JESUS CHRIST'S SUBSTITUTIONARY DEATH:
AN ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE TWO
DIVERGENT SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST
TEACHINGS

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In 2001 Jack Sequeira was used by God to open my spiritual eyes so that I could begin to appreciate Jesus Christ’s substitutionary death, which is the basis of the message of righteousness by faith. At the same time, he challenged me to study when he said to me; “I am an old man now. My generation has failed. Study for yourself and preach the good news of salvation as it is in Christ so that Christ may come again to take us home.” From that time, a desire was ignited in me to study the doctrine of atonement. I am greatly indebted to Jack Sequeira for this dissertation.

My experience in writing this dissertation has taught me that it is one thing to have ideas, but another to put down those ideas on paper in a scholarly and readable standard. My supervisor, Dr J M. Wood has taught me how to write. In fact, it is perfectly in order to say that this dissertation is a joint work of my supervisor and I. Dr. Wood was ever patient with me, and guided me all the way to the completion of the study. She even helped me access valuable sources that enriched the study. More than that, she was willing to take some of the stress from me by helping me with printing and binding of the dissertation. Thank you very much, Dr. Wood! I have enjoyed your supervisorship, and benefited greatly from your expertise in the area of systematic theology. The Almighty will always smile on you.

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I believe that the Triune God gave me the dream to undertake this study. I have seen His hand guiding me through the process of writing. There were moments when I got so discouraged that I nearly gave up; God encouraged me to keep pushing. This He did through my supervisor who wrote me emails that reminded me that I needed to keep pushing to reach the goal I had set for myself. Praise and honour be to the Holy Trinity!
Dedication

To my wife, Betty, and my three children for whom I do the many things I do in my life; Emmanuel Happy Martin, Blessings Chimwemwe and Charis Jewel. I want to be a model to all of you, for I had no one.
Declaration:

I declare that this dissertation is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

Unless otherwise stated, all biblical quotations and references have been taken from the New King James Version (NKJV) Remnant Study Bible, copyrighted in 2009 by Remnant Publications, Inc.

Name: Emmanuel Mwale

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Summary:

At the incarnation, Jesus Christ assumed the fallen human nature that He found. Having lived a life of perfect obedience in the fallen human flesh that He assumed, He voluntarily and willingly bore the sins of the entire human race and died the second death for, and in our place; thereby paying the penalty for sin. Jesus Christ bore our sins (acts or behaviours) vicariously, while sin as nature or a law residing in the fallen human flesh that He assumed was condemned in that flesh and received eternal destruction on the cross. Thus, on the cross, in Christ, God saved the entire humanity. On the cross, the condemnation that the entire humanity had received by being genetically linked to Adam was reversed in Christ. Thus, the entire human race stands legally justified. But this is a gift, which can either be received or rejected. Therefore, salvation is not automatic.

Key Terms:

Penal substitution; vicarious atonement; actual atonement; vicarious liability; in Adam; in Christ; Christ in you/us; postlapsarian view; prelapsarian view; alternative Christology

Most Frequently Used Abbreviations:

ULJ = Universal Legal Justification

SDA = Seventh-day Adventist
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: THE FOCAL POINT OF THE THESIS

1.1. Orientation

Atonement is a very important term in Christian theology. According to Pfeiffer, Vos and Rea (1975: 175), the word atonement is an Anglo-Saxon term which has the force of 'at-one-ment, a making at one. It speaks of a process of bringing those who are enemies into harmony and unity, and thus means reconciliation (Pfeiffer et al 1975: 175). Atonement means to make amends for sin (Elwell & Yarbrough 2005: 395).

From the moment sin entered the world (Gen. 3) to the time it will be completely removed (Rev. 22), the term atonement will remain part of the Christian vocabulary. Throughout Christian history, scholars have engaged into its study without really harmonizing their views regarding how God brought about this atonement.

Theories of atonement abound so much that it is just difficult to tell how it is that people read the same Bible but come up with different conclusions regarding what it says about atonement. I will discuss the ransom theory, the moral influence theory, the satisfaction theory, the penal substitutionary theory, the recapitulation theory, Eastern Christianity, and Roman Catholic views on atonement and reparation. The discussion of these theories will only set the stage for the vicarious and actual models of atonement, which are at the centre of this study. What is especially baffling is that sometimes scholars of the same faith; belonging to the same church fail to reconcile their ideas about atonement. This is true about the Seventh-day Adventist Church, as much as it may be true about other Christian churches. A theory of atonement may be formulated by one scholar. After that scholar’s death, there will be those who will want to preserve what their pioneer taught. Others will want to revise the theory to agree with latest research findings in the area of atonement. Thus, one theory can have several variations.

From the time the penal substitutionary theory of atonement was formulated to date, it has positively impacted on Christianity. It has liberated desponding legalists by assuring them that they are saved by grace through faith (Eph. 2: 8-9). Martin Luther got liberated from Roman Catholic legalism when he understood that it was all about what God did for him in the doing and dying of Jesus Christ. For the very first time, it dawned on his mind that he could not earn salvation through acts of penance. George R. Knight talks about his fruitless efforts to becoming
the first perfect Christian since Christ ascended to heaven. He says; “Ever since my conversion from agnosticism in 1961, I have wrestled with what it means to be saved—with what God can do for us and in us” (Knight 2008: 9). My personal experience is not any different from that of Luther and Knight. As a matter of fact, Protestantism is all about the penal substitutionary theory of atonement. At the time that Roman Catholic theologians were teaching that it was not all about grace alone, but some penance was also necessary to salvation, the Reformers taught that it was all about grace and grace alone. But this theory has some variations. Scholars talk about limited atonement, universalism, provisional atonement, vicarious atonement, corporate or shared atonement, and actual atonement. Two seemingly divergent views (vicarious and actual) compete for recognition in the Seventh-day Adventist Church today and I want to briefly talk about each one of them. But before I do that, I want to briefly talk about the penal substitutionary theory of atonement itself.

What is this theory of atonement all about? It is the teaching that on the cross Christ died for, and in our place. Pfandl (2015: 134) asserts; “He [Christ] interprets His own death as a ransom for many (Matt. 20: 28); and on the eve of the crucifixion, He saw himself as the sinner’s substitute (John 15: 13). Substitutionary atonement refers to Christ dying in place of sinners and bearing the punishment that should have been theirs (Elwell & Yarbrough 2005: 404). Wahlen (2015: 190) states; “I believe that Jesus’ sacrificial atonement is substitutionary.” Jesus bore it all for me as an individual, not just for the world—though He did that too (Wahlen 2015: 190).

But the penal substitutionary theory of atonement has attracted a lot of debate among theologians. Heppenstall (1989:243), for example, has argued that substitution is a clear biblical teaching, and that the death of Christ for sinners can only be understood in terms of substitution. For him and others who hold this view, the real issue requiring a critical evaluation is how substitution was accomplished.

On the other hand, theologians like Burke and Taylor (2006: ix, x) have rejected the penal substitutionary theory of atonement. They have argued that it is not only unbiblical, but also an unfair way of explaining how God saves sinners. It is their contention that of all the elements of Christianity, the most repugnant is the notion of the Christ who took our sins upon Himself and sacrificed His body in agony to save our souls (Burke & Taylor 2006: ix, x). They do not see the reason for Christ to do that when no one asked Him to (Burke & Taylor 2006: ix, x). Thus, the
penal substitutionary theory of atonement has also negatively impacted on some people. Cross (2010) argues; ōOne problem with the Reformed conception is that it would either make the Father guilty of the greatest evil of all time (pouring out the punishment for all sin on an innocent man, knowing that he is innocent), or if Christ were truly guilty and deserved all that punishment, then His suffering would be of no benefit to us.Ô will have to evaluate such statements made against the penal substitutionary theory of atonement.

Debate in Seventh-day Adventism is not so much on the penal substitutionary theory itself, but on its variations. I want to evaluate these variations of the penal substitutionary theory of atonement and see where they are different and where they are similar. I want to make a contribution that will somehow either close the debate or ignite further debate and research. Meanwhile, I will briefly talk about the two variations of atonement (vicarious atonement and actual atonement).

According to Bauer (2008:1), vicarious atonement means a one-for-one representation, in which Christ is understood to personally represent you individually on the cross as your personal representative and substitute. Thus Christ bears our sins through the transfer of sin from sinner to substitute, as seen in the symbolism of the Mosaic sanctuary (Bauer 2008: 1). Shepherd (2015: 178) says; ōQuite commonly elsewhere reference is made to ChristÔ vicarious death (Rom 5: 6-8; 14: 15; 1 Cor. 8: 11; 15: 3).ÔShepherd (2015: 180) asserts; ōPeter has suddenly shifted from speaking of following the example of Jesus to describing the vicarious nature of His death.ÔHe makes this comment with respect to 1 Pet. 2: 24. Similar to PaulÔ description of the Christian life in Rom. 6, Peter indicates that the purpose of ChristÔ vicarious sacrifice in bearing our sins on the cross was that we might experientially die to sin as a master and live for the new master: righteousness (Shepherd 2015: 180). His wound, received from sinners when He deserved no such treatment, bore vicariously the guilt of the world, removing the penalty of everyoneÔ sins (Shepherd 2015: 181). Our lives must first be changed and renewed by ChristÔ vicarious death on the cross (Shepherd 2015: 181).

BauerÔ argument that vicarious atonement is a one-for-one representation needs to be evaluated in the context of the actual view of atonement. Does it exclude corporate representation where Christ represented the entire humanity when He died on the cross? If so, how did Christ vicariously deal with the problem of sin as nature? How does BauerÔ statement fair in light of
Shepherd's statement that Christ bore vicariously the guilt of the world, removing the penalty of everyone's sins? If Christ bore vicariously the guilt of the world, and removed everyone's sins, did He not forgive everyone? Did He not justify everyone? Did He not save everyone? I will have to answer these questions in this study.

The above comments on the vicarious nature of Christ's death have to be evaluated in light of a competing theory of atonement: actual theory. Thus, in 1993, it was asserted; “Christ, in His humanity, saved men and women in actuality-not vicariously” (Sequeira 1999: 42-43). Again, in 1996, it was argued; it may be possible for Christ to bear our many sins vicariously on His cross-although that would be illegal-but it is impossible for Him vicariously to overcome and condemn the principle of sin that resides in our sinful flesh (Sequeira 1996: 87). When I read these two statements, I realized that the vicarious and the actual views of atonement are direct opposites. The options for me have been limited to two: throw away Jack Sequeira's books, or do a research and try to reconcile the two views.

According to Sequeira (2005: 81); in the law of the land and the law of God, guilt cannot be legally transferred. This is a fundamental truth of all law. Thus, Sequeira's formulation of the actual view of atonement is meant to make substitutionary atonement legally acceptable. He calls substitution a biblical doctrine (Sequeira 1999: 40). He also calls it a central pillar of the gospel (Sequeira 1996: 72). The question that naturally arises is: How can substitution be a biblical doctrine and vicarious atonement not? Are the terms vicarious and substitutionary not synonymous? What was Jack Sequeira thinking about when he was writing his two books where he rejects vicarious atonement? I will critically analyze these questions.

What is actual atonement? It is the view that when Christ died on the cross, the entire humanity died in Him since He was us in His humanity (Sequeira 1996: 134). This view is based on the belief that Christ assumed fallen human nature (Sequeira 1996: 134). The human Christ who died on the cross was the entire human race. But how could we be in another person, Christ? In this research I will answer this question.

In 2009 Jack Sequeira made a statement that has given me some more hope that the two views of atonement can be reconciled. He argues; Since Christ did not participate in or commit sins (in thought, word, or deed), we can say that he vicariously redeemed humanity from its sins (sinful
behaviour) (Sequeira 2009: 355). Thus, in Sequeira’s opinion, Christ did vicariously redeem humanity from its sins or acts.

Each of the two views of atonement has some implications on the concepts of justification, in Christ, and Christ’s humanity. I will look for differences and similarities in what is taught on these concepts of salvation, and seek possible reconciliation of the views in the similarities.

At the centre of the controversy between the two views about Christ’s substitutionary death is the question of vicarious liability as it relates to both God’s law and human law. As already noted Sequeira (1996: 73) argues that no law allows an innocent person to die in place of the guilty. If for example, my son broke the laws of our country and was proved guilty, Sequeira’s argument is that the courts would not possibly allow me to go to prison in my son’s place even if I was willing to do so. If my son murdered another person and was sentenced to die by hanging, the courts would not allow me to be executed in his place. It is for this reason that I will now discuss the subject of criminal vicarious liability. It should be noted nevertheless, that the discussion will borrow concepts from vicarious liability in the law of torts. And for the purposes of this research, vicarious liability cannot be discussed without making reference to elements in criminal law that go to establish the guilt of an offender. These are actus reus and mens rea.

These are the elements in criminal law that go to prove that a person is guilty of having committed an offence. Forster (2008: 18) notes that the actus reus of a criminal offence defines the prohibited act which if performed will attract criminal liability. In many instances, the actus reus is straightforward. For instance, punching another person in the face (provided there exists no defence) amounts to an assault; the act of punching causing an injury is the actus reus of the offence and such an act will attract criminal liability. It should be noted that in some few instances, the actus reus may not be straightforward. The discussion of such instances is beyond the scope of this research.

According to Forster (2008: 18), the mens rea of a criminal offence establishes the mental element of the offence and means that the offender had the necessary mental state or degree of fault at the relevant time the actus reus was carried out.

The effect of the two elements is that in a criminal trial, the prosecution has to prove that the accused person committed a prohibited act as well as that that person had the necessary mental
state or degree of fault at the time the prohibited act was carried out. If either of the two elements is missing, the accused person is not guilty.

Applying the above scenario to the subject of Christ’s substitutionary death, it would mean that for Christ to be guilty, it would have to be proved that He committed a prohibited act, and that at the time of committing that act, He had the necessary mental state or degree of fault. But it is a known fact according to the Scriptures that Christ did not sin, or in legal terms, commit a prohibited act (Heb. 4: 15). That is why His death has to be explained not in criminal terms, but in terms of substitution. Christ did not die for His own sins, but for the sins of fallen human beings.

Dederen (2000: 177) argues that Christ’s death was vicarious. This goes to suggest that Christ incurred vicarious liability. But this is biblical vicarious liability. It is this biblical vicarious liability that Sequeira partially rejects. As already noted above, he argues that no law allows an innocent person to take the place of the guilty. It is important then that the concept of vicarious liability be briefly looked at.

Botha and Millard (2014) define vicarious liability as the strict liability of one person for the delict of another. In simpler terms, Richards and Curzon (2011: 278) define vicarious liability as liability which arises because of one person’s relationship to another. Thus, an employer is generally liable to a third party for the torts of his employee performed in the course of his employment. Richards and Curzon (2011: 278) argue that in criminal law, a master may sometimes be held liable for a servant’s offences.

According to Botha and Millard (2014), many theories attempt to explain the rationale and basis of vicarious liability, such as the employer’s fault in selecting the employee, the interest and profit theory, the solvency theory, and the risk or danger theory, to mention a few. I will not attempt to explore these theories as that is beyond the scope of this research. However, regardless of the basis of vicarious liability, it is now well established that one person can be vicariously liable for the damage caused by another.

It should be noted that vicarious liability is an exception to the basic premise of the law of delict that fault is a prerequisite for liability. According to the fault theory as noted above, the
wrongdoer has to act with fault, either intent or negligence, in order to incur delictual liability, whereas vicarious or strict liability is liability in the absence of fault.

For the purposes of this research, I should note that in South Africa parents have been held vicariously liable for the offences of their children. Botha and Millard (2014) submit that the reasons for vicarious liability of parents for the conduct of their children have to be sought in a number of policy considerations, for example the risk created by bringing a child into the world, the fact that the parent rather than the impecunious child is usually better suited to pay for the loss caused by the child, the notion that possible liability for a child’s conduct may cause the parent to instruct, control, supervise, guide and discipline the child more thoroughly regarding potentially damage-causing behaviour.

Having given the reasons for holding the parents liable for faults of the children, Botha and Millard (2014) argue that naturally the existence of a parent-child relationship should not without further ado give rise to parental liability, just as an employment relationship in itself does not constitute vicarious liability: prerequisites must be satisfied for liability to follow. Although the prerequisites for vicarious liability in the traditional categories may offer valuable guidelines, the requirements for a parent’s vicarious liability, should it be recognized, will have to be worked out with reference to the distinctive nature of the parent-child relationship in a particular fact-situation.

Botha and Millard (2014) suggest that corporate criminal liability is also a form of vicarious liability. This is where individuals who form part of the corporate body can be held liable. This may not only be on the basis of vicarious liability, but also on the basis of the doctrine of identification. In terms of the doctrine of identification, a corporate body may be identified with certain key individuals who act on its behalf, whereas vicarious liability lays a corporate body open to liability for crimes committed by individuals in the course of their duties, or in the scope of their employment and with the intent to further the interests of the corporation.

To illustrate how vicarious liability works, I will cite some decided court cases. In the case of Polland v Parr & Sons [1927] 1 K.B. 236, a carter, who suspected on mistaken but reasonable grounds that a boy was pilfering sugar from the wagon of the carter’s employer, struck the boy on the back of the neck with his hand. The boy fell and a wheel of the wagon went over his foot.
The employer was held liable because the blow given by the carter, although somewhat excessive, was not sufficiently so to make it outside the scope of employment.

The above case illustrates a situation where the employee makes a mistake but the employer is held liable. This is because of the relationship that exists between the employer and the employee.

Sometimes employers are held vicariously liable for the willful wrong of their employees. It is important to note here that the act done may still be in the course of employment even if it was expressly forbidden by the employer. This is as it was stated by Lord Thankerton in *C. P. R. v Lockhart [1942] A.C. 591* at page 600 and by Lord Justice Willmer in *Ilkiw v Samuels [1963] 1 W. L. R. 991* at page 998.

In *Limpus v London General Omnibus Co [1862] 1 H. & C. 526*, a driver of the defendants’ omnibus had printed instructions not to race with, or obstruct, other omnibuses. In disobedience to this order he obstructed the claimant’s omnibus and caused a collision which damaged it. The defendants were held liable because what he did was merely a wrongful, improper and unauthorized mode of doing an act which he was authorized to do, namely, to promote the defendants’ passenger-carrying business in competition with their rivals.

Again, in *LCC v Cattermole’s (Garages) Ltd [1953] 1 W. L. R. 997*, a garage-hand was not allowed to drive vehicles, but it was part of his duty to move them by hand. His employers were held liable for his negligence while driving a vehicle. However, in *General Engineering Services Ltd v Kingston & St Andrew Corp [1988] 3 All E. R. 867*, a fire engine crew engaging in a “go-slow” in support of a pay claim were held not to be acting in the course of their employment when they failed to arrive in time to put out a fire.

In *Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22*, the House of Lords held that the defendant children’s home was vicariously liable for the acts of the warden in abusing the claimants: the home had undertaken the care of the children and entrusted the performance of that duty to the warden and there was therefore a sufficiently close connection between his employment and the acts committed by him.
*Doe v Bennett [2004] SCC 17* is a Canadian case which dealt with a situation of abuse done outside the context of residential homes. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a Roman Catholic diocese was vicariously liable for the abuse by a priest on the basis of the degree of power and influence it conferred on him in relation to the children in the parish. In *Maga v Birmingham Archdiocese [2010] EWCA Civ 256*, the trial judge dismissed a claim in respect of sexual abuse by a priest because the priest, although he had engaged the young claimant for small jobs like cleaning, had made no attempt to involve him in religious activities and his position as a priest merely gave him the opportunity to commit the abuse; but the Court of Appeal was of a different view. Among the factors which pointed the other way were that a priest’s role was to bring the Gospel to all people, though not necessarily by seeking converts, that the priest in question had a special responsibility for youth work, that he had engaged the claimant in helping with social events at church, that some of the abuse had taken place at the presbytery and that his priestly status and authority meant that no one would question his being alone with the claimant.

Baker (2014) does not support vicarious liability as it relates to bishops and dioceses. He argues that vicarious liability is appropriate only in civil or administrative cases (Baker 2014). He further argues that regardless of the very serious criminal and moral wrongs perpetrated by some priests, and the terrible spiritual, moral and psychological damage to the victims, however, negligence in responding to these crimes does not constitute criminal conduct by a bishop or diocese (Baker 2014).

The net effect of what has been discussed is that there is what is called criminal vicarious liability in human law. There is also civil and administrative vicarious liability. I will have to find out what impact this vicarious liability has on our understanding of Christ’s substitutionary death. Is vicarious liability provided for in human law similar to vicarious liability in Christian theology? Is vicarious liability legally and ethically acceptable? A serious debate needs to be engaged in.

### 1.2. Approach and relevance

Much of what has shaped my theological thinking is what I have read in both scholarly and non-scholarly books. I had no privilege of reading God’s word; not even listening to a preacher
preach from it, for I did not go to church until I was twenty-two years old. I did not begin my Christian journey with the Bible, but with Christian books. I first read books that emphasized the life of Jesus Christ, which later pointed me to God’s word. When I read books and heard sermons on Christian living, I failed to reconcile what God did for me through Christ (justification) and what He does through me (sanctification). I read and heard about the importance of preaching Christ and Him crucified, but failed to really grasp what this entailed. I received Christian baptism in the Seventh-day Adventist Church (SDAC) six months after I started attending church. It was not long before the church gave me an opportunity to preach. Later I got into lay leadership positions like eldership that made me a teacher of God’s word to congregants. I was also involved in lay evangelism. After training as a Mathematics teacher, I taught for only two years, and left to begin full time pastoral ministry. This was at first ministry without training. I preached our Seventh-day Adventist doctrines without being fully convinced of my own salvation. If ever I thought I was saved, it was because I had made a lot of lifestyle changes in my life in the vain hope of winning the favour of God. My theological training did little to give me Christ, for I did not have any personal encounter with Him during the training. I can only say that theological training gave me tools for personal study, but not Christ.

This background sets the stage on which I stand to explain my approach to this research. My own experience with God’s word and Christian works, and the way I have interpreted them to make them applicable in my Christian experience is of great importance and I will therefore identify my approach to Christianity and Scripture.

The Bible is God’s authoritative word, which has recorded all I need to find salvation in Jesus Christ. With prayer and a commitment to understand what it says, I can read the Bible and interpret it correctly both for myself and for others. Therefore, I should not begin with interpretations of the Bible to understand what it says. Instead, I should first read the Bible for myself, and hear God speak to me through His word before reading what interpreters have said about the topic of consideration. This is not what I did; I read interpreters first before I could read the Bible for myself. There are many “gospels” in the Seventh-day Adventist Church today. Martin Weber, in his book: *Who’s Got the Truth? Making sense out of five Adventist gospels* (1994) has identified at least five Adventist “gospels” or explanations of the gospel. In such an environment of multiplicity of explanations about salvation, it has been difficult for me to decide
for certain what the Bible really says about atonement. If Christ’s death was substitutionary, was it vicarious? If it was all vicarious, does this vicarious view of atonement take into consideration how Christ dealt with the duo problem of sin? If on the other hand it was actual, did we not die for ourselves in Christ? Did we not pay for our own sins in Christ? I view Christianity as a very authentic religion, built on Christ Himself. Christ is not dead, but living. Therefore, He must become real in my life. This interpretation of Scripture and Christianity has made me want to step aside from the traditional mindset of taking whatever has been said by seniors to be what the Bible says, and critically look at what is being taught in the Seventh-day Adventist Church on atonement with an independent mind. One of the views of atonement (actual view) has made profound impact on my life. But it is not accepted by most of our well respected scholars and church administrators because the view seemingly negates the aspect of transfer of sin from the guilty to the innocent, which is the very foundation of the penal substitutionary theory of atonement. Therefore, I will attempt to reconcile this view with the other view (vicarious view).

As I have already stated, I am a Pastor in the Seventh-day Adventist Church (SDAC) whose major tasks are to teach and preach God’s word. As a teacher and preacher, I am expected by my church to teach and preach biblical truth as understood by the Seventh-day Adventist Church (SDAC). This truth has been summarized in a statement of fundamental beliefs voted by representatives of the church from all parts of the world in what we call a General Conference Session.

Left as they are, without any attempt to explain in detail the meaning of these fundamental beliefs, there is no controversy among Adventist scholars about them. This is true about beliefs related to the penal substitutionary theory of atonement as well as all other doctrines.

The challenge comes when scholars begin to explain in detail the meaning of each of the fundamental beliefs. Here scholars get divided into groups, with each group claiming to adhere more closely to the Bible than the other groups. The substitutionary death of Christ is explained differently by different groups of Adventist scholars.

As a Pastor, I am expected to teach what is contained in Seventh-day Adventists Believe and Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology. These two books were not voted as representative of what Seventh-day Adventists believe and teach by a duly called meeting of church
representatives from all parts of the world. However, they are generally taken as representative of the truth as it is in Jesus (Ephesians 4:21) that Seventh-day Adventists around the globe cherish and proclaim (Ministerial Association of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists 2005: vi).

In the two books, the teaching is that Christ death was *vicarious*. This is what I am expected to teach. I have no problem with this, except for one thing; that is, the humanity of Jesus Christ in relation to His substitutionary death. I do not wholeheartedly accept the view of Christ humanity presented in these two books. In my view the two books do not satisfactorily explain how God dealt with sin as a principle that resides in the flesh.

The idea to do this research can be traced back to the year 2001 when Jack Sequeira took me in a theology class. The course was *The Four Gospels*, a requirement for the award of a bachelor’s degree in theology. Sequeira explained the gospel in a manner I had not before heard.

At first I had thought that what Sequeira taught was in total agreement with the teaching of other Adventist scholars. I had assumed that since he was one of the church’s long serving ministers of the gospel, his teaching was approved by the church. I therefore, taught it freely to those under my care. I learned later that his teaching on Christ substitutionary death was different from what was taught in *Seventh-day Adventists Believe* and *Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology*. This created a tension in my mind, which I believe can only be resolved through this research.

I cherish Sequeira’s writings, and I freely share them with fellow pastors. The challenges I face are reports my fellow pastors bring to me after their encounters with scholars who doubt Sequeira’s writings. It appears that theology teachers who do not approve of Sequeira’s understanding of Christ substitutionary death warn their students about his writings. The result is that many of these teachers’ students have written off his writings without reading them. I believe that this is not a scholarly spirit. I strongly believe that Sequeira’s understanding of Christ substitutionary death in connection with the humanity Christ assumed makes sense.

It is true that the statement he made in 1993 when he first published his book on salvation, *Beyond Belief*, made many scholars to doubt everything else he teaches. In that year, Sequeira wholesomely condemned (vicarious) substitution as being unethical and illegal. In his attempt to
defend the doctrine of substitution from attacks by both Christian and non-Christian scholars, he did not see that something that Christ did on the cross could be explained in vicarious terms. But every theologian grows in the understanding of the truth as it is in Christ. Sequeira is not an exception. His recent writings demonstrate that he has grown in his understanding of Christ’s substitutionary death.

The other group of scholars has also demonstrated growth. What Sequeira condemns in his writings is the teaching that Christ assumed the nature of Adam before the Fall. This in fact appears to be what led to his rejection of (vicarious) substitution. The truth is that the position in Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology is not the one condemned by Sequeira. It is what is termed the alternative Christology. In any case, advocates of this teaching believe that Christ assumed a sinless nature. It is interesting that the Bible texts used to give credence to the belief that Christ assumed sinless human nature are the ones, which Sequeira uses to teach that Christ did not sin. This point is important to note because reconciliation can be sought here.

It appears that both Dederen (and others who believe as he does) and Sequeira believe that Christ was not exactly like us. He was unique. Where these theologians seem to differ is on what made Christ unique.

I believe that the Bible alone is the infallible word of God. Writings of scholars are fallible. For this reason, it is my argument that both groups of scholars represented in this research have some truth, but not the whole truth. This is why this research is relevant.

I believe that one theological term is not enough to adequately explain what happened on the cross. Theologians should therefore, be open to incorporate in their vocabularies terms that may help to clarify what God did through Christ to save human beings.

It is my considered view that theologians should not reject a teaching simply because on the surface it appears to be heretical; or the terminology used to explain it sounds heretical. There is need to critically evaluate what is taught, and find points of agreement. This is what this research tries to do about the two seemingly divergent teachings on Christ’s substitutionary death.

It is important that the two seemingly divergent Seventh-day Adventist teachings on Christ’s substitutionary death are reconciled. This will help scholars to appreciate what both groups
together can do in terms of refining knowledge on the topic. Seventh-day Adventist scholars need to contribute a unified view of Christ’s substitutionary death to the general body of theological knowledge. I believe this research presents fairly that view.

1.3. Research interest

Thus, my interest in this study is to examine the differences and similarities in the vicarious and actual views of Christ’s substitutionary death, and attempt a reconciliation of the two views. I will argue that some of the differences in the two views are semantic in nature. For example, I will argue that the difference on the use of the term *provision* with regard to the concept of justification is semantic in nature. I will argue that universal legal justification (ULJ) and the objective aspect of justification (or justification as a provision) are not different, but just different terms talking about the same thing. The difference is not in what happened on the cross; the difference is in what happened when Christ incarnated. The difference lies in how the scholars on either side of the debate view the human nature of Christ.

I will evaluate Jack Sequeira’s rationale in rejecting the vicarious model of atonement in his 1993 and 1996 books, and also his argument in favour of vicarious atonement in his 2009 book. I will point out the fallacy of attempting to evaluate the penal substitutionary theory of atonement from a merely human judgment of how things ought to be. Three basic questions undergird this study. What is the nature of atonement? What influenced Sequeira to reject the vicarious model in his 1993 and 1996 books, and formulate the actual model? What are the implications of taking Christ’s substitutionary death as either vicarious or actual?

1.4. Research aims

There are five primary aims of this study. The first aim seeks to highlight the two seemingly divergent views on Christ’s substitutionary death being taught in the Seventh-day Adventist Church (SDAC) today (vicarious and actual views); secondly, the study seeks to point out differences and similarities in the two views. The third aim is to clarify and revise the existing knowledge on substitutionary atonement in the context of the two views under debate. The fourth aim is to reconcile the vicarious and actual views of atonement, and the fifth aim is to make recommendations in terms of how Seventh-day Adventists should handle the controversy in view of the findings of this study.
1.5. Research methodology

The nature of this research is qualitative and descriptive review of literature that talks about the vicarious and actual views of atonement. I will discuss the penal substitutionary theory of atonement based on the literature that is available on the topic. The data used here is taken from secondary and tertiary sources. Published and unpublished works of Seventh-day Adventist and non-Seventh-day Adventist experts on the topic of study is consulted. The vicarious model of atonement has been popularized in *Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology* (2000) and *Seventh-day Adventists Believe* (2005); as such, while works on the vicarious model of atonement outside these two sources are consulted, it should be noted that the two books are my main sources. The actual model is mainly taught in the way that I will present it in this study by Jack Sequeira; therefore, I will heavily rely on his works: *Beyond Belief* (1993), *Saviour of the World* (1996), and *Romans: The Clearest Gospel of All* (2005). Christ’s substitutionary death is critically evaluated in the context of the two seemingly divergent models. Both models (vicarious and actual) are evaluated in the context of God’s law and human law (especially vicarious liability in criminal law). Differences and similarities in the vicarious and actual models are noted. The reconciliation of the two models is sought in the similarities. A conclusion is then drawn.

1.6. The way forward

In their quest to explain atonement scholars study what those who have gone before them have said and written. Generally, almost all who have tried to explain atonement have done so within the context of what their predecessors have formulated as models of atonement. For example, the actual model of atonement is a variation of the penal substitutionary theory. Depending on how the term vicarious is used, it can be taken to be a variation of the penal substitutionary theory. Some theories of atonement have developed from others. For example, the penal substitutionary theory developed from the satisfaction theory. When critically analysed, most of the criticisms of the penal substitutionary theory turn out to be statements made by scholars who prefer other models of atonement to the penal substitutionary theory. Therefore, in chapter two, I have discussed various theories of atonement with special attention given to the penal substitutionary theory of atonement. The penal substitutionary theory of atonement has set a foundation on which the seemingly divergent views: vicarious and actual have developed.
Chapter three is not an attempt to exhaustively review literature on the vicarious model of atonement. It will focus on the definition of the term vicarious and how scholars use it in relation to the term substitutionary. What is important in this chapter is how Christ dealt with the duo problem of sin. Related to the vicarious model of atonement are the concepts of justification, in Christ, and the humanity of Christ. These concepts form part of chapter three. It will become clear in this chapter how scholars who promote the vicarious model of atonement describe justification, in Christ, and Jesus Christ’s humanity.

Chapter four will discuss the actual model of atonement as taught by Jack Sequeira. To be consistent with chapter three, I will focus on how Sequeira uses the term vicarious in relation to the term substitutionary. Like in chapter three, what is important in this chapter is how Christ dealt with the duo problem of sin. Sequeira’s rationale for his actual view of atonement comes out clearly in this chapter. This is of particular interest to me because it sets the stage on which to evaluate his thinking as he was formulating the actual model of atonement. Did he intend to come up with a completely different model of atonement from the vicarious model? Did he reject the penal substitutionary theory of atonement? Was he trying to redeem the vicarious model of atonement from its abuse? Has he demonstrated growth in his understanding of the substitutionary nature of Jesus Christ’s death? It will become clear in this chapter that Sequeira understands the concepts of justification, in Christ, and Christ’s humanity differently from the scholars who traditionally teach the vicarious model of atonement. It will also become clear in this chapter that the term provision, which is crucial in vicarious atonement as understood by scholars represented in chapter three forms part of Sequeira’s atonement vocabulary.

Chapter five leaves the field of theology and goes to the field of law to set the stage for evaluating chapters three and four. I decided to include this chapter to state what the law of the land says in terms of transfer of sin; since one criticism of the vicarious or substitutionary atonement is that both the law of God and the law of the land do not permit transfer of sin from the guilty to the innocent. It is argued that the vicarious model of atonement is illegal and unethical. What is important in this chapter is how the law of the land deals with offences. Important in this chapter also is the concept of vicarious liability.
In chapter six, I will present the findings of the research, focusing on two models of atonement: the vicarious model and the actual model. As various theories of atonement were included in this study to simply provide the context for the penal substitutionary theory with its vicarious and actual variations, I will only make some evaluative comments on each of the theories without seriously engaging the theories. In evaluating the two seemingly divergent views of Christ’s substitutionary death, I will put the scholars on either side of the debate in opposition with each other with the view to point out differences and similarities in their views on the substitutionary nature of Christ’s death. I will take up the question of why Sequeira rejected the vicarious model of atonement in his 1993 and 1996 books: *Beyond Belief* and *Saviour of the World* respectively, and note why scholars need to evaluate the 2009 Sequeira, and not the 1993 and 1996 Sequeira. Attention will be placed on the concepts of justification, in Christ, and Christ’s humanity as these concepts play a big role in the debate on Christ’s substitutionary death.
CHAPTER 2: THEORIES OF ATONEMENT

Introduction

There are several theories of atonement that compete for recognition among Christian scholars, and in the Christian church today. In this chapter the following theories are presented: (1) Ransom theory; (2) Moral Influence theory; (3) Satisfaction theory; (4) Penal Substitutionary theory; (5) Recapitulation theory; (6) Eastern Christianity; and (7) Roman Catholic views on atonement and reparation.

The penal substitutionary theory of atonement will be presented in more detail than the other theories because it is the theory that is at the centre of the controversy among Seventh-day Adventist scholars. There are mainly two variations of this theory in the Seventh-day Adventist Church: vicarious and actual models, which will be highlighted briefly in this chapter, but will be given a detailed treatment in chapter three and chapter four respectively. After giving an overview of the support the theory has received, comments of Seventh-day Adventist authors and scholars will be presented beginning with two representatives from the pioneers of the church to our contemporary scholars. It is not possible to review the works of all the scholars who have written on this highly controversial theory of atonement. For this reason, only works of selected scholars will be considered. A general overview of criticisms of this theory will be given first, followed by a summary of the major criticisms from Millard J. Erickson’s book: Christian Theology (2013). While heavily depending on Erickson’s summary of the criticisms of the penal substitutionary theory of atonement, other scholars will also be cited.

With this short introduction, I will begin discussing these theories of atonement first with the ransom theory. The other theories will be discussed in turn.

2.1. The Ransom theory

The historical overview of the theory will be given first, followed by its description. These will be followed by a review of the variations of the theory, the positive support for the theory, and criticisms of the theory. To begin with, I will now give a brief historical overview of the ransom theory.
2.1.1. Historical overview

Robinson (2007) asserts that the ransom theory was the dominant belief in the early Christian church. One of its advocates was Origen (185-254 CE), a Church Father and leader of the Alexandrian School in Egypt (Robinson 2007). Robinson (2007) observes that the ransom theory has also been called the classic theory of the atonement by Gustaf Aulen (1879-1978). It was God’s self-reconciliation that Aulen called the classic view (Aulen 1931: 4-7). According to Robinson (2007) this theory was accepted by the church leaders for about a millennium, from the second to the twelfth century CE.

Gulley (2012:646) suggests that before the appearance of Aulen’s 1931 Christ Victor, studies on atonement usually began with Anselm. Aulen’s contribution was to focus on the thousand years before Anselm and to present Christ’s victory as the theme running through the writings of such persons as Origen (185-254), Gregory of Nyssa (ca. 330-395), and Augustine (354-430) (Gulley 2012:646).

It has been noted by Robinson (2007) that there are only few theologians outside of the Eastern Orthodox churches and Protestant World-faith movement who believe in the ransom theory of atonement today.

2.1.2. Description of the theory

According to Robinson (2007), the ransom theory of atonement has its foundation on the premise that the death of Christ constituted a ransom paid to Satan, in order to nullify the claims which Satan had on fallen humanity. Robinson (2007) asserts that the early church Father, Origen suggested that, as a result of the sin of Adam and Eve, Satan had acquired a formal dominion over, and ownership of, all of humanity and the rest of the world. Since Satan held claim to humanity, in order to free that humanity from his grip, God agreed to compensate for Adam and Eve’s sin by arranging the death of Jesus, His Son, as a ransom price to be paid to the devil (Robinson 2007).

Origen’s argument as noted by Tanner (2004), quoted by Robinson (2007) was that the payment could not be made to God because God was not holding sinners in captivity for a ransom, so the payment had to be made to the devil. Origen believed that Satan accepted the offer because he
assumed that he would end up with ownership of Jesus, but he did not realize that Jesus would escape his clutches (Tanner 2004, quoted by Robinson 2007). It was Origen’s contention that God deceived the devil by resurrecting Jesus a day and a half after his death on the cross, and this left the devil without a reward, as Jesus had escaped his grasp and was reunited with God (Tanner 2004, quoted by Robinson 2007). Thus, Origen concluded that humans can then be reconciled with God if they trust Jesus as Saviour and Lord (Tanner 2004, quoted by Robinson 2007).

According to Johnson, quoted by Robinson (2007), the ransom theory was based, in part, on Mark 10:45 and 1Tim. 2:6, where Origen interpreted the word literally. Mark 10:45 says; “For even the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give His life a ransom for many.” 1Tim. 2:5-6 says; “For there is one God and one Mediator between God and men, the Man Christ Jesus, who gave Himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time.”

As this section closes it is important to note that the ransom theory has some variations, which will be my focus in what follows.

2.1.3. Variations of the ransom theory

As noted by Robinson (2007), quoting Williams (1997), one variation of the ransom theory was presented by Gregory of Nyssa as an alteration of Origen’s theory by teaching that God was not acting deceitfully, but only repaying Satan for his own deceptions. Robinson (2007), quoting Armstrong (1998), observes that another variation of the ransom theory says that the devil lost his dominion over humankind by unjustly trying to extend his control to a sinless Christ in addition to humanity. In later, more highly developed versions of the ransom theory, according to Robinson (2007), God is not seen as deceiving Satan. It has been argued by Robinson (2007) quoting Martin (1991:252-263) that the devil was tricked by his own inordinate pride. According to Robinson (2007), this adaptation at least avoids having God playing a dishonourable role in the transaction.

There is yet a modern-day variation of the ransom theory, which Gilley (2000) as quoted by Robinson (2007) asserts is taught by Morris Cerullo, Kenneth Copeland, Kenneth Hagin, Benny Hinn, Robert Tilton and others in the World-faith Movement. Their concept, according to Gilley (2000), quoted by Robinson (2007) is that when Jesus descended into Hell after His death, he
was tormented by Satan and all his demons. The suffering that he experienced during His torture was the ransom that God paid to Satan (Gilley 2000, quoted by Robinson 2007).

In what follows, I am going to give the positive support that the ransom theory of atonement has received.

**2.1.4. Positive support for the theory**

As noted by Robinson (2007), the ransom theory has received positive support from Orthodoxy Christianity. One of its supporters, according to Robinson (2007), is Van, who was once a Baptist seminarian but converted to Orthodoxy Christianity. It has been observed by Robinson that Van converted to Orthodoxy faith because of its theory of atonement. Van, suggests Robinson (2007), considers the ransom theory as more highly supported by biblical passages than are the other theories. He wrote that the ransom/classic theory was the view of the New Testament Christians (Robinson 2007). In Van’s view, as observed by Robinson (2007), the New Testament makes few references to guilt, justice, satisfaction, and other distinguishing marks of the satisfaction theory, but is overwhelming in references to the distinguishing marks of the classic idea. Some citations believed to be in support of the ransom theory include passages like First Cor. 15:21-26; First Cor. 15:55; Heb. 2:14-15; Second Tim. 1:10; and Matt. 27:52-53 which refer to death as an enemy, and describe Jesus’ death and resurrection as being victorious over death and destroying death for believers. Passages like Rom. 6:18; Rom. 8:21; Gal. 5:1; Rom. 6:7; and Rev. 1:5 emphasize setting the captives free, a strong theme in the ransom theory of atonement. Rev. 5 and 19 describe Jesus as a victorious conquering king who has conquered death.

Along with the positive support that the ransom theory has received, quite a number of criticisms have also been raised against it. These criticisms will be considered below.

**2.1.5. Criticisms of the theory**

It has been argued by Robinson (2007) that the ransom theory as well as other violence-based atonement explanations, suffer from an inconsistency in Christian teaching. This argument, according to Robinson (2007), is based on the fact that the church has traditionally taught that a person is responsible for their own sin, and that a person cannot morally be punished for the sins
of others. The church has also historically taught that the default destination for all humans currently living, after death, will be Hell because of the Adam and Eve’s transgression in the Garden of Eden when they ate the forbidden fruit (Robinson 2007). Thus, according to Robinson (2007), all will be tortured in Hell, unless they are saved through sacraments and/or good works and/or faith. The sins of Adam and Eve were imputed to the entire human race; therefore, the human race should pay for its own sins (Robinson 2007).

Robinson (2007) argues that most liberal and many mainline Christians believe that Adam and Eve were mystical humans; that is, they did not exist as actual people. Without that belief, therefore, the ransom theory of atonement collapses (Robinson 2007).

Another criticism, according to Robinson (2007), is based on the argument that some Christians note that Adam and Eve were created as proto-humans without a sense of sin. Thus, they ate the forbidden fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil in order to develop a knowledge of good and evil; and since they were without a moral sense, they cannot be responsible for eating the fruit any more than an animal might (Robinson 2007). Therefore, if the first parents are not responsible for eating the fruit, the ransom theory of atonement collapses; there was no need for any ransom to be made (Robinson 2007).

From Johnson (2003), quoted by Robinson (2007), comes a criticism that there is no support in the Bible for the concept that Satan has a legitimate claim on sinners. Johnson (2003) suggests that the biblical word ransom simply means redemption price; it does not necessarily imply a price paid to Satan. It is argued that several passages in the Bible such as Isa. 53:10 and Eph. 5:2 imply that Christ’s death was a ritual sacrifice to God, and thereby not to Satan (Johnson 2003).

Robinson (2007) has argued that Origen’s version of the ransom theory requires that God acts in a deceitful manner; and that does not match the traditional Christian belief about the justice, honesty, and truthfulness of God.

There is another criticism coming from Robinson (2007); that many versions of the ransom theory assume that Satan is unaware of the magical powers of Jesus Christ. The later version especially, assumes that Satan is deluded into thinking that he is more powerful than Jesus Christ (Robinson 2007). However, according Robinson (2007), Satan is portrayed in the Bible as a dedicated, intelligent, and evil angel, not a quasi-deity who is so disconnected from reality that
he is unaware of Jesus Christ’s capabilities. Satan is not described in the Bible as suffering from delusions of grandeur (Robinson 2007).

Many Christians today, as noted by Robinson (2007), reject the entire concept of Satan as a living entity; they view Satan as merely a symbol of evil, not as an actual person. Thus, according to Robinson (2007), if Satan is not an all-evil quasi-deity, Origen’s theory collapses.

It has been argued by Robinson (2007) that the Bible identifies Satan as a created being who was before he sinned called Lucifer; an angel who disobeyed God. Similarly, humans are commonly portrayed in the Bible as created beings that have disobeyed God and fallen (Robinson 2007). Therefore, according to Robinson (2007), there is no obvious rationale for assuming that Satan had control over all of humanity any more than the reverse might have been true.

Robinson (2007) has also argued that since God is omniscient, omnipotent, just, and ethical, it is illogical to assume that he would be willing to allow His Son to be tortured to death if there were another way to achieve atonement. According to Robinson (2007), God might have, for example, simply forgiven Adam and Eve for their sin, for according to the gospels, Jesus repeatedly taught that extending forgiveness is to take the moral high road.

Professor of Philosophy, Martin (1991), quoted by Robinson (2007) argues that since, on the ransom theory, after Jesus’ death and resurrection, human beings were out of the devil’s clutches, it would seem that the way to salvation would simply be to follow a life free from sin so as not to fall under the devil’s control. According to Martin (1991), the ransom theory supplies no answer to the question about the role of faith in Jesus Christ as it relates to the life that a person should live in light of the fact that he is out of the devil’s clutches.

Robinson (2007) has identified three additional criticisms of the ransom theory which also apply to other atonement theories. These criticisms attribute to God the same sort of cruel, hate-filled, punishing behaviour seen in the lives of Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein, and others (Robinson 2007).

One of these additional criticisms according to Robinson (2007) is that there is no obvious mechanism whereby a person can achieve salvation and atonement with God by simply expressing faith and/or trust in Jesus. If trusting Jesus were the only path to atonement and
salvation, then those who have followed a non-Christian religion would not achieve salvation and atonement (Robinson 2007). They would be sent to Hell after death for basically in their case the commission of a thought crime would consist of believing the wrong God or in no God (Robinson 2007). But current moral belief systems, both religious and secular consider punishment for thought crimes to be immoral and unjust (Robinson 2007).

It has been observed by Robinson (2007) that the ransom theory would also route many non-Christians to Hell after death for the simple reason that they have not had the opportunity to learn of Jesus, Christianity, or the gospel message. Being ignorant of Jesus, they could not trust Him as Saviour and Lord and be saved (Robinson 2007). Thus the ransom theory punishes non-Christians for not having made a decision in favour of someone of whom they are unaware; and this appears to many people to be irrational, unjust, and immoral (Robinson 2007).

After this discussion of the ransom theory, in what follows I will give a brief review of the moral influence theory.

2.2. The Moral Influence theory

The moral influence theory will be reviewed in the order that was followed in the preceding section. A historical overview will be given, followed by a description of the theory. Variations (if any) of the theory will be followed by the positive support to the theory, which will be followed by criticisms that have been made of the theory. For now I will give a brief historical overview of the moral influence theory.

2.2.1. Historical overview

According to Robinson (2006), the elements of the moral influence theory were initially suggested by various Apostolic Fathers during the second century CE. For example, Ῥείβλεμπτ (?-Circa 99 CE) referring to Jesus’ life, wrote: Ῥεὶθροσ Ὑμᾶς ἑλκυεθα δι᾽ αἰώνας ἐκ τῆς σκοτεινες πρὸς ἑλπίς ἐκ ἀγωγες (Robinson 2006). He also wrote that Jesus’ sufferings should bring us to repentance (Robinson 2006).

Robinson (2006) has noted that Hemas, writing about 150 CE, suggested that Jesus reveals to us the true God. He has observed that Barnabas (circa 1 to 60? CE) wrote that Jesus came to abolish death and to demonstrate resurrection after death (Robinson 2006).
As argued by Martin (1991:257-258), the moral influence theory was first fully developed in the writings of Peter Abelard (1079-1142) in the 12th century CE. Abelard was a French abbot, theologian and philosopher (Martin 1991:257-258). His birth surname was du Pallet; he took the nickname Abelard while in college (Martin 1991:257-258). Abelard wrote a book called *Expositio in Epistolam AD Romanos* (*Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*) in which he explained his theory of the atonement (Martin 1991:257-258).

This brief historical overview of the moral influence theory will be followed by a description of the theory.

### 2.2.2. Description of the theory

According to Robinson (2006), the moral influence theory teaches that atonement is not attained through a payment to Satan as in the ransom theory. It is not attained by a payment made to restore God’s honour as in the satisfaction theory. God’s justice, in Robinson’s view, might demand such a compensation. But God does not ask for it; rather, His limitless love overrules His need for justice (Robinson 2006). Jesus’ life and death become an inspiration and example for Christians to follow (Robinson 2006). Thus, as argued by Robinson (2006), the focus of the atonement is not Satan or God as in the ransom and satisfaction theories; the focus is the individual Christian believer seeking wholeness. Jesus’ life and death are intended to inspire or influence us to willingly take up our crosses daily in the service of some good cause to humankind, and thus work out our own salvation (Robinson 2006).

With this brief description of the moral influence theory, my task is to now consider its variations, which I seek to do below.

### 2.2.3. Variations of the theory

Different scholars have described the moral influence theory variously. For example, Kiefer, quoted by Robinson (2006) says; "Christ came to win men’s hearts by an example of reconciling love."

Johnson (2003), quoted by Robinson (2006), describes the theory as; "Christ’s death was an example for believers to follow, a radical expression of love that influences sinners morally and gives them a pattern to follow."
It is Sasser (1997) as quoted by Robinson (2006) who writes that Jesus’s death was designed to greatly impress [humankind] with a sense of God’s love, resulting in softening their hearts and leading them to repentance.

In the view of Wilson, quoted by Robinson (2006), the moral influence theory describes the subjective effects of Christ’s cross on the sinner. Abelard, according to Wilson, teaches that when we look at the cross we see the greatness of divine love, which delivers us from fear and produces in us an answering love, putting aside selfishness and sin (Robinson 2006).

Focusing on the effect of God’s unconditional love, Roberts, quoted by Robinson (2006), writes; God’s unconditional love is so powerfully revealed in the life and death of Jesus that it awakens within sinners a reciprocal response.

For Cline, quoted by Robinson (2006), Christ did not die in order to repay our sins, but instead to serve as an example of love and mercy, thus reminding us of what we need to do and how we must behave. In Cline’s opinion, Christ was supposed to be an influence on us rather than a ransom for us (Robinson 2006).

In summary form, the moral influence theory considers atonement as demonstrating God’s love. For Peter Abelard, the death of Christ provided a moral influence to do right (Gulley 2012:645). Christ did not come to die, but He died because He came (Gulley 2012:645). Horace Bushnell (1802-1876) and Hastings Rashdall (1858-1924) were later exponents of this view (Gulley 2012:645).

It should be observed at this point that the moral influence theory is similar to the example theory also called the Socinian theory (Gulley 2012:645). As asserted by Gulley (2012:645), Faustus Socinus (1539-1604) and his uncle, Laelius Socinus (1525-1562) taught that Christ’s death was merely an extension of His teaching, an example He presented to humankind. According to the Socinians, the death of Christ did not atone for sin; neither did it move God to pardon sin (Gulley 2012:645). Christ saves men and women by revealing to them the way of faith and obedience both in His life and in His death, and by inspiring them to lead a similar life (Gulley 2012:645).
According to Peters (2005:5), Philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) lifted up Jesus as our moral ideal; and the father of liberal Protestantism, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), saw the rise of God consciousness in today’s Christians as the subjective appropriation of Jesus’ consciousness by members of the church.

The moral influence theory has received some positive support, which it is now my privilege to highlight.

2.2.4. Positive support for the theory

Robinson (2006) has noted that the moral influence theory has considerable support in the more liberal wings of Christianity where it helps inspire believers to alleviate poverty, relieve suffering, and work for the liberty and justice for all people including women as well as racial, religious and sexual minorities.

While this theory has received positive support in the more liberal wings of Christianity, it has also been heavily criticized. I will now highlight the criticisms which have been made of this theory.

2.2.5. Criticisms of the theory

According to Robinson (2006), many of the criticisms to the ransom theory can also be applied to the moral influence theory. Therefore, it will not serve any purpose to repeat those criticisms that have already been highlighted. It will suffice however, to highlight those criticisms that are unique to the moral influence theory.

Quoting Heb. 9:22, Robinson (2006) argues that a ritual human sacrifice is required before God is able to forgive sin. This, in his view, negates the validity of the moral influence theory and all other non-violent atonement theories (Robinson 2006).

It has been reported by Robinson (2006) that a contemporary of Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux, commented that if Jesus’ death was only an example for Christians to follow, then they could attain salvation through their own efforts. They would be able to do good and to avoid sinful behaviour by simply following Jesus on their own initiative. According to Robinson (2006), this is contrary to a major belief among Protestants that salvation is by faith alone, and not by works;
it is a gift of God. Thus, the moral influence theory is incompatible with that belief since it depends on personal effort (Robinson 2006).

Robinson (2006) argues that if one can be saved through Jesus’ example of an ethical life, then His torture-death was not really necessary. Buddha died a natural death and was not executed; yet his teaching and example has inspired hundreds of millions of Buddhists to lead exemplary lives (Robinson 2006).

It is the contention of Robinson (2006) that the moral influence theory attacks the uniqueness of Christianity in that it treats Jesus as just another charismatic martyr whose life and death has inspired His believers. Roman Catholics, Mormons, Sikhs, members of the Bahá’í faith and followers of other religions all have influential martyrs in their history who inspired believers (Robinson 2006). Thus, Christianity based on the moral influence theory becomes just another religion, another way to God (Robinson 2006). Therefore, Robinson (2006) suggests that those parts of Protestantism which consider Christianity to be an exclusive religion; the only true religion which offers the only way to God, must reject the moral influence theory. Further, as argued by Robinson (2006), if as the moral influence theory states, people are able to raise themselves out of sin by their own bootstraps, then Jesus’ death was really not that important. They can read any number of inspiring books, attend motivation seminars, liberate themselves from sin, and achieve atonement through their own effort; Jesus’ death is not needed and can be dispensed with (Robinson 2006). For that matter, Jesus Himself is no longer needed (Robinson 2006). This, according to Robinson (2006) violates many of the core beliefs of historical Christianity.

Commenting on the attributes of God, Robinson (2006) notes that “God has many attributes: love, holy, just, righteous, etc. They are in balance.” In his view therefore, to say that love is God’s dominating characteristic, as the moral influence theory requires, distorts the image of God and implies that He has a warped, unbalanced nature (Robinson 2006).

Sasser (1997) as quoted by Robinson (2006) observes that the moral influence theory completely denies the spiritual condition of man, the deity of our Lord Jesus Christ, and necessitates a curtailment or surrender of every other characteristic of Christianity: inspiration, sin, the deity of Christ, justification, regeneration and eternal retribution.
Away from this violence-free theory of atonement, I will now turn to the satisfaction theory as one of the violence-based theory of atonement.

2.3. The Satisfaction theory

In reviewing literature on the satisfaction theory, I will follow the pattern followed in sections 2.1 and 2.2 above. That is, a historical overview of this theory will be followed by its description. Variations of the theory will be followed by its positive support. The review will conclude with criticisms which have been made of this theory. To begin with, I will now give a brief historical overview of the satisfaction theory.

2.3.1. Historical overview

According to Robinson (2006), the satisfaction theory is generally attributed to Archbishop Anselm of Canterbury, (1033 to 1109 CE). It is contained in his book Cur Deus Homo (Why God became man), which was written about 1098 CE (Robinson 2006). Its format is that of a conversation between himself and his friend Boso (Robinson 2006). The theory is grounded in the concept of personal honour found in the European feudal culture (Robinson 2006). During the Middle Ages, a serf had to honour both God and the feudal lord who controlled his or her life and land (Robinson 2006).

With this brief historical overview of the satisfaction theory, it is important that its description is given, and this description will be given hereunder.

2.3.2. Description of the theory

According to Peters (2005:11), Anselm began by describing the world as God originally created it. It was a world of order, a world of justice; all things were ordered in harmony for the benefit of God’s creatures (Peters 2005:11). This is because it is God’s will that we creatures enjoy lives of fulfillment, felicity, and blessedness (Peters 2005:11). However, human disobedience in the form of sin has disrupted the world order (Peters 2005:11). Now like defaulting on a mortgage, humanity cannot pay what it owes to make amends; as a result, justice requires that humans be disqualified from enjoying the blessedness God had originally planned (Peters 2005:11). But there is a question as to whether God’s will has been thwarted by human sin.
God wants to continue with His plan; therefore, He decides to confront this human dilemma, and He will deliver blessedness despite human sin and still in harmony with the order of justice (Peters 2005:11). Neither God alone nor humanity alone can pay the debt to satisfy what is required by the order of justice (Peters 2005:11). On the one hand, if God simply forgives humanity for its sinful disobedience, then this would throw the order of justice out of sync; on the other hand, the human race cannot fix what is broken either (Peters 2005:11). And yet, an offering to satisfy justice must be made from the human side; but only God has the capacity for making such satisfaction (Peters 2005:11). Because only God is able to make the offering that we ought to make, it must be made by a combination of the divine and the human (Peters 2005:11). Therefore, concludes Anselm, the incarnation is necessary to accomplish salvation (Peters 2005:11). Anselm’s goal is to provide a coherent concept of atonement that explains why Jesus’ death results in our salvation (Peters 2005:11).

As noted by Martin (1991:252-263), quoted by Robinson (2005); “Only the God-Man is able, by his divinity, to offer something that is worthy of God and, by his humanity, to represent [humankind].” Thus, the satisfaction theory of Anselm suggests that God’s honour would only be satisfied by a ritual sacrifice of a God-Man, His own Son (Robinson 2005).

According to Robinson (2005), the death of Jesus as taught in the context of the satisfaction theory was not considered unjust since He voluntarily allowed Himself to be executed.

Peters (2005:11) asserts that there are some variations of the satisfaction theory such as: substitutionary atonement, penal substitution, or even blood atonement. He notes that the idea of satisfaction is a narrow theological concept, which is used to interpret a large collection of verbal symbols in the Bible: blood, lamb, sheep, the Good Shepherd, scapegoat, the lamb upon the throne, high priest, and such (Peters 2005:11). The governmental theory is also some form of a variation of the satisfaction theory (Peters 2005:11). In section 2.4, the penal substitutionary theory will be considered in detail. Under this section, I will only consider the governmental theory and scapegoating as variations of the satisfaction theory.

2.3.3. Variations of the theory

As already noted variations of the satisfaction theory include: penal substitution, governmental theory, and scapegoating. The last two will now be briefly considered.
2.3.3.1. The Governmental theory

This theory, according to Berkhof (1941:388) was first advocated by Hugo Grotius (AD 1583-1645), a lawyer to whom law was vital, hence, law breaking was taken seriously. The theory was later adopted by Wardlaw and several New England theologians, and is also supported in such recent works as those of Dale, Cave, Miley, Creighton, and others (Berkhof 1941:388). Berkhof (1941:388) observes that the governmental theory denies that the justice of God necessarily demands that all the requirements of the law be met. The law is merely the product of God's will, and He can alter or even abrogate it, just as He pleases (Berkhof 1941:388). While in strict justice the sinner deserved eternal death, that sentence is not strictly executed, for believers are set free (Berkhof 1941:388). For them the penalty is set aside; and that without strict satisfaction (Berkhof 1941:388). Christ did indeed render a certain satisfaction, but this was only a nominal equivalent of the penalty due man; something which God was pleased to accept as such (Berkhof 1941:388). If the question is asked, why God did not remit the penalty outright, as He might have done, the answer is that He had to reveal in some way the inviolable nature of the law and His holy displeasure against sin, in order that He, the moral Ruler of the universe, might be able to maintain His moral government (Berkhof 1941:388).

According to Gulley (2012:646), in the governmental model of atonement, Christ's death was seen as satisfying the justice of God (objective) and as a deterrent to prevent humankind from sinning (subjective). Both the holiness of God and the sinfulness of humans were kept in view in this theory (Gulley 2012:646). But because Grotius did not believe punishment could be transferred from one person to another, he said Christ did not suffer humankind's punishment (Gulley 2012:646). Rather, he said, Christ suffered to make punishment unnecessary, because the demonstration He provided was supposed to turn humans from sin-and thereby preserve God's government (Gulley 2012:646).

As I noted above, the scapegoating theory is another variation of the satisfaction theory. Therefore, in what follows, I will discuss this theory.
2.3.3.2. Scapegoating theory/model

It has been noted by Peters (2005:17) that the construction of the scapegoat model is of recent development. He asserts that theologians are now considering this light of the theory of scapegoating put forth by French literary critic, Rene Girard (Peters 2005:17).

According to Peters (2005:16), the scapegoating theory or model of atonement has the Old Testament for its precedent. On the Day of Atonement, two goats were selected, one of which was slaughtered; and its blood sprinkled on the veil separating the Holy place from the Most Holy place of the sanctuary (Lev. 16). The other goat had the confessed sins of all the Israelites ritually laid on its head and then driven out into the wilderness, bearing the sins away. Concerning this scapegoat, the Bible says; "The goat shall bear on itself all their iniquities to uninhabited land; and he shall release the goat in the wilderness" (Lev. 16:22). Peters (2005:16) suggests that the ritual of blood, goats, sacrifice, and bearing away sins provides symbolic background for framing the atoning work of Jesus in the New Testament.

Human belief in the scapegoat mechanism, a spiritual practice that unifies the social order around victimage, according to Peters (2005:16), is hidden within the practice of sacrifice. Human beings lie about their sins; never wanting to accept that they have sinned; and because we humans lie to ourselves, for atonement to happen, we need to unmask the lie (Peters 2005:16). Jesus steps in as the final scapegoat, because His unjust death unmasks the lie. Thus, Peters (2005:16) asserts; "To scapegoat is to sacrifice someone else for our own self-preservation and self-justification."

A good example of scapegoating in the New Testament according to Peters (2005:16-17) is what happened just prior to the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. Ironically, the most respected religious leaders; including the high priest found it necessary to justify their protection of the nation of Israel from damage by the Romans with this statement; "nor do you consider that it is expedient for us that one man should die for the people, and not that [the] whole nation should perish" (John 11:50). In the view of Peters (2005:17), Caiaphas and his colleagues believed in sacrifice: the sacrifice of Jesus would save the nation. There is sacrifice that is initiated by God and is mediated by priests, but there is also the political practice of scapegoating (Peters 2005:17).
These two, according to Peters (2005:17) merge in the New Testament as testimony to human hypocrisy.

When critically analysed as Peters (2005:17) suggests, the idea of sacrifice is a product of our own vain prostitutions of the truth to justify ourselves while making others suffer; which is actually sin. This sin is revealed by Jesus’ death. Thus, Jesus is the scapegoat that reveals the lie we tell ourselves; and it renders the scapegoat mechanism lame and unusable (Peters 2005:17). In principle, according to Peters (2005:17), Jesus is the final scapegoat, because the lie no longer can fool us into believing we can justify ourselves by sacrificing others.

In conclusion, as Peters (2005:17) puts it; “According the final scapegoat model, God accepts no sacrifice from human beings, either visible ritual sacrifice or invisible scapegoating of enemies.” Thus, according to Peters (2005:17), we can interpret the book of Hebrews to be saying that as high priest Jesus Christ has performed the final sacrifice, after which no future sacrifices will be accepted. Peters (2005:17) suggests that the task of human beings is to study the cross and ask themselves what it reveals to them about covering up their scapegoating with hypocritical lies. In this regard, according to Peters (2005:17), the final scapegoat model could be considered a much more intense version of the moral example model.

With these concluding statements on the scapegoating theory/model of atonement, which is one of the variations of the satisfaction theory of atonement, I will proceed to consider the positive support for the theory.

2.3.4. Positive support for the theory

According to Robinson (2005), the satisfaction theory of atonement is taught by both the Roman Catholic Church and most Protestant denominations. Some variations of this theory are equally supported by both the Roman Catholic Church and most Protestant denominations. However, as noted by Robinson (2005), the Roman Catholic Church does not raise the theory to the level of dogma.

With the positive support that the satisfaction theory of atonement has received are a number of criticisms that deserve attention. These criticisms will be highlighted below.
2.3.5. Criticisms of the theory

In his book, *The Case Against Christianity*, Martin (1991:252-263), as quoted by Robinson (2005), has made a number of points in criticism against the satisfaction theory of atonement, which are highlighted below.

The first criticism that Martin makes is that the theory is based on the assumption that because God is infinite, even a single, minor human sin is an infinite insult to God; it can only be cancelled by an infinite satisfaction (Robinson 2005). But, using the same reasoning, it has been suggested that a minor positive act by a human would bring about an infinite amount of good (Robinson 2005). But that is irrational, because only God can bring about an infinite good (Robinson 2005). Martin’s second criticism, as quoted by Robinson (2005) relates to justice. It is Martin’s argument that justice surely demands that at the very least the guilty party, that is, humanity, should provide as much of the satisfaction as he or she can (Robinson 2005). But in the satisfaction theory of atonement, humans contribute nothing and Jesus everything (Robinson 2005). The contrast of the death penalty for Jesus and the zero contribution of humanity seems unjust and unfair (Robinson 2005).

In Martin’s view as quoted by Robinson (2005), the belief that God’s pride is so wounded that He would demand as satisfaction the death of an innocent person assumes a view of God’s moral nature that many modern readers would reject. Martin argues that being omnipotent God could simply forgive humans, or find some other way for humanity to attain atonement (Robinson 2005).

Since as taught by the satisfaction theory, sin damages the honour of God, it is Martin’s contention as quoted by Robinson (2005) that any new human sins committed after Jesus’ execution would also damage His honour. These sins would then necessitate the execution of a second God-Man (Robinson 2005). Thus, in Martin’s view, multiple incarnations and executions would be required over the millennia; therefore, an indefinite number of human sacrifices might eventually be required (Robinson 2005).

According to Martin as quoted by Robinson (2005), it seems logical that if the death of Jesus satisfied God’s damaged honour, and if humans made no contribution to the process, then salvation and atonement should be granted to everyone; to Christian believers and unbelievers
alike. In Martin’s view, it is unclear why only persons who trust Jesus as Lord and Saviour would be rewarded (Robinson 2005).

Adding to the criticisms above, Robinson (2005) says; “one might argue that the essence of the Satisfaction Theory is that violence, suffering, and punishment of an innocent person is justified, if it produces beneficial results for other people. Many find this concept offensive and immoral. In Robinson’s view, some of the criticisms which have been made of the ransom and the moral influence theories of atonement are also applicable to the satisfaction theory.

Moving from the satisfaction theory of atonement, I will now review literature on the penal substitutionary theory. As noted above, the penal substitutionary theory is a variation of the satisfaction theory. My decision to give it a separate treatment stems from the fact that it is at the centre of the controversy currently existing among Seventh-day Adventist scholars. Jack Sequeira, whose views of substitution will be highlighted in detail in chapter four, has been accused of rejecting substitutionary atonement. For this reason, his statement on substitution deserves inclusion in this section alongside the statements of other scholars.

2.4. The Penal Substitutionary theory

As with the atonement theories highlighted above, the penal substitutionary theory will be given a historical overview, which will be followed by its description. Then the variations of the theory (if any) will be highlighted, followed by positive support that has been given to it. The review will close with criticisms of the theory. To begin, I will give a historical overview of the penal substitutionary theory.

2.4.1. Historical overview

The penal substitutionary theory, according to Robinson (2005) is a variation of the satisfaction theory already highlighted in section 2.3 of this chapter. Robinson (2005) asserts that this theory was held by Martin Luther (1483-1546 CE), John Calvin (1509-1564 CE), and other leading theologians of the Reformation period. It continues to receive attention today, and it is the theory of atonement that Seventh-day Adventists have adopted.

But how is this theory of atonement described? In what follows, I will describe this penal substitutionary theory of atonement.
2.4.2. Description of the theory

Robinson (2005) asserts that the penal substitutionary theory teaches that God’s mercy replaces His wrath after the infinite sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross. According to Robinson (2005), this theory is based on the need for justice. It views sin as a matter of breaking God’s law, and this breaking of God’s law puts humanity in a debt to God, which requires payment without which payment the sinner must suffer the consequences of his sin (Robinson 2005). The consequence of sin is death (Rom. 6:23). Robinson (2005) quotes Martin who argues that justice demands that sin must be punished and full compensation must be given to the injured parties. Thus, in Martin’s view, as quoted by Robinson (2005), the attitude of a just God toward sinners can only be that of wrath. And only Jesus, the Son of God, who as a man represents sinful humanity, can take on the infinite sins of the world and can be punished for these sins (Robinson 2005).

Referring to both the Old and New Testaments of the Bible, Robinson (2005) suggests that the punishment for sin must involve the shedding of blood. He notes that in the Old Testament, this was the ritual sacrifice of animals; in the New Testament it involves the ritual sacrifice of a human; Jesus Christ (Robinson 2005). The shedding of blood according to Robinson (2005) suggests that God is apparently unwilling or incapable of forgiving sin in any other way. To buttress his argument, Robinson (2005) quotes Heb. 9:22 which reads; “And according to the law almost all things are purified with blood, and without shedding of blood there is no remission;” and Rom. 6:23 which reads; “For the wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord.”

Johnson, quoted by Robinson (2005) argues that God requires that humankind obey an immutable law in a life of perfect, perpetual obedience. Thus, the purpose of the law given on Mount Sinai in Johnson’s view was to prove humanity’s inability to live up to these requirements. It is noted by Johnson as quoted by Robinson (2005), that by perfectly keeping the law, Jesus earned salvation; and by suffering our punishment in our place, Jesus extends this salvation to us.

There are some variations of this theory. One variation was taught by John Calvin, which has been described as limited atonement. The other variation worth mentioning is what is called
universalism. Then there is what is called provisional atonement. It is necessary to also talk about vicarious atonement, corporate atonement, and actual atonement. I will briefly highlight these variations of the penal substitutionary theory.

2.4.3. Variations of the theory

The variations of the penal substitutionary theory mentioned above will be highlighted one after the other. It should be noted at the outset that some scholars may not agree with me that these are really variations of the penal substitutionary theory as in most books they are not taken to be such. Limited atonement will be the first variation of the penal substitutionary theory that will be considered.

2.4.3.1. Limited atonement

The first thing that can be said about limited atonement according to Robinson (2005) is that Calvin linked the concept of the elect and of predestination to the penal substitutionary theory. He taught that God selected a small percentage of people before their birth to form the elect (Robinson 2005). This selection or choosing as taught by Calvin and commented on by Robinson (2005) was not based on any special achievement on the part of those who were selected, for they did not deserve to be selected. The selection was by a process known only to God (Robinson 2005).

Describing Calvin’s teaching, Martin (1991:257-258) writes; “Those who have faith in Jesus and are, therefore, saved are the elect of God and those who are saved through this gift [of faith] were predestined to have this gift bestowed upon them.”

Since those who have faith and, therefore, are saved are the elect of God, it follows, according to Robinson (2005), that Jesus died, not to repay the debt for the sins of all humanity, but only for the sins of the elect. This, according to Robinson (2005) is how Calvin understood penal substitution.

Summarizing how Calvin understood atonement, Helm (2002) notes; “From Calvin’s own statements in the Institutes we shall show that Calvin subscribed to three key ideas. Calvin’s first key idea as observed by Helm (2002) is that Christ’s death procured actual remission. In the second place is the idea that all the elect and they alone, have their sins remitted by the death of
Christ (Helm 2002). Thus, the effect of the death of Christ is to atone for the sins of a definite number of people (Helm 2002). This, according to Helm (2002) is what Calvin called limited atonement. The third and final key idea is that Calvin expressly teaches that it was the intention of Christ, in dying, to procure atonement for the elect (Helm 2002).

It is important at this point to look at universalism as one of the variations of the penal substitutionary theory.

2.4.3.2. Universalism

Dederen (2000: xxiv) defines universalism as a doctrine that affirms that all human beings will be saved ultimately because all are by nature children of God. As it will be noticed, this definition of universalism is based on the biblical teaching that all human beings were created by God (Gen. 1:26-28; Acts 17:26). Thus, since all human beings were created by God, He cannot destroy that which His hands have made.

The definition of universalism that is of interest to me is the one that relates to Jesus Christ’s death. Quoting the Dictionary of Christianity in America, Knight (2008:85) defines universalism as a doctrine that affirms that everybody will be saved because Christ died for all people.

From universalism, I will highlight what is called provisional atonement. A clear understanding of this variation of the penal substitutionary theory is crucial to this research because Seventh-day Adventist scholars who teach this theory have not reconciled their position with those who teach actual atonement.

2.4.3.3. Provisional atonement

Seventh-day Adventist Church theologian and historian, Knight (2008:71) writes; “On the cross God provided salvation for every person, but each person must accept it before the provision becomes effective.” In the context of the concept of legal justification, Knight (2008:87) argues that the traditional Protestant/Adventist teaching is that legal justification is provisional until accepted by faith.

Jesus Christ died for the ungodly (Rom. 5:6), and this He did because God loved all of these ungodly (John 3:16). However, the death of Christ did not save all the ungodly (Knight 2008:87).
Instead, through that death, God made a provision that those who accept Jesus as Saviour and Lord should be saved (Knight 2008:87). This is what has been described as *provisional* atonement.

Note should be made that Sequeira (2012:8) differentiates the term *provision* from *provisional*. He accepts the former, but rejects the latter. In his view the term provision as it relates to salvation applies to the objective facts of the gospel which may be described as an offer that is made effective by faith alone (1 Cor. 3:11-13) (Sequeira 2012:8). He cautions; however, this provision must not be confused with the word *provisional* as taught by Arminianism, that on the cross Christ did not actually secure salvation for anyone but only made it possible for all mankind to be saved (Sequeira 2012:8).

With these comments on provisional atonement, I can go ahead to briefly highlight what theologians have termed vicarious atonement. This variation of the penal substitutionary theory will be looked at briefly because it will receive a separate treatment in chapter three.

### 2.4.3.4. Vicarious atonement

Bauer (2008:1) asserts; “Vicarious atonement means a one-for-one representation, in which Christ is understood to personally represent you individually on the cross as your personal representative and substitute. Thus, according to Bauer, Christ bears our sins through a transfer of sin from sinner to substitute, as seen in the symbolism of the Mosaic sanctuary (2008:1). A detailed presentation of this variation of the penal substitutionary theory will be my task in chapter three. For now, I will proceed to look at corporate atonement as another variation of the penal substitutionary theory of atonement.

### 2.4.3.5. Corporate atonement

As described by Gulley (2012:626), corporate atonement is a variation of the penal substitutionary theory where all sinners have already died for their sins in Christ’s death, in the sense that Christ died *as us* rather than *for us*. Gulley (2012:626) suggests that the promoters of corporate atonement such as Barth make it appear that there is an automatic atonement for all human beings.
Barth, quoted by Gulley (2012:626) says; "His [Christ’s] death was the death of all."
Commenting on this statement, Gulley (2012:626) argues that there is a big difference between death for all, and death of all. In his view, death for all is what is taught in the Bible and death of all is what is called corporate atonement, which according to him is not biblical (Gulley 2012:626).

In the footnote under corporate atonement, Gulley (2012:626) points his readers to Stephen Bauer’s article: "Universal Legal Justification and Vicarious Atonement," in Reflections: The Biblical Research Institute Newsletter, number 24 (October 2008):3-6 in which the author evaluates what is called actual or shared atonement. By doing this, Gulley (2012:626) seems to suggest that corporate atonement is synonymous with actual or shared atonement. Nevertheless, I will give actual atonement a separate treatment because in my view, the two are not synonymous. With this comment, I will proceed to highlight actual atonement as a variation of the penal substitutionary theory.

2.4.3.6. Actual atonement

As it will be shown in chapter four, actual atonement as I understand it, is mainly taught in the Seventh-day Adventist Church by systematic theologian Jack Sequeira. And since this research aims to reconcile this model of atonement with the vicarious model, it will be presented just as Sequeira teaches it.

Sequeira (1999:48) asserts; "Christ, in His humanity, saved men and women in actuality-not vicariously." In his opinion; "Christ’s life and death actually changed humanity’s past; Christ’s life and death became our life and death. In Him we lived a perfect life; in Him we died the penalty for sin (see 2 Corinthians 5:15)" (Sequeira 1999:48-49). Generally, Sequeira’s view is that on the cross God, through Christ saved the entire human race. He argues that as the second Adam ([humankind]) Christ took our place and died our death in order that we might be identified with Him, both in death and resurrection (Sequeira 1996:135). This, according to Sequeira (1996:135), is what our baptism was all about. He observes; "This is where vicarious substitution and actual substitution part company. The former teaches an exchanged experience; while the latter teaches a shared experience" (Sequeira 1996:135). Thus, Sequeira views actual atonement as a shared experience.
There is another way that Sequeira explains actual atonement. He affirms; “Yes, we accept salvation as individuals, but humanity was condemned corporately in Adam and redeemed corporately in Christ” (Sequeira 1996:53). The term corporately as used by Sequeira may be interpreted as done by Gulley (2012:626) above to suggest that being redeemed corporately in Christ means dying for our own sins in Him. It will be noted in chapter six that this is not the case. A detailed presentation of Sequeira’s actual view of atonement will be done in chapter four.

As this section on variations of the penal substitutionary theory closes, I wish to state that this theory has received positive support as well as criticisms. In what follows, the positive support will be highlighted.

**2.4.4. Support for the theory**

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, this theory will receive more attention especially in its support than the rest because the research is focused on two variations of it, namely; vicarious atonement and actual atonement.

**2.4.4.1. General support**

According to Robinson (2005) the penal substitutionary theory is commonly accepted and supported today by fundamentalist as well as other evangelical Protestant denominations, and some mainline faith groups.

**2.4.4.2. Support from contemporary non-Seventh-day Adventist scholars**

Reymond (1998: 634) defines penal substitutionary theory as a theory that regards what God did through Christ for the salvation of humanity as the imputation or transfer of the sinner’s sin to Christ on the analogy of the Levitical legislation. In his view, the resultant substitution of Christ in the stead and place of, or because of, or for, and in behalf of those sinners whose sins had been imputed to Him; was the necessary expiation or cancelation of their sins (1998:648).

When explaining the mysteries of the death of Christ, Grudem (2000: 579) states that in the penal substitutionary theory, substitution is penal in that Christ bore a penalty when He died. He notes that it is also a substitution in that Christ was a Substitute for us when He died (Grudem 2000:579).
Jeffrey, Ovey and Sach (2007: 103) are in harmony with Grudem when they state that the theory of penal substitution states that God gave Himself in the person of His Son to suffer instead of us the death, punishment and curse due to fallen humanity as the penalty for sin.

It is Barrick (2009: 150) who argues that penal substitutionary theory suggests that Christ gave Himself to suffer and die in place of the sinner in order to bear the full penalty for sin.

With these few testimonies from modern scholars in support of the theory of penal substitution, I will proceed to discuss some testimonies from Seventh-day Adventist Bible students and scholars.

2.4.4.3. Support in the Seventh-day Adventist Church

Because of the nature of the research which focuses on what is obtaining in the Seventh-day Adventist Church, it is necessary that a separate section be devoted to the penal substitutionary theory of atonement as understood in the Seventh-day Adventist Church. It will be noticed that Seventh-day Adventists have believed and taught that Christ's death was a penal substitution from the nineteenth century when the Church was founded to date. Many Adventist authors do not use the term penal because it is universally taken in Adventist circles that there was a penal element to the atonement that God accomplished through Christ.

In reviewing the understanding of the theory of penal substitution in the Seventh-day Adventist Church, I will briefly consider the writings of some pioneers of the Church and those of contemporary Bible scholars.

2.4.4.3.1. Writings of the Pioneers

A number of Americans began a movement in the eighteen hundreds, which became known as the Millerites, after William Miller, who was preaching that Jesus Christ was going to return to take people to heaven on 22nd October, 1844. After experiencing a disappointment as a result of the event they had been waiting for not taking place, many followers of Miller left the group. A small group remained, and continued to study the Bible to figure out where they had gone wrong in the interpretation of the prophecy of Daniel 8:14. They later concluded that instead of coming to planet earth to take people to heaven, Jesus Christ began the second phase of His heavenly ministry (Dan. 7:9-14; Heb. 8, 9) of which the sanctuary ministry here on earth had been a type.
Ellen G. White was one of the few of those who remained to whom Seventh-day Adventists believe God gave the prophetic ministry to guide the Seventh-day Adventist Church when it was later organized. Ellen G. White and the others who remained are known as the pioneers of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. She did not treat the subject of substitution systematically, but she wrote on it very extensively. It may not be an exaggeration for me to even suggest that whatever Seventh-day Adventist scholars have said and written on the subject of substitution is either in support of the foundation she laid or against it. Seventh-day Adventist scholars in my view have merely refined her thought and presented it in scholarly language. Her writings are very authoritative in the Seventh-day Adventist Church, and therefore, deserve a special treatment in this research.

Apart from Ellen G. White, Ellet J. Waggoner is another pioneer whose writings have greatly influenced Seventh-day Adventist thought on the subject of substitution. His writings also deserve some special treatment. There are other pioneers who wrote on the subject, but these two will represent all of them.

**Ellen G. White**

The Seventh-day Adventist Church was officially organized as a Church in 1863, although it is right to trace its roots to 1844. As already noted, one of the founder members was Ellen G. White whose writings are very authoritative within Seventh-day Adventism. She made it clear in her writings that Christ’s death was substitutionary. Her writings are replete with the substitutionary understanding of atonement.

White (1958: 250) asserts that Christ was appointed to the office of Mediator from the creation of God, and set up from eternity to be our substitute and surety. White (1958: 308) further asserts that by bearing in His body the curse of sin, Christ placed happiness and immortality within the reach all. According to White (1958: 322), Christ was innocent, yet He offered Himself as a substitute for the transgressor. She states that the evil thoughts, the evil words, the evil deeds of every son and daughter of Adam, called for retribution upon Himself; for He had become man’s substitute (White 1958:322). White (1958:322) notes that Christ’s decision to be our substitute was made without compulsion from anyone, and He submitted Himself to the sword of justice that we might not perish but live forever in fellowship with God and holy angels. In some of her
writings, she uses very strong language to describe the death of Christ. For example, she asserts that Christ died as a condemned criminal, suspended between the heavens and the earth; He died a lingering death of shame, exposed to the taunting and reviling of a debased, crime-loaded, profligate multitude (White 1995:763).

Ellen G. White worked with two teachers of the message of righteousness by faith of which the penal substitutionary theory of atonement is the foundation. These teachers were Ellet J. Waggoner, a Medical Doctor, and Alonzo T. Jones, a former sergeant in the United States Army. The views of Ellet J. Waggoner, which will be highlighted hereunder, are representative of those of Alonzo T. Jones.

Ellet J. Waggoner

Ellet J. Waggoner’s biographer, Whidden II (2008: 20) lists him among some Bible scholars who have experienced a noticeable turn around in their own lives, and contributed something of great significance to the Christian faith. Whidden II (2008: 20) observes that Waggoner’s defining moment would point the way to his path-breaking contributions to the great righteousness by faith revival of late-nineteenth-century Adventism. Waggoner gained prominence in Seventh-day Adventism in 1888, when he together with his friend Alonzo T. Jones emphasized for the very first time in Adventist history that the righteousness that counts with God is that which we receive from Him by faith. At that time most Adventist scholars taught the law without reference to grace because they thought that they had a duty to restore the law which the world had trampled upon. Unfortunately people were taught the law without the needed grace, which would enable them to keep that same law. It was in the context of emphasizing the message of righteousness by faith that Waggoner also taught that Christ’s death was substitutionary.

Waggoner (2003: 91) argued that in the fullest sense of the word and to a degree seldom thought of when the expression is used, Christ became man’s substitute. He observed that Christ becoming our substitute literally meant taking our place (Waggoner 2003:91). He noted that it did not mean instead of us; it meant coming into us and living His life in us and for us (Waggoner 2003:91-92).

There is a debate among Seventh-day Adventist scholars about what Waggoner taught. However, what is worth mentioning at this point is that he was one of the Seventh-day Adventist pioneers
who taught that Christ’s death was substitutionary. Seventh-day Adventist scholars generally agree that he supported the penal substitutionary theory of Atonement. And with this comment in mind, I can proceed to consider the writings of contemporary Seventh-day Adventist scholars.

2.4.4.3.2. Writings of contemporary Seventh-day Adventist scholars

Edward Heppenstall

Giving the historical background of Edward Heppenstall, Webster (1984:248) asserts that he influenced the Adventist theological thinking during the nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixties largely through his influence as seminary professor at Andrews University, Michigan, in the area of systematic theology and Christian philosophy. He retired from active teaching in 1970, but his published works appearing during the 1970s have continued to remind Adventists of his impact on our understanding of theology (Webster 1984:248). My description of his teaching on the penal substitutionary theory of atonement is based on the article he contributed to the book: *The Sanctuary and the Atonement* (1989).

Heppenstall (1989: 243) argues that the death of Christ can be understood only in terms of substitution. Thus, in his view, it is impossible to understand the death of Christ without the penal theory of substitution (Heppenstall 1989:243). This is too bold a statement of faith, but it says something about how most Seventh-day Adventist scholars view the death of Christ. According to Heppenstall (1989:243) it was not necessary for Christ to die if His death was not substitutionary. Heppenstall (1989: 243) further argues that the subject of Christ taking the place of sinners, bearing their sin and guilt, is frequently mentioned in the New Testament. Christ voluntarily substituted Himself in man’s stead (Heppenstall 1989:243). He had the sins of all men imputed to Him, making atonement by His death (Heppenstall 1989:243). Talking about how Christ and the Father related with regard to this penal substitutionary atonement, Heppenstall (1989: 243) states that God did not punish the Son; neither did He regard His Son as guilty when He knew He was innocent. But the Father suffered with the Son; together they bore their own judgment on sin (Heppenstall 1989:243). Heppenstall (1989:243) quotes 1 Pet. 3: 18, which states; “For Christ also died for sins once for all, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God.” Heppenstall (1989: 244) notes that it is sometimes argued that the “for the unrighteous” means “for our benefit” rather than “in our place.” He responds to this
argument by noting that two Greek prepositions are used in the frequent phrase that Christ died for us (Heppenstall 1989:244). The first is anti which in his opinion invariably means instead of (Heppenstall 1989:244). This is what is found in texts such as Matt. 20:28 and 1 Cor. 11:24. In these texts the preposition for can be understood to mean in place of, instead of (Heppenstall 1989:244). In Heppenstall's view the idea of substitution cannot be removed from this preposition.

According to Heppenstall (1989:244) the second preposition used more frequently in connection with Christ's death for us is huper. This is found in texts like; "The love of Christ controls us, because we are convinced that one has died for [huper] all" (2 Cor. 5:14).

Having explained the meaning of the two Greek prepositions, Heppenstall (1989: 244) notes that the particular use of for in any text must be determined by the context. In his view, the fact of the substitutionary work of Christ cannot be denied regardless of which preposition we use (Heppenstall 1989:244).

Commenting on the text; "Take the Levites instead of all the first-born" (Num. 3:45), Heppenstall (1989:244) observes that the Septuagint uses anti which, like the English instead of, exactly represents and unmistakably conveys the idea of substitution. He asserts that as the Levites were to be substituted for the firstborn in Israel, so the ransom money was to be substituted for sinners (Heppenstall 1989:244). And quoting Matt. 20:28, Heppenstall (1989:244) observes that Christ's sacrifice was not a mere money payment but the actual gift of life, the substitution of His death for ours. According to Heppenstall (1989:244), Christ's agony in Gethsemane and on the cross is inexplicable on any other basis than in His death Christ took our place. Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us (Gal. 3:13), means that Christ bore the penalty for our transgression of the law of God, the judgment on men's sins that belonged to us (Heppenstall 1989:244). According to Heppenstall (1989: 245), substitution is a word we cannot discard. Thus, in his view, the meaning and use of the word has reference to God's work of atonement in Christ. Christ voluntarily became our substitute in order to restore us to God. His sacrifice is vicarious, to meet the need of the sinner as he stands at the judgment bar before God (Heppenstall 1989:245).
Before Heppenstall retired, there were some scholars who were influenced by his teachings, and one of those scholars is Raoul Dederen. The views of Raoul Dederen will be highlighted below.

Raoul Dederen

Raoul Dederen is Professor Emeritus of Systematic Theology, Andrews University, Michigan, United States of America, one of the Seventh-day Adventist scholars who followed Edward Heppenstall. He is the editor of the Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology, Volume Twelve in the Seventh-day Adventist Commentary Series. He contributed an article to this Handbook entitled: Christ: His Person and Work in which he describes Christ’s death as being substitutionary. But for the purpose of this chapter, I will review his understanding of substitution based on the article he contributed in the book: The Sanctuary and the Atonement (1989).

According to Dederen (1989:204); “entirely in harmony with the thought of Christ as a sacrifice is the idea of the substitutionary character of His death on the cross.” He notes that in submitting to the judgment of God upon sin, Jesus has delivered us from that experience (Dederen 1989:204). Thus, by suffering death, the penalty of sin, He delivers us from that same death (Dederen 1989:204). It is for us and in our stead that Christ voluntarily came under the condemnation of sin, and so His death was unique (Dederen 1989:204). Of all men, Jesus alone knew no sin (2 Cor. 5: 21). His death was not the result of any sin or guilt of His own (1 Pet. 2: 22). Death, the wages of sin (Rom. 6: 23), fell upon Him as the sinless representative (dikaios huper adikon, 1 Pet. 3: 18) in order that He might bring us to God (Dederen 1989:204). According to Dederen (1989: 204-205), besides being representative, Christ’s atonement is also substitutionary. Christ did something for the salvation of sinners, acting on their behalf as their representative, and as the head of a new humanity, the second Adam, He regained for man all that had been lost by the first Adam (Rom. 5: 18-19; cf. 5: 12-21; 1 Cor. 15: 21-22, 45-50) (Dederen 1989:205).

In harmony with Heppenstall, Dederen (1989:205-207) clarifies his understanding of the substitutionary nature of Christ’s death by analyzing the Greek prepositions anti and huper. Perhaps what he adds is the idea of ransom where he observes that Paul, in 1Tim. 2:6 describes
Christ as the one who gave Himself a ransom \( [\text{antilutron}] \) for \( [\text{huper}] \) all. In his view, the use of \( \text{anti} \) (in the stead of) suggests substitution. Christ's death is held forth as substitute ransom.

Apart from Heppenstall and Dederen, Seventh-day Adventists have heavily been influenced by the writings of Angel Manuel Rodriguez. His views will be presented hereunder.

**Angel M. Rodriguez**


In harmony with Heppenstall and Dederen, Rodriguez (1989: 123) argues that the theory of sacrificial substitution usually is understood as stating that in the Old Testament sacrificial system atonement was achieved by transferring the offerer's sin and penalty to the sacrificial victim, which died in his place, satisfying the divine justice requiring the death of the sinner. In *Spanning the Abyss*, Rodriguez uses such terms as substitution, substitutive, substitute, and substitutionary several times. Altogether, he uses these terms forty-seven times in just one hundred and fifty-five pages. Rodriguez (2008: 104, 115) uses the term vicarious or vicariously three times. He uses the term vicarious to mean substitution. His views will be considered in more detail in chapter three.

Another scholar whose views on substitutionary atonement deserve attention in this study is Norman R. Gulley, and his views will be considered below.

**Norman R. Gulley**

Norman R. Gulley is Research Professor of Systematic Theology at Southern Adventist University in Tennessee and holds a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Systematic Theology from
The University of Edinburgh, Scotland. He has taught in the Far East (Japan and Philippines) at the collegiate and graduate seminary levels respectively, and in the United States during a long career of pastoring, teaching, academic administration, professional society involvement, writing, and extensive worldwide travel as a visiting lecturer. He has authored several books including three volumes on Systematic Theology.

Gulley (2012:625) writes; *Christ’s* blood always symbolized His substitutionary death in the place of the redeemed, as in the Passover. In his view, properly understood, the word *substitutionary* applies solely to Christ taking our place at the cross, doing for us what we could never do for ourselves, that is, perish in the second death (Rev. 20:6) and yet live again (Gulley 2012:625). According to Gulley (2012:625) Christ paid the wages of sin (Rom. 6:23), so that we do not have to, and gave us eternal life. He asserts that in paying the price for our sins, Christ alone could be our substitute (Gulley 2012:625). One aspect of Christ atoning death that comes out clearly from Gulley’s pen has to do with Christ being God. He observes; *He [Christ] had to be God in order to pay the debt and live beyond the grave; He had to be human to die our death, so that we can live beyond the grave (if not translated)* (Gulley 2012:625). In Gulley’s opinion, this is the most glorious news—the wondrous exchange (Gulley 2012:625).

I would do myself injustice if I did not include the views of Systematic Theologian Jack Sequeira on this list of contemporary scholars who have influenced Seventh-day Adventists on the penal substitutionary theory of atonement. For this reason, his views will be considered below.

**Jack Sequeira**

Jack Sequeira served as a missionary in Uganda (at Bugema University), Kenya and Ethiopia for eighteen years, and pastored in the United States of America for twenty-two years before he retired from active service in the Seventh-day Adventist Church. He earned his Bachelor of Arts (Theology) degree in England, and Master of Systematic Theology (MTh) and Master of Divinity (M.Div.) at Andrews University in the United States of America.

Commenting on the Reformers’ rejection of the Catholic scholars’ teaching that before God could declare the individual believer justified, He first had to make him righteous through an infused grace, Sequeira (1999: 39), notes that the Reformers came up with the biblical doctrine of substitution. Sequeira (1996: 72) asserts that substitution is no doubt a central pillar of the
gospel. He defines the word substitute as one person acting on behalf of another (Sequeira 1996:72). According to him, the doctrine of substitution teaches that Christ, as the second Adam, saved us as our Substitute, because He lived and died for, or instead of, us (Sequeira 1996:72).

Sequeira (1996:72) assures his readers that he does not deny the doctrine of substitution. However, he observes that the doctrine of substitution has its dangers—even as does the teaching of salvation by grace (Sequeira 1996:72). He argues that the doctrine of substitution is misused as a result of the vicarious view (Sequeira 1996:72). In other words, Sequeira suggests that what he rejects is the vicarious view of substitution. As it can be observed, Sequeira does not use vicarious and substitution as synonymous terms. This will be discussed in chapter three and chapter four.

Sequeira (2009:355) dichotomizes Christ’s substitutionary death. On one hand, Christ died vicariously. On the other hand, Christ died in actuality. This is the way he solves the problem of how Christ dealt with sin as behaviour (what we do) and sin (our nature) (Sequeira 2009:355). He argues that since Christ did not participate in or commit sins (in thought, word, or deed), we can say that He vicariously redeemed humanity from its sins (sinful behaviour) (Sequeira 2009:355). Christ dealt with sin as nature by identifying Himself personally with the sin problem (Sequeira 2009:355). In other words, Christ took human nature at the point He found it, and through His life of obedience and His death on the cross, He condemned sin in the flesh (Sequeira 2009:355).

With Sequeira’s views closing the discussion on positive support for the penal substitutionary theory of atonement, I am ready to highlight criticisms of the theory.

2.4.5. Criticisms of the theory

It should be noted that some scholars have raised criticisms to the penal substitutionary theory of atonement. I will review these criticisms, first, in a general sense. Then a summary of the major criticisms based on Erickson’s work: Christian Theology (2013) will be presented.

2.4.5.1. Criticisms generally

As observed by Robinson (2005) most of the criticisms of the satisfaction theory apply as well to the penal substitutionary theory with minimal modification. Therefore, it is not necessary to
repeat them. Worth mentioning however, is the assertion that one of Jesus' main messages was that we must love our enemies, forgive those who injure us, and overcome evil with good (Robinson 2005). According to Robinson (2005), these teachings appear to be totally opposite to God’s demand for blood and torture death of an innocent person. He notes that theologians such as Father John Mabry view the penal substitutionary theory as an oppressive theology, and inauthentic in light of Jesus' teaching (Robinson 2005). Additionally, as asserted by Robinson (2005), one might argue that the essence of the penal substitutionary theory is that violence, suffering, and punishment of one or more innocent people is justified, if it produces beneficial results for other people. Nevertheless, as observed by Robinson (2005), many find this concept offensive and profoundly immoral. They regard punishment of the innocent for the sake of others to be inherently evil (Robinson 2005). According to Robinson (2005), it is this concept that partly justified the Burning Times (the extermination of witches during the Middle Ages and Renaissance), the Armenian genocide, the Nazi Holocaust, the genocide in Bosnia Herzegovina by Serbian Orthodox Christians, and other recent genocides, religious oppression, and mass crimes against humanity.

As noted above, I will give a summary of the major criticisms of the penal substitutionary theory based on Millard J. Erickson’s book: Christian Theology (2013).

2.4.5.2. Summary of major criticisms by Millard J. Erickson

Erickson (2013: 744-752) has made a summary of the major criticisms to the penal substitutionary theory of atonement. He has identified and reviewed five of them. These criticisms are highlighted hereunder, beginning with one where it is said that the penal substitutionary theory distorts the nature of the Godhead.

2.4.5.2.1. Distortion of the nature of the Godhead

According to Erickson (2013:745) the claim of those who present this criticism is that the penal substitutionary theory of atonement distorts the nature of the Godhead. It is argued that the idea of the wrath of God obscures the fundamental nature of God, namely, that He is love. Erickson (2013:745) notes that an emphatic form of this criticism has been given by Chalk and Mann (2003: 182) who argue that the cross is not a form of cosmic child abuse-a vengeful Father, punishing His Son for the offence He did not even commit. They further argue that both people
inside and outside of the Church have found the penal substitutionary theory of atonement morally dubious and a huge barrier to faith (Chalk and Mann 2003:182 quoted by Erickson 2013:745).

As observed by Erickson (2013:745) there is a dual criticism here; that the picture of a wrathful, judgmental God is unfaithful to the biblical picture, and that this is unjust; punishing an innocent person for the sins of others. Accordingly, it is argued that the penal substitutionary theory of atonement portrays a god who is angry, bloodthirsty, and must be appeased, a picture derived from pre-Christian views (Erickson 2013:745). A further dimension of the theological problem is the apparent division that it introduces between a gentle, loving Son, and a violent, judgmental Father (Erickson 2013:745). Another facet of the criticism relates to the concept of propitiation; that the loving Son wins over the Father from His anger and wrath against sin to a loving, forgiving spirit is seen as an indication of internal conflict within the mind of God or between the persons of the Trinity (Erickson 2013:745).

Apart from the criticism that deals with the alleged distortion of the nature of God, Erickson has highlighted one talking about the morality or rightness of the penal substitutionary theory. This will be considered below.

2.4.5.2.2. The morality or rightness of the penal substitutionary theory

Erickson (2013:746) observes that the whole idea of the Father’s substituting His Son to bear our penalty is said to smack of unfairness and injustice. The argument, as analyzed by Erickson (2013:746), is that in a courtroom situation, the judge, upon finding a defendant guilty does not punish an innocent party. In the same way, it is improper for God to punish Jesus for the sins of guilty human beings (Erickson 2013:746).

Another criticism of the penal substitutionary theory of atonement as summarized by Erickson relates to what is called divine hypocrisy. In what follows, I will present this criticism.

2.4.5.2.3. Divine hypocrisy

It has been noted by Erickson (2013:746-747) that critics of the penal substitutionary theory of atonement argue that the theory makes God guilty of requiring others to do what He Himself is unwilling to do. God expects believers to forgive without exacting punishment, which He is
unwilling to do Himself (Erickson 2013:747). Critics argue that the God who expects His believing children to forgive freely should equally do the same of those who have trespassed against Him (Erickson 2013:747).

The other criticism that Erickson mentions talks about the alleged culturally conditioned nature of the penal substitutionary theory. This will be highlighted below.

**2.4.5.2.4. The culturally conditioned nature of the theory**

The criticism, according to Erickson (2013:747) is based on the claim that the theory is culturally conditioned. Thus, those who criticize the theory (such as Green and Baker) state that although the people who hold the view believe that it is clearly taught by the Scriptures, it actually grew up in a period in which society was structured on the basis of feudalism (Erickson 2013:747). They argue that in Anselm’s version, from which the modern penal substitutionary theory is derived, the owing of honour to the feudal lord became a very important matter (Erickson 2013:747). In this connection, Green and Baker (2000: 126-136) as quoted by Erickson (2013:746-748) argue that Anselm came to conceive of the individual’s relationship to God on that model. It is argued that such a view hinders the church’s mission; in other words the whole idea of a vengeful God is offensive to persons today (Erickson 2013:747). Green and Baker (2000: 28-29) contend that the popularity of the penal substitutionary view is tied to a modern view, and as such has little to say to a postmodern world.

There is yet another criticism that Erickson has identified which talks about the penal substitutionary theory of atonement as being too individualistic. It is now my task to highlight this criticism.

**2.4.5.2.5. Too individualistic a view**

Erickson (2013:748) suggests that this criticism is based on the emphasis on the individual’s relationship to God, and individual sins, to the neglect of the broader societal dimensions of sin. Beyond that, Green and Baker (2000: 153-170) as quoted by Erickson (2013:748) argue that the penal substitutionary theory is far too Western in its origins and its tone to be acceptable to persons in other parts of the world, particularly those in shame-based, rather than guilt-based, societies.
In this section, I have looked at the penal substitutionary theory of atonement as understood by both non-Seventh-day Adventist scholars as well as Seventh-day Adventist scholars. Seventh-day Adventists early in their history believed and taught the penal substitutionary theory of atonement. And they have consistently believed and taught this theory throughout their history. They believe that it is biblical. As noted above, some Seventh-day Adventist scholars even argue that the term substitution cannot be discarded. Two variations of this theory, namely; vicarious atonement and actual atonement highlighted in chapter three and chapter four respectively will be reconciled in chapter six.

With these concluding statements on the penal substitutionary theory of atonement, I will now go ahead to consider the recapitulation theory.

2.5. The Recapitulation theory

Like the four theories of atonement I have highlighted above, the recapitulation theory has received support as well as criticisms. My task in this section is to give a brief historical overview of this theory, its description, the positive support it has received, and criticisms. To begin with, I will give a historical overview of the theory.

2.5.1. Historical overview of the theory

Mahoney (2013) reports that the recapitulation theory of atonement is most associated with the written work of Bishop of Lyons, Irenaeus who lived from about AD 125 to AD 202. This however, is not to suggest that Irenaeus was the first to teach the theory. Justin Martyr (AD c. 110-165) made a passing reference to recapitulation which has survived in a quote by Irenaeus (Mahoney 2013).

In Against Heresies, IV 6, quoted by Meek (2013), Irenaeus quotes Justin:

And Justin well said in his book against Marcion, that he would not have believed the Lord Himself, if He had announced any other God than the Fashioner and Maker [of the world], and our Nourisher. But since, from the one God, who both made this world and formed us, and contains as well as administers all things, there came to us the only-begotten Son, summing up His own workmanship in Himself, my faith in Him is
steadfast, and my love towards the Father is immoveable, God bestowing both upon us.

Thus, Meek (2013) sees in Justin’s words as quoted by Irenaeus, the beginning of the recapitulation model of the atonement. He suggests that this theory of atonement has been taught since the time of Justin Martyr to the time of modern Protestants (Meek 2013). He mentions Athanasius (AD c. 296-373), Gregory of Nazianzus (AD c. 329-389), Reformers (16th Century), and modern Protestants including the famous reformed theologian Louis Berkhof and Methodist theologian Thomas Oden as examples of Bible expositors who have taught the recapitulation theory of atonement (Meek 2013).

But how is the recapitulation theory of atonement described? It is now my task to give a brief description of this theory.

2.5.2. Description of the theory

It is important to begin the description of the recapitulation theory of atonement by defining the English word *recapitulate*. According to the *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary* (2010), it means “to repeat or give a summary of what has already been said, decided.”

Meek (2013) asserts that the English word *recapitulate* essentially means *to sum up or go over again* and is the longer word from which we derive the shorter and more popular word *recap*. According to Meek (2013), this English word is rooted in the Latin word that means *head*. Thus, in Latin, recapitulation means *providing a new head* (Meek 2013). As noted by Meek (2013), the recapitulation theory views the work of Christ as an undoing of all the harm done by Adam and the fall. In this model of atonement, Christ becomes the new head of the human race, and as the second Adam, Christ succeeds where Adam failed (Meek 2013).

Raby (2013), quoted by Meek (2013), suggests that the concept of recapitulation is in view in First Cor. 15:22 and 15:42-49, where the idea is that Christ is the new Adam that succeeded where the first Adam failed. He argues; “Because of that success, Christ undoes the wrong (He Recapitulates) that the first Adam started and humanity and begins to work backwards toward its original state with God” (Raby 2013, quoted by Meek 2013). In his view, Christ’s incarnation and union with humanity makes it possible for humanity to find eternal life including morality in
this life (Raby 2013, quoted by Meek 2013). Thus, human evolution, as argued by Raby (2013), quoted by Meek (2013), goes from a downward bent to an upward bent because of Christ’s identification with humanity in all things. Christ reverses humanity’s course from disobedience to obedience (Raby 2013, quoted by Meek 2013).

Meek (2013) is in harmony with Raby on the biblical foundation of the recapitulation theory. Apart from First Cor. 15: 21, 22 and 15: 42-49, which are cited by Raby, Meek (2013) cites Second Cor. 5:21 and Rom. 5:15-21. Second Cor. 5:21 says; “For He made Him who knew no sin to be sin for us, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him.” This text, according to Meek (2013), stresses the unity of Christ with believers. He argues; “Recapitulation only works if we can be unified with Christ, so that, what Christ did we also accomplish” (Meek 2013). In Rom. 5:15-21, parallels are drawn between our identification with Adam, in whom we all sinned, and Christ, in whom we all are made righteous (Meek 2013). Analyzing this passage of Scripture, Meek (2013) concludes; “Paul is obviously comparing Adam and Christ, but Paul seems to confine that comparison to the sin of Adam. Later writers, like Irenaeus, will greatly expand on this comparison.”

In his famous work: Against Heresies, quoted by Schaff, Irenaeus develops the idea of recapitulation in a fairly detailed manner. He writes:

É He became incarnate, and was made man, He commenced afresh the long line of human beings, and furnished us, in a brief, comprehensive manner, with salvation; so that what we had lost in Adam—namely, to be according to the image and likeness of God—that we might recover in Christ Jesus (Schaff AH, III 18:1).

Berkhof (1941:385) quotes Orr who expresses the idea of recapitulation in this way; “Christ recapitulates in Himself all the stages of human life, including those, which belong to our state as sinners.” He argues:

By His incarnation and human life Christ reverses the course on which Adam, by his sin started humanity and thus becomes a new leaven in the life of mankind. He communicates immortality to those who are united to Him by faith and effects an ethical transformation in their lives, and
by His obedience compensates for the disobedience of Adam (Berkhof 1941:385)

This view is true of Evangelicals in general, and not just of reformed writers such as Berkhof. For example, Oden (2009:241) asserts; ÒAs Adam represented all the human family in its previous history, Christ represented the whole of humanity in its future history under the new covenant.Ó

The recapitulation theory of atonement has received some positive support, which it is now my privilege to highlight.

2.5.3. Positive support to the theory

As it has been noted above, the recapitulation theory of atonement has been taught all the way from the time of Justin Martyr (AD c. 110-165) to our modern time of Protestantism. Some aspects of this theory were taught by the Reformers in the 16th Century. For example, commenting on Rom. 5:17-18, Luther, quoted by Meek (2013) writes:

Paul gives us the same thought in Romans 5:17-18, where he compares Adam and Christ. Adam, he says, by his disobedience in Paradise, became the source of sin and death in the world; by the sin of this one man, condemnation passed upon all men. But on the other hand, Christ, by his obedience and righteousness, has become for us the abundant source wherefrom all may obtain righteousness and the power of obedience (Luther Devotions 32).

The views of modern Protestants such as Berkhof and Oden have already been highlighted. It has been observed by Meek (2013) that in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, the recapitulation theory of atonement plays a much larger role. This will be given a separate treatment in the next section.

Alongside the positive support that the recapitulation theory has received are some criticisms. These will now be highlighted.
2.5.4. Criticisms of the theory

The criticism that I have been able to find comes from Matt Slick, the President and Founder of the Christian Apologetics and Research Ministry.

Slick (2015) states; “The recapitulation theory of atonement states that Christ experienced all the phases of Adam’s life including the experience of sin. This theory maintains that Christ succeeded where Adam failed. After thus describing the recapitulation theory, Slick (2015) presents what he views to be a problem with this theory. And what is that problem? In his view, it is with the fact that the Bible tells us that Jesus never sinned (Slick 2015). Apart from that, the failure of Adam was to sin (Slick 2015). Thus, if Jesus experienced sin, then He, too, failed (Slick 2015). On this basis, Slick (2015) concludes that the recapitulation theory of atonement is wrong.

Eastern Christianity has views on atonement, which deserve my attention. I will now consider these views.

2.6. Eastern Christianity

The general view of Eastern Christianity on atonement appears to be an extension of the recapitulation theory highlighted in the previous section. Thus, Meek (2013) writes; “In the Eastern Orthodox tradition recapitulation plays a much larger role.” This theory will be highlighted following the order in the preceding sections, beginning with the historical overview.

2.6.1. Historical overview

According to Meek (2013) the view of Eastern Christianity on atonement appears to be an extension of the recapitulation theory highlighted in the previous section. Thus, Meek (2013) writes; “In the Eastern Orthodox tradition recapitulation plays a much larger role.” This brief historical overview of the view of Eastern Christianity on atonement will be followed by a description of this view.

2.6.2. Description of the view

As argued by Copple (2015) the redemption and reuniting of man with God was the reason why Jesus Christ came to earth, why He was incarnate in the Virgin Mary and the Holy Spirit, why
He went to the cross and died, and was resurrected the third day. The goal of God in our redemption is the restoration of oneness with Him, to have the likeness of God, His energies enlivening us once again as it did Adam and Eve, and to correct the corruption of His creation (Copple 2015).

Commenting on Eastern Orthodox soteriology, *Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia* (2015) says; “Salvation is seen as participation in the renewal of human nature itself by way of the eternal Word assuming the human nature in its fullness. Thus, Christ died to defeat and secure the destruction of sin and death, so that those who are fallen and in spiritual bondage may become divinely transfigured, and therefore fully human, as their Creator intended; that is to say, human creatures become God in his energies or operations but not in his essence or identity, conforming to the image of Christ and reacquiring the divine likeness (Bernstein 2008, quoted in *Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia* 2015).

In the *Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America* (2010), it is asked; “How do we Eastern Orthodox and the early church tradition understand the debt, the exchange, the ransom and to whom it was paid? To answer this question, the author quotes Saint Athanasius who writes; “For by the sacrifice of His own body He did two things: He put an end to the law of death which barred our way; and He made a new beginning of life for us” (*Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America* 2010). To the question: To whom did He make the sacrifice? The author again quotes Athanasius; “it was by surrendering to death (my emphasis) the body which He had taken, as an offering and sacrifice free from every stain, that He forthwith abolished death for his human brethren by the offering of the equivalent” (*Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America* 2010). Athanasius, quoted by the *Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America* (2010) argues that through the union of the immortal Son of God with our human nature, all men were clothed with incorruption in the promise of the resurrection. According to Athanasius, the solidarity of mankind is such that, by virtue of the Word indwelling in a single human body, the corruption which goes with death has lost its power over all (*Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America* 2010).

Meek (2013) notes that Second Pet. 1:4 has become especially important in the Eastern Orthodox which believes that Christians are actually becoming part of the divine. This is called the doctrine of divination (Meek 2013). This doctrine, according to Meek (2010) plays a large role in
the Eastern Orthodox tradition. As we live in union with Christ, in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, we become like God (Meek 2013).

On recapitulation, Meek (2013) suggests that the most famous quote from Athanasius is; “He, indeed, assumed humanity that we might become God.” This quote is used by the Eastern Orthodox theologians to support the doctrine of divination.

Torrey (2013) calls divination based on Second Pet. 1:4 as the “deification” of the Christian. This deification is the result of Jesus Christ’s active work in our salvation (Torrey 2013).

Being an extension of the recapitulation theory of atonement, the Eastern Orthodox Christian view need not be elaborated further. The description of the view will equally serve as positive support to it. My task at this point then, is to highlight some possible criticisms of this view of atonement.

2.6. 3. Criticism of the view

The criticism of the recapitulation theory of atonement equally applies to the Eastern Christian view of atonement. Since Christ experienced all the phases of Adam’s life including the experience of sin, and since Adam failed, it follows that Jesus also failed (Slick 2015). Thus, in Slick’s opinion, this view is wrong because it makes Christ a failure or sinner.

In what follows, I will close this chapter with Roman Catholic views on atonement and reparation.

2.7. Roman Catholic views on atonement and reparation

The Roman Catholic view of atonement is a combination of elements found in a number of theories of atonement already highlighted above. In this section, it will be shown how the Roman Catholic Church views atonement by lifting what the church believes is biblical from those theories (while discarding what is viewed to be unbiblical), and putting them together to form what may be termed in Catholic theology, a balanced view of the atonement. An attempt is made also to highlight what Roman Catholic theologians call reparation. These Roman Catholic views on atonement and reparation will be presented following the order followed above.
2.7.1. Historical overview

The *Catholic Encyclopedia* (1907) indirectly suggests that the Roman Catholic views of atonement can be traced to the recapitulation theory, the ransom theory, the satisfaction theory, and the moral influence theory. The *Encyclopedia* (1907) seems to view each of these theories as containing some truth. These theories have already been described above and need not be described again in this section. It will suffice to note how the *Encyclopedia* (1907) concludes; "On looking back at the various theories noted so far, it will be seen that they are not, for the most part, mutually exclusive, but may be combined and harmonized." The *Encyclopedia* (1907) concludes also; "And in point of fact it will generally be found that the chief Fathers and Schoolmen, though they may at times lay more stress on some favourite theory of their own, do not lose sight of the other explanations."

The question that may arise has to do with whether there are particular views of atonement that can clearly be identified as what the Roman Catholic Church teaches. This will be highlighted below. Reparation will also be highlighted in the context of Roman Catholic views of atonement.

2.7.2. Description of Roman Catholic views of atonement and reparation

2.7.2.1. Atonement

It is necessary to begin by defining atonement in Roman Catholic language. The *Catholic Encyclopedia* (1907) puts it this way; "in Catholic theology, the Atonement is the Satisfaction of Christ, whereby God and the world are reconciled or made to be at one."

In this definition of atonement is the phrase: *Satisfaction of Christ*. This echoes the satisfaction theory of Anselm (1033-1109 CE) that I highlighted in section 2.3 of this chapter. The view that the Roman Catholic Church teaches the satisfaction theory of atonement is supported by Robinson (2005) in this statement; "The Roman Catholic Church teaches this theory [satisfaction theory] of the atonement (or a variation of it), as do most Protestant denominations. However the Catholic Church does not raise the theory to the level of dogma." It is not necessary to describe this theory again in this section, but it will simply be noted that the theory teaches that Jesus appeased God by being a ritual human sacrifice (Robinson 2004). It is necessary however, to state what Catholic theologians say regarding the sacrifice made.
Beem (2013) argues; Divine Justice must be satisfied but there was no great infinite law that required a sacrifice. The Trinity was not forced to choose the Cross, in fact, God could have chosen to forgive without a need for Divine satisfaction. Thus, the Cross was not literally our punishment, our verdict of death that Christ took upon Himself (Beem 2013). Beem (2013) writes; God could have forgiven Adam and Eve without need of Divine reparation. The full measure of sin and the full measure of Love were displayed at Christ’s death. The display of love that is mentioned in this statement echoes the moral influence theory of Peter Abelard (1079-1142). This should not be strange because it has already been noted that Catholic views of atonement combine elements from a number of other theories. Beem (2013) asserts; Christ, our Saviour, handed His soul freely to death, that we might look upon His sacrifice and trust Him. He observes that our heavenly Father, looking upon His Son on the Cross was seeing the greatest display of love ever known and it was beautiful and pleasing in His sight (Beem 2013).

According to Beem (2013), the Cross is not about blood and offerings to satisfy an angry God, it is about proving for all time that love is more powerful, and bigger than sin.

The views expressed by Beem are in harmony with those by Cross (2010) who writes; The Catholic conception of Christ’s Passion and atonement is that Christ offered Himself up in self-sacrificial love to the Father, obedient even unto death, for the sins of all men. According to Cross (2010), the Passion is Christ’s greatest act of love, the greatest revelation of the love of God, and the glory of Christ. In Christ’s Passion we humans poured our enmity with God on Christ, by what we did to Him in His body and soul (Cross 2010). Christ did not die as a result of the wrath of God poured out on Him; we humans crucified Him, and we continue to crucify Him when we delight in vices and sins (Cross 2010). The Passion is a revelation of the love of God, not the wrath of God (Cross 2010).

As it will be noticed, Roman Catholic views of atonement lean towards the satisfaction and moral influence theories. The church also appreciates views expressed in the recapitulation and ransom theories. What needs to be done now is to look at reparation as understood in Roman Catholic theology.
2.7.2.2. Reparation

According to Slater (1911), reparation is a theological concept closely connected with those of atonement and satisfaction, and thus belonging to some of the deepest mysteries of the Christian Faith. As argued by Slater (1911), by voluntary submission to His Passion and death on the cross, Jesus Christ atoned for our disobedience and sin. He thus made reparation to the offended majesty of God for the outrages which the Creator so constantly suffers at the hands of His creatures (Slater 1911). We human beings are restored to grace through the merits of Christ’s death, and that grace enables us to add our prayers, labours, and trials to those of our Lord (Slater 1911). We can thus make some sort of reparation to the justice of God for our own offences against Him, and by virtue of the Communion of the Saints, the oneness and solidarity of the mystical body of Christ, we can also make satisfaction and reparation for the sins of others (Slater 1911).

Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (2015) says; "In the Roman Catholic tradition, an Act of Reparation is a prayer or devotion with the intent to repair the sins of others, e.g. for the repair of the sin of blasphemy, the sufferings of Jesus Christ or as Acts of Reparation to the Virgin Mary. It is noted in Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (2015) that the prayers do not usually involve a petition for a living or deceased beneficiary, but aim to repair sins.

In the encyclical Miserentissimus Redemptor Pope Pius XI as quoted in Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (2015) called acts of reparation a duty for Roman Catholics: "We are holden to the duty of reparation and expiation by a certain more valid title of justice and of love, of justice indeed, in order that the offense offered to God by our sins may be expiated."

According to Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (2015), the need for reparation has been mentioned in some Marian apparitions. The messages of Our Lady of Akita, which were formally approved by the Holy See in 1988 by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI), include the following statement attributed to the Blessed Virgin Mary:

Many men in this world afflict the Lord. I desire souls to console Him to soften the anger of the Heavenly Father. I wish, with my Son, for souls who will repair by their suffering and their poverty for the sinners and ingrates.
To conclude, it should be emphasized that from a theological viewpoint, reparation is closely connected with those of atonement and satisfaction, and thus belonging to some of the deepest mysteries of the Christian Faith (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 2015). Roman Catholic theology asserts that it was by voluntary submission that Jesus Christ died on the cross to atone for man’s disobedience and sin and that His death made reparation for the sins and offences of the world (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 2015). Reparation is the teaching of that Faith that man is a creature who has fallen from an original state of justice in which he was created, and that through the Incarnation, Passion, and Death of the Son of God, he has been redeemed and restored again in a certain degree to the original condition (Slater 1911). Although God might have condoned men’s offences gratuitously if He had chosen to do so, yet in His Providence He did not do this; He judged it better to demand satisfaction for the injuries which man had done Him, and this satisfaction was made adequately to God by the sufferings, passion, and death of Jesus Christ, made Man for us (Slater 1911).

This description of Roman Catholic views of atonement and reparation will be followed by criticisms that have been advanced of these views.

2.7.3. Criticisms to Roman Catholic views of atonement and reparation

As it was observed above, Roman Catholic views of atonement combine some elements from the recapitulation theory, the ransom theory, the satisfaction theory, and the moral influence theory. Therefore, the criticisms made of these theories also apply to Roman Catholic views of atonement. Seventh-day Adventist theologians criticize the Roman Catholic doctrine of reparation because of three major reasons: (1) it turns to emphasize what a sinner should do in addition to what Jesus Christ already did on the cross, thereby promoting legalism; (2) it teaches that prayers can be made for the deceased, which in Adventist theology is unbiblical; and (3) it teaches that prayers can be made through Mary, the mother of Jesus who Adventist theologians believe is dead in the grave, and therefore cannot hear our prayers. To pray through Mary, according to Adventist theologians, puts her in the position of a co-mediator with Jesus.

Conclusion

Atonement; a term that theologians use to talk about how reconciliation between God and man is achieved has eluded Bible students and scholars for centuries. Several theories have been
formulated, and will continue to seek recognition. In this chapter, I have highlighted five theories: Ransom theory, Moral influence theory, Satisfaction theory, Penal substitutionary theory, and Recapitulation theory. I have also highlighted the views of Eastern Christianity on atonement as well as Roman Catholic views on atonement and reparation. The penal substitutionary theory of atonement has been given quite some detailed treatment because I intend to reconcile two variations of this theory, namely; vicarious atonement and actual atonement. These two variations of atonement will be discussed in chapter three and chapter four respectively.
CHAPTER THREE: CHRIST’S SUBSTITUTIONARY DEATH AS VICARIOUS

Introduction

In chapter two various theories of atonement were looked at, including the penal substitutionary theory. It was noted that Seventh-day Adventists have throughout their history believed and taught that Christ’s death was substitutionary. It was also emphasized that by substitution it is meant that Christ died for, or in place of sinners; the righteous for the unrighteous; the holy for the unholy; the innocent for the guilty. Except for one or an unknown number of scholars who may have questioned the substitutionary nature of Christ’s death, Seventh-day Adventist scholars generally regard this view of the atonement as the one that best reflects what is taught in Scripture.

However, although there is general agreement among Seventh-day Adventist scholars that Christ’s death was a penal substitution, there is no harmony as to how these scholars view the nature of this penal substitution. Christ’s penal substitutionary death is viewed as either vicarious or actual.

According to Nichol (1980: 567), Christ’s death was “vicarious and substitutionary.” He supports this thought by stating that Christ paid the penalty for the guilt of others (Nichol 1980: 567). He notes that the thought that Christ’s death was vicarious was chosen by some Old Testament writers such as Isaiah to predict what would happen at the cross. He further notes that the prophet Isaiah predicted that Christ would die vicariously. He sees in Isaiah 53:4-6 an emphasis on the vicarious nature of Christ’s suffering, and death (Nichol 1980: 291).

White (1995: 151) is in accord with Nichol when she asserts that the Old Testament sacrificial offerings had been instituted to teach humanity concerning the vicarious atonement of Christ, to teach humanity that without the shedding of blood there is no remission of sins (Heb. 9: 22).

According to Dederen (2000: 177), Christ’s death was vicarious. He notes that a ransoming and vicarious death is one description chosen by the New Testament writers (such as Matthew, Mark, John, Paul and Peter) to explain to the early believers what happened at the cross (Dederen 2000: 177).
In this chapter, the vicarious view of Christ’s substitutionary death is presented. The term vicarious is defined first. Then a detailed explanation of how the term is understood by both Seventh-day and non-Seventh-day Adventist scholars is given. The chapter closes with a discussion about the implications of the vicarious position with respect to justification, the in-Christ motif, the humanity of Christ, and the uniqueness of Christ’s humanity.

To begin this presentation of the vicarious view of Jesus Christ’s substitutionary death, I will first define the term vicarious.

3.1. Definition of the term vicarious

By way of explanation, Heppenstall (1989: 248) notes that when it is said that Christ’s death was vicarious, it is affirmed that Christ died for the sins of others. Thus of Himself Christ did not commit sin, and therefore, without our sins being laid on Him, He would not have died. When it is said according to Heppenstall, therefore, that Christ’s death was vicarious, the meaning is that Christ died in place of others (Heppenstall 1989: 248).

In the context of atonement, Bauer (2008:1) states that vicarious atonement means a one-for-one representation, in which Christ is understood to personally represent a sinner individually on the cross as the sinner’s personal representative and substitute.

As stated by Slick (2014), the word *vicarious* means substitute, and substitute refers to someone who takes the place of the other. This means that Christ was a substitute for others in that He took their place and suffered their punishment. Commenting on Gen. 22 verse 13, Slick (2014) argues that the ram was offered in place of Isaac. He argues further that this was a substitutionary sacrifice, and this is what the term *vicarious* means (Slick 2014).

Having looked at the definition of the term vicarious, how this term is used by theologians is now considered. It will be noted that the word is generally used in two different ways; namely, (1) that Christ’s death was a substitution, and (2) that His substitutionary death was vicarious. In the former usage, the term vicarious means substitute. In other words, the terms vicarious and substitution are used interchangeably. In the latter usage, the term vicarious emphasizes the substitutionary nature of Christ’s death.
3.2. The terms vicarious and substitution used interchangeably

According to the *Collins English Dictionary* (2009), when used as an adjective, the term vicarious means taking the place of another person or thing; acting or serving as a substitute. In other words, vicarious and substitution are synonymous terms. To say therefore, that Christ’s death was vicarious is to say that His death was a substitution, or that His death was substitutionary.

Berkhof (1941: 375-376) uses the terms vicarious and substitution interchangeably. For example, under *Scriptural proof for the vicarious atonement of Christ*, Berkhof (1941:376-377) argues that the Bible teaches that the sufferings and death of Christ were vicarious. According to him, vicarious in the strict sense of the word, means that Christ took the place of sinners. This means that their guilt was imputed, and their punishment transferred, to Him. Berkhof (1941:376) further argues that the sufferings of Christ were not just the sympathetic sufferings of a friend, but the substitutionary sufferings of the Lamb of God for the sin of the world (Berkhof 1941: 376).

In volume 6 of the *Seventh-day Adventist Bible Commentary*, Nichol (1980: 866-867), uses the terms vicarious and substitutionary, one following the other, separated by a comma. In volume 7 of the *Seventh-day Adventist Bible Commentary*, Nichol (1980: 567), again uses the terms vicarious and substitutionary together, but this time joined by *and*. It is not certain what the implication of this use of the terms is. However, a parallel reading of all the uses of the two terms in the *Seventh-day Adventist Bible Commentary* series, suggests that the terms are used interchangeably. This is consistent with how the terms are used in other works by Seventh-day Adventist scholars. The terms seem to be used together to emphasize the fact that Christ’s death was for or in place of others.

Blazen (2000: 286) uses the terms vicarious and substitution interchangeably. He argues that Isaiah 53 where the ñServant dies a vicarious death for the breakers of God’s law clarifies the nature of Christ’s death. ñBlazen (2000:286) notes that the evidence in Isaiah 53 makes it clear that Jesus’ death not only represents sinners, but substitutes for them, for by it Jesus bears the guilt and penalty, judgment and wrath, which fallen humanity personally would have borne.
Commenting on how atonement was achieved in the Old Testament, Dederen (2000: 175) argues that the “daily sacrifice or continual burnt offering seems most perfectly to have embodied the sacrificial idea through its vicarious character.” According to Dederen (2000: 177), “a ransoming and vicarious (substitutionary) death is one description chosen by the New Testament writers to explain to the early believers what happened at the cross.” Dederen puts the term substitutionary in brackets after the term vicarious to indicate that the two terms have the same meaning. In other words, to say that Christ’s death was vicarious is to say that it was substitutionary.

Rodriguez (2000: 384-388) is in accord with Blazen and Dederen with regard to the way they use the terms vicarious and substitution. He uses the example of the laying on of hands on the sacrificial animal in the Old Testament sacrificial system, and notes that laying on of hands was practiced on non-cultic occasions to express the idea of transfer and, in some cases, substitution (Rodriguez 2000: 384). He further notes that on the basis of the blood ritual God accepted the sacrifice as a substitute for the sinner (Rodriguez 2000: 385).

In his view, Cairus (2015:24) sees the language of sacrifice and ransom used in the New Testament to clearly establish the substitutionary (vicarious) nature of Jesus’ death. As it can be noticed, Cairus places the term vicarious in brackets after the term substitutionary as a suggestion that the two terms can be used one in place of the other. He makes this statement under the subtitle: Summary of the Biblical Evidence for Vicarious Atonement. The term substitute or substitutionary is used in the whole passage under this subtitle, except for the last paragraph where the term vicarious is placed in brackets. Thus for Cairus, the terms vicarious and substitutionary are synonymous.

It should be noted however, that under the subtitle: Atonement as Substitutionary Ransom, Cairus (2005:22) asserts that “More than any other group of terms, the lytron words highlight the vicarious, substitutionary nature of atonement.” In this statement, the terms vicarious and substitutionary are separated by a comma. As already noted above, when these two terms are used one following the other in most of Seventh-day Adventist writings, the idea of emphasis on the substitutionary nature of Christ’s death seems to be in view.

According to Adams (2007:96), Caiaphas talked about Christ’s death in John 11: 50-52 in vicarious terms. He explains that the term vicarious refers to Christ’s death in place of others.
Christ was going to die instead of the whole nation of Israel as thought by Caiaphas. However, that death was to be for others, and not for Himself. Christ would die for the sins of Israel, and for the whole world. Adams (2007: 100), like other scholars uses the terms vicarious and substitutionary interchangeably. Commenting on Eph. 5: 2 and Heb. 9: 26, he says; “The idea in those passages is that of vicarious death or substitutionary death.”

As argued by Leigh (2011), Christ’s death is best understood as a substitution. Leigh (2011) notes; “Some theologians refer to this substitutionary death as the vicarious death of Christ.” Thus, according to Leigh and the theologians he refers to, vicarious and substitutionary, are synonymous terms. For this reason, the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably.

Having established that the terms vicarious and substitutionary are used interchangeably as synonymous terms, in the next section, it will be noted that scholars sometimes do not use the two terms interchangeably. This is important because it is this use of the terms vicarious and substitutionary that has created a controversy among theologians.

3.3. The terms vicarious and substitution not used interchangeably

The terms vicarious and substitution are sometimes not used interchangeably by both Seventh-day Adventist and non-Seventh-day Adventist scholars. In other words the two terms are sometimes not viewed as being synonymous. They do not mean the same thing. Instead, the term vicarious is used to describe how Christ’s substitutionary death was achieved on the cross. This is particularly the case with regard to how Seventh-day Adventist scholar Jack Sequeira uses the term vicarious when he is critiquing Adventist and evangelical understanding of substitutionary atonement. Norman R. Gulley uses these two terms in a similar way when he is refuting what is called corporate atonement, and describing the vicarious nature of Jesus Christ’s substitutionary death (Gulley 2012: 626).

In light of the foregoing statements, Sequeira (1996:84) argues; “According to Paul, the death of Christ was not one man dying instead of all men (vicarious substitution), rather His death was all men dying in one man (actual substitution).” Thus Sequeira dichotomizes substitution into vicarious substitution and actual substitution. If there is vicarious substitution and actual substitution, then for Sequeira, the terms vicarious and substitution are not synonymous, and so,
in a sense, they are not used interchangeably. The term vicarious is not used in place of the term substitution.

Commenting on how the Reformers solved the ethical problem related to how God justifies the ungodly without compromising His integrity, and how they rejected the solution offered by Catholic scholars, Sequeira (1999:39) observes; ÌńThe Reformers rejected this solution to the problem and came up with the biblical doctrine of substitution.Ìı He calls substitution a biblical doctrine. But while referring to substitution as a biblical doctrine, Sequeira (1999:48) contends; ÌńChrist, in His humanity, saved men and women in actuality-not vicariously.Ìı In Sequeira's view therefore, Christ's death was a substitution for the sinner's death, but this substitutionary death was not vicarious.

It is important to note however, that while arguing that Christ did not save people vicariously, Sequeira (2009: 355) admits; Ìńwe can say that he [Christ] vicariously redeemed humanity from sins (sinful behaviour).Ìı He suggests that this was possible Ìńsince Christ did not participate in or commit sins (in thought, word, or deed Ìı (2009: 355). This seeming contradiction in Sequeira’s views will not be given a detailed treatment in this chapter, but in the next chapter, and also in chapter six.

Refuting what theologians call corporate atonement, Gulley (2012:627) writes; ÌńLikewise there is no corporate atonement at the cross, for atonement is Christ’s bearing all sin as a vicarious substitute in death for all sinners.Ìı In this statement, it will be noticed that the term vicarious describes the term substitute. Again Gulley (2012:628) writes; ÌńThe transfer of sin onto the Saviour that crushed out His life was a vicarious substitutionary atonement for all humans.Ìı As in the preceding statement, the term vicarious in this statement describes the term substitutionary. Gulley wants to be clear that Jesus Christ’s substitutionary death was vicarious, and not corporate. As understood by Gulley (2012:626), corporate atonement means that Ìńall sinners have already died for their sins in Christ’s death, in the sense that Christ died as us rather than for us.Ìı

Just like Sequeira who tries to differentiate vicarious substitution from actual substitution, Gulley tries to differentiate vicarious substitution from corporate atonement. The terms vicarious and substitutionary are in this sense not used interchangeably. The term vicarious is used instead to
describe the *substitutionary* nature of Jesus Christ’s death. As Gulley (2012:625) notes; “The word *substitutionary*, properly understood, applies solely to Christ taking our place at the cross.

As asserted by a non-Seventh-day Adventist scholar, Pounds (2005), “Christ set His people free from the power of sin by His vicarious, substitutionary death for our sins.” Elsewhere in the same article, however, Pounds (2005) uses only the term vicarious to refer to the suffering and death of Christ. He notes that Christ sacrificed Himself for us, or that Christ gave Himself to redeem us from the power and penalty of sin to set us free. Pounds (2005), elaborates that “behind the term vicarious is the idea of someone substituting himself for another person.” Thus, for Pounds the terms vicarious and substitutionary are used together simply to denote emphasis that Christ’s death was for the benefit of the fallen race, and not for Himself. Christ’s death was substitutionary, and that substitutionary death was vicarious.

With the vicarious position of Christ’s substitutionary death having been highlighted I will now consider the implications of this position on *justification*, the *in-Christ* motif, *Christ’s humanity*, and the *uniqueness of Christ’s humanity*. I will begin this discussion with justification.

### 3. 4. Justification

Justification is one of the Bible concepts that attract a lot of debate among theologians. It is however, not the intention of this researcher to join any side of the debate because that is outside the parameters of this research. This researcher’s intention here is simply to state the position on justification held by some of those scholars who teach that Jesus Christ’s substitutionary death was vicarious.

Biblically, to justify a person is to declare that person righteous. The Greek word which is translated as *to justify* in the New Testament is *dikaioun*. Barclay (2013:67) notes that all Greek verbs that end in *ioun* mean not to *make* someone something, but *to treat, to reckon, to account* that person as something. Justification as used by Paul in the Book of Romans is a metaphor from the law courts (Barclay 2013: 67). The metaphor of justification in Barclay’s view thinks of an individual as on trial before God (Barclay 2013: 67). In the law courts, if an innocent person is brought before the judge, then for the judge to treat that person as innocent is the same as *acquittal* (Barclay 2013: 67). The person is acquitted not because the judge has exercised his
mercy to acquit that person, but because the person is innocent. On the other hand, as noted by Barclay (2013:67), "the point about our relationship to God is that we are utterly guilty, and yet God, in His amazing mercy, treats us, reckons us, accounts us as if we were innocent." This is what justification in the biblical sense means. Therefore, Barclay (2013:67) asserts that when Paul says that God justifies the ungodly, he means that God treats the ungodly as if they had been good men and women.

Erickson (2013:883) is in harmony with Barclay when he defines justification as God’s action pronouncing sinners righteous in his sight. According to Erickson (2013:884), in the New Testament, justification is God’s declarative act by which, on the basis of the sufficiency of Christ’s atoning death, he pronounces believers to have fulfilled all of the requirements of the law that pertain to them.

Seventh-day Adventist scholar, Knight (2008:77) is of the view that justification is one of the most significant metaphors of salvation in the New Testament and as does Barclay, he notes that it is a word that takes us to the language of the law courts with the essential meaning as to be declared righteous.

Having defined the concept of justification, it is important that I highlight what some of the scholars who teach that Jesus Christ’s death was vicarious believe is the means by which this justification is received. It is important also to state the relationship between justification and restoration as understood by these scholars. This is what is discussed hereunder.

3.4.1. Justification received only by faith

Generally, the teaching among most Seventh-day Adventist scholars who hold the vicarious view of substitution is that on the cross God made a provision that those who believe in the birth, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ may be justified or declared righteous. They argue that God did not universally justify all people; instead, He made a provision for those who believe to receive the gift of justification.

In the light of the foregoing statement, for example, Blazen (2000: 291) asserts that there is only one justification, which is only by faith (Rom. 1: 17) and which accompanies the believer from faith’s inception to the final judgment, where its reality is attested by its fruits. Commenting on
Paul's teaching on justification, Blazen (2000: 281) argues that Paul did not teach merely that God justified the ungodly, but that He justified the ungodly who placed their faith and trust in Him.

Bemmelen (2007: 6-7) notes that there is significant unity among Adventist scholars concerning the doctrine of justification through grace alone and by faith alone. He understands justification to be primarily a judicial declaration by God that the sinner who believes in Christ is righteous.

Knight (2008: 84) is in accord with Blazen and Bemmelen when he states that to be justified in the biblical sense means that a person is no longer in a sin relationship (in rebellion), but in a faith relationship. Thus, according to Knight, a person who has been justified belongs to the covenant family (Knight 2008: 84). The net effect of this being that justification only goes to those who exercise faith in the saving history of Jesus Christ. It is Knight's view then, that those who have not yet exercised faith in God have not been justified.

As argued by Kane (2011) while commenting on Rom. 3: 25, 26, it is the sacrificial death of the sinless Christ, as guilty man's substitute, which fully satisfies the penalty of the law and thus demonstrates God's righteousness and justice in remitting the sins of the believer and justifying him. Like other scholars discussed whose views are presented above, Kane does not believe in justification that precedes faith in Christ.

Some scholars such as Blazen have looked at justification in the context of reconciliation. For this reason, it is imperative that I briefly consider how Blazen has related the two concepts of salvation.

3.4.2. Justification as Reconciliation

According to Blazen (2000: 287), reconciliation is another way of talking about justification, as the parallelism between Romans 5: 9 (justified by His blood) and 5: 10 (reconciled by His death) shows. He notes that the essential synonymity of the two terms is seen in 2 Cor. 5: 18, 21 (Blazen 2000: 287). Blazen (2000: 287) argues that reconciliation is first an objective event before it is subjective. In Blazen's opinion, 2 Cor. 5:18-21 is a statement of fact that reconciliation is achieved by the event of the cross. The objective event in the past history of salvation is the presupposition for the proclamation of reconciliation, whereby the possibility for
humans to be reconciled with God on the existential level is made available through the apostolic appeal to be reconciled to God (Blazen 2000: 287-288). Thus, in the apostolic preaching the already-won reconciliation projects itself toward every person, and seeks lodgment in the experience of those who believe (Blazen 2000: 288).

Blazen (2000: 288) suggests that in Rom. 5 Jesus Christ dies for people while they are still sinful. He asserts that the saving event is apart from them and before the emergence of faith (Blazen 2000: 288). Thus, the death of Jesus Christ is the originating cause of faith; there is no genuine faith without the death of Jesus Christ (Blazen 2000: 288). It is likewise in the letter to the Ephesians. Through the death of Jesus, which in principle breaks down the wall of hostility between Jews and Gentiles, these diverse people are reconciled to God (Blazen 2000: 288). Therefore, the gospel announces that people are to enter the new situation of reconciliation already existing in Christ (Eph. 2: 13), who is our peace (Eph. 2:14) (Blazen 2000: 288).

As a summary, this research reveals that Blazen and some of the other Seventh-day Adventist scholars, who believe that Jesus Christ’s substitutionary death was vicarious, understand reconciliation as both an objective event and something that involves the experience of restored relations with God. They understand reconciliation as another way of talking about justification. Thus, what they teach about reconciliation applies to justification as well. They note that in 2 Cor. 5: 18 reconciliation is coordinated with God not counting our trespasses, an expression found in Paul’s discussion of justification in Rom. 4: 8. They observe that in 2 Cor. 5: 21 reconciliation, the subject of 2 Cor. 5:18-20, alternates with the word righteousness, a word intimately connected with justification. Therefore, to say that we might become the righteousness of God in him (2 Cor. 5:21) is, in this context, the same as saying that we might be reconciled to God through him (2 Cor. 5:20) (Blazen 2000: 287).

The vicarious model of Jesus Christ’s substitutionary death does not only concern the concept of justification, it also concerns the in-Christ motif. This is also a subject of debate among Adventist theologians. In what follows I will discuss this concept.

3.5. The In-Christ Motif

This research reveals that some of the scholars who teach the vicarious model of Christ’s death also teach that only those who have accepted Christ as Saviour and Lord are in Christ.
Accordingly, the in-Christ motif presupposes a saving relationship existing between Christ and the believer. There is therefore, no such thing as being in Christ without first of all knowing who Christ is, and making a decision for Him as Saviour and Lord. The discussion of this concept is based on the works of Blazen (2005: 1-15) and Rodriguez (2008:136-143).

3.5.1. Ivan T. Blazen on the in Christ motif

Blazen (2005:1) notes that there is the in Christ concept properly so-called which refers to Jesus' person and work as messianic Saviour. He further notes that there is the in the Lord motif which often has practical and ethical significance for how Christians live their lives under His lordship (Blazen 2005: 1). He argues that there exists some synonymity or overlap between the two concepts (Blazen 2005: 1). In any case, there is always the most intimate connection; but generally the first bears soteriological connotations having to do with the indicative of God's grace, and the second has practical or imperative connotations having to do with God's claim, guidance, or protection (Blazen 2005: 1).

The phrase in-Christ or its equivalents according to Blazen (2005:1) appears 164 times in Paul's writings alone. "Outside Pauline writings, Blazen (2005:2) asserts, "the phrase is found 32 times. This count of the phrase in Blazen's view, therefore, suggests that this is a very important concept which requires careful study. It is Blazen's observation that in Christ is Paul's most frequently occurring concept and arguably the centre of his religious faith (Blazen 2005: 2). His concept of the righteousness of God or justification, often presumed to be the heart of Paul's thought, finds its source and significance in the in Him reality (Blazen 2005: 2-3).

Blazen discusses the in Christ concept under three major headings relevant to this research. These, in the order in which they are presented hereunder are: We in Christ, Christ in us, and spiritual union.

3.5.1.1. We in Christ

According to Blazen (2005: 3), in Christ means to be incorporated into the salvation-historical events of Christ's death and resurrection and become the receptor of the efficacy and redeeming qualities of those events. He notes that to be in Him is to share in His redemption and the new history inaugurated by, and grounded in, His death and resurrection (Blazen 2005: 3). It means
that henceforth one's whole life is determined by the cross and resurrection, just as to be a citizen of a particular sovereign state is to have one's existence determined by the new history begun in the founding events of the revolution of that state leading to its freedom (Blazen 2005: 3).

It is Blazen's observation that there is incredible salvific benefit to being in Him. For example, according to him, Eph. 1: 3 says that God is praiseworthy because He has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in Christ. He notes that the events included in these blessings are election to holiness (Eph.1:4), adoption as God's children (Eph.1:5), redemption or the forgiveness of sins through Christ's blood (Eph.1:7), the revelation of God's will to unify everything in Christ (Eph.1: 9-10), and the gift of the Holy Spirit which brings God's seal of ownership and pledge of eternal inheritance (Eph.1: 13-14). In Blazen's view, the blessings of God in Christ include eternity past, eternity future, and historical time in between (Blazen 2005: 4).

3.5.1.2. Christ in Us

Blazen (2005:4) argues that Christ in us basically means the same thing as we in Christ except that Paul far prefers the in Christ manner of speech. Accordingly, both expressions denote relationship; neither is merely legal or objective (Blazen 2005: 4). It is argued that according to Gal. 2:20, Paul is saying as a result of his crucifixion with Christ-which must refer to an event which happens for one who is in Christ-he is no longer alive, but Christ is alive in him (Blazen 2005: 4). According to Blazen (2005: 4), this does not refer to sanctification, for the entire context is about justification, and it is expressly said following the statement about the indwelling Christ that Paul's present life in the fleshly body is lived by faith in Christ Jesus who loves him, as His death shows.

It is Blazen's contention that a careful study of the phrases in Christ and Christ in us shows that in Christ can be connected with sanctification as well as justification (Blazen 2005: 6). In Blazen's view therefore, the Christ in us motif functions in terms of union with Christ, reception of His benefits, and the very reality and truth of the gospel and Christianity. And 2 Cor. 10-13, according to Blazen, reveals this fact.

In Blazen's view the gospel (John 15) and the first epistle of John confirm the indivisible reality of the phrases Christ in us and we in Him where many times the theme is abide in me and I in you (John 15:4) (Blazen 2005: 6). According to Blazen (2005:4), it follows that the argument
that *in Christ* is an objective reality referring to our new legal or forensic standing before God, as in the case of justification, and that *Christ in us* refers to subjective experience, as in sanctification, is not entirely true, as this does not cohere with the data the New Testament presents.

As noted above, Blazen also talks about the in Christ motif in terms of spiritual union between Christ and the believer. This aspect of the in Christ motif as taught by Blazen will be considered hereunder.

### 3.5.1.3. Spiritual Union

According to Blazen (2005:8), there is no question when Paul speaks of being *in Christ* or *Christ in us* (or similar expressions), the deepest meaning of his words is that the Christian is incorporated not merely into a history; even if that history centres in the death and resurrection of Christ; with all the saving benefits that history brings, but into a person, the person of Christ Himself. A vital union of the greatest intimacy is forged so that not only is the life of the Christian determined by the saving events of the cross and resurrection, but is determined, defined, and indwelt by the crucified, resurrected Christ Himself (Blazen 2005: 8). To be *in Christ* then, means that a personal union between Christ and the Christian has taken place (Blazen 2005: 8). It is the symbiosis between the living Christ and the Christian that makes possible the believer’s entry into salvation history (Blazen 2005: 8). Accordingly, there is no possibility of, or meaningfulness to, being *in Christ* without a personal relationship with the living Christ (Blazen 2005: 8). Without that relationship there is no access to salvation history. If Christ is dead then, salvation history is a myth and we are yet in our sins (1 Cor. 15: 14, 17) (Blazen 2005: 8).

With those bold statements from Blazen about the meaning and implication of the *in Christ* or *Christ in us* motif, I turn to Rodriguez’s understanding of the concept.

### 3.5.2. Angel Manuel Rodriguez on the in Christ motif

It is very important to note right on the outset that Rodriguez is former Director of the Biblical Research Institute of the General Conference of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. To a large extent therefore, his understanding of this concept has a great impact on how other scholars and
non-scholars understand the in Christ concept. Although it should not be the case, the tendency of many people is to put unqualified trust in a person who has been placed in a position of responsibility like the one that was occupied by Rodriguez. In context then, it is possible for scholars and non-scholars alike to take Rodriguez’s views as what Scripture teaches without personally studying the Bible on the concept under discussion.

This research reveals that Rodriguez is in accord with Blazen on the in Christ motif. To him as to Blazen, in Christ refers to the intimate relationship that exists between Christ and the believer. He does not believe in the understanding of the in Christ motif where a person who has not accepted Jesus as Saviour and Lord could be said to be in Christ (Rodriguez 2011).

Since Rodriguez understands the in Christ motif much the same way as Blazen, I will not give a detailed review of his work. What will be noted are those areas of emphasis that are not found in Blazen’s work, In Christ: Union with Him as Saviour and Lord in Paul. These areas of emphasis include: Election, united to Christ, and In Adam/In Christ. My presentation is a summary of chapter twelve of his book, Spanning the Abyss, under the subheading, Union with Christ.

3.5.2.1. Election

According to Rodriguez (2008:137), election cannot be separated from the divine call to salvation and service. In this sense, it is worth noting that in Rodriguez’s view, when the New Testament uses the word election theologically, it always refers to those who have placed their faith in Christ, and whom God has chosen for a particular role or mission (Rodriguez 2008: 137). This could designate both the individual (Acts 1: 24) and the church (Titus 1:1; 1 Pet. 1:1). The Bible, according to Rodriguez, does not know anything about double predestination; God choosing some for salvation and for perdition (Rodriguez 2008: 137).

It is Rodriguez’s contention also that the Bible does not teach the universal election of every individual to salvation independent of a faith relationship with the Lord (Rodriguez 2008: 137). He notes that there is an element of universality in the Bible, but this should be understood as meaning that through the preaching of the gospel and the work of the Spirit God is choosing not only Jews but also Gentiles (1 Thess. 1: 4) (Rodriguez 2008: 137-138).
According to Rodriguez (2008: 138), our election is an expression of divine grace, something Paul had in mind when he wrote that God chose us in him [Christ] before the foundation of the world (Eph. 1:4). The divine decision took place before we existed; prior to the creation of the world; and consequently it was part of the divine mystery for the salvation of sinners (Rodriguez 2008: 138).

Eph. 1: 4, in Rodriguez’s opinion, speaks of only the preexistence of Christ. It is the decision to elect us in Christ that happened before the creation of the world (Rodriguez 2008: 138). God made the decision to elect us in Christ at the point of believing in Him (Rodriguez 2008: 138).

Rodriguez (2008:138) argues that according to Eph. 1: 3, 4, God, in accordance with His purpose and sovereign will, predetermined that our election will take place exclusively in Christ. Thus, he contends that the believer’s election is a reality through and in union with Christ (Rodriguez 2008: 138). It is possible because Christ is the Elect One (Luke 9:35; 1Pet. 2:4), and as such He is the person, the sphere, within which our election occurs (Rodriguez 2008: 138). Believers are elected/chosen only in the Chosen One—never outside or apart from Him (Rodriguez 2008: 138). Such an election manifests itself in a holy and blameless life (Eph. 1:4). Election is in fact, being chosen not simply for salvation but for a holy life. The one cannot be separated from the other without robbing election of its meaning and content (Rodriguez 2008: 138).

3.5.2.2. United to Christ

Rodriguez (2008: 138) contends that the grace of God aims at uniting repentant sinners to Christ in order for them to receive the full benefits of His saving death. On the cross Christ died as our substitute, but in our union with Him we join Him as Saviour and Lord (Rodriguez 2008: 138). Rodriguez (2008: 138) contends further that there is no text in the New Testament where we read about believers dying in Christ, that is to say, in union with Him. Christ died alone on the cross—abandoned by all, including the Father (Rodriguez 2008: 138). Our union with Christ designates the experience of the new creature and presupposes the death of the old self (Rodriguez 2008: 138). Such union with Him is the subjective experience of the atonement (Rodriguez 2008: 138).

Having briefly looked at what Rodriguez teaches on the concept of our being united to Christ, it is important that I say a word about our being in Christ. Since his views on this concept are
similar to those of Blazen already presented above, I will only highlight what Blazen may not have emphasized in his work.

3.5.2.3. In Christ

Rodriguez (2008: 139) argues that the New Testament specifically expresses the idea of union with Christ through the phrases in Christ, in Him, and in the Lord. He suggests that the difference in meaning among them is insignificant, with the exception that in the Lord appears to emphasize more than the other two the idea of His lordship (Rodriguez 2008: 139). In the phrase in Christ, the preposition in (Greek en) could express the idea of instrumentality (through) or locality (in, in the sphere of) (Rodriguez 2008: 139).

According to Rodriguez (2008: 139), the phrase in Christ informs the believers that God does something for them in Christ. The implication of Paul’s use of the phrase in Christ is that God has been and is still fully active in Christ (Rodriguez 2008: 139). It is through Christ and in union with Him that the Father has granted the believers so many gifts (Rodriguez 2008: 139). Christ is the sphere of divine activity on behalf of humans—the place where God does many wonderful things for the believers and where the believers receive no condemnation (Romans 8:2) (Rodriguez 2008: 139).

To be in Christ, according to Rodriguez (2008: 139), is another way of saying that a person is a Christian. This is because the union of the believer to Christ is intimate and all-encompassing. The implication of this is that those who are not Christians cannot be said to be in Christ.

3.5.2.4. In Adam/In Christ

Under this heading, Rodriguez aims to clarify a little more how it is possible for humans to be in Christ. He starts this clarification by looking at the biblical teaching of the two Adams, from whom originated two humanities. Paul speaks of a first man/Adam and a last/second man/Adam (1Cor. 15:45, 47). Humans belong by nature to the first Adam—that is to say, they are part of the fallen human race whose head or father was Adam (Rodriguez 2008: 141). They are born in Adam in the sense that they belong to or are inexorably united to sinful humanity, and as such their fate is fixed: ἐν Αδάμ ἀναπτυχθεῖται θανάτος (verse 22) (Rodriguez 2008: 141). The phrase in Adam does not refer to the presence of every human being in Adam—a type of corporate or mystical presence
in him—but to the spiritual condition in which human beings find themselves as a result of the first Adam’s fall (Rodriguez 2008: 141). They have been unable to escape from the sphere of sin he brought into existence (Rodriguez 2008: 139).

In Rodriguez’s opinion, the New Testament compares and contrasts the two Adams in order to demonstrate that the fate of humans is no longer determined by being in Adam, but by being or not being in Christ (Rodriguez 2008: 141). What human beings get from Adam is physical and spiritual death, not his personal sin, in which they did not participate (Rodriguez 2008: 141). Christ brought the human race eternal life (Rom. 5: 21). The result of the transgression of Adam was a judgment of condemnation against sinful humanity (verses 16, 18). Through the one act of righteousness the second Adam brought justification to sinful human beings (verse 16)—a justification that brings life for all men (verses 18, 21) (Rodriguez 2008: 141).

Rodriguez (2008: 142) concludes by stating that the contrasts reveal that the first Adam originated a human family separated from God, spiritually dead. As a result of his sin, death awaits all. Their condition made it impossible for humans to overcome the power of sin in their lives, and consequently sin became inevitable. On the other hand, Christ brought into existence in His own person a human family united to God (Rodriguez 2008: 141). He has given to those who belong to Him a new life, and consequently sin is no longer their inevitable fate (Rodriguez 2008: 142). They are alive in Him, and sin no longer reigns over them (Rodriguez 2008: 142).

Just as to be part of the family of the first Adam, humans are born through the natural birth, to be part of the family of the second Adam, human beings are to be born through the power of the Holy Spirit (John 1: 12, 13) (Rodriguez 2008: 142). Jesus called this the new birth experience (John 3:3, 5, 6). A divine declaration constitutes them into God’s children, bringing to an end their participation in the Adamic condition of sin and death (Rodriguez 2008: 142).

It is important at this point that I look at how some scholars who advocate the vicarious view or model of Christ’s substitutionary death understand the human nature of Christ. This is very important to this research because one area of controversy among Seventh-day Adventist scholars related to the subject of this research involves the humanity of Jesus Christ.
3.6. The Human Nature of Christ

Seventh-day Adventist scholars who apparently agree on the subject of the vicarious nature of Jesus Christ’s substitutionary death do not agree on what really constituted the human nature of Jesus Christ. In this section three views will be presented, but the view that will be taken to represent most modern Adventist scholars who believe that Jesus Christ’s substitutionary death was vicarious is the one in the Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology. This is the twelfth volume in the Seventh-day Adventist Commentary series, written by a number of respected scholars and edited by Raoul Dederen.

Zurcher (1999: 272) identifies postlapsarian, prelapsarian, and alternative Christologies as the three current views existing in the Seventh-day Adventist Church on the human nature of Christ. A brief review of literature discussing these positions is done hereunder.

3.6.1. The Traditional, or Historical, Christology (Postlapsarian)

According to Zurcher (1999:272), this view has historical seniority in the Seventh-day Adventist Church. It is called postlapsarian because it teaches that Jesus came in fallen human nature, the nature of Adam after the Fall. Consequently Christ’s flesh is considered like that of all human beings (Zurcher 1999: 272). It was not a carnal flesh, but a flesh that, in accordance with the law of heredity, carries within it inherent tendencies to sin-tendencies to which Jesus, however, never succumbed (Zurcher 1999: 272). Although He was ἐν all points tempted as we are ὁ (Heb. 4:15), He committed no sin. Hence, He not only ἐπήκοος condemned sin in the flesh but made it possible that ἡ righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who do not walk according to the flesh but according to the Spirit (Rom. 8:3, 4) (Zurcher 1999: 272). Zurcher finds support for this view in a number of writings such as those of White, Waggoner, Jones, Prescott, and Douglass. The first four belong to what Seventh-day Adventists call the pioneers of the Seventh-day Adventist Church; while the last one is a contemporary Seventh-day Adventist scholar whose writings have shaped the thinking of many Adventist theologians.

White (2006:38-39) asserts that Jesus accepted humanity when the race had been weakened by four thousand years of sin; accepting the results of the working of the great law of heredity. This is generally to say that Christ took upon Himself fallen human nature. There are several
statements scattered in the many volumes of White’s writings that confirm that she believed that Christ’s nature was that of fallen humanity.

Using a soteriological logic, Waggoner (1999: 31) argues that if Christ took upon Himself the likeness of man in order that He might redeem man, it must have been sinful man that He was made like, for it is sinful man that He came to redeem. His view is made even stronger when he says that the flesh which Christ assumed had all the weaknesses and sinful tendencies to which fallen human nature is subject (Waggoner 1999: 31). He finds support in the statement: He was born of the seed of David according to the flesh (Rom. 1:3) (Waggoner 1999: 31).

In harmony with Waggoner, Jones (2003: 27) argues that Christ’s likeness to man is as man is in his fallen, sinful, nature, and not as he was in his original, sinless nature. This, he claims, is made certain by the phrase: We see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death (Heb. 2:9). Thus, in Jones’s opinion, what man is since he became subject to death, is what we see Jesus to be, in His place as man.

In the tradition of his early Adventist friends, Prescott (1920:52) argues that the divine Saviour so united Himself with the sinful race of man that He bore in His body, in His own personal experience, not only the weight of its sorrow, but also the weight, though not the guilt, of its sin.

In his survey, Zurcher (1999: 105) observed that Prescott’s Christology had the merit of being both the most complete and most explicit. Accordingly, Prescott’s testimony, Zurcher (1999: 105) asserts, constitutes an undeniable indication of what Adventists taught and believed regarding Christ’s human nature, since the origin of the Adventist Movement to the end of his long career in 1944.

From a contemporary viewpoint, but maintaining the traditional position of the early Seventh-day Adventists, Douglass (1977:27, 28) asserts that Christ was born with the hereditary traits of His ancestors and was not exempt from the weaknesses and liabilities of man. Douglass further asserts that Christ took upon Himself man’s sinful, fallen human nature with the possibility of yielding to temptation (Douglass 1977: 27, 28). In Douglass’s opinion, Christ had the normal passions and tendencies of humanity and faced temptation from within as well as from without. He notes that the burden of proof rested with those who believed that a break existed between
Mary and Jesus and that He did not take upon Himself the full liability of human nature (Douglass 1977: 27, 28).

It should be noted at this point that Seventh-day Adventists are not the only ones who have taught, and still teach that Christ took fallen human nature. Zurcher (1999: 23-24) advises us to recognize that the most eminent Protestant theologians of the second half of the twentieth century, such as Karl Barth, J. A. T. Robinson, Oscar Cullmann, and others, have openly declared themselves in support of a human nature of Christ affected by the Fall. Since this research does not propose to give a detailed review of literature on the human nature of Jesus Christ, it will suffice as it was done for the writings of Seventh-day Adventists to simply give a brief review of the writings of the three non-Adventist scholars listed above.

Barth (1956: 153-155) quotes many nineteenth-century authors whose teaching on the humanity of Christ was that He took upon Himself fallen human nature. Apparently Barth (1958:481) himself taught that Christ took upon himself fallen human nature. This would suggest that early in their existence as a Movement, Adventists had non-Adventist counterparts who held to the same belief that they held; that Christ’s human nature was that of fallen humanity, except that in His case, He did not sin.

In language similar to what one finds in Seventh-day Adventist literature, Robinson (1952:37) argues that the first act in the drama of redemption is the self-identification of the Son of God to the limit, yet without sin, with the body of the flesh in its fallen state. Robinson further argues that if the question of the humanity of Christ is looked at in its Bible terms, there is no reason to fear to ascribe to Christ a manhood standing under all the effects and consequences of the Fall (Robinson 1952: 37).

Cullmann (1963: 172), contrasting the first Adam and the second Adam or Heavenly Man, argues that it was necessary for the Heavenly Man, the divine prototype of humanity to enter sinful humanity in order to free it from its sins. This was basically the reasoning of Adventist pioneers Ellet J. Waggoner, Alonzo T. Jones, and William Warren Prescott cited above.

It will suffice to say that the promoters of the fallen nature of Christ view have examined the word likeness in Rom. 8:3, and concluded that whatever the meaning given to it, it cannot signify that Christ’s flesh might be different from that of humanity at His birth. Thus, Zurcher (1999: 23-24) advises us to recognize that the most eminent Protestant theologians of the second half of the twentieth century, such as Karl Barth, J. A. T. Robinson, Oscar Cullmann, and others, have openly declared themselves in support of a human nature of Christ affected by the Fall. Since this research does not propose to give a detailed review of literature on the human nature of Jesus Christ, it will suffice as it was done for the writings of Seventh-day Adventists to simply give a brief review of the writings of the three non-Adventist scholars listed above.

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It will suffice to say that the promoters of the fallen nature of Christ view have examined the word likeness in Rom. 8:3, and concluded that whatever the meaning given to it, it cannot signify that Christ’s flesh might be different from that of humanity at His birth. Thus, Zurcher (1999:
concludes that Jesus was not like Adam before the Fall, for God had not created Adam "in the likeness of sinful flesh." In Zurcher's view Phil. 2:7 and Heb. 2:9 also suggest that Jesus took fallen human nature.

To conclude this section, it is important to note that on the surface, the supporters of the fallen nature view of Christ agree. However, they differ on the details of what constituted that fallen nature. For example, Knight (1987:143) observes that both Alonzo T. Jones and Ellen G. White believed that Christ had sinful nature, but Jones tried to include more in the sinful than she did.

As I now look at the second view of the human nature of Christ, it is important to state that Zurcher (1999:272-273) observes that "many Adventists today do not know that their church has taught, for a century-from the origin of the movement until 1950-the postlapsarian position." With the passage of time, it would appear that some Adventist theologians, not understanding how it could be possible for Jesus to live without sin in fallen human nature, believed it was necessary to formulate a new Christology. That new Christology is the subject of the next section.

3.6.2. The New Christology (Prelapsarian Position)

The main argument of the new Christology is that Jesus took Adam's sinless human nature; that is to say, Adam's nature before the Fall. Zurcher (1999: 273) claims that promoters of the new Christology argue that even if Christ was tempted in all points as we are, it was never from within, since He inherited from Adam none of the propensities to sin. That is to say that whatever Jesus took was not His intrinsically or innately; all that He took, all that He bore, whether the burden and penalty of our iniquities, or the diseases and frailties of our human nature; all was taken and borne vicariously (Zurcher 1999: 273). The word that became prominent during the time when the prelapsarian position was being formulated was vicariously (Zurcher 1999: 273). Thus, vicariously, Christ took our sinful, fallen nature (Zurcher 1999: 273). He bore our weaknesses, our temptations, vicariously, in the same way He bore our iniquities (Zurcher 1999: 273).

According to Donkor (2005: 9-11), the unfallen nature position is argued primarily from the nature of sin, that is, that if sin were simply a matter of acts, then, it would be possible to conceive of Jesus as born with sinful flesh and yet not a sinner. But according to the unfallen
nature position, it simply is not true that sin is not present until the person’s first act of sin (Donkor 2005: 9). Men are born sinners; therefore, Jesus could not be born of sinful flesh; otherwise, He could have been born a sinner, Himself in need of a saviour (Donkor 2005: 9).

In summary form, Donkor notes that scholars who teach that Christ had an unfallen nature do so from three arguments. Firstly, they argue that Christ was not born with sinful flesh because of the nature of sin; that is, all post-fall humans partake of original sin which is defined first as a broken relationship between man and God (Rom. 14:23), which then leads to the commission of wrongful acts (1 John 3:4) (Donkor 2005: 9). Thus, if Christ had been born with sinful flesh, He would have been in a broken relationship with the Father just like the rest of humanity. Secondly, Jesus’ nature was unfallen because He was unique. This uniqueness is interpreted christologically to mean that it consisted not only in how Jesus was born (without human father) but in what nature He was born (without human sin) (Donkor 2005: 10). Donkor (2005:9-11) suggests that this understanding is based on the Greek word monogenes used nine times in the New Testament, five of which apply to Jesus (John 1:14, 18; 3:16, 18, 1 John 4:9). As applied to Jesus, it means unique, and one of a kind. The uses of the Greek word prototokos with reference to Christ (Heb. 1:6; Rom. 8:29; Col. 1: 15, 18; Rev. 1:5) also mean uniqueness with particular reference to mission. Thirdly, it is argued that Jesus was not in sinful flesh, but in the likeness of sinful flesh. As with the fallen nature position, the unfallen nature position examines Rom. 8: 3 but comes to the opposite conclusion. It is argued that not only in Rom. 8:3, but also in Phil. 2:7 and Heb. 2:9, the use of the Greek homoiooma or homoioo (likeness) instead of isos (same) suggests that Jesus was only similar to other humans in having a sin-affected physical human body, but not the same as other humans, for He alone was sinless in His spiritual relationship with God (Donkor 2005: 10-11).

Evaluating the unfallen nature position, Zurcher (1999: 273) says that what is surprising about this position is that its promoters rest their case on the writings of Seventh-day Adventist prophetess, Ellen G. White, who it has already been stated, believed that Christ took fallen human nature. He thus concludes that the dispute boils down to differences of interpretation in regard to certain crucial Ellen G. White statements (Zurcher 1999: 273).

It would appear that at some point in the history of Seventh-day Adventist Christology, scholars began to notice that there was a shift from the traditional, historical, postlapsarian view to the
new prelapsarian view. They then formulated a third view, which as noted above, is called the alternative Christology. I will now present the alternative Christology.

3.6.3. The Alternative Christology

According to Zurcher (1999: 273), the alternative Christology is the most recent and probably the most widespread in the Seventh-day Adventist Church today. It is now promoted in the book *Seventh-day Adventists Believe*, prepared by more than 200 representative church leaders and scholars drawn from the highest levels of the denomination. It should be added that it is also promoted in the book *Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology*, published in 2000, after Zurcher had already published his *Historical Survey of Adventist Thought on the Human Nature of Christ*.

According to Zurcher (1999:273), the alternative Christology is in harmony with the traditional Christology of the Adventist pioneers when it teaches that Jesus took Adam’s human nature *after* the Fall. Zurcher (1999: 273-274) observes that the promoters of this view (such as Dederen and Adams) teach that Christ did not come in *power and splendor*, or even with the sinless nature of Adam. On the contrary, He took the form of a servant, with a nature enfeebled by 4,000 years of degradation of the race (Zurcher 1999: 274).

Zurcher (1999:274) reminds his readers however, that when the promoters of the alternative Christology teach that Jesus Christ took Adam’s human nature *after* the Fall, they do not imply that He inherited *evil tendencies* from Adam. They argue that although the body of Christ was subject to physical deterioration and inherited the weaknesses of humanity’s physical constitution, He inherited none of the inclinations to evil associated with fallen human nature (Zurcher 1999: 274).

In Zurcher’s opinion, the formulation of this Christology seems to borrow from the formula of one of Ellen G. White’s sources, the Anglican minister Henry Melvill (Zurcher 1999: 274). Based on Melvill’s formula, the promoters of this Christology maintain that Jesus inherited from Adam only *innocent infirmities*, and *such characteristics as hunger, pain, weakness, sorrow, and death* (Zurcher 1999: 274). They argue that although these are consequences of sin, they are not sinful. It is thus concluded by the promoters of this Christology that Christ was neither like Adam before the Fall nor exactly like Adam after the Fall (Zurcher 1999: 274). Unlike all other
fallen human beings, He was born without evil tendencies. Thus, on this point they agree with
the new or pre-lapsarian Christology (Zurcher 1999: 274).

As noted above, the alternative Christology has been popularized in *Seventh-day Adventists
Believe* and the *Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology*. Thus, in support of this
Christology, Dederen (2000: 164-165) contends that Jesus’ humanity did not correspond to
Adam’s humanity before the Fall, nor in every respect to Adam’s humanity after the Fall, for the
Scriptures portray Christ’s humanity as sinless. Commenting on Rom. 8:3, he argues that Christ
took human nature in its fallen condition with its infirmities and liabilities and bearing the
consequences of sin; but not its sinfulness (Dederen 2000: 164-165). Christ took human nature,
weakened by and deteriorated by four thousand years of sin, yet undefiled and spotless (Dederen
2000: 165).

The subtitle to Dederen’s article *CHRIST: HIS PERSON AND WORK* is *A Sinless Human
Nature*. In his opening statement, he advises that in one’s assessment of the human nature of
Jesus, it is necessary for one to take account of a clear testimony of the New Testament
concerning His sinless character, addressed clearly in a number of statements (Dederen 2000:
164). Then he proceeds to explain what he means by pointing to New Testament texts that in his
view clearly state that Christ was without sin.

Dederen (2000:164) reminds us that Christ was conceived by the Holy Spirit; the implication
being that His birth was supernatural (Matt. 1:20; Luke 1:35). Thus, the angel, sent by the Father
told Mary that the Holy One who is to be born will be called the Son of God (Luke 1:35).

It should be noted however, that according to Dederen (2000:165), the uniform witness of
Scripture to the sinlessness of Jesus does not mean that He could not have sinned. He argues that
while it is true that God does no evil and cannot be tempted (James 1:13), it is fitting to point out
that Jesus, as a human being, could have sinned, though He did not (Dederen 2000: 165). He
refused to break His intimate relationship with the Father. But He experienced genuine struggles
and temptations, some of enormous intensity, as His struggle in Gethsemane to do the Father’s

Before Dederen got to teach the Christology Zurcher (1999:272-273) calls the alternative
Christology, one of Seventh-day Adventism’s prominent professors of Christian philosophy,
Edward Heppenstall, had already started teaching it. For Heppenstall, theology was not truly useful unless it led to a living relationship with God through Jesus Christ. This relationship with God was made possible through the incarnation of the Son of God. Thus, according to Heppenstall (1977:21), if one does not believe in the incarnation, then it is impossible to understand what the Christian faith stands for because the substance of our faith lies in what Christ was and in what He did, and not merely in what He taught.

Heppenstall (1977:74, 126) argues that Christ took a weakened human nature, not the perfect nature of Adam before he sinned. He argues that if the transmission of sin is by natural propagation, then Jesus must have inherited from Mary what all human beings inherit from their parents, unless we favour some form of immaculate-conception doctrine. But according to Heppenstall, original sin could be separated from the genetic process. In this way he is able to affirm that Christ did not have a sinful nature like the rest of mankind. Christ could inherit from Mary only what could be transmitted genetically. This then, means He inherited the weakened physical constitution, the results of sin upon the body that we all inherit. All other human beings are born without God, and therefore, need regeneration. Christ did not need regeneration because He was not born without God. The great difference between Christ and human beings lies here.

It may not be necessary to give a detailed description of Heppenstall’s teaching on exactly how far Christ went in reaching us in our weakened nature. It will suffice to say that what Dederen teaches is basically Heppenstall’s teaching.

Zurcher (1999:251) notes that when Dederen was contacted with regard to his belief on the human nature of Christ, he assured him that his point of view was the same as that expressed by Edward Heppenstall. In other words, Christ took Adam’s nature after the Fall, but without the participation of the natural tendencies to sin; flesh like that of sin, but not identical.

One of Dederen’s followers, Adams (1994:58) asserts that he follows the interpretation as full university seminarians for the past 25 years or so have received it from the lips of longtime theology professor Raoul Dederen. Thus, like the professor whose interpretation he follows, Adams concludes at the end of his search for the truth about the human nature of Christ that the incarnate Christ was *neither just like Adam before the Fall, nor just like the rest of human beings.* Christ was unique.
In a discussion with Biblical Research Institute of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists Associate Director Gerhard Pfandl in October, 2010, I was referred to Adams’ book as the one that best expresses the human nature of Christ as understood by most Adventist theologians. In other words, Pfandl confirmed to me that most Adventist theologians teach the unique view of the human nature of Christ, which Zurcher calls the alternative Christology.

It is important to end this discussion by adding Eric Claude Webster to the list of Adventist Theologians who hold to the alternative Christology. Webster’s research entitled *Crosscurrents in Adventist Christology* looks at the teachings of four prominent Adventist thinkers, two from the pioneer group, and two contemporary ones. Apparently the thoughts of these Adventist thinkers have already been considered in this chapter.

In summary form, Webster (1984:451) submitted that Christ came into the world in the humanity of Adam after the Fall and not before the Fall; assuming humanity affected by the laws of heredity and subject to weakness, infirmity and temptation. He submitted also, however, that while coming in fallen human nature, Christ was not infected by original sin and was born without any tendencies and propensities to sin (Webster 1984: 451). He submitted further, that Jesus Christ freely chose to assume not only a nature like ours in all respects, sin excepted, but also a common situation of suffering, alienation and lostness, by coming in mortal flesh, vicariously taking our guilt, punishment and separation on Himself (Webster 1984: 451).

I wish at this point to add a section based on Norman R. Gulley’s position found in his book: *Christ Our Substitute* (1982:33-39). It appears as argued by Zurcher (1999:222- 223) that Norman R. Gulley supported the pre-lapsarian position after doing a linguistic and theological study to define the meaning of the Greek words *sarx, harmartia, isos*, *homoioama, monogenes*, and *prototokos*. This research however, reveals that Gulley’s position is that Christ’s human nature was pre-lapsarian (spiritual nature) and post-lapsarian (physical nature) as shown below.

### 3.6.4. Prelapsarian and Postlapsarian

Gulley (1982:33) argues that Jesus Christ took the spiritual human nature of Adam before the Fall and the physical human nature of Adam after the Fall. He begins his argument with the affirmation that Seventh-day Adventists believe that Jesus Christ was fully God and fully man. Then he proceeds by arguing that we can look at the phrase fully man in two ways: Jesus had
either (1) unfallen human nature, such as Adam possessed prior to the Fall, or (2) fallen human nature (1982:33). According to Gulley neither of the two positions is correct. He contends that Christ took both natures. As already stated above, he explains this by stating that Christ took the spiritual nature of human beings before the Fall, and the physical nature of human beings after the Fall. But this may not be clear enough. Gulley (1982:38) clarifies what he means by stating that Jesus actually met humanity where humanity was; taking upon Himself all the physical results of the Fall, but not the spiritual. In Gulley's opinion, our Saviour assumed the infirmities of humanity, his hunger and tiredness, but not humanity's broken relationship with God. Spiritually He had the pre-Fall human nature of Adam. Gulley (1982:38) contends that this is what qualified Christ to be the second Adam, humanity's substitute, to bring humanity that which humanity had lost-oneness with God.

Gulley (1982:38) asserts that Jesus came to go over the entire life span of the race to become the one human who is perfect, our substitute at every stage of life. Accordingly, only as we regard His incarnation as radically different from our birth can we understand Him as our complete substitute and rejoice in His full salvation. It is Gulley's contention that any idea that Christ became exactly like us in birth, including the spiritual nature-participating in the genetic stream of fallen human nature, receiving the results of heredity-calls in question His substitution and often leads us to consider Him only as an example to copy (Gulley 1982: 38).

To emphasize the difference of Jesus Christ's human nature from that of the rest of humanity, Gulley (1982:38) contends that if Christ was born only like us and made it, we also can make it if we try to live as Christ lived. In this case we would not need a Saviour. He notes that such a concept completely misunderstands the terrible reality of sin as humanity's utter estrangement from God. Sin, according to Gulley (1982:38), can only be healed by one from outside the stream of human history-never from within. In his view, humankind, trapped in sin, cannot find salvation in self. Redemption is not a healing, but a radical new creation, which has its basis in the incarnation as a startlingly new act of God in the realm of humankind (Gulley 1982: 38).

Gulley (1982:38) concludes his exposition on the human nature of Christ by noting that to be our Saviour, it was necessary that Jesus become one with us; but He had to identify Himself with us only as far as His saving mission made it necessary. He could not go beyond the requirements of His mission or He would have needed a Saviour Himself, and therefore, His mission would have

In his *Historical Survey of Adventist Thought on the Human Nature of Christ*, Zurcher (1999:222-224) has placed Gulley on the list of those who teach that Christ took human nature before the Fall. But this researcher instead suggests that Gulley’s position is difficult to categorize. It is in a certain sense pre-lapsarian and in another sense post-lapsarian. It is very close to the alternative Christology.

In his latest book: *Systematic Theology: Creation, Christ, and Salvation*, Gulley (2012:434) argues; ‘although Christ is the second Adam, He is not to be identified fully with either the pre-Fall or post-Fall views of human nature.’ He notes that whereas the unfallen Adam had a human nature free from the consequences of sin, Christ took upon Himself a human nature that was weakened by the long heredity of sin, even though He did not actually sin (Gulley 2012: 434). In Gulley’s opinion, as God became the second Adam, He entered human creation and assumed human nature with its damaged image of God, even though He did not take its depravity (Gulley 2012: 434). Christ identified with fallen human nature in every way except in sin in nature and life. Gulley asserts; ‘This means that the phrase the unassumed is unredeemed (taught by Eastern theology from Athanasius onward) does not do justice to the uniqueness of the humanity of Jesus’ (2012:434).

Before concluding this chapter, I will present the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as understood by the promoters of the three Adventist Christologies discussed above. This is important because all the three views on Adventist Christology claim that Jesus Christ was unique to some extent.

### 3.7. The Uniqueness of Christ’s Humanity

As already noted, all the three positions on the human nature of Christ presented in this chapter teach that Christ’s humanity was unique. There is no harmony however, on what made Christ’s humanity unique.

#### 3.7.1. The Postlapsarian View and the Uniqueness of Christ’s Humanity

The position summarized under this heading is based on Sequeira (1996:163-193) and Zurcher (1999:292-293). Sequeira’s position on Jesus Christ’s substitutionary death is the subject of
chapter four, but his position on Christ’s humanity is the postlapsarian, and so my decision to summarize his views in this section together with Zurcher’s views to represent the other scholars who hold a similar view on Jesus Christ’s uniqueness but have not clearly stated that position.

While strongly holding to the view that Christ took upon Himself the nature of man after the Fall, Sequeira (1996:169) believes that Christ’s humanity was somehow unique. He argues that first and foremost, Christ’s human nature was unique in that in Him, humanity and divinity were united in a mysterious manner to the extent that He was both man and God. The phrase *Son of Man*, used several times in the New Testament points to the fact that Christ was born of a woman (Matt. 1: 21; Gal. 4:4), thereby suggesting that He was a human being. Christ was a human being in a nature like that of the people He came to save. The phrase *Son of God* (Luke 1:35) understood in the context of the announcement that conception would be by the power of the Holy Spirit points to the fact that Christ was divine. Thus, the term *monogenes* (John 1: 14, 18; 3:16, 18; 1John 4:9) refers to the nature of Christ’s birth as God who became human, not in the natural way, but by the power of the Holy Spirit. It does not mean that Christ’s human nature was sinless, otherwise, as argued by Sequeira (1996:172) if the term *monogenes* meant that Christ’s human nature was sinless, then it could be said also that since the term is used of Abraham’s promised son, Isaac (Heb. 11:17), then his human nature was sinless. But it is a known fact that Isaac did not have a sinless human nature, instead he was a unique (*monogenes*) son of Abraham because he was born by God’s promise, and after Sarah had reached a stage where she could no longer have a child. This is not uniqueness in the sense of an only child as in the case of the widow of Nain’s only (*monogenes*) son (Luke 7:12). The term *prototokos* (Heb. 1:6; Rom. 8:29; Col. 1:15, 18; Rev. 1:5) refers to Christ’s uniqueness with reference to His mission. But this uniqueness does not mean that Christ’s human nature was sinless.

The second way that Christ’s humanity was unique as argued by Sequeira (1996:169) is in the fact that He did not commit any sin. While all human beings who have ever lived have sinned, Christ did not yield to temptation (Heb. 4:15; 1Pet. 2:22; 1John 3:5; John 8:29, 46; 15:10; Heb. 7:26). It should be emphasized that in Sequeira’s view these texts refer to Christ’s perfect obedience in the fallen human nature that He took upon Himself. They do not suggest that Christ’s human nature was in itself sinless.
In harmony with Sequeira, Zurcher (1999: 292-293) argues that according to James 1:15, lust is only the father of sin, and not sin itself, just as sin is the father of death, and not death itself. Lusts are temptations to which all human beings are subject, and that Jesus Himself had to confront, since He was ἐν in all points tempted as we are (Heb. 4:15). But, unlike all others, Christ never allowed His evil tendencies although hereditary and potentially sinful, to become sins. In this way, Christ’s humanity could be said to be unique.

Jesus Christ was, according to Sequeira (1996:102-103), unique in yet another way: While all of the people in the world are naturally human beings, Jesus Christ ἦσσον flesh [human]ό (John 1:14); was ἐν the likeness of sinful fleshό (Rom. 8:3); was ἐκ made of a woman, made under the lawό (Gal. 4:4, KJV). Jesus Christ ἦσσον or ἦσσον,ό in Sequeira’s view means that humanity was not His by native right. He ἦσσον what He never was, and would not have been if human beings had not sinned. And since that which He became was not His by native right, Jesus Christ was not a sinner like us who are sinners by both nature and performance.

Apart from being looked at in the context of the postlapsarian view, the uniqueness of Christ’s humanity is also looked at in the context of the new Christology. This is what I now will highlight.

3.7.2. The New Christology and the Uniqueness of the Humanity of Christ

Donkor (2005:10) suggests that the promoters of the prelapsarian view argue that one reason Christ’s human nature was unfallen was because He was unique. He asserts that the unfallen nature position defends Jesus’ uniqueness ontologically and otherwise, by a consideration of two key Greek terms applied to Jesus: monogenes and prototokos. First, all the nine uses of the term monogenes in the New Testament are examined to show that in its five applications to Jesus (John 1:14, 18, 3:16, 18; 1John 4:9) it means unique, and one of a kind. This uniqueness is interpreted Christologically to mean that Christ’s uniqueness consisted not only in how He was born (without human father) but in what nature He was born (without human sin) (Donkor 2005: 10). Second, the uses of the word prototokos with reference to Christ (Heb. 1:6; Rom. 8:29; Col. 1:15, 18; Rev. 1:5) yield the same results of uniqueness with particular reference to mission (Donkor 2005: 10).
Christ’s uniqueness can also be explained in the context of the alternative Christology. What the promoters of the alternative Christology say about the uniqueness of Christ’s humanity will be highlighted below.

3.7.3. The Alternative Christology and the Uniqueness of the Humanity of Christ

One of the promoters of the alternative Christology, Dederen (2000: 164) seems to use the terms *sinless human nature* and *sinless character* without clarifying what he means by those phrases. The texts that he cites to support the *sinless human nature* of Christ view are both those that refer to Christ’s divinity and those that refer to His perfect obedience (Heb. 4:15; John 6:69; 1Pet. 2:22; 1John 3:5; 2Cor. 5:21; John 8:29, 46; 15:10). He notes that Christ’s birth was supernatural (Matt. 1:20; Luke 1:35), but does not say what this implies, except that he notes that the angel from the Father told Mary that the child to be born will be called holy (Luke 1:35) (Dederen 2000: 164). But the subtitle to his article seems to indicate that he is emphasizing the point that Christ’s human nature was sinless (Dederen 2000: 164).

As argued by Rodriguez (2007: 2), Christ is *monogenes (unique)*, first and foremost because He is divine (John 1: 18). Although Jesus is human, He is also divine, and consequently He is and has always been *unique*; there has never been anyone like Him in the universe. This explains what John says at the beginning of his gospel; namely, that the divine Logos became flesh (John 1:1, 14). It explains why Jesus was free to say; *I and the Father are one* (John 10:30).

Secondly, the title *monogenes* is applied to Christ to indicate that He is the only and unique revelator of God (John 1:14, 18) (Rodriguez 2007: 2). Because Christ is divine, He is the only one who can reveal the Father. In other words, the title *monogenes* speaks of Jesus as unique in nature and function (Rodriguez 2007: 2). His divine nature and His closeness to the Father enable Him to be the only and unique revelator of the Father (Rodriguez 2007: 2).

Thirdly, the title *monogenes* identifies Jesus as the one and only redeemer through whom God’s saving love reaches human beings (1John 4:9) (Rodriguez 2007: 2). In this text, the terms son and *monogenes* are used together. In His redemptive mission Jesus demonstrated to be God’s unique and only Son, that is, to have a unique relationship with God that made possible humanity’s redemption (Rodriguez 2007: 2). In fact the Father loved humanity so much that He
gave his one and only Son to save those who believe in Him (John 3:16, 18) (Rodriguez 2007: 2).

According to Rodriguez (2007:2), then, when the title monogenes refers to Jesus, it designates the uniqueness of His nature, the uniqueness of His relationship with the Father, His uniqueness as the revelator of God, and His uniqueness as redeemer. There is no other like Him; He is the only one of His kind (Rodriguez 2007: 3).

It should be noted that Rodriguez does not in any way suggest that the title monogenes refers to Christ’s sinless human nature. Instead He is unique because He is divine. He is unique in His relationship with the Father. He is unique as the revelator of God the Father. And He is unique as the redeemer.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed sources that refer to Christ’s substitutionary death as being vicarious. The term vicarious is used in two ways. Firstly, vicarious means substitutionary. Secondly, vicarious is used to stress the substitutionary nature of Christ’s death.

Generally, the promoters of the vicarious view of Christ’s substitutionary death believe that on the cross, God made a provision for those who believe to be justified. God justifies only those who believe in Christ. However, this justification is based on the objective fact that Christ died for humanity.

The phrase in Christ refers to an existing relationship between God and the believer. Only those who have accepted Jesus as Saviour and Lord are in Christ. The phrases in Christ and Christ in us mean one and the same thing; the close relationship between Christ and the believer.

Three views exist on the human nature of Christ. These are the postlapsarian view, the prelapsarian view, and the alternative Christology. The view that is currently popular among most Adventist scholars and Church leaders is the alternative Christology. This is the view that Christ’s human nature was not like that of Adam before the Fall, and not exactly like that of Adam after the Fall; Christ’s human nature was unique. According to the promoters of this view, while Christ took upon Himself fallen human nature, Scripture portrays His nature as being sinless.
CHAPTER FOUR: CHRIST’S SUBSTITUTIONARY DEATH AS ACTUAL

Introduction

Chapter three dealt with the vicarious view of Christ’s substitutionary death, which as it was noted, is the view held by most Seventh-day Adventist scholars. Another view of Christ’s substitutionary death is taught within the Seventh-day Adventist Church today. This is called the *actual* view, and it is the subject of this present chapter.

The *actual* view of Christ’s substitutionary death has mainly been popularized in the Seventh-day Adventist Church by Adventist systematic theologian Jack Sequeira. Sequeira was born of Indian parents in Nairobi, Kenya. He earned his Bachelor of Arts in Theology (BA-Theology) degree in England, a Master of Systematic Theology (MA-Systematic Theology) degree, and a Master of Divinity (MDiv.) degree at Andrews University in the United States of America. He served as a missionary in Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia for eighteen years and pastored in the United States of America for twenty-two years before retiring. I had a privilege of being taught by Jack Sequeira in 2001. Therefore, the information presented in this chapter is not only from the books authored by Sequeira, but also from direct contact with him in a classroom situation. When contacted, Sequeira authorized me to use his works; even to reproduce any parts of them.

Sequeira’s *actual* view of substitutionary atonement is supported by such other scholars as Donald K. Short, Robert J. Wieland and other members of what has been termed the 1888 Message Study Committee (1888 MSC).

Sequeira has set forth his view in a number of his books such as; *Beyond Belief: The promise, the power, and the reality of the everlasting gospel* (1993), *Saviour of the World: The humanity of Christ in the light of the everlasting gospel* (1996), *Romans: The Clearest Gospel of All* (2005), *Built Upon the Rock: The 28 Fundamental Adventist Beliefs in Light of the Gospel* (2009) and *Ephesians, Queen of the Epistles* ([Sa]). In this chapter, the rationale for his *actual* view is presented first. This is followed by a description of the view as he understands and teaches it. Finally, the implications of the view with respect to *justification*, the *in Christ motif*, the *humanity of Christ*, and the *uniqueness of Christ’s humanity* are considered.
4.1. Rationale for the Actual View

Sequeira (1999: 40) argues that it is only when we identify the humanity of Christ with the corporate fallen humanity that He came to redeem that we can preach an ethical gospel that is unconditional good news. He claims that the Reformers failed to solve the ethical problem of the gospel for the reason that they, like the Roman Catholic Church, made a distinction between the humanity of Christ and the humanity He came to redeem. And what is the ethical problem of the gospel? According to Sequeira (1996:72), it relates to how God was able to justify the ungodly by allowing an innocent person, His Son Jesus Christ to die in place of the guilt ones.

Sequeira aims to provide a solution to what he calls the ethical problem of the gospel. He argues that the vicarious view of substitution as taught by both Adventist and evangelical theologians makes the gospel unethical. According to Sequeira (1999: 39) the vicarious view of substitution made Catholic scholars to argue that the Reformers had made the gospel unethical and illegal. The argument is that no law, God’s or humanity’s will allow a person to assume the guilt of another person (Deut. 24: 16; 2Kin. 14:6; Ezek. 18: 1-20). It is Sequeira’s argument that if Christ took the sin of the world without identifying Himself with the fallen human nature that He came to redeem, then God acted in an unethical manner.

4.2. Christ Died in Actuality

Sequeira (1999: 42-43) argues that in His humanity, Christ saved men and women in actuality—not vicariously. Sequeira (1996: 84) further argues that the death of Christ was not one man dying instead of all men (vicarious substitution); rather His death was all men dying in one man (actual substitution). He finds support in such texts as 2 Cor. 5:14, which says; “we judge thus: that if one died for all, then all died.” This, to Sequeira, is the true meaning of biblical substitution. Christ died for us, in our place, in the sense that He tasted death instead of all humankind (Heb. 2:9). Accordingly, Sequeira concludes that genuine Christians will not have to experience the second death which Christ tasted on the cross on behalf of all humanity (Rev. 20:6).

What should be emphasized is that according to Sequeira (1999: 43), when Christ died, it was not just one Man dying instead of all human beings. He argues that that would be illegal, since no law, God’s or man’s, would allow it (Ezek. 18: 20). When Christ died, the whole human race
died in Him (2 Cor. 5:14). Sequeira (1996:84) uses an illustration about winning an Olympic gold medal. He observes that if an American, for example, wins the medal, all Americans, and not just the person who actually competed for it, will rejoice because the one American who won the medal represents all Americans. In the same way, when Christ died, He died as the entire human race. He died as us. Just as all humanity sinned in Adam, so also all humanity died in Christ; the second Adam.

It is interesting to note that Sequeira does not end with his actual view of Christ’s substitutionary death. He acknowledges that to some extent, Christ’s substitutionary death was vicarious. This is what the section that follows highlights.

4.3. Christ Died Vicariously

In 1993, Sequeira boldly taught that the vicarious view of Christ’s death made the gospel unethical. However, in 1996, Sequeira (1996: 87) argued that it might be possible for Christ to bear humanity’s many sins vicariously on His cross—although that would be illegal. He further argued that it was impossible for Him vicariously to overcome and condemn the principle of sin that resides in our sinful flesh. He noted that it was not possible for Christ to bear our sins without bearing us (1 Pet. 2: 24).

In 2009, Sequeira (2009: 355) argued that since Christ did not participate in or commit sins, it could be said that He vicariously redeemed humanity from its sins or sinful behaviour. He however noted that Christ had no immediate avenue for saving humanity from its nature, unless He identified Himself, personally, with the sin problem (Sequeira 2009: 355). He had to meet head-on the law of sin (a constant force dwelling in our sinful natures, according to Rom. 7: 22-24) (Sequeira 2009: 355).

Since it was established in the previous chapter that the terms vicarious and substitution are sometimes used interchangeably, as synonymous terms, and since Jack Sequeira differentiates the two terms, it is important that his use of these terms is highlighted. This is what I seek to do hereunder.
4.4. The terms vicarious and substitution as used by Jack Sequeira

It will be noted that in 1993, when Sequeira authored the book *Beyond Belief*, he used the term vicarious not as a synonym of the term substitution. This can be seen from his argument where he seems to suggest that the doctrine of substitution is biblical, while at the same time he rejects the use of the term vicarious to refer to what happened when Christ became a human being.

Sequeira (1999:41-42) claims that the Reformers taught that Christ in His humanity, saved men and women vicariously; that is, one person acting in the place of the other. He suggests that this view is held by many evangelical Christians today, including some Seventh-day Adventist scholars. It is argued by the proponents of this view, according to Sequeira (1999:42) that Christ took on a pre-Fall human nature—the spiritual nature Adam had before he sinned.

As noted in the previous chapter, those who hold this view argue that sin is a dual problem. A sinful nature is itself sin and automatically stands condemned. Therefore Christ had to take a sinless human nature (like Adam's before the Fall) in order to substitute Himself vicariously for our sinful nature, which stands condemned (Sequeira 1999: 42). They insist that if Christ had taken our sinful nature as we know it, He would automatically have become a sinner and in need of a saviour Himself (Sequeira 1999: 42).

It is further argued by those who hold the vicarious view that sin is also performance or sinful acts (Sequeira 1999: 42). Christ’s perfect life and sacrificial death substituted for our sinful performance (Sequeira 1999: 42). This is how Christ dealt with this dual problem of sin. His sinless human nature vicariously substituted for sinful natures; and His perfect performance; His doing and dying, vicariously redeemed humanity from sin (Sequeira 1999: 42).

Sequeira (1999:42) observes that the view of the Reformers, which is held by many Adventist and evangelical Christians today, presents two problems, which are highlighted hereunder.

Firstly, it makes the gospel unethical. Sequeira (1999:42) argues, as already noted, that no law of God or man will allow guilt or righteousness to be transferred from one person to another. Thus, he alleges that those who teach vicarious substitution are rightly accused of teaching legal fiction or a passed-on righteousness. According to Sequeira (1999:42), attempts to solve this ethical problem like: Christ is above the law, or He volunteered to die in our stead, so this makes it
ethical, are unacceptable since law simply will not allow sin to be transferred from the guilty to the innocent. He suggests that it is only when the guilty and the innocent are actually linked together, as illustrated in the Old Testament sanctuary service, that substitution becomes legally acceptable (Sequeira 1999: 42).

According to Sequeira (1999:42); ÒThe second problem with the idea of a salvation based on vicarious substitution is that it very easily turns the gospel into cheap grace.Ó He contends that if Christ did it all without having to identify Himself with us, if He lived and died instead of us, then we should be able to receive the blessings of His holy life and death simply by agreeing mentally to this truth (Sequeira 1999: 42). We do not have to identify ourselves with His living and dying, as true faith and baptism demand us to (Gal. 2:19, 20; Rom. 6:1-5) (Sequeira 1999: 42). To simply accept that Christ lived and died instead of us is, according to Sequeira, cheap grace.

As it will be noticed, Sequeira uses the terms vicarious and substitution, one following the other. The terms are not used here interchangeably. In other words, as understood by Sequeira, the term vicarious explains how ChristÕs substitutionary death became a reality or was achieved.

But it would appear that in 2009, Sequeira used the terms vicarious and substitution interchangeably. He argued, as already noted, that since Christ did not participate in or commit sins, it could be said that He vicariously redeemed humanity from its sins or sinful behaviour. Here he does not use the terms vicarious and substitution, one following the other.

When I contacted Sequeira to clarify his understanding of the term vicarious, he told me that the term vicarious means substitution. He noted that Adventist prophetess, Ellen G. White used the term vicarious to refer to how Christ redeemed humanity from sin as acts or behaviour. According to him, she never used it with reference to sin as nature. And she never used the term to refer to the human nature that Christ assumed.

On November 1, 1882, White (1995: 151) said;

Christ came to reveal to the world the knowledge of the character of God, of which the world was destitute. This knowledge was the chief treasure which he committed to his disciples to be communicated to men
[and women]. The truth of God had been hidden beneath a mass of tradition and error. The sacrificial offerings which had been instituted to teach men [and women] concerning the vicarious atonement of Christ, to teach them that without shedding of blood there is no remission of sins, had become to them a stumbling-block (emphasis, mine).

As one can easily notice from the Ellen G. White’s statement above, it is clear that she related the vicarious atonement of Christ to the shedding of blood for remission of sins. Thus, Sequeira concludes that she used the term with reference to sin as behaviour or acts, and not to sin as nature. As it was already observed in chapter two, Ellen G. White taught that Christ’s death was substitutionary. A close analysis of her writings on the subject of atonement suggests that she used the terms vicarious and substitutionary interchangeably, which Sequeira did not do in his 1993 and 1996 books.

At this point, it is in order that the implications of the actual view of Christ’s substitutionary death as taught by Jack Sequeira are highlighted. Justification will be considered first.

4.5. Justification

Sequeira’s understanding of Justification is closely linked to the human nature that Christ assumed. In all his writings, he relates justification to the humanity that Christ assumed.

Sequeira (1996: 39-40) argues that the wonderful good news of the gospel is that just as all are condemned to death in one human being, Adam (Rom. 5:12-18; 1 Cor. 15:21, 22), so God has redeemed all in one human being, Jesus Christ. According to Sequeira (2005:77), at the incarnation God united, in the womb of Mary, the divine life of His Son with the collective life of the human race that stood condemned and which needed redeeming. In this way Christ became the second Adam, or the last Adam. In reality, He became us, and we became one in Him. Sequeira (1996:134) observes that this corporate oneness with Christ in His humanity did not save us, but it legally qualified Christ to be our substitute and representative, just as the first Adam was our representative when he fell. Hence by His perfect life, which met the positive demands of the law, Christ re-wrote our human history. And in His resurrection, He changed humanity’s status from one of condemnation to one of justification (Rom. 4: 25; 5:18).
According to Sequeira (1996:39), this is what constitutes the fantastic good news of the gospel (1 Cor. 1:30, 31; Eph. 1:3-6; 2:5, 6).

Commenting on how God was able to exercise both mercy and justice with respect to fallen humanity, White (1995:97) asserts;

\[\text{The reconciliation of mercy and justice did not involve any compromise with sin, or ignore any claim of justice; but by giving to each divine attribute its ordained place, mercy could be exercised in the punishment of sinful, impenitent man without destroying its clemency or forfeiting its compassionate character, and justice could be exercised in forgiving the repenting transgressor without violating its integrity.}\]

All this could be, because Christ laid hold of the nature of [humanity], and partook of the divine attributes, and planted his cross between humanity and divinity, bridging the gulf that separated the sinner from God.

Thus, Sequeira's argument that Christ's incarnation qualified Him to be our Substitute is in agreement with what Adventists have taught since they became a Christian movement. As our substitute, Christ had to meet the full demands of the law; both its positive demands, as well as its demands for justice, in order to save sinful humanity. By doing this, He obtained legal justification for all humankind and became the Saviour of the world (Rom. 5:18; 10:4; Titus 2:11; 1 John 2:2). Sequeira (1996:40) calls this God's indescribable gift to every human being (2 Cor. 9:15). As noted in chapter three, there is however, no agreement among Seventh-day Adventist scholars on the aspect of all humanity having been legally justified on the cross about 2,000 years ago.

For Sequeira, nevertheless, the entire human race stands legally justified. However, Sequeira (1996:15) notes also that since Christ's holy history is God's supreme gift to humankind, and in view of the fact that God created human beings with a free will, then the objective gospel Christ obtained for each person demands a human response (John 3:16-18). Those who respond and accept the gospel message by faith stand perfect in Christ; perfect in performance, in justice, as well as in nature. Sequeira (1996:39) claims that this is what justification is all about; God
looking at the believer as he or she is in Christ. This is what entitles all believers to eternal life and heaven, both now and in the judgment. So while the gospel itself is unconditional good news to all human beings, experiencing that salvation is conditional and will be enjoyed only by those who believe (Mark 16:15, 16).

It should be stressed that Sequeira (1996:68) asserts that at the cross, the condemnation we inherit as a result of Adam’s sin, as well as the guilt and condemnation incurred by our many personal sins, were terminated. The blood of Christ cleanses us of all sin as we walk in the light of the gospel (1 John 1:7, 9). Therefore, while Adam’s sin did bring the judgment of condemnation to all his posterity, we can praise God that in the original righteousness of Christ; His perfect life and sacrificial death, justification came as a gift to all humanity as well. This is the good news of the gospel which makes possible the experience of justification by faith (John 5:24; Acts 13:38, 39; Rom. 8:1).

In simple terms, Sequeira teaches that on the cross, God through Christ justified all of humanity. This is a gift that He gave to all of humanity. But humanity is not aware of the fact that in Christ we stand justified. The gospel then has to be preached to every person (Matt. 24:14; 28:18-20; Mark 16:15, 16; Acts 1:8; Rev. 14:6-12). Those people who respond to the gospel; accept Jesus as Saviour and Lord, who is God’s gift to them, experience justification. On the other hand, those who reject the good news as it is in Christ receive condemnation, which ends in experiencing the second death (John 3:16-18).

Disapproving of those who reject this understanding of justification, Short (2003: 3) quoted by Knight (2008: 85), says; “some Christians I’m acquainted with do not believe that the whole race was legally saved, justified, and glorified independent of a personal faith commitment to Jesus as Saviour and Lord. Short, therefore, supports the teaching that at the cross, the entire humanity was legally justified, but that this justification needs to be activated by faith at the point when the good news is preached to an individual.

It is necessary to observe at this point that justification as understood by Sequeira and others in his group can be looked at in two ways; justification as an objective or past event (a provision), and justification as something that has to be experienced by faith. One makes the other possible. Note should be made that Sequeira talks about universal legal justification as a provision while
rejecting the term *provisional*. Robert J. Wieland of the 1888 Message Study Committee (1888 MSC) also rejects the term *provisional*. Their understanding of salvation is that on the cross, God did not just make a provision for those who believe to be saved; He actually saved the entire humanity.

### 4.5.1. Justification as an objective fact (a provision)

According to Sequeira (1996:129-138), at the incarnation, Christ’s divine nature was joined to fallen humanity’s nature, and in that fallen human nature Christ perfectly obeyed God. Christ took the fallen nature to the cross after it had been perfected through suffering and His perfect obedience. God judged that nature in Christ on the cross, and impaled it. But because Christ of Himself did not commit sin, He could not remain in the grave. He was declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead (Rom. 1:4, KJV). Since humanity’s fallen nature was joined to Christ’s divine nature, when Christ obeyed, all humanity obeyed in Him; when Christ died, all humanity died in Him; and when Christ rose from the grave, all humanity rose from the grave in Him. Thus, according to Sequeira, in a way, it could be said that humanity was on the cross judged in Christ. Humanity was also justified in Christ. Since Christ did not commit sin, He was declared righteous by His Father. In essence, Christ was humanity; and since He was humanity, when He was declared righteous by virtue of the fact that He did not commit sin, humanity was declared righteous in Him. This is, according to Sequeira, the objective good news of salvation through Jesus Christ.

It should be understood that what happened in Christ about 2000 years ago when He was born, He lived, He died, and He rose from the grave, is described by Sequeira (2012:8) as a *provision* or an *offer* that is made effective by faith alone (1 Cor. 3:11-13). He admonishes however, that the word *provision* must not be confused with the word *provisional* as taught by Arminianism, that on the cross Christ did not actually secure salvation for anyone but only made it possible for all humankind to be saved.

In accord with Sequeira, Wieland, quoted by Knight (2008: 87) argues;

> The common idea is that the sacrifice of Christ is only *provisional*, that is, it does nothing for anyone unless he first does something and accepts Christ. Jesus stands back with His divine arms folded, doing nothing for
the sinner until he decides to accept. The true Good News is far better than we have been led to think. According to the precious 1888 message, our salvation does not depend on our taking the initiative, it depends on our believing that God has taken the initiative in saving us.

According to Sequeira (1996:136), all true Christian experience is based on the objective reality of the gospel. Therefore, if our knowledge of the objective gospel is incomplete so will be our experience. Likewise, if our knowledge of the objective facts of the gospel is incorrect so will be our experience.

Sequeira (2005:86) argues that as soon as Christ made atonement for sin at Calvary, justification for sinners became a reality; yet that justification cannot be activated without the sinner’s appropriation of it.

On this aspect of justification, Sequeira is supported by Weber (1994: 62) when he asserts that condemnation exists wherever there is sin, but it is only imputed to those who choose to live in rebellion. Likewise, justification has existed ever since Calvary’s atonement, but it is only imputed to those who choose to live in faith. Accordingly, Weber (1994: 62) argues that condemnation and justification—both are universal realities ready and waiting our personal decision. Sequeira’s understanding of justification, which as I have noted is supported by Weber, can be illustrated using the analogy of money deposited into our bank account. He notes that salvation accomplished in Christ does not benefit us if we reject or neglect the gospel, just as money deposited into our bank account, though legally ours does not benefit us unless we lay claim to it.

It is Sequeira’s argument that Christ’s sacrifice on the cross brought about our reconciliation and salvation (Col. 1:22). For him, both reconciliation and justification are first and foremost objective in nature; achieved by God in the death of Christ some 2,000 years ago. He sees this as a clear teaching in 2 Cor. 5:18-20.

Having considered Sequeira’s understanding of justification as an objective fact, achieved in the death of Jesus Christ, it is important that his understanding of justification by faith is highlighted. This is what is considered hereunder.
4.5.2. Justification by faith

According to Sequeira (1996:41,135), justification by faith takes place when a person responds to the good news of salvation through Christ, and accepts Christ as Saviour and Lord. Justification by faith presupposes the preaching of God’s word as it is in Jesus Christ (Mark 16:15, 16; Rom. 10:6-17). In other words, when a person accepts Jesus Christ’s holy history, God declares that person righteous. God treats that person as if they had never sinned. This is possible because that person obeyed God in Christ, they died in Christ, and they rose from the grave in Christ.

Sequeira (2005: 45) asserts that the moment a person believes in Jesus Christ, the righteousness of God, which He obtained for all humanity in Jesus Christ, is made effective and the believer stands justified by faith. He argues that the word justified in Rom. 3:24 refers to what Christ accomplished for the entire human race on the cross. This is God’s free gift to all humankind. At the moment we believe we come subjectively under the umbrella of justification by faith. Sequeira (2005:86) notes that in John 5: 24, a person who hears Jesus’ word and believes in God has everlasting life, and shall not come into judgment, as that person has passed from death into life. He suggests that the text literally means that the person has passed from condemnation to justification.

It is Sequeira’s contention that God’s grace, His loving disposition toward fallen human beings enables Him to justify fallen humanity. It is by grace that we are saved (Eph. 2:4-9). And when a person is justified, they live under the umbrella of grace.

Sequeira also discusses the in Christ motif. As with justification, the in Christ motif is discussed in the context of the incarnation, and the human nature of Christ. In what follows, I am going to discuss this concept.

4.6. The In Christ Motif

Sequeira (2012:4-5) argues that the phrase in Christ, which is actually the central theme of Paul’s theology, is applied objectively as well as subjectively in the New Testament. But it must be remembered, that the subjective experience is always based on the objective facts of the gospel; that which was realized in the holy history of Christ some 2000 years ago (1 Cor. 3:11-13).
good example is Paul’s defense of the resurrection of the believers in 1 Cor. 15:12-22, based on Christ’s resurrection.

According to Sequeira (2012:4), the fundamental truth of the in Christ motif is that God united the corporate condemned human life (Greek: bios), to Christ’s eternal divine life (Greek: Zoe) at the incarnation, thus legally qualifying Him to be the last Adam, humankind’s substitute and representative (1 Cor. 15:45). Hence by His perfect life, sacrificial death and resurrection God re-wrote humankind’s history, giving humanity a new status in which the entire human race stands legally and objectively justified in Christ, that is, reconciled to God and accepted in the beloved (Rom. 3:22-24; 5:18; 1 Cor. 1:30; 2 Cor. 5:18-21; Eph. 1:3-6; 2:4-6). This objective reality of the gospel is made effective or subjective individually by faith (John 3:16).

To fully understand Sequeira’s teaching on the in Christ motif, it is necessary to begin where he begins. He begins with Adam as a corporate human being in what theologians call the in Adam motif.

4.6.1. In Adam

Sequeira (2009:72) argues that at creation, God put the life of every person who was ever to inhabit planet earth in Adam. Thus, while the name Adam may refer to the individual person that God first created, it is generally used in the Bible to refer to the corporate person that God created. Adam in the Hebrew language means humankind. That is why in the King James Version of the Bible, both the man and the woman (Adam and Eve) are called Adam (Gen. 5:2). Sequeira (2009:75) suggests that Paul understood that Adam was a corporate human being. Thus, in Acts 17:26, he said; “And He has made from one blood every nation of men to dwell on all the face of the earth, and has determined their preappointed times and the boundaries of their dwellings.”

Apart from the texts cited above, Sequeira (1996:39) finds evidence that the first man was created a corporate person in Gen. 2:7. He argues that in this text, in the Hebrew, the phrase breath of life is actually breath of lives. This to him suggests that Adam was a corporate person.

Sequeira (2012:7) also finds evidence of corporate solidarity in Gen. 25:23 where God told Rebecca that “two nations are in your womb.” To Sequeira, this appears to be evidence that God
looks at people as a corporate group. According to him, there is evidence in scripture that as predicted, the Edomites (descendants of Esau) served the Israelites (descendants of Jacob or Israel). There was never a time that Esau as an individual served Jacob.

A text in the New Testament that Sequeira (2012:8) relies on to teach corporate solidarity of human beings is Heb. 7:5-10. In verses 9 and 10, it is stated that Levi paid tithe while in the loins of Abraham. In other words, according to Sequeira, when Abraham returned tithe to Melchizedek, Levi, his great grandchild was implicated in what Abraham did. Levi returned tithe in Abraham.

After establishing that God created the entire humanity in one man, Adam; Sequeira (2012:8) goes on to state that when Adam sinned, the entire humanity sinned in him. He finds support in Rom. 5:12 where the Bible says; “Therefore, just as through one man sin entered the world, and death through sin, and thus death spread to all men, because all sinned.” Sequeira suggests that because God created all human beings in one man Adam, when that one man sinned, the entire human race sinned in that one man. This, according to him, in no way suggests that individual persons existed in Adam in a certain form, capable of making decisions to obey or disobey God. The individual person Adam, sinned by making a conscious choice to sin. But since Adam represented the entire human race, the entire human race was implicated in that sin. In other words, since Adam had not yet had a child when he sinned, when time came to have children, Adam produced sinners; sinners not by choice, but sinners by nature. Thus, all of Adam’s descendants are born sinners.

Contrasting what Adam brought with what Christ brought, Paul argues; “For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ all shall be made alive” (1 Cor. 15: 22). Sequeira argues that this statement is as Paul puts it because of the idea of corporate solidarity.

Writing about the sinfulness of human beings, and in solidarity terms, Cullmann (1963: 172) says; “But men are sinful; the first man Adam, the representative of all men, sinned, and redemption from sin requires atonement. The Heavenly Man [Christ], the divine prototype of humanity, must therefore himself enter sinful humanity in order to free it from its sins.” Thus, in Cullmann’s view, Adam was a representative person, and Christ, the Second Adam or Heavenly Man was also a representative person.
The concept of corporate solidarity is supported by other scholars such as William Barclay. Commenting on this concept he says; “The Jews never really thought of themselves as individuals but always as part of a clan, a family or a nation, apart from which the individual had no real existence” (Barclay 2009: 92). Barclay cites as support for corporate solidarity, the sin of Achan recorded in Josh. 7, which he claims was the nation’s sin. He notes that the nation was not a collection of individuals; it was a mass of people in solidarity (Barclay 2009: 92-93). Thus, according to Barclay (2009: 93), Paul saw Adam not as an individual; he was one of all humanity; and because of this, his sin was the sin of all.

In simple terms, the concept of human solidarity as understood by Sequeira teaches that the corporate person, Adam, brought sin, condemnation, and death to the entire human race. We sin as individuals because we already sinned corporately in Adam. The condemnation that came to Adam naturally came to us because we were in him when he sinned.

It is Barclay’s contention that Paul conserves the truth that all humanity was involved in a situation from which there was no escape; sin had human beings in its power, and there was no hope (2009: 96). Thus hope was only going to come with another corporate human being in the person of Jesus Christ. Barclay’s contention is basically the same as Sequeira’s contention.

With these brief comments on the *in Adam* concept, I will now proceed to highlight the phrases *in Christ* and *Christ in you* as understood by Sequeira.

**4.6.2. In Christ and Christ in You**

According to Sequeira (1999:31) the phrases *in Christ* and *Christ in you* generally refer to Christ’s work for us (incarnation, justification, sanctification, and glorification) and Christ’s work in the believer (sanctification, or holy living, or walking in the Spirit). These are two distinct, but related aspects of salvation.

**4.6.2.1. In Christ**

At the risk of repetition, it should be stated that Sequeira (2009:74-75) argues that just as God created all human beings in one man, Adam; at the incarnation, God put all human beings into one man, Christ. By this Sequeira suggests that Christ became *us*. Since Christ became us, our being in Him first and foremost, is something that is by the act of the incarnation. Secondly, our
being in Him is something that results from our accepting Christ as our Saviour and Lord. This, according to Sequeira is simply recognizing our status already existing in Christ.

The individual Christ who obeyed God; the one who died on the cross; the one who rose from the grave; and ascended to heaven; was the entire human race in one person. He was the totality of all human beings. He was the human race. On the basis of this, Sequeira (1996:45-46) contends that when Christ obeyed, the entire human race obeyed in Him; when He died on the cross, the entire human race died in Him; and when He ascended to heaven, the entire human race ascended to heaven in Him; the entire human race is seated on the right hand of God in Christ Jesus (Eph. 2:6).

Sequeira (1996:46) makes it clear that the human race did not obey on its own, but in Christ. It did not die on its own, but in Christ. It did not ascend to heaven on its own, but in Christ. All these things were done by the individual person Christ, who walked on this planet about 2000 years ago. But that individual person, Christ, who consciously did these things about 2000 years ago, was the entire humanity in Him.

According to Sequeira (1996:46), it can be asserted that just as individual human beings did not consciously sin when Adam sinned, but were implicated in his fall, in the same way, individual human beings did not consciously obey God when Christ obeyed, but were implicated in Christ’s obedience. Individual human beings did not consciously die on the cross when Christ died, but were implicated in Christ’s death. They obeyed and died in Him in the sense that the Christ who died was the entire human race in one person.

And since the Christ who died on the cross, was an individual person as well as a corporate human being, Sequeira (1996:46) argues that He died as humanity’s substitute. With respect to sin as nature, Christ died in actuality, while with respect to sin as what human beings do, Christ died vicariously. Sin as nature was condemned in Christ, and died the second death. Sin as actions or behaviour was vicariously laid on Him, and as such that took Him to the grave.

According to Sequeira (2012:3), being in Christ by virtue of Christ’s incarnation is something that fallen human beings are not aware of. As such, the gospel has to be preached to the entire human race. When the gospel is preached, those who accept this good news of salvation in Christ Jesus are subjectively in Him. At the incarnation, they were put into Christ without their choice,
just as at creation, they were created in Adam without their choice. But when they receive the good news of salvation, they individually choose to belong to Christ, just as they choose to leave their old status in Adam.

What should not be forgotten is that according to Sequeira (2012:4), the in Christ motif in the writings of Paul has both objective and subjective elements. God chose us in Christ before the foundation of the world (Eph. 1:4). At the cross we were saved in Christ (Eph. 2:4-5). When Christ rose, we were raised in Him, and were made to sit in heavenly places in Him (Eph. 2:6). Our spiritual resurrection objectively took place at the incarnation when God joined our fallen human nature to Christ’s divine nature. When we accept Christ as Saviour and Lord, what took place at the incarnation is made effective in us.

Sequeira suggests that human beings commit sin not because Christ did not save them on the cross, but because they have not accepted salvation already existing in Christ. They have not made a conscious choice to leave their old status in Adam. They need faith to enjoy their new status in Christ; the status which God gave them in Christ about 2000 years ago.

Sequeira relies on the aorist or past historical tense in Eph. 1: 3, and other texts to indicate that our spiritual blessings in Christ are first and foremost objective before they are subjective. Commenting of Eph. 1: 4, he argues that God chose all of humankind in Christ before the creation of the world, that humankind should be holy and blameless in his sight. He notes that while we are one hundred percent sinners by nature and terrible sinners by performance, in Christ, we are holy and without blame because in His history we have not sinned even once, in His death we have met the justice of the law which is upon us.

According to Sequeira ([Sa]), Eph. 1 is addressed to believers who have accepted the truth as it is in Christ. He notes that while God redeemed all human beings in Christ, which is His gift to humankind, unless each individual accepts this gift, the privileges of the in Christ motif are not the individual’s subjectively. This is how Sequeira treats all other writings of Paul dealing with the in Christ idea.

For Sequeira, the phrase in Christ is not synonymous with the phrase Christ in you. It will be shown below how he views the phrase Christ in you.
4.6.2.2. Christ in You

Regarding the concept of Christ in the believer, Sequeira (1999: 36) observes that Paul describes the salvation God accomplishes in men and women through the Holy Spirit as Christ in you (Rom. 8:10; Gal. 2:20; Eph. 3:17). He argues that this can also be referred to as the subjective gospel because it is making real in our experience what God has already accomplished for us objectively in Christ. This is fruit bearing (John 15: 5) or walking in the Spirit (Gal. 5:16-25). This is holy living. This is producing good works (Eph. 2:10; Titus 2:11-14).

According to Sequeira (2009:69-70), what God does in us through the Holy Spirit does not in any way add to our salvation in Christ. What God does in us through the Holy Spirit is evidence that we are born again children of God. The good works that result from our relationship with Christ speak to the fact that we are developing a Christ-like character. The good works that result from our relationship with Christ are profitable to humanity (Titus 3:8), and humanity in turn glorifies God (Matt. 5:16).

With these comments on the in Christ and Christ in you ideas, it is time to proceed to look at how Sequeira views Christ’s human nature. It has been emphasized that Sequeira’s understanding of Christ’s substitutionary death is founded on his view of the human nature that Christ assumed. And Christ’s human nature as understood by Sequeira must be that which was able to deal with sin both as nature and as acts or behaviour.

4.7. The Humanity of Christ

Sequeira’s teaching on the humanity of Christ is found in almost all of his major works. However, Saviour of the World (1996) handles this important subject quite exhaustively. This researcher will therefore, heavily rely on this work for the description of what Sequeira believes. It should be noted that his actual view of substitution came about as a result of his desire to present what he believes to be the truth about the humanity of Christ, which is a very contentious issue in the Seventh-day Adventist Church.

In the prologue of his Saviour of the World, Sequeira (1996:7)) quotes Seventh-day Adventist prophetess, Ellen G. White who notes; “the humanity of the Son of God is everything to us.” As quoted by Sequeira, White asserts that Christ’s humanity is the golden chain that binds our souls
to Christ and through Christ to God. This, according to White, should be our study. Thus, Sequeira dedicates his work to that study.

4.7.1. Christ Assumed Fallen Human Nature

According to Sequeira (1996:61), Christ assumed fallen human nature at the incarnation. The very nature that needed redeeming was the nature that Christ assumed. At the incarnation, Christ became *us*. This, in Sequeira’s view, is not to suggest that He just became a human being-He became the very human being that He found.

Repeatedly, as highlighted above, Sequeira argues that at the incarnation, God joined the fallen human nature that needed redeeming to Christ’s divine nature. In this way, human nature got quickened or became spiritually alive in Him.

In chapter three the view that Christ took fallen human nature was highlighted as one of the positions held by some Seventh-day Adventist scholars. I therefore, see no need to summon other scholars to support Sequeira on this point. Nevertheless, there is a statement made by Seventh-day Adventist prophetess that I feel is worthy referring to. White (1995: 752) asserts; “Christ did in reality unite the offending nature of [h humankind] with his own sinless nature, because by this act of condescension he would be enabled to pour out his blessings in behalf of the fallen race” (emphasis, mine). It is common knowledge that the offending nature of humankind cannot be anything but the fallen nature that Christ found when He became a human being.

Anticipating the argument that if Christ took or assumed fallen human nature, He would have then become a sinner needing a redeemer, Sequeira (1996:164) argues that the Bible uses terms that suggest that Christ *became* what He was not by native right. For example, the Bible says; “And the Word *became* flesh” (John 1:14). Christ had always been God’s eternal Word (John 1:1-3). But for the sake of the salvation of the fallen race, He *became* flesh. Christ was sent *in* the likeness of sinful flesh (Rom. 8:3). He *came* in the likeness of men (Phil. 2:7). Heb. 2: 14-17 suggests that Christ *took* part of what was subject to death. Christ was *made* of a woman; *made* under the law (Gal. 4: 4, KJV).

We are human beings by nature. Christ *became* what He was not by nature. He was *made* what He was not by nature. He *took* what He was not by nature. He *assumed* what He was not by
nature. These terms to Sequeira, suggest that Christ could take the very fallen human nature that He found, and yet not be a sinner. He took that fallen sinful human nature in order to redeem it.

For Sequeira (2005:139), Christ condemned sin in the flesh that He assumed (Rom. 8:3). In other words, sin as nature was in the flesh that He assumed, and it was in that flesh that He suffered (1 Pet. 3:18; 4:1). When Christ was tempted just as we are tempted, He suffered in the flesh because He did not allow the sinful human flesh He assumed to commit sin as an act (Heb. 4: 15; James 1: 14, 15). The devil tempted Christ from within as well as from without. But He did not yield to temptation. People who commit sin do not suffer in the flesh. Their minds agree with what the flesh desires. Christ’s mind did not agree with what the fallen human flesh that He assumed desired. In other words His mind always focused on pleasing His Father. He submitted His will to His Father’s will (Matt. 26:36-46; Luke 22:40-46). In this way He did not commit sin. He depended on His Father for everything He did (John 5: 30). He was always in the Father (John 17:21).

As already noted, Sequeira (1999:147) argues that Christ’s temptations came to Him the same way ours come to us—through the sinful (selfish) desires of the flesh. He asserts that it was through bodily wants that Satan tempted Him in the wilderness to use His divine power to satisfy self, independently of His Father’s will (Luke 4:2-4). It was His natural fear of death (self-love of the flesh) that led Jesus three times to plead with His Father to remove the bitter cup of the cross (Mark 14: 34-41).

Sequeira (1999:147) makes a very strong statement: ÒChrist’s flesh, being our corporate sinful flesh, lusted after sin.Ó But then, he observes that His mind, being spiritual, never yielded to sin, and thus He conquered sin in the flesh through the power of the Spirit (Luke 4:13, 14) (Sequeira 1999: 147).

On Christ’s qualification to be our substitute, Sequeira (1999:45) argues that in order for Christ to qualify legally to be our substitute and representative, His divinity had to be united to our corporate fallen humanity that needed redeeming. The two distinct, opposite natures were united in one Person, and Christ became the second Adam. This, according to Sequeira, is to say that all that Christ became was for the purpose of our salvation. He did not come to save unfallen human beings. He came to save fallen human beings. As such, He had to take fallen human nature.
According to Sequeira (1996:143), if we deny Christ’s full identification with our sinful humanity—apart from actually sinning—we deny the complete redemption He obtained for us in the gospel. But according to Sequeira (1996:146), *Christ could actually bear our sins on the cross only if He also bore us and our sinful human nature*. Christ assumed this sinful humanity at the incarnation when He was *made flesh* (John 1:14); He defeated it by His perfect life; and He finally executed that condemned nature on the cross (1 Pet. 2:24). This, according to Sequeira is what constitutes the good news of the gospel. By bearing us on the cross, Christ struck at the very root of our sin problem.

Sequeira (1996:148) argues further, that if we admit that it was sinful humanity which died on the cross, then not only were the law’s just and legal demands met, but fallen men and women can honestly identify themselves, through faith, with the death which sets them free from the curse of the law as well as its power (Rom. 6:7). On the other hand, if we say that it was sinless humanity that died vicariously on the cross, instead of our corporate condemned nature, we are accusing God of an injustice, since His own Word will not legally accept the death of an innocent person in the place of one who is guilty (Deut. 24:16; Ezek. 18:20). Such a belief, according to Sequeira also makes it impossible for fallen human beings, to identify themselves truly and sincerely with the death of Christ, as true faith demands (2 Tim. 2:11; Rom. 6:3, 8).

It should be noted again that for Sequeira (1999:44), the need for humankind to be saved necessitated the incarnation. Had it not been for the fact that fallen humankind needed to be saved; Christ would not have become a human being. The major reason Christ became a human being then, was so as to taste death for every human being (Heb. 2:14). Thus, *in all things He had to be made like His brethren* (Heb. 2:17). Adam did not need a saviour before he sinned. Thus, Christ could not have been made like Adam before he fell.

According to Sequeira (1999:41), Christ becomes our example in holy living and selfless service after saving us. Thus, if Christ had come in sinless human flesh like that of Adam before he fell, He would only have been an Example to the unfallen Adam. Fallen human beings need a saviour who identifies with their sinful flesh; and yet does not Himself sin. Such a saviour sets an example that a born again fallen human being can gladly follow.
Sequeira (1996:186) argues that the human nature of Christ that he presents is supported by Adventist prophetess, Ellen G. White. This is important to note because the scholars on the other side of the debate also believe that their position finds support in the writings of Ellen G. White. On the list of supporters of the post-Fall nature Christ assumed, Sequeira (1996:121) also summons a number of contemporary scholars who include Karl Barth, J.A.T. Robinson, T.F. Torrance, C.E.B. Cranfield, Nels F.S. Ferre, Harold Roberts, and Leslie Newbigin. Since this research is not about the human nature of Christ, the views of these scholars will not be considered.

4.7.2. Christ’s Mind Was Not Joined to Fallen Human Nature

There is something very important that Sequeira says about what happened to Christ’s mind at the incarnation. He notes that the Bible (Rom. 7:25; Eph. 2:3) makes a clear distinction between the flesh (our sinful nature) and the mind (the seat of the will). Sequeira (1999:147) argues that the fallen human nature Christ assumed, was dominated by the law of sin, but His mind, never consented to sin.

Sequeira (1996:120) finds support for this view in the writings of such scholars like Johnson (1962: 62, 63) who argues that Jesus assumed fallen human nature, but He never added His will to this nature, and there was no break in fellowship between Himself and His Father. Thus, according to Sequeira and Johnson, on the cross, there was the purging of human nature.

It is important to note that Sequeira’s major concern even as he deals with Christology, is soteriology. Because, there is no way he can discuss soteriology without talking about Christology, Sequeira has to take a position on the humanity of Christ.

Having looked at Sequeira’s teaching on the human nature that Christ assumed, it is important that I also consider what he says in terms of Christ’s uniqueness in the fallen nature that He assumed. This is what I seek to highlight in the next section.

4.8. The Uniqueness of Christ’s Humanity

While maintaining that Christ took fallen human nature, Sequeira (1996:169) argues that the Son of God was somehow not exactly like us. Christ was not exactly like us at least in three aspects, which will be looked at below.
4.8.1. Christ was the Son of God as well as the Son of Man

According to Sequeira (1996:170), Son of God (Luke 1:35) means that Christ was divine. In other words He was God. He argues that the Greek term *monogenes* (John 1:14, 18; 3:16, 18; 1 John 4:9) as it applies to Christ refers to His divinity. It does not mean that the human nature He assumed was sinless. It was not His humanity which was sinless, but His divinity. Sequeira (1996:171-172) notes that the same term is applied to Isaac (Heb. 11:17). Thus if we say that it means that Christ assumed sinless human nature, we must necessarily say that Isaac had sinless human flesh. But if we say that the term refers to the fact that Christ’s conception by Mary was *unique* in that it was without human father, or that He was divine, we will say also that Isaac was *unique* in that He was a child of promise; born by the power of the Holy Spirit. Isaac was born after Sarah had gone past the age of bearing. We are human beings by virtue of creation; Christ is a human being through the act of the incarnation. We are human beings, and nothing else. Christ is not only a human being, He is also God. As Son of Man, Christ is human. As Son of God, He is divine. Thus, He is *unique*.

There is another way in which Christ was unique. This relates to the fact of Him having been *made* or having become.

4.8.2. Christ was *Made* or *Became*

As noted above, we are fallen human beings by nature. Christ on the other hand was *made* what He was not. He *became* what He had never been. He was sent in the *likeness* of sinful flesh (Rom. 8:3). He was *made* in the *likeness* of men (Phil. 2:7). The same Greek term *homoiomati* (*likeness*) used in Rom. 8:3 is used in Phil. 2:7. It is Sequeira’s contention that if we say that in Rom. 8:3 *homoiomati* means that Christ’s human nature was only *like* ours, and not *identical* to ours, we must necessarily say that *homoiomati* in Phil. 2:7 means that Christ was only *like* a human being, but not a human being. But if we say that Christ was made what He was not by native right, then, we can say that in that sense, He was *unique*. He *took* or *assumed* fallen human nature in order to redeem it.

We can never and we will never become human beings. We are human beings. Christ was and is God. He *became* man. He is the only person who existed as man by *becoming* or being *made* what He had never been.
In Sequeira’s theology, there is yet another way in which Christ was unique in the fallen human nature that He assumed. This had to do with the aspect of sin as an act or behaviour.

4.8.3. Christ Never Sinned

According to Sequeira (1996:170) Christ was *unique* in that He did not sin. In fallen human flesh, Christ did not sin. We have sinned in fallen human flesh. And so we are different from Christ.

It was because He did not commit sin that Christ could ask; “Which of you convicts Me of sin?” (John 8: 46). Because He did not sin, Christ could declare that the prince of this world had nothing in Him (John 14:30). He was tempted just as we are, and yet He did not sin (Heb. 4:15). While all human beings have sinned, Christ did not sin; as such He is separate from sinners (Heb. 7:26). He did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth (1 Pet. 2:22). In Christ, there is no sin (1 John 3:5). According to Sequeira, all these texts refer to Christ’s performance. In fallen human flesh, Christ perfectly obeyed God. Christ was the only man who in fallen human flesh kept God’s holy law perfectly.

It is Sequeira’s contention that such texts as John 6: 69 do not refer to Christ’s sinless human nature, but to His divinity. In fact, in the Authorized King James Version, the text says; “And we believe and are sure that thou art that Christ, the Son of the living God.” The English Standard Version (ESV) says; “and we have believed, and have come to know, that you are the Holy One of God.”

Thus, according to Sequeira, Christ’s uniqueness is not that He assumed sinless human nature, but that He was both God and Man. He was unique not because He took sinless human nature, but because He *became* or was *made* what He was not by native right. Christ was not unique because He assumed sinless human nature, but because in the fallen human nature He assumed, He obeyed God perfectly.

Before this chapter is concluded, it is important to note that Sequeira (1996:115) has identified two groups within Seventh-day Adventism that support the post-Fall human nature of Christ, but with divergent views on His substitutionary death. He notes that one group, the more insistent group, is proclaiming a *vicarious* substitution in the context of the post-Fall human nature of
Christ; the idea that one man, Jesus Christ, took fallen human nature instead of, or in the place of, all humankind. This group, according to Sequeira, claims that its position is historic Adventism.

The other group, according to Sequeira (1996:115) is desperately trying to restore what he calls the 1888 message of a post-Fall view in the context of an actual substitution; the idea that all humankind was actually in the humanity of one Man, Jesus Christ, who assumed our corporate, condemned, sinful human nature at the Incarnation in order to be the Saviour of the world. Sequeira asserts that this understanding of substitution is the unique Adventist message God brought to the Seventh-day Adventist Church in 1888.

Conclusion

According to Sequeira, Christ died for sin as nature in actuality. But He took our sins (what we do), vicariously. When Christ died, all of humanity died in Him, since at the incarnation, all humanity was put into Him. On the cross, God executed the entire of humanity in Christ. And since Christ obeyed God, the entire humanity was justified in Him. This justification came before individual human beings could exercise faith. But for it to become effective in each individual’s life, each individual has to believe the holy history of the Son of God. Those who do not exercise faith in Christ will not enjoy the benefits of the salvation that Christ bought for them on the cross.

The condemnation that we incurred by virtue of being descendants of Adam was reversed on the cross. This good news must be preached, and those who hear this truth as it is in Christ, but decide to reject it are condemned subjectively.

At the incarnation, God placed the entire of humanity into Christ. When Christ obeyed, the entire humanity obeyed in Him. When Christ died, all humanity died in Him. When He rose from the grave, all humanity rose in Him. And when He ascended to heaven, all humanity ascended to heaven in Him. This is the truth about our status in Christ. We are objectively in Christ before we are subjectively in Him.
The phrase *in Christ* generally refers to justification, while the phrase *Christ in you* refers to sanctification, or fruit bearing, or walking in the Spirit. Victorious living is possible for those who remain in Christ by faith, and Christ remains in them.

Christ assumed fallen human nature—the very nature that He found when He incarnated. Nevertheless, He was not exactly like the rest of humanity. First and foremost He was both God and Man. Secondly, He was not Man by native right; He *became or was made* what He had never been. Thirdly, in fallen human flesh, Christ did not commit any sin.
CHAPTER FIVE: VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW

Introduction

In chapter four, the actual view of substitution as taught by Adventist theologian Jack Sequeira was presented. It has been argued by Sequeira (1996:73) that no law allows an innocent person to assume the guilt of another person. According to him, man’s law will not just allow an innocent person to assume responsibility for the criminal liability of another person.

Since Sequeira argues that man’s law does not provide for the transfer of guilt from the guilty to the innocent, this chapter deals with vicarious liability in Criminal Law. It is not however, restricted to Criminal Law; civil and administrative vicarious liabilities are also considered. In the light of how criminal law establishes the guilt of a person, the elements that constitute one a criminal are briefly highlighted. The four legal theories of punishment (retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation) are also highlighted because they have a bearing on the subject of this research. What this chapter will establish in terms of whether or not man’s law provides for vicarious liability will be evaluated in chapter six in the context of vicarious liability as it relates to the substitutionary nature of Jesus Christ’s death.

To begin this discussion, I will highlight the elements of crime, which need to be established for someone to be convicted of a crime. The first element is called the *actus reus* and the second element is called the *mens rea*.

5.1. The Elements of Crime

For a person to be criminally liable, two things must be proved. Firstly, the person must have done something, which is according to *The Longman Dictionary of Law* (2011:8) legally called in Latin, the *actus reus*. Secondly, the person must have intended to do that act, which according to *The Longman Dictionary of Law* (2011:300) is legally called in Latin, the *mens rea*. These two legal terms will have to be defined.

5.1.1. The Actus Reus

Forster (2008:18) defines the *actus reus* of a criminal offence as the *prohibited act*, which if performed will attract criminal liability. This presupposes a law, which prohibits a certain act. If
a person does the prohibited act, that person has broken the law, and therefore, is criminally liable. An example would be stealing goods from a shop. There must be a law that prohibits stealing. Stealing goods from the shop is the *actus reus* of the offence, and such an offence will attract criminal liability.

The *actus reus* of an offence may not be as straightforward as it has been made to appear. For this reason, it will be necessary to look at the concept of the *actus reus* in more detail in order to provide a greater awareness of its application. Generally, the *actus reus* of all criminal offences will fall into one of three possible situations; this is dependent on the nature of the offence itself and that act or conduct that is to be prohibited. The three possible situations as noted by Forster (2008: 18) are as follows: (i) where the defendant carries out an unlawful, deliberate, positive, and voluntary act; or (ii) where the defendant fails to act by an omission or a duty owed to another; or (iii) where there is a given state of affairs.

Richards and Curzon (2011:8) talk about the *actus reus* as a phrase referring to elements of the definition of an offence. However, this does not include those elements which concern the condition of the mind of the accused. Thus, the *actus reus* would only include such elements as the offender’s outward conduct, its results and surrounding circumstances. It should be noted that where any element of the *actus reus* is not present, the offence has not been committed. For example, it was stated in *Haughton v Smith [1975] AC 476* that: “It is not the *actus* which is *reus*, but the man and his mind respectively.”

In fault cases, the *actus reus* is of no use in the process of establishing the guilt of a person without the corresponding mens rea. For this reason, I will now discuss the mens rea as the second element of a crime.

**5.1.2. The Mens Rea**

According to Martin and Law (2006: 339), *mens rea* is a Latin phrase which is translated as a guilty mind. Thus, it refers to the state of mind that the prosecution must prove a defendant to have had at the time of committing a crime in order to secure a conviction.

It should be noted that mens rea varies from crime to crime. It may either be defined in a statute creating the crime or established by precedent. By precedent is meant what was established in a
past court case. Common examples of mens rea would include; intention to bring about a particular consequence, recklessness as to whether such consequences may come about, and for a few crimes, negligence.

Some crimes require knowledge of certain circumstances as part of the mens rea; for example, according to section 318, subsection (1) of the Penal Code Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia, the crime of receiving stolen goods requires knowledge that the goods were actually stolen. Some crimes on the other hand require no mens rea; these are known as crimes of strict liability. Whenever mens rea is required, the prosecution must prove that it existed at the same time as the actus reus. According to section 7 of the Penal Code Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia, the defendant cannot plead ignorance of the law. This is the case in many other jurisdictions of the world. Good motive is also not a defence.

At this point, it is necessary to consider the implications of the two elements of crime, which have been highlighted above.

5.1.3. Implications of the Two Elements of Crime

First and foremost, in many jurisdictions of the world, it is trite law that a person is innocent until proved guilty. The two elements of crime therefore, are there to assist the prosecution in proving the guilt of a defendant. To be guilty, the defendant must have done a certain prohibited act, or must have neglected to act in a certain way, or a certain state of affairs must have existed with respect to the conduct of the defendant. Where none of these is present, the defendant did not commit the crime. He may have committed the crime, but if the prosecution fails to prove that he did indeed commit the crime by establishing any of the above conditions, he is in the eyes of the law, innocent.

Except in cases of strict liability, the defendant is only criminally liable if he had the necessary mens rea at the time of committing the offence. He is criminally liable if he had the intention to commit the crime (for example, section 9 of the Penal Code Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia deals with this requirement).

What this amounts to then is that if a person did not do a prohibited act, he cannot be convicted of a crime. If he did the prohibited act, but lacked the mens rea, he may bring evidence to show
that he had no mens rea for the crime he is charged with. Alternatively, he may admit that he had mens rea, but raise a general defence or a particular defence in relation to the crime. The defence may, if accepted by the court, prompt the court to give a lesser sentence, or even to acquit the defendant depending on the circumstances of the case. Defences to crimes are generally provided for in the penal codes of various jurisdictions.

Since criminal liability requires proof of the two elements of crime as shown above, it becomes difficult if not impossible for an individual who has not committed a crime to go to court and tell the Judge that he or she wants to assume responsibility for another person's offence. If the judge were to allow it, it would be illegal. For it to be legal, the law itself would have to make a provision that when a person commits an offence and is found guilty, anyone who wishes to serve the sentence of the convict on the convict's behalf is free to go to court and substitute himself or herself for the convict. Otherwise, it is the principle of law that the court shall not convict an innocent person. Even if it were a parent who freely decided to substitute himself or herself for the convicted child, it would be illegal. This is what Sequeira points out as shown in the previous chapter.

Where the two elements of crime have been established, what follows is a sentence for the offender to be punished. It is important therefore, to briefly look at the four theories of punishment.

5.2. Four Theories of Punishment

Under criminal law, the state punishes people following four main legal theories of punishment. Clarkson, Keating and Cunningham (2010:23) list these theories as: (i) retribution; (ii) deterrence; (iii) incapacitation; and, (iv) rehabilitation.

The retributive theory looks back to the crime, and punishes because of the crime (Clarkson et al. 2010: 23). The person has committed the crime, so he or she has to be punished. The offender should be given their just deserts. The remaining three theories all look forward to the consequences of punishment and hope to achieve something thereby, namely, crime reduction (Clarkson et al. 2010: 23). These three theories are often termed consequentialist or utilitarian theories (Clarkson et al. 2010: 23).
These theories are not in this study discussed in detail. It should only be stated that when deciding the sentence to be given to a convict, the courts generally consider these theories of punishment. It should be noted therefore, in relation to our study, that the question of an innocent person freely deciding to substitute himself or herself for the guilty person can be answered by considering these theories of punishment.

If the law were to allow an innocent person to serve the sentence of the guilty person, the question that arises is whether the innocent person would be treated fairly. The other question that arises is whether the freed guilty person would stop committing crime. These questions are very important, as they point to the question of the illegality or legality of vicarious liability.

With this brief discussion of the four theories of punishment, I will now proceed to look at vicarious liability.

5.3. Vicarious Liability

As defined by Botha and Millard (2014), vicarious liability in general terms is the strict liability of one person for the delict of another. An innocent person becomes liable for the offence of another person. According to Botha and Millard (2014), many theories attempt to explain the rationale and basis of vicarious liability, some of which are the employer’s fault in selecting the employee, the interest and profit theory, the solvency theory, and the risk or danger theory.

The basis of vicarious liability may be an issue to many scholars of law. However, what is important to note is that it is now well established that one person can be vicariously liable for the damage caused by another. But there is need to mention that vicarious liability is an exception to the basic premise of the law of delict that fault is a prerequisite for liability.

It has already been noted that for a person to be criminally liable, the fault theory requires the wrongdoer to act with fault, either intent or negligence. On the other hand strict liability is liability in the absence of fault.

As argued by Botha and Millard (2014), recognized instances of strict liability are rare, and generally stem from modern legislation. They note that in South Africa, strict liability is applied to product liability based on the Consumer Protection Act. They assert that it may also stem from common law actions of Roman origin (Botha and Millard 2014).
It is noted by Botha and Millard (2014) that the recognition of strict liability in the case of product liability can be justified by various other factors, which include the public interest in the physical-psychological well-being of human beings that requires the highest measure of protection against defective consumer products. The argument is that by marketing and advertising the manufacturer creates a belief in the minds of the public that the advertised product is safe (Botha and Millard). Strict liability therefore, serves as encouragement to take the utmost degree of care; the manufacturer is, from an economic perspective, the party most capable of absorbing and spreading the risk of damage by price increases and insurance (Botha and Millard).

Practically then, it can be argued by way of illustration that if a manufacturer manufactures a product, which is not safe, if that product harms a consumer who buys it from a retail shop, the manufacturer must be held liable for the harm caused. This applies to products, which are sold to consumers by retailers without making any changes to them. An example would be a bottle of grape juice, which contains a rotten cockroach. If a consumer takes the juice, and eventually gets sick, the manufacturer must be held liable.

Generally, strict liability has been applied to the employment relationship where an employer may be held vicariously liable for delicts committed by employees. Other areas where strict liability is applied include relationships between a principal and an agent; motor vehicle owner and driver, as well as state and public school.

Botha and Millard (2014) also talk about parents being held vicariously liable for the conduct of their children. They note that the reasons for so doing have to be sought in a number of policy considerations; for example the risk created by bringing a child into the world, the fact that the parent rather than the impecunious child is usually better suited to pay the loss caused by the child, the notion that possible liability for a child’s conduct may cause the parent to instruct, control, supervise, guide and discipline the child more thoroughly regarding potentially damage-causing behaviour (Botha and Millard 2014).

There are rules that govern vicarious liability, which will be discussed later. However, as argued by Botha and Millard (2014), although the prerequisites for vicarious liability in the traditional categories may offer valuable guidelines, the requirements for a parent’s vicarious liability, if
recognised, will have to be worked out with reference to the distinctive nature of the parent-child relationship in a particular fact situation. It would in this regard, be useful to investigate instances in a number of legal systems where parents are being held liable for the damage caused by their minor children (Botha and Millard 2014). This investigation however, is not possible in this study.

This general discussion of vicarious liability takes me to a specific discussion of criminal vicarious liability, civil vicarious liability and administrative vicarious liability. This will help in appreciating the question raised about the legality or illegality of this area of law.

5.3.1. Criminal Vicarious Liability

The first point to note as asserted by Childs (2011:139) is that the language, scope and object of some offences enable vicarious liability to arise for the acts of an agent or servant acting in the course of employment. However, it is important to remember that mens rea words cannot be extensively construed and so this principle can only be used for strict liability (Childs 2011: 139).

A decided case will do to illustrate what happens in vicarious liability involving employer and employee. In the case of Coppen v Moore (No. 2) [1898] 2 QB 306, despite contrary instruction from the employer, goods were sold by false description. The employer was held liable. The defendant’s appeal was dismissed. The effect of the relevant statute was to make masters or principals criminally liable for the acts of servants or agents committed within the scope of their employment. In this case, the defendant had therefore, sold the goods through his servants.

The second point is that parties must generally be master and servant or agent and the act must occur in the scope of employment and not when the servant is doing his own business. Thus, a person who delegates the performance of their duty to another will be held responsible for the actions and states of mind of that other.

In Allen v Whitehead [1930] 1 KB 211, contrary to the licensee’s instructions, the manager of a café allowed prostitutes to gather on the premises. The licensee was convicted of an offence under the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 which required proof of mens rea. It was held that since
the defendant was absent from the premises and had delegated to a manager, that manager’s acts and knowledge were imputed to the defendant.

In reaching this conclusion, the court looked to the purpose of the Act and concluded that it would be rendered nugatory if licensees could avoid liability by absenting themselves from premises by appointing a delegate.

It is a principle that whether delegation has taken place is a question of fact, requiring evidence of the transfer of authority. For example, in the case of *Vane v Yiannopoullus [1965] AC 486*, the licensee was in a restaurant basement when a sale in breach of licence took place elsewhere without his knowledge. The sale was by a waitress and the licensee was originally found guilty of knowingly making the sale in breach of licence.

The Prosecution appeal was dismissed by the House of Lords. There was insufficient evidence of delegation on the facts. The waitress had not been left in charge of the premises and all the effective management had not been handed over.

In this case, the House of Lords expressed distaste for the principle of delegation. The defendant was acquitted because the court felt that delegation required a transfer of the whole of one’s authority to another and some felt that it was necessary that the licensee be absent from the premises.

However, in the case of *Howker v Robinson [1973] QB 173*, where a barman made an illegal sale whilst the licensee was in a different bar, the licensee was found guilty of the breach of licence and appealed. The appeal was dismissed. Delegation was a question of fact and since the barman had been given complete control over the lounge bar, effective delegation had occurred.

In this case, the decision was reached despite the presence of the licensee on the premises which the court said was not a conclusive factor. Moreover, delegation had taken place even though there had not been a transfer of all of the licensee’s authority to the barman.

It should be noted that historically, vicarious liability was confined to circumstances in which the employee’s wrongdoing was related to his job and did not extend to what were described as a frolic of his own. However, in *Lister v Hesley Hall [2001] UKHL 22*, the scope of vicarious
liability was extended to encompass any act which was *sufficiently closely connected* to his employment and so applied to criminal acts committed by employees.

The question of whether an employer could be held vicariously liable for the murder committed by an employee was discussed in *Vaickuviene v J Sainsbury plc [2012] CSOH 69*. In this case the Outer House of the Court of Session (the equivalent of the High Court in England) was asked to consider the application of vicarious liability for the murder of Lithuanian shelf stacker at Sainsbury in Aberdeen by another worker.

Robert McCulloch admitted stabbing Roman Romasov to death in 2009. The murder followed several months of racist, insulting and aggressive conduct by McCulloch towards Romasov.

Romasov’s family brought a claim against Sainsbury asserting that McCulloch’s conduct amounted to harassment in breach of the Protection of Harassment Act 1977 and that repeatedly stabbing a man to death is properly to be regarded as one of the ultimate forms of harassment. In bringing the claim, no fault was attributed to Sainsbury but it was said that it was vicariously liable.

In *Majrowski v Guy’s and St. Thomas’ NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34*, it was made clear that the ordinary principles of vicarious liability apply to claims under the Protection of Harassment Act 1977.

As both the murderer and the murdered were employed by Sainsbury and the events had all taken place during their employment, it would have seemed at first blush that there should be no question that vicarious liability applied but Sainsbury made a good case of arguing to the contrary.

Predominantly, they argued that although the protagonists came into contact through work, the dispute was unconnected with their employment. Moreover, McCulloch had no supervisory or other special relationship with Romasov as was true in other authorities.

Ultimately however, the judge was not convinced. She agreed with the Claimant that a broad view must be taken when considering the *close connection* test. It was not possible at this stage to say that vicarious liability could not apply and so she refused to strike the claim out.
As asserted by Botha and Millard (2014), under corporate liability, vicarious liability lays a corporate body open to liability for crimes committed by individuals in the course of their duties, or in the scope of their employment and with the intent to further the interests of the corporation.

It should be noted however, as argued by Childs (2011: 141) that the doctrine of identification requires a corporation to be identified with its controllers (directing mind and will) such that their actions and states of mind are those of the corporation.

As to whether Catholic dioceses and bishops should be indicted for the crimes of individual priests, Baker (2014) argues that this should not be the case. He seems to generally argue against the doctrine of vicarious liability. It is his contention that regardless of the very serious criminal and moral wrongs perpetrated by some priests, and terrible spiritual, moral, and psychological damage to the victims, negligence in responding to these crimes does not constitute criminal conduct by the bishop or diocese (Baker 2014).

One would expect Baker to then state that individual priests who perpetrate crime should be personally indicted. However, he argues that that should not be done. For him, the Catholic Church should apply its own law to deal with priests who perpetrate crime. The Catholic Church has its own legal process provided in the 1983 Codex luris Canonic-the Code of Canon Law.

Baker (2014) observes that the attempts to indict bishops and dioceses on the sexual abuse crimes of priests amount to efforts to impose vicarious liability, which he argues, is appropriate only in civil or administrative cases. He contends that for a criminal case based on the failure to act by a bishop, the facts would have to demonstrate that he acted in ways that reflected a clear mens rea (Baker 2014). He seems to be of the view that bishops should not be regarded as simply secular Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), as regarding them that way would necessarily demand that they be treated like other Chief Executive Officers of corporations; implying that they could be indicted for crimes committed by their employees even though they were not actually complicit in the crimes. He hopes that prosecutors will realize and respect that the Church as a corporation does not owe its existence to the state, and that state officers exceed their jurisdiction by judging Church procedures and doctrines (Baker 2014).

I need to remind myself at this point that the Roman Catholic Church is more than a church, for it is both a religious and political system. The Vatican is a City State administered like any other
independent state. According to Dixon and McCorquodale (2003:137), the Vatican City is governed by the Holy See, which is a non-member state maintaining a permanent observer mission to the United Nations. They note that the Holy See is regarded as the jurisdictional personification of the Roman Catholic Church (Dixon and McCorquodale 2003: 137). It is a full member of some United Nations specialized agencies and some European intergovernmental organizations. The Holy See receives and sends diplomatic representatives to other states. It can enter into treaties, address the United Nations General Assembly and participate as an associate member of the United Nations on the same basis as state delegations in United Nations conferences and meetings (Dixon and McCorquodale 2003: 137). It has exercised considerable influence within both the specialized agencies and at global conferences. The Holy See has its own law (Canon Law) to which employees are subject. Thus, Baker (2014) is probably appealing to secular states to recognize the fact that the Roman Catholic Church is on equal footing with these states, if not on higher footing since it is also religious.

At the same time, it needs to be stated that secular states could be cognizant of the fact that their laws apply to their citizens and others who live within their boundaries. Baker then might be asking these secular states to treat employees of the Roman Catholic Church within their jurisdictions as special people enjoying some kind of immunity (like that enjoyed by diplomats) from criminal liability, but who could be held liable according to Roman Catholic law.

As a matter of summary, it should be stated that criminal vicarious liability exists where an employer or a corporation could be held criminally liable for offences committed by employees or agents. But certain guidelines and principles should always be put into consideration when deciding to apply criminal vicarious liability.

Apart from criminal vicarious liability, law provides for civil and administrative vicarious liabilities. These forms of vicarious liability are considered below.

5.3.2. Civil and Administrative Vicarious Liabilities

Generally, the principles that apply to criminal vicarious liability also apply to civil and administrative vicarious liabilities. By way of explanation Rogers (2010: 943) notes that the expression *vicarious liability* signifies the liability which a person D may incur to another person C for damage caused to that other person C by the negligence or other tort of a person A, who
enjoys a particular relationship with D. Generally, the relationship between D and A is that of employer and employee. However, in *Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp [2002] UKHL 43* it was said that the fact that D is liable does not, of course, insulate A from liability, though in most cases such as *Merrett v Babb [2001] QB 1174*, where the employer was insolvent and *Shapland v Palmer [1999] 1WLR 2068*, it is unlikely that he will be sued or that judgment will be enforced against him. It all depends on what statute may provide. For example, according to Rogers (2010: 943) in New South Wales only the Crown and not the individual officer, is liable for torts by the police, as provided by the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 section 9B (2).

It is not necessary for vicarious liability to arise that D shall have participated in any way in the commission of the tort nor that a duty owed in law by D to C shall have been broken. What is required is that D should stand in a particular relationship to A and that A’s tort should be referable in a certain manner to that relationship. Thus, D’s liability is truly strict, though for it to arise in a case of negligence, there has to be fault on the part of A. However, one finds occasional traces of an alternative theory, that the employer is in breach of his own duty through the act of the servant as noted in *Twine v Bean’s Express [1946] 175 L.T. 131* and *Broom v Morgan [1953] 1 QB 597*. But this approach has now been discarded as noted in *Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] HKHL 34*. There are echoes of the employer’s tort theory in the reasoning of Lord Hobhouse in *Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2002] 1 AC 215* in the context of employers who enter into a voluntary relationship with others; for example, schools and pupils, occupiers and visitors. The general view requires that the servant be personally liable to the claimant. Hence in *Commonwealth v Griffiths [2007] NSWCA 370* the servant’s witness immunity availed the employer.

The relationship is a specific one, that arising under a contract of service, and the tort must be referable to that relationship in the sense that it must have been committed by the servant in the course of his employment. Other instances of vicarious liability include liability of partners for each other’s torts, and the liability of a principal for the torts of his agent. Although the great majority of the cases involve common law torts, the principle of vicarious liability is a general one which will be applied to statutory wrongs sounding in damages unless the statute indicates the contrary, expressly or by implication.
It is necessary at this point to look at the situation that arises where there is a contract of employment. How does the law deal with such a situation?

5.3.2.1. The Contract of Employment

Vicarious liability generally arises from a contract of service but not from a contract for services (Rogers 2010: 948). In the contract of services, the employee is known as a servant, whereas in the contract for services, the contractor is called the independent contractor. In the employment cases the issue will normally be whether there was a contract of service with a degree of continuity, but in the context of vicarious liability the question is whether A is working as D’s servant at the time when he injures C (Rogers 2010: 952). It would certainly be odd if, for example, A did work for D in circumstances where A was subject to direct orders and close control over his manner of work and yet D was not liable for A’s acts simply because A had the right to decline work when it suited him to do (Rogers 2010: 952).

It is perfectly possible to say that, while there is no ongoing relationship between D and A amounting to a contract of service, A is D’s servant, at least for the purposes of vicarious liability, while he is actually working (Rogers 2010: 952-953). As in Lee v Cheung [1990] 2 AC 374, it is perfectly possible for a person to be a servant on a casual basis for a number of employers. A factor which, however, is likely to point away from a contract of service is the fact that the person engaged is not required to perform personally but may delegate to others if he chooses as in Express and Echo Publications Ltd v Tanton [1999] IRLR 367.

Apart from the issue of contract of service, there is also the issue of scope of employment, which is a factor in vicarious liability. This is considered hereunder.

5.3.2.2. Scope of Employment

What should be noted here is that unless the wrong done falls within the scope of the servant’s employment the employer is not liable at common law (Rogers 2010: 958). The focus is not so much on the wrong committed by the servant as upon the act he is doing when he commits the crime (Rogers 2010: 958). Traditionally it has been said that the act will be within the scope of employment if it has been expressly or impliedly authorized by the employer or is sufficiently connected with the employment that it can be regarded as an unauthorized manner of doing
something which is authorized (Kirby v NCB [1958] S.C. 514 at page 533), or is necessarily incidental to something which the servant is employed to do (Rogers 2010: 958). If the act authorized is inherently wrongful, the employer is liable because he has procured a wrong and there is no need to rely on vicarious liability. The underlying idea is that the injury done by the servant must involve a risk sufficiently in (Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2002] 1 A.C. 215 at page 65), or characteristic of (Ira S. Bushy & Sons Inc v USA 398 F. 2d 167 (1968) per Judge Friendly) the employer’s business that it is just to make him bear the loss.

It should be observed that scope of employment and course of employment tend to be used interchangeably, though the latter expression is often found in legislation dealing with other matters and it is dangerous to assume that authorities from such contexts can be automatically transferred to that of vicarious liability (Rogers 2010: 958). It may also be the case that statute imposes a liability for the acts of others in a particular context. Whatever form of words used, the question under the statute is one of construction and it may lay down some wider or narrower principle than the common law (Rogers 2010: 958). It is often an extremely difficult question to decide whether conduct is or is not within the scope of employment as thus defined, and, while it would not be correct to say that the question is one of fact; for it involves the application of legal principle of fact, it is not one that lends itself to the imposition of mechanical or precise formulae (Rogers 2010: 958-959).

In Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22 the House of Lords to some extent restated the test for scope of employment in terms of whether the act was so closely connected with the employment that it would be just to hold the employer liable. The case concerned willful wrongdoing of an extreme kind and was intended to extend the scope of liability but it cannot necessarily be confined to that situation and, despite the fact that very soon afterwards in the same court the traditional formula was used and it was said that in this area previous authorities were particularly valuable, some cases cited here which have gone against the claimant are at least open to argument, even if at the end of the day most of them would probably be decided in the same way.

At this point, it is important to note that civil and administrative vicarious liabilities fall under seven specific headings namely; (a) carelessness of employee/servant, (b) mistake of employee/servant, (c) wilful wrong of employee/servant, (d) theft by employee/servant, (e)
damage caused to goods bailed and entrusted to employee/servant, (f) fraud of an employee/servant, and (g) acts of a government employee/servant. These specific headings under which civil and administrative vicarious liabilities fall are discussed below. To clarify what these specific areas of vicarious liability entail, decided court cases are cited and briefly discussed.

a. Carelessness of Employee/Servant

The commonest kind of wrong which the servant commits is one due to unlawful carelessness, whether it be negligence of the kind which is in itself a tort, or negligence which is a possible ingredient in some other tort (Rogers 2010: 959-960). In such cases the employer may be responsible for conduct of the servant to which no moral blame attaches; but, inadvertence is a possible element in its commission, it may still be in the course of employment even if the servant is not acting strictly in the performance of his duty, provided he is not doing his own business (Rogers 2010: 960).

A number of cases falling under this heading are concerned with deviations by drivers from routes authorized by their employers. The test dealing with deviations of drivers was stated in the old case of Storey v Ashton [1869] L.R. 4 QB 476 which discussed the question of degree how far the deviation could be considered a separate journey divesting the employer of responsibility.

Having looked at the heading of carelessness of the employee/servant, I will now highlight the situation where the employee/servant has made a mistake. How does the law deal with such a situation?

b. Mistake of Employee/Servant

Bayley v Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Ry [1873] L.R. 8 C.P. 148 will illustrate what the situation is when the servant makes a mistake. The defendant’s porter violently pulled out of a train the claimant who said his destination was Macclesfield and who was in a train that was going there. The porter mistakenly thought it was going elsewhere. The defendants were held liable. The porter was doing in a blundering way something which he was authorized to do; to see that passengers were in the right trains and to do all in his power to promote their comfort.

Another application of the same principle is an act done in protection of the employer’s property (Rogers 2010: 962). The servant has an implied authority to make reasonable efforts to protect
and preserve it in an emergency which endangers it (Rogers 2010: 962). For wrongful, because mistaken, acts done within the scope of that authority the employer is liable, and it is a question of degree whether there has been an excess of authority so great as to put the act outside the scope of authority (Rogers 2010: 962). For example, in *Pollard v Parr & Sons [1927]* 1K.B. 236, a carter, who suspected on mistaken but reasonable grounds that a boy was pilfering sugar from the wagon of the carter’s employer, struck the boy on the back of the neck with his hand. The boy fell and a wheel of the wagon went over his foot. The employer was held liable because the blow given by the carter, although somewhat excessive, was not sufficiently so to make it outside the scope of employment. It should be noted however, that after the case of *Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001]* UKHL 22, even a grossly excessive reaction would not take the servant outside the course of his employment.

It should be observed that while a servant’s authority to protect his employer’s goods against armed robbery extends to acts done in self-defence against the robber it does not extend to using a customer as a human shield (Rogers 2010: 962). The case of *Reilly v Ryan [1991]* 2 I.R. 247 illustrates this point. A servant has no implied authority to arrest a person whom he suspects of attempting to steal after the attempt has ceased, for the arrest is then made not for the protection of the employer’s property but for the vindication of justice (Rogers 2010: 962). For an illustration of this principle, reference is made to the cases of *Abrahams v Deakin [1891]* 1Q.B. 516; *Hanson v Waller [1901]* 1 Q.B. 390; and *Radley v LCC [1913]* 109 L.T. 162.

The existence of an emergency gives no implied authority to a servant to delegate his duty to a stranger, so as to make his employer liable for the defaults of the stranger (*Houghton v Pilkington [1912]* 3 K.B. 308; *Gwilliam v Twist [1895]* 2 Q.B. 84), but it may be that the servant himself was negligent in the course of his employment in allowing the stranger to do his job (Rogers 2010: 962). But on the basis of the reasoning of Diplock Lord Justice in *Ilkiw v Samuels [1963]* 1 W.L.R. 991 at pages 1003-1006, these cases may be differently decided today.

In *Ilkiw v Samuels [1963]* 1 W.L.R. 991, a lorry driver in the employment of the defendants permitted a stranger to drive his lorry, and an accident resulted from the stranger’s negligent driving. The defendants were held liable, not for the stranger’s negligence, for he was not their servant, but on the ground that the driver himself had been guilty of negligence in the course of his employment in permitting the stranger to drive without even having inquired whether he was
competent to do so. Equally, the employer may sometimes be liable even though the servant has usurped the job of another, provided that what he does is sufficiently closely connected with his employer’s business and is not too gross a departure from the kind of thing he is employed to do (Rogers 2010: 963). In Kay v I.T.W. Ltd [1968] 1 Q.B. 140, a storekeeper employed by the defendants needed to return a forklift truck to the warehouse but found his way blocked by a large lorry belonging to a third party. Although there was no urgency and without first inquiring of the driver of the lorry, he attempted to move the lorry himself, and by his negligence in doing so caused an injury to the claimant. The Court of Appeal considered that the case fell near the borderline, for it cannot be for every act, however excessive, that the servant may do in an attempt to serve his employer’s interests that the employer is liable. Nevertheless, taking into account the fact that it was clearly within the terms of the storekeeper’s employment to move certain obstacles out of the way if they blocked the entrance to the warehouse, and since it was part of his normal employment to drive trucks and small vans, the court held that his act of trying to move the lorry was not so gross and extreme as to take it outside the course of his employment.

What can be noted in this discussion is that the employer is generally vicariously liable for the mistakes of his servant if the servant causes injury to third parties. It can be noted however, that the servant’s mistake must be made in the course of his employment, or that what he was doing must have been closely related to the employer’s business. Where the servant’s actions are grossly excessive, the employer may not be liable.

At this point, I will proceed to consider the situation where the wrong of the employee/servant is wilful. The question that arises is as to whether the employer is still held vicariously liable for the injury or damage caused by the employee to a third party.

c. Wilful Wrong of Employee/Servant

Regarding the servant’s wilful wrongdoing, two rules are settled, which are here discussed. In the first place the act done may still be in the course of employment even if it was expressly forbidden by the employer (Rogers 2010: 963). The prohibition by the employer of an act or class of acts will only protect him from liability which he would otherwise incur if it actually restricts what it is that the servant is employed to do: the mere prohibition of a mode of
performing the employment is of no avail (Rogers 2010: 964). It is a question of fact in each case whether the prohibition relates to the sphere of employment or to the mode of performance (Rogers 2010: 964).

In *Limpus v London General Omnibus Co [1862] 1 H. & C. 526*, a driver of the defendant’s omnibus had printed instructions not to race with, or obstruct, other omnibuses. In disobedience to this order he obstructed the claimant’s omnibus and caused a collision which damaged it. The defendants were held liable because what he did was merely a wrongful, improper and unauthorized mode of doing an act which he was authorized to do, namely, to promote the defendants’ passenger-carrying business in competition with their rivals. Again, in *LCC v Cattermoles (Garages) Ltd [1953] 1 W.L.R. 997*, a garage-hand was not allowed to drive vehicles but it was part of his duty to move them by hand. His employers were held liable for his negligence while driving a vehicle. However, in *General Engineering Services Ltd v Kingston and St Andrew Corp [1988] 3 All E.R. 867*, a fire engine crew engaging in a go-slow in support of a pay claim were held not to be acting in the course of employment when they failed to arrive in time to put out fire.

The question of prohibition by the employer has given rise to particular difficulty where the servant has given a lift in the employer’s vehicle to an unauthorized passenger (Rogers 2010: 964-965). Lord Green M.R. said in *Twine v Bean’s Express Ltd [1946] 62 T.L.R. 458*, that giving a lift to an unauthorized passenger was not merely a wrongful mode of performing the act of the class the driver was employed to perform but was the performance of an act of a class which he was not employed to perform.

Nevertheless, this test is capable of producing divergent answers on the simplest facts and did so in *Rose v Plenty [1976] 1 W.L.R. 141*. A milkman had been warned by his employer not to allow children to assist him, nor to allow passengers on his float. In breach of these instructions he engaged the claimant, aged 13, to help him, and the claimant was injured, while a passenger on the float, by the milkman’s negligent driving. To Lord Justice Lawton the situation was indistinguishable from that in *Twine v Bean’s Express Ltd*, but the majority of the Court of Appeal, while accepting the decision in *Twine’s case*, held that the milkman was acting in the course of his employment because the engagement of the claimant was made to further the employer’s business: the milkman was employed to deliver milk, which was precisely what he
was doing when he caused the accident. This decision is in harmony with the long-standing tendency to apply a very broad description to course of employment, and it was approved by three judges in *Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22*, but it is questionable whether it is so easily reconcilable with the earlier passenger cases as the majority of the court asserted. It may also be asked in this context whether, assuming a prohibition to limit the scope of the servant’s employment, the claimant’s knowledge of the prohibition is of any significance (Rogers 2010: 965). In principle, it is submitted that knowledge is not necessary but that in cases where the servant has ostensible authority to invite persons into his employer’s vehicle a passenger should not be affected by any prohibition of which he is unaware (Rogers 2010: 965-966).

Whatever the present status of the earlier decisions on the unauthorized passengers, it remains clear that even if the servant is acting outside the scope of his employment with regard to the passenger he may still be within it with regard to other road users (Rogers 2010: 966).

In the second place, it does not necessarily follow that the servant is acting outside the scope of his employment because he intended to benefit himself and not his employer (Rogers 2010: 966). At one time it was generally thought that this was so but this view was displaced by *Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co [1912] A.C. 716*. The defendants, a firm of solicitors, employed a managing clerk who conducted their conveyancing business without supervision. The claimant, a widow, owned some cottages. She was dissatisfied with the money which they produced and went to the defendants’ office where she saw the clerk, who induced her to give him instructions to sell the cottages and to execute two documents which he falsely told her were necessary for the sale but which in fact were a conveyance of the cottages to himself. He then dishonestly disposed of the property for his own benefit. The House of Lords unanimously held that they were liable: the clerk was acting as the representative of the firm and they had invited the claimant to deal with him over her property.

Many claims have been lodged against local authorities and other bodies in respect of abuse suffered by the claimants while they were children in care (Rogers 2010: 967). In *Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22*, the House of Lords held the defendant children’s home vicariously liable for the acts of the warden in abusing the claimants: the home had undertaken the care of the children and entrusted the performance of that duty to the warden and there was therefore a sufficiently close connection between his employment and the acts committed by him.
Outside the context of residential homes, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that a Roman Catholic diocese was vicariously liable for abuse by a priest on the basis of the degree of power and influence it conferred on him in relation to children in his parish. It should be noted that these questions are fact-sensitive. In Mega v Birmingham Archdiocese the trial judge dismissed a claim in respect of sexual abuse by a priest because the priest, although he had engaged the young claimant for small jobs like cleaning, had made no attempt to involve him in religious activities and his position as a priest merely gave him the opportunity to commit the abuse; but the Court of Appeal was of a different view. Among the factors which pointed the other way were that a priest’s role was to bring the Gospel to all people, though not necessarily by seeking converts, that the priest in question had a special responsibility for youth work, that he had engaged the claimant in helping with special events at the church, that some of the abuse had taken place at the presbytery and that his priestly status and authority meant that no one would question his being alone with the claimant.

From the discussion of the case where the employee/servant has caused injury or damage due to a wilful wrong, I will now look at the case where the employee/servant has stolen. At face value it would appear that the employer would not be held vicariously liable for the theft of the employee. It will be shown under this heading that that may not be the case.

d. Theft by Employee/Servant

At one time the view was that if a servant stole goods his employer could not be held vicariously liable to their owner on the ground that the act of stealing necessarily took the servant outside the course of employment (Cheshire v Bailey [1905] 1 K.B. 237). This view was however, inconsistent with Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co. In Morris v C. W. Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 Q. B. 716, where some of the older cases were overruled, the claimant had sent her fur coat to X to be cleaned, and X, with her permission, sent it on to the defendants, who were specialist cleaners. The defendants handed the coat to their servant, M, for him to clean it, and M stole the coat. It was held by the Court of Appeal that on these facts the defendants were liable. Although reliance was placed on the duty owed to the claimant by the defendants themselves as bailees of the coat, so that, in effect, the theft of the coat by the servant, to whom they had delegated their own duty of reasonable care in respect of it, constituted a breach of that duty, yet the case has been regarded as illustrative of the general approach of the law to wilful wrongdoing by a
servant. That is not to say that in the particular context of the theft the bailment was irrelevant: an essential element of the defendant\'s liability on any ground was that they had been entrusted with the coat and had in turn entrusted it to their servant. Had this not been the case it could not have been said that they had delegated to him their own duty as bailees, nor would the theft have been committed by him in the course of his employment. On the other hand, the principle is not confined to situations where there is a bailment to the defendant and the servant is given physical custody of the goods. There may be liability, for example, where the employer\'s duty is to take steps to keep property secure and this task is entrusted to the servant. Thus landlords of a block of flats were held liable when the dishonest porter employed by them used his keys to enter the claimant\'s flat and steal (Nahhas v Pier House Management (Cheyne Walk) Ltd [1984] 270 E.G. 328); but the result would have been different if, say, the boiler-man had stolen the keys and used them for the same purpose: it is not enough that the employment gives the opportunity to steal for there is then insufficient connection between the employment and the theft (Heaseman v Clarity Cleaning Co [1987] 1 C.R. 949).

What happens when there has been damage to goods bailed and entrusted to an employee/servant will be discussed hereunder.

e. Damage to Goods Bailed and Entrusted to Employee/Servant

Rogers (2010:971) notes that when a servant causes damage to goods bailed to the employer, the approach used in the case of theft also serves to solve the problem. The employer will be held vicariously liable for damage negligently caused by the servant to the goods, which the employer had entrusted to the care of the servant. The reason for this is that there is a close connection between the employment and the damage or, to put it another way, the servant has done carelessly what he was employed to do carefully, namely, to look after the goods. It makes no difference that the servant at the time of his negligence was using the goods improperly for purposes entirely of his own, as, for instance, if he uses a car, bailed to his employer and entrusted to his care, for taking his friends for a ride, and then negligently damages the car in an accident (Coup Co v Maddick [1891] 2 Q.B. 413; Aitchison v Page Motors Ltd [1935] 154 L.T. 128). The servant is as much guilty of failure to look after the car as he would have been if the accident had occurred while he was using the car for an authorized purpose.
It should be noted nevertheless, that some difficulty has been felt to exist in such a case because the servant would, in relation to a third party injured in the same accident, be held to have been doing his own business. In *Morris v C.W. Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 Q.B. 716* at pages 724-725; Lord Denning M.R. asked how it was possible that the servant on one and the same journey could be both within and without the course of his employment. He stated that the solution was found in abandoning the notion of vicarious liability in favour of that of primary liability of the bailee. But Rogers (2010: 972) suggests that the solution lies in recognizing that the facts relevant to the two claims; that brought by the car owner and that brought by the third party, are different. The car owner’s claim is based on the fact that the servant was at fault in looking after the car, which he was employed to do (another case in this category is *Photo Productions Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] A.C. 827*; a case of a security guard setting fire to premises). The third party’s claim is based upon the fact that the servant was guilty of negligent driving at the time and place in question, and if the servant was using the car for a journey then he was not, with regard to the third party, at that place at that time in the course of employment.

Having looked at the case of goods bailed and entrusted to an employee/servant, I will now proceed to consider the case of fraud of an employee/servant.

**f. Fraud of an Employee/Servant**

It should be stated at the outset here that cases of fraud raise special problems because of the special nature of fraud itself (Rogers 2010: 972). Of its very character, fraud involves the persuasion of the victim, by deception, to part with his property or in some other way to act to his own detriment and to the profit of the person practicing the fraud (Rogers 2010: 972). In *Uxbrigde Permanent Benefit Building Society v Pickard [1939] 2 K.B. 238*, the clerk had full authority to conduct the business of a solicitor’s office in the name and on behalf of his principal. It was not within his actual authority to commit a fraud, but it was within his ostensible authority to perform acts of the kind that come within the business conducted by a solicitor. It is settled law that so long as the servant is acting within the scope of the class of act, his employer is bound whether or not the servant is acting for his own purposes or for his employer’s purposes (Rogers 2010: 973).
Nevertheless, there must be some statement or conduct by the employer which leads to the claimant's belief that the servant was acting in the authorized course of business (Rogers 2010: 973). It is not enough that the belief has been brought about solely by reliance on the servant's misrepresentation of the scope of his authority, however reasonable, from the claimant's point of view, it may have been to have acted upon it (Rogers 2010: 973). In *Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA* [1986] A.C. 717, M had authority to sell a vessel belonging to the defendants on terms that it was to be chartered back to them for 12 months. As part of the fraudulent scheme he induced the claimants, the purchasers, to believe that the contract involved a 36-month charter back. Such a transaction was not within the usual class of acts which an employee in his position was entitled to do and, the claimants' belief resting solely on M's statement that he had the defendants' consent for what was being done, it was held that M's employers were not liable for his fraud. M's employment by the defendants to deal with the vessel gave him the opportunity to commit the fraud but, as in the case of theft by a servant of goods bailed to his employer that is not enough.

What is the case like when a government employee/servant has injured or caused damage to a third party? This will be discussed hereunder.

**g. Acts of a Government Employee/Servant**

Sometimes the employer happens to be the state or, a government department like the police service department. In such a situation, the state or, a particular government department is supposed to be held vicariously liable for the faults of the servants. To illustrate this point reference is made to the South African case of *Fv Minister of Safety and Security*.

The facts in the case were in short that Ms F visited a night club in George on 14 October 1998. After midnight (on 15 October) she was offered a lift home by one Van Wyk. There were two other passengers in the car. It was also common cause that Van Wyk was a police officer on standby duty. The court referred to Standing Order 6, issued by the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service in June 1997, and explained that standby duty meant that Van Wyk could have been called upon to attend any crime-related incident if the need arose. In addition, Van Wyk had the use of an unmarked vehicle if he needed it for standby duty and he
was being paid the prescribed hourly tariff. Ms F also noticed that the vehicle was equipped with a police radio.

Ms F was seated on the back seat of the vehicle with one of the other passengers when they left the club. After they had been dropped off, Van Wyk asked her to move to the front passenger seat. Upon moving to the front seat, Ms F saw a pile of police dockets and when she asked Van Wyk about them, he replied that he was a private detective. Ms F understood that he was a policeman. Instead of driving her home as agreed, Van Wyk drove towards Kaaimansrivier and told Ms F that he wanted to see his friends before dropping her off. At that point Ms F became suspicious. When they approached Kaaimansrivier, Van Wyk stopped the vehicle at a dark spot. Ms F got out of the vehicle, ran away and hid. Van Wyk left after a while. After a while Ms F approached the road and hitchhiked. Van Wyk’s vehicle then stopped next to her and again he offered to take her home. Ms F was desperate and agreed. She testified that she believed that Van Wyk was a policeman and she trusted him despite her suspicions. It was on their way to Ms F’s home that Van Wyk unexpectedly turned off the road near Krraibos. Again Ms F tried to flee but Van Wyk prevented her and then assaulted and raped her. He threatened to kill her if she told anybody. However, Ms F reported the crime and this resulted in Van Wyk’s conviction and subsequent sentence. Upon reaching the age of maturity in December 2005, Ms F instituted an action for damages against the Minister of Safety and Security and Van Wyk.

In the High Court, Bozalek J found the Minister vicariously liable for the damages suffered by Ms F. The court ruled that there was a sufficiently strong link between Mr. Van Wyk’s actions and his employer’s business to justify that conclusion. However, on appeal the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the High Court, arguing that proper interpretation of *K v Minister of Safety & Security [2005] ZACC 8*, which the High Court relied on, led one to conclude that the state was not vicariously liable for the positive delictual acts of police officials but only for their omissions.

The Constitutional Court concluded that the Minister was vicariously liable, even though the case at hand was distinguishable from *K v Minister of Safety & Security* because of the fact that in that case the policemen were on duty and Van Wyk was not.
Conclusion

There does exist in the law operating in our societies what is called vicarious liability whereby an employer is held responsible for the faults of their servants or employees. Employers can be held vicariously liable for the criminal delicts of their employees. Vicarious liability is also applicable in civil and administrative cases. What is important is that there must be an employer-employee relationship. The other condition is that the employee must commit an offence while in the course of his employment. The employee's act must be closely related to the business of the employer. What the employee must have been doing when he committed the offence must have been within the scope of his employment.

It is not only private employers and corporations that can be held vicariously liable for the delicts of their employees; the state also can be held vicariously liable. What is important is that the state is as much an employer as the others are. There exists an employment relationship between the state and its employees.

It should be noted however that Baker (2014) is of the view that vicarious liability should only be applicable in civil and administrative cases. He argues that criminal cases, which require proof of mens rea, should be restricted to the people who actually commit the offences. Whatever the case, vicarious liability does exist in our societies. In chapter six, this will be evaluated in the light of vicarious liability as it relates to the substitutionary nature of Jesus Christ's death.
CHAPTER SIX: CHRIST’S SUBSTITUTIONARY DEATH: A CRITICAL EVALUATION

Introduction

My research journey set out with a seemingly divergent Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) teaching regarding Jesus Christ’s substitutionary death. On the one hand scholars such as Dederen and others taught that Christ’s death was vicarious and on the other hand Sequeira taught that it was actual.

I undertook this study to try to point out differences and similarities in these seemingly divergent views regarding Christ’s substitutionary death, and come up with a reconciled view. It was my aim also to make recommendations of what Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) scholars and the Seventh-day Adventist Church (SDAC) should do in view of the findings of this study.

This study will be my contribution to literature on the doctrine of atonement, which is one of the most controversial topics in systematic theology. I will clarify, revise, and refine already existing knowledge on the subject of atonement. In terms of Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) theology, I will contribute a view of atonement that takes into consideration the duo problem of sin; sin as acts or behaviours and sin as nature. I will do a chapter by chapter critical evaluation of what I have discussed in order to come up with the reconciled view that I envisioned at the beginning of the research journey. Chapter five will help me to evaluate chapter four.

6.1. Critical Evaluation: Theories of Atonement

I am of the opinion that there are elements of truth in the ransom theory, the moral influence theory, the satisfaction theory, the recapitulation theory, Eastern Christianity, and Roman Catholic views on atonement and reparation. The problem is that there are some elements included in these theories that cannot be supported from the Scriptures. For example, there is nowhere in Scripture where it is written that the ransom was paid to the devil. Scripture nowhere talks about God deceiving the devil. Some of the theories deny what is actually taught in Scripture. For example, in the moral influence theory, the penal nature of Christ’s substitutionary death is rejected. Roman Catholic theology rejects the penal substitutionary nature of Christ’s
death, which is clearly taught in Scripture. In the sections that follow, all these theories are evaluated one after the other.

6.1.1. The Ransom theory

It is biblical to say that Jesus Christ’s death was a ransom given for the human race, for the Bible says; “For even the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give His life a ransom for many” (Mark 10:45). The Bible also presents Jesus Christ as a victorious conqueror over the devil, sin and death (Heb. 2:14; 1 Cor. 15:50-57). Irenaeus’ emphasis on the full identification of Christ with humanity as the Second Adam, and His freeing of humanity from the devil by the ransom of death is commendable (Pfeiffer et al 175: 176). The great importance of the incarnation brought out by later writers such as Athanasius and Gregory of Nyssa is also commendable (Pfeiffer et al 1975: 176). The problem with the ransom theory is that to take it on its own to represent everything the Bible says about atonement would be to do injustice to the doctrine of atonement. It emphasizes payment to Satan, which has no biblical support. It also makes God to be a deceiver, thus, making Him equal to His adversary the devil in His manner of operation. The stratagem whereby the devil was lured by the bait of humanity and caught on the hook of divinity is completely not supported by God’s Word. This theory presents danger lurking in the approximation to a cosmic or metaphorical reconciliation by the simple equation of God and man irrespective of the cross.

Apart from the ransom theory, in chapter two I discussed the moral influence theory, which deserves a critical evaluation.

6.1.2. The Moral Influence theory

There is no doubt that the death of Jesus Christ demonstrates God’s love for fallen humanity (John 3:16; Rom. 5:8; 1 John 4:10). Therefore, the moral influence theory teaches some truth about God’s love to influence people to do good for fellow human beings. However, this kind of influence could also result from a martyr’s death. God’s demonstration of love on the cross in itself alone cannot bring about reconciliation; for there is no change that takes place in the sinner by simply beholding Jesus Christ dying on the cross without understanding that His death was substitutionary. This theory therefore, does not address what Scripture clearly teaches about how God solved the problem of sin, thereby bringing about reconciliation.
After this brief evaluation of the moral influence theory, it is my privilege to also evaluate the satisfaction theory of atonement, which I highlighted in chapter two.

6.1.3. The Satisfaction theory

A particularly fine statement is made in the famous *Cur Deus homo*? of Anselm, where the greatness of sin, the significance of divine holiness, the demand for satisfaction, and therefore the absolute necessity of the incarnation and crucifixion, are all convincingly declared (Pfeiffer et al 1975:176). Anselm held the essentials of a true biblical concept in his satisfaction theory. There is no doubt that the Reformers formulated the penal substitutionary theory of atonement based on Anselm’s satisfaction theory. Pfeiffer, et al (1975:176) support this view when they state; “The Reformation fathers followed for the most part the Anselmic line, though with significant modifications.” However, the idea of an equivalent payment and the transfer of a merited but superfluous reward are questionable. I commend Anselm for laying a foundation for the penal substitutionary theory that will be evaluated later.

The recapitulation theory is another theory that I discussed in chapter two, and it equally needs to be evaluated.

6.1.4. The Recapitulation theory

The emphasis on the incarnation in the recapitulation theory of atonement, whereby Jesus Christ becomes the new Head of humanity by assuming humanity is taught in Scripture (Rom. 5:12-21; 1 Cor. 15:21, 22, 45-49). Jesus Christ identified Himself with humanity completely, except in actual sinning (Rom. 8:3; 2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 2:14, 17; 4:15). But the incarnation is only the foundation upon which atonement is built.

According to Berkhof (1941:385), the recapitulation theory suggests that by His incarnation and human life Jesus Christ reverses the course on which Adam by his sin started humanity and thus becomes a new leaven in the life of humankind. Jesus Christ communicates immortality to those who are united to Him by faith and effects an ethical transformation in their lives, and by His obedience compensates for the disobedience of Adam (Berkhof 1941:385).

There is no mention of what the role of Jesus Christ’s death is in this theory. It is not stated how it is that sinners develop faith in Jesus Christ, whereby they get united to Him, and He effects an
ethical transformation in their lives. While it is true that Jesus Christ’s obedience compensates for the disobedience of Adam, this appears to be an end in itself, and not part of the basis on which sinners could be justified; the other parts being His death on the cross and His resurrection.

The statement Orr makes; “that Christ recapitulates in Himself all the stages of human life, including those which belong to our state as sinners” (Berkhof 1941:385), needs some clarification. When one critically analyzes what the Bible has to say about the life of Jesus Christ here on earth, one sees that He obeyed God where Adam failed. For example, the temptation that came to Adam was on appetite, and he failed. Jesus Christ’s first temptation after His baptism was on appetite, but in His case He did not fall under it. No human being since Adam has died the second death and risen from it, except Jesus Christ. It is not clear what is meant when it is said that Jesus Christ experienced the stages of human life that belong to our state as sinners.

In what follows I am going to evaluate the views of Eastern Christianity on atonement.

6.1.5. Eastern Christianity

Meek (2013) observes; "2 Pet. 1:4 has become especially important in the Eastern Orthodox which believes that Christians are actually becoming part of the divine." Becoming part of the divine is called in Eastern Orthodox teaching as divination (Meek 2013). Gregory speaks of humankind being deified by union with Christ, and rests all of salvation upon the union of God and human beings in Christ and of Christians to the God-Man- Jesus Christ (Meek 2013). Athanasius is quoted as saying; "He [Christ], indeed, assumed humanity that we might become God." (Meek 2013).

While union of the divine and the human in Christ is taught in Scripture, it is not all there is to the plan of salvation. In fact, the union of the divine and the human in Christ Jesus through the incarnation is nothing if the other aspects of salvation such as Jesus Christ’s death on the cross are absent. Deification or divination as understood in Eastern Christianity does not seem to agree with the plain teaching of Scripture. Human beings were not created to be part of the divine; instead we were created in the image of God (Gen. 1:26, 27). The incarnation does not make human beings divine or part of the divine. The incarnation creates a new humanity in Christ Jesus. In other words, Jesus Christ is the new humanity.
To become partakers of the divine nature (2 Pet. 1:4) does not mean to become divine. It simply means to experience the new birth (recreation) whereby we operate in the realm of holiness. We think holy thoughts; we love with the pure love of God. We hate sin as God does because our lives are controlled by the Holy Spirit. I agree with Meek (2013) when he says; "To partake of the divine nature is an amazing thought, and indicates the dynamic (and dramatic) union we have with Christ. This is a unity between Christ and believers, whereby through the incarnation we got into Him, but this objective fact became a reality when each individual personally accepted Christ Jesus as Saviour and Lord, and Christ now lives in that individual through the personal presence of the Holy Spirit.

As it was noticed in chapter two, Roman Catholic theologians do not have a theory of atonement that is unique to their Church. However, they hold some views on atonement and reparation that like the theories that have been evaluated above, need to be evaluated.

6.1.6. Roman Catholic Views on Atonement and Reparation

Roman Catholic theologians appreciate the elements of truth found in the major theories of atonement. Commenting on the recapitulation theory, the ransom theory, the moral influence theory, and the satisfaction theory, Kent (1907) states; "On looking back at the various theories noticed so far, it will be seen that they are not, for the most part, mutually exclusive, but may be combined and harmonized. He observes; "And in point of fact it will generally be found that the chief Fathers and Schoolmen, though they may at times stress on some favourite theory of their own, do not lose sight of the other explanations." (Kent 1907).

There are at least two problems that I have with Roman Catholic views of atonement and reparation. The first deals with the rejection of the penal substitutionary nature of Jesus Christ’s death. For example Beem (2013) writes; "The Cross was not literally our punishment, our verdict of death, that Christ took upon Himself." This statement will be discussed when evaluating the penal substitutionary theory of atonement. But it will suffice here to say that this is a total rejection of the penal substitutionary nature of atonement.

The second problem I have with Roman Catholic views on atonement and reparation deals with the doctrine of reparation. This doctrine suggests that believers can repair the sins of others (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 2015). In my view, this doctrine encourages legalism or
righteousness by works. The aspect of Mary the mother of Jesus desiring souls to console Jesus to soften the anger of the Heavenly Father (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 2015) presupposes the resurrection of Mary after she died. But there is no evidence of Mary’s resurrection in Scripture. There is also no evidence of her having been translated alive to heaven.

Freze (1993) quoted by the Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, asserts; “The Rosary of the Holy Wounds (which does not include the usual rosary mysteries) focuses on specific redemptive aspects of Christ’s suffering in Calvary, with emphasis on the souls in purgatory.”

In Roman Catholic theology, all who die in God’s grace and friendship, but still imperfectly purified, are indeed assured of their eternal salvation; but after death they undergo purification, so as to achieve the holiness necessary to enter the joy of heaven (Chapman 1994:235). This final purification is what the Church has given the name Purgatory, and is entirely different from the punishment of the damned (Chapman 1994:235). The Church commends almsgiving, indulgences and works of penance undertaken on behalf of the dead (Chapman 1994:235).

According to Chapman (1994:219) “it is a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead that they may be loosed from their sins.” The prayers Christians offer for the dead are capable not only of helping them, but also of making their intercession for those Christians effective (Chapman 1994:219).

These views about the dead seem to contradict what is plainly taught in Scripture. For example, it is written in Heb. 9: 27-28; “And as it is appointed for men to die once, but after this the judgment, so Christ was offered once to bear the sins of many. To those who eagerly wait for Him He will appear a second time, apart from sin, for salvation.” This text suggests that once a person dies, they await judgment. There is no final purification done to them, and so it is pointless to pray for them. A dead person does not know anything that happens among the living (Eccl. 9:5, 6). A dead person cannot praise God (Is. 38:18, 19). Therefore, if a dead person knows nothing that happens among the living, and cannot even praise God, the living should not expect that person to intercede for them. They are dead (they have fallen into the sleep of death), and are unconscious of what goes on among the living. Jesus Christ equated death to sleep (John 11:11-14). A person who has slept does not know what is happening during the time of his being asleep. And since Scripture equates death to sleep, it can be concluded that a person who has
died does not know what is happening among both the living and the dead during the time he is dead.

It is my contention that the Roman Catholic doctrine of Purgatory puts people into false security that if they do not measure up to the biblical standard of holiness, they still have the hope of final purification that will happen after they have died. Thus, the doctrine of Purgatory militates against the doctrine of atonement, especially with regard to the believer’s subjective experience. I should state that Purgatory is not in the Bible, but only in Roman Catholic tradition. It is important that I state also that the term Purgatory is not my main point of argument, for there are many terms that theologians have used to describe some Bible doctrines, and yet those terms cannot be found in the Bible. My point of argument is that the Bible does not teach that there is a place between earth and Paradise where people receive final purification. Prayers, almsgiving, penance, and indulgencies are not meritorious to both the dead person and the one doing them on behalf of the dead. I contend also that the Roman Catholic rejection of the penal substitutionary nature of atonement necessarily leads to an understanding of atonement without biblical support.

As noted above (chapter two), some theologians (including Roman Catholics) have raised criticisms against the penal substitutionary theory of atonement. In fact, as it was noted in chapter three, the actual model of atonement is an attempt to respond to the challenge raised by Roman Catholic theologians against the penal substitutionary theory. In what follows, therefore, I will critically evaluate this theory of atonement.

6.1.7. Penal Substitutionary theory

This is the theory that Seventh-day Adventist theologians and scholars believe best describes atonement as taught in God’s Word. It should be noted however, that Seventh-day Adventist theologians and scholars are not in harmony when it comes to what really was involved in Jesus Christ’s substitutionary death. Generally, variations of this theory include: limited atonement, universalism, provisional atonement, vicarious atonement, corporate atonement, and actual atonement. The variations of the penal substitutionary theory at issue among Seventh-day Adventist scholars are vicarious atonement and actual atonement.

Before evaluating the penal substitutionary theory itself, I will briefly evaluate its variations, except for the vicarious and actual models, which will be evaluated separately when evaluating
chapter three and chapter four. As it was noted in chapter one, the vicarious and actual models of atonement need to be reconciled. For this reason, each model deserves a separate and detailed evaluation.

6.1.7.1 Limited atonement

Bible texts such as John 3:16 clearly state that God’s love demonstrated in the giving of His Son has a universal and not limited extent. It is therefore, illogical to say that God loved the whole world, but His Son only died for the elect. The gospel of the kingdom of God is expected to be preached to the whole world (Matt. 24:14; Mark 16:15, 16; Acts 1:8; Rev. 14:6-7). It does not make sense for God to command His church to preach to the entire humanity, and yet He knows that only those He has elected to save are the only ones who will be saved.

The Samaritans said it nicely: ‘Now we believe, not because of what you said, for we ourselves have heard Him and we know that this is indeed the Christ, the Saviour of the world’ (John 4:42). This is a universal text, and it therefore, excludes any thought that the atonement was only meant to cover the elect.

2 Cor. 5:14-15 clearly states that Christ died for all, and not just for the elect. Similarly Rom. 5:6-8 tells us that Christ died for the ungodly; He died for sinners. And it is common knowledge that all human beings are sinners.

The doctrine of the judgment suggests that all human beings will be judged (Ps. 50:1-5; Eccl. 12:13, 14; Dan. 7:9-14; Acts 17:30-31; Rom. 14:10; 1 Cor. 6:1-3; 2 Cor. 5:10; 1 Pet. 4:17, 18; Rev. 14:6-7; 20). If this is true, it does not make sense for God to judge all people, and yet He made atonement only for the elect. What the Bible seems to teach is that people are only condemned because of rejecting Jesus Christ; not because they are not part of the elect (John 3:18). People will not be saved not because they were not part of the elect God intended to save but because they rejected free salvation given to them in Christ Jesus.

God is love (1 John 4:8, 16), and as God who is love, He has given people freedom of choice. It would therefore, go against His nature of love for Him to save people against their free choices. If God operated that way, Adam and Eve would not have sinned in the Garden of Eden, as He would have made sure that they did not sin, even against their wish. Therefore, the teaching that
the elect will be saved, for God will make sure they are saved even if they do not want to be saved, is not supported by Scripture and the nature of God. This teaching suggests that God will make the elect want to be saved at least at some point in their life time. The truth is that God will not save people arbitrarily. At least His Word does not permit arbitrariness when it comes to the plan of salvation.

The Bible obviously talks about the elect (Eph. 1:1-14) who were predestined to be adopted as God’s children in Christ Jesus. In the limited atonement view, these elect are the only ones for whom atonement was made. I have a contrary view; atonement was made for the entire humanity, but not the entire humanity will accept this precious and great gift of God. Those who accept the gift of God in Christ Jesus are the ones who will be benefited by that gift. The entire humanity was predestined to be adopted in Christ Jesus in a general sense. But only those who accept and appreciate this gift of God are really adopted in the sense of being heirs of God through Christ Jesus. More will be said on this when evaluating chapter three and chapter four.

But how do we interpret such texts as John 6:44: “No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him; and I will raise him at the last day.” God does the drawing through the message of the cross of Jesus Christ (John 12:32, 33). The gift of salvation through Christ Jesus has been given to the entire humanity. As the Spirit of God points people to the sacrifice made on Calvary’s cross, people sense the drawing. Some choose to accept this gift of salvation, while others reject it. Those who genuinely surrender themselves to God’s drawing receive the new birth experience. Christ Jesus does everything in His power to make sure that they do not lose salvation. But He does not do this against their choice. The people who will be lost are those who resist the drawing of God, or like Judas Iscariot, they do not surrender themselves completely to God for Him to work out salvation in their lives.

John 10:16 can be interpreted similarly. The other sheep that Christ Jesus talked about are the people who when the Spirit of God draws them, they will respond positively, and surrender their lives completely to Him. This text does not mean that God has predestined some people to be saved in such a way that He will make sure that they accept salvation whether they want or not. Christ Jesus was simply saying that in this world that God loved with infinite love, apart from those who had already accepted Him as Lord and Saviour, there are others who will also do so at some time as the good news of salvation reaches them. Where there is a choice between God and
Satan some will choose God while others will choose Satan. Where there is a choice between life and death, some people will choose life while others will choose death. This is just how it is where there is freedom of choice. So Christ Jesus was merely expressing a fact of life in the plan of salvation.

Universalism deserves evaluation as much as limited atonement. This is very important because some Seventh-day Adventist theologians and scholars who do not support the actual model of atonement as taught by Jack Sequeira fear that that model, especially universal legal justification (ULJ), which forms part of its package, may lead to universalism.

6.1.7.2. Universalism

Universalism in the context of atonement is the teaching that since Jesus Christ died for the entire humanity the entire humanity will eventually be saved (see p. 38 of this dissertation). It is true that the atonement is universal in the sense that Christ Jesus died for the entire humanity. However, the Bible clearly teaches that individual human beings have to believe in order for them to be benefited by the atonement that God made in Christ Jesus (John 3:16). When the everlasting gospel is preached to the whole world, it is those who believe who will be saved in the sense of being benefited by God’s gift of atonement (Matt. 24:14; Mark 16:15, 16). I am of the opinion therefore, that universalism is not supported by Scripture.

Another variation of the penal substitutionary theory of atonement that is a subject of debate in Seventh-day Adventism is what is called provisional atonement. An evaluation of this variation of the penal substitutionary theory is therefore, necessary.

6.1.7.3. Provisional atonement

In the provisional view of atonement it is taught that on the cross God made provision for those who would believe to be saved (see p. 38 of this dissertation). The argument is that God did not save the entire humanity, but that He simply made provision for individuals who would learn about this provision and believe to be saved. The provision was made for the entire humanity, but only those who believe will be saved.

In my view, God in Christ Jesus saved the entire humanity. But this salvation, which was accomplished in Christ Jesus, is a provision in the sense that individuals have to believe that they
were already saved in Christ Jesus in order to be benefited by that salvation. The entire humanity was reconciled to God in Christ Jesus (2 Cor. 5:18-21). In Christ Jesus, God reconciled the entire humanity to Himself; and yet at individual level, not everyone has subjectively been reconciled to God in the sense of accepting God’s gift of reconciliation through Christ Jesus. Thus, while objectively already reconciled to God, some individuals have not yet been subjectively reconciled to Him either because they have not heard about this gift of reconciliation through Christ Jesus, or they have decided to reject it. That is why some individuals (the majority of humanity) are still at enmity with God. On God’s side, the entire humanity has already been reconciled to Him; but on the side of individuals, some individuals have not yet been reconciled to Him by way of believing the good news of salvation through Jesus Christ. For me, salvation for the entire humanity is a definite and past event; the entire humanity was saved in Christ Jesus about two thousand years ago when Christ Jesus died on Calvary’s cross; yet it still has to become effective in each individual as they hear this good news and believe. I believe that even those who may not hear about Christ Jesus, but in a way only known to God they live their lives in line with God’s will, will be saved on the basis of the objective facts of atonement.

Corporate or shared atonement is another variation of the penal substitutionary theory of atonement, which deserves evaluation and my comment. In what follows therefore, I will evaluate this variation of the penal substitutionary theory of atonement.

6.1.7.4. Corporate Atonement

In corporate atonement as understood by Gulley (2012:626), all sinners have already died for their sins in Christ’s death, in the sense that Christ died as us rather than for us. Gulley (2012:626) argues that there is not such atonement. I partly agree with him. There is no sinner who has died for their own sins in Christ’s death. The teaching that all sinners died for their own sins in Christ’s death is not taught anywhere in Scripture. However, what I am prompted to say about Gulley’s evaluation of corporate atonement, especially as taught by Jack Sequeira is that he has not done justice to it. That is why I decided to differentiate between what Gulley calls corporate atonement and what Sequeira calls actual atonement. Apparently Sequeira uses the terms corporate and shared as he describes his view of atonement. But he does not mean what Gulley has made it appear he means. It is true that Sequeira teaches that Christ died as us because he was a corporate or representative individual. Nevertheless, he does not interpret this
to mean that when we died in Christ, we died for our own sins. Christ Jesus died for us, but when He died for us, He died as us. That individual Christ Jesus, who died for us, was the totality of all of us; so He died as us. When Christ Jesus died, the entire human race died in Him. This is what corporate atonement means as taught by Jack Sequeira. But if there are others who teach it the way Gulley has expressed it, then I join him in rejecting it. On the other hand, I agree with Sequeira’s understanding of corporate atonement. It will be made clear why I support corporate atonement as taught by Sequeira when evaluating chapter four of this dissertation. For now, I will evaluate the penal substitutionary theory in a general sense.

I will again give the definition of the penal substitutionary theory of atonement. Then the theory will be evaluated in the context of some of the criticisms leveled against it. The criticism that deals with some alleged injustice done to Christ Jesus if indeed His death was as a result of our penalty borne by Him in our place will be considered when evaluating chapter four.

Elwell and Yarbrough (2005:404) define substitutionary atonement as Christ dying in place of sinners and bearing the punishment that should have been theirs. This definition is in harmony with Calvin’s formulation; “Christ took upon Himself and suffered the punishment which by the righteous judgment of God impended over all sinners, and by this expiation the Father has been satisfied and His wrath appeased (Institutes, II, 16, 2)” (Pfeiffer et al 1975:177).

I am of the view that the penal substitutionary theory is clearly supported by Scripture. In Gen. 2:17 God told Adam that the penalty for disobeying Him would be death. Paul echoed this in Rom. 6:23 when he wrote; “For the wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord.” When Adam and Eve sinned, they did not immediately die, instead an animal died in their place (Gen. 3:21). Some scholars such as Rodriguez (2000:376) have seen a promise of redemption in God’s gracious act in providing Adam and Eve garments of animal skin after they sinned. Rodriguez (2000:377) sees evidence of substitutionary atonement in the sacrifices offered by Noah (Gen. 8:20) and the sacrifice offered by Abraham in place of his son of promise Isaac (Gen. 22).

The book of Leviticus is God’s established cult of the sacrificial system initiated by Him in Ex. 25 when He commanded Moses to instruct the children of Israel to build Him a sanctuary. In the book of Leviticus, God instructed that a sinner who desired forgiveness for sin committed should
bring a specified ritually clean animal, lay hands on its head, confess sin, and slaughter the animal. The blood of the animal was used to make atonement between God and the sinner. The animal died in place of the sinner. The death of the animal did not save the sinner, but represented the death of Christ Jesus. John the Baptist testified to this fact when He declared; Behold! The Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world! (John 1:29).

Commenting on Isaiah 53 verse 4 to 5, Barker and Kohlenberger III (1994:1131) assert; The onlookers put aside their premature judgment on the matter and accept that the sufferings of the Servant are not only penal but also substitutionary. There is evidence in the New Testament that the suffering Servant of Isaiah 53 is Jesus Christ (Acts 8:28-35).

Several New Testament texts point to the penal substitutionary nature of Jesus Christ’s death. I can think of such texts as Matt. 26:26-28; Mark 10:45; Rom. 5:6-8; 8:32; 2 Cor. 5:14-15, 21; Gal. 3:13; 1 Pet. 2:24; 3:18; and many others. In my view, there is no better way to explain atonement than that Jesus Christ’s death was a penal substitution. The death Jesus Christ died was our death.

As it was noted in chapter two, several criticisms have been advanced against the penal substitutionary theory of atonement. Scholars such as Berkhof and Erickson have ably responded to these criticisms. What should be echoed however is that many criticisms do not put into consideration the fact that God exists as a Trinity. Therefore, they consider Christ’s sacrifice as offered by some kind of a third party in the whole transaction. The fact however, is that Christ is God; the second Person of the Godhead. Christ is the God-Man who was actually the only one qualified to bring about reconciliation between the Godhead and humanity. He is the only Son who is equal to the Father. In fact the prophet Isaiah calls Him the Everlasting Father (Is. 9:6). The truth about penal substitutionary atonement is that God in human form reconciles humanity to God (2 Cor. 5:18-21). When Christ came to die on the cross, He represented the Godhead on one side, and humanity on the other side. It was not like a human father sending his son on a dangerous mission, instead of him going. The penal substitutionary theory of atonement is about the Father going on that dangerous mission Himself, for the Father and the Son are one (John 10:30). Therefore, there is no child abuse in this transaction.
There is no contradiction between the wrathful Father and the gentle and loving Christ as some scholars have suggested. The wrath of God (Rom. 1:18; 2:5) is equally the wrath of the Son or the Lamb (Rev. 6:15-17). Scholars generally agree that while on earth, Christ revealed the Father’s character (John 14:9). What the people saw in Christ was the character of the Father. Therefore, if Christ’s penal substitutionary death appeases the wrath of the Father; then it appeases the wrath of the Son. There is no internal conflict in the Godhead.

But did not God go against His own law in requiring that His Son dies in place of sinners (Deut. 24:16; 2 Kin. 14:6; Ezek. 18:4, 20)? Does not the Bible say that a sinner should die for their own sin? Is it not unfair for an innocent person to be punished in place of the guilty? These questions will be answered when evaluating chapter four in the context of chapter five. For now, it will suffice to state that Christ Jesus died in the place of sinners; the just for the unjust; the innocent for the guilty. This is what is plainly taught in Scripture, and in my opinion, it is immaterial that this teaching appears to be unfair.

I wish to state that the penal substitutionary theory of atonement does not neglect the aspects of atonement expressed in other atonement theories. It takes into consideration the aspect of ransom. It takes into consideration the aspect of God’s love revealed by Christ on the cross. It does not ignore the aspect of Christ being an example to believers. The penal substitutionary theory takes into consideration the aspect of the incarnation. The challenge however, is that scholars are not in harmony on the aspect of the human nature of Christ. Thus, it is on this aspect that Sequeira differs with the Seventh-day Adventist scholars on the other side of the debate.

In the next section, I will briefly evaluate chapter three: Jesus Christ’s Substitutionary Death as Vicarious. There will be no attempt to look at the legal aspect of the vicarious nature of Christ’s death as this will be done when evaluating chapter four.

6.2. Critical Evaluation: Jesus Christ’s Substitutionary Death as Vicarious

In this section, I will first evaluate the use of the term vicarious in relation to the term substitutionary. Secondly, I will evaluate the concepts of justification, in Christ, and the humanity of Christ as understood by scholars who hold the vicarious view of atonement.
6.2.1. The use of the terms vicarious and substitutionary

As it was noted in chapter three, the vicarious view of Jesus Christ’s substitutionary death is held by a number of both Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) and non-Seventh-day Adventist scholars. Generally the terms vicarious and substitutionary are used interchangeably as synonymous terms. Thus, when scholars say that Jesus Christ’s death was vicarious, they mean that it was substitutionary. Adams (2007:100) for example writes; “The idea in those passages is that of vicarious death or substitutionary death.” Commenting on John 11 verse 50, Adams (2007:96) argues; “The entire episode makes it explicit that Jesus’ death was vicarious-offered in place of ours.” This definition of the term vicarious applies to the term substitutionary as well, for the two terms mean the same thing.

According to Shedd (2015); “Vicariousness implies substitution.” A vicar is a person deputized to perform the function of another (Shedd 2015). When this is applied to the discussion at issue, the particular function to be performed is that of atoning for sin by suffering and dying. Humankind the transgressor is the party who owes the atonement and who ought to discharge the office of an atoner; but Jesus Christ is the party who actually discharges the office and makes the atonement in his stead (Shedd 2015). In Shedd’s view; “The idea of vicariousness or substitution is, therefore, vital to the correct theory of Christ’s priestly office” (Shedd 2015).

Bauer (2008:1) asserts; “Vicarious atonement means a one-for-one representation, in which Christ is understood to personally represent you individually on the cross as your personal representative and substitute.” Thus, in vicarious atonement, Christ does not represent humanity collectively, but represents each person on the one-for-one arrangement. The emphasis in this model is the transfer of sin from the repentant sinner to the innocent Son of Man.

To the extent that Jesus Christ’s death was vicarious or substitutionary without relating this understanding of the penal substitutionary atonement to a specific position on the humanity of Christ, I support this view. Both the Old Testament and the New Testament teach that Jesus Christ’s death was vicarious or substitutionary. There is nothing wrong to say that Jesus Christ represented me as an individual; my sins were transferred to Him just as it was in the Old Testament sacrificial system where the sins of an individual were transferred to the sacrificial animal offered by that individual.
The Bible talks about sin in terms of *nature* and *acts*. Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) scholars who hold the vicarious view of atonement are not clear on how Jesus Christ dealt with this duo problem of sin. It is on this aspect of atonement that Jack Sequeira has a challenge with what most Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) scholars teach. The whole controversy on atonement in Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) theology hinges on how each group on either side of the debate explains how Christ dealt with sin as *nature*. I am of the view that Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) scholars who it could be argued believe that they represent the majority in the Seventh-day Adventist Church (SDA) have failed to explain satisfactorily how Christ Jesus dealt with sin as *nature*. This failure in my view is necessitated by the fact that most of the scholars who teach the vicarious view of Jesus Christ’s death view His humanity as having been different from our fallen humanity. This point will be elaborated when evaluating the humanity of Jesus Christ as understood by scholars who teach the vicarious view of His death. For now, I will evaluate justification in the context of the vicarious view of atonement.

### 6.2.2. Vicarious atonement and justification

It was observed in chapter three that most of the Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) scholars who teach the vicarious view of atonement also teach that on the cross, God made *provision* for those who would believe to be justified. In other words, on the cross, there was not what some theologians call universal legal justification (ULJ), whereby the entire humanity was legally justified in Christ Jesus when He died about two thousand years ago.

I have found it quite difficult to understand what most of the Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) scholars who teach vicarious atonement mean when they say that on the cross, God in Christ only made a *provision* for those who would believe to be justified. A thorough analysis of what they write on this subject reveals a failure to look at justification in both *objective* and *subjective* terms. Where they acknowledge the *objective* and *subjective* aspects of justification, the problem becomes semantic in nature. They reject universal legal justification (ULJ) for fear that it may lead to universalism; the belief that because Jesus Christ died for the entire humanity, then the entire humanity will eventually be saved (see p. 38 of this dissertation). But this fear is unfounded. Seventh-day Adventist scholars such as Jack Sequeira, Donald K. Short and Robert J. Wieland teach what may be termed universal legal justification (ULJ), but they reject universalism.
Let me at this point show that proponents of provisional justification on one hand actually teach universal legal justification (ULJ), which on the other hand they reject. This they do in the context of reconciliation.

Blazen (2000:287) argues; reconciliation is another way of talking about justification, as the parallelism between Romans 5:9 (justified by His blood) and 5:10 (reconciled by His blood) shows (see p. 74 of this dissertation). In this statement, Blazen suggests that reconciliation and justification are, in the context in which they are used in the two texts, synonymous terms. Commenting on the objective aspect of reconciliation, Blazen (2000:287) asserts; reconciliation involves the experience of restored relations with God, it is first an objective event before it is subjective. As I noted earlier, Seventh-day Adventist promoters of provisional justification fail to look at justification in both objective and subjective terms. However, when it comes to reconciliation, Blazen has shown that he is an exception, for he does look at it in both objective and subjective terms. The question is whether he would do the same with justification. The earlier statement he made where he suggests that reconciliation is another way of talking about justification should be taken as indicating that in his view, justification is objective before it is subjective. He says;

According to 2 Corinthians 5:18, 19, 21, reconciliation is achieved by the event of the cross. This objective event in the past history of salvation is the presupposition for the proclamation of reconciliation, whereby the possibility for humans to be reconciled with God on the existential level is made available through the apostolic appeal to be reconciled to God (verse 20). In the apostolic preaching the already-won reconciliation projects itself toward every person, and seeks lodgment in the experience of those who believe.

In Romans 5 Jesus dies for people while they are still sinful. The saving event is apart from them and before the emergence of faith. In fact, through the preaching of the gospel, Jesus’ death is the originating cause of faith. It is likewise in the letter to the Ephesians. Through the death of Jesus, which in principle breaks down the wall of hostility between Jews and Gentiles, these diverse people are reconciled to God. What the
gospel announces, therefore, is that people are to enter the new situation of reconciliation already existing “in Christ Jesus” (Ephesians 2:13), who is our peace (verse 14) (Blazen 2000:288).

In my view, if reconciliation is another way of talking about justification and reconciliation already exists in Christ before people can experience it, it follows that justification exists before people can experience it. To experience reconciliation, people have to believe the holy history of Jesus Christ. In the same way, to experience justification, people have to believe the holy history of Jesus Christ. The justification that exists before people can experience it at individual level is what some theologians call universal legal justification (ULJ), whereby the entire humanity was justified in Christ Jesus on the cross before they could hear the good news of this justification just as the case was with reconciliation. If as Blazen puts it, on the cross, God in Christ reconciled the world to Himself (2 Cor. 5:19), it follows that on the cross, God justified the world in Christ Jesus since reconciliation is another way of talking about justification. There is no way to escape this logical conclusion. Thus, there is no way to escape universal legal justification (ULJ). As it will be observed when evaluating chapter four, scholars who teach universal legal justification (ULJ) simply emphasize the objective and subjective aspects of justification. In their view, the objective aspect of justification suggests that justification is entirely an act of God without an individual exercising faith. The subjective aspect of justification suggests that justification where God declares an individual righteous who has believed the holy history of Jesus Christ. When an individual believes the justification already existing in Christ Jesus, that individual is declared righteous or acquitted by God at a subjective level.

Where Blazen says that in Rom. 5 Jesus dies for people while they are still sinners; and the saving event is apart from them and before the emergence of faith; the promoters of universal legal justification (ULJ) teach that in that saving event, God in Christ saved the entire human race. What Blazen and others call provision made by God for those who believe to be saved, the promoters of universal legal justification (ULJ) call actual salvation, which only becomes effective when individuals believe. I am of the view that the scholars on both sides of the debate have lost each other on the use of terms. Apart from that, the promoters of the vicarious view of
atonement have lost Sequeira in particular on the humanity of Jesus Christ as it relates to atonement. This will be made clear when evaluating chapter four.

I support the view that justification is always preceded by faith. But this support has to be qualified. Justification that is always preceded by faith is that justification whose basis is the justification already existing in Christ Jesus by virtue of Him having been justified or declared righteous by His Father. Jesus Christ rendered perfect obedience to His Father. As such, though the sins of the entire humanity were laid on Him, and thus He died on the cross, God declared Him righteous by raising Him from the grave. His resurrection is evidence that of Himself He did not commit any sin. Emphasis should be made that God justified the individual Christ who died on the cross on the basis that He did not commit any sin. But that individual Christ who did not commit sin, and so was justified by God, was the entire human race in one person. Now if Christ was the entire human race in one person, then the entire human race was justified in Him. Thus in justifying the individual Christ because He did not commit sin, and that Christ who was justified was the entire human race, the entire human race was justified. This truth has to be accepted by individuals for them to be justified by that justification which is always preceded by faith. This is what Christ meant when He said that those who believed would be saved (Mark 16:15, 16). This is the required faith for salvation in John 3:14-19.

The difference between provisional justification and universal legal justification (ULJ) hinges on the subject of the humanity of Christ. This is equally true about vicarious atonement and actual atonement. This will be made clear when evaluating chapter four. For now I will evaluate the in Christ motif as understood by the promoters of the vicarious view of atonement.

6.2.3. Vicarious atonement and the in Christ motif

According to Blazen (2005:3), ἐν Χριστῷ means to be incorporated into the salvation-historical events of Christ’s death and resurrection and to become a receptor of the efficacy and redeeming qualities of those events. ὁ ἐν Χριστῷ means that a personal union between Christ and the Christian has taken place (Blazen 2005:8).

A survey of Paul’s epistles in which the in Christ concept is taught more than elsewhere in the Bible reveals that the epistles were addressed to believers in Christ. Therefore, this context in itself suggests as Blazen puts it that the people in Christ are personally united to Christ. There is
no possibility of, or meaningfulness to, being in Christ without a personal relationship with the living Christ (Blazen 2005:8). Thus, those who have not yet accepted Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord cannot be said to be in Christ.

In my view, Blazen's contention is only true if we neglect the general context of the Bible, and in particular of the whole plan of salvation. His contention is only true if in the incarnation Jesus Christ did not take upon Himself the fallen human nature that He found. But it is my contention that Jesus Christ took upon Himself the fallen human nature that He found. Thus, fallen human nature got into Christ at the time that fallen nature was joined to His divine nature. Because of the incarnation, the entire human race is objectively in Christ Jesus. When Christ obeyed, the entire humanity obeyed in Him. When He died on the cross, the entire humanity died in Him. When He rose from the grave, the entire humanity rose in Him. When He ascended to heaven, the entire humanity ascended to heaven in Him.

It should be noted that there was definitely an individual Christ who existed at some point in human history. But this individual Christ was a corporate human being. He had all of us in Him in the sense that He became us. He had always been God by nature. He became what He had never been by nature. At a risk of repetition, Christ became us. He obeyed as an individual Christ; and yet that individual Christ who obeyed was us. We did not consciously obey; it was the individual Christ who obeyed. Yet we obeyed in Him. He died as an individual Christ; and yet that individual Christ who died was us. He rose as an individual Christ; and yet that individual Christ who rose was us. He ascended to heaven as an individual Christ; and yet that individual Christ who ascended to heaven was us. This is what the in Christ motif is all about. It is founded on the biblical teaching that the entire humanity was created in one man, Adam (Humankind). There was the individual person, Adam; yet that individual person Adam was the entire humanity. He consciously sinned as an individual person Adam; yet the individual person Adam who consciously sinned was the entire humanity. It was the individual person Adam who was condemned to die the second death; yet that individual person Adam who was condemned to die the second death was the entire humanity. Thus, it is perfectly right to say that the entire humanity sinned in Adam (Rom. 5:12) in the sense that the seed from which the entire humanity originated was in Him when He sinned. Adam’s sin ruined the entirety of life in all its aspects since the entire humanity was genetically in him.
It is perfectly right also to say that when Christ died on the cross, since sin was condemned in His flesh, which was our flesh (Rom. 8:3), the condemnation was objectively reversed for the entire humanity. This is God’s incredible good news of salvation through His Son Jesus Christ. When this truth is preached to the world, every individual who believes is justified in a subjective sense (Mark 16:15, 16; John 3:14-16, 36; 5:24). They get into Christ in a subjective sense of acknowledging their new position already existing in Him. Those who reject Christ, however, are condemned in a subjective sense (John 3:18). They are condemned because they have rejected their new position already existing in Christ Jesus.

What has this got to do with vicarious atonement? The individual Christ, after taking us into Himself, obeyed and died on the cross for us and in our place. He died for and in place of the entire humanity of which He had become part. At the same time, He died for me and in my place, for He took me into Himself. Christ Jesus was the Substitute for the entire humanity in the sense that He died in the place of the entire humanity. Christ Jesus was my Substitute in the sense that He died in my place. The one who died as our Substitute was one of our own, Jesus Christ. The incarnation qualified Him to be our Substitute. Thus, I am in support of vicarious atonement, which is based on the in Christ motif as I have explained it.

The view that at the incarnation, Jesus Christ took humanity into Himself is taught by Seventh-day Adventist Prophetess, Ellen G. White. She writes; “In Christ, divinity and humanity were combined. Divinity was not degraded to humanity; divinity held its place, but humanity by being united to divinity withstood the fiercest test of temptation in the wilderness” (White 1958:408). That humanity which was combined with divinity was the fallen humanity that Christ found.

The union of divinity and humanity took place at the incarnation. It is our fallen humanity, which was united to Christ’s divinity at the incarnation, which we say is in Christ even before we subjectively get into Him by virtue of our having accepted Him as Saviour and Lord. We are not in Christ in a mystical way; our fallen humanity was united to His divinity at the incarnation. That humanity represents us in Christ Jesus. Christ condemned sin in the fallen humanity that was joined to His divinity at the incarnation through His life of obedience, and also at the cross when He died in our place. So, Christ dealt with sin as nature as well as sin as acts or behaviour.
Related to the vicarious model of atonement as the in Christ motif which has just been evaluated is the humanity of Jesus Christ, and this is what I will now evaluate.

6.2.4. Vicarious atonement and the humanity of Christ

In chapter three, it was shown that at least three views on the humanity of Christ exist in the Seventh-day Adventist Church today. These are the post-lapsarian (nature of Adam after the Fall), the pre-lapsarian (nature of Adam before the Fall), and the alternative Christology (not corresponding to Adam’s humanity before the Fall and not in every respect like Adam’s humanity after the Fall). Each of the various groups of scholars who teach the vicarious view of atonement teaches one of these positions on the humanity of Jesus Christ. It should be indicated however, that the alternative Christology has been popularized by including it in *Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology* (2000) and *Seventh-day Adventists Believe* (2005). For this reason many Seventh-day Adventists do not know what the position of the church had always been up to about 1952. When they read these two books, they believe that this is the position of the Seventh-day Adventist Church.

In the preface to the *Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology*, Dederen (2000: xi) writes;

This volume is sent forth, not with any idea of finality, but rather in the hope that it will be of use in Adventist and non-Adventist homes, classrooms, and libraries, as well as in pastoral offices as a handy and valued reference tool for information in various aspects of Adventist understanding and practice.

As new Seventh-day Adventists and non-Seventh-day Adventists read this book they come across the alternative Christology and convince themselves that it is the official teaching of the Seventh-day Adventist Church on the humanity of Christ, and yet it simply reflects what some Seventh-day Adventist scholars of influence and administrators believe best expresses what the Church believes. As Dederen (2000:x) makes it clear; the preparation of this work itself was mandated by an action of the 1988 Annual Council meeting of the General Conference Executive Committee in Nairobi, Kenya. The Annual Council does work on behalf of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, but is not mandated to vote statements of fundamental beliefs.
What has been said about the *Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology* is true about *Seventh-day Adventists Believe*. New Seventh-day Adventists and non-Seventh-day Adventists who read this book believe that the alternative Christology is the official teaching of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. This statement therefore, is helpful;

Although this volume is not an officially voted statement (only the summary statements have been officially voted by the General Conference in session), it may be viewed as representative of the truth as it is in Jesus (Ephesians 4:21) that Seventh-day Adventists around the globe cherish and proclaim (Ministerial Association of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists 2005: vi).

In my view, the alternative Christology has been subtly imposed on especially pastors who because it is in these two books, are forced to teach it in the very language of the scholars who promote it for fear that if they taught something else they would be regarded as rebels. There could be very few pastors who may know that the alternative Christology is not an official teaching of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. This is a very unfortunate situation for the Seventh-day Adventist Church.

What then is the official position of the Seventh-day Adventist Church? It is this;

God the eternal Son became incarnate in Jesus Christ. Through Him all things were created, the character of God is revealed, the salvation of humanity is accomplished, and the world is judged. Forever truly God, He became also truly [humankind], Jesus the Christ. He was conceived of the Holy Spirit and born of the virgin Mary. He lived and experienced temptation as a human being but perfectly exemplified the righteousness and love of God. By His miracles He manifested God's power and was attested as God's promised Messiah. He suffered and died voluntarily on the cross for our sins and in our place, was raised from the dead, and ascended to minister in the heavenly sanctuary on our behalf. He will come again in glory for the final deliverance of His people and the
restoration of all things (Ministerial Association of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists 2005:43).

As it will be noticed, this Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) fundamental belief does not say anything about the specific human nature that Christ took. On this issue Rodriguez (2003) says; Ũhe church has wisely not elucidated in a doctrinal statement the specific nature of Jesus’s human nature.Š The Seventh-day Adventist Church (SDAC) therefore, does not have an official doctrinal statement on the specific nature of Jesus Christ’s humanity. This however, does not suggest that the Church has always had no universal teaching on the humanity of Christ. There was a time when the Church spoke with one voice on the specific human nature of Jesus Christ. Since Seventh-day Adventists believe that Ellen G. White was a God given prophetess to their church, her teaching on the specific human nature of Jesus Christ could be said to be representative of what all Seventh-day Adventists taught at least for a good number of years before other views were accommodated.

White (1958:256) writes; ŨIn taking upon Himself man’s nature in its fallen condition, Christ did not in the least participate in its sin.Š White’s teaching was that Jesus Christ took upon Himself man’s nature in its fallen condition, except that He did not participate in its sin. She wrote; ŨJesus told them… that He would take man’s fallen nature.Š (White 2005:176). That Ellen G. White taught that Jesus Christ took the fallen human nature has been confirmed by such scholars as Webster (1984:95-98), Larson (1986), Knight (1987:143), and Zurcher (1999:53-67). As noted by Larson (1986: ix), this was the teaching of the Seventh-day Adventist Church for about one hundred years; from about 1852 to 1952.

In the early 1950s, some Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) theologians began to teach that Jesus Christ took upon Himself the pre-Fall nature of Adam (Zurcher 1999:153-166). This, in Zurcher’s opinion was Adventism’s Milestone (1999:153). The controversy about vicarious atonement and actual atonement can be traced back to the beginning of this milestone. As it will be noticed when evaluating chapter four, Jack Sequeira came up with the actual view of atonement, which he believed did justice to the original Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) teaching on the humanity of Jesus Christ.
The alternative Christology was formulated after some theologians had started teaching the pre-Fall human nature of Jesus Christ. Evaluating this Christology, Zurcher (1999:273) says; “In harmony with the traditional Christology of the pioneers, the alternative position teaches that Jesus took Adam’s human nature after the Fall. He notes however, that its promoters teach that Christ was unlike all other fallen human beings in that He was born without evil tendencies, and therefore they at this point agree with the new Christology or pre-Fall view of Christ’s humanity (Zurcher 1999: 274).

My personal opinion is that both the pre-Fall view of Christ’s humanity and the alternative Christology fail to address the questions that arise in relation to the penal substitutionary theory of atonement. Had Jesus Christ come in unfallen flesh, He would not have suffered in the flesh (1 Pet. 4:1), for it is fallen flesh that suffers when it is tempted. I can add that if Jesus Christ had come in unfallen flesh, He would not have been tempted as we are (Heb. 4:15). The Bible says; “But each one is tempted when he is drawn away by his own desires and enticed (James 1:14). This I believe is how Jesus Christ was tempted if indeed He was tempted as we are. This is not possible in an unfallen flesh.

The alternative Christology fails to address the question of how Jesus Christ dealt with sin as nature. While upholding the fallen nature position, Webster (1984:451) says; “We submit, however, that Jesus Christ, while coming in fallen human nature was not infected by original sin and was born without any tendencies and propensities to sin, thus, we need have no misgivings concerning His absolute sinlessness.” If Christ Jesus was born without tendencies and propensities to sin, He definitely did not reach us where we were; and so He left us half unsaved.

To conclude this section I wish to commend Seventh-day Adventist promoters of the vicarious view of the penal substitutionary theory of atonement for emphasizing the fact that Jesus Christ’s death was substitutionary. The vicarious or substitutionary view of atonement emphasizes salvation by grace through faith, which the Reformers taught. Biblically, we are saved by grace through faith in the birth, life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. This holy history of Jesus Christ takes the place of our sinful history in a way of exchange whereby Jesus Christ takes our sinful history and we receive His holy history. Our sins were laid on Jesus Christ, and therefore, He died the death we deserved to die (1 Pet.2:24). Jesus Christ died for and in our place. Since our salvation comes from Jesus Christ, we cannot boast of any goodness that can commend us
before God (Eph. 2:8-9). In the context of the vicarious or substitutionary view of atonement, Paul’s statement makes a lot of sense; "But of Him [God] you are in Christ Jesus, who became for us wisdom from God-and righteousness and sanctification and redemption-that, as it is written, ‘He who glories, let him glory in the Lord’ (1 Cor. 1:30-31).

While commending these Seventh-day Adventist promoters of the vicarious or substitutionary view of atonement, I wish to observe that by taking the humanity of Jesus Christ to have been quite different from ours although being that of fallen humanity, these scholars have failed to give a satisfactory answer as to how the Saviour dealt with sin as nature. If Jesus Christ’s humanity, though being that of fallen humanity was sinless in the sense that His flesh was not indwelt by the law of sin that resides in every child of Adam then He did not condemn sin in His flesh, which is actually our flesh (Rom. 8:1-3). And if Jesus Christ did not condemn sin in His flesh, which is actually our flesh, then overcoming sin is impossible this side of eternity. But if Jesus Christ assumed our fallen nature with all its liabilities, except that in His case, He was different from us in the sense that He was also divine and He did not commit sin, then we have a Saviour who has totally dealt with the sin problem. Our sin as nature has been dealt with as well as our sin as acts or behaviour. In the Old Testament sanctuary service, the sinner identified with the sacrificial animal by placing his hands on the head of the animal. There was transfer of sin, but there was also sinner’s identification with the animal.

As it was stated in chapter one, the vicarious model of atonement has a competing view in the actual model of atonement. The actual model of atonement will now be evaluated.

6.3. Critical Evaluation: Jesus Christ’s Death as Actual

As noted above, chapter four will be evaluated in the context of chapter five as chapter five was meant to clarify what our human legal system says about vicarious liability. This is because Seventh-day Adventist systematic theologian Jack Sequeira in his 1993 and 1996 books claimed that both God’s law and human law do not allow transfer of sin from the guilty to the innocent. Roman Catholic theologians had advanced a criticism to the Reformers’ penal substitutionary theory that it taught ‘legal fiction,’ a ‘passed-on righteousness’ or ‘celestial bookkeeping’ (Sequeira 1999). Therefore, Sequeira formulated his actual view of atonement to try to explain how God could allow an innocent person (Jesus Christ) to die for the sins of guilty humanity, and
still remain true to His teaching that an innocent person shall not die for the sins of the guilty (Deut. 24:16; 2 Kin. 14:6; Ezek. 18:4, 20). In his view, the solution lay in the human nature that Jesus Christ assumed at the incarnation (see p. 99 of this dissertation). The format followed in evaluating chapter three will also be followed in evaluating chapter four.

6.3.1. The use of the terms vicarious and substitutionary

In chapter three it was noted that Jack Sequeira did not until 2009 treat vicarious and substitutionary as synonymous terms. For this reason, in his 1993 book, he rejected the vicarious view of atonement. He wrote; “Christ, in His humanity, saved men and women in actuality—not vicariously” (Sequeira 1999:48). To prove that Sequeira did not in 1993 use the terms vicarious and substitutionary as synonymous terms, I will quote another statement from his 1993 book; “Biblically, the doctrine of substitution is based on the concept of solidarity or corporate oneness” (Sequeira 1999:40). Thus, while rejecting vicarious atonement, Sequeira supports substitution. In the pre-2009 Sequeira view, Christ death was substitutionary, but it was not vicarious.

Three years later, Sequeira (1996:72) wrote; “Substitution is no doubt a central pillar of the gospel.” In his view, the doctrine of substitution teaches that Christ, as the second Adam, saved us as our Substitute, because He lived and died for, or instead of, us (Sequeira 1996:72). But while supporting the doctrine of substitution, Sequeira (1996:87) asserts; “It may be possible for Christ to bear our sins vicariously on His cross—although that would be illegal—but it is impossible for Him vicariously to overcome and condemn the principle of sin that resides in our sinful flesh.” Again this statement proves that Sequeira did not in 1996 use the terms vicarious and substitutionary as synonymous terms. Had he used them as synonymous terms, he would not have said that it would be illegal for Christ to vicariously bear our sins on His cross.

It has been argued that Sequeira rejects the doctrine of substitution. For example, Zurcher (1999: 258), while evaluating Sequeira Christology observes;

Sequeira Christology is only a foundation of his theology regarding how sinners are saved in Christ. His nontraditional stand against substitutionary atonement has proved to be controversial, but he clearly
takes a stand in favour of traditional Christology, basing his arguments
on Scripture and not Ellen White.

Should it be taken as Zurcher suggests that Sequeira has taken a stand against substitutionary
atonement? This is a very difficult question to answer. On one hand, if it is taken that the term
vicarious is synonymous with the term substitutionary, I have to answer the question in the
affirmative. Saying that Christ’s death was not vicarious is the same as saying that it was not
substitutionary. On the other hand however, if I critically analyze what Sequeira himself has
written about the doctrine of substitution, I will conclude that he supports it by relating it to the
humanity of Christ. It was noted that he calls it a biblical doctrine (see p. 5 of this dissertation). It
was also noted that he affirms that it is a central pillar of the gospel (see p. 5 of this dissertation).

Having been taught by Sequeira, and also having read his books, I can affirm that he does not
reject the doctrine of substitution. He instead tries to make it ethically right by relating it to the
humanity that Christ assumed; thereby qualifying Him to be our Substitute. However, by failing
to point out clearly that he was not using the terms vicarious and substitutionary as synonymous
terms, he led scholars on the other side of the debate to accuse him of rejecting the doctrine of
substitution.

The view that Sequeira does not reject the doctrine of substitution is supported by Weber
(1994:66) who writes;

[Quote from Weber]

So Jack Sequeira indeed does believe in salvation through the doing and
dying of Christ. His point is that rather than dying instead of us, Jesus
incorporated our humanity within his body and thus died as our
representative. In that sense He is our substitute.

In responding to Sequeira’s argument that he had been misrepresented on his statement that the
vicarious model of atonement was both illegal and unethical, Bauer (2008:5) notes that he did
not address the rationale of Sequeira in rejecting vicarious atonement in any detail. This being
the case, I am of the view that no effort has been made by Sequeira’s critics such as Bauer to
consider his rationale in rejecting vicarious atonement. It will be noticed that those who have
attempted to evaluate Sequeira’s teaching on atonement have only referred to his 1993 book.
They have not considered what he has said in his 1996 book. Neither have they read his 2009 book.

At the same time, I wish to state that in both his 1993 and 1996 books, Sequeira argued that he believed in the concept of Christ dying *for us* and *in our place*, yet he opposed the vicarious model of atonement. For him, vicarious substitution is not held in partial contrast but in complete contrast to the in Christ view (Bauer 2008:5). I therefore, support Bauer’s assertion that Such verbiage leaves the conscientious reader with the impression, not that Sequeira is trying to redeem the vicarious model to a proper usage, but, rather, that he fully opposes the concept (Bauer 2008:5). Again I am in harmony with Bauer (2008:5) when he states; If Sequeira wants us to understand him to be rehabilitating and not rejecting the vicarious substitution model, then this mega-argument, which holds vicarious substitution in opposition to actual substitution, subverts this intention.

In my opinion, Sequeira is in no way rehabilitating the vicarious model of atonement in his 1993 and 1996 books. It should be emphasized however, that his aim is to teach a legal and ethical substitutionary model. In doing this, he forgets that the terms vicarious and substitutionary are in Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) thought used interchangeably, and so creates a doubt in the minds of his readers as to what he is really trying to achieve. Therefore, his critics are perfectly right in concluding that he rejects the vicarious model of atonement, for that is what he actually does.

There is another way to show that Sequeira understood vicarious substitution quite differently from those who teach it. He notes that there are three groups in the Seventh-day Adventist Church who teach the post-Fall view of Christ’s human nature (Sequeira 1996:112). The group that is of particular interest to me is the one of which he observes; Those in this group teach the post-Fall view of Christ’s human nature in the context of His being our *example* and *vicariously* substituting Himself for us (Sequeira 1996:112). So there is a group in the Seventh-day Adventist Church that teaches the post-Fall view of Christ’s human nature, and also supports vicarious substitution. This group emphasizes the idea that Christ was our example in holy living, and so we can overcome as He overcame. It is contradictory that this group as argued by Sequeira could teach vicarious substitution, and yet take to the front the example idea of Christ’s mission. This is because those who emphasize the example idea of Christ’s mission turn to be legalistic, and do not emphasize salvation by grace through faith in Jesus Christ, which is
actually the main thrust in vicarious substitution. Whatever it is that this group teaches about vicarious substitution, what is of interest to me is that Sequeira rejected the vicarious model of atonement with full knowledge that it was not only taught by those who held to the pre-Fall view of Christ's human nature, but also by a group that teaches that Christ took the post-Fall human nature of Adam. And since the terms vicarious and substitutionary are synonymous, he was rightly accused of rejecting the doctrine of substitution. For, if his intention as he suggests had only been to teach the doctrine of substitution in the context of the fallen human nature that Christ assumed, he would have at least tried to find out how it was possible for a group that believes as he does that Christ took fallen human nature to teach vicarious substitution. My opinion is that in trying to restore the postlapsarian position, Sequeira ended up rejecting the doctrine of substitution in a manner that he cannot himself understand and accept.

There is however, a 2009 Jack Sequeira who appears to partially accept and support the vicarious model of atonement. He writes; "Since Christ did not participate in or commit sins (in thought, word, or deed), we can say that he vicariously redeemed humanity from its sins (sinful behaviour)" (Sequeira 2009:355). In his view however; "He [Christ] had no immediate avenue for saving humanity from its nature, unless He identified Himself, personally, with the sin problem" (Sequeira 2009:355). To save humanity from its nature, He had to meet head-on the law of sin (a constant force dwelling in our sinful natures, according to Romans 7:22-24) (Sequeira 2009:355). The only way He could do so was by assuming mankind's fallen nature (Sequeira 2009:355).

Thus, it can be argued that all along, Sequeira was failing to find a way of explaining that he believed in a vicarious model of atonement that takes into consideration a human nature of Christ that is able to deal with the law of sin that dwells in our flesh, but he rejects a vicarious model of atonement that leaves humanity without hope in terms of how Christ dealt with sin as nature. And as the case should be, the 2009 Sequeira is the one we need to evaluate, for he represents growth in the understanding of substitutionary atonement from his 1993 total rejection of the vicarious model to the 1996 moderate rejection to partial acceptance in 2009.

There is need at this point to evaluate Jack Sequeira's actual view of atonement to see how it could be reconciled with the vicarious view, which he as of 2009 partially accepts and supports.
6.3.2. The actual view of atonement

As it has been observed, from 1993 to before 2009, Sequeira rejected the vicarious model of atonement. It will be noticed in his 1993 and 1996 books that he did so because in his view those who promoted it taught that Christ had to take a sinless human nature (like Adam’s before the Fall) in order to substitute Himself vicariously for our sinful nature, which stands condemned (Sequeira 1999:42). In his opinion, this view makes the gospel unethical and illegal, as no law of God or man will allow guilt or righteousness to be transferred from one person to another (Sequeira 1999:42). Sequeira (2005:81) writes; “In the law of the land and the law of God, guilt cannot be legally transferred. This is a fundamental truth of all law. So those who teach vicarious substitution are rightly accused of teaching a legal fiction or a passed-on righteousness.”

Sequeira’s view as it will be noticed tries to make the doctrine of substitution ethically and legally acceptable. He notes that those who take this actual position of atonement teach that Christ took the human nature Adam had after his fall (Sequeira 1999:43). This was necessary because Christ came to save fallen humanity; He had to assume the sinful humanity that needed redeeming; and by thus identifying Himself with our corporate fallen humanity, Christ qualified Himself to be the second Adam and legally gained the right to be our Substitute (Sequeira 1999:43).

A critical analysis of Sequeira’s actual model of atonement reveals that he teaches that by assuming fallen humanity, thereby qualifying Himself to be our Substitute, Christ died for us, or in our place, or as us. As it will be noticed except for where he suggests that Christ died as us, this is vicarious or substitutionary atonement. It is necessary therefore, that Sequeira’s argument that transfer of guilt from the guilty to the innocent is illegal in both the law of the land and God’s law be evaluated. This will be done hereunder. The legality of Sequeira’s actual view of atonement will also be evaluated.

6.3.2.1. The legality or illegality of vicarious atonement

Is Sequeira’s argument that transfer of guilt from the guilty to the innocent is illegal correct? The Bible seems to suggest this when we are told that the son shall not die for the sins of the father and vice versa (Deut. 24:16; 2 Kin. 14:6; Ezek. 18:4, 20). But this is a son and father situation.
Would it apply to the situation existing between humanity and God? Sequeira’s argument is that God does not contradict Himself. Thus, He should not be made to contradict His own law by teaching that He allowed a transfer of sin from the guilty to the innocent.

However, as it was noted in chapter two and chapter three, the Bible clearly teaches that the sins of fallen humanity were transferred to Christ (1 Pet.2:24). This understanding of atonement is found in both the Old Testament and the New Testament. And in his 2009 book, Sequeira partially supports this model of atonement. According to him, this was possible because Christ did not commit any sin either in thought or deeds (Sequeira 2009:355). Thus, for Sequeira, it is now settled that vicarious atonement is biblically legal. It should not be forgotten, nevertheless, that in Sequeira’s view, what makes this vicarious atonement legal is the fact that Christ was qualified to be our Substitute by assuming our fallen nature at the incarnation.

With respect to the law of the land, Sequeira’s argument is correct. As it was noted in chapter five, a person is criminally liable if he committed an offence called in Latin, the *actus reus*, and he had a guilty mind at the time of committing the offence called in Latin, the *mens rea*. Guilt therefore, cannot be transferred from the guilty to the innocent. I, therefore, cannot be punished for the criminal offence of my child, although some legal minds are suggesting that the law should make provision for parents to pay for the offences of their minor children on the basis of the parent-child relationship and the responsibility that parents have to train their children. Even if this were to be universally accepted, it would only apply to the relationship existing between parents and their minor children who are still under the tutorship of their parents. Thus, it still remains a fact that the law of the land does not allow transfer of guilt from the guilty to the innocent.

It should be noted nevertheless, that the illegality of vicarious liability is only true to a limited extent. In civil and administrative law, vicarious liability, including criminal vicarious liability is permitted. It was noted in chapter five that in employment situations for example, where there is an employer-employee relationship; where the employee commits a tort in the course of his employment; where what the employee was doing was within the scope of his employment; and the employee did what he did or failed to do what he should have done, thereby causing injury or damage to a third party in the course of business, the employer is liable. In certain situations, the employer might be held criminally liable.
While this kind of liability may suggest that Sequeira is not hundred percent right in his assertion, it should be observed that there are three parties involved in the transaction that brings about civil vicarious liability. In an employment situation the first party is the employer. The second party is the employee. And the third party is the person who suffers damage as a result of the second party’s action or omission. This does not apply in the God and man situation. Man offended God by breaking His law. There was no third party who suffered damage due to man’s sin. And it was Jesus Christ, the second person of the offended Godhead who paid the penalty for the sin that man committed. Jesus Christ satisfied both the positive and negative demands of justice. He obeyed the law perfectly, and He died the second death for, and in place of the entire humanity. In vicarious liability that is permitted in the law of the land, an innocent employer cannot choose to die in place of an employee where such an employee has for example, committed a capital offence. The employer may simply compensate the relatives of the deceased. But even if the employer were to voluntarily accept to be executed in place of the employee, it would be contrary to the principles of justice, which require that the guilty and not the innocent should be punished. A corporate body may vicariously be held responsible for the criminal offence or tort of its employee. But while that corporate body is a legal person capable of suing and being sued, it is an artificial person and therefore, in terms of criminal liability of its employees, it cannot take the place of those employees since though a legal person, it is not a human being. To hold its directors criminally responsible for criminal offences of its employees would be unethical and illegal. The offender should in this case be held personally liable for the offence committed. The relationship subsisting is merely that of employer and employee, and is completely different from that between God and man. In the God and humankind relationship, God is the Creator of the human being who has not offended a third party, but the Creator who created him. And so it is the Creator who has decided to make a vicarious atonement, where He, in the person of His equal who becomes a human being takes the place of the human being who has sinned and dies to effect that atonement. Therefore, vicarious liability permissible in the law of the land is different from that obtaining in Scripture. There are no issues of mercy in the vicarious liability that is permissible in the law of the land. In vicarious atonement, however, it is God’s mercy that provides a Substitute for the sinner. As Schwertley (2014) puts it; ‘God’s infinite holiness, justice and righteousness of necessity demand the infliction of punishment on
the sinner himself or on an appropriate substitute. Mercy found a Substitute in Jesus Christ, the second person of the Godhead.

I need to note that the law of the land is made up of different categories of law, which are administered differently. There is for example, public law, which has some subdivisions. Criminal law belongs to the category of public law. It is in criminal law where guilt is never transferred from the guilty to the innocent, and offences are always made against the state. I believe this is what Sequeira refers to in his books. There is also private law to which civil law belongs. Civil cases can either be between the state and a private person, or between a private person and another private person. Included also could be cases between a company and another company, or between the state and a company and vice versa. Unlike in criminal law where offenders are punished by way of being imprisoned or executed (for a capital offence in Zambia), in civil law the person who has caused injury or damage to the other is required only to compensate the offended party. In civil law, the state may offend private persons and vice versa; the remedy is always an award of compensation to the injured party. Thus, it remains a fact that public law of the land does not permit the transfer of guilt from the guilty to the innocent.

Biblically there was and there will always be one law the breaking of which necessitated substitutionary atonement. This is God’s law, which in the Garden of Eden was in form of the command not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil (Gen. 2:17). That law was later (at Mount Sinai) written on two tables of stone in ten statements (Ex. 20:1-17). Jesus said that He did not come to destroy, but to fulfill that law (Matt. 5:17-19). Of course the law referred to by Jesus includes both the Ten Commandments and the five books of Moses. A simple definition of sin is that given by the apostle John, that it is the breaking of God’s law or lawlessness (1 John 3:4). In my opinion, God’s law is similar but not identical to public law. Sin is always committed against God, and not against other human beings. And the penalty for sin is always death (Rom. 6:23). A person will die for his own sin and not for the sin of another person (Ezek. 18: 4, 20). Like in criminal law, for a person to be punished he must have committed sin (an offence) against God. It should be observed however, that while criminal law does not punish people for an offence, which is only in the mind, and is not translated into an act or an attempt, God’s law holds a person guilty who cherishes sinful thoughts even if these thoughts are not translated into acts (Matt. 5: 21-30). The net effect of what has been noted is that law, whether God’s or of the
land (state), does not permit transfer of guilt from the guilty to the innocent. Only private law permits what is called vicarious liability. Therefore, biblical vicarious liability should never be thought of in terms of civil or administrative vicarious liability. I should hasten to state also that in public law, the offender who is serving a jail sentence can be pardoned by the president under what is called the prerogative of mercy, which is provided for in the constitution of the land. The president does nothing in terms of satisfying the law; He simply pardons the offender on the recommendation of a constituted committee. This is not possible with God’s law. It is either the sinner completely pays for the sin committed, or a substitute takes the sinner’s place. It is either the sinner dies the second death, or a substitute dies in his place.

There is another essential difference between vicarious liability, which is permitted by the law of the land and the one that applies to the God and human being situation. While the employer may be held vicariously liable for the criminal offence or tort of the employee, the employee is not always released from personal liability. It should be noted however, that it is for each jurisdiction in a statute to indicate what the case shall be. Where vicarious liability is of a tortuous nature, the injured party merely chooses where to place that liability; either on the employer or the employee. It all depends on who is in the position to compensate; and as fast as the injured party may expect. In administrative vicarious liability, the employee may be sent to prison for say, raping a third party, but the government may still have to compensate the victim if that victim decides to sue it (see for example, the South African case of F v Minister of Safety and Security). But vicarious atonement is different in that Christ’s death releases the offender from all liability. The only person, who will suffer personally despite Christ having died for him, or in his place, is the one who has decided to reject Christ’s sacrifice on Calvary’s cross.

I wish to note at this point that the legality of vicarious atonement may probably (as Jack Sequeira suggests) be supported based on the truth that in the incarnation, Christ assumed fallen human nature, thereby qualifying Himself to be our Substitute. Otherwise, it will have to be concluded that God permits vicarious atonement on terms that can be understood by Him alone. Vicarious atonement is God’s demonstration of His love. In letting sinners free and punishing Himself in the person of His Son (God incarnate), God demonstrated that He is both merciful and just. It should be stressed that God did not punish a person other than Himself (in the person of His Son). Therefore, if ever there was injustice done to Jesus Christ, it was injustice done to
God Himself. The doctrine of the Trinity allows me to make this conclusion. It was unnecessary therefore, for Jack Sequeira to reject vicarious atonement because of the seeming illegality that some scholars associate with it. With this comment, it is necessary to evaluate the legality of actual atonement.

6.3.2.2. The legality of actual atonement

In actual substitution, Christ assumes fallen human nature, obeys God, dies on the cross, and rises from the grave. Christ died for us, or instead of us (Sequeira 1996:74). This Christ, who died for us, or instead of us, died as us in the sense that the fallen human nature He assumed was not His by native right but ours. He took that fallen human nature in order that He may redeem it. Thus, He legally qualified to be our Substitute by becoming us.

The question is: If the Christ who died on the cross died as us, did we not die for our own sins? Does this model not reject the concept of transfer of sin? If we died for our own sins, then Christ died in vain. We can boast of having saved ourselves against what Scripture clearly teaches (Eph. 2:1-9).

It is important for us to remind ourselves that the 2009 Jack Sequeira is different from the 1993 and 1996 Sequeira. As of 2009, Sequeira believes that Christ took our sins (acts or behaviour) vicariously. What about sin as nature? He condemned it in the fallen human flesh that He assumed. And since the fallen human flesh He assumed was ours, sin no longer has power over those who believe the holy history of Jesus Christ. This is because those who believe the holy history of Jesus Christ identify themselves with His life, death, and resurrection. They believe that sin as nature was condemned in the flesh and died the second death in Christ Jesus. When fallen nature tries to pull them towards sin, they say to it; ÒYou are dead!Ó They count themselves as being dead to sin, but alive to righteousness. By denying the flesh of its cravings, they suffer in that flesh just like Christ suffered in the fallen flesh that He assumed (1 Pet. 4: 1). Just like Christ was victorious over sin, they are victorious over sin through Christ.

Sequeira does not teach that we died for our own sins. It was Christ who died about two thousand years ago. But since that which He became (a fallen human being) was us, He died as us. Thus, on one hand, we did not die in the sense that it was that Christ who assumed fallen human nature who died on the cross. A particular identifiable individual Jesus Christ died on the
cross the death identifiable individuals deserved to die. On the other hand, we died in the sense that that particular identifiable Jesus Christ who died on Calvary’s cross was us. Therefore, it is perfectly right to say that Jesus Christ’s death was vicarious or substitutionary. At the same time, it can be argued without contradiction that Christ’s death was actual in the sense that He identified Himself with fallen humanity in everything except for sin as an act or behaviour. In His life and death, He condemned sin in the flesh.

Is actual substitution legally acceptable? What I wish to state is that both the vicarious and actual models of atonement create legal questions that we may not be able to answer. For example, law does not permit transfer of guilt, and yet the Bible clearly teaches that Christ bore the guilt of the entire humanity. Even in the actual model, I did not physically die on Calvary’s cross about two thousand years ago; it was Christ who died. Indeed, the incarnation legally qualified Him to be our Substitute; yet, it is a fact that though a corporate person, Christ was as well an individual person. An African may go to work as our representative at the United Nations headquarters. While it could be argued that we are working at the United Nations headquarters as Africans because our representative is working there, it is true that we are here in Africa doing our own businesses. The African who is physically working at the United Nations as our representative is an individual independent of us; but still an African who is flesh of our flesh and bone of our bones. What qualified him to go there (apart from his personal qualifications) was the fact that he is an African. If he were to be substituted, another African would be required. If that African were to die out there, we would not all of us physically die, we would still be physically alive. And yet the African who died was bone of our bones and flesh of our flesh. Man sinned. He deserved to die. But in His infinite mercy, God found a Substitute for man in the person of His Son Jesus Christ. As a Substitute, He needed to be human, and so Christ assumed human nature. He needed to be the very flesh and blood of the human being that He was to substitute (Heb. 2:14).

The law applicable to a substitute may not in every respect apply to Christ because in His case, He is the God-Man. He was legally qualified to be our Substitute by joining His divinity to humanity because only one who was God could be our Substitute. But it must be emphasized that He was not our Substitute as God, but as a Human Being. This is a mystery, and scholars would do well to accept the truth as it is in God’s Word. It is beyond us to talk about the legality
of substitutionary atonement. I nevertheless, commend Jack Sequeira for his effort to try to explain the inexplicable, although in trying to do so he has brought confusion in the minds of some of his readers. For example, I believe that if vicarious atonement is illegal, then actual atonement is also illegal. How? In both models, guilt is transferred from the guilty to the innocent; from the sinner to Christ. Jack Sequeira may not have seen this in his actual model of atonement. In my view, I did not die about two thousand years ago; Christ died. Christ in fallen human flesh died. And since it was Christ in fallen human flesh who died, and not me, following Sequeira's argument, this was illegal and unethical. While it is true that by assuming fallen human nature, Christ qualified to be our Substitute, it still remains that He died as an individual Christ in my place. What makes the difference, however, is that the Christ who died was a human being in the very flesh that I possess. This is the flesh that can be traced back to fallen Adam through Mary; the very flesh in which dwells the law of sin. And so it was my flesh; for the flesh I have is the very flesh that I got from fallen Adam. And so in dying on the cross, Christ died as me or as a human being. Jack Sequeira will have to forget about trying to make the death of Christ legally acceptable, for it is not possible to do that. He simply has to teach that the Christ who died was a human being in the fallen human flesh He assumed; our very fallen human flesh. In that flesh, He condemned sin as nature, and did away with it. Sins (acts or behaviour) were vicariously laid on Him.

Jack Sequeira's actual view of atonement has some implications on how he views justification. This is what I will now try to evaluate.

6.3.3. Actual atonement and justification

As it was noted in chapter four, in the actual model of atonement, on the cross, in Christ, God legally justified the entire humanity. This is justification in an objective sense in that God did it without any individual's exercise of faith. Scholars such as Bauer (2005:4) argue that this universal legal justification (ULJ) rejects the vicarious model of atonement and the corresponding teaching of the transfer of sin from sinner to substitute.

While Bauer's argument is partly true about the 1993 and 1996 Jack Sequeira, it should be remembered that the 2009 Jack Sequeira is different, for he does believe in vicarious atonement. But he wants to address the question of the legality of this model of atonement by linking it to
the fallen humanity that Christ assumed. Apart from this, Sequeira talks about justification in both objective and subjective terms. Thus, objectively, the entire humanity stands justified in Christ Jesus, while subjectively, only those who have accepted by faith this gift of justification have been justified. There is no contradiction in his teaching on this aspect of salvation. It was the human race in the Christ who assumed our fallen human nature that was legally justified about two thousand years ago. As I noted when evaluating chapter three, it was Christ who obeyed God’s law, died on the cross, and rose from the grave. Therefore, it was Christ who was legally justified in that He of Himself did not commit sin (Heb. 4:15). But the Christ who was legally justified about two thousand years ago was us in the sense that He assumed our fallen human nature. Thus, about two thousand years ago, we were justified in Him. This justification however, can only be experienced by those who accept Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord (Mark 16:15, 16; John 3:14-18, 36; 5:24). This aspect of Jesus being justified does not come out clearly in Sequeira’s theology. That is simply how I have come to interpret what he teaches. Christ was justified or acquitted not out of God’s mercy but because He did not commit any sin. God’s justification of Christ is as of a judge in a secular court who acquits an innocent person not out of mercy but because the person is innocent. Just like the innocent person is set free, Christ was set free from the second death that He died because He was innocent. By setting Christ free, God set us free since the Christ who was set free was us. In this sense the entire human race is already free in Christ. God did not set Christ free out of mercy, since Christ was innocent. But He set us free in Christ out of His mercy because we were not innocent. Christ did not deserve to die, so He died an unjust death for us and in our place. We deserved to die, but we received mercy in Christ by being set free. Christ was given what He did not deserve; the second death. We were given what we did not deserve but needed; eternal life. The death of Christ was unjust to Him as an individual who did not commit sin; but it would have been just to us who committed sin (had we died that death). And so it was just because our sins were laid on Him. Christ’s death was just on a Christ who bore the sins of the entire world; but it was unjust on the innocent Christ who did not commit any sin. Thus, we have a Christ who does not commit sin and therefore is innocent, but our sins are laid on Him, and He dies vicariously a death He did not deserve to die. It is only God who can explain to our satisfaction what this transaction really means. And this He does by showing us in Scripture that Christ’s death was substitutionary. Otherwise, it is inexplicable.
Having been taught by Sequeira, and having carefully read his books, I assert that his teaching on justification is perfectly in harmony with Scripture. His critics therefore, should evaluate him with the full context of what he teaches in view. As long as his critics do not consider that Sequeira premises whatever he teaches on the specific human nature that Christ assumed, they will never come to a point of appreciating his contribution to both Christology and Soteriology. In Sequeira’s teaching, when it comes to the plan of salvation, Soteriology informs Christology. The incarnation was necessitated by the fact of the fall of humanity into sin. So Sequeira relates all aspects of salvation to the specific human nature that Christ assumed. And he does state that this universal legal justification (ULJ) or the objective fact of the gospel is in a sense, a provision since it only becomes effective when an individual accepts Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord (Sequeira 2012: 8). At the point of believing, an individual accepts the gift of justification already existing in Christ Jesus.

Talking about the objective reality of justification as taught by Sequeira, Weber (1994:62) summarizes;

> Put simply, condemnation exists wherever there is sin, but it’s only imputed to those who choose to live in rebellion. Likewise, justification has existed ever since Calvary’s atonement, but it’s only imputed to those who choose to live in faith. Condemnation and justification—both are universal realities ready and waiting our personal decision. Salvation accomplished in Christ does not benefit us if we reject or neglect the gospel, just as money deposited into our bank account—though legally ours—does not benefit us unless we lay claim to it.

Evaluating justification from the subjective point of view as Sequeira understands it, Weber (1994:63) writes; “This is not a new justification beyond what happened to humanity at the cross, it’s our personal identification with something the whole world already owns in Christ but needs to claim as individuals.”

What has been said about actual atonement and justification for the purposes of this research is enough. I need to now evaluate Jack Sequeira’s understanding of the in Christ motif, which is also related to atonement.
6.3.4. Actual atonement and the in Christ motif

For Sequeira, atonement is best explained in the context of the in Christ motif. And the in Christ motif is best explained in the context of the fallen humanity that Jesus Christ assumed. Sequeira’s critics therefore, should evaluate his understanding of atonement with these contexts in mind, for failure to do so would result into misrepresenting this Adventist systematic theologian.

It was noted in chapter three and chapter four that the in Christ motif is the greatest theme of Paul’s epistles. Removing the phrase in Christ and its related renditions from Paul’s epistles would create a big hole in his theology.

In summary form, the in Christ motif as understood by Sequeira is the teaching that in Christ, God saved the entire humanity when Christ died on the cross. In Christ, we died, rose from the grave, and ascended to heaven. In Christ we were justified, sanctified, and glorified. In Christ we are seated in the heavenly places (Eph. 2:6). The justification that takes place when we believe what is already ours in Christ is based on what already took place about two thousand years ago when Christ died on the cross. Jesus Christ lived a sanctified life; and since we were in Him, we lived a sanctified life. The call to a sanctified life therefore, is based on the fact that we were already sanctified in Christ Jesus about two thousand years ago when Jesus Christ lived a sanctified life. In His resurrection, Jesus Christ was glorified. And since we were in Him when He rose from the grave, we were glorified. The glorification we are awaiting will only be possible because about two thousand years ago, we were already glorified in Christ. This is the everlasting gospel that Jack Sequeira proclaims to the fallen world. As we noted above, this is what he calls actual atonement. And as of 2009, he has accepted the vicarious view of atonement as it relates to sin as an act or behaviour, which was transferred to Jesus Christ as our Substitute.

Sequeira traces the in Christ motif to the in Adam concept in the Old Testament where he argues that God created the entire humanity in one man, Adam (Gen. 2:7; 5:2; Acts 17:26). And according to Rom. 5:12-21, when Adam sinned, the entire humanity was ruined in Him. Human beings die because they sinned not as Adam sinned, but in him (Rom.5:12). Commenting on this text, Sequeira (2005:77) argues; Paul must be saying that humanity all dies because it sinned in Adam. He draws support for human solidarity in Adam in such texts as Gen. 25:21-23 and Heb.
In the first text, God saw not just individuals in Esau and Jacob; He saw nations. In the second text, Levi returns tithe in the loins of his great grandparent, Abraham.

But evaluating the in Christ concept as taught by the 1888 Message Study Committee (1888 MSG), which is also taught by Jack Sequeira, Rodriguez (2011) argues that such understanding of the phrase in Christ is not biblical. He observes that not everybody was at the same time in Christ at the cross (Rodriguez 2011). In his opinion, if we were in Christ when He died for our sins, paying the penalty for our sins, then we died in Him; He did not die for me, I actually died for my own sins; I was not saved through Jesus; I saved myself through Him; since I was in Jesus, He was not my Substitute, my sin was not transferred to Him; I took my own sin to the cross in Jesus (Rodriguez 2011). While acknowledging that this is not what is meant, Rodriguez (2011) suggests that that is what is being said, for "If I was in Adam when he sinned and if his sin is in fact my sin by virtue of the fact that I was in him, then I have to conclude that since I was also in Christ when he was saving me I saved myself through him." This is an unwarranted conclusion because, it is common knowledge that the individual Christ died on the cross for our sins, and in our place. Christ was an individual as well as a corporate person in the same way that Adam was an individual as well as a corporate person. Thus, Christ could die on the cross as an individual; with my sins transferred to Him; and at the same time actually have sin as nature condemned in the fallen nature that He assumed, which was actually our nature because Christ was a representative person. Sin as nature received eternal destruction in the fallen nature that Christ assumed. Christ as a human being in the fallen human nature that He assumed was sentenced to eternal death by God, and so since sin as nature was in the fallen flesh that He assumed, it died eternally in Him. In the in Adam concept as understood by Sequeira, it is not taught that because I was in Adam, then his sin is in fact my sin. I would have to have been in Adam in a real or literal way, and consciously committed my personal sin in him for that sin to be in fact my sin. Sinning in Adam as taught by Sequeira simply means being implicated in the sin that he committed because of our having been genetically linked to him at creation (Gen. 1:26-28). Man (male and female) is the entirety of the human race. That is why man was only confronted after Adam (as an individual) ate the forbidden fruit, because at that time, the entire human race was ruined. Otherwise, if Adam as an individual had not eaten of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, God would only have to deal with Eve. But when Adam ate the fruit, the entire humanity was ruined as both male and female, constituting humanity sinned. And
in handling the sin problem, Adam as a representative person is contrasted with Christ, also a representative person (Rom. 5:12-21; 1 Cor. 15:21, 22, 45-49).

My view is that scholars such as Rodriguez (2011) have misinterpreted Sequeira and other scholars who talk about our solidarity in Adam. Explaining the meaning of the plural form for life in Gen. 2:7, he says;

The Hebrew term translated "life" is chay, but is used here in the plural, chayyayim, "lives." From that fact it is concluded that when God created Adam he placed in him the lives of all his descendants. They were in some literal or real way in Adam (Rodriguez 2011).

While I agree with Rodriguez that we cannot conclude based just on the plural form of the term life in Gen. 2:7 that God created all human beings in Adam since the term is used similarly elsewhere in the Old Testament, I disagree with him on his interpretation of what is taught about being in Adam. At least Sequeira does not teach that the descendants of Adam were in him in a literal or real way. Also, it is possible to conclude that Gen. 2:7 supports human solidarity if it could be proved from other texts that in fact the Bible teaches human solidarity. In that case, the context would determine the meaning of lives as used in Gen. 2:7. Rodriguez well knows that this is how words of this nature are applied in Scripture; the context determines the meaning.

Rodriguez (2011) asserts; "To argue that I was in Adam before I came into existence in my present bodily form is to imply that I, or something of me, existed in Adam independent of my body and my present existence. Again, this is not what Sequeira teaches. What Sequeira teaches is this; if what they mean is that the seed of our lives was in Adam, that is to say, that we are his descendants, then, they are closer to the truth (Rodriguez 2011). What Sequeira teaches is that the seed of our lives was genetically in Adam. We were not in Adam in a literal or real way. The truth that Sequeira teaches is that God created all of humanity in Adam. The word Adam in the Old Testament actually means Humankind. It should be noted that in Gen. 5:1, 2 the word Humankind in the NKJV is actually Adam in the original Hebrew. The entire humanity was genetically in Adam (Sequeira 2005:81).

To clarify, the in Adam concept as taught by Sequeira is based on biblical solidarity, which means that the life of Adam, after he sinned (Gk. bios), was passed on to the entire human race.
This is how Acts 17:26 puts it; “And He [God] has made from one blood (life) every nation of men to dwell on all the face of the earth, and has determined their preappointed times and the boundaries of their dwellings.” Sequeira uses Heb. 7:7-10 as an example simply to support biblical solidarity. Just as Levi was a descendant of Abraham and therefore in his loins when Abraham paid tithe to Melchizedek, so also the entire human race is descended from Adam (Acts 17:26) and therefore was in his loins when he committed sin.

Sequeira’s view on Rom. 5:12 is supported by scholars such as Barclay (2013:93); “The passage ought to be given what is called the realistic interpretation, namely that, because of the solidarity of the human race, all humanity actually sinned in Adam.” This idea, according to Barclay (2013:94), was not strange to a Jew; it was the actual belief of the Jewish thinkers.

Rodriguez (2011) admits the fact that the Bible talks about social solidarity. He notes that Western culture on the other hand emphasizes the value of the individual and consequently it is a very individualistic culture (Rodriguez 2011). Rodriguez (2011) observes however, that biblical solidarity is not based on the idea that Hebrew psychology is fundamentally different from Western psychology. This, in his view was the teaching of liberal scholars. Biblical solidarity in Rodriguez’s view is based on four facts: First, the Israelites had a common God; second, they had a common religious experience and system of worship; thirdly, they had a common human ancestor; and fourth, they had a common future (Rodriguez 2011).

Sequeira emphasizes the fact dealing with the Israelites having a common ancestor, Abraham, going back to the first ancestor, Adam. His point is that the entire human race was genetically in Adam when he committed sin. A critical analysis of Rodriguez’s evaluation of the in Adam/in Christ concept as taught by Sequeira and others reveals a failure to take into context what is taught. Instead of evaluating Sequeira and the others who teach the in Adam/in Christ idea, Rodriguez evaluates the liberal theologians whose works he has read, and projects what they teach on Sequeira and others.

My own view is that corporate solidarity as taught by Sequeira has biblical support. The entire humanity was created in one man, Adam. And when Adam (Humankind) sinned, the entire humanity sinned. The individual Adam who sinned made a conscious decision to sin. Human beings who descended from him did not make a conscious decision to sin. They sinned in the
sense that they were implicated in the sin Adam committed because of the concept of corporate solidarity. Adam is responsible for his own sin; His descendants on the other hand receive the fatal result of his transgression (Rodriguez 2011). They are only responsible for their personal sins. An emphasis should be made that the fatal result of Adam’s transgression that his descendants receive is because of the concept of corporate solidarity. We are not responsible for Adam’s sin; but we are implicated in his sin in the sense that what came out of him was already ruined in him. If Adam had not sinned, his descendants were not going to be sinners by nature; but because he sinned and ruined the very substance of which we are made, we are born sinners by nature. Adam as an individual was condemned because of the conscious choice he made to commit sin. We were condemned in him because corporately or genetically we were related to him in the sense of him being our common ancestor. God does not hold us accountable for Adam’s sin; and yet we were condemned in him. If Adam as a corporate human being had died the second death, there would have been no other human being because the seed of life in him would have perished. We die the first death because of the sin Adam committed, which brought about death on all of us because we were genetically in him when he sinned (Rom. 5:12). We die as a consequence of Adam’s conscious sin. If we conclude that we die because we have personally sinned like Adam sinned, then we have no explanation as to why babies die. But if we say that we die because we got ruined in Adam, then we cannot ask any question as to why children who have not committed any sin die. The case of the second death is different because eventually anyone who will experience the second death will die because they committed their own personal sin.

The other side of the in Adam/in Christ concept is that what happened in Adam is undone in Christ. Through the incarnation, the entire humanity got into Christ. When Christ obeyed, the entire humanity obeyed in Him. When Christ died on the cross, the entire humanity died in Him. When Christ rose from the grave and ascended to heaven, the entire humanity rose from the grave and ascended to heaven in Him. On the cross, Christ reversed the condemnation that the entire humanity had incurred through Adam’s sin. Just as we were implicated in Adam’s sin without our choice, we were implicated in Christ’s obedience without our choice. Just as we were condemned in Adam without our choice since we were not yet born, we were justified in Christ without our choice. This was entirely the act of God. We have to choose to commit sin in order to receive personal condemnation, which is actually the condemnation already existing, but
is only activated because of the personal sins we commit. In the same way, we have to choose to leave our Adamic life, and accept life in Christ in order to receive personal justification, which is actually the justification already existing in Christ, but is activated when we accept Jesus as Saviour and Lord. This is what Sequeira teaches, and I am in total support of it. This is what I believe is clearly taught in Scripture (Rom. 5:12-21; 1 Cor. 15:21, 22, 45-49).

I agree with Sequeira when he argues that the Western mind finds it difficult to accept the in Christ motif as he teaches it (Sequeira 2005:73). This, as it has been noted is because the Western mind is individualistic (Rodriguez 2011). To understand the in Christ motif therefore, we have to think like the Jews. We also have to accept the post-lapsarian view of the humanity of Jesus Christ. Only then are we going to fully appreciate what Sequeira teaches on the in Christ motif and the actual view of atonement.

There is one aspect of Sequeira’s teaching on the in Christ motif that still remains to be evaluated. That is, that in Christ refers to justification, and Christ in you refers to sanctification (Sequeira 1999:33). For the phrase in Christ, Sequeira (1999:33) cites Acts 13:39; Rom. 3:28; 10:4; Gal. 2:16; Eph. 2:8, 9 and Titus 3:5. I support Sequeira’s argument that these texts refer to God’s work for us in Christ. For the phrase Christ in you, Sequeira cites John 15:1-5; 17:23; Rom. 8:9-14; 13:12-14; Gal. 2:20 and 1 John 3:23, 24. I agree with him that these texts talk about Christ’s work in us or through us. Christ in you witnesses to or gives evidence of our salvation in Christ, but is not meritorious (Matt. 5:14-16; John 13:34, 35; 14:12; Eph. 2:10; Titus 3:8) (Sequeira 1999:33). As it can be noticed, Sequeira differentiates between in Christ and Christ in you. In my opinion, this is true as we consider the general context of the in Christ motif, and not just its immediate context.

It should be noted however, that Blazen (2005:4) rejects the argument that in Christ is an objective reality referring to our new legal or forensic standing before God, as in the case of justification and that Christ in us refers to subjective experience, as in sanctification. In his view, this does not cohere with the data the New Testament presents (Blazen 2005:4). He suggests that the use of these two phrases is for Paul just a matter of preference (Blazen 2005:4). Otherwise, the two phrases basically mean the same thing; both expressions denote relationship; neither is merely legal nor objective (Blazen 2005:4).
When we analyze Paul’s epistles, we discover that they were written to believers in Christ Jesus. Therefore, it is perfectly right to say as Blazen does that the phrase in Christ refers to union with Him in a relational way. Nevertheless, in these epistles are to be found both objective and subjective aspects of the in Christ motif. For example, Eph. 2:11-18 has both objective and subjective elements of the in Christ motif. Apart from this, Sequeira’s in Christ concept is premised on the fallen human nature position whereby our spiritually dead human nature was joined to the divine nature at the incarnation, thus the spiritually dead humanity was quickened or raised in Him. The entire human race got into Christ at the incarnation. With this context of the in Christ motif, it is perfectly right for Sequeira to teach that in Christ is both objective and subjective. Thus, as he interprets Paul’s epistles, he does not only have the immediate context, he also has the wider context in mind. Blazen and Rodriguez therefore, would do well to take this context of the in Christ motif into consideration as they evaluate the writings of those who teach this concept the way Sequeira does.

In the light of the in Christ motif which has just been evaluated, Sequeira teaches actual atonement based on the fallen humanity that Christ assumed. This is what I will now evaluate.

6.3.5. Actual atonement and the humanity of Christ

As it was highlighted in chapter four, Jack Sequeira’s actual model of atonement is built upon the humanity of Jesus Christ to the extent that if his understanding of the human nature that Christ assumed is taken away, then he has nothing to teach. It would appear also that his actual model of atonement in contrast with the vicarious model was formulated to take into consideration the specific human nature that Christ assumed. Later he accepted the vicarious model of atonement, which took into consideration how Christ dealt with sin as nature. In my opinion, Sequeira’s critics evaluate his Soteriology without taking into consideration his Christology.

What then is Sequeira’s position on the humanity of Christ? It was noted in chapter four that Sequeira takes the view that Jesus Christ assumed the human nature of Adam after the Fall. This evaluation of Sequeira’s teaching on what specific nature Jesus Christ assumed is supported by Zurcher (1999:258) who asserts that Sequeira clearly takes a stand in favour of traditional
This traditional Christology is as it was noted what theologians call the post-lapsarian position of the human nature of Jesus Christ.

It was noted in chapter four that in response to scholars who argue that had Christ taken the fallen human nature of Adam, He would Himself have been a sinner in need of a saviour, Sequeira notes that Jesus Christ was not a sinner despite having fully taken upon Himself fallen human nature because He became, He was made, He assumed. Human nature was not His by native right; He became what He had never been before. We human beings were created human beings, and nothing else. We cannot become human beings, for we are human beings. Christ however, became a human being. Moreover, Jesus Christ is the God-Man; fully God and fully Human. He is both the Son of God (divine) and the Son of Man (human). There is no way therefore, that it can be said that assuming fallen human nature would have made Him a sinner in need of a saviour. In terms of performance, Jesus Christ perfectly obeyed His Father in the fallen human flesh that He assumed (Heb. 4:15). So while Jesus Christ assumed fallen human nature, He was different from the rest of fallen humanity in the sense that He became what He had never been, and in what He became, He never committed sin. In this lies the uniqueness of the God-Man. For those who argue that if Christ came in fallen human nature, and overcame, then there is a possibility that one day another person will come and overcome as Christ overcame (Gulley 1982:38), it should be said that there will never come a man who is as unique as Christ, for only Christ is the God-Man. He is Son of God (divine) as well as Son of Man (human); but as Son of Man He took all our liabilities. His mind, however, was quickened right at the incarnation since humanity which is spiritually dead was joined to divinity. Spiritually dead humanity was joined to divinity, and so dead humanity was quickened in Christ Jesus at the incarnation.

In my opinion, Sequeira satisfactorily defends the Christology that Seventh-day Adventists taught for about one hundred years before the church entered a period of identity seeking, and hence lost its traditional teaching. I totally support his Christology, for in my view, Jesus Christ assumed my fallen nature to its fullest, except that in His case, He did not commit any sin. I have a complete Saviour in Jesus Christ who fully identified Himself with me, except for sinning. Having assumed me through the incarnation, He fully obeyed His Father, and died on the cross as me. He rose from the grave as me, and ascended to heaven as me. What I mean is that the human side of Jesus Christ is us. Thus, when Christ obeyed, we obeyed in Him. When He died
on the cross, we died in Him. When He rose from the grave, we rose from the grave in Him. When He ascended to heaven, we ascended to heaven in Him. We should have individually died the second death and not risen because we sinned. But God gave us a Substitute in Christ Jesus who was qualified to take our place by assuming our fallen human nature. He died the second death, and because He did not commit sin, He rose from the grave. It is important to note that since the Christ who died the second death, and rose was us, we died and rose from the grave. We did not die for our sins in Christ Jesus as scholars such as Gulley and Rodriguez would want to make people believe is what is taught by Sequeira and others. Christ died. But that Jesus Christ who died was us, and so we died the second death, and came back to life. This is the true meaning of baptism. This is what Sequeira teaches, and I support it. This is biblical substitution. Our sins were laid on Jesus Christ as our Substitute. Sin as nature was condemned in the fallen human flesh that He assumed.

If it remains difficult to understand how it was that every person was in Christ when He lived, died, rose from the grave, and ascended to heaven, scholars who find it difficult to understand this teaching should be reminded that it is equally difficult to understand how we could have a human being in Christ through only one parent. If these scholars can accept by faith that Jesus Christ was a human being who was born not the natural way, but through the incarnation, they should also accept by faith the teaching about the entire human race being in Christ by virtue of Him having taken upon Himself fallen human nature. This teaching like that of the incarnation does not belong to the realm of reason, but of faith. Our reason can be exercised to the limit in order to understand this inexplicable mystery, and still fail to grasp it. But faith will victoriously triumph where reason will fail us.

At this point I will try to note the areas of difference as well as the areas of similarity in the two views of substitutionary atonement that have been evaluated above. Then I will try to reconcile the two views. These areas of difference and similarity will be sought in the vicarious model, justification, the in Christ motif, and the humanity of Christ.

6.4. Reconciling Vicarious and Actual Models of Substitutionary Atonement

There are differences and similarities in the vicarious and actual models of Christ’s substitutionary death as taught by Seventh-day Adventist scholars, which deserve comment.
6.4.1. The Vicarious model

As of 2009, both the scholars who have traditionally taught the vicarious model of atonement and Sequeira teach that sins (acts or behaviour) were laid on Christ, and therefore He died vicariously. While some of those who have traditionally taught the vicarious model of atonement teach that in His sinless nature Christ vicariously substituted for our sinful nature, and so dealt with sin as nature, Sequeira teaches that Christ died for sin as nature in actuality in the sense that He assumed fallen humanity. What I want to note for the purposes of this research is the fact that the scholars on both sides of the debate agree to some extent that Christ died vicariously.

6.4.2. Justification

For the scholars who have traditionally taught the vicarious model of atonement, God in the holy history of Jesus Christ made a provision for individuals who would believe to be justified. There is no such thing in their vocabulary as universal legal justification (ULJ), whereby the entire human race was justified in Christ Jesus. Justification is always preceded by faith, and so it can never be said that God in Christ justified the entire human race, as to say so would naturally lead to universalism. However, at least one of the scholars talks about justification in objective terms when he observes that restoration is another way of talking about justification (Blazen 2000: 287). In his view, the restoration individuals are called to enter already exists in Christ Jesus, which God initiated on the cross (2 Cor. 5: 18-21). In my opinion, if restoration is another way of talking about justification, and restoration exists in Christ before individuals heed the call to enter it, then justification exists in Christ before individuals heed the call to experience it. Blazen (2000: 284) argues; “That which both makes possible and expresses the justification of sinful man is the cross of Christ, considered as a vicarious, atoning sacrifice whereby humanity’s sin is forgiven and God’s wrath is averted.” In my opinion, if through the vicarious, atoning sacrifice of Christ humanity’s sin is forgiven and God’s wrath is averted, it follows that by virtue of that vicarious, atoning sacrifice of Christ, humanity is justified. While the scholars who have traditionally taught vicarious atonement call this a provision, it is nothing but universal legal justification (ULJ). It will only be something different from universal legal justification (ULJ) if it is taken that humanity’s sin is forgiven and God’s wrath is only averted at the point humanity believes. But it is common knowledge that humanity as a whole will never come to a point of believing the holy history of Jesus Christ. Some individuals will believe. Nevertheless, if
humanity’s sin is forgiven and God’s wrath averted on the cross, then humanity is justified at the cross. In my opinion, there is no way to escape this logical conclusion.

Sequeira’s position is that on the cross, God in Christ legally justified the entire humanity. But individuals will have to accept this gift of justification by faith in order for it to become effective in their lives. He argues that because each individual has to accept this gift by faith, then it can be said to be a provision. There are two aspects to the concept of justification; the entire humanity was objectively justified in Christ about two thousand years ago; and yet at individual level, each person has to accept the gift by faith in the holy history of Jesus Christ.

In my opinion, there is no real issue in the supposed differences between the objective facts of salvation (provision), which include justification; and universal legal justification (ULJ). There is a possibility that these supposed differences have just been magnified because of Sequeira’s rejection of vicarious atonement at some point in his scholarly life (1993 to 2008). In both views, it is taught that salvation is a provision to the entire humanity, which each individual has to accept by faith.

6.4.3. The In Christ Motif

Scholars on both sides of the debate teach that the in Christ motif has objective as well as subjective aspects. Scholars who have traditionally taught the vicarious view of atonement teach that in Christ and Christ in you are just different ways of talking about the same thing; that is, the believer’s union with Christ Jesus. In their view, there is not such a teaching in the Bible where the entire humanity is in Christ. Only individuals who are in faith relationship with Christ are in Him. These scholars do not relate the in Christ motif to the humanity that Christ assumed at the incarnation.

For Jack Sequeira, in Christ refers to the objective facts of the gospel (justification, sanctification, and glorification), which are ours in Christ by virtue of His birth, life, death, and resurrection, and which we personally experience when we accept Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord. In Christ, the entire humanity was justified, sanctified, and glorified. Christ in you refers to our subjective experience whereby Christ reproduces His character in us through the indwelling Holy Spirit. This is called fruit bearing; evidence that we are in a faith relationship with Jesus
Christ. Sequeira relates the in Christ motif to fallen humanity that Christ assumed at the incarnation.

In my opinion, reconciliation on this concept of salvation is only possible if scholars who have traditionally taught the vicarious view of atonement and Jack Sequeira will relate the in Christ motif to the fallen humanity that Christ assumed in the incarnation. Without reconciliation on the humanity of Christ, there will be no reconciliation on the in Christ concept, which is a Christological and soteriological issue, and therefore, affects our understanding of atonement.

6.4.4. The Humanity of Christ

Scholars who traditionally teach the vicarious view of atonement teach what has been termed the alternative Christology (see pp. 86-91 of this dissertation). It has elements of both the prelapsarian and the postlapsarian views of Christ’s humanity. Sequeira on the other hand teaches the traditional postlapsarian view of the humanity of Christ. Reconciliation of the two models of atonement based on these different Christologies is impossible. In my opinion, scholars who teach the alternative Christology should revert to the postlapsarian view that the SDA Church has traditionally taught.

6.5. The Reconciled View

In my opinion, the reconciled view would be one that takes into consideration the problem of sin as nature as well as sin as acts or behaviour. This view must be one that is built on the fallen human nature view of Christ’s humanity. In this reconciled view, there must be a transfer of sin (acts or behaviour) from the sinner to Christ, and sin as nature must be dealt with in the fallen human flesh that Christ assumed. The first aspect of this reconciled view must deal with the issue of God condemning sin in the fallen human flesh that Christ assumed; the second aspect must deal with the issue of God transferring our sins (acts or behaviour) to Christ, and Christ dying vicariously for us. The 2009 Jack Sequeira seems to present such a view. In my opinion, it is perfectly right to talk about Christ’s death as being substitutionary, or that Christ died in actuality and vicariously. When I say that Christ’s death was substitutionary, I mean that it was vicarious. And this substitutionary or vicarious view of atonement is one that takes into consideration that Christ assumed fallen humanity. When I say that Christ died in actuality and vicariously, I mean that His death was substitutionary. Therefore, there is no actual atonement;
there is only substitutionary or vicarious atonement, in which the Christ who died assumed fallen human nature, and dealt with the duo problem of sin. The term actual only comes into the picture to deal with the aspect of sin as nature, which Christ could not deal with without bearing us.

As this dissertation closes, it is important for me to make personal submissions. What is my submission in view of the findings of this research? Why are Seventh-day Adventist scholars not in harmony on the penal substitutionary theory of atonement, which they all claim they teach? Could there be a reconciled view? In the section that follows, I will present my personal submissions.

6.6. Personal Submissions

Having critically evaluated Christ’s substitutionary death as understood by Seventh-day Adventist scholars;

6.6.1. It is submitted that scholars on both sides of the debate believe that Christ’s death was substitutionary.

6.6.2. It is submitted that scholars on both sides of the debate believe that this substitutionary death was the penalty for the sins of the whole world, which were laid on Christ Jesus.

6.6.3. It is submitted that Jack Sequeira rejected the vicarious model of atonement in his 1993 and 1996 books because in his view, some of the scholars who promoted that model did it in the context of the pre-lapsarian position of the humanity of Christ in contrast with the traditional post-lapsarian position Seventh-day Adventists had taught for about one hundred years before the church went into an identity crisis.

6.6.4. It is submitted that Jack Sequeira has finally accepted that Christ’s substitutionary death was vicarious with respect to sin as an act or behaviour.

6.6.5. It is submitted that the actual view of atonement that the 2009 Sequeira teaches does not rule out a one-for-one representation and transfer of sin from the sinner to Christ on the cross, which is actually vicarious atonement.

6.6.6. It is submitted that therefore, if scholars on the other side of the debate would accept the post-lapsarian position of the human nature of Christ, which deals with the aspect of sin as nature
by Christ condemning it in the fallen human flesh He assumed, Sequeira would do away with his actual view of atonement, and simply teach that Christ’s death was substitutionary or vicarious where the two terms are taken to be synonymous.

6.6.7. It is submitted that on justification and the in Christ motif, the differences in what scholars on both sides of the debate teach are semantic; scholars misinterpret each other’s teaching on the use of words, and somehow fail to consider the context and rationale of the teaching. This is particularly true about how Jack Sequeira is evaluated by his critics.

6.6.8. It is submitted that the in Christ motif as taught by Jack Sequeira takes into consideration the post-lapsarian position of the humanity of Jesus Christ, and therefore, is a better explanation of how God through Christ dealt with sin both as nature and acts or behaviour. The in Christ motif as taught by scholars on the other side of the debate leaves a gap in terms of how Christ dealt with sin as nature.

6.6.9. It is submitted that Christ’s substitutionary death was actual and vicarious; actual in the sense of how God through Christ dealt with sin as nature in the fallen flesh, which Christ assumed; vicarious in the sense of our sins (acts or behaviour) being transferred to Christ as our legally qualified Substitute. It is better however, to simply say that Christ’s death was substitutionary or vicarious.

6.6.10. It is submitted that the reconciled view in 6.6.9., above, takes into consideration the fallen human nature that Christ assumed at the incarnation.

I realize that a research like this one cannot be exhaustive, and therefore, some recommendations are in order. There is need also of recommendations with respect to what the Seventh-day Adventist Church should do in the light of what this research has highlighted. These recommendations are made hereunder.

6.7. Recommendations

In view of the findings and submissions of this research, I;

6.7.1. Recommend that a research be done that will look at substitutionary atonement in the context of the in Christ motif and the humanity of Christ.
6.7.2. Recommend that the Seventh-day Adventist Church elucidates a position of the specific human nature of Christ, or include all the existing views in the church in the books *Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology* and *Seventh-day Adventists Believe* rather than just promote the alternative Christology as if it were the position of the whole church. If this cannot be done, then the explanation on the specific human nature of Christ (alternative Christology) should be removed from both books since it does not represent the position of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. Only the voted summary statement on the Son (Christ) should remain in the two books. The confusion on the penal substitutionary theory the church is currently experiencing among its scholars is a result of our failure to agree on a position of the specific human nature of Christ. Christology and Soteriology are related concepts, so when one is not well handled, the other is negatively affected.

6.7.3. Recommend that Seventh-day Adventist scholars take advantage of the rich history of the pioneers of the church with regard to how they handled contentious issues, and if possible hold Bible conferences where to reconcile the divergent views on substitutionary atonement.

6.7.4. Recommend that the Seventh-day Adventist Church teaches a reconciled view of atonement such as I have submitted in this dissertation. This reconciled view takes into consideration the fallen humanity that Christ assumed through which God dealt with the problem of sin as nature residing in our flesh.

6.7.5. Recommend that university professors to whom this recommendation applies stop stifling critical thinking by telling students not to read certain books like those of Jack Sequeira, as such an attitude is not progressive and is not scholarly. Students should not be made to be mere reflectors of the professors’ thoughts, but should be taught to be critical thinkers who can even challenge the views of their professors.

**Conclusion**

In my introductory chapter I stated that there are two divergent views of Christ’s substitutionary death in the Seventh-day Adventist Church; namely, the *vicarious* view and the *actual* view. This research has shown that a reconciliation of these views is possible. That reconciled view is that Christ’s death was *actual* as well as *vicarious*. It was *actual* in the sense that Christ dealt with sin as *nature* by *actually* and not *vicariously* assuming the fallen human nature that He found, and
died the second death in that fallen human nature; thus, sin as nature died eternally in Him. It was *vicarious* in the sense that our sins as *acts* or *behaviours* were laid on Him, and with those sins on Him, He died the second death as our Substitute. Where Christ is viewed as having assumed the fallen human nature He found, it is perfectly right to simply say that Christ’s death was *substitutionary* or *vicarious* since the two terms are synonymous. Since through that *substitutionary* or *vicarious* death, Christ dealt with the duo problem of sin, there is no need to talk about *actual* substitution. But I still need to state that penal substitutionary atonement will still remain God’s mystery, which defies all logic, and can only be fully accepted by faith.

The mystery began with Adam and Eve disobeying the triune God. But the triune God is merciful, and so instead of letting our parents suffer the consequences of their sin, He decided to bring into effect the plan He had already conceived right at the foundation of the world (Rev. 13:8). The announcement was made that sometime in the future the seed of the woman would crush the serpent’s head (Gen. 3:15), signifying the fatal wound the devil would receive through Christ’s death on the cross (John 12:31-33; Heb. 2:14). The blessing that would be brought by the seed of the woman was repeated to Abram (Gen. 12:1-3). All the patriarchs lived in expectance of the promised seed of the woman. When finally that seed arrived, the shepherds rejoiced as they heard the announcement of His birth by the heavenly messengers (Luke 2:8-20).

It was the manner of His coming that was unconventional by human standards. The birth of Isaac to Abraham was meant to prepare the people for this inexplicable event (Gen.17:15-22; 18:9-15; 21:1-7). Abraham and Sarah laughed at the news of the birth of Isaac because it had become a gynecological impossibility for Sarah to conceive. Yet it can to pass. By human standards, it was impossible for Mary to conceive since she was a virgin (Luke 1: 34, 35). And yet it came to pass since the message had come from the God to whom nothing is impossible.

The mystery of how God could allow His innocent Son to die in place of sinners, and yet remain just is not a big issue among the common people. They simply celebrate the fact that Christ paid the penalty for their sins just as the shepherds rejoiced at the news that a Saviour was born for them. But to scholars, this has become one of the most mind-boggling issues whose solution may not be found in this life. It will suffice therefore, to simply say that Jesus Christ’s death was substitutionary. He died *for*, and *in place of* sinners; paying the penalty for sin that man had committed. His divine nature was joined to our fallen human nature, and in that fallen human
nature, He perfectly obeyed God. By His obedience he fulfilled the positive demands of the law, and by His death, He fulfilled the negative demands of the law. Sin as an act, or behaviour was laid on Him; while sin as nature was condemned in His flesh, which was our flesh, and so He completely dealt with the sin problem. Therefore, for those who are in Christ Jesus, there is no more condemnation for sin for as long as they walk in the Spirit and not in the flesh (Rom. 8:1-4). Scholars will do well to simply celebrate this truth as it is in Christ and leave what is inexplicable to God as they heed the counsel; ÒThe secret things belong to the LORD our God, but those things which are revealed belong to us and to our children forever, that we may do the words of the lawÓ (Deut. 29:29). The subject is a complex one.
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