

**THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, RECONCILIATION AND UNITY
IN ZIMBABWE: FROM THE 1978 INTERNAL SETTLEMENT
TO THE 2008 GLOBAL POLITICAL AGREEMENT**

by

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DECLARATION

Student number: **50850091**

I, Douglas Munemo, author of this thesis, do hereby declare that the work presented in this document entitled: “THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, RECONCILIATION AND UNITY IN ZIMBABWE: FROM THE 1978 INTERNAL SETTLEMENT TO THE 2008 GLOBAL POLITICAL AGREEMENT”, is a result of my own research and independent work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references. I also hereby certify that the work embodied in this thesis has not already been submitted, either in whole or in part, for any other degree in this University or other institute of higher learning.



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19/04/ 2016

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DEDICATION

To my daughter, Tehillah Kudiwanashe Munemo and all decolonialists.

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ABSTRACT

This study is a critical examination of the complex search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe between the years 1978 and 2008, with a view to identify factors that have been blocking sustainable peace, national unity, reconciliation and development. It is a qualitative study which draws data from document analysis and oral interviews. The specific focus of the study is an analysis of the four peace agreements signed in this period namely; the 1978 Internal Settlement, the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement, the 1987 Unity Accord and the 2008 Global Political Agreement. Its central thesis is that coloniality in its multifaceted invisible forms is largely responsible for conflicts that have engulfed Zimbabwe and for compromising the chances of success of the four peace agreements. Coloniality has produced a 'postcolonial' leadership that has continued to practice politics in a violent, repressive, corrupt and unaccountable manner because of interpellation by the very immanent logic of colonialism that reproduces such inimical practices as racism, tribalism, regionalism and patriarchy. Theoretically, the study deploys de-colonial epistemic perspective in its endeavour to unmask and explain challenges to peace, unity, reconciliation and development in Zimbabwe. Finally, the thesis makes a strong case for pursuit of decoloniality as the panacea to conflicts and as an approach to conflict resolution and peace building that privileges decolonization and deimperialization so that Zimbabwe's development goals could be achieved.

Keywords

Peace; unity; reconciliation; peace agreements; unity governments; conflict; crisis; Zimbabwe; decoloniality; coloniality; coloniality of power; coloniality of knowledge; coloniality of being.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIPPA – Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
ANC – African National Council
AU - African Union
CIA- Central Intelligence Agency
CIO- Central Intelligence Organization
DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo
ESAP- Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU - European Union
FROLIZI- Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
GDP- Gross Domestic Product
GPA- Global Political Agreement
GNU - Government of National Unity
IMF - International Monetary Fund
MDC Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-M - Movement for Democratic Change – Mutambara
MDC-T - Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
NCA - National Constitutional Assembly
OAU - Organization of African Unity
ONHRI - Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration
POSA – Public Order and Security Act
PF - Patriotic Front
PF-ZAPU- Patriotic Front - Zimbabwe African People’s Union
RENAMO – Mozambique Resistance Movement
RF-Rhodesian Front
SADC- Southern African Development Community
SAPS – Structural Adjustment Programmes
UDI - Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UANC- United African National Council
UN - United Nations
WB - World Bank
WTO - World Trade Organization
ZANLA - Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU- Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF- Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZAPU - Zimbabwe African People’s Union
ZCTU- Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZDERA- Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
ZIPRA- Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army
ZNA - Zimbabwe National Army
ZUPO- Zimbabwe United People’s Organization

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

After protracted struggles against British colonialism and a war of liberation against white settler minority rule Zimbabwe finally gained its independence in 1980. The end of conflict brought high hopes that the Zimbabwean society, which had been fissured by years of quarrel, would finally be reconciled and live in peace and harmony. However, three decades into independence Zimbabwe is mired in conflict and a socio-economic and political crisis whose roots can be traced to coloniality, an invisible global power matrix produced in the pursuit of modernity that has stagnated and reversed development.

This thesis seeks to understand the politics of peace agreements, reconciliation and unity governments in Zimbabwe in the years between 1978 and 2013 from a de-colonial epistemic perspective. In particular, it is a study of the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe that locates the logic of violent conflict and the failure to achieve sustainable peace, unity reconciliation and development in coloniality. More specifically, it analyzes how coloniality pervaded by repetition without change in arrested transitional politics hampers Zimbabwe's quest for peace, unity, reconciliation and development. The study systematically focuses on four specific attempts at conflict resolution, namely; the 3rd March Peace Agreement of 1978, the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, the Unity Accord of 22 December 1987 and the Global Political Agreement of 15 September 2008. These agreements were followed by the establishment of unity governments and reconciliation endeavours. The research then examines the problems that have arisen from peace agreements and unity governments in Zimbabwe and interrogates the efforts made to resolve them. It also assesses how successful peace agreements and unity governments have been in their efforts to solve Zimbabwe's problems. The thesis does not attempt to rewrite the history of the four peace agreements signed among the people of Zimbabwe between the years 1978 and 2008. This can be found in greater detail in other literature. Instead it uses the four peace agreements to illuminate events and processes that have shaped the quest for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe from a decolonial perspective.

The research begins by examining the 3rd March 1978 Peace Agreement, an extraordinary and important event in the country's political and conflict history. Starting with the 3 March Peace Agreement enabled the study to explain the deep-rooted and multi-layered nature of conflict in Zimbabwe. The agreement followed a phase when the war of liberation had reached its peak with damaging repercussions to belligerents in the conflict. The agreement was a determined attempt to halt hostilities after a realization that no one side could get outright victory. Both the white minority government and the Africans agreed to movement in the negotiation process. This was an acknowledgement that they were in what Zartman (2000) refers to as a mutually hurting stalemate. In that year, Ian Smith's white minority government and a section of moderate African nationalists led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa managed to reach agreement on majority rule and the establishment of the state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the death of the state of Rhodesia. The concession reached in 1978 marked the first time that whites and blacks actually agreed to share power in a government of national unity, albeit very problematically as other disputants refused to participate in what they considered to be an attempt by the colonial white regime to perpetuate its rule.

Through the 1978 agreement, Africans were for the first time given the opportunity to exercise their right to elect a candidate of their choice based on the basis of one man, one vote. It marked the end of overt white rule and the beginning of black political rule in Zimbabwe. The agreement thus became a significant event in Zimbabwe's history. Even though it was not acceptable to all, the 3rd March Peace Agreement managed to excite a significant number of the populace because for the first time the name "Zimbabwe" was officially used to refer to the land bounded by the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers that the minority whites and African nationalists were fighting to control.

The 3rd March 1978 Peace Agreement gave Africans a semblance of political power but failed to address the inequitable distribution of resources between Africans and whites. It reflected how minimalist solutions can hamper peace prospects. That it did not give full legitimacy was apparent, yet the agreement was the first meaningful attempt to incorporate blacks into government; an important step in the search for peace, reconciliation and unity. Therefore acknowledging the above and the fact that in Zimbabwe peace, unity and reconciliation problems are complex and multi-faceted makes the 3rd March 1978 peace agreement the most promising event to begin the study of the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe.

1.2 PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

According to Suhrke and Chaudhary (2009:384) development in economic terms should be understood as sustained high growth rates or the transformation of agrarian economies into industrialized systems of production. Social development can be taken to mean poverty reduction and improving the socio-economic conditions of people by providing adequate food, livelihoods and employment and achieving other millennium development goals. In political terms development refers to a combined process of national integration, state and nation-building and social modernization embraces inclusivity in decision making and broad based citizen participation that are thought to produce effective institutions and political stability.

The thesis acknowledges that development is relative and the conceptualization of development by Suhrke and Chaudhary (2009) cannot be universalized. There are indigenous concepts of development from the South that largely focus on humanity in development. For instance the African philosophy of development is relational. It sees development as something that can be achieved through strengthening relationships not in the romantic sense but with regard to how we engage at various levels, be they power, economic or political relations so that mankind sees each other as human and as equals (Interview with a media practitioner and ZANU PF official : 10/9/2015). This perception of development is critical for the achievement of peace, reconciliation and unity as it seeks to fulfil humanity's desire for harmonious living with fellow mankind. This view of development is different from the Western liberal conception that equates development with the increase in material and financial possession of society or individuals. The thesis therefore conveniently and reservedly elects to employ the Cartesian view of development in recognition of the fact that the politically and economically powerful and epistemologically dominant Europe and America have over the decades largely been successful in using their hegemonic positions to foist their view of development on other parts of the world.

A strong co-relationship exists between peace and development on the one hand and conflict and underdevelopment on the other. Peace is a pre-requisite for development. Without peace, there cannot be development. Without development, there cannot be peace. This is Zimbabwe's problem, if not a general problem of the 'post-colony' as defined by the leading Cameroonian postcolonial theorist Achille Mbembe (2001). Peace, unity and reconciliation propose to overcome underdevelopment. Thus the question of lack of development in

Zimbabwe prompted the researcher to embark on this study of the politics of peace agreements, reconciliation and unity governments in Zimbabwe. It is a study conducted within the realm of development studies in acknowledgement of the fact that the field of development studies is multi-disciplinary and multi-dimensional and that development is heavily influenced by peace and conflict.

It is a thesis of this study that where there is violence and destruction, it is impossible to attain any development, such as would meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to define and meet their own needs. This is because conflict situations draw resources away from development direly needed in the present and the future. Strong compatibilities exist between peace and development, in Sorensen's (1985: 70) words, they are 'structurally interlocked'; for development to be achieved, peace is *sine qua non*.

A peaceful environment is essential as it provides a solid foundation for development. In societies ridden by conflict, vulnerability is high and the capacity to withstand stress and shocks is diminished, thus derailing the development process. Societal disharmony and disunity may result in wars which destroy infrastructure, threaten human security and create an atmosphere of insecurity which is not conducive to development. No development can take place in conflict situations that hamper access to basics like health and education. In fact, in the absence of peace and human security the achievement of development is difficult.

The study articulates some important relationships between peace and development. Intra-state conflicts, communal conflicts and civil wars have prevented post-colonial Africa from attaining sustainable development by destroying or at least neglecting infrastructure during conflict. The disturbance of peace and reconciliation has had serious ramifications on peace and development as evidenced by the retardation and reversal of development in the Ivory Coast, the Maghreb and the Middle East in recent times to cite a few examples. These conflicts have suspended and in some cases, even reversed human and economic development. Ikejiaku (2009:18) argues that the absence of peace has significantly led to Africa's poor development. Countries in Africa, particularly those in the Horn of Africa and East Africa, for example Somalia (1998), Sudan (since 2003), Rwanda (1990-94), Kenya (1991/92, 1997), Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000) and others have all been involved in civil wars. These conflicts wrecked economies. Collier (2004:1) estimates the cost of a typical civil war to be at least \$50 billion, which tremendously inhibits Africa's development. According to Ayissi (2008:22), at least half the countries in the West African sub region are

either in post-conflict recovery or significantly weakened by growing or endemic crisis situations and are now inclined towards peace and security as some of the pillars of their poverty reduction strategies and meeting of development goals. This is an acknowledgement of the centrality of peace to development.

Peace, security and development are not only interlinked but are also mutually reinforcing. Developing countries embroiled in conflict and crisis like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi have made the delivery of development aid and services problematic. Being unable to address peace and security issues renders it hard for developing countries to attain the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. These are goals that United Nations member countries at the 2000 millennium summit agreed they would seek to achieve by the year 2015. For instance, the first Millennium Development Goal is to reduce poverty and the number of hungry people by half, by 2015. Violent conflict and insecurity in most rural areas of less developed countries undermines efforts to meet this target. In West Africa, agriculture has suffered with main routes for transporting agricultural produce to urban centres and markets experiencing attacks from criminal gangs or armed bandits. During the 1991–2000 civil wars in Sierra Leone some 500,000 farming families were displaced and production of rice, the main staple crop, fell to 20% of pre-war levels (Ibid).

The importance of peace and security as a pre-condition for development cannot be overemphasized. A World Bank survey of sixty thousand people from sixty poor countries revealed that the first priority for the poor was security, even above other essential needs such as food and shelter. This makes human security fundamental to development. This is revealed by the United Nations Human Development Report of 1994 cited in Chandler (2007:366) which states that:

Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict.

With regards to Zimbabwe, development has suffered the effects of conflict. The liberation war ravaged the economy compelling the new independence government in 1980 to turn to debilitating aid so as to carry out massive infrastructure development and post war reconstruction. According to Bond and Manyanya (2003:17), the conflict left the government with financial burden that included a multi-lateral debt of US\$5.3billion, a bilateral debt of US\$97.9 million and a private debt of US\$593.9 million. These debts weakened the state's

capacity to resist international finance and aid, thus negating efforts at achieving development in the early years of independence.

The violence in the Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces in the 1980s disrupted social life, derailed economic activities and the government's development programmes. Dissidents operating in the area sabotaged government infrastructure and installations and investors shunned the area to the detriment of development. The civil war between the Mozambican government and the rebel Mozambique National Resistance Army (RENAMO) spilt into Zimbabwe disrupting the development projects in the country's eastern districts. In another conflict, Zimbabwe spent US\$200 million during its five years of military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (www.irinnews.org). The war of liberation, the disturbances in Matabeleland and Midlands, the involvement of the military in civil wars in Mozambique and the DRC all retarded Zimbabwe's development by depriving it of much needed economic and social resources.

Political contestations from the year 2000 onwards triggered conflict and a socio-economic crisis that to Clemens and Moss (2005:1) is so deep that it reversed the country's development by more than half a century. They argue that in the Southern Rhodesia of 1953 on average one had an income of \$760 per year (in constant 1990 US\$ at purchasing power parity rates). In mid-2005 the average Zimbabwean had fallen back to that level, wiping out the income gains of the past 52 years (ibid).

This section explained the nexus between peace and development but it should be highlighted that peace does not automatically lead to development and conflict does not necessary result in underdevelopment. There are instances where conflict and insecurity can equally result in social and political changes that can spur development rather than retard it and there exist situations where the prevalence of peace has not been accompanied by growth and development. The study does not only advance frontiers of knowledge in the field of development studies by examining the nexus between peace and development but also endeavours to enrich the field of development studies by revealing how coloniality blocks prospects of genuine political transitions, peace and sustainable development.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The developmental trajectory of Zimbabwe can be posed in this revealing manner: from the 'Rhodesian problem' to the 'Zimbabwe crisis.' While the 'Rhodesian problem' was

essentially that of colonialism and the attempt by the Rhodesian Front under Ian Smith to pursue ‘unilateral independence,’ the ‘postcolonial’ ‘Zimbabwe crisis’ is rooted in the same colonial legacy, hence it manifests itself as problems of incomplete decolonization as well as a governance and leadership question. Both in its ‘Rhodesian’ and ‘Zimbabwean’ incarnations and manifestations, global imperial designs have actively played a role and even imposed sanctions while at the same time positioning the Western powers as concerned peace brokers. It is these complex imbrications of the ‘problem’ in complicated global imperial designs that make coloniality relevant in trying to unmask and reveal the structural and agential issues at place in the failures of peace, reconciliation and development in Zimbabwe.

Peace, unity and reconciliation have remained elusive in Zimbabwe despite the signing of four peace agreements and the creation of four unity governments between the years 1978 and 2008, and pronouncements of reconciliation. This is evidenced by ethnic, political, ideological and racial conflicts that have hindered Zimbabwe’s development prospects. Despite the pronouncement of reconciliation and the rolling out of various activities to promote national unity, peace has eluded Zimbabwe. The failure to achieve peace, unity, reconciliation and development can be traced to flawed peace agreements, ineffectual governments of national unity and feeble reconciliation programmes permeated by coloniality.

Fanon (1968) argues that if peace agreements do not address fundamental issues they turn out to be just signatures on papers. Agreements should be revolutionary and transformative, new dispensations should emerge. They are expected to change the oppressive conditions and end injustice. Post –independence agreements have fallen short of providing that. They have not fostered unity. Achieving national unity entails the extinguishing of old quarrels and addressing grievances. Failure to resolve these leads to the re-emergence of conflict and the death of unity. Zimbabwe’s experience with peace agreements between 1978 and 2008 lends credence to Fanon’s views.

Peace agreements and unity governments inadequately addressed the problem of the unequal distribution of resources, especially economic, and the need to create an inclusive socio-economic environment. Inter-racial and intra-racial economic disparities both in the colonial and post colonial periods have had a significant bearing on peace building. Economic resources have remained largely in the hands of settlers and former colonisers much to the disenchantment of the African population and to the detriment of development. The few

economic resources that came to be controlled by the post-independence black governments fell under the control of the black political elite to the exclusion of the majority. Unity governments have also been unsuccessful in bringing about meaningful socio-economic and political transformation. The socio-economic and political crisis that has haunted Zimbabwe since the year 2000 is indicative of the lack of peace and unity which are essential ingredients for development.

A glance at Zimbabwe's pursuit of peace after violent conflict reveals that justice has been the missing link in efforts to achieve peace and reconciliation. There are two main forms of justice. There is restorative justice that concerns itself with questioning and seeing to it that deep structural injustices that cause problems are addressed. To Zehr (2001), delivering restorative justice basically means restoring property loss or personal injury, sense of security, dignity, sense of empowerment and restoring harmony based on the feeling that a situation or issue has been fairly handled. It is different from retributive justice that encourages tit-for-tat exchanges that are detrimental to sustainable peace and development. Restorative justice is thus more developmental as it seeks to promote psycho-social and spiritual healing.

Convinced that justice was not served by the 1978 Internal Settlement which retained white control of land and the economy, African nationalists resolved to intensify the war against the newly established unity government. The 1979 Lancaster House Agreement was essentially no different to the 1978 agreement. The Marxist scholar Andre Astrow (1983) is of the opinion that it was just a watered down version of the 1978 agreement and thus did not guarantee sustainable peace. The 1987 Unity Accord focused on ending violence in the south-western parts of Zimbabwe but failed to address Zimbabwe's land and wealth distribution issues at a time when Zimbabwe's socio-economic problems were mounting. Given that land is the bedrock upon which any economic activity can take place, again justice was not served when the issue was overlooked. By the year 2000 the land issue had still not been resolved. This omission sparked land invasions by landless peasants and Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) supporters who accused whites of perpetrating some form of violence on them by unjustly depriving them of land and other benefits that accrue from its ownership.

The 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA) was a product of negotiation and compromise intended to end violence in the post electoral period. This resulted in the land issue and

critical development challenges being put on the backburner by the power sharing government that emerged out of the agreement. The failure to address the land question and resolve the development crisis left a significant part of the Zimbabwean population restless. Stakeholders in the land issue yearn for justice; justice delayed is justice denied and development retarded. Hence the failure to deliver justice, not only with regards to land but also with regards to a host of socio-economic issues has been at the core of Zimbabwe's development crisis.

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS

The main objective of the research is to examine the impact of coloniality on peace, reconciliation and unity from the 1978 Internal Settlement to the 2008 Global Political Agreement.

The specific objectives of this study are to:

- present coloniality as an analytical framework for understanding the challenges of peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe;
- examine the four peace agreements signed in Zimbabwe between the years 1978 and 2008;
- identify colonial factors that are barriers to sustainable peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe;
- make recommendations for moving Zimbabwe towards, peace, reconciliation, unity and development.

The research questions are:

1. What framework can be employed for an understanding of Zimbabwe's challenges of peace, reconciliation, unity and development?
2. How have the four peace agreements signed between the years 1978 and 2008 sought to achieve peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe?
3. How has coloniality in its multi-faceted forms militated against the search for peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe?

4. What can be done to achieve peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe?

1.5 PEACE, UNITY AND RECONCILIATION – A DISCUSSION OF CONCEPTS

For a better understanding of the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe it is prudent to clarify concepts that are central to this study. The concepts of peace (agreements), unity (governments) and reconciliation are transient and abstract and therefore contested. An understanding of them depends on subscribed values and standpoint. In acknowledgement of the contention and ever changing perceptions surrounding the terms, the study uses them reservedly and conveniently.

Peace is defined by Galtung (1990) as a political condition that ensures justice and social stability through formal and informal institutions, practices, and norms. Galtung (ibid) identifies several conditions that must be met for peace to be reached and maintained. These include a need for recognized and valued interdependent relationships among groups, thereby fostering long-term cooperation during periods of agreement, disagreement, normality and crisis. This definition of peace is apt for the research as it recognizes that social justice and interdependence are integral for peace to prevail. The absence of these conditions has compromised peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe.

Galtung (1989) further identifies two main notions of peace, negative peace and positive peace. He explains the distinction between the two. To him, negative peace refers to a situation when something undesirable has stopped happening such as when oppression ends. Imposed peace accords and the deployment of peace keeping troops are associated with this type of peace. Positive peace describes a situation where there is the building and restoration of healthy relationships amongst parties to the conflict and the creation of social systems that serve the needs of the whole population and the constructive resolution of conflict. The Institute for Economics and Peace (2015: 6-7) defines positive peace as “the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies.” It identifies the following positive peace factors: a well functioning government, equitable distribution of resources, acceptance of the rights of others, low levels of corruption, free flow of information, high levels of human capital, good relations with neighbours and a sound business environment (ibid). Positive peace implies a proactive process that deals with structural violence that underlies the conflict. It takes a long term view of conflict and

highlights the fact that peace is fundamentally aimed at transformation of the relationships and issues that underlie the conflict.

The study thus conceptualizes peace beyond the classic understanding of peace as the mere absence of violence. This enables an exploration of other concepts that closely relate to the concept of peace such as structural violence. Structural violence refers to violence that is embedded in social and political hierarchies that impose conditions which place people at high risk of negative repercussions, such as unemployment, landlessness, illiteracy, corruption, poverty, poor service delivery and marginalization (Cheru:2002). Structural violence is a process which can breed direct violence, thus becoming a clear manifestation of the absence of peace. Direct violence refers to the physical harm perpetrated on an individual. Structural violence thus breeds negative peace and direct violence although negative peace is a preferred option to direct violence. Unlike negative peace, positive peace seeks to eliminate structural violence and direct violence while fostering unity and development. It involves creating structures which provide increasing degrees of freedom and social justice.

Peace agreements are another notion that is closely related to the idea of peace. According to Nita and Ouellet (2003) peace agreements are accords that aim to end a conflict, or to considerably alter a conflict, so that it can be more constructively addressed. Chinkin (2003:4) identifies three types of agreements. There are ceasefire agreements which refer to a temporary suspension of war or any armed conflict for an agreed-upon time period or in a given area. There are also pre-negotiation agreements that define how peace will be negotiated. These agreements determine the procedure for drafting later comprehensive agreements.

The study however concerns itself with comprehensive peace agreements since they have dominated Zimbabwe's political landscape. They address the substance of the underlying issues of a dispute. They broadly agree upon the principles and agenda upon which the substantive issues will be negotiated. Comprehensive agreements are usually accompanied by protracted negotiations. They seek to find the common ground between the interests and needs of the parties to the conflict, and resolve the substantive issues in dispute. Their conclusion is often marked by a handshake, signifying an "historical moment" that ends a long-standing conflict (Chinkin: *ibid*).

It should be highlighted that resolving a complex conflict is not a matter of appending signatures on documents. There may be need for later meetings to elaborate on the details of

a comprehensive agreement. These meetings discuss ways of putting into practice what would have been theoretically agreed upon in comprehensive agreements and are referred to as implementation agreements. Implementation agreements work out the details and mechanics that enable the facilitation and realization of the comprehensive agreement. The signing of peace agreements does not give birth to peace, reconciliation and unity. Four peace agreements were signed in Zimbabwe between the years 1978 and 2008, but the signing of these peace agreements did not translate to peace. The peace agreements facilitated transition without fundamentally transforming conditions responsible for conflict in the first place and therefore failed to foster peace.

Unity denotes merger, the coming together of elements to produce a single entity. However, our understanding of it must go beyond merely viewing it or referring to it as just the quality of oneness. It should also be conceptualized as denoting the feeling of being undivided or unbroken. It implies that there is harmony and solidarity and that people are working together peacefully and united as a country with common aims, goals, visions and aspirations. According to Mugabe (1989:356);

unity enhances the national spirit and creates the atmosphere for the reconciliation of divergent and sometimes antagonistic political and social outlooks and philosophies. Through its ennobling and elevating effect it destroys petty and divisive loyalties based upon tribe, region, race, sex and religion and in their place creates and nurtures a national ethos. Unity brings together the nation in the psychological, cultural, intellectual and spiritual sense. Unity can yield the transformation and amelioration of material and social well-being of the people which is critical for human development.

Peace agreements that have been signed in Zimbabwe have in one way or another genuinely intended or purportedly sought, with varying success, to bring not just a spirit of oneness to the Zimbabwean people during the search for peace, reconciliation and unity but to engender an atmosphere in which they can be achieved.

A unity government is basically a coalition government, designed specifically to accommodate all participating political players in governmental structures (Mukoma: 2008). This includes the civil service, cabinet, diplomatic posts, the judiciary and in other instances, army, police and the intelligence arms. They are usually formed after violent conflict and negotiations that culminate in peace accords. The logic behind creating unity governments is that, equitable participation will diminish the potential for conflict and enhance prospects for national stability, integration and development. The assumption behind this logic is that

conflict arises from mere exclusion of key political players in structures and processes of national governance (Chigora and Guzura: 2009).

Unity governments are in essence a form of conflict management through power-sharing. Levitt (2004:44) describes power sharing as an arrangement in which rival parties agree to co-exist in government and share power, both political and economic, in predetermined ways, often under the mediation of international community leaders. The joint exercise of power in principle enables conflicting groups to remedy long standing patterns of antagonism and discrimination, and to build a more just and stable society for all (O'Flynn and Russell: 2005). In addition unity governments as transition arrangements may provide the opportunity for the creation of constitutional review commissions, truth commissions and electoral reform which abet the search for peace. This form of managing conflict has gained currency in 21st century Africa as evidenced by the establishment of power-sharing governments in Kenya, Madagascar and Zimbabwe amongst others.

Unity governments have been able to foster peace unity and reconciliation in many parts of the world but they also have their own weaknesses. What is conspicuously absent from them is the absence of broad based participation such that they end up serving elite interests and regime security interests while sacrificing democracy in the name of peace. The underlying cause of the conflict is more often than not left unaddressed. This state of affairs hampers efforts to achieve sustainable peace. The creation of unity governments is attractive both to those elements whose power is waning and those whose power is rising. The sharing of power appeals to the former because it gives them a slice of power that they might not otherwise retain. Spears (1999:128) argues that ruling minority groups, who feel the pressure to democratise, and yet recognise that under a democratic system they are likely to lose power, turn to power-sharing as the best possible long-term means of protecting their interests. To those whose power is on the ascent inclusion in government may offer the opportunity of international legitimacy that may be lost by opting against being part of a unity government.

Unity governments may be formed with the promotion of peace as a goal but in some instances they are no panacea to conflict. Since unity governments are products of compromise they do not offer long term political stability. When agreements are reached to share power manifest conflict may be transformed into latent conflict which would perhaps re-emerge more virulently in the future. The failure to find common ground in unity

governments may result in deadlock which may trigger conflict particularly where power is shared by parties with divergent ideologies, interests and visions as was the case in Zimbabwe's 2009-2013 power-sharing government (Matyszak: 2010).

The other concept central to this study is that of reconciliation. Reconciliation varies in meaning and significance. It can simply mean co-existence or it can mean dialogue, remorse, apology, forgiveness and healing. To Clark (2008) reconciliation is the rebuilding of fractured individual and communal relationships after conflict, with a view to encouraging meaningful interaction and cooperation between former antagonists. He contends that reconciliation entails much more than simple definition of reconciliation as peaceful coexistence. He argues that to achieve reconciliation there is also a need to reshape parties' relationships, to lay the foundation for future engagement between them. Lederach (2001:842) quoted in Bloomfield (2006) perceives reconciliation as a "dynamic, adaptive process aimed at building and healing". He views reconciliation as "a process of change and redefinition of relationships". Bloomfield (2003:12) elaborates;

Reconciliation is an over-arching process which includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness, healing and so on. At its simplest, it means finding a way to live alongside former enemies – not necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately.

The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (2005:32-35) concurs with Bloomfield. It perceives reconciliation as finding a way to make two or more ideas, situations agree with each other, when actually they seem to be in opposition. It involves making parties to conflict establish amity after a period of quarrelling and to accept a situation because there is nothing that can be done to change it. The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (ibid) identifies three stages in the process of reconciliation, namely acknowledgement; when perpetrators acknowledge wrongs committed, contrition; when perpetrators take responsibility for past actions to express regret and to directly request forgiveness from victims, and finally, forgiveness; which is the victim's voluntary forgiveness of past injuries.

There are three main forms of reconciliation. There is spiritual reconciliation that involves the rehabilitation of victims and restoration of previous harmonious relationships between victims and perpetrators. Then there is psycho-social reconciliation which centres on the social fabric of those affected by conflict, particularly their emotions with the intention of relationship adjustment. The third type, structural reconciliation, is the concern of this thesis.

It gives priority to security, institutions, economy, political processes, elections, and constitutions as a way of fostering peace, unity and harmonious co-existence. The study finds it apt to focus on structural reconciliation because since 1978 peace-building and reconciliation efforts in Zimbabwe have been elite driven and barely ever attended to the psycho-social and spiritual health of victims and perpetrators of violence after conflict, electing to focus on structural issues such as power, constitutions and the economy.

Reconciliation is critical in peacemaking. It is composed of various elements that include healing, justice, reparation and truth-telling. These lay the foundations for the creation of the various outcomes of the reconciliation process. Truth-telling creates objective opportunities for people to see the past in terms of shared suffering and collective responsibility. In addition, the acknowledgement of the past is a way of breaking the vicious cycle of impunity: silence and amnesia which are the enemies of justice.

Huyse (2003: 97) argues that to achieve reconciliation and peaceful coexistence, justice must be delivered and past crimes acknowledged and punished. Justice is a vital requirement for “healing wounds, making offenders accountable, and re-establishing a relationship of equity and respect” (Bloomfield, 2003: 22). Justice has many faces; it can be retributive and based on prosecution. Truth commissions produce historical justice while reparation policies aim for compensatory justice. It can be restorative and based on mediation. Restorative justice, if adequately organized, can heal the wounds of both victim and perpetrator since it is concerned far more with the restoration of the victim and victimized community than about punishing the offender. Besides, it also places greater emphasis on getting offenders to accept responsibility for their behaviour and make amendments, whenever possible.

Reconciliation processes tend to be ineffective as long as the vicious cycle of impunity is not broken. Apparently in most post-conflict societies atrocities go unpunished, unacknowledged and without redress as has been the case with Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Forgiveness and forgetting are intrinsic and cannot be imposed. This is because they are not a result of cognitive processes but flow from the heart. Therefore, immunity through amnesty legislation if overused together with the inculcation of a culture of impunity may block reconciliation (Zehr: 2001).

The researcher adopts Hauss's (2003) definition of reconciliation which refers to reconciliation as “a number of activities that help to turn the temporary peace or agreement which ends fighting into a lasting end to the conflict itself.” Various Zimbabwean

governments have put efforts aimed at reconciling Zimbabweans as was done through the signing of agreements to establish peace after periods of violent conflict. Efforts by past and the present governments to turn uneasy peace into durable peace have been deficient. It is imperative for reconciliation to be a broad and inclusive process if it is to succeed. It should take into consideration the interests and experiences of society that was affected by conflict. As such reconciliation processes have to reach down to communities and individuals instead of being confined to politicians at national level.

Closely linked to the concept of reconciliation and crucial to it is the notion of healing. Healing is defined by Hamber (2003:77) as “any strategy, process or activity that improves the psychological health of individuals following extensive violent conflict.” It concerns itself with processes or activities aimed at rehabilitating and reconstructing local and national communities implying the restoration of a normalized everyday life that can recreate and confirm people’s sense of being and belonging which is important for reconciliation (ibid).

1.6 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The study focuses on four specific attempts at conflict resolution, peace building and reconciliation, namely: the 3rd March Peace Agreement of 1978, Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, the Unity Accord of 22 December 1987 and the Global Political Agreement of 15 September 2008. These are some of the peace agreements that have been agreed upon among the people of Zimbabwe as part of their long search for peace, reconciliation and national unity.

The four peace agreements ended violence and brought political transition but they failed to transform the existing economic, political and socio-cultural order because of coloniality and its concomitant role in facilitating repetition without change in arrested transitional politics. Transition is evolutionary; it is concerned with movement that does not lead to radical alteration. Transformation is revolutionary; it is concerned with drastic changes in the essence, basic nature and sum and substance of something. The failure to bring about transformation peace agreements, reconciliation processes and unity governments did not only fail to engender an environment suitable for the fostering of peace, reconciliation and unity, but also failed to address the problem of the absence of development in Zimbabwe.

1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this qualitative study of *The Search for Peace, Reconciliation and Unity: From the 1978 Internal Settlement to the 2008 Global Political Agreement* is to initiate debate on how coloniality both local and global, but with greater emphasis on the latter has impacted on peace, nation building and development in Zimbabwe. It would appear that there is a dearth of research on the interconnections between peace, unity and reconciliation and coloniality and development.

Most scholars on Zimbabwe have studied and articulated the absence of development in Zimbabwe from a Eurocentric perspective that reduces the problem of underdevelopment to structural weaknesses or unequal global economic and power relations without interrogating the origins of the modern world that produces these relations (Ndlovu-Gatsheni:2013b). What this study demonstrates is that the colonial matrix of power is constituted by an array of factors ranging from the social, economic, cultural, ideological and epistemological amongst others. These combine to produce violence and underdevelopment in the non-Western world that in part explain Zimbabwe's peace and reconciliation conundrums.

As the Zimbabwean problem is deep- rooted and multi-layered, coloniality is able to provide a comprehensive exploration and deeper understanding of the dynamics of peace, unity and reconciliation. This study finds it prudent to employ conceptual and theoretical tools from the de/coloniality perspective as they provide a platform for a decolonisation of the search for peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe through their ability to unmask coloniality and to create space for the resolution of challenges to peace, reconciliation and development in Zimbabwe.

The research challenges traditional theories on peace, unity and reconciliation that have skirted or ignored coloniality as a source of Zimbabwe's conflict and development problems. It is inspired by the uniqueness of the Zimbabwean crisis where peace and reconciliation have been pursued in an atmosphere laden with continuing colonial influences that are to blame for conflict. The study is ground-breaking as it is arguably the first comprehensive research to establish linkages between the persistence of colonial forms of domination that define power, economy, knowledge and being long after the end of colonialism as explanations for the absence of peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. This study of the politics of peace agreements, unity governments and reconciliation in Zimbabwe from the coloniality perspective reorients and revitalizes the discussion of peace, reconciliation and development.

The study brings to the fore the strong nexus that exists between coloniality and peace-building, thus shedding light on an important element that has blocked development in Zimbabwe.

The coloniality perspective is advanced by radical Latin American scholars such as Quijano, Mignolo, Grosfoguel, Maldonado- Torres and Escobar among others working under the Modernity/Coloniality Research Programme (Ndlovu-Gatsheni:2013b) . The study confronts and speaks directly to coloniality that has culminated in the creation of asymmetrical global power structures that allow the West to dominate and exploit the non- Western world via the control of power, knowledge and being to the detriment of peace, unity and development. The development crisis and conflict Zimbabwe continues to experience is a consequence of employing deficient conflict resolution mechanisms and epistemologies that spring from coloniality.

This specific study of peace agreements, reconciliation and unity governments pushes forward the frontiers of knowledge in the field of development studies by examining the confluence of coloniality and development. It builds on the extensive literature around the domination and exploitation of the Global South by the hegemonic Europe and America. It explains how the Global North created structures of power that allowed it to become hegemonic and how these structures of power continue to impinge on subalternised parts of the world through the colonial matrix of power produced by Western modernity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b). Zimbabwe has not escaped these matrices of power; it has remained ensnared by them and its nationalist ruling elite has domesticated its. That explains why despite the celebration of decolonization it has remained politically, culturally, economically and epistemologically under the influence of the Global North. A more detailed discussion of the concept of coloniality will be conducted in the following chapter.

The research hopes to benefit development practitioners, conflict managers, peace builders, students of politics, diplomats, political parties, international Organizations and institutions so that they appreciate the relationship between peace, unity, reconciliation on the one hand and development on the other hand. The study hopes to add a new chapter to the discourse on peace, unity and reconciliation so that academics and politicians reconsider their perceptions of these phenomena alongside coloniality.

1.8 METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS

The study was based on a qualitative approach. Qualitative research can be defined as research that provides a general description of a phenomenon by words rather than by statistical explanations. It was mainly employed in this research for its ability to present a detailed picture of the phenomenon under study and its capacity to enable the researcher to learn, participate and be involved in the study (Hitchcock and Hughes: 1995).

Qualitative research methods combining theory with fieldwork were employed to provide detailed accounts of the challenges to peace and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. The methodology was effective because it enabled the researcher to focus on facts and opinions about peace, unity and reconciliation. A quantitative approach would not have been suitable for research on peace, unity and reconciliation as these issues are not easy to quantify. In line with Creswell's (2008:26) observation the researcher also employed the qualitative research method because "the researcher relies on the views of participants; asks broad, general questions and collects data consisting largely of words from participants."

One of the major distinguishing characteristic of the qualitative research methods is the fact that the researcher attempts to understand people in terms of their definition of their world. This makes qualitative research methods useful as they are adaptable to dealing with multiple realities. They are therefore also sensitive to the many mutually shaping influences that permeate peace, unity and reconciliation. Cognizant of the fact that reconciliation and the achievement of unity is a process and people have different conceptions and perceptions of the terms, it was envisaged that a qualitative research design would also further illuminate on the current status of Zimbabwe's search for peace, unity and reconciliation.

The starting point was a critical analysis of the text of the four peace agreements referred to above. The research sought to establish the essence of the agreements - their objectives, their terms, strengths, weaknesses, successes, failures and the consequences for peace, unity and reconciliation. Thereafter the researcher engaged in document analysis of other related literature. Document analysis to Yin (1995) involves a systematic review of both primary and secondary documents. Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that document analysis is a pivotal part of the research process that seeks to arrive at credible findings. Document analysis was vital as it gave the researcher ideas and insights into issues and questions to pose in the interviews. Documents that were consulted include published and unpublished books and research papers from academics, journalists and development workers, reports, journal

articles and peace agreements. Electronic sources, magazines, newspapers and information from the Internet were used to get as much as possible out of the on-going debates on the topic. Document analysis was mainly employed to generate background and contextual information on the peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe.

The researcher followed this up by conducting individual unstructured face-to-face interviews in English. Where challenges with the use of English were encountered vernacular languages were used. Frey and Oishi (1995) define interviews as a face-to-face purposeful conversation in which one person asks prepared questions (interviewer) and another answers them (respondent). In the study eleven unstructured face-to-face interviews were conducted with informants from various backgrounds. Unstructured face-to-face interviews were chosen for the reason that they allowed the researcher to probe deeper and obtain greater detail (Wimmer and Dommick: 1997). Furthermore, Frey and Oishi (1995) highly recommend unstructured face-to-face interviews as a useful technique to gather particular data. In this case, unstructured face-to-face interviews were used to clarify and further probe into the insights which were drawn from document analysis. Unstructured face-to-face interviews also offered the researcher great latitude to draw data from conversational partners on their experiences of conflict and violence as well as peace, unity and reconciliation overtures confined to particular peace and conflict events or processes. The danger of obtaining strait-jacketed responses from informants discouraged the researcher from using structured interviews.

Because the structural approach to achieve peace, reconciliation and unity has been employed in Zimbabwe, the researcher found it prudent to interview political analysts, academics, political parties' conflict managers, development practitioners, civil society activists, survivors of violence and social actors representing the state. These informants were selected on the basis of their knowledge of the subject under investigation and/or their involvement as conflict actors or peace builders in Zimbabwe's search for peace, unity and reconciliation. Data from such a wide spectrum of informants provided the researcher with a critical and balanced understanding of conflict and peace processes in Zimbabwe without falling into the trap of subjectivity. In addition a broad range of informants were interviewed because for any reconciliation and peace building exercise to succeed thorough conflict analysis which identifies the source of the conflict, its nature, profile and the players is *sine qua non* to the attainment of peace, reconciliation and unity.

An official letter of the University identified me as a registered student and also explained the purpose of the study. Interviews were generally audio-taped and permission obtained prior to conducting them. In cases where permission for recording was not granted extensive notes were taken. Personally conducting interviews gave the researcher an opportunity to explain issues that required clarification. These issues included the importance of anonymity and confidentiality of the informants. Personally conducting interviews also allowed the researcher an opportunity to allay fears of informants given the sensitivity of the topic within the Zimbabwean context. Conducting interviews was useful as the researcher did not have the time and resources to employ and train research assistants capable of asking de-colonial questions. The researcher also relied on information from interviews previously conducted by other researchers.

Interview data was analyzed using the approach advocated for by Rubin and Rubin (1995:226-227), who describe it as follows:

data analysis begins while the interview is still underway. This preliminary analysis tells you how to redesign your questions to focus in on central themes as you continue interviewing. After interviewing is complete, you begin a more detailed and fine-grained analysis, you discover additional themes and concepts and build toward an overall explanation. To begin the final analysis, put into one category all the material from all your interviews and that speaks to one theme or concept. Compare materials within the categories to look for variations and nuances in meaning. Compare across categories to discover connections between themes and concepts into a theory that offers an accurate, detailed, yet subtle interpretation of your research arena. The analysis is complete when you feel that you can share with others what your interpretation means for policymaking, for theory, and for understanding the social and political world.

Data obtained from documentary analysis and unstructured interviews were triangulated. Triangulation went a long way in enhancing the validity and reliability as it verified information obtained from different data- collection methods. This was invaluable to making the research more comprehensive and reliable. The data collected was analyzed qualitatively and evaluated to determine its trustworthiness. The researcher intensively read literature, listened to informants and assimilated as much as possible the explicit and implicit meanings. Thereafter the researcher categorized the data in thematic areas and concepts, thoroughly weighed the data gathered, and interpreted it before drawing conclusions.

Zimbabwe was the case in which an in-depth investigation of the search for peace, reconciliation and unity were conducted. It also provided the population of the study from which information was obtained and recorded. With regard to sampling, the sample

population was selected by the researcher through the purposive sampling technique that falls within the broad category of non-probabilistic sampling techniques. Chiromo (2006) defines a sample as a smaller group or subset of population selected from the entire population and describes sampling as a process of selecting a sub-unit from the entire population on which generalization of findings will be done. Patton (2002) refers to purposive sampling as a form of convenience sampling in which population elements are selected based on the judgment, experiences and prior knowledge of the researcher which he/she exerts in choosing the population he/she believes are true representatives of the entire population. Although purposive sampling technique was in part chosen for leaving the inclusion and exclusion of informants to the discretion of the researcher the choice of informants was done in an objective manner that did not infringe on the credibility of the research process followed.

The choice of purposive sampling was important given the flexibility, latitude and convenience it provided with regards to research on an open-ended topic such as this one. The researcher was able to identify and access specific informants who could provide relevant data on issues of peace, unity and reconciliation and other informants who provided related data and added on to what was obtained from other informants or filled gaps that were left the same informants. The study sample comprised of eleven people from diverse backgrounds and from different regions of Zimbabwe. The various interviewees (political analysts, academics, political parties' conflict managers, development practitioners, civil society activists and social actors representing the state) as has been alluded earlier were chosen on the basis of their acquaintance with and assumed understanding of the issues surrounding peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe. Survivors of violence were selected to provide details of their experiences during the different conflict periods. In general the interviewees were data rich informants whose contributions went a long way in achieving the study's aims and objectives.

The study was confined to Zimbabwe, a landlocked country located in the southern part of Africa, between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers. It is bordered by South Africa to the South, Botswana to the West, Zambia to the North and Mozambique to the East. It is about 390 757 square km with a population of approximately 12,5million people (Central Statistics Office: 2009). Zimbabwe has three official languages: English, Shona and Ndebele. The country is mainly populated by two dominant ethnic groups: the Shona and the Ndebele people. Administratively, the country is divided into ten provinces and characterised by various

government ministries, public institutions, parastatals, non-governmental and privately run Organizations.

Cognizant of the challenge of covering the whole of Zimbabwe, the researcher conducted interviews in the major cities of Zimbabwe, namely Harare, Gweru and Bulawayo. This was because most people and agencies conversant with politics of peace agreements, unity agreements and reconciliation issues were more likely to be found there. The researcher found it worthwhile to conduct fieldwork in these provinces as he is familiar with the geography and local languages. In addition these provinces provided a broad platform for the analysis of conflict, peace and reconciliation since they experienced different forms and levels of violence. They also granted a basis from which to understand how conflict processes experienced there have given shape to the trajectory of peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.

At the time of conducting the research Zimbabwe was in the throes of crisis and governed by a power sharing government of national unity constituted by two MDC formations and ZANU PF. The unity government was established after an unresolved 2008 presidential election that was marred by violence and allegations of rigging. Although tension and political polarisation that characterised the 2008 election period persisted it ebbed under the unity government therefore permitting the researcher to accomplish his task.

1.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

All interviewees and other informants were told that their knowledge was required for purposes of a thesis and were assured of their security and confidentiality. Those that chose to be anonymous were respected by the researcher. In instances where informants wanted their identities to be known despite the sensitivity of the information they were advised accordingly. Those who did not want to be informants had their rights respected. In short, the research heeded to confidentiality and maintained independence from possible attempts to manipulate the results during data collection and even after completion.

1.10 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The study is organized into eight chapters. Each chapter, save for Chapter 2 which grapples with theoretical and conceptual issues, presents a historical narrative that discusses issues thematically. As a result of having opted for a predominantly thematic approach the reappearance of some material has not only been unavoidable but necessary because events

that impinge on Zimbabwe's politics, peace and conflict processes are multi-layered and cut across epochs.

Chapter 1 – Introduction to the Study

The chapter introduces the study and outlines how the research was done. Captured in this chapter is a presentation of the statement of the problem, the conceptual issues, the analytical framework, the aims of the study, the research questions, and the motivation of the study, the research methodology and data collection methods and ethical considerations of the research.

Chapter 2 – Coloniality: Towards a Construction of a Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Zimbabwe Problem

This chapter succinctly reviews literature on Zimbabwe's peace and reconciliation conundrums. It presents coloniality as the conceptual framework of the study and examines its applicability to Zimbabwe. The chapter is of significance in that it discusses how the concept of coloniality illuminates this study of the politics of peace agreements, unity governments and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 3 – A Brief History of Conflict and Peace Issues in Zimbabwe up to 1977

The chapter chronicles Zimbabwe's conflict history from the pre-colonial era right up to the eve of the signing of the Internal Settlement. It provides background information on the conflicts that have afflicted Zimbabwe and overtures that were made to try and resolve them. The issues looked at include pre-colonial raiding, colonial rule and violence, the UDI, nationalist violence, the war of liberation and negotiations to try and resolve the Rhodesian problem. This chapter is important as it traces and brings to the fore salient historical issues that characterize Zimbabwe's deep-rooted, complex, multi-layered and multi-dimensional problems that the four peace agreements tried to resolve as part of efforts to foster development.

Chapter 4 – The Internal Settlement– Towards Pseudo-Independence

This chapter discusses attempts by the Rhodesian white minority government to resolve the Rhodesian question by negotiating and reaching agreement with moderate internal African nationalists to the exclusion of nationalist guerrilla leaders. The chapter exposes the devious means by which imperialist capitalist interests fronted by Smith's Rhodesia Front government sought to perpetuate colonial rule by offering Africans a façade of independence

that was not accompanied by any developmental transformation. This attempt to offer Africans pseudo-independence was rejected by externally based guerrilla leaders who vowed to continue with the war in pursuit of complete decolonisation.

Chapter 5 – The 1979 Lancaster House Agreement and the Aftermath

In this chapter the research goes to great length to show that despite the end of formal colonial rule colonial situations persisted in the independence period to the detriment of the socio-economic development of the majority black population. The chapter critically analyzes how this was achieved via an agreement in London which to all intents and purposes was merely a watered down version of the 1978 Internal Settlement which had incompletely decolonised Zimbabwe resulting in the continuation of the guerrilla war. The chapter discusses how the failure of the 1979 agreement to resolve in particular the land question bequeathed to the country a future laden with tension and conflict that culminated in the Zimbabwe crisis.

Chapter 6 – Post-Independence Violence in Matabeleland and Midlands and the 1987 Unity Accord

The chapter explains the 1980s conflict in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces with an emphasis on how global capitalist and imperialist interests contributed to the 1980s violence in Matabeleland and Midlands. It reveals collusion between Zimbabwe's post independence ruling class and the capitalist West to crush and discipline perceived internally based opponents of global capitalism. It explains how coloniality is replicated by the new African ruling class that continued to use colonial *modus operandi* and methods of repression to suppress dissenters. This chapter reveals that peace agreements and unity agreements do not necessarily culminate in transformation, peace and national unity and development.

Chapter 7 – The Zimbabwe Crisis and the 2008 Global Political Agreement

This chapter explains how a combination of poor economic governance and authoritarian rule coupled with the overt meddling of triumphant global capitalist imperialist forces in Zimbabwe's affairs gave birth to the Zimbabwe crisis. The chapter examines the role of the West in fomenting the Zimbabwe crisis by seeking to eject an authoritarian neo-nationalist ruling party hanging on to power through modes reminiscent of the colonial era and replacing it with one perceived to be compliant to the Western neo-liberal philosophy. It analyzes the Global Political Agreement, yet another attempt to resolve the challenges facing Zimbabwe.

Chapter 8 – Conclusion: Decoloniality as a Panacea for Peace, Reconciliation and Unity

This chapter concludes the thesis with a brief summary of the findings of the study and makes recommendations for the achievement of peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe.

1.11 CONCLUSION

This chapter provided the outline of the thesis. It is an exposition of the research problem, the aims, objectives, significance and analytical framework of the study. In pursuit of fulfilling the research objectives, the study elected to employ qualitative research methods so that an in-depth understanding of the various covert factors that impact on peace and development could be exposed. The chapter provides a bird's eye view of the study. The next chapter profits from this foundation that has been laid and discusses relevant literature and concepts that explain challenges to peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 2

COLONIALITY: TOWARDS A CONSTRUCTION OF A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE ZIMBABWE PROBLEM

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets out the conceptual framework of the thesis. It analyses the concept of coloniality and its impact on the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe. The first section discusses the notions of coloniality, colonialism and neo-colonialism. This is followed by an examination of the contours of coloniality- coloniality of power, being, and knowledge. Thereafter the chapter examines the applicability of coloniality in Zimbabwe before finally exploring the feasibility of the de-coloniality paradigm as a panacea to peace and reconciliation conundrums in Zimbabwe.

This thesis stands on Anibal Quijano's (2000) concept of coloniality to explain the challenges to peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. It sees colonial patterns of power that survived decolonization as the *problematique* in the quest for peace and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. It however acknowledges the importance of several theories that have been advanced to explain challenges to peace, reconciliation and unity on Zimbabwe's political landscape.

Hammer, Raftopoulos and Jensen (2003) locate the challenges of peace and reconciliation in the "unfinished business" of decolonization. They argue that contentious issues that should have been resolved at independence were shelved by African nationalists for resolution at a later date. These contentious issues they attest have presented obstacles to reconciliation and harmonious co-existence. They include unresolved controversial issues such as land, citizenship, property relations and governance. Bond and Manyanya (2003) place the challenges to peace in the country's economic plunge arising from what they refer to as "exhausted nationalism" in the neo-liberal era. Moyo and Yeros (2005, 2007) point to the radicalization of the state as it embarked on what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) refers to as a "nativist revolution" that commenced at the turn of the new millennium. Moore (2001, 2003) views peace and reconciliation challenges as embedded in elite primitive accumulation, while

Holland (2008) perceives Mugabe's long incumbency and "dictatorial rule" as responsible for the challenges to peace and reconciliation.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009a) views colonial violence, *gukurahundi* - 1980s violence in the Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces and other post colonial conflicts that have been experienced in Zimbabwe as symptomatic of failed peace and reconciliation following a continuum of a catalogue of violence spanning decades. Eppel (2004) cites the culture of impunity that has accompanied violence and the continuous use of violence by the state against its citizenry as reasons for the failure to attain reconciliation. Mlambo (1998) and Muzondidya (2004; 2010) situate the problem of violence in race. They argue that whites are viewed by the ruling black regime as settler people without legitimate claims to Zimbabwean nationhood while whites argue that they are Zimbabwean as most of the current generation knows no other home other than the Zimbabwe in which they were born or emigrated to a long time ago.

Munemo (2012a) sees challenges to peace and reconciliation as rooted in hegemonic political struggles. The struggle for hegemony is noted in battles for the control of state power by various Zimbabwean political parties, champions of neo-imperialism and remnants of the colonial settler state. Huyse (2003) cites inter-racial/intra-racial socio-economic inequities as the *raison d'etre* of conflict in Zimbabwe. She also views peace and reconciliation problems as products of the failure to decapitate settler and western influence which has obstinately refused to relinquish economic control of the country. To Chigora (2012), the history factor (colonial legacy) and external factors best explain the root causes of the unending search for peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.

The violence that engulfs Zimbabwe in the new millennium calls for a serious interrogation of the peace predicament. The scholars cited above have unsuccessfully tried to unlock complexities regarding the achievement of peace and unity. Despite the invaluable contributions they have made, they have not delved deep enough to uproot the fundamental source of peace problems. They have only succeeded in discussing the symptoms while neglecting the underlying causes of conflict that can be traced to coloniality.

2.2 THE ESSENCE OF COLONIALITY

This section explores the notion of coloniality. It provides the conceptual tools with which to understand the politics of peace agreements, reconciliation and unity governments in Zimbabwe. The turn of the new millennium marked a new era in Zimbabwe where it appears as if the state is radically delinking yet in actual fact what it is hiding is the continuity of colonial patterns of domination that have survived colonialism. It is the contention of this study that coloniality has permeated its way into governance, politics, society, identity, epistemology and economy with the resultant effect of weakening institutions and processes that promote peace, unity and reconciliation.

Coloniality is an analytical concept developed by Anibal Quijano and other radical Latin American scholars such as Mignolo, Escobar, Maldonado-Torres and others to explain the origins of the contemporary capitalist world created by Western modernity that is based on the racial categorisation of the global population (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2012a). Their primary aim was to develop a new understanding of modernity based on colonial difference from the perspective of the ex-colonized that experienced its dark side (Mignolo:2011). To Quijano (2000:1) coloniality is part of modernity, which to Escobar (2004:211) is essentially a European phenomenon that historically has its origins in the discovery of the so-called New World in 1492 that resulted in progress, civilization, modernization and development. Modernity to Escobar straddles the processes of Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, neo-liberalism and globalisation. It hides in the latter to perpetuate Western control of the global power structure and capitalist modernity. The pursuit of modernity is constituted by coloniality, a global power matrix that lies at the centre of the current racially hierarchised, imperialistic, colonialist, Euro-American-centric, Christian-centric, hetero-normative, patriarchal, violent and modern world order (Grosfoguel: 2007).

According to Quijano (2000), with the conquest of the Americas in 1492, Europeans created a new global social structure in which humanity was ranked primarily on the basis of differences in race and also in the control of labour. The lighter skinned peoples were perceived to be closer to full humanity while the darker races had their humanity doubted. In the social realm the Christian, capitalist, patriarchal white race was ranked as superior to the darker races that were perceived to be inferior, primitive, uncivilized and thus placed at the bottom of the social ladder where they were virtually dehumanized. The construction of a

new way of classifying people based on the codification of differences between the conquerors and conquered that mainly centred on the idea of race was used to justify the slave trade, imperialism and colonialism, neo-colonialism and globalisation. Maldonado-Torres (2007) refers to the imperial attitude exhibited by the Europeans as a ‘racist/imperial Manichean misanthropic skepticism’. He argues that this attitude has sustained the imagined superiority of the imperial white being which today is hidden within structures of global coloniality where Westerners have remained at the top of racial hierarchies rooted in colonial modernity(Maldonado- Torres 2007: 245). The basis of classification and hierachization was to fragment and assume dominance over the other polities and societies. The consequences of stratification and hierachization at various levels have been conflict, division and underdevelopment amongst the marginalized and subalternized societies of the world.

Maldonado-Torres (2007: 243) refers to coloniality as “long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, that define culture, labour, inter-subjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations.” Coloniality allows the continuity of colonial forms of domination after the end of formal colonial administrations. Although colonial administrations have virtually been eradicated the world over, the majority of the developing world is still experiencing colonial situations as they are living under a racialized and ethnicised global hierarchy that privileges European people over non-European people, and embraces Euro-American exploitation and control of the rest.

Grosfoguel, (2007) quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a:14) succinctly explains coloniality:

... although "colonial administrations" have been almost entirely eradicated and the majority of the periphery is politically organised into independent states, non-European people are still living under crude European/Euro-American exploitation and domination.

Developing nations today live under the regime of global coloniality imposed by the Euro-American alliance through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and their domination of the United Nations (UN) (Ndlovu-Gatsheni:2013a). Although these states are no longer under colonial rule they remain in a colonial situation because the life force of colonialism endured the end of colonial rule. Coloniality is found alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience (Quijano, 2001 cited in Maldonado –Torres:

2007: 243). Coloniality is constitutive of modernity; there can be no modernity without coloniality. Modernity deposited coloniality on its underside, the two are in effect opposite sides of the same coin with coloniality being the hidden and darker underside (Mignolo: 2000).

Santos (2007) contends that the stratification of society based on race concomitant with coloniality was accentuated by what he refers to as Western abyssal thinking. Abyssal thinking he argues is all about making distinctions between peoples. To him an imaginary abyssal line distinguishes the subalternized darker races from the privileged whites. Those considered to live above the abyssal line were said to belong to the zone of being, while those that live below the line to be in the zone of non-being. On the privileged side of the abyssal line he attests, one finds superiority, development, Christianity, knowledge, heterosexuals, humanity, peace and democracy, while on the oppressed side there is underdevelopment, violence, invisibility, darkness, heathens, inhuman practices, savages, dictatorship, homosexuals, inferiority and a host of other negations and deficiencies.

As a result of these imagined radical differences whites of Western European descent assumed a higher social status while the darker indigenous races were placed at the bottom of the social ladder. This racial classification at the social level undergirds coloniality. It has led to the erection of a modern global social structure that associates the privileged white race with superiority while further truncating the status of the underprivileged subjects on the darker side of the abyssal line. By ascribing superiority to the ex-colonizer and “fairer” races and inferiority to people of colour and the ex-colonised coloniality accentuates racial and cultural differences. The ex-colonized darker races are treated as lesser beings; and little is done to protect them against violence. The idea of race to Quijano (2000) became the most efficient instrument of social domination. European peoples were privileged over non-European people, culminating in the white race assuming dominance over the darker races of the world. To Mignolo (2009), the whole world gradually came to be seen in the light of this logic resulting in global coloniality. To Moya (2011), the situation described above has resulted in the differential treatment of races that explain the high number of resolution resistant identity-related conflicts engulfing many parts of the world today.

Owing to the elevated position whites occupied in the social hierarchy, they came to control four key elements of coloniality; control of authority, control of gender and sexuality, and control of subjectivity and knowledge. This dominance was not only restricted to race as

coloniality overflowed to cover ethnicity, gender, sexism and masculinity resulting in what Wynter (2003) refers to as multiple colonialities. The logic of perceiving the world in terms of a racially based hierarchy was perpetuated and entrenched in many parts of the colonised world. In spite of the end of formal colonial rule in most parts of the world colonial forms of domination that characterized colonial rule have persisted. This is evident in current oppressive structures and exclusionist relations both within independent states and between ex-colonizers and ex-colonized that bear similarities with the colonial past. This has prompted Salvatore (2010) to refer to coloniality as the persistence of the colonial in the present.

Quijano (2000) however conceptualises coloniality as being more than the residual form of colonial relations because coloniality also exists even where formal colonial administrations have not been established as domination and exploitation along cultural, political and economic lines may occur. He argues that we should debunk the notion that humanity lives in a decolonised world because everywhere it is engulfed by political and economic systems shaped around a colonial capitalist world system.

Grosfoguel (2007) lends his weight to the above when he argues that the notion of a decolonized world is one of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century because the end of juridical-political colonization did not result in the dismantling of a complex matrix of global structures. To buttress the argument of an illusion of a decolonized world (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2014) points to the persistence of Western dominated post World War II and post Cold War orders produced by coloniality that have remained resistant to deimperialization. He argues that Euro-American dominance is still notable in various aspects of global life, politics, culture, labour, economy and knowledge. This to Grosfoguel (2007) explains underdevelopment and conflict in the exploited peripheral Global South and privileges enjoyed by the more peaceful and developed former colonial powers of Europe and America. Corollary to the above, this study is conscious of the controversies surrounding the use of the term “postcolonial” and elects to functionally use the term to refer to the period that followed the termination of juridical-political administrations in most parts of the world. This is in line with Maldonado-Torres’ (2007) conceptualization of coloniality as patterns of power that survived the end of colonialism.

This state of affairs in which the West continues to dominate the Global South despite the end of juridical-political control prompts Mignolo (2000) to refer to coloniality as a new form of

colonialism: colonialism without territoriality, while Quijano (2000) alludes to it as “independence without decolonization”. Colonialism at a global scale was thus replaced by global coloniality, which refers to the continuities of colonial practices and imaginations across space and time (Grosfoguel: 2004). Global coloniality is critical to the understanding of the asymmetrical world order that explains global power imbalances between the North and the South.

Coloniality is not only found at the global level but also at the local level. Local rulers in the ex-colonized parts of the world have since independence developed a new understanding of modernity based not on colonial difference as in global coloniality but based on class difference from the viewpoint of the ruling elite that inherited colonial states. In domestic coloniality the power matrix is constituted by ethnicism, regionalism and the “Big Man syndrome” (Mutunga cited by Matinenga 1999 in Mandaza: 2016). The executive engages in the stratification and hierachization of society with the intention of fragmenting and assuming dominance over state citizens that that it calls “My People”.

Coloniality is closely related to and interwoven with the concepts of colonialism and neo-colonialism. According to Maldonado-Torres cited in Mignolo (2005:9) “colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such nation an empire.” Colonialism is crude and essentially overt. It is different from the covert, adroit and suave coloniality which does not require the existence of formal colonial administration systems to survive. Coloniality persists because of the continued existence of invisible tentacles of power that hook the ex-colony to the former colonial power.

Neo-colonialism is a policy of political and economic domination of a less powerful country by another without necessarily taking over territorial control. The central focus in neo-colonialism is the economy and its relationship with the state (Mignolo: 2000). In neo-colonialism like in colonialism the essential characteristic of imperialist domination remains the same: the negation of the historical process of the dominated people by means of violent usurpation of the freedom of development of the national productive forces (Saul: 1973:306). Nkrumah in his *Neo-colonialism the Last Stage of Imperialism (1965)* and *Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for De-Colonization (1970)* perceives neo-colonialism as a greater danger to independent states than colonialism. He argues that colonialism is crude, essentially overt, and apt to be overcome by a purposeful concert of national effort. In contrast, in neo-

colonialism, the people are divided from their leaders and, instead of providing true leadership and guidance which is informed at every point by the ideal of the general welfare, leaders come to neglect the very people who put them in power and incautiously become instruments of suppression on behalf of neo-colonialists.

Unlike colonialism and neo-colonialism, coloniality is deeper and goes beyond merely focusing on the continuing economic exploitation of the Global South by the industrialized North. The difference between coloniality and neo-colonialism is that the latter makes the economy and its links with the state the central and only focus, while coloniality reorients and enlarges the analytic dimension, and touches on the imperial complicity between knowledge, racism, and patriarchy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a:13). Coloniality recognizes that domination is not just economic; it also operates at all levels of interrelation between the different domains of coloniality; power, being and knowledge (Mignolo, 2011).

Coloniality endeavours to concern itself with knowledge production, identity, race, sense of being and differential power hierarchies in the global system. It lies at the centre of the making of the modern/colonial world of yesterday and today, where Europe and North America are at the apex of the global power hierarchy and Africa is at the bottom (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2013a). Thus coloniality is best understood as a matrix constituted by three main pillars; the coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and the coloniality of being.

2.3 CONTOURS OF COLONIALITY

There are three main contours of coloniality namely; coloniality of power, the coloniality of knowledge and the coloniality of being.

2.3.1 Coloniality of Power

According to Martinot (undated) the coloniality of power is an expression coined by Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano to refer to the structures of power, control and hegemony whose source can be traced from the conquest of the Americas in the late 15th century to the current contemporary era. It explains how the current global political order was constructed and constituted into the asymmetrical and modern power structure. To Taylor (2013:598), the coloniality of power is a structuring process in the modern world system in which the US and Europe have created a power structure that privileges the white race and enables them to dominate not only the global political economy but to be epistemologically and culturally hegemonic. Quijano (2000) also refers to the coloniality of power as the colonial matrix of

power because a multifarious combination of elements constitutes the power structure. This is seen in the domination and exploitation of the rest of the world by the hegemonic Europe and America based on race, labour, state, knowledge, and production capitalism.

The coloniality of power explains the asymmetrical global power structure that emerged from the quest for modernity. In the coloniality of power, global power structures that privilege the West and facilitate its dominance continue to exist despite decolonization in most parts of the world. Most power is located in the western hemisphere amongst the “fairer” races of the world. In this global power structure everything is considered from the point of view of the politics of constitution of a racially hierarchized, Euro-America-centric, Christian-centric, patriarchal, capitalist, hetero-normative, hegemonic, asymmetrical, and modern global power structure (Grosfoguel:2007). Britain and the United States control the global political system and use their economic, political and diplomatic muscle to dominate smaller and weaker nations (former colonies) that are dependent on them for various forms of assistance. Their dominance of the global political system has been responsible for conflict and the absence of development in most parts of the Global South and stable peace and development in Global North.

Grosfoguel (2003:7) contends that the post World War II era was accompanied more by transition from global colonialism to global coloniality than by decolonization across the globe. What changed, he argues, were the global forms of domination, but not the structure of core-periphery relationships on a world scale. The consequence is that most peripheral states and subalternized peoples of the world are still colonial in relation to the hegemonic Europe and America. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) states that the coloniality of power articulates continuities not only of hard power between the North and the South but also continuities of colonial mentalities, psychologies and worldviews from centuries of colonialism into the so-called ‘postcolonial era’. Therefore what is implied by the coloniality of power is incomplete decolonization of the world and the continuation of colonial power relations in post-independence (Grosfoguel, 2003). Coloniality has ensured that most of the developing world has remained in colonial situations even though they are no longer under any particular juridical-political administration. This has been achieved through the Euro-American domination of multi-national bodies like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN Security Council. These multi-lateral institutions have been financially and economically imperial in their relations with peripheral states on which they dictate terms and

conditions. For instance, the US and British invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the United Nations resolution 1973 that permitted NATO's invasion of Libya in 2011 were unilateral actions opposed by most countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

The control of these institutions has permitted the West to wield control over the global political-economy and to influence the trajectory of development processes in various parts of the world. In the UN decisions made by the Western dominated Security Council hold sway over those made by the rest of the Assembly as they enjoy veto powers. In the WTO the West champions terms of trade that promote the protection of markets yet at the same time forcing the South to liberalize. This creates a skewed balance of trade in favour of Europe and America. With regards to the Bretton Woods institutions voting powers in these bodies are greater for Europe and America, and they go on to formulate global financial and economic policies advantageous to them. Often powerful states like Britain and the US use their economic, political and diplomatic muscle to dictate terms to weaker nations (former colonies) that are dependent on them for aid. Former colonies with little voice in these institutions have been forced to ally themselves to former colonizers in order to get decisions passed in their favour at international gatherings.

The Global South has received aid, loans and grants with conditionalities from the multi-lateral institutions controlled by the North. The assistance has come against the backdrop of structural, political and economic weaknesses inherent in the South, thus exacerbating an already dire situation for these states. More often than not the former colonies have been unable to adhere to the conditions. The consequences have been debt crisis, aid, dependency and poverty in the South. This situation has entrenched unequal global power relations wherein former colonies are subordinate to former colonisers.

Western control of power, economy and labour has allowed it to acquire riches which they are unwilling to share equitably with the rest of the developing world which provides the bulk of the raw materials and labour used to process high standards of living for the North. This exploitative practice at the global level has reproduced itself within states of the developing world where those who bear the burden of carrying the developmental process of the state do not get to eat the fruits of their labour, thus creating conditions for conflict.

It can be noted that besides explaining the current global power structural hierarchies, the coloniality of power also cascades down to explain structural hierarchies at national level. In Zimbabwe these hierarchies are mainly economic, political, ethnic and racial in nature. These

hierarchies that existed under colonialism were accentuated during the nationalist struggles and liberation war. Independent Zimbabwe has retained almost similar structures that were the source of conflict under colonialism. The ruling Shona-dominated ZANU PF party has placed itself at the apex of the power structures and has deployed resource control and political power to exclude and subordinate other ethnic and racial groups. This has served to generate and perpetuate conflicts. The study therefore aptly employs the concept of the colonality of power to explain how global hierarchies have been reproduced at national level resulting in the “hierachization” of Zimbabwean society based on race, ethnicity, political persuasion/affiliation, class and gender, *inter alia*, that has served the purpose of dividing the country rather than promoting nation building.

Euro-American political and military strength has also enabled the West to control the ruling elite in other parts of the South that rely heavily on Western diplomatic and military support for regime survival. For a long time Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime in Zaire and Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt and a number of South American countries have had their budgets subsidised by the Americans resulting in their pandering to the dictates of the American government (Weiner :1991). This prompts Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a:13) to agree with (Spivak: 1990) that as a consequence of the failure to completely decolonize the periphery the people of the Global South remain in a “postcolonial neocolonized world”. He argues that Africans live under the colonality of power in which their leaders have no power and freedom to decide on the course of any development of their countries without approval from Washington, London, Paris and other Western capitals. This is in spite of the fact that political colonialism has been eliminated. The relationship between the West and the developing world continues to be one of colonial domination. While Kwame Nkrumah would perceive this as neo-colonialism - the last stage of imperialism- it is the conviction of this study that such a situation depicts colonality as yet another stage of Western hegemonic imperialism.

The problems of peace, reconciliation and unity in the ex-colonized parts of the world are not only a consequence of machinations of foreigners and their local puppets but are also a reflection of the workings of local colonality that created its own domestic power matrix. In this local power structure things are considered from the point of view of the politics of constitution of an ethnically hierachized, region- centric, elite-centric, “Bigman-centric” and patriarchal state power structure. Concomitant with end of empire was a transition from colonialism by foreigners to a capture of the state by local ruling elite that replaced the

retreating settler state. What fundamentally changed were the forms of domination, but not the structure of horse-and-rider relationships that characterized colonial rule. The consequence is that most ex-colonies and citizens of these states remain colonial in relation to the hegemonic elite nationalist bourgeoisie that filled the shoes of the former colonizers. The control of the state political system by the elite has been responsible for conflict and the absence of development in the countryside and for those living on the margins of society in urban areas while those in power live in affluence.

Local coloniality has also ensured that most state citizens have remained in colonial situations even though they are no longer under any particular colonial juridical-political administration. This has been achieved through the nationalist elite domination of the political economy and securocratization of the state. Mandaza (2016) refers to a securocrat state as one in which the military-security apparatus is a dominant factor in the power complex and rules without or despite popular will. In Zimbabwe apparently decisions made by the nationalist elite hold sway over those made by the rest of the populace. For instance the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme was adopted in the early 1990s against the wishes of a significant proportion of the population and so was a 2005 slum clean-up campaign launched that violated over 700 000 citizens' rights to habitation.

2.3.2 Coloniality of Knowledge

Closely linked to the coloniality of power is the concept of the coloniality of knowledge which is useful in any understanding of the modern/colonial world we live in. The coloniality of knowledge to Maldonado-Torres (2007: 242) is concerned with the impact of colonization on the different areas of knowledge production. It is a power structure that entails the control and monopolization of epistemology by the West. It privileges knowledge from Europe and holds in high esteem knowledge produced by the white race while undermining, ignoring, silencing, oppressing and marginalizing knowledge from the Global South (Grosfoguel 2009). Eurocentric epistemologies have not only assumed preponderance but have also been presented as objective and universal knowledges (Escobar, 2007). Quijano (2000) concurs, pointing out that the Euro-American World concentrated all forms of the control of subjectivity, culture, especially knowledge and the production of knowledge, under its hegemony so as to further imperialism and maintain colonial situations in previously colonized territories. This has resulted in the West's epistemic hegemony in the modern/colonial capitalist world-system we live in (Grosfoguel: 2009).

Coloniality of knowledge territorialized epistemology; those born in the Global North came to be regarded as more knowledgeable than those born in the Global South, thus creating an unbalanced knowledge structure in the world (Mignolo: 2013). Coloniality of knowledge also concerns itself with who generates knowledge, from where and for what purpose, and who controls and monopolizes this knowledge. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a:11) notes that endogenous and indigenous knowledges were being pushed to the margins while privileging Western knowledges. Sylvia Wynter (2003) refers to this as epistemological “disregard” of epistemologies of the South.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) further argues that with the expansion of western modernity subaltern knowledges that were found not to be useful to the colonizers were either repressed or displaced only to be replaced by alien Eurocentric knowledges. He laments that Africa today is saddled with irrelevant knowledge that disempowers rather than empowers individuals and communities. Western thinkers and scholars in the mould of Foucault, Gramsci, Zartmann and Galtung have been made to overshadow subaltern thinkers like Ali Mazrui, Claude Ake, Ghandi, Ngugi wa Thiongo and Mamdani whose ideas are more relevant to the subalternized. The darker races of the Global South are seen as incapable of producing knowledge worthy of consumption by the North. Not only have western thinkers supposedly eclipsed epistemologies of the South, but they have also largely barricaded themselves against them. This is indicative of the prevalence of both epistemic and ontological racism.

Despite the end of formal colonial rule in many parts of the developing world epistemologies are still heavily Euro-American centric. The global knowledge industry is dominated by the western scholars. This state of affairs has allowed structures of knowledge production in an asymmetrical world order to continue to be dominated by the West. The use of what Valentine Mudimbe refers to as colonial libraries (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2013b) has restricted the Global South’s capacity to produce the alternatives knowledges advocated for by New Zealand scholar Linda Tuhiwai-Smith. The predominance of Euro-American epistemology is seen in the way Europe and America have gone to great lengths to try and make the western university system the global university system thus allowing the epistemic hierarchy created by colonialism to survive (Grosfoguel, 2009:19).

The strong influence of Euro-American centric epistemologies has and continues to

tremendously affect the locus of enunciation of the subalternized population of the developing world. This is because the territories were formally decolonised but the minds of the people were not decolonized, they remained epistemologically colonized. Mignolo (2000) argues that we always speak from a particular location in power structures, be they class sex, spirituality, race, ethnicity, ideological. Apparently, Africans enjoying the fruits of independence articulate issues from a Euro-centric perspective although they may physically be located in Africa. Some think like white Europeans in Paris although they may have been born to Mandingo peasant parents in Mali. The fact that one may be located geographically in Africa but think as though they are in Europe is what Argentinean-Mexican writer Enrique Dussel refers to as the geo-politics of knowledge, whereas a scenario whereby one is black but thinks like a Whiteman is what Grosfoguel (2009:14) calls the body politics of knowledge. To Quijano (2000) this is a reflection of continued epistemological colonization of the South as a consequence of the persisting colonization of imagination bequeathed by colonialism.

Colonial rule did not just confine itself to the control of power, authority and economy but also extended its tentacles to the domain of knowledge. The epistemic effects of colonialism have been far-reaching, for instance under colonialism Africans were taught European culture and civilization which celebrated the achievements of Europeans at the expense of African great figures that were denigrated or ignored. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011a:5) has the following to say about the form of colonial education and its impact on the Africans.

Schooling openly took the form of Westernization that resulted in Africans liking Europe and America that rejected them, and hating Africa that produced them. African modes of knowing, of producing knowledge, and of producing perspectives became subordinated to Euro-American epistemology that assumed universal proportions and universal truth. Euro-American knowledge was placed far out of reach of the majority of Africans, and when it was made available and taught to Africans, it was done in a partial and selective manner, to those few who were wanted by colonial state to service some of its institutions as teachers, nurses and policemen.

Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014) in his book *Epistemologies of the South* refers to these acts as “epistemicide,” that is, the extermination of knowledge and ways of knowing. Africans were indoctrinated into thinking that they were an inferior backward racial group characterized by lacks and deficits that had to look up to the “superior” white man for enlightenment and progress. Africans were therefore not just territorially colonized but also cognitively colonized and their sense of being and identity was hugely impacted upon.

According to Alcoff (2007) the ex-colonized people exude what was planted in their minds by colonialism. Colonial subjects were schooled into believing that they were barbaric and savage. He argues that the violence that engulfs former colonies today is perhaps unleashed to fulfil that label.

Independence in most African states did not change the mindset of the ex-colonized people. Their perception of things remained largely influenced by Euro-American worldviews; what one can refer to as the coloniality of imagination. One way through which the West has retained control of the African mind as has been mentioned was through what has been highlighted by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) as Mudimbe's colonial library. Most African educational institutions still consult books informed by methodologies and theories of the former colonizers. The effect of this situation is that the knowledge on conflict resolution and peace building that is produced in Zimbabwe /Africa is least likely to be effective as it is not suited to the context. Those scholars that refuse to pursue western epistemologies do not get published and neither is their work disseminated or recognized by the epistemologically hegemonic West. This is because to Escobar (2004:217) indigenous and traditional epistemologies of conflict resolution have been subalternized by coloniality. We thus have to recognize that the geo-politics of knowledge has carried the myth that Africa can develop and enjoy peace only if it follows a development path trodden by Europe.

Coloniality of knowledge therefore exposes the influence that former colonizers still have with regards to methodologies and knowledge production. Although colonialism in many parts of the world has come to an end, its effects linger; western tools of analysis, methods and theories are still employed in the realm of knowledge. This has been noted in the domain of peace in the post-independence period of the ex-colonized world where European models of conflict resolution have been preferred ahead of indigenous modes of conflict resolution that have been sidelined. The ex-colonized peoples of the developing world have, because of the coloniality of knowledge, persisted with a mindset in which they feel that they are still colonized yet the shackles of colonialism have long since been removed.

Zimbabwe's education system still largely followed the curriculum of its former colonial master, Britain despite the end of colonial rule in 1980. By inheriting the British education system that was out of sync with the reality and experiences of the Africans meant that the African majority were compelled to persist with a colonial curriculum that celebrated European heroes and taught about the culture, of the ex-colonizers while ignoring to

underscore the achievements and lives of great African figures such as Mzilikazi, Lobengula, Mbuya Nehanda and Kaguvi. The way Zimbabweans perceive the world despite the end of formal empire did not change much due to the persistence of colonial epistemologies. In the discipline of history for instance the country had to wait for more than a decade to radically change the Ordinary level syllabus that placed equal emphasis on European and central African history in a predominantly black country. It was only after the Nziramasanga Commission concluded that the educational system was 'both inappropriate and outdated' that a nationalist, Africa-centred and Marxist-inspired syllabus was introduced (Barnes: 2004).

The knowledge Zimbabwe has continued to receive long after the end of colonial rule has served to weaken the socio-economic and political fabric of the country. It has not laid the foundations for establishing strong economic and political structures that promote sustainable peace and development. Zimbabwe was cajoled into accepting western generated IMF and World Bank sponsored programmes. This was surprising given the fact that Zimbabwe is a developing state trying to extricate itself from the after-effects of colonialism. The consequences were disastrous for Zimbabwe's development as they led to serious socio-economic ills which generated civil strife. This makes one doubtful of the suitability and sincerity of western development and economic models and development paradigms. The political crisis and civil strife that have engulfed Zimbabwe since independence are indicative of troubled peace and reconciliation epistemologies derived from the Western powers. In fact coloniality of knowledge has determined strategies, theories and approaches that have been employed to try and resolve the Zimbabwean conflict.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012a:423) is skeptical of the appropriateness and sincerity of western driven conflict resolution pedagogies. He surmises that "powerful people benefitting from the lack of peace will not teach you how to be peaceful lest their power is eroded." The liberation war could have been stopped by the British before it claimed many lives. Since Britain was benefitting from the war it was not in a hurry to resolve the conflict in a way that was likely to compromise its political and economic interests. This did not make the British best placed to deliver pedagogies of peace in Zimbabwe. Its resolution of the Zimbabwean conflict in the year 1979 did not produce durable peace but rather papered over the cracks as conflict re-emerged not long after independence as evidenced by *gukurahundi* in Matabeleland in the 1980s and farm invasions from the year 2000. The above shows that rarely, if at all, do former erstwhile colonizers with massive economic interests in a particular region give sound and honest counsel of a political nature to liberated territories. British actions were informed

more by imperial political and economic interests more than a desire to bring peace and stability to Zimbabwe (ibid).

Zimbabwe has been a victim of externally generated pedagogies of peace and reconciliation that are not informed by any geo-biographical contextual understanding of its history and politics. Ostensibly ‘experts’ from the West or educated in the West are given space to deliver their pedagogy of development and governance to Zimbabwe. These experts have perceived the Zimbabwe conflict and analyzed it through foreign lenses. This has militated against the proper diagnosis and resolution of Zimbabwean conflicts as they lack the connectedness with everyday experiences of Zimbabweans. Zimbabwe suffers from an epistemological crisis where its citizens have put aside their intellectual possessions and adopted colonizers’ forms of thought. They have also discarded indigenous modes of development, governance and conflict resolution that focused on community health and restoration in favour of western notions of resolving conflict which are alien to their culture (ibid).

Peace processes have not been so successful on Zimbabwe’s political landscape because of a crisis in the loci of enunciation of facilitators and mediators to conflicts. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012b:5) cites Mignolo (2009) who refers to the locus of enunciation as the geographical spaces from which academics and intellectuals speak, their ideological orientations, subject-positions (racial, gender and class identifications), and the historical processes and events that inform their knowledge-claims. Since no fundamental change has occurred with regards to knowledge production and acquisition since decolonization, western epistemologies continue to pervade peace and reconciliation processes. The resultant effect has seen Zimbabwe /African conflict managers speaking geographically from the South but articulating ideas, beliefs and approaches on conflict resolution consistent with western thought and methods of conflict resolution. Thabo Mbeki, the Southern Africa Development Council (SADC) mediator in the Zimbabwe crisis, adopted quiet diplomacy. This conflict resolution philosophy is rooted in western diplomacy and thus alien and unsuitable for the Zimbabwean context as a conflict resolution strategy. The consequences of employing it were an escalation and extension of the Zimbabwe crisis, the violent 2008 elections, a flawed Global Political Agreement, a polarized GNU and the contested 2013 elections which have not offered Zimbabwe prospects for sustainable peace.

A glance at the coloniality of knowledge within the realm of domestic coloniality reveals that

inheritors of colonial states came to control and monopolize epistemology. Knowledge produced by the ruling nationalist elite has come to be held in high regard while that produced by the masses is neglected and ignored. Knowledge produced by the state ruling elite and its sympathizers is privileged and accorded space while that of civil society is marginalized or denied space. The masses are seen as *tabula rasa* and incapable of conceiving anything that can contribute to state development. As a result the knowledges of the subalternized state masses have over time been replaced by the ruling elites' knowledge. Corollary to Wynter's (2003) view one may refer to this as the disregard of epistemologies of the subalternized masses that have allowed epistemologies of the state to be dominant. State-centric epistemologies do not only become dominant but are also seen as the "right" knowledge. This has accentuated the states' epistemic hegemony in the ex-colonies.

It is important to note that local coloniality does not only disregard alternative knowledges but also employs Boaventura de Sousa Santos' (2014) "epistemicides" in the ex-colonies. The rural populace of ex-colonies has been taught the culture of the urbanites and told to forget their traditional way of life. Impoverished rural masses now speak from an urban-centric perspective although they may physically be resident in the countryside. This loss of identity has eroded social cohesion among the rural population and triggered cultural conflict. The fact that masses located geographically in the countryside but think as though they are in the heart of the urban area is reflective of the existence of the geo-politics of knowledge, whereas a scenario where one is of peasantry stock but thinks like a suburbanite is evidence of the body politics of knowledge at play. The foregoing is indicative of the epistemological colonization of the rural by the urban.

2.3.3 Coloniality of Being

The coloniality of being is a useful analytical tool developed by Mignolo to analyze the relationship between power and knowledge in the framing of being. According to Maldonado-Torres (2007:242) while the coloniality of power concerns itself with the interrelation between modern forms of exploitation and domination and the coloniality of knowledge has to do with the impact of the different areas of knowledge production, the coloniality of being is primarily concerned with what Escobar (2004) refers to as the ontological dimension of coloniality that emphasizes ontological difference. It explains the processes of the dynamics of power that discriminate the different races of the world through the ranking of humanity according to ontological conceptions of the sense of being.

There is a social classification of the world's population around the idea of race. Race is placed at the centre of the structuring of the global order where whites of western European descent are found in the higher echelons of the global social hierarchy and enjoy privileges over other racial groups. The ex-colonized people of the continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America, darker races in general, are regarded as inferior to the Caucasian former colonizers from Europe and North America, who are perceived as superior. This determines the rights, privileges and levels of development that are enjoyed and accrued to these races. This has perpetuated colonial situations that ascribed inferiority to the conquered races and superiority to conquering race. Under coloniality the Cartesian "I think therefore I am (human)" was replaced by "I conquer therefore I am". This provided the white race with the excuse to not only discriminate but also eliminate the conquered darker races that owing to their having been conquered were seen as a sub-human, non-thinking, dispensable population.

In a world marked by the coloniality of being, the humanity of the darker races of the world is doubted. Fanon (1968) argues that the "*damn e*" (the black race – the wretched, the condemned and the oppressed) emerges in the eyes of the white race as a race perceived to be distant from humanity when compared to light skinned persons. Whiteness in this world is considered to have greater ontological density than blackness. Lighter skinned races are regarded as closer to humanity (Maldonado –Torres 2007: 244). To Fanon (1968) the blacks occupy the zone of non-being while the privileged white race endowed with full humanity is seen as occupying the zone of being. Mignolo (2007: 480) sees striking resemblances between racism and the coloniality of being. At the centre of the coloniality of being and racism is the discrimination of people in the pursuit of hegemony. To him, the two are groomed in the same stable and are cognitively aligned in the colonial matrix of power.

Colonialism's impact was not just confined to the political and economic realm; it transcended these to impact greatly on the conquered people's conception of being. The conquering white race elevated and privileged its culture and imposed it on indigenous conquered people who had to endure cultural erosion resulting in them losing their identity and corrupting their sense of being. Having culturally dominated the conquered races the conquering white European race perceived itself as ontologically denser than the conquered darker races, thus accentuating colonial difference. Grosfoguel (2009) argues that the domination of the darker races by the white race persists despite the end of colonialism. This is evident in today's global power structures where we observe attitudes, traits and cultures

imposed and bequeathed by white European and American colonialists in most parts of the world.

As an analytical concept the coloniality of being helps us to analyze and understand how the ontological structuring of society that accompanied modernity explains violence and underdevelopment in the zone of non-being and development and peace in the zone of being Fanon (1968). The dehumanized Africans are regarded by the white race as being at the bottom of the human ontological ladder located in the domain of violence, war, rape, diseases, death and mourning. This realm is perceived to be characterized by lacks and deficits; lacking history, lacking civilization, lacking development, lacking good governance, lacking democracy, lacking human rights, and lacking ethical leadership (Mignolo 2007; Grosfoguel 2007; Maldonado-Torres 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni:2013b).

According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012b:4), under the coloniality of being Africans are pushed to the lowest rank of human ontology where even their constitution as human is doubted and where they exist as objects while the whites are regarded as subjects found higher up the ontological ladder. He further argues that blacks were considered to be inferior under colonialism, and remain regarded as such today within structures of global coloniality where Westerners have remained at the top of racial hierarchies.

People living in the zone of being or above what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) calls the abyssal line are recognized socially in their humanity as human beings and, thus, enjoy access to human rights and other rights that people living below the line of humanity are denied. In the zone of non-being life is hellish. Conflicts are not managed before serious bloodshed. The Rwandan genocide of the 1990s and Zimbabwe's *gukurahundi* of the 1980s are evidence of this. However, in the zone of being resources are available to prevent and mitigate potential genocide as was the case in Serbia in the 1990s. Grosfoguel et al (2014) cite Santos (2006) as arguing that conflict in the zone of being is managed through mechanisms of regulation and emancipation. "Regulation" refers to relations of civility that provide spaces of political negotiation and action between the oppressors and oppressed. "Emancipation" refers to discourses of liberty, autonomy, and equality that provide the crucial levers for the management of conflicts (Grosfoguel et al: 2014).

As a consequence of the absence of these regulatory and emancipation mechanisms, conflict in the zone of non-being is mainly resolved through violence but this is not to say that violence is not used in the zone of being to deal with conflict. It is also used as an exception

to the rule as it is not the primary conflict resolution approach. Grosfoguel et al (2014: 5) put it succinctly saying “conflicts in the zone of being are administered through perpetual peace with exceptional moments of war, while in the zone of non-being we have perpetual war with exceptional moments of peace”. It is important to note that Santos’ abyssal line and Fanon’s zones do not just separate races; they also exist in ethnicity, gender, political formations and other social groups where peoples within these groups also see each other as living either in the zone of being or non-being or above or below the abyssal line. There is thus the denial of rights and privileges based on perceptions of being or humanity of the other amongst these groups.

The categorization of people as being or non-being generated conflict based on race that led to colonial conquest and colonial violence. The classification based on this idea overlapped colonialism. It explains racial and identity based conflicts that exist in the ex-colonies long after the end of formal colonial rule. Despite the end of colonialism the ontology of whites and blacks is seen as different. The West was disgusted when pictures and stories of the violence against Zimbabwean white farmers at the hands of war veterans and landless black peasants were broadcast across the world in the year 2000. It was quick to punish Zimbabwe through sanctions and other restrictions. The West did not react in the same manner when thousands of black refugees that included women and children were killed by Rhodesian forces at Chimoio in 1977 and when striking black miners were gunned down by the South African police at Marikana in 2012. The difference in reaction perhaps reveals that the West/whites viewed black inhabitants of Zimbabwe as ontologically lighter than whites who they saw as ontologically denser. This failure to attach similar value to the lives of both black and white races in part explains the difficulty of achieving peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.

In 2013 a British parliamentarian, Labour MP Kate Hoey, condemned the shooting down of the Air Rhodesian Viscount RH 827 by ZIPRA forces during the liberation struggle and the House accepted the event as an atrocity that should be commemorated. This action was condemned by nationalist Zimbabweans who called it racial commemoration. They pointed out that no motion has ever been made in Britain to commemorate the massacres of black victims of the liberation war (*Bulawayo24.com*, 27 February 2013). Apparently, the white man’s life is given greater ontological density than that of the black whose humanity is questioned. This differential treatment of races stands in the way of peace and reconciliation in multi-racial societies like Zimbabwe.

In local coloniality unlike in global coloniality ontological differences go beyond race. They have been modified by the ruling elite of ex-colonies to socially classify of the country's population around the idea of ethnicity and region. Ethnicity and region are placed at the centre of the structuring of the state order where those that come from the region where the executive hails and belong to his tribe enjoy privileges over other ethnic and regional groups. The dynamics of power discriminate the different ethnicities and regional groups and rank them. The non-ruling ethnic groups are seen as less national and dispensable populations. The prime objective in all this is the quest to be hegemonic but it comes with dire consequences for peace, national unity and development. This is because the ontological hierarchization of society that accompanied the end of formal colonialism brought violence and underdevelopment in the zone uninhabited by the ruling ethnic group and development and peace in the zone where it resides.

In domestic coloniality the ruling elite of ex-colonies have created national and community structures that associate the privileged ruling elite with superiority and the underprivileged marginalized groups with inferiority. In Zimbabwe they use the idea of class and history as an efficient instrument of social domination. Liberators of the colonies are privileged over non-liberators culminating in the liberators assuming dominance over the rest of the state citizenry. The situation has resulted in the differential treatment of national classes and this explains the high number of intractable conflicts that engulf the country.

The ruling elite in the former colonized parts of the world have also created a new national social structure in which the sense of belonging to nation is primarily based on one having participated in the decolonization of the state and the degree to which one adopted the former colonizers way of life. Those with links to nationalist struggles and dress and pursue the hobbies of the colonizer, as well as speak the former colonizers language fluently have been perceived to be closer to full nationhood while those that do not have the same qualities have had their nationality doubted. The perception of the latter as lacking full nationality by the local ruling elite resonates with abyssal thinking. In the eyes of the ruling elite an imaginary abyssal separates them from the subalternized commoners seen as living in the zone of non-being.

The ascription of superiority to the ruling elite based on the class categorisation of the national population while inferiorizing other social groups domestic coloniality accentuates national and historical differences and therefore hampers prospects of peace. Contributions of

the rural inhabitants and urban poor to issues of national development have been ignored and frowned upon as they are seen by the ruling elite as lesser beings lacking sophistication and ontological weight. They have thus been placed at the bottom of the social ladder. The consequences of this action at various levels have been to generate conflict, foment division and underdevelopment between and amongst the marginalized and exploited communities.

The concepts discussed above help shed light on the challenges faced in the search for peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. In summation coloniality should be understood as a global power matrix centred on race that explains the current racially hierarchized, patriarchal, Western-centric, Euro-American-centric, hetero-normative, Christian-centric, capitalist, contemporary modern/colonial world order that was born with the conquest of America in 1492 (Grosfoguel: 2007). The power matrix has not just maintained race as the classifying element but race has hidden and undergone modification only to reappear as a classificatory system based on knowledge, power and being that engulfs different parts of the world with varying implications on peace and development (Ndlovu-Gatsheni:2013b). The concept of coloniality therefore presents perhaps the most promising conceptual space to undertake a study of the politics of peace agreement, reconciliation and unity governments in Zimbabwe.

2.4 THE APPLICABILITY OF COLONIALITY AS AN EXPLANATION FOR CHALLENGES TO PEACE, UNITY AND RECONCILIATION IN ZIMBABWE

This section discusses the applicability of coloniality as an explanation for problems of peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. It provides a glimpse of how coloniality helps unmask the challenges to peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe was in the 1890s colonized violently by white British imperialists who regarded themselves as superior to the indigenous black people who inhabited the area. The colonialists created a racialized social structure that privileged the whites and oppressed the blacks. As a consequence of this there developed wide socio-economic disparities between the privileged whites and marginalized blacks.

Under colonial rule the blacks were indoctrinated into believing that they were inferior to whites in various facets of life and thus accepted oppression and exploitation. The whites imposed on the blacks their culture, values, traditions and knowledge systems. For instance, the colonial education system was structured along British lines and indigenous languages were marginalized as the English language was made the official language for both the

colonizers and colonized. Many Africans abandoned their religions for Christianity brought by western missionaries and evangelists. The effect of this was to alter the Africans sense of identity and being. Their understanding of self was corrupted resulting in many Africans becoming mentally colonized and losing their identity.

Global capitalist and imperialist powers presided over a flawed and incomplete decolonization process that resulted in the birth of Zimbabwe as a neo-colonial state. The state was forced to postpone critical issues such as land owing to capitalist/imperialist elements that interfered to safeguard capitalist and settler interests. Zimbabwe was sucked into the global capitalist system. It continued to be dependent on Western state support and assistance from western dominated institutions like the IMF and WB that facilitate the exploitation of resources from the marginalized parts of the world for the benefit of the industrialized countries.

More than three decades after independence Zimbabwe finds itself in the clutches of coloniality. The country employs colonial templates and frameworks in various spheres of life. Its governance *modus operandi* is more British than it is African as it resembles the Westminster form of administration. The British culture, traditions and values dominate societal life. Christianity remains the dominant religion and the English language is still the official language of the country and is official medium of instruction in schools and universities that still make use of British curricula.

Apparently, Zimbabwean society is epistemologically still mired in antique colonial thinking that is inimical to the development of a just society. The dark epistemic colonial cloud that hangs over the psychology and identity of Zimbabweans has had them entrapped in a colonial time warp that has driven citizens into the depths of the epistemic abyss from which escape has almost been impossible (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b; Quijano 2000). Through the concept of coloniality the thesis reveals that in an epistemologically unequal world the control of knowledge by the Global North in various domains of human existence has led to the development of weak, ineffectual strategies, theories and methodologies to deal with conflict and to build peace. What is also exposed is the continuation of colonized epistemologies that curtail the development of models likely to extricate the South from snares that hold back development and the attainment of peace.

Despite the attainment of independence the white settlers maintained ideas of colonial difference by continuing to live above the socio-ontological imaginary line accentuated by colonialism without giving much consideration to the realities of transition brought by independence (Mignolo, 2013; 2009). The white former colonizers have remained a distinct group detached from the majority black population and still enjoy privileges akin to those they enjoyed under colonialism. As a social group they have elected to remain aloof from mainstream Zimbabwean society apparently still hanging on to the idea of colonial difference even though a new political and social arrangement came with the establishment of a new independent state in 1980.

Attempts by the Zimbabwean government to unshackle itself from debilitating coloniality has incurred it the wrath of the West. It has been ostracized and punished through sanctions and other measures for embarking on a land redistribution exercise that in part seeks to eradicate remnants of colonialism. The thesis contends that it is because of coloniality that a subaltern state like Zimbabwe is being punished for attempting to break ranks with global capitalist powers. The consequences of defying the West have been hunger, economic decline, sanctions and civil strife. It should be noted that coloniality is a relevant concept with which to analyse the search for peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe as it provides the lenses through which we can examine how the inheritors of the colonial state developed their own variant of coloniality (domestic coloniality) that has fissured Zimbabwean society and triggered conflicts that have negated the quest to achieve peace, unity, reconciliation and development.

This section took a glance at the relevance of the concept of coloniality in attempts to explain the obstacles to peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. It highlighted that the country's conflict problems and the lack of peace, unity and reconciliation are traceable to the persistence of colonial forms of domination within the realms of power, knowledge and being that survived decolonization. Essentially, it is a harbinger for more detailed discussions of the part played by coloniality in Zimbabwe's peace, unity and reconciliation challenges.

2.5 WHY DE –COLONIALITY IN ZIMBABWE

The study finds it prudent to stand on a decoloniality epistemic framework to unmask and analyze the problems of peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe rooted in coloniality.

Grosfoguel (2007:19) has the following to say about coloniality

One of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonization of the world. This led to the myth of a ‘postcolonial’ world. The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the same ‘colonial power matrix.’ With juridical-political decolonization we moved from a period of ‘global colonialism’ to the current period of ‘global coloniality.’ Although ‘colonial administrations’ have been almost entirely eradicated and the majority of the periphery is politically organized into independent states, non-European people are still living under crude European/ Euro-American exploitation and domination. The old colonial hierarchies of European versus non- Europeans remain in place and are entangled with the ‘international division of labour’ and accumulation of capital at a world-scale (Grosfoguel, 2007:19).

In light of what Grosfoguel reveals about coloniality it is important that liberated territories do not allow colonial patterns of power that survived the end of colonialism to continue to bind them to the former colony to the detriment of peace and development. Coloniality should be dismantled through the pursuit of decoloniality for peace, unity and reconciliation to be achieved among ex-colonized peoples. Decoloniality responds to Fanon (1968) who challenges independent African states to look for a way out from the modern/colonial hell as they pursue peace and development.

Decoloniality should be conceptualized as any action or thought from the subalternized, colonized and marginalized that understands colonial difference. It is directed at dismantling the modern colonial world which created the present system of coloniality and manufactured an asymmetrical world order that privileges the global capitalist North while exploiting the Global South. To Mignolo (2013) it is different from imperialist modern colonial thinking that conceptualizes issues from a western liberal perspective. It is concerned with the dismantling of relations of power and conceptions of knowledge that foment the reproduction of racial, gender, and geo-political hierarchies that came into being or found new and more powerful forms of expression in the modern/colonial world (Maldonado-Torres: 2007).

Decoloniality operates in the realms of power, knowledge, and being. The starting shot in the battle for de-coloniality is to overthrow hegemonic modern/colonial Euro-centred epistemologies so as to achieve cognitive justice. Grosfoguel (2013:89) argues that decolonizing structures of knowledge can be made possible by acknowledging the prevalence

of epistemic racism and universalism in the current global epistemic structures. He suggests the introduction of epistemic diversity as a way of liberalizing knowledge and producing pluriversality within the knowledge domain. There is a need to shift the geography of knowledge, to switch angles from which we rationalize, idealize, conceptualize and perceive things from the hegemonic Western Europe and America to the Global South (Maldonado – Torres 2007:262). This may be achieved through epistemic disobedience (Mignolo 2013) and what Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986) refers to as the decolonization of the mind. They argue that there is a need to reject imperial epistemologies and to turn away from the colonial epistemic path. This is after a realization that the colonized subaltern is still trapped in a cocoon of colonialism and colonial/modernity as a result of partly and persistently referring to Mudimbe’s colonial library.

Departing from the imperial colonial epistemology liberates the subalternized from Eurocentric knowledge. It allows the underprivileged marginalized peoples of the Global South to comprehend articulate and address issues from a subaltern perspective. Alcoff (2007) argues that it is because of a lack of understanding of the subaltern’s way of life and thinking that has culminated in the West employing what Mills calls “epistemologies of ignorance” to deal with problems in the Global South. The West’s failure to understand the nature and dynamics of conflict among the subalternized peoples has resulted in them prescribing peace and reconciliation models unsuited to the context.

It is because of epistemologies of ignorance that the US failed to resolve the crisis in Somalia in the 1990s and fuelled the Zimbabwean crisis in the new millennium. Decoloniality permits the employment of epistemologies of the subaltern to address challenges faced by peoples in the marginalized parts of the world as they are more likely to understand the context and realities of problems experienced in the South. It also allows for the deployment of decolonial epistemicides to kill persisting colonial/modern knowledges that obliterated indigenous knowledge values that were crucial to societal unity and peace (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2012a). It is therefore critical for the marginalized to employ decolonial epistemicides to abolish the persisting colonial/modern knowledges.

In an article entitled *Nathaniel Manheru: A Lowbrow Bedside Operator*, semiotician Dinuzulu Mbikokayise Macaphulana argues that when colonialists came to Africa, they found the indigenous people with their many gods and they replaced the many gods with one God. They found them with many languages and they sought to replace the languages with

one language. He goes on to cite Lewis R. Gordon who has written that when colonialists came to Africa they found many knowledges and sought to replace the knowledges with Eurocentric knowledge. Where colonialism found multiplicity it replaced it with an imperial singularity. In light of this logic it is critical that we decolonize knowledge to preserve multiplicity of our cultures, identities and indeed languages (*Newzimbabwe.com*. 5 January 2015).

Concomitant with epistemic disobedience that Mignolo and Ngugi wa Thiongo advocate for is the crucial need to decolonize language in decoloniality because it is in language that space is created for the development of thought. According to Mignolo (2007) coloniality privileged the languages of the conquering European races while marginalizing indigenous languages of the conquered. Today the subalternized ex-colonized subjects are viewed as incapable of producing anything pedagogically worthwhile as long as they are not producing it in European languages. Adopting and employing decolonial language is crucial to the transformation of relations and the production of a more just global epistemic structure as it permits the subalternized to penetrate and contribute to the production of knowledge, to critical thinking and to the resolution of conflict.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011a) highlights the importance of decolonizing knowledge when he argues that it privileges insights and knowledges cascading from the Global South without necessarily throwing away progressive aspects of Euro-American epistemology and the best of modernity. This allows the subalternized parts of the world to be rational generators of knowledge rather than mere consumers of global knowledge. He sees the decolonization of knowledge allowing the subalternized to speak from the vantage point of ‘colonial difference’ and to think from a subaltern epistemic location. To him, this allows for a clear subaltern locus of enunciation that enables conflict managers and peace builders to think from Global South

It should be noted that decolonizing knowledge is merely the beginning of a long process that seeks complete decolonization which also entails decolonizing power and being. The decolonization of epistemology precedes decolonization of the being. Decolonization of the being to Maldonado-Torres (2014: 30) is the liberation from the dominance of the euro-centred being, knowledge, power and politics. Maldonado-Torres (2004) argues that an ontological turn is required so that a rehumanization process can occur for the subalternized so that they perceive themselves as human and not what imperial powers ascribed to them.

The ontological turn allows for the restructuring of the topology of being in which the white race and the darker races of the world see each other as equals. This is invaluable to the establishment of a world that allows for the proper recognition of human difference and the rejection of exploitation, alienation, marginalization and oppression which is critical for peace, unity and development.

Grosfoguel (2007) argues that to decolonize the being, focus must fall on the locus of enunciation that is the geo-political and body-political location of the subject that speaks. The subalternized people of the world who despite having gained political independence but continue to articulate issues and think as though they are in Europe and belong to the white race must learn to speak from where they are situated both physiologically and geographically. Doing this does not only free the subaltern but also emancipates them. They are able to articulate issues from the perspective of the marginalized on the underprivileged darker side of colonial difference. This enables them to make effective interventions in peace-building, conflict resolution and development.

Such interventions to Mignolo (2007) do not only raise the doubted ontology of the subalternized but are also envisaged to result in the redrawing of the global cartography of power in pursuit of global justice and dismantling the existing coloniality of power matrix that privileges the North and under develops the South. They also have the potential to not only alter the terms but also content of conversation within global power relations, thus possibly paving the way for the racially inferiorized to push for the decolonization of the exploitative and oppressive metropolitan centre.

The current global political and economic relations between the North and the South are still imperial. The US, Britain and the EU dictate terms to the rest of the world via multi-lateral institutions they dominate. Their activities have choked the development process in much of the developing world and furthermore, their interference in the internal affairs of independent sovereign subaltern states has been the root of conflict. Thus the need to deimperialize prior to decolonizing power becomes imperative. The decolonization of power is in essence concerned with the pursuit of global political and economic justice and equality (Mignolo: 2013). It therefore behoves the Global South to exert pressure on Euro-American hegemony in an endeavour to check imperialism and loosen its grip on the global political and economic power structure that explains the absence of development and peace in the subalternized parts of the world.

Decolonizing the colonial matrix of power enables a view of the modern/colonial world that goes beyond the capitalist/ socialist binary. Alternatives to the hegemonic capitalist world system that has deposited underdevelopment and violence in many parts of the Global South appear in our field of vision. In the words of the Mexican Zapatista Liberation Movement, decoloniality seeks to eradicate imperialism by fighting for a world where other worlds are possible (Mignolo: 2007). In their world the Zapatistas notion of democracy is that "we are all equals because we are all different". This struggle by the Zapatistas is born out of the realization that there exist diverse alternatives to the modern/colonial world and there are many other ways of thinking other than the ones imposed on the world by Europe and America. The existence of alternatives to the modern/colonial world makes the decolonization of the colonial matrix of power a possibility.

Decoloniality should be perceived as an antithetical political and epistemological liberating project that seeks to unmask and resist coloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b). It calls for the ex-colonized peoples of the world to start perceiving themselves and the world in a different light. The ex-colonized are challenged and encouraged to reorder the world in a fashion that enables them to speak, think and act as equals in global interactions so that colonial matrices of power that define labour, power, culture and race are shaken to the ground. For this to be achieved, Mpfu (2013a:115) advocates for the deployment of attitudes and activities of rebellion against and refusal of coloniality in all its technologies of power, knowledge and being.

Decoloniality seeks to shake the very foundations of global imperial designs. Its mission is the decolonization of knowledge, power and being as well as those institutions that create the contemporary asymmetrical world order. Through decoloniality it is possible to explain how the coloniality of power, knowledge and being has contributed to conflict and violence in Zimbabwe. Decoloniality unravels how the global power structure has allowed colonial forms of domination to persist long after the end of colonialism in Zimbabwe.

Decoloniality allows us to understand that the authoritarian modes of governance employed in Zimbabwe are a continuation of oppressive colonial rule. Many amongst the current political leadership that is at the centre of generating political conflict in Zimbabwe are products of coloniality. They were born under colonial rule, schooled by it, oppressed by it, were brutalized by it and even fought against it. This militates against their effectively combating coloniality. They, by commission or omission, find themselves working in the

service of coloniality. A decolonial turn in Zimbabwe is therefore important if peace, unity and reconciliation are to be achieved.

Decoloniality also facilitates the unmasking of racism/ethnicism, oppression, and economic, knowledge and power inequities as global peace problems. As a thinking and perspective decoloniality inculcates ontological egalitarianism despite differences in race, religion, gender, wealth and power. It is in this space that the underlying causes of the Zimbabwean conflict can be addressed. Peace, unity and reconciliation stand a better chance of being achieved through decoloniality because it advocates for redistributive justice and the respect of human rights as key ingredients for the cultivation of a deeper form of democracy. Decoloniality should be seen as having the potential to establish a new economic and political system/order rooted in Zimbabwe's own culture, history, tradition and orientation that allow Zimbabwean subjects to cut the surviving colonial tentacles that are still clutching the country and thereby preventing it from attaining genuine and full independence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b). Mignolo (2007) buttresses this view by arguing that decoloniality advances the agenda of achieving peace, unity and reconciliation since it advocates for delinking from the colonial matrix of power. Delinking is to Mignolo decolonial epistemic shift that allows the marginalized to detach from the prevailing global matrix of power.

Mignolo (2007) identifies a process referred to as border thinking that closely relates to the concept of delinking. Border thinking is a product of the encounter between traditional communal thinking and modern global imperial designs (2011a). According to Escobar (2007:187) it entails thinking from the subalternized and peripheralized zones produced by western hegemony. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011a) articulates that border thinking springs from the experiences of those exploited and marginalized people living in the purlieu of the capitalist world order and who are at the mercy of its oppressive tendencies. It aims to de-subalternize knowledge by exposing how the subaltern perspective of the world is ignored and marginalized and how some epistemologies of the south have been contaminated by Eurocentric knowledge.

To purify this knowledge it is critical that we adopt border thinking as an epistemic perspective. That way we can be able to critique the structures of power from a decolonial epistemic perspective that acknowledges colonial difference since our knowledges, as argued by feminist thinker Donna Haraway as well as Mignolo (2000), are always situated in the geo-biographical politics of knowledge. The adoption of border thinking as an epistemic

perspective is valuable in the cleansing of this knowledge. The feminist thinker, Donna Haraway (1988), and Mignolo (2000), aver that our knowledges are always situated in the geo-biographical politics of knowledge. There is therefore a need to acknowledge our colonial differences and evaluate structures of power with such an appreciation in mind. The border thinking perspective thus enables such recognition.

Border thinking's main concern is harnessing and releasing epistemological energy generated in the South and directing it toward the transformation of the prevailing western dominated global capitalist system produced by modernity. This, Mignolo (2000) argues, can be achieved if a powerful epistemic response comes from the subaltern challenging the current global power structure that privileges the Global North and white race. Through border thinking the oppressed and marginalized can query hegemonic forms of knowledge from the subaltern. This in a way privileges new ways of thinking that can alter the terrain of our understanding and interpretation of the world around us so that we can develop innovative ways of dealing with problems. For instance, we could transform and reorient the subject of conflict and its resolution in Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa by encouraging the discussion of the issues from the perspective of the citizens experiencing the oppression and injustice and not from the perspective of the elite ruling class that inherited instruments of oppression, or that of the former colonial masters that seek ways of retaining control of former colonies.

Border thinking is enriched by *Ubuntu/hunhu* an African indigenous philosophy that emphasizes humanness and conceptualizes the life of the being as defined by relationships with other beings and that happiness and fulfilment is found in relations between individuals (Nabudere, 2008). The *ubuntu/hunhu* philosophy acknowledges the existence of one as a consequence of relations with others around them. This philosophy allows for knowledge nurtured and developed by relationships to be used for the betterment of society. In the *ubuntu/hunhu* philosophy one finds humanity's desire to share knowledge and use it for the development of mankind which is different from the Western liberal conception of knowledge as an imperial instrument of power, domination and control.

Ubuntu/hunhu is an anti-colonial paradigm that promotes epistemological liberation, epistemological parity and the restoration of African ways of knowing and producing knowledge that have suffered oppression and marginalization by the imperial western knowledge. The *Ubuntu/hunhu* philosophy provides space for African knowledge systems to seek solutions to problems that are peculiar to Africa and Africans therefore making it

critical for the achievement of peace, unity and reconciliation. All in all border thinking challenges imperial Euro-American epistemologies and versions that seek to explain and understand modernity.

In close association with the concept of border thinking is the notion of transmodernity that Dussel (2001) refers to as the establishment of a horizontal global system that corrects the evils of domination and exploitation found in the vertical modern colonial global power structure. According to Escobar (2007) transmodernity is a term coined by Dussel to refer to a project for overcoming modernity not simply by negating it but by thinking about it from its underside, from the perspective of the excluded other. Transmodernity imagines a fully decolonized world beyond the current Euro-American centred modernity. Like border thinking transmodernity encourages subaltern thinking as a route towards the rejection of universalism and the promotion of diversity and equality of races. It argues that if the different races of the world were to interact on an even global political and economic landscape then a more peaceful world could be created through overthrowing capitalism, patriarchy, imperialism and coloniality which have been the bane of the quest for world peace.

According to Grosfoguel (2013, 2009) solutions to the plethora of problems bedeviling peace and reconciliation can be found in a transmodernity that calls for the pluriverse and rejects universality of solutions where only one prescribes solutions for the rest. To him, diverse subalterns must speak and provide solutions to the European centred modernity and coloniality. He illustrates his point by advancing the argument that western women cannot impose their notion of liberation on Islamic women. Westerners cannot impose their notion of democracy on non western peoples (ibid). Embracing transmodernity in the Zimbabwe situation can go a long way in educating conflict managers that solutions to the crisis can be found beyond the euro-centric prescriptions imposed by the British, Americans and the EU.

It has been noted that the failure to engage in border thinking, to shift the geography of reason and adopt transmodernity and epistemologies of the South among other decolonial actions explains conflict and the absence of peace in Zimbabwe and most of the ex-colonized Global South. The study of the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe strengthens calls for the adoption of decoloniality as it enables us to erase and cross the abyssal line, engage in border thinking, promote epistemologies of the South, reject universalism and adopt diversity and pluriversality, highlight colonial difference,

decolonize the mind and epistemologies, embrace transmodernism, engage in epistemic disobedience and shift the geography of reason. These are some of the pathways through which Zimbabwe's peace and development could be achieved.

Decoloniality also permits us to visualise and identify the invisible matrix of coloniality and to plot ways of extrication from its entanglement and entrapment. It does not only expose the negative ramifications of a western dominated order that subalternized the population of the Global South but also unmasks the consequences of replicating and modifying coloniality despite the end of juridical-political rule within independent states of the developing world. This way we are able to analyse challenges to peace and development not only from without but also from within. This makes decoloniality critical to understanding obstacles to peace, unity and reconciliation.

2.6 CONCLUSION

This section discussed the concept of coloniality, its contours, and its appropriateness as lenses through which to examine Zimbabwe's search for peace, unity and reconciliation. It also examined the applicability of coloniality and reasons why decoloniality should be used to analyze the obstacles to peace and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. Through a range of examples the chapter tried to explain how coloniality is a source of conflict in Zimbabwe and lies at the centre of the challenges to peace, unity and reconciliation. Our concern should be about how peace and reconciliation processes could be designed to surmount obstacles placed by coloniality. These problems include domination, the lack of social peace, economic inequity, political instability and ethnicity and racism. It remains to be seen how far the concept of coloniality can illuminate peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe. The next chapter provides the historical background to the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 3

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONFLICT AND PEACE ISSUES IN ZIMBABWE – 1830s to 1977

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter uses decolonial epistemic perspective to provide a historical brief on Zimbabwe. It surveys pre-colonial conflict, the colonial wars of conquest and the establishment of colonial administration. It discusses structural violence experienced by Africans under colonial rule which gave rise to the African nationalist movement. Thereafter it discusses confrontation between the African nationalists and radical white nationalism that culminated in the war of liberation. Finally, the chapter examines the series of negotiations held in attempts to resolve the Rhodesian Question up to 1977. It should be highlighted that the chapter is not merely a narrative of historical facts but uses them to explain historical events that impact on the search for peace, unity and reconciliation through the lenses of coloniality.

3.2 CONQUEST AND DOMINATION

The search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe comes against the backdrop of a long history of violence that dates back to the pre-colonial period. In the 1830s, Zimbabwe experienced violence when the Ndebele fleeing the *mfecane* (violence in Nguniland, South Africa) crossed the Limpopo River onto the Zimbabwean plateau where they fought and defeated various Shona chiefdoms. They established a powerful military state in the south-western part of Zimbabwe and assumed supremacy over other polities. Relations between the Ndebele and Shona were largely cordial but occasional Ndebele raids for cattle, women, grain and children brought tension between the two groups that continues to manifest in various forms in post-independence Zimbabwe.

On the 12th of September 1890, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) occupied Mashonaland in the north of Zimbabwe. In the psyche of European imperialists a non European region was regarded as empty or nearly empty of people, hence conquest and settlement by Europeans. Those living there were seen as barbarians or lesser beings and therefore without rights to own the land (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2012a). British imperialism was accompanied by the shift from the Cartesian notion of *cogito ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am) to the paradigm of war informed *ego conquiro/ego conquistus* (I conquer, therefore I am)

which legitimized conquest and violence against Africans (Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 245). The occupation of Mashonaland was followed by victory in the Anglo-Ndebele war of 1893. The BSAC occupied Matabeleland and acquired full control of the country which it named Rhodesia. To ensure that Matabeleland was completely overrun each member of the invading force was promised six thousand acres of land anywhere in Matabeleland, twenty claims in the goldfields and a share of the booty, half of which would go to the company and the remainder to be divided among the officers and men (Martin and Johnson, 1981: 46). The resort to violence by the settlers meant that the African masses would have to regain their land by using similar methods at a later time. To him, the question of land distribution was to become one of the thorniest single issues in Zimbabwean politics (Moyana, 1984:66).

The violent colonization of Zimbabwe in the 1890s was part of British imperialist plans driven by a conviction that they were epistemologically and ontologically superior. The British saw themselves as the “first race” in the world, duty bound to colonize the territory and bring “civilization”, Christianity and light to a “dark” continent inhabited by “barbaric savages”. They were inspired by the pseudo-scientific doctrine of Social Darwinism that espouses survival of the fittest and differences between races. The white conquerors viewed themselves as stronger and saw the conquered Africans as weak and therefore meant to be colonized by the strong.

The Africans were unable to fathom the loss of land as well as the loss of political and economic independence and decided to revolt against settler rule between 1896 and 1897 in rebellions known as the Chimurenga I /Umvukela I. They were in fact decolonial uprisings against nascent colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2013b). The first to rise were the Ndebele in March of 1896; they were incensed by the presence, arrogance and brutality of the Shona police who were stationed in Matabeleland to preside over them. The Ndebele regarded the Shona as their former slaves and thus treated the Shona police with contempt. The deployment of Shona police amongst the Ndebele population apparently gave the Shona the impression that they were a superior social/ethnic group. The stationing of Shona police in Ndebele country was not only designed by settlers to divide and rule the Africans but to also socially classify them in line with the coloniality of being. The effect of these colonial actions was the souring of relations between the Shona and the Ndebele, therefore sowing seeds of future conflict between the two ethnic groups.

The revolts were brutally crushed by the Britain in operations characterized by a disproportionate employment of force against Africans. The Ndebele were the first to be defeated. A peace settlement was reached at the Matopos Hills in October of 1896 between the Ndebele chiefs and Cecil John Rhodes who represented the British. Under the agreement that was in fact dictated, the Ndebele were given assurances that they would be given security and adequate land to grow their crops and graze their cattle, and a fair and dignified dispensation in the peace. Rhodes promised to buy all the land in the vicinity of the Matopos for Ndebele settlement and promised that none of the land would ever be disposed. In return the Ndebele pledged their loyalty and to end the war. The terms of the agreement were however violated by the settlers leading to the expropriation of Ndebele land (Ranger: 1999).

The Shona insurrection came in June of 1896 and by the end of 1897 the rebellion had been crushed. To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012b), overcoming African resistance was perceived as pacifying savage tribes resisting modernity. Unlike with the Ndebele, the Shona were not offered peace terms. Most defeated Shona chiefs and warriors in the north-east of the country were not even offered the indignity of surrender but were instead hunted down like animals and killed. The hunting of African chiefs and warriors like animals was informed by the coloniality of being that made violence on the African appear as sport.

The pacification of the Shona and Ndebele groups permitted the British to establish a brutal, oppressive, exploitative colonial system of administration that discriminated against blacks. It taxed them, forced them to work and also coerced them into lowly paid contract labour. To the settlers, the defeated Africans were Manichean and had to be placed at the bottom of the colonial socio-economic and political hierarchy. They were seen as an ontologically inferior race constituted by lacks and deficits. The coloniality of being sought to keep the colonized Africans covered and subjugated. They were indoctrinated into believing that they were an inferior and unwanted racial group. In essence a racialized colonial administration that unleashed violence on blacks was established. Racialization to Grosfoguel (2004:326-327) is the process through which groups, particularly the hegemonic self group, use cultural and/or biological features/criteria to create a hierarchy of superiority and inferiority among collective social actors. Not only was society racialized but also structured based on Christianity, Western education; ethnicity, patriarchy, gender and economy.

Santos (2010) and Fanon (1968) view the colonized blacks as having been classified in the zone of non-being at the bottom of the social structures and thus targets of racism. To

Grosfoguel et al (2014), global coloniality was being reproduced at the periphery. European settlers regarded Africans as primitive objects who had not developed any writing system and with no history, and therefore were not worthy of human rights. It can thus be noted that coloniality arises from the colonial encounter from which colonial society is then structured and classified on the basis of race, ethnicity and labour in pursuit of strengthening and advancing modernity.

In Africa, prior to colonization land was conceptualized as something inseparable to existence but after colonization the white race introduced the concept of land as a commodity (Martinot: undated). This led to the indiscriminate expropriation of land by the settlers. Across the length and breadth of Zimbabwe Africans were pushed through legislative reform or force into poor lands with infertile soils and insufficient rainfall, which came to be known as reserves while the whites, took the best lands. The Africans that were disenfranchised of their land and living in the reserves created a large pool of cheap labour for the settlers' farms, mines and developing urban centres.

Various pieces of legislation were passed to deny Africans rights and freedoms that could permit them to contest for economic and political power. Of particular note in this respect was the 1930 Land Apportionment Act. This led to a further loss of land and serious poverty amongst Africans who were peasantized and proletarianized while the whites basked in affluence. The result of this was the development of socio-economic and political disparities between whites and Africans which became a source of conflict both under colonial rule and in independent Zimbabwe. It should be highlighted that some of the European colonizers had been deemed undesirable elements in Europe but upon conquering the indigenous people of Zimbabwe they assumed an important status and began to dispossess Africans, some of noble status, of their land. The new social class that the whites occupied reflected shifting designations associated with the coloniality of being and power that accompanied colonialism.

In colonialist discourse and thinking dispossessing Africans of their land and designating it as private property of white settlers and the opening up of Zimbabwe for economic exploitation and settlement for whites was seen as development. In the mindset of the white settler colonialist it was development to deprive Africans of their modes of life and production and to force them into joining the evolving capitalist one in which they were viewed as subaltern persons compelled to participate primarily as sources of cheap labour (Ndlovu-Gatsheni:

2012b). According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014) coloniality and racism were driving forces of the colonial state that enabled colonialism to produce what Mamdani (1996) termed bifurcated social formations inhabited by ‘citizens and subjects.’ Settlers were regarded as citizens and included in the imagination of the colonial state while the indigenous Africans were seen as subjects or natives and excluded. The “settler” and “native” binaries were later inherited as relations of difference and became sources of conflict (Mpofu: 2013a). Rhodesian colonialists denied the Africans an opportunity to unite into a majority identity by fragmenting them into various antagonistic tribes and minorities (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2012b). Where and when it was convenient the settler banded together various fragmented tribal groups such as the Kalanga, Tonga, Ndebele and Shona amongst others and called them natives through a process one can term “tribal reductionism”. By depriving these groups of their different historical identities seeds of future identity-based conflict were sown in Zimbabwe.

For thirty three years, Africans were ruled by the BSAC until 1923 when the country became a self-governing colony of the British crown known as Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesians were given limited self government, they could elect a legislative assembly from which a prime minister and cabinet would be chosen but the British retained a veto on matters affecting local Africans and controlled foreign relations. Southern Rhodesia was therefore conferred with quasi –dominion status under the dominions office and not the colonial office in London (Martin and Johnson: 1981).

After being granted self- government the European settlers ensured that the African would remain tied to the colonizer through various pieces of legislation such as the 1895 law on Compulsory Identity Cards, Registration of Labour Act 1896, Private Location Act 1908, African Labourers’ Act 1911, the Land Apportionment Act 1930, Industrial Conciliation Act 1934 and Native Passes Act 1937(Moyana, 1984; 66). These pieces of legislation were all instruments of oppression meant to entrench settler domination and intensify the exploitation of the African. In line with notions of coloniality of power and being these pieces of legislation placed the European in a position of privilege and power over the African and produced an aura that the white race was superior. Colonial legislation subalternized and dehumanized the African. For instance, the African’s humanity was questioned by legislation that demanded the compulsory carrying of identity documents. His identity and being would only be acknowledged upon production of identity documents. Failure by the African to have

his identity documents on his person resulted in degrading and inhuman punishment such as *sjamboking* (whipping). According to Grosfoguel (2007:214), denial of the humanity of Africans was based on misreading the African being as lacking souls, rationality, writing, history, civilization, development, democracy, human rights and ethics. Differential treatment of whites and blacks by the colonial rule fostered racial conflict in Zimbabwe.

According to Ranger (1985: 66) the Land Apportionment Act became the most important law governing land distribution in Rhodesia. It established the principle of possessory segregation between black and white and paved the way for differential agricultural production. The Act did not only keep the African population in a state of serfdom but also retarded economic development by preventing the majority of its citizens from active participation in the exploitation of its resources. Bhebe (1989:65) argues that this Act more than any other disenfranchised Africans, and to nationalists the Land Apportionment Act became the root of racial misunderstanding between Africans and Europeans. In 1969 the Land Tenure Act was passed. It entrenched the 1930 legislation by formally dividing the country's land into two equal portions: 45 million acres each for the Africans and the whites yet there were approximately 5 million blacks and 250,000 whites. The enactment of the Land Tenure Act was part of a hard-line shift in Southern Rhodesian politics that further strained relations between nationalists and the white minority government (Moyana :1984).

In 1953, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland combining three British territories of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia was formed. The latter had the largest white population and came to dominate the Federation. Salisbury the capital of Southern Rhodesia also became the capital of the Federation. Economically, Southern Rhodesia benefitted immensely as most industries and infrastructure were built there. The Federation fell apart in 1963 partly as a result of nationalist agitation for independence in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Soon after its collapse the northern territories were granted independence under black majority rule as the "winds of change were blowing across Africa". Southern Rhodesia was denied independence and reverted to a relationship with Britain which had existed earlier. This agitated African nationalists who increasingly became militant calling for black majority rule. Alarmed by this, white nationalism in Southern Rhodesia grew and white perceptions of rights to independence became stronger with the effect of blocking African aspirations for independence and thus setting the stage for future conflict (Sibanda: 1989).

3.3 COLONIAL STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

Direct violence was used by the settlers to conquer, suppress and pacify Africans. This type of violence alone was not going to be the best means by which to get the Africans to participate in the colonial political-economy. For the settlers to obtain the co-operation of the Africans indirect violence or structural violence was employed. Africans were dispossessed of their fertile land in areas of good rainfall and pushed into reserves. Not only were reserves characterized by infertile soils and poor rainfall, they were also far from transport and other forms of communication making it difficult for Africans to market their products and compete with white farmers. Relatively successful African farmers who had provided supplies to the early European settlers were pushed out of business. They faced competition from settler agriculture that was supported by government subsidies and loans obtained at favourable rates from commercial banks and other financial institutions. This kind of support was denied to African farmers by the colonial government. The success of African agriculture was also hampered by various pieces of legislation such as the Maize Control Act of 1934 that forced African farmers to sell their produce to the settlers cheaply while maize from white farmers was bought at lucrative rates (Martin and Johnson, 1981: 55). The loss of land and the creation of reserves economically disempowered the Africans. By 1961, a third of the land in Southern Rhodesia was held by Europeans who constituted a mere seventeenth of the population. Africans who could not leave the land expropriated by whites either became squatters, rent paying tenants or providers of labour for the settlers. Often the rents were unaffordable for most Africans who were forced to provide labour to the whites as the only alternative to avoid eviction from land (ibid).

The settlers imposed taxes as a way of obtaining African labour to work on the land. In order for the African to pay tax he had to find employment. Those that did not want to be recruited as forced labour were required to pay the tax. Africans that did not heed colonial advice to be monogamous had to pay a tax of ten shillings for each wife exceeding one (Arrighi: 1970). This was an assault on African cultural rights and a form of cultural imperialism. The plethora of taxes Africans had to pay drained African resources. Their failure to raise taxes created a large reservoir of cheap labour that was forced to take up contract work on white farms, railways or mines. Contract work terms were written in English which was not easily understood by semi-literate Africans resulting in them being exploited by white employers. Often the working conditions were harsh and characterized by long hours, poor conditions,

flogging and low pay. The consequences of breaching contracts were as severe as life imprisonment.

Wherever they went Africans were expected by colonial authorities to carry ‘passes’, specific identification documents for Africans. This pass system was used to control African labour and migration. The pass contained details of the district of origin of the African, the employer and length of employment. The pass system curtailed the Africans’ freedom of movement and association. In 1973 the African registration and Identification Act and the Vagrancy Act were enacted to control African job seekers and small traders in urban areas (Martin and Johnson, 1981:61). If an African left employment without the permission of a white employer they were to be arrested and returned to the employer. Africans who refused to engage in contract labour or could not pay taxes were forcefully driven into forced labour camps by colonial authorities. The difficult existential conditions created for inferiorized Africans was actually the coloniality of being naturalized through the pass system, forced labour, taxation and other pieces of legislation that objectified the African.

To bolster labour supplies native commissioners and the police often raided villages for young men. Chiefs and headmen were expected to co-operate with colonial officials in this exercise (Moyana: 1984). Those that failed to assist were humiliated by being subjected to public flogging before their subjects. This action diminished the authority of chiefs and headmen. The beating of chiefs and headmen not only devalued the ontology of the traditional leaders but also denied the African humanity as they were treated like animals. In the psyche of the bigoted colonizer the only language that the dehumanized and racialized African understood was that of the *sjambok*. The being of the African was seen as detached from the body. The infliction of pain on the body was justified on this basis. Through the coloniality of power the colonizing whites became a law unto them and unleashed various forms of violence on the African. Santos’ (2007) concept of abyssal thinking is useful for an understanding of colonial violence. Africans were labeled savages in the zone below the abyssal line and therefore deserved to be treated in the most brutish way by the human whites. Designation of animal-hood to Africans made it easy for the colonizing whites to unleash violence on them. This was in furtherance of the coloniality of being.

White supremacy was at the core of colonial society and culture. Traditional African authority was either supplanted or eroded by colonial authority which was modeled along western undemocratic lines of domination and subjugation. No longer could chiefs allocate

land. Judicial power previously held by the chiefs was taken away by the colonial legal system. Chiefs and headman were barred from trying serious criminal cases like murder. Gradually Africans disregarded the authority of traditional leaders. They began to perceive traditional law and customs as primitive and to treat traditional leaders with disdain to the detriment of social cohesion and peace (Moyana: 1984).

African custom and achievements were denigrated while celebrating and glorifying exploits by the whites. African culture was frowned upon, polygamy was discouraged and considered unchristian. Traditional African religion came to be regarded as superstition and diabolical, in its place Christianity was promoted. Colonialism allowed the assault on African culture to leave the European in a position of social and cultural superiority. Apparently under colonial rule the whites measured the African's proximity to humanity based on levels of education and depth of Christianity. An African rich in the above was considered to be ontologically denser than one without, thus closer to humanity but was never considered to be in the zone of being; the ultimate marker of humanity to the whites remained race.

Africans that could not stomach the oppressive conditions in the reserves fled to towns or other urban centres where they found conditions were no better; wages were low and working conditions poor. Employment was scarce in urban areas as evidenced by the fact that by 1977 only 15 % of Africans were in wage employment (Martin and Johnson: 1981). Legislation such as the Masters and Servants Act of 1901, the Public Services Act 1931 and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934 placed a number of restrictions on Africans in employment and privileges on whites. Racial segregation in employment assigned office jobs to whites while the tough menial jobs were mainly left for the blacks. The few office jobs that were given to blacks were only meant to serve the colonial system such as clerical work, teaching and nursing. There was a huge wage gap between Africans and Europeans, where whites and blacks did the same job the whites were paid more. The assumed racial inferiority of the colonized driven by the colonality of being, implied that they were not worthy of equivalent wages.

African workers had no social security and they also worked long hours for small wages under unhealthy conditions with little or no safety devices or protective clothing. There was no minimum wage for Africans while employment in agriculture, mining and domestic service for Africans meant exclusion from trade union activity (Martin and Johnson,

1981:59). Exclusion from trade union activity made it difficult for Africans to organize themselves to fight labour injustice. The Law and Order Maintenance and Emergency Powers Act (LOMA) (1960) worsened the situation as it made it an offence to incite strike action in essential services. Such action could result in imprisonment for life or death. This Act did not only restrict the African labour movement but also the African nationalist movement. A number of African trade unionists and nationalists were incarcerated under this law which remained in existence until Zimbabwe's independence (ibid). Under this Act it was difficult to communicate and broadcast African grievances against the colonial system because African political work was prohibited. Colonial structural violence masked and normalized the abominable existential conditions Africans were exposed to.

Urban life for the African was difficult as it was associated with crime, prostitution and other social ills while whites lived in luxurious, spacious and safe suburban environs. After work the Africans went home where they lived in squalid conditions of overcrowding and poor sanitation and ventilation. They were often harassed in their living quarters with frequent night inspections by the police who checked on the miscellaneous such as levels of cleanliness and "illegal" visitors, often relatives. Under colonialism one notes that the existential conditions for Africans living in the zone of non-being was hellish (Fanon, 1968). They were subjected to such appalling working and living conditions because they were seen as a subaltern group undeserving of the privileges that were enjoyed by the colonizing white race. The fear produced by colonialism was a mode of violence intended to cow the African into docility and thus made it easy for the Europeans to dominate and oppress them.

The post-World War Two boom that transformed socio-economic life in Rhodesia did not extend benefits to the Africans who remained marginalized and poor. So stratified and hierarchized was society under colonial rule that to Mlambo (2013:241) there were, in fact, two Rhodesias made up of citizens, white Rhodesian – politically and economically powerful, and enjoying full rights of citizenship and subjects, and those derogatively known as natives who were subject to a special type of jurisprudence known as "customary law" which was not applicable to whites. Drawing from Maldonado-Torres (2008), in these two Rhodesias the white colonizers or community of masters had absolute power over the life of the colonized African. Their abuse of the African was not accounted for since they were considered to be outside the realm of the human.

To Mignolo (2009:72), race lies at the centre of coloniality as an epistemic structure dividing and ranking human beings according to their ontology. In Rhodesia, like in other European colonial territories, race legitimized the structuring of society along language and colour. The most influential social and economic positions were reserved for white English speaking persons while dark skinned non English speaking persons were marginalized. European immigrants were ranked at the top of the social order, coloureds and Asians occupied the middle order while the indigenous dark skinned people were placed at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Fanon (1952:83) amplifies on this classification by stating that ‘the black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man’. It was the dark skinned African who bore the rough side of colonial marginalization more than any other race. The lives of the blacks were to Mignolo dispensable. Their ontology was devalued under colonialism and this justified their engagement as forced labour. It is the nature of coloniality to reproduce itself at various levels. Among the indigenous ethnic groups in Rhodesia the Shona and Ndebele were given pre-eminence while other African groups such as the Chewa, Nambya and Tonga were marginalized.

In the health sector the colonial system favoured whites ahead of blacks. Separate healthcare facilities were established to take care of the different racial groups. The best health care comparable to that provided in Europe and America was reserved for whites while Africans had to endure poor health services. There were more doctors and health institutions for the minority whites than they were for Africans. According to Martin and Johnson (1981:63) in 1971 there was one doctor for 45 556 Africans in rural areas, and in 1976 there was one hospital bed for every 1261 Africans compared to one bed for every 255 whites. The national health budget was skewed towards providing more services for the minority whites at the expense of blacks. Blacks often had to seek curative treatment for preventable conditions and diseases like malnutrition, infections in the respiratory system, the gastrointestinal system, skin, eyes, and scurvy; diseases associated with low standards of living and poverty (ibid).

There was also discrimination in education where separate schools for whites and blacks were established. Educational institutions for blacks were underfunded and under equipped. White education was well funded but only ten pounds per child was allocated to African education. Under the 1907 Native Education Ordinance, education for the blacks was mainly left to missionaries and Africans themselves. It was meant to create an African that would be a humble and subservient subject to serve the colonial system. In 1930 education was made compulsory for white children but these rights were not extended to blacks till 1980. There

was also a bottleneck system where a limited number of Africans were allowed to advance into tertiary institutions (ibid: 57). This system of education did not create equal opportunities for blacks and whites. The white race came to possess better qualifications which enabled them to obtain better and higher paying jobs ahead of Africans. In addition, the educational curriculum was designed to enable Europeans to control the African.

Still in education, knowledge and knowledge production came to be dominated by the whites. Colonialists employed what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2010) calls “epistemicide,” that is, the extermination of knowledge and ways of knowing. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012b) argues that the teaching of history from a Eurocentric perspective were epistemicides meant to obliterate Africa’s glorious past. The generations- long and trusted indigenous knowledge was discarded, marginalized and eradicated and replaced by colonial western oriented knowledge through a process Mignolo (2009) refers to as epistemic colonialism.

Politically, under colonial rule Africans were not effectively represented because of the existence of a qualified franchise system and restrictions on voters. There existed a separate voters rolls, “A” for whites and “B” for blacks. Africans did not earn much, had little education and owned little in property and thus could not be effectively represented. This forestalled many from running for political office or qualifying as voters. The white race was given greater representation in parliament because they were a better educated and propertied group. The structurally uneven nature of colonial society bred and incubated violence. The African, who was othered, impugned and discriminated, itched to hit back at the colonial system that denied him space for growth and development.

It has thus been demonstrated that the hellish existential conditions Africans experienced under colonialism cannot be understood outside structural violence. The structural violence the Africans had to endure under colonialism falls neatly within the realm of the three pillars of coloniality. Patterns of power between the colonizer/white race on the one hand and the colonized/black race on the other hand allowed the former to permeate and order the lives of the latter economically, culturally, socially and politically, thus sowing seeds of conflict. Although there was no war between blacks and whites at the time, there was not any unity and sustainable peace; what prevailed was negative peace. The oppressive and discriminatory existential conditions Africans had to experience were a form of violence. There might have been no fighting but the relations between Africans and whites were laden with latent conflict on the verge of rapture. The exploitation, poverty, land alienation, socio-economic inequities

and political injustice experienced by Africans under colonial rule were forms of violence. Injustice with regards to land more than any other issue became responsible for generating political consciousness among the African population that realized the futility of attempting to better their lives without political power. The land issue led to political awakening of every class and came to be the dominant theme in the 1960s and 1970s war of liberation, the Second *Chimurenga/Umvukela*. By responding to structural violence through direct violence the African nationalists denied claims by the Rhodesian premier Ian Smith that he had “the happiest Africans in the world” (Martin and Johnson).

3.4 NATIONALIST STRUGGLES

The 1950s and 1960s were a period of mass mobilization beginning with the formation of the Southern Rhodesia African Nationalist Congress (SRANC) and ending with the formation of ZANU in 1963 (Bhebe: 1989). Earlier masses had been mobilized to protest against colonial injustices such as the Land Apportionment Act which legalized white seizure of African land. The attitude of these movements ceased to be protest against the government. Sibanda (1989:47) states that a more qualitative change in the goals, organization and strategy occurred for the first time in the SRANC that included Joshua Nkomo, James Chikerema and Joseph Msika amongst its leadership. They challenged the repressive colonial superstructure and its supportive discriminatory legislation. Africans now sought to replace the white minority government with majority rule. This was unlike in the 1920s and 1930s when the African struggle was reformist in character. Africans had not sought to change the regime but had sought participation, respectability and representation within the overall framework of a racially hierarchized colonial political economy.

In 1960 the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed and its leadership was almost similar to that of the SRANC. The NDP was militant. It engaged in civil disobedience and demonstrations which were a manifestation of nationalist anger and violence rooted in the difficult existential conditions of Africans created by coloniality. The Rhodesian government banned the NDP on December 8, 1961. By 1962, the NDP had been reconstituted under the name Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and was led by Joshua Nkomo, Leopold Takawira, Robert Mugabe and Ndabaningi Sithole among others. Its goal was to include fighting for the removal of the racist Rhodesian state and establish a democratic state based on one man one vote.

In 1963 ZAPU split, resulting in the formation of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1963. Various theories and explanations have been advanced to account for the 1963 ZAPU split. Meredith (2002:28) is of the opinion that the roots of the ZAPU split were located in Nkomo's alleged political blundering and inept leadership. The NDP under Nkomo's leadership was in 1961 invited by the British to a constitutional review conference in Salisbury. Under the proposed constitutional deal nationalists were to get 15 seats out of 65 parliamentary seats and majority representation was expected in the distant future. Instead of outrightly rejecting the proposals that would have postponed majority rule for several decades Nkomo initially accepted them before having a change of heart (Martin and Johnson: 1981). The white minority government took advantage of Nkomo's apparent initial acceptance and slow action to repudiate conference resolutions and adopted the proposed constitution as law. Through this action Nkomo lost the confidence of his colleagues who perceived him as indecisive and inept.

Confidence in Nkomo further plummeted when he made a decision to travel the world seeking international support at the expense of organizing his party. Some of his colleagues in ZAPU criticized him for adopting a political strategy of paying much attention to international diplomacy and constitutional change while neglecting the need to build a mass organization. They also accused him of being extravagant, opting for the luxury of foreign travel while leaving the party in disarray at home. To his critics, the plan to establish a government in exile instead of pursuing the struggle within was cowardly, ineffective and futile. Some members of the ZAPU executive like Sithole, Mugabe and Malianga also accused him of dictatorially running the party and thus plotted leadership change (ibid).

Joshua Nkomo in his (1984) autobiography accuses his subordinates of scheming against him because he was from the minority Ndebele tribe. He argues that Shona speaking members of ZAPU led by Leopold Takawira were uncomfortable with a person from the small Ndebele tribe leading the nationalist struggle in a country where the Shona are the dominant ethnic group. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009a:97) buttresses Nkomo's tribalism argument by arguing that nationalism just like colonialism re-tribalized politics and fragmented its supporters along ethnic lines. Independent Zimbabwe, he laments, has had to pay a huge price for this failure of nationalism.

When ZAPU broke up, initially the split was not along tribal lines, it had more to do with power dynamics as both Ndebele and Shona members were found on either side of the divide

and both drew supporters from the same Shona areas. One of the main plotters of the rebellion was Enos Nkala of the Ndebele tribe who Nkomo accuses of personally disliking him and holding a vendetta against him. Upon the formation of ZANU in 1963, Nkala remarked at a press conference “now I am going to see to it that Joshua Nkomo is crushed,” thus vindicating Nkomo’s assertion (Meredith 2002:32). Nkomo (1984) also alleges that the ZAPU fissure was externally influenced by Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere who wanted the ZAPU leadership to be more active within Rhodesia.

The 1960s ZAPU split was therefore a result of a confluence of factors. It had to do with administrative differences, tribalism, ambition, personality clashes, tactical differences, power politics and ideological divergences among others. The bottom line is that the split was acrimonious. The ZAPU fissure became a source of conflict during the liberation struggle and in the immediate post-independence period with the effect of negating peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe.

From its inception, ZANU distinguished itself from ZAPU and political parties before it by intensifying the use of violence against rivals. In his inaugural address, ZANU President Sithole stated that, “time for speeches has gone. This is now time for action in order to solve the problem facing us.” Quoting the Algerian nationalist leader Ben Bella, he stated that, “we must be prepared to die a little if need be” (Nyangoni and Nyandoro, 1979:65). The party implemented military training programmes which were firmly associated with the Chinese model and intensified the use of violence against the enemy. The party was also committed to a non racial, democratic, socialist, and Pan-Africanist state. The major goal was to liquidate elements of coloniality such as colonialism, settler rule, neo-colonialism and imperialism.

Ideologically, ZANU and ZAPU differed; the latter was influenced by the Africanist ideas of the Pan Africanist Congress in South Africa and Maoism while ZAPU was a disciple of Marxist Soviet philosophies. As the two groups competed for political high ground conflict became inevitable as armed youths began to roam the townships canvassing for support. Whenever party youths encountered each other violence would erupt characterized by petrol bombings of property and the burning of houses in both urban and rural areas. Sithole (1979: 38-39) states that a commissioner of police is reported to have described the violence as “almost a state of civil war”. This violence was motivated by the coloniality of power. Sachikonye (2011:3) amplifies this view by pointing out that the violence was a manifestation of latent aggression built into the colonial system. It was tutored to the

nationalists and masses by the colonialists who employed violence as a mode of governance. The resort to the paradigm of violence as a way of addressing political questions and attaining power became ingrained in the population and was to haunt Zimbabwean society in the future. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:4) opines that an understanding of how Zimbabwean nationalism emerged in opposition to a fundamentally undemocratic and violent colonial rule is critical for an understanding of the post-independence violence engulfing Zimbabwe.

The Rhodesia Front government responded to nationalist violence by banning ZAPU and ZANU as well as arresting the political leaders. Nkomo and other ZAPU figures were detained at Gonakudzingwa, a remote detention unit in the south-east of the country, while the leaders of ZANU were briefly held in turn at two similar units near Gweru, before being transferred permanently to Salisbury Prison on 8 November 1965 (Martin and Johnson: 1984).

From the above discussion it has been shown that the ZAPU split had a profound and lasting effect on the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe. The fissure planted seeds of conflict for future generations beginning with violence between supporters of ZAPU and those of the newly created ZANU party in the 1960s. It precipitated conflict between the military wings of both parties in the 1970s and was one of the principal reasons for the post-independence civil war in the Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces. The split also bequeathed a culture of violence where political parties have employed coercion in struggles for power.

3.5 THE RHODESIA FRONT AND UDI

The banning of ZAPU and ZANU did not stop African nationalists from expressing their disapproval of the white minority regime. They went underground and continued to demand self rule and the uprooting of racially structured colonial settler systems. They caused unrest by engaging in acts of sabotage on government property, white mines, farms and settlements. African nationalist activities coincided with a slump in economic growth in the 1960s. The economic crisis was so profound that there was even white unemployment for the first time since the 1930's (Bowman, 1973:35). These factors gave whites every reason to unite to ensure the permanent establishment of the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia. The factors actually radicalized white politics and nationalism. This unity was demonstrated by the formation of the right wing Rhodesia Front (RF) in 1962. To Grann and Gelfand (1964:234)

the RF was the first Rhodesian political party to mobilize whites into an effective political organization and to involve them in public policy decisions.

At its inception, the RF named itself a Front in an attempt to underline its interest in embracing as many participants as possible. The result was that the RF experienced rapid growth from an initial foundation membership of less than a thousand to nine thousand by December 1962 and eighteen thousand by December 1968 (Bowman, 1973:35). The reasons for its success include the fact that from the beginning the RF articulated issues, explicitly guaranteeing that it would ensure the permanent establishment of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia. As testimony to this, Smith, the RF leader, bluntly stated in the Rhodesia Herald (1964) that, 'If in my lifetime we have an African nationalist in power in Southern Rhodesia then we would have failed in the policy I believe in'.

In a bid to ensure that no African nationalist government assumed power in Southern Rhodesia, Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front went on to undermine all of the 1964 principles laid down by the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home;

1. Unimpeded progress to majority rule.
2. Guarantees against retrogressive amendment to the Constitution of 1961.
3. Progress towards improving the political status of Africans.
4. Progress towards ending racial discrimination.
5. Guarantees against oppression of one section of the population by another. (Hull 1978: 39).

The RF managed to establish solid linkages with a significant proportion of the white community. The success of the party was a result of it successfully managing to unite whites in Southern Rhodesia by promising the preservation of the Land Apportionment Act and the rejection of forced integration (Martin and Johnson: 1981:69). These promises were embellished in the coloniality of being as they sought to maintain the assumed racial superiority of the white race over the darker races.

The RF was determined to block African progression and majority rule that it saw as a threat to the racialized colonial structure that privileged the whites. One RF official commented;

We in Rhodesiaare determined to control the rule of African political advancement to power till time and education has made it a safe possibility to do so. Moreover we wish to have power to retard it, should that advancement outstrip the capability of the African

to govern wisely and fairly. We could not say 5,10,50 or a thousand years. It cannot be forced; it has to develop in accordance with the character and the nature of the African and his hitherto unapproved qualities of democratic behaviour (Skeen, 1966:59).

Another objective of the RF was to crush African Nationalist movements to ensure white survival in Southern Rhodesia. Smith remarked that,

If for a normal span of life for a man my age we can stave this thing off [nationalist calls for majority rule], then I believe we may stave it forever. And if as a government we fail to do this, then I don't think we deserve to be charged with the responsibility of handling the affairs of Southern Rhodesia (Rhodesia Herald: 1964).

The RF was therefore very clear about its long-term commitment to perpetual white rule.

The RF objective of maintaining white rule in Southern Rhodesia was threatened by the “winds of change” sweeping across Africa in the 1960s that were bringing with them new independent African led governments. It was alarmed and feared that if blacks, that it associated with a series of lacks and negatives such as corruption, dictatorial tendencies, one party state systems, incompetence and nepotism, would assume power in Rhodesia then advances made by the European race would be reversed. To prevent the establishment of African majority rule in Rhodesia the RF first banned African nationalist parties. Smith then decided to go against the “winds of change”. He vowed that “never in a thousand years would there be black majority rule in Rhodesia” and then on the 11th of November 1965 he announced the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). UDI meant that Rhodesia was no longer accountable to Britain as the colonial power with ultimate legislative responsibility for Rhodesia (Smith, 2001:65).

Smith and the RF represented a section of white supremacists intoxicated by the coloniality of power that believed that only whites possessed the necessary qualities to rule Rhodesia and were thus supposed to rule it. To them, quality leadership was associated with race. University education and Christianity were not enough for African nationalists to rule; race was the determinant. The African race was said to lack the requisite political acumen, knowledge and ontological weight to form and run a government. To the white supremacist RF party the blacks had not evolved far enough for them to govern a modern political economy. It argued that blacks had to be educated and prepared for governance before independence as if whites monopolized knowledge and knowledge production. To the RF, only the whites had evolved farthest to become beings fit for political leadership and the rule of Rhodesia. The ability to govern was seen as a quality possessed only by the white race and the rule of Southern Rhodesia was perceived to be the preserve of the white race. These

notions on governance and race reflect that Southern Rhodesian society was engulfed in coloniality.

According to Meredith (2002:36), apparently the British government had no qualms with granting independence to the white minority government in Rhodesia. Its misgivings were that African representation was not substantial enough for it to be granted independence. This reveals that even the British did not believe Africans were best suited to rule themselves. This task they were convinced belonged to the whites in Rhodesia who were however unwilling to make minimal concessions to Africans. The belief that the white race alone was ordained to rule was to set ablaze the flames of conflict in Rhodesia as Africans fought for their rights.

The rise of the RF and UDI set the stage for war with Africans, particularly after the RF introduced a new system of governance akin to South Africa's system of apartheid. ZAPU had in 1962 noted the radicalization of white politics and resolved that the only way to liberate the country against obstinate white rule was to use force (Martin and Johnson, 1981:69). It brought arms and ammunition into the country and sent out young men for military training and sabotage in preparation for war with the intransigent white minority regime.

In order to bring about the collapse of the Rhodesia Front government, Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, declared UDI an act of rebellion, thus illegal and imposed selective sanctions. On 19 November 1965, the UN Security Council Resolution followed suit, declaring UDI unlawful and passed a resolution to apply economic sanctions against Rhodesia as well as calling on Britain to end the rebellion. There were attempts to impose full sanctions on Rhodesia in the Commonwealth which were however thwarted by Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand (*ibid*). Their actions strengthened Smith's position and increased the likelihood of war. Despite being fewer in number these states were ontologically denser than the African, Caribbean and Asian states that outnumbered them in the Commonwealth. The sanctions which Rhodesia had to face turned out to be feeble given that some states like South Africa, Portugal, the US and British companies like BP Shell continued to trade with Rhodesia, frustrating efforts aimed at bringing peace in the country through economic processes. Besides, Britain stated that it would not use force against white Rhodesia for UDI. The British unwillingness to use force to bring Rhodesia to legality could also be interpreted as a sign that Britain did not think the cause of Africans was worth the sacrifice of white blood.

Besides, to Britain Smith's rebellion was not considered a threat as long as it did not shake the capitalist imperialist interests based on plunder, control and exploitation. The British decision not to use force in Rhodesia essentially gave Smith the blank cheque and set the stage for war between African nationalists and the white minority regime that was to span fifteen years. Only when Africans waged the liberation struggle did Smith's rebellion threaten capitalist interests that Britain determinedly began to seek a lasting solution to the Rhodesian question.

3.6 THE SECOND WAR OF LIBERATION

The Rhodesia Front's unilateral declaration of independence spurred ZAPU and ZANU to take up arms against the white minority government to reverse the illegal act and submit to the demand for majority rule based on one man one vote. Scholars are generally agreed that the nationalist armed struggle against white minority rule began in earnest in 1966, but from 1964 military preparations against the Rhodesian regime had already begun by both ZANU and ZAPU military wings. To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b), the Second Chimurenga/Umvukela or Second War of Liberation was a decolonial revolt against an obstinate colonial administration bent on perpetuating settler rule at a time most African states were being granted independence.

The existence of chasms between and within African political formations was a harbinger of tensions and conflict that was to bedevil the nationalist movement in the struggle for independence. Intense distrust and hostility characterized the relationship between ZAPU and ZANU military wings even as they prosecuted the liberation war. The antagonism between the two parties extended to their military wings, ZAPU's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and ZANU's Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). The two espoused different political strategies and military tactics and often criticized each other's *modus operandi*, thus compromising unity between the two. The two parties largely de-campaigned and spread divisive propaganda about each other with the resultant effect of polarizing relations between supporters. Save for a brief moment when the two armies fought as a united front as Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), the two forces executed the war separately and at times even fought each other. This state of affairs created fertile ground for the political rivalry to develop into ethnic conflict, thus retarding peace, unity and reconciliation prospects for Zimbabwe.

ZANLA operated mainly in the north and east of the country making use of the bases in Mozambique. Its strategy was based on Mao's guerrilla tactics. They believed in winning peasants' "hearts and minds" in areas they occupied. The area from which ZANLA operated and recruited was mainly Shona speaking and this explained the large Shona support that ZANU extracted. ZIPRA on the other hand preferred conventional warfare although at times guerrilla tactics were employed. It operated mainly from the Ndebele speaking south and western parts of Zimbabwe from which it drew most of its support (Martin and Johnson, 1981). Apparently, more than anything the patterns of recruitment and areas of operation of the two military wings determined the volume and nature of ethnic support given to the two parties. The war of liberation against colonial white minority rule re-enhanced tribal identities. The post-independence tribal schism that gripped Zimbabwe in the early years of independence is in part traceable to the form that nationalism took in its fight against injustices of colonial rule (Ndlovu-Gatsheni : 2009b).

The liberation war was pervaded by what Sithole (1979:1) refers to as "struggles within the struggle". He explains internal contradictions, disunity and divisions within and amongst nationalist movements as they fought to control the direction of the liberation struggle and positioned themselves for political office in an independent Zimbabwe. He begins by exploring the ZAPU-ZANU split discussed in the previous section. Thereafter he then generally discusses infighting within and between Zimbabwe liberation organizations, namely ZAPU, ZANU, and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLOZI), the African National Council (ANC) and the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front. Contradictions within the Zimbabwe liberation movement fomented further disunity and conflict amongst Africans both in the pre-independence and post-independence.

Violence and untold suffering characterized the war of liberation. Sachikonye (2011) discusses in detail the different types of liberation violence. He explains how guerrillas unleashed violence against the colonial forces, the white community and even the African population including headmen and chiefs they suspected of collaborating with the white minority government. Guerrilla methods of coercion caused fear and trauma in the population. One could be killed for not conforming to guerrilla instructions. Apparently the violence on the white public was racial and strategic. It was meant as a form of revenge and to instill fear in the settler government that had for a long time devalued African lives that Mignolo (2009) argues were seen by white settlers as bare and dispensable.

An atmosphere of insecurity pervaded rural society during the war as the civil population found itself caught between Rhodesian force brutality and guerrilla coercion. Guerrilla on guerrilla violence was also experienced within liberation movements. The 1970-71 ZAPU mutiny led by Mtshkhulu and the 1975 Nhari-Badza rebellion in ZANU unleashed considerable violence and led to the deaths of hundreds of guerrillas (Sachikonye: 2011). Sachikonye also discusses colonial regime violence where in seeking to contain guerrilla violence the regime forces used violence against guerrillas themselves and their collaborators. It collectively punished the civilian population for morally or materially supporting them.

The war of liberation divided Zimbabwean society along race, ethnicity, settlement and ideology. The war laid the bases for the adoption of and institutionalization of a culture of violence as the mode through which to resolve disputes. There was little accommodation and tolerance of divergence. Dialogue had no place in the resolution of conflict, the war situation created conditions in which brute force replaced systems of justice. The culture of violence nurtured during the struggle against colonialism war survived and has continued to be the way of resolving contradictions in the post-independence period.

For almost a decade and a half the war of liberation raged in Rhodesia. Despite brave guerrilla attacks the white minority government persisted partly because the coloniality of power ensured that the Rhodesia Front government received substantial funding from capitalist Portugal, South Africa, and multi-national corporations based in the USA and even Britain itself. These countries defied UN sanctions on Rhodesia as punishment for declaring UDI. Their intention was to protect capitalist interests in Rhodesia by ensuring that the white race remained in power.

On the whole the liberation war hurt both the African and the white community. As the war raged African nationalists and the Ian Smith's white minority regime decided to engage in negotiations to resolve the conflict. The next section discusses attempts at settlement between various parties to the conflict. It explains why they failed to reach agreement on problems bedeviling Rhodesia, and ultimately to end the war.

3.7 TALKING WITHOUT NEGOTIATING

Smith's white minority government used various strategies to resist regime change and frustrate transitional politics in the face of opposition from nationalist guerrillas, Britain, and the wider international community. Coercion was not the only instrument Smith used to

remain in power. The Rhodesian government's long survival in power also depended on skilful employment of divide and rule tactics, false promises, propaganda, devious diplomacy and political dexterity. Smith outmanoeuvred his opponents at the bargaining table, enabling him to maintain the illegal white minority regime in power.

The white minority regime managed to remain in power by courting the support of right wing governments and the local white community. It told them that that if Africans were to be given independence then the country would become a corrupt undemocratic one party communist dictatorship lacking skills, professionalism and expertise (Smith: 2001). Giving Africans power, he argued, would reverse advances made by western civilization through colonial rule. Some western governments and multinational companies believed Smith and decided to render him assistance. This enabled the Rhodesian Government to bust sanctions and other restrictions placed on it by the UN. The Rhodesia Front government also successfully rallied together the local white community against sanctions which it was able to withstand for almost a decade and a half.

Dialogue with various opponents was the other tactic employed by the RF to keep the white minority in power. To Mathews (1979:91), the RF engaged in talks with the intention of not reaching an agreement. Time and time again Smith gave the appearance of bowing to the necessity of reaching a compromise through negotiations with the British government (alone or in conjunction with the United States) and with African nationalists (collectively or separately). In each instance, however, Smith's negotiators disengaged from the talks at the last moment but without killing hopes for success in future negotiations.

The Rhodesia Front government tried to hoodwink Africans and the international community by engaging traditional chiefs. The government convened the 1964 Domboshawa *indaba* where it presented Chiefs and not African nationalist leaders as the legitimate representatives of the African people. This was not the case as the power and authority of the chiefs was exaggerated. Chiefs under Ian Smith were essentially salaried government agents. In exchange for their co-operation Smith rewarded chiefs handsomely, thus preserving his regime.

In 1965, Smith held talks with officials of the British Premier, Wilson. He managed to secure guarantees that Britain would not intervene militarily in Rhodesia in the event of the RF unilaterally declaring independence (ibid). The British decision against the use of military force to compel Smith to rescind UDI was in contrast with the British decision to send its

troops to bolster settler forces that ruthlessly crushed the 1896-97 Ndebele-Shona uprisings in Rhodesia. What this implied was that Britain valued the lives of the white race more than those of the blacks.

After Smith declared UDI, Britain imposed selective sanctions. In December it imposed full economic sanctions against Rhodesia which were to be renewed annually. Although Wilson had vowed not to talk to an illegal regime he changed his stance in 1966 under pressure from Commonwealth leaders who demanded British military intervention to settle the Rhodesian question. Wilson met Smith on the *HMS Tiger* off the coast of Gibraltar. In the talks, Smith rejected proposals to dissolve parliament, meaningfully review the constitution and surrender independence to Britain. Instead he maintained a qualified franchise and separate voters roll for Africans and whites banking on the fact that it was unthinkable for Britain to use force against its own kith and kin to force compliance. He also managed to get the British government to ignore a significant cause of the armed struggle, the absence of majority rule based on one man, one vote (ibid).

The 1968 *HMS Fearless* talks focused on Rhodesia's return to legality and the renunciation of the 1961 constitution. At the talks Wilson laid down the policy of No Independence Before Majority Rule (NIBMAR) which Smith rejected, thus ending the talks with no agreement on fundamental issues. Smith was under little pressure to cave in to Wilson's demands because during the talks Rhodesia was surprisingly coping with sanctions better than most had anticipated. It managed to do well because of import substitution and trade with South Africa and Portugal and with French, US, German, Japanese and Italian companies that defied UN sanctions. In addition, the RF government was containing nationalist guerrillas whose structures were in shambles (Smith 2001:145). Wilson and Smith were unable to end the war and foster peace and unity because the two perceived UDI as a problem between Rhodesia and Britain and had engaged in talks to the exclusion of African nationalists. Their decision to leave out African nationalists, an important stakeholder in peace process, militated against the chances of finding a solution to the Rhodesian question.

When Wilson failed to get Smith to reverse UDI, he abandoned the Rhodesian problem to focus on constitutional issues at home. In 1969, Sir Humphrey Gibbs resigned as Governor of Rhodesia just before a new constitution was brought into existence. The new governance charter was followed by a proclamation of a Republic in 1970. The RF was victorious in the

elections that year, sweeping all fifty roll “A” seats for the second time since UDI (Smith, 2003:152).

In 1971, Wilson revisited the Rhodesian issue. He dispatched his Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home to iron out an agreement with Smith which they reached in November. According to Hull (1978:40) this time the British proposals were accepted because they represented virtually total capitulation to Rhodesian demands. Under the agreement, the 1969 Rhodesian Constitution (which permanently denied Africans a majority in the House of Assembly) was to be modified. The African franchise was to be considerably widened, and provision for unimpeded progress towards majority rule made. A justifiable Declaration of Rights, to reduce discrimination and promote racial harmony, was also proposed, and a commission of enquiry was to be set up to look at the question of discriminatory legislation. In addition, British aid of £50m over 10 years was to be made available for economic and educational development in African areas and this was to be matched by the Rhodesian Government. The package was to be submitted to the Rhodesian people for approval, with a test of acceptability to be conducted by a commission appointed by the British government and led by Lord Pearce (Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Information Office, 1979:3).

Essentially, what the agreement stated was that there was to be increased representation for Africans in parliament but the Rhodesian government would not assent to majority rule based on one man, one vote. The agreement confirmed white minority rule indefinitely. The agreement revealed Smith’s political astuteness as it served to entrench white supremacy, while delaying immediate majority rule based on one man, one vote. Smith’s genius was that he could give the appearance of movement and momentum in negotiations without conceding anything of substance (Martin and Johnson, 1981:239).

The agreement reached by Home and Smith was put to the population to test acceptability via a commission established under Lord Pearce, a British judge. The Rhodesian government encouraged the population to accept the proposals while the African nationalists who had reorganized themselves and formed the African National Council (ANC) campaigned against the proposals. This was a temporal non political body headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, an African nationalist clergy man who had been requested by detained African nationalists under the banner of the ANC to negotiate with Smith on their behalf. Muzorewa however, had little influence over other nationalists and no control over guerrillas. When Pearce’s Commission finished its work in March of the year 1972 it published a report to the effect that the African

people had rejected the proposals. The proposals were turned down because fundamentally they did not alter the constitution as white privileges were protected and also because the principle of majority rule based on one man one vote was rejected. The Rhodesia government argued that the proposals were good and had been declined because nationalists and guerrillas had employed intimidation and violence on the people (Hull: 1978).

Muzorewa transformed the ANC into a political organization and approached Smith with a proposal to review the 1972 proposals. This action played well into Smith's strategy. He preferred to talk to nationalist leaders separately; this enabled him to sow seeds of division and to play one nationalist against another thus intensifying intra-nationalist conflict and dashing prospects of peace. In 1974, Smith signed an agreement with Muzorewa. The agreement signed in private merely granted an increase of African seats in the legislative assembly from 16 to 22 (Martin and Johnson: 1981). African nationalists were disappointed by the settlement as it fell short of guaranteeing majority rule based on one man, one vote as the basis of independence. The agreement was therefore rejected by the ANC central committee.

The Rhodesian government continued to talk to opponents separately, creating more discord within their ranks. In October 1974, Rhodesia and Zambia reached an agreement without the participation of African nationalist leaders. It was agreed that Zambia would freeze all guerilla activity in its territory and in return Smith would release nationalists who were in detention. The agreement between Lusaka and Salisbury was meant to discourage nationalist armies from continuing with the struggle. It intended to get the guerrilla leaders to abandon their calls for majority rule 'here and now' as this was viewed by Zambia as blocking Smith from coming to the negotiating table. ZANU rejected this call outright therefore frustrating efforts at peace. The exclusion of African nationalist leaders in the agreement between Zambia and Rhodesia caused misunderstandings between the nationalist leaders and the Zambian President, particularly ZANU which at the time was very active militarily and had ignored the ceasefire agreement (Sithole, 1978:17).

The 1974 agreement was followed by the Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity signed in Lusaka at the behest of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. The objective was to unite the various Rhodesian African nationalist organizations. Leaders of African nationalist movements, namely ZAPU, ZANU, FROLIZI and ANC agreed to unite under the United African National Council (UANC) and chairmanship of Bishop Muzorewa. The year 1974 is

significant in the discussion of the history of peace agreements and the search for peace in Zimbabwe as that was the year in which nationalist leaders were released from prison and joined their guerrilla armies in Zambia and Tanzania. It is also the year in which ZAPU, ZANU and the ANC agreed to form a broad umbrella body, the UANC. It was also the year in which there was an escalation in the war that prompted Britain and the US to push for a more plausible solution to the Rhodesian question in the form of the 1976 Kissinger proposals.

In 1975, Smith and Kaunda managed to get the Rhodesian government and an enlarged ANC to talk culminating in the Victoria Falls conference of 1975. The talks were not successful because of divisions within and between nationalist ranks. ZAPU refused to unite under the leadership of Muzorewa while Mugabe and Sithole were squabbling over the leadership of ZANU. As a result the nationalists were not able to wring anything from Smith who stuck to his stand of no majority rule. Muzorewa's UANC managed to get an audience with Smith. It requested that there be a constitutional conference attended by Britain and nationalist leaders but the talks did not take place after deadlock over the venue for the conference (Martin and Johnson: 1981).

Late in 1975, the British launched a new initiative to get the Rhodesian government to yield. Through the Zambian and South African governments the British alerted Smith that Nkomo was willing to negotiate. In 1976, Smith held talks with Nkomo to the exclusion of other African nationalist leaders. The understanding was to get some African nationalists to positions in the Rhodesian government, with Nkomo as Foreign Minister. Smith conceded to Nkomo what only a few months before he had refused to grant the ANC as a whole. Smith wanted to achieve a settlement, but only with Joshua Nkomo, whom he considered more moderate than the other ANC leaders. By dealing with Nkomo alone Smith divided the enemy camp and thus strengthened his own hand at the bargaining table (Mathews, 1979:104). Nkomo was accused of being a sell-out and was denounced by African nationalist rivals for agreeing to engage in talks which would not bring about majority rule based on "one man, one vote" and thus dismantle the racially hierarchized colonial state system.

Apparently, Smith would meet nationalists separately so that he would know what they were thinking. His tactics according to Martin and Johnson (1981:98-99) were to "seek alternative groups to the fighters to negotiate with, and over the years, Muzorewa, the Chiefs, Nkomo, Sithole, Chikerema and others were lured into this trap, with the result that their political

reputations suffered.” By dealing separately with African nationalists Smith was able to take advantage of the schism between his opponents to sow divisions among them so as to prolong the survival of his regime.

In 1976, an agreement was reached between the US represented by its Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger and the leaders of the Rhodesian, South African and Zambian government. Smith broadcasted to the Rhodesian nation that he had accepted the Kissinger proposals of January 1977. The proposals made provisions for majority rule in two years, conditional upon the removal of sanctions and an end to the insurgency. Smith announced that the Kissinger proposals also provided for representatives of the Rhodesian Government and African leaders ‘to meet immediately at a mutually agreed place’ to organize an interim government. The government was to be comprised of a Council of State with equal numbers of black and white members, nominated by their respective sides, and a white chairman without a special vote; and a Council of Ministers with a majority of African members taking decisions by a two-thirds majority. For the period of the interim government, the Minister of Defence and Law and Order was to be white and Britain was to provide the legislation for the process to majority rule. The establishment of the interim government was to lead to the lifting of sanctions and an end to all acts of war including guerrilla warfare. Substantial economic support was to be made available by the international community to stimulate the Rhodesian economy (Muzorewa: 1978; Zimbabwe Rhodesian Information Office, 1979:8, Martin and Johnson: 1981). In the talks, Smith managed to keep the fundamental problem of majority rule based on one man, one vote in the shadows. As a result, the African nationalists who had not been party to the talks rejected the Kissinger Agreement.

A few days after Smith’s announcement the Front Line States issued a statement calling upon Britain to convene a conference to work out the modalities for restoring peace and independence in Rhodesia. Britain responded positively to the call by the Front Line States and summoned stakeholders to a conference in Geneva. The commencement of the 1976 Geneva Conference raised hopes that a solution would be found to the Rhodesian problem. Massive support was given to these talks by many governments that included the US, Britain, South Africa and the Frontline states. There was dissension, competition and disunity within the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement, but the elements in it remained focused. They demanded majority rule based on one man, one vote and asked that the specific date for the final grant of independence be written into the agreement.

The Geneva document provided for;

a transitional government to be headed by an Interim Commissioner appointed by Britain, and a Council of Ministers with a substantial African majority. The Council of Ministers would have full executive and legislative competence, subject to the Interim Commissioner's reserve powers in certain matters (primarily external affairs, defence, internal security and the implementation of the independence programme.) These powers would enable the Commissioner to ensure a smooth transition to majority rule and independence. A National Security Council, presided over by the Interim Commissioner, would be responsible for defence and security and for ensuring effective government control of the defence and security forces. The Council of Ministers would implement the independence programme and work out a constitution. For this purpose it would appoint a constitutional committee presided over by the Interim Commissioner, and representative of the political groupings (Zimbabwe Rhodesian Information Office, 1979:9).

The proposals were accepted as a basis for negotiation by the Front Line States and by all the nationalist leaders. However, as the negotiations were being held the Rhodesian Government scuttled the process by including in the negotiations non essential detail and making claims that it had been misled by the governments of the US and Britain. It argued that it was rejecting British proposals on the grounds that they differed considerably from the Anglo-American proposals as presented by Kissinger. As an alternative, Smith hinted at the possibility of an 'internal' solution.

At the Geneva conference, just like at the Victoria Falls talks, Smith played on nationalist ambitions and rivalries. He was able to keep nationalists divided and continued to rule while undermining the efforts of the guerrillas by raising false hopes of a settlement (Martin and Johnson, 1981:99). Smith once again managed to wriggle his way out of an agreement that could perhaps have resulted in majority rule based on one man, one vote. He had once again managed to raise the hopes of the nationalists and the international community only to dash them at the last moment.

Revised Anglo-American proposals were tabled in September 1977. The Rhodesian government accepted the basic principle of Anglo-American proposals that enunciated the need for majority rule based on one man, one vote and independence in Zimbabwe in 1978. However, in order to save his regime, Smith rejected the mechanics for the proposed interim government that would have handed power to a British Resident Commissioner who would form a one man legislative authority for the interim period between agreement and the democratic election of a majority rule government based on universal suffrage (Sithole,1978:21). The African nationalists accepted the proposals save for the Patriotic Front (ZAPU and ZANU) that had misgivings with transitional processes.

Talks held in Malta from 30 January to 1 February 1978 between the Patriotic Front and British and American governments tried to reconcile the position of the Patriotic Front to the Anglo-American proposals. This drove Smith into trying to correct the failed mechanics of the Anglo-American proposals. He moved with speed and came up with a variant of his own that he wanted endorsed. He invited moderate African nationalists to participate in internal talks.

It has been observed that for the most part whenever Smith engaged in negotiations nothing of substance ever came out of them. He would agree to talks with the intention of scuttling them before the end in pursuit of his “never in a thousand years” declaration. The British told the US Secretary of State, Kissinger, that a lasting settlement was impossible with the Rhodesian government as long as Smith remained in office because he (Smith) was congenitally unable to settle (Martin and Johnson, 1981:239). It should be noted that Smith neither expected nor wanted the talks to succeed, unless he could obtain a favourable settlement, as he did in 1971 and in 1978, which assured the whites a dominant position. For the most part, he entered into negotiations to gain time, to deflect hostile action or secure positive support from outside, and to divide his enemies (Mathews, 1979:92). Smith employed delaying tactics with the hope that there might be a shift in the balance of power as that might aid the persistence of the white minority regime.

The RF’s intransigent and stubborn hold on to power was perhaps informed by the belief that the white race had brought “civilization and light” to the dark people of the African continent. To them surrendering governance to the African nationalists was tantamount to taking Rhodesia and white civilization back to the “dark ages”. Talks collapsed frequently because the white race would not allow blacks to take a position of power and dominance. Smith’s government would not accept proposals from the South on how to fix the Rhodesian problem as he viewed it as a constellation of societies that had embraced communism, dictatorship, the one party state systems, corruption and nepotism that threatened white interests and way of life and thus without the capacity and knowledge to bring peace to Rhodesia. Only when America actively involved itself in the Rhodesian crisis from the mid 1970s was the search for peace catalyzed. This reflected global coloniality’s great influence and leverage in decolonization. Kissinger managed to coax Smith into accepting the principle of majority rule based on one man, one vote which the latter had rejected for a long time.

This section discussed the various initiatives taken to resolve the Rhodesian crisis. It exposed Smith as a witty and wily negotiator who despite economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure managed to keep the nationalists, Frontline states, South Africa and Britain talking to him but without breaking through. It was more of talking without negotiation because there was no movement on Smith's part who for twelve years did not concede to the fundamental of majority rule based on one man, one vote. Smith's intransigence ensured that the white minority regime was able to prolong its stay in power albeit at the cost of peace and unity because while they were talking the war was raging. On the whole, the initiatives were important in that they kept the pressure on the Rhodesian Government and paved the way for a final break through that eventually came at the close of the decade.

3.8 CONCLUSION

The chapter provided the basis from which an in-depth exploration of the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe can begin. A brief history chronicling pre-colonial conflict and European conquest was given. This was followed by a discussion of how settler rule and domination exploited blacks while promoting white interests. The chapter also discussed the structural violence Africans had to endure which led to the rise of African nationalist movement that challenged the racially structured colonial system. To resist the Black Nationalist wave radical white nationalism developed, culminating in UDI. The failure by African nationalists to obtain meaningful concessions from the white minority regime forced the Africans to engage in an armed struggle against the RF government. Finally, the chapter discussed the various initiatives that were taken to end the war up to 1977. The next chapter examines the 3rd March, 1978 Internal Settlement. Under this agreement Smith yielded for the first time to majority rule based on one man, one vote that led to the creation of the "independent" state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT: TOWARDS PSEUDO- INDEPENDENCE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter broadly and critically examines the Internal Settlement of March 3, 1978, one of the modalities through which Zimbabweans sought to achieve peace, unity and reconciliation. It explains how coloniality permeated the peace agreement and the implications on the quest for sustainable peace and unity in Zimbabwe. The chapter begins by providing the background to the settlement. It explains how in the mid-1970s, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger and the South African Premier, Vorster, coaxed Ian Smith into accepting the principle of majority rule after applying economic and diplomatic pressure on his white minority government. This was despite Smith prevaricating and procrastinating on the issue of granting black majority rule for over a decade. The chapter examines nationalist bifurcation and fragmentation that resulted in Sithole of a ZANU faction, Chirau of the Zimbabwe United Peoples' Organisation (ZUPO) and Muzorewa of the UANC breaking ranks with externally based African nationalists like Nkomo and Mugabe while closing ranks with Ian Smith to negotiate what they considered to be a less painful decolonisation. The chapter then explores the motivations and aims of the various parties that eventually signed the 3 March Peace Agreement with Smith. Thereafter the chapter analyses the terms of the agreement, the work of the transitional government and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government that emerged from the concession.

4.2 BACKGROUND TO THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT

The Rhodesian Internal Settlement came against a backdrop of a history of failed peace overtures that tried to find a solution to the Rhodesian impasse dating back to the mid 1960s. Involved in the talks were various players in the Rhodesian conflict that included the African nationalists, the Front Line States, Ian Smith's white minority government and the governments of Britain, America and South Africa.

The 3 March 1978 Peace Agreement can however be immediately traced to Smith's loss of political leverage following the diplomatic onslaught on his regime by Vorster and Kissinger in the years 1974 -1977, a deepening socio-economic crisis generated by the war and an

escalation of the war by guerrilla armies. According to Day (1978:268-272) in 1976, Kissinger anxious to prevent the Rhodesian guerrillas setting up another Marxist state like Angola and Mozambique in Southern Africa, exploited South Africa's reliance on American economic and diplomatic support by cajoling Vorster into pushing the Rhodesian Government to grant majority rule. Although Vorster enjoyed power over the blacks in Africa, his powers in the coloniality of power were subservient to the powers of metropolitan states.

South Africa exerted great pressure on the Rhodesian Government to reach a political agreement with the country's African nationalist leaders. Under pressure from Vorster, Smith reversed his policy of the previous ten years of treating the nationalist leaders as dangerous criminals and released many from prison, Nkomo and Mugabe among others. Smith had no choice but to comply with South Africa's commands because of the demands of the coloniality of power. Rhodesia relied on South Africa for political and economic support. Since UDI in 1965, South Africa was Rhodesia's main ally in beating sanctions. Rhodesia's trade with the outside world was through South Africa. From early 1976 the only two unblocked rail routes from land-locked Rhodesia ran into South Africa. South Africa also helped pay about half of Rhodesia's defence bill, thus Pretoria could easily throttle the Rhodesian economy and war effort (ibid).

Vorster withdrew South African forces from Rhodesia in 1976, a time when the guerrilla war had become much more intense as one of the African nationalist parties, ZANU, was effectively making use of the vast border of recently independent Mozambique to significantly intensify the war against the Rhodesian security forces that lost twice as many men in 1976 as in the previous three years together (Hull: 1978). ZAPU, which operated from Zambia, had built up a well- equipped army of, possibly, 10,000 men, which, if fully committed to action, would have greatly increased the Rhodesian army's difficulties in defending the country. This danger to the white minority government persuaded Smith to move towards a formal commitment to black rule at the end of 1977 (Day: 1978).

According to (Hull, 1978:36), economically Rhodesia's GDP fell by 3.4% in 1976 with the government spending a quarter of its budget on defence. White emigration reached alarming proportions with a net outflow of over 10,000 whites in 1977, which was the worst since 1964. Against this backdrop, in September of 1977 Smith bowed down to pressure and

accepted the basic principle of the 1976 Anglo-American proposals that enunciated the need for majority rule based on one man, one vote and independence within two years.

Smith was however uncomfortable with sections of the Anglo-American proposals (discussed in chapter 3) that would have given authority to a British Resident Commissioner to possess legislative authority in the transition period. Radical African nationalists rejected the Anglo-American proposals and so did Smith who had misgivings about transitional issues. He took advantage of the rejection of the proposals by radical African nationalists and proceeded to persuade moderate African nationalists into negotiating a home grown solution with him.

In his solution Smith proposed the elimination of an outsider to oversee the transition. Instead of having a British Resident Commissioner in charge of the transition he proposed the establishment of a ruling council in which power would be shared on a rotational basis until black majority rule based on one man, one vote would be granted. Influenced by the coloniality of knowledge and power internal African nationalist leaders began talks for an internal deal at the end of 1977. They also agreed to an internal settlement to save their political careers in view of the fact that they had over the years been sullied, marginalized and compromised in the struggle for independence.

Mitchell (1992) views internal settlements as power sharing arrangements which involve internal leaders amenable to compromise reaching an agreement with the former oppressor while bypassing radical external leaders connected with the armed struggle and less amenable to compromise. These arrangements fall far short of providing a solid foundation upon which to produce true majority rule. Equally important, Mitchell identifies four main political roles for blacks seeking majority rule and independence, namely: armed struggle advocate; conciliator; nationalist proxy; and traditional collaborator. By the end of the 1970s decade Sithole and Muzorewa were seen by guerrillas and revolutionaries as fitting the profile of nationalist proxies, while Chirau was viewed as a traditional collaborator.

These personalities (Sithole, Muzorewa, and Chirau) were to Smith ideal candidates for an internally driven solution to the Rhodesia question. Smith was opposed to Marxist leaning armed struggle advocates, Mugabe and Nkomo, that he regarded as ontologically debased and therefore to be excluded from the internal talks. Smith was aware of the differences in policy and strategy that existed between internal and external leaders of the nationalist struggle and the tension that came with it. He was able to get the internal nationalist leadership at the table

by virtue of exploiting the differences between the two groups. The moderates preferred a negotiated settlement to end the war, unlike the nationalist revolutionaries that favoured a military solution to the conflict. To Smith, it was imperative to reach a settlement with moderates to the exclusion of radical nationalist leaders that sought to overhaul the colonial governance system. Moreover, settling with western oriented internal leaders was ideal in light of the Frontline states' decision to support only the pro- Marxist Patriotic Front. This decision was crucial in driving internal African leaders into Smith's hands.

Zartman in Preston (2004:65-66) emphasizes the significance of a mutually hurting stalemate and a mutually enticing opportunity for exit from conflict, also referred to as a "ripe moment", as important for the achievement of a peace settlement. He argues that "escalation" and "turning points" are crucial components for the generation of a mutually hurting stalemate. He defines escalation as a "significant change in the nature of the conflict in the direction of increased violence as distinct from a gradual intensification of conflict with no definable change in its nature." The turning point to him serves to reinforce belligerents' awareness of the futility of continued fighting. The sources of turning points can include an inconclusive defeat, a bloody stand-off that suddenly brings costs home, a loss of foreign support or an increase in foreign pressure and a shift in fortunes that weakens the stronger side or strengthens the weaker.

The above mentioned conditions prevailed in Rhodesia from the mid 1970s. The war was escalating and became undesirable to both Smith and the internal leaders of the nationalists. For Smith, it was economically costly while for the internal nationalist leaders it was politically taxing. The latter were losing political legitimacy and mileage to external leaders whose armies were gaining ground. The turning point in the war was when Vorster at the behest of America decided to abandon Smith. The loss of foreign support and increase in foreign pressure coupled with the intensification of the war by nationalist guerrillas served to reinforce Smith's awareness of the futility of continued fighting in view of huge costs the bloody stand-off was bringing at home. On the whole, by the end of 1977 Smith had grown weaker while the nationalists were growing stronger but could still not secure victory which compelled both parties to seek a settlement informed by Kissinger's package.

An internal settlement had by this time also become attractive for various players in the Rhodesian crisis as those involved in Rhodesian affairs had thus far proven incapable of resolving the problem. According to Sithole (1978:31) Britain was unqualified to negotiate

for the African people because she was external to the fundamental problem affecting Rhodesia and besides her authority for Rhodesia had been effectively liquidated by UDI. The South African government was also not the appropriate actor as it presided over an apartheid system inconsistent with democracy. Frontline states were guilty of bias in the struggle for independence as each state advanced its own interests. For instance, Zambia tried to impose Nkomo as the future leader of an independent Zimbabwe. Mozambique preferred Mugabe with whom it shared Marxist principles. Tanzania at first supported Sithole because in his early days of nationalism he had admired the philosophy of *Ujamaa* but shifted support to Mugabe for his radical Marxist thinking. The OAU saw the Rhodesian problem through the eyes of the Frontline states while the United Nations' take on Zimbabwe was influenced by the general interest of its member states rather than those of Zimbabweans. To Sithole (1978:33), these forces acted in their own interests and according to their own prejudices and suggested conflicting solutions to the problem. These contradictions in the colonial matrix of power left the local players in the Rhodesian conflict convinced that they were ideally placed to resolve the Rhodesian problem.

4.3 INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN THE 3 MARCH PEACE AGREEMENT

For a long time Britain, South Africa and the America had been trying to settle the Rhodesian problem in a manner that suited their own interests and not necessarily those of the Rhodesia Front. Smith realized this and concluded that the time had come for him to settle the Rhodesian question in a manner that suited Rhodesia Front. He facilitated the return of exiled moderate African nationalists and, after three months of negotiations, Muzorewa of the UANC, Sithole of the ANC and Chirau of ZUPO and Smith agreed to an internal deal to resolve the Rhodesian problem. The 3 March Peace Agreement, also referred to as the Internal Settlement, the Rhodesian compromise or the Rhodesian Constitutional Agreement, marked the first time that whites and blacks agreed to establish a power sharing government. The main objectives of the settlement were to discuss constitutional arrangements for the transfer of power to an interim government and the creation of the state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia based on the principle of one man, one vote and majority rule.

Ngara (1978) sees internal settlements as generally motivated by the desire to retain power and protect the interest of the ruling regime before losing more ground to their rivals. To him, they usually exclude radical elements preferring to engage moderate unpopular elements with more to gain than to lose. For Ian Smith and the Rhodesia Front the Internal Settlement was

designed to blunt the power of the nationalist cause and to put a halt to the war by offering Africans self-rule in a transitional government. It was a political counter insurgency strategy by the Rhodesia Front government that saw what it had perceived as a 'no win' war turning into a losing war as it was suffering increasing reversals to the guerrilla forces. Smith decided to hold talks with nationalists before more ground was lost so that he could negotiate from a position of strength and resist revolutionary political change that may have entailed having to completely handover control of government and the army to African nationalists, thus threatening the continuity of the colonial in the new arrangement. The Rhodesian internal settlement was therefore an ingenious plan by Smith calculated to abort decolonization by shielding the interests of the ruling white minority by seemingly handing over power to a black dominated government before guerrilla forces could sweep everything away.

To Mitchell (1992), the settlers had three broad objectives in agreeing to surrender political power to blacks. Diplomatically they hoped that by creating a coalition government with moderate African nationalists they would receive external recognition that would result in the lifting of sanctions and gain both domestic and international legitimacy. Politically, through the Internal Settlement, Smith sought to garner support from the African population that was experiencing severe hardships by bringing the war to an end. An internal settlement also gave Smith the opportunity to play blacks against each other and also intensify political and ethnic divisions that were blighting the struggle for independence. By bringing moderate blacks into government Smith intended not only to widen the gulf between guerrilla leaders and the moderate nationalists but also to blunt revolutionary changes to the *status quo*. To do this, Smith identified nationalist factions that had lost favour with either the Frontline states or guerrilla forces and lured them into a political deal with the hope of undercutting the Patriotic Front and at the same time have the political outcome securely under the control of whites (Sithole: 1999:151). Lastly, according to Mitchell (1992) an internal settlement with Muzorewa and others was to Smith also intended to strike a blow at the guerrilla war effort by causing disaffection and defection in and amongst guerrilla ranks. He hoped that when news of the 3 March Peace Agreement was to filter across Rhodesia guerrillas would be disenchanted and mortified leading to the termination of the war. While talks on an internal settlement were underway the Rhodesian army raided refugee camps in Chimoio and Tembwe, Mozambique, killing 3000 people (Martin and Johnson: 1981). The raid sought to create the impression that the Rhodesian army could crush the guerrilla forces. It aimed at giving Smith the leverage to negotiate from a position of strength.

An internal agreement with internal black leaders in favour of majority rule but against the guerrilla war was to Smith also a strategy of circumventing the British Government that had since UDI refused to grant Rhodesia independence. Through securing an internal settlement Smith wanted to send a message to the British that Rhodesians could settle their own affairs without British interference and input. In addition, to Day (1978: 272) an internal settlement to Smith offered better prospects of maintaining white supremacy in Rhodesia than the Anglo-American proposals. In their plan, the Rhodesian whites were to give up control of the government and the army to a transitional authority as soon as a cease-fire was to be agreed. However, in Smith's internal package General Peter Walls of the Rhodesian Army would virtually retain control of the military forces, thus safeguarding white settler power in Rhodesia. The RF also sought an internal arrangement that included but was not limited to; a justiciable Bill of Rights; an independent judiciary; neutral Public Service Board; a public administration free from political interference; guarantees relating to the payment and transmission of pensions abroad; dual citizenship; white representation in parliament. This to Sithole (1978:48) was merely the relinquishing of the shadow rather than the substance of power. In summation Smith and the Rhodesia Front saw in an internal settlement an avenue through which to retain the presence of the colonial after the accord.

Settling internally was attractive to the Rhodesia Front which was beginning to have doubts about the future of white rule against the backdrop of the rising guerrilla war and international isolation and condemnation of the UDI. An internal settlement was an opportunity to salvage something for the white minority. Smith was under the impression that Sithole and Muzorewa still had guerrilla allegiance and could convince the guerrillas to lay down arms. This was after Muzorewa had made Smith believe that he could stop the war once he was in power. Apparently Muzorewa was under the illusion that guerrillas would obey him since most guerrillas that had been recruited from 1974 onwards had been drafted with him as leader of ANC.

According to Hull (1978), by the end of the 1970's Smith's government notion of power had metamorphosed from the traditional political, economic and military control to the conception of power in terms of social class. It therefore sought through an internal settlement an alliance between the ruling whites and the more affluent Africans against the communist leaning emerging African working class. The whites were comfortable with an internal settlement because they knew that internal black leaders dominated by an intellectual bourgeoisie favoured the retention of the basic structure of capitalism. They saw them as

representing values acceptable to the white community and as a group more reasonable than the external African leaders that sought to establish communist/ socialist states.

The whites had little faith in Africans as custodians of future peace, democracy, stability and balanced economic progress and thus felt that only under strong white involvement in the future governance of the country could their interests be safeguarded. A deal with moderate black leaders was to the RF expected to lead to the placement of African nationalist leaders in the higher echelons of national governance while retaining a strong white influence in key institutions. It was to the RF the only way to maintain settler privileges while providing a solid buffer against nationalist liberation forces (Hull, 1978:37; Astrow, 1983:109; Smith, 1997:224).

Smith's main negotiation partner in pursuit of an internal deal was UANC's Muzorewa. He had from the early 1970s always favoured the transfer of power after negotiations as opposed to violent confrontation. The clergyman is on record as having said that "I will fight as a Christian and by Christian methods of non-violence ... I do not subscribe to the romantic and unhistorical view that the liberation struggle is won by armed clashes between forces of liberation and the colonial army"(Muzorewa, 1978:82). He was of the conviction that settlements arrived at through negotiations and mutual understanding were more stable than settlements reached after military confrontation. To him, the latter approach would leave a legacy of distrust on both sides, and feelings of injustice among the losers which could be a source of future conflict. In light of this Muzorewa preferred non-violent resistance as the principal avenue by which to achieve peace and decolonization.

Despite the rejection of the UANC by the guerrillas, the Frontline States and the OAU that elected to back the Patriotic Front (PF), Muzorewa still enjoyed substantial support within Rhodesia. Muzorewa was aware that Smith saw him as the key person with who to reach an internal deal as his UANC enjoyed a huge African following within Rhodesia. The internal settlement was therefore to Muzorewa an opportunity to outflank external nationalists and secure the preeminent position for the UANC in the future governance of the country. He even argued that by participating in the talks he was fulfilling the desires of ZAPU and ZANU that in 1972 had mandated him with uniting the people and bringing about majority rule (Muzorewa, 1978:94).

The UANC was composed of educated African intellectuals who held little wealth but saw an opportunity of acquiring wealth by filling the shoes of the retreating settler state. UANC

negotiators were restricted from making radical demands upon the Rhodesia Front by opportunities they saw to acquire economic and political power. According to Ngara (1978:344), during the time of the talks James Chikerema had just bought a £20,000 farm in the Zvimba area and was therefore perceived as having joined the white class which was exploiting the African masses, particularly the peasants. It appears as though the African intellectuals that negotiated the Internal Settlement were more interested in an elite transition instead of seeking radical changes to the socio-economic and political order.

The other party that was involved in internal talks was Sithole's ZANU. Sithole was deposed from the leadership of the main ZANU in a power struggle. He was accused of having denounced the liberation struggle and the commission of a number of political blunders. African nationalists and the Front line states turned against him. Upon his return to Rhodesia in 1977, Sithole abandoned the path of trying to achieve independence through armed struggle in favour of constitutional means. He turned away from the articulation of radical views and declared the war wholly abhorrent to him. Sithole as leader of ZANU thought that since he had commanded the war to start he could thus order it to stop (Flower: 1987).

Although Sithole claimed to be the true leader of ZANU it was apparent that he had lost the support of the guerrillas and control of the party to his more radical colleagues, Zvobgo, Tekere, Mugabe and others. Like Muzorewa he had not realized that political dynamics had since changed; only Nkomo and Mugabe of the Patriotic Front had the mettle to stop the war in the late 1970s. He was barred from seeing guerrillas in Zambia and Mozambique and was also rejected by the OAU. To Mufuka (1979: 440), Sithole was therefore no longer relevant outside Rhodesia which forced him to seek political relevance in Rhodesia via an internal settlement. His participation in the internal settlement talks was driven by the desire to reinvent himself and regain political importance and position himself for the leadership of an independent Zimbabwe. In light of having been rejected and humiliated by former partners and allies, he was prepared to co-operate with imperialism to advance his political career.

As has been cursorily highlighted above, Muzorewa and Sithole were not necessarily sell-outs that the Patriotic Front leaders perceived them to be and portrayed them as. The negative labeling of Muzorewa and Sithole was part of nationalist rivalries and ideological differences concerning the prosecution of the liberation struggle. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008a:88-89) the rivalry was not only rooted in philosophical differences but also strategic divergence. Moderate African nationalists saw in an internal settlement an opportunity to out-

manoeuvre the exiled nationalists led by Nkomo and Mugabe and not a chance to betray the nationalist struggle. He further argues that Sithole and Muzorewa were certainly not mere 'sell-outs' and 'neo-colonial puppets' any more than Mugabe and Nkomo were not mere 'puppets' of Frontline States, China, Cuba, or Soviet Union that combined to impose the Patriotic Front on them.

The other party that participated in internal settlement talks was Chief Jeremiah Chirau's ZUPO, an organization led by traditional leaders. The white minority government had from the 1964 Domboshawa Chiefs indaba managed to co-opt chiefs into political governance on the pretext that they were the legitimate representatives of the African people. The government managed to obtain co-operation from traditional leaders by making chiefs paid employees of the state and also by rewarding them with other benefits. ZUPO incurred the wrath of African nationalists and guerrillas who accused it of selling out because of this close relationship and collaboration with the minority white government. For instance, Chirau from April to December 1976 held the following posts; senator-chief in the Rhodesian senate, deputy minister and head of ZUPO. The latter post was gifted to him by the Rhodesian Ministry of Internal Affairs (Mufuka: 1979). Chirau was instrumental in the formation of ZUPO so that it could act as a pawn for Smith's regime as it dealt with radical nationalists. As a consequence of this ZUPO found itself maintaining a difficult existence and therefore sought legitimacy through the internal talks. Other than seeking legitimacy, ZUPO leaders were apparently interested in benefits that would come with being part of the envisaged interim government and rewards for agreeing to be used by Smith as a lever against Sithole and Muzorewa in the internal talks.

It is important to highlight that the personalities that led internal talks were products of coloniality or entrapped in coloniality. Smith was the son of a Scottish settler farmer who was apparently indoctrinated into believing that Rhodesians were a superior race, in fact more British than the British. Smith believed in a hierarchized and racialized society with whites at the top and blacks at the bottom. He declared that "never in a thousand years would there be black rule in Rhodesia" (Martin and Johnson, 1981). In spite of the oppression and racism in Rhodesia, Smith boasted that he had "the happiest Africans in the world" (Ibid). Chirau had a strong inclination towards cooperation with Europeans. He was awarded a medal for service in World War Two by the British and his ZUPO party owed its existence to settler interests. Sithole and Muzorewa were both Christian clergymen educated in the United States of America. This had a strong influence in the way they perceived the decolonization process

and dealt with western influence. In short, Smith, Sithole, Chirau and Muzorewa as subjects of coloniality were not likely to engage in decolonial talks to produce a decolonial settlement that Rhodesia direly needed to achieve peace, unity and reconciliation.

Although excluded in the internal talks, Britain, the United States and other capitalist states were extremely concerned by the development of events in Rhodesia. They did not support an internal deal that excluded the Patriotic Front. They feared that if the liberation forces triumphed in Zimbabwe against the internal settlement forces it would mean the end of the prospect of retaining a western foothold in the country (Ngara, 1978: 349). According to Astrow (1983:111-112), Britain and America wanted more time to create a more stable African government while retaining real power in European hands. He further states that imperialist interests were aware that an internal settlement would provide no long term answers, only a temporal gain for European settlers because African internal leaders were likely to make too many concessions that would leave too much power in white hands. This would be a future source of conflict and a danger to imperialist investments. The British and Americans preferred a negotiated settlement inclusive of the Patriotic Front that would deliver a majority government that would at least not be antagonistic to western interests.

Apparently the differences that existed between the British and Rhodesian settler imperialists were not over the exploitation of the locals but the manner and circumstances under which the Africans were to be exploited. The British preferred exploitation of Africans under the auspices of global capitalism and coloniality while the Rhodesia Front preferred to exploit Africans under colonial rule or under a weak puppet government. An internal settlement with moderate African nationalist leaders was likely to give birth to the latter while an all parties' concession was likely to produce a neo-colonial government apparently desired by Britain.

Talks for an internal settlement were held without the participation of the leaders of the Patriotic Front or the input of the Frontline States. The Patriotic Front regarded itself as the legitimate and rightful leaders of the Zimbabwe liberation movement. This claim was informed and influenced by the fact that they had the backing of the pro-socialist/communist Frontline States that resented settler capitalist interests behind an internal settlement. The Frontline States were also averse to an internal deal in fear that the resultant government could turn out to be an ally of the apartheid regime, thus blocking independence and black majority rule in South Africa (Ngara, 1978: 349).

The Patriotic Front and the Frontline States rejected internal talks as they felt that Smith's proposals did not offer substantial decolonization and full unfettered independence. They wanted Smith's unconditional surrender and power transferred to external African nationalists immediately. They were also totally opposed to a settlement with Smith as he was not to be trusted having proved intransigent and cunning in the past. In light of this the two sought to scuttle the talks by intensifying the war and ratcheting up diplomatic pressure against a settlement.

According to Smith (1997:271) Mugabe and Nkomo were invited to participate in the transitional government and were offered seats on the executive council in a bid to end the war but declined because of the support received from the Frontline States and the Eastern bloc that were seemingly obstructing efforts aimed at achieving peace. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008:90) however sees things differently as he argues that the pro-East Nkomo and Mugabe were excluded from the internal deal by both Smith and moderate African nationalists who sought to outmanoeuvre and render them irrelevant, thus thwarting their chances of assuming power.

Whether they were left out or not it should be pointed out that self interest may have been behind the Patriotic Front's exclusion from the internal deal. Day (1978:274) argues that because Mugabe had operated outside Rhodesia since 1975 he had little organized domestic support while Nkomo, although having a well-organized party within the country, was less popular than Muzorewa who had eclipsed him since the formation of the ANC. To undercut Muzorewa and other internal leaders, the Patriotic Front refrained from negotiating with Smith. They labeled moderate nationalist leaders as sellouts for electing to collaborate with Smith. The Patriotic Front desired power and saw guerrilla military victory, or the use of the leverage of guerrilla support to secure a negotiated settlement presided over by the British and the Americans. They saw a negotiated settlement with these capitalist powers that had lost patience with the Rhodesian inferno as guarantee of a place in the first independent African government.

By and large it has been noted that inclusion and exclusion in the internal talks was driven and informed by the coloniality of power. Parties that participated in the talks did so out of a desire to acquire power through an internal arrangement while those that did not take part sought power through the barrel of the gun or a broader negotiation forum.

4.4 TERMS OF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT

It was agreed that an Executive Council of four was to be created to take over the powers of the prime minister and run the interim government. Chairmanship of the Council was to be rotated among the four signatories during the transition period. There was to be a council of ministers composed of an even number of whites appointed by Smith and the other half split among three competing African delegations whose main task would be to assist the rotating chairpersons of the council. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011b) criticizes this arrangement as it gave the impression of political power- and authority-sharing between colonizers and colonized.

Under the provisions of the Internal Settlement the principle of universal adult suffrage was to be the basis of a new constitution for Rhodesia. It was agreed that the principle of separation of powers would be maintained and guaranteed under the new constitution. All personnel hitherto serving the present Rhodesian government were to be guaranteed their jobs and pensions for ten years. It was also agreed that there would be one hundred representatives in the proposed assembly, of which twenty-eight would be reserved for white legislators for at least ten years. The reservation of white seats contradicted the principles of majority rule and non-racialism as it entrenched white separate representation (Sithole: 1978). Both Sithole and Muzorewa railed against racial representation, arguing that it smacked of discrimination in an independent African state by maintaining an independent European community in an independent African state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011b:56-7).

The terms of the March 3 Agreement did not aid the decolonization of Rhodesia; rather they facilitated coloniality and the continuity of effects of colonialism. Smith was to remain as prime minister and the predominantly white Parliament was to continue to exist with the ability to block any new legislation or constitutional amendments and supervise the transition to majority rule. This meant that executive and legislative power enjoyed by whites under Rhodesia Front rule was to persist unaltered. The retention of Smith in government reflected the persistence in power of a regime regarded as the author of the constitutional mess and violence that engulfed Rhodesia. The allocation of posts to whites in the cabinet and parliament disproportionate to their population reflected the retention of white dominance in the new political dispensation. The idea of parity in the council of ministers in a country where there were two million blacks to one hundred thousand whites was an obstacle to full decolonization. The provision of the settlement placed whites above blacks in furtherance of coloniality of being and power and did not set Rhodesia on the path to majority rule. These

provisions were to come into effect on 31 December 1978 but the date was pushed forward to 31 May 1979. The clauses were to last for the life of two parliaments or ten years, whichever was longer (Mufuka, 1979:442).

Real power was not given to internal African leaders. This was evidenced by the fact that the white-dominated civil service, police and military structure was largely left intact. The agreement spelt out that there would be no nationalization of the economy or seizure of property in the Rhodesian economy and dual citizenship would be permitted during the transition period. Although the Internal Settlement provided for universal adult suffrage, Whites (including Asians and Coloureds) were to control 25% of the seats in the new assembly in a country with six million six hundred thousand Africans. They were also to have a blocking vote in critical matters that threatened their hegemony such as private property, defence, civil service, and the courts. By accepting the terms moderate African nationalists were in a way embracing the coloniality of power by permitting the continuation of imperialist and racist structures of power that the Zimbabwe liberation movement was fighting against.

The Internal Settlement just like legislation under colonial rule apparently gave whites greater political and ontological weight than Africans. By allowing white votes to be worth more than black votes the concession placed whites on a higher ontological pedestal than blacks, implying that they were superior to blacks and therefore deserved more political rights. The value of the white vote in proportion to the population was therefore made significantly more important than the black vote since one African had one vote yet one white person had the value of five to six votes (ibid).

Although planning a black government, the internal deal aimed at maintaining white power in the new state. The settlers retained control of the security sector that largely resembled a colonial force that operated along a colonial *modus operandi*. The Internal Settlement was able to secure settler interests while Africans were offered little protection against exploitation and injustice. The black majority government that was to come into power was to inherit colonial debts. These debts were odious as they were acquired in the fight against black majority rule. Courtesy of the Internal Settlement settlers were to maintain property acquired by virtue of conquest and colonial legislation and policies. There was no fundamental alteration to land ownership which was an obstacle to the pursuit of justice. Despite conceding power to African nationalists the settlers were still able to influence the

political and economic trajectory of the country. This did not come as a surprise as Smith had held the aces at the negotiating table.

The fact that Smith remained part of the new political set up on hand to offer tutelage on governance to the incoming administration reeked of coloniality. Apparently, Smith did not trust Africans with governance, nor could he fathom them fully in charge. He had little faith in Africans as custodians of future peace, democracy, stability and balanced economic progress. His refusal to relinquish key state institutions ran deeper than just an interest in retaining state control and power. It was tainted by the coloniality of being and knowledge. He also thought that African nationalists were ontologically and epistemologically incapable of running a modern capitalist economy. By staying on as part of the new transitional government Smith wanted colonial tentacles of power that guaranteed whites a pleasant and familiar way of life to remain attached to the new government (Smith 1997:224). On the contrary, Flower (1987) is of the opinion that had Smith disappeared too quickly it would have undermined white confidence, caused anxiety and uncertainty and left Rhodesia vulnerable to economic ruin and the prospect of conflict. But also contrary to Flower's view, Smith's refusal to retreat rendered the Internal Settlement an instrument to perpetuate neo-colonial relations and thus a reason for an escalation of the war.

To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011b:56), although heavily criticized, the Internal Settlement when measured "in terms of the moderate nationalist positions of Muzorewa and Sithole, founded on African bourgeois ideologies of legitimation, it was a great achievement. Measured also against Ian Smith's vow that there was not going to be majority rule in a thousand years, it was a great African stride" To him, it was not fundamentally different from the other negotiated compromise settlements that brought about transfer of power from whites to blacks in Africa. On the whole the Internal Settlement was enveloped in coloniality and ultimately intended to protect imperialist interests. In intent, it was all about the transfer of power from the white minority to the black majority regardless of its nature. This was seen in whites retaining control of critical state institutions that ensured the virtual survival and continuation of a racially structured colonial state. Moderate African nationalist leaders were co-opted into government but token changes were made to the constitution. The idea was to retain the confidence of the white people so that they could be encouraged to continue living and working in Rhodesia under conditions that resembled colonial rule albeit under black political leadership. Perhaps that explains why Smith remarked "we have now got majority rule but not majority rule based on colour" (Astrow, 1983:113).

4.5 FLAWS AND FAILURES OF THE INTERNAL DEAL

According to Mitchell (2004) internal settlements often fail because they are associated with fear and anxiety and often follow the pattern of ‘too little, too late’. Settlements born out of the context of desperation and rushed compromise are seldom durable and sustainable as they involve foregoing principles and positions. The Internal Settlement was doomed to fail because it was negotiated within the parameters of the coloniality of power. Internal African nationalist leaders agreed to the compromise even though it brought relatively minor changes as it was apparently the only way by which they could gain political power in light of having been discarded by the larger African nationalists block, the PF.

The character and composition of the team that negotiated the peace concession with the white minority regime were compromised by their being both products and subjects of coloniality. The African nationalists that negotiated the settlement were moderate intellectual bourgeoisie. They included the likes of Enerst Bulle, a university lecturer, Stanlake Samkange, an American educated writer and professor and Solomon Nenguwo, former principal of Schools. These representatives represented elite interests instead of those of the revolutionaries that sought to radically transform the colonial system. They were not keenly interested in taking over the power of the state, but sought inclusion in the nest of accumulation. Their interest in accessing state resources should be understood within the realm of the coloniality of power. This group made it possible for the continuity of colonialism as they identified with capitalism. According to Ngara (1979:346), it was behind this group of persons that capitalist and imperialist interests managed to hide and continued to exploit the newly independent country, therefore making it vulnerable to conflict and instability.

The internal African nationalist leaders were in essence a rag-tag of nationalists with varying goals that had been outwitted in “the struggles within the struggle” for Zimbabwe’s independence (Sithole: 1999). They lacked the necessary support to enable them to negotiate a credible internal deal and guarantee an end to the guerrilla war. This militated against their ability to bargain effectively with Ian Smith in the internal talks. As political outcasts internal leaders were desperate to regain political relevance through an internal settlement, making them vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation by the Rhodesia Front. Perhaps more important than the composition of the teams that led the internal talks were the leadership. Smith as a defender of colonialism, Muzorewa and Sithole as products of

colonialism and Chirau as a surrogate of colonialism were not the best personalities to lead and dominate peace talks in 1978 since their interests were inextricably bound to the dictates, desires and interests of coloniality.

It could be argued that the Internal Settlement was presided by coloniality of knowledge since it was epistemologically the brainchild of Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State, modified by Smith and presented to moderate African nationalists as the solution to the Rhodesian question. The conflict resolution paradigm employed to resolve the Rhodesian impasse was informed by foreign epistemologies bent on maintaining capitalist imperialist economic and political interests in the face of socialist/communist expansion. The solutions followed western capitalist modes of conflict resolution without taking into cognizance the uniqueness of the Zimbabwe situation and conflict. There was little home grown and local about the Internal Settlement, it was essentially a capitalist project that sought the survival of colonial situations that served the interests of both the white minority settlers and their agents, the moderate bourgeoisie black nationalists who claimed to represent the interests of the majority of the Africans in Rhodesia.

The exclusion of Britain and the US in the internal deal meant that these global powers could not use their influence to promote the acceptance of the Internal Settlement as a gateway to peace, reconciliation and unity in Rhodesia. Frontline states were also excluded from the internal deal and thus opposed. They used their influence at international forums such as the Commonwealth, OAU, UN and Non-Aligned Movement to sway the global community against embracing the new political arrangement in Rhodesia. The exclusion of a senior political figure from Matabeleland also made the search for peace and unity difficult as people from the region felt marginalized and unrepresented in the new political dispensation. This was vindicated in the April 1979 elections in which the predominantly isiNdebele speaking people of Matabeleland voted overwhelmingly for Ndiweni, a Ndebele chief who came in third in the polls behind Muzorewa and Sithole but ahead of Chirau, a member of the Executive Council in the Interim Government.

From the drawing board the Internal Settlement was calculated to safeguard white interests and maintain their control of the country through the construction of a class of neo-colonial rulers dependent on them. To Mitchell (2004) this strategy had worked successfully in former French and British colonies in the north in the 1960s where wars of liberation were not waged. By trying to superimpose a Euro-centred template used to grant independence to

French and British territories in the North in the 1960s through the Internal Settlement prospects for peace and unity were ruined in Rhodesia as radical African nationalists vowed to continue with the war for total independence. The plan also failed because the war had radicalized and revolutionarized the quest for independence to a point where guerrilla leaders were not willing to glibly embrace independence without any significant control and ownership of the means of production.

It should be noted that because internal settlements are generally exclusionary in nature they thus tend to be characterized by escalation of violence especially by those left out as they attempt to delegitimize and liquidate the internal concession. The 3 March, 1978 concession did not achieve some of its goals because it excluded the Patriotic Front. Chirau, a signatory to the 3 March Peace Agreement, later criticized the Internal Settlement for being exclusionist when he remarked that “*hapana nhaka inogarirwa vamwe vana vasipo*” (there can be no discussion of inheritance in the absence of other siblings) –implying that there could be no discussion of the future of Zimbabwe in the absence of externally based African nationalist leaders - the Patriotic Front (Interview with a retired ZANU PF ex- government minister: 14/9/2015). Chirau’s criticism of the settlement was perhaps driven by envy as Muzorewa had emerged dominant amongst internal African leaders of the Internal Settlement and upon the realization that the Bishop was the most popular of the internal African leaders.

Because the Patriotic Front was left out of the 1978 peace process, the Internal Settlement was unable to bridge the differences that existed between the major belligerents to the conflict. According to Mufuka (1979:449), on the one hand the Patriotic Front viewed Smith as a white supremacist bent on perpetuating white rule. It associated Muzorewa with the persistence of the colonial, imperialist interests and neo-colonialism. On the other hand Muzorewa and Smith continued to see guerrillas as communist terrorists. The Internal Settlement failed because it was unable to placate the Patriotic Front. Relations between the parties to the internal deal and the Patriotic Front remained antagonistic and hostile. The former desired to maintain the economic and political set-up while the Patriotic Front sought wholesome changes to the status quo. Neither the internal African leaders nor the Rhodesian Front could secure peace without the participation of the men who controlled guerrilla forces. As long as the gulf between the interests of the parties to the internal deal and the Patriotic Front remained divergent the achievement of peace, unity and reconciliation was always going to be difficult. The refusal by the Internal Settlement leaders to accede to the demands of the PF was informed by the coloniality of being. The new government was bigoted and

imperial in its attitude. It saw itself as righteous while perceiving the Patriotic Front as evil and immoral for not embracing the internal deal.

The achievement of an internal deal was not altogether a dark episode in the history of Zimbabwe. Despite the numerous flaws of the Internal Settlement Sithole and Muzorewa managed to wring out of the settlers something the guerrilla leaders had failed to do in over a decade of fighting and negotiations - a modicum of independence. The Internal Settlement surpassed all other previous negotiations, and stood as a very dramatic change that included majority rule, universal suffrage, non- racialism and a Bill of Rights (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008a:90). The 3 March Peace Agreement produced a settlement in which for the first time white and blacks agreed to work and govern together and eventually establish the state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia run by the first government of national unity on Zimbabwe's political landscape. It marked the end of overt white rule and the beginning of black political rule in Zimbabwe, and thus the agreement became a significant event in Zimbabwe's political history. Although the agreement lacked popular legitimacy, it was the first meaningful attempt to incorporate blacks into government- an important step in the search for peace, reconciliation and unity as it created hope where there was despair. There was always hope, as the war raged on it dawned on the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government that only a settlement endorsed by all political players in the conflict could bring lasting peace.

On the whole, as has been noted in this section, the 3 March Peace Agreement had many structural faults. Behind the smokescreen the edifice of the agreement had the foundational weakness in that it was produced within the bounds of coloniality. It therefore advanced coloniality and sought to bring transition without transformation. The results were elusive peace, false unity, illusive reconciliation and incomplete independence in Zimbabwe.

4.6 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, MARCH 1978 TO MAY 1979

On 12 March, the internal black leaders were sworn in as members of the new Executive Council and on 28 March they each nominated three black ministers to serve in the new ministerial council as counterparts to those whites already in office. The main objective of the interim government was to obtain an effective ceasefire with a safe-return policy for guerrillas. This was seen as important for peace and recognition (Muzorewa, 1978:261). Peace and recognition were however not achieved because the interim government was a creation of the Internal Settlement whose legitimacy was questionable. The absence of the Patriotic Front in the interim government meant that the guerrilla war would continue. The

Eastern bloc and the Frontline states increased military support to the Patriotic Front. Muzorewa and Sithole found themselves in an awkward situation in that they had to persuade guerrillas whose allegiance they did not command to lay down their arms yet at the same time as members of the transitional government working with the Rhodesia Front they were responsible for the continued defence of the country against guerrilla incursions.

Despite entreaties from Muzorewa and Sithole guerrillas refused to lay down their arms. Only 100 out of the 6000 guerrillas operating inside Rhodesia heeded the call to give up fighting (Hull, 1978: 42). Throughout the transitional period Smith continuously castigated Sithole and Muzorewa for failing to keep their side of the bargain of persuading the guerrillas to lay down their arms. The failure by internal leaders to halt guerrilla incursions prompted Smith to maintain the Rhodesian army onslaught on the guerrillas and peasants further compromising the delicate peace process. Nkomo and Mugabe fiercely challenged the legitimacy of the interim government. They felt that under the new arrangement the whites still held too much power. They urged guerrilla forces to intensify the war. The continuation of the war hampered the effectiveness of the transitional government which was unable to bring any fundamental change to the rural populace that continued to suffer as before.

Internationally the interim government also suffered from a legitimacy crisis. The West at first welcomed the March 3 Peace Agreement as "a step in the right direction" (Ngara 1978:349). Confidence in the transitional government was nevertheless shaken when Vance, the American Secretary of State, and Owen, the British Foreign Secretary, made it clear to Muzorewa and Smith that peace would be a hard call unless the Patriotic Front was included in any future Rhodesian settlement. Western capitalist states therefore refused to endorse the Internal Settlement. They argued that the internal deal fell short of offering African genuine independence. They preferred the handover of power to the more revolutionary Patriotic Front government that although Marxist in orientation would be forced by the dictates of economics to accept western aid and thus become a capitalist lackey subservient to the coloniality of power (ibid).

In a bid to strengthen their positions and secure the interim government against guerrilla forces, Muzorewa and Sithole, who did not control armies of their own, deployed auxiliary forces created by the Rhodesian police Special Branch. The main task of these armies was to counter guerrilla incursions, win over peasant support from the Patriotic Front and shield rural communities from guerrilla influence. They however evolved into Sithole and

Muzorewa's private armies numbering 10 000 by the end of the war (Preston, 2004:63). These new security units complicated the security situation as they increased the number of belligerents in the conflict, thus raising the specter of violence. They were unleashed on guerilla armies and their supporters. They embarked on campaigns of violence and intimidation. Their creation and activities added a new dimension to the war.

The interim government sought to foster unity by promoting racial integration and the incorporation of blacks in governance and state institutions. Programmes were put in place to promote the emergence of an empowered black bourgeoisie and racial integration. Blacks were permitted to buy houses and live in communities previously designated for whites such as Mount Pleasant in Harare. Muzorewa also began the process of Africanizing the civil service and other state institutions by absorbing more blacks. Despite these noble objectives the changes that the transitional government brought were piecemeal and did not bring the transformation that the majority black population of Zimbabwe had hoped for. Few blacks were actually integrated into government and the civil service and social relations were not radically transformed. There was not much change regarding racial relations under the transitional government, it was repetition without difference. Although the Rhodesia Front pledged to narrow the gulf between races during internal settlement talks it failed to see through its pledge as evidenced by the limited number of inter-racial social interactions under the interim government. Apparently the Rhodesia Front held on to the view that different racial groups had to be kept separate in the interests of peace and harmony (Muzorewa, 1978:81). This view was enforced by what Santos (2007) regards as abyssal lines that seek the division of people in distinct racial groups.

Although common interests brought together internal political leaders the alliance was blighted by numerous internal contradictions and disunity bred by the coloniality of power. The African nationalist leaders in the interim government competed for political preponderance and political high ground. Sithole worked against Muzorewa who he accused of trying to overshadow his fellow partners in the hope of getting white RF support. Muzorewa in turn accused Sithole of trying to hijack the struggle and to lay claim to guerrillas as his personal forces. Within the UANC, the dominant internal African party, all was not well; leadership differences ravaged the movement with Muzorewa's deputy, Chikerama, and his followers, frequently criticizing their leader's management of the party (Ngara:1978).

Although a transitional government that incorporated both blacks and whites governed, politically whites still retained a significant amount of power. Colonial laws such as the repressive Law and Order Maintenance Act and the system of justice in general remained in place. Byron Hove, the Co-Minister of Justice Law, questioned this state of affairs. He was also critical of the transitional government because racial discrimination still pervaded government institutions. Blacks still did not hold any senior posts in the police and there were wide disparities in the salaries paid to black and white officials working the same jobs. "I am aware", said Byron Hove, "that in this country the police force has been used as an instrument to enforce Rhodesian Front laws" (Mufuka, 1979:446). Having said this, the Muzorewa appointed Hove was asked by the white members of the transitional government to publicly apologize or face forced resignation. Co-justice minister Hilary Squires, the Chief of Combined Operations, General Peter Wall, and the Commissioner of Police, Peter Allum, all united in demanding his removal (ibid). He refused to apologize and was dismissed from his post as Joint Minister of Justice, Law and Order on 27 April by Chirau who held the rotational chair of the four-man executive. It was because of the coloniality of power that Chirau capitulated to these demands by the whites.

The UANC demanded his reinstatement and threatened to withdraw from the interim government if its demand was not met. When Hove was not reinstated the UANC was unable to carry out its threat. The fact that Muzorewa was unable to prevent the dismissal of Hove was evidence that white minority power had not been destroyed; Rhodesia was not on the path to full decolonization despite the Internal Settlement. Blacks had come to occupy political offices but had remained without political authority as they did not control the levers of power. This proves that the settlement protected the status quo of those public service bodies that supported the continuation of colonial patterns of power and relations. The Hove case demonstrated the force of the coloniality of power. The black government was not ready to dismantle the colonial system of government and left no doubt that whites were in charge in Rhodesia especially after undermining the credibility and position of black leaders in government (Flower, 1987:202).

The Byron Hove saga also glaringly reflected the workings of the coloniality of being. Whites were still regarded as ontologically denser despite political changes. The Co-minister of Justice, Squires, Police Commissioner Peter Allum and others still bore greater political influence than Muzorewa and other black transitional government officials who were far

senior to them on the political ladder but whose influence weighed far less than those of the whites when it mattered.

Martin and Johnson (1981:294) point out that after the Hove affair there was a decline in support for Muzorewa among those who had believed that the agreement was a sincere attempt to move towards genuine black rule, racial integration, unity and reconciliation. Hove's dismissal portrayed that the agreement was a sham where on the one hand Europeans signed an agreement to hand over majority rule and yet on the other hand any African who spoke against it was dismissed indicating that black members of the executive council were lackeys of whites. This attracted the wrath of guerrilla leaders who regarded Africans in the interim settlement as powerless sellouts and puppets of Ian Smith while others criticized the interim government as more concerned with gaining European confidence than reforming the colonial governance structure.

Instead of reforming colonial institutions and closing ranks with the generality of the population African leaders in the transitional period alienated themselves from African support in the rural areas. They threatened peasants that they would be barred from voting in the April 1979 elections unless they stopped supporting the guerrillas (Martin and Johnson, 1981:294). These threats reflect the manifestation of the coloniality of being in the interim government. African leaders were now thinking and speaking from their new situations of political power and new found wealth and status. Their locus of enunciation was now influenced by their new positions and interests in the interim government. They ceased to think like nationalists pursuing revolution but more like whites defending capitalist privileges. Although urban support for the settlement was high, the intense propaganda campaign against the Patriotic Front and the escalation of the war eventually converted many neutrals who ended up throwing their lot with the guerrilla struggle thus further alienating the interim government and corroding the transitional government's stability.

The awkwardness and weakness of the transitional government was further exposed after ZIPRA forces brought down Rhodesian civilian aircraft in September 1978 and February 1979. The events riled the white community both within and outside Rhodesia, prompting the still white commanded Rhodesian army to launch retaliatory attacks into Zambia and Mozambique. This action revealed that all of the transitional government leaders could not deal with guerrilla incursions and that the black internal leaders were unable to restrain

Smith. Power remained reposed in white hands despite political changes that incorporated blacks in government.

Rhodesian army attacks on guerrilla camps in retaliation for the ZIPRA downing of a Rhodesian aircraft also showed that little had changed in the mentality of the Rhodesian army even though it was now under an interim government. The swift retribution was specifically motivated by the desire to avenge the loss of white lives. These lives apparently were seen by the white controlled Rhodesian army as more valuable than those of blacks who were also dying in rural Rhodesia in their hundreds at the hands of guerrilla forces yet operations were not being conducted to avenge their lives. According to Preston (2004), the raids into Zambia and subsequent attacks on ZANU bases in Mozambique virtually guaranteed Nkomo and Mugabe that the guerrillas and international community would not bless the internal arrangement.

During its tenure the transitional government produced a constitution for the future state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia which was to be run by a government of national unity. Each party with seats in parliament would be represented in government in proportion to the number of seats won. White representatives were to be elected on a constituency basis while black representatives were to be drawn from the party that would win the most votes in a particular electoral district. The Rhodesian white population constituted less than 5% of the population but was to hold twenty-eight seats in a legislature of one hundred people. This was to leave whites with influence disproportionate to their demographic status in the new state, therefore perpetuating colonial situations that privilege the white race over the darker races.

Furthermore, a referendum on the new constitution on January 20, 1979 was only reserved for the white population who voted for it. There was however no referendum to ascertain African opinion on the same constitution (Sithole, 1999:152). The African population was denied the right to decide how they wished to be governed while whites were given that right. Separate voters' rolls were to be used in elections for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. This was against the principle of equality between races and humanity. Whites were given special treatment as though they were superior to other races as was the situation under colonial rule. This differential treatment of races did not reflect commitment towards genuine decolonization.

Despite the internal contradictions of the transitional government, the opposition of the Patriotic Front, a flawed constitution and the escalation of the guerrilla war, elections were held in April 1979. For the first time Africans were given the opportunity to exercise their

right to elect a candidate of their choice based on one man, one vote. Over 60 % of the eligible voters cast their votes and Muzorewa's party won fifty one of the seventy-two black seats in the legislature and sixty seven percent of the votes allowing him to be the first black prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (Sithole 1999:155). Despite the high voter turnout the results did not truly reflect the will of the people as votes were obtained coercively against the backdrop of intimidation, violence and propaganda by pro-Muzorewa and Smith forces.

The huge UANC vote was not necessarily a love for Muzorewa but more of a desire to see an end to violence and hardships. Nkomo and Mugabe dismissed the election as bogus while Sithole and Chikerema, Muzorewa's former deputy in the UANC, denounced the elections and refused to join the government. Besides exposing political divisions the 1979 elections revealed the deep ethnic divisions that existed in Rhodesia. Sithole got most of his votes from tribesman in the south-east of the country while Ndiweni, an isiNdebele speaking chief, obtained most of his from the Matabeleland provinces while most Shona groups had voted for Muzorewa. This did not bode well for relations between the different ethnic groups in post-independence Zimbabwe.

On the whole the transitional government was in Smith's imperialist schemes designed to serve the purpose of massaging and tampering down internal African leaders. African leaders were neutralized during the transition period so that they would not be able to demand drastic changes to the colonial situations once black majority rule came into effect.

4.7 ZIMBABWE –RHODESIA

In spite of all the criticism directed towards the UANC electoral victory on 1 June 1979, Muzorewa, backed by white military and economic power, took up office as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's Government of National Unity. From its birth the state was beset by problems. On the eve of the independence of the new state Muzorewa put it to the whites that the Rhodesian flag had to be lowered before the raising of the new flag for the state that was coming into being. The Rhodesia Front objected to the lowering of the Rhodesian flag first before the raising of the flag of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia as they perceived it as surrender to blacks. Muzorewa lost the argument. The flag issue cost Muzorewa a significant amount of support from the African nationalists for failing to stand up to the whites (Flower: 1987). The flag incident symbolized that colonialism and coloniality had not been dismantled. Muzorewa had taken over the country only in name but not in practice.

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia had to deal with the continuing guerrilla insurgency. In addition to this problem, Muzorewa's deputy, Chikerema, and nine other MPs quit the UANC to form their own party after accusing the former of running the party as a 'secret tribal mafia' (Mufuka, 1979). Furthermore, twelve ZANU-Sithole members initially boycotted parliament claiming irregularities in the electoral process. Given the vulnerability of Muzorewa's government in its nascence, Chikerema's defection made Muzorewa more dependent on the Rhodesia Front for survival. Dependence on the whites left Muzorewa with little choice but to continue the oppressive and unpopular policies of the European settler regime. Doubts arose both domestically and internationally over Muzorewa's claim to leading an African majority government independent of white influence (Astrow, 1983:116). Although the government had changed in Rhodesia the colonial regime of power had not. This state of affairs in the young state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia did not provide a solid foundation for the promotion of peace, unity and reconciliation.

It is important to note that the double-barreled name (Zimbabwe-Rhodesia) given to the new state was not an indication of unity between settlers and the Africans but a sign of incomplete decolonization. It was in fact a product of imperialist machinations that aimed at hoodwinking Africans to believe that colonialism had ended yet in fact it had survived the end of formal colonial rule. The name Zimbabwe –Rhodesia instead of merely Zimbabwe as the nation imagined by nationalists was dismissed by its enemies. The name screamed that colonialism was not dead but still alive. It was just a case of black political power meeting white capital in a settler dominated state ruled by the black majority. Muzorewa's Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government was unable to stamp its mark and bring transformative change. There was in reality no real transformation as the political economy of the country remained firmly under colonial capitalist control. It was overwhelmed by colonality as real power was still wielded by settler whites who rendered Muzorewa as both a puppet and a tyrant. He was regarded a puppet because the governance path was charted by the Rhodesia Front and tyrant in that his government presided over the deaths of thousands of guerrillas and their supporters.

The establishment of the new state marked the end of direct white minority rule but it did not gain both domestic and international recognition even though Smith had opted out of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia as a condition for its recognition, the lifting of sanctions and independence. Muzorewa's Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government faced a legitimacy crisis at home as it did little to alter the status quo for the vast majority of the Africans. It tended to

focus on increasing its support by promoting the rise of a black bourgeoisie. What Muzorewa's government ushered was an elite transition where the black intellectual and bourgeoisie class filled the shoes of the retreating settler class. The peasant and the working class population opted to continue supporting the guerrillas who promised better living conditions and a more egalitarian society.

The 3 March Internal Settlement which produced the new state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was not designed to produce durable peace. It was hardly possible for peace to be achieved through a template designed by Smith, a white supremacist whose actions in 1965 had triggered the war. Although the template might have appeared to moderate internal African nationalists as offering the best prospects for peace, it fell short of fulfilling the basic tenets of a durable peace process. For instance, no reconciliation process was inaugurated nor was any truth, justice and compensation programme legislated and rolled out. It appears the whole arrangement of March 1978 was just a ruse to maintain white supremacy and to prolong the survival of Smith's regime. This is because Smith retained real power by retaining the control of the army, police, civil service judiciary and economy. The talks produced a settlement which guaranteed that Africans would be leaders of the new state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia but wielding ineffectual political and economic power. The settlement was Smith's way of trying to ensure that white power was retained in light of the impending black majority rule. Peace, unity and reconciliation therefore became problematic because this state of affairs went against the principles that had driven guerrillas into war against the white minority regime. Ultimately, the persistence of the asymmetrical white controlled state power structure was responsible for the continuation of conflict and the retardation of peace and development.

When the new conservative British Premier, Thatcher, came into office in May of 1979, she told Muzorewa that recognition was out of the question until major constitutional changes had been made to the defective Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution (Martin and Johnson, 1981:312-13). The shortcomings of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution and the persistence of the guerrilla war did not only influence Britain and America's decision to maintain sanctions but also to organize an all-parties conference at Lancaster, London, to resolve the crisis. In August 1979, Muzorewa accepted an invitation by Thatcher to attend an all party's conference slated for September in Lancaster, to try and resolve the conflict. That sounded the death-knell for Muzorewa's Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

4.8 SETTLING WITHOUT TRANSFORMING

The Internal Settlement paved the way for the rise of a new political administration but there was not much change in the way the government related with the outside world. Muzorewa's first journey as prime-minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to the outside world was to South Africa, which had supported settler capitalist imperialism in Rhodesia. Strengthening ties with capitalist interests was unlikely to yield complete change and peace in Zimbabwe. From South Africa, Muzorewa proceeded to several western capitals to sell the internal agreement in an attempt to gain support and international recognition for the new government. No similar trips were made to fellow African countries or states in the South in search of recognition. The excursions to the West were manifestations of coloniality of power; the new leaders looked up to the Euro-American world for acceptance and guidance. African states were perhaps seen by these internal leaders as lacking the mettle to bestow the necessary legitimacy to the internal deal while the West was perceived as possessing stature to sway political opinion in favour of the agreement.

The transitional arrangement born out of the 3 March Peace Agreement provided Africans inexperienced in national governance with an opportunity to learn from the more experienced whites. By being part of the transitional government African nationalists were schooled on the art of state governance by settlers who followed the Westminster system of governance. This system of governance, capitalist in nature and unsuited for the emerging "independent" state, was inherited without alteration by Muzorewa's Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government. The retention of the colonialist's *modus operandi* meant that wholesome changes to the way colonial society was structured and governed were blocked.

Despite Muzorewa becoming the head of state, real power was reposed in Ian Smith and the Rhodesia Front. The racially hierarchized power structure that privileged the RF and the white minority while marginalizing the blacks persisted. This was seen in members of the Rhodesia Front remaining in control of the army, police, civil service, judiciary and economy. Rhodesian force attacks on Mozambique and Zambia based guerrillas increased under the command of General Peter Walls who had been appointed Rhodesian Army Commander by Smith under white minority rule.

Internal nationalist leaders also awarded medals to white pilots for "distinguished service" in village bombing raids in the same fashion Smith had decimated the African population (Ngara, 1979:346). This also reflected that the body-politics of knowledge of the internal

nationalist leaders had shifted from seeing whites who killed blacks as oppressors to seeing whites killing blacks as heroes. This action alienated these leaders from mass support and reflected double standards as these black leaders were expected to be defending and leading Africans in pursuit of total independence and freedom. This reflected that although the government had changed from being predominantly white to black the regime of power had not changed.

In addition, Muzorewa's Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government dominated by the African petty-bourgeoisie perpetuated the colonial situation. It adopted a technicist approach to governance that suited western capitalist development models that advanced coloniality. The approach did not dismantle the capitalist system of governance which pro-Marxist nationalists and guerrilla forces were battling to demolish. It continued to hierarchize society and negated egalitarian values consistent with African society. As a consequence of retaining the colonially inclined mode of production, whites, affluent blacks and the rising black middle class forged an alliance to maintain the prevailing economic status quo. The failure to destroy the capitalist system of governance resulted in the persistence of huge inter-racial and intra-racial socio-economic disparities, thus threatening peace and stability in the newly independent state. This went a long way in blocking efforts aimed at fostering reconciliation in the years 1978-1979.

Society in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was hardly any different from that under colonialism. White minority control and privilege and black marginalization and exploitation were maintained in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia disguised as African majority rule. Racial segregation persisted reinforcing what Santos (2007) regards as abyssal lines where there is an invisible distinction between racial groups. The quality and genuineness of the independence was in doubt. Marxist scholars refer to such changes as bourgeoisie revolutions. The salaries of white workers still averaged more than ten times those of Africans. There continued to exist serious land imbalances between races where fifty percent of the land was reserved for 6.4 million Africans while the other fifty percent was reserved for 280 000 whites. This meant that Africans remained in hunger and poverty, leaving the state at the mercy of neo-colonialism (Muzorewa, 1978:247-248). The absence of fundamental change in land and property relations despite the Internal Settlement made it hard for the new African headed government to undertake a meaningful policy of land reform and to plant a solid base upon which durable peace; unity and reconciliation could be achieved.

Invisible lines drawn by colonialism to separate races continued to exist after the Internal Settlement, thus leading to the persistence of societal inequality and the colonial under the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government. The only difference was the co-option of African intellectuals, bourgeoisie and educated middle class into the new ruling hierarchy under the guise of democracy while millions of blacks continued to wallow in poverty in the countryside. The whites had seemingly accepted the principle of majority rule but in reality majority rule to the whites was only accepted in exchange for the safeguarding of white minority privileges by the African elite that participated in the Internal Settlement. Ngara (1978:344) is of the opinion that the Internal Settlement was to white settlers “a tactic to gain advantages for themselves from an unchanged exploitative system”. For instance, the still white dominated civil service did not inaugurate any crash training program in public administration to up-grade the skills of African civil servants or to recruit new cadres. The same civil service continued to administer the "protected villages" or “keeps” to Africans in which nearly one million rural Zimbabweans still lived (Hull, 1978:42). That was because moderate African nationalists that negotiated the Internal Settlement were willing to embrace the vestiges of colonial rule. They opted to do this instead of radically transforming colonial society to enable it to serve the new political dispensation.

Furthermore, internal African leaders under the interim government and under the Zimbabwe–Rhodesia government failed to use their political positions to radically transform the political environment. They began to articulate issues from a colonial perspective denouncing guerrillas as terrorists in a fashion similar to that seen under white minority rule. This was contrary to African liberation values. Political detainees remained in prison; reviews of sentences for offences of a political character were not conducted, there was no further removal of discrimination; the rehabilitation of those affected by war was not conducted while protected villages continued to exist. In Smith’s own words majority rule was conceded by the 3 March Peace agreement but it did not mean black majority rule (Muzorewa, 1978:226). To Preston (2004: 67), “Smith had finally signed away exclusive white rule in Rhodesia but he had by no means signed away white power.” Behind the facade of African majority rule white privilege in Zimbabwe Rhodesia was preserved.

4.9 CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the 3 March Peace Agreement/Internal Settlement and its impact on the Rhodesian problem and peace process in the years 1978 to 1979. The agreement intended to stop the war through internal talks that aimed at forming an interim unity government to promote unity and reconciliation before the holding of elections and majority rule under a unity government. It revealed how the Internal Settlement negotiated within the ambit of coloniality and be-saddled by a plethora of problems rooted in coloniality offered minimalist solutions to problems confronting Rhodesia, rendering it unable to foster sustainable peace and unity.

The chapter demonstrated how coloniality enveloped the search for peace, unity and reconciliation. It produced a power-sharing arrangement dominated by settler interests but veiled as majority rule. The state power structure that privileged the white minority while discriminating against the blacks persisted despite the signing of the 3 March, 1978 Peace Agreement that sought decolonization. The agreement thus had the hallmarks of coloniality. The next chapter discusses the 1979, Lancaster House Agreement; a second attempt at the close of the 1970s decade to achieve peace, unity and reconciliation and bring closure to the Rhodesian question.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE 1979 LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT AND THE AFTERMATH

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the 1979 Lancaster House Peace Agreement. It begins by looking at events leading to the conference at Lancaster and then analyzes the terms of the agreement. It discusses how African nationalists were hoodwinked by global capitalist interests into accepting a settlement that failed to radically transform the colonial situation leaving the interests of the settlers, the British and other global capitalist interests secure. The chapter demonstrates how this failure to transform the colonial situation, particularly with regard to land, became the genesis of the crisis that has compromised peace, unity and reconciliation and has reversed development goals in Zimbabwe.

5.2 THE ROAD TO LANCASTER

Muzorewa's victory in the May 1979 elections made him the country's first black Prime Minister. He was however rejected by the Patriotic Front which also refused to recognize the newly established state of Zimbabwe- Rhodesia. It was regarded as a puppet state of white Rhodesians. This is because the Internal Settlement left the governing process unaltered: white privilege was maintained, land redistribution did not take place, and the judiciary and bureaucracy continued in their colonial form (Cownie, 1984:39). The Frontline States denounced the new black led government while in the US, President Carter's administration refused to recognize the new political arrangement. Nigeria, Britain's biggest trading partner in Africa, threatened to block British investments in Nigeria until the Rhodesia crisis was resolved (Mtisi et al, 2009:165). This meant that the crisis in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was set to continue. The continuation of the war swung the balance of power and popularity from Muzorewa to the Patriotic Front inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. These developments disturbed Thatcher and capitalist/imperialist states that did not want to risk the possibility of a Patriotic Front victory that would have seen the country turn out to be a lackey of the Soviet Union and China. Besides, Thatcher was determined to rid Britain of the last vestiges of responsibilities for Rhodesia.

It was against this backdrop of glaring inadequacies of the Internal Settlement and pressure applied by international players that Thatcher resolved to seek further compromise in Rhodesia. She engaged in discussions with presidents Nyerere of Tanzania and Kaunda of Zambia, influential figures among Frontline States that were mobilizing support in the Commonwealth against any British intentions to recognize the Internal Settlement. Thatcher was afraid of upsetting the Commonwealth and Frontline States. She assured Nyerere and Kaunda that Britain would get Muzorewa's government to attend a peace conference in London. The onus of getting the Patriotic Front to attend was left on the Frontline States (Gregory, 1980:13). It should be noted that the negotiations over Zimbabwe's decolonization under the auspices of the British could have gone beyond Britain's role as the *de jure* colonial power and its economic and political interests to reflect the little faith it had on the epistemological capacity of Africans to resolve their own problems.

Although Thatcher sympathized with Muzorewa she withdrew her support for him and denounced the Internal Settlement and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Constitution. She called it defective as it retained a significant amount of power in white hands, therefore a recipe for disaster. She acknowledged the need to involve the Patriotic Front in the search for a solution to the Rhodesian crisis. With the concurrence of Nyerere, Kaunda and Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary General, Thatcher announced at the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference in August 1979 that there was to be an all-party peace conference in London. At the Conference discussions were to focus on reaching consensus on the terms of an Independence Constitution and the holding of independence elections under British authority (ibid).

Through persuasion and subtle coercion Kaunda and Nyerere managed to pressure a reluctant Patriotic Front to the bargaining table. They told the Patriotic Front that they could not indefinitely continue to support them as the war was draining the economies of most Frontline States and heightening insecurity in southern Africa. They also informed the Patriotic Front of changes in negotiation conditions. The proposed London talks were different from the Anglo-American plan that had sought an UN-supervised election and a cease-fire before negotiations on the constitution could commence. The agreement reached in Lusaka had reversed this process. The new plan entailed the abandonment of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution. A British governor would be sent to arrange new elections and take control of the army and police. The veto power given to whites by the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution would be removed. The number of white seats would be reduced to twenty.

Zimbabwe would be the new name for the independent state. Britain would urge the UN to lift economic sanctions provided elections were held and Smith would be urged to resign from politics (Gregory, 1980; Mungazi, 2000). This went a long way into convincing the Patriotic Front to participate in the London talks.

Perhaps more important than the changes to the negotiating conditions in inducing the Patriotic Front to attend the talks was the fact that the period immediately after the internal deal was characterized by both an intensification and escalation of the conflict. Both Muzorewa's government and the Patriotic Front were engaged in bloody standoffs with inconclusive victories. The military deadlock coupled with political pressure from regional patrons Mozambique, Zambia and South Africa, and an increase in foreign pressure, produced what Zartman (1983; 2000) refers to as a mutually hurting stalemate. The belligerents realized the futility of continued fighting and accepted Thatcher's invitation to congregate at Lancaster to terminate the war.

What also catapulted the Patriotic Front into agreeing to attend the Lancaster negotiations was not only the growing pressure from Frontline states that were burdened by the Rhodesian conflict and the mutually hurting stalemate but also the fact that the Conservative government had through Lord Boyd's assessment of the April 1979 elections concluded that they had been 'free and fair'. Thatcher used this assessment to warn the Patriotic Front about possible recognition of Muzorewa's government if they were to go ahead with their threat to boycott the talks. She publicly stated that "British sanctions will lapse in November [1979] and we doubt very much whether any renewal will go through the British parliament" (Martin and Johnson, 1984: 305).

The Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government at first viewed the proposed London talks as an insult as it perceived itself as the legitimate administration. An increase in threats to white civilian spaces played an important role in bringing the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government to the negotiation table. Two Air Rhodesia Viscounts were brought down and oil storage tanks in Salisbury were shelled by the guerrilla armies in the aftermath of the Internal Settlement (Mtisi et al, 2009:165). The Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government could not keep on fighting as it was burdened by a war costing a million dollars a day (Flower, 1987:229). It consented to the London negotiations not only because of the unending war, diplomatic pressure from South Africa that had suspended critical oil supplies and the biting economic sanctions, but also because Muzorewa and Smith were under the perception that they would benefit from the

constitutional conference. They saw the conference as an opportunity to get the international community to lift sanctions and recognize their government. For the whites in general participation in the Lancaster talks would likely limit the degree to which the power they had retained through the internal deal would be eroded.

According to Anstey (2007: 417), by consenting to the Lancaster House negotiations the white dominated government had moved from a position of

denying majority rule in the 1960s, to talks with international powers (Britain and the USA) on a power sharing formula which would retain white control; from there to talks with 'moderate' African leaders willing to accept minority control in 1974; then in 1978 to negotiations with internal 'moderate leaders' (Muzorewa and Sithole) on minority protections in a context of majority rule; and finally in 1979 to negotiations on the same basis with leaders of the guerrilla armies (Mugabe and Nkomo).

Ultimately, it can be argued that the agreement to gather at Lancaster was a manifestation of the coloniality of power at work in the Rhodesian crisis. The refusal by Britain and the US to recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia had a tremendous influence on the international community's decision to reject the new state. They used their global political, economic and diplomatic powers to cajole various players in the conflict into agreeing that a fresh round of talks at Lancaster could unlock the crisis. The Lancaster House Conference was also a product of capitalist support given to white minority rule during UDI. For 15 years capitalist interests propped Smith's intransigent white minority regime by trading with it and providing it with military support in defiance of UN sanctions. This action enabled Smith to stubbornly resist regime change and also frustrate liberation forces. By 1979, western capitalist interests had wearied various parties to the Rhodesian conflict and prepared them for the London conference.

5.3 NEGOTIATION AND AGREEMENT

The Lancaster House Conference began on the 10th of September under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, the British Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. It was attended by the British, the Patriotic Front, the UN, the US, South Africa, the Frontline states, the Commonwealth and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government constituted by the UANC, ZUPO, Sithole's ZANU and the Rhodesia Front. The multinational representation at the Lancaster House Conference reflected the tremendous interest that Rhodesia had attracted internationally. Notable at the conference was the presence of Ian Smith representing the Rhodesia Front element in the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government. Smith was regarded by many quarters as a white supremacist notorious for declaring that there would be no black

majority rule in a thousand years. The decision by Muzorewa to include white members from the Rhodesia Front government in his delegation at a time he was perceived as a puppet of the minority whites increased criticism against him, further soiling his image. He argued that he needed David Smith of the Rhodesia Front for his knowledge of economic affairs. This was a manifestation of the coloniality of imagination. The implication was that whites were more conversant on economic matters and epistemologically superior to blacks.

At the start of the conference, Carrington in his opening remarks pointed out that the fundamental problem that the parties had to iron out was agreement on the independence constitution. He stated the need for the principle of majority rule to be maintained and guaranteed; the necessity of guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the constitution; the immediate improvement in the political status of the African population and the need to do away with racial discrimination (Chari: 2013). Carrington decided to dispose of the constitutional issues first, then to discuss matters such as ceasefire during the transition period and finally to implement what had been agreed including the holding of elections. He did not want either party to lose face amongst its supporters - agreement was not negotiable (Flower, 1987:232).

In the negotiations the British stance with regards to property was for its protection from compulsory acquisition by the new government. For any legal acquisition the British demanded immediate and adequate compensation remittable outside Rhodesia. Contrary to this, the Patriotic Front argued that the prime objective of the liberation war was the recovery of lost land and therefore stressed that agreement had to be reached without need for the new government to pay compensation. Deadlock thus arose over property rights especially over land. In an interview with *The Herald* in London, Mugabe, alarmed that proposals on land reform were not revolutionary enough, remarked that “the land issue is a crucial issue. There has to be land given to the people who have suffered in the course of colonialism. That land has to be found. We feel that land is inseparable from the whole majority rule issue” (The Sunday Mail, February 19-25, 2012). The Patriotic Front was aggrieved that the proposals did not guarantee the transfer of land to the majority blacks and threatened to walk out of the talks and return to the battlefield. It was however forced to stay on by the Frontline States leaders who were no longer prepared to bear the brunt of the war. The Patriotic Front also stayed after South Africa's declaration of support for the British proposals and pledged to intervene on Muzorewa's behalf should the guerrillas choose to fight.

The impasse over the land issue was only broken when Britain and America gave assurances of a multinational effort to fund land, agricultural and economic programs. Lord Carrington issued the following statement on the 11th of October 1979 regarding the issue of land;

We recognize that the future of Zimbabwe, whatever its political complexion, will wish to extend land ownership. The costs would be very substantial, indeed well beyond the capacity, in our judgement, of any donor country, and the British Government cannot commit itself at this stage to a specific share in them. We should, however, be ready to support the efforts of the Government of Independent Zimbabwe to obtain international assistance for these purposes (Chari, 2013:292).

The Patriotic Front bought the promise of assistance and issued the following statement

We have now obtained assurances that...Britain, the United States of America and other countries will participate in a multinational donor effort to assist in land, agricultural and economic development programmes. These assurances go a long way in allaying the great concern we have over the whole land question arising from the great need our people have for land and our commitment to satisfy that need when in Government (ibid).

It should be highlighted that the pledges made by Britain and America were not included in the text of the constitution.

The British government proceeded to draw a “willing-seller, willing buyer” clause. Under this clause the new government would only be able to acquire land provided the seller was willing to let it go at market prices and in a currency determined by the seller. Sections 16 and 52 of the Lancaster House Constitution on Declaration of Rights stipulated that there could be no major amendments to the constitution for a period of ten years (Kriger, 2003:41). The clause on land was silent on the modalities upon which the so called assistance was to be rendered, therefore making it inadequate in addressing the land question. There was a keenly felt sense of injustice and deprivation over the question of land amongst Africans, making it one of the most contentious issues in the aftermath of the conference (Sachikonye, 2012:109).

The number of seats reserved for whites in the legislature was reduced from twenty eight to twenty. Under pressure from international capital it was agreed at Lancaster that the new government would inherit the Rhodesian debt that stood at \$200 million and other financial obligations such as the payment of pensions to Rhodesian public servants including those that had emigrated (Mtisi et al, 2009:165). The Agreement provided for a ceasefire in which all belligerents would cease hostilities. The ceasefire demanded the grouping of Patriotic Front forces at assembly points and the return of Rhodesian Forces to barracks. South African troops were to withdraw from Rhodesia and the Rhodesian Air force was to be grounded.

After elections the guerrilla armies were to be integrated with the Rhodesian Army to form the Zimbabwe National Army.

The agreement had provisions for a transition period in which the country would return to temporary British rule under a governor who would organize elections to pave the way for independence. During the transition the Rhodesian forces would remain intact and so would the police force, judiciary and civil service under the authority of the British Governor (Gregory, 1980:18). The placement of ground-level enforcement of law and order during the transition period in the hands of the Rhodesian security forces reflected the fact that the Rhodesian state had not been defeated (Preston: 2004). Colonial forms of domination were still very much alive. The Lancaster House Conference ended on 21 December 1979 and the accord reached came to be known as the Lancaster House Agreement.

5.4 SLEIGHT OF HAND - HOODWINKED AT LANCASTER

From the point of view of parties that desired to be unyoked of the Rhodesian problem, (Britain and the US), the Lancaster House Agreement proved a remarkable success. The Agreement achieved its immediate objective of ending almost one and half decades of war. They saw the adoption of a new constitution which eliminated most of the explicitly discriminatory provisions of the Smith–Muzorewa ‘Internal Settlement’, elections and independence as a giant step forward (Preston: 2004). Astrow (1983:149) concurs that for imperial powers the Lancaster House agreement was a success as it managed to preserve imperialism in Zimbabwe by eliminating the main threat to capitalist stability - war. However, to the Patriotic Front and other parties concerned with fostering sustainable peace the settlement was just a watered down version of the Internal Settlement which favoured the retreating settler state and capitalist imperialist interests.

This is seen in the fact that the Lancaster Agreement left white control of the economy essentially unchallenged. The Lancaster House constitution allowed the British to block the Zimbabwean government from making fundamental changes to land and property rights until the lapse of ten years. British intentions were to delay if not block full decolonization by protecting capitalist property and white settler interest even if it meant subverting the will and aspirations of the majority of the African population in Zimbabwe who yearned for the restoration of land to the dispossessed. To compound matters, the agreement on land was in essence a gentlemen’s agreement that could be violated at any time. This weakness rendered the agreement a ticking conflict time bomb that exploded when the British reneged on

funding Zimbabwe's land reform programme at the end of the second decade of independence that sent the country spiraling into crisis.

The outcome of the agreement was largely shaped by Britain, the authority responsible for granting legal independence to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The talks were held at the behest of Britain and were hosted and chaired by her. The fact that discussions for the independence of Zimbabwe were presided over by the colonizer in her own citadel reflects the coloniality of power. It was therefore difficult for African nationalists to obtain a settlement in their favour as long as the talks were presided over by the British. The negotiations were not likely to produce sustainable peace as they were "held thousands of miles away and outside of the contextual realities of the conflict they sought to solve" (Interview with a media practitioner: 7/9/2015).

Britain aimed at producing a stable pro-capitalist African government that would protect capitalist interests (Astrow, 1983:134). Her large stake in mining, manufacturing, service industry, business and land compelled her to settle the Rhodesian problem in a manner that best suited not only her political interest but also her economic interests. It was therefore difficult for Carrington to get a constitution through that would not safeguard British and capitalist interests in Rhodesia. That is why from the onset, Carrington sought a constitutional agreement that would guarantee the status quo on land.

Carrington was a biased referee in a settlement that failed to prioritize African interests. He was capitalism's man on the ground whose sleight of hand produced a settlement that satisfied global capital interests. He employed a negotiating style that Novak (2009) describes as "dominant third-party mediation". He controlled the agenda, the tempo of the talks, imposed terms, deadlines and directed the trajectory of the talks. One commentator likened the agreement to Africans having been offered the driver's seat while the whites would continue to map the route the car must take and control the fuel which made it run (Mtisi et al, 2009:166).

Britain succeeded in obtaining the settlement largely by pressuring the Patriotic Front through the use of the 'stick,' while offering the 'carrot' to the Muzorewa-Smith regime. Britain threatened the Patriotic Front with recognition of Muzorewa's regime if they did not append their signatures to the Lancaster document while Muzorewa and Smith were encouraged to sign in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and nominal changes to the Internal Settlement.

The Patriotic Front was therefore coaxed into accepting unfavourable terms which perpetuated the colonial situation they sought to eradicate.

Carrington virtually got what he wanted out of the negotiations and his performance was lauded by colleagues in international diplomatic circles. The Patriotic Front leaders conceded to almost every point he laid on the table at the beginning of the conference. Astrow (1983) attributes the Patriotic Front's indulgence to reliance on imperialism to bring a secure settlement. Dependence on western powers to resolve the Rhodesian question militated against Lancaster producing an outcome that would favour Africans and fully decolonize Rhodesia. When Britain finally granted Zimbabwe independence in 1980 it was largely on neo-colonialist terms. This was at the expense of peace, unity and reconciliation which were sacrificed at the altar of imperialist capitalism that desired to perpetuate the colonial situation in Zimbabwe.

The invisible hand of the colonial matrix of power influenced the proceedings at the Lancaster House Conference. American and British intelligence services worked behind the scenes at Lancaster to produce a settlement that favoured their interests. According to Ken Flower, who served as the chief of Rhodesian intelligence under Smith, the CIA were helping the Patriotic Front and undermining Muzorewa. Flower (1987) states that a document later emerged that a senior official in the British foreign office was given the task of handling a foreign office press campaign to discredit Muzorewa and push Thatcher towards Mugabe. This may be plausible given the fact that a Muzorewa victory was unlikely to end the war and a Nkomo win was likely to increase Soviet influence in southern Africa. Mugabe backed by China was seen by western intelligence services as a mild threat to capitalist interests. The best option to western intelligence services was an electoral victory for a Muzorewa-Nkomo-Smith coalition. When that was proving hard to achieve they opted for the Chinese backed Mugabe who was seen as less of a threat compared to the Soviet backed Nkomo.

The issue of land was not the only issue on which the Patriotic Front got a raw deal. The fact that no fundamental changes could be made to the constitution for ten years meant that white settlers got ten years more in which to enjoy the fruits of colonialism. To Muzondidya (2009a:172) during this time issues around the radical restructuring of the legacy of economic inequality were effectively put on hold, thus guaranteeing the white race unfettered political and economic power. The twenty seats reserved for whites in the new parliament were far

disproportional to their population as whites constituted only three percent of the population. This scenario in effect depicted qualified majority rule.

The whites effectively used the twenty seats to protect settler imperialist interests. The whites were more experienced in statecraft and had a better understanding of parliamentary proceedings than their black counterparts who had spent most of their time in prison or in the bush fighting the guerrilla war. They were also more seasoned debaters and who often floored African legislators, thus enabling them to block motions intended to change legislation and policies that perpetuated the colonial situation (ibid). Mamdani (2008:4) argues that the reservation of seats for whites sustained illusions among the settlers that what they had failed to achieve through UDI and force of arms, they could now achieve through the British tailored Lancaster House Constitution. The reservation of seats for whites created the impression that whites were a distinct and special racial group whose being is heavier than that of Africans. The provision was thus against ideals of nation-building and unity that emphasize the equality of persons; the provision became a source of racial friction in Zimbabwe.

The terms of the Lancaster House Agreement meant that the new African government would begin its tenure on the economic back foot. It was expected to pay an odious debt, a huge debt incurred by the white minority fighting a war against nationalist guerrillas in defence of a racist discriminatory regime and coloniality. Furthermore, the new government was supposed to reward employees who had sustained the illegal regime with pensions for life. Debt payment robbed the new government of important financial resources that the country required to avoid international capital, strengthen the economy and promote peace and stability (Bond and Manyanya: 2003). The retention of Rhodesian forces and the integration of the guerrilla armies under General Peter Walls, the former Rhodesian Army commander, meant that African guerrilla armies would adopt the *modus operandi* of the retreating colonial army. The objective behind placing the population under the protection of security services that operated in a colonial fashion was to assure the remaining whites that their protection was guaranteed.

It is noteworthy that Africans got a raw deal from the Lancaster House talks because colonialism had produced social categorizations which prevented the Africans from significantly contributing to governance issues. Nationalist intellectuals that represented the majority black population at the Lancaster House negotiations to the exclusion of the views

of the generality of the indigenous population who were regarded as an indistinct mass were compromised by virtue of being products of colonialism. Apparently, most of the intellectuals and nationalists that negotiated the settlement lived in affluence while the majority of the black population struggled to make ends meet. The talks at Lancaster thus merely paved the way for an elite transition from white minority rule to the rule by the black elite but bringing little change for the majority of the Zimbabwean population that was marginalized in the decolonization process.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011b:7) criticizes the Lancaster House Conference for being a neo-colonial trap set to block revolutionary transition from racially biased land ownership to non racial land ownership. The Lancaster House Agreement allowed economic forms of domination that had characterized colonialism to continue in the post-independence period evidenced by white settlers and global capitalist powers retaining a significant amount of land. He further states that the Lancaster House Agreement was the maternity ward where de-colonization was suffocated and died in its mother's womb. By inference he argues that in spite of Zimbabwe gaining independence it remained trapped in the European and American dominated global capitalist system. This essentially meant Zimbabwe was born a neo-colonial state vulnerable to economic and political instability. It was a tragedy that African nationalists left the economy of a fragile state coming out of war and in search of regime security in white hands. By failing to conclude the business of decolonization, the Lancaster House Agreement sowed seeds of future conflict in Zimbabwe rooted in land ownership imbalances and socio-economic inequities.

On the whole the Lancaster House Agreement was designed to block full decolonization, perpetuate resource control by the ex-colonizer and to facilitate the exploitation of the ex-colony. It was fashioned by the British to serve British, white settler and American capitalist imperialist interests. Blacks received political power (flag independence) while the whites retained economic control. Underlying problems were not resolved by the Lancaster House talks. They merely swept the problems under the carpet for possible resolution in the future. For instance, the thorny issue of land was essentially parked for a decade. It is this state of affairs that explains the conflict between the white and the blacks and the rise in conflict between the elite and the masses in Zimbabwe three decades after colonialism. Although peace was produced by the Lancaster House conference it was negative peace, a peace held together by the fear of violence and undesirability of war and not by mutual co-operation, common interests and goals. Its durability depended on the goodwill of the parties to it, since

it was in essence a gentlemen's agreement and this did not bode well for peace in Zimbabwe. Despite the failure of the 1979 agreement to engender sustainable peace, unity and reconciliation, it ended the war and established a modicum of stability, therefore laying the ground on which the new independent black government would endeavour to achieve the peace, unity and development.

5.5 INDEPENDENCE AND RECONCILIATION

The conference at Lancaster failed to unite African nationalists and to fill the cracks that existed in African society. Astrow (1983) sees petit bourgeoisie nationalism as responsible for deepening the persistent divisions sown amongst the African people by colonialism. After the conclusion of the Lancaster House talks, the Patriotic Front unity was broken when ZANU resolved to run the election race as ZANU PF without ZAPU that later changed its name to PF ZAPU. Peace was sacrificed at the altar of political expedience. The Patriotic Front split robbed Zimbabwe of an opportunity to consolidate national unity because elections accentuated not only partisan differences but also heightened ethnic identities as the country was divided into 'Nkomo's country' and 'Mugabe's country' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2009a).

During the transition period British and Commonwealth troops failed to provide security resulting in elections being conducted under an atmosphere of fear, violence and intimidation as ZIPRA, ZANLA, and Muzorewa's Auxiliary Forces campaigned for their candidates. Soames argued that it was impossible to turn Rhodesia overnight into a humanitarian utopia (Soames, 1980). Despite the absence of suitable conditions for campaigning and elections, polls were held in February 1980. They were regarded as free and fair by international observers. Robert Mugabe of ZANU PF won 57 seats and 63% of the vote against 20 for PF ZAPU, 3 for UANC. 20 seats reserved for whites were won by the Rhodesia Front (Martin and Johnson: 1981). ZANU PF had chosen to break the unity with PF ZAPU in favour of electoral glory and political power that came with it.

PF ZAPU's loss came as a shock to Nkomo and many of his supporters who suspected foul play. Nkomo doubted the fairness and credibility of the elections. He was convinced that the elections did not truly reflect the will of the people (Nkomo, 1984). PF ZAPU alleged that ZANU PF had employed tribalism to win elections. PF ZAPU had however been warned that it would lose the 1980 election. During the Lancaster House talks a senior PF ZAPU leader was dispatched to Rhodesia by Nkomo to prepare for elections. He was told by Chief Khayisa

Ndiweni that if the intention of the Patriotic Front was to establish a unitary state then Nkomo could forget about ever becoming president (Interview with a retired ZANU PF ex-government minister : 14/9/2015). Apparently Ndiweni was aware that ethnicity strongly influenced political fortunes. Although Nkomo was the most senior African nationalist, he would not make president in a predominantly Shona country as he was from the minority Kalanga ethnic group. Sibanda (2005:239) cites Professor Stanlake Samkange, a leading Zimbabwean intellectual and writer, who concurred and commented; “there is no other way to explain it, the Mashonaland people will never have Nkomo and Matabeleland will never have a Shona”.

ZANU PF commanded the support of the bulk of the majority Shona ethnic group as it had recruited and operated from areas that were predominantly Shona. PF ZAPU had most of the support of the minority Ndebele and Kalanga ethnic groups. Voting patterns in the 1980 elections showed that ZANU PF got most its votes from predominantly Shona speaking areas while PF ZAPU obtained most its votes from Ndebele and Kalanga speaking areas. Election results reflected a tribal inclination; Mugabe could not therefore claim to be a national leader as the results did not reflect national unity but division based on ethnicity.

Sithole (1999:180) downplays the tribal factor. He surmises that in 1980, a great number of people were driven into voting for ZANU PF by the need for peace. ZANLA controlled two thirds of Zimbabwe and had promised the population that any result other than a ZANU PF victory would entail the resumption of war, something that Muzorewa had failed to stop. He buttresses his argument by citing Nkomo (1984) who attributed his loss to PF ZAPU’s failure to campaign in the northern and eastern provinces owing to violence and intimidation by ZANU PF militias. A more plausible explanation however would be that in a country deeply tribalized by colonialism the majority Shona population voted ZANU PF. This had negative ramifications for future peace of Zimbabwe.

After ZANU PF’s victory Mugabe requested that Lord Soames remains in Zimbabwe for a year or two to help him establish a new government, but the latter declined. The above suggests that Mugabe doubted his own governance ability and regarded Soames as an epistemologically superior being in governance. A former ZIPRA guerrilla based in Bulawayo argues that Mugabe had little knowledge on how to govern. To him the lack of knowledge on governance resulted in post- independence schism between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU and schism in the army integration that led to the dissident problem and *gukurahundi*

(Interview with a former ZIPRA guerrilla : 22/9/2015). To Astrow (1983), Mugabe's request to be hand-held by Soames was in essence a proclamation that Zimbabwe would be a pro-capitalist nation just as it had been under the former Rhodesian premier, Smith. In his autobiography *Bitter Harvest: The Great Betrayal and the Dreadful Aftermath* Smith reveals that in the first months of independence Mugabe frequently sought his advice (Smith: 2001).

On 18 April 1980, Robert Mugabe was sworn in as independent Zimbabwe's first Prime Minister. It was out of a combination of violence and diplomacy that Zimbabwe eventually became independent (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2013b). Many blacks demanded revenge for exploitation and brutality experienced over 90 years of colonialism but the government decided against retribution. Prime Minister Mugabe pronounced a policy of reconciliation and issued the following statement.

If yesterday I fought you as my enemy, today you have become a friend and ally and with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you, the wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten...let us join together. Let us show respect to winners and losers...there is no intention on our part to victimize the minority. We will ensure there is a place for everyone in this country. I want a broadly based government to include whites and Nkomo. (Huyse, 2003:34).

Mugabe's reconciliatory tone and clarion call to forgive and forget was preceded and guided by the Amnesty Ordinance 3 of 1979 and the Amnesty (General Pardon) Ordinance 12 of 1980 which guaranteed that there would be no prosecution of the former Government or security forces or persons or forces acting in opposition to that Government. This meant that those who had committed crimes and human rights abuses in the 1970s were not made answerable for their actions, thus denying justice to thousands who had fallen victim to the most grotesque of abuses (CCJP and LRF, 1997: 37.) The ZANU-PF government was concentrating more on the consolidation of regime security at the expense of a clear nation-building agenda beyond the policy of reconciliation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b:211).

After independence Zimbabwe was therefore left with a huge justice and reconciliation task. Asking the country to let "bygones be bygones" so that the country could start on a new path meant that justice was put on the backburner. It is noteworthy that the idea of letting "bygones be bygones" is against African conflict resolution philosophy that perceives conflicts as a continuum and circular and not as something on which the door can be closed. By advocating for amnesia and amnesty in Zimbabwe's first reconciliation policy a precedent was set for later reconciliation processes to do the same at the expense of truth and justice.

Put against Bloomfield and Reilly's (1998) characterization of reconciliation, the reconciliation policy pronounced by Mugabe in 1980 fell far short of satisfying the prerequisites for reconciliation. There was no truth and reconciliation commission set up, neither were programmes for national healing and forgiveness inaugurated nor were provisions made for the grassroots to be involved yet they had suffered colonial injustices and violence. These issues are crucial for any reconciliation process to succeed.

In spite of the failure to inaugurate a robust agenda for nation building in the spirit of unity, peace and reconciliation, the ZANU PF government formed a government of national unity. Mugabe included in it members from the Rhodesia Front and opposition PF ZAPU with the intention of calming old rivalries and prejudices and averting potential conflict between the liberation movements. Former cabinet ministers in Ian Smith's government, David Smith and Dennis Norman were appointed Minister of Commerce and Minister of Agriculture respectively. General Walls was retained as the head of armed forces to preside over integration. Four PF ZAPU members were given ministerial posts while three were made deputy ministers. Nkomo was given the Home Affairs portfolio after initially having rejected presidency. Critics of the government of national unity argue that it was PF ZAPU's presence with twenty seats in parliament that made it possible to forge an alliance with the Rhodesia Front against ZANU PF that forced Mugabe to form a government of national unity and not statesmanship (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b; Smith, 2001; Martin and Johnson, 1981).

Conciliatory remarks and actions from Mugabe were not only aimed at promoting peace, unity and reconciliation, but also to pacify capitalists and placate the whites whose capital, experience and expertise he desperately required for the nascent black government to achieve growth with equity. The reconciliation policy was also intended to attract investment after conflict. Reconciliation in 1980 was therefore not genuine; it was a deal between the African nationalists and the remaining white settlers to co-exist. Co-existence does not denote reconciliation as reconciliation means much more – it entails building trust, co-operation and the acknowledgement of having transgressed. What the new black government apparently achieved with independence was the deracialization of the country and state-building at the expense of full decolonization and nation building. Socio-economic inequities between races and fragmentation of Zimbabwean people along ethnic and political lines persisted (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b).

The white community did not acknowledge any wrong doing in the colonization and ill treatment of blacks over the ninety years of white rule. It is ironic that it was Mugabe's government that appealed for reconciliation and pledged to forgive the whites even though whites had not asked for forgiveness. This prompts Mandaza (2000), a leading Zimbabwean political scientist quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009c:1142), to describe reconciliation as "the mourn of the weak, even when pronounced from positions of apparent moral and political superiority over oppressors and exploiters of yesterday". Mugabe's plea for reconciliation and forgiveness was in fact an acknowledgement of the weakness of his newly established government that sought to extend reliance on white capital, expertise and skills in the post-independence period.

Mandaza (2000) further argues that the reconciliation exercise was sheer political expediency, nothing fundamentally changed. It was to him largely a political function, facilitating the necessary compromise between the rulers of yesterday and the inheritors of state power, within the context of incomplete decolonization. The hierarchical social structure that existed under colonial rule persisted in the independence era. Civil servants became the petit bourgeoisie; professionals like accountants, doctors and journalists became the professional elite while the brutalized farm workers joined the proletariat. This failure to transform these colonial-like forms of domination and socio-economic relations in post independence Zimbabwe laid the ground for future conflict.

Reconciliatory discourse from Mugabe's government was also intended to allay white fears as some black members of the newly inaugurated black government often spewed communist/socialist rhetoric that scared capitalist interests. Mugabe's government feared that an exodus of whites was likely to lead to the destruction of the economy and cause instability as it had in Mozambique. Herbst (1988:46) writes;

The victory of the Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) liberation movement that year [1975] in the guerrilla war of independence caused the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of white Portuguese settlers who had run every aspect of the economy. In their attempts to retaliate against the blacks for winning their independence, the Portuguese destroyed almost everything-even down to the lightbulbs-that they could not take with them. The new leaders of Mozambique therefore took over an economy that had been brought to a complete standstill by the white departure and that had no prospect of significant growth. The chaos in Mozambique was observed at first hand by many of Zimbabwe's future leaders who, by the late 1970s, were fighting their own war from internal bases in western Mozambique.

White fears were indeed allayed as there was no sweeping nationalization; civil servants were guaranteed their jobs and pensions. House owners and farmers were also assured that their property rights would be respected. Herbst (ibid) surmises that in essence the ZANU PF government bargained with the remaining whites in 1980 where it was unwritten but understood by almost everyone that whites who were economically active could remain in the country and operate their businesses and farms but not bequeath these to their children. The reconciliation mantra was to Alexander (2002:92) symbolically and politically weak as it did not effectively address the historical grievances or economic woes of communities in the reserves, yet the whites continued to live their colonial life styles.

The provisions of the Lancaster House settlement gave the settlers a decade long period of consolidation and little progress was made towards justice and reconciliation. (Muzondidya, 2009:172). Race relations did not change much with independence in Zimbabwe. The white community opted to co-exist with blacks instead of reconciling with them. Weiss (1984) argues that there was no true reconciliation, whites accepted the new black elites because they needed politics and policies to facilitate commerce but personal contact between the races remained at a low level.

According to Herbst (1988:45) whites continued to live a colonial lifestyle with servants, large gardens and tennis courts, while the vast majority of the population continued to eke out an existence from inadequate land-holdings. The white community saw itself as existing outside the new nation state. The white community withdrew into racial enclaves. In urban areas some responded to black encroachment by creating alternative spaces where they continued to keep to themselves retreating from public life into the laager of sports club, home entertainment and the video. In clubs, diners and restaurants, separation was enforced through practices such as membership-based admission (Muzondidya, 2009a:172). The refusal by the whites to interact with the African race was perhaps because they saw themselves as superior beings with higher ontological density that could not interact with blacks that they regarded as inferior. By sequestering themselves from blacks, the whites were in a way advancing something akin to apartheid, a philosophy rooted in coloniality.

In the education sector, some white parents responded to the government's deracialization of education and the admission of blacks into formerly white-only schools by building new, independent schools whose fee structures were designed to exclude the majority of the children from middle-and low-income black families. By isolating themselves and putting

little effort in addressing inherited racial imbalances in wealth whites abdicated from actively engaging in the process of nation building (Muzondidya, 2009a:192-193). According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b), it is social apartheid rooted in settler colonialism that helped maintain a hierarchized society consisting of two separate races, one white and the other black. Many Africans interpreted white isolation as arrogance from a group they perceive as unindigenous and holding on to ill-gotten wealth. This in part explains the violence against whites during land invasions at the turn of the millennium.

Kinloch (1997) studies racial attitudes in post-colonial Zimbabwe and reveals that by the close of the first decade the blacks were particularly critical of their colonial past and complaining about continuing white racism. To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b:219), the white community seemed to adhere to what Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock described as the spirit of 'Rhodesians Never Die' which prevented them from embracing the policy of reconciliation fully, socially, politically, psychologically and economically. The whites were either defensive of the past or deaf to complaints from the blacks. The whites still did not feel like they were a part of the new state. Instead they regarded themselves as an extension of the mother country and identified with it more than the land that played host to them. This is partially explained by the reluctance of whites to renounce British citizenship. The preference of British citizenship over Zimbabwean citizenship by the white settlers strained relations with the government. It also signified the absence of unity in the post-independence period and the failure of nation building and national integration.

With regards to the economy, the white race was seen as generally unwilling and/or reluctant to surrender or share with the rest of the population the benefits they had accrued from colonialism. They continued to hold on to the bulk of the land and this was seen by the majority blacks as an obstacle to justice. The behaviour of the whites was to Muzondidya (2009a:173) influenced by what both Ranger and Mandaza refer to as "settler culture"- "the great power exerted by settlers, their virtual monopoly over political and legal institutions, their coercive control over the labour and livelihoods of Africans, their manipulative methods for advancing the economic interests of themselves".

One can draw parallels between settler culture and coloniality. Settler culture endorsed the creation of hierarchical social structure that placed the white race in a position of domination and control while sanctioning the exploitation of the black race. To Grosfoguel (2004: 328), the persistence of a colonial culture after independence constitutes social power. This earned

the whites resentment from the majority black population who expected retribution or at least a significant erosion of white power. Peasants and workers became more militant and often blamed the white race for their plight as the years went by. Black opposition to inequality took an increasingly racial form. Frustrated black business people formed pressure groups to address these inequalities by lobbying with government and launching scathing attacks on white capital. Zimbabwean society remained fissured along the lines of race with the effect of compromising racial co-existence, reconciliation and national stability

The reconciliation achieved in Zimbabwe was cosmetic as it promoted co-existence but failed to engender mutual understanding and co-operation. This was seen when controversy was generated by the government's decision to embark on projects of removing colonial symbols and replacing them with Zimbabwean ones. They included the removal of Cecil John Rhodes' statue on 31 July 1980 among others (Bhebe and Ranger, 1995:140). To the new black government colonial symbols represented a dark oppressive past repugnant to Africans and thus argued in support of their removal. Glaring in this act was that blacks could not embrace the colonial past no matter how sad and a part of Zimbabwe's history it was. The dismantling of colonial symbols was interpreted by the white race as a rejection of whites and their history while blacks saw the removal as great achievements. This went a long way in blocking efforts aimed at building a nation united across different races.

The study is of the conviction that by 1990, the post-colonial project of building a just and equitable non racial society was not achieved and nor was reconciliation because colonial patterns of domination escaped independence and the transformative power of reconciliation. Apparently at independence, reconciliation to the ex-colonizers meant that the ex-colonized bent on revenge had to be placated from revolutionarily engaging in asset redistribution. To the former colonizers Zimbabwe had to remain open to Euro-American economic exploitation and the permanent settlement of white settlers. To achieve this, fundamental change to land ownership had to be blocked and whites had to be protected. The reconciliation of interests where black political power had found common ground with white economic power in 1980 was to break in the late 1990s as the gulf of socio-economic inequalities between races widened and blacks began to advocate for asset redistribution.

Another factor that blighted Zimbabwe's reconciliation process was the obsession with focusing on deracializing but not detribalizing Zimbabwe. There was little investment put in the project of unity amongst blacks. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008a:82-83), during the

early years of independence and much later triumphant political leaders and their supporters for the most part ignored, ridiculed, detained, sidelined and criminalized as dissidents and puppets those nationalist figures that failed to make it into state power. The ZANU PF government monopolized the liberation past, and made itself the central focus of the mainstream narrative and systematically excluded many other participants from the story. By alienating nationalist figures like Nkomo, Muzorewa, Chikerema, Sithole and others who contributed to the liberation struggle the government sacrificed reconciliation, nation-building and unity of the people.

Reconciliation between blacks became even more difficult when little was done by the new government to attend to the weaknesses of the Lancaster House Agreement. The Lancaster House agreement did not provide a reconciliation framework to address intra- black differences evidenced by the violence that was to engulf the Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces in the early 1980s. The ceasefire agreement reached at the Lancaster House Conference failed to adequately disarm rival guerrilla armies and provide a sound framework for demobilization and reintegration and the integration of the guerrilla armies into the Rhodesian army. Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (DDR) was not even employed as instruments to reward or punish parties to the peace talks, leaving these issues to an elected government which fumbled the process. The failure to have DDR programmes resulted in the persecution and desertion of former ZIPRA members from the Zimbabwe National Army to become dissidents. Perhaps had intra-black divergences been attended to at the Lancaster House Conference then disturbances that were to rock Matabeleland and Midlands could have been avoided. One can thus conclude that although the 1979 Lancaster peace process ended the war it did not do much to promote both racial and intra-racial reconciliation in Zimbabwe.

5.6 LEGACY OF LANCASTER – THE COLONIAL SITUATION LINGERS

After ZANU PF's 1980 electoral victory and the establishment of a government of national unity that embraced PF ZAPU and the Rhodesia Front, expectation was high that the country would take a new political trajectory. Independence was expected to herald a new era characterised by non racialism and equal opportunities for both blacks and whites. There was hope that the creation of such a society would foster peace, unity and reconciliation that were integral to the development of the nascent state. Independence implied that the colonial past was to be left behind and a new epoch was to begin in the political governance of the country.

However, this did not come to pass. The liberation struggle only managed to get rid of the white colonial administration but failed to extricate Zimbabwe from coloniality. As result of this, the new state of Zimbabwe was thus born a neo-colonial state succeeding the Rhodesian colonial state. It failed to do away with of remnants of colonialism because of the blocking forces of global imperialism and capitalism that allowed white settlers to retain most of the benefits accrued under colonial rule.

Fanon (1968) studied decolonization in Africa and saw no fundamental change between the colonial situation and independence in most African states. He sees coloniality and calls it repetition without change. The 1979 Lancaster House Agreement paved the way for a transition from white to black rule but the capitalist/imperialist system hid and survived by changing the order. The consequence was that a new order that privileged the elite at the expense of the majority emerged despite Africans remaining in the driving seat. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011b:60) adds his voice to the arguments that independence in most of Africa did not culminate in change. He argues that in political science a “political order” emerges as a product of “political system”, systems are more resistant to change; they are likely to endure when orders undergo transformation. The capitalist system on which settler colonialism thrived survived by resisting transformation when Zimbabwe got its independence and a new order was installed.

Mandaza (2015:1) explains the absence of real change at independence as a result of the new independent state having its

origins premised on the national bourgeois democratic model, in the acceptance of the (national) independence constitution bequeathed to it by the departing (European) colonialists on “Independence Day”, and with all the related paraphernalia such as the (new) name for the nation–state–in–the–making, the flag and national anthem; and as the new member of the international community of nations, the United Nations, the OAU/AU, etc.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a) argues that Zimbabwe’s independence leaders tried to cover up their failure to transform Zimbabwe by emphasising the policy of reconciliation yet the reality was that coloniality was being rehabilitated. One thing that left Zimbabwe vulnerable to coloniality was the fact that the transfer of political power from the white settlers to an elite group of African nationalists was supervised by the British and Americans at the Lancaster House Conference. Among the objectives of the two capitalist powers was to make sure that radical decolonial Marxist ideologies espoused by the liberation forces that sought to dismantle coloniality and construct a socialist state did not come to fruition.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011b) further argues that coloniality was also able to survive in Zimbabwe because the African bourgeois elite like Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe amongst others that dominated the Lancaster House talks had not completely ‘committed class suicide’ to fully embrace the radical demands of the peasants, workers and the guerrilla forces who wanted revolutionary changes. Nationalists were apparently satisfied with replacing the retreating white colonial bourgeoisie rather than bringing a radical transformation to colonial structure. This was proven when the black bourgeoisie colonized spaces previously occupied by white colonizers soon after independence.

To prove that there was transition without transformation, socio-economic inequities characteristic of the colonial era continued under the new black government. The whites lost overt political power but they retained economic power. The standards of living of the whites remained higher than that of the rest of the population even though political transition aimed at resource redistribution. The ownership of resources and means of production remained in the hands of the whites allowing them to retain under a new black government a privileged status they had enjoyed under colonial rule. For instance, the Oppenheimer family continued to hold on to land the size of Belgium while millions of landless black Zimbabweans suffered deprivation (*Zimbabwe Independent*, 24 March 2005). Peasants and other marginalized groups remained socially and economically disadvantaged in much the same way they were underprivileged under colonial rule when the white minority leadership controlled the levers of economic and political power. This has become a source of consternation for some blacks who charge that “whites are rich because they are white”. Black dissatisfaction with white affluence at the expense of black poverty, itself rooted in the failure to radically transform the existential socio-economic conditions of Africans despite independence, triggered the anti-white violence from the late 1990s onwards. This can also be traced to the persistence of the colonial in which whites remain richer than black communities around them in spite of political transition.

The coloniality laden terms of the Lancaster House Agreement dictated that the Westminster model of governance was to be adopted for the new state of Zimbabwe. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b: 6) argues that this state governance framework inherited from the Westphalia state template imposed on Africa by colonial modernity and carried over into the postcolonial African present did not work well for Africans. It was not ideal for the newly independent black state that was yet to define its political and economic identity, thus weakening political and social institutions. Under this model there was to be a constitutional head of state with

ceremonial powers (president) and a head of government with executive powers (prime minister). It was not appropriate for Zimbabwe as its traditions were far different from those of Britain from which it was being adopted.

In Britain, the monarch, though not involved in the day to day running of the state, is a respected figure whose advice to government is almost sacrosanct, but in Zimbabwe the situation was different (Nkomo, 1984). The head of government was under obligation to heed advice from the head of state and the consequence of adopting this model of governance was the expropriation of far reaching powers by the Prime Minister. The Westminster system in Zimbabwe permitted the Prime Minister to make senior appointments in the public service and others services, thus allowing ZANU PF to entrench its rule and dominate the political terrain in a fashion reminiscent of colonial times. Zimbabwe was thus prevented from framing a development model suited to its context by coloniality.

A cursory glance across Africa's political landscape in the 1960s and 1970s reveals that upon gaining independence a number of countries developed into one-party dictatorships. They also replicated undemocratic styles of governance reminiscent of colonialism. The Zimbabwean state under the ZANU PF government developed into a nationalist, pan-Africanist, anti-imperialist, anti-neo colonialist, securocrat, neo-patrimonial authoritarian regime that uses both violence and political dexterity to remain in power. In a neo-patrimonial regime the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage rather than through ideology or law. The right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than an office. The essence of neo-patrimonialism is the awarding of public officials and granting of personal favours by the patrons. In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patron. Mugabe has managed to use the system of patronage to reward personalities that are important to the survival of the regime with senior positions in the army, parastatals, in government and assets such as mines and farms (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Masunungure, 2009; Mandaza, 2016).

The ZANU PF regime has also blurred the lines between government and party. The late ZANU PF Minister of Gender, Youth and Employment Creation Border Gezi said "if you want to work for the government you should be prepared to support ZANU PF (Bond and Manyanya, 2003:82) this statement shows that state and party were conflated. It should be noted that the conflation between state and party is not only a consequence of deliberate

political will but is also a product of complex historical forces. For instance, in search of regime security in the 1980s ZANU PF recruited from its ranks people to serve as intelligence operatives. These members have been more loyal to the party than to the state. They have assisted the regime whenever its stay in power has been threatened. Masunungure (2009) perceives ZANU-PF as a party whose stay in power hinges upon a destructive mix of ideology, patronage, and violence. A detailed discussion of this will be provided in chapter seven.

ZANU PF attempted to establish a one-party state like other ruling parties in Africa. It was frustrated in its bid in the early eighties by PF ZAPU and in the late eighties by the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM). After failing to create a *de jure* one party state ZANU PF had to be content with a *de facto* one party state system. The creation of a *de facto* one party system restricted citizen participation in governance and decision making promised in struggles for independence.

Observed from the lens of the coloniality of power, the ZANU PF independence government assumed the role of a patriarchal figure. It saw itself as the patron of everything existing under its authority. That which obeyed its commands was rewarded while that which defied its orders was punished. The violence, marginalization and exploitation of those that disobeyed the government were predicated on coloniality of being in which the patriarchal government saw its ontology as denser than that of its constituency. Once in power, ZANU PF metamorphosed into an authoritarian neo-patrimonial regime with an entrenched patronage and discrimination system. The regime had a lot in common with Smith's authoritarian government although the difference was the racial composition of the country's leadership. Coloniality was therefore being reproduced in Zimbabwe albeit under a different guise; the oppressor was no longer white, but black. This cast a dark shadow on prospects to achieve peace, unity and reconciliation.

The violence that has been experienced in Zimbabwe can be explained as consequence of ZANU PF inheriting the repressive colonial machinery intact at independence. It inherited intact an infrastructure of violence; the police service, central intelligence agency, prison service and army. To Muzondidya (2009a:176), the Lancaster House Agreement ensured that there was a strong continuation with the Rhodesian state perpetuated through the application of repressive laws, such as the Emergency Powers Act (Chapter 11:04) and the 1960 Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) which were used to detain political rivals and silence

critics. Patterns of repression under colonialism persisted in Zimbabwe as little was done to reform oppressive colonial legislation such as LOMA that was still in use. In the year 2002, a variant of LOMA known as the Public Order Security Act (POSA) was passed. POSA curtailed the freedom of association and movement of the population giving the government greater coercive control of the state in a similar way that the colonial government had controlled Africans. By assuming the colonial and equally military oriented structures of the retreating settler state serious implications were left for peace and democracy.

Still on repression, the post-independence government, like colonial authorities, employed violence as a mode of governing and pacifying the population. It employed violence to crush insurgency in Matabeleland in the 1980s, to thwart the opposition ZUM in the 1990s and to punish whites and the MDC from 2000 onwards. The violence unleashed by the state mirrored colonial forms of governance that sanctioned violence as a mode of domination, an instrument of control and form of conflict resolution. While the colonial settler state employed violence in pursuance of retaining white minority privileges, repression in the independence period has, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012a), come under the guise of the national unity, regime security, and post-colonial development but contributing little towards the achievement of the same. Sachikonye (2011) adds his voice to arguments on institutionalized state violence in Zimbabwe by pointing out that state sanctioned violence on citizens in Zimbabwe is a legacy of colonialism and the liberation war waged to end it which in essence is consequence of coloniality. The settlers resorted to brute force to conquer Zimbabwe and violence to cower the colonized peoples. In pursuit of independence nationalist violence swept away colonial rule but violence associated with colonialism and nationalism did not die with independence as it overlapped into the independence period.

In a fashion akin to colonial rule the police brutally crushed strikes at Hwange Colliery, Empress Nickel mine and at Swift Transport Company in Harare in May 1980. The government was congratulated by Don Bullock, chairman of the combined employers' federation on "handling the strike situation very well" (Astrow, 1983: 178). The agreement at Lancaster did not usher in a new governance *modus operandi*. The new black government was employing violence to resolve labour disputes just as it had before independence (1927 Shamva mine strike). The brutal use of force by the government to resolve labour disputes was to set it on a collision course with the labour movement by the close of the second decade of independence. Government's conflict with the labour movement contributed significantly to the generation of the Zimbabwe crisis.

In 1980, the new ZANU PF government announced that it would be socialist. Although having professed to be socialist at independence, Zimbabwe was in reality capitalist, what Bond and Manyanya (2003) call talking left but walking right. To Astrow (1983:142 -43), the provisions of the Lancaster House Constitution channeled the new Zimbabwe government on a capitalist path and integrated it into the global capitalist system. The terms regarding land and property and the inheritance of debt forced the country to adopt capitalism despite the state's Marxist rhetoric. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b:19) concurs that the birth of post colonial Zimbabwean state was straight into the hands of neo-colonialism, lending credence to observations by Grosfoguel (2007) that the most powerful myth of the twentieth century was the notion that the end of direct colonialism amounted to decolonization of the ex-colonized world.

The notion of “coloniality of power” is that the world has not fully decolonized. The first decolonization was incomplete. It was limited to juridical-political “independence” from the European imperial states (Grosfoguel: 2003). This is perhaps exactly what Zimbabwe experienced in 1980. This was seen when Zimbabwe's first budget in 1980 was virtually indistinguishable from previous budgets presented by the Rhodesian Front ministers in the 1970s (Astrow, 1983:175). The budget was pro-capitalist and served to perpetuate the colonial situation in Zimbabwe. Having embraced capitalism Zimbabwe was unable to resist international finance and got sucked into a dependency it was unable to shake off.

The Lancaster House Agreement left Zimbabwe economically tied to and dependent on Britain in particular and global capitalism in general. The economy of the new government was tailored for interaction with Western powers within the global capitalist system. For instance, the Zimbabwean agrarian systems were arranged to make sure they produced the cash crops needed in Europe and America. There was no change in the marketing of products for the young independent country that was obliged to use the same economic channels used by former colonizer. The basis of Zimbabwe's exports remained fundamentally raw materials while finished products continued to be the main import. The economy was still organized in order to complete the economy of Britain. Multi-National Companies (MNCs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations became the main conduits through which Europe and America controlled Zimbabwe. This arrangement benefitted Britain more than Zimbabwe just as it had under colonialism, as Britain developed Zimbabwe remained mired in underdevelopment and poverty. Post-independence Zimbabwe remained ensnared in the coloniality of power.

Zimbabwe therefore remained largely a colonial state, a geo-political concept shaped by the colonizer. In a classic case of what Fanon (1968) terms repetition without change both the African nationalists that acceded to the Lancaster House Agreement and the educated African nationalists that embraced the Internal Settlement inherited a bourgeois state model from the colonizer that was designed for business with the Western white bourgeoisie. The state's capacity for autonomous and transformative economic development was blocked, therefore giving rise to underdevelopment, undemocratic tendencies, an unaccountable executive, a weak legislature, a pliant judiciary and distressed "National" institutions. This situation retarded Zimbabwe's development process. (Interview with a leading academic and publisher: 4/9/2015).

A resident of the city of Harare partially concurs with the above and adds that the absence of development and the conflict engulfing Zimbabwe is a consequence of the ZANU PF government having ruined the economy as well as its international and domestic relations as it attempted to remedy the flaws of the British tailored Lancaster House Agreement that failed to bring fundamental economic change at independence (Interview: with a local resident 14/3/2015). While the above respondent has a point that the denial of full economic independence to Zimbabwe by the Lancaster House agreement has been responsible for conflict, it should also be noted that the ZANU PF government has presented capitalist powers as solely responsible for the crisis to cover up for its corruption and policy failures that also explain conflict in Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe's development was further set back by a huge debt inherited from Ian Smith's Rhodesia Front government that it had to repay. According to Bond and Manyanya (2003:17), at independence the Rhodesians left the Zimbabwe government the following financial liabilities: a multi-lateral debt of US\$5.3million, a bilateral debt of US\$97.9million and a private debt of US\$593.9million. Attempts by the government to get the settlers to pay were blocked by Britain and America that threatened to cut aid grants if the government persisted. The Zimbabwean government backed off. The fact that Britain could still call the shots on Zimbabwe as it had done under colonial rule was a manifestation of coloniality of power. Furthermore by inheriting the Rhodesian debt the new government was embracing coloniality as it was taking over a problem from colonialism.

Bond and Manyanya (2003) point out that by the end of the first decade of independence Zimbabwe's debt stood at US\$2.9 billion, forcing it to adopt the disastrous ESAP in the

1990s as a way out of economic difficulties. Debt to Bond and Manyanya weakened the Zimbabwe's capacity to resist international finance. The country was forced to borrow from the WB and IMF not just to settle debts but to fund massive post-war reconstruction programmes. Zimbabwe was thus sucked into the exploitative global financial system dominated by Europe and America from which it was unable to extricate itself. US and Europe controlled IMF and WB institutions became the vehicle through which the West managed to influence Zimbabwe's economic governance. It is clear from the above that tentacles of economic power that tied colonial Zimbabwe to international capital were not severed after independence.

Colonial continuities were also noted in the way the new African leadership merely facilitated the removal of the privileged whites who were hindering their advancement only to fill their shoes - what Marxists term an elite transition and what Fanon (1968:27) in particular calls the replacing of a certain "species of men by another species of men". Zimbabwe's black political elite that took over power at the end of colonialism were a poorly resourced class with no economic power. To Bond (2000) the ruling ZANU PF elite did not make a break with the past. The black political elite underwent transformation from being a force of liberation for all people to a highly compromised vehicle serving the economic and political interests of an elite few. The political leadership invaded towns built by settlers and engaged in primitive accumulation of wealth. They corruptly and greedily enriched themselves at the expense of initiating development programmes and projects to benefit the rest of the population. Wealth came to be concentrated in the hands of the minority elite that ignored the basic needs of the population leading to civil unrest in the late 1990s.

Colonialism had created a hierarchical society with whites occupying the top echelons and blacks the bottom. After independence black political power and white economic power combined to make the two groups the new elite that occupied the top strata of the social order leaving the urban proletariat and peasantry to occupy the bottom echelons of the social hierarchy. Kinloch (2007) notes the rise of a ruling indigenous bourgeoisie in the place of colonial elites. For instance, by 1990 most of the land that had been taken from whites had been allocated to government officials, senior civil servants, ministers and members of parliament. The interests of a small section of black Zimbabweans were advanced at the expense of landless peasants and the generality of the population of Zimbabwe. Edgar Tekere, then Minister for Manpower Planning and Development told university students in July of 1981 that some MPs had "inherited the colonial mentality". Two years later Mugabe,

on 17 April 1983, attacked what he called bourgeois tendencies among ministers, who he said “with a more theoretical and thus hypocritical commitment to socialism have, under one guise or another, proceeded to acquire huge properties by way of farms and other business concern” (Rich, 1982:503).

The Patriotic Front leadership at the Lancaster House talks had only managed to remove the discriminatory structures of settler society but failed to radically transform Zimbabwean society. There was no full transformation of Zimbabwean society nor were there fundamental changes to eliminate the last vestiges of settler society. Ingham-Thorpe (1997) makes reference to several structural inequities that remained unchanged, which coupled with the policy of reconciliation, allowed whites to entrench their privileged social and economic positions. The Lancaster House Conference may therefore have ended formal colonial rule and brought Zimbabwe’s independence but imperialism endured. Imperialism became covert and influenced government policies through white dominated bodies such as the Commercial Farmers Union and the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries. These bodies possessed powerful international connections and possessed tremendous economic and political muscle to interfere with government programmes.

Despite gaining independence culturally, Zimbabwe remained essentially British, for instance; British military advisers under the British Military Advisory Training Team, (BMATT) trained the Zimbabwe National Army while several British universities and institutions offered Zimbabwean students scholarships to study abroad. In the first decade and a half of independence Mugabe became a darling of the West. He was lauded and praised by the West for “outstanding” leadership and was knighted by the Queen in 1994. The close relationship the British government cultivated with the Zimbabwe government allowed the former to influence government policy decisions that promoted coloniality, underdevelopment and conflict in Zimbabwe. Because independent Zimbabwe was a product of colonialism it thus remained entrapped in colonial relations of power.

It has been observed that in spite of being independent the sovereignty of the newly liberated Zimbabwean state was left in doubt in much the same way that the independence of fellow African countries Senegal and Gabon was in doubt as they remained tied to their former colonial power, France. On the eve of independence Senegal’s first President, Leopold Senghor, announced that there would be no change, as his country would remain under France’s wing. He remarked; “In Africa, when children have grown up they leave their

parents' hut, and build a hut of their own by its side. Believe me; we don't want to leave the French compound. We have grown up in it and it is good to be alive in it. We simply want to build our own huts (Senghor, 1957:13, quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2013b). M'ba, the late President of the Republic of Gabon on arrival in Paris on an official state visit said "Gabon is independent, but between Gabon and France nothing has changed; everything goes on as before. In fact, the only change is that M'ba is president of the Gabonese Republic and that he is received by the president of the French Republic" (Fanon, 1968:52). The tentacles of power that linked Gabon and Senegal to France under colonialism still hook Gabon and Senegal to France in the post-independence period. Fundamentally nothing changed too in Zimbabwe after independence. The only change was that Mugabe was the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe and was now being received by Margaret Thatcher in the British compound.

5.7 THE UNRESOLVED LAND QUESTION

Liberation forces in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle managed to push back judicial-political control but failed to extricate Zimbabwe from the snares of coloniality. One marker of the persistence of coloniality was the continued control the white minority had in the ownership of strategic resources like mines and industries and above all else, land. At independence 1.2 million blacks lived on 19.8 million hectares. Eight thousand five hundred (8.500) black small scale and commercial farmers owned 1.6 million hectares whilst 4500 white large scale commercial farmers owned 12 million hectares in a country with a total land area of 39, 6 million hectares (Munemo, 2013:21).

Despite these land imbalances the new black government could not soon after independence renege on the Lancaster House Agreement and expropriate land from whites because the government's hands were tied by the ten year moratorium regarding land African nationalists had agreed to under duress from capitalist interests at the Lancaster House Conference. It was thus the Lancaster House Settlement of 1979 that was directly responsible for compromising a revolutionary transition that could have resolved the racially biased inequalities in land. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) blames the African elite not only in Zimbabwe but throughout Africa for incomplete decolonization by arguing that they were mainly concerned with taking over where the white colonial bourgeoisie had left off as new leaders rather than with radical transformation. This he further argues resulted in Zimbabwe being born with what Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopoulos termed 'unfinished business.'

In the first ten years the new Zimbabwean government could only acquire land on a “willing-buyer willing –seller” basis in line with the agreement reached at the Lancaster House talks. This task was difficult for the government. The government encountered problems from white landowners who were unwilling to sell. When the government tried to arm-twist them they turned to the courts for protection. The courts frequently ruled in favour of white farmers, thus frustrating government efforts aimed at land redistribution. For those that agreed to sell, the land was either unproductive or was pegged at steep prices making it difficult for the government that had inherited Smith’s debilitating odious debt to purchase the land (Bond and Manyanya: 2003).

When the land issue finally ruptured violently in the year 2000, apparently the British and whites settlers blamed the ZANU PF government for corruption, and the disregard of the rule of law among other things, which is a classic case of what Maldonado-Torres (2004) refers to as ‘forgetfulness of coloniality’ where modernity tends to forget that it creates problems for the subalternized for which it does not have immediate solutions. Similarly, in domestic coloniality ZANU PF forgets that through corruption and other related bad governance practices it has run down the Zimbabwean economy, struggled to find solutions and finds it convenient to blame imperialism.

Most pledges made by the West to assist the government with funds for resettlement purposes were not fulfilled. This further rendered the “willing-seller-willing-buyer” arrangement ineffective as little land was acquired owing to the lack of resources. Difficulties with “willing –seller willing buyer” arrangement meant that the government was unable to resolve the problem of land hunger. Land hunger had led to the problems of the illegal occupation of white owned land by the black population in the 1980s (Bond and Manyanya: 2003). The government labeled the black land occupants ‘squatters’. At this point, according to Mamdani (2008:4), Zimbabwean law still defined a squatter in racial terms as ‘an African whose house happens to be situated in an area which has been declared European or is set apart for some other reason’. Although the government was black it enunciated policy issues in colonial terms and viewed developments through settler lenses, a sign that independence had not brought about decolonization of the mind and epistemological liberation.

The government was on numerous occasions forced to use violence to remove the illegal settlers as it did not want to upset the whites in the spirit of reconciliation and economic stability. This strained relations not only between government and the landless peasants but

also between the peasants and the white population, the former blamed the latter for holding on to what they considered to be their birthright. According to Mamdani (2008), the Mugabe government policy of evicting illegal land occupants that his government referred to in colonial terms as “squatters” earned him praise as conciliator from the international community (the West) for ensuring the security and the property rights of whites who remained in Zimbabwe. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) such political madness takes place within neo-colonial situations whereby black people are forced to decimate each other as Western powers and their European diaspora in Africa continue looting national resources and expatriating the profits. It should be highlighted that the Zimbabwean government was in the 1980s largely praised by the West for protecting imperialist capitalist interests that sought to perpetuate the colonial situation regarding land. However, when it refused to evict farm invaders from 2000 onwards when it no longer required white support it was vilified and demonized by the West because its actions were de-colonial. This is a clear manifestation of the hypocrisy of the coloniality of power.

Although frustrated by several obstacles placed to land redistribution by white capitalism, the Zimbabwean government could not in the early years of independence throw a tantrum and disregard the agreement on land reached at the Lancaster House peace talks. Such action would have been seen to be against the spirit of reconciliation. Whites were seen as vital to avert capital flight, the loss of skills, expertise and experienced public servants. Disregarding the Lancaster House Constitution would also have compromised the state’s access to international capital to finance post-war reconstruction and development programmes. The reconciliation policy made land redistribution difficult and this failure to redistribute land became one of the primary causes of the Zimbabwe crisis and a bulwark to peace, unity and reconciliation.

For the greater part of the 1980’s the government was also bogged down by insurgency in the south western parts of the country. The Fifth Brigade that was deployed in the region committed atrocities bordering on genocide (CCJP and LRF: 1997). The international community turned a blind eye to it. Any revolutionary takeover of white owned land at this time may have lost the government international sympathy and support to tackle the dissident problem. In 1987, the insurgency in the south western parts of the country ended but the government could still not take drastic action on land as this may have interfered with efforts to secure South Africa’s independence. It was likely that revolutionary takeover of land by the Zimbabwean government would have hardened the capitalist backed apartheid regime in

South Africa. Therefore international factors imperial in nature also militated against the Zimbabwean government's efforts to acquire land.

In 1990, the Lancaster House terms regarding land lapsed. Restrictions on the acquisition of land by the government were reduced but the government could still not take decisive action to redistribute land. It was forced by a global economic recession, debt and economic hardships that Bond and Manyanya (2003) trace to colonialism and the adoption of the IMF and WB sponsored Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1990. The programme was imposed by international capital and required its assistance to succeed. Among many things ESAP entailed rolling back the state as a strategy for development and integrating the economy into the global capitalist system. It therefore became difficult for the government to engage in land reform during ESAP as this would have compromised its success and upset international capital whose assistance it direly needed. As a consequence of factors mentioned above the Zimbabwean government failed to commit itself to land reform and to address the land discrepancies which allowed settler capitalists to continue to hold on to land at the expense of the majority black population. This did not promise a future with harmonious racial co-existence and sustainable peace and development.

It should be noted that the failure to address the land issue was not all together a consequence of interference by capitalist linked imperial interests but also a result of other factors of an internal nature. Of note is that in the first ten years of independence the ZANU PF government was largely popular because it had launched successful social amenities and reconstruction programmes with improvements in transport, education and health provision. The massive reconstruction and social rehabilitation projects embarked on by the government after the war were part of efforts to foster peace and stability. Failure to do this may have led to disenchantment with the government and civil strife. These early post-independence successes lulled most of the peasant population that would have otherwise put pressure on the government to redistribute land. In the end the government relaxed and put the land issue on the back burner. Muzondidya (2009a:174) states that as a consequence of the lack of concerted pressure for justice and economic reform from both the government and poor masses, the whites were lulled into a false sense of political and economic security, in which many felt safe in their privileged economic positions over blacks.

Corruption also explains the failure to effectively redistribute land. By 1996 farms for resettlement had mostly been given to senior government officials at the expense of peasants

in marginal lands. According to Meredith (2002:119–121) Witness Mangwende, a government minister, received from government a 3000 acre farm in Wedza which was earmarked for the resettlement of thirty three landless peasant families. Furthermore Meredith reveals that during this time some seventy farms were allocated to members of parliament, senior civil servants and members of the security forces, and influential friends. Disappointed by corruption in land resettlement the British government from 1990 reduced and then terminated funding for the land resettlement programme with 3 million pounds of the 44 million allocated at independence left unspent (ibid). This meant that about 4000 white commercial farmers would continue on land therefore leaving the land issue unsettled.

The year 1991 saw the government avoiding action likely to upset the West in view of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference, due to be held in Harare in the latter part of the year. It backtracked on the Land Acquisition Bill designed to among other things address inadequacies of the “willing-seller, willing buyer” policy. The law would also have allowed land and improvements to be expropriated by government (Smith, 2002: 390). Disenchanted by the failure of the “willing-buyer, willing -seller” understanding which had only managed to resettle 70 000 families on 9 million acres out of a target of 162 000 since 1980 the government promulgated a new law, the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 (Mamdani, 2008:5).

The Land Acquisition Act (1992) was enacted to speed up the land reform process by removing the “willing -seller willing- buyer” clause. It gave the state powers to compulsorily purchase land although the landowners retained the right to challenge the price set and to receive prompt compensation. White land owners exercised this right further frustrating government efforts to redistribute land. Not only did the whites frustrate government’s efforts to redistribute land, but they also put little effort into bridging the gulf of socio-economic inequities between black and white communities (Mbeki, 2001 in Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2013b). Between 1992 and 1997 opposition by white landowners against compulsory acquisition by the government increased with many turning to the courts for protection. The government was undeterred and threatened the expropriation of white farms arguing that land stolen in conquest should not have to be bought back. According to Anstey (2007: 423) the UK, the WB and the IMF responded by threatening to cut aid packages if land was taken without the payment of compensation. This act exposed the West’s conspiracy in keeping the colonial *status quo* regarding land in Zimbabwe.

The adoption of the ESAP was accompanied by a decline in living standards of the majority. Unemployment, retrenchments, shortages of basic commodities and poverty took their toll on the population. War veterans of the liberation struggle were not spared. They took to the streets in July 1997 demanding compensation in the form of cash and land for their participation in the war. They disrupted a number of state functions including the Heroes Day celebrations held in August by jeering Mugabe who presided over the event. Sensing that the war veterans might erode the credibility of his government Mugabe capitulated to the war veterans in November. He promised them land and awarded them financial gratuities of ZW \$50 000 each and ZW\$2000 monthly payment (Bond and Manyanya: 2003). This action more than anything was ruinous to the economy in the 1990s as the Zimbabwe dollar hit an all time low against the US dollar.

The land issue had been reignited. The ZANU PF government's attacks on white settlers, Britain, the IMF and WB increased as the government fingered them as the problem in Zimbabwe's development conundrums. Drawing from Fanon's (1968: 39) injunction that "the settler never ceases to be the enemy, the opponent, the foe that must be overthrown", the Zimbabwe government threatened to expropriate 1503 farms covering 12 million acres for redistribution - about 45% of land held by white commercial farmers, thereby attracting external criticism and the erosion of the economy (Anstey, 2007:424). The promise of land to war veterans alarmed white farmers and the international community who began to tighten screws on the Zimbabwean government for threatening white capitalist interests. In September, the government failed in its efforts to obtain the US\$2billion assistance it wanted from the UN, IMF, World Bank, EU, and 23 foreign governments to resettle 150000 families (ibid). The international community suggested that it supervises the proposed resettlement programme arguing that earlier resettlement programmes had been bedeviled by government corruption. It also insisted that the programme adheres to market related prices and "willing buyer-willing seller" principles, a thing the government was averse to.

In November 1997, the new labour government announced through its Secretary for International Development, Claire Short that Britain was no longer prepared to fund the Zimbabwean government's land reform programme. In a letter written to the Zimbabwean Minister of Agriculture, she said "my own origins are Irish and as you know we were colonized not colonizers" (Eriksson, 2007:12-13). The labour government was in effect stating that it would not be held responsible for what Britain had done in colonial Rhodesia.

This letter marked the breaking point in British-Zimbabwe relations. Immediately after the Zimbabwean government announced the seizure of 841 farms (Meredith 2002:142–4).

With the British government having refused to fund land reform and the Zimbabwean government threatening possible expropriation of white owned land without the payment of compensation, an attempt was made to resolve the impasse. In September, the government called a donors conference in Harare on land reform attended by 48 countries and international organizations, white farmers, the commercial farmers union and multi-lateral institutions. The participants insisted on principles such as transparency, respect for the rule of law, poverty reduction, political stability and economic growth as crucial for any land reform the Zimbabwean government would want to undertake. Most of these principles were viewed by the Zimbabwean government as designed to frustrate land reform and complete decolonization. Once again global capitalist interests stood between the Zimbabwean government and its attempts to correct the wrongs of the Lancaster House terms that had insufficiently decolonized Zimbabwe by leaving most of the land in the hands of white settlers.

5.8 LAND REVOLUTION- THE DEATH OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT

In February 2000 the Zimbabwean government organised a referendum on a new constitution to replace the 1979 Lancaster House constitution. The draft constitution proposed that the government be given powers to compulsorily acquire land without paying compensation. This was a source of consternation for whites who saw the imminent expropriation of their property by the state. Together with western donors, civil society organisations, NGOs and the opposition political parties, whites campaigned against the new constitution. The people of Zimbabwe voted “NO” against the government supported draft on 14 February 2000.

Stunned by the referendum outcome, but clear on the policy of the government, President Mugabe, rather than accepting the election result, opted to continue even more vigorously to appeal to the people on the need to pursue the land re-distribution (Mamdani :2008). He projected himself as the champion of victims of colonialism. Two weeks after the referendum results hordes of ZANU PF supporters and landless peasants backed by war veterans invaded farms indicating the beginning of the land reform exercise. The ZANU PF government saw

the invasions as a Third Chimurenga, a continuation of the aborted decolonial Chimurenga II / Umvukela II and a rebellion against neo-colonialism(Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2013b).

It was carried out in a haphazard manner and was accompanied by violence that mainly targeted the white community. Whites were labeled foreigners by the government and thus denied the right to own land. ZANU PF supporters were told that “*murungu hasi munhu, murungu*”- (the white person lacks the quality of being human, he is just a white person). They were not seen as human but white objects. Only the blacks were said to possess human ontology. The violence unleashed on whites during the land invasions should be understood from the coloniality of being; it was seen as violence not on humans but on dehumanized objects. By so doing the nation building project suffered and doom was spelt for reconciliation. The government refused to pay compensation to dispossessed white landowners declaring that it was the duty of the British government to do so. Mugabe described white farmers as enemies, not just political enemies but definite enemies for wanting to reverse our revolution and independence (Alexander, 2003:103).

The refusal by the Zimbabwean government to remove farm invaders and compensate white farmers for the loss of land was a violation of the rule of law. The government suspended the law to affirm its dominance over the objectified whites. This also explains the failure of the state to prosecute any of the farm invaders that caused the deaths of white farmers. The coloniality of power placed the ZANU PF government and its supporters above the law. The post-independence leaders, themselves victims of colonial violence in the struggle for liberation, were now perpetrators of violence against people fighting for democracy and freedom from authoritarian rule. The above lends credence to arguments that the paradigm of violence cuts across epochs.

The government gave whites 90 days to leave farms and informed them that compensation for improvements made on land would come in due course but not for the land itself as this land was stolen from the original owners in the colonial era. The white population that for more than a decade had withdrawn from mainstream politics returned with renewed interest. It threw its weight behind the nascent opposition MDC hoping that the new party would defeat ZANU PF in the June 2000 elections and restore expropriated land to the white farmers. The white community and the British government responded to land invasions by calling for the imposition of sanctions on the government of Zimbabwe for human rights

abuses and the absence of the rule of law that characterized the land reform exercise (Raftopoulos: 2006).

Land grabs continued over the years and by 2004, only 300 white farmers remained (Anstey, 2007: 426). Crucially, in 2005 the government passed an amendment declaring all agricultural land to be state land and by the end of the year it had seized 6.42 million hectares of land from 4000 white farmers and redistributed to about 200 000 landless blacks (Mamdani, 2008: 7). This act of revising the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement that Mugabe referred to as a “a dirty little piece of paper” (Smith, 1997: 381) by expropriating white owned land without paying compensation signaled the death of the Lancaster House Agreement and the policy of reconciliation between blacks and whites. To Mamdani (2008) it marked the end of the settler colonial era.

The seizure of white owned farms by blacks was an attempt to complete the decolonization process that had been blocked by provisions of the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement. Officially opening the 2002 ZANU PF National People’s Conference, Mugabe remarked that “Ownership of land completes our freedom and makes us real, complete Zimbabweans” (The *Sunday Mail* 16 February, 2012). This de-colonial action had negative ramifications for the country as it was followed by economic collapse, social problems, political polarization, international isolation which scholars generally refer to as the Zimbabwe crisis that reversed the country’s development by half a century.

To quote Ncube (2015), in the agricultural sector which is the country’s mainstay, the crisis had the following impact between 2000 and 2015;

Maize production has fallen from a peak of 2 million tons in the year 2000 to just over 500 thousand tons in 2014; wheat from a peak of just over 300 thousand tons in 2001 to less than 10 thousand tons last year; coffee from 10 thousand tons in 1998 to around 1 000 tons in 2014; beef from a peak of just under 160 thousand tons in 1991 to around 25 thousand tons by 2014; milk from a peak of 250 million liters in 1991 to about 50 million liters by last year. As a result, the country’s food imports as a percentage of total imports has multiplied on average almost seven-fold between the year 2000 and to date.

Mugabe blamed the West for the crisis. At the 2002 Earth Summit in Johannesburg he blasted Western imperialism; “We have fought for our land, we have fought for our sovereignty, small as we are, we have won our independence and we are prepared to shed blood...So, Blair keep your England, and let me keep my Zimbabwe” ” (The *Sunday Mail* 16 February, 2012).

To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b:18) the Lancaster House Agreement sired a Zimbabwe with terrible birth defects, superficial racial reconciliation and incomplete decolonization. It was thus more of a ten year armistice than the resolution of the race and land problems. The settler-native conflict bequeathed by colonialism resurfaced in a more virulent form with the expropriation of white farms. This meant that the gloves were off once again between Africans and whites and the fight sucked in a host of players and reversed Zimbabwe's development.

5.9 CONCLUSION

It has been shown that for more than a decade the colonized people of Zimbabwe fought a war of liberation against Smith's white minority regime only to lose the war to the settlers at the Lancaster House negotiation table. Under pressure from local but in the main external pressure African nationalists mortgaged Zimbabwe to external international interests. Imperialist deception drove the African nationalists into agreeing to an imperfect settlement. This was confirmed by an agreement that safeguarded settler interests, particularly land that was left in white hands. The agreement came to be labeled the "root of all evil" for failing to create a stable social, political and economic order that Zimbabwe required to surmount its development challenges. It was noted that the new black government inherited and refashioned colonial *modus operandi* and modes of power such that the colonial structures remained intact to the detriment of progress for the generality of the population. Efforts by the Zimbabwean government to improve the lives of the majority of the population who had endured colonial injustice by radically departing from colonial continuities were viewed by the capitalist forces as an attempt to reverse the defeat suffered at Lancaster and a bid by a former colony to escape the clutches of imperial power that had survived the end of formal colonial rule. This set the stage for conflict between a de-linking neo-nationalist Zimbabwean government and western capitalist powers at the end of the second decade of independence, but more immediately the hurried and flawed peace process failed to foresee ethno-political violence in the form of *gukurahundi* in the early years of independence. The results were negative ramifications for peace and development in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER SIX

POST-INDEPENDENCE VIOLENCE IN MATABELELAND AND MIDLANDS AND THE 1987 UNITY ACCORD

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the 1980s disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces, also referred to as *gukurahundi*, and the 1987 Unity Accord. It begins by tracing the roots of the violence that rocked the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces in the 1980s. It examines the contribution of coloniality to *gukurahundi* by revealing how the Cold War provided global capitalism with a platform from which to influence events leading to the conflagration that engulfed Matabeleland and Midlands. It explains how triumphant global capitalist and imperialist interests were indirectly and directly involved in shaping the nature and trajectory of the 1980s violence and the nature of the agreement reached to end the conflict. The chapter also exposes how the new black government in Zimbabwe continued with colonial modes of governance and repression in pursuit of regime security during the 1980s. Lastly, the chapter discusses the absence of transformation in the aftermath of the Unity Accord. It argues that the unity agreement facilitated transition but there were no fundamental changes in the post unity period as a consequence of coloniality permeating the peace accord.

6.2 THE ROOTS OF THE 1980S VIOLENCE IN MATABELELAND AND MIDLANDS

6.2.1 Ethnic Differences

In the 1970s and 1980s there was a lot of focus from scholarship on race as the chief driver of conflict before independence. After independence it was noted that ethnicity had for a long time been an important source of conflict and threat to peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe. The violence that engulfed the Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces in the 1980s transformed the discussion of violence from a focus on race to ethnicity.

Although denied by nationalist leaders, ethnicity, it has been discovered, is an important explanation for the 1980s *gukurahundi* violence. The roots of ethnic tensions between the Shona and the Ndebele can be traced to coloniality that led to British expansion in the Cape, the Great Boer trek to escape British rule and the *mfecane* (ethnic warfare between Nguni groups in 19th century South Africa). Pressure from these processes forced Mzilikazi in the

1830s to lead the Khumalo clan and other disparate groups across the Limpopo to settle on the south-western parts of the Zimbabwean plateau where they vanquished Shona chiefdoms and established the Ndebele state. To consolidate the new state especially in the early days of settlement the Ndebele raided the Shona for cattle, women and grain and later raided them to mete out punishment on errant chiefs (Ranger, 1968). Ndebele conquest and raids on the Shona and other indigenous groups on the Zimbabwean plateau raised ethnic animosity.

Despite Ndebele raids on the Shona, relations between the two ethnic groups were relatively cordial in the 19th century until the British occupied Mashonaland in 1890. The white settlers encouraged Shona chiefs living on the margins of the Ndebele state to disregard the Ndebele king, therefore creating tension between Shona chiefdoms and the Ndebele. In 1893, the Ndebele king dispatched an *impi* (army detachment) to punish Chief Gomara for wayward behaviour in settler occupied Fort Victoria. This resulted in a war between the Ndebele and white settlers that led to the destruction of the Ndebele State (ibid).

As part of their strategy to administer Zimbabwe the British employed divide and rule tactics to maintain dominance and control. Shona police were deployed in areas inhabited by the Ndebele. They were often harsh on the Ndebele and this caused resentment among the Ndebele who for a long time had considered the Shona to be their subjects. The deployment of Shona police in Matabeleland became one of the main reasons for the 1896 *Umvukela* and it came as no surprise that the first victim of the rebellion was a Shona policeman (ibid).

While the seeds of ethnicity in Zimbabwe could be found in the pre-colonial period, it was in the colonial era that tribalism was nurtured and flourished. British colonialism introduced the politics of ethnicity to the politics of race emerging from the pre-colonial period (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2011b). The whites produced a version of history that did not seek to unite the Ndebele and Shona but to portray relations between the two ethnic groups as ever hostile, thus entrenching divisions. Colonial historians depicted the Ndebele as a violent warrior group that mercilessly plundered helpless Shona villages leaving a trail of destruction and bloodshed (ibid). The politicians in independent Zimbabwe later exploited this colonial rendition of history to create friction between the two groups. It has been argued that ZANU PF politicians in the early 1980s reminded the Fifth Brigade and the Shona of nineteenth century Ndebele raids as part of efforts to bolster its support among the Shona (CCJP and LRF: 1997). This action served to sow seeds of resentment towards the Ndebele, thus making unity and nation building difficult.

Rhodesian colonialism continued to deepen divisions between ethnic groups to the detriment of peace. It politicized African ethnic identities which hitherto had been more social than political. It did this through attempts to construct and reconstruct people's identities and by compartmentalizing them in cultural and geographic terms culminating in Shona-Ndebele political polarization (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2007, Chimhundu: 1992, Ranger: 1985). For instance, provinces were named along tribal lines by colonial authorities. The people of Zimbabwe came to identify provinces with tribes and not with the nation. The naming of provinces after tribes broke the spirit of unity and fomented conflict. The fact that provinces continue to bear colonial names after independence is not only a reflection of colonial continuities but also a reflection of unresolved tribal divisions. Maintenance of these colonial names for provinces has hampered efforts aimed at de-tribalizing Zimbabwe for the achievement of peace.

Ranger (1985) and Chimhundu (1992) explain how colonial authorities and colonial missionaries invented tribalism in Zimbabwe and planted seeds of ethnic conflict. Missionaries in an attempt to standardize 'native' languages created ethnicity while colonial authorities through rigid ethnic demarcations, legislative codifications (identity cards), census mappings and other cartographic measures that organized Africans into various ethnic groupings denied them the chance to unite into a single national identity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011b:12). The ethnic violence that has been experienced after independence is in part a consequence of the Zimbabwean government failing to dismantle the system of racial and tribal profiling introduced by the colonial regime. Identity documents that bear one's race, ethnic identity and village of origin and other information that make it easy to reveal one's identity continue to be used today.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) is of the view that colonialism never intended to create nations in Africa based on common national identity capable of uniting against colonial oppression and domination. Mahuku and Mbanje (2013:7) concur with Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2013b) argument when they argue that "British colonialism activated, worsened, heightened and enlarged ethnic differences between the Shona and the Ndebele by strengthening ethnic loyalties and segregating ethnic groups into various provinces. They even promoted differential treatment of ethnic groups as a policy". Partly as a result of settler influence and other social dynamics the Ndebele and the Shona resented each other's presence in areas they regarded as their domains. Msindo (2012) cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008b:42) reveals that the Ndebele attacked the Shona working and residing in Bulawayo in 1929 as part of their claims to

Bulawayo as their city, while Sibanda (2005) makes reference to the Shona in the Gwelo district as not being very comfortable among the Ndebele. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011b: 24-25) the overall contribution of colonialism to ethnic conflict in Zimbabwe is captured by Solomon Mombeshora (1990) who he quotes as stating that ‘the seeds of ethnic factor were derived from the pre-colonial past, [but] the colonial era provided fertile soil in which the ideology of tribalism germinated, blossomed and was further propagated’.

By the 1950s ethnic differences had taken root in nationalist politics evidenced by disagreements that emerged between the Ndebele and the Shona nationalist politicians over the use of the name “Zimbabwe” for the imagined future independent state. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011c) an insignificant party called the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP) formed by some Karanga-speaking politicians that had broken up from NDP used the name Zimbabwe for the imagined future state. It drew criticism from some members of Matebele Home Society who preferred the use of the name Matopos as it was seen as inclusive and non-ethnic, thus more accommodative. Not only did differences arise in African nationalist politics over the naming of the imagined future state but also over which heroes, symbols and history the nationalist struggle had to adopt. The struggle for independence was thus not all about the racial question but also about the ethnic question that was subordinated to nationalist struggle (ibid). In a bid to destroy the racialized colonial state, nationalism by inadvertence reproduced ethnic discrimination and created the notion of ethnic citizenship, thus forestalling efforts aimed at building national unity.

The 1963 ZAPU split added to ethnic tensions between the Shona and Ndebele. The emergent ZANU party apparently pursued political dominance and the re-establishment of Shona preponderance on Zimbabwe’s political landscape within the framework of the nationalist struggle against colonial rule. Critics of ZANU PF argue that it achieved this objective in 1980 when Mugabe and ZANU PF won the 1980 elections at the expense of Nkomo and PF ZAPU. The restoration of Shona hegemony in Zimbabwe was an affront to the Ndebele who historically had considered the Shona to be their subjects. PF ZAPU and Ndebele disenchantment grew as ZANU PF celebrated its victory in the 1980 elections not only as a victory for the party over settler colonialism but also as the triumph of the Shona and ZANU PF over the Ndebele and PF-ZAPU (ibid). This laid the ground for conflict between the two parties and ethnic groups in the post-independence period.

The newly independent state of Zimbabwe was built on a ZANU PF and Shona platform. The politicized and ethnicized power structure on which the new state stood privileged the Shona and ZANU PF while marginalizing other political actors and ethnic groups like PF-ZAPU and the Ndebele and ZANU Ndonga and the Ndau. They were denied space to contribute to the national project. The coloniality of power was propagated through Shona and ZANU PF symbols, slogans, regalia and music used at national ceremonies like Independence and Heroes' days to the exclusion of those of other parties and ethnic groups. ZANU PF therefore created an ethnocracy in Zimbabwe. To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) ethnocracy arises where the distinction between nation and ethnicity is eliminated. The Shona-speaking people to him became the authentic subjects of the nation, while other ethnic groups were marginalized. He traces the birth of ethnocracy in Zimbabwe from colonialism's divide and rule practices of governance to African nationalism as a terrain of re-tribalization of politics. ZANU PF's imagination of the newly independent state in Shona terms was tantamount to bestowing on the Shona greater ontological density than other ethnic groups in Zimbabwe. Most resources and development projects were directed to Shona country at the expense of other regions where groups like the Tonga, Ndebele, Venda, Kalanga and Ndau among other ethnic groups lived. The elevation of the being of the Shona above that of other tribal groups was a reproduction of coloniality albeit at the ethnic level. This placed obstacles to unity and nation building and prompts Ndlovu-Gatsheni: (2011b) and Masunungure (2006) to conclude that in 1980 what was born was the state of Zimbabwe but not the nation.

The neglect and exclusion of PF ZAPU, ZIPRA and the Ndebele from the narrative of the liberation war and the history of the state in general aroused a new form of Ndebele particularism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008c) defines Ndebele particularism as

the rendition of a separate Ndebele history which is different from the Shona historical experiences, the attempts to revive Ndebele kingship, and the continual formation of Ndebele particularistic organizations up to the mass nationalism phase of Zimbabwean history.... in its new form Ndebele particularism seeks autonomy as the Ndebele feel like outcasts in the imagination of the newly independent state of Zimbabwe.

The failure to build a nation state with a common vision, aspirations and unity of mind and purpose tremendously contributed to the violence that afflicted Matabeleland and the Midlands in the 1980s. This can be traced to coloniality which bifurcated social formations and prevented the coalescence of citizens into a united nation state (Mamdani, 2001 in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b). Coloniality was replicated when divide and rule tactics used by colonizers to conquer, subjugate and rule the African people were borrowed by new

governments to create cleavages amongst different ethnic groups in furtherance of elite hegemony. One can draw parallels between the exclusion of other political players and ethnic groups by the new Shona dominated ZANU PF government on the one hand and the white minority colonial regime that pushed to the periphery other racial groups in the imagination and governance of the state of Rhodesia on the other. This bifurcation of social formations went a long way in preparing fertile ground for *gukurahundi* internecine conflict after independence.

6.2.2 The 1963 ZAPU Split

In Chapter Three, the study highlighted that the 1963 ZAPU split was due to a number of factors. Principally, the discourse touched on arguments related to tactics, power dynamics, ideology, ethnicity, leadership and personality. This section does not focus on a discussion of the several reasons behind the fragmentation but explains how the split became the genesis of the tensions between ZAPU and ZANU and the role of the split in generating the post-independence ethno-political conflict in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces.

The ZAPU split was primarily caused by political differences but as the differences widened the split assumed an ethnic dimension; most Shona speaking members formed ZANU while the majority of the Ndebele speaking members remained in ZAPU save for the likes of Enos Nkala who had personal differences with Nkomo. Mutual aversion between these two men was to be exploited by the ZANU-PF government in the 1980s (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2011b). Msindo (2012) who argues that up to 1963, the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism was by and large cordial. It only deteriorated after the split that saw the emergence of ZANU as a rebel movement. Mugabe (1989:338) explains the tribal division as a consequence of “remnants of loyalties emanating from old feudal social formations” under which the Shona and Ndebele were governed in pre-colonial times. To him, the Ndebele came to support ZAPU because the leader was Ndebele while those that drifted towards ZANU were Shona as its leader was Shona. He further argues that colonial authorities capitalized on the divisions between ZANU and ZAPU and played them against each other by exaggerating and accentuating tribal consciousness among Africans in an attempt to weaken national consciousness and the nationalist cause. Mubako (1975) agrees with Mugabe (1989) that colonial authorities fanned the flames of the conflict. He points out that the Rhodesian Secret Service encouraged interparty battles as it sought to present Africans as

unfit to govern and thus justify continued settler colonialism. Ultimately the political rivalry between ZAPU and ZANU turned into enmity between the Ndebele and the Shona.

The split resulted in fierce competition for political high ground between ZANU and ZAPU. The conflicting parties employed vitriolic rhetoric to denounce each other. According to Sachikonye (2011) violence pervaded the contest for political power with running battles between supporters of both parties taking place across the country. The culture of arson and coercion to obtain political consent so common in Zimbabwe was nurtured in the struggle against colonial rule when houses of rival supporters and politicians were burned down. This culture of violence came back to haunt Zimbabwe in the new millennium. Arson characterized the 2000 farm invasions and MDC-ZANU PF electoral and political violence. Sachikonye (ibid) is of the opinion that the viciousness of the inter-party violence was a manifestation of latent aggression built into the colonial system.

After the ZAPU split, the geographical spaces from which the military wings of the parties recruited and operated during the war of liberation reinforced political and tribal differences. As was highlighted in chapter 3, ZIPRA mainly recruited and operated from the south-western part of the country mainly inhabited by Ndebele speakers while ZANLA operated from the more populous northern and eastern parts of the country that are largely Shona country. The split was also in part responsible for conflict in guerrilla training camps in Zambia, Mozambique, Libya and Tanzania, fights would breakout between ZIPRA and ZANLA. Battles were also witnessed whenever the two guerrilla armies encountered each other in the field. Bhebe (2004) attributes the fighting between rival guerrilla armies to the influence of the political leadership of both parties;

These young men and women were trained to hate each other by their leaders, who wanted to justify the separate existence of their parties. Each party had its own Commissariat Department, whose task was to teach recruits the history of the party, how the party was different from each other, who the leaders were and how they were different from the less revolutionary or sell-out leaders of the rival party. Thus, the cadres were brought up to hate (Bhebe, 2004:256).

This state of affairs underlay the deep division that existed between the two liberation movements and left a legacy of distrust between their military wings.

Mpofu (2013a) concurs with Bhebe's (2004) analysis that the post-independence tribal schism that gripped Zimbabwe in the early years of independence is in part traceable to the

form that nationalism took in its fight against injustices of colonial rule. His point of view is backed by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009a:97) who argues that

Zimbabwean nationalism failed not only to unite the key nationalist actors throughout the struggle for independence but also to unite different ethnic groups into a common Zimbabwean identity. Nationalism just like colonialism re-tribalized politics and fragmented its supporters along ethnic lines, and the post-colonial state is paying a huge price for this failure of nationalism.

What Ndlovu-Gatsheni exposes above is that the 1963 ZAPU split exhibited manifestations of coloniality seen in its fragmenting tribal groups in much the same way coloniality fragments races and ethnicities. Coloniality thus contributed immensely to nationalist violence as well as ethno-political violence that gripped the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces with the resultant effect of reversing strides made in the quest for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe.

In the late 1970s, under pressure from the Frontline states, ZANU and ZAPU agreed to an alliance - the Patriotic Front – to negotiate independence with settler government. At the Lancaster House Conference they presented common positions and secured an agreement to decolonize Zimbabwe. ZAPU's Nkomo was the most senior nationalist and was seen in nationalist circles as likely to lead the alliance to contest the 1980 elections. ZANU however broke ranks with ZAPU and decided to contest the elections alone. This action further damaged the relations between the two parties and their military wings as ZAPU/ZIPRA felt betrayed by their counterparts. The relationship between ZANU/ZANLA and ZAPU/ZIPRA was also further strained when the two blocks forestalled each other from campaigning in areas they considered to be their spheres of influence. When ZANU PF emerged victorious in the 1980 elections following voting that followed ethnic and regional lines, ZAPU was disenchanted, accusing ZANU PF not only of violence to win the elections but also tribalism. This did not bode well for harmonious ethnic and political co-existence in independent Zimbabwe.

6.2.3 Suspicion, Mistrust and Exclusion

At independence the Zimbabwean government was faced with a difficult task of soothing historical animosities between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU. Prime-Minister Robert Mugabe tried to ease the tension through his conciliatory action of forming a government of national unity that included members of PF ZAPU and the Rhodesia Front. Despite this, suspicion and mistrust ran deep between partners in the coalition government, especially between PF ZAPU

and ZANU PF. Although Nkomo accepted the invitation to join the unity government, apparently PF ZAPU found it difficult to accept the role of junior partner in government as the party regarded ZANU PF as a splinter group and Mugabe as junior to Nkomo. A senior surviving PF ZAPU official intimated that Nkomo was under pressure from many ZIPRA combatants and some PF ZAPU politicians not to embrace the 1980 election results (Interview with a retired ZANU PF ex- government minister :14/9/2015).

Mistrust between the two political formations extended to their military wings with a history of skirmishes between them. ZANU PF was particularly worried by ZIPRA's capacity for conventional warfare. ZIPRA like ZANLA had violated the Lancaster House Agreement by caching weapons and keeping a significant number of the fighting forces outside the country during the transition period. This made ZANU PF uncomfortable because ZIPRA had sophisticated military hardware which the new government assumed PF ZAPU would use to launch a counter revolution supposedly to make up for the 1980 electoral defeat.

ZANU PF's mistrust of PF ZAPU was deepened by the fact that Soviet support for PF ZAPU dramatically increased during the transition period. According to Kriger (2003:53) arms valued at US\$60 million were given to ZIPRA by the Soviets in 1979. The escalation in funding also continued after elections. Arms from the Soviet Union were directly flown to Zambia contrary to the custom of delivering them to Angola first. This fueled speculation that Soviets were planning to back Nkomo in a military campaign against ZANU PF, a party capitalist powers saw as lesser of a threat than PF ZAPU. ZANU PF also accused ZIPRA of having held back its troops and of having halfheartedly fought the colonial regime with the intention of unleashing its full military might against ZANU PF.

The CIA was keen on keeping Soviet influence out of Zimbabwe and distorted facts regarding PF ZAPU's intentions. Their actions together with those of the South African intelligence agents who engaged members of the former Rhodesian CIO to work with disgruntled former ZIPRA cadres to destabilize the new Zimbabwean government as part of their strategy to protect the apartheid regime against the threat of Frontline States elevated the government's sense of insecurity and raised tensions between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU (Chimhanda: 2003).

PF ZAPU's status as a formidable opposition also gave the new ZANU PF government little sleep. To counter the threat posed by PF ZAPU, the ZANU PF government peddled a singular and celebratory narrative buttressing ZANU PF's claims to power at the same time

undermining the contributions of ZIPRA and PF ZAPU. The ZANU PF politicians used the state controlled media to cast the Ndebele, PF-ZAPU and its leader Joshua Nkomo, and its military wing (ZIPRA), as no heroic liberators, as no committed nation-builders, but as a threat to the country's hard won independence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011c:6). Even on the occasion of Zimbabwe's independence Nkomo was undermined. He was given a seating position among the back benchers which was an affront not only to him but also to PF ZAPU supporters. Nkomo lamented that "behind the saluting base were the benches for junior ministers, the party officials and the supporting cast. At the back of those rows, in the dark by the radio commentators' box where the television cameras could not see us and our supporters in the crowd could not single us out for applause, places were reserved for maFuyana[Nkomo's wife] and myself" (Meredith,2002:40). This cold treatment of Nkomo and PF ZAPU was a spillover of the unresolved contestation for power between the two parties in the 1960s and 1970s. It served to heighten the tension between the two parties and members of the former military wings. Moreover, the Ndebele population, most of who identified with Nkomo, was particularly incensed when their leader was sidelined by the ZANU PF government. In Sibanda's (2005) opinion, as long as Nkomo remained undermined by the new government, hopes of reconciliation that had been kindled by the formation of a GNU would not last for long and co-existence was always going to be difficult.

In October 1980, Prime Minister Mugabe signed an agreement with the North Korean President, Kim Il Sung, for the North Korean communists to train what was to become the "Fifth Brigade" of the Zimbabwean army. The Fifth Brigade was largely comprised of Shona-speaking soldiers that operated outside of the army chain of command, and was answerable only to Mugabe. Implied in this move was that Mugabe was preparing for confrontation with PF ZAPU. In February 1982, the government announced that it had discovered weapons cached on properties owned by PF ZAPU and ZIPRA around Assembly Points and used this as evidence that ZAPU had for a long time been planning to stage a coup (Mashingaidze, 2010:83). For ZANU PF, the question of control of political power which since the 1960s had remained unresolved between African nationalist parties was soon to be resolved as this discovery provided it with a *casus belli* to crush PF ZAPU and terminate a longstanding battle for political supremacy.

6.2.4 The Pursuit of a One Party State

According to Mashingaidze (2010:83), Africa's post-colonial nation building processes have been marred by the failure to tolerate political difference, and he also cites the absence of open-mindedness to share political space by the ruling elite as important. Despite a landslide victory in the 1980 elections ZANU PF was uncomfortable sharing political space with its main rival PF ZAPU. It suspected PF ZAPU of harbouring ambitions of staging a coup to oust it from power. ZANU PF began to pursue a long held desire to establish a one-party state but PF ZAPU with its 20 seats in parliament and huge following in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands provinces were to ZANU PF the elephant in the room.

To achieve the objective of a one party state a political-military campaign had to be launched against the PF ZAPU leadership and its supporters. In January 1982, Mugabe declared that it was 'not a matter of whether' a one-party state was feasible, but 'when it shall come about' (Rich, 1983:502). Soon after the declaration a violent campaign was launched until PF ZAPU finally capitulated to state pressure and violence, culminating in the 1987 Unity Accord that paved the way for the merger of PF ZAPU and ZANU PF. Although the accord did not make Zimbabwe a *de jure* one party state due to the presence of ZANU Ndonga and ZUM in parliament, the country assumed a *de facto* one party state status sealing ZANU PF's dominance of Zimbabwean politics.

Further credence to arguments that ZANU PF sought to destroy ZAPU and establish a one-party state are exposed by Dumiso Dabengwa, the former ZIPRA intelligence supremo who was unlawfully incarcerated by the ZANU PF regime in the 1980s on allegations of planning a coup. In an interview with Nduduzo Tshuma of the *Southern Eye* Dabengwa revealed that Enos Nkala, Edison Zvobgo and Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa visited him in Chikurubi Maximum Prison in 1986 after the death of ZIPRA commander Lookout Masuku offering him freedom on condition that he abandons PF ZAPU to join ZANU PF (*Southern Eye*, August 25 2013).

It would not be an overstatement to suggest that the employment of force to try and force PF ZAPU to govern with ZANU PF under a one party state system was coloniality driven. Coloniality seeks dominance and justifies the use of force to obtain compliance. ZANU PF sought hegemony on Zimbabwe's political landscape even if it meant violently crushing PF ZAPU in the name of regime security and state building.

6.2.5 Flawed Integration of the ZNA

The achievement of independence in Zimbabwe in 1980 did not usher in a period of stable peace. National leaders at the Lancaster House Conference and immediately after independence were preoccupied with racial and political reconciliation while scantily attending to reconciliation between former fighting forces. Tension characterized relations between the Rhodesian Army, ZANLA and ZIPRA. It was the latter two in particular that envisaged the assumption of power at independence. When PF ZAPU did not acquire state power ZIPRA forces loyal to Nkomo were dissatisfied, prompting ZANLA to suspect that it intended to acquire through the barrel of the gun what it had failed to acquire through elections (Martin and Johnson, 1981).

The tense relationship between ZIPRA and ZANLA was further stretched by the botched integration of the guerrilla armies and the Rhodesian Army to form the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). The failure of integration had its roots in the 1963 ZAPU split and the hostile relations that characterized PF ZAPU and ZANU PF and their military wings. Against the background of hostilities, mutual suspicion, distrust, racial and ethnic rivalry, the integration of ZIPRA, ZANLA and the Rhodesian Army to form the ZNA was always going to be problematic. These armies were of different political persuasions and loyalties, differed in training and outlook, had recruited and operated from different parts of the country and fought each other. The incomprehensive intra-ethnic and inter-party political reconciliation after the Lancaster House Agreement meant that ill feeling between the two guerrillas movements did not die. The sour relationship was worsened by sidelining of PF ZAPU in government and the belittling of ZIPRA's contribution to the liberation war by the ZANU PF government controlled media.

The integration of the ZNA was also bungled when bias in the integration exercise was not removed. ZIPRA complained about favouritism in the army integration exercise. It accused the former Rhodesian security forces of allying with ZANLA. ZIPRA cited the promotion of junior ranked and ill trained ZANLA forces ahead of the conventionally trained ZIPRA army. According to Dabengwa, when most ZIPRA went into the integration exercise most "came out tops because by that time they were already well trained to fit easily into the army. However, the ZANLA comrades complained when the ZIPRA comrades always excelled, and it was then decided that if number 5 unit of the battalion is headed by ZIPRA, number 6 must be headed by ZANLA. (*Sunday Mail*, 21 July 2012). One of the ZIPRA grievances

about favouritism in the ZNA integration exercise resonates with coloniality that seeks to fragment groups before structuring institutions.

The tension in the ZNA was also a result of government's decision to hire British troops to train the new army. The British Army worked together with General Peter Walls, Commander of the Rhodesian Army, who was retained to lead the army. The British and former Rhodesian security forces were perhaps the least apt forces to train and integrate the new army as they did not have a full understanding of the ethnic and political dynamics that surrounded ZANLA and ZIPRA tension. Perhaps integration and training of the new ZNA would have been better conducted by people with the knowledge of the dynamics. The disregard of local epistemologies for integration and training in preference of western epistemologies in part explains the failure of integration and *gukurahundi* violence. It was really awkward that colonial and settler personalities were placed at the helm of creating an army that was expected to defend and provide security to an African people. The result of the mess was the desertion of ex- ZIPRA members from the army citing persecution and unfair treatment. This failure to properly integrate the armies became one of the principal sources of *gukurahundi* violence.

The unresolved political conflict between PF ZAPU and ZANU PF dating back to the 1960s also contributed to the failure to integrate the armies that consequently resulted in *gukurahundi*. In November 1980, at a rally in Bulawayo Nkala, the then ZANU PF Minister of Finance, threatened to discipline PF ZAPU and its supporters” if they did not behave,” implying that the ZANU PF government was unhappy with PF ZAPU conduct in the post – independence period. This threat triggered clashes between the still armed ZANLA and ZIPRA forces that were housed in Entumbane, Bulawayo, awaiting demobilization and integration into the ZNA. Within a year unease between the two armies had led to fighting in other centres where the two guerrilla armies were accommodated, such as Connemara, Intabazinduna and Chitungwiza (CCJP and LRF: 1997).

The discovery of arms on properties owned by PF ZAPU, the subsequent dismissal of Nkomo and other PF ZAPU ministers from government and the arrest of former ZIPRA commanders Lookout Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa on treason charges added to turbulence in the army and compounded an already dire security situation (Stiff:2000). The courts acquitted the two but the government immediately re-detained them. The dismissal of Nkomo was particularly painful for ZIPRA soldiers who deserted the ZNA in droves in solidarity with their former

Commander-in-Chief and took up arms against government. Nkomo was forced to flee into exile in Britain alleging state agents intended to kill him (Nkomo, 1984). Nkomo's forced exile led to a further increase in ZIPRA forces abandoning the army with their weapons to join disenchanted disparate elements prepared to fight the ZANU PF government. Together they developed into what the ZANU government termed dissidents.

Dzinesa (2006:2) ultimately sees the Lancaster House Agreement as responsible for the flawed ZNA exercise. He argues that the 1979 agreement did not deal with rivalries amongst the different security forces and neither did it provide the framework for army integration resulting in a botched army integration exercise. The leaders at the Lancaster House Conference also failed to see that the guerrilla armies' objectives of the armed struggle were secondary to guerrilla parties' quest for power (Kriger, 2003:36). As a result of this failure, ZANU PF took advantage of flaws in the integration system to put forward its factional forces as the national force while alienating ZIPRA (Raftopoulos: 2006). The domination of the integration exercise by ZANU PF produced discontent and tensions within the army that led to the desertion of ZIPRA members, some of whom went on to become dissidents. The absence of stringent integration regulations also resulted in the remaining white Rhodesians in the army creating panic and insecurity amongst guerrillas by promising to punish the guerrilla armies upon the completion of the integration exercise. To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011c) the threat issued by Rhodesians prompted the caching of weapons by both ZIPRA and ZANLA fearing that the Rhodesian soldiers might attempt to see through their threat. On the whole the coercive nature of state-building bequeathed by the Lancaster house agreement that "paid little attention to the ethnic configuration of the inherited state, as well as the structures and institutions which enacted and produced ethnicity" bequeathed to Zimbabwe a future characterized by ethnic and political instability and disunity such as that which blighted the army integration exercise and triggered *gukurahundi* (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2007).

6.2.6 Apartheid South Africa's Destabilization of Zimbabwe

As a proxy for western imperialism and capitalism with the responsibility of stemming the socialist/communist threat in southern Africa apartheid South Africa played a significant role in brewing troubles in Zimbabwe. Some ZIPRA elements that deserted the ZNA were recruited and retrained by white Rhodesian soldiers that had left the army soon after independence to join the South African military and intelligence services (Stiff:2000). These

former Rhodesian servicemen saw themselves as continuing with the struggle against a communist terrorist government threatening the South African capitalist system. They retrained former ZIPRA fighters who were then later sent into Zimbabwe as Super ZAPU to fight against government forces and to commit acts of sabotage. Super ZAPU missions were carried out under "Operation Drama" the South African code name for covert support of dissidents in Zimbabwe as part of South Africa's grand plan of weakening Frontline States (ibid).

South Africa employed former members of the Rhodesian CIO as double agents. They were ideally placed to ignite an already combustible situation in Matabeleland. To further destabilize Zimbabwe, they exploited the mutual hostility between PF ZAPU and ZANU PF to further entrench the wedge between the two parties. The act of sabotage at Inkomo Barracks in August 1981, and the destruction of several Zimbabwean Air force jets in an attack on the Thornhill Airbase in July 1982 were part of this scheme (Mashingaidze, 2010: 84-85). South Africa also used misinformation as a tool to foster an atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust and insecurity thus exacerbating the already strained relations between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU. The 1997 Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation report reveals that PF ZAPU was often blamed for various events, which were in fact often at least partly the work of South African agents (CCJP and LRF 1997:40). It has thus been noted that independence in 1980 did not mean that capitalist imperialist South Africa would cease to interfere in Zimbabwe's affairs. South Africa in furtherance of the agenda of global capitalist powers sought to ensure that Zimbabwe did not fall under communist control and therefore played a significant role in generating the 1980s violence in Zimbabwe.

6.3 VIOLENCE IN THE MATABELELAND AND MIDLANDS PROVINCES

The previous section discussed the factors that provided fertile ground for ethno-political violence that engulfed Matabeleland and Midlands and the emergence of dissidents. This section explores the nature of banditry in Matabeleland and Midlands and the government's reaction to the problem. It also examines the contribution of capitalist imperialists to the nature of violence that engulfed the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces.

The discourse has highlighted how the ceasefire agreement reached at the Lancaster House Conference failed to adequately disarm rival guerrilla armies and to provide a sound framework for the integration of the guerrilla armies into the Rhodesian army. This resulted

in the persecution and desertion of former ZIPRA members from the Zimbabwe National Army. Some of the deserters became dissidents after teaming up with bands of disgruntled former ZIPRA members operating in the Matabeleland and Midlands Provinces.

The years 1982 to 1987 mark a period in Zimbabwe's history known as the dissident era. The dissidents were responsible for attacks on government infrastructure and installations as well as rape, robbery, murder, attacks on tourists, government personnel and civilians. Civilian attacks often targeted Shona speakers, particularly those in the Midlands district of Mberengwa (Mashingaidze, 2010: 85). Alexander et al (2000) identify three categories of dissidents. The first category was that of the ex-ZIPRA dissidents that were loyal to PF ZAPU although hard proof that they took instructions from it is yet to be availed. The second group was that of South African backed Super ZAPU armed units discussed in the preceding section and the last is that of criminal elements taking advantage of the lawlessness and security situation in Matabeleland.

From late 1983, the dissidents presumed to be loyal to PF ZAPU operated from three zones in Matabeleland and parts of Midlands. The Western region was under the command of a dissident called Tulane, the Northern region was under the command of three successive dissidents, first Gilbert Sitshela, then Mdawini, and then Masikisela, while the Southern region was under the command of a man called "Brown". Each region had a commander and a few platoons of 15 to 30 men, with sections of up to five men (CCJP and LRF, 1997:42).

The dissidents' population was not large. They numbered no more than around 400 at their peak but were still able to cause a lot of mayhem and create an atmosphere of insecurity amongst the population. They disrupted government's development projects and threatened regime security. In response integrated security units and the North-Korean trained Fifth Brigade were deployed into Matabeleland and Midlands to deal with the insurgency. To Rich (1983:501) the ZANU PF regime had learnt little from the independence struggle. It once again sought to resolve long term political problems through military means. In an interview with Mugabe, Donald Trelford, the Editor of *The Guardian* newspaper in the early 1980s and credited with breaking the story of *gukurahundi* to the outside world, reveals that when he asked Mugabe "if he would consider a political rather than a military solution in Matabeleland" he replied bluntly: 'The solution is a military one. Their grievances are unfounded' (*newzimbabwe.com*, 12 March 2000).

The mandate of the security forces led by the Fifth Brigade was to deal with the dissident problem by any means necessary. The operation was dubbed *gukurahundi*. The violence turned out to be ethno-political in nature as many Ndebele speaking and PF ZAPU supporters were killed by the predominantly Shona and ZANU PF sympathetic government security forces. The campaign to flush out dissidents was brutal and mirrored colonial atrocities. It resulted in the deaths of an estimated 20 000 people (CCJP and LRF: 1997).

The Fifth Brigade tortured, harassed, raped, detained and killed civilians they suspected of providing dissidents with material and logistical support. Some were shot dead in public executions, often after being forced to dig their own graves in front of family and fellow villagers. Some of the victims of the Fifth Brigade campaign were thrown down mine shafts or burned alive in huts (ibid). Life in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands during *gukurahundi* was terror laden. Just like under colonialism terror was employed as a mode of violence to subjugate PF ZAPU and the Ndebele. One feature of coloniality is the disregard and devaluation of life. The way Ndebele speakers and PF ZAPU supporters' lives were extinguished by the Fifth Brigade reflects the reproduction of coloniality as the ZANU PF government saw them as what Mignolo (2009) refers to as "dispensable bare lives" living in Fanon's (1968) zone of being and lacking ontological resistance in the eyes of the dominant ZANU PF (Fanon:1952, Maldonado-Torres: 2007). The extreme brutality with which security forces sought to end banditry in Matabeleland lingers in the memories of the victims, making hopes of achieving future national unity difficult.

The government cordoned off Matabeleland and imposed strict curfews that restricted access to areas where the Fifth Brigade operated, thus enabling it to place a blanket over the atrocities. Information regarding security force excesses did however leak out but the world at large believed the ZANU PF government's propaganda that the disturbances in Matabeleland were all about violence perpetrated by PF ZAPU supporting dissidents rather than the largely one-sided massacre and oppression of civilians that the conflict had turned out to be (Eppel : 2009). A commission of enquiry established on 13 September 1983 chaired by Justice Chihambakwe to investigate Fifth Brigade activities in Matabeleland North never had its findings published; even at the time of writing these findings are yet to see the light of day. It is not within the scope of this study to provide a detailed account of the government campaign in Matabeleland and the Midlands. One can refer to the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation Report on the 1980s disturbances in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces for a more detailed explanation.

Ndebele speaking people in Matabeleland and Midlands were the main targets of the largely Shona speaking Fifth Brigade and other state security units. This was partly a result of the Shona having cultivated negative feelings towards the Ndebele by passing on to their children stories about the Ndebele crossing the Limpopo from South Africa to settle in Zimbabwe where they conducted raids which involved the confiscation of cattle, food, strong young men and beautiful women (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008b:34-35; ZCBC, 2009:2). Basing on these stories negative perceptions of the Ndebele filtered to the Fifth Brigade. Their attacks on the Ndebele were in part driven more by a desire to revenge for 19th century Ndebele raids rather than to contain the insurgency in Matabeleland.

Ndebele speaking people were also targeted as they were seen as Nkomo sympathizers given the massive support he enjoyed in the Matabeleland provinces evidenced by PF ZAPU's victory in all Matabeleland seats in the 1980 elections. Given this state of affairs state security units perceived all Ndebele as supporters of dissidents loyal to Nkomo and PF ZAPU and thus candidates for liquidation. This is despite the fact that dissidents were not welcome in Ndebele speaking areas from which they operated. This kind of reasoning was characteristic of how coloniality- produced imperial tribal reductionism dealt a major blow to peace and national unity in post-independence Zimbabwe.

Mashingaidze (2005:85) states that although the state security units mainly targeted the Ndebele, the Shona were also attacked if they were perceived to be amenable to the dissident cause, especially those that fell under the PF ZAPU spheres of influence during the liberation struggle, such areas as Hurungwe and Gokwe. All in all, Fifth Brigade violence was largely justified in political and tribal terms; an attack on the Ndebele was an attack on PF ZAPU and attack on PF ZAPU was seen as an attack on Ndebele (Alexander et al, 2000). To Nkomo (1984) cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b), the Fifth Brigade was a 'political army' fighting a 'political' if not purely partisan cause that was justified in ethnic terms. Santos (2007) concept of abyssal thinking is relevant for an understanding of *gukurahundi* violence. PF ZAPU, ex-ZIPRA and the Ndebele were labeled enemies of the state living below the abyssal line and thus worthy of punishment. The appropriation of enemy-hood to Africans made it easy for the state's repressive machinery to unleash violence on them.

According to Mignolo (2013) colonial subjects regurgitate, relive, and re-enact experiences of colonialism. The violence and oppression that continues to engulf the formerly colonized parts of the developing world are a result of the experiences of liberators that in fighting

against colonial rule adopted the former colonizers' oppressive tendencies (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2012). These liberators have unleashed terror of a similar nature on their populations. To make his case Ndlovu-Gatsheni cites Friedrich Nietzsche (1990:102) who echoes Fanon by arguing that: "He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster..." Implied by Ndlovu-Gatsheni is that the ZANU PF leadership that suffered colonial brutality and repression gave the people of Matabeleland a similar kind of treatment during *gukurahundi*. The ZANU PF government found comfort in using colonial legislation to allow its security forces to operate unhindered in Matabeleland just like Smith had justified the Rhodesia Front excesses in the fight against guerrillas on draconian colonial legislation. Colonial situations were therefore evidently continuing albeit in independent Zimbabwe.

The persistence of colonial situations was seen in July 1982, when the government reintroduced colonial laws such as the Indemnity and Compensation Bill first used in 1975 to grant immunity from prosecution to government agencies. The intention was to protect security units and provide them with greater latitude in the campaign against dissidents and their perceived supporters in Matabeleland and the Midlands. The Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order 1960) regulations were also reactivated. These gave security units sweeping powers of arrest and detention without trial, the right to control meetings, and so on. Using emergency powers, the Government had the right to override almost all fundamental rights in existence under the Constitution if this was deemed necessary to maintain law and order (CCJP and LRF, 1997).

In order to further buttress the argument that the Zimbabwean state had become a monster devouring its own children Kevin Woods, a former CIO officer that the Zimbabwean government once detained and who published *The Kevin Woods Story in the Shadow of Mugabe's Gallows*, a book that details among other things government's involvement in *gukurahundi* atrocities, argues that the ZANU PF government created dissidents, planted them in Matabeleland and created an excuse for the Fifth Brigade to be deployed in the region to destroy ZAPU and its supporters by any means necessary (Woods, 2008).

Atrocities that were committed in Zimbabwe were not only perpetrated by PF ZAPU sympathetic dissidents and the Fifth Brigade but also by South African sponsored Super ZAPU that operated mainly in southern Matabeleland and were no more than 100 in number (Ibid). Faced with the involvement of a more economically and militarily powerful force in the form of South Africa. Mugabe's government did the unthinkable in its quest to destroy

PF ZAPU and the dissidents. It found it tactically prudent to work with the South African Defence Forces against the Soviet backed *Umkhonto we Sizwe* fighting for independence against apartheid South Africa. Bi-annual meetings between the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) and their counterparts in the South African Defence Force were held in 1982 and 1983. From this alliance Mugabe's government hoped to obtain security intelligence from South Africa regarding ZIPRA operations and in exchange it pledged to deny the *Umkhonto we Sizwe* Zimbabwean bases from which to operate and to destroy its historic link with ZIPRA (Scarnecchia, 2011:88). Imperialist interests represented by South Africa were therefore able to worm their way into the 1980s disturbances with the resultant effect of exacerbating the conflict.

The South African policy of destabilizing Zimbabwe through Super ZAPU worsened the relationship between PF ZAPU and ZANU-PF, prompting the latter led government to retain the State of Emergency throughout the 1980s and to deploy more security forces and to place more restrictive measures in Matabeleland. By and large in the 1980s, Mugabe could at that time be therefore be perceived as both puppet and tyrant. By presiding over the massacre of over 20 000 Ndebele speaking people thought to be PF-ZAPU and dissident supporters in the Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces Mugabe was exuding tyranny. By working with apartheid South Africa to destroy Soviet ally PF ZAPU in exchange for diplomatic, military and financial support from Britain, Mugabe was embracing puppetry. This is reflective of coloniality, a power matrix characterized by entrapments and entanglements that negated the search for unity and peace in Zimbabwe.

6.4 INDIFFERENCE, COLLUSION AND THE SILENCE OF COLONIALITY

This section discusses the role of the West in the violence that engulfed Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces in the 1980s. In an interview with the *Sunday Mail*, 15-21 February 2015, one of Zimbabwe's two newly appointed vice presidents Phelekezela Mphoko, a former member of ZAPU who was once incarcerated by the ZANU PF government in the 1980s, had the following to say about the West's complicity in *gukurahundi*;

... I have always said the post-Independence Gukurahundi was a conspiracy of the West. This I maintain ...People can say what they want, but that was a Western conspiracy...Because their (West's) concern was South Africa, they wanted to protect their interests in South Africa from the Mozambican front and the Angolan front that side...Come Zimbabwe becomes independent: South African gets the same threat now. Zimbabwe is independent; the front is open...So what do they do? They create – from a myth, from nothing: 'Ah, Zapu wants to overthrow you (the Zanu Government)'. (This

was) in order to justify, to create something...You can never hear the British condemning that – never! They can't say anything. They never said anything. They never condemned anything because it was their baby...They knew what they were doing because they were protecting South Africa. So that point should be emphasised; it is very important (*Sunday Mail*, February 15-21 2015).

The British Conservative Party that was in power when Matabeleland atrocities occurred had long foreseen *gukurahundi*. Rich (1983:500) argues that Britain had predicted tribal conflicts between the Shona and the Ndebele, the implementation of a one-party state, economic decline as the whites left, and an increasing disregard for the rule of law with the coming of independence in Zimbabwe. Despite this prediction Britain did nothing to stop it. Instead when the Matabeleland massacres began in 1982, so unconcerned was Britain that in August it even agreed to provide further training to the Fifth Brigade officers. It went on to strengthen bilateral relations with Harare. Aid to Zimbabwe was increased by 10 million pounds (Taylor and Williams, 2002:553). In 1984, the British gave the Zimbabwe government new planes to replace the ones destroyed at Thornhill Airbase by South African saboteurs, thus abetting the *gukurahundi* campaign. For the British and Americans, Mugabe's government at war with PF ZAPU but also co-operating with apartheid South Africa was a strategic regional partner in the fight against the spread of socialist expansion in southern Africa.

There was no attempt by the British to rein in the ZANU PF government at the time. This was because the ZANU PF government was protecting British economic and political interests from ex-ZIPRA guerrillas allegedly receiving support from the Soviet Union. Mpofo (2013b:13) lambasts the West's duplicity when he writes that the British and the Americans, "self-appointed prophets of human rights, stood by as the Mugabe regime slaughtered political enemies, the Ndebele people, with impunity, as long as Western business interests were secure in Zimbabwe."

In December 1982, Ronald Reagan joined Britain in turning a blind eye to the inferno in Matabeleland. The Americans viewed Zimbabwe as a non-Soviet southern African state that with sufficient funding and support could help maintain a balance against Soviet and Cuban influence in Angola, Mozambique and to a certain extent in Zambia (Scarnecchia, 2011:89). The ZANU PF government thus received a significant amount of Cold War funding from the US. It pledged to assist Zimbabwe with military aid, declaring that the "stability and security of Zimbabwe, a pivotal new state striving for the support of the Western democracies to achieve national unity and economic and social justice after years of civil strife, is important

to US interests in Southern Africa and to world peace” (Phimister, 2009:476). The Americans had in fact seen the peaceful transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe as “the greatest reverse the Russians had suffered in Africa for years” as it had effectively blocked the Russians from gaining a foothold in Zimbabwe (Scarnecchia, 2011: 90). The military and diplomatic support rendered to Mugabe by the West during the Cold War gave ZANU PF the space to carry out the *gukurahundi* to crush PF ZAPU and consolidate its control of the state (Scarnecchia, 2011: 87).

While the British and the US decision to ignore *gukurahundi* massacres could be regarded as indifference, their provision of military aid and diplomatic aid to the ZANU PF government could be regarded as collusion with the regime. Scarnecchia (2011:96) makes reference to a Panorama documentary that investigated Britain’s support for Mugabe during the *Gukurahundi* in which Sir Martin Ewans, the British High Commissioner in Harare at the time, admitted on camera that his instructions from London were to ‘steer clear of it’. Other countries like Sweden acquiesced to the use of coercion by African leaders as instruments of state building. Before becoming the Swedish ambassador to Zimbabwe Kristina Svensson when asked about her country’s silence over human rights abuses in Africa in the 1970s and 1980s responded by saying that “it was a period of post-colonial consolidation, the period of one-party rule was necessary and Sweden supported it” (Hill, 2003:78).

British criticism of ZANU PF’s authoritarianism and human rights record in the new millennium has thus confounded many because not a word of criticism from Margaret Thatcher’s conservative government was uttered during the Matabeleland massacres. The interests of coloniality of power were in the preservation of the ZANU PF regime even though it was committing human rights violations. As long as the ZANU PF regime did not threaten capitalist interests the West was quite comfortable with the situation. Ironically when human rights abuses of the magnitude of *gukurahundi* or even smaller visit the whites and threaten capitalist interest the western leaders are quick to respond and douse the flames as was the case in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. The swift response with which western dominated multilateral institutions attend to crises afflicting whites while slow to respond to problems affecting blacks suggests that these institutions in line with notions of the coloniality of being regard the lives of the whites as more valuable than those of blacks.

Phimister (2009:476) argues that silence over *gukurahundi* was not confined to the influences of the coloniality of being but overlapped to the coloniality of power. For instance, Masire,

the president of Zimbabwe's neighbour Botswana, offered sanctuary to thousands of PF ZAPU and Ndebele speakers fleeing *gukurahundi* violence at Dukwe refugee camp but heaped praise on Mugabe on a state visit in August 1983. It can be argued that his silence on *gukurahundi* was a consequence of his country's dependence on western capitalist economic support that he did not want to upset. Silence on *gukurahundi* both globally and locally gave the Zimbabwean government latitude to continue with repression uncensored to the detriment of peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.

6.5 TERMS OF THE UNITY ACCORD

According to Sibanda (1985) post-independence talks to discuss unity between PF ZAPU and ZANU PF began as early as 1981. Other attempts were made in 1983 but these efforts did not yield results. Following PF ZAPU's acquisition of all Matabeleland seats in the 1985 elections and the continuation of disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces the two parties saw a dire need for talks to end the violence. Negotiations for unity talks took off after the elections but broke down in April 1986 mainly over the issue of the new name for the party. PF ZAPU preferred that the new party be called the Zimbabwe Unity Party but ZANU PF insisted that the new party remain ZANU PF. Following the suspension of talks the government increased the heat on Nkomo who had returned from exile, PF ZAPU, dissidents and their perceived supporters. PF ZAPU offices were closed country wide and its activities banned. Nkomo's personal security was at high risk especially after allegations of harbouring dissidents were leveled against him (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2009a, Mashingaidze: 2005). In light of this, Nkomo eventually capitulated and agreed to the resumption of talks in 1987.

The talks culminated in the signing of the Unity Accord that merged PF-ZAPU with ZANU-PF to form the United ZANU PF on 22 December 1987, thus terminating the violence.

Shari Eppel (2009) succinctly outlines the terms of the Unity Accord below;

1. That ZANU PF and PF ZAPU have irrevocably committed themselves to unite under one political party.
2. That the unity of the two political parties shall be achieved under the name Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front), in short ZANU PF.

3. That Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe shall be the First Secretary and President of ZANU PF.
4. That ZANU PF shall have two Second Secretaries and Vice Presidents who shall be appointed by the First Secretary and President of the Party.
5. That ZANU PF shall seek to establish a socialist society in Zimbabwe on the guidance of Marxist-Leninist principles.
6. That ZANU PF shall seek to establish a One Party State in Zimbabwe.
7. That the leadership of ZANU PF shall abide by the Leadership Code.
8. That the existing structures of ZANU PF and PF ZAPU shall be merged in accordance with the letter and spirit of this Agreement.
9. That both parties shall, in the interim, take immediate vigorous steps to eliminate and end the insecurity and violence prevalent in Matabeleland.
10. That ZANU PF and PF ZAPU shall convene their respective Congress to give effect to this Agreement within the shortest possible time.
11. That, in the interim, Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe is vested with full powers to prepare for the implementation of this Agreement and to act in the name and authority of ZANU PF.

There was also a gentleman's agreement to the effect that by mutual agreement one vice President and the Chairperson of the united party would come from PF ZAPU. Other than this concession, Eppel (2009) notes that there were no other commitments made by ZANU PF in the signed unity agreement. After the signing of the Unity Accord, President Mugabe announced that there would be an amnesty for all dissidents provided they lay down their arms. Amnesty was extended beyond dissidents to security units responsible for human rights violations as well as criminals languishing in jail (CCJP and LRF: 1997, Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2009a, Mashingaidze: 2005). The final seal to the Unity Accord came at the joint congress of both PF ZAPU and ZANU PF in December of 1989. As a way of promoting peace and nation building Nkomo was promoted from Senior Minister in the President's office to vice-president joining the other vice president, Simon Muzenda, while Mugabe retained presidency.

The agreement came as relief to the people of Matabeleland and Midlands who had suffered much of the brunt of the conflict. It is estimated 20 000 people died due to *gukurahundi* violence (CCJP and LRF: 1997). There was a severe disruption and a halting of development projects in the Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces. By early 1984, the disturbances had resulted in nearly 500 000 acres of commercial farmland in Matabeleland being abandoned by fearful white farmers (Ncube: 1989). There was also the destruction of infrastructure and attacks on schools, resettlement schemes, and commercial farms. This forced the government to shift some of its resources towards the provision of security. The consumption of state development resources in security provision retarded the development.

6.6 CRITICISM OF THE ACCORD

The Unity Accord was an attempt to attend to issues inadequately addressed and ignored by the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement and the immediate post-independence peace and nation building process that bequeathed to Zimbabwe a huge reconciliation and integration task. It has been criticized for the manner in which it was reached and its failure to provide a solid base from which to foster sustainable peace, unity and reconciliation. The accord was not a genuine commitment by parties to negotiate peace as a better option than continuing with violence. It was a product of unrelenting state sanctioned violence aimed at coercively imposing ZANU PF's will on PF ZAPU. It exhibited the restrictions that are concomitant with coercion as a force for nation-building.

A quick glance at the text of the agreement confirms that for ZANU PF the "explicit and sole objective was the complete annihilation of PF ZAPU as a separate entity" (Eppel 2009:8). After the battering PF ZAPU and the Ndebele were invited into government and a Shona-imagined nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2008b). This echoes the manner in which European colonialists only summoned Africans into the state after vanquishing them. Clause 3 of the Unity Accord states that "Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe shall be the First Secretary and President of ZANU PF" while clause 4 reads "That ZANU PF shall have two Second Secretaries and Vice Presidents who shall be appointed by the First Secretary and President of the Party." The position given to Mugabe as First Secretary and President of the united ZANU PF with powers to appoint reveals that the Unity Accord was heavily skewed towards ZANU PF. The failure by the Unity Accord to dilute Mugabe's powers allowed for the continuation of pre-Unity Accord patterns of power to persist in Zimbabwe the same way the

Internal Settlement of 1978 and the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement failed to check the powers of the retreating authorities.

Eppel (2009) is of the opinion that the agreement entailed the submersion of PF ZAPU into ZANU PF rather than the sharing of power; ZANU PF surrendered little to PF ZAPU. This was shown by the continued use of the name “ZANU PF” and the cockerel as the symbol of the united party while denying the use of any of PF ZAPU’s symbols. To reinforce the fact that PF ZAPU was swallowed Sithole (1991:150) points out that;

Nowhere in the eleven-point agreement does Nkomo's name appear, but Mugabe's appears three times. (Nkomo's name only appears as a signatory to the document.) Nkomo should be praised for the bitter pill he swallowed because his humility brought peace to Matabeleland. Eight of the eleven points are pregnant with victorious Mugabe's ideas. Where mention is made of PF-ZAPU it is either to indicate that henceforth it shall be called ZANU (PF) or that its leadership shall take 'immediate vigorous steps to help eliminate and end the insecurity and violence prevalent in Matabeleland'.

The fact that the being of the ZANU PF party remained unaltered while that of PF ZAPU was diminished reinforces the notion that coloniality permeated the agreement. ZANU PF perceived itself as an ontologically superior political formation to PF ZAPU.

Despite having been subsumed in ZANU PF, PF ZAPU claimed to have retained its political identity. One ZAPU official said “a woman doesn’t lose her maiden name even if she uses her husband’s name” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2008b). Loyalty was given first to the party in the marriage than to the united movement. The above statement from the PF ZAPU official lends credence to arguments that the PF ZAPU-ZANU PF unity was a product of political expedience rather than a genuine commitment to peace and unity.

According to the terms of the Unity Accord the PF ZAPU leadership was supposed to take immediate steps to help eliminate banditry and end the insecurity and violence prevalent in Matabeleland. This clause implied that PF ZAPU was responsible for causing the disturbances in Matabeleland and was thus supposed to end it. There was no provision in the agreement that required ZANU PF to take any action to end hostilities in Matabeleland. Putting the blame on PF ZAPU was not reconciliatory but provocative, it was likely to arouse feelings of resentment among a large number of innocent PF ZAPU supporters in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces that had to endure hardship and state sanctioned violence. It should be highlighted that the template used to produce the agreement was framed and presented by the ZANU PF party. ZANU PF in tandem with notions of

coloniality regarded itself as epistemologically superior to PF ZAPU whose contribution to the peace document was undermined.

The granting of amnesty and clemency for dissidents and state security units by the Unity Accord was condemnable as it denied justice for both dissidents and government forces. By granting amnesty the politicians were taking away the victims' right to forgive perpetrators of violence. A truth-telling commission should have been set up before the state appropriated forgiving powers for itself given the fact that the process of psychological healing for any victim of abuse is being given the opportunity to recount that suffering to a supportive, non-judgmental audience (CCJP and LRF, 1997:17).

Apparently it was not in the interest of government for truth to be known as a precondition for the signing of the Unity Accord. The Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry Report into disturbances in Matabeleland and Midlands and the Dumbutshena Commission of Inquiry Report on the Entumbane battles were not published (CCPJ and LRF: 1997). These reports could have provided the starting point for healing but their suppression blocked truth and justice processes which are integral to peace, unity and reconciliation.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003a) argues that peace and reconciliation can only be achieved where justice is served, the guilty are recognized publicly and victims restored their honour, but this was not the case with the Unity Accord. The victims were not in any way restituted nor were the perpetrators of violence punished. State officials, ZANU PF supporters and security details were not brought before the justice system to answer for *gukurahundi* excesses because the coloniality of power placed the ZANU PF government and its supporters above the law.

While the Unity Accord ended the disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, it failed to foster reconciliation and healing. It did not establish a truth and reconciliation commission that would have created space for acknowledgment, truth-telling and apology which may have possibly brought closure to the *gukurahundi* issue. The Accord did not also make provisions for memorialisation or ritualization but instead preferred to elect silence and amnesia as reconciliation mantra, thus making the achievement of unity difficult. By opting for silence and amnesia the Unity Accord left the ground fertile for seeds of bitterness, resentment and revenge to germinate, which bodes ill for peace, unity, reconciliation and development in Zimbabwe. This is because "it is the axe that forgets what it has done, but

the tree that has been cut does not forget,” as the old proverb goes (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2009a). As long as the socio-economic, political and psychological problems the victims experienced were not addressed little headway would be made to reconcile, heal and unite the people of Matabeleland and the Midlands with their counterparts in the Northern provinces.

The government may not have apologized for *gukurahundi* but Mugabe acknowledged the violence. At the memorial of the late Vice President Nkomo on 2 July 2000 Mugabe referred to the 1980s violence as a ‘moment of madness’. “It was an act of madness; we killed each other and destroyed each other’s property. It was wrong and both sides were to blame. We have had difference, a quarrel. We engaged ourselves in a reckless and unprincipled fight” (Stiff, 2000:228). Dabengwa sees this admission as inadequate for reconciliation. The following is an excerpt from an interview he had with Munyaradzi Huni of the *Sunday Mail*;

H: But, Cde Dabengwa, the President described what happened as “a moment of madness.”

DD: Is that an apology? Do you call that an apology? When the amnesty was declared and even those people, the so-called dissidents, who were responsible for what happened, they should have offered an apology to the government for all that happened and the government was supposed to do the same. We should have a public apology from those dissidents that were operating at that time and then the element of healing should have immediately taken effect (*Sunday Mail*, 21 July 2012).

The closest the government has come to regretting *gukurahundi* came from the late former Defence Minister, Moven Mahachi, who is reported to have said in the *Sunday Mail* of 6 September 1992 that: "...events during that period are regretted and should not be repeated by anybody, any group of people or any institution in this country" (CCJP and LRF:1997). Other government ministers have not shown contrition and have blatantly refused to apologize or show regret. Zimbabwe’s Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, then ZANU PF secretary for administration, is quoted as having said in 2004; “Politically, if the ZAPU leadership had accepted that they had lost the elections and that the number of seats they had were equal to their popularity and convey(ed) that message to their forces, then it could not have happened. It was necessary for them to have accepted democratic decisions” (*Zimbabwe situation* 15 November 2004). Another senior ZANU PF official and former government Minister, Nathan Shamuyarira, asked if he ever regretted the *gukurahundi* atrocities, is reported to have told a conference on national reconciliation in Vumba: "No, I don’t regret. They (5 Brigade) were doing a job to protect the people",” (*Zimbabwe Focus*, 5 June 2014). These comments try to exonerate the ZANU PF government from culpability and

explain government's non-committal attitude towards the compensation of *gukurahundi* victims.

The Unity Accord lost an opportunity to extend the measure of political and ethnic unity gained between PF ZAPU and ZANU PF and the Ndebele and Shona to other ethnic groups and political formations. By not including other political parties and ethnic groups in the imagination of Zimbabwe after the Unity Accord the opportunity for comprehensive nation building and reconciliation was also lost. Minority groups like the Shangani, Kalanga, Tonga and Venda, located in the marginal borders with little economic development felt marginalized and complained of political and cultural domination by both the Shona and Ndebele (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007: 289) quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b:224). In addition, because the accord focused on inter-tribal Ndebele –Shona schism, it did not address conflicts among the various Shona sub-ethnic groups such as the Karanga, the Manyika, the Zezuru, the Korekore and the Ndau, which have accused and counter-accused each other of ethnic favouritism. Coloniality as has been discussed earlier in the discourse transcends racism and overlaps into the realm of ethnicity. The marginalization of small ethnic groups by the larger, more dominant ones in Zimbabwe in the Unity Accord was evidence of coloniality reproducing itself at the level of ethnicity.

The accord did not just exclude other ethnic groups in the framing of a peace charter for Zimbabwe but the other political players as well. The absence of civil society and other political parties meant that simmering grievances in society that had been overshadowed by *gukurahundi* continued to be ignored. The failure to attend to societal disgruntlements resulted in students, opposition and the labour movement protests over bad economic and political governance in the immediate post-Unity Accord period.

Another weakness of the Unity Accord was that it was minimalist in that it merely sought to create space in government for leading political figures in ZANU PF and PF ZAPU. It actually ignored, ridiculed, and sidelined prominent nationalist figures that fell outside the new political arrangement. These include the likes of Muzorewa, Chikerema, Sithole, later Tekere and others. The alienation of these figures who contributed immensely to the struggle for independence held back nation-building and unity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008a:82-83).

The accord was in fact an exclusionist top-down project in which Mugabe and Nkomo appended their signatures to the agreement, announced to the people that PF ZAPU and ZANU PF were now one. The agreement was achieved without grassroots consultation. The

Ndebele and the Shona were told to forget the past and start working together for development. This was naive given that the state had not instituted any programmes for healing and reconciliation that are integral to unity and development. As a result of this, as Mashingaidze (2005: 87) argues, the Unity Accord came to be “perceived in personality terms rather than as a communal and national undertaking. To the grassroots the accord symbolized nothing more than a piece of paper that contained the signatures of the political elite.

Despite the destruction of infrastructure and the retardation of development in Matabeleland and Midlands due to *gukurahundi*, the Unity Accord made no promises to these regions in terms of future development. For unity to be meaningful, it should be accompanied by reconstruction and economic development. By neglecting the need to develop and rehabilitate infrastructure the Unity Accord permanently alienated many people from these provinces. Ncube (1989:318) cites the state’s main daily news paper for the southern region, *The Chronicle*, as reporting that “there was a poor turnout at meetings in Matabeleland by an integration taskforce to form new cells for the united ZANU PF party” (*The Chronicle*, July 31 1988). This was a sign that the Unity Accord was not popularly embraced by the rank and file of PF ZAPU.

The Unity Accord was a home grown project, just like Smith’s Internal Settlement. ZANU PF like Smith’s regime during the Internal Settlement talks dictated the tempo, pace and agenda of the talks. The outcome was determined by an interested party that sought to end the violence and guarantee regime security, silence the opposition, pave the way for a one party state and political hegemony as is revealed by Mutasa, a cabinet minister and ZANU PF stalwart who stated that ‘unity was necessary for ZANU (PF) to achieve the long cherished goal of a one-party state, (Sithole, 1991:150). Therefore for one to conclude and say that the Unity Accord was a compromise and not surrender would not be inaccurate. Because the accord was reached after capitulation it was far from being a durable and a comprehensive conflict resolution mechanism.

Ultimately, the Unity Accord did not alter the asymmetrical national political and ethnic power structure in Zimbabwe that privileges the Shona and the old ZANU PF. Most power continues to be located amongst the old ZANU PF guard from Mashonaland. In this power structure everything is considered from the perspective of the politics of region and ethnicity. The Matabeleland provinces largely populated by Ndebele speaking peoples continue to

suffer from marginalization from the more hegemonic Shona populated northern provinces. Most development resources are consumed in the north while the south is denied development projects. A good example is the government's failure to fund the Matabeleland – Zambezi water project yet numerous new projects such as the Tokwe- Mukosi dam project have been inaugurated in Shona speaking provinces long after calls for water problems to be resolved in Matabeleland. The old ZANU PF and Shona controlled power structure can be argued to be responsible for ethno-political tensions that continue to engulf the country to the detriment of peace and development in Zimbabwe.

Like on any dark cloud one can find a silver lining, the Unity Accord did manage to terminate the bloodshed of genocidal proportions and to end the insecurity that had come to characterize life in the Matabeleland and the Midlands. State resources that had been directed towards the suppression of banditry became available for other development priorities. Refugees from Dukwe camp in Botswana returned. The feud between politicians from Matabeleland and Mashonaland subsided allowing the two parties to work together on development projects that had come to a halt during the war. Although not by any great measure, a modicum of unity was achieved between the Shona and the Ndebele, allowing the two ethnic groups to co-exist and work together. The misery and suffering that had become part of day to day living came to an end and hope replaced despair. There was also hope that maybe the unity agreement might bring not just transition but transformation and development to Zimbabwe.

6.7 LEGACY OF THE 1980s VIOLENCE AND THE UNITY ACCORD

Following the merger with PF ZAPU, ZANU PF's political dominance on Zimbabwe's political landscape reached new proportions. It held 79 of the 100 seats in the House of Assembly. Its dominance of parliament enabled ZANU PF to make significant changes to the independence constitution. Constitutional Amendment No 7 of 1987 created executive presidency which gave Mugabe monolithic powers to control parliament and make senior appointments with grave consequences for constitutionalism, political stability and peace in Zimbabwe. ZANU PF's dominance of parliament and the sweeping powers given to the executive through constitutional Amendment No 7 made Zimbabwe virtually a *de facto* one party state.

The *de facto* one party state system in the post-unity period entrenched the ZANU PF hegemony. A new era was ushered in which anyone seen not to embrace the idea of a one-

party state was seen as an enemy of unity, the united ZANU PF and government. Unity was regarded by the government as synonymous with the idea of a one party state. A close analysis of the concept of a one party state system reveals that it has similarities with coloniality. Both seek dominance through authoritarian and undemocratic means. The *de facto* one party political system that emerged after the Unity Accord led to government arrogance, unilateralism, intolerance and a decline in constitutionalism, critics of government called it a dictatorship. The powers of the rulers were scantily limited. For instance, the ZANU PF dominated parliament became a rubber stamping institution, acceding to ESAP under instructions from the party executive without debate. The adoption of the IMF and WB imposed ESAP in 1990 became one of the main reasons for civil strife that engulfed Zimbabwe at the close of the 1990s decade.

According to Ncube (1989) the conclusion of the Unity Accord allowed a host of discontented forces that had been held back for fear of state excesses or that had not surfaced as they had either allied or sympathized with the state in the 1980s. The opposition, student movement and labour movement found space in the aftermath of the Unity Accord to criticize government on a host of its failings such as corruption and deteriorating standards of living. The rise of the opposition Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in the aftermath of the Unity Accord to challenge the one party state plan and corruption heralded a return to the pre-unity atmosphere of division and fighting. Anti ZUM violence was unleashed on the population by the government with the resultant effect of negating the quest for peace and unity in Zimbabwe.

The killing of the Ndebele by the Fifth Brigade and the denial of development for Matabeleland during *gukurahundi* sowed seeds of resentment among the Ndebele against both ZANU PF and the Shona people that has lasted well into the new millennium. In spite of the termination of hostilities the region continues to suffer from the lack of development in the post-Unity Accord era. Expectation was that the Unity Accord would be followed by development to consolidate it or it would come as a reward to the people of Matabeleland for having accepted unity. A strong conviction has remained amongst the people of Matabeleland that the 1980s violence is the reason behind the political and ethnic discrimination and the lack of development (Alexander et al: 2000).

According to Martinot (undated) the idea behind racialization/tribalization under colonialism was to create social categorizations that differentiated between who could access, control and

utilize resources. Through racialization/tribalization social inferiorization and superiorization emerged. People were given different positions in society. In colonial Zimbabwe if one was black they occupied the lower strata of society and performed menial work but if one was white one was usually accorded an office job. With the signing of the Unity Accord a supra-tribal political dispensation was envisioned but it has been difficult to achieve. Shona tribal groups have continued to dominate the political economy. The country has been administered in the way the Shona imagine it. Most leadership positions in the public and private sector in Matabeleland are occupied by Shona speaking people from the north and the bulk of student and staff vacancies in tertiary education institutions in the south are filled by Shona speaking people (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2011c). In Zimbabwe's post independence labour market belonging to the Shona tribe apparently enhances chances of landing a job in management while other tribal groups have to make do with inferior posts.

For the most part state development resources are consumed in the north and hardly find their way to the south. Radical Matabele politicians in particular and the people of Matabeleland in general interpret this marginalization and deprivation of important development resources for Matabeleland as a continuation of 'ZANU-PF's disciplining of a dissident city'. The perception carried by the Ndebele is that they are being punished for past dissent by a Shona dominated government and this hardens feelings of resentment they have against the government and alienates them from identifying with Zimbabwe (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007: 286). To the Ndebele a feeling of being "second class" citizens in the Zimbabwean state has been engendered amongst them owing to their marginalization by the government. In fact, despite the Unity Accord an ethnically and politically hierarchized power structure that privileges the Shona, the old ZANU PF and Mashonaland provinces while marginalizing other ethnic groups, political actors and the Matabeleland provinces persists in Zimbabwe.

Complaints by politicians from Matabeleland such as the late MP Sydney Malunga, the late Governor of Matabeleland North Welshman Mabhena and former ZANU-PF Politburo member Joshua Malinga regarding the region's marginalization and the unequal sharing of the national cake have been to no avail. The systematic and unfair deprivation of the fruits of independence through the disproportionate reallocation of resources to the Shona-speaking people and to Harare, the capital, at the expense of Bulawayo has not stopped (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008a:47). As a result of this the people of Matabeleland see the post-independence

state as an ethnocracy in existence to serve Shona interests at the expense of the Ndebele. Not only do the Shona dominate the government and private sector but their language has been hegemonic too. Shona personnel have tended to use the Shona language even when employed in areas that are predominantly inhabited by the Ndebele or speakers of other local languages. This is against the spirit of unity envisioned in the 1987 Unity Accord.

There has been little change in the socio-economic status of the common man in Matabeleland since the Unity Accord. The backhanded treatment of the Matabeleland provinces in spite of the Unity Accord can be argued to be a consequence of the ZANU PF government continuing to see PF ZAPU, Ndebele speaking people and the south western regions of Zimbabwe as occupying a lower socio-political rank. The Shona and ZANU PF see themselves as ontologically denser than those of different ethnicity and political persuasion. This mirrors colonial situations in which whites and the Rhodesia Front occupied higher echelons in social and political strata and ill-treated the blacks that they saw as inferior. Hierarchization consistent with colonial society has been replicated at the level of ethnicity. This state of affairs has soured relations and compromised peace between the Shona and other ethnic groups, particularly the Ndebele who argue that the north receives greater funding from government because it is largely Shona populated.

Some Matabeleland politicians have elected not to complain about Matabeleland's lack of development but to defend the government's failure to develop Matabeleland while amassing personal wealth. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011c) laments this when he writes; "They [Matabeleland politicians] conduct themselves like colonial constables, whose brief is to represent Mugabe in Matabeleland, rather than to represent Matabeleland in government." The locus of enunciation of former PF ZAPU politicians from Matabeleland and the Midlands has changed. They have begun to think and act as though they were originally ZANU PF or from the Zimbabwe's Northern provinces. Some have begun to speak of the absence of development in Matabeleland as consequence of Ndebele people being "lazy and sleepy" (*Zimeye*, 1 October 2012). This echoes the sentiments of white colonizers that would argue that blacks were impoverished because they were lazy.

Although the Matabeleland region has been neglected one should note that there are also other regions of Zimbabwe such as Chipinge in the Manicaland province, parts of Masvingo Province, Gokwe in the Midlands and Omay in Mashonaland West that have suffered the same fate. It is also noteworthy that while the neglect and marginalization of Matabeleland

can be blamed on the post-independence government, it should be seen as a continuation of colonial tendencies. Historically the whites had little interest in the remote and sparsely populated areas of Binga in Matabeleland and this has persisted under an independent black government.

Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2007:286) argue that the brutal and ethnic nature of the violence that engulfed Matabeleland hardened ethnic prejudice and aroused amongst the Ndebele a feeling that they were a different and unwanted social group, thus giving birth to Ndebele cultural nationalism, Ndebele particularism and radical Ndebele politics. To them, one of the gravest consequences of *gukurahundi* atrocities is that it reinforced the feeling of Ndebele-ness among the people of Matabeleland at the expense of being Zimbabwean, with the resultant effect of making national integration difficult to achieve.

The lack of unity, the failure of national integration coupled with the neglect and marginalization of Matabeleland have hardened the determination by radical Ndebele politicians to entertain conflict provoking ideas of secession as a way of addressing their plight. This has culminated in the rise of the *Mthwakazi Liberation Front*, a political party whose agenda is to secure the secession of Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands from the rest of Zimbabwe. As a consequence of the marginalization of Matabeleland and Midlands and Shona control of economic, social and political space, radical Ndebele-oriented pressure groups have also emerged. These include *Vukani Mahlabezulu*, *Imbovane Yamahlabezulu*, as well as *Mthwakazi Action Group* and *Mthwakazi People's Congress*. They have openly questioned the dominance of the Shona in employment in general, senior civil service, security and education as well as open neglect of economic development of Matabeleland and the Midlands regions (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2011c). These groups have not only challenged ZANU PF's political power but also the Shona identity, thus laying the bases for ethnic-based identity related conflict. The actions of these groups that are sometimes perceived by the state media to border on tribalism have also attracted support and funding from western NGOs and civil society groups that sympathize with the experiences and plight of the people of Matabeleland.

It appears inter-tribal grievances, just like under colonialism have apparently been used to advance the colonial and imperialist agenda. Former colonial powers have been accused by the Zimbabwean state media of working through NGOs to redeploy tribalism as part of an effort to foment division, disunity and disharmony in an attempt to asphyxiate sustainable

political and socio-economic development (*The Sunday Mail*, January 11 2015). Some of the civil society groups with political agendas to tarnish and weaken the ZANU PF regime have sown seeds of division among Zimbabweans. They have deployed millions of dollars into keeping Ndebele memories of *gukurahundi* fresh yet not putting a penny into ensuring that the people of Matabeleland do not forget the brutality of the white race under colonial rule.

Identity related conflict rooted in ethnicity has also found expression at social events like football matches pitting the Bulawayo based and predominantly Ndebele supported Highlanders Football Club and the Harare based and largely Shona supported Dynamos Football Club. These clubs although not admitted in football and political circles represent not only Ndebele and Shona ethnic identities but also political identities of the PF ZAPU of old and the old ZANU PF. The violence that is sometimes experienced when the two clubs meet goes beyond football hooliganism. This is seen in the fact that both Dynamos and Highlanders fans have composed songs that denigrate the ethnic identity of the other or refer to a period in history when acts of brutality were committed against each other – pre-colonial Ndebele raids on the Shona and *gukurahundi* violence against the Ndebele. The violence and hate language used at the matches is evidence that the Unity Accord did not mend cracks between the Shona and Ndebele but merely papered over them (author's own observations and experiences).

In 1999 the MDC was formed to challenge to ZANU PF hegemony. Its entrance into the political ring was greeted with enthusiasm in Matabeleland. The party thought it could end the Ndebele-Shona tribal rift through political therapy. The MDC leaders pretended that tribalism was not a factor in Zimbabwean politics arguing that ZANU PF was the fount of tribalism. They claimed to have found a formula or panacea to the tribal question. The MDC split of 2005 proved them wrong. The experiment failed as the MDC split into two factions. Most Ndebele executive members opted for the faction led by the Ndebele speaking party Secretary General Welshman Ncube while most Shona party officials backed Shona speaking party President Morgan Tsvangirai. The mass of the MDC supporters in Zimbabwe across ethnicities threw their weight with Tsvangirai save for a few pockets of Ndebele supporters that backed Ncube. In the diaspora many Ndebele-speaking ones opted for the MDC that was led by Welshman Ncube (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2011c). Although the split in the MDC was caused by a multiplicity of factors that included differences over strategy and leadership, the

inadequacies of the Unity Accord as a mode by which to resolve conflict rooted in regional and ethnic divisions was exposed.

One of the lasting legacies of the Unity Accord is that it ended the violence in Matabeleland and Midlands but it brought what Bloomfield and Reilly (1998) refer to as Cold Peace, where there is almost a neutral view of a previous enemy and little mutual hostility but where there exists a lack of mutually beneficial interactions aimed at developing trust, independence and collaboration. If programmes are not inaugurated to translate cold peace into positive peace the former may serve as an incubator for the re-emergence of conflict thus retarding progress made towards the achievement of sustainable peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.

6.8 THE DEATH OF NKOMO AND THE REJECTION OF UNITY

On 2 July 1999 Vice-President Nkomo passed on. It was a colossal event for both ZANU PF and the nation, for Nkomo was instrumental in securing the Unity Accord that ended the violence in the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces. He was the symbol and the driving force behind the 1987 agreement. His death heralded a new era for ZANU PF as it was a period in which its political dominance was beginning to wane and a time in which it began to implode and an epoch in which the significance of the Unity Accord was increasingly being questioned. His death also created uncertainty around the ability of the Unity Accord to subsist in his absence since some had perceived the Unity Accord in personality terms, as an Nkomo-Mugabe agreement because of its top-down nature. Mashingaidze (2005: 87) argues that many saw the death of Nkomo as spelling the death of the Accord. He cites Bulawayo Human Rights Lawyer David Coltart as commenting that “just as the President Robert Mugabe is the cement that holds ZANU (PF) together, Nkomo was the cement that held PF ZAPU together and those former (PF) ZAPU members who are now ZANU PF.” Bekithemba Sibindi, leader of a Ndebele pressure group said “Nkomo has gone with his signature, it is the end [of the unity accord]” (Stiff 2000:227).

Despite the marginalization of the people of Matabeleland, the region itself, and former PF ZAPU leaders, after the signing of the Unity Accord, restraint was exercised as a mark of respect and sign of loyalty to Nkomo. However, following his death dissent and open hostility towards government has been displayed lending credence to arguments that Nkomo was indeed the glue that held disgruntled elements in check. Dissatisfaction with the Unity Accord became evident when within a year of Nkomo’s death an attempt was made to revive PF ZAPU under the ZAPU 2000 banner. ZAPU 2000 was a regional party that sought the

repudiation of the Unity Accord that it perceived as unjust as it largely served the interests of one ethnic group. The group remembered 22 December 1987 as a day of national mourning in Zimbabwe and not the day of national unity. At the same time it attacked the former PF ZAPU elite for “selling out” the people of Matabeleland for personal aggrandizement (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011c).

Disenchantment with the Unity Accord after Nkomo’s death was worsened by the lack of development, investment, unemployment, inflation and corruption that was choking not only the Matabeleland provinces but the country as a whole in the late 1990s. This disenchantment with the Unity Accord was reflected in support for a new political party that made significant inroads into Matabeleland. In the 2000 and 2002 parliamentary and presidential elections respectively the MDC party did remarkably well in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. Its successes in these regions were viewed as a rejection of ZANU PF and the Unity Accord. This rejection can be explained as a consequence of *gukurahundi*, the regions’ marginalization and lack of development and Nkomo’s death that further weakened the existing loose bond between the Ndebele ethnic communities in Matabeleland and the Midlands with the ruling ZANU-PF party. This is summed up by Dabengwa, a losing ZANU PF candidate in the 2000 parliamentary elections, who observed that:

[T]he people have rejected us not only as candidates, but also as ruling party ZANU-PF now. The reason is that since the signing of the Unity Accord in December 1987, the people of Bulawayo feel they have not gained anything. The people have been saying what is the use of supporting ZANUPF and its candidates and that is their message (*Sunday Mail*, 2 July 2000).

6.9 WALKING OUT – THE UNITY ACCORD IN THE INTENSIVE CARE UNIT

On November 8 2008, disgruntled PF ZAPU members in ZANU PF teamed up with elements nostalgic of the ZAPU of old and announced that a congress would be held to re-establish ZAPU as a separate party. They declared that the political structures of PF ZAPU had ceased to operate under the title ZANU PF, and were to resume under the title ZAPU. In 2009, ZAPU was re-launched with high-ranking ZANU PF leaders from Matabeleland in the mould of Thenjiwe Lesabe, Cyril Ndebele and Dumiso Dabengwa breaking ranks with their colleagues in ZANU PF. Some high-ranking members of the former PF ZAPU however chose to remain in the united ZANU PF. Although many high-ranking former PF ZAPU members remained in the party the walkout could by some quarters be regarded as a repudiation of the Unity Accord.

Amongst some of the grievances borne by members that walked out was that ZANU PF had destroyed the values PF ZAPU stood for through the ethnicization and racialization of national politics and development particularly in the new millennium. The pull out was also as a result of what they saw as ZANU PF's arrogance by acting unilaterally and ignoring protests made by PF ZAPU. Amongst the complaints were unequal development and the conferment of national hero status seen as favouring ZANU PF. They were also disaffected by the way Nkomo's legacy was being instrumentally used to capture the Matabeleland constituency yet depriving the people there of development resources (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011c).

Although the Unity Accord has lost its gloss and credibility the last that is left of it has been kept alive by members of the former PF ZAPU that have remained in the United ZANU PF. These include Phelekezela Mphoko, the ZANU PF vice president, Simon Khaya Moyo, the spokesperson of ZANU PF, Sithembiso Nyoni, Angeline Masuku, Andrew Langa and Kembo Mohadi, the Minister of State Security. Despite their presence in the state and ZANU PF hierarchy a significant number of the Matebele and original PF ZAPU that walked out with Dabengwa argue that these remaining members have no real power; they see them as self seeking sycophants serving the interests of the original ZANU PF that need them to deliver votes from Matabeleland and Midlands at election time.

6.10 CONCLUSION

It has been noted that as a consequence of the colonial past, the continuation of colonial situations and their reincarnation under a different political dispensation that Zimbabwe experienced ethno-political violence in the early years of independence. It is also in conflict resolution mechanisms resembling colonial modes of ending conflict via violence that the Zimbabwe's peace and reconciliation problems were inadequately resolved leaving the country in dire need of peace, unity, reconciliation and development.

It was noted that peace and unity have been difficult to achieve in the post independence period because colonialism entrenched ethnic divisions and set ethnicities against each other during the height of African nationalism while decolonization through the Lancaster House Agreement focused on ending the war and fostering racial reconciliation while leaving historical, ethnic, political and military animosities amongst the blacks unresolved. These issues became the source of the violence in Matabeleland and the Midlands in the 1980s

resulting in the retardation of development in Matabeleland in particular and Zimbabwe as a whole.

Perhaps more striking than anything in the failure to foster and institutionalize peace is the fact that the new independence government like the colonial government sought to create a state instead of building a nation. To Masunungure (2006:3-4), a state “entails creating and strengthening the institutions necessary to support and promote long-term economic, social and political development” while nation building is the creation of a nation united in cultural diversity. There is need to rethink and build a Zimbabwean nation which will be sensitive to the disadvantaged provinces of the Matabeleland and Midlands regions. It is imperative that the Zimbabwe government develops clear policies on the fair sharing of resources and ethnic power balancing as a mode of promoting peace, reconciliation and unity so as to avert the potential of the combination of ethnicity and power politics becoming a powerful divisive force in the future. The following chapter discusses the Zimbabwe crisis and the 2008 Global Political Agreement, another attempt to foster peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 7

THE ZIMBABWE CRISIS AND THE 2008 GLOBAL POLITICAL AGREEMENT

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the global context within which the Zimbabwe crisis emerged and the impact of the crisis on the quest for peace, unity, reconciliation and development in Zimbabwe. It traces the origins of the Zimbabwe crisis, the rise of the MDC, western machinations against the ZANU PF regime, government's increasing repression in search of regime survival, SADC mediation and the 2008 harmonized elections, the signing of the GPA and the establishment of a GNU and its end. Concomitant to this analysis is an examination of how the persistence of colonial forms of domination that define power, knowledge and being long after the end of colonialism contributed to the crisis and the search for peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.

7.2 HURLING TOWARDS CRISIS

Following the failure of corporatist economic policies adopted at independence and debt accrued in post-conflict reconstruction the Zimbabwean government was unable to resist international capital and thus adopted the IMF and WB sponsored ESAP in 1990. It was forced to implement ESAP not only because of the failure of corporatist economic policies but also because of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This was after a capitalist onslaught on the Eastern bloc left the Marxist leaning ZANU PF government with only one global hegemonic power in the form of the Euro-American alliance to negotiate with. Embracing ESAP meant that Zimbabwean government had to submit to the dictates of neo-liberalism and surrender the economic trajectory of the country to multi-lateral imperialism.

The government was unable to chart its future on its own terms but was instead forced to pursue an economic programme designed by ex-colonizers of the developing world. According Bond (2000) Zimbabwe succumbed to arm twisting by Washington to accept structural adjustment as a way of accessing western financial aid. Structural adjustment was supposedly home grown but the World Bank staff drafted much of the document, which was substantially identical to those imposed across Africa during the 1980s and 1990s. By adopting ESAP Zimbabwe was formally embracing capitalism, a development and

governance model espoused by its former colonizer and most of the western world. It formally became part of the global capitalist system just like it had been under colonialism.

The IMF and WB programme was prescriptive and laden with conditionalities unfavourable to Zimbabwe. These included the removal of subsidies by government, democratization, deregulation of government services and devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar. Grosfoguel (2009) warns the developing world of the need to decolonize capitalist informed political economy paradigms that constructed and sustained colonial states. The Zimbabwean government did not heed this warning and thus found itself clasped in the jaws of coloniality. ESAP was so immensely unsuited to Zimbabwe that instead of positively transforming the economy its effects were catastrophic. It brought immediate, unprecedented increases in interest rates and inflation as money was drained from the country. In 1991 the stock market plummeted by 65% while manufacturing output declined by 40% over the subsequent four years (Thompson: 2000). There were also shortages of basic commodities, rising prices and poverty, unemployment, retrenchments and company closures and a decline in health and education among a host of social and economic hardships that served to reverse the development process and erode the government's legitimacy.

ESAP did not just bequeath on Zimbabwe socio-economic problems but political ones as well. The socio-economic hardships brought by ESAP directly led to a decline in ZANU PF support while that of the opposition rose creating spaces for conflict. Because ESAP required the state to open democratic space and to be more tolerant of dissenting voices, opposition political parties and civil society groups encouraged citizens to criticize government inadequacies and oppose its policies. Also taking advantage of the increase in democratic space that accompanied ESAP civil society organizations coalesced around the labour movement and increasingly began to criticize government repression and poor economic management. Social upheavals pervaded ESAP years, labour unrest and urban riots over the poor state of the economy became commonplace particularly in the late 1990s. The government turned to repression to deal with dissenters. Citizens were denied the enjoyment of basic human rights by an increasingly authoritarian government (Raftopoulos: 2006). Eventually the labour movement mutated into the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Its creation heralded a new era of political contestation characterized by violence and repression.

Munemo and Matunhu (2011) argue that the imposition of ESAP by the IMF and WB was perhaps a neo-colonial agenda by the Bretton Woods institutions to weaken the political-economy of Zimbabwe and keep Harare dependent on international finance. These institutions were aware of the failure of such programmes in most of Africa and Asia with structural weaknesses such as corruption, lack of expertise, lack of managerial knowhow, and corruption that would militate against the success of ESAP but still cajoled the Zimbabwean government into accepting structural adjustment. Perhaps more than anything ESAP's biggest drawback was that it distracted the Zimbabwean government from embarking on indigenization and black empowerment policies such as the land reform following the expiry of the Lancaster House Agreement clauses regarding land. This left the country politically and economically dependent on western support and vulnerable to conflict. By the mid 1990s, Zimbabwe was already experiencing political and economic instability that was blamed on ESAP, an instrument of coloniality and multilateral imperialism.

One can thus trace the origins of the Zimbabwe economic crisis to coloniality. The imposition of the IMF and WB sponsored ESAP was a ploy by former colonizers that through multi-lateral and financial imperialism sought to keep Zimbabwe entrapped within the clasps of the ensnaring global capitalism. ESAP left Zimbabwe economically feeble and dependent, socially distressed and politically unstable, therefore holding back prospects of achieving peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe.

Despite the difficult existential conditions brought by ESAP the government plodded on with the western framework, pandering to the dictates of western capitalist interests while ignoring the national context and the voices of the masses in much the same way African grievances had been ignored by colonial authorities. Government took little notice of the plight of the suffering masses including veterans of the liberation war who were not spared the troubles brought by ESAP. The governing liberators and ruling elite enjoyed privilege while the governed were exploited and marginalized as they were seen as deficient in ontology and therefore deserved to endure the hellish conditions created by greed, corruption and primitive accumulation.

In 1997 the politically explosive war veterans joined the bandwagon of protesting suffering citizens. They displayed their frustration and displeasure towards the ruling black elite and whites. The two social groups led better lifestyles as they owned most of the land and controlled the economy. With pressure mounting on a government that was increasingly

becoming unpopular, it was in August 1997 forced to pay unbudgeted gratuities of ZW\$450 million, monthly payments of ZW\$2000 and make promises of land to restive war veterans (Bond and Manyanya: 2003). This had a devastating effect on the economy with the Zimbabwean dollar plunging to an all time low against the greenback as investors lost confidence in the economy. A swift economic decline set in characterized by regular price increases, inflation and a further decline in the standard of living of the majority.

The decision by Mugabe to award generous gratuities to war veterans was not only to pacify them but also to enlist their support in preparation for an assault on the opposition. War veterans became a security arm of the ruling party tasked with the intimidation of opponents and the dissemination of propaganda that glorified ZANU PF and its liberation history while vilifying opposition parties and the whites. The war veterans' involvement in politics and governance issues compounded an already dire peace and security situation. Together with security units, war veterans became the epicentre of ZANU PF violence on opponents of the government (Raftopoulos: 2006).

Hard upon the payment of war veterans gratuities the Zimbabwean government decided to send troops to fight a war in the DRC as part of SADC intervention forces. The Zimbabwean army's involvement attracted a lot of political criticism from both within and outside Zimbabwe. Civil society and domestic opposition forces together with western forces criticized the government for its intervention in the DRC war; a distant conflict that hardly threatened Zimbabwe's security. The war in the DRC cost the government an estimated US\$1 million a day and exacerbated the economic situation (Bond and Manyanya, 2003). Against the backdrop of economic, social and political turmoil a new opposition party backed by civil society emerged on the Zimbabwe political landscape to challenge ZANU PF government's rule with the resultant effect of further straining relations between the government and the opposition and civil society.

7.3 THE EMERGENCE OF THE MDC, POLARIZATION AND CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE

According Bloomfield and Reilly (1998), for a system of government to be considered democratic, it must include three essential conditions: meaningful competition for political power between individuals and organized groups; broad involvement in the choice of leaders and policies, free and fair elections; and a level of civil and political liberties adequate to

ensure the integrity of political contestation and participation. By 1999, Mugabe's regime had fallen short of achieving the above and thus could not be considered democratic.

Perhaps motivated by the absence of democracy in Zimbabwe and compounded by escalating political, economic and social problems, a constellation of civil society groups with a strong backing of the labour movement formed in 1999 a new political party, the MDC. The ZANU PF government claimed that the MDC was not a home grown response to the challenges facing the country but a British project formulated on 23 January 1999 at a Chatham House where Britain convinced the EU that Mugabe should be removed and replaced by Morgan Tsvangirai (*The Herald*, 21 October 2014). New African magazine editor Baffour concurs with voices that place the origins of the MDC in the ex-colonizer. He argues that in 2001, the Westminster Foundation, an organization that manages funds of three of Britain's main political parties put together published on its website a breakdown of money that it had spent nurturing the MDC (*New African*, October 2013). Perhaps to confirm this in his memoirs *At the Deep End* (2011), Tsvangirai acknowledges strong foreign and white involvement in the formation of the MDC. The British government role in the formation and sponsorship MDC is consistent with coloniality which seeks to perpetuate colonial situations in ex-colonies through creating and sponsoring the opposition elements to eject from power defiant governments.

The MDC asserted that its formation was to salvage Zimbabwe from *de facto* one party rule and to preserve democracy. It pronounced the need for both political and economic reforms and captured the growing disenchantment of the populace over poor economic and political conditions prevailing in the country. The MDC managed to attract a broad support base particularly among the workers, because of the declining benefits, unemployment and overall economic malaise. It also had support from the rural populace who had been frustrated by ZANU PF's lack of progress towards their development and the resolution of the land question (Raftopoulos: 2006).

The MDC forged alliances with whites whose economic interests were threatened by ZANU PF's desire for black empowerment through the redistribution of resources such as land. The party received massive support from the large white commercial sector whose lands had been earmarked by the ZANU PF government for redistribution. The massive support the MDC received from whites could be explained as an attempt to defend the unfair colonial situation regarding land that continued to exist. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014) argues that Zimbabwe's white

population was opposed to the decolonial action of taking land because they were set to lose their ill gotten wealth and racially constructed notions of superiority. He further argues that as a group that had never experienced the dark side of modernity and yet at the same time enjoying the fruits of modernity they felt justified in resisting decoloniality.

Western capitalist support was also rendered to the young party in light of the government's threats to shrink the economic space western countries enjoyed in Zimbabwe. Within a few months of its formation the MDC had made inroads in the urban centres where social hardships had taken their greatest toll. The MDC's strongest bastion became the Matabeleland region ostensibly because the people of the region still had memories of Fifth Brigade violence unleashed by the ZANU PF government in the 1980s and government's failure to acknowledge atrocities and develop the region. The popular support the MDC received in the late nineties suggested that the people of Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces had not been reconciled (Raftopoulos: 2006).

The MDC's first major blow on ZANU PF was a successful "NO" vote campaign against a government sponsored draft constitution in February of 1999. With the support of white farmers and civil society groups such as the NCA, ZCTU and ZINASU, the MDC frustrated government efforts to introduce a constitution which would have entrenched Mugabe's rule and also enabled government to compulsorily acquire land without paying compensation. Striking in the referendum of February 2000 was the British interest and the massive white voter campaign and turn out against the draft constitution that threatened their economic interests. The threat of white farm takeover had awoken the white population from their deep political slumber. Not long after the formation of the MDC white farmers were captured by state television cameras making massive donations to bolster the party. Nyakudya (2013:171) surmises that the conflict that characterized Zimbabwe's political landscape after the formation of the MDC was more than just a confrontation between it and ZANU PF. It was also a confrontation between the West and ZANU PF.

The MDC had used the "vote no" campaign against the government draft constitution as a test of support before parliamentary elections that were due in June 2000. The rejection of the constitutional draft drew a hostile response from the government. The ZANU PF government blamed Britain and white farmers for the referendum loss. The state controlled media unleashed a torrent of racist attacks against whites claiming that all whites were racist and denounced them for trying to perpetuate white economic domination. Whites were

accused of profiteering and the government began to increasingly call for the indigenization of the economy and land redistribution.

The government encouraged ZANU PF linked war veterans and peasants to violently take over farms belonging mainly to the white community in what came to be called the Fast Track Land Reform Programme/*Hondo Yeminda/Jambanja /Third Chimurenga*, discussed in chapter 5. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009c:1139), to the Zimbabwean government the ‘return’ of the land to its ‘rightful’ owners marked the completion of the decolonization process. The act of taking land from white farmers of mainly British descent was de-colonial and the year 2000 marked the year Zimbabwe took a pronounced decolonial turn that led to the fallout between Zimbabwe and Britain/West. According to Maldonado- Torres (2006:114), decolonial turn refers to the decisive recognition and propagation of decolonization as an ethical, political, and epistemic project. This project reflects changes in historical consciousness, agency, and knowledge, and it also involves a method or series of methods that facilitate the task of decolonization at the material and epistemic levels. In Zimbabwe the decolonial turn manifested itself through the appropriation of white farms, an act the government argued was geared towards the completion of the decolonization project that was aborted by the Lancaster House Agreement and the dismantling of coloniality which was proving to be a stumbling block to the quest to achieve development.

From the year 2000 onwards, Zimbabwean citizenship was re-defined along nativist lines following the occupation of white farms. The white commercial farmers were redefined as *mabhunu* - a term derogatorily used commonly during the colonial era to refer to white settlers descendent from South Africa - rather than citizens (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2009b). The government went further to label the whites as unindigenous and therefore neither Zimbabwean nor African and thus without a right to citizenship and resources in Zimbabwe. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009c: 1152) cites Phineas Chihota, a deputy cabinet minister as saying that an indigenous person had to have a rural home. This description to him is a purely nativist definition of an indigenous Zimbabwean. The government’s labelling of whites as unindigenous was tantamount to a repudiation of the earlier policy of reconciliation which had favoured the settlers.

The Zimbabwe Supreme Court ruled in 2000 that farm invasions were illegal. The government was annoyed by the decision of the country’s highest court still manned by judges inherited from the colonial era. The government launched scathing attacks on the

white judiciary accusing it of bias and racism and eventually forced the judges to retire (Meredith: 2002). Some sections of the white population that had been responsible for the brutalization and oppression of blacks began to scream to the world that they were victims of black on white racism by a neo-nationalist black government targeting whites yet forgetting their own past transgressions on the black population of Zimbabwe. Maldonado-Torres (2014: 30) is of the opinion that coloniality is blind and forgetful when it is the perpetrator of violence. The whites did not see oppression on blacks during colonialism but only began to see it after independence only because they were on the receiving end of “injustice”.

As was mentioned in Chapter 3, colonialists in Zimbabwe employed what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2010) refers to as “epistemicide,” that is, the extermination of knowledge and ways of knowing. For instance, the teaching of history from a Eurocentric perspective was an epistemicide meant to quash Africa’s glorious past (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2011a). Under ZANU PF rule a new variety of historiography known as patriotic history that fomented anti-white sentiment and engendered black on white racism and abhorrence of the opposition MDC was born as an epistemicide to exterminate knowledges that were pro MDC and white. The white population was accused of being unrepentant racists bent on blocking black empowerment while the MDC was portrayed as a puppet party selling out to imperialists for opposing the mode by which land reform was being carried out, thus deserving the full wrath of the state coercive machinery (Ranger:2004). The ZANU PF attacks on the MDC as a white-sponsored party reflected the operations of the forgetfulness of coloniality. During the liberation struggle ZANU PF received funding from white liberals in the western world. ZANU PF continues to receive support from white businessmen based in Europe to thwart regime change. These include John Bredenkamp, Rautenbach and British businessman Nicholas van Hoogstraten to name a few.

Whites and MDC supporters became the targets of black political and economic violence and discrimination in what Mlambo (2013:245) refers to as reverse nationalism. The attacks on whites and perceived MDC supporters were retribution for having championed the “NO” vote, resisting land redistribution and generally opposing the government. These attacks fissured Zimbabwean society. By the end of the first decade of the new millennium Zimbabwe was fragmented into the following identifiable groups; patriots, puppets, war veterans, *machef* (senior ZANU PF officials) *bornfrees* (born after 1980), *machinja* (MDC supporters), *macomrades* (ZANU PF supporters), *varungu* (whites) and so on. In this

classification war veterans and senior ZANU PF officials were taken to be ontologically denser and thus regarded as “first class” citizens with more rights than MDC supporters or whites who were seen as “second class” or even third class citizens. Social classification was determined by the role one played in the liberation war or plays in defence of the ZANU PF regime.

Whites previously seen under colonial rule as superior and ontologically denser beings were no longer viewed in this light. They were seen as detractors bent on reversing the gains of the liberation struggle. MDC supporters were seen as puppets, sell-outs, and totemless descendants of immigrants while ZANU PF supporters were regarded as patriots. The ontology of the MDC supporters and that of whites came to be doubted. They were now perceived by the ZANU PF government to be in the zone of non-being, thus not worthy of rights and protection from violence in Zimbabwe. Santos’ (2007) concept of abyssal thinking is invaluable for an appreciation of post-2000 violence. The MDC and the white race were labeled puppets and agents of neo-colonialism situated below the abyssal line, bent on reversing the gains of the liberation struggle. This left them open to violence from state enforcers indoctrinated by state propaganda into uncritical acceptance of these labels. This was evidence of the workings of the coloniality of being.

Mignolo’s (2009) notion of dispensable lives within the realm of coloniality also helps to explain the treatment of perceived opponents on Zimbabwe’s political landscape. Under colonialism human ontology was hierarchized according to race. The white race was privileged while blacks were marginalized and seen as an unimportant, dispensable population without writing, history, Christianity and therefore did not qualify to enjoy human rights. Colonialists saw African nationalists, activists and guerrillas who took up arms to fight the racially structured colonial system as problems that had to be eliminated. Colonialists never bothered to research or concern themselves with African grievances but simply resolved to dispense with those that stood up to voice their grievances. The colonialist’s perception of Africans as a problem resulted in colonial brutality and liberation war violence against Africans whose elimination was seen as good for the perpetuation of colonial society. This perception of people as problems while ignoring the need to acknowledge that people are not problems but have problems crossed over into the post independence era and explain the violence unleashed on political opponents.

Since independence the ZANU PF government has similarly ranked persons based on

political persuasion and adherence to the ruling elite's philosophy. Post independence elements with views contrary to those of the ruling party have suffered state oppression. They have been perceived as problems that ought to be eliminated and this has been used to justify state violence. ZANU PF regarded PF ZAPU in the 1980s and MDC supporters after 2000 as worthless dispensable lives. This perhaps explains why thousands of Ndebele-speaking PF ZAPU supporters were killed in the 1980s and hundreds of MDC supporters were killed in the year 2008 in state sanctioned violence.

White farmers and immigrants from Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique, perceived as MDC supporters, were denied full citizenship and the right to own land by the government, resulting in them being violently ejected from farms by war veterans in 2000. As people they were denied humanity, citizenship and polity and thus became dispensable. Mignolo (2009: 81) notes that devaluation through dispossession leads not only to the loss of rights but the loss of humanity too. The lives of these minority groups were made dispensable so that the ruling elite could exploit and dominate them. These groups, particularly black immigrants, were discriminated against and denied development resources by the state on allegations of sympathising with the opposition.

The denial of development assistance to persons perceived to be anti-government is informed by the state's perception of the persons as expendable people that the state can do without. According to the *Newsday* of 22 January 2015, in 2002, Didymus Mutasa, then a senior government minister, was asked how he felt about three serious development problems confronting Zimbabwe which related to hunger, the effect of HIV and Aids, and the mass exodus of Zimbabweans to other countries, responded as follows; "We would be better off with only 6 million people, with our own [ruling party] people who supported the liberation struggle. We don't want all these extra people." To Mutasa those that did not belong to the ruling ZANU PF was dispensable surplus population that the state could do without. Mutasa's sentiments were echoed by Emmerson Mnangagwa, the country's Vice President, who intimated that if he had the power he would deprive MDC supporters of oxygen (*newsdzezimbabwe*, 29 April 2015). Like Mutasa, Mnangagwa thinks MDC supporters dispensable and in a way authorizes their extermination in much the same way colonialists saw the lives of blacks as dispensable.

Human rights violations, contested elections and shrinking democratic space from 2000 prompted Britain and the United States to sympathize with and render support to the MDC and other opposition elements bent on removing ZANU PF from power. To counteract western support for the opposition the government passed legislation such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and the Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). The former curtailed the freedom of movement and assembly while the latter restricted the media. Opponents of the ZANU PF regime were the main victims of this legislation. The MDC received sympathy from the liberal West that perceived the legislation as draconian and designed to curtail opposition activities while entrenching ZANU PF's rule.

The collaboration of domestic opposition groups, the US, the British government and their allies against the Zimbabwean government's excesses gave birth to what ZANU PF christened the "Regime Change Agenda" (Munemo: 2012a). ZANU PF argued that the agenda involved removing Mugabe from power and replacing him with MDC's Morgan Tsvangirai, a character it saw as a puppet of the British government. The quest to remove the ZANU PF regime from power and the desire by the ZANU PF to retain power at all costs precipitated a new era of violence never before experienced in Zimbabwe.

The emergence of the MDC on Zimbabwe's political landscape ushered in a new era of political violence. Inter-party violence between ZANU PF and the MDC engulfed Zimbabwe. Youths from both parties frequently clashed resulting in injuries and deaths. A programme officer at a local peace building organization is of the view that socio-economic hardships drove the youth into engaging in acts of political violence in exchange for rewards from political gladiators (Interview with an NGO programme officer: 28/8/2015).

The MDC and its officials often suffered the most from the violence as partisan state security agents and war veterans often lent support to ZANU PF. In the 2000 and 2002 parliamentary and presidential elections respectively the MDC gave ZANU PF a strong challenge. The elections were the most tightly contested since independence. In the June 2000 elections, the MDC gained nearly 50% of the parliamentary vote in the face of enormous electoral obstacles and state violence. With this performance, chances were high that the MDC would defeat ZANU PF in the 2002 presidential elections. The government increased repression to forestall the likelihood of such an occurrence. In a closely fought 2002 election ZANU PF defeated the MDC but violence, intimidation and allegations of rigging pervaded the elections resulting in them being disputed.

The MDC with the aid of western funded civil society broadcast its disgruntlement over unfair elections and human rights abuses to the international community, in particular to the West. Owing to this, the legitimacy of the government was eroded and it lost friends and neutrals particularly in the West. This was evidenced by the withdrawal of aid by Britain, the EU and the US from various government development programmes, thus compromising the government's ability to provide services to its citizens who then blamed the government for economic difficulties, thus compromising peace and stability.

7.4 WESTERN MACHINATIONS TO OUST ZANU PF FROM POWER

Lawson (1993) studied regime change on the African continent and discovered that the majority of regime changes have been masterminded by capitalist states working with agents in satellite states. These states have engineered regime changes in Zaire in the 1960s, Uganda in the 1970s and in Zambia and Liberia in the 1990s and the Arab Springs of 2011. Some of the regime changes have been hatched to extend Western capitalist control and access to and over important resources such as oil, gold, diamonds and other investment opportunities. For instance, in 1997 Lissouba's government in the Congo was overthrown by the French for refusing its companies oil contracts (*New African*, November 2009).

Since the year 2000, the ZANU PF government has been struggling to ward off regime change from the West that is bent on controlling Zimbabwe's economic resources. European economic interests in Zimbabwe can be traced to the colonial era, through neo-colonialism right up to the globalization period. Through these epochs the Western countries with huge investments in agriculture, tourism, manufacturing and mining amongst others, have been using their economic muscle to keep Zimbabwe dependent on them. At the turn of the new millennium Western machinations to remove ZANU PF from power were largely triggered by the government's introduction of indigenization and black empowerment policies aimed at ending the persistence of colonial patterns of power that determined the control of authority, labour and economy – hence coloniality of power. The massive capitalist investments in the country and the presence of a significant white population with strong ties to their kith and kin in Europe make Zimbabwe a special case in the West's recolonization agenda and its resolve to determinedly seek to effect regime change in Zimbabwe.

From 2000 onwards, the West that used to mainly fund civil society and NGO social welfare programmes began to increasingly fund NGOs and civil society organizations that focus on democracy and human rights. They began to document and publicize extensive human rights

abuses that accompanied elections and Operation *Murambatsvina*/Restore Order of 2005 (Raftopoulos, 2006:29). Civil society organizations and NGOs lobbied regional, continental and international organizations such as the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), African Union (AU), the EU and the UN to censure the Zimbabwean government for human rights violations. The government lost friends and neutrals particularly in the West when human rights violations and other democratic deficits were broadcast to the international community. The West did not only seek to erode the legitimacy of the Zimbabwean government but also intended to put pressure on Zimbabwe to reform state institutions critical to ZANU PF's survival.

The collusion between the West and civil society critical of the ZANU PF government soured state and civil society relations in the new millennium. Arrests, torture and harassment of civil society activists increased in the new millennium. The then Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Patrick Chinamasa, branded western funded civic society organizations as regime change activists. He identified the Media Institute of Southern Africa, Zimbabwe chapter, Legal Officer Wilbert Mandinde, as an activist working for British and American funded Non - Governmental Organizations (zimbabwesituation.com/23 May 2007).

Citing human rights violations, the absence of the rule of law and democratic deficits, Britain, the EU, Australia, Canada and New Zealand imposed targeted sanctions on ZANU PF officials and its associates as from 2000. These sanctions entailed a travel ban on Mugabe and nineteen members of his inner circle, an asset freeze affecting those same individuals, an embargo on the sale of arms and technical and training assistance relating to arms in Zimbabwe, and an embargo on the sale or supply of equipment that might be used for internal repression (Taylor and Williams, 2002:555). The West felt that the action would send an important message of political support to Zimbabwe's beleaguered opposition while simultaneously isolating Mugabe's regime and targeting the private wealth and liberties of senior ZANU PF officials (Raftopoulos: 2006).

Britain imposed an arms embargo against Zimbabwe on 3 May 2000. In addition, it halted the provision of 450 Land Rovers to the Zimbabwe police force, withdrew the British Military Advisory Training Team, which left at the end of March 2001, and cut aid to Zimbabwe by one third (Taylor and Williams : 2002).The disciplining of the Zimbabwean government by the West through the imposition of sanctions and international isolation

reveals that the economically and politically powerful North still dominates other parts of the world just like they did in centuries past. In addition, the coloniality of being was behind the West's perception of self as standing on higher moral ground, thus passing judgements and imposing sanctions on the Zimbabwean government in an imperial way.

The ZANU PF government argued that the imposition of sanctions by the West was not a consequence of the absence of the rule of law, human rights abuses and democratic deficits but anger over the decolonial action of redistributing white owned land to landless black farmers. Zimbabwe therefore had to be disciplined for challenging Western hegemony through redistributing land owned by the white farming community ('the children of the empire') with roots in Rhodesian settler colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b:180). To him, it also reveals the machinations of the colonial matrix of power and the troubles that visit a small peripheral state for trying to chart an autonomous decolonial path of development.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) and Mpofo (2013a) argue that coloniality masks itself behind the promotion of democracy, human rights, gender equality and freedoms. Under the guise of promoting these former colonizers infiltrate and dominate ex-colonies. The imposition of sanctions was not meant to restrain the Zimbabwean government and encourage it on a good human rights and democracy path but was part of British machinations to remove the ZANU PF regime from power. Furthermore, Zimbabwe, compared to other countries globally, is a relatively peaceful country by any measure but it has captured the attention of *The New York Times* and the *London Guardian*. This is because it still plays host to a significant number of white British settlers and businesses. Europe and America have thus meddled in Zimbabwe's affairs in defence of not only their white kith and kin that they consider to be of the same ontological weight and epistemological capacity but also their commercial, political and neo-colonial interests.

In June 2004, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair openly told the House of Commons that his government was working with Tsvangirai's MDC to effect regime change in Zimbabwe. Grebe (2009:6) quotes Blair as saying:

We work closely with the MDC on the measures that we should take in respect of Zimbabwe, although I am afraid that these measures and sanctions, although we have them in place, are of limited effect on the Mugabe regime. We must be realistic about that. It is still important that we give every chance to, and make every effort to try to help, those in South Africa – the southern part of Africa – to put pressure for change on the Mugabe regime, because there is no salvation for the people of Zimbabwe until that regime is changed.

The above is a clear statement from the British government aiming at changing the Zimbabwean regime. This statement exposes naked machinations of coloniality of power in Zimbabwe. African actions seldom take place in their own forms and in a vacuum. They are clearly orchestrated and they are controlled and directed externally by coloniality of power. British open support for the opposition exposed the MDC as a puppet party abetting post-independence colonialist machinations against the emerging state of Zimbabwe. Puppetry represents a new form of imperialism, weakens political institutions and attracts violent attacks from patriots. ZANU PF reacted to British interference in Zimbabwean affairs by increasing repression against the MDC that it viewed as an agent of imperialism and a threat to national security, thus raising the spectre of violence in Zimbabwe.

The US Congress and Senate reacted to a decline in democracy and an increase in human rights violations in Zimbabwe by passing the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic and Recovery Act (ZDERA) in 2002. The document outlines the sanctions. ZDERA states that the US will not support any multi-lateral or bilateral loans or grants to Zimbabwe unless there are specific reforms regarding ownership of property, the rule of law, and the use of political violence. ZDERA specifically sought collaboration of the European Union in the enforcement of these sanctions. What this means in reality is that Zimbabwe cannot access grants and investments from the West. Zimbabwe used to receive an average of about US\$350 million in aid and investment in the 1980s and 1990s, but this stopped abruptly in 2001 (Chung: 2010). This points out to the constitutive nature of coloniality of power.

To the US, the idea behind ZDERA was to assist democratic transition in Zimbabwe and to revitalize the collapsed economy. Cancellation of debt or any other kind of financial assistance through the multilateral financial institutions were prohibited under ZDERA until the US President was satisfied that crucial improvements of basic human needs for the Zimbabwean people had been met and that the government in Harare would be able to meet good governance criteria (Grebe, 2009:4). ZDERA forbade US representatives on the boards of the Bretton Woods institutions to vote for the provision of loans to Zimbabwe (Matyszak, 2010:119). Essentially what this has meant in reality is that Zimbabwe was to be deprived of grants and investments from the West for more than a decade and its economic well being became the subject of US control. This loss of financial resources owing to ZDERA has devastated the Zimbabwean economy and created a wedge between the national leadership and ordinary people evidenced by people's hostility towards government and their rejection of ZANU PF during elections. It would not be an exaggeration for one to surmise that

sanctions and ZDERA were passed to reduce Zimbabwe into an ungovernable and poverty stricken country so that the population could rise against the ZANU PF government and replace it with a more democratic US friendly administration.

The sanctions have also been viewed as responsible for Zimbabwe's failure to exercise its rights to borrow bilaterally and multilaterally, particularly from the World Bank and IMF or any such other world lenders linked to the Bretton Woods community. The IMF and the World Bank have attached good governance conditions for Zimbabwe to access development aid and trade privileges. It is the western notion of good governance that is not particularly suited to Zimbabwe that the IMF and WB encourage. To the IMF and WB, land reform from the year 2000 onwards was bad governance as it was accompanied by violence, the violation of the rule of law and human rights abuses and as such the IMF and WB withheld development aid. To the ZANU PF government the land reform programme constituted good governance practice as it was addressing colonial injustice.

According to Bond and Manyanya (2003) IMF and WB denied the Zimbabwean government access to credits and loans in 2001. They criticized the Zimbabwean government for prioritizing intervention in the DRC at a time the economy was struggling. They demanded that the ZANU PF government first furnish them with details of its engagement in the DRC as a precondition for accessing loans. The denial of loans and credits in Zimbabwe has had negative ramifications on economic stability, a crucial ingredient for peace and unity.

Therefore, one can arrive at the conclusion that the West has used its control of the IMF and WB to decide Zimbabwe's economic fate and perhaps its future peace and stability. While the West viewed ZDERA and targeted sanctions as restrictive measures, the Zimbabwean government argued that they were comprehensive. The government perceived sanctions to be part of a scheme to effect regime change by weakening ZANU PF economically and politically. The issue of sanctions became a matter of semantics depending on one's political persuasion. The imposition of sanctions heightened tension not only with the West but also within Zimbabwe. The MDC and civil society who supported the sanctions were roundly criticized by the Zimbabwean government for having called for the imposition of sanctions that had the net effect of suffocating the economy. The sanctions did not just hurt the ruling elite but also government development programmes, access to finance, trade opportunities, all which cascaded down to affect the standard of living of the ordinary people.

The unilateral imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe by the US and EU was a reflection of coloniality of power in practice in Africa. Sanctions were imposed unilaterally without a discussion with Mugabe's regime or continental powers, reflecting that power remained reposed in the West despite the end of colonialism. The West defied sentiments from fellow African countries while appropriating to itself powers to discipline the Zimbabwe government when the rest of the continent pleaded for patience, sympathy and understanding. The voices of these countries were not respected in much the same way African voices were ignored by whites under colonial rule. The EU and the US regarded their judgment calls on Zimbabwe as superior to those of African states, thus dismissing the notion that African problems can best be found from Africa or within Africa. By imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe the EU and the US instead of quenching the fire in Zimbabwe actually fuelled it as the ZANU PF government in pursuit of regime survival dug in and increased repression, thus exacerbating the conflict.

Sanctions have not been the only instrument the West has used to try and unseat the ZANU PF government. The West has supported the anti-Mugabe media industry that has gone to great lengths to tarnish the image of ZANU PF by broadcasting the dark side of the Zimbabwean government. The Western funded diasporan media and most of the independent media whose sources of funding are also external has vilified and demonized Mugabe's government in the new millennium with the objective of generating disaffection towards the ZANU PF regime. Radio stations such as *Studio 7* and *SW Radio Africa* and newspapers such as the *The Zimbabwean* have been at the forefront of carrying stories that denigrate the government and expose its undemocratic tendencies and often described its leader an authoritarian tyrant (Raftopoulos: 2006). The West sought to turn the population against ZANU PF by funding media which in the main carried negative stories about the Zimbabwean government. Seeds of division were sown amongst the readership and within communities in Zimbabwe as the state media in defence of the ZANU PF regime hit back by publishing stories that portrayed Europeans as brutal enslavers and colonizers and the MDC as a "sell-out puppet party" and its supporters as enemies of the state and traitors (Saidi and Munemo: 2011). This media war increased tension between pro-regime and anti-regime elements which culminated in the erosion of peace, reconciliation and unity gains.

Although the ZANU PF government has suffered from sanctions imposed on it by western powers and spews decolonial rhetoric it has maintained a close relationship with some quarters in the global coloniality stable. British businessman Nicholas van Hoogstraten and

South African born businessmen John Bredenkamp have helped the Zimbabwe government to survive sanctions imposed by the EU and the US. Despite the sanctions ruling elite have also been able facilitate business transactions with the West through these individuals. The ZANU PF government has also by inadvertence benefited from coloniality by blaming the country's economic woes on the western regime change agenda and not policy failure and economic misgovernance. It has used the regime change agenda to deflect attention from the pertinent issues that explain the suffering of millions of Zimbabweans to focus on race. It has also used the western regime change agenda to turn to authoritarian means to remain in power and accumulate surplus despite growing unpopularity.

It is important to highlight here that notions of puppetry and tyranny are never constant but change overtime. These identities are tools of coloniality. The relationship between the Zimbabwean government and global coloniality can also be characterized as a “love-and-hate” relationship. In the first decade and a half of independence relations were cordial with the West. Mugabe was a darling of the West and was seen as a model statesman especially after pronouncing the policy of reconciliation in the 1980s although his human rights record left a lot to be desired after the gukurahundi war. In the early 1990s Mugabe adopted ESAP and was perceived as a puppet of the West by the labour movement that went on to form the opposition MDC. However, in the new millennium it is the MDC that is seen as the puppet, selling Africa's freedom and sovereignty under the guise of human rights and democracy while Mugabe is seen as a tyrant abusing human rights and oppressing forces of democracy despite redressing colonial wrongs by redistributing land to thousands of black farmers at the expense of whites. Mugabe's victory in the July 2013 elections has been followed by moves towards re-engagement with the West which may be the beginning of puppetry. Whether one is a puppet or a tyrant, the ultimate goal it appears is that one has to obtain the approval of the West. This situation allows coloniality to survive and this does not bode well for peace and development in Zimbabwe.

7.5 IN SEARCH OF REGIME PERSISTENCE

A retired army officer in the Midlands Province explains the crisis in Zimbabwe as a result of the continuation of the nationalist struggle against capitalist imperialism working in cahoots with local opposition agents (Interview with a retired ZNA officer : 12/5/2015). He argues that in the face of concerted efforts by the domestic opposition and external actors to oust Mugabe from power the ZANU PF government became increasingly authoritarian in order to

survive regime change. It roped in the security sector in the economic and political governance of the country. The support of the security forces was secured when the government offered them those important means of production like farms and mines. They became an important interest group in the political and economic governance of the country.

A study of the political-military alliance in Zimbabwe by Muzondidya (2009b) reveals that a symbiotic relationship exists between the military and the ZANU PF. Trying to remove ZANU PF from power directly threatens the military; they are one. The army has been quick to rush to ZANU PF's aid thus ensuring the regime's continued stay in power because removing ZANU PF from power is likely to bring new political structures which would have a destabilizing effect on the security sectors political and economic power as well as personal security.

The security sector has intervened in electoral processes from the year 2000 onwards. War veterans - a para-military wing in Zimbabwe's security circles - would often threaten the population with war in the event of an MDC electoral victory (ibid). Security chiefs also declared that their units would not cooperate with or salute a presidential candidate with questionable liberation war credentials (Makumbe, 2003:39). These declarations were tacitly aimed at Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC. The threats of war from veterans of the liberation struggle sent fear across the population while the rejection of persons without liberation war credential by the service chiefs annoyed the opposition and led to a decline in trust and confidence in the military, thus compromising cordial civil-military relations that are critical for national peace and stability.

To safeguard ZANU PF's position the security forces terrorized civilians, committed gross human rights violations, and were deployed to infiltrate and disrupt the opposition. In some cases, tactics from the guerrilla war such as re-education camps, propaganda bombardment, and all-night *pungwes* were revived (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006, Sachikonye, 2011). Security structures were also mobilized by the ZANU PF to campaign and organize elections. Members of the security structures were deployed to run the Electoral Supervisory Commission, while war veterans were recruited to work as militias during elections. A National Command Centre was established by the government and became the nerve-centre from where elections were run. It was manned by personnel from the Zimbabwe National Army, Air Force of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Republic Police and Central Intelligence Organization (Muzondidya: 2009b).

It has been highlighted that after the year 2000 state sponsored terror was unleashed on the populace just like the colonial government had; it was therefore a case of repetition without difference. The difference was that the violence that the ZANU PF government unleashed on the populace in pursuit of regime survival was a reaction to neo-colonial violence. The Zimbabwe government was convinced that colonialism had not died but just changed form; it saw the MDC as a front for the West to retake control of Zimbabwe. This was unlike the colonial violence that targeted nationalist agitators calling for independence.

While the army took care of the situation for the government in the countryside, in urban areas the police increasingly used POSA to curtail the people's freedoms and to blunt the activities of opposition groups. Under POSA, civil society meetings were categorized as political gatherings making it difficult for civil society to make a big impact on the way people voted. It became difficult to campaign for the opposition owing to the subjective interpretation of the law by partisan security forces. Opposition and civil society often defied POSA leading to the brutal crushing of demonstrations by security units (Raftopoulos: 2006, Muzondidya: 2009b).

In 2005, the Zimbabwean government with the assistance of the security units launched Operation *Murambatsvina*/Restore Order (2005) to destroy slum dwellings and restore the social order. According to Grebe (2009:3) *Murambatsvina* was an ingenious plan by the government to hit at the heart of the opposition vote by disrupting its urban supporter base. The government destroyed illegal housing structures thought to shelter urbanites largely regarded to be against the government. Over 700 000 people were displaced from urban centres which affected their abilities to vote in their constituencies, thus compromising the opposition vote (ibid). The violent destruction of homes and displacement of people earned the government resentment and opposition from urbanites who saw it as insensitive to the plight of the urban poor.

This prompted the late Elphias Mukonoweshuro, formerly a professor of politics at the University of Zimbabwe and former Minister of Public Service under the GNU, to comment: "this is no ordinary African dictatorship. It is a very strange regime which uses ... armed military units against civilians" (Bond and Manyanya, 2003:257). It should be noted that the use of security units against the masses as an instrument of regime survival in Zimbabwe predates independence. Ian Smith's white minority regime and Muzorewa's Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government turned to the military in pursuit of regime survival. This vindicates

Fanon (1968) who argues that repetition without change accompanied political transition with the end of colonialism. The withdrawal of the colonial state and its replacement with black political and military leaders did not alter the way the politicians and the military treated the masses.

It should be emphasized that the authoritarian rule and violence the Zimbabwean people had to endure in the crisis years was not all together repression for the sake of regime persistence. The logic of the violence was also a consequence of the coloniality of power. Hegemonic global capitalist powers disenchanted by ZANU PF's rule and defiance of the global order put pressure on Harare, which in turn responded by activating totalitarian regime survival mechanisms that pushed back peace, reconciliation and development.

In true Gramscian style, to survive regime change, ZANU PF did not just rely on coercion but also sought the consent of the populace. Through the indigenization and black empowerment programmes that included land redistribution ZANU PF obtained support from the wide cross section of blacks who had suffered marginalization in an economy dominated by the whites. Among the main beneficiaries of the land reform were landless peasants, war veterans and state security personnel and ZANU PF supporters. The ruling party obtained a significant number of votes from these grateful beneficiaries in the 2000, 2002 and 2005 elections enabling it to retain power. Because indigenization and black empowerment programmes were largely partisan they became a new source conflict as they marginalized those who were not affiliated to ZANU PF.

Strategic appointments were a made in the judiciary. Independent judges such as Justices McNally, Blackie and Ibrahim were sidelined on allegations of being unpatriotic, harbouring political agendas and siding with the commercial farmers. They were replaced with those more acceptable to the regime such as Godfrey Chidyausiku, a former ZANU PF deputy minister who was appointed Chief Justice. He had a record of chairing several politically sensitive commissions and ruling in favour of the ruling party. To Ruswa (2009:8), this constituted what has come to be known as the "Zanunisation" of the judiciary. The new judges began to pass pro-government rulings and even reversed the judgements made in the year 2000 that had declared farm invasions illegal. As a result of questionable judicial appointments and the lack of judicial impartiality political tensions and conflict increased in Zimbabwe. It is noteworthy that the employment by the ZANU PF government of Gramscian strategies to survive regime change is symptomatic of coloniality and repetition without

change as the Rhodesian engaged in the same to attempts to block Zimbabwe's independence.

In sustaining itself in power ZANU PF also used anti-imperialist nationalist rhetoric. Bond and Manyanya (2003:40) argue that ZANU PF reacted to the threat of the MDC and the British by reviving its dormant leftist rhetoric which was used to displace the Zimbabwean crisis to an international level which enabled Mugabe to project himself as the champion of African and Third World Rights. Mugabe's rhetoric touched on emotive issues that appealed to the developing world such as projecting land as an historic injustice, neo-colonialism as an ongoing legacy which needs to be dealt with, economic exploitation as a major problem on the African continent and race as a problem which remains unaddressed in Zimbabwe (Raftopoulos:2006).

A leading academic and publisher is however of the opinion that ZANU PF's castigation of the West and white settlers is not because it is bitter with West's exploitation of the developing world but is actually bitterness over the Zimbabwean leadership's exclusion from the Western capitalist feeding trough (Interview : 4/9/2015). An MDC-T senior official concurs that the crisis that Zimbabwe has had to endure since 2000 is a consequence of the ZANU PF government foisting its bilateral fight with London on Zimbabwe (Interview : 3/9/2015). ZANU PF's nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric with race as a key trope divided Zimbabwean society on the basis of race and ideology. Although this served well the regime's stay in power, it did not provide a good basis on which to foster peace, reconciliation and national unity

7.6 MARCH 2008 HARMONISED ELECTIONS AND THE JUNE PRESIDENTIAL RUN-OFF ELECTIONS

In the parliamentary elections held in the year 2005 the MDC once again mounted a strong challenge despite government efforts to curtail its activities. Like in the year 2000 and the year 2002 election violence, intimidation and allegations of rigging led to a disputed election. The MDC appealed to the international community, particularly the EU and US not to recognize ZANU PF's victory. The MDC was roundly criticized by SADC states and other African countries for turning to the West for solutions instead of seeking answers from within the continent. It was because of the persistence of the coloniality of imagination that the MDC thought that its problems could better be resolved by extra-continental powers whose understanding of the context of African problems were not deep as that of African states. The

MDC saw the West as ontologically denser and epistemologically better endowed to deal with African problems. The MDC decision of turning to the West while shunning African states incensed African leaders. They sympathized with Mugabe who at many forums had often argued that the MDC was a puppet of the West. As a consequence of the MDC's preference of the West to resolve African problems and Africa's disdain for parties inclined towards the West, the resolution of the Zimbabwean conflict was pushed back by several years.

Although ZANU PF triumphed in the 2005 elections, it was unable to overcome economic and political problems that continued to afflict the country. Disenchantment with ZANU PF grew as a result of the failure to deal with the challenges facing the country. As ZANU PF's popularity waned that of the MDC waxed. According to Haggard and Kaufman (1997:226) economic crises undermine the authoritarian bargains forged between rulers and key socio-political constituents and expose rulers to defection from within the business sector and protest from below. When the economic crunch began to bite a significant proportion of the business community abandoned ZANU PF and shifted its allegiance to the MDC which was seen as a progressive force seeking to cure the cancer of corruption and economic mismanagement that characterized ZANU PF's rule. With the backing not only of the business community but also the support of white capital and western countries and an impoverished population living under the world's highest inflation that hit 89 sextillion percent in mid-November 2008, the MDC remained a serious threat to ZANU PF's hegemony (Fournier and Whittall , 2009). It should be highlighted that in the year 2005 the MDC split into two formations. The larger one, the MDC-T, was led Morgan Tsvangirai and Tendai Biti as president and Secretary General respectively while the smaller one that retained the name MDC was led by Arthur Mutambara as president and Welshman Ncube as secretary general.

On 11 March 2007, the MDC-T and civil society leaders held an unsanctioned prayer meeting. The gathering was disbanded by the police who arrested and assaulted opposition civic activists and political leaders, who included MDC-T President, Morgan Tsvangirai. The arrest and assault of Tsvangirai ignited strong international revulsion which compelled the SADC leadership to convene an emergency Summit in Dar-es Salaam on 29 March 2007 (Munemo: 2012b). Sensing that conflict might breakout the SADC summit called for negotiations between Zimbabwe's conflicting parties with South African president Thabo Mbeki as mediator. The talks forced ZANU PF to push through Constitutional Amendment

No 18, which allowed for presidential and parliamentary elections to take place concurrently (Raftopoulos, 2013:9).

The March 29 2008 elections, also called harmonized elections, were held after reforms were made to the Electoral Act. Some of electoral laws were aligned to the 2005 SADC Principles and Guidelines governing democratic elections. The adoption of some the principles and guidelines went a long way in leveling an electoral playing field tilted in favour of the ruling party. This gave the opposition space to campaign and organize. It got space to sell its manifesto on state controlled radio and television, something which hitherto had been unheard off. The police often accused of being partisan observed neutrality. They did not, like in previous elections, invoke sections of POSA to frustrate opposition campaigns. They allowed the opposition to freely hold rallies, meetings and distribute pamphlets and as a result the opposition was able to make inroads into ZANU PF strongholds (Munemo: 2012b).

Although the atmosphere was tense on polling day people were allowed to vote unhindered. There were few and isolated incidences of violence. These did not however affect the outcome of the elections in which the opposition for the first time since independence gained control of the lower house and drastically reduced ZANU PF's control of the Upper House. In the 210 Lower House the MDC-T won 101 seats, ZANU PF 99 seats, MDC 9 seats while Jonathan Moyo an independent candidate won the remaining seat. In the Upper House ZANU PF won 30 seats, MDC-T 24 seats and MDC 6 seats.

The announcement of presidential election results was delayed by six weeks during which time political tensions between ZANU PF and the MDCs soared. The MDC-T was accused by ZANU PF of prematurely declaring itself winner of the elections and of extending an invitation to whites to reoccupy lost land as part of efforts to recolonize Zimbabwe by the British. The MDC-T accused ZANU PF of withholding results for the purposes of rigging. It also blamed ZANU PF for launching a brutal campaign of violence against those it suspected of having voted against it. This triggered massive violence between supporters of MDC-T and ZANU PF.

When the results were finally announced by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission the MDC-T candidate Morgan Tsvangirai had obtained 47% of the vote while Robert Mugabe of ZANU PF had 42% of the vote, and an independent candidate, Simba Makoni, who had broken ranks with ZANU PF got 8% of the vote. ZANU PF's loss was a consequence of it having grown unpopular because of policy failures, corruption, economic mismanagement

and the failure to provide development which had led to widespread poverty, suffering and loss of livelihoods. Equally important in ZANU PF's loss was the West's economic squeeze on Harare. The ZANU PF government was unable to prevent a protest vote by the population disgruntled by socio-economic hardships. The masses had turned against the government and voted for the pro-West opposition in anticipation of a better future. The socio-economic crisis also handicapped the ruling party's ability to keep its system of patronage well oiled to thwart a Tsvangirai victory.

Tsvangirai's election victory was not enough to avoid a run-off election. Zimbabwe's electoral laws required that one obtains at least 50% plus one vote to be declared outright winner in presidential polls. June 27 was set as the day of the presidential run-off election. In the run up to the election there was an escalation of violence. The state security services and the entire ZANU PF structure were mobilized to overturn the result (Munemo: 2012b). Between April 4 and June 20, ZANU PF supporters launched *Operation Makavoterapapi* (Operation where did you put your vote?). The strategy was designed to use violence to dismantle MDC-T party structures ahead of the elections. The paradigm of violence was so ingrained in the psyche of the Zimbabwean rulers such that they could not fathom staying in power without resorting to violence. Mugabe had even boasted in the year 2000 that he had "degrees in violence" (Blair: 2002).

ZANU PF youths and militias harassed, murdered, abducted and tortured the opposition in the terror and intimidation campaign (Muzondidya, 2009b:6). President Mugabe appeared on television boldly declaring that the "bullet was mightier than the pen". Mugabe insinuated that the MDC would not be allowed to rule the country in the event that it would win the election. The statement discouraged peace-loving Zimbabweans from voting for the opposition. Apparently Zimbabweans who did not want to be revisited by the horrors of the liberation war and the violence experienced in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces in the 1980s may also have been disaffected by this. To ZANU PF, the right to rule it appeared was derived from the ability to muster and use force, the "gun" rather than the ability to persuade, convince and obtain consent, "the pen". The Cartesian concept of "I think therefore I am- the pen" was replaced by the paradigm of war informed "I conquer therefore I am – the gun." ZANU PF employed violence because it perceived subjects that fought the liberation war as politically and ontologically denser beings entitled to rule Zimbabwe than those subjects that did not participate in the war of liberation who to it belong to the zone of non-being and therefore not entitled to rule Zimbabwe.

The violence unleashed by ZANU PF was in its brutality comparable to the 1980s violence in Matabeleland and the Midlands. Unlike the 1980s conflagration, violence after the year 2000 did not take ethnic lines; it was largely racial, political, ideological and electoral. In the year 2008 the crescendo of this new wave of political violence was hit. The violence disrupted social life leading to internal displacement, uncertainty and untold suffering. Against the backdrop of a state sponsored campaign of violence on his supporters Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC pulled out of the run-off election a few days before polls after his party indicated that over 400 people had been murdered (*Reliefweb*, 30 July 2013). The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission refused to accept his withdrawal but the MDC-T leader remained adamant. Tsvangirai's withdrawal from the presidential run-off election worked in ZANU PF's favour. Mugabe emerged resoundingly victorious with 85% of the vote (Munemo: 2012b). ZANU PF's "victory" in the presidential elections was obtained in a fashion akin to colonial times where colonial authorities would use violence and intimidation to obtain a result that pleased the regime in power as was the case with Muzorewa's victory in the 1979 elections.

The election was seen as bogus and a sham by the international community while SADC saw the election as inconclusive. In the face of international hostility, a crumbling economy at home and the refusal by SADC and the AU to endorse the elections Mugabe was forced to negotiate a power sharing arrangement with the opposition MDC formations in a bid to end the crisis in Zimbabwe.

Below is a diagram reflecting the crisis situation in Zimbabwe that necessitated negotiations between the MDC formations and ZANU PF;




FIGURE 1 - SOURCE (MAKOCHEKANWA AND KWARAMBA: 2009)

7.7 THE GPA AND ITS CRITICISM

According to Booth (2000) protracted regime crisis increases the likelihood of a negotiated settlement and major regime transformation with new political rules, redistributed benefits, and the inclusion of both the challengers and key old-regime actors. The prolonged crisis in Zimbabwe necessitated negotiations for a power sharing government with the intention of creating a power sharing government that would include both the incumbent rulers and the opposition.

South African president Thabo Mbeki as mediator on behalf of SADC convened the talks. He sought to avert the possibility of the socio-economic and political crisis degenerating into a war situation. He viewed the creation of a transitional power sharing government of national unity as a solution to the crisis. Mbeki also had personal motivations for pushing for a peace agreement and the establishment of a unity government in Zimbabwe. According to (Matyszak, 2010:94) Mbeki's own position as President of South Africa was threatened by Jacob Zuma and his team who were unhappy with his running of the country. He thus wished to deflect attention from himself and salvage his Presidency. As a decolonial pan-Africanist averse to Western interference in African affairs Mbeki saw in the establishment of a unity government an opportunity to undercut Western capitalist powers that were pushing for the removal of the anti-West ZANU PF regime. He sought to replace it with a pan African government unlikely to safeguard the continuation of colonial patterns of power that permitted the West to dominate and exploit Zimbabwe.

It was in the interests of SADC to resolve the crisis because both illegal and legal Zimbabwean migrants fleeing the crisis were a burden on SADC states as they demanded social services from countries hosting them. The poor performance of the Zimbabwean economy also affected trade and investment. It was exigent for the crisis in Zimbabwe to be resolved as it had created divisions in SADC over its resolution. These differences were threatening not only southern Africa's regional economic and political stability but also the political and economic interests of global powers such as the US and Britain. SADC thus found it extremely important for a political deal to be worked out in Zimbabwe before global political powers the US and Britain stepped in to resolve the crisis in a way that served western interests.

Both the MDCs and ZANU PF agreed to talks as they were tired of the long drawn conflict spanning almost a decade that had virtually culminated in a stalemate. ZANU PF on the one

hand had structural power as coercive instruments of state power were under its control. The MDCs on the other hand had situational power as it could heavily influence the economic trajectory of the country and international opinion. They had the international connections that could help improve the economic and political climate or to worsen it as well as the sympathy of a population enduring socio-economic and political hardships. Although the two MDC formations enjoyed situational power they desired talks for they lacked structural power, the control of the security apparatus, the media and other key state institutions important for state control. They had also failed to acquire power through elections and thus saw a GNU as an avenue by which to get into government. The situation almost resembled the state of affairs in the late 1970s which compelled the white dominated Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government to negotiate with the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front had situational power, it could choose to escalate the war or terminate it while Muzorewa with state institutions at his disposal had structural power. These dynamics had forced them to agree to the Lancaster House Talks.

ZANU PF also agreed to negotiations with the MDCs as it saw an opportunity to block regime change machinations through the creation of a GNU. To ZANU PF a GNU would save it from the embarrassment of electoral “defeat” and would also allow it to reorganize itself and prepare for the next election. ZANU PF further agreed to talks as was finding it virtually impossible to govern without the MDCs whose inclusion it direly needed to obtain legitimacy and attract economic support. ZANU PF was aware that attempts to establish a government without the MDCs would be suicidal given the precarious state of the economy and its eroded legitimacy. For the MDCs, the creation of a GNU would provide an opportunity to get into the corridors of power and institute key reforms to democratize the country and provide it with space to erode ZANU PF’s power and perhaps unseat Mugabe. One cannot ignore the fact that besides political motives for agreeing to talks moral issues may also have influenced the decisions of the MDCs and ZANU PF to engage in dialogue. This was because the Zimbabwean people were experiencing untold hardships that included a cholera epidemic, rampant poverty, lack of service delivery, a collapsed education system, poor health care, amongst a myriad of development problems.

Talks began at the end of July 2008 with representatives of ZANU PF, MDC-T and MDC meeting in South Africa. From the onset the EU and the US put pressure on Mbeki to produce a result designed to lead to a transfer of power from ZANU PF to the MDC. Raftopoulos (2013a:xxi) buttresses this point when he cites Hoekman as noting that “western

governments were only agreeable to the MDC-T joining the Inclusive Government on condition that ZANU PF was serious about genuine power sharing, that there were sufficient guarantees to ensure transition and that Mugabe's exit was ensured." Mbeki was however not intimidated by the West, he made it clear to the US and Britain that he would use the African solutions to African problems paradigm to try and resolve the Zimbabwean crisis. He reiterated that it was up to the people of Zimbabwe to find solutions to their problems and not the business of foreigners.

After more than six weeks of negotiation characterized by "deadlocks, walkouts, harsh exchanges, delays, continuing violence, raised hopes, false expectations and angry words" (Bloomfield et al, 1988:61), the talks finally culminated in the signing of the 15 September 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA) which created a power sharing government of national unity mandated to heal and reconcile the strife torn and crisis ridden state.

In the talks, it was also agreed that a new constitution would be drafted, democratic conditions would be created and a roadmap for free and fair undisputed elections would be constructed. Provisions were also made in the GPA for the establishment of an Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration and three commissions to promote peace and unity. The other salient provisions of the GPA were that the government structure would change to allow for the sharing of Executive Authority between the President, Cabinet and the office of Prime Minister that was to be created. The President (Mugabe) would however remain the chair of the Cabinet while the Prime Minister (Tsvangirai) was to chair a new organ known as the Council of Ministers. The two vice presidents from ZANU PF were to be retained but two new posts of deputy prime minister were to be created with each one to be filled by each of the MDC formations. There were to be 31 ministerial posts in terms of the GPA, 15 from ZANU PF, 13 from MDC-T and 3 from MDC. With regards to deputy ministers ZANU PF got (8), MDC-T (6) and MDC (1). This arrangement was for the first time in Zimbabwe's history going to result in a party other than ZANU PF taking numerical control of Cabinet (Eppel: 2009).

Mugabe was to remain as both head of state and government. Tsvangirai was to deputize Mugabe in the Cabinet and his role was to evaluate and adopt all government policies and the consequential programmes. Tsvangirai was however to chair the soon to be created Council of Ministers responsible for the formulation of government policies by the Cabinet and

ensure that the policies so formulated were implemented by the entirety of government (Eppel and Raftopoulos, 2008). Below is the structure of the power sharing arrangement;




FIGURE 2 –POWER SHARING DEAL- SOURCE: BBC, 15 SEPTEMEBR 2008

In general, the GPA contained details on problems afflicting Zimbabwe that required resolution. These problems concerned land acquisition; sanctions; the need to promote national healing; the need to have respect for the rule of law; free political activity; freedom of assembly and association; the need to depoliticize traditional leaders; the need to depoliticize national youth training; non interference in humanitarian assistance; security of persons and prevention of violence; freedom of expression and communication including the media; and importantly a framework for a new government (Eppel, 2009:10-11). The implementation of the Agreement was to be monitored by a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) composed of four senior members from ZANU PF and four from each of the MDC formations (Eppel and Raftopoulos, 2008). SADC and the AU were to be the guarantor of the GPA.

The GPA has been criticized as a product of a flawed conflict resolution mechanism known as quiet diplomacy. Badza (2009:7) refers to quiet diplomacy “as the negotiation strategy applied by the mediator who avoids applying pressure directly and openly, on one or more of the critical parties to a conflict even when and if it is ethically necessary”. Quiet diplomacy has its origins in the Cold War era and is foreign to Zimbabwe. The adoption of quiet diplomacy as a conflict resolution strategy in Zimbabwe reflected the persistence of colonial influences with regards to methodologies for conflict resolution. It also displayed that Africa suffers from an epistemic crisis where its citizens have put aside their intellectual possessions and adopted colonizers’ forms of thought while discarding indigenous modes of conflict

resolution that focus on community health and restoration in favour of western notions of resolving conflict which are alien to their culture.

Mbeki may have opted for quiet diplomacy because he feared that Mugabe may have gone ballistic had he been publicly criticised. Besides, he elected to use quiet diplomacy because he had a soft spot for Robert Mugabe who he regarded as a liberation icon and a champion of the Third World in the fight against neo-colonial domination. In line with the principles of quiet diplomacy Thabo Mbeki shied away from using the “stick” and avoided public criticism of the parties to the conflict. His quiet diplomacy scored minimal success because ZANU PF was able to manipulate weaknesses in this conflict resolution method to resist fundamental changes to the status quo. It resulted in the escalation and extension of the Zimbabwe crisis as well as the violent 2008 elections and the flawed GPA which have not fostered sustainable peace, reconciliation and unity.

Raftopoulos (2013b:4) is of the opinion that Mbeki also failed to secure a solid agreement that would have led to sustainable peace in Zimbabwe because South Africa had to balance its ambitions of being a continental leader while at the same time maintaining western support. Perhaps had Mbeki abandoned the urge to please the West and adopted pan-African solutions to the Zimbabwean crisis untainted by the coloniality of knowledge and power a more durable solution would have been found.

Colonialism may have ended but its effects have lingered in the subconscious of the ex-colonized people whose judgment is haunted and clouded by colonial experiences. Mbeki and his SADC mediation team sought to resolve the Zimbabwean impasse from the perspective of a people that feared the influence and spread of what they perceived to be western imperialism in a region that had suffered greatly from capitalist colonialism for centuries. The mediator was thinking from the “border” but still psychologically haunted by bad memories of colonial rule that lingered in his psyche despite the end of colonialism. The middle-of-the-road solutions he proffered were tempered by this fear, thus resulting in a document that fell short of fostering sustainable peace.

A notable weakness of the GPA was that it was undemocratic as it was reached without mass consultation. As such it did not reflect the will of the electorate who did not vote for government of national unity but a single government. It was not a product of popular mass involvement but rather the product of a bourgeoisie political elite working with SADC to foist a unity government on the people. It also sidelined civil society, excluded other political

players leaving the future of Zimbabwe to be decided by three political parties yet Zimbabwe is a diverse country whose desires and aspirations cannot be encapsulated in the philosophies of three political formations. A former co-Minister of National Healing and Reconciliation concurs that there was nothing global or holistic and perhaps even national about the GPA. It was to her merely an inter-party agreement masked as a national accord (Interview, 17/9/2015).

The GPA lacked legitimacy and this crisis of legitimacy drove away investment, increased the country's risk factor, took away the sovereignty of the people and gave it to the politicians, therefore inviting distrust and socio-economic problems that have reversed Zimbabwe's development goals. Masunungure (2009:5) sees the crisis of legitimacy in Zimbabwe as having to do with right to rule on one hand and, on the other, a feeling by the governed that they had an obligation to obey their rulers. The GPA could not therefore be a solid foundation upon which peace could be fostered in Zimbabwe. It made durable peace virtually difficult to achieve.

Another weakness of the talks was that the position of President was non-negotiable. ZANU PF insisted that Mugabe would remain as the head of the new government arguing that he had "won" the June presidential run-off elections and would not brook anything contrary to that. Aware that Mugabe held most of the cards but desperate to get into government, the MDC formations yielded to ZANU PF's demands and a flawed agreement that preserved most of ZANU PF's power. It was perhaps because the MDCs wanted to enter the corridors of power and access financial benefits that accrue from ascending political office.

The bulk of critics of the GPA interviewed argued that it blocked winners of elections while rewarding losers with a place in government yet violence and undemocratic means had been employed to remain in power. They argue that this decision to reward losers at the expense of winners set a bad precedent for democracy on the African continent because election losers would see violence as a means by which to reclaim power. To highlight this, the GPA gave ZANU PF a place in government yet it was apparent that ZANU PF had "lost" the election after the first round of voting and had only been able to remain in power after employing violence in the presidential run-off elections.

Although Mbeki was praised for managing to get the leaders of the three main parties in Zimbabwe to append their signatures to a unity government deal he was criticised for trying to get parties with different ideologies and philosophies to share power. According to

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013: 233) the GPA was faced with the challenge of how to “synthesize the radical nationalist position of ZANU-PF premised on uncompromising socialist oriented redistributive project with the equally radical neoliberal position of MDC-T premised on democratization and human rights discourse.” Critics saw trying to get ZANU PF and the MDCs to work together as similar to trying to mix oil and water. It was almost impossible to bridge the wide gulf of differences between the parties to the Agreement.

Mugabe reveals this in an interview with *The Sunday Mail* on the differences between the parties to the GPA.

One might think they [MDCs] want systems far much better than our own, more aggressive, more resolute, more revolutionary. But no, it's more negative. They want us to go back to a system where there is great reliance on foreign investment, foreign support and on foreign advisers...really they are for whites being the main players of our political system...they rely more on the views of the west. We rely on our views. (*The Sunday Mail*, 19-25 February 2012)

Pamela Machakanja (2010) scrutinises the GPA document and exposes its lack of commitment. She reveals that the GPA document does not in any way make reference to justice and reconciliation except in the body text and uses non committal phrases such as the ‘*the government will ensure...*’ ... ‘*the state will strive...*’. Signatures were appended to the agreement purporting to signify a commitment towards peace but there was in reality little sincerity behind the signatures. Mugabe had learnt quite well from his dealings with the white colonial government of the 1970s that signatures could be put to paper but without fundamentally changing the status quo, just like the Lancaster Agreement had shown. He appended his signature to the GPA document but did little to adhere to the agreement. The refusal by ZANU PF to fulfil some of the provisions of the GPA vindicated this lack of commitment.

Article VII of the GPA provided for the creation an Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration. An analysis of this article reveals that reconciliation and healing were going to be structural and elitist at the expense of a mass and victim centred psycho-social and spiritual healing and reconciliation process. Instead of the GPA providing a comprehensive healing and reconciliation framework that covers Zimbabwe’s multi-layered conflict periods it failed to provide clarity on the conflict periods that the future government had to work with. It also failed to develop a template for the establishment of a truth and justice commission to promote peace and reconciliation.

Another fundamental weakness of the GPA was that it never got into the mechanics of how power was to be shared and this became the source of conflict that bedevilled the GNU. Thabo Mbeki's mediation team did not delve into the business of sharing out cabinet posts to the GPA parties arguing that it was the business of the GNU. Immediately after signing the GPA, ZANU PF and the MDCs failed to agree on ministerial allocations. Mugabe allocated to ZANU PF coercive ministries while the MDCs were given social service and delivery ministries. The MDCs objected to this resulting in delays in the formation of the GNU and procrastination in addressing the crisis engulfing the country. The GPA's failure to provide a framework for institutional reforms also resulted in schism within the GNU as ZANU PF refused to accede to any reforms that threatened its power.

The GPA was vague on the relationship and powers of the prime minister and president especially regarding the sharing of powers within the executive. Various sections of the document stated that the president would make decisions in consultation with the prime minister but it was not made clear in the document whether consultation meant merely informing the prime minister or reaching consensus with the prime minister. Besides being unclear on the powers of the executive, the GPA also failed to strike a balance of power between the MDCs and ZANU PF, an illusion of power sharing was created as the prime minister's powers were just cosmetic. The president's executive authority was left intact; as a matter of fact it was scantily checked. He remained the Head of State, Government and Commander in Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces with power to appoint senior government officials, declare war and proclaim and end martial law (Global Political Agreement, 2008). Mugabe later declared at his birthday celebrations in March 2009 ; "I am still in control and hold executive authority so nothing much has changed" (Matyszak, 2010:103) .The fact that most power was retained by ZANU PF and institutions that it controlled cast a dark shadow on the prospects for peace and unity because the institutions that ZANU PF was left controlling were the very same institutions that had been responsible for democratic deficits, violence, repression and human rights violations. Matyszak (2010) lambasts the MDCs for entering into an agreement (GPA) with ZANU PF that did not offer prospects of the restoration of democracy and the rule of law, components crucial to peace, unity and stability.

To a greater extent and with regards to where the substance of power resided, the GPA was not fundamentally different from the 3 March 1978 Internal Settlement and the 1987 Unity Accord that left incumbent powers dominating the new political arrangements. The GPA left

ZANU PF with control over the levers of state power while surrendering to the MDCs a mirage of power. Similarly the Internal Settlement left the white minority in control of key institutions while giving Muzorewa the shadow of power. Like the moderate African nationalist leaders that signed the 3 March Peace Agreement the MDCs leadership was not fighting for the substance of power, but wanted access and space at the feeding trough as this was to be vindicated by corruption cases involving MDCs officials in the inclusive government. It is thus within the domain of the coloniality of power that we should understand the MDCs consent to an unbalanced power-sharing unity government.

It should be highlighted that the GPA like the 1987 Unity Accord was a product of coercion as MDC-supporters suffered violence at the hands of ZANU PF supporters and state sponsored militia groups as the negotiations were on-going. State security forces arrested and brought before the courts MDC officials. Apparently the idea was to pressure the MDC into agreeing to a settlement that left ZANU PF in a dominant position.

Ultimately not only was the GPA a product of coercion but also of coloniality; on the one hand it was a consequence of a Western diplomatic pressure on the SADC region as well as a capitalist political and economic squeeze on the ZANU PF government that was forced to accept a power-sharing government of national unity as a mode of surviving regime change. On the other hand it was a result of Western support to pro-democratic parties that espoused the neo-liberal philosophy of governance that was attractive to the West. The West's endeavour to propel the opposition into power was neutralized by anti-imperialist neo-colonial pan-Africanist forces.

7.8 THE 2009-2013: GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY - SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY

A power sharing government is generally formed when the ruling party's confidence and legitimacy are severely weakened although it remains strong enough to exercise control over the most important institutions. ZANU PF was able to secure the Global Political Agreement because it had the capacity to retain control of key state institutions although confidence in it had plummeted to an all time low.

Although the GPA was signed in September 2008, the establishment of a Government of National Unity did not follow immediately after owing to disagreement over the allocation of ministerial and other senior government posts, namely; Reserve Bank Governor,

Ambassadors, Attorney General and Permanent Secretaries. ZANU PF insisted on the control of the key hard power state ministries such as defence, home affairs, media and state security while offering the MDCs low key soft power social service and delivery ministries. As the parties haggled over the allocation of posts socio-economic woes mounted. By the end of 2008 the Zimbabwean currency was virtually useless and a cholera epidemic had killed over a thousand people.

The GNU was only formed on 13 February 2009 when ZANU PF acceded to SADC's request to co-share the Ministry of Home Affairs and following the passing of Constitutional Amendment No. 19 of 2009 that allowed the GPA to be legislated. To Eppel (2009), the formation of a GNU was controversial because ZANU PF had not since the signing of the GPA relented on its abuse of coercive power evidenced by the continuing abduction and torture of people perceived to be MDC-T. The MDC formations managed to coax ZANU PF into sharing ministerial posts but they had to work with a state bureaucracy that was largely pro-ZANU PF in the top echelons. Because the GPA did not robustly demand institutional reforms and bureaucratic change attempts by MDCS' ministers to implement ministerial programmes were frequently frustrated by these ZANU PF appointed bureaucrats.

Since the GPA did not lead to a shift in the centre of political power ZANU PF was able to resist reforms to the media, security, Electoral Act and judiciary which would have whittled down its power in the unity government. The MDCs had anticipated that institutional reforms would limit the powers of President Mugabe and broaden democratic space. Since this was not realized, ZANU PF was thus able to maintain its stranglehold on the country. For instance, ZANU PF made piecemeal reforms to the media and totally refused security sector reform, yet the media and security sector had been identified as two of the key institutions responsible for violence. Although demands for an overhaul of security personnel were difficult the MDCs could have insisted on reforms at the management level of the security forces (Interview with a senior MDC-T official: 3/9/2015). One can draw parallels between the absence of security sector reform in the unity government created after the 1978 Internal Settlement and the refusal by ZANU PF to reform the security sector under the 2009-2013 GNU.

By February doubts had already arisen over the sincerity of the signatories to the GPA to resolve Zimbabwe's problems. For instance, violence on supporters of the MDC formations continued, contempt for the rule of law and abductions of opposition supporters persisted

while the arrest of Roy Bennett, MDC-T's white nominee for Deputy Minister of Agriculture on the day on which Cabinet was sworn in was the icing on the cake. This reflected that little had changed in the state power structure despite the GPA and the formation of an inclusive government as ZANU PF had maintained control of levers of state power enabling it to maintain its authoritarian grip over the country. One can draw parallels to the above with continuation of violence on the peasant population and continued incarceration of nationalist leaders despite the 1978 Internal Settlement. Colonial situations were thus replicated in Zimbabwe although the political players and dynamics had changed in the post-independence period.

Political polarization, suspicion and mistrust pervaded the GNU. The parties to the unity government refused to co-operate with each other. The result was that parallel governments were created within the GNU. ZANU PF ministers would refuse to take instructions from Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai who was charged with the day to day running of government. On one occasion Tsvangirai issued a directive to Webster Shamu, the information minister during the inclusive government, that the latter refused to follow claiming that only the president had the powers to issue directives (Matyszak: 2010). Under the GNU security chiefs also stuck to their pre-GPA declaration that they would not salute anyone without liberation credentials (Tsvangirai). The lack of executive authority and powerlessness of Tsvangirai was starkly exposed. This lack of power on the part of Tsvangirai was also revealed by a survey carried out by the Mass Public and Opinion Trust, a civil society think tank in August 2012 that reported that 76% of the citizens in a sample size of 1,002 adults, believed that the president (Mugabe) exercised real executive power while Tsvangirai did not. He was no more than a lame duck prime minister (CISOMM, 2011:51).

Drawing a leaf from Fanon's (1968) observations, one can note that the 2008 GPA like the 1978 Internal Settlement, the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement, and the 1987 Unity Accord was accompanied by political transitions but did not culminate in fundamental transformation of the socio-economic and political order. The asymmetrical state power structure that privileged ZANU PF and facilitated its dominance remained intact in spite of the signing of the GPA and the creation of the GNU. Most power under the GNU was located in the ZANU PF politburo that continued to chart and influence the political and developmental trajectory of the country. In the state power structure everything was considered from the point of view of the politics of constitution of a politically hierarchized system. ZANU PF would unilaterally make decisions in spite of the presence of the MDCs. ZANU PF's ontology as a

political party remained heavier than that of MDCs. Key state institutions would take instructions from ZANU PF but would decline instructions from MDC government officials. The power structure that survived political transition it can be argued was responsible for blocking peace, unity and development in Zimbabwe.

Although Mugabe was a strongman fully in charge at home, the coloniality of power ensured that his powers would be of no consequence at the global level. His anti-imperialist rhetoric directed at British and US made him a hero amongst the oppressed people of the Third World but he could not sway the hegemonic West that maintained sanctions on his regime. SADC and the AU pleaded with the West to lift sanctions but the West remained adamant insisting on fundamental reforms before any such consideration. The issue of sanctions was a source of friction and remained contentious throughout the life of the GNU. It stood in the way of possible co-operation between the MDCs and ZANU PF. The former continued to blame the MDC for the persistence of the sanctions and used this as an alibi to reject institutional reforms while the MDC demanded democratization of the country as a pathway to sanctions removal. Reforms without the lifting of sanctions were seen by ZANU PF as likely to weaken Mugabe's grip on power and result in regime change.

By maintaining sanctions on Zimbabwe against African advice, the West within the bounds of coloniality of power and knowledge assumed that its take on the Zimbabwean situation and approaches towards resolving the crisis were superior to those offered by SADC, AU and parties in the inclusive government. Misled by its epistemic arrogance the West saw its conflict resolution epistemology as superior to that of other players. It doubted the effectiveness of perspectives from the subaltern side of colonial difference on how to pursue peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. It wrongly assumed that democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, the writing of a new constitution and elections were the panacea to Zimbabwe's problems. The Zimbabwe problem is far more complex than that and requires analysis from both sides of colonial difference.

SADC and the Zimbabwe government have argued at various forums that imperialism and neo-colonial agendas tremendously contribute to the Zimbabwean crisis but these explanations have been frowned upon by the imperial hegemonic West that locates Zimbabwe's problem as coming from within, particularly the person of President Robert Mugabe, corruption and other related internal structural weaknesses common to developing countries. The West, to Nyakudya (2013:199), could have provided the GNU with breathing

space by lifting sanctions, but by maintaining sanctions on Zimbabwe the West blocked pathways towards peace as they gave ZANU PF an excuse to resist reforms likely to produce an environment conducive for peace. The West's attitude was shaped by conceptualizing power from Cartesian perspective that sees it as something linear. Within the African governance philosophy leaders traditionally perceive power as relational. They do not see themselves as omnipotent and all knowing. They consult widely; they do not view others as inferior and subaltern. Everyone gets an opportunity to contribute to peace, governance and development of society.

The GNU barely resolved the conflict over land in Zimbabwe. It was agreed in Article V of the GPA that land reform was reversible. The inclusive government was charged with conducting a transparent non partisan comprehensive land audit that the British government was to be asked to fund. The British utterly refused to fund the programme. The ZANU PF elite that had benefitted tremendously from the chaotic land reform by acquiring several farms frustrated calls for a land audit. Because land was a resource through which ZANU PF obtained votes it blocked any reforms to land that it did not control as it threatened its power base. As a result, the conflict over land which had triggered the Zimbabwe crisis that had reversed development gains remained unresolved. The future of peace in Zimbabwe remains dark as a consequence of this failure to address the land question.

The violence of 2008 was characterized by rape, beatings, murders, torture, maimed figures and a huge number of internally displaced people. Communities and relatives had turned against each other along partisan and ideological identities. Many livelihoods were lost due to the widespread destruction of property and the uneconomic environment that prevailed in the wake of the violence (Munemo, 2012b). Against this backdrop Article VII of the GPA made provisions for the creation of the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) to deal with the post-electoral civil strife and healing, reconciliation and integration.

ONHRI was created in 2009 and was constituted by three ministers from each of the parties in the power-sharing government. The idea was not only to achieve equitable representation of the three main political parties but also to make the Organ effective and acceptable to a wide cross section of the population. The mandate of the ONHRI as contained in Article 7, Section 1, Subsection (c) of the GPA was to

...study the physical, including emotional, social and mental trauma afflicting most Zimbabweans with the view to addressing it and to promote programs to compassionately address the economic and social needs of victims of political violence and related maladies (Global Political Agreement, 2008)

Instead of fulfilling its mandate as stated above ONHRI was consumed by analysing the drivers of conflict in Zimbabwe and insisting on “letting bygones be bygones” while ignoring the need for justice, the acknowledgement of past wrongs and the creation of a truth telling commission. As a consequence of prioritizing peripheral issues obstacles were placed on the path of a successful national healing and reconciliation process.

On the whole, ONHRI’s work was made difficult by the fact that it was set in the context of a transitional power sharing arrangement characterised by political polarisation. Since national healing and reconciliation was entrusted to parties that were central to the conflict their disagreements in the power sharing arrangement spilled over into ONHRI hampering its functions and effectiveness. The situation was worsened by the fact that ONHRI’s leadership was chosen on partisan bases allowing party interests to interfere with peace building. Political parties represented in ONHRI refused to accept blame for the 2008 violence as they saw this as likely to diminish their support. As a result of this the parties to the GNU agreed that ONHRI’s work would only consider the post-GNU period. This decision to be amnesiac is similar to the decision reached after the liberation war where former belligerents agreed to let “bygones be bygones”.

Article VI of the GPA stated that the GNU would have to draft a new constitution that would pave the way for elections. Despite working in a difficult environment characterized by polarization, a shortage of resources, a short time frame and state sanctioned violence and intimidation, a new constitution was agreed to in a referendum on 16 March 2013. The document was however dismissed by civil society groups led by the National Constitutional Assembly, a strong voice in civil society circles that argued that the constitution making process was dominated by the three parties in the inclusive government and thus inclined to reflect and serve the interests of its makers. A new constitution was produced for Zimbabwe but a new constitutional order was not. The government continued to flout the principles of constitutionalism in spite of the enactment of a new constitution. There was no change in the governance attitude as ZANU PF refused to democratize institutions and relent on repression. Despite the criticism, the making of the 2013 constitution of Zimbabwe was one notable achievement of the GNU. The GPA also made provisions for the establishment of a Human Rights Commission as one way of promoting peace. Despite the GNU having been formed in

February 2009 it was only in March 2010 that the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission was appointed. There were high expectations that the Commission would unravel and publicise cases of human rights violations of the past that explained recurrent conflicts in Zimbabwean society but hopes were dashed when the commission was only mandated to investigate cases of human rights abuses committed in the post-2008 electoral violence period. No more than two years into his job the Chairperson of the ZHRC Professor Reginald Austin resigned from his post in frustration citing the lack of funds and state support.

Complaints by the MDC over ZANU PF's unilateral decision making and failure to adhere to the GPA were ineffectually dealt with by Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC). ZANU PF perceived the organ as meddling and thus treated it with disdain and disregarded its advice. Attempts by JOMIC to rope in SADC to put pressure on ZANU PF to adhere to the terms of the GPA were in vain. Mugabe threatened to withdraw from SADC and even insulted South Africa's international relations adviser, Lindiwe Zulu, calling her a "street woman" when he thought that the South African mediator was overstepping her mandate (*Newsday*, 6 July 2013).

During the life of the GNU, Zimbabwe moved from a crisis situation to one of unstable peace. Michael Lund (2009:13) refers to unstable peace as "a situation in which tension and suspicion among parties run high, but violence is either absent or only sporadic...the parties perceive one another as enemies". There was little mutual co-operation and understanding in the GNU. Political polarization that had characterized the pre-GPA period persisted. Incidences of violence continued to be recorded across the country especially during the constitution making period.

The GNU eased political tensions which hitherto had been at fever pitch, abated the economic slide and averted the possibility of civil strife. There was an improvement in the economy especially after the introduction of the multi-currency system with the US dollar as the main note of tender. The economy was stabilized and the runaway inflation of 2008 brought down to single digit figures. Positive economic growth was recorded during the life of the GNU with improvements in health, education and food security (CISOMM: 2011).

Although there was a transition from crisis to a semblance of normalcy evidenced by a decline in violence, an improvement in the economy and the standard of living of the majority especially in urban areas the socio-economic and political problems refused to go away. The common ground, mutual co-operation and understanding that the GNU had sought

were not achieved. There was consistent haggling and bickering in the GNU since parties had seen the power sharing arrangement as an opportunity to reorganize in preparation for the next election.

It has been noted in this section that the GNU was an uneasy power sharing arrangement, the parties in it hardly saw eye to eye as they carried different ideologies and philosophies. The MDC formations saw themselves as progressive democrats arguing for a rational development and governance approach related to global trends and economic and democratic best practice while ZANU PF pursued a radical neo-nationalist development and governance paradigm based on correcting colonial injustices. These divergences filtered down to party structures and the population in general, thus further compounding challenges to the achievement of peace, unity and reconciliation.

7.9 THE 2013 ELECTION AND THE END OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

The 2008 GPA gave the GNU a life span of a maximum five years. This meant that elections were due in 2013. The MDC formations were however uncomfortable with elections being held before fundamental reforms. They cited piecemeal changes to the Electoral Act, cosmetic media reforms and the absence of security sector reform as inadequate to provide a free and fair election. ZANU PF was eager for an election in spite of the absence of reforms, arguing that the marriage of convenience had outlived its mandate.

A Supreme Court application by Jealous Mawarire, an ordinary citizen demanding that the President sets a date for elections before July 31 2013 pushed the GNU parties towards elections. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the President to declare an election date. The President duly complied by announcing 31 July 2013 as the date for the elections (*The Herald*, 13 June 2013). The MDC formations protested to SADC arguing that elections before reforms would not lead to free and fair elections. They sought SADC support for elections to be delayed until reforms. A June SADC summit held in Maputo, Mozambique, encouraged Mugabe to postpone elections by two weeks to allow reforms to take place but Mugabe refused. He argued that such action would be unconstitutional and a violation of the rule of law. MDC formations thus found themselves frog-marched to an election without reforms.

The election campaign period was generally peaceful but the MDCs were disturbed by what they cited as bias by the Registrar General and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. They

accused the Registrar General's office of concentrating registration activities in ZANU PF rural stronghold holds while ignoring to thoroughly carryout registration in urban centres considered MDC strongholds. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission allegedly staffed by people sympathetic to ZANU PF failed to produce an electoral voters roll in time and only produced the hardcopy of the voters role two days before the election. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was accused of working with NIKUV; a private Israeli company suspected of helping governments rig elections by manipulating voter's rolls. All this raised suspicion of rigging on the part of ZANU PF (*Zimbabwe Independent*, 2 August 2013).

The polls were conducted in a peaceful atmosphere. When elections results were announced ZANU PF had won the parliamentary elections with more than two thirds majority while President Mugabe had 61% of the presidential vote. The MDC formations cried foul, arguing that although elections were peaceful they were not free and fair. They accused ZANU PF of rigging but SADC and the AU endorsed the elections arguing that despite the elections being imperfect they were on the whole a reflection of the will of the majority of the electorate. The West declared that although the elections had been peaceful they had not met the bench marks of free, fair and credible democratic elections. The West thus refused to acknowledge Mugabe as the winner of elections and to lift sanctions on Mugabe's regime. After futile attempts by the MDC to challenge the results in court Mugabe was sworn in as President, signaling the end of the GNU and the beginning of yet another era of ZANU PF governance in Zimbabwe but the Zimbabwe conflict remained unresolved.

7.10 CONCLUSION

It has been noted in this chapter that the West had a huge role to play in the conflict that engulfed Zimbabwe. Its role in the formation and funding of the opposition which sought to unseat the Harare regime which had broken ranks with neo-liberalism is apparent. The political rivalry between the ZANU PF government and the MDC culminated in dire socio-economic and political consequences for Zimbabwe. It took the GPA and its child the GNU to manage the conflict, end the violence, abate the economic slide and produce a new constitution for the people of Zimbabwe. They were nevertheless unsuccessful in achieving durable peace as the persistence of remnants of colonialism and the replication of coloniality fanned the coals of conflict and blocked the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION: DECOLONIALITY AS A PANACEA FOR PEACE, RECONCILIATION AND UNITY

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This is the concluding chapter of the thesis. It summarizes arguments advanced throughout the chapters that show that Zimbabwe's peace, unity and reconciliation problems are a consequence of the combination of coloniality and repetition without change within the context of arrested transitional politics. Finally the chapter advocates for the adoption of decoloniality as a plausible solution to Zimbabwe's peace, reconciliation and development problems.

8.2 KEY FINDINGS

In general, what this thesis sought to do, in its quest to advance frontiers of knowledge in the field of peace and development studies is to interrogate coloniality and its concomitant effect on the search for peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe from a decolonial epistemic perspective. In line with the first specific objective of the study which sought to present coloniality as an analytical framework for understanding the challenges of peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe. The thesis demonstrated that global capitalist powers have been the common denominator not only in conflicts that engulfed Zimbabwe but also in failed attempts to foster peace and reconciliation. The thesis argued that the asymmetrical world order that privileges the North while marginalizing and oppressing the South is responsible for the absence of peace, unity and development in Zimbabwe. It was shown that power remains reposed amongst the more developed white race and global capitalist powers while less developed countries inhabited by the darker races are marginalized and denied opportunities for growth and development. What was also highlighted as problematic in the quest for peace, unity and reconciliation was the overlap of colonial patterns of power into the post-independence period. It exposed how the Global North created structures of power that allowed it to become hegemonic and how these structures of power continue to impinge on subalternized parts of the world through the colonial matrix of power produced by Western modernity. The thesis demonstrated that Zimbabwe has not escaped these matrices of power but has remained ensnared by them. That explains why despite the celebration of independence Zimbabwe has remained politically,

culturally, economically and epistemologically under the influence of the Global North and in particular the former colonizer and the white race that retained control of the various modes of production and dominance of the political economy.

The thesis demonstrated how the control of power also overlaps into the domain of knowledge and being. European epistemologies have displaced or dominated knowledges produced in the South with the effect of retarding growth and the development of solutions to African problems. Knowledges of the subalternized have been deemed less important and this has militated against finding solutions to conflict and violence. The epistemological dominance of European and white settlers culminated in the employment of deficient decolonization strategies and peace and reconciliation methodologies. Such strategies and methodologies were epistemologically mired in coloniality and thus inadequate to resolve problems arising from rebellion against coloniality.

The study examined the notion of being and its relationship with power. The perception that the white race is superior to the darker races has persisted in much of the world despite decolonization in most parts of the globe. The racially structured global society dominated by the white race has been responsible for conflict and underdevelopment in the darker parts of the world such as Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe was colonized by the British that ascribed inferiority to the Africans while appropriating superiority to whites. They created a classificatory system based on race that has structured society and placed the whites above Africans, thus justifying violence on those they subalternized. It explained how the African's ontology was devalued and his being dehumanized and thus exposing the African to violence. Furthermore, devalued ontology of the darker races explained the absence of commitment by the global community towards finding lasting solutions to Zimbabwe's peace problems. The white race's perception of self as superior while ascribing inferiority to darker races negatively affected the resolution of conflict in Zimbabwe. The treatment of darker races as lesser beings by the white race was exposed by the study as a source of conflict that retarded the search for peace, reconciliation and unity.

In tandem with the second specific objective which aimed at examining the four peace agreements signed in Zimbabwe between 1978 and 2008. The thesis analyzed the four peace agreements signed in Zimbabwe between the years 1978 and 2008. It explained why in spite of four peace agreements having been signed between during this period to end conflict, foster reconciliation and nation building, Zimbabwe remained a very divided and polarized

country characterised by intra-racial, inter-racial, ethnic, ideological, and partisan conflict. It argued that the politics of peace agreements, reconciliation and unity governments should not be understood in terms of what is superficial and glaringly visible but should be informed by an understanding of the hidden and invisible colonial matrix of power. The conflicts that engulf Zimbabwe in the post independence era are complex with roots embedded in the persistence of colonial patterns of power that survived the formal end of colonialism.

The study exposed the role of capitalist Europe and America in blocking full decolonization in Zimbabwe. Their control of the global political and economic system enabled them to pull the puppet strings of the negotiations that led to the 3rd March 1978 Internal Settlement and 1979 Lancaster House Agreement. They were essentially concerned with the protection of white and foreign economic and political interests more than the fulfilment of the aspirations of the majority black population. The Internal Settlement enabled the African nationalist Muzorewa to replace Ian Smith of the Rhodesia Front as Prime Minister of Rhodesia. Although there was transition there was no transformation of the white colonial regime.

The 1979 Lancaster House Agreement allowed political transition from white minority rule to black majority rule but it was not accompanied by any transformation in economic and property relations. The agreement paved the way for elections which ushered in a new black government led by Robert Mugabe. However, there was little change in the socio-economic status quo. This situation did not bode well for the future of peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe.

The disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands in the 1980s that culminated in the 22 December 1987 Unity Accord and the 15 September 2008 GPA were also tremendously influenced by coloniality. This study examined the origins of the 1980s *gukurahundi* violence and discovered that the much lampooned conspiracy argument has much substance if advanced from a decolonial perspective. The invisible hand of the former colonizers and global capitalist forces shaped political and economic processes during these periods. The 1987 Unity Accord brought about transition as ZANU PF and Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (PF ZAPU) resolved to end violence, merge and rule together in a government of national unity. There was however, no transformation in the way the country was governed as PF ZAPU was essentially absorbed by ZANU PF which hardly altered its *modus operandi*. Pre- Unity Accord socio-economic and political grievances of the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces were not addressed.

With regard to the 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA), it ended post-election violence and facilitated transition by paving the way for the formation of a coalition government but transformation was not achieved. The socio-economic problems refused to go away and political polarization persisted. ZANU PF retained control of the levers of power and little was done to address the socio-economic crisis that engulfed the country.

It was noted in the study that central in the four peace agreements that failed to foster peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe between the years 1978 and 2008 was that of exclusion, a feature embedded in coloniality. They were exclusionary as they left out some state and non-state actors. Civil society organizations and small political parties did not participate in the peace agreements, unity governments and reconciliation processes. Those in power chose players they wanted to negotiate with in the search for peace. It should be highlighted that the culture of exclusion is informed by the philosophy of coloniality that embraces hierarchization and classification according to the perceived ontological value. Those that were included in the talks were seen as ontologically dense enough to warrant a seat at the negotiation table. In addition the four agreements were by and large elite pacts that put the interest of personalities ahead of those of the masses and therefore brought transition without transformation. The negotiations were also characterized by win/lose scenarios rather than a genuine concern to find common ground for the sake of peace, unity and development. As a result the four agreements were resented by significant sections of the population who never supported them but instead worked against them.

The thesis revealed that the state has also been an important constant factor in Zimbabwe's search for peace, reconciliation and unity. This is despite the fact that the state has been a perpetrator of violence and have rewarded people accused of human rights violations with top government posts. It has dominated peace and reconciliation processes and has framed them in its interest. Attempts to inaugurate processes that seek to exclude or accord the state a less prominent role in peace and reconciliation have been frustrated by the state and this is likely to continue unless there is a change in the power dynamics and mindset of the state.(Interview with an international relations expert : 7/9/2015).

Fundamentally, what these peace agreements sought to achieve did not come to pass. In the end the peace agreements did not translate to peace, unity governments failed to unite; reconciliation processes did not result in harmonious, mutually beneficial co-existence and development. Transitions were witnessed with the creation of unity governments but the

underlying causes of the conflict that could have led to transformation were hardly addressed. In most cases there were no fundamental changes in the character of governance and practice of politics. The peace agreements ignored the need to uplift various groups in society resulting in the compartmentalization of society and divisions that spring from it. They contradicted Fanon (1968) who argues that reconciliation and nation building can only be achieved through the upward thrust of the people and under their leadership.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) succinctly envelopes in coloniality the challenges the various modalities of achieving peace and reconciliation have encountered in Zimbabwe. He writes;

Zimbabwe's reconciliation efforts have proven to be minimalist and inadequate against the backdrop of incomplete decolonization, the unresolved colonially induced economic inequalities, incomplete nation building, contested state -making and resilient ethnic tensions informed by a combination of pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial experiences (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b:189).

The study also revealed that the quest for peace, reconciliation and unity has not been successful because of structural top-down processes that were pervaded by political expediency at the cost of genuine commitment to end violence and achieve sustainable peace. Justice, a fundamental element of any peace and reconciliation process, was ignored in all four agreements. Peace and reconciliation processes were also dominated by the elite that ignored the views of the subalternized and marginalized people. Unity governments that were established after peace agreements were signed also contributed to the failure because they neglected the need to legislate the creation of commissions to deal with peace, reconciliation, and unity after violent conflict. Ultimately the thesis revealed that peace and development are structurally interlocked. The absence of peace in Zimbabwe retarded development in as much as the absence of development has been responsible for conflicts and the failure to foster peace, unity and reconciliation.

The study in fulfilment of the third specific objective which sought to identify colonial factors that are barriers to sustainable peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe the thesis exposed how the control of power, knowledge and being by the hegemonic global capitalist North had detrimental effects on the quest to achieve sustainable peace and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. Euro-American powers used their control of the global political economy to block complete decolonization and to pursue a neo-colonial agenda in Zimbabwe with the effect of negating the search for peace, unity and reconciliation. The US and European dominated global political and capitalist system and

controlled multilateral institutions such as the IMF and WB have resulted in the unfair treatment of the ex-colonized world and creation of conditions that encourage conflicts and hamper resolution of conflicts.

The thesis argued that the challenges to reconciliation and the problems of peace, unity and development in Zimbabwe are also explained by Fanon's (1968) coloniality related notion of repetition without change within the context of arrested transitional politics. Global capitalism blocked transformation through employing its power to weaken political and economic structures that could enable transformational processes to accompany political transition. Global imperialist and capitalist forces with vested interests in Zimbabwe's political economy also interfered with peace processes with the effect of blocking the achievement of durable peace. They have refused to unhook colonial tentacles of power that have been responsible for underdevelopment and conflict in Zimbabwe.

The study exposed how remnants of colonialism have been the sources of conflicts that have retarded the development process since independence in 1980. These residual effects of colonialism have not only blocked various endeavours to achieve peace, unity and reconciliation but have been behind conflicts that have engulfed the country. There was not any fundamental break between the colonial period and the post independence period. Structures of power remained essentially the same politically, socially and economically and problems of tribalism, regionalism, racism and other drivers of conflict emerging from coloniality persisted. This absence of change created instability and left the country vulnerable to violence and conflict.

The thesis highlighted how the inheritance of colonial *modus operandi* did not offer a solid foundation upon which peace and stability could be engendered because the new rulers reproduced coloniality. Although having fought hard to end colonialism the new rulers exhibited colonial tendencies and behaviours that blocked paths to peace and sowed seeds for conflict. They opposed the repressive colonial system steeped in coloniality but ended up becoming what they were fighting against (oppressors). They mutated and took the form of the colonial regime and this negatively affected post independence nation building. The reproduction of the former colonizer's *modus operandi* in the post-independence era hampered development, a pre-requisite for peace, reconciliation and unity.

The fourth specific objective of the thesis which aimed at making recommendations for moving Zimbabwe towards, peace, reconciliation, unity and development is addressed in section 8.3 which discusses the implications of the findings.

8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS TOWARDS A DECOLONIZED SEARCH FOR PEACE, RECONCILIATION AND UNITY IN ZIMBABWE

The thesis has argued that peace, unity, reconciliation and development can only be achieved by a comprehensive peace and reconciliation process that acknowledges the importance of coloniality as a source of conflict in Zimbabwe. In light of the challenges to peace, reconciliation and unity presented by coloniality, the thesis advocates for the need to adopt decoloniality as a panacea to conflict and as an important ingredient to achieve peace, reconciliation, unity and development. Decoloniality is a unifying philosophy that acknowledges and respects the humanity of others as opposed to the hierarchizing and divisive philosophies bequeathed by colonialism that doubt the humanity of others. It confronts injustice and seeks to restore the ontological density of the dehumanized darker subalternized races experiencing hellish existential conditions under coloniality.

The study proposes that there is need to destroy what Maldonado-Torres (2008) refers to as the complicit structures of the global capitalist system and decolonize Zimbabwe's political economy. This is critical for the achievement of peace and development and this can only be possible if Zimbabwe disentangles itself from the colonial matrix of power operating at the local level before destroying it by seeking to transform the modern/colonial capitalist world-system. One way of achieving this is through exploring other alternatives to the modern/colonial world. This prompts Mignolo (2007) to call for a world in which many worlds can exist as opposed to the notion of a universal Euro-American dominated world we currently live in. In one of these worlds the exploited and marginalized Zimbabweans can come to understand their own situations and realities and come up with development strategies and programmes that are sensitive to their context.

An important contribution the study makes is an illumination of Zimbabwe's peace and development problems from a decoloniality epistemic perspective. The thesis recommends that this new twist to the discourse of peace, reconciliation, unity and development be employed by conflict managers and peace builders so that they can rethink on the fundamental drivers of conflict in Zimbabwe and review peace and reconciliation theories

and methodologies that they have been using. Only then can they develop modes of conflict resolution and search for peace, reconciliation and development embedded in decoloniality.

This thesis advocates for a shift in the geography of reason, a relook into the geo-political and body-political location of the subject that speaks the development of a new locus of enunciation for African scholars, development practitioners, conflict managers and peace builders away from the decadent Universalist neo-liberal canon that has failed to resolve problems of conflict, violence and underdevelopment in Zimbabwe. This can be achieved by decolonizing the mind, for it is in the mind that decolonial struggles are first won. Freeing the mind allows for the development of strategies of circumventing coloniality by creating a new political order uncontaminated by coloniality. The other way is by studying the absence of peace, reconciliation and unity from a decolonial epistemic perspective to unmask coloniality of knowledge, power and being as drivers of conflict. The thesis goads people of the ex-colonized world to embrace decoloniality and its constitutive elements that include; border thinking, transmodernity, diversality, pluriversality and delinking.

8.3 GENERAL CONCLUSION

It has thus been demonstrated in the thesis that the colonial matrix of power has been a source of conflict in Zimbabwe as well as a bulwark in the search for peace, reconciliation and development. It has brought to the fore the contribution of coloniality to conflict and the challenges of achieving peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. The thesis revealed how the four peace agreements be-saddled by a plethora of problems rooted in coloniality offered minimalist solutions to problems confronting Zimbabwe, rendering it unable to foster sustainable peace and unity. Global capitalist and imperialist forces involvement in Zimbabwean conflicts resulted in imperfect settlements as they sought to produce agreements that safeguarded their interests. The study explored and established that Zimbabwe's peace and reconciliation challenges, while explained by various factors, are fundamentally a consequence of colonial forms of domination that survived the end of colonial rule that continue to negatively impact on Zimbabwe's economy, politics and society. It has been noted in this thesis that it is because of the colonial past, the continuation of colonial situations and their reincarnation under a different political dispensation that Zimbabwe experienced conflict. It is also exposed in the study that conflict resolution mechanisms resembling colonial modes of ending conflict via violence resulted in the failure to create a stable social, political and economic order Zimbabwe requires to surmount its development

challenges. The thesis surmises that the best hope for the achievement of sustainable peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe lies in dismantling the colonial matrix of power by embracing decoloniality.

This thinking is buttressed by a renowned Zimbabwean academic who opines that as long as classes exist in Zimbabwe in particular and global society at large peace, unity and reconciliation will remain a pipe dream because class interests drive conflict. This perception of the challenges to peace is aligned to decolonial thinking that locates conflict in the global and local hierarchization and stratification of peoples. (Interview with a leading academic and publisher : 4/9/2015). Perhaps for Zimbabwe to achieve peace, reconciliation and unity, the Cartesian “I think therefore I am” could be replaced by the African idea of “I relate therefore I am” which is informed by decolonial *ubuntu/hunhu* philosophy. Within the *ubuntu* philosophy the Zulus would say "*Umuntu Ngumuntu Ngabantu*", which means that a person is a person through other persons. The *ubuntu/hunhu* philosophy allows for rediscovery and strengthening of the lost African relational structure that focuses on parity and restoration in realms that include power, knowledge and being as opposed to modes of pursuing peace produced by modernity that emphasize retribution.

Ubuntuism/hunhuism is an indigenous African philosophy that gives an understanding of us as human beings in relation with the rest of the world. According to the philosophy there exists a common bond between us all and it is through this connection, through our interaction with our fellow human beings, that we discover our own human qualities. Ubuntu/hunhuism embodies all those virtues that sustain harmony and the spirit of sharing and cohesion among the members of a society (Samkange and Samkange, 1980; Manda, 2009). It is therefore imperative for *ubuntuism/hunhuism* to be adopted as decolonial African philosophy in the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe.

Appendix I - Political Map of Zimbabwe



Source: (www.ezilon.com)

Appendix II - Agreement of Unity between The Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) and Patriotic Front (ZAPU)

PREAMBLE

Conscious of the historical links between Zanu PF and PF Zapu in the struggle for national independence and democracy through the strategy of the Armed Struggle and their alliance under the banner of the Patriotic Front;

Cognisant of the fact that the two Parties jointly command the support of the overwhelming majority of the people of Zimbabwe as evidenced by the General Election results of 1980 and 1985 respectively;

Notwithstanding that Zanu PF commands a greater percentage of the said overwhelming majority of the people of Zimbabwe;

Desirous to unite our nation; establish peace, law and order and to guarantee social and economic development and political stability;

Determined to eliminate and end the insecurity and violence caused by dissidents in Matabeleland;

Convinced that national unity, political stability, peace, law and order, social and economic development can only be achieved to their fullest under conditions of peace and the unity primarily of Zanu PF and PF Zapu;

We, the two leaders of Zanu PF and PF Zapu, that is to say Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe, First Secretary and President of Zanu PF, and Comrade Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo, President of PF Zapu, assisted by a Sub-Committee of equal members of Zanu PF and PF Zapu, held ten meetings to discuss the possible unity of our two parties as follows.

Consequent upon these meetings and paying due regard to all the principal issues raised thereat, we have agreed as follows: –

1st Meeting:	2nd October, 1985:	Parliament Buildings
2nd Meeting:	28th November, 1985:	Parliament Buildings
3rd Meeting:	4th April, 1986:	Parliament Buildings
4th Meeting:	22nd July 1986:	Parliament Buildings
5th Meeting:	29th December, 1986:	Parliament Buildings
6th Meeting:	25th February, 1987:	Parliament Buildings

7th Meeting:	3rd August, 1987:	Parliament Buildings
8th Meeting:	10th August, 1987:	Parliament Buildings
9th Meeting:	23rd October, 1987:	Parliament Buildings
10th Meeting:	10th December, 1987:	Parliament Buildings

THE AGREEMENT

1. That Zanu PF and PF Zapu have irrevocably committed themselves to unite under one political Party;
2. That the unity of the two political Parties shall be achieved under the name Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) in short Zanu PF ;
3. That Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe shall be the First Secretary and President of Zanu PF ;
4. That Zanu PF shall have two Second Secretaries and Vice Presidents who shall be appointed by the First Secretary and President of the Party;
5. That Zanu PF shall seek to establish a socialist society in Zimbabwe on the guidance of Marxist-Leninist principles;
6. That Zanu PF shall seek to establish a ONE-PARTY STATE in Zimbabwe;
7. That the leadership of Zanu PF shall abide by the Leadership Code;
8. That the existing structures of Zanu PF and PF Zapu shall be merged in accordance with the letter and spirit of this Agreement;
9. That both parties shall, in the interim, take immediate vigorous steps to eliminate and end the insecurity and violence prevalent in Matabeleland.
10. That Zanu PF and PF Zapu shall convene their respective Congresses to give effect to this Agreement within the shortest possible time;
11. That, in the interim, Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe is vested with full powers to prepare for the implementation of this Agreement and to act in the name and authority of Zanu PF.

Signed.....

SOURCE: (Newsday, 7 August 2014)

Appendix III - Agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two Movements for Democratic Change (MDC) formations, on resolving the challenges facing Zimbabwe

Preamble

We, the Parties to this Agreement;

CONCERNED about the recent challenges that we have faced as a country and the multiple threats to the wellbeing of our people and, therefore, determined to resolve these permanently.

CONSIDERING our shared determination to uphold, defend and sustain Zimbabwe's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity, as a respected member of the international community, a nation where all citizens respect and, therefore, enjoy equal protection of the law and have equal opportunity to compete and prosper in all spheres of life.

ACKNOWLEDGING the sacrifices made by thousands of Zimbabwe's gallant sons and daughters in the fight against colonialism and racial discrimination and determined to accept, cherish and recognise the significance of the Liberation Struggle as the foundation of our sovereign independence, freedoms and human rights.

DEDICATING ourselves to putting an end to the polarisation, divisions, conflict and intolerance that has characterised Zimbabwean politics and society in recent times.

COMMITTING ourselves to putting our people and our country first by arresting the fall in living standards and reversing the decline of our economy.

EMPHASISING our shared commitment to re-orient our attitudes towards respect for the Constitution and all national laws, the rule of law, observance of Zimbabwe's national institutions, symbols and national events.

RESPECTING the rights of all Zimbabweans regardless of political affiliation to benefit from and participate in all national programmes and events freely without let or hindrance.

RECOGNISING, accepting and acknowledging that the values of justice, fairness, openness, tolerance, equality, non-discrimination and respect of all persons without regard to race, class, gender, ethnicity, language, religion, political opinion, place of origin or birth are the bedrock of our democracy and good governance.

DETERMINED to build a society free of violence, fear, intimidation, hatred, patronage, corruption and founded on justice, fairness, openness, transparency, dignity and equality.

RECOGNISING and accepting that the Land Question has been at the core of the contestation in Zimbabwe and acknowledging the centrality of issues relating to the rule of law, respect for human rights, democracy and governance.

COMMITTED to act in a manner that demonstrates loyalty to Zimbabwe, patriotism and commitment to Zimbabwe's national purpose, core values, interests and aspirations.

DETERMINED to act in a manner that demonstrates respect for the democratic values of justice, fairness, openness, tolerance, equality, respect of all persons and human rights.

SUBMITTING ourselves to the mandate of the Extraordinary Summit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) held in Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, on 29th March 2007 and endorsed in Lusaka on 12th April 2008 and in the AU Summit held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt from 30th June to 1 July 2008.

RECOGNISING the centrality and importance of African institutions in dealing with African problems, we agreed to seek solutions to our differences, challenges and problems through dialogue.

ACKNOWLEDGING that pursuant to the Dar-es-Salaam SADC resolution, the Parties negotiated and agreed on a draft Constitution, initialed by the Parties on 30 September 2007, and further agreed and co-sponsored the enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe

Amendment Number 18 Act, amendments to the Electoral Act, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act, Public Order and Security Act, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and Broadcasting Services Act.

APPRECIATING the historical obligation and need to reach a solution that will allow us to put Zimbabwe first and give the people a genuine chance of rebuilding and reconstructing their livelihoods.

PURSUANT to the common desire of working together, the Parties agreed to and executed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21 July 2008, attached hereto as Annexure "A". Now therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I - DEFINITIONS

Definitions The "Agreement" shall mean this written Agreement signed by the representatives of ZANU-PF and the MDC, in its two formations ("the Parties") in fulfillment of the material mandate handed down by the SADC Extraordinary Summit on 29th March 2007 and endorsed by SADC in Lusaka, Zambia and adopted by the African Union Summit in Sharm El- Sheikh, Egypt. The "Parties" shall mean ZANU-PF, the two MDC formations led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara respectively. The "Government" or "New Government" means the new Government to be set up in terms of this Agreement.

ARTICLE II DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT

2. Declaration of Commitment

The Parties hereby declare and agree to work together to create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation and in particular to implement the following agreement with the aims of resolving once and for all the current political and economic situations and charting a new political direction for the country.

ARTICLE III RESTORATION OF ECONOMIC STABILITY AND GROWTH

3. Economic recovery

3.1 The Parties agree:

(a) to give priority to the restoration of economic stability and growth in Zimbabwe. The Government will lead the process of developing and implementing an economic recovery strategy and plan. To that end, the parties are committed to working together on a full and comprehensive economic programme to resuscitate Zimbabwe's economy, which will urgently address the issues of production, food security, poverty and unemployment and the challenges of high inflation, interest rates and the exchange rate.

(b) to create conditions that would ensure that the 2008/2009 agricultural season is productive.

(c) to establish a National Economic Council, composed of representatives of the Parties and of the

following sectors:

(i) Manufacturing

(ii) Agriculture

(iii) Mining

(iv) Tourism

(v) Commerce

(vi) Financial

(vii) Labour

(viii) Academia; and

(ix) Other relevant sectors

(d) that the terms of reference of the Council shall include giving advice to Government, formulating economic plans and programmes for approval by government and such other functions as are assigned to the Council by the Government.

(e) to endorse the SADC resolution on the economy.

ARTICLE IV SANCTIONS AND MEASURES

4. Sanctions and Measures

4.1 Recognising and acknowledging that some sections of the international community have since 2000 imposed various sanctions and measures against Zimbabwe, which have included targeted sanctions.

4.2 The Parties note the present economic and political isolation of Zimbabwe by the United Kingdom, European Union, United States of America and other sections of the International Community over and around issues of disputed elections, governance and differences over the land reform programme.

4.3 Noting and acknowledging the following sanctions and measures imposed on Zimbabwe:-

(a) enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act by the United States of America Congress which outlaws Zimbabwe's right to access credit from International Financial Institutions in which the United States Government is represented or has a stake;

(b) suspension of Zimbabwe's voting and related rights, suspension of balance of payment support, declaration of ineligibility to borrow Fund resources and suspension of technical assistance to Zimbabwe by the International Monetary Fund;

(c) suspension of grants and infrastructural development support to Zimbabwe by The World Bank; and

(d) imposition of targeted travel bans against current Government and some business leaders.

4.4 Noting that this international isolation has over the years created a negative international perception of Zimbabwe and thereby resulting in the further isolation of the country by the non-availing of lines of credit to Zimbabwe by some sections of the international community.

4.5 Recognising the consequent contribution of this isolation to the further decline of the economy.

4.6 Desirous and committed to bringing to an end the fall in the standards of living of our people, the Parties hereby agree:-

(a) to endorse the SADC resolution on sanctions concerning Zimbabwe;

(b) that all forms of measures and sanctions against Zimbabwe be lifted in order to facilitate a sustainable solution to the challenges that are currently facing Zimbabwe; and

(c) commit themselves to working together in re-engaging the international community with a view to bringing to an end the country's international isolation.

ARTICLE V LAND QUESTION

5. Land Question

5.1 Recognising that colonial racist land ownership patterns established during the colonial conquest of Zimbabwe and largely maintained in the post independence period were not only unsustainable, but against the national interest, equity and justice.

5.2 Noting that in addition to the primary objective of the liberation struggle to win one man one vote democracy and justice, the land question, namely the need for the re-distribution of land to the majority indigenous people of Zimbabwe was at the core of the liberation struggle.

5.3 Accepting the inevitability and desirability of a comprehensive land reform programme in Zimbabwe that redresses the issues of historical imbalances and injustices in order to address the issues of equity, productivity, and justice.

5.4 While differing on the methodology of acquisition and redistribution the parties acknowledge that compulsory acquisition and redistribution of land has taken place under a land reform programme undertaken since 2000.

5.5 Accepting the irreversibility of the said land acquisitions and redistribution.

5.6 Noting that in the current Constitution of Zimbabwe and further in the Draft Constitution agreed to by the parties the primary obligation of compensating former land owners for land acquired rests on the former colonial power.

5.7 Further recognising the need to ensure that all land is used productively in the interests of all the people of Zimbabwe.

5.8 Recognising the need for women's access and control over land in their own right as equal citizens.

5.9 The Parties hereby agree to:

(a) conduct a comprehensive, transparent and non-partisan land audit, during the tenure of the Seventh Parliament of Zimbabwe, for the purpose of establishing accountability and eliminating multiple farm ownerships.

(b) ensure that all Zimbabweans who are eligible to be allocated land and who apply for it shall be considered for allocation of land irrespective of race, gender, religion, ethnicity or political affiliation;

(c) ensure security of tenure to all land holders.

(d) call upon the United Kingdom government to accept the primary responsibility to pay compensation for land acquired from former land owners for resettlement;

(e) work together to secure international support and finance for the land reform programme in terms of compensation for the former land owners and support for new farmers; and

(f) work together for the restoration of full productivity on all agricultural land.

ARTICLE VI CONSTITUTION

6. Constitution

Acknowledging that it is the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make a constitution by themselves and for themselves; Aware that the process of making this constitution must be owned and driven by the people and must be inclusive and democratic; Recognising that the current Constitution of Zimbabwe made at the Lancaster House Conference, London (1979) was primarily to transfer power from the colonial authority to the people of Zimbabwe; Acknowledging the draft Constitution that the Parties signed and agreed to in Kariba on the 30th of September 2007, annexed hereto as Annexure "B"; Determined to create conditions for our people to write a constitution for themselves; and Mindful of the need to ensure that the new Constitution deepens our democratic values and principles and the protection of the equality of all citizens, particularly the enhancement of full citizenship and equality of women.

6.1 The Parties hereby agree:

(a) that they shall set up a Select Committee of Parliament composed of representatives of the Parties whose terms of reference shall be as follows:

(i) to set up such subcommittees chaired by a member of Parliament and composed of members of Parliament and representatives of Civil Society as may be necessary to assist the Select Committee in performing its mandate herein;

(ii) to hold such public hearings and such consultations as it may deem necessary in the process of public consultation over the making of a new constitution for Zimbabwe;

(iii) to convene an All Stakeholders Conference to consult stakeholders on their representation in the sub-committees referred to above and such related matters as may assist the committee in its work;

(iv) to table its draft Constitution to a 2nd All Stakeholders Conference; and

- (v) to report to Parliament on its recommendations over the content of a New Constitution for Zimbabwe
- (b) That the draft Constitution recommended by the Select Committee shall be submitted to a referendum;
- (c) that, in implementing the above, the following time frames shall apply:
 - (i) the Select Committee shall be set up within two months of inception of a new government;
 - (ii) the convening of the first All Stakeholders Conference shall be within 3 months of the date of the appointment of the Select Committee;
 - (iii) the public consultation process shall be completed no later than 4 months of the date of the first All Stakeholders Conference;
 - (iv) the draft Constitution shall be tabled within 3 months of completion of the public consultation process to a second All Stakeholders Conference;
 - (v) the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be tabled before Parliament within 1 month of the second All Stakeholders Conference;
 - (vi) the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be debated in Parliament and the debate concluded within one month;
 - (vii) the draft Constitution emerging from Parliament shall be gazetted before the holding of a referendum;
 - (viii) a referendum on the new draft Constitution shall be held within 3 months of the conclusion of the debate;
 - (ix) in the event of the draft Constitution being approved in the referendum it shall be gazette within 1 month of the date of the referendum; and
 - (x) the draft Constitution shall be introduced in Parliament no later than 1 month after the expiration of the period of 30 days from the date of its gazetting.

ARTICLE VII PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY

7. Equality, National Healing, Cohesion and Unity

7.1 The Parties hereby agree that the new Government:

- a) will ensure equal treatment of all regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin and will work towards equal access to development for all;
- b) will ensure equal and fair development of all regions of the country and in particular to correct historical imbalances in the development of regions;
- c) shall give consideration to the setting up of a mechanism to properly advise on what measures might be necessary and practicable to achieve national healing, cohesion and unity in respect of victims of pre and post independence political conflicts; and
- d) will strive to create an environment of tolerance and respect among Zimbabweans and that all citizens are treated with dignity and decency irrespective of age, gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin or political affiliation.
- e) will formulate policies and put measures in place to attract the return and repatriation of all Zimbabweans in the Diaspora and in particular will work towards the return of all skilled personnel.

ARTICLE VIII RESPECT FOR NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND EVENTS

8. Respect for National Institutions and Events

- 8.1 In the interests of forging a common vision for our country, the Parties hereby agree:-

- (a) on the necessity of all Zimbabweans regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion to respect and observe Zimbabwe's national institutions, symbols, national programmes and events; and
- (b) that all Zimbabweans regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion have the right to benefit from and participate in all national programmes and events without let or hindrance.

ARTICLE IX EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE

9. External Interference

9.1 The Parties reaffirm the principle of the United Nations Charter on non-interference in the internal affairs of member countries.

9.2 The Parties hereby agree:-

- (a) that the responsibility of effecting change of government in Zimbabwe vests exclusively on and is the sole prerogative of the people of Zimbabwe through peaceful, democratic and constitutional means;
- (b) to reject any unlawful, violent, undemocratic and unconstitutional means of changing governments; and
- (c) that no outsiders have a right to call or campaign for regime change in Zimbabwe.

ARTICLE X FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY

10. Free political activity

Recognising that the right to canvass and freely mobilise for political support is the cornerstone of any multiparty democratic system, the Parties have agreed that there should be free political activity throughout Zimbabwe within the ambit of the law in which all political parties are able to propagate their views and canvass for support, free of harassment and intimidation.

ARTICLE XI RULE OF LAW, RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS

11. Rule of law, respect for the Constitution and other laws

11.1 The Parties hereby agree that it is the duty of all political parties and individuals to:

- (a) respect and uphold the Constitution and other laws of the land;
- (b) adhere to the principles of the Rule of Law.

ARTICLE XII FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

12. Freedoms of Assembly and Association

12.1 Recognising the importance of the freedoms of assembly and association in a multi-party democracy and noting that public meetings have to be conducted in a free, peaceful and democratic manner in accordance with the law, the Parties have agreed:-

- (a) to work together in a manner which guarantees the full implementation and realisation of the right to freedom of association and assembly; and
- (b) that the Government shall undertake training programmes, workshops and meetings for the police and other enforcement agencies directed at the appreciation of the right of freedom of assembly and association and the proper interpretation, understanding and application of the provisions of security legislation.

ARTICLE XIII STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS

13. State organs and institutions

13.1 State organs and institutions do not belong to any political party and should be impartial in the discharge of their duties.

13.2 For the purposes of ensuring that all state organs and institutions perform their duties ethically and professionally in conformity with the principles and requirements of a multi-party democratic system in which all parties are treated equally, the Parties have agreed that the following steps be taken:-

- (a) that there be inclusion in the training curriculum of members of the uniformed forces of the subjects on human rights, international humanitarian law and statute law so that there is greater understanding and full appreciation of their roles and duties in a multi-party democratic system;
- (b) ensuring that all state organs and institutions strictly observe the principles of the Rule of Law and remain non-partisan and impartial;
- (c) laws and regulations governing state organs and institutions are strictly adhered to and those violating them be penalised without fear or favour; and
- (d) recruitment policies and practices be conducted in a manner that ensures that no political or other form of favouritism is practised.

ARTICLE XIV TRADITIONAL LEADERS

14. Traditional Leaders

14.1 Recognising and acknowledging that traditional leaders are community leaders with equal responsibilities and obligations to all members of their communities regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, race, religion and political affiliation, the Parties hereby agree to:-

- (a) commit themselves to ensuring the political neutrality of traditional leaders; and
- (b) call upon traditional leaders not to engage in partisan political activities at national level as well as in their communities.

ARTICLE XV NATIONAL YOUTH TRAINING PROGRAMME

15. National Youth Training Programme

Recognising the desirability of a national youth training programme which inculcates the values of patriotism, discipline, tolerance, non- violence, openness, democracy, equality, justice and respect. Determined to ensure that the National Youth Training Programme raises awareness of the HIV and AIDS pandemic, engenders a spirit of community service, skills development and a commitment to the development of Zimbabwe

15.1 The Parties hereby agree that:-

- (a) all youths regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, religion and political affiliation are eligible to participate in national youth training programmes;
- (b) the National Youth Training Programme must be run in a non- partisan manner and shall not include partisan political material advancing the cause of any political party; and
- (c) while recognising that youths undergoing training at national youth training centres have a right to hold political opinions, they shall not, during the period of their training, collectively and as part of a scheme of the training centre be used or deployed for partisan political work.

ARTICLE XVI HUMANITARIAN AND FOOD ASSISTANCE

16. Humanitarian and food assistance

16.1 In times of need, every Zimbabwean regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion is entitled to request and receive humanitarian and food assistance from the State.

16.2 It is the primary responsibility of the State to ensure that every Zimbabwean who needs humanitarian and food assistance receives it.

16.3 Non-Governmental Organisations involved in giving humanitarian and food assistance shall do so without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political

affiliation and religion and in doing so, shall not promote or advance the interests of any political party or cause.

16.4 In this regard the Parties hereby agree:

(a) that in the fulfillment of its obligations above, the Government and all State Institutions and quasi State Institutions shall render humanitarian and food assistance without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation or religion;

(b) that humanitarian interventions rendered by Non-Governmental Organisations, shall be provided without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion.

(c) that all displaced persons shall be entitled to humanitarian and food assistance to enable them to return and settle in their original homes and that social welfare organisations shall be allowed to render such assistance as might be required.

(d) that all NGO's rendering humanitarian and food assistance must operate within the confines of the laws of Zimbabwe.

ARTICLE XVII LEGISLATIVE AGENDA PRIORITIES

17. Legislative agenda

17.1 The Parties hereby agree that:

(a) the legislative agenda will be prioritized in order to reflect the letter and spirit of this agreement;

(b) the Government will discuss and agree on further legislative measures which may become necessary to implement the Government's agreed policies and in particular, with a view to entrenching democratic values and practices.

ARTICLE XVIII SECURITY OF PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

18. Security of persons and prevention of violence

18.1 Noting the easy resort to violence by political parties, State actors, Non-State actors and others in order to resolve political differences and achieve political ends.

18.2 Gravely concerned by the displacement of scores of people after the election of March 29, 2008 as a result of politically motivated violence.

18.3 Recognising that violence dehumanises and engenders feelings of hatred and polarisation within the country.

18.4 Further recognising that violence undermines our collective independence as a people and our capacity to exercise our free will in making political choices.

18.5 The Parties hereby agree:

(a) to promote the values and practices of tolerance, respect, non- violence and dialogue as means of resolving political differences;

(b) to renounce and desist from the promotion and use of violence, under whatever name called, as a means of attaining political ends;

(c) that the Government shall apply the laws of the country fully and impartially in bringing all perpetrators of politically motivated violence to book;

(d) that all political parties, other organisations and their leaders shall commit themselves to do everything to stop and prevent all forms of political violence, including by non-State actors and shall

consistently appeal to their members to desist from violence;

(e) to take all measures necessary to ensure that the structures and institutions they control are not engaged in the perpetration of violence.

(f) that all civil society organisations of whatever description whether affiliated to a political party or not shall not promote or advocate for or use violence or any other form of

intimidation or coercion to canvass or mobilise for or oppose any political party or to achieve any political end;

(g) to work together to ensure the security of all persons and property;

(h) to work together to ensure the safety of any displaced persons, their safe return home and their enjoyment of the full protection of the law.

(i) to refrain from using abusive language that may incite hostility, political intolerance and ethnic hatred or unfairly undermine each other.

(j) that while having due regard to the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the principles of the rule of law, the prosecuting authorities will expedite the determination as to whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution or keeping on remand of all persons accused of politically related

offences arising out of or connected with the March and June 2008 elections.

ARTICLE XIX FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND COMMUNICATION

19. Freedom of Expression and Communication

Recognising the importance of the right to freedom of expression and the role of the media in a multi-party

democracy. Noting that while the provisions of the Broadcasting Services Act permit the issuance of licences, no licences other than to the public broadcaster have been issued. Aware of the emergence of foreign based radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe, some of which are funded by foreign governments. Concerned that the failure to issue licences under the Broadcasting Services Act to alternative broadcasters might have given rise to external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe. Further concerned that foreign government funded external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe are not in Zimbabwe's national interest. Desirous of ensuring the opening up of the air waves and ensuring the operation of as many media houses as possible.

19.1 The Parties hereby agree:-

(a) that the government shall ensure the immediate processing by the appropriate authorities of all applications for re-registration and registration in terms of both the Broadcasting Services Act as well as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act;

(b) all Zimbabwean nationals including those currently working for or running external radio stations be encouraged to make applications for broadcasting licences, in Zimbabwe, in terms of the law;

(c) that in recognition of the open media environment anticipated by this Agreement, the Parties

hereby:-

(i) call upon the governments that are hosting and/or funding external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe to cease such hosting and funding; and

(ii) encourage the Zimbabweans running or working for external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe to return to Zimbabwe; and

(d) that steps be taken to ensure that the public media provides balanced and fair coverage to all political parties for their legitimate political activities.

(e) that the public and private media shall refrain from using abusive language that may incite hostility, political intolerance and ethnic hatred or that unfairly undermines political parties and other organisations. To this end, the inclusive government shall ensure that appropriate measures are taken to achieve this objective.

ARTICLE XX FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT

20. Framework for a new Government

Acknowledging that we have an obligation to establish a framework of working together in an inclusive government; Accepting that the formation of such a government will have to be approached with great sensitivity, flexibility and willingness to compromise;

Recognising that the formation of such a Government would demonstrate the respect of the Parties for the deeply-felt and immediate hopes and aspirations of the millions of our people.

Determined to carry out sustained work to create the conditions for returning our country to stability and prosperity; Acknowledging the need for gender parity, particularly the need to appoint women to strategic Cabinet posts;

20.1 The Parties hereby agree that:

20.1.1 Executive Powers and Authority

The Executive Authority of the Inclusive Government shall vest in, and be shared among the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, as provided for in this Constitution and legislation. The President of the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the Constitution and the law. The Prime Minister of the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the Constitution and the law. The Cabinet of the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the Constitution and the law. In the exercise of executive authority, the President, Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers must have regard to the principles and spirit underlying the formation

of the Inclusive Government and accordingly act in a manner that seeks to promote cohesion both inside and outside government.

20.1.2 The Cabinet

(a) shall have the responsibility to evaluate and adopt all government policies and the consequential programmes;

(b) shall, subject to approval by Parliament, allocate the financial resources for the implementation of such policies and programmes;

(c) shall have the responsibility to prepare and present to Parliament, all such legislation and other instruments as may be necessary to implement the policies and programmes of the National Executive;

(d) shall, except where the Constitution requires ratification by Parliament, or action by the President, approve all international agreements;

(e) shall ensure that the state organs, including the Ministries and Departments, have sufficient financial and other resources and appropriate operational capacity to carry out their functions effectively; and

(f) shall take decisions by consensus, and take collective responsibility for all Cabinet decisions, including those originally initiated individually by any member of Cabinet.

(g) The President and the Prime Minister will agree on the allocation of Ministries between them for the purpose of day-to-day supervision.

20.1.3 The President

(a) chairs Cabinet;

(b) exercises executive authority;

(c) shall exercise his/her powers subject to the provisions of the Constitution;

(d) can, subject to the Constitution, declare war and make peace;

(e) can, subject to the Constitution, proclaim and terminate martial law;

(f) confers honours and precedence, on the advice of Cabinet;

(g) grants pardons, respites, substitutes less severe punishment and suspends or remits sentences, on the advice of Cabinet;

(h) chairs the National Security Council;

- (i) formally appoints the Vice Presidents;
- (j) shall, pursuant to this Agreement, appoint the Prime Minister pending the enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment no.19 as agreed by the Parties;
- (k) formally appoints Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers in accordance with this agreement;
- (l) after consultation with the Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Ministers, allocates Ministerial portfolios in accordance with this Agreement;
- (m) accredits, receives and recognizes diplomatic agents and consular officers;
- (n) appoints independent Constitutional Commissions in terms of the Constitution;
- (o) appoints service/executive Commissions in terms of the Constitution and in consultation with the Prime Minister;
- (p) in consultation with the Prime Minister, makes key appointments the President is required to make under and in terms of the Constitution or any Act of Parliament;
- (q) may, acting in consultation with the Prime Minister, dissolve Parliament;
- (r) must be kept fully informed by the Prime Minister on the general conduct of the government business and;
- (s) shall be furnished with such information as he/she may request in respect of any particular matter relating to the government, and may advise the Prime Minister and Cabinet in this regard.

20.1.4 The Prime Minister

- (a) chairs the Council of Ministers and is the Deputy Chairperson of Cabinet;
- (b) exercises executive authority;
- (c) shall oversee the formulation of government policies by the Cabinet;
- (d) shall ensure that the policies so formulated are implemented by the entirety of government;
- (e) shall ensure that the Ministers develop appropriate implementation plans to give effect to the policies decided by Cabinet: in this regard, the Ministers will report to the Prime Minister on all issues relating to the implementation of such policies and plans;
- (f) shall ensure that the legislation necessary to enable the government to carry out its functions is in place: in this regard, he/ she shall have the responsibility to discharge the functions of the Leader of Government Business in Parliament;
- (g) shall be a member of the National Security Council;
- (h) may be assigned such additional functions as are necessary further to enhance the work of the Inclusive Government;
- (i) shall, to ensure the effective execution of these tasks, be assisted by Deputy Prime Ministers; and
- (j) shall report regularly to the President and Parliament.

20.1.5 Council of Ministers

To ensure that the Prime Minister properly discharges his responsibility to oversee the implementation of the work of government, there shall be a Council of Ministers consisting of all the Cabinet Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister, whose functions shall be:

- (a) to assess the implementation of Cabinet decisions;
- (b) to assist the Prime Minister to attend to matters of coordination in the government;
- (c) to enable the Prime Minister to receive briefings from the Cabinet Committees;
- (d) to make progress reports to Cabinet on matters of implementation of Cabinet decisions;
- (e) to receive and consider reports from the Committee responsible for the periodic review mechanism; and
- (f) to make progress reports to Cabinet on matters related to the periodic review mechanism.

20.1.6 Composition of the Executive

- (1) There shall be a President, which Office shall continue to be occupied by President Robert Gabriel Mugabe.
- (2) There shall be two (2) Vice Presidents, who will be nominated by the President and/or Zanu-PF.
- (3) There shall be a Prime Minister, which Office shall be occupied by Mr Morgan Tsvangirai.
- (4) There shall be two (2) Deputy Prime Ministers, one (1) from MDC-T and one (1) from the MDC-M.
- (5) There shall be thirty-one (31) Ministers, with fifteen (15) nominated by ZANU PF, thirteen (13) by MDC-T and three (3) by MDC-M. Of the 31 Ministers, three (3) one each per Party, may be appointed from outside the members of Parliament. The three (3) Ministers so appointed shall become members of the House of Assembly and shall have the right to sit, speak and debate in Parliament, but shall not be entitled to vote.
- (6) There shall be fifteen (15) Deputy Ministers, with (eight) 8 nominated by ZANU PF, six (6) by MDC-T and one (1) by MDC-M.
- (7) Ministers and Deputy Ministers may be relieved of their duties only after consultation among the leaders of all the political parties participating in the Inclusive Government.

20.1.7 Senate

- (a) The President shall, in his discretion, appoint five (5) persons to the existing positions of Presidential senatorial appointments.
- (b) There shall be created an additional nine (9) appointed senatorial posts, which shall be filled by persons appointed by the President, of whom, 3 will be nominated by ZANU-PF, 3 by MDC-T and 3 by MDC-M.

20.1.8 Filling of vacancies

- (a) In the event of any vacancy arising in respect of posts referred to in clauses 20.1.6 and 20.1.7(b) above, such vacancy shall be filled by a nominee of the Party which held that position prior to the vacancy arising.

ARTICLE XXI ELECTORAL VACANCIES

21. Electoral Vacancies

Aware of the divisive and often times confrontational nature of elections and by elections; Noting the need to allow this agreement to take root amongst the parties and people of Zimbabwe; and Cognisant of the need to give our people some breathing space and a healing period;

21.1 The Parties hereby agree that for a period of 12 months from the date of signing of this agreement, should any electoral vacancy arise in respect of a local authority or parliamentary seat, for whatever reason, only the party holding that seat prior to the vacancy occurring shall be entitled to nominate and field a candidate to fill the seat subject to that party complying with the rules governing its internal democracy.

ARTICLE XXII IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS

22. Implementation mechanisms

22.1 To ensure full and proper implementation of the letter and spirit of this Agreement, the Parties hereby constitute a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee ("JOMIC") to be composed of four senior members from ZANU-PF and four senior members from each of the two MDC Formations. Gender consideration must be taken into account in relation to the composition of JOMIC.

22.2 The committee shall be co-chaired by persons from the Parties.

22.3 The committee shall have the following functions:-

- (a) to ensure the implementation in letter and spirit of this Agreement;
- (b) to assess the implementation of this Agreement from time to time and consider steps which might need to be taken to ensure the speedy and full implementation of this Agreement in its entirety;
- (c) to receive reports and complaints in respect of any issue related to the implementation, enforcement and execution of this Agreement;
- (d) to serve as catalyst in creating and promoting an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between the parties; and
- (e) to promote continuing dialogue between the Parties.

22.4 JOMIC shall be the principal body dealing with the issues of compliance and monitoring of this Agreement and to that end, the Parties hereby undertake to channel all complaints, grievances, concerns and issues relating to compliance with this Agreement through JOMIC and to refrain from any conduct which might undermine the spirit of co-operation necessary for the fulfillment of this Agreement.

22.5 The new Government shall ensure that steps are taken to make the security forces conversant with the Constitution of Zimbabwe and other laws of Zimbabwe including laws relating to public order and security.

22.6 The implementation of this agreement shall be guaranteed and underwritten by the Facilitator, SADC and the AU.

22.7 The Parties and the new Government shall seek the support and assistance of SADC and the AU in mobilizing the international community to support the new Government's economic recovery plans and programmes together with the lifting of sanctions taken against Zimbabwe and some of its leaders.

22.8 The Parties agree that they shall cause Parliament to amend any legislation to the extent necessary to bring this agreement into full force.

ARTICLE XXIII PERIODIC REVIEW MECHANISM

23. Periodic review mechanism

23.1 Having regard to the Objectives and Priorities of the New Government as set out in this Agreement, the Parties hereby agree that:

- (a) they shall constitute a committee composed of 2 representatives each to review on an annual basis progress on the implementation and achievement of the priorities and objectives set out in this Agreement, namely: Economic (restoration of economic stability and growth, sanctions, land question) Political (new constitution, promotion of equality, national healing and cohesion and unity, external interference, free political activity, rule of law, state organs and institutions, legislative agenda and priorities) Security (security of persons and prevention of violence) and Communication (media and external radio stations); and
- (b) The committee shall make recommendations to the Parties and the new government on any matters relating to this Agreement, more particularly on measures and programmes that may be necessary to take and make to realise full implementation of this Agreement.
- (c) This Agreement and the relationship agreed to hereunder will be reviewed at the conclusion of the constitution-making process.

23.2 The Parties will continually review the effectiveness and any other matter relating to the functioning of the Inclusive Government established by the Constitution in consultation with the Guarantors.

ARTICLE XXIV INTERIM CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

24. Interim Constitutional amendments

The Parties hereby agree:

24.1 that the constitutional amendments which are necessary for the implementation of this agreement shall be passed by parliament and assented to by the President as Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No 19. The Parties undertake to unconditionally support the enactment of the said Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment

No 19; 24.2 to include in Constitutional Amendment No19 the provisions contained in Chapters 4 and 13, and section 121 of the draft Constitution that the Parties executed at Kariba on 30 September 2007 (Kariba draft).

ARTICLE XXV COMMENCEMENT

25. Commencement This Agreement shall enter into force upon its signature by the Parties.

In WITNESS WHEREOF the Parties have signed this Agreement in the English language, in six identical copies, all texts being equally authentic:

Done at Harare on this 15 day of September, 2008

ROBERT G MUGABE PRESIDENT, ZANU-PF

MORGAN R TSVANGIRAI PRESIDENT, MDC

ARTHUR G 0 MUTAMBARA PRESIDENT, MDC

In WITNESS THEREOF the Facilitator: THABO MBEKI SADC FACILITATOR

THE 15 SEPTEMBER 2008 GLOBAL POLITICAL AGREEMENT

SOURCE (GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE)

APPENDIX IV – Sample of questions that guided the unstructured interviews

My name is Douglas Munemo. I am a student at UNISA in Development Studies. I am carrying out research on ‘The Search for Peace, Reconciliation and Unity in Zimbabwe: From the 1978 Internal Settlement to the 2008 Global Political Agreement’. May you please help me by answering questions below. Your responses will be used for no other purpose apart from academic purposes only. You are assured of the confidentiality of your responses and you will remain anonymous.

1. Why in spite of the four peace agreements, unity governments and reconciliation processes between the years 1978 and 2008 have peace, unity and reconciliation not been achieved in Zimbabwe.
2. How have the continuation of colonial forms of domination that define power, economy, identity, being and knowledge that survived the end of formal colonialism – affected the quest for peace, unity and reconciliation in
3. What **fundamentally** is the Zimbabwean problem

Thank you.

APPENDIX V - Sample Introduction Letter From The Employer¹

3 December, 2014

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing to introduce Mr. Douglas Munemo, who is a lecturer in the Department of Development Studies at the Midlands State University, Zimbabwe. Mr. Munemo is reading for a PhD in Development Studies at the University of South Africa (UNISA). His research topic area is on The Search for Peace, Unity and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe: From the 1978 Internal Settlement to the 2008 Global Political Agreement. To enable him undertake this study, Mr. Munemo requires access to relevant public organizations/institutions and officials in Zimbabwe.

The Department would like to ask for your cooperation and support during Mr. Munemo's research. I should be very grateful if you could facilitate his work and help him in any way possible.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. J. Matunhu

Chairperson of the Department of Development Studies

¹ The original letter used during the field work had the official logo of the institution

APPENDIX VI - Sample Introduction Letter From The Researcher²

8 December, 2014

Dear Sir/Madam,

Ref: Request for Interviews

I am writing this letter to request your permission to conduct face-to-face interviews with you. I am a Doctoral (PhD) candidate of Development in the Development Studies Department, University of South Africa. I am conducting a research on *“The Search for Peace, Unity and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe, 1978- 2012”*. In light of this, I have few questions that I would like to ask in order to test the assumption of the study and/or answer the research questions.

I would like to further emphasize the importance of this research in trying to understanding the challenges of peace, reconciliation and national unity. This study would, no doubt, serve as a theoretical and empirical framework for understanding and developing strategies to foster peace and sustainable development in Zimbabwe. I would therefore, be much grateful if my request is given the best of your favorable consideration. You will find attached an introductory letter from my University and interview schedules for your perusal and consideration.

Thanking you in anticipation of your favourable cooperation. I can be contacted through the following mobile number; 0779 483 041

Yours sincerely,

Douglas Munemo.

² The original letter used during the field work had the official logo of the Institution the researcher was attached

APPENDIX VII - Table Showing Documents Analysed

CATEGORY	DOCUMENTS
1	Published Books
2	Journal Articles
3	Newspapers
4	Magazines
5	Reports
6	Peace Agreements
7	Unpublished Theses
8	Online Materials
9	Research papers

APPENDIX VIII - Table: Showing the study population, sample, sampling and research method

Population	Target Population	Sampling procedure	Sample	Method/technique	Date
Harare	Local resident	Purposive	1	Unstructured interview	14/3/2015.
Harare	Academic and publisher	Purposive	1	Unstructured interview	4/9/2015
Harare	International relations expert	Purposive	1	Unstructured interview	7/9/2015
Harare	Media practitioner and ZANU PF party official	Purposive	1	Unstructured interview	10/9/2015
Harare	former co-national healing and reconciliation minister	Purposive	1	Unstructured interview	17/9/2015
Harare	Media practitioner	Purposive	1	Unstructured interview	7/9/2015
Harare	NGO programme officer	Purposive	1	Unstructured interview	28/8/2015
Harare	Senior MDC-T Official	Purposive	1	Unstructured interview	3/9/2015
Gweru	Retired ZNA officer	Purposive	1	Unstructured interview	12/5/2015
Gweru	Retired ZANU PF ex-government minister	Purposive	1	Unstructured interview	14/9/2015
Bulawayo	Former ZIPRA guerrilla	Purposive	1	Unstructured interview	22/9/2015

APPENDIX IX - CHRONICLE OF EVENTS 1830s – 2013

1830s	Ndebele people fleeing Zulu violence and Boer migration in present-day South Africa move north and settle in what becomes known as Matabeleland.
1888	Cecil John Rhodes obtains the Rudd concession from the Ndebele king Lobengula
1889	Rhodes establishes the British South Africa company (BSAC) Incorporated under Royal Charter
1890	occupation of Mashonaland by the BSAC Pioneer Company
1893	BSAC forces invade Matabeleland and destroy the Ndebele state
1895	Mashonaland and Matabeleland renamed Rhodesia
1896-97	Ndebele –Shona uprisings crushed
1897	Country renamed Southern Rhodesia
1923	Southern Rhodesia becomes a self-governing British colony
1930	Land Apportionment Act divides Rhodesia into African and European Areas
1934	The first African National Congress (ANC) formed in Bulawayo
1948	First general strike by African workers
1951	1951 Land Husbandry Act forces African farmers to destock
1953	Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland formed
1960	National Democratic Party (NDP) founded to replace ANC Law and Order Maintenance Amendment Act passed
1961	Africans reject new constitutional proposal, NDP banned replaced by ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo
1962	Rhodesia Front party under Ian Smith wins election
1963	ZAPU splits, ZANU formed under Ndabaningi Sithole.
1964	ZAPU and ZANU banned after clashes. Nkomo forms the Peoples Caretaker Council
1965	ZIPRA forces enter the country in May UDI- Unilateral Declaration of Independence declared by Ian Smith on 11 November Harold Wilson, British Prime Minister, declares UDI illegal (henceforth known as IDI) and an act of rebellion on. UN Security Council Resolution declares UDI illegal and calls on Britain to end the rebellion.
1966	Smith and Wilson meet on the <i>HMS Tiger</i> Britain applies selective sanction on Rhodesia Seven ZANLA guerrillas die in a battle at Chinhoyi
1968	Smith and Wilson meet on the <i>HMS Fearless</i>
1970	Rhodesia becomes a Republic The African National Council is set up as a temporary non-political body under Bishop Abel Muzorewa.
1971	FROLIZI is formed
1972	ANC under Abel Muzorewa is formed ZANLA begins military offensive in the north-east section of the Country
1974	By the Lusaka Agreement the leaders of ZANU, ZAPU, ANC and FROLIZI agreed to unite in the African National Council with Muzorewa as President Smith and Muzorewa sign an agreement in private

- 1976 The Patriotic Front Agreement is signed
Kissinger Agreement
The Geneva Constitutional Conference on Zimbabwe
- 1977 Anglo-American proposals
- 1978 3 March Internal Settlement between Smith moderate internal African nationalist leaders
8 March ministerial council of interim government composed of black and white ministers created.
April 28 dismissal of Byron Hove (UANC- appointed Co-Minister of Justice, Law and Order)
3 September: An Air Rhodesia Viscount civilian aircraft shot down by ZIPRA.
- 1979 12 Feb ZIPRA shoot down another Viscount aircraft.
April Muzorewa of the ANC wins elections boycotted by the PF
10 September Lancaster House Constitutional Conference begins.
October - An impasse over land reform emerges at Lancaster House. The United States seeks to break the deadlock.
21 December - Lancaster House talks end with a constitution, including a sunset clause' that precludes any changes to the constitution for 10 years. Land resettlement set up on a 'willing buyer-willing seller' basis.
- 1980 4 March - ZANU won the elections for a new black government
18 April - Zimbabwe Independence Day
Mugabe sworn in as first Prime Minister includes Zapu leader Joshua Nkomo in his cabinet.
Sporadic outbursts of violence in the vicinity of Guerrilla Assembly Points (APs) all over the country. State of Emergency, in place since 1965, renewed: it is further renewed every six months until July 1990.
Prime Minister Mugabe enters into an agreement with North Korea for the training and arming of a brigade of the Zimbabwe defence forces. Late in the year there is a battle between ZIPRA and ZANLA Guerrillas, moved from rural Assembly Points to Entumbane near Bulawayo.
- 1981 Early in the year there is a second, major outbreak of violence at Entumbane which spills over to Ntabazinduna and Connemara in the Midlands. More than 300 die. The Dumbutshena Report is commissioned by the government to investigate events surrounding the Entumbane uprising: to date its findings have been suppressed. Inkomo Army Barracks are sabotaged by South African agents destroying \$50 million in ammunition and equipment. North Korean instructors arrive to begin training the "5 Brigade". South African agents sabotage ZANU-PF headquarters, killing 7.
- 1982 Discovery of arm caches on ZAPU owned properties ZAPU Ministers removed from government. Ex-ZIPRAS defect in large numbers. Dissident problem begins. North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade deployed to crush the insurgency in the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces. Government forces are accused of killing thousands of civilians over next few years.
- 1983 Nkomo is placed under house arrest and flees to Botswana.

- 1984 Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry is set up to investigate atrocities in Matabeleland.
- 1985 It is announced the Chihambakwe Commission's report will not be made public.
- 1987 White reserved seats abolished
In April Unity Talks between PF ZAPU and ZANU PF begin
22 December Unity Accord signed between PF ZAPU and ZANU PF
The Zimbabwe government changes the constitution and Mugabe becomes Executive President
- 1988 An Amnesty is announced for all dissidents which is later extended to include all members of the army who committed offences before the Unity Accord.
- 1989 Formation of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) with Edgar Tekere as leader
- 1990 The Zimbabwean government passes the Land Acquisition Act, changing the Zimbabwean constitution. This granted the government more power to redistribute land.
- 1996 End of the first phase of Zimbabwe land reform. £3 - £3.5m unspent (depending on accounts)
Presidential elections held in Zimbabwe. Land reform is a key issue during the campaign.
- 1997 veterans of the liberation war awarded hefty payout gratuities
The Zimbabwe dollar plunges to an all time low against the US\$
New prime minister Tony Blair meets President Mugabe at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. Blair downplays Britain's responsibility for past, infuriating President Mugabe.
- 1998 Zimbabwe enters the DRC war
An economic crisis marked by high interest rates and inflation provokes riots and increasing support for the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions led by Morgan Tsvangirai.
- 1999 The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is formed and Tsvangirai is appointed leader in 1999.
- 2000 Zimbabweans reject a new constitution in a referendum
Landless peasants and War Veterans invade mainly white owned farms
- 2001 Finance Minister Simba Makoni publicly acknowledges economic crisis. Western donors - including the World Bank and the IMF - cut aid because of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme.
- 2002 Mugabe wins election against Tsvangirai. Observers condemn the poll as flawed and unfair. European Union imposes sanctions on Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe suspended from Commonwealth
- 2003 Zimbabwe pulls out of Commonwealth after organisation decides to extend suspension of country indefinitely.
- 2005 May-July - Tens of thousands of shanty dwellings and illegal street stalls are destroyed as part of a "clean-up" programme. The UN estimates that the drive has left about 700,000 people homeless.
The opposition MDC splits over its poll boycott decision
ZANU-PF wins parliamentary election, giving it the majority it needs to change the constitution.

- 2007 June - Ruling ZANU-PF and opposition MDC hold preliminary talks in South Africa.
- 2008 March: ZANU PF loses an inconclusive presidential election to the MDC-T
 June: Mugabe wins a landslide victory in the presidential runoff election boycotted by Morgan Tsvangirai.
 July 21 - ZANU-PF and both groups of the MDC signed a MOU outlining a framework for talks on 21 July
 July 25 - GPA talks officially begin
 August 10 – reports of deadlock in the talks filter across the country
 11 September - A final deal is reached on 11 September 2008, providing for Mugabe to remain President while Tsvangirai would become Prime Minister.
 15- September: the Global Political Agreement on the challenges facing Zimbabwe is signed between the two MDC formations and ZANU PF
 Annual inflation rate hits new high of 231 million% according to official figures.
- 2009 February: A government of national unity between ZANU PF and the two MDC formations led by Mugabe is established.
 Tsvangirai is sworn in as prime minister by Mugabe.
 June - Constitutional review begins.
 One year after power-sharing deal, progress is slow. MDC continues to allege persecution and violence against members.
- 2013 March - New constitution approved by an overwhelming majority in a referendum. Future presidents will be limited to two five-year terms
 July 31: the GNU ends as ZANU PF wins with the elections by a landslide.

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