STAKEHOLDERS' PERCEPTIONS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE 2011 ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

By

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DECLARATION

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I, Tumba Tuseku Dieudonné, declare that the dissertation: “STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTIONS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE 2011 ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO” is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

____________________________  ____________________
Signature                   Date
Abstract

This study investigated the perceptions of election stakeholders with regard to the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The involvement of civil society organizations, electoral experts and academia, including party agents as domestic observers and stakeholders in Congolese electoral processes, is crucial as they help electoral and participatory democracy to take root in the DRC. This study was underpinned by political trust, political support and neopatrimonial theories. Furthermore, a mixed methods research design was used in order to understand the perceptions of stakeholders on the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. The findings of the study showed that stakeholders’ perceptions on the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC were driven by both internal and external factors pertaining to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) that have the potential to affect the electoral processes as well as the level of trust in the INEC and other institutions involved in the electoral processes.

KEY WORDS: Electoral process, Independent National Electoral Commission, election management bodies, stakeholders, perceptions, integrity, impartiality, political trust, political support, patrimonialism, Democratic Republic of Congo.
Dedication

I dedicate this study to my father Ntumba Kabukapua Floribert (Pastor) and my mother Shangu Belangeni Charlotte (Mama) for love, caring and instilling in my childhood the spirit of good and hard work and encouraging me to pursue my dream.

May you forever Rest in Peace.
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List of acronyms and abbreviations

ACE  Administration and Cost of Elections
AETA  *Agir pour les Élections Transparentes et Apaisées en RDC* (Act for Transparent and Peaceful Elections in the DRC)
AFDL  *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo* (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo)
APCLS  *Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain* (Patriotic Alliance for a Free and Sovereign Congo)
CAFCO  *Cadre Permanent de la Femme Congolaise* (Permanent Consultative Framework for Congolese Women)
CC  Carter Center
CENA  *Commission Nationale Electorale Autonome* (Autonomous National Electoral Commission)
CENI  *Commission Nationale Electorale Indépendante* (Independent National Electoral Commission)
CEO  Chief Electoral Officer
CODESRIA  Council for the Development of Social Science research in Africa
CSOs  Civil Society Organizations
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
EC  Electoral Commission in Ghana
EC  Electoral Commission in Uganda
ECCAS  Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EISA  Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
EMB  Election Management Body
EPOP  Evaluation of Public Opinion
ESS  Election Satisfaction Survey
EU  European Union
EUEOM  European Union Election Observation Mission
HSRC  Human Sciences Research Council
IEC  Independent Electoral Commission in the DRC
IFE  *Instituto Federal Electoral in Mexico*
IFES  International Foundation for Electoral Systems
INEC  Independent National Electoral Commission
L.E  *Ligue des Electeurs (League of Voters)*
MLC  *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo)
MPs  Members of Parliament
MPR  *Mouvement Populaire pour la Révolution* (Popular Movement for the Revolution)
NDI  National Democratic Institute
NEC  National Election Commission
NEO  Cameroonian National Elections Observatory
NGO  Non-Governmental Organizations
NSCC  *Nouvelle Société Civile du Congo* (New Civil society in Congo)
PDP  People’s Democratic Party
PEMMO  Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation
PPRD  *Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et le Développement* (Party of People for Reconstruction and Development)
PR  Proportional Representation
<table>
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>RCD-GOMA</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD-KML</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy-Kisangani Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>RCD-N</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy-National</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>République Démocratique du Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo)</td>
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<td>RENOSEC</td>
<td>Réseau National pour l’Observation et la Surveillance des Élections au Congo (National Election Observation and Monitoring Network in Congo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RKM</td>
<td>Research and Knowledge Management</td>
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<td>RLTV</td>
<td>Radio Lisanga Television</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADC-ECF</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community-Electoral Commissions Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC-PF</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community-Parliamentary Forum</td>
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<td>SASAS</td>
<td>South African Social Attitudes Survey</td>
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<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Package for the Social Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Television</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDPS</td>
<td>Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (Union for Democracy and Social Progress)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>Union pour la Nation Congolaise (Union for Congolese Nation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIKIN</td>
<td>Université de Kinshasa (University of Kinshasa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPEC</td>
<td>Unité de Production pour les Emissions d'Éducation Civique (Unit for Civic Education Broadcasting)</td>
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<td>VPS</td>
<td>Voter Participation Survey</td>
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VSV

Voix de sans Voix (Voice of Voiceless)
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with a total area of 2,345,000 square kilometers, is the third largest country in Africa after Sudan and Algeria. Geographically, it is located in the central Africa region. The DRC shares borders with nine states as follows: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Its population is approximately 77,433,744 inhabitants.¹ The majority of the population is African and more than one hundred African languages are spoken. The most well-spoken are Chiluba, Kikongo, Lingala, and Swahili; and French is the only official language. The DRC is inhabited by around 450 ethnic groups. The country is subdivided into 10 provinces, namely: Bandundu, Equateur, Kasai Oriental, Kasai Occidental, Katanga, Bas Congo, Maniema, Province Oriental, North Kivu, and South Kivu. Kinshasa is the capital city of the DRC (see appendix A the map of the DRC).

In 1879, the Belgian King Leopold II assigned Henry Morton Stanley² to establish his authority in the Congo basin in order to take over trade opportunities in central Africa along the Congo River.

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¹ According to the United States based Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the estimated population in the DRC in July 2014 is 77,433,744 inhabitants. Source: CIA: Online. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2119.html#cg [Accessed: 27 September 2014]. For many years, the DRC has not organized the census of its population. The last census in the DRC (Zaire) was organized in 1984.

² Sir Henry Morton Stanley named Bula Matari (“Breaker of Rocks”) by the Congolese, became one of the most well-known British explorers. After becoming a naturalized American, he fought during the American civil war. He became famous when the New York Herald commissioned him to rescue David Livingstone in Africa. Furthermore, when Livingstone died in 1873, Stanley resolved to continue his exploration of the region, funded by the Herald, a British newspaper. He explored vast areas of central Africa, and travelled down the length of the Lualaba and Congo Rivers, reaching the Atlantic in August 1877, after an epic journey that he later described in ‘Through the Dark Continent’ (1878). Failing to gain British support for his plans to develop the Congo region, Stanley found more success with King Leopold II of Belgium, who was eager to tap Africa's wealth. In 1879, with Leopold's support, Stanley returned to Africa where he worked to open the lower Congo to commerce by the construction of roads. He used brutal means that
Morton Stanley succeeded in the mission by dispossessing land ownership from chiefs\(^3\) (local or traditional authorities) who were trapped and handed over their land rights to the Association International du Congo (International Association of Congo) which was a King Leopold II trust company. Following the Berlin conference on Africa held from 1884-1885, The DRC, previously known as Congo Free State and then Zaire, was formerly allocated to King Leopold II as a private domain due to his pretending previous presence in the Africa Central region as a result of Stanley’s exploration in the basin Congo River. Subsequently, the massive violation of human rights, exploitation of natural resources and enormous debt to the Belgian State led the King to transfer the Congo Free State to the Belgian government in 1908. After five decades of Belgian colonization, the DRC became an independent state on 30 June 1960.\(^4\) Joseph Kasa Vubu and Patrice Emery Lumumba became respectively the State President and the Prime Minister after being elected by the parliament house in 1960.

Kabemba (2011:81) states that after independence, the country plunged into confusion and conflict. Thus in 1960, less than a fortnight after independence on 30 June 1960, the Congolese leadership found itself unable to govern. According to Kabemba (2011:81), no ethnic group was prepared to tolerate others; the army mutinied against its officers’ corps, Katanga seceded, and a rebellion was included the widespread use of forced labor. Competition with French interests in the region helped bring about the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) in which European powers sorted out their competing colonial claims in Africa. Stanley’s efforts paved the way for the creation of the Congo Free State, privately owned by Leopold. Source: BBC: Online. Available at: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/stanley_sir_henry_morton.shtm](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/stanley_sir_henry_morton.shtm). [Accessed:27 September 2014].

\(^3\) The chiefs considered Stanley as a guest and welcome him. However, Stanley took advantage on chiefs’ hospitality in cheating and forcing them to sell their land. Those who tried to object were killed. The Belgian King hired Stanley as his personal head of a colonization project with almost unlimited resources. Online. Available at: [http://crawfurd.dk/africa/stanley.htm](http://crawfurd.dk/africa/stanley.htm). [Accessed: 2 February 2014].

\(^4\) The DRC gained its independence on 30 June 1960 from the Kingdom of Belgium following the violation of human rights and massive killings from 1885-1960 under the colonial authority. Subsequently, violence and massacre occurred in the country on 4 January 1959 which was a precursor of the independence.
launched in the east. The chaotic situation that ensued immediately after independence paved the way for General Joseph Désiré Mobutu to seize political power in a successful coup d’état on 24 November 1965.

On coming to power, General Mobutu who called himself Mobutu Sese Seko,\(^5\) instituted a single party state system all over the country. From 1967 until 1990, the Mouvement Populaire pour la Révolution (Popular Movement for the Revolution) (MPR) was the only legal party in the country, and membership was compulsory and automatic for all citizens from birth (Kadima and Tshiyoyo 2009:94). President Mobutu Sese Seko ruled the country for 32 years under a single party and neopatrimonial system characterized by kleptocracy and violent oppression of any form of opposition. On 17 May 1997, his regime was overthrown by the rebels of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo) (AFDL) led by Laurent Désiré Kabila, with the backing of Rwanda and Uganda. In 1998, after having been told by some of his advisors that a Rwandan officer James Kabarebe was about to overthrow him, President Kabila decided on the dismissal of James Kabarebe as the chief of staff of the Congolese armed forces, and on his substitution by General Kifwa Celestin, who was Katangan, as was Kabila. President Kabila also sent back home all foreign armed forces. However, former backers of Kabila accused him of monopolization of power.

It was against this backdrop that the DRC went into a second war led by former fellows\(^6\) of Laurent Désiré Kabila on 2 August 1998. Subsequently, President Kabila was assassinated on 16 January 2001 in Kinshasa. On attaining political power after the assassination of his father, the new President, Joseph Kabila Kabange, was committed to ending war in the DRC. In order to restore peace, a peace agreement was signed between the rebel movements, civil society, leaders from opposition parties and the government of the DRC in Pretoria (South Africa)

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\(^5\) Claiming to return to African roots and identity, Joseph Désiré Mobutu later declared Congolese (Zairois) should abandon western names to embrace African names as well as culture through the use of the concept the “retour” à l’authenticité (return to our authenticity). For this reason, he changed his name to Mobutu Sese Seko which means Mobutu forever and ever.

\(^6\) Former fellows of Laurent Désiré Kabila are Ruberwa, Nyarugabo, Bugera and James Kabarebe who created a second rebellion movement on 2 August 1998.
on 17 December 2002. This peace agreement framed the agenda for the transition process to a democratic as well as a peaceful state. Following the implementation of the peace agreement, the interim constitution came into force on 4 April 2003. As a result of the ending of political bargaining between Congolese parties, along with the establishment of political institutions, the interim constitution made provision for institutions supporting democracy during the transitional period: the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), the High Authority of Media, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Rights National Observatory and the Commission on Ethics and Fight against Corruption. The IEC was a temporary institution responsible for preparing and organizing the constitutional referendum and the electoral processes during the transitional dispensation from 2003 to 2006.

The table below outlines the evolution of electoral practices in the DRC from 1960 to 2011. It shows the different electoral experiences that the Congolese people underwent.

Table 1.1 Historical evolutions of Congolese elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>Types of elections</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Multiparty Elections of Members of Parliament</td>
<td>Firstly, members of parliament were elected. Secondly they elected respectively Mr Joseph Kasa Vubu as first President of the Republic and Mr Patrice Lumumba first Prime Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Constitutional Referendum</td>
<td>Congolese approved the constitution known as constitution of Luluabourg: 90.82% of voters approved the constitution and 9.18 % rejected it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Legislative Elections</td>
<td>Elections were organized under the multiparty system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Constitutional Referendum</td>
<td>Referendum was organized under single party system after the coup d’etat of Mr Mobutu Sese Seko: 98.44% of voters said yes to the constitution and only 1.56% of voters said no to it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Mr Mobutu Sese Seko, sole candidate, was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Type of Election</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Elections of the National Assembly (Parliament)</td>
<td>Elections organized under single party system. All members of National Assembly were partisans of the MPR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Elections of National Legislative Council (which played the role of National Assembly)</td>
<td>Elections organized under single party system. Elections took place by acclamations at mass rallies held throughout the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Presidential Elections</td>
<td>Mr Mobutu Sese Seko was re-elected unopposed as President of the Republic and head of the party (MPR) for the second term under single party electoral system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Elections of National Legislative Council</td>
<td>Elections organized under single party system. All members of National Assembly were partisans of the MPR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Presidential Elections</td>
<td>Mr Mobutu Sese Seko was re-elected unchallenged as President of the Republic and head of the party (MPR) for the third term under single party electoral system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Elections of National Legislative Council</td>
<td>Elections organized under single party system. All members of National Assembly were partisans of the MPR.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2005 Constitutional Referendum  Registered voters numbered 25,021,703. The total number of votes was 15,505,810 with a turnout of 62.0%. The number of voters who said yes to constitution was 12,461,001 (84.31%) and the number of voters who rejected was 2,319,074 (15.69%). (Tshiyoyo 2009:134)

2006 Presidential Elections  Election of Mr Joseph Kabila Kabange for first term (5 years) as President of the Republic at second round under a multiparty electoral system.

2006 Elections of the National Parliament  Elections of members of Parliament were organized under a multiparty electoral system.

2011 Presidential Elections  Mr Joseph Kabila Kabange was re-elected for second term as President of the Republic after one round of elections under a multiparty electoral system.

2011 Elections of the National Parliament  Elections of members of Parliament were organized under a multiparty electoral system. The outcomes of 2011 electoral processes (presidential and legislative elections) in the DRC were widely considered as lacking credibility by the majority of electoral stakeholders (political actors, electoral experts, domestic and international election observers.

Source: Adapted by the author from Tuseku 2012.

1.2 BACKGROUND
The holding of the 2006 elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo had a dual purpose. First, it was seen as a suitable way to bring peace after a long armed conflict and, second, it marked the end of the transitional government in the DRC. This was made possible when all parties to the DRC conflict (rebels movements, congoleseparties that participated in the political negotiations held at Sun City and later in Pretoria, South Africa, are generally perceived to be rebel movements such as: Liberation
government, political parties and social forces) agreed to sign the Global and Inclusive Agreement on 17 December 2002 in Pretoria. Following this agreement, the IEC was a transitional institution in charge of managing the 2006 electoral processes in the DRC in order to support electoral democracy. In spite of the instability and uncertainty that characterized the transitional period in the DRC, the IEC largely succeeded in managing both the electoral processes and the referendum for the new constitution. In doing so, the new constitution, known as the constitution of 18 February 2006, established the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as a State institution supporting democracy. In 2010, all parties represented in Parliament agreed to the creation of the INEC as the institution for managing electoral and referendum processes in the DRC. The institutionalization of the INEC as the permanent Election Management Body (EMB) meant that elections became the unique source of legitimacy for political power in the DRC. It was therefore expected that good performance by INEC would build confidence in electoral processes amongst the stakeholders and contribute to the consolidation of democracy. Thus INEC replaced the IEC, which was a provisional institution that arose from the political agreement among Congolese parties.

In order to guarantee the integrity and credibility of the electoral processes, article 211 of the constitution of the DRC lays out the function of the INEC. Its main function is to organize and manage electoral and referendum processes; in particular voter registration, the maintenance of the voters’ roll, the management of voting operations and of vote counting, and the publishing of election results.

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8 Congolese political negotiations were ended by the endorsement of a global and inclusive agreement on transition in the DRC by all participants in order to bring peace back to the DRC after a long and bloody armed conflict.

9 The new constitution in the DRC was voted by referendum on 18 February 2006 to replace the transitional constitution that was adopted for the transition period from 2003 to 2006.

10 The article 211 of the Congolese Constitution establishes the INEC as a permanent Election Management Body and state institution in supporting democracy in the DRC.
The first test of the INEC in managing electoral activities was on the electoral operations of the 2011 presidential and legislative elections.

1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Credible electoral processes are important pillars in the delivery of acceptable electoral outcomes. The lack of impartiality and independence in running elections affects the credibility and integrity of electoral processes, which results in declining stakeholders’ confidence in electoral processes as well the legitimacy of political institutions. The observers of the DRC’s 2011 electoral processes noted that the mismanagement of the vote tabulation process compromised the integrity of the election, which had been fraught with legal, technical, and logistical deficiencies from the outset (Dizolele and Kambale 2012:111). Given widespread allegations of irregularities in the running of the 2011 elections and since negative perceptions have the potential to destroy public trust in electoral democracy, thereby undermining the very core of participatory democracy as exemplified by the electoral processes, it is imperative to undertake research in this regard in order to examine stakeholders’ views about the management of electoral processes in an attempt to shed more light on this crucial issue.

1.3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Against this backdrop, this research sought to investigate the following questions:

1.3.1.1 Main question
- What are the perceptions of stakeholders with regard to the management of the 2011 electoral processes by the INEC in the DRC?

1.3.1.2 Subsidiary questions
- What factors affected the management of the 2011 electoral processes?
- To what extent is the INEC free from partisan interference?
- To what extent does the INEC build confidence in the 2011 electoral processes?
- What steps need to be taken to guarantee credible elections in future?

1.3.2 OBJECTIVES AND AIM
The overall aim of the study was to explore the perceptions of stakeholders on the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. In order to achieve this aim, these related objectives were pursued:
1. To investigate electoral malpractices pertaining the management of the 2011 elections;
2. To assess the level of INEC’s impartiality and independence in performing its tasks;
3. To determine the level of satisfaction of stakeholders and their trust in the INEC;
4. To provide recommendations in order to improve the management of future electoral processes.

1.4 RATIONALE

This study is significant both on practical and theoretical grounds. This research attempts to contribute to the literature on democratization theory, which also deals with elections, electoral systems, governance, democracy and economic, social and cultural factors, but seldom focuses on the election management bodies. The intention of this research was to contribute to knowledge on the subject of election management as a central component in the continent’s democratization process. In developing countries that include the DRC, the management of electoral processes has become the source of disputes, violence and even armed confrontation among election stakeholders. Therefore, it sought to address one of the most salient institutions in the democratization process, namely the EMB. To this end, Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe (2010:67) observe that many governments have established EMBs to support free and fair elections where all stakeholders can feel that their success or loss was fair. It has been recognized that tensions leading to confrontations that threaten state stability often arise during the preparation for elections, while conducting elections, and after election results have been declared (Hounkpe and Fall 2011). Additionally, Hounkpe and Fall (2011) assert that this may be upstream, where stakeholders do not agree with the rules that govern the electoral process or the modalities for the organization of elections; or downstream, where candidates who lost elections view the outcome of elections as not being a true reflection of the will of the electorate and choose to contest the results of polls (Hounkpe and Fall 2011:2). On the one hand, it was established that one of the fundamental prerequisites of a democratic polity is the extent to which elections are free and fair. This is where the role of election management bodies is of paramount importance (Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe 2010:66). On the other hand, after the announcement of electoral results by the
EMB, if some stakeholders do not have confidence in the entire electoral process, the question of election outcomes and legitimacy could be raised due to the lack of trust in the EMB. In this respect, the recent electoral experience in the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC was examined in order to determine the perceptions of stakeholders on the management of the 2011 electoral processes.

1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This section provides an overview of the research framework and design that was used in carrying out this study. A methodology is the strategy, plan of action, process, or design lying behind the choice and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes (Crotty 1998:3). The methodology applied to this study was a mixed methods approach. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004:17) define the mixed methods approach as the type of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study (see chapter Three).

1.6 ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE DRC
The constitution, electoral law and decisions, as well international covenants and treaties to which the DRC is party, constitute the legal framework of the 2011 electoral process in the DRC. Elections are complex logistical, administrative, technical and political processes. According to Kadima (2009:11), the success of the electoral process depends largely on the independence, impartiality, professionalism, integrity and responsiveness of the EMB. The legal framework that governed the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC consisted of the Constitution the DRC, known as the Constitution of 18 February 2006, as well as the following laws:
- Law No. 11/002 of 20 January 2011, revising the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of 18 February 2006 (instituting the simple majority presidential election system);
- Law No. 10/13 of 28 July 2010, governing the establishment and function of the INEC and governing its internal organization;
- Ordinance No. 11/012 of 3 February 2011, formally installing the members of the INEC;
- Law No. 11/003 of 25 June 2011, modifying Law No. 06/006 of 9 March 2006 on the organization of presidential, legislative, provincial, urban, municipal and local elections;
- Law No. 11/014 of 17 August 2011, on the allocation of legislative and provincial seats according to registered voters;
- Law No. 04/002 of 15 March 2004, on political parties;
- Law No. 04/028 of 12 November 2004, regulating the DRC citizenship;
- Law No. 11/001 of 10 January 2011, on the composition and functioning of the Supreme Council of Audiovisual and Communication;
- Decision No. 052 bis/INEC/BUR/11 of 18 August 2011 of the INEC, on the implementation of the Law No. 11/003 of 25 June 2011, modifying Law No. 06/006 of 9 March 2006 on the organization of presidential, legislative, provincial, urban, municipal elections;
- Decision No. CSAC/AP/0002/2011 of 28 September 2011 of the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication, relating to campaign through the media.

1.6.1 ELECTORAL SYSTEM
According to Law No. 11/002 of 20 January 2011, modifying certain articles of the constitution, article 71 of the constitution made the following provision: the president of the state is elected by simple majority of suffrage. This means that at the presidential level, the electoral system is one of a simple majority, where the winner-takes-all principle is applied. Article 70 of the Constitution stipulates that the president of the DRC serves five years per term, for a maximum of two terms.

In the DRC, at National Assembly level, the electoral law provides a mixed electoral system. Members of Parliament are elected through both constituencies based on a Proportional Representation-open party list (PR-open) electoral system, and single-member constituencies using the First-Past-The-Post (simple majority) system. Members of Parliament serve for five-year terms.

1.7 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS
- Elections stakeholders
According to Wall, Ellis, Ayoub, Dundas, Rukambe and Staino (2006:201), stakeholders of an EMB are those individuals, groups and organizations that have
an interest or ‘stake’ in the EMB’s operations. They can be classified either as primary stakeholders, who directly affect or are directly affected by the EMB’s activities, policies and practices; or as secondary stakeholders, who have a looser connection with the EMB’s activities. Genuine and open dialogue with stakeholders can contribute to confidence in the electoral process and trust in the EMB’s activities.

- Proportional Representation-open list
The PR-open list is an electoral system in which voters have the liberty to choose the candidate from the party list according to their preference without any predetermined order of name on the list. The open list PR system is the electoral system in which the voters determine which candidate will be their representative. The candidate is elected according to the number of votes obtained.

- Proportional Representation closed List
The PR-closed list is an electoral system in which candidates are elected according to their position of appearance on a list as fixed and predetermined by the party itself. This means voters do not have the power to determine or to vote for the candidate of their preference. This is the case in South Africa where electors are required to vote for the party not for the individual candidate. In most cases, the ballot paper is designed in the way it represents the party names and logo as well as the picture of the party leader rather than the names of the candidates. Candidates are elected as a result of a fixed and predetermined list as submitted to the IEC by the parties themselves.

- The First-past-the-post
The first-past-the-post is an electoral system in which the candidate who receives the most votes in an election is elected. There is no need to get a majority of votes (50 %+). The candidate who obtains a higher number of votes than other candidates in a given constituency is declared the winner.

- Election Management Bodies
Wall et al. (2006:5) notify that the complexity and specialist skills necessary for electoral management require that an institution or institutions be responsible for electoral activities. Such bodies come in a variety of shapes and sizes, with a wide range of titles to match, which include ‘Election Commission’, ‘Department of Elections’, ‘Electoral Council’, ‘Election Unit’, or ‘Electoral Board’. In addition, Wall
et al. (2006) maintain that the term ‘Election Management Body’ (EMB) has been coined as a name to refer to the body or bodies responsible for election management, whatever wider institutional framework is in place. An EMB is an organization or body which has the sole purpose of, and is legally responsible for, managing some or all of the elements that are essential for the conduct of elections and of direct democracy instruments such as referendums, citizens’ initiatives and recall votes, if these are part of the legal framework.

Wall et al. (2006:7-8) suggest three models of election management bodies, which are outlined as follows:

The Independent Model of electoral management exists in those countries where elections are organized and administrated by an EMB which is institutionally independent and autonomous\(^\text{11}\) from the executive branch of government, and which has and manages its own budget. Under the Independent Model, an EMB is not accountable to a government ministry or department. According to Wall et al. (2006:7-8), the EMB may be accountable to the legislature, the judiciary, or the head of state. Furthermore, Wall et al. (2006:7-8) contend that many new and emerging democracies have chosen the Independent Model of electoral management. Examples of EMBs under the Independent Model include Armenia, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, Estonia, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Poland, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay. In some countries, two bodies are established for the management of elections, both of which are independent of the executive and can be considered as independent EMBs. One of these bodies is likely to have responsibility for policy decisions relating to the electoral process, and the other to be responsible for conducting and implementing the electoral process. Provisions may exist which insulate the implementation EMB from interference by the policy EMB in staffing and operational matters. Examples of this ‘double-independent’

\(^{11}\) In this study the autonomous of the EMBs refers to the way EMBs conducting their internal activities (managing the elections, recruitment and training of election officers, conducting voter and civic education) vis-à-vis the Government. In this view, Maphunye (2014) declares that in each country, the autonomy of the EMBs is relative and depends on the provision made in the electoral legal framework.
framework under the Independent Model include Jamaica, Romania, Suriname and Vanuatu (Wall et al. 2006:7-8).

The **Governmental Model** of electoral management exists in those countries where elections are organized and managed by the executive branch through a ministry (such as the Ministry of the Interior) and/or through local authorities (Wall et al. 2006:7-8). In addition, Wall et al. (2006:7-8) declare that where EMBs under the Governmental Model exist at national level, they are led by a minister or civil servant and are answerable to a cabinet minister. With very few exceptions they have no ‘members’. Wall et al. (2006:7-8) posit that their budget falls within a government ministry and/or under local authorities. Countries whose EMBs fall into this model include Denmark, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, Tunisia, the United Kingdom (for elections but not referendums) and the United States. In Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, elections are implemented by local authorities. In Sweden and Switzerland the central EMB assumes a policy coordinating role (Wall et al. 2006:7-8).

According to Mozaffar (2002:93), the EMBs are non-autonomous (located within the formal Government bureaucracy) in the following African countries: Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Djibouti, Mauritania, Seychelles and Rwanda.

In the **Mixed Model** of electoral management, there are usually two component EMBs, and dual structures exist: a policy, monitoring or supervisory EMB that is independent of the executive branch of government (like an EMB under the Independent Model) and an implementation EMB located within a department of state and/or local government (like an EMB under the Governmental Model). Wall et al (2006:7-8) state that under the Mixed Model, elections are organized by the component governmental EMB, with some level of oversight provided by the component independent EMB. The Mixed Model is used in France, Japan, Spain

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12 Mozaffar (2002:91) identifies three types of EMBs in terms of autonomous as follows:
- Non-autonomous EMBs located within the formal Government bureaucracy (Governmental model);
- Semi-autonomous EMBs located within the formal Government bureaucracy but under the supervision of an autonomous body established specifically for that purpose;
- Autonomous EMBs otherwise also known as Independent Electoral Commissions.
and many former French colonies, especially in West Africa, for example Mali, Senegal and Togo (Wall et al. 2006:7-8).

In addition, in Africa each country has a specific model of institution (EMB) in charge of managing the electoral processes. For instance, during the 2011 elections in the DRC, the INEC was under the independent model.

Moreover, within the SADC region the independent model of EMB seems to be the most established among members state. According to Balule (2008:109-110), all the SADC member States have established independent EMBs to manage their elections. Balule asserts that except the Republic of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia where their EMBs are established by statutes, other SADC member states have established their EMBs under their respective Constitution.

Furthermore, Balule (2008:110) maintains that the legal instruments establishing these institutions save for Botswana and Lesotho expressly provide that they shall be independent in the exercise of their functions and shall not be subjected to the direction or control of any person. However, many EMBs do not comply with democratic political culture, standards and norms related to the management of elections in Africa and especially in the SADC region.

- Electoral process

According to Wall et al. (2006:330), the electoral process is a series of steps involved in the preparation and carrying out of a specific election or direct democratic instrument. The electoral process usually includes the enactment of the electoral law, electoral registration, the nomination of candidates and/or political parties or the registration of proposals, the campaign, the voting, the counting and tabulation of votes, the resolution of electoral disputes and the announcement of results.

Wall et al. (2006:151-152) provide certain fundamental guiding principles of electoral management\(^\text{13}\) namely: independence, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, professionalism and service-mindedness as

\(^{13}\) A deeper understanding and more detailed discussion of guiding principles of electoral management can be found in the Encyclopedia of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network at [http://www.aceproject.org](http://www.aceproject.org) and _The Management Design Handbook_: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
indispensable features of election administration in insuring integrity, legitimacy and credibility of electoral processes, no matter which model of EMB is used in managing electoral processes. These principles are discussed below.

- **Integrity**: the ability to act in a non-partisan and independent manner by not acting to benefit political interests and/or corruptly, and by ensuring that the electoral law, rules and codes of conduct are followed;

- **Impartiality**: the ability to be fair and to afford stakeholders equitable and honest treatment on a level playing field, and the ability to treat all stakeholders in an even handed, non-partisan manner;

- **Independence**: meaning the ability to carry out the work without influence from or being under the control of an external force, such as the government or the ruling party;

- **Transparency**: referring to the ability of the EMB to be open and truthful and to avail to stakeholders of timely information and access to EMB records;

- **Efficiency**: meaning that optimal use of resources of all kinds and those electoral funds are used wisely, and all activities are designed and conducted in a sustainable and cost-effective manner;

- **Service-mindedness**: ensuring that all activity is aimed towards the delivery of high-quality services to all stakeholders, and in particular voters;

- **Professionalism**: meaning the meticulous and accurate implementation of electoral procedures as a key element for the delivery of credible elections. EMBs need to ensure that all election officials, whether core staff or temporary workers, are well trained and acquainted with the necessary skills so as to apply high professional standards in the implementation of their technical work. Professional training prompts public trust that the entire process is ‘in good hands’.

- **Electoral integrity**
Norris (2013:579) defines electoral integrity\(^{14}\) as complying with agreed international conventions and global norms\(^{15}\), which apply to all countries worldwide throughout the electoral cycle, including during the pre-election period, the campaign, on polling day, and its aftermath. In addition, the recent Report of the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security (2012:6) defines an election with integrity as any election that is based on the democratic principles of universal suffrage and political equality as reflected in international standards and agreements, and is professional, impartial, and transparent in its preparation and administration throughout the electoral cycle.

- **Election quality**

According to Kadima (2009:5) it follows that the assessment of the quality of an electoral process is a complex process, for a number of reasons. These reasons include the logistical and financial challenge of monitoring an electoral process from its very early stages up to the final post-election stages, and the difficulty of accessing some of the hidden parts of election management, such as computerized results, tabulation and management.

Alemika (2007:2) states that the concept of electoral quality is often used interchangeably with electoral integrity. Both concepts refer to the degree of the freeness and fairness of elections. There are several factors that impact on the quality and integrity of elections. Among these are (a) legal framework; (b) electoral system; (c) technical efficiency of electoral management authority; (d) relative autonomy of the electoral agency from interference by other organs of government and the ruling party; and (e) degree to which electoral processes, decisions, participation and outcomes are insulated from manipulation, corruption, and violence.

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\(^{14}\) In the case of this study the term electoral integrity refers to the extent to which the INEC complied with the democratic principles and international norms related to elections, in conducting the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC.

\(^{15}\) Global norms and international standards in this study refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections; and Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation.
The quality of elections around the world is assessed according to free and fair criteria. Mpabanga and Rakner (2007:7) declare that elections must comply with international standards in order to qualify as free and fair.

- **Perception**
Perception is the process of recognition, appreciation and being aware of something by means of the senses. According to the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2006:1036), perceptions refer to a way in which something is regarded, understood, or interpreted. In this study, perceptions refer to the way election stakeholders observed, understood and interpreted the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC.

- **Free Elections**
Tlakula (2011:3) declares that for an election to be free, citizens must have the right and opportunity to choose. There must be freedom of assembly, association, movement, and speech for candidates, parties, voters, media, observers and others. The political environment should be free of intimidation, and there should not be any impediments to standing for election by both political parties and independent candidates. Therefore freedom is an essential precondition to meaningful elections.

- **Fair elections**
According to Tlakula (2011:3), for an election to be fair, it must have honest voting and counting, and be administered without fraud or manipulation by impartial election authorities. Political parties and individuals must have reasonable opportunities to stand for election, and there must be prompt and just resolution of election-related disputes and grievances, before and after election day. Fairness also requires a ‘level playing field’. Misuse of public resources for campaign purposes and incumbency should be avoided, and all parties and candidates must have an adequate chance of communicating with the voters, including reasonably equitable access to the media. Furthermore, for elections to be fair official announcements of results should be expedited and electoral complaints should be treated with impartiality.
In the same vein, Elklit and Svensson (1997) are questioning what makes elections free and fair. For them, the translation of theoretical concepts such as free and fair into practical factors has proved difficult (Eklit and Svenson 1999). In addition, Eklit and Svensson (1999) declare that the pre-election period is especially important: it is at this stage that observers must assess whether the election law and the constitution guarantee the freedom of the voters, and verify that relevant resources are not too unequally distributed among competing parties and candidates. They argue that:

*Whereas, freedom is a necessary though not sufficient condition for an election's acceptability, the combination of freedom and the fair application of electoral rules is both necessary and sufficient for such acceptability. For an election to be free and fair, however, the main competitors should have had at least some access to campaign resources and the media, even if that access was not fully equal. In determining the acceptability of a given election, observers should focus on the degree of conformance to the country's election law and related regulations, considering not just election-day events but also the periods before and after the balloting.*

Table 1.2 below summarizes the nature of the electorate, the exercise of the right to vote and defines the characteristics required of the voters, parties and candidates; and the electoral campaign itself.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freeness: nature of the electorate</th>
<th>Fairness: securing a level playing field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) All adults are qualified voters;</td>
<td>a) The criteria for registering parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Each voter has only one vote;</td>
<td>and nominating candidates;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Each voter has an equal opportunity to participate in the elections;</td>
<td>b) Each party or candidate should have an equal opportunity to present to the voters their arguments, both arguing for their own case as well as to formulate a critique against the incumbent government;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) When casting their votes the electorate should be free to choose among the alternatives (parties’ candidates) without threat or coercion and without being compensated for choosing a particular</td>
<td>c) None of the contenders should</td>
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alternative;
e) Each vote is counted only once and for the person/party chosen by the voter;
f) Only ballots cast by the voters are included in counting.

have greater access to resources that are supposed to be neutrally and evenly distributed, should be politically neutral.

Table 1.2 adapted by the author from Mpabanga and Rakner (2007:8)

1.8 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This study only focuses on the exploration of stakeholders' perceptions of the 2011 electoral processes. The views of stakeholders on the management of electoral processes constitute the essential matter of this study. This study did not intend to attend to all stakeholders in the DRC. However, in this study stakeholders are a sample of domestic election observers, electoral experts and selected members of civil society who were involved in the 2011 elections. In addition, twelve key informants were interviewed and 120 self-administration questionnaires were distributed. The researcher conducted field work in Kinshasa from June to July 2013 and October to December the same year. For this reason, the researcher did not intend to produce statistically generalizable findings.

1.9 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS
Chapter one introduces the study and provides the background, research problem, aim, objectives and rationale of the study. It also provided the limitations, methodology and definition of key concepts in relation to the study.

Chapter two deals with the theoretical framework and the literature review in relation to this study. The literature review focused on the management of electoral processes. In addition, political trust, political support, patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism theory helped to investigate factors that contribute in shaping stakeholders’ perceptions in the management of elections. These concepts also helped to gauge the stakeholders’ trust with respect to the management of elections in order to understand their perceptions of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC.
Chapter three highlights the methodology. It intended to shed light on the data collection techniques used during the data gathering phases. The research design, data collection and analysis are also discussed in this chapter.

Chapter four analyses and interprets the findings. Finally, Chapter five summarizes the findings, presents conclusions and recommendations.

1.10 SUMMARY
This chapter gave a succinct overview of the historical and political context in which the Congolese 2011 election was organized. It further provided the problem statement, research question, objectives and rationale of the study on 2011 election management in the DRC. The scope of the study, an overview of the methodology and concepts related to election management were discussed in this chapter. The following chapter will discuss the literature relevant to election management and the theoretical framework that underpins this study.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to explain what has been studied previously in order to determine what remains to be studied in future research. Gray (2014:98) notes that a comprehensive review of the literature is essential because it serves a number of purposes, including: providing an up-to-date understanding of the subject, its significance and structure; identifying significant issues and themes that present themselves for further research, particularly where there are gaps in current knowledge; guiding the development of research topics and questions; assisting future researchers in understanding why the research was undertaken, its design and direction, and helping others to replicate the research; and presenting the kinds of research methodologies and tools that have been used in other studies, which may guide the design of the proposed study.

There are a range of publications dedicated to the 2011 elections in the DRC (see Dizolele and Kambale, 2012; Mangu, 2013). The literature review in this study revolves around various themes which are related to the topic. Furthermore this chapter lays out the theoretical framework that informs this study on the perceptions of stakeholders with regard to the 2011 elections in the DRC.

2.2 REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
The literature review discusses scholarly and other publications related to the role of the Election Management Body (EMB) as an institution responsible for managing all election phases and stakeholders’ views of electoral processes.

2.2.1 LEGAL BASIS FOR CONDUCTING ELECTIONS IN AFRICA
The African Union’s Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (Chapter 7, Article 17) and Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, which was adopted in Durban, South Africa in July 2002, made provisions for holding regular, transparent, free and fair elections and the establishment of independent and impartial national electoral bodies responsible for the management of elections within all member states.

In a recent report entitled “Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence” published by the African Union Panel of the Wise (Panel of Wise 2010:9) it was
confirmed that for elections to enhance democracy, relevant institutions need to be built, including impartial and independent election management bodies, and the roles of political parties and civil society organizations in all stages of the electoral cycle need to be guaranteed. This report examines the political context and legal framework that can help prevent election-related violence. It maintains that an independent and impartial national electoral body assuredly in charge of election management should be established and strengthened in order to ensure the credibility and transparency of electoral processes.

Matlosa (2004) examines the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. He highlights the fact that there are three instruments which deal with elections in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The first is the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections; the second is the SADC Parliamentary Forum (PF), a parliamentarian initiative that developed norms and standards for elections in the SADC region since 2001; and the third is an initiative of civil society organizations (CSOs) and the election management bodies (EMBs) known as the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation (PEMMO) in the SADC region.

Moreover, Matlosa states that technically, the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections suffer some kind of schizophrenia: it is more of an election observation guideline than a document on election management principles; although SADC leaders tend to think that it is in fact an election principles document. It is more inclined towards election observation than election management. Matlosa declares that methodologically, the correct title for this document should have been SADC Principles and Guidelines for Observation of Elections, given that it is more elaborate on observation than it is on election management as such. In contrast, the SADC Parliamentary Forum (PF) guidelines are more comprehensive on election observation and less so on management. Matlosa concludes that the three instruments can be used independently of each other in election management and observation and there should not be concerns regarding duplication, since they would be administered towards the same end-goal: democracy consolidation and political stability (Matlosa 2004:20). In order to determine the quality of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC, the researcher
made use of the PEMMO as a tool for analyzing the preparation, conducting and observation of the 2011 Congolese elections, since it encompasses all dimensions related to the holding of credible elections.

According to Kambale (2012:1-2) the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance adopted by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2001 states that among the principles to be declared as constitutional principles shared by all Member States is that every accession to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections (article1[b]). The ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance also specifies that the bodies responsible for organizing the elections shall be independent or neutral and shall have the confidence of all the political actors (article 3). Kambale’s study sheds light on the evolution of electoral management and its impact on the quality of citizenship, and political participation in West African countries. Kambale (2012:9) claims that the central role that electoral management is now playing in the political life of an increasing number of African countries means that the management of elections is now also at center stage.

Kambale (2012:9) concludes that the institutional framework for these bodies, and their endowment with adequate human and financial resources, has thus become an important concern in the constitutional reforms that have accompanied the second wave of democratization in West Africa.

2.2.2 IMPORTANCE OF ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN MANAGING ELECTORAL PROCESSES

In a study entitled “Matters Arising: African Elections and the Problem of Electoral Administration”, Jinadu (1997) draws attention to the structure that is required in order for elections to be organized and conducted, rather than on the election outcomes. He states that the centrality of elections presupposes the importance particularly of the impartial electoral administration. In order to shed light on matters surrounding elections in Africa, Jinadu (1997:1) cautions: “elections have to be organized and conducted; who does this and how it is done, the structure and processes for doing it, are all of paramount importance”.

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In a study entitled “Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of Governance”, Pintor-Lopez (2000:13) underlines the importance, role and challenges of an Elections Management Body (EMB) for democracy-building in developing countries, as opposed to old democracies.

Pintor-Lopez observes that the United States established the Federal Election Commission only in 1975; Australia created its Electoral Commission as an autonomous body as late as 1984; in the United Kingdom, the desirability of introducing a general electoral authority into the country’s political system is still being discussed. In both new and older democracies, arguments advocating the establishment of independent electoral bodies highlight the importance of these structures in promoting democratic technical efficiency.

Besides, Pintor-Lopez (2000:21-24) examines EMBs as permanent public institutions of governance in a democratized world. He discusses technical aspects of their sustainability, as well as their contribution to the legitimacy of democratic institutions and to their enhancement of the rule of law in a democratic state. In addition, Pintor-Lopez also explores main structural patterns of EMBs by regions of the world as well as by political and cultural traditions. Furthermore, Pintor-Lopez also provides three-fold classifications for running elections: Around 53% of countries have elections run exclusively by independent EMBs, a total of 27% have elections conducted by the government under the supervision of an independent collective authority; finally, in only 20% of the countries are elections organized exclusively by the executive (Pintor-Lopez 2000:26).

Table 2.1 Mode of elections management worldwide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>53% of countries</th>
<th>27% of countries</th>
<th>20% of countries</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elections run exclusively by independent EMBs</td>
<td>Elections run under the supervision of an independent collective authority</td>
<td>Elections run exclusively by the executive</td>
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Table 2.1 adapted by the author from Pintor-Lopez (2000:26)

Pintor-Lopez (2000:123) concludes by averring a significant contribution of EMBs to democracy and the rule of law.
Pastor (1999:5) argues that during the transition toward democracy in developing countries, the administration of elections takes on the status of great importance. Because the stakes are so high, the failure to conduct elections efficiently and impartially could lead to violence. In addition to this, Pastor also provides reasons as to why democratic transitions derail during the electoral process. The author sheds light on some reasons: the character, competence and composition of election management bodies; the weakness of the state; and bureaucratic incapacity, which often affects the quality of electoral processes in developing countries such as the DRC.

In the same vein, Harris (1998:310) argues that the primary purpose of any electoral administration body is to deliver credible free and fair election services to the candidates and voters. In doing this, it must ensure that the integrity of each election process is adequately safeguarded from incompetent election officials and fraudulent manipulators. Issues relating to impartiality and independence, efficiency, professionalism, and transparency are particularly important in the context of suspicion and mistrust that characterizes post-conflict elections (Lyons 2004:45).

2.2.3 ELECTION STAKEHOLDERS AND MANAGEMENT OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Stakeholders in elections are individuals, groups and organizations that have an interest or stake in the electoral processes (Wall et al. 2006:201). According to Wall et al. (2006), stakeholders of an EMB affect directly or are directly affected by an EMB’s activities, policies and practices. Genuine and open dialogue with stakeholders can contribute to confidence in the electoral process and trust in the EMB’s activities.

According to Wall et al. (2006:330) the electoral process is defined as a series of steps involved in the preparation and carrying out of a specific election or direct democratic instrument. The electoral process usually includes the enactment of the electoral law, electoral registration, the nomination of candidates and/or political parties or the registration of proposals, the campaign, the voting, the
counting and tabulation of votes, the resolution of electoral disputes and the announcement of results.

In a study entitled “Assessment of Elections Stakeholders in Elections Management”, Norman (2010:320) claims that election stakeholders include all individuals and organizations that conduct the elections or ensure that the elections occur; and individuals for whom elections are performed. Furthermore he concludes that thorough accomplishment of election management depends on two aspects of the role players: the competence of the election management body, and the ability of election stakeholders to articulate the rules and regulations that govern elections (Norman 2010:326).

Tötemeyer (2010) in an article titled “Namibia’s Constitution, Democracy and the Electoral Process” reminds us that the most important stakeholders in an election in the Namibian context are the governing electoral bodies, the Electoral Commission, and the Directorate of Elections, along with political parties, the associations and organizations participating in elections, and civil society, particularly the electorate. Focusing on the Namibian case, Tötemeyer declares that the building of democracy includes not only the pursuance of political values and political attitudes that uphold democracy, but also the conducting of comprehensive voter registration, effective electoral campaigns, and proper voter education as an integral part of the electoral process. An electoral process can only be meaningful if voters understand the essence and consequence of democracy as it relates to elections (Tötemeyer 2010:289-290).

According to Jinadu (1997:2), electoral process refers to the rules, procedures and activities relating to, among others, the establishment of electoral bodies, the appointment of their members, the registration of voters, the nomination of candidates, balloting, counting of the ballots, the declaration of results, the selection and training of electoral officials, constituency delimitation, voter education and, in some cases, registration of political parties and supervision of party nomination congresses.

asserts that it is widely held by election observer missions and other participants that the 2007 Nigerian elections were heavily flawed. Nigeria’s INEC has been accused of partiality and outright collusion with the police, other security organizations, the executive arm of the government and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) to rig the elections in favor of the PDP. This collusion manifested in massive stuffing of ballot boxes, deliberate delays in delivering election materials to areas considered non-PDP strongholds, and the issuing of fake results sheets. In addition, Ijim-Agbor (2007:93) suggests that the Nigerians need to evolve an electoral process where each vote is taken into account; and the Nigerian state should develop the ethics of participation, with citizens having a greater voice in government through their votes.

In their book entitled _Electoral Democracy in Uganda: Understanding the Institutional process and outcomes of the 2006 multiparty elections_, Makara, Rakner and Rwengabo (2008) analyze the role of the Ugandan Electoral Commission (EC) in administering the 2006 multiparty elections (presidential and parliamentarian). They contend that in order to guarantee legitimacy, the electoral process should be regulated by constitutional rules and special legislation as well as by cultural norms developed to govern the behavior of the actors. They maintain that the key factors in achieving this are the quality of the electoral process, the capacity of the administrative unit mandated to administer the elections and the unit’s autonomy from political forces (Makara _et al._ 2008:90).

Debrah, Pumpuni, and Gyimah-Boadi (2010:7) conducted a study on Ghana’s Electoral Commission; they stated that since failure of the election authority to manage credible elections has serious ramifications for democratic legitimacy, assessing the performance of Ghana’s Electoral Commission (EC) seems most appropriate and salient because of its multiple implications for other governance institutions in Ghana and elsewhere. In their study, they investigated whether the EC as a governing institution performed in accordance with principles of governance. They identify factors that could contribute to failure or success of the EC in Ghana, and Debrah _et al._ (2010:26) are of the view that efficient electoral management is crucial. Efficient electoral management is capital intensive; lack of or delay in releasing resources for the good functioning of the EC can compromise the integrity of the
election and democratic process. Debrah et al. (2010:26) recommend that, in order to overcome recurrent insufficient financial resources for elections, stakeholders may agree by consensus to set up an election fund for managing elections.

Sebudubudu and Bothhomilwe (2010) in their study on the management of elections in Botswana, highlight the uncontested role of elections as an important ingredient in liberal democracy. They argue that Botswana is an election success story in Africa and beyond. They assert that one of the fundamental prerequisites of a democratic polity is the extent to which elections are free and fair. This is where the role of election management bodies (EMBs) is of paramount importance (Sebudubudu and Bothhomilwe 2010:66). However, Maphunye, in a paper presented in 2013 during the colloquium on Electoral Democracy in Africa, questioned the independence of the IEC in Botswana. Maphunye claims that there is no clear difference between public servants and elections officials, as long as the IEC is still under state control in terms of election commissioners’ appointment as well as logistical means (finances, buildings, cars, etc.).

In his article entitled “Election Management Bodies in Africa: Cameroon’s National Elections Observatory in perspective”, Fombad analyses the Cameroonian National Elections Observatory (NEO). He claims that a selected type of EMB is at stake not only for the reason that it is shaping the nature of political competition, but because it could affect the credibility of electoral outcomes in any electoral processes. Fombad concludes that elections could lose their relevance as an effective means of enforcing governmental responsibility and accountability and may give rise to the feeling that government can neglect people’s welfare as much as it likes and still manage to return to power against the will of the people (Fombad 2003:50).

In a study entitled “Election Management in Cameroon: progress, problems and prospects”, Menang (2006:69) asserts that the most important challenge facing election managers in Cameroon is the building of public confidence in the electoral process to the extent that election results are readily accepted and cease to be the subject of such controversy that they threaten the stability of the country’s democratic institutions at the end of each electoral process. Further, Menang
(2006:70) declares that for public confidence in the electoral process to grow, election stakeholders must comply with the laws that govern elections. Furthermore, Menang recommends the reform of the EMB by adapting electoral laws perceived as a source of conflict: this can be accomplished by including several new measures in order to strengthen the EMB, harmonize procedures, restrain impunity, and restructure functions.

Rakner and Svåsand (2005) in a working paper entitled “Maybe Free but not Fair: Electoral Administration in Malawi 1994-2004”, assesses the Malawi Electoral Commission’s (MEC) autonomy, capacity and relationship with stakeholders through the electoral process in Malawi across three consecutive elections. He argues that the quality of the elections, in terms of voter participation (registration), a level playing field for campaigning, and certainty about the rules and regulations guiding the electoral exercise, have not improved significantly. The lack of improvement of the electoral process continues to undermine the legitimacy of elections and prevent the consolidation of democracy (Rakner and Svåsand 2005:16).

Ibrahim and Garuba (2010), in Codesria’s commissioned study of the Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria, examine in a holistic way (the structural culture of the organization, legal framework, composition, institutional autonomy, internal structure and capacity, functioning and performance with particular respect to transparency, accountability and democratic governance, as well as public perception and credibility) factors that contribute to shaping perceptions of the quality of the management of electoral processes. Ibrahim and Garuba (2010:4-6) set up an analytical framework of electoral processes that include indicators and areas of assessment such as public perception and public confidence in the institution, quality of the leadership of the institution, level of public trust in the institution, level of development of the political system and how it influences the electoral authority’s (EA) performance.

In an article entitled “Independent Electoral Commission in Tanzania: a false debate?” Makulilo declares that the importance of elections in the contemporary world calls for the need to establish an impartial body to manage them. The
establishment and operation of this body, however, must meet the principles of a credible election administration. He therefore examines the independence of the Tanzanian EMB, and its capacity to promote free and fair elections. Taking into account the perceptions of political parties and the public about the National Election Commission (NEC), Makulilo (2009:446) is of the opinion that from its formation to date, the NEC has not enjoyed the confidence and trust of some of the key stakeholders in elections; that is, the political parties (particularly the opposition parties) and the general public.

In their study of electoral processes in post-apartheid South Africa, Struwing, Roberts and Vivier (2011:1127) argue that confidence in the electoral process is enhanced and strengthened by trust in the institution, which enhances the electoral process in South Africa. This point of view came about as a result of two nationwide surveys that were conducted in South Africa. The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) organized (from 1998 to 2001) the first survey called Evaluation of Public Opinion (EPOP), and the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) ran from 2003 to 2010. At the same time, these authors scrutinized voting behavior, perceptions of electoral processes and the performance of the South African Electoral Commission using both the 2010 Voter Participation Survey (VPS) and the 2011 Election Satisfaction Survey (ESS) in order to capture perceptions of voters regarding the 2011 local government elections in South Africa. Subsequently, this study assessed public opinion about the South African Electoral Commission and measured people’s trust in the political system and other social and political institutions in South Africa. Struwing et al. (2011) discovered that the level of the general public trust had increased due to the performance of and various efforts by the South African Electoral Commission, which were aimed at being responsive, proactive and innovative.

Birch (2008:306-307) states that it is worth noting that elections are a process that ordinary citizens are more likely to be competent to assess than most government procedures, given widespread participation and the attentiveness this is likely to breed. In this regard, Birch is of the view that any individual voter may have the capacity to evaluate electoral processes. While this might be true in established democracies, it may not be the case in new democracies or countries attempting
democratic transition. Such countries also face problems related to illiteracy that might undermine citizen participation.

In addition, Kerr (2009:9-10) argues that citizens are, for the most part, capable of assessing the capacity and autonomy of the electoral commission through direct experience with the EMB and indirect information about the EMB. According to Kerr, voters who have experienced electoral processes through voter registration, voter education, and polling activities are most capable of assessing the performance (capacity and autonomy) of the EMB. Kerr’s main argument is that the performance of the EMB influences citizens’ confidence in the EMB and consequently shapes citizens’ perceptions of election quality. Being involved in the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC, stakeholders had experiences that shaped their perceptions of the INEC in terms of independence and impartiality. For instance, stakeholders who were interested in the 2011 elections would be more able to assess the electoral processes throughout the pre-elections phase, elections phase and post-elections phase than those who were not involved. Hence, the Congolese electoral experience could have increased or decreased the level of stakeholders’ confidence and trust in the INEC.

In his article entitled “The Citizens’ View on Electoral Governance in Mexico”, Ugues (2010:495) asserts that it is important to understand how institutions of electoral governance affect the credibility of elections but also how individuals view these institutions, as this may also affect their credibility within society. He explores how public opinion of an electoral governance institution is shaped within a particular country and context. Using data from the Mexico 2006 Panel Study, a public opinion study of Mexico’s general election and campaign spanning from 2005 to 2006, (Ugues 2010: 503), observes that the partisanship for the winning or losing party correlates to the positive attitudes or pessimistic views regarding the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), which is the EMB in Mexico.

Hall, Monson and Patterson (2009:10) indicate that rating the job performance of a poll worker as excellent continues to produce high levels of confidence. Their analysis revealed that voters who rate the job performance of poll workers as excellent were more likely to express more confidence in the process.
recommended that election administrators should invest more in the recruitment and training of poll workers due to the fact that their efficiency could have an effect on voters’ confidence in voting process.

In their study entitled “Are Americans Confident their Ballots are Counted? “ Alvarez, Hall and Llewellyn (2008:756) investigate the confidence American voters have that ballots were recorded as intended for the 2004 presidential contest between George Bush and John Kerry in the United States. In this study, they find a relationship between voter turnout and confidence. The more confident voters are, the more likely they are to turn out to vote. They believe that the study of the relationship between voter confidence and political participation may provide a better understanding of voter behavior in a representative democracy. Further, Alvarez et al. (2008:764) indicate that a significant difference in confidence levels exists along racial lines, as the proportion of the African American voters who are confident that their vote for President in the 2004 election was counted as intended is significantly lower than the proportion of white voters who are similarly confident. Alvarez et al. (2008:756) think that white Republicans are more confident than white Democrats due to a winner’s effect stemming from the 2000 and 2004 national elections. In Addition, they conclude that both political affiliation and voter familiarity with the electoral process, as measured by education and age, exert a significant influence upon confidence.

In his study, “Election Observation and Monitoring in Botswana”, Sebudubudu (2006:168) argues that election observation and monitoring have promoted transparency and accountability as well as public confidence in the credibility of the Botswana electoral process, especially in the recent years. According to Sebudubudu (2006:168), election observers and monitors are not only central to but have become part and parcel of the electoral process worldwide, especially in emerging or young democracies, as a way of promoting transparency in the electoral process and encouraging free and fair elections. Lekorwe (2006:65) states that election management is a service that normally attracts attention at the time of elections but is usually ignored during the intervals between them, a factor which can be costly. In his study, Lekorwe examines the role and the status of Botswana’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) which
is a subject of the opposition’s criticism with regard to its independence from the government. Lekorwe (2006:76) emphasizes that the credibility of the election management body is essential to the holding of free and fair elections, and transparency is essential to credibility. Transparency can be facilitated by all stakeholders playing an active part and appreciating the role and functions of the commission (Lekorwe 2006:75). In the same vein Lekorwe (2006) claims that the confidence that is bestowed by members of the public in the IEC may be measured by voters’ own views of the elections, the levels of accountability of politicians to voters, and the manner in which the commission renders its service to the public.

In his article entitled “Evaluating Election Management in South Africa’s 2009 elections”, Maphunye (2009:57) argues that most of the complexities relate to the fact that running an election is an elaborate process that requires various skills, including knowledge and expertise in implementing relevant legal and regulatory frameworks; public sector administration and management skills; effective organizational and events management measures; the ability to respond to the needs of the electorate in various ways, such as providing them with the necessary information before, during and after an election; and the ability to make the relevant arrangements.

Harris (1998:310) states that the functioning of an electoral body should not be subject to the direction of any other person, authority or political party; it must function without political favor or bias. In addition, the body in charge of administering or supervising an election must be able to operate free of interference simply because any allegation of manipulation, perception of bias, or alleged intervention, will have a direct impact not only on the credibility of the body in charge, but on the entire process. In connection to this idea, Harris (1998:310) stresses that the failure to fulfill even a simple election task or activity may not only adversely affect the quality of the services delivered, but may jeopardize public perception of the competence and impartiality of election administrators.

According to Adebayo and Omotola (2007:203-205), the certification by an election monitoring group that an election is free and fair is usually sufficient for
the citizens of a nation and the international community to accept the elected government as legitimate. Besides, Adebayo and Omotola argue that the importance of the certification of elections by monitoring groups is that the reports of election monitoring groups may be, to a very large extent, a reflection of the perception of the wider population. Adebayo and Omotola (2007:203) maintain that a critical dissection of such perceptions may be useful in identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the elections. It may also help in designing appropriate reform measures to protect the competitiveness, openness, freedom and fairness of electoral politics in the country. Adebayo and Omotola argue that in the absence of longitudinal data, perceptions of the 2007 Nigerian general elections were centered on the view of domestic and international observers, political parties, interest groups and individuals.

2.2.4 FEATURES OF 2011 ELECTORAL PROCESSES MANAGEMENT IN THE DRC

Dizolele and Kambale (2012:111) observe that with regard to the 2011 elections in the DRC, the poor election management and lack of expertise and skill among some election commissioners led to serious irregularities, including the loss of results from nearly two thousand polling stations in Kinshasa, as well as incredibly high voter turnouts, which exceeded 100% in the Katanga province.

Dizolele and Kambale (2012:112) point out that the Roman Catholic Church, arguably the DRC’s most influential institution, which itself deployed thirty thousand election observers across the country, backed the Carter Center’s statement. Speaking at a press conference, Kinshasa’s Archbishop, Cardinal Laurent Monsengwo, told journalists that the Electoral Commission’s results represented neither truth nor justice. He stressed that the announced results posed a serious credibility problem for the election. Dizolele and Kambale underline the question of legitimacy and its aftermath due to irregularities and deficiencies that characterized the 2011 electoral process in the DRC.
Tshiyouyo\textsuperscript{16} (2012) sheds light on the preparedness of the INEC to manage the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. He stresses that if in 2006, elections were successfully organized and celebrated as a milestone in the peace process, it was unfortunate to note that ahead of the 2011 elections, the constitution was reviewed and tailor-made to suit President Joseph Kabila. In the same vein, following the constitutional revision, a number of substantial prerogatives of the Government, Parliament and the Judiciary were curtailed to the presidential office’s benefit.

Tshiyouyo (2012) notes that the 2011 elections were obviously a dilemma: to respect the constitutional deadline and organize botched elections; or ignore that deadline and slide into a situation of unconstitutional power. In conclusion, he asserts that the quality and integrity of the vote tabulation process has varied across the country, ranging from the proper application of procedures to serious irregularities (loss of nearly 2 000 polling station results in Kinshasa); multiple locations, particularly in Kabila’s strongholds, reported high rates of 99\% to 100\% voter turnout with all, or nearly all, votes going to the incumbent President. There were serious allegations of fraud in the parliamentary elections: Members of the National Assembly resembled appointees rather than elected representatives of the people of the DRC.

According to Githaiga (2012), the second post-conflict election in the DRC took place in a context of significant challenges and was marred by allegations of electoral fraud and mismanagement. The pre-electoral climate was characterized by lack of confidence among elections stakeholders, persistent insecurity in parts of the country, and pervasive socioeconomic adversity. He points out that other aspects of controversy plaguing the work of the INEC were allegations of a lack of transparency and insufficient readiness for the elections. Following allegations of discrepancies in the voter register ranging from double registration to the registration of minors and militia members, the opposition launched public demonstrations demanding transparency, resulting in the INEC agreeing to an audit of the electoral register (Githaiga 2012:4). Additionally, Githaiga (2012:6)

\textsuperscript{16} “The 2011 Elections in the DRC: Assessing the electoral legal framework and CENI’s preparedness to organize the 2011 elections”. Presentation paper by Tshiyouyo (2012) at the National Library of South Africa (Pretoria) under the auspice of the Africa Institute of South Africa.
alleges that polling day was not without incidents. Githaiga claims that voters burnt down several polling stations in Kananga (Kasai Occidental province) and destroyed electoral materials in Lubumbashi (Katanga province) due to suspicions of fraud; gunmen in Lubumbashi opened fire at a polling station, killing three people; and other gunmen raided election material that was being delivered. Githaiga (2012:6-7) asserts that observers also highlighted other irregularities like voter intimidation by security forces, ballot stuffing, undelivered ballot papers and voters being turned away at polling stations. At the close of the polls, the vote counting for the presidential race began in the wake of rising controversy over limited access to compilation centers. This led to mounting suspicions of electoral fraud.

Roberts (2011) states that the situation before the holding of the 2011 election in the DRC had become increasingly tense in the months running up to the elections. Roberts contends that the amendment of the electoral system in January 2011 resulted in the scrapping of the second round of elections, and was the biggest blow for opposition parties aspiring to the presidency. An added frustration for the political opposition was the rumor of irregularities within the INEC as it promoted the possibility of vote rigging by the ruling party.

The survey of the existing literature on EMBs reveals that there are many studies on elections management, types of EMB, and public perceptions on elections as well as the importance of elections in a democratic dispensation. However, the current study focuses on perceptions of stakeholders (especially domestic election observers and election experts) on electoral processes management. This study gives consideration to domestic election observers and election experts for their important role in accompanying voters and EMB officials through their advice, advocacies and observations with regard to the integrity of the electoral cycle. In the DRC, domestic election observers and election experts get involved in electoral processes from pre-election, on election day, and throughout post-election phases. In addition, in this study, election experts and domestic election observers’ views are important because they are informed and trained as well as have knowledge regarding electoral processes (legal framework, procedural issues and their implementation). For example, Struwing et al. (2011); Ugues
(2010) and Kerr (2009) dedicated their studies to the public opinion of elections. Ougude’s article (2012) entitled “An appraisal of elections monitoring and observation in Africa: the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s 2011 presidential elections”, is relevant for this dissertation because it strives to understand what factors lead election observers and monitors to determine to what extent elections are credible. However, Ougude’s article does not clearly show the method used to collect primary and secondary data as well as the unit of analysis.

This study seeks to fill in this gap and contribute to the current literature on elections and democracy, by going beyond the legal framework and structural or functional organization of the EMB in investigating how stakeholders (domestic election observers and election experts) in elections perceive the quality of election management in terms of trust in the INEC, integrity and the credibility of electoral outcomes that reflect the will of the voters in the DRC.

2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this section is to discuss the theoretical framework that was used to guide this study and provide an understanding of the political and economic context as well as the practical manner in which the 2011 Congolese electoral processes were conducted. There is no single and specific theory that can explain the way in which stakeholders’ perceptions of the quality of election management are shaped. This study is therefore informed by the following theories: political support, political trust, as well as neo-patrimonialism.

2.3.2 THEORY OF POLITICAL SUPPORT
Democratic regimes are dependent on citizens’ political support. In representative democracies, political parties, elections, and civil society institutions act as agents of this support. In addition to these institutional channels, however, citizens’ support of a democratic regime and its institutions are important for democratic sustainability (Aydin and Cenker 2012:230).

According to Easton (1957:390) support means that B supports A either when A acts on B’s behalf or when he orients himself favorably toward B’s goals, interests,
and actions. In the same vein, he describes support as an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or negatively.

The Eastonian perspective of support emphasizes the fact that support is primarily about attitude, behavior, confidence or commitment, based on a mutual action directed to a person, a policy or an institution. Easton (1957) makes a distinction between two types of political support known as specific support and diffuse support. According to Easton in Dalton (1999:58), diffuse support is a deep-seated set of attitudes towards politics and the operation of political systems that is relatively impervious to change. Diffuse support has also been interpreted as measuring the legitimacy of a political system or political institutions. In contrast, specific support is closely related to the actions and performance of the government or political elites. In addition Easton (1957:391) specifies and examines the political objects in relation to which support is extended.17 In a similar way, Norris (1999) in a book entitled *Critical Citizens’ Global Support for Democratic Governance*, claims that political support should be understood as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Norris (1999a:9) asserts that in practice people seem to make a judgment concerning different but related institutions within a regime, expressing confidence in the courts, for instance, while rejecting parliament. They often do appreciate democratic values, and for example they are able to criticize the way democratic governments work in practice. Additionally, Norris (1999a:10-12) sets up a framework which displays five domains of political support. Table 2.2 clearly displays to what extent a particular trend of support corresponds to a specific object of political support.

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17 Three domains of support as identified by Easton (1957) are: political community, regime, and government. According to Klingemann (1999:33), political community is the cultural entity that transcends particularities of formal governing structures and inscribes the elemental identity of the collectivity constituting the polity. The regime is constituted of those principles, processes, and formal institutions that persist and transcend particular incumbents. The political authorities are those officials occupying governmental posts at a particular time.
Table 2.2 Support and trends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object of Support</th>
<th>Summary of trends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political community</td>
<td>High levels of support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime principles</td>
<td>High levels of support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime performance</td>
<td>Varied satisfaction with the working of the regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime institutions</td>
<td>Declining confidence in government institutions; low levels of support in many newer democracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political actors</td>
<td>Mixed trends for trust in politicians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Norris (1999a:10)

In the view of Norris (1999a:10-12), there are five levels of support that are elaborated as follows:

- The first level is about a diffuse support for the political community. Political community is usually understood as the essential prerequisite for the foundation of any stable nation state. Political community may be defined narrowly in terms of a local or regional community, or as political cleavages based on ethnic, class, or religious identities, as much as by physical geography.

- The second level refers to support for the core regime principles representing the values of the political system in a democratic state. Nevertheless, according to Beetham (1994) and Simon (1996) as quoted by Norris (1999a:11) those values are basic principles of democratic regimes commonly understood to include freedom, participation, tolerance and moderation, respect for legal institutional rights, and the rule of law.

- The third level concerns evaluations of regime performance, meaning support for how authoritarian or democratic political systems function in practice. For a deep understanding of any evaluation of a regime’s performance, both Afrobarometer and Eurobarometer surveys reflect a real perception of the extent to which the public is satisfied with the incumbent government and how democracy is perceived to be working. This is a realistic way to portray the perception of the public on how the government performs in a practical way rather than an idealistic one.
The fourth level focuses on support for regime institutions. This includes attitudes towards governments, parliaments, the executive, the legal system and police, the state bureaucracy, political parties, and the military.

The last level is interested in comparing specific support for political actors or authorities, including evaluations of politicians as a class and performance of particular leaders (Norris 1999a:12).

In the present study, the researcher supports the view of Dalton (1999:58-59) who refines the Eastonian model of system analysis in providing two categories of political beliefs (affective orientation and instrumental evaluation). In addition, Dalton (1999:58-59) points out that affective belief involves an acceptance or identification with an entity. It represents adherence to a set of values (what Easton labels diffuse support), and evaluative beliefs involve judgments about performance or appropriateness of the object; they reflect judgments about political phenomena (specific support).

Table 2.3 is a combination of affective orientations, instrumental evaluations and political levels of analysis. It emphasizes the importance of making a distinction between two types of political beliefs in understanding how public attitudes are oriented toward the political process (Dalton 1999:58).

Table 2.3 Types of political belief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Affective orientations</th>
<th>Instrumental evaluations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>National pride</td>
<td>Best nation to live in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime principles</td>
<td>Democratic values</td>
<td>Democracy best form of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participatory norms</td>
<td>Evaluations of rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime institutions</td>
<td>Institutional expectations</td>
<td>Trust in institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for parties</td>
<td>Trust in party system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Output expectations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities</td>
<td>Feelings towards political leaders</td>
<td>Evaluations of politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party identification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Dalton (1999:58)
The Eastonian model of political support was not applied within this study (Easton 1957:390). However, in this study the author followed the model of systems analysis, in particular the regime institutions as object of political support, as refined by Dalton in Norris (1999a:11). This approach assisted the author in understanding to what extent electoral stakeholders oriented their attitudes regarding the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. In the context of this study the core of regime institutions as objects of political support is constituted by the Government, Parliament, INEC, political parties, the Supreme Court, the Police and the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication. Dalton’s approach of political support theory was applied to the INEC in order to find out to what extent electoral stakeholders trusted the INEC with the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. Further, this theory enabled the author to measure the level of support for the INEC among national elections observers. Finally, the political support theory advances our understanding of how the decline or increase of trust in, as well the level of support for, the INEC may have affected the stakeholders’ perceptions of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC.

2.3.3 THEORY OF POLITICAL TRUST
According to Arancibia (2008:6), research on political trust appeared at the end of the 1960s, used as a crucial element for the definition of support for the political system in the works of Easton (1965, 1975) and Gamson (1968), and it was experimentally observed and promoted with the publications of Miller (1974a, 1974b) and Citrin (1974).

Levi and Stoker (2000:476) write that although trust is a contested term, there appears to be some minimal consensus about its meaning. Trust is relational: it involves an individual making himself/herself vulnerable to another individual, group, or institution that has the capacity to do him/her harm or to betray him/her. For instance citizens may entrust their lives to their government during wartime but not trust the bureaucracies that expend funds during peacetime.

According to Citrin (1974:973), political elites make policies. In exchange, they receive trust from citizens satisfied with these policies and cynicism from those who are disappointed.
Van de Meer (2010:519-520) argue that trust is a rational evaluation of social situations along four dimensions. A person who trusts (the subject) implies that he/she thinks that the object of trust meets certain requirements: the object would be competent, intrinsically committed (caring), extrinsically committed (accountable because of encapsulated interest) and predictable.

In line with this study, the researcher suggests that the subjects of trust who are election stakeholders rely on the INEC as an object of trust, because they think that the INEC has the capacity and independence to manage the electoral processes with credibility, integrity and professionalism of the electoral process. This implies that the INEC will perform its task and reach the stakeholders’ expectations (credible electoral outcomes). Further, this study suggests that election stakeholders may support or disparage the INEC as regards the way in which the 2011 electoral processes were managed by the INEC.

Aydin and Cenker (2012:232) argue that the bulk of research on citizens’ confidence in political institutions focuses on advanced industrial democracies. So far, only a limited number of scholars have attempted to explain confidence levels across developing democracies. Yet, we believe that studying citizens’ confidence in political institutions in developing democracies is important because the stability and legitimacy of a fledgling democracy largely depend on citizens’ support.

Rudolph and Evans (2005:661) argue that political trust, a global affective orientation toward government, is the reflection of citizens’ policy satisfaction. Trust is higher when policies are viewed as effective or when there is perceived similarity between citizens’ expectations and policy outputs. In other words, when citizens believe that their expectations are met by the government, they are likely to trust the government. In 2011, tensions were high between election stakeholders who supported and those who did not support the INEC as an institution in charge of elections processes in the DRC. Thus, this study makes use of the evaluation instruments of regime institutions (Dalton1999) such as trust in the INEC and confidence in the electoral processes, in order to explain whether or not the INEC met the expectations of election stakeholders in the 2011 elections in the DRC.
Political trust may be understood as a reflection of how positively citizens perceive the institutional performance with regard to their expectations. Moreover, in a study entitled “Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1974”, Miller (1974a:952) writes that political trust can be thought of as basic evaluative or affective orientation toward the government. According to Miller (1974a), trust may be expressed from high political trust to high political distrust or political cynicism. Miller (1974a) argues that the level (high or low) of trust is a matter of how the government functions in order to produce the outputs that meet the expectations of the people. As shown elsewhere in this study, the researcher argues that the level of trust in the INEC depends on how the INEC performed its duties (for example the management of the 2011 electoral processes and the levels of credibility and integrity throughout pre-election phase, election phase and post-election phase).

According to Mishler and Rose (2001), two theoretical frameworks are in competition to explain the origins of trust, and these offer different perspectives on the prospects for developing sufficient trust for democratic institutions to survive and function effectively. Mishler and Rose (2001:31) argue that cultural theories hypothesize that trust in political institutions is exogenous. Trust in political institutions is hypothesized to originate outside the political sphere in long-standing and deeply seated beliefs about people that are rooted in cultural norms and communicated through early-life socialization. From a cultural perspective, institutional trust is an extension of interpersonal trust, learned early in life and, much later, projected onto political institutions, thereby conditioning institutional performance capabilities. Institutional theories, in contrast, hypothesize that political trust is politically endogenous. Institutional trust is the expected utility of institutions performing satisfactorily; it is a consequence, not a cause, of institutional performance. Trust in institutions is rationally based; it hinges on citizen evaluations of institutional performance. Institutions that perform well generate trust; untrustworthy institutions generate skepticism and distrust.

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18 Cynicism refers to the degree of negative effect toward the government and is a statement of the belief that the government is not functioning and producing outputs in accord with individual expectations (Miller 1974a:952).
19 See Chapter two, section 2.3.2 on political support.
Mishler and Rose (2001:32) explain that macro-cultural theories emphasize the homogenizing tendencies of national traditions and make little allowance for variation in trust among individuals within societies. Micro-cultural theories focus on differences in individual socialization experiences as sources of significant variation in political trust within as well as between societies. To an even greater extent, macro-institutional and micro-institutional theories are distinct (Mishler and Rose 2001:32).

Mishler and Rose (2001:32) stress that macro-institutional theories emphasize the aggregate performance of institutions in such matters as promoting growth, governing effectively, and avoiding corruption. The outputs of institutions are assumed to determine individual responses. By contrast, micro-institutional theories emphasize that individual evaluations of institutional performance are conditioned by individual tastes and experiences, for example, whether a person thinks that political integrity or economic growth is more important and whether that individual personally has experienced the effects of corruption or the benefits of economic growth (Mishler and Rose 2001:32).

In similar vein, the expectation from stakeholders was that the INEC should manage the 2011 electoral processes according to electoral legal frameworks (electoral law; the INEC Establishment Act, elections provisions made in the constitution and elections procedures). Failing to do so could affect the stakeholders’ degree of trust in the INEC as an institution established to run the election processes in the DRC.

Additionally, in the DRC, with reference to the 2011 electoral processes, since its establishment the INEC was strongly criticized by some stakeholders such as political parties and civil society organization leaders, who called into question the capacity, ability and neutrality as well as the leadership of the INEC, as these pertained to its ability to implement election processes and deliver election results that would certainly reflect the will of the voters as expressed in ballot papers. In this view, trust in the INEC entailed support from stakeholders (political parties, civil society organizations, election experts, voters and domestic observers) and acceptable institutional performance of the INEC in managing the 2011 elections.
Moreover, based on their experiences in electoral and civic education, domestic election observers who were involved in the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC were able to assess the institutional performance of the INEC in delivering credible electoral outcomes.

2.3.4 NEOPATRIMONIALISM THEORY

Bach in Bach and Gazibo (2012:26) declares that in Africa, as earlier in Latin America or Asia, references to the notion of the patrimonial state were initially designed to account for institution-building processes rooted in a traditional, neotraditional or traditionalist turf. Historically, Bruhns in Bach and Gazibo (2012:12-13) asserts that Max Weber neither invented the concept of patrimonialism (Patrimonialismus) nor that of patrimonial domination (Patrimonialherrschaft). These terms were part of the political vocabulary of political reactionaries and conservatives in the German states of the nineteenth century.

In an effort to describe patrimonialism, Bruhns in Bach and Gazibo (2012) stresses that Weber wrote several of his typologies of three pure types of legitimate domination. Weber distinguished three forms of domination as follows: rational legal, traditional and charismatic.

According to Weber quoted by Bruhns in Bach and Gazibo (2012:18), patrimonialism, and in the extreme case, sultanism, tends to arise whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master. For Weber, patrimonialism as a form of political domination occurs when the mode of obedience, domination or authority is based not on legal rational legitimacy but on traditional legitimacy through the personal relationship between the ruler, master, or the incumbent holder of political power, and those who are governed or ruled.

Willame (1972:2) defines patrimonialism as a system of rule incorporating three fundamental and related elements: appropriation of public offices as the elite’s prime source of status, prestige, and reward; political and territorial fragmentation through the development of relationships based on primordial and personal loyalties; and the use of private armies, militias, and mercenaries as chief
instruments of rule. However, Pichter, Moran, and Johnston at al. (2009:126) stress that for Weber, patrimonialism was not a synonym for corruption, bad governance, violence, tribalism, or a weak state. It was instead a specific form of authority and source of legitimacy.

Bach in Bach and Gazibo (2012:25) asserts that neopatrimonialism was conceived as a particular variant of patrimonialism: a hybrid model-type intended to account for new power systems in the post-traditional societies of Latin America, South Asia and the Middle East. Neopatrimonialism in Africa is classically defined as the expression of confusion between office and officeholder within a state endowed, at least formally, with modern institutions and bureaucratic procedures (Bach 2012:28).

In neopatrimonial regimes, the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law. As with classic patrimonialism, the right to rule is attributed to a person rather than to an office. In contemporary neopatrimonialism, relationships of loyalty and dependency pervade a formal political and administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic office less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. The distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred. The essence of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favors, both within the state (notably public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, contracts, and projects). In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994:458).

According to Bourmaud (1997:62) quoted by (Bach 2012:28), neopatrimonialism is a dualistic situation, in which the state is characterized by patrimonialization, as well as by bureaucratization.

Erdmann and Engel (2007:104) claim that all the attempts to define neopatrimonialism (or ‘modern patrimonialism’) deal with, and try to tackle, one

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20 According to Bach in Bach and Gazibo (2012:25) it was Shmuel Eisenstadt who settled the terminology by suggesting the addition of the ‘neo-’ prefix to eliminate any ambiguity over the distinction between modern traditional and post-traditional regimes.
and the same intricate problem: the relationship between patrimonial domination on the one hand and legal-rational bureaucratic domination on the other, i.e. a very hybrid phenomenon. Various authors give different weight to it, but almost all fail to elaborate sufficiently on the constituent elements of this form of hybrid structure.

Further, Erdmann and Engel (2007:105) write that neopatrimonialism is a mixture of two co-existing, partly interwoven types of domination: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. Under patrimonialism, all power relations between ruler and ruled, political as well as administrative relations, are personal relations; there is no differentiation between the private and the public realm. However, under neopatrimonialism the distinction between the private and the public, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference can be made to this distinction. Neopatrimonial rule takes place within the framework of, and with the claim to, legal-rational bureaucracy or ‘modern’ statehood. Formal structures and rules do exist, although in practice the separation of the private and public sphere is not always observed.

2.3.4.1 Clientelism and patronage as part of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism

Likoti (2008:81) posits that a patron-client relationship is an exchange between a superior patron or patron group and an inferior client or client group. In addition Likoti maintains that in most developing countries, and especially in Africa, the ruling party acts as a patron and voters become an inferior group voting in expectation of some reward from the patron (ruling party).

For Erdmann and Engel (2007:107), clientelism means the exchange or brokerage of specific services and resources for political support, often in the form of votes. It involves a relationship between unequals, in which the major benefits accrue to the patron; redistributive effects are considered to be very limited. They posit that the difference between patrimonial and neopatrimonial clientelism is that the latter is more complex than the former. It is a reiterating patron-client relation, forming a hierarchy of dominance relations.
Erdmann and Engel (2007:107) contend that in neopatrimonialism there are brokers to mediate the exchange between the ‘little man’ and the ‘big man’; and through a network of brokers, sometimes even traditional patrons, the political center is linked with the countryside. In patrimonialism there is only a direct dyadic exchange relation between the little and the big man. Second, the object of the exchange is different. The transactions are less about the exchange of private or personal goods and services and more about the transfer of public goods and services by the patron.

Erdmann and Engel (2007:107) argue that the difference between clientelism and patronage is essentially a distinction between the recipients, between ‘individual’ (e.g. land, office, services) and ‘collective’ benefits (e.g. roads, schools). Further, for Erdmann and Engel (2007:107), patronage is part of high-level politics and an important instrument in creating and maintaining political cohesion, for instance a coalition of ethnic elites, which is needed to form and support a government or a political party. In contrast, clientelism concerns individuals and, thus, is based on personal relations. It involves the personal network of a politician, but it also occurs within and around the bureaucracy at all levels.

Furthermore, Erdmann and Engel (2007:107) point out that a client needs a patron for protection, either to avoid something or to be assisted in gaining something which otherwise would not be obtainable. In short, developing a clientelist network is a means to gain protection and to achieve goals in a situation of societal uncertainty created by public institutions that may behave in ways that are not calculable.

In a neopatrimonial system, during the electoral processes, certain election stakeholders decide not to comply with the electoral law. On the one hand, intuitively, opposition candidates are virtually assured that they will get into power. On the other hand, the incumbents are distressed at not being re-elected for a second term in office. The uncertainty of election outcomes in developing countries may lead election challengers to use clientelism and patronage, which harm the integrity of electoral processes.
In the DRC, neopatrimonialism theory as well as its constituent elements (patron-client network) contributes to shedding light on the political context in which the 2011 elections were conducted. The neopatrimonialism theory helps one to understand how the patron-client network influences the management of the electoral processes. In the wake of the 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections in the DRC, certain contenders (patrons, bid men, godfathers) made use of election maladministration practices (corruption, faking of electoral reports and results, regionalism, ethnicism, misuse of state resources, refusal of access to public media for opposition parties, intimidation, threats and illegal arrest of opposition leaders, bribery of voters, pressure on elections commissioners) as well as the appointment of election commissioners who were either closer to the incumbent or to the opposition.

In order to control all electoral processes, some of the election stakeholders (political parties and independent candidates or their representatives) interfered with the 2011 election processes as managed by the INEC at the expense of the electoral law. During the 2011 elections in the DRC, electoral contenders behaved as patrons. Some of them resorted to the usage of patron-client relationships, in which the patron’s political clients (followers) had an interest in seeing see their patron keep power. In addition, a patron’s political clients (followers) in the Congolese 2011 elections secured the political and economic position of their patrons by helping them to be elected regardless of the nature of the means and strategies that were used.

Moreover, the latter situation was addressed by Githaiga (2012) who highlights the link between politics and economics in the DRC. Githaiga (2012:3) remarks that the high number of 18 500 parliamentary candidates vying for 500 legislative seats, and the disproportionately high candidature in the parliamentary race, may in part be attributed to the link between political leadership and economic gain. Githaiga (2012) asserts that the parliamentary position offers a competitive remuneration and, for the unscrupulous, the opportunity to use power to gain economic benefits.
2.4 SUMMARY
This chapter discussed the literature review and theoretical framework related to election management. A survey of the literature was done in order to discover what has been done and what needs to be done in the field of election management as a modest contribution to the existing body of knowledge. Furthermore, political support, political trust and neopatrimonial theories that underpin this study were discussed as a basis for explaining and understanding stakeholders’ perceptions about the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. The next chapter describes the research methodology.
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the methodology used in carrying out this study. A methodology is a strategy, plan of action, process, or design lying behind the choice and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes (Crotty 1998:3). Because of the close correlation between the methodology and the procedures of research, Creswell (2003:4) defines methodology as the framework that relates to the entire process of research. To answer the research questions in this study, the researcher employed a mixed methods approach to achieve the study’s research objectives (see Chapter one). According to Johnson et al. (2007:113), mixed methods research is an approach to knowledge (theory and practice) that attempts to consider multiple viewpoints, perspectives, positions, and standpoints, always including the standpoints of qualitative and quantitative research. Recently, debates between positivists and interpretivists (see sections 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2; Table 6) were impeded by researchers who do not take their positions in either the positivist or the interpretivist camp (Schram 2007). Some researchers (Lieberman 2005; Parry and Kupiec-Teahan 2010; Mathagu 2010; Muboko 2011) have previously used mixed methods approaches to carry out their research.

3.1.1 PHILOSOPHY AND ASSUMPTIONS OF METHODOLOGY

It is worth mentioning that any scientific research is led by a philosophical paradigm. Punch (2011:27) argues that a paradigm is a complex term that is used very frequently in research methods literature. As used in social science, it refers to a set of assumptions about the social world, and about what constitutes proper techniques and topics for inquiry. In short, it means a view of how science should be conducted. It is a very broad term, encompassing elements of epistemology, theory and philosophy, along with other methods. Paradigms have been the subject of vigorous debate, as in the phrase ‘paradigm wars’ which has been used to describe the arguments between quantitative researchers and qualitative researchers. Sometimes the term ‘paradigm’ is used to describe quantitative research or qualitative research, as in ‘the quantitative paradigm’ or ‘the qualitative paradigm’.
Huff, as quoted by Creswell (2013:18), claims that it is helpful to articulate the importance of philosophy in research. It shapes how we seek information in order to answer questions. A cause-and-effect type of question in which certain variables are predicted to explain an outcome is different from an exploration of a single phenomenon as found in qualitative research. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009:4-8) state that in general, researchers in the social sciences and behavioral sciences can be categorized into three groups:

- Quantitatively-oriented social and behavioral scientists (QUANs) primarily working within the post-positivist/positivist paradigm and principally interested in numerical data and analyses;
- Qualitatively-oriented social and behavioral scientists (QUALs) primarily within the constructivist paradigm and principally interested in narrative data and analyses; and
- Mixed methodologists working primarily within the pragmatist paradigm and interested in both narrative and numeric data and analyses.

Over the past fifteen years, the debate over the relative virtues of quantitative and qualitative methodology has gained considerable impetus. While the exact constitution of the two methodologies varies somewhat from author to author or is defined with varying degrees of specificity, there is substantial agreement about the fundamental antinomies and their practical implications for the conduct of research (Bryman 1984:75). In the social sciences, in order to make sense of what we observe and to understand it, researchers use paradigms. The most commonly used philosophical paradigms in social sciences are positivism and interpretivism. The former is almost always associated with the quantitative approach while the latter with the qualitative approach. However, the philosophical paradigm that guides this study is that of pragmatism (see section 3.3.1).

3.1.1.1 Positivism

Amaratunga et al. (2002:18) argue that logical positivism uses quantitative and experimental methods to test hypothetical-deductive generalizations. Among the major implications of this approach are the need for independence of the observer from the subject being observed and the need to formulate hypotheses for subsequent verification. Positivism searches for causal
explanations and fundamental laws, and generally reduces the whole to its simplest possible elements in order to facilitate analysis.

3.1.1.2 Interpretivism

Amaratunga et al. (2002:18) stress that a phenomenological (interpretive science) inquiry uses qualitative and naturalistic approaches to inductively and holistically understand human experience in context-specific settings. This approach tries to understand and explain a phenomenon, rather than search for external causes or fundamental laws.

In some cases writers have chosen not to use the quantitative/qualitative distinction and have instead used terms which have been used as synonyms. The terms 'positivist' and 'empiricist' often denote the same fundamental approach as 'quantitative', while 'naturalistic' field research, 'ethnographic', 'interpretivist', and 'constructivist' are sometimes used instead of 'qualitative' (Bryman 1984:77).

Table 3.1 Distinction between positivist and interpretivist traditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical assumptions</th>
<th>Positivism</th>
<th>Interpretivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ontology</td>
<td>Person (researcher) and reality are separate.</td>
<td>Person (researcher) and reality are inseparable (life-world).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>Objective reality object exists beyond the human mind.</td>
<td>Knowledge of the world is intentionally constituted through a person's lived experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research object</td>
<td>The research object has an inherent quality that exists independently of the researcher.</td>
<td>Research object is interpreted in light of meaning and structure of person's (researcher's) lived experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory building/testing</td>
<td>Theories are postulated that can be tested to be confirmed or rejected. A theory is proven from observable phenomena/behavior. Theories are tested in a controlled setting, empirically supporting or falsifying hypotheses through a process of experimentation.</td>
<td>Theories are built/constructed from multiple realities: the researcher has to look at different things in order to understand a phenomenon. Theory is shaped by social and cultural context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Statistics, content analysis, etc.</td>
<td>Hermeneutics, phenomenology, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Theoretical assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical assumptions</th>
<th>Positivism</th>
<th>Interpretivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theory of truth</td>
<td>Correspondence theory of truth: one-to-one mapping between research statements and reality.</td>
<td>Truth as intentional fulfillment: interpretations of research object match lived experience of object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of data</td>
<td>Quantitative data</td>
<td>Qualitative data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validity</td>
<td>Certainty: data truly measures reality</td>
<td>Defensible knowledge claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td>Replicability: research results can be reproduced</td>
<td>Interpretive awareness: researchers recognize and address implications of their subjectivity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sonubi (2010:97)

### 3.2 MIXED METHODS AND RESEARCH DESIGN

#### 3.2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN

Research design refers to a particular strategy for research, such as experiments, case studies, ethnography, and action research. The process of research design refers to the practice of working through a given focus for research and the generation of a research plan and design for that topic (Gibson and Brown 2009:48). Gibson and Brown declare that the research design entails specifying analytic interests and working out what kind of data is required to explore those interests, and how it is generated. Furthermore, Creswell (2013:5) asserts that the research design refers to the entire process of research from conceptualizing a problem to writing research questions, and on to data collection, analysis, interpretation, and report writing. In addition, Punch (2011:63) maintains that one requires a basic plan for a piece of research, and includes four main ideas. The first is strategy, the second is the conceptual framework, the third is the question of who or what will be studied and the fourth concerns the tools and procedures to be used for collecting empirical data. In this study centered on stakeholders’ perceptions of the 2011 elections management, the researcher adopted the mixed methods approach as a research design to respond to the research questions.
Mixed methods, as a research paradigm, is seen as emerging from the 1990s onwards, establishing itself alongside the previous paradigms so that we are currently in a three methodological or search paradigm world, with quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods research all thriving and coexisting (Robson 2011:164). In addition, Klassen et al. (2012:379) claim that:

There is no rigid formula for designing a mixed methods study, but the following general steps should provide some guidance, especially for an investigator new to mixed methods. Preliminary considerations include considering philosophy and theory, resources (for example, time, financial resources, skills), and the research problem and reasons for using mixed methods. Clarification of study aims and research questions that call for qualitative, a quantitative and mixed method is important, to incorporate these into the reasons for conducting a mixed methods study. It is also critical to determine the methods of quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis (when it will be collected, what emphasis will be given to each, and how they will be integrated or mixed), and select a mixed methods design that helps address research questions and the data collection/analysis/integration procedures. After collecting and analyzing the data, meta-inference allows the researcher to interpret how the combined quantitative and qualitative approaches contribute to addressing the research problem and questions, and to report findings while making explicit the contribution of the mixed methods approach.

Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004:17) define the mixed methods approach as the type of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study. Moreover, Greene in Johnson et al. (2007:119) stresses that the mixed methods inquiry is an approach to investigating the social world that ideally involves more than one methodological tradition and thus more than one way of knowing, along with more than one kind of technique for gathering, analyzing, and representing human phenomena, all for the purpose of better understanding.

Johnson et al. (2007:119) maintain that:

In sum, the 20th century started with some use of what later came to be called mixed research, but social and psychological research quickly became primarily quantitative (e.g. as influenced by logical positivism and a reinvigorated scientism). Partially in reaction, many qualitative currents developed throughout the century,
coalescing into a qualitative research paradigm in the 1980s and 1990s (for example, Guba, 1990). In reaction to the polarization between quantitative and qualitative research, another intellectual movement (focusing on synthesis) occurred and it has come to be called mixed methods research. We currently are in a three methodological or research paradigm world, with quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods research all thriving and coexisting.

In addition, Creswell (2008) argues that mixed methods research is a research methodology with philosophical assumptions as well as methods of inquiry. Furthermore, Creswell states that mixed methods as a methodology involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of the collection and analysis of data and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches in many phases in the research process. As a method, it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or series of studies. Its central premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches, in combination, provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone.

### 3.2.3 QUALITATIVE APPROACH

Creswell et al. (2012:4) claim that a salient strength of qualitative research is its focus on the context including the significance of human lives and experiences for the purpose of inductive or theory development-driven research. It is a systematic and particular form of inquiry that uses methods of data collection such as in-depth interviews, ethnographic observation, and review of documents. Qualitative data help researchers to understand processes, especially those that emerge over time; provide detailed information about setting or context; and emphasize the voices of participants through interviews. Qualitative methods facilitate the collection of data when measures do not exist and provide a depth of understanding of concepts.

### 3.2.4 QUANTITATIVE APPROACH

Quantitative research is described as a mode of inquiry used often for deductive research in order to test theories or hypotheses, collect descriptive information, or examine relationships among variables (Creswell et al. 2012:4). In addition, Creswell et al. assert that these variables are measured and produce numeric data that can be analyzed statistically. Furthermore, Quantitative data have the
ability to provide measurable evidence, to help to establish (probable) cause and effect, to provide efficient data collection procedures, to create the possibility of replication and generalization to a population, to facilitate the comparison of groups, and to provide insight into a breadth of experiences (Creswell et al. 2012:4).

Table 3.2 Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods research approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Consideration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>- Uses numerical data to make sense of information.</td>
<td>- Allows collection and analysis of large amounts of data relatively quickly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Examples: scores on a test or survey answers on a five-point scale.</td>
<td>- Analysis perceived to be less open to interpretation and typically considered more objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>- Uses narrative forms, such as thoughts or feelings, to describe what is being evaluated.</td>
<td>- Can provide rich context for examining participants’ experiences and how a program operates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Examples: observations, interviews, focus groups, photographs or videotapes.</td>
<td>- Allows in-depth investigation of questions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Methods</td>
<td>- Uses a combination of both quantitative and qualitative data.</td>
<td>- Allows quantitative data to be collected from a large number of participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Example: a combination of surveys and interviews.</td>
<td>- Allows in-depth qualitative investigation of evaluation questions with a smaller number of participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Requires an evaluator capable of collecting data using a variety of methods and analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Muboko (2011:106)

3.3 RATIONALE FOR USING MIXED METHODS APPROACH

For the purpose of this study, which focuses on the perceptions of the stakeholders in the DRC’s 2011 electoral processes, both quantitative and qualitative methods are important and useful. The goal of a mixed methods approach is not to replace either of these approaches but rather to draw on the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of both in single research studies and
across studies (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004:14-15). The major advantage of the mixed methods approach is that it enables the researcher to simultaneously ask confirmatory and exploratory questions and therefore verify and generate theory in the same study (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009:33). Creswell and Plano (2007:18) stress that it is premised on the idea that the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone. This leads to a better understanding of the results because mixed methods offer strengths that offset the weaknesses of separately applied quantitative and qualitative research methods. It also encourages the collection of more comprehensive evidence for study problems, helps answer questions that quantitative or qualitative methods alone cannot answer, and reduces adversarial relationships among researchers and promotes collaboration (Creswell and Plano 2007:18).

According to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009:7), the philosophical assumption most often associated with mixed methods is pragmatism, although some researchers are philosophically oriented to the transformative perspective. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009:7) define pragmatism as a deconstructive paradigm that debunks concepts such as ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ and focuses instead on what works as the truth regarding the research questions under investigation. Pragmatism rejects the either/or choices associated with the paradigm wars, advocates for the use of mixed methods in research, and acknowledges that values of the researcher play a large role in the interpretation of results.

Creswell (2003:12) claims that pragmatism is not committed to any one system of philosophy and reality. This applies to mixed methods research in that inquirers draw liberally from both quantitative and qualitative assumptions when they engage in their research.

**3.3.1 MIXED METHODS DESIGN**

Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009:138) declare that a tenet of mixed methods research is that researchers should mindfully create designs that effectively answer their research questions; this stands in contrast to the common approach in traditional quantitative research where students are given a menu of designs
from which to select. It also stands in stark contrast to approaches where one completely follows either the qualitative paradigm or the quantitative paradigm.

Creswell (2003:213-219) spells out six types of mixed methods strategies as follows:

- **Sequential explanatory strategy** is characterized by a chronological order of the collection and analysis of data into two phases. The process of collection and analysis of quantitative data is followed by the collection and analysis of qualitative data. The priority is given to the quantitative data phase.

- **Sequential exploratory strategy** is conducted in two phases; the first phase is characterized by the collection and analysis of qualitative data followed by quantitative data collection and analysis.

- **Sequential transformative strategy** is the mixed methods strategy in which the priority is given either to quantitative or qualitative data collection and analysis. Unlike sequential explanatory and sequential exploratory designs, sequential transformative strategy has a theoretical perspective to guide the study.

- **Concurrent triangulation strategy** is the most familiar of the six mixed methods designs. It is applied as research design when research uses two different methods in an attempt to confirm, cross-validate, or corroborate findings within a single study. In this case, ideally, priority is given to neither qualitative nor quantitative phases of data collection and analysis, but practically, priority may be oriented to either a qualitative method or quantitative method. The quantitative and qualitative data collection is concurrent and happens in one phase of research study.

- **Concurrent nested strategy** can be identified by its use of one data collection phase for both quantitative and qualitative data in a simultaneous manner. Unlike the concurrent triangulation design, in a concurrent nested design, less priority is given to one method (qualitative or quantitative) which is nested, or embedded within the predominant method (qualitative or quantitative).

- **Concurrent transformative strategy** is guided by the researcher's use of a specific theoretical perspective, as with the sequential transformative
model. This theoretical perspective may be based on ideologies, such as critical theory, advocacy, participatory research, or a conceptual or theoretical framework.

3.3.2 MIXED METHODS DESIGN PROCESS

Johnson and Onwuegbuzo (2004:23), based on their interpretations of the extant literature, recommend eight steps that represent the mixed methods process. Researchers would apply them before, during, and/or after the conduct of their mixed analyses as follows:

1. Research Question(s)
2. Purpose of Mixed Research
3. Selection of Research Methodology
4. Data Collection
5. Data Analysis
6. Data Interpretation
7. Legitimation
8. Conclusion

3.4 THE DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND SAMPLING PROCESS

In this study, the researcher applied the concurrent mixed method design in which both qualitative and quantitative data are collected, not following any chronological order, within one phase. According to Creswell (2003:217), this model generally uses separate quantitative and qualitative methods as the means to offset weaknesses inherent within one method with the strengths of another method. In addition, this strategy usually integrates the results of the two methods during the interpretation phase. The traditional mixed method model is advantageous because it is familiar to most researchers and can result in well-validated and substantiated findings (Creswell 2003:217). In addition, the concurrent data collection results in a shorter data collection time period as compared to one of the sequential approaches. During the process of data collection, the researcher should be aware of the accuracy of the instruments used to collect the data.

Cooper and Schindler (2011:280) provide the following major criteria to evaluate a measurement tool: validity, reliability, and practicality.
- Validity refers to the extent to which the test measures what we actually wish to measure.
- Reliability has to do with the accuracy and precision of a measurement procedure.
- Practicality is concerned with a wide range of factors of economy, convenience and interpretability.

The collection of data in the current study was done by means of interviews and questionnaires. Ethical considerations were taken into account by providing a consent form to all participants with information related to the study.

### 3.4.1 POPULATION

Robson (2011:530) defines a population as a universe of elements from which the sample elements are drawn. It can be literal population (that could a number of people) but it is also used more specifically (for example, it could be the population of all hospitals in the region). In addition, he states that population may be a list of those in the population from which the survey sample is drawn. Survey researchers refer to it as a sampling frame (Robson 2011:250). The population from which the sample of interviewees and respondents for this study comprised election experts, members of political parties, academia, INEC as well as CSOs such as Agir pour les élections transparantes et apaisées\textsuperscript{21} (AETA), Réseau National pour Observation et la surveillance des élections au Congo\textsuperscript{22} (RENOSEC) and representatives of International Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI), The Carter Center (CC) and Konrad-Adenauer, who were involved in the 2011 electoral processes.

### 3.4.2 SAMPLING

The sampling process involves selecting units of analysis in a manner that maximizes the researcher’s ability to answer research questions that are set forth in a study. The sampling frame refers to a formal or informal list of units or cases from which the sample is drawn (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009:345). The research

\textsuperscript{21} Agir pour les élections transparantes au Congo is French for Act for Transparent and Peaceful Elections in the DRC.

\textsuperscript{22} Réseau national pour l’observation et la surveillance des élections au Congo is French for National Election Observation and Monitoring Network in Congo.
did not make use of representative samples, as doing would have been highly costly. Notably, this study did not aim to attend to all stakeholders or to assemble a representative sample of election stakeholders in the DRC and therefore the researcher did not intend to generalize the findings.

The 2011 electoral processes are still sensitive issues in the DRC. During data collection, people were not ready to talk or to comment openly about these elections: they preferred talking secretly due to security threat and post-election violence that occurred after the publication of the results. According to Creswell (2013:299), purposive sampling is the primary sampling strategy used in qualitative research. It means that the inquirer selects individuals and sites for study because they can purposively inform an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study. For this reason, the research made use of a purposive sampling technique to select twelve interviewees who participated in in-depth interviews.\(^{23}\) The maximum variation sampling approach was also followed in this study, because it allowed the researcher to finalize in advance some criteria that distinguish the sites, events or participants. The researcher applied this approach because it allows the maximizing of differences at the beginning of the study and it also increases the likelihood that the findings will reflect differences or different perspectives in qualitative research (Creswell 2013:156-157).

In addition, the researcher used convenience sampling to select a sample of 120 stakeholders (domestic observers) from a population of domestic observers in order to measure their perceptions (quantitative data) on the management of the 2011 electoral processes. According to Robson (2011:274), a convenience sample involves choosing the nearest and most convenient persons to act as respondents until the required size has been reached. As a non-probability sampling method, convenience sampling is the most used because it is simple and cheap. This kind of sampling method means that all respondents do not have

\(^{23}\) The researcher made use of different lists of election role players who were involved in the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. The 12 informants and 120 respondents were selected based on their availability, knowledge in terms of election processes and involvement in the entire electoral cycle as election experts, domestic observers as well as civil society organization leaders.
an equal chance of being selected to be part of the study. Thus, the sample was not representative of all respondents (stakeholders), while it may reflect the general perceptions of domestic observers on the quality of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC.

3.4.3 QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

According to Creswell and Plano (2007:6), qualitative data consists of open-ended information that the researcher gathers through interviews with participants. The general open-ended questions asked during these interviews allow participants to supply answers in their own words. In addition, qualitative data may be collected by observing participants or sites of research, gathering documents from a private (e.g. diary) or public (e.g. minutes of meetings) source, or collecting audio-visual material such as audiotapes or artefacts. Qualitative data were generated by means of semi-structured in-depth interviews, which are appropriate for a deeper exploration of the perceptions and opinions of respondents regarding complex and sometimes sensitive issues, and enable probing for more information and clarification of answers. The variety of professional, educational and personal histories of the sample group precluded the use of an interview schedule (Barriball and While 1994:330). The researcher (interviewer) generated qualitative data through in-depth interviews by means of open-ended questions (interview schedule see appendix b).

Firstly, the interviewer sought the respondents’ permission to use a recorder during the interview process. Secondly, the interviewer explained the purpose of the study to the interviewees as well as reminding them that they could withdraw their participation in the interview at any time should they decide to discontinue the interview. Lastly, twelve interviewees gave their consent for the interview but requested anonymity. Furthermore, interviews were conducted and recorded in a place chosen by the interviewees at their convenience. In contrast, the Carter Center interviewee refused to be recorded but asked the interviewer to make notes only. The interview was conducted in French in Kinshasa (DRC) and later transcribed and translated into English. In order to ensure the quality and authenticity related to the translation of data from interviews, the researcher was
assisted by two impartial and professional translators. The table below provides information about the interview process.

Table 3.3 List of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee No. 1</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>NSCC of the DRC</td>
<td>31 October 2013</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee No. 2</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>3 November 2013</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee No. 3</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>UNIKIN</td>
<td>6 November 2013</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee No. 4</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>RENOSEC</td>
<td>10 November 2013</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee No. 5</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>CC</td>
<td>12 November 2013</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee No. 6</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>KONRAD ADENAUER</td>
<td>18 November 2013</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee No. 7</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>22 November 2013</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee No. 8</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>CAFCO</td>
<td>26 November 2013</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee No. 9</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>UPEC</td>
<td>2 December 2013</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee No. 10</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L.E</td>
<td>16 December 2013</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee No. 11</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>PPRD</td>
<td>21 December 2013</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee No. 12</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>UDPS</td>
<td>23 December 2013</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own source: adapted by the author 2013

3.4.4 QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

According to Creswell and Plano (2007:6), quantitative data includes closed-ended information such as that found on attitude, behavior, or performance instruments. The collection of this kind of data might also involve use of closed-ended checklists on which the researcher checks the behaviors observed. Sometimes, quantitative information is found in documents such as census records or attendance records.

The quantitative data in this study was gathered by means of survey questionnaires. Gray (2014:352) describes questionnaires as research instruments by means of which people are asked to respond to the same set of questions in a pre-determined sequence. The questionnaire which was used to collect data in this study made use of dichotomous and multiple option statement questions (see appendix C). The former are the kind of questions that have only two possibilities for response, for instance: “Yes” or “No” or “Do you feel that way”
or “Do you not feel that way”. The latter is the type of question mostly used to get data that are naturally subjective, for example, data about dispositions, attitudes and opinions (Delport and Roestenburg 2011:198-201). Delta and Roestenburg also provide the ordinal scaled questions that are designed in such a way that the respondents are required to mark a certain point on a scale in order to obtain information on more subjective aspects such as the degree of satisfaction towards a certain service or institution. The commonly used Likert scale approach was applied to measure the stakeholders’ perceptions with regard to their degree of satisfaction and trust in the DRC’s 2011 electoral processes. The researcher developed 120 questionnaires, which were distributed to 120 selected respondents from a population of short-term domestic observers. The 120 respondents were civil society members (short-term domestic observers) who were involved in the 2011 election processes in terms of voter education, election observation and human rights in the DRC. The questionnaires were designed in such a way that each respondent could tick or fill in the appropriate boxes. The Respondents(n=120) were conveniently selected and requested to complete the questionnaire within a two-week time frame, based on instructions given by the researcher to each respondent. The respondents returned 105 questionnaires (87.5%) of 120 questionnaires distributed. Out of 105 returned questionnaires, only 10 questionnaires were inadequately completed to be used, while 5 respondents refused to complete their questionnaires alleging fear of being suspected as opposition supporters or people who are against the regime. A total of 90 questionnaires were analyzed.

24 The fear expressed by some respondents could be justified due to the fact that the outcomes of 2011 elections in the DRC were internally contested by the opposition supporters and Congolese diaspora worldwide. On 6 December 2011, the Congolese diaspora protested outside the ANC’s headquarters (Luthuli House) in Johannesburg against the recognition by the South Africa’s government of the incumbent president Joseph Kabila as elected president following the 2011 elections. At the same time, the Congolese Embassy in Pretoria was vandalized by some Congolese in reaction to the reelection of president Kabila. Since 2011 elections became a very sensitive issue among Congolese. This could justified the fear among respondents including the fact that the researcher is resident in South Africa that is perceived by certain Congolese as being one opposition stronghold.
The outcomes of the quantitative data analysis will be in the form of tables, graphs and bar charts showing the level of satisfaction and trust towards the INEC, as well as some electoral aspects and confidence in the electoral processes, as this reflects the ability of the INEC to run the 2011 elections in the DRC successfully.

Consequently, the stakeholders’ views were divided in ten categories:

- Demographic background;
- Credibility of the 2011 electoral processes;
- Opinions on the freeness and fairness of the 2011 elections in the DRC;
- Level of satisfaction in some election aspects: voter registration, information on voting procedures, adequacy of equipment in the voting station, competency and impartiality of voting officers;
- Views on the independence of the INEC;
- Level of trust towards institutions such as Government, Parliament, Supreme Court, INEC, Police and the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication;
- Views on vote buying;
- Views on election-related violence;
- Views on the secrecy of the vote; and
- Comments on the 2011 elections in the DRC.

Therefore, the data were captured in a computer file which was imported to the Statistical Package for Social Science Software (SPSS) for quantitative data analysis purposes.

3.5 DATA ANALYSIS

Data analysis involves the gathering of raw data which could be images, views, words, interviews, experiences, opinions, attitudes, perceptions, and numbers in order to measure, explain, explore, understand and interpret the meaning of their content. Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie (2003:351) highlight that “the point at which data analysis begins and ends depends on the type of the data collected, which in turn depends on the sample size, which in turn depends on the research design, which in turn depends on the research purpose”. If the qualitative data and the quantitative data for a particular piece of research are collected concurrently, then the analysis will be performed after all the data has been collected. However, if the
two kinds of data are collected sequentially, then the data analysis will begin before all the data has been collected.

3.5.1 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

According to Patton (2002) quoted in Schurink et al. (2011:397), qualitative analysis transforms data into findings. This involves reducing the volume of raw information, sifting significance from trivia, identifying significant patterns and constructing a framework for communicating the essence of what the data reveal. The analysis of conversations with respondents concerning their experiences and perceptions relating to the electoral processes in the DRC was done through the thematic analysis process. With regard to this study, the thematic analysis was used to analyze the data collected from semi-structured interviews because it allowed the researcher to identify factors that shaped the perceptions of the stakeholders on the management of the 2011 elections in the DRC.

Braun and Clarke (2006:79) define thematic analysis as a qualitative diagnostic method for identifying, analyzing and reporting on patterns or themes detected in data. As Elshamly (2013:194) contends, the concept of themes is central to thematic analysis. Essentially, it enables the researcher to limit the total amount of information related to the research questions. This enables the researcher to focus on the key aspects relevant to the research and to organize and classify data. The use of thematic analysis requires the process of coding as part of analysis in categorizing data into meaningful groups. Besides, Robson (2011:474) posits that coding is how one defines what the data one is analyzing are about. It involves identifying and recording one or more passages of text or other data items, such as the parts of pictures that, in some sense, exemplify the same theoretical or descriptive idea. In the same vein, Punch (2011:199) states that usually, several passages are identified and they are then linked with a name for that idea: the code. Coding is the specific and concrete activity which starts the analysis. Codes are tags, names or labels, and coding is therefore the process of putting tags, names or labels against pieces of data. The process of conducting thematic analysis as proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006:87) was applied in this study.

The qualitative data recorded was transcribed from the recorder during in-depth interviews. Subsequently the researcher was involved in a careful reading of data
transcripts in order to familiarize himself with them. This process was crucial because it allowed the researcher to give significant attention to each item of qualitative data, such as activities, behaviors, meaning, actions, description, feelings, statements and interpretations that emerged from each segment of the raw data related to the electoral cycle of the 2011 elections in the DRC. After being familiarized with the data, the researcher was able to code each segment. The purpose of grouping together the coded segments of the data with a label or name in clusters was to pinpoint different themes related to the research questions. By these means, the themes were used to develop a thematic diagram in order to serve as cradle for data analysis and interpretation (see Chapter Four).

Table 3.4 Different phases of thematic analysis process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Description of the process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Familiarising oneself with the data</td>
<td>Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading the data, noting down initial ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Generating initial codes</td>
<td>Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Searching for themes</td>
<td>Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data relevant to each potential theme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reviewing themes</td>
<td>Checking whether the themes work in relation to the coded extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2); generating a thematic ‘map’ of the analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Defining and naming themes</td>
<td>Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions and names for each theme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Producing the report</td>
<td>The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, compelling extracted examples, final analysis of selected extracts, relating back to the analysis of the research question and literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Braun and Clarke (2006:87)

3.5.2 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

The quantitative data obtained by means of survey questionnaires were processed by using descriptive statistics. According to Babbie (2007:450), descriptive statistics are statistical computations describing either the characteristics of a
sample or the relationship among variables in a sample. The researcher used the SPSS version 21 and Excel 2010 to process the responses (data) from the questionnaires and presented them in a statistically competent manner (see Chapter Four). Outcomes from these statistics are bar charts, tables and pie charts showing the demographic background of the respondents, portraying and presenting levels of satisfaction and trust in the 2011 electoral processes and in the INEC. These results from the survey were not generalized as representing the perceptions of all the stakeholders of the 2011 DRC electoral processes. However, they showed interesting trends related to stakeholders’ perceptions, which enriched the understanding of the quality of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC (see chapter Four).

3.6 SUMMARY
This chapter focused on the research design and methodology used, including population, sampling method and sample, ethical considerations, validity and reliability. It described data collection and analysis. Chapter four discusses the data analysis and interpretation.
CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses and presents the data in line with the purpose of this study, that is, the assessment of the quality of the 2011 election management processes according to the perceptions of selected election stakeholders in the DRC. According to Schurink, Fouché and De Vos (2011:397), data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of collected data.

4.2 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS
The first phase of this chapter sheds light on the analysis of qualitative data. The thematic analysis of the qualitative data provided findings on factors that affected the quality as well as shaped stakeholders’ perceptions on the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. Subsequently, the themes and sub-themes that developed following the thematic analysis of the data as provided by interviewees are presented in Table 4.1 followed by a discussion below.

Table 4.1 Themes and sub-themes that emerged from interviews

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<th>Themes</th>
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<td>- Bias in campaign process</td>
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<td>- Inaccurate vote tabulation</td>
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Source: interviews (2013).
4.2.1 POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

4.2.1.1 Insecurity

The political environment during the 2011 electoral processes was not fully conducive to credible elections. The eastern region of the DRC was under the occupation of a rebel movement popularly known as the March 23 Movement. In Kinshasa as well as other cities, the 2011 electoral processes were characterized by a growing feeling of insecurity regarding some members of the ruling party and opposition. This situation of insecurity was described by the following informants:

Inf. 4: “Our country is in a post-conflict state; elections were organized in an environment of crisis.”

Inf. 8: “The environment in which the 2011 elections were conducted was disastrous; have a look at the ongoing conflict in the eastern region of the country, this is horrible.”

Inf. 2: “On the eve of election day, we witnessed a climate of insecurity and assassination. Marius Ngangale, an opposition Member of Parliament from the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC), was assassinated on 22 November 2011 in Kinshasa… on 25 November 2011 another member of the opposition party named Union pour la Nation Congolaise (UNC) was stabbed in Kinshasa at the same time since a part of our territory is under the control of rebel groups like M23, Mayi-Mayi and FDLR who are plundering … raping and violating humans rights.”

The above statements are supported by the International Crisis Group report (2011a:1) as follows: in 2006, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) were engaged in talks to secure the 2006 general elections in the DRC. Five years later, the Congolese authorities regained their responsibility to secure the 2011 election processes. However, the climate of insecurity persists in the eastern region of the DRC due to the fragility of the state security machinery. The researcher from the International Crisis Group (2011b:3) stated that lack of

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25 Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo is French for Movement for the Liberation of Congo.

26 Union pour la Nation Congolaise is French for Union for Congolese Nation.

27 Mayi Mayi is Swahili for water. In the context of armed groups in the DRC, it is most often seen to symbolize the magic force that makes the combatants (armed groups) become allegedly invincible, invisible and immune to gunfire.
security disrupted voter registration at every local level. In the eastern province particularly in Irumu territory, the INEC relocated registration centers in Bahema-Mitego and Bahema-South after they were looted. In the territory of Djugu, a kit was stolen but replaced immediately. In North Kivu, in the territories of Lubero and Rutshuru, armed groups attacked voter registration centers. In Walikale territory, the clash between two armed groups (Mayi-Mayi Cheka and the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain)\(^{28}\) (APCLS) interrupted the voter registration process. In South Kivu, especially in Kabare, Kalehe and Mwenga territories, registration materials were stolen by armed groups such as Mayi Mayi (International Crisis Group 2011b:3).

4.2.1.2 Mistrust

The political climate before the 2011 elections in the DRC was not peaceful because the political actors suspected each other of cheating in the elections. The lack of trust and consensus were predictable in such an environment. This situation was substantiated by the following informants:

*Inf. 3:* “Before the day of elections, tension was already terrible anywhere in the country. Also among contenders, some political actors suspected others of fraud.”

*Inf. 4:* “I’ll admit that the elections were held in an environment of agitation, suspicions, mistrust and doubt among election competitors. There is also the integration of the historic leader of opposition Mr Etienne Tshisekedi into the 2011 electoral processes after the boycotting of the 2006 elections. Its political party the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progress Social\(^{29}\) (UDPS) presence was a real threat.” [sic]

The final report of domestic long-term observers from the National Network for the Observation and Monitoring of Elections in DR Congo (RENOSEC) confirmed this finding. They noted that the electoral processes leading to the elections of 28 November 2011 in the DRC were characterized by a lack of consensus that

\(^{28}\) Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain is French for Patriotic Alliance for a Free and Sovereign Congo.

\(^{29}\) Union pour la Démocratie et le Progres Social is French for the Union for Democracy and Social Progress.
opened up the way for contestation at each stage of the electoral processes (RENOSEC 2012:11).

The above statements were supported by Mavungu (2013:30) who mentioned that, being a popular and legendary leader; Tshisekedi’s decision to participate in the 2011 electoral processes was a shock and stumbling block to the ruling party, due to the poor record of the incumbent regime.

4.2.1.3 Amendment of the Constitution of 2006 as a strategy to favor one contender

The amendment of the constitution, as mentioned above, could suggest the move was intended to ensure that a simple majority would secure the incumbent’s victory. On 20 January 2011, the parliament (senate and assembly) changed Article 71, which previously stipulated that a candidate who obtains 50% plus 1 of votes cast should be elected as president (absolute majority electoral system) into First-past-the-post (the simple majority electoral system). Many informants commented on this point as follows:

Inf. 3: “The speed with which the ruling party and its allies revised the constitution suggested the picture that the incumbent candidate was not strong enough to win the 2011 elections. To revise the constitution in the middle of the electoral process requires a minimum agreement from all competitors…the constitution is the foundation of constitutional democracy therefore its amendment could need a general consensus among election stakeholders but this did not happen…you can understand why…”

Inf. 1: “The ruling party and its allies changed the electoral system for presidential race from absolute majority electoral system to simple majority ten months before the run of presidential elections without serious debate within the parliament.”

According to Mangu (2013:8), President Kabila’s party and supporters anticipated that their candidate would hardly go through the first round and was likely to lose to a common opposition candidate, as had happened to President Laurent Gbabgo, who lost to Allasane Dramane Ouatara in the Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 2010 presidential elections. He asserted that to play safe, the possibility of a second round had to be ruled out by an amendment to Article 71.
The absence of a genuine consensus with regard to the amendment of the legal framework created tensions that weakened the electoral process (European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) 2011:10). Besides, Mavungu (2013:29-30) declared that the constitutional amendment was passed in the face of controversy from political parties and CSOs.

4.2.1.4 Controversial appointment of new Justices of Supreme Court

In the DRC, the constitution makes provision for the Supreme Court to be transformed into three courts, namely: a Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court of Appeal and the State Council. The transformation of the judiciary did not take place as stipulated by the constitution. For this reason, Article 223 of the constitution allows the Supreme Court to deal with all election litigations and disputes in the absence of the Constitutional Court. On 13 November 2011, 17 new justices were appointed to the Supreme Court by President Kabila. In relation to this appointment in the course of the elections, one informant declared that:

**Inf. 10:** “The constitution was not observed by the ruling party and its allies because they failed to make effective the transformation of the Supreme Court. The surprise was that on the eve of the elections the media announced the nomination of new justices; this demonstrated the intention of the ruling party to manipulate the outcome of the elections.”

In view of this declaration, Mangu (2013:23) argues that the President appointed the judges of the Supreme Court from among his supporters in the judiciary without any consultation with the High Council of the Magistracy (Judicial Commission), as required by Article 82 of the constitution. The legality and relevance of the appointment of these justices so close to election day were contested by opposition parties, CSOs and the legal fraternity (Tshiyoyo 2012).

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30 According to Article 82 of the constitution of the DRC, constitutional judges must be appointed and dismissed by the President on the initiative of the High Council of the Magistracy. However, the Supreme Court judges were shortly appointed before the polling day. The circumstantial evidence related to the appointment of these judges without the approval of the Congolese judicial commission could have led public opinion to speculate on the judges’ loyalty to the regime as basis of their appointment by their incumbent President.
The lack of an independent judiciary could have been a stumbling block to the deepening of electoral democracy as well as a trigger of election conflict in the DRC. Elsewhere in Africa, this situation has been observed in Kenya by Shilaho (2013:94) who declared that the absence of a credible judiciary contributed to the 2007 and 2008 post-election violence because the opposition had no confidence in it and so resorted to mass action to express anger rather than file a petition against the results.

4.2.2 DELAY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INEC

4.2.2.1 Protracted divergence in approving the appointment of INEC members

In the DRC, the appointment of election commissioners was a central topic of discussion in the public discourse, especially CSOs as well as political role-players. In ensuring the nomination of their supporters (persons close or aligned to their political agenda) as chairperson, deputy chairperson, chief electoral officers and election commissioners within the INEC; political role-players represented in Parliament attempted to take over the management of the INEC. This situation resulted in a stalemate which contributed to the delay in the establishment of the INEC. The appointment of election commissioners was approved by parliament in January 2011 and on 03 February 2011 President Kabila enacted Act No. 11/012 on the nomination of INEC members.

In this regard, one informant described this situation as follows:

Inf. 1: “The DRC is still an immature state, how come the politicians approved the choice of election commissioners only 10 months just before the organization of elections on 28 November 2011? This meant that the INEC began its work late in February 2011. The Act on the organization and functioning of the INEC took the electoral processes hostage. The ruling party and opposition appointed their supporters in the leadership positions (chairperson, deputy chairperson and commissioners) of the INEC at the expense of the people. It is clear that the INEC will never act as an impartial body. This is a danger for our young democracy while opposition and the ruling party spent time discussing who should be a member of the INEC and who should not without including the CSO members.” [sic]
The delay in electoral processes was caused by the controversy around the composition of the INEC, when the majority rejected the nomination of Senator Jacques Ndjoli, a member of the opposition, as they suspected that he would be an obstacle to the re-election of their leader, President Kabila; while the opposition perceived the presence of Daniel Ngoyi Mulunda at the head of the INEC as a sign that the elections would be rigged in support of the ruling party.

According to Mangu (2013:7), the opposition opposed the nomination of the INEC’s chairperson, Ngoyi Mulunda, who was seen by the opposition as being likely to take the side of President Kabila since he was in the same province (Katanga) as the President and was one of co-founders of the ruling party. In addition, Tshiyoyo (2012) stated that it was only on 10 January 2011, mere months before the scheduled date of elections, that the seven members of the CENI were appointed with Ngoyi Mulunda as Chairperson.

4.2.3 THE USE OF PATRONAGE
4.2.3.1 Allegations on the use of patronage in the recruitment process of INEC’s members
The appointment of the INEC members was based on political and ethnic loyalty rather than on the basis of competency in election management. In this regard, it can be said that the way in which INEC members are nominated and behave once they are appointed could affect the quality of the elections as well as undermine voters’ confidence in the EMB. The informants illustrated this situation as follows:

Inf. 8: “The members of the INEC were selected according to the law on the establishment of the INEC, but they acted irresponsibly. Each member attempted to pay back his sponsor (political party) and this way of doing things seriously undermined the credibility of the elections. You know what, the political parties represented within the INEC appointed some of their political members as voting officers.”

Inf. 1: “The nomination of election commissioners was made on basis of patron-client relationships and political agendas; this way could likely

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31 The use of patronage in the recruitment process of the INEC members may undermine the quality of the electoral management processes.
undermine the impartiality of INEC to act as a referee. It seemed like the INEC members worked respectively to secure the victory of their political parties. In some constituencies, members of political parties without any qualifications were recruited to serve as polling staff. Instead of resolving the problem of electoral integrity and credibility, INEC members were busy answering the unemployment issues for their political members.”

Inf. 4: “For the sake of your research you must be aware that the chairperson of the INEC is a Reverend; in 2006 he got involved in the campaign of President Joseph Kabila and also originates from the same province. During the process of election officers’ recruitment, the head of the INEC Reverend Ngoyi Mulunda and his deputy the Senator Jacques Djoli divided the country into two sides. The Reverend was in charge of selecting electoral agents from the eastern part of the country where he is a native and his colleague recruited election workers from the western side of DRC. The process was tainted by nepotism.”

The preceding statements echoed the Carter Center’s final report on the 2011 elections in the DRC, which mentioned that the partisan nomination of the Commission Electorale National Indépendante\textsuperscript{32} (CENI) leaders, along with the absence of civil society representation, allowed a politicization of its decisions by the majority and opposition political party representatives. This did not permit the INEC to sufficiently fulfill its mandate of independence (Carter Center 2011:67). Besides, in its report on the 2011 presidential and legislative elections in the DRC, the RENOSEC (2012:12) stated that although there was a consensus, the appointment of INEC members did not enjoy support because of the exclusion of CSO members as well as power granted to political parties to nominate their political members as leaders of civic institutions instead of neutral and independent persons as recommended by the Act on the establishment of the INEC. Similar to a study conducted on EMBs in another country in West Africa, Benin, Hounkpe (2011:29) notes that the brevity of the term of the Commission

\textsuperscript{32} The Commission Nationale Electorale Indépendante is French for Independent National Electoral Commission.
Nationale Electorale Autonome\(^{33}\) (CENA) can encourage commission members to look for some sort of security by sacrificing independence in the defence of the parties that appointed them. It is a fact that candidates for appointment to CENA are often forced to promise fidelity to party interests before they are appointed. Others are promised reappointment or a share in the fruits of victory if they are members of the winning coalition, all of which are factors that have an influence on the CENA’s independence. Subsequently, the INEC in the DRC did not clearly respond to allegations of political patronage in the recruitment process of election officers (EUEOM 2011:28).

### 4.2.4 ALLEGATIONS OF POOR PERFORMANCE OF THE INEC

In this study, certain informants indicated that the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC were characterized by concerns such as financial inadequacy, lack of professionalism, lack of organizational capacity and strategic electoral planning from the EMB side.

#### 4.2.4.1 Lack of professionalism

According to Gildenhuys (2004:116), professionalism refers to the qualities or typical features of a profession or of professionals, especially qualities of competence, skill and ethical conduct. In addition, Meticulous and accurate implementation of electoral procedures and suitable skilled staff are key elements for the delivery of credible elections. Moreover, EMBs need to ensure that all election officials, whether core staff or temporary workers, are well trained and acquainted with the necessary skills to apply high professional standards in the implementation of their technical work (Wall *et al*. 2006:25). One can question the rationality of the INEC leadership decision that preferred to swiftly recruit new electoral and presiding officers without experience and appropriate skills as well as competency on the eve of the 2011 elections, instead of keeping former and experienced electoral officers who were involved into 2006 elections (Tuseku 2011). Some informants articulated their opinions on INEC’s lack of professionalism in this way:

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\(^{33}\)The *Commission Nationale Electorale Autonome* is French for Autonomous National Electoral Commission.
Inf. 11: “Due to the lack of professionalism, the INEC organized the 2011 elections like we were about to take a stroll into the field. Elections require staff with experience. However, Election officers lacked experience in conducting the 2011 election… In future the INEC should train its personnel to become more professional in order to improve the quality of its performance.”

Inf. 6: “Elections workers were under skilled and were incompetent to perform their duties. Some elections workers were overtaken in running their task; some of them did not know how to use election materials such as computer, camera. They were unqualified; they botched up and misunderstood the electoral processes. They were unable to unearth duplicated voters or voters who registered twice as a strategy of cheating.” [sic]

Inf. 9: “Anyone with common sense should ask himself this question: why recruit new agents with neither competence nor experience instead of keeping those who worked during the 2006 electoral processes and having experience?”

Inf. 7: “We did not have enough time to train election workers. However, we made use of cascade training methods to reach a big number of trainees. Good cascade training implies much time to ensure that all levels are covered. We as INEC, we have experienced a serious shortage of time as well as funding from our first funder who is the government. We did not have appropriate resources in respect of our missions.”

In this regard, compliance with the legislative framework, including electoral regulations, procedures and manuals, is a prerequisite for the achievement of professionalism by an EMB (Wall et al. 2006:151). In contrast, it has been said that the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC revealed that some election workers lacked the ability to perform their duties and were also not involved in addressing the grievances raised by stakeholders. The lack of a clear understanding on how to apply the electoral law characterized the 2011 elections.
4.2.4.2 Lack of organizational and functional capacity

Organization is the key in elections management. It allows the EMB to reach its objectives and at some point the needs of election stakeholders in delivering credible elections. However, in the DRC, the INEC was far from fulfilling its legal functions and obligations due to lack of organizational capacity. The following points on lack of organization, planning and finances were regularly raised by informants during interviews.

Inf. 9: “The INEC did not have a clear strategic and operational plan related to the management of 2011 electoral processes. The choice of ballot papers and ballot boxes supplier was changed three times with financial consequences. We have experienced delay in dispatching of electoral materials (computer, ballot papers, ballot boxes, voters rolls, ink…).”

Inf. 5: “By the lack of planning, things were done in haste. For example, the design of ballot boxes and ballot papers is the showcase.”

Inf. 11: “In some constituencies there were lack of computers, and when electoral materials were supplied their number was insufficient to cover the need as expressed by electoral officers. In Kinshasa, the constituency of Tshangu, which is the largest constituency and the most popular country wide, some members of the public failed to be registered due to the shortage of electoral kits.”

Inf. 10: “The INEC did not display on time the localization of registration centers as well as polling stations. In certain provinces especially in remote areas, the INEC asked the potential voters to travel more than 20 km to reach the registration centers. I have realized that the location and number of registration centers were disproportional depending on being known as opposition or ruling party stronghold”.

Inf. 1: “Being in the western Kasai province to supervise election observations, I met this guy alone, carrying sensitive electoral materials such as ballot papers, voters’ roll, ballot boxes on his bicycle; who told me that he is a presiding officer in one voting station. He told me that elections should be running on the following day and, he was 80 km towards his destination where he is affected as a presiding officer; this means the electoral kits were delivered late.” [sic]
Inf. 12: “A general unpreparedness was invited by the INEC. Voters were confused by INEC who did not provide on time an electoral mapping containing names and localization of polling stations in some areas throughout the country. You will recall that not the majority of voting stations were visible. Although some of them were listed, it was difficult to confirm their physical existence on the ground. For this reason, the opposition parties started shouting about invisible voting stations that produced a certain number of votes apparently in favor to the incumbent. [sic]
After overseeing some voting stations, I observed the shortage of electoral materials and this situation resulted in dispute between election officers and voters.”

Inf. 7: “First of all, everything was done in a hurry and disorganized. How come before and after elections sensitive electoral materials such as ballot papers could be found on the streets? The INEC failed to coordinate its activities due to its administrative inability. It had no clear plan for collection and storage of ballot papers. In Kinshasa, there was a loss of an important number of ballot papers while others were abandoned under the rain without any attention from the INEC. This situation led the opposition parties to raise the question of electoral fraud.” [sic]

Inf. 3: “I know voting officers who complained about not being paid while the INEC hired them during the electoral processes.” [sic]

In managing the 2011 elections, the INEC failed to perform some of its legal, administrative and managerial tasks effectively. One can argue that the lack of organizational and functional expertise within the INEC adversely affected the transparency and the credibility of the electoral processes. The chaos that characterized the management of 2011 electoral processes clearly showed that there was a paucity of empirical electoral information from the INEC due to the non-existence of a research and knowledge management tool (RKM) function or section in this EMB. The absence of an operational RKM system resulted in bleak internal organization, electoral planning as well as unpreparedness. As Maphunye (2013:66) posits, the existence of an RKM function or unit can assist the EMB to pinpoint their strengths and weaknesses. Being part of the organization, the RKM system and process can engender innovative ideas, highlight issues for debate
that might not be in the EMB’s official program or calendar of events and mandate; and in terms of election management, for instance, RKM could play a critical role in the electoral processes. Maphunye (2013:66) states that during electoral processes, EMBs are normally flooded with huge demands for information from electoral stakeholders. However, even in countries with a reputation for respecting timelines, planning remains an unresolved issue for many governments, which wait until the election year to roll out electoral operations such as voter registration and upgrading voters’ rolls (Sadiki 2013:74).

4.2.5 ELECTORAL MALPRACTICES

The credibility of elections depends on the existence of a level playing field within the electoral processes and the perceptions that the public have towards the EMB in ensuring that the electoral outcomes reflect the will of the voters. Merloe (1997:4) maintains that the core of the level playing field is related to the extent to which political contenders benefit from political equity in terms of political freedom, availability of electoral materials, accessibility to voting facilities, media access and coverage, campaign financing and abiding by electoral law and regulations. For the duration of the electoral processes in the DRC, electoral contestants did not compete under equal conditions. The INEC barely attempted to create a level playing field for all electoral stakeholders. During the interview process, informants raised issues related to electoral malpractices as described below.

4.2.5.1 Flawed voter registration process

The registration process was subject to criticism from opposition parties. There was a serious lack of confidence among some stakeholders (political parties and CSOs) involved in the 2011 elections with regard to the accuracy of voters’ lists. This situation raised the question of the credibility of the voters’ roll that led the opposition political parties and CSOs to ask for access to the central database in order to verify the accuracy of the voters’ roll. In this regard, the informants expressed their views as follows:

Inf. 2: “The voter registration process was flawed and caused many problems. Voters complained about missing names or misplaced voters’ rolls. In certain constituencies, voters’ rolls did not correspond to specific voting stations.”
Inf. 6: “There were allegations of unlawful practices like registration of minors (under age of 18), security forces (the police and army) and foreigners when it is well known that the electoral law denies them the right to vote. As a consequence, the voters’ roll did not reflect the reality of Congolese electorate.”

Inf. 5: “There was also the issue of people omitted from the list who were in possession of electoral cards while their names were not found on the voters’ roll, including those whose names appeared on the voters’ roll but they did not have their electoral cards. Now the INEC did not communicate properly whether this category will be voting or will not be allowed to cast the ballot paper as expression of right to vote.”

Inf. 1: “In certain areas, voters were nervous because they either could not locate the voting stations or find their names on the voters’ roll. There were complaints about a shortage of ballot papers. Some voters might travel a long distance such as 25 km to reach the voting station and were told that they should wait for 2 to 3 hours to cast their ballot because either the voting stations opened late or the election officers were not ready.”

Maladministration in the sphere of electoral registration appears to be one of the most common forms of electoral abuse in many jurisdictions (Birch 2011:36). In the DRC, the reliability of the voters’ roll was seriously questioned by electoral stakeholders (La Voix de Sans Voix34 report on the 2011 elections). The VSV report cautioned that Act No. 11/003 of 25 June 2011, modifying Law No. 06/006 of 9 March 2006 on the organization of presidential, legislative, provincial, urban, municipal and local elections, was violated by the INEC. Article 5 of the electoral law stipulated that “no one who is under the age of 18 at the end of the voter registration process will be granted the right to vote”. Further, there were allegations regarding people under the age of 18 who voted in some constituencies in Bandundu, Katanga and North Kivu provinces. Besides, Article 8 of the electoral law required the INEC to publish voters’ lists in each province and constituency at least thirty days before the beginning of the campaign. In most cities and constituencies, voters’ lists were published on Election Day on 28

34La Voix de sans Voix (VSV) is French for The Voice of Voiceless.
November 2011. This was the case in Demba in Kasai Occidental Province, Tshela in Bas Congo province and Kasongo Lunda city in Bandundu Province where Article 8 of the Electoral Act was not observed; some voters were allowed to vote using a hand-written list (The VSV report on 2011 elections). The Carter Center’s report on the 2011 elections (2011:54) contends that the delay in posting voters’ roll violated Congolese law and the rights of voters. In line with Article 8 of the electoral law, the CENI should have displayed the voters’ roll at voting stations not later than 28 October 2011, that is, the starting day of campaign. In doing so, voters could identify their names before Election Day and have sufficient time to inform the INEC about errors related to the voters’ roll or voting station locations. This situation denied a huge number of Congolese voters an opportunity to express their right to vote.

4.2.5.2 Misuse of state resources
According to the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2004:19), not all political parties and candidates had access to public resources; governing parties in SADC had an unfair advantage in this area, using the public resources to which they had exclusive access for campaign purposes or to further their political ends. This was the case in the DRC when during the campaign, premiers of provinces and ministers made use of state resources at their disposal to campaign for the incumbent President Joseph Kabila. Despite the prohibition against using state resources made by principles governing the electoral campaign (Congolese electoral law, Constitution as well as PEMMO) some candidates and government officials (ministers, premiers, mayors and CEOs of state-owned enterprises) used state resources for election purposes. This situation biased the playing field during the 2011 electoral processes. In relation to this case, the following informants added:

*Inf. 2: “No respect of electoral law, those who were in power at that moment used the state resources (media, finance, police service, means of transport, facilities). We saw them (ruling party and allies members) campaigning with state vehicles, even travelling, as well as obtaining housing throughout the country at the cost of the state.”*
Inf. 11: “Some candidates used the public building to launch their manifesto as well as to expose their posters while the electoral law prohibited the use of any state spaces or infrastructures.”

Inf. 6: “The ruling party and its allies took advantage of its incumbency status to gain protection from police service; also, the huge surprise to everyone was the fact that the ruling party booked itself the unique private airplane to travel countrywide. The opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi who hired a private South African aircraft; he received from the Congolese Civil Aviation Authority the permission for travelling over airspace to campaign nearly at the end of the campaign period.”

There is no clear regulation or law governing election expenditure in the DRC. The 2011 Congolese elections campaign was tainted by disproportionate campaign spending among contenders. The use of public finances as well as illegal sources of financial support affected the playing field of the elections. This situation was also experienced in Zimbabwe and Guyana in 1980, where the governing parties were financed by special public ministries and/or official state subventions to the exclusion of others. Incumbents also deployed the machinery of the state such as state edifices, vehicles and communication organizations for electoral campaign purposes (Levitsky and Way 2010:11). The EUEOM (2011:5) in the DRC declared that the electoral law was totally violated; including the prohibition of any display of posters for propaganda on public buildings as well as the involvement of public officials in election campaigns by using state resources for electioneering purposes. In most cases, there were premiers and mayors who were candidates for MPs who took advantage of their positions to campaign for the ruling party using public resources. The EUEOM (2011) stated that neither the INEC nor prosecutors had ever conducted actions to prevent such violations of the electoral law.

4.2.5.3 Media access and coverage
Sadiki (2013:75) emphasizes the worthy role played by the media in the political arena in any society. He argues that in competitive electoral processes, the media can serve as an extended arm of the propaganda machinery of political actors to maximize their chances of success. In the DRC, only the state-owned media have
the capacity to broadcast throughout the country. The editorial line and broadcasting program of the state media as well as private media linked to the ruling party largely changed during the 2011 electoral campaign period. Much airplay was dedicated to a new documentary related to President Kabila describing his childhood as well as his role in the presidency. This documentary aired by the public media as well as those who are close to the ruling party was shot and edited by the state media at the cost of the state. During the electoral process, the state media created a special television and radio production to support the ruling party’s presidential candidate (Kabila) as well as the MPs. The substance of this new production was mostly intended to denigrate opposition personalities as well as distort information related to opposition parties. Despite the existence of institutions such as the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication, which is in charge of broadcasting and regulation programs in the Congolese media industry for either public or private radio and television stations; the ruling party and its coalition upheld the monopoly on the state-owned media and others. As the following informants explained:

Inf. 10: “The process was not equal; the state-owned media did not cover all candidates and political parties in the same way. In the public media and others close to the incumbent regime, enough airtime and space were predominantly given to the ruling party and its followers rather than the opposition parties.”

Inf. 3: “The DRC has more than thirty television and radio stations. We saw during the campaign period that television and radio stations close to the opposition were seriously annoyed by state services such as the Intelligence Service and the Department of Information and Communication. There were also some of the media closer to the opposition [sic] that were completely banned from broadcasting.”

Inf. 7: “The public media were not balanced; certain candidates were more privileged and had more airtime as well as visibility on public media than other candidates. The gender balance was not respected; overall the debate was absent. The core of electoral discourse was centered on personal attack rather than on manifesto, state project and idea.”
In the process of advancing the integrity, transparency and credibility of the electoral process, the Southern Africa Development Community Parliament Forum (2001:9) underlines that the control of state-owned media by government causes an imbalance in the playing field between stakeholders, mainly the ruling party and opposition parties. This situation creates a kind of tacit personal censorship in the reporting process. The EUEOM (2011:47) in the DRC points out that there was a discrepancy of access to the state-owned radio and television stations that did not play their role as a public service, neglecting the principle of equity and equality in the matter of information distribution. In addition, the Department of Information and Communication took a discriminatory and arbitrary decision that led to the interruption of the broadcasting signal of media associated with the opposition such as Radio Lisanga Television (RLTV) and Canal Futur TV, without considering any legal repercussions. This led other journalists to practice self-censorship that threatened the right to information completely during the electoral campaign period. In addition, the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication failed to regulate equal access to media between opposition and ruling party candidates. For example, the EUEOM (2011) media monitoring statement reported that the state-owned National Congolese Television spent 86% of coverage on Joseph Kabila’s presidential candidate while ten other presidential candidates shared 14% of coverage on National Congolese Television. Levitsky and Way (2010:11) assert that when opposition parties lack access to media that reach most of the population, there is no possibility of fair competition. Taking a lesson from Malawi, where President Bakili Muluzi defeated the former President Banda, one journalist criticized the incumbent control of media as follows: “Before it was Banda, Banda every day; now it is Muluzi, Muluzi, and Muluzi.” (Levitsky and Way 2010:11)

4.2.5.4 Campaign process
The election campaign was organized in a climate of intimidation and coercion. All means were justified to achieve the end of being elected. In this respect, some candidates donated money and gifts to voters for election purposes, while others made use of a youth syndicate known for their violence and harassment in order to terrorize their opponents. As several informants told the researcher:

Inf. 9: “Donation and vote buying were there. Some candidates gave money, T-shirts, alcohol, and built bridges in same remote areas and donated..."
electrical cables in order to attract voters. These are vote determinants on the basis of which certain MPs and presidential candidates were appreciated by some voters”. [sic]

Inf. 1: “Some contenders in the parliamentary elections were accompanied by the militia and youth syndicate called Kuluna...There was a clash between the incumbent President Joseph Kabila and opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi’s followers in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi cities. In Kinshasa, UDPS headquarters of Etienne Tshisekedi were attacked by armed persons known to be close to the ruling party. At least 8 members of UDPS died and 23 others were wounded. The political intolerance was very high among partisans who belonged to opposition parties and ruling parties.” [sic]

Inf. 2: “The last day of campaigns, the presidential guards, a special unit of the Congolese army in charge of presidential security, opened gun fire on Etienne Thisekedi’s supporters gathered around the Kinshasa National Airport to welcome their leader who came back to Kinshasa after a long journey for the electoral campaign.”

Inf. 9: “Women candidates (MPs) were threatened by men candidates (MPs). In some constituencies, women candidates were prohibited to campaign; and their posters also have been removed in certain provinces.”

According to a report published by the Ligue des electeurs (2011), the electoral process was devoid of a specific theme or real debate and it was marked by human rights violations. The League of Voters reported that there were cases of intimidation of opposition candidates such as Roger Lumbala and Martin Fayulu, who were arrested in order to discourage them from campaigning. In addition, Etienne Tshisekedi received an approval letter to fly over Congolese airspace for campaigning purposes only a few days before the end of the campaign period. After campaigning in the province of Bas Congo, the airplane on which Etienne Tshisekedi was aboard was denied the right to land at the International Airport of Ndjili in Kinshasa on 26 November 2011. This situation led to a murderous repression of Tshisekedi’s followers and supporters who came to welcome him.

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35 Youth association known for their violence and attacks on members of the public in Kinshasa and other provinces.
4.2.5.5 Inaccurate counting and results acceptance

Accurate and comprehensive tabulation of votes is another dimension of free and fair elections. Incorrect procedures for counting votes marred the outcomes of elections that led the opposition to allege rigging of election results. Once the votes are cast, they must then be counted, tabulated (aggregated) and reported accurately (Birch 2011:180). The counting of votes in the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC was largely criticized by voters for being biased by the election commissioners. On 20 November 2013 in Kinshasa during the course of data collection, one polling worker\textsuperscript{36} told the researcher that “we are the ones who decided who should be elected or not. Candidates who were interested to get power visited us and we helped them to get elected by changing the results. Therefore, those who paid us, we facilitated them to gain more votes than their opponents by creating invalid ballots in the amount of their opponents”. In relation to voting inaccuracy, the following informants elaborated that:

\textit{Inf. 7:} “We did our part of the job assigned to us as elections workers. If there was wrongdoing, this came from the politicians; which means INEC leadership.”

\textit{Inf. 5:} “As the majority of election workers were recruited on the basis of patron-client relation, some of them refused to deliver the sheet of results to party agents and participated in rigging the electoral results. One voter claimed that we made our choice for the lamb; how it came about that the result gave us the cat...those people robbed us.”\textsuperscript{[sic]}

\textit{Inf. 6:} “We did not vote for him. How come that if people voted for you; after the announcement of the results, why thanks everywhere? We were surrounded by soldiers.”\textsuperscript{[sic]}

One member of the ruling party’s electoral alliance, Jean Claude Muyambo, claimed that Kabila’s powerful advisor Augustin Katumba Mwake instructed Ngoyi Mulunda as to which candidates should be elected and which should be excluded.

\textsuperscript{36} One polling worker openly admitted his participation in the electoral fraud because he felt betrayed by his client (MP candidate) who got elected but did not fulfill his promise to pay him after the elections. This situation can be illustrated by a large number (500) of electoral charges laid to the Supreme Court by MP candidates who alleged that the electoral results were rigged.
Muyambo spoke out to justify his failure to get elected (Mavungu 2013:41). The results of the 2011 elections were differentially appreciated depending on opposition or ruling party alignment. After the Supreme Court of Justice definitively pronounced the results, opposition parties rejected the result. The UDPS party claimed that its leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, won the elections. He held an inauguration ceremony at his house in Limete, after which he was put under house arrest immediately after the announcement of the election results (Mavungu 2013:43). In a study on Electoral Malpractice, Birch (2011:180) argues that noteworthy violations include miscounting, inaccurate tabulation, and the misreporting of results; failure to report in a timely manner is also a cause for concern. In the same vein, the EUEOM (2011:20) report on the 2011 elections in the DRC illuminates that non-compilation of nearly two thousand tallies in Kinshasa, which had been approved by the local compilation center but subsequently disappeared or were destroyed, affected the results of elections and credibility. However, this situation did not result in criminal sanctions against those who were responsible for the loss and destruction of these tallies in accordance with Articles 82, 83 and 89 of the Electoral Act.

The Carter Center (2011:69) concluded that many local compilation centers seemed to have delivered credible tallies to the satisfaction of political party witnesses and other observers. Nevertheless, certain election observation missions documented that other local compilation centers, especially in Kinshasa, North and South Kivu and Katanga provinces, were poorly planned and chaotic in their operations, thus compromising the integrity of the results process in those areas.

4.3 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

The second phase of this chapter is about the analysis and interpretation of quantitative data from 90 respondents who correctly completed and returned the questionnaire. The data is statistically presented in relation to the questionnaire (see Appendix C) as pie charts and bar charts showing the demographic background of respondents, the views of stakeholders on attempts at vote buying, violence related to election as well as the level of satisfaction and trust in the INEC.
and other institutions involved in the management of the 2011 elections in the DRC.

4.3.1 DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND
The demographic background of respondents was described in terms of: gender, highest level of education, membership of CSOs, training related to election observation and years as members of CSOs.

4.3.1.1 Gender distribution
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 below show that there are more males in the sample than females. The data indicates that the sample was not proportionally represented in relation to gender distribution. The sample could be described as a male dominant group.

Table 4.2 Gender of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>86 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.1: Gender of respondents (source: survey)
4.3.1.2 Levels of education

Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2 below indicate that 11% of respondents obtained a grade twelve certificate and 89% of respondents had a tertiary level of education. This means that the majority\textsuperscript{37} of the respondents had a tertiary qualification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.2: Education levels of respondents (source: survey)

4.3.1.3 Membership of CSOs

Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3 below show that 95% of respondents are members of CSOs, while the minority of the sample 5% do not have membership with any CSOs. The findings show that the majority of respondents are CSOs role players.

Table 4.4 CSOs membership of respondents

\textsuperscript{37} The term majority in this study refers to the high number (percentage) out of 90 respondents who expressed in the same way their views about the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC.
### Membership with CSOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership with CSOs</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Membership Pie Chart]

Figure 4.3: CSOs membership of respondents (source: survey)

### 4.3.1.4 Training related to election observation

Table 4.5 Election observation training of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training in observing elections</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4.4: Election observation training of respondents (source: survey)

Table 4.5 and Figure 4.4 above indicate that 79% of respondents were trained to observe elections, and 21% of respondents did not receive training related to election observation. This means that the majority of the respondents received training in observing elections.

4.3.1.5 Experience of being CSOs role player in the DRC

Table 4.6 and Figure 4.5 below reveal that 30% of respondents had been CSOs role players for less than 5 years. The largest group of the sample, with 53% of respondents, fell in the category of 6-10 years’ experience as CSOs role players, while 17% of respondents were in the category of 11-15 years. None of the respondents was in the category of 16 and more years of experience as CSOs role players. This could be explained by the fact that in 2005 the DRC organised the constitutional referendum in which CSOs role players were involved as domestic observers.

Table 4.6 CSOs tenure of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenure as CSOs role players</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-5 years</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 years</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15 years</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16+ years</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.2 VIEWS ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE 2011 ELECTORAL PROCESSES

4.3.2.1 Views on whether the election results reflect the will of the voters

Table 4.7 and Figure 4.6 below show that 84% of the sample responded negatively: the results of the 2011 elections did not reflect the will of the voters. The remaining 16% agreed that the results of the 2011 elections reflect the will of the voters. The results in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.6 indicate that the majority of respondents believed that the results of the 2011 elections did not reflect the way electors voted. This means that the results of the 2011 elections were not credible.

Table 4.7 Views on the credibility of the 2011 elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents’ views on the credibility of the 2011 election outcomes</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, accurate reflection</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, inaccurate reflection</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4.6: Views on the credibility of the 2011 elections (source: survey)

4.3.2.2 Respondents’ views on the electoral legal framework to ensure the integrity of the 2011 electoral processes

The results in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.7 below indicate that 51% of respondents said that the electoral legal framework did not ensure integrity in electoral processes while 49% confirmed that the election legal framework ensure the integrity of electoral processes. This means that the integrity of the 2011 electoral processes was not ensured in the DRC, according to the majority.

Table 4.8 Views on electoral legal framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents’ views on electoral legal framework</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.3 Respondents' Opinions on the Freeness and Fairness of the 2011 Elections in the DRC

Table 4.9 Opinions on freeness and fairness of the 2011 elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freeness and fairness of 2011 elections</th>
<th>Respondents’ opinions on the freeness of the 2011 elections</th>
<th>Respondents’ opinions on the fairness of the 2011 elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.7: Views on electoral legal framework (source: survey)
4.3.3.1 Opinions on the freeness of the 2011 elections

![Freeness of 2011 elections](image)

Figure 4.8: Freeness of the 2011 elections (source: survey)

The results in Table 4.9 and Figure 4.8 above indicate that 18.9% of the respondents strongly disagreed, and 34.4% of respondents disagreed that the 2011 elections were free. However, of the respondents, 15.6% strongly agreed, and 31.1% agreed that the 2011 elections were free. This means that the majority of respondents (53.3%) disagreed that the 2011 elections were free. The results in Table 4.9 and Figure 4.8 suggest that the 2011 elections were not free.

4.3.3.2 Opinions on the fairness of the 2011 elections

![Fairness of 2011 elections](image)

Figure 4.9: Fairness of the 2011 elections (source: survey)

The results in Table 4.9 and Figure 4.9 above indicate that 20% of the respondents strongly disagreed, and 50% of respondents disagreed that the 2011 elections were fair. However, of the respondents, 5.6% strongly agreed, and 16% agreed that the 2011 elections were fair. This means that the majority of respondents (70%) denied that the 2011 elections were fair. The results in Table 4.9 and Figure 4.9 suggest that the 2011 elections were not fair.

4.3.4 RESPONDENTS’ VIEWS ON THE IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE INEC
Table 4.10 Views on the impartiality and independence of the INEC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The INEC made decisions that favor some contenders</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| The INEC performed its duty with independence    |                |       |                            |          |                  |
| Frequency                                       | 3             | 15    | 9                          | 36       | 27               |
| Percentage                                      | 3.3%          | 16.7% | 10%                        | 40%      | 30%              |

4.3.4.1 Views on INEC’s decisions

Figure 4.10: Views on INEC’s decisions (source: survey)

The results in Table 4.10 and Figure 4.10 above indicate that 32.2% of the respondents strongly agreed, and 30% of respondents agreed that the INEC favored some contenders. However, 4.4% of the respondents strongly disagreed, and 26.7% disagreed that the INEC favored certain contenders. The majority (62.2%) of the respondents believe that the INEC made decisions that undermined its neutrality. This means that the INEC was not impartial in performing its duty.
4.3.4.2 Views on INEC’s independence

![INEC performed its duty with independence chart]

Figure 4.11: Views on the independence of the INEC (source: survey)

The results in Table 4.10 and Figure 4.11 above show that 30% of the respondents strongly disagreed and 40% of respondents disagreed that the INEC performed its duty autonomously. However, 16.7% of the respondents agreed, and 3.33% strongly agreed that the INEC was not under partisan control in performing its duty. The majority of respondents (70%) said that the INEC was dependent in performing its duty. This suggests that the INEC was not free from partisan interference.

4.3.5 LEVEL OF SATISFACTION IN CERTAIN ELECTION ASPECTS

Table 4.11 Level of satisfaction in registration, information, equipment, competency and impartiality of electoral officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of satisfaction in certain election aspects</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voter registration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information on voting procedures
4.3.5.1 Voter registration

The informations in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.12 show that 11.1% of respondents were very satisfied with the process of voter registration, and 33.3% of respondents were somewhat satisfied with voter registration. In contrast, 45.6% of respondents were somewhat dissatisfied and 7.8% were very dissatisfied with voter registration. Only 2.2% of respondents were undecided. The results in Table
4.11 and Figure 4.12 indicate that a majority of 53.4% of respondents were not satisfied with voter registration in the 2011 elections.

4.3.5.2 Information on voting procedures

The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.13 indicate that 13.3% of respondents were very satisfied and 22.2% of respondents were somewhat satisfied with the information given on voting procedures. Another 41.1% of respondents were somewhat dissatisfied and 15.6% of respondents were very dissatisfied. However, 7.8% of respondents were uncertain. The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.13 indicate that 56.7% of respondents were not satisfied with the information on voting procedures in 2011 elections. This means that the majority of respondents confirmed that the information on voting procedures was not well distributed and conveyed.

4.3.5.3 Competency of electoral officers

The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.14 above show that 11.1% of respondents were very dissatisfied and 42.3% of respondents were somewhat dissatisfied with the competency of electoral officers. Of the respondents, 24.4% said that they
were somewhat satisfied and 12.2\% were very satisfied with the competency of electoral officers. The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.14 indicated that 53.4\% of respondents said that electoral officers were not competent. This means that the majority of respondents confirmed that the electoral officers were not skilled.

4.3.5.4 Equipment in voting station

The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.15 above show that 12.2\% of respondents were very dissatisfied and 34.4\% of respondents were somewhat dissatisfied with the equipment in the voting station. Of the respondents, 34.5\% were somewhat satisfied and 13.3\% were very satisfied with the equipment in the voting station. The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.15 indicate that 47.8\% of respondents said that they were satisfied with this aspect and 46.6\% were not satisfied. With a difference of 1 \% this means that the divergence of views in terms of the equipment in the voting station among stakeholders is slightly expressed.

4.3.5.5 Impartiality of electoral officers

Figure 4.15: Adequacy of equipment in voting station (source: survey)

Figure 4.16: Impartiality of electoral officers (source: survey)
The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.16 above show that 4.4% of respondents were very dissatisfied and 44.4% of respondents were somewhat dissatisfied with the impartiality of electoral officers. Of the respondents, 30% were somewhat satisfied and 15.6% were very satisfied with the impartiality of electoral officers. The results in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.16 indicate that 48.4% felt that they were not satisfied with the competency of electoral officers. This means that the electoral officers were not skilled.

4.3.6 LEVEL OF TRUST TOWARDS INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO ELECTION MANAGEMENT

Table 4.12 Level of trust towards Government, Parliament, INEC, Supreme Court, police, High Council of Audio-visual and Communication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of trust towards institutions</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the INEC is constitutionally responsible to manage the elections processes, there are other institutions that play indirectly an important role in the management of elections. For example the Police should ensure the security of the electoral cycle; Supreme Court should deal with all electoral disputes, Government supplies finances, Parliament provides electoral legal framework and the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication should regulate the use and access to the media.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Court</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                | Percentage | Frequency | Percentage |
| High Council of Audio-visual and Communication |            | 3         | 3.3%       |
|                |            | 13        | 14.4%      |
|                |            | 25        | 27.8%      |
|                |            | 23        | 25.6%      |
|                |            | 26        | 28.9%      |

4.3.6.1 Trust in the Government

![Graph showing trust in the Government](image)

Figure 4.17: Trust in the Government (source: survey)

The results in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.17 above show that 3.3% of respondents asserted a very high level of trust and 13.3% had a high level of trust towards the Government. Of the respondents, 43.3% confessed a low level of trust and 7.8% had a very low level of trust in the Government. The majority of respondents (51.1%) indicated a low level of trust towards the Government. This means that they had low trust in the Government.
4.3.6.2 Trust in the Parliament

The results in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.18 above show that 3.3% of respondents had a very high level of trust and 22.2% had a high level of trust towards parliament. Of the respondents, 34.4% had a low level of trust and 22.2% had a very low level of trust in Parliament. Overall significant percentage of respondents (56.6%) did not trust the Parliament.

4.3.6.3 Trust in the INEC

The results in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.19 above show that 3.3% of respondents indicated a very high level of trust and 6.7% had a high level of trust towards the INEC. Of the respondents, 26.7% claimed a low level of trust and 32.2% had a very low level of trust in the INEC. The majority of respondents (58.9%) expressed a low level of trust towards the INEC. This means that many respondents did not have trust in the INEC. It seems that the poor quality of 2011 election management raised by some interviewees (see section 4.2) could have influenced the decline of trust in the INEC.
4.3.6.4 Trust in the Supreme Court

![Graph: Trust in the Supreme Court](image)

Figure 4.20: Trust in the Supreme Court (source: survey)

The results in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.20 above show that 3.3% of respondents had a very high level of trust and 3.3% had a high level of trust towards the Supreme Court. Of the respondents, 32.2% had a low level of trust and 45.6% had a very low level of trust in the Supreme Court. The majority of respondents (77.8%) had a low level of trust towards the Supreme Court. This means that almost all respondents believed that the Supreme Court lacked judicial independence and did not perform its duty, especially in resolving electoral disputes and complaints raised by some election contenders.

4.3.6.5 Trust in the Police

![Graph: Trust in the Police](image)

Figure 4.21: Trust in the Police (source: survey)

The results in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.21 above show that 6.7% of respondents had a very high level of trust and 11.1% had a high level of trust towards the police. Of the respondents, 36.7% had a low level of trust and 14.4% had a very low level of trust in the police. More than half respondents (51.1%) expressed a
low level of trust towards the police. This means that the police did not sufficiently secure the electoral processes, especially the election campaign (see section 4.2).

4.3.6.6 Trust in the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication

![Graph: Trust in the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication](Source: survey)

The results in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.22 above show that 3.3% of respondents had a very high level of trust and 14.4% had a high level of trust towards the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication. Of the respondents, 25.6% had a low level of trust and 28.9% had a very low level of trust in the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication. Over half of respondents (54.5%) reported a low level of trust towards the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication. This means that the majority of respondents believe that the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication did not fairly regulate media access and coverage during the 2011 electoral processes. The inadequate implementation of media regulations during the 2011 election period could have contributed to the decline of trust in the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication among respondents (see section 4.2).

4.3.7 RESPONDENTS’ VIEWS ON VOTE BUYING, VIOLENCE RELATED TO ELECTIONS AND SECRECY OF THE VOTE

Table 4.13 Views on vote buying, violence related to elections and secrecy of the vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occurrence of vote buying</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occurrence of violence related elections</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secrecy of the vote</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.7.1 Vote buying

![Pie chart showing 64% Yes and 36% No]

The results in Table 4.13 and Figure 4.23 above indicate that 36% of respondents said that there was no vote buying during the 2011 elections while 64% confirmed that voters were exposed to vote buying. This implies that some candidates were seen to be soliciting votes unfairly.
4.3.7.2 Violence related to elections

The results in Table 4.13 and Figure 4.24 above indicate that 60% of respondents confirmed that there was violence related to elections during the 2011 elections while 40% said that voters were not exposed to violence related elections. The majority of respondents agreed that there was violence related elections. This means some contenders and their supporters employed violence in some constituencies during the 2011 elections.

4.3.7.3 Secrecy of the vote

Figure 4.25: Views on the secrecy of the vote (source: survey)
The results in Table 4.13 and Figure 4.25 above indicate that 13% of respondents confirmed the secrecy of the vote while 87% said that there was no confidentiality. This means that the secrecy of the vote was compromised at voting stations during the 2011 elections.

4.4 SUMMARY
This chapter covered the data analysis and interpretation of both interviewees and respondents’ views on the management of 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. Data from interviews were analyzed in order to understand factors that affected the quality of the 2011 electoral processes management in the DRC while data from questionnaires were used to explain the capacity of the INEC in performing its task with impartiality and autonomy. Chapter five concludes the study and makes recommendations based on the findings of the study.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter concludes the study by presenting the conclusions as they pertain to the objectives of the study. In addition, the limitations of the study are outlined and recommendations for future research are made.

This study analyzed the perceptions of election stakeholders on the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The importance of election stakeholders and EMBs as well as their role in electoral democracy was underlined through the literature related to the study. As Maphunye (2014) cautions, “election stakeholders play a critical role to ensure transparent, free and fair elections”; and he states that “elections are also about perceptions: stakeholders’ roles in election prove that there is nothing to hide”. The question addressed in this study was: what are stakeholders’ perceptions on the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC? The Findings of the study reveal that external and internal factors related to election management may shape the perceptions of election stakeholders. Taking into consideration the specificity of this study that is informed by both qualitative and quantitative results, the following is the summary of the findings that reflect the perceptions of elections stakeholders in the DRC.

The research design used in this study was the mixed methods approach: an application of qualitative and quantitative methods in the same study. Pragmatism was the philosophical assumption that underpinned the study (see Chapter three). The literature relevant to this study showed that a lot has been written in the field of election management but not focused on election stakeholders, especially domestic observers and their role in enhancing electoral democracy in Africa and, particularly in the DRC. The political support, political trust and neopatrimonial theories were applied by the researcher in order to understand and explain factors affecting the management of the 2011 electoral processes and how election stakeholders came to shape their perceptions of the 2011 elections. The researcher conducted twelve interviews with election role players in Kinshasa (DRC). Of informants who were interviewed 17% (n=2) were female and 83%
(n=10) were male. Furthermore, of the 90 respondents who correctly completed their questionnaires, 86% (n=77) were male and; 14 % (n=13) were female.

The objectives of the study are summarized as follows:

5.2 FACTORS SHAPING ELECTION STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTIONS
The findings of the study (see Chapter four) showed that the following external and internal factors shaped the perceptions of stakeholders on the management of the 2011 elections: election environment, delay in the establishment and nomination of INEC members (leadership), allegations of patronage in nomination process of INEC members (leadership), allegations of poor performance of the INEC, and electoral malpractices. The context in which the Congolese 2011 elections were conducted was not conducive to ensuring integrity and credibility of the election outcome.

5.3 FACTORS AFFECTING THE MANAGEMENT OF THE 2011 ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN THE DRC
Findings from interviews suggested that insecurity, misuse of state resources for election purposes, bias in media access and coverage, the use of client-patron relations, divergence in nomination processes of INEC members (leadership), mistrust among contenders due to the amendment of the constitution and the appointment of new justices on the eve of 2011 elections are external factors that affected the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. However, internal factors that affected the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC are as follows: lack of skills among election officers, lack of organizational capacity within the INEC, flawed voter registration processes, bias in campaign processes and inaccurate vote tabulation.

5.4 PERCEPTIONS OF RESPONDENTS ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE 2011 ELECTION OUTCOMES
The responses from respondents indicated that the majority (84%) believed that the 2011 election results did not reflect the will of the people. Of respondents, 51% believed that the electoral legal framework did not secure the integrity of the 2011 electoral processes. In addition, 53.3% of respondents perceived the 2011 elections as not being free and 70% perceived them as not being fair and 70% indicated that the INEC lacked independence in performing its duty.
5.5 PERCEPTIONS OF RESPONDENTS ON SOME ELECTION ASPECTS
The majority of respondents (53.4%) were not satisfied with voter registration processes; 56.7% were dissatisfied regarding information on voting procedures. A total of 53.4% perceived electoral officers as not being competent; 46.6% observed that the voting stations were inadequately equipped and 48.8% regarded the electoral officers as being partial.

5.6 PERCEPTIONS OF RESPONDENTS ON ELECTION INSTITUTIONS AS ROLE PLAYERS
The perceptions of respondents on some institutions that were role players (Government, Parliament, INEC, Police, Supreme Court and High Council of Audio-visual and Communication) in the running of the 2011 elections in the DRC are expressed by their level of trust in each of them. The findings revealed that the majority of respondents (51.1%) felt a low level of trust in the Government and 56.6% did not trust the Parliament. A total of 58.9% of respondents expressed a low level of trust in the INEC and 77.8% expressed a low level of trust in the Supreme Court. Furthermore, 51.1% of respondents recorded a low level of trust in the Police and 54.5% indicated a low level of trust in the High Council of Audio-visual and Communication.

5.7 PERCEPTIONS OF RESPONDENTS ON VOTE BUYING, VIOLENCE RELATED TO ELECTIONS AND SECRECY OF THE VOTE
A total of 36% of respondents indicated being exposed to vote buying and 60% confirmed the use of violence in the 2011 elections. The majority of respondents (87%) said that the vote was secret.

5.8 RECOMMENDATIONS
The study found that integrity, credibility, impartiality, independence, professional performance, trust and confidence were the weak links in the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. To improve the quality of future election management the following actions need to be taken:
• The Congolese Parliament should amend the electoral law in order to enhance the integrity, transparency, accuracy, impartiality and credibility of the management of electoral processes (electoral cycle);
• Provide an adequate training for electoral and presiding officers in order to make them more skilled, competent and professional;
• Review the current electoral law in order to guarantee an active participation of domestic observers (CSOs) as key watchdogs of electoral processes from pre-election phase to post-election phase;
• The Parliament should insert a clause in the electoral law that prevents the incumbent from using public resources for election purposes and propose legal actions against election commissioners who are found guilty of falsification of results;
• The Congolese Government should apply open advertising for members of the INEC and inclusiveness of other institutions (parliament and Constitutional Court) in the recruiting process of INEC members in order to avoid the pressure from political role players who want to control the electoral processes;
• The establishment of a reliable Constitutional and Electoral Court as an organ in charge of political and election disputes;
• The Congolese Government should put sufficiently large budgets at the disposal of the INEC;
• The CSOs should be organized and more vibrant to ensure an effective civic and voter education;
• The INEC should organize and create a space for regular dialogue with election stakeholders in order to mitigate harmful actions (violence during elections, restrictions on opposition access to state-controlled media, election mismanagement, and suppression of certain media during the campaign period) that undermine electoral integrity.

Further research on other election stakeholders such as EMBs, CSOs, SADC-Parliamentary Forum (PF), SADC-Electoral Commission forum (ECF), international observers, and media, the Police, Electoral Court and AU, EU, ECOWAS, ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) as well as SADC should be conducted in order to understand their role and contribution to the advancing of electoral and participatory democracy in Africa.
5.9 LIMITATIONS

This study was limited to election stakeholders (domestic observers and election experts) in Kinshasa, the Capital city of the DRC, and the sample was not fully representative. Thus, the results could not be generalizable to all stakeholders all over the country, even if some of the stakeholders who participated in the study had representations and were involved in observing and reporting on the 2011 elections throughout the country. The security threat and the fragility of political situation in the DRC as well as lack of funding undermined the movement of the researcher from one place to another during data collection. Additionally, fear of respondents; less attention paid to the level of education and gender profile of respondents; less interest of female respondents to participate in this study were the main limitations of the study. All these limitations undermined the researcher’s attempt to ensure balanced profile of respondents based on gender, and level of education, among other variables.

5.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The involvement of domestic observers in the electoral process is crucial because it contributes to the enhancement and establishment of participatory democracy in Africa and particularly in the DRC. Despite the participation of domestic observers in the 2011 elections, some contenders and their supporters interfered in the electoral management processes of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. This situation seriously undermined the possibility of electoral democracy taking root in the DRC. In this study, the perceptions of election stakeholders were analyzed from the pre-election phase, through the election phase and into the post-election phase. In addition, the findings of the study revealed that perceptions of stakeholders on the management of 2011 electoral processes were influenced by mixed levels of trust and satisfaction regarding some election aspects and institutions involved in election management, as well as internal and external factors that affected the performance of the INEC in meeting expectations (integrity, credibility, professionalism and impartiality in managing the 2011 Congolese electoral processes) of citizens and in particular domestic observers and election experts. The perceptions of election stakeholders as suggested in the study does not mean that the management of elections in the DRC is the worst;
but the findings suggest that there is room for improving the management of electoral processes in Africa and particularly in the DRC.
5.11 LIST OF REFERENCES


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[Accessed: 3 April 2013].


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Law No. 11/014 of 17 August 2011, on the allocation of legislative and provincial seats according to registered voters. [Online]. Available at:


Maphunye, K.J. 2013. Colloquium on Electoral Democracy in Africa organized by WIPHOLD-BRIGALIA BAM Research Chair in Electoral Democracy in Africa and the University of South Africa: Pretoria.


Appendix A

DRC geographical and administrative map

Appendix B

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

My name is Tumba Tuseku Dieudonné, currently studying for a Master’s degree in Politics at the Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA). In fulfilment of the requirements of the Master’s degree, each student is required to carry out a research study in any approved topic relating to Political Sciences. Hence, I am undertaking this research as part of these requirements.

My research topic focuses on “STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTIONS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE 2011 ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO”. The information you provide is requested for educational purposes only, will not be used against you in anyway and will be treated confidentially. Therefore, you do not have to give your name or other details that might identify you, should you prefer to remain anonymous.

Statement of consent

I have read the above information. I consent voluntarily to participate in the study.

Participant’s Name:………………………………………………………………………

Participant’s Signature…………………………………………………………………..

Date…………………………………………………………………………………….

I THANK YOU FOR AGREEING TO BE INTERVIEWED.
Appendix C

Schedule interview for key informants

Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed for this research study. The study which is part of my Master’s dissertation research at the University of South Africa (Pretoria), Department of Political Sciences, explores the perceptions of election stakeholders on the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. You may choose not to answer a particular question if you feel uncomfortable, or you may withdraw your consent to participate in this interview at any time, should you prefer to do so.

Section 1: Informants Information

1. Gender:

2. Organizational Affiliation:

Section 2: Perceptions on the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC

1) What can you tell me about the management of the 2011 elections the DRC?
..........................................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................................

2) What factors affected the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC?
..........................................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................................

3) How would describe the capacity (performance) of the INEC in managing the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC?
4) How did you perceive the following aspects related to the 2011 elections management in the DRC?
   - Political context in which the 2011 elections were organized
   - Nomination process of INEC members
   - Recruitment of election officers
   - Competence of presiding and election officers
   - Election logistic related to the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC
   - Voter registration process
   - Civic and voter education
   - Election campaign
   - Counting and tabulation of the vote
   - Election dispute resolution
   - Credibility of the 2011 election outcome

5) Is there anything else you would like to say with regard to the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME
Appendix D

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESPONDENTS

Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed for this research study. The study which is part of my Master’s dissertation research at the University of South Africa (Pretoria), Department of Political Sciences, explores the perceptions of election stakeholders on the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC. You may choose not to answer a particular question if you feel uncomfortable, or you may withdraw your consent to participate in this interview at any time, should you prefer to do so.

Section I: Demographic background of respondents

a) Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

b) Level of Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secondary school</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

c) Membership with Civil Society Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

d) Have you been trained in order to become skilled and knowledgeable in election observation and monitoring?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

e) How many years of experience do you have as Civil Society Organizations role player in the DRC? Please tick the appropriate box

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1-5 years</th>
<th>6-10 years</th>
<th>11-15 years</th>
<th>16-20 years</th>
<th>21- above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Section II: Credibility of the 2011 electoral processes in the DRC

1) Thinking only about the 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections in the DRC, do you believe that the election results accurately reflected the way people voted?

   Yes   ![Yes]  No   ![No]

If no, could you explain your answer?

..................................................................................................................................

2) In your view, did the electoral legal framework ensure the integrity of the 2011 electoral processes?

   Yes   ![Yes]  No   ![No]

If no, could you explain your answer?

..................................................................................................................................

3) Please rate the degree to which you agree with each statement below by ticking the appropriate box

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Congolese 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections were free</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Congolese 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections were fair</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The INEC made decisions that favor some contenders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The INEC performed its duty with independence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section III: Level of satisfaction in certain election aspects

4) Please rate the degree to which you are satisfied with certain election aspects below by ticking the appropriate box

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of satisfaction in election aspects</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat satisfied</th>
<th>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voter registration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on voting procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competency of electoral officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequacy of equipment in voting station</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartiality of electoral officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section IV: Level of trust towards institutions related to election management in the DRC

5) Please rate the extent to which you trust the institutions below by ticking the appropriate box

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of trust towards institutions</th>
<th>Very high</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Neither high nor low</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Very low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INEC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Court</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Council of Audio-visual and Communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section V: Respondents’ views on vote buying, violence related to elections and secrecy of the vote

6) During the 2011 elections did anyone try to buy votes for a certain candidate?

   Yes  No

7) During the 2011 electoral processes did you hear about any violence related to elections?

   Yes  No

8) How likely do you believe that someone could find out how you voted, given the fact that there is supposed to be a secrecy of the vote this country?

   Yes  No

I appreciate the time you took for this interview. Is there anything else you think would be helpful for me to know which might be of importance to my research study?

.............................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................

Thank you again for giving me this opportunity to interview you.

THANK YOU FOR TIME