

**The role of school-based teacher incentives to improve student achievement:
Experiences from selected secondary schools in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe**

by

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SUMMARY

This study explored the role of school-based teacher financial incentives on student academic achievement. Despite great efforts made by Zimbabwean government towards improving the education system in terms of infrastructure development and increasing number of schools, prior and after 1980, not much attention had been paid to the role of teachers' extra-financial incentives on enhancing teacher motivation which leads to student achievement in and outside classroom situation. Extra-financial incentives differ from government to government depending on the revenue base and political will by such governments to support these teacher incentives programmes. In developed countries, respective governments pay different teacher incentives while in developing countries, parents/guardians or School Development Committees (SDCs) shoulder the burden. This study contented that one of the ways to improve student achievement has been payment of school-based teacher incentives to supplement teachers' low salaries. While the need to adequately compensate teachers had been a worldwide phenomenon, this is in contrast to Zimbabwean experience after 2014, when Government of National Unity (GNU) came to an end. Zimbabwean government banned payment of teacher incentives under unclear reasons which were widely purported to be political. This research adopted a qualitative approach and as such, collection of primary and secondary data were done using multiple data collection techniques. Techniques included interviews with key informants, focus group discussions and open ended questionnaires in selected secondary schools. Results from this study revealed that improving teacher motivation through school-based incentives had been central to improved student achievement. In schools where teacher incentive system was practiced pass-rates increased, with a sudden decline when teacher incentives were banned. Banning or lack of properly designed incentive systems, where teachers were consulted, was seen as negatively affecting student achievement in selected secondary schools of Makoni District.

Keywords

School-based teacher incentives, teacher motivation, teacher retention, financial incentives, non-financial incentives, student academic achievement, Zimbabwean education system, teaching and learning process, school pass-rate, pedagogical style, public school examinations, hyper-inflationary environment, creative beings, teachers, educational planners, teachers' self-concept.

DECLARATION

STUDENT No. 53321545

I declare that **The role of school-based teacher incentives to improve student achievement: Experiences from selected secondary schools of Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe** is my own work and that sources I used have been acknowledged by means of complete references.

Signature

Date: 21 June 2016



Mr. Joseph Chakandinakira

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my wife, Unique, my mother, Virginia, and my daughter, Rauleen-Sibonginkosi Chakandinakira.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This study examined the role of school-based teacher incentives to improve student achievement. The research was conducted in selected secondary schools of Makoni District in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe. It analysed the nature of implementation process of school-based teacher incentives to cushion teachers from debilitating effects of an economic slump in Zimbabwe between 2003 and 2008. This study contended that payment of incentives to teachers was a necessary initiative to motivate teachers as well as to improve student achievement. Student achievement had been affected in part by lack of teacher motivation due to economic meltdown that had affected Zimbabwean economy during that period. It should be noted from the outset that student under-achievement is not caused by lack of teacher motivation only, either is it a new phenomenon that started during a crumbling of Zimbabwean economy. It has always been there, but the period under study, 2003 to 2008 witnessed a convergence of negative forces that worked against interests of both teachers and students. To teachers, morale was at its lowest ebb as they tried to eke out a living from an employer who could not satisfactorily pay. Students had to be contended encountering demotivated and sometimes unqualified teachers as some of most experienced and qualified teachers had either left the profession for greener pastures or had abandoned the profession altogether (Gomba, 2015). Introduction of school-based teacher incentives, which is the focus of this study, generated a lot of academic debate as to their role in improving student achievement. (Machivenyika, 2014; Makanga & Mutsagondo, 2014).

The period under study was characterised by political upheavals in Zimbabwe, which had a long term effect on this country's education sector (Ndlovu, Phiri & Mutale, 2014). At independence in 1980, Zimbabwean government realised how important education was in transforming Zimbabwean society. Government then channelled much resources towards development of education through payment of teachers'

salaries, building of schools and expanding its curriculum and teacher training colleges. This placed Zimbabwe on an international map as one of the countries with a fast developing and viable education system. Despite these enormous steps taken by government to improve its education system, Zimbabwean economy began to face serious challenges between 2003 and 2008, which almost reversed gains that the education sector had attained over the previous years (Ndlovu, Phiri & Mutale, 2014). After 2008 general elections in Zimbabwe, government realised that it could not be a lone player in addressing economic and political challenges in this country, leading to formation of Government of National Unity (GNU).

GNU was formed as a result of a compromise between two main rival political parties in Zimbabwe. These main political parties are Zimbabwe African National Union, Patriotic Front (ZANU) PF and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). GNU realised damages that had been done in Zimbabwean education sector and put in place measures to rejuvenate morale of demotivated teachers. There was limited debate among major political players then regarding the inevitability and importance of teacher interaction with students in teaching process.

One of the main challenges faced by Zimbabwe during GNU was how to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of education sector in face of limited human and material resources due to an economic slump (Adebayo & Gombakomba, 2013). This study argues that teachers are the most vital group of professionals for the future and progress of every nation. It was disturbing to note that prior to and after GNU, many teachers were disgruntled with their jobs as these two phases were characterised by the inception and subsequent withdrawal of school-based incentives. It is the contention of this study that education is fundamental and central in making a positive difference to lives of people world over (Butrymowicz, 2012). Teachers play a crucial role in the development of students' minds and students are key to a future development of any nation. It is therefore important that teachers, who spend greater part of their time with students, be sufficiently motivated in order for student learning experiences to be productive. Through a process of social interaction, which is the main theory that informed this study, students stand to benefit by interacting with a

committed and motivated teacher. Therefore, inclusion of school-based teacher incentives was seen as a mitigating factor meant to cushion teachers whose morale had dampened due to low salaries. Thus the quality, disposition, pedagogic approaches and choice of materials by teachers, are critical in determining the quality and nature of students that a school produces (Bennell, 2004; Mukeredzi, 2013).

Termination of GNU spelt a death knell to the school sector through policy changes, such as, banning of school-based teacher incentives and abolition of vacation school lessons (Agere, 2015). These had been key factors, among others, that had led to a resuscitation of teacher morale, which had contributed to improvement in student achievement. These policy changes have been a subject of debate among educators, community and different stakeholders, hence the need to carry out a study on the role of school-based teacher incentives on improving student achievement.

1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

This research study focused on whether or not school-based teacher incentives increased achievements of students in Zimbabwean schools with specific reference to Makoni District in Manicaland region. In this study, the term school-based teacher incentives referred to teacher incentives peculiar to a certain school. Incentives vary, in terms of quantum, from one school to another, depending on the ability of school authorities to provide such incentives to teachers. Student achievement can be related to improved pass-rate of students in public examinations, namely Grade Seven, Ordinary and Advanced levels. However, this study focused only on improved pass-rate in Ordinary level. These public examinations are administered by Zimbabwe Schools Examination Council (ZIMSEC). Providing financial incentives for teachers to increase students' performance, is a popular practise in any education system around the world (Fryer, 2011). Thus, Zimbabwean education system had not been spared from this global trend.

Standards in Zimbabwean education system declined during an economic slump in Zimbabwean economy. This period was characterised by high inflationary rates

during which transactions were conducted using local currency (bearer cheques). Those who were in civil service could hardly sustain their living by means of salaries received from government. Zimbabwe was thus hit by a massive exodus of teachers who either left for perceived greener pastures in neighbouring countries or abandoned the profession altogether to pursue other fields locally and internationally. A study conducted by the Research and Advocacy Unit in 2012 indicated that 70 000 teachers had fled from Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008. The then minister, in Ministry of Education, Art, Sport and Culture (MoEASC) during an inclusive government in Zimbabwe, added that in only two years, 20 000 teachers were lost, that is, between 2007 and 2008, due to economic crisis (Newsday, 6 February 2013). As in 2009, Zimbabwe had an estimated teaching staff complement of 106 000 out of a required 136 000 (Research and Advocacy Unit in 2012).

The departure of teachers from civil service meant that students were negatively affected as they would spend much of their school-time without teachers to attend to them. Few teachers who decided to remain in country, lost the spirit and motivation to work hard because the money they earned was barely enough for their sustenance. This period was also characterised by intermittent work stoppages through strikes, absenteeism, absconding, go slows and sit-ins. Some schools were left with skeletal staff, usually those in administrative roles, that is, school head, deputy and other senior members of staff. Duties of these school administrators were then relegated to managing a depleted staff base and to maintain discipline among those students who opted to attend school. Teachers spent much of their time, either queuing for basic commodities which were in short supply in supermarkets or conducting private tutorial lessons in order to supplement their meager salaries. Some teachers opted to raise money through engaging in unlawful activities such as exchanging foreign currencies or transferring electronic money. This activity was popularly known as *burning money* in which one could deposit a small amount of United States dollars into a bank account of a client in return for a lot of largely worthless Zimbabwean money (Bearer Cheques) which could run into quadrillions if not quintillions. Other teachers even engaged in illegal alluvial gold and diamond mining where they could raise a bit of cash for their family up-keep.

Period prior to 2008 was also characterised by mushrooming of private backyard schools. These private schools enrolled many students who realised that no learning was taking place at public schools, as teachers had directly or indirectly withdrawn their services. Tutors at these private schools were mostly unqualified, as they had not completed any teachers' training course. As these tutors lacked pedagogical skills to conduct their lessons, it might have impacted negatively on students' achievement.

In a bid to arrest human capital which had migrated to countries which were paying better salaries for their workers, Zimbabwean government mooted an idea of school-based incentives for teachers. This idea was supported by parents through their representative bodies, School Development Committees (SDC), as a way of retaining teachers and improving pass-rates in schools. According to 2009 Circular No. 5, of MoEASC, parents were expected to remunerate teachers through money collected by respective School Development Committees (SDCs). Thus, school-based teacher incentives were introduced as a stop-gap initiative meant to supplement teachers' salaries.

This current study was conducted to explore the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. It is important to conduct a study of this nature because the assumption is that student attainment is dependent on motivation of teachers among other factors. Teacher incentives thus came as a way of motivating disgruntled teachers due to economic meltdown in Zimbabwe. To date, there has been lack of empirical evidence to justify the inception of school-based teacher incentives in Zimbabwean education system. This study therefore attempted to indicate the usefulness of school-based teacher incentives to student achievement.

The teaching force in most countries has never enjoyed full professional status (Adeyeni, & Oyetende, 2011). Adeyeni and Oyetende (2011) further argue that the status of teaching as a semi-profession is more evident in developing countries. Globally teachers, have been found to be among lowest-paid personnel within civil services (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2008). Hannaway and Rotherham (2008) further argue that this has seriously affected the social status of teachers. Social status can

be viewed as a position or rank of a person or group in society. It is often based on power, education, occupation and most importantly, a person's economic status, that is portrayed through one's lifestyle, among other factors (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2008). Leigh and Ryan (2006) argue that in Australia only a few students had been attracted to teaching over the last several decades. This was a consequence of a decline in teacher wages in relative terms, as well as a decline in general status of teaching within community. Leigh and Ryan (2006) further postulate that between 1983 and 2003, the average percentile rank of those entering teacher training fell from 74 to 61, while the average rank of new teachers fell from 70 to 62.

The relationship between various governments and teachers in different countries had been viewed largely as hostile (Bennell, 2004). Teachers argue that they are not rewarded like other professionals. For instance, in United States of America (U.S.A) the government policy on rewarding teachers as compared to other professions is discriminatory (Vigdor, 2008). Vigdor (2008) further asserts that a lawyer can expect to reach his/her highest salary level (excluding a few years of extra-high earnings toward an end of his/her career) around an age of 35 and a doctor around 40 years. In contrast, a teacher would not reach her/his maximum earnings until an age of 55. This means that novice teachers have little incentives to stay in a system that makes them wait for years before earning a viable salary (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2008). However between 2003 and 2008, teachers in Zimbabwe were not demotivated by a maximum earning they would get at the peak of their years in service but by an economic turmoil that characterised this period. Thus, school-based teacher incentives were introduced to supplement teachers' low salaries because of this economic collapse which occurred during 2003 to 2008.

1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This research is informed by an interactionist perspective within the interpretative or qualitative paradigm (Henning, Van Rensburg & Smit, 2004). The basis of interactionist argument is that man is an active and creative being who is able to create his/her own social world (Giddens, 2001; Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2013;

Haralambos & Holborn, 2013). According to an interactionist theory, meaning is constructed, attributed, sustained and developed in the course of everyday social interaction (Gilbert, 2008:515). From this conceptualisation, achievement at school is not viewed in terms of one's background. It involves interaction processes at different levels within whole spectrum of education system. Incentivisation of teachers has been seen as one of the elements that enhance the type and quality of interaction between teachers and students in the teaching process. This is because of a motivating effect that teacher incentives can have on teachers' performance.

From a sociological perspective, a school represents society in miniature. Interaction processes that take place at school, therefore, to a large extent, determine outcomes of performance of students. (Giddens, 2001; Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2013; Haralambos & Holborn, 2013). In general terms, a motivated teacher goes an extra mile in giving students extra work/ homework, marking students' work and availing him or herself for consultation. According to interactionists, teacher-pupil and pupil-pupil interaction determine achievement at school. In the absence of effectively established and productive interaction there would not be any meaningful achievement. In context of this study, achievement of students is determined by the nature of interaction with sufficiently remunerated teachers.

The advent of school-based teacher incentives was meant to mitigate teachers from effects of hyper-inflationary environment that characterised the period between 2003 and 2008 in Zimbabwe. Key stakeholders in education sector, like United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), and some Non-governmental Organisations, (NGOs) also had to re-visit the nature of their contribution to Zimbabwean education system with a view to increase financial support to boost student achievement. From an interactionist point of view, far from being influenced by one's background, Bilton, Bennett, Jones, Skinner, Stanworth and Webster (1996) say that humans are active, creative and interpretive beings capable of creating their social world. This means that key stakeholders had to find alternative means of improving teacher performance which would in turn improve students' achievements. Symbolic interactionists conclude that human beings interact on the basis of shared meaning. Without shared

meaning, meaningful social interaction may not be possible (Haralambos & Holborn, 2013). In context of this study there was a commonality of interests or shared values and vision among educational stakeholders, that is, teachers, parents/guardians, NGOs and international organisations to improve student achievement.

According to Merton (1968) in Giddens, 2001; Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2013; Haralambos & Holborn, 2013) self-fulfilling prophecy implies that expectations made by teachers about a student's behaviour or achievement tend to come true even though an original expectation may have been faulty. In other words, predictions made by teachers about success or failure of students tend to come true because prediction(s) would have been made. Students' self-concepts could be shaped by teacher's definition, attitudes and expectations. However, these attitudes and expectations are largely influenced by teachers' working conditions. Improved working conditions, by means of paying incentives to teachers, have a high potential of raising teacher morale (Heneman, 1998). Research has shown that high teacher morale results in increased work-rate thereby improving student achievement (Bennell, 2004).

Zimbabwean education system, just like any other education systems globally, is characterised by various types of interactions within and outside school system. Teachers interact with different stakeholders, such as officials from MoEASC, SDCs, community, as well as students. These interactions have an effect on teachers' and stakeholders' attitudes, expectations and how they relate to each another. Positive interaction is beneficial to students as it improves student achievement in a learning process.

1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

1.4.1 Empirical studies

Chapman, Snyder and Burchfield (1993) posit that many developing countries are facing serious economic and fiscal constraints and are therefore unable to augment direct salary incentives. This has led educational planners and policy-makers to

identify monetary and non-monetary low-cost incentives that would allow them to improve quality and efficiency of education with little or no additional cost for the government. Lavy (2002) studied how schools in Israel had embarked on school-based incentive schemes for improved students' achievements. Lavy (2003) found that large teacher incentives in Israel were associated with increases in standardised tests directly rewarded by teacher incentive programmes.

Sarda (2005) researched on how incentives improved teacher attendance in Peru. Although Sarda (2005) made an input on how teachers' behaviour was positively influenced by introduction of incentives, this research was concluded on teacher attendance, without indicating whether other aspects of teaching process improved. For example, other aspects could be pedagogical styles employed by teachers, and above all, student achievement which this study provided among selected secondary schools in Makoni District of Manicaland Province.

Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2003) noted that in rural Kenya there has been a direct relationship between teacher incentives and student achievement. However, Glewwe et al.'s (2003) shortcoming is that this study had an experimental research design which had a control and an experimental group. The main limitation of this design is that those persons in experimental cluster may have produced unintended outcomes after realising that they were being studied. Effects of teacher incentives have also been investigated in Botswana (Chapman, et al., 1993). In Botswana, it was noted that incentives had, however, no major impact in changing behaviour of teachers, as teachers are earning relatively better salaries.

Teacher incentive schemes have, however, not been a unique phenomenon in developing countries alone. Incentive schemes have enjoyed growing popularity worldwide (Figlio & Kenny, 2007). In United States of America (U.S.A.) a number of teacher incentive programmes have been introduced in the past decade (Glewwe et al., 2003). Glewwe et al. (2003) further note that a legislature has been introduced in U.S.A., for example, No Child left behind Act (NCLB) in 2001, where poorly-performing schools faced sanctions across U.S.A. In order to improve learning

experiences of students, efforts have been made in U.S.A. to motivate teachers through incentives. Teachers were expected then to work hard, thereby improving students' achievement.

Masters (2012) presented a host of factors that may increase student outcomes in Australia. These are summarised below.




Figure 1: Factors that increase student outcomes

Source: Adapted from Masters (2012) *Measuring and rewarding school improvement: A discussion paper* commissioned by the Commonwealth Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, DEEWR Australian Council for Educational Research.

Masters (2012) focused largely on other factors that can lead to student achievement, such as school practices and contextual influences. Although these factors can influence student achievement, however, to completely ignore an influence of teacher motivation which, in turn, increases their effort is an under-estimation of the power of incentives in the teaching process. Thus, much against a notion of denigrating the role of a motivated teacher on improving student

achievement, Liang and Akiba (2013) argue to the contrary. Liang and Akiba (2013) assert that teachers play a pivotal role in students' lives. Thus, in his 2012 State of the Union Address, President of U.S.A., as cited by Liang and Akiba (2013), reiterated a strong desire to improve teacher quality through reforming compensation of teachers. President of U.S.A. said;

Teachers matter. So instead of bashing them, or defending the status quo, let's offer schools a deal. Give them resources to keep good teachers on the job, and reward the best ones (Liang & Akiba, 2013)

This study, therefore, explored the role played by school-based teacher incentives in improving student achievement among selected secondary schools in Makoni District.

Bennell and Acheampong, (2003) assert that while the need to adequately compensate teachers has been a worldwide phenomenon, this is in contrast to Zimbabwean experience after GNU. Zimbabwean government banned payment of incentives to teachers (Agere, 2015). Kingdon and Teal (2002) argue that additional allowances and other benefits make up a relatively large component of compensation packages in many countries. In Nepal, Pakistan and Cambodia for example, they are as large as basic salary. However, Bennell and Acheampong (2003) assert that excessive politicisation of teacher remuneration has had a profound impact on levels of accountability in many education systems, which has, in turn, seriously affected teacher commitment, motivation and how teachers ultimately desire to improve student achievement.

After conducting a study in Portugal, Martins (2010) affirms that incentives have little or no significant impact on student achievement in national examinations as compared to performance in school based continuous assessment tests. This may suggest that teachers were cheating in order to qualify for and receive incentives. However, it could seem education reforms in Portugal were not clear from the outset

what specific results this incentive system was expected to achieve. Thus, a robust plan should be designed whenever incentives are to be applied. The assumption could be that if incentives are administered well and objectives are clearly defined, they could motivate teachers to make to work hard and subsequently improve students' achievement.

According to the World Bank (2009), there is a general consensus that teachers' remuneration in majority of Low Income Countries (LICs) is seriously inadequate. This is because their total pay package does not cover their basic household needs, let alone enable teachers to enjoy a decent standard of living. This has resulted in many countries designing supplementary incentives for teachers (World Bank, 2009).

In Zimbabwe, various arguments have been offered to explain the failure rate among students in public examinations. Criticism had been levelled against the history of Zimbabwe that saw an exodus of experienced teachers to greener pastures, leaving many posts vacant or occupied by unqualified teachers. Poor performances in public examinations in Zimbabwe have also been blamed on the abolishment of Zimbabwe Junior Certificate (ZJC) examinations in 2001. An abolishment of ZJC examinations resulted in students being tested only once during their four years at secondary school (Nziramasanga Commission, 1999). Thus, it can be argued that failure of Zimbabwe's education system could therefore be a result of an ill-conceived idea of abolishing ZJC examinations.

1.5 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The issue of school-based teacher incentives has received mixed reactions from Zimbabwean community. It has been asserted that teacher incentives increase student achievement, while others argue that in schools where teacher incentives were not practised it demotivated teachers from working hard, leading to student failure. This study therefore explored perceptions of key personnel in Zimbabwean education sector on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement among selected secondary schools in Makoni District of Manicaland

Province. Those who supported inception of school-based teacher incentives argued that the overall national pass-rate for Zimbabwean schools rose during the incentive era. According to ZIMSEC information, prior to incentive era, national Ordinary Level pass rate was 13,0% in 2003, 10,2% in 2004; 12,2% in 2005; 14,2% in 2006; 9,85% in 2007; 14,44% in 2008 and there was a rise after 2009 which recorded 16,33 %, 2010 recorded 16,5%; 2011 it was 19,5% (Newsday, 2013). While there could appear to be a drop in 2012 which recorded 18.4%, the argument raised had been that it was due to an increase in candidates who set for Ordinary Level that year as compared to 2011. November 2013 national pass-rate recorded 20, 72% which was a 2, 32% increase from November 2012 pass-rate. Reasons for this increase after 2009 had been attributed to among other factors, an improvement in teacher morale due to improved remuneration (Newsday, 2013). However, while June 2014 national Ordinary Level pass-rate recorded 37, 96%, there was a sudden dropped in November Ordinary Level results which recorded 22, 38%. One of the criticisms raised for this drop could have been due to low teacher morale as a result of withdrawal of teacher incentives among other factors. One of the selected secondary schools under this study which used to practise teacher incentive system scored 98% in 2013 Ordinary Level school pass-rate but this pass rate dropped to 90% in 2014, while Advanced Level at the same school dropped from 100% to 94%. This school also dropped in Zimbabwe national school ranking. This decline in student achievement could be a result of withdrawal of teacher incentives, as teachers could have been demotivated and were no longer eager to improve student achievement.

1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main research question was:

What are the perceptions of key personnel in Zimbabwean education sector on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement?

Sub-questions were:

1. What are the principles behind creating school-based teacher incentives?
2. How is student achievement affected by creating incentives for teachers?
3. Do teachers who are paid school-based teacher incentives also accommodate the teaching of other co-curricular activities?
4. What are the perceptions of community members towards school-based teacher incentive schemes on student achievement?
5. How do school-based incentives affect teachers' motivation to work?

1.7 RESEARCH APPROACH, DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Neuman (2007) indicates that a research design is a strategy, a plan and nature of conducting a project. This research consisted a case study involving selected secondary schools in Makoni District of Manicaland Province. The study was largely qualitative. Qualitative researchers aim to gather an in-depth understanding of human behaviour as well as reasons that govern such behaviour. Qualitative research is an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem (Creswell, 2008). Creswell (2008) goes on to assert that qualitative research provides a rich source of information leading to formation of theories, patterns and or policies that help to explain and inform a phenomenon under study. Qualitative research emphasises importance of looking at participants in their natural setting as interaction between participants is important. This research method differs from quantitative research, which attempts to gather data by objective methods to provide information about relations, comparisons and predictions. More so, quantitative research attempts to remove an investigator from a subject being investigated.

According to Rule and John (2011:4), a case study is a systematic and in-depth investigation of a particular instance in its context in order to generate knowledge. It gives special attention to the case in point in order to obtain in-depth data (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007). Graham (2000) argues that a case study has an advantage in that it is a detailed study of an item singled out for research on a small scale and of relatively short duration. Gilbert (2008) posits that a case study is

necessary to probe deeply into systems governing behaviour and interrelationships among individual institutions. It helps to establish and explore attitudes and beliefs and indicate why certain behaviours occur.

Thus, through the use of a case study the researcher gathered information on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement among selected secondary schools in Makoni District.

1.7.1 Population and sample

The research was carried out in Makoni District of Manicaland Province. This district was purposively chosen as it represents different types of schools in the province. The district consists of schools that engaged in school-based teacher incentives programmes. Thus there was a minimal likelihood of transfer to other districts of teachers and school heads who were primary participants in this research.

A school list was obtained from District Education Office. Schools were categorised as mission boarding and day schools, urban government day schools, government boarding schools and rural council day schools. Steinberg (2004) alludes that a population should be carefully chosen, clearly defined and delimited in order to set precise parameters for ensuring discreteness to the population. Failure to properly identify a population can falsify results of a study.

Purposive sampling of schools was done from lists of schools obtained from District Education Office. Kumar (2011) asserts that purposive sampling depends on researcher's judgement to select a sample or participants who can provide best information for the study. In this study participants had specific knowledge or experience of interest to the researcher (Roper & Shapira, 2000). The researcher employed two strategies within purposive sampling, namely stratified purposive sampling and maximum variation, in order to obtain a sample that elicited adequate information on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. Stratified purposeful sampling was used to divide the population into a number of

strata or layers based on what were seen as significant characteristics of particular sub-groups of interest, and that facilitates comparison (Patton, 2002). As such, schools under study were grouped according to whether they were mission boarding schools, urban government day schools or rural day schools. Stratified purposeful sampling was furthermore used to select teachers, school heads, community leaders and education officers who participated in this research.

Maximum variation was used as another sampling strategy. Neuman (2007) posit that many different variations of data in a given case should be explored and be carried out to ensure that a researcher selects those cases which provide rich sources of information to have a better understanding of a phenomenon. Silverman (2010) asserts that the goal of maximum variation is to add rigour and an in-depth understanding derived from data arising from fullest range of participants and settings. A total of five secondary schools were chosen for this study to explore the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in Makoni District.

1.7.2 Data-collection techniques

Two types of data, namely from primary and secondary sources, were used in this study. Neuman (2007) asserts that primary sources involve reports from actual participants. Field data were obtained from teachers, school heads, education officers and School Development Committee (SDC) representatives by means of interviews, focus-group discussions and questionnaires. Questionnaires with open-ended questions were administered to representatives of SDCs. Interviews were conducted with education officers and school heads. Teachers participated in focus-group discussions. Data were also obtained from secondary sources as second hand information that is passed on from one person to the other through word of mouth or written documents (Kumar, 2011). The researcher collected information from reports on Zimbabwean school examination results in order to explore the effects of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. Information was also gathered from internet on schools' pass-rates in Makoni District.

1.7.3 Analysis of data

The qualitative data were analysed using ATLAS TI. Data were compiled, coded and organised according to themes. This programme helped me to sort data on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement among selected secondary schools in Makoni District. An exploration on collection of data, management of data, writing of memos, segmenting of data and coding in qualitative research would be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this study.

1.8 ISSUES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS/ CREDIBILITY

According to Guba, (1981) trustworthiness in qualitative research promotes scholarly rigour, transparency and professional ethics, unlike quantitative studies which focus on aspects of reliability and validity. Trustworthiness is achieved by giving attention to a study's transferability, credibility, dependability and conformability (Rule & John, 2011). Transferability refers to a degree to which results can be generalised or transferred to other contexts (Gilbert, 2008). In order to achieve generalisability of results to other contexts, it is argued that sample should be carefully delineated. In this research a sample of 30 school teachers, two education officers and five school heads was essential to understand whether school-based teacher incentives increased student achievement among selected secondary schools in Makoni District. This research also employed triangulation of data-collection strategies. Baxter and Jack (2008) view triangulation as a process that makes use of several research instruments in order to check-list findings produced by other research methods. The researcher conducted interviews, focus-group discussions, administered open questionnaires and reviewed documents on how students were performing in public examinations. By using these methods, the researcher explored the relationship between school-based teacher incentives and student achievement. Thus, triangulation increased confidence in research results that are arrived at in a study.

Trochim and Donnelly (2007), cited in Gilbert (2008) view credibility as whether established results are credible or believable in this case from a perception of participants in a research. Hence, results on school-based teacher incentives and its influence on student achievement were returned to participants, who participated in the research in order to confirm research results. Babbie (2010) views dependability as being concerned with whether one would obtain same results if the same thing is observed twice. Trochim and Donnelly (2007) argue that as qualitative research advocates for flexibility and freedom it may be difficult to replicate outcomes to ascertain level of dependability. However, (Merriam,1995; Creswell & Miller 2000; Bailey, 2007) assert that through provision of a thick description of a phenomena in qualitative research, other researchers could be in a position to decide if it matches or extent to which it is applicable in their settings. Thus, the researcher explored the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in selected secondary schools of Makoni District and hoped that findings from this study could be applicable to other schools in the rest of Makoni District, Manicaland province and Zimbabwe in general.

1.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The researcher explained the objectives of this research to participants in order for them to make a voluntary informed consent to be engaged in this study. The researcher also asked participants to sign consent forms to indicate their willingness to give information on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. Data collected by means of questionnaires and interviews were used for the purpose of this study only. For focus-group discussions, participants set group norms which governed how discussions were conducted. Focus-groups were designed in such a way that only teachers participated, excluding administration staff, such as school heads and education officers. This ensured that every participant could be comfortable to air their views without feeling threatened by other participants with supervisory roles. Information gained during focus-group discussions was not referred to later outside the context of this study. Although participants were encouraged to participate throughout the period of data-collection, they had right to

withdraw from the study at any time if there were circumstances that hindered their further participation. An Ethical Clearance Certificate (See Appendix 1) was obtained from the College of Education at UNISA.

1.10 CHAPTER OUTLINE

The study consisted of six chapters. Chapter 1 comprised an introduction, background of the study and an overview to the study. Chapter 2 explored the theoretical approach on teachers' incentives and a review of related literature on the role of teacher incentives on student achievement. Chapter 3 provided a broader contextual picture of teachers' incentives globally and within Zimbabwean education system. Chapter 4 discussed the research design, data-collection instruments and procedures. Chapter 5 presented results of the study, while Chapter 6 explored conclusions, limitations of the study and recommendations.

1.11 TIME-FRAME

The first year was devoted to writing of research proposal. During first half of second year, the researcher worked on consolidating chapter 2, while the last half of year consolidation chapters 3 and 4 was done. During third year the researcher collected data and discussed results from selected secondary schools. In fourth year was devoted to consolidation research findings and also concentrated on conclusions, recommendations and limitations of the study.

1.12 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY

This study analysed the role of school-based teacher incentives in selected schools in Makoni District of Manicaland Province. It focussed on five secondary schools, namely a rural day school, an urban council day school, a boarding school, a government school and a school on previously white-owned farms. The researcher used a social interactionist approach to explore how interactions among various stakeholders within Zimbabwean education system has been influenced by inception

and subsequent withdrawal of school-based teacher incentive system and the role of teacher incentives on student achievement.

1.13 DEFINITION OF THE KEY TERMS

School-based teacher incentives: refer to monetary or non-monetary benefits that are given to teachers over and above their salary (Bennell & Acheampong, 2003). In this study, school-based teacher incentives related to monetary benefits that teachers received from their various SDCs. They are peculiar and vary from one school to another depending on the ability of school authorities and SDCs to provide such incentives to their teachers. The term school-based teacher incentives will be used as defined above.

Student achievement: refers to improvement in performance and pass-rate of students in public examinations such as Grade Seven, Ordinary Levels and Advanced Levels. (Burke & Sass, 2013). In the context of this study, student achievement will refer to pass-rates in Ordinary Level, which is run by local examining board, the Zimbabwe Schools Examination Council (ZIMSEC).

School Development Committee: is a group of elected parents and teachers who assist the school in co-ordinating school development activities (Bennell, 2004). It also plays an inter-mediatory role between a school and parents/guardians. The term School Development Committees will be used as defined above.

Motivation refers to the force that initiates, guides and maintains goal-oriented behaviour. There are two kinds of motivation namely intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic motivation is the inherent enthusiasm and drive by an individual to accomplish activities (Cherry, 2010; Cherry & Burchfield, 2010; Heartfield, 2013). Extrinsic motivation emerges from external factors arising from the environment (Emmett & McGree, 2013).

Retention refers to keeping or holding of something. It can refer to an act of retaining something or a condition of being retained (Gomba, 2015). The term retention will be used as defined above.

1.14 SUMMARY

This chapter presented an introduction and background to the study, theoretical approach that guided this study, a brief literature review, problem statement, research approach, design and methodology, issues of trustworthiness, ethical considerations and chapter outline of the study. In the next chapter, the researcher discusses the theoretical framework that guided this study and review related literature on the role of teacher incentives on student achievement.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL APPROACH

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter was to explore the theoretical approach that guided this study on the role of school-based teacher incentives and its role on student achievement. The chapter also provided a review of related literature on teacher incentives and student achievement. In this chapter, the researcher also reviewed related literature within the context of Zimbabwean education system.

Labaree (2013) argues that a theoretical framework is important as it provides a contextual lens that informs a study. Trochim and Donnelly (2007) postulate that theories are formulated to explain, predict, understand a phenomena, in many cases, to challenge and extend existing knowledge within the limits of critical bounding assumptions. Theoretical framework is a structure that can hold or support a theory of a research study. Thus, a theoretical framework introduces and describes a theory which explains why a research problem under study, exists. This study was guided by interactionist framework.

Literature indicates that globally, education stakeholders and other interested groups directly or indirectly involved in education system, have noted an importance of teachers' efforts in learning of students (Bennell & Acheampong, 2003; Bennell, 2004; Adebayo & Gombakomba, 2013; Gomba, 2015). In order for teachers to work effectively, they have to be motivated through monetary or non-monetary incentives. The argument is that if teachers are not motivated, they tend to have a negative attitude towards their work, through displaying various forms of unwarranted behaviour. Effects of low teacher morale could be manifested through coming late for work, absenteeism, absconding, taking unorthodox sick leave, failure to mark students' work, or failure to assign meaningful homework to students. Some teachers would actually abandon the teaching profession to pursue other jobs (Black, 2001; Bennell, 2004; Butrymowicz, 2012).

Research also indicates that paying of incentives changes teachers' attitude and behaviour towards work, thereby improving students' academically. It is against this background that this study explored the role of school-based teacher incentives and its influence on students' academic achievement.

It is important to note that there are other sociological perspectives such as functionalism and conflict theory that would be explored briefly. The discussion showed why these two theories were relegated in favour of interaction theory.

2.2 MACRO SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES

There are two macro sociological theories namely functionalism and conflict theory that could have informed this study. Haralambos and Holborn (2013) assert that macro sociological theories' basic impetus is that they offer a general explanation of a society as a whole. Society is viewed as systems hence the two theories are sometimes called systems theories. Macro sociological theorists see human behaviour, attitude and perception as being shaped by society. Giddens (2001) points out that micro sociologist theory focuses on small scale interaction rather than on society as a whole. It rejects the notion of a social system and as a result it does not regard human action as a response or reaction to a system. Thus, for macro sociological theories, society evokes its dictates and precepts on human beings. Human beings are regarded as passive entities and only behave and act on what society stipulates (Giddens, 2001; Alex, 2008).

2.2.1 Functionalist perspective

Functionalist theory was propounded by Emile Durkheim, who is known as father of the functionalist perspective (Haralambos & Holborn, 2013). It was further developed by proponents such as Talcott Parsons and refined by Davies and Moore. It became a dominant theoretical perspective in sociology in 1960s (Alex, 2008). However, functionalism as a theoretical base began to lose its grip due to criticisms levelled against it towards the end of 1960s. Functionalists drew their analogy from the

human body which is made-up of different parts which are inter-dependent and inter-related. Parts of society such as education, religion and family work together for sustenance of social system. From a functionalist viewpoint, human beings' behaviour, attitude, perception and world-view are largely fashioned by norms and values of the social system considered to be intertwined as they form a complete system. Within functionalist perspective, in order to understand any part of a society, that part must be understood in relation to a contribution that it makes to society as a whole.

Functionalists propose that societies have certain needs or requirements which must be met if a society is to survive (Giddens, 2001; Anderson & Taylor, 2013). Functionalist approach emphasises consensus and order that exist in society, focusing on social stability and shared values. From this perspective, dis-organisation in the social system, such as deviant behaviour, leads to change because societal components must adjust to achieve stability (Giddens, 2001; Anderson & Taylor, 2013). Malfunction in one part of society affects all other parts and creates social problems, which lead to social change. From a functionalist point of view, teachers' behaviour, attitudes and perceptions towards their commitment to duty and performance are largely determined by norms and values that guide the teaching profession. These individual conscious behaviour, perceptions and attitudes are largely determined by values and norms of society.

2.2.2 Conflict perspective

Conflict theorists differ from functionalist theorists in that they hold that there are fundamental differences of interest between social groups (Anderson & Taylor, 2013; Haralambos & Holborn, 2013). These differences result in conflict which is a common and persistent feature in society. From a Marxist perspective, society is made up of two major social groups, the powerful and less powerful or the dominant and subordinate groups. These social groups are always in conflict, where dominant group monopolises power and controls over weaker groups. Belief systems and values of society reflect and legitimate values of the dominant group. A dominant

group protects itself and safeguards its interests through institutions such as education and politics and through use of state machinery such as army and police (Giddens, 2001; Haralambos & Holborn, 2013). Therefore, in terms of student achievement or under-achievement, conflict theorists desist from blame the victim approach. Instead of blaming students for under-achievement, they place blame on machiavellian activities of a dominant group in society. Bernstein (1971) cited in Giddens (2001) argues that it is the culture of dominant group that is favoured by schools, hence students from subordinate groups end up under-performing in school because they are exposed to a new culture. Students from dominant groups are better placed to perform well at school because a school is an extension of students' home culture. Student achievement or under-achievement is therefore not primarily influenced by teachers' efforts but by student's background.

Within the context of conflict theory, Zimbabwean education system is characterised by conflict among various stakeholders. This conflict is manifested within different individuals or groups of society such as government officials, officials from education sector, parents, teachers, students and Non-Governmental Organisations. These are all directly or indirectly involved with learning process of students. Those in power exert their influence and control over weaker groups and the latter develop resistance against imposed ideas, norms and values.

Although conflict theory made immense contributions in explaining the education environment and processes of students' learning, they have been criticised for over-emphasising the idea of domination (Rodney, 2007). They failed to provide an insight into how teachers, students and other human agents in education system come together to reproduce conditions of their existence. By down-playing importance of human agents, conflict theorists offer little hope in explaining how students from poor backgrounds and poor schools can also excel in learning. It is against this background showing some glaring limitations from both functionalist and conflict theories that I settled for interactionist perspective. This study focused on the influence of school-based teacher incentives in enhancing interaction between

teachers and different stakeholders with an interest in education, and how this relationship subsequently improves student achievement.

2.3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INTERACTIONIST THEORY

This research is guided by interaction theory. The basis of interactionist argument is that man is an active and creative being who is able to create his/her social world (Giddens, 2001). Meaning is constructed, attributed, sustained and developed in the course of everyday social interaction (Gilbert, 2008:515). However, before discussing the significance of interaction perspective for this study, it is imperative to explore the growth of interaction theory in sociological spheres, over years.

There are many scholars and theorists who contributed towards the idea of interactionism (Alex, 2008; Anderson & Taylor, 2013). This theory was developed by George Herbert Mead and Charles Cooley as key contributors (Haralambos & Holborn, 2013). Blumer (1962), inspired by core founders of the theory later coined the term interactionism and introduced this theory to the world (Giddens, 2001). The basic notion that this theory puts forward is that people behave according to meanings they ascribe to individuals, phenomena, issues or events.

2.3.1 Basic premises and approach of interaction theory

Interactionist theory approaches human life and conduct from a unique point of view. Proponents of this theory assert that reality is socially-constructed. Most interactionists believe that physical reality exists by an individual's social definitions and that social definitions develop in part or relation to something (Rodney, 2008). Blumer (1962), one of the proponents of interaction theory, posit that humans act towards things such as physical objects, actions and concepts on basis of personal meaning they ascribe to these and through interacting with them (Giddens, 2001). This theory purports that humans are social beings and that social interaction leads human beings to act in a manner in which they do. Kuwabara and Yamaguchi (2013) argue that instead of focusing on individual or his/her personality and on how society

or social situations influence human behaviour, interactionists focus on interaction that takes place between actors. According to interactionists, individual actions are a product of interaction.

Opposed to macro sociological perspectives that view human beings as passive actors waiting to be shaped and directed by dictates of society, interactionists view humans as having power to create their own society. What people do depends on their interaction with others (Alex, 2008). As a result, the way teachers interact with community, government, parents or students has a bearing on how these teachers act and behave. If the nature of interaction is hostile or naive, it creates an unfavourable environment and eventually affects teachers' attitude, aptitude and perceptions towards their work.

If there is bad blood between teachers and stakeholders within education system, teachers may develop a laissez-faire and negative approach towards their work, leading to student under-achievement. When a relationship is cordial, it may drive teachers to strive for excellence, thereby improving students' achievement which is among others, an ultimate goal of education. By and large, this relationship can be influenced by how teachers are viewed and rewarded in society.

The other central assertion, according to Blumer (1962), is that meaning of things germinates from interaction that one has with others and society (Giddens, 2001; Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2013; Haralambos & Holborn, 2013). Blumer (1962) claimed that people interact with each other by interpreting or defining each other's actions instead of merely reacting to each other's actions. According to Blumer (1962) these meanings are handled and modified through an interpretative process used by a person. Thus, the idea of thinking and minding come into place (Sarwo, 2007). Kuwabara and Yamaguchi (2013) define minding as a delay process that happens when one thinks about what to do next. Human beings, unlike animals, naturally have internal dialogue and discourse within themselves to configure a meaning in respect of an action or event. Thus, human beings must be understood as thinking beings (Stryker & Vryan, 2003). Human action is not only interaction among individuals but

also interaction within the self. Ability to think therefore enables people to define a situation as they understand or perceive it. This ultimately shapes their actions, attitudes, perceptions and behaviour. Thus, Charon (2004) asserts that people are not simply conditioned, are not simply beings that are influenced by those around them, are not simply products of the society, but are thinking animals. According to interactionists, people do not merely act according to what society dictates upon them, they have power to influence and change society.

Stryker and Vryan (2003) assert that the cause of human action is a result of what is occurring in their present situation. Situations that unfold in the present social interaction present thinking and definition of the situation among individuals or social groups (Stryker & Vryan, 2003). Thus, it is not society's encounter with human beings that causes action that shapes self-concept, nor is it past experience, instead, it is through social interaction.

2.3.2 Teachers' self-concept and its effect on work delivery

Mruk (2006) postulates that Mead (1934) understood basis of humanity to be the self. The self is that part of an individual's personality that is composed of an individual's self-awareness and self-image. According to Mruk (2006), for Mead (1934), the self was a totally social phenomenon, inseparable from society. Connection between these two aspects was explained in a series of steps which are emergence of the self through social experience, based on exchange of symbolic interaction and occurring within a context in which people take on roles of one another, or take their point of view into account during social interaction (Mruk, 2006). For Mead (1934), people become self-reflective in this process of taking on the role of others (Haralambos & Holborn, 2013). Mead (1934) identified two types of others, namely significant others and generalised others, who all play a pivotal role in development of the self-concept of an individual (Giddens, 2001). Teachers, therefore, develop their self-concepts through interaction with different stakeholders. It is an individual's self-awareness and image that is influenced by these 'others' that eventually make teachers act and

behave in a certain way. A positive self-concept influences teachers to work hard as they would be aware of their mandate in students' learning endeavours.

2.3.3 Significant and generalised others impacting on teacher motivation

The significant other refers to someone important in one's hierarchy of values or a person who has primary influence on one's behaviour, self-esteem and general world-view. Within education system, there are different stakeholders and people who exert primary influence on teachers such as Ministry of Education, Education Inspectors and parents/guardians. Williams (2003) defines the generalised others as those persons whose attitudes and perspectives are taken into consideration in a social group. These, in turn, allow one to determine how to behave in a given setting. Emergence of the generalised other requires presence of some type of organised community or social system (Alex, 2008; Anderson & Taylor, 2013). The generalised other gives one a sense of 'self' and helps to view oneself in relation to a group to which one belongs. Through understanding the generalised other, one is able to predict consequences of one's behaviour and how it would affect others. Thus, within education system, there are stakeholders who may have little influence on teachers' work, but teachers realise that these stakeholders also exert an influence on how they work. This realisation consequently influences teacher motivation which may have an effect on student achievement.

2.3.4 Teachers' self-esteem on improving student achievement

Olsen, Breckler and Wiggins (2008) assert that self-esteem is a term used to reflect a person's overall emotional evaluation of his or her own worth. It is a judgment of oneself as well as an attitude toward the self. Self-esteem encompasses beliefs and emotions such as triumph, despair, pride and shame (Eaton, Wardstruthers, & Santell, 2006; Hewitt, 2009). It can be seen as positive or negative evaluations of the self, as in how human beings feel about it. Self-esteem is also known as an evaluative dimension of the self that includes feelings of worthiness, pride and discouragement (Greenberg, 2008). It is the disposition that a person has, which

represents their judgments of their own worthiness. Thus, according to Burke (2008), self-esteem is the sum of self-confidence (feelings of personal capacity) and self-respect (a feeling of personal worth). It exists as a consequence of implicit judgment that every person has of his or her ability to face life's challenges, and to understand and solve problems, and their right to achieve happiness and be given respect. It therefore becomes apparent for individuals to be conscious of how individuals interact with other people, so as to influence these people they interact with to develop a high self-esteem. A high self-esteem can be manifested in oneself through accomplishment of desired goals that were set.

Teachers who have a positive self-esteem avoid dysfunctional behaviours that detract them from their work. Two different forms of esteem exist, namely need for others' respect and need for self-respect or inner self-esteem. Respect from others entails recognition, acceptance, status, and appreciation and is believed to be very fragile (Giddens, 2001; Alex, 2008; Anderson & Taylor, 2013). It is built through interaction with others. If relationship among individuals or a group of individuals is not favourable, that form of interaction also warrants that an individual would not fully develop his or her self-esteem. Without fulfilment of self-esteem needs, teachers would be driven to seek these needs, thus failing to grow and to obtain self-actualisation. Teachers' positive esteem induces in them a spirit to work hard and to improve student achievement.

2.3.5 Positive self-esteem leading to positive outcomes

Self-esteem has been conceptualised as an influential predictor of relevant outcomes, such as academic achievement, good performance at work or to exercise behaviour (Burke, 2008). Thus, ability of teachers to produce positive results through improving students' achievement is largely dependent upon the level of their self-esteem that motivates them to desire good results. From this conceptualisation therefore, teachers' performance is not viewed in terms of their backgrounds, type or nature of college training which they underwent, or the geo-location and status of school. It is viewed as a process involving interaction at different levels within whole

spectrum of education system. That interaction eventually translates into development of a positive self-esteem within a teacher. Thus, incentivisation of teachers, either financially or in kind has been seen as one of the elements that enhances this type and quality of interaction between teachers and stakeholders within education system. Teacher incentives subsequently improve students' achievement because of a motivating effect they have on teachers' performance.

2.3.6 Teachers' expectations, influencing on student achievement

According to Merton (1968), in Alex, 2008; Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2013), the theory of self-fulfilling prophecy argues that expectations made by teachers about a student's behaviour or achievement tend to come true even though an original expectation may have been false. This theory maintains that predictions made by teachers about success or failure of a student tend to be realised because prediction would have been made. The argument being that pupils' self-concepts are shaped by teacher's definition, attitudes and expectations. However, these attitudes and expectations are largely influenced by teachers' working conditions. The assumption is that improved working conditions through incentives has a high potential to motivate teachers, which has an effect on improving student achievement (Heneman, 1998). If teachers are demotivated, it could have serious repercussions, as teachers could develop negative attitudes towards their work. It is argued that it can be difficult to measure outcomes of students' learning, unlike any other profession, because students' learning is not quantifiable. Teachers may attend to all lessons, give students homework, always be present at school, but without any meaningful learning of students. The argument is that tools that may be used by education administrators to monitor teachers may only improve attendance of teachers but students may not improve in academic endeavours. Thus, teachers hold key to the process of students' learning, they know how to teach, when to teach and most importantly, what to teach so that students pass their examinations.

Donald and Wesselman (2013), argue that teaching is complex, intellectual work that should be given high status and should pay well. The assumption is that the success

of young people lies heavily in education. Barack Obama, president of U.S.A., states that:

If we really want to make sure the next generation has kinds of opportunities that I think this country can offer, if the ladder that enables somebody to go from a very poor beginning in a family up to real achievement in the U.S. is going to be maintained, we as a society owe all our young people a decent start at education (Donald & Wesselman, 2013)

However, most importantly, a decent start in education cannot be achieved while ignoring needs and working conditions of teachers. These working conditions can be generated through an interactive process within an education system.

2.3.7 Interaction processes within education sphere

An education system is characterised by interactions. Teachers interact with stakeholders like Ministry of Education, School Development Committees (SDCs), community, other teachers, and students. The assumption is that these interactions therefore, shape their attitudes and expectations and how different stakeholders relate to one another. However, most importantly, it is the nature of teacher-student interaction which has a bearing on students' learning experience. The argument is that when teacher-to-student interaction is not fostered well, students are likely to fail in their academic endeavours.

2.4 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.4.1 Literature based on research questions and aspects of school-based teacher incentives in Zimbabwe

2.4.1.1 Principles behind an introduction of incentives

The first sub-research question focused on principles behind introduction of school-based teacher incentives in Zimbabwe. The background behind introduction of school-based teacher incentives was that between 2003 and 2008, Zimbabwe was hit by a massive exodus of teachers who either left for perceived greener pastures in neighbouring countries or abandoned the profession altogether to pursue other fields locally and internationally. Zimbabwean government, through Ministry of Education, introduced extra-salary incentives for professionals. According to 2009 Circular No. 5, of Ministry of Education, Art, Sport and Culture (MoEASC), parents were required to remunerate teachers through money collected by respective SDCs.

Education system in Zimbabwe faced numerous strikes, worker apathy, work stoppages and sit-ins by teachers who demanded better salaries and working conditions. Civil servants, teachers included, earned meager salaries far below poverty datum line and were thus unable to sustain their families. In order to improve teachers' low salary, Ministry of Education, Art, Sport and Culture (MoEASC) decided that parents/guardians were supposed to remunerate teachers in schools where their children learnt. Thus, school-based teacher incentives were introduced as a temporary solution meant to address a challenge that had threatened to destroy the education system in Zimbabwe, that is, low salaries for teachers. However, this policy was not supported by force of law since it had not passed through parliament (Towindo, 2011). The policy was abused since some unscrupulous SDCs and school heads allocated themselves amounts that far exceeded that 10% benchmark stipulated in Circular 5 of 2009 (Circular No. 5 of 2009, Ministry of Education Art Sport and Culture). There were no clear-cut guidelines to address issues to do with accountability within schools.

2.4.1.2 Economic status of teachers during the colonial era

Teachers in Zimbabwe were poorly remunerated, both during pre- and post-independent era. However, it should be noted that during colonial period, teachers' situation was slightly better because economic condition of Zimbabwe was stable. From their salaries, teachers could send their children to boarding schools and had enough disposable income to meet their day-to-day expenses. Although teachers could afford to purchase basic commodities, it should be noted that they were not paid enough compared to their other counterparts in the then Public Service Commission which later changed to Civil Service Commission.

2.4.1.3 Economic status of teachers during post-independent period

After attainment of political independence, Zimbabwean government paid little attention to demands of teachers with teachers occupying the lowest position on salary ladder of professionals within the civil service. As teachers continued to engage government over salary reviews and other conditions of service, teachers were negatively labelled as affiliated to opposition parties. Thus, with formation of an opposition party in Zimbabwe known as Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), teachers were presumed to form the largest support base of this party (Country of Origin Information Report, 2006). Relationship between Zimbabwean government and teachers became sour as teachers got blamed for advocating regime change. The teaching profession was thus politicised with government doing nothing or very little to alleviate teachers' plight.

Teachers' conditions were further aggravated during hyper-inflationary period in Zimbabwe, ranging from 2003 to 2008. Teachers and other civil servants were receiving their salaries in Zimbabwean currency (bearer cheques). During this economic slump, teachers suffered most. They could hardly earn a living from their salaries. However, according to UNESCO recommendation no. 115 of 1966 teachers' salaries should:

- a) *reflect the importance to society of the teaching function and hence the importance of teachers as well as the responsibilities of all kinds which fall upon them from the time of their entry into service;*
 - b) *compare favourably with salaries in other occupations requiring similar or equivalent qualifications;*
 - c) *provide teachers with the means to ensure a reasonable standard of living for themselves and their families as well as to invest in further education or in the pursuit of cultural activities, thus enhancing their professional qualification(s)*
- (UNESCO,1966)

No section or part of this recommendation was fulfilled during economic melt-down in Zimbabwe. This greatly affected teachers' attitude towards their work resulting in negative effects on student achievement as teachers were de-motivated to properly teach students.

2.4.1.4 Inclusive government in Zimbabwe

With inception of inclusive government in Zimbabwe in 2009, the then Prime Minister pleaded with Zimbabweans in foreign countries to come back home and work for their country. Teachers, for instance, who wished to re-join teaching service were instructed to visit their former provinces and districts for re-deployment. Even those teachers who had not gone abroad but who had abandoned the profession for other menial jobs were also accorded this opportunity to re-join. No waiting period or relevant procedures that were normally done when one leaves profession were followed. Large numbers of teachers who had abandoned teaching took advantage of this opportunity to re-join teaching profession.

There was a high influx of people who started looking for places to train as student teachers as they began to realise benefits of training as teachers. In 2013 one

teachers' training college recorded about 3000 applicants who competed for 600 places offered for training.

2.4.1.5 Position of Zimbabwean government after 2013 general elections

In a run-up to July 31 2013 general elections, Zimbabwean government pledged to hike civil servants' salaries, acknowledging that salary review exercise was long overdue. Public service unions also demanded a salary hike enough to sustain employees' basic welfare (Newsday, October, 2013).

Rural teachers in Zimbabwe were at that stage receiving state-paid incentives amounting to 20% of their gross salaries, to supplement state-paid incentives. Al-Samarrai and Bennell (2003) stated that allowances for teachers in remote areas were paid in many countries, but in general they were too little to have a major impact on teachers' quality and effectiveness in students' learning process. For example, in Uganda allowance goes up to only 20% of gross salary (Al-Samarrai & Bennell, 2003). In countries such as Sierra Leone, remote area allowances have been withdrawn altogether because of financial stringency. However, most urban and boarding school teachers in Zimbabwe were receiving well above regulated 10% incentive collected from schools, depending on what SDCs were recouping from parents. However, while the issue of school-based teacher incentives was highly topical, it should be noted that it applied to a small section of schools, mostly in urban areas, approximately 38% of the total number of schools in Zimbabwe.

It has been claimed that after 2013, Zimbabwean government noted negative effects of school-based teacher incentives on quality of service-delivery after consultations with different stakeholders. Measures were taken to address stakeholders' concerns on school-based teachers' incentives, with particular emphasis being put on the best interests of students (Circular 6 of 2014, Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education).

2.4.1.6 Banning of incentives by Zimbabwean government

In 2014 Zimbabwean government issued Circular No. 6 of 2014 of Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, which sought to cancel Circular No. 5 of 2009 that legalised payment of incentives to teachers by schools. Circular No.6 of 2014 (Circular No. 6 of 2014, Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education) stated that teachers' incentives were contrary to attainment of Millennium Development Goal number 2 which aimed at reducing cost of education to ordinary students. Millennium Development goal number 2's aim was to achieve universal primary education to all by children by 2015.

Zimbabwean government maintained that incentives rendered education inaccessible to ordinary children whose parents could not afford to pay for their children's education and hence was contrary to provisions of the Constitution of Zimbabwe section 75, which guarantees right to education for all Zimbabweans (Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 20: Act of 2013). This constitution also guarantees non-discrimination of citizens on basis of their economic or social status. The government's argument on banning school-based teacher incentives was anchored on provisions of section 36 of the Education Act, 2006 (Zimbabwean Education Act , 2006) as amended. This section stipulates that levies are for development of schools and should not be used to pay school employees. Banning of teacher incentives was further reinforced by the Public Service Act of Zimbabwe which regulates that setting of conditions of service for any member of Civil Service is a responsibility of the Civil Service Commission as an employer, and not SDCs or parents, as suggested by Circular No. 5 of 2009 (Circular No. 5 of 2009 of the Ministry of Education, Art, Sport and Culture). Hence, banning of school-based teacher incentives was therefore supported by force of law.

2.4.1.7 Justification to ban teacher incentives

Zimbabwean government pointed out the following, among other concerns, over payment of incentives to teachers:

- *Teacher incentives were not based on merit thus creating unnecessary division among teachers from different schools.*
- *Teachers' incentives were unevenly distributed. Teachers in rural areas earned less than their counterparts in the urban areas due to low levies paid by rural students.*
- *Owing to this uneven distribution of incentives, some new teacher graduates were shunning rural area deployment, preferring to be deployed in urban areas where the incentives are higher than in rural areas.*
- *Schools in rural areas were struggling to retain qualified teachers.*
- *Teacher incentives were being abused. According to Circular No. 5 of 2009 (Circular No. 5 of 2009, of Ministry of Education, Art, Sport and Culture), only 10% of collected levies at a school were supposed to be paid as incentives. However, several audit reports revealed that many schools had been paying more than 10% of levies as incentives. (Circular 6, of 2014, Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education)*

Having put across its reservations over payment of incentives, Zimbabwean government then banned payment of school-based teacher incentives by SDCs and urged all concerned parties to comply with Circular 6 of 2014 of Ministry of Education Primary and Secondary Education.

2.4.1.8 Teacher associations' reaction to scrapping of teacher incentives

Teacher representative boards challenged the Zimbabwean government's move to ban teacher incentives. Zimbabwe Teachers' Association (The Herald Zimbabwe, 24 April 2014) argued that it had not been consulted pertaining to scrapping of school-based teacher incentives. Zimbabwe Teachers Association then pointed out that Zimbabwean government and teachers were heading for a collision (The Herald Zimbabwe, 24 April, 2014). It is surprising to note that while Zimbabwean government

claimed that its decision to suspend teacher incentives were arrived at after wide consultations, the association disagreed to this assertion. The association maintained that scrapping of incentives was made prematurely as teachers' salaries were still below the then poverty datum line in Zimbabwe (The Herald Zimbabwe, 24 April, 2014). Teachers also expressed their displeasure at a decision by Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education to ban school-based teacher incentives, arguing that this decision was done without sufficient consultations (The Zimbabwe Mail, 29 April, 2014). The Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) also criticised Ministry of Education for making decisions without seeking stakeholders' opinions.

In March 2014, Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education declared also that holiday extra lessons were illegal without first consulting teacher organisations. PTUZ warned that this unilateral decision to ban holiday lessons had far-reaching consequences as it would push teachers to margins of poverty (The Zimbabwe Mail, 29 April 2014). Initially, it was parents' desire to see their children getting a decent education that prompted parents to suggest that teachers be given incentives. Following a banning of school-based teacher incentives and conducting of vacation school lessons, teachers were given a marginal \$54 increment back dated to January 2014 (Agere, 2015). Teachers criticised this increment from government arguing that it was too little to have an impact on their disposable income (The Zimbabwe Mail, 29 April 2014).

It had been argued that while Zimbabwean government down-played teachers' importance on students' learning, other countries such as United States of America (U.S.A.) were strengthening their teaching professions. U.S.A. government had shown recognition of teachers' importance on improving student achievement. USA government had thus called for incentives to keep best teachers in the classroom (White House Report, 2012). U.S.A. president Barack Obama pointed out that:

At this defining moment in our history America faces few more urgent challenges than preparing our children to compete in the global economy. The decisions our leaders make about education in

the coming years will shape our future for generations to come. It will help determine not only whether our children have a chance to fulfil their God-given potential or whether our workers have a chance to build a better life for their families, but whether we as a nation will remain in the 21st century the kind of global economic leader that we were in the 20th century. The rising importance of education reflects the new demands of our new world (White House Report, 2012).

2.4.1.9 State media's perspective on teachers' performance

The concept media refers to both the printed media such as newspapers, articles, or books as well as the electronic media, like radio and television. The state media has been influential in negatively labelling teachers and castigating them as money-mongers through making parents pay for extra-lessons and teacher incentives. The media has generally been unfavourable to views of teachers who accuse it of mis-representing teachers' interests in respect of both their salaries and manner in which they execute their duties. Wrong figures of what teachers actually earned were being publicised, thus confusing parents and the general public on how much teachers were paid. This mis-representation of teachers' salaries by state media was noted when one SDC member from a selected school in this study asked:

By the way, how much are teachers taking home as salary, \$700 or \$800? Teachers, do you know you are now earning more than parents who are giving you incentives?

In fact teachers were actually earning far below what the general populace were led to believe through state media. By 2014, Zimbabwean teachers had not been receiving such high salaries. Hence, negative publicity on teachers could also demotivate them from working hard and this could also affect student achievement.

2.4.1.10 Role of incentives on teacher retention

According to Gomba (2015) retention refers to keeping or holding of something. It can refer to act of retaining something or condition of being retained. Teacher-retention therefore relates to keeping or maintaining teachers within teaching profession. This means that teachers refrain from abandoning the teaching profession or resigning to take up other jobs.

Attraction and retention of teachers in Zimbabwe is a challenge not only unique to Zimbabwean schools, but also to other parts of the world (Gomba, 2015). However, Zimbabwean education system has been rocked by massive overt and covert resignations and subsequent flight of qualified teachers to countries in the region and internationally in pursuit of greener pastures (UNICEF, 2008; Adebayo & Gombakomba, 2013). Civil servants, in particular teachers, were forced to face a worst-ever economic sag between 2003 and 2008. They could hardly survive on their salaries, as Zimbabwean dollar (bearer cheque) continually lost its market value. Payment of school-based teacher incentives was meant to complement teachers' low salaries. Parents/guardians, through their representative SDCs, agreed to this initiative to remunerate teachers, as a way of retaining teachers and improving students' learning outcomes. The assumption is that when teachers left teaching profession, it meant that students who were continuously taught by new teachers had to adjust and learn anew teacher's pedagogical styles and methodologies, thus also compromising student achievement. Thus, when teachers spend more time with their students it would also help them to understand students' individual differences and learning needs.

Mandoga and Chakandinakira (2014) assert that students have different learning needs which are influenced by their social and economic backgrounds, race, gender and physical abilities, among other factors. Teachers, therefore, have to cater for these individual learning needs in order to achieve educational parity and equality among students with diverse learning backgrounds. The assumption could be that introduction of school-based teacher incentives brought normalcy in Zimbabwean

education sector by retaining teachers and this could subsequently have a positive effect on improving student achievement.

2.4.1.11 Teachers' incentives and students' achievement

The second sub-research question explored how student achievement was affected by creating incentives for teachers. There has been a lot of debate on causes of student under-achievement in Zimbabwe. Some scholars have pointed to demotivation of teachers due to low salaries and non-payment of incentives. Those opposed to payment of incentives to teachers, argue that teachers would only focus on students passing public examinations at the expense of holistic education of students. Holistic education focuses on total development of students, which includes a student's physical, social, mental, spiritual needs and paying particular attention to diverse learning needs of individual students (Mandoga & Chakandinakira, 2014).

However, despite opposition to payment of teacher incentives, there has been growing enthusiasm among education reformers and policy-makers around the world to link teacher payment to student achievement (Fryer, 2011). Chapman et al. (1993) argue that declining school quality has been identified as one of the most serious problems facing many Third World countries. It should be noted that decline in quality of education is not only experienced by Third World countries, as suggested by Chapman et al. (1993), but it is a worldwide phenomenon. Hoxby and Leigh (2004) assert that globally, quality and aptitude of teachers have significantly declined in the last 40 years resulting in student under-achievement.

2.4.1.12 School-based teacher incentives and co-curricular activities

The third sub-research question in this study, focused on whether teachers who are paid school-based teacher incentives also accommodate the teaching of other co-curricular activities. In line with this argument, Bennell (2004) asserts that teacher incentives may contribute to student achievement, although incentives may negatively affect teachers' pedagogical styles of teaching students or the teaching of

other co-curricular activities. In this context there is tendency among teachers to suspend or ignore some co-curricular activities such as sports and other outdoor activities. Much of teachers' time and effort is channelled towards academic activities and at times using unorthodox pedagogical styles. Holmstrom and Milgrom, (1991) also posit that incentives could cause teachers to sacrifice promoting sporting activities, much more curiosity and creative thinking among students in order to focus on curricular activities.

2.4.1.13 School-based teacher incentives and its influence on teaching styles

It had been assumed that school-based teacher incentives had a bearing on the nature of a teacher's selection of various teaching methods. Thus, rote learning by means of lecture method as opposed to participatory methods is promoted as teachers would focus much on desiring students to pass examinations. The argument is that teachers become a source and centre of all learning activities in order to drill students to pass examinations. Students are given little room to discover knowledge on their own and this kind of knowledge quickly vanishes as soon as examinations are over. Studies done in Kenya by Glewwe et al. (2003) reveal that while students in treatment schools scored higher than their counterparts in comparison schools during teacher incentive programme, students did not retain these gains after the end of programme, consistent with a hypothesis that teachers focused on manipulating short-run scores.

Jacob and Levitt (2003) propound that teacher incentives may have unintended consequences such as explicit cheating or focusing on specific tested objectives at the expense of more general learning of students. Students who are exposed to such kind of learning usually have difficulties in applying their education outside classroom setting for instance, when conducting outdoor activities, a student may fail to apply theory into practice. Thus, it is argued that teacher incentives may have a negative impact on student performance.

2.4.1.14 School based incentives versus free riders

The other short-coming of school-based teacher incentives is that other teachers may be free riders. Within an education system, free-riders refer to individuals who benefit from this system despite poor performance or utter neglect of duty. All teachers within a school set up need to share the vision and goals of education. The assumption is that it helps teachers to co-ordinate their efforts in order to achieve institutional (school) goals which are, among others, enhanced student achievement. Whether an institution achieves its goals or fails, free riders still benefit from school-based incentives, this may discourage high performing teachers from working hard. Emergence of free-riders within a system resulted in some scholars opting for individual based incentives. However, Ahn and Vigdor (2011) present a contrary dimension to dispute the effect of free riders on group performance. Ahn and Vigdor (2011) argue that ‘free riders’ do exist within a system, but their effect is insignificant for instance in a school-based incentive scheme. This study is in line with Ahn (2009)’s argument on the role of free riders in achieving institutional goals.




Figure 2: School incentives versus individual incentives

SOURCE: Adapted from Ahn (2009) The missing link: Estimating the impact of incentives on effort and effort on production using teacher accountability legislation (Working paper, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 2009.

From Figure 2, it can be noted that despite existence of free riders as presented by Ahn (2009) when a school practices group incentives, their effect does not affect institutional success in a situation where individual or group incentives are given. Individual incentives as well give less positive impact on teachers' effort towards teaching of students as compared to group incentives. According to Ahn (2009), group incentives yield best results on influencing teachers to work hard and subsequently improve student achievement.

2.4.1.15 Perceptions of community towards incentives

The fourth sub-research question in this study was concerned with perceptions of community members towards school-based teacher incentives. Inclusion and subsequent withdrawal of school-based teacher incentives within Zimbabwean education system brought mixed reactions from different stakeholders. Varied perceptions emanated from those who propounded that teacher incentives increased student performance while others disagreed, citing that incentive system was not sustainable (Makanga & Mutsagondo, 2014). Teacher trade unions in Zimbabwe initially called for discontinuation of school-based incentives. They argued that school-based teacher incentives brought about differences among teachers as some schools could not afford to pay the extra tuition fees for teachers. Teacher trade unions further argued that a burden of paying teachers had to be government's responsibility. However, majority of parents supported payment of incentives to teachers, arguing that it motivated teachers to work hard. Some parents transferred their children from schools where incentives were poorly paid to where teachers received higher incentives. These parents claimed that motivated teachers improve their child's academic achievement. One parent asserted that,

I transferred my child to this school because I believe that she will get best schooling. Teachers at this school receive incentives and I am convinced that they work hard. My child has greatly improved.

This is in agreement with Pop-Eleches and Uroquiola (2011) who postulate that parents/guardians usually look for best schools where their children could attain wholesome education that promotes student achievement.

2.4.1.16 Incentives and teacher motivation

The fifth sub-research question focused on how school-based incentives affected teachers' motivation to work. Cherry (2010) views motivation as the force that initiates, guides and maintains goal-oriented behaviour. There are two types of motivation, namely intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is the inherent enthusiasm and drive by an individual to accomplish activities (Heartfield, 2013). An individual's motivation is influenced by biological, intellectual, social, political and emotional factors. Heartfield (2013) asserts that at work employers, therefore, have to inspire employee motivation. To create a work environment in which an employee is motivated about his or her work involves both intrinsically satisfying and extrinsically encouraging factors (Cherry, 2010). Employee motivation is a combination of fulfilling employee's needs and expectations at work.

Bennell (2004) points out that issues of teacher motivation and pay as having an influence on student achievement have been skimmed over and, at times, ignored altogether in many countries. Bennell (2004) further asserts that, given enormous financial implications of reversing growing impoverishment of teachers in many Low Income Countries (LIC), it is perhaps not surprising that this problem has not been adequately acknowledged and addressed by both various governments and donors. Springer, Ballou, Hamilton, Le, Lockwood, McCaffrey, Pepper and Stecher (2010) argue that teacher incentives have an effect of triggering both intrinsic and extrinsic drives of teachers. Intrinsic motivations are those that arise from within an individual, such as doing a complicated crossword puzzle purely for personal gratification. Extrinsic motivations emerge from external factors arising from the environment. Emmett and McGree (2013) argue that there is no dividing line between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as both are key to human participation and aptitude in a given

time. Thus, financial support that teachers receive, should stimulate both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of teachers which is fundamental to students' learning outcome.

Ahn and Vigdor (2011) note that the rate of teacher absenteeism would be reduced if they were intrinsically and extrinsically motivated through the payment of incentives. However, raising teacher motivation is not enough if it is not translated into student achievement. Ahn and Vigdor (2011) further enquired whether students learned more with motivated teachers and concluded that a highly motivated teacher would raise students' standardised test scores by a significant amount. Thus, Ahn and Vigdor (2011) claim that teachers are motivated to work harder by monetary rewards and that motivated teachers get students to perform better in their examinations, which this study also attempts to explore.

The argument is that teachers affect student achievement most as they mediate students' encounter with content and control classroom activities through intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Zindi et al., 1997). Materials or technology-based innovations may have little success without support of motivated classroom teachers. Cole (2010) asserts that systems are now not judged on how much they spend, nor on how many teachers are employed, but on student learning outcomes. This study therefore, discussed how motivation among teachers through school-based teacher incentives in selected secondary schools in Makoni District inspired student achievement.

2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter discussed the theoretical framework that underpinned this research, it reviewed related literature and it looked at the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement and perception of various stakeholders on teacher motivation. The school-based teacher incentive scheme was an attempt to motivate teachers who had been economically deprived during 2003 to 2008 in Zimbabwe. Proponents of this scheme argue that teacher motivation by means of remuneration is central to raise teachers' effort in respect of working hard, thereby improving student achievement.

Attention was therefore given to an exploration of how interaction processes among teachers and different stakeholders have impacted on student achievement. Zimbabwean education system, in the process of rebuilding and redressing 2003 to 2008 hyper-inflationary economic effects, introduced school-based teacher incentives to try and retain teachers, more so, to improve their service delivery. However, teacher incentive scheme had been politicised by different governments that came into Zimbabwe prior after and 2013. Circulars have been issued to either introduce or ban teacher incentives without adequate consultations with different stakeholders. Barber and Mourshed (2007:19) claim that the quality of an education system cannot exceed the quality of its teachers. Two key lessons that are learnt from a research by Hattie (2003) indicate that in order to improve students' learning outcomes, attention needs to be given to

- focusing on improving teachers' welfare and
- focusing on up-skilling teachers, with those attributes that contribute most to students' success.

Marzano (2003) assert that a highly effective teacher can thus improve students' academic results. The assumption is that teachers among other factors play a very crucial role in enhancing student achievement. In Chapter 3, the researcher discussed contextual realities of teachers' incentive schemes in developed and developing countries and also to ascertain how teachers in other countries are coping and making ends meet.

CHAPTER 3

TEACHER INCENTIVE SYSTEM IN SELECTED DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

3.1 INTRODUCTION

One of most important observations of chapter 2 was that the issue of cushioning teachers through payment of incentives received mixed reactions. People seem to have divergent views regarding its inception or its subsequent withdrawal from Zimbabwean education system. What was also observed was that the issue of awarding incentives to teachers is not a unique practice to Zimbabwe alone. Governments and School Development Committees in developed and developing countries have been battling on how they could best improve quality of education in their respective countries. One of the strategies adopted has been to improve teachers' morale by means of awarding them incentives (Randall, Hollenbeck, Stone & Miner, 2000).

Teacher incentive system has been and is being practiced in varying degrees and approaches by governments, school systems and school-parent association bodies all over the world. A generic model does not exist that can be adopted to suit every country, government or school-parent body. However, the major challenge has been that these incentive systems have been designed with minimal or no consultation from teachers as primary recipients of incentives. This has left incentive programmes without yielding intended results, or achieving only minimum results. Incentive systems were largely designed by those who have political or economic muscles to have their voices heard. A misconception by these powerful groups or people would be that they understood better what teachers need. The assumption is that people at the top forgot that teachers themselves have their own expectations of incentive systems. These expectations, attitudes and behaviour towards incentive system are shaped and modified through interaction. Teachers are creative human beings and not merely passive recipients of various incentive systems. Failure to involve teachers at designing stage of award systems has often led to collapse of incentive

systems, with incentives being denigrated as non-beneficial strategies to improve students' achievements (Cooper & Alvarado, 2006). Cooper and Alvarado (2006) furthermore assert that without a set of common understandings, an incentive system would be received with conflict and with inefficiencies in teachers' service delivery being inevitable. This has led to an impression that awarding teachers incentives has no or only little effect in motivating them to work hard in order to advance student achievement (Randall et al., 2000).

Dolan, Metcalfe and Navarro-Martinez, 2012) maintain that awarding teachers by means of remuneration through incentives motivates them to improve their work and thereby increasing students' achievements. The argument is that if teachers are happy they could work harder to improve the students' achievement (Loeb & Page, 2000; Kingdom & Teal, 2002). A discontented teacher could not be motivated to work harder, and subsequently students could not obtain the best results in public examinations.

The aim of this chapter is therefore to present and discuss contextual realities of teachers' incentive schemes in developed and developing countries, and also to ascertain how teachers in other countries are coping and making ends meet.

3.2 TEACHER INCENTIVES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: THE U.S.A.

3.2.1 Background to introduction of teacher incentives in U.S.A.

Ballou (2001) in Figlio and Kenny (2007) stated that education reforms were adopted in U.S.A from as early as the 1970s but became profound after 1984 when U.S.A. government endeavoured to improve quality of education among USA students. Quality education in U.S.A. had declined due to a plethora of factors. One of the most important contributing factor to poor quality in education had been low teacher morale. Low teacher morale among other influences had been contributing to student under-achievement (Hoxby & Leigh, 2004) Reasons for teachers' diminished morale include, work overload, poor working conditions, low status assigned to the teaching

profession by community and more importantly poor salaries (Marzano, 2003). Hoxby and Leigh (2004) present evidence that the decline in quality of teachers in U.S.A. is due to highly compressed teaching wage structure. This has forced teachers to abandon the profession for other higher paying jobs, or they embarked on other negative behaviour, such as absenteeism, absconding and general low performance. These negative behaviours had been detrimental to student learning outcomes. Prendergast (1999) uses the term dysfunctional behavioural responses to refer to these negative and uncouth behaviours, while Murnane, Richard and Cohen (1986) call it opportunistic behaviour. Eventually students suffer on grounds of neglect from teachers, contributing to poor or low student achievement. To rescue U.S.A students from receiving poor education, U.S.A. government supported a variety of incentive systems.

3.2.2 U.S.A. government and its support for teacher incentives

U.S.A. government supports a wide range of programmes to improve quality of teachers and to make the teaching profession more attractive for both current and potential new teachers (Rivkin, Hanushek & Kain, 2005.) Funds for these programmes are distributed to different states in U.S.A; Local Education Agencies (LEAs), Institutions of Higher Education (IHEs) and to individual teachers directly by United States Department of Education. Incentive programmes are then instituted to attract prospective teachers to highly needed subjects and schools. Other incentives are designed to improve teacher recruitment, training, retention and compensation. Rivkin et al. (2005) assert that in 2013 fiscal year, U.S.A. Congress apportioned \$2.9 billion for these teacher programmes, which account for 4.4% of total discretionary budget of U.S. Department of Education. The thrust to support these teacher incentive programmes had been informed by realisation that teachers play a critical role in students' learning experiences.

3.2.3 Teachers a fundamental vehicle for student learning

U.S.A. government also noted that teachers are vital in respect of students' learning outcomes. A school can have best facilities, adequate resources such as textbooks, computers, highly qualified teachers and best students but this may not equally be transferred into improved student achievement. While these aspects are important, the role of teachers may not be under-estimated. The President of U.S.A. remarked that good teachers make a great difference to students' academic achievement (Butrymowicz, 2012). Hanushek and Rivkin (2004) are of the opinion that good and quality teachers can positively influence student learning. This is in tandem with Wentzel (2009) observation that it is true that children are a nation's future but teachers lead the way. The assumption is that teachers are important to students' learning. A great deal is thus known of what students need through their teachers and also, how big a difference high quality teaching makes to student's learning, achievement, development and success in school (Richard, 2012). As a result of great importance placed on the role of teachers, U.S.A. government introduced a number of financial awards in order to motivate teachers to offer quality education that improves student learning experiences.

3.2.4 Teacher Award System in U.S.A.

Fryer (2011) states that the Department of Education received funding from U.S.A. government, for instance, in 2007 to 2008 through 2009 to 2010 school year for paying basic and additional salaries (incentives) to over 20, 000 teachers. It should be noted that this practice of rewarding incentives to teachers had not been transferred to students' parents/guardians. This could ensure that no teacher is prejudiced on grounds of which type of school he/she works at or failure by parents/guardians to support a school financially. The argument is that not all schools have the same capacity to support their own school activities. It is argued that the type, status and nature of school are determined by, among other factors, economic status of parents who send their children to that school or geo-location of a school (Giddens, 2001). The assumption is that those parents with a sound revenue base

would support school activities financially unlike in poor communities. Thus, all teachers and schools in U.S.A. could compete and win awards if they meet the criteria for selection (Rivkin, Hanushek & Kain, 2005).

3.2.5 Strategy adopted by teachers in U.S.A.

U.S.A. teaching department faces a challenge of attrition where there has been a gradual reduction in number of teachers on grounds of many factors such as retirement or resignation, or of abandoning the profession to join other professions (Haberman, 2004). Haberman (2004) further asserts that an average length of a teaching career in U.S.A. was down to eleven years. One quarter of all beginner teachers leave teaching profession within four years and even more so in urban areas (Haberman, 2004). However, Rowan, Corenti and Miller (2002) are of the opinion that teachers who leave have less of a negative impact on schools and students than those who burn out but remain in teaching. The assumption is that teachers who have burnouts and remain teaching, demonstrate significantly less task-oriented behaviour (i.e., less hands-on, active learning) and provide fewer positive reinforcements to their students (Rowan et al., 2002). Black (2001) indicates that teachers' burnout has negative effects on student performance because if teachers feel good about their work then students' achievement rises. The reason for attrition or burnout has been linked to, among other factors, poor working conditions, which have been manifested through poor remunerations.

Having discussed teacher incentive programmes in U.S.A. as one of the selected developed countries, the next section discussed teacher incentive programmes in selected developing countries.

3.3 TEACHER INCENTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA (L.A.)

3.3.1 Background to the Incentive Systems in Latin America

Governments in Latin American countries such as Chile, Brazil and El Salvador have also been struggling to improve the quality of education. Vegas (2005) indicates that while many Latin American countries have succeeded in providing access to basic education for greater majority of children, the quality of education in this region remains very poor. Vegas (2005) further asserts that students from Latin American countries are among the worst performers in two recent international assessments, such as Progress in International Reading and Literacy Study and the Programme for International Student Assessment. Although most Latin American countries, just like other countries, are aware of the importance of improving quality of education systems for reducing poverty, inequality and increasing economic development, they are not clear on how to achieve this. A growing body of evidence supports a conception that teachers play a key role in what, how and how much students learn in schools. (Burke & Sass, 2013). Burke and Sass (2013) argue that successful reforms to improve the quality of education cannot be done whilst ignoring teachers' plight. The argument is that quality of teachers has a strong impact on student achievement. Latin American countries thus introduced different incentives to attract and retain effective teachers in teaching profession.

3.3.2 Attracting and retaining teachers in Latin America

Different types of incentives have been introduced in LA in a quest to attract and retain teachers in teaching profession. The main objective was to raise student achievement through improving the quality of teachers. It has been realised that no meaningful educational reforms can be achieved without improving teachers' quality (Mizala & Romaguera, 2004). The supposition is that the quality of an education system is never better than the quality of its teachers (World Bank, 2009). Optimum learning of students cannot therefore be divorced from the quality of its teachers. As a result, attracting and retaining qualified teachers and motivating them to work

effectively, is arguably the most important education challenge in LA. Some countries, such as Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico initiated rewarding teachers for working in rural areas, or introduced salary structures that compensate teachers for improved performance and students' learning. Brazil increased resources available in education and for teachers' salaries more specifically, as well as mechanisms by which resources are made available to municipality and state-level education systems (Vegas, 2005). El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua devolved their authority to their communities, thus granting professional autonomy to schools and teachers in a belief that increased accountability would lead to a higher quality in students' learning outcomes. To strengthen efforts to draw and keep quality and effective teachers to improve student achievement, policies had been introduced within different Latin American countries. These are discussed in the ensuing section.

3.3.3 Policy options to improve the quality of teachers in L.A. countries

Policy options to improve the quality of teachers in Latin American countries can be grouped into three clusters, namely;

- (a) policies to improve preparation and professional development of teachers;
- (b) policies that have an effect on who becomes a teacher and how long he or she remains in the field; and
- (c) policies that affect the work that teachers do in classrooms (Mizala & Romaguera, 2004).

The second and third policies were created to focus on payment of incentives to teachers and how incentives motivate teachers to work hard. The argument underlying this is that, teachers respond to incentives and education policymakers can improve the quality of teaching and also students' learning by designing effective incentives to attract, retain, and motivate highly qualified teachers (World Bank, 2009). But how teacher incentives are designed and implemented also matters. In various cases teachers have been found to respond adversely to incentives by, for example, not collaborating as much with other teachers, excluding low-performing

students from exams or classes, providing students with the answers to tests, or even undertaking that students would fail if they do not attend private tutoring lessons that are conducted (Fryer, 2011). However, despite these numerous incentive systems being introduced, Vegas (2005) maintains that this had not been translated into improved student achievement as evidenced by students from LA countries who had failed to improve in their academic performance.

3.4 TYPES OF INCENTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA

3.4.1 Career ladder

Santibanez (2002) mentions that within L.A., Mexico adopted a career ladder called a *carrera magisterial*. This award entails that promotion is not solely based on seniority. Instead, it is based on requirements that teachers know of in advance, including, for example, training, proven experience and performance. Mexico's approach sought to meet two goals, namely to improve teachers' status by providing economic and morale-related incentives and to raise quality of education. A career ladder incentive model, consists of a promotion system in which teachers participate on a voluntary and individual basis. This incentive model is oriented to all teachers at different kinds of schools, principals, supervisors and teaching assistants.

However, one of the shortcomings of a career ladder approach is that 'good' teachers have been removed from classrooms to be rewarded with administrative positions. The assumption is that appointment of good teachers to administrative positions would have a negative impact on student learning outcomes as students would be left with probably poor teachers. Thus, while career ladder system looks rewarding to teachers, students who should be ultimate beneficiaries of a learning process suffer as they are sometimes left with poor or inexperienced teachers, which can contribute to low student achievement.

3.4.2 Merit award system in Bolivia

Bolivia attempted a pay for competencies award system (Urquiola & Vegas, 2005). This award system stressed a creation of incentives for improving quality and performance of teachers. Teachers had to pass an examination to measure their knowledge of subjects they taught. There were no restrictions that barred teachers from participating. Teachers signed up voluntarily and those who passed the examination received a wage increase and promotion into principal level, while those who failed remained in the traditional pay scale system.

Challenges could also be noted in respect of this scheme. Once again focus was primarily on teachers and not on how this system would subsequently benefit students' learning process. Good teachers would be removed from classrooms as they were selected to take up administrative roles. More so, by not prescribing minimum requirements for entry, it could mean even junior teachers participated, passed and were appointed as principals to lead more experienced teachers. It resulted in a scenario where a principal would have to learn from his or her subordinates who in this case could be more experienced. Those teachers who failed to attain required grades for promotion at times opted for disruptive behaviours that were detrimental to learning of students (World Bank, 2009). These negative behaviours were displayed in various forms, such as teacher absenteeism, absconding, failure to give students adequate work or any work at all. The assumption is that teachers who failed might be negative about the whole school environment and oppose any progressive ideas to help students learn (World Bank, 2009).

As a result of opposition of the merit awards received from teacher trade unions and teachers in Bolivia, this merit wage programme was later replaced by other incentive schemes, such as an upgrading incentive, a bilingual mode incentive, an incentive to remain in rural areas and a collective school incentive, namely school award system (Conteras & Talavera, 2003). All these attempts were a bid to foster quality and

effective education through improving teachers' motivation which would subsequently improve student achievement.

3.4.3 School award system in Bolivia

School award system was also introduced in Bolivia (Conteras & Talavera, 2003). This system entailed that principals, school teachers and administrative staff would receive monetary incentives for their performances and services provided to students. The award system encouraged a spirit of comradeship and teamwork among education practitioners. It promoted a positive environment for students to learn, in the end improving student achievement. However, Conteras and Talavera (2003) still maintain that this award system also met resistance from teacher trade unions and teachers themselves. This caused teachers to often strike (closing down schools for days or weeks) to protest for higher wages, or other issues. While teachers were striking, students were left with no or only minimal attention from teachers. The assumption is that withdrawal of labour by teachers negatively affected student learning outcomes.

3.4.4 School award system in El Salvador

El Salvador introduced a school award system which was meant to encourage public school teachers to work together to solve problems affecting their schools and to improve the quality of educational services that they offer in their communities (Sawanda & Ragatz, 2005). This award consisted of a monetary incentive for each teacher working at schools that met objectives previously established by Education Ministry. To qualify for an award, all public schools at pre-school, primary and secondary level were evaluated.

The major setback of this school award system was that there was no differential treatment of schools. Schools underwent same evaluative process which used same tools. The argument was that schools were considered as a homogeneous group despite numerous indications that schools were different. These differences arose

due to their geo-location, whether schools were in rural areas or in urban centres. Even urban schools differed, namely whether they were located in high, middle or low density suburbs. The geo-location of schools as well determined the nature of students enrolled at these schools.

The nature of students was also affected by their socio-economic background. Haralambos and Holborn (2013) maintain that students' home culture plays a critical role in student participation in the learning process. Bernstein (1971) as cited in Giddens, (2001) talks of students from low/ poor classes using a restricted code while students from top/rich class use elaborate code in terms of their use of language. Littlejohn and Foss (2011) view a code as a set of organising principles behind the language employed by members of a social group. Littlejohn and Foss (2011) further suggest that Bernstein's (1971) theory shows how languages that people use in everyday conversation reflect and shape assumptions of a certain social group.

However, schools are societies in miniature. They uphold and perpetuate an ideology of rich people in societies. Thus, it is the language and culture of rich classes that is maintained and learnt in schools. This means that students from rich classes have a comparative advantage over students from low/poor classes and perform better at school because they are using their home language. Students from low/poor classes suffer a dual predicament in that they have to master new content depicted through a culture of rich classes and using a new language. Students from lower classes thus end up under-performing in school. Maton and Muller (2007) affirm that as students come from different classes in society and use different languages, this influences how they eventually succeed at school. Wa thiongo (1986) sums it up saying, to speak a language is to assume a culture. It can be argued that, school award system in El Salvador failed to take into account differences among schools, as literature had established effects of students' socio-economic level on their school achievement. As a result, an attempt to motivate teachers to improve teacher quality and in the end enhance student achievement yielded minimal positive outcomes.

In the next phase the researcher discussed similarities and differences between school award system as practised in L.A. (Bolivia and El Salvador) and Zimbabwean school-based teacher incentives.

3.5 SCHOOL AWARD SYSTEM OF L.A. VERSUS ZIMBABWEAN SCHOOL-BASED INCENTIVES

3.5.1 School award system non-discriminatory

School award systems or group incentives in both Bolivia and El Salvador have some common traits with Zimbabwean school-based teacher incentive programme. Firstly, every teacher at awarding schools in Bolivia and El Salvador received incentives regardless of his or her performance, attitude to work or behaviour that may or may not be productive. As long as a school won the award, all teachers at this school were entitled to incentives. This is reminiscent of Zimbabwean school-based teacher incentive system. Every teacher in Zimbabwe, at a school where incentives were/are practised was/is entitled to same amount of incentive payment. This is done without considering effectiveness or positive behaviours that are required to raise student achievement such as giving students enough home-work, thorough marking of students' work and reduced teacher absenteeism from school. Thus, both systems encouraged a culture of 'free riders' where even those who do not deserve to benefit ended up being rewarded. Teacher accountability is another similarity which exists in L.A. countries and Zimbabwean education system.

3.5.2 Teachers' accountability

Majority of L.A. teachers are viewed as not accountable for their classroom conduct, or more importantly, for their students' learning progress (UNICEF, 2011). This suggests another commonality with Zimbabwean situation. There are a minimal number of strategies that could be used in L.A. countries, similarly with Zimbabwean education system, to check on teachers' accountability in classrooms. The assumption is that classroom teaching experiences largely lie with what teachers do.

Michaelowa (2002) stresses that it is teachers who break subject matter into palatable units for students to comprehend. Teachers translate educational philosophy and objectives into knowledge and skills and transfer them to students in classrooms (Perumal, 2011). Thus, teachers are at liberty to select pedagogical styles that may enable student to comprehend subject matter/content resulting in improved or negatively influencing student achievement.

Through social interaction, teachers also have a responsibility to determine students' feelings and attitudes towards school work. Perumal (2011) concludes that young minds are easily influenced by what they see and learn. Teachers therefore, play fundamental roles and carry a huge responsibility towards students' learning outcomes. On the whole, due to lack of teacher accountability, school award system could have a challenge, especially when hard-working teachers felt that other teachers are free riders. Existence of free riders may demotivate hard-working teachers. Thus, this school award system could lead to ineffectiveness of incentive systems in improving students' learning outcomes.

In the following section the researcher explored how the amount of incentives paid to teachers are the same across all teachers in LA, a practise which was similar to Zimbabwe situation.

3.5.3 Teachers paid same amount of incentives in LA and Zimbabwe

School award system in L.A. similar to Zimbabwean school-based teacher incentive is not linked to one's level of education, years of service and not to any measure of performance (Vegas, 2005). This similarity in treatment of all teachers had been one of the reasons raised by anti-incentive proponents to justify why school award system has failed to produce desired results in raising students' achievement. These people who opposed the incentive programme would argue that it would be difficult for individuals within an organisation, schools included, to be exerting same influence and more so, same amount of effort to enhance student achievement. If then people's work rate differs, it therefore becomes absurd to reward them equally.

In this study the researcher also investigated whether Zimbabwean schools had also suffered same challenges as reflected in selected secondary schools. The researcher furthermore, discussed how teachers in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a region for developing countries responded to low salaries.

3.6 TEACHERS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (C.E.E.) AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (C.I.S.)

UNICEF (2011) conducted a study of six countries on teachers' recruitment into teaching, teacher development, and teacher salaries in Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova and Uzbekistan. It came out that governments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), face challenges on how best to recruit school graduates into teaching, develop effective teachers and then retain them on the job (UNICEF, 2011). Despite all efforts made by CEE and CIS governments to motivate teachers, quality of education system in that region remains low. However, various interventions such as allowing teachers to conduct extra-tutorial in order to supplement teachers' salaries and also requesting parents/guardians to pay their teachers, had been adopted to motivate teachers in that region as a way of encouraging teachers to improve student achievement.

3.6.1 Motivating teachers in the CEE and CIS

Steiner-Khamsi, Kumenova and Taliev (2008) note that what attracts newly-qualified teachers to a particular teaching post is not necessarily identical to what induces teachers to stay in teaching profession. In many countries, as well as in CEE and CIS, salaries and benefits have been critical in luring and retaining qualified teachers. However, teaching profession, like any other job in public sector, has lost its appeal for those intending to join teaching profession, for those already in this profession and for community at large (Steiner-Khamsi, Kumenova & Taliev, 2008). There had been a strong commitment on part of governments in CEE and CIS to try and

understand what works best in other countries to motivate teachers in order that teachers may work effectively and raise student achievement. Efforts to address teachers' plight have been made by readdressing teacher's salaries. This is based on the assumption that a motivated teacher would attend to students' learning needs or stay in teaching profession for a long time. If a teacher stays in teaching profession for a long time, the argument is that, this teacher could become more experienced in his/her work and could now be more effective in improving student achievement.

3.6.2 Teachers' salaries in CEE and CIS

An average monthly basic salary for a teaching load of 18–22 hours per week ranges from \$20 to \$398 (U.S. dollars) in some countries of CEE and CIS region (UNICEF, 2011). Teachers' salaries do not compare favourably with those in other professions which may require same qualifications. In turn, this has led to a loss of status accorded to teaching profession in CEE and CIS countries. It can be argued that remuneration of teachers does not only have repercussions for teachers' status in teaching profession but also determines how much time teachers spend on pedagogical work other than simply teaching. Thus, the way teachers interact with their students in a learning environment could have an influence on students' learning outcomes, such as students' achievement in standardised tests.

3.6.3 Strategies adopted by teachers in CEE and CIS to supplement poor salaries

Governments in CEE and CIS countries designed a number of initiatives in order to address teachers' poor salaries (Vegas, 2005). These interventions include allowing teachers to conduct additional hours and private tutoring, which are both regulated and unregulated (Vegas, 2005). However, it should be noted that responsibility of paying for these initiatives has been transferred to parents or guardians of students. The aim could have been to retain teachers in teaching profession, which could lead to improved student achievement. The assumption could be that students might

benefit immensely in a learning process when being taught by experienced and motivated teachers.

3.6.3.1 Teaching additional hours in CEE and the CIS

Teachers conduct an addition of 9-11 hours weekly of teaching other than their normal load in order to boost their income (UNICEF, 2011). Normal teaching hours are between 18-22 hours per week. However, teachers who had good relations with school administration or experienced teachers had an opportune of teaching these additional hours, unlike young teachers who already suffered from poor salaries. This differential in treatment could lead to conflict among teachers and school administration or teachers themselves and could have negative effects on teacher morale and subsequently affect student achievement. As a result of additional hours, teachers' load had risen to up to 30 hours a week. A teaching load of up to 30 hours per week is an excessive load and can contribute to low quality in teaching. As teachers spend 30 hours teaching they would be worn-out and this reduces their output. This could mean that students might not receive adequate learning support from worn- out teachers. In the end, students may fail to produce good academic results. Teachers also embarked on private tutoring that is either regulated or unregulated, in order to supplement their salary income.

3.6.3.2 Private tutoring

(a) Regulated private tutoring

Teachers in CEE and CIS regions often engaged in regulated private tutoring which is known by their government. Parents pay for extra tuition for their children. These fees charged are for extra-curriculum and curriculum activities. Most expensive additional classes are for foreign languages and sport, while least expensive are arts lessons (UNICEF, 2011). Besides regulated private tutoring, teachers also embark on unregulated tutoring.

(b) Unregulated private tutoring

Unregulated tutoring is when teachers and parents/guardians of students enter into a private agreement. Parent/guardian pays teacher(s) for whatever private services that are rendered to their child at or outside school parameters. Fees for this unregulated tutoring are high compared to what parents pay for regulated private tutoring. Unregulated fees have also been paid in form of bribes to have their child admitted to a special school or a prestigious university (Steiner-Khamsi et al., 2008).

3.7 CHALLENGES TO PRIVATE TUTORING

Although private tutoring had been seen to boost teachers' salaries, this system had sometimes been abused by teachers. Some teachers would withhold prescribed curricular content or purposefully not educate students for tests during class in order to get extra payment outside normal school hours (Urquiola & Vegas, 2005). School classes could be taught poorly, thus creating a demand for income-generating private tutoring after school hours. Other teachers could blackmail or even threaten their students with low marks, forcing them to seek extra tuition (Urquiola & Vegas, 2005). Students could also stay behind when classes have ended to receive private tutoring. This in itself could expose students to all forms of abuse from teachers. On the whole, private tutoring constituted a substantial part of teacher's income and forms one of the benefits received by teachers within CEE and CIS regions.

The next section focuses on Africa, exploring teacher motivation and school improvement in Nigeria. Despite its economic stability Nigeria also faced a teacher motivation crisis which affected its education system and more importantly student achievement (Adelabu, 2005).

3.8 TEACHER MOTIVATION AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT IN NIGERIA

Ofoegbu (2004) studied motivation of public primary and secondary school teachers selected from south-eastern part of Nigeria. Ofoegbu (2004) indicates that

participating teachers almost unanimously agreed that teacher motivation is a vital and central factor for classroom effectiveness and improvement in student achievement. This concurs with Michaelowa (2002) observation where incentives could enhance teacher motivation and have been resolutely related to student achievement in sub-Saharan Africa, where Nigeria is located. It was therefore recommended that in this era where people feel secure in displaying how rich they might be and in face of persistent poverty, teachers need to be adequately motivated (salaries must be paid when due and teaching facilities have to be made available) for an effective viable school system (Ofoegbu, 2004). Chiemeka (2015) says that governments and any relevant bodies need to seriously consider their remuneration of teachers which might increase teacher morale, thus enhancing teachers' classroom effectiveness. The assumption being that when teaching is effective, it could lead to student achievement.

3.8.1 Morale and motivation of teachers in Nigeria

Chigbu (2006) conducted a study on morale and motivation of teachers in Nigeria and noted a multiplicity of factors that determine how teachers behave and perform in classroom learning environment. Chigbu (2006) furthermore indicates that motivation influences an individual's behaviour and performance. Teacher motivation has to do with a teacher's desire to participate in pedagogical processes within a school environment. It relates with teachers' interest in improving discipline and control of students and thus encompasses teachers' involvement or non-involvement in academic and non-academic activities, which are practiced in schools. During social interaction with students, teachers therefore command and emit the image of one who improves knowledge and physical conditions of a classroom through orderliness, discipline and control. Chigbu (2006) concludes that, major responsibility of working with students rests with teachers. Therefore, depending on degree of congruence with classroom practices and school environment, teachers' teaching activities may positively or negatively enhance students' performance (Chigbu, 2006).

Adelabu (2005) indicated that teachers in Nigeria, just like any other teacher, have both intrinsic and extrinsic needs. A teacher who is intrinsically motivated may be driven to take on a task for its own sake, for the satisfaction it provides, or for feeling of achievement and self-actualisation. On the other hand, an extrinsically motivated teacher may perform an activity/duty in order to obtain some rewards, such as a salary increase. The assumption is that both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation play an important part in people's lives which could influence and determine a person's behaviour. Therefore, any government, school or organisation that devotes its interest in education aims to enhance teachers' intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Maliki, 2013). The argument being that when teachers' motivation is high, it could make them desire to improve student achievement. This study also discussed how teachers' morale and motivation in selected secondary schools in this research affect student achievement. Although there are a multiplicity of factors that may determine teacher morale and motivation, this study focused on how school-based teacher incentives have an effect on student achievement.

3.8.2 Education system in Nigeria staffed by teachers with a low morale

There has been a consistent trend to improve job morale of teachers in Nigeria, especially with coming to power of a democratic government in 1999 (Ofoegbu, 2004). However, education sector in Nigeria appeared to be staffed by teachers with poor morale and low levels of commitment to their work (Adeyeni & Oyetende, 2011). Adeyeni and Oyetende (2011) further point out that a motivation crisis exists in Nigeria which had been influenced by poor infra-structure in schools and a poor reward system in terms of salaries. Because of poor morale, Nigerian teachers are seen as having a negative attitude towards their work. This negative attitude had thus been manifested in numerous ill-behaviours that could not improve student achievement. Nigerian teachers therefore, adopted various strategies to respond to poor working conditions, in particular low salaries, in order to supplement their salaries.

3.8.3 Survival strategies of teachers in Nigeria

3.8.3.1 Private tutoring in Nigeria

Teachers in Nigeria are involved in secondary employment activities after work in order to supplement their meagre incomes (Razquin, 2004). Increasingly more teachers, especially in urban areas, conduct private tuition. Students are encouraged to register for private tuition either with same teachers who teach at the school or with other teachers and at different schools. This practice had enabled teachers to supplement their income. However, this private tutoring is sometimes unregulated tutoring, thus students could be solely left at the mercy of teachers. These teachers could be at liberty to increase tuition fee or at times withhold important information so that students could continue to seek academic assistance. This research also discussed how unregulated tutoring in Zimbabwean schools, could not bring desired results in terms of improving student achievement.

3.9 CONCLUSION

In this chapter the researcher presented an overview of teachers' incentive scheme in selected developed and developing countries. The researcher also described background information to the rise of incentive system in these countries. What emerged was that there is no single standard procedure on how teachers are paid incentives. Systems varied from country to country and are largely dependent upon the revenue base of that country and other factors such as socio-political factors. In developed countries, responsibility of awarding teachers' incentives is supported primarily by government. However, in developing countries this responsibility had been transferred to parents/guardians of students. Awards paid to teachers ranged from regulated awards such as those structured by various governments or school administrations to unregulated awards where teachers and parents entered into private contracts. Unregulated awards are sometimes exploitative to parents/guardians.

Chapter 4 focuses on research methodology and design of the empirical investigations of this research. Methods and techniques used during data-collection procedure on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in Makoni are also discussed.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH APPROACH, DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter presented and discussed contextual realities of teachers' incentive schemes in developed and developing countries. The aim was to explore how teachers in those countries are coping and making ends meet. Chapter 3 also discussed that various governments in both developed and developing countries realised how important it is to motivate teachers for student achievement. However, how to do it varied from country to country and government to government. As a result, different incentive systems had been introduced with a quest to make teachers work harder and subsequently improve on student achievement.

Chapter 4 describes methods and techniques used to explore the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. The research design, data-collection methods, such as interviews, open-ended questionnaires and focus-group discussions were discussed. Methods used to select the sample of participants for this study were also discussed. The chapter indicates how data were analysed. A qualitative approach was used to explore the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in five selected secondary schools in Makoni District.

4.2 THE RESEARCH DESIGN

Neuman (2007) indicates that a research design is a strategy, a plan and nature of conducting a research. Thus, a research design is a blueprint of how one intends to conduct a research (Babbie, 2010). This implies that it is the manner in which a researcher puts a study together in responding to a set of questions. A research design illustrates a systematic plan, outlining methods of compiling and analysing data that could be used to arrive at a conclusion in respect to a research problem in a study. A research design can also be envisaged, within qualitative approach, as the whole process of research, that is, from problem conceptualisation to narrative report

writing (Creswell, 2008). In line with this frame of thought, a research design is a delineated plan of action that a study exploits to collect and utilise data so that desired information can be obtained from specified and intended sources.

This study explored the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in five selected secondary schools in Makoni District.

4.3 QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY RESEARCH

Baxter and Jack (2008) assert that a qualitative case study is an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. This ensures that an issue is not explored through one lens only, but by means of a variety of lenses which allow for multiple facets of a phenomenon to be revealed and understood. Hynett, Kenny and Swift (2014) view a qualitative case study as an investigation and analysis of a single or collective, case, intended to capture complexity of an object of study. Rule and John (2011) identify three types of cases which are; an intrinsic case, which is used to understand particulars of a single case, rather than what it represents; an instrumental case study that provides insight into an issue or is used to refine a theory. An instrumental case is also selected to advance an understanding of the object of interest. The third type is a collective case, which Yin (2003) calls, multiple cases. Multiple case refers to an instrumental case which is studied as multiple, nested cases, observed in unison, parallel, or in sequential order (Yin, 2003). More than one case can be simultaneously studied. However, each case study is a concentrated, single inquiry, studied holistically in its own entirety. In this research, the study made use of a multiple case approach where five different secondary schools were selected and studied in Makoni District.

4.3.1 Case studies

According to Rule and John (2011:4), a case study is a systematic and in-depth investigation of a particular instance in its context in order to generate knowledge. It

gives special attention to the case in point in order to obtain in-depth data (Cohen et al., 2007). Graham (2000) argues that a case study has an advantage in that it is a detailed study of a singled-out item for research in a small scale and of relatively short duration. Gilbert (2008) posits that a case study is necessary to probe deeply into systems governing behaviour and interrelationships among individual institutions. It helps to establish and explore attitudes, perceptions and beliefs and shows why certain behaviours occur. Thus, through the use of a case study, the researcher information on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in five selected secondary schools in Makoni District was gathered.

4.3.2 Determining a case study

Baxter and Jack (2008) argue that while it may look simple to explain what a case is, determining a case may be challenging. As a result, a set of questions should be laid out to determine and guide one on what a case is. Questions such as, Do I want to analyse an individual? Do I want to analyse a programme? Do I want to analyse a process? Do I want to analyse difference between organisations? Answering these questions can be effective strategies to further delineate one's case. This study explored the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in five selected secondary schools and this implied that multiple cases were studied. Denzin and Lincoln (2000) assert that in a multiple case study, we are examining several cases to understand similarities and differences between cases. Yin (2003:47) describes how multiple case studies can be used to either predict similar results (a literal replication) or predict contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication). This type of a design has its advantages and disadvantages. Overall, evidence created from this type of study is considered robust and reliable, but it can also be extremely time-consuming and expensive to execute.

In this particular study, a case study design was employed. Data that were obtained from selected secondary schools helped to decipher whether school-based teacher incentives had a role to play in student achievement. This study also investigated whether school-based teacher incentives have a motivational effect on teachers that

consequently enhance teachers' performance, which could eventually improve student achievement.

4.4 CHOICE OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH FOR THIS STUDY

In exploring the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement, a qualitative case study approach was applied. Divergent views and perceptions regarding inception and subsequent withdrawal of teachers' incentives within Zimbabwean education system, as a way of cushioning teachers' salaries, made an exploratory methodology appropriate for this study. Qualitative case study research is typically considered appropriate for this study because of numerous merits which it carries.

Hancock (2002) indicates that the basic impetus of a qualitative case study research is its constructivist approach. Constructivists believe that truth is relative, and that it is dependent on one's perspective. This paradigm recognises the importance of subjective human creation of meaning, but does not reject outright some notion of objectivity. Constructivism is built upon a premise of social construction of reality (Hancock & Algozzine, 2008). One of the advantages of this approach is the close collaboration between a researcher and participants, while enabling participants to tell their stories. This collaboration is built through social interaction. Thus, it was incumbent to create a favourable environment that enabled participants from selected secondary schools to describe their views. This enabled this study to capture rich information, perceptions and attitudes towards school-based teacher incentives and its role on student achievement.

4.4.1 Personal experience and engagement

In making use of qualitative approach, this study had direct contact with and got close to people, situation and phenomenon being studied. The researcher's personal experiences and insights as a former teacher were an important part of the inquiry and critical to understanding the role of school-based teacher incentives on student

achievement. Thus, during data-collection phase, the researcher employed data-collecting strategies such as interviews and focus-group discussions and had an opportunity to visit selected secondary schools to have a direct conduct with participants. The researcher also observed how teachers who were primary informants in this study responded to school-based teacher incentives, whether their behaviour was affected by incentives (either inception or withdrawal of incentives) and in the end how this affected student achievement.

4.4.2 Characteristics of qualitative research methods

Type of questions to be used is another characteristic of qualitative research. Qualitative methods in exploratory research may make use of open-ended questions which are probing and give participants opportunity to respond in their own words, rather than forcing them to choose from fixed responses and answers. Open-ended questions can have an ability to evoke responses that are;

- meaningful and culturally salient to participants;
- unanticipated by a researcher;
- rich and explanatory in nature.

By making use of open-ended questions, participants were not restricted to provide the kind of responses wished to be gathered by the researcher. This was based on a supposition that human beings unlike animals are thinking beings that have an ability to create their own world and meaning (Charon, 2004).

Fetterman (2008) asserts that open-ended questions help in exploring an emic perspective of participants. An emic perspective is an insider's view of reality. It is one of the principal concepts guiding qualitative research. An emic perspective is fundamental to understanding how people perceive the world around them. Thus, participants were asked open-ended questions about their perceptions on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. This allowed individuals to frame the concept, idea, or situation and then elaborated on it. Kottak (2006) states

that open-ended questions provide a more accurate depiction of an individual's mental map or cultural understanding. Thus, open-ended questions coupled with other data-collection tools such as interviews, focus-group discussions and documents collected from selected secondary schools were used to explore the role of school-based teachers' incentives on student achievement.

Another characteristic of qualitative method is that a researcher works in a natural setting. Norum (2008) propounds that qualitative research is conducted in natural settings. This means that qualitative researchers study things as they are and do not manipulate the environment. Qualitative researchers are of the opinion that behaviour of people under investigation can best be understood when it is observed in a setting in which it occurs. For instance, there are no experimental and control groups. Data were collected in the field, not in a laboratory. Ordinary events and behaviours are studied in their everyday context. This process generally involves interacting with people by interviewing them and observing their settings. Rather than removing people from their settings, qualitative researchers go to people, allowing for gathering of information directly from participants. Hence, this approach is sometimes called naturalistic inquiry (Neuman, 2007). Neuman (2007) further argues that a researcher, therefore, tries to be unobtrusive so that he/she has little influence on behaviour(s) being studied. A researcher tries to understand reality as others experience it. During visits to selected secondary schools, embedded and explicit data on participants' views on incentive system was gathered. Observations on how teachers in selected secondary schools behaved with or without incentives was documented.

Roller (2013) also points out that qualitative research is distinguished because it places a researcher in the centre of data-gathering phase and indeed, a researcher is an instrument by which information is collected. Closeness of a researcher to research participants and subject matter instils an in-depth understanding which can prove beneficial to the thorough analysis and interpretation of outcomes. Patton (2002) comments that if a qualitative researcher wants participants to be open, he /she must be willing to reciprocate on the same level. In this study, it was inevitable to develop and build a relationship of reciprocal trust and rapport with all participants,

including teachers, school heads, and education officers, as quality of data on their perceptions towards school-based teacher incentives depended on this cordial relationship.

Another characteristic of qualitative research is that participants are not regarded as objects but as subjects who have power to influence and determine outcomes of a research. As such, it is very crucial for a researcher to establish a favourable environment that would allow a smooth flow of opinions and ideas from participants in order to generate rich information for a research. Kielborn (2001) asserts that associated with this idea that a researcher is a tool by which data were gathered is an important function of participant-researcher relationship in qualitative research. This relationship is at the core of in-depth interviews, focus-group discussions and participant observation. Participants and the researcher share research space within which certain conventions for communicating (knowingly or not) may be formed and which, in turn, shape the reality a researcher is capturing by means of data collected (Creswell, 2008). In this study, participants were given space to communicate their views and reactions on the role of school-based teacher incentives and how students could subsequently benefit from a learning environment where teachers were motivated by receiving incentives.

An inductive approach in analysing data were another characteristic of qualitative research. Roller (2013) argues that, without doubt, an analysis of qualitative research is messy. Data analysis does not follow a straight line, where point A leads to point B, but rather, is a multi-layered process (Neuman, 2007). The messiness of interconnections, inconsistencies and seemingly illogical input reaped in qualitative research demand that researchers embrace tangles of their data from many sources (Roller, 2013). A big contributor to messiness of analytical process could be the inductive method. Thus, qualitative researchers do not search out data or evidence to prove or disapprove hypotheses they hold before entering the study; rather, abstractions are built as particulars that have been gathered are grouped together. This may allow a researcher to explore reality without having to fit into a preconceived theoretical perspective although one may disagree arguing that some

qualitative research may use literature based or theoretical frame to analyse data. Once data were collected and summarised, a researcher looks for relationships among categories, themes and patterns that suggest generalisations, models, and conclusions. Thus, a researcher interprets results based on data collected. In this study, data were analysed from the onset of data-collection until a meaningful interpretation was achieved on the role of school-based teacher incentives on teacher motivation which could influence student achievement in five selected secondary schools.

Qualitative research stresses a holistic view, that is, it attempts to gain a complete view of what is being studied (Gerring, 2006). The entire phenomenon being studied is understood as a complex system that is more than the sum of its parts. It focuses on complex interdependencies and system dynamics that cannot meaningfully be reduced to a few discrete variables and a linear cause-effect relationship (Flybiorg, 2006). Thus, qualitative researchers seek to understand phenomena in their entirety in order to gain a complete understanding of a person, programme or situation. This study, explored a holistic view on the role of school-based teacher incentives from different participants using various research tools such as interviews, focus group discussions and open-ended questions.

Qualitative research is also exploratory, using thick descriptions to analyse people's individual and collective social actions, beliefs, thoughts and perceptions (Bergold & Stefan, 2012). Research instruments used to gather data from participants were in-depth interviews, focus-group discussions, observations and open-ended questions, which invited participants to explore and describe their worldviews. In this study identifiable information were collected about students' achievements and teachers' performance (from student and staff records) to triangulate data that were gathered by means of other instruments. Therefore, a qualitative researcher relies primarily on non-statistical data such as words, observations and pictures (Maxwell, 2004). The data were detailed, thick descriptions, with a researcher using quotations to capture participants' personal perspectives and experiences (Patton, 2002). Thus, results of this research contain quotations from participants to illustrate and substantiate the

role of school-based teachers' incentives on student achievement. An exploratory approach which uses thick descriptions of participants' perceptions on school-based teacher incentive makes qualitative research appropriate in this study, especially when this issue of school-based teacher incentives had received different reactions from Zimbabwean community in general and in five selected secondary schools being studied.

Qualitative research makes use of small samples, leading qualitative researchers to be accused of suggesting findings that cannot be a true representation or be generalised to entire population. However, the focus in qualitative research is not about generalisability of findings, but an in-depth understanding of a phenomena. Flick (2009) argues that although qualitative research does not exclude the use of large samples, most qualitative research uses small samples, hence such research focuses on details and quality of individuals or small group's experiences. In this study only five out of 60 secondary schools in Makoni District were explored. This gave the study ample time to understand and observe participants' views and reactions on their perceptions of the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement.

In qualitative research, a researcher is concerned with the process which includes seven stages, namely; thematising, designing, interviewing, transcribing, analysing, verifying and reporting (Fink (2000). This split is not made to imply that researchers ought to work in this orderly progressing manner. In fact, this is probably impossible. Thus, a qualitative researcher is expected to feel personally involved in every step of the research process, because every consideration and decision would have to be based on entirely personal grounds (Hobbs, 2010). This study was involved in data-collection and analysis of the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. Interviews and focus-group discussions were conducted with participants. Emerging themes were coded and grouped together. A report was compiled on participants' views and reactions on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. More so, participants' views on inception and

subsequent withdrawal of school-based teacher incentive system by Zimbabwean government were gathered.

4.5 POPULATION AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUE

Patton (2002) states that a population is a group of individuals who have one or more characteristics in common that are of interest to a researcher. Population may be all individuals of a particular type, or a more restricted part of that group. Identifying a population to be studied requires much reflection on the nature of research. Creswell (2008) asserts that a population should be carefully chosen, clearly defined and delimited in order to set precise parameters for ensuring discreteness to a population. Failure to properly identify a population can falsify results of a research.

This study was carried out in Makoni District of Manicaland Province, which has a population of 170 primary and 60 secondary schools. Education officers, school heads, School Development Committee (SDC) members and teachers were the target population. Five school heads and two education officers were interviewed as key informants while 30 teachers participated in focus-group discussions (FGDs), comprising an average of five to eight members. 10 SDC representatives from selected secondary schools responded to questionnaires. This sample size depended on resources and time available for data collection. However, other informants were continually engaged until a point of data-saturation (a point when new data no longer brought additional insight into the research questions). Schools were purposively chosen as they represented different types of schools that awarded incentives to teachers and also those that did not. Makoni district consists of schools that embraced school-based teacher incentive system which was assumed to enhance teacher morale, so there was minimal transfers of teachers and school heads to other districts, as these were primary participants in this research.

Purposive sampling of schools was done from a list of schools obtained from District Education Office. Two education officers were purposively selected as area education officers responsible for supervision of selected schools that participated in

this study. School heads by virtue of heading these selected schools, automatically were also chosen as key informants to this study. The researcher purposively selected chairpersons and treasurers from SDC committees to respond to questionnaires, as these were directly involved in administration of teacher incentives. From lists of teachers obtained from selected schools, the researcher randomly selected names of those who could voluntarily participate in focus group discussions and had to consider issues of equal gender representation among participants. Berg (2009) asserts that purposive sampling depends on a researcher's judgement to select a sample or participants who can provide best information for the study. Two strategies of purposive sampling were employed, namely stratified purposive sampling and maximum variation, in order to obtain a sample that would elicit adequate information on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. Stratified purposive sampling was used to divide the population into a number of strata or layers based on what are seen as significant characteristics of particular sub-groups of interest and which facilitate comparison (Patton, 2002). As such, schools which were selected to be studied, were grouped on whether they are mission boarding, urban government day schools or rural day schools. Stratified purposive sampling was used to select teachers, school heads, community leaders and education officers who also participated in this research.

Maximum variation was also used as another sampling strategy. Graziano and Raulin (2010) posit that many different variations of data in a given case should be explored to ensure that a researcher selects those cases which provide rich sources of information to have a better understanding of a phenomenon. Silverman (2010) asserts that the goal of maximum variation is to add rigour and an in-depth understanding derived from data arising from fullest range of participants and settings.

4.6 DATA-COLLECTION STRATEGIES

The researcher used open-ended questionnaires, (the questionnaires were not for statistical use but to explore SDC representatives' views on the role of school-based

teacher incentives on student achievement). In-depth interviews with key informants such as school heads and education officers were conducted while teachers participated in focus group discussions. These key informants had robust information on the role of school-based incentives on student achievement. SDC representatives participated in this study as these were directly involved in payment of incentives to teachers. Documented evidence was used to buttress and confirm data that were collected through using of other instruments.

4.6.1 The questionnaire

Open-ended questionnaires were used as instruments for collecting data for this study (See Appendix 2). Mhlanga and Ncube (2003) view a questionnaire as a sequence of questions designed to elicit information upon a subject from an informant. Open-ended questions can be extremely useful for providing large amounts of data at a relatively low cost and in a short period of time (Mhlanga & Ncube, 2003). Questionnaires allow for anonymity, which can encourage openness when sensitive issues are involved. As this study was based on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement, which had received mixed reactions from different people, a questionnaire would obtain rich information for this research. There have been divergent views regarding inception and subsequent withdrawal of teachers' incentive schemes in Zimbabwean education system. Teachers, school heads and other teacher representative bodies were of the opinion that where an incentive scheme was practised, the idea to withdraw this scheme was ill-timed. This is based on the assumption that withdrawal of teachers' incentive scheme negatively affected teacher morale and in the end teachers were not motivated to improve student achievement. The use of open-ended questions allowed participants to air their perceptions on the role of school-based teacher incentives without fearing victimisation. A questionnaire can be used to access precisely what a researcher has devised without participants having to identify themselves. Neuman (2007) indicates that among one of the advantages of open-ended questions is that they are flexible, resulting in unexpected answers. Open-

ended questions allow participants to provide their answers rather than choose among a set of given alternatives.

However, a questionnaire might have a problem in that data could be superficial and a researcher may fail to check the honesty and seriousness of responses. In order to achieve trustworthiness of results and for results to be meaningful, a questionnaire must be well-constructed, with clear, unambiguous instructions and careful wording of questions. In an attempt to achieve trustworthiness of my questionnaire, I distributed copies to colleagues to check for inconsistencies and ambiguity of questions.

4.6.1.1 Administering a questionnaire

The researcher distributed questionnaires to 30 SDC representatives who then gave feedback in respect of questions asked. Before administering questionnaires, the researcher requested permission from Manicaland Provincial Education (See Appendix 3) to visit selected secondary schools in Makoni District. After permission was granted (See Appendix 4), the researcher then requested participants to complete the questionnaire within two weeks. Giving participants specific time before collecting completed questionnaires was important so that participants could not procrastinate in responding to the questionnaires. The purpose of study was explained to participants, stressing on aspect of confidentiality and that no names should be written on questionnaires. An emphasis on importance of individual input and that participants were not to compare their responses or discuss them with others was also made. Collaboration among participants might result in bias in research findings hence results could not be a true reflection of their perceptions, attitudes or feelings in respect of the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. Thus open-ended questionnaires were used to obtain information about thoughts, feelings, attitudes, beliefs and perceptions of participants on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in selected secondary schools.

4.6.2 Interviews

Interviews can be done by means of the telephone, online, or face-to-face among other methods which could be used. Interviews were conducted with education officers and school heads from selected schools (See Appendix 5 of interview guide). The purpose of interviews was to explore participants' perceptions on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. These interviews were semi-structured to allow participants to talk about whatever they considered important and relevant to this study. Thus, interviews can be done through telephone, online, or face-to-face among other means.

4.6.2.1 Telephone interviews

Telephonic interviews have an advantage in that a researcher could reach distant areas from one place instead of having to travel to those places. It is also undemanding to participants for they do not necessarily have to see that researcher. However, this study did not make use of telephone interviews as a primary tool for conducting interviews but was only used as a secondary tool to seek clarifications on data which could have been collected from participants. If telephone interviews were to be used as a primary tool for data collection, the costs of phoning could also lead to limited discussions with participants. Hence, important information could be left out during conversations and the researcher could be limited to short and simple questions. Thus, the researcher only used telephone interviews to clarify some issues, which were during face-to-face interviews such as when education officers said their children were learning in schools which offered or continue to offer school-based teacher incentives or from documents collected from schools, such as schools' examination reports and teachers' record books.

4.6.2.2 Face-to-face interviews

Another kind of interview is known as face-to-face interview. Krathwohl (2009) defines a face-to-face interview as a situation where an interviewer and interviewee

converse face-to-face. Face-to-face interviews are among the most familiar strategies for collecting qualitative data. An interview is meant to be a personal and intimate encounter where open, direct, verbal questions are used to elicit detailed narratives and stories (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2009). Face-to-face interviews offer a possibility of modifying one's line of enquiry, following-up interesting responses and investigating motives in a way that cannot be done by a self-administered questionnaire (Cozby, 2009). Thus, this study was able to probe for responses given by participants in order to gain clarity on participants' views on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement.

Face-to-face interviews provide for non-spoken information that could be observed from participants (Silverman, 2010). Participants and an interviewer have access to facial expressions, gestures and other para-linguistic features that may enrich meaning of spoken words (Kant, 2008). One assertion frequently made in support of face-to-face interviews is that both a researcher and participants are in the same space and thus have access to more than just verbal data. They can build rapport that may enable participants to freely disclose their experiences more effectively than it can be in telephone interviews (Silverman, 2010). Fink (2000) describes an interview inquiry as a moral enterprise. Whether it is the researcher or an assistant who is doing interviewing, forming relationships with participants seems to be rather inevitable. While interviewing, an interviewer uses his/ her personal empathy to make participants feel more at ease and therefore more willing to tell their story, in this case on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. Furthermore, Kant (2008) assert that face-to-face interviews yield authentic and deep descriptions of phenomena via an interviewer's ability to facilitate trust and openness in interviewee, which then lessens interviewee's need for impression management and enables examination of her or his private experiences. Krathwohl (2009) notes some benefits of face-to-face interviews, which may help maintain participant's involvement more successfully than telephone interviews. These include less dropping-out of participants and clarifying information being communicated. Five school heads and two education officers were interviewed as key informants while 30 teachers participated in focus group discussions. The main reason for engaging interviews with

these participants in this study was to gather their reactions and attitudes and to probe for more information on their perceptions and reactions of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement which could not be done by means of a questionnaire.

4.6.2.3 Online Interviewing

Online interviewing was helpful when this study wanted to integrate participants into the study who were not easily accessible, because they could be living far away or because they did not want talking to a stranger (about a possibly sensitive topic). Online research could also allow its participants anonymity, which could be an advantage. Online interviewing produces data which are already available in form of texts, so that one can skip a time-consuming step of transcribing interviews (Yin, 2010).

4.6.2.3.1 Limitations of online interview

Online interviewing is a kind of simulation of real-world interviewing and spontaneity of verbal exchange is replaced by reflexivity of written exchanges (Yin, 2010). Nonverbal elements of communication are difficult to transport and integrate. Finally, the application of this approach is limited to people ready and willing to use computer-mediated communication or this kind of technology and communication in general. However, this study did not use online interview as a primary interview strategy. It could remove other elements (non-verbal) which could be paramount in expressing attitudes, views or perceptions of participants towards the role of school-based teacher incentive on student achievement. Thus, the researcher only used online interviews to clarify and making follow up on certain information that was gathered during data collection phase. For instance, when it was used to seek more information from school heads whose schools initially practised the incentive system and later devised different ways to circumvent the banning of incentives imposed by minister of education.

4.6.3 Interviewing procedure

Interview dates and times that suited participants were set and interview guides were also developed that assisted on what aspects to be focused on during discussions with education officers and school heads.

4.6.4 Focus-group discussions

Focus-group discussions (FGDs) were held with teachers from selected secondary schools (See Appendix 6 for FGD guide). Focus-group discussions are sometimes used when it is considered better to obtain information from a group rather than from individuals (Kant, 2008). Group interviews can be used when resources such as time, manpower and finances are limited (Krueger & Casey, 2000). They can also be used when a phenomena being researched requires a collective discussion in order to understand circumstances, behaviour or opinions of participants. Flyvbjerg (2006) highlights that several focus-group discussions should be used in order to get a more objective and macro view of an investigation a researcher is set to enquire. Using several groups would add to breadth and depth of information (Rennekam, 2010). More-so focus-group participants should also have something in common which is important to what is being investigated. In this study teachers participated on their own in focus-group discussions, without administrative members such as school heads or education officers. Presence of school administrators such as school heads or education officers could deter teachers from freely express their attitudes, opinions or feelings regarding teacher incentive schemes. Teachers might be fearing to be victimised, if they might oppose the banning of such incentives. Focus-group discussions in this study were designed to capture participants' feelings, perceptions and opinions (Bergold & Stefan, 2012). FGDs required a range of facilitating skills such as moderating, listening, observing and analysis in order to capture participants' views on the topic being researched.

Thomas (2011) argues that focus-group discussions are usually enjoyable for participants. They may be less fearful of being evaluated by an interviewer because

of group setting. Thomas (2011) further postulates that group members get to hear what others in a group have to say, which may stimulate them to rethink their own views. Rich data can emerge through interaction within a group, for example, sensitive issues that could have been missed in individual interviews, may be revealed. In a group, people develop and express ideas they would not have thought about on their own (Thomas, 2011). A total of five focus-group discussions (FGDs), comprising an average of five to eight members were conducted. Efforts were made to ensure that each group could be homogeneous in terms of sex and age. Participants were asked to sign consent forms (See Appendix 7 for consent form) to confirm their voluntary engagement in focus-group discussions.

4.6.5 Documentary evidence

Documents were used as another technique for collection of data. Creswell (2008) maintains that documents deal with written information that already exists. This study collected information from school record books, school-based examination analysis lists, teachers' attendance registers, textbooks and internet on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. However, when using written information, necessary precautions should be taken to determine the environment and conditions that might have impacted on composition and nature of information (Creswell, 2008). Taking necessary precautions could be important on checking trustworthiness of data.

4.7 TRIANGULATION

Triangulation of data collection methods was done in order to enhance reliability of data as this is a case study, the subject should be studied from various points of view. In social sciences, triangulation indicates that two (or more) data collection methods are used to check the results. Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2007) define triangulation as an attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint. This study therefore employed interviews, focus group discussions and open-ended

questionnaires with various participants in order to gather their perceptions on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. Thus, Altrichter, Feldman, Posch and Somekh (2008) conclude that triangulation gives a more detailed and balanced picture of a situation. Through triangulation, O'Donoghue and Punch (2003), assert that data could be cross-checked from multiple sources to search for regularities. By means of triangulation information is crosschecked to produce accurate results (Denzin, 2006).

This concept of triangulation is borrowed from navigation and land surveying techniques that determine a single point in space with convergence of measurements taken from two other distinct points (Paulette, 2008). The idea is that one can be more confident with a result if different methods can lead to same result. Thus, triangulation is a powerful technique that facilitates validation of data by means of cross-verification from two or more sources. In particular, it refers to an application and combination of several research methodologies in a study of the same phenomenon.

By combining multiple strategies, theories and methods, this study could overcome weakness or intrinsic biases and problems that could come from a single method in exploring the role of school-based incentives on student achievement.

4.8 STUDY AREA

Makoni District is one of the largest district in the seven districts of Manicaland Province. There are 170 primary and 60 secondary schools with at least one school in each of the 49 wards. Over the years, this district has celebrated a privilege of producing best Ordinary Level results nationally in public examinations. Two or more schools had been among the five top schools nationally with results that do not only display quantity (total number of students who have passed) but also portray quality (number of A grades obtained at Ordinary Level which was the focus of this study).

Besides its uniqueness in producing best results, Makoni District is highly volatile politically, as evidenced by a number of recorded cases of political violence, prior to, during and after any general elections. These include assaults, either verbally or physically, kidnapping, murder or destruction of property. As a result of this political unrest in Makoni, any public activity is monitored closely by security agents. As a result, meetings were held with relevant government officials to apprise them on the nature and purpose of this study. These government officials were informed that research findings on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement has a potential to contribute information on how this district could continue to be an educational giant and maintain its supremacy in Zimbabwean public examinations.

A pilot study was then conducted to check on feasibility of research instruments before going to selected secondary schools. This pilot study assisted in identifying questions which could be difficult for participants to interpret correctly. Thereafter, final interview guides and questionnaire were developed.

4.9 ANALYSIS OF DATA

The term qualitative research encompasses a wide range of philosophical positions, methodological strategies, and analytical procedures. Morse (2000) believes that all qualitative analysis, regardless of a specific approach, involves:

- *comprehending* a phenomenon under study;
- *synthesising* a portrait of a phenomenon that accounts for relations and linkages within its aspects;
- *theorising* about how and why these relations appear as they do; and
- *recontextualising*, or putting new knowledge about a phenomena and relations back into a context of how others have articulated evolving knowledge.

Although the form that each of these steps could take may vary according to such factors as research question, researcher's orientation to an inquiry, or setting and context of study, this set of steps helps to depict a series of intellectual processes by which data in their raw form are considered, examined and reformulated to become a research product (Morse, 2000).


Creswell (2008) maintains that what is at issue during an analysis of data were to make sense of data in ways that facilitate continuing unfolding of an inquiry and understanding of a phenomenon being studied in its context. With regard to this study, data were collected and transcribed on a daily basis. Data collected from in-depth interviews, focus-group discussions and questionnaires was critically analysed. The analysis of data involved coding, categorising and clustering of research themes.

Margrit (2012) asserts that a goal coding in qualitative research is to learn from data and to keep revisiting it till one understands patterns and explanations of data. So, one needs to retain data records or relevant parts of records, until they are fully understood. In this case the data referred to the role of school-based teacher incentives on improving student achievement. Coding does not mean to merely label all parts of the documents about a topic, but rather to bring these parts together so they can be reviewed, and one's thinking about a topic is developed. Johnny (2012) affirms that many purposes for coding in qualitative coding exist. Most researchers use coding

- to reflect on what coded segments tell one about the category, and its meaning in the project;
- to ask questions about how the category relates to other ideas from the data, and to construct theories about those relations;
- to gather all data about a case, from different sources, so that one can apply the information to understand a topic that is being researched.
- to search for blends or combinations of categories, to find patterns in the attitudes and viewpoints of participants.

ATLAS TI software was used to analyse qualitative data, compiled, coded and organised on the basis of themes. Glaser and Laudel (2013) identified these steps in data- analysis as represented by the following diagram;

Figure 3: Steps between texts and explanation



Source: Adapted from Glaser and Laudel (2013) *Life with or without coding: Two methods for early stage analysis in qualitative research aiming at casual explanations* in *Forum for Qualitative social research* 14(2).

However, it should be pointed out that an analysis of qualitative data was an on-going and cyclical process that is integrated into all different phases of a research. Data were continuously coded, categorised and emerging patterns sought in order to interpret data and make logical conclusions on the role of school-based teacher incentives to improve student achievement.

4.9.1 Collection of data

Data from interviews and focus group discussions were collected through an audio voice recorder. Responses from participants were transcribed manually in preparation for data analysis. Qualitative research produces large amounts of raw data that do not have meaning on their own. This purpose of data analysis is to give meaning to these enormous amounts of data. According to Creswell (2008), qualitative data analysis is a search for general statements and underlying themes. Newman (2007) argues that data analysis is what a researcher does with data in order to develop explanations of events, so that theories and generalisations about causes, reasons and processes of any piece of social behaviour can be developed. However, it is important to note that data analysis in qualitative research is a continuing and not linear process (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007; Bergold & Stefan, 2012). However, Denzin (2006) opines that qualitative analysis transmutes data into findings and a challenge of qualitative analysis lies largely in making sense out of the huge amounts of data. Data analysis in this study focused on uncovering patterns, themes and categories on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. Creswell (2008) further states that concepts are developed from data and raised to a higher level of generalisation and their interrelationships are then drawn out. However, there is also need to ascertain that data analysis is not an activity that takes place entirely at a certain stage but is an on-going process. O'Donoghue and Punch (2003) assert that data analysis is a characteristic of an ongoing process in qualitative research, it begins at the start of research study and ends up while writing research results. Glaser and Laudel (2013) opine that data analysis involves collecting new data, analysing additional data and analysing those data throughout a research study. In this research study, data were analysed in terms of phases of data analysis outlined by Creswell (2008) which are; data collection, data management, writing memos, classifying, organising data, generating themes and coding data. Data analysis ended in writing of final report.

4.9.2 Data Management

According to Patton (2002) an analysis begins with a record of what one has and questions to be asked include; Are field notes comprehensive? Creswell (2008) argues that data management is the first step a researcher needs to organise his/her data into folders which could be file, index cards or computer files. In this regard a researcher has to visit enormous amounts of data generated. In this study, the researcher went on to record on note cards, data that were generated and discrete various forms of data from open-ended questionnaires, focus group discussions and interviews. Initial editing was conducted to make field notes understandable.

4.9.3 Engagement with data and writing memos

During this stage, the researcher desired to explore and understand data generated in this research in order to get sense of this data, before breaking it into meaningful parts (Creswell, 2008). Engagement with data also involves perceiving data from participants' view-points. Thus, the researcher revisited data collected in order to establish familiarity with data on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. One could argue that acquaintance with data could be a significant stage that could importantly assist in coding as well as creating categories and themes. Another important aspect of qualitative analysis is writing of memos and it is an ongoing practise that takes place at all stages of data analysis. Birk, Chapman and Francis (2008) assert that memoing serves to assist a researcher in making conceptual leaps from raw data to those concepts that explain research phenomena in the context in which it is studied. Birk, Chapman and Francis (2008) further postulate that data exploration is enhanced, continuity of conception and contemplation is enabled and communication is facilitated through the use of memoing. Montgomery and Bailey (2007) say that memos are reflective notes that a research writes about what he/she is learning from their data. These notes are meant to capture significant issues emerging from data. Therefore, throughout data analysis, it could be ideal make reflective notes about what one is learning from data being collected.

4.9.4 Segmenting of data

Qualitative data analysis also involves sorting themes and categories and this could be seen as a process of segmenting data. Segmenting could also be viewed as a process of dividing data into meaningful units and also generating categories emerging from data. The researcher was able to establish categories on the role of school-based teacher incentives on improving student achievement. The objective was to find categories that had internal repetitiveness and external similarity regarding this phenomenon under study. Internal repetitiveness is concerned with an extent to which data belonging to a certain category hold together in a meaningful way, whereas external similarity is concerned with extent to which differences among categories are clear (Creswell, 2008). The research further established themes related to this current study. These themes are crucial for development of codes.

4.9.5 Coding in qualitative research

Codes could be viewed as names, tags or labels and a process of coding involves attaching names or labels to pieces of data. (Bailey, 2007) states that coding involves labelling of data obtained which could be a word or short phrase. Bailey (2007) further argues that coding then unlocks data for analysis and interpretation. Two forms of codes could be identified and these are a prior codes and empirical codes. A prior codes are prior to examination of data and empirical codes are produced through examination of data itself. In this study, the researcher used empirical codes which were abbreviations of key words on school-based teacher incentives on improving student achievement. Examples of abbreviations which were used include;

TIP-Teacher incentives politised

TDCSP- Teacher determined to see student pass

SPRI- School-Pass rate increased

INT-Increased teacher morale

ISA-Improved student achievement

These codes were developed so as to adequately capture participants' perceptions on the role of school-based teacher incentives to improve student achievement. This becomes significant when it was realised that coding is an analysis strategy many qualitative researchers could employ in order to help them locate key themes, patterns, ideas and concepts that may exist within their data

4.9.6 Thick descriptions in qualitative research

As alluded to before, qualitative data have no inherent meaning, so thick descriptions of a phenomena gives meaning to qualitative data. Thick description refers to a detailed account of field experiences in which a researcher makes explicit the patterns of cultural and social relationships and puts them in context (Bailey, 2007; Lin, 2013) Bailey (2007) further asserts that a fairly uncontested and extreme aspect of field research manuscript involves detailed descriptions and observations that could have occurred over a prolonged period of time. The purpose of descriptions is to respond to the following questions; (who?, what?, why?, where?, when? and how? (Walcott, 1994 cited by Bailey, 2007). Thick description could also be viewed as attaching significance to what was found, making sense of research findings, offering explanations, drawing conclusions, inferring lessons, considering meaning and otherwise imposing order (Lin, 2013). In this study, the researcher put together responses of research participants who included school heads, teachers, education officers and teachers. The researcher went on to explore the role of school-based teacher incentives on improving student achievement in selected secondary school of Makoni district.

4.10 ISSUES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS AND CREDIBILITY

Rule and John (2011) assert that trustworthiness in qualitative research promotes scholarly rigour, transparency and professional ethics unlike in quantitative studies which focus on aspects of reliability and validity. Trustworthiness is achieved by giving attention to a study's transferability, credibility, dependability and conformability (Rule & John, 2011). Transferability refers to the degree to which results of a topic

that is being studied can be generalised or transferred to other contexts (Gilbert, 2008). Although it may be difficult to establish in qualitative research, the researcher hopes that the role of school-based teacher incentives could give an in-depth understanding of whether teacher incentives could motivate teachers and lead to improved student achievement. A sample was carefully chosen that was essential to understand whether teacher incentives increased their students' achievement in selected secondary schools. This study also employed a strategy of data triangulation. Baxter and Jack (2008) view triangulation as a process where a researcher uses several research instruments in order to compare findings produced after using other research instruments. The researcher used questionnaires, interviews, focus-group discussions and document analysis. By means of these methods, the researcher explored the relationship between teacher incentives and student achievement. Thus, triangulation in this study increased confidence in the research findings on the role of school-based teacher incentives on students' achievement. One other key aspect that is central to qualitative research is the issue of confidentiality. Creswell (2008) argues that researchers have a responsibility not to disclose information to other people without consent from participants. Cohen et al. (2007) assert that confidentiality involves an agreement between participants and researcher on how data could be handled during and after the research. In line with this assumption, it would be essential for the researcher to consider how data could be stored and research information be disseminated. The researcher guaranteed that audio data were not to be accessible to anyone.

McMillan and Schumacher (2006) view credibility as whether or not established results are believable from a viewpoint of participants in a research. Bogdan and Biklen (2006) state that reliability in qualitative research is viewed as the fit between what is recorded as data and what has actually occurred in a setting under study.

Hence, findings on school-based teacher incentives and its influence on student achievement were taken to those who had participated in this research to confirm the results and for participants to confirm that what they said had been correctly interpreted by researcher. Babbie (2010) views dependability as being concerned

with whether one would obtain same results if one could observe the same thing again. Baxter and Jack (2008) argue that as qualitative research advocates for flexibility and freedom, it might be difficult to replicate research findings obtained from study in another different context. However in qualitative research if a researcher provides a thick description of content, other researchers may be in a position to decide if it matches or extent to which it is applicable in their settings (Merriam, 1995; Creswell & Miller, 2000; Bailey, 2007).

4.11 CONCLUSION

This chapter described the rationale for choosing qualitative approach for this study on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in Makoni District. The chapter also dealt with methods used in collecting data, such as interviews, focus-group discussions, questionnaires and the use of document evidence. It also described the research design and data collection methods for this study which would be explained in greater detail in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION OF THE DATA-ANALYSIS AND THE FINDINGS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter 4 discussed methods and techniques used to explore the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. It also discussed the research design and data-collection methods used in the study, namely interviews, questionnaires and focus-group discussions. The method of selecting a sample of participants was also indicated. In this current chapter, the researcher presents and analyses data that were collected on the role of school-based teacher incentives to improve student achievement in selected secondary schools in Makoni District

Permission was sought from the office of Provincial Education Director of Manicaland to conduct this study in Makoni District from January 2015 (See Appendices 3 and 4). Data-collection period lasted about three months. Focus-group discussions were held with 30 teachers from five selected secondary schools and interviews with two education officers and five school heads were conducted. 10 School Development Committee members responded to questionnaires.

Through triangulation of various data collection methods, the researcher was able to validate findings on this study. Triangulation could be viewed as the use of more than one data collecting tool method (Wiersma & Jurs, 2009). The researcher also made use of member-checking which involves a process where data, analytic categories, interpretations and conclusions are tested by members of those groups from whom data were originally obtained (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). Andrew and Smith (2014) assert that this is the most fundamental procedure for establishing trustworthiness in a qualitative research study. This method provides an opening to appreciate and consider what participants planned to say and furnishes participants with an opportunity to correct errors and challenges and what are perceived as incorrect interpretations to a study (Andrew & Smith, 2014). For instance in this study, after collecting data from participants from school E, whose teachers and parents/

guardians were initially opposed to school-based teacher incentives, the researcher had to revisit this school to verify whether participants understood what was meant by school-based teacher incentives. After probing further, participants acknowledged that they had understood the term to only mean monetary incentives and ignored non-monetary incentives. Education officers as well, initially opposed teacher incentive system and supported Ministry of Education's policy that banned payment of school-based teacher incentives to teachers. However, after a prolonged engagement with education officers, mutual trust was developed between the researcher and participants. Education officers then started to give data that enabled the researcher to understand that they were in support of teacher incentives. These education officers even sent their children to schools where teacher incentive systems were being practised, arguing that teacher incentives could motivate teachers to work harder and lead to improved student achievement.

During focus-group discussions, teachers set their own operational parameters that guided discussions. For an example, agreeing that what they discussed was not going to be referred to in other contexts later or that no individuals would be reported to school administration for fear of victimisation. The researcher also attended Annual General Meetings and Prize Giving Day ceremonies for selected secondary schools and had an opportunity to gather data from various participants regarding their views and reactions towards paying teachers extra financial incentives, among other discussions made during these school occasions.

5.2 TYPES OF SCHOOLS SELECTED

Data were collected from five different secondary schools in Makoni District. These schools represent a rural day school, council day school, boarding school, government school and a school that is located on previously white-owned farms. For the purpose of this study a rural day school was named school A, and council day school, school B. Council schools are administered by Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development. These schools fall either under rural or urban district councils. However, in this study school B was administered by an urban council. The

boarding school was known as school C, government school as school D and a school on previously white-owned farms as school E. Because of location and nature of these, teacher incentive systems were practised in varying degrees within a particular school.

In the sample chosen for this study, one school could not afford to pay teachers school-based incentives, while in other schools teachers received incentives that surpassed even the 10% award that was supposed to be collected from school levies. Thus, teacher incentive systems were practised differently in schools A, B, C and D. School E failed to raise money needed to pay school-based teacher incentive. School E is a farm school which is located in previously owned white farms. Under the land reform programme in Zimbabwe, whites were evicted from their farms which were later occupied by black farmers. However, most of these black farmers did not have enough resources to even support their families, let alone to finance school activities. This made it difficult for them to participate in school-based teacher incentive system and to reward their teachers.

Another challenge that emanated from the land reform programme was that Zimbabwean government was left with an obligation to establish farm schools which were under-resourced. Staff houses, school furniture and textbooks were limited, while general resources to run day-to-day school activities were hard to come by. Teachers from such farm schools thus received no financial incentives from parents/guardians. Haralambos and Holborn (2013) indicate that the economic well-being of parents/guardians of a school has a bearing on the nature of learning activities at that school.

5.3 INTERVIEWS

Face-to-face interviews were conducted with education officers and school heads in Makoni District. Kumar (2011) states that an interview can be face-to-face, telephone or internet. The researcher could note facial expressions, gestures, and other para-linguistic features from education officers and school heads that enriched meaning of

spoken words and how participants reacted to the concept of teacher incentives. This enabled the researcher to discover implicit and explicit data on the role of school-based teacher incentives to improve students' achievements. The researcher made field-notes in respect of non-verbal communication which were observed, for instance when different teachers were initially silent, as everyone was hesitant to contribute first regarding banning of school-based teacher incentives. Although teachers had agreed that their discussions could not be taken outside the context of FGDs, these teachers had not initially developed mutual trust may be because banning of teacher incentives was considered to be politically motivated. Teachers feared to be victimised by their school administrators after FGDs, for instance if anyone released information to these school administrators on what could have been discussed during FGDs, including names of those who participated in such discussions.

5.3.1 Challenges encountered during interviews

Despite interviews posing remarkable advantages which enhanced data-collection from education officers, school heads and teachers, it would be a mistake for the researcher to imagine to have discovered the truth about the role of school-based teacher incentives. These participants could have responded to the researcher based on what they thought safeguarded their positions as education administrators and different players in education system. Their responses could had been superficial, suggesting that they were in agreement with Ministry of Education's Circular 6 of 2014 that sought to outlaw payment of financial incentives to teachers.

It could also be possible that the desire to be in line with government's policies initially made education officers and school heads to speak against financial incentives. Education officers and school heads wanted to safeguard their administration positions and purported to defend Ministry of Education policy on scrapping teachers' incentives. These education officers however later opened up regarding the banning of teacher incentives. One education officer had this to say,

I know government has outlawed the issue of giving teachers financial incentives but we close our eyes and ears and pretend as if such practice is not occurring in this district. We will only act when a problem surfaces. My child is currently learning at a school where teachers are receiving financial incentives, despite the ban from government.

5.4 QUESTIONNAIRES

Questionnaires were distributed to School Development Committee (SDC) members of selected secondary schools. The researcher first explained these questionnaires to committee members so that members understood what was expected from them. Some SDC members from farm schools experienced challenges in understanding questionnaires that were in English. Interviews were later conducted in Shona, their mother language and data had to be translated into English. Others had problems writing their responses, so the researcher had to write what they said, their views and reactions on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement.

5.5 THE EMERGING RESEARCH FINDINGS

5.5.1 Introduction of teachers' financial incentive systems in Zimbabwe

In selected secondary schools that were visited, participants had similar views of what led to an introduction of financial incentives in Zimbabwe. Participants indicated that remuneration of teachers declined drastically between 2003 and 2008, as Zimbabwean government failed to pay teachers decent salaries. It then led teachers to abandon the profession for other jobs in neighbouring countries. A SDC representative from school B stated that,

Teachers' situation drastically deteriorated during the bearer cheque period in Zimbabwe. Those who could not brave the heat and cross to neighbouring countries, sought employment locally in

farms herding cattle and working in the fields in order to earn a living. Financial incentives were then introduced to cushion teachers from poor salaries.

During a focus-group discussion, teachers from school B indicated that,

Many teachers left the profession as they could hardly survive and government introduced incentives during Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe to bring financial dignity to teaching profession.

Education Officers and school heads interviewed had same sentiments. One education officer stated,

As Zimbabwean government in 2009 was emerging from a worst economic turmoil, a situation that has never been experienced ever before in Zimbabwe, a period where government itself could not pay its own workers satisfactorily, after serious consultation with relevant stakeholders, Ministry of Education Sport and Culture introduced financial incentives under Circular 5 of 2009 which sought to allow School Development Committees to channel 10% of their levies towards paying their own teachers.

Teachers from schools visited indicated that teaching was no longer regarded as a noble profession. The argument had been that teachers' economic status was grossly eroded as evidenced by people who were not formally employed earned a better life as compared to teachers. For instance, teachers from school A, added that some students had a better revenue base than their teachers as they could engage in illegal economic dealings to get much needed foreign currency. A school head from school C pointed out,

Learning was no longer given due respect it deserved. A student could just give a teacher some money in exchange for passing

marks or an answered homework assignment more so even assistance during public examinations. Teachers ended up befriending those students who could come to their aide financially. That was the level of educational decadence that characterised a period prior to 2009.

One education officer had a different opinion arguing that paying teachers incentives was an old practise prior to 2009.

Giving teachers incentives is as old as teaching profession itself in Zimbabwe. Paying of incentives was practiced in varying degrees ranging from food stuff, clothes and money or even allowing teachers to open credit accounts with local business shops and then pay at the end of month. This motivated teachers not to transfer to other schools.

Discussion

It is evident from findings that financial incentives were introduced in Zimbabwe as a way of supplementing teachers' low salaries due to economic recession that characterised a period prior to 2009. From 2003 to 2008 Zimbabwe had been hit by a massive exodus of teachers who either left for perceived greener pastures in neighbouring countries or abandoned teaching profession altogether. Zimbabwean government, through Ministry of Education, introduced extra-salary incentives for teachers. According to 2009 Circular No. 5, parents were required to remunerate teachers through money collected by their respective SDCs. During this period, teachers earned very little salaries that could be enough for their sustenance (Gomba, 2015). Zimbabwean government then realised that it had no financial stamina to address this challenge and transferred the burden of remunerating teachers to parents/guardians as an expedient measure to cushion teachers from low salaries (Machivenyika, 2014; Makanga & Mutsagondo, 2014). This decision was

also meant to motivate teachers to work harder and even improve on teacher retention which could subsequently improve student achievement.

From this research, it also emerged that students were financially better positioned than their teachers as some of these students were engaging in illegal economic dealings such as illegal diamond and gold panning, exchanging money in streets or illegal sales of fuel. It is further argued that teachers ended up accepting bribes from students or befriending these students in return for passing marks. To such students, one could assume that teachers ended up executing their duties unfairly, for instance favouring students who could assist them with financial resources. This could lead to differential treatment of students by teachers, much against the norm that teachers are expected to provide equal educational opportunities to all students regardless a students' economic, social, political or religious status. Within Zimbabwe's Ministry of Education code of conduct this kind of teacher-student relationship is not acceptable as it could be classified as improper association. It is a chargeable offence for a teacher found engaging in this kind of relationship. However, it could be argued that such cases of teacher-student relationship went unnoticed as teachers struggled to make ends meet between 2003 and 2008. One can conclude that teachers' incentives could had been introduced to restore teachers' economic or social status that had been eroded by economic woes they faced between 2003 and 2008.

An education officer gave another dimension that it could be a distortion of reality and a negation of historical evidence to claim that awarding of incentives was a new phenomenon that started only around 2009 in Zimbabwe. Prior to 2009, parents/guardians had been giving teachers incentives that ranged from non-financial to financial benefits. The main reason for pre and post 2009 teacher incentives could had been to show appreciation of teachers' work. It was further assumed that teacher incentives could improve teacher retention in schools, thus keeping hold of teachers with greater experience of teaching students which could subsequently improve student achievement. However, findings from this study revealed that after 2009 there was an increase in teacher incentive systems within schools as

parents/guardians realised a need to improve teacher morale, improve teacher retention which could ultimately improve student achievement.

Thus, research findings from this study on reasons behind introduction of teacher in Zimbabwe could confirm Vegas (2005) and UNICEF (2011)'s findings that governments in developing countries such as in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States had been failing to pay teachers well and handed the burden of paying teachers extra-financial incentives to parents/guardians.

5.5.2 Teacher motivation's influence on teacher performance to improve student achievement

All participants, namely school heads, education officers and teachers stated that teachers were motivated by receiving incentives, which could be mostly financial incentives. When teachers are happy, the assumption was that they could develop a positive attitude towards their work leading to student achievement. One school head from school D remarked,

Motivation is a vital tool in shaping teachers' working ego and ethos either in and out of school. Teachers' efforts then lead to student achievement. A motivated teacher is determined to go an extra mile. Look at motivation of teachers during Zimbabwe dollar era, it was very low. School pass-rate at schools or nationally also depicted and resembled that as well, where it was below 10%.

Education officers interviewed revealed that as they moved around Makoni District during supervision, they noted that schools with motivated teachers performed better and differently. In those schools which were not practising teacher incentive system, teachers demonstrated poor motivation. One education officer had this to say,

As teachers do their work, they feel good if there is bread and butter on their table. Teachers develop a sense of satisfaction and ownership of school programmes, when they are fully motivated. Teachers are determined to see students faring well in school work. Ownership of school programmes contributes towards effective learning of students.

A school head from a government school noted that teachers' motivation could not only have an effect of teachers desiring to improve students' achievements, but it had a spectrum of effects on teachers' overall work. This school head remarked,

Incentive programmes in education systems are largely meant to attract and retain teachers in teaching. Incentives inspire teachers to make different decisions once they are in the profession and motivate them to utilise and experiment with different pedagogical styles for betterment of student. Teaching is not teaching as usual but teachers each day carefully plan, execute and perform their work differently to assist children pass their execution.

Teachers from school D stated that,

Motivation inspires teachers to do their best to make students pass their examinations.

Teachers from school C concurred,

Motivation is like fertile soil that feed a plant with good and sufficient nutrients. Removal of fertile soil starves this plant, the plant produces no yield, withers and finally dies. A motivated teacher therefore stirs student to change his/her world view and in the end could lead to student achievement.

School heads and education officers also noted that while intrinsic motivation could be fundamental in enhancing teachers' morale, extrinsic motivation should also be supported, as this was equally important. One education officer remarked,

Extrinsic motivation ignites intrinsic motivation. It can be compared to an ignition key that starts a vehicle engine, everything then follows and is interconnected. The two are inseparable and vital.

During visits to schools that practised teacher incentive system, school heads and teachers who were interviewed were of the opinion that incentives were necessary in a school sector, as a way of bringing normalcy to an education system that had collapsed due to economic reasons.

School heads and teachers indicated there was hard work among teachers in line with vision, mission and goals of schools among teachers who were sufficiently paid. At all selected secondary schools that the researcher visited, visions, missions and goals of schools were clearly displayed on notice boards, in classrooms, school heads' offices and in staffrooms. These visions, missions and goals of schools described how students could benefit in a learning process and *be better citizens in this world and the world to come*, as stated by a mission statement of a certain boarding school. School head from school C had this to say,

Everyone in this school campus is expected to align their activities with the vision of this school if they feel they are well-supported financially by government, education actors or parents. Teachers for instance, could work hard to ensure that no student is left behind in the learning process, which could result in improved student achievement.

Interviews also indicated that teachers who had been given incentives were eager to involve students in meaningful learning by engaging these students in various

activities which stimulated students' desire to succeed. It is in this regard that a teacher from school B explained,

I have been enjoying my work prior to banning of financial incentives by Minister of Education because I knew at the end of the day, I will be rewarded and be able to sustain my family. Teachers' salaries before 2009 were, for instance in October 2008, around 729,000 Zimbabwe dollars per month which was equivalent of 72 US cents. From 2009 up to a time when incentives were banned, I used to receive \$450 as monthly incentive from parents on top of my \$120 government salary. It motivated me to work hard so that my students could pass their examinations.

However, teachers from school E who did not benefit from parent/guardian incentive scheme because these parents/guardians could not afford, spoke strongly against introduction of financial incentives in Zimbabwean school system. Teachers postulated that awarding teacher incentives was discriminatory. Teachers from school E stated,

Only those teachers from boarding, urban schools and some rural school had been benefitting and gave them a comparative advantage over teachers from farm schools. Teachers from farm schools only received government regulated salary.

With further probing whether teachers from school E, who were also against direct financial/monetary incentives, teachers were quick to have a second opinion, arguing that indirect incentives were good and could improve their working conditions.

Discussion

From these research findings it could be argued that both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation were fundamental prerequisites to raise teacher morale which could

enhance student achievement. This motivation had to come from both teachers and students and should be a shared experience as partners in a school environment. It had been noted that teachers' motivation was low during economic recession in Zimbabwe.

Those who disputed importance of extrinsic motivation could argue that intrinsic motivation could be paramount in enhancing teacher morale which could subsequently improve student achievement. The argument was that when one is intrinsically motivated, that individual could have an inherent enthusiasm and drive to accomplish activities (Cherry, 2010; Cherry & Burchfield, 2010; Heartfield, 2013). Participants revealed that properly designed incentives in form of school-based teacher incentives could stimulate extrinsic motivation which could lead to enhanced teacher morale and in the end could improve student achievement. Patrick and Jane (2013) indicated that as long as teachers' personal needs are not addressed, as long as teachers remain dissatisfied, and in particular, as long as teachers are not paid satisfactorily, then very little can be expected in terms of student achievement. One could argue that to equate student achievement to only improved teacher morale could be an insufficient explanation of factors leading to student achievement. Improved student achievement could be a result of a multiplicity of factors which could include contextual factors such as cultural and family aspirations to education, socio-economic backgrounds of students or school practices such as school resources and infrastructure, curriculum clarity or collaboration among teachers. These contextual and school practices could indeed have an influence on student achievement, but findings from this study and related literature confirmed that these other factors when taken in isolation to enhance teacher morale could not improve student achievement.

When school pass-rates in Zimbabwe rose gradually, it had been argued to be attributed, among other factors, to motivated teachers who were inspired to see their students passing examinations. Prior to 2003, school-pass rates had been, low for instance, when considering Ordinary Level pass rate, in 2003 it was 13,0% in 10,2% in 2004; 12,2% in 2005; 14,2% in 2006; 9,85% in 2007; 14,44% in 2008 and there

was a rise after 2009 which recorded 16,33%, 2010 recorded 16,5%; 2011 it was 19,5% (Newsday, 2013). This could have been attributed to among other factors, an influence of school-based teacher incentives which enhanced both teacher morale and teacher retention. Ordinary Level pass-rate for November 2013 was 20.72% a 2.32% increase from November 2012 pass-rate which stood at 18.4% (Tafirenyika, 2014). Although in 2014, June Ordinary Level recorded 37.96% this pass-rate dropped in November 2014 which recorded a 22.38% pass-rate. One of the reasons for this drop could have been a result of banning of school-based teacher incentives, among other contributory factors (Tafirenyika, 2014). The assumption had been that teachers felt betrayed by Zimbabwean government which succeeded GNU. This government banned teacher incentives which had been assumed to have motivated teachers to work harder and improve student achievement. Although one might argue that percentages indicated for increase or decrease in pass-rate had been low, this argument could be refuted by an assumption that these pass-rates are national pass-rates and any increase or decrease in percentage could be resemblance of many candidates who could have sat for that examination. Hanushek (2010) maintains that rewarding extra-financial incentives to teachers could improve teachers' morale, attract more effective teachers to the field or by improve effectiveness of existing teachers. Subsequently, this could lead to improved student achievement.

On the whole, research findings on importance of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations on enhancing teacher morale which could lead to an improvement in student achievement confirmed with Bayo-Moriones et al. (2015), who argue that incentives boost an individuals' morale, in this case teachers' morale which, in turn, had a positive effect on improving student achievement. Martins (2010) also argues that properly designed teacher incentives could improve student achievement if incentives satisfy aspirations of teachers.

It is evident from this study findings that school heads and teachers supported a need for inclusion of financial incentives either directly or indirectly, within Zimbabwean education. This is mainly because Zimbabwean education system had been choked due to a decline in its economy and could not meet financial and non-financial

obligations to support its personnel. Teachers prior to 2009 were earning around USD 72 cents per month and introduction of teacher incentives raised their earnings to around USD 600 per month. It had been assumed that due to increased salaries, teachers were now motivated to work harder and improve student achievement. Some teachers who received incentives also pointed out that they enjoyed work before the ban and these teachers were even motivated to work harder which could subsequently enhance student achievement while others who did not receive incentives opposed this system.

However, there had been an inherent tension between teachers who received extra-financial incentives and those who did not. Teacher who did not receive incentives claimed that this system was discriminatory, more so they were being disadvantaged unlike their counterparts in schools that practised payment of school-based teacher incentives. Thus, teachers who did not receive school-based teacher incentives felt that none monetary incentives were better, because these could be largely coming from their same employer and could reduce instances of discrimination among teachers, because of the capacity of schools and parents to support school-based teacher incentives. School-based teacher incentives were viewed as discriminatory to teachers, as these incentives depended upon what could be paid by parents/guardians in various schools. Some parents/guardians could afford to pay high incentives while others struggled or even failed to fund school activities let alone to pay teachers extra-financial incentives.

However, one could assert that teachers who received incentives were holding parents at ransom as payment of incentives might suggest parents should pay more for students to do well in school. Although this assertion could appear true, an underlying factor could still remain that these teachers also wanted to survive and support their families. It could be assumed that teachers had limited time to engage in other income generating activities as they spent much of their time in classrooms with students. Therefore, it could remain apparent that these teachers be adequately remunerated so that they could work harder and subsequently improve student achievement.

On the whole, research findings from this study confirmed what had been presented by Department of Education and Science in Ireland (2008) which asserted that a fully functional education system is anchored upon adequate funding from government. However, Zimbabwean government had failed in this respect. Parents/guardians in Zimbabwe then saw this need to pay teachers extra-financial assistance in an attempt to raise teachers' morale, which could make them to work harder and also improve teachers' retention. The assumption being that teachers' improved efforts could also improve student achievement.

5.5.3 Co-relationship between extra-pay and teachers' behaviour on student achievement

School heads interviewed, and teachers who participated in focus-group discussions noted positive and negative behaviour changes among teachers due to an introduction of incentives in their schools. These behaviour changes could had an influence on student achievement. One school head from school C stated,

Running schools was easy when teachers received incentives. There was self and group monitoring of each teacher's behaviour at school. Of interest was positive competition that grew among teachers to see their students pass. Absenteeism, counterfeit sick leave and general absconding was a thing of the past as these were seen to derail student achievement.

During a focus-group discussion at school B, teachers remarked,

Incentives drove us as teachers to avoid negative behaviour that was detrimental to students' learning. We could assist each other as teachers, especially when one had challenges in delivering certain concepts and topics to students.

A school head from school D also indicated,

My teachers from different subjects established cluster teaching, as they felt motivated to do their work. They could assign each other different topics/areas depending on what a teacher could choose. Even if one teacher was away, others could take over to ensure that students succeed.

A SDC representative from school D echoed:

As parents we heard positive remarks from our children regarding their teachers. Our children reported that teachers were no longer absconding lessons. These children were now receiving adequate attention and homework. Teachers could also always communicate with parents regarding their students' performance whether it was good or bad.

An education officer also revealed:

Disciplinary cases of absenteeism, absconding or any mischievous acts were limited during the incentive era. In fact we recorded minimal acts unlike prior to 2009. This positive behaviour was also manifested in improvement in pass rate displayed by many schools in this district.

Negative behaviours could be noted as well as in the teaching process, although one could argue that these assisted in improving student achievement. One school teacher at school C said,

Because of teacher incentive system that had been introduced at our school, teachers resorted to using non-interactive methods as they delivered their content. Teachers believed that participatory methods were time consuming and do not give them adequate time to prepare for public examinations.

Teachers also could focus on subjects there were examinable in public examinations and not on holistic development of students. This was against an argument that students are differently gifted. A teacher from school D remarked,

The school head at our school banned sporting activities, claiming that these were not examinable at public examination and had little positive impact in improving student achievement. This school even withdrew itself from participating in district sporting competitions.

School heads who initially practised the incentive system noted negative behavioural changes as a result of abolition of school-based incentive system. At a boarding schools visited, the school head remarked,

Teachers have now adopted a work as you earn attitude. Teachers are no longer keen to work hard and the effects are beginning to be noticed and experienced where there Ordinary level in public examination has dropped from 98% to 90% at this school while Advanced level dropped from 100% to 94%.

SDC representatives from school E, which did not practise the incentive system revealed,

It was difficult to find a full complement of teachers at this school. Teachers would always be away citing different reasons such as being ill, attending funeral or their children being sick. On Mondays teachers could start work after 10.00 am as most of them would be commuting from their homes. On Fridays teachers could end work at around 10.00 am as they could be rushing back to their homes for weekend. Ultimately our students just learnt three days a week.

Teachers from school D, which initially practised school-based teacher incentive system but was banned from doing so as a result of ministerial directive noted that

they had were no longer working hard and were engaging in other activities to supplement their meagre income. One teacher indicated,

As teachers we are longer motivated to work like we used to do during the incentive era. We are demotivated. More so, there are a lot of policy changes that are instituted much against our desire. We are no longer committed to our work. It is now a work as you earn approach. We are just giving students minimal work as stipulated by subject requirements. Absenteeism through unorthodox sick leave, absconding and an uncommitted spirit are now rampant. If students do not work on their own and wait for us, then they are mistaken and will fail in public examinations.

Discussion

Findings from this research indicated that one could argue that there was a co-relationship between extra-pay, teachers' morale and student achievement. As teachers received extra-financial incentives they adopted both positive and positive mal-adaptive behaviours such as adoption of drilling method which encouraged rote learning. These mal-adaptive behaviours, which one could be view as negative behaviours could not be recommended in this 21st Century participatory methodologies. On the whole, all these different forms of behaviours whether positive or maladaptive behaviours were meant to improve student achievement.

Positive behaviours noted could include reduced absenteeism and absconding from work, giving students adequate homework, thorough marking of students' work, teacher retention and collaboration among teachers to improve their teaching experiences. However, one could argue that these behaviours should have been normal professional behaviours for teachers without being incentivised. However, as the teaching environment during 2003 to 2008 era was now an abnormal scenario, as evidenced by low teacher morale and poor teacher retention due to economic meltdown these positive behaviours could not be taken as normal behaviours. The

assumption was that teachers were no longer motivated to perform these expected positive behaviours because of poor teacher morale which was caused by poor remuneration. It had been argued that with an improvement in teacher morale when teachers receive extra-financial incentives, these teachers then felt motivated to work harder and improve student achievement.

Mal-adaptive behaviours could include use of pedagogical styles, such as drilling, that could stimulate rote learning among students. Students could not be given an opportunity to explore their world-views through interactive methodologies. One could argue that students were viewed as empty vessels that needed to be filled with information. Some teachers from selected secondary schools could view themselves as centres of all knowledge. These teachers believed that through transferring of information to students, students could eventually pass their examinations. It could be assumed that teachers continued with negative practices in order to achieve results among students and keep incentives coming. By and large, whether teachers adopted either positive or mal-adaptive behaviours, one could opine that the attempt was to improve student achievement.

Participants asserted that banning of school-based teacher incentives was negative both to teachers and students. Teachers could adopt negative behaviours such as increased absenteeism, abscondment from work and not giving due attention to students' learning needs. The assertion could be that, for teachers banning of financial incentives negatively affected their salaries as they could now depend on government paid salaries which could be viewed as low for teachers' sustenance. This could result in teachers being demotivated to work harder and not desired to improve student achievement. As for students, it could lead to student under-achievement, as these students could be interacting with demotivated teachers who could have developed a negative attitude towards working harder and improve student achievement.

It also emerged from this study that, while teacher incentives could have made teachers to work harder, one could not avoid a negative effect of teacher incentives

on students' learning process. For example, rather than developing a student in his/her entirety, teachers could largely focus on students passing public examinations alone (in order to please various parents/guardians), at an expense of other out-door curricular activities which were essential for a maximum development of different students. It could be concluded that focusing only on academic subjects, could disadvantage those students who were good in out-door classroom activities such as vocational training and sporting (Mandoga & Chakandinakira, 2014).

Thus, research findings on co-relationship between extra-pay and teachers' behaviour which could influence student achievement confirmed what had been obtained from related literature. Hanushek (2010); Guerrero, Zapata, Sugimaru and Cueto (2012) pointed to both positive and negative behaviours which teachers could also adopt in a bid to improve student achievement.

This study also confirmed literature from Murnane et al. (1986); Perry, Engbers and Jun (2009) and Banker, -Lee, Potter, and Scrinivasan, (2015) assessment on the role of negative behaviours (dysfunctional behaviour) which could arise due to employees receiving or not receiving financial incentives. Teachers in some schools in this study seemingly adopted these positive and negative behaviours which could influence students' achievement.

5.5.4 Teachers' response to incentive system

Interviews with teachers revealed that there were mixed reactions on the issue of school-based teacher incentive programmes. Teachers from schools B, C and D stated that incentives were essential as they improved teachers' earnings. Teachers from school D said,

Incentives greatly improved our lives. We could now send our children to good schools and universities, feed the family and even buy second hand cars from Japan. Before 2009, only vehicles we had at this school were a school bus and truck and dreaming of

buying a personal car by an individual teacher was a nightmare. But now every teacher at this school has a car, others are even driving two cars.

Teachers from school C concurred,

Our economic status which had been eroded before 2009 had once been restored during the incentive era. We were no longer shy to move around in streets as we could compete well with those from private sector.

However, teachers from school E who did not receive incentives, or from school A where payment was irregular did not approve of teacher incentive system. These teachers argued that this system was discriminatory and brought about differences on how teachers were rewarded. A teacher from school E said,

It is not an evil that we are teaching in these farming schools where parents could not afford to give us incentives. We cannot all be teaching at mission or boarding schools where these incentives were/are paid. Teachers from mission and boarding schools had been benefitting financially. We are demotivated, scrapping them could make us equal. As teachers we need same treatment and equal job opportunities.

Discussion

Findings from this research suggested that school-based teacher incentives improved teachers' sustenance, while others could argue that teacher incentives brought job inequality among teachers themselves. Teachers who received incentives could now be able to look after their families in terms of sending their children to school and general up-keep of family. This was opposed to a situation between 2003 and 2008 when teachers could be viewed as paupers. One could argue that while teachers

themselves could significantly contribute to other students' success, these teachers were failing to send their own children for further education. If it was so, one could also remain with an interrogation as to how these teachers could be motivated to improve other children academically when in essence they were failing to send their own children to school. Thus, it could be argued that low teacher morale during 2003 to 2008 could have been one of the reasons for poor student achievement.

Participants asserted that school-based teacher incentives could have increased teachers' morale, as teachers were now getting extra-financial support from parents/guardians. It was now evidenced by teachers being able to compete favourably with other professionals in private sector, for instance teachers could now be able to buy a car/s for family use. One could further raise an argument whether it could be justified to describe the incentive system as a get rich scheme and more so how this scheme could relate to normalised teacher professionalism. However, the assumption could be that if teaching could be given equal status like any other professional occupations, then its employees should have equal status (economic and social) like these professionals. During 2003 to 2008, teachers could hardly sustain their families and could survive as semi-beggars. Teachers' salary of around USD 72 cents was hardly enough for them to buy food, pay tuition fees for their children and any other general up-keep of their families.

Findings from this study therefore confirmed what had been observed from reviewed literature. Literature established that teachers should be remunerated extra-well for one to do his or her normal work as a teacher (Adebayo & Gombakomba, 2013). In the end, students could benefit in a learning process. Paying teachers extra-well, tended to boost teachers' self-esteem resulting in enhanced attitude towards their work, which could improve student achievement. Donald and Wesselman (2013) commented that teachers are a means to an end in students' learning process. The assumption is that teaching is a complex occupation which should be given high status and teachers should be paid extra-well. When teachers are satisfied financially, one could argue that they develop positive expectations about a student's behaviour or achievement. This is reinforced by self-fulfilling prophecy theory which

maintains that one's expectation/s tend to come true even though the original expectation may have been false (Bearman & Hedstrom, 2009). It can also be argued that pupils' self-concepts could be predisposed to teacher's positive definition, attitudes and expectations on student achievement. Conclusively, improved working conditions through incentives could have a high motivational potential for teachers which could increase their productive levels and inspire student achievement. The assumption is that when teachers are demotivated, this could have a serious effect on their teaching experiences.

5.5.5 Parents' response to incentive system and its relationship on student achievement

During interviews with teachers, school heads and SDC representatives it was noted that parents had mixed reactions on the issue of school-based teacher incentives. In this regard, teachers from school C said that most parents at their school were disappointed with banning of teacher incentives. School-based teacher incentives played an important role in motivating teachers to work harder. During Prize-Giving Day (PGD) ceremony at school C one parent was heard saying,

My child had greatly improved at this school which is taught by motivated teachers and these teachers work harder. I pray that teachers could continue with this spirit even without incentives as the future of my child greatly lies in the hands of motivated teachers.

Education officers who were interviewed also reported that parents complained over banning of teacher incentives. One education officer remarked,

We received a signed document by parents from a certain school showing dissatisfaction on minister's directive but our hands were tied to accept it. Rather we advised parents to visit Provincial Education's Office with their petition.

However, an SDC representative from school E which never practised the incentive system strongly supported ministerial decision to scrap school-based teacher incentives. This member indicated,

The decision to ban incentives was long overdue. Teachers at our school were no longer working hard as they demanded to be treated like their counterparts in boarding and mission schools. They forced us to pay them incentives as if we were their employer. As parents we were opposed to this system.

Discussion

According to findings from this study, parents had divergent views regarding school-based teacher incentives. While other parents advocated that teachers should be adequately supported financially so that they could improve their performance and contribute to improved students' achievement, others argued to the contrary. Those parents who were opposed to teacher incentives shared same sentiments with some legal experts who viewed school-based teacher incentives as exploitation to most parents/guardians (Towindo, 2011) and thus, supported minister' directive to ban these teacher incentives. It also emerged from this study that some parents/guardians could pay teacher incentives against their wishes to protect their child/ren from being discriminated against. However, The Herald Zimbabwe of 29 August 2014, reported a different opinion when parliamentarians in National Assembly of Zimbabwe accused the minister of banning school-based incentives without consulting parents/guardians of students. These parliamentarians then requested government to repeal this ban as a way of enhancing teacher morale which could have an influence on student achievement. Thus, this study also confirmed what U.S.A President said about that teachers being important in society and that they should be remunerated extra-well (The White House, 2012).

5.5.6 Government's response to incentive system and its on student achievement

All participants interviewed shared same sentiments on how Zimbabwean government responded to teacher incentive system in post-GNU government. Participants alluded that government's response had been politically motivated. Teachers at school B had this to say,

When incentives were introduced in Zimbabwe during GNU which was a government formed by a coalition of different political parties, the Minister of Education then was from an opposition party which formed the largest support base for teachers. This minister wanted to gain mileage by attending to plight of its supporters and hence introduced teacher incentive system.

Teachers from school D responded as follows,

When GNU came into extinction, with the ruling party regaining its ground in Zimbabwean government, an elected minister of education immediately banned incentives without making proper consultations. Despite outrages from general populace and private media that the banning was ill-timed, with no effort to address teachers' challenges, this minister maintained this ban.

Education officers who participated in this study, despite them being government officials were not in support of this ban of teacher incentives. One education officer indicated,

As an eye of Ministry of Education on the ground, I am forced to support government's policy and regulation on banning of incentives. However, the direction to scrap incentives at this juncture reverses gains made in bringing sanity in the education

sector and improving students' learning experiences. Government should not have made an abrupt end to school-based teacher incentives.

At one of the schools visited during a Prize Giving Day (PGD) ceremony, an education officer remarked as teachers were receiving prizes,

We have heard that some schools are disobeying ministry's directive that sought to outlaw payment of incentives to teachers, but today is the day when you could reward each other in our presence if one had done well. Awards for showing excellence have not been banned, but monthly incentives had been banned.

Education officer's comment was received with much happiness from both parents and teachers who graced this PGD, citing that teacher incentives were indeed important in improving student achievement.

Interviews with school heads also indicated that government did not only ban monthly teacher incentives but also banned vacation school studies claiming that students needed time to rest. One school head from school C said,

This school applied for 2015 April vacation school for writing classes but Provincial Education Director turned down the application saying students should go and rest as per minister's directive. If the school could go ahead with this vacation school, I was going to face disciplinary action.

In this regard teachers at the same school said,

The motive by minister not to approve April vacation school was far from being sympathetic with students but to close any avenues that

might bring any extra dollar to teachers. However, we are going to teach these students from our homes. We know students will come.

Teachers from schools A, B, C and D stated that incentives should not be scrapped from education system until Zimbabwean government had positioned itself well to address teachers' sustenance. Teachers from school B remarked,

Removing incentives at this time would be detrimental to the gains schools had achieved in post 2008 era. Students are going to fail like what they used to do. Teachers could be demotivated to the best, to assist these students.

A group of teachers from school B asserted that this banning of incentives by minister had no moral justification but was politically motivated. One teacher said,

Teachers had been perceived to form a support base for Movement for Democratic Change an opposition party in Zimbabwe and scrapping of incentives by minister Dokora who is from a ruling party was meant to fix us. If this minister was genuine and sincere about his decision then school fees were supposed to go down.

One SDC member also asserted that the minister of education did not consult them when Circular 6 of 2014 was issued that regularised banning of school-based incentives to teachers.

We were not consulted and our children are suffering as they are no longer receiving the best schooling. The problem with our leaders is that their children are learning outside this country where teachers are motivated to work. If minister cancelled Circular 5 of 2009, where teachers received incentives which were deducted from 10% levies paid by parents, then we are going to find other

incentives which are not bound by this ban. The minister could not have any legal base to deny these.

From interviews conducted, it emerged that teachers, school heads, SDC representatives and education officers had same sentiments, in supporting teacher incentive system. In this regard a school head from school C said,

Incentives both financial and non-financial should be administered to teachers. Incentives motivate teachers to work very harder. This motivation radiates into their work as well. Students then benefit from this radiation and excel in their school endeavours. As a school head despite banning of teacher incentives and purported disciplinary measures by ministry to school heads who would continue with awarding teachers incentives, I for one would continue with this system as I have witnessed its benefits on students. It is rather I sacrifice myself for slaughter; rather than see these students fail their schooling.

Education officers, school heads, teachers and SDC representatives from schools A, B, C and D also said that their school pass-rates rose significantly from 2009 when teacher incentives were introduced. After banning of teacher incentives, pass-rate began to drop. A school head from school D remarked,

Prior to 2009, pass-rate at my school which is a boarding school was no better than a pass-rate from a day school. The pass rate was very low, as low as 20% for Ordinary level due to a plethora of reasons. We could recruit any student at this school as long as parent could afford to pay school fees, screening of students was not based on merit but on financial stamina of these parents. Mediocre students then found their way into this school. Textbooks were a nightmare. Teachers were demotivated due to poor salaries

and had lost heart in thriving to assist students. All this zeroed down to poor pass rate. This school lost its jewel of excellence.

During interviews conducted, it was observed that most schools continued with teacher incentive system, though devising other forms of payment such as teacher appreciation, per diems and boarding allowances for teachers. In this regard a school head from school C said:

Parents in this school have vowed to continue supporting payment of incentives as a way of motivating teachers to improve student achievement. Students are subjugated through a set of rules and routine monitoring by teachers which prepare them for acceptable behaviour that could make them perform well in school leading to good student achievement.

Discussion

Findings of this research envisaged that school-based teacher incentives had been politicised in Zimbabwe. The inception or withdrawal of teacher incentives had been determined by a government in power. What also had been observed was that not much consultations with various stakeholders either for introducing or withdrawing these teacher incentives had been done by different Zimbabwean government which could have left the incentive system prone to abuse (Makanga & Mutsagondo, 2014). While the Minister of Education during GNU government noted an importance of teacher incentives in improving teachers' morale and retention which could subsequently improve student achievement, the minister of education who came after GNU claimed that teacher incentives were contrary to achievement of universal access to education by all students (Circular 6 of 2014, Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education) and government policy on Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Transformation (ZIMASSET) which seeks to attain educational equity for all Zimbabwean citizens, under a pillar of social services (Circular 6 of 2014, Ministry of Education, Art, Sport and Culture). This later minister then decided to ban teacher

incentives. However, it had been argued was that the later minister's decision was illogical and lacked consistence by Ministry of Education in a bid to assist both parents and students. A follow-up statement for schools to maintain previous school fees structures, meaning schools could not increase or decrease their amount of school fees paid by parents was made by this minister. Regarding banning of teacher incentives, it had also been argued that Zimbabwean government should have made a gradual shift on how it could address this issue without necessarily banning it, more so before finding alternative ways to assist teachers financially. It also emerged that teachers decided to continue with extra-tutorials in order to supplement their low salaries, however under various claims or at different centres such as their homes. This could prompt one to argue that children could be at risk of different forms of abuse such as sexual, financial or any other forms of abuse from teachers as there was no one to monitor these teachers.

Findings from this study also confirmed what happened in Kenya, when Kenyan government arbitrarily banned vacation schools without proper consultations from stakeholders (Mogaka, 2014; Kosgei, 2015). Teachers in Zimbabwe, similarly, could find other avenues to counter government policies. For example in Kenya, when government banned holiday tuition and extra classes in all schools in 1999, 2008 and in 2012, private tuition expanded (Mogaka, 2014; Jeruto & Bernard, 2014). In selected secondary schools under this study, schools and teachers also deployed methods to counter ministerial ban on teacher incentives. Some schools hiding behind their teachers rented private centres where students could go and learn during school holidays. These private centres were purported to be run by teachers as individuals and that schools were not involved. As a result, school administrators could not be held accountable for violation of ministerial ban on teacher incentives. For example, at one school, teachers organised private holiday tutoring at a private centre away from the school (about 200 kilometres away). It can therefore be argued that whenever government could issue out certain policies and instruments, prior consultations should be done with stakeholders, for these stakeholders to have a buy-in. This could lessen chances of these policies to be politicised, manipulated and ignored by stakeholders. Bande (2015) in *The Manica Post* of week 3-9 July 2015

indicated that a government audit report on schools in Manicaland revealed that schools continued with payment of incentives for their teachers despite a ministerial ban of teacher incentives and teachers earned between \$80 and \$250 per month (Bande, 2015).

From this study's findings, one could as well give another dimension, to dispute an assertion that students' failure during 2003 and 2008 could have been a result of teacher low morale but that there were poor resources such as textbooks for students to use. The assumption could be that even if students could have motivated teachers on one hand whilst these students had poor resources, then there could be low student achievement. Individuals who could agree with this assertion might want to dispute the role of a motivated teacher on enhancing student achievement.

Another assumption which might be raised which led to poor school pass-rate during 2003 to 2008, could had not been poor teacher morale or poor resources but could be that schools especially boarding schools were no longer streaming students, as these schools enrolled any students even those who were not good academically. Schools could recruit students with mixed abilities as long as a parent of that student was able to pay school fees. As a result, mediocre students even found their way into purported high-performing schools. Although this might had been the case though, one could assert that the role of a motivated teacher to enhance students' achievement could not be over-looked. Even these poor or good students still needed a motivated a teacher who could assist them to excel in school.

From this research, it also emerged that those who criticised Zimbabwe government's position to ban teacher incentives opined that Zimbabwean leaders were not concerned on seeing an improvement in student achievement as most of their children were learning outside this country. The assumption had been that these leaders could have amassed a lot of wealth for themselves, at the expense of ordinary Zimbabweans and this enabled these leaders to have financial capacity to pay for their children's tuition fees abroad. In the end, rather than weighing benefits against banning of teacher incentives, Zimbabwean government after GNU had been

accused of pursuing a malign agenda of either punishing teachers for aligning with opposition parties or garnering support from parents who were also opposed to teacher incentive systems. Conclusively, although myriad arguments might be raised for government's response to teacher incentive system but an assumption could still remain that school pass-rates increased when incentives were introduced, which made teachers to work harder, while schools began to experience a decline in pass rates when such incentives were banned.

5.5.7 Media influence: Teachers' morale versus student achievement

Interviews conducted with teachers, school heads and education officers pointed out that media could play a critical role in influencing teachers' morale, attitudes and perceptions towards student achievement. The nature of teachers' morale could then either increase or decrease students' achievement. Teachers from school C said,

It is unfortunate that the state media had been used as a vehicle to demonise teachers describing them as money mongers, with a mercenary's attitude that is driven largely by an agenda of milking money from parents. This had made those who subscribe to state media to be brainwashed and ignored a reality that teachers are suffering economically.

School heads acknowledged that while the school sector had received support from private media, this sector had been at the receiving end from state media. One school head from school B pointed out,

State media, through The Herald, radio and television had often been negative about teachers while promoting ideas and intentions of government against teachers.

Education officers also said that state media had at times wrongly reported on teachers' remuneration. One education officer indicated,

As Education Inspectors we are at times shocked with what state media reports on teachers, especially on their remuneration. The stories are exaggerated and largely distorted. These negative stories affect teacher morale and teachers' desire to work harder.

SDC members also echoed same sentiments against state media, which they described as anti-teachers. One SDC member said,

If one wants to truly understand what is happening among teachers, he/she should not get that information from state media which is always biased against teachers.

However on private media, participants concurred that this media had been supportive of teachers' welfare especially advocating for improved remuneration of teachers which could subsequently improve student achievement.

One teacher said,

Private media had often been supportive of teachers. Reportage from this media had tried to depict challenges that teachers face especially their poor remuneration which is not the case with state media.

Discussion

From this study, findings have shown that media both state and private media played an important role on enhancing or demotivating teacher morale which could then affect student achievement. State media had been accused of failing to address teachers' economic plight which could affect teachers' morale. One could assert that state media ignored a reality that teachers could be remunerated poorly which could also affect their morale and attitude towards work. Those individuals who read or

supported state media had further been accused of being brainwashed to think that what they got from state media could be a true reflection of what could be a reality regarding teachers' remuneration. One of the main contributing factor why people could be brainwashed, could be that state media enjoyed much media space as compared to private media. Reportage from state media could often be disseminated through state machinery such as radios, televisions and newspapers. However, reporting from private media which had been assumed to be pro-opposition parties had been viewed as supportive to teachers and also asserted that these teachers could be poorly remunerated. On the whole, different media coverages could affect people' morale in this case teachers, either motivating or demotivating them from working harder. When teachers are motivated or demotivated, the assumption could that this had a positive or negative influence on student achievement.

Research findings on media's influence towards teachers' morale could be confirmed from reviewed related literature. A 2010 report from editors of *Rethinking schools* disclosed that in America teachers had been unhappy when U.S.A. government decided to fire teachers who were not improving students' learning outcomes. (Editorial Report from Rethinking Schools, 2010). Tone (2014) also noted that in California teachers were criticised by conservative mass media for failing to perform well in their work. Thus, state media could be a mechanism for state propaganda, which a government could use to further its own interests. Scott (2013), asserts that media can be used as an ideological state apparatus by the ruling class, in this case could be a government in power so as to safeguard and promote its agenda. In this current study, it also emerged state media had also been used by government to denounce teachers' attitude and behaviour especially on teacher remuneration. A reason for this government being anti-teachers could be that teachers had been labelled mostly to belong to opposition parties. However, rather than blaming teachers for having low morale towards work, private media tended to find the problem rooted in the nature of government itself that failed to address teachers' economic needs, which subsequently had an influence on student achievement.

5.5.8 Teacher incentive models and their influence on student achievement.

Interviews conducted with participants in selected secondary schools revealed that participants had divergent perceptions regarding the type of incentive model that could be adopted to enhance or demotivate teachers' morale and ultimately influence student achievement. Teachers from school B said,

Group-based incentives brought a sense of team spirit and oneness.

This observation was supported by teachers from school C who mentioned that,

Family and working ties are bonded together in a group based incentive system with teachers soldering together to put their school on the map and improve student achievement.

School heads from schools B and C also expressed their sentiments in support of group-based incentives indicating that it brought about team work among teachers. A school head from school B stated,

Teachers worked like ants, each doing their expectation and sharing experiences to meet organisational goal and improve students' learning outcomes. Those teachers who could fail on their way were assisted by other teachers.

A school head from school C alluded that it became undemanding and eventually easy to run a school if teachers received group-based incentives. This school head said,

Through payment of group incentives, teachers supported, monitored, supervised and encouraged one another. My work as head became easy.

However, teachers from school A, who received incentives irregularly supported individual incentives rather than group incentives. Teachers said,

Group incentives promote free riders. Even those teachers whose performance is below par are rewarded equally with others. However individual incentives encourage that only those who should be rewarded are duly rewarded.

Discussion

This study revealed that while there are two models of incentives which could be adopted, such as group or individual incentive models, individual incentive model received least support from participants. Group incentive model was favoured because of innumerable advantages it could possess in comparison to individual incentive model. It had been argued that group incentive model could bring a sense of urgency to a group, in this case teachers, which could result in greater performance. It had further been argued that teachers could collaborate with one another as they could stimulate, share experiences and support each other's efforts which could then improve student achievement. It had also been assumed that group incentives could have a potential to enhance team work among teachers, as teachers could desire to improve student achievement while unhealthy competition among teachers to out-do one another could be greatly minimised. Resultantly, this could enhance collective achievement among teachers which could also improve student achievement. Positive peer pressure could also be noted when under-performing teachers could put more of an effort in their teaching process so as not to disappoint other team members. Therefore, group incentive model might also had a potential of bringing together different talents, skills and abilities among teachers for an attainment of school goals. The assumption had been that students could benefit more in their learning experiences when a group incentive model is adopted, as this could lead to improved students' achievement.

However, proponents of individual incentive model assert that group incentives could promote free riders, where lazy teachers could be equally be rewarded like those teachers who could be working harder. This could then demotivated hard-working teachers when they realised that lazy teachers were also equally benefitting from teacher incentives. In the end, students' achievement could also be negatively affected as hard working teachers could disengage from their spirit of working harder. Indeed free riders could exist but participants' views from this study confirmed Figlio and Kenny (2007); Ahn (2009) and Ahn and Vigdor (2010) assertion that the effect of free riders on student achievement could be insignificant as compared to positive influence of group incentive model on teachers' morale which could also improve student achievement. The assumption had been that when group incentives were properly designed and more so when incentives are higher enough to satisfy teachers' economic needs, teachers could then be motivated to worker harder and keep these incentives coming, despite an existence of free riders.

5.5.9 Teachers' working conditions and its influence on student achievement

Participants from all schools visited agreed that Zimbabwean government should take sole responsibility for addressing teachers' working conditions. Teachers as civil servants, employed to perform civil and national duties by government are therefore required to be remunerated extra-well by their employer. Teachers from school E remarked,

As teachers we are employed by government and not parents. Thus, shouldering the burden to parents to look after our welfare and financing school activities is an indication of malfunctioning and an unpardonable failure by our Zimbabwean government.

Teachers stated that it was difficult to work during an era when teacher received incentives, as parents/guardians increasingly demanded to see how teachers were performing in their day-to-day activities. Teachers from school D said,

It became progressively more difficult to work during the incentive era. Parents were making their demands to us while at the same time we were also obliged to report to government. One could not serve two masters at the same time.

SDC representatives from school D pointed out that as government had failed to adequately reward teachers, parents then assumed this responsibility.

As SDC we resolved to take over when we noted that our school was deteriorating. Our teachers were left begging and borrowing money from students and we noted that this was not a healthy situation. It could be difficult for students to respect and in the end listen to these teachers.

The same SDC from school D, pointed out that when parents took over a responsibility of financing school activities, power to run schools was also transferred to SDCs. An SDC remarked,

Zimbabwe government could not continue to claim to have power to monitor and supervise schools whilst it failed to meet teachers' working conditions. As parents we wanted to know how our money was being used, who was using it and whether our children were benefitting in their learning experiences. We could require underperforming teachers to be transferred from our schools.

Teachers from school D stated that parents from their school demanded to come and observe teachers conducting lessons. Parents/guardians alleged they were

responsible for rewarding incentives to teachers and as a result wanted to know whether teachers were working harder.

One teacher stated,

Even parents who were not educationist or not acquainted on what constitutes a good lesson demanded to attend and observe us as we conducted lessons. Some of these parents had even failed Form 4, while others ended in Grade 7 but they thought they could still comment that this is a good or bad lesson. Therefore, if a teacher had a total of 365 students from Form 1 to 6, it could eventually mean that 365 parents could visit that teacher for supervision which could subsequently translate to every day of a year including weekends and school holidays. This was not practical at all and could disrupt school learning environment.

Education officers stated,

It became apparently difficult to institute Ministry of Education requirements and expectations in schools. SDCs had their own expectations, at the end, one with economic muscle was better listened to and in this case was SDCs.

Discussion

From this study it emerged that addressing teachers' working conditions had been a challenge faced by Zimbabwean government, as a result of economic meltdown that characterised 2003 to 2008. Zimbabwean government failed to remunerate its employees adequately. It could be noted that when government realised it might not address teachers' economic challenges alone, it surrendered this responsibility to SDC through Circular 5 of 2009 of MoEASC, regardless of government itself being an employer (Ndlovu, Phiri & Mutale 2014). By devolving powers to financially support

teachers to SDCs, it could be argued that this government also lost its powers to monitor and control school activities as manifested by role conflict that arose between parents and SDCs on one side versus education officers on the other side. Conflict arose as a result of who amongst these stakeholders could have greater authority to supervise teachers and more so monitor day to day activities of schools. This could be surprising because under Zimbabwean government's jurisdiction, the government itself is mandated to monitor performance of its own employees and not any other players. The argument is that other different stakeholders might rather suggest recommendations to government for an improvement in service delivery and not to demand supervision of government employees or services that are provided. The role of these other stakeholders could be to complement government efforts and not to run or have greater authority over government. However during the incentive era, parents then demanded to have greater influence over seeing a value for their money whether students' learning process improved or whether teachers were working harder. For instance, SDCs claimed they could expel under-performing teachers from their schools, despite certain procedures should be followed before one is relinquished from his/her duties. Education officers acknowledged that by transferring responsibility of addressing teachers' working conditions to various SDCs, these education officers were now disempowered to supervise teachers and monitor students' learning activities. Education officers argued that their duty as ministry officials was to ensure that students' learning process could be maintained as per set minimal educational standards. The assumption which could contribute to this role conflict between SDCs and education officers might be that, one with better economic muscle was also expected to have more authority over schools. In this case it were SDCs. However, findings from this study revealed that these various SDC members had no sufficient educational prerequisites and pedagogical trainings to perform such duties.

What also emerged from this study was that teachers were now overwhelmed with different responsibilities, that could have negatively affected their work. The argument was that these teachers were expected to satisfy needs of different parents who were contributing their money as levies, satisfy needs of different individual students which

indeed they could be expected to do within a school set up and more so to satisfy Ministry of Education's expectations. One might conclude that these different stakeholders had their own different expectations which exerted more pressure on teachers and in the end prevent teachers from working harder and subsequently improve student achievement.

Thus, findings from this study confirmed Maposa (2013) argument that Zimbabwe Civil Service Commission as government department responsible for employing civil servants should be responsible for addressing working conditions of its civil servants, in this regard teachers. Subsequently, a motivated teacher could work harder resulting in improved student achievement.

5.5.10 Conclusion

In this current chapter, the researcher discussed themes that emerged from the study on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. In Chapter six, focuses on a summary of this study was, an integration on findings that emerged from literature and empirical findings from this study. The researcher also discussed conclusions and recommendations based on research findings from selected secondary schools in Makoni District.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study was to explore the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in selected secondary schools in Makoni District. Interactionist perspective within an interpretative or qualitative paradigm was used to explore how interactions among various stakeholders in Zimbabwean education had influenced student achievement by means of incentive system. Findings from earlier studies on the role of teacher incentives on student achievement had been fused with key issues that arose from this study. In this regard, following themes were explored; principles behind emergence of incentives globally and in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwean education system during various phases such as a period from 2003 to 2008, during Government of National Unity (GNU), a period that stretches from 2009 to 2013 and a period after GNU. This current research also discussed rapport between various Zimbabwean governments and teachers and how this relationship then affected teachers' attitude towards their work. Perceptions of community towards teacher incentive system and challenges with or without incentives were analysed. Data from this study indicated that school-based teacher incentives had a motivational effect on teachers which then stimulate them to desire students' achievement.

This chapter provides a study overview and provides summaries of chapters, conclusions and recommendations on how school-based teacher incentives can motivate teachers to work hard. Limitations of this study and recommendations for further study were also discussed.

6.2 SUMMARIES OF THE CHAPTERS

CHAPTER 1

This chapter presented background to the study, theoretical approach that guided this research, a brief literature review, problem statement, research approach, design and methodology. Issues of trustworthiness, ethical considerations, chapter outline, delimitation of study and definition of the key terms were also discussed.

CHAPTER 2

This chapter provided an in-depth discussion of the theoretical approach that informed this study, and gave a review of related literature on the role of teacher incentives on students' achievements. The chapter also focused on principles behind inclusion of teacher incentives in education systems, globally and in Zimbabwe. Literature indicated that education stakeholders had noted an importance of teachers' efforts in students' achievement. In order for teachers to work effectively they have to be motivated through receiving monetary or non-monetary incentives. Lack of motivation leads teachers to adopt dysfunctional behaviour that negatively affects student achievement.

Literature also indicated that the issue of supplementing teachers' low salaries through payment of additional incentives had received mixed reactions. In Zimbabwe, for example, people seemed to have divergent views regarding inception of teacher incentives and its subsequent withdrawal from Zimbabwean education system. What was also observed was that the issue of awarding incentives to teachers was not a unique practice in Zimbabwe alone. Governments and School Development Committees in developed and developing countries had been battling on how they could best improve the quality of education in their respective countries for students to succeed academically and therefore introduced different forms of teacher incentives.

CHAPTER 3

In Chapter 3, the researcher presented an overview of teachers' incentive schemes in selected developed and developing countries to explore how teachers in other countries are coping and making ends meet. What emerged from different countries was that there was no single standard *modus operandi* on how teachers were incentivised. Incentive systems varied from country to country and were largely dependent upon the revenue-base of that country. In developed countries responsibility for awarding teachers incentives lies principally on government's shoulders, while in developing countries this load had been transferred to parents/guardians of students. These awards ranged from regulated awards such as those that are structured by government or school administration to unregulated awards, where teacher and parent/guardian enter into private contracts.

CHAPTER 4

In this chapter the researcher explained characteristics of qualitative method to explore the effectiveness of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement in five selected secondary schools in Makoni District. The researcher described methods and techniques used to explore the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. Data-collection methods, namely; interviews, questionnaires and focus-group discussions were also discussed. The researcher also analysed methods used to select the sample of participants for this study.

CHAPTER 5

In Chapter 5, the researcher discussed data-collection methods that were used and their limitations, also presented and analysed data that were collected from selected secondary schools in Makoni District. Types of schools that participated in this study, which included a rural day school, a council school, a boarding school, a government school and a school on previously-owned White farms were indicated. What emerged from the findings was that school-based teacher incentives were important in improving teacher motivation which might then lead to student achievement (5.4.2 & 5.4.12).

CHAPTER 6

In Chapter 6, the researcher gave an overview of the entire study and summaries of chapters. Conclusions and recommendations on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement were presented. The limitations of this study and recommendations for further study were outlined.

6.3 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

One of the central challenges facing Zimbabwean education system was to try to enhance teacher motivation which would lead to students' achievement. Indeed, this is a mammoth task that requires a multi-sectoral approach. There are many factors that contribute to students' academic achievement. However, of critical importance to these factors had been the role of a motivated teacher in contributing to student achievement. While some may assert that intrinsic motivation should be central, others argue to the contrary, asserting that both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are important.

Globally, the issue of teacher incentives as one of contributory factors to student achievement had been a bone for contention among individuals, unions or different governments. Various criticisms had been levelled against incentive systems, such as that they could promote a mercenary attitude among teachers. In schools where group-incentive was practised it was said to have encouraged free riders among teachers, while individual incentives promoted unhealthy competition among staff members. Students had also been said not to benefit adequately from teacher incentive system as teachers could only concentrate on having their students pass public examinations at the expense of other learning activities. Criticism in this respect against teachers included the use of non-participatory pedagogical styles, such as drilling and rote-learning that do not enhance students' active participation.

There was no universal model that had been adopted to award teachers' incentives by different governments, unions or parent/ guardian bodies. Awarding systems varied from one country to another. In developing countries this practice of awarding

teachers incentives had been predominantly a responsibility of their governments, while in developing countries a burden of addressing teachers' welfare had been taken over by parents/guardians of various students.

School-based teacher incentives in Zimbabwe emerged after 2008, when Zimbabwe government issued Circular 5 of 2009 of MoEASC, which recommended that respective SDCs from different schools remunerate teachers from the 10% collected from school levies. This was meant to supplement teachers' low salaries. However, it is argued that this system of awarding teachers' incentives other than teachers' usual pay was as old as the profession itself. Parents/guardians from time immemorial had given teachers incentives as a way of appreciating teachers' work. Inception of school-based teacher incentives, however, raised controversy as some denounced the inception of teacher incentives in Zimbabwe after 2008, while others supported the idea, arguing that students would greatly improve in their academic achievements as these students would be taught by motivated teachers. With changing of Zimbabwean government, after 2013, teacher incentive system was outlawed as per Circular 6 of 2014. Teachers felt short-changed as they thought this banning was politically motivated. The Minister of Education after announcing the ban of school-based teacher incentives later announced that fee-structures would remain unchanged and not decrease with scrapping of incentives from Zimbabwean education system.

What emerged from this study was that some schools continued with teacher incentive system, however under different claims, such as per-diems, boarding allowances or appreciation allowances for their teachers (5.4.12.1). School administrators and parent bodies argued they would not be found contravening Circular 6 of 2014, as the minister had specifically outlawed the 10% which was deducted from school levies.

The main research question that was discussed was: What are the experiences of key personnel in education sector pertaining the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement? (1.5). School-based teacher incentive system

received mixed reactions from different stakeholders. Some supported inclusion of incentives in education system while others indicated that this incentive scheme exploited parents/guardians in respect of their meagre resources. In schools where incentive system was practised, students' achievements improved, but later declined with its subsequent withdrawal (5.4.3.1 & 5.4.5). Studies from other countries globally, have also shown that if teacher incentives are properly designed they yield positive results on students' learning experiences. Thus, there are lessons that Zimbabwean government can take about, on how the incentive system has successfully improved student achievement internationally and adapt its own systems accordingly.

Qualitative data were analysed and assumptions were reached in respect of the following;

- Reasons for introduction of financial incentives in Zimbabwean;
- Teacher motivation's influence on teacher performance to improve student achievement;
- Co-relationship between extra-pay and teachers' behaviour on influencing on student achievement;
- Teachers' response to incentive system
- Parents' responses to incentive system;
- Government's response to incentive system;
- Media influence: Teachers' morale versus student achievement
- Types of incentive models for teachers and their influence on student achievement.
- Addressing teachers' working conditions and its influence on student achievement

6.4 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

This section discusses an integration of findings that emerged from related literature and this study.

6.4.1 An integration of literature and empirical findings

It had been argued that literature can either corroborate or contradict what has been found in the field. Thus, this section discusses integration of findings from literature and what emerged from this study.

- This study confirmed what had been obtained from literature that human beings are active, creative and interpretive beings capable of creating their social world through interaction. It had been noted from this study that teachers and students interact with different stakeholders within Zimbabwean education system and consequently, this interaction shaped teachers and students' attitude towards student achievement. When interaction is cordial, it was assumed that it might contribute to good and desirable results, in this case which was student achievement. Literature has also pointed out that education systems are characterised by different types of interactions, such as between stakeholders and teachers, among teachers themselves and between teachers and students and among student to student (2.2.7) and this was also confirmed in this study. Within Zimbabwean education there are different stakeholders who have an interest in education. These could be parents/guardians, school heads, education officers, Ministry of Education itself, students or Non-governmental organisations among others. It had been noted from literature and from this study that both teachers' morale and students' achievements are largely influenced by the nature of these interactions.
- The self-fulfilling prophecy assert that expectations of an individual to the other can be realised even though an original expectation could be false. This assumption had also been confirmed in this study. Teachers' expectations about a student's behaviour or achievement could be influenced by how these expectations and attitude were nurtured (1.2).
- Literature also pointed out that improved working conditions through incentives, when these incentives are properly designed have a high motivational potential among teachers which might increase their productive

levels in the education field and consequently improve student achievement and this assertion had also been confirmed in this study. In Zimbabwean schools, where teacher incentive systems had been practised, improvement was noted in students' achievements in public examinations (5.4.3.1). Motivated teachers were at liberty to experiment with and institute different pedagogical styles that enhanced student achievement.

- Literature pointed out that people have divergent perceptions on the role of incentive system in boosting teachers' morale, and eventually influencing students' achievements and this had also been confirmed in this study. For instance, studies carried out by Lavy, 2002; Lavy 2003 on Israel and studies carried by Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2003) in rural Kenya (1.4.1) noted a direct relationship between teacher incentives and student achievement. However, Martins (2010) after studying the role of teacher incentives in Portugal refuted an argument that teacher incentives positively influence student achievement. The divergent in perceptions among different stakeholders from literature on whether teacher incentives improve student is similar to what emerged from this study. Different stakeholders such as teachers, school heads, education officers, community members and various Zimbabwean governments also had mixed reactions on importance of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement. However, both literature and this study confirmed that if these teacher incentives were properly designed they could improve student achievement.
- Findings from literature and this study confirmed that teachers demonstrated both positive and negative behaviours as a result of receiving incentives which could affect student achievement (5.4.2.2). However, positive behaviours outweighed negative behaviour in influencing student achievement. As a result of teachers' high morale which was enhanced by teacher incentives, teachers felt motivated and aligned with goals, visions and missions of their schools. Teachers then imparted these positive attitudes to students, leading to student achievement (2.2.1 & 5.4.4).
- Literature also indicated that there is no generic incentive model that can be adopted to suit every country, government or school-parent bodies (3.0) and

this had been confirmed by this study. Various incentive models such as No child left behind model in U.S.A; merit award system in Bolivia, career ladder in Mexico are some examples of different incentives that have been adopted by different countries. However, this study as well noted that school-based teacher incentive programme in Zimbabwe varied from school to school depending on how much SDCs might afford to pay its own teachers. In some schools, teachers received incentives which were more than what was stipulated by Circular 5 of 2009 while other schools failed to pay teachers these school based teacher incentives or payment to teachers was irregular.

- From related literature, it had been noted that many developing countries, unlike developed countries are facing serious economic and fiscal constraints and are therefore unable to augment direct salary incentives in order to enhance student achievement (1.2.1) and this had also been confirmed by this study. As a result, developing countries transferred the burden of paying teachers incentives to parents/guardians of students unlike governments in developed countries which took over this responsibility (3.0). Zimbabwe being a developing country, during GNU issued Circular 5 of 2009 where respective SDCs (parent/guardian bodies) were to remunerate their own teachers from levies which these SDCs collected.
- Related literature pointed out that socio-economic status of parents/guardians of a given school often determines provision of educational services that are offered at that school (5.1) which had also been confirmed by this study. Parents/guardians from selected secondary schools in Makoni District paid different amount of incentives to their teachers. This was a result of different amount of levies that were collected in these schools.
- This study also corroborated what had been obtained from literature (1.4.1) that excessive politicisation of teacher incentive systems design and effectiveness of these incentives in enhancing student achievement (Bennell & Acheampong, 2003). The issue of teacher incentives being

politicised had been experienced in Zimbabwe during GNU and after 2013. Inception and withdrawal of school-based teacher incentives within these different Zimbabwean governments had been linked to politics. For instance, similarly to Kenya, where minister of education claimed that extra-tuition impinged on students' constitutional rights (Kosgei, 2015), one of the reasons given for banning teacher incentives programmes in Zimbabwe was that teacher incentive infringed on students' rights. When incentives were introduced in Zimbabwe, minister of education then was from an opposition party and this minister sought to gain political support from teachers who were purported to belong to opposition parties. However, the Minister of Education who then took over after 2013 was from a ruling party, banned teacher incentives, a decision which had been criticised by different stakeholders arguing that teachers could be demotivated leading to student under-achievement (5.4.8.1).

- Related literature and findings from this study as well postulate that state media or private media could positively or negatively influence teachers' attitudes, their enthusiasm towards their work and how teachers executed their duties. This consequently affected students' achievements (2.5.5 & 5.4.10.1).
- Literature and this study asserted that there are two models of incentive system, namely group-incentives and individual incentives. Literature and this study also confirmed that group-incentives inculcated team spirit among teachers leading to student achievement (5.4.11.1). Although there could be free riders within a group incentive model, these free riders are encouraged by other staff members to work hard and improve student achievement (2.8 & 5.4.11.1). In this study therefore, teachers receiving group incentives are responsible towards each other in execution of their duties as they continually encourage one another.
- This study however refuted an assumption from Martins (2010) on a study on Portugal. Martins (2010) argues that incentives have little or no significant impact on student achievement in national examinations as compared to performance in school based continuous assessment tests.

This could suggest that teachers were cheating in order to qualify for and receive incentives. However, this study maintained that if incentives are properly designed, they could increase student achievement in public examinations as well as in the learning process which might be reflected in improvement in continuous assessment work.

6.4.2 New aspects found by this study

- This current study addressed gaps found in Chapter 1. For instance, a study conducted by Sarda (2005) on Peru (1.4.1) discussed how teachers' behaviour on attendance was positively influenced by introduction of incentives. A limitation of Sarda (2005) study was that it did not indicate whether other aspects of teaching process improved such as teaching styles employed by teachers and above all student achievement which this study explored among selected secondary schools.
- Another gap from literature which this study addressed was on a study done by Masters (2012) on Australia (1.4.1). Masters (2012) focused largely on other factors that could lead to student achievement, such as school practices and contextual influences. Although these factors could influence student achievement, however, to completely ignore an influence of teacher motivation which, in turn, increases their effort is an under-estimation of the power of incentives in the teaching process, a gap which this research addressed.

6.5 CONCLUSIONS

An exploration on the role of school-based teacher incentives in selected secondary schools assisted the researcher to collect rich data from participants in Makoni District on how a motivated teacher improves his/her students' achievements. In this study, the researcher wanted to explore perceptions from different stakeholders on the role of school-based teacher incentives on increasing teacher morale which could subsequently influence student achievement.

From this study the followings conclusions could be reached:

- Participants who took part in this study revealed that student achievement is paramount in school learning environment. This might be achieved through an effort of a motivated teacher. It is assumed that if teachers are remunerated well, they are committed to see their students do well in public examinations. Lack of properly designed incentive systems, where teachers themselves are also consulted, or withdrawal of incentives from education system was seen as a challenge among selected secondary schools in Makoni District.
- School heads, teachers, education officers and SDC members in this study indicated that in schools where incentive system was practised, teachers were committed to support goals, visions and missions of these schools and this contributed to student achievement. For example, goals, visions and missions were clearly displayed in all important places at these schools and everyone in that school aligned his or her efforts towards their fulfilment.
- In a school where teacher incentive system was not practised teachers felt demotivated and had no vigour to do their work. This might lead to students performing badly in public examinations. The assumption could be that demotivated teachers set low standards for students' achievement.
- In schools where incentive system was practiced, school heads and education officers reiterated that their work to manage, monitor and coordinate school activities eventually became easy as teachers felt motivated to do school-work. It had been assumed that teachers worked as a unit, each knowing his or her obligation within a school system. Team-work prevailed among teachers and thus enhanced student achievement.
- Participants in this study were of the opinion that school-based teacher incentives in Zimbabwe were largely introduced after 2003 to 2008, a period that was marked by high inflation in this country. Government issued Circular 5 of 2009 that gave parents/guardians an opportunity to supplement teachers' low salaries. This enhanced teacher retention and subsequently improved student achievement (5.4.1.2). One education

officer also indicated that it could be inaccurate and a negation of historical evidence to claim that school-based teacher incentives only emerged after 2009 in Zimbabwe. The issue of rewarding teachers by parents is as old as the teaching profession itself. However, the system became pronounced after 2009.

- Participants argued that an only way to bring normalcy in Zimbabwean education system which had been crippled by a high exodus of teachers, was to introduce school-based teacher incentives. However, in a school where teacher incentive system was not introduced teachers and school head were initially opposed to incentive system. These teachers and school head argued that teacher incentives brought discord within an education system as other teachers from different schools received school-based teacher incentives and greatly benefitted financially (5.4.6).
- Teachers, school heads, education officers and SDC representative members asserted that when a government put in place policies and circulars without consulting different stakeholders, schools and parents could devise methods and ways to evade these policies. For instance, other types of incentives were introduced in schools which were not outlawed by Circular 6 of 2014, which sought to ban payment of school-based teachers' incentives collected from levies (5.4.12.1).
- Participants indicated that scrapping of incentive system by Zimbabwean government was done prematurely. This government had no financial base to address teachers' working conditions. The assumption is that this ban negatively affected teacher morale as teachers were now demotivated to improve students' achievements. School-based teacher incentives acted among other factors, as a morale-booster for teachers, who then eager to have their students improve in school learning and consequently pass public examinations.
- In schools where incentive system was practised it emerged that participants supported group incentives as opposed to individual incentives. It has been argued that group incentives foster team spirit and oneness (5.4.11) and subsequently enhanced staff unity could then contribute to an

improvement in students' learning process. (5.4.11.1) Selected secondary schools that participated in this study, where teacher incentive system was practised, had an improvement in student achievement. Withdrawal of incentive system by government led to a decline in school pass-rates. In a school where teacher incentive system was never practised students' achievements could not improve, teachers adopted unfavourable behaviours that were detrimental to students' learning experiences (5.4.5).

6.6 SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Key themes that emerged from this study are blended together with the main study findings. Recommendations were outlined on each theme that has been explored.

6.6.1 Reasons for introduction of financial incentives in Zimbabwean

School-based teacher incentives were introduced as a measure to mitigate against low salaries that teachers were receiving and as a ploy to retain them in service. Some teachers abandoned the profession for various jobs locally or internationally including up-take of tedious jobs which they had not trained for. Against the backdrop of incentive programme, student pass-rate soared higher as teachers felt motivated to do their work (5.4.2). Teachers' morale and efficiency greatly improved as they conducted their day to day school activities. Findings from this study indicated that motivation improved teachers' self-awareness and self-image (2.2.2). It is important to note that teachers' positive attitude is transmitted to students during social interaction (2.2.1). Alex (2008) indicates that human action is at times influenced by interaction with other individuals or social groups. As a result of an introduction of school-based teacher incentives, it is argued that most teachers adopted positive behaviours, which included reduced absenteeism and absconding work. Further to that, most teachers started giving students adequate homework, thoroughly marking students' work and engaging in team teaching as a way of making students benefit from teachers' different abilities (5.4.4). Consequently, it is assumed that students who were the ultimate beneficiaries of this learning process improved in public

examinations. The assumption could be that improved remuneration through incentives, also enhanced effectiveness of Zimbabwean teachers. Hanushek (2010) maintains that rewarding teachers improves student achievement by attracting committed and effective teachers into teaching profession. Patrick and Jane (2013) postulate that as long as teachers' personal needs are addressed, they are bound to be satisfied and in the end student achievement improves.

Participants who were interviewed indicated that the only way to improve teachers' performance was to allow a continued existence of school-based teacher incentives in education system. This was against the backdrop of government's failure to pay teachers meaningful salaries due to an on-going economic melt-down in Zimbabwe. This incentive system was not only a notable intervention in terms of retaining teachers at their work places, but it also prevented the school sector from total demise. A period 2003 to 2008 was marked by subdued teacher morale which paralysed Zimbabwean education system. Chaos that characterised the education system during this period was addressed by many factors but teacher incentive system proved very critical. Findings from this study indicated that most teachers co-operated with school authorities in terms of advancing values, vision and programmes of their schools if teachers were supported financially by government or parents/guardians (5.4.2). Addressing teachers' welfare and needs through financial support collected from school levies impelled most teachers to apply extra effort towards ensuring that no student lagged behind in a learning process. This resulted in enhanced student achievement as teachers who had been incentivised were eager to involve students in more meaningful learning by designing activities which stimulated students' learning. According to an interactionist theory, teachers and students developed a shared vision in terms defining a common goal to achieve student success (5.4.2). Teachers from a school which did not approve of school-based teacher incentive system, initially opposed the incentive system but later withdrew their stance in support of school-based teacher incentives. Thus, participants felt a need for inclusion of school-based teacher incentives within Zimbabwean education system (5.4.2.2).

RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of observations raised on reasons for introduction of financial incentives, it is recommended that:

- School-based teacher incentives should be maintained in order to motivate teachers to work hard. Teachers might be deterred from engaging in unorthodox behaviours which are detrimental to student achievement. In order to address this recommendation, Zimbabwean government could engage different stakeholders so that they share views and experiences on how properly designed school-based teacher incentives could be implemented.
- Parents/guardians should support teacher incentive system until Zimbabwean government is in a position to remunerate its teachers well. To address this recommendation, parents/guardians could work harder, for instance starting income generating projects, thus finding means to raise extra-financial incentives for teachers.
- Parents/guardians should engage teachers on matters relating to quantum and nature of teachers' incentives. In order to address this recommendation, teachers could be involved in decision making process regarding designing of incentives as they are primary beneficiaries of teacher incentive system. This could result in teachers having a buy in of the whole process.
- Teachers should also work very hard to ensure students succeed in the learning process, thus reciprocating parents/guardians' goodwill for paying teacher incentives. To address this recommendation, teachers could careful plan, properly organise their work and meaningfully assist students regardless of different learning needs.

6.6.2 Teacher motivation's influence on teacher performance to improve student achievement

This research indicated that selected secondary schools in Makoni District designed initiatives to motivate their teachers through school-based teacher incentives. Motivated teachers developed positive attitude towards their work and students benefitted by being taught and interacting with them (5.4.3). Incentives inspired teachers to make different and positive decisions in terms of assisting students, teachers utilised and experimented with various pedagogical styles to enhance students' learning (5.4.3 Teachers each day, carefully planned, executed and performed their work differently in order to improve student achievement. Bayo-Moriones et al. (2015) assert that incentives, either individual or group incentives, boost concentration and passion for individuals to work, in this case teachers to do their best in supporting students to excel in school work. Thus, Bennell (2004) points out that the issue of teacher motivation and pay had been ignored altogether in many countries (2.11.1). Teacher incentives have an effect of stimulating both intrinsic and extrinsic drive for teachers (2.11.1). Intrinsic motivation arises from within an individual while extrinsic motivation is driven by external factors. The overall national pass-rate for Zimbabwean schools after 2009, for November Ordinary Level increased and this had been attributed to among other factors, an improvement of teacher morale due to better remuneration (Newsday, 2013).

Bayo-Moriones et al. (2015) indicate that incentives, whether group or individual, enhance people's morale, in this instance teachers' morale, which had a positive effect on improving student achievement. Findings from this study on selected secondary schools in Makoni District indicated that a motivated teacher was central to improving student achievement (5.4.9). This motivation should be intrinsic and extrinsic, as these two are equally important (2.11.1 & 5.4.9). Both teachers and students should be motivated if positive results are to be realised (5.4.9.1). Martins (2010) points out that teacher incentive may improve student achievement if incentives satisfy aspirations of both teachers and students.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of teachers' response to incentives, following recommendations are made:

- Education players should continue to find ways to stimulate both the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of teachers so that teachers perform well and improve students' achievement. To achieve this recommendation, teachers' condition of service could be regularly reviewed to address teachers' plight so that these teachers might be motivated to work harder.
- Teachers should also employ different pedagogical styles that arouse student learning leading to student achievement. To implement this recommendation teachers could receive in-service trainings to equip them with latest information and skills on how to conduct lessons using participatory methodologies.

6.6.3 Co-relationship between extra-pay and teachers' behaviour on student achievement

Glewwe et al. (2008) indicate that results of incentives are not always positive, some outcomes are negative. School heads and teachers who were interviewed noted positive and negative behavioural changes among teachers due to an introduction of incentives. The assumption was that positive behaviours led to improved student learning, thereby increasing student achievement (5.4.3.1). Leading and coordinating school activities became easy for administrators when working with motivated teachers. Most teachers monitored each other's behaviour at these schools (5.4.4). Assistance was rendered to a teacher especially when he/she had challenges in teaching certain concepts and topics to students, thus team teaching was introduced in most schools. SDC representatives and school heads who participated in this study reported reduced teachers' absenteeism and also that students received adequate attention and homework from being taught by motivated teachers. Negative behaviours included use of teaching styles that did not stimulate positive change in the teaching process as effective teaching methods were viewed as time-consuming.

Teachers also developed a tendency to concentrate more on in-class activities rather than a full spectrum of a curriculum that led to an all development of students. (2.8). Focusing only on in-class activities is not commendable as students are differently gifted (Mandoga & Chakandinakira, 2014). Some students are good in academic subjects while others have a prowess for co-curricular activities and as such both traits should be nurtured.

Banker, Lee, Potter and Scrinivasan (2015) use a term dysfunctional behavioural responses to refer to negative and coarse behaviours such as teacher absenteeism, abscondment and teachers' poor attitude to work due to low morale. Perry et al. (2009) describe these negative behaviours as opportunistic behaviours Findings from this study indicated that teachers in some schools seemingly adopted these negative behaviours such as unorthodox sick leave, absenteeism, absconding and abusing school hours due to vending by both teachers and students during school hours (5.4.5.1). Such behaviours negatively consumed time that could be meant to be used for teaching students. Findings from selected secondary schools in Makoni District revealed that those teachers who initially received school-based teacher incentives adopted negative behavioural changes as a result of abolition of incentive system. Thus, Ordinary Level examination results at a certain school dropped from 98% to 90%, while Advanced Level results at same school dropped from 100% to 94% in public examination (5.4.5).

RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of positive behavioural changes that teachers adopt as a result of incentives which subsequently improve student achievement, it is recommended that:

- School documents such as log books should be kept at every school, for school administrators to monitor on teachers' attendance where teachers have to individually sign for time in and out. In order to achieve this recommendation, school administrators could ensure that such documents are availed and regularly monitored to check teachers' attendance.

- Schools should set individual school pass-rate targets, subject to be reviewed periodically so as to monitor students' progress. In order to achieve this, a teachers' committee might be set within individual schools that could regularly revisit a school's achievement and apprise other staff members of how it could further improve.
- Schools should increase their interaction with parents/guardians through holding consultative meetings and consultation days where parents/guardians can visit these school and consult with teachers on performance of their children. Schools could designed effective consultation day programmes could where parents/guardians might have ample time to assess performance of their children.
- Stakeholders in education system, including government should work together towards ensuring teachers' needs are met. It is argued that this could increase teacher morale and teachers' desire to see students succeed in academic experiences. To achieve this recommendation, stakeholders' meetings might be held where stakeholders could have an opportunity to share experiences on how to improve the education system.

6.6.4 Teachers' responses to the incentive system

Teachers who participated in this study postulated that incentives are essential and could lead to improved teachers' disposable income. Teachers could now take care of their family's needs. Teachers pointed out that their economic and social status which was poor prior to 2009 was now restored after 2009 (5.4.6). However, teachers from two schools whose payment of school-based incentives were irregular or did not receive any incentives initially against the incentive system. These teachers further said that this incentive system was discriminatory and brought differences on how teachers were remunerated (5.4.6). Literature indicates that teachers should be remunerated extra-well among other factors that could motivate them to work harder and lead to student achievement. The argument is that paying teachers extra-well, enhances teachers' positive self-esteem towards their work (2.2.5). It is argued that teachers' performance in enhancing student achievement, is not viewed in terms of

teacher's own background, type or nature of college training that teachers went through, geo-location or status of a school (2.2.5). Rather, teacher performance is viewed as a process involving various interactions within a whole education system that ultimately translates into establishment of positive teacher performance that enhances students' learning. Donald and Wesselman (2013) assert that teachers are a means to achieve student achievement as teachers know how, when and most importantly what to teach so that students would pass their examinations (5.4.6.1). When teachers are remunerated pleasingly well, teachers develop positive expectations about a student's behaviour, attitude or achievement. The self-fulfilling prophecy theory maintains that one's expectation/s tends to come true even though an original expectation may have been false (Bearman & Hedstrom, 2009). Thus, predictions made by teachers about the success or failure of students could come true because these predictions could have been made (2.2.6). More-so, pupils' self-concepts might be shaped by teacher's definition, attitudes and expectations. Improved working conditions through incentives had a high motivational potential for teachers which augment teachers' productive levels that contributed to student achievement (2.2.6.). If teachers are demotivated, this could have a negative effect on improving student achievement. Findings from this study also pointed out that some teachers and schools organised private holiday tutoring at private centres away from their schools to evade government's ban so that teachers might continue to receive additional remuneration from parents/guardians. (5.4.8.1), while other teachers organised unregulated extra tuition similar to teachers in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (3.6.3).

RECOMMENDATIONS

On teachers' response to incentive system it is recommended that:

- Teachers should develop a positive attitude towards their work which in the end positively affects students' achievement.
- Teachers and students should have a shared desire to see students succeed in a learning process. To implement this recommendation, schools

could create a conducive atmosphere that enable teachers and students to share their experiences in the learning process.

6.6.5 Parents' responses to incentive system

Findings from this study indicated that parents had mixed perceptions on the issue of school-based teacher incentives (Share, 2014). Most parents disapproved banning of teacher incentives as school-based teacher incentives played an important role in motivating teachers to work harder (2.9). President Obama of U.S.A. commented that teachers are important in any society and they should be remunerated extra-well (The White House, 2012). Some parents from selected secondary schools under this study sought a meeting with minister of education to show their disgruntlement over banning of teacher incentives. Parents felt their children would be disadvantaged in the learning process as teachers could be demotivated to work harder (5.4.7) However, findings from a school which never practised teacher incentive system indicated that parents supported minister's decision to ban school-based teacher incentives (Machivenyika, 2014). Teachers from this school that did not practise incentive system, however demanded as well to receive teacher incentives paid by parents/guardians (5.4.7).

RECOMMENDATIONS

With regards to parents' response to teacher incentive system, it is recommended that:

- Parents should find ways and means to motivate teachers in light of Zimbabwean government' failure to adequately cater for teachers' welfare. To address this recommendation, parents could assist teachers with resources to start income generating activities, so that these teachers could supplement their salaries.
- Monetary incentives paid towards teachers should not be very high such that ordinary parents might find it difficult to contribute towards teachers'

upkeep. To address this recommendation, government could regulate uniform amount of incentives that could be paid by parents/ guardians not for these incentives to remain subjective to a school's capacity to pay such incentives.

- Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) should also focus on teachers' welfare and not only presume that student achievement can be attained by focusing on students' needs alone. To address this recommendation, NGOs might also give teachers start-up grants to initiate their own livelihood activities. This could be a sustainable way to address teachers' economic challenges.

6.6.6 Government's response to incentive system

Findings from this study, among selected secondary schools in Makoni District, indicated that government's response had been shaped by nature of its relationship with teachers. Teachers received school-based incentives during 2009 to 2013 era, when Government of National Unit (GNU) was in power. The then minister of education was from an opposition party whose support base was believed to be largely teachers (2.4.3 & 5.4.8). School-based teacher incentives were later abolished with collapse of GNU in 2013 (2.5.2 & 5.4.8). Interviews with school heads also revealed that after GNU, government did not only ban payment of monthly teacher incentives but also did not regularise holiday studies, claiming that students needed time to rest (5.4.8). Removing of financial support given to teachers was viewed as politically motivated rather than showing concern to students' welfare. Mogaka (2014) noted that while Kenyan government banned holiday tuition and extra classes in all its schools in 1999, 2008 and in 2012 (5.4.8.1), private tuition had been expanding in magnitude. Whenever various governments adopt policies that are not consultative, an education system among other sectors is negatively affected (5.4.8.1). Schools and teachers devise methods to oppose government's bans (Jeruto & Bernard, 2014). Various schools from secondary schools that were selected for this study hired private centres where students could go and learn during

vacations. However, these private centres were administered by teachers. School administrators could not be held accountable for violating ministry policy (5.4.8.1).

Findings from this study indicated that removing incentives could be detrimental to academic progress schools had achieved in post 2008 Zimbabwean era. Removing incentives could result in schools achieving low pass rates, as students could be taught by demotivated and poorly paid teachers. Findings from this study also showed that scrapping of incentives had no moral justification but was politically motivated (5.4.12). There were minimal or no consultative meetings held between minister and different stakeholders, for the later to give their input on effects of scrapping school-based teacher incentives (2.5.4 & 5.4.12). Ironically, scrapping of teacher incentives created conflict between school heads and teachers. This friction was necessitated by the fact that teachers became suspicious of how the money that was initially budgeted for incentives was now used for, as there was no reduction in payment of school levies by parents/guardians. Findings from this study indicated that various incentives which were not forbidden by Circular 6 of 2014 were introduced in schools (5.4.12.1). Bande (2015) in *The Manica Post* of week 3-9 July 2015 indicated that a government audit report on Manicaland schools revealed that schools continued with payment of teacher incentives despite a ministerial ban. Teachers earned between \$80 and \$250 per month (5.4.12.1). Kingdon and Teal (2002) assert that additional allowances and other benefits make up a relatively large component of compensation packages in many countries. Findings from this study also indicated that school pass-rates had risen significantly from 2009 when incentives were introduced. After teacher incentives were scrapped, this graph started to decline (5.4.12). Bennell and Acheampong (2003) conclude that unwarranted politicisation of teacher remuneration has had a profound impact on teachers' responsibility of improving student achievement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

With regards to government's response to incentive system, it is recommended that:

- Zimbabwean government should not pass laws to discontinue payment of school-based teacher incentives in schools without finding alternative mechanisms to remunerate teachers. To address this recommendation, Zimbabwe government could re-introduce payment of teacher incentive systems and ensure strict measures are adhere to, in order to safeguard abuse of this system.
- There should be transparency in management of school funds with respect to school levies initially designed for teacher incentives and developmental projects. To address this recommendation, consultative meetings could be held between school authorities and stakeholders where comprehensive feedback might be given on how school funds were used.

6.6.7 Media influence: Teachers' morale versus student achievement

Findings from this study suggested that media plays a crucial role in influencing teachers' attitudes, perceptions and behaviour towards work (2.5.5 & 5.4.10). State media had been used by government as a vehicle for shooting down the issue of incentives. In this context, teachers were portrayed as individuals who were driven by greed through expropriating money from parents. This stance was in contrast to private media's perception of teacher incentives on students' achievement. Stakeholders in education sector were not in agreement with state media's position on the issue of teacher incentives as reportage from state media was mostly exaggerated and distorted (5.4.10). Negative reportage had also a negative effect on teacher morale which as well negatively affected teachers desire to improve student achievement. In U.S.A., the teaching profession had been devalued as government called on school administrators to fire ineffective teachers. (Editorial Report from Rethinking Schools, 2010). Tone (2014) also made similar observations that in California teachers received criticisms from conservative mass media. Teachers' negative criticisms from state media however raised concern from the general public. (5.4.10.1) Private media made positive reportage on the issue of incentives, albeit these stories receive little coverage as state media enjoys monopoly of media space (5.4.10.1). Regardless of the nature of reportage, findings from this study pointed out

that media influenced teachers' morale in one way or the other. This had an effect on students' learning outcomes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

With regards to media influence on teachers' performance which could affect students' achievement, it is recommended that:

- Media should not take sides on reporting as biased reporting is counter-productive not only to education sector but also to aspects of national development. In order to address this recommendation, media could be apolitical and make an attempt to depict a true reflection of any situation without exaggerating.
- Media consumers should not depend only on one source of media if they are to get a balanced representation of a story. To address this recommendation, media consumers could consult various sources of media in order to have a balanced understanding of a situation/ story.

6.6.8 Incentive models for teachers and their influence on student achievement

Most participants in this study rallied behind group incentives as opposed to individual incentives. Various arguments have been levelled in favour of group incentives, namely that it brought a sense of team spirit and oneness (5.4.11). When teachers received group incentives, they supported, monitored, supervised and encouraged each other. This eased pressure on school administrators as they performed day-to-day supervisory roles. McQuerrey and Media (2012) assert that group incentives bring a sense of importance to a group which results in greater performance and inculcates friendship among employees. Group incentives also promote staff unity as this staff cooperate with each other to achieve organisational goals (5.4.11.1) However, some participants pointed out that group incentives promote existence of free riders, indicating that even lazy teachers would be

correspondingly rewarded together with hard-working teachers. By and large, students tend to benefit more in their learning experiences when they interact with a purposeful, committed and motivated staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On the issue of individual or group incentives, it is recommended that:

- Schools should consider giving out group incentives rather than individual incentives. Individual incentives bring a sense of competition among staff members as they seek to out-perform one another. To address this recommendation, school administrators might invite teachers to make their own recommendations regarding payment of incentives, so that these teachers could have a buy in of the whole process.
- Local school authorities should put in place mechanisms to check against free riders in order to improve teachers' teamwork and student achievement. In order to achieve this recommendation, strict measures such as not paying incentives to these free riders could be adopted in order to encourage them to work harder.

6.6.9 Teachers' working conditions: Influence on student achievement

Most governments in Third World countries have shifted responsibility of addressing plight of their employees to their citizens (3.0) Findings from this study from selected secondary schools in Makoni District indicated that Zimbabwean government should take sole responsibility of meeting working conditions of teachers as civil servants (5.4.13). Teachers also mentioned that it was difficult to work during 2009 to 2013 era, when school-based teacher incentive system was practised in Zimbabwe. During this teacher incentive period, parent/guardians demanded greater control of school activities usurping responsibility of government. Findings from this study also revealed that as government had failed to perform a duly role of rewarding teachers, parents/guardians then assumed this responsibility. Evidence from this study showed

that education officers suggested that bestowing responsibility of meeting teachers' working conditions on parents/guardians disempowered ministry officials from their supervisory roles. However, this responsibility of addressing teachers' working conditions had been a challenge to Zimbabwean government in general including Makoni District (5.4.13.1) because of economic comatose that gripped this country between 2003 and 2008. As a result of this economic meltdown, Zimbabwean government surrendered responsibility to address teachers' welfare to SDCs, irrespective of government being the employer. It meant that by devolving power to parents, to financially support teachers, government also lost its power to monitor and control school activities. Maposa (2013) asserts that Zimbabwe Civil Commission, a department of government, is obliged to remunerate all its civil servants.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In this light of addressing teachers' working conditions, it is recommended that:

- Clear lines of responsibility between government and key stakeholders (parent/guardians) should be set to avoid role-conflict. To address this recommendation, government could invite other stakeholders to complement its efforts towards improving teachers' working conditions and not just to hold on to its policy that no one is mandated to look after and improve civil servants' welfare.
- Government should redirect its resources towards improving teachers' welfare and lessen the burden on parents/guardians. To address this recommendation, government might prioritise channelling its resources towards supporting students' learning and commissions could be set to monitor accountability and proper use of these resources.

6.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study was limited to five selected secondary schools in Makoni District which comprises of 60 secondary schools. From secondary schools selected, data were

collected through focus-group discussions with 30 teachers while, two education officers and five school heads participated in interviews. Open-ended questionnaires were responded to by 10 SDC representatives. However, education officers could have influenced volunteering of data on matters regarding school-based incentive system. This is because as officials from Ministry of Education representatives, they might want to safeguard government's interests on issues relating to interpretation and implementation of policies in education. Although findings were situational to selected secondary schools under study, rich data were gathered on influence of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement.

Trustworthiness of research results might have been affected by:

- The nature of relationship between government and its employees within education sector. Volunteering data that appeared to be against the interest of government could have led to flawed responses from participants. However, the researcher had to establish mutual trust with participants and assured them that whatever they said was only meant to benefit this study. More so, there was not going to be any disclosure of names of participants engaged in this research.
- Adequate documentary evidence relating to how schools were performing and trends of teachers' attendance and absenteeism from their schools might have been concealed as school heads felt this was going to be reported to their superiors.
- Another limiting factor was that, according to Zimbabwean employment regulations, if a person merely brings a letter from a nurse/doctor for any recommendation to be off-duty, it is unconstitutional and lacks professionalism to verify whether that sick leave is genuine. As a result, it became difficult to ascertain whether teachers were taking sick leave as a result of low morale or for other reasons like, for instance, to pursue their studies within normal working periods.

6.8 CONCLUSION

The following conclusions are drawn from data analysis conducted. These conclusions are given as answers to research questions outlined in Chapter 1. This research maintains that to a large extent the study answered to these initial questions.

The main research question was:

What are the perceptions of key personnel in Zimbabwean education sector on the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement?

This research contended that various key personnel in Zimbabwean education sector had mixed perceptions towards the role of school-based teacher incentives on improving student achievement. Participants such as school heads, teachers and SDC members in schools where teacher incentive systems had been practised concurred that school-based teacher incentives were important in motivating teachers to work harder. This was evidenced by improved school-pass rates and more so teachers adopted positive behaviours that enhanced student achievement. Education officers, trade unions and Minister of Education during GNU government in Zimbabwe also shared this same sentiment on importance of teacher incentives in improving student achievement. Although participants from schools that did not practise teacher incentive system were initially opposed to this incentive system, they finally agreed that school-based incentives either financial or non-financial had a positive effect on student achievement as teachers could be motivated to improve student achievement. Zimbabwean government after GNU had a different perspective. It banned teacher incentive system arguing that school-based teacher incentive system was being abused in various forms such as paying teachers more than a stipulated 10% deducted from school levies and that teachers' incentives were unevenly distributed. Teachers in rural areas earned less than their counterparts in urban areas or boarding schools due to low levies paid by rural students. However, reasons for withdrawal of teacher incentive system were alleged to be political as it

was argued that the minister wanted to punish teachers for aligning to Zimbabwean opposition parties.

This research also answered the following sub-questions:

Firstly, regarding a sub-question that focuses on principles behind inclusion of school-based teacher incentives in Zimbabwean education system, this research maintains that school-based teacher incentives were introduced as a stop-gap measures to supplement teachers' salaries after 2003 to 2008 economic collapse in Zimbabwe. Teachers could hardly survive from low salaries they were getting and this forced them to abandon the teaching profession. Consequently, when teachers left the profession this had a negative impact on students' learning leading to students' under-achievement. Thus, this research question was answered.

The other sub-question explored how student achievement is affected by creating incentives for teachers. This sub-question was also answered. Data collected indicated teacher incentives had a motivational effect on teachers, stimulating both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation among teachers. When teacher morale is high, it had been argued that they could work harder and also desisted from adopting negative behaviours that were detrimental to student achievement.

Another sub-question that was answered included whether teachers who were paid school-based teacher incentives also accommodate teaching of other co-curricular activities. Data collected indicated that if school-based teacher incentives are not properly managed, teachers could concentrate more on teaching curriculum subjects which were examinable by Zimbabwe School Examination Council (ZIMSEC) at the expense of co-curricular activities. This was much against an argument that students are differently gifted. Some students are good academically while others are good in co-curricular activities (Mandoga & Chakandinakira, 2014).

On perception of community members towards school-based teacher incentives scheme, the researcher also answered this sub-question. Data collected in this

research indicated community members also had varied perceptions on teacher incentive system. However, most community members affirmed that as they could desire to see their children succeed in school and community members might rather pay teachers extra-financial incentives in order to motivate these teachers. The argument was that when teachers are motivated, they could enhance student achievement as these teachers hold keys to the success of their students. However, other community members who could not afford to pay teacher incentives, it might be because of these members' economy situation, opposed incentive system arguing it was a responsibility of Zimbabwean government to look after the welfare of its own employees.

The last sub-question discussed how school based teacher incentives affect teachers' motivation at work thereby impacting on student achievement. This sub-question had been answered. This research indicated that school-based teacher incentives are important in respect of how students learn and on improving student achievement. However, teachers themselves as recipients of incentives should be consulted in the designing stage of incentive programmes so that they might have a buy in of the whole process. When teachers could support an incentive system, it had been argued that they might be motivated to enhance student achievement. Usually there is a tendency by those with economic or political muscle to impose awarding models onto teachers. If teachers fail to have a buy-in, teacher incentive system then may fail to achieve its intended objective of motivating teachers to work harder and thereby improve students' achievements.

6.9 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

The issue of the role of school-based teacher incentives on student achievement is complex. A multiplicity of factors relate to how a teacher might be motivated through incentives either direct or indirect and subsequently influence students' learning outcomes. Thus, this subject requires detailed research. The following areas are suggested for further research:

- Ways to improve involvement of governments in Third World governments to support the education system in their countries.
- Influence of politics or the nature of government and its impact on students' learning experiences.
- Level of financial income of parents/guardians on previously white owned farms and its impact on students' learning outcomes.
- School Development Committee and teacher relationship, its influence on students' achievements.
- Unregulated private tuition versus students' security and welfare.

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Appendix 1: Ethical Clearance Certificate



Research Ethics Clearance Certificate

This is to certify that the application for ethical clearance submitted by

J Chakandinakira [53321545]

for a D Ed study entitled

**The role of school based teacher incentives to improve student achievement:
Experiences from selected schools in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe**

has met the ethical requirements as specified by the University of South Africa
College of Education Research Ethics Committee. This certificate is valid for two
years from the date of issue.


Prof VI McKay
Acting Executive Dean : CEDU


Dr M Claassens
CEDU REC (Chairperson)
mcdtc@netactive.co.za

Reference number: 2014 OCTOBER /53321545/MC

22 OCTOBER 2014

Appendix 2: Questionnaire for School Development Committee (SDCs)

My name is Joseph Chakandinakira, a Doctoral student with the University of South Africa (UNISA). My student number: 53321545. Email address ichakandinakira@gmail.com Cell. No. +263 772 246 904. I am currently working on my thesis. The title for my thesis is: **The role of school-based teacher incentives to improve student achievement: Experiences from selected secondary schools in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe.**

The aim of this study is to explore whether teacher motivation through incentives is vital in improving student achievement. This questionnaire will be completed anonymously (do not write your name on it) and it will take approximately 50 minutes of your time.

Your responses and views are important as they form the basis for this study. I kindly request you to give your honest opinions.

Your support is greatly appreciated.

NB Show by ticking the appropriate box where necessary.

SECTION A: PERSONAL PROFILE

1. Gender

FEMALE
MALE

2 Which category do you represent?

School Development Committee member	School head	School Teacher
--	-------------	----------------

SECTION B

3 In your opinion what led to the introduction of teacher incentives (financial) in Zimbabwe? Explain your response.

.....
.....

4 Should financial incentives in be incorporated in the education system as a way of supplementing teachers' salary? Elaborate more on your response.

.....
.....

5 Do you think that teachers are motivated by receiving incentives? Give more on your response.

.....
.....

6 Is intrinsic or extrinsic motivation vital in driving teachers to work? Can you say more on your response?

.....
.....

7 Have you noted any behavioural changes among teachers with or without incentives? Explain your response and highlight the nature of the behavioural changes, if any.

.....
.....

8 What challenges do you think may arise in terms of the learning of students as a result of introduction of incentives?

.....
.....

9 What has been the response of the following sectors to the financial/non-financial incentive scheme?

- (a) teachers
- (b) parents
- (c) government

10 In your view do you think that a motivated teacher can improve student achievement? Explain your answer.

.....
.....

11 Are teachers affected in their execution of duties by the negative publicity they receive from media? Explain your response.

.....
.....

12 In your view do you recommend individual or group based incentive model? Elaborate why recommendation.

.....
.....

13 Should teacher incentives be scrapped off from the education system? Explain your answer

.....
.....

14 Who should take the responsibility of teachers' working conditions?

.....
.....

15 What do you think should be ultimate goal for the optimum learning of a child?

.....
.....

16 Has pass rate in schools been affected by teacher incentives? Explain your response.

.....
.....

17 Do you recommend that teachers should receive incentives (either financial/non- financial? Justify your response

.....
.....

END THANK YOU

Supervisor Prof. Petronella Van Niekerk

Contact details: +27 12 6673491

Cell: (0) 795601015

Fax: 0866417098

Email: vniekmp@unisa.ac.za

Appendix 3 Request for permission to Provincial Education Officer

5285 Area 3
Dangamvura
Mutare
2 December 2014

(Cell. +263 772 246 904)
email address: jchakandinakira@gmail.com

The Provincial Education Officer
Manicaland Region
P.O.Box 146
Mutare

Dear Sir/Madam

REQUEST FOR COLLECTING RESEARCH DATA IN SCHOOLS IN MAKONI DISTRICT


I am presently registered with the University of South Africa (UNISA) for D.Ed studies in Educational Foundations. My thesis is entitled: **The role of school based teacher incentives to improve student achievement: Experiences from selected schools in Manicaland Province.**

The aim of this letter is to ask you to please grant me the permission to conduct an empirical research in your schools in Makoni District.

I intend to distribute questionnaires to School Development committee representatives, and conduct focus group discussions with teachers from the schools as from the 19 January 2014. I will also conduct some interviews with School heads and Education Officers working in the district and hope to terminate the study when a point of saturation is reached. I hope it will not be more than three months. All schools and individuals involved in this study will remain anonymous.

Hopefully the findings of this study will help to inform those involved in the education system to revisit the issue of teacher incentives and its role on student achievement. The issue of teacher incentives has received mixed reactions with some advocating for the inception of incentives to cushion teachers' salary while others want incentives to be scrapped from the system.


Yours faithfully



Joseph Chakandinakira

Supervisor: Prof Petronella Van Niekerk

Contact details: Tel: +27 +12 6673491
cell: (0) 795601015
Fax: 0866417098
Email: vniekmp@unisa.ac.za



Appendix 4 Permission from Provincial Education Director

Ref : C/377/1

All communications should be addressed to
 "The Provincial Education Director Manicaland"
 Telephone: 64216, 64279, 64280
 Telegraphic address: "EDUCATION"
 Fax: 60356
 http://www.moesc.gov.zw



Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education
 Manicaland Provincial Office
 Cabs Building, Cnr H. Chitepo &
 R. Mugabe Road
 P.O Box 146
 Mutare
 Zimbabwe

2/12/14

THE DED MANICALAND

Re : REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH IN
 PRIMARY/SECONDARY : NAME : JOSPH CHIKANBWAHURA
 COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY : UNISA

The above matter refers.

Please be advised that the Provincial Education Director has granted you permission to carry out research in Primary/ Secondary schools on THE ROLE OF SCHOOL BASED TEACHER INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE STUDENTS ACHIEVEMENT: EXPERIENCES FROM SELECTED SCHOOLS IN MANICALAND PROVINCE.

J. CHIKANBWAHURA is advised to liaise with the District Office and Heads of targeted schools before embarking on the research.


 K. Mberera C.
 PROVINCIAL EDUCATION DIRECTOR MANICALAND

Disciplinary Forms/cnr

Recommended

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
 MAKONI DISTRICT OFFICE
 DISTRICT EDUCATION OFFICER
 04 DEC 2014
 P.O. BOX 232, MUTAPES
 ZIMBABWE

Appendix 5: Interview guide for Education Officers and School heads

The researcher is a D.Ed student with the University of South Africa (UNISA) who is carrying out a research on: **The role of school-based teacher incentives to improve student achievement.** The area of study is Makoni District. You are kindly requested to respond to the following questions. The information that you give shall be kept in strict confidence and shall not be used for any other purpose besides this research, therefore your honest and fair response to questions is kindly requested for

1. May you explain what led to the emergence of school-based incentives?
2. Has the issue of rewarding teachers been a new phenomenon in the education system? If no what are the similarities or differences between the old and the new system?
3. In your opinion do you think that teachers should be incentivised?
4. What is your view regarding the idea that teachers are motivated to work by receiving incentives?
5. During your supervision exercises, have you noted any behavioural changes among teachers with or without incentives?
6. What challenge may come into play in terms of the learning of students as a result of introduction of incentives?
7. What has been the response of the following sectors to the incentive scheme?
 - (a) Teachers
 - (b) Parents
 - (c) Government
8. In your view can a motivated teacher improve student achievement?
9. Are teachers affected by the negative publicity from the state led media?
10. In your view do you recommend individual or group based incentive model?
11. Are there any advantages or disadvantages of the model you have supported?
12. Should incentives be scrapped or incentives by the government?
13. Who should take the responsibility of looking after the working conditions of teachers?

14. In view what do you think should be ultimate goal for the optimum learning of child?
15. Has pass rate in schools been affected by teacher incentives?
16. In your assessment do you recommend that teachers should receive incentives?

Appendix 6: Focus group discussions guide for teachers

The researcher is a D.Ed student with the University of South Africa (UNISA) who is carrying out a research on: **The role of school-based teacher incentives to improve student achievement.** The area of study is Makoni District. You are kindly requested to respond to the following questions. The information that you give shall be kept in strict confidence and shall not be used for any other purpose besides this research, therefore your honest and fair response to questions is kindly requested for. NB. May we also agree on some norms that will guide how we are going to work as a group?

1. May you explain what led to the emergence of school-based incentives?
2. Has the issue of rewarding teachers been a new phenomenon in the education system? If not what are the similarities or differences between the old and the new system?
3. In your opinion do you think that teachers should be incentivised?
4. What is your view regarding the idea that teachers are motivated to work by receiving incentives?
5. Have you noted any behavioural changes among teachers with or without incentives?
6. What challenge may arise in terms of the learning of students as a result of introduction of teacher incentives?
7. What has been the response of the following sectors to the teacher incentive scheme?
 - (a) Teachers
 - (b) Parents
 - (c) Government
 - (d) School Development Committee
8. In your view can a motivated teacher improve student achievement?
9. Are teachers affected by the negative publicity from the state led media?
10. In your view do you recommend individual or group based incentive model?
11. Are there an advantages or disadvantages of the model you have supported?

12. Should incentives be scrapped off by the government?
13. Who should take the responsibility of looking after teachers' working conditions?
14. In your view what do you think should be ultimate goal for the optimum learning of child?
15. Has pass rate in schools been affected by teacher incentives?
16. In your assessment do you recommend that teachers should receive incentives?

THANK YOU for sparing your time during this discussion.

Appendix 7: Consent form

Dear Participant (s)

My name is Joseph Chakandinakira (Student Number- 53321545) and I am currently studying for my Doctoral studies in Education with the University of South Africa (UNISA). I hereby request your cooperation during the interview session that I will carry out with you in relation to: **The role of school-based teacher incentives to improve student achievement from selected secondary schools in Manicaland Province.** Your responses will be used only for the purpose of this study and will help inform those in the education sector on effectiveness of teacher motivation of student achievement.

The information will be held in strict confidence and please be advised that participation is voluntary. Although you can discontinue anytime if you can choose not to participate, the researcher would encourage you to continue up-to the end of the data collection period so that adequate information is collected. The researcher would come back to the district after the research has been approved to give feedback on the findings.

Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. Thank you.

Yours Joseph Chakandinakira

(Cell. +263 772 246 904)

Signature of Participants

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Date