AFRICA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Agent, bystander or victim?

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Africa’s role and position in international relations has often been studied by focusing on the role and impact of exogenous actors on the continent instead of focusing on Africa’s role and impact on these exogenous actors and relations. Conventional attempts to search for an African voice in discourses on its position in international relations often focus on the victimhood of the continent by emphasizing the exploitation, colonisation, discrimination, marginalization and underdevelopment of the continent, which is here defined as the geographical area which constitutes the continent. This definition corresponds with the membership of the African Union (AU).

The discourse of Africa’s victimhood can result either in a political persecution complex; political fatalism through a culture of passive bystandering; self-marginalization; and/or Othering in respect of the continent’s contribution to and position in international relations. In contrast to the victimhood discourse, Africa has made significant contributions to international relations. The continent was, for example, one of the first continents to declare itself a nuclear weapons free zone; it led the global campaign against apartheid; two Africans served as secretary-generals of the United Nations (UN); African states have served on the UN Security Council; African states form part of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM); Africa has adopted the Ezulweni Consensus on UN reform; and several Africans are Nobel Laureates. In addition to this, Africans have served, and continue to serve, in leadership positions in several multilateral organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). Moreover, the notion of ‘African solutions for African problems’ is another reflection of African agency in international relations.

Africa as ontology asks the question: how do students of Africa conceptualize what they study? This presupposes the acceptance of differences of ‘being’ and a certain view about the nature of the world. Therefore, ontologically, this
contribution postulates that Africa’s role and position in international relations have several components, namely identity (agent, bystander and victim) and context (structure).

However, Africa presents a number of ontological dilemmas. First, the continent is not a monolithic actor and second, different historical experiences have resulted in various notions of identities such as Francophone, Anglophone and Arab Africa.

How, then, does Africa and the world interpret its identity and role as an agent, bystander or victim in international relations? Moreover, how is Africa represented in international relations and how is it represented by others? Or is it 'The Economist’s ‘hopeless continent’'?  

The dilemma of interpretation and representation is that Africa and its IR scholars can become complicit in maintaining hegemonic theoretical approaches and discourses. Thus, ‘Knowledge – as truth claims rather than objective historical facts – thus becomes intertwined with power, resulting in ‘regimes of truth’ that perpetuate particular (unequal) relationships’. This complicity is evident in Africans’ studies on the continent’s international relations and the study of IR on the continent with the use of Western IR debates. Notwithstanding this, African scholars were attracted to theoretical developments elsewhere such as the Dependencia School in Latin America in the 1970s.

Against the aforesaid, the purpose of this contribution is three-fold. First, it attempts to survey some academic literature on African victimhood in contemporary international relations. Second, it attempts to dismiss the notion of Africa as a passive bystander and a victim in international relations by illustrating African agency in international relations, especially in nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy where the continent continues to impact on the global agenda. The choice of this case study is deliberate as this is an area where the continent has made important contributions, which are explained below. Finally, the contribution attempts to indicate African contributions to the study of international relations and how this can be integrated into the universal study of international relations.

Context

Contemporary Africa finds itself within a particular international order. Whereas the cold war provided a strange type of stability in the international system, the immediate post-cold war international system was characterized by some turbulence. During this period, the international system displayed a greater degree of anarchy with no single powerful state; though some maintained that the US achieved and maintained this position for some time until the international system realigned itself. Once this realignment took place, the international system showed some shifts in the axis between powers. Whereas cold war bipolarity was based on ideological differences, the period after the cold war was characterized more by economic differences between the developed and developing world and the North–South division compared to the cold war’s East–West division.
For Africa, the context within which it operates changed as well. Cold war support and protection from either the US or its allies, or the Soviet Union and its allies, was terminated or redefined. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow remained the ally of some African states. However, it was no longer the Moscow of the Soviet Union, but the Moscow of the Russian Federation. For a decade or so as superpowers realigned themselves, Africa found itself marginalized; a situation that changed on 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9/11) when Africa’s strategic importance for the US and Europe in the ‘war on terrorism’ increased.\(^6\) In addition to this, the continent is also experiencing China’s greater involvement in and engagement of the continent.

Against the aforesaid, it is clear that the international context, within which the continent operates, consists of four sub-contexts, namely multilateral intergovernmental organizations and negotiations such as the UN; bilateral relations with both super and emerging powers; intra-regional cooperation; and sub-state or transnational contexts.\(^7\) An example of Africa’s agency in multilateral intergovernmental organizations and negotiations is the UN. Forming part of the largest group of states, African states wield considerable voting power and form a strong bloc advocating reform of the UN to reflect contemporary global realities and represent the interests of less-developed states and continents. Further examples of African agency include the continent’s role in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) to prevent the proliferation of conflict or so-called blood diamonds; African membership of and participation in gatherings such as the Group of Eight (G8) and the Group of Twenty (G20). Africa’s opposition to the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) establishing its headquarters on the continent is another example of its agency as AFRICOM continues to operate from its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany.

A more recent development illustrating African agency is its membership of formations such as the India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). One of the consequences of this has been the increase in African involvement in South–South cooperation, which, in turn, has resulted in greater foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa from non-Western states such as India, Brazil, China and Turkey.\(^8\)

In a bilateral context, African states could expand their relations with China, for example, to the detriment of US demands and prescriptions in its relations with certain African states. In a regional context, African agency has been improved with the transition of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the AU in 2002. The first decade of the AU’s existence has enabled the continent to enter into agreements with the European Union (EU) through the EU-Africa Partnership; with China through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC); and with Japan through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). The importance of Addis Ababa (the headquarters of the AU and some UN agencies) as a diplomatic capital is growing with several states with missions to the AU. On a sub-regional level, African agency is evident in agreements such that between the EU as the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
Africa’s triangulated identity: Victim, bystander and agent

Africa has a unique cultural, economic and political context. This uniqueness is duplicated among the differences between ethnic groups within the continent that often stretch beyond Africa’s Westphalian state system. For the purpose of this contribution, Africa’s identity is investigated in terms of three types of identity, namely that of an agent, bystander or victim.

Victim

The notion of African victimhood has been the subject of both African and international literature and the study of IR. The work of, for example, Chinua Achebe, Edward Said, Mahmood Mamdani and Frantz Fanon supports empirical evidence and the literature on Africa’s position in both international relations and IR. Literature on Africa’s identity as a victim of colonialism, Western hegemony and marginalization abounds. Empirical evidence continues to suggest that Africa is not represented as a permanent member of the UN Security Council; that it is not a major shareholder in international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and that the continent suffered tremendously due to, inter alia, these institutions’ structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and conditionalities. When the OAU adopted the Lagos Plan in 1980 it stated clearly that the continent’s woes were the result of the West’s historical injustices on the continent.

In regarding itself as a victim, in terms of, for example, colonialism and hegemonic Western academic traditions and global political agendas, Africa has bestowed on itself a certain identity, which has several implications. First, by identifying itself as a victim, Africa acknowledges its vulnerability and presupposes the existence of a perpetrator. This supposes a power relation, which has at least two actors, i.e. a dominant actor(s) and a dominated actor(s), resulting in asymmetry and inequality. Another result of this inequality is that the continent has not always been able to flex its own muscles on the international scene. This has resulted in both the international and internal subjugation of the continent.

Second, one aspect related to victimhood is that of solidarity with other victims resulting in a certain kind of intimacy between victims. Sharing the same identity and a collective memory of victimization, victims sometimes align themselves with other victims. Africa has often expressed solidarity with similarly dominated and victimized countries and regions such as Latin America and some parts of the Pacific. An example of the formalization and institutionalization of this solidarity is the establishment of the NAM in 1955 and the OAU in 1963. With solidarity, collective action can occur. This is often evident in bloc formation and bloc voting at, for example, the UN.

The victim faces several dilemmas. First, it faces the dilemma of identification and definition. What makes it a victim, and is it a legitimate claim accepted by others? Second, is the actor still victimized? Finally, an identity as a victim can have...
unintended consequences. Jews, for example, are often reminded of their victimization during the twentieth century’s Holocaust when called on to consider the statehood of Palestine.

Earlier reference was made of solidarity as one of the unintended consequences of victimhood. For Africa, solidarity with similarly less-development continents has contributed to the continent’s agency in respect of certain international relations. The continent, for example, forms part of the NAM, which represents the largest grouping in the UN General Assembly. Similarly, the continent’s solidarity with these countries has resulted in the strong voice of developing countries in negotiations on, for example, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

**Bystander**

Defined in terms of what is does not do, a bystander is often accused of being passive and not responding to a certain actor, event, threat or situation. Switzerland, for example, may be defined as a bystander due to its centuries-long neutrality. The bystander identity is often contextual, i.e. involving distance or proximity and a social element (relations or not with the actor or event). Moreover, the bystander identity is also situational, requiring the salience and the clarity of an actor, condition, event or situation. A third element of the bystander identity is the ability to define and interpret a particular actor, condition, event or situation. Depending on this definition and the fourth element of this identity – a normative obligation to act – an actor will decide whether it will remain passive (a bystander) or intervene depending on its abilities, authority and influence and power (the fifth element).

Africa is often accused of being a bystander in the enforcement of human rights on the continent and, therefore, guilty of not honouring its continental and international human rights obligations. This has resulted in African inaction/passivity in respect of human rights violations such as the Rwandan Genocide (1994) and the ongoing Darfur Genocide. Africa’s impunity of violators has resulted in its international impunity of, for example, China; a major investor in Africa and a declared violator of human rights. In the past decade, Africa’s trade with China’s has increased from US$11 billion to US$166 billion. This has cast doubts on the continent’s ability to resolve its own human rights crises, insecurity and underdevelopment. Whereas bystanders may generally experience a sense of helplessness of guilt *ex post facto*, Africa through continental organizations such as the AU or regional organizations, has not even issued formal apologies in cases of its passivity, or sanctioned contravening states. Notwithstanding this, Africa has contributed to an understanding of justice and conflict resolution. For example, Rwanda’s *gacaca* courts, established in 2001 and a localization of justice, are contributing to new notions of grassroots justice and conflict resolution. These courts completed their official mandate in 2012.

The bystander faces several dilemmas, which includes the definition of the actor or situation, a feeling of powerlessness that may result in passivity, guilt,
accountability and unintended consequences. In defining an actor or situation, the bystander’s subjectivity often results in Othering. In identifying the ‘Other’, the bystander may decide that it is not in its interests to act; often resulting in guilt and/or questions of accountability in terms of the obligation to act.

Agency

Agency refers to the ability of an actor to set the international agenda in order to set a new normative framework and/or advance its own interests. Agency, therefore, refers to an actor’s influence and freedom of action and its material and/or non-material ability to determine its destiny and affect its environment (agency). It also includes the extent to which an actor’s destiny and ability is determined by external actors (structure). Apart from freedom and ability, agency also requires authority and influence to achieve a specific objective. Moreover, agency also requires inventiveness and initiative.

Therefore, agency focuses on Clapham’s ‘view from below’. It also focuses on political action by and objectives of African actors; especially in the context of the structural limitations experienced by these actors. In order to determine African agency, it is necessary to determine how much influence the continent exercises, and how much freedom or how many options are available to the continent within the limitations it experiences. In considering this, Brown and Harman offer further insights into agency. They suggest that an analysis of agency should also focus on the kind of agency exercised; the types of agents involved; the social context; the political purpose of agency and agents; the instruments of agency; the arenas and extent of African agency.

The continental slogan ‘African solutions for African problems’ that emerged during the 2000s provided further impetus for the continent’s agency. Since the OAU adopted the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980, the continent attempted to terminate the socio-economic legacies of colonialism. Despite its failure, the Lagos Plan initiated a series of African-led initiatives and counterstrategies to improve conditions on the continent and the continent’s international agency. Calling for an African Renaissance, South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki led continental efforts to engage with states and international actors such as the EU and the US. By 2002, this has resulted in the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP), which called for a partnership between Africa and developed countries. Despite some differences on the continental agenda, African states adopted the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) in October 2001, a month after 9/11, as a refined successor of MAP. In 2002, the OAU was transformed into the AU, which adopted NEPAD as its development strategy. Subsequent to these developments, the EU signed new agreements with the AU; the US adopted the African Growth and Opportunity Acts (AGOA I and II); and China entered the continent as a major investor.

African agency was also evident during the cold war when it was able to play the superpowers off against each other. Currently, Africa finds itself in a similar
advantageous position in respect of superpowers' efforts to acquire or maintain a foothold on the continent. China has become the continent's largest investor; a major bargaining chip for African states in their relations with the EU and the US. Moreover, African agency is clearly evident in the North's greater interest in the African continent through aid; the provision of security; a deepening of Africa's involvement in the multilateralism in the South; and the role of the continent in the global war on terror.¹⁷

One example of the continent's agency is the establishment of the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (ANWFZ) with the entry into force of the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty) on 15 July 2009, to which we turn next as an illustrative case study.

**African agency and nuclear non-proliferation**

The 1960s was a geopolitical and nuclear turning point for Africa. The independence of African states and the decolonization process on the continent represent a major event in and contribution to African agency. African leaders were set to determine their countries' destinies. In fact, African states, in some instances, responded strongly to perceptions of Soviet (Egypt, for example, expelled the Soviet Union in 1973) and Chinese influence on the continent. When the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou En Lai stated in the early 1960s that Africa 'was ripe for revolution' African leaders were offended and responded by limiting Chinese activities on the continent.¹⁸

Considering that most African states gained independence in the 1960s; that the cold war had intensified; that the OAU was established; and that France conducted nuclear atmospheric tests in the Sahara Desert in February 1960, African states responded by expressing their opposition to these tests by terminating diplomatic relations (e.g. Nigeria); freezing French assets (e.g. Ghana); and by sponsoring a 1960 UN General Assembly resolution condemning the French tests.¹⁹ The resolution, however, was not adopted due to a lack of international support.

As more African states became independent and faced new national and continental security threats, Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first post-independence president, observed ‘There are two threatening swords of Damocles hanging over the continent, and we must remove them. These are the nuclear tests in the Sahara by the French government and the apartheid policy of the Government of the Union of South Africa’.²⁰ Nkrumah’s government was one of the African governments to freeze French assets in response to French atmospheric nuclear tests in Africa. Moreover, Nkrumah’s stature as Africa’s first post-independence president added weight to anti-nuclear sentiments on the continent. In 1961, a larger number of African states supported the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 1652 (XVI) (1961) on the Consideration of Africa as a Denuclearized Zone, which declared Africa a nuclear weapon free zone. This resolution also called on UN members to refrain from testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons in Africa.²¹
The UN initiative was endorsed by the OAU. At the Inaugural Summit of the OAU from 22 to 25 May 1963 French nuclear tests in Africa, which were eventually terminated in 1966, were discussed under the agenda item of general disarmament. Resulting from this discussion, the summit unanimously adopted a resolution to declare Africa ‘a denuclearized zone’ and to ‘promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy’. At the first Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the OAU in July 1964, the organization adopted Resolution AHG/Resolution11 (1) (1964) on the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (hereafter the Declaration). Moreover, the OAU committed itself to negotiate an international agreement on this matter under the auspices of the UN. When the Declaration was submitted to the UN General Assembly in November 1965, the Assembly furthermore endorsed another resolution, Resolution 2033(XX) (1965) on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Africa.

Despite these developments in the 1960s and the subsequent formulation of a Draft Convention for the Denuclearization of the Continent of Africa by the OAU in 1964, a treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty) on Africa as a nuclear weapon free zone only entered into force in July 2009. Several explanations for this can be offered. As the cold war intensified, calls for a universal rather than a regional (African) nuclear non-proliferation treaty increased. The resultant treaty, the NPT, only entered into force in March 1970. Several African states participated in the negotiations on the NPT, thus delaying the negotiation of a treaty on an African nuclear weapon free zone, and they eventually became party to the NPT. In addition to this and at the same time, South Africa’s status as a state with a nuclear weapons capability contradicted the purpose of such an African treaty. In fact, South Africa’s nuclear capability was a negation of Africa’s aim to keep the continent free from nuclear weapons.

On 11 April 1996, OAU member states signed the Pelindaba Treaty in Cairo, Egypt, and adopted the Cairo Declaration. As indicated previously, the OAU had adopted its first resolution on the denuclearisation of Africa in Cairo in 1964. In the 1996 Cairo Declaration, members of the OAU recognized the ‘valuable contribution’ of nuclear weapons free zones to nuclear non-proliferation. In addition, OAU members called on all non-nuclear weapons states (NWS) to ratify the Pelindaba Treaty’s Protocols and to pursue the ‘complete elimination’ of nuclear weapons. This formalized the territory covered by the ANWFZ. Annex I in the Pelindaba Treaty includes a map of the ANWFZ that ‘extends across the entire continent of mainland Africa’ and several islands, including the Agalega Island, Bassas da India, the Canary Islands, Cape Verde, the Cardagos Carajos Shoals, the Chagos Archipelago – Diego Garcia, Comoros, Europa, Juan de Nova, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mayotte, Prince Edward and Marion Islands, Reunion, Rodrigues Island, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Tomelin Island and Zanzibar and Pemba Islands.

The provisions of the Pelindaba Treaty require signatory states to undertake the following:
renounce nuclear weapons (Article 3);
- prevent the stationing of nuclear explosive devices (Article 4);
- prohibit the testing of nuclear explosive devices (Article 5);
- declare, dismantle, destruct or convert nuclear explosive devices and facilities for their peaceful development (Article 6);
- prohibit the dumping and storage of radioactive waste (Article 7);
- promote peaceful nuclear uses and verification of these peaceful uses (Articles 8 and 9);
- provide physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials, and prohibit armed attacks on nuclear installations (Articles 10 and 11);
- establish the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) (Article 12);
- report and exchange information on nuclear activities (Article 13).

Three protocols to the Pelindaba Treaty require extra-zonal states to comply with the Treaty’s provisions (see Table 6.1). The AU has repeatedly indicated that the failure of non-African countries and NWS to ratify the Treaty’s protocols has hindered some African states from ratifying it. This weakens the Treaty and poses a challenge to global non-proliferation. On 8 July 2011, the AU supported by the US and the UN repeated calls on non-member African states to ratify the Pelindaba Treaty and for NWS and Spain to ratify its protocols as prescribed without further delay. The AU issued this call despite welcoming the long-awaited Russian Federation’s ratification of the Treaty’s Protocol I and II on 11 March 2011, albeit conditional and thus contrary to the text of the Pelindaba Treaty.

On 8 July 2011, the AU also welcomed President Obama’s undertaking of 2 May 2011 to seek consent for Protocol I and II from the US Senate, reversing a long-standing reluctance on the part of the US to ratify them. Obama expressed

**TABLE 6.1 Protocols of the Pelindaba Treaty**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Obligations</th>
<th>Open for ratification by</th>
<th>Signed</th>
<th>Ratified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>NWS not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon against any Party to the Treaty and against any territory within the ANWFZ</td>
<td>By all NWS</td>
<td>By all NWS</td>
<td>France, China, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>NWS not to participate or assist in or encourage the testing of a nuclear explosive device in the ANWFZ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Parties de jure or de facto in control of territories within the zone (France and Spain) to apply the Treaty’s principles in the territories under their control</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Pelindaba Treaty (2009)*
the belief that it was in the interest of the US to ratify Protocols I and II to strengthen US relations with African allies. This would improve the security of the US by serving the overall objective of non-proliferation and arms control; demonstrate US commitment to the decisions taken at the 1995 Regional Economic Community of the NPT; and contribute to the achievement of an ANWFZ. China has ratified Protocol I and II, while France has ratified Protocols I, II and III. The UK and Russia have ratified Protocols I and II but with provisos. The UK objected to the inclusion of the Chagos Archipelago in the Treaty as an infringement of the UK’s sovereignty, whereas Russia objected to the military base of the US, a NWS, on Diego Garcia. For Russia, the presence of a NWS in an area subject to denuclearization is counter to the objective of the Treaty. Spain has neither signed nor ratified Protocol III. However, it remains equally disturbing that the AU has not called on the world’s risky atomic weapons states in Asia and the Middle East, namely India, Iran, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan to ratify the Pelindaba Treaty.

The Pelindaba Treaty is an innovative development in respect of NWFZs and the norm of nuclear non-proliferation. The AU has identified five innovations in the Pelindaba Treaty as a NWFZ treaty. First, it bans research into nuclear explosive devices by any means in the zone’s territory (Articles 3, 4 and 5). Second, it requires the destruction of nuclear devices that a state may have had prior to the Treaty’s entry into force (Article 6). In the third instance, it prohibits the dumping of radioactive waste and other radioactive matter anywhere in the ANWFZ (Article 7). The fourth innovation is that armed attacks by conventional and other means against nuclear installations in the ANWFZ are prohibited (Articles 10 and 11). Finally, the Treaty supports states’ use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes (Article 8).

**Conclusion**

It could be argued that Africa has been a victim and bystander in respect of global nuclear issues as exogenous actors extracted the continent’s uranium resources, enriched it and armed with nuclear weapons determined the global agenda since the end of the Second World War until the end of the cold war.

In assessing African agency in nuclear non-proliferation in the form of the Pelindaba Treaty it is evident that the continent skillfully operated in all of the contexts referred to above. By elevating nuclear non-proliferation to a continental (at the OAU and AU) and international (UN) context, the continent influenced the global agenda, preventing non-proliferation as outlined in the Pelindaba Treaty.

The case study presented here highlights some of types of agents involved, namely certain individual states such as Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria with strong political leaders as agenda setters and domestic and continental decision makers. The case also illustrated the types of agency Africa exerted. These kinds of agency include activism (by calling for a NWFZ), reformism (by expanding on the content of NWFZs) and revisionist (by showing Africa’s ability, power and
influence vis-à-vis traditional nuclear powers and requiring these states to sign the Treaty’s protocols).

The case study also revealed the instruments of African agency, namely bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Negotiation rather than conflict has been Africa’s preferred instrument. This raises questions on the purpose and consequences of African agency. Surely, material and non-material gains are to be made from African successes in this area. Materially, the continent can set the rules for the extraction of its uranium extraction and export, and thus gain financially. Non-material gains include the status and prestige associated with a particular normative stance (i.e. the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy) that expresses power through solidarity and influence.

Africa remains characterized by a triangulated identity (agent, bystander and victim). Africa’s contribution to the study of IR is significant. Less significant is a unique African approach to IR; one that questions Western ideas and contributes to an understanding of IR and international relations. In order for Africa and its scholars to achieve this, a research agenda is proposed. This agenda could include a (comparative) study of Africa’s empires such as that of Shaka Zulu or the Ashanti; city-states such as Mapunbupwe and Great Zimbabwe; leaders such as the Kabaka and the Asantehene.

Second, a proposal is made for a pan-African research project on teaching IR in Africa, African IR and the status of Africa’s voice in IR. This could result in identifying, for example, a Johannesburg School, an Algiers School, a Cairo School, a Lagos School or a Mombasa School of African IR. A study or the identification of schools such as these could be able to capture the African voice in international relations and contribute to African theory building in IR.

Notes
5 Ibid., 74.

10 Osaghae and McGowan, ‘Africa in the global system, 1600 to decolonization’, 231.


16 Ibid., 2–7.


18 Osaghae and McGowan, ‘Africa in the global system, 1600 to decolonization’, 225.


23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.


Bibliography


