AN EXAMINATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S APPROACH TO THE MIND- BODY PROBLEM

by

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Declaration

I, Sandra Therese Baker, student number 7903170, hereby declare that:

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is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted from have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.
Acknowledgements

A special thank you to my supervisor, Professor Kruger for his continued help and support, to my husband who introduced me to Wittgenstein’s work and to my children, who discussed Wittgenstein on the way to kindergarten.
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Abstract

This dissertation explores Wittgenstein’s views on the mind-body problem. It is possible to provide an examination of Wittgenstein’s approach by tracing the evolution of the theory of mind and the mind-body problem, by considering the current ways of dealing with the mind-body problem, and Wittgenstein’s critique of the notion of the mind. Wittgenstein’s views on the nature of philosophy and the relationship between philosophy and psychology make it possible to understand and as this dissertation argues – see beyond – the conceptual confusion that has since arisen out of philosophic tradition that perpetuates a ‘myth of the mind’. Schools of thought such as the Cartesians and cognitivists have attempted, through the construction of various elaborate theories, to solve the ‘riddle’ of the mind and to address the so-called ‘mind-body problem’. Cognitive science, in particular, has used the tradition and the myth of the mind as a basis for its research. Wittgenstein shows that such thinking is particularly muddled. By examining Wittgenstein’s approach to the mind-body problem, it is argued here that theories based on the tradition of the ‘myth of the mind’ are inherently flawed. Wittgenstein uses his methods, consisting of his notions of ‘grammar’, ‘language games’ and the rearrangement of concepts, to extrapolate meaning and to see through the conceptual confusions that the use of language causes and that give rise to the mind-body problem.
Chapter one

INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTATION

Chapter One provides the aim of the research, introduction to the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the outline of the dissertation.

1. Aim of the research

The dissertation examines the approach by the philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, to the theory of mind, as it is commonly understood in philosophy and psychology. The notion of ‘mind’ developed over a lengthy period of time in an attempt to explain how humans can know (experience and reflect on) a world which is external to their own bodies. The issue originated in epistemology and the search for valid truth as opposed to opinion. The idea that the world is only explicable in physical terms was not obvious before the ‘modern’ era of science. Plato, for example, considered the problem to be how there can be ‘certain; knowledge or ‘true’ knowledge of an ever changing confusing world. The development of the notion of the mind itself led on to the development of the mind-body problem.

1.1. Introduction to the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein (1889-1951) is arguably one of the most influential thinkers of the 20th century. According to Warnock, “Wittgenstein has exerted an influence more powerful than that of any other individual upon the contemporary practice of philosophy” (Warnock, 1958 p.62).

Two schools of philosophical thought, the analytical and the linguistic, have been attributed to his works. His first work, and the only work to have been published during his lifetime, is the Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus. The Tractatus mainly deals with language and logic and the picture theory of meaning, where language is used as a means to represent reality and to understand the mind. In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein considers the role of language and grammar and how they are used in every day language and how meaning is derived from this usage.

Wittgenstein was initially distanced from psychology. In line with the anti-psychologistic thinking of the time, he states in the Tractatus that psychology has no special
relation to philosophy. However, his lectures on private experience and sense data in the mid-1930s show that Wittgenstein’s interest in psychology remained with him until his death in 1951. In particular, his later works on *Philosophy of Psychology* develop the themes of the interrelationship between language use arising out of social context, human interaction, human nature and behaviour. These themes have important implications for psychology, and particularly the area of cognitive psychology. His work in the *Investigations* on concepts – and in particular on concepts used in psychology – differs from those used by the cognitivists who have adopted a use of concepts based more on developmental and theoretical approach.

It is questionable as to whether Wittgenstein conforms to the traditional idea of a philosopher. He seems to embody many of the traits of a Romantic while formulating questions in a Socratic manner. He was tormented by philosophical problems and seemed to struggle to express himself and articulate his thoughts, writing and rewriting numerous versions of the *Philosophical Investigations*, and was never satisfied with the outcome (Stroll, 2002). Eventually, his executors were left with the task of finalising and publishing it. He wrote prolifically and left behind a vast amount of documents, which have become: *On Certainty*, Nachlass, Zettel, *Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics* and *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I* and *II*, respectively. All of these are currently being researched.

Wittgenstein is of the view that the way that language is used had led to the philosophic tradition of the mind-body problem and the myth of the mind. According to him, it makes no sense to attempt to solve these philosophical and psychological problems in line with traditional methods, such as careful observation and the construction of theories as has been done previously. He considers these as non-sensical pursuits by claiming that this approach does not make sense. Wittgenstein did not deny the existence of mental processes and states, but his later works rejected the approaches of behaviourism, mentalism and cognitivism. He was more of the view that it was necessary for the concepts used to explain mental processes and states to be better described and better arranged. He does this himself by showing that concept meaning arises out of a particular context. He termed it a language game. He referred to the way that mental processes are dealt with differently in psychology to the way that the physicist deals with physical processes. Mental processes are dealt with, based on the dualist notions of body and mind. The relationship between the mental and the behavioural arises as a consequence of this dualism. These notions or concepts of the mental and the mind are likened to physical objects but are considered to be immaterial. Wittgenstein’s contribution to the mind-body debate is firmly underpinned by his notions of
language as a human activity, and the role that language and concepts play in contributing
towards meaning.

Wittgenstein envisaged that the *Investigations* would put an end to philosophical
problems, because these problems come about through an incorrect or an incomplete
understanding of how certain words are used. His point was that meaning ‘grammar’ comes
from how words are used and not from an ‘essence’ hidden inside the words themselves.
Wittgenstein went further to state that the *Investigations* is a grammatical investigation, where
‘grammar’ is used to include the rules that describe the ways that language is used.
Wittgenstein does not use ‘grammar’ to describe formal rules of syntax. He uses ‘grammar’ in
his own way to show how words derive their meaning from the way there are used by a
society of language users. Wittgenstein wanted to show that a clear overview of grammar or
meaning comes about from the philosophical aim of a well-organised, correct description of
grammar or the rules of language use.

Wittgenstein is more concerned about having an overview and a re-arrangement of the
concepts, as opposed to exactness. His concern relates to the idea that the meaning of a word
is constituted by the way in which it is used in language. The way in which words are used or
the grammar is not hidden. The language and the grammar usage do not need to be explained,
description is enough. For Wittgenstein, the aim of philosophy is to describe, and when the
descriptions are properly organised, the philosophical questions that come about such as
“What is a proposition?” will disappear. Considering the ontology of the mind is necessarily
complex. But Wittgenstein would claim that this apparently difficult question implies a
misunderstanding of grammar, possibly because there is an assumed definition for every use
of the word ‘mind’. There is a tendency to think of the mind as a thing, such as a container.

Wittgenstein does what no other philosopher has done before him, and that is to
examine language, down to words themselves and how they are used, in a way that has no
precedent in philosophy. He possibly provides a new insight by rejecting both ‘essentialism’
(words that point to ‘essences’) and nominalism (words are meaningless symbols). He also
provides a new insight by looking at word meanings in terms of how they are used in various
contexts or ‘language games’, by a community of language users in their day-to-day
interactions with the world and with each other. Wittgenstein’s entire critique follows from
this (cf. section 4.2). It is through his attempts that he discovers that it is language which
bewitches the intelligence and that language confuses understanding, rather than providing
clarity. It is the way in which words are used that causes the confusion, such as the misleading
way in which language encourages thinking of the mind, itself, as an object.
Wittgenstein made a unique contribution to philosophy, where he campaigned against making theories which are explanations of how objects are related to one another. If ‘mental objects’ are not what they are said to be (e.g. objects ‘inside’ the mind), making theories to ‘explain’ them is misdirected. His message is to look at things differently, and not to think or explain, but to look and describe. In his writing, Wittgenstein proposes an alternate approach to the theory of mind, and that is to consider how meaning is acquired, and the use of language. He does not explain what a mind is, but he does show that the concept of mind is a social construct, which was developed by philosophers. Since then, the theories surrounding the concept have become increasingly more complex. Wittgenstein is of the view that these theories are essence built on an extremely precarious philosophical house of cards, having a false premise at their base, namely that the construct of the mind is an object.

1.2 Outline of Dissertation

1.2.1 Chapter Two In Chapter Two, I discuss how the notion of mind came about based on how certain philosophers within a specific materialist Enlightenment tradition considered the structure of reality and the nature of valid knowledge (ontology and epistemology). How they developed a dualistic conception, or the ‘inner mind’ knowing an ‘outer reality’. This philosophical tradition and underlying point of view still permeate the guiding models used in psychology, notwithstanding the view that psychology as a science now stands independent of its roots in philosophy.

The notion of the mind can be traced back to the time of the early Greeks, without it being satisfactorily resolved and, if anything, the explanations of it have become increasingly more complicated ever since. It has subsequently gone through many iterations, from being considered as ‘breath’, through to Cartesianism, where the mind is thought to be an indistinct ethereal substance residing somewhere in the head, through to today, where it is still considered as an object of the brain. I will be exploring this argument in more depth in Chapter Two, where the evolution of theory of mind can be traced from the early civilisations including the early Hebrews and the Greeks, through to notable writers of the middle ages, such as Augustine, then to Empiricists such as Descartes, Kant, and to early Romantics such as Schopenhauer.

1.2.2 Chapter Three In Chapter Three, I show the effect that the attempts at resolving the mind-body problem have had on the discipline of psychology. I discuss the assumptions that underpin the various theories that try to explain human experience and behaviour. In particular, those assumptions that are considered are fundamental to cognitive
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psychology, and the theoretical orientation of cognitive neuroscience, as they are those branches of psychology that deal with thinking such as reasoning, perceiving and memory. These branches include dualism, reductionism or eliminativism, and cognitivism, including the cognitive information processing approach. In addition, I will also briefly touch on behaviourism, as some consider Wittgenstein to be a behaviourist. I will briefly mention Wittgenstein’s views regarding these attempts although those will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.

1.2.3 Chapter Four Chapter Four considers a critique of the attempts to resolve the mind-body problem from a Wittgensteinian perspective. Included in the critique is an explanation of Wittgenstein’s method. The focus is mainly on his later works, while keeping in mind that the Tractatus gives an important insight into the context within in which his later work developed. This chapter discusses Wittgenstein’s considerations of his method as a therapy to assist in clearing the conceptual confusion that has beset philosophers for over two thousand years, his notion of language meaning evolving out of everyday use; his consideration of language being a form of life and the implementation of his method, which attacks the notion of a private language that lies at the heart of the dualist notions. Wittgenstein shows that there is no such thing as a private language. Aligned with the notion that there is no private language are his notions concerning the concept of an ‘inner’. He elucidates how these notions have come about through the use of grammar. The use of grammar sets the rules of the language used by a community of language users to determine the meanings of words.

Wittgenstein uses ‘grammar’ in an idiosyncratic way that will be discussed further in Chapter Four. For Wittgenstein, grammar is determined by the way in which the language is used, and this usage may be considered as a form of a language game. It sets the parameters for the way in which words are used. Aligned with the notion is the concept of ‘family resemblances’ helps to identify the words and language games based on their connections, similarities and differences. Wittgenstein attempted to conduct a perspicuous overview or survey of the words and concepts that are used, particularly in psychology. He wanted to try to address the conceptual confusion that has arisen due to words being used in a way that departs from the language game in which they find their home.

1.2.4 Chapter Five Chapter Five examines Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology, with a particular emphasis on the issue of concepts. Wittgenstein’s conception of psychology rejects the conceptual basis on which the mind-body problem was founded and
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which turns it into an unnecessary problem, or a solution in search of a problem. His concerns about psychological concepts deal with the inherent conceptual confusions that reside in it.

In most instances, Wittgenstein is referring to cognitive psychology, although what he says is equally applicable to behaviourism as well. The concepts that abound in psychology are everyday concepts, and the confusion that persists is as a result of positivist notions of meaning that were thought to apply to these concepts. As a result, the meaning of certain psychological concepts was not addressed and was taken for granted. Wittgenstein attempts to address the psychological concepts, particularly as he believes that psychologists would be making a mistake by not addressing them. Wittgenstein attempted a perspicuous representation or survey of the concepts in order to try and arrange them more clearly.

Wittgenstein attempted to solve the mind-body problem by rejecting the notion of it outright, noting that it is an unnecessary construct that has come about through a conceptual confusion. From this perspective, his notion is quite successful; he makes the problem go away.

However, due to the pervasiveness of the Cartesian model, the problem is likely to persist in discourse. Notwithstanding this, Wittgenstein’s influences on psychology and psychological theory are far-reaching and extend into current day cognitive psychology and neuroscience, where an understanding of the meaning of concepts could clear up the conceptual confusion that exists. Concepts are not always used in a clear way. In particular, the notion of ‘embodied enactivism’, one of the more recent developments in cognitive science, is discussed. It fits closely with Wittgenstein’s notion of language and meaning as a form life, where being is derived from social contexts by a particular group of language users.

Wittgenstein’s influence may be seen to extend far beyond the world of psychology into the realms of social constructionism and embodied enactivism.
Chapter Two

THE ORIGIN OF THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

2. The origin of the notion of the mind

The origin of the notion of the mind may be traced back to the writings of the early Hebrews, possibly even the early Egyptians and the early Greeks. They may not have actually coined the term ‘mind’, but they came close to modern day notions of the mind by reflecting on the puzzle of their own sense of awareness. It is through their endeavours that thinking was conceived of as the action of a ‘mind’. Generally speaking, the ‘theory of mind’ is an attempt to explain the way in which people are able to ‘think’; how the mechanism of thought is possible; or how the process of thinking works or is possible, relative to the demands of a materialistic worldview.

2.1 Classical era (from the early scriptures to Augustine)

Wittgenstein uses the word ‘psychology’ to refer to the ‘theory of mind’. He does this because he assumes that psychology is the study of the mind. In order to ascertain Wittgenstein’s views on the mind-body problem, it is helpful to have some idea of how this notion developed, by introducing some historic context. As mentioned in Chapter 1, generally speaking, a theory of mind is a product of a specific tradition of reflection on the problem of knowledge that originated in early times. Currently, the terminology of the theory of mind tends to get broken down into constructs such as ‘consciousness’ and ‘mental acts’. The ancients tried to explain life by using the notion of a life force, which tended to be linked to breath. The notion of mind developed from this concept through to the idea of the ‘soul’ and what it constitutes, and further into the introduction by Augustine of the notion of the mental realm, regarded as a kind of ‘inner space’ (Cary, 2000).

2.1.1 Early Judaic/Hebraic scriptures

Whilst there may not necessarily be a direct link between the Jewish/Hebrew tradition and Greek philosophy, early speculations before the era of formal philosophical reflection suggest that there may be an indirect connection. Barrett (1962) argues in his seminal work on existentialism, titled *Irrational man: a study in existential philosophy*, for Hebraism and Hellenism as influences on contemporary thinking based in the Greek philosophical tradition. Following this argument, this study argues for the
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origins of the notion of mind generated by the confluence of Hebraism and Western thought. This view is supported by the attempts made by the Christian philosophers – including Augustine – to connect the Greek philosophy (especially Plato) to the sources in the Torah or the Old Testament (the Septuagint). The Septuagint is a translation by 72 Jewish scholars of the Jewish scripture (Torah) into Greek done in Hellenistic times, for an audience of Greek speaking Jews. The Christian philosophers wanted to promote the idea of Christianity as a philosophical system akin to that of the Greek school of philosophy. Christians even managed to interpret Christianity in such a way as to incorporate it into the Church, to retroactively make Plato and Aristotle ‘honorary Christians’. In so doing, their philosophical contributions would be deemed to be Christian in nature and this would further support the idea of Christianity being a philosophical system. Notwithstanding this, it does not follow that Greek notions were specifically developments of notions found in early Judaic ideas and scriptures: Greek thought and Judaic thought developed separately but were deliberately merged by early Christians.

Early Judaic/Hebraic Jewish writings dating back to about 5700 years BCE discuss the nepesh when referring to ‘me’ or ‘I’ or ‘instinct’; leb when referring to ‘heart’, ‘bosom’ or ‘morality’; ruach when referring to ‘breathe’ or ‘wind’; and neshamah when referring to ‘intellect’ and ‘awareness of God’, respectively (MacDonald, 2003). The meanings of the words are dependent on the context in which they are used, and the meanings may vary from quite literal to figurative; for example, nepesh can mean ‘wanting to have a drink’, or it can mean ‘one’s own freely chosen desire’ (ibid.). What is quite evident, however, is that these words also refer to the intellect and cognitive abilities of people, and thus reveal an awareness and description of the ‘inner’, which is hidden from others. These words are discussed in more detail as follows.

Nepesh can also indicate a desire for God’s grace when used in a context of a discussion pertaining to the spiritual. According to Westermann, in MacDonald (2003), the human characteristic of nepesh, in its striving for God’s grace, refers to ‘life with a sense of meaning’. This sense of meaning may also be understood to refer to a soul.

In the Septuagint, ruach was translated as pneuma (breath), and when it was later translated around the fourth century, it was also given a Latin translation of spiritus (spirit). It has the literal meaning of wind, but as God is perceived to control the wind, it can mean God’s breath and it can also mean a life force (MacDonald, 2003). Leb tends to refer to the heart or the thoracic cage and is thus seen as the seat of the emotions. The writers of the Old Testament use leb exclusively when talking about humans, whereas nepesh and ruach may be used either
for humans or animals, depending on the context (ibid.2003). *Leb* is considered to be in the chest area, containing the heart and the organs, which have thoughts and memories. *Ruach* is the seat of emotions. Negative emotions are considered bad for the heart, whereas positive emotions, such as thought, memory, understanding, attention and ethics, are to be found in the heart. *Ruach* is also the breath that fills the lungs, and through which the life force is spread throughout the whole body. The heart is seen to be the driving force of life. While the heart is considered the seat of emotions, it is also clear that the Hebrew usage shows that it is where the mental states such as cognition and introspection originate. All of the activities associated with these occur internally in the body. According to Hebraism, the heart is the starting point of sensory operations. The cognitive functions occur before the sensory functions such as “seeing with eyes or hearing with ears”, (MacDonald, 2003, p. 9). The concepts of *ruach* and *leb* are also closely linked to each other. When they are both linked to *nepesh*, the concept of doing something with your heart, mind and soul or being ‘fully immersed’ comes about. The idea of having the intellectual and cognitive functions in the heart may indicate an awareness of things happening inside oneself.

The purpose of explaining these Hebraic terms is not to imply that there was Hebraic a notion of an ‘inner being’, but rather that for the Hebrews, the heart was the part of the body, which ‘thought’, and that this is what is today inherited in the terminology used for the ‘mind’. Interestingly, the early Egyptians also believed that the heart was where the thought and the ‘soul’ of the person resided. It was the one organ to remain in the body during the embalming process. According to Egyptian mythology, the heart was weighed against a feather, and if it weighed the same or less than the feather, the person could go into the ‘afterlife’. If it weighed more than a feather it would be given to a crocodile to be eaten. The implication is that the early Egyptians, the heart/thought had a moral aspect.

2.1.2 Greek philosophy in the classical era The early Greeks considered a person without a psyche not to be alive. When someone faints, the psyche was perceived to leave the body, and it is thought that it returned at some stage, when the fainting spell was over. It is not known where the psyche resided in the body. In the Iliad, the psyche flies away from the limbs or leaves the body through the mouth, the chest or through a wound in the flank (Homer, cited in Parry, 1971). Homer considers the psyche to be a human life force. Homer was a storyteller, who lived sometime between 1200 BC and 850 BCE. He makes no attempt to

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1 There is some controversy whether there was an individual named ‘Homer’ and if there was, when he lived. There are disagreements about whether the same individual wrote both the Iliad and the Odyssey (which were recordings of oral history). But someone obviously wrote it down and so ‘Homer’ must have existed in some form or another. Herodotus, the Greek historian claimed that Homer lived 400 years before he, Herodotus did, that is about 850 BCE and other writers claim that he lived closer to the time of the fabled Trojan War which may or may not in itself be a myth (Parry, 1971).
explain the stories he conveys in the Iliad. The meanings are to be inferred from the way he
tells the stories, for example, he did not seem to have a word for ‘body’. He used the Greek
word ‘soma’, only for a corpse, and he used the concept of the psyche or life force in the Iliad
and the Odyssey. According to Homer, when a person dies, his psyche leaves, never to return,
and it goes to Hades or the underworld (the place where the souls of the dead go). It becomes a
sort of a shadow or an echo of what it used to be.

Along with the use of the term psyche, Homer also uses thymos, nous, and menos
(MacDonald, 2003). Thymos tends to be linked to hope, and principally, to emotions. It may
also be used in a similar way to the Hebrew nepesh, to indicate longing, and may be used to
mean something similar to leb when thinking things over, as ‘thought’ was believed to reside
in the chest. Nous, a term used by Homer, is the closest classical Greek term for the ‘mind’,
and it may be understood as “the mind or an act of the mind, a thought or a purpose”,
(Bremmer, 1983, p. 60).

The nous was also thought to reside in the chest. However, Homer may have used it to
refer to the ability to form visual images, as Snell (as cited in Macdonald, 2003) has suggested
in response to Bremmer’s comment mentioned above. The idea of an accompanying mental
act is linked to the ability see, as the verb idein is often linked to the verb noein. The visual act
of seeing does not just refer to looking, but also to perceiving or understanding what is being
seen.

Homer also uses the term menos, which may be translated as life force. Menos is not a
bodily organ, nor is it physical. When menos is translated as life force, it shows a unification
of “all physical, psychical and life uses of the words”, Claus (1981, p. 26). A dualism is
created where the soul becomes understood as being a separate entity from the body.

Socrates (470 BC–399 BCE) was a classical Greek philosopher. The classical era is
around 480 to 320 BCE. Most of what is known is known about Socrates is based on the
writings of Plato (also a Greek philosopher and a pupil of Socrates, who lived between
428/427 BCE and 348/347 BCE. Socrates was a teacher who asked uncomfortable and
awkward philosophical questions and in so doing undermined people’s conceptions. Although
he is highly influential on subsequent Western thought, he did not commit his thoughts and/or
teachings to writing.

Plato, however, claimed that his own thought was preceded by that of Socrates, and
used Socrates as a character in his writings. Scholars seem to believe that Plato’s complex
metaphysics, viz. the system where the soul is an immortal element that shares in the
transcendent order of knowledge, is more Plato’s own conception than that of Socrates.
Plato states that Socrates proposed the core property of the soul to be the intellect (nous), where the body is the prison house of the soul. Socrates adds an intellectual aspect to the soul by claiming that it is the soul which practices philosophy and seeks wisdom. Socrates believed that the mind had the ability to think about the particular and the general at the same time. If, for example, someone thought about a beautiful vase, it would generate thought about the particular vase in question, as well as the universal concept of beauty. Socrates reasoned that it was the definition or the permanent value of a thing that constitutes the idea of beauty. Socrates was of the view that the process of definition was the process of determining clear and firm ideas. You need to already know the ‘form’ of beauty to be able to recognise it when you encounter it. He considered the act of knowing as an internal function. He situates thought inside the body and describes the activity of thought by using the soul or psyche, which can be thought of as a capacity for thought, as opposed to being a particular faculty or substance.

With its capacity for intelligence and character, the soul could be considered as a person’s “conscious personality” (Stumpf, 1982, p. 36). Socrates considered the main purpose of the soul to be to assist in day-to-day activities. He saw the maintenance of the soul as important so that it could be morally good. Socrates was condemned to death by the Athenian Tribunal for treason and for being disrespectful to the gods. He was seen to be corrupting the youth by making them question things. Plato wrote, in *Phaedo*, about Socrates’ time in prison shortly before his death. Socrates talked to his friends about death, and talked about the body and soul being divided, into two separate things that can be separated when the body dies, and the soul lives on.

Initially, the early Greek philosophers believed that psyche, a word meaning ‘life force’ did not have much to do with thinking. The concept of a metaphorical ‘inner’ was foreign to them. They did not think that thinking occurred inside oneself or that there even was an inner-self. For the early Greek philosophers, the world consisted of impermanent phenomena (immanent) and eternal structures, such as forms or ideas (transcendent).

Plato believed that impermanent phenomena were an illusion, but that the transcendent was real. The transcendental could only be revealed through reflection, a manner of remembering of the soul before it was born. But, by the time of Plato, the thinking aspect had become very central to the soul (psyche), dominating the life (animal) and emotional (wilful) parts. The thinking aspect being central to the soul led to the notion of the soul producing the reason or logos. The notion of a soul (psyche) included the feelings, of willing and reasoning. In his *Timaeus Dialogue*, Plato believed that it was necessary for a rational soul to try to live a life in harmony with the universe. In so doing, it would restore the soul to its original state,
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which it lost at the time of the birth of its human body, to ‘live’ in a restored state for eternity (Zeyl, 2009).

Plato considered that the soul had a previous existence before it took on human shape. After death, the invisible soul departs. Plato perhaps considered this to be a metaphor for the soul traversing to the transcendent world of perfect ideality. The soul is immortal and does not die with the body. The soul is eternal and joins the ultimate (possibly divine) order of transcendent reality only to be reborn. Plato writes that it is those humans, whose souls are pure and who have practiced philosophy, who are rewarded with happiness, amongst other things, such as release from human forms of evil. Plato embedded his ideas into Greek myth, making them widespread, though his theology is at times unclear. Religion was a dangerous subject to be explicit about at that time, and Socrates was executed for dishonouring the gods and leading young people astray.

Plato developed the notion of the three-part soul in Phaedrus, where he presented the archetype of the human being as chariot and driver with two horses - one noble, one base. The three parts of the soul are reason, emotion and life force. There is the rational aspect (seat of reason, in the head), an emotional aspect (seat of passion, in the chest), and a heart or animal aspect (seat of the appetite – i.e. food and sex – under the diaphragm). The role of reason is to control the other two aspects in the same way that the charioteer steers the horses.

The driver of the chariot is the one who thinks and reasons and tries to provide direction and control over two conflicting ‘engines’; the horses, namely the spirit, which is initially neutral, but later responds to reason; and appetite, which is the desire for sensual things for the body. The body, like a chariot, is considered to be inanimate without the soul. The charioteer guides the horse. In a similar way, reason guides the spirit or the emotions and the needs.

Without balance between the three aspects, control is lost. Plato was of the view that moral evil results from a lack of balance and is an outcome of ignorance. The three-part concept of the soul is similar to Freud’s notion of the ego, which is in charge of the superego and the id. Reason is in charge of emotion and the life force (or should be: this an ethical point). Reason and intellect are seen to be the controlling or overriding factors in the tension between the desire for wisdom/knowledge, and hence, purity and the more basic needs. Plato was of the view that reason exists before the person and after the person.

Aristotle, who lived between 384 and 322 BCE, was Plato’s pupil. He eventually broke away from Plato, and tried to turn Plato’s metaphysics into a more integrated system.
Aristotle tended to be less metaphysically minded, and more empirical than Plato. Aristotle was heavily influenced by Plato and based his work on Plato’s concept of forms.

In the *De Anima*, Aristotle developed a ‘unified theory of things’ where he explained the nature of all things, whether inanimate or animate. He did this by using “conceptual templates: substance and attribute, matter and form, and explanatory factors” (MacDonald, 2003, p. 55). In Aristotle’s ‘Theory of Forms’, he puts forward the view that the world is composed of forms and matter, in the form of a sort of neutral material. ‘Forms’, as used by Aristotle, can be understood as ideas, where form is the English translation of the Greek word, *eidos*, or ideas. The ideas may be considered as the principles, which shape and determine the essence of a thing. Aristotle developed the concept of formal logic and the idea of separated sciences. He considered that language uses logic to try to understand science. There is a link between formal logic and forms of thinking.

Aristotle differentiated between matter and form. Matter is the material out of which all things are made. When forms are applied to matter, they give the matter its identity; they help make it appear as it is, in other words, forms make matter manifest. The form ‘essence-of-gold’ manifests as gold. Gold-essence is not gold, but the material stuff. Gold, is what exists when this essence becomes manifest in matter. Only the integrated manifestation can be said to exist. Gold, in itself, is not matter. It is only when some universal forms are added to the form ‘essence of gold’ that it reveals itself to be gold. When the form for circles is added to the essence of gold, it becomes a gold ring. Aristotle used this argument of ‘integrated manifestation’ to argue against Plato’s dualism.

A more complex structure comes about when matter and form unite and combine. Included in Aristotle’s ‘unified theory of things’ is the notion that the human soul, like everything else, may be explained in terms of a composition of matter and form and explanatory factors. Accordingly, all things consist of matter, and are made manifest their forms and these things that can be built or destroyed. However, some forms do not manifest as matter or in the form of objects. They exist as ideas, and can only be understood by reason or intellect (*nous*), and these things are called intelligible matter. Reason contains pure categories of understanding, which, when an act of perception is performed and applied to the object, the form of the object is then perceived. The perception of the object makes the essence of the object available to reason in the form of the Aristotelian logic of syllogisms. Matter that can be touched or perceived can be changed, but intelligible matter comprises that which is neither touchable nor changeable. In the second book of *De Anima*, Aristotle shows the difference between the soul and the body. The soul is located with living things. The form of a human is
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A (rational) soul. The soul is that essential form, which distinguishes humans from animals. Here it is interpreted as the ability to reason, where the soul’s substance takes its form as a human body, with the potential for life.

Aristotle makes use of Plato’s concept of the ‘passion soul’ which distinguishes animals from plants, and the life-soul distinguishes plants from dead matter. The body cannot exist without the soul. The body and soul are not two separate things, but are matter and soul combined into a unified entity. For Aristotle, the soul cannot exist without the body. It would be like having vision without an eye. According to Aristotle, the soul is the most important form that identifies us as human. It is not the same as the body, which belongs to the order of matter. Aristotle determined a hierarchy of being, from ‘dead’ earth-like matter to higher levels, such as plants, or even higher ones, such as animals, and finally humans. These different levels are manifestations of higher forming principles. The soul is the necessary form that when added to a living body makes it human.

The soul is closely identified with reason, and people are able to manifest as beings, that are able to reason and to apply reason. The essence of man is a reasoning being: the term ‘Homo Sapiens’ originates from this etymology. For Aristotle, ethics is tied to his notion of soul. A moral life is when people are true to their essence, where morality is linked to reason. As the form of the human is the soul, one way to attempt to be good is by making manifest the application of reason. One way of making reason or logos manifest can or should be through speech. As speech comes from the chest or lungs, according to Aristotle, this is where he also situated the soul.

Aristotle has no associated organ for thought or the soul, but he seems to think that every thought is somehow linked to impressions people get from their senses. When the body ceases to exist, the soul ceases to exist. This differs from Plato, who was of the view that the soul is immortal.

Confusingly, Aristotle also seems to say that the nous or the intellect or mind is the part of people that is most likely to survive death. According to Aristotle, humans have the capacity for higher order thinking, such as reflection and insight, or what is today called nous, and this is what sets people apart from animals. Aristotle further states that there is nothing that the mind is incapable of thinking. Thought is considered not as an actuality, but as a potentiality, in much the same way that gold exists but gold-essence has the potential to be gold when it actualises in matter. Stumpf explains Aristotle’s notions, “the knowing function exists only as a potential function, where somehow through the activity of thinking, it gets used” (Stumpf, 1982, p.96). Aristotle refers to the ‘unmoved mover’ as the soul (nous) of the
world. It is the originating source of the entire world that follows. If people knew truth fully, in its pure form, they would have the ultimate mind; but the unmoved mover is not a mind per se. It is rather the transcendent *logos*, namely all the truth about the world combined.

In the *De Anima*, Aristotle refers to the ‘active intellect’ as a way of saying that *nous* continually functions. The active intellect is eternal and separate to man, and as a result, possesses no potentiality, similarly to the ‘unmoved mover’. The unmoved mover, the active intellect and the collective *nous* of the world are made up by the systems of forms. A possible interpretation of what Aristotle means is that the soul (psyche) uses the world mind (**nous**) to think, and that when people die, the part of knowledge that they have in their soul that is part of the world knowledge or **nous** lives on, but that their soul being combined with their bodies means that it dies. This lack of clarity seems to be a bit unconvincing, even though it seems to be more sophisticated than the explanation provided by Plato.

### 2.1.3 Augustine

Augustine of Hippo lived between 354 AD and 430 AD. According to Cary (2000), he developed the notion of ‘interiority’ in a way that would lead to the modern view of consciousness as the mind viewed through introspection or the conception of the mind as a kind of ‘inner space’, which is somewhere in the body or the head.

Augustine studied the classical Greek writings on the notion of the soul by Plato and Plotinus, while simultaneously wrestling with his own issues of faith. He tried to combine the writings of the classical Greeks with orthodox Christian views of soul and God. His attempts resulted in a concept of the soul as being an ‘inwardness’ that is related to the spiritual presence of God or of the divine presence. Augustine, in reading the works of the early Greek Philosophers such as Plotinus and Plato, sometimes confused the Plotinus’ neo-Platonism and its mystical elements with Plato’s philosophy. This confusion resulted in him giving a particular interpretation to the works that make it unlikely that the early Greek Philosophers would recognise themselves in it. Augustine’s particular interpretation is responsible for the Western sense of spiritual inwardness and the notion of a private inner space.

Basing his thought on Plato, Augustine viewed the body as a prison of the soul. He moved away from Platonic theory when he talked about the soul acquiring knowledge. Knowledge is formulated as an act of the soul. Augustine considered the soul to be spiritual, and not material, where the mind makes its own images out of its own substance when people see something, where, at the same time as seeing something, people also make judgements about it.

When Augustine considered that in order to make judgements about something, there must be a standard in mind that is apart from the visual sense that people have, he
reformulated Plato’s notion of forms (ideas). Physical, visual and auditory sensations provide knowledge. Judgements about what people perceive with their senses, must, according to Augustine, mean that they are thinking about other things involving “eternal and necessary truths” (Stumpf, 1982, p.135). The mind can ‘see’ these truths by means of God’s light or illumination. God’s light provides the means for people to make these judgements. Similarly, when Augustine considered how his ‘finite’ mind could know eternal and necessary truths, he concluded that it must be because of God and that God must somehow be inside people.

Augustine conceived of thinking as viewing an inner space. If the inner space is seen to be private, where people have their private thoughts, and is essentially a sort of mini-screening where they watch their lives unfold, then there may be doubt as to whether the ‘outer’ world exists or not. However, Augustine’s concept of the soul considers it as a sacred place where people may be able ‘see’ their thoughts.

The conceptualisation by Augustine of the concept of the ability to turn inward and to contemplate what the soul does, is quite a move away from the concept of the soul as mentioned above from Hebraic times and from the classical Greek era. Augustine comments on Plato in an attempt to reconcile Plato’s views with the new religion of Christianity. By attempting this reconciliation, Augustine moves away from Plato on the issue of inner-outer duality, as Plato does not mention this aspect. Augustine makes Christianity Platonic.

Early Christianity set out to deliberately put itself forward as a philosophic school. In the New Testament, Paul used the word 'psyche' in a similar way to the Greek usage, as an indication of a 'life force', and he preferred to use *pneuma* when referring to the sacred element (possibly indicating the presence of the divine). Augustine later picked up on this motion, and it was possibly used to further promote the idea of Christianity as a philosophic school.

Augustine considers that the soul does not literally have a size nor is it tangible but it is large in other areas. He considers that because memory contains so many ‘things’ it is ‘infinite’; it is an enormous inner space. Augustine writes of the need to go ‘inside’ oneself, where people are too focused on physicality and material things, and, as a result, they are out of touch with themselves. So, to be able to get closer to God, people need to get closer to themselves, to go inside themselves, to be able to see the Holy Spirit. They need to look and see with an inner eye. Augustine is also of the view that souls are finite, but because people have God in their souls, who is bigger than their souls, what they see in the ‘inner’ is more than the physical world. Cary (2000) cites Augustine thus:
The same ‘space’ becomes the inner world of memory {…}, a place where God can be both hidden and present, sought and found within the human self (p.125).

This conception of the soul ascribes it the characteristic of being somehow inside people, and through reflection, it is ‘visible’ is a result of Augustine’s construction. It provides for a literal ‘intro-spection’. It is seemingly able to see its own thoughts. Augustine created a foundation for a move away from the inner as a soul and a move towards the inner as a concept of the self. This move or shift forms the foundation for the follow-up thoughts on where the inner self is understood by later philosophers as the mind itself.

2.2 Descartes

René Descartes lived from 1596 to 1650. He went to a Jesuit school as a boy. In his youth he seemed to have been some kind of gentleman soldier who served as a mercenary on the side of the (Protestant) Dutch states against the (Catholic) Spanish, while carefully avoiding any actual combat. After having had a mystical dream, he began to develop his philosophy. He also famously invented analytic geometry and the Cartesian coordinate system. Because Descartes turned from basing knowledge on accepted authority towards basing it on one’s rational faculties, he is often called the founder of modern philosophy (Kolak, 1994, p.39).

Descartes is probably the person who has contributed the most to how the mind is currently viewed. In his Meditations on the First Philosophy, (1641) he radically criticised all previous philosophy and science. Descartes provides a commentary on Augustine, as well as attempts to reconcile Christianity with materialism. Like Augustine, Descartes also uses the Latin word anima for the Greek word psyche. The essence of the soul (anima) is pure thought, which is distinct from matter. Descartes rejects the idea of the anima as being a life force; an animal is a machine, explicable in physical terms, without needing to use the notion of a life force. In contrast to the ancient Greeks, he believes that living is a mechanical function and that the psyche or anima is not responsible for life.

Descartes considered that people’s minds have the powers of intuition and deduction, and if, not used properly, would lead people astray (Descartes, as cited in Lagarde & Michard, 1970, pp. 86 -88). So, he developed a method of thinking to deal with this comprising of rules, to guide these powers so that the mind can work properly. Descartes’ based his model of thinking on the notion of thinking coming about through the act of reflection, and hence, being able to see an inner vision. Descartes saw the main activity of the anima or soul as that of
knowing and reasoning. It has the ability to reason or to know and has the ability to understand and be aware.

For Descartes, the soul refers to the ability to think or reason, which can then be evidenced through inner reflection. This activity serves to de-link the thinking substance from the boundaries of the physical existence, which somehow allows the soul to link to the transcendent, eternal truth, and in so doing, reveal the eternal truth of God. Descartes explicitly stated in *Meditations on the First Philosophy* that his main purpose was to try to prove that God exists and that the soul is immortal. As a young man and Catholic soldier who fought the Protestants it is likely that he feared excommunication from the Catholic Church and tried to show that he believed in God. While he was writing his first book, Galileo was arrested, and Aristotle’s system was re-confirmed as sacred doctrine of the Church. As a result, Descartes suppressed the book, and it was only published posthumously.

Descartes’ use of the word *anima* varies from previous usage of the word, and he uses it interchangeably to mean mind or soul, respectively. It is not clear as to whether Descartes fully understood the implications of this different usage. Later in the English-speaking world, philosophy tended to use the ‘mind’ meaning of the word ‘anima’ rather than the ‘soul’ meaning.

According to Descartes, the soul is quite different to the body, with its purpose being to think. The mind and the body are seen to be two distinct substances. Descartes considers the soul to be substance-based, and this creates a critical distinction between the notion of the soul and the mind. As the soul does not grow, nor move, it is considered to be non-material. According to Descartes, humans have a soul, which controls the will and animals only have bodies, with automatic activities or reflexes. Descartes did some cruel experiments on animals in an attempt to prove this (Lagarde & Michard, 1970, p. 86). According to Descartes, the mind controls the body through the pineal gland (a small gland found in the brain, near the vertebrae). Descartes links the brain and the soul (mind) through the pituitary gland. It is not clear how this works. He thought that the brain worked through a system of hydraulics, where the spinal fluid flowing in the brain makes it work, similar to the way in which a musical fountain works. Interestingly, Leonardo Da Vinci thought the brain worked like that as well.

Descartes thinks that the awareness that people ‘see’ comes about due to something happening in the soul. In a similar way to Homer, Descartes considers that it is the soul that sees by way of the brain. Knowing that people can see because of the soul is what is important, rather than the physical ability to see. Homer, mentioned earlier in 2.1.2, considers the act of seeing as a physical act, accompanied by the mental act of knowing.
As mentioned above, Descartes considers the human soul as able to give humans the ability to think. The purpose of the soul, according to Descartes, is not to make people alive or show that they are living, but rather to make them think and reflect. In essence, he considers humans to be machines with a soul, that is, humans that think. Descartes is trying to show that the new (materialist) science can accommodate God, soul and eternal life and that the Church is wrong to fear the implications.

Using Plato’s ‘Theory of Forms’ or ‘ideas’ (where knowledge is represented as ideas) and incorporating Augustine’s concept of an ‘inner space’, Descartes states that it is through thinking that people know that they are alive. Descartes arrived at his conclusions by using doubt as a contrast to certainty. Descartes looked for certain knowledge as he considered certain knowledge to be everlasting. His conception of dualism and non-materialism flow from this.

All Descartes could be certain of is that his awareness of his doubt shows that he must exist. Descartes seemed to think that the level of certainty is a measure of a degree of reality. By using doubt, he questioned whether or not he is awake. The more certain he was of something, the less doubt he had, and vice-versa. By using this as his basis, he questioned (employs doubt) as to whether he existed or not. He built up his argument by asking whether or not he was awake.

This lead him to state that it could be that all his knowledge and everything around him were mere figments of a dream, or that they could be produced by some other part of his mind, or that he could have been deluded by his senses. He reduced his level of doubt by arguing that he had previously certain knowledge of something that he could not have obtained whilst dreaming, and thus, he is not sleeping.

In order to determine whether or not he was indeed being deceived by his own senses, Descartes convinced himself that there is nothing in the world and that if there is nothing in the world, he questions whether he, himself exists.

Descartes demonstrated his existence by thinking and knowing that he can think. It was by being able to doubt his senses or the sensations that he feels, caused by factors external to him, that he knows that he exists because he thinks. Descartes concluded that there is a difference between the mind and the body.

According to Descartes, people perceive their bodies only through the intellect and not through their senses or imagination. He considered perception to be an event in the soul, or the physical process of perception analysed by process (much like analytic geometry), which somehow brings awareness of the perceptual object to the soul. It is through this argument that
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Descartes tried to show that people’s knowledge of their minds is more immediate than that of their bodies. Such thinking is a precursor to the thought of Kant and to idealism.

Descartes does try to maintain that the anima is intangible, and that it is not part of the physical world, and that it could be immortal. He does this by proving that the external world exists, the world other than that of the “I exist because I am a thinking being”, or of an inner reality. He states that various ideas or sensations come to him that do not arise from his will, for example, when he senses heat, irrespective of whether he wants it to be hot or not. That this happens means that something other than him caused those sensations. Therefore, there exists another world external to his, an outer world. Descartes determines that God caused the external world, which is made up of a material/corporeal substance or some other substance. He argues (Descartes, as cited in Lagarde & Michard, 1970, p. 86) that God would not create a world of illusion or ideas, as God is a benevolent god, but God gave him the ability to believe that corporeal or material things form ideas, and therefore, that corporeal or material things exist.

It could be argued that by trying to prove the existence of the material world, Descartes serves to confirm the presence of God. Descartes tries to show that people who are aware are able to access eternal truths. Their minds are able to investigate more than the physical aspects of being alive. In so doing, the mind is connected to the transcendent realm of universal truth. Descartes tried to convince people that there is an implied immortality inherent in this connection, and that the idea of God, who is infinite, can only exist by revealing itself. God must therefore exist. He seems to be using the Aristotelian tradition, where using a word means applying a concept within a universal form, where the form makes meaning manifest. However, today it is accepted that a word is just a word, and it is doubtful as to whether Descartes’ argument in this regard is convincing.

2.3 Idealism

A new philosophical notion of the ‘mind’ was developed, possibly in reaction to Cartesian Dualism. It brought a different account to the mind-body problem, which was based on the premise that there is only awareness and physical reality. The Idealist account of the mind-body problem side steps the issue of the physical and considers a person’s ‘own mind’ to be everything. It is a form of monism in that the body and all that is physical, or all, which, according to Kant, extends in time and space, are perceivable through the mind alone.

George Berkeley (1685-1753) was an Irishman, who later became the Bishop of Cloyne. Berkeley argued against the idea that things exist, particularly the idea of materials. He may be
considered as one of the founders of idealism. According to Berkeley, if something is being watched, it exists. Whatever is seen or experienced is just “a collection of ideas in your mind and in other people’s minds (and perhaps in God’s mind)” (Warburton, 2011 p. 87). Berkeley found the idea of an external world, as opposed to an inner world, nonsensical. Given the example, cited in Warburton, of kicking a hard stone, Berkeley’s view is that it is only the idea of a hard stone being kicked that produces the sensation of the resultant pain. The idea of a hard stone comes about only in and of the sensations that it evokes in the mind. Berkeley wrote that the hard stone does not actually exist. His view does not really account for how the notion of kicking a hard stone would produce pain, if it had not actually been done before. For Berkeley, however, the only reality is that of the mind and of ideas. Hence, he is known as an ‘idealist’.

According to Warburton, Berkeley is also known as an ‘immaterialist’, because of his rejection of the idea that physical or material things exist. The rhetorical question “if a tree falls in a forest and there is nobody there to hear it or see it, does it make a sound?” would seem to encapsulate Berkeley’s thinking. Berkeley was of the view that if nobody hears or sees a tree fall, then the tree cannot be said to exist. Nobody would have the idea of the tree. Berkeley claims that people perceive the world directly, because the world is made up of ideas and ideas exist in people’s minds. Experience is everything, and it is located in the mind. Berkeley believes that everything exists in the mind. He summed this up by saying, “to be or to exist is to be perceived – ‘Esse est percipi’” (Berkeley, as cited in Warburton, 2011). It is necessary for there to be an idea of someone for that person to exist. This view would also lead to some absurd situations where things would stop existing as soon as somebody stopped thinking about them, and then exist again when somebody thought about them again.

Given his religious background, Berkeley’s answer to this potential absurdity is to say that as God always perceives things, things ‘continue to exist’. Berkeley’s explanation for being able to tell the difference between real objects and optical illusions is that people’s ideas of how things should be will reveal the correct answer. An example, would be that when people see themselves reflected in a mirror, they know that they are not in the mirror, because they have the idea of themselves standing in front of the mirror. This idea contradicts the idea of them ‘being in’ the mirror at all. They can touch themselves and touch the mirror, and when they feel themselves, they feel flesh, as opposed to the smooth surface of the mirror.

Berkeley’s idealism is known as ‘subjective idealism’ because it is generated from a subjective perspective. Descartes, in contrast to Berkeley, also questioned whether the world was an illusion. He invoked doubt in order to help clarify his understanding, and concluded
that God was benevolent, and would not play such a trick on people. Similar to Kant, Berkeley is of the view that people have no knowledge that things exist, where all things are ‘things-in-themselves’. It is only through reason that things may exist. There are arguments against this which Berkeley, being a bishop, hoped that by using the notion of God, he would be able to argue. One of the arguments is that people cannot know for certain what the true nature of the self is, and because of this, it makes no sense to speak of it. Such a view would make the science of psychology quite limited, but is somewhat reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s famous conclusion in the *Tractatus* (1921) where he says, “We must remain silent on that which we cannot speak”.

2.4 Kant
Another philosopher who greatly influenced current thinking on the mind-body problem and who is instrumental in developing the way in which the problem is now viewed, is Immanuel Kant. He lived from 1724 to 1804, in Konigsberg, now Kaliningrad. Kant tried to reconcile the conflicting views of Continental rationalism as forwarded by Leibniz, with British Empiricism, as forwarded by Hume.

Kant may be seen as someone who tries to bridge the gap between the account of idealism and the Cartesian dualistic account of the mind-body problem. Kant’s view is that the ‘real’ world is unknowable, as it is beyond human abilities to grasp it or understand it. Kant’s idealism arises partly as a response to Hume. Hume’s empiricist view is that all knowledge comes to people through their senses and that because of this, they can never really be sure of anything, (Solomon, 2004, p. 67). His idealism is also partly in response to his desire to rework Leibniz, who had a profound influence upon him. Kant proposes that people’s experience determines or constrains the way in which they perceive things that are ‘outside of them’. According to Hume, sense impressions transmit knowledge, which the mind connects using associative principles. People know a world of their own making, which they will never be able to confirm. They cannot change that, they must just accept it.

Kant tries to reconcile the two views of the mind: as ‘inner vision’ and logical processes (as per the idealists) and a world as wholly constructed from sense-impressions (empiricists). He wrote his main body of work in *The Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781. He followed this with the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and the *Critique of Judgement* (1790). It is in the *Critique of Reason* that he addresses the issue of the philosophy of mind, and the way in which reason functions. The explanation of how the mind works and how reality is known is accounted for in terms of a constructed version of it, or the ‘phenomenal’
world. By means of this argument, only a few things about the ultimate nature of reality, the
‘noumenal’ world or the ‘thing-in-itself’, can be known. They can only be known by indirectly
applying knowledge.

Kant agrees with empiricists such as Locke and Hume that people use their senses to
gather information about things, that is to say, that knowledge arises out of sense impressions.
Experience or information coming from the senses requires reason in order to be applied
through a synthesising activity to convert such experience into true knowledge. Knowledge of
the laws of nature is true knowledge. Kant calls this knowledge ‘synthetic a priori’ judgement.
This synthesising activity cannot be understood through introspection. It is not apparent to the
person who is thinking. Here Kant differs from Descartes. This synthesising activity is done
by analysing the conditions which must be true, to enable humans to make judgements. It is in
the synthesising activity of the mind that categories of logic are applied to sense impressio ns.
This process forms concepts which allow the universal truths about reality (thinking or
discovering the laws of nature) to be expressed. Imagination is important in this process. The
concept comes about as a sort of image, which is buried in schemas or certain logical rules.

Kant’s argument of the transcendent (the transcendent being the true reality that is
hidden behind appearances) is based on the thinking subject, who is able to form concepts.
The thinking subject is a logical requirement for his theory of mind to work. Judgements must
be formed on the basis of logic, that is to say they must be deduced. There is a distinction
between ‘transcendent’ and ‘transcendental’. Kant uses ‘transcendental’ to indicate his logic.
‘Transcendent’ is ‘what lies beyond’ or the ‘true’ reality hidden behind appearances (in Plato’s
sense). Transcendental reasoning refers to things that can never be known (because for Kant,
the ‘thing-in-itself is unknowable) but some truths about it can be deduced through a process
of logic. So transcendental reasoning is to apply logic to reveal things that must be true (by
logic) but cannot be known by direct apprehension.

Kant’s view is that the information from the senses is complex or diverse, in German, 
*Mannigfalt*,. This view stands in contrast to the empiricists, who see information as a
disjointed series of impressions. Awareness of this information from the senses comes about
through *Anschauungen* or intuitions. It is not a crude awareness. Rather it is an awareness that
is shaped by the form-giving universal categories of space (making it possible to imagine an
objective order which extends into space) and time (making it possible to imagine oneself as
separate to the ‘objective’ world but having an awareness of the world).

It is the activity of *Verstand*, which can be translated from the German as ‘mind’ or
*nous*, as used by Aristotle, which allows for the ability to reason or *Vernunft* to form
representations. The interaction between a complex diversity of information from the senses and the structuring activity of mind results in knowledge. It is through the application of ‘categories’ or logical forms to sense information that structuring comes to the mind. In this way, the information is adjusted into judgements or Urteilen, by means of which concepts arise.

Kant uses the term Begriff, which suggests a sort of ‘grasping’ action by the mind, to refer to concepts. It is through this grasping action of the mind that information is transformed into concepts. He also agreed with the rationalists such as Descartes and Leibniz that this information is turned into understanding through the structure of reason or the way that it is sorted by reason. Kant’s theory implies that it is only through the structuring activity of the mind that a thinking person can access reality. His theory implies a certain unity of the self. What he means by this is that knowledge is comprised of imagination, sensation, memory and perception or intuitive synthesis. When something is sensed, its characteristics are noted, and give it shape (a form in space and time and cause and effect). All of this must happen in one place, otherwise there could be no knowledge. The various operations of the mind need to be unified in order to have experience. The unified operations of mind is what Kant means when referring to the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’.

Kant argued that a person does not experience the ‘self’ directly, even though they do experience it in some sense. Because a person is able to unify all the parts of experience, they are aware of their own unity. Their own self-awareness or consciousness comes about at the same time as their awareness of a unified world of experience. People can only consider themselves, in the same way, that they can consider other things. They are unaware of those things being different from the perspective from which they see them. They are also not aware of this ‘transcendental unity of apperception’. All they have is the unity of experience and from this they know that they have a unified self.

A person is able to conceive of the world of phenomena as they are able to conceptualise it. However, they will never be able to understand the intrinsic nature of ‘pure’ reality (the ‘thing-in-itself’ or Ding-an-Sich). The true nature of a person’s own psyche lies beyond possible knowledge, and as a result, the true nature of the soul is also beyond a person’s own ambit. It is not possible to discover the soul through the application of natural science, but only through logical deduction.

‘Things-in-themselves’ are those things about which a person has no experience or knowledge. However, because of a person’s ability to reason, it is possible to conceive that
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such things exist. An apt example of this may be black holes. It is conceivable that black holes exist, although there is no direct proof that they do. In a way, it is almost as if a person lives in two worlds. The world they live in and that is known to them, and a world about which they have no knowledge, and is therefore unknown to them.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that there ought to be a kind of mental ‘viewing’ or Anschauung of what is essential to an object when forming a judgement. Kant’s use of the term Anschauung is the process where the mind turns complex arrangements of sense impressions into concepts or Begriff, by finding the general aspect of a particular object or by using what Aristotle refers to as the form.

Thus, if there is no concept of something or that something cannot be intuited, then there can be no knowledge of that thing. Hence, there can be no positive knowledge of the mind, and there cannot be a Cartesian idea of a ‘privileged’ self-knowledge. Kant considers that there is no proper concept of the self as such, nor is it possible to intuit a ‘phenomenal’ nor ‘noumenal’ self. Pure reality is similarly unknowable.

Kant places the nature of the soul in the realm of the thing-in-itself, namely something that is beyond scientific knowledge. Kant reflects on the nature of the soul in order to understand what it must be like for it to exist. He argues that the soul and the body are located in the same space at the same time, because the soul fully penetrates the body. However, due to the divine schema of the world, a substance located in space has a repulsive force and is impenetrable. Both the soul and the body must be impenetrable. But as they are both impenetrable, they cannot exist in the same space at the same time.

Kant saw it as necessary to be able to find an explanation for the soul being an unextended, immaterial substance that could penetrate material bodies and be located in space. Kant was able, some years later in the Metaphysik L lectures (mid-1770s) to state that the main premise of the mind/body problem is that the body is an object of outer senses and the soul an object of inner senses (Carpenter, 2004). In Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (1776, cited in Carpenter) Kant, is able to reconcile the problems of proving that souls do not have the same material nature as physical things. The soul has a virtual presence in space, and thus is not subject to issues of impenetrability. Hence, the soul and the body can exist in the same space at the same time. The inner sense thesis also provides a new version of the relationship between the soul and its body, and of the role of the body in cognition.

Kant’s viewed the body as mediating the soul’s outlook on the world, where the body’s density and lethargy hampers the succession of mental states (known as cognition) that take
place in the soul. Thus, the soul is unable to use its own conceptual powers in a proper manner. Kant perceives matter as having been distributed in the solar system, with heavy matter being on the inner planets and lighter matter on the outer planets. He is of the view that people’s bodies are dense as they are on one of the inner planets. The idea of information originating in sense perception could account for Kant’s sensitivity to notion of embodiment.

Kant’s ideas were adopted by the neo-Kantians such as the logical positivists in the twentieth century, who based the notion of the ‘mind’ on the mental processes outlined in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The notion of the soul, with its metaphysical and theological associations, fell away and came to be replaced by the Cartesian-inspired information-processing model of mind.

Kant seemingly lays the groundwork for an early form of the information-processing approach. What a person can be said to know, the truths, are fact-based and are a mixture of those facts and what follows from the process of reason itself. However, the real world is unknowable, as it is beyond a person’s ability to grasp it or understand it (Luchte, 2007). Kant added another aspect to the concept of ‘the outer’, that while a person may ‘know’ what is ‘outside’ herself, she cannot understand or know everything that is ‘outside’ her.

### 2.5 Romanticism

The 18th century came to be known as of the ‘Age of Enlightenment’ or the ‘Age of Reason’. Thomas Paine’s book, entitled the *Age of Reason* (1794/1795) challenges institutional religion and the Bible. This challenge combined with the works of Descartes and the ideals of the French Revolution, giving name to the age. The *Age of Reason* was so named due to the proliferation of enlightened and scientific thinking of the time. It was an age certain ideals governed human activity, based on the precept that there was rationality in nature. There was also the idea that man should strive to be perfect and to have noble ideals. These ideals tended to be sourced from classical Greek orators and classical Roman senators, to whom Plato’s validation of the ‘noble pursuit of wisdom’ was attributed.

There was an attempt to try to discover the principles behind such things as had been discovered by Copernicus and Newton. The Romantic Movement in Europe and England developed in response to the over-reliance on reason by enlightenment thinkers, where thinking was reduced to logic-like reflection, distant from experience. The Romantic Age rejected the ‘cold’ reasoning and intellect of the Enlightenment, with its dispassionate view of the workings of nature, and its need for a language of science to account for observed natural phenomena. While the French Revolution may be seen to be more directly linked with the
Romantic Movement, it may be said that German Romanticism lead to further developments in the theory of the mind.

The Germans used the term *Sturm und Drang* (storm and impulse or urge) to describe what came to be known as German Romanticism. It dealt with the intense focus the Germans had on nature, as well on subjective experiences. It exuded a particular emphasis on extreme emotions, which are perhaps best exemplified in Goethe’s novel *The Sorrows of young Werther* (1774). The novel is credited with having initiated and inspired the Romantic Movement. In Goethe’s novel, the protagonist Werther, realising that he can no longer see the woman he loves as she has married someone else, knows that he, she or her husband has to die. He chooses to commit suicide rather than to live with unrequited love. The story focuses on the Werther’s inward torment and love. Previously, the subjective soul searching in anguish had not been mentioned in novels. Werther is seen to be in the grip of an uncontrollable, inner life force. He is aware of this, living his life close to ‘Will’ or ‘life force. His act of suicide is an extreme example of ‘Will, both in the sense of intent and as a meaning of ‘life-force’, as per Schopenhauer’s meaning, which I discuss below. *The Sorrows of Young Werther* also set the template for literary works and has become something of a clichéd representation of the Romantic Movement, The Romantic Movement embodied more than unrequited love.

According to Berlin, Romanticism embodies:

A new and restless spirit, seeking violently to burst through old and cramping forms, a nervous preoccupation with perpetually changing inner states of consciousness, a longing for the unbounded and the indefinable, for perpetual movement and change, an effort to return to the forgotten sources of life, a passionate effort at self-assertion both individual and collective, a search often means of expressing an unappeasable yearning for unattainable goals.

(Berlin, 2013, pp. 96-97)

The Romantics deemed feelings to be more important than scientific thought. They professed a greater interest in nature. They conceived of nature as a primordial, dynamic, living process and not in terms of the ‘sterile’ relationships among abstract forces (like science). According to Lurie (1992, p.195), man was considered as a cultural being, with culture being related to nature as opposed to the construct of the Enlightenment era, where culture was considered to have been an intellectual endeavour. Nature, in its wilderness, as opposed to a stylised version, was used as a metaphor to express feelings. As discussed below,
this is close to what Schopenhauer means when he talks of Will. The uncontrollable forces of nature that Schopenhauer talks about reflect the yearnings and expressions of emotions of the Romantics. (See below for a more detailed discussion on Schopenhauer).

Romanticism can also be seen to be aware of the life force, and of trying to live in accordance with it, rather than deny it. There was greater interest in feelings, arts, music and literature, as these were considered forms of expression. For the Romantics, life is to be lived passionately and authentically, by being aware (or being deliberate) in what one does, and trying to be as close to nature as possible.

For the Romantics, the power of expression gave meaning to life. It is by being able to express and give form to the forces of nature that one is considered to be living. It is by expression that one is able to show that one is alive, and to reveal oneself. It is the revealing of an inner self that is as turbulent as nature, and which originates in nature. The inner self, must, however also withstand the tumultuous forces of nature.

The Romantic idea of a primitive inner life force is reminiscent of the early Greek concept of the psyche as a life force. This conception of an inner life force also suggests Schopenhauer’s concept of the will and Freud’s notion of the id (in particular, the struggle of the rational ego to balance the primitive urges of the id with the morality and criticisms of the superego); which in turn resonate strongly with Plato’s idea of the chariot driver (reason) driving his two horses (emotion and life-force).

It is highly probable that the Freudian notion of the ‘id’, ‘ego’ and ‘superego’ could have originated out of the Romantic movement (and possibly also out of the early Greek era) of a primitive inner life force.

From a Romantic point of view, the life pursued and achieved by human beings in a given culture was judged to be similar to a work of art. Culture, in this view, was seen to provide the necessary aesthetic framework for expressing the life of man. It was seen as a joint communal effort to produce ‘a great work of art’. Within such effort, individual human beings got together by learning to express themselves within its refined practices and cherished customs. In so doing, they contribute to a given cultural tradition, draw sustenance from it, and, thereby give deeper meaning to their lives. Together, language and culture are seen to be working hand in glove to express and provide meaning (Lurie, 1992, p.195). Language is used in the expression of the self. According to Lurie (1992, p. 195) this expression was tempered by means of ‘communal forces’, in other words, language is tempered by its use in society.
This expression of an unappeasable yearning for unattainable goals reflects the important part of Romanticism, which is an expression of self, manifested in various forms, usually in paintings, or verbally, in prose and poetry.

2.5.1 Schopenhauer Kant was one of the first of the German philosophers (amongst Fichte, Hegel, Schilling, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche), who came to be known as the German Idealists. He also inspired his peers. German Idealism came about as a response to the problem set up by Kant of how reality (as the thing-in-itself which is beyond knowing) can ever be truly known. The thoughts of these philosophers developed out of Romanticism.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) tried to bridge the gap between Romanticism and scientific realism. He tried to bridge the gap between ‘will’ (with a small ‘w’) as a direct apprehension of living in the ‘now’ and the way science presents the world as a product of logical reflection (representation). He was representative of the attempts to reconcile the thinking of the age of Enlightenment with its focus on reason, with the Romantic view of ‘awareness’ as the definite means of expression of personal will. The world is a series of representations created in the finite mind of man, and the true thing-in-itself is the infinite will itself (Schopenhauer, cited in Solomon, 2004, p. 83).

The main idea in Schopenhauer’s work *The World as Will and Representation* (1818) is that Will (with a capital ‘W’) and representation are two aspects of reality. Schopenhauer’s Will is a manner of infinite life force; it is a force of energy that is found in everything. It helps animals and plants to grow, crystals to form and is even found in magnetic forces generated by the movement of the earth. It is a world that exists beyond appearances, made up of a deeper reality and is in a way similar to Kant’s notion of the noumenal world. Schopenhauer claimed that it was through deliberate actions that people can come close to experiencing the ‘world as will’. The energy required to will oneself to do something is not the same as the energy that is needed for animal and plant growth. For Schopenhauer, ‘Will’ is the energy and drive that is in both natural phenomenon and the deliberate or conscious act of willing something. It is a blind force. The world as representation is the way that people experience the world. It is how ‘finite’ minds conceive reality. This is akin to Kant’s notion of the phenomenal. Representation, according to Schopenhauer, is the world that is constructed and experienced from sense impressions and made up of the true thing-in-itself, and infinite Will.

Schopenhauer considered himself to be Kant’s successor, (Solomon, 2004). He professed that what is important in Kant’s work is the concept of will as the ‘thing-in-itself’. It
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is force driving through people, animals and nature. Based on Kant’s works, Schopenhauer maintained that it is by applying reason to the understanding of the senses that people can know things. People do not know reality, even what they do know, such as space and time and causality, comes about from their understanding, and not from the ‘things-in-themselves’ (Solomon, 2004, p. 83). It is through will that they are able to know the ‘things-in-themselves’. Schopenhauer is of the view that it is ‘will’ that makes them think and do things, both consciously and unconsciously. Will can also be seen in nature, the will of animals to live, the gravitational force of the earth and in the growth of vegetation. People express the ‘one infinite Will’ in their breath, movement and thoughts. This notion of will seems vaguely reminiscent of the Hebrew notion of ruach, which is also the breath that fills the lungs and through which the life force goes through the whole body. Schopenhauer, however, differs with the Hebraic version, as he sees the ‘will to life’ as purposeless, similar to the Romantic notion of man:

Man as a being is tossed in a kind of frail bark upon a vast ocean of the will, which has no purpose, no need, no direction, which man can only resist at his own peril, with which man must come to terms only if he manages to rid himself of this unnecessary desire to order, to tidy himself up, to create a cosy home for himself in this wild and unpredictable element. (Berlin, 2000, p.133)

His view is that humans have no greater purpose than any other living being, in being alive. People, all, just wish to be alive. Schopenhauer, a practicing pessimist, is of the view that the “world is an illusion, and it is by seeing through the illusion of the meaninglessness of it all, that life can be made tolerable” (Schopenhauer, cited in Solomon, 2004, p. 85). Schopenhauer’s view creates a tension between abstract contemplation and passionate involvement, which he tries to resolve by proposing a sort of mystical withdrawal.

According to Yalom, (2005), Schopenhauer, in contrast to Kant, argued that a person can access a great deal of information from the body, as a person exists in time and space, and is materially present. According to the ideals of the Romantics, Schopenhauer held that it is a person’s feelings that give them knowledge. But they are not able to communicate this knowledge because they do not know their inner lives. Their knowledge is repressed, as they are not able to deal with it. He considers the human condition to be part of ‘blind’ or meaningless forces. He sees people as constantly wanting things that they haven’t got, and that they will never be satisfied. He also considered life to include suffering, but concludes that art
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and music provide a brief respite from the constant craving people have. The reason for this respite is that music, in particular, is a form of the Will itself. Schopenhauer considers that music has the ability to help people to obtain a quick view of ‘reality.’ Schopenhauer is often considered the artists and musicians’ philosopher, due to his views on art and music as providing respite from the constant craving of living. In a way, this idea of a will or life force and insatiable desire, is similar to Freud’s idea of the unconscious id. He extended the concept of ‘world as will’ to show that people are all part of this living force, and that the concept of individuals exists only in the ‘world of representation’, or as constructs of the mind. Schopenhauer argued, people are all connected to and form part of each other. For this reason, people ought to look after one another, as that way, they look after themselves. Interestingly, Schopenhauer is not known for his philanthropy due to an altercation he had with a woman which resulted in him having to pay her a stipend for numerous years and when she died, he wrote “obit anus, abit onus”, which is Latin for the “old woman dies, the burden goes” on her death certificate (Warburton, 2011, p. 136).

In developing this concept of the Will, Schopenhauer reintroduced the concept of an intangible substance into the mind, as some sort of driver of the mind. The mind is re-situated inside the individual and does not comprise a greater whole. In this instance, the reasoning mind has been replaced by the will. The Cartesian aspect of duality remains, but is cleverly hidden under the façade of a primitive inner life force, which is somehow linked to nature.

Schopenhauer started with the concept of the ‘world as will’, incorporating the notion of Romanticism into philosophy and the theory of the mind. In his youth, Wittgenstein considered Schopenhauer as one of his influences.

2.6 A summary of the development of the notion of the mind-body problem

From the early Hebrews and the early Greek philosophers, through to current times, the notion of mind has perplexed and confused people. In an attempt to grasp the notion of mind various elaborate theories have been devised. The language used in these theories has determined the construction of the notion of mind. Language has defined the understanding of thought and the way in which it developed the current theory of mind, which has an embodied mind situated in the body, and more recently, in the brain. These theories have been influenced and have influenced the thinking of the times. Thought has evolved from being considered as a breath or a life-force existing in the chest, to an ability to reason situated in the brain, and finally, as the very ability to express oneself. The views mentioned above try to identify and explain these parts of the mind.
The above outline shows how the philosophical tradition of ‘awareness’ implies that a ‘mind’ exists, which is made up of ‘mental objects’ (‘ideas’ to Plato and Descartes and ‘concepts’ to Kant), which constitute thought. Their influences have been carried on into contemporary times, and are manifest not only in identifying and explaining the mind, but also in some cases, even in trying to explain away the concept of the mind entirely.
Chapter Three

THE PROBLEM OF DUALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

3. Chapter Overview
In the previous chapter, I discussed the way in which the notion of mind came about, based on how certain philosophers within a specific materialist Enlightenment tradition thought through the structure of reality and the nature of valid knowledge (ontology and epistemology) and how these philosophers developed a dualistic conception, with the inner mind knowing an outer reality. This philosophical tradition and underlying point of view still permeate the guiding models used in psychology, even while acknowledging psychology as an independent science, the philosophical foundation persists.

The problem with dualism is that it doesn’t really provide an adequate explanation. It attempts to provide a scientific theory to account for thought by claiming that the mind can be reduced to the brain and brain activity, but is unable to convincingly substantiate or evidence its claims. This will be explicated in this chapter. Further, the concepts and terms put forward in this theory are so pervasive that they have crept into everyday usage and have determined a narrative for the way in which people generally view themselves, which leads to vagueness and confusion. Wittgenstein alerts people to the fact that language can mislead. His famous statement warning against language’s bewitchment of people’s intelligence makes clear how language use can obfuscate. Although, not often acknowledged in psychology, and in the ‘philosophy of mind’ these reflections on the nature of reality and the way in which they are known about has led to the dualism or the mind-body problem.

There have been various attempts to overcome this problem, and these have resulted in a specific effect on how the discipline of psychology is understood as a science, which tries to clarify human behaviour as opposed to it being a therapeutic art (Hutto, 2008). Although not often acknowledged in psychology, these philosophical reflections have strongly influenced the way in which these issues have been thought and are thought about in psychology.

My focus in this chapter is to show the effect that these attempts at resolving the mind-body problem have had on the discipline of psychology. I hope to give a basic overview of different attempts to deal with the problem that Descartes brought about, and my intention is not to give an in-depth exposition. I discuss the assumptions that underpin the various theories that try to explain human experience and behaviour. In particular, the assumptions considered
are those that are fundamental to cognitive psychology, and the theoretical orientation of
cognitive neuroscience, as they are those branches of psychology, which deal with thinking
such as reasoning, perception and memory. In addition, I will also briefly discuss
behaviourism in order to address the fact that some consider Wittgenstein to be a behaviourist,
although Wittgenstein rejected this viewpoint. Later in the chapter, I will briefly mention
Wittgenstein’s views regarding these assumptions, although I will provide a fuller explanation
of Wittgenstein’s views in Chapter Four.

3.1 Dualism

The traditional, dualist point of view can be expressed as the knowledge of reality through
inner representations of the outer physical world. The space where this happens is known as
the soul or mind, and can consist of the general categories by means of which things are
known, as well as statements which represent the facts about the world, also known as
propositions. These representations operate as a sort of inner commentary on the world and
are similar to a language, operating in a language-like way. It is thought that language is
structured in a kind of formal logic, where ‘reasoning’ is the application of this logic.

The thinkers that I discuss in this chapter all take a position on this traditional view.
Most, if not all of them, accept the view that people know reality through inner
representations, and they attempt to resolve the issue in these terms. Most of them also accept
and take for granted that the space where this happens may be known as the soul or mind. Of
course, ‘soul’ is avoided because of its religious connotations. However, the notion that
representations are ‘language-like’ is accepted by some, and questioned by others.

The dualist view is ascribed to Descartes, who sought certainty and took certainty as a
measure of degree of ‘reality’. As discussed in Chapter Two, his view was that by first being
able to think, a person would be able to know more about her physical nature. According to
Descartes, this means that a person is more certain about their thinking aspect (the mind) than
they are about the body, and as a result, the minds is independent of the body, and must be
constituted by a different substance. Dualism is based on certain philosophical assumptions
made by Descartes, that the mind and body are two mismatched and distinct substances. In
essence, dualism is a reduction of the Aristotelian theory of substances, from many down to
two.

According to Descartes, the mind is made of a gaseous or ethereal substance or some
sort of a non-physical substance, and the physical world, including the body, is made of a
material substance. However, today it is difficult to know what a non-physical substance or an
immaterial substance is, where even gases are made up of atoms, and possibly even smaller constituent parts. The mind is deemed to be a non-physical substance that experiences things, not the body. The mind is considered as the site of inner mental activity, and is considered as having nothing to do with the activities of the brain.

As mentioned in Chapter Two, Descartes claimed that the connection between the mind and the brain is through the pineal gland. A body extends in space, that is to say, it takes up space, and it is tangible and material. According to the dualists, the mind does not extend in space. It is not tangible, but it can exist independently of the body. The mind is the soul and the soul/mind is the person, namely the ‘I’ or the self. It is located somewhere inside the body, it is the inner, and it reflects on information from outside. The body is the person’s body, a separate entity to the ‘I’. It is the outer. The body is affected by the inner mental process and shows the ‘outer’ behaviour.

The anima (or, as Augustine made distinct, the mind/soul) and body, create what Descartes calls a ‘substantial union’. Leibnitz, another dualist, thought that there were two parallel processes preset by God, one process being the mind or logic and the other being the physical world. These two processes were not connected. The mind-body dualists consider that the mind has experiences and emotions due to the relationship between behaviour and psychological acts, mental activities, including states. It is not possible to see such psychological or mental states/activity so the question is raised as to whether there are other minds. The minds of other people or animals cannot be seen nor perceived. Even writing about mental states reveals the extent to which perceptual metaphors creep in, where the mind is considered an ‘inner space’ which I ‘see’. It is not clear however, how I perceive my own awareness or that of others. The dualists propose the solution to this problem, where knowing that I think means that knowing that others think. Others are not merely automatons that move. Only by knowing that I think and what I think am I able to extrapolate this quality and pass it on to others. The problem of how I perceive my own awareness is not so easily solved.

One of the more recent developments in dualism is the move away from the mind-body notion to that of the brain-body, where the brain is substituted for the mind, and to which various psychological attributes have been ascribed. Even though it is known that the brain interacts with the body via neurons (Descartes’ gaseous fluid being replaced by electricity). It is not known how a brain process – a configuration of around 100 000 000 000 or so interacting neurons – can bring about the sense of direct personal awareness that each person experiences. The concept of the brain as the seat of thinking is seemingly easier for people to accept than the concept of the mind. The issue of first person subjective descriptions of
experience versus third person objective descriptions still remain. This move from mind to brain raises an additional question of how the brain is able to experience things and to bring about new experiences.

3.1.1. **Property dualism and non-reductive monism** Maslin (2011) is of the view that dualism has another variant, namely property dualism. This variant states that the brain is a physical substance and that it has mental properties, including consciousness, that are not physical. Cartesian dualists believe that only humans have minds (mental features and consciousness) and that animals do not. The Cartesian premise is that humans use language and animals do not. It is probable that Descartes had a religious motivation for such claims. He even claimed to have proven that souls are immortal. The dilemma of reductionism (see below) is swept aside by maintaining that humans are adaptable and creative when faced with new situations and that animals are supposedly not. Property dualists believe that there is one physical reality, but that it manifests in two types of properties: physical and mental. These types of properties are not compatible, as reality is described in discordant ways, composed of different kinds of concepts. The mind is caused by the brain, the structure of the brain (its physical structure) and its biochemistry. Property dualists acknowledge that ‘consciousness’ or ‘mental states’ are different to brain activity.

Whilst it may be possible to see the process working within the brain, it is not possible to actually see ‘consciousness’. Thus, consciousness does not appear to be a public phenomenon, but more of a private one. The individual is able to have private mental acts; nobody else can see them. Even though there is a physical state and a mental state, the two are linked and are not two distinct substances as proposed by the Cartesians. They are seen as more of a singular unit, with two states or aspects. Hence the title, non-reductive monism, as it does not reduce to one simple element, but rather to one element, comprising two sub-aspects.

Searle, a proponent of property dualism, says, “mental phenomena are caused by neuro-physiological processes in the brain and are themselves functions of the brain” (Searle, cited in Maslin, 2011, pp. 158-159). He uses the analogy of water to explain the point further, noting that water is wet, it behaves in a certain way, it freezes or turns into gas, it takes on the shape of the container that it is in. It is also known, however, that water is composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. The brain may be seen as the atoms, and mind and consciousness could be regarded as analogous to the water. Searle’s argument raises the question why the mathematical model for water, \( \text{H}_2\text{O} \), is more ‘real’ than the experience of the wetness of water. It is interesting to note for the record, that the phenomenologists such as
Husserl have an opposite view, where the wetness is ‘real’ and the H$_2$O mathematical model is an abstract and artificial construction used to explain it.

However, what Searle doesn’t factor in, is that water in the analogy is responsive to outside intervention, where it does not take on these states without some agent acting on it, otherwise it is stagnant, waiting for an agent to act upon it for it to change. Human beings and animals are different to water, they can act and interact with third parties and have mental activity or states without an external agent acting on them. Searle’s point is that describing water in the formal model of ‘H$_2$O’ is different to the experiencing of it. This view implicitly perpetuates the idea of some mysterious force, which makes mental activity possible, as it is not easy to explain how consciousness/mental activity can arise out of brain activity.

Property dualists argue that there are different ways of describing the situation. A sophisticated version of the property dualist is the idea that the mind ‘supervenes’ on the brain. Donald Davison introduced the term ‘supervenience’ in his 1970 essay ‘Mental Events’ to account for a relationship between physical phenomena (the brain) and mental phenomena (the mind). There is no implication of a causal link between the mind and the brain. It also seems to suggest that mental states do not impact on physical states, in other words, that there is one way ‘traffic’ from the physical to the mental, thereby not taking into account the role reason or mental activity can play on the physical.

The views mentioned above do not go much further than Descartes. Here, the brain and the activity of the brain transpose Descartes’ idea of the pineal gland. The concept of the inner mental activity affecting the outer behaviour is maintained. There is an attempt to try to situate the mind in the brain instead. Descartes considered that the mind is not ‘in’ the pineal gland. The pineal gland was the point of contact between immaterial mind (res cogitans) and the physical brain. The problem of how an immaterial substance can have a causal-physical effect on a material brain remains. Ideas or mental objects may somehow be perceived by a kind of inner viewing. The main flaw in this argument is that there is no way of explaining why there are two kinds of descriptive domains (experience on the one hand, and physical laws on the other). It also assumes that experience is another name for some type of description. It is critical to ask why certain physical processes (in the brain) would bring about a sense of awareness. The idea that there needs to be an identification of different ‘properties’ to explain awareness does not explain how it comes about in the first place, nor how it is linked to the description of the world in terms of physical properties. How can the idea that they are just different types of description serve as an ‘explanation’? The explanation implies a kind of language of thought. The ‘language of thought’ notion is closer to information
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processing (cognitivism). It is difficult tell whether property dualism reduces to a ‘language of thought’. Property dualism seems to imply that there needs to be different kinds of descriptors for mind and brain which do not account for the sense of being aware.

3.2 **Reductionism or eliminative materialism**

Materialism, in essence, is the view that all that exists is physical or made up of matter. The reductionist aspect occurs because the dualist aspect is reduced to a simpler form. There are no two distinctive substances (mind and brain/body). The brain is not a ‘substance’. The only ‘substance’ is the material world made of matter and energy where matter is considered to be concentrated energy. The brain (and mind) has to be explainable in terms of this. The materialists consider that the mind is not an insubstantial or immaterial substance. The brain is now considered as the mind.

Reductionism or eliminative materialism is a view put forward by the brain scientists and Churchland and Churchland, a married couple who argue an extreme view of this. They represent theorists who hold this view, but they did not invent it. There were contemporaries of Descartes (or those who came shortly after him), who would fit into this category, like La Mettrie (early eighteenth century). The concept of the mind, including the ability to think, is considered to be a result of the physical functioning of the brain, in other words, the way the brain is structured and the combination of the various chemicals within the brain and the actual brain matter and neurons, nerves, synapses and so on. The brain is thereby viewed in isolation, with the mind analogous to brain activity, and which cannot in itself bring about any action.

‘Eliminative’ may be understood to mean ‘to be getting rid of’. In this instance, what is be gotten rid of is ‘folk psychology’. Folk psychology is the common-sense explanations people have for what they do, for example, my thoughts make me behave in certain ways. Folk psychology also includes the terminology used for such explanations. Materialism is used to show that the mind is the physical brain; there is no immaterial mind. Eliminativists claim that science will show that the ‘real’ causes of what people behave they way that they do are physical and relate to brain activity.

Hacker maintains that according to the Eliminativists, folk psychology may be broken up into two categories. “The first category is that of non - or quasi-intentional concepts such as grief, fear, pain, hunger and the full range of emotions and bodily sensations” (Hacker, 2001, p. 61). These tend to be causal, for example, somebody who has not been allowed to eat for a period will be hungry. The other category is that of intentional concepts, which predict the
behaviour of others. Intentional concepts are termed ‘laws’ by the Eliminativists, and tend to sound familiar, where for example, if I hurt myself, it can be predicted that I will be in pain. It is believed that these ‘laws’ perpetuate commonsense explanations.

The proponents of eliminative materialism claim that the terms that folk psychology ‘describe’ never actually existed. To support their argument, they claim that people used to believe in witches and goblins, and such ‘folk’ terminology has a history of being used to ascribe supernatural powers to unusual events taking place in nature. For example, the Norse god Thor, was ascribed a role in the making of thunderstorms. Nowadays, there are now known reasons for much of what used to be speculated upon in superstitious folklore. The Churchlands claim ‘folk psychology’ expressions are no longer needed as they are considered to be ‘mythology (Churchland, 1988).

According to the eliminativists, what is needed is empirical, experimental psychology. According to Churchland (as cited in Hacker, 2001), there are three reasons why folk psychology needs to be replaced. The first is that folk psychology cannot explain certain phenomena, such as sleep or mental illness; the second is that it has not developed in the way that other sciences such as astronomy have and lastly, it does not seamlessly integrate into the developing combined fields of biochemistry and neuroscience. They claim that science requires an experience of something for it to be explained.

Hacker (2001, pp. 76-77) addresses the three points raised by the eliminativists. In the first instance, they maintain that folk psychology does not explain, nor predict nor is able to manipulate theories about sleep, learning, intelligence or mental illness. In other words, folk psychology is not theoretical, the language used is not theoretical, nor are the concepts put forward theories. They are not intended to be understood as formal explanations. It is not possible to then to reject them as theories if they do not purport to be theories. Empirical, experimental psychology develops theories about why people sleep, how they learn, what intelligence is and what and how to treat mental illnesses. It is not yet clear how successful these theories have been at explaining these concepts.

The eliminativists deride folk psychology for not developing much over 2500 years. However, as folk psychology language is neither theoretical nor scientific, any idea of a ‘lack of progress’ is irrelevant. It is also unclear as to what is meant by progress. Theories in science are explanations of why things are as they are. The theories do not explain how things are, these have to be accepted as a given. If the question as to why the world appears as it does is considered, and people remove their experience of it, it would mean that it does not manifest at all. It is this experience of direct experience and how people relate it to science that is the
problem of ‘consciousness’ in the first place. The experience of direct thinking immediately
leads to dualist thinking, and a series of attempts to ‘solve’ the problem.

Hacker’s third reason that there can be no integration of human behaviour, is that folk
psychology does not seamlessly integrate into the developing combined fields of biochemistry
and neuroscience, which is implied in reduction. There are no laws of folk psychology, so they
cannot be reducible. Further, there is no reason to suppose that psychological language should
be reducible. In a similar way, there is no reason to suppose that the language of empirical
psychology, sociology or history ought to be reducible to the laws of physics.

It is probably not that easy to replace folk psychology with eliminative materialism in
the way that eliminativists maintain that physical biology replaced folk biology. Physical
biology took the existing ideas of nature and integrated them into the theory of biology and in
the process abandoning the idea of a ‘life-force’, as have other disciplines such as astronomy.
Science develops by means of theories, which are explanations of why people experience the
world the way that they do. If the actual experience is removed or eliminated, then there is
nothing to explain and no one to explain it. An explanation of pain does not replace the pain, it
merely explains that there is pain and possibly why there is pain.

Eliminativists are of the view that learning to apply psychological terminology and
concepts means that it is necessary to learn generalisations about the concept regarding its use,
such as learning about being in pain would incorporate all those things can happen which
cause pain. Eliminativists consider that the word ‘pain’ and other psychological expressions
are defined by generalisations.

Concepts are used according to the rules and norms governing the use of language; for
example a child feels pain and cries out in pain. Concepts are not determined by
generalisations. The child learns social norms for expressing pain as it more effective to
explain your pain to the doctor than to just cry. Wittgenstein makes this point in his discussion
of the role of social norms in language; see 4.6.2 below.

According to the eliminativists, there is brain activity, and processes and nothing else.
This means that feelings of jealousy or love are purely brain activity. Based on these premises,
it makes no sense to talk about pain or emotions, but rather, purely about the brain activity.
The eliminativists propose that folk psychology language and terminology be rejected, and the
correct biological and physical terminology be used. For example, instead of saying, “I am
happy when I am with him”, I should say, “my endorphin levels rise which in turn make the
synapses in my brain fire or vice versa, when I am with him”. The question that gets raised is
whether people could and would only be happy once they had completed a course in
neuroscience. The correct biological and physical terminology does not explain the state of happiness fully. Neither does it explain how a person describes what s/he felt about something, as it is not visible as an object in the brain.

Underlying the eliminativists’ view is the idea that the only knowledge that is worthwhile or which has any meaning is scientific knowledge. Their view doesn’t take into account the importance of everyday language use, where meaning is derived through use, and by implication, knowledge is made manifest and shared through language. It tends to revert to a positivist account of language, which is limiting, and does not account for the complexities of language.

Eliminativists are also accused of merely changing the terminology from one kind to another, arguing that instead of expressing that the someone is pain, one must now say that that person’s C-fibres are firing, (Wilkes, cf. as cited in Maslin, 2011, p.95). The question arises as to why someone would even say this, if they could not feel pain and even if they could, what would it mean and how would it be understood. One of the criticisms of the theory is that it ignores the fact that the philosopher who is asking these questions presupposes a person with a mental life (even if that person’s name happens to be Churchland).

Many, if not most, brain scientists are of the view that eliminative materialism is a view that is becoming increasingly important. They consider that its aim is to show that processes in the brain cause mental processes that are really just illusions, as accounted for in folk psychology. It is not clear what mental processes are or what causes them.

The eliminative materialist view is either considered true or philosophically naïve, where it may be seen to help with the way in which people view their existence. Likewise, it avoids dealing with the issue of how the mind-body interacts, as well as avoids the issue of consciousness.

It becomes clear that eliminative materialists assume that Descartes understood the problem correctly and have tried ‘solving’ it, with dubious success. They do not consider the possibility that Descartes may have misrepresented or misunderstood the problem (does awareness require a physical explanation after all?). While eliminative materialism attempts to do away with the mind; it succeeds in merely substituting Descartes’ idea of the pineal gland with neurophysiology. Its conception of language has overtones of positivism, and for that reason is limiting. Eliminative materialism limits knowledge to scientifically justified facts and as such does not seek to understand everyday language and meaning, nor does it consider the meaning and intent of psychological concepts.
3.3 Behaviourism

Based on a scientific method of building theory by careful observation and measurement of verifiable facts, behaviourism argues that minds of others should be ignored, as they cannot be observed. Behaviourists believed that links could be found between stimuli and behaviour, which would be adequate to explain behaviours and that all behaviour can be reduced to a conditioned response. Behaviourism is a form of monism, as it is believed that all activity can be reduced to behaviour and that there is no mind-body duality, as the mind is not deemed to be important.

According to the behaviourists, all behaviour is a result of responses to stimuli. As the mind cannot cause anything, it can be ignored. J.B. Watson (1878-1958) is considered the father of behaviourism, and was of the view that psychology is nothing more than a description of human behaviour, where its purpose is to be able to control and predict behaviour. Watson seems to have ignored awareness, because he rejected ‘introspection’ as a viable scientific method, thereby neatly side-stepping the mind-body problem.

Watson tried to establish psychology as a variant of natural science and was of the view that it should be subject to the same sort of independent, objective tests. According to Kerr (2008), Watson spent years studying the way in which animals behave and learn. He was of the view that humans should be studied the same way that birds and animals are studied. It is through the observation of an external stimulus and the corresponding response or behaviour that scientific laws could be ascertained (Hacker, 2001). This stimulated response is known as causal conditioning. Based on the observation of children’s behaviour, Watson was of the view that thinking was ‘talking to oneself’, in other words, a form of ‘sub-vocal word-behaviour’ (Watson, cited in Hacker, 2001, p. 99). While it may not be clear exactly what ‘sub-vocal’ speech is, Watson may have considered it to be a form of ‘word-behaviour’. He thought speaking was a result of ‘laryngeal movements’.

B.F. Skinner (1904 -1980), developed a more sophisticated version of behaviourism using the expression ‘contingencies of reinforcement’, and was of the view that psychological terms (possibly now known as folk psychology) led to the thinking that there was a little man or a ‘homunculus’ living inside the head, who was responsible for thought (Maslin, 2011). Skinner equated thinking with behaviour, and considered thought to be behaviour irrespective of whether that behaviour was verbal, non-verbal, overt or not. For Skinner, thought was not a mysterious process. He considered it ‘sub-vocal’ and is referred to below.

According to the behaviourists, speech is a result of causal conditioning. This is, however, strongly rejected by Noam Chomsky (1959), a linguist, who stated in his famous
repudiation of Skinner (Chomsky, 1959), that a behavioural stimulus response system involving reinforcement and ‘a finite grammar’ model, is too slow to account for the rapid acquisition and complexity of language. It may be said that Chomsky’s argument against the behavioural stimulus response system started the movement away from behaviourism towards cognitivism or the information processing approach.

Ostensibly, behaviourism may be seen to be a rejection of Cartesian dualism. Behaviour rejects the idea of an inner mind or mental activity and ascribes all behaviour as a response to external stimuli. It fails to account for awareness, and how exactly behaviour is a manifestation of a response to external stimuli is unaccounted for and remains hidden.

Not only do behaviourists side step the mind-body problem, but they also do not have to deal with obscure mental activity. Even if all activity could be explained as some form of response to a stimulus, there is still the issue of one’s own personal sense of awareness to explain. It may not ‘cause’ awareness, but it is difficult to deny that this awareness exists. It is not clear if there is a kind of identity for behaviourists, or merely a ‘zombie-like’ creature, which simply exhibits certain behaviours to which he or she has been conditioned. Watson was opposed to the view that humans have a soul that cannot be observed, which differentiated them from animals. In other words, for Watson there was no ‘inner’ mental activity. Behaviourists concern themselves with physical attributes of the body, which are responsible for behaviour. Behaviourists, Carnap and Ryle, proposed that “first-person psychological propositions can be verified by self-observation” (Glock, 2001, p. 11), for example, one could verify a proposition like “I am sad” by observing one’s own posture and behaviour. Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) tried to interpret Wittgenstein in behaviourist terms. Since Ryle’s book was published before the English translation of the Investigations, it led to much confusion as to whether Wittgenstein was a behaviourist. Glock (ibid.) states that Wittgenstein was of the view that the expression “I am sad” is neither a proposition nor a description, but rather an expression of the mental. The question of whether Wittgenstein can be interpreted as a behaviourist will be discussed in section 4.6.

Behaviourists do not deal with mental activity and are of the view that there is no such thing as ‘human nature’, rather, there is only conditioning, whether ‘self-conditioning’ or ‘external-conditioning’. It is not clear how people condition themselves. According to Kerr “behaviourists consider neurotic behaviour a result of inappropriate cultural conditioning” (Kerr, 2008, p. 68). In the sixties, there was something called ‘social behaviourism’. The notion behind social behaviourism was that if the ‘system’ could be changed then all inappropriate behaviours (like crime) would go away. It was considered that there was no such
thing as ‘wilful’ behaviour only bad conditioning. The effect of behaviourism has been a move to physical experimentation away from introspection.

A sub-division of behaviourism, analytical behaviourism which has to do with analytic philosophy and which focuses on the ways logic functions in language, is according to Maslin not really a psychological construct but more of a philosophical construct. Analytical behaviourists are of the view that statements of mental activity can easily be translated into statements of behaviour and potential behaviour (Maslin, 2011). These descriptions of mental activity are better articulated in behavioural descriptions, which are understood to reveal the true nature of the mental. This means that the way that a person behaves is indicative of their mental state, or of their character. This differs with behaviourists, who are of the view that behaviour is a response to a stimulus and that brain activity is not necessary to consider.

Ryle, a proponent of the analytical behaviourism, attempts to address the mind-body problem, as well as to counter the Cartesian concept of the mind as a sort of ‘ghost in the machine’, by showing that there is not another non-physical entity called the mind in addition to a person’s public performance, that is, his/her actions which are visible to others. The behaviour of a person, their actions and performances, or conduct, is the manifestations of a person’s mental processes. A person’s overt behaviour is the evidence of mental activity. This is not functionalism as Ryle is not, according to Maslin (2011), equating brain activity with behaviour. Maslin (ibid.) further states that Ryle’s view on intentional states, such as beliefs, is that a belief is a tendency to act in a certain way, and that there were no underlying mental states which supported this disposition, as beliefs are predicated upon a series of ‘if …then’ statements. Ryle was not supportive of the idea of mental states, in fact, according to Maslin (ibid.), he was of the view that having the disposition to behave in a certain way does not mean that the person has a particular mental state.

Analytical behaviourism was confusing because it explained mental states as a form of behaviour, and this lead to confusion as to how to explain behaviour itself (Glock, 2001). The link between behaviourism and cognitivism is that there is a growing need to introduce ‘intervening variables’ between stimulus and response.

### 3.4 Cognitivism or the information processing approach

The origins of this approach can be traced to the seventeenth century Enlightenment, where the aim was “to find true knowledge free from propositions […] language had to be cleared from all those elements that implied a pre-existing meaningful order” (Kruger, 2003, p. 21). This approach can also be traced back to Leibniz, who initially proposed that the workings of
the brain were analogous to that of a mill, and that if one were to look inside the brain, it would be like looking at the workings of the inside of a mill. It can also be traced back to Descartes with inner mental processes affecting the outer behaviour. This approach is a form of ‘representationalism’, but with a very specific interpretation of ‘representations’ as elements in a system of logic. Representationalism is the idea that people access inner presentations that refer to the outer world and include the assumption that thinking is the same as the application of logic. It can also be said that this approach developed out of a critique of behaviourism or out of a need for behaviourist theorising to include ‘intervening variables’ between stimulus and response. This approach could be considered as behaviourism with lots of intervening variables, and not a ‘new’ train of thinking at all.

The basic point of departure is the proposal that it is necessary for ideas in the mind to be based on objects that can be identified by their specific, individual qualities. Language is a means to be able to identify patterns between these ideas, and hence, to be able to classify them. Language is also a way of identifying relationships between ideas and a way to explain these relationships in terms of rules. *Principia Mathematica* (1910) by Russell and Whitehead was the result of this endeavour, where these authors attempted to develop a mathematical logic as a theory of thought. Technically they wanted to develop the philosophy of (or philosophical grounding of) mathematics by showing it can be based on a self-consistent application of set theory. Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* had a similar goal to show that it is possible to create a homogeneous self-consistent system of logic which can represent all the ‘truth’ (i.e. true propositions) in the world. Whether this can serve as an explanation of ‘thought’ is not clear; it is an assumption. Presuming logic to be the same as thought, was often taken for granted, except by the Romantics. Wittgenstein initially thought that there was merit in this view, but later discounted it in favour of meaning in language being dependant on the context in which it is used and by it acquiring meaning through use.

Turing conceived of a problem-solving process as a kind of universal mechanism (later called a Turing machine) which works through a formal problem in a step-by-step way. Many became convinced that this could serve as an abstract specification of all systematic process. Whether Turing thought of his ‘machine’ as a ‘theory of thought’ is not clear. It was generally taken for granted that thinking is mechanical and that a Turing machine explains how thinking works. The formal problem solving, in a step-by-step way, led directly to the invention of digital computers. Putnam initially introduced the idea of the mind as a Turing machine, but later questioned this view. Putnam believes that the nature of mental events is one of
functional states that cannot be reduced to neurology (Putnam, cited in Moravia, pp. 136-137).

The problem arises when ‘information processing’ as a function, is made independent of its medium. It is a formal process that can be explained by its logical structure, and whether this manifests in a brain or in electric circuits, is irrelevant. In terms of the information processing approach, the brain or ‘wetware’ is compared to a computer software program which drives the computer hardware i.e. the brain, and somehow in the brain, mental processes like computer programs direct all bodily movement and behaviour. It is not possible to understand the program by looking at it, but only by seeing what it does i.e. what the functions of the program are, hence the term ‘functionalism’. It is not quite clear how these brain ‘programs’ are linked to the mental phenomena that they try to explain, or even if they are apparent to awareness. This process is hidden, and it functions in a subconscious (not as used by Freud but in a manner of sub-awareness). If the process is subconscious, then the information processing approach is not useful in dealing with ‘mental phenomena’, as it cannot be described or explained. This approach is another that has been directly influenced by the Cartesian dualistic account of the ‘inner mental processes’ affecting the ‘outer behaviour’. It refines and modernises Cartesian dualism. It also does not properly account for the fact that a computer is unable to refer to an outer reality. Symbols in a formal axiomatic system (which is what a Turing machine is supposed to ‘model’) refer only in terms of how they are used within a formal system of rule; there is no reference possible to anything outside the system.

Functionalism can be considered as a sub-branch of cognitivism. It is also similar to behaviourism, which claims that behaviour can be linked directly to stimuli. The idea is that a few ‘intervening variables’ came to be accepted. Functionalists believe that that the behaviour that is being expressed must be able to be linked to something that would normally produce such behaviour.

As mentioned earlier in this section, functions are independent of the medium. It is for this reason that functionalism has been thought to be an improvement on the theories of mind-brain identity from the 1950s, as it makes provision for “different internal states that may ‘realize’ [sic] the functional state of pain in different species - perhaps even in different people” (Teichmann 2001, p.25).

Moravia notes “functionalists hold that mental phenomena are ultimately functional phenomena” (1995, p. 141). This means that it is important to examine the way in which actions and behaviour are carried out from a psychological perspective. Fodor considers
behaviour to be a function and he distinguishes between being and acting, to help identify what things are and what functions are (Moravia, 1995). Fodor and Putnam (Putnam, 1967) developed a functionalism, which separates the mental properties from the physical properties. It shows linkages to the dual aspect theories discussed above. Functionalism hopes to show that ‘computation’ or the manipulations of tokens according to formal rules can, in fact, be shown to ‘cause’ mental phenomena. However, it is not clear how this would work. Fodor (2008) claims that his functionalism is non-reductive as it is a special science. Any event that occurs in terms of this special science also occurs in physical terms, but this does not happen the other way around. Fodor also claims that special sciences ought not to reduce to physical theories, in other words it is a dual aspect theory. He tries to link it to ‘property dualism’ referred to in 3.1.1. This is also known as non-reductive physicalism.

Fodor (2008) maintains that he is working towards a theory of mind and the intentionality of cognition. Intentionality refers to a mental representation that points at something (an object or a fact) so as to represent the world (inside the mind). The idea is that these representations can be conceived of as ‘tokens’ inside a computing device. Fodor has defended folk psychology or common sense type explanations of motivation and behaviour. Folk psychology may be divided into two states, namely those states that depict the surroundings and which direct behaviour, and those states which show goals and which stimulate action.

The reason for Fodor defended folk psychology is that it is intentional (about things) and it can be evaluated, and there are ‘genuine causal explanations and laws’. The concept of ‘intentionality’ which had fallen into disuse since the Middle Ages, was revived by Franz Brentano (1838-1917), who claimed that every mental state has a representative content, whether real or imaginary, which that state represents. But not all content is the same: intentions are different to beliefs. Brentano called this ‘intentional in existence’ or ‘intentional states’. Now, ‘intentional states’ are more commonly referred to as ‘propositional attitudes’ (Maslin, 2007). In other words, people ‘know’ their mental representations, which in turn point to a world of physical things and facts. Such a view is ultimately a dualistic.

Fodor considers that a thing is always a thing and that, when considering its function, it is necessary to ask what the function is, and to question what it does (Morovia, 1995). Fodor is of the view that the function of intentional psychology is to express the rules of mental representations. This does not solve the problem of how a machine or physical system could bring about a sense of awareness. Fodor developed his Representational Theory of Mind (1981) to address this issue. Representational theories of mind conceive of thinking as
occurring within an internal system of representation. Fodor’s version is sometimes referred to as the ‘language of thought hypothesis’ and its name shows the relevancy of Wittgenstein’s private language argument.

Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind is a mixture of ‘realistic mental acts’, (for Fodor, the ‘mental’ are propositional attitudes’ which are beliefs about the world carried within an inner representation), which processes information in step-by-step manner. It is not exactly clear what a realistic mental act could be. Fodor claims that the mental ‘belief’ can be understood as an internal symbol that represents the mind-world relation of the thing that is being thought about. He refers to these internal symbols as ‘tokenings’. In representational theories of mind, there are representations which function like ‘symbols’ in a formal system. Fodor uses the ‘symbol’ as a meaningless token, which gets its ‘meaning’ only from how it is used in a formal (logical) system, which is for example, the way computers work. Fodor realises that the problem of reference requires explanation. In his book Psychosemantics, The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind, 1987, Fodor argues that the idea of an inner representation that acts as symbols for an external world, naturally leads to the notion of language of thought. This language of thought hypothesises that there is an inner private language which takes the sensory input and converts it into a sort of mentalese i.e. processes the input and then converts it into a public language so that people may be able to speak to each other with it and share ideas between them. Pylyshyn defends this thesis by saying that computation is the only worked-out view of process that is both compatible with a materialist view of how a process is realized [sic] and that attributes the behaviour of the process to the operation of rules and representations. (Pylyshyn, 1990, p. 113)

The ‘language of thought’ hypothesis implies lexical concepts, which are the instinctive language of thought. In his later work, Fodor takes this view further when he says, “beliefs are constructs out of concepts” (Fodor, 2008, p.26). He defines concepts as being ‘something like a definition’, not the other way around, and it is by not recognising this that leads to circular thinking. Fodor is of the view that the mind is modular, that is, it comprises a number of independent modular systems that relate to decision-making and beliefs. The modular mind notion is similar to the idea of a local area network, where small computers are attached to each other, but which work independently of each other. In his book Modularity of Mind (1983), Fodor developed this modularity thesis. He argued that ‘peripheral modules’ work according to his theory, but there is a ‘central process’, which he indirectly admits he cannot
explain at all, and he concludes that the *Representational Theory of Mind* alone cannot provide a model of how cognition works. It only works in areas of the mind that are modular. This is an indirect admission of the failure of this theory. Fodor (2008) identifies the leading cause of error in the current study of the mind as pragmatism.

Fodor (2008) reveals the central role that the compositionality of thoughts plays in the representational theory of mind, where thoughts have concepts as their constituents. Fodor maintains that there is a proper relationship between logical theories and theories of reasoning, which means that mental representations have a logical form or syntax. Mental representation is taken the language of thought, an inner language or a sort of ‘*mentalese*’. These inner representations must (according to him) fit into a formal system of logic.

Fodor argues that both behaviourism and reductionism are inadequate and functionalism or the cognitive information processing approach is the only option, and so it must be true. Wittgenstein was very close to this point of view in the *Tractatus*, (1921). In his later work, *LOT2* (2008), Fodor is more of the view that there aren’t any alternatives, and that even functionalism or the cognitive information process is limited.

In essence, Fodor’s theory cannot account for how the inner representations (symbols in a formal logical system of some kind) are linked to the meaningful world in which people find themselves (objects, events, emotions, etc.). Fodor’s view tries to reduce all thought to formal processes (syntax) but does not explain how these processes can mean anything (semantics). Searle’s ‘Chinese room’ experiment makes the point that the syntax of a language can be fully specified, and its meaning may still not be understood. Fodor’s view also fails to explain how the link between inner representation and outer world was initially established.

Fodor’s *Language of Thought* approach, while attempting to explain how people communicate, is no more than a refinement of the dualist construction. Again Fodor presents the idea of a mysterious inner, where sensory input and language is somehow interpreted into ‘mentalese’ and then converted back into a public language. It is only through a kind of inner viewing that mental processing can be made apparent. Fodor goes a bit further in trying to explain the ‘hidden’ workings of the ‘inner’, and he has constructed an elaborate theory to do this. Fodor himself considers the limitations of his theory by stating that it only works in areas of the mind that are modular, or in peripheral systems, such as perception and motor control. Daniel Dennett attempts to take the information processing approach further, when he claims “the mind is like computer software and the neurophysiology of the brain is irrelevant to the debate around the mind-body problem” (Dennett, 1978, p. 112). Dennett reinforces the point made earlier that the medium (brain or electronics or gears or pulleys) is assumed to be
irrelevant to the actual processes. He is a firm believer that artificial intelligence is the best way to explain consciousness. Dennett regards consciousness as a mystery. He makes consciousness into a phenomenon. He states that brains are conscious and that they make consciousness. It would appear here that what Dennett is trying to say is that the brain is conscious, but it is not fully clear what is meant by consciousness. If it means being aware and being able to perceive, then it is perhaps better to say that a person is conscious or unconscious, as opposed to a brain being conscious or unconscious.

The information processing approach does not explain what thinking is or what consciousness is. The mind is seen to be like a computer programme. The analogy that it uses, while simple and easy to understand, is not correct. A computer programme is written by someone, it is limited in its application. The problem is that thinking is conceived of as representations and that these are assumed to imply an inner descriptive language, which is logic-like. It is not clear how it works or how meaningful experience or direct awareness can be brought about by it. The Internet contains all the knowledge and fantasies of humans all over the world and could be considered a very comprehensive ‘representation’ of knowledge. However, it is not considered ‘conscious’ or ‘aware’ or how direct awareness can be brought about by it. The Internet, for example, contains all the knowledge and fantasies of humans from all over the world and could be considered a very comprehensive ‘representation’ of knowledge and yet it is not considered conscious or aware. Something needs to be added to the Internet to make conscious or aware. The information processing approach does not account for the complexity and diversity of thought, thinking and consciousness, nor does it embrace the gamut of human emotion. It is, in essence, a modernisation and refinement of dualism, where the ‘wetware’ is the physical brain, which in a computer would be ‘hardware’ (the actual circuits and wires). Software is the formal language placed onto the machine and proponents of the information processing approach claim that software can run on either wetware or hardware (it is irrelevant which). The problem is the underlying assumption that a formal logic (Turing machine) can explain all information systems, including human knowledge. This is not necessarily true of all processes of logic as proven by Hilbert and Godel (Cellucci, 1992), so why would it be true as an explanation of human thought?

The information processing approach towards the mind-body problem may be seen to be another reductionist approach, where instead of mind-to-body, there is a mind-to-machine approach. The idea is that the mind is supposed to be the programme, so it may be better to talk about a programme-to-machine approach. It may be acceptable that some comparisons of “certain aspects of psychic functions with certain operations of some machines” can be made.
The wholehearted adoption of the idea of the mind as computational and being exactly like computer software, has been criticised. Putnam (cited in Moravia, 2007, p.145) clarifies the difference between computers and humans to be that the computer can only undertake basic factual and causal ‘if…then’ type functions. Humans have complex thoughts, and do not only work on a causal basis. In addition, a computer merely responds to its program it can never be said to be wrong, it is merely following its program. A counter argument would be robots like Google’s self-driving car which responds interactively to its environment. By even the interactive responding to the environment is due to following a program. Human behaviour and human thought, possibly due to the complex systems of practices develop among humans. These systems are based on the kinds of embodied beings that we are, and on the systems of meanings that we require to maintain cohesive social systems. It is questionable whether a mechanism can be made which would appreciate these complex systems.

Humans may show emotion or preferences for things, and in so doing, be able to achieve satisfaction when they have accomplished a task, unlike a machine. The welfare of a human is affected by circumstances. A machine or computer may be adversely affected by events and circumstances, but its welfare cannot be affected, as it is inanimate (Hacker, 1993).

3.4.1 Connectionism or neural nets Connectionism or neural nets may be seen to be a variation of the information processing approach or functionalist approach. Connectionism differs from other information processing approaches in how it represents the inner storage process of information taking place within networks of nerve cells. The information is not stored as elements of formal logic but is stored in the nerve cell networks. The way that the information moves along the networks comprises the actual mental states or cognitive processes. Neural nets can be linked to reductionism, as this eliminates the notion of the mind.

The neural nets have not been based on the actual neural nets, but rather on a stylised system. The nets are divided into three groups, namely input nets, hidden nets and output nets. The result is a network where each ‘neuron’ in one group is connected to all ‘neurones’ in the next group. The neurones in the input nets are connected to the neurons in the hidden nets, which are in turn connected to the neurons in the output net. The neuron in the input net sends an activation value to each of the neurones in the hidden net to which it is connected. Based on the activation value that is has received, each neuron in the hidden net then determines its own activation value, which it transmits to either another neuron in the hidden net or to a neuron in the output net. The strengths between the neurones determine the pattern of activation of the net. It is assumed that the functioning of mental states depends on the strength of the connection between the neurones.
It is not exactly clear how these ‘fuzzy’ categories such as neural nets tie up with formal logic, although mathematically, they can be shown to be approximately equivalent. The point is that a neural net can be simulated with a digital computer (which is what the European ‘Brain Project’ is trying to do. The *Representational Theory of Mind* (2000) proposed by Fodor could tie up with this connectionist theory, by supposing that there could be bundles of neural nets that would be associated with various representations. An example would be, for instance, the notion that everything to do with the subject ‘dogs’ would be included in a specific neural network. Fodor explicitly denies this notion. He is of the view that inner symbols must be the type of things that can be dealt with in a formal logic-like system, or with a certain ‘systematicity’. Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) identify a feature of human intelligence called ‘systematicity’, which is difficult to explain through associative methodology. Fodor and Pylyshyn believe that thinking is a type of mentalese, or inner language code, which is determined by rules. According to Fodor, if the initial belief is true, then the thoughts that follow from that are also likely to be true and are known as ‘truth preserving’. If it were not so, then there would not be much point in thinking. Pylyshyn and Fodor’s idea of truth is linked to how it functions in formal logic. Extrapolating this notion further leads to the notion that reasoning is an exercise in logic. Indeed, according to Fodor and Pylyshyn, it is only through a formal structure (where information is represented by strings of symbols as opposed to the connectionist where information is stored in connection strengths between the neurons in a neural net) that connectionism can achieve the same level of truth preserving’ processing, as well address the systematicity and productivity of thought.

These connectionist views are related to how the brain works, although according to a much simpler model. It is not clear how they relate to the issue of mental phenomena. The lack of clarity raises the question of how sense awareness comes about out of all these disembodied formal processes.

Whilst the information processing approach may be likened to computer software or programs, the neural net model is more like the actual process of linking various computers within a network. It attempts to describe the neuro-physiological process of how we think, and is related to brain activity. This neuro-scientific approach is becoming more and more important. It is a reductionist approach, where the concept of the ‘mind’ is eliminated. Mental activity is accounted for as being a type of an illusion that arises out of the brain processes, or from folk psychology, as propounded by the Churchlands. While it may be seen as a form of reductionism where it eliminates ‘mind’, it distributes information of the inner representations over a system of neural networks that somehow result in the outer, such as behaviour,
including speech etc. It is clear that brains are involved with thinking. Whilst the neural net approach does not have the traditional idea of the mind, this approach is still dualist, where there are inner representations and outer behaviours.

3.5 Summary remarks

The theoretical psychology outlined above arises out of implicit and sometimes naïve assumptions that come about from philosophical reflections. The Cartesian dualistic account is the predominant view that is used to try to account and explain cognitive or mental phenomena. Dualism is difficult to avoid; ‘I’ am a subject that can have my own thoughts that no one can perceive, and I am seemingly living in a physical world that is not constructed by ‘me’. Idealists may have a different conception of the world. Most of the discourse used when trying to explain the mental process is based on the dualistic assumption of an inner mental process affecting outer behaviour. This is true even when used by those who deny the Cartesian aspect, such as the eliminative materialism approach, where mental processes such as thought and reflection are deemed folk psychology, and where the brain replaces the mind. In this instance, the brain is the inner that affects the outer or behaviour. The cognitivist or the information process purports to explain how the brain works, but it, too, reinforces the notion on a mysterious inner. It is left up to behaviourism to explain the outer, which simply negates the whole tradition, by stating that behaviour is the expression of the reactions to external stimuli, completely ignoring the idea of inner.

Psychology has been conceptualised and based on the Cartesian dualist model and as such it is not easily discarded. Theoretical psychology has not been able to shed this model despite coming up with sophisticated theories such as cognition and cognitive neuroscience. Theoretical psychology seems to be caught in Cartesian dualism thinking and even new and current theories seem to be unable to move away from a dualist account of mental processes. The notion of the mind as a thing, whether tangible or not, is deeply embedded in the thinking process and theories. It is accepted and the theories that have evolved to explain this notion of mind have become exceedingly more complex.

This chapter has attempted to provide a context within which Wittgenstein’s thought is to be understood and which will be dealt with in the following two chapters.
Chapter Four

WITTGENSTEIN’S CRITIQUE OF THE NOTION OF MIND

4. General overview

I have shown the progression of thought over the past two chapters from how the mind-body problem evolved to how contemporary thinkers attempt to address the issue. The question of how Wittgenstein addresses the issue and where he fits into the discussion can now be discussed greater depth.

Wittgenstein writes as though he is building philosophy from the ground up, totally outside the ordinary traditions of philosophy, which is to think in terms of existing paradigms. The main attack by Wittgenstein on the traditional way of thinking about a theory of mind is to look at the claims made when discussing terms such as ‘mind’, ‘subjectivity’ and ‘I’. Wittgenstein’s main problem is how these concepts are used and what they are commonly understood as implying. Although he rejects that these ideas refer to an inner space that reflects the world, he does not reject subjectivity outright. In so doing, he is able to show that ultimately, such statements are meaningless in the context of developing a whole new understanding of meaning itself.

Meaning is not to be understood as a pointer to a universal truth, as Plato suggested, nor is it a symbolic configuration in the brain, but rather has to do with social practices. These would be the norms that are used by a society of language users within social practices. An example would be the use of a word like ‘I’, which can be used as a description of what one is doing, such as “I am typing”; or “I have a pain in my hand”, which is an expression of a sensation to another person. These uses do not imply the existences of an inner space. It is only when the use of the term ‘I’ implies an inner space that it becomes meaningless.

An overview of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus or Tractatus, shows that the notions in it seem to proceed from the belief (in common with Frege and Russell) that it should be possible to develop a universal logical language, which can describe all truth. Wittgenstein seemed to have believed that these truths are embedded in how the rules (of this logic) are applied across the propositions (statements of fact), which signify, or picture the world. Later, he came to question whether such a single formal language is possible. From this came the idea that different domains of rule-use are possible, which depend on context, which he referred to them as ‘language games’.
What Wittgenstein seemed to have retained (beyond the problem of how thought relates to the world) is the idea that meaning is dependent on the use of rules. Not the firm rules of formal logic, however, but normative rules that were developed from practical considerations among communities of language-users. His notion that meaning is dependent on rules use leads to his criticism that the philosophic tradition is playing the wrong game. Elaborate explanations of phenomena are developed that are misunderstood or misrepresented, an example of which is that thinking is explained as a mechanical process of symbol manipulation ‘inside’ the brain. The statement “I think” suggests an object ‘I’ that is performing an action is very much in line with the idea of Descartes’ soul. Wittgenstein’s point is that this need not be the case. The expression “I think” is used in various ways in relation to the involvement with other people, in other words, the context in which it is used. For example, it can mean to give an opinion, or it can mean the ‘act of thinking’.

4.1 The Tractatus: The search for a universal logic of truth

Although people such as Schopenhauer, influenced Wittgenstein, the works of Frege and Russell inspired the Tractatus (Monk 2005). As logic concerns itself with truth statements and their interrelationships, it was thought that there could be a perfectly logical language, which expresses all truth. Initially Wittgenstein was supportive of this view, but he later came to doubt it. Frege thought of language as a guide to the thoughts that it conveys. Russell thought that language is a structure for describing facts. However, there are certain developments within the field of logic, which make the idea of a single, all-encompassing logical system implausible, and perhaps impossible, as Russell discovered with his set theory.

Through his interest in the philosophy of mathematics and an interest in the nature of logic, Wittgenstein wanted to study with Frege, whose contribution to philosophy was symbolic logic. Frege’s view is that logic is a family member of mathematics. He also developed a theory of symbols and how symbols relate to what is symbolised. Frege may be regarded as an adversary of the school of idealism and in particular, of Husserl, as he did not believe that logic could be grounded in the realm of the mental (psychologism). Logical statements are true due their logic, which need not hold for psychological entities. Frege believed that truth is revealed in logic. In an attempt to explore Frege’s ideas, Husserl developed phenomenology. Husserl believed that contemplating the way the world presents itself directly in thought could reveal truth. In this way his thinking was similar to Descartes. Frege referred Wittgenstein to Bertrand Russell, who was at that stage trying to develop a theory of logic for language together with Whitehead, Principia Mathematic (1910). Russell
developed logical atomism, which consists of logic-like inner representations comprising of elements (logic atoms), which refer to facts about the world; a sort of language of thought. The thinking at the time, as well as later, was to try to find a formal descriptive (logical language) for these representations that describe the world, and from that, show that the mind can be understood in terms of formal logic-like processes, which underlie rational thought.

Frege and Russell were of the view that normal everyday language was defective and that logic and philosophy were able to counter this defect and would be able to provide a perfect logical language for philosophy. It was out of the coming together of Russell and Wittgenstein that the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (*Tractatus*) came into being. Wittgenstein was interested in both the problems of logic and metaphysics and he was heavily influenced by Frege and Russell. He approached his problems “from the perspective of the Cambridge analytical revolt against Absolute Idealism, reinforced by the complementary Fregean realist revolt against German psychologism” (Hacker 1996, p. 23). ‘Absolute Idealism’ refers here to the metaphysics of Hegel, which was very popular at that time.

These influences can be seen in Wittgenstein’s treatment of, and the relation of, language and reality. In particular, Wittgenstein accepted that the main function of words is to name and that the main function of sentences is to describe. He also accepted that there is a connection between words and their meanings. It is noteworthy that Wittgenstein also accepted, at that stage, the anti-psychologism of Frege and Russell. According to Monk, 2005, he did not want to get caught up in psychological matters. Rather, he wanted to study the logical structure of all statements relating to truth (Monk, ibid.). At issue was the truth structure required of statements in logic that enable them to be considered true. Frege and others assumed that logic reveals the formal laws of thought, but it was not clear whether Wittgenstein was of the same view. Frege saw sign language as a correlation to the study of thought processes, and he thought that psychological matters were unnecessary.

The *Tractatus* was an attempt to create such a logical and logically self-consistent language. Its view was to create a final system for using pictures as representations of fact (every word has a picture associated with it) and of the structure of the world (in its ‘objective’, physical aspect). Wittgenstein tried to show that language is a logically consistent formal system, while proposing that sentences are expressions of thought. Wittgenstein wanted to develop a comprehensive, homogenous system of logic in which all truth-statements could fit. While it was not clear that this could cover all types of thought, it was often taken for granted that this is what it implied. The implication was then that thought could be viewed as a sort of language, made up of thought parts. There is a sort of language of thought, much
as Fodor suggests (he bases his language of thought on the early Wittgenstein), which is different to the natural language used for expressing thoughts.

According to Frege’s theory of symbols, a name is fixed to an object when that object is meant when its name is used. Hence, its meaning is established. The intentionality (where this means the way in which thought points at something or refers; a more logic-functional use of the word than Brentano or Husserl) of something depends on the intentionality of the thought, which is linked to the meaning of the object. Understanding is considered to be a mental process that interprets the sounds heard and gives them the same meaning as was intended by the speaker. The *Tractatus* attempts to explain thought, language and reality by seeking to understand in which cases a thought is true, has content, is intentional, and will make known what it is that will make a thought true.

It was through Frege’s theory and the *Tractatus*, that Wittgenstein was later to develop a different method for dealing with these issues as, Wittgenstein said, “the *Tractatus* was not all wrong: it was not like a bag of junk professing to be a clock, but like a clock that does not work” (Wittgenstein, cited in Anscombe, 1971, p. 78).

Some aspects of the original work were maintained, and led to overturning the original assumptions about what logic can do. What was maintained is the use to which elements are put, rather than something essential about the elements themselves. This notion leads to Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘meaning’ as ‘grammar’.

Wittgenstein states in the preface to the *Tractatus* that he thought that the problems in philosophy arise from a misunderstanding of the logic of language. His aim in *Tractatus* was to put a limit to thought. He states that to do so would mean having to be aware of what thoughts can be thought, and what thoughts cannot be thought. So, he limited himself to a discussion of the expression of thought. Given that it is not possible to know what cannot be thought, the border can only be drawn in language. Anything other than that, he considered to be nonsense. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein thought that he had solved the problems of psychology, and he attempted to explain the problems through a series of propositions. Once the propositions were read and understood, and crucially - accepted, then there would be no need to discuss philosophical matters further. The book would have served its purpose.

The impact of the *Tractatus* was, in the Anglo-Saxon world especially, to fundamentally change the way philosophers considered philosophy - from considering ultimate questions, to analysing how meanings are conveyed in language. It may be said that Wittgenstein, in the *Tractatus*, introduced a ‘linguistic turn’ in analytic philosophy, by trying to set the limits of language and thought, by focusing on language and its forms and structures. Heidegger
inspired a similar ‘turn’, in the German world, which was transferred to France after the Second World War.

The effect of the *Tractatus* with its emphasis on clarity and argument and respect for logic and science influenced the development of logical positivism through its impact on the Vienna Circle. The Vienna Circle comprised a group of philosophers and physicists, who congregated around Moritz Schlick, who held a chair at the University of Vienna. Initial members included Friedrich Weismann and Herbert Feigl. Later members included Rudolf Carnap and Kurt Gödel, amongst others. There was also a group in Berlin, known as the Berlin Group, and there was close dialogue between the two groups. The Vienna Circle had its origins in empiricism and was inclined to favour Hume’s idealist tradition. It was not accommodating of realist (Platonist) analysis. Wittgenstein met Schlick on a regular basis. Schlick commenting on the *Tractatus*, was of the following view:

This book, in my unshakeable conviction is the most significant philosophical work of our time [...] The scope of these ideas is in truth immeasurable: anyone who reads them with understanding must thereafter be a changed man from a philosophical point of view (Schlick, as cited in Hacker, 1996, p. 40).

The *Tractatus* was read and discussed at the weekly meetings of the Vienna Circle. Although some of the ideas were interpreted and perhaps also misinterpreted by the members, the impact on the members was huge, where Carnap and Ayer acknowledged Wittgenstein and also Bertrand Russell and to a lesser degree Frege as fundamental influences.

The Vienna Circle tried to develop ontology for modern physics without any metaphysical speculation. It used the *Tractatus* as a basis to develop ‘logical positivism’, which accepted scientific knowledge as the only sort of factual knowledge. All other knowledge was considered meaningless and was discarded. By the mid-1930s, the Vienna Circle started to break up, Frege had died in 1925, some members accepted chairs at foreign universities, and Schlick was murdered. Nazism was on the increase, and other members were forced to leave Austria for English-speaking countries.

Consequently the philosophical debate, although commonly made as an over-generalisation, which can be contested, may be divided into two: the Anglo-Saxon, which comes from Vienna (and could be known as the Austrian Anglo-Saxon) and the Continental (linked back via Heidegger to German Romanticism) thinkers. The Anglo-Saxon thinkers, also known as the analytical or the logical positivists, use scientific ideas of symbolism, deduction and proof when developing theories. They tend to follow the idea of a broadly coherent
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underlying theory which forms the basis for the development of other theories. The Continental thinkers after the war, tended to stress language more, mainly as a result of French commentaries by Foucault, Derrida etc., in reaction to Heidegger, while also focusing more on the social-cultural contexts and the role of social forces. Wittgenstein, it would seem, straddles both groups, as he created more than one stream, mainly in the English-speaking world. His earlier work in the *Tractatus*, which has a broadly coherent underlying theory and structure accounting for the nature of logic and the metaphysical structure of the world, was used as the basis for logical positivism. His later work tended to focus on the importance of social context, and, in particular, on how the use of language within a particular social context determines its meaning.

4.2 Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy – A kink in the development of thought

Wittgenstein withdrew from philosophy for many years, during which time he was a teacher in a small village in Austria, a gardener in a monastery, and he designed his sister’s house. He continued, however, to produce many notes, particularly when he moved to England to avoid Hitler. Wittgenstein also became a lecturer at Cambridge where the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* was submitted as doctoral dissertation and published, even though it had been written many years earlier in the final throes of the First World War. The *Philosophical Investigations* reflects the change in thinking from a young man to that of a more mature person. A person who has had time to incorporate the various influences in his life, including his earlier work on the *Tractatus*, the notions of Romanticism, his life experiences, such as his upbringing and tragic family circumstances, where two of his brothers committed suicide, and the effect of two World Wars.

Wittgenstein wrote the *Philosophical Investigations* as an attempt to bring about the end of philosophy (Stroll, 2002). He wrote it as a type of dialogue where he struggles with an imaginary critic, quite possibly himself. The Investigations is not written in a flowing narrative but tends to criss-cross and appear rather jumbled, as Wittgenstein comes at problems from various angles. He likens his attempts to being a tour guide through the streets of London, where roads are traversed and repeatedly traversed without any apparent clear plan. The purpose of such writing is, according to Wittgenstein, not to provide a concrete theory, but rather to try to get people to think. He attempts to jolt the reader out of complacency and an armchair style of reading by involving them in an interactive thinking experience, where they do not merely agree with what he is saying, but rather they need to try to work out what is implied.
In contrast to the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein describes the *Philosophical Investigations* as a ‘kink’ in the development of thought. The *Investigations* may be considered to be a break with the philosophic tradition of theory of mind, the origins of which were discussed in Chapter Two and the current ways of dealing with it were dealt with in Chapter Three. The *Investigations* has no clear tradition out of which it arises. Wittgenstein developed a completely new way of conceiving ‘meaning’ and then working out what this implies. Traditionally, meaning was explained in terms of ‘essences’ (the realism of Plato or Aristotle) or as inherently meaningless symbols used by those ascribing to ‘nominalism’. Wittgenstein rejects both and sees ‘meaning’ as the norms for the use of symbols adopted by people for practical reasons, which are not arbitrary. They must be used correctly to communicate effectively. Everything else in Wittgenstein’s writing flows from this premise. Wittgenstein’s aim is to help people avoid the assumptions that come about as a result of the way that people use grammar and language. The *Investigations* broke with the idea that language is dependent on an underlying logic-based theory of language. Language is used in so many different ways to mean a variety of things, what Wittgenstein famously referred to as ‘language games’, that it is not possible to describe a singular underlying logic underpinning this use. Wittgenstein came so see that a logically consistent formal system is a closed system that can refer only to itself, and that it cannot cater to the different ways of use or the language games. The logical form of language or its syntax cannot solely account for meaning. It goes without saying that the symbols or pictures used in language cannot interpret themselves.

Wittgenstein was particularly aware of the temptations caused by the rules that govern how meaning is established (Wittgenstein uses the term ‘grammar’ to indicates these rules of meaning) as opposed to constructing elaborate theories. He had done so in the *Tractatus*. His purpose was then to clear up the confusion caused by language, which has resulted in philosophical confusion. His method was to attack the problem at its roots, namely by looking at the way that words are used.

The later Wittgenstein came to reject theories of mind, and to reject the need for theories. He believed that philosophers were tending to imitate science by creating formal explanations that tend to limit rather than to free. Wittgenstein rejected the traditional theory of mind, as it is based on a structural model of how the mind works. Wittgenstein believed that this model of the mind is incorrect. In the mid-1940s, Wittgenstein abandoned his works on mathematics to concentrate on the philosophy of the psychology, which he pursued until shortly before his death in 1951.
Wittgenstein attempts, by criticising the works of others in an apparently disjointed way, to get people to understand that the idea of a mind ‘inside’ themselves reflecting and representing a world ‘outside’ themselves, is fundamentally flawed. To understand means to investigate, to get to the very bottom, to get to the ground of philosophy. To understand requires investigating how words gather their meaning through the use of language, or as Wittgenstein terms it, through the ‘grammar of language’.

Wittgenstein’s philosophy moves from the unitary crystalline, pure logic of the Tractatus, where the influence of Frege and Russell is strongly felt, to the seemingly chaotic, pluralistic Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein states in the Investigations that he sees his role as having to destroy the houses of cards built by the philosophers, and to clear up the ground of language upon which they are built. Wittgenstein sees his role as someone who has to show people the way out of the quagmire of grammar-induced misconceptions. The path that he leads over is not linear. It criss-crosses over areas already gone over as he seeks to help people see through the “bewitchment of their intelligence through language” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p.27). This bewitchment has created a number of flawed accounts of a theory of the mind, without a concern for the problem of meaning. It does not explain what it purports to explain, and the ‘entity’ being explained is the result of philosophical confusion.

4.2.1 Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy When considering Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, it should be kept in mind that he only produced one book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (and this was actually his doctoral dissertation which was subsequently published) during his lifetime. The Blue and Brown books which consisted of notes that he dictated to two of his students when his classes had gotten too big for him to be comfortable with and their partial reconstruction of his lectures and most of his work (Philosophical Investigations, Zettel and On Certainty) have been produced posthumously, as he was constantly revising it. There are volumes of bound photocopies and rolls of microfilm of his handwritten notes, not all of which have yet been exposed to critical scrutiny. The Investigations is more of a focused extract of what he regarded as the ‘core’ of his thought: a reflection of his inner dialogue. Wittgenstein is on record as saying that he would have liked to have the Tractatus and the Investigations printed together in one volume so that he “could publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking” (Wittgenstein, 1958, preface).

In considering Wittgenstein’s notion of philosophy, it is important to keep both works in mind, as those views that he espoused in the Tractatus are the very ones he cautions against
in the *Philosophical Investigations*. The *Tractatus* is in contrast to the philosophical notions embodied in the *Philosophical Investigations*. The former proposes an underlying theory to account for the logical forms of thought, language and the world, while the latter seeks to have no theory, by situating meaning in the social context.

Kenny (2006) is of the view that despite the differences between the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* there is continuity to be found in Wittgenstein’s views on the nature of philosophy. Stroll, (2002, pp. 80-81) states that there is a continuity in Wittgenstein’s thinking from his early studies with Bertrand Russell, through to his final writings in 1951. Stroll (2002,) further states that the continuity is based on the presuppositions that the purpose of philosophy is to describe the world correctly towards *understanding* rather than reduced to scientific description. It is almost as if Wittgenstein is a kind of phenomenologist, perceiving direct engagement as more fundamental than indirect explanation, but without becoming an idealist. If these suppositions are taken to be correct, then there is a continuity of thought, from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations*, which shows an evolution in thinking, where the latter differs quite considerably from the former, but where it is still possible to see how the latter evolved.

For the later Wittgenstein, the aim of philosophy is to provide clarity on why things mean what they do, as opposed to an explanation of what things are. He considers words as they are used in everyday use. He tries to give them proper descriptions of ordinary everyday use. Wittgenstein wants to describe the descriptions and organise them to see what the connections are between them, what the similarities and the differences are. Wittgenstein maintained that the problem is that people misunderstand aspects of language because they don’t reflect on it due to using it every day. The use of the word ‘explanation’ leads people to think of scientific matters, such as an explanation of the ‘mechanism’, by which something works. It is by wanting to describe things and by not explaining them, by not conducting empirical studies as is done in scientific studies, that Wittgenstein shows that philosophy is not like other sciences. Philosophy should not be regarded as the ‘Queen of Science’ (Kenny, 2006, p.182). Philosophy is not like science where there is large body of work which is constantly being built on by successive generations of scientists.

Sluga (2011, p. 74) states that Wittgenstein introduced a plurality of thinking, which stands in contrast to a tradition of philosophy and science that always acted in support of the ideal of unity. Words can refer to the world in only one way (ultimately based on factual state of affairs, or the Platonic ‘forms’). There is a tendency to develop a unifying theory, for example when it comes to whether it is about religion and having only one God or whether it
is a ‘big bang theory’. Unity as an ideal has shaped virtually everything that is thought about, from philosophy, to science, to society. Wittgenstein challenges this unifying principle and the assumption that words can refer to the world in only one way (ultimately based on factual state of affairs; or the Platonic ‘forms’ or ‘essences’). He tries to demonstrate meaning functions in different ways in different contexts, relative to the practical concerns of language users. Sluga (ibid.) has noted that Wittgenstein argues for diversity in the world. People have diverse world pictures (Weltanschauung) and systems. A unifying principle struggles to account for diversity and plurality. Wittgenstein moved from the Tractatus where he maintained that the world is the plurality facts, but that there was a singular, unitary underlying logic of the world. Wittgenstein replaces the mathematical logic that he used as the methodology in the Tractatus, which explains the world as atomic facts, with an everyday discourse describing everyday life. The later Wittgenstein is of the view that there is no one singular logic in the world, as he considers that there may be various relations between language forms and forms of life.

For Wittgenstein, the body of philosophical work over the past two and half millennia, and, in particular, the past three to four hundred years, has been constructed on a false basis. The result of which is philosophy enjoying greater esteem than the sciences because it is presumed to focus on ‘ultimate’ questions about the essences of things. Wittgenstein considered philosophy to be different to other disciplines. It has a unique set of problems. Philosophy is an activity of clarification, not of theory building. For Wittgenstein philosophy is all consuming, almost a way of life.

The descriptive and sometimes seemingly-disjointed method used by Wittgenstein is reminiscent of the Socratic style, but as Stroll states, Wittgenstein’s method is wholly original. The purpose of the descriptions is to clarify the propositions to avoid confusions that may arise out of what is being said. The purpose of describing everyday life is, according to Stroll, to provide the background for that everyday life. It is this background that is associated with certainty and it is not “revisable or eliminable like scientific theory or historical conjecture”, (Stroll, 2002, p. 82).

4.2.2 Philosophy as therapy Kenny (2006, p.13) has noted that Wittgenstein sees the aim of philosophy as being therapeutic, to cure us of talking non-sense (not making sense) and being tormented by problems for which there is no solution.

It is the ‘patient’s’ use of words that leads to the philosophical confusions that are seemingly unsolvable. The patient here is the philosopher. The philosopher is suffering from being unable to solve the philosophical problems tormenting her. That is, Wittgenstein notes,
why it is important to look at the ‘patient’s’ exact words to understand where and how the
confusion arises:

The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness…
He should not try to terminate a disease of thought, for slow cure is all
important […] there are different philosophical methods, like different
therapies. (Wittgenstein, 1958, p.16)

While able to criticise traditional philosophy, Wittgenstein was also respectful and
cognisant of the problems that it faced in trying to solve difficult problems. However, his
main contention is that traditional philosophy tries to squeeze the “complex world into
preconceived patterns (conceptual models or visions) of how things must be”, (Stroll, 2002, p.
85). Such an approach leads to confusion. As Wittgenstein said:

Human beings are profoundly enmeshed in philosophical - i.e. grammatical -
confusions. They cannot be freed without first being extricated from the
extraordinary variety of associations, which hold them prisoner. You have as
it were to reconstitute their entire language. (Wittgenstein, as cited in Kenny,

In this comment, Wittgenstein refers to the ‘grammar’ as related to how the meanings
(rules of use) of words should be understood, rather than to the common use of the word
‘grammar’ as it is traditionally understood as syntax.

Of course there isn’t a philosophical grammar and an ordinary English
grammar, the former being more complete, since it includes ostensive
definitions […], Russell’s theory of descriptions, etc. These are not to be
found in ordinary grammar books; but this is not the important difference.
The important difference is in the aims for which the study of grammar are
pursued by the linguist and the philosopher […] The grammarian has no
interest in these; his aims and the philosophers’ are different. We are pulling
ordinary grammar to bits. (Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 40)

According to Monk (2005), Wittgenstein later came to believe all philosophical theories
are confusions, which have arisen due to language and the notion that language works as a
picturing of reality. Language as a picturing of reality refers to the ‘mapping’ of logic-like
propositions onto the state of affairs of things in the world. People are trapped by the imagery
created by language, and these philosophical confusions and the pictures become enmeshed. Elaborate theories are built to try to explain the way out of the confusion, as those developed by cognitivists, including functionalists, such as Fodor in his ‘language of thought’ and his ‘theory of representation theory’. Cognitivism rests on the functionalist assumption that the formal process of logic is what matters, where the physical medium, such as a brain, is irrelevant. Wittgenstein sees it, took on the task of disentangling the entangled state by using imagination because to do it through argument proves limiting, as the argument is part of the entangled, enmeshed confusion. The use of imagination is given through the examples that he cites, and through the language games that he mentions.

4.2.2.1 Wittgenstein’s Therapeutic Method Both Freud and Wittgenstein were Austrians, and both came to end their days in the United Kingdom. Wittgenstein knew of Freud’s early work, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), and often quoted from Freud’s works. Wittgenstein’s sister had a short session of psychoanalysis with Freud, and later helped him escape from the Germans. Wittgenstein thought of his work as therapy, but he was critical of Freud. In his letters to Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein writes:

Unless you think very clearly, psychoanalysis (sic) is a dangerous and foul practice and it’s done no end of harm and comparatively very little good.

(Wittgenstein, as cited in Malcolm, 1984, p. 101)

Wittgenstein’s therapeutic method is based on his theory of meaning, which is completely different to Freud’s psychoanalytic method of philosophy. Wittgenstein was openly critical of Freud. None-the-less, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic method may be considered to be similar to the method employed in psychoanalysis. The Freudian notion of psychoanalysis as ‘depth-psychology’ could be seen as analogous to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘depth-grammar’ (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 88). Both consider that the patient has deep-rooted prejudices adopted from social ways of thinking that manifest in symptoms such as being in a state of torment. For both Freud and Wittgenstein, it is essential for the treatment that the patient acknowledges that there is problem, and that the problem has been correctly diagnosed, such that we may be successfully cured. Like Freud’s patient, in therapy, the philosopher is forced to accept that the particular grammatical analogy that has led us towards formulations that support the philosophic tradition. Wittgenstein’s therapy involves a ‘patient’ needing to change their entire way of thinking. It starts with looking at what the philosopher is likely to say, and then examines the technologies of language that guide the formulation.
The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human beings, and it was possible for the sickness of philosophical problems to get cured only through a changed mode of thought and of life, not through a medicine invented by an individual. (Wittgenstein, 1983, p.132)

Wittgenstein’s approach of digging at the ‘grammar’ of language is similar to Freud’s, where he attempts to dig at the bottom of the patient’s unconsciousness to understand their symptoms, as part of a therapy involving a complete psychological transformation.

Both Freud and Wittgenstein consider that the patient has a resistance to accepting that there is a problem and that it is necessary to gain the acknowledgement of the existence of a problem. It may be that the resistance is unconscious and that this unconscious aspect in both the work of Freud and Wittgenstein, respectively, needs to be revealed. Wittgenstein tries to get his patient to acknowledge the dogmas arising out of the philosophic tradition that have caused a particular way of thinking. The patient has to want to acknowledge this notion, and must be willing to do so, or else it will not happen. Wittgenstein envisages that this can be done by showing the patient that there are various ways or various aspects of ‘seeing something’. Wittgenstein’s famous example of a ‘duck/rabbit’ image, amongst others, proves instructive. The viewer perceives a drawing of either a duck or a rabbit, or both simultaneously. The different ways of seeing or changing the aspect can be considered similar in approach to Freud’s use of free association, which permits the patient to think uncritically about his/her thoughts. In so doing, the patient is allowed to acknowledge that which has been hidden or repressed. Wittgenstein attempts to get the ‘patient’ a to look at the problems and in this case the mind-body problem, from a new aspect. This new aspect consists of focussing on how meaning comes about through language used by a community of language users. As with Freud’s therapeutic methods, Wittgenstein’s process is a long-term endeavour.

4.3 Wittgenstein’s critique of traditional prejudices

Wittgenstein considered various themes in a piecemeal way, as if struggling with various false assumptions. He did this in a manner of kind of dialogue with himself; an alter ego often referred to by commentators as ‘the interlocutor’. He tried to think through the implications of some of the hidden assumptions in philosophy, especially those pertaining to the ‘philosophy of ‘mind’’. His attempts to deal with these issues are not presented in a clear, well-defined structure. They are rather dealt with in a disjointed way, moving from one theme to another, as he tries to ‘think through’ the issues without ‘building a system’ to replace
those which he destroys. Wittgenstein assumed people to be in torment, and that they wanted to be free of the philosophical problems that beset them. The sections that follow constitute Wittgenstein’s method, which aims at introducing a more rigorous methodological reflexivity. Wittgenstein’s methodological concern over the meaning of propositions, words and concepts in philosophy lead in his later works, to the classification of psychological concepts.

4.3.1 Propositions, words and concepts Wittgenstein explores the way in which propositions or expressions in language acquire and retain meaning. Traditionally, propositions are treated like facts (truth-statements), which refer to the words existing in the mind ‘representing’ the world in a symbol system (Fodor’s view). It was also the view in the *Tractatus*, where the proposition represents a fact; much the same way as a picture represents an object.

Wittgenstein states in the *Blue Book* that there are, in essence, two forms of proposition: one that describes facts in a material or external world, and another that describes personal experiences. According to Wittgenstein, this means that there is a tendency towards the Cartesian dualist interpretation, “that here we have two kinds of worlds, worlds built of different material; a mental world and a physical world” (Wittgenstein, 1960, p. 47).

Wittgenstein describes how, through the use of the same proposition, different meanings come about: The propositions ‘a has a gold tooth’ and ‘a has a toothache’ are not used analogously. They differ in their grammar, where, at first sight, they might not seem to do so (Wittgenstein, 1960, p. 47).

Wittgenstein shows that, at first glance there is no difference in meaning between the two propositions, in fact, the propositions have different functions and service different needs. The former describes an attribute (the tooth), and the latter describes a state (of pain). Wittgenstein later rejects all of those interpretations of prepositions, including all metaphysical interpretations that lead to cognitivism, eliminative materialism and behaviourism.

In his later works, Wittgenstein considers that the meaning of a word or a concept has to do with how it is used by a community of language users. Words can have various meanings depending on the context in which they are used, which is always a social context. An example of this is Wittgenstein’s later views on solipsism, and in particular, the use of the word ‘I’ with regard to the first person/third person asymmetry (Sluga, 2011). Wittgenstein uses ‘I’ as both an object and a subject. ‘I’ or ‘my’ is used as an object when referring to the human body and its characteristics, for example, “I have broken my arm” or “I have grown six inches” (Sluga, 2011, p. 63). ‘I’ is used as an object, which has been identified and spoken
about. When referring to mental states, mental process or sensations, the use of the ‘I’ is as a subject. It is a direct expression of how something is experienced by me.

In some sense, Wittgenstein accepts the concept of subjectivity. However, he questions whether ‘subject’ implies ‘mind-stuff’ in a Cartesian sense, namely that which refers to the entire metaphysical construction of an ‘inner space’ where a description of experience can somehow be perceived in an act of ‘introspection’. ‘I’ is taken to refer to this inner object, ‘the place’ where the object is represented i.e. the mind. Wittgenstein uses examples to show that there is no object being referred to such as “I see so-and-so,” “I hear so-and-so”, “I try to lift my arm”; “I think it will rain” and “I have toothache” (Wittgenstein, 1960, pp. 66-67). These statements are not about stating facts, but are meant to draw attention to oneself. By stating “I have toothache”, I am showing that I am in pain. I want people to know that I am in pain, so that they can assist, or treat me with sympathy and understanding. Wittgenstein considers it “nonsensical to ask if I am sure that I am in pain” (Wittgenstein, 1960, p. 67). The non-sense or confusion arises because of the word ‘I’, which ironically it tends to make people draw attention away from and forget about the body itself, to obscure the body with the mind. It tends to makes people think that there is no ‘body’. But rather that there is something else which is ‘in’ their bodies, where the pain is revealed or identified and to which the ‘I’ refers to i.e. the mind. Wittgenstein believes this is where the Cartesian idea of the metaphysical ‘I’ arises and where confusion is caused.

4.3.2 Perspicuous representation of concepts Wittgenstein points out that philosophical problems are not empirical problems. They cannot be solved in a scientific manner, nor can they be solved by psychological experience. They can be solved in Übersichtliche Darstellung (roughly translated as ‘putting-it-there-in-view’) or by means of a perspicuous representation, which may be considered as an organised description of ordinary, everyday language, which is common knowledge to its community of users. Wittgenstein writes:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. – Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’, hence the importance of finding and inventing immediate cases (italics original). (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 28)

Looking at how a concept is used in its practical application, where the development of a formal theory is not necessary, can solve these problems. The aim of this argument is to
demonstrate that once people can use language correctly, they hold the (grammatical) knowledge to rid themselves of philosophical problems. In this instance, Wittgenstein is referring to the knowledge of a community of language users of which the individual is a member.

According to Budd, Wittgenstein understood the aim of the philosophy of psychology to be:

…the construction of perspicuous representations of everyday psychological concepts; this aim is achieved by the delineation of the grammar of psychological words; the importance of the philosophy of psychology derives from its underlying purpose, which is the dissolution of philosophical problems about the nature of the mind; these problems can be treated successfully only by attaining a synoptic view of the ordinary language of psychology. The philosophy of psychology is purely descriptive and in no way explanatory. (Budd, 1989, pp.1-2)

Wittgenstein maintains that the purpose of philosophy is to provide proper descriptions of ordinary language use. These descriptions are not meant to be explanatory. They are only meant to be descriptive. They should be organised in order to reveal the connections between the words, such as how similar they are, how they differ, and what connects them or what affinities they have. It is not that ordinary usage is incorrect, but rather that it is misunderstood, where everyday usage may obscure certain aspects of its meaning. The perspicuous representation helps to reveal a particular aspect of their use of words in a new way. It helps people to avoid creating theories and trying to explain things.

The perspicuous representation or organised overview focuses on the way in which language is used. It is helpful in considering the ways in which language could be used, even considering fragments of grammar, such as the grammar of psychological words or concepts. This grammar could then be broken down further into an organised description of those words or concepts. A particular philosophical problem would determine the propositions for a particular perspicuous representation. Two such methods of perspicuous representation Wittgenstein emphasises, are ‘language games’ and ‘family resemblances’.

4.3.2.1 Language Games Wittgenstein noted in the *Tractatus* that the logic of language was responsible for the philosophical problems. He unsuccessfully tried to develop a uniform system of logic that covers all truth about the world, which can be stated in any language. Wittgenstein later questioned whether such an endeavour was possible and used this as an example of how he as a philosopher had been misled by language into a confusing and
complicated philosophical pursuit. Wittgenstein wanted to show that the meaning of language is varied. As such, it cannot be made to fit into a preconceived notion to suit philosophical purposes.

One of the ways of considering how to focus on a word or concept and how to describe it is by looking at the language game of which it forms part. Wittgenstein considers the ‘meaning’ of a word not by implying some ‘mapping’ of an essential meaning onto an object in the world, as per the Western philosophic tradition since Plato. Instead, his conception of meaning concerns the way in which words are used in different contexts (the rules of their use are pragmatically established by language using communities).

According to Monk (2005), the notion of the language games was first put forward in the *Blue Book* in 1934 and was more widely used in the *Investigations* and *On Certainty*. A language game is not a game. Rather, it is means of depicting an activity or situation within everyday life. Each activity or situation is different. There are ‘builder activities’ or activities that have to do with construction such as moving building equipment, or ‘lawyer activities’ or activities pertaining to the legal profession such as filing heads of argument and other activities that focus on practices such as affirming, believing and following rules. The application of the game analogy to language helps Wittgenstein express the range of linguistic uses. An understanding of a language game is that it is “a more-or-less complicated, sharable human activity which might or might not, have utility, which could be grasped and stated outside the game” (Kenny, 2006, p. 133).

Wittgenstein uses the analogy of an ancient city with twisting winding streets and modern additions added to it with long straight roads to describe language and how it has developed. His conception of games is equally striking. Games do not in Wittgenstein’s explanation have any single feature that is common to all. There are many different types of games such as competitive games, solitary games, ball games and card games. Wittgenstein thought that the concept of the game shared many similarities and relationships with the concept of languages. In making these comparisons, Wittgenstein was trying to show how varied the language games could be. “The term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or form of life” (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 9-10).

Wittgenstein considers philosophy to be an activity. Similarly, the use of language games is an activity that the patient as philosopher embarks upon as part of the therapy to help clear up the confusions, and bewitchments, of language. It helps the ‘patient’ to understand better how words are used within particular activities and here activities could be substituted
for societies, if this analogy were to be extended further. Language games can affect the way words are to be understood or the rules governing their use. Language games may be seen to be different ways to frame descriptions or communications, which are taken for granted. Wittgenstein writes:

Review for example the multiplicity of language games in the following examples, amongst others:

- Giving orders, and obeying them -
- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements -
- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) -
- Reporting an event -
- Speculating about an event -
- Forming and testing a hypothesis -
- Presenting the result of an experiment in tables and diagrams -
- Making up a story; and reading it -
- Play-acting -
- Singing catches -
- Guessing riddles -
- Making a joke; telling it -
- Solving a problem in practical arithmetic -
- Translating from one language into another -
- Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying -

It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of the kinds of words and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language... (Including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*). (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 9-10)

In the first part of this quote, the Wittgenstein evidences the kind of sentence that speaks to the complexity of language games. The quote on language games is necessarily long to be able to convey the notion of the expanse and breadth of the language games. Wittgenstein uses language games to help see similarities and connections, such as understanding that members of a family can be recognised.

Wittgenstein’s aim with the language games was to make visible connections not seen before. He wanted to show the way in which words may derive their meanings from language games.
By using language games, Wittgenstein focused on the original source of the philosophical confusion surrounding the philosophy of psychology in particular which “lie in the forms of our language” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 8). He focuses on the current theoretical constructs of consciousness and mind. He examines the bases and the mythologies that perpetuate these constructs. It is through focusing on the unique grammar of the psychological game that a proper understanding is brought about, which Wittgenstein argues stands in contrast with the mistaken understanding that comes from regarding these constructs as ‘things’ or ‘events’ and then attempting to give a theoretical explanation for them.

Wittgenstein uses the notion of language games, to show that social practices affect the way words are to be understood, or as Wittgenstein’s would say, how these games affect the rules of their use or grammar. He gives examples, such as assertions, questions, and commands. There are many different sorts of uses of words, sentences and symbols. The combination of sentences, words and symbols lead to new languages and new language games, while existing ones become obsolete and forgotten. Wittgenstein equates this with the changes that take place in mathematics (Wittgenstein’s philosophy of maths is as radical and controversial as his views on language), and uses those changes as an example to support his notions.

The term language game is meant to highlight the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity or a form of life. The purpose of the notion of language games may be considered as a means of comparing different language games. It is through such comparison that an overview arises of the extent to which rules determine linguistic expressions. The determination of linguistic expressions helps to make it possible to know whether these rules can be modified, in so doing, greater awareness of the way in which similarities or differences in the language games can come about. The purpose of an expression, once determined, may be then used to establish whether or not an expression ‘makes sense’. Lastly it is through identifying different types of language games, that people are able to get a better understanding of their respective functions and contexts of the language game.

According to Wittgenstein, there are a variety of tools in language, which work in the same way as the tools in a toolbox. Just as each tool has both a specific and a variety of uses so too, do words have different functions. Just as to understand what a screwdriver is, it is necessary to know how to use it and for what it is used. So is it with words and language. It is not possible to specify one purpose that is applicable to all tools; likewise it is not possible to specify one overarching purpose for language. The different aims of all linguistic expressions can only be understood by looking at how they work or function in different contexts.
The notion of a language game helps to reveal aspects of language that are often not considered, such as its non-linguistic features, and how different language games are played in different contexts. These non-linguistic or non-spoken features add meaning to what is being said. Examples of non-linguistic features include having a sense of humour and also include the social or cultural mores, such as the behavioural rituals for mourning. The rituals and language of mourning are considered to be a language game that encompasses both verbal and non-verbal expression and behaviour. These expressions include gestures and rites to express and deal with the emotional loss, discomfort and hardship caused by death. In each culture there are rituals to help the bereaved cope with the loss, and whilst the rituals and language may differ from culture to culture. There are certain similarities, or ‘family resemblances’ to be found, for example, in both the Jewish and Muslim faiths and cultures there is a convention that when someone dies, the relatives of the deceased cover the mirrors.

Lurie (1992) interprets Wittgenstein as working in a Romantic frame of reference by describing people as both ‘cultural’ and ‘natural’ beings. Culture involves language games as well as being one of the tools of language. Lurie’s notes that culture exists due to norms shared within society of language users. Culture is not just a kind of language game. It is due to the shared practices that define a ‘culture’ that different games gather their meaning and come to make sense.

In using the notion of language games, Wittgenstein introduces what people do and say in their daily lives into a philosopher’s framework of understanding. A word like ‘belief’ is not an entity with a logic-like form that is available for introspection as Fodor, for example, claims. According to Wittgenstein, confusion arises through using a word in an inappropriate language game, and he argues that this is the way in which, repeatedly over time, the confusion surrounding the theory of mind arose.

To understand the meaning of a word like ‘belief’, one should examine different ways in which this word can be used, and not postulate it as an inner mental state. It is by constructing an elaborate theoretical account for thought that Cartesian Dualism arose. It propagates the idea of an inner space, a mind with some ghostly substance that controls bodily behaviour of the person, who is the machine or mechanism of the mind. Numerous other ideas such as cognitivism, idealism and eliminative materialism have all evolved from this confusion. Wittgenstein argued that meaning should be understood within the context of the game that is being played (the norms of use in a particular context). Words such as ‘belief’ are not entities with a logic-like form, which is available for introspection, as people like Fodor have claimed.
The main point about language games is their use in trying to work out what is meant, and to do so; it is necessary to look at the language game that is underway. In particular, in philosophy, the concepts used must be understood depending on the rule of their use within the context of the game that is being played. As language evolves, and words acquire new meaning, it is important to consider that the explanations of the words can only be reached in terms that are already there, or by using existing examples and paradigms (Sluga, 2006).

4.3.2.2 Family resemblance The term ‘family resemblance’ is a concept which Wittgenstein used to explain how his concept of languages games function, what is common to all language games, and how they are part of, or constitute language. Wittgenstein acknowledges that these phenomena have no one thing in common, but that that they are related to each other in various ways. He uses the term ‘family resemblances’ to characterise the way in which they fit together. Just as in a family, it is possible to discern a resemblance between the members.

Sluga maintains the concept of ‘family resemblance’ comes from Nietzsche, who used ‘Familienähnlichkeit’ when talking about the Indian, Greek and German philosophies (Sluga, 2011. Whatever the case may be, it is through Wittgenstein that the term has acquired its particular prominence. He first used the term in the *Blue Book*. When he observed that symbols or signs are used when thinking, and that at times, thinking is done by the hand when writing, and by the mouth and larynx when speaking (Sluga, p.77). Although words are used in different ways, there is the tendency to always want to find a generality. The notion of a family resemblance is Wittgenstein’s way of providing such a generality.

Wittgenstein questions the need for one overall generality, such as he had done in the *Tractatus*: providing a homogenous ‘system’ of meaning that covers everything. In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein provides for ‘local’ generalities or common things in the context of different games. It is this ‘common thing’ that is best described as ‘family resemblance’. Wittgenstein mentions the way in which likenesses in facial features and gait of walking, tend to overlap in families, when he discusses family resemblances and language games (Wittgenstein, 1960, p.17).

Family resemblances help to account for the difference and similarities, affinities and connections across the various language games and concepts. The term, family resemblance, is an aide for the ‘patient’ (the philosopher), crisscrossing the philosophical landscape, while learning to see the way in which the words, language games and concepts are similar, different, as well as what their connections might be.
4.4 Putting Wittgenstein’s method to work: Private language

Wittgenstein starts the *Investigations* by way of reference to Augustine’s account of how he learnt language. He reinforces the notion that language has been used to represent the world and happenings and occurrences in the world that dates back to at least the time of Augustine. Augustine describes how he learned language by watching his parents associate objects with sounds. The implication of this is that he must have already known, or somehow realised, that sounds can refer to objects. In other words, there must be some manner of innate knowledge and the ability to acquire and learning a new language. In terms of his notion, thinking is viewed as sort of inner, or private language. This inner language is used to represent the world inside a person. Spoken language is used to communicate the inner thought of someone to the inner thought of another. This notion is the basis of the information processing approach, or cognitivist approaches, such as Fodor’s *Language of Thought*. However, Wittgenstein considers that thinking need not imply some kind of inner, descriptive, symbolic language and that such a view is in any case incoherent.

The Romantic view formulates its explanation of language as a means of expressing oneself. In speaking, a person shares their subjective experience with others in an attempt to get them to experience the world in the same way, rather than providing objective information. The world is thus understood by the words that are used to do this, and whose meaning is determined by a socially determined frame of reference. Lurie (1992), mentioned earlier in this Chapter and Chapter Three, explicitly interprets Wittgenstein as a Romantic, or as an heir to the Romantic movement. Lurie’s interpretation may of course reflect some lingering influence of Schopenhauer. It is within this Romantic frame that Wittgenstein bases his ideas. For Wittgenstein, meaning comes about through the social context and conventions of culture and history; it is not based on a symbolic, private representation of external objects as found in the philosophic tradition.

Although Wittgenstein did not name sections §243-315 of the *Investigations* ‘the private language argument’, scholars in considering his work often do. Wittgenstein did however talk about a language, which only the speaker can understand. The ‘private language argument’ contains many themes that are all interrelated, and which all subscribe to the idea of a language which no one but the speaker can understand. The private language argument attacks this notion and completely undermines the philosophic tradition. It has been regarded as being particularly pertinent to psychology albeit indirectly through the Cartesian concept of mind.

The argument for a private language is, if correct, one of the most important philosophical insights achieved in this century. It is a criticism of the conception of mind,
which is not merely the dominant concept in European philosophy. It is moreover pervasive in
culture, psychology, linguistics, and indeed in most Western reflections on the nature of self-
consciousness and the mind (Hacker, 1986, p. 245).

Wittgenstein argues that the traditional accounts imply an underlying language of
thought. Where the world is described ‘in’ the mind. However, meaning cannot be generated
out of meaningless symbols, accessed by ‘looking into oneself’ (as Descartes or Husserl may
claim). Symbols need to be interpreted, and this means that their meanings have to be
established. Their meanings exist in the way in which symbols are used by societies as
symbol-users relative to a set of intentions (via language games) that ‘make sense’ or are
understood in an intersubjective way.

The issue of whether or not a private language is possible has important philosophical
ramifications in the discourses pertaining to the philosophy of mind (Kenny, 2006, p. 141). If
a private language is possible, this means that traditional and other influential theories such the
rationalist, empiricist, and Kantian metaphysics mentioned above, are in principle possible.
Wittgenstein is of the view that these theories are based on conceptual confusion. They make
no sense, and they are not possible, so it is not necessary to investigate whether they are true
or not.

Wittgenstein considered that there are two fundamental mistakes with the concept of a
private language, namely the nature of experience and the nature of language. He argued that
there is no private experience and no private language. Wittgenstein does not seem to deny
awareness or subjectivity; only that it should be thought of as an inner description or inner
ideas (in a private language). It is possible to experience something. Such an experience is
direct; no intermediate layer of description such as symbolic representations in the mind is
needed. The moment the experience is to be described or expressed, language is needed, and
inherent in language is the implication of shared meaning and context. From this point of
view, language exists not only to help people experience their own reality, but also to
coordinate activities and possibly attempt to share their experiences with other people.

According to Wittgenstein, the implicit assumption that a private language exists comes
about because philosophers of mind have long held the view that the claims people make
about what they know are based on their own mental states and processes, and their
experiences of them. Not only empiricist philosophers, but also idealists like Berkeley and
Husserl, make this mistake. The claims that people make are made in a language that they
speak to themselves, and not necessarily to anyone else. The claims constitute a type of a
private language. Words in this instance acquire their meaning through a private process. The
issue is that meaning is taken to be the pointing of an internal symbol to a fact about the world. However, meaning (for Wittgenstein) derives from how symbols are used by a society of symbol users. Inner symbols would refer to what people have agreed or tacitly shared or that the meanings are somehow pre-established. Plato or Aristotle would have held this view; as would have later philosophers such as Leibniz and Hegel. Such a view leads to doubt as to whether a person uses words or the meaning of words in the same way as someone else, for example, one person may have learnt that the name for the colour red is red, and another may have learnt that the name for the colour red was green.

Wittgenstein, however, shows when arguing against private language that this form of empiricist philosophy, with its attendant scepticism, is nonsensical. His argument is that a word like ‘red’ makes sense to a person only by the way in which it is used. For this reason, if someone wants to know what ‘red’ is, a red object can be pointed out to them, or it can be explained that this is how a certain wavelength of light (620-740 nanometres on the electromagnetic spectrum) is interpreted by an intact human nervous system. However, these are the only explanations that make sense. There is no ‘mental entity’, in other words, no ‘pure’ experience of redness as available to introspection, which is required for the explanation. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein wrote:

….scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For doubt can only exist where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said. (1922, p. 89)

Just because there is doubt as to whether people could use language and meaning, in the same way, it does not follow that there must be the possibility of a private language. People use language to express their direct experience in a socially available way. However, Kenny (revealing his analytical or behaviourist influence), suggests that there might be the possibility of a language which is private in that its words refer to private sensations without necessarily being private in that its words were learnt from private sensations by bare ‘ostension’ in other words there may be some form of training in the use of words to identify what private sensation was being felt. (Kenny, 1984, p.143)

In other words, where the sensation of pain is felt, pain is what that sensation is. The word ‘pain’ is needed to convey the fact of suffering to other people. Once the notion of a
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‘sensation’ has been established, Wittgenstein turns his attention to the way in which words refer to sensations. He proposes an imaginary language, where someone is able to write down his/her own inner feelings. Wittgenstein put forward the following proposal:

Imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods and the rest - for his private use? - Well, can’t we do so in ordinary language? - But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. (Wittgenstein, 1958, p.48, italics original)

In answering his question as to how words refer to sensations, Wittgenstein examines what sensations are, and how they came to be named. Wittgenstein proposes that words are the substitute for cries, such as when “a child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences” (1958, p.48). Wittgenstein makes the point that it is possible to have a personal experience which others cannot directly experience or sense. Having this personal experience does not mean that the person who has the experience does so in the form of an inner description. Where there would be a text containing a list of facts to be read off to ‘know’ if he or she is in pain or not. Nor does it imply that there is some inner entity doing the reasoning which is referred to by the word ‘I’. The proper use of the word ‘to know’ is that it is used to describe various things (to each other). In the case of direct (‘private’) experience, the way ‘to know’ functions is exactly the same as in other cases. Experience is not a privileged kind of knowing. Knowing that you are in pain in not the same as knowing a list of facts, even if it can be expressed in the same way. Confusing the two sorts of knowing is what creates non-sense. The importance of the private language argument is that it is this particular nonsense which makes cognitivism (or ‘psychology’ in Wittgenstein’s sense) seem plausible. So he explores various ways of using the expression ‘to know’ specifically in relation to knowing about one’s own pain. On the surface the idea of one’s own pain would seem to be irreducibly private and that there is no need for an inner representation acting as an intermediary (in a ‘private language’). Wittgenstein makes the point that a private inner realm which only oneself can ‘see’ is not a necessary prerequisite for ‘knowledge’, ‘belief’ etc. by considering various cases. He does this in his usual style of presenting arguments and then trying to punch holes in these as if he is arguing with his interlocutor. In a similar way, Wittgenstein explores the use of related concepts like ‘to have’
and how symbols can be said ‘to mean’ something, and eventually the proper use of the word ‘I’ which is discussed in the section dealing with the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’.

Wittgenstein’s argument concerning the use of the word ‘pain’ can be summarised as follows: Being in pain is the direct sensation, but knowing that you have pain is a public business. It depends on the appropriate ways that people can use the verb phrase ‘to know.’ I ‘know’ my own pain because I feel it, and can therefore express it to other people. I can know someone else is in pain because I have sufficient reasons to believe so; likewise I know that they are faking it; and so on.

So, if the word ‘pain’ is named by way of a definition that shows an example of pain then, according to Wittgenstein, the word ‘pain’ is not the name of a sensation. The word pain is only the name of a sensation when it is used in the normal way (ibid.)

Direct experience is not 'knowing', it is 'seeing' (direct and fundamental); but on occasion we use the language of 'knowing that' to convey such experiences to other people. Ultimately, Wittgenstein uses this argument to demolish the idea that just because people can experience, and express experiences in the language of knowing, it does not follow that ‘I’ refers to an inner domain consisting of knowledge-like descriptions which requires a 'subject' or ego to perceive it. Like other words, ‘I’ can be used in various ways. Experience is direct and fundamental, and it does not require to be transformed into 'facts' to make it 'known' to the one having the experience (as cognitivists tend to presume). This section is dealt with further in 4.4.1

Wittgenstein presents different aspects of the argument: the meaning of 'to know'; the meaning of 'to have'; the meaning of 'to mean' (in the case of a symbol, etc.) and the meaning of ‘I’. These will be addressed below.

The meaning of ‘to know’. In looking at how the word or name ‘pain’ is connected or how it refers to the sensation of pain, Wittgenstein considered the possibility that pain is a “learnt articulate replacement of unlearnt, inarticulate expression of sensations such as moans and winces” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 48). Wittgenstein considers that the expression “I am in pain” is useless if there is no accompanying behavioural criteria when it is used. He considers that those who use the word ‘pain’ when playing the ‘pain language-game’ with the word ‘pain’ must behave in a way that shows their pain, although they may sometimes be able to hide their pain. Wittgenstein (1958) further explains that although the verbal expression of pain takes the place of pain, it does not describe the pain. Pain also does not mean the same as the act of ‘crying’ itself. Wittgenstein believes being in pain is a direct sensation. It is not possible for a person to be in pain and not know it (if the person is given anaesthetic, that
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person will no longer be in pain). According to Wittgenstein, one cannot say that people ‘know that they are in pain’ since they are either are in pain or they are not. In this example the meaning of the word ‘know’ as it is used in everyday language use is wrong.

Wittgenstein considers the word ‘private’ in the sense of having private sensations, and differentiates between two senses of the word ‘private’, i.e. that of knowledge and that of ownership. If only I am able to know about something, then that knowledge is private. If only I am able to own it, then that it is my private possession. The idea that it is not possible to communicate being in pain if using it to argues for a private language is, according to Kenney based on two different ideas, namely that “(i) I can know that I am in pain; and (ii) other people cannot know that I am in pain” (1984, p. 146). He further states that Wittgenstein rejected this notion as it is both “false and nonsense” to say that other people cannot know that I am in pain. Wittgenstein bases this on the way that the word ‘know’ is used. The issue here is that ‘knowing’ is traditionally interpreted as having an inner representation of something in a private language.

Wittgenstein raises the issue of pretence as a reason someone may not know a person is in pain. It is possible for some, such as actors, to pretend to be in pain while the audience ‘knows’ that they are acting, where they would react differently if they thought the actor was really in pain. There may be certain instances (such as with infants and animals) where pretence is not possible. In the middle ages, it was believed that only a being with a soul could feel pain so people ‘knew’ that animals did not feel pain, regardless of how they behaved. There are also instances where people claim not to not know whether or not someone is in pain, because they themselves are not in pain, and they believe that they cannot know another person’s pain.

The meaning of ‘to have’. In considering the ‘ownership’ aspect of the words ‘to have’ the issue becomes the meaning of ‘to have’ where before the meaning was ‘to know’. Wittgenstein considers both the aspect of the person who feels the pain, and the aspect of what pain is being spoken about. For Wittgenstein, the person who has the pain is the one who states it. But he considers that it may be grammatically possible to identify pain that is located outside one’s body. Pain is identified according to its “intensity, similar characteristics, and location” (Wittgenstein, 1960 p. 49). The awareness of the sensation of being in pain implies some kind of a descriptive account; where there must be some sort of criteria (in order to ‘identify’ it). The criteria are established by the legitimate social uses, or conventions, which become attached to the use of the word ‘pain’. People can have pain and be able to describe it
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(according to particular criteria). The ability to describe it implies the use of language, and it is only because of this language use that people are able to show and describe pain. Language is the difference between ‘showing’ (direct experience) and ‘telling’ (describing experience). Wittgenstein’s views are completely opposed to traditional cognitivism, which supposes that the direct experience is a private version of its description.

It is the person’s behaviour that confirms the location of the pain. Somebody who claims that their pain is outside their body would not be understood. It is only possible to ask where the pain is, if it is known who is in pain. The identity of the person is part of the criteria used to identify the pain.

Generally when two people who have a pain in the left thumb, it is usually acceptable to say that they have a pain in the same place (Hacker, 1993, p. 22). However, that there are two distinct left thumbs belonging to two distinct people does not mean that the pain is different. Therefore, it is possible for people to have the same pain in the same place. Even the meaning of the word ‘same’ depends here on context. In a similar way, it is a mistake to think that because the pain is in two different places, it cannot be the same kind of pain. Arising out of this apparent contradiction is the confusion that arises out of the way in which grammar is used for expressions of experience and for the names of objects. People are said to ‘have’ feelings and sensations, for example, pain. People also ‘have’ (viz. possess) things such as cars and cellular phones. These concepts of having or ownership differ where, for example, other people may own my possessions, but they cannot experience my pain as I do.

The use of the concept of ‘ownership’ also covers relationships, such as having a husband, although, in this instance, it means a state of relation with another person. With concepts such as ownership, other concepts are implicit, such as ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’. To have a duty may mean to have a relationship with someone to whom I have made a promise. However, when it comes to the use of the concept of ‘pain’, I have pain, or I am suffering, or I am in pain, it does not mean that I ‘own’ the pain. Nor does the pain belong to anyone else. Therefore, the pain is not the same, as the pain is merely found in the same place in each respective person. Even though conjoined twins might suffer the same pain, this pain is numerically different, because it belongs to each twin. It is not possible to say that pain is the same numerically or qualitatively different or the same. ‘Pain’ is not in the same category of objects, where it is possible to refer to the same objects where one can say for example state “this is the same chair that I sat in yesterday”. Wittgenstein teases out the meaning (according to grammatical usage) of the word ‘I’ itself to further consider the ownership aspect of ‘having a pain’. When ‘I’ am in pain, the sensation is not a separate ‘object’ belonging to ‘I’
(the radical subject). Pain is simply pain, directly available to those who suffer it. To link it to a subject is to misunderstand the way in which ‘I’, or the radical subject, can be used in language.

The grammatical usage of the term or concept of ‘having’ determines the way sensations and feelings, ‘ideas’, ‘opinions’, ‘beliefs’, and ‘thoughts’ are spoken about. In the same way that pain may be identical, but not the same, so too, people may have identical thoughts, but not the same thoughts. There is a tendency to treat thoughts the same way as experiences, that is, to consider thoughts as material substances. Grammatically, such thinking implies that two people may have the same thoughts. Wittgenstein regarded such thinking as confused, as it perpetuates the myth of the mind as being separate from the body.

*The meaning of ‘to mean’ (for signs and symbols).* The issue then becomes the meaning of meaning or what it meanings for sign to have meaning. Signs or symbols do not reveal their meaning from within themselves, but is derived in terms of how they are used by people who agree on their use. To explain how meaning is derived through use, Wittgenstein discusses the notion of sensation as an element of private language by using the analogy of keeping a diary. Every time a certain sensation is experienced, it is noted in a diary using the letter ‘S’. There is no definition of the sensation. If there were a definition, then the language used for the sign would not be private. Only the person jotting down the sign can know what the sensation is. Wittgenstein questioned how, when next the person using the diary refers to something as ‘S’, that person would know what is meant by ‘S’. For even to think incorrectly that something is ‘S’, means that the person must know the meaning of ‘S’. According to Wittgenstein, this is not possible in a private language because there is no definition for ‘S’. Wittgenstein questions the way in which he will know what he means by ‘S’ when he next calls something ‘S’. It could be argued that he would be able to remember what he means by calling something ‘S’. Wittgenstein’s response would be that it doesn’t matter whether he can remember things correctly or not. But, rather whether the thing that he remembered could have been remembered correctly or not. ‘S’ would not have been able to be remembered correctly because there is nothing that will assist in the correct use of ‘S’ in the future. The notion that the ‘S’ stands for the particular sensation, came about because there was no ‘grammar’ or rule to establish the correct use for ‘S’, as with other language games. The unreliability of memory presents more of a problem for the user of a private language than for the user of a public language. The reliability of memory may be confirmed for public language users, but not for private language users. Those who use the unreliability of memory as a criticism of Wittgenstein’s argument misunderstand it. So, too, do those who use the reliability of
memory, as confirmed by public language users, as a counter-argument to what Wittgenstein proposed.

The meaning of ‘I’. Wittgenstein teases out the meaning (according to grammatical usage) of the word ‘I’ itself to further consider the ownership aspect of ‘having a pain’. When ‘I’ am in pain, the sensation is not a separate ‘object’ belonging to ‘I’ (the radical subject). Pain is simply pain, directly available to those who suffer it. To link it to a subject is to misunderstand the way in which ‘I’, or the radical subject, can be used in language. Wittgenstein rejects the notion that the privacy of sensation can be used to imply the existence of a radical subject. Such expressions (of experiences) depend on public criteria which have to be mastered/learned (and are therefore not really private). He rejects the notion that a private object can be accurately identified, and then described, by saying, for example, “I have a pain”. To do so would imply that an expression of pain needs a preceding identification of pain, or an inner object. Similarly, if pain is to be a description of one’s state, then it is a description that is compared with itself; and that this is a unique description, in other words, it is an expression more than it is a description. Wittgenstein’s view is that the use of the word ‘description’ differs when describing a room and when describing a conscious state, as the description of the room is not a criterion whereas when he describes his conscious state, it is.

When he describes the room, the language game for describing the room starts with what he noticed about the room, and the criteria he used to make his observations. Sensations are identified by making use of the expressions that have been learnt. So, the statement “I am in pain” is the start of the language game, not its end (Wittgenstein, 1958). What he means here is that by deconstructing the statement, more meanings become apparent and that such a statement cannot just be accepted as it is. People have to learn to use these words in an appropriate way relative to public criteria.

Analytical philosophers such as Kenny (1984, p. 158) read Wittgenstein to be particularly concerned with logical form and formal ‘truth’ but other interpretations exist. Wittgenstein is however, more concerned with the investigation of the proper use of language. So, the statement “I am in pain” when I am in pain is not a description in the normal sense. It is a tautology, as the truth of the statement simultaneously occurs because it can be seen from my behaviour that I am in pain, and this behaviour shows the statement to be true. The statement does not reveal more about the pain than the fact of being in pain. Such an argument is analogous to the statement that ‘a circle is round’. It relates nothing that is not contained in the word ‘circle’, and is just a socially agreed upon way of bringing a shared concept to another person’s attention. It is not a means to refer to an inner state. It can also be
said that the statement ‘I am in pain’ is a description (usually directed towards another person) expressing how a subject is feeling. Actually being in pain is an experience they may choose to describe or share in further detail or not.

Utterances such as ‘I have a pain’ and ‘I am scared’ are expressions of pain and fear. They are in themselves forms of behaviour that make up the standards of identification that help to determine whether a person is in pain, or is scared. These utterances are “learnt extensions of natural expressive behaviour and are connected with those forms of behaviour” (Hacker, 1993, p. 56). These expressions exclude the possibility of misidentification or misrecognition. They lead to the impression that the expressions are true in terms of identification and recognition; in other words, the person has recognised and identified his/her pain. This is taken to imply that there is an inner, private rationale taking place, which has justified itself. Hacker explains further “the word ‘pain’, is not defined by reference to a ‘private object’, nor is it defined by reference to a public object” (Hacker, 1993, p. 56). The confusion created by these expressions is a result of the way in which the description of physical objects is applied to sensations, combined with the notion of experience as an inner event.

Wittgenstein shows that both the notions of ‘private’ experience and the language that are used to describe it are indeed not private. For expressions of pain and the like to be considered as expression there must necessarily be ‘outer’ or public criteria for their proper use. If not, they would not be linguistic expressions as they would not be meaningful. Screaming in pain can be an expression of pain but it does not function as an item in a sentence used in conversation would, even if other people could infer from it that the person is in pain. If someone just makes strange noises, there is no way of interpreting them. For Wittgenstein, there is a distinction between the ‘raw’ experience and its description. The former is how the world is as a given, it is not necessary to call it private. Any attempt to grasp the raw experience implies a description which infers that there has to be a common understanding of what is being said, for there to be shared meaning. At the core of Wittgenstein’s argument is the fact that meaning is a shared normative frame of reference.

Wittgenstein’s discussions help to show that the current understanding on the differentiation between the inner and the outer, and in this case, public language, is based on the differences in the grammar of concepts generated by and used in different language games. He sets aside the notion of a ‘private language’ and with it, the inference of mind as a form of inner space. According to this formulation, there is no special way of communicating with the
self internally. There is no special knowledge that people have of themselves. In Wittgenstein’s grammar, it makes no sense to say people know themselves.

4.4.1 The ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ It is the notion of the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ that is the point to which all the preceding arguments lead. ‘Private language’ implies such a distinction, but without it, the distinction between inner and outer is no longer forceful.

By separating direct awareness from physical description (as different orders of being), Descartes gave rise to the radical dualist division of the notions of the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’. Wittgenstein’s critique of the notion of a ‘private language’ will now be used to show how he criticises the idea of a ‘mind’ as a description of the world by means of some kind of inner (logic-like) language. His critique shows, rather, that ‘thinking’ need not imply such a process of description.

The two ways of dealing with the qualities of the world are contrasted in this aspect of Wittgenstein’s argument. In the first, the world, aspects of it, objects and events in it, to each other are described. In the second, the subjective stance outwards towards the world, including mood, or how the world feels, the concrete or direct involvement with it, is expressed. The philosophic tradition assumes that the latter can be considered as a description of inner states. It is as if people ‘observe’ their ‘mental states’ and then ‘describe’ what they see or perceive and this is exactly what Descartes assumed in a literal way. Malcolm states “Descartes created a picture of the relationship between the human mind and the human body with which philosophy has struggled ever since” (1972, p.1).

Wittgenstein criticises the idea of a mind as a description of the world by some kind of an inner (logic-like) language. He shows that thinking need not imply such a process of description. Wittgenstein says that the mind is not to be thought of as a description at all, but rather, it represents direct expression.

Traditional philosophy confuses the problem of a thing such as an ‘own mind’, trying to describe the minds of others, by basing its assumptions on third-person descriptions as objective and truthful, where the concept of a ‘mind’ implies such an internal description. The later Wittgenstein dealt with the asymmetry of first- and third-person present tense psychological propositions. The psychological attributes of others, or of the third person, are determined by what they say and do. However, the use of the first person in present tense is not a reflection of one’s own behaviour. According to the tradition, the asymmetry is a reflection of the privacy of experience. Wittgenstein rejected this view. As mentioned above, asymmetry is a result of grammatical differences between first- and third-person utterances that arise out of language games (in certain languages but not in others). The first-person
utterance does not describe anything, but is rather an expression, for example ‘I am in pain’, is an expression of pain. As mentioned earlier, it is nonsensical for me to say to myself ‘I know that I am in pain’. It makes no sense in terms of grammar, to ascribe knowledge, belief, doubt or certainty in the present tense to the first person.

In contrast, third-person cases, avowals of thought and experience are indicative of psychological attributes, and this may be taken as evidence for the so-called ‘inner’. However, according to Wittgenstein, the inner stands in need of outer criteria. This means that the outer criteria is determined within a social context and by the experience of others, and can be used to help understand others. The tradition assumes that experience is privately owned. This, according to the tradition, means that people cannot have the same experiences. They may only ever have similar experiences because different people experience the same thing differently. According to Hacker (2010, p.10) concepts of experience are not acquired by means of association or a private analogue of ostensive definition. Wittgenstein is further of the view that there is no such thing as private ostensive definition. By that he means that the phrase a ‘private ostensive definition’ is excluded from language, in the same way, that the phrase ‘checkmate’ is in draughts (Wittgenstein, cited in Hacker, 2010, p.10).

Wittgenstein’s discussions on the connection between mental activity (Wittgenstein questions whether such a term is even useful in the first place) or psychological processes and behaviour may be said to deal with the issue of the inner and the outer where mental processes refer to the inner and behaviour refers to the outer. Wittgenstein wrote,

[the] asymmetry of the [psychological language-] game is brought out by saying that the inner is hidden from someone else. Evidently there is an aspect of the language game (italics original), which suggests the idea of being private or hidden. (1982, p. 36)

This separation of psychological processes and behaviour has been incorrectly used to separate the inner and the outer. According to McGinn (1997, pp. 115-116), such a separation has placed an artificially high value on the role of introspection in defining psychological concepts, as well as misrepresented the connection between psychological concepts and types of human and animal behaviour.

Wittgenstein’s discussions help to show that the current understanding on the differentiation between the inner and the outer is based on the differences in the grammar of concepts from different language games. The asymmetry of the psychological language game is brought about by saying that the inner is hidden from someone. According to Wittgenstein, there is an “aspect of the language game (italics original) which suggests the idea of being
private or hidden” (1982, p. 36). Certain language games give rise to the notion of a part of a person being hidden or inside themselves, that others can’t see, which gives rise to the notion of a mind. But Wittgenstein says, if there is an ‘inner’, then it must be different to an ‘outer’ in terms of the way it is conceptualised. It is on this basis of conceptualisation, and on the basis of the way that language is used, that the concepts can become better understood.

Wittgenstein wrote: “what I want to say is surely that the inner differs from the outer in its logic (italics original). And that logic does indeed explain the expression the inner, it makes it understandable” (1982, p. 6).

The descriptions of the inner are used to refer to ‘inner events’, and to describe direct experiences in descriptive language. When referring to others, there is no ‘direct’ experience to refer to the thoughts of others. There are only one’s own experiences, feelings and expressions that form the basis by means of which to understand the thoughts of others. It is on this basis that one assumes other to have the same experiences, feelings and expressions. That both have these ‘inner’ experiences is understood to mean that there is some sort of inner language relating to these experiences, feelings and expressions. Wittgenstein shows that, however, the converse is true. People can describe feelings due to their interaction with others, because they are social beings and they are brought up in society. It is through being in a society, ‘the outer’, and by using language, that words acquire their meaning for use by ‘the inner’.

Wittgenstein states in the *Investigations*, when referring to the difference between physical objects and sense impressions, that this is a comparison between two different language games. These have complicated relations, and it would be a mistake to reduce these to a simple formula. Senses perceive physical objects as sense impressions. The problem is that the reality of direct experience (pain, anxiety, etc.) is not sense impressions, but is mistakenly dealt with as if it were. Physical objects are perceived by the senses as ‘sense impressions’. However, the reality of direct experience (pain, anxiety, etc.) are not sense impressions, but are mistakenly dealt with as if they are. The question is then how people perceive their mental states. It becomes worthwhile to consider which of their senses they use to do this. People are able to recognise that someone is in pain through using their senses. However, this recognition is based on complex criteria that go beyond simply looking at behaviour and speech. The behaviour may be verbal, non-verbal or both.

Wittgenstein raises the question of how mental states are perceived, and which of the senses are used to do this. In the *Investigations*, he gives the example of a doctor asking a nurse about a patient’s condition. The nurse responds that the patient is groaning. Wittgenstein
suggests that on the basis of such information, the doctor may prescribe more painkillers. Wittgenstein also states that if the patient has reported that he was in pain, and where it was hurting, the same result might have ensued.

It is on the basis of these sorts of arguments that Wittgenstein has been characterised as a behaviourist. A behaviourist would however deny that there is a difference between pain and pain behaviour. Wittgenstein maintains that there is a big difference between pain and pain behaviour. The difference is based on the idea that sensations are not things, but they are not ‘no-things’ either. They are not ‘objects’ of perception. Wittgenstein considers that pain is deemed to be a sensation. But he states that pain is thought of as being a sensation, where the actual sensation of pain is concluded as being a nothing. He is of the view that the sensation is not a ‘nothing’, and neither is it a ‘something’. Sensation thus becomes paradoxical. The paradox will only disappear when the thinking of language functioning in only one way, where having a thought is interpreted as perceiving an ‘inner object’, to convey thoughts is stopped. Wittgenstein wrote:

[…] and yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing!”

He replies “Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either… The paradox disappears only if we break radically with the idea that language functions always in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts - which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything you please. (1958, p. 55, Italics in the original)

The paradox that Wittgenstein alludes to is the way in which a thing can be neither a ‘something’ nor a ‘nothing’. In order to solve this paradox, it is necessary to look at the way that language is used, and in particular, to consider that language functions in ways that have been determined by society and culture. Words are necessary when speaking to another subject, but not all words refer to ‘objects’, some express a state of being. There are no words or definitions for there to be a ‘not something’ and a ‘not nothing’. So, in certain cases, pain tends to be ascribed to mental processes. The meta-lingual consideration of these processes leads to Cartesian dualism, idealism or behaviourism. Wittgenstein states the reason for this is that “we talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided […] but that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter” (1958, p. 55).

Sluga (2011) considers this relevant to Wittgenstein’s argument regarding private language. By using the construct of object and designation for expressions of sensations and
inner states, people are misled into thinking that there are inner objects to which their sensations refer. By use of analogy, Wittgenstein shows that there can be no inner objects in language and thought, as, “the thing in the box has no place in the language game at all; not even as a something for the box might even be empty” (1958, p. 54).

If it is said that there is meaning based on the notion of “object and designation”, “the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant” (Wittgenstein, 1958 p.54). Thereby the paradox of how there can be a ‘not something’ and a ‘not nothing’ is resolved. It is by thinking that a sensation is a thing (according to the conventional use of this word/concept) that people are misled (by language) into thinking of a sensation as an inner object. Broadly speaking, sensation is conventionally thought of as being both an object, and a feeling. According to Wittgenstein, such a notion is fallacious. It is also conventional to talk about processes happening in the mind, without defining the mind as such, where the mind is considered to be beyond understanding. According to Sluga (2011, p. 72), Wittgenstein argues against such a notion by distinguishing whether a third person (“he is in pain”) is being spoken about, or the first person (“I am in pain”). When talking about a third person, outer criteria such as pain behaviour or words are used to determine whether or not that person is in pain. As there is no single definite criterion used to determine whether or not a person is actually in pain, it is necessary to consider the person’s behaviour, how that person presents, and the surrounding circumstances. For example, people may pretend to be in a pain when they are not. The reason for looking at the behaviour is because there is generally a predictable relation between someone who is in pain and how they behave. This does not mean that Wittgenstein’s argument is behaviourist, since the relationship he is referring to, is more nuanced and complex than the stimulus-response behaviour determined by behaviourism.

Behaviourism tends to confuse functions when it maintains, “that pain utterances are descriptions of behaviour” and first person utterances of pain are a way of denying behaviourism (Sluga, 2011, p. 72). These utterances are not made by means of the observation of one’s own behaviour. In this regard, behaviourists appear to be like Cartesians. They think ‘mental events’ are, as Skinner states, ‘sub-vocal’ speech, but since ‘mental events’ are not physical entities, they cannot act as physical causes, so they can be ignored.

4.5 Wittgenstein’s refutation of metaphysics

It is by constructing elaborate scaffolding in the attempt to account for how people think and what thought is, Cartesianism became pervasive in Western philosophy. As previously noted, the idea of an ‘inner space’, a mind as some sort of ‘ghostly’ substance that controls bodily
behaviour of the person who is the machine, and numerous other ideas, such as cognitivism, idealism, eliminative materialism, have all evolved from this confusion. They are all attempts to deal with Descartes’ problem, but the existence of the problem is taken for granted. Behaviourism may be said to have evolved in reaction to this confusion. Behaviourists argue that since mental events cannot have physical effects, they can be ignored; science deals with causal forces only. But is behaviourist able to deny his/her own sense of being aware? The confusion results from the tendency to use either a word or a concept that requires an elaborate theoretical structure in order to be understood which in turn creates even more confusion. Wittgenstein is well aware of this tendency, as he himself built such an elaborate theory in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein’s alternative is that a person expresses their own direct experience in language, where it is made meaningful relative to the practices/norms of a community of language users. It is not necessary to have an inner description of the world (in private language) which then converts into English or another public language to tell others about it.

Wittgenstein critiques Cartesianism and behaviourism by stating that they do not acknowledge the diverse functions of language, and as a result, they both lead into a metaphysical quagmire. As a result, the function of language is not only to as based on the traditional view of having a thought, which is then communicated by language, but alternatively, speech may also be a direct expression of a way of experiencing the world, where language is the medium of thought. Language exists due to the need amongst humans, who are highly social, to ‘show’ our own relations to other people for purposes such as coordinating activities. Wittgenstein argues that language also describes states, and is a form of behaviour that may, in certain circumstances, replace behaviour.

Sluga (2011) states that Wittgenstein anticipated the case of a person who has a private language that only she can understand. He subsequently demolished that notion by stating that the, “conception of such a language is incoherent, because it would have no criteria for determining whether one has properly identified a sensation or not” (Sluga, 2011, p. 73).

So the language of thought used by the cognitivists, such as the information processing approach, and terms like ‘mentalese’ used by Fodor, are here shown to be without critical weight. It is simply not possible to determine whether sensations that are felt have been identified correctly or not. A helpful analogy would be to imagine buying a number of copies of the same newspaper to determine whether the story that you read about is true.

According to Grayling (2001), Wittgenstein finds the idea of private mental states wrong in the sense of being an inaccurate description. In a similar way it is wrong to think that
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it is only the individual who has experiences, feelings and thoughts and who can access or even experience them. Since Descartes, the traditional view has been that mental states of experiences and thoughts have been represented as inner states, based on subjective study. That is to say, because people know more about their own thoughts and sensory experiences, they tend to base their knowledge of such matters as well as their knowledge of everything outside themselves on these states. Cartesian philosophy places the individual or the ego as the starting point, as there is a concomitant tendency to assume the certainty of its existence.

Sensory experience is the starting point for the empiricist, for whom such information derived from the senses is incontrovertible. According to Hacker, Berkeley is notable as being the exception to the Cartesians and the empiricists. By considering what the nature of the ‘inner’ of others might be, or what he called ‘our knowledge of spirits’ can in fact be said to be (Hacker, 1993, p. 127). As mentioned in Chapter Three, Berkeley was of the view that it is not possible to know others as well as one can know God. It is God who produces ideas in people, and who helps them to know others. However, Berkeley’s argument is flawed. The flaw is in the fact that plans don’t work. If ‘I’ am all that is, why do things work out differently than I might plan or anticipate? If God produces ideas in my head that, for example, other people exist, then those people cannot be anything other than ideas and cannot have substance, the way that I do. Berkley here follows in the tradition of idealist thinking, which holds that everything that is experienced is experienced in the mind.

Metaphysical idealism claims that the mind is the consequence of perception and that perception can be false, such that no truth about reality can be known. The question is whether this conclusion ought to follow. The reductive materialists hold a similar view, albeit from a different angle, namely that all experience is caused by brain events. They cannot quite explain how it works, though. Wittgenstein shows this notion to be nonsense, by showing that the way in which language is used creates confusion in people’s thinking. As people use language to express their experiences directly, they do not need to suppose that a description inside the mind, which they are somehow able to observe, is necessary to explain. The issue then is not what the nature of ‘thought’ is, but rather, in what context and in which way it is proper to say that a person is thinking. The use of a word does not have to imply that there is an inner process. It may often be assumed that there is only one activity that is linked to the word to ‘think’. In fact how it is how the word is used that determines which one variety of activities it refers to.

People can see others and accept that they exist, but they cannot see their ‘consciousness’ or ‘mental states’ in their physical bodies. It is hidden from them, or it is
inner’. They can only see the ‘outer’ of others, or their physical forms, and their behaviour. It seems obvious that it is the ‘inner’ that causes the behaviour, where it is pain that make people cry out, and (direct) experiences of the world are subjective. Even physical objects exist according to subjective experience. Language exists so that I can attempt to describe this to other people (if this need did not exist there would be no language). But because people do this, they presume that their reflection on their being is also a description of events/objects that they perceived in an interior way. Wittgenstein considers that this last piece of reasoning is unnecessary and artificial.

This view presupposes that people are able to attribute their mental states to others and that they are aware of the differences when they do it. Strawson has noted:

There is no sense in the idea of ascribing states of consciousness to oneself or at all, unless the ascriber already knows how to ascribe at least some states of consciousness to others. So he cannot (or cannot generally) argue ‘from his own case’ to conclusions about how to do this; for unless he already knows how to do this, he has no conception of his own case […].

(as cited in Malcolm, 1972, p. 21, italics in the original)

There is a view that people only know that others think, because they can think. However, if I do not think that others think, then I am only aware of my own thinking, and I have no knowledge of others. Wittgenstein argued, “if you logically exclude other people’s having something, it loses its sense to say that you have it” (1958, p. 64). This notion that others have experiences because I have experiences or have a mind is inherently solipsistic. It ought to be noted that Wittgenstein would not even articulate this in terms of ‘having’ a mind as he explicitly argues that ‘mind’ is not an object one can have. The solipsist thinks that his/her thoughts are the only thoughts to be had. Descartes, for example, argued that the mind could exist without a human body, in other words, that the mental is separate from the physical. If I am happy, I am able to imagine that others people may be happy too. But, to imagine that other beings and objects are happy takes considerable effort. According to Malcolm (1972), if there is a gap between the physical and the mental, it doesn’t matter whether the other bodies or objects are the same as mine. It would make as much sense to ascribe emotions to stone as to ascribe them to a person. Wittgenstein states that people do not ascribe emotions to a stone. They are able to tell when a person or an animal is pain, but they do not know whether a stone or a chair is in pain. Although it is possible to say the sentence, a
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stone feels pain; because of not being able to know whether the stone feels pain or not makes
the sentence is in itself, nonsensical.

If I am only able to infer what someone is thinking from that person’s behaviour and I
am only able to know what someone is thinking if they tell me, then the question of whether
other people have minds becomes redundant, and leads to the question of whether others think
or not. It is here that Wittgenstein’s pain analogy becomes of particular use. If someone is in
pain, only they can feel it. I cannot know it or feel it, or so traditional thinking tells me. I can
only indirectly know when someone is in pain, but they know directly when they are in pain.
The confusions of inner and outer may be considered parallel and connected to the misuse of
the terms ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’. It makes no sense to talk about indirectly knowing something,
as indirect knowledge can only be talked about if direct knowledge is talked about. We can
only ‘know’ directly if we see someone in pain, moaning. We can only know something
directly if we are told something by someone who opens up to us and who says what he or she
is thinking. Wittgenstein explains: that if people are asked how they know someone is in pain,
they can say that the person was rolling about in agony. They would not say that they saw only
the behaviour, but inferred that the person was in pain. Wittgenstein explains:

But doesn’t what you say come to this: that there is no pain for example,
without pain behaviour? It comes to this, only of a living human being and
what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has
sensations; it is blind, hears, is deaf, is conscious or unconscious. (1958, p.
52)

Wittgenstein makes these remarks because our knowledge of others partially arises out
of our knowledge of ourselves, as well as common behavioural patterns. We tend to empathise
(imagine the pain of others) based on our own experience of it. But, Wittgenstein goes on:

If one has to imagine someone else’s pain on the model of one’s own, this is none too
easy a thing to do, for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of pain
which I do feel. (1958, p. 54, italics in the original)

As referred to earlier in this chapter, the experience of the pain is not the description of
it. However, when I am trying to tell someone like a doctor about the pain, the expression
becomes a description. The behavioural expressions of the inner are not mere symptoms of
how things are, but criteria used to designate it. It is through the use of the terms ‘inner’ and
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‘outer’, that the tendency arises to think that the behavioural expressions are merely the outward expression of an inner state.

Wittgenstein undermines and discredits the metaphysical belief that the mind, or the concept of the mental, does not need a living human body. This belief forms the basic assumption of cognitivism and functionalism (which Wittgenstein reveals to be metaphysics, rather than science, as cognitivists would claim). Wittgenstein seems to point towards ‘embodiment’. A living body is related to an environment in a particular way, and this can be (but need not be) expressed, and therefore described, in language.

4.6 Thinking and language
Thinking is normally considered to be a mental event, and as such, an activity of the mind. Thinking is more than a description. The use of the term depends on when it is appropriate to refer to oneself, or to someone else, as thinking, where this can mean different things at different occasions. Language can be used to express thought, and to describe it, but somewhere in the unarticulated background is the fact of experience, which can only be said by ‘forming’ it with language.

In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein explores the relationship between thinking and talking. The behaviourists believe that thinking is a form of sub-vocal speech. The Cartesian dualists are of the view that thinking is ontologically different to the physical realm, where behaviour takes place. The cognitivists believe that thinking is the processing of symbolic representation ‘inside’ the mind. According to Arrington:

> When we reflect on these matters, we can be pulled in both directions [...] it is difficult to find ourselves with a thought without at the same time catching ourselves talking to ourselves [...] We are all familiar with phenomenon of talking without thinking, which suggests that there is a difference between talking and thinking. (Arrington, 2001, p. 129)

It would appear that thinking is both a behavioural act, as well as some mysterious process that occurs. It also appears that thinking and talking are somehow linked, but are necessarily different.

Wittgenstein (1953) holds that thinking and talking, irrespective of whether it is quiet or loud, are closely linked, but are different. He is also of the view that contrary to what he had said previously, thinking is not the same as speaking. In fact, the concept of thinking is quite different to the concept of speaking. Neither does thinking accompany speaking, or any other
process. As a result, it is not possible to have a ‘thought-process’. In the same way, there cannot be any parts of thought that correlate with parts of other activities. What is meant by a ‘thought-process’ is that of inferring or calculating something. In a similar vein, it is not entirely wrong to say that speaking is an instrument of thinking. But it is not correct to say that the process of speaking is a tool of the process of thought. According to Wittgenstein (1980), language is not a carrier of thought. Thinking is often done in words, and it would be a mistake to separate talking and thinking in such a way as to exclude this. Wittgenstein, following his own strategy, to show the word ‘thinking’ can be used in different ways and does not have to have a single object to which it refers, wrote:

Remember that our language may possess a variety of different words: one for ‘thinking out loud’; one for thinking as one talks to oneself in the imagination; one for a pause during which something or other floats before the mind, after which, however, we are able to give a confident answer. One word for a thought expressed in a sentence; one for the lightning thought which I may later ‘clothe in words’; one for wordless thinking as one works. (1967, p. 23)

Wittgenstein’s meaning here requires explanation, as it appears paradoxical. At stake in this statement are the ‘categorical’ differences between thinking and speaking. Wittgenstein’s strategy is to ask: ‘when is it proper to say of a person (including oneself) that they are thinking?’ The answer to the question lies, if following Wittgenstein, in understanding the full gamut of what the word ‘think’ can be taken to mean in a variety of contexts. He demonstrates this in the citation below, where he asks for a comparison of different ways of thinking:

Thinking is a widely ramified concept. A concept that comprises many manifestations of life. The phenomena of thinking are widely scattered. Now compare these different ways of thinking.

Speak thoughtfully;
Speak before thinking;
Think while speaking;
Speak to yourself in imagination;
Think of someone;
Think of a solution to a puzzle;
Let a thought cross your mind;
Whistle a tune thoughtfully and then without thought;
Now just be thoughtful. (Wittgenstein, cited in Heaton and Groves, 2009, p. 96)

What is clear from this proposed exercise is that thought is to some extent indeterminable. There appear to be different aspects to thought and ways of thinking, and possibly even different activities of thinking. The use of the word ‘thought’ is, in fact, varied and depends on context and circumstance. This wide and varied use of the word ‘thought’ in contrast to the notion that philosophers or neuroscientists can reveal the true, essential meaning of ‘thought’ distinct from its uses in ‘folk psychology. Wittgenstein explains that when one learns the word ‘think’ one is taught its use within certain circumstances. However, these circumstances are not taught along with it. As a result, confusion arises as it leads us to suppose that thinking is an activity. It is like the way we consider, a description by inner events to be in an inner (logical) language. Wittgenstein shows that thinking is not an activity. He does this by asking how people can think ‘harder’ and what they can do to think harder. Here thinking is compared to an activity such as running, where people can run ‘harder’ by running ‘faster’ but they do not know how to think harder or how they can even think harder. It is because people cannot account for how they are to ‘think harder’ that the idea of thinking as some sort of mysterious activity that occurs in the mind comes about, and confusion and muddled thinking occurs. It is through this sort of thinking that there is the idea of the mind being an ‘inner space’, where people can ‘look into’ their minds and perceive their own thinking. The activities that take place in this ‘inner space’ are conventionally called thinking. Wittgenstein considers the activity that happens when there is a particular mental phenomenon taking place, such as “understanding, or decision [which] are mental events” (Wittgenstein, cited in Malcolm, 1976, p. 31-32).

What Wittgenstein opposes is, of course, the assumption that ‘thinking’ is a description of an inner process, which can be ‘observed’ through introspection. Wittgenstein often refers to mental images as they can be interpreted in different ways, noting that it is not clear how they can be put together to form concrete thoughts.

Wittgenstein considers that one difference between thought and talking is that thoughts do not have parts, where they are not articulated as tunes are. Speech, however, has many parts such as words, sentences and clauses, to name a few. Thought, according to Wittgenstein does not have parts, nor are there ways of putting parts together to form whole thoughts. The notion that ideas, mental images and concepts might be considered as the
working ‘parts’ of the processes of thought, is not correct. Wittgenstein’s strategy is to ask when it is proper to say that a person (including oneself) is thinking. Consideration must be given to the proper use of the word (‘thought’) in a context. The cognitive approach that thinking is a process is also wrong: as mentioned above thought is not articulated nor non-articulated so parts of thought cannot be arranged in a process.

Thought and intention (taken on their own that is) are neither ‘articulated’ nor ‘non-articulated’; to be compared neither with a single note which sounds during the acting or speaking, nor with a tune. (Wittgenstein, 1958, p.46)

It is the way the proposition is used that gives it its meaning. Where it is common to say, “he articulated his thought”, Wittgenstein shows that thoughts are neither articulated nor unarticulated. Thoughts are simply what they are. It is precisely in the way that thoughts are described that creates the illusion of a mechanism. The formulation of ‘having a thought’ implies a linked series of events, or implies that it is articulated. The point is that “he articulated his thought” means that a person expressed a view. The viewpoint was expressed in a socially appropriate way, and was not an implication of an inner realm of pre-existing thought, which was transferred into language.

Wittgenstein considers that the various meanings of the verb ‘to think’, for example, the question ‘what do you think of that person?’ is generally understandable. Children, who are doing their mathematics homework, are considered to be thinking. Moreover, to state, “I think it will rain tomorrow” can be clearly understood to mean that it will more than likely rain tomorrow. The problem comes when people try to think about what thinking is, when they reflect on thinking. Wittgenstein is of the view that when people reflect on things, they are unable to ascertain what thinking is. The self-awareness of thinking impedes.

Wittgenstein, in grappling with the issue of when it is appropriate to use the verb ‘to think’ to describe what someone is doing, as opposed to using the verb ‘to talk’, considers thinking as a concept that covers many areas of life. It is used in a variety of ways. Just as he did with language games, to consider their varied uses and meanings, so Wittgenstein wants people to compare different ways of thinking.

What is clear from this exercise is that the issue of thought is not resolved, where it does not represent just one activity. Instead, there appears to be different aspects and ways of thinking, and possibly even different activities of thinking.

According to Wittgenstein, being taught the meaning of a word without having the language game in which it is set to play explained is like trying to play chess without knowing the rules, and by trying to work out what the word ‘mate’ means, by carefully looking at the
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last move in a game of chess. To be able to understand what the term ‘mate’ means in chess, it is necessary to have an understanding of the rules of the game. In a similar way, to be able to understand thought, people need to be able to understand the rules for the use of the word ‘think’. These rules of convention that govern meaning are social norms, not formal (mechanical/logical) laws of nature, and are not the same as lexical rules. When being challenged with a mathematics problem, for example, it is not necessary to perform a particular action when thinking. There is no need for physical movement, inner speaking or mental pictures. What matters is whether or not the problem can be solved, for that is the real evidence of thought. Stating an answer provides the evidence of thought.

Language is used to express a thought. It is done to convey something about the speaker, or about the speakers’ experiences to other people (using social norms which were developed to enable us to share such meaning). Wittgenstein, in the *Investigations*, questions whether or not it is possible to think a thought without using language, and then to report that thought. To do so means that there are two distinct processes - language and thought. Wittgenstein further questions, whether or not it is possible to separate out the thought from language when people speak thoughtfully, and whether they are able to ‘see’ their thoughts in the same way that they can feel pain without groaning. The purpose of these questions is to show that in some instances, thought cannot be separated from language, and it is not possible to ‘see’ one’s own thoughts or thought processes. People first think, and then only do they use meta-language to describe or report it. Wittgenstein shows how the ‘grammar’ or the use of the words for thought builds on concepts and reinforces the notion of certain functions as activities. Talking about thinking in such a way leads to confusion, which is then compounded by the assumption that language is used to transmit the ideas and thoughts that are in people’s brain or head to the brains or heads of others.

Speaking may be considered a form of thinking, but it is not the only form in which thinking manifests. It is through social interaction that words acquire meanings and are used. Social interaction here includes the use of language, conventions, norms, culture and history. Issues are interwoven into the meanings of words, Wittgenstein notes, in an apparent contradiction to a previous citation, that it is difficult to think without words, so in a way then, talking may be considered a form of thinking. Such a conception of words seems to represent the effect of Romantic Expressionism that so influenced Wittgenstein and reinforces Lurie’s view of him; and could even reflect some of Schopenhauer’s influence.

As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Romantics considered language as a means of expression. They considered expression a creative act. Wittgenstein refines the Romantic
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concept of expression to show that it is the community, the circumstances and context within
which language is used and in which it evolves that provides meaning not just to language but
also to human activity, and as a result helps to determine thought.

Wittgenstein cautions that the notion that people think in their heads is dangerous,
particularly for philosophers. It tends to create an aura of mystery about the concept of
thinking, particularly for the philosopher. Wittgenstein also criticises psychologists and
psychoanalysts for having a tendency to think according to the same conventions.
Wittgenstein reiterates here how thought cannot be in the head, as it is commonly expressed:

Thought cannot be isolated from what it accompanies. There are no pure
thought processes. There is no inner process, which we communicate by
means of language. What I think is no more in (italics in the original) my
head than the facts that make it true are in the world. My chair is in the
world, but the fact that it is my chair is not - it is not anywhere. Similarly,
when I think ‘this is my chair’ - the thought is not in me, although it is my
thought.
So when I tell you what I think, I am not transferring thoughts to you. I do
not lose them when I tell them. I express what I think, and for you to
understand, you need not think what I think, or have the same thought as I
[do]. You may need to know what I think and to say it, but not to have the
thought or to think it. (Wittgenstein, cited in Heaton and Groves, 2009,
p.110)
The fact that it is his chair is not situated in the world, the way that an actual chair is.
The chair can be experienced directly and it can be expressed or not expressed. If the notion of
the ownership of the chair is brought to the attention of another, it does, however, have to be
expressed by saying so, or by pointing to the object, similarly, the notion that having thoughts
has to be expressed. In expressing the thought he is not transferring ownership of it to another.
That person does not need to ‘have’ the thought. The notion of thoughts cannot be in the head.
They cannot be anywhere. Wittgenstein focuses on the correct use of words. The idea of direct
experience seems implicit in his approach, but he does not seem to confront it overtly with any
of his published arguments.

Thinking is often done in words, and is it is possible to describe experiences in speech.
The ability to describe experiences in speech has become a tool that can be used when alone,
as a way of grasping the experienced world. It does not imply a sort of inner language; rather
it is more the case that a language has been learnt by being part of a community of language users. If it were not for the community of language users, it would not have been possible to learn language. It would not be possible to describe experiences and share them. Life would be lived mainly in the moment, or in a series of direct experiences, without the ability to express or share meaning.

There may not be words for all the instances of thought that Wittgenstein provides in his descriptions. His account may not be comprehensive of all the possibilities of thought available. None-the-less, people are able to differentiate between the different accounts by understanding and description. They are able to identify different forms of thinking. As Wittgenstein states:

Remember that our language may posses a variety of different words: one for ‘thinking out loud’; one for thinking as one talks to oneself in the imagination; one for a pause during which something or other floats before the mind, after which, however, we are able to give a confident answer.

One word for a thought expressed in a sentence; one for the lightning thought which I may later ‘clothe in words’; one for wordless thinking as one works (as cited in Kenny, 1994, p.133).

The notion that thinking is a process or an activity, which accompanies thoughtful speech, is to have in mind the notion of a certain grammatical model. What this means is that ‘talking’ and ‘speaking’ are grammatically different although there is, according to Wittgenstein, a strong connection. It would be a mistake to separate talking and thinking in such a way that excludes this.

Wittgenstein uses the term ‘vehicle’ to express the idea of speaking, where speaking is considered a vehicle of thought, it is a way of expressing thought. This leads to the complex relationship between thinking and its expression in speech and writing. Wittgenstein often talks about expressing a psychological fact, such as, for example, expecting someone. To assist in understanding what expectation means it helps to put the expression of expectation in the place of the expectation. If the expression of thought were put in the place of the thought, it would then be possible to determine what is being thought about. The closest connection of thought and its expression is speaking. For a thought to be recognised, it must be internally related to the object of the thought or its content.
If someone says to me what he thought - has he really said: what he thought? Would not the actual mental event have to remain undescribed (sic)? - Was it not the secret thing - of which I give another a mere picture in speech? If I say what I think to someone - do I know my thought here better than my words represent it? Is it as if I were acquainted with a body and showed the other a mere photograph? (Wittgenstein, as cited in Kenny, 1994, p. 208, italics in the original)

The answer to the first question is that if someone has been sincere in what they have said, then there is no reason to presume discordance between what was said and what was thought. This issue is only a problem on the assumption that there is a thought, which is then translated into a public language, and then spoken out loud. If the expression in, say, English is taken as a direct expression, it is what gives form to the thought and is how the experience gains a particular meaning. Someone may be able to lie about what they feel, but even then, they must be aware of the feeling in order to be able to describe it in a deceptive way. Things are expressed in a certain way to create a certain effect, but behind that is an experience being expressed.

The response to the second question, Wittgenstein asks in the quote, whether I know my thought better than my words represent it, is a little more complicated. Wittgenstein supposes that if I am asked to express my thought, on one level I have the same understanding of the thought as the person to whom I have expressed it. I may be able to express the thought better at a later stage, but this is different to having better knowledge of the thought. Referring back to the discussion on the statement “I know my thoughts” is nonsensical as the issue of my knowing what I think is not valid. The reason the idea that I know my thoughts better than the way my words represent it is wrong because the way of expressing it is redundant. I can know what someone else is thinking, but not what I am thinking. The question Wittgenstein asks assumes that knowing and thinking are different things. It makes no sense to speak of knowing thoughts, although people acknowledge that they say they have thoughts. It does not mean that they are not aware of their thoughts, or that they are not thinking of something. The problem is rather, according to Wittgenstein that it is nonsensical to speak of thoughts that way. He points out that if a person thought, but didn’t realise it, the person would be unable to speak about it at all. The error only comes about because current ideas about thinking and its expression are flawed. Wittgenstein showed that even though thoughts cannot be inside the head and that they cannot be seen in the same way that a chair can be seen and be described, they can still be described, expressed and made known.
Despite Wittgenstein’s argument that it is nonsensical to say “my thoughts are known to me alone”, they are. Whether or not thought is described and expressed is an individual’s choice. It could be that maybe I don’t want to express my thoughts or that I may even think that I have not expressed my thoughts properly, because I am either mistaken about facts or am unclear about my thoughts. Where my thoughts are uncertain, my expressions would also be uncertain.

The implication of Wittgenstein’s considerations is that, contrary to the works of Jerry Fodor (mentioned in Chapter Three), there can be no language of thought. Language is used to express thought, and is not thought itself. It also repudiates the information processing approach. It is also contrary to the idea of a sort of ‘mentalese’ code. The code implies that thinking is talking and there is a description of the world running in parallel to the experiencing of it (presumably in a kind of logical language), This description is somehow ‘perceived’ through introspection (an argument without a full account). For example, if I had a full description of the configuration of neurones in someone’s brain when they perceive a cat, how will I know it is a cat that they are perceiving? Are these configurations of neurones unique/specific to each person, or universal across all humans? Implicit in this model is the notion of a rule governing how all this happens. In contrast, there is direct experience (awareness, subjective involvement) and the ability to interpret experience by descriptions provided in language (relative to the linguistic practices of a culture of language users). It is possible that Wittgenstein may have accepted the notion that is implied in the latter, but is hampered by having to use language to articulate it. Wittgenstein’s notes that thinking and talking are two different concepts, that are grammatically different in terms of the grammar of the language game.

In a similar way, these arguments by Wittgenstein reduce the risk of seeing a confluence of his views and those of behaviourism. Behaviour is a process, thinking is a not a process. The behaviourist notion of equating thinking with behaviour is refuted by his argument. Thinking may be expressed in behaviour and it may be expressed in speech, and thinking may not be expressed at all. Thinking and its expression in whatever form are not identical. The expression of thinking is a vehicle for thinking, but is not the same as thinking.

4.7 Reflective summary

Wittgenstein appears to proceed from the belief (in common with Frege and Russell) that it should be possible to develop a universal logical language which can describe all truth to a more fundamental insight. The insight being that a single formal language is not possible, and
attendant to that, that different ‘language games’ are possible and likely. The use of language is dependent on the use of rules dependent on context. What Wittgenstein seemed to have retained (beyond the problem of how thought relates to the world) is that meaning is dependent on the use of rules. Not the firm rules of a formal logic, however, but normative rules that were developed from practical considerations among communities of language-users. This led to his criticism of the philosophic tradition, which he argued to be involved in ‘the wrong game’. It develops elaborate explanations of phenomena that are misunderstood or misrepresented, such as thinking as a mechanism of the brain. Wittgenstein’s point is that this need not be the case. The statement ‘I think’ is used in various ways in relation to the involvement with other people. It suggests an object, ‘I’, that is performing an action very much in line with the idea of Descartes’ ‘soul’. The word ‘I’ need however not imply an inner space or some fundamental core of myself, accessible only to me. “I am going to the shop” is a description of a behaviour, or an explanation of it to another person. “I am afraid” is a direct expression of an emotional state, usually used to reveal this to another person.

Some of the commentators discussed above approach Wittgenstein from an analytical perspective, which focuses more on form and logic than on the Romantic element which is also present in his thought. The analytical approach is probably due to the particular way in which Wittgenstein deconstructs utterances, so as to bring about better understanding. An example of his deconstruction is made evident by the way that he identified that the mind is spoken about in the same way that a physical object is. By inference the mind is accorded the same properties as that of a physical object. Such a use of language is misleading, and creates confusion. Wittgenstein helps to explain that the mind is neither a ‘thing’, nor a ‘no-thing’.

Wittgenstein considered his approach to be a form of therapy to help the confused philosopher avoid the entanglements that come about from the everyday use of language. The everyday use of language is not the problem. It is rather the misuse of every day language which is interpreted in a certain way to construct elaborate theories that ‘explain’ the surface phenomena (i.e. metaphysics). The problem gets compounded when the misuse of everyday languages is linked to the assumption that a word has a specific ‘essential’ meaning rather than being able to be used in a variety of ways. Wittgenstein developed the concept of the perspicuous representation to help dig down into the grammar or rules of language use. He uses the concept of a language game, to consider the context in which a community of language users uses language, and the concept of family resemblances to help identify the different language games.
It may be said that Wittgenstein tends towards the Romantic use of language that considers expression to be important. Wittgenstein considers language as a means of expression and not necessarily as a form of description. It through expression that the rules governing expression and language use (language games) determined by language users are made, and by means of which the meaning of the words is able to be understood. This notion has been picked up by social constructionists to mean that the mind is a social construct because experience can be described in speech. This tool of describing experience in speech, using words, is also used when people are alone and not interacting with others. It provides a way to ‘grasp’ the world as it is experienced. However, without the language community (which teaches the meanings of words), this grasping would be impossible. Without it people would mostly live in the moment, or live sequences of direct experiences without reflection. Such a form of living raises the question whether animals live like this. The notion that the ‘mind’ exists could be as a consequence of a process of social construction. The next chapter will deal with this notion more thoroughly in the next chapter, where its implications and the notion of living in the moment will be more closely examined.
Chapter Five

A REFLECTION ON WITTGENSTEIN’S PERSPECTIVES

5. Wittgenstein’s Notions of Philosophy of Psychology

The thoughts which I publish in what follows are the precipitate of philosophical investigations which have occupied me for the last sixteen years. They concern many subjects: the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things. (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. vii)

So begins the preface to the *Philosophical Investigations*. It was written in 1945, in the last year of the Second World War. It clearly outlines that Wittgenstein will be remarking on concepts such as meaning, understanding and states of consciousness. The word ‘concepts’ usually refers to structures in the mind used to ‘grasp’ categories of entities in the world (developed mainly by Kant). Wittgenstein shows that this idea – of determinate psychological concepts and categories – is not useful as a means to explain how people use words to refer to aspects of the world. He argues that the way in which people actually use words in everyday language does not fit the theoretical model of formal ‘concepts’ as both philosophers of mind and cognitivists use it. Wittgenstein considers the meaning of concepts to be derived from the context in which they are used. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, he considers how language relates to human behaviour, how language is used, how language is a form of behaviour, and by extension, how language is a form of life. Language is regarded as a tool or an instrument of social activity. Budd has noted:

The aim of the philosophy of psychology is the construction of perspicuous representations of everyday psychological concepts; this aim is achieved by the delineation of the grammar of psychological words; the importance of the philosophy of psychology derives from its underlying purpose, which is the dissolution of philosophical problems about the nature of the mind; these problems can be treated successfully only by attaining a synoptic view of the ordinary language of psychology. The
philosophy of psychology is purely descriptive and in no way explanatory.
(1989, pp.1-2)

Budd explains that Wittgenstein’s aim was to develop a representative overview or perspicuous representation (Übersichtlich Darstellung) of every day psychological words, terms and concepts. His aim was to dissolve philosophical problems of mind. The representative overview encompasses a description of the everyday use of the words but does not function as an explanation.

5.1 The problem of the meaning of words

The traditional view of how words acquire meaning, including the realist view of Plato, is where meanings refer to essences. The nominalist view is where meanings are taken as meaningless symbols linked to objects or facts in the world on a case-by-case basis. The nominalist view assumes that people can only experience what they can describe; that ‘thinking’ is the ‘apprehension’ (or perception) of an inner descriptive dialogue of the self. It could be argued that Wittgenstein shows both these views to be inadequate, and he presents a genuinely useful third alternative. The alternative that he offers is that the meanings of words are derived from the way that a community of language users use them in a practical, everyday ways, in dealing with the world and their experiences of it, relative to each other.

‘Concepts’ are traditionally understood to be attempts to explain how words refer to ‘reality’. Wittgenstein considers this attempt to be a mistake, and he produces an alternative description of how words can be said ‘mean’ something. He tries to show how ‘meaning’ functions in language, or how it becomes more meaningful in its practical use. He does this by looking for the way in which the same word can be used in different ways or different words used in similar ways as it is in everyday use.

Kant’s notion of a concept or Begriff is useful for articulating the way in which the mind grasps sensory information to make into knowledge or meaningful. Wittgenstein’s view is that the whole notion of inner referencing is unnecessary. He considers that it was invented to solve the problem of the way that people understand. Wittgenstein disputes that there is a particular way or mechanism that people need to use in the process of understanding. He considers this assumption to be metaphysical ‘baggage’, conjured-up to solve a non-existant problem.

The dominant account in Western philosophy, which can be referred to as the traditional account, takes ‘meaning’ to involve the uncovering of a homogenous logic that underlies all
language. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Wittgenstein tried to ascertain in the *Tractatus* what such a logic might be. It would be a logic that could express all the statements of fact about the world that could be made. Based on this assumption, meaning is involved with the exposing of these formal relationships between (atom-like) prepositions. At that junction, Wittgenstein seemed close to Frege’s and Russell’s interpretation of Kant. In particular, the introduction of the notion of ‘concepts’ produced by inner logical processes, ‘grasping’ this perceptual data (termed ‘neoKantian’). As mentioned in Chapter Three, Kant referred to perceptual data as a manifold of the apperception; he was not a logical atomist as were Frege and Russell. However, Wittgenstein later repudiated his explanation of this way in which meaning works. He proposed that meaning comes about from the way in which a community of language users uses words for practical effect.

According to Wittgenstein, words function relative to the practical concerns of people in a context, and the same words are not always used in the self-same way. They do not refer to universal concepts, which in turn refer to ultimate reality, as per Plato and the realists. Neither are they just arbitrary signs which are made up and discarded, as per the radical nominalists. If words were they would then not be able to convey meaning. Meanings do not have an inner logic-like pattern of representation that reflect the structure of the world, as Fodor accepted nor do they constitute some ‘inner’ description in a formal language of thought of outer reality. Wittgenstein denies the notion of an inner/outer duality outright. People are able to experience the world and are able to talk about it with others. However, this does not imply that there is metaphysical dualism.

Words work in the way that they are entrenched in the practices of communities of language users, which may be heterogeneous. Words work through a multitude of language games used to make sense (mostly) of the practices of the community of users. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Wittgenstein refers to the social rules or norms for the correct use of words in relation to the domain of its use in a context (language game) as grammars. These rules do not refer to some formal structure inside the head, but rather exist within societies of language-users. They depend not on 'reference' but *social norms*, based on the practicalities of life. ‘Meaning’ depends on how words are used in social contexts, and the fact that the same word is used across contexts need not imply that they refer to one thing.

Taking this view further implies that all language acquires its meaning from the social arena. If there were no interaction with others, there would be no need for language. If there were no language, there would be no way to reflect on experiences, life would be lived on a moment-by-moment basis. It is through language that people can distance themselves from
direct experience, and it is through language that they can ‘show’ or ‘say’ their experiences as opposed to only experiencing them. That they can talk about their experiences helps others to understand them better.

If, as Wittgenstein argued, thinking is done in words and words are part of language with its rules (grammar); and language and its meaning arises out of a social arena, then thinking also arises out of a social arena. This social arena consists of notions of culture and history. He wrote, “When I think in language, there aren’t ‘meanings’ going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 57).

The Romantic notion of language is that it is an expression of the self, or of an inner core. It does not imply that the Romantics thought of a private language, but rather that they considered it an expression of self. The notion that the meaning of language arises out of a social context by a community of language users may be in line with the Romantic notion of self-expression. Language is used to reflect on experiences and attempts to grasp the meaning of those experiences. Self-expression is a way of grasping at the meaning of the experiences, and attempting to share those experiences with others. Further, as Wittgenstein has pointed out, there is no private inner core, but rather that the soul is manifest. It is possible to see what a person is thinking by the expressions on their faces and how they behave (Wittgenstein, 1958, p.60). In this way, it is possible to see what people are expressing about themselves. It is only the unpredictability of behaviour that causes uncertainty about what people are thinking. People are able to situate themselves within their social context and within the grammar and rules of such a social arena. It is difficult to ever fully comprehend the way in which people situate themselves in their social context, and the way in which it impacts others; this leads to the notion of unpredictability of behaviour.

Wittgenstein considers that language is a manifestation of expression of experiences a person has of and within the world, based on the social context and arena in which that person finds themselves. Wittgenstein differs with Romantics on the point of language being a manifestation of expression of experience. The Romantics belief that language is a means of expression of the self, leads to the problem of making sense of what the ‘self’ is. It could be that the Romantic notion of expression of self comes about from an over-emphasis on the notion of a person as radically free; an influence that the Romantics inherited from Kant.

A likely Wittgensteinian perspective is that it is through language that the social construction of systems of meaning becomes possible. Such a manifestation of expression of experiences is not in doubt, according to Wittgenstein. However, it does not imply there is a
mind, if what is understood by mind is that it is a physical object, or a process that needs to be explained. Wittgenstein’s identification of language and meaning as being determined by social context has been taken to mean that he would be a supporter of the social construction of mind. Interestingly enough, social construction does not necessarily imply a concept of mind per se. Collectives of people socially construct ‘Meanings’, but this does not imply that there is a mind at work behind them. While Wittgenstein is influential in the development of social constructionism, he wrote preceding its advent, and it would be hard to say what his attitude towards it would have been.

It could be said that Wittgenstein rejects the notion of the explicit subject, but accepts the existence of subjectivity. The experiences of others cannot be shared directly. It is through language that people are able to express their experiences, such as seeing something, in words. It is only by looking at how the word is used in practical everyday discourse (and not by uncovering an underlying essential meaning) that it is possible to learn how to use words appropriately when dealing with the phenomena of everyday experience.

There has been a tendency in twentieth-century continental philosophy after Heidegger, to claim that all understanding is embedded within ordinary life and practice. Wittgenstein is close to saying the same. He has been mistaken for a behaviourist where he focuses on the normative origin of language (its social rule-bound nature) and little on the direct experience that makes language possible.

5.2 Wittgenstein’s conception of psychology
Psychology is normally considered to be a science of ‘feeling’, ‘thinking’, ‘acting’ and ‘perceiving’. However, it is not clear what any of these terms actually mean. Wittgenstein’s notion of psychology was probably more resonant with conventional cognitive science such as the model that was implied in the Tractatus. He considered psychology to be the study of the mind. He felt that this study was based on misunderstandings or conceptual confusion. These conceptual confusions lead to artificial dilemmas like the mind-body problem. Wittgenstein tends to reject the whole notion of the mind-body problem. He felt that the problem was due to over-thinking the mind-body problem, and trying to develop a theory to explain the relationship between them in terms of how they interact, and direction of influence between them. In his lectures on Philosophy of Psychology, Wittgenstein opined as follows:
Psychology is often defined as the science of mental phenomena. This is a little queer… it is the word ‘phenomena’ which may be troublesome. We get the idea; on the one hand you have phenomena of one kind, which do certain things, on the other, phenomena which do other things: so how do the two sorts compare? […] ‘The science of mental phenomena’ - by this we mean what everybody means, namely the science that deals with thinking, deciding, wishing, desiring, wondering […] And an old puzzle comes up. The psychologist when he finds his correlations finds them by watching people doing things like screwing up their noses, getting rises in blood pressure, looking anxious, accepting this after S seconds, reflecting that after S plus 3 seconds, writing down ‘No’ on a piece of paper, and so. So where is the science of mental phenomena? Answer: You observe your own mental happenings you alter them and create new ones: and the whole point of observing is that you should not do this - observing is supposed to be the thing that avoids this. Then the science of mental phenomena has this puzzle: I can’t observe the mental phenomena of others and I can’t observe my own, in the proper sense of ‘observe. So where are we? (as cited in Monk, 2005, p. 500)

Monk (2005, p. 501) makes the point that people are then in a ‘fog’ of introspection. It cannot be resolved, by either introspection or by behaviour. There is no theory of thinking that can resolve this. The only way is to clear this conceptual confusion surrounding words, which can be achieved by methodological examination of the way language is used when these things are considered.

While it may appear that Wittgenstein is critical of psychology and science, it is more likely that he is complaining that there is conceptual confusion about the language and grammar of psychology. This conceptual confusion has, at its source, the whole edifice of dualist metaphysics, namely the separation of mind from body (to explain the existence of knowledge about the world) and the inability to put it together again. Wittgenstein notes here that this whole edifice is based on false assumptions, which he considers as philosophical conceptual confusions. He likens philosophers to Savages, primitive people who hear the expressions of civilized [sic] men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 43).
The use of scientific methods in psychology tends to also be falsely interpreted and result in peculiar conclusions. According to Wittgenstein, the only way to deal with this problem and with the philosophers is his therapeutic method of clearing up conceptual confusions. Wittgenstein writes:

The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a young science; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings’ […] For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion […] The existence of the experimental method makes us think that we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by. (1958, p. 120)

The reason why the ‘problem and ‘method’ pass each other by, as Wittgenstein puts it, is because the problems are misconceived. Wittgenstein says that psychology is confused, due to the conceptual confusions abounding in it, based on the philosophical conceptual confusions. That psychology in the sense of the ‘study of the mind’ is barren means that there are no further areas for development in the field. The reason for this is using a scientific approach in a field such as psychology, which deals with issues arising out of philosophical conceptual confusion. Psychology is not like physics, where empirical research methods can be used to explain and account for things. The ‘mind’ cannot be explained by scientific research, if there is in the first instance confusion about to what the word refers. Wittgenstein participated in scientific experiments in the field of psychology at Cambridge. He knew that before doing the experiments it is important to know what is being looking for, or else the findings will be difficult to interpret. The assumption that the mind processes information derived from data input by the senses cannot be investigated by further experiments. It is not an empirical claim, but a metaphysical one, hence the accusation of conceptual confusion.

Wittgenstein says that instead of doing empirical experiments, what is required is description. The psychologist observes expressions of the mental states such as emotions as they are not hidden. The person being observed is not observing his or her own mental states either. The whole experiment is thus flawed, as the mental states are not being observed per se but rather only the expression of them.

Psychologists use the model of physical sciences based on the philosophical doctrines of positivism. This is presumed to mean that psychology will only be on a level with physical science when definite conclusions can be established between the observations (made by the
brain scientists and psychologists) and psychological events or brain states and processes can be measured by indirect means such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging. Even if it were possible to measure them, it would not clear in what sense they would present as psychological events. It would also be questionable as to what it means to claim that the measurements are ‘psychological’. It is the causal link between direct experiences – as it appears in personal concrete awareness – and scientific explanations, that constitutes the problem. How can the latter explain the former? Science proceeds by abstracting general principles, and by representing these in formal ‘models’, while direct experience is concrete; it is what comes directly given, at the moment, before abstraction or expression. Cognitivists talk as if each individual were an inner scientist who develops formal models (representations) of the world, and refers to these when they think. Wittgenstein says that this assumption is flawed and unnecessary.

The tension between experiences and brain events is glossed over by brain scientists, who forget that they are basing conclusions on the events they experience. Ordinary psychological terminology is used to make qualitative observations. The question is how this will work for psychological concepts, which are different to concepts in physics, such as ‘inertia and ‘acceleration’. The eliminative materialists proposed such a vocabulary and, as mentioned in Chapter Three, this was not convincing. There are numerous difficulties in developing a vocabulary, as it will have to take into account the range and subtlety of psychological concepts. There is also the problem of how people could stop using psychological vocabulary to explain psychological states as the vocabulary is so entrenched in everyday use and that the meanings have all evolved out of social interaction. Wittgenstein wrote:

Psychological concepts are just everyday concepts. They are not concepts newly fashioned by science for its own purpose, as are the concepts of physics and chemistry. Psychological concepts are related to those of the exact sciences as the concepts of science are comparable to those of old women who spend their time nursing the sick. (Wittgenstein, as cited in Heaton, 2010, p. 29)

Wittgenstein was of the view that the problems that occur in psychology arise out of conceptual confusion. Concepts embedded in language help to determine the phenomena in the world. The problem in psychology is that the concepts embedded in language perpetuate the bewitchment of language, most notably, the study of the Cartesian dualism notion of the
inner and the outer. Due to the positivistic account of meaning, psychological had been assumed to have been accounted for. As a result fundamental conceptual confusion was assumed to have been dealt with, and was consequently ignored. The mind-body problem is taken as the background assumption or as the thing that needs to be explained.

Wittgenstein considers that psychologists would be making a mistake if they were to think that empirical research would solve philosophical problems. The issue is that if the metaphysical frame of reference needed in order to make sense of empirical observations is flawed, it will result in misleading conclusions. This issue can only be resolved by clarifying the phenomenon that is to be researched. It cannot be resolved by merely undertaking some experiment or another. Clearing up conceptual confusions prior to undertaking research will result in more informed and effective research programmes.

The concept of experience, like that of event of process, of state, of something, of fact, of description and of statement. Here, we think that they we are standing on the hard bedrock, deeper than any special methods and language games, but these extremely general terms have an extremely blurred meaning. They relate in practice to innumerable special cases, but that does not make them any solider (sic); no, rather it makes them more fluid. (Wittgenstein, as cited in Hacker, 2010, p.10)

According to Wittgenstein there needs to be “an ordering of the psychological concepts [which] helps in the treatment of all” (Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 33). He compared and contrasted psychological concepts, and attempted to rearrange them into a perspicuous (surveyable) representation or rearrangement (Übersichtlich Darstellung). He uses provisos that the concepts are vague and elastic; hence his metaphor of family resemblances. These concepts are different to physical concepts, with the same names such as states, processes and activities; they must be classified differently; a problematic category may be subsumable under different categories. Wittgenstein concludes that categorical classification may be of use for a comparative overview.

An analysis of the use of words such as ‘intention’, ‘willing’, ‘hope’ etc. shows that they gain their meanings from a ‘language game’ that is quite different to that of the scientific use for describing and explaining physical phenomena (Monk, 2005, p.501). Wittgenstein considered the similarities and connections and differences of meanings as important. The connection used to put these all together is both complex and subtle.
Wittgenstein considered the surface grammar of the psychological verbs and nouns to be misleading, as they all appear to be the same. He considers that the only way to avoid being misled is by looking at language games, and by looking at the behaviour and the occasion in which the concept is used. He also thinks that it would be helpful in understanding a concept if the ways that the concept was taught could be considered and reformed.

5.3 Wittgenstein’s response to the conceptual confusion in psychology

Wittgenstein has noted:

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise? - The first step is one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Some time perhaps, we shall know about them - we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive move in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent). And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts fall to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them. (Wittgenstein, 1958, p.103)

Wittgenstein shows that both those who assert that there are mental processes, and those who deny that there are mental processes, are mistaken. It does not matter whether you are a Cartesian dualist or a behaviourist, since either way the view is fundamentally flawed.

The conceptual confusion arose from the way in which words are used and the confusion of language games or ‘grammar’, by using the words from one language game in another. The mind-body problem, according to Wittgenstein, is an example of these conceptual confusions. If the ‘wrong grammar’ is used where the words for one language game are used instead of another, where it is usually used, then a different game is being played and something else is being spoken about. Wittgenstein believed that once the conceptual confusions arising out of the use of words like consciousness are cleared away, the need to look for the areas in the brain that would relate to the use of such words would stop. There is a tendency to think that mental states and processes act like physical states and processes.
According to Bennett and Hacker (2003, p. 68), there is a fallacy in neuroscience, of attributing properties belonging to the whole person to a part of that person, such as, the mind and the brain. This fallacy persists due to the dualistic notion of inner mental representations and the notion of there being a private ‘inner’ object such as a mind. Wittgenstein’s whole ‘private language argument’ as explained in Chapter Four is relevant to this discussion, where he argues against a private ‘inner’. The notion that the concept of an ‘inner’ is private, according to Wittgenstein, is incorrect. It is public, and it is related to behaviour, language games and ways of living, and forms of life, society and culture.

Knowledge of Wittgenstein’s works could help neuroscientists to keep in mind the possibility and prevalence of conceptual confusions. His view that psychological phenomena are sometimes the result of an illusion of grammar may not at first be popular, due to the fundamental methodological rigour and complexity that this implies. He does provide an example to show how this notion works. Wittgenstein argued that it was not possible to express knowledge of one’s own emotions and pain. There is no relationship with them. One merely feels one’s emotions. However, people know when others are in pain, or are experiencing emotions, or are thinking of something, because they can see it in the others’ faces. Thus, in the grammatical terms of language games, the concept of mind is unsound, as it is based on a false premise of what knowing means, and an erroneous use of the word knowing. It is possible to know emotions, to feel pain, and to have thoughts, because this is seen in people’s behaviour which arises out of shared social and cultural contexts. Likewise, the meanings of words also come about through social contexts.

Any move away from the tradition of philosophy and a dualist way of thinking is difficult. These systems of thought are bound to a concept of mind consisting of forms of representation from which it is possible to interpret the actions of others. It is only possible to understand practices inasmuch as they are within their realm of comprehension. It is the manner of representation that makes different practices intelligible, and these arise out of shared language users and social practices. For this reason, cognitivists ought to pay particular attention to the pragmatics of language.

There is a tendency to approach the actions of others from one’s own perspective. Such a tendency may be misleading when treating others from different cultural and social identities and language groups. Wittgenstein suggests that an understanding of the social practices and ‘forms of expression of self’ of others in the languages and associated customary games ought to be considered fundamental in order to assist in the ‘therapeutic treatment’.
5.4 Wittgenstein's approach to the mind-body problem

Wittgenstein traversed the same ground and approached the mind-body problem from different angles, but provides greater clarity in the areas of psychology and the study of ‘mind’. He did not offer a substitute for the traditional problem of mind. However, he argued that if thinking is done in words and words are part of language with its rules of usage (‘grammar’), and language arises out of a social arena, then thinking ought also be understood to arise in a social arena. Wittgenstein questions whether it is a problem at all – that is, whether the issue of a theory of mind is something that requires an 'explanation' (in terms of a theory). He thinks the ‘problem’ of ‘mind’ is due to the way in which it is traditionally conceived. Implicit in Wittgenstein’s views is the critique of the superficiality of the normative tradition of philosophy. He wrote, “the sickness of philosophical problems can be cured only through a changed mode of thought and life, not through a medicine invented by an individual” (1978, p. 132).

For Wittgenstein, philosophical problems continue to be addressed based on assumptions that were used over 2000 years ago. Since Plato, it has been assumed that a word is a category that refers to an essential element of the (concrete) object to which it refers. Such an assumption implies that there is a deep logic behind everyday views, which requires an effort to uncover. Wittgenstein shows this is not necessarily true, and that it has led to pseudo-explanations where everyday meanings are misinterpreted. Unless there is a changed mode of thought and life, many problems in the tradition are likely to remain unresolved. There are different experimental methods, and here Wittgenstein is possibly referring to cognitivism and other areas referred to in Chapter Three that make people think that they are able to solve the problems. However, the problems arise out of conceptual confusion, and the methods that are devised to solve the problem come about as a result of not being able to do so, through the impositions of flawed metaphysics.

In order to address the conceptual confusion, Wittgenstein attempted to remove prejudices and over-generalisations with his method of perspicuous representation and his concept of family resemblances. He tried to impose an order on psychological terms that would involve new categorical concepts. Wittgenstein believed that a new paradigm was necessary for these concepts employed in psychology or a new way of arranging or categorising psychological concepts. As mentioned earlier, he had problems with the use of terminology that included ‘mental states’, ‘mental processes’, ‘mental event’, ‘mental act’ and
‘experience’. Psychologists and neuroscientists tend to rely on such terminology. He was not, however, replacing the old metaphysics with a new one. He was trying to disclose the metaphysical assumptions imposed in certain words as a consequence of centuries of philosophical speculation.

As I attempted to show in Chapter Two, a formal theory of knowledge developed over the centuries, from Plato to Descartes, and then to Kant. The outcome was logical positivism resulting from attempts to formalise epistemology or to create a sort of formal algorithm for doing science. This is used as a model by cognitivism for acquiring knowledge in general, and not limiting it ‘science’. This algorithm was assumed to be an explanation of the workings of mind and was thought to be broadly applicable. Each baby is considered to use a process of experimentation and hypothesis testing based on logic to construct a ‘true’ picture of the world (some theories of cognitive development take this view quite literally).

It is somewhat ironic that science came about by a careful removal of anything that might seem ‘subjective’ from the description of the world. Science left behind one central aspect without sufficient explanation, that is, the direct apprehension of subjectivity itself. This direct apprehension of subjectivity leads to the ‘mind-body problem’, and an attempt to explain ‘subjectivity’ without using anything that could be construed as subjective. It is for this very reason that Wittgenstein’s view of meaning can be seen to be important. Wittgenstein speculated that there is an alternative way of conceiving of the link between words and world and that previous developments by certain philosophers were unhelpful or unnecessary.

As mentioned previously, it could be the case that the attempt to decipher Wittgenstein’s notion of psychology has led to various forms of social constructionism, although he may not have used such an expression. What becomes important is the social context of linguistic meaning. Meaning ceases to be understood as an expression of representations in an individual’s mind. Meaning involves a psychology that studies how people make sense of their world from within their social practices. The world is experienced directly. Thoughts constitute an embodied involvement with the world. It is possible to develop ways of dealing with this embodied involvement in relation to other people, using systems of meaning developed by the practical concerns of entire societies of language users. Meaning is not realised, because people live ‘inside the process’, which stretches beyond them from the past into the future.

Wittgenstein claims that the apparently difficult ontological question of mind implies a misunderstanding of the use of language (grammar). The misunderstanding is possibly due to the fact that people assume that there is a definition or meaning for every use of the word.
‘mind’ e.g. ‘being in two minds’, ‘do you mind’, ‘mind your step’ to name a few. Wittgenstein may agree that there are contexts where he would not object to the use the word, but that there is no reason to suppose a mind conceived of as a kind of inner monitor of brain activity. The word can still be used in its everyday sense, but the reference to a mechanism of thought disappears. When examining the use of the word ‘mind’, there are different correct uses of the word, where all that is needed to know about mind is to be found in those descriptions. For this reason, the philosophical question of “what is a mind?” vanishes, along with the need for having to explain what a mind is.

Wittgenstein brings a linguistic turn to the mind-body problem and with it, a break in the tradition. He reduces the issue down to, some may argue, a matter of semantics, when he proposes that the meaning of words arises out of the social context or arena and the attendant grammar. He attempts to resolve the mind-body problem, by radically eliminating it.

The trouble with interpreting Wittgenstein is that his arguments are broadly used to substantiate individual views, where his work is often considered to be, for example, behaviourist. His ideas do agree with the behaviourists on certain points, such as “that language learning is based on training, and it presupposes natural behaviour and behavioural reactions”. (Hacker, 2010, p.8) However, he disagreed with their assumptions that direct experience is irrelevant to the explanation of why people do what they do, and say what they say. The word ‘I’ can be used in different ways, namely as a description of ‘my’ behaviour, but also as an expression of ‘my’ feelings.

Wittgenstein accepted that there is direct experience. It is not a fiction for him, as it may be for the behaviourists. Nor does he consider that the mental is merely expressed in behaviour. Likewise, he rejects the dualist notion of the inner as a private experience. He does not consider consciousness to be a private viewing of private individual perceptions and experiences. Moyal-Sharrock (2013) attributes a ‘pre-thinking’ to Wittgenstein; a pre-language, a state of being that is almost animal-like. It is before trying to grasp experience. It is after that state that thought comes and the action, where, as Wittgenstein stated, “you don’t need knowledge to find a smell repulsive” (as cited in Moyal-Sharrock, 2013).

As mentioned in Chapter Four, Wittgenstein explored the issue of first person third person asymmetry. The third person present tense is used to describe and explain what others are doing and saying. He did not deny the importance of direct experience, although it is not clear whether or not this was effectively consolidated. While the idea of ‘grounding’ thought in a pre-conceptual domain of poorly expressed direct experience is prominent in Heidegger
and those following him, it is not clear in Wittgenstein, even though it is implied. This idea has, further, been taken up in contemporary cognitive science as the problem of embodiment.

For Wittgenstein, the subject is a person as a being, as a whole, not a part of a being. So the subject is a person as a whole (not a body and a mind) who lives within a community or society of people. His view is resonant with the ‘embodied enactivistic’ approach discussed further on. Wittgenstein shows that there is no such thing as an ‘inner space’ comprising of ‘mental objects’ such as a requisite inner representation of an emotion. He reveals that there are concepts that have arisen out of the pragmatics of communication. These concepts can be considered as precursors to the notion of an organism interacting with its environment, or ‘embodied enactivism’. He shows that meanings, thoughts, mental states and the like do not come about as traditionally explained in theories of mind. According to Moyal-Sharrock (2013), in speaking of mental processes, Wittgenstein accepts that there is physiological correlation between brain processes and thinking, but not that there is one of representation or encryption. It is more a primitive, animal-like pure physiological correlation. Wittgenstein, questions why there should be a correlation between a brain impulse and a thought. He further stated that “…nothing seems more possible to me than that people someday will come to the definite opinion that there is no copy in either the physiological or the nervous systems which corresponds to a particular thought, or a particular idea or memory” (Wittgenstein, as cited in Moyal-Sharrock, 2013, p. 274).

According to Moyal-Sharrock (2013, p. 275) Wittgenstein considers the brain to be a mechanical enabler, stating that a happening or experience leaves a trace in the nervous system. What is left in the nervous system is not the memory, but rather the impression of it. To remember would mean having to grasp the memory from the traces, as opposed to having some sort of filing and retrieval system.

5.4.1 Evaluating Wittgenstein’s approach to the mind-body problem Evaluating Wittgenstein’s approach to the mind-body problem is not an easy matter as there is no standard empirical basis on which to do so. Wittgenstein’s work is not empirical in the sense that it cannot be proved or disproved in a set of experiments or by means of formal logic. His ideas reach behind empirical undertakings, to look at what is meant in the exchange of language, and how the domain of investigation is to be understood. He considers the meanings of the words that comprise the topic of the study before an empirical study can be conducted. A rhetorical consideration of Wittgenstein’s own ambitions and methods may, however, be of use.
Wittgenstein questions the assumptions behind the concept of mind throughout the course of philosophical investigation. They are the consequence of a particular epistemology found in a specific tradition which underlies the assumptions of ‘modernism’ and a mechanistic worldview. He does this in a halting, piecemeal way, deconstructing the traditional discourse around this concept bit by bit. Wittgenstein, by his own admission, acknowledges that trying to follow his lectures is like being guided around London by a rather bad guide (Wittgenstein, cited in Monk, 1990).

Just as Wittgenstein envisaged that the *Tractatus* would put an end to philosophical questions by limiting what could be thought about, so he envisaged that the *Investigations* would lead towards the end to philosophical problems. They might have come about through an incorrect or an incomplete understanding of certain words. He wrote:

> It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was not of any possible interest to us to find out empirically ‘that contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and-such’; - whatever that may mean (the conception of thought as a gaseous medium). And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all *explanation*, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize [sic] those workings: *in despite of* an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved not by new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 27)

Wittgenstein states that the *Investigations* is a grammatical investigation, where ‘grammar’ is used to include the rules that describe the ways that language is used. Wittgenstein wanted to show that meaning comes about from the philosophical aim of a well-organised, correct description of every day use of psychological words. In *Zettel* (loosely translated as ‘notes’ [colloquial]), Wittgenstein stated that he was more concerned with generating an overview of working concepts as opposed to an ‘exactness’ by means of which to put them to use. This is related to the way in which a word is made to mean by its
conventional use. The way in which words are used is not hidden and does not need to be explained, a description will suffice. For this reason, the aim of philosophy is to describe. When the descriptions are properly organised in terms of family resemblances and their everyday usage has been scrutinized and the conceptual confusions cleared, the philosophical questions that come about such as “what is a proposition?” (Wittgenstein, 1985, p. 25) necessarily fall away.

By limiting philosophy to a description of everyday use of language and meaning, it would be impossible “to advance any theses raised in philosophy, because everybody would agree with them” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 29). The reason is that it would be describing something that all have in common; the ‘rules of language’ interpreted as ‘norms’ as socially agreed upon usage. The meanings would be the same because the language acquired would be from speakers in their social context. If the theses are all the same and are, as just described, then there would be nothing to be disputed. As established, for Wittgenstein, the dissipation of philosophical problems comes about from the description of how words are used. However, it does not mean that philosophy will disappear as it provides insight into seeing new aspects of what is already known.

What Wittgenstein achieved with his critique should be considered when evaluating his approach. It is not that he shows that X is ‘actually’ Y, but that he reveals the scope for misapprehension of philosophical propositions of what is at stake in a philosophical argument. It makes it possible to become aware that their conception of psychological being is embedded in a very long tradition of reflection, not just a description of reality that philosophers may be able to observe directly. Philosophers, as much as people, in general, operate by means of unchecked paradigms.

Wittgenstein’s views on meaning (as normative rules for the use of language), language games, etc. are all arguments formulated to show that a ‘theory of mind’ as the description of some kind of ‘inner’ logic-like mechanism for the processing of representations is not really necessary. Moreover, it does not actually make much sense. The mind-body problem (as traditionally conceived) is not, in fact, a philosophical problem in the true sense. There is nothing originating in the phenomena itself that necessitates this dualism and its concomitant elaborate explanations. Of course, Wittgenstein may have raised a new set of issues, such as the relationship of personal, direct experience and the way in which humans as communities of language users develop ways of grasping experience and the impact of social forces. A possible outcome of this may be to put psychology and its philosophic consideration on a whole new path, however, this is beyond the scope of the current study.
Wittgenstein does not attempt to provide a thesis or a theory for psychology, and so he should probably not be evaluated on this basis. A contemporary view of psychology that considers the mind-body problem an explanation of the ‘mechanism of mind’ or ‘how the brain represents the world and incidentally produces consciousness’, is a rejection of Wittgenstein’s argument. His argument tends to imply a view where a person is directly involved in a world or directly present in an experience. A person, who is able to ‘grasp’ this direct experience by applying a frame of reference developed by others in a community of language users (by using language where the meaning is determined by a community of language users). He raised these issues, mentioned above, which cannot simply be ignored in future theorising, but which must be answered.

5.4.2 Are Wittgenstein’s arguments convincing? Cognitivism is the dominant movement in contemporary psychology. It reaches from cognitive psychology into social psychology, personality, psychotherapy, development, and beyond (Green, cited in Byrne, 2012, p. 29).

Such a view may be more in spite of Wittgenstein’s ideas than due to them. Cognitivism is fairly dominant, and neuroscience theorists automatically link their interpretations to cognitivism (as do evolutionary psychologists enjoying every-increasing popularity). Bennett and Hacker (2003, p. 13) claim that theories constructed by neuroscientists about emotion or thought are based on traditional dualist (mind-body) assumptions. A brain event can be measured, but the measure of direct experience cannot be undertaken without asking the person in the experiment to relate it. The brain event that is assumed to exist is proven if the response is interpreted as a direct report of the mental state. Generally, these cognitivist concepts are the same as those which are used in everyday language but have different meanings. Bennett and Hacker (ibid.) seek to sort out the conceptual confusions that would help scientists to avoid problematic formulations and misused concepts.

Wittgenstein used concepts such as ‘mind’ and ‘the mental’. Concepts of ‘mentalism’ meaning ‘mental states’ and ‘processes’ (although dismissed by Wittgenstein) have now been replaced in discourse with concepts of ‘cognition’ and ‘cognitive processing’.

Wittgenstein did not attempt to provide psychologists with a new theory or new methods; rather he merely tried to disentangle the conceptual knots in their thinking. It is by engaging with Wittgenstein’s philosophy that his ‘therapeutic’ method remains relevant and critical to psychological investigations. Does Wittgenstein fully succeed in his arguments? On the terms set by his own argument, probably not. Wittgenstein was a perfectionist, who was
always working and reworking the *Investigations*. Monk has noted “Wittgenstein was deeply dissatisfied with it, particularly with the last third of it - the analysis of psychological concepts that had largely been drawn from earlier manuscripts” (2005, p. 503).

In most of his writing about the philosophy of psychology, Wittgenstein deals with the clarification of the *meaning* of certain terms used or studied by psychology like pain. Wittgenstein, by his own admission, made the *Investigations* public with doubtful feelings. He wanted to put his thoughts on philosophical investigations into a book where, as he noted:

> My thoughts would proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks. After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realised that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks.

(Wittgenstein, 1958, p. vii)

He was also doubtful that he would be able to bring purpose or to inform others, because of what he considered the ‘poverty of the work’ and the darkness of the times. He wrote the preface to the *Investigations* in 1945, the last year of the Second World War.

What Wittgenstein showed was that certain words like ‘mind’ have become so laden with metaphysical baggage that their meanings have been taken for granted. By his unique approach to meaning, Wittgenstein showed that humans are irreducibly social beings and that individuals can only be explained by taking their embeddedness in a social way of life, into consideration. Such a view is contrary to the logical positivist point of view, which is based on the nominalist realist tradition of thinking.

Wittgenstein quite successfully avoided developing a ‘theory of mind’. Some of his followers and detractors, however, have managed to develop a theory out of his works. His meaning of language being determined by the social arena and grammar may be considered as is being quite close to a theory, a process of which he is openly critical. He attempted to explain why words have the meaning that they do, along with providing his therapeutic methods.

How adequate is an approach determined over 50 years ago, given the latest developments in cognition? Wittgenstein is relevant where he focuses on interpersonal rather than intrapersonal meaning. For this reason, the question would be whether his approach to the problem of meaning is adequate, namely whether it is a new radical alternative beyond realism (Plato) and nominalism. The implication for psychology would then be to work out how
meanings are negotiated among people, and what the link of the socially constructed meanings and personal involvement in the world would be.

Theoretical psychology attempts to provide conceptual development. Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology seeks to remove the conceptual confusion that is implicit in theoretical psychology. Wittgenstein’s method offers psychologists a means that offers either to remove conceptual confusion or to gives an overview (perspicuous, or surveyable representation) to use the correct concepts.

It is clear that Wittgenstein has inspired empirical and applied psychologists. For some brain scientists, for example, Bennett and Hacker (2003), the notion that all sensation including pain is felt in the brain is demolished by applying ‘Wittgensteinian clarification’ to conceptual confusion. Bennett and Hacker offer a critique of contemporary neuroscience from a Wittgensteinian point of view. In this way, it can be shown that the ways in which various psychological theorists and cognitive brain scientists frame their discussions is based on certain (metaphysical) assumptions, in particular the assumption that there is something which is called a ‘mind’. The theorists are unaware of this assumption and need not make it. Wittgenstein was not hostile to neuroscience, but would have been against attempts to connect neuro-physical measurements with cognitive type tasks. Bennett and Hacker (ibid.) try to demonstrate this in their book. Using a Wittgensteinian approach, they claim to provide an analysis of neuro-scientific concepts such as ‘thought’ and ‘emotion’, examining the way in which these concepts have become conceptually confused through use. They base their work on Wittgenstein’s notions that the meaning of an expression is determined by the rules governing its use in a particular social context. It determines whether an expression makes sense, is meaningful or lacks meaning. This view is in contrast to science preoccupied with veracity.

If Wittgenstein’s method is evaluated using his own criteria of providing a method, such as the perspicuous representation of psychological concepts, then Wittgenstein has succeeded admirably. At the very least he has opened people’s eyes to alternative ways of looking at things. Western tradition sees the order of problems dualistically (object/subject) but Wittgenstein drew attention to the interpersonal order, which cannot necessarily be reduced to either of these (cf. section 5.5.1 below). He has removed the element of mystery enshrouding thinking. However, the ingrained use of the words and concepts of a theory mind and the over four-hundred-year-old Cartesian model is not easily disbanded, and remains in indefinite use. Wittgenstein’s critique however, will ultimately have to be answered or incorporated.
5.5 Wittgenstein in current psychology and psychological theory

It seems as if Wittgenstein has been largely ignored by ‘scientific’ psychology, and that his influence is not directly manifest. Wittgenstein’s arguments are not used to support research, but rather to provide inspiration for experimental investigation. It would seem that he is more influential in fields that fundamentally question the dualist tradition. These fields include social constructionism and possibly even embodied enactivism, although the extent of his influence in these fields is beyond the scope of this study.

Even though Wittgenstein did not support the dualist view of embodied cognition, his remarks, from the *Investigations* and *Philosophy of Psychology* on concepts have impacted the approach of the cognitivists, who have been conducting research on psychological concepts. It could be that the claims that cognitivist views are dominant is true only within those circles, which knowingly present themselves as working on psychology within a scientific paradigm (including cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary psychology which also works from a cognitivist viewpoint). However, the notion of embodied cognition is starting to be taken more seriously amongst cognitive scientists, although they tend to be a bit wary of the idea of the social origins of meaning.

It appears that there is a split with a more practically inclined view, with names like socio-cultural psychology, critical psychology, postmodern psychology and evolutionary psychology, amongst others. The latter group is more likely to consider Wittgenstein as an influence, together with Heidegger, Vygotsky, Foucault and others.

5.5.1 Social constructionists

As has been mentioned, possibly one of Wittgenstein’s greatest influences is that he has shown that language arises out of a social context. It has had numerous spin-offs and has spawned various schools of thought, such as social constructionism. It may be said, although beyond the scope of the current study, that his influence could have given rise to the postmodernist movement. Language and the deconstruction of language resulted in the development of that movement and people such as Foucault (heavily influenced by Heidegger), who argued that mental illness comes about as a process of social construction.

A social constructionist view is to take some ‘mentalist’ terms (emotion, passion, aggression) and look at how people use them. It considers how certain entities or possibly even behavioural complexes are in fact constructed by their use. People develop ways of referring to the world as direct and experience it based on practical concerns mainly due to the requirements of social interaction. Words have meanings because communities of language
users, who relate their personal experience to those of other people, use them. In other words, the only way to relate your personal experiences is to express them within a common frame of reference. It is why the meaning generated by language is irreducibly social. If there were no need to interact with other people, it would be possible to live totally in the moment, but then the power of reflection would be lost. Such an idea of socially constructed meaning is likely to be influenced by the interpretations of Wittgenstein. Though the nature of the connection would have to be explored.

It is possible that Wittgenstein was getting to a point where it may be possible to describe, using the common resources of language, a more direct apprehension, or involvement with the lived experience. The moment that one tries to explain this experience language is needed. It is not possible to ever be able to get to the ‘raw’ experience, because in order to ‘grasp’ it, it is necessary for it to be put it into a frame of reference (conventionally provided by language). This does not necessarily imply an inner language. Rather, it indicates the language shared by a community of language users. Language ultimately exists to fulfil the need to act in coherence with others.

5.5.2 Embodied enactivism One of the more recent developments in cognitive science is that of the ‘enactive embodiment’ approach, which may be seen to be in opposition to traditional cognitivism, and which is generally considered to be a representational basis of mental computation. Part of the impulse behind this comes from Dreyfus (1991), who mounted a critique of cognitivism, using notions that come from Heidegger. Enactivism is, according Boncampagni, 2014, considered to be “one of the most relevant approaches in the field of the cognitive sciences.” The term enactive first came about in The Embodied mind by Varela et al. 1991. Varela (along with Maturana), were influenced by complexity theories and considerations of biological organisation. Its main purpose was described thus:

We propose as a name the term enactive to emphasize [sic] the growing conviction that cognition is not representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind, but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of a variety of actions that a being in the world performs. (Boncampagni, 2014, p. 32)

According to Varela:
An embodied mind refutes the notion of mental representations, but supports the notion that experience needs a body with sensorimotor functions, which are embedded in a biological, psychological and cultural context [...] perception consists in perceptually-guided action and cognitive structure emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided. (as cited in Boncompagni, 2014, p. 32)

The fundamental basis of the ‘embodied’ notion of mind is that the conceptual organisation of the world as presented to humans (and animals) is grounded in how their bodies interact with the physical environment. The reference to pre-conceptual ground is derived from Heidegger, via Dreyfus. Dreyfus’s (1991) commentary on Heidegger strongly influenced cognitive science. The conceptual organisation of the world as presented to humans (and animals) is grounded in the way in which their bodies interact with the physical environment. This direct, lived experience constitutes the ‘raw feelings’ of how people are involved with the world from moment to moment. It is not a conceptual, description of the world and involves no separation between thinking and feeling. It is just what it feels like for a living being to be in the world or to be engaged with it. Such a notion is very close to Heidegger’s notions of being, and what is called thought.

It is possible that Wittgenstein tried to make the point that direct experience is a precondition of thought. If there is no way to experience something directly, then there is nothing to think about. Without having the ability to ‘just look’ (and not think) behind the expressions of thought, there is nothing to think about. People live in the flow of direct encounters with the world. It is what makes the world ‘feel’ a certain way. It is not based on an inner description of facts (a private language). It is what is seen when people look (without reflecting on what they are looking at. Wittgenstein argues lucidly, such reflection is impossible due to the routine elision of the moment of apprehension with the moment of reflection).

It is not clear whether Wittgenstein would consider embodiment to ground direct experience, but it may be compatible with his ideas on direct experience. Wermcrantz (2010) makes this connection. He applies Wittgenstein’s notion of people living in a community as a ‘form of life’ and he extrapolates this to mean that Wittgenstein would be likely to support the embodiment theory as a way of experiencing or participating in the world (Wermcrantz, 2010 p. 54). He further argues that Wittgenstein’s critique of a private language builds on the philosopher’s notions of forms of life. The critique “suggests the presence and viability of
embodiment theory in language” (ibid.). He goes on further to state that Wittgenstein’s private language argument proposes an embodied approach to a linguistic notion of the mind and body. Absurd examples come about from conceptually dividing the body and the mind, such as the notion of a mind being a non-tangible thing, which exists outside and independent of the body, or that all experience resides in the mind.

It is the acts of seeing and looking, and not reflecting; that depend on embodiment. Social context and culture become important when expressing reflections, and that requires a shared frame of reference. Personal being is in experience (given in embodiment), but it becomes meaningful only in a social frame of reference. Thinking exists at the interface between personal (embodied) experience and socially derived meaning. Wittgenstein has a lot to say about the latter and less to say about the former. It is what he says about the latter that is close to the notion of embodiment, where the concept of a living being is bound up with its environment.

A further tenet of embodiment is that the embodied organism is a self-organised or autopoietic system. The autopoietic system is a concept of a 'self plus organisation' developed by Maturana, with help from Varela. It is used to explain complex biological systems while denying the relevance of ‘information’ altogether. It means that the system is able to deal with disturbances to it from outside itself, and can reorganise itself and maintain its structural integrity. When extrapolated to people, it means that a person can interact with the world in ever-increasingly complex ways. People would need to have a system within which they would be able to adapt to environmental challenges in order to survive. The construction of inner representations would hinder this adaption and would pose a risk to the person’s survival. The embodied enactivist approach implies a view of a brain that is based on the interactions of the body with the environment. Such a view is analogous to Wittgenstein’s notion of language and meaning, arising out of social context and culture, where language and meaning are influenced by everyday use and culture. Furthermore language is a way of becoming aware of the world, as it provides a common set of shared references. Language as such may be seen to be an expression of a person’s interaction with society and the world. Wittgenstein’s view is that language is not something hidden. It is ‘plain view’. There is nothing new to be found but all that is required is a re-arrangement of what is known to bring about a better understanding. As Moyal-Sharrock has noted:
Wittgenstein’s enactive account of mindness is informed by unassuming description, not tendentious explanation; it relies on what is ‘already in plain view’ (2013, p. 16).

Wittgenstein combines his notion of language deriving its meaning through everyday use and through social interaction with his understanding that there is no separation of the mind and body and with his desire for description and rearrangement of what is in plain view (as opposed to explanation and the development of theory) is the basis for what, Moyal-Sharrock terms his ‘enactive account of mindness’. It provides support for the notion that Wittgenstein’s influence has been carried forward.

5.6 Wittgenstein and beyond
It may have been that readers of the Philosophical Investigations were initially taken aback by Wittgenstein’s style. However, his piecemeal, halting and interactive style is nowadays not so unusual. They may still, of course, find his meaning quite difficult. Perhaps the most difficult concept to accept is that mental activity is not a physical phenomenon produced by the physical processes in the brain, nor can it be reduced to brain states. Thoughts have traditionally been considered as a kind of ‘inner’ language. The reason for the difficulty in accepting this notion, has not so much to do with Wittgenstein, as with the way that language is used and how language has led and continues to lead to the acceptance that there is something else that needs to be appreciated. The ‘something else’ is accepting the social order as ‘real’ i.e. not reducible to either ‘subject’ or ‘object’ as has been the tradition since Descartes. Theorists automatically assume the dualist stance when they try to ‘explain’ thinking and the world. It could be argued, however, that human conduct is largely in relation to imaginary objects (like ‘money’ or the ‘state’ or ‘sports teams’) but which have real consequences for behaviour. The behaviour depends on the coordinated beliefs of millions, not individual subjectivity.

Of course, there have been developments in cognitive science, especially in the field of enactive embodiment since Wittgenstein was alive, but that does not necessarily mean that Wittgenstein’s work is discredited. If anything it makes his work even more important now, given the focus on brain states and the pervasiveness of cognitive thinking.

It is argued here that the clarification of concepts and meaning derived from usage could become quite helpful in the fields of neuroscience and psychology, as it provides a framework for clearing up conceptual confusions. In terms of day-to-day use, whilst it may assist in clearing up conceptual confusions, the meaning of psychological concepts will continue to be
derived from the social context in which they are used. It is by knowing this that there could be wider applications than just in the psychological field but also in neuroscience and other fields. The issue of meaning coming from a community of language users, and the need to act in coherence with other people, could have important implications for promoting an understanding of the cultures of others. It could also highlight the need to share another’s culture by being able to understand the language and the ‘grammar’ or social rules applicable to the language that is used.

It is through social interaction with others that people can grasp the meaning of experience. The notion that the meaning comes about from a community of language users and the search for grasping meaning through experience could impact on how people relate to others and how their relationships could be shaped through language by using it as a means of identification and ‘othering’. This has been noted by post-modern psychologists such as Foucault and Derrida, who have built on the notion of meaning arising out of social context, which have in turn been followed by the social constructionists and the embodied enactivists. Exactly how Wittgenstein’s influence is manifested in embodied cognition and social construction would constitute the possible subject of a future study.
An Examination of Wittgenstein’s Approach to the Mind-Body Problem

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