TRANSFORMATION IN THE MILITARY POLICE AGENCY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

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PREFACE

DECLARATION

I, Khanyisile Litchfield Tshabalala, hereby declare that the thesis report, 'Transformation in the Military Police Agency of the South African National Defence Force' is my own original work and that each significant contribution to, and quotation from other sources and the work, or works of other people in this dissertation have been accurately acknowledged and referenced. I also declare that this document has not (as yet) been utilized at my agency to obtain professional promotion, transfer, or salary raise.

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SUMMARY

The goal of this research was to describe the nature, occurrence and extent to which integration preceded normative and institutional transformation in the SANDF and therefore in its Military Police, thereby demonstrating how in its aftermath, integration has become a recipe for disaster, casting a spell on further transformation within the military. The research also aimed at bringing the reader face-to-face with the daily struggles of Africans in the SANDF, by focusing on one of the smallest divisions of the military, the Military Police Agency (MPA).

The research project was limited to all reported interviews and questionnaire responses of eighty five participants of the Southern Military Police Region (S MPR), excluding the S MPR HQ as well as the MPA HQ. A total of eighty five respondents out of a total strength of 172 S MPR composition, took part in the sample. Seventy nine participated in the questionnaire, fifty one in the interview and a total of forty five participated in both. Interviews were used as follow-up sessions to respondents' questionnaire answers. While the questionnaire was structured, the interview was semi-structured, allowing members to comment, object, affirm or question the process of transformation both in the SANDF and in the MPA. In keeping with the qualitative research method, the semi-structured interview enabled the mapping of categories, trends and patterns in the responses.

It was found that MK and APLA cadres who integrated into the ex-Naval MPs surpassed their counterparts in the ex-Army MPs, by far. The two groups are incomparable, in rank level, experience, training, attitude and knowledge of the organisation.

It was further discovered that most practices that had taken place before 1999 at W CSC and still continued within the MPA, negate SANDF policy and are

criminal. Prejudice, racism, obscene language and gender insensitivity were rife, forming part of institutional culture.

It is recommended that Weitzer's proposed solution for the transformation of coercive institutions be considered. It is a thoroughgoing transformation of the security apparatus through a legal framework because civil control is not enough to guarantee the pre-eminence of the democratic forces.

Key terms used

Transformation
Integration
Amalgamation
Military Police Agency (MPA)
Ex-uMkhonto weSizwe (MK)
Ex-Azanian People Liberation Army (APLA)
Ex-Non-Statutory Forces (Ex-NSF)
Ex-South African Defence Force (Ex-SADF)

OPSOMMING

Die doel van die navorsing was om die aard, gebeurtenis en wydte te beskryf wat die integrasie proses, tot die normale en institutionele transformasie in die SANW gehad het en daardeur ook in die SA Militere Polisie Agentskap (MPA). Daar is ook gewys op hoe integrasie 'n resep vir 'n ramp geword het, wat 'n resep vir onheil op verdere transformasie plaas. Die navorsing beoog ook om die leser van aangesig tot aangesig met die daaglikse probleme van swart lede in die SANW te bring, deur te fokus op een van die kleinste divisies van die SANW, die Militere Polisie Agentskap.

The navorsing projek was beperk tot gerapporteerde onderhoude en reaksie op vraelyste van vyf en tagtig (85) deelnemers van die Suidelike Militere Polisie Area (S MPA), uitgesluit die S MPA HK en die MPA HK. 'n Totaal van vyf en tagtig deelnemers uit 'n totale sterkte van een hondrerd twee en sewentig (172) S MPA lede, het deelgeneem in die steekproef. Nege en sewentig het vraelyste voltooi, met een en vyftig was onderhoude gevoer en 'n getal van vyf en veertig het aan albei deelgeneem. Onderhoude was gebruik as opvolg sessies tot deelnemers se antwoorde op vraelyste. Die vraelys was gestruktureerd, die onderhoude was semi-gestrukureerd, aangesien daar toegelaat was dat deelnemers kommentaar kon lewer, om beswaar aan te teken, om antwoorde te beklemtoon en om vrae te stel tov die transformasie proses in beide die SANW en in die MPA. Om tred te hou met die kwalitatiewe navorsingsmetode, die semi-gestruktuurde navorsing is kategorieë, neigings en patrone in die antwoorde uitgelig.

Daar is gevind dat MK en APLA lede wie geintegreer het in die voormalige Vloot MP's hulle ewekniee van die voormalige Leer MP's' tot 'n groot mate verbygesteek het. Die twee groepe is nie vergelykbaar nie, in rangvlakke, ondervinding, opleiding, houding en kennis van die organisasie nie.

Daar was ook vasgestel dat meeste praktyke wat plaasgevind het in 1999 by die W CSC en nog steeds voortgesit word in die MPA, die SANW beleide weerspreek en krimineel is. Vooroordeel, rassisme, liederlike taal en geslags ongevoeligheid was algemeen, en was deel van die organisasie se kultuur.

Dit is aanbeveel dat Weitzer se voorgestelde oplossing vir die transformasie van dwang organisasie in ag geneem word. Dit is 'n deeglike en volledige transformasie van die sekuriteits apparaat deur wetgewing omdat siviele kontrole nie genoeg is om die voornemenheid van demokratiese magte te waarborg nie.

Sleutelterme

Transformasie

Integrasie

Amalgamering

Militêre Polisie Agenskap (MPA)

Voormalige uMkhonto weSizwe (MK)

Voormalige Azanian People Liberation Army (APLA)

Voormalige Nie-Statutêre Magte (Ex-NSF)

Voormalige Suid Afrikaanse Weermag (Ex-SADF)

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATION

Denzin and Lincoln (Rudestam & Newton 2000:36) stated the following in 1998: "The distinction between quantitative and qualitative research can be misleading. Qualitative researchers do not possess a distinct set of methods that are all their own. They can make use of interviews, hermeneutic inquiry, survey research, participant observation, even statistics. Over time, different research traditions have evolved that bring to bear particular value-laden perspectives by which to investigate particular topics".

1.1   Introduction

In May 1996 Parliament ratified the White Paper on Defence (WPD) 1996. The new WPD 1996 legislation propagates defence in a democracy as its main theme (Uys 1997:58). The legislation also establishes the framework for the new Department of Defence and both, incorporates civilian control of the military and a new security approach for the country. Firstly, it marks a shift from the security of the state to a people-centered security approach (Shelton & Alden 1998:345). The symbolism of this approach lies in its complete break with the previous Defence policies, especially those of the Botha administration, which emphasised state security over citizen vulnerability. Secondly, by focusing on the welfare of an individual, the new Defence policy promotes national reconciliation through the principles of equity, non-racialism, non-sexism, and religious tolerance. This is another historical achievement for the current nation-building effort – in the past, Defence policies were based on racial segregation as well as on white supremacy. Thirdly, the WPD 1996 incorporates socio-economic factors into security and Defence -- advocating that the State cannot be stable while the individual is poor, and likewise, the State cannot be secured while the region is unstable.

The WPD of 1996 makes provision for the Defence Review (DR) 1998, which elaborates on the WPD's policy framework "… through comprehensive long-range planning on such matters as posture doctrine, force design, force levels, logistical support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding" (SANDF 1998: 1). As was its purpose, the DR 1998 elaborated in detail on, the issues raised in the WPD 1996.

In the initial stages of existence of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the majority of the ex-Non Statutory Force (ex-NSF) members were undergoing orientation and bridging training, while those in other units were learning the system, and were allowed to participate in either the formulation or execution of the policy. This also applied to the members of the ex-Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) forces. This allowed ex-SADF freedom of action and the opportunity to maintain the Defence status quo as it allowed within the changing political situation in the country, thus resulting in the slow start of integration and transformation in general. It was not until 1998 that the first visible successions took place: NSF officers replaced the Chiefs of Defence, Army and Intelligence, but top and middle management remained largely ex-South African Defence Force (ex-SADF) members.

These changes had a profound impact on those components of the former military forces that were tasked with curbing, fighting, and preventing crime in the armed forces of South Africa -- the military police. The focus of this research relates to the impact these changes had on the staff working in those components, particularly those working in sampled units.

In the rest of this chapter, the research focuses on the goal, rationale, approach, design and sampling to address the problem. Furthermore, the structuring of the interviews, the setting of the interviews and the biographical data of the participants will also be explained. Finally, ethical issues relating to this research and their limitations will be highlighted.

1.2   Research Goal

The goal of this research is {SOURCE}. It remains a question whether the SANDF top and middle management possess sufficient commitment to the efficient and effective execution of transformation policies aimed at institutional change, because structural transformation has proceeded without any major uproar.   The term "structural transformation" relates to routine adjustments such as the name changes, common musketry and ceremonial procedures, symbolism, and so forth {SOURCE}.   To this end, this research has been conducted with the fundamental aim of illuminating the reasons why structural transformation proceeded at a faster pace than the organisational or institutional transformation in the SANDF and in its Military Police. In order to do this, it has been necessary to forge a link with specific apartheid military processes, which continue to be the source of anti-transformation today. The research thus revolves around the following themes:

- The history of the military during apartheid, with a special focus on its institutional culture as shaped by the politics of race more generally, and the politics of state repression and violence more specifically.

- Efforts towards reform of the military as undertaken in the context of political transition.

- The form, content and impact of transformation in the MPA as viewed through policy and qualitative analysis.

- Consideration of the outstanding challenges for restructuring in the new MPA in pursuit of the objectives entailed in key policy frameworks.

1.3   Rationale for the Research

This study is motivated by the assumption that it was not a change of heart, but rather outside conditions which forced the National Party Government to change. To this extent, throughout President de Klerk's transitional state, that is, from 1989 to 1994, the ex-SADF subtly continued to be a tool for political power. The old racist philosophy

about the subservice of both ex-uMkhonto weSizwe (ex-MK) and ex-Azanian People's Liberation Army (ex-APLA) continued unabated. The fact that MK and the SADF could never be equated became evident in statements made by the Minister of Defence at the time, Magnus Malan: "The difference between MK and SADF is not just the level of training. The SADF creates technology, MK simply is a user. We are not on the road to using the army to keep unemployment off the streets" (Nathan 1997:3). The ex-SADF counter-insurgency activities and philosophy did not abate; perhaps they simply became even more secretive. This was revealed in the Inkatha-gate scandal during the multi-party talks, where state funding for Inkatha's Kwa-Zulu Police and Self Protection Units was uncovered. The Kwa-Zulu Police and Self Protection Units' third force activities were aimed at supporters of the ANC, to frighten voters from the polls, and lower turn-out as much as possible. The linking of the ex-SADF and the South African Police to third force operations was an even more shocking phenomenon, and it proved the continued use of the ex-SADF in an unconstitutional manner (SABC 1991).

The manner in which the eight forces were integrated to form the SANDF gave the ex-SADF preference over the forces because its infrastructure was adopted. It further created the misconception that the ex-SADF was integrating all the other forces, which complicated things more because the superiority of the ex-SADF remained unquestioned. This was confirmed by the opening clause of the Joint Military Co-ordination Council Agreements, which states that: "Recognising the military experience of the SADF, they shall remain the chief executor of the integration process" (JMCC Agreements in TEC Documents 1994:1). Hence the ex-SADF members became masters of the new system, which was akin to being the masters over all the other forces. This gave them advantage, while psychologically reinforcing the superior race philosophy. In addition, this resulted in the fragmentation of the term "transformation"; it assumed a subjective definition constructed through the frame of reference of one's former force. For example, for the ex-SADF members whose force numbers continued after 1994, it meant being suddenly joined by African faces in their daily routine; yet for ex-Non Statutory Force members, with force numbers starting only 1994, it meant a new beginning.

Furthermore, given the superiority of the ex-SADF, especially the Army, which was the dominant partner in the formation of the Military Police Agency (MPA); the transformation of the Agency could be viewed as a myth or an unaccomplished dream. The rationale for this research is thus an attempt to answer the following questions: Is the institutional transformation in the MPA feasible? Is it occurring? Are there problems encountered and, if so, what are they? What are the challenges? And finally: What is the way forward?

Lastly, the fact that the military police works in the field of crime prevention, served as a motivation to conduct this research in the discipline of Criminology in order to register the impact of the military changes since 1994 on these important crime prevention units in the military.

1.4   Research Approach

The first dilemma in formulating the research problem is the research standpoint or approach, which is compounded by the on-going debate on the actual clarification of qualitative and quantitative research angles. Some writers regard the two angles as competitive ways of studying social reality, while Bryman, amongst others, sees it as "… denotations of different ways of conducting social investigations … appropriate to different kinds of research and even as capable of being integrated" (Bryman 1988:5). Therefore, Bryman suggests two approaches to these angles of research: one being that they are incompatible, while the other states that they are mutually compatible and synthetic because the differences are merely technical. In the latter instance it is the researcher who elects which angle will suite the research.   Denzin and Lincoln (Rudestam & Newton 2000:36) are fully in agreement:

> The distinction between quantitative and qualitative research can be misleading. Qualitative researchers do not possess a distinct set of methods that are all their own. They can make use of interviews, hermeneutic inquiry, survey research, participant observation, even statistics. Over time, different research traditions have evolved that bring

to bear particular value-laden perspectives by which to investigate particular topics….

Before the researcher elects the angle for this study, it is important to point out the differences between the two standpoints, albeit that these differences are technical. The first point is that, as compared to quantitative research, qualitative research tends to be relatively unstructured. However this freedom of manoeuvre does not obliterate the obligation on the part of the researcher to embark on proper systematic planning, that is "… soliciting participants, selecting and preparing research materials and data collection tools, and formulating research procedures" (Rudestam & Newton 2000:90).

The researcher has chosen to employ the qualitative approach for this dissertation. This choice is based on the subjectivity and consequent complexity of the research question, that is: If change was imposed on the National Party Government, which continued to use the ex-SADF as a tool of subversion during the transitional period, would the ex-SADF be ready to embrace transformation later on? Only the qualitative method would allow for the construction and de-construction of the thought processes of the participants and thus enable the researcher finally to map the problem as perceived by the participants. Firstly, this was achieved through a social survey of transformation in the MPA, and counter-proven through participant observation and unstructured, in-depth interviewing (Bryman 1988:1). Only through person-to-person in-depth interviews and participant observation would the underlying truthful perceptions about transformation of the MPA surface. Furthermore, qualitative research would allow for the emphasis on processes and meanings, in this instance transformational processes and the meaning thereof to the various role players in the SANDF – especially for members of the MPA (Rudestam & Newton 2000:36).

Secondly, qualitative research conducts a natural inquiry that seeks to understand phenomena in their natural environment, thus making it a discovery-orientated approach (Rudestam & Newton 2000:36). This approach augured well for the research goal, that is, to uncover why structural transformation preceded institutional transformation in the MPA, and to answer the following questions: Is the institutional transformation in the MPA feasible? Is it occurring? Are there problems encountered

and if so, what are they? What are the challenges? And finally: What is the way forward?

Thirdly, Lincoln and Guba (1985:90) assign an important role to assumptions in a qualitative study. This is the third reason why it was decided to utilise the qualitative research approach for this study, because the study is based on several assumptions. The first assumption is that change was imposed on apartheid South Africa by external forces beyond the National Party's control, hence the continued manipulation of the ex-SADF, especially the Army, as a tool of power and subversion during the transitional period. The second assumption is that the inheritance of the ex-SADF superstructure by the SANDF was in itself a recipe for disaster with regard to the institutional transformation of the new Defence Force. From these two assumptions arise the third assumption, that the MPA is one of the most difficult structures to transform in the current Defence Force, given the domination of ex-Army MPs in management positions in the MPA.

Fourthly, the qualitative approach was chosen for its inductive nature, which Patton (1990:37) upholds as being in keeping with the qualitative method: "Research begins with specific observations and moves toward the development of general patterns that emerge from the cases under study". This approach allows for a holistic view of the research topic.

1.5   Determining the Research Focus

The researcher initially set out to study the alleged subjective prosecution of Africans in the SANDF since 1994, especially ex-Non Statutory Force members. The intention was to determine whether the Military Criminal Justice System was being consciously manipulated to systematically break the will of Africans, or to systematically work them out of the system. However, after preliminary consultation it became apparent that a legal background would be necessary to engage the Military Criminal Justice System in a study of this nature.

Hereafter the research problem was refined into a more sociological framework, although it was still unclear. The requirement to place it within the field of Criminology directed the focus of the research to the Military Police. Coincidentally, the MPA was being instituted at the time, and the most visible change in the organisation was its structure, as all MP personnel moved from the different arms of the service into one structure. Another visible development was the change in emphasis from crime control to crime prevention. Therefore the first focus of the research problem was on crime prevention, using it as a criterion to assess MPA transformation into a professional service.

However, professionalism in the SANDF includes transformational democratisation, representivity and equity, as contained in the WPD 1996, where it is stated: "The theme of this White Paper is the formulation of new Defence policy and the transformation of the Department of Defence" (SANDF 1996:8). To this end, one of the 16 principles of the WPD 1996 is that the "SANDF shall develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture as required by the Constitution; and the composition of the SANDF shall broadly reflect the composition of SA. To this end, affirmative action and equal opportunity programs will be introduced" (SANDF 1996:8). This meant that the study could not separate military professionalism in the MPA from transformation towards representivity, better service delivery and equity. Therefore, once data was gathered, research problem was refined to its final form of integration, amalgamation and transformation of the MPA.

1.6   Research Design

In view of the study being based on an assumption that suggests racial undertones, the researcher set out to conduct and produce an unbiased, scientific (factual) and objective research project. The on-going struggle between black and white in the SANDF resulted in the fear that findings would be discredited by white SANDF members on account of them being subjective or biased. This fear became more real in the context of the dominant western and the marginalised African discourses. Being a female from the African marginalised discourse, the pressure to produce an outstanding study prevailed. It became apparent from the in-house information on

transformation to which the researcher became privy, information which indicated rampant suffering on the part of the black personnel, that acceptance or rejection of these findings would take place via racial partisan interpretations. Therefore, the researcher's direct involvement with the subject matter, coupled with her NSF status and her position as a senior officer, resulted in almost obsessive concerns with plausibility and credibility. Boulton and Hammersley (1993:7) define both terms as: "The extent to which a claim seems likely to be true given its relationship to what we and others currently take to be knowledge that is beyond reasonable doubt. …whether the claim is of a kind that, given what we know about how the research was carried out, we can judge it very likely to be true".

Therefore, if the concept of research design is understood in its broadest terms to mean the aim (end product), usefulness (point of departure), and intended plan (logic of research) of the study within practical and realistic constraints, whatever they are, then the researcher's SANDF membership inhibited the initial blueprint for the study (Mouton 2001:56). The result was a very large research sample aimed at a 100 percent plausibility and credibility. Three of the four MPA regions were sampled, aiming at a population sample group of about 75 percent per region. After the initial consultation with the research supervisor, it became apparent that the sample was too big for the scope of the study, therefore further sampling occurred.

1.7   Sampling

Purposive sampling was utilised to curtail the initial population sample. With reference to numbers 4--7 in Rudestam and Newton's (2000:92) 10-point design given above, the naturalistic approach employs a purposive sampling method in order to increase the scope or range of data as well as to uncover the full array of multiple realities. This was the case for the population sampled for the study, namely, the Southern Military Police Region (S MPR). Random sampling could have either omitted some former force, race or gender elements within the sample, resulting in a skewed representation of personnel and a biased opinion survey. For this reason, the three main Area Provost stations were selected, not their smaller satellite stations because that could have limited the number of participants. The three main Area Provost stations are the

Wynberg Client Service Centre (W CSC), Simon's Town Client Service Centre (ST CSC) and the Southern Military Correctional Facility (SMCF). Furthermore the 85 participants (out of a total of 142, i.e. 59,85%) who were drawn into the study were selected through non-probability surveys; that is, incidental, purposive, quota and snowball samples were all combined (Welman & Kruger 2001:46) to eliminate bias as far as possible. Data was collected through structured questionnaires as well as individual semi-structured interviews.

Meetings were held with the Southern Military Police Region HQ members - in line with what Welman and Kruger (2001:47) actually refers to as selection, rather than (purposeful) sampling. They argue that this is what the researcher does in qualitative research and that, 'sampling' might give the connotation of random or probabilistic methods. In this case the selection was based on the representivity of the sample, that is, both the units and their HQ had to be studied so as to balance opinions.

Secondly, through the phenomenological approach of idiographic sampling, a case study was conducted amongst the 85 respondents. The choice was based on the participants' experiences of the phenomenon under investigation, that is transformation within the Military Police Agency (MPA). Members were all ex-Non Statutory Force and ex-Naval MPs who joined the SANDF in 1994; this means that they lived through both the naval and MPA transformation. The aim of the case study was to understand the full complexity of their experiences, so as to compare and contrast their progression and development in the Naval Military Police with that of their counterparts who integrated into the ex-Army Military Police. This would enable the researcher to determine whether implementation of transformation policies in the SANDF was experienced or perceived by the respondents as either planned or haphazard process.

1.8   The Interviews

The aim of this section is to familiarise the reader to the views of the people involve in the transformation of the MPA through the SANDF. They comprise of serving MPA personnel in its various former force affiliations, race, gender and military status (rank).

The semi-structured interview data gathering technique was chosen for the S MPR, which is the region selected for intensive research amongst the four MPA regions. The aim of the semi-structured interview was to allow for a spontaneous interaction between the interviewer and each research participant (Welman & Kruger 2001:188), as well as to clarify certain issues arising from the structured questionnaire. These interviews followed the structured written questionnaire, a process in which the participant was left on his own by the researcher. Before the participants could begin with the questionnaire, the researcher pointed out that it was mandatory to participate in the follow-up interview process, and that the two processes were mutually inclusive. Although the vitality of the interview was not pointed out to the participants, it was clear that the researcher had been influenced by Rudestam and Newton (2001:36):

- Words (not figures) symbolised the power of this study because it is investigating subject matter that has to do with people's feelings, experiences and opinions of a process, in this case transformation.

- As opposed to a structured interview, a semi-structured interview would allow for the generation of all the categories prevailing in the different segments of the MPA; in relation to understanding the complex variety of experiences around the issue and the process of transformation.

- Without the semi-structured interview process, the researcher runs the risk of streamlining categories to only those experiences relevant to her experiences and background, in view of the fact that she also is a member of the SANDF.

This interview also helped in facilitating the involvement of the researcher in the topic under discussion, because she forms part of the same military organisation as the participants, and would therefore have pre-conceived notions on the subject under investigation. This is consistent with the qualitative approach because, according to Welman and Kruger (2001:36) "…not only do semi-structured interviews differ from structured interviews in that they are not bound to a previously compiled list of questions, the interviewer also departs from his or her role as detached interviewer and interacts with the individual with whom the interview is conducted". It is through

such interaction that the researcher gained qualitative information about transformation in the MPA, by "…seeking clarification and elaboration on the answers given to the initial questionnaire questions" (May 1997:111).

To this end, it was important to quantify the measuring variables, for example satisfactory or unsatisfactory, negative or positive, and so forth, and; hence the coded answers to open-ended questions.

Another advantage of the semi-structured interview is that immediate clarification is possible when misunderstandings occur regarding questions and answers (Hagan 1982:82), especially the answers in the questionnaire. The researcher sat face-to-face with the respondent and there was flexibility in the choice of follow-up questions asked. This means the order of the interview questions altered the details in the questionnaire. The order also varied due to the different answers resulting from different experiences among the respondents.

Such semi-structured interviews do however, run the risk of respondent control instead of researcher control, because they yield rich insights into people's experiences, aspirations and attitudes, and the respondents might wish to expand on these (May 1997:109). Despite the caution by Welman and Kruger (2001:188) that "… the interviewer is supposed to remain in control of the interview situation by, for example, encouraging the individual to continue undaunted if he or she is getting bogged down and kindly yet firmly revert to the theme if he or she is straying from it", it was easier said than done in this research. Some of the participants cried while describing their experiences and the conditions within their perceived lack of transformation. Some literally wept while others slumped into clear depressive states. It would have been too insensitive to admonish them, firmly, yet kindly, to straighten up and continue with the interview. The researcher had to bear with them. Owing to this, semi-structured interviews can take a long time, and that is exactly what happened in this research.

As a result, the researcher spent more time in the various MPA Client Service Centres than initially planned. This was problematic, because participants had to stay behind after their normal long working shift. It also meant that the researcher worked late into the night to include all members who had participated in the questionnaire process.

Apart from the above mentioned inconveniences, the psychological stress that followed was seen as part of the process.

1.9   Classifying Respondents

A total of 85 respondents was studied out of a total strength of 172 SMPR composition. Of the 85 respondents, 79 participated in the questionnaire, 51 in the interview, and a total of 45 participated in both questionnaire and interview. Only 40 participated in either the interview or the questionnaire. The empirical findings detailed in Chapters 6 and 7 are based on the interviews, while the subsequent analysis in Chapter 8 is a consolidation of the questionnaire. The classification codes for all respondents are contained in a section that follows the table of contents. However, the internal functional differentiation of members will not be disclosed, as this might narrow the identification code and reveal the identity of the respondents. Hence the collective term Client Service Centre (CSC) for each respondent, instead of, for example Traffic or Investigation section.

Table 1.1 below shows the classification of the questionnaire responses.

Table 1: 79 QUESTIONNAIRE PARTICIPANTS DIVIDED BY FORMER FORCE

TOTALS

W CSC: 40
SMCF: 19
S CSC: 22
79

SADF: 34
MK/APLA 35
TBVC 2
SANDF 8

W CSC	SMCF	SMST CSC
17,16, 2, 3.	6, 9, 0, 4.	11, 10, 0, 1.

COLOUR CODES LEGEND

RED   Ex-Statutory Forces, ex-South African Defence Force (SADF). There are 17 members at the WCSC, 6 at the SMCF and 11 at the SCSC; totaling 34 out of the total of 79 respondents.

GREEN   Ex-Non Statutory Forces (NSF), which is both ex-MK (MK) and Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA). There are 16 members at the W CSC, 9 at the SMCF and 10 at SCSC; totaling 35 out of the total of 79 respondents, just one more than the ex-SADF.

GOLD   Ex-Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei Forces (TBVC). There are 2 members at the WCSC, and zero for both SMCF and S CSC; totaling 2 out of the total of the 79 respondents.

BLACK/WHITE   Stands for members who joined after 27 April 1994, that is, after the formation of the new SANDF. There are 3 members at the W CSC, 4 at the SMCF and 1 at SCSC; totaling 8 out of the 79 respondents.

1.10   Ethical Issues

1.10. 1 Consent

Being a senior officer in the SANDF, and a former MK cadre posed certain ethical considerations for the researcher. For instance, although consent is a basic pre-requisite of research on human beings, it was not always possible to negotiate access because in the SMPR such overt negotiation resulted in ethical problems of their own, as will be shown. Respondents were informed about the researcher's status prior to her arrival, even though, it was requested that such information should not be divulged during the visit as it was only research related. Therefore respondents expected a senior officer, and the civilian clothes could not conceal the researcher's status,

especially as some respondents knew her well. One or two had worked with the researcher in MK camps in Angola, during apartheid days, and had not seen them since. As a result, no re-assurance and informality on the researcher's side could establish researcher-respondent relationship. This posed a serious ethical problem, because respondents related to me as juniors and subordinates (up to 80 % were juniors, that is, non-commissioned officers (NCOs). In a military organisation that means no back chatting, mechanical respect, typical 'yes Sir' or 'Ma'am' answers, standing at attention until told to stand at ease, and so forth.

However, another problem faced was that of 'forced participation'. The researcher also realised that the participants felt compelled to participate in the survey, as asked by senior officers, that is, the researcher and their Divisional Officer. Even when the researcher voiced the possibility of optional participation with an emphatic emphasis on the safety of those who choose not to participate, almost 99, 7 percent chose to stay behind and participate. The reasons could vary from respect for the researcher's rank, to actual interest in the research. It could also have been a chance to vent their frustrations to the researcher, expecting her help in solving the problems concerned, especially for black respondents, particularly those of NSF origin. Even if voluntary consent was obtained from all participants, it could still be argued that it was consent under duress. Be that as it may, the nature of the study was explained to all participants, including the intention to use the data in a dissertation. Their choice of participation can therefore be ascribed to 'voluntarism'. Hence the need to proceed with observational research without having to negotiate access in the NMPR.

1.10. 2 Validity Assessment

One of the criteria for assessing validity is through concurrent evaluation of the various variables in the study, because the validity of a research study is assessed through its variables (Osuala 1991:125). This means concurrent correlation of information from the various elements in the population sample in order to establish consistency in the emerging patterns. This helps to establish the validity of the information. In this research information across gender, race, services, previous force, rank and unit was correlated.

Of the total strength of 172, a total of 85 members was sampled, with 79 (46%) of them completing the questionnaire. This allowed for reasonable mapping of general patterns and tendencies, that is, concurrent comparison as well as the construction of deductions.

1.11   Research Limitations and Constraints

At the SMPR, the first limitation experienced was that members regarded the researcher as an officer in the SANDF, and they expected that something would be done to assist them in their plight. This perceived Messiah status posed several problems. They are shared with the reader in the light of what feminism advocates for in relation to the researcher. According to Hammersley (1992:188), feminists maintain that the researcher is an important element of the research focus. Harding in (Hammersely 1992:192) is more direct in this regard: "The best feminist analysis insists that the inquirer herself/himself be placed in the same critical plane as the overt subject matter". In the light of this, the following was experienced during the field research:

- Members became emotionally involved, for example, the researcher had a white male crying on her shoulder. She was taken aback! Given the years of apartheid in South Africa, the researcher's perceptions of the white male, as strong, confident and anti-African, were challenged. She did not know how to respond both as an African female or as a researcher, let alone as a Commander in the Navy. The researcher did not know whether to go ahead and even touch this human being. In the end the compassion in her rose to the occasion. She actually comforted him. This is but one of the many instances where a respondent broke down.

- NSF members challenged me openly about their plight, and demanded that I do something, whatever that was. They went so far as to tell me – "We NSF senior officers do not care because the struggle has been reduced to rands and cents, that we are earning better money and therefore have become bourgeoisie in our approach and dealings with them".

- Other NSF members engaged the researcher as a political MK cadre, pouring out details of their ill treatment in the MPA (SANDF).

This became emotionally more demanding than the researcher could have imagined. She had to constantly strive to keep the duration of the interviews within permissible research limits, but the nature of the topic encouraged diversion into politics. The more the research, progressed, the more difficult it became not to empathise with the respondents. By the end of the week, the researcher was very depressed and fatigued.

The researcher also found that being African was a limitation. Firstly, some white and coloured members exhibited feelings of anger while completing the questionnaire. By the time they came to the interview they were antagonistic. This challenged my humanity and, being an ardent fighter for human rights, as well as a challenger of white domination, the researcher struggled to maintain my equilibrium. The easiest response was to fight back. Secondly, some ex-SADF members saw me as epitomising the struggle between the NSF and SF. Therefore a lot of "no comment" responses were given, meaning I had to struggle twice as hard to get them to talk. Hammersely's (1992:192) response to the feminist theory on the importance of the researcher's experiences, advocates caution in handling research limitations and constraints. Hammersely's response is that such feminist arguments may play down the importance of methodology by rendering subjective opinion and experiences as facts beyond scrutiny. For this reason there has been an attempt to subject the limitations and constraints to ethics and accountability:

- The questionnaire was designed to augment the interview and vice versa, so as to give the respondents a private time where they could be themselves without the self-consciousness of an NCO confronted by a senior officer.

- Questionnaire questions were subtly repeated or rephrased during the interview, in order to monitor consistency in answering.

- It was made clear to members before research sessions that their participation is strictly voluntary. I re-assured members that the research was purely for academic purposes and that it would not affect their careers in any way.

- In order to make the research more individualistic and personal, I requested members not to discuss the questionnaire, and to ask me, and not their colleagues, for clarification.

1.12   Layout of the Research

The results of both the literature and empirical research are presented systematically and consists of ten chapters, structured in the following manner:

The introductory part, Chapter 1, outlines the aims of the research, and the relevant issues of research methodology, ranging from the research focus, design, approach, ethics to limitations and constraints. Besides working with both the respondents and the subject under investigation, the researcher is also a senior officer and the respondents are subordinates. It has consequently been necessary for the researcher to use this chapter in order to explain the validity of data collection and processing, thereby clarifying and justifying the ethical considerations that were undertaken in order to resolve the limitations and constraints that were encountered.

Chapter 2 is the beginning of the literature review dealing with the historical analysis of the military under apartheid, the transition period (De Klerk era) and the new post-1994 Defence Force, the SANDF. This analysis focuses on the way in which the institutional culture of the military developed, that is, through a quest for the maintenance of racist dogma and the perpetration of societal 'Afrikanerisation' as well as militarisation. A parallel is then drawn to indicate how that institutional culture defies change in the SANDF even today. The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section provides an historical analysis of political and military interplay under former President P.W. Botha; the second reviews early attempts at military reform under former President F.W. de Klerk; the third section focuses on post-1994 efforts at the large-scale

transformation of the SANDF, while the fourth, fifth and sixth sections respectively focus on the analytical, policy and professional framework.

Chapter 3 is a continuation of the literature review, providing a narrowed and streamlined in-depth scrutiny into the research focus, the Military Police (MP). The organisational cultures of the mother services, the Army, Air Force and Navy, all form the individual lenses through which to view the ex-SADF MP structures referred to as the Army MPs, Air Force MPs and Naval MPs. The organisational culture of each policing structure is compared and contrasted, with the emergent outcome during the years from 1994 to 1999, which was a period of transition from the segmented MP structures to the amalgamated MPA. The MPs were left behind by the larger SANDF that was already in the process of transformation, having just completed the transition process. The chapter ends with an appraisal of the amalgamation process, which was the birth of the MPA.

Chapter 4 is the focal point of the literature review contained in Chapters 2 and 3, and comprises a spotlight analysis of the national pronouncements and philosophy of the new MPA, ranging from the geographic organisation, functional differentiation, new discourses, mission, vision, strategy and philosophy, in order to establish the magnitude of the change that has occurred.

Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 all deal with empirical findings. Chapter 5 sets the pace through an evaluation of structural transformation in the MPA, looking at the amalgamated structure of the MPA for race and gender representation through the ranks, as well as management representation. The final part is a commentary on current transformational imperatives.

Chapter 6 is a continuation of empirical findings, based on the results of the structural transformation outlined in Chapter 5, where it was concluded that gross racial and gender imbalances characterise the MPA structure across the ranks. Chapter 6 is therefore a review and analysis of the normative and institutional transformation in the MPA, through the mapping of patterns emerging from race, gender and human resources discrimination. These patterns emerge from a central question(s) to which

respondents replied in the interview, and are grouped under two themes: institutional or organisational culture and the respondents' feelings about transformation.

Chapter 7 continues to elaborate on the nature of racial and human resources discrimination as described in Chapter 6. This is done through an analysis of what Barker (1988:37) terms "cultural deprivation". This is a lack of certain socialisation experiences that affect one's effectiveness in that particular social environment. Therefore, while Chapter 6 establishes the presence of racial discrimination, Chapter 7 explains the way in which it took place, from 1994 to the amalgamation process in 1999; and how it affected those discriminated against at that time, as well as now within the new MPA. Deprivation also includes gender discrimination, especially of African females. The chapter ends with a brief comparison between NSF members integrated into the ex-Army MPs and those integrated into ex-Naval MPs, establishing through this the conscious cultural deprivation of NSF members in the ex-Army MPs and; hence the gross disparities in experience, training and rank levels between the two groups despite having been absorbed into the SANDF at the same in 1994.

Chapter 8 is the final chapter dealing with empirical findings. It is composed of collated questionnaire responses, divided into three categories: positive, negative and opinionated. Each category manifests internal trends, from which patterns emerge. The positive and negative categories are each followed by a graphic sketching of common patterns.

Chapter 9 is a qualitative analysis on the failure of transformation in the SANDF and its impact on the MPA. Weitzer's (1990:) analysis of repressive states is employed to investigate how the ex-SADF behaved during transition, its survival methods after 1994, and how the model for liberalising the security apparatus can be applied to it.

Chapter 10 is a summary, presentation of findings, and recommendations, followed by final remarks and conclusion.

1.13   Conclusion

In Chapter 1, the emphasis was on the methodological framework, utilised to conduct the research. Therefore, the focus is on the goals of the research, the rationale for the study, the research design, the measuring instrument, the limitations as well as problems encountered and what ethical considerations were taken in account to counter limitations and establish validity. The last part, the research layout, comprises a summary of each chapter.

In Chapter 2 the emphasis is on the historical analysis of the military under apartheid, to set the backdrop against which the current SANDF was established in 1994. This is followed by a discussion of the establishment of the SANDF, efforts at transformation, including the policy, analytical, and professional framework within which such transformation was taking place. The chapter consists of six sections.

CHAPTER 2

THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY:
FROM APARTHEID SADF TO THE TRANSFORMING SANDF

However, flawed as the basis of conception in the South African case was, total strategy (Total Strategy) emerged from board rooms of the military to occupy the centre stage in the direction of the affairs of the apartheid state. Initiated under his tutelage and devout supervision there was no better suited person to ensure and oversee its implementation than P.W. Botha when he assumed the reins of power in 1978. Accumulating the post of Defence Minister to that of Prime Minister, Botha promoted to the state security council (State Security Council) military officers of proven loyalty to his concept (Dlamini 1991:32).

2.1   Introduction

This chapter focuses on the past and present events relating to the military enterprise in South Africa. Relevant transformation issues will also be addressed.

State and military synonymy has come a long way in the history of South Africa because of the constant need to keep check on the larger black race groups. There existed little, if any, civilian oversight of the military. However, this interplay reached its peak during the reign of President Botha, who ascended into power in 1978. The military was elevated from its boardrooms to the centre of politics through the State Security Council, an information sharing body which made it possible for the military to become involved in decision-making matters of the state. The adoption of Total Strategy as the fundamental philosophy of the state also encouraged the military/political porosity. Society was also militarised through:

- an increase in the size of armed forces

- development of a large military capability, including a nuclear capability,

- enormous growth in the Defence Budget,

- mobilisation and politicisation of the white youth,

- the cadet school programme, coordinated by the SADF,

- mobilisation and militarisation of white males through conscription.

In order to further the ideas of the State Security Council, the National Security Management System was established to take care of provincial and sub-regional matters. This body existed until President de Klerk came to power in 1989. The National Security Management System entrenched SADF control in the affairs of government by changing the information coordination role that was played by its predecessor, the State Security Council, to that of coordinating policy implementation. So the decade of the eighties "… saw the military rise to great heights in the affairs of the state" (Seegers 1996:161). Therefore, despite parliamentary control, for almost two decades after Botha assumed power, there was little debate on defence matters in South Africa. For instance, Parliamentary Defense Committee did not exist, instead there was a Parliamentary Study Group which was "… little more than a toothless watchdog" according to Williams (1992:11). Although the Auditor General inspected the expenditure of the Defence Budget annually, he had little control over the allocation of monies from the Defence Special Account, which constitute more than half of the Defence Budget by 1992.

2.2 The Guiding Strategy

The overriding policy of the National Security Management System at the time was the Total Strategy, described by Dlamini (1991:32) as "… a hasty response to distorted perceptions of the threat confronting the regime". It was an idea imported from the French military strategy against Algerian insurrection during colonial rule. Basically, it was a combined violent domestic and foreign policy aimed at defending apartheid against the perceived 'total onslaught' championed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in partnership with Marxist regional states and making use of the local Black population (Crawford 1995:2). This strategy failed to recognise the

aspirations of the local black population, especially Africans, towards self-government. Instead its proponents falsely argued that internal political insurrection would be incited from beyond the borders, mainly from Moscow. Despite its flaws, the Total Strategy gave the SADF political power, and paved the way for an *"… installation of a system of government that resorted to and increasingly relied on bullying opponents into compliance with its dictates"* (Adam & Moodley 1989:27).

The National Security Management System allowed the SADF a role in all levels of government; from the State Security Council at national level, the Joint Management Centres (JMCs) at regional level, a sub-JMC in the sub-regions, and so on. A senior security officer headed a JMC, with the main aim of collecting information about the security status of the area and devising a counter strategy, if necessary. The JMCs were created so that they could correspond with the 11 military districts in the country and they consisted predominantly of the military. The officer's close ties with community matters through the JMCs led the officer straight into involvement with black administration, which was falling apart at that time and, in some areas, did not even exist, due to the increase in state opposition. The Commando and Citizen Force, within its responsibility for area defence, proved to be a willing and strong ally in involvement in black areas, ultimately entrenching the unprecedented terror tactics that characterised state dealings with black people during the Botha regime.

The affairs of the JMCs were highly secretive and the Limited State of Emergency in 1985, as well as the National State of Emergency in June 1986, encouraged such secrecy. Extensive powers and freedom of action were ceded to the ex-SADF, especially the Army, in its duty to restore law and order. Such was the latitude of power enjoyed by security agencies under the Total Strategy that totalitarianism began to creep in. The introduction of the counter insurgency tactics encouraged further military unaccountability. The military duties also configured with those of the South African Police (SAP), rendering the SADF an active internal role player in matters of law and justice.

2.3   Splits within the White Community

Splits within the white community existed long before the Botha administration. However, divisions became more pronounced at the time because of the state maintenance of apartheid through the Total Strategy. While one group considered the method as pragmatic, there were those who argued for less violent methods, such as concessions and universal franchise. Political splits ultimately pressurised the Botha government to consider changes. This coincided with a heightened political resistance in the African townships. One such cosmetic change was the Tri-Cameral Parliamentary system of 1983, which granted a limited vote to coloureds and Indians, but an equal Defence responsibility. Parliament was responsible for the violence in the townships, marked by protests by the youth and others opposed to it.

The abuse of military power was rampant by this time, and this accelerated the loss of credibility and professionalism by both the South African Police and the ex-SADF. Nevertheless military terror was not sufficient to stamp out internal violence or to restore law and order. By 1984 there developed a new wave of mass struggle and violence, starting in the Vaal Triangle townships. The rallying factor was exorbitant rent increases and anger was focused on the immediate targets, the township councilors and their families. "Unlike in other previous mass actions the ferocity of the events which erupted in the Vaal Triangle immediately overwhelmed the capacity of the Police Force. Consequently, the Army was immediately detailed to occupy strategic positions" (Dlamini 1991:37). However the violence of mass action could not be contained, it spread through the country like wild fire, leading to the National State of Emergency in 1986. Ultimately the state became desperate and death squads were introduced, within and also under the control of the Special Forces of the police and the Defence Force (Dlamini 1991:38). By this time, the military was being run like a Mafia organization; it was used against its own people and at the whim of mad men. Finally, the Total Strategy caused the collapse of the Botha government. The cultural organisation of the ex-SADF had forever been altered by the Total Strategy philosophy. There was a general disregard for law and human rights. The new government under President De Klerk came to power in 1989.

2.4   Political Resurgence and Security Retrogression

The De Klerk era began in August of 1989. President de Klerk avoided a public admission that apartheid had failed. However, visible political and security changes were introduced. The ban on the liberation movements was lifted, as well as the State of Emergency, but not in Natal where violence raged between the ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party. In January 1990, the President ordered the security apparatus to act in a non-political manner. In the following two months he ordered the investigation into the killings at Boipatong, where police shot 84 protesters in the back (Africa Watch 1991: v). Furthermore, the old geographic and regional National Security Management System (NSMS) was abolished. However, its strategy and strategic communications branches were retained for support purposes. Further changes included the restriction of State Security Council membership to elected politicians.

The military could have been severely restricted by this, had it not been for the opportunity left by the remnants of the NSMS. The killings at Boipatong proved that the military had been so entrenched in its ways of terror and mass murder, that it required the opportunity to emerge. Seegers (1996:4) says: "The weakening of the State Security Council and the replacement of the NSMS has done much to convince observers of the intentions of President De Klerk. Yet, it could also be argued that (he) as much as was presented, he failed to act on an opportunity to diminish the security establishment's power further."

In July and August 1990 black townships around Johannesburg erupted in warfare. This was the third terrorist attack within one week. The death toll had risen to 1, 000 by the end of 1990 (Africa Watch 1991:v). There were accusations that the security forces had been involved in the violence, which had started in the Natal area and spread to Johannesburg. The Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, denied the involvement of the security apparatus to the press, hiding behind an old security ploy of the apartheid government: that what could not be publicly proved exonerates the security forces from any form of suspicion. Despite this denial, Africa Watch compiled evidence over four years of the involvement of the security forces. Its findings were contained in a report released in 1991, titled, 'The Killings in South Africa'. The report

read: "Interviews by Africa Watch – as well as an overwhelming number of reports, affidavits, press accounts and personal testimonies - compiled over the last four years by human rights monitors, relief workers, academics, attorneys, community service and church workers in Natal – provide convincing evidence that the biased actions of state-directed security forces have exacerbated and prolonged the violence in Natal, and have measurably affected outcomes in the conflict" (Africa Watch 1991:8).

The 'third force' type activities as initiated by the police and the military through the Kwa-Zulu Police and enlisted death squads escalated. The end result was that the institutional culture within the military and the police remained the same, while other government departments made preparations for the inevitable change of government. This later affected the readiness of military personnel for transformation, especially in respect of integration and racial equity.

Nathan (1991) argues in the same vein as Seegers (1996), that President De Klerk did not have the political willingness to disband the security force systems, their hold on power and their abuse of it. Nathan (1991:4) says President De Klerk was quoted as saying, "the insistence on the maintenance of a professional security force will be the safeguards sought by the government in relinquishing minority rule. It suggests that during negotiations the National Party will attempt to forestall efforts by a future government to reshape the composition of the leadership of the defence force through affirmative action or political appointments".

Nathan (1991:3) further demonstrates this resistance to change in an interview with the then newly appointed Chief of the Army, Lt. General Meiring: "(He) spoke only of the need for a renewed emphasis on the basics of training, such as marching, fitness and musketry; … and the retention of a Whites-only conscription and the commando system. He also insisted that the SADF was the only organisation in South Africa that spans the whole political spectrum…"

Allusions to integration by the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, further demonstrate the strength and status that security agencies enjoyed under President de Klerk, and how the NP sought to utilise them as remnants of white power against a black government. General Malan uttered the following statement in Parliament in

May 1990: "The SADF is an instrument of state which protects the security, life and property of all people. On the other hand, MK conducts the revolutionary struggle against the population and aims to destroy that part of society it disagrees with".

In that same year the SADF's official reaction to the Groote Schuur Minute (GSM) further demonstrated the continued resistance to equity with MK. General Malan and eight top SADF generals and officers "… publicly rejected the recommendations of the conference, especially its call for the integration of MK with SADF" (Cilliers 1990:3). General Meiring, the newly appointed head of the Army, reiterated this stance. He ruled out any need for restructuring the SADF, claiming that the SADF was a completely balanced force. The incoming head of the SADF, General Kat Liebenberg, expressed similar views (Cawthra, Cilliers, & Mertz 1987:38–39). Indeed, towards the end of 1990, the only national campaign embarked upon in order to prepare the way for integration was the abolition of the 'know your enemy campaign'. The negativity towards MK and public ridicule of it continued unabated (Phillips 1990:14).

Hence the years between 1990 and 1993 were characterised by political negotiations, which were marred by violence against the black population, orchestrated by the security apparatus. For this reason, the ANC found itself having to re-organise its military formations in defence of the local support base that was under attack. As a result an undeclared war ensued between the ANC and the security apparatus. This led to disputes between the ANC and the De Klerk government on the role of the security forces. This in turn prolonged the political negotiations and also delayed the resumption of military talks until May 1993. While the ANC was caught between the violence and negotiations, the SADF was strategising on its desired future role. This process was led by the Constitutional Development Services in conjunction with the Operations Division and it culminated into the Defense Review of November 1993. It was stated in The Defence Review (SANDF 1993:9-10) that:

- the SADF will form the nucleus of any future defense force,

- the SADF structures shall be retained,

- the position of SADF members shall be assured,

▪ all forces shall be integrated into existing SADF structures.

2.5   Progenitors Re-incarnate

Since the resumption of military talks in May 1993 it was apparent that the SADF would re-incarnate in the form of the new defence force. The negotiations took place under the auspices of the Joint Military Co-ordination Committee (JMCC), which was tasked with the creation of the new defence force. The committee's key role players were MK and the SADF, while APLA joined on the 13th occasion of the negotiations. Although represented in the Joint Military Coordinating Committee, the status of the TBVC forces was negligible in comparison with the key role players. By the time APLA joined the negotiators, crucial decisions on the following matters had been taken (Cawthra 1997:149).

▪ integration,

▪ civilian control (Defence Secretariat),

▪ re-examining the mission, role and tasks of the SANDF,

▪ drafting of the White Paper on Defense,

▪ the Defense Review Process.

The integration of forces was of pivotal importance for the Joint Military Coordinating Committee (JMCC) because this process that would give birth to the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Therefore, immediate implementation was imperative. The definition of the term 'integration' was politically inspired; namely, the negotiators saw it as a merger of equal partners despite the domination of technical expertise by the SADF. The process would involve four stages, namely, the assembly of members under MK regional leadership, assembly in Assembly Areas, appearance before a placement board – including undergoing potential tests and placement into different units after completion of conventional military training (Mokalobe 1999:13-14).

Despite the supposed equality of forces, the opening clause of the JMCC Agreements encapsulates the principle of the SADF's superiority over the other seven forces. It states that in recognition of the military expertise of the SADF, it shall remain the chief executor of the integration process (Williams 1992:3). The ramifications were the following:

- All forces would be integrated mainly by the SADF, with minimal inputs from MK and APLA, as well as the British Military Advisory and Training Team SA (BMATT),

- As members of the 'chief executor,' SADF members did not have to undergo a rank review process; they retained their previous ranks,

- Only NSF members reported to the Assembly Areas, initially designated as Wallmansthall and De Brug, although in later years other centres were used,

- At the Assembly Areas, NSF members underwent the ranking process, after having been through the interview process to defend their rank before a placement board. The member would then be placed in a mustering (specialised field) within the SANDF,

- In instances where a member was not successful at the interview, either her/his rank would be reduced or s/he would be demobilized,

- Placement was accompanied by a prescribed training programme in order to qualify for the rank bestowed.

Many problems beset the integration process. The most common problem was that ex-Non Statutory Force members on the ground interpreted the process as subjugation or absorption. On the other hand, ex-SADF members saw the other forces as vanquished soldiers who were being initiated into their ranks. For this reason the concept of integration became a loosely defined term, with a different meaning for each of the participating forces. The opening clause of the Joint Military Coordinating Committee stated that the SADF would remain the chief executor of the process, and

this implied that the SADF was 'making' or 'doing' (executing) the process for the other forces. In turn, it meant that MK had lost the initiative and was being absorbed into the superstructure of the SADF. One glaring and practical example of this was the issue of force numbers and pension dates, as the ex-SADF members kept pre-1994 dates for both, while ex-Non Statutory Force members' force numbers and pension dates only as far back as 1994 and later. Instead of fostering unity, force numbers have consistently encouraged the 'us' and 'them' syndrome, remaining a glaring reminder that the ex-SADF are the system owners.

The worst effect of the force numbers on the SANDF has been the issue of seniority. Seniority is defined as accumulated experience and time served in rank, and obviously forms an important part of one's force number. The result has been that ex-SADF members claimed experience over ex-Non Statutory Force members, and rightly so, because the inherited system did belong to the SADF, and their force numbers bore witness to the claim. The philosophical argument about the SANDF being as young as the new South Africa is often brought forth by the intellectuals, while the ordinary man and woman manipulate the force numbers to determine which group has a sound understanding of the military.

However, it is crucial to point out that black members within the ex-SADF, because of their historical subservience in the SADF, did not share the view of their white counterparts. They would rather have undergone a rank review, like NSF members, in the hope of attaining better ranks.

For TBVC forces, integration was about job preservation. Their members felt that they had no conspicuous role to play, but were caught between the ex-Non Statutory Force claim of being the liberator while they were actually part of the system, and the confusing ex-SADF superiority over them as the former master, trainer, and in certain instances, colleague. These would be times when the ex-SADF utilised the ex-TBVC forces to suppress internal political violence, for example, in the 1976 Soweto uprising. The Transkei Defence Force was used to patrol the streets and this had involved harassing, lynching, and arresting activists and anyone deemed as such.

In the light of all these reasons, SANDF members have continued to use the term 'integration' in reference to ex-Non Statutory Force members only, in spite of official frenzy that the term denotes all the forces that constituted the SANDF in 1994. It remains a contested and controversial term, used and abused to fit individual or group motives. Seegers (1996:277) captures this controversy as follows: "The negotiators' use of the term was politically inspired; given the SADF's grip on senior positions. However, it could not fail to be nonsense. The truth was that MK was going to be absorbed by the SADF."

It can therefore be argued, based on the above statements, that both MK and APLA emerged vanquished from the JMCC Talks, while the SADF was the victor. Apart from adoption of its super-structure, the very process and procedure of integration favoured the ex-SADF. TBVC forces were also not adversely affected by the integration process. Apart from not reporting to Assembly Areas, they had also benefited from large-scale promotions in their homeland forces just before integration started (Cawthra 1997:150).

The most adverse effect of the integration process was the fact that ex-Non Statutory Force members had to undergo bridging training. This meant that for about four years after integration, they would be out of circulation, leaving the ex-SADF to continue with the transformation of the military. Therefore the integration process as stipulated in the JMCC Agreements failed to create conditions for transformation in the SANDF, because ex-Non Statutory Force members could not actively engage in the process from 1994 until around 1998, and for a number of these members, the prescribed bridging training extended beyond 1998.

In spite of inherent obstacles within the SANDF at the time, the general Public Service forged ahead with transformation, passing legislation that was both mandatory and revolutionary for the Department of Defence. The next section examines the most important of these policies.

2.6   Transformation of the Public Service

As one of the Public Service departments, the Department of Defence is governed by the Public Service Act in its human resource function, whilst the Defence Act drives its military function. For this reason, it is important to define the concept of transformation as stipulated in both the White Papers on Public Service (WPPS) and on Defence (WPD 1996). The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service defines transformation as a process featuring a number of priorities. These priorities are (SA Soldier 2001:24).

- Representivity and affirmative action,

- Human resource development and training,

- Employment conditions and labour relations,

- Rationalisation and restructuring,

- Transforming service delivery,

- Information technology,

- Promoting a professional service ethos,

- Institution-building and management,

- Democratising the state.

On the other hand, the new White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery, Batho Pele ('people first') stipulates eight principles as well as the norms for transforming Public Service delivery. These principles include consultation, service standards, access, courtesy, information, openness and transparency, redress, and value for money. Transformation is therefore geared towards continuous service delivery improvement, equity and professionalism. Batho Pele is also described as having the potential to bring about a major change in the Public Service delivery. The

Batho Pele White Paper marks the start of a continuous process of improvement, which will lead in time to the quality of public services that the public has a right to expect, and that public servants are proud to provide.

The SANDF, as a public service entity, has subsequently incorporated the Batho Pele principles into its service delivery ethics. For this reason, any analysis of SANDF transformation will have to take cognisance of these principles.

As far as the WPD 1996 is concerned, it is argued that transformation in the Department of Defence cannot be isolated from the broader national transformation processes. Against this background, the WPD 1996 states that the three major challenges in the migration from pre-1994 to democratic structures lie in the fundamental transformation of economic relations, political structures, and culture and values of South African society (SANDF 1998:9). There is confirmation in the DR 1998 that structural transformation in the Department of Defence constitutes part of a much broader process as compared to organisational transformation. This broader process comprises of the following:

- Civil-military relations,

- Normative and cultural transformation,

- Restructuring.

Structural transformation is quantified as rationalisation and includes right-sizing processes to streamline the effective utilisation of state resources. It encompassed the disbanding of units, demobilisation and rationalisation, elimination of wasteful practices, elimination of duplication, and the more efficient co-location of military bases and units. Winkates (2000:10) agrees that structural transformation (the difficult third phase) has yet to begin, while the first phase (integration) has been completed and the second one is under way. There are some critics who argue that although completed, integration has not achieved any significant transformation. These critics maintain that the SANDF differs little from its predecessor; it remains a conventional force dominated by an experienced corps of Afrikaners.

There have been a few gains with regard to normative and cultural transformation, like the adoption of the new coat of arms and other symbolism, the code of conduct, the promulgation of transformational policies such as the Equal Opportunities Policy and related plans, and the Human Resources Strategy 2010 (HR 2010). In spite of such policies, true representivity is still a remote possibility in the SANDF, because ex-SADF members continue to be allowed the privilege and luxury of using the knowledge of the inherited ex-SADF super-structure as experience. As a result, the implementation plans for such policies remain haphazard and isolated from crucial performance agreements as well as from post profiles. For instance although the aim of HR 2010 is rationalisation and streamlining through rejuvenation and representivity in line with the 1998 Defence Review, to date there exists no exit mechanism to facilitate its implementation, yet already two or three years have elapsed since inception of the implementation plan.

2.7   Analytical Framework

Very little has been written on coercive institutions and their transformation to democracy. However, according to Weitzer (1990:1), there are basic characteristics of a repressive or coercive institution under transition. These are the following:

- The political state relies heavily on such a repressive institution, which ironically become the catalyst in its breakdown and the driving force of the new democratic experiment,

- Such institutions remain unreconstructed under the new democratic experiment, and they are resistant to reform and meaningful democratisation, leading to a decisive delay of the democratic progress,

- Such institutions frustrate efforts towards any change to the rule of law and human rights, thus destabilising and reversing the process of democracy,

Secondly, Weitzer (1990:1) also points out that however resistant the security apparatus is, it remains the only guarantee of genuine democracy. It is the researcher's conviction that Weitzer's premise stems from the understanding that a

lack of fundamental transformation in the security apparatus, in this case the military, carries with it the silent threat of a military take-over. This means that the political leadership is constantly under the threat of being undermined or removed. Democracy cannot be assured under such conditions. Apart from a military dictatorship, it is the researcher's contention that the unreformed and previously repressive security apparatus could always hand power back to the preferred, coercive political leadership. As explained by Weitzer in the characteristics of coercive institutions, the political state relies on repression, thereby ceding a lot of powers to the security apparatus. This state of 'lawlessness' is what attracts the security apparatus to a coercive government, because under democracy the military is subjected to the rule of civilians. The nature of the military is that it is power seeking, therefore civilian leadership could be limiting or even belittling for a previously repressive military.

It would be interesting to apply this formula to the South African military as part of the security apparatus. As argued earlier in this dissertation, during the Botha regime, the SADF emerged from the boardrooms of the military to a central position in government through the agency of the State Security Council (Dlamini 1991:32). When the new transitional state of President De Klerk came to power, the challenge was to wrest these powers from the hands of the military. This leads to the third point of Weitzer's argument: that by resisting change and thwarting efforts towards the new rule of law, the security apparatus invents alternative modes of survival, that is, of repression and totalitarianism.

Lastly, Weitzer offers a model for the liberalisation of repressive states and their authoritarian security apparatus. It consists of four criteria, which enables and also facilitates the swift transformation of a coercive security apparatus:

- The level of change in political culture between the old and the new force.

- The authority and ability of the new government to control and coerce the security establishment.

- The presence of a mature and politically stable civil society, able to hold the security agencies accountable.

- The ability of the new government to implement its goals, an ability which depends largely on the legacy of the transitional period, and also on existing contingencies.

Therefore transformation in the MPA will be evaluated against Weitzer's framework, within the overall context of the SANDF. It remains to be seen how the transformation of the SADF influenced that of the SANDF, and the current state of this interplay.

2.8   Policy Framework

The transformation of the SANDF started with the JMCC talks where an agreement on integration was reached. Therefore, between 1994 and 1996, the JMCC agreements along with the Interim Constitution guided the new Defence Force on policy matters. The following processes were already underway as a result of the Joint Military Coordinating Committee Agreements (Cawthra 1997:149):

- integration,

- civilian control (Defence Secretariat),

- re-examining the mission, role and tasks of the SANDF,

- drafting of the White Paper on Defence,

- the Defence Review Process.

In 1996 the White Paper on Defence (WPD) was crafted and was promulgated in May 1996. The WPD 1996 was a landmark in the history of defence policy in South Africa. It was a defence policy which embraced regional cooperation, military democratisation, civilian oversight and the security of the citizen, as opposed to that of the state. The main theme of the WPD 1996 is defence in a democracy. Therefore the WPD 1996 differed markedly from the previous Defence Act No. 44 of 1957 under which the ex-SADF operated. Its point of departure had been the Total Strategy (Total

Onslaught) as well as Counter Insurgency. It was also state-centred with respect to security. Consequently, it had authorised the state President to use the ex-SADF in the following instances: "prevention or suppression of terrorism and disorder; preservation of life, health or property; maintenance of essential services, including the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of crime in co-operation with the South African Police" (Khuzwayo 1998:1).

Apart from guidelines on the utilisation of the Defence Force and civilian oversight, the WPD 1996 also deals with environmental changes requiring the transformation of the Defence Force, such as changes in the international environment and the regional strategic climate (Shelton & Alden 1998:346). It aims at improving the lives of South Africans through a transformed public service, which will be representative, coherent, transparent, efficient, effective, accountable and responsive to the needs of all.

In 1997 the new Constitution of South Africa was promulgated, and it served to consolidate the democratic prescripts outlined in the WPD 1996. For the first time in the history of the Republic of South Africa, the Constitution outlined the required principles, structures, responsibilities and relationships necessary to secure democratic civil-military relations and also the permissible conduct of the Defence Force. The following relevant and applicable issues arise out of the Constitution:

- The transformation of defence policy in line with the new constitution.

- Civil-military relations with specific focus on transparency.

- Freedom of information, military professionalism.

- The strategic environment.

- Regional security.

- The primary/secondary functions of the SANDF.

More substance was added to the WPD 1996 by the Defence Review of 1998. Restructuring took precedence in order to comply with the force design, force structure, force employment and the Human Resource imperatives as stipulated in the Defence Review (SANDF1998: ii-iii). The former Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils, explained the aim of the DR 1998 as being a process of "… complete overhaul of South Africa's Defence system and to configure Defence for the next fifteen years" (Shelton & Alden 1998:346). The DR 1998 is regarded as the final clarification of the future of defence, its structure and policy. Therefore, together, the WPD 1996 and the DR 1998 form the framework for transformation in the new Department of Defence (Department of Defence) by emphasising people security as the key defence issue (Shelton & Alden 1998:345).

2.9   Conclusion

The focus of this chapter was on the past and present history of the military in South Africa, as well as on some relevant transformation issues. The following are the important issues relating to the research topic.

Although it would seem that Parliament has done well in promulgating the framework within which transformation should occur, the biggest challenge facing the SANDF since 1998 when the DR was promulgated, is implementation. Several measures aimed at restructuring have since taken place, one of which, has been the staffing exercise, whereby the old 'as is' structure was to migrate to the new 'to be' structure in line with the force structure and design as outlined in the DR 1998. The process, which was authorised by the Department of Defence Level 1 Plan took place between April 1999 and 2000, and its implementation was streamlined by a set of guidelines, one of which was representivity. It appears that the exercise failed to transform the middle structures of the SANDF, because the newly staffed 'to be' structure still reflected white domination in middle management. Meanwhile the importance of middle structures (middle management) lies in its ability to implement policy. Williams (1992:2) had already alluded to this difficulty as far back as in 1992. He stated that the "… logical, conceptual and strategic parameters of the integration argument fail to address the key question of the transformation of the institutional power of the present

SADF… because thorough restructuring could only be effected from both political and civil society".   Nonetheless, transformation continues to be internally driven and although the discrepancy between theory and practice continues to haunt success, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the solution lies internally.

Until all the leaders in the SANDF realise that they are change agents, and in fact, accept responsibility for change, transformation will remain nothing more than a grand policy without practical results.   No one understands this more than the Chief of the Defence Force, General Siphiwe Nyanda.   In his address to the Strategic Leadership Summit in Pretoria, July 2001, he emphasised it with the following words: "In order for the entire SANDF to move as a whole along the directed path, there has to be a very strong cohesive force that keeps the SANDF bound together.   It is both individual and collective leadership that must provide that cohesion" (SA Soldier 2001:15).

The next chapter gives in-depth attention to the research focus: the Military Police, its historical emergence, operation and administration under the ex-SADF and its subsequent transformation through amalgamation, into the Military Police Agency (MPA) of the SANDF.

CHAPTER 3

THE EMERGENCE, STRUCTURING, AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE MILITARY POLICE IN SOUTH AFRICA

The policing institutions which emerged under apartheid were dominated by the ethnic political elite and controlled by illegitimate bantustan administrations. This is reflected in political appointments of commissioners, nepotism, the use of senior positions to pursue personal and political interest and widespread allegations of human rights abuses and corruption, in many of these agencies (Rauch et al. 2000:4).

3.1   Introduction

The Military Police Agency (MPA) as it is known today is a product of transformation. It came into being in April 1999 through the amalgamation of three Military Police (MP) sections.   Before that, there had been three different military police structures, fashioned after the services: Army, Navy and Air Force, called respectively Naval MPs, Air Force MPs and Army MPs. The only service without a separate MP structure was the South African Military Health Service (SAMHS), and this was because of the ex-SADF war dispensation that South African Military Health Service was a support structure and the interpretation at the time was that it rendered support mainly to the Army. For this reason SAMHS made use of the Army MPs.

Technically speaking, the Military Police was not an organic structure in the ex-SADF. Each service, for example the Navy, Army, and Air Force, hereafter referred to as the mother service or body, determined the structure, size and status of the military police within it's organisation.   Subsequently, the services played a major role in the establishment and shaping of organisational culture within the various MP sections, especially as each MP section was answerable to the mother body Service Chief, who was the ultimate authority.

If the organisational culture of the MP sections was determined largely by the mother body, it is crucial to understand those particular cultures and their origins, so as to better understand the current Military Police Agency, as well as its predecessors, the Army, Naval and Air Force MPs. It was mentioned in Chapter 2 that the ascendance of Botha into power in 1978 saw the rise of the ex-SADF into the political realm through state organs that allowed it to champion the Total Strategy and later Counter Insurgency. As regards the Army, both Total Strategy and Counter Insurgency elevated the Army above the other services, creating a culture of seniority and complacency that rendered the other services subservient: "In South Africa the Army had always been the dominant and largest service within the armed forces. South African Defence policy has always been orientated towards a land threat, not a naval invasion. It has also not been overly concerned with air power" (Cilliers 1998:2). This ultimately led to the SADF service hierarchy wherein the Army enjoyed a dominant and very influential status because of its overall involvement in internal, regional and international apartheid campaigns (Cilliers 1998:2). This is the background against which service culture, and subsequently MP culture, evolved in the eighties.

3.2   The Organisational Culture of the Army

The first characteristic of Army organisational culture is its porous relationship with the South African Police Services (SAPS). Owing to it's involvement in Total Strategy and Counter Insurgency, the Army was in an alliance with Military Intelligence (MI) together with the SAP Security Branch, and not the National Intelligence Service (NIS) because: "under PW Botha there was in the end little strategy and lots of boot. For that sort of state, the type of information and preferred actions of MI and the SB were ideal" (Williams 1990:7). This is the background against which the human rights violations in black ethic townships started and flourished, as well as the harassment of that portion of the white sector that was opposed to apartheid and therefore pro-change. This would later have a direct bearing on transformation in the Army MPs, whose heritage came from the Army and the SAP.

The situation was so serious that in 1990 when police political affiliation was outlawed, between 2 500 and 3 000 police reservists resigned within one week of the

announcement. At the time, it was reported that as many as 80 percent of the white policemen in the Transvaal were either active members or sympathisers of the Conservative Party (Williams 1990:7). As was later revealed during the CODESA talks in late 1991, the Army, the police and MI continued with subversive activities against the ANC, using the Inkatha Freedom Party's Self Protection Units (SPUs) and the Kwa-Zulu Police (KZP) as the agents.

The second characteristic of Army organizational culture was the Afrikanerisation of the Army, and this directly influenced the success of Total Strategy and Counter Insurgency, whereby the white race, especially Afrikaners, were purported to be in danger of annihilation by the Africans, assisted by the communists, mainly the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This influenced not only the language, but also the value system, the world outlook and religious philosophy. Dlamini (1991:12) describes language as intertwined with culture, while in itself culture is all-permeable; that is, it is a complex whole inclusive of knowledge, belief, art, morals, laws, customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.

On the personal level Afrikanerisation within the Army meant adherence to Christian National Education, a type of philosophy long associated with Afrikanerdom, but made publicly official in the National Party's policy document of 1941. Christian National Education was primarily mutually exclusive of all non-Afrikaans speakers, as well as all those whose history and culture was anything other than Afrikaans. Thus 'national' was used to mean 'Afrikaner'. Based on this definition, 'Christian' meant a philosophy of life based on the Bible, but as formulated in the Articles of Faith of the three Afrikaans churches – the Dutch Reformed Churches (Mzimela 1983:149). It was in the Articles of Faith that racism was justified, rendering apartheid as God-ordained and thus sanctioning the rule of Afrikaners over South Africa as holy and God-given. As accurately recorded in Mazrui and Tidy (1984:160-161) the coming into power by the Afrikaners in 1948 represented a passionate opposition to Prime Minister Smuts' liberal policy towards blacks, and the retention as well as perpetuation of 'baasskap' (mastership) in SA. Therefore the Army did not only adopt Afrikaans as its first language, but it also became a service of consolidated Afrikaner power. Once this personal belief system had been entrenched, the public level could be easily

commanded. Hence the intense and almost fanatical involvement of the Army and MI in Counter Insurgency, and also their belief in the reality of the total onslaught.

The third characteristic was a communist and African take-over war psychosis that evolved into a gross violation of African human rights, in an attempt 'to kill them before they grow into dangerous communists'. Out of this third characteristic developed the fourth, namely, an inhumane internal culture that terrorised Army personnel into subjugation, transformation them into obedient 'robots' in the national campaign of human rights violation. The reliance on conscription necessitated such ruthlessness because the school-leavers 18-year olds had to be silenced, psychologically broken and then molded according to the whims and wishes of their superiors. In itself, military culture became supreme, producing a segmented, stratified and hierarchical system of relations based on the baas (master) and servant type.

For instance, it was not an anomaly 'to suck up' to a senior officer by buying him drinks at the bar. On the contrary, it was abnormal not to do so. Ultimately, this began to lead to undue work-related favours bestowed by the senior on the junior member - typical of the 'baas' and servant relationship. This type of relationship extended to the suppression and repression of juniors under the guise that 'orders cannot be negotiated', and thereby produced officers who were terrified to defend a standpoint in public, or in the presence of a senior. On the other hand the seniors, reached a point where they never expected their statements to be challenged, simply because of their seniority. Ultimately this unconditional submissiveness affected military training and education, in that academic debate disappeared while teaching platforms were used either to further Afrikaner propaganda or to 'punish' those who were seen to be free thinkers. Therefore Christian National Education permeated rank relations, management, leadership, and basically shaped the institutional culture of the Army.

3.3 The Organisational Culture of the Navy and the Air Force

The Navy and Air Force have always regarded themselves as professional elite services superior to the Army, although in strict academic terms it is the South African Military Health Service (SAMHS) that could claim such professionalism because it is fundamentally a service of specialist health workers ranging from nurses and doctors to social workers, psychologists, dieticians, radiographers, and so on. However, the SAMHS damaged its image through its close liaisons with the Army in the days of the cross border wars, although these ties were necessary because it is the core business of the SAMHS to provide medical support to the other services. Be that as it may, South African Military Health Service's involvement in southern Angola and northern Namibia resulted in a inglorious stigma, notwithstanding the subsequent chilling revelations during the Basson saga. This left both the Navy and Air Force unchallenged in their claim of professionalism, which often meant non-direct involvement in Total Strategy operations and projects.

The organisational culture of the Navy and Air Force developed in different circumstances to that of the Army. The Army has historically attracted Afrikaners, while the other two services have always boasted of a large English intake. These two services also adopted a more functional approach to discipline and military service, and membership of the Navy and the Air Force was viewed as an occupation, a career (Cilliers 1998:2). These three factors seem insignificant, yet they played a significant role in dividing the institutional cultures within the ex-SADF services. This does not mean however that apartheid and NP politics did not influenced either the Navy or the Air Force. After all, the SADF as a force existed to defend white supremacy, but it is actions on the ground, that is, the tactics, which differed between these services.

The nature of the core business of the Navy and Air Force is such that reliance on conscription for the permanent force component was impossible. For example, the technical and combat roles (sea going and piloting-related functions) demanded continuity, assured progression, availability of expertise, and so on. Therefore conscription did not alter the shape and design of the organisation to the point where it could influence institutional culture and careerism became the standard for military

service. Therefore both the Navy and Air Force escaped the large-scale repercussions of conscription. These repercussions included mainly power abuse, acute racism and strong Christian National Education beliefs. The Army is often ridiculed by the other services as managing force numbers, and not human beings.

Another major distinction is that while the Army's culture was being shaped by internal events, the Navy was already looking outside the country for management and leadership practices. Its very formation and heritage lay with the Royal Navy, and this influenced a great part of its *modus operandi*. As a result the emphasis in officer training was adopted from the liberal western model based on Huntington's idea of the expertise of officership as a profession. Wakin and Huntington (1979:12) formulated it as follows:

> The professional person is an expert with specialised knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavour. Prolonged education and experience are necessary for the acquisition of this expertise. It is the basis of objective standards of professional competence and such standards are universal. This competence is inherent in knowledge and skill and is capable of general application irrespective of time and place.

The Navy prides itself on what is known as the officership code, both written and unwritten. The written would be the ideals that Huntington advocates. The unwritten is the whole officer etiquette, which covers almost every aspect of daily life. In fact the unwritten code is more stringent and difficult to master as no-one teaches the code, and yet this is the code that makes or breaks a naval officer.

The equivalent of Counter Insurgency in the Navy was the Special Operations. Such operations were conducted mainly to justify the Navy's existence so as to ensure budgetary considerations, because during the Botha era the Navy was relegated to a position below that of the other services. Therefore the focus was mainly on an external communist threat, for example the Cubans in Angola, rather than local black citizens.

The situation in the Air Force was more or less the same. Its very formation was based on the Royal Air Force, and at the height of apartheid's international isolation the Air Force proponents turned to the American and British forces for copycat *modus operandi*. However, of the two forces, the Royal Air Force had the greater influence and left a deeper imprint. Like the Navy, the Air Force saw its role as secondary within the ambit of Total Strategy. They regarded themselves as a form of transportation and protection service to the Army in the frontline trenches of South West Africa (now Namibia) and Angola. The Air Force was spared the brutality of the war by the distance from the trenches, and the blood and the mud, spared from a brutality which always results in war psychosis due to the breaking of the human code of innocence. Consequently, although involved in the same bush war as the Army, the Air Force could afford to ignore an internal code of brutality and callousness that would turn its officers into unthinking robots.

It is befitting to add that although a very liberal picture has been painted the Navy and the Air Force, this is only in comparison with the Army. On their own, the Navy and the Air Force were also riddled with racial segregation, albeit diplomatic and more subtle. The strict professional and stringent organisational cultures were blended with segregationist ploys that were used to fend off non-white members, with the excuse of 'professionalism'. In the typical British style, who are the crafters of the apartheid doctrine in South Africa, these services perfected professional racial discrimination to the point where it became more a professional ethic than a morality issue.

These are the different organisational cultures of the three services, which subsequently influenced that of the MP structures. The next section takes a closer look at the evolution of Army and Naval MPs, starting with the Army MPs. The Air Force MPs will not be discussed separately, because they have little bearing on the research sample, which is largely Army followed by the Naval MPs.

3.4   The Emergence of the Organisational Culture of the Army MPs

The history of Army MPs dates back to the British occupation of South Africa after the Anglo-Bore War. The 1912 Act 14 of the Union of SA gave rise to the South African Mounted Rifles (SAMR) and the South African Police (SAP). The latter is the military policing constabulary structure, charged with policing the black population in peacetime. The SAMR evolved into the SA Field Artillery (SAFdA) in 1922, and became the source of military policing until 1938, when Proclamation 290 allowed for the establishment of the SA Corps of Military Police (SACMP). With the outbreak of the second World War, Proclamation 276 changed the SACMP to the Military Police Corps (MPC) (MPA 2001:1).

South Africa was under British governance and influence during this time, hence the provost influence on the MPs. The term 'provost' originates from an old English policing method dating to feudal times, when the state conscripted soldiers and used them for policing purposes, often subjecting them to extremely brutal conditions. This was the same backdrop against which the MPC was formed during the second World War, therefore absent without leave (AWOL) was rampant and mutiny common. Soldiers also inflicted the same terror on the population that they themselves experienced. Hence the need for sterner policing and discipline enforcement.

The following definitions of the term 'provost' are taken from feudal literature. They demonstrate the harshness of the calling, and the difficulties on the ground. The Articles of War of Charles 1 of England defines the term as:

> the Provost must have a horse allowed him and some soldiers to attend him and the rest commanded to obey him and assist or else the service will suffer, for he is but one man and must correct many and therefore he cannot be beloved. He must ride from one garrison to another to see that the soldiers do not outrage nor scathe the country. (MPA 2001:3).

Perhaps an even more illuminating description of this office is found in the 1312 royal instructions, where it is defined as an authority more potent and terrible than all of the evil omens and witchcraft (MPA 2001:2). The provost culture ran deep within the Army MPs, and the name provost, was adopted for the central training school located in Pretoria.

The more recent history of the Army MPs starts with the National Party coming to power in 1948. After the second World War, the MPC was renamed the South African Corps of Military Police (SACMP). The SACMP became involved in South West Africa in 1968, and by 1978 when Botha came to power, the MPs had earned unit status. They were subsequently fully tasked in Counter Insurgency operations, becoming involved in operations Moduler, Hooper and Packer in Angola from 1987 to 1988 (MPA 2001:3). It is on record that the last SADF soldiers to leave South West Africa, just in time for the UN deadline of 1 July 1989, were the SACMP units of 1 South West Africa Provost Unit and the Northern Logistical Command Provost Unit.

Internally, the Provost School was also deployed along Counter Insurgency lines from 14 June 1986, in Mamelodi East, and Tembisa. In order to accommodate the large numbers of MPs who had been stationed in South West Africa and to find newer roles for the SACMP, about 500 were re-trained and the Border Customs and Excise Police formed in 1991. This training took place at Provost School, however the project was abandoned in 1992, presumably due to the democratisation of society taking place at the time (MPA 2001:1). After the launch of the new Defence Force the SAMCP became known as the Army MPs. It is clear that the cultural heritage inherited by the Army MPs from the SAMCP as well as from its predecessor, the SA Field Artillery (SAFdA), is one riddled with brutality and racism. Like its mother body, the South African Army, the Army MPs have tasted the full might of the Total Strategy, and its Counter Insurgency operations both internally and externally. Presumably, the organisational culture was that of suppression and hushed up subjugation - typical of its mother body.

3.5 The Emergence of the Organisational Culture of Naval MP's

Naval MPs are a recent version of the old Dockyard Police (DP), formed in Simon's Town in 1890. They were responsible for dockyard security, hence the nickname, 'gate guards'. In about 1928 an Inspector was seconded to the DP from the London Metropolitan Police. During the second World War, DP was assigned harbour patrol duties (MPA 2001:1-2).

In 1959 for functional differentiation the Naval MPs split into the SACMP (Navy) and the DP. The latter embarked on investigation work. The following year the Naval Detention Barracks were transferred to the Officer Commanding DP (MPA 2001:2).

The Naval Police was established in 1973 out of the DP, with the assigned tasks of securing the Naval Detention Barracks, the security of all naval establishments as well as sea-borne security. Both the Naval Police and the SACMP (Navy) amalgamated to form the SA Naval Police in 1978 (MPA, 2001: 1-2).

After the re-establishment of the Marine Corps within the Navy, dockyard security was transferred to the Marines in 1982. As a result a large personnel contingent moved over to the Marine Branch from the Naval Police. The latter retained specialised functions such as investigation and traffic duties. Its sub-units were dispersed to Naval Base (NB) Cape Town, Saldanha Bay, Walvis Bay and Silvermine, under the name 'Naval Provost Unit,' and under the Officer Commanding Naval Command West Provost Unit (centralised). Only the units in Pretoria and Durban came under the jurisdiction of their respective units (SAS IMMORTELLE and Naval Base Durban). After eight years, the Naval Provost Unit was disbanded in 1991 and the Naval Military Police (Navy Police) resuscitated with the original Provost sub-units, only this time the naval parent unit administered each of the stations (decentralised). This was the status quo until 1994, when the Naval Police were absorbed into the SANDF (MPA, 2001: 3).

The advantage of the Naval Police over the Army MPs, is their non-involvement in the Counter Insurgency operations, due to the separation of functions between them and the Marines Corps that was re- established in 1982. This forced the Naval MPs into the

role of a functionally specialised section, as the Marines took over the third-force type external activities, leaving aside functions such as investigation, crime prevention, traffic and general policing. When change became inevitable in the 1990s, the Navy rationalised its personnel, and the majority of Marines were laid off through an exit mechanism; one of the two best things that happened to Naval MPs, as they were spared having to absorb the contaminated elements that would have been withdrawn from Counter Insurgency activities in South West Africa. Another good thing was their own non-involvement in internal Counter Insurgency operations. This meant that by 1994 the remnant of the Naval MPs that was ready to be integrated into the new Defence Force was a relatively small group of 'professional' individuals who, unlike their Army MP counterparts, had been allowed the grace and liberty to carry on with their core business, namely policing. This had a direct bearing on integration and the subsequent assimilation of ex-NSF members.

3.6   The Transitional Period: April 1994–April 1999

Very little, if anything at all, has been written on the organisational preparations, culture and activities of the MP sections during the transition. Consequently the information in this section has been gathered mostly from interviews and inferences from the past, as well as deductions from current conditions. The year 1994 was marked by the birth of the SANDF which came about through the integration of the seven different forces plus the Kwa-Zulu Police (KZP). The bulk of ex-NSF, TBVC and later KZP members all went into the Army, the SAMHS as well as the Air Force. The Navy displayed a conspicuous reluctance to take in the other forces, especially ex-Non Statutory Force members, and as a result only an insignificant number trickled in. The argument was that ex-NSF members were inexperienced in maritime or naval affairs, which was ironic because at the time the Navy was recruiting matriculants with no previous military background, and after a year at the Naval College, they emerged as officers.   Judging from the previously explained professional discrimination displayed by both the Navy and Air Force MPs, discussed under the topic on organisational culture, this was not an expected attitude.

As the controlling authority over Naval MPs in 1994, decisions of the Navy affected the Naval MPs. For example, ex-NSF members integrated into the Navy lost their integration status, which is the recognition of prior military experience. This recognition of prior military experience determined rank, that is, becoming a Non- Commissioned Officer (NCO) or a Commissioned Officer (CO), seniority, salary notch (in certain instances), mustering (particular field such as personnel, engineering, intelligence, etc), future post and orientation as well as bridging courses. It meant that members were taken into the Navy as recruits, without any rank, namely, as seamen. The only exception was in the case of about 11 ex-MK cadres who were trained at the Naval Academy in the USSR. The Navy was willing to bestow officers' ranks on all of them. As a result of this, integration produced three peculiar features in the Naval MPs.

The first feature is that ex-NSF members who found their way into the Naval MPs lost their integration status, so they were all ranked as seamen (privates), except one member who had come across from C SANDF's personal staff (VIP driving). Apart from higher authority intervention, he was also in possession of a policing higher diploma (Egypt) and related work experience in the security field. He was accorded the rank of Warrant Officer Class 2. In spite of the junior status, members reveal that their reception was civil and professional and the MP members did not exhibit any visible resentment or prejudice towards them. Presumably these Naval MP members did not participate in the integration decisions and negotiations made by the mother body, the Navy, so they were free from any complex displayed by the Navy at the time. Furthermore, as already mentioned, the Naval MPs had lost a significant number of their members to the marines, who were assigned external policing Counter Insurgency tasks, and then retrenched in 1990. So from a professional point of view, they were only too glad to receive 'manpower' in order to ease the tight shifts and watches. For this reason, integrated members were exposed to relevant hands-on training as well as the required formal courses between 1994 and 1999.

Secondly, another peculiar feature of the Naval MPs during this time was its semi-autonomous status. When compared with its counterparts, the Naval MPs were by far the most 'self governing' because the mother body, the Navy, did not exercise very much command and control over this structure. The MPs were simply not viewed as a top priority transformation imperative. As a result, ex-Non Statutory Force members

integrated into the Naval MPs received a far better reception and exposure compared to their counterparts in the mother body, the Navy.

The third peculiarity was the structure of the Naval MPs. Notwithstanding, the relative size of the mother body, the Navy, the Naval MPs were by far the smallest of the three MP structures. The highest rank was Warrant Officer Class 1, which meant there were no officers at all. The effect was that competition for resources was healthy and reliance on each other very important. Scarcity of personnel was acute, therefore the Naval MPs functioned as a family, as every member was needed. Consequently, former force differences that threatened unity in other SANDF structures during this time were not as fierce. If the Naval MPs had been entirely free from mother body influence during this time, the structure would have been more dynamic, transformed and united. The few limitations and constraints that did exist originated with the mother body, limitations and constraints such as denial of integration status to ex-Non Statutory Force members, or the lack of structural growth, affecting upward mobility.

On the other hand, of all the integrated forces, the Army received the largest intake. Of the ex-SADF camp, it was also the chief negotiator in the Joint Military Coordinating Committee Talks because of its privileged position in terms of power relations with other services, a position which stemmed from its involvement with the Total Strategy. Therefore if any ex-SADF service had any reservations about accepting ex-Non Statutory Force members, the Army had several. Unfortunately, unlike Naval MPs, the Army MPs had also been involved in Counter Insurgency, so it was a union of two evils, meaning that both the mother body and the MP structure lacked a neutral and professional approach to race relations and professional policing – having been contaminated by the jack boot management methods of Counter Insurgency.

The effects on Army MPs during transition varied. In the first instance, Army MPs had to contend with a large number of ex-Non Statutory Force , TBVC and Kwa-Zulu Police intakes. This exerted pressure on an already overloaded structure, because during the Total Strategy period Army MPs had received large numbers of intakes in order to stay abreast of the increasing number of tasks related to Counter Insurgency activities. As a result, the integration of members did not receive the full attention and exposure that the process had received in the Naval MPs.

Secondly, the inflated numbers, linked with inherited distorted race relations emanating from Counter Insurgency philosophies, led to a very cold reception of integrating members. Resentment and prejudice were openly displayed and the consequences were many. The most important being that integrating members were not assimilated into the family, so they remained 'the other' throughout the transition period.

Thirdly, although some members' integration status was recognised, the bulk came in as privates. Those whose status was recognised were accorded junior NCO ranks, with only a trickle of senior NCOs and a handful of officers, mainly junior officers.

Fourthly, integrated members did not progress as a single intake group, which is common practice for the military everywhere, because rank progression and course qualification are worked out according to a mean average, and time in rank is progressive. Unlike civilian upward mobility where members can jump levels, skipping ranks in the military requires policy intervention because it is an anomaly. Yet with these members the mean average was not followed, so while some followed the normal rank progression, the majority either stagnated at the rank of private until the time of the research in 2000 (requirement was only a year or two at the most) or progressed only once, when they could have been promoted three times already, if the mean average rank promotion policy had been applied. It is fair to state that only a handful had been promoted twice by 2000, and the majority of these promotions were junior NCOs, that is, from private to corporal.

3.7   The Amalgamation Process: April 1999

Little has been written about the MP sections during the transition period, and there is also not much documentation on the actual organisational preparations and activities during amalgamation. A greater part of this information has therefore been obtained from interviews and follow-ups on questionnaire responses.

The information gathered reveals that both the Naval and Army MPs reacted differently to amalgamation. While the initiative of amalgamation was developed by the Army MPs and subsequently made full preparations for the eventual occurrence,

Naval MPs were caught by surprise, for instance, there was no officer within the Naval MPs during the transition years. This meant that a Warrant Officer Class 1 represented the naval MPs at the amalgamation talks, while other MP structures were represented by Brigadier Generals, Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels. By the time it was decided to commission the Warrant Officer Class 1 into an officer, it meant that he would have to abandon the amalgamation negotiations in order to undergo officer training. The decision to withdraw him in the middle of the talks prejudiced the Naval MPs and the situation was exacerbated by the fact that an Army Colonel was appointed to stand in for the Navy.

While all of this was going on, ex-SADF members within the naval MPs realised the folly of having no officers, because it meant they would be eventually swallowed up by the other two policing structures, especially by the Army MPs, who were the 'rival' structure in terms of numerical strength and a different institutional culture. These members, mostly Indian and coloured, applied for officers courses. Of course, the experience they did possess, as well as tertiary policing qualifications in some instances, stood them in better stead, yet the Navy rejected their applications. This was not the first time the Indian and coloured members had tried to become officers, but they were simply in the wrong place every time, because the Navy's priorities were elsewhere. The Military Police was clearly not a prestigious section of the Navy and police officership was regarded as a waste of commissioning.

At this time, a process called, the 'rank appeal process', started within the Navy. It was inspired by policy intervention and the aim was to restore the denied integration status of ex-Non Statutory Force members, which had led to incorrect rank decisions and general unfair treatment. As a result, a couple of the ex-Non Statutory Force Naval MP members became officers, while the majority became senior NCOs. By the time the process was finalised in 2001, the MPA was born already in existance.

It would appear that the Army MPs were better prepared for amalgamation. The transition period was used for training members who would be transferred over to the MPA. There were attempts to re-define the role of post Counter Insurgency policing, for example the idea of re-training for border patrols was considered for a while.

3.8   The Establishment of the Military Police Agency

The Military Police Agency (MPA) came into being in April 1999 through the amalgamation process. The three previously segmented MP sections were brought together under one agency, the MPA. Naturally, due to its size, the Army MPs formed the larger component of the MPA, followed by the Air Force and then Naval MPs. Had it not been for the rank review process of ex-Non Statutory Force members, Naval MPs would have boasted of one officer only within the MPA, but with the inclusion of these newly appointed officers, the number reached six.

When the structure of the MPA was announced late in 1999, the ex-Naval MPs were the most disgruntled.   Most of its members, especially ex-Non Statutory Force members, became unstaffed.   They generally occupied the same ranks as before amalgamation, while most ex-Army MP personnel had been promoted into new posts. The nucleus of ex-Naval MPs, Simon's Town, was staffed with ex-Army MP personnel at section head- and disciplinary Warrant levels, making the Area Provost Marshal (head of station) the only ex-Naval MP at managerial level.

Ex-Naval and Air Force MP members felt betrayed by amalgamation - they felt as though the ex-Army MPs had taken over. Whether this was true or imaginary, remains to be seen.   This aspect will be dealt with in the research findings.   It is also not entirely unnatural that ex-Naval or ex-Air Force MPs felt the way they did towards the ex-Army MPs. It is an international phenomenon that the three services are usually at loggerheads in respect of organisational culture because they are structured differently.

Amalgamation has, on the other hand, opened and broadened the horizons for all MP personnel, because whereas they were confined to areas within their respective services before, they can now work anywhere within the SANDF, provided a policing centre exists in the area. This is especially true for ex-Naval MPs because they were previously confined to the Cape Town, Durban and Tshwane (Pretoria) areas.

The establishment of the MPA has also centralised functions, resources and administration, and thus promoted a tighter command and control, better accountability and cost effectiveness. There is one director, the Chief of Military Police Agency (C MPA), who sits at Defence Headquarters in Tshwane. C MPA has four deputy directors, referred to as Regional Provost Marshals, spread in the Northern, Southern, Central and Western Military Police Regions (MPR). Each region is internally divided into areas, with an Area Provost Marshal in charge. These provost areas serve as area headquarters, with a cluster of satellite stations. However, it is not a given that each area provost will have a satellite station.

3.9   Conclusion

In this chapter the emergence of the Military Police in South Africa was discussed, dating back to the British colonial occupation of the country. It was subsequently demonstrated how the British legacy within this policing structure remained behind, and how, when the structures were assigned to services (mother bodies), that same British culture was re-inforced in the case of the Naval and Air Force MPs. This played out differently in the Army MPs because the mother body, the Army, had acquired a local Afrikanerisation culture, hence it was not influenced by the British legacy to the same degree as the other two. This set the three policing structures apart in terms of institutional culture, and, while estranging the Army MPs, brought the Naval and Air Force MPs closer.

When Botha came to power in 1978 the differences between the Naval and Army MPs deepened. This was due to the involvement of Army MPs in Counter Insurgency operations, while in the Navy a separate structure, the marines, took over the responsibility of external deployment. Subsequently, the Army MP structure became bloated upon the return of its Counter Insurgency operatives in the late 1990s, while the naval marines who had been responsible for external deployment were retrenched, which left the Naval MP structure very small.

As a result, during the transition years, 1994 to 1999, integratees found the working environment within the Naval MPs to be more accommodating, when contrasted to that within the Army MPs.

When amalgamation finally happened and the MPA was born, the small ex-Naval MP structure was absorbed by the bigger ex-Army MPs. Not only was this assimilation numeric in nature, it was also managerial in that there were far more ex-Army officers than a handful of ex-Naval MPs. In general, the ex-Naval MPs were taken by surprise by amalgamation events, and the mother body, the Navy, somehow contributed to the lack of readiness on the part of its MPs.

Although the Air Force MPs were affected in more or less the same way, they are not part of the bigger discussion because they do not constitute part of the actual S MPR sample.

In the next chapter, which forms the core of the literature review, the national MPA pronouncements and philosophy are analysed, ranging from new discourses, mission, vision, strategy and philosophy, the geographic organisation and functional differentiation. This will help to determine the magnitude of the transformation.

CHAPTER 4

THE FUNCTIONING OF THE MILITARY POLICE AGENCY

The professional person is an expert with specialised knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavour. Prolonged education and expertise are necessary for the acquisition of this expertise. It is the basis of objective standards of professional competence and such standards are universal. This competence is inherent in knowledge and skill and is capable of general application irrespective of time and place (Wakin & Huntington 1979:12).

4.1   Introduction

The MPA is configured differently from its predecessor structures, the Naval, Army and Air Force MPs. Noticeable in these differences is the quest to streamline the structure, procedures, processes and mode of operation in line with SANDF transformation policy as well as international professional policing. The fundamentals of these changes are outlined in the MPA Strategy, however, there are three that override the rest in terms of the magnitude of their after effects on personnel morale and security, transformation, as well as the buy-in of members into the MPA. The three are highlighted as part of the introduction, in order to facilitate a better understanding of the chapter.

In accordance with its philosophy, the MPA has decentralised its functional differentiation. Before amalgamation, members were utilised in a multi-functional way, which means that the vacancy of posts determined where next a member would be staffed. One could move from Investigations into Traffic, if that was where a vacancy allowed one's next rank progression. Now, one is bound by 'functional specialisation', which means that a member chooses a field, for instance Crime Prevention, and that becomes their specialist field so they can be staffed only in that specific field.

The six MPA functions are general policing duties, including investigation, crime prevention, crime intelligence, correctional facilities and traffic control (including ceremonial escorting of VIPs and military convoys as well as traffic regulation). Of the new discourses introduced by the MPA, functional specialisation has caused much concern within the agency. Members perceive it as career limiting, because if a member is due for promotion to chief petty officer for instance, but the vacant post is in the Correctional Facility, while the member's specialty is Crime Prevention, he will not be promoted into that post, even in a case where there is no qualifying member from the Correctional Facility itself. In this example, it would mean the post would stay vacant, while the petty officer due for promotion would also remain unpromoted; so both the member and the organisation lose out.

Members are exceptionally unhappy about functional decentralisation because of the shrunken structure of the MPA. The current structure is not even the size of the ex-Army MPs, let alone, that of the ex-Naval and ex-Air Force MPs. This means upward mobility has in itself become stringent, and decentralisation would simply make it worse instead of alleviating the problem.

Together with the introduction of functional decentralisation and the shrunken structure is the eradication of the rank of private. In the military it is actually not a rank, but rather a title ascribed to a new recruit in the process of completing the basic introductory military course. Hereafter the member is ranked as Lance Corporal, in recognition that he/she has academically succeeded in entering the professional military arena and is now expected to master practical experience and blend it with learnt theory. Although it is indicative of the MPA alignment with international trends and professional policing, it is a sensitive matter because almost 100 percent of the privates are Africans. Not only are they African, they are mostly ex-NSF, or SANDF recruits who joined during the years 1994–1996, which means that the members have not been promoted once since attestation into the SANDF. Therefore a greater challenge is what to do with them because in actual fact, they are a 'surplus' in the MPA structure, along with the other members who cannot be accommodated within the new structure.

4.2   New Discourse

The gist of transformation within the MPA is contained in its strategy, released on 28 October 2002. Its aim is to "… direct all MPA structures in effective, efficient, economical and transparent functioning of the MPA" (MPA 2002:i). Firstly, this is the rationale for the amalgamation of the three previous MP structures; it is also the fundamental reason for the existence of the MPA because it is in line with the WPD 1996. As a result of previous budgetary frivolousness by the ex-SADF the White Paper advocates military effectiveness and efficiency within the budget constraints imposed on the SANDF since its establishment in 1994: "The SANDF shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently" (MPA 1996:8). The importance of affordability in the midst of a changed security dimension, where human security takes precedence over state security, lies in the supposition that it will be years, even decades, before the SANDF is able to enjoy the luxury of its required share of the national budget. Therefore affordability means adaptation of structures in line with current realities, that is, budget constraints. Consequently, the MPA strategy could not be more relevant or accurate. The process of amalgamation is also justified by the DR 1998, where it is referred to as, restructuring and rationalisation (MPA 1998:ii-iii) and also by the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (SA Soldier 2001: 24).

Secondly, it is further stated in the MPA strategy that its aim is to convert the mission and vision into specific performance targets (MPA 2002:1). The MPA functional differentiation can be viewed against this objective, because the strategy recognises professional competition between the MPA, South African Police Services (SAPS) and SANDF Services and Divisions. This imposes the need for an improved MPA service delivery in order to stand a better chance than the other two structures of attracting the attention of the Minister of Finance (MPA 2002:2). The C MPA argues that a specialised Crime Intelligence MPA officer is more efficient in his job than a multiskilled MPA officer who turns out to be a jack-of-all-trades, but master of none.

Thirdly, these new MPA goals as set out in the strategy emphasise effectiveness, efficiency and quality service. This means there is recognition that the MPA is a service provider, and hence the need for service delivery. Therefore, paragraph 9 of the strategy espouses Human Resources (HR) values as does Chapter 5 of the WPD 1996, (MPA 2002:3) namely:

- Human resources development through formal and informal training

- Fast tracking of identified top-achievers

- Representivity at senior level

- Development of middle management

- Health status of personnel

- Merit and reward system

This is a significant achievement for a structure that was traditionally more discipline bound than human resource bound (MPA 2002:9-10). To this end, the traditional MP station has been renamed the Client Service Centre (CSC), in keeping with the HR values. This demonstrates there is an effort to change the policing language, which is a starting point for organisational change.

Fourthly, the MPA strategy recognises the need for detainee rehabilitation and sets the targets at 100 percent for 2003/2004, increasing by 10 percent each year. It also calls for adherence to governing laws, conventions and regulations in the handling of prisoners. This is another shift from retribution to corrective action, hence the change in name from the old Detention Barracks (DB) to the Correctional Facility. The symbolism behind this is powerful, because the DB was infamous for its detention of anti-state offenders, such as the anti-conscription and anti-Counter Insurgency activists. Therefore the DB was used as an ideological tool, resulting in human rights violation, in the form of physical and emotional abuse.

Fifthly, the strategy defines crime intelligence, or police intelligence as "… a shift away from reactive investigation after events, towards targeting active criminals on the balance of intelligence" (MPA 2002:13). Such police intelligence is based on a triangular interaction between intelligence, investigation and prevention. Never before has the South African Military Police reached such heights in terms of the method of stamping out crime. At last there is recognition that investigation cannot be conducted as an end within itself, that in fact intelligence and crime prevention takes precedence over investigation, because they allow for pro-activity. This is also a shift away from the statement based investigation, where intelligence is so weak or even non existent that torture and terror remain the key methods of conviction through the suspect's own confession statement. This is typical of the military policing function of the ex-SADF, especially within the ambit of Counter Insurgency operations. It is a backward method that is prone to violence and no intelligence.

Reactive investigation also gives the police the monopoly of crime prevention and policing, within a total disregard for community partnerships and, according to modern policing, the community is the source of information. This is also true of modern intelligence, therefore police can no longer handle crime single-handedly.

The most important fact about the MPA strategy lies in its consultative process. All staff officers and C MPA collaborated in drafting the strategy. The Chief of the MPA confirmed in an interview that the strategy of his organisation was drawn with the acknowledgement of the fact that the MPA is required in terms of its function to excel over any other service or division within the Department of Defence. The strategy of the MPA is not the only new discourse; its mission, vision, strategic profile and philosophy are also new, and all in line with service delivery. The next section takes a closer look at each one of these discourses.

4.3   The Mission of the Military Police Agency

The mission of any organisation normally gives an indication of institutional reform or at least a commitment thereto. The mission of the MPA reads as follows:

The MPA renders a professional cost effective Military Police Service to all our clients and other interest groups in supporting the development of a crime free and disciplined environment, by means of: community involvement; competent members with high morale and integrity; mutual support and optimal utilisation of resources (MPA 2002:1).

It is apparent from the mission that the transformational imperatives of the SANDF were taken into consideration: the budget cuts (therefore cost effectiveness), professionalism and community involvement (outlined in both the WPD 1996 and the DR 1998), as well as integration (the need for mutual support). Therefore, on paper, the MPA mission casts the agency in a favourable light. The blueprint for its existence is clear and unambiguous. The international policing trend is also captured; namely, community involvement.

The MPA mission statement attests to these transformational imperatives: "cost effective service in community partnerships through community involvement, competency, high morale, integrity, mutual support and optimal resource utilisation" (MPA 2002:1). Each region can in turn develop its own mission in line with the fundamental ideas contained in the national mission.

4.4 The Vision of the Military Police Agency

The vision driving the MPA towards the attainment of its mission is short, direct and memorable. The vision is "to attain a crime free and disciplined Department of Defence" (MPA 2002:1). It is stated in one of Chief MPA Command Briefings that the vision "indicates management's aspirations for the Military Police Agency, providing a panoramic view of what business we want to be in, where we are headed, etc" (MPA 2002:1). This is yet another demonstration of commitment to service delivery, efficiency and effectiveness.

4.5   The Strategic Profile of the Military Police Agency

Herein lies the primary goal of the MPA and its sub-goals. The golden thread of service delivery and cost effectiveness remains visible. The goal is to provide effective policing within the military domain. The sub-goals (MPA 2002:14) read as follows:

- To render quality policing services,

- to ensure a military correctional service of a high standard,

- to provide strategic direction and command and control within the MPA,

- to ensure adequate training and force preparation of MPs,

- to ensure effective Military Police operational support.

The strategic profile provides the framework against which to evaluate the institutional culture of the MPA, ranging from strategy, training and development as well as providing operational support to the Department of Defence.

4.6   The Military Police Agency Philosophy

The MPA philosophy clearly documents the shift from traditional ex-SADF military policing. It states the consecutive steps in line with the adopted style of policing, namely crime prevention, followed by investigation and projective policing (MPA, 2002:14).

MPA values are also contained within the philosophy: "dynamism, impartiality, efficiency, cost-effectiveness and a decentralised functional execution" (MPA 2002: 14). This is where the functional differentiation originates.

Other aspects addressed by the MPA philosophy are adherence to policy and laws in relation to handling detainees, the employment of MP forces in accordance with

stipulated operational guidelines, continuous self improvement of members within career management prescripts and the required levels of discipline.

4.7 The Functions of the Military Police Agency

There are three main functions of the MPA, namely, policing, correctional incarceration and operational support to the Department of Defence. Each function has sub-objectives (MPA 2002:15). The sub-objectives within the policing function include the following:

- Prevention of crime

- Investigation of crime

- Maintenance of law, order and discipline

- Detention and safe-custody of military offenders

- Traffic control duties, including:

    - ceremonial escorting of VIPs and military convoys
    - parking duties
    - regulating traffic

- Projective police intelligence for effective crime prevention and investigations,

- Crime administration.

As far as correctional incarceration is concerned, the following are the stipulated sub-objectives (MPA 2002:16).

- Prevention of recidivism by military offenders by means of the military correctional facilities

- Correctional upliftment training of offenders,

- Administration of detainment.

Just as crime prevention and community partnerships are embraced as new transformational discourses within the policing role, so is rehabilitation embraced as the new trend for the correctional service role.

The role of operational support is more passive during peacetime and more pronounced during war. It is the role whereby the MPA supports the SANDF mission and deployment. The sub-objectives as stipulated in the role of operational support (MPA 2002:17) includes the following:

- Internal as well as external traffic control support, which includes implementation of the traffic control plan, control of refugees, control of stragglers, escort duties, protection, maintenance of law and order as well as the investigation of crime.

- Detention, control, care, handling and administration of military offenders, prisoners of war and civilian internees and the safeguarding of their personal property.

4.8   Functional Differentiation

Functional differentiation refers to the six different functions performed by the MPA on a day-to-day basis. Prior to amalgamation members could perform any of these six functions, depending on post availability and staffing. With the new transformation imperatives it has become necessary for members to specialise in one specific function. Below is a discussion on five of the six functions; Traffic has not been given individual attention because although unique in itself, it is usually managed from the General Policing Duties section.

4.8.1   Crime Prevention

Crime Prevention is defined by the MPA as "means, actions or attempts applied by MP structures in conjunction with any other stakeholders in the area of MP responsibility to control, reduce, eliminate and/or prevent occurrence and/or re-occurrence of any specific crime, criminal activity and/or behaviour" (MPA, 2002:18). Therefore the MPA does not view crime prevention as it's responsibility alone; the Department of Defence community along with any other stakeholders are also involved. It is a joint responsibility and a partnership, but the MPA accepts that it will initiate such a responsibility.

4.8.2   Crime Intelligence

In crime intelligence information gathering and the establishment of information-sharing arrangements between the police and the community are crucial. The aim is to obtain information on unreported crime and not to narrow the focus to crime statistics already provided.

The combating of crime in the Department of Defence is based on the MPA triangular reciprocal interplay between the Police Intelligence (PoliceInt), crime investigation and crime prevention sections of the MPA. POLICEINT is still relatively new in the MPA. It has been the last of the different specialised functions to be introduced. However, it plays a very important role in the core business of the MPA. PoliceInt is used to provide Crime Prevention with intelligence reports as well as to answer intelligence requirements as defined by both Crime Prevention and Crime Investigation.

4.8.3   Crime Investigation

The MPA is aware that the increase in the rate of crime in the Department of Defence and the RSA is not only disturbing, but that it also impacts detrimentally on the economy, therefore it remains the duty of every investigator to handle investigations in a responsible manner so as to contribute to a crime-free military community. Although the ultimate priority of crime management in the Department of Defence is to prevent or deter crime, investigation remains one of the most important components of the

strategy. This is because the MPA maintains that it is possible to deter potential perpetrators from committing crimes through aggressive crime investigations, which result in positive court convictions. For this reason, crime investigation forms an integral part of the policing responsibility, so all Regional Provost Marshals (R Pro Ms) are expected to take ownership of the investigation function and to a display pro-active interest in it. They are also expected to maintain a positive and aggressive approach to crime investigation.

4.8.4   General Policing Duties

The main function of the MPA centres on the General Policing Duties section. This is the section that physically runs the Client Service Centre (CSC), that is, it deals with complainants, takes statements, prepares dockets, responds to the crime scene, and so on. So they are usually the first contact between the MPA and the Department of Defence community. The MPA insists that this section should be the most professional because of its exposure to the community. Moreover it also encompasses the traffic section, which is in itself dealing with the community in all its functions. Included in the expected professionalism is the ability to communicate as well as versatility and excellent inter-personal skills. To this effect, it is stated in the MPA strategy that: "The MPA in serving the Department of Defence community, victims of crime, or any other person seeking help or information, must not be disadvantaged because of perceived shortcomings or inadequacies (of General Policing Duties Section). Creativity in allocating or re-allocating human and other resources is therefore critical in serving the country" (MPA 2000:1).

4.8.5   Correctional Incarceration

There is a definite shift towards rehabilitation in the new Correctional Facility discourse, as is evident from the following excerpt from the strategy:

> A high quality service will ensure effective re-socialisation of offenders so that they can be primarily utilised in the community (military or civilian) upon their release. Only the highest quality of service/training must be accepted. This will ensure effective re-socialising of all inmates sentenced to detention and it

will also prevent recidivism from occurring. In service delivery emphasis must be placed on continuous improvement of the defectiveness of the correctional service to all its clients. The humane treatment and adherence to the fundamental rights of all inmates must be respected, upheld and protected. This must be done in accordance with the constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 and all relevant legislation providing the correctional facilities with its powers, functions and duties" (MPA 2002:19).

In order to ensure this, the MPA has ordered, through its strategy, the development of policies and training curricula that are in line with modern developments in the subject of confinement science. Members will be qualified as instructors, in order to contend with the re-socialisation of offenders, which is primarily aimed at increasing inmate fitness and sharpening discipline. Owing to the shortage of qualified Military Correctional Facility staff, outside professional practitioners will be contracted to present life skills training to inmates in the short term, that is, 2003/2004. However, by the end of 2007, Military Correctional Facility staff must be qualified to take over.

4.9   The Geographical Organisation

The head of the MPA, C Military Police Agency, is a Brigadier General whose office is in Tshwane at Defence Headquarters (DHQ). Notwithstanding his personal staff sitting with him at DHQ, including a Colonel, C MPA is assisted in his management and leadership by six regional deputy directors all with the rank of Colonel. The MPA is geographically divided into six main administrative components as indicated in the organogram below:

- the S MPR (S MPR)

- the Northern Military Police Region (N MPR)

- the Central Military police region (C MPR)

- the Western Military Police Region W MPR)

- the Military Police Training School in Thaba Tshwane

- the Combat Ready Provost Company (COY)

The are two military correctional facilities (MCF) in the Southern and Central regions, that is, Wynberg and Bloemfontein respectively. The other regions have what is termed 'overnight cells', which, as the name states, permit overnight custody only. Inmates in these regions are expected to be transferred to the closest MCF.

Each region in turn, has a regional headquarters (HQ), known as the Military Police Region (MPR), for example the SMPR is a regional HQ. The SMPR is in turn divided into areas, and each area might have one or more satellite stations under it.

Table 4.1: MPA National Organisational Structure

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                              │       MPA        │
                              │  HEADQUARTERS    │
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│S MPR CAPE   ││  N MPR    ││  C MPR    ││  W MPR    ││   MP    ││ COMBAT READY  │
│  TOWN       ││THABA      ││BLOEMFONTEIN││POTCHESTROOM││TRG     ││ PROVOST COY   │
│             ││TSHWANE    ││           ││           ││SCHOOL   ││               │
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S MPR CAPE TOWN	N MPR THABA TSHWANE	C MPR BLOEMFONTEIN	W MPR POTCHESTROOM	MP TRG SCHOOL	COMBAT READY PROVOST COY
WYNBERG MP Bredasdorp Detach AFB Ysterplaat Detach	THABA TSHWANE MP	BLOEMFONTEIN MP Ladybrand Detach	POTCHESTROOM MP		
NBS MP SAS Wingfield Detach	DEQUAR ROAD MP	KROONSTAD MP Bethlehem Detach AFB Durban	JOHANNESBURG MP Heidelberg Detach		
OUDTSHOORN MP	AFB WATERKLOOF	PORT ELIZABETH	KIMBERLY MP		
AFB LANGEBAAN MP SAS SAL Detach	AFB LOUIS TRICHARD	LADYSMITH MP	LOHATLA MP Upington Detach		
S MCF Wynberg	WONDERBOOM MP	C MCF			
	MIDDLEBERG MP				
	POLOKWANE MP				
	AFB HOEDSPRUIT Phalaborwa Detach				

4.10   The Southern Military Police Region (SMPR)

The SMPR is the primary sampled region, hence the focus on its composition, mission and vision.

4.10.1   Composition

The S MPR HQ is housed at the Castle in Cape Town. It controls four main units: Simon's Town, Wynberg, Oudtshoorn and Langebaan. Each unit has a satellite station, while Wynberg has two and Oudtshoorn none.

- Simon's Town: Wingfield,

- Wynberg: Ysterplaat and Youngsfield,

- Langebaan: Saldanha,

- Oudtshoorn.

The largest unit is Wynberg. It is made up of the Wynberg Client Service Centre (WCSC) and the correctional facility, namely the Southern Military Correctional Facility (SMCF).

Although the units are now integrated, for the purposes of this research it remains important to highlight former service peculiarities. For example, Wynberg Military Police Services is situated within the Wynberg Military Base, where 2 Military Hospital is also located. It is an ex-Army MPs unit, and is still predominantly Army MPs. Another former Army unit is Oudtshoorn, and it remains so. The former ex-Naval MP unit is the Simon's Town Client Service Centre (SCSC), while Langebaan is ex-Air Force MPs. Both units remain as such, except that in SCSC there is a handful of ex-Army personnel that has been staffed there by the Military Police Agency.

4.10.2   Mission

There is a close similarity between the mission of S MPR and the national MPA mission, namely: "To render an efficient Military Police service in times of peace and war in the S MPR by means of:

- Mutual trust and support,

- Competent and specialised members,

- High morale and Integrity,

- Optimal utilisation of all resources.

The S MPR mission shows a high degree of correlation with the national mission. This means that the S MPR also subscribes to the transformational imperatives of cost effectiveness, community partnerships, competency, high morale and mutual support (MPA, 2002:1).

4.10.3   Vision

The S MPR's commitment to professionalism is confirmed in its vision: "to work in a crime free environment with professional, well equipped Military Police officials serving all our clients in our area of responsibility" .

The five values show alignment with new methods of management, a fresh look at managing human resources and continued commitment to professionalism, namely:

- Professionalism

- Accountability

- Transparency

- Integrity

- Mutual support

4.11   Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the new discourses, namely: mission, vision, strategy, philosophy, geographic organisation and functional differentiation of the MPA. The aim was to determine the magnitude of the transformation, as well as alignment to the policy prescripts of the Department of Defence. It had been established that the MPA's new discourses are aligned with the Department of Defence transformation prescripts such as, the White Paper on Defence of 1996, the Defence Review of 1998, as well as the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service and the White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service Delivery. It was also found that the new discourse is dynamic in terms of the policing profession, in that it is in line with international trends, such as crime prevention and rehabilitation, as opposed to crime control and retribution. There is also a shift towards the decentralisation of functions, so as to foster specialisation and subsequent professionalism, as is seen in the introduction of Crime Intelligence, and its combination with Investigations and Crime Prevention, all aimed at proactive policing.

The next chapter contains an evaluation of the amalgamated structure of the MPA, looking at rank representation by race and gender. The final section is a commentary on current transformational imperatives.

CHAPTER 5

THE AMALGAMATED STRUCTURE OF THE MPA

In order to secure the legitimacy of the armed forces, the Department of Defence is committed to the goal of overcoming the legacy of racial and gender discrimination. It will ensure that the SANDF, and its leadership in particular, is broadly representative of the South African population (SANDF 1996: 47).

5.1   Introduction

At the time when the amalgamated structure of the MPA was announced in the middle of 1999, there was already widespread apprehension within the ex-Naval MPs as to the establishment of the new agency. As with any new process or change, the coming into existence of the MPA led to untold anxiety and speculation.

The most common was the fear of being assimilated by the ex-Army MPs, purely on the grounds of their numerical strength, but also because of the lack of proper naval representation in the amalgamation talks, agreements and implementation process. When the structure was finally made public, it caused dissension within the ex-Naval MPs as a result of the ex-Army domination. Furthermore, the Section Heads posts in Simon's Town had been staffed with ex-Army personnel, including the Regimental Sergeant Major post (disciplinary Warrant Officer). In addition, all ex-Non Statutory Force personnel were not staffed in posts and they had just undergone a rank review process that left them either as senior NCOs or as officers. Therefore the promulgation of the MPA structure resulted in uncertainty and low morale amongst the ex-Naval MPs.

However, the feelings experiences by the ex-Naval MPs was not an isolated phenomenon. Within the ex-Army MP members, it was felt that the staffing of the MPA

had followed the same old route of red-tape and bureaucracy that had typified ex-Army MPs, for example, they felt that closeness to authority advantaged some while disadvantaging others. Morale was also low and anxiety rampant, especially in the junior NCO ranks where a number of personnel were not staffed, that is, they were surplus to the MPA structure.

Therefore, a race and gender evaluation of the amalgamated rank structure is necessary, as well as a further racial break down of management distribution, as this will paint a more complete picture of the MPA structure.

5.2   MPA Rank Structure after Amalgamation

The aim of analysing the MPA structure stems from the WPD 1996: "In order to secure the legitimacy of the armed forces, the Department of Defence is committed to the goal of overcoming the legacy of racial and gender discrimination. It will ensure that the SANDF, and its leadership in particular, is broadly representative of the South African population" (MPA 1996:47). The aim is to evaluate the level of transformation in the MPA, looking at structural, normative and institutional changes. The national structure will also be examined so as to quantify a total picture.

The MPA rank structure follows (PERSOL System, 2000)

Table 5.1:   MPA Rank Structure by Race

	B Gen	Col	Lt Col	Maj	Capt	Lt	Wo1	Wo2	S/Sgt	Sgt	Cpl	L/Cpl	Pte	Total
☐ Indians	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	3	3	2	0	0	11
☐ Coloureds	0	0	0	1	2	7	4	5	6	46	25	7	3	106
■ Africans	0	0	1	2	3	18	3	16	34	136	314	464	925	1916
■ Whites	1	4	17	12	31	22	47	58	69	97	55	0	3	416

Several logical conclusions may be drawn from Table 5.1. The first involves racial composition and totals, the second is about race and staffing and the third deals with race and management, as well as leadership. Another related but separate topic is gender representation within the MPA.

5.2.1 Race Representation

The MPA strength totaled 2 449 during the time of research. The racial break down was as follows:

Table 5.2:   MPA Total Racial Representation Percentage

RACE	TOTAL	PERCENTAGE
Africans	1 916	78
Whites	416	17
Coloureds	106	4
Indians	11	1
Total	**2 449**	**100**

Looking at Table 5.1 and its amplification in Table 5.2, the MPA structure is not representative according the SANDF prescripts of 64 percent African, 25 percent white, 10 percent coloureds, and 1 percent Indian, as stipulated in the Action Implementation Plan (MPA 1999:3). Therefore, in order to configure the structure to the specified quotas, there would have to be a ripple effect promotion of Africans through the ranks, so that each rank group would ultimately be representative. This is problematic in the absence of an exit mechanism that would enable the top to give way to bottom-up mobility. Therefore the first logical conclusion is that until an exit mechanism is finalised, the structure will remain largely white, which in itself defeats transformation and amalgamation.

According to Table 5.2 the total MPA membership during research was 2 449. At the time, over 70 percent of the staffing process had been completed, therefore the second race related conclusion to be drawn is that of the 2 449 members, 931 were supernumerary because they were privates: a rank which no longer existed in the new MPA rank and post structure. This is over and above other supernumerary members in the other rank groups.

It is important to note that Africans made up 925 of the total number of 931 privates, notwithstanding the fact that the African figure was expected to be higher than that of other races because Africans made up 78 percent of the MPA. In spite of this, the racial contrast in Table 5.3 below proves that this figure is exceptionally high if contrasted to other races. For example, of the 78 percent African population, 48 percent were privates, with only 30 percent in the other rank groups. However, the picture is totally different with whites and coloureds. In comparison to a total of 17 percent whites, only 1 percent were privates. The same applies to coloureds, 1 percent privates out of a total of 4 percent. Therefore the third logical race-related conclusion is that almost 50 percent of the total number of Africans are privates.

Fourthly, although the MPA structure is smaller than the total of the three previous MP sections, and even if it was expected that through amalgamation some members would be either retrenched or inter-departmentally transferred, it becomes more sensitive and peculiar if all those members happen to be of one race. Given the history of race relations in South Africa, as well as the SANDF transformation imperatives, it is not palatable to both the members concerned and also to the SANDF at large that ex-Non Statutory Force members who integrated in 1994 should now vacate their jobs for whatever reasons.

The fifth conclusion is that, from an SANDF career management and rank progression point of view, such a high incidence of privates of one race indicates a possible large-scale organisational career negligence leading to non-course attendance, and resulting in a lack of qualifications, non-promotion and subsequent misutilisation. This is actually the case because, at the time, the SANDF rank progression policy allowed for one year in the rank of private, although in practice, some members spent a maximum of two years in the rank. Promotion to lance corporal was expected as soon as basic

training had been completed, and for all the services, this could be achieved within the period of one year. Therefore the picture painted by Table 5.2 raises concerns because, in accordance with policy, the SANDF refrained from large-scale recruitment after 1996, which means members could have been privates prior to 1996. This confirms the seeming large-scale non-promotion of Africans either in the ex-Naval or Army MPs, because the statistics reflect numbers sampled from both structures. This shall be further illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7, on human resources discrimination.

Table 5.3: MPA Total Racial Breakdown

RACE	NO. OF PRIVATES	OTHER RANKS			OVERALL TOTAL 2 449
		OTHER RANKS	RACE TOTAL	PERCENTAGE OF PRIVATES PER RACE	PERCENTAGE OF PRIVATES PER MPA
Africans	925	991	1 916	48 percent	38 percent
Whites	3	413	416	1 percent	0 percent
Coloureds	3	103	106	1 percent	0 percent
Indians	0	11	11	0 percent	0 percent
MPA Total	**931**	**1 518**	**2 449**		**38 percent**

Lastly, Tables 5.2 and 5.3 further demonstrate that, in contrast to the whole MPA, Africans make up 38 percent of the privates, while the percentage of white, coloured and Indian privates shrinks to a zero, indicating that Africans form the total percentage of privates in the MPA.

5.2.2 Race and Staffing

With regard to race and staffing, Table 5.1 reveals that Africans were mostly affected by the shrunken MPA structure, and by the eradication of the rank of Private, because they represented the majority of privates. If 48 percent of un-staffed Africans lie in the rank of private only, it means that when unstaffed members from other rank groups are

added, the figure would rise above 50 percent, thus leading to the conclusion that the Africans are the most unstaffed race in the MPA.

5.2.3 Race, Management and Leadership

Table 5.4: Race Distribution of MPA Management

CIVILIAN EQUIVALENT		W	A	C	I	MPA TOTALS
SENIOR OFFICERS						
Director	Brigadier General	1	0	0	0	
Dep. Director	Colonel	4	0	0	0	
Asst. Director	Lt. Colonel	17	1	0	0	
Total Per Race		22	1	0	0	**23**
Total Percentage of Posts Occupied by Whites						**96%**
JUNIOR OFFICERS						
Middle Management	Major	12	2	1	0	
	Captain	31	3	2	1	
	Lieutenant	22	18	7	1	
Total Per Race		65	23	10	2	**100**
Total Percentage of Posts Occupied by Whites						**65%**
WARRANT OFFICERS						
Functional Management	WO1	47	3	4	1	
	WO2	58	16	5	0	
Total Per Race		105	19	9	1	**134**
Total Percentage of Posts Occupied by Whites						**78%**
SENIOR NCOs						
Supervisors	Staff Sergeant	69	34	6	3	
	Sergeant	97	136	46	3	
Total Per Race		166	170	52	6	**394**
Total Percentage of Posts Occupied by Whites						**42%**

JUNIOR NCOs						
Work –force	Corporal	55	314	25	2	
	Lance Corporal	0	464	7	0	
	Private	3	925	3	0	
Total Per Race		58	1 703	35	2	**1798**
Total Percentage of Posts Occupied by Whites						**3%**

Management and leadership in the MPA is in the hands of whites, who control every facet of management, from the level of director to the supervisory level. They also occupy the top five officers' ranks and the top two senior NCO ranks. Simply put, there were 416 white members at the time, of which 413 were in a management or supervisory capacity. While the coloured and Indian races contrasted better when compared to their respective totals of 106 and 11, Africans came off worst. They not only made up the rank of private, they also formed the bulk of the three most junior ranks, the work-force, comprising 1 703 of the total 1 798. This becomes even clearer when the total number of Africans, that is, 1 916, is juxtaposed against the figure of 1 703, which means only 213 Africans are privileged to be staffed in higher posts. Therefore, the first conclusion regarding race, management and leadership is that, where structural change has succeeded in merging the three MP structures through amalgamation into the MPA, institutional transformation seems far from realisation. Normative transformation has also succeeded ahead of institutional transformation, as is illustrated by the adoption of the new discourses by the MPA, for instance, Crime Prevention and Crime Intelligence, or the re-naming of the old MP station as a Client Service Centre.

Secondly, since Africans are junior officers and junior NCOs, it means they are not involved in decision-making or policy matters. This leaves ex-SADF whites in charge of policy formulation as well as middle management policy implementation, while Africans are simply followers with no meaningful influence on the organisational culture. African lack of involvement in policy matters augurs badly for institutional transformation, as well as for the consolidation of the structural and normative changes achieved thus far.

Undated MPA schedules with promotions dating back to January 2003 titled "Section, Post and Application Numbers and Reasons for Members Staffed", indicate that 70 percent of the personnel between the ranks of lance corporal and corporal are, in fact, ex-NSF, followed by ex-TBVC and a minute SANDF mixture. The information illustrates staffing of all rank groups, gender, former force, race and the last promotion date. Subsequently, the third conclusion on race and management is that the institutional culture of the MPA is still dictated and shaped mainly by whites, especially ex-SADF members.

Fourthly, it is a logical conclusive deduction only that, because SANDF recruiting diminished after 1996 due to several transformation imperatives, it then means that the 298 coloured and white corporals, sergeants and staff sergeants were once privates and Lance Corporals together with the 1 389 Africans, who, at the time of the research, still filled the ranks of private and lance corporal. This implies that whites and coloureds progressed and advanced about two to three ranks above their African counterparts between 1994 and 2000.

Table 5.5: NCO Totals per Race

SENIOR NCOs	W	A	C	I	MPA TOTAL
Staff Sergeant	69	34	6	3	
Sergeant	97	136	46	3	
Total Per Race	166	170	52	6	**394**
JUNIOR NCOs					
Corporal	55	314	25	2	
Lance Corporal	0	464	7	0	
Private	3	925	3	0	
Total Per Race	58	1 703	35	2	**1 798**

The fifth argument on race, management and leadership is that due to the conspicuous scarcity of Africans in the Warrant Officers' ranks, it follows that the Warrant institutional culture has remained that of the ex-SADF. Warrants are custodians of

discipline and functional management, so the absence of Africans in this rank group delays institutional and normative transformation by perpetuating ex-SADF dominance.

The sixth and last logical conclusion is that overall there are no built-in mechanisms for meaningful African participation in the MPA because whites dominate leadership positions. There is 96 percentage control from Director to Assistant Director, assisted by 65 percent white middle managers, 78 percent functional managers and 42 percent supervisors.

5.3   Gender Representation in the MPA

The next table displays the gender status within the MPA. Although there were women in the previous MP sections, female participation was not encouraged. This was not because of specific MP chauvinism, but was due to the SADF institutional culture. White women were treated as fragile, they were protected and so their roles were almost solely confined to administration, communication and intelligence in the security of the office, the unit and within the borders. Therefore, the integration of NSF members led to an increase of women in the three previous MP structures. The rank structure is as follows:

Table 5.6:   MPA Rank Structure by Gender

RANK	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	100 PERCENT	
SENIOR MANAGEMENT				**M**	**F**
Brigadier General	1	0	1	100%	0%
Colonel	4	0	4	100%	0%
Lieutenant Colonel	16	2	18	89%	11%
TOTALS	21	2	23	**91%**	**9%**
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT					
Major	15	0	15	100%	0%
Captain	34	3	37	92%	8%
Lieutenant	32	16	48	67%	33%
TOTALS	81	19	100	**81%**	**19%**

SUPERVISOR / FUNCTIONAL MANAGEMENT					
WO1	51	4	55	92%	8%
WO2	70	9	79	88%	12%
S/Sgt	101	11	112	91%	9%
Sergeant	244	38	282	86%	14%
TOTALS	466	62	528	**88%**	**12%**
WORKFORCE					
Corporal	364	32	396	92%	8%
Lance Corporal	279	192	471	59%	41%
Private	830	101	931	89%	11%
TOTALS	1 473	325	1 798	**87%**	**13%**
OVERALL TOTAL	**2 041**	**408**	**2 449**	**83%**	**17%**

Several deductions can be made from table 5.6 about the position of women in the MPA. The first is that when juxtaposed against male numerical strength, the number of women in the MPA is negligible. This becomes all too obvious expressly clear when women officers are compared to male officers: women constitute 21 out of the 123 officers and that is only 17 percent versus 83 percent males. This can be further illustrated by comparing the total number of women in the MPA to the total number of women officers, namely, 21 versus 408, that is, 5 percent women officers and 95 percent NCOs.

Secondly, the position of women in the MPA can be contrasted to that of Africans, because, in comparison, both groups occupy the NCO ranks rather than the officers' rank. This argument can be further substantiated by comparing the number of senior NCOs to that of junior NCOs within the total of 387 women NCOs. Junior NCOs constitute a figure of 325, while there are only 62 senior NCOs. This constitutes 80 percent junior NCOs and 15 percent senior NCOs (5% officers + 80% junior NCOs + 15% senior NCOs = 100%). This is a perfect comparison to Africans in the MPA, who like the women, not only occupy the NCO ranks, but the junior ones.

Thirdly it means, as with Africans, women are neither in policy formulation posts, nor in positions of authority, let alone in ranks where they could influence organisational culture. Consequently, MPA organisational culture is not only ex-SADF dominated and

shaped, as was discussed under race and management; it is also white male controlled.

Fourthly, although table 5.6 makes no distinction between races, more recent MPA staffing schedules reveal that over 80 percent of women lance corporals are African, while over 60 percent are corporals and sergeants. The representation of white women begins to be conspicuous only from the rank of staff sergeant upwards, while for coloured women it would be from sergeant and above, both of which are senior NCO ranks. Therefore, it would seem that race and gender exclusionism continue, and the position of African women in the MPA is reminiscent of the pre-1994 liberation struggle era when African women were said to be triply oppressed; as women, as workers and as a race.

5.4   Current Status of Transformation in the MPA

Owing to the fact that this research was conducted in the middle of 2000, it has been essential to peruse the latest developments with regard to transformation in the MPA in order to establish correctness of data. There has been a handful of revolutionary changes since 2000. An illustration of the most crucial of these follows.

The first change was the coming into power in April 2003 of an ex-Non Statutory Force African General, as the new head of C Military Police Agency. This alters top management statistics, as whereas before his tenure, there was only one African in this bracket - a Lieutenant Colonel, there are now two, including the Director of the Military Police Agency. Although his appointment alters statistics, it remains a challenge for him to effect any institutional culture changes, along with the outstanding normative and integration matters. However, changes relating to institutional culture are particularly singled out because of the level of ex-SADF white male control in the MPA. For this reason, although organisational leadership has changed, the management thereof has remained the same. In terms of policy implementation and dissemination, this poses a serious problem, as a Director relies on his deputies and assistants to effect any form of change. Suffice it to say that despite this short-coming, the new C MPA has already introduced some visible changes.

- Although still on a very negligible scale, foreign learning opportunities are opening up for African members, whereas this was a white preserve before.

- African members are also able to enjoy the opportunity to travel by air, which was also a white preserve before, save for exceptional circumstances when the privilege was extended to coloureds and Indians. This is a good example of what actually happens when the institutional culture of an organisation is in the hands of a sectarian clique. Even those things that are supposed to be obvious, because they form part of a written policy, end up becoming clouded and uncertain; there was no need for an African General to have to rule over such a matter, because it is within SANDF travel regulations for all rank groups.

- The line function of staff visits, which had also been turned into the secluded privilege of whites, is now being extended to Africans.

- A succession plan was promulgated towards the end of 2003, giving hope to the hundreds of Africans that transformation in the MPA is at last beginning to take place. However, there is still no exit mechanism to use for top rank retrenchment, which would enable the upward mobility of black people (African, coloured and Indian). Therefore progress is very slow.

The second change has been the appointment of an ex-Non Statutory Force African female as the first female Regional Provost Marshall. She is in charge of the N MPR. This is a milestone appointment, not only for Africans, but also for women and ex-Non Statutory Force members who constitute the majority of the three bottom ranks. Her appointment also alters the gender statistics of 2000. Whereas at the time male representation at the rank of major was 100 percent, she now neutralises that control.

The third change has been a relative increase in the number of African officers as well as senior NCOs through re-training. The ex-Naval MPs have to this effect contributed a handful of officers to the MPA, as well as to the senior NCOs, through the process of rank reviews, which took place simultaneously with amalgamation talks and staffing. However, the staffing of these members has been a challenge because they were not

considered for staffing within the MPA in 1999, therefore it took time for them to find posts.

5.5   Current Challenges Relating to Transformation

The first obvious challenge is that of the shrunken MPA structure. Having shrunk to a third of its former size (previous three structures together), competition for posts has become fierce, resulting in racial, former force and gender conflict.

The second challenge has to do with the volume of unstaffed ex-Non Statutory Force personnel, mainly from the ex-Army MPs, who remain under-qualified for promotion to lance corporal in order to be considered for staffing.   However, the problem is exacerbated by the shortage of posts, because there are amongst this group, many privates who are course qualified to be promoted to lance corporal, but it has simply not happened. Linked to this challenge is the new SANDF Human Resources Strategy 2010, the aim of which is the rejuvenation of the Defence Force, amongst many other developments.   Contained within the document is the age-rank pyramid prescript, which stipulates suitable age brackets per rank (SANDF: HR Strategy 2010). Most of the ex-Non Statutory Force privates within the MPA have been held back for too long, such that they fall out of the age-rank pyramid, and in instances such as these, a member should be expelled. Therefore, once the exit mechanism has been finalised, these members would be potential candidates.   In the meantime, they pose a management problem, as their morale is low.

Thirdly, there is a problem with access to further training for the unstaffed members, because the stipulated requirement for acceptance at the Provost School is the post title and number, and proof of staffing. This means that in addition to not being promoted, the members are also not being developed both formally and as far as hands-on experience goes, because they are supernumeraries.

Fourthly, training is a problem even for staffed members in that rank qualification is a pre-requisite for acceptance to specialisation courses, for example a corporal who is staffed in the Investigation Section cannot be accepted for the Investigation Course

because only sergeants are accepted for such a course. As a result, even though the member is counted as part of the Investigation Section, such member cannot be fully utilised due to a lack of proper qualifications. On the other hand, such a member would not be promoted to sergeant according to MPA rules, because he needs to qualify in his speciality before, in this instance, the member's qualifications requires the Investigation course. This is indicative that the old pre-MPA methods have not yet been fully altered, because the basic (individual course) was done as a private, followed by other functional courses. Now, because members were multi-functional, courses such as Investigation, which demand a degree of intellect, are offered done at senior NCO level, with the prerequisite that the member would have some form of policing experience by then.

A fifth challenge relating to the fourth challenge, is that functional differentiation led to the placement of members in posts for which they did not fully qualify, because each member chose a speciality, or it was chosen for him by the organisation - and that is what determined staffing. The adverse results have been seen in the recent withdrawal of cases by both the Military and the Civilian Courts due to a lack of substantive evidence or maybe due to incorrect methods of data collection. As a result, the number of civil claims against the MPA has risen. In the same vein, members have been staffed in higher posts since 1999/2000, but they have not as yet been promoted.

All these problems render management extremely difficult. An innocent action on behalf of one race group, former force or even former service, can be perceived 'favouritism', notwithstanding the already prevalent connotations about the domination of the MPA by ex-Army MPs, as well as by the white ex-SADF members. Therefore, a sixth challenge is the perception of non ex-Army MP members that crime response is slack and slow, whereas vehicles are used for unit visits and functions, but are never available for crime response and investigation. An MP officer has twice reported crime in the military house in which she is resident and the answer given was that the duty driver was out on patrols. She was shocked and also concerned that if this is the treatment she receives from her own NCOs, then how would an ordinary Defence Force member be treated in those desperate moments when they need the MPA. She is even more concerned that when she later investigated the incident, she found out

that the duty car had gone out on errands secondary to the actual policing function. A further worrying aspect is that the duty corporal reports that the Warrant Officer on duty said: "*S*he (complainant) talks too much, so she can personally walk to the centre to lay the charge or complaint, we are not driving there."

Professionalism is the seventh challenge. It remains a contentious issue, as ex-Air force MPs and ex-Naval MPs perceive the ex-Army MPs as being more interested in overseas trips, unit visits, unit functions, vehicle inspections, and so on, while the actual job on hand is relegated to the bottom. Members also complain that the illegal practice of withdrawing cases against white members still continues unabated because of the way the MPA is structured, namely, a vacillation between mono-ethnicism and pluralist differentiation. Therefore the system allows for the appointment of white investigators for white offences and it further allows for these cases to disappear within the MPA long before they reach the Legal Satellite Offices. Another cited example is that of military patrols in the designated SANDF housing quarters. For the ex-Air Force MPs and Naval MPs this has always been part of their crime prevention function, but it is not a priority for the ex-Army MPs. The result is that ex-Air Force and Naval MPs regard this as incompetence on the part of the ex-Army MPs.

The 825 unstaffed and supernumerary African members represent the eighth challenge. The emotionalism surrounding the matter relates to the race ratios of unstaffed members, for example, 825 Africans as against seven whites, one Asian and one coloured. On the other hand, more Africans are involved in self development through part-time studying than are their white counterparts. More over, they are studying at their own expense, forced to do so by the red-tape within the MPA, inherited from the old Army MPs. A further complication is the non-utilisation of these members in the day-to-day duties of the MPA. Meanwhile it is stipulated that they stay at work within the given time frames because they are on the payroll. Although this could differ from unit to unit, these members loiter around the offices, watching their staffed counterparts put in a day's work. They report for the 07:30 roll call and then disappear until 16:00 for the final roll call. When there are impromptu events, they are then marked as absent, which leads to the charge of absent without official leave (AWOL). In return AWOL is further broken down into several other offences, which could ultimately lead to three or more charges at one time.

Lastly, ex-naval MPs generally begrudge the fact that, as a norm, they have been staffed in posts equivalent to their amalgamation ranks, whereas for both the ex-Army and ex-Air Force MPs this is not the usually the case. What complicates this issue is that the ex-Naval MPs have been moved around and sometimes even geographically transferred to posts of the same rank. For this reason, they perceive upward mobility in the MPA as something that is happening for some, but certainly not for all.

5.6   Conclusion

This chapter has examined the amalgamated structure of the MPA, focusing on rank representation by race and gender, as well as giving a further break down of management distribution by race. The final section was a commentary on current transformational imperatives.

The aim was to establish whether the MPA structure is in line with transformation, or to ascertain the depth of institutional change; in view of the fact that structural transformation had succeeded in creating the MPA. However normative and institutional transformation remains a challenge because the structure is still dominated by ex-SADF white males. It was also found that gender affirmation has not fully taken root, therefore both the isolation of Africans and women allows for a continuation of old ways by the ex-SADF members. In this way, normative transformation is also weak, because those who could provide an alternative are too junior to influence the organisation in any way.

The next chapter is a continuation of the empirical findings commenced in this Chapter. Whereas in Chapter 5 the focus was on structural changes in the MPA, in Chapter 6, the focus moves to normative and institutional transformation.

CHAPTER 6

HUMAN RESOURCES ISSUES: RACISM, DISCRIMINATION AND AMALGAMATION

The logical, conceptual and strategic parameters of the integration argument fail to address the key question of the transformation of the institutional power of the present SADF (Williams 1992:2).

6.1   Introduction

This chapter is a continuation of the empirical findings. Whereas in the previous chapter, the focus was on structural changes, in this chapter the focus shifts to normative and institutional transformation. The patterns emerge from central questions to which respondents replied, covering the following consecutive themes:

- Institutional or organisational culture,

- Respondents' opinions about and experiences of transformation, and

- Issues on education, training, and development (ETD).

Findings are based on interviews only because the questionnaire results will be dealt with in Chapter 8. For clarity, the classification codes allocated to respondents indicated in Assigned Codes (p. 207 following) will be used when quoting interviewees.

Interviews were conducted as a follow-up to the questionnaires answered in the three sampled units of the S MPR: Simon's Town Client Service Centre (S CSC), Wynberg CSC (W CSC) and the Southern Military Correctional Facility (SMCF). It follows that

interviewees from the three units include ex-NSF, ex-SADF, ex-TBVC and possibly ex-KZP. Interviewees are mainly ex-Naval and ex-Army MPs, because both S and W CSC, as well as the SMCF are former strongholds of the Navy and the Army.

Included in the interviews is the case study conducted at the S CSC with the seven ex-NSF members available at the time. They have been classified as respondents 8 – 14.

Although respondents are classified into codes, in certain instances it might be necessary for the researcher to reveal the respondent's race, rank, former force and former MP service, as these classifications might help in understanding the point in question better. In order to protect the respondents' rights to privacy, as well as respect the code of ethics between the researcher and respondents, the internal functional differentiation of members will not be disclosed, as this could lead to the uncovering of identification codes. Hence the collective term, Client Service Centre (CSC) will be used for every respondent, instead of for example, Traffic Section or Investigations.

6.2   Background: Structural Imbalances

Although the new Defence Force was founded on the principle of non-partisanship, former force sentiments, race and the SANDF structural transformation all served to reinforce political partisanship. As was discussed in Chapter 5 for instance, the MPA structure does not reflect the demographic composition of South Africa per rank group, although in total the numerical count Africans exceeds the SANDF 64 percent race prescript. Structural imbalance does not augur well for institutional and normative transformation, and this form the gist of this chapter. Most of the interviewees' responses trace the story of their reception into the ex-Army MPs, dating as far back as 1994. They give an account of the conditions they encountered on the ground; prejudice, ignorance, racial arrogance, and an inflexible all-white system, now forced to include Africans. Included in the stories is a summation of the events that led to the establishment of the MPA, and how the birth of the agency has not brought forth much hope.

Captured in these stories are one or two examples of red-tape and mutual exclusivity within the old white ex-Army MPs themselves, where sect membership benefits some white males while disadvantaging non-members.

There is a noticeable difference between the organisational cultures of both the ex-Army and ex-Naval MPs, manifest in the reception and treatment of ex-NSF members, as well as those ranks held by members at the time of the research. This difference is also clear when it comes to the organisational evaluation by ex-SADF members; where ex-Army white male MPs pinpoint sectarianism, their ex-Naval MP counterparts have only praise for their organisation.

6.3   Organisational Culture: Sectarianism, Racism and Prejudice

There is a peculiar organisational culture prevalent within the MPA, which is alluded to more and more by former Army MPs. It is the notion of an 'old boys' network', which dictates promotion, staffing, career development and happiness in the job. It is based upon appeasing one's immediate superiors to a point where one's feelings and emotions, let alone one's thinking ability, are all shelved in order to allow the superior to dictate. Immediate superiority starts from as low as far down as a lance corporal (L/Cpl) ruling over a private, to the general ruling over a colonel (Col).

6.3.1   Sectarianism

Various forms of appeasement have been mentioned by interviewees, but the most common one is aligning oneself with the drinking and 'braai' sessions known as the drinking club. Members feel a tacit obligation to join the drinking club, both at unit level and in their private social lives. The drinking club is part of the decision-making tool of the privileged few, where rank separation dissipates, and the camaraderie allows a private to be privy to the methods that would be used to frustrate the career options of a colonel who is in the opposite camp. The drinking club can make or break one's performance assessment, let alone one's merit assessment. These drinking sessions vary per unit, from mid-week afternoon sessions to the special Friday session. Obviously, the presence of ex-TBVC, ex-NSF and ex-KZP members has somehow

minimised the intensity of such sessions in the work-place, so that they are now more confined to after hours 'braais'.

When asked if the culture of drinking sessions within the ex-Army MPs was as strong as alluded to by respondents ex-Naval MPs at the S CSC, respondent no. 30, who is an ex-Army and ex-SADF coloured officer from W CSC, responded:

> Yes, things come out of the bar here, and that information is used against members to either advance them or spite them by stagnating their careers. It is a culture of gossip, and it is encouraged from the top. Freedom of speech is a scarce commodity in the MPA; you watch your mouth with golden attention. You have to remember what you said to whom, especially about conditions in the organisation, its leadership and transformation.

The names linked to the drinking club includes the most senior officers within the MPA. It is like second nature - part of the culture.

Interviewee no. 37 from W CSC, a senior NCO, ex-SADF and ex-Army MP, describes an incident that took place in 1996, when he was still a Lance Corporal. He says that he felt obligated to go out drinking with two White colleagues, one his equal and the other his senior, a corporal.

Question: You have alluded to racism in the agency, can you elaborate?
Response: "The first example is the language they *(management)* use. When we go out on patrols, away from the unit, White people use the term, 'kaffir' very loosely. You cannot challenge it, because you can also see that they will react emotionally if you do so. It is part of the culture.

A fourth incident happened in 1996 when I still worked at the then Detention Barracks. There were two white guys who became my friends, or so I thought. One of them was a corporal. We went out to clubs together *(white clubs)* on our off days, or weekends. They would introduce me to all their friends and brag about me, and I enjoyed this until one particular night. On this night the corporal met a childhood

friend at the bar, and he did not even mince his words as he said to this guy: Ek wil julle voorstel aan die hotnot chommie van my (I want to introduce you to a hotnot friend of mine). Apparently the corporal's friend was also with another friend there. I lost my cool, we argued and it turned out ugly. He just drove off with his white friends and left me stranded, even though he knew that I had driven in his car to get to this place. I had to ask for lifts; in the end I went to my own kind and they took me home. On Monday morning at work, he apologised and said that he was drunk, but I knew in my heart that he was lying. He had been undermining me throughout our relationship, but I was always turning a blind eye, because of my training in the MPs."

Reacting to the subject of drinking, the same respondent said that he felt obliged to go out and drink with these guys, "Yes, because here the drinking club is part of the culture. That is where important decisions are taken, where individuals' stands are analysed to see on which side of the fence they stand and where merit assessments are carved. This can affect one's merit assessment; you can be labelled as anti-social".

The culture of sects within the MPA is seemingly most hated by ex-Naval MPs, who refer to it as a cultural shock. Interviewee no. 3, a senior NCO from S CSC, ex-Naval MPs and ex-SADF, responded in the following way when asked about transformation in the Military Police Agency:

Question: In your analysis where does the MPA stand with respect to transformation - with specific reference to integration and amalgamation?

Response: The average mentality of an ordinary MPA member does not match the thinking of the top leadership. They have moved on, on their own, and left people behind. The average perspective is not in keeping with the new trends. Reasons for this are many, for example training has not been restructured to suite amalgamation; the top structure has not changed yet and therefore the whole staffing exercise (Public Service imperative whereby all employees had to re-apply for posts either within own departments or other external ones and constituted staffing boards

conducted the 'staffing function' as per laid down guidelines and procedures) was a farce.

We in the Navy are experiencing problems because we are not used   of this kind of red-tape and bureaucracy. The MPA is run like a Mafia organisation. The old boys' network in the Army (meaning ex-Army MPs) dictates that one should 'suck up' to the leadership, buy them liquor in the weekly mess functions, be their 'informant' (bring them gossip about what others say about them), etc.

There is no ex-Naval MP representation in the organisational culture, because up to the moment of amalgamation there was no naval MP officer. This means nobody represented our interests throughout the negotiations and agreements relating to amalgamation.

It is ironic; even more so that he 'apparently' is a relative of C Military Police Agency's son-in-law or something. The Regimental Sergeant Major here in our unit is also said to be the relative of the S MPR Provost. He says with his own mouth that he never applied for this post, he just got it!

Interviewee no. 3 is describing what is referred to in social work as a cultural shock: "… the experience of temporary confusion, depression, and anxiety when an individual enters another cultural or sub-cultural group environment and is uncertain about the expected roles and norms" (Barker 1988:37). This is echoed by interviewee no. 7 from S CSC, a senior NCO, ex-Naval MP and ex-SADF, when asked to comment on the recent changes in the MPA.

Question: Comment on the recent changes in the MPA.
Response: Not good, we (Navy) have not benefited at all; I am staffed in a post I did not apply for, and I am told that other applicants filled the posts I applied for. The staffing process was a farce; the 'wit brookies' (whites) knew what they were doing. Before the process began Army MPs, obviously white, were promoted to senior posts in preparation for the new

structures (to-be structures). For example, in 1985 when I was at Provost School, this man that is now the Regimental Sergeant Major here (disciplinary warrant officer - RSM*),* was busy writing matric. I already had matric plus a year's experience. He holds the highest NCO office today, at 32 years old! The RSM post is normally for people over 40 years. My current rank is two ranks below his. When he took over here this year, he still asked me, "What happened to you?"

A certain Army colonel, a retired ex-Army MP, acted as the Naval MP representative. He had tried to amalgamate the MPs even in his time, but the Air Force refused. The Navy has always been willing to give us away, somehow the Naval MPs have never been important to the Navy during all my years here.

The Army MPs brought here are mostly clueless about the job at hand. My boss in Investigations is years younger than all of us here. He told me that this post was his eighth choice, he was formerly in Crime Prevention. In the meantime, we must do the job, and he must get the credit. He dogmatically follows a University of South Africa (Unisa) Investigations Book on everything he does. We have a saying here now which says, "Let us see what the book says about that." We are not getting enough support from him as our superior, he would not know how to; instead he tells us that he is concerned with more pressing issues, like the unit routine. He fits into the regimental Sergeant Major's obsession with military chores at the expense of actual policing.

Respondents 30, 37,3 and 7 are describing the element of a sect within the ex-Army MPs, which leads to unconstitutional HR practice. This culture has been imported over to the MPA and there is a reason it act as catalyst for its perpetuation. The reason is what was uncovered under structural transformation, that is, the absence of Africans, especially ex-NSF members, in positions of authority or policy formulation. This means, Africans cannot influence organisational culture because they do not occupy decision-making levels in terms of rank. Therefore the ex-SADF mind set goes unchallenged because of the lack of an alternative discourse.

Of the various former forces within the SANDF, the ex-NSF group remains the only group which is a viable alternative able to challenge ex-SADF white minority doctrine. Ex-KZP members do not posses a separate discourse, because they were trained by the ex-SADF as a third force type squad. On the other hand, ex-TBVC members were not politicised in terms of any substantive future doctrine for a post apartheid South Africa and like the ex-KZP, they were also trained SADF-style because senior ex-SADF officers acted as advisors to the bantustan ministries of defence. Therefore by side-lining ex-NSF, ex-SADF power has continued unchallenged within the ex-Army MPs, and now within the MPA. The following replies from interviewee no. 31 show the lack of an alternative discourse:

Question: In your opinion, is there a fair treatment of members in the Military Police Agency?

Response: Not at all! For example in the staffing process some of us who are Warrant Officers Class 2 (WO2) were prohibited from applying for WO1 posts; we were informed that it is against the staffing regulations. Yet some WO2 were selectively allowed to do, and now they have been promoted accordingly.

Another source of confusion is the promotion of Africans into senior posts where they are in charge of personnel that come from a long tradition with the MPA. An example is the female who has been put in charge of the Investigation Section, which is a major's post, but she is still busy with bridging training - who said that she would pass? People here are very bitter about her staffing, because they had to work hard to get where she is. She just integrated and there she gets a post. We had to endure trillions of geographic transfers and prove our professionalism, as well as dedication to the MP, to deserve what she was just given because she is black.

Question: You sound to me like you do not understand the objectives of the new South Africa, the White Paper on Defence and also why the SANDF was formed, like why we did not continue with the ex-SADF.

Response: Ma'am, I understand what you say, but do you understand the history that we have built into the MP? Some of us over 30 years old.

Secondly, ex-SADF influence continues unchecked simply because of the numerical strength of ex-Army MPs within the MPA. The biggest problem is that the ex-SADF organisational culture inherited in 1994 through the Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee Agreement is in itself not conducive to moulding a new SANDF culture, because it was premised upon superior race arrogance. Owing to the Army bearing the brunt of the secretive, counter insurgency and third-force-type racial war, the ex-Army MPs also were dragged into it. Unfortunately this has left a legacy of sectarianism in the culture of ex-Army MPs, to the extent that during the phase transition, between 1994 – 1999, the ex-Army MPs did not change much. Several ex-NSF members were received, but they were largely prevented through non-exposure, lack of training and lack of promotion from being able to have any form of influence in the organisation.

6.3.2   Racism and Prejudice

One of the complaints of racism stems from the members' living conditions (referred to as 'messing' in the military). It is a general source of bitterness and frustration linked to organisational culture. However this is limited to the W CSC and SMCF members only and it affects members who originate from other regions, predominantly from Gauteng, the Eastern Cape and KZN. Over 95 percent of these members are African, mostly ex-Non Statutory Force and SANDF members who attested during 1994 and 1997. They live in typical migrant labour conditions, namely, a hostel hall with rows of beds next to each other. Most are adults, either married, or with stable relationships back home. The lack of privacy, shift work and only one or two annual leave periods during which they can actually return home, all combine to aggravate frustrations.

The main complaint is the discontinuity between work and private life because of the system of informants originating from the ex-Army MP management. Some members within the group are used to spy on the rest of the group, in exchange for work-related favours such as course nomination and favourable treatment. Usually such information will influence work-related decisions, a practice highly reminiscent of the

old compound system on the mines, where the induna was appointed by management to reinforce unpopular decisions. In certain instances, the induna could even physically abuse members. Therefore, members feel violated, demeaned and without any semblance of privacy. As a result, members loose their self worth and morals, which becomes a vicious cycle of a downward slope at work and in their personal lives.

The general feeling is that management is unconcerned about the state of the messing conditions, more so because Africans are the dominant ethnic group making use of the facilities. Interviewee no. 38, a junior NCO from W CSC, describes the living conditions, and subsequently touches on the sectarian organisational culture as well.

Question: Tell me about yourself.

Response: I joined the MPA in 1995, I passed standard seven and dropped out of standard eight to come and integrate.

Interjection: But why are you not studying part-time now?

Response: I did register with Intec College in 1998, but I could not continue because of the living conditions in the mess. I am not from around here, and since I have been a private all my life in the MPs, I cannot afford a house, not to buy it or to rent it. Meanwhile the living conditions at the mess are bad, for example, the day shift personnel comes for tea at 10:00 every morning. They make a noise, and I cannot shut them up, it is daytime for them. The same thing happens at lunchtime, so that when you try to sleep after a shift, it is difficult. It is made worse by the off shift, its personnel would be polishing boots, washing clothes, cleaning their cupboards, etc. Most of them would be singing, playing music or chatting, sometimes even entertaining outside visitors. Our mess is just an open hall, there is no privacy at all. Sometimes when you sit on your bed to study, someone walks in and they want to have a whole conversation with you. If you ignore them, they take it personal, and conflict starts.

Question: Did you explain to your divisional officer that you are studying, or perhaps solicit his or her support?

Response: Do you think he wants to know that? We are treated so badly here, especially here at the Duty Room, you cannot even read a magazine if you are African. If they (management) catch you, you are sent on foot patrols. … I was paid late every month; this went on until Jan 2000. They could not help me with my pay; do you think they could help with my studies?

The prevalent view is that the institutional culture is characterised by racial stereotyping, male chauvinism, red-tape, the old boys' network, unprofessionalism and Army domination. Virtually all race groups experience this in various ways, perhaps in the form of racism for Africans, or as exclusivity for coloureds or as estrangement for whites. For example, in the case of interviewee no. 38 above, it might be the general sense of backwardness brought into the MPA through the old Army MPs, where academic education or self development was neither rated highly nor rewarded. However, because the superior concerned is white, the interviewee views it as racism, especially in the light of the general treatment of Africans in the unit.

Another anecdote that reflects prejudice was related by interviewee no. 38, a junior NCO form W CSC, ex-NSF and ex-Army MP:

Question: Why did you miss out on staffing, is it your disciplinary record perhaps?

Response: Could be! But course qualifications also worked against me. You see whites can plan destruction, I do not like them, but they can plan for tomorrow. We in the ANC just live, for tomorrow we die! These people (whites) had a plan all along; that they blocked our development in the Army MPs was no mere coincidence or the act of a mad man, they knew what they were doing. It has now paid off in that the bulk of Africans, whether NSF or SANDF (those who joined after 1994 through normal recruiting requirements), we are not qualified to be staffed in the Military Police Agency. Therefore while amalgamation took us by surprise, they only ripped what they had been planting diligently and consistently since

1994, namely the systematic removal of the Black (African) face from the MPs. This topic depresses me, excuse my emotions!

Last year they (management) got us all hopeful by asking us to apply for posts, it was a lengthy and colourful exercise, so we became enthusiastic. But we should have known, in the end they told us our applications got lost, so we had to start the process all over again. People were so disheartened; they chose to just let it go. Now they tell us that we are not staffed because we are typical African, too lazy to do anything; we are even lazy to apply for our own posts.

No. 39 shares an almost similar experience:

Question: Do you love your job?

Response: "Yes, but it is hard; favouritism is rampant and Africans are not eligible for training and development. Only the Africans work hard here, we do all the … eh … menial work? Yes, all the dirty jobs like patrols, construction jobs, cleaning the unit, gardening, etc; but the recognition goes to the superiors who are white. The attitude towards Africans is bad. We are handled and talked to like children (by management); notice that I do not say, talked with, because we are talked to. We are described as lazy, big headed and politically obsessed people. It is a continuation of stereotypes".

Question: How do you feel about your job?

Response: There is too much racism here. It started during integration days already. When we arrived here they (management) were so harsh, in so much that some of our colleagues resigned, while others were discharged. We were being destroyed openly. The principle of divide and rule was used to charm some of our comrades, and they ended up fighting us, in exchange for a lot than what faced us. So the timid gave in to the RSM's intimidation, some benefited but other did not, they are still privates like us, and it is very hard to come back into our midst once again. It might sound light to you now, but the problem is bigger than what it appears to

be. You see whites did not arrest each other, and we could not either. The least we could do was to report them to the Duty Room, and they would enlist African support as their witnesses. To answer you, I am confused because I enjoy what I am doing, but I hate to work in an environment where you are provoked every time.

Although admitting to some form of racial division, management denied the existence of racial discrimination. Managers were quick to point out that often it is the ex-NSF element that has remained in protest time, and therefore, refuses to accept discipline and professionalism. They blame any complaints about racial segregation or prejudice on the different levels of professionalism that exist between ex-NSF and ex-SADF. The following statement was made in the interview with all the Area Provost Marshals:

We also had an old boys' network in the SADF, but it was more to make the system work, to boost the divisional system, not to sabotage or interfere. One can't discipline your guys (referring to ex-Non Statutory Force). They phone some General in Pretoria and you have to succumb to their pressure. They blame everything on racism. It is all a colour thing!

The divisional system referred to in this quotation is the official SANDF system of command and control, where the immediate superior becomes the divisional officer (DO) of the immediate subordinate. Therefore any welfare, disciplinary measures, communication or any other matter relating to a particular subordinate is channeled through the DO, who would in turn channel the communiqué to the next higher authority until it reaches the Human Resources directorate.

6.4   Human Resources Discrimination

6.4.1   Management Style

In the literature review it was shown how the dominant management style within the ex-SADF was that of racial exclusivity based on the ideology of racial superiority. It was further established that long after President de Klerk had abolished this ideology, it continued unabated in the security agencies because the then Minister of Defence and several other top leaders refused to buy into equality with ex-NSF. As the ex-SADF was managed through transactional leadership, its middle and bottom managers interpreted these premises as the requisite and acceptable behaviour.

Brewster (2000: 37) provides quite a fairly insightful definition of the two terms:

> Transactional leadership is based on the contingent-reward and management-by-exception styles of leadership. Exchanges or agreements with followers are developed, which point out what the followers will receive if they do something right as well as wrong. It is consequently not a relationship that binds the leader and the follower together in a mutual and continuing pursuit of higher purpose.

On the other hand,
> Transformational leadership is a direct contrast to the transactional approach, in which the status quo within the organisation is maintained. It raises both the leader and the follower to a higher level of motivation and morality with a view to changing the present situation by focusing primarily on the external environment. Transformational leadership combines charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation and individual consideration.

For this reason, ex-SADF HR practices were based on transactional methods. This was especially true in the case of the Army and the ex-Army MPs, who were both involved in Counter Insurgency COIN activities, through which human rights were overlooked in the first place. So in the end it became a vicious cycle, where transactionalism encouraged involvement and vice versa. So the ex-Army MPs

represent one of those ex-SADF structures that became bogged down with the preservation of the status quo. That tendency has been transferred to the MPA, as is evident in the many anecdotes quoted by interviewees:

Question: How do you feel about your job?

Response: I feel discriminated against. White privates find us here and they get ranked to Lance Corporal in front of our eyes, and then they are again promoted to Corporals. With the MPA staffing, they were promoted once again to Sergeants. How do I feel about my job? I feel cheap, sub-human and confused. When we inquire about our development, we are referred to MK or APLA, where supposedly we left our ranks. Some of us assisted the ANC in voter education, but like in our spare time. Word went around that we are working double jobs and therefore, which of the two bosses do we serve. They then cynically added: 'Oh! You serve the political master'. It did not end there, continued harassment followed, and we were constantly trapped with little things. You can feel when people are just parking around your private space waiting for you to trip. For example, I was ordered to shave out of the blue, but I had been given a doctor's shaving pass for the previous months already. When things come to a heated point like that, we know that we just succumb, because it can either end up with a charge or incarceration at the Detention Barracks (Interviewee no. 68, a private from the SMCF, ex-NSF and ex-Army MP).

Members from S CSC attest to the same experiences with the transactional management system of the ex-Army MPs. However, they term it "unprofessionalism", or "obsessive militarism", manifesting itself through a fierce clash of interests in terms of the day-to-day running of the unit. For example, it is felt that the RSM, who comes from the Army MPs, is running a police unit like an Army battle school unit, where militarism is more important than policing. The Regimental Sergeant Major is an appointed Disciplinary Warrant Officer, a very prestigious and powerful office, held only by a Warrant Officer Class 1. On the other hand the RSM feels he is not there to be loved but to enforce discipline. He maintains that discipline is the core of policing business, that when this aspect is taken care of, the rest falls into place. The former

Naval MPs feel differently. They maintain that nothing falls into place unless cultivated. Therefore they strongly argue that unless they spend actual time in policing functions, they will not reap the policing benefits of reduced and controlled crime.

Interviewee no. 5 from S CSC, a senior NCO, ex-Naval MP and ex-SADF, described the situation in this way: "Clean vehicles and the shiniest boots do not accost criminals, carry out investigation or conduct deterrence activities. Naval members boast of professionalism, sensitivity to MP-community relations and more 'spot on' policing measures like crime prevention.

Question: What has amalgamation meant for the Naval MPs?
Response: Here in Simon's Town nothing has changed. Change basically entailed assimilating other services - Navy and Air Force into the Army MPs. The work itself has not changed, except for the addition of trivial ceremonies and chores imported from the Army MPs, like the morning parades and inspections; the dogmatic application of the CSW; the strict adherence to laid down procedures – whether they yield results or not, like the 12-Point Investigation Procedure; etc. We are replacing policing with infantry. It does not bother me; it is different but bearable. (The bitterness in the voice gives the interviewee away, one can tell that it does bother him). The 12-point Investigation Procedure is based on the UNISA model.

This conflict of interests in management styles is more deep-seated than it appears on the surface. For instance, it has led to the abandonment of entire projects that had been up and running during the time of Naval MPs, especially in the field of Crime Prevention (CP) and Community Policing. In September 1999 the Naval MPs actually received a letter of commendation from the Ministry of Community Safety, Sport and Recreation through the Flag Officer Fleet. Other projects include Mermaid, a 'dagga' swoop on a nearby area, the Glencairn bushes or Black Hill. The unit boasts a wealth of letters of appreciation and commendation from ordinary S CSC citizens, as well as government ministries. However, when ex-Army MP officers took over the management of the various sections at the S CSC through the staffing exercise most of these projects were not only abandoned but they were destroyed by ex-Naval MPs in anger and frustration. The dissent also stemmed from what ex-Naval members

described as a "… sheer lack of respect for and appreciation of Naval culture and traditions by the new MPA leadership and management. Surely they (the MPA leadership) would not allow a Naval member to take over the Army Battle School".

Other terms used to refer to transactional management and leadership include favouritism and Mafioso:

Question: How do you feel about your job?

Response: The unit is characterised by favouritism; coloureds and whites develop quicker than Africans. We do the hard work, not only hard labour, but also in the offices, because they throw everything at us, but they do not give us recognition. For example, at the moment I am doing a Sergeant's job, and I am only a lance corporal. We were the same rank in 1995. There is reluctance to change here; it is almost like White people plan against transformation all the time. The unstaffed Africans are utilised in physical labour like gardening, and they feel unhappy and angry, as a result, the morale is low. It is not true that they have disciplinary charges against them, that is the minority (Interviewee no. 70 from SMCF, Lance Corporal, ex-NSF, ex-Army MPs).

Another example:

Question: What were your first impressions of the unit?

Response: I arrived here as a lance corporal in 1995, we were made to live in a hall for about a month. This unit has White people who have an attitude problem, for example when we came here there was a certain white Captain who was very nice to us (Africans), the other Whites did not like him. He was transferred from this unit to Pretoria, because he did not agree with them on how they treated us and also how they would talk about us in our absence. So he destabilised their plans and actions; he was a misfit here. Management changes all the time, but only the face, the system of doing things is intact.

Question: Do you love your job?

Response: "Sometimes. It is their (whites) attitude that discourages me. One time I was involved in an incident with a Sergeant, my Section Leader. He likes talking to Africans like they are deaf, he shouts at us, so I stood up against him. Later I came in late due to the taxi violence in Khayelitsha. As I walked in he burst out shouting at me. I put in a statement against him, and the warrant called us both into his office. They started out asking me why I was late, and I pointed out to them that they now going about it the right way; you first find out the reason and then only can you shout. They did not like being corrected by an African, soon their tempers flared up. They shouted so much that the RSM rushed into the office, thinking there was something wrong. He did not ask anything, as he came in, he made indictments to the laziness of Africans (swartes). I just looked at them, all three looked like madmen, I had to stop myself from laughing. I think they could see they were not getting through to me, so the sergeant major started manhandling me, pushing me around and hurling me against the wall.

Interviewee no. 30 is more direct:

Question: I have been given the impression that the MPA is run Mafia-style, do you agree with this premise?

Response: "Those who said so are not far from the truth. This current Officer Commanding is the fourth in a row, since I started working here. I can count up to three of them who qualify for such Mafia-style cliques, terror, suppression and using divide-and-rule. The MPA is white controlled, period. It depends with whom you drink with for a successful or stagnated career.

Members also alleged that management is not consistent in the application of rules. For example, if an African complainant laid a charge against a White member, the complainant could be intimidated. The following incident was related by a Private, interviewee no. 38 from W CSC, ex-Non Statutory Force and ex-Army MP:

… (so and so) called me "'n swart gesig' during the Navy 75 celebrations, so I lost my temper. I answered back and threatened to report him. On our return to the unit he took advantage that we were no longer in the public eye. He pointed fingers at my face, grabbed me, shook me and promised to charge me. I wanted to play it safe, before I also loose my temper once more. I ran to the RSM's office, only to be told, *"Ek luister 'fuckall' van die troepe. Ek wil eers hoor wat die Sersant se."* When the sergeant arrived they spoke in Afrikaans and then I heard, *"Kla hom aan! Sluit hom in DB in. Ek wil 'fuckall' hoor van die swart troepe."* I was locked up for five days. After my release every effort was aimed at frustrating me. Sergeant Major (so and so) told me that, "I am on his firing line, I will be shot. I put in a statement of complaint. The RSM tore it right in front of my eyes. I went to report to the Unit Counter Intelligence Officer, I found a white person once again. He told me to put in a redress of wrongs, but I could see where his sympathies lay, he made no effort to hide it … You know the truth is, there is no escape for us here, not until they change the leadership completely, and also increase the number of African officers. The whites are everywhere; they rule the Military Police Agency. In any case my Redress of Wrongs was also torn right there in my face, I was told that *'n swart gesig, is 'n swart gesig.*

The last anecdote reveals what members generally described as unprofessional HR management, characterised by the 'us' and 'them' attitude, divisions between members on the grounds of former force, race group and gender. In turn this causes the Divisional System to break down, as members develop mistrust. They ultimately choose to agonise over their situation, resulting into a spiral of depression because the more they agonise, the more they depress one another. HR management was also found to be perpetuating division amongst members, as the 'privileged' tend to cling together and vice versa. For instance a member related the following incidence:

Last year, we assisted the ANC voter education campaign in preparation for national elections. We work shifts as you know, so we could do it in our spare time. It was three of us, all from Natal. The Whites here started saying that 'we work double jobs to help political organisations'. Actually my Divisional Officer started the whole thing. Now why must I trust him? He is working

against me. Our treatment became worse after that. It affected my merit assessment, e.g. my discipline was marked low. I was then forced to shave, despite a shaving pass exempting me on medical grounds. Sores and pimples burst out afterwards, and they did not even admit that they had treated me unfairly (Interviewee no. 68, SMCF, ex-Non Statutory Force and ex-Army MP).

Management was alleged to be misusing the MCJS by manipulating facts in order to 'criminalise' whoever was deemed 'a troublemaker.' For instance despite a civilian doctor's letter, some members have been prosecuted for AWOL and discharged, yet for others members, this rule was waived. The members were asked to produce a doctor's letter, which was then certified by a military doctor as valid. This inconsistency led to the discharges of several ex-NSF members at W CSC, especially during 1994 and 1997.

Commenting on the existence of racism, management stated categorically that no incidences had been officially reported and that the Divisional System was fully equipped to contend with incidences of this nature. However, the concern was that the ex-NSF members were flaunting their SANDF leadership contacts by openly fraternising with senior officers as well as by-passing the Divisional System and reporting problems directly to Generals. Fraternisation refers to friendship across the ranks, that is, between an officer and a NCO, especially within the military environment.

Management also expressed concern about the disciplinary levels of Africans and their lack of readiness to assimilate into the Defence Force. This was a subtle echo of the pre-1994 premises as cited in the literature review, where the likes of General Magnus Malan and other senior ex-SADF members contested the notion that MK and SADF standards were equal. Thus management saw the problem as being more one of the unprofessionalism of Africans or ex-NSF, than an inherent MP organisational culture or mismanagement problem.

On the other hand the majority of members tended to condemn the Divisional System as subjective, allowing for bias and prejudice. They cited incidents, such as those described in this chapter, where they were victimised even more through the Divisional System. However, it is apparent that for management the issue at stake is the survival of historical customs dating from the ex-SADF. It would appear that ex-SADF managers imagine a NSF membership, which should fit neatly into the ex-SADF organisational culture blocks, without causing even a slight ripple. This would constitute integration and transformation in the eyes of many ex-SADF members. Interviewee no. 37 incorporates this point in his closing remarks to a question on the key challenges facing the transformation of the MPA:

> You see at the moment there is too much victimisation of personnel, if you are not in favour of management, or you are not seen to be buying them drinks. It happens to white guys as well, who are not part of cream, or favoured ones. Earlier on there were white guys who had no problems with coloureds and Africans, so they befriended us and always came over to our group during lunch or so. They soon realised that they were choosing the wrong side of the fence, so they crossed over to where their bread was buttered, and all of a sudden doors opened up for them.

6.4.2 Amalgamation

This is the process through which the ex-Army, Navy and Air Force MPs came together to form the MPA in 1999. This fusion raised certain fundamental issues, such as organisational culture as well as leadership and management styles.

The general attitude towards amalgamation was found to be negative. However reasons differed per former service, former force, race, gender, rank, and so on. For example, at S CSC members were unanimous negative about amalgamation. The objections were fundamentally similar, cutting across race, gender, rank and former force. The main reason for this negativity is the alleged lack of transparency, red tape and nepotism. Members have gone as far as equating the MPA to the 'volkstaat' or a Mafia clique. There is widespread resentment against the former Army MPs, who are perceived as negating naval culture and customs. Therefore the term, 'amalgamation',

is itself contested, in favour of 'absorption'. There are certain reasons why members at this CSC felt this way. The primary reason is that at the time, three of the four section heads were ex-Army MPs, recently transferred to the centre through the staffing process. Then too there was the an additional role played the RSM, who insisted on running the unit like an Army base.

The most important matter arising from the presence of these ex-Army MPs at S CSC, was the managerial approach, especially with regards to the Regimental Sergeant Major. There are fundamental differences between a RSM and a warrant Master at Arms (WMAA) – Navy equivalent. The RSM is a demigod who knows no limits and his entire position is dependent on how much he can shout at his 'vassals'. His main aim is to instil discipline through terror, and this is often mechanical rather than conscious discipline. His attitude towards his role is that he owns the unit - after all he is the RSM! He is the type that flourishes on statements such as 'I came here to instil discipline, not to be loved'. Naturally, members would scatter helter-skelter at the appearance of the RSM. However, the overriding difference between the RSM and the WMAA will always be about the power wielded over officers. Whereas the RSM's power extends to officers, in the Navy it is almost taboo for the WMAA to command officers in any way. He remains a disciplinarian, but in charge of NCOs. The disciplining of officers is the function of their Divisional Officer (DO), the Executive Officer (XO) and Officer Commanding (OC). Therefore the resentment of officers at S CSC was noticeable:

> Check with the Area Provost Marshall here, he will tell you that time allocated to actual policing duties and functions, has shrunk since this Army sergeant major took over here. The two of them are forever in conflict. I mean it is normal in the Army for the sergeant major to take charge of officers. You know that is unheard of in the Navy!" (Interviewee no. 4, SCS, ex-SADF, ex-Naval MP).

> Here in Simon's Town nothing has changed. Change basically entailed assimilating into other services. The work itself has not changed, except for the addition of trivial ceremonies and chores imported from the Army MPs; like the morning parades and inspections, the dogmatic application of the CSW, including the strict adherence to laid down procedures – whether they yield

results or not. An example is the 12-Point investigation Procedure and the unwavering obsession with military perfectionism, as opposed to policing perfectionism. We are replacing policing for infantry, our professions as police officers are secondary, but that is what we are paid for on the 15th of the month (Interviewee no. 5, S CSC, ex-SADF, ex-Naval MP).

These were the dilemmas faced by ex-Naval MP personnel at the SMST CSC at the time of the research. It was almost as if two people were trying to coexist in a situation where one believed that the rules were meant to facilitate the well-being of the organisation's while the other believed the opposite, namely, that the organisation was meant for the success of the rule. The final effect of this is that members felt negative about amalgamation. On the other hand, the RSM and his two ex-Army MP colleagues were totally ignorant of these frustrations. They were clearly operating in a world of their own. This rendered dialogue between the two parties extremely difficult, and also hampered the formation of trust. The ex-Army MPs were seen as the informants of the new Regional HQ, the S MPR, which was overwhelmingly ex-Army MP. The ex-Naval MP members felt like prisoners in their own turf, because their every move was reported to the S MPR, and this would then be used against their provost marshall, an ex-Naval MP.

Apart from the managerial aspect, this internal conflict affected the core business of the MPA. In the section, Crime Prevention, documentation regarding standing campaigns and police-community crime combating projects, was destroyed by the ex-Naval MPs as a result of frustration. The argument was, that the new ex-Army MP section head should prove his worth, prove that he could effectively take charge of a Navy-heavy unit and stay abreast as his naval predecessor had. The Crime Prevention section had been one of the strongest sections with the ex-Naval MPs receiving letters of commendation from the national to the regional parliament. Relations with the local community and South African Police Services had also been very strong.

In the two ex-Army units, W CSC and the SMCF, there were different reasons for the alleged failure of amalgamation. Members contested the difference between the old Army MP and the MPA. In their perception there was still widespread red tape,

nepotism and a clandestine mode of operation, typical of the old Army MPs. For instance, during this time, a new section, Crime intelligence, was being established at the W CSC. Members expected the establishment of the section to be transparent, so that they could indicate interest in an equitable way. However management handled it in a secretive way. Certain individuals were handpicked as the pacesetters, and unfortunately they were overwhelmingly white. Therefore, the issue of colour re-surfaced once again, leaving Africans with the same old feeling of being excluded.

6.4.3   Staffing

Another source of discontent linked to amalgamation, was the staffing. Members alleged that it was riddled with favouritism and rigidity. They also contested its aim - to transform the MPA and to consolidate amalgamation. They said that it did not integrate MPs into the MPA, instead it re-incarnated the ex-Army MPs, under the new name of the MPA. For instance, they argued that even in cases where the organisation could accommodate a member's domestic circumstances, this was not done. There was a rigid adherence to the rules. Although there was also a select clique that got exactly what it wanted, and this clique happened to be the same old clique from the Army MPs. For example, a respondent who cannot be named even by number, because that was the agreement, insinuates that he was transferred from the Eastern Cape because of his wife. She refused to be silent, like the other wives, about a sexual harassment saga involving the commanding officer. The researcher interviewed the member's wife, who confirmed the story.

MPA HR practices are reflective of Williams' (1992: 2) key statement:

> The wrestling of power from ex-SADF personnel and the sharing of it within the rest of the SANDF, that would be true normative and institutional transformation, but the logical, conceptual and strategic parameters of the integration argument fail to address the key question of the transformation of the institutional power of the present SADF.

6.5   Conclusion

In this chapter normative and institutional transformation were investigated through the mapping of patterns emerging from race and HR discrimination. The patterns emerge from central questions to which respondents replied, questions which covered the following consecutive themes:

- Institutional or organisational culture

- Respondents' opinions about and experiences with transformation

- Issues on education, training and development

It was found that racism and prejudice still occur in the MPA, and also that members cannot use the Divisional System to fight this, because MPA management employs transactional leadership. Therefore frustration builds up, aggravated by the messing conditions for those who live in the mess.

It was further established that transactional management as imported from the ex-Army MPs, continues to flourish within the MPA due to three structural imbalances; racial, former force and former MP service. For this reason, tendencies such as favouritism, Mafioso, prejudice and victimisation, continue to haunt MPA HR practice.

The ex-Army MPs human resources practice of transactionalism impacts mostly on the ex-Naval MPs, who describe it as militarism or infantry-style leadership. It has become clear that there are two management systems in action - whereas ex-Naval MPs tend to emphasise actual policing, ex-Army MPs concentrate on procedures, such as the 12-Point Investigation procedure, vehicle inspections, section competitions, shining boots, and so on.

The next chapter continues with empirical findings. The nature of racial and HR discrimination is discussed, by means of an analysis of what Barker (1988: 37) terms "cultural deprivation - a lack of certain socialisation experiences that affect one's effectiveness in that particular social environment". Deprivation also includes gender

discrimination, especially of African females. While Chapter 6 established the presence of racial discrimination, Chapter 7 explains the guise in which it has occurred through the MP transitional period until today. It shall also be shown how this has affected Africans in the MPA. The chapter ends with a brief comparison of NSF members integrated into the ex-Army MPs with those integrated into the ex-Naval MPs.

CHAPTER 7

CULTURAL DEPRIVATION

Cultural deprivation refers to the absence of certain socialisation experiences that an individual may need to cope effectively in new social situations. One who has been deprived in this way often lacks the social skills, values, or motivations necessary to deal with the relevant environment (Barker 1988:37).

7.1   Introduction

In this chapter the focus is on denied education, training and development (ETD), referred to by Barker as "cultural deprivation". Having established in the previous chapter that the human resource of career management is riddled with sectarian tendencies, racism and red-tape, it is important to focus attention on the state of ETD, another function of HR. This will be done in two ways, namely; through a gender perspective and a review of the ETD component of the ex-Army MPs; and through a comparative analysis between ex-Non Statutory Forces members in the ex-Army and ex-Naval MPs.

The term, 'cultural deprivation', is employed in this chapter by the researcher to mean a lack of adequate and proper exposure, training and development of certain Africans, especially females, within the ex-Army MP's and subsequently within the MPA itself. At the time of the research, such individuals had undergone one course only in six years, their hands-on experience was minimal, and, judging from their day-to-day activities, even after all that time, they could not claim MP experience as part of their acquired skills. These members were behind the white and coloured counterparts with whom they once shared the rank of Private. They were even behind their comrades who had integrated into the ex-Naval MPs at the same time that they had joined the

ex-Army MPs.   As a result they did not meet the staffing requirements for amalgamation into the MPA.

7.2   Deprivation: A Gender Perspective

Female interviewees have provided an interesting insight into the Education, Training and Development deprivation of women in general. However, it is apparent from their anecdotes that African women are the worst affected. Reasons for this lack of training and development are numerous, and the following table attempts to highlight the major ones:

Table 7.1:   Gender Awareness as well as ETD

UNIT	INTERV. NUMBER	FORMER FORCE	MEMBERS' VIEWS
SCSC	No. 4, Senior NCO	Ex-SADF Ex-Naval MP	*No satisfactory African representivity at decision-making level. *Gender representation even worse, at S CSC 2 females out of +_ 35
WCSC	No. 24 Junior NCO	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	*Started off in 1994 in a group of 28, 7 were Coloured. Am still a Lance Corporal, they are Sergeants. *The way I see it, MPA structure is smaller; somebody somehow must be affected – but why us ex-Non Statutory Forces? Whose fault is it that I am not qualified? *Up to 1999 the toilet in the unit was segregated. Was done cleverly, but it was. *Love my job, although I have more bad memories. I am ill-trained.

W CSC	No. 26, Senior NCO	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	*In spite of numerical strength, Blacks (African) sit at the bottom, therefore would argue that gender representation still better. *Great need to invest in the education, training development and empowerment of women. *Resistance to free women to go out and achieve. *Department of Defence EO and AA policies are only a paper show in MPA; management too two-faced *MPA staffed like the pre-1994 racial hierarchy: Whites on top, followed by Coloureds, Indians and at the bottom – Africans.
WCSC	No. 28 Junior NCO	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	*Change is happening as we (ex-Non Statutory Forces) predicted it would, that it will benefit Whites and a few Coloureds who agree with them on the suppression of Africans. *Gender representation very poor, especially African women. They are relegated to the bottom: shift work, patrol guards, duty room guards, etc. *African women work shifts, Whites and Coloureds work a straight 8-hour day as typists, data capturers, personal assistants.
WCSC	No. 29 Senior NCO	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	*There is no representivity here, unlike in Pretoria where I worked. It interferes with my right to the culture, the only little bit I know, I had to go out of my way to learn. *Agree we are soldiers first, then women; but cannot deny nature. Last year I fainted on course a week before its completion, I was ruthlessly informed that I am feeble. They tried to remove me and make me re-do it this year.

W CSC	No. 32 Junior NCO	Ex-KZP Ex-Army MP	*With all the negative things, I love my job. The MP did not develop me, only did one basic course since I joined. *No coaching or anything, I am going out of my way to learn the work, they (management) hide it from us. We must just do foot patrols. Coloured and White women find us here and leave us here to go on course. *Am short-term, so my two kids are not even covered in my medical! *My boss is a woman, she refers to my written work as 'kak'.
WCSC	No. 34 Senior NCO	Ex-SADF EX-Army MP	*Think the agency is fully supportive of women. *Am not discriminated against, am getting support. *Do not know if we are treated the same as Africans, but I know that we fall under the same laws.
WCSC	No. 36 Junior NCO	EX-KZP EX-Army MP	*Are treated like prisoners or children here. *Shouted at, sworn at, like 'fuck off troop!' *Only Africans work shifts. *Have chronic chest problem, if booked off, am woken up for night shift if RSM and sergeant feel like it. *The closest we get to office work is through pretty reports – re-write neatly what the sergeant or other superiors scribbled in a hurry.
SMCF	No. 70 Junior NCO	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	*I joined the MPA in 1995, this was my first unit. I was on course from October to December 1995. Following year was on a promotional course once again, was told to expect promotion upon completion, only promoted in 2000 in the MPA. *It is therefore not true what they (management)

			might have told you, and you do not have to deny it, we know them all very well. I know they told you that Africans are not promoted because they are unqualified: it is a lie! *I am occupying a corporal's post, and I qualify for promotion, but I will not be promoted.

According to table 7.1 all the women agree that there is general suppression of the female gender in the MPA, as well as misuse on the mundane and menial level of work. They further agree that African women are the worst affected, relegated to the bottom of the ladder. This seems to be more common at WCSC and SMCF. Although SCSC is the worst in terms of numerical representivity, with only one female in the whole unit, judging from her entire interview schedule she has no complaints about internal treatment.

There are various forms in which female suppression and misuse takes place. Table 7.1 has raised about ten of these issues; insults in the work place, the writing of 'pretty reports' by African women, shifts being reserved for African women, lack of on-the-job coaching, lack of promotion, ill-treatment while on course, resistance to gender equality, staffing the MPA according to pre-1994 race hierarchy, lack of gender representivity and deprivation. They are grouped into four main categories:

- Gender insensitivity

- Disregard for SANDF policies

- Formal and informal deprivation and racism

- Misutilisation of women

7.2.1   Gender Insensitivity

Respondent 32 raised an issue about her two children who cannot be covered by her medical benefit because she is a contract employee. Although this is a SANDF rule, it would be interesting to see how much support she receives from her female superior, especially on women-specific issues. She said:

> I am 42-years old. I joined the Army MPs as a private (Pt), which means my experience in MK was not considered. I remained a Pt till 1999, when I was promoted to a lance corporal. When I was still a private, I applied for married quarters, I am still waiting. My Divisional Officer (DO) says my son is 17-years old and therefore old enough to take care of himself, but I am a single parent, and my son is still at school. Besides, my daughter is 14 years of age. At first I stayed in a shack with my children, but it was far from here, and my DO threatened to charge me for AWOL if I kept coming late because of bus or taxi boycotts and shooting. The taxi problems in the Western Cape are too much and here at work you do not even get to open your mouth to explain when you are late. By the time you arrive the AWOL sheet has been prepared. You must sign. In the end I moved into the accommodation here, an open hall with beds one after the other. I live with kids 19 and 20 years younger than me; they fight, make noise and use foul language all the time. I feel out of place. On the other hand my kids had to be separated, one is with my sister and the other somewhere else. It is so expensive to support myself here, and the two of them at different places. I am only a lance corporal. I cannot sleep at night sometimes. When I phone them they cry on the phone, especially the younger one. I am course qualified for promotion to corporal; I am told I cannot be promoted because there are no posts. First I wasn't qualified, now it's the posts."

This is one example of gender insensitivity. Of course it is not a major problem. The sensible thing to do would be to write a motivation to the housing committee and facilitate the interviewee's application. It is also common practice in the SANDF, it is within the law and it falls within the Divisional Officer's responsibility to ensure that her subordinates are happy. It is also permissible for the interviewee to seek help from

higher authority, if the sergeant is not responding positively. In this case the next in line would be the staff sergeant or the RSM, but it was established in the previous chapter that the RSM himself is prone to abusing Africans. He is the man quoted as saying: "Ek luister fuckall van troepe"! (He listens to nothing from troops – fuckall.)

Although most of these women's problems are mostly minor routine problems, for instance respondent 32's problem, they require gender sensitivity and awareness. However, because the unit has to endure male domination at all levels of management, there are no women to reinforce gender issues. So firstly, the white female does not see any gender commonality between herself and her African subordinates, race sentiments override that bond and hence she cannot help. Secondly, many gender studies reveal that women who work in male-dominated and chauvinistic environments tend to imitate men, especially as they rise to higher positions. Moreover, the management style at W CSC is transactional, which itself reinforces the mob-psychology mentality, which in this instance is general abuse of Africans, especially ex-NSF and women.

Concerning support from her other male managers, no. 32's problems were seemingly not regarded as urgent, although they had to do with her welfare and the well-being of children, something to which the SANDF attaches a high value. Yet due to being an African female and a member of the ex-Non Statutory Forces, her managers at W CSC dared to defy the Constitution, which advocates protection of women and children. They further defied a SANDF social worker's report, which evaluated the matter as being emotionally damaging to the individual. Worse still, W CSC managers were in a position to influence respondent 32's application for a state house, but they did not do. It is not that they tried and failed, they failed to try. In Table 7.1 above, this is the same interviewee who complains that even when she is booked off by a doctor for a chronic chest problem, she is woken up for night shift if there are staff shortages - another form of defiance on the part of her managers. In the SANDF, the doctor's report is not regarded as final, it is open for discussion, as any Divisional Officer can question it and decide to overrule the doctor. On the other hand, the medical staff became strict with the patient, expecting her to follow their recommendations, and hence in this example the patient is complaining that the doctor was scolding her for disobedience. It is common practice that the most junior

members choose to ignore the doctor's recommendation because their careers depend on their Divisional Officers, not on the doctors.

7.2.2   Disregard for SANDF Policy and Practice

Continued disregard for SANDF policy and practice at W CSC, is reminiscent of the ex-SADF practice where the Divisional Officer's word was law, and a personnel member was manhandled.   The following anecdotes by respondents 36 and 33 respectively, highlights some of the incidents:

> I am not okay, and I am not waiting for you to ask me a question, I am telling you why. I have personal problems; the situation is urgent. I joined here in 1997. That same year I joined, my child's father died. I was forced to move my child in with my mother, but she abuses alcohol and hhm… she… has boyfriends. She is not very responsible; you see what I mean? So, my daughter has been forced to move in with my stepsisters. They are not my full relatives…, and they also use alcohol a lot, but I never saw my father; home has always been with them. I know how it feels to grow up with drinking people; I do not want my daughter to go through my pain. Sometimes I doubt even how they spend the money that I send for her food and clothing.

> I have tried everything; I even involved social workers… In 1999 they informed the MP that my daughter is not in safe home, and that the environment is not suitable to raise a child. The social workers asked that I be transferred to the MPA Central region so as to be closer. Throughout the staffing I have been hopeful that somebody somewhere will come across the social workers' report and do the right thing…this unit did not even forward that report. Why I think so is that I cannot imagine that the C MPA does not care about black people to the extent of ignoring a social work report.

> Of late I started inquiring on my own and I was told that I should wait in line for a post just like all other Privates. The RSM says that the MPA has no posts for Privates. He is asking me how I hope to get a post because I am not qualified, whose fault is it? Every year they put us in that big hall and tell us that no

courses for you (mostly ex-Non Statutory Forces, all African) this year, budget cuts. You see 'sisi', we work shifts here, so it is not easy to study because leave is a privilege, you cannot read a book on the shift and you cannot get away to go and write exams. I sound silly to you, but ask any African here. For example Africans are not allowed to use the phone, even to receive calls. We use the public phone outside, but they (whites) do use the phone.

Respondent 33 said:

When I was transferred here I could feel the resentment in the air, they (sergeant and sergeant major) hate me here. I am pregnant, so I got sick on shift. I did not know at the time, and when I went to 2 Military Hospital (2 Mil), the doctor confirmed pregnancy. He said that I must go easy because I might loose the baby. He followed the procedure, he wrote me a letter, which I handed to the staff sergeant; in return he informed me that it would be the RSM's decision if the doctor's letter will be recognised or not. When the answer came, it was pretty much what I expected: I would work as per normal requirements because pregnancy is not a disease. I tried to go to the Colonel, thinking that as an officer, he would exercise reason and fairness. He sent me back to my superiors saying that he does not get involved in junior NCO matters. I stand a big chance to loose my baby, and I am scarred. One night not so long ago I bled while on shift, I ran to the sergeant, who happens to be a white female by the way, and she candidly told me that I would have to wait for an ambulance to pick me up and take me to 2 Mil. You know…we have ample cars in this unit, 2 Mil is less than ten minutes away, yet she rather preferred to phone for an ambulance and wait for it; I was in a state! The doctors and nurses shouted at me, that I was not obeying them, and that I would be formally charged if I continue to disobey military health rules. They do not know what I am facing here".

Interruption: So why don't you report to the doctors?

Response: So you also do not know how it is here. Afterwards what do I do to protect myself against the sergeant, staff sergeant and the RSM? When they want to destroy here, you can even end up in the Correctional Facility. Anyway I was booked off for ten days and when I came back I was put in the same shift work. I am not even going to ask them, I just hope that I will survive".

7.2.3   Cultural Deprivation and Misutilisation

Having covered gender insensitivity and disregard for SANDF policies, it is time to turn to the third and fourth elements of cultural deprivation and misutilisation, which belong together. Race and gender discrimination have overlapped in South Africa since apartheid rule. African women are exploited as women, as workers and as a race. Therefore they have suffered acute deprivation in comparison with their White and coloured counterparts at WCSC and the SMCF. It is therefore not peculiar that coloured women are treated differently from African women. Interviewee no. 29 from WCSC, a senior NCO agrees with this: "No, we (coloured women) are not in the night shift work". However, as an individual, she finds it wrong that there is the hierarchy of race relations in the unit. She is the same respondent who questions the lack of African representivity in the senior NCO ranks.

Respondents 70 and 24 shed light on the general deprivation and misutilisation of Africans, and in particular, African women:

Question: How do you feel about your job?
Response: The unit is characterised by favouritism; coloureds and whites develop quicker than Africans. We do the hard work, not only hard labour, but also in the offices, because they throw everything at us, but they do not give us recognition. For example, at the moment I am doing a sergeant's job, and I am only a lance corporal. We were the same rank with the coloured ladies in 1995, now they are sergeants, but it means I am not stupid because I am doing the work now! I qualify, but I am black…so…(shrugs shoulders). There is reluctance to change here; it is almost like White people plan against transformation all the time. The

unstaffed Africans are utilised in physical labour like gardening and they feel unhappy and angry. As a result, the morale is low. It is not true that they have disciplinary charges against them, that is the minority.

Respondents 24 continues to paint a gloomy picture about how Africans were held back while other races advanced, and also how they were misutilised in the process.

This was my first unit, from 1994 to somewhere mid-1995, then I was transferred to 9 SAI. As already explained I washed windows and cleaned the yard here before I left. At 9 SAI the same thing happened. I fought, moaned and complained all the time, until I was attached to the Duty Room. No person was assigned to show me the work; neither the Duty Room Sergeant in charge nor his Staff Sergeant welcomed me officially. I was just informed by the RSM that I can go and work in the Duty Room, this means I was not staffed there but only detached. One day a Good Samaritan White lady from Crime Prevention took me aside and volunteered to teach me Crime Prevention work. She negotiated with the RSM to move me from the Duty Room. At first I was only limited to registering the in–and–out movement of cars in order to establish a pattern and then the Good Samaritan would follow me to the mess (living quarters) and there, out of sight, teach me everything I needed to know. It was like we were committing a crime, you know, while all I was doing was learning my job! Now I might not have the certificate, but I know the job, I think you can hear from my speech that I am not ignorant, neh?

When I came to this unit in 1996, the treatment of Africans was still bad, and that was already four years after the SANDF was formed. Only ex-Non Statutory Forces members and other African recruits were building braai-stands, cleaning the yard or washing windows. We were officially told that the Military Police has no use for us, but because we are getting paid every month, we have to work for our money: 'You cannot be paid for nothing', said the RSM. We were wasting time, while White and Coloured recruits were attending courses; today they are qualified and therefore senior to us. Now, if there is an inspection, I become the Crime Prevention maid; cleaning windows, floors, walls, etc. If Crime Prevention wins the Cleanliness Trophy of the Month, I am

not even called to the front to receive it on behalf of the section; instead one of the coloured ladies will be called. Hmm … I think that management is doing this on purpose, just to deal with my morale, or to remind me that I do not belong here – like we were always told when we arrived from Wallmansthall.

Gender suppression and insensitivity were found to be akin to the general management discourse of W CSC and the SMCF. More disturbing however, is the constant overlap of gender suppression and race where African women are the most deprived and misutilised. This is in flagrant contradiction of the WPD 1996, which advocates a new people-centred definition of security and a new defence approach, 'Defence in a democracy'. It is also in violation of one of the 16 principles of the White Paper: "The SANDF shall develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture as required by the Constitution, and the composition of the SANDF shall broadly reflect the composition of South Africa. To this end, affirmative action and equal opportunity programs will be introduced" (SANDF 1996: 8). The examples cited above have only captured a few of the numerous examples which the researcher uncovered.

7.3   Training Opportunities and Hands-on Training

7.3.1   Training Opportunities

The main threat running through all the concerns and explanations is that ex-Non Statutory Forces members were never welcome in the Army MPs at W CSC and that such attitude already predisposed future treatment. Cultural deprivation was found to be acute at the W CSC and the SMCF. Consequently, the cultural deprivation that ensued was not akin to the reception as well as utterances made at the reception. Again, what renders the African stories substantive is that other white and coloured members confirm them as true. The ex-Non Statutory Forces reception is such an emotional issue with many of the respondents, that both at the W CSC and the SMCF a similar version of the story told below was repeated by more than 80 percent of the interviewees in different individual sessions.

Respondent 25 was among the most senior of the African sample. He was the first senior NCO the researcher saw, therefore the researcher thought he might have been promoted through the years, yet she could not reconcile his bitterness.

Question: No question was asked; interviewee came in and burst out with the following.

Interviewee: I am an MK cadre, I am not represented in the leadership of the Military Police. I feel that nobody cares about me. The attitude of whites towards me is negative, they aim their whole effort at discouraging me.

Question: What rank were you in 1994 when you integrated?

Response: Sergeant, that means I have never been promoted in the Military Police since 1994 - this despite the fact that I was under-ranked anyway! My years in MK do not justify this rank. I joined MK in 1978; I was sixteen years in MK by 1994. Show me a White SADF boy of 16-years service who is still a sergeant! This means my experience in MK was not considered at all. I mean one takes seven years to be a sergeant in the Defence Force, ten at the most, but that is an abnormal situation. Instead I was told that I lack military policing experience.   These Coloured girls they take from the streets, and they become sergeants in seven years, where do they get policing experience?

I completed my bridging training by 1996–1997, but I was not promoted since. In the Military Police Agency, I was again staffed as a Sergeant, yet my White counterpart was promoted to a Staff Sergeant (S/Sgt). He is currently being re-staffed in Crime Intelligence and I have to do his job here in Crime Prevention. What will happen is that some other White person will be moved to our section, maybe a sergeant, so that it is promotion for that individual. I do not know what is the problem, because I am doing well in my job; my merit assessments are seven and eight out of ten.

Respondent 41, a junior NCO from the W CSC, has an even more chilling revelation on the reception given to the first ex-NSF batch that arrived from Wallmansthall:

> When I first came I was confused; the reception was cold and harsh. We arrived late at night and they (management) lighted us with torches, searched us and made the dogs sniff at us. It was very hostile. In the midst of that confusion, we were shouted at and informed that we were way too many for the Army MP's; they did not need us all. After that we were shown to our accommodation for the night, an empty hall with mattresses strewn on the floor. For about a whole month we were kept in the hall between 07:30 and 16:00, i.e. official working time and towards the second month we started doing the unit's menial jobs. That festive season we were granted leave to go home".

> I do not know how I feel now, because the treatment has not changed; it is getting worse. In 1999 I was nominated for a Junior Leaders' Course and I did well on the course. I was then selected for an officers' course through the Senior NCO Board. It did not take two weeks for this unit to interfere; I was stripped of the white stripes, and informed that it was all a big mistake. The RSM told me that I would never be officer material. Our matter is confusing because on paper, we were staffed in other units like Natal Command, Gauteng, Far North, etc, but we ended up here. Throughout our time here, we were refused transfers, swaps or anything; even leave is a privilege here. You know just to prove we were brought here for a purpose, i.e. to break us and then sift us out of the Defence Force; our pay sheets were not available in this unit for years while we were already here. In the SANDF you get your pay sheet where you are staffed. I have no charge against my name, but I do not condemn those who do it, because they were mostly charged unnecessarily.

The story of ex-NSF reception at W CSC is repeated in many of the interviewee's anecdotes. Although it is frightening that this is happening to soldiers in the democratic era, it is reminiscent of the treatment given to conscripts on their first day of camp in ex-SADF times. The imbalances in the ex-Army MP's structure allowed for

this practice, because there was no senior ex-TBVC or NSF to dilute the approach. The management style also contributed to the attitude, in that everyone within the base wanted to show off their power and prove that they would be able to hold these 'terrorists' down. Hence the abuse, the insults and the whole drama.

Another retold story is that of the conscious deprivation of Africans of access to courses, exposure to actual policing work other than mundane chores, promotion, self-development (members were discouraged from studying) transfer (some realised that in order to develop they would have to change units), as well as integration. Most SANDF members do not realise that the integration of ex-NSF members ends when they have completed their orientation and bridging training. Orientation training entails courses below the member's rank, while bridging training is the sum total of all the courses required to the current rank. Therefore even if members were attested mainly as Privates, which means no orientation courses, bridging training itself should have been completed, and most of them would have been eligible for promotion to Lance Corporal. In all, the ex-Army MP's failed ex-NSF members by denying them the right to be integrated into the MP's, hence they stayed on the periphery as the 'other', and they were turned into the laughing stock of the unit - loose soldiers without a job description, unqualified and used rather as a task-force. Respondent 73, from the SMCF, SANDF and ex-Army MP's argues that it is not about being ex-Non Statutory Forces, but that it is a colour problem.

Question: What were your first impressions of this unit, or any other unit of the Military Police Agency?

Response: I have always been in this unit and this unit has always been Coloured and White dominated. Career development does not exist for Africans. With my Matric certificate, I am still a private since 1996 when I joined. I have only been allowed two courses, which qualify me for promotion to lance corporal. If I was a lance corporal from around 1997 when I completed the courses, I could have gone for further training, and who knows, with the MPA 'application for post kind of thing'; I would now be contesting for sergeant like my fellow white and coloured colleagues. I am losing interest in the SANDF and when I joined it I was overjoyed and filled with the spirit of a new South Africa. The treatment of Africans has

nothing to do with MK or APLA; I am a living proof. If you are an African you are hated without reason here, or at least that is the reason. The treatment towards Africans is bad. A white private and an African lance corporal do not receive the same treatment; the White Privates get first class treatment compared to the African lance corporal. The SANDF has exposed me to racism. Coming from school, and having been inside the country all the time, I did not have first hand experience of Afrikaner racism, unless when they teargas in the townships or shot at us. Now I can say that I joined the SANDF to meet racism face to face, I hate Whites now, especially Afrikaners.

Yet another anecdote from respondent 67, also from SMCF:

Question: How do you feel about your job?
Response: There is too much racism here. It started during integration days already. When we arrived here they (management) were so harsh, in so much that some of our colleagues resigned, while others were discharged. We were being destroyed openly. The principle of divide and rule was used to charm some of our comrades, and they ended up fighting us, in exchange for favours. So the timid gave in to the RSM's intimidation, some benefited but others did not, they are still Privates like us and it is very hard to come back into our midst once again. It might sound light to you now, but the problem is bigger than what it appears to be. You see Whites did not arrest each other, and we could not either. The least we could do was to report them to the Duty Room, and they would enlist African support as their witnesses, in exchange for protection or favours. To answer you, I am confused because I enjoy what I am doing, but I hate to work in an environment where you are provoked every time.

Question: How do you feel about the Military Police Agency?
Response: It is the same as the Army MP's. We used to be called names when we first arrived here, like 'swartes', 'kaffirs' or 'lazy'. If one of us committed an offence, we were all addressed and warned, as though we did not have individual self-consciousness. The MPA is doing the same thing,

that is, favouring Whites over Africans. All the privileges belong to Whites. Africans are just one number, like we do not have individuality.

It is clear that the problems faced by ex-NSF members are not peculiar to them, but that it is a general ex-Army MPs, S MPR problem, common to Africans in general. The few members that qualified in the group have not been promoted further and their training has also stopped. Basically junior NCO was like a ceiling for Africans in general. Members who escaped menial work, such as gardening, building braai stands or foot patrols, were confined to clerical duties, logging in movement of cars and writing pretty reports. They were still not exposed to taking statements, opening dockets, handling the crime scene, and so forth. Respondent 32 sums it up:

> I was registered with Intec. College for Std 8 in 1998. The living conditions proved futile for studying. The barracks are one endless open hall. There's no privacy. I work shifts. Day workers come into the barracks for tea at 10:00, and for lunch at 12:30. They join those who are off and are loitering around making noise. You cannot sleep or study.

Question: But you are not so busy all the time here in Duty Room. Can't you do some studying at work when the activity is down?

Respondent: Yo! We are treated so badly. At the duty room you cannot even read a magazine. Once caught, you are sent on foot patrol, it is like a punishment. The phone is grabbed right out of your hand while still talking to a complainant, if it is felt that the case 'is beyond your intelligence'. We are not exposed to taking statements, opening dockets, or going to the crime scene, which is all part of General Policing Duties. If you are not confined to the clerk duties, just filling in data in the register or answering the phone, then you are a foot patroller. I am a contract worker. First I was PY, then PV (meaning short term and medium term contract). My contract is renewable twelve-monthly. I cannot risk being seen as arrogant.

The conditions in General Policing duties and its duty room (now CSC), could not be better summed up:

> In General Policing Duties we (Africans) sometimes conduct search and arrest functions. Otherwise the norm was that we bring in statements and then Whites make the follow-up and arrest. So in those times when we can arrest, it becomes impossible to arrest White offenders. When we arrest them and bring them to the Duty Room, our White MP colleagues side with the White offender right there in your face. They tell the offender in Afrikaans that 'I will sort him out' (Ek sal hom uit-sorteer!) and then they let them go. After this you cannot break any law, like coming in late, even if there is taxi violence. If you receive a call they will shout at you that you are blocking official calls. They will give you problems with your leave, you know they do anything to make you angry, and then you react – and they have a case against you. We cannot arrest Whites here, and White offenders know this! When we arrest them or question them on duty they report us to the Duty Room and they are always believed over what we say. It is so bad it is laughable, you know when we stop Whites in the unit, they swear at us, they ask: 'Who is the Military Police Officer in the Duty Room? They imply that they are not ready to deal with you, you are nothing."

When management was questioned as why the bulk of ex-Non Statutory Forces members and SANDF Africans were still Privates and lacked experience, the hasty answer was that the MP's were flooded with ex-Non Statutory Forces personnel that they could not handle within the given structures. When asked why these members were recruited from Wallmansthall in the first place, if the structure could not absorb them, the answer was not as forthright. Management knows that if proper planning and career management were practised, these members could have been transferred to other services or divisions, especially the 20-year olds that joined in 1994–96, whose time in the ex-Army MP's has been an absolute waste of youth, creativity and talent. At the time, the plan was to transfer them to the SAPS, since they were not qualified to be in the MPA. If these members are unsuitable for staffing in a sub-structure, it goes without saying that they are not suitable for a national policing structure, unless some form of training intervention occurs. The SAPS is too beset by

its own problems of competency and professionalism for the Defence Force to use it as a dumping ground.

7.3.2   Ex-Non Statutory Forces Members in the ex-Army and ex-Naval MP's.

Ex-NSF members at the SCSC tell a different story. The ten members were stationed in SCSC straight after Wallmansthall. Unlike their counterparts at WCSC, they report that they were well received. They caution against the over-simplified premise, that they simply walked into a friendly environment and lived happily ever after, but on average they are satisfied with their welcome. They were equipped for the tasks they were expected to perform, either through formal training or on-the-job exposure. They were integrated into the CSC, and at the time of the research they felt a strong sense of belonging. They had just gone through a rank review, a process by which the Navy admitted to their under-ranking in 1994, and therefore re-ranked them anew. The process was open and fair, as a result the members became either senior NCOs or officers.

Interviews with their ex-SADF counterparts at the centre showed that the general feeling was that they deserved their promotion, that their diligence and commitment to policing earned them the right to their ranks. In fact ex-SADF members boasted about their ex-NSF colleagues, saying that in the whole MPA there were no better African products than them. Hence they were concerned that the CSC was fully staffed, without taking these members into account, and this would mean that they would ultimately be drafted elsewhere.

The following focus group case study was conducted in a round table format, with all ten members present. The first hour was a controlled interview, and the second hour allowed for a freer discussion. The last two hours were spent comparing their experiences with those of their counterparts at WCSC.

7.3.3   Focus Group on the Reception and Training of Ex-NSF Members at the
SCSC

The members arrived in S CSC immediately after completing basic training at SAS
SALDANHA. They had experienced some form of antagonism from their instructors
there and also from some of the other Naval members. Hence they were unsure of
what to expect. They were rather scared because they had already heard stories
about the cruel treatment of their fellow comrades in the ex-Army MPs. Some were
already being charged for one or other offence, while others had already been locked
up in the Detention Barracks. At SAS SALDANHA they slept in group dormitories
(open halls), so they expected to find the same accommodation in Simon's Town. To
their surprise and relief, they realised that the Waterfall Barracks, which is junior NCO
accommodation, offers single rooms. This unexpected pleasant surprise re-assured
them, so that by the time they reported for work the following day they were quite
hopeful. Another pleasant surprise awaited them, when they found all the station
members gathered in the conference room where they were formally introduced and
received. An ordinary gesture like shaking their hands was very significant to them,
after hearing snippets about the conditions at WCSC (the arrival at night, the sniffer
dogs, the insults, etc). Within days of arrival in SCSC, their own naval counterparts in
the Protection Branch started complaining about working conditions and the tacit
discrimination. The others also started complaining, especially those on board the
ships.

> It soon became obvious that the conditions at the Naval MP Station were
> better than elsewhere. Like our counterparts at W CSC, we did experience a
> brief lack of purpose, that is, there seemed to be no clear direction on our
> utilisation and development. Then we were split under the various sections at
> the station and each member was assigned a specific 'coach.' We started
> learning. Some of us were not as lucky, they were assigned to people who did
> not teach them much, but the majority of us benefited from such coaching. So
> we taught each other also. You know, it was actually the station commander
> who instructed us to teach one other what we were learning from our different
> coaches" (Respondents 8 – 14).

The members were not accepted for further MP training within that year. However the station commander called them in and explained that the problem lay with Provost School, not the Navy. Basically he experienced some difficulty with the College in getting these members accepted for courses and he interpreted it as attitudinal resistance. All the same the hands-on training continued and the members were encouraged to learn. In the end the station commander bargained for these new members based on the Navy slots at the College, and some progress was made. At the time of the interview, the station commander, now known as the Area Provost Marshall, said: "As compared to their counterparts elsewhere, these guys are the best in the whole Military Police Agency. I do not doubt their ability to lead and execute tasks. We trained them well!" The relationship observed between him and the members was cordial, respectful and quite frank.

The above case serves to illustrate how, with just a little support and acceptance from their ex-SADF counterparts, ex-NSF members could make it in the ex-Naval MPs. In a spirit of integration and reconstruction, as true pace-setters, they have gone on to leave lifetime trails for all other Africans who will join the MPA in the future. On the other hand, their counterparts who ended up with the WCSC were not so fortunate. One SMCF member, respondent 67, sums up their position:

> I came in the first group, from Wallmanthall. It was late at night. Just as we were alighting from the trucks, they flashed torches at us, shouted at us and one Warrant Officer told us that we were too many, that the MPs did not need so many Blacks. He made a personal undertaking to sift us before he left this unit. He did fulfil his undertaking. The MPA has now rewarded him, he is the youngest RSM I have ever seen.

In order to conclude this chapter, a recent interview was conducted with an ex-NSF, ex-Naval MP, now a senior officer in the MPA. The aim was to contextualise the 2000 data, and also to ensure that recent changes are noted.

7.3.4   An Interview with an Ex-Naval MP Member from the MPA HQ

Researcher: Describe the conditions of ex-Naval MPs in the MPA as at June 2003.

Respondent: We are generally disgruntled, we are even thinking of coming back to the Navy. I am a senior officer, and my seniority is 1997, but I do not even have an office. I am sharing an office with a Sergeant Major, and I am also doing his work because I am not staffed. So I have to look for work. This is not peculiar to me, in all we are six ex-Non Statutory Forces and ex-Naval MPs, that are not staffed yet, except one member who is an Area Provost Marshall. What I see are efforts to staff us all out of the MPA environment, in other divisions like Chief Joint Operations. In fact, at the WCSC one of our Lieutenant Commanders is working under an Army Captain, a junior. Another one does not have an office. Just like me, she has no specific job description, she fits in wherever she can, just to keep herself occupied. One of us ex-Naval MP's has told me that he has found himself a post in the Navy, he wants to leave the MPA.

Researcher: Was it better then during the time of the Naval MPs?

Respondent: It was much better. We had work to do. We were seamen (privates) but we were overloaded with work. The Navy did not teach me to come to work and loiter, or to use Crime Prevention patrols as an excuse for walking or driving around. The Navy taught us to be creative thinkers, not foot patrol soldiers.

Researcher: Do you think you are in this predicament just because you are ex-Non Statutory Forces?

Respondent: The situation of the NCOs is not much better. The MPA is not coming out of its blocks to incorporate Naval MPs, period, whether you are NSF or ex-SADF. The SAAF MPs are in no better position. They have just unstaffed an Air Force Colonel from a post within the MPA HQ, and they have replaced him with another Army MP white male; like the MPA is running short of them so badly we have to unstaff other

services, just to get them in. Where is the logic here? There are more Army MPs at HQ than there ever will be other services, if you are asking me! I know the Army is the largest service, but at the moment they are not large, they are the MPA. The conditions of Naval MPs are actually the same whether Black or White. What makes it worse for us Africans is that we are predominantly ex-Non Statutory Forces, which means we have gone through the process of rank review and are therefore not staffed. But while other Naval MPs are in posts, those posts are too junior! They have not been promoted since 2000! You know that I am the only Naval representative within the MPA HQ, and I have already told you how they are treating me!

I want to talk to you about the excess list, just to show you that nothing makes sense in the MPA at the moment. The excess list is a list of all members who are not staffed in this newly approved force structure, i.e. the 'to be' structure, that means they are 'supernumerary'. Out of a list of 862 members, about 850 are ex-NSF members, from privates to lieutenant commander (major) like me.   These privates have undergone the promotional course requirements to the rank of lance corporal, but they were neither promoted nor given the opportunity for further training.   Today they are human excess, waiting to join the force of the unemployed. What I find so ironic is that nobody is asking why?

The Defence Force is just finding ways and means to dispose of this 'surplus', but it was created internally.   Why did so many ex-NSF members end up in the MP if that was not the needed number? You know that the Navy does not have a single Seaman (private) in the whole MPA as we talk? Why do we live in a Defence Force where only juniors are prosecuted for violating the law? Somebody senior must take responsibility for creating this mess, by not doing their job. This is lack of career management and a waste of tax-payers' money, because for so many years we paid MP's to do gardening and build unit braai-stands! Now we sit with 'a human surplus' that is over-age

to be privates or even lance corporals and we want to send it to the police.

Members in the excess list have been instructed to undergo courses with the Service Core just in case we are retrenched. We are told that we will be transferred elsewhere, maybe to the South African Police Services and if a post is available in the future, we will be re-called. The fact is, there should be no ex-Naval MP on the excess list if representivity or equity also means equal service representation in the MPA, at least by quotas, because I accept that the Army is bigger. We are far too small to be discarded, in fact, if quotas can be introduced, you will find that we need more Naval MPs in the MPA.

This interview is important in that it reinforces what emerged from the group interview used as a case study. This officer was working elsewhere at the time, hence was not involved in the case study. It is interesting to observe that the views and perceptions of this member are compatible with those in the case study, especially as regards the level of exposure in the ex-Naval MPs, its professionalism and sincerity to put in a day's worth of work. The interview has also confirmed that ex-NSF members who integrated into the ex-Army MPs and were assigned to WCSC were disadvantaged.

7.4   Conclusion

In this chapter it was discovered that gender awareness and sensitivity do not exist within the organisational culture of the MPA, as well as in its management style. Although gender insensitivity is the norm rather than the exception, African women bear the brunt of its consequences, for instance ETD deprivation - both formal and informal, misutilisation and rank stagnation.

It also emerged that the lack of transformational management as well as an equity-based institutional culture affects the core business of the MPA, which is policing and correctional service. Relationships are characterised by sectarian allegiances, stemming from the old ex-Army MPs, where transactional leadership characterised

choices. In the process, internal divisions posed challenges on commitment and honesty, resulting in members being partial, partisan and prejudiced. Ex-NSF members have cited examples to the effect that they could not arrest White offenders in the ex-Army MPs and that, the dockets in fact would be torn up in their faces.

Likewise, the Military Correctional Facility (MCF) is far from effective and efficient because the same problems are experienced here. Furthermore, the average MCF staff member is not fully equipped to carry out his functions because, at the time of the research, the unstaffed ex-NSF Privates and Lance Corporals composed the bulk of the staff. Having gone through some of their interviews, it can be concluded that the majority was just going through the motions in their day-to-day work. Zeal and dedication had been choked by looming retrenchment, possible transfer to the South African Police Services, re-skilling, and so on. Members were too unsure of what the future held to put in a day's work.

Finally, WCSC and its sister unit, SMCF were found to be the worst in respect of human rights violation, defiance of SANDF policy and practice, racism and prejudice, as compared to SCSC. For this reason, of the ex-NSF members who integrated into the ex-Naval MP's in the same year that others integrated into the ex-Army MPs, not one is still a junior NCO today. Members are either senior NCOs or officers, while those from the ex-Army MP's are not only mostly junior NCOs, they are primarily Privates. Not only are they Privates, they are also in-experienced in policing because they have been misutilised, while their colleagues from the ex-Naval MP's are not only course qualified, they are equally competent due to their years of exposure.

The next chapter is an attitudinal analysis of patterns emerging from answers on transformation and amalgamation. The data is based on questionnaire responses.

CHAPTER 8

TRANSFORMATION AND AMALGAMATION:
A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF EMERGING PATTERNS

Qualitative research conducts a natural inquiry that seeks to understand phenomena in their natural environment, thus making it a discovery-orientated approach (Rudestam & Newton 2000:36). Research begins with specific observations and moves toward the development of general patterns that emerge from the cases under study (Paton 1990:37).

8.1 Introduction

The term 'respondent' will be employed instead of interviewee, because the data used in this chapter originates from the questionnaire responses. However, members will keep the same number code, for example Interviewee no. 3 from the previous chapters would be same as Respondent no. 3 in this chapter. The respondents' responses are divided into three central themes: positive, negative and opinionated.

The term 'transformation', is employed in the chapter to denote amalgamation, that is, changes within the MPA.

Members' attitudes and views about transformation and amalgamation are collated into three categories, positive, negative and opinionated. From these categories trends emerge, from which patterns are mapped. It is of interest that by mapping out the patterns, members' attitudes on transformation and amalgamation collate, because the members displaying positive attitudes, base their response on the futuristic success of normative and institutional transformation.

8.2   Positive Attitudes

8.2.1   Loves the Job

Many respondents reacted positively when asked how they felt about their jobs. Respondent 2 said he feels good, because amalgamation has created intra-service access. He further motivated his standpoint by adding that now members could now be staffed in previous service strongholds such as WCSC which used to be an Army unit, or SCSC which used to be a Navy unit. Respondent 5 and 31 described their jobs as very challenging and therefore enjoyable.   This view was reiterated by respondents 8-14 who commented also on the investigative aspects of the job. Respondent 8 added: "After the trauma of both integration and amalgamation, the appeal process has brought light at the end of the tunnel – hope of a career in the MPA". They displayed pride in being MPA members and also members of the SANDF. In their view military policing is a good job. They are convinced that, in principle, amalgamation is good; it should yield better policing, save funds and ensure uniformity when deployment outside the borders of the country is needed. These respondents were convinced that the MPA has a bright and prosperous future. Respondent 29 feels very positive about her job and loves it. For her there is no other corps other than the Military Police.   She evaluates the transformation as good, because it has broadened the scope of the MPA. Respondents 42 and 85 feel very happy about their jobs.

8.2.2   Passionate

This positive attitude was also reiterated by Respondents 15-23 and 68. They feel passionate about their jobs and maintained that it is their first priority. In their view the MPA is a disciplined organisation. Amalgamation has opened horizons for intra-service expansion. They are convinced that transformation in the MPA is for the betterment of the organisation.

8.2.3   Serving

Different respondents said that in their view this job is aimed at serving others. Although they describe the recent changes in the MPA as challenging, they still loves the job and the people they serve. Satisfied with his career in the MPA, respondent 8 sees himself as a professional soldier. He is convinced the MPA will become the teeth of the SANDF, like the infantry. The post-transformation era of the MPA looks bright. A good solid foundation is set for the future of the MPA. Respondent 31 added that many Africans had altered their mindset because of transformation. Respondent 48 saw transformation as good, it opens the doors for equal opportunities. Respondent 49 is hopeful that on completion of its cycle, transformation will result in a much better MPA.

8.2.4   Challenge

Respondents 59-61 say the MPA is a challenge. They describe it as a career and stated that they have to make it work. Their view is that it is an excellent job. Subject 78 describes his job as important and sophisticated. The job is great with lots of opportunities (Respondent 80). Respondent 82 adds that she enjoys the job, because it teaches her about human relations. Respondent 30 added that the positive attitude towards the MPA is based on the fact that it is a privilege to combat crime.

8.2.5   Professionalism

Respondent 42 added that he is very happy about his job because the new structure has brought with it professionalism. The changes have taken place in a professional manner and he is very happy about this. He is also happy because in his view the MPA is representative of the South African population. Respondent 43 says he feels special to be in the MPA and his primary objective is to prevent crime. He is particularly happy about the increased numbers of the CP Section under the new MPA structure. MPA is representative of the South African population and is characterised by an equal spread of race and gender throughout the ranks.

8.2.6   Representative

Respondents 67, 70 and 77 see the MPA as being representative of the South African population. Respondent 48 sees the MPA as representative, that is, there is an equal spread of race and gender representation throughout the ranks. Respondents 59-61 are convinced that the change has been working in favour of the MPA. It has improved the structure and opened doors for functional specialisation.

8.2.7   Training

Generally speaking, the respondents believe the training programme is average and acceptable (Respondents 25; 26; 28; 31; 37; 70; 76). Some even evaluate it as good (Respondents 28; 39; 41; 45; 67; 77). Respondents 42 and 71 went even further. They are convinced the training is excellent. Respondents 80 and 81 agree.

8.2.8   Positive Relations with the Community

Respondents 26 and 40 conclude that the community relations can be rated as fair. Respondents 28, 31, 39, 77 and 83 says that from their viewpoint such relations are good. Subject 44, 46, 60, 78 and 84 rate the ralations as fair. Respondents 47 to 52 rate the MPA – community relations as good and excellent.

The following table collates all the respondents' attitudes and feelings with regard to the category positive attitudes.

8.3 Emerging Patterns

Table 8.1: Patterns Emerging from the Category: Positive Attitudes

TRENDS	EMERGING PATTERNS
1. Loves the job	Amalgamation can only usher into a better future for the MPA: broader scope, better policing methods, saving of funds and ensuring uniformity. Challenging and enjoyable job. Hope brought about by the appeal process. Hope for a bright MPA future.
2. Passionate	Disciplined nature of the Military Police Agency. Intra-service horizons opened by amalgamation. Transformation can only result in the betterment of the organisation.
3. Challenge	Although they describe the recent changes in the MPA as challenging, they still loves the job and the people they serve. The post transformation era of the MPA looks bright. The MPA will become the teeth of the SANDF, like the infantry. Many Africans have made a mind-switch because of transformation.
4. Serving	MPA is an excellent job, it is important and sophisticated. The job is great with lots of opportunities. The job teaches about human relations. The positive attitude towards the MPA is based on the fact that it is a privilege to combat crime.
5. Representivity, Training Community Relations	MPA is representative of SA population. Training rates from acceptable, to good and excellent.

In Table 8.1 above, the most common patterns emerging from the category, 'positive attitudes', revolve around the central hope that transformation will usher into a better tomorrow for the MPA. This is indicated in numbers 1–3, namely, that members still love the job, they are passionate about it and still regard it as a challenge, because their perceptions and attitudes are pinned on a transformed Military Police Agency. It is worth noting that out of the five categories of trends, three are based on this common trend, meaning that responses are not motivated by the current situation, but by what tomorrow could be.

Discoveries made in the natural environment (Rudestam & Newton 2000:36) of the respondents, that is, the office space, the unit and area of patrols, show that structural transformation has proceeded well (Chapter 4) and includes the re-naming of the Military Police as an agency, and the adoption of a new mission, vision and strategy as well as a new discourse. However, the amalgamated structure of the MPA and its HR functioning, as well as its management style, career management and staffing, as well as ETD, all reveals that normative and institutional transformation are still lagging behind structural transformation.

In keeping with the qualitative method of research (Lincoln & Guba 1985:90), several deductions can be made from the category, 'positive attitudes'. Firstly, it is fair to assume that members' hopes are pinned on the success of the normative and institutional transformation, because structural transformation was almost complete at the time of the research. Secondly, should normative and institutional transformation fail, this category of positive respondents could easily turn to a negative one. Thirdly, the number of respondents whose positive attitude relies on the success of transformation is greater than those whose attitude stems from the actual policing job, as demonstrated by numbers 4-5.

8.4   Negative Attitudes

8.4.1   Feels Cheated

Respondent 3 says she used to enjoy her job, but not any longer, because the Navy MP's have been cheated in the amalgamation process. Amalgamation has meant creating posts for the Army at the expense of Naval MP's.

Respondent 6 is convinced the undermining of African people continues. Apart from General Policing Duties, where they are confined to foot patrols or re-writing procedures, they are also staffed in Crime Prevention only because it involves foot patrols as well. Transformation benefits white people only. The top structure is (still) white and opportunities are for whites (only). The MPA is unrepresentative, both in race and gender. Respondent 6 continues to comment that the rate of theft in the Defence Force is too high. Respondent 6 thinks the future lies in a concerted effort to decrease crime as well as in introducing adequate, professional and efficient utilisation of human resources, not forgetting strong community partnerships.

8.4.2   Bordering on Dictatorship

Respondent 4 complains that crime investigation has ceased to be apprehension-related; the end result does not match the aim, that is, to solve crime. There is instead a shift towards an obsession with administrative and presentation technicalities, as illustrated by the UNISA 12-Point Investigation procedure. The aim of policing has shifted from crime prevention (pro-active stance) to crime investigation (reactive). The function of policing has been reduced to a rigorous concern with militarism (referring to extremism; a harsh dogmatic disciplinary system bordering on dictatorship). SAN has been given a raw deal in the amalgamation process.

8.4.3   People are Numbers

Respondent 5 says: "We are just another number in the MP. Transformation is not occurring; the top structure is white and Army. Civilians in the MPA are not considered as equals with the uniform component." Crime prevention is not a priority in the MPA: it rates 1 out of 10. The focus is on crime control, which involves reacting to a crime which has occurred. MPA does not focus on its core business. The MPA is male dominated. Unless there is a drastic and fundamental change, the MPA will not survive the next five years.

8.4.4   Staffing serves Whites

Respondents 8 -14: Staffing is serving white interests, resulting in continued ex-SADF rule in the MPA. whites are favoured over Black people, they are getting all the higher posts. The staffing process is used to suppress ex-Non Statutory Forces members by staffing them in lower posts. Staffing has resulted in the frustration of ex-Non Statutory Forces members across the MPA. Ex-Naval MPs integrated far too few ex-Non Statutory Forces members; that is, less than twenty. A sign of resistance to change, a practice taken from the mother body, the Navy. MPA employees lack the freedom of scope and initiative; there is always interference from the top (practice taken from ex-Army MPs); it stifles productivity. The MPA top structure is still the same, no organisation can transform itself, therefore there is no transformation in the MPA.

Transformation in the MPA is positive for top ranks, while it impacts negatively at the bottom because nothing has really changed; just the name and adoption of the Army culture. The MPA has no future, unless of course something drastic changes. The future looks bleak; it is a White volkstaat, mainly Afrikaner. Interference from the top is mostly driven by self-interest, seldom is it in the interests of the organisation.

Racism is still overtly and covertly practised, depending on the situation. The MPA breeds White officers (COs) and Senior Ratings versus Black, especially African Junior Ratings. Actual policing has shrunk to 20 percent, while militarist chores and mundane mechanical procedures occupy 80 percent of the time. Used to equate good policing with apprehending and punishment, now we are confused; it is equated to presentable

dockets and clean police vehicles, as well as shiny boots and sparkling belts. Course attendance is not structured as a right, but rather as a favour. The MPA does not adhere to the Public Service policies and views employee development either as a favour or a chance to 'punish' the loud-mouthed by covertly failing them on course.

Respondents 15-23 notes: Transformation has created posts for the Army, regressing the Navy by 10 years. The top MPA structure could be mistaken for the Broederbond. Ex-Naval MPs are being taken over by the Army. Felt victimised at unit level. Used to be proud of their jobs, now felt very negative. Structural adjustments had taken place, but not all embracing change, that is, still the same leadership, tasks and culture. Amalgamation has led to an increase in the crime rate, low morale and low levels of detection.

Respondent WB notes: Dissatisfied with her job because she is not staffed and management is not looking after the interests of Africans, especially in respect of course attendance and promotions. Transformation has been an unfair exercise because only White people are being staffed in posts. MPA is unrepresentative.

Respondent 25 notes that management is still in the hands of a few white people. Rapid changes still need to be done on the ground. MPA is partially representative.

Respondent 26 notes that transformation has not adhered to government policy, for example there are still no signs of representivity especially in senior posts. Integrated members (ex-Non Statutory Forces) are kept back on purpose through keeping them in the dark (lack of exposure and coaching). MPA is not representative and manifests an unequal spread of races and sexes.

Respondent 28 notes that transformation has not meant the staffing of black people, as with ex-Army MPs, they are told that they have no future in the SANDF. The MPA is not representative, either in gender or in and race.

Respondent 29 notes that: the MPA is partially representative with an unequal spread of races and sexes. Training programme is minimally relevant, practical and applicable.

Respondent 30 notes that the MPA is partially representative with an unequal spread of races and sexes.

Respondent 33 notes that she is not enjoying her job, because of interference from superiors. Transformation is changing from negative to positive, the MPA has gone from bad to worse. Conditions have not changed for Africans. MPA is not representative, either in race or in gender. On a scale, MPA training is not relevant, practical or applicable.

Respondent 35 notes that the experience of racism in the Military Police Agency is the same as was experienced in the Army MPs. There are no changes in the Military Police Agency, the management is still the same and also white, right from HQ to the regions. MPA is not representative, only whites are managers, or allowed to be.

Respondent 37 notes: There has not been much change in the Military Police Agency, except that Black people (Africans) joined the SANDF, and came over to the Army MPs - but it seems that white people do not want to work under black people. MPA has an unequal spread of races and gender. On a scale, MPA– community relations rate as poor.

Respondent 39 notes: The situation makes me not to feel well. There are no changes in the Military Police Agency. In Wynberg the posts are only for whites. MPA has an unequal spread of races and gender.

Respondent 40 notes: The treatment of personnel differs significantly from person to person. Change favours only certain people while Africans are treated like dogs. MPA has an unequal spread of races and gender.

Respondent 41 notes: There are no changes in the Military Police Agency, the top structure is still white and promotion is still a White reserve. Promotion is one-sided, only for whites. MPA has an unequal spread of races and gender. On a scale, MPA – community relations rate poor.

Respondent 38 notes: Recent changes left some people behind, while others moved with the changes into the MPA. Those that are unstaffed cannot proceed with the required courses, which means they cannot be staffed because they are unqualified. MPA has an unequal spread of races and gender.

Respondent 46 notes: Views and feelings meant nothing to the MPA because the Colonel is bent on psychological warfare against Africans. As an African in the Military Police Agency, I feel like an outcast. Transformation has been cruel to Africans, therefore it is not good. Feels that he (as an African) threatens White domination in the Military Police Agency.

Respondent 47 notes: Her problems started only when she arrived at this unit; she was labelled and discriminated against. Has a problem with the racist nature of the MPA staffing, consider only white and coloured interests. The MPA is partially representative, there is an unequal spread of gender and race.

All three Africans (respondents 48-51) felt that the attitude of fellow colleagues do not exhibit a humane disposition. They claim there are still too many mistakes left unrectified on the side of non-SADF members who integrated in 1994. As such, education of Africans is not recognised, the bulk of NSF and TBVC members have been reduced to a task force, engaged in menial work. Two African members see transformation as having been unsatisfactory and unfair for the Africans. Three members see the MPA as unrepresentative. One African rates MPA– community relations as poor.

Four members (respondents 52-55) have used words such as 'confused ' and 'upset' in referring to how they feel about their jobs. For the first member the confusion stems from working with colleagues who "hate you due to the colour of your skin; this results in a dilemma between loving the job and facing the reality that you will never prosper as long as your superiors are white". Although staffed, the second member is experiencing the same feelings as the other three because of the rampant corruption in the agency; member is calling for Chief of the SANDF to intervene.

According to respondents 59-61 there has been no transformation in the Military Police Agency, it remains lily-white and many problems are still unresolved. Two member sees the MPA as unrepresentative.

Respondent 67 said the changes in the MPA are confusing because they staff unqualified Whites and leave Africans aside. Respondents 62-64 formulated it as follows: Transformation has been antagonising, unsettling and a nightmare because of favouritism and the predominant promotion of Whites and the lack of representivity.

According to respondent 68 the MPA is racist, it victimises Africans. Whites are advantaged over Blacks. The MPA is un-representative of the South African population. On a scale MPA – community relations rate as poor. Subject 79 had mixed feelings about the job, the doubting part has to do with the blatant advantaging of Whites through transformation.

Respondent 71 wants to see transformation become practical. His view is that Blacks are undermined by Whites, especially Afrikaners. He does not feel right about transformation because it is not for Blacks but for Whites. NSF and SANDF members who joined in 1994 at the birth of the new force) members are still privates and lance Corporals; whites and coloureds who came later, for example, in 1998 are sergeants upwards. The top structure is strictly white. MPA is unrepresentative, there is an unequal spread of races and gender.

Respondent 72 feels the Defence Force is still run like apartheid institutions, where the African is not part of the human beings. Amalgamation was done very wrongly; the very boards that negotiated the process and those that sat down to conduct the staffing exercise were not representative. As a result, over 90 percent Whites have been staffed, but the bulk of Africans are unstaffed. Africans are treated like imperfect, guilty persons. He sees the MPA as unrepresentative - unequal spread of races and gender.

Respondent 76 said transformation is not happening because key positions like the officer commanding and regimental sergeant major, are still white-controlled.

Respondent 77 says the future is negative for Africans, especially the 1994 to 1998 intakes. Respondents 83 and 84 added that the changes are happening too slowly, and benefiting only a certain race, a few people.

Respondent 85 agrees that transformation favours one group only, the whites.

8.5 Emerging Patterns

Table 8.2: Patterns Emerging from the Category: Negative Attitudes

TRENDS	EMERGING PATTERNS
1. Feels Cheated	Navy MP's have been cheated in the amalgamation process. Amalgamation has meant creating posts for the Army. Undermining of African people continues. In General Policing Duties and Crime Prevention, Africans are confined to foot patrols. The MPA is unrepresentative both by race and gender. Rate of theft in the Defence Force is too high. The future lies in a concerted effort to decrease crime as well as in introducing adequate, professional and efficient utilisation of human resources, not forgetting strong community partnerships. Course attendance is not structured as a right, but rather as a favour. MPA views employee development either as a favour or a chance to 'punish' the loud-mouthed; by covertly failing them on course. Structural adjustments have taken place, but not deep-seated change. MPA transformation has not adhered to government policy, not even to Public Service policies.

2. Bordering on dictatorship	Crime investigation has ceased to be apprehension-related; end result does not match aim, that is, to solve crime.
	A shift towards obsession with administrative and presentation technicalities.
	Policing has shifted from crime prevention (pro-active stance) to crime investigation (reactive).
	Function of policing has been reduced to a rigorous concern with militarism.
	Transformation not occurring; the top structure is White and Army.
	The MPA is male dominated.
	MPA employees lack freedom of scope and initiative; there is always interference from the top, a practice taken over from ex-Army MPs, it stifles productivity.
	Interference from the top is mostly self-interest driven, seldom in the interests of the organisation.
	Transformation in the MPA is positive for top ranks, while it impacts negatively at the bottom.
	Actual policing has shrunk to 20 percent, while militarist chores take up 80 percent.
3. Persons are Numbers	Just another number in the Military Police Agency.
	Civilians in the MPA are not considered as equals with the uniform component.
	Crime prevention is not a priority in the MPA; rates it 1 out of 10.
	MPA not focus on its core business.
	Focus is on crime control, that is reacting to a crime that has occurred.
	Unless there is drastic and fundamental change, MPA will not survive next five years.

4. Staffing Serves whites	Staffing is serving White interests, rendering continued ex-SADF rule in the MPA. Whites are favoured over black people, they are getting all the higher posts. Staffing process used to suppress ex-Non Statutory Forces members by staffing them in lower posts. Staffing has resulted in frustration of ex-NSF members across the MPA. The MPA top structure is still the same, no organisation can transform itself; therefore there is no transformation in the MPA. The future looks bleak; it is a white volkstaat. Racism is still overtly and covertly practised, depending on the situation. The MPA breeds White officers and Senior Ratings versus African Junior Ratings. Integrated members (ex-Non Statutory Forces) are kept back on purpose. Africans are treated like dogs. Colonel is bent on a psychological warfare against Africans. Bulk of NSF and TBVC has been reduced to a task force, engaged in menial work. Africans are treated like imperfect guilty persons. Coloureds are the preferred race, as in apartheid times.

The collation of trends emerging from the category, 'negative attitudes' in Table 8.2 above points to the fact that normative and institutional changes have not yet taken place. This is the reason that members think they are being cheated, treated as nothing more than numbers through a management style bordering on dictatorship, and also that staffing serves whites.

The trends can be divided into themes, namely, the utilisation of the workers' right to employer-provided education, training and development as a favour, and as a punishment in order to get back at members who oppose management and to

stagnate Africans in general. This is what has been referred to as cultural deprivation in the previous chapter. The following sub-trends are linked to this bigger theme:

- Interference from the top is mostly self interest driven, seldom in the interests of the organisation.

- Racism is still overtly and covertly practised, depending on the situation.

- Course attendance is not structured as a right, but rather as a favour.

- The future is negative for Africans, especially the 1994 to 1998 intakes.

- Seniors are bent on a psychological warfare against Africans.

- Bulk of NSF and TBVC (Blacks) has been reduced to a task force, engaged in menial work.

- Treatment of personnel differs from person to person.

Another central theme is continued racism, sometimes covert and, at other times, overt. The following sub-trends are linked to this theme of racism:

- Undermining of African people continues.

- Africans are treated like dogs.

- Africans are treated like imperfect guilty persons.

- Coloureds are the preferred race, as in apartheid times.

- Integrated members (ex-Non Statutory Forces) are kept back on purpose.

- The MPA breeds white officers and senior ratings versus African junior ratings.

- Whites are favoured over black people, they are getting all the higher posts.

A crucial theme that attests to structural changes without necessarily transforming institutional and normative culture is the repeated 'nothing has changed' premise. It is also linked to a variety of sub-themes:

- Navy MPs have been cheated in the amalgamation process. Amalgamation has meant creating posts for the Army.

- On a scale MPA training is not relevant, practical or applicable. MPA manifests the same problems as the Army MPs.

- Structural adjustments have taken place, but not deep seated change. MPA transformation has not adhered to government policy, not even to public service policies.

- Staffing is serving white interests, bringing about continued ex-SADF rule in the MPA.

- The MPA top structure is still the same, no organisation can transform itself; therefore there is no transformation in the MPA.

- MPA employees lack freedom of scope and initiative; there is always interference from the top, a practice taken from over ex-Army MPs; it stifles productivity.

- Nothing has really changed, only the name and adoption of Army culture.

- MPA lacks gender representation.

In keeping with Rudestam and Newton's (2000:36) premise that qualitative research makes discoveries in the natural environment of the phenomena under investigation, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 established the prevalence of racism, misuse of managerial powers to award or deny career development opportunities, transactional leadership

and the fact that the MPA has undergone cosmetic changes only while the real challenges still lie ahead. Therefore the questionnaire data serves to validate conclusions reached in the other three chapters on empirical findings. It has been indicated that even where respondents showed a positive attitude towards their jobs in the beginning of this chapter, this optimism was based on the success of institutional and normative transformation. As a result, respondents' positive attitude is in itself not a negation of the discoveries made in respect of red-tape, sectarianism, cultural deprivation, prejudice, racism and gender insensitivity.

8.6   Opinionated

8.6.1   Representative

Respondents 8-14 said that the Chief of the SANDF needs to investigate the overt transgression of the equal opportunities and affirmative action policy in the MPA. There cannot be a structure that is newly staffed, which looks like ours; it is a violation of the Constitution. Amalgamation was not a consultative process, I have never seen a revolution imposed from above actually succeed. This was a chance for revolutionary change in the MP, we could have given birth to something dynamic; history shall judge us one day. The MPA is not representative, both by race and gender. Respondent 2 said it is good to have women police for female body searches. She has never heard of the Cultural Diversity Course. The Correctional Facility is a place of rehabilitation. The future looks good, the MPA is going to be one of the biggest military policing structures in the world.

8.6.2   Training

Respondent 2 believes the training offered is good to excellent. She heard of the Cultural Diversity Course. Respondent 3 strongly supports the Cultural Diversity Course but cautions that old habits die slowly. Respondent 4 also strongly supports cultural diversity training; thinks it is long overdue for MP's for it breeds better inter-race understanding. Subject 6 says the cultural diversity course breeds social understanding and respect for different cultures, it is a good course. Subject 7 strongly

supports the cultural diversity course; it fosters understanding. Subjects 8-14 said the MPA require specialised equipment and a training review to improve course standards. This will improve community relations through service delivery.

Respondents 8-14 gave the following reviews: One member believes the training offered is not relevant, practical or applicable, while another believes it is minimally relevant, practical and applicable. Four members believe it is average. Some think Cultural Diversity fosters understanding of historical atrocities and healing. The course must be introduced at all levels of management and in the training curriculum. A civilian member should be appointed as a full-time employee of the Military Police Agency, looking after race relations and cultural diversity. One member has never heard of the course. Cultural diversity breeds social understanding, respect for other cultures and good race relations.

Respondents 15-23 had the following to contribute: Three members believe the training programme is minimally relevant, practical and applicable. Two believe it is good. Two believe it is excellent. One believes it is average. Seven strongly support the Cultural Diversity Course because it fosters understanding.

8.6.3   Correctional Facility

Respondent 2 believes the Correctional Facility is a place of rehabilitation. Respondent 3 believes the Correctional Facility is heavy punishment, because the instructors have no knowledge of rehabilitation. Respondent 5 said the following: The Correctional Facility is a place for discipline, introspection and rehabilitation. It must instil self-discipline, not mechanical behaviour. It would be hard to implement rehabilitation because it requires time. One has to find the cause of criminal behaviour, then devise solutions, not treat the symptoms. Military personnel who transgress the law should be discharged, the Defence Force has no time for rehabilitation. Success of the MPA lies in honesty, multi-racialism, emphasis of tertiary education (gone are the days when policing was a career of illiterates) and cultural diversity (very important).

Respondent 6 says the Correctional Facility is a place of punishment because former inmates do not change their behaviour, instead, they become worse. They are instilled with hatred, and they wish to avenge themselves on the organisation. Respondent 7 agrees that the Correctional Facility is a place of punishment, that is, retribution because offenders emerge from them more bitter and full of hatred. They normally go back, that is, same offenders. Respondents 8-14 also agree that the Correctional Facility is a place of retributive punishment. One member thinks it is a mixture of both, because soldier imprisonment must be harsher than that of civilians – soldiers should know better than to break the law. Africans are the primary inmate statistic, members are instilled with hatred, and there is an absence of gainful time utilisation such as skills development. Four members say it is a rehabilitation place because members are given a chance to step outside of their daily routine to think about their standard of discipline.

Two members believe it is a place of rehabilitation; it is hygienic, provides reading material and is not harsh enough for 'soldiers' – they should never break the rules in the first place.

8.6.4   Task of the Military Police Agency

Respondent 2 believes crime prevention is strictly the task of the MPA. He believes the MPA is engaged in crime prevention, not crime control. Community policing partnerships are the way to go because the MPs and the defense community are all soldiers. This partnership is important. The community is the source of information for the MPs. Respondent 4 sees Community Policing as a partnership with the larger SANDF community. More specialised equipment should be available for proper policing. Respondent 7 and 8-14 believe crime prevention is the nucleus of policing. They say prevention is always better than cure. Crime prevention utilises deterrence, a fundamental aspect of policing; it scares criminals through enforced psychological presence. Successful crime prevention is the best public relations campaign to improve the name of the SANDF amongst citizens.

Respondent 3 thinks the MPA is committed to heavy crime control (reactive) instead of crime prevention (proactive). There is no plan, it is more crises management. Seven

members believe the MPA is conducting crime control, because there is a crime prevention manual. Three believe it is crime control. One member believes the MPA is more crime control inclined, that is, re-active. Her argument is based on the size of the crime prevention sections and the absence of a specialised crime prevention course.

8.6.5   Women

Respondent 2 states it is good to have women military police for female body searches. Respondent 3 believes women should be employed in the MPA in order to ensure equal opportunities. Subject 5 is of the opinion that it is good to have women military police because they bring a different insight into an investigation and crime scene; for example, rape cases, domestic violence, child abuse, and body searches. Females brings normality and humanness into harsh policing. Respondent 6 says it is good to have women police, it promotes equal opportunities and also allows for the utilisation of women in special cases, which require women only, such as female body searches. Subject 7 argues that women are more capable than men, they are usually wives, employees, mothers and overall Chief Executive Officers of the family; and they still get awards as best performers on all these fronts. The MPA does not only need women police, but also women managers; at top, middle and lower echelons. Most women hate crime, so they will make excellent crime fighters. Employing women in the MPA promotes equal opportunities, non-sexism and the sprit of non-racialism.

8.6.6   Future Prospects

Respondent 2 thinks the future looks good, the MPA is going to be one of the biggest military policing structures in the world. Respondent 4 thinks the future of the MPA is bleak, dominated by the Army MP's while both the Navy and the Air Force are being systematically phased out. Respondent 5 thinks the future lies in a concerted effort to decrease the crime rate, introducing adequate, professional and efficient utilisation of human resources as well as breeding community partnerships. Respondent 6 says that for the MPA to secure a better future, the following should happen: representivity (gender and race), timely promotions and the introduction of Y2K compliant courses. Subject 7 thinks the future looks good, but success depends on an open structure that

allows for upward mobility. Respondents 15–23 thinks the future looks good, but success depends on an open structure that allows for upward mobility, an increase in personnel, strong community partnerships and successful change.

According to Respondents 15-23 the transformation in the MPA has both been positive and negative; that is, created new structures, therefore better opportunities. However the accommodation of all personnel in the new structures will determine if the change was positive or not.

Respondent 25 believes the MPA should invest in training, in order to better equip its members to perform their jobs effectively. It would be good to be a Military Police Officer if the MPA functioned according to a plan.

The MPA needs to correct the current staffing statistics, cannot just staff only Whites.

Women military police can do typing and also serve as the backbone of the organisation. The women outweighs the man as the backbone of the organisation. Cultural diversity is the most important course: it prevents cultural conflict. The Correctional Facility is a place of punishment. She thinks the inmates are treated badly; Pollsmoor (civilian prison) is even better. For the future, more work has to be done in order to transform the MPA into a professional organisation.

Respondent 30 is of the opinion that transformation has both been good and bad. Women have the right of employment in the MPA because discrimination should not exist, whether by colour or gender. Cultural diversity is good, it will facilitate a mind-shift towards inter-cultural understanding. The Correctional Facility is a place of rehabilitation; used to be a place of punishment in the past. New changes such as the 1996 Constitution, the Bill of Rights, etc protects inmates. The future looks good, there will always be a need for policing; must just get a little bit of scope to do the job more freely.

Respondent 70 believes the Correctional Facility is a place of punishment, discipline and fitness. Says the future looks good, the MPA has opened up prospects for promotion. Women should be employed in the MPA. Cannot see the future.

Respondent 69 says women should be employed in the MPA. Respondent 71 agrees that women should be employed in the MPA because there are female – specific tasks. Women should be employed in the MPA, it is an inherent job requirement. Respondent 76 and 77 says they believe women should be employed in the MPA because it is part of the job requirement. Respondent 79, 80, 81 and 82 all agreed that women should be employed in the MPA because it is part of the job requirement. The Defence Force has women in its population, and women can also be offenders and require policing. It is in line with women's democratic rights. Respondent 83 and 84 believe women should be employed in the MPA because it is part of the job's inherent requirement. Believes women should be employed in the MPA. Women should be employed in the MPA because the MPA should not be chauvinistic.

Respondent 79 says the future is only guaranteed if the staffing process is reviewed and the structure is re-staffed, focusing on making race representation throughout the ranks. Only if members of the MPA start believing in each other.

8.6.7   Crime Prevention

All six respondents (Respondents 8-14) believe in community policing partnerships. Policing is impossible without the help of the community. They also asserts that community partnerships are essential to ensure success. The MPA is the natural leader of such partnerships.

The duty of the MPA is to prevent crime, especially in collaboration with the SAPS, because of the national situation of a high incidence of crime. The MPA conducts crime prevention because the focus is on specific areas of the SANDF only, while nation-wide crime goes unabated.

Respondent 28 believes it is the duty of the MPA to prevent crime because it is trained to do that. Believes the MPA conducts crime prevention because there is a Crime Prevention Section amongst the six specialisations. Community Police partnerships must be part of the corps training. It is good to have women police because Defence Force women also commit a lot of crime.

Respondent 29 states that it is not the duty of the MPA to prevent crime. The SANDF community should assist the MPA because MP's cannot be everywhere 24 hours a day. Rather, the MPA should conduct crime control because statistics indicate the same repetition of the same crimes. Community police partnerships is good because crime prevention cannot take place if the community is working against the police.

It is not the duty of the MPA to prevent crime, the SANDF community should assist the MPA. Believes the MPA largely conducts crime control but the mandate is actually crime prevention. There has to be a mind-shift. Believes in community police partnerships because these breed good policing results.

The MPA largely conducts crime prevention. Believes in community – policing partnerships. Respondent 72 believes in community – policing partnerships. Together with the police, the community can be a team, a force multiplier. Believes the MPA largely conducts crime control.

Respondent 79, 80, 81 and 82 believe in community – policing partnerships because the MPA is part of the Military Criminal Justice System (MCJS), so the other partner, LEGSATO is part of the community. Secondly, the community will learn to trust the MPA in a partnership and therefore exercise loyalty. Thirdly, crime prevention can only happen when the police stand behind the community. Lastly, it is better to look at the whole Defence Force as a family, rather than at segments. Respondent No. 83 and 84 believe in community – policing partnerships because if the community confides in the MPA, it will give up perpetrators and information that is valuable in both crime control and prevention.

8.7   Patterns Emerging from the Opinionated Category

It is important to note that even through these opinionated responses, the lack of normative and institutional transformation is again reiterated: "There is a future only if drastic change happens soon, there has been enough racial killings, the MPA should acknowledge the negativity towards Africans and their justifiable grievances. The

future looks bleak, the majority of Africans are still unskilled, and training is still the reserve of whites" (Respondent 82).

Furthermore, the domination of courses by whites, as well as the need for them to embrace diversity, is also repeated: "The Cultural Diversity Course is suitable for Whites, but that is the course they overlook – for all the monopoly they have on course attendance" (Respondent 76).

The pinning of hopes on the aftermath of transformation has also been repeated by respondents in the process of sharing their opinions. Respondents 8-14 could not have summarised it better fashion: "Future success depends on the following: representivity, establishment of viable upward social mobility channels, an improved education and training system, replacement of the top structure and a civil education campaign. The future will be dictated by the success of transformation; it should be deep-seated, not just changing of names or uniform. The future depends on a visionary leadership that is committed to the country and the SANDF, not just self-seeking individuals".

8.8   Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter collated questionnaire responses, first into trends, then into patterns, followed by a graphic summary of the positive and negative responses. It came out that, even amongst those members who are optimistic, hope comes from the conviction that normative and institutional transformation will work out, just as structural changes worked out. This was an important discovery in that it authenticates findings from Chapters 5, 6 and 7, which indicate that the organisational culture of the MPA has not changed. It further corroborates trends from the category, negative responses, wherein members cite the continued usage of ex-Army MPs mode of operation within the MPA, as well a lack of deep-seated transformation, other than simply a name change.

Consequently, one cannot help but walk away from the empirical findings convinced that the transformation has yet to take place in the MPA. At this point it is good to pause and consider again the series of questions asked in the section, 'research goal'. Firstly, it was asked why structural transformation preceded normative and institutional transformation. Secondly, is organisational transformation feasible and thirdly, what stumbling-blocks and challenges are there? Using material from the empirical findings discussed in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 the following responses emerge. Structural transformation preceded organisational transformation because structural transformation is easier to implement than organisational transformation. There is hope for normative and institutional transformation, but it will take visionary leadership, external intervention and thoroughgoing representivity, including gender representivity. The difficulties are the shrunken structure of the MPA, the large numbers of unqualified African personnel, especially ex-Army MPs and changing the mind-set, that is, a clean break with the past. The challenge faced is to bring about mobility, that is, to exit the top white candidates, so as to create space for upward mobility.

 Respondents 8-14 sum it up perfectly: "Chief SANDF needs to investigate the overt transgression of equal opportunities and affirmative action in the MPA. There cannot be a structure that is newly staffed, which looks like ours; it is a violation of the Constitution. Amalgamation was not a consultative process, I have never seen a revolution imposed from above that succeeded. This was a chance for a revolutionary change in the MPA, we could have given birth to something dynamic; history shall judge us one day. Believes the MPA is not representative, both by race and gender ".

The next chapter is a qualitative analysis of the failure of transformation in the SANDF and its impact on the MPA. Weitzer's analysis of repressive states is employed to investigate how the ex-SADF behaved under transition, its survival methods after 1994, and how the model for liberalising the security apparatus can be applied to it.

CHAPTER 9

TRANSFORMATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON FINDINGS

It would appear that, to maintain the primacy of civil control over the armed forces, more than legal framework is needed. One can suggest that it requires the political will of the principal actors in the armed forces to ensure compliance with the constitutional prescripts, coinciding with a visible determination from the political authorities to involve themselves proactively in the affairs of the military (Weitzer 1990:8).

9.1   Introduction

Whatever the circumstances, the fact is that the negotiation process in the Republic of South Africa (RSA) had to start from the premise that the current white population was in the country to stay, that they were also part of the nation, and therefore their fears had to be taken into account. Actually, the former President of the Government of National Unity (GNU) labelled this as 'white fears' and by understanding its fears, he worked very hard to get this sector of the population to buy into the new democratic dispensation. Sachs (1998:16) describes the position of the African National Congress (ANC) at the time as having been inspired by all the lessons learnt throughout the years in exile and prison, especially the years spent in Robben Island: "Fortunately for us, it was possible to open our eyes wide before entering into negotiations. It was important not to reject pluralism, but to accept it, not as something negative, but as something that would allow the people to work, to participate, to advance their interests, and not to be afraid of democracy".

Regardless of the good intentions of the ANC, the claim existed amongst Whites for " … a protected and special position … so as to avoid a black majority controlling and dominating everything and taking revenge" (Sachs 1998:12).   One could therefore argue that in this respect, the South African negotiation process differs from the rest of the Southern African processes; it was not 'a winner takes all' situation. It has been

further analysed by Sachs as a process of accommodation, rather than compromise, wherein " … the participation of millions of people acting with great calm and intelligence in the midst of severe conflict and mistrust. We worked and worked and attended thousands of meetings" (Sachs 1998:18). He also presented the South African process as a successful but difficult example of democratisation and nation-building. Nevertheless, he admits that democracy and human rights do not provide the final solution to political problems, but that they are merely a framework within which to consolidate nation-building. This implies that the conflict continues to seethe beneath the veneer of democracy.

Therefore democracy is more the channelling and contextualisation of conflict than the end of it. In this regard, the struggle for the implementation and maintenance of democracy continues at micro-level, long after the victory over apartheid had been pronounced at macro level. Therefore this chapter seeks to contextualise the conflict within the SANDF, therefore MPA, in order to establish whether it is a result of genuine cultural, political and intellectual differences, or the typical response of a 'coercive security apparatus resisting change' (Weitzer 1990:1).

9.2   Background on Empirical Analysis

Although the ex-SADF had the Divisional System, an internal structure composed of a hierarchy from the bottom to the top, and vice versa, to be used for conflict resolution, administration, welfare and general organisation, the secret war necessitated a third-force type management. This tendency to manage in a Mafia-style still continues in the SANDF where, as was demonstrated by the ex-Army MPs, there is an official channel and the sect. As was demonstrated, this sect is more powerful than the official system, therefore members feel obliged to mingle with the sect to ensure normal or accelerated career development. This is the reason why the ex-Army MPs did not change between 1994 and 1999 - the transition years. Change had to be driven within the official Divisional System, while the sect proved the stronger in its resistance to change. As a result, the ex-Army MP culture has been imported into the MPA.

The opportunity to reform the security apparatus came in 1989 when the country started the transition from apartheid to democracy. However, the security forces did not utilise this opportunity. It would seem that it was untimely to open up to transparency and accountability after the decades of secrecy. Perhaps there was too much still to hide or to destroy. Irrespective of the reasoning behind it, the reality is that the security apparatus continued in the same way as before. Most third-force activities continued unabated, the top SADF leadership continued to publicly attack MK and APLA in the media, and the role of the police and the Defence Force in repressive action against Africans continued. This cynicism remained in the minds and hearts of middle and lower management, so that when the top leaders were demilitarised after the JMCC Talks, the middle layer of leadership that moved up to the top was itself not broad-minded. This ripple effect filtered down to middle management, which had previously been lower management. As a result, after 1994, the top and middle leadership of the ex-SADF perpetuated racial hatred within the SANDF, not explicitly, but simply through resistance to change.

As a result, when actual democracy came in 1994, the ex-SADF was not ready to embrace it fully. As in any organisation in the throes of transformation, it was easy to change the top leadership, but it was not so easy to change the mindset on the ground. Perhaps middle management did accept the change because, being far off retirement, job security was necessary. However, middle management also had to contend with the attitude of the lower ranks from time to time, and after many years of racial superiority, it was often not easy to make a moral decision. As has been demonstrated in the field research, these became difficult times, and often the old philosophy transcended over that which was in the process of coming into being. For instance, a case in point is the W CSC, where White MP personnel interfered in the powers of arrest of its fellow African members, whenever such powers happened to cross the Black and White racial barrier. As expressed in many anecdotes by interviewees or respondents, Africans are generally treated as an inferior class in the unit, especially women. This is reminiscent of the apartheid hierarchy, wherein African women occupied the very lowest rank.

However, it is equally important to highlight the failure of the current democratic government to address the situation within the MPA, a situation which is not uncommon in SANDF units. It is a problem that is embedded in the SANDF mode of operation, where formulae for change are numerous and available, but there is no capacity for monitoring or for retribution. Therefore there is considerable discrepancy between theory and practice, so that the key role players can actually afford to ignore off transformation without any adverse effects on their performance assessment and career development; and this is exactly what happened in the ex-Army MP unit, Wynberg. When it came to Africans, management even dared to ignore the doctor's recommendation, knowing that there would be no adverse effects because of the lack of external monitoring and evaluation.

9.3   Peculiarity or Universality

This section examines the South African military transformation against the backdrop of Weitzer's analysis of the reform of coercive institutions; namely, the interplay between a coercive state and the military, and how the military tends to remain unchanged under the new democratic government. The analysis will achieve two things; that is, it will assist in establishing the peculiarity or the universality of the South African situation, as well as investigate the various attempts by government at military reform. Weitzer's model for reform will also be used to map out a framework for further reform and transformation in the SANDF, which would impact on transformation in the MPA, which is, in turn, viewed in the overall context of the successful transformation of the SANDF.

9.3.1   Security Apparatus during Transformation

Weitzer's first argument is that coercive states rely on the security apparatus, which in turn become their source of demise. This characteristic has been discussed at length in the section on literature review. It has been demonstrated how the political state under apartheid relied heavily on the police, the Defence Force and the intelligence institutions. It was also shown how the violence meted out by this security apparatus ultimately became the very catalyst for the breakdown of apartheid.

9.3.2   Unchanged Security

Weitzer's second point is that the security apparatus remains unchanged during the transition period. If applied to the South African situation, the security apparatus did not transform with the political state under the De Klerk administration. This has already been demonstrated in Chapter 2. For this reason, excuses were sought to ensure the former security personnel's survival after the integration process. The requirement for the maintenance of 'standards' was used, more as an exclusive excuse rather than a professional reason, because MK and APLA were supposedly less professional. As a result, the ex-SADF superstructure became the basis for the new SANDF. Ex-SADF members simply went to bed on the 23 April 1994 as SADF members, and woke up on the 24 as SANDF members. Whatever happened next found them in the security and comfort of their offices. These and many other benefits created the impression that all eight forces were assimilating into the old SADF, now known as the SANDF. This had a major impact in reversing the consolidation of democratic change in the Defence Force, especially in the Army, which was the forerunner of the old Army MPs, and the largest service within the MPA.

9.3.3   Routine Adjustment

Therefore, what transpired in the JMCC Agreements in terms of the ex-SADF was not total liberalisation, but a mere " … routine organisational adjustment, innovation and reform" (Weitzer, 1990:11). It had little or no impact on the underlying organisational culture. This can be seen in the 1993 ex-SADF internal proposals for the formation of a new Defence Force, in which it is insinuated that the ex-SADF should form the nucleus of whatever new force comes into being. This is exactly what triumphed in the JMCC Agreements. Consequently, the JMCC Agreement was not an accidental occurrence for the ex-SADF, it was pre-planned in a spirit of racial arrogance and domination. On the other hand, the other forces accepted this premise in good faith, believing that it was unnecessary to re-invent the wheel.

9.3.4   Resistant to Change

Therefore the ex-SADF (Military Police Agency) has remained largely resistant to change, unless that change ensures the old way of life. Weitzer (1990:11) calls this " … a decisive delay of democratic progress". A closer examination of the SANDF in the first three to four years after democracy indicate very slow progress with regard to equity matters, namely, Equal Opportunities, Affirmative Action and Representivity. This is because there was continued ex-SADF control of training, recruiting, the Military Criminal Justice System and the officer corps. The degree of control differed from service to service, or division to division. Seemingly, the MPA is amongst the worst. On the other hand it was a very crucial time in the history of the SANDF. It was the period of the first phase of integration, which entailed " … the integration of the former SADF and the NSF and the education and training of all members of the new SANDF to meet international standards of competence and professionalism" (Shelton & Alden 1998:347). However, due to the inheritance of the ex-SADF superstructure, the ex-SADF members did not experience the problems of ex-Non Statutory Forces members of having to undergo training in order to qualify for their ranks. While ex-Non Statutory Forces members were undergoing bridging training courses, the ex-SADF continued to control the system, with ample time to stall democratisation efforts, as is evident in the MPA.

9.3.5   Training

Respondents have alluded to the above pattern during field research, albeit with anger and bitterness, which sometimes clouded the real issue. The control of education, training and development enabled the ex-SADF to allow selective access to training and development by the ex-Non Statutory Forces or any other member who was not part of the old boys' network at the time. If not selectively availed, education, training and development could simply be deprived, leading to complete intellectual under-development. The latter occurred in the MPA, as was demonstrated by vast numbers of ex-Non Statutory Forces members who, up to the year 2000, had been exposed to only the most basic MP course. As a result, the majority did not even qualify for staffing in the MPA, because the new rank structure does not accommodate the rank of Private, which unfortunately constitutes the bulk of African people.

On the other hand, where access to training was granted, it could also be complicated by other related factors, such as disciplinary action for alleged copying. Not that disciplinary action is in itself an underhanded act, but it becomes so when applied selectively. Members have cited incidences that show that this was the case within the ex-Army MPs, and that this culture has now transcended into the MPA. This illustrated another aspect of this pattern. The MCJS was still ex-SADF controlled, therefore as already shown in the field research, this allowed for its manipulation by those who intended to do so in order to stagnate transformation. For example, cases were cited where black members were reprimanded for applying the MCJS to white members. In the same context, it was illustrated how such cases ultimately disappeared within the system. With regard to recruiting being under the control of the ex-SADF, the pattern of race ratios changed very slowly and selectively, mostly in the support sector as opposed to the combat sector, which is the core business of the SANDF. In return this prolonged the advantage scored in the JMCC, that is, being the process as well as the system owner. Therefore the core business of the SANDF remained white, especially in the Navy and SAAF.

9.3.6   Frustrating the Restructuring

The third point made by Weitzer (1990:14) is that the security apparatus frustrates the efforts of transformation to encompass the rule of law and human rights. As far as the MPA is concerned, field research uncovered several incidences that bear testimony to how ex-SADF personnel frustrated efforts at transformation. During the transitional state efforts were concentrated on wresting state power away from the military and returning it to the barracks. Therefore, after 1994, formal legislation was passed, aiming at democratising the SANDF and regulating its deployment in order to ensure that never again would a clique within a specific population (white) be able to use the Defence Force against the rest of the country's population. Such legislation was encapsulated in the WPD, which came out in 1996 propagating Defence in a democracy, establishing civilian control of the military and identifying the security of the people as the key Defence issue. After the WPD 1996 the restructuring of the SANDF took precedence, in order to comply with the force design, force structure, force employment and human resource imperatives as stipulated in the Defence Review. At present, the moment the government is restructuring the public service through the

transformation and restructuring process, which relates to the human resources function of the SANDF.

However, while there is acclaimed success on paper, there is minimal, if any, success in reality. If Weitzer's analysis of coercive institutions is employed, it would seem that the discrepancies are not SANDF specific; instead they are a replica of not only a repressive state under transformation, but also a coercive security apparatus that has been forced to democratise. An obvious example of the discrepancy between theory and practice can be seen in the implementation of the human resource-related principles of the WPD 1996 theme, 'Defence in a democracy.' While the Equal Opportunities (EO) Directorate was established in 1997 and the EO Policy promulgated in 1999, followed by all its related aspects such as the Affirmative Action Plan, the Fast Tracking and Mentoring Policies, such policies have had little impact on the mode of operation in the MPA. Moreover, the EO Directorate is not empowered to undertake a retributive function, it is only empowered to exercise a mere monitoring activity. As a result, as has been seen in this research, the MPA leadership and management has not abided by these policies, especially the old Army MPs, and also the MPA before April 2003 when the old leadership was changed. Therefore, to date, the MPA remains White male dominated, and gender representivity still has a long way to go.

It was found that, at level four, gender sensitivity is still an unknown factor, and even more, any consciousness of female empowerment, regardless of the Department of Defence's EO Policy, which is already four years old. Another example of non-compliance with the principle of 'Defence in a democracy' is the continued defiance of the principle relating to respecting "…the rights and dignity of SANDF members within the normal constraints of military discipline and training" (SANDF 1996:8). It was demonstrated how the dignity of members has been violated, violation based on gender, race, former force as well as service. It has also been established that normative and cultural transformation has not taken root in the MPA, despite a stipulation to this effect in the DR 1998. While Equal Opportunities (EO) and Affirmative Action (AA) form part of the Performance Agreements between Service and Division Chiefs on the one hand and the Chief of Defence on the other, neither EO nor AA form part of the line function assessment criteria. What is clearly required is

governmental capacity for structured monitoring, intervention, and retributive action for failure to implement transformation policies such as the WPD 1996 and the DR 1998, or the current Human Resource Strategy 2010, or any other policy imperative.

To summarise, the old SADF within the MPA remained unreconstructed during the transition period, therefore the integration process failed to alter fundamentally the face of the SANDF, because the ex-SADF dominated managerial positions and combat posts. This led to a stalling of the transformation process in the first few years after 1994, while from the year 2000 the problem has been the upward mobility of qualified Black people, caused by stagnated ex-SADF members at the top. Hence, long after 1994 and up to the year 2000 when the empirical research was conducted, gross violation of human rights still took place at W CSC. Even though the MPA provided MPs with a rare opportunity for a new beginning, this chance was missed because ex-SADF members were in charge of the process. Hence six years after the democratic government came into power, the MPA structure looks as pathetic as it appeared last in June 2000 - with top management positions occupied by one particular race (white), that is, 96 percent top management, 65 percent middle management, 78 percent functional management and 42 percent supervisory management. At the time, the white work-force constituted about 3 percent of the work-force, so every white person was in charge. Meanwhile, out of a total of 1 916 Africans, 925 were privates - the work-force. These figures clearly reflects an in-balance ratio in management.

9.4   Proposed Solution

9.4.1   Civil Control

Weitzer's (1998:8) proposed solution for the transformation of coercive institutions is a thorough transformation of the security apparatus, which would guarantee genuine democratisation of a newly established state that was formerly a repressive state. It would appear that, to maintain the primacy of civil control over the armed forces, something more than a legal framework is needed. It is possible that this would require the political will of the principal actors in the armed forces to ensure compliance

with the constitutional prescripts, coinciding with a visible determination on the part of the political authorities to involve themselves proactively in the affairs of the military.

9.4.2   Strong Policy, Weak Delivery

The Presidential Review Commission (PRC) established in 2000 that there had been little success with regard to the transformation of state departments, and that too little progress had been made in remedying the inequalities and inefficiencies of the past. The PRC clearly states that strong policy does exist in respect of weak delivery. The report identifies various causes for the weak delivery, ranging from a lack of skills and capacity to a lack of common vision. Hence, a deficiency in coordination and cooperation, exacerbated by contracting outside agencies to carry out major transformational projects without necessarily re-educating existing staff. The list is lengthy, including such issues as the mismatching of administrative budgets, which has to do with the allocation of scarce public human and financial resources. As a result, policies often lack funds or the human capacity needed to carry them through to implementation.

The situation in the SANDF has not been different. "There are those who argue that no significant transformation has yet occurred. This position asserts that the ostensibly more enlightened SANDF differs little from its predecessor. The force remains a conventional military dominated by an experienced corps of Afrikaners" (Winkates, 2000:9). Elsewhere, Shelton and Alden (2000:346) give an account on how government, in a bid to foster transparency in Defence matters, invited the public to participate in the formulation of the WPD 1996. As a result, the WPD 1996 was criticised as vague, inconclusive and lacking in time frames and figures. For this reason, it became necessary to formulate the DR 1998, which streamlined planning and delivery targets. This meant a two year delay for delivery targets.

9.4.3   Gender Issues

Finally, gender insensitivity remains a severe obstacle to democratisation of society. South Africa "… is a country with vast inequalities in race and class, which bring a new dimension to gender integration beyond that of the 'equality of rights' commonly

associated with the European debates" (Heineken 2002:715). Despite having one of the most democratic constitutions in relation to gender awareness and women affirmation, the need to go beyond the policy rhetoric lingers on. A recent national survey revealed that of 1 000 women in metropolitan, urban and rural South Africa, 63 percent of the women had experienced sexual abuse. The average reported rape cases increased by 23 percent between 1994 and 1997, and these trends continue unabated (Heineken 2002:724).

These facts cast some light on the gender problems confronting the SANDF and also provide a background to understanding the obstacles in the way of race and gender equity in the MPA. Despite the promulgation of the policies against women and child abuse, sexual and gender harassment as well as rape and gender violence is on the rise in the SANDF, with black women being victims to a great extent than their white counterparts. This mirrors the situation in broader society. Therefore social cohesion is more race based than gender-based (Heineken 2002:722). This is the background against which the misutilisation of African women takes place at WCSC. The continued denial of their basic human rights should also be understood against this backdrop.

9.5   Challenges

9.5.1   Commitment

It is evident that transformation and restructuring in the MPA require a clear and total commitment on the part of all parties concerned in the broader context of the SANDF. Transformation and restructuring should be encapsulated not only as a function of service/division chiefs, but also as that of line managers through a regulated line function enforced and monitored through performance assessment. This factor is emphasised by Brewster et al. (Weitzer 2000:57) in their principles of Strategic Human Resource Management wherein they identify the three major tasks of strategic managers namely, the formulation of fully considered business strategies, the establishment of Human Resource goals and action plans at all levels, and lastly,

working with line managers as principal clients to ensure that established action plans are indeed implemented.

In the case of the MPA the top level leaders seem to have put the framework in place and business strategies are out e.g. the WPD 1996, the DR 1998, Human Resource Strategy 2010, the Equal Opportunity-related policies and action plans etc. It would seem that the third step, that is, the buying in by line managers is a glaringly absent. The transformational imperatives are not part of the line function and, as such, they are ignored, mocked or simply viewed with disdain, as was found at the W CSC. Therefore for a long time the MPs continued along the same path. It is therefore of crucial importance to move the implementation of transformation beyond merely the theory, and also beyond the executive as well as top leadership functions, to the grass roots level and to task the Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate with the monitoring function.

9.5.2   Monitoring

Proper monitoring as well as retributive functions need to be developed and perhaps located within the Inspector General directorates, because they conduct unit inspections as well as investigations. The biggest challenge remains the buy-in by white members in relation to AA matters, and the buy-in by males in general with regard to women affirmation. To this end, SANDF leadership needs to embrace as the defining essence of leadership, the concept of leading by non-routine influence Katz and Kahn (1978:87). Zaccaro and Klimoski consider *"… the essence of organisational leadership to be the influential increment over and above mechanical compliance with the routine directives of the organisation"* (2001:8). Applying this kind of leadership within the SANDF will enable even those small segments of the military such as the MPA to transform, because leaders and managers will lead by example knowing that transformation is a line function.

Even so, the Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate has to be mandated with the overall monitoring function and its reporting line should be directly to the Secretary of Defence and to the Minister Of Defence, who is the ultimate authority in the department. In turn, the Minister Of Defence should report quarterly progress to the President, who is

after all, the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. This would force the service and division chiefs out of their comfort zones of referee and player – this includes the Chief of the SANDF.

9.5.3   Dissemination

The WPD 1996, the DR 1998, and the Human Resource Strategy 2010 have to be popularised and disseminated to members of the SANDF, so that each member understands the direction of transformation and the challenges involved. Members also need to start treating these documents as the blueprints of transformation. This would enable leaders and managers, especially at levels three and four, to realise that representivity is an issue of legitimacy for the SANDF, and that the lack of it will always breed mistrust and non-compliance, leading to low morale and poor discipline. At the moment transformation documents are not well known within the SANDF, and they are hardly taught in formal training. On the other hand the principal purpose of the WPD 1996 is stated as: *"… to inform citizens and other states, particularly those in Africa, of South Africa's new Defence policy. The White Paper is also intended to serve as a confidence and security building measure in Southern Africa"* (SANDF 1996:4). Therefore, if the WPD is intended to announce something new, namely, a new Defence policy, then it becomes the task of all leaders and mangers at all levels to propagate its message and influence. The danger with the military is that it is bureaucratic by nature, and routine in its line functions, so it is easy for non-routine tasks to be relegated to the bottom.

9.5.4   Racial Interaction as Communication

Communication is often cited as the backbone of any relationship. It has already been established how the organisational culture within the MPA is primarily exclusive of Africans and Black people in general, which means there is minimal citizenry interaction or communication between the various races in the MPA. It further means there is little scope for commonality and co-operation between fellow workers, but most of all, between fellow compatriots in arms. Although it might seem negative and frightening, it is however interesting to note that this might not be peculiar to the MPA - it could be a reflection of the state of affairs in the SANDF and broader society. Wilson

(2003:14) states that integration is about creating and maintaining high levels of morale, patriotism and pride, which is in turn brought about by the nation's ability to first establish and then adhere to a set of national norms – without these, the people in society will feel increasingly insecure resulting in escalating self preservation behaviour, thus destroying any sense of patriotism and pride. The commissariat played this exact role in the ex-Non Statutory Forces in close conjunction with managers at all levels, especially line managers. The commissariat was defined as a structure of political commanders. It's role was moral regeneration, maintenance of morale, unity, equity and encouraging members' self improvement through collective criticism. The commissariat also served as a constant reminder of organisational policies, goals and principles.

9.5.5 Equity

It would also seem that apart from the strategic interventions suggested above there is also a need for immediate thoroughgoing intervention in the form of MPA Affirmative Action (AA), MPA Fast Tracking (FT) and mentorship in order to promote race and gender equity as speedily as possible. No amount of good intentions or change will bring about unity and accommodation in the MPA for as long as gross inequalities exist in terms of not only race and gender representation, but rank levels as well. Equity would also facilitate professionalism because hierarchical mono-ethnicism breeds favouritism and corruption, therefore rendering the organisation ineffective, as has already been highlighted in this dissertation.

9.5.6 Inspirational Leadership

Lastly, emotions are running high in the MPA - the general perception of African members is negative. Therefore, it seems that inspirational leadership is among the main requirements at the moment. Zaccaro and Klimoski define an inspirational leader as one " … with executive attributes (which are) personal qualities that facilitate the successful accomplishment of executive performance requirements, which in turn drive organisational success" (Zaccaro & Klimoski 2001:23). Therefore a new type of leader is required for the MPA, in order to bolster the top leadership change that occurred in 2003, otherwise this advance will also be reversed.

9.6   Conclusion

In this chapter a qualitative analysis of the failure of transformation in the SANDF and its impact on the MPA were analysed. Weitzer's analysis of repressive states was employed to investigate how the ex-SADF behaved under transition, what its survival methods became after 1994, and the model for liberalising the security apparatus was applied to the SANDF. A solution was proposed, followed by challenges.

It was generally found in the chapter that, although a regulatory framework for transformation does exist, a tighter grip on the MPA executive is needed as well as on middle and line management. Equity should be demanded from the MPA, with rigid time-frames that would force management to comply without trying to buy more time. The MPA needs to adopt a more business-like approach in its dealings with the SANDF policy, otherwise it will remain distance from fulfilling its policing function.

The next chapter and the last chapter, outlines the findings, conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER 10

SUMMARY, FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

The SANDF shall develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture as required by the Constitution; and the composition of the SANDF shall broadly reflect the composition of SA. To this end, affirmative action and equal opportunity programs will be introduced. (SANDF 1996:8).

10.1   Introduction

The future of an integrated and transformed military through the imperatives of both the WPD 1996 and the DR 1998 lies in effective and efficient execution. Sadly, as alluded in the previous chapter 9, and further demonstrated earlier in Chapter 2, the capacity for implementation lies with Ex-SADF members within the new SANDF who has remained resistant to change during the transition period. Instead, the Ex-SADF members merely went through a nominal adjustment, such as the name change – from SADF to SANDF. As such, they are still a force within a force. The impact is that the legislated requirements seems more as an exclusive excuse for maintenance of the status quo rather than a professional reason.

10.2   Summary

The preceding chapters comprised an introduction and description of research methodology, in which attention was given to the researcher's choice of qualitative research, the goal, rationale, approach, focus, design, sampling, ethical issues, limitations as well as constraints and layout of the study. It is in the first chapter that the reader was orientated on the direction of the research, the reason why it was undertaken and the reason for the choice of topic. Care was taken to include

respondent classification, since it is a qualitative study in which respondents would be frequently quoted.

The second chapter of the research was dedicated to reviewing literature on the military under apartheid, the transition era, 1990–1994, as well as the Defence Force born of democracy, the SANDF. The focus was on the origin of military institutional culture, its resistance to democracy post 1994, and its effects on non ex-SADF members. To this end, transformational policies were evaluated, and the analytical framework discussed against which past policies were evaluated.

The third chapter provides an in-depth review of the research focus, the Military Police. A link to the mother services is provided, and this link spans the spectrum of establishment, the links to the colonial predecessor, involvement in the Total Strategy in the 1980's and resistance to or embracing of transformation after 1994. Next, the Military Police structures themselves are reviewed from formation up to 1994, with special emphasis on the continued interplay with the organisational cultures of the mother services. The chapter ends with the establishment of the MPA in 1999.

The fourth chapter is the core of the literature review wherein the pronouncements of the MPA are analysed in order to determine the thoroughness of the changes undertaken. This is done through an evaluation of the new discourses, the mission, vision and strategy.

The fifth chapter follows with a description of amalgamated structure of the MPA, taking into account race and gender equity, especially at managerial levels, which is linked to rank in the military. This is the first chapter which deals with empirical findings and which introduces material from the interviews, in between the literature analysis.

Chapter 6 is an analysis of the normative and institutional transformation in the MPA, following on the structural changes as discussed in chapter five. This is done through the analysis of the Human Resources function, looking at the organisational culture, racism, managerial style, and the process of amalgamation. Attention was given to the way these issues were experienced and reviewed by the respondents.

Chapter 7 continued with human resources issues as experienced and perceived by respondents by way of evaluating the education and training aspect of the human resources issues. The term "cultural deprivation" is used to cover the conscious denial of training opportunities to African members due to racism. The chapter ends with a comparative analysis of ex-Non Statutory Forces integrated into the ex-Army MPs as opposed to those who integrated into the ex-Naval MPs.

Chapter 8 presents empirical data from the questionnaires, mapping trends and patterns which emerged from the findings. It is in this chapter that the respondents' attitudes and opinions are discussed.

Chapter 9 provides a qualitative analysis of the failure of the normative and institutional transformation in the SANDF and therefore, in the Military Police Agency. Weitzer's analysis of repressive states was employed to investigate how the ex-SADF behaved during transition, what its survival methods were after 1994, and the model for liberalising the security apparatus was applied to the ex-SADF. A proposed solution was offered, followed by challenges.

The tenth and last chapter is devoted to summarising, providing findings, drawing conclusions as well as making recommendations on how to transform the MPA.

10.3   Findings

10.3.1 The South African Military, Past and Present

Under the apartheid government, especially from 1978 when Prime Minister Botha came to power, the military, known as the South African Defence Force, gained political status through the adoption of the Total Strategy policy. This was a philosophy based on the paranoia that communist were about to take over the country, under the guise of the African National Congress.

The tactics of Total Strategy were finalised in the early eighties, under the name, Counter Insurgency (COIN). This gave the military unlimited powers in its campaigns

against the liberation movement and its allies, resulting in an organisational culture of unaccountability, red-tape, extreme secrecy, racial intolerance and hatred, as well as a transactional leadership and management style.

The State Security Council ensured political interplay at state level, while the National Security Management System allowed for provincial and grassroots organisation and mobilisation. The military permeated all levels of government, and all aspects of civilian life, including the community, the church, the schools, and business.

The South African Army soon became notorious for its obsession with Counter Insurgency tactics, resulting in gross violations of human rights. The ex-Army MP's were also drawn into Counter Insurgency. In the end the ex-Army MP's inherited the organisational culture of its mother service, the Army.

During the political transition, from 1989 to 1994, the South African Defence Force did not transform along with the other government departments because President de Klerk lacked the political will to enforce deep-seated military change, but also because he intended to use the military as a power bait, in case negotiations failed.

The Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee Agreements appointed the ex-SADF as chief executor of the integration process, creating the impression that it was professionally above the other integrating forces - this reinforced its culture and domination, and therefore its resistance to change.

10.3.2 The Military Police Sections

The Military Police structures which emerged under apartheid were segmented according to the three services, the Army, Navy and Air Force. These three services originated in varying circumstances, albeit from the same source, the British military. However, with the rise of the National Party, the Army was Afrikanerised, while the other two services remained predominantly English, especially the Navy.

During the Botha regime the Army, along with its Military Policing structure, became involved in the secret war against the liberation movement and the regional states.

The experience of this involvement was not progressive, rather it led to narrow nationalism, racial prejudice and lack of transparency. Hence when transformation occurred in 1994, the ex-Army MPs were not ready to embrace it.

During 1994 and 1999, when amalgamation took place, the ex-Army MPs sought newer methods of survival, instead of transforming with the rest of the SANDF. For this reason the ex-Non Statutory Force members who integrated into this structure were unwelcome. From 1994 until recently - when the empirical research was conducted, the bulk of these members still felt like outsiders in the Military Police, because they had remained unqualified, incompetent and "un-promotable".

10.3.3 The Military Police Agency

The Military Police *modus operandi* was adopted in the middle of 1999, with the establishment of the Military Police Agency, amalgamating ex-Army, Navy and Air Force MPs. New discourses were adopted, and these were contained in a document called the MPA Strategy.

Central in these discourses was the abolition of multi-functionalism, which allowed for the cross-utilisation of members in all policing functions, such as Traffic, General Policing Duties, Crime Prevention, Crime Intelligence, Investigations and Correctional Facility duties. Functional specialisation was introduced which forced members to make life-long choices within a specific field.

The new mission, vision and values were found to be progressive and in line with transformational policy prescripts, such as the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, and the White Paper on Defence, 1996. The general approach and aim were found to be aligned with professional policing, service delivery and accountability.

The amalgamated structure was not as progressive as the policy documents. It was found that the ex-Army MP's dominated the structure, making it White male – heavy, while ex-Non Statutory Forces and women occupied the bottom rung of the rank hierarchy. Of the women, Africans were the most affected, denied access to

formal education and training opportunities as well as on-the-job exposure, they constituted the three bottom ranks of Private, Lance Corporal and Corporal.

Africans were the most affected when it comes to racial discrimination. The coloureds people were given preference, which is a legacy of apartheid, wherein they were regarded as second class citizens, next to the whites. For this reason, Africans constituted the majority in the rank of privates, namely, 925 out of a total of 931 members. Of the total percentage of Africans in the MPA, which was 78 percent, only 30 percent were not privates.

Race inequalities in rank mean unequal race representation at the various management levels, which in turn means the continued domination of the ex-Army MP culture within the MPA. It also means White domination of institutional culture, thereby fostering resistance to change and inculcating a spirit of 'business as usual', defying both transformation and amalgamation. As a result, marked differences developed between the ex-Army MP's and the ex-Naval MP's with regard to management and leadership, *modus operandi* as well as policing focus. These differences reached a peak with the staffing of a Regimental Sergeant Major in a previously Navy-strong unit, Simon's Town Client Service Centre. According to ex-Naval MPs policing had shrunk to a shadow of what it used to be, while military chores took over, such as vehicle inspections, or the dogmatic application of the 12-point Investigation Procedure – whether it yielded results or not, as long as the steps were correctly followed.

Although completed, structural transformation was not all embracing. It has created structural imbalances resulting in the alienation of Africans, women and ex-Naval MP's. Accordingly, normative and institutional imperatives were doomed before application, because the ex-Army MPs lack the political will to create equitable conditions for all. It was discovered that racism still exists in the MPA because of the organisational culture inherited from the ex-Army MPs of the Wynberg Client Service Centre. It is practised both overtly and covertly. Sectarianism and prejudice were also found to be rife, especially in the light of the transactional management as practised by the ex-Army MPs.

The concept of amalgamation was found to be nonsense because ex-Army MP's dominated the Military Police Agency, in terms of rank and also numerically. The tension was pronounced between the ex-Naval and ex-Army MP's, where fierce differences in *modus operandi* led to the destruction of documentation in the former Naval Crime Prevention section - the rationale for this being that the MPA could start its own projects under the leadership of ex-Army MPs.

The staffing exercise which produced the MPA structure also came under fierce attack by members who called it a 'meat market', and a mere routine adjustment to ensure the continued domination of the ex-Army MPs. Of the total number of Whites, that is, 416, none were not staffed.

The conscious denial of education, training and development opportunities to Africans and women was found to be part of the organisational culture at W CSC. Linked to this practice was the use of training opportunities as a bait, to either punish or reward members. The point was made by interviewees that their reception at the unit almost said it all, for at their reception a promise was made to members that they would be sifted, broken and de-politicised.

Gender insensitivity, a general disregard for the SANDF policies and personnel misutilisation were found to constitute part of the institutional culture at W CSC, all reminiscent of the ex-Army MPs. The victims were Africans and women, which makes African women the worst treated of the victims. Personnel misutilisation was often linked with ill-treatment, which also involve verbal and emotional abuse. Again, Africans were the worst victims of the ill-treatment.

A comparative analysis between ex-Non Statutory Forces members who worked at W CSC and those who worked at S CSC from 1994–2000 reveals that the ex-Naval MP's were better trained and better exposed, and as such, were of superior quality. They were of a higher rank than their Army counterparts, and ex-SADF members at S CSC had a high regard for them, but they (ex-SADF) also accepted that back in 1994 they had been the deciding factor as to whether these members would succeed or fail. It has also been established that the MPA is still facing most of the challenges that beset it at the time of the research.

10.3.4 Transformation and Amalgamation: Military Police Agency

Most members feel negative about transformation, although there were a handful that is positive about it. However, collated trends and patterns reveal that of the group that is positive their hope is pinned on the success of normative and institutional transformation, so that the answers are more futuristic than actual. For this reason, if the number of members who feel negative is added to this futuristic group, it is safe to deduce that transformation has not been welcomed in the MPA, or at least those phases of transformation that have already occurred.   This means structural transformation has led to apprehension and negativity, whilst all hope is pinned on the success of institutional transformation.

The negative feelings stem from a number of causes. Members feeling cheated by the structural changes, because they entailed creating posts for the Army, or Africans feel cheated because they have been relegated to those sections where they can be assigned mundane tasks, such as foot patrols under General Policing Duties. Furthermore, members are of the opinion that structural changes brought about an Army dictatorship. Some feel they have been reduced to nothing more than numbers. The bulk of respondents feel that the staffing exercise, brought about by structural amalgamation, serves White members only.

Patterns emerging from the opinionated category also carry several negative opinions.

10.3.5 Transformation: SANDF

It was discovered that the SANDF remained unchanged during the transition to democracy, that is, during de Klerk's era. While the state underwent transition, in preparation for transformation, the SANDF sought newer ways of survival. The issues of standards and professionalism were used to alienate liberation forces, and to render them inferior to the ex-SADF. Ultimately the JMCC Agreements granted the wish of the ex-SADF leadership, by making the ex-SADF the chief executor of the integration process.

The ex-SADF did not transform through integration, it merely went through a nominal adjustment, such as the name change, and the impact was that the ex-Army MP's did the same. The ex-SADF within the SANDF has remained resistant to change. They are a force within a force. This was evident at W CSC, where the ex-Army MPs continued functioning as usual after 1994, refusing to acknowledge democratisation and thereby purposely frustrating the ex-Non Statutory Forces intakes. Within the current Military Police Agency, ex-Army MPs remain a separate clique, dominating the ex-Naval and Air Force MPs, Africans and women. Coloured and Indian members are used selectively, depending where they fit into the sect.

Some of the ways in which the ex-SADF has remained a force with which to be reckoned within the broader SANDF is in its controlling the education, training and development function. This is used selectively to reward favoured members, or to punish members seen to question the status quo. This was the finding at W CSC, where course attendance was treated as a favour, resulting in the neglect of the bulk of Africans who have remained as privates from as far back as 1994.

Another way in which the ex-SADF has remained a force with which to be reckoned has been in its domination of the Military Criminal Justice System, which has been manipulated to 'deal' with members who are deemed to be 'troublemakers'. This was found to be particularly significant at W CSC, where African members were barred from arresting White offenders, while the system was itself was used to either sift the African members out or to discredit them.

The ex-SADF continue to frustrate the efforts to transform to 'Defence in a democracy'. Policy is ignored, for example, the Equal Opportunities Policy was promulgated in 1999, but application thereof is still lacking. Matters of representivity, equity, affirmative action and mentoring do not even constitute part of the post profiles of senior Human Resources posts, nor do they form part of the performance agreements of directors in general. They merely constitute the performance agreements of service of division chiefs, including the Chief of Defence. A disregard for policies was found to be common within the MPA, and it was mainly pioneered by the ex-Army MP's leadership. To staff any government department in the manner that the MPA was staffed in June 2000, is tantamount to mutiny. It was almost as if the MPA leadership

was voicing its disrespect for the government of the day. The top leadership was 96 percent white, 65 percent middle management, 78 percent functional management white and 42 percent supervisory management, white, but the work-force comprised only 3 percent whites.

10.4   Recommendations

10.4.1   The Correction of the Superior Status of the Ex-SADF

The perception created by the ex-SADF leadership during the transition period, reinforced by the JMCC Agreements, that the ex-SADF is superior to the other forces within the SANDF still needs to be contextualised and corrected. Firstly this could be achieved by passing severe legislation dealing with racism, prejudice and any form of ill-treatment meted out to non ex-SADF members. For example, somebody is accountable for all the privates who have been culturally deprived within the MPA, but no retributive action has been taken, therefore the message that ex-SADF members are above military law persists. Secondly, at the moment the Defence Force is harsh on members who use the word, 'racist', which is good because if one human being is going to insult another human being in this way the perpetrator should be able to substantiate what he has said. However, this is targeting Africans only, who tend to use the word in anger or despair when faced with conditions like those at W CSC, while the actual racists remain protected. Again, this perpetuates the superiority of the ex-SADF by encouraging its ill-treatment of Africans, in which it is joined by white SANDF members. Equity of forces shall be achieved by dealing severely with those guilty of racism and not just those who bandy the world around.

10.4.2   Mandatory Change Management and Transformational Leadership as Part of the Human Resource practice for Top and Middle Managers

The heritage of the ex-SADF in respect of leadership and management is transactional, riddled with red-tape, fuelled by racial intolerance and hatred, sectarian and mutually exclusive of those considered to be outside of the sect. Since the superstructure of the ex-SADF was inherited and incorporated into the SANDF, this

means this style of leadership and management is rife within the organisation. W CSC is but one case in mind, where the ex-Army MP's practice a draconian managerial style with total disregard for members' human rights. The danger is that those whites who joined the SANDF after 1994 are also being incorporated into the ex-SADF white sects which means the perpetuation of racism. The mandatory change of leadership and management style will expose transactional leaders, and hopefully they will be removed from the system. This will help foster cohesion in the MPA.

10.4.3 Enforcement of Representivity Quotas by the Office of the Chief of Defence in Conjunction with the Secretary of Defence

Despite the fact that representivity quotas do exist, they are simply ridiculed or ignored, as happened with the staffing of the MPA in June 2000. The reasons given allowed service or division chiefs to manipulate figures, and thus negate qualitative representivity, leaving only quantitative representation. For example, in June 2000 Africans made up 1 916 of the total MPA strength of 2 449, however 925 of these Africans were unqualified, inexperienced privates. By enforcing the quotas as part of the performance agreements with service or division chiefs, this will force the SANDF to move beyond quantitative representation. The MPA would be one of the beneficiaries of this development.

10.4.4 The Principles of the Public Service, Batho Pele, as Part of the General Managerial Performance Assessment

The situation at W CSC with regard to personnel misutilisation, education, training and development deprivation, double standards with regard to personnel administration and general ill-treatment of lower ranks, is common SANDF practice. It is the legacy of the ex-SADF Human Resources practice. Unless Batho Pele principles are enforced, general misutilisation of personnel will continue, resulting in an ageing force of partially qualified employees who have no scope or hope of a second career outside the Defence Force. Enforcing the principles will ensure that what happened to ex-Non Statutory Forces members at W CSC will never happen to an employee of the SANDF again.

10.4.5   Profiling a Member of the MPA

The MPA members have to be profiled, according to required competencies, ranging from inter-personal skills, research skills, literary and oratory skills, willingness to embrace democracy, as well as a certain tertiary qualification in a related field. The current state of personnel in the MPA leaves a lot to be desired, and this includes the ex-SADF, ex-Army MP members who boast of a 20 years service or more. Profiling will ensure that the right quality of human resources succeed to managerial positions, and the vision shall be realised of a crime-free Department of Defence, achieved through proactive crime prevention and intelligence gathering.

10.4.6   Re-Skilling and Re-deployment of Members who are in the Excess List, as well as Top White Managers

The re-skilling and re-deployment of members who constitute the Excess List should form part of the MPA transformation and amalgamation programme. Out of a total of 862 members on the Excess List in June 2003, 850 were ex-Non Statutory Forces members, with little or training in the Military Police.   Re-skilling them would ensure that they would be re-deployable but, the SANDF as the employer, will also be owning up to its long overdue responsibility towards these members – education, training and development. An appropriate exit mechanism package must be identified for top White executives, so as to allow for the upward mobility of other races.

10.4.7   Promulgation of Time Frames with regard to Normative and Institutional Transformation

A concerted effort at speeding up normative and institutional transformation, together with stipulated time frames is required of the SANDF. The process of transformation has to be brought to an end. The Defence Force has now been in transformation for the last 10 years. By promulgating time-frames, the process will be speeded up and brought to a conclusion, so that planning for post-transformation can resume. This shall also be binding on the MPA, and therefore its own amalgamation and transformation will be finalised.

10.5   Conclusion

Applying the concepts of structural, normative and institutional transformation, as well as integration and amalgamation, to the changes that have taken place within the MPA, highlight the interplay between criminological and human resource perspectives on such changes. The findings of this research indicate that there is a major problem with restructuring the South African military in line with the rule on law and human rights.   It is a discrepancy that is not SANDF specific, but rather a replica of a repressive state under transformation and its coercive security apparatus, which has resisted change by merely undergoing routine organisational adjustment. This calls for comprehensive research on each of the mentioned criminological and transformational issues mentioned: the structural (mere adjustment such as name change, quantitative structural changes, and so forth), normative (new policies, symbolism, language, etc), institutional (culture, leadership, management, etc), as well as the ways in which the old security apparatus resists transformation within the new force, as well as delaying it. If this is not done, the crime fighting and crime prevention capacity of the MPA will continue to suffer.

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ADDENDUM 1

SANDF RANK STRUCTURE IN DESCENDING ORDER

RATINGS / NCOs		OFFICERS	
SA NAVY	SA ARMY	SA NAVY	SA ARMY
Senior Officers			
Warrant Master at Arms Navy (WMAA)	RSM	Not applicable	
Fleet Master at Arms (FMAA)	RSM	Vice-Admiral	Lieutenant-General
Base Master at Arms (BMAA)	RSM	Rear-Admiral	Major-General
Coxswain	RSM	Rear-Admiral (JG)	Brigadier-General
Warrant Officer Class 1	Warrant Officer Class 1	Captain (SAN)	Colonel
Warrant Officer Class 2	Warrant Officer Class 2	Commander	Lieutenant-Colonel
Junior Staff			
Chief Petty Officer	Staff Sergeant	Lieutenant-Commander	Major
Petty Officer	Sergeant	Lieutenant	Captain
Leading Seaman	Corporal	Sub-Lieutenant	Lieutenant
Able Seaman	Lance Corporal	Ensign	2nd Lieutenant
Seaman	Private	Midshipman	Candidate Officer

ADDENDUM 2

ASSIGNED CODES: 85-MEMBER RESEARCH SAMPLE

Questionnaire, Interviews & Case Study Responses

DATE	UNIT	RACE	GENDER	RANK	FORMER FORCE/ SERVICE	ASSIGNED CODE
Mon 10/7/00	S MPR HQ	W	M	Lieutenant Colonel	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	Regional Provost Marshall
Mon 10/7/00	S MPR HQ	4x W 1x A	M	Lieutenant Colonel	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	Area Provost Marshals
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	W	M	Warrant Officer 1	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 1
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	A	M	Lance Corporal	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 2
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	C	M	Chief Petty Officer	Ex-SADF Ex-Naval MP	No. 3
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	W	Fe	Petty Officer	Ex-SADF Ex-Naval MP	No. 4
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	C	M	Warrant Officer 2	Ex-SADF Ex-Naval MP	No. 5
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	A	M	Warrant Officer 2	Ex-NSF Ex-Naval MP	No. 6
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	C	M	Chief Petty Officer	Ex-SADF Ex-Naval MP	No. 7

CASE STUDY / FOCUS GROUP						
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	A	M	Able Seaman	Ex-NSF Ex-Naval MP	No. 8
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	A	M	Petty Officer	Ex-NSF Ex-Naval MP	No. 9
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	A	M	Petty Officer	Ex-NSF Ex-Naval MP	No. 10
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	A	M	Petty Officer	Ex-NSF Ex-Naval MP	No. 11
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	A	M	Petty Officer	Ex-NSF Ex-Naval MP	No. 12
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	A	M	Ensign	Ex-NSF Ex-Naval MP	No. 13
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	A	M	Sub- Lieutenant	Ex-NSF Ex-Naval MP	No. 14

UN-INTERVIEWED MEMBERS

Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	I	M	Lieutenant Commander	Ex-SADF Ex-Naval MP	No. 15
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	A	M	Private	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 16
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	C	M	Captain	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 17
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	W	M	Undisclosed	Ex-SADF Ex-Naval MP	No. 18
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	C	Fe	Captain	SANDF Ex-Army MP	No. 19
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	W	M	Undisclosed	Ex-SADF Ex-Naval MP	No. 20
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	W	M	Sergeant	SANDF Ex-Army MP	No. 21
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	W	M	Undisclosed	Ex-SADF Ex-Naval MP	No. 22
Tue 11/7/00	S CSC	W	M	Undisclosed	Ex-SADF Ex-Naval MP	No. 23

WYNBERG MILITARY BASE						
Wed 12/7/00	W CSC	A	Fe	Lance Corporal	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 24
Wed 12/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Sergeant	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 25
Wed 12/7/00	W CSC	C	Fe	Sergeant	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 26
Wed 12/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Corporal	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 27
Wed 12/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Private	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 28
Wed 12/7/00	W CSC	C	Fe	Sergeant	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 29
Wed 12/7/00	W CSC	C	M	Captain	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 30
Wed 12/7/00	W CSC	W	M	Warrant Officer 2	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 31
Wed 12/7/00	W CSC	A	Fe	Private	Ex-KZP Ex-Army MP	No. 32
Wed 12/7/00	W CSC	A	Fe	Lance Corporal	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 33

Wed 12/7/00	**W CSC**	**W**	**Fe**	**Sergeant**	**Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP**	**No. 34**
Wed 12/7/00	**W CSC**	**A**	**Fe**	**Lance Corporal**	**Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP**	**No. 35**
Thu 13/7/00	**W CSC**	**A**	**Fe**	**Private**	**Ex-KZP Ex-Army MP**	**No. 36**
Thu 13/7/00	**W CSC**	**C**	**M**	**Sergeant**	**Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP**	**No. 37**
Thu 13/7/00	**W CSC**	**A**	**M**	**Private**	**Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP**	**No. 38**
Thu 13/7/00	**W CSC**	**A**	**M**	**Lance Corporal**	**Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP**	**No. 39**
Thu 13/7/00	**W CSC**	**A**	**M**	**Sergeant**	**Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP**	**No. 40**
Thu 13/7/00	**W CSC**	**A**	**M**	**Corporal**	**Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP**	**No. 41**
Thu 13/7/00	**W CSC**	**W**	**M**	**Major**	**Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP**	**No. 42**
Thu 13/7/00	**W CSC**	**W**	**M**	**Warrant Officer 2**	**Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP**	**No. 43**

Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	W	M	Staff Sergeant	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 44
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	W	M	Sergeant Major	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 45
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Lance Corporal	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 46
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	A	Fe	Private	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 47
UN-INTERVIEWED MEMBERS						
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Private	Ex-TBVC Ex-Army MP	No. 48
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Private	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 49
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Private	SANDF Ex-Army MP	No. 50
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	C	M	Private	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 51
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	A	Not Known	Corporal	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 52
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	A	Not Known	Corporal	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 53

Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	A	Not Known	Corporal	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 54
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	A	Not Known	Corporal	SANDF Ex-Army MP	No. 55
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	C	Not Known	Sergeant	SANDF Ex-Army MP	No. 56
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	C	Not Known	Sergeant	SANDF Ex-Army MP	No. 57
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	W	Not Known	Sergeant	SANDF Ex-Army MP	No. 58
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	C	Not Known	Staff Sergeant	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 59
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	C	Not Known	Staff Sergeant	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 60
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	A	Not Known	Staff Sergeant	Ex-TBVC Ex-Army MP	No. 61
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	C	Not Known	Undisclosed	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 62
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	C	Not Known	Undisclosed	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 63

Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	C	Not Known	Undisclosed	SANDF Ex-Army MP	No. 64
Thu 13/7/00	W CSC	Spoilt Questionnaire				No. 65
SOUTHERN MILITARY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY						
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	W	M	Captain	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 66
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Private	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 67
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Private	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 68
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Private	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 69
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	A	Fe	Lance Corporal	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 70
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Corporal	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 71
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Lance Corporal	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 72
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Private	SANDF Ex-Army MP	No. 73
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Private	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 74

UN-INTERVIEWED MEMBERS						
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	A		Private	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 75
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	A		Private	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 76
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	C		Private	SANDF Ex-Army MP	No. 77
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Corporal	SANDF Ex-Army MP	No. 78
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	C	M	Sergeant	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 79
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	C	M	Sergeant	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 80
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	W	M	Sergeant	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 81
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	C	Fe	Sergeant	SANDF Ex-Army MP	No. 82
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	C	M	Staff Sergeant	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 83
Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	C	M	Staff Sergeant	Ex-SADF Ex-Army MP	No. 84

Fri 14/7/00	W CSC	A	M	Undisclosed	Ex-NSF Ex-Army MP	No. 85

ADDENDUM 3

ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

Arm of Service (AoS)   Refers to the four Services of the South African National Defence force, the Army, Air Force, Navy and Military Health Services.

APLA   Azanian People's Liberation Army, which is the former armed wing of the Pan African Congress (PAC).

AA   Assembly Areas were demarcated ex-South African Defence Force (SADF) bases where all Non-Statutory Forces (NSFs) had to assemble in order to undergo the process of integration into the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF), like Wallmansthall and De Brug. This was in keeping with the Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee Agreements, a document which prescribed the terms and conditions for the establishment of the SANDF.

B MATT   The British Military Advisory & Technical Team was stationed in South Africa after 27 April 1994 in order to serve in an advisory and arbitrary capacity throughout the process of establishing the SANDF. One practical example where B MATT played an active role was the Placement Boards, comprising of ex-SADF and ex-NSF agents, the function of which was to preside on the ranking of each and every ex-NSF member.

CSC   Client Service Centre. The new name for what used to be called the Military Police Station. The new name is in accordance with the White Paper on the Public Service, which stipulates that Public Service departments are service delivery points.

DB   Detention Barracks. This is the old name for what is now called the Military Correctional Facility.

DR 1998   The Defence Review was promulgated in 1998, following the White Paper on Defence of 1996 (WPD 96). It is seen to be the strategic document, which follows up and elaborates on the policy prescripts of the WPD 96.

DoD   Department of Defence includes the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the Defence Secretariat as well as the Ministry of Defence.

INTEGRATION	The integration process was officially launched through the JMCC Agreements. It was the first phase of transformation in the SANDF, comprising of the fusion of eight different forces, which constitute the SANDF. These forces are Umkhonto WeSizwe (MK), Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), South African National Defence Force (SADF), Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei Defence Forces (TBVC) and the Kwa-Zulu Police (KZP).
JMCC	The Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee was established and authorised by the Transitional Executive Council (TEC). Its aim was to overseer defence negotiations for the new military dispensation in line with the Interim Constitution. The main participants were primarily MK and SADF. The product of this committee is known as the JMCC Agreements, which provides the blueprint for integration and the establishment of the SANDF.
LEGSATO	Legal Satellite Office refers to the Legal Service of the SANDF consisting of a pool of judges, legal officers and prosecutors. LEGSATO is the partner of the Military Police Agency (MPA) within the Military Criminal Justice System (MCJS).
MCJS	The Military Criminal Justice System refers to the two role players, the MPA and LEGSATO as well as the processes involved, viz. policing and correctional service (MPA) and justice (LEGSATO).
MK	Umkhonto WeSizwe, the former liberation army of the African National Congress.
MPA	Military Police Agency is the official name for the newly established military police structure. The MPA was born in 1999, forged out of the amalgamation of former Army, Air Force and Naval Military Police sections.
N MPR	Northern Military Police Region. This is one of the administrative regions of the MPA.
NSF	Non-Statutory Forces refers to both MK and APLA because they were guerrilla forces, that is, non-state or conventional forces.
NSMS	National Security Management System was formed in 1979, dominated by the ex-SADF. Its aim was to co-ordinate information for state use, however it ended up co-ordinating and implementing state policy, thereby allowing the ex-SADF to interfere in state matters.

SAAF	South African Air Force.
SADF	The South African Defence Force is sometimes referred to as the Statutory Forces (SFs); it was conventional force of the apartheid government.
SAN	South African Navy
SANDF	South African National Defence Force refers to the current defence force, which was established after 27 April 1994, when the first democratic government came into power.
SAMHS	South African Military Health Services.
SMCF	The Southern Military Correctional Facility is the new term for what was referred to as the Detention Barracks.
S MPR	The Southern Military Police Region is one of the administrative regions of the MPA.
SMST	Abbreviation for Simon's Town.
TBVC	Transkei (TDF), Bophuthatswana (BDF), Venda (VDF) and Ciskei (CDF) Defence Forces are the four ex-Bantustan forces.
W CSC	Wynberg Client Service Centre, is one of the sampled units of the S MPR.
WPD	The White Paper on Defence of 1996 is the first defence policy document of the democratic government, making a clean break with the past, through its re-definition of security and re-alignment of the military with democratic rule.