AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT
SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG.

by

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SUPERVISOR: PROF J KRIEL

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DECLARATION

I, Joel Mthembu declare that AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

I further declare that I have not previously submitted this work, or part of it, for examination at Unisa for another qualification or at any other higher education institution.

__________________________
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The Researcher
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG.

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SUMMARY

This research is aimed at analysing the nature, extent and cause of smuggling at selected Correctional Centres in Gauteng with the aim to provide appropriate strategies to combat smuggling.

Smuggling is seen as a chain of command that reflects predisposition of an organised crime.

Smuggling in correctional centres is an ongoing concern. Unauthorised items that are smuggled into the correctional centres have an adverse effect into the lives of people and death is an ultimate price. The Department of Correctional Services is also experiencing a severe shortage of officials due to The Seven Days Establishment and the Occupation Specific Dispensation (OSD) policies of Centre-Based and Non-Centre-Based staff.

The study shows an increase of smuggling of items such as dangerous weapons, dagga, cellular phones and sim card over a three-year period at the three Correctional Centres. Various recommendations are made to combat smuggling in correctional centres including going back to the basics of proper searching of visitors, offenders, cells and staff when entering the facilities.
KEY TERMS

Smuggling in correctional centres, Smuggling extent, Offenders in correctional centres, Correctional officials, public members and smuggling, smuggling and security, smuggling as organised crime, unauthorised items in correctional centres, Rehabilitation in correctional centres and security in correctional centres.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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<td>Act85 of 1993</td>
<td>Occupational Health and Safety Act</td>
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<td>AOA</td>
<td>Approved Offender Accommodation</td>
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<td>APCO</td>
<td>Association of Public Safety Communication Officials</td>
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<td>APP</td>
<td>Approved Performance Plan</td>
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<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Director</td>
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<td>CB</td>
<td>Centre-Based</td>
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<td>CMAX CC</td>
<td>Close Maximum Correctional Centre</td>
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<td>Correctional Officer grade one</td>
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<td>DCS</td>
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<td>FCC</td>
<td>Federal Communication Commission</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Smuggling can be classified as an organised crime because multiple tasks and people are involved in this operation of trafficking unauthorised items into correctional centres. Smuggling operation involves more specialised tasks which are the transportation plan, recruitment plan, procurement plan of unauthorised items to be smuggled, bribing security officials and payment of stashers. For dagga to be smuggled into a correctional centre, dagga must be sourced from a reliable supplier who from time to time must supply a large quantity, another person would transport the merchandise from the supplier to the next person who would wrap up the dagga in a very convenient way for it to be concealed. The next person would usually be an offender who would recruit a corrupt correctional official to turn a blind eye in assisting the dagga to go through the security check points without any hinderence, the offender would also employ other offenders as runners who would be responsible for selling dagga inside the correctional centre.

Smuggling involves a chain of command regardless of where it is conducted. This sentiment is shared by Morselli (2014:118) and Williams (1959:256), who clearly articulated the definition of smuggling as transportation of illegal goods or any item through the restricted area, excluding amongst others, international borders, correctional centres and any building or space. But the researcher in this study concentrated on smuggling into the correctional centres. Correctional centres are like an ocean that is relatively silent on the outside but when one goes deeper into an ocean one would realise that there is life and inexplicable activities happening inside the ocean. For the mere fact that people are born free, because of their failure to abide by the approved regulated ways of doing things, they find themselves behind bars, confined to a controlled environment where the authorities try to rehabilitate them into law abiding citizens. It is rather disheartening to realise that most of the
offenders, correctional officials, and the public continue to smuggle unauthorised items into the correctional centres. This phenomenon is wildly experienced around the world and also in South African correctional centres (Clarke, M. 2013.).

According to Hardman (2007:08) and others (www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic figures/howard john.shtml) John Howard, a philanthropist born 2 September 1726 in Clapton, London discovered that correctional officials during those years were not salaried but lived on fees paid by offenders for food, bedding, release and other favours. Poor offenders lived in appalling conditions, many correctional officials demanded payment before offenders were released, and this resulted in poor offenders staying in correctional centres even if they have fully served the duration of their sentence. In 1774 Howard reformed correctional centres by regulating the correctional system, it is disheartening to realise that after 239 years, Howard’s untiring search to have a stable security and order in the correctional system, correctional centres today, are currently experiencing incidents of smuggling that are destroying the mission and objectives of the correctional systems around the world.

Since the introduction of a democratic government and subsequent introduction of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa in 1994 and 1996 respectively, and the amended Correctional Services Act (Act 111 of 1998) the Department of Correctional Services has introduced a management approach where human rights are reinforced and where offenders are motivated and encouraged to do away with negative values and encouraged to stick to the values which are positive and acceptable to the general public. Nevertheless, we see many unauthorised items smuggled into the correctional centres. Unauthorised items smuggled into the correctional centre range from Fire-arms, bullets, Other dangerous weapons (knives, self-made knives, pieces of steel, blocks of sunlight soap in socks, padlock on a rope), explosives, nyaope, mandrax, dagga - bank size, dagga – blades, dagga – kilograms, cellular phones, cellular chargers, SIM cards, bankcards, cash, etc.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG.

Offenders have creative methods of hiding unauthorised items. Correctional officials have found items concealed under mattresses, concealed under the wrist watches, contained inside the body cavity, cereals containers, false bottom boxes, hollowed out books, toilets, televisions, radios, lights fixtures, sweeping brooms and many more. Visitors, offenders and corrupt correctional officials smuggle related paraphernalia’s into correctional centres.

There is a strong need to investigate smuggling in correctional centres as an ongoing concern.

Unauthorised items smuggled into the correctional centres have affected the lives of offenders, correctional officials and the South African public. Smuggling is as old as the correctional system and in many instances it has a detrimental effect to the life of people and the correctional system. From this scourge we saw a Head Correctional Centre and an Area Coordinator shot and killed by offenders with an alleged smuggled firearm in an attempted escape. This research is intended to generate information on the nature, extent and causes of smuggling in correctional centres and to make recommendations that will assist in combating smuggling.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

This research topic touches an interesting and a wildly occurrence rather than a more narrowly defined problem. It arises from the problems that have been experienced for many years in correctional centres around the world. The causes of smuggling in correctional centres are presumed to be gangsterism, overcrowding, non-compliance with policies by correctional officials, offenders and members of the public. The revelations of The Jali Commission (2006:1205) stated the following “This malady of smuggling in the correctional centres which filters into the Department of Correctional Services also causes the environment to become industrious for the operation of gangs inside the Correctional Centre walls. The gangs which had always operated covertly within the Correctional system are now operating openly. He also believed that some correctional officers are members of
correctional centre gangs”. He also mentioned that gangs are a powerful force in correctional centres and they play a significant role in smuggling and that gangs are everlasting threat to the functioning of the correctional centres. The commission further mentioned that correctional officials took bribes to turn a blind eye on smugglings. Some of the officials of the department were even seeking the aid of the gangs for their own benefit, and this renders correctional centres uncontrollable.

1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this research is to analyse the nature, extent and cause of smuggling at selected correctional centres in Gauteng with the aim to endow appropriate strategies which may contribute towards the prevention of smuggling in correctional centres.

1.4 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this research are:

- To describe the nature, extent and causes of the phenomenon of smuggling at selected correctional centres in Gauteng.
- To make recommendations that may contribute to the prevention of smuggling in correctional centres.

1.5 RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
- To conduct a literature review on the phenomenon of smuggling in correctional centres nationally and internationally.
- Describe and explain the South African legislation and the Department of Correctional Services’ policies and procedures with regards to smuggling.
- To analyse information on confiscated items that have been reported to the department where smuggling has been an element.
1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question for this study is “What are the nature, extent and causes of smuggling at correctional centres”?

In answering the primary research question, data was collected and analysed aimed at answering to the following secondary research questions:

- What is the range of unauthorised items involved in smuggling within a correctional centre?
- What are the security risks involved in smuggling?
- How many unauthorised items were smuggled into the selected correctional centres for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15
- Which unauthorised items are most commonly involved during smuggling in a correctional Centre?
- What are the trends in the type of unauthorised items smuggled – is there a growth in certain unauthorised items such as smuggling with cellular phones?

1.7 DESCRIPTION OF KEY CONCEPTS
In this section we will describe the key concept relevant to the study with a view to give a basis for understanding of this phenomenon of smuggling.

1.7.1 UNAUTHORISED ITEMS
Are also referred to as contrabands, are anything introduced or found in correctional centres that are not permitted by the Correctional Services Act (Act 111 of 1998).

1.7.2 SMUGGLING
Is a clandestine transportation of unauthorised items past a security check area (main gates and all the gates inside the correctional centre are security check areas where searching and confiscation of unauthorised items takes place). Smuggling is an unauthorised delivery of unauthorised items through security check points into a correctional centre in violation of applicable laws or regulations.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG.

1.7.3 OFFENDER
Is a person who is sentenced by the courts to serve a determined sentence and also includes remand detainees still awaiting trial or any person housed in the correctional centre or housed by the service providers of the Department of Correctional Services.

1.7.4 SERVICE PROVIDERS
Are people who are rendering services to the correctional centre or Department of Correctional Services.

1.7.5 SEARCHING
Is an action employed in examining carefully or thoroughly and removing any unauthorised item from a person or place.

1.7.6 MOVEMENT OF OFFENDERS
Any movement of an offender from his cell out of his/her unit must at all time be controlled and monitored, if the movement is not controlled and monitored it may promote smuggling of unauthorised items.

1.7.7 SECURITY
Security is defined as protection from harm of vulnerable people and valuable assets. It also includes the seizure and removal of unauthorised items from correctional centres.

1.7.8 CORRECTIONAL CENTRE
Correctional centre is established by Correctional Service Act (Act No 111 of 1998), is a place where offenders are housed, trained, detained, rehabilitated and taken
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG.

care of under protective custody. This also includes offenders in public hospitals, offenders in court and offenders in transit to other facilities.

1.7.9 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

Department of Correctional Services is established by section 7(2) of the Public Service Act, and is part of the Public Service. It is also established by section 197 of the Constitution. Department of Correctional Services must act in accordance with the purpose of the correctional system in terms of this Act it must as far as practicable, be self-sufficient and operate according to business principles and perform all work necessary for its effective management. This view is clearly narrated by Correctional Services Act, 111 of 1998.

1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Recommendations from this study can lead to an improvement of security and the reduction of smuggling in Department of Correctional Services. The study also adds to the body of knowledge in the field of smuggling at correctional centres. This can contribute to address challenges experienced with smuggling in correctional centres.

1.9 DELINEATION

In this research the researcher focused on smuggling at selected correctional centres in Gauteng which are Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detainees (RD) Correctional Centre, Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, and Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre. The three correctional centres are primarily selected because they are the larger correctional centres in the Gauteng region.
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1.10 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.10.1 RESEARCH DESIGN

Research design is used as a strategic framework that is a bridge between research questions and completing of the entire research (Blanche, Durrheim and Painter 2006:34). Welman and Kruger (2002:46) also deduced that research design is a plan on how the researcher would conduct the research. This includes, research methods, research problem, research questions and the significance of the study. Research Methodology then would follow and focuses on with the target population, sampling method, data collection tools, data analysis and ethical consideration. This plan would help the researcher to draw conclusion and finding of this research and its validity. Henning (2004:15) states that design is the procedure used to collect analyse data and the selection of participants. Stewart and Shamdsani (1990:13). A descriptive approach of the phenomena of smuggling in correctional centres was followed in this study. The study included a thorough literature review on the topic followed by empirical research in terms of the analysis of the nature and extent of confiscated unauthorised items were smuggling was involved. The study also included a review of legislation and policies with regards to smuggling in correctional centres of South Africa. The researcher studied confiscated unauthorised items that were reported to the Gauteng Regional offices by the three selected correctional centres, each unauthorised item was analysed to arrive at a reliable conclusion of the empirical research. The confiscation registers were kept at the correctional centre. The researcher obtained permission to access data from the selected correctional centres from the Department of Correctional Services National Head Office.

1.10.2 DEMARCATION OF STUDY

According to Auriocombe (2001:97), the study is limited to the unauthorised items that were smuggled into the selected correctional centres in Gauteng that were reported for the financial year, 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. Anonymity was observed, names of affected parties were not revealed only data was analysed. During the financial year 2014/15, Kgoşi Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre was
overpopulated with the occupancy level of 65%, Kgoši Mampuru II Local RD Correctional Centre was overpopulated with the occupancy level of 98% and Johannesburg Med B Correctional Centre was also overpopulated with the occupancy level of 247%. A large number of offenders in Gauteng are kept in these three correctional centres. It is also strange to find that the most of cases where smuggling occurred also affect these three correctional centres in the Gauteng Region. Although the results of this study cannot be generalised to all correctional centres, it provides a comprehensive description of the nature, extent and causes of smuggling at the typical correctional centres in South Africa.

1.11 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION
The researcher conducted a thorough literature review aimed at identifying and describing good international correctional practices in combating smuggling in correctional centres. The data gathered in this regard forms the basis of recommendations (see last chapter) in promoting good correctional practices in combating smuggling in correctional centres (see second objective of the study).

Deficiencies and limitations in the policies regarding smuggling in correctional centres were identified and recommendations were made to the National Office of the Department of Correctional Services in order to make the necessary amendments.

Data is collected and analysed from confiscation registers where smuggling played a role. Data was kept in a lockable steel cabinet in the researcher’s office which was always locked, files were not lying in the researcher’s office for everyone to see, information which can link the case to a specific offender or official was not revealed in the study or to anyone. Data was generalised to aspects or categories such as type of unauthorised items involved, frequency of occurrence, security risk factors. The researcher conducted the analysis on his own and did not make use of research assistants. The researcher analysed data from the selected correctional centres in line with instruction outlined by Department of Correctional Services in the approval document by the gate keeper. Data of smuggling reported in the selected
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correctional centres and focus on following: WHAT was smuggled? And HOW MANY was smuggled.

The gathering and analysis of quantitative data is primarily aimed at the achievement of the two objectives of the study, i.e.:

- To describe the nature, extent and causes of the phenomenon of smuggling at selected correctional centres in Gauteng.
- To make recommendations that may contribute to the prevention of smuggling in correctional centres.

1.12 REFERENCE METHOD

For consistency the adapted Harvard method of referencing (UNISA 2014) is used throughout the dissertation. Some practical guidelines used in other scholarly guides were adopted and in all references in brackets the comma is not used. For instance, no comma between the name and the year of publication. Direct quotes from sources are put in inverted commas or the sources are acknowledged in the text. For instance, the researcher would state that according to Cavadino and Dignan (2006:430) correctional centres are or would put the text in full and acknowledge the author in brackets e.g., “These are unsound assumptions and create systematic flaws in the operation of a bifurcation approach” (Hucklesby & Dickinson 2007:271).

1.13 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Request for the permission to conduct this investigation was forwarded to Department of Correctional Services and approval to conduct the study was given by the Department of Correctional Services. Only unauthorised items that were confiscated where smuggling has been an element were analysed. Confidentiality and anonymity of offenders and officials involved in smuggling was maintained as explained above. Data was handled confidentially (only by the researcher) and stored in a safe place when not in use. Research results were made available to the
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Department of Correctional Services. There is also the potential for results to be published.

1.14 SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTERS
The dissertation will be structured in the following five Chapters.

CHAPTER ONE:
Introduction, here the topic was introduced including a discussion of the problem statement, purpose and objectives of the study, research questions and methodology followed.

CHAPTER TWO:
Literature review of the phenomenon of smuggling in correctional centres. The chapter also deals with good national and international correctional practices aimed at eradicating smuggling in correctional centres.

CHAPTER THREE:
Discuss the policies and procedure regarding the prevention of smuggling in correctional Services in South Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR:
Focuses on the empirical research conducted. Data collection of unauthorised items that were smuggled into the correctional centre were analysed in terms of the nature, extent and causes of smuggling at the selected correctional centres in Gauteng.

CHAPTER FIVE:
Provides conclusions from the findings of the research. Recommendations for policy implementation and the eradication of smuggling in correctional centres are made.
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1.15 CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED DURING THE STUDY.

This phenomenon of smuggling is seen as a reason for all the problems of order and security in correctional centres. The problems that were associated with this study are:

1.15.1 INCONSISTENCY IN CAPTURING THE DATA WITH REFERENCE TO CONFISCATION REGISTERS.

Headings of the Confiscation Register is characterised by dissimilar headings from the correctional centres under study, for example:

1\textsuperscript{st} Register from one of the correctional centre consists of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description of Items</th>
<th>Circumstances Found</th>
<th>By Whom</th>
<th>SAPS</th>
<th>Remarks Checked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2\textsuperscript{nd} Register from one of the correctional centre consists of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Item Found</th>
<th>Place where Items were found</th>
<th>Official who found Items</th>
<th>SAPS No.</th>
<th>Place where Item kept</th>
<th>Surname of the Recipient</th>
<th>Checker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3\textsuperscript{rd} Register from one of the correctional centre consists of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description of Items</th>
<th>Circumstances Found</th>
<th>By Whom</th>
<th>SAPS</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Remarks Checked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above analysis of Confiscation Registers from the three correctional centres under study it was revealed that:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG.

- Information is sometimes not registered on the same day of the event. Therefore, the clear sequence of events is not reflected in a chronological order.
- All the registers are registering the unauthorised items which made it easy for data comparison.
- The other registers are looking for the circumstances found. Whereas the other correctional centre is looking for the place where items were found which makes it difficult to compare the three correctional centres as most of the columns were not filled.
- All the registers are requesting the name of the person who found the unauthorised items however, this information was also incomplete which again made it difficult to analyse.
- All the registers request information about the reporting of the case to SAPS - in most cases no case numbers are registered, which means that cases are not referred to SAPS for further investigation. And follow up of the outcome of the cases was difficult.
- Only one correctional centre has information on where the item was kept after seizure whereas the other two correctional centres do not register that, which also makes it difficult to compare the data.
- The information about the perpetrator is always missing and is not reflected on the confiscation register.
- Dagga is sometimes registered as bank size packet and dagga blades which make it difficult to compare the weight in kilograms because the people who are packaging this also do not use a universal measuring tool. For the purpose of this study dagga blades and bank size packets were converted into an average weight i.e., 1 dagga blade = 2 grams and 1 dagga bank size packet = 34 grams.

1.15.2 ETHICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The gate keeper has given permission to the researcher to conduct a study at the Department of Correctional Services, Kgoši Mampuru II Management Area which
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consist of five correctional centres and Johannesburg Management Area which consist of three correctional centres. Because of time and budget constrains the researcher was able to analyse data from Kgoši Mampuru II local Correctional Centre, Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre and Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre. The researcher was not allowed to take pictures for security reasons hence no pictures were used in this study.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW ON SMUGGLING WITHIN CORRECTIONAL CENTRES

2.1 INTRODUCTION

It would be impossible to cover all the issues available in the literature with regard to smuggling of unauthorised items into the correctional centres, nevertheless the researcher hopes to provide a relatively broad theoretical framework on this phenomenon of smuggling.

In this chapter smuggling is seen as an organised criminal act that undermines the objectives of Correctional systems of the world. Correctional centres are seen as a different environment with their own sub-cultures. A comparative study of an offender incarcerated in a correctional centre and the general member of the public not incarcerated is also analysed. Policy with regards to unauthorised items that an offender is not entitled to have in a correctional centre is also outlined.

Money is playing a central role in all the troubles of smuggling that are observed in correctional centres. Dagga is also playing a secondary role, which is also relevant in this scourge of smuggling. The cellular phones are used as a link to the outside world and contribute to all the problems related to smuggling.

The problem of smuggling has a number of contributory factors that will be analysed in profundity. Elements that are contributing to smuggling will be analysed such as offender population, management of the offenders’ transgression and remedial action will be discussed.
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Although fire-arms and explosives are not smuggled as much as the other unauthorised items these items are more deadly in nature and they are regarded as life threatening devices like all the dangerous weapons.

The most profound consequences associated with the problem of smuggling include the killings of offenders, officials and service providers during escapes and disturbances of order in correctional centres.

2.2. DESCRIPTION (S) OF THE CONCEPT “SMUGGLING IN CORRECTIONAL CENTRES”

Smuggling should be classified as an organised crime because numerous tasks and people are involved in this operation of smuggling unauthorised items into the correctional centres. Smuggling activities involve specialised tasks such as the transportation plan, recruitment plan, procurement plan of unauthorised items to be smuggled, bribing of security officials, and payment of collectors. For dagga to be smuggled into a correctional centre, dagga must be sourced from a reliable supplier who from time to time supplies a large quantity, another person transports the merchandise from the supplier to the next person who would package the dagga in such a way for it to be concealed. The next person usually an offender would recruit a correctional official who would at most be making sure that the dagga to go through the security check points without any hinderence, the offender would also employ other offenders as ‘runners’: who would be responsible for the selling of dagga inside the correctional centre. Smuggling is a chain of command regardless of where it is conducted (Morselli 2014:118).

Koshy (2008:70) maintains that “Correctional officials play a major role in smuggling drugs, weapons, alcohol and food into the correctional centre. A correctional official might want to conduct illegal activities without the possibility of disciplinary actions from the correctional centre. Therefore, a reciprocal relationship is built in which guards are granted financial percentages of the smuggling of drugs, gambling or alcohol, in exchange for turning a blind eye to the underground activity.”
Correctional centres are like an ocean that is relatively silent on the outside but when one goes deeper into an ocean one would realise that there is life and inexplicable activities happening inside the ocean. For the mere fact that people are born free, because of their failure to abide by the approved regulated ways of doing things, they find themselves behind bars, confined to a controlled environment where the authorities would attempt to rehabilitate them into law abiding citizens. It is rather disheartening to realise that despite all risks involved most of the offenders, some correctional officials, and the public continue to smuggle unauthorised items into the correctional centre. This phenomenon is widely experienced in correctional services around the world and also including South African correctional centres (www.prisonwriters).

The problem of smuggling in correctional centres had its origins in the United State of America. The history largely ascribes this to offenders’ need to break away from a correctional system which was associated with inhumane treatment and punitive by nature. Institutionalisation was a more favoured way of handling offenders on a daily basis. Amid this primary objective of correctional centres smuggling was seen as insalubrious on the business of rehabilitation (www.thefix.).

For an offender to have unauthorised items smuggled into correctional centres he or she must first smuggle into the correctional centre money that would be used to pay for the merchandise that is smuggled, pay corrupt official to turn a blind eye and to pay his people that are organising and bringing the item to be smuggled.

### 2.3. NATURE OF UNAUTHORISED ITEMS THAT ARE SMUGGLED INTO THE CORRECTIONAL CENTRES.

Correctional centres are seen as a different environment compared to a normal environment that an ordinary law abiding citizen is enjoying. A comparison of the two environments is essential in order to understand the root course of smuggling. Table
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG.

2.1 below shows a comparison of offenders and a person not in a correctional centre. One would take note of the following:

Most people in the South African community have a cellular phone

Table 2.1: Comparison between a person incarcerated in a correctional centre and an ordinary person in a community.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A PERSON INCARCERATED IN A CORRECTIONAL CENTRE</th>
<th>ORDINARY PERSON IN A COMMUNITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limitation of movement</td>
<td>Freedom of movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitation on choice of food - cannot buy food from a supplier of choice</td>
<td>Freedom to choose food and buy from any supplier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitation on communication</td>
<td>Communicate freely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No choice of furniture</td>
<td>Free to choose furniture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation of liberty</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation of cellular phones</td>
<td>Free to have cellular phones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation of iPods</td>
<td>Free to have iPods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation of smart phones</td>
<td>Free to have smart phones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation of money</td>
<td>Free to have money.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not to drink liquor</td>
<td>Free to drink liquor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot enter into a contract</td>
<td>Can enter into a contract of choice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot run a business</td>
<td>Entitled to run a business.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of the unauthorised items smuggled into the correctional centres are seen by the South African public as items that are not prohibited however those unauthorised items are posing a security risk to the correctional centres, and the South African community. In this study the researcher only concentrated on the most common unauthorised items that were found in the selected correctional centres which disintegrate the security of the correctional centres.
From the researcher’s experience in Corrections the most common unauthorised items that are smuggled into the correctional centres range from weapons including fire-arms, ammunition, other dangerous weapons and explosives, drugs involves so called nyaope, mandrax and dagga. Electronic gadgets include cellular phones, chargers and SIM cards. Finally money being the main source of all ills in correctional centres. The above mentioned unauthorised items are further discussed below.

2.3.1 INFORMATION DOCUMENTS

Documents are usually used to distribute information about the security of the correctional centre and also used to arrange smuggling of unauthorised items into/out of the correctional centre. A piece of paper that is smuggled in or out of the correctional centre can transmit information that may result in life of people being compromised. From the researcher’s experience messages are usually written in a way that may misinform an unintended recipient or ordinary person, e.g. I love you can be written as w “+? 2) +- 16 1 4.

2.3.2 DIFFERENT TYPES OF DRUGS

There is variety of drugs that are smuggled into the correctional centres; they differ in shapes and sizes. Drugs commonly found in correctional centres are: dagga, mandrax and nyaope. These drugs are smuggled by corrupt correctional officials, private people who visit the correctional centres and offenders who for some reason pass through the main gates of the centre. Drugs are concealed around their body, some inside their food containers, some upped into their body cavity. Perpetrators apply different methods of concealing drugs which in turn calls for vigilant approach on officials responsible for searching at the main gates.

Mandrax is a synthetic drug containing Methaqualone. The composition of the original Mandrax pill is a thin white pill, it is plus minus 1mm in size and is marked with MX as a trademark. The reverse side of the Mandrax reflects RL and it is also
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available in capsules with two different colours from both sides. Because the Mandrax trademark is generally known by the public, the composition of this drug has dramatically changed in recent years. The thickness of the pill nowadays is 1cm and people call it double Barrel, and its colour ranges from pink, blue, purple, beige, black, brown and green and the mixture of two or more of the above colours. However, in South African correctional centres and the general public Mandrax is commonly known and named lizards, doodies, MX, Buttons, white pipe, press outs, flowers. Mandrax drugs are also used to mix with other drugs like Dagga and Nyaope (www.drugaware).

2.3.3 DAGGA AS COMMON DRUG

Dagga is one of the prohibited drugs in South Africa. The cultivation and the use of dagga was prohibited in South Africa since 1928 (www.flrc). It is a cheaper drug and easy to plant as it is derived from the plant. Sometimes it can grow anywhere and grow as high as 3 meters and 15 centimetres in diameter. The fact that it is easier to find dagga makes it possibly the highest drug in circulation in South African correctional centres. Dagga is mostly packaged in various sizes including grams, bank size bags, blades, fingers, matchboxes, sticks, balls, and compressed dagga. Dagga does not normally burn in its own, it need to be mixed with tobacco for it to burn and to be effective. However in South Africa dagga has different names according to geographical areas. Those names are, amongst others, Pot, Ganja, Dope, Hash, Zol, Marijuana, Green gold, Grass, Weed, Joint Skyf and Hemp (www.flrc).

2.3.4 MONEY AS THE CENTRE OF ALL ILLS

Offenders are not allowed to have money in their possession. Due to the fact that offenders use money in order to smuggle unauthorised items. Money is used by offenders to buy favours from corrupt correctional officials and also to gain control in a correctional centre. Money is at the centre of the ills happening in a correctional centre. Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 in Section 23 (1) (m) restricts offenders to possess unauthorised items.
2.3.5 CELLULAR PHONES FOR UNAUTHORISED COMMUNICATION

Although cellular phones are prohibited in correctional centres, a high number of these gadgets are removed daily during searching. The fact of the matter is that these gadgets are used in the planning and the execution of crime in and outside the correctional centre by the offenders. Cellular phones are sometimes used to plot the assassination of key witnesses and those whom they feel betrayed them. These gadgets are also used by offenders to defraud unsuspecting law abiding citizens by fraudsters who are serving sentences in the correctional centres (www.browardpalmbeach).

2.3.6 ASSORTMENT OF WEAPONS

There are assortments of weapons that are smuggled into the correctional centre with one clear aim of facilitating escapes and bamboozling the good order and security of the correctional centre, commonly smuggled weapons in the correctional centres are: fire-arms, bullets, explosives and knives. Weapons are the most deadliest instrument used by offenders in an escape. And in the process lives of both officials and offenders are at risk and at times even lost. But a fact to consider is that fire-arms are smuggled into the correctional centre by people and those people passing through the main gates of a correctional centre with unauthorised items but are not detected and seized at the point of entry. Usually they would take in weapons in pieces. (Researcher’s experience) However offenders are not allowed to handle or possess weapons in a correctional centre.

2.3.6.1 Fire-arms and bullets

Fire-arms and bullets are the deadliest weapons and are not permitted inside correctional centre or next to offenders. If firearm and bullets are smuggled into the correctional centre, the lives of everyone within that particular correctional centre are at risk. Offenders, correctional officials and general public are at high risk of losing their lives at any time if the firearm and bullets are in the hand of an offender.
2.3.6.2 Knives as a common weapon.

The toilet flashing masters are broken by offenders and smuggled into the cells where they are modified to make weapons. Hence many toilets are registered daily as dysfunctional. Glasses are installed on the windows of all cells where offenders are accommodated and this practice is in line with Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 which requires that any building should have enough ventilation. The normal window panes are broken by offenders and are wrapped around with pieces of cloth to make a weapon. Those weapons are used during gang fights by offenders to stab fellow offenders and also officials, however the correctional officials on daily basis conduct routine searching of cells offices but this type of weapon can be quickly be manufactured by offenders for instantaneous use.

- Toilets flushing rods were used to manufacture weapons.
- Pair of scissor dismantled to form weapons.
- Pieces of metal used to manufacture weapons.
- Bed frame used to manufacture weapons.
- Window pane used to manufacture weapons.
- Spoons used to manufacture weapons.

Mostly these types of weapons are used by gangs to demonstrate their strength.

2.3.7 WEAPONS

There are varieties of weapons that are smuggled into the correctional centre with one clear aim of aiding escapes and bamboozling the good order and security of the correctional centre. Generally smuggled weapons in the correctional centre include fire-arms, bullets, explosives and knives (Researcher’s experience). Weapons are the most deadliest instrument used by offenders in an escape which can lead to the killing of officials and offenders.
Offenders are not allowed to handle or possess weapons but from experience weapons such as sharp instruments are in many instances found in offender’s possessions during searching.

### 2.3.7.1 Fire-arms and bullets

Fire-arms cannot be operated without a bullet, in most cases fire-arms are concealed in a dismantled shape; the parts of a fire-arm are mostly hidden in different locations and only assembled when ready for use. Because a bullet cannot be dismantled it will also be hidden as part of the package. Bullets and fire-arms are mostly used for the escaping. Offenders use this type of weapons to gain their way out of the correctional centre.

### 2.3.7.2 Other dangerous weapons

Self-made knives: Offenders use any pieces of steel or hardened plastic to manufacture self-made knives. Toilets flushing rods are used to manufacture weapons. Toilet flashing masters are broken by offenders and modified to make weapons. Incidents of offenders who are vandalising the ablution facilities and breakages are common and registered daily to the Facilities managers.

Glasses are installed on the windows of all cells where offenders are accommodated as required by the Occupational Health and Safety Act, Act 85 of 1993 to ensure that any building should have enough ventilation. This requirement is also supported by Correctional Services Act (Act 111 of 1998) which shares the very same sentiment that offenders must be held in cells which meet the requirements prescribed by regulation in respect of ventilation, sanitary installations and general health conditions. These requirements must be enough for detention under conditions of human dignity. The normal window panes are broken by offenders and are wrapped around with pieces of cloth to make a weapon. Those weapons are manufactured in order to protect smuggled items. These weapons are used during gang fights by
offenders to stab fellow offenders and also officials. Despite searching of cells and offices on a daily routine where these dangerous items are confiscated, they can be replaced easily because offenders can manufacture them quickly for instantaneous use.

Other types of knives which are manufactured by offenders include:
- Pair of scissor dismantled and rapped with a piece of cloth that will form a grip.
- Pieces of sink metal are used to manufacture weapons.
- Steel bed frame are used to manufacture weapons.
- Spoons are sharpened to form weapons.
- Knives may be stolen from Kitchen.
- Sunlight soap bricks in a sock (so called aeroplane) - blocks of hard Sunlight soap are placed inside a socks, this is usually rotated around an open air before it is directed on a target.
- Padlock tied on a rope: This type of weapons is used by gangs and non-gang members to demonstrate their strength.

2.3.7.3 Explosives
Explosives such as dynamite may be used to demolish the structure of a correctional centre in order to pull off an escape. It must also be mentioned that this phenomenon occurs minimally in the South African Correctional Services.

2.3.8 DRUGS
Drugs are unauthorised and are prohibited by the South African Law. Drugs are smuggled into the correctional centres through the main gates of the correctional centres by corrupt correctional officials, private people who visit the correctional centres and offenders who for some reason pass through the main gates of the correctional centre while there are security officials manning the gates 24/7.
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There is a link between drugs and crime. Drugs are linked to crimes such as smuggling, stealing, sexual offenses, physical assault, robbery, murder, gang activities and escapes inside a correctional centre.

Penfold, Turnbull and Webster (2005:06) illustrate that drugs that were reported to be in circulation were supplied through six different routes namely social visits, mail, newly arrived offenders, staff, over the perimeter and after court appearances.

2.3.8.1 *Nyaope*

Nyaope (Whoonga) is a fine white powder that is usually combined with dagga and smoked. The ingredients of Nyaope are heroin, detergent powder, rat poison, and crushed anti-retroviral drugs (www.mobieg).

2.3.8.2 *Mandrax*

Mandrax varies radically in appearance is commonly smoked. The MX tablet is crushed, mixed with dagga and smoked through a pipe or broken bottleneck known as a 'white pipe'. Mandrax can also be swallowed or injected.

2.3.8.3 *Dagga*

Dagga is a green plant-like substance derived from the Dagga plant. The Dagga plant can be found in the form of a bush, Dagga plantations can grow up to 3m high and 15cm in diameter. A distinctive of the Dagga plant is the leaf that can be found in the form of a hand and that usually consists of an uneven number of leaves, usually five, seven, nine or eleven leaves, situated on the stem. Drugs dagga is packed in various forms as an "Arm", Bank size bags, Blades, Finger, Matchboxes, Sticks or Compressed dagga. It is commonly called: Marijuana, Zol, Skyf, Joint, Weed, Grass, Shit, Pot, Boom, Ganja, Dope, Hash, Smoke, Hemp or Green Gold. Dagga is primarily smoked and is usually mixed in with tobacco because Dagga doesn't burn easily on its own. Pips and stems are removed (www.flrc).
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A very popular method of smoking Dagga is in the so-called "Bottle Neck" or Pipe that is broken off or is cut from the bottle. In 1928 the cultivating and use of Dagga was prohibited (banned) in South Africa. Large numbers of drug users are incarcerated in correctional centres in most countries throughout the world. Rates of drug use by offenders is high, this view is supported by, Penfold et al., (2005:8).

According to Strang, Gossop, Heuston, Green, Whiteley and Maden (2006:1) the incarceration of drug users leads to problems of order in a correctional centre. Drug users tend to have fewer educational qualifications, poorer physical health, as well as more behavioural, psychological and psychiatric problems.

2.3.8.4 Methodology of drugs smuggling

Drugs are concealed by smugglers around their bodies, some inside food containers, underwear or upped in the bodies’ cavity, rectum or back of the throat. Smugglers may spray the package with perfume to make detection by the sniffer dogs difficult. Drugs are also concealed in babies’ clothes or nappies (Penfold et al. 2005:15).

Offenders are giving money to corrupt officials, fellow offenders or the public members in order for them to smuggle drugs into the correctional centre.

Drugs are central to all the smuggling. Offenders use cellular phones in order to order drugs from the drug suppliers who are in the community. Drugs are also used by gangs. Drugs are contributing to the lawlessness in correctional centres of the world.

The presence of drugs and drug use has fundamentally changed the correctional centres reality over the past two decades and, nowadays, all countries in Europe and South Africa experience major security problems due to drugs that are smuggled into the correctional centre to offenders.
Strang et al. (2006:2) suggested that drugs seem to be more prevalent in United Kingdom’s’ correctional centres. Smuggling of drug into the correctional centres is high. Offenders continue to smuggle drugs because of the level of disregard to the applicable laws. According to several studies in Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Austria, Portugal and Sweden between 3% and 26% of drug users in correctional centres report their first use of drugs while in correctional centres, while between 0.4% and 21% of drug users in correctional centres started injecting in correctional centres. Experts believe that the reasons for drug use in correctional centres are guided by ease prevalence of drugs in correctional centres. At several correctional centres in European Union it was discovered that the use of dagga and heroin were cited as the main drugs being used. Corrupt correctional officials in most cases are the ones that bring drugs into the correctional centres due to the fact that there are no stringent security checks for correctional officials compared to the ones visitor are exposed to.

In Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria and the United Kingdom has showed that a high proportion of offenders in correctional centres share injection equipment. Within correctional centres, drug use is often associated with the sharing of injecting material, and in some cases up to 100% of drug users reported sharing behaviours, syringes are cleaned with water only and, in 22% of cases, they are not cleaned. Sharing injection equipment in correctional centres is more frequent than in the community (Strang et al.2006:116).

2.3.9 ELECTRONIC GADGETS

Cellular phones, cellular chargers and SIM cards

Cellular phones are not able to operate and deliver messages without a SIM card. Offenders mostly will have one or three cellular phones in a communal cell that accommodates ±50 offenders with close to 30 SIM cards which will be concealed
separately in the communal cell. Offenders will from time to time share the use of the three cell phones.

Cell phones are becoming one of the most dangerous forms of correctional centre’s unauthorised items, because they allow offenders to bypass regulations and conduct illicit activities from behind bars. The age old cat and mouse game of controlling whom offenders communicate with in the outside world has been bypassed by the cell phones. The cell phones are creating a problem of safety.

In the 1990’s the cellular phones were larger and heavier, today they are small and lighter, they can be concealed with ease. In many parts of the world unauthorised cellular phones have been used by offenders to arrange the silencing of witnesses. Cellular phones are also in the centre of smuggling activities. These unauthorised items jeopardises the safety of the South African public. Cellular phones are prohibited in a correctional centre; however large numbers of these gadgets are removed daily during searching operations. The fact of the matter is that those instruments are used in the planning and the execution of crime in and outside the correctional centre by the offenders. They are used for smuggling of drugs, lethal weapons like fire-arms and explosives into the correctional centre that are used in most of the escapes (Van der Laan 2012:1).

Cellular phones jamming is prohibited and causes more problems than it solves because it don’t just obstruct offender’s calls, it can also interfere with emergency mobile number and public safety communication.

A gadget (so-called ‘offender call capture’) was introduced, tested as a new technology in a number of United States with great success. The offender call capture is one technology with enormous potential to save lives and protect the public, while preserving public safety communications. It allows and passes through all 9-1-1 and authorised calls, and rejects unauthorised calls, including those placed by or made to offenders. This technology stopped 216,000 unauthorised calls made
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by and to offenders from ever reaching their destination in just one month at its first trial in the correctional centre in Parchman, Mississippi. Advantages of the offenders call capture is that offenders call capture systems are legal when properly authorised by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC). Offenders call capture does not jam signals but rather acts like a cellular base station that picks up calls made within the correctional centre and passes along only authorised calls. If a cellular phones number is on an approved list, the call would be instantaneously handed off to the cellular phone company and handled normally. If the call is not on this list, meaning it is illegally placed by or to an offender; the call would not be completed and can receive an intercept message stating that the call is not authorised (www.ntia).

Wireless 9-1-1 calls and public safety communications are put at risk by the use of jamming devices. National public safety organisations including the National Emergency Number Association (NENA) and the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO) have expressed concerns with the potential for cell jammers to block 9-1-1 calls and disrupt critical public safety radio communications. It has not been demonstrated at this point whether jamming systems can be sufficiently designed and installed to prevent such interference outside of the correctional centres walls. Jamming thus has the potential to negatively impact response efforts by first responders and other emergency responders during emergencies. In fact, the Enforcement Bureau has received reports from police and fire departments receiving interference from operation of unauthorised jamming devices. State communications officials have expressed concern about jammers bleeding interference outside the correctional centre and disrupting police and fire-fighter frequencies which are close to cellular phones frequencies. The potential proliferation of cell jamming equipment, particularly if sanctioned, leads to great concerns for criminal or terrorist use absent significant controls. Cell jammers can be used to disrupt communications by the general public as well as state and local government for nefarious purposes, endangering public safety and security. In addition to being unauthorised, jammers are not necessarily the low cost option, and may be more expensive than other technologies. They require extensive engineering design to accommodate the various distinct building
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features in order to provide effective coverage, and continued maintenance and monitoring, as well as distributed antenna engineering, cabling and secure housing to prevent tampering (www.nena).

2.3.10 MONEY

Money is the mother of all the wrongs of smuggling in correctional centres. It is for this reason that offenders are not allowed to have money inside the correctional centres. Offenders that are having money in their possession have the propensity to bully the other offenders and also corrupt correctional officials for them to render favours that will weaken the security and order of the correctional centre. Offenders are not entitled to have money in their possession. Money is seen at the frequent distributor of all the nuisance of smuggling that correctional centres around the world are faced with.

- Offenders pay money to corrupt officials, fellow offenders or the public members in order to smuggle money into the correctional centre.
- Offenders give money to corrupt officials, fellow offenders or the public members in order to smuggle food from the public food chains.
- Offenders give money to corrupt officials, fellow offenders or the public members in order to accomplish an escape from lawful custody.
- Offenders give money to corrupt officials, fellow offenders or the public members in order for them to turn a blind eye on smuggling.
- Offenders give money to corrupt officials, fellow offenders or the public members for the smuggling of cellular phones.
- Money is the cause of the disruption of order to security and order of the correctional centre.

Offenders are able to smuggle money through the contact visit - their visitors will come into the correctional centre with money and during the visit they will find a way of leaving the money with offenders (sometimes the money will be swallowed by offenders, sometimes the money is concealed in the ablution facilities for offenders to get them after the visit, sometimes an official is bribed to turn a blind eye, sometimes money is smuggled to offenders by corrupt service providers (lawyers,
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delivery vehicles), correctional officials are allowed to enter a correctional centre with money and some of the corrupt officials find their way to deliver money to offenders.

2.4 CONTEMPORARY TRENDS REGARDING THE PHENOMENON OF SMUGGLING

According to Sykes (1958:63) offenders’ perspective to incarceration is that imprisonment comes with pains for the deprivation of liberty, goods and services, heterosexual relationship and autonomy. Hence the offenders have limited freedom with a primary objective of correcting him/her into a law abiding citizen however offenders believe smuggling is a way of survival in correctional centre.

Sparks, Bottoms and Hay (1996:132) states that Correctional Officials on their first arrival at a correctional centre have different expectations of a certain level of violence and that offenders must be kept behind bars under strict security. According to the White Paper on Corrections (2005), Correctional Officials are expected to play a pivotal role of rehabilitating offenders from their criminal behaviour into law abiding citizens.

According to Luyt (1999:38) the “Department of Correctional Services in aligning its activities to the new democratic South African way of doing things shifted from inhumane to humane treatment of offenders and from a centralised to a decentralised management approach that is found in Unit Management.” Currently the Department of Correctional Services is dominated by the problem of non-compliance to applicable laws within the walls of its correctional centres whereby unauthorised items are smuggled into the centres. The causes of such non-compliance range from gangsterism, overcrowding, and disobedience with policies by the officials, offenders and the public.

The Jali Commission (2006:825) found that some of the officials of the department even pursue the assistance of the gangs for their own ends, and this renders correctional centres uncontrollable. The Department of Correctional Services should
endeavour to maximize output with the available resources, but the biggest challenge of the Department are the unauthorised items smuggled into the correctional centres which erode the moral fibre that the Department of Correctional Services is intending to inculcate in the minds of offenders. Smuggling emasculates all attempts of rehabilitating offenders into law abiding citizens.

None-compliance with policies of the department can lead to insalubrious relations between officials, offenders and the public. The goals and objectives of the department are also compromised.

2.5 GOOD PRACTICES/STRATEGIES IN THE PREVENTION OF SMUGGLING IN CORRECTIONAL CENTRES

2.5.1 METHODS USED IN COMBATING SMUGGLING

Because smuggling is executed by people who from time to time would employ strategies that would emasculate the available means of making the correctional centre safe from smuggled unauthorised items, multi-prong strategies are employed to address this malady of smuggling. These strategies among others include the following:

2.5.1.1 Searching

Hernán (1998:2) states that searches carried out for security reasons inside a correctional centre are justified. Offenders all over the world try to smuggle a variety of unauthorised items for a variety of purposes.

The main reason to search offenders and all people entering or leaving the correctional centre is to prevent offenders from smuggling unauthorised items with which they could inflict injury or harm on correctional officials, other offenders or themselves, and the South African community. This belief is underpinned by the
National Development Plan outcome 3, which elicits that people of South Africa are and must feel free.

Generally speaking, three categories of searches performed on offenders can be distinguished, by increasing degree of thoroughness:

- Pat-down searches of the clothed body;
- Searches involving the removal of clothing – “strip searches”
- Electronic searching that includes scanners and surveillance cameras.

According to Stichcomb (2005:71) unauthorised items can be eradicated by searching offenders, their private property, cells, courtyards, workplaces, searching of visitors, correctional officials and offices. Searching forms an integral part of correctional centre security. - Body-cavity searches (visual inspection and manual probing) should be implemented with all the respect it deserves, not one of these strategies should be applied in an inhumane manner, but a consideration of the applicable policy is significant. All three types of searches are supposed to be carried out in a manner that would preserve the dignity of the offender or person searched. Obviously, searching can be conducted any time, while offenders are in their cells, when moving in or out of their unit to other units, recreational area, visiting area, hospital, courts, dining hall, and offices.

Correctional services employ different methods of security to keep offenders in correctional centres and also to prevent the smuggling of unauthorised items into the correctional centres.

Multi-pronged strategies are implemented in a fight against smuggling in correctional centres.

There are three distinctive reasons for searching in correctional centres is outlined in Correctional Services B Order Sub Order 2 Chapter 14. (CSBO2)
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- To find and confiscate any unauthorised items that may be used as a weapon against correctional officials, other offenders or the public;
- To seize any illicit substances harmful to health, such as drugs, which offenders may attempt to smuggle into the correctional centre.
- To recover any object that could be used as evidence when one offender has been attacked by another.

The main reason to search offenders is to prevent them from smuggling anything with which they could inflict injury or other harm upon correctional officials, other offender or themselves and disturb the security of the correctional centre.

Sometimes offenders exert excessive demands on their support system, including trying to control their movements and social contacts. Most women experience being controlled and/or manipulated by their partners who are serving sentences. The way this control is expressed includes: frequency of visits, trying to restrict partners associations and demanding their account for how they spend their time and also forcing them to smuggle items into the correctional centre. Toepell and Greaves (2001:64), found it common for partners of offenders to try to provide offenders with unauthorised items that are prohibited as the offenders would demand them as it helped to alleviate their partners ‘suffering.

2.5.1.2 Constant monitoring

Constant monitoring implies placing Correctional Officials on the strategic position whereby they monitor and control entry and exit of people including, Correctional Officials, offenders and other people into the correctional centre. A correctional official must at all times be vigilant and be able to see and put a stop to the threat of smuggled items. A correctional official should at most be able to receive information.

Department of Correctional Services has correctional officials that are in the core of its operations, Department of Correctional Services must have good working
relationship with the other Government Departments. Inter Departmental relationship is important for information sharing with regard to all the security threats that Department of Correctional Services is exposed to. Correctional Official must work closely with the community members because they have information about smuggling and smugglers. Department of Correctional Services cannot fight smuggling alone. In addition Department of Correctional Services should foster good working relationship with non-governmental organisations. Smuggling activities must be reflected on the Annual Approved Performance Plan (APP) of the Department of Correctional Services. Department of Correctional Services must ensure that service delivery is aligned to the National Development Plan (NDP). The (APP) is an essential building block towards realisation of the NDP.

It is of utmost importance that, whatever Department of Correctional Services does as a government department, it must align all its activities to the broader government outcomes and the NDP. The below elucidated role players are pivotal in dealing with the annoyance of smuggling, smugglers and unauthorised items that are finding their way into the correctional centres.

![Figure 2.1: Role players in correctional system and the fight against smuggling.](image)

unauthorised items that are smuggled into the correctional centres comes from the community hence fighting this scourge will always need the involvement of
nongovernmental organisations that will be coming from the community, Government Department in the law fraternity, involvement of correctional officials in solving this problem is pivotal and offenders should be encouraged to refrain from smuggling activities.

2.5.2 RESULTS OF SMUGGLING

2.5.2.1 Gang violence
Gangs smuggle unauthorised items that will contribute to violence in a correctional centre. Gangs commit acts of rape, bullying, manifestation of disorder, assaults during gang initiation rituals, assaults for promotion in the gang, assaults on a gang member as punishment/discipline for breaking code of conduct of a gang and demotion, assaults on non-gang members for general misconduct or disrespect against gang members and for gang activities against other gangs' formations.

2.5.2.2 Assaults
Offenders always assault each other for possession of unauthorised items that are smuggled into the correctional centre. Assaults range from offender on offender assaults, offender on officials and officials on offender. These types of assaults normally take place after unlock and most likely in passages, kitchens, dining halls and also during the night inside the locked cells.

2.5.2.3 Death
Offenders kill each other and officials for or with unauthorised items that are smuggled into the correctional centres. Various incidents are recorded of correctional officials who were killed by offenders with fire-arms and other weapons that are smuggled into the correctional centres. Some of these incidents are discussed below.
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At Kgoši Mampuru II C Max Correctional Centre, the Head of Close Maximum Correctional Centre and the Acting Area Commissioner of Kgoši Mampuru II were shot and killed by offenders with a smuggled fire-arm inside the correctional centre. During a foiled escape attempt, a correctional official was implicated (www.news24).

Johannesburg Correctional Centre 2012 October 38 offenders detonated an explosive at the back of the panel van that was transporting offenders to Johannesburg Correctional Centre,(3) three offenders lost their lives and the other offenders were apprehended (www.news24).

2.5.2.4 Escapes

Through unauthorised items smuggled to offenders, Department of Correctional Services has experienced a number of incidents as outlined below. The incidents are narrated in an unsystematic order.

During1995 at Kgoši Mampuru II Local Correctional Centre, Nine offenders moved out of the isolation cells, all nine of them were carrying firearms and cellular phones, they forced their way out of the correctional centre one correctional official was implicated (www.news24).

A mass escape by 41 offenders at the Harrismith Correctional Centre has led to the immediate dismissal of two correctional services officials who were linked to smuggling of unauthorised items that were used by the offenders in an escape. This was the biggest single escape from a correctional centre in many years. (www.news24

Escape of nine awaiting trial offenders from Durban Westville Correctional Centre on 21 February2005. It was found that there had been a failure to comply with policy and operational procedures. A cellular phone had been instrumental in the escape. The escape plans had become known in November of the previous year 2004, and
offenders had been moved from Durban to Kokstad. One of the escapees had escaped eight times before. There had been a lack of managerial leadership and technical security measures. Ten (10) officials were subjected to the Department of Correctional Services disciplinary hearing, though there was no indication of criminal liability. The escapees were re-arrested. The causes of this escape included the following: the escapees had obtained cellular phones; the bus transporting visitors to the correctional centre had not been searched; offenders used a makeshift rope to lower themselves from the seventh floor; they ran across the roof of the fifth floor, scaled the fence, cut through an outer fence and broke a fence post and escaped. Collusion between officers and offenders was suspected. There had been poor management of service providers. Service providers had to be thoroughly searched. They could bring in tools, and check out leaving some behind. No electrified fence surrounded the centre (www.news24).

Because of the shift system fewer officials were on duty at Zonderwater Correctional Centre on 06/11/2005 an incident of an attempted escape at Zonderwater Correctional Centre in Cullinan just outside of Tshwane, which resulted in one official fighting for his life and one offender dead. One of the notorious Cash in transit master mind and others planned and executed a plan to escape from lawful custody. A group of five callous long term serving offenders with no respect for human life took hostage five officials in an attempt to escape from Zonderwater Correctional Centre in the morning of Sunday, 6 November 2005. The South African Police Service (SAPS) were immediately called in with their experts to help handle the situation. Negotiators managed to control the situation without panic or irrational decision that could have led to a bloodbath from about 11:00 until after 18:00. The offenders were demanding loaded assault rifles (R5), a getaway kombi with its windows painted to conceal people inside and a safe passage out of the correctional centre. The SAPS and Correctional Officials managed to save many lives. Regrettably one official was seriously injured, four other officials survived unhurt. One offender serving 80 years for multiple serious crimes including murder, armed robbery and possession of fire-arms and bullets was killed. The four surviving offenders were immediately transferred to Kgoši Mampuru II C Max Correctional
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Centre. These offenders include one who is serving two life sentences for murder, attempted murder and robbery, another one serving a life sentence for murder and robbery, another one serving a life sentence for robbery and the last one who is serving 15 years for rape. It was believed that there was collusion by at least three officials of the Department whereby a fire-arm was smuggled into the centre (www.news24).

A notorious serial killer, serial rapist and armed robber from Mozambique who achieved further notoriety in 2006 by being the only person to have ever escaped from the maximum high-security in Kgoši Mampuru II C-Max Correctional Centre. This offender was initially arrested on 51 counts of murder, attempted murder, rape, hijacking and armed robbery in November 2006. Whilst being detained in the A6 unit of C-Max which houses dangerous and hardened criminals, he managed to escape by sliding out of his cell window, measuring only 20 cm x 60 cm. He had escaped from police custody before, previously in April 2005. He was found guilty on 64 charges including rape, attempted rape, attempted murder, robbery and theft, and was sentenced to 54 years imprisonment (www.news24).

Losperfontein escape: The incident took place in the early hours of the morning at approximately 03:00 when two awaiting trial offenders allegedly broke out through the correctional centre where after an alarm was raised by correctional officials on duty. Members of the South African Police Service around the area were immediately summoned and through their prompt response and action, a manhunt went underway. The search was very difficult to conduct due to rain and also that Losperfontein Correctional Centre is situated within a bushveld area, however, the offenders were recaptured at approximately 07:00 (www.news24).

An escape incident that occurred at Mthatha Correctional Centre on 20 March 2011, whereby seven (7) offenders managed to overpower correctional officials. In this instance, only the unit keys were taken from the correctional officials by the offenders to unlock cells of other offenders. The unit keys were left behind by the
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offenders and were recovered by officials after the escape took place (www.news24).

Offenders escaped from the Barkley West Correctional Centre. The offenders took the correctional officials hostage and stole a firearm from a safe. On their way out they shot dead a correctional official in the courtyard. Four other correctional officials were injured (www.news24).

Dangerous offender walked out of court. An investigation was launched into how an alleged bank robber, was able to stroll away from the court unchecked during a hearing in the Pretoria Magistrate court. The suspect had been held as an awaiting trial in a high security correctional centre after being arrested over in connection to at least 35 armed raids. This escape was the second time in 2012 that the Zimbabwean has managed to flee custody. He had been kept under tighter security following a previous escape in March 2012. He was on remand for a string of robberies but previously escaped from correctional centre in March and was at large for several weeks before being re-arrested. He was neither chained nor shackled in the court building because he was walking on crutches after suffering leg injuries. But he later ditched the crutches and strolled calmly out of the building after he was apparently left unattended outside the courtroom. Correctional Officials said they had warned SAPS about the possibility he might try to escape. In March, he was one of seven offenders who broke free from Boksburg Correctional Centre (www.bbc.).

Kgoši Mampuru II Local - Attempted escape by three remand detainees on counts of armed robbery with aggravating circumstances and possession of unlicensed firearms. In their attempt to escape, they got injured and were rearrested by Correctional Services officials. Their attempt to escape was foiled after they were spotted by a newspaper vendor who saw them jumping from the roof of a double-storey building and climbing the correctional centre fence (www.news 24.com).
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Queenstown - Four offenders arrested for crimes including rape and murder escaped from the Queenstown Correctional Centre at 21:00. They broke a toilet window and cut through steel bars with a saw to make their escape (www.news24).

According to Gelderloos and Lincoln (2005:16) offenders can do anything possible to win back their freedom. Usually imprisonment comes with depravation and limitation of certain rights. Therefore, offenders will also want to imitate correctional centre living conditions and make incarceration easy and limit restrictions as much as possible in their respective correctional centres by smuggling unauthorised items. It is this belief system that enhances offenders to continue smuggling unauthorised items.

2.6 FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW

Smuggling in correctional centres are characterised by smuggling unauthorised articles into and out of centres such as, fire-arms, ammunition, explosives, dangerous weapons such as knives, drugs such as nyaope, mandrax and dagga, cellular phones, SIM cards and chargers and money.

Smuggling has dreadful consequeses that are epitomized by loss of lives and disregard for the policies and the maintenance of order in correctional centres. From the items that are smuggled into the correctional centres escape from lawful custody are more prevalent.

Through unauthorised items smuggled to offender Department of Correctional Services has experienced a high number of incidents of escapes.
CHAPTER 3

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES REGARDING THE PREVENTION OF SMUGGLING AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED IN RSA CORRECTIONAL CENTRES

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the challenges experienced with the practical application of these policies and procedures. Although we have the legislation against smuggling in correctional centres, we still observe it. It is either the existing policies are outdated or do not address adequately all the challenges of our modern times.

3.2 CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT 111 OF 1998 AND SMUGGLING

Smuggling is a clandestine transference of unauthorised items into an area where are prohibited, for this argument smuggling is supplying of unauthorised items to offenders. This practice constitutes a crime according to Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, Section 119 subsection (1) "No person may without lawful authority

(a) supply, convey or cause to be supplied or conveyed to any offender, or hide or place for his or her use any document, intoxicating liquor, dagga, drug, opiate, money, or any other article;

(b) bring or introduce into any correctional centre, or place where offenders may be in custody, any document, intoxicating liquor, dagga, drug, opiate, money, or any other article to be sold or used in the correctional centre; or

(c) Bring out of any correctional centre, or convey from any offender any document or other article.
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(2) No correctional official or other person in the service of the Department or in
the employ of a Contractor may without lawful authority allow or participate in
the commission of any act prohibited in subsection (1).

(3) Any person who contravenes any provision of this section commits an offence
and is liable on conviction to a fine or, in default of payment, to incarceration
for a period not exceeding four years, or to such incarceration without the
option of a fine or both.”

The narratives of the act and its section above do not talk directly to the problems of
smuggling and the nature that it presents of being an organised act of crime. This
Act is not talking direct to a person who is intending to smuggle a cellular phone,
weapon or drugs which are commonly smuggled into the correctional centre.

The Department of Correctional Services is mandated by the legislator to keep
offenders in custody until they are lawfully released. During custody rehabilitation
strategies aimed at discouraging offenders from participating in criminal activities
should be applied. By placing rehabilitation of offenders at the centre of all its
activities the Department of Correctional Services demonstrates the belief that
offenders as humans can also change from their offending behaviour to law
abiding citizens. Section 2 of the Correctional Services Act stipulates that the
purpose of Department of Correctional Services is to protect and maintain South
Africa which is safer, just and peaceful. This is possible through the
implementation of sentences imposed by South African courts. However,
offenders should be kept in a safe custody whilst ensuring their human dignity,
promoting social responsibility and human development.

However, acts of smuggling which are endemic in the correctional centres
undermine the very purpose of Department of Correctional Services as mentioned
above and this has become a pandemic experienced in correctional centres
around the world including South Africa. Through use of unauthorised items like
fire arms, we have observed with displeasure how dangerous offenders managed to
shoot their way out of the most secure correctional centres in the country, e.g.
Super/Close Maximums. The unfortunate tragedy happened in Kgoši Mampuru II,
where during a pre-planned escape, offenders managed to shoot and kill two of Department of Correctional Services’ senior managers. Such fugitives, whilst on the run they will continue terrorising and tormenting unsuspecting communities. They will never hesitate to commit new crimes involving house breaking and theft; robbery; car hijacking; rape and even murder. Gangs seem to be a major concern in all smuggles manifesting in correctional centres and they need to be rooted out. We have seen assortment of unauthorised items often smuggled in by offenders’ or corrupt correctional officials and visiting members of the public. Correctional centres are perceived as security areas where no unauthorised items should be found. Surely these items cannot just drop into the correctional centres from the sky as rain but are carried or transported in by the people who come in to contact with the offenders.

Unauthorised items smuggled into the centre ranges from cellular phones, drugs, knives, fire-arms, letters, and information and so on. Cellular phones are gadgets that are mostly smuggled into the centres. Cellular phones are used by offenders for the commission of additional crimes whiles they are incarcerated in the Correctional centres. Offenders communicate with their associates in arranging escapes from lawful custody.

### 3.3 Managerial Style and Smuggled Unauthorised Items

According to King (2015:45), correctional centre management style has an impact in maintaining order in South African correctional centres. An individual centre management is a key in setting the standard for social relations of offenders and correctional officials. King further emphasises that this relation be at the forefront of the whole correctional system. The author further deduced that when management provide authoritarian style of leadership to offenders, it is likely that offenders resort to violence as a means to show resistance to management style of leadership. However, the solution to combat violence in the correctional centres is through good communication between offenders, correctional officials and management. Boredom, depravation, depression can also promote and accelerate the extent of smuggling within the correctional centres.
According to Abramova, Avdeeva and Kovriga (2008:94) the marketing and dealings of drugs in the correctional centres is nearly the same as in the general public. However, in correctional centres setting the issue of drugs is escalated by corrupt correctional officials, visitors and corrupt service providers. It is also not a good idea to rule out the possibility that some of these drugs hail from the local offenders hospitals within the correctional centres. Visitors who provide services such as religious, spiritual, cultural, educational, awareness and technical may also form part of the chain that escalated the marketing of drugs in correctional centres.

3.4 UNAUTHORISED ITEMS THAT ARE COMMONLY SMUGGLED

Unauthorized items that are commonly smuggled are documents, intoxicating liquors, drugs, money, cellular phones and weapons. Smuggling undermines the values of the Department of Correctional Services which are exemplified as: Accountability, Development, Equity, Effectiveness, Integrity, Justice, Security and Ubuntu. All the smuggled unauthorized items find their way into / out of correctional centres through a central point which is the main gates. Whereas there are officials manning those gates 24/7. And it is known by all officials that searching is a pre-requisite for any person entering the correctional centre. Those perpetrators have no respect for the applicable laws of the Department of Correctional Services. An overview of unauthorized items that are commonly smuggled is narrated below. The unauthorized items smuggled into the correctional centres are supplied through six different routes: family visits, mail, offender admission, correctional officials, over the perimeter, court / hospital movement, by service providers, maintenance teams, agricultural teams and delivery trucks (Penfold et al. 2005:15).

3.5 METHODS USED IN SEARCHING PERSONS

Searching is a prerequisite for people entering or leaving a correctional centre and a person refusing to be searched may be refused entry / exit. The following searching methods are used: manual search, search by visual inspection of the
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person and technical means of searching. X-rays machines and any technical device may be used by qualified technicians when there is reasonable ground to do so. This is always done when offenders swallowed substances that are regarded as unauthorised and which may cause damage to the offenders: Correctional Services B Order 2, Chapter 14 paragraph 2.4(d).

3.5.1 APPROACH TO SAFETY IN THE CORRECTIONAL CENTRES

It is the responsibility of every offender to accept the authority of the correctional centres and to obey all lawful instructions imposed by the correctional officials. Department of Correctional Services should make sure that offender safety is a priority and these include safe and secure environment, development and care, health and hygiene, including exercising within the correctional centre. According to Section 4 of Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 as amended, the Department of Correctional Services has to act on the basis of the above utterances and is obligated by the legislator in realizing this fundamental principle. Imagine a correctional centre where offenders disobeys the authorities, anarchy may prevail and the Department of Correctional Services would not realize its purpose of rehabilitating offenders into law abiding citizens that would be returned back into the society after the completion of their sentences. Smuggling compromises safety of offender’s, correctional officials and the South Africa public.

Within the correctional centre, an offender who uses drugs poses threats to correctional officials and other offenders. This is because drug abuse turns offenders into violent behaviour which leads to assaults and even killing of staff or fellow offenders. It would also accelerate the incidents of riots, hostages taking, drug overdose deaths and suicides. The above mentioned incidents are likely to make the correctional centres ungovernable and uncontrollable. As a result, this would undermine all efforts to create a safe and secure environment, as well as, the integrity of the correctional system. These gigantic challenges faced by the Department of Correctional Services today are caused by a variety of issues including disparity in staff salaries, corrupt officials, overcrowding and
members of the public who violate safety and security rules of correctional services.

3.5.2 OVERCROWDING AND ACCOMMODATION REQUIREMENTS

Overcrowding is defined as the high number of offenders that are accommodated in correctional centres which are designed to accommodate a lesser number. Overcrowding in South African correctional centres is a reality. And this problem is not caused by the Department of Correctional Services as many people may perceive. But overcrowding is a direct result of the scourge of crime rampanting the South African society. Crime is a societal responsibility, those people who commit crime are amongst others, our brothers, sisters, friends, colleagues, mothers, and fathers, the society is responsible to correct them and give guidance before they are counted as statistics in correctional centre. According to Goyer (2011:3) the most serious problem facing South African Department of Correctional Services is the overcrowding of offenders which also nourishes the problem of smuggling of unauthorised items. South Africa’s correctional centres were designed to accommodate 100668 offenders. Currently they struggle to house 172271 offenders. Overcrowding exacerbates the problems that correctional centres have of gangs, violence, sexual assault, public health problems and escape attempts. As such it makes managing a correctional centre difficult, and reducing the chances of rehabilitation. To make matters worse, The South African correctional centres are also under-staffed, proper searching and one-to-one care of offenders in the correctional centres is compromised, due to the fact that offenders do not have enough floor space. In some correctional centres, a communal cells which are designed to accommodate 24 offenders, are accommodating 90 offenders, in single cell which are designed to accommodate 1 (one) offender 2(two) or 3 (three) offenders are accommodated. Nationally, Department of Correctional Services consist of 241 correctional centres have approved offender accommodation which varies on different financial years due to maintenance of the buildings which render some units not utilised. To ensure the safety of the offenders, the correctional officials, and the greater community, security is a priority in any correctional centre. Overcrowding leads to poor training inappropriate supervision of offenders which
leads offenders harming each other, attempting to escape, or a general loss of life- (Goyer 2011:8).

There are 241 correctional centres in the 6 (six) Department of Correctional Services’ Regions:

- Gauteng
- KwaZulu – Natal
- Western Cape
- Eastern Cape
- Free State and Northern Cape (FS/NC)
- Limpopo, Mpumalanga and North West (LMN)

Correctional centres are classified as Minimum, Medium, Maximum and Close Maximum correctional centres. These facilities are distributed in the 48 Management Areas. The correctional centres are further categorised as correctional centres for juveniles, men and women. We also have centres for sentenced offenders and remand detainees as outlined in the Department of Correctional Services Strategic Plan 2011/2012–2015/2016.

The figure below shows different actual total number of offenders per financial year compared to approved accommodation total and overpopulation figures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>AOA</th>
<th>DAOP</th>
<th>OP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>114386</td>
<td>158330</td>
<td>43944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>115266</td>
<td>160370</td>
<td>45104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>114559</td>
<td>157304</td>
<td>42745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>114822</td>
<td>163599</td>
<td>48777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>114000</td>
<td>164500</td>
<td>50500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>114000</td>
<td>160280</td>
<td>46280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.1: Offender population as compared per financial year 2006 – 2012 (www.dcs.gov.za).
The rate of overcrowding in South African correctional centre is high. This phenomenon is reflected by the disparity of Department of Correctional Services approved offender accommodation (AOA) compared with daily average offender populations (DAOP). The figure above illustrates accommodation figures from year 2006 until 2012 as received from Department of Correctional Services website (www.dcs.gov.za). The totals of Overcrowding as shown above are indicating that for some years there had been a gradual increase which is reflected differently when one is analysing only the current three years, because of the increase in the total of offenders the rendering of service such as individual offender management, application of security and preventing and removing unauthorised items that comes into the correctional centres through smuggling is compromised.

3.6 CONDUCT OF OFFENDERS
Rehabilitation of offenders is pivotal in the operations of Department of Correctional Services however offenders has a responsibility to make sure that they allow the rehabilitation initiatives by Department of Correctional Services to work for them. Rehabilitation involves changing the inner beliefs of an individual offender to participate in such initiatives.

Through the implementation of rehabilitation programmes, the Department of Correctional Services aims at maintaining discipline and order; safety and security in correctional centres. Section 23 of Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) outlines the transgression for which an offender may be disciplined. These disciplinary infringements by an offender include the following:

a) Replies dishonestly to legitimate question.
b) Disobeys a lawful command or order.
c) Is abusive to any person.
d) Fails or refuses to perform any labour or other duty.
e) Is careless or negligent with regard to any labour or duty.
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f) Uses insulting, obscene or threatening language.
g) Conducts himself or herself indecently by word, act or gesture.
h) Commits an assault.
i) Communicates with any person at a time when or a place where it is prohibited.
j) Makes unnecessary noise or causes a nuisance.
k) Without permission leaves the cell or other assigned place.
l) In any manner defaces or damages any part of the correctional centre.
m) Possesses unauthorised items.
n) Commits theft.
o) Creates or participates in a disturbance or foments a mutiny or engages in any other activity that is likely to jeopardize the security or order of a correctional centre.
p) Professes to be a member of a gang or takes part in gang activities.
q) Makes a dishonest accusation against a correctional official or fellow offender.
r) Conceals, destroys, alters, defaces or disposes of an identification card, document or any issued article.
s) Commits an act with the intention of endangering his or her life, injuring his or her health or impairing his or her ability to work.
t) Attempts to do anything referred to in this section.

2) An offender who assists, conspires with or incites another person to contravene a provision of subsection (1) commits a disciplinary infringement.

3.7 SALARIES OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICIALS

Correctional officials are in the centre of order in correctional centres and they need to work together in realising this objective. But the current Occupation Specific Dispensation (OSD for Correctional Official 2008) for Correctional Services Officials creates the acumen of them and us. Non-Centre-Based officials turn to distance themselves from security activities and this creates a serious security breach. This dividing concept is shown in the disparity of correctional officials, in this OSD the
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non- Centre - Based officials are on daily basis working with offenders but are not salaried like the Centre - Based officials and this leads to non-centre base officials turning a blind eye on issues that contribute to smuggling. In 2012 Department of Correctional Services had 40388 of correctional officials in its employment from the approved post establishment of 46874 with the vacancy rate of 13.8% (Department of Correctional Services Strategic plan 2013/2014). From the above figure one can safely say Department of Correctional Services has 24560 officials employed as Centre base officials who are hypothetical to be the ones that deal directly with offenders through the structured daily programmes of offenders.

This leads to a conclusion that only 46874 of a total of an approved establishment of 24560 officials which is also halved to 12280 officials by the 7 days establishment. Daily 12280 officials are expected to deal with 172271 offenders and the unauthorised articles that offenders are trying to smuggle into correctional centres. The Department of Correctional Services is trying so hard to fill the vacant posts but this endeavour is not reachable due to the death of officials, retirement, officials dismissed for smuggling, exodus of officials to other government departments or private sectors.

As mentioned above the reason for officials’ exodus from the department is the same salary levels but different salary notches which are brought about by the OSD.

Correctional officials are pivotal in the rehabilitation of offenders, their duties include amongst others couching offenders into being law abiding citizens, and this responsibility is achieved through the following activities.

- Constant offender monitoring
- Individualised offender management
- Sporadic searching
- Rendering rehabilitation programmes.
- Escorting offenders.
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- Maintaining the safety of the correctional centre.
- Removing unauthorised items from the correctional centre.

The large part of the correctional officials is non-Centre-Based officials whereas the small number of officials are Centre-Based. Non Centre-Based are rendering Administrative and Support services - these officials are found at the Head Office, Regional Offices, Management Areas and some inside the correctional centres. These officials were previously able to beef up security during the weekends and holidays. Security incidents are mostly experienced during weekends and holidays when the deployment of the staff compliment is generally low. Currently because of this OSD non Centre Based officials are not allowed to beef up security during the times when staff compliment is low.

This practice that comes about with this OSD is compromising security and it encourages division in the Department of Correctional Services whereby the other correctional officials are not contributing to the core business of Department of Correctional Services i.e., securing offenders in custody until they are lawfully released. By eradicating or putting an end to smuggling of unauthorised items in the correctional centres.

Although Department of Correctional Services is a different community in a bigger community of South Africa, correctional centres have to deal with almost all the activities that are seen in a community. A correctional centre for example can provide for various activities also found in the outside “free world” such as, schools, recreational facilities, hospitals, workshops (carpenters, boiler makers, electricians, painters, welders, bricklayers, cabinet makers, all the trades) and provides for the services of social workers, psychologists, nurses, doctors, nutritionist, and even teachers All these people are rendering services to offenders in a correctional centres and are qualified in their trades and need to also be capacitated in dealing with offenders and their smuggling tendencies.
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Incorporating these 'specialists into the core function of security will most certainly add to the achievement of Department of Correctional Services objectives.
CHAPTER 4

NATURE, EXTENT AND CHALLENGES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The nature of smuggling in correctional centres can be directly linked to the dealings and exchange of unauthorised items such as weapons, drugs, cellular gadgets and money amongst offenders, offenders and their visiting families and between offenders and corrupt officials. As a result of poor and insufficient searching practices, these unauthorised items are primarily smuggled into the correctional centres during visits of families to offenders, offenders returning from work outside the correctional centre (such as workshops and work spans) and corrupt officials who exchange favours and items for money. It is very difficult to determine the nature and extent of smuggling in correctional centres. The main source is found in records which are kept in terms of unauthorised items which are confiscated during the searching of cells and inmates. However, these records reflect what was confiscated and recorded only. It is common knowledge that the frequency and efficiency of searching practices is hindered by factors such as shortage of staff. Other factors which promote smuggling in correctional centres include overcrowding, an unfavourable staff-offender ratio and a high idleness rate. At most these records of confiscated unauthorised items provide an indication of the nature and minimum extent of unauthorised items in circulation in correctional centres.

The purpose of this chapter is to have a clear indication of the nature, extent and challenges of the phenomena of smuggling in selected correctional centres in Gauteng. Data was sourced from the regional security section. As such, the researcher analysed records of confiscated unauthorised items within the Gauteng Region in general and an in-depth analysis of records at selected correctional centres in the Gauteng Region in particular. The correctional centres which were selected for the empirical study of this research include the following:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG.

- Johannesburg - Medium B Correctional Centre
- Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre
- Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Correctional Centre

The correctional centres were selected because they are the three largest correctional centres in Gauteng.

Lastly, the operational challenges and practices which impact on the frequency and efficiency of searches were scrutinised to establish areas for improvement.

4.2 PROFILING OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF UNAUTHORISED ITEMS

Unauthorised Items that are smuggled into the correctional centres are sometimes not presented in their original form but are concealed or given a different shape e.g. unauthorised items concealed inside a loaf of bread, to look like ordinary authorised items to an unsuspecting official who conducts searching. The nature and extent of confiscated items is elucidated below. At first a glimpse of the nature and extent of unauthorised items confiscated are given for the Gauteng Region as a whole, where after an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon is discussed for the three largest correctional centres in the Gauteng Region i.e. Johannesburg Medium B, Kgoši Mampuru II Central and Kgoši Mampuru II Local Correctional Centres.

The nature of the empirical research conducted includes visits to the correctional centres and an in-depth analysis of records kept of unauthorised items confiscated from offenders for a 3-year period (Financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15). The purposes of the empirical research were to determine the nature and extent of unauthorised items confiscated from offenders. The data collected was also used to determine increasing/decreasing trends in type of items confiscated. A comparison of the nature and extent of confiscated unauthorised items between the correctional centres and the findings which emanated from the literature review was also done.
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4.2.1 ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF CONFISCATED UNAUTHORISED ITEMS IN THE GAUTENG REGION

Gauteng Region of the Department of Correctional Services has the following Management Areas under its control, Baviaanspoort; Boksburg; Johannesburg; Kgoši Mampuru II; Krugersdorp; Leeuwkop; Modderbee and Zonderwater.

Data was collected from the Gauteng Region for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 in order to have clear indication of the nature and extent of the problem of smuggling in the Gauteng Region. The data was sourced from regional office security section which provided the Gauteng Regions’ confiscated unauthorised items.

For the purpose of this study, unauthorised items are grouped into the following categories and items per category:

- **Weapons**: Including items such as fire-arms, bullets, explosives, other dangerous weapons (e.g. all self-made knives, knives, broken glasses, pieces of steel, scissors, hag saws, iron saws, self-made stoves, plastic self-made knives, kettle elements, stoves, screwdrivers, pots, sharp objects, tattoo machine, needles, steel spoons, syringes etc.)

- **Drugs**: Such as Nyaope, Mandrax, Dagga (in various forms e.g., bank size bags = 34 grams/bag, blades = 2 grams/blade, and bricks etc., expressed in kilograms)

- **Cellular gadgets**: Cellular phones, cellular chargers and SIM cards

- **Money**: cash

Table 4.1 below provides a summary of confiscated unauthorised items reported at the various correctional centres of Gauteng. Although not all categories indicated above are covered, data on certain categories is included.
Table 4.1: Nature and extent of unauthorised items confiscated at correctional centres in the Gauteng Region for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. (Gauteng Regional Office, Security Section).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATURE OF UNAUTHORISED ITEMS</th>
<th>FINANCIAL YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL FOR 3-YEAR PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>2013/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRE-ARMS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMMUNITION</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPLOSIVES</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRUGS (incidents)</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAGGA (kg)*</td>
<td>523.180kg</td>
<td>307.390kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANGEROUS WEAPONS (Items)</td>
<td>2051</td>
<td>1650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CELL PHONES &amp; SIM CARDS</td>
<td>8080</td>
<td>7466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the data in Table 4.1 above it is clear that in the Gauteng Region:

- Only 1 (one) fire-arm was confiscated during the three year period i.e., during the 2013/14 financial year;
- 37 (thirty seven) rounds of ammunition were confiscated during the three year period – the number of rounds confiscated indicates a downward trend (annual decrease) over the 3-year period;
- 1 one explosives was confiscated during the 3-year period;
- A total of 1108 incidents occurred during the 3 year period where drugs were confiscated. Despite a drop of \(-20,6\%\)[\(((456 - 574) ÷ 574) x 100 = -20,6\%\)] in the incidents experienced between 2012/13 and 2013/14 a huge year-on-year increase of \(71,1\%\)[\(((780 - 456) ÷ 456) x 100 = 71,1\%\)] is observed between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial year;
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- A total of 1339.57 kg of dagga was confiscated for the 3 year period - despite a drop of \(-41,2\%\)\(\frac{(307.39 - 523.18)}{307.39}\) x 100 = \(-41,2\\%\) in the dagga confiscated between 2012/13 and 2013/14 the figures bounced back with a year-on-year increase of \(65,6\%\)\(\frac{(509 - 307.39)}{307.39}\) x 100 = \(65,6\\%\) between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial year;

- **Dangerous weapons** (i.e., all self-made knives, knives, broken glasses, pieces of steel, scissors, hag saws, self-made stoves, plastic self-made knives, kettle elements, stoves, screw drivers, pots, sharp objects, self-made prison keys, tattoo machine, needles, steel spoons, syringes etc.) - not less than 6705 dangerous weapons were confiscated during the 3-year period. Despite a drop of \(-19,6\%\)\(\frac{(1650 - 2051)}{2051}\) x 100 = \(-19,6\\%\) in the number of dangerous weapons confiscated between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial year, a huge year-on-year increase of \(82,1\%\)\(\frac{(3004 - 1650)}{1650}\) x 100 = \(82,1\\%\) is observed between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial year;

- A total of 30564 **cell phones/SIM cards** were confiscated from offenders in the Gauteng Region. Despite a small drop of \(-7,6\%\)\(\frac{(7466 - 8080)}{8080}\) x 100 = \(-7,6\\%\) in the number of cell phones/SIM cards confiscated between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial year, a staggering increase of \(106,1\%\)\(\frac{(15389 - 7466)}{7466}\) x 100 = \(106,1\\%\) between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years is observed.

Overall a decrease were experienced in the extent of all the unauthorised categories during the 2013/14 financial year, while a significant increase was experienced in terms of dangerous weapons, cell phones and SIM cards during 2014/15 financial years.

4.2.2 ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF Confiscated Unauthorised Items at Selected Correctional Centres in The Gauteng Region

The following management areas in Gauteng Region have been selected for an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of smuggling:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG.

- Johannesburg - Medium B Correctional Centre
- Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre
- Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Correctional Centre

Data was collected for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 in order to have clear indication of the nature and extent of the problem of smuggling at each of the three Correctional Centres in the Gauteng Region. The data was sourced from records of confiscated unauthorised items held at each of the Correctional Centres.

The nature and extent of confiscated unauthorised items are analysed per Correctional Centre below. A comparative analysis between the three Correctional Centres is given in terms of a summary.

4.2.2.1 Analysis of the nature and extent of confiscated unauthorised items at Johannesburg - Medium B Correctional Centre

Only sentenced male offenders are incarcerated in this centre. The approved accommodation at the Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre is 1300 with a staff establishment of 439. The daily average inmate population for 2014/15 was 3110. The occupation percentage for 2014/15 was \([(3110 \div 1300) \times 100 = 239\%\]. This implies a overcrowding of 139%. The staff-offender ratio for 2014/15 was 1 staff member per 7 offenders \((3110 \div 439 = 7 \text{ approximated})\), which is more than double the required ratio of 1 staff member per 3 offenders \((1300 \div 439 = 3 \text{ approximated})\).

Table 4.2 below provides a summary of confiscated unauthorised items reported at the Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre, for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15.
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Table 4.2: Summary of recorded confiscated unauthorized items at the Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre, for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. (Correctional Centre Johannesburg Medium B, Security Section).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNAUTHORISED ITEMS</th>
<th>TOTALS PER FINANCIAL YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL FOR 3 YEAR PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CATEGORY</td>
<td>ITEM</td>
<td>2012/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEAPONS</td>
<td>Fire-arms</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bullets</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other dangerous weapons</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRUGS</td>
<td>Nyaope</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mandrax</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dagga - bank size (N1)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dagga - blades (N2)</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dagga - kilograms (N3)</td>
<td>24.653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Dagga – kilograms*</td>
<td>27.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECTRONIC GADGETS</td>
<td>Cellular phones</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellular chargers</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIM cards</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONEY</td>
<td>Bank Cards</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>R17,056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total Dagga (kg) = (N1 x 0.034) + (N2 x 0.002) + N3

Explanation: one blade = 2 grams (approximately), one small bank bag = 34 grams (approximately)
From the data in Table 4.2 above it is clear that at the Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre:

- No fire-arms, bullets or explosives was confiscated during the three year period;
- Not less than 565 other dangerous weapons were confiscated during the 3-year period. Despite a drop of \(-48.8\%\)\(\left[\frac{126 - 246}{246}\right] \times 100 = -48.8\%\) in the number of other dangerous weapons confiscated between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial year, a huge year-on-year increase of \(82.1\%\)\(\left[\frac{3004 - 1650}{1650}\right] \times 100 = 82.1\%\) is observed between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial year;
- A total of only 6 incidents occurred during the 3 year period where drugs (Nyaope) were confiscated.
- A total of 2452 dagga blades, 466 bank size bags and another 41,653 kg of dagga, which add up to a total of 66,401 kg of dagga was confiscated for the 3 year period. Despite a drop of \(-69.4\%\)\(\left[\frac{8.364 - 27.373}{27.373}\right] \times 100 = -69.4\%\) in the total dagga confiscated between 2012/13 and 2013/14 the figures bounced back with a staggering year-on-year increase of \(218.8\%\) \(\left[\frac{26.664 - 8.364}{8.364}\right] \times 100 = 218.8\%\) between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial year;
- A total of 3316 cell phones, 832 cellular chargers and 3566 SIM cards were confiscated from offenders at the Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre during the 3-year period. Despite a decrease of \(-22.9\%\) \(\left[\frac{256 - 332}{332}\right] \times 100 = -22.9\%\) in the number of cellular chargers as well as a relatively low decrease of cellular phones of \(-7.8\%\) \(\left[\frac{1349 - 1463}{1463}\right] \times 100 = -7.8\%\) confiscated between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial year, an increase of \(24.6\%\) \(\left[\frac{1688 - 1355}{1355}\right] \times 100 = 24.6\%\) between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years is observed.
- A total of R34, 497 was confiscated for the 3-year period. A slight decrease in amounts of money confiscated was observed in year on year basis.
Overall a decrease was experienced in the extent of confiscated unauthorised items such as other dangerous weapons and the total kilograms of dagga, during the 2013/14 financial year. However, a significant year on year increase was experienced in terms of the number of SIM cards confiscated.

4.2.2.2 Analysis of the nature and extent of confiscated unauthorised items at Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre

Only sentenced male offenders are incarcerated in this centre. The approved accommodation at the Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre is 2171 with a staff establishment of 720. The daily average inmate population for 2014/15 was 2574. The occupation percentage for 2014/15 was [(2574 ÷ 2171) x100 = 119%]. This implies an overcrowding of 19%. The staff-offender ratio for 2014/15 was 1 staff member per 4 offenders (2574 ÷ 720 = 4 approximated), which is 1 offender more per staff member than the required ratio of 1 staff member per 3 offenders (2171 ÷ 720 = 3 approximated).

Table 4.3 below provides a summary of confiscated unauthorised items reported at the Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15.
Table 4.3: Summary of recorded confiscated unauthorized items at the Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. (Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, Security Section).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>UNAUTHORISED ITEMS</th>
<th>2012/13</th>
<th>2013/14</th>
<th>2014/15</th>
<th>TOTAL FOR 3 YEAR PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WEAPONS</td>
<td>Fire-arms</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bullets</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other dangerous weapons</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>1488</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRUGS</td>
<td>Nyaope</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mandrax</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dagga - bank size (N1)</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>1112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dagga - blades (N2)</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>2639</td>
<td>3851</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dagga - kilograms (N3)</td>
<td>70,964</td>
<td>60,741</td>
<td>54,417</td>
<td>186,122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Dagga – kilograms*</td>
<td>80.158</td>
<td>62.139</td>
<td>80.265</td>
<td>222.562</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECTRONIC GADGETS</td>
<td>Cellular phones</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>1551</td>
<td>2645</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellular chargers</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>754</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIM cards</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>1629</td>
<td>2944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONEY</td>
<td>Bank Cards</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>248</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>R363</td>
<td>R310</td>
<td>R149</td>
<td>R822</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total Dagga (kg) = (N1 x 0.034) + (N2 x 0.002) + N3
Explanation: one blade = 2 grams (approximately), one small bank bag = 34 grams (approximately)

From the data in Table 4.3 above it is clear that at Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre:

- No fire-arms was confiscated during the three year period;
- However, one bullet and 0 explosive device were confiscated during the 2013/14 financial year;
- Not less than 1488 other dangerous weapons were confiscated during the 3-year period. An significant increase of 89.3% \([(600 – 317) ÷ 317) x 100 = 89.3\%]\ in the number of other dangerous weapons confiscated between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial year was observed. A slight decrease of 4.8% \([(571 – 600) ÷ 600) x 100 = 4.8\%]\ is observed between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial year;
- A total of 103 incidents (67 incidents of Nyaope during the 2013/14 financial year and 36 incidents of Mandrax during the 2012/13 financial year) occurred where drugs were confiscated;
- A total of 3851 dagga blades, 1112 bank size bags and another 186.122 kg of dagga, which add up to a total of 222.562 kg of dagga was confiscated for the 3 year period. Despite a drop of -22.5% \([(62.139 – 80.158) ÷ 80.158) x 100 = -22.5\%]\ in the total dagga confiscated between 2012/13 and 2013/14 the figures bounced back with a year-on-year increase of 29.2% \([(80.265 – 62.139) ÷ 62.139) x 100 = 29.2\%]\ between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial year;
- A total of 2645 cell phones, 754 cellular chargers and 2944 SIM cards were confiscated from offenders at the Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre during the 3-year period. A year-on-year decrease of -43.9% \[((393 – 701) ÷ 701) x 100 = -43.9\%]\ in the number of cellular phones confiscated, a year-on-year decrease of -85.1% \[((94 – 629) ÷ 629) x 100 = -85.1\%]\ in the number of cellular chargers confiscated and a year-on-year decrease of -26.1% \[((557 – 758) ÷ 758) x 100 = -26.1\%]\ in the number of SIM cards confiscated, were observed between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial years. However, a year-on-year increase of 294.7% \[((1551 – 393) ÷ 393) x 100 = 294.7\%]\ in the number of cellular phones confiscated, and a year-on-year increase of 192.5% \[(1629 –
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG.

557) ÷ 557) x 100 = 192,5%)] in the number of SIM cards confiscated, were observed between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years;

- A total of 248 bank cards and R822 cash were confiscated for the 3-year period. A year-on-year decrease in the number of bank card and the amount of cash confiscated is observed.

Overall a decrease was experienced in the extent of confiscated unauthorised items such as the total kilograms of dagga, electronic gadgets and money during the 2013/14 financial year. However, a significant year-on-year increase was observed in terms of the number of the total dagga, cell phones and SIM cards confiscated between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years.

4.2.2.3 Analysis of the nature and extent of confiscated unauthorised items at Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Correctional Centre

Only remand male detainees are incarcerated in this centre. The approved accommodation at the Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Correctional Centre is 1563 with a staff establishment of 572. The daily average inmate population for 2014/15 was 2904. The occupation percentage for 2014/15 was [(2904 ÷ 1563) x 100 = 186%]. This implies a overcrowding of 86%. The staff-offender ratio for 2014/15 was 1 staff member per 5 offenders (2904 ÷ 572 = 5 approximated), which is 2 offenders more per staff member than the required ratio of 1 staff member per 3 offenders (1563 ÷ 572 = 3 approximated).

Table 4.4 below provides a summary of confiscated unauthorised items reported at the Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Correctional Centre, for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15.
Table 4.4: Summary of recorded confiscated unauthorized items at the Correctional Centre Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention, for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. (Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Correctional Centre, Security Section).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>2012/13</th>
<th>2013/14</th>
<th>2014/15</th>
<th>TOTAL FOR 3 YEAR PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WEAPONS</td>
<td>Fire-arms</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bullets</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other dangerous weapons</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>1175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRUGS</td>
<td>Nyaope</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mandrax</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dagga - bank size (N1)</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dagga - blades (N2)</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>1161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dagga - kilograms (N3)</td>
<td>23.64</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>113.53</td>
<td>142.640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Dagga – kilograms*</td>
<td>30.690</td>
<td>16.284</td>
<td>122.846</td>
<td>169.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECTRONIC GADGETS</td>
<td>Cellular phones</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellular chargers</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIM cards</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONEY</td>
<td>Bank Cards</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>R1,156</td>
<td>R8,386</td>
<td>R4,567</td>
<td>R14,109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total Dagga (kg) = (N1 x 0.034) + (N2 x 0.002) + N3

Explanation: one blade = 2 grams (approximately), one small bank bag = 34 grams (approximately)
From the data in Table 4.4 above it is clear that at the Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Correctional Centre:

- No fire-arms, ammunition or explosives were confiscated during the three year period;
- Not less than 1175 other dangerous weapons were confiscated during the 3-year period. Although a decrease of 50.8%\(\frac{[(212 - 431) \div 431] \times 100}{431} = 50.8\%\) in the number of other dangerous weapons confiscated was observed between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial years, the figures bounced back with a significant increase of 150.9%\(\frac{[(532 - 212) \div 212] \times 100}{212} = 150.9\%\) between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial year;
- A total of 25 incidents occurred during the 3-year period where drugs (Nyaope) were confiscated;
- A total of 1161 dagga blades, 892 bank size bags and another 142,640 kg of dagga, which add up to a total of 169,820 kg of dagga was confiscated for the 3 year period. Despite a drop of -46.9%\(\frac{[(16.284 - 30.690) \div 30.690] \times 100}{30.690} = -46.9\%\) in the total dagga confiscated between 2012/13 and 2013/14, the figures increased drastically with 654.4%\(\frac{[(122.846 - 16.284) \div 16.284] \times 100}{16.284} = 654.4\%\) between the 2013/14 and the 2014/15 financial year;
- A total of 559 cell phones, 121 cellular chargers and 753 SIM cards were confiscated from offenders at the Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Correctional Centre during the 3-year period. Despite a small decrease in the numbers of cell phones, chargers and SIM cards confiscated during the 2013/14 financial year, significant year-on-year increases of 112.1% \(\frac{[(280 - 132) \div 132] \times 100}{132} = 192.5\%\) in the number of cellular phones confiscated, and a year-on-year increase of 81.8% \(\frac{[(309 - 170) \div 170] \times 100}{170} = 81.8\%\) in the number of SIM cards confiscated, were observed between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years;
- A total R14, 109 cash were confiscated for the 3-year period with the highest amount of R8, 386 confiscated during the 2013/14 financial year.

Overall a decrease was experienced in the extent of confiscated unauthorised items such as other dangerous weapons, the total kilograms of dagga, and electronic...
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gadgets during the 2013/14 financial year. However, a significant year-on-year increase was observed in terms of the number of other dangerous weapons, the total dagga, cellular gadget such as cell phones, chargers and SIM cards confiscated between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years.

4.2.2.4 Comparative analysis of the nature and extent of confiscated unauthorised items at the three selected Correctional Centres in Gauteng

In table 4.5 below, a summary of the type and extent of unauthorised items confiscated at the three correctional centres are displayed:

From the data in Table 4.5 it is evident that:

- unauthorised items were confiscated at the three Correctional Centres in respect of all of various categories i.e., weapons, drugs, electronic gadgets and money;
- only 1 round of ammunition was confiscated at Kgoši Mampuru II Central during the 2013/14 financial year;
- no explosives were confiscated during the 3-year period;
- sporadic incidents occurred at all three the correctional centres where drugs (Nyaope) were confiscated, while Mandrax was only confiscated at Kgoši Mampuru II Central during the 2012/13 financial year;
- dagga in various forms (bank size bags, blades, bricks and kilograms) were confiscated at all the three Correctional Centre throughout the 3-year period;
- other dangerous weapons (i.e., all self-made knives, knives, broken glasses, pieces of steel, scissors, hag saws, self-made stoves, plastic self-made knives, kettle elements, stoves, screw drivers, pots, sharp objects, self-made prison keys, tattoo machine, needles, steel spoons, syringes etc.) were confiscated at all the three Correctional Centres throughout the 3-year period;
- cell phones, chargers and SIM card were confiscated from at all the three Correctional Centres throughout the 3-year period;
- bank cards were only confiscated at Kgoši Mampuru II Central during the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial years;
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- Cash were confiscated from all the three Correctional Centres throughout the 3-year period.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG.

Table 4.5: Summary of recorded confiscated items at the Correctional Centres Johannesburg Medium B, Kgoši Mampuru II Central and Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention, for the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 (Security Offices of the 3 Correctional Centres)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNAUTHORISED ITEMS</th>
<th>JOHANNESBURG MED B</th>
<th>KGOSI MAMPURU II CENTRAL</th>
<th>KGOSI MAMPURU II LOCAL REMAND DETENTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totals per financial year</td>
<td>Totals per financial year</td>
<td>Totals per financial year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEAPONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire-arms</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullets</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other dangerous weapons</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRUGS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyaope</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandrax</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagga - bank size (N1)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagga - blades (N2)</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>1096</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagga - kilograms (N3)</td>
<td>24,653</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>13.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECTRONIC GADGETS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cellular phones</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>1463</td>
<td>1349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cellular chargers</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIM cards</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>1355</td>
<td>1688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONEY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Cards</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>R17,056</td>
<td>R16,907</td>
<td>R15,744</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total Dagga (kg) = (N1 x 0.034) + (N2 x 0.002) + N3

Explanation: one blade = 2grams (approximately), one small bank bag = 34 grams (approximately)
4.2.2.5  Trend analysis of the extent of selected confiscated unauthorised items at the three Correctional Centres in Gauteng

In this section the focus is on a trend analysis of the extent of the following confiscated unauthorised items at the three Correctional Centres in Gauteng:

- Other dangerous weapons confiscated
- Total Dagga confiscated
- Cellular gadgets such as cell phones and SIM card confiscated
- Cash confiscated

(i)  Other dangerous weapons

The extent of the number of confiscated ‘other dangerous weapons’ per Correctional Centre are displayed in Table 4.6 below. A forecast (based on the actual numbers for the financial year 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15) of the number of confiscated ‘other dangerous weapons’ foreseen for the 2015/16 is also portrayed in Table 4.6 below. The FORECAST function in Microsoft Excel is used to calculate the projected value.
Table 4.6: Actual number of ‘other dangerous weapons’ confiscated during the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 and a forecast of the number of ‘other dangerous weapons’ projected to be confiscated during the 2015/16 financial year, per Correctional Centre.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Number of other dangerous weapons confiscated/projected per Correctional Centre</th>
<th>Total number of other weapons confiscated / projected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Johannesburg Med B</td>
<td>Kgoši Mampuru II Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projected number for 2015/16</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The trends in the extent of confiscated ‘other dangerous weapons’ for the three Correctional Centres and in total are displayed in graph 4.1 below.
Graph 4.1: Trends for the confiscated unauthorised article ‘other dangerous weapons’ for the Correctional Centres Johannesburg Medium B, Kgoši Mampuru II Central and Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention individually and in total for the 3 financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15, and projected for 2015/16

The following trends are observed for each of the three Correctional Centres as displayed in Graph 4.1 above:

- A downward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre, with a marginal downward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year.

- An upward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal downward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, with an upward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year.

- An upward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal downward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Centre, with a marginal downward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year.

The number of ‘other dangerous weapons’ confiscated for the three Correctional Centres in total as displayed in Graph 4.1, indicates a marginal downward trend
between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial years with a steep upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years and a gradual upward trend projected between the 2014/15 and 2015/16 financial year.

(ii) Total Dagga confiscated

The kilograms of dagga confiscated per Correctional Centre individually and in total are displayed in Table 4.7. A forecast (based on the actual numbers for the financial year 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15) of the kilograms of dagga foreseen to be confiscated for the 2015/16 is also portrayed in Table 4.7 below. The FORECAST function in Microsoft Excel is used to calculate the projected weight.
Table 4.7: Actual weight (kg) of dagga confiscated during the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 and a forecast of the projected kilograms of dagga to be confiscated during the 2015/16 financial year, per Correctional Centre individually and in total.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Kilograms of dagga confiscated/projected per Correctional Centre</th>
<th>Total kilograms of dagga confiscated / projected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Johannesburg Med B</td>
<td>Kgoši Mampuru II Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>27.373</td>
<td>80.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>8.364</td>
<td>62.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>26.664</td>
<td>80.265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projected weight for 2015/16</td>
<td>20.091</td>
<td>74.294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The trends in the extent of confiscated dagga for the three Correctional Centres individually and in total are displayed in graph 4.2:
Graph 4.2: Trends for the total kilograms of dagga confiscated for the Correctional Centres Johannesburg Medium B, Kgoşî Mampuru II Central and Kgoşî Mampuru II Local Remand Detention individually and in total for the 3 financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15, and projected for 2015/16

The following trends are observed for each of the three Correctional Centres as displayed in Graph 4.2:

- A marginal downward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre, with a marginal downward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year;
- A marginal downward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Kgoşî Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, with a marginal downward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year;
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- A marginal downward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14 with a steep upward trend between 2013/14 and 2014/15, is observed for Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Centre, with a gradual upward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year;

The kilograms of dagga confiscated for the three Correctional Centres in total as displayed in Graph 4.2, indicates a steep downward trend between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial years with a steep upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years and a marginal upward trend projected between the 2014/15 and the 2015/16 financial years.

(iii) Cellular gadgets

The extent of the number of confiscated cell phones and SIM cards per Correctional Centre individually and in total are displayed in Tables 4.8 and 4.9. A forecast (based on the actual numbers for the financial year 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15) of the number of confiscated cell phones and SIM cards foreseen for the 2015/16 are also portrayed in Tables 4.8 and 4.9. The FORECAST function in Microsoft Excel is used to calculate the projected values for the 2015/16 financial year.
Table 4.8: Actual number of cell phones confiscated during the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 and a forecast of the number of cell phones projected to be confiscated during the 2015/16 financial year, per Correctional Centre and in total.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Number of other cell phones confiscated/projected per Correctional Centre</th>
<th>Total number of other weapons confiscated/projected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Johannesburg Med B</td>
<td>Kgosii Mampuru II Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>1463</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>1349</td>
<td>1551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projected number for 2015/16</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1732</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The trends in the extent of confiscated cell phones for the three Correctional Centres individually and in total are displayed in graph 4.3.
The following trends are observed for each of the three Correctional Centres as displayed in Graph 4.3:

- A steep upward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal downward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre, with a gradual upward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year;
- A marginal downward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a steep upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, with a marginal upward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year;
- A steady trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention.
Remand Detention Centre, with a marginal upward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year;

The number of cell phones confiscated for the three Correctional Centres in total as displayed in Graph 4.3, indicates a steady upward trend between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial years with a steep upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years and a steep upward trend projected between the 2014/15 and the 2015/16 financial years.
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Table 4.9: Actual number of SIM card confiscated during the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 and a forecast of the number of SIM card projected to be confiscated during the 2015/16 financial year, per Correctional Centre and in total.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Number of SIM cards confiscated/projected per Correctional Centre</th>
<th>Total number of SIM cards confiscated / projected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Johannesburg Med B</td>
<td>Kgoši Mampuru II Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>1335</td>
<td>557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>1688</td>
<td>1629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projected number for 2015/16</td>
<td>2347</td>
<td>1852</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The trends in the number of confiscated SIM cards for the three Correctional Centres individually and in total are displayed in graph 4.4.
Graph 4.4: Trends for the confiscated number of SIM card for the Correctional Centres Johannesburg Medium B, Kgoši Mampuru II Central and Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention individually and in total, for the 3 financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15, and projected for 2015/16

The following trends are observed for each of the three Correctional Centres as displayed in Graph 4.1 above:

The following trends are observed for each of the three Correctional Centres as displayed in Graph 4.3:

- A gradual upward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a marginal upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre, with a gradual upward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year;

- A marginal downward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a gradual upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre, with a marginal upward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year;
A relative steady horizontal trend is observed for Kgoşi Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Centre for the 3-year period, with a steady horizontal trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year;

The number of SIM cards confiscated for the three Correctional Centres in total as displayed in Graph 4.4, indicates a steady upward trend between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial years with a steep upward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years and a steep upward trend I projected between the 2014/15 and the 2015/16 financial years.

(iv) Cash confiscated

The extent of the amount of cash confiscated per Correctional Centre individually and in total is displayed in Table 4.10. A forecast (based on the actual numbers for the financial year 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15) of the amount of cash foreseen to be confiscated for the 2015/16 is also portrayed in Table 4.9 below. The FORECAST function in Microsoft Excel is used to calculate the projected value.
Table 4.10: Actual amount of money confiscated during the financial years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 and a forecast of the number of ‘other dangerous weapons’ projected to be confiscated during the 2015/16 financial year, per Correctional Centre and in total.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Actual amount (Rand value) of cash confiscated/projected per Correctional Centre</th>
<th>Total cash confiscated / projected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Johannesburg Med B</td>
<td>Kgoši Mampuru II Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>17056</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>16907</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>15744</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projected value for 2015/16</td>
<td>15257</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The trends in the extent of the cash amount confiscated for the three Correctional Centres individually and in total are displayed in graph 4.5 below.
The following trends are observed for each of the three Correctional Centres as displayed in Graph 4.5 above:

- A marginal downward trend is observed for Johannesburg Medium B Correctional Centre for the 3-year period, with a marginal downward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year;
- A steady horizontal trend is observed for Kgoši Mampuru II Central Correctional Centre for the 3-year period, with a steady horizontal trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year;
- An gradual upward trend between 2012/13 and 2013/14, with a gradual downward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 is observed for Kgoši Mampuru II Local Remand Detention Centre, with a marginal upward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year;
The amount of cash confiscated for the three Correctional Centres in total as displayed in Graph 4.5, indicates a steady upward trend between the 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial years with a steady downward trend between the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years and a gradual upward trend projected for the 2015/16 financial year.

4.3 **MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CHALLENGES THAT ARE CENTRAL TO UPHOLDING SECURITY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES**

Because of operational challenges that correctional officials and management are faced with, it is not possible to search every cell or unit every day. It is for this reason that the researcher believes that all unauthorised items found inside cells or units went through the main gates of a correctional centre. Although correctional officials are doing all in their power to eradicate smuggling of unauthorised items in correctional centres, there are contributory factors to this phenomenon of smuggling. These contributory factors are discussed in more details below:

4.3.1 **12 HOUR SHIFT**

Correctional officials that are working with offenders, have to do a 12 hours shift per day which starts from 06:00 - 1800, working with offenders demands that a person should always be on the alert and ready to deal with any challenge that an offender may bring. Offenders have plenty of time to plan and execute their preposterous of smuggling. The twelve hour long shift is counterproductive and impacting negatively on officials’ concentration span and alertness levels.

4.3.2 **SEVEN DAYS ESTABLISHMENT**

The introduction of the Seven Days Establishment policy brought with a huge of shortage of staff in correctional centres and is also contributing to deficiency of security that contributes to unauthorised items finding their ways into the correctional centres. Seven days establishment works as follows:
Week 1 = four (4) days IN and three (3) OFF
Week 2 = three (3) IN and four (4) days OFF
In a unit that has 10 officials with ± 500 offenders. Those officials are further divided into 5 officials per A and B division respectively whereas the number of offenders remains 500 on daily basis. Meaning that officials on ‘A’ division will not work on the same day with officials on ‘B’ division due to the Seven Days establishment. This system is deprives Department of Correctional Services of officials that can strengthen security and have a power to deal with smuggling. The more officials we have in correctional centres the easier we can deal with smuggling.

4.3.3 CATEGORIES OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICIALS
Resolution no 1 of 2007 Occupation Specific Dispensation (OSD) for Correctional Services Officials' intention was to reinforce service delivery in a correctional facility, however one sees some gaps that are created by this resolution. This resolution categorises correctional officials into two namely Centre - Based and Non- Centre - Based. This approach is dividing correctional officials with reference to their OSD. For the Department of Correctional Services to win this fight against smuggling of unauthorised items into correctional centres, it needs correctional officials that are united towards a common goal which is to ensure safety and security of all the people and property.

4.3.3.1 Centre - Based Correctional staff
Centre – Based correctional staff includes all employees who are employed at Department of Correctional Services and fall within the following work streams of the Occupation Specific Dispensation in Category A (45 hour work week) Security.

a) Corrections (Case Management / Social Re-integration).

b) Management of Correctional Centre and Community Corrections.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG.

4.3.3.2 **Non-Centre - Based correctional staff**

Non-Centre - Based correctional staff all employees who are not categorised as Centre - Based correctional staff, who shall operate as Category B (40 hour work week):

This means that from the ±42000 officials we have ± 21000 officials that are Centre - Based and the remaining total that is Non -Centre - Based. The Centre - Based officials are receiving training that prepares them in dealing with offenders and smuggling.

On the other hand the non- Centre - Based are not trained in dealing with offenders, whereas their qualification or trade and the fact that they are working in the Correctional environment they always deal with offenders, it can be an offender that is working in their office doing the cleaning work. Monitors that are rendering some type of labour or offenders in a workshop doing some trade that is rendered by the Non-Centre - Based officials who are artisans also inter act with non–Centre-Based staff, offenders receiving counselling by psychologist or social worker, this category of officials are also playing a pivotal role in the rehabilitation of offenders in rendering care, development and training to offenders. This category officials are not salaried the same as Centre - Based officials and they have the propensity to turn a blind eye on issues of security, because they are not regarded as security officials and this is the number that is missing in effecting security.

By categorising correctional officials into centre and non- Centre - Based officials this system is contributing to the division within Department of Correctional Services where correctional officials are within their ranks treating each other as them and us. When one needs a stronger force to deal with smuggling and smugglers we need to create a unified force which is identified as correctional officer with same benefits and same purpose that will contribute to the believe system and a sense of belonging to the community of correctional services. This phenomenon of OSD has created a crack in the system that weakens security and feeds the habit of smuggling.
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4.3.4 OVERCROWDING OF OFFENDERS

The Department of Correctional Services has 243 correctional centres with a total 155000 offenders in a space that is designed to accommodate 118154 offenders. This means that the department is overpopulated by 32%. When comparing against 21000 correctional officials who are categorised as Centre-Based, it gives us the ratio 1/562 offenders.

If one can add the other 21000 correctional officials who are non-Centre – Based to the above total, the ratio would improve almost by half. And this could enhance the fight against smuggling in correctional centres, it is clear that Department of Correctional Services needs all its employees to be trained and equipped to contribute to its core business, namely; safety and security as well as rehabilitation of offenders.

4.3.5 THE OPERATIONAL PRACTICES AND FREQUENCY OF SEARCHES

Lastly, because of the shortage that is explained above together with other operational challenges such as number of officials against number of offenders in a unit. The information gathered in this report shows that at Kgoši Mampuru II Central which is having 10 units the researcher can reveal that from the collected data, at most on the day when searching was conducted only one unit or one cell was searched, which strongly suggest that if all the units and cells were searched daily more unauthorised items would have been confiscated, because of shortage of officials. There were only five correctional officials during the day shift in a unit of approximately five - hundred (500) offenders. Offenders need to be escorted internally from one office to next to receive their support services including health care and social work services.

Activities of a Correctional Official in a Unit:

- Locking and unlocking.
- Inspection of cells.
- Counting offenders.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG.

- Hygiene parade
- Serving of meals: three times a day.
- One on one interaction with offenders.
- Taking complaints and request of offenders.
- Escort offenders internally to/from one office to the next for various needs, e.g. development, care, and so on.
- Escort offenders externally to court or public hospitals.
- Man the entrance gate.
- Officials will be responsible for the patrolling and maintenance of order in the unit.
- In between all those activities officials must remain vigilant and conduct searching and removal of smuggled unauthorised items.

4.3.6 DOCUMENTATION OF CONFISCATED UNAUTHORISED ITEMS

Documentation of confiscated items is recorded differently not all correctional centres are having a uniform recording system hence it was a challenge to determine the value of dagga that was confiscated. We found that some of the dagga registered as blades, some registered as bank size packages. As a result, the researcher was compelled to estimate the value of the above after measuring each of the items. And it must be noted that packaging of such items will not always reflect the same weight because also the people packaging these items do not weigh them.

Some days had nothing registered, meaning that searching was not conducted on the particular day.

4.4 AREAS THAT ARE IDENTIFIED AS THE CENTRAL NERVE FOR SMUGGLING.

Most searching at the points of entry into the centre is conducted by means of the following methods:

- Pad down searching and
- Visual probing.
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These two methods are effortlessly intruded by the smugglers. Electronic scanners are at most not used due to lack of scanners. The smuggler conceals items in such a way that a naked eye will have difficulty in discovering them.

The areas that are identified by the researcher as central nerves for smuggling in a correctional centre are:

- Main gates to the correctional centre.
- Delivery gates
- Workshops
- Kitchen
- Visitors area

Mainly those areas do not have scanners that can detect unauthorised items that are concealed in the delivery trucks, body cavity, containers, and food parcels.

4.4.1 THE NATURE OF THE ACTIONS TAKEN AGAINST THE PERPETRATOR.

4.4.1.1 Offender as a perpetrator

The following corrective measures can be implemented against an offender:

- He/she can be reprimanded,
- Lose his/her gratuity for a period not exceeding one month.
- Restricted amenities for a period not exceeding seven days.
- Be segregated to undergo certain programmes.

4.4.1.2 Public member as a perpetrator

Public member he/she can be charged criminally. Department of Correctional Services can restrict him/her from entering a correctional centre where he has transgressed. It must be noted that such people are able to visit another correctional centre and continue their illegal practice without being detected.
4.4.1.3 Correctional official as a perpetrator

He or she can be charged departmentally and criminally. He may be subjected to a disciplinary process which can ultimately result in dismissal.

All the penalties as outlined above seem not to be deterrent enough to discourage perpetrators from engaging in smuggling activities.

4.4.2 SEIZURE OF UNAUTHORISED ITEMS

All unauthorised items recovered during a search of a body cavity or orifice or any other seizure must be recorded in the prescribed register marked "Confiscation Register ". The items must be handed to the investigating officer where disciplinary procedures will be facilitated to serve as exhibits during the enquiry.

In the case where money has been retrieved, a receipt number must be entered into the said register as well as the manner in which it was disposed of.
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CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The study was set out to analyse the nature, extent and causes of smuggling at the selected correctional centres in Gauteng. The rationale for this study was to make a scientific description and associated findings and recommendations against the investigation *supra*. The approach to the findings will be positivistic as described by Vold (1958:4) this study has also sought to know the nature of unauthorised items that are mostly smuggled into these centres, it also sought to know the extent and causes of smuggling unauthorised items into the correctional centres, which disrupts order and security.

The range of unauthorised items involved in smuggling within correctional centres are amongst others: money, that is seen as a frequent distributor of all the nuisance of smuggling; drugs, which are regarded as illegal, unauthorised, habit-forming and are stupefying; weapons, such as fire-arms and explosives which are the deadliest instruments used by offenders in any escape activity; other dangerous weapons such as knives are used for gang related and escapes activities. Cellular phones are also unauthorised items that are dangerous in a correctional centres’ environment. This is because they allow offenders to bypass regulations and conduct illicit activity from behind bars.

The security risks involved in smuggling result in disrespect of order and security of the correctional centre. Activities such as vandalism of the structures of correctional centres are carried out to protect and enhance smuggling activities. Violence becomes high due to the problem of smuggled items. Assault and death are common during smuggling. Offenders assault and kill one another and officials for or with unauthorised
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CAUSES OF SMUGGLING AT SELECTED CORRECTIONAL CENTRES IN GAUTENG.

items that they have smuggled into the correctional centres. Smuggling accelerates the rate of escapes.

There were many unauthorised items that were smuggled into the three selected correctional centres for the financial year 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. For the financial year 2012/13 there were 0 firearm, 1 bullet, 3428 other dangerous weapons and explosives confiscated. Drugs confiscated for the same financial were as follows: 98 Nyaope incidents, 36 Mandrax tablet incidents, 454.783kg dagga (see Table 4.5 in Chapter 4). Cell phones confiscated were 6520. Cash to the value of R64638 was also confiscated. Given the above statistics, it is clear that offenders have creative and illusive methods of hiding unauthorised items, whereby ordinary searching methods are unable to detect unauthorised items at the points of entry to the correctional centres. It is also evident that these unauthorised items are not only introduced into the correctional centres by offenders, but also by people such as corrupt correctional officials, service providers and visitors that are entering the correctional centre through the point of entry to the correctional centre which are the main gates.

The statistics above gives an indication that Pat-down searches of the clothed body were not thoroughly conducted. Searches involving the removal of clothing and electronic searching were commonly not conducted as a result of a lack of electronic devices. Pad down searching method and visual probing are effortlessly infringed by the smugglers. Electronic scanners are not available in most South African correctional centres. The smugglers conceal items in such a way that a naked eye will have difficulty in discovering them.

Given the above statistics, it was evident that smuggling operation involves more specialised tasks which are the transportation plan, recruitment plan, procurement plan of unauthorised items to be smuggled, bribing security officials, payment of collectors. The act of smuggling should be categorised as an organised crime activity.
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Because of poor documentation of data with regard to smuggling activities, the people that are smuggling items into correctional centres are able to smuggle an item for instance to Kgoši Mampuru Central II Local CC and be apprehended while the same person again smuggle other items to Johannesburg Correctional Centre without being detected or refused entry.

There are several contrabutary factors to the problem of smuggling of unauthorised items into the correctional centres. The factors found are amongst others, overcrowding which is a reality, overcrowding of offenders also nourishes the problem of smuggling.

The introduction of the seven days establishment in the Department of Correctional Services has brought about a negative output into the phenomenon of smuggling. The Seven Days Establishment policy is depriving the Department of Correctional Services of officials that can strengthen security and have strength to deal with smuggling. The more officials we have in correctional centres the easier we can deal with smuggling.

The new dispensation of categorising correctional officials into Occupational Specific Dispensation has created Centre-Base and Non - Centre - Based officials.

Inconsistency in capturing the data with reference to confiscation registers is also a smuggling contributory factor. It was found that the Department does not have a standardised searching register and a global computer system.– The Confiscation registers of the three correctional centres under study had different headings.
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5.2 FINDINGS

5.2.1 No electronic scanners in most correctional centres.
5.2.2 Unauthorised items are transported into correctional centres by offenders, public visitors and corrupt officials.
5.2.3 Money is at the centre of smuggling in correctional centres.
5.2.4 Several Department of Correctional Services Policies are contributing to the problem at hand;
   5.2.4.1 12 hour shift.
   5.2.4.2 Seven days establishment.
   5.2.4.3 Occupation Specific Dispensation.
   5.2.4.4 Overcrowding increasing the burden.
   5.2.4.5 Shortage of staff to perform daily activities.
   5.2.5 Inconsistency in capturing data regarding unauthorised items confiscated per correctional centre.
5.2.6 The main gate is the entry point for nearly all unauthorised items.
5.2.7 Smuggling is the work of involving criminal syndicates. Therefore it must be seen for what it is - organised crime.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

(The use of must in some instance is a peremptory obligation).

5.3.1 ENTRANCE GATES AND ELECTRONIC SCANNERS

The entrance gate into a correctional centre should have electronic scanners that can be used to detect unauthorised items that may be concealed in the body oracles and containers. People entering or leaving a correctional centre must be thoroughly searched. The use of cell phone detection devices should be introduced.

5.3.2 ACCESS CONTROL UNIT

Main gates are the reflection of the security of the correctional centre, if corrupt officials are placed at such important gates. More unauthorised items will be found
inside the correctional centre. The practice of placing officials at such gates as a form of punishment must be discouraged. There is a strong need for a creation of Access Control Unit with strong team of officials that has good ethical values, this type of officials must be selected for the main gate posts; the post must have incentives for promotion. More emphases must be given to the main gate management. That will be headed by an Assistant Director who will subsequently report to Area Coordinator Corrections, with a staff complement that will have at least two male and two female officials with a rank of Correctional Officer Grade I per shift of eight hours a day. One Senior Correctional Official who will be a supervisor. All this officials must receive specialised access control management training, with more emphasis to confidentially, Safety and Security.

5.3.3 MONEY AND UNAUTHORISED ITEMS
Money must not be allowed to go through the security check point in to the correctional centre. No person including correctional officials must be allowed to enter a correctional centre with money or any unauthorised item. Each correctional centre must have safes that are mounted in officials’ rest rooms. Money that is intended for the payment of fines and bails must be collected at a designated area by officials authorised to handle such moneys.

5.3.4 8 HOURS SHIFT REPLACING 7 DAYS ESTABLISHMENT
Seven days establishment should be replaced. The Twelve-hour shift is also a contributing factor to smuggling in that officials that are working with offenders’ are working 12 hours a day, the shift starts from 06:00 until 18:00, working with offenders demand a person whose body and soul are ready to deal with any challenge that an offender will bring. Offenders have abundance of time to plan and execute their preposterous plans that contribute to smuggling. This long hour shift is impacting on the concentration of such officials in dealing with smuggling The Department should introduce the three shift system of 8 hour working shift, this shift will improve availability of officials to deal with the problems of security that are resultant of smuggling.
5.3.5 CORRECTIONAL SERVICES AS A CENTRE-BASED ORGANISATION
All the officials of the Department of Correctional Services must be classified and trained in security matters as correctional officials regardless of the type of service that they are rendering. The current OSD has created a division that is impacting heavily on the core business of the Department which is security. Centre-Based and Non-Centre – Based classification should be discontinued, regard all staff as Centre-Based. Non - Centre - Based officials should be incorporated and training as security personnel, with this strategy Department of Correctional Services will have more officials that are dealing with security matters and a fight against smuggling.

5.3.6 RELEASE STRATEGY AS A TOOL TO DOWN MANAGE OVERCROWDING
Overcrowding of offenders must be down managed by effectively managing the release strategy. Availability of documents such as SAPS62 (crime description), SAPS69 (previous convictions) and Sentence Remarks must be submitted with a warrant immediately on admission of the offender after sentencing by the courts. Procedure to complete profile report (G326) should be complied with, late submission of profile report must be discouraged. The following document must be available.

- Development programmes must be attached.
- Correctional programmes must be attached.
- Judges remarks must be attached.
- Full details regarding escapes must be attached e.g. date escaped and date re-admitted and days served before escape.
- Bail pending appeal information must be furnished e.g. date released and date re-admitted and days served before bail pending appeal.
- Offender exposure to Restorative justice and such intervention must be attached. Victim offender dialogue (VOD) and Victim offender mediation (VOM) are imperative.
- Social workers vocational report must be attached.
- Psychologist vocational report must be attached.
- Medical history must be attached.
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- Effective sentence is either incorrect or omitted.
- SAPS62 must be attached.
- SAPS69(c) must be attached.
- Disciplinary offences must be attached and properly defined on prescribed disciplinary offence form (G363A)
- Registration numbers and names of accomplices must be furnished.

The Head Correctional Centre must ensure that profile reports are completed correctly and the above mentioned factors are accounted for, **no late submission of profiles**: Correctional Services B Order 1, Chapter 26 paragraph 37.2.1.

**5.3.7 RIGOROUS ADDRESS TO SHORTAGE OF STAFF**
Shortage of staff is a challenge that must be rigorously addressed. Safety and Security is the core business of the DCS and is essentially people-driven. **Four Pronged Approach** to shortage of officials:

1. Appoint learners immediately into system after they have succeeded in the interview and there after they may undergo training.
2. Discontinue the OSD of Non-Centre based and train all officials in security matters.
3. Shift from 7 days establishment to 3 shifts of 8 hours a day,
4. Correctional Officials that are working at National Head Office, Regional Offices and Management Area’s offices should work weekend and holidays at the correctional centres.

**5.3.8 GLOBAL SYSTEM OF CAPTURING CONFISCATED ITEMS**
A uniform and a global computer system of capturing Confiscated items must be introduced, which will reflect the perpetrators identity and information, the item smuggled, where was it hidden (in order to quantify and analyse the hot areas). In this system the information is immediately circulated to the other correctional centres around the Department of Correctional Services.
5.3.9 SMUGGLING AS AN ORGANISED CRIME
Pragmatically smuggling is the work of involving criminal syndicates. Therefore it must be seen for what it is - organised crime. The security risks such as loss of life, vandalism of the structures of correctional centres are carried out to protect and enhance smuggling activities. High rate of escapes from lawful custody, disregard for order and security in correctional centres and in general security of the nation, the act of smuggling must be classified as an organised crime with a heavy sentence being instituted on the perpetrators. Because smuggling is an organised act, all the security clusters should work together in a fight against smuggling. The involvement of NIA is pivotal.

5.3.10 PROMOTION POLICY FOR PRODUCTION WORKERS
There is no promotion policy for Correctional Officials on Grades III, II and I whereby good and competent officials are lost along the way because they are not motivated through promotions. DCS should consider a promotion policy in order to enhance the moral of production officials.
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