS refutes the narrative that only the elite benefited from the FTLRP. Civil servants, former farm workers, senior politicians, war veterans and ordinary citizens all benefited from the FTLRP, albeit to different extents. The beneficiaries also had varied educational levels ranging from no formal education to tertiary qualifications such as degrees. The average age of the land beneficiaries is 55 years. About farm residency trends, I observe

that most beneficiaries in A1 type of farming, especially the villagised type, reside on the farms they were allocated.

I premised Chapter 7 on the understanding that production is a centrepiece in the realisation of social policy outcomes. Hence, enhancement of the productive potential of members of society is a key variable in ensuring that social policy outcomes become a reality for the people. This chapter therefore answers the production question of what land beneficiaries are doing with the land they got, looking at both agricultural and non-agricultural activities. I argue that in appreciating the productive outcomes of the FTLRP, it is imperative to realise that it was not every land beneficiary's aspiration to consider agriculture as a business, which subsequently would contribute to national development. Some of the farmers I spoke to noted that their motivation for participating in the land reform exercise was to be able to get a *musha* for their children. It seemed though that the government was well aware of this as can be explained by coming up with A1 farms meant for family production, compared to A2 and LSCF designed for commercial production.

Overall, production trends showed a slump between 2001 and 2002. This was caused by a severe drought as well as the shocks of the land reform exercise. Thereafter, there was a gradual rise in production patterns for sorghum, tobacco and maize. In 2008, production of these crops fell to unprecedented levels. From 2009, despite the challenges which farmers faced, there was a gradual rise again in production, although the levels of productivity are still lower than those of years before 2000.

I observe also that export and cash crops are mostly produced by A2 farmers. Tobacco production has however been on the rise across all the settlement models because of the support of private companies through contract farming arrangements. Even in districts such as Kwekwe which had no history of tobacco farming, farmers are slowly adopting this export crop. I note that, land utilization is still constrained by access to inputs and capital, while recurrent droughts pose challenges to grain production, which is sensitive to the rainfall patterns. Diversified markets now exist for a wide range of commodities produced by rural households beyond the state marketing system.

In the chapter, I also cover the issue of agricultural financing, attending to the question of how the land beneficiaries are coping with this aspect. I observe that after the collapse of the agricultural system in 2008, the government has not been able to provide adequate support to the farmers. As such, issues of means of production such as inputs, access to tools, labour and access to information about agriculture pose challenges to farmers. As a coping mechanism, farmers have come up with ways of mitigating the impact by sharing productive tools and information. Further, I interrogate the availability and accessibility of quality extension services in Kwekwe District. I observe that indeed extension services are available and also accessible though their quality is low due to inadequate resourcing. I end the chapter by looking at non-farming activities which take place on the resettled farms. In the context of Kwekwe District, gold panning is a pronounced activity so I attend to the nuances around this issue.

I argue that the FTLRP created new agrarian labour structure which has resulted in the semi-proletarianisation of labour. Most farm workers do not have farm tenancy as was the case under white farmers. This has led to a situation where they roam from one farm job to another while negotiating a wage for each task being based at the compounds where farm workers used to stay. Under this arrangement, they are able to engage in gold panning and other productive non-agricultural activities.

In Chapter 8, I borrow from Alva and Gunnar Myrdal when they posit that social policy should be prophylactic. In view of this, I demonstrate that land reform is an *ex ante* social protection instrument. I show that even in droughts and periods of economic crises, the severity of vulnerability is reduced for land beneficiaries. The most immediate vulnerability that was reduced as a result of the FTLRP is destitution. This is because land beneficiaries have the opportunity to build for themselves reliable shelter. Some of the land beneficiaries have made the resettlement areas their home where they do not have to pay any accommodation costs. Further, the land beneficiaries have significant potential for food security. This is because the land beneficiaries can use the land to produce food for their families, grow gardens, and establish other income streams such as selling firewood, selling grass for thatching houses, gold panning and mould bricks. All these options help the land beneficiaries in diversifying their livelihoods.

I also observe that livestock is a form of insurance against the vagaries of the market and other exogenous factors which may affect the farmers. While livestock is a form of accumulation on the one hand, it is also a form of insurance when farmers are in dire straits. The farmers can sell their cattle, goats or chickens to get the money they may need for other things. They can also engage in barter trade in exchange for the products they need. Lastly, they can use the livestock for food.

Overall, I note that there are different levels of precarity amongst the farmers. These levels are characterised according to the tri-modal agrarian structure as posited by Moyo (2011). As a result, the farmers are affected differently by such things as droughts and economic crises. Farmers who fall into the first category of poor peasants are the hardest hit by droughts and economic crises. This is because they do not have diversified livelihoods that are sustainable. More often, they end up selling their labour to those with diversified livelihoods. Land beneficiaries who receive remittances from their children and are on pensions have lower levels of precarity compared to the land beneficiaries who do not have any reliable streams of income.

Despite the challenges which farmers in resettlement areas face, their levels of precarity are lower than their communal areas counterparts. The means of verification for this were the statistics of those receiving food aid in a particular year were more in communal areas compared to the resettlement areas. Further, the AIAS survey showed that land beneficiaries in the resettlement areas indicated that they ate three meals in day whilst in communal areas the average number of meals per day was two. These observations show that land reform prophylactically reduces the levels of household vulnerability for the land beneficiaries in a lot of ways.

Chapter 9 explores the social cohesion outcomes of the FTLRP. I used Jenson (1998)'s conceptualisation of social cohesion which denotes that there is vertical and horizontal cohesion. I acknowledge that several scholars have attended to the function of social cohesion outcomes of the FTLRP albeit using primarily the horizontal cohesion lenses. In the chapter, I show that the FTLRP brought people of different backgrounds, religious beliefs and value systems together. Be that as it may, they were faced with similar challenges which made them to collaborate as they tried to solve these challenges. In the process of doing that, there were trust issues amongst the beneficiaries in some instances suspecting each other of witchcraft. Despite these suspicions, land beneficiaries collaborated, in some instances, successfully whilst

in other instances without much success. I observe that the collaboration of the farmers transcends the tri-modal agrarian structure's categorisation of the farmers. A1 farmers work with A2 farmers in solving common challenges such as water and building of schools. The building of Bonstead Secondary School is one example of a project where the farmers are working together to make sure that the school is established. This project is on the road to succeeding since most of the materials needed have been provided by the farmers. The success of this project is because, for the A1 farmers who are not able to provide financial contributions, they avail themselves for labour. An example of a project that was not so successful was the Umlala Water Project. The failure of the project was because when financial contributions were needed, most farmers in A1 resettlement scheme were not able to raise the required amounts, to the frustration of A2 farmers who could meet their part of the bargain.

The other major areas of cooperation for the land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District is on sharing productive tools and participation in farmer groups. As a result, there has been some solidarity amongst the farmers as they help each other to solve common problems. I observe that one institution in horizontal cohesion that has played an instrumental role in bringing people together is the church. Through it, members have come up with mutual aid societies (*mikando*) where they support each other in addressing challenges they face.

Chapter 10 does not necessarily address one of the transformative social policy functions as other findings chapters. Instead, the chapter explores education outcomes of the FTLRP since it had pronounced outcomes. The reason for focusing particularly on education is that human capital development is a centrepiece in increasing productivity in any context. As such, in exploring the outcomes of the FTLRP, it is imperative to appreciate the extent of human capital investment that subsequently leads to increased productivity which would culminate in economic development. Beyond contributing to economic development through labour and skills, education is an entry point to increasing one's (capability set) opportunities and options to realise one's full potential.

I argue that the major education outcome of the FTLRP was increased accessibility of both primary and secondary education in the resettled areas. Secondary education significantly

increased (31 percent) in Kwekwe District mainly due to the absence of secondary schools in the farming communities prior to the land reform program. Consequently, the demand for education in resettled areas inevitably compromised quality of the education provided. Some of the factors which compromised the quality of output from the satellite schools include inter alia, distances which the children have to walk to and from school, poor welfare of the teachers thereby affecting their motivation in school, and inadequate infrastructure.

Finally, Chapter 11 is a summary of the thesis and provides an in-depth discussion of the major findings from the study. It ties up various conceptual strands with empirical data and provides a way forward for research around social policy tools that are relevant for the global south.

1.13 Conclusion

This introductory chapter sets the foundation of the thesis by framing the central questions analysed in this study. The thesis comes from an appreciation that there has been a lot of attention given to the process and outcomes of the FTLRP. Some of the scholars who have written on this subject have grappled with some of the social policy outcomes without however a conscious focus on these as social policy outcomes.

I noted in this chapter that the major contribution of this thesis to the body of knowledge is its exploration of the extent to which the FTLRP achieved social policy outcomes. This is important because for a long time land reform has not been generally considered as a social policy tool in the main stream social policy literature. The reason for this is that social policy literature has been dominated by OECD scholars who naturally focused more on social policy tools that are more relevant to their contexts. Consequently, social policy tools from the global south, such as land reform, have not featured in any significant way in mainstream social policy literature.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The FTLRP invoked a lot of ideological grandstanding on interpreting how the land reform transpired. This chapter provides an analysis of the various literature on land reform as well as the polemical analytical frameworks which were used by scholars to write on the process and outcomes of the land reform. The research outputs of the scholars have been influenced mainly by the analytical frameworks they chose to employ in assessing both the FTLRP processes as well as outcomes (Scoones, 2009). The choice of framing was driven mainly by ideological commitment of the scholars, instead of simply analytical considerations. In view of this, I decided in this chapter to explore the literature with a special focus on the approaches which the various scholars used. My review of the literature as well as analysis of the various approaches which scholars used, focusing mainly on the crucial strands of the scholars' arguments. It is worth noting that there are a lot of overlaps amongst the analytical frameworks that were employed by the scholars. The following analytical frameworks will be examined: the neo-patrimonial approach, the human rights approach, the neo-liberal approach, the livelihoods approach, and the political economy approach.

2.2 Right of conquest justification for redistribution

One of the myths which provides premise of some of the approaches used by scholars mentioned below stems from the perspective that the land rights held by the white minority over the land they expropriated should have enjoyed social and political legitimacy. This notion is advanced by Floyd (1959) when he notes that 'the historic fact that Southern Rhodesia was finally occupied and subdued by force of arms, and that the Europeans are thereby the heirs to land by right of conquest, is also advanced as justification for land apportionment'. He further argues that when Cecil John Rhodes won a military victory in 1889 in what is now Zimbabwe, and gave large tracts of land to victorious soldiers – evicting the occupants. Floyd argues that it is a natural principle of war that the defeated people become subjects to the victors with their land and any other possessions liked by the victors becoming properties of the latter. This

argument has been challenged by several scholars who posit that acquisition of property by conquest is not part of international law unless in limited circumstances of a just war.²

This line of thinking legitimises the skewed agrarian structure where the white minority dominated agricultural production and excluded local black farmers from the production of certain products such as tobacco, wheat and flowers. Hanlon *et al* (2012) posit that the liberation war was fought to regain control over alienated land making the land symbolic, having economic and social value. This notion is corroborated by Sacco (2008: 346) when he argues that access to land is a means of achieving economic, social and cultural rights especially in a country such as Zimbabwe where land remains the premier factor of production. Access to arable and fertile land becomes a determinant factor in fighting poverty. The nationalist scholars argue that the liberation war in Zimbabwe was fought in part to reclaim the land, so simply taking it back is an important goal (Hanlon *et al*, 2012). One can then use Floyd's conquest argument, albeit in reverse, to argue that when the whites were defeated in the war of liberation, which subsequently compelled them to resort to the negotiating table, the liberation war victory similarly legitimized repossession of land since the victors of the war were the majority blacks. In international law, this would pass the test of a just war since the land had been expropriated violently previously.

Sacco (2008: 347) takes this argument further by noting that the preconception that the land belonged to white commercial farmers and everyone else received land as largesse of the state or political entity is flawed. This is because if indigenous communities were seen as holding rights to restitution and compensation after colonialism, for the deprivation of property, this would have allowed a rational basis to question the moral and legal rights of white farmers to farms settled during the farm occupations under the fast track land reform program (Sacco, 2008:349).

Sacco further argues that under international law, each government inherits the obligations undertaken by its predecessors on the basis that the obligations are undertaken on behalf of the state. The government of Zimbabwe is the descendent in title of the southern Rhodesian, Rhodesia and Nyasaland governments and therefore would be liable for any wrong done by the previous government. A claim against the government of Zimbabwe for the unlawful acts of its predecessor in title is the easiest claim to make considering the obvious link between the government of Zimbabwe and acts perpetuated by the state under previous, if illegitimate,

regimes. A strong argument can be made that the government of Zimbabwe owed compensation and restitution to the people dispossessed by colonialism.

2.3 The fast track land reform process

The land Reform and Resettlement Program Phase 1 was done from 1980s up to 1996. This phase included the first ten years when the Lancaster House Agreement was in effect.³ Soon after the lapsing of the Lancaster House provisions, the government of Zimbabwe embarked on neo liberal policies. Mbaya (2001) argues that the post-colonial Zimbabwe government was under a lot of external pressure on how it executed the land reform program. As a result, Phase 1 of the land reform program was in tandem with global trajectories while securing the interests of local white and black capital.

The failure of ESAP exacerbated the frustrations and discontentment which already existed amongst the war veterans, the peasantry and urban workers who had lost their jobs. The situation was aggravated by government's reduced role in regulating the provision of public goods such as education and health, an outcome of the structural adjustment package. It is the argument of scholars such as Moyo and Yeros that the discontent over the 'snail pace' (Kinsey, 2004) with which government was resolving the land issue led civil servants, the rural folks and war veterans to invade white owned commercial farms (Moyo and Yeros, 2007a). The discontentment of the peasantry has come to be epitomised by the Svosve people in the Svosve communal lands near Marondera.⁴ These displayed vigorous discontentment of the state's collaboration with white farmers. Their major issue was that the government had not done enough to fulfil the promises they had made of redressing colonial wrongs of land expropriation (Magaisa, 2010).

2.3.1 Organisation of the FTLRP

The organisation of the fast track land reform program has been a subject of polemical debates amongst scholars. In this section I will explore the various debates that have been posited by the different scholars. The process and organisation of the FTLRP pits two sides with diametrically opposed views. On the one hand, there are scholars who argue that the FTLRP was a stage managed project by ZANU PF in an effort to gain traction with the electorate after the opposition forces started gaining power proven by their victory in the February 2000

constitutional referendum vote. This argument is advanced by such scholars as Hammar *et al* (2003), Raftopoulos (2004), Rutherford (2007), Moore (2005), Zamchiya (2011) to mention a few.

On the other hand, there are scholars such as Moyo (2005, 2011), Scoones (2010, 2015), Helliker (2006), Sadomba (2011), Murisa (2007), Chambati (2011), Chiweshe (2012), Mkodzongi (2013) who argue that the FTLRP was a bottom up initiative that cannot be considered as a monolithic neopatrimonial project. In support of this argument, Moyo (2001:3) posits that the historicity of the land movement during the post-independence period:

...[were] an ongoing social phenomenon in both urban and rural areas of Zimbabwe, before and after the country's independence... the 2000-2001 occupations mark a climax of a longer, less public and dispersed struggle over land shortages and land demand in the post-independence period.

This argument about a *longue duree* movement has been criticised by another school of thought (Sachikonye, 1994; Alexander, 2003; Hammar and Raftopoulos, 2003; Raftopoulos 2003) for not providing an explanation the sudden eruption that was experienced in 2000 revolving around significant violence in the rural areas, the precipitating economic meltdown and the imminent elections. These events are often labelled as insinuating circumstances for the state, ZANU PF and President Mugabe to actively intervene in the land occupations and to use the land issue as a scapegoat for the continued control of power. These scholars' argument falls short in that it disconnects the 2000 ruptures from the previous periods and yet there is an intricate symbiosis which makes the year 2000 the climax year (Sadomba, 2008: 147).

This notion is attested by Hanlon *et al*, (2012) then they note that the war veterans became increasingly restless and began to take action. There were more than 1,000 occupations of white commercial farms between March and April 2000. Sadomba (2011: 80) argues that war veterans were an embodiment of this anti-colonial demand (Kriger, 1995), although a scattered peasant movement had dominated land struggles until 1996 as postulated by Moyo (2001). The war veterans as a social category were constituted by a movement of former military youth and so called former refugees, whose nucleus were fighters of the Zimbabwe's liberation war.

He further argues that the state had actively suppressed the war veterans' movement in the 1980s. In 1997 however, the state conceded to provide for their welfare and financial demands.

In trying to meet its promises, the government gave war veterans \$Z50 000 each as financial compensation and further monthly payments of Z\$2,000 – from unbudgeted funds. Also, as part of the conditions of a truce between the state and the war veterans, President Robert Mugabe promised to redistribute land. This promise was not honoured. The war veterans then started a movement which became militant, challenging settler capital, the state, ZANU PF elite and the presidency from 1998. This caused sharp class conflicts in the polarisation of land politics and state/society relations. Chaumba *et al* (2003) notes that after the people had settled in 2001 state agricultural extension service arrived to allocate plots formally, using technical criteria of the colonial period and the base commanders had been joined by village committees, with chairman, secretaries and women and youth league members.

Moore (2005), Hammar *et al* (2003), Raftopoulos (2004) and others argued that it was the ZANU-PF directing its cronies to invade land to shore up its declining electoral prospects as the 2000 elections drew near. Scoones *et al* (2010) have argued that in the Masvingo areas the land invasion was complex in motivation, drivers, and duration—with a combination of grassroots driven and state-directed land invasions. Ruling party politicians initially condemned the invasions. Thus John Nkomo (then Minister of Home Affairs) argued:

If we allowed this kind of behaviour it will spread like a veld fire. The law will take its course if irregular settlers refuse to move back to their villages. Policy cannot be compromised [quoted in Sithole *et al* 2003:4]

Helliker *et al* (2008) argues that measures taken against the squatters generally failed and squatters would even return to their site of eviction. As well, squatters were often encouraged, supported and protected by local party leaders (Zishiri, 1998:13). At times national ZANU-PF figures expressed qualified support of squatters, arguing though that the peasantry was expressing its long standing grievance against racially based land distribution and not a dissatisfaction with the pace of the land reform set by the government. Clearly, squatting in the late 1990s was ‘a macro challenge at national level’ (Zishiri, 1998: v)

Moyo (2001:321) argues in his theory of social movement that there is a conspicuous ‘unbroken chain of rural action by semi-proletariat’ with the FTLRP as the climax of constant and consistent struggled over land (Moyo, 2001: 314). Interestingly, Richardson (2005) agrees with this notion when he notes that ‘war veterans saw the commercial farms as a just prize for having supported Mugabe during the independence movement 20 years earlier, and they *continued to*

clamor for the commercial farmland prior to the 2000 parliamentary election' [emphasis added]. Whilst Richardson is a prominent critic of the process of the FTLRP as having been stage managed by the state for patronage purposes. In the citation noted, Richardson seem to be acknowledging that the FTLRP was not a top down initiative, but started at the grassroots where war veterans 'continued to clamor' for the land, an argument which Moyo has made through the use of the 'unbroken chain' imagery.

I concur with Scoones *et al* (2010) that the FTLRP cannot be simplified using a single narrative. The process was complex with different dynamics depending on the area. In Masvingo Province, Scoones et al note that the process was driven by the war veterans and the state later come in to regulate and standardise the processes. This approach was also noted by Mkodzongi in Mhondoro Ngezi area which is in Mashonaland West Province. Scoones *et al's* (2010) observations are in harmony with Sadomba (2008:159) who argues that

The organisation of land occupations from 1998 to 2001 reflects complex relationships of forces within the liberation movement in the post-independence period. Lower classes of peasants, farm workers, the urban unemployed and poor war veterans who participated in the liberation struggle in various ways only to be abandoned after independence by the ruling clique meant that there was a simmering volcano waiting for eruption at any moment...

Helliker *et al* (2008:18) corroborate this argument when they note that:

...there were clear signs of volunteerism and spontaneity in the pattern of physical movements between the communal lands and occupied farms, involving a rich diversity of individuals, motivations and interests that cannot be reduced to some ill-defined state-cum-party political manipulation.

This line of argument is supported by Moyo who posits that the origins and processes of the FTLRP cannot be explained away as being driven merely by a monolithic neopatrimonial agenda as it was complex.

The detailed chronicle of the whole process in different contexts has been documented by several scholars (see *inter alia* Sachikonye, 2002; Hammar *et al.*, 2003 Moyo and Yeros, 2007a; Murisa, 2010; Scoones *et al*, 2010; Sadomba 2011; Chiweshe, 2012; Moyo and Chambati, 2013 Hanlon *et al.*, 2012; Zamchiya, 2013; Mkodzongi, 2013).

In the quest for empirical evidence on the FTLRP outputs, the African Institute for Agrarian Studies conducted a baseline study in 2005-2006 covering 6 districts which were purposively sampled. The study indicated that 14.5 percent of the beneficiaries had obtained the land through invasions. 9.7 percent of the land invaders then formalised their occupations. The table below illustrates that the majority of the land redistribution process was conducted in a formal process on the 4 874⁵ farms that were gazetted by the government when they were establishing control of the process.

Table 2.1: Mode of land access for beneficiaries⁶

Mode of land access	A1		A2		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Formally allocated	1285	83.0	336	81.2	1621	82.6
Occupations	158	10.1	33	8.0	191	9.7
Both formal & occupation	69	4.5	25	6.0	94	4.8
Purchasing	37	2.4	20	4.8	57	2.9
Total	1549	100.0	414	100.0	1963	100.0

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey (2009)

Only 1000 farms were occupied before formalised land allocation by the government. These observations of the AIAS Baseline dispel the general narrative peddled by neopatrimonial scholars who argued that the land redistribution program was chaotic and characterised by anarchy (Hammar *et al.*, 2003; Hellum and Derman, 2004). These scholars further note that the Fast Track Land Reform Programme was a highly centralized and discretion-based political process, not human rights based (Ibid). In support of this narrative, Ikdahl *et al* (2005) noted that ‘the FTLRP was legitimized *ex post facto* through constitutional changes’. They further argued that the state largely adopted a state-centric rights approach.

On the contrary, formalised land allocations were spread over time, place and between the two land allocation schemes (A1 and A2) (Chaumba *et al.*, 2003, Murisa, 2007 and Hanlon *et al.*, 2012). In the year 2000, there was a lot of activity on land allocations. This is when the land invasions were taking place. After the formalisation of the program by Vice President Joseph Msika on the 15th of July 2000, the subsequent processes became formal and those who had invaded sought to regularise their occupations.

The land redistribution exercise that was led by Government picked momentum towards the end of 2000 when the 3 000 farms were gazette. In the same breadth, in May 2001, the Rural Land Occupiers Act Chapter 20:26 was promulgated which protected people who had occupied

land on or before the 1st of March 2001. The same Act deemed illegal any occupations that were to happen after the passing of this law with the state committing to evicting them. This however did not stop land occupations as they continued albeit at a low scale.

2.4 Diction of ideological framing

The naming of the FTLRP has been a subject of attention from various scholars coming from diverse ideological persuasions. Some scholars have called it '*jambanja*' (Chaumba *et al*, 2003) literally meaning violence or angry argument. They further note that *jambanja* was used subtly in different contexts to refer to people who conducted the farm occupations and also places where the farm occupations had taken place. While this term was used in some quarters to describe the land reform, it gave insight into one's perception of the land reform by the terms which they used to call it. Scholars who considered the process to be of *jambanja* chose the neopatrimonial analytical framework, thereby calling the white farmers 'victims' who were dispossessed of 'their land' using unorthodox means. This narrative is closely linked to the one which calls this process 'land grabbing'.

The naming of the process also suggests that the redistribution, overall, took an acrimonious approach. This however is not a true depiction of the process as the AIAS Baseline has shown that in most of the areas, the processes were without violence. This diction rides of the teleology and sensationalism that the media and some quarters of civil society adopted in portraying the process of the FTLRP. It further implies that there is a party that is forcefully taking from an unwilling party who then becomes the 'victim'. Scholars belonging to this narrative have blamed the FTLRP for promoting environmental destruction and land degradation. The newly resettled farmers have been accused of cutting down trees and overexploiting wildlife and other natural resources rather than farming (Masekesa, 2012). Off-farm livelihood activities such as gold panning, hunting and harvesting of non-timber forest products, which have increased in the aftermath of land reform, have been 'criminalised' as evidence of environmental banditry brought about by the land reform (Saxon, 2011; Bell, 2012).

2.5 Approaches To FTLRP Outcomes Debates

The proceeding section reviews approaches that have been used by scholars in interrogating the outcomes of the FTLRP. While some of the approaches have overlaps, I have identified the

dominant strands that are posited by the scholars who use each approach. Kirk Helliker (2011) acknowledged this when he summarised the debates around this issue as:

Polarized between a minority position that argues that the radical restructuring of agrarian capital has served as a progressive tendency that has opened up opportunities for black small-scale farmers, and a majority position that insists that land redistribution has dramatically undercut agricultural production, thereby severely compromising food security for most Zimbabweans. This latter position “brings to the fore violent state action in instigating land occupations and in thwarting political opposition to ‘fast track’ (Helliker, 2011).

The proceeding section of the thesis seeks to unpack the major approaches to the debates by providing a ‘face to face’ engagement with the literature from the polarised perspectives. Moore (2004) has characterised this schism among left leaning academic commenters as between ‘patriotic agrarianists’ and critical cosmopolitans’, and all sides of the debate have aired their views, often coming to much more accommodating positions along the way.

2.5.1 The neopatrimonial approach

Mkandawire (2015) describes neopatrimonialism as a narrative that has been used to describe ‘different styles of exercising authority, idiosyncratic mannerisms of certain individual leaders, and social practices within states’. Bach (2012:221) posits that:

Neopatrimonialism provided the ‘common denominator’ for a range of practices that are highly characteristic of politics in Africa, namely despotism, clannish behaviour, so-called ‘tribalism,’ regionalism, patronage, ‘cronyism,’ ‘prebendalism,’ corruption, predation, factionalism, etc. All of these practices had . . . been frequently treated as a disparate collection of phenomena in the scholarly literature.”

The neo-patrimonial repertoire reduces the state to be an institution that is rife with endemic corruption, patronage and tribalism (see de Grassi, 2008; Olukoshi, 2011; Mustapha, 2002; Mkandawire, 2012). These scholars agree with Christopher Clapham’s concise definition of neopatrimonialism as “a form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organizations with powers which are formally defined, but exercise those powers . . . as a form of private property.” The scholars that use this approach fit niftily into the narrative on African crises’ economic collapse, political instability, socio-economic inequalities, corruption, crime and war, and depictions of failed, vampire, or collapsed African states as depicted by Bayart (1999). Chege (1997) calls the neopatrimonial approach to be ‘brazen name calling’ and laments that this narrative by noting that

there is unbridled use of anecdotes, pejorative vocabulary and vivid vignettes of all too frequent cases of egregious abuse of state resources and power (Mkandawire, 2015).

There are several scholars who used this approach in their appreciation of the processes and outcomes of the FTLRP. These scholars account for the land reform process as one that ignored bureaucratic and technical practice of most of the post-independence period for a period of disorderly and violent state sanctioned appropriation of land.⁷ This has been held directly responsible for the country's transition from 'breadbasket to basket case' and for 'plunging the country head first into a morass of lawlessness and, ultimately starvation'. The neo-patrimonial approach contends that the land reform was a ZANU PF machinated response to the outcomes of a constitutional referendum that had been done by the state in 2000 (Sachikonye, 2002; Hammar, 2003). In this referendum, the majority of the electorate did not vote in favour of ZANU PF's standpoint. The loss of the constitutional referendum in February 2000 was 'the straw that started to [break] the ZANU PF camel's back' and was the direct catalyst for the third chimurenga (Moore 2001:255). In fear of losing the impending elections of 2002, ZANU-PF elites initiated a process of taking over land from white commercial farmers by force as a desperate way of salvaging political support in the wake of a growing opposition (Moore 2012; Alexander and McGregor, 2013). Consequently, the state had to engage in patronage politics and exclusionary sovereignty over development and violence (Bracking, 2005; Raftopolous, 2009; 2013a; Zamchiya, 2013). Richardson (2005) lucidly puts it:

The vast differences in wealth between whites and blacks became a political opportunity for President Mugabe to focus upon in the run-up to the 2000 parliamentary election. War veterans, who had vaulted Mugabe to power in 1980, now became more strident; they felt that promises of land after the war had been repeatedly broken...

Moore argues that the ruling party's election jingles for the year 2000 and beyond – 'anti-Blair vote' and 'the land is the economy' – all captured the moments of the social crisis, as these moments facilitated an effort by ZANU PF to 'rebuild a fading hegemonic project' (Moore 2003: 8) and to coagulate its external and internal sovereignty through land reform. Kinsey (2004: 5) corroborates the foregoing argument when he notes that the FTLRP was compelled by 'Robert Mugabe's political megalomania, to his cynical manipulation of the land issue as an election tool'. Andreason (2003: 385, 395-396) argues that Zimbabwe was a 'complete democratic breakdown in the late 1990s in Zimbabwe and hence a decreased likelihood of obtaining an inclusive policy environment

The foregoing argument which posits that the state ‘stage-managed’ and manipulated the peasantry in order to rescue political power that was slipping from their hands has several shortcomings. The argument ignores empirical facts and reproduces a ‘history from above’ while the ZANU PF narrative about ‘sons and daughters of the soil’ reclaiming their land is a ‘history from below’ (Sadomba, 2008: 159). Sachikonye (2003:234) erroneously claims that the occupations differed from the ones in the late 1990s in that the latter were ‘spontaneous, and thus not orchestrated or directed by state institutions’.

Moyo (2011) dislodges the argument by *inter alia* Moore, Sachikonye, Raftopolous, Andreason, Zamchiya and Hammar on the purpose of the FTLRP. Overall, these scholars argue that the FTLRP was instrumentalised by ZANU PF to get political support after they realised through the February 2000 constitutional referendum that they were losing traction with the electorate. Moyo on the contrary argues that the origins and greater goal of the land reform was to ensure the efficient use of scarce and abundant national resources, while promoting food security and household self-reliance. At the same time, the land reform was aimed at achieving economic growth by reducing the size of land holdings per individual and allocating it to diverse beneficiaries that included the landless, former refugees, war veterans, the general poor and former commercial farm workers (Moyo, 2011).

The other argument by scholars in the neopatrimonial camp is that the FTLRP benefited primarily the elite (see Willems, 2005). Richardson corroborates this argument by positing that ‘President Mugabe set in motion the seizure of nearly all the 4,500 commercial farms, beginning in early 2000. Most ended up in the hands of Mugabe’s party supporters and government officials, who knew little about farming’.

As the AIAS (2009) noted, what is in dispute is the character and the extent of the elites’ benefit. The literature that labels the land reform as elitist homogenizes a complex group of people without interrogating its disaggregation. As a result, inadequate attention has been paid to the class struggles within this group. The elitism narrative assumes that a beneficiary who is an employee of the state, a war veteran and a member of the security forces of the country all belong to ZANU PF. Further, these land beneficiaries have been assumed in the literature to have received the land through corrupt means. The narrative further downplays the fact that

most of the beneficiaries of the land reform were rural based peasants, small capitalists, bureaucrats and traditional authorities (see Chapter 6 on redistribution outcomes). Urbanites and farm workers were also involved in the land occupation movement (AIAS, 2009).

The preceding arguments are however not to submit that the neopatrimonial approach got it all wrong. There are some of their arguments which are of merit. The scholars in this camp speak to corruption in the allocation of the land. Moyo, a critic of the neopatrimonial approach does not disavow the existence of corruption (Moyo, 2011). Further, while there are sound arguments given for the FTLRP, it can be said that ZANU PF leveraged the momentum that existed for their benefit in view of the elections that were pending.

2.5.2 The human rights approach

Scholars who use the human rights approach cite several human rights violations that took place during the FTLRP and this section will seek to address these aspects. These violations include; the illegality of the land reform itself, especially land invasions and the failure by the government to evict land occupiers in violation of court orders (this is also referred in some texts as violations of the rule of law); the abuse of farm workers and failure to include them in resettlement schemes; and the violation of proprietary rights- predominantly white commercial farmers. This line of argument further notes that land reform destroyed the Zimbabwean economy and caused food crises. The narrative goes further to address the issue of environmental degradation caused by the FTLRP. Scholars such as Richardson (2004; 2005), Marongwe (2002; 2003 & 2008) and Zamchiya (2011) provide the details of the human rights violations that occurred and the corruption by the political elite in obtaining the most fertile, strategically positioned pieces of land. The last perspective that this section will consider will be what Sacco (2008) called the right to development as enshrined in the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development.

2.5.2.1 Property rights

Richardson (2005) argues that the nature of property rights in a country has a direct bearing towards economic growth. He further notes that damaging property rights is likely to cause a sudden collapse. This is his diagnosis for the economic down turn in Zimbabwe from 2000

onwards. Richardson argues that by the year 2000, 80 percent of the white owned commercial farms had changed hands since independence. There were less than 5 percent of white farmers who could trace their ancestry back to the original British colonists who arrived in the 1890s. Using this argument, Richardson suggests that the land legitimately belonged to the white farmers since they had bought it. The white farmers therefore were entitled to the land as their property regardless of the history around the same land. The colonial government provided secure property titles for the land. This gave the white farmers incentives to efficiently manage the land and allowed a banking sector to loan funds for machinery, irrigation pipes, seeds and tools. The narrative further uses a human rights approach to analyse this process and condemns the state as the major duty bearer with a social contract to protect its citizenry and their property rights (Johnson, 2009).

Richardson makes a parallelism with the communal areas where the blacks were pushed to when land apportionment was taking place. He argues that areas without well-defined property rights suffered severe erosion, as communal farming methods took their toll through slash-and-burn agriculture. On the contrary, small- and large-scale farms with property titles (owned by both whites and blacks) suffer no such environmental degradation. It is worth remembering that not only were the lands where the Africans were made to stay arid, they were forced to stay crowded as has been noted in the Introduction Chapter of this thesis. Inevitably, this caused environmental degradation. Degeorges and Reilly (2007) corroborate this point by noting that since the early 1980s, the black population had increased by 60% to about 12 million compounding the problem of land compression, degradation and hence land hunger. This assertion debunks Richardson's point where he argues that where there is no security of tenure like is the case in communal areas, the people do not take good care of the land.

The argument about who owned the land that was redistributed by the FTLRP is not simplistic as has been portrayed by Richardson. Sacco (2008) counters Richardson's argument by noting that:

I consider an approach to the rights of the communities dispossessed during colonialism and suggest that a rights based approach to the land question in Zimbabwe should include attention to the question of how to deal with colonial violations of the right to property... the rights of commercial farmers who have had their farms expropriated have received international attention. However, no attention has been given to the rights of persons and communities that lost land, property and labour during colonial rule and the racist settler regime. In many instances the very same persons who were disposed by the colonial government still live in the arid communal areas into which they were

evicted more than fifty years ago. An interesting argument can be made that the victims of colonial expropriation are entitled to restitution and compensation. This argument has precedence in international law. Some of the examples that could be given include the Mau Mau restitution in Kenya.⁸ It thus can be said that ownership to the land was not as straight forward as Richardson suggested hence the argument about property rights needed to be traced back to colonialism for it to hold water. Sacco (2008: 349) concludes his argument by noting that if indigenous communities are seen as holding rights to restitution and compensation for the deprivation of property during colonialism, this allows a rational basis to question the moral and legal rights of white farmers to farms settled during farm occupations under the fast track programme.

2.5.2.2 Violence

Zimbabwe experienced an increase in social and political violence between 1999 and 2003. Most of this violence was related to the elections and ZANU PF and MDC clashes. Inevitably, partisan political differences over the FTLRP meant that electoral and inter-party violence also affected the land reform (Sacco, 2008: 350). The situation was further compounded by the inherent violence of some of the war veteran-led invasions. There was also another element of violence caused by the commercial white farmers who were trying to defend their farms from invasions. Such resistance escalated the acrimony. It is worth noting that the white commercial farmers that experienced violence were those who themselves had a history of being violent with their employees or communities around (This aspect has been covered in greater detail in the redistribution chapter of this thesis).

Sacco further argues that the land reform often gets conflated with numerous instances of violation of human rights committed throughout the period, such as election violence and ruling party violence, attack on the independence of the judiciary. It is instructive to note that human rights violations that took place between 1999 and 2006 were supposed to have been dealt with by the government. There were supposed to be prosecutions of those accused of the crimes committed. A misnomer however is the conflation of all the human rights violations that occurred between 1999 and 2003 with the FTLRP. This narrative then fails to appreciate the merits of the FTLRP

2.5.3 Right to development

Beyond focusing on the rights that were violated, there has been an effort to focus on the rights that were fulfilled through the land reform. The shortcoming of focusing on the rights that were violated presupposes that there are some groups of people with superior rights that dare not be violated, and another group whose rights do not matter. The mainstream literature which gives attention to the violated rights focuses more on the rights of the white commercial farmers. It is important to look at the rights of the beneficiaries of the FTLRP and appreciate the human rights fulfilment that happened, if any.

As shall be noted in proceeding chapters, it can be argued that land reform is a means of achieving economic, social and cultural rights. In a country that is agro based, access to arable and fertile land is a determinant of poverty and individual development. Land reform allows access to the resources that facilitate production of sufficient food for communities and individuals to feed themselves. It thus can be said that provision for land is a panacea to food security in the long run. This argument dislodges the argument by scholars noting that the land reform violated food security of the country. Looking at the FTLRP using the lenses of the beneficiaries makes one realise that there are a lot of rights that will be fulfilled for a whole lot more persons than was the situation before the land reform.

Another aspect to consider on the fulfilment of rights through the FTLRP is the issue of non-discrimination. One of the fundamental principles of human rights is non-discrimination. The agrarian structure that was in existence before land reform perpetuated discriminatory patterns, a principle that is contrary to human rights principles. The FTLRP therefore can be lauded attempting to address the skewed agrarian structure that was premised on discrimination.

2.6 The 'Two Lefts'

The other analytical paradigm used by scholars is a nationalist, populist perspective (Scoones, 2009) that underscores that 'the people' took back their land through a bottom-up process (Hanlon et al. 2012). The process of obtaining land was therefore spearheaded by a popular rural movement (Moyo and Yeros, 2005) which some scholars call 'third Chimurenga', a culmination of the liberation struggle (Moyo and Yeros, 2007a). As a result, the state and ZANU PF had to respond to the will of the people by backing their quest for land through provision of a necessary legal and technocratic framework for the redistribution of the land (Moyo and Chambati, 2013). This approach blends the radical political economy approach

(Scoones, 2009) as well as the Marxist analytical framework. The other analytical framework which will be looked at is the livelihoods framework.


Moyo and Yeros (2007b) observed that there are two left camps that have written on the fast track land reform in Zimbabwe. The scholars in the first left camp include Moyo *et al.* 2009; Hanlon *et al.* 2012; Chambati, 2011; Murisa 2011; Mutopo, 2011; Sadomba, 2011; Chiweshe, 2012, Matondi, 2012. The second left is composed of such scholars as Chaumba, 2003; Scoones *et al.* 2010, Scoones, 2012 and Mkozongi, 2013. The two lefts' reading of the evidence from their research was incongruent to the Neopatrimonial School. The two left camps' studies show that the outcomes of the FTLRP are complex and beneficiaries should not be homogenised as one group, like for example the elite, or the farming workers. These scholars have conducted extensive research in different areas of Zimbabwe.

2.6.1 The livelihoods approach

Chambers and Conway (1992) define a livelihood as comprising 'capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living'. A livelihood is then deemed to be sustainable 'when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base' (Ibid). The foregoing definition of a livelihood provides a descriptive analysis which portrays a multifaceted web of activities and interactions that highlights the diversity of ways with which people make a living. The definition further suggests that livelihoods cuts across several disciplines in a bid to provide an essential counter to the monovalent approaches that have dominated development enquiry and practice (Scoones, 2009). A livelihoods approach places primary focus on the people, their assets and capabilities. In its enquiry, it pays attention to how the people use the resources they have, the scope of opportunities available to them and impediments they face in quest for elimination of poverty from their lives (Baumann, 2002). The livelihoods approach uses a Sustainable Livelihoods Framework that was developed by Scoones (1998:4). The Framework (see Figure 2) provides an interrogation of the policy environment of a given context, articulating the history, politics, macro-economic conditions, climate, demographics and social differentiation. Having articulated the contextual issues, the framework outlines livelihood resources which the people have such as natural, financial and human capital. A centre piece for accessing livelihoods resources are institutions and forms of organisations that act as conduits. The

framework identifies three livelihood strategies which people use to cushion themselves against vulnerability in the context of farming. These strategies are livelihoods diversification, agricultural intensification and or extensification and migration. The expected livelihood outcomes are reduction of poverty, increased number of working days, wellbeing and capabilities.

Figure 2.1 Sustainable rural livelihoods: a framework for analysis



Source: (Scoones, 1998:4)

As can be deciphered from the framework in Figure 2.1, sustainable livelihoods approach offers a structured way of thinking about the connections among vulnerability, poverty and environmental or natural resource management. The framework provides for an opportunity to reflect on the context, considering how different people follow a range and combination of livelihood strategies in view of the vulnerabilities that may characterise a given context. The framework further explores the interlinkages of various forms of capital, namely natural capital, human capital, financial capital, social capital and physical capital assets (see Giddens,

1979; North, 1990; Mehta *et al.*, 1999), whilst interrogating how people leverage these to prevent vulnerability. The framework draws inspiration from diverse work on vulnerability and assets (Swift, 1989); well-being, capabilities and entitlements (Sen, 1981; Drèze and Sen, 1989; Leach *et al.*, 1997.). The framework has however been criticised for taking a pentagon approach where it only identifies five forms of capital. There has been a push to have a hexagon approach for the inclusion of information capital. Odero (2003) argues that:

Information capital is a core livelihood asset. As an important factor that affects people's livelihoods, including information capital as a core asset in the sustainable livelihoods framework promises to improve our understanding of livelihoods, particularly the livelihoods of the poor.

The framework is continually being improved by several scholars so that it can encapsulate some of the missing elements such as political capital as well. Despite the criticism, the benefits of using the livelihoods framework are widely acknowledged, including for example, their stress on the importance of people-centred change, a holistic approach, and people's access to different assets, poor people's vulnerability, partnerships, sustainability, change and the multi-faceted nature of livelihoods (Dorward *et al.*, 2003; Neely *et al.*, 2004; Hajer, 1995). No doubt this approach has enriched the coverage and comprehension of the outcomes of the FTLRP. Since its conception, the livelihoods approach has sought to bring disparate perspectives together, allowing conversations across disciplinary and professional divides and providing an institutional bridging function linking people, professions and practices in new ways (Gieryn, 1999). Furthermore, it is argued by Scoones and Wolmer (2003: 5) that the livelihoods perspective offers an important lens for looking at complex rural development questions. They further argue that a sustainable livelihoods approach encourages deeper and critical reflection which stems from looking at the consequence of development efforts from a local-level perspective, making the links from the micro-level, situated particularities of poor people's livelihoods to wider-level institutional and policy framings at district, provincial, national and even international levels.

In looking at the outcomes of the FTLRP, the camp that uses the livelihoods approach as encapsulated in Figure 2.1 includes scholars such as *inter alia* Scoones *et al.* (2010), Scoones (2015), Mkodzongi (2013), Mutopo (2011), Mushongah (2012). These scholars have sought to interpret the outcomes of the FTLRP using the framework given above. Scoones *et al.* (2010) demonstrated that households in Masvingo Province, where the research was focused on, had

invested significantly in their land by doing such things as clearing the land for it to be arable, drilling boreholes, obtaining farming equipment and draught power. The scholars approximate that, on the average, each household spent more than US\$ 2,000 in these investments. The scholars further posit that production levels have been on the rise over the years though there are disparities from scheme to scheme and between households. Scoones et al (2010) and Scoones (2015) provide insights on investments that the land beneficiaries have done for increased production, the types of crops that are produced, livelihood portfolios and changes in the marketing of products.

Using the Dorward *et al's* (2009) categorisations of livelihoods status, the scholars using the livelihoods approach identify several livelihood pathways and patterns of accumulation from below (cf. Neocosmos, 1993; Cousins, 2010). This pattern is where there is a new group of petty commodity producers who regularly sell, continuously invest, and who are new farm based entrepreneurs. The literature goes further to show market linkages (both legal and illegal) that exist for the land beneficiaries. This aspect of marketing of the petty commodities is a thread that can be traced in the works of Mutopo, Mkodzongi, Chiweshe, Murisa and Scoones. Some of the market linkages that are outlined in the literature include cross border trading, bartering, extraction and selling of the natural resources on the allocated land, trying to avoid state control on production and pricing.

Overall, the scholars endeavour to demonstrate the increased levels of household resilience for the land beneficiaries using several livelihood diversification initiatives. The resilience is being achieved through leveraging the capitals that are available to the land beneficiaries. There is therefore substantial literature that has been produced focusing on social capital, physical capital, human capital, financial capital (albeit the most lacking) and natural capital (See Scoones *et al*, 2010; Scoones, 2015; Mkodzongi, 2013; Mutopo, 2011; Mushongah, 2012; Murisa, 2007; Chiweshe, 2012; Richardson, 2004).

Whilst the livelihoods thinking has enriched our insights on the outcomes of the FTLRP, the approach has several problem which need to be borne in mind when appreciating the literature that has been produced. The first challenge with this approach is its conceptual grounding. This

‘malleable concept’ (Scoones, 2009) is ahistorical and belongs to no discipline in particular. Scoones (2009) endeavoured to trace its origins but could hardly find any substantial information to prove its existence and centrality to the development discourse. Only in the 1990s was the concept defined and those who advanced it sought to pitch it as the development discourse of choice. This lack of history affects this approach as it struggles to find its place without losing its assumed identity.

There are four fundamental shortcomings of the livelihoods approach that are glaring in the literature that has been produced on the outcomes of the FTLRP by scholars like Scoones *et al.* (2010), Mkodzongi (2014), Scoones *et al.* (2014), and so forth. The first gap relates to the lack of interrogation of economic globalisation and monopoly finance as it relates to the outcomes of the FTLRP. While there is encapsulation of economic thinking in the sustainable livelihoods thinking, it does not do justice to this component. The quest of livelihoods thinking to being locally embedded, while providing place-based analysis and soliciting the views and participation of the poor made this discourse to be lacking in political nuances when dealing with global scale questions (Clarke and Carney, 2008). Whilst the sustainable livelihoods framework provides for analysis of the policy environment, the literature that has been produced on the FTLRP does little, if anything on engaging with debates about how global processes impinge on livelihood concerns at local level. As a result, the livelihoods literature on land reform has not engaged with the implications of monopoly finances’ decisions of alienating Zimbabwe and how these affected the outcomes of the FTLRP. Consequently, the livelihoods scholarship on the FTLRP borders on naive localism and idealistic liberal analyses that ignore the structural forces of class and capital.

Bernstein *et al.* (1992: 24) notes that at the centre of a livelihoods approach are relations of class, caste, gender, ethnicity, religion and cultural identity. He further notes that understanding agrarian structures requires asking the basic questions: who owns what, who does what, who gets what and what do they do with it? The livelihoods literature neglects these important questions including the class formation, patterns of work and divisions of labour, the distribution of income and the dynamics of consumption and accumulation (Bernstein, 1992; Moyo, 2009). In concluding this aspect, O’Laughlin (2004: 387) corroborates the foregoing when she argues that:

Class, not as an institutional context variable, but as a relational concept, is absent from the discourse of livelihoods. Accordingly, political space is very limited – focusing mainly on ‘empowering’ the poor, without being clear about how this process takes place or who might be ‘disempowered’ for it to occur.

Moreover, the livelihoods approach is silent about a ‘cocktail of economic and political sanctions’ (Chirimambowa, 2012) which Zimbabwe was subjected to. Mamdani (2008) and Chirimambowa (2012) provide a detailed account of how the sanctions from the United States of America through the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery (ZIDERA) Act and those imposed by the EU affected the country including the agricultural sector. After ZIDERA in 2001, the Act noted that:

The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director to each international financial institution to oppose and vote against– (1) any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the Government of Zimbabwe; or (2) any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed by the Government of Zimbabwe to the United States or any international financial institution.

A year later, the IMF declared Zimbabwe ‘ineligible to use the general resources of the IMF’ and subsequently removed it from the list of countries that could borrow from its Poverty and Growth Facility (Mamdani, 2008). In 2002, the IMF issued a formal declaration of non-cooperation with Zimbabwe and suspended all technical assistance. As a result of this, the total foreign payments arrears increased from \$109 million at the end of 1999 to \$2.5 billion at the end of 2006 (Mamdani, 2008; Chirimambowa, 2012). Foreign direct investment shrunk from \$444.3 million in 1998 to \$50 million in 2006. Donor support, even to sectors vital to popular welfare, such as health and education, was at an all-time low. Danish support for the health sector, \$29.7 million in 2000, was suspended. Swedish support for education was also suspended. Agriculture could not enjoy the subsidies which are essential for sustainability. Consequently, a proper credit facility could not be put in place for the land beneficiaries (Mamdani, 2008).

It must be noted that the strategic underpinnings of the sanctions were to put political and economic pressure on selected individuals (and entities) holding political decision-making power in the governments (Sitt *et al.*, 2010:46). As Tostensen and Bull (2002: 374) argued, the fundamental flaw in conventional sanctions theory is its assumption that hardships inflicted on the civilian population of a targeted state will lead to grassroots political pressure on that state's

leaders to change their behaviour. Furthermore, the scholars argue that the weapon of economic sanctions is incapable of discriminating between combatants and civilians. In the case of Zimbabwe, the sanctions had collateral damage in various aspects of the economy including the agriculture as Mamdani (2008) noted. Unfortunately the livelihoods approach does not pay any attention to this even though it had direct repercussions for the outcomes of the land reform.

The other gap in livelihoods approaches literature has been the lack of focus on dealing with long-term changes in the agrarian situation of FTLRP beneficiaries and the country as a whole. Livelihoods literature does not answer the question of direction and projected future of the agrarian structure that now exists. Since its major concern is the current state of affairs, it neglects some long run slow agrarian changes that may occur due to such factors as demographics (Tiffen *et al.*, 1994) and the ‘intergenerationality’ of the existing agrarian structure which was established by the FTLRP. The literature using this approach is silent on aspects like climate change (Adger *et al.*, 2003) and how it has affected the outcomes of the FTLRP since this does not have dynamic change which can be captured in a snapshot view as the livelihoods approaches usually do. Failure by the livelihoods approach to pay attention to these slow variables which affect agrarian relations and outcomes compromises the approach in articulating slow transformations of people. Some of these slow transformational areas which may be missed include gradual intensification of production, improving or deteriorating environmental conditions, long term investments in strengthening land beneficiaries’ capacity or migrations due to pull or push factors outside the scope of a livelihoods framework. As a result, the livelihoods approach does not provide insight and ideas for the generations to come in view of the prevailing status quo (Chambers and Conway, 1992: 26).

Furthermore, the livelihoods approach puts premium on diversification. Scoones *et al* (2010:166) corroborates this view when he notes that ‘diversity is the watchword, and livelihoods approaches have challenged fundamentally single-sector approaches to solving complex rural development problems...’ Razavi (2006) however has reservations in broadly using this concept when she notes that

‘Diversification captures several different economic processes and its blanket use to describe all forms of non-farm employment is misleading. It is particularly important, from the point of view of thinking about poverty, to distinguish between diversification as a survival strategy (which it very often is) and diversification that feeds into a process of accumulation’.

Most literature from the livelihoods perspective however focus on the former. There is a gap in interrogating accumulation that is going on among the beneficiaries of the FTLRP while cognisant of the different power dynamics at play both amongst the different classes and the broader state politics.

The fourth failing of the livelihoods approach literature is its inability to capture the nuances around markets. The approach does not put emphasis on markets and their roles in livelihood development and poverty reduction amongst the beneficiaries of the FTLRP. Dorward *et al.* (2003) argues that if the roles of markets and market relationships are not properly addressed in livelihoods analysis and action, it can lead to failure in identifying and act on livelihood opportunities and constraints arising from critical market processes and institutional issues that are important for pro-poor market development. It must be noted that the livelihoods of poor people are directly dependent on their involvement in a range of markets as private agents or as employees (and are indirectly dependent on the wider economy for the demand and supply of goods and services) (Ibid).

2.6.2 The political economy approach

Ricardo (1817) suggested that the political economy analytical framework is concerned mainly with the relations and distribution of resources among three classes, namely 'the proprietor of the land, the owner of the stock or capital necessary for its cultivation, and the labourers by whose industry it is cultivated'. This is the approach that has been used by Moyo *et al.* and the AIAS in demonstrating the outcomes of the FTLRP. The approach focused mainly on power relations that mutually constitute the production, distribution and consumption of the outcomes of the fast track land reform. Scholars using this approach further interrogated the emerging production and trade dynamics that are developing in the farming communities. They link these to the law, customs and government processes. To understanding outcomes of the land reform, the political economy approach paid particular attention to the new agrarian structure in the resettled areas by focusing on the character of redistribution of the land that occurred and accumulation that is happening among the land beneficiaries. The studies conducted demonstrated the ramifications in change of the agrarian structure from a bimodal to a tri-modal arrangement after the FTLRP.⁹

To demonstrate the case of transformation, the political economy literature by the aforementioned scholars focused both on the beneficiaries of the land reform and the prevailing circumstances in the communal areas where most of the beneficiaries came from. This approach to understanding the outcomes of the land reform provides a unique opportunity to compare between those who remained in the communal areas to the ones who benefited from the land reform. Lastly, the political economy approach located the outcomes of the FTLRP in the global political economy. The studies conducted demonstrated the linkages that exist between the production of the new farmer at a local level to national and global politics like economic alienation of Zimbabwe after the commencement of the FTLRP, the global recession, and dynamics in national politics under the government of national unity. The linkages of these issues to what happens on the farm provides enriching insights on understanding why the outcomes of the FTLRP resulted in the way they did.

This analytical framework also focuses on the extent to which small scale farmers who got the land have been able to ensure productivity in order to secure their social reproduction while establishing a ‘broad based and inclusive local, regional and national economic development, that benefits the majority of the population’, as well as ecologically sustainable methods of farming (IPC for Food Sovereignty, 2006; cited in Borras, 2008: 144). The assessment of redistributive outcomes of land reform is also done at a scale beyond the individual farm or land reform project, and seen in the context of a new agrarian order that embodies social justice, socio-economic transformation, and ecological sustainability (Scoones, 2009).

The major criticism of this approach however has been that it turned a blind eye to the unorthodox way the land reform took place in some areas where human rights were violated. Further, the writings using this approach have not gone into detail in highlighting any possible corruption that might have taken place in the process of land redistribution.

2.7 Conclusion

The FTLRP generated a lot of academic curiosity amongst various scholars. Inevitably, this created ideological polarity as the scholars analysed both the process and outcomes of land reform using their ideological lenses. This chapter has endeavoured to critique the various

approaches which scholars used. The following approaches were interrogated in this chapter: the neopatrimonial approach, the human rights approach, the livelihoods approach, and the political economy approach. It is important to note that these analytical frameworks were chosen by the scholars on the basis of their ideological standpoints. It is instructive to note that each of the scholars produced nuanced arguments anchored on their ideological grounding. I however made sure that the key strands of debates and submissions which the scholars made are the ones I located in their respective ideological framing implemented through the analytical framework which the scholars chose. The next chapter then builds on this analysis by unpacking the transformative social policy framework which was used in this research. The chapter also demonstrates the symbiotic link between social policy and development as a way of setting the framework for interpreting the social policy outcomes of the FTLRP.

CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: TRANSFORMATIVE SOCIAL POLICY

3.1 Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to provide details about the conceptual framework that I use in this thesis. The chapter is divided in three sections. The first section builds on the previous chapter by providing a nexus between land reform and social policy. As has been demonstrated in the preceding chapter, there have been several approaches that have been used to write on both the process and the outcomes of the FTLRP. This chapter therefore adds to that literature by providing a perspective that has not been used before of viewing land reform as a social policy tool. The second section of the chapter provides an analysis of the transformative social policy framework which is my analytical tool of both existing data and the data that I collected from Kwekwe District. The last section of the chapter explores the nexus between social policy and development. The exploration of the nexus between social policy and development has been necessitated by the fact that social policy outcomes are measured through social development indicators. It therefore becomes imperative to interrogate this relationship.

3.2 Returning to the wider social policy vision

As has been noted earlier, at the core of social policy is an aspiration to ensure quality of life for citizens in a 'given territory' (Adesina, 2007a, 2007b). This notion had been noted by Marshal (1950) in his *Citizenship and Social Class* where he argued that 'citizenship is essentially a matter of ensuring that everyone is treated as a full and equal member of society. And the way to ensure this sense of membership is through according people an increasing number of social rights' (Marshal, 1950). Marshal divided citizenship rights into three categories namely civil rights, political rights, and social rights which included public education, health care, unemployment insurance and old age pension' (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994). Esping- Andersen (1990: 21) took Marshal's argument further by noting that 'if social rights are given the legal and practical status of property rights, if they are inviolable, and if

they are granted on the basis of citizenship rather than performance, they will entail a decommodification of the status of individuals *vis a vis* the market' (ibid).

The foregoing arguments have been key in social policy debate with Titmuss (1974:31) adding that social policy is supposed to be 'beneficent, redistributive and concerned with economic as well as non-economic objectives'. This implies that for social policy outcomes to be achieved, there has to be a symbiosis between social policy and economic policy. Chang (2001) refers to Polanyi (1946) in backing this notion when the latter notes that the 'economic is inseparably linked to the social'. Arguments contrary to this view had been prompted mostly by neoliberals who believed that 'economic growth is a precursor to social development' (Udegbe, 2007). These scholars' argument was that economic growth subsequently leads to social development. This neoliberal thinking inevitably prompted a lot of debate among scholars over time. The neoliberal persuasion is however contrary to documented experiences where significant growth did not really translate to reduction in poverty, inequality and unemployment. This 'residualist welfare' approach, though it has persisted in some quarters, has been challenged by scholars (Titmuss, 1974; Myrdal, 1984; Sen, 1999; Adesina, 2011*b*; Mkandawire, 2002*b*; UNRISD, 2006; Fine, 2009) who argue that social policies are intricately linked to economic policies and there should be emphasis on human development, as a conduit for economic development. In conclusion, as Mkandawire (2004:20) notes:

Studies on the linkages between social policy outcomes and economic growth show that at both microeconomic and macroeconomic levels, social development outcomes have beneficial effects on economic growth.

While there is not much contention on social development indicators, there is, however, considerable contention on the classification of social policy systems. Scholars like Titmuss (1958,1974), Korpi (1980), Korpi and Palme (1998), Esping-Andersen (1990), and Bonoli (1997) have taken pains to come up with various welfare state classifications that summarize how some countries' social policy systems are structured.

Some countries established their social policy architecture on the basis of the various schools of thought, with United Kingdom heavily influenced by the Fabian Society established in 1884.¹⁰ The society developed a social policy paradigm, which tapped into, the evidence

emerging from the research conducted by Booth and Rowntree (Alcock, 2012:23). The research indicated that poverty was widespread and serious in Britain at the end of the nineteenth century despite the existence of Poor Laws. This research finding challenged conservative political assumption that economic markets could meet the welfare needs of all (ibid). The Fabians used the findings of the research to convince those of contrary persuasion, who believed in the commodification of welfare services, that policy intervention through the state was needed to provide the support and protection which markets could not. Scholars that followed like John Maynard Keynes were informed by the thinking that was already prevailing. Keynes, who was a liberal, played a key role in helping Europe recover from the Second World War of 1939–45 – in contrast to the failures after the First – and in establishing the Bretton Woods institutions and the welfare state (Townsend 2004). In 1936, his *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* was published which made a clear distinction between macro and micro economic theories (Townsend 2004). Keynes’ macroeconomics was linked to his insistence on planning and social development. One of Keynes’ major contributions to social policy was his view of the state ‘as [the] ultimate protector of the public good and has a duty to supplement and regulate market forces’ (Alcock 2012:24). Later, Beveridge came up with his report, which sought to address the ‘five giants on the road to reconstruction’ (Beveridge 1942) while giving the state a central role in driving the processes.

In his report, Beveridge proposed a system of national insurance for Britain to deal with the infamous ‘giants’ namely want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness’ (ibid). The primary emphasis of Beveridge was on addressing want which later dominated the social policy discourse of Europe. On the basis of Beveridge’s recommendations to address the five ills of the British society, the Labour Government introduced key legislations namely the 1946 National Insurance Act, which implemented the Beveridge scheme for social security; the National Health Service Act 1946; and the 1948 National Assistance Act, which abolished the Poor Law while making provision for welfare services (Bonoli 2007). The laws became an example of a welfare state using *inter alia* ‘flat rates’ of contribution and subsistence. The insurance scheme classified the population into six classes namely (Beveridge 1942):

Employees, that is, persons whose normal occupation is employment under contract of service; others gainfully occupied, including employers, traders and independent workers of all kinds; housewives, that is married women of working age; others of working age not gainfully occupied; below working age and retired above working age. The category of below working age were covered by children’s allowances.

The Beveridge Report of 1942 created the bedrock of a welfare state because it built on the macro economic analyses that had been done by Keynes in 1936 which envisaged the state playing a key regulating role.

Under Otto von Bismarck, Germany in 1883 introduced sickness insurance, Accident Insurance in 1884 and later came up with an old-age and disability social insurance program in 1889. By giving substantial advantages to workers, he was able to buy their allegiance since this was the group that potentially was a threat to the politics of the day (Alber, 1986; Baldwin, 1990). The Bismarckian social policies were based on social insurance while providing earnings-related benefits for employees. Entitlement to the social insurance was conditional upon a satisfactory contribution record. The financing thereof was mainly based on employer/employee contributions (Bonoli, 1997). In essence the Bismarckian policy did not have a concern on poverty, but for the section of the population which was in the labour market and crucial for the country's economic development. The policy became a powerful instrument to enhance the position of the workers in the Germany market economy (ibid). The foregoing developments informed the social policies architectures of several countries. There were efforts to establish contextually relevant architectures as can be exemplified by countries like Sweden (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 52) which combined different ways of achieving the objective of wellbeing for all in its territory.

One of the oversights however which social policy has had historically has been the reproductive and nurturing roles of women and their centrality to understanding the wellbeing of individuals, households, communities and indeed nations (Folbre, 1994; Bonoli, 1997; Elson and Catagay, 2000; Mkandawire, 2005; Adesina, 2007a). As such around the 1980s up to the 1990s, there was a lamentation that social policy was oblivious of women's reproductive roles in the society. This outcry is succinctly captured by Adesina (2007:45) when he notes:

The gendered dimensions of labour market participation and sustained employment record – and therefore retirement annuity or provident fund contributions – distinctly disadvantage women whose labour market participation is often interrupted by marriage, childrearing, or who bear the burden of the unpaid care economy.

Adesina (2007b:45) further reinforces the foregoing notion when he asserts that rethinking of social policy 'requires a strongly pro-natal approach, but it also requires social provisioning

that treats women as people in their own right rather than in their procreation and nurturing roles'. In light of the gender consciousness that social policy has tried to have in recent history, Bonoli (1997) notes that some countries responded to the call for gendered social policy by putting significant steps in place to improve the position of women within their social insurance systems. Most notably these measures included the use of contribution credits for years spent rearing a child, the availability of maternity leave, and (free) childcare facilities.

In the context of Africa, social policy was structured in an exclusive way because of the peculiarities, which the continent went through in the 1800s and 1900s. After removing the shackles of colonialism, which had lasted for more than a century, most African states came up with a nationalist ideology for their people. This ideology focused on the 'eradication of the "unholy trinity of ignorance, poverty, and disease"' (Mkandawire, 2005: 13), by adopting development strategies on the tripod of people, hard work and use of intelligence, public education (Garba, 2007: 63). Garba (2007:54) also gives another example of Zambia, which had an economy that heavily depended on mining. At independence, the country did not have a single indigenous mining engineer (ibid).

In the nationalist discourse, social spending on education was meant to address the legacy of colonialism, which deprived the indigenous people of an education (ibid). Further, investment in education was meant to address the human resources needs that existed after colonialism. In several countries – from Malawi to Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal – the schooling strategies involved bringing young people of different ethnic or regional backgrounds together in secondary schools, and even more so at the university level (Garba, 2007:56). The intended result of this effort was to enhance nation building and social cohesion. The nationalists envisaged to create nations that had mechanisms to enhance the social and economic capacities of its people while establishing cohesive polities.


3.3 Transformative Social Policy Conceptual Framework

Transformative social policy conceptual framework is a systematic way of thinking and considering social policy so that it will not miss all its functions. This systematic way of thinking was hatched by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development in its research on Social Policy in a Development Context. The conceptualisation of social policy using the transformative social policy way of thinking shifted attention to the neglected dimensions of social policy, especially in the context of development or catch-up. As has been

noted, social policy had lost its developmental orientation as had been suggested by the Myrdals (Myrdal & Myrdal, 1934; Myrdal, 1960). It is grounded on the ‘imperative of reconstituting the state in its policy making capacity, and its ability to run the state, administer society, and define the parameters of economic activities’ (Adesina, 2007c). The starting point would be the recognition that successful efforts at building socially inclusive developmental agenda have always depended on visionary agenda setting ‘... the visionary agenda setting can only come along when the state plays its role’ (ibid).

In view of the foregoing, the transformative social policy conceptual framework has been able to provide a structured way of looking at social policy without neglecting the other functions of social policy which seem to have been forgotten due to the OECD bias. The conceptual framework can be summarised diagrammatically as below (Adesina, 2011):

Figure 3.1: Transformative social policy conceptual framework



Source: Adesina (2011)

The diagram above identifies the five social policy tasks namely production, protection, reproduction, redistribution and social cohesion. Moving from the monotasking of social policy

as has been characterised by most literature that is Eurocentric, social policy is supposed to address the five functions noted above. It is worth noting that the extent of coverage of the five functions may differ from one tool to the other. Some social policy interventions however do not cover all the five functions.

One key ingredient that would ensure the actualisation of social policies is leadership commitment. It can be argued that having benign laws and constitutions that guarantee social rights as posited by T.H. Marshall (1950) is not good enough if there is no visionary leadership to make the policies a reality. Adesina (2007:44) argues that:

... Leadership matters; so does policy. Constructing social consensus around a developmental project is fundamental: it calls for *visionary leadership* that is locally grounded in Africa's realities; it calls for putting at the heart of our collective social contract social justice, equity, and the vicarious indignity that we should experience when others in our societies contend with poverty and destitution [emphasis added].

This notion is attested by Yi and Mkwandawire (2014) in their exploration of the lessons that could be learnt from South Korea's development success. The book shows a conspicuous strand of the role of leadership in spearheading the development process. Through quality leadership, such ingredients as *inter alia* impeccable legislation; genuine platforms for citizen's participation; a vibrant civil society, not NGO society (Adesina 2007); easy access to information; free media (Koehler 2011); gender equality and competent institutions to deliver on the public goods will be provided. It is worth noting that many of these enablers are themselves subject to the vagaries of politics and public resource management (human and material).

3.4 Development and Social Policy: A Nexus

Having unpacked the nexus between social policy and land reform, I will now look at the linkages between social policy and development. This is important because social policy outcomes are measured using social development indicators. Examples of such indicators include *inter alia* information about health, education, employment and general quality of life in a given context.

3.4.1 Conceptualising Development

The term ‘development’ has become a ‘modern shibboleth, an unavoidable password’ (Rist, 2007) which is elusive to define, since it depends on where and by whom it is used (Mafeje, 2003; Mkandawire, 2011). There is a tendency to take for granted the meaning of this buzzword. In this section, I will give a snapshot analysis of the evolution of the idea of development. Thereafter, I will compare and contrast the concept of development and its outcomes to social policy.

The concept of development emerged after World War 2 (Sen, 1997). Development thinking became prominent in the middle of the 20th century with a speech delivered by the then US President Harry Truman in 1947 about foreign aid, in what got to be known as the “Truman Doctrine”. Taking from Truman’s perspective, development was conceptualised as a linear process that was geared towards increasing prosperity of the perceived ‘underdeveloped’ people (Nustad, 2004) in the areas of infrastructure, agriculture and industrialization. The western societies were then viewed as the developed world who were supposed to be role models to the “bottom billion” who had missed the development boat.

Inevitably, the conceptualisation of development as a way of emancipating some ‘left behind’ societies of the world in the south created a condition of underdevelopment which was the arch enemy that had to be fought. The idea therefore was that underdeveloped countries in the south would catch up if they would become nation-states and get capital, technology democracy, education and the rule of law (Hart, 2000; Nustad, 2004). In the words of Hirschman (1968), African countries were characterised as “late, late-comers” to development. Some of the writings on Africa resonated with this view giving Africa the synonym of what Frantz Fanon (1965) termed the “Wretched of the Earth”.

Previously, Africans had been the dominant denizens of the world populated by the “Bottom Billion” were the sole inhabitants of the Third World who have “missed the boat” (Collier, 2007). It is against this background that African nationalists like Julius Nyerere in the post-1980s wanted to address the lagging behind of the continent when he made the statement that “We must run while others walk”. Western scholars attributed this backwardness to intra-

country deficits which needed to be addressed as a precondition for western governments and institutions to provide assistance. As a result, the concept of development became a vehicle that was driven by the agency of elites as “experts and scientists were given the responsibility for guiding the development of peoples seen as lacking it” (Collier, 2007).

The development discourse had two strands: the Truman version which involved geopolitical considerations and humanitarianism. The second strand, also named the “Bandung Conference”, conceptualised development in terms of catching up, emancipation and the ‘right to development’ (Mkandawire, 2009). The Bandung Conference development narrative argued for a judicious mix of tradition and modernity. Rather than an imitation of the West, they drew inspiration from a diversity of experiences. For instance, Nyerere sought to draw inspirations from ‘traditional’ modes of association and organizing production and was inspired by the Chinese example. Kiswahili was chosen as the national language rather than English.

Another school was led by Rostow, through his Stages of Growth model, which suggested that development should occur in five stages, was a key reference point for the modernization theory. ‘Traditional societies’ framed as hierarchic, fatalistic, heavily dependent on agriculture, and by their low use of technology would reach the “Age of High Mass Consumption” after passing three sequential stages of development (Ibid). The third stage, “Take-off” was considered vital because it would occur when society is driven more by economic processes than tradition. For modernization theorists, historic conditions and unfair international economic structures were only of minor importance (Nuscheler, 2004:78; Fischer *et al.*, 2004: 35). Through this modernisation discourse, efforts were therefore made to make the third world a resemblance of the western countries. This was viewed as the ultimate goal of development. This narrative was within the ambit of modernization theory which contended that the poor countries could become democratic nation-states governed by the rule of law, accumulate capital and focus on economic performance, acquire technology to enable industrial production, and increase the level of education (Niznik, 2011).

In this corpus, the Bretton Woods Institutions gave themselves the mandate to provide financing and policy advice to the countries that were trying to catch up. For these institutions,

development was, from the outset, defined as the promotion of economic growth. This view did not change despite the changes in the approach and functions of the Bank's growth model over time (Woods, 2006: 43). The Bank's ethical and economic arguments for development have been varying and "what is so remarkable is the rapidity with which the Bank's new political rationalities shift and often contradict one another, yet circulate and become legitimate" (Goldman, 2005: 266). Developing countries have been dragged into the confusion where they became experimentation grounds for the feasibility of these policies. Moyo (2009) in consonance to the foregoing notes that the post-war development assistance can be broken down into seven decades and associated with different development paradigms: the birth of the Bretton Woods system in the 1940s; the era of the Marshall Plan and modernization theory in the 1950s; the heydays of industrialization and dependency theory in the 1960s; the shift towards aid as an answer to poverty in the 1970s; the "lost decade" of stabilization and structural adjustment in the 1980s; the emphasis on good governance and democracy in the 1990s; and the decade of the Millennium Development Goals (Moyo 2009: 10). Garba (2007:54) provided a more nuanced analysis of the policy advice by providing the approach which was adopted at each stage. In the first advice, governments in sub Saharan Africa were encouraged to borrow in order to fund national development plans that failed to bring about economic growth, structural transformation or equity, but left most heavily externally indebted. In the second diagnostic, the development advisers blamed the state as a means of starting the process of deepening and widening the influence of the neoclassical doctrine in development finance and advice. It was not enough to get prices right [second advice], policies had to be right [third advice] and reform had to extend to the state [fourth advice] (Garba, 2007: 54)

Boas and McNeill (2004: 4) contend that development is a question of planned socio-economic change, and consequently a political question. This perspective is corroborated by Gardner and Lewis (1992) who argue that development and anthropological representations of development processes are embedded in power relations. To these scholars, development is "an enormously powerful set of ideas which has guided thought and action across the world" for the best half of the 20th century. They concur with Boas and McNeill in that:

It "involves deliberately planned" political, economic and social change, and continues to affect the lives of millions of people around the world, regardless of what critiques think or say of it... [development is] a series of events and actions, as well

as a particular discourse and ideological construct” that are “inherently problematic”, and in certain regards, “actively destructive and disempowering” (Gardner & Lewis 1996:25). Far from being simple, homogenous, wholly monolithic, static and encompassing, as is often thought, development decision-making, policy and practice actually comprise a variety of countervailing perspectives and practices, as well as a multiplicity of voices” (Gardner and Lewis 1996:78).

Nyamnjoh (2010) seems to conclude on the definition of development by noting that the development discourse is heterogeneous, contested and constantly changing. In consonance to Nyamnjoh, Mafeje (2003) posits that development can be given empirical relevance by looking at it as: the expanding and adaptive capacity of society to satisfy the changing and increasing needs of its members, be they material or cultural. I believe, these can be investigated through the use of both quantitative and qualitative indices. For Sen, development, as expounded in his *Development as Freedom* work (Sen 1999), has to be about individual’s freedom to choose.

3.4.2 Social development indicators and social policy outcomes

Having defined development broadly, this section now explores social development in particular and its linkages with social policy. The purpose of this section is to show the cleavages that exist between social development and social policy, which will later in the thesis be linked to the context of land reform. Midgley's (1993) identifies social development as one of the different "types" of development amongst economic, political, self-development, human, community and grassroots development. Social development can be defined as ‘a process of planned social change designed to promote the well-being of the population as a whole in conjunction with a dynamic process of economic development’ (Midgley, 1995: 25).

In consonance to Midgely’s definition, Burkey (1993) conceptualise social development as a progression of change starting from individual development of confidence, cooperativeness, awareness and skills. These two definitions dovetail with the social policy definitions that I have given earlier where the latter is about the collective public efforts that are meant to affect and protect social well-being of people within a given territory. If we therefore mirror the definitions of social development and social policy, some key synergies can be identified on have human welfare and enhancement of human capabilities as the centre piece. Prioritising the individual in the right to development is conceptually important because it emphasises that development is not simply the economic or social growth of a society but the growth of

individuals within that society. (Sacco, 2008: 358). The following section unpacks the areas of mutuality between social development and social policy.

3.4.2.1 Investing in human capabilities

Scholars agree that the concept of development is problematic. Sen (1989) argues that instead of focusing on the points of disagreements and contentions, which is the process of development, focus should be placed to the intended results rather than means. In providing the nexus with social policy, I decided to focus on this element. Rist (2007) notes that the concept of development conveys an idea that ‘tomorrow things will be better...’ Mkandawire cites Arthur Lewis, who was of the view that development meant the widening of the ‘range of human choices’ (Lewis, 1955). This is the view that then received greater prominence and expression by Amartya Sen. Taking from Lewis, Sen argues that development is premised on the understanding that ‘human beings are the agents, beneficiaries and adjudicators of progress, but they also happen to be directly or indirectly the primary means of all production’ (Sen, 1989). He further noted that

the *enhancement of living conditions* must clearly be an essential- if not the essential-object of the entire economic exercise and that enhancement is an integral part of the concept of development [emphasis added].

This approach by Sen builds on that of Aristotle in arguing that development is about providing conditions which facilitate people’s ability to lead flourishing lives. He further argues that these conditions include access to quality primary goods which subsequently enable human beings to be given free choice of what they want to be or do. This conceptualisation of development as freedom places premium on human being’s capabilities to live lives that they choose to live.¹¹ Midgley (2001) concurs with the foregoing when he notes that ‘the goal of social development in the context of modern welfare is to produce a social well-being that makes people capable of acting and making their *own decisions in the broadest sense*’ [emphasis added]. What can be noted in both social policy and social development is an aspiration to widen the range of human choices through enhancing their capabilities so that they can live lives they have reason to value.

3.4.2.2 *Inseparability of social and economic policies*

Another area of converge between social policy and development is the symbiosis of relationship that exists with economic policy. While neoliberals take a residualist approach in dealing with social policy when they argue that economic growth should precede social development, Polanyi argued that economic policy is inseparably linked to the social. Midgely weighs in on this argument by positing that social development endeavours to promote human well-being in collaboration with a dynamic, ongoing process of economic development. He further argues that social development considers economic and social processes as inextricably important components of the development process. As such, social development cannot take place without economic development, and economic development is meaningless if it fails to bring about significant improvements in the well-being of the population as a whole (Midgely, 2005).

Research has shown that increase in GNP per capita does not have a direct relationship with enriching human lives. Countries with high GNP per capita can nevertheless have astonishingly low achievements in the quality of life, with the bulk of the population being subject to premature mortality, escapable morbidity, overwhelming illiteracy and so on. Midgely (2001) refers to such as scenario as '*distorted development*'. Birdsall and Londono (1997) observed that sustainable growth that avoided addressing inequality was only achievable when there was a redistributive component in a country. As such, addressing poverty and vulnerability which are at the core of social policy and development only happen when there is symbiosis between economic and social policy (see Polanyi, 1946; UNRISD, 2006; Adesina, 2007; Garba, 2007; Mkandawire, 2007; Tharamangalam, 2010; Yan Shik *et al*, 2012).

3.4.2.3 *Interest on social justice*

Sacco (2008: 361) argues that the right to development can only be fulfilled if all human rights are realised in a comprehensive manner based on principles of equity and social justice. Looking at the transformative social policy framework above, the quest for equality is one of the desired outcomes as well as the normative premise. One key way of reaching equality is through equity, which is one of the ingredients that have been identified correctly by Sacco (2008) as a prerequisite for realisation of development. This quest for equality can be deciphered in social policy as well since it strives to guarantee every member of the society certain minimum standards and certain opportunities (Hagenbuch, 1958:205).

Social policy's purpose is to make sure that people within a given territory live lives of dignity with their wellbeing protected regardless of status, ethnicity, gender, age and any other potential area of discrimination. Adesina (2007) affirms the aspect of social justice and quest for equality. The minimum standard of living for each person is guaranteed through social policy elements such as direct government provision of social welfare through, for example, broad-based education and health services, subsidies and benefits, social security and pensions, labour market interventions, *land reform* [italics for emphasis], progressive taxation and other redistributive policies. Using Sen's terminology, social policy tools can be said to be conduits through which human functionings are realised.

From the foregoing, one can decipher that at the core of both social policy and development, is a desire for social justice and equality. The ultimate goal of both social policy and development are individuals and societies that are liberated from any inhibitions such as poverty, but with choices and freedoms to live lives they have reason to value. Social policy tools facilitate social development and enhance economic development. Social policy answers the 'how to' question of development. I can also argue that there may not be development, that is, deliberate and intentional social change, without social policy.

3.4.2.4 Role of the state

It is important to note that the drivers of both social policy and development should be the state. The state has a responsibility to mobilise human, natural and economic resources to achieve social change as ideally should be set out in national policies which includes social policy (European Report on Development, 2010). In consonance with the foregoing, Midgely (2001) argues that developmental welfare requires a strong role for the state, not only in social welfare but in promoting economic development as well. It is instructive to note that while the state may set out the parameters of social policy, it is not always the one that would deliver on the broad range of social policy measures. Esping-Andersen's typology and the earlier one by Richard Titmuss show that self-provisioning and occupational welfare (linked to employment) are important aspects of how social policy is delivered. Esping-Andersen's Anglo-Saxon 'liberal' welfare regime limits state's role to addressing indigency (something that goes back to the Poor Law).

While this is the ideal case, there is substantial literature against the involvement of the state. This discourse focused on approaches such as the New Public Management to promote market principles in the governance of the public sector or the direct privatization of public-sector entities (Dostal, 2010). Other neoliberal policies have included the downscaling of state intervention in the economy, financial market deregulation, efforts to attract rising levels of foreign direct investment, and multilateral trade liberalization under the World Trade Organization. In addition, policy-making was supposed to be based on the contracting out of formerly public services to the private sector, decentralization of decision-making, and good governance (UNRISD, 2010: 257-58).

Alternative development theorists however have argued that the state must provide leadership in the transition to an industry- and information-based economy, that markets require for their survival conditions that cannot be provided by the marketplace itself, and that the answer to the structural needs of the economic transition is the formation of developmental states with expanded state agency and activity (UNRISD, 2010: 257-58). It should however be noted that in Scandinavian countries which have exemplary social policies and are considered developed, the state played an instrumental role. The active involvement of the state brings with it leadership, political will, financing and integration into the legislative and policy regime of the country. Koehler (2011), showed that political change in several countries such as India in 2005, Pakistan in 2008 and Bangladesh in 2009 and the end of civil conflict in Nepal-2006 all created political pressure, political will, as well as policy space for social policy innovations. Tharamangalam (2010) provides evidence for this narrative using the case studies of Kerala and Cuba. The effective role of the state has been documented in various case studies by several scholars (see also Kwon, 2005; Wu, 2007; Dostal, 2010; Adesina, 2010).

3.4.2.5 Investing in social capital formation

One of the functions of social policy is engendering social cohesion. The concept of social cohesion, as shall be noted in Chapter 9, is used to refer to social networks and institutionalised social relationships that promote community integration (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1995). Apart from social cohesion being a desirable end in itself, research has shown that communities with higher social cohesion have a high degree of social capital and economic well-being

(Putnam et al, 1993). Midgely (2001) observed that communities with a high degree of social cohesion are more prosperous than those with a low degree of social cohesion.

Consequently, communities with high rates of disorganisation, despondence and crime have low social capital as well as low levels of economic development. This assertion by Midgely suggests that social cohesion is a necessary ingredient to economic and social development. Putnam (1995: 2) echoes this assertion when he argues that the productive activity of social capital is visible in its ability to facilitate coordination and cooperation for common benefit. This is because communities will be able to harness their social capital in undertaking programs that would have an impact on the living standards of the people in that particular community. Midgley and Livermore (1998) substantiate this argument by positing that social cohesion requires investments in initiatives that mobilise local people around a variety of local social and economic projects. In the context of social cohesion outcomes of the FTLRP, Chapter 10 enunciates the dynamics at play in Kwekwe District- the case study of this thesis.

3.5 Conclusion

The chapter has demonstrated that land reform is a social policy tool which has not received academic attention in that regard, except recently by Yi and Mkandawire (2014). The second section of this chapter has unpacked the identified five social policy functions namely production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and social cohesion. The last section of the chapter provided a nexus between social policy and development. The purpose of the section was necessitated by the fact that social policy outcomes are measured using social development indicators. In this section, I demonstrated that social policy instruments are conduits for the achievement of social development in any society. I identified five areas of mutuality between development and social policy. First, there is a common interest in investing in human capabilities. Secondly, both social policy and development emphasise the inseparability of economic and social policies. Thirdly, both development and social policy put emphasis on social justice, which can be achieved amongst other means, through redistribution. Social capital is considered both as a process and an outcome of development and social policy in view of Midgley's argument that communities with higher social cohesion have a high degree of social capital and economic well-being. Both social policy and development recognise the involvement of the state in achieving desired outcomes. The next chapter will discuss the

processes of field research and data collection. Prior, however, the chapter will look at the ontological and epistemological issues that are relevant to this research.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

There are a lot of ontological, epistemological and methodological contestations in the process of knowledge production (Gialdino, 2009). Wright Mills argues in his 1959 work, *The Sociological Imagination*, that the contestations are a result of the complex nature of science. The arguments on knowledge production reflect the different ways of observing, studying and measuring the world or what constitute reality (Neuman, 1994). Ontology is one of the root issues as a point of departure in research. Blaikie (2000) has defined it as:

‘claims and assumptions that are made about the nature of social reality, claims about what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact with each other. In short, ontological assumptions are concerned with what we believe constitutes social reality’ (Blaikie, 2000: 8).

When we have defined what constitutes social reality, the next issue to grapple with would be on how we get to know it. Epistemology therefore is a broad set of approaches to the study of knowledge and a form of proof to justify a claim about the social world (Longino, 1990). It considers the appropriate foundation for the study of society and its manifestations, and provides the underlying philosophical basis for the arguments supporting the validity of a research strategy (Chiweshe, 2011). Galliers (1990) noted that epistemology, being what is known to be true, is different from doxology, which is what is believed to be true. He further argues that the purpose of science therefore is to transform the things that are believed (doxology), into the things that are known—from doxa to episteme. The transformation from doxa to episteme uses primarily two research philosophies, namely positivism and interpretivism. On the one hand, scholars such as Bacon, Descartes, Mill, Durkheim, Russell and Popper have been prominent in using the positivist approach while on the other hand scholars such as Kant, Freud, Polanyi and Kuhn have been characterized by using the interpretivist approach (Hirschheim, 1985).

4.2 Positivism

Positivism can be defined as a body of techniques for investigating phenomena and acquiring new knowledge of the natural world, as well as the correction and integration of previous knowledge, based on observable, empirical, measurable evidence and subject to

laws of reasoning (Kalebe-Nyamongo, 2012). Crotty (1998) argues that positivism is based on the assumption that the only authentic knowledge is scientific knowledge, and that such knowledge can come only from positive affirmation of theories through strict scientific and quantitative methods. This notion is corroborated by Levin (1988) when he noted that positivists believe reality is constant and can be observed and described from an objective viewpoint, without meddling with the phenomena being studied. In view of this notion, it can be argued therefore experimental research would not be positivist since experiments involve ‘meddling with the phenomenon being studied.’ Scholars from the positivist orientation argue that the researched subject should be isolated and that observations should be replicable. Thus, a positivist researcher employs a deductive process to gather facts and produce generalizations about cause and effect relationships between variables through objective, observable, and quantifiable data. These cause and effect relationships, once identified, can be used to predict general patterns of human activity or outcomes (Marsh and Stoker, 2002; Deacon *et al*, 1999; Neuman, 1994; Kalebe-Nyamongo, 2012).

Key positivist tenets are measurement and objectivity, with a focus on quantitative data. The general positivist approach to research usually starts with theories, conceptual frameworks, and models and structures the research through framing of hypotheses that are then tested (Schell, 1992:7). The approach places premium on observable external realities over internal reality. Its main shortcoming has been this inflexible concern with abstract laws, formulas and statistics that pay relatively low attention to the importance of contextual factors such as social and cultural forces that might also affect human activity. As a result, the approach, particularly in the natural sciences context, has been criticized for failing to distinguish between people and social institutions from the world of nature as well as assuming that the respondents’ understanding of their questionnaires is the same as theirs; and also the assumption that it is possible to control’ variables in experimental research involving human beings to achieve unambiguous results (Denzin, 1970; Cicourel, 1964; Blumer, 1956; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). In appreciation of this, researchers conduct pilot test of survey instruments and use them in conjuncture with methods such as FGD primarily because it is understood that the researcher’s frame of reference is not the same as that of the research subjects. The following section will look at interpretivism and its nuances in the context of research designing.

4.3 Interpretivism

Lindlof (1995) argues that, 'unlike quantitative researchers who perform tests of prediction and control, qualitative inquirers strive to understand their objects of interest' (Lindlof 1995:9). His view is corroborated by Mommsen when he notes that interpretivists pay attention to human cultural values, symbols, and social processes, although viewed from a subjective perspective of the researcher (Mommsen, 1992). This approach contends that reality can only be understood through interpretation of people's customs and cultures. The interpretive epistemological assumption is that through methods such as interviews, document analysis and observation, we can understand people's beliefs, preferences and the meanings they attach to social phenomena (Kalebe-Nyamongo, 2012). Therefore, interpretive researchers cannot divorce themselves from their own socio-cultural realities and adopt a value-free position, nor can they operate in an apolitical environment.

Researchers need to reflect on their own views and feelings and identify how these might impact on their study. In other words, an objective analysis of events or social phenomena is impossible (Deacon et al, 1999; Neuman, 1994; Marsh and Stoker, 2002). Interpretivists admit that there may be several interpretations of reality, however, these interpretations are in themselves a part of the scientific knowledge. It is through the researcher's insight that qualitative research achieves its ultimate goal-understanding (Ashley & Orenstein, 2005). Qualitative research begins from an ontological foundation that defines reality as some type of projection of imagination, the point of view of at least one actor and ultimately a social construction, which can be explored through a science of meanings, phenomenological insight and subjective processes (Kalebe-Nyamongo, 2012). Joniak (2007) argues that qualitative research embraces an ontology that negates the existence of (or at least the efficacy of arguing for the existence of) an external reality. Searle (1995) regards external reality as one that exists outside and independent of our interpretations (Searle, 1995:154).

Williamson (2002) argues that an important component of interpretivism is that people are continuously involved in interpreting their dynamic world. Interpretivists believe that the social world is constructed by people and is, therefore, different from the world of nature. This implies that evidence about social action cannot be isolated from the context in

which it occurs, nor from the meanings that social actors assign to them (Joniak, 2007). Therefore, people act on their beliefs and preferences, and their actions can be explained by these beliefs and preferences (Jennings, 1983; Neuman, 1994; Bevir *et al*, 2003; Joniak, 2007). As such, researchers' interpretation, translation and representation of data obtained from research subjects cannot be considered objective, as it is also socially constructed. This thesis is alive to that fact and therefore cannot have its findings generalizable to other contexts.

In view of the foregoing epistemological debates, Gramsci weighed in firstly by condemning the positivists for adopting “the conception of the objective reality of the external world in its most trivial and uncritical sense” (Gramsci, 1971: 444 quoted in Femia, 2009: 38). For Gramsci, there is some acceptable sense of “objective reality”, albeit one which recognizes the contribution of human thought to the way that reality is structured and accessed (ibid: 38). Nevertheless, Gramsci disapproved of conventional positivist approaches by saying that:

Bare 'facts' acquire meaning only when organized in the frame of a theory, which cannot itself be derived from the facts to be explained. Knowledge is not like a photographic plate that reproduces the picture it receives, for our images of reality are filtered through culturally determined presuppositions. (ibid: 38)

The citation by Gramsci is not necessarily a vote for interpretivism, instead, it is more about how we apprehend external reality which has an autonomous existence from the knowing subject. Femia (2009) completes his study of Gramsci's ontology by noting that Gramsci “was a truly dialectical thinker who asserted the *interdependence of mind and objective reality*, and not the absolute priority of either” (ibid: 41) [emphasis added]. Consistent with Gramsci's persuasion, I structured my research to use the mixed method approach.

It is worth noting that the dichotomy between positivism and interpretivism as has been discussed above falls down when one enters the terrain of mixed methods research. Post-positivists for instance accept that the world we observe is independent of the knower without assuming that we can objectively observe the world or phenomenon. The following section now looks at the emic and etic approaches in research which were used significantly in articulating the findings of this thesis.

4.4 Emic and etic approaches in research

Emic and etic approaches to research are key strategies that enrich research when dealing with the issues of culture especially. Pike (1967: 37) posits that ‘the etic viewpoint studies behaviour as from outside of a particular system, and as an essential initial approach to an alien system. The emic viewpoint results from studying behaviour as from inside the system’. Pike (1967: 41) argues that ‘the emic and etic data do not constitute a rigid dichotomy of data, but often present the same data from two points of view’. Pike elaborates the symbiosis of the two approaches by noting that:

Through the etic ‘lens’ the analyst views the data in tacit reference to a perspective oriented to all comparable events (whether sounds, ceremonies, activities), of all peoples, of all parts of the earth; through the other lens, the emic one, he views the same events in that particular culture, as it and it alone is structured. The result is a kind of ‘tri-dimensional understanding’ of human behaviour instead of a ‘flat’ etic one. (Pike, 1967, p. 41)

In the emic approach, ‘culture’ is an integral part of human behaviour, and is inalienable to an individual (see, Gergen, 1985). As such, the behaviour of humans cannot be detached from their cultural context. This same behaviour therefore cannot be established through exploration of *causes* which can be studied by means of methods of natural sciences, but rather, by interrogating *reasons* which are within the control of the person in question. The reasons must also be comprehended using the eyes of individuals under investigation. The emic approach emphasizes human self-determination and self-reflection (Berry, 1989). Emic approach provides views of a person who is familiar with a system or culture under study, and who has the know-how of functioning within it. Pike (1967: 41) posits the value of using the emic approach in research as: firstly, it permits an appreciation of the way in which a language or culture is constructed, ‘not as a series of miscellaneous parts, but as a working whole’; secondly, it assists one to understand individuals in their daily lives, including their attitudes, motives, interests and personality; and thirdly, the approach ‘provides the only basis upon which a predictive science of behaviour can be expected to make some of its greatest progress, since even statistical predictive studies will in many instances prove invalid’ (Ibid).

There are four reasons which Pike gives for why the etic approach is valuable in research. Firstly, it provides a wide viewpoint and training about various events around the world, so that similarities and differences can be acknowledged; secondly, methods of recording differing phenomena can be attained; third, an etic approach is the only point of entry, since there is ‘no other way to begin an analysis than by starting with a rough, tentative (and

inaccurate) etic description of it' (p. 40); and, fourth, an etic comparison of selected cultures may allow a researcher to meet practical demands, such as financial limitations or time pressures.

It is these foregoing compelling reasons as posited by Pike (1967) and Berry (1989) on the value of using emic and etic approaches to research that I decided to have them guide my data collection. I then developed the research design to be cognisant of the emic and etic approaches in the process of data collection.

4.5 Background information on research site- Kwekwe District


The research was conducted in Kwekwe District. The District is one of the eight districts centrally located in the Midlands province. The capital of the district is located approximately 220 kilometres, by road, southwest of Harare, the country's capital city. The district covers a geographical area of 8 625 square kilometres. Most of the district falls within agro ecology region 3 (78.8 percent) and a small segment of 21.2 percent is in region 4 (Moyo *et al*, 2009: 24). The area is generally dry with an average rainfall of 550mm which falls intermittently during the summer season (Zimbabwe Meteorological Department, 2000). The area has mostly vertisols and paraferriallitic soils (Mararike, 2001). Such soils rapidly lose fertility when cleared of autochthonous vegetation. Subsequently, year after year cultivation worsens soil infertility, and thus crop yields easily deteriorate (*ibid*). The major rivers in the district include the Kwekwe River, Munyati River and Mbembezani River.

With a warm temperate climate, the district has an annual average temperature of 19°C. Kwekwe district has both rural and urban areas. Rural areas include Silobela, Chiundura, Zhombe and urban areas include Mbizo, Fitchlea and Chicago to mention a few. The area is generally suitable for large scale cattle farming and the growing of some drought tolerant crops such as millet, rapoko and sorghum. Mujeyi (2010) notes that Kwekwe district is characterised by land use patterns such as extensive livestock production, cash crops and marginal production of drought tolerant food crops. The main economic activities found in this district are subsistence crop cultivation and intensive crop cultivation on smallholdings in irrigation schemes (*ibid*).

In view of the above facts, the area is generally suitable for large-scale cattle farming and the growing of some drought resistant crops such as sorghum, millet and rapoko (Maposa *et al* 2011). Maize, which is the staple food for Zimbabwe, does not grow well in the dry Region 3, unless there is the practice of irrigation agriculture. This explains why the former white farmers specialized in cattle ranching and wild life management in Kwekwe District. As a result, some of the resettled farmers take advantage of the fact that Kwekwe district is located within a mineral-rich belt known as the Great Dyke by participating in gold panning partly driven by the practical need to survive (Mhope, 2010). Common minerals extracted include gold, chrome and iron ore from mines such as Globe and Phoenix. Major industries operating in the Kwekwe district include ZIMASCO (production of ferrochrome), ZISCO (steel making), Sable Chemicals (fertiliser production) and Munyati Power Station (electricity generation). Moreover, because Kwekwe District is located on the great Dyke, the area is predominantly a mining area and is prominent for informal mining affectionately known as ‘*chikorokoza*’. This presented opportunities of exploring how such mining activities had shaped the lives of newly resettled households.

Kwekwe district had approximately 291 large and small-scale commercial farms (Magauzi *et al*, 2011). In a baseline survey conducted by AIAS, Kwekwe District had 1925 households that were settled on 42 farms (AIAS, 2009:25). Most of these households were settled under the A1 scheme. These identified beneficiaries participated in the initial baseline survey that was conducted by AIAS thereby making entry easier into the district.

Map 1: Map of Kwekwe District



The district is easily accessible by road and is relatively close to Zimbabwe’s capital city, Harare (approximately 212 km), which made data gathering process relatively easy to manage. Moreover, despite its close proximity to Harare, the area has had very limited academic attention except for the AIAS Surveys in 2009 and in 2014. Besides these surveys, there has not been another academic study conducted in the District exploring the outcomes of the FTLRP.

4.6 Kwekwe Demographics

Kwekwe district has a varied population with more people living in the urban areas and a higher female population. As of 2012 national census, the district was reported to have a population of 174 727 people (86 698 males and 88 029 females). Kwekwe urban areas had 100 900 people

(48 265 males and 52 635 females) whereas Kwekwe rural areas had 73 827 people where 49.6% were males and 50.4% were females (ZIMSTAT, 2012). There is also diversity amongst newly resettled land beneficiaries. AIAS Survey (2014) established that marital status of newly resettled land beneficiaries in the Kwekwe district is much diversified from single, divorced and widowed to monogamously and polygamously married, with the majority of land beneficiaries being monogamously married.

4.7 Research design

According to Mouton (2001), research design is a blue print of how one intends conducting a research. This definition is corroborated by Terrell (2012: 258) who describes research design as a road map that determines the most appropriate route to take when carrying out a study. Research designs guide the methods and decisions that researchers make during their studies and set the logic which they use to interpret their findings (Flick, 2002: 220). In coming up with my research design, the earlier noted philosophical research standpoints were instructive. For quality results, I decided to use both emic and etic approaches (Lett, 1990: 130) in the research but with a greater bias towards the former. As such, I employed the mixed methods approach for this research.

4.7.1 Mixed methods approach


Mixed research is a synthesis that includes ideas from qualitative and quantitative research (Johnson *et al*, 2007). John Creswell (2003) corroborates this definition by noting that ‘mixed methods research is a research design (or methodology) in which the researcher collects, analyses, and mixes (integrates or connects) both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or a multiphase program of inquiry’. Tashakkori (2010) consolidates the various definitions of this third paradigm of research by noting that:

Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration.

The foregoing definitions have been summarised diagrammatically by Johnson *et al* (2007) in Figure 4.1 below. The diagram demonstrates the qualitative-quantitative continuum, with several overlapping groups of mixed methods researchers or types of mixed methods research.

Moving from the centre of the figure outward either the left or the right, with the exclusion of the area near poles, is where mixed methods research, generally falls. The centre of the figure represents the strongest or “pure” form of mixed methods approach in research.

Figure 4.1: Locating the mixed methods approach in research paradigms



Source: Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004)

A researcher therefore might have one primary home (out of the three major homes: qualitative research, mixed research, and quantitative research). Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) posit that it is sensible for a researcher to borrow from other research paradigms if the research can benefit from such. Hence, what comes from it could be a research design that could be considered to be qualitative dominant mixed methods research. This type of research would be ideal for qualitative or mixed methods researchers who consider it important to include quantitative data and approaches into their otherwise qualitative research. The other type of mixed methods research as can be deciphered from the diagram is the *quantitative dominant* mixed methods research. This approach is ideal for quantitative or mixed methods researchers who find it important to include qualitative data and approaches in their otherwise quantitative research projects (Ibid).

It is in appreciation of the foregoing that I decided to use the mixed methods approach in my data collection. Overall, the research design is qualitative dominant mixed methods research. This is so because my fieldwork collected primarily qualitative data. The reason for this was that I had access to two baseline studies that had been conducted by the African Institute for Agrarian Studies in 2005-2006 as well as in 2013-2014. The baselines provided detailed quantitative information about the state of land beneficiaries in six districts namely Kwekwe, Zvimba, Chiredzi, Goromonzi, Mangwe and Chipinge. The two baseline studies collected primarily quantitative data on the new agrarian structure, characteristics of the land beneficiaries, redistribution patterns, production and land use patterns of the land beneficiaries, social institutions that are being formed in the farming communities, and the agrarian change that has been happening over the years. My research had access to these datasets. The AIAS data provides the quantitative element to my thesis while my own data provides the qualitative component.

Armed with the AIAS data which was mainly quantitative, I structured my fieldwork in such a way that I had to avoid duplication of efforts by collecting the same data as had been collected by AIAS. I therefore designed my research tools to address the gaps that I had observed in the AIAS data sets. Since the AIAS data was collected using a political economy approach, it neglected some elements that are important when looking at social policy outcomes. Some of the missing elements from the AIAS data include providing inadequate or in some instances, no attention to *inter alia* the dynamics around social services in the resettlement areas; giving attention to social protection, in the event of vulnerability caused both by market failures as well as external shocks such as droughts and the non-economic value of land for the beneficiaries. To be able to identify these gaps, I had to spend three months (January to March 2015) at AIAS. During this time, I acquainted myself with the data they had collected in the two baseline surveys as well as literature that they had which was not readily available in libraries and on the internet.

4.7.2 The ethnographic study of Kwekwe District

After the three months at AIAS, I spent six months (April to September 2015) in Kwekwe District. During this time, I was collecting emic data on the experiences of the land beneficiaries as well as addressing some gaps in the AIAS data through ethnography. I

collected a large corpus of data through semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, informal conversations and systematic observations.

Ethnography has been defined as an approach developed in the social sciences for understanding how a culture works by observing it from the inside (Ybema, 2009). This is corroborated by Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), Lofland (1995), and Prasad (2005) when they note that ethnographic fieldwork typically involves the development of close connections between the ethnographer and the subjects and situations being studied (Van Maanen, 1988: 2, 49–50). Through systematic, intensive, detailed observations and in-depth interviews, the social organization of behaviour and interaction is examined, including the nature of social rules, interactional expectations, and cultural values (Andrew, 1983). Using the transformative social policy framework, I went into the field to undertake the ethnographic work seeking clarity on the five functions of social policy. This however does not mean that I was inflexible to both observe and identify some pertinent data, in fact, some of the findings that I have in the thesis, such as the chapter on education, were a product of this open mind. This is in view of the fact that education is a critical aspect of social policy, with implications for production task of social policy (as a human resource investment), and relative ex-ante protection from vulnerability.

One special emphasis of ethnography is the dual perspective of the participant observer, to look at everything from the viewpoint of the insider, while remaining conscious of being an outsider with an analytical perspective (Agar, 1980). Spradley and McCurby (1972) define the perspective of ethnography as “instead of asking ‘What do I see these people doing?’ [The ethnographer] must ask ‘What do these people see themselves doing?’ This approach made me appreciate the quality of life for the families in the resettled areas from their own viewpoint. The method allowed me to ‘illuminate the often taken-for-granted everyday life’ (Bloch, 1997) of the households, in appreciating the impact of the FTLRP. Details around how fieldwork happened, the logistics, challenges, entry and exit of the field sites are all covered in the administration of the study section below.

4.7.3 Study sample

A sample can be defined as a representative selected for a study whose characteristics exemplifies the larger group from which it was selected (Patton, 2002: 408; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 370). The foregoing definition is taken further by McMillan and Schumacher (2010:138) who define purposive sampling as ‘an approach whereby participants are selected because of the rich information they hold that is required to answer the research questions’. In consonance, Cohen *et al* (2007:115) posit that, in purposive sampling, researchers handpick the cases to be included in the study on the basis of their typicality or possession of particular characteristics being sought.

The choice of Kwekwe District as the study area was done through purposive sampling based on six districts where AIAS had done baselines to investigate the outcomes of the FTLRP in both 2009 and 2013. The AIAS studies covered six districts namely Mangwe, Chiredzi, Zvimba, Goromonzi, Chipinge and Kwekwe. The latter was chosen also because of the convenience it provided in collecting data. Further, the district is close to my rural home therefore understanding of the way of life of the people would not have been a challenge for me. In Kwekwe District, two research sites (Sherwood Block and Umlala Farm) were purposively sampled with the assistance of a District Agricultural Extension Officer. The officer helped me to identify the two sites which had a contrast in terms of infrastructure as well as a history of how the people had been resettled. Umlala Farm had land beneficiaries resettled officially by the government. This was a farm which war veterans had initially not invaded since the white farmer had a reputation of hospitability. Because of the approach that was used, land beneficiaries were randomly selected resulting in having a mix of war veterans, former farm workers, civil servants such as teachers and individuals from the communal areas. This farm has 44 A1 farms. I held 20 semi-structured interviews with land beneficiaries purposively sampled to capture the various categories of beneficiaries cited earlier.

With the help of the Agricultural Extension Officers, I visited the farmers at their homes as they were doing their daily chores. The Agricultural Extension Officers are part of the Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX) in the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development. One of their responsibilities is to visit farmers and provide on-site training whilst also monitoring productivity. In some of my visits

to the farmers for interviews, I joined the Agritex Officers as they were doing their job. I had shared my semi-structured interview guides with them. In some of the cases when we could not establish rapport to conduct the interviews comfortably, the officers would ask the questions on my behalf as I listened and recorded where possible. In both Umlala Farm and Sherwood Block, I managed to use the trust which farmers had developed with the extension officers to get the interviews done. With constant interaction, I then managed to build my own relations so that the respondents became confident to express themselves in my presence.

When we visited potential interviewees, in most instances, we joined in the work they were doing. It is interesting to note however that most of the uncensored responses to our questions were those when we spoke whilst we were working together on whatever the farmer was doing. In some of the occasions, the farmers had to stop what they were doing to sit down with us. In those instances, the interviews morphed into formal processes, with an impression of one party wanting to get information from the other party, not necessarily like colleagues having a conversation. Such interviews did not yield detailed accounts of the outcomes of the FTLRP.

Sherwood Block is an area which had four commercial farms before the land redistribution namely Devilwood Farm, Bonstead, Lindela and Dickel Farm. The first three belonged to one family with three brothers, each owning a farm. The three brothers are popularly known as the Burger brothers. On these four farms, there were 171 households that were settled there in several ways—from farm occupations to allocation by the chief and also government's formal process.

Most beneficiaries of A2 farms in this area were soldiers who were in Democratic Republic of Congo when the land reform started. Of the 171 beneficiaries, I managed to hold 25 semi structured interviews. Details of how these happened are noted later in the section of research techniques. I purposively sampled the households in view of the agrarian structure that existed. The farm was a total contrast to Umlala Farm for two main reasons. First, it was one of the farms with a unique arrangement where the white farmers remained on the farms albeit with reduced land sizes. Each white farmer was categorized under the A2 farms and had their land size reduced to 450ha. I discuss elsewhere in this thesis (see Chapter 7 on production) on the

nature of the relationship between the land beneficiaries and these white farmers. The second uniqueness of Sherwood Block is that the greater part of the land is fully equipped with irrigation equipment as well as canals for irrigation.

Since the relationship with white farmers was not severed, the latter still maintain their equipment and water pump so that all A2 farms can irrigate their farms. In choosing the 25 respondents, I made sure that I interviewed two representatives of the white farmers, the former soldiers, as well as former farm workers who were now in the village type of resettlement of Bonstead Farm, which is now called Bonstead Village.

Table 4.1: Summary of the systematic random samples

Farm name	Farm size (ha)	Number of resettled households	Number of households interviewed
Umlala Farm	2500	44	20
Sherwood Block	6000	171	25
Total	8500	215	45

4.8 Research techniques

The research relies mainly on primary and secondary data. The key methods that were employed during the fieldwork were observations and in-depth interviews.

4.8.1 In-depth interviews

Gay *et al* (2011:386) posit that ‘an interview is a purposeful interaction in which one person obtains information from another’. The interviews provide information that is inaccessible through observation (Wiersma and Jurs, 2009). In-depth interviews help researchers to obtain important data that they may not acquire from observation alone (Silverman, 2004:181). In-depth interviews were conducted with 45 farming households who were beneficiaries of the FTLRP. As has been noted in the section on sampling, the interviewees were purposively sampled to make sure that all the various categories of beneficiaries participated. The categories of the beneficiaries whom I interviewed are as below:

Table 4.2: Disaggregation of the in-depth interviews with FTLRP beneficiaries

Category of interviewee	Number
War veterans	5
Former farm workers	4
Civil servants	7
Beneficiaries from communal areas	8
Beneficiaries from urban areas serving in private sector	5
Pensioners	5
Farm workers	6
Traditional authorities (chief and two headmen known as <i>sabhuku</i>)	3
White farmers' representatives	2

Source: Own Fieldwork (2015)

As I have noted earlier, a semi structured interview guide structured according to the five functions of social policy was used. As such, there were questions on production and productive capacity of the beneficiaries. There was a category of questions on redistribution, in terms of how the beneficiaries had obtained their land and the configurations of the new landowners. The interview guide had also a set of questions on social protection mechanisms available to the farmers. Another category of questions was on social reproduction as well as the gender relations that are emerging in the resettled communities. Lastly, there was a category of questions on social institutions that had been established in the farming communities and the extent to which social cohesion was being realised. While the foregoing gave a guide on the interviews, I used a rolling and flexible approach to the interviews to make sure that they were not mechanical. This approach made the interview process to be fluid and the interviewees in most cases would let down their informational guard.

4.8.2 Key informant interviews

Key informants are people in authority or of certain expertise working within or with a community. Such people include local government authorities, teachers and agriculturalists (Meis, 2007:4). Due to their personal skills or position in a society, key informants are able to proffer details and insights into the vicissitudes of that particular community (Marshall,

1998:92). The purpose of these interviews were to bridge any informational gaps or areas that needed clarity on the basis of my interaction with the farmers. These key informants included ministry of education personnel such as teachers and administrators. Interviews were also conducted with ministry of agriculture personnel at district level and also the agricultural extension officers of the two sites I was focusing on. I had the opportunity also to talk to the local political leadership representatives albeit they wore two hats, as land beneficiaries as well as the political leadership of the area. Please see Annexure 1 for the list of the key informants interviewed.

The in-depth interviews were relatively more fruitful as the interviews were done without many people around. Also, most of the respondents in this category had previously participated in research so they did not have any fears. Another dynamic which was at play was that most of the key informants were in some position of power so they did not express any discomfort on discussing the outcomes of the FTLRP. Some of the key informant interviewees indicated that they had participated in several researches. Their major concern was that the researcher never returned to share with them the outcomes of the research, something which they hoped I would not do.

4.8.3 Focus group discussions

Focus groups are part of a category of qualitative research methods useful when wanting to obtain some understanding of participants' views, feelings and attitudes. Focus group discussion (FGD) is a useful method for exploratory research (Mahr, 1995:112). It produces data and insights that ordinarily would not have come out without group interaction as hearing the experiences of others would stimulate memories, ideas, and experiences in the discussants (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002:182). Group interactions provide several benefits. Kitzinger (2004) exemplifies this by noting that group interactions can inspire a variety of communication including anecdotes and jokes, which may be an eye opener to the researcher on what the participants know and encourage a wide understanding of issues. The researcher gets exposed to subject areas that usually remain untapped using the conventional data collection techniques like in-depth interviews. The various forms of communication used during focus group discussions may enlighten the researcher to the normative values of the participants that are enveloped in the participants' culture (Kitzinger, 2004).

There were two reasons for using FGDs in this research. Firstly, FGDs help in understanding primarily the solidarity and equality dynamics within the communities. Understanding solidarity and equality dynamics is key since these are the normative framings of social policy. Secondly, FGDs assist in understanding both horizontal and vertical social cohesion issues in line with one of the functions of social policy.

In this study, four focus group discussions were conducted with resettled farmers with an average of six participants in each session (see annexure 3 for the details of the FGDs). The FGDs were mainly composed of A1 farmers. A2 farmers were mostly based in urban areas. I however noticed that the participants were not very free to discuss issues in the FGDs. This was primarily because there were two exercises that were taking place at the time of the research. The first exercise was a government initiative of identifying underutilised farms for repossession and reallocation to people on the waiting list. It took a long time for the respondents to appreciate that I was not an undercover government official looking for farmers who are underutilising the allocated land. Even though the agricultural extension officers I was working with to get entry into the farms explained several times the purpose of the research, some of the respondents kept on asking why I was doing the research. When I asked for permission to record the conversations, the respondents were categorical in their rejection. I had to rely on writing in my journal as the discussions went on. The respondents noted that they were not comfortable with being recorded whilst expressing themselves since they were not sure of who could end up with the information. Even after my explanations that the information I was collecting was going to be confidential and also that there would not be any mention of the names, the respondents registered concerns arguing that whilst I could have good intentions, should the recordings by any means get into the hands of some people, it could turn out bad for them. I therefore respected their sentiments so I did not record the FGDs.

As a result, the focus group discussions then did not achieve as much as I had anticipated. The focus group discussion that yielded much was with teachers at Umlala Primary School. The teachers spoke freely on their experiences with children from the farming communities. They also had no problems with having me write in my journal their views verbatim as the discussion

happened. This could have been due to the collegiality which I observed amongst the teacher who were all females.

Another reason why the farmers specifically were uneasy with me and the questions I had was that the research coincided with a cleansing exercise of members of ZANU PF who were aligned to the ousted former vice president Joyce Mujuru. The local ZANU PF structures were on the lookout for their members who were alignment with or expressed support for Joyce Mujuru. The suspected members were to be ousted from the party and will relinquish any position they may hold. There was a fear of losing the land as well. These fears made every farmer to be economical with their words so that they would not say the 'wrong' thing which would get them suspected of sympathising with Joyce Mujuru. Even though my questions were not political, the polarised nature of the issue around the land reform invokes a lot of sensibilities amongst the respondents.

4.8.4 Observation, interaction and informal questioning

Observation is often effectively used to explain what is transpiring in a context and why it is happening (Silverman, 2004:181). This method of data collection is in coherence with Tedlock (2005:468) argument that the most thorough form of gathering sociological data is through participatory observation. This approach enables a researcher to record their observations with the aid of an observation checklist (Wiersma & Jurs, 2009:232). In the context of this research, I had a journal which I used to systematically record my observations in line with the transformative social policy framework. To do this, I participated in the activities of the farmers such as harvesting their crops, tending to their livestock as well as watering their gardens. Interacting with farmers doing their daily chores helped in breaking the barriers and suspicions that initially existed. I also visited schools and other social services institutions that were on the two sites. At the end of each day, I would sit to reflect on the conversations that I had participated in and record the conversations with my observations and reflections in the field journal. As I reflected, the process raised questions that I pursued in the days that followed.

4.9 Data analysis

The analysis of data started with content analysis which was followed by segmentation of the findings from observations and interviews according to the transformative social policy conceptual framework. In this framework, I categorised the data according to the five functions of social policy namely production, redistribution, protection, reproduction and social cohesion. What simplified the task is that the research questions were drafted along the five social policy functions as well. For the areas where there were linkages, I compiled a list of data available for each social policy function. Having done so, I then identified the similarities and differences in the data. I realised that some of the data I had categorised as for the production social policy function, for example, were also useful for social protection or reproduction. I made sure that the linkages of the data were deliberate so that there would be coherence in the writing.

Having used ethnography in collecting the qualitative data, I then adopted a realist approach in writing this thesis. Carol Bailey (1996) argues that:

The presentation of respondents' voices is assumed to be a true reflection of their point of view. The researcher dispenses a realistic tale as the disembodied voice of authority... the author includes quotations, interpretations by members, summaries of informal interviews, and members' accounts and interpretation of events... (p.106)

In light of Bailey's assertion, my findings chapters are primarily written using this approach. The use of this approach is supported by Patton (2002:225) who argues that in qualitative research, direct quotations and excerpts from interviews can be used as they present the participants' perceptions. As a result, in my findings chapters, premium was put on direct quotations from farmers and technocrats that I interfaced with.

4.10 Administration of the study

Working with and through AIAS made the fieldwork amenable. This was because Kwekwe District was a study site in two baseline surveys by AIAS. During the two surveys, AIAS established rapport with the gatekeepers as well as the key informants. AIAS officers linked me up with the District Agricultural Extension Office. Having participated in the earlier studies, the district officers had an idea about what I wanted since AIAS personnel had explained to them, linking my going to the studies they had done earlier. The challenge I had to deal with was managing expectation of paying the Agritex officers for assisting me. When they

participated in the AIAS baselines, they were paid modest honorariums. They expected me to pay them the same way since I had come through AIAS. I had to use the letter which I had gotten from the SARCHI Chair to explain that though the research was related to the AIAS baseline surveys, it was separate, with funding coming from different sources, hence I could not pay similar honorariums. When we got that out of the way, the officers were keen to assist with the research.

The District Agricultural Extension Office linked me up with their ward officers who had direct interface with the farmers. The Agritex officers at ward level were responsive to my working with them since I had been referred to them from the district office. Working with the ward officers made it easy to get access to farmers. In the two sites, I worked with the agricultural extension officers for those wards, travelling with them as they undertook their responsibilities. While my access to farmers and their struggles was easy, it had a down side in that some of the farmers thought I was a government representative investigating on their land utilisation which will inform the downsizing of the farms, an exercise that was impending at the time of the research.

Throughout the six months when I was staying with the farmers in the district, I would go back to AIAS offices in Harare at the end of each month. The purpose of this was to have an opportunity to reflect on my findings up to that stage and get feedback from the colleagues at AIAS. I found this process to be helpful because as I engaged with other doctoral fellows and post-doctoral fellows at the institute I got a lot of insights which informed my return to the field. In our usual informal engagements over lunch, the discussions assisted me to engage with the data I was bringing from the field and provide rigorous interpretation of the data.

One of the major challenges that I encountered was that my research grant was in South African Rand and Zimbabwe used United States Dollar as their currency. This meant that my purchasing power drastically reduced when I was in Zimbabwe. As a result, the scope that I ideally would have wanted to cover in the research was reduced. The situation was further compounded by erratic electricity which meant that sometimes I would not be able to transcribe my fieldwork notes into the computer expeditiously.

As I noted earlier, political polarity was very pronounced during my research. As a result, most respondents refused to be recorded on the Dictaphone which I had carried to the field. I resorted to writing in my journal which was inconvenient since most of the data collection happened as people went about their daily chores. I also noticed that some of the respondents were not comfortable to see me write in my journal as they spoke. It made them to be extremely cautious on how they responded to my questions so that they would not say anything that could get them into trouble with local authorities, should the information leak. In instances when I left the notebook, I found that the respondents spoke freely. This meant that most evenings after interaction with the farmers, I had to spend some time transcribing my experiences for each day into my journal. My experiences were not peculiar as Helliker (2006:8-12) had experienced the same, as well as Murisa (2010) in Zvimba and Goromonzi.

To gain access to teachers and schools, I had to get a letter of approval from the head office of the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education in Harare. The process of getting this letter was strenuous considering the fact that I was staying in Kwekwe which is about 250km away. After some delays and a lot of going back and forth, I managed to get the letter despite fears that I was not going to be cleared in view of the sensitivities around my topic.

After obtaining the clearance letter from the head office, the provincial office in Gweru needed to give me another letter as well. The process of getting this one was easy since I had obtained the difficult one from the head office. After obtaining the provincial letter, I needed to get another one from Kwekwe District to allow me access into the schools. The process of getting the clearance letters took me about two weeks. I had gotten the clearance letters by end of April 2015 considering that I had started fieldwork in Kwekwe beginning of April. After all the bureaucratic processes were done, I then was allowed to access the schools in the two sites. I must say that the bureaucratic processes were worth it because interviewing the teachers brought insightful etic views on the land reform which I could not get from the farmers or the agricultural extension officers.

4.11 Ethical considerations

Patton (2002:273) regards informed consent as a process whereby respondents give their consent to take part in a research study after getting candid information about its procedures, risks and benefits. In compliance with this, I informed all my respondents about the purpose of the study as well as making them cognizant of the risks they may face in take part in the study. I also made sure that the participants were free to make choices about whether they wanted to participate or not at any point in the study. The purpose of this was to seek the respondents' informed consent (McMillan & Schumacher, 2006:333). All the respondents gave consent though some did not want to sign the consent forms. Those ones gave verbal consent. I was clear to the participants that they were free to withdraw at any point in the study.

Confidentiality means that no one has access to the participants' data or names in the possession of the researcher and that no one can match research information with that of a participant (Patton, 2002:412; Christians, 2005:145). In view of this, I made sure that all my respondents remained anonymous. In writing the subsequent chapters of this thesis, pseudo names were adopted of farmers and technocrats whom I interacted with.

In line with the research principle of not exposing the participants to any physical, social, emotional and spiritual harm or potential harm of any nature (Patton, 2002:274), I made sure that I did not expose my respondents to any harm by not asking private and sensitive questions.

4.12 Conclusion

The methodology chapter has provided the mechanisms through which data that informed this thesis was collected. In this chapter, I first tackled issues of research philosophy, giving attention to the paradigm wars that exist between interpretivists and positivists. I then gave attention to the mixed methods approach, which was the research design for this thesis. I noted that whilst the thesis uses the mixed methods approach, it has an inclination towards the qualitative mixed methods research design. Overall, I used ethnography for the qualitative data collection. The methods used for data collection include in-depth interviews with land beneficiaries, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and systematic observation. I outlined the pros and cons of using these tools in data collection. For quantitative data, I relied

on the baseline studies that were conducted by AIAS in 2008-2009 and 2013-2014. The baselines covered six districts, including Kwekwe District. The baseline surveys primarily provided data on the production and redistribution functions of social policy.

In the chapter, I chronicled the challenges that I experienced in data collection, especially in view of the fact that the subject under investigation is highly polarised in Zimbabwe. I outlined the ethical considerations I observed *inter alia*, confidentiality on the collected data, obtaining informed consent from the respondents, voluntary participation of the interviewees and not exposing the research participants to any form of risk through the research. I also gave demographic and ecological details about the case study site-Kwekwe District.

Having detailed the mechanisms that were used in data collection, the next chapter is a product of the same fieldwork but setting the context for the results that shall follow. The chapter challenges available narratives in literature (especially the literature that was produced after 2010) on the outcomes of the FTLRP. Based on the sentiments of the farmers that I interfaced with during the fieldwork, I argue that what transpired in 2008 changed a lot of things for the farmers who had picked up momentum since 2001 when most of them had settled on the land. The momentum was disrupted between 2007 and 2008 that the farmers had to start afresh in a different setting from 2009 when the multi-currency system was instituted.

CHAPTER 5: IN THE YEAR 2008...

“True, we are experiencing hardships, *some self-inflicted, others of exogenous origin*, [emphasis added] at all levels of our existence but let us take comfort from the fact that no winter, no matter how severe, is permanent and no spring ever skips its turn”

*Dr Gideon Gono, Governor Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
Mid-year monetary policy statement
October 01, 2007*

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is a product of my interactions with the land beneficiaries during fieldwork. My initial mind frame, informed by literature was that it is logical after a period of fifteen years to start seeing outcomes of the FTLRP (see Hanlon, 2012; Scoones, 2010, 2015; Richardson, 2012; Zamchiya, 2012; Matondi, 2011; Mutopo, 2011). My experiences from interfacing with the resettled farmers dislodged this narrative. The farmers do not consider the period between 2001 and 2015 as a wholesale time frame where the conditions were the same. In their periodisation, the farmers in Kwekwe District categorised the period between 2000 and 2015 into three phases. The first phase being 2001-2006. The second phase starting 2007 to 2008. The last phase being 2009 to current. Having listened to the farmers, I then went to triangulate the experiences of the farmers with what literature says about these three phases. This chapter therefore is a critical analysis of why the farmers periodised their time in the farms in the three phases. The chapter is important in that it puts context in appreciating the social policy outcomes of the FTLRP which shall follow.

5.2 First phase: 2000-2006

Moyo (2011) posits that the FTLRP was concluded in 2004, though there were isolated incidences of land expropriation that continued to take place beyond 2014. The period saw some of the farmers settling on their land for productivity. During this period, the farmers started gaining momentum and were beginning to appreciate the terrain they were working in, especially for the land beneficiaries who had not been in farming before. One of the farmers noted that:


I got settled in 2001. In 2002, there was a drought but it did not affect me much because I had not planted much. I took my time to acquire equipment and knowledge about what I could do with the land. 2003 was the year when I used all the capital I had raised. It paid off. The harvest was good. I produced enough for consumption and sold five tonnes of the maize to GMB. When GMB paid me, I used the proceeds to finance the next season. I was really on track... (In-depth Interview, 9/06/2015, Male, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm).

This quotation serves to show that from the time the land beneficiaries most of the farmers delved into working the land. The output immediately showed especially after the 2002 drought. Another farmer attested to this when he noted that:

For me, 2006 was my best year. After selling my produce, I had enough money to take my family to Victoria Falls for a holiday. After working that hard, I did not regret taking my whole family with me. Isn't that what the white farmers used to do also? (In-depth Interview, 16/07/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block).

Data from the Central Statistical Office confirms this scenario. The 2001 season was the best in this first phase. The 2002 drought affected productivity. The drought did not however affect food security because the agricultural season before was good. As can be deciphered from the graph below, after the devastating drought, there is a steady improvement in agricultural productivity at national level. Even though the agricultural performance is in the negative, there was a significant improvement from -23.4 in 2002 to -4 in 2006. This improvement happens in a space of four years. At micro level, the quantum produce for the farmers I spoke to in Kwekwe District was significant.

Figure 5.1: Phase 1 agricultural performance



Source: Central Statistical Office and RBZ

Another farmer used his experience to demonstrate the data shown in Figure 5.1 above when he said:

Except for the drought in 2002, all the agricultural seasons were very good for me. I managed to produce enough food for my family and then sell the surplus to GMB. When GMB paid, I used the money to buy the inputs I needed for the next season. I managed also to increase my herd by buying five more cattle. My plan was that after ten years, my plot would have electricity, borehole for irrigation and home use and at least a tractor. With the returns I had made in the first few years that was going to be a reality. For me the 2007-2008 season changed everything... (In-depth Interview, 9/06/2015, Male, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm).

The sentiments of all the farmers cited show that the whole agricultural system was functional. Though there were challenges, overall, the farmers could rely on the government services such as subsidized access to inputs like fertilizers and seeds. Through the Grain Marketing Board, the farmers had a ready buyer for their produce despite the fact that the buying price was low. The functionality of the entire agricultural chain created predictability, something which the second phase 2007-2008 interfered with.


5.3 Second phase: 2007-2008

At the global level, the year 2008 saw a global financial crisis that had its epicentre in the United States of America (Stiglitz, 2008). Global economic growth slowed down, from 4.9% in 2007 to an estimated 3.7% in 2008. The crisis was caused by the burst of the housing bubble in USA. This crisis affected the developed countries mostly and centred on the liquidity crunch which adversely affected commodity prices and reduced demand for raw materials (Rudd, 2009; Shiller, 2008). The UK and other European countries also spent some \$2 trillion on rescues and bail-out packages (Gangadharan and Yoonus, 2012). The global economic crisis did not affect Zimbabwe much because the country is not fully integrated into the global financial system. It is however worth noting that this global crisis coincided with the Zimbabwean crisis in the same year 2008. There were some factors which compounded the situation in Zimbabwe. Some of these factors include sanctions on Zimbabwe, hyperinflation, political instability and drought. The following section unpacks these factors.

5.4 Sanctions

While sanctions on Zimbabwe had been put in place more than five years before 2008, they contributed significantly to the compounding challenges which the country found itself in. The Bush administration enacted the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act in 2001, linking financial support with democratic reforms and soon after, the International Monetary Fund withdrew support along with the European Union (Chengu, 2009). Amongst other factors such as RBZ policies which caused hyperinflation, the sanctions also contributed adversely to most the sectors of the Zimbabwean economy (RBZ, 2008). Of course one may argue that the seclusion of Zimbabwe through the sanctions meant that the country was not overly affected by the global recession. This however is a half-truth because when the country needed foreign direct investments or loans from the World Bank and the IMF to mitigate the abrupt shocks of the FTLRP, there was no support available. The graph below shows how financial support drastically dropped soon after the year 2000.

Figure 5.2: Zimbabwe periodic loan inflows




Source: RBZ 2008 Annual Report

In the build up to 2008, Zimbabwe did not have lines of credit open to it. The IMF stopped supporting Zimbabwe by way of balance of payment support in 1999 while the World Bank did the same in 2001. The African Development Bank, also stopped balance of payment support in 1998, earlier than the international Bretton Woods Institutions. These developments formed part of the background that exacerbated the economic situation of the country eventually.


Furthermore, the negative perception associated with sanctions on Zimbabwe adversely impacted on foreign direct investment to Zimbabwe. Thus, investors shied away from investing in Zimbabwe as the country was portrayed as risky. Reflecting this, most multinational corporations such as Anglo-American have been strongly discouraged from investing in Zimbabwe by their home countries (RBZ, 2008).

Figure 5.3: Trends on Foreign Direct Investment since independence



Source: RBZ 2008 Annual Report

Figure 5.4: GDP trends for Zimbabwe



Source: Biti (2013)

During this time, Zimbabwean companies struggled to access lines of credit because of the perceived country risk (RBZ, 2008). Consequently, Zimbabwean companies had to pay cash for imports. Figure 5.4 above demonstrates this point using real time value of the trajectory of FDI flows which the country had access to since independence. From 2000, the country experienced investor flight and companies which were not on the sanctions list were also affected. Having to resort to paying cash for imports, the companies had to come up with mechanisms of getting the United States Dollar which was not readily available officially. This partly explains why the supermarket shelves were empty of basic commodities. Four hundred companies shut down in 2000 alone. By mid-2009, the country was operating at about 10 per cent of its industrial capacity (Hanke *et al*, 2009). Over a period of 12 months up to May 2007, the government itself had lost 15,000 employees (as many as 40 per day), who quit in search of better remuneration elsewhere, mostly in other countries but also in the informal economy within Zimbabwe (The Financial Gazette, 16 May 2007). As people lost their jobs, those who did not emigrate to other countries moved into the informal sector. An independent *tabloid* in Zimbabwe noted that out of a population of about 12 million, 3 to 4 million Zimbabweans earned their living through informal sector employment while supporting another 5 million

people. The proliferation of the informal sector presented a challenge for government of Zimbabwe tax collection policy as it was found inadequate, further handicapping the government as it could not finance its own spending using the economic activities of its population. The state was only assured of tax from the 1.3 million people who were in formal employment (cited in the Zimbabwean 24-30 June 2005:.8).

5.5 Historical inflation

Inflation continued on an upward trend, increasing from 1 593.6% in January 2007 to close the year at 66 212.3% (RBZ, 2007). In July 2008, all the foregoing factors compounded the situation to have inflation that was incredulous. In that month, Zimbabwe recorded a historical inflation of 231 million and it was believed to have reached 5 billion by the end of 2008 (Mankiw, 2014: 484). The policies which the RBZ promulgated, as shall be noted later, further exacerbated hyperinflation. This was worsened by the declining mineral prices at global level, prohibitive export tariffs, and restrictive exchange control measures that were put in place by the Government of Zimbabwe (Elich, 2002). The latter fuelled the foreign currency parallel market. By 2008, the private sector had lost confidence in the Zimbabwe-dollar, but it remained the official legal tender of the country, and as such, all domestic payments were to be made in Zimbabwe dollars (Ibid). The difference between the official rate and the parallel market rate reached as high as 4,000 times the official rate, indicating the extent to which the official exchange rate was divorced from reality (Ibid).

Table 5.1: Foreign currency market rates-annual averages: Zimbabwe dollars to one US Dollar

Year	Annual average: official market Zim\$/US\$	Annual average: roadside market Zim\$/US\$	Roadside market: average premium%
2000	44.00	49.00	11.40
2001	55.00	215.00	290.90
2002	55.00	1 049.00	1 807.30
2003	698.00	3 675.00	426.50
2004	5 123.00	6 354.00	24.00
2005	25 142.00	45 868.00	82.40
2006	162 699.00	768 713.00	372.50
2007	81 937 500.00	818 000 000.00	898.30
Period		102 353 240.40	
Average	10 266 414.50		897.00

Source: Robertson Economic Information Services at: <http://www.economic.co.zw>

The tragedy of this scenario was that the government and state owned enterprises like the Grain Marketing Board were still required to provide public services in Zimbabwe-dollars, priced at the official exchange rate. Many of the state owned enterprises went bankrupt because they could not obtain the much needed imports at the official exchange rate. Since the disparity between the official rate and the parallel rate was so huge, the private sector refused to pay for utilities and taxes which the state owned enterprises were not able to provide. Right there, one of the major income streams for the state dried up. It can be said that the government exchange rate policy was the major culprit for the collapse of the state owned enterprises. This policy discrepancy went unabated resulting in the Zimbabwe dollar becoming worthless. This resulted

in goods disappearing from shops; the formal economy grounded to a halt by mid-2008. The difference in using the official versus the parallel market rate could be thousands of times.

It is imperative to link this to what was happening in the agriculture sector since some of the challenges which the sector is facing can be traced to this point. The Grain Marketing Board went bankrupt in 2008 as it lost value due to the exchange rate policy that existed. Inevitably, it meant that the parastatal could not pay the farmers for the produce which they had supplied in trust. My research showed that some of the farmers in 2015 are still struggling to pick themselves up as they could not get their money from GMB to reinvest in the subsequent seasons. The GMB is yet to emerge from the abyss it found itself in 2008. The classic case study from the research was of a 65 year old farmer who took 33 tonnes of maize to GMB in the 2007/2008 season. He explained that:

In 2006 I had a good harvest. I took 33 tonnes of the maize I had produced to GMB. I was expecting them to pay on time as they used to do. After several follow ups with the parastatal, I got money in Zimbabwe dollars that could only buy a soft drink. So how was I supposed to prepare for the next season? I had put all my confidence in GMB but they failed me. I have learnt my lesson, it won't happen again (In-depth Interview, 6/08/2015, Male, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm).

This was at a point where the differences between the official rate and the parallel market rate were more than a thousand in value. In the case of this farmer, he was not able to get any other money to reinvest in the proceeding season. The inputs were also not readily available and if they were, the middlemen who were selling them demanded US dollars which the farmers did not have.

5.6 Political polarity

On the political front, a Government of National Unity (GNU) was established after the contested elections of 2008. The GNU brought together the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), in an inclusive government with the main opposition parties-the two "Movement for Democratic Change" (MDC) factions, the MDC-T, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, who became the prime minister, and the MDC led by Arthur Mutambara, who became the deputy prime minister, with Robert Mugabe remaining as president. The inclusive

government formally took power on February 11, 2009 (Noko, 2011). That month, under its Short-Term Economic Recovery Program (STERP), the government consented to transactions in foreign currency and to the full dollarization of Zimbabwe, though without any formal agreements (Ibid).

5.7 Social policy in crisis times?

5.7.1 The Basic Commodities Supply Side Intervention (BACOSSI)

During the crisis period building up to 2008, the RBZ played the centre stage both in trying to solve the problems and creating some of the problems. When the government established a price freeze policy in March 2007 trying to counter inflation, the policy brought with it unexpected repercussions. For the retail shops, it did not make business sense to import food products using foreign currency then sell on the local market using a depressed official rate whose value was miles away from the parallel market value (Ellyn *et al*, 2013). The next logical thing that the retailers did was either to hoard their products with the hope that the market distortion would be addressed, then they would sell. Alternatively, the retailers sold their goods on the parallel market, though this was illegal. As has been noted, the shops did not have any commodities like mealie meal, sugar, salt and so forth. At this point, the country was characterised by queues. As shops would sell a single product, people would make long queues with the hope of getting the products. The case was similar on petrol stations. Fuel was scarce so those filling stations that would have managed to import would witness long queues with motorists wanting the scarce commodity.

During these times of food shortages through the RBZ, the government came up with the Basic Commodities Supply Side Intervention (BACOSSI). The program started in 2008 with the PEOPLE'S Shops concept. From July 2008, Reserve Bank officials were deployed to all the provinces to distribute the heavily subsidized commodity baskets which were sold at only ZWR\$10 as of October 2008. A total of 1,578,365 households, which is 77% of the established number of households of 2,049,410, were served under the BACOSSI programme (see table 5.2). It is noteworthy that the program sought for universal access to the food basket for all Zimbabweans. Even though in practice this did not happen considering the polarized environment, it is fascinating for a social policy scholar to note that during the crisis time, for

all the priorities which the government had, attention was given to providing universal food baskets.

Table 5.2: BACOSI distribution total reach

Province	Household after previous census	Households served by BACOSI	Percentage served
Matebelaland North	164.602	117.514	71
Matebeleland South	135.074	135.074	100
Manicaland	369.000	293.669	80
Midlands	222.163	212.953	96
Mashonaland East	285.316	208.864	73
Mashonaland West	230.690	155.391	67
Mashonaland Central	274.263	186.242	68
Masvingo	368.302	268.658	73
Total	2. 049. 410	1.578.365	77

Source: RBZ 2008 Annual Report

The RBZ kept on printing money through 2007 and 2008 to buy foreign currency on the parallel market. Under this new regime of concentrated economic power, the Reserve Bank increased currency in circulation at escalating rates, with the period from January 2005 to May 2007 noteworthy for exceeding the peak of the efforts of the German central bank's printing presses in January 1921 to May 1923 (Hanke, 2008).

Since the official rate was far lower than the parallel rate, the RBZ would print Zimbabwe dollars in the form of bearer cheques. Through this process, the RBZ managed to get US dollars that were in the market at cheap prices. The people who sold their US dollars were taking advantage of the situation as well because most payments had to be done in Zimbabwe dollars since it was the legal tender. These shenanigans around the exchange rate policy made the RBZ to have a lot of disposable US dollars to buy food baskets that they distributed under the BACOSI program. The program was flourishing to the extent that it was extended to strategic institutions like the army, all the 58 prisons of the country and hospitals. The food rations were to assist hospitals feed patients.

5.7.2 Farm mechanization program

The farm mechanization program was launched in March 2007. In 2008 the Government, through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, continued to procure tractors, combine harvesters, and other farm equipment for distribution to farmers to increase agricultural production (RBZ, 2008). Under this program, a lot of equipment was distributed to farmers around the country. This research however noted that ordinary beneficiaries of the FTLRP did not get the equipment. One war veteran who had benefited from the land reform noted:

I had been identified at national level to receive a tractor. Personnel from the Reserve Bank even visited me here in Kwekwe as they were doing their due diligence. They noted that the tractor was there and in the near future I should collect it. But after a month or so, they went quiet on me. I tried making follow ups to no avail. I even visited the Reserve Bank division that was working on this project to understand what was happening. That is when I was told that the tractor had been taken by someone senior in our political establishment. I was extremely disappointed (In-depth Interview, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm, 27/06/2015).

Another farmer confirmed this point when he noted that:

If you go to the farms of our superiors, even here in Kwekwe, you will find all the equipment that was supposed to have benefited all the farmers. At one farm here in Kwekwe, there are three tractors which we know were gotten through the mechanisation program. The problem is that these tractors are not accessible to all of us. This boss of ours has privatised them. What kind of greed is that? Imagine if at least two of the tractors rotated amongst us, which would save us a lot of money we use on hiring tractors (In-depth Interview, A1 Farmer, Sherwood Farm, 18/07/15).

One Agritex Officer confirmed the sentiments of the land beneficiaries when she noted that:

It will be untrue to say farmers did not benefit from the mechanisation program. Yes some farmers benefited from the mechanisation program. They however got small equipment such as ploughs, animal drawn harrows and scotch carts. I do not know any farmer, both A1 and A2 who is not a heavy weight in the political establishment who got such equipment as tractors, combine harvesters or even motor cycles. These were taken by the senior leaders in the party (ZANU PF). If you take a tour around their farms, you will find all the equipment, some of them laying idle... (Key Informant Interview, 20/08/2015, Female, Sherwood Block).

As can be noted from the citations, most of the valuable equipment was primarily taken by the government senior civil servants and political leaders of ZANU PF. Corruption emerged within and outside ZANU-PF as various classes competed for access to the subsidies and rents.

Patronage often included or excluded both political opponents and supporters. These events widened the fractures within ZANU-PF and fuelled the violently contested elections of 2008 (Moyo and Yeros, 2009). Table 5.3 below is an inventory of the equipment that was distributed to beneficiaries of the FTLRP:

Table 5.3: Farm mechanization program equipment distributed

Equipment	2007	2008
Tractors	2125	100
Combine Harvesters	85	20
Ploughs	1386	-
Harrows	1263	10
Vicons	378	-
Boom sprayers	541	-
Planters	371	15
Animal drawn ploughs	50000	400
Knapsack sprayers	70000	17000
Animal drawn planters	1000	50
Animal drawn cultivators	20000	1000
Animal drawn scotch carts	45000	7000
Animal drawn harrows	70000	4000
Generators	-	400
Spreaders		50
Motorcycles	-	750
Grinding Mills	-	150
Chains	-	50000

Source: RBZ 2007 and 2008 Annual Reports

5.7.3 Interventions on the Cholera Outbreak

As though the above mentioned predicaments were not enough, the country was bedevilled by a cholera outbreak. The epidemic had its tentacles across the whole country. 98 592 people were infected and 4 288 died (WHO, 2010). This represents a case fatality rate of 1.7% and for Budiriro suburb in the southern part of Harare, the fatality rate was 2.3% as it was one of the most affected suburbs, where 206 people died (Chipare, 2010).

The primary cause of the epidemic was lack of access to safe water in urban areas. This was a result of the collapse in urban water supply, sanitation and garbage collection systems. The situation was compounded by dysfunctional drainage system which were overwhelmed by the rains that were falling leading to human excrete flooding water sources which were the only available water sources for the people. The RBZ intervened to contain the spread of the disease through the improvement of the national water supply by ZINWA and the rehabilitation of sewer systems. In this regard, the Bank funded cholera programmes through ZINWA by providing US\$1 million and ZAR5.6 million for the importation of water treatment chemicals from South Africa, and also provided Z\$375 quadrillion for cholera programmes (RBZ, 2008). The Bank also financed the ferrying of ZINWA water treatment chemicals from ZIMPHOS to Morton Jaffray.

In addition, the Bank allocated 28 vehicles to ZINWA, 3 tractors to Harare City Council to assist in refuse collection and the transportation of equipment towards the anti-cholera programme. The Bank provided all fuel requirements for the containment of the cholera outbreak (Ibid). In mid-2008 the government authorized the RBZ to print “Special Agro-Cheque” notes to finance farmers. The purpose of these agro cheques was to act as currency which was bankable for farmers to use in buying farming inputs. Noko (2011) notes that this support added to the inflationary quasi-fiscal activities of the RBZ, which were a key contributing factor to the rampant growth in inflation rate.

5.8 Phase 3: 2009 to current


5.8.1 Dollarization in 2009

While the Zimbabwe dollar was still legal tender, the market had already dumped it, with some service providers not accepting it as tender for payment. The GNU eventually became operational after a protracted period of negotiations amongst the political parties. Some of the sticking points were on which political party was to take which ministry. One of the issues agreed on without a lot of contestation was the adoption of multi-currency system. This was partly because the new government did not have a choice since the US dollar and South African Rand were the currencies that were circulating in the informal market. Tendai Biti, the newly appointed Minister of Finance, acknowledged in his first midterm budget review that "since

February this year, the Zimbabwe dollar is no longer a currency that the public and any trader will accept. Our national currency has, thus, become moribund" (Biti, 2009). On April 12, 2009, the Zimbabwe dollar was suspended as a legal tender and the multi-currency system became operational.

Immediately after the adoption of the US dollar, the monthly inflation declined significantly between January and May 2009: -2.3 percent for January, -3.1 percent for February, -3.0 percent for March, -1.1 percent for April, and -1.0 percent for May (Kwesu, 2009). The growth rate also improved soon after dollarization. Graph 5.5 below shows the growth trend which Zimbabwe went through after the introduction of the dollar as the official currency.

Figure 5.5: Zimbabwe growth rate 2009-2015



Source: World Bank (2015)

Whilst the growth rate was positive, the farmers had hardly recuperated from the legacies of the second phase crises 2007-2008. For the farmers who had not managed to recoup any meaningful income from the bankrupt GMB, the situation became dire since they could not get the scarce United States Dollar. It meant that the farmers had to start afresh. Farmers found themselves owing some of the parastatals in electricity, water which they had used for irrigation and loans which they had taken. The farmers were not able to pay their bills. For those who

had taken loans using their houses as collateral, they lost the houses to the banks. With the Damocles' sword of debt hanging over them, the farmers were left with no choice except to work the land with the little resource they had (Kwesu, 2009). Most sold their cattle or any form of assets they had to have capital so that they could start afresh.

Understanding of these dynamics can help explain the current outcomes of the land reform. It is my argument that interrogation of the social policy outcomes of land reform should not be undertaken as though the period in question had similar operating conditions with all factors held constant. Most farmers had to start afresh from 2009 henceforth since GMB had not paid them for the proceeds of previous good seasons. One farmer retorted:

The year 2008 really got me out of sorts. I lost everything from my house to cattle and all. What made the situation worse was that the good harvests I had obtained in 2006/2007 season did not account for much since GMB could not pay for what I had given them. I did not have money to reinvest so I am literally starting afresh (In-depth Interview, 11/04/2015, Female A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm).

Another farmer reiterated the foregoing when he noted that:

I am really stuck. I can't get a loan from the bank because I don't have collateral. The situation of 2008 returned me to 2001 when I came to this land. I have to start again. I have no option. So I will use a small portion of the land until I raise enough capital to fully utilise my whole plot. I have to rely on my own labour and perhaps get remittances from my children to get seed, hoping that the heavens will smile on us and send us rain on time (In-depth Interview, 19/07/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block).

It is worth noting that land utilisation was also affected by the fateful 2008. The writing of this thesis is hardly seven years from 2008 and not many changes have been witnessed on the farms except for those farmers who managed to get starting capital again from either remittances, pensions or employment. All these factors have a bearing on the social policy outcomes of the FTLRP.

5.9 Conclusion

The purpose of the chapter was to set the context through which a nuanced understanding of the FTLRP social policy outcomes can be understood. In this chapter, I have argued that interrogating the outcomes of the FTLRP should not be glossed over as though the period under

review was the same. From interacting with the farmers, I observed that there were three phases which the farmers put their time after getting the land. The three phases are 2000-2006, 2007-2008 and 2009 to current. The chapter has shown that in all the three phases, there were different dynamics which impacted the prevailing situation on the farms right at the time of my field research. The first phase was characterised by farmers occupying the land and most of them enthusiastically working on the land. The production trends showed that whilst productivity drastically dropped between 2001 and 2002, there was a gradual increase in productivity up to 2006. This was despite the 2002 drought which affected farmers' yields.

The second phase of 2007 to 2008 was observed by the farmers as the one when they were taken back to the starting point. This phase was characterised by drought and hyperinflation. Due to the latter, the Grain Marketing Board could not pay farmers for the agricultural produce which they had supplied to the marketing board in good faith. This meant that most farmers did not have capital to use for the season that followed, hence they had to start afresh. The third phase is linked to the second one. To salvage the hyper-inflationary environment, the government introduced a multicurrency system, with the US Dollar being the main currency. This compounded the situation for the farmers as they did not have means to get much needed capital to invest in the proceeding agricultural season. Hence, phase three is about farmers trying their own machinations without much help from the state. I argue therefore that understanding social policy outcomes of the FTLRP has to be done in the context of these three phases in order to fully appreciate what is happening currently. Having set the context, the next chapters now look at the five social policy outcomes of the FTLRP. The proceeding chapter looks at the redistributive outcome, exploring how the agrarian structure has changed from a bi-modal structure to a tri-modal arrangement.

CHAPTER 6: REDISTRIBUTIVE SOCIAL POLICY OUTCOME OF THE FTLRP

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I interrogate the redistributive outcome of the FTLRP. I weigh in on the debates around the question of who got the land. In this chapter, I rely significantly on the AIAS quantitative data in understanding the character of the new agrarian structure at national level. I then narrow down to Kwekwe district using both my data and that of AIAS. I confirmed the assertion by Moyo that the FTLRP transformed the agrarian structure from a bi-modal system to a tri-modal arrangement. The composition of the new structure is explored in details in the chapter. The chapter also provides detailed accounts of how the land beneficiaries access the land. Some of the beneficiaries got the land during farm occupations, which were mainly orchestrated by the war veterans. The majority of the land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District got the land through formal allocation by the government, without having invaded the farms initially.

The chapter provides profiles of the land beneficiaries. The data I collected and that of AIAS refutes the narrative that only the elite benefited from the FTLRP. Civil servants, former farm workers, senior politicians, war veterans and ordinary citizens all benefited from the FTLRP. In answering the question of who got the land, the chapter provides gender disaggregation of the land beneficiaries. The data collected confirms the earlier findings that women did not constitute a majority of the beneficiaries. The percentage of the women beneficiaries is even lower in A2 type of farms. Lastly, the chapter explores farm residency trends in a bid to contribute to the debate around farmers who got land for speculative reasons as well as the concept of absentee farmers. I observed that most beneficiaries in A1 type of farming, especially the villagised type, can be said to have residency on the farms. This then challenges scholars who provided claims that farmers are not resident on the land. I conclude the chapter by setting the tone for the subsequent chapter on production outcomes, which will endeavour to answer the question of what the land beneficiaries are doing with the land.

6.2 The redistributive function of social policy

Using empirical data from the World Bank programs, Birdsall and Londono (1997) observed that redistribution of assets was an indispensable component to growth and addressing poverty. This observation was made after witnessing the failure of the World Bank programs which were pushing growth only without redistribution. Deininger and Squire (1998) later confirmed this when they argued that redistributive land reform can improve growth and address poverty. On the other hand, Ghatak and Roy (2007) found an overall negative impact of land reform on agricultural productivity in their study on India, although some state-specific effects suggest heterogeneity in the impact of land reform across states. In Korea, land reform was found to have increased agricultural production through enhancing economic incentives (Jeon and Kim, 2000). In view of the forgoing, Kinsey (2004) argues that ‘a redistributive growth path is always likely to be superior to a distribution-neutral path (the discredited notion of “trickle-down”) for reducing poverty’.

Redistribution can be said to be one of the unequivocal outcomes of the FTLRP as it significantly changed the agrarian structure of the country. As has been noted earlier, the settler-colonial regime was configured to plunder the country through accumulation by dispossession thereby creating a labour reserve economy (Amin, 1972) dependent on cheap domestic and foreign migrant labour (Arrighi, 1973). There was little room for peasant farming to flourish as it was repressed through extra-economic regulations and taxes (Moyo and Yeros, 2005). This scenario did not however create full-scale proletarianisation (Bush and Cliffe, 1984; Yeros, 2002). The skewed racial inequalities in agrarian structure were consolidated by discriminatory subsidies to large-scale white commercial farmers introduced by the state (Moyo, 2002) and narrow import substitution export-led strategies. This created a bi-modal agrarian structure characterised by 6000 white farmers and a few capitalist agro-industrial estates, operating alongside 700,000 peasant families and 8000 small-scale black commercial farmers (Moyo, 2011). By 1999, approximately 3.4 million hectares had been redistributed under the willing seller/willing buyer arrangement. This reduced the land under white farmers to 11 million hectares, which translated to approximately 35 per cent of the total agricultural land, most of which was ‘prime’ land (Moyo, 2011).

The bi-modal agrarian structure diminished the prospects of every member of the community to have certain minimum living standards and opportunities, which is the mainstay of social policy (UNRISD, 2006; Adesina, 2007a; Mkandawire, 2007). The social relations that existed favoured white farmers as they owned the land on freehold tenure which assisted them to access capital and state subsidies to finance agricultural productivity. The 4500 white farmers, who were a minority of the population were assured of quality of life and social wellbeing while the majority of the black populace had to sell their labour in the market or to these white farmers to meet their social reproduction needs. The labourers did not have any leverage to negotiate for wages that would cushion them from the failures of the market and any external shock (Moyo and Yeros, 2005). This was a phenomenon exacerbated by the structural adjustment programme which affected both agriculture and the manufacturing sector. As has been noted earlier, the state had failed to cushion people by withdrawing social services subsidies. Consequently, the general population was subjected to market forces. Compounded by the skewed agrarian structure, this exposed the peasantry to vulnerabilities. The effects of economic structural adjustment programmes made acquisition of land a strategic move that would cushion vulnerability while ensuring dignity, belonging, and protection (Jiririra and Halimana, 2008; Moyo, 2011b).

6.3 The new agrarian structure

The FTLRP restructured Zimbabwe's agrarian relations by reconstituting the agrarian structure, primarily through expanding the numbers of small and middle-scale agricultural producers and reconfiguring the underlying labour relations (Moyo *et al*, 2009; Moyo, 2011; Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo, 2012). The land tenure system also changed significantly, warding off private ownership of land towards state ownership of most land. A total of 150 000 households were settled in A1 scheme with 30 000 households allocated A2 farms (Scoones, 2015); 180 000 households benefited in both the A1 and the A2 in the FTLRP. About 30 percent of the A1 beneficiaries are made up of urban workers and a few former farm workers (Moyo *et al*, 2009). 90% of the farmers are small holders working on 80% of the land (Scoones, 2015).

The new tri-modal agrarian structure (Moyo, 2011) is made up of the peasantry who are variegated and consist of Communal Area and A1 farmers, small to medium capitalist farmers

as well as conservancies, private and public agro-industrial estates. It is important to note that the peasantry are a differentiated group, based on the labour they hire, sources of income, and access to markets (Moyo and Yeros, 2005; Bryceson, 2000; Shanin, 1997). The peasantry is characterised by heavy reliance on family labour (Yeros, 2002; Moyo, 2014). More often, the poor peasants sell their labour to supplement their income or for social reproduction. This labour is usually sold to the better off peasants and small to middle capitalists farmers (Moyo, 2014). Within the peasantry there are those that are '*better off*' who are able to hire wage labour, be it permanent or casual (Moyo, 2011; Bryceson, 2000). These also have better access to credits and markets. In some ecological regions of the country where agriculture relatively flourishes, these farmers are able to negotiate for contracts with capital (Moyo, 2011). In Sherwood area, 15 percent of the land beneficiaries fitted into this category. They employ on the average 2 permanent labourers. These also have other sources of income to cushion them from vulnerability during bad seasons. Some of their incomes come from pensions, gold panning, and remittances from children and households in towns.

This structure was more pronounced in Sherwood Resettlement area which saw the foregoing three types of peasants getting land in the same vicinity. Bonstead Villagized A1 plots were given mainly to poor peasants. Most of the beneficiaries of this area were former farm workers. To supplement their income, they sell their labour to the A2 farmers who were allocated land in Devilwood Farm which has irrigation infrastructure and water canals. Bonstead Village is located in a dry area where they get water from a borehole that was sunk at a central place. The village has 53 households. All of the land beneficiaries of this village are based there. Due to the arid nature of the area, the peasant farmers are not involved in any contract farming. They wait to receive government input for their agriculture.

Table 6.1: Kwekwe District Agrarian Structure

Farm categories	Farms/households				Area held (ha)				Average Farm size (ha)	
	2000		2014		2000*		2014*		2000	2014
	No	%	No	%	ha	%	ha	%		
Peasantry	29065.68	98.65	33801	98.58	485977.2	52.54	659496.9	71.79	16.72	19.51
Medium	108	0.37	260	0.76	12485.33	1.35	37752.64	4.11	115.60	145.20
Large scale	243	0.82	205	0.60	265192.9	28.67	146583.1	15.96	1091.33	715.04
Agro-estates	47	0.16	22	0.06	158926.7	17.18	70191.96	7.64	3381.42	3190.54
State land					2442.05	0.26	4574.05	0.50		
Total	29463.68	100	34288	100	925024.3	100	918598.7	100	31.40	26.79

Source: Compiled by author from MLRR data sheets (2012); framework adopted from Moyo (2011)

The third prong to the agrarian structure are large-agro industrial estates (Moyo, 2011). Their existence post FTLRP contradicts the radical nature with which the process happened and deliberate inclusion of international capital. Several large agro-industries remained which include two sugar plantation estates in Chiredzi which are owned by a South African transnational corporate; Tongaat Hulett found in Masvingo Province and Hippo valley (Moyo, 2011). There are also 16 private forestry plantations that are owned by international companies, tea estates owned by domestic capital and other 40 large estates owned by the state (e.g. ARDA) (ibid).

Table 6.2: The Tri-modal agrarian structure

Farm type	Hired labour	Source of income	Source of capital	Marketing
Differentiated peasantry	Few permanent plus casual labour; family labour	Farm income, some wages, and remittances	Own equity, some formal finance (contracts)	Self-marketing; contracts; farmers associations
Small to medium capitalist farmers	Over 2 permanent and many casual workers, manager/supervisor	Farm Income, business, and employment	Formal finance, Equity, contracts	Self-marketing (urban); contract exports
Private and public plantations	More permanent and casuals; managers	Farm income, agro-industry	Share capital, profits; loans	Vertically integrated urban and export markets

Source: Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo, (2012)

As can be noted from the Table below, overall, the FTLRP increased the peasantry and the number of ‘middle farmers’ (Scoones, 2015), while downsizing the number, farm size and area of large-scale capitalist farms, as well as of the agro-industrial estates (Moyo, 2011).

Inevitably, the tri-modal dispensation however brings with it new class formation and struggles on the farms. The relations of the peasantry are mainly defined by use of family labour in the production of food for consumption and selling any surpluses that may be realised. The peasantry also relies on various non-farm work and short-term wage labour. More often, the selling of the labour is done to the middle farmer and the large-scale farms.

Table 6.3: The new agrarian structure at the national level

Farm category	Farms/households (000's)						Area held (000 ha)						Average Farm size (ha)		
	1980		2000		2010		1980*		2000*		2010*		1980	2000	2010
	No	%	No	%	No	%	Ha	%	ha	%	Ha	%			
Peasantry	700	98	1,125	99	1,321	98	16,400	49	20,067	61	25,826	79	23	18	20
Small/middle commercial farms	8.5	1	8.5	1	30.9	2	1,400	4	1,400	4	4,400	13	165	165	142
Large farms	5.4	1	4.956	0.4	1.371	0.1	13,000	39	8,691.6	27	1,156.9	4	2,407	1,754	844
Agro-Estates	0.296	0.1	0.296	0.02	0.247	0.02	2,567	8	2,567	8	1,494.6	5	8,672	8,672	6,051
Total	714	100	1,139	100	1,353	100	33,367	100	32,72	100	32,878	100	46.7	28.7	24.3

Source: Moyo, (2011a)

6.4 Land access in Kwekwe District

In Kwekwe District, land redistribution took place mainly between 2001 and 2002. At the national level, this was when government gazetted the farms that were to be acquired. Key informant interviews with the leadership of war veterans in Kwekwe District who led the land occupations indicated that these were targeted and organised. The war veterans in Kwekwe did not occupy all the large-scale commercial farms that were owned by Whites. Instead, selection was done primarily on the basis of how the white farmer had been treating his employees and cooperating with the governance structures of the area. There were those farmers who were targeted first because they had a reputation for racism and exploitation of farm workers.

One farmer was known in the district for having ordered women whom he had found fetching firewood to strip naked for his amusement. He took photos of these women and shared them with his colleagues. The photos unfortunately got into the hands of political leadership of the area. When the farm occupations started, he was one of the first to be targeted. He did not want to negotiate with the war veterans. When he heard that the war veterans were scheduled to occupy his farm, he hired rangers from fellow white farmers who were given the instruction to shoot the team of war veterans that were coming. The war veterans had intelligence that had informed them about the rangers. They then strategized on how they would subdue the rangers since they were only seven to an entourage of about 300 war veterans. This narrative corroborates Sadomba (2011) and Scoones (2010) that war veterans played a key role in the occupations. It further confirms that the occupations were not done in ad hoc fashion. There were reasons that justified the farms that were occupied before the government regularised the occupations.

Umlala Farm was not targeted by the war veterans in their occupations. There are several reasons proffered. The first was that the farmer, whose father was a reverend, treated his staff with dignity. The other reason given was that the farmer was the only producer of oranges in the periphery of Kwekwe town. The thinking was that occupying Umlala Farm was going to disturb the supply of the oranges to the town. Moreover, the farmer understood political dynamics in his area so once in a while he supplied both traditional and political leadership with oranges. In May 2001 when the government gazetted farms that were to be taken over, to the surprise of the war veterans' leadership, Umlala Farm was on the list. As a result, the farm


was partitioned into 44 A1 plots. The character of the occupants of these plots will be explored later.

The story of Umlala Farm is corroborated by the AIAS 2014 Surveys which indicated that 64.5% of the beneficiaries in Kwekwe District had obtained access to land by 2003. Umlala Farm was allocated in 2001 through the Land Committee that had been established. Names of the people who had applied for land in this area were put in a hat. Randomly, the names were picked simultaneously with the plot number. This explains why a poor peasant who does not have equipment like ploughs and any livestock is located next to the dam on the farm. This presents opportunities for the poor peasant households to undertake horticultural farming and get money from the better off neighbours.

The graph below shows that 17.1% of the occupations happened before formal allocation. This was when the government had not gazetted farms that were to be redistributed. The majority of the redistribution happened under the government land allocation programme through the District Administrator's Office. It is worth noting that before 2008, redistribution had reached the lowest figure as there was little activity going on. Through key informant interviews, the researcher realised that there were farm abandonments that occurred after the 2008 elections. An agricultural extension officer in one ward posited claimed that:

Before the 2008 elections, all parties preached peace and tolerance. People's true political ideologies came out. Some even started wearing the regalia of their parties every here in Kwekwe. But when the results were announced and there was no clear winner, things changed. In building up to a run off, the tone of the political parties changed. ZANU PF wanted to win in areas they had not done well. Kwekwe District was one such area. The process brought with it violence targeted at those in the farming communities who were known to support MDC. In my district, two land beneficiaries abandoned their land in fear of being victimised (Key Informant Interview, 14/04/15, Umlala Farm).

Figure 6.1: Year of formal land allocation of newly resettled land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District



Source: Adapted from AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14

Figure 6.1 above shows that the number of new land allocations declined after 2002, to the lowest level in 2008. There was however a 6.3 percent surge in the number of new allocations after 2008. The Extension officers attributed this trend to the politics of the day where there were abandonments and forced evictions. As a result, new land beneficiaries were identified to take over the plots that had be left vacant. As was noted by the agricultural extension officer in one of the wards, the scenario was the same in the other ward. The extension officer noted that:


In my ward, there was one person who left their farm after the general elections. The farmer was very vocal speaking about need for change. The ZANU PF leadership told him to vacate since he did not understand that the land came at the barrel of the gun. Voting for MDC would reverse the land reform so the leaders of ZANU PF wanted to make sure that ZANU PF wins in the resettled areas since they would be accountable to their superiors (Key Informant Interview, 20/08/2015, Female, Sherwood Block).

The initial general election results for Kwekwe District saw MDC-T gain a lot of ground against ZANU PF. In preparation for the runoff, the district was targeted by ZANU PF as one they needed to get back, especially the resettlement areas. By the time the runoff election happened, the district had so much tension with ZANU youth mobilising the farmers against MDC-T. That created unprecedented polarization that forced the farmers who had shown

support for the MDC-T to abandon the farms. ZANU PF leaders seized the opportunity to replace those farmers with another one who was on the waiting list.

Using the AIAS 2014 Baseline findings, for A1 famers, the majority obtained 5.1-10 hectares of land. These are mainly self-contained plots where the maximum number of cattle permissible is 6. For those in more arid areas, they accessed 10.1-20 hectares.

Figure 6.2: Kwekwe District land holding for A1 beneficiaries




Source: Adapted from AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14

The A2 farms are fewer compared to A1 allocations. These farms are meant for the small to medium capitalist farmers who have their tools and can access their own capital to engender production on these farms. The research noted however that some of the people who obtained these farms did so for speculative reasons, hoping that the state would provide them with support to work on the land. It must be noted that from the start, the state had made it clear that this group of farmers were meant to support themselves or be able to outsource support. This is important because there are some narratives that criticise the state for not providing any

support or A2 farmers, yet this was not part of the terms for taking these A2 farms. As a result, ideally, A2 farms are not supposed to receive any inputs from the state. This research however observed that some of the A2 farmers, because of their political connections, are able to leverage these to get government inputs.

Figure 6.3: Kwekwe District A2 land beneficiaries



Source: Adapted from AIAS Survey 2013/14

The sizes of the A2 farms depend on the natural region in which the farm is located as provided for by the farm size guidelines (see Moyo *et al*, 2009). Kwekwe District, which is predominantly in NR III, does not have any small-scale A2 farms. The chart shows that those occupying farm sizes of 250 hectares or larger are the single largest group. Over 83% have farms that are 120 hectares or bigger. These are mostly small sized A2 plots in NR III and IV and those with 100-120 hectares are considered to be medium scale in NR I. A reflection on the two graphs above confirms Moyo's (2011a) assertion that the FTLRP increased the size of the peasantry; 48 households obtained A2 farms compared to 107 households in A1.

6.5 Profiles of land beneficiaries

This has been the core subject of contention between the various narratives on the outcomes of the FTLRP. On the one hand, there are scholars who usually cite Chabal and Jean-Pascal's narrative on 'instrumentalization of disorder' to argue that the beneficiaries of the FTLRP were primarily the elite political figures (see Marongwe, 2009; Davies, 2004; Hammar *et al*, 2005;

Raftopoulos, 2004; Richardson, 2010). On the other hand, there are scholars who have gone to lengths to prove that while there were elite beneficiaries, these constitute a small percentage (see Moyo, 2005; 2009; 2011a; 2011b; AIAS, 2014; Matondi, 2012; Scoones *et al*, 2010; Scoones, 2015). Citing a research that was conducted by Zimbabwe Independent Institute covering 375 A1 farmers located in Mashonaland West, Mashonaland East, Manicaland, Masvingo and Matebeleland South Province, about 53.1% of the beneficiaries were previously unemployed.

Table 6.4: Redistribution patterns in selected provinces of the country

Category	Number	Percentage
Business people	7	1.6
Civil Servants (Agriculture and Lands Ministries)	18	4.8
Civil Servants (Education)	24	6.4
Civil Servants (Other)	15	4
Ex-Security	20	5.3
Ex-Combatants	3	0.8
Ex- Farm workers	4	1.1
Informal sector	24	6.4
Gold panners	5	1.3
Local councils	3	0.8
Pensioners	3	0.8
Parastatals	2	0.6
Private sector (finance)	3	0.8
Private sector (other)	14	3.7
Security ministries	13	3.5
Unemployed	119	53.1
Others	12	3.2
Total	375	100

Source: Zimbabwe Independent Institute, 2007

Table 6.4 confirms the assertion by scholars like Moyo *et al* (2011) that while the elites¹² benefited from the land reform, the majority of the beneficiaries were ordinary people as can be deciphered from this table where 53.1% of the beneficiaries in the sample used were the unemployed. Table 6.5 confirms Zimbabwe Independent Institute’s findings in that 85.8% of the A1 beneficiaries did not have any other employment except tending to the land. For A2 farmers, 68.7% were also previously unemployed. The figure is lower than that of A1 farmers because some of the A2 farmers are still employed in urban areas. As shall be noted, they use some of the money from their employment to invest in agriculture which cushions them in bad seasons. The next highest percentage is of beneficiaries who are in civil service for A2. This speaks to some of the discussions raised by Marongwe (2009) and Scoones *et al* (2010) who noted that obtaining A2 farms needed political connections which the senior civil servants had. Civil service is also the second highest percentage for A1 as well. The take away from the two tables under discussion is that redistribution predominantly benefited ordinary people that were land hungry but civil servants also leveraged their positions to access land albeit in smaller proportions.

Table 6.5: Profession of land beneficiaries in 6 districts surveyed by AIAS

Employment status	Settlement type							
	A1		A2		Communal Area		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Not currently employment	412	85.8	204	68.7	245	78.5	861	79.1
Private sector managerial	7	1.5	26	8.8	4	1.3	37	3.4
Civil service managerial	23	4.8	32	10.8	6	1.9	61	5.6
Self-employment	7	1.5	12	4.0	19	6.1	38	3.5
Uniformed forces	3	0.6	5	1.7	5	1.6	13	1.2
Private sector semi-skilled	11	2.3	6	2.0	13	4.2	30	2.8
Civil service semi-skilled	10	2.1	8	2.7	8	2.6	26	2.4

Farm worker	4	0.8	2	0.7	4	1.3	10	0.9
Other	2	0.6	0	0	8	2.6	12	1.1
Total	478	100	296	100	312	100	1086	100

Source: AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14

6.6 Educational levels of land beneficiaries

The FTLRP benefited people of all educational levels. Table 6.6 below shows that the highest percentage (27.4%) of plot owners completed secondary education. The second highest (17.2%) is for those who had some secondary education. These figures confirm that the majority of the land beneficiaries are ordinary citizens who did not hold high profiled jobs. With the competitiveness that is in Zimbabwe, completing primary or secondary education would not ordinarily propel one to be an elite. Due to the limited formal employment opportunities, there is a tendency to invest more in education amongst some Zimbabweans so that they remain competitive.

Table 6.6: Education levels for Kwekwe District FTLRP plot owners

Education Level Attained by plot owner	Kwekwe District	
	N	%
No formal education	6	3.8
Some primary education	27	17.2
Completed primary education	24	15.3
Some secondary education	27	17.2
Completed secondary education	43	27.4
Completed advanced level	2	1.3
College education	11	7.0
University degree	16	10.2
Vocational training	1	.6
Total	157	100.0


Source: Adapted from AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14

The flip side to looking at education is interrogation of how the education received translates to added value in farming, understanding how agriculture should be run as a business. The secondary education levels set a basic foundation for ensuring comprehension of technical knowledge needed for farming. This comes in light of the fact that the government has Agritex extension officers in all the wards of the district. I observed that these support services from the state are readily available for any farmer to tap into them. Of note is a fortnightly program that is run by the Agritex extension officer of Sherwood Block. In these sessions, she trains the farmers on subjects like understanding the pesticides used, animal husbandry, horticulture and book keeping. Such training, coming to farmers who already have obtained basic education will improve their farming skills and understanding of agriculture.

6.7 Ages of land beneficiaries

The majority of the land beneficiaries are above the age of 50. When looking at the future of farming in the country, this does not speak well for continuity of experience and reproduction. The graph below outlines the age distribution of land beneficiaries in Sherwood farm. It can be noted that there are more people who are above 65 years of age than any other age. This is followed by the 50-64 age range.

Figure 6.4: Age distribution of land beneficiaries in Sherwood Plots



Source: Own fieldwork, (2015)

The inevitable question which this research asked in discussions with the respondents was about continuity after the natural cause of life- death. As shall be noted below, this element of death was met with mixed fortunes for the farmers. One farmer noted with despair that:

I have the desire to farm but now I am old as you can see. Amongst my children, there is no one who has the same desire to do farming. They now have their families in towns. Perhaps they will consider it after my death (In-depth Interview, 5/08/2015, Male, A1 Farmer, Sherwood Farm).

Another farmer, noted that:

I was very lucky. My last born has a passion [for] farming. He actually went to Mlezu Agricultural College. I don't have any worries should I die now. My son will come and take over (In-depth Interview, 6/08/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Farm).

In both Sherwood and Umlala farms, there were cases where the husband and the wife died and there was no one to take over. The farms laid idle waiting for a decision from the state. In Umlala, 6% of the farms were in this category. There are some however where children took over. Looking at the graph above, this explains primarily the 18-29 and 30-39 age ranges having plots. Indeed there were some young people below the age of 40 years who participated during the redistribution exercise, though their number is very small. In Umlala and Sherwood, the majority had to take over after the death of their parents. This mostly happened to families who moved totally either from the communal areas or the urban areas. The idle farms are those of beneficiaries who either did not totally relocate to the land they had been allocated or to those whose children had grown and are living elsewhere.

6.8 Gender composition of land beneficiaries


A lot of work has been done by various scholars on gender roles in an African context (see Tsikata, 2003; Roth and Gonese, 2003; Hellum, 2004; Jacobs, 2010; O'Laughlin, 2009; Goebel, 2005; Gaidzanwa, 1985, 1994, 2011; Mutopo, 2011). The general analysis notes that gender relations in an African setting short-change women. The social environment for women to access land is not supportive as it is riddled with patriarchal dispositions as well as the legacy of colonialism that subjugated women through structural framing of families which colonialism brought.

As a result, rural peasant women face exclusion particularly from different political and traditional regimes that control land, in spite of their immense contribution to food production (Mutopo, 2011). This narrative was confirmed by how the FTLRP unfolded. Derman and Hellum (2004) and Mazhawidza and Manjengwa (2011) note that women mostly from urban and rural areas were discriminated against on political, social and economic grounds. This

could explain why the Government of Zimbabwe’s Utete Report on the FTLRP (2003:40) noted that a total of 18 percent of the land beneficiaries including both A1 and A2 resettlement schemes were women. This figure is corroborated by Gaidzanwa (2011) who postulated that 13-22% of the settlers under FTLRP in various provinces of the country were women.

There are several figures from other scholars hovering in the same region. Moyo (2011b) asserts that 14 percent of women benefited countrywide; Scoones *et al*’s (2010: 55) research found that women constituted 8 percent of the A2 plots, 14 percent of the A1 villagised resettlements, 13 percent of the A1 self-contained sites and 15 percent of the unofficial sites, which were not formally registered under fast track. Matondi (2012)’s research noted that 14 percent of women had acquired land in Mazowe. In Zvimba district, 25 percent of A1 beneficiaries were women and 22 percent of A2 beneficiaries were women (Murisa, 2007). The research conducted confirm the aforementioned figures. The average figure of the women that accessed land in Kwekwe District is 21.6% which is in line with national figures that were obtained by various other researchers.

Figure 6.5: Gender disaggregation of land beneficiaries



Source: Own fieldwork, (2015)

The above statistics serve to demonstrate that access to land had gender biases. Women did not get equal access to land compared to men. The situation is even more deplorable for A2 farms. In Sherwood Block, there are 8 A2 farmers and none of them are women. In Umlala, out of the 6 A2 farmers there, only one is a woman. This finding confirms the observations that were made by Gaidzanwa (2011) that the application criteria for A1 farms were not accommodative to women as has been noted earlier.

6.9 Land ownership versus land access

The research observed that most of the land beneficiaries in Umlala Farm and Sherwood Block of Farms, are Shona. Naturally therefore, it is the Shona customs that I found to be dominant. One of the issues that stood out in the research was the different appreciation of the concept of land ownership. The neoclassical discourse emphasises property rights and individual land ownership. There is a tendency to impose neoliberal values on a people who have their own culture and way of thinking. Mafeje (2003) argues that the concept of individual land ownership is alien to the African customs. Individuals did not own any land. It belonged to the clan, the lineage, and the household or production unit. In this context, landholders are vertically organised groups with corporate rights (Ibid). In the resettled areas, the land does not fall under customary regulations. Instead, the land is vested in the state while usufruct rights are vested in the individual beneficiary.

Whilst usufruct rights are vested in the individuals, I observed that the land beneficiaries brought their customs and norms in managing the land. This transference of norms and cultures informs how land use happens in the resettled areas. As such, Mafeje's conceptualisation of land ownership is still valid in practice, though on paper, usufruct rights of the land are vested in individuals. Using the formal ownership of land has made some scholars to protest that the FTLRP did not have mechanisms to include more women in land ownership (see Mazhawidza and Manjengwa, 2011; Matondi, 20012; Gaidzanwa, 2011).

Mutopo's (2011) research found that ownership did not hold much premium in the farming communities as women still had access to the land even though it was not in their names. Most land ownership was vested in men, with women only accessing the land as extension of a male

holder. For these women who could not access the land for themselves, they had access through the institution of marriage. In the Shona culture, the institution of marriage has a deeper and more symbolic meaning for access to resources (Mutopo, 2011). Schmidt (1992) and Bourdillon (1992) state that in the Shona culture, marriage carries important symbolic, social, political, and economic significance for the couples and their families. As a result, when the researcher asked one woman about who owned the land, she retorted:

This is our plot. The permit is not in my name but that does not matter... (In-depth Interview, 11/07/2015, Female, Umlala Farm)

I asked a follow up question on repercussions of a divorce on the plot since it is not in her name. She responded:

Where would I go, my son? We have grown old together and have raised our children who are now adults. I will not go anywhere...

Another lady registered the same sentiments when she noted that:

You children of these days you trouble yourselves because of self-interests saying this is mine and that is mine too. In marriage, you care for each other, doing things together... (In-depth Interview, 18/06/2015, Female, Sherwood Farm).

This perspective addressed both the neoliberal conception of ownership as well as the Shona traditional view of marriage as postulated by Schmidt (1992) and Bourdillon (1992). The concept of ownership did not seem to mean much in the day-to-day management of the families. The reason why the issue of ownership did not matter much to women can be attributed to the socialisation of patriarchy which normalised the subjugation of women. Patriarchal thinking would argue that what matters is land access, not necessarily ownership. The consequences of such thinking are seen in instances of divorce or where the husband wants to bring another wife. The current wife would not have much to leverage on strategic decision making. Having access to land without having it in one's name means that when decisions are made either with the state or the community about issues of the land, the women would not be consulted as they are not permit holders.

6.10 Gender dynamics amongst farm workers on the resettled farms

I observed that there are two types of families on the resettled land. There are land beneficiaries who are based on their plots. There are also labourers who are based on the plots whose owners reside either in towns or elsewhere. For farm worker's family households, both the husband and wife would engage in wage labour also known as *maricho*. *Maricho* is a Shona concept

where farm owners hire labour to undertake a specific task. Payment for the task may be in cash or in kind. In years of drought, farm workers would engage in *maricho* for grain or basic groceries. The latter was primarily the case for those farmers who are based in towns who would bring groceries items such as soap, cooking oil, salt, sugar and clothing as methods of payment for *maricho*. As they sold their labour, they negotiated for a combined wage since they would work together. For farm workers, the wives however still had to take care of the children and cook for the husbands after jointly doing *maricho*. Talking to a Mrs Bodo, the wife of a farm worker, she asserted that:

Eish my brother, it's tough. You would have come from *maricho* exhausted, then you start cooking. If the father of the house would assist by at least slicing the tomatoes, it was going to be better. You just have to be strong as a woman... (In-depth Interview, 21/05/2015, Female, Umlala Farm).

Mrs Bodo discussion illustrates some frustrations which the burden of patriarchy places on women. This corroborates Hartmann (2010)'s assertion that patriarchy uses men who are even at the lowest level to oppress women. There are however some women who did not consider this as oppression because they argued that:

This is what we are used to... do you think it's possible to relax while my husband cooks for me? It can only happen when I'm sick (In-depth Interview, 24/06/2015, Female, Sherwood Farm).

Another retorted that:

While the father does not cook, there are other tasks in the home which the father does in the home which I do not do. I don't see any problem... (In-depth Interview, 14/06/2015, Female, Sherwood Farm)

Such tasks which the father does include fetching water since the water is far away. This was the case also in Mrs Bodo's experience, the father of the house fetched water and firewood. He would engage in other activities such as thatching houses or clearing people's fields to generate money. The foregoing citations present stories of women who see nothing wrong with the patriarchal social ordering though it is oppressive to them. This shows the power of social orientation which conditions the women not to question the repressive system of patriarchy.

6.11 The *tsewu*

One way in which the patriarchal system appeases its segregation of ownership is through provision of a portion of land to the women of the family for their own use. Mutopo (2011) argues that in the concept of marriage, women were enabled to have access to their own fields

within the husband's family after a certain period. These fields are called *tsewu*. A *tsewu* is a piece of land that is given to a wife to engage in her own agricultural activities and grow crops that are considered to be feminine like groundnuts, roundnuts, soya beans, sugar beans and cow peas. The forgoing is corroborated by Scoones *et al* (2010:95) when he notes that within households, there is often some specialisations structured along gender lines. He further notes that often, women, focus particularly on gardening and the production of vegetables, groundnuts and Bambara nuts, while men focus on the outfields and maize production. Similarly, women may specialise in goats and chickens, while men focus on the cattle. This results in a gendered division of labour and potential competition over resource allocations within the household (Scoones *et al* (2010:95).

For this division of labour to play out well, in the context of the resettled farms, the farmers had to subdivide the land to make room for the *tsewu*. The allocation of *tsewu* confirms the notion that the resettled farmers brought with them their customs and norms to inform how land use happened. Bourdillon (1992) is in consonance with this notion when he notes that the Shona mythology of agriculture should be understood from the fact that young and older women were able to survive as agriculturalists because they had a portion of their own individual land where they could grow crops and vegetables that feed the household all year round. The research spoke to one farmer Mr Ngende who was settled on an A1 plot in Umlala Farm. He noted that:

It's our culture that the mother of the household gets a *tsewu* where she decides on the crops that she grows without my interference (In-depth Interview, 23/05/2015, Male, Umlala Farm).

The down side of this concept is that women have to double their effort since they will first work on the family farm then on their *tsewu*. The observations noted that main crops such as maize, wheat and tobacco were prioritised on the family farm since their returns were also more on the market. One wife noted that:

It's a good thing that I have a *tsewu*. The problem however is that I then will not get enough support to work on it even though I would have worked on the family farm (In-depth Interview, 07/08/2015, Female, Sherwood Farm).

These sentiments expose the double burden that is on the women in farming communities.

6.12 Place of origin of Kwekwe land beneficiaries

The significant number of land beneficiaries in Kwekwe came from communal areas within the district (30.1%) followed by those that came from other districts (22.9%). This scenario confirms a narrative that was made by scholars like Moyo (2004, 2011), Matondi (2012) and Scoones (2010, 2015), *inter alia*, that the land reform helped to decongest the communal areas. One of the beneficiaries of an A1 self-contained plot expressed that:

I wanted to stay at a free and spacious place where my livestock would get good pastures while I will be ploughing on these red soils... (In-depth Interview, 11/04/2015, Male, Umlala Farm).

The citation denotes an intrinsic value that the beneficiaries from communal areas got by finding a spacious place. The grazing areas in communal areas were overcrowded which affected the health of the livestock. For this A1 plot beneficiary, the 30 hectares he got will suffice for both his agricultural production which is on 6 hectares, and grazing ground for his livestock.

Table 6.7: Place of origin for land beneficiaries

	Kwekwe District	
	N	%
CA in this district	46	30.1
CA in this province	35	22.9
CA from other provinces	21	13.7
LSCF in this district	7	4.6
LSCF in this province	2	1.3
LSCF in another province	0	.0
Diaspora	0	.0
Urban area	30	19.6
Place of employment in another area	1	.7
Old resettlement	8	5.2
Other	3	2.0
Total	153	100.0

Source: Adapted from AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14

It is worth noting that 19.6% of the beneficiaries in Kwekwe district came from urban areas. This is understandable because the district is close to three towns namely Gweru, Kadoma and Kwekwe. Interestingly, some of these urbanites are the ones that got A2 farms because they could demonstrate ability to source for capital and also the simple issues of filing in the forms in a convincing way. In an interview with the Agritex extension worker, she lamented that:

The people who came from towns to occupy the land did not have a lot of knowledge on what they needed to do with it. They had not had exposure to agricultural education compared to those who came from communal areas. We had worked with these for a long time so they did not need much education compared to their urban counterparts (Key Informant Interview, 20/08/2015, Female, Sherwood Block).

The comment shows that most of the land beneficiaries who had come from communal areas had necessary knowledge about what they needed to do on the land since they had access to government extension services in the communities where they were based prior to their relocation. This dismisses the myth that the land beneficiaries were all ‘new farmers’ who were not knowledgeable, not having any clue about agriculture. This assertion cannot hold when it comes to land beneficiaries who came from the communal areas where extension services were available.

6.13 Farm residency and homesteads

Consideration of farm residency for the land beneficiaries is important for several reasons. Firstly, residency speaks to availability to engage in agricultural work. The farmer will be able both to work on the farm and supervise the progress that will be happening in real time. Residency on the farm can be said to make a statement on commitment and elimination of options of occupation. Secondly, residency will also confirm the notion that has been noted by several scholars that the FTLRP benefited ordinary people in the country. This view is premised on Sen (2005)’s concept of development as freedom to choose. In this case, residency would mean that the beneficiaries did not have another choice of where to stay because of their economic status. They therefore had to settle on the farm which they were allocated. The flip side of this is also true when land beneficiaries are not staying there. Though this may be a long shot, but those who would not reside at the farm could be categorised as the better off farmers in the small to medium capitalist production of the tri-modal structure. Table 6.8 shows that 87.1% of the A1 and 61.1% of A2 beneficiaries stay on the farms.


Table 6.8: Residency of plot owners in newly settled areas by settlement type

Residency of plot owner	Settlement type					
	A1		A2		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
On farm	412	87.1	179	61.1	591	77.2
Communal area	4	0.8	6	2.0	10	1.3
Urban area	49	10.4	95	32.4	144	18.8
Diaspora	4	0.8	6	2.0	10	1.3
Other	4	0.8	7	2.4	11	1.4
Total	473	100	293	100	766	100

Source: AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14

There is a higher percentage of A2 farmer who stay in urban areas (32.4%) compared to 10.4% of A1 farmers. This speaks more to the middle farmer who still has his or her job in town and comes often to the farm to monitor progress. In the Sherwood area, some of these farmers are able to use the money they generate from their various vocations in urban areas to sustain their agricultural interests. Some have bought equipment and inputs even after drought seasons when other farmers would not have starting capital.

Figure 6.6: A1 Farm residency trends in Kwekwe District



Source: Own fieldwork, (2015)

Figure 6.6 shows that in villages, all the beneficiaries reside at the plots they were allocated. The research observed that these villages are made up of former farm workers and individuals who came from communal areas. Those who came from towns did not accept to be given villagised A1 farms. The farms with highest numbers of people who are not based at the farm are those that are close to the high way where transport to and fro is not difficult to find. Some of the push factors for those with options of staying in urban areas include non-availability of electricity on most plots. All the households of Umlala farm are not connected to electricity. Some of the households have invested in solar panels that can mostly charge the phone and play the radio for some time. Furthermore, access to drinking water is a problem. Water has to be collected from Sebakwe River which is an average of 5 kilometres from most residences.

6.14 Conclusion

This chapter interrogated the redistributive social policy outcomes of the FTLRP. In the chapter, I demonstrated that one of the major outcomes of the FTLRP was the changed agrarian structure from a bi-modal arrangement to a tri-modal structure. The new agrarian structure has about 150 000 households settled under the A1 scheme and 30 000 under the A2 scheme with some transnational agro estates still operating in the country. The new agrarian structure has created a broad base for the peasantry in its variegated categories. Indeed the process had its own shortcomings since it was mostly a revolution from below. As a result women did not get access to land on equal footing as men. This was mainly pronounced in A2 resettlement scheme where in Sherwood Farm there are no women who received A2 plots. There is consensus among scholars that between 13-22% of the land beneficiaries are women. The majority of the women then access land through their husbands, which reinforces the patriarchal nature of the society. I observed that the land beneficiaries brought their cultural relationship with the land. As a result, the allocated plots are subdivided by the households to make provision for *tsewu* for the women and the main field for the household. I however observed that this increases the women's burden of labour as they are supposed to work on their *tsewu* and contribute to the household plot.

The chapter also provided detailed accounts of how the land beneficiaries accessed the land. Some of the beneficiaries got the land during the informal farm occupations, which were mainly orchestrated by the war veterans similar to other districts studied by scholars such as

inter alia Scoones *et al* (2010), Murisa (2007, 2010), Sadomba (2011) and Mkodzongi (2013). The majority of the land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District got the land through formal allocation by the government. The chapter also provided profiles of the land beneficiaries. The data I collected and that of AIAS refutes the narrative that only the elite benefited from the FTLRP. Civil servants, former farm workers, senior politicians, war veterans and ordinary citizens all benefited from the FTLRP. The beneficiaries also had varied education levels ranging from no formal education to degrees. The average age of the land beneficiaries is 55 years. Lastly, I explored farm residency trends in a bid to contribute to the debate around farmers who got land for speculative reasons as well as the notion of absentee farmers. I observed that most beneficiaries in A1 type of farming, especially the villagised type, can be said to be resident on the farms. Having appreciated the new agrarian structure that was brought about by the FTLRP, the next chapter interrogates production outcomes of the FTLRP. The chapter will endeavour to answer the question of what the land beneficiaries are doing with the land.

CHAPTER 7: PRODUCTION OUTCOME OF THE FTLRP

7.1 Introduction

It is instructive to note that the enhancement of productive potential of members of society is a key variable in realizing social policy outcomes. The purpose of this chapter therefore is to answer the production question of what land beneficiaries are doing with the land they got, looking at both agricultural and non-agricultural activities. In this chapter, I rely on the AIAS data at national level and for Kwekwe District. The chapter interrogates agricultural trends of key crops such as maize and tobacco.

The issue of financing is also covered, attending to the question how the land beneficiaries are coping with this aspect. Concerns of means of production such as inputs, access to tools, labour and access to information about agriculture are attended to. The chapter interrogates the availability and accessibility of quality extension services in Kwekwe District. Access to markets is a key element in realising agricultural success. Looking at the how farmers engage with the markets is important in answering the question of value derivation. The chapter ends with looking at non-farming activities which take place on the resettled farms. In the context of Kwekwe District, gold panning is one non-agricultural activity which most land beneficiaries are involved in so I gave some attention to the nuances around this issue.

7.2 Production and productivity- whose productivity?

Production and productivity in the aftermath of the FTLRP has been a subject of debate among various scholars as shall be envisaged. This is not surprising considering the argument by Helliker (2010) of polarized views on the outcomes of FTLRP. On the one hand, some scholars argue that the FTLRP had progressive outcomes and brought success to the beneficiaries. On the other hand, other scholars argue that it undermined production and food security. An empirical interrogation of land beneficiaries' production and productivity is one key way to address the polarity amongst the scholars. Production can only be better assessed empirically and several scholars have taken that challenge to provide empirical evidence (see Scoones *et*

al, 2010; Moyo, 2011a; Moyo, 2011b; Chambati, 2011; Zikhali, 2012; Hanlon *et al*, 2012; Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo, 2012; AMID, 2012a; AMID, 2012b).

While there has been empirical research that has been conducted to appreciate production and productivity levels of the FTLRP beneficiaries, it is worth noting that productive outcomes take at least a generation to be fully realized (Hanlon *et al*, 2012). As has been noted earlier, I argue that reviewing the outcomes of the FTLRP should be periodised appropriately in view of the various phases which characterise the period 2000 up to 2015. Failure to do so will result in gross generalizations that will not depict the correct picture on production outcomes. As such, Hanlon *et al*'s (2012) argument of the need for a generation to fully appreciate the production outcomes has been marred by a lot of exogenous factors which have compromised the concrete realization of the production outcomes of the FTLRP.

In my interaction with the land beneficiaries, I observed that there is an important question which had been neglected by the literature which explored the production outcomes of the FTLRP. The question is 'whose expectation will be measured when assessing the productivity of the land beneficiaries?' The dominant narrative seems to suggest that every beneficiary who got land was motivated by the need to produce surplus and contribute to the GDP of the country. The reality on the ground as I observed, was not the case for all the land beneficiaries. In my interviews with the farmers, there was a significant group of land beneficiaries whose primary motivation for getting the land was to establish a home (*musha*) for their families and generations that follow:

I participated in the land reform to secure my children's future. I did not have anything to leave them before the land reform. Now I have something to give to my children. What kind of a father doesn't leave a *musha* to his family? My dignity has been restored... (In-depth Interview, 10/05/2015, Male, A 1 Farm, Umlala Farm).

Another farmer noted that:

My primary objective has been achieved, my family now has a *musha*. When I shall die, they will not be migrants without a base. If things don't work out in their lives, they can now come back home and no one will chase them. If my daughter's marriage does not work out, she can come back home... (In-depth Interview, 12/04/2015, Female, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm).

The foregoing citations show that the concept of *musha* is entrenched in the understanding that land is not only a commodity for production as the political economy approach views it as. Beyond being an economic commodity, the land is a social endowment that is in principle inalienable (Mafeje, 2003). It is associated with corporate existence that is fixed in space but transcends time. The research found that several land beneficiaries consider land this way. This view motivated them to participate in the land reform so that they secure a social endowment for their grandchildren in the future. As has been shown in the previous chapter, the average age of the land beneficiaries is 55 years of age. This means that their productivity is relatively lower considering the physique that is needed in agriculture. As one farmer noted:

I do not have the strength to work all this land. I can only do so much. I know that my children, when they shall realise that the wealth is in the soil, they will come with their knowledge and strength to make the best use of this land... (In-depth Interview, 6/08/2015, Male, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm).

If appreciation of production and productivity is alive to the foregoing perspectives of the farmers, it then becomes imperative to not paint all the farmers with a single brush as though they got the land for business.

7.3 Production trends

Hanlon, *et al's* (2012) titled *Zimbabwe Takes Back its Land* corroborates the findings of Fox, *et al*, (2007), Chambati (2011), Moyo (2011), Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo (2012), Zikhali *et al* (2012), that while production levels in the short term plunged, these have increased gradually. Production and productivity started declining unevenly among the major crops mainly from the 2001-2 season, sliding to their lowest levels in 2004-5 and 2006-7 seasons. Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo (2012) observed that the 2012 agricultural season production levels for most crops were at least 40% below the 1990s average. From 2009 however, the agricultural sector has been recovering and grew by 21 percent in 2009, 33.9 percent in 2010 and 7.4 percent in 2011 (Ministry of Finance, 2011; European Union, 2012). The 2012 growth rate was 11.6 percent (Ministry of Finance, 2012). Hanlon *et al* (2012: 10) observed this steady upward trend and posited that:

...small holder farmers ... now produce together almost as much as the big white farmers did'; given that 'on average, in just a decade the farmers have caught up to the white farmers' production ... so the new farmers can be expected to develop significantly in the next decade.

This is happening against the backdrop of the fact that large-scale farms always benefited from vastly superior access to inputs and technical services which the land beneficiaries do not have. Zikhali *et al* (2012) conducted a comparative study of FTLRP land beneficiaries and communal farmers. She observed that while FTLRP beneficiaries have not achieved their full potential (as measured by commercial farm production before the onset of the FTLRP), they do seem to have been able to mitigate the reductions in output per hectare accompanying the FTLRP better than communal farmers (Zikhali and Chilonda, 2012). The foregoing empirical researches can be demonstrated using the graph below:

Figure 7.1: Production trends for maize, tobacco and sorghum



Source: AIAS Database, 2015

The data in Figure 7.1 shows trends for three crops. There are two trends coming out. Firstly, there is a lower level average output in the post 2000 period than for the period before. Agricultural outputs for 2014, though not a drought year, are generally lower. Even for soya beans, average of post-2000 is lower than for 2000. Secondly, the volatility is not limited to the drought years (2002, 2008 and 2012) alone. Further, the graph shows that tobacco production in 2013 (highest for the post 2000 period) was less than the output for 1998, although on an upward trajectory if you take 2006 as the base year. Maize production continues to show huge volatility, while the output for the post-2000 years was on the average lower than

similarly highly volatile production for 1980 to 2000 period. Soya beans production has been similarly volatile. The post-2000 production average was lower than the output in 2000. Using 2001 as the base year, then the production level since has been higher.

Overall, the graph shows that despite the volatility on production outputs, there seem to be a growth trajectory with major slumps in production trends in drought years. This speaks to unavailability of irrigation equipment and water management systems so that even in drought years, production should not fall significantly. This scenario was witnessed also in the 1992/1993 drought where, for example, maize production decreased by almost 75 percent leaving a large percentage of the population in dire need of food aid. In that same drought, over one million head of cattle died of starvation during the year.

The steady growth has been happening at a time when UNEP (2010) called it a decade when the country has been receiving rainfall that has been regular to the multi decadal mean. In 2012, a drought saw agricultural deficit of approximately 45 per cent in the nation's staple food source, maize, (FDI Global Food and Water Security Research Programme, 2012). About 1.4 million Zimbabweans faced food insecurity in 2012 (Ibid). This was a result of a drought hardly four years after another severe one in 2008.


Wilhite and Glantz (1985) note that there are four types of droughts. These are meteorological, hydrological, agricultural and socio-economic droughts. Zimbabwe has been plagued mainly by the meteorological and agricultural droughts.¹³ In 2008, in-depth interviews I conducted revealed that the rains only fell in December up to January. They had already planted their seeds in November. When the rains fell, the crops had already wilted. When it rained however, dams were filled and all water bodies. One farmer noted that:

The amount of rains that fell in two months were equivalent to the usual rains for the entire season. For the crops that had survived the sun, they got too much rain that they also died. (In-depth Interview, 11/04/2015, Male, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm).

Based on the explanation of the farmer, this was an agricultural drought. Whilst the rainfall was equivalent to what is recorded in the area on a good season, all of it fell in a span of one

irregular month. Crops experienced impaired growth. The AIAS 2013/2014 Survey corroborated this aspect in the six districts where the study was conducted. The graph below shows Kwekwe District as the most affected. This is because the farmers in the district do not have irrigation facilities. In Umlala Farm, there is no farmer who has any irrigation equipment. They rely on rain for agriculture. The nearest source of water is Sebakwe River which is an average of 5 kilometres from the households. The other source of water is a dam that was constructed by the white farmer for his livestock. Of the 44 households in the area, the dam is only close to five households.


Figure 7.2: Land beneficiaries’ crop production affected by drought



Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2013/14

Below, the Meteorological Office of Zimbabwe developed a trend analysis of the rainfall patterns up to 2008. Resonating with the UNECA (2010) observation, it can be noted that from 1999, the rainfall patterns have been going down. While the data for 2008 suggests there was an improvement, most of the rain fell in one month which was not beneficial for the agricultural season. This however was helpful for the livestock and those who had water harvesting mechanisms. The research did not find such mechanisms in both Sherwood and Umlala Farms.

Figure 7.3: Time series showing the extreme rainfall years in Zimbabwe



Source: Meteorological Office of Zimbabwe, 2009

Figure 7.3 above shows the rainfall patterns of Zimbabwe from the 1950s up to most recent as 2008. The graphs shows that the amounts of rainfalls which the country used to get have been generally on a decline. Even in high rainfall seasons such as 2005/2006 season, the amount of rainfall received was just above normal. These rainfall patterns have had a bearing on the outcomes of the FTLRP.

During my fieldwork, I observed that the 2014/2015 agricultural season was characterized by an agricultural drought. This is because the expected rains did not fall at the intervals they were expected. One farmer noted that:

This season the rains let us down. They were playing hide and seek with us. When we expected it to rain, it was dry so the seeds we had planted could not grow. After the sun had wilted our crops, the rains came down heavy in one month. So the rains fell between December and January only... (In-depth Interview, 24/06/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block).

The effects of this are still going to be seen. In spite of the drought, the Ministry of Finance projected a 3.4% growth in agricultural production. This projection is premised on the fact that the farmers were coming to grips with the weather variability trends and will be able to adjust accordingly.

7.4 Tobacco production

Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo (2012) argue that the trends over the decades in the aftermath of the FTLRP have experienced differentiated growth patterns in crop production and productivity. One of the crops that can define the progression of productivity after 2008 is tobacco. Tobacco used to be produced primarily by the large-scale commercial farmers where the average production capacity was 198,000 tonnes in the 1990s. Immediately after the FTLRP, the production levels plummeted to 82,000 tonnes between 2000 and 2004. This decline was 40 percent below the average of the 1990s. The production levels further declined to 55,000 tonnes in 2005/06 which was 28 percent of the 1990s average production. From 2009 after dollarization, tobacco production levels started picking up to reach 103,900 tonnes which was over half of the 1990s averages. The 2010/2011 season witnessed another improvement in production level to 132,400 tonnes which were two thirds of the 1990s production levels. The growth in production was propelled by the entry of many smallholder farmers into tobacco production and the entry of new contractors into the sector. What motivated the smallholder farmers into tobacco production was availability of lines of credit through contract farming arrangements that were being offered by private companies. Further, dollarization also made tobacco farming to be a worthwhile venture as the farmers could realize profit and had a guaranteed market.

Total flue cured tobacco output in 2014 amounted to 216 million kilograms, compared to 165.85 million kilograms realized in 2013 (Ministry of Finance, 2015). The surge in tobacco output was attributed to a 10.3% increase in the number of growers, from 78 756 in 2013 to 86 900 in 2014. Correspondingly, hectareage rose by 21.2% from 88 626 hectares in 2013 to 107 371 ha in 2014. In terms of tobacco sales, a total of US\$684.87 million was realized in 2014 compared to US\$610.31 million achieved in 2013, at an average price of US\$3.17/kg compared to US\$3.68/kg in 2013.

Table 7.1: National tobacco sales in 2013 and 2014

Seasonal	Total auction	Contract	Total 2014	Total 2013	% change
Mass sold in kilograms	50 745 154	165 253 617	215 998 771	165 846 412	30.24
Value in USD	136 669 850	548 200 219	684 870 070	610 309 838	12
Average PRICE USD/kg	(2.69)	(3.32)	(3.17)	(3.68)	(13.84)

Source: Tobacco Industry Marketing Board, 2015

In preparation for the 2014/15 season, about 86 751 growers had been registered as of 7 November 2014. Below is a disaggregation of the distribution of the growers for the 2014/2015 season:

Table 7.2: Disaggregation of the distribution of tobacco growers 2014/2015 season

Grower sector	Registered growers	%
A1	31879	37
A2	7 688	9
Communal Area	40 359	46
Small scale commercial	6 825	8
Total	(86 751)	(100)


Source: Tobacco Industry Marketing Board, 2015

Table 7.2 shows that communal areas lead in tobacco production followed by A1 farmers and lastly A2 farmers. This means that most farmers in communal areas have abandoned producing food crops such as maize. In 2014, an overall hectareage of 90 000 hectares was under the crop, with a projected output of 222 million kilograms. In support of this planned output, the respective seed sales of about 1 032 869 kilograms were made by the cut-off date of 5 September 2014. In 2015, exports are projected to increase by 5% to US\$3.832 billion. Growth in exports will be driven mainly by flue-cured tobacco (3.4%), raw sugar (4.7%), gold (4%) and ferrochrome (1.4%).

7.5 Maize production

The 2011 harvests were observed to be 86% of the 1990s averages (Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo, 2012). Of that overall percentage, 49 per cent of the maize came from resettlement farmers and 43 per cent from communal farmers;

Figure 7.4: Maize production trends for the first decade of the FTLRP



Source: Compilation from RBZ Annual Reports

Maize yields remain far below potential even though there is a steady increase (Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo, 2012). Scholars argue that the low yields have not been a result of poor farming skills. Instead, they have been caused primarily by capital scarcity. In tobacco and cotton, where access to credit is easier due to the contract farming, yields have started to rise for the same farmers that also produce the commodities where production levels are not yet rising. As a result, the production trends for tobacco and maize seem to suggest that halfway through their two-decade settling in period, and with none of the support given to the white farmers, the land beneficiaries are poised to be on a trajectory that will make them more productive than the white farmers they replaced.

These farmers however have a plethora of challenges to deal with, which are slowing down their production levels. These challenges range from working capital, as was noted by 22%

(Figure 7.5) of the farmers in Kwekwe District. The farmers also suffer from draught power shortages. The major challenge for most farmers is access to inputs, which is related to working capital as well. Talking to an A1 farmer from Umlala Farm, he lamented that:

If the government would help us with inputs and equipment, we would be better off. We are not lazy to work... (In-depth Interview, 14/05/2015, Female, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm).

Another farmer noted that:


After the losses I incurred in 2008, I would have wanted the government to assist me in getting off my feet. Help with inputs is important. I know that in countries like South Africa, the farmers' inputs are heavily subsidized compared to ours (In-depth Interview, 28/06/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Farm).

This sentiment was also echoed by another farmer who noted that:

If I were to get the inputs I need, my produce would significantly improve. Whilst the desire to make use of the land I have, my capacity is limited... (In-depth Interview, 9/06/2015, Male, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm).

The foregoing quotes from the farmers confirm AIAS finding, as deciphered in Figure 7.5 below, that the major production challenges that the farmers have are inputs.

Figure 7.5: Production grievances for Kwekwe District



Source: Adapted from AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14

Figure 7.5 shows that the major grievance which the farmers have is access to inputs. The second highest challenge which the farmers raised is shortage of draught power. The third

challenge which farmers noted which impedes their production is access to credit. One farmer encapsulated these aspects when he summarised his challenges to improved productivity as:

I have the land which is the most important thing. The next issue for me, is for government to help us in accessing loans from banks like the former white farmers used to get. Hiring tractors is very expensive, I end up using my hoe or if I get money, I hire draught power from my neighbours. These neighbours also have their own fields and families to feed so even though they may be willing to help, I can't be going to them every time... (In-depth Interview, 19/07/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block).

These production challenges share similar trends for A1 and A2 farmers. The difference however is on credit unavailability where A2 farmers are not able to get so that they can maximize production on their farms. Due to the land sizes on A2, agricultural production is not sustainable when it is not mechanized. This notion can be witnessed on land utilization matrix. The AIAS survey noted that, an average of 50.3 percent arable land was utilized in the A1 model in the 2013/14 season compared to 41.4 percent in A2 model. The underutilization of land is a result of the tools that the farmers use. A2 farmers are on large tracts of land which is an average of 100 hectares. On such land, it will not be possible to maximize land use using basic tools in the Table 7.3 below.

Table 7.3: Access to productive tools at national level – A2 model, 2013

Type of asset	HH with asset access	Mean	Type of access (%)	
	% accessed		% Owns	% Borrows
Hand tools				
Hoes	95.3	11	99.6	0.4
Axes	93.2	3	99.6	0.4
Mattocks	59.1	2	94.3	5.7
Picks	77.4	2	95.6	4.4
Spades	70.6	3	98.1	1.9
Spade folks	32.8	2	91.8	8.2
W/barrow	81.4	2	96.7	3.3
Knapsack	82.8	3	99.6	0.4
Animal drawn				
Scotch carts	38.9	1	82.6	17.4
Ploughs	47.6	1	94.3	5.7
Planters	6.1	1	38.9	61.1
Power driven				
Tractor	52.4	2	80.6	19.4
Plough	38.2	1	78.8	21.2

Planter	14.9	1	70.5	29.5
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Source: AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14

Table 7.3 shows that most A2 farmers have basic hand tools such as hoes, axes and knapsacks. 82.6% of the A2 farmers have scotch carts. The equipment which is not owned by the majority of the A2 farmers is the animal drawn planter with 38.9%. The table also shows that borrowing is relatively low on hand tools but grows when going to animal drawn tools. The power driven tools are the most borrowed (29.5% for planters) by the farmers without the tools. This speaks to solidarity amongst the farmers as they work on increasing their productivity.

Contrary to the AIAS data captured in the table above where 80.6% of the A2 farmers own tractors, at Umlala Farm, all the 6 A2 farms do not have tractors. They rely on borrowing from individuals who have seized the opportunity to have tractor-hiring services. Hiring the tractor costs USD40 per hectare. For a farmer who would want to use the 100 hectares to their disposal, this may be a challenge. As a result, the farmers end up utilizing the land within their means. In a focus group discussion, one of the farmers noted that they assign their children to adopt a hectare through hiring a tractor for the hectare. This is how they have been able to work on the land. As a result, the major production grievance for A2 farmers in Kwekwe District is credit unavailability and the high cost of inputs.

7.6 Agricultural Inputs and financing


The government initiated a Presidential Input Scheme to mobilise resources to support A1 households, communal, old resettlement and former small scale purchase area farmers. For the 2013/2014 season, the Scheme managed to mobilise US\$252.3 million. The program covers crops like maize and small grain inputs which were financed to the level of US\$184.8million, 51.2 million to livestock farmers US\$9.9 million to cotton farmers and US\$ 6.2 million for soya beans or cow peas farmers (BAZ, 2014). The financial support will reach 1.6 million households.

The US\$9.9 million intervention in cotton should reverse the decline in output realised in 2014, when production fell to an estimated 140 000 tons. This should complement continued contract farming arrangements between farmers and cotton merchants in 2015, estimated to mobilise about US\$28 million for the crop (Ibid). The research observed that distribution of these inputs is one of

the responsibilities of the agricultural extension officers. The extension officers noted that one of the challenges with the distribution of these inputs is timing. Sometimes the inputs are delivered late to the farmers. One of the informants in an interview noted that the allotment they had gotten from the 2012/2013 season were used in the 2014/2015 season since they had been delivered late.

In addressing the issue of government support, attention has to be given to the macro economic environment of the country. Access to agricultural credit for famers can be said to be one of the herculean tasks which is hanging over the government like the sword of Damocles. The country is riddled with international debt which compromises its opportunities to get lines of credit. In 2014, the Zimbabwe debt to GDP ratio was 77%. This raises concerns of the ability of the country to pay back creditors. As a result, most of the agricultural credit which farmers got after the FTLRP was through private agribusiness contracting firms (Mkhize-Binswanger and Moyo, 2012). The Government of Zimbabwe does not have adequate resources to comprehensively fund agriculture. As a result its initiatives like the President Input Scheme end up having limited coverage. The individual farmers have been taking the initiative to approach banks as a possible option. The graph below shows agriculture to be the fourth most funded sector by the banks. In view of the fact that Zimbabwe is an agro-based economy, one would have expected investment in this sector to be higher.

Figure 7.6: Bank loans by sector in 2014



Source: Adapted from the RBZ August 2014 Monetary Policy

Of the loans that were issued by banks in 2014, only 15.68 went to agriculture. Farmers would get funding if they go to the bank looking for a loan as long as they would have a property to use as collateral.

Given the high real interest rates prevailing in Zimbabwe and the prevailing short lending terms, informal lenders and loan sharks have also entered the field, and they too prefer to lend against urban properties. However, lending against collateral is dwarfed by short term agricultural financing that has come in through contract and out grower farming (especially for export crops), with banks playing a significant role in lending to such contractors. When farmers are unable to access the foregoing lines of credit, they resort to other sources such as own savings, wages from formal employment, pensions and remittances as can be seen in the graph below.

Table 7.4: Kwekwe District sources of agricultural credit for farmers in 2013

Sources of credit	Settlement type			
	A1	A2	CA	Total
	%	%	%	%
Government scheme	12.5	0	0	1.9
Private company	37.5	77.5	50	68.5
Commercial bank	0	15	0	11.1
Relatives and friends	0	2.5	0	1.9
Cooperatives	0	2.5	0	1.9
Microfinance institutions	37.5	2.5	0	7.4
Chimbadzo (high interest rate loan)	12.5	0	0	1.9
Other sources	0	0	50	5.6

Source: AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14


As can be noted from the table above, A2 farmers have been able to access private credit more than any other settlement type. Private companies enter into contract farming arrangements with the farmers. In the year of introducing the contract scheme, 23 percent of the tobacco crop was under that arrangement. In the 2011/12 summer, 13 companies contracted farmers on a

total area of 39,227ha; this constitutes 60 percent of the total area under tobacco cultivation (AMID, 2012a; AMID, 2012b) and 65 percent of the total crop under cultivation (Irwin *et al*, 2012). In this arrangement, each contracted farmer is obliged to deliver a crop to the contracting company to a value equivalent to the level of support provided. Contract arrangements and all marketing of tobacco are regulated by the Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board (TIMB); a quasi-state institution; an arrangement that has helped ensure a cordial relationship between contracting companies and the contracted (Ibid).

7.7 Livestock production patterns

Resettled households rear livestock as part of their farming. Cattle, are held in high regard by the farmers. This is because they are both a means of production and a source of reproduction. In the Shona culture, which is dormant in Kwekwe District, cattle are considered a form of wealth. Having plenty of them would mean that the owner is wealthy. Below, the graph shows ownership patterns in Umlala farm for A1 farmers. 42.2 percent of the farmers do not have any cattle while 100% of A2 farmers have at least five cattle. The percentage of those that do not have draught power is more at 48.8%. This means there are some of the farmers who have cattle that have not been trained for farming. In cases like this, the research observed that households hire draught power from each other.

Figure 7.7: Cattle ownership in Umlala Farm



Source: Own fieldwork, 2015

Outside cattle, poultry, and goats, donkeys and guinea fowls are other common types of livestock, owned by 6.90 percent and 5.50 percent of the households respectively. The other livestock types continue being owned by less than 5.0 percent of the households. On other forms of livestock such as sheep, rabbits and pigs, A2 households are the dominant players. Communal sector households own more goats, donkeys and free-range chicken in comparison to the two resettlement models.

7.8 Agricultural labour


The FTLRP drastically changed the agrarian labour structures that had been in existence for several years. It is estimated that between 30,000 and 45,000 workers were displaced from the former LSCFs to Communal Areas, towns, informal settlements (Chambati and Moyo, 2004, Chambati and Magaramombe, 2008) and neighbouring countries (Rutherford and Addison 2007). Since not all LSCF land was acquired, the remaining plantations and LSCFs (Moyo, 2011b) retained an estimated 100,000 full-time and part-time wage workers as of 2003 (Chambati and Moyo, 2004, Chambati and Magaramombe, 2008).

Another change was the displacement of an estimated 200,000 formal farm jobs nationally (Chambati and Magaramombe, 2008), of which about 50 percent were part-time. Nationally it is estimated that over two thirds of the former farm workers remained on the former LSCF land (Chambati and Moyo, 2004; Moyo *et al*, 2009; Magaramombe, 2010). This change in the agrarian structure brought with it different dynamics for both the farmers and the labourers. Some of the farm workers got land. This can be exemplified in Umlala Farm where 18% of the land beneficiaries were former farm workers. For those who could not get the land, 69 per cent of the former farm workers indicated that the majority of their colleagues were still resident in the compounds (AIAS farm worker survey, 2006). These labourers established different type of relations with the new farmers.

The FTLRP land beneficiaries do not have total control of farm workers as was the case under the white farmers. In the latter dispensation, the employers enforced residential tenancy which inhibited the labourers from looking for other opportunities. As a result, the white farmers wielded extensive political and social control over the labourers. The current arrangement is

not a master and servant relationship. Instead, the new employers have less total control over farm workers as they only have land user rights and cannot enforce the residential labour tenancy (ibid).

Figure 7.8: Hiring of farm labour in Kwekwe District for both A1 and A2 farmers



Source: Adapted from AIAS Survey, 2013/2014

As can be observed from the graph above, 57.6% of the labour in Kwekwe District is not committed to a specific farmer. Instead the labourers rove within the district and some of them have established labour gangs especially in summer to do big jobs. This arrangement empowers the worker because for every task which they have to undertake, they can negotiate their wage with the farm owner unlike if they were to be set on a monthly salary. Also, the workers are able to engage in other productive activities like gold panning. The research observed that those labourers who are roving have the liberty to be on several contracts which broadens their social reproduction. This has been term semi-proletarianisation of the labour force (Bush and Cliffe, 1984; Moyo and Yeros, 2005; Moyo, 2011a).

Overall there has been a net gain in livelihoods, as 45,000 farm workers and 4,000 physically displaced farmers have been replaced by 170,000 farm households (see Moyo, 2011a). By 2011, the total number of people working full time on resettlement land had increased five-fold, from 167,000 to over one million (Chambati, 2011). Chambati also estimated that in 2011, 240,000 people were employed full time on A1 farms and 115,000 on A2 farms. Another

crucial point to note is that 510,000 people from the A1 farmers' families were 'self-employed' full time and 55,000 from extended families on A2 farms. In view of this, it can be said that the FTLRP created employment from a meagre 167 000 to over a million, when taking into cognisance the more than 100 000 that remained on large scale commercial farms which were not redistributed.

For the employees who are in permanent employment, more often it is because the land owner is based in town. In such scenarios, the labourer runs the farm. In an in-depth interview with one A2 farmer, he indicated that his success was directly linked to the labourer he had hired. The labourer understood agriculture and livestock rearing. When the farmer decided to plant tobacco, the labourer had in depth knowledge of the timing, pesticides, fertilisers to be used and so forth. Though the permanent labourers do not have leverage to negotiate for their wage each time they work, they are more often chosen as permanent employees on the basis of their honesty, knowledge and skills. Such reputations mean that they are in much demand and renowned so that they can negotiate for other things which are not necessarily wages. I spoke to a farm worker who had managed to negotiate with the farmer for his children's fees and all educational requirements. He noted that:

Sometimes pay day is on the 52nd day of the month (*indefinitely*). I don't even know when next I will be paid. I have obligations to meet for my family. This means that I have to go and talk to the headmaster so that my child is allowed into class before I pay the fees. The school is now used to my request almost every term... (In-depth Interview, 17/05/2015, Male, Sherwood Farm).

This citation demonstrates how the labourer negotiated for his children's education which was important for him, even though he may not be paid on time. The farm worker's sentiments are confirmed by the research on mechanisms of wage determination. 77.2% of the farm workers claimed that they were able to negotiate for the wages which sometimes were paid in kind. Beside money, some of the payment methods included sharing of the harvests, covering all the subsistence costs of the worker and providing stationery for the worker's children.

Table 7.5: Wage determination methods in Kwekwe District


Method of wage determination	Kwekwe District	
	No.	%
Permanent labour		

Government gazetted wages	7	12.3
Local farmers agreement	6	10.5
Negotiated	44	77.2
Other	0	0
Total	57	100
Casual labour		
Government gazetted wages	2	2
Local farmers agreement	6	6
Negotiated	92	92
Other	0	0
Total	100	100

Source: AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14

Asked for their perceptions on the conditions of work between the old dispensation (working for white farmers) and the new employers, 36% of the labourers indicated that the conditions were now much better than before. This can be attributed to the freedom which the workers have as they are not tied to a single farmer. As has been noted, the new arrangement gives the farmer workers a lot of leeway to increase their incomes by engaging in petty commodity production. About 21 percent of the former farm workers were involved in the extraction of natural resources on a full-time basis (AIAS, 2006). Alluvial mining (especially gold and diamonds) has created an alternative source of income for farm workers and others in various provinces (Chambati, 2011).

Figure 7.9: Kwekwe District farm worker perceptions of working conditions compared to LSCF



For those who said that the conditions are worse, I observed that these were permanent workers whose employers were struggling with meeting their obligations of paying the wages. Most farmers who fell into this category are those who are not based at the farm but are invited as and when work arises. In such instances, the resettled farmer will not feel obligated to pay the worker as he/she argues that they are also providing them with a place to stay and livelihood. This speaks to the changing pattern of agrarian relations between land beneficiaries and farm workers.


7.9 Support services for production

Agricultural extension officers provide technical support to the farmers. Entry into the case study area was easy because the researcher used the extension officers 'presence on the ground' to access the farmer. This observation confirms Murisa (2010) assertion that public extension services are present at local level and remain active. Murisa's argument was in response to some scholars who anecdotally claimed that public extension services had collapsed since 2000. Agricultural extension officers in Kwekwe District reside in the areas where they are supposed to provide assistance. The agricultural extension officer who covers Umlala Farm demonstrated intimate knowledge of the area and the farmers who were allocated land. He

conducts monthly farmers meetings. At these meetings, he addresses agricultural challenges that he would have observed while doing his regular visits.

The extension officer was equipped with a motor bike by the government for ease of travel. The other extension officer of Sherwood farm however does not have a bike. Instead, she uses public transport when conducting her routine monitoring visits. To address her transport issue, she conducts single monthly visits where she combines all her activities to be done in the ward. It must be noted that whilst it is commendable that the agricultural extension officers are located in each ward, these officers need to be well equipped for the farmers to take them seriously. The extension officer for Sherwood registered frustrations that the government was not giving them ample support to deliver on their work. Figure 7.10 shows contact with government support services by the resettled farmers. It can be noted that agricultural extension workers have a heavy presence in the farming communities than any other department of government. The extension officers are supposed to provide training and visits to the farmers; facilitate the Master Farmer Training Schemes and share new technologies and information.

Figure 7.10: Contact with Government agencies for resettled landholders Kwekwe District for 2013



Source: Adapted from the AIAS Survey, 2013/2014

As can be seen from Figure 7.10, extension services are available in Kwekwe District. The challenges which these extension officers face were captured by Hanyani-Mlambo (2002) when he noted that:

...AGRITEX is only able to recommend technologies that were made available 15 to 20 years ago. The problems of inappropriate technology are most serious in the low-rainfall and marginal agro-ecological zones (i.e. agro-ecological regions III to V). Most farmers indicated that, where they have not adopted recommended technologies, they use either technologies from their own informal experiments or modifications of recommended technologies. AGRITEX has neither systematically identified farmer-developed technologies that work nor adapted these for extension to other farmers in other wards, districts or provinces. This problem has been compounded by an ever-dwindling operating budget and lack of transport, which have also severely limited extension agents' contact with farmers. According to one key informant, "AGRITEX's financial woes and the government's expectations are like trying to milk a cow without feeding it", a scenario reflected by too many demands and insufficient financial backing.

The foregoing sentiments were corroborated by Scoones (2014) when he noted that:

... Today the extension service is a sorry reflection of past glories. Many qualified staff left or passed away (the ravages of HIV/AIDS hit many government services very badly), posts are unfilled, the transport capacity virtually non-existent and the ability to offer up-to-date advice severely hampered by the parallel decimation of government research services. Most farmers rely on private input suppliers, agro dealers and their neighbors for advice these days. Of course there are extension workers in the field, and they are usually extraordinarily committed and informed, despite the poor conditions of their posts.

In consonance with Scoones, I observed that Agritex extension workers maintained a presence and were available to provide training to the resettled farmers in spite of their many challenges. The AIAS survey however revealed that only 9 percent of the sampled A1 and A2 beneficiaries had received training up to Master Farmer Certificate level and a mere 1.65 percent in both categories attained the Advanced Master Farmer Certificate (AIAS, 2014). The uptake of the training was low leading to the extension officer complaining that:

These farmers think that they know everything. When I invite them for the trainings, they don't come but if you visit them, they start asking questions of things they could have learnt during the training. I have never started a class Master certificate class with farmers who complete the course, farmers come when doing a lesson they think they need then abscond [for] the rest. It's frustrating... (Key Informant Interview, 20/08/2015, Female, Sherwood Block).

On the other hand, the farmers registered concerns that the extension officers did not have much to offer them, despite their willingness to help. One farmer noted that:


The reason for not attending training sessions by the extension officers is that they do not have information that can improve my farming much. I once attended the trainings but did not learn anything. I think the extension officers need to be equipped with new information on how we can do farming better. They are still teaching the same material even though the farming environment and conditions have changed... (In-depth Interview, 16/07/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block).

It has been argued that the absence of formal agricultural training does not necessarily translate to poor farm management as land beneficiaries are generally educated so they can conduct their own research when they want certain information (Moyo *et al*, 2009).

7.10 Media and production

Beside the government departments, farmers have been getting a lot of information from various other sources. The research observed that every farmer has a radio that is either powered by batteries or a solar pan. Having a radio is essential because most of the hands on information about farming is obtainable from there. Successful farmers are brought on the program to share their experiences as well. I had several opportunities of listening to the farming programs, these were a wealth of information. Different experts would come on radio to address different issues. Television programs such as *Murimi Wanhasi* (Today's Farmer) and the Radio Zimbabwe program *Zvevarimi* (About Farmers) proved to be very popular with the farmers.

Figure 7.11: Sources of agricultural information in new resettlement areas



Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2013/14

It is not surprising that in the 21st century, the media is playing such a key role in supporting agriculture in Zimbabwe. Radios and televisions as mediums to relay information have wider reach to even those areas where the government personnel would not reach. Such support mechanisms need to be strengthened by making sure that the media addresses farmers’ concerns in a systematic way, following a tailor-made program that would have been developed in collaboration with the farmers. The absence of a structured way to addressing issues of farming can be said to be one conspicuous gaps in working with mainstream media.

7.11 Agricultural markets

Between 2002 and 2008, the state has been controlling both input and outputs markets. This scenario was characterized by bottleneck on imports and the GMB used unrealistic prices to the detriment of the farmers. When the GMB collapsed after the 2008 inflation crisis, agricultural markets were re-liberalised. As a result, the markets have been dominated by private actors; 31.5 percent of A1 farmers have been selling their formerly controlled staple cereals to the private market (AIAS, 2014). This AIAS survey finding was corroborated by my interaction with the farmers who expressed lack of confidence in the GMB after the 2008 fiasco. Sales which were done mainly through the GMB around 2005/06 (52.5 percent for

maize and 73.8 percent for wheat) in accordance with the law have since declined significantly to 16.1% of A1 maize producers respectively. In consonance with the foregoing assertion, one farmer posited that:

After the losses I incurred in the 2007/2008 season, I will be a fool to go back there. Once beaten, twice shy. Their buying price is higher than that of the middlemen who come to the farms. This saves us transport costs. GMB would want us to take our produce there at our costs. Though the private buyers offer lower prices, and they pay immediately... (In-depth Interview, 19/07/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block).

The wheat crop was mainly marketed through on-farm middlemen (66.7 percent) and private players in nearest towns (33.3 percent). No maize or wheat crop was sold to on-farm contractors (Ibid). Overall, the current agricultural marketing policies have adversely affected the production of maize, wheat and other controlled crops due to unintended market distortions (Mukwereza, 2013). There seems to be little incentive for farmers to produce beyond their subsistence needs, given the lack of alternative marketing channels and price controls with inflexible procurement prices (Ibid).

The trajectory is fairly different for A2 farmers where 37.6 percent of the households in Kwekwe District choose to sell part of their produce through the state marketing board (AIAS, 2014). This is motivated by the need to access the GMB input schemes which have a precondition of a farmer having to sell a certain amount of produce to qualify for the subsidized inputs. Although offering the highest prices for grain in the market, the GMB has largely been unable to pay for grain deliveries on time resulting in farmers selling at cheaper prices from the private sector players. More recently, the government has gazetted regulations compelling all buyers to purchase maize from farmers at the GMB price. Its effect on the market however requires further examination. The production, marketing and pricing of small grains have remained uncontrolled as the Government tries to promote their production and consumption. Production of small grains (sorghum and millets) is only undertaken by a few A2 farmers who sold all their sorghum to the local village markets while A1 farmers sold most of their sorghum to on-farm consumers (35.7 percent), on-farm middlemen (21.7 percent), and local village market (7.1 percent) while only 21.4 percent was sold to the state marketing board.

Table 7.6: Marketing channels used by A2 resettled farmers in Kwekwe District

Type of crop	pp	marketing channel used (No and % of market participants in parenthesis)									
		local/village market	on farm to middlemen	nearest town	on farm to consumers	road side	state marketing	on farm to contractors	auction floor	other	Total
Main food crops											
maize crop	228(0)	11(7.1)	34(24.1)	31(22)	7(5)	0(0.7)	53(37.6)	1(0.7)	0(0)	4(2.8)	141(100)
wheat crop	4(0)	0(0)	1(100)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	1(100)
millet crop	0(0)	0(0)	1(100)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	1(100)
sorghum crop	4(0)	1(100)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	1(100)
groundnuts crop	67(0)	1(8.3)	4(33.3)	2(16.7)	5(41.7)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	12(100)
sweet potatoes	19(0)	0(0)	2(50)	1(25)	1(25)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	4(100)
sugarbean crop	50(0)	3(8.8)	13(38.2)	10(29.4)	4(11.8)	0(0)	1(2.9)	0(0)	0(0)	3(8.8)	34(100)
		8.8	38.2	29.4	11.8	0(0)	2.9	0(0)	0(0)	8.8	100
roundnut crop	18(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	(100)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(100)
Oil seed crop											
sunflower crop	3(0)	0(0)	1(50)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	1(50)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	2(100)
soybean crop	41(0)	1(2.4)	17(41.5)	10(24.4)	1(2.4)	4(9.8)	6(14.6)	0(0)	0(0)	2(4.9)	41(100)
Key export crops											
tobacco crop	53(53)	0(0)	0(0)	2(3.9)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	6(11.8)	43(84.3)	0	51(100)
Estates crops											
Sugarcane	37(0)	0(0)	1(2.7)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	17(45.9)	0(0)	19(51.4)	37(100)

Source: AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14

Quite different from the situation obtaining in the A1 sector, on farm middlemen was the channel mostly used by A2 farmers for marketing oilseed crops. Fifty percent and 41.5 percent of A2 sunflower and soya bean farmers, respectively, sold their output through the on farm middlemen while 50 percent and 14.6 percent farmers sold their sunflower and soya bean through the state marketing board, respectively (Table 7.6) (Ibid). In the absence of regulation compelling farmers to sell their oilseed commodities through the GMB, the parastatal is no longer the major option for most of the farmers. The farmers opt for middlemen who reach out to them instead of the arrangement which exists with GMB where farmers incur transport costs taking their produce to the latter (AIAS, 2014).

7.12 Non-farm income generating activities

Besides agriculture, the resettled land beneficiaries are engaging in several non-farm activities such as gold panning, woodcarving, firewood selling and river/pit sand selling. In the case of Kwekwe District, gold panning is one of the non-agricultural activities that the land beneficiaries are involved in. Prior to the FTLRP, the natural resources were controlled exclusively by the white farmers. Some of the resettled farmers noted that there is a lot of evidence to suggest that these farmers were involved not only in agriculture. One farmer highlighted this when he noted that:


I am certain that the white farmers were not only involved in agriculture. We see aerodromes at almost all the farms. What were they flying out? I don't believe it was for transport. The best example for this was what happened to Marange which was part of the farm that was owned by a renowned white farmer, a former MDC cabinet member. Only when the farm was repossessed [did] Zimbabwe realised that it had diamonds. We hear of stories that he would send his staff to look for the shiny stones for a reward. Because there was an aerodrome, he would fly out to go and trade... (In-depth Interview, 2/06/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block).

One farmer echoed the same sentiments when he noted that

Some of the farmers were involved in trophy hunting and tourism which they did not declare to the state. At a conservancy close to here, there are chalets showing that the farmers used to provide accommodation to their guests. This thing of doing non farming activities is not new. Why is it made to be something out of this world when it is done by us? (In-depth Interview, 11/06/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block).

Scoones et al (2010:89) posited that there was a lot of alluvial gold panning in resettled farms. He noted that getting permits to undertake small scale mining operations is extremely difficult, and is usually captured by those with power and influence. He further argues that unregulated gold panning can cause major erosion in riverine areas, resulting in substantial erosion and downstream deposition with the silting of dams and pools.

Figure 7.12: Involvement in non-farm income generating activities



Source: Adapted from the AIAS Survey, 2013/2014

Despite these environmental detriments, the AIAS survey noted that 72.6 percent of the beneficiaries were involved in gold panning (Figure 7.12). During my fieldwork, I discovered that about 69 percent of the former farm workers chose to do gold panning instead of looking for employment. The extension officer who was assisting me in this research noted that:

...Almost every plot has a pit. Most farmers tried to dig in their fields to find the gold. Some found it whilst others did not find much. Since gold panning is a labour intense activity, most farmers' ages do not allow them to do such work. For those who got something, they used young people whom they paid to dig. There is no field without a pit (Key Informant Interview, 20/08/2015, Female, Sherwood Block).

In the Sherwood area, almost every farmer was curious to know whether there was gold on their farm. Some indeed found the gold. I spoke to one farmer who had found alluvial gold on their plot without digging much. The farmer noted that:

When I got this plot, I did not expect to find gold. I was one of the farmers who were struggling to make the best use of the land. In a discussion with my neighbours, they indicated to me that there were possibilities of finding gold on our land because of the type of the soil. I asked my son to find out about how we would know if there was gold here. He came back with good news. I wanted to keep this a secret so that the *makorokoza* would not know about availability of gold here. I invited my family to come and dig. To our surprise, we did not have to dig very deep before we started finding the gold. I enquired with my neighbour, he was digging discreetly as well. I investigated about the markets for the gold. There were people who could buy it for cash on the black market. Their rates were not very good compared to selling to the government. The problem with selling to the government is that they would need a permit and also they have so many charges. So I decided to sell the gold on the black market. On my first transaction, I made about USD10 000. This was a lot of money but I had a lot of obligations that I had to meet. I managed to pay the outstanding fees for my daughter at Midlands State University. I also managed to put a security wall on my house in Mbizvo suburb. On my other transactions, the money I got varied but I managed to buy my wife a fridge that she had always wanted in her kitchen. I replaced old sofas which were in my house there. I brought the old ones here at the plot. With the second and third times, I can't remember but I think I got about USD8 000 dollars after about a month or so. The money I got the fourth time, I bought a family car that I am still using. The amounts kept reducing until the last time I made USD300 dollars. The problem with lower amounts is that I would not be able to pay the guys who were digging for me. The gold is still there but requires sophisticated equipment I do not have. Am hoping that I will be able to make more money from farming so that I can buy the equipment I need (In-depth Interview, 24/06/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block).

Another farmer narrated his experience noting that:

I was very fortunate to find a plot where there is gold. I specifically wanted a plot in this Sherwood area because I knew that it is in the gold belt. When I started digging, first few days, I could not get anything. What encouraged me were the stories I was hearing of my neighbours who were getting some gold without digging much. I changed the spot I was digging. I did not have to dig very deep to find my jackpot! I realised that the wait was worth it. I was surprised that I got a big stone that made me get some USD 14 000 at once! I was not guaranteed of having such money in one go so I decided to buy two commuter omni-buses. This business has really helped me to get off my feet. I managed to buy two residential stands in town. After the big stone I got, I have been getting irregular amounts but averagely USD5000 in some two months. I have been using the proceeds of the omni-buses to build a house at one of the stands in town. The money I have been getting from digging has been going to buy cattle. I have bought some 10 cows. When I finish with the building project, I will now start working on the things that I need for this plot. Whilst the money from digging is good because

it comes as a lump sum, it is back breaking, hard labour. If I had all the strength, I would dig every day. But that is not possible. My only consolation is that as long as the gold is there in the ground, it will not go anywhere. I will have to rest my back before I start digging again... (In-depth Interview, 11/06/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block).

The foregoing stories of the farmers corroborate Maponga *et al* (2002) when they articulate that small scale mining increases economic power to rural communities, and in that way, contributes positively to social development. In my interactions with the land beneficiaries, I got a sense that there were a lot of incidences of farmers who were involved in digging for gold on their plots. This was predominant in Sherwood Block. The impact varied, with some having their lives transformed whilst others only managed to get relatively low money for their efforts.

7.13 Conclusion

Production is a centre piece in the realisation of social policy outcomes. Hence, enhancement of the productive potential of members of society is a key variable in ensuring that social policy outcomes become a reality for the people. The purpose of this chapter therefore was to answer the production question of what land beneficiaries are doing with the land they got, looking at both agricultural and non-agricultural activities. In this chapter, I relied on the AIAS data at national level and for Kwekwe District.

In appreciating the productive outcomes of the FTLRP, it is imperative to realise that it was not every beneficiary's aspiration to consider agriculture as a business which subsequently contributes to the national development. Some of the farmers I spoke to noted that their motivation for participating in the land reform exercise was to be able to get a *musha* for their children. Indeed the government was well aware of this as can be explained by coming up with A1 farms meant for family production, compared to A2 and LSCF designed for commercial production. Be that as it may, empirical research by several scholars point to the fact that while production levels slumped in the period 2000 to 2003, productivity started picking up thereafter.

The levels of production and productivity are differentiated by agro ecological region and producer type. Export and cash crops are mostly produced by A2 farmers. Tobacco production

has been on the rise across all the settlement models because of the support of private companies through contract farming arrangements. Even in districts such as Kwekwe which had no history of tobacco farming, farmers are slowly adopting this export crop. Overall, land utilization is constrained by access to inputs and capital, while recurrent droughts pose challenges to grain production, which is sensitive to rainfall patterns. Diversified markets now exist for a wide range of commodities produced by rural households beyond the state marketing system.

In the chapter, I covered the issue of agricultural financing, attending to the question of how the land beneficiaries are coping with this aspect. I observed that after the collapse of the agricultural system in 2008, the government has not been able to provide adequate support to the farmers. As such, issues of means of production such as inputs, access to tools, labour and access to information about agriculture pose challenges to farmers. As a coping mechanism, farmers have come up with ways of mitigating the impact by sharing productive tools and information. Further, I interrogated the availability and accessibility of quality extension services in Kwekwe District. I observed that indeed extension services are available and also accessible though their quality is low due to resourcing. I end the chapter by looking at non-farming activities which take place on the resettled farms. In the context of Kwekwe District, gold panning is a pronounced activity so I attended to the nuances around this issue. In Kwekwe, 72 percent of the farmers are also involved in gold panning.

I have argued that the FTLRP created new agrarian labour structure which has resulted in the semi-proletarianisation of labour. The farm workers mostly do not have farm tenancy as was the case under white farmers. This has made them to be roving from one farm job to another while negotiating a wage for each task based at the compounds where farm workers used to stay. Under this arrangement, they are able to engage in gold panning and other productive non-agricultural activities. The next chapter now looks at the extent to which land reform is an *ex ante* social protection tool.

CHAPTER 8: LAND REFORM AS AN *EX ANTE* SOCIAL PROTECTION TOOL

8.1 Introduction

Social protection is one function of social policy that has received a lot of scholarly attention as a result of the diminution vision of social policy as has been articulated in Chapter One and Chapter Three. As a result, there are various approaches that have been suggested on addressing social protection. Some of these approaches include the Social Risk Management Framework, the Asset Vulnerability framework and the transformative social protection framework. In the first section of this chapter, I attend to some of the nuances of these frameworks, setting the context of appreciating the social protection outcomes of the FTLRP. I present evidence from the AIAS baseline as well as my own in to show that land reform is an *ex ante* social protection instrument. I demonstrate that even in droughts and periods of economic crises, the severity of vulnerability is reduced for the farmers. Further, I posit that the land beneficiaries are affected differently in view of the tri-modal agrarian structure that now exists amongst the land reform beneficiaries. The most affected land beneficiaries are those in the ‘poor farmers’ category.

One immediate social protection outcome of the FTLRP as shown in this chapter is opportunity for reliable shelter. The chapter presents evidence of land beneficiaries who have made the resettled areas their home where they do not pay any rentals. Another outcome noted in this chapter is potential of food security for the land beneficiaries. Since they own the land, they can use it to produce food for their families, grow gardens, and establish other income streams such as inter alia, selling firewood, selling grass for thatching houses, gold panning and mould bricks.

The chapter also explores the idea of livestock being a safety net against the vagaries of the market and other exogenous factors which may affect the farmers. I observed that while livestock is a form of accumulation on the one hand, it is also a form of insurance when farmers are in dire straits. I end the chapter looking at social assistance initiatives that are available to

the land beneficiaries. The chapter set the tone to one form of capital that is available to the land beneficiaries through social capital.

8.2 Social protection conceptual handle

Social protection has been the most dominant component of social policy in OECD literature. Some of the reasons for this can be said to be the Bismarckian focus on sickness, injury, and old-age. During the Bismarckian reforms in Germany, social insurance-based social protection schemes proliferated. This was coupled with the raft of legislations on social welfare which were passed by the Liberal government in the UK between 1906 and 1914. Using his 1942 Report, Beveridge sought to expand on these earlier initiatives. In this report, Beveridge identified five ‘giants’ which had to be addressed in the aftermath of the Second World War. These giants were want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness. The primary emphasis of the Beveridge Report was to address want. This discourse later shaped the understanding of social policy in Europe where it then became characterised by ‘mono-tasking’ (Mkandawire, 2005: 6). As such, most of the available literature on social policy consists of attempts to identify solutions to the social consequences of both economic decline and economic policy (Ibid). The neoliberal turn in social policy then reduced it to social assistance or social safety nets, which are components of social protection (Holzman and Kozel 2007). The literature therefore has been dominated by ex post interventions with much neglect of ex ante interventions (Adesina 2011).

There are mainly two conceptual frameworks that are used in understanding social protection. There is the Social Risk Management (SRM) Framework, which is primarily used by the World Bank. The Bank posits that SRM focuses on the ‘critically poor’ as an approach to reducing vulnerability to poverty in countries with an incomplete space of instruments to manage risks. Holzmann *et al* (2000) submit that the basic thrust of the SRM framework is based on two assessments: firstly, that the poor are typically most exposed to diverse risks ranging from natural (such as earthquake and flooding) to manmade (such as war and inflation), from health (such as illness) to political risks (such as discrimination). Secondly, that the poor have the fewest instruments to deal with these risks (such as access to government provided income support and market-based instruments like insurance). The foregoing risks hit individuals,

communities, and regions mostly in an unpredictable way or cannot be avoided, which cause them to increase poverty.

The challenge with this framework is that it does not question the class issues and power relations. Instead, it takes a survivalist approach without interrogating the root causes of vulnerabilities. The framework characterise the poor as a static group that is identifiable in any community. Concomitantly, it also emphasises a lot on targeting of the ‘ultra-poor’ with beneficiaries categorised as the ‘deserving poor’ and ‘underserving poor’. The issue of targeting and means testing has received ample attention from scholars like Besley *et al* (1990), Sen (1992), Van Oorschot (2002), Castaneda *et al* (2003), Coady *et al* (2004), Mkandawire (2005), Johannsen (2006) and Sharif (2009). Further, the approach only addresses short-term emergency and humanitarian concerns. The framework does not have a strategic view to addressing vulnerability; the reason why it is *ex post*.

Also, the SRM approach does not build on strategies that strengthen people’s own initiative solutions to their vulnerabilities (Moser 1998). Moser’s research through her ‘asset vulnerability framework’ demonstrates that even the poorest of all people are not ‘helpless victims’ but have many resources which can be leveraged to build resilience against vulnerability (Anderson and Woodrow 1989,12). The approach further neglects Sen’s discussion of human capabilities in dealing with ‘politics of hope and despair’ (Sen 1985).

In view of the shortcomings of the SRM approach, Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2004) came up with the transformative social protection framework. They defined transformative social protection as:

All initiatives that *transfer income or assets to the poor* [emphasis added], protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalized; with the overall objectives of extending the benefits of economic growth and reducing the economic or social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalized groups.

This definition recognises the role that is played by redistribution of income and or assets in reducing economic or social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups. The framework uses a rights approach as elucidated by Marshall (1950) which makes it grounded in the doctrine of entitlements as propounded by Sen (1981). The transformative approach is

long term oriented and seeks to pursue policies that integrate individuals equally into society, allowing everyone to take advantage of the benefits of growth and enabling excluded or marginalized groups to claim their rights (Devereux *et al* 2004). Using this approach transformative interventions are those aimed at addressing power imbalances that create or sustain economic inequality and social exclusion, and include legal and judicial reform, budgetary analysis and reform, the legislative process, policy review and monitoring, and social and behavioural/attitudinal change (Ibid). It is from this understanding that the FTLRP can be considered as an *ex ante* social protection tool that addressed power imbalanced which engendered or maintain economic inequality and social exclusion.

8.3 Land reform as a social protection tool


In addressing the FTLRP as a tool that brings about social protection, scholars like Scoones *et al* (2010), Mkodzongi (2013), Zikhali (2012), Mutopo *et al* (2012) have looked at the land reform from a livelihoods perspective. In line with the foregoing viewpoint, Mbwadzwo-Siangombe *et al* (2014) have argued that land is a key asset in sustaining livelihoods and ensuring human security. The scholars argue that access to land determines who lives or dies (Yeros 2001: 87; King and Murray, 2002:585). Consequently, access to land has strong social, political and economic implications by firstly guaranteeing protection from danger and any form of vulnerability. Sacco (2008: 368) corroborates this argument by noting that land reform in Zimbabwe is a means to achieve economic, social and cultural rights as well as fulfil the right to development as a means for achieving poverty reduction.

Moser (1998) argues that having assets increases household ‘resilience, or responsiveness in exploiting opportunities, and in resisting or recovering from the negative effects of changing environment.’ The means of resistance are the assets and entitlements that individuals, households, or communities can mobilize and manage in the face of hardship. While in outlining what she considers as assets, land was not part of the list, the same argument holds even more when households have land, which Bardhan (1996) considered as a productive asset.

8.3.1 Shelter from vulnerability

One of the fundamental issues that easily expose households to vulnerability is access to shelter. Using the Marshall’s narrative of social rights, shelter is a right which when not provided, households will be subjected to serious detriments which can harm life itself (Mbwadwo-Siangombe *et al*, 2014). This research observed that all land beneficiaries erected houses for themselves using bricks which they had moulded themselves. They thatched the houses from the grass which they had collected from the farm where they had been settled. In the early years of settling, the farmers were reluctant in building high cost structures because they were uncertain about the length of time they were going to be allowed on the farms. When the government addressed tenure issues and promulgated the Statutory Instrument (SI) 53 of 2014. The Instrument replaced offer letters which the government had given to the A1 farmers and 99 year leases that were issued to A2 farmers. The farmers would hold the land indefinitely. Tenurial guarantees prompted the farmers to develop lasting structures since the SI provides for compensation to farmers for any development made, should the state consider taking the land back.

Figure 8.1: Land Reform beneficiaries’ residency on the farms



Source: Own fieldwork, 2015

With the security which the SI guaranteed, farmers were at liberty to erect houses of their interests and budgets. The graph above shows that most of the beneficiaries of land reform reside on the farms they were allocated. In Bonstead Villages 12 and 13, the research observed that all the beneficiaries were resident on the farms where they do not pay any rentals or any bills that are related to accommodations such as water, electricity (primarily because all the households in the villages do not have electricity) and sewerage (this is because the farmer constructed Blair toilets). In an interview with one farmer from Umlala Farm, she noted that:

The problem of accommodation was solved by the land reform. What remains is for us to build ourselves good houses and toilets... In-depth Interview, 11/04/2015, Female A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm).

Another farmer from Sherwood Farm noted that:

Constructing accommodation for my family did not present any major challenges. The grass for thatching is there, for the bricks, we moulded for ourselves, for poles, we got from the forest. There is no reason that I could have given if I had not constructed my accommodation (In-depth Interview, 21/05/2015, Male A2 Farmer, Sherwood Farm).

The conversations with the farmers demonstrated that constructing a basic shelter was not expensive as most of the raw materials needed are obtainable within their vicinity at little costs. As a result, there is no land reform beneficiary who can be stranded, without accommodation as long as they remain on their land.

8.3.2 Food

Golay *et al* (2013) argue that access to food is a human right enshrined in human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Article 11 of the ICESCR notes that ‘the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food...’ as well as ‘the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger...’ While this scholar acknowledges the problematics that exist in the conceptual grounding of the above cited human rights instruments, it is important to note that the Zimbabwean government ratified the ICESCR and produces periodic reports on the progress of its implementation.

This research observed that while some of the beneficiaries FTLRP may not have cash some of the times, they would still manage to have balanced meals. This is because in the rainy season, there would be plenty of vegetables and fruits accessible to them. Because of communitarianism that exists among these communities, households are able to cushion each other by sharing grain, salt, productive equipment and livestock produce like milk. The table below proves this point that households are able to produce their own food where 96.9 percent of the A1 farmers and 93.9 percent of A2 produce their own food. 18.8 per cent of A1 depend on food aid for some of their nutritional intake (against 2.7 per cent of A2 farmers) and 24.5 per cent depend on grain loan scheme. What this would suggest is that while 96.9 per cent of A1 farmers (for instance) engage in own food production, the food produced is not sufficient in many instances to meet their nutritional requirements. Dependence on food aid and food for work is higher in the communal areas but significantly lower in the land reform areas.


Table 8.1: Household Source of food by settlement type in Kwekwe District

Source of food	A1	A2	Communal
	%	%	%
Percentage of farmers who produce their own food	96.9	93.9	93.4
Percentage of farmers who purchase their food	96.4	97.3	94.3
Percentage of farmers who rely on food aid	18.8	2.7	48.1
Percentage of farmers who rely on food for work	7.9	2.0	18.0
Percentage of farm workers who rely on food rations from employer	1.9	7.8	2.5
Percentage of farmers who rely on grain loan scheme	24.5	2.4	13.6

Source: Adapted from AIAS Survey, 2013/14

Table 8.1 shows that grain loan scheme is higher among A1 farmers. A2 farmers are the least beneficiaries of this scheme. The scheme is a government initiative to provide food for the farmers who would have been affected by a drought. Since it's a loan, the farmers are expected to return the grain when they have a good harvest. Figure 8.2 demonstrates that land reform beneficiaries are doing much better than their communal areas counterparts in terms of taking three meals a day.

Figure 8.2: Number of meals consumed per day by settlement type in Kwekwe District



Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2013/14

8.4 Beyond livelihood diversification to accumulation

Devereux (2001) argued that dependence on a single crop for food or cash introduces unpredictable vulnerability to a collapse in production or price of such food or cash crop. He further argued that pursuing an undiversified livelihood strategy matters less if the source of income is secure and stable than if it is subject to uncertainty or inter-temporal fluctuation. This notion is corroborated by Scoones (2009) who argued that ‘diversity is the watchword, and livelihoods approaches have challenged fundamentally single-sector approaches to solving complex rural development problems...’ Razavi (2006) has however challenged this line of arguing when she noted that ‘diversification captures several different economic processes and its blanket use to describe all forms of non-farm employment is misleading. It is particularly important, from the point of view of thinking about poverty, to distinguish between diversification as a survival strategy (which it very often is) and diversification that feeds into a process of accumulation’ (Ibid). This research observed that the land beneficiaries have diversified livelihood to address Devereux’s notion of vulnerability on the basis of multi-cropping for food.

As has been noted earlier (see Chapter 7), gold panning is the key non-agricultural activity which the farmers are involved in. This activity enables land beneficiaries to get substantial money to ensure accumulation as Razavi (2006) noted. Using the proceeds of gold panning, some of the farmers have gone beyond livelihoods to accumulation of productive assets like trucks, cattle, goats, equipment for farming like ploughs and farming inputs. Some of the farmers have managed to improve their quality of life through the proceeds of gold panning. To demonstrate this transition from just livelihoods to accumulation, one farmer from Sherwood farm noted that:

Gold panning has really changed my life. I have managed to buy a vehicle that I use as a taxi operating in this farming community to take people to town (In-depth Interview, 27/05/2015, Male, Sherwood Farm).

Another farmer noted that:

I bought new sofas for my house in town. I also bought my wife a fridge that she wanted. I managed to pay fees for my child who is at university (In-depth Interview, 14/06/2015, Male, Sherwood Farm).

Another farmer noted that he had bought a truck as a strategic asset which he hires out for farmers to take their products to town. These testimonies demonstrate that beyond livelihood on the farms, the farmers are engaged in accumulation which is improving their quality of life as noted by Sen (2005). Beyond the enterprise activities noted above where farmers are exploiting the natural resources that are at their disposal, these households also receive income from other sources as outlined in the table below:

Table 8.2: Source of Household Income by Settlement Type in Kwekwe District

Source of Income	A1	A2	Communal
	%	%	%
% of farmers getting remittances from Diaspora	16.4	16.7	23.5
% of farmers getting local remittances	21.7	19.6	32.6
% of farmers on pension	16.5	28.6	7.0
% of farmers in formal employment	12.9	31.3	13.0
% of farmers relying on selling forestry products	4.6	0.7	2.9
% of farmers relying on selling their labour on a permanent basis	1.5	0.0	1.3

% of farmers relying on selling their labour on a casual basis	8.6	1.0	19.0
% of farmers relying on petty trading	9.9	7.9	9.2
% of farmers on commercial loans	1.3	2.8	0.6
% of farmers who sold their assets	1.5	1.4	1.6
% of farmers on NGO Grant	1.9	0.0	4.1

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2013/14

For A1 farmers, 21.7 per cent of land beneficiaries get financial support from children who are around the country. These send money to assist with subsistence and also the hiring of labour and equipment for production. One farmer in Umlala Farm noted that:

For me, my children send me money several times. If I get into any trouble financially, I just send a WhatsApp message telling them that I need help. One child can send twenty dollars, another one ten dollars and so forth. But it is not my desire to trouble them because I know that they have families of their own (In-depth Interview, 09/04/2015, Female, Umlala Farm).

Another farmer affirmed this AIAS finding by citing a Shona proverb:

... isn't it is said nurture them, they will nurture you in future. It's their turn to support me when things are not well) (In-depth Interview, 12/04/2015, Male, Umlala Park).

The foregoing show that diversification of incomes for land beneficiaries includes remittances from children who usually are working in towns. This argument builds on the earlier observation that the average age of the land beneficiaries is above 55 years of age.

Table 8.2 also shows that a significant number (31.3%) of A2 farmers are still in formal employment. Besides farming, this group of A2 farmers sustains its livelihoods through formal employment. As noted in Chapter 5, these farmers use their income from formal jobs to finance their agriculture. Their ability to access that income helps them acquire productive assets which enhance productivity on their farms. Since they are involved in formal employment, these are the farmers who hire permanent farm workers who are based at the plots.

In seeking to explore the diversification of the livelihoods and streams of incomes for the land beneficiaries, I observed that pensions are also a key source of income. 16.5 percent of A1

farmers and 28.6 of A2 farmers receive monthly pensions. The average pension amount for a former civil servant is 70USD. One farmer noted that:

The pension really cushions me when the harvests are bad. I also use it to buy inputs when my children are not able to support me. Whilst the amount is not much, at least it helps me to meet some of my needs. I can't be desperate when I have it... (In-depth Interview, 14/06/2015, Male, Sherwood Farm).

8.5 Livestock as insurance

On the one hand, livestock represent a form of accumulation for farmers. On the other hand, they serve as insurance when the farmer is not able to meet his or her need. Interviews with the farmers noted that this is usually the last resort for the farmers in the direst situations. One farmer noted that:

...you will sell the livestock when all else has failed... (In-depth Interview, 13/04/2015, Male, Umlala Park).

Another farmer corroborated this view when he posited that:

When you see me selling a cow, you will know that there is no other way... (In-depth Interview, 17/05/2015, Male, Sherwood Farm).

Whilst the quotes from the farmers suggest depletion of assets rather than accumulation, it must be considered that in the absence of insurance schemes, farmers invest in livestock which they know have high demand. This means that when a farmer is not able to meet some of his or her obligation, he or she can sell a cow so that proceeds from the sale can help in meeting the need. Such coping mechanisms are not considered in the OECD literature. The sale of livestock therefore speaks to a safety net, which the farmers have created for themselves.

Table 8.3: Livestock sale patterns in newly resettled and communal areas of Kwekwe District

Type	A1	A2	Communal
	% of farmers who sold	% of farmers who sold	% of farmers who sold
Cattle	33	53.6	16.6
Goats	20.2	18.9	11.4
Donkeys	0	0	6.7
Pigs	31.6	38	28.6
Free range chicken	17.9	15.3	18.6

Broilers	30.8	53.6	37.5
Layers	33.3	0	0
Milk (Litres)	5.6	12	4.8
Eggs	0.9	0	2.1

Source: AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14

Table 8.3 shows that cattle and broilers are the most sold livestock by A2 farmers with 53.6 percent for each. This is because for broilers, some of the farmers are involved in poultry farming as another activity on the farm. For cattle, this is because A2 farming does not receive support from the government since these types of farms were meant for people with their own means. The table shows that indeed the A2 farmers have their own means through selling of livestock when they want to meet their needs. Most of the sale of the cattle was to finance agriculture. Under the A1 scheme 33 percent of the farmers sold cattle as well. Speaking to the agricultural extension officer of Umlala area, he noted that:

Generally people sell their cattle for several reasons. The most common reasons are financing of agriculture, payment of children's fees be it at university or high school, to buy food in years of droughts. In drought years, the price for cattle comes down because there will be many farmers selling cattle compared to years with good harvests. I have discovered that the farmers sell cattle as a last resort, when they do not have any other option... (In-depth Interview, 6/04/2015, Agricultural Extension Worker, Umlala Farm).

Following the Moyo (2011)'s tri-modal arrangement, some of the poor farmers do not have cattle. These are the households that sell their labour to the better off farmers to get food in drought seasons like the 2007/2008 and 2011/2012 seasons. The 2014/2015 agricultural season was a drought year as well. I spoke to one farmer who had not harvested anything on how he was going to cope since he did not have any cattle. He noted that:

In drought years, we struggle a lot. We cannot afford irrigation like some of the farmers in this area. Others drilled boreholes on their plots so watering their gardens is not a challenge. For this season, I spoke to our neighbour who harvested twenty tonnes of maize. Since I do not have money to pay him, my wife and I will work on his farm, for the grain. Of the twenty four tonnes, he said he will keep fifteen tonnes for his family up to the next harvest. He offered us seven tonnes in exchange for working on his plot. I think this is a good deal for us... (In-depth Interview, 20/05/2015, Male, A1 farmer, Umlala Farm).

What can be witnessed from the above quotes is the various levels of precarity amongst the land reform beneficiaries. It can be noticed that exogenous factors such as droughts and economic crises affect these beneficiaries differently. The land beneficiaries who fall in the

‘poor farmers’ category of the tri-modal agrarian structure bear the brunt of market failures and droughts. The ‘better off’ farmers usually have formal jobs in towns hence they have reliable sources of income which they can use to cushion themselves in times of need. The availability of such incomes also gives them leverage in their farming as they are able to invest in productive assets which the poor farmers would not be able to do.

8.6 Food sovereignty and social assistance

Food sovereignty has been defined by Via Campesina (2007)’s Declaration, as:

Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of the next generation. It offers a strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate trade and food regime, and directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems determined by local producers. Food sovereignty prioritises local and national economies and markets and empowers peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal fishing, pastoralist-led grazing, and food production, distribution and consumption based on environmental, social and economic sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees just income to all peoples and the rights of consumers to control their food and nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage our lands, territories, waters, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food. Food sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social classes and generations. (Via Campesina, 2007)

As can be deciphered from the definition, food sovereignty is about the right of a household, community and nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods respecting cultural and productive diversity. The concept addresses questions of power, complicity, and the profundity of a commitment to egalitarianism. Food sovereignty is different from food security. Below, FAO (1996) defines food security as:

Food security, at the individual, household, national, regional and global levels [is achieved] when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. (FAO 1996 cited in FAO 2003)

The definition shows that food security is primarily concerned with food provisioning, without interrogating the power relations in the production of the food. Food sovereignty addresses the autonomy of food production. In view of this, I observed that most land beneficiaries produce their own food. The number of land beneficiaries who rely on social assistance programmes is relatively smaller than that of communal areas. International agencies and non-governmental

organisations had been reluctant to provide social assistance through food aid to land beneficiaries because they considered the land that had been redistributed as contested land (Moyo 2011a). Furthermore, assisting the farmers who had obtained land was considered as an act of legitimising the FTLRP. Be that as it may, 16.3 per cent of A1 land beneficiaries (refer to table below) received food aid from NGOs.¹⁴ The number is significantly smaller for A2 farmers where only 4.4 percent received food aid. This can be attributed to diversity of streams of incomes for A2 farmers ranging from remittances, employment, pensions, livestock and exploitation of natural resources.

Table 8.4: Number of households receiving food aid by settlement type in Kwekwe District

Households receiving food aid	A1	A2	Communal
	%	%	%
Yes	16.3	4.4	41.1
No	83.7	95.6	58.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2013/14

Table 8.4 shows that 16.3 per cent of A1 households and 4.4 of A2 households receive food aid from NGOs with 41.1 percent from the communal areas. This data is consistent with other data which shows that there are higher levels of vulnerability in the communal areas relative to the land reform areas.

8.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented data to show that land reform is an *ex ante* social protection instrument. I demonstrated that even in droughts and periods of economic crises, the severity of vulnerability is reduced for land beneficiaries. The vulnerability is reduced due to one immediate social protection outcome of the FTLRP being the opportunity for reliable shelter. I presented evidence of land beneficiaries who have made the resettled areas their home where they do not have to pay any accommodation costs. Another outcome that has been noted in this chapter is potential of food sovereignty for the land beneficiaries. The land beneficiaries can use the land to produce food for their families, grow gardens, and establish other income streams such as *inter alia*, selling firewood, selling grass for thatching houses, gold panning and moulding bricks. I also observed that livestock is a form of insurance against the vagaries of the market and other exogenous factors which may affect the farmers. While livestock is a

form of accumulation, it is also a form of insurance when farmers are in dire straits. The farmers can sell their cattle, goats or chickens to get the money they may need for other things. They can also do barter trade in exchange of the products they need. Lastly, they can use the livestock for food.

Overall, I discovered that there are different levels of precarity amongst the farmers. These levels are characterised according to the tri-modal agrarian structure as posited by Moyo (2011). As a result, the farmers are affected differently by such things as droughts and economic crises. Farmers who fall into the first category of poor peasants are the hardest hit by droughts and economic crises. This is because they do not have diversified livelihoods that are sustainable. More often, they end up selling their labour to those with diversified livelihoods. Land beneficiaries who receive remittances from their children and are on pensions had lower levels of precarity compared to the land beneficiaries who do not have any reliable streams of incomes. Despite the challenges which farmers in resettlement areas faced, their levels of precarity were lower than their communal areas counterparts. This is based on the statistics of food aid recipients in a particular year; these were more in the communal areas than in the resettlement areas. Further, the AIAS survey showed that land beneficiaries in the resettlement areas indicated that they ate three meals on an average day whilst in communal areas the average number of meals per day was two.

In the next chapter, I will look at the social cohesion outcomes of the FTLRP. The purpose of the chapter will be to interrogate the extent of social solidarity amongst the land beneficiaries in the process of nation building.

CHAPTER 9: SOCIAL COHESION

A nation is a goal rather than an actuality. Put simply, nations are not creatures of ‘God’s hand’, as post-Herder prophets of nationalism often claimed: instead they are synthetic—they have to be created in a complicated educational process.
(Alter, 1989:21)

9.1 Introduction

This chapter interrogates the social cohesion outcome of the FTLRP in the context of social policy. In the chapter, I acknowledge that there has been a lot of academic attention on this subject by several scholars. The difference with my approach is that I look at the social cohesion outcomes using social policy lenses. I start the chapter by delving into the conceptual issues concerning social cohesion. I used Jenson (1998)’s conceptualisation which posits that there is vertical cohesion and horizontal cohesion. In the context of this research, horizontal cohesion will look at how land beneficiaries relate with each other, especially in view of the fact that the FTLRP brought people of different backgrounds, religious beliefs and value systems to be neighbours. Horizontal cohesion also explores the land beneficiaries’ agency and solidarity in addressing common problems. Vertical cohesion will attend to how the land beneficiaries mobilise each other to engage with institutional mechanisms that are established in these communities. Such mechanisms include state, political parties and traditional authority structures. I end the chapter by looking at one of the institutions that has significantly facilitated cohesion in the resettled areas, the church and mutual aid societies that emerge from it.

9.2 What is social cohesion?

Jenson (1998) posits that the concept of social cohesion was popularised by one of the “fathers” of sociology, Émile Durkheim. Durkheim’s writings at the end of the 19th century, in a Europe that had been shaken for several decades by rapid social change associated with industrialisation, urbanisation, massive immigration and population movement across Europe changed social roles in that context. She observed that *interdependence* was *sine qua non* in the complex division of labour that existed where shared principles and expectations could be fostered by well-functioning institutions such as formal state law and markets (Jenson, 1998). Several scholars have sought to build on Durkheim’s work by unpacking how interdependence, which translates to social cohesion happens in different contexts (see Albert, 1953, Bettenhausen, 1991; Carron, 1982; Cartwright, 1968; Doreian and Fararo, 1998; Drescher *et al*, 1985; Evans and Jarvis, 1980; Hogg, 1992; Kellerman, 1981; Levine and Moreland, 1990;

Lott and Lott, 1965; McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 2002; Mudrack, 1989; Shaw, 1981; Stein, 1976).

Despite the much attention on the subject of social cohesion, there have not been consensus on its definition (Jenson, 1998: 17; Chan *et al*, 2006). Various scholars take different approaches in defining it. Those scholars that take a social psychological approach emphasize on individual's attitudes and behaviours in relation to membership of a society or community (Friedkin, 2004). Some scholars take a horizontal dimension to looking at social cohesion. This approach focuses more on cohesion within civil society (see Lockwood, 1992; Maxwell, 1996:13; Chiweshe, 2011). Other scholars focus on the vertical dimensions of social cohesion where the attention will be on the relationships between the state and its institutions with the citizen (see Mkodzongi, 2013). Chan *et al* (2006: 290) however tried to combine all these approaches in their definition of social cohesion:

social cohesion is a state of affairs *concerning both the vertical and the horizontal interactions* among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioural manifestations [emphasis added].

Chan *et al*'s definition recognises the various levels of interactions that exist firstly amongst the individuals within a given locality and the coming together of these individuals to engage with the outside world which includes the state and capital. The definition includes both objective and subjective components of social policy (Ibid). The former alludes to people's actual participation, cooperation, and inclusion in community initiatives. The latter refers to the norms and subjective feelings of trust, a sense of belonging, and the willingness to help others (Bollen and Hoyle, 2001).

One of the ingredients that ensure cohesion of any community is social capital. Jane Jacobs in her seminal work titled *The Economy of Cities* (1994), cites Rosabeth Moss Kanter's argument that successful communities have a glue called social capital, which attracts. This glue is composed of, for example, cultural amenities, safety, health care, and sociability. In this view, social capital is almost "infrastructural" (Jacobs, 1994). Bourdieu (1986:249) conceives of social capital as one of four key forms of capital, along with economic, cultural (embodied, objectified or institutional) and symbolic. He defines social capital as:

The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively owned capital, a credential‘ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word (Bourdieu 1986: 249–250).

Social capital is thus a collective asset that grants members social credits ‘that can be used as capital to facilitate purposive actions (Glover and Parry, 2005:452). Social relations, in this fashion, constitute useful resources for actors through processes such as establishing obligations, expectations and trustworthiness, creating channels for information, and setting norms backed by efficient sanctions (Burt, 2000; Coleman, 1988; Putman, 2000). Chiweshe (2011) analysed the institutions that were formed in the aftermath of the FTLRP using this perspective. The challenge however of using the social capital approach in analysing the social formations that happened after the FTLRP is that social capital focuses primarily on the individual and group levels, like the networks maintained by each individual and the personal benefits that flow from them. This analysis falls short in appreciating the cohesion in a particular community since the latter is a holistic way of looking at the relations and is mainly concerned with the overall condition of the community (Chan *et al*, 2006).

Looking at social cohesion is instructive to appreciating the FTLRP as a social policy tool. Social cohesion is linked to T.H. Marshall’s thesis on citizenship. He argued that ‘citizenship is essentially a matter of ensuring that everyone is treated as a full and equal member of society’ (Kymlicka and Norman, 1995: 285). Central to the citizenship thesis, is the role of social institutions, both formal and informal in ensuring the dignity of each citizen. This concept dovetails with Jenson’s (1998: 15-17) five dimensions of social cohesion in that citizenship inculcates a sense of belonging while being inclusive and ensuring that there is meaningful participation of the citizenry in processes that affect their lives.¹⁵ For many of those who use the concept of citizenship, belonging (that is, having the status of full citizen) includes attention to distributional questions, social justice, and equity. Only full citizens can be said to enjoy real equality of opportunity (Noël, 1996; Jenson and Phillips, 1996; and McAll, 1995).

9.3 Social cohesion in the African context

In the African setting, several scholars have done some work in appreciating social cohesion of their contexts (see Rahmato, 1992; Mbembe, 1992; Mamdani, 1996; Murisa, 2010;

Mkodzongi, 2013; Chiweshe, 2011; Mafeje, 1993, 1997, and 2003). In these studies, three critical facets have emerged on the subject:

- (i) the nature of local authority (Mamdani, 1996),
- (ii) the manner in which rural communities organise themselves for production and consumption (Mafeje, 1993, 1997, 2003),
- (iii) The role of associational forms in redefining social organisation (Rahmato, 1991).

Archie Mafeje (1993, 1997 and 2003) argued that the dominant form of rural sociability in rural Africa is in some form of a structural relationship within a lineage grouping and an ethnic clan. At the helm of the customary model is the office of the chief and its subordinate structures. The organisation for access to natural resources, production and consumption is based on principles of inclusion in or exclusion from the clan or lineage group. The hierarchy of institutions within the traditional framework establishes criteria for access to land and also the norms for defending these land rights (Murisa, 2010). The clan asserts political and ritual rights over land, followed by the lineage, which establishes concrete claims over land supported by actual ties of consanguinity and corporate interests, and finally use rights conferred on the household, in most instances through the male household head. Only the products of social labour such as crops and livestock are objects of appropriation (Mafeje, 2003:3).

9.4 Social organisation in the aftermath of the FTLRP

The social organisation that existed prior to the FTLRP was interfered with. A criticism of the process by some scholars notes that the FTLRP led to the ‘unravelling’ of local state institutions (Hammar, 2003 and Alexander, 2006:187). As a result, there was a makeover in the political and social organisation of the resettled areas. Chiefs and war veterans emerged as key actors in the resettled areas’ polity with a lot of authority over land since they led some of the land occupations. Local government structures such as Village Development Committees (VIDCOs), Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) and District Administrators (DAs) had to contend with having to share their role over rural administration with war veterans and chiefs who in some places had become powerful political figures (Mkodzongi, 2013). Murisa (2010), Chiweshe (2011) and Mkodzongi (2013) delved in details about the relationship that formed between local state structures and the traditional authority structures as they overlapped


in their interface in the resettled areas. Murisa used a social economy approach in appreciating the vertical and horizontal relationships that now exist. His thesis explores the association-based economic initiatives founded on solidarity, autonomy and citizenship. In the horizontal dimension, he provides analysis of the way the farmers relate to each other, how they resolve their conflicts and how they collaborate to ameliorate common challenges. In the vertical dimension, he traces the formation of local governance structures and how they are relating with the traditional structures that existed already in Goromonzi and Zvimba Districts. It is instructive to note that the dynamics which took place in these districts are not generally similar to those in Kwekwe District even though the state structures are similar, which would suggest that the organisations are products of local agencies exercised by the beneficiaries.

Chiweshe (2011)'s thesis primarily looks at the taxonomy of the horizontal dimension social institutions which resettled land beneficiaries came up with. His focus provides details on the aspects of membership and the dynamics which happen in the informal social institutions which the farmers established. This approach is beneficial in appreciating the level of cooperation that exists amongst the farmers. It however falls short in answering the cohesion question since the latter requires an interrogation of all social cohesion dimensions as elucidated by Jenson (2008). While Mkodzongi (2013) straddles all the dimensions of social cohesion, his main focus is on livelihoods, which I have dealt with earlier in this thesis. The section below looks at the social cohesion as a social policy function, recognising both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of social cohesion.

9.5 Strangers all around!

The FTLRP brought together people who came from different backgrounds and classes, and had different value systems. The resettlement program randomly brought land beneficiaries from different classes, belief systems and backgrounds to be neighbours. Dekker and Kinsey (2011: 6) observed that, besides living as neighbours, 'the new inhabitants had to solve various problems of collective action together relating to natural resource management, inputs for agricultural production ... and the management of risk and uncertainty'. The graph below shows places of origin for Kwekwe District land beneficiaries.

Figure 9.1: Place of origin of land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District



Source: Adapted from AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14

It is worth noting that the majority of the land beneficiaries came from the communal areas within the district. This however does not mean that they knew each other or had social relations. The variable that brought in interesting dynamics on the graph above is the percentage of beneficiaries who came from urban areas. For those who were formally employed, they were coming from a general worldview characterised by a well-defined relationship between the individual and capital. The ethos for survival and cohesion can be said to be generally different between the communal areas and the urban areas. Bringing together people with such different worldviews in relation to cooperation, problem solving and adherence to norms and practices of the area as dictated by a chief and his surrogates posed challenges to land beneficiaries. Mkodzongi (2013) observed these dynamics when he noted that the ‘relationships among newly resettled households have been dynamic, influenced also by their heterogeneity based on class, ethnicity and geographical location’.

Compounding the new neighbours’ relationship is an aspect of competition in accessing livelihoods opportunities linked to the land. This created tacit animosity amongst the land

beneficiaries. These can be epitomised by one farmer in Sherwood Farm who complained that their neighbour, an A2 farmer:

... has a big problem. When my cattle get into his field, even when it's out of season with no crop on his field, he close the cattle in his kraal then he would demand a chicken for the cattle to be released. Where have you seen something like that? What kind of co-existence is that with others? He thinks of himself too much as a 'white man'¹⁶ because he stays in town] (In-depth Interview, A1 Farmer, Sherwood Farm, 18/07/15).

As Mkodzongi (2013) noted, the relationships at first were not so romantic among what has been called the 'land occupation movement' by Moyo and Yeros (2005). It can still be said, even after fifteen years, that the relations are not overly characterised by solidarity and camaraderie. There is still competition and more complex issues like witchcraft, political polarity and conflict of values amongst the resettled farmers.

9.6 Witchcraft

Everything connected with witchcraft takes place in a fantasy realm which is, almost *ex hypothesi*, intangible and beyond empirical verification (Nadel, 1952). In my interaction with the land beneficiaries, this subject kept coming up. It is a tacit element that compromises the 'glue' (Jacobs, 1994) that strengthens cohesion and collaboration for livelihood and production. Since this is difficult to prove, there have been accusations and counter accusations amongst the land beneficiaries. In one instance, three houses were struck by lightning (*maenza*) after an altercation amongst the neighbours. Could this has been coincidence or pure supernatural powers that summoned the lightning to strike specific houses? When the lightning struck, the farmer lost all the valuables that were in the house since it was thatched by grass. From the victim's perspective, the issue was a result of a GMB policy. GMB has a policy where more agricultural inputs are given to those farmers who would have sold their produce to them. In this particular instance, three farmers from Umlala Farm had sold more tonnes of maize to GMB than the rest of the land beneficiaries in Umlala Farm. So GMB gave these three farmers more inputs compared to what every other farmer got in Umlala Farm. This did not auger well with a farmer who registered his disapproval at what GMB had done.

The following day when it was raining, lightning struck the homes of all the three farmers who had gotten more inputs. For one of the farmers, the lightning struck the very house where the inputs had been put. They were all destroyed by the fire. I mapped out how far the three houses which were struck by lightning were, I noted that the houses were on average 5 kilometres

apart. There was no possible explanation how lightning that struck at the same time would affect the houses in different locations at the same time whilst leaving other houses in between. This issue boggled the land beneficiaries in Umlala. One of the three farmers' sentiments to this were telling:

Up to now, I can't understand how lightning can strike my home, leave the next four households and strike another one, then leave seven houses to strike the third one at the same time! I was greatly afraid. I am convinced that it was Gavi who did it because he is the one who said a lot of things when we got inputs from GMB. The whole neighbourhood was afraid. This was really a lesson because we don't know where some of these people here came from. They could have been chased away from their villages because of witchcraft... [indepth Interview, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm, 27/06/2015]

Another farmer raised similar witchcraft concerns during an informal discussion. He noted that he had harvested 20 bags in the 2014/2015 season which was a drought year when the rest of the farmers had harvested, on the average, 5 bags. He noted that he was afraid of putting his maize cobs in a *ngarani*¹⁷ where everyone would see the amount of maize he had gotten. He said he feared to be labelled a witch that uses goblins to get maize from other people's fields. As a result, when he harvested his crop, he did not put it in a *ngarani*, instead, he put in a house where the sun could not reach. The maize then took long to dry up. Mr. Gwanya's experience shows that there are a lot of suspicions amongst some of the farmers.

It is noteworthy that I did not find these issues among A2 farmers in this area. This is primarily because they are not as close to the rest of the A1 land beneficiaries. The issues of conflict amongst the land beneficiaries were more pronounced also amongst the villagised land beneficiaries. This can be attributed to proximity. Because of their proximity to each other, the likelihood of crossing each other's paths is high. Some of the conflicts are caused by livestock getting into the neighbour's field. The animosity could be caused by the children beating each other as they play. The foregoing horizontal dimension of social cohesion narrative serves as a testament that it is not all romantic amongst the land beneficiaries.

9.7 Agency and norms of solidarity

When there is need to address common challenges, the people are able to put aside their differences for common good. This notion is affirmed by Rahmato (1992:27) when he noted that men and women often find common ground to work together and establish networks that work as a form of insurance against hard times. Giddens (1984) posited that 'agency depends heavily upon the emergence of a network of actors who become enrolled in the project of some

other person'. Murisa (2007: 5) argues that within the context of the FTLRP, agency is 'concerned with how rural households respond both collectively and individually to the opportunities and constraints that have the potential to alter their way of living' (Murisa 2007: 5). In view of this conceptualisation of agency, there have been several collective efforts by the land beneficiaries in trying to address constraints that affect their ways of life.

9.7.1 The water project at Umlala farm

At Umlala Farm, one of the major challenges which the farmers had to grapple with was that they were resettled on dry land which was not under irrigation. This meant that they had to rely on the rains which have been erratic in the recent past. Not only did they need the water for irrigation, they needed it also for home use. As such, a lot of time was lost with family members going to fetch water from as far away as five kilometres. The opportunity that exists however is that there is Sebakwe River that is hardly 5 kilometres away. Seven farmers took the initiative, with the blessing of the headman whom they elected, to call for a meeting to discuss how they were going to address the water challenge. Mr Gambu, an A2 farmer led the process of bringing the farmers together. This was also because his farm is central for farmers to attend the meeting. Several meetings were held and there was consensus on the need to have a mechanism to pull water from the river. One of the farmers was tasked with getting quotations for a water pump and the pipes needed for the water to reach each household that was interested. It took too long for the quotations to come as the identified potential service providers needed to visit the place before giving a quotation. Several quotations were sought. A meeting was called to discuss the way forward when the figures were now known for drawing water from the river to interested farmers' plots. The arrangement which was made was that each farmer would pay *pro rata* since some of the farmers were not as far from the river as others. The cheapest cost for buying a water pump and installation of water pipes to Umlala Farm was almost USD20 000. Some of the farmers were willing to contribute to this amount. Others did not have it. In a focus group discussion, one farmer retorted:

I really wanted water to come to my house and farm but the cost was beyond my reach. I did not have a clue of where I would get the money. If I were to sell cattle, I would have sold the whole herd. So I opted out of the project. It then never took off. We should try it later when we shall have good harvest... [FGD at Umlala Farm, 27/06/2015]

The water project was not completed. Several efforts were made by the farmers to their members of parliament to support the initiative and the politicians made empty promises. In his frustration, one farmer in the FGD decried:

Ah these politicians, they make promises which they can't keep. We had done our homework and all we needed was USD20 000 which is not a lot of money to them, especially if you compare with the impact that will come out of it! We will keep on reminding them towards elections. I'm sure they will deliver, since they want our votes... [FDG at Umlala Farm, 27/06/2015]

While the desire to draw water from the river was there, the initiative brought together A1 and A2 farmers whose means were not the same. The A2 farmers could contribute to the cost that was needed but with their means they still could not do it alone. The A1 farmers who were interested could not contribute the cost that was needed. As a result, the project did not see the light of day. The need for water amongst land beneficiaries was also captured by Scoones et al, (2010: 84) when they noted that:

When the land was taken there was little water and sanitation infrastructure, although the former ranches occasionally had some small scale irrigation near the main house farm, which also had running water and toilet facilities. Elsewhere there were scattered cattle troughs, possibly a dip and sometimes some small dams. In other words, the infrastructure was not set up for settlement. As a result the new settlers have had to invest substantially in the development of water and sanitation facilities across the schemes. In the absence of external support, this has almost exclusively been done through the settlers' own efforts. The investments have been substantial.

While the Umlala Farm water initiative failed, the farmers use similar mechanisms to help each other in accessing inputs, relevant information, sharing of productive assets and in some instances sharing cooking ingredients such as salt and cooking oil.

9.7.2 The secondary school project in Sherwood Farm

In the research areas, I observed that there were no secondary schools. This could be attributed to the legacies of the white capitalist farmers who chose to build primary schools only as a strategy to reproduce labour for their farms through denying farm workers' children access to secondary education. I observed that each farmer, or a consortium of farmers would come together and build primary schools for their farm workers' children. In Kwekwe District, no farmer built a secondary school in the farming communities. The available schools are in urban centres which is more than 30 kilometres away.

As such, one of the challenges which the resettled farmers had to tackle was access to secondary schools for their children. In Sherwood Farm, the farmers had to use as the secondary school the residential house in which the white farmer who previously owned the farm used to stay. The farmers, through their farmer group, approached the Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture so that they would have their school registered and get teachers with other support that the government provides. After several years of going back and forth, Bonstead Secondary School was registered in 2005. The school has qualified teachers and recently got text books from United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) under the Education Transition Fund (ETF).

Bonstead Secondary School is provisionally using the former residential house of the white farmer as classrooms and teachers' offices. In an interview with the chairperson of the School Development Committee, he noted that they had managed to negotiate with some farmers to donate part of their land for building the secondary school. The farmers then donated their grazing land for the school. At the time of this research, parents had moulded 84 000 bricks out of the 248 000 needed to complete the first phase of building the school made up of 5 classroom blocks and a teachers' house. The parents, through the SDC have built a 10 hole Blair toilet. The parents dug the pit toilet and also carried sand from the river using their scotch carts and draught power. The toilet is not being used yet because the children are still attending class at the former white farmer's residential house. The Rural District Council drilled a borehole at the school site which provides water for the construction work. The SDC Chairperson ended this discussion by noting that:

... White people built Lomagundi Private School for their children. It was the farmers who built it, not the government. We should do the same for our children and this school project is an opportunity we have to do as they did... (In-depth interview with Mr Dube at Sherwood Farm, 08/08/2015).

9.8 Horizontal agency in action

Murisa (2010) argues that at the centre of rural struggles for social change is a variety of structured and unstructured local organisations that employ both legal and illegal tactics to achieve their goals. This is in consonance to the observations that I made in Sherwood Farm. As a way of background, three white farmers, known as the Burger Brothers were not totally dispossessed of land. Their hectareage were reduced to 400ha each. They remained with their

infrastructure and equipment. A social contract was agreed on where they were supposed to assist the resettled farmers with equipment and mentorship. A SADC Ministerial Delegation which sought to understand how the land reform had happened was brought to Sherwood. Subsequently, the mission came up with a positive statement about how the land reform had happened to the dismay of the activists and scholars in the neopatrimonial camp.

In informal discussions with the farmers of Sherwood area, they cited two reasons why the Burger Brothers were able to retain part of their farms. The first reason is that the farmers treated their workers well so the war veterans did not consider them as deserving to lose their farms. The second reason is that the Burger Brothers had built social capital with the political elite of the country hence they had protection. Some of the farmers I spoke to noted that the white farmers owe allegiance to the now vice president of the country, Emmerson Mnangagwa. This aspect corroborates Rahmato (1992)'s assertion that:

Men and women would always 'attempt to spread their personal relationships as widely as possible, often through marriage and other personal ties, as a form of insurance against hard times; this involves forming relationships not just in one's own community but in others. Not infrequently, localized, small-scale disasters affect one community and not another next door, or at times only a part of a community with the other remaining unscathed, and a peasant in dire straits but with friends or relatives untouched by the disaster will recover less painfully than another without these kinds of ties.

This assertion proved correct for the Burger Brothers. The ZANU PF Ward Chairperson for Sherwood area corroborated this by noting that:

The Burger Brothers know how to live well with others. They treat our people with dignity, which was different from most white farmers whom we dispossessed of the land. Not only that, they knew how to give honour to whom it was due. When they had their produce, they would take some tokens to our leaders in this area, who is now the vice president, just to inform him that their crops are ripe. It might look like a small thing but those gestures made them to be seen by party structures favourably when we were listing farms for occupation... (In-depth interview with ZANU PF Sherwood Ward Chairperson, 08/08/2015).

In the first few years of settling by land beneficiaries in Sherwood area, the social contract was adhered to by all parties. The Burger brothers would plan for their agricultural season to include using their tractors for the resettled farmers and also providing irrigation equipment. The arrangement worked with very few glitches.

After a decade, there has been slackening especially on the part of the white farmer in providing the support they committed to deliver. One of the changing dynamics is that the resettled farmers have not been having inputs to use. In such a scenario, the resettled farmers get into informal arrangements for the Burger brothers to use the resettled farmer's land at a cost. In the 2014/2015 agricultural season the Burger brothers accessed approximately 100 hectares of the A1 farmers who could not undertake production for themselves. For 10 hectares, the Burger Brothers pay USD1 500 for the season. In return, they will use the land as they wish and all the proceeds would be theirs. The resettled farmers tried to negotiate for an increase in the amount but they were not successful. For those who protested, they were left out of the deal and their fields were idle since they could not finance their production. About 6% of the farmers in Sherwood area are part of this arrangement. Most of them are dissatisfied with the arrangement. The land beneficiaries do not have any leveraging power to renegotiate the deal afresh. Their consolation is that they get some USD 1 500 per season for owning the land only, without being involved in any productivity.

9.9 Whose water?

Since some of these resettled farmers in Sherwood Farm are not engaged in any production, having leased their farms to the white farmer, they are then limited to horticulture production as a mechanism of fending for their families. They grow such crops as tomatoes, onions, vegetables and potatoes on approximately a hectare having leased about 40hectares per household. The challenge which faces the land beneficiaries as they do horticultural production is water. There is however an opportunity. The Burger Brothers, well before the FTLRP, constructed a water canal from Sebakwe River to cover the whole Sherwood Farm. The canal stretches for more than ten kilometres, passing through various fields which have now been allocated. The Burger Brothers invested in a powerful water pump which they worked on securing so that it may not be stolen. Resettled farmers take the opportunity of the flowing water to water their gardens. I observed that every household which is close to the canal has a garden with vegetables, tomatoes, onions and other vegetables. The Burger Brothers know that these resettled farmers use the canal water to water their gardens. The Burger Brothers have tried to discourage it arguing that they pay a lot of money to pump the water for the resettled farmers to take it for free. One farmer in a FGD defiantly noted:

These white people say that this canal water is theirs. Then it should not pass through my field. As long as the canal passes through my field, it's my water too. They should

build a flying canal which does not pass through here. Then I won't get the water. Can I ignore this water flowing to go and fetch in the river that is far away? They are crazy. I will continue to do my garden for my family using this water... [A1 Farmer in a FGD at Sherwood Farm, 15/08/2015]

This confirms Murisa (2010) assertion that 'at the centre of rural struggles for social change is a variety of structured and unstructured local organisations that employ both legal and illegal tactics to achieve their goals.' Would this defiance by the resettled farmers be deemed as illegal? These are efforts which recognise the injustices that existed and seek to establish equity since the remaining white farmers still have an upper hand on infrastructure and equipment. The A1 farmers who were resettled along the canal have worked together to defy the Burger Brothers' instructions for not using the water. The farmers have collaborated to negotiate with these white farmers so that they get favourable conditions on leasing the land as well as accessing water. The farmers have been using the water for their household horticultural gardens. I observed that along the canal, there is a green stretch where each household has a garden of mainly tomatoes, vegetables, onions

9.10 Social organisation and agency


This aspect has been a subject of much examination by Murisa (2010), Chiweshe (2011) and Mkodzongi (2013). Murisa provided conceptual grounding for rural social associations tracing from the colonial, to post-colonial times. He showed the overlaps between the informal formations and the extension of the state in the resettled areas. Chiweshe then took the discussion further by analysing the formation, taxonomy and membership systems of these rural associations. As has been noted earlier, Mkodzongi provided a critique of how these institutions are contributing to livelihoods of the resettled farmers. The foregoing works were informed by Rahmato (1991)'s appreciation of the rural communities' nine forms of associations:

1. Mutual support networks;
2. Welfare associations;
3. Societies for resource mobilisation;
4. Self-help organisations;
5. Cooperatives;

6. Non-governmental organisations;
7. Farmer organisations;
8. Secret societies; and
9. Political organisations.

The above mentioned theses confirmed the existence of most of Rahmato’s identified forms of association. The graph below shows that the major point of collaboration amongst the farmers is through the farmer groups. The farmer group is where farmers cooperate in dealing with common challenges and also sharing of ideas and equipment for production. Most often these formations seek to maximise group synergies such as improved ability to mobilise finances for travel to the local government offices to request assistance (Murisa 2010). They were also formed as part of an effort to improve the means by which inputs are obtained from government agencies.

Figure 9.2: Cooperation among resettled households in Kwekwe District



Source: Adapted AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14

The farmers share animal drawn power and labour on the basis of household rapport and negotiation. I observed that the farmers have created a lot of synergies where they help each other especially with productive tools. Whilst there is a lot of sharing of productive assets, the graph shows that there is limited joint agricultural production (2.5%). The other area where

there is limited cooperation amongst the farmers is on sharing tractors. One A2 farmer who owns a tractor noted that:

We can share the ploughs, cattle, hoes and labour, but one thing I will not release for sharing is my tractor. The reason is that the more I use it, the more it can break down easily. And when it breaks down, all these farmers will not contribute a dime to fixing it. That will be my problem. So I will keep my tractor so that it can serve me for longer... [In-depth interview with an A2 Farmer, Sherwood Farm, 08/08/2015].

9.10.1 The role of chiefs in social cohesion

It can be said that one major outcome of the FTLRP is the opening up of former LSCF areas to the authority of chiefs and or through their surrogates. The chiefs played an important role in mobilising the peasantry in land occupations. In the aftermath of the FTLRP, chiefs have emerged as a vital part of the rural polity wielding some authority over land. The foregoing was corroborated by Mujere (2011:7) in their study in a southern part of Zimbabwe when he observed that:

FTLRP has thus provided traditional authorities with an opportunity to pursue an agenda akin to land restitution as they have been making a number of claims both substantiated and unsubstantiated over the new settlements which they regard as their *Matongo* (old homes).

Under the Ministry of Local Government Urban and Rural Development Act (1982), customary authority was limited to communal areas. The LSCF were outside their jurisdiction, a situation which has now changed. As a way of background, the post-independence political regime sought to side-line chiefs in rural administration (Moyo *et al*, 2009: 146). Its efforts were fruitless as they continued to dominate rural administration, deciding on who could get the land even though the Rural District Councils (RDCs) had the state authority (Herbst, 1990; Munro, 1998 and Alexander, 2006). The government then made a shift in its policy on customary authority around the 1999 when traditional leaders were given the status of salaried civil servants through the Traditional Leaders Act⁷ (Moyo *et al*, 2009: 147). This development made chiefs to be in a position where they felt like they owed the government when they were receiving salaries and eventually got trucks for transport. The chiefs then became more like an extension of state machinery both in speech and execution of their *bona fide* responsibilities.

Sherwood area was under the jurisdiction of Chief Samambwa before the current chief's grandparents were driven off the land by the white farmers. Together with state agents, the

incumbent Chief Samambwa participated in the allocation of land in this area. In each of the villages, he seconded a headman from his family to stay with the people and enforce the traditional value systems of the area. The chief moved from Zhombe where he was based and established a new *musha* on an A2 farm that he got. He however administers his duties from the Zhombe home which he did not abandon completely. The urbanites who were resettled in this area registered reservations in offering allegiance to a chief whom they did not know or have kinship ties with. One A2 farmer who is based in town retorted:

I am surprised to hear that there is a chief in this area. One of the most important relationship I need to maintain is with ZANU PF leadership, not with the chief. If I were to be evicted from my plot, can he save me? I don't think so. So I will stay here on my plot and he can have his authorities everywhere, not in this plot, sorry... [Mr Dube, at Sherwood Farm, 08/08/2015]

Mkodzongi observed similar attitudes towards chiefs in his study of Mhondoro-Ngezi District when he noted that people who had come from faraway places with no kinship ties with chiefs did not see any reason to submit to their authority. These people would prefer the authority of local state structures such as VIDCOs and WADCOs which they feel better represent their interests. In an interview with the chief, he expressed frustrations because he did not have sanctioning power for the people in the resettled areas who choose not to recognise his authority [In-depth Interview with Chief Samambwa at Sherwood Farm 15/08/2015]. Such people would prefer civil law than traditional authority. He noted that land beneficiaries who had come from the communal areas recognised his authority and were inclined to submit to his authority.

In an interview with one of the Sabhuku (headmen) in villagised Bonstead resettlement area, she noted that she did not have any issues of people who would refuse to submit to her authority [In-depth Interview with Bonstead Headwoman at Bonstead Village 20/08/2015]. She noted that each household is always represented at the monthly village meetings that she calls. She noted that people comply with the directive that each household should donate a dollar or a bowl of mealie-meal when a funeral happens in the village. She noted that there were no incidences of revolt against her rule. It thus can be noted that in areas made of A2 farmers who reside in urban areas, traditional authority does not wield much influence compared to the villagised A1 farms where land beneficiaries are permanently based.

9.10.2 Role of rural authorities in fostering horizontal cohesion

In Kwekwe District, there were contestations between the government local structures on one hand and chiefs with war veterans on the other hand (See Chapter 6 on how the redistribution process happened in Kwekwe District). The contestation of land authority can be traced to the onset of the land occupations in 2000 when chiefs and war veterans led the occupations and subsequently became figures with authority in the politics of the day over land. Local state structures such as Village Development Committees (VIDCOs), Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) and District Administrators (DAs) had to negotiate with the chiefs and war veterans so that they could undertake their responsibilities.

In all this conundrum, ZANU PF activists played an important role in both the traditional and state structures at the local level. As Mkodzongi (2013:86) observed, ZANU PF patronage networks operated in complex ways while being influenced by a plethora of factors such as ethnicity, class and intra-party factional politics. He further posit that the relationship between ordinary people and ZANU PF structures was dynamic and influenced by prevailing factional politics pitting ZANU PF politicians against each other (Ibid). At the time of carrying out this research, ZANU PF was riddled with intra-party fights which subsequently resulted in the ouster of Joyce Mujuru from the party. She had formed strong networks at grassroots levels. Her ouster split the party as she had loyalists at every level. More than half of the cabinet ministers who were aligned to her were either suspended or ousted with her. Against these intra party conflicts, the farmers in Kwekwe District had to align themselves appropriately so that they would access inputs for agriculture. One farmer noted that:

It is important not only to be known as a staunch member of the party, but also to be known that you are on the right side. If you get all those right, you will be safe. You will also be guaranteed of getting inputs and other government subsidies... [In-depth interview with Mr Chivhi, Umlala Farm, 7/06/2015]

In consonance to the foregoing citation, another farmer posited:

When I participated in the land reform, my objective was to give my family a better future. I will not lose focus by starting to be vocal in the politics within ZANU PF. If I do that, I may find myself on the wrong side then lose the opportunity of getting input under the presidential scheme... (In-depth Interview, 18/06/2015, Female, Sherwood Farm).

The foregoing citations are epitomes of how some resettled farmers handle ZANU PF patronage networks as a way of negotiating access to essential government services. Since the input scheme is run by the president's office, I observed that ZANU PF local leadership

consider it to be a strategic tool to consolidate political support for the president. This means that those farmers who would have shown support for either opposition political parties or intra ZANU PF opponents of the president would not be prioritised in getting the farming inputs.

Mkodzongi (2013) corroborates this notion by arguing that some of the resettled farmers pretend to be ZANU PF members so that they can access essential services. He cited the 2008 general election results where some ZANU PF candidates lost parliamentary seats in these resettled areas where they were expected to win overwhelmingly. After the elections, those areas where ZANU PF had lost became centre of focus for campaigning and witch hunting for opposition political party supporters. Further, the members of the communities started suspecting each other of surreptitiously supporting the opposition political parties. Such undertones increased polarization among land beneficiaries. As land beneficiaries want to ward off any doubts of supporting the opposition, participation in ZANU PF meetings and projects increased. When community projects were called for, people availed themselves to show support. I observed this in the process of building Bonstead Secondary School. The ZANU PF ward Chairperson indicated that support from the community was overwhelming. Of course one of the reasons for such support would be the nature of the project, where each farmer's child would benefit hence the solidarity. The other way of looking at it is the aspect of land beneficiaries not wanting to be considered as an outsider by party leadership of the area as articulated by Mkodzongi (2013).

The collaboration of farmers in tackling issues that affect them is witnessed in the way which they leverage the relationships they have to their advantage. Sherwood Farm is where the current vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa was allocated land. Farmers have been taking advantage of the proximity to the vice president to highlight their grievances. One farmer noted that each week they visit the vice president's residence to relate with his staff so that they can be told when he is around. This tacit lobbying has managed to get the vice president to appreciate the plight of the resettled farmers. Mr Maki noted that:

We take advantage of the vice president's vicinity to us so that we can air out our grievances. Some of the policies that they are implementing are detrimental to the farmer. How can you sign a bilateral agreement with Turkey to supply flour when we are producing wheat here? So the other time he was around and we highlighted this issue to him, saying that they should first of all see the amount of wheat that we would

have produced then decide on how much to import. Again they should not import flour, they should import wheat so that we can create employment. After we told him, the following week, the issue was raised in parliament. It really is an opportunity to have the vice president here... [In depth interview with Mr Maki at Sherwood Farm 27/07/2015]

The Ward Chairperson of ZANU PF corroborated this point when he noted that:

We are very privileged to have the vice president in our area. Every time he comes to his farm, we take time to share with him the general sentiments of the people, how life is difficult and offer suggestions of what the government can do. Last time we raised the issue of importing flour from Turkey and hardly a month later, he raised the issue in parliament. During question and answer time, he asked the minister of agriculture about it and newspapers captured the issue. So what we raised as farmers in Sherwood became an issue of national debate. I heard that they are going to review the agreement with Turkey... [In-depth interview with ZANU PF Sherwood Ward Chairperson, 08/08/2015].

The quotations above are an illustration of how farmers are leveraging their social capital in addressing some the challenges bedevilling them. I observed that the few farmers who could have access to the people in power would take it upon themselves to represent their counterparts who may not have similar access. Of the farmers who spoke about wheat important, none of the farmers are involved in wheat production, but it was an issue of solidarity with fellow farmers involved in wheat production.

9.10.3 Churches and mutual aid societies

Several churches have emerged in the resettled areas of Umlala and Sherwood. These include the main line churches, such as Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches, the African Apostolic Faith churches (popularly known as white garment) and Zionist sects. Despite their theological differences, they have played an essential role in promoting cohesion among the newly resettled households. They have been a point of assistance for resettled people lacking draught power such as widows and the poor. Scoones *et al*, (2010:71) observed this when they noted that:

Religion and church affiliation have emerged as a vital component in the construction of social relations and networks on the new resettlements. These play an important role in shaping the outcomes of resettlement in terms of agricultural production, access to inputs and productive assets. Church affiliation has been an important source of labour, as settlers have contributed pooled labour based on it... these connections have been important for contribution of labour, draught power and other resources.

In Kwekwe District, I observed that mostly women have collaborated within their churches to form micro finance schemes locally known as *mukando* (*mikando* is plural and *mukando* is singular). A *mukando* is essentially a type of informal credit-rotating association in which a group of people enter into an agreement to contribute a fixed amount of money to a common pool on a weekly or monthly basis or as frequently as the members may agree upon (Schulze, 1997). In the case of Kwekwe District, these groups have been a source of peer mentorship amongst the members on *inter alia* planning, budgeting and household management. In consonance with Moyo (2011)'s submission that the FTLRP created a tri-modal agrarian structure, I observed that *mikando* are organised around people of the same class, who share similar challenges. As a result, *mikando* have become a platform for solidarity and shared learning. Some of the initiatives of *mikando* have led to members of these schemes to acquire livestock, household groceries and other productive assets. Talking to Mai Chivhi, she noted:

Mikando have been very helpful to me. It's an opportunity to meet with other women and share ideas, and plan. Men often think that when women meet, they will be gossiping only. Last time when it was my turn to get the money, I bought a cow. Right now the cow is expecting. We however have since giving each other money because it has been difficult to come by. We now give each other groceries. They are helpful because you can use them in your house. You can also use them to pay for labour when planting, weeding or harvesting. We made sure also that the scheme is for people who share same beliefs as us because last time we opened it up to our neighbours and they were not faithful in making their contributions...[In-depth Interview with Mai Chivhi at Umlala Farm, 22/05/2015]

As can be deciphered from the quotation above, some of the schemes have been helpful in acquiring productive assets and leveraging the participation of women in the rural economy. One woman spoke of how *mikando* helped her:

We have developed trust amongst ourselves. We have time each month to share our plans and review our progress. It will be embarrassing to go to that meeting with nothing to report. This puts us under pressure since I know there will be people who will ask me what I would have done to develop myself and also my household. The way our *mukando* works is that we agree on what we should buy each other. Towards end of year, we usually do groceries so that come Christmas time, every household has the basics like sugar, cooking oil, soaps, mealie meal, salt, and so forth. Around midyear, we buy each other things that we need for the households. Last time I told my colleagues that I needed a plough so the money I got from *mukando* contributed to the plough we use here...[In-depth Interview, 14/05/2015, Female, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm].

The quotes above show that the mutual assistance societies are tailor made to meet the needs of the members. On the average, each group has five members. The reason they limit the number of members is that the cycle of receiving contributions should not take too long.. Such

initiatives have been a glue within the resettled farms and have brought households together and to be in solidarity with each other's problems.

9.11 Conclusion

In this chapter, I used Jenson (1998)'s conceptualisation social cohesion which denotes that there is vertical and horizontal cohesion. I appreciated that several scholars had attended to the aspect of social cohesion outcomes of the FTLRP albeit using primarily the horizontal cohesion lenses. In the chapter, I showed that the FTLRP brought together people of different backgrounds, religious beliefs and value systems. Be that as it may, they were faced with similar challenges which made them to collaborate as they tried to address the challenges. I have noted that the land beneficiaries collaborated, in some instances, successfully whilst in other instances without much success.

I also observed that the collaboration of the farmers transcends the categorisations which characterise the tri-modal agrarian structure. A1 farmers work with A2 farmers in solving common challenges such as water and building of schools. The building of Bonstead Secondary School is one example of a project where the farmers are working together to make sure that the school is established. This project is on the road to succeeding since most of the materials needed have been provided by the farmers. The success of this project is because for the A1 farmers who are not able to provide financial contributions provide their labour. An example of a project that was not so successful was the Umlala Water Project. The failure of the project was because when financial contributions were needed, most farmers in A1 resettlement scheme were not able to raise the required amounts, to the frustration of the A2 farmers who could provide their own portion of the required amounts.

The other major areas of cooperation for the land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District is on sharing productive tools and participation in farmer groups. As a result, there has been some solidarity amongst the farmers as was noted in the lobbying activities done by those close to government leaders on behalf of those who do not have such access. One institution in horizontal cohesion that has played an instrumental role in bringing people together is the church. Through it,

members have come up with mutual aid societies (*mikando*) where they support each other in addressing challenges they face.

In the next chapter, I now look at one of the instruments for development- education. The chapter is premised on the understanding that investment in human capability, particularly education, is a key factor to development.

CHAPTER 10: EDUCATION OUTCOMES OF THE FTLRP

Education plays a key role in achieving moral, aesthetic, intellectual, ideological, cultural, social, scientific and technological development of the people in society as well as the national goals of unity, democracy, economic progress and security for all the country's citizens.

SENATOR DAVID COLTART

Minister of Education, Sport, Arts and Culture 2009-2013

10.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the FTLRP education outcomes. The reason for focusing particularly on education is that human capital development is a centrepiece in increasing productivity in any country. As such, in exploring the outcomes of the FTLRP, it is imperative to appreciate the extent of human capital investment which subsequently will lead to economic development as has been posited by some scholars such as Psacharopoulos (1973; 1992) and Becker (1993). Beyond contributing to economic development through labour and skills, education is an entry point to increasing one's (capability set) opportunities and options to realise one's full potential. In the first section of the chapter, I provide justification on why we need to focus on education in looking at outcomes of FTLRP. I then provide a snapshot analysis of the education provisions in the national constitution. I use the Tomaševsk (2001) framework on assessing quality education which looks at education availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability. I argue that the major education outcome of the FTLRP was that it increased accessibility of both primary and secondary education in the resettled areas. Access to secondary education significantly increased primarily due to the absence of secondary schools within the farming communities prior to the land reform program. With the abrupt demand for education in the resettled areas, this inevitably compromised the quality of the education provided. Some of the factors which compromise the quality of output from the satellite schools include; distances which the children have to walk to and from school, poor welfare of the teachers thereby affecting their motivation in school, inadequate infrastructure and so forth.

10.2 Education as an *ex ante* social policy tool

The post-colonial African state generally considered education as an instrument for development and as a means for reversing the injustices that colonial regimes had perpetuated. Obtaining inspiration from Theodore Schultz (1961)'s ideas on investment in human capital as the conduit for development, the newly independent governments saw the 'eradication of the unholy trinity of ignorance, poverty, and disease' (Mkandawire, 2005:13) as being central to addressing all the ills of underdevelopment (Hendricks, 2007: 121). This approach was necessitated by the reality which nationalist governments had to face having inherited very weak or non-existent human resource necessary for embarking on a development project which would redress the colonial legacy of inequality and injustice (Adesina, 2007:9).

This human resource capacity gap can be exemplified by the fact that at independence, Congo-Kinshasa had only thirty university graduates while in Zambia, the country did not have a single indigenous mining engineer despite the fact that the country's economy depended on mining (Adesina, 2007). As such, social spending on education was not necessarily about the moral imperative of overcoming the legacy of colonialism, but a *sine qua non* for the human resources needs of a modern economy in Africa (Adesina, 2007). This notion is corroborated by Chachage (2007: 89) when he considered education as 'a means to social and economic development at national level, a way to employment opportunities at personal level and, a means to forging national cohesion and reducing inequalities left by the colonial legacy'. Chachage's sentiments dovetail with Sen (1989)'s human capability approach which views education as an instrument for social promotion (Carron & Chau, 1996) since it expands the freedoms that people have reason to value. Sen further argues that the ability to exercise freedom may, to a considerable extent, be directly dependent on the education that one would have received.

Becker (1993:7) argues that for individual's human capital development, training and education are the most important investment to be made, because the return to training investment can be envisaged in the form of higher income, effective deeds, improved health and acquiring better career positions. The human capital developed from work experiences and

competency development, may contribute to higher earnings, better chance of promotions and acquiring better position (Judge *et al*, 1995 in Berntson *et al*, 2006:226).

Thus, beyond contributing to economic growth through labour and skills, education is a gateway right that increases one's (capability set) opportunities and options to realise one's full potential (UNESCO 2002, 32-33). Development economists have confirmed that investments in education, nutrition and health care produce net economic gains. Economists like Psacharopoulos (1973; 1992) have demonstrated that it is possible to quantify the rate of return to these investments, and to manipulate investment decisions to produce the highest rates of return on capital. For example, in developing countries, investments in primary education produce far higher rates of return than investments in secondary and university level education (Psacharopoulos, 1973). In view of the foregoing, education therefore plays intrinsic and instrumental roles in the process of development. This process requires the 'removal of major sources of 'unfreedom' such as poverty, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public institutions as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states' (Sen, 1999: 3).

10.3 Education in Zimbabwe

Several scholars have written extensively on the progress which Zimbabwe made since independence in 1980 (see *inter alia* Chung, 1989; Colclough *et al*, 1990; Edwards *et al*, 1990; Chisvo, 1993; Hungwe, 1994; Zvobgo, 1994; Cleghorn, 1997; Nziramasanga, 1999; Chitiyo *et al*, 2004; Kariwo, 2007; Mutepfa *et al*, 2007). In a nutshell however, the trajectory of education in Zimbabwe after independence can be divided into three phases. The first decade can be regarded as the first phase where the country experienced exponential growth in the education sector at all levels. This growth can be epitomised by an increase of 662 percent in secondary schools (UNESCO, 2000). Correspondingly, there was a whopping 229 percent increase in the number of teachers that were enrolled at the teachers colleges (UNESCO, 2000). School fees were abolished during this decade which made access to education easy for children in various contexts such as rural, the urban and farming communities. This aggressive progress embodied President Robert Mugabe (1990: 9)'s sentiments that;

‘(I) believe that a commitment to education is a commitment to development and that manpower training is essential for the many development tasks that require a trained and enlightened cadre. The prosperity of the SADCC [Southern African Development Coordination Conference] region will depend, among other interrelated forces, on the effective and efficient utilisation of human resources... (T)he solution of unemployment is necessarily related to the education and training programme.’

The second phase of the trajectory of education in Zimbabwe is the structural adjustment era in the 90s. During this time policy advice from the Bretton Wood Institutions sought to cut government expenditure in providing basic social services to its people (Garba, 2007: 56). In response to this advice, secondary school fees went up by 150 percent in 1992 alone (Mokutekwa, 1999: 14). The state sought to shift the burden of education to parents as a cost recovery mechanism of adjustment. The salary of teachers fell in real terms from an annual average of \$4,934 in 1990 to \$2,249 in 1996. The structural adjustment policies caused a reversal in the gains that had been made in the first decade of independence. Because of the introduction of exorbitant fees, children started to drop out of school as their parents could not afford the new fees ((Hendricks, 2007:132).

The third phase can be said to be the one when the government was trying to address the effects of ESAP within a context of disgruntled, retrenched and agitated population. This led to the land reform and the subsequent nose-diving of the economy that Zimbabwe found itself in. The consequences of this crisis are the subject of the following sections as the country is yet to recover from some of these.

10.4 Education legislative framework in Zimbabwe

The country has since come up with education guarantees that are justiciable since they are enshrined in the national constitution. Section 75 of the 2013 constitution is in the Bill of Rights and is dedicated to the right to education. It provides that:

1. Every citizen and permanent resident of Zimbabwe has a right to—
 - a. a basic State-funded education, including adult basic education; and
 - b. Further education, which the State, through reasonable legislative and other measures, must make progressively available and accessible.

2. Every person has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, independent educational institutions of reasonable standards, provided they do not discriminate on any ground prohibited by this Constitution.
3. A law may provide for the registration of educational institutions referred to in subsection (2) and for the closing of any such institutions that do not meet reasonable standards prescribed for registration.
4. The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within the limits of the resources available to it, to achieve the progressive realisation of the right set out in subsection (1).

Besides the provisions of the national constitution, the country also has an Education Act, as amended in 2006. The Act spells out the obligations of duty bearers in providing education for children when it notes that:

1. Every child in Zimbabwe shall have the right to school education
2. It is the objective in Zimbabwe, that, primary education for every child of school-going age shall be compulsory and to this end, it shall be the duty of the parents of any such child to ensure that their child attends primary school
3. It is the objective that tuition in schools in Zimbabwe be provided for the lowest possible fees consistent with the maintenance of high standards of education, and the Minister shall encourage the attainment of this objective by every appropriate means.

The legal provisions spell out the state's commitment to education in principle. The challenge however comes at making these a reality to the lives of children in the country. Talking to one educationist in the country, she noted that:

Of course we have good education laws. For me these are a statement of the government's intentions should resources be available. The challenge is that we can't implement some of the provisions of these laws because they require money and there is no money. I think in future when the country will be more stable, we will provide what is in the constitution and the Education Act [Key Informant Interview with Kwekwe District Education Officer, 29/05/2015]

The sentiments of the education officer recognise that at policy level, the country has come up with relevant laws. The challenge however is in making sure that the laws are implemented to benefit children in various contexts such as those in farming communities.

10.5 State of education in satellite schools

This section interrogates the state of education in the satellite schools using a Tomaševsk (2001) framework on assessing quality education which is premised on T.H. Marshall's theory of citizenship where the government has responsibility to deliver to its citizens services such as education (Marshall, 1967:6). The framework looks at four key aspects necessary for the provision of quality education. These are:


1. Availability
2. Accessibility
3. Acceptability
4. Adaptability

10.5.1 Availability

10.5.1.1 Making the schools available

Before attending to the quality of education in the resettled areas, it is instructive to note that one of the major outcomes of the FTLRP was an increase primarily in number of secondary schools in the farming communities. Prior to the land reform program, the number of secondary schools in Kwekwe District was 40. Most of these secondary schools are in urban and communal areas. There were hardly any in the farming communities. After the land reform program, there was a 31 percent increase in the number of secondary schools in Kwekwe District. All the schools that were established after 1999 were in resettled areas (refer to Figure 10.1).

Figure 10.1: Number of schools between 1999 and 2015 in Kwekwe District



Source: Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, Kwekwe District Report, 2015


As can be deciphered from the graph above, the number of primary schools prior to 1999 was 117 compared to 40 of secondary schools. This meant that primary education was easily accessible to children in the district. I observed that even in farming communities, there were well-furnished primary schools with running water and electricity. This explains why after the FTLRP, there was only an increase of 13 percent in the number of primary schools. The FTLRP can be commended for making secondary education accessible to the children whose parents benefited from the land reform program.

10.5.1.2 Fiscal allocations

According to Tomaševsk (2001) availability looks at the fiscal allocations that the government makes; the presence of hard and soft infrastructure and sufficiency of the materials, equipment and other requisite facilities.¹⁸ As has been noted, the state made education provisions in the legislation, the herculean task that remains is making sure that the laws become a reality. One way of ensuring that this happens is through prioritising education when doing budget allocations. In 2000, Zimbabwe was one of the countries that agreed to the *Dakar Framework on Education for all* which provides that twenty percent of the national budget should go to education. The Dakar Framework therefore provides a benchmark on how countries are

supposed to structure their fiscal allocations as they relate to education. The challenge with this model of looking at how a government invests in education is that it assumes that investment in school related activities is the only variable that best reflects the conditions of education (Yi, 2014: 173). It can be argued that the availability of schools or teachers, which are the major indicators of investment in education, do not guarantee high levels of school attendance. As shall be noticed later in this chapter, there are several other factor which are not captured by merely looking at budget allocations (Ibid). Some of these factors include social attitudes towards education, living standards and environmental conditions including geographical location. Addressing these issues would improve accessibility of education. Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments, it is worth considering the extent to which a government invests in education. The graph below shows how Zimbabwe has been faring in this regard.

Figure 10.2: National budget allocation to education in Zimbabwe



Source: Own compilation from Ministry of Finance national budgets

The graph above shows that from 2009 to 2012, the government did not meet its twenty percent obligation to education. 2013 however marked a significant improvement to this where 27 percent of the USD 3.8 billion national budget went to education. The following years have seen the government meeting its obligation. It is important to note that using the benchmark is worthwhile in assessing the government's commitment. What is most important however the

size of the budget is since it determines the quantum of 20%. For example, 20 percent of a US\$100 billion budget is US\$20 billion whereas 20 percent of a US\$10 billion budget is US\$2 billion. Further, the size of the education budget should be analysed in relation to the task that needs to be accomplished by the same budget. In light of this, there are two challenges that should be considered in view of the graph above. The first issue is that Zimbabwe has been living on a cash budget since 2009, when it was introduced by the then Finance Minister, Tendai Biti. In his words as was captured in the Revised Budget Statement of March 2009, he explained the concept of cash budgeting as:

The natural law of cash budgeting is '*what we gather is what we eat*' or '*we eat what we kill*' [emphasis added]. This is the basic economic law of hunter-gatherer economies. No ministry or public agency should expect to eat beyond what we have gathered through collection of taxes, fees and any other legitimate sources of revenue. '*What we gather, we eat*' unambiguously defines the priority not just in the Ministry of Finance but throughout all arms of government. If we want to continue eating, we must all focus our minds and energies on maximizing the revenues that are needed first to get those of us in the public sector back to work and then to implement all of the pressing issues."

Cash budgeting meant that the national budget could only be limited to the resources that the country would raise through tax and other means. As a result, budget allocations to various ministries were drastically reduced to fit into the revenue that the state would collect. While it is commendable that the national budgets from 2013 to 2015 exceeded the Dakar Framework, the amounts in question were not much compared to the needs which the ministry would have.¹⁹

One educationist succinctly captured this when she said:


Don't be deceived by the 27 percent in budget allocations. 27 percent of peanuts is peanuts. If disbursed, the money is not able to address all the challenges in the education sector of the country. [Key Informant interview with Kwekwe District Education Officer, 29/05/2015]

The sentiments noted above lead to the second issue with the graph above- the issue of disbursement of the allocated money. Having the money allocated to the ministry is a welcome development, it is even better when it is disbursed. In response to the 27 percent allocation of 2013, the then Minister of Education, David Coltart resonated with the foregoing when he was quoted:

We are pleased with the theoretical figure that we have gotten, but the theoretical figure needs to be matched with actual disbursement. For this year, we only got 15% of the non-salary figure and we need to see if we're actually going to get more. For us that's the real test...²⁰

When the disbursement hurdle is overcome, the challenge is on how the money is spent. In the 2013 education budget, 68.4 percent of it went towards salaries and wages (Ibid). Figure 10.3 can be an epitome of how national budget allocations are spent by the ministry.

Figure 10.3: Ministry of Education Sport, Art and Culture expenditure categories, in 2010



Source: Ministry of Education Sport, Arts and Culture, 2011

Figure 10.3 notes that national budgets primarily address the employment costs of the ministry. There is little money that is available to address some of the challenges which schools in general face, more so satellite schools. This explains why this research observed that in all the schools, there were teachers available for all grades with relevant qualifications albeit conducting lessons in dilapidated infrastructure as shall be noted later. For the 2015 budget of the Ministry of Education, 98 percent of the allocated USD890 million were taken up by employment costs leaving it to rely on donors to cover most of the non-personnel cost.²¹

Donors intervene however to address other aspects that are not related to employment costs. UNICEF supports the Ministry of Education to implement its education sector plan and manages the Education Development Fund (EDF) funded to the tune of \$115 million from 2012 to 2015. Donors to the EDF are Germany, DfID, the EU, Sweden, OSISA, Finland and Norway. On behalf of the Global Partnership for Education, UNICEF also manages support to

Zimbabwe pegged at \$23 million for three years. In 2015, satellite schools would have received \$6 500 to help improve the schools' infrastructure.²²

10.5.1.3 Status of teachers' working conditions in satellite schools

While employment costs take the lion's share of the education budget, the welfare of teachers needs a lot to be desired. According to the Ministry of Education, the average salary of a teacher was around USD500 prior to 2008 (MOESAC Strategic Plan, 2011-2015). This figure was hit hard by inflation to virtually nothing by end of 2008. In 2009 the government was able to pay a flat rate of US\$100 per month to all civil servants, including teachers (Ibid). This has been gradually increased; a more graduated scale and allowances have been reinstated, so that as of July 2011 a diploma-qualified teacher started at a monthly income of US\$363 (US\$232 basic salary, US\$66 transport allowance and US\$65 housing allowance) (Ibid). The Poverty Datum Line in July 2011 was US\$540, indicating that the starting salary for a qualified teacher remains substantially below the minimum amount required to sustain a small household. Thus teaching is no longer the envy of many but the profession of last resort. As a result, the respect for teachers by society was undermined (Ibid). This scenario subsequently affected the teachers' motivation. In a focus group discussion, one teacher retorted:

It's difficult to give it your all when you are not appreciated. The government does not seem to care about our welfare. I am having to do other things to get an extra dollar. It's embarrassing to be a teacher, it's the profession of scorn. It's just that I don't have other options seeing there are no jobs if I leave teaching. I am having to rely on my husband for subsistence. So coming here to school is just to find something to do as I while up time... [Focus group discussion at Mupamombe Secondary School, 19/06/2015]

Another teacher gesticulated:

...For me the money I am paid ends when I administer the school assembly. When I teach in class, it's my sheer passion... [Focus group discussion at Mupamombe Secondary School, 19/06/2015]

For the teachers who could not stand their working conditions, 2008 was the defining year. More than 20 000 teachers left the profession leaving several classes unmanned. The then Minister of Education, David Coltart (2013) substantiated this assertion when he noted that:

...in 2008, there was hardly any teaching that took place in schools. There weren't textbooks and unfortunately there is a batch of children now coming through the system whose education was affected by those calamitous times.

One teacher at Bonstead Secondary narrated his everyday experience when he lamented that:

I walk five kilometres to school in the morning, there is no public transport that comes into this area. I have to be here on time for assembly at 0730. This means that I have to wake up at 4 am. I get to school tired, sweaty and dusty. I have a towel which I now keep here at school for freshening up before I start my lessons. I finish the lessons at 1pm. Because of the distance, I can't carry any books home so I have to remain behind for some hours to mark the work I would have given the students. Then my long march will begin. Tomorrow, the cycle is the same... this is tough! [Key Informant Interview with Head teacher at Bonstead Secondary, 3/07/2015]

The opinion of another teacher from Umlala Primary resonated with the Head teacher of Bonstead secondary when she postulated:

We are lucky that our school is 30 kilometres from Kwekwe town. So I commute every day to and from home. I don't have a choice because the school does not have accommodation for us here. The challenge then is transport fares every day from town. My friends who are teaching in town have it easy. They walk short distances to their school where they don't incur any transport costs. If you calculate, each day I use USD4 just for transport. By end of month, it's about USD100 all gone. That's a third of my salary gone, before we talk about food, accommodation and general upkeep. How also do we account for the time I spend on the road looking for transport considering the fact that transport here is erratic? [Focus group discussion at Umlala Primary School, 15/06/2015]

The foregoing personal experiences show that the plight of teachers in satellite schools needs to be improved. Since the national budget is spent more on administrative costs, schools are incapacitated to provide accommodation or build houses for their teachers even though the land for it is provided. Such a teacher, even with the passion to teach ends up fatigued as they almost always start the day exhausted already. This also means that the teachers would not have time for research and recreation during the school term.

The challenges which teachers face explain why qualified and competent teachers shun rural and farm communities' schools. At Bonstead Secondary, the first term of 2015 saw 4 teachers out of the 18 at the school getting transfers. This means that students have to get new teachers once in every while should a teacher get an opportunity to transfer to the urban areas or other rural schools with the necessary amenities. With such high teacher turnover in satellite schools, the education ministry was left with no option than to resort to unqualified individuals. By September 2015, the ministry reported that there were almost 22 000 unqualified teachers in the system at national level. 10 341 of these were at primary level while 11 519 were at secondary level. In Kwekwe District however, all the four schools that participated in this study

had qualified teachers. This was primarily because of their proximity to Kwekwe town, despite transport and accommodation challenges which teachers faced.

10.5.1.4 Satellite schools infrastructure

Empirical research in different context have all come to the conclusion that the quality of school facilities have an indirect effect on learning (See Fuller, 1999; Carron and Chau, 1996; Willms, 2000; Pennycuick, 1993). These studies have shown that the quality of the learning environment was strongly correlated to pupils' academic performance. Such factors as on-site availability of lavatories and a clean water supply, classroom maintenance, space and furniture availability all have an impact on the critical learning factor of time on task (UNICEF, 2000).

I observed that in both Sherwood and Umlala, primary schools had infrastructure that was built more than fifty years ago. Umlala Primary school was established in 1952. The white farmer's father, Newbolt Senior, built the school in collaboration with other farmers who were around him. The school has a catchment radius spanning more than twenty kilometres. The school had electricity and running water when the land reform started. Talking to the deputy headmaster, he narrated that:

This school had all the necessary infrastructure. The white farmer drilled a borehole which supplied running water to the toilets. We just had to build new Blair toilets since the old ones had filled up. Currently, our major need are houses for the teachers. Qualified teachers prefer being in town than to commute every day to school at their own expense. The school even had a telephone line which was connected to long cables going to Kwekwe town. Electricity and telephone cables were stolen and the school did not have the means to replace them [Key Informant Interview with Umlala Primary Deputy Head teacher, 15/06/15].

Sherwood Primary School had a similar story as was told by the headmaster:

This school has been here since the 50s. It is said that the parents of the Burger Brothers put their resources together to build it. They took the pit sand from Sebakwe River. They made their farm workers to mould the bricks. Their job was to make sure that the project was completed. The school just needs one class room block since the number of children in the area is now increasing. There are three teachers' houses which they share. Our school is lucky to have electricity and running water [Key Informant Interview with Sherwood Primary Head teacher, 17/ 07/2015].

It can be noted however that in both primary schools, there is no library and recreational centres. For the latter, the nearest they have are soccer and netball fields only. The story in secondary schools is dissimilar to that of primary schools. The white commercial farmers did not build any secondary schools. In view of this, it thus can be argued that one of the key outcomes of the FTLRP is introduction of secondary schools in the former LSCF. After the land reform, more than 1,000 satellite schools were established in response to population resettlement (Ministry of Education of Education, 2011-2015 Strategic Plan). The introduction of secondary schools however came with some compromises. Since there was no infrastructure, the land beneficiaries had to make strategic decisions of using tobacco barns and former white farmers' houses as the secondary schools. Mupamombe Secondary School is one example where the resettled farmers turned the white farmers' residential house into the school. Students at this school will be packed in their various classrooms which have limited space. One teacher in the focus group discussion noted that

Introducing secondary schools in the farming communities was a good move. It created jobs for some of us. The classrooms are small though. Students have to squeeze together. It's difficult on hot days. Children will be struggling to concentrate because the ventilation is poor. When I came the school had constructed Blair toilets some hundred meters away. I know that when a child goes there, it takes them about fifteen minutes to come back... [Focus group discussion at Mupamombe Secondary School, 19/06/2015]

At Bonstead Secondary School, the school is also using the former white farmer's house pending the building of new structures at the identified site. The story is not dissimilar to that of Mupamombe Secondary School. Children are crowded in the classrooms. Because of the nature of set up, proceedings in one class interfere with those of the next class. When it is raining, the roofs leak so learning literary stops. Some window frames were stolen by some resettled farmers who wanted to use the window frames for their own houses. This affects learning on rainy days as much as it does on windy days. Undisturbed learning is therefore subject to the vicissitudes of Mother Nature, with the hope that it does not rain.

For both secondary schools, there are no libraries and laboratories necessary for science classes. This means that the students' options are limited to what is provided. I can only shudder to think of those students who may be good in science subjects and yet have no opportunity to do them anywhere else except at Bonstead Secondary School. The furniture in the classrooms is affected also by the weather. Due to lack of security, the school leaves valuable tables and

chairs locked in one lockable room. The rest of the furniture is left in the classrooms that are not secure.

Concerning textbooks, in 2010 through the support of the Education Transitional Fund (ETF), every primary school child received what were considered a core set of textbooks, and secondary textbooks were distributed at the end of 2011. The table below shows student to book ratio at Mupamombe Secondary School.

Table 10. 1: Book to pupil ratio at Mupamombe Secondary School

	English	Shona	Science	Geography	Maths	Commerce	History	Agriculture	Fashion and Fabrics
Form 1	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:38	1:1	1:13	1:27
Form 2	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:18	1:1	1:10	1:8
Form 3	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:20	1:1	1:10	1:8
Form 4	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:16	1:1	1:10	1:8

Source: Own fieldwork, 2015

Each student has access to a textbook in the subjects that the government considered core subjects. Schools did not receive any text books in agriculture, fashion and fabrics and commerce. Unfortunately, these are also the subjects that are relevant to their immediate contexts in farming communities. At Bonstead Secondary School, book to student ratio takes the same character as at Mupamombe Secondary School. The headmaster of Bonstead Secondary School had different concerns about the textbooks:

Having the textbooks is a good thing. Now each student can have their own book to use at school. We don't allow the children to take the books home. We tried it when the books came in 2011. It didn't work. Some lost them while others returned them soiled, dirty and defaced. The students use these books here at school. The problem however is their security. As you can see that the classrooms are not lockable and also if it rains, the books will be damaged. We have however built a small storeroom to keep valuables


of the school. I know you will ask me about how students then access the books, that's the down side of it now... the books are available by access may be another story. [Key Informant with Headmaster at Bonstead Secondary School, 3/07/2015]

The two secondary schools do not have sports and recreation facilities. For Mupamombe Secondary School, they use Umlala Primary School's soccer and netball pitches. Bonstead Secondary School does not have a nearby primary school so the school improvised by putting up a soccer pitch with the goal posts made of tree trunks. That is the same for the netball pitch. This state of affairs can explain why the two secondary schools have not flourished in sport in Kwekwe District.

10.6 Accessibility

Tomaševsk (2001) notes that accessibility means that education is accessible to every child, while addressing geographical accessibility, economic accessibility (affordability), absence of discrimination and access to information. At national level, the net attendance rates for primary school are above 90 percent with gender parity as well. This can be attested by the enrolment trends at Sherwood Primary School as can be deciphered from Figure 10.4 below:

Figure 10.4: Gender dynamics in Sherwood Primary School's Enrolment, 2015



Source: Own fieldwork

The graph shows that other than in Grades 1, 5, and 7, there are gender disparities in enrolment. In Grade 3, girls' enrolment is only 52.6% of boys. There have been several efforts by government to address this anomaly through the government policy for equitable access for boys and girls in education. One respondent from Umlala Farm confirmed this argument when he said:

To me there is no difference between my son and my daughter. I treat them all the same. They are my children. If the girl is good in school, let her go as far as she can. I will not allow my daughter to depend on a man. It will make her a servant to that man. I have been teaching my daughter to do her own things just like the way they are taught by the examples of some of our female politicians who are leading big men. [In-depth interview with Mr Chivhi, Umala Farm, 27/06/2015]

Another factor can be said to be the work of civil society organisations such as Campaign for Female Education (CAMFED) who are promoting education for the girl child. Talking to the CAMFED district coordinator, she passionately elucidated that:


Our job as CAMFED is to make sure that the girl child is not deprived of her right to education. We have come up with an educational program which pays fees for all the girls at Umlala Primary so that there will not be any excuses for girls dropping out of school. We also hold campaigns during farmers' monthly meetings so that in the home, the girl child and the boy child all receive equal treatment. It's one thing having the girl in school. It's the other having the home environment not supporting her by loading her with all the work as the boy child studies. [In-depth interview with CAMFED representative at Umlala Farm, 16/05/2015]

At secondary school, the enrolment figures are almost the same, though the number of girls has reduced more as compared to primary school figures. After grade seven, some girls fall through the cracks and are not able to proceed to secondary school. The same campaigns happening in primary school also happen in secondary school. In Kwekwe District, CAMFED is playing a key role in educating the resettled farmers about the importance of having the girl child in school. The organisation is also playing a key role in flagging out any practices that would undermine the girl child's education.

Of note also on Figure 10.4 is that the number of both boys and girls drastically reduces when the children get to grade 7 which is an examinable class. The primary reasons for this include issues of school fees, the need for children to help with home chores such as taking care of livestock as well as helping in the fields. This drastic fall in number of children enrolling for grade seven means that the same children cannot proceed to secondary education. This means that the capability set of the children and their families will be compromised.

Figure 10.5 below shows Mupamombe Secondary School’s enrolment figures since 2011.

Figure 10.5: Enrolment figures for Mupamombe Secondary School



Source: Own fieldwork, 2015

10.6.1 Distance to schools

Children in the farming communities, like their teachers, have to walk long distances to and from school. Inevitably, this affects their concentration in school as they will be exhausted by the time the lessons start. In all the schools that participated in this study, their assemblies are done at 0730 hours each day. For the children who will be coming from a distance of about five kilometres, it means they would have to wake up early to start the journey. This is working with an expectation that they would not have any chores to do at home. To make it to school on time, I observed that the children would jog almost half of the journey. They have come up with solidarity mechanisms where they travel in groups while encouraging each other to catch up as they run. This means if one child misses the group in the morning, the child is likely to be late and also vulnerable, walking the kilometres in the forest. In one of my walks along the route that the children from Umlala Farm walk to and from school, I witnessed a snake trail. The agricultural extension officer I was with indicated that a python had just passed and it was

in the vicinity. Some of the children had to confront such creatures to get to school. Table 10.2 is a catalogue of the distances that children at Sherwood Primary School walk daily:

Table 10.2: Sherwood Primary School Catchment Area

Sherwood Primary Catchment area Distances		
Catchment area	Distance in km	No. of Students
Green Diamond	3	35
Machakwi	0.1	50
Mbudzi	2	8
Sable Farms	5	15
Pricable farm (Mnangagwa)	4	26
Sherwood area	1	46
Devilwood Farm	6	40
Ministry of Transport Camp	6	12
Prichard	7	7
Dekel Farm	1	33
Indarama	3	110

Source: Own fieldwork

In all the schools that participated in this study, the issue of children walking long distances was not a surprise to the school authorities. At Mupamombe Secondary School, the headmistress noted:

It's almost impossible for children not to walk long distances. The self-contained A1 farms are 30 hectares. So if a child lives at the 10th farm, then already that child would have walked for more than a kilometre. Because these are farming communities, households are far away from each other so it's easy to have one child walking five kilometres to school. But the children are now used. The issue only is about the dangers that are along the way, especially for the girl child. Imagine the distances that a child walks if he or she passes A2 farms on their way home... [In-depth Interview with Ms Godho, at Mupamombe Secondary School, 19/06/2015]

10.6.2 Early childhood development education (ECD)

Research by UNICEF (2008) and Willms (2000) has shown that positive early experiences and interactions play an important role in preparing a child to be a quality learner. The UNICEF

research in Philippines, Sri Lanka and Turkey, and has shown that children who participate in early childhood education do better in primary school than those who do not benefit from formal early child programmes (UNICEF, 1998). Besides the cognitive effects of ECD education, the child also develops much better psychosocially (Ibid). McCain and Mustard (1999) further observed that ECD education provides appropriate stimulation to the child's brain development necessary for emotional regulation, arousal, and behavioural management (McCain and Mustard, 1999). A child who misses positive stimulation or is subject to chronic stress in the pre-school years may have difficulty with psychosocial development later in life (ibid).

The government adopted a National Early Childhood Education Policy in the 1990s. The policy bestowed responsibility for the ECD centres to the Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture. This policy changed practices that existed where ECD was done informally. Subsequently, ECD services became more regulated and professionalised using international standards (UNESCO, 2005). This change was reinforced by the Presidential Commission on Education and Training which carried out extensive consultations with stakeholders into the status of Early Childhood Development (ECD) in Zimbabwe (Nziramasanga, 1999). The Nziramasanga Commission recommended for ECD to be accessible to all children as a way of improving the quality of Zimbabwean education. Pursuant to this goal, the Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture instituted a policy requiring all primary schools to establish two ECD classes for 3 to 4 year olds (Class A) and 4 to 5 year olds (Class B) (Secretary's Circular 14: 2004). The ramifications of this policy meant that more educational staff with required training were necessary to serve these children.

The Ministry of Education went on an aggressive drive in making sure that all schools in the country have ECD education. By 2011, 97 percent of all primary schools have ECD classes (MOESAC Strategic Plan, 2011-2015). The primary schools which participated in the study both had ECD classes, manned by trained teachers and integrated into the school system. The focus on ECD came up in a focus group discussion with farmers from Sherwood Farm. One lady who was explaining her chores in the home registered this as a challenge in her doing her home chores. I then probed further about this issue and discovered that there was a lot that needed to be considered for children in farming communities. She explained that:

Crèche is for children between 3 years and 6 years. I have two children who should be going to crèche, the first one is 5 years and the second one just turned 3. This age group is very active. Sometimes when I want to undertake my chores, I get distracted trying to make sure that the children are safe. If the crèche was close by, it would be helping me and also help the children with writing and interacting with others... The nearest crèche is at Sherwood primary which is 5km from here. Even older children complain about the distance so I decided that I can't let my children walk that long distance. What if something happens to them? I am left with no choice except to keep them here until they are old enough to join others for the long walk to school... I know they are missing out but I have no choice. Their safety comes first... [Focus group discussion at Sherwood Farm, 15/08/2015]

The foregoing personal account shows that most children who stay far from the schools miss out on ECD education because they will not be able to walk the long distances to and from school. The Umlala FGD raised similar issues when one respondent mentioned that:

The issue of ECD needs innovative approaches here in farming communities. The distances that the children have to walk are too much. It's not safe for a five year old to walk 3 kilometres to school... [Focus group discussion at Umlala Primary School, 15/06/2015]

As a result, UNICEF (2008) and Willms (2000)'s findings on the benefits of early childhood education will not be realised by a significant number of the children. I observed that for those who manage to attend school at Umlala Primary, the school does not have necessary equipment, toys and materials which the children would need. The play area at Umlala Primary was in a sorry state because there was nothing that the children could use safely. Their options for play therefore are limited to field activities such as soccer, running and so forth. The situation at Sherwood Primary was similar to that at Umlala Primary. While ECD education is available at all the schools in this research, it cannot be said that it is accessible to all children who need it.

10.6.3 The Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM)

The government has however been trying to put mitigatory measures in place to make sure that access to education for all children becomes a reality. In 2001, the Government of Zimbabwe introduced a program called Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM). The initiative is a demand-side response to the cost barriers affecting the ability of OVCs to access education due to increasing poverty levels in the country. It is implemented in all the 61 districts of the country both urban and rural (Government of Zimbabwe, 2001; 2005). The *BEAM Evaluation Report of 2012* estimated that there were 3.6 million children of school going age (primary and

secondary) in Zimbabwe. Of that number, about 1 million of them were in need of financial assistance. For primary school children that need assistance, 28 percent of them needed assistance. BEAM however could only reach to 16 percent of them in 2011. For secondary schools pupils, the report noted that about 24 percent of the children needed assistance. BEAM however could only assist 17 percent of them.

The program has been riddled with many challenges. Some of these challenges include opaque selection criteria for students to be on the program, lack of effective coordination between the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, where money for the program is disbursed to, and Ministry of Education, Sport, Art and Culture which administers the program. As a result, the program does not disburse the money for the students to relevant schools on time. The program has also been criticised for only paying school fees without giving consideration to other factors that affect attendance in school such as stationery, uniforms and levies.

BEAM's colossal challenge has been its financing. The biggest chunk of its budget has been supported by donors such as Department for International Development (DfID). When the country came up with a new constitution in 2013 which provided for free primary education, the donors withdrew their financial support on the rationale that there no longer a need for BEAM since basic primary education was free and compulsory. Schools however needed financial support so they identified their weakest link, the parent. Schools started charging levies for their upkeep since BEAM was no longer giving its assistance. The headmistress of Mupamombe Secondary elucidated this:

BEAM was very helpful to this school, though the disbursements where in arrears by two years. Because of the US Dollar, whenever the money would come, it would make the school progress. But the withdrawal of donors will make a lot of children drop out of school. It is unfortunate. For us also, for the school to be functional, we need money so we now charge levies to parents... so yes we will not violate the new constitution, but we have to be innovative if we should survive. Here we use the School Development Committee to enforce the levy requirements because it's the parents who agreed to the levy amount. The SDC chairperson comes to send those who would not have paid back home to bring the levies. This is where we lose some of our students because they won't come back. I hope something will be done to make BEAM functional again. [In-depth Interview with Mupamombe Secondary School Head teacher, 19/06/2015]

As can be noted from the sentiments above, BEAM was very helpful both to the schools and also to the students who were its beneficiaries. It's over reliance on external funding made it to

be inefficient as disbursement were done late and also it paid fees only, without providing stationery needs of the child. The issue of levies also compromises children's attendance as parents would not be able to pay these. The policy of charging levies is against the constitutional provisions which provide for free basic education.

The government can however be commended for creating an environment where civil society organisations could intervene to cover the gaps. To this end, The CAMFED program that has been alluded to earlier played a key role in keeping girls in school. The School Improvement Grant (SIG) was key in improving furniture and infrastructure at the schools. At Mupamombe Secondary School, the SIG was used to buy desks and chairs for the students while at Umlala Primary, the grant was used to repaint the school and build a storeroom. This grant has proved to be helpful to schools considering that the national budget is handicapped to assist in infrastructures of schools.

10.7 Acceptability


10.7.1 Fluid curriculum

One of the issues that generated a lot of debate among the teachers who participated in a focus group discussion was on the reasons why children in farming communities do not perform well academically relative to their counterparts in towns. One of the issues of consensus amongst the teachers though was that 'the children in farming communities lacked exposure'. The geography teacher gave an example of one of the topics in the syllabus on technology for human development. She noted that all her students do not perform well on that topic. As a result, their options become limited in an exam because they do not have exposure to some of the contemporary technology. This discussion led to an intriguing engagement about the need for fluid curriculum which would take into cognisance the various contexts where children come from.

A fluid curriculum was described as where curriculum development should not homogenise all the children as though they have similar backgrounds and also live in identical settings. The discussion agreed that children in farming communities fail, both grade seven and ordinary levels because the curriculum is designed for an average urban child who gets a lot of exposure

from television, radio, internet and social media. The child in a farm environment, for most in Umlala Farm and Sherwood, do not have electricity, do not have phones and the solar charged radios which most households have are monopolised by the adults in the home. A comparison of Bonstead Secondary School results since 2010 and the national pass rate presented a sorry picture where even though the national pass rate is low, like in 2010 when the national pass rate was 16.5 percent, the Bonstead Secondary School pass rate was 9 percent for the girls and 0 percent for the boys.

Figure 10.6: Bonstead Secondary School and national O Level Pass Rate Comparison



Source: Own fieldwork, 2015

The discussion was unanimous on the point that as long as the curriculum would not be adjusted to recognise the contexts of some of the children, the national pass rate will continue to be low and also satellite schools would produce failures each year. This line of argument is however problematic in that it seeks to address the symptoms. It can be argued that the reason why children fail is largely because of the learning conditions that are not conducive. As such, attention should be on addressing the learning conditions instead of making the curriculum fluid without addressing the underlying issues.


10.7.2 Language of instruction

The issue of language of instruction has been on the international human rights agenda for decades. On the one hand, there is a school of thought which argued for making mother tongue the language of instruction. On the other hand, there have been scholars who argued that such an approach will not help considering globalisation (Tomaševsk, 2009). One teacher argued that:

We are getting the children from primary school where they are being taught in Shona. My job in secondary school is not to introduce language to them, that's what primary school is for. We have a challenge with the students because most of them cannot construct a grammatically correct sentence in English. How do you help such children? All the subjects they do at secondary are taught in English, except Shona... [Focus group discussion at Mupamombe Secondary School, 19/06/2015]

At Sherwood Primary School, the Grade Seven pass rate for the previous two years showed that Shona was the subject which most students passed, way above other subjects.

Figure 10.7: Sherwood Primary School Grade 7 Results



Source: Own fieldwork, 2015


While the issue of language of instruction has been debated for a long time, in interrogating the reasons why children in farming communities perform dismally in exams, one aspect that can be attributed to this is the language of instruction. I observed that the delivery by the teachers is in Shona both at primary and secondary schools in resettled areas. This compromises

learners' understanding of English. The citation in the FGD above noted that teachers use Shona to teach all subjects which compromises learners' comprehension in national examinations.

10.7.3 What exposure? Whose exposure? Why exposure?

I observed that children in farming communities perform better in subjects that relate to them more. The graph below shows that while children would fail all other subjects, the majority would pass agriculture. This is mainly because they are able to relate with what is being taught.

Figure 10.8: Mupamombe Secondary School Pass Rate




Source: own fieldwork, 2015

At Bonstead Secondary School, Form 1 students performed better in Shona, English, Science and History. The graph further shows that overall, students in all forms at Bonstead Secondary School performed better in agriculture compared to other subjects. In addressing the issue of exposure as was raised by the teachers at the Mupamombe Secondary School focus group discussion, it can be observed that children perform better in subjects they can relate with. As a result, the need to adapt delivery methods by the teachers will assist the learners in understanding concepts. The issue is not solved by adapting curriculum to suit learners in rural settings, instead, the teachers need to be innovative in their delivery mechanisms. The graph also shows an interesting picture where learners fail Shona, which is the language of command by most teachers. In talking to the head teacher at the school, I discovered that teachers for

most subjects would come and leave mid-term as they struggled to cope with the working conditions. This meant that the students would spend a long time before a replacement is found.

Figure 10.9: Bonstead Secondary School 2014 Results



Source: Own fieldwork, 2015

In the context of increasing human capabilities for increased productivity in agriculture, better performance by children raises the hope of the reproduction of young farmers who are knowledgeable and informed. This realisation also answers the ‘intergenerationality’ of agrarian change of the FTLRP considering the fact that the majority of land beneficiaries are in their late fifties and sixties.

10.8 Adaptability

Education has to be adaptable to the needs of the diverse communities it is serving. It should also be responsive to the dynamism of the social and cultural environment. In being adaptable, education has to be holistic in nature to address the physical, social and emotional development of the individual. The Nziramasanga Commission of 1999 noted that education in Zimbabwe

lacked relevant practical training skills since the curriculum is mainly academic and theoretical (Raftopoulos, 2003). Glatthorn and Jailall (2000) argue that curriculum should emphasize in-depth instead of broad coverage of important areas of knowledge, authentic and contextualised problems of study, and problem solving that stresses skills development as well as knowledge acquisition. Further, curriculum should be able to provide for individual differences, closely coordinate and selectively integrate subject matter while focussing on results or standards and targets for student learning (Ibid). The focus group discussion with teachers at Mupamombe Secondary School was very instructive to this issue. One of the teachers noted that:

I think what we teach children should be in line with their interests. It's not true to think that all children are the same and will perform the same way given different subjects. Our pass rate for the last five years renders us failures as teachers because our students are not passing their ordinary level exams. For me the issue is to make sure that the curriculum is flexible to accommodate the areas of aptitude which the children have. Our education system does not tolerate difference, every child has to be academic otherwise they will be rendered as failures by the system... [Focus group discussion at Mupamombe Secondary School, 19/06/2015]

The head teacher at Bonstead Secondary School weighed in on this subject by noting that:

You do not expect a child at a Harare school and our student here at Bonstead to perform the same in any given subjects. Their trajectories are different. A child at Bonstead walks approximately 5 kilometres to school. At home the same child will be having a lot of chores to do such as fetching water, firewood and taking care of livestock. All these factors have to be considered. The rural child has a lot of burdens to bear... it then does not make sense to expect this child who also is coming from a school without a library, without laboratory and other necessary equipment needful for one to pass, to compete at the same level... it's one thing which powers that be in education have to address. [In-depth interview with Bonstead Secondary School Head Teacher, 3/07/2015]

The foregoing quotes affirms the point that the issue of prior cultural capital that pupils bring to school and the impact on performance is something that is widely recognised in the field of education. The nature of the problem may be greater in rural farming communities but this is a general problem. Beside the need to address the different contexts where children come from, respondents were calling for schools system that appreciates what children in farming communities go through. One parent in a Sherwood focus group discussion complained that it was unrealistic for school to start at 0730 hours when the children are having to walk long distances and also undertake some home chores especially during the rainy season. I observed that Moyo (2011)'s typologies of a tri-modal agrarian structure had a bearing on the responses

which I was getting. For the poor peasants who depend on family labour, during the rainy season, children also have a role to play in planting, weeding and protecting crops, especially from baboons. One farmer in this category noted that:

The school should bear in mind that children have responsibilities at home. During the planting season, the time they start lessons should be reviewed to 0900. This will make me not ask the child to abscond from school. The school should make such decisions in consultation with us parents. This child does not live in [a] vacuum; they come from a family which also has expectations of them... [Focus group discussion at Sherwood Farm, 15/08/2015]

The Ministry of Education has put in place a statutory instrument allowing each school to have a School Development Committee (SDC) that is made up of the parents. This SDC is supposed to represent the interests of the parents. In the schools that participated in the study, the SDC has been instrumental in setting school levies which parents can afford. One farmer was sceptical about their role when she noted that:

The SDC is made up of political figures who don't consult us when making decisions about the school. For you to be in that committee you will need to have money for people to respect you. The decisions that they are now making do not consider poor people like us. Now they are the ones who chase our children from school if I fail to pay the school levies. They don't even understand that sometimes money is difficult to find because most of them have it [FGD at Sherwood Farm, 15/08/2015].

In line with this farmer's complaint, I observed that the parents nominated people who have means into the SDC. Their reason was that such people would help the school through donations and networks, which can benefit the school. At Umlala Primary, I witnessed the SDC chairperson sending the children back home to get school fees. As a result, children missed lessons that day because going back home and coming back is not feasible because of the distances. One teacher noted that:

Sometimes when the children are sent home like that, they will take more than a week or two weeks to come back, if at all they will come back.

10.9 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to explore FTLRP education outcomes. The reason for focusing particularly on education is that human capital development is a centrepiece in increasing productivity in any country. As such, in exploring the outcomes of the FTLRP, it is imperative to appreciate the extent of human capital investment which subsequently lead to

increased productivity which would culminate in economic development. I have argued that beyond contributing to economic development through labour and skills, education is an entry point to increasing one's (capability set) opportunities and options to realise one's full potential. In the first section of the chapter, I presented justification on why focusing on education is important. I then provided an overview of the education provisions in the national constitution of Zimbabwe. In looking at the state of education in resettled farms, I used Tomaševsk (2001)'s framework on assessing quality education which looks at education availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability. I argued that the major education outcome of the FTLRP was increased accessibility of both primary and secondary education in the resettled areas. Secondary education significantly increased (31 percent) in Kwekwe District mainly due to the absence of secondary schools in the farming communities prior to the land reform program. Consequently, the abrupt demand for education in resettled areas inevitably compromised quality of the education provided. Some of the factors which compromised the quality of output from the satellite schools include inter alia; distances which the children have to walk to and from school, poor welfare of the teachers thereby affecting their motivation in school, and inadequate infrastructure.

The deplorable state of education in satellite schools affirms the transformative social policy conceptual framework which argues that there must be a symbiosis between economic and social policies. In this case, the economic challenges bedeviling the country adversely affected efforts to improve the quality of education in satellite schools. As a result, the aforementioned challenges do not have a solution in sight until the economic conditions of the country improve. Subsequently the education provided in the satellite schools is not able to significantly improve human capabilities of the learners so that their productive capacities are increased as initially envisaged.

CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION

11.1 Introduction

This thesis has explored social policy outcomes of the FTLRP. The thesis has come from an appreciation that there has been a lot of academic attention that has been given to the process and outcomes of the FTLRP. Various and sometimes antagonistic analytical approaches have been employed by different scholars who come from different epistemological stand points. I therefore endeavoured to transcend the various analytical frameworks to provide a unique perspective of the extent to which the FTLRP achieved social policy outcomes. Some of the scholars who have written on this subject have tackled some of the social policy outcomes without however a deliberate effort to focus on social policy outcomes.

This concluding chapter consolidates the various arguments from the earlier chapters in order to illuminate a conceptual understanding. I have organised this chapter into three broad sections. First of all, I provide an outline of the thesis whilst highlighting the major aspects of each of the chapters of this thesis. Secondly, I demonstrate how my thesis contributes to the body of knowledge on social policy whilst using the transformative social policy conceptual framework. Lastly, through the recommendations provided, I suggest how the findings of the thesis can be taken forward in view of the conceptual debates around social policy tools that are relevant for the global south.

11.2 Summary of the discussions

In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the social policy outcomes of the FTLRP, it is necessary to recap on the discussion so far. Chapter 2 provided an analysis of the polemical literature that has been produced on the FTLRP. The land reform process generated immense academic curiosity amongst scholars. Inevitably, this created ideological polarity as the scholars analysed both the process and outcomes of land reform using their ideological lenses. The following analytical frameworks were interrogated: the neopatrimonial approach; the human rights approach; the livelihoods approach and the political economy approach. It is instructive to note that each of the scholars produced nuanced arguments anchored on their ideological grounding. I however made sure that the key strands of debates and submissions

which the scholars made are the ones I used in providing a critique of the analytical framework which the scholars chose.

Having engaged with the literature attending to both the process and the outcomes of the FTLRP, in chapter 3, I unpacked the conceptual framework that I used in writing this thesis. I used the transformative social policy framework to analyse the FTLRP as a social policy tool. The framework was designed by scholars such as Adesina (2007), Mkandawire (20011) and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (2011) to correct the social policy mono tasking (Mkandawire 2005: 6) conceptual malaise as propagated mainly by most OECD scholars due to neoliberal bias. These OECD scholars reduced social policy to social assistance or social safety nets, (Holzman and Kozel 2007) resulting in literature focusing more on *ex post* interventions not *ex ante* (Adesina 2011). This mono tasking of social policy has reduced it to social protection as enunciated by scholars like Koehler (2011), and Sabates-Wheeler and Devereaux (2004). The transformative social policy conceptual framework therefore helps in conceptualising social policy in its broader functions of production; protection; redistribution; reproduction and social cohesion.

The chapter also provided a nexus between social policy and development. The reason for this was the realisation that social policy outcomes are measured using social development indicators. I demonstrated that social policy instruments are conduits for the achievement of social development in any society. I identified five areas of mutuality between development and social policy. First, there is a common interest in investing in human capabilities. Secondly, both social policy and development emphasise the inseparability of economic and social policies. Thirdly, both development and social policy put significance on social justice, which can be achieved amongst other means, through redistribution. Social capital is considered as a process and an outcome of development and social policy in view of Midgley's (2005) argument that communities with higher social cohesion have a high degree of social capital and economic well-being. Both social policy and development recognise the involvement of the state in achieving these desired outcomes.

Chapter 4 discusses methodological issues of the thesis. In this chapter, I first tackled issues of research philosophy, paying attention to the paradigm wars that exist between interpretivists and positivists. I then gave attention to the mixed methods approach, which was the research design for this thesis. I noted that whilst the thesis uses the mixed methods approach, it has an inclination towards the qualitative mixed methods research design. The methods used for data collection include in-depth interviews with land beneficiaries, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and systematic observation. I outlined the pros and cons of using these tools in data collection. For quantitative data, I relied on the baseline studies that were conducted by AIAS in 2008-2009 and 2013-2014. The baselines covered six districts, including Kwekwe District. The baseline surveys primarily provided data on what could be considered the production and redistribution functions of social policy. In the chapter, I chronicled the challenges that I had experienced in data collection, especially in view of the fact that land reform is a highly polarised subject in Zimbabwe. I outlined the ethical considerations I observed *inter alia*, confidentiality on the collected data, obtaining informed consent from the respondents, voluntary participation of the interviewees and not exposing the research participants to any form of risk through the research.

Chapter 5 sets the context for discussing the findings of the research. Having talked to the farmers, I realised that there was a general assumption in literature which suggested that the period between the time when beneficiaries got land (2000-2001 mostly), the circumstances were similar therefore outcomes of the FTLRP should be evident. From interacting with the farmers, I observed that there were three phases into which the farmers put their time after getting the land. The three phases are 2000-2006; 2007-2008 and 2009 to current. The chapter showed that in all the three phases, there were different dynamics which were telling to the situation that is prevailing on the farms right now. The first phase was characterised by farmers occupying the land and most of them enthusiastically working on the land. The production trends showed that whilst productivity drastically dropped between 2001 and 2002, there was a gradual increase in productivity up to 2006. This was despite the 2002 drought which affected farmers' yields. The second phase of 2007 to 2008 was observed by the farmers as the one when they were taken back to the starting point. This phase was characterised by drought and hyperinflation. Due to the latter, the Grain Marketing Board could not pay farmers for the agricultural produce which they had sold to the marketing board in good faith. This meant that most farmers did not have capital to use for the season that followed, hence they had to start

afresh. The third phase is linked to the second one. To salvage the hyper-inflationary environment, the government introduced a multicurrency system, with the US Dollar being the main currency. This compounded the situation for the farmers as they did not have means to get much needed capital to invest in the following agricultural season. Hence, phase three is about farmers striving on their own without much help from the state. I argue therefore that understanding social policy outcomes of the FTLRP has to be done in the context of these three phases in order to fully appreciate what is happening currently.

Chapter 6 interrogated the redistributive social policy outcomes of the FTLRP. In the chapter, I demonstrated that one of the major outcomes of the FTLRP was the changed agrarian structure from a bi-modal arrangement to a tri-modal structure. The new agrarian structure has about 150 000 households settled under the A1 scheme and 30 000 under the A2 scheme with some transnational agro estates still operating around the country. The new agrarian structure has created a broad base for the peasantry in its variegated categories. Indeed the process had its own short comings since it was mostly a revolution from below. As a result women did not get as much access to land on equal footing as men. This was mainly pronounced in A2 resettlement scheme where in Sherwood Farm, there are no women who were allocated A2 plots. There is general consensus among scholars that between 13-22% of the land beneficiaries are women. The majority of the women then accessed land through their husbands, which reinforces the patriarchal nature of the society. I further observed that the land beneficiaries brought their cultural values in the way they relate to land. As a result, the allocated plots are subdivided by the households to make provision for *tsewu* for the women and the main field for the household. I however observed that this increases the burden of labour on women as they are supposed to work on their *tsewu* at the same time contribute to the household plot.

The chapter also provided detailed accounts of how the land beneficiaries accessed the land in Kwekwe District. Some of the beneficiaries got the land during informal farm occupations, which were mainly orchestrated by the war veterans as similar to other districts studied by scholars such as *inter alia* Scoones *et al* (2010), Murisa (2007, 2010), Sadomba (2011) and Mkodzongi (2013). The majority of the land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District got the land through formal allocation by the government. Concerning the profiles of land beneficiaries, the data I collected and that of AIAS refutes the narrative that only the elite benefited from the

FTLRP. Civil servants, former farm workers, senior politicians, war veterans and ordinary citizens all benefited from the FTLRP, albeit to different extents. The beneficiaries also had varied education levels ranging from no formal education to tertiary qualifications such as degrees. The average age of the land beneficiaries is 55 years. Concerning farm residency trends, I observed that most beneficiaries in A1 type of farming, especially the villagised type, reside on the farms they were allocated.

Chapter 7 is premised on the understanding that production is centrepiece in the realisation of social policy outcomes. Hence, enhancement of the productive potential of members of society is a key variable in ensuring that social policy outcomes become a reality for the people. This chapter therefore answered the production question of what land beneficiaries are doing with the land they got, looking at both agricultural and non-agricultural activities. I argued that in appreciating the productive outcomes of the FTLRP, it is imperative to realise that it was not every land beneficiary's aspiration to consider agriculture as a business which subsequently contributes to national development. Some of the farmers I spoke to noted that their motivation for participating in the land reform exercise was to be able to get a *musha* for their children. Indeed the government was well aware of this as can be explained by coming up with A1 farms meant for family production, compared to A2 and LSCF designed for commercial production.

Overall, production trends showed a slump between 2001 and 2002. This was caused by a severe drought as well as the shocks of the land reform exercise. Thereafter, there was a gradual rise in production patterns for sorghum, tobacco and maize. In 2008, production of these crops fell to unprecedented levels. From 2009, despite the challenges, which farmers faced, there was a gradual rise again in production, although the levels of productivity are still lower than those of years before 2000.

I observed that export and cash crops are mostly produced by A2 farmers. Tobacco production has been on the rise across all the settlement models because of the support of private companies through contract farming. Even in districts such as Kwekwe which had no history of tobacco farming, farmers are slowly adopting this export crop. Overall, land utilization is still constrained by access to inputs and capital, while recurrent droughts pose challenges to

grain production, which is sensitive to rainfall patterns. Diversified markets now exist for a wide range of commodities produced by rural households beyond the state marketing system.

In the chapter, I covered the issue of agricultural financing, attending to the question of how the land beneficiaries are coping with this aspect. I observed that after the collapse of the agricultural marketing board system in 2008, the government has not been able to provide adequate support to the farmers. As such, issues of means of production such as inputs, access to tools, labour and access to information about agriculture pose challenges to farmers. As a coping mechanism, farmers have come up with ways of mitigating the impact by sharing productive tools and information. Further, I interrogated the availability and accessibility of quality extension services in Kwekwe District. I observed that indeed extension services are available and also accessible though their quality is low due to resource constraints. I end the chapter by looking at non-farming activities which take place on the resettled farms. In the context of Kwekwe District, gold panning is a pronounced activity. In Kwekwe, 72 percent of the farmers are also involved in gold panning.

I have argued that the FTLRP created new agrarian labour structure which has resulted in the semi-proletarianisation of labour. The farm workers mostly do not have farm tenancy as was the case under white farmers. This has made them to be roving from one farm job to another while negotiating a wage for each task being based at the compounds where farm workers used to stay. Under this arrangement, they are able to engage in gold panning and other productive non-agricultural activities.

Alva and Gunnar Myrdal posit that social policy should be prophylactic. Chapter 8 demonstrates that land reform is an *ex ante* social protection instrument. I demonstrated that even in droughts and periods of economic crises, the severity of vulnerability is reduced for land beneficiaries. The most immediate vulnerability that was reduced as a result of the FTLRP was destitution. This is because land beneficiaries have the opportunity to build for themselves durable shelter. Some of the land beneficiaries have made the resettlement areas their home where they do not have to pay for accommodation. Further, the land beneficiaries have significant potential for food security. This is because the land beneficiaries can use the land

to produce food for their families, cultivate gardens, and establish other income streams such as *inter alia*, selling firewood, selling grass for thatching houses, gold panning and mould bricks. All these options help the land beneficiaries to diversify their livelihoods.

I also observed that livestock is a form of insurance against the vagaries of the market and other exogenous factors which may affect the farmers. While livestock is a form of accumulation on the one hand, it is also a form of insurance when farmers are in dire straits. The farmers can sell their cattle, goats or chickens to get the money they may need for other things. They can also do barter trade in exchange of the products they need. Lastly, they can use the livestock for food.

Overall, I discovered that there are different levels of precarity amongst the farmers. These levels are characterised according to the tri-modal agrarian structure as posted by Moyo (2011). As a result, the farmers are affected differently by such things as droughts and economic crises. Farmers who fall into the first category of poor peasants are the hardest hit by droughts and economic crises. This is because they do not have diversified livelihoods that are sustainable. More often, they end up selling their labour to those with diversified livelihoods. Land beneficiaries who receive remittances from their children and are on pensions had lower levels of precarity compared to the land beneficiaries who did not have any reliable streams of incomes.

Despite the challenges which farmers in resettlement areas faced, their levels of precarity were lower than in the communal areas. The means of verifying this were the statistics of those receiving food aid in a particular year. This was more in communal areas compared to the resettlement areas. Further, the AIAS survey showed that land beneficiaries in the resettlement areas indicated that a greater proportion of the people in the resettlement areas eat three meals in a day whilst in communal areas the average number of meals per day was two. These observations show that land reform prophylactically reduces the levels of household vulnerability for the land beneficiaries in a lot of ways.

Chapter 9 explored the social cohesion outcomes of the FTLRP. I used Jenson (1998)'s conceptualisation social cohesion which denotes that there is vertical and horizontal cohesion. I acknowledged that several scholars had attended to the aspect of social cohesion outcomes of the FTLRP albeit using primarily the horizontal cohesion lenses. In the chapter, I showed that the FTLRP brought people of different backgrounds, religious beliefs and value systems together. Be that as it may, they were faced with similar challenges which made them to collaborate as they tried to solve the challenges. Land beneficiaries collaborated, in some instances, successfully whilst in other instances without much success. I observed that the collaboration of the farmers transcends the tri-modal agrarian structure's categorisation of the farmers. A1 farmers work with A2 farmers in solving common challenges such as water and building of schools. The building of Bonstead Secondary School is one example of a project where the farmers are working together to make sure that the school is established. This project is on the road to succeeding since most of the materials needed have been provided by the farmers. The success of this project is because for the A1 farmers who are not able to provide financial contributions provide their labour. An example of a project that was not so successful was the Umlala Water Project. The failure of the project was because when financial contributions were needed, most farmers in A1 resettlement scheme were not able to raise the required amounts, to the frustration of A2 farmers who could meet their portions of the required contributions.

The other major areas of cooperation for the land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District is on sharing productive tools and participation in farmer groups. As a result, there has been some solidarity amongst the farmers as was noted in the lobbying activities done by those close to government leaders on behalf of those who do not have such access. One institution in horizontal cohesion that has played an instrumental role in bringing people together is the church. Through it, members have come up with mutual aid societies (*mikando*) where they support each other in addressing challenges they face.

Chapter 10 does not necessarily address one of the social policy function as other findings chapters. Instead, the chapter explores education outcomes of the FTLRP since it had pronounced outcomes. The reason for focusing particularly on education is that human capital development is a centrepiece in increasing productivity in any country. As such, in exploring

the outcomes of the FTLRP, it is imperative to appreciate the extent of human capital investment, which subsequently lead to increased productivity that would culminate in economic development. Beyond contributing to economic development through labour and skills, education is an entry point to increasing one's (capability set) opportunities and options to realise one's full potential.

I argued that the major education outcome of the FTLRP was increased accessibility of both primary and secondary education in the resettled areas. Secondary education significantly increased (31 percent) in Kwekwe District mainly due to the absence of secondary schools in the white farming areas prior to the land reform program. Consequently, the abrupt demand for education in resettled areas inevitably compromised quality of the education provided. Some of the factors which compromised the quality of output from the satellite schools include inter alia; distances which the children have to walk to and from school, poor welfare of the teachers thereby affecting their motivation in school and inadequate infrastructure.

I observed that the deplorable state of education in satellite schools affirms the transformative social policy conceptual framework which argues that there must be a symbiosis between economic and social policies. In this case, the economic challenges bedeviling the country adversely affected efforts to improve the quality of education in satellite schools. As a result, the aforementioned challenges do not have a solution in sight until the economic conditions of the country improve. Subsequently the education provided in the satellite schools is not able to significantly improve human capabilities of the learners so that their productive capacities are increased as initially envisaged.

11.3 Contribution to debates and knowledge

11.3.1 Land reform as a social policy tool

This thesis has provided an important perspective of land reform as a social policy tool. This is significant because for a long time, land reform has not been generally considered as a social policy tool in the mainstream social policy literature. The reason for the unavailability of self-conscious literature on the land reform as a social policy tool has been due to the fact that literature on social policy has been dominated by Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) scholars resulting in the literature having an OECD bias (Mkandawire 2007). The OECD scholars have also endeavoured to write on social policy in developing countries albeit wearing their lenses hence unable to put premium on social policy instruments relevant to the developing world such as land reform. As a result, social policy tools found in the global south, such as land reform, have not been given due consideration on how they have contributed to the well-being of the people. In trying to return to a 'wider vision of social policy' (Adesina, 2015), the UNRISD (2006)'s unpacking of social policy elements included land reform despite there being little to no self-conscious literature that views land reform as a social policy tool, except for researches by Gough (2004); Huch-ju Kwon & Ilcheong Yi (2008); Nitya Rao (2014); Mark Alan Hughes & Peter M. Vandoren (1990) and Yi *et al* (2014).

Land reform researches that have been done by such scholars as Moyo (2005, 2007, 2009, 2011), Scoones (2010, 2015), Mutopo (2011, 2012), Murisa (2007, 2010), Chiweshe (2014) have proven that the FTLRP achieved social policy outcomes. This body of literature does not necessarily make a deliberate effort of looking at the outcomes of FTLRP from a social policy perspective. It can be argued that even though the land reform program might not have been conducted with a full consciousness that it was addressing social policy outcomes, but a thorough interrogation of the aforementioned literature demonstrates that the five social policy functions namely production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and social cohesion have been realised to varying extents.

11.3.2 From bi-modal to tri-modal agrarian structure

The FTLRP changed the existing agrarian structure from a bi-modal arrangement to a tri-modal agrarian structure. Though there have been debates on who benefited from the land, with the Neopatrimonial School arguing that only the elites benefited while most of the left scholars have been refuting that claim noting that people of all classes benefited. In consonance with Moyo (2009) and Scoones *et al* (2010), I observed that the FTLRP benefited all classes of society. Civil servants, former farm workers, senior politicians, war veterans and ordinary citizens all benefited from the FTLRP, albeit to different extents. The FTLRP gave 180 000 households access to land which was previously owned by 6000 white farmers. As I noted in Chapter 7 on social protection outcomes of social policy, access to land reduced significantly the precarity of these households to vagaries of the market and other exogenous factors such

as droughts and economic crises. Having access to land meant that the land beneficiaries could diversify their livelihoods. In some instances, working on the land gave the land beneficiaries an opportunity to increase their capabilities.

11.3.3 Reproduction in the resettlement areas

It is imperative to note that the families on the resettlement farms are not a homogenous group. There are farm workers who provide labour as families to some of the land beneficiaries. These also take care of the properties of the land beneficiaries as the latter are in towns or elsewhere. In this set up, both the husband and the wife team up to provide labour to the better off land beneficiaries. The wife of the farm worker has double burden of work because she still does home chores such as taking care of the children and preparing food after working on their employer's field together with the husband. The men have also their own responsibilities such as looking for more jobs like thatching houses, tending after livestock, clearing fields and so forth.

For the families that are resettled, I observed that these brought with them their cultural way of using the land. The allocated plots are further subdivided by the households to give the women *tsewu*. *The tsewu* increases burden of labour on women as they are supposed to work on their *tsewu* at the same time contribute to the household plot. The concept of *tsewu* gives women reprieve that they have access to land to carry out any productive activities of their choice. It is however worth noting that the *tsewu* concept does not challenge the patriarchal norms that are repressive for women. Whilst allocating a *tsewu* for women gives access to land, it does not address the issues of ownership and control of the land. Women are then left in false comfort of having access to land but not having power to make decisions when it matters. The *tsewu* concept reinforces patriarchal system. In this regard, I disagree with Mutopo (2011) who posited that the *tsewu* concept enables women to have access to land so that they can grow crops such as Bambara nuts, sweet potatoes and ground nuts. These crops are for the family's consumption and should there be surplus, she sells still to supple the other needs of the home. It is my argument that access to land which does not empower the women with ownership and control is not empowerment at all.

11.3.4 The concept of *musha*

I have noted that most scholars writing about the production outcomes of the FTLRP have a tendency to make gross generalisations as though the land beneficiaries are homogeneous group. I discovered that not all land beneficiaries are there for production purposes. Some of the land beneficiaries took the land in order to create a *musha* for their children who may be in towns, diaspora or any other context. In the Shona culture, when children leave their parents' home to start their own families, they always leave provision of coming back should it not work out where they will be going. This idea of a young person knowing that there is a safety net called *kumusha* will make them not be destitute. It therefore brings dignity and pride to have a home that you can go to. In good times, children visit the home during holidays and special occasions such as marriages. The home is also the place where one is usually buried in the event of death. Therefore having a *musha* gives one a sense of belonging and dignity.

Some of the land beneficiaries, especially the former farm workers, did not have a *musha* for their children. For such land beneficiaries, getting allocated a plot which they could transform into a *musha* for their children was a lifetime achievement that would bring them dignity. For such a land beneficiary, their aspiration is not necessarily production. Not to say that they would not get involved in any productive activity, but their goal is to occupy the place for their children. There will be dissonance of expectation if such a land beneficiary is expected to strive for increase in productivity. Whose expectation will that be? It is on the basis of this argument that this thesis does not call all the people who got land to be 'farmers'. Some are not farmers but certainly all are land beneficiaries.

11.3.5 Livestock as a safety net

I have noted in the introductory chapter that social policy literature has not provided ample attention to social policy tools that are relevant to the global south. One of such tools is livestock. In my interaction with land beneficiaries, I observed that cattle are both a form of investment as well as a safety net. Livestock, especially cattle, are a resource which almost every land beneficiary strives to have many of. I observed that this is because the more the cattle, the safer the household from any precarity. In times of income shortages, households sell cattle to pay children's school fees, to buy food or even to buy other productive assets which the family may not have. One farmer sold cattle to have a borehole drilled on his plot.

Besides selling, cattle can be exchanged for products or tools which one would not have. In years of drought, land beneficiaries exchange cattle for grain. In some instances, the livestock are slaughtered for food, with surplus meat sold to neighbours sometimes for cash and in other instances for household goods. It is therefore my submission that livestock be considered as social policy tool that is relevant for the global south.

11.3.6 Grain marketing board as a social protection tool

When the GMB collapsed in 2008, farmers were affected significantly resulting in the latter struggling to find capital for the seasons that followed. The reason why the farmers were affected by the collapse of the GMB was that the parastatal had been put in place as a mechanism to cushion farmers against market failures as well as droughts. The GMB was a ready market for the farmers which meant that they would not struggle in selling their produce. It also gave the GMB an opportunity to redistribute the food to those regions which may not have had good harvests. GMB's selling price for the grain was highly subsidized meaning that in years of droughts, farmers could access the grain they had rendered to GMB in years of good harvests. This meant that there was consistent food supplies for households around the country. The collapse of this facility can be traced back to the neoliberal policies of the World Bank and IMF through the structural adjustment programs. After the land reform process in Zimbabwe, the GMB had not recovered subsequent to the 2008 economic crisis; this was the last blow. It is imperative that this facility be revived as a social protection mechanism for the farmers.

11.3.7 The symbiosis between economic and social policies

Using education outcomes of the FTLRP, I demonstrated that there is a symbiotic relationship between economic and social policies. On the one hand, the quality of education that is produced in resettlement areas is a function of the ailing economy of the country. Due to this, there is no adequate resources available to invest into improvement of quality of education. The realisation of social policy outcomes is directly related to the contribution of the economy in sustaining such outcomes. Social policy outcomes are not sustainable when they are not supported by the economic policy. On the other hand, economic policy is compromised by reduced human capabilities since education will not be able to provide the necessary skills to individuals so that they may improve their productive capacities. Increased production in agriculture is to some degree dependent on the quality skilled labour power available.

11.4 Policy Recommendations

This section outlines recommendations that follow from the analysis and results of this study. This study recognises that there have been efforts already for agrarian reform through the Zimbabwe Agricultural Investment Plan (ZAIP 2012-2016). These recommendations therefore contribute to some of the initiatives in the ZAIIP.

11.4.1 Land audit

After the completion of the FTLRP, there is need for a comprehensive land audit. The audit needs to address issues of multiple farm ownership. Further, the audit needs to conduct a skills audit of the land beneficiaries so that tailor made capacity building interventions can be made. The audit also needs to address issues of farm sizes, especially on A2 farms. I observed that some of the land beneficiaries in this category do not have the capacity to fully utilise the land they obtained. Some piece meal audits are being conducted albeit not in a systematic manner so they may not pick the trends that transgress districts of the country.

11.4.2 Land tenure security

The proposals in ZAIIP of making A2 leases collateralable and transferable should be executed promptly and could be expediently extended to the family farmers under the A1 scheme, where it will be most useful to the market-oriented ones. Such reforms would need to be supported by enhanced capacity to survey the land subdivisions and issuance of associated leases. Completion of the surveying of the new A2 farms would be a crucial initial step to allow issuance of documents to make land usable as collateral.

Further, there is a need to make clear the procedures for the further redistribution of some lands owned by government, and unutilized land held by some A2 farmers, and private estates. Other elements that could be strengthened include improving administration capacity of the central government and districts to consolidate landholding records and their registration/notarization; to administratively redress the actual and potential threats of eviction and boundary disputes and to issue the finalized version of the land permits and leases.

11.4.3 Agricultural financing modalities

Firstly, the government needs to improve its fiscal space so that there may be substantial resources available for improving agricultural financing. One strategy that could be employed is the introduction of an ear-mark tax for agriculture. We have seen such an arrangement working in countries like Ethiopia where each citizen contributes to the construction of their national dam. Zimbabwe is not new to earmark taxes, previously, the country instituted an AIDS Levy where each worker contributed 3percent of their income to efforts meant to address HIV and AIDS. A similar initiative can be done, coming up with mechanisms though of those in informal employment to contribute.

Secondly, the government needs to improved access by all farmer groups to short-term credit, with emphasis on micro-finance for the part time and semi-subsistence farmers and cooperative, and commercial bank credit for market oriented farmers, as well as for commercial farmers. Contract farming arrangements have the potential to advance further in crops and livestock products that are most likely to be perishable, and require major processing or packaging near the area where they are produced. The commodity-specific arrangements can be very specific to the requirements of the crop or livestock product, and therefore need to emerge out of intensive consultations of the producers and the contracting firms.

11.4.4 Strengthening agronomic services

The government needs to strengthen agronomic and farm management skills that are provided by the AGRITEX workers. The extension workers need continuous training themselves so that they can add value to the farmers. The extension workers need reliable modes of transport to be able to access the farmers on a regular basis for continuous support. Further, the farmers need support for sustainable natural resources management and utilisation. The extension workers, if well equipped with both information and work paraphernalia, can be able to provide these agronomic services.

11.4.5 Investment in irrigation services

Zimbabwe is a drought prone country. As such, irrigation becomes essential for assuring national food security and subsequently food sovereignty. Irrigation will facilitate the growth of a full complement of agricultural products. During the FTLRP, irrigation systems and irrigation capital was vandalised hence it got ruined significantly, hence reducing areas under irrigation. The Zimbabwe Agricultural Investment program therefore justly underscores the rehabilitation of dilapidated irrigation schemes and their redesign to suit the new farm structure where for example, one farm now has 44 households. A systematic effort is required to adapt irrigation technologies and systems to serve the full range of farm types. For example, for A1 farmers, supplying smaller water pumps and water distribution equipment, such as mini-center pivots will go a long way in addressing this particular issue.

In addressing the irrigation challenge, priority should be put on agro-ecological regions that face frequent droughts which then result in low crop yields. Prioritizing the marginal areas in irrigation development and rehabilitation will be critical in boosting food security and supplies in these deficit areas. Kwekwe District predominantly falls in region 3 which generally does not receive adequate rainfall for good crop yields.

11.4.6 Access to inputs and product markets

The government needs to put subsidies on agricultural inputs that differentiate across the different agro-ecological zones, not necessarily poor families only. There is need to focus on the family farmers in marginal areas which are characterized low use of productivity enhancing inputs are thus not prioritized. There is need for improved targeting of input subsidies and services advocated for in ZAIP to take into account the differentiation in input use across the different agro-ecological zones. Beyond agro-ecological region specific inputs, the government should be able to provide inputs to all A1 farmers. The needs of the family farmers in the marginal areas which are characterized low use of productivity enhancing inputs need to be prioritized.

11.5 Conclusion

Due to the OECD bias in social policy literature, social policy tools that are relevant for the global south have not received a lot of academic attention. One of such tools is land reform. This thesis explored the extent to which the FTLRP achieved social policy outcomes using the transformative social policy framework. The transformative social policy framework seeks to correct the neoliberal conceptualisation of social policy, where the latter has been reduced to social protection. As such, the transformative social policy framework helps in realising that social policy has five main tasks, namely production, redistribution, protection, reproduction and social cohesion.

It can be said that the unequivocal social policy outcome of the FTLRP is redistribution. The land reform program redistributed land to 180 000 households which used to be owned by some 6000 white farmers. Having access to land achieves developmental outcomes as it reduces vulnerability of the households from destitution and starvation since land reform is a prophylactic social policy tool. There were several other outcomes such as social cohesion as the land beneficiaries seek to solve common challenges such as access to water and agricultural inputs.

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ANNEXURES

Annexure 1: Schedule of Interviews

The names of the interviewees are given only in the case of those who granted me the permission to do so

Mr Dube, ZANU PF Sherwood Ward Chairperson, (Sherwood Farm), 08/08/2015]

Ms Dhebhu, Kwekwe District Education Officer, (Kwekwe District Offices) 29/05/2015

Mr Koki, Bonstead Secondary School Headmaster, (Bonstead Secondary School) 3/07/2015

Mr. Makina, Umlala Primary Deputy Head Teacher, (Umlala Primary School), 15/06/15

Mr. Moyo, Kwekwe District War Veterans Chairperson, (Umlala Farm), 17/06/15

Ms. Chavhi, CAMFED Representative (Umlala Farm), 16/05/2015

Mr. Gomba, Sherwood Primary Head teacher, (Sherwood Primary School), 17/ 07/2015

Mr. Nyama, Umlala Ward Agricultural Extension Officer, (Umlala Farm), 14/4/15

Ms. Madamombe, Sherwood Ward Agricultural Extension Officer, (Sherwood Farm), 23/7/15

Ms. Samambwa, Bonstead Headwoman, (Bonstead Village), 20/08/2015

Chief Samambwa, (Sherwood Farm), 19/08/2015

Annexure 2: Schedule of the Focus Group Discussions

Location	Name of group	Number of participants	Date
Sherwood Farm	Sherwood A2 farmers	7	15/08/2015
Sherwood Farm	Sherwood A1 farmers	5	16/08/2015
Mupamombe Secondary School	Mupamombe Secondary School Teachers	5	19/06/2015
Umlala Farm	Umlala A1 and A2 Farmers	8	14/04/2015
Umlala Primary School	Umlala Primary School Teachers	6	15/06/2015
Bonstead Secondary School	Bonstead Secondary School Teachers	7	3/07/2015

End Notes

¹ Gough only noted land reform as a social policy instrument but did not discuss it further. Chung devoted a portion of his chapter to land reform. Other scholars who recognised land reform as a social policy instrument include: Huch-ju Kwon & Ilcheong Yi. (2008); Nitya Rao. (2014); Mark Alan Hughes & Peter M. Vandoren. (1990). Like Chung, Kwon & Yi noted land reform as a social policy instrument in Korea, Rao mentioned land reform as having the same objectives as social policy—rather *as a social policy instrument*. Whilst Hughes and Vandoren’s paper has the title “social policy through land reform”, the focus however was on the equity outcome of the Mount Laurel ruling by the US Supreme Court.

² See Grotius 1583-1645) on the right of acquiring things taken in war (as discussed by Friedman 1972). For contrary views, see Brownlie (1959) and Dugard (1983).

³ The Lancaster House Agreement precluded the post-colonial Zimbabwe government from taking the land for the first ten years.

⁴ The Svosve invasions were not the first as stated by one author: “Between 1983 and 1997, villagers from Mutasa, Chihwiti, Mhondoro and Nyamatsitu, communal lands that the state had leased to white commercial farmers were repeatedly invaded by those seeking to exert historical claims. In each instance, the government evicted these landless villagers by force. In June 1998, the Svosve people of the Marondera and Wedza districts undertook a series of illegal farm occupations. Earlier in October 1996, the land issue came to a head when a group of 200 land hungry peasants invaded an idle state farm adjacent to the Matobo Research Station in Matabeleland in defiance of the government. The unilateral action by citizens was an illustration of the growing impatience among thousands of landless Zimbabweans over the implementation of the nation-wide land redistribution programme to correct pre-independence

imbalances.” Chikuhwa J. The Haphazard Land Reform at <http://chikuhwa.net/zimbabwelandreform.htm>

⁵ The number of farms gazetted shifted over time. Between June 2000 and Feb 2001 some 2 706 farms were gazetted. By Jan 2002 6 481 farms were listed. After discounting for double counting (918) and those removed from the list because of litigation or negotiation (689), there remained 4 874 farms on 9.23 million hectares (HRW 2002:11, UNDP 2002:12).

⁶ These figures are for the six districts where AIAS conducted its research. The districts are the following; Kwekwe, Mangwe, Zvimba, Chiredzi, Goromonzi and Chipinge

⁷ See the observer, 18.5.2003, JAG Zimbabwe, <http://www.justiceforagriculture.com/newsrelease131202.shtml>

⁸ See Onyekachi Wambui’s article in the *New African* titled Ending Colonial Impunity: The News That the British Government Has Agreed in Principle to Compensate the Torture Victims of the 1950s Land Wars in Kenya, Otherwise Known as Mau Mau, Is Earth-Shaking

⁹ Details on the bimodal and tri-modal arrangements are covered in the Chapter 6 on Redistribution outcomes of the FTLRP.

¹⁰ The Fabian influence on the immediate post-WWII Labour government and its programme of social reform is significant but the actual British social policy architecture is a patch work that reflect the reform of those immediate post-WWII as well as long rule of the Conservative Party from 1951 to 1964, and the years since Thatcher in 1979.

¹¹ The capability approach defines poverty as the absence or inadequate realization of certain basic freedoms (such as the freedoms to avoid hunger, disease, illiteracy, and so on) owing at least in part to lack of command over resources.

¹² Note that in the categorisation of the land beneficiaries, there is no category called ‘political elites’ as is posited especially by the neopatrimonial school. The elites are however scattered in the categories of war veterans, civil servants and self-employed.

¹³ the following are the four types of droughts: 1) Meteorological drought: A reduction in rainfall supply compared with a specified average condition over some specified period; defined as a period during which less than a certain amount (e.g. 70 percent) of the normal precipitation is received over any large area for an extended period. 2) Agricultural drought: A reduction in water availability below the optimal level required by a crop during each different growth stage, resulting in impaired growth and reduced yields. Agricultural drought relates to an imbalance in the water content of the soil during the growing season, which although influenced by other variables such as the crop water requirement, the water-holding capacity and degree of evaporation, is also largely dependent upon rainfall amount and distribution. 3) Hydrological drought: The impact of a reduction in precipitation on natural and artificial surface and subsurface water resources. It occurs when there is substantial deficit in surface runoff below normal conditions or when there is a depletion of groundwater supplies. Hydrological drought reduces the supply of water for irrigation, hydroelectrically power generation, and other household and industrial uses. 4) Socio-economic drought: The impact of drought on human activities, including both indirect and direct impacts. This relates to a meteorological anomaly or extreme event of intensity and/or duration outside the normal range of events taken into account by enterprises and public regulatory bodies in economic decision-making, thereby affecting production and the wider economy.

¹⁴ It is important to note that NGOs gave food aid whilst the government provided grain loan schemes through the GMB.

¹⁵ Jenson, 1998: 15-17) outlines five dimensions of social cohesion which are the following: (1) Belonging v. Isolation. This refers to the existence or absence of shared values and a sense of identity (Jenson, 1998: 15). (2) Inclusion v. Exclusion. This dimension looks at the equality of opportunity among citizens in economic realm, that is, the market (Jenson, 1998: 15). (3) Participation v. Non-involvement. This focuses on people's political participation at both the central and the local levels of government (Jenson, 1998: 16). (4) Recognition v. rejection. This dimension concerns the respect for difference or tolerance for diversity in society (Jenson, 1998: 16). (5) Legitimacy v. illegitimacy. This refers to the maintenance of legitimacy of major political and social institutions - the state in particular - as mediators among individuals of different interests (Jenson, 1998: 16-17).

¹⁶ White man here is used as a symbol of power, someone with means, not needing any help from people around. It also depicts a mind-set of individualism with no regard of the vulnerabilities of people around.

¹⁷ This is a form of storage where farmers put their maize cobs to dry before graining it. It has to be built high so that livestock will not reach.

¹⁸ Hard infrastructure refers to the buildings, furniture and equipment necessary for education to happen. Soft infrastructure refers to availability of competent and motivated teachers and ancillary support staff able to support the students in their learning experience in the school.

¹⁹ The total budget for 2013 was USD 3.8 Billion. For 2014, the total budget was USD3.6 Billion. For 2015, the total budget was USD 4 Billion. The figure remained constant for 2016 at USD4 Billion.

²⁰ <http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2012/11/23/2013-budget-disbursements-the-real-test/>

²¹ <http://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2015/02/27/increase-education-budget-unicef>
<http://www.herald.co.zw/budget-allocates-close-to-us1bn-to-education/>

²² <http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2014/12/19/chinamasas-us6bn-budget-dream/>