Family Ties and Political Alliances in Marius' Career

Le sort fait les parents, le choix fait les amis.

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Introduction

The various types of relationships which republican politicians either possessed from birth, or which they were bound to cultivate and accumulate in order to become successful in the public life of the city, are well illustrated by the author of the Commentariolum Petitionis (16–31). The multiplicity of obligations was evidently nothing short of immense, and the significant point

1 The date and authorship of this work remains disputed and, although it may have been composed during the first century AD, the writer seems to have possessed a good
which surely emerges from a reading of this text is that the candidate in elections, with the help of his closest helpers, was obliged to seek out all possible alliances and contacts to ensure a good result in the forthcoming poll. Eminence in Roman politics was almost exclusively the result of personal efforts. There were no party cadres available to undertake work on behalf of an aspiring politician.  

Canonvassing for the magistracies involves paying attention to two aims of equal importance, the first concerned with gaining the support of friends, the second securing the favour of the people. The support of the friends should be acquired through various kindnesses and attention to duties, old acquaintance, courtesy and personal charm. But the word ‘friends’ has a broader meaning in the canvass than in the rest of one’s life, for anyone who exhibits goodwill to you, or seeks your company, or who visits your house, deserves to be numbered among your friends (Comm. Pet. 16).  

The various interpretations placed on the nature of factiones and partes in second-century republican politics by scholars over the years do not require detailed analysis here. It should be sufficiently clear from the discussion thus far that I have adhered to the arguments which stress personal and transient political relationships rather than those which postulate formal or even informal groups in the senate. The creative genius of Mommsen continues....
to enrapture those who feel more at home working with an organized political structure with which they are obviously familiar, but political slogans, however inventive, cannot be converted into a hypothetical system simply because they appeal to current modes of thought and experience.\(^5\) The evidence to be obtained from the *Commentariolum Petitionis*, which appears to lack inherent bias, indicated by the absence of political catchwords, unlike so many of the sources cited for ancient evidence of partes, shows that, in the last analysis, the route to success in a political career lay in the ability of the individual to harness all the possible advantages available among the community, from his fellow citizens and from his various personal relationships, before the voters went to cast their ballots. In the words of Brunt, ‘of large, cohesive, and durable coalitions of families there is no evidence at all for any period’.\(^6\)

**Marius’ Earliest Ties**

The evidence for Marius’ connections with the Corneli Scipiones rests on an anecdote related by Plutarch (*Mar.* 3.2–3) concerning a prophecy made by Scipio Aemilianus about his officer’s future greatness, and on another, found in Silius Italicus’ *Punica* (13.853), in which, on a visit to Hades, the

\(^{351-381,\text{and } FRR\ 443-502}\) on factions in republican politics, and especially 459-461 on the period of Marius. Note also Ch. Meier, *Res Publica Amissa*. 162-200 and Brunt’s review of Meier’s thesis regarding the nature of republican politics, in *JRS* 58 (1968) 230-232. Cf. In general, Scullard, *Roman Politics*, who was undoubtedly much influenced by the ideas of L. B. Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III*, London 1957\(^2\), 3: ‘In leading political families – old aristocratic houses or families which can best be described as the aftermath of great men – the predestination of Parliament extended even to younger sons.’ On politics at the close of the second century, Badian, 1957: 324-342; *FC* 200, on a *factio* supportive of Marius; Gruen, *RPCC* 115, for a ‘Metellan factio’; cf. Brunt, *FRR* 459-461. These ideas remain in evidence, though more recently, 1984: 101-147, Badian has, on the whole, avoided the term *factio* in preference for ‘boni’, moreover, 1984: 125, draws attention to the problem of distinguishing groups in political life at Rome.

\(^{5}\) For optimates and populares used nearly in the sense of modern parties, Carney, *Marius* 53: ‘The optimates, who in domestic politics had carried the extensions of the franchise’; Epstein, *Personal Enmity* 79: ‘Marius and Furius defected to the optimates’; Keaveney, *Sulla* 28: ‘popularis movement’. G. Alföldy, *The Social History of Rome*, trans. D. Braund & F. Pollock, London 1985, 66: ‘These two interest groups were labelled, in the prevailing terminology of the late Republic from the beginning of the first century BC, as populares and optimates.’ It is true that Cicero, *Sest.* 96-97; *Flacc.* 34; *Rep.* 1.43, employs ‘optimates’ in opposition to ‘populares’, but neither epithet is a commonplace in his *opera*. They are mostly confined to his rhetorical works, are rather rarities and, certainly, do not deserve to be considered regular terms describing politicians of the period of Marius’ career. Indeed, as Cicero, *Sest.* 97, clearly indicates, ‘optimates’ were not even confined to the senate: ‘Quis ergo iste optimus quisque? Numero, si quaeris, innumerabiles, ...; sunt principes consili publici, sunt qui eorum sectam sequuntur, sunt maximorum ordinum homines, quibus patet curia, sunt municipales rusticique Romani, sunt negoti gerentes, sunt etiam libertini optimates.’ For optimates and populares in the sources see *TLI* 2.2082, 9.819-820; Strasburger, *RE* 18.1 (1939) 773-798; Ch. Meier, *RE Suppl.* 10 (1965) 549-615.

\(^{6}\) Brunt, *FRR* 502.
careers of later republican figures were revealed to Scipio Africanus by the Sibyl. As both Valgiglio and Carney have noted, however, the prediction of a young man’s subsequent fame is a *topos* in ancient historiography (cf. Suet. *Iul.* 1). It need not represent a real event nor, in this instance, may it be taken to imply a particular connection between Scipio Aemilianus and Marius.

Similarly, the two other Marii mentioned by Silius (9.401, 13.231), the first killed at Cannae in 216, who is said to have been a native of Praeneste and the second, killed during the siege of Capua and described as an *amicius* of Scipio Africanus, are more likely to be the inventions of the writer than historical figures. A Marius Statilius is also attested at Cannae by Livy (22.42.4–6, 43.7), but he is called a Lucanian, and the nature of his relationship with Scipio, if any, is not provided. The high incidence of the *nomen* Marius in accounts dealing with such a brief phase of the Second Punic War is extraordinary, but it may simply be indicative of just how common the name was. It seems rather improbable that in relating tales containing various Marii, Livy, Silius or Plutarch have preserved a memory of an early connection between the young Marius and his commander-in-chief at Numantia. A patron–client relationship may not be deduced with any confidence from these ancient sources, though the family of Scipio Aemilianus undoubtedly possessed ties throughout the community, both in Rome and in the surrounding *municipia*. The Marii of Arpinum were clearly an important local family, and their connections would also have spread beyond the confines of their town to include many other families, among whom the Cornelii Scipiones might very well have been one. Nevertheless, although Scipio Aemilianus may have lent his support to Marius’ campaign for a military tribunate, the family of the victor over the Numantines were probably less responsible for guiding this young man into a public career than his own

7 Valgiglio, *Vita* 16; Carney, *Marius* 15 n. 81.
8 Cf. Carney, *Marius* 15 n. 80, who considers that there was an ‘obvious bond’ between the Marii and the Cornelii Scipiones.
9 For Marius Statilius, his rank and other sources which possibly refer to him see MRR 1.251.
10 Carney, *Marius* 15 n. 80, seems to be under the impression that the Marii in Silius’ *Punica* were ancestors of C. Marius, though this assumption is simply not credible. Carney makes no reference to the Lucanian Marius.
11 Cf. Carney, *Marius* 15 and n. 80, citing RE Marius no. 1. Taylor, *VDRR* 18, 93, 307–308 notes that the family of Marius was in the Cornelia, as were all Arpinates, Liv. 38.36.7–9, which was also the tribe to which the Cornelii Scipiones perhaps belonged. Taylor, *VDRR* 307. Carney also points out, 15 n. 81, that, while Plutarch’s tale of a prophecy made by Scipio Aemilianus concerning Marius’ future fame need not be regarded as factual, it may, nonetheless, indicate that he was a *contubernalis* in 134–133. It seems more likely, however, that Marius was already in Spain where he attracted the notice of his general. Considering the size of the entourage which is said to have accompanied Scipio Aemilianus to Spain, MRR 1.491, a close connection appears almost impossible. Cf. Badian, *PC* 195, who is more guarded about this conjectured tie.
ambitious family. Furthermore, the Corneli Scipiones do not feature among Marius’ numerous later political alliances.\textsuperscript{12}

In fact, it was another famous family, the Caecilii Metelli, who are said to have used their great prestige to assist Marius in winning a place in the tribunician college in 120 (Plut. Mar. 4.1). If a single Metellus is to be identified as a patronus then he must be L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus (cos. 119) who campaigned for the consulship in the same year as Marius’ candidacy for the tribunate of the plebs.\textsuperscript{13} Such an assumption makes sound sense because Delmaticus, in characteristic Roman republican fashion, probably cast around for a suitable ally among the tribunes for 119 whom he could attach to himself. It is highly probable that most consuls sought to acquire a tribunician ally before their own election to office, so powerful was the tribunate when it came to legislative matters, especially in its potential use of the veto. The natural choice would have been for a man from a family known to the consul’s own,\textsuperscript{14} though his expectations of Marius as an obedient junior official were not to be realized.

Had Marius received the aid of Metellus Delmaticus in his election campaign and afterwards opposed the consul over the question of narrowing the voting pontes, there would undoubtedly have been resentment and distrust at his ungracious and unprincipled behaviour. Moreover, it seems almost inconceivable that so major and public a breach between Marius and this branch of the Caecilii Metelli could have been forgiven or forgotten by the time Marius was employed as senior legatus to Metellus Numidicus in 109. Marius was appointed to the staff of Metellus because he was a good and experienced soldier, not because he was an old friend. His link with this famous senatorial family was not re-established after 119, as is evident

\textsuperscript{12} Although Scipio Aemilianus (cos. II 134) was the last of his line, the Corneli Scipiones Nasicae were still represented in the senate with a consul in 111, MRR 1.540, and a legate in Spain in the 90s, MRR 3.72. Neither of these Scipiones appear to have had any link with Marius. Note also a Cn. Cornelius Scipio, praetor possibly during the last decade of the second century, Val. Max. 6.3.3b; Münzer, RE Cornelius no. 321; MRR 1.546.

\textsuperscript{13} For Metellus Delmaticus see MRR 1.525; 3.38. Cf. Carney, Marius 17–18, who argues, without good reason, that Marius’ patron was Q. Caecilius Metellus Baliaricus (cos. 123). A link with Delmaticus would explain the relationship, in the campaign against Jugurtha, between Metellus Numidicus, his younger brother, and Marius which is attested in the literary sources. Marius is nowhere specifically credited with ties with the family of Metellus Macedonicus (cos. 143).

\textsuperscript{14} Plutarch, Mar. 4.1, evidently believed that the Marii of Arpinum had a long and close link with the Caecilii Metelli: οὗ τὸν οίκον ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ πατρότητι ἐθέλαντο. It would be useful to know whether the family of L. Caecilius Metellus Calvus (cos. 142), father of Delmaticus, owned estates in the neighbourhood of Arpinum. Delmaticus’ younger brother Metellus Numidicus certainly owned an estate at Tibur, Cic. de Orat. 2. 263, which was only a relatively short distance away. This villa was probably the one inherited by Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio (cos. 52), Cic. fam. 12.2.1; Phil. 5.19; Shatzman, Senatorial Wealth 309. Metellus Numidicus also possessed a villa at Tusculum, Cic. Att. 4.16.3; Balb. 56; Wiseman, New Men 191.
from the constant hostility which characterized the relationship between
general and legate in the campaigns against Jugurtha in 109 and 108. The
rather odd argument espoused by Badian, Carney and Gruen, that Marius'
trial in 116 had the salutary effect of making him desist from ‘popular’ ac-
tivity to regain the favour of his former patroni, overlooks the fact that his
double repulsa for the aedileship in 117 is a far more likely explanation for
his political actions thenceforth being more subtle and cautious.  
Moreover, an early tie of friendship with a political maverick such as P.
Decius Subulo, whose own career was damaged beyond repair during his
praetorship in 115, might go some way to explaining why Marius became
more discreet in his political manoeuvring.

Marius was accused of ambitus after the elections for the praetorship were
concluded, and he was brought to trial (Plut. Mar. 5.2–5). Although he was
eventually acquitted on a tied vote, this did not occur before a witness, who
was said to be the defendant’s patron, was summoned to appear by the
prosecuting counsel.

Plutarch (Mar. 5.5) plainly thought that Marius’ stance in the trial was dis-
honest and untenable since only curule offices freed clients from their obli-
gations to a patronus. Although Marius risked forfeiting this curule office,
he had, however, recently won election to the praetorship, and the author
of the biography had presumably lost sight of the significance of the material
he had in his possession.

Although Badian, Carney and Gruen are in agreement that Marius’ trial
de ambitu was a direct consequence of his tribunician actions against Metellus

15 Badian, FC 195; Carney, Marius 22 and n. 118; Gruen, RPCC 124. If there was revenge for
Marius’ narrow escape, it was the expulsion of Cassius Sabaco from the senate by the cen-
sors of 115, Plut. Mar. 5.4; MRR 1.531. This action against a friend of Marius certainly strength-
en the case for identifying Delmaticus, rather than his less famous cousin Diadematus, as
censor in 115. Sabaco is mentioned only by Plutarch, and his fate is rather reminiscent of
the political demise of Decius Subulo, another possible ally of Marius in this formative stage
of his career.

16 Badian, 1956: 94.
Delmaticus in 119,\textsuperscript{17} it is more plausible that the charge of electoral corruption was brought by one of the candidates he had defeated in the praetorian elections. Thus compare with this case the prosecution of M. Aemilius Scaurus (cos. 115), perhaps a matter of days before Marius' trial, by P. Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105) (Cic. \textit{de Orat.} 2.280). Rutilius Rufus had been defeated by Scaurus in the consular elections and brought a charge of electoral corruption against his more fortunate competitor. The suit failed and Rutilius Rufus was in turn subjected to a similar charge brought by Scaurus, which was also unsuccessful. The trial of L. Licinius Murena (cos. 62) in 63 had an identical history. His prosecutor was Ser. Sulpicius Rufus (cos. 51), an erstwhile fellow candidate from the consular elections for 62 (Cic. \textit{Mur.} 7–8). Again the charge failed to convince a jury. It is therefore not beyond the bounds of possibility that the accusation of bribery was actually brought by C. Herennius, the prosecution witness in this trial. He may well have lost in the recent poll, and was piqued at the thought that a politician from a family of inferior social and political standing should have triumphed.

The Herennii appear to have been hereditary patrons of the Marii, but this family was not prominent in public life in Rome.\textsuperscript{18} There is not a shred of evidence to support the contention that after 116, and as a result of the trial, the position of patron and client became reversed and that the Herennii became loyal supporters of Marius.\textsuperscript{19} It says something of Marius' confidence both in his innocence and in the \textit{iudices} that he refused to recognize the validity of Herennius' rights over him. It also says much about his skill as a politician, for had Marius accepted Herennius' claim to patronage, it would have indicated to the \textit{iudices} that he had not been elected to curule office and hence illustrated his guilt.\textsuperscript{20} The prosecution's ploy evidently had the unforeseen effect of winning some sympathy for Marius, and may even have contributed to his acquittal. Marius had won a place in the praetorian college which only a conviction could annul and he was therefore correct to insist that he had no further obligation to Herennius. Plutarch does not relate whether or not Herennius then gave his evidence. His supposed

\begin{footnotes}
\item[17] Badian, \textit{FC} 195 n. 3; Carney, \textit{Marius} 22; Gruen, \textit{RPCC} 123–124.
\item[19] Badian, \textit{FC} 201 n. 10, merely conjectures an alliance between Marius and the Herennii by 100; cf. \textit{Studies} 223 where this conjecture is advanced more confidently. However, note 1990: 405 n. 21, where Badian considers that the consul of 93 and the patron of Marius were not related. See also Gruen, \textit{RPCC} 123, who assumes a reversal of roles between Marius and the Herennii after 116, but cites no ancient evidence. Carney, \textit{Marius} 49, calls M. Herennius (cos. 93) a Marian consul, but again is able to cite no ancient source for this contention.
\end{footnotes}
testimony was, of course, worthless unless he could be seen refusing the plea to give it. Herennius had been called by the prosecuting counsel to embarrass the defendant over a technical breach of etiquette and mos maiorum. Understandably, the tactic was to no avail.

Family and Marriages

That Marius’ own family was ambitious for the magistracies of the res publica can hardly be in doubt, particularly since a brother of his also became an active and successful politician. M. Marius was almost certainly several years the younger since he achieved the praetorship only in the period of his elder brother’s iterated consulships (104–100). Appian (Iib. 100) dates his proconsulship of, probably, Hispania Ulterior to five years before the highly successful campaign against the Celtiberi of Hispania Citerior by T. Didius (cos. 98). M. Marius could have succeeded L. Caesius (‘IMP’) as governor of Ulterior and hence have been a contemporary of M’. Sergius <Silus> or Q. Fabius Labeo, who were apparently active in neighbouring Citerior. Moreover, it is perhaps significant that his older brother may also have governed Ulterior a decade before. I suggested above that the province of Hispania Ulterior was a prize much sought after. The elder Marius, who must surely have hoped that his younger brother would also go on to win a consulship, was probably able to manipulate the sortition so that M. Marius would obtain a command beneficial for a subsequent consular campaign.

Like Cicero’s younger brother Quintus, praetor in 62, M. Marius was never to attain the consulship. He may either have died soon after his praetorship or, after the upheaval caused by the seditio of Saturninus and Glaucia, considered a canvass for the consulship to be doomed to failure. Had he been a praetor in 102, he would have been eligible for the consulship in 99, but he is not attested as a consular candidate when his brother’s support, as the presiding magistrate, would have been crucial. Marius

21 For a stemma of the Marii see Carney, Marius facing 76; and below.
22 Dated ca. 102, MRR 1.568 and n. 3, for the sources and his likely relationship with C. Marius.
23 Assuming that his account is accurate, Appian states that Didius destroyed some Celtiberians near Colenda, whom M. Marius had settled there five years beforehand: ‘τοῖς βουλίταις ἐπιτρέποντος, ὁμοίως πρὸ πάντα ἐναυτῶν ...’; MRR 2.7.
24 Wilsdorf, fasti 109–110; Richardson, Hispaniae 158, 166, 192. For evidence of a business association between the family of Marius and some regions of Spain, see Carney, Marius 23. Note, however, that the governorship of Ulterior ascribed to Marius by Plutarch, Mar. 6.1, may have arisen due to confusion with his brother who does not feature in the Life. It is unlikely that Plutarch’s source will have omitted to mention Marius’ brother, so the error must have been committed by the biographer himself. See above, Chapter 2. A misapprehension regarding the exact identity of the various Marii had, however, developed by the beginning of the second century AD. For example, Tacitus, Ann. 12.60, confuses the elder and younger Marius; App. BC. 1.60, 1.65, the younger Marius and his cousin Gratidianus.
regained more than enough of his former prestige in the 90s to have enabled his younger brother to aspire to the highest magistracy, but his absence from public life at this time also suggests an early demise. Although little is known about this shadowy figure, who does not feature at all in Plutarch’s biography, he was, like Q. Cicero, probably his elder brother’s staunchest supporter. He had everything to gain from C. Marius’ success and everything to lose if his elder brother lost his pre-eminent position in the senate and in Rome.

The Marii, as might be expected of a longstanding and wealthy family in a municipium, were related by marriage to other leading houses in the locality. A marriage connection with the Gratidii is well recognized, and the son of a Gratidius, presumably the man described as ‘perfamiliaris’ of M. Antonius, and a Maria was adopted by M. Marius. The political affiliations of this M. Marius Gratidianus are equally obvious. While he was a tribune of the plebs he accompanied the consul L. Cornelius Cinna into exile when Cinna was expelled from Rome by his colleague Cn. Octavius in 87 (App. BC. 1.65). He returned with Marius and Cinna, and was entrusted with the prosecution for perduellio of Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 102) who pre-empted a conviction before the populus, however, by committing suicide (App. BC. 1.74; Diod. 38.4). The Gratidii were also related to the Tullii Cicerones, another prominent local family which had strong ties with political figures in the city through which one of their members was eventually to reach the consulship. The political sympathies of the Gratidii

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26 This M. Gratidius, a relative of Cicero who praised his erudition, Brut. 168, de Orat. 1.2, died in Cilicia where he served on the staff of the praetor M. Antonius in 102/1.

27 M. Marius Gratidianus, praetor twice in the 80’s, MRR 2.57, 2.60, with putative dates for 85-84; cf. MRR 3.140-141, with 85 and 82 now preferred. Gratidianus was killed soon after Sulla’s victory at the Colline Gate in 82. For his murder and the legend which grew up around this episode see Marshall, 1985: 124-133. For a stemma of the Gratidii see Carney, Marius facing 76. The young Gratidius was probably adopted by M. Marius in his will, and a date close to 100 would be fully explicable. It followed soon after the death of the elder Gratidius. Testamentary adoptions were, of course, a common feature of Roman society, U. R. D. Vogel-Weidemann, Die Statthalter von Africa und Asia in den Jahren 14-68 n. Chr., Bonn 1982, 409-413.

28 Broughton, MRR 2.47 and n. 2, notes that the ‘Gaius Marius the younger’ mentioned by Appian must be an error for M. Marius Gratidianus. Appian states earlier that both Marius and his son had fled from Rome in 88, BC. 1.60.

29 For M. Marius Gratidianus as the prosecutor of Catulus see Gruen, RPCC 233 and n. 83.

30 As a youth, Cicero was in the company of politicians such as L. Licinius Crassus (cos. 95), the Mucii Scaevolae (coss. 117 and 95), and younger men such as M. Livius Drusus and P. Sulpicius. Marius was also connected, from the mid-90s, with Crassus and Sulpicius and, from beforehand, with the Cicerones, may have facilitated the introduction of the young Cicero into this illustrious circle. It is hardly remarkable that Cicero should have entertained high opinions of Marius, which found its way into his works. For Marius’ connections with the Granii, a family of Puteoli, see Carney, Marius 24 n. 126; cf. Badian, 1957: 344-346, who
may also easily be gauged by the fact that a certain M. Gratidius was sent by Marius in 88 to take control of Sulla’s army at Nola after the consul had been relieved of the Mithridatic command by Sulpicius’ tribunician law. It is plain, therefore, that the core of Marius’ support came, not from famous aristocratic Roman personages, but from those Arpinate notables with whom he was most closely linked. Yet these connections are not readily apparent in the literary sources for neither Plutarch nor Sallust has much to say about the men who were Marius’ keenest and most faithful followers.

It was only when Marius came to form a marriage alliance with the patrician Iulii Caesares that Plutarch (Mar. 6.2) began to show an interest in the interpersonal and political relationships of his subject. Still, the very intensity of his assurance, untiring labour, and his plain and simple manner of living, won him a degree of popularity among his fellow citizens, and his honours brought him increasing influence, with the result that he married into the illustrious family of the Caesars and became the husband of Iulia, the aunt of that Caesar who in later times became the greatest of the Romans, and who to a certain extent, because of this relationship, made Marius his example, as I have stated in his Life.

The magnitude of the achievements of C. Iulius Caesar – who was the first man to win permanent sole rule in Rome since the time of the kings through his appointment in early 44 as ‘Dictator Perpetuo’ and the establishment of an imperial dynasty by his adopted son – naturally meant that the past glory of this family was elevated to provide such greatness with a suitable origin and background. In the second century, however, the Iulii Caesares, though a thoroughly respectable senatorial family, were not on a par with...
politicians who bore names such as Cornelius Scipio, Caecilius Metellus, Mucius Scaevola or even Domitius Ahenobarbus. Nonetheless, Marius forged a useful alliance with a family which had gained praetorships consistently for some generations and had, moreover, obtained one consulship within living memory.

Marius’ wife was the daughter of a certain C. Iulius Caesar, whose senatorial career is unattested, though a curule aedileship or even a praetorship is not impossible given the lack of evidence about the majority of magistrates during these years. This Caesar was probably the son of a praetorius, and of his own sons, one reached the consulship in 91, while the other one known to us was praetor a year or two beforehand. This branch of the Caesares was not nearly as distinguished as the family of the consul of 157, however, whose son was a praetor in 123, and whose grandson was consul in 90. Marius did not acquire substantial political influence by this marital arrangement comparable with, for instance, Sulla’s marriage to a Caecilia Metella in 89 or 88. The Caesares had, however, bound themselves to a politician of similar status in the senate, and to one who must also have possessed, even by this stage in his career, a sizeable fortune.

35 The Cornelii Scipiones, like the Caesares, were an ancient patrician family, but the Caecilli Metelli won their first consulship only in 251, MRR 1.213, while the Scaevolae and Ahenobarbi had their first consuls in 175/4 and in 192 respectively, MRR 1.401-403, 1.350. Unlike the Scipiones, who fade from political life, these plebeian families gained several consulships during the second century. No Ahenobarbus is attested in the senate before Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 192) though this family may perhaps be a collateral branch of the Domitii Calvini. See Badian, 1990: 376, 383, 388 for the affiliation of the Ahenobarbi in this period.

36 Sex. Iulius Sex. f. L. n. Caesar (cos. 157), MRR 1.446-447. His father is likely to have been the praetor of 208, MRR 1.290; Badian, 1990: 377. For a stemma of the Caesares see G. V. Sumner, ‘A Note on Julius Caesar’s Great Grandfather’, Phoenix 25 (1971) 343. The Caesares can, therefore, hardly be described as a family which had ‘lost the public eye’, Badian, 1957: 323.


38 L. Iulius Sex. f., MRR 3.109; Mattingly, AJP 93 (1972) 412–423; Appendix 2. Note also Sulla’s possible marriage to a Julia of this branch of the Caesares, Mattingly, Chiron 9 (1979) 160–161 and n. 68.

39 Sulla’s marriage to the widow of M. Aemilius Scaurus (cos. 115), a daughter of either L. Caecilius Metellus Deltaticus (cos. 119) or L. Caecilius Metellus Diadematus (cos. 117), was clearly influenced by his political ambitions as Plutarch states, Sull. 6.10; Keaveney, Sulla 56–57.

40 C. Marius C. f. was evidently born about 108 since he was consul at the age of twenty-six, Velleius, 2.26.1, MRR 2.66. Appian, BC. 1.87; cf. Vir. ill. 68.1 states that he was twenty-seven, however, and Orosius, 5.20.6, simply that he was a young man. Velleius’ testimony should probably be preferred since he was closest in time to the actual events, but because just three ancient writers mention this politician’s age, it is possible that what they had in mind was a young man of pre-quaestorian age. That age during the early Principate was undoubtedly twenty-six or twenty-seven, but as I argue further below, Appendix 1, the average age of quaestors before Sulla’s dictatorship was closer to, if not in excess of, thirty. Marius’ son may, therefore, have been somewhat older than Velleius believed, with a date
Furthermore, he might in turn produce an heir with patrician blood.  

All in all, this was unquestionably a good step forward for any *novus homo* and certainly welcomed by the Arpinate clans which stood closest and most firmly behind Marius. Sound marriage ties by *novi homines*, however, were not at all uncommon; Marius and the Caesares did not break new ground in the connection they forged at this time. Marius’ social position rather than his political base was enhanced by this move, which most likely occurred in 113 or 112 perhaps soon after returning from a command in Spain, within a year or so of his praetorship, and while he may have been considering a campaign for the consulship. If his attachment to the Julii Caesares was intended as a means of simply enhancing his electoral prospects it therefore brought him no immediate political advantage.

About eighteen years later, Marius’ son was married to Licinia, a daughter of L. Licinius Crassus (cos. 95). This link brought the elder Marius into the orbit of literati and the highest intellectual circles in Rome. He may already have had political affiliations with Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 102) and M. Antonius (cos. 99), and now also came to be associated with powerful fellow senators such as Q. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 95) and his cousin, the consul of 117, and with promising young men such as M. Livius

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41 Cf. Carney, *Marius* 23-24, with the unsubstantiated contention that the Caesares pursued a ‘policy of enmeshing rising men of wealth by dynastic marriages’; cf. Keaveney, *Sulla* 9-10: ‘The Caesars had the reputation of making somewhat unusual matches ...’. No such evidence exists for the second century. Moreover, no senatorial family, however wealthy and famous, could ignore the attraction of marrying into a family with great wealth whatever its origins. The Caesares were certainly not exceptional.  

42 See above, Chapter 2 n. 33.  

43 See above, Chapter 1.  

44 Syme, *Sallust* 161: ‘Marius was to contribute more to the Julii than he received.’  

45 Münzer, *RAA* 279-280. Although Badian, 1957: 329, 343; FC 213 n. 4, argues for 94 or 93 as the date of the marriage between the younger Marius and Licinia, soon after the former had assumed his *toga virilis*, there is no evidence for the assumption. A betrothal could well have taken place several years earlier, and if a date is sought for this tie it would actually make better sense in the year of Crassus’ consulship in 95. Compare the marriage of Sulla’s eldest daughter to a son of Q. Pompeius Rufus, dated to 89, Keaveney, *Sulla* 10, or possibly to 88 during their consulship year, and presumably shortly before or shortly after his own marriage to Caecilia, App. BC 1.56. Note also the marriage of Pompey to the daughter of Caesar in the latter’s consulship in 59, Plut. *Pomp.* 47.6; *Caes.* 14.2; Suet. *Iul.* 21-22. If Marius C.f. was born about 112 the obstacle to 95 may be removed. Cf. Badian, ‘Q. Mucius Scaevola and the Province of Asia’, *Athenaeum* 34 (1956) 112, where the possibility of a marriage tie with Crassus prior to the trial of Rutilius Rufus, dated here to either 94 or 93, is acknowledged.  

46 The set associated with Crassus, the Mucii Scaevolae and Antonius appears from Cicero’s *de Oratore* to have been something of an élite. The portrayal may, however, be coloured by Cicero’s fond memories of his youth. His description of these politicians should not necessarily be taken at face value.  

47 See further below.
Drusus, C. Aurelius Cotta and P. Sulpicius. A marriage link with the most outstanding orator of the day, and with a family which had risen to fame and fortune during the second century, if not especially lucrative to Marius himself, was intended to be a source of lasting support for his son which would be available when that young man eventually began his public career. The premature death of Crassus in 91 and the outbreak of the Social War, followed closely by the civil wars of the 80s, put paid to the aspirations of Marius and his family. But the links which were constructed and contemplated in the 90s clearly show the route by which Marius intended his family to proceed in the future. They also well illustrate how new families in the senate became quickly accepted and absorbed by their more established peers. The Marii of Arpinum do not feature in the politics of the Roman republic after the suicide of Marius' son at Praeneste towards the end of 82, and the execution of his cousin M. Marius Gratidianus after the battle of the Colline Gate; the plans of Marius for the continued prominence of his family in later generations came to naught.

48 It is obvious that this was not a coterie based only on men from old and established senatorial families. For example, Sulpicius, a plebeian and probably a novus homo, Mattingly, Athenaeum 53 (1975) 266, was evidently fully acceptable to these politicians. He was presumably of much the same background as Marius and Cicero, who were also on the fringe of this circle, ad Quir. 20. For a link between Sulpicius and Marius see Cic. de Orat. 1.66, 2.196. Indeed, in imitation of the example set by Crassus in 119 in his suit against C. Carbo, Sulpicius began his political career in about 96 or 95 by taking up the prosecution of C. Norbanus, tribune of the plebs in 103, Cic. Amic. 2; de Orat. 1.25; Badian, 1957: 320. By then, Sulpicius was in his mid-twenties as was Cicero when he too began his forensic activity in about 80, with two major defence speeches, the pro Quinctio and the pro Roscio, T. N. Mitchell, Cicero: The Ascending Years, New Haven & London 1979, 90-92; and a pro Muliere Arretina and pro Tittinia Cottae, J. W. Crawford, M. Tullius Cicero: The Lost and Unpublished Orations, Göttingen 1984, 39-40.

49 Badian, 1957: 328-329, has suggested that Crassus was on the periphery of what he terms 'the factio' or the controlling group in the senate. As Brunt, FRR 459-460, shows, however there is scant evidence for Badian's political scenario in the 90s.

50 The real admixture of family origins of those who participated in republican political life is easily apparent here. Marius married into an ancient patrician family, but was also keen to be associated with other families which, in terms of antiquity, may have been less prestigious, but were politically more powerful. The Licinii Crassi had been represented in the senate since the third century, but their first consulship came only in 205, MRR 1.301. The Scaevolae had a similar background to the Crassi, but the Antonii were scarcely less new to politics than the Marii. For the prominence the Antonii acquired in the first century see G. V. Sumner, 'The Lex Annalis under Caesar', Phoenix 25 (1971) 365-367.

51 Note the existence of a M. Marius, an officer of Sertorius, MRR 3.140, possibly a relative of the Marii of Arpinum, but more likely perhaps one of the Mariii of Lucania or Campania (enfranchised after 90?). Note also C. Marius Capito, moneyer about 81, RRC 1.392-395, no. 378; MRR 3.140, probably not connected to Sulla's foe. A L. Marius L.f., MRR 3.139, is also attested in the senate in the 50s, but may belong to a quite separate family.

52 Plut. Sull. 32.1; MRR 2.66.
The Immediate Family of Marius

C. Marius = Fulcinia

C. Iulius Caesar = Marcia

Maria

M. Marius = Iulia Sex. Caesar (cos. 91)

C. Marius C.f. (cos. 82) = Licinia

C. Caesar = Aurelia

C. Iulius Caesar (cos. 59)

Political Connections

Young and aspiring politicians came under the influence of more senior statesmen from whom they received invaluable advice and training for public life and, in more concrete terms, from whom they received practical help during electoral contests. When these same men became 

aequales

in the senatorial hierarchy such ties could be maintained, especially whenever they brought mutual benefits. It seems quite reasonable to suppose that in a political environment in which so much depended on individual initiative and in which party ideology and long-lasting programmes were absent, interpersonal relationships were a striking feature, but these could, on the whole, be ephemeral since they were subjected to the strains imposed by particular likes and dislikes and often petty desires. Amicitia which survived for many years between certain politicians is well attested in the literary sources, but similar evidence for active cooperation between two or more senators over an extended period of time is conspicuously lacking.

Although attempts have been made to show the importance of various alliances in Marius’ career, by and large the arguments are unconvincing and not based securely on ancient evidence. Still, like his fellow senators, Marius must have possessed friendships and associations with public figures of similar seniority and prestige throughout his long participation in political

53 Carney, Marius stemma facing 76, postulates that Marius had three sisters, though the high incidence of divorce and remarriage may mean that there were, in fact, only one or two.

54 For instance, the famous friendship between Scipio Aemilianus and C. Laelius, Cic. de Orat. 2.22, 2.154; Off. 2.31, and that between Q. Lutatius Catulus and C. Iulius Caesar Strabo, Cic. de Orat. 2.12-16. It is possible, of course, that these became celebrated because they were so unusual. One should also note the open affection, extending over many years, between Cicero and Atticus. We cannot, however, gauge Atticus’ commitment to this amicitia, and he maintained close contacts with politicians who were not necessarily well disposed to Cicero.

life. His known connections with various tribunes of the plebs have already been examined, and these are well documented and indisputable, but his allies among the upper echelons of the senate are less discernible at any one time. For example, Marius may possibly have come to some form of agreement with one of his competitors for the consulship in 108. His consular colleague was L. Cassius Longinus, praetor in 111, who may have campaigned before. A repulsa in 109 might have made him more circumspect at a second attempt and driven him into an alliance with a politician who seemed certain to be elected. Had an understanding been reached between these two, it was not to be of long duration since Longinus was killed in battle against the Tigurini before the end of that year.

The election of Marius to the consulship and his subsequent success against Jugurtha may have eased the way to high magisterial office for other politicians from previously non-senatorial families or from others who had not before acquired great prominence. It was surely a closely related phenomenon that in 105 P. Rutilius Rufus and Cn. Mallius Maximus were to win the consular elections. Furthermore, of Marius’ colleagues between 104 and 100, one, C. Flavius Fimbria, was certainly a novus homo and another, Q. Lutatius Catulus, was the first of his family in over a hundred years to achieve the highest magistracy. It is quite feasible that the citizen body was struck by the fact that Marius, from a relatively unknown political family, could have won great military fame and that other new men, if placed in a similar position, might emulate his success. The electoral campaigns of candidates from other less noteworthy families may therefore have been given a boost. However, it is as well to remember that during this time there were as many consuls from the political establishment, while the new breed of politician occupying the highest magistracy, apart from Marius, failed to live up to expectations. There was evidently not a sudden or

56 The fasti as recorded by Pliny, NH. 10.36, show that Longinus was returned first, MRR 1.550; Inscr. Ital. 13.3.83 (reconstructed), but both Sallust, Jug. 65.5, and Plutarch, Mar. 9.1, imply that Marius was the firm favourite to win in these elections.

57 MRR 1.550.

58 For the consuls of Rutilius Rufus, Mallius Maximus, Flavius Fimbria and Lutatius Catulus see MRR 1.555-567. For their consular candidacies see Broughton, Candidates 13–14, 16; Evans, Acta Classica 34 (1991) 118–119.

59 Q. Servilius Caepio (cos. 106) and L. Valerius Flaccus (cos. 100) were both patricians. C. Atilius Serranus (cos. 106) was related to other consular Serrani of the second century, Badian, 1990: 386, and his family was perhaps a collateral branch of the Atilii who had held consulships in the third century. L. Aurelius Orestes (cos. 103) was the third consul in his family in as many generations, Badian, 1990: 383, 387, while M. Aquillius (cos. 101) was the son of a consul, Badian, 1990: 387. On the other hand, the failure of a politician such as C. Billienus, Cic. Brut. 175, who may have been endowed with all the correct qualities, illustrates that he was clearly unable to make an impression on the voters. There may well have been others like him. For Billienus’ candidacy see MRR 3.34–35; Wiseman, New Men 217; Sumner, Orators 105; Brunt, FRR 129, 424 n. 112; Evans, LCM 14 (1989) 103–104; Broughton, Candidates 8.
irrevocable change in the voting habits of the comitia centuriata even if for a short interval politicians from famous Roman families were worsted in electoral contests.  

Nor may the political inclinations of novi homines or other relative newcomers to high office be pronounced upon with any degree of certainty. Badian and others have argued that a number of the politicians who reached high office at this time should be regarded as the natural allies of Marius and therefore the members of a group which formed around him. Nonetheless, on close analysis this hypothesis may be seen to have its weaknesses. Rutilius Rufus, for instance, served with Marius under Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia and again as a legate of Metellus Numidicus. The two obviously knew each other well, but no friendship is attested between them. Evidence for the hostility, which is generally assumed to characterize their relationship at a later stage and which may have been visible in Rutilius’ memoirs, composed during his exile in Asia, emanates from a remark made by Plutarch to the effect that he and Marius had once had a private quarrel (Mar. 28.5). This may imply that they had been amici and that they were estranged, though the reason why this occurred and the date must remain speculative. Without access to the original source it is impossible to arrive at the degree of inimicitia, which may be rather overstated in modern accounts. The antagonism towards Marius, attributed by Plutarch to Rutilius, may not have been either mutual or to the extent commonly believed.

Cn. Mallius Maximus, consular colleague of Rutilius Rufus, was a novus homo according to Cicero (Planc. 12), who did not regard this politician as sufficiently worthy to have held high public office (‘... sine virtute, sine ingenio, vita etiam contempta ac sordida’). Why Cicero should have had such a low opinion of Mallius Maximus is never stated, but it would be a most unsuitable description had this politician ever been closely connected  

Among those who may confidently be listed here are a C. Sempronius <Tuditanus>, son of the consul of 129. Other politicians who may have campaigned at this time were a Cornelius <Cethegus>, a grandson of the cos. 160, a Cornelius Scipio and a Fabius Labeo, all of whom are attested as pretorii or legates of possibly senior standing. See Appendix 3. It is also possible that there was a dearth of candidates from respected senatorial families during the decade 110–100, Evans, LCM 10 (1985) 76-77.


Marius and Rutilius Rufus were roughly the same age, and while the latter was the more senior as regards magistracies, it was the former who played a more vigorous role in the campaign against Jugurtha, probably as Metellus’ senior legatus.


Although Badian, Athenaeum 34 (1956) 111–112, FC 210, 215, sees the trial and condemnation of Rutilius as being engineered by Marius, and that they were enemies by that time, the question of the basis of their enmity is not addressed. It may have been less dramatic than Badian supposes. See above, Chapter 3.
with Marius. Cicero’s estimation of Lutatius Catulus’ abilities who, he thought, had been inexplicably rejected by the Roman voters on three occasions, must have something to do with this statement, especially since he had first been defeated by Mallius Maximus in 106. The consul was also certainly unsuccessful in war, but his other qualities have probably been obscured by Cicero, for Mallius Maximus at election time, at least, had enjoyed the confidence of the voters.

On the other hand, animosity is far less apparent towards C. Flavius Fimbria, Marius’ colleague in 104. Cicero noted his good qualities (Brut. 129; de Off. 3.77), but neither his activities as consul nor as a senior figure in the senate afterwards caught the attention of any ancient writer whose works survive. Nevertheless, on the basis that his son later served as a legate of L. Valerius Flaccus (cos. suff. 86) and hence was presumably a supporter of Marius and Cinna, it has been assumed that the elder Fimbria must also have thrown in his lot with Marius before 100. But events in 87 and 86 need have little bearing on those of a decade and a half before, and should not be used to argue that the Fimbriae were consistent followers of Marius for over twenty years. The younger Fimbria may have latched on to Marius only after the successful coup d’état in 87.

There is absolutely no cause to suppose that Marius was strongly attached to his consular colleagues in either 103 or 101, L. Aurelius Orestes and M’. Aquillius. Aquillius served as a senior legatus in the Cimbric
Wars, but his link with Marius was very brief indeed, lasting at the very most for twelve months.\textsuperscript{70} A personal friendship has been assumed because Marius was to appear as a witness in the defence of his former officer in a trial \textit{de repetundis} in about 97 (Cic. \textit{de Orat.} 2.194–196).\textsuperscript{71} A close and active political association is unlikely, however, if only because Aquillius was assigned Sicily as his province in 101 from where he returned only in 99 to celebrate an \textit{ovatio} for his suppression of the slave revolt.\textsuperscript{72} The careers of Marius and Aquillius therefore barely overlap; and the argument for sustained political co-operation is not especially persuasive.

Much more problematic is the connection between Q. Lutatius Catulus and Marius, which has exercised the imagination of some scholars in recent years. Thus the advent of the argument that Catulus must have obtained his consulship through Marius’ benevolence but that, having served with Marius and been allowed to share in the triumph for removing the threat of invasion by the Cimbri and Teutones, he afterwards turned against his former patron in order to glorify his own role in the victory. This snub was never forgiven and culminated in such a hatred that Marius was to order his death in 87.\textsuperscript{73} The idea that such an alliance existed, a tie which certainly falls almost into a patron–client category, is based mostly on Catulus’ apparently appalling performance in three consecutive consular elections.

he would have needed the aid of Marius to fulfil his ambitions of a consulship. See above, Chapter 2. No partnership between them is attested and none should be sought.

\textsuperscript{70} Aquillius’ praetorship is dated to 104, \textit{MRR} 1.559, and cannot be much earlier than this year because his father was consul only in 129, \textit{MRR} 3.23. However, if Aquillius joined Marius’ staff at the beginning of the campaign in Gaul his praetorship should more probably be dated to 105. It is improbable that he would have been sent to Marius as a serving praetor so, if he spent his year in office in Rome in 104, he could not have gone out to Gaul until the beginning of 103, returning to the city by the end of the same year in order to initiate his canvass for the consulship of 101. He was with Marius only for a short time, and may have replaced a legate who departed prematurely or who had died on campaign. Aquillius was himself replaced by M. Claudius Marcellus in 102, \textit{MRR} 3.55. See also above, Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{71} Badian, 1957: 331; Gruen, \textit{RPCC} 194-195.

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{MRR} 2.2 and n. 10. His ovation could have taken place fairly late in 99; cf. Bradley, \textit{Slavery and Rebellion} 80 who postulates that Aquillius was in Rome early in that year.

\textsuperscript{73} Note, in particular, Badian, 1957: 324: ‘on no one’s death did Marius more emphatically insist, after his capture of Rome in 87\textsuperscript{7}; \textit{FC} 231; \textit{DUJ} 149, 1984: 127, for the hypothesis which has since found widespread acceptance. This is surely based primarily on a comment made by Cicero, \textit{Phil.} 11.1: ‘C. Marius in iracundia perseverans’, and applied to Catulus’ possible desertion from his colleagues’ camp after 100. Cf. Plutarch, \textit{Mar.} 44.5, discusses his death only after that of Antonius. Furthermore, although epitomes may omit such material, the fact that Florus, 2.8.15–16, does not accord the death of Catulus special prominence and the epitome of Livy (\textit{Per.} 80) fails to mention the death of this consular altogether; Oros. 5.19.19, Eutrop. 5.7.3, suggests that the original work did not dwell at length on the subject. On the basis that Catulus was the half-brother to L. Caesar (cos. 90) and C. Caesar Strabo (aed. 90), Cic. \textit{de Orat.} 2.12. 44, 3.10; \textit{Tusc.} 5.55; \textit{Dom.} 114; \textit{Att} 13.19.4, Badian, 1957: 323, has also linked this branch of the Caesares to Marius. On the extent of Valerius Maximus’ coverage of the murders in 87 see Bloomer, \textit{Valerius Maximus} 175–184.
His only hope of success, it is therefore claimed, was in tying himself to
the great man from Arpinum. However, while Catulus' electoral reverses
may have been dramatic, they were not unique.74 Numerous politicians
may have had to mount multiple candidacies before they won the much-
sought-after consulship. It is quite likely that Catulus' experience was not
as novel as Cicero implies (Planc. 12) and that it was simply his own tenaci-
ity rather than Marius' active intervention which finally paid off.75 The ba-
sis for a strong link between Catulus and Marius in 103 seems to disappear
when recognition is given to the difficulties suffered by other politicians in
attaining their ambitions.76

Cicero does suggest some form of relationship (Tusc. 5.56) when he likens
Catulus to C. Laelius the alter ago of Scipio Aemilianus ('paene altero Lae-
lio'), implying that he was close to Marius though, in the process, also in-
timating that Marius was a latter-day Scipio. However, such was his admi-
ration of both politicians that he may have wished to portray them as friends
when in fact they were not that close at all. Marius did forego the honour
of a single triumph for his military victories in 101 and chose instead to share
the occasion with Catulus. The gesture cost him nothing and probably en-
sured his election to a sixth term as consul. Amicitia can hardly be proved
on the basis of Cicero's evidence, which may indicate only that they worked
well together in 102 and 101. Marius' principal reward in 101 was a further
consulship which he achieved, the political motive probably outweighing
personal considerations. Yet it was probably at this time that a truly un-
precedented honour was granted to Catulus by the populus Romanus. His
mother Popillia was the first woman to be accorded a laudatio funebris,77
delivered by Catulus, before the assembled citizen body (de Orat. 2.44),

74 Develin, Practice 171; Evans, Acta Classica 34 (1991) 111–136, the example of Q. Fulvius Flac-
cus (cos. suff. 180), MRR 1.387, who also received three repulsae before he won an election.
See also Broughton, Candidates 1–4; Develin, Patterns 80, 91–95, for similar conclusions regard-
ing elections in general.
75 Cf. Lewis, 1974: 107 n. 58, who also notes Catulus' marriage to a Domitia, a family with
considerable prestige at this time.
76 Thus compare Cicero, Planc. 12 and 51, where Marius' famous defeat in two aedilician elec-
tions is at least as prominent as the repulsae endured by Catulus. Had Catulus been such an
unorthodox figure in republican politics, other ancient writers might have also picked
up the information. But Plutarch, Mar. 14.8, thought that he had been popular with voters.
It is, of course, possible that Plutarch's source presented this view, but Cicero also admired
Catulus, Off. 1.109, 133, and also felt a great affinity with Marius.
77 Cf. Plut. Caes 5.2; Suet. Iul 6.1, who both evidently believed that Caesar's laudatio of his
aunt was a 'customary' Roman practice, though Plutarch notes that public laudations of
younger women such as Cornelia, daughter of Cinna, were unusual. In 69, however, the
practice of eulogizing women before the citizen body was barely more than a generation
old. Moreover, Cornelia, married to Caesar since about 84, was not a young woman when
she died, and must surely have already been in her thirties. Her marriage to Caesar lasted
for over fifteen years, M. Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman, Trans. P. Needham, Ox-
possibly in recognition, not of her own qualities, but of her eldest son’s services to the res publica. This might well illustrate the extent of Catulus’ popularity in 101, not only as an ally of Marius perhaps, but in his own right. After much tribulation in winning the consulship he does appear to have enhanced the glory of his family, and become a well-respected politician in Rome.

The belief that L. Valerius Flaccus (cos. 100) was more like a servant to Marius than a true consular colleague (Plut. Mar. 28.5) probably has its origins in the memoirs of Rutilius Rufus, which are referred to by Plutarch at this juncture. Such disingenuous material is not likely to have been found in the Commentarii of Sulla since L. Flaccus was still alive and active after Sulla had died. If Rutilius Rufus was not the author of this scurrilous information, it is possible that it featured in the memoirs of Aemilius Scaurus or Catulus though neither seems to have been employed by the biographer for his study of Marius.

Much has been made of this derogatory comment, but little joint participation in political life may be ascertained, except in the suppression of the sedition of Saturninus and Glacia. L. Valerius Flaccus came from a distinguished and ancient senatorial family, and his father had been consul just thirty years beforehand; his own career must have progressed rapidly and without reversals, which suggests that he probably did not seek the aid of Marius to improve his chances of winning elections at Rome. While it is possible to believe that politicians with retarded careers might attach themselves to someone such as Marius in the hope that his success and influence would increase their chances, it is less plausible to believe that Flaccus should have had recourse to the aid of Marius, however mighty and powerful he had become by 101. Flaccus is linked with Marius only during the course of 100 (Cic. Rab. perd. 21), after which he won the censorship. He does not appear to have been particularly energetic in the senate, and if his interests coincided with Marius in 100 they diverged shortly after their year in office. Plutarch’s remark about Flaccus looks suspect and derived from a source hostile to Marius’ memory.

Finally, some mention should be made of some of the consuls who came to office immediately after Marius’ sixth term and, in particular, M. Antonius

78 See R. J. Evans, ‘Popillia mater vestra: A Note on Cicero, de Orat. 2.11.44’, LCM 17 (1992) 35, where I did not consider this point which now seems entirely plausible.
79 The history of Posidonius may have contained this material but he, too, may not have been consulted by Plutarch. Note, moreover, that this picture does not emerge from Cic. Rab. perd. 21.
80 Badian, Studies 86-87, believes that a link may be traced back to, at least, Flaccus’ praetorship; cf. Klio 66 (1984) 298-301; MRR 3.212, where the identity of this politician is now questioned. Badian also assumes, FC 201, 209, 212; 1957: 333, that Flaccus’ election as censor in 97, MRR 2.6-7, represents a resurgence of Marius’ political power, but the evidence is not conclusive.
Once again he has been portrayed as a close ally of Marius. The basis for this contention, however, rests on Antonius' defence of certain individuals, such as M'. Aquillius (cos. 101), who are also said to have been associated with Marius prior to 100. Moreover, his censorship with L. Valerius Flaccus has also been regarded as an indication that Marius' prestige at Rome was in some measure restored. Cicero does not, however, mention any friendship between Antonius and Marius nor even the slightest political link. He is not always to be trusted, but he held both of these politicians in high regard; had a close tie existed he could hardly have failed to exploit the situation. Cicero had little reason to disguise any relationship between Marius and other senators during the period of his iterated consulships or afterwards. Indeed, he felt that Marius was a true outcast in Roman political circles, Cicero might have gone to some lengths to create some links for his fellow Arpinate. As it is, he devotes much attention to the events in 87 in which many of those politicians for whom he had a sentimental attachment were slaughtered (de Orat. 3.9–12). But he does not lay the blame for the murders solely on Marius nor does he attribute the cause of death of numerous politicians to their breaking of fides or amicitia (de Orat. 3.8).

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81 T. Didius (cos. 98) and C. Coelius Caldus (cos. 94) were both novi homines, but neither seem to have been associated with Marius. Consequently, attempts have been made to allocate these politicians into an opposing camp, Badian, Studies 94; Gruen, RPCC 164–165, 189, though Cicero clearly states, Verr. 5.181, that Caldus, like Marius and Fimbria, won his high position through sheer hard grind and personal efforts. Didius, also like Marius and Fimbria, was probably well above the minimum age when he reached his consulship.

82 Badian, 1957: 332–333, also notes that Antonius defended C. Norbanus one or two years later against a charge of maiestas, Cic. de Orat. 2.198. Norbanus had been Antonius’ quaestor in either 102 or 99 and had worked with Saturninus when they had been tribunes together in 103, MRR 1.563. Antonius had also acted for M. Marius Gratidianus, Cic. de Orat. 1.178; Off. 3.67. Antonius’ choice of defendants, on the evidence supplied by the Commentariolum Petitionis, illustrates, however, that such forensic activity did not necessarily depend only on a politician’s friendships. His support for Gratidianus may well have been based on his intimacy with that politician’s father, Cic. Brut. 168, but surely need not imply that this relationship had been transferred to the son. Antonius, like Cicero, could act as counsel to anyone who would henceforth be in his debt. This was the real nature of republican political life, Brut FRR 420–421. Furthermore, it may be significant that Antonius refused to allow the publication of his orations in case they compromised his future actions, E. B(adian), OCD2 76; 1984: 139. This is surely a good indication that he considered himself free from obligations to any clique or single patron.

83 Badian, 1957: 333; FC 212.

84 On Marius see Carney, WS 73 (1960) 122: ‘The Arpinates were proud beyond measure of Marius ... By the end of Cicero’s lifetime Marius had become the hero of the people’; cf. Cic. Planc. 20. On Antonius see Cic. Brut. 138–143.

85 As is to be expected, Cicero tried to shift much of the blame for the political killings in 87 from Marius to Cinna, for whom he had no regard, Phil. 11.1. Badian has argued that politicians such as Catulus and Antonius deserted Marius after 100, and Cicero presumably could not mention such dishonourable conduct by politicians whom he esteemed. At the same time he could not condemn Marius for his actions. All in all this must place Cicero’s evidence for this time in a rather dubious light.
It seems quite plain, therefore, that Marius had no special tie with consulars such as Catulus, Aquillius, Antonius, Crassus or even Valerius Flaccus, nor they with him. At various points their interests may have converged, but these were brief encounters and not over extended periods. Marius may have harboured grievances and, like an elephant, remembered any slights he may have received (Cic. Phil. 11.1), but the politicians who died in 87 need not have been his bitter opponents for all that long. There may have been a special hatred of Catulus, particularly since his memoirs were presumably already in circulation, and of P. Licinius Crassus (cos. 97), the Iulii Caesares (cos. 90, aed. 90) and Antonius who had all probably sided with Sulla in 88 against Sulpicius (Plut. Ant. 1.1). Cn. Octavius and the unfortunate L. Cornelius Merula (cos. suff. 87) were more likely destined to die as a result of an order given by Cinna. The rest were the natural victims of any civil war.

Roman republican politicians tended to be solo performers who occasionally acted together. Marius was no exception, and for most of the time advanced his own career. His closest supporters were not his aequales in the senate, but his family, his neighbours and his amici beyond the charmed circle of political life. The politicians of this period of Roman history did not make senatorial factions or cliques for the purpose of governing the res publica, as is well recognized.

**Clients**

The number of clients who clustered around a single wealthy patron could be enormous and for the most part they remain anonymous. Like his fellow senators, Marius was naturally at the centre of an extensive network of clientelae (Plut. Mar. 32.1). Among these only a small number of figures who were to feature in the next generation of political life may be identified. Others were like T. Matrinius, a new civis Romanus, who was a local notable and whose status had been obtained under the lex de coloniis of Saturninus. When his citizenship was challenged in the courts in the aftermath of Saturninus' death, Marius fulfilled his obligations as a patronus and successfully defended his client. I have already discussed Marius' connections with various tribunes of the plebs - T. Manlius Mancinus, Saturninus, Glaucia and Sulpicius - who at some stage may have been his clientes.

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87 In terms of seniority, those politicians who were killed in 87 far exceeded those who were to die under the Sullan proscriptions, Evans, in Charistion 31.

88 Badian, *FC* 213; Brunt, *FRR* 131.
Here the attention turns to politicians of perhaps lesser repute and stature, but no less significant in the realms of politics.

There have been attempts to show that Marius, through his unique place in the senatorial hierarchy of the late second century, was able to exert pressure on the *tresviri monetales* and so influence the types and legends which are apparent on the denarius issues of this time.\(^89\) It is almost unthinkable, however, that any one politician before the dictatorships of Sulla and Caesar, unless possibly a consul who was resident in the city throughout his year in office, could interfere with the choice of designs made by the moneyers against their wishes.\(^90\) Furthermore, since the *monetales* were also elected officers, any intrusion in the running of the Roman mint may well have been viewed with great hostility not only by the moneyers themselves, who were not all young men of limited political prestige, but also by the quaestors in charge of the treasury, and the Roman electorate who had made their choice of magistrates by the ballot box. If the selection of coin types was prompted by Marius, this could surely have occurred only in 107 and from 104 to 100,\(^91\) and even today with the benefit of coin hoard evidence the identity of the moneyers during these years is not known for certain.\(^92\)

In about the same year as Marius' first consulship, both M'. Aquillius (cos. 101) and L. Valerius Flaccus (cos. 100) held moneyerships, though neither illustrates a connection with this consul.\(^93\) And a quaestor Q. Lutatius Cerco issued denarii with explicit references to the victory in the First

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\(^89\) For example, note H. Mattingly, ‘Roman Numismatics: Miscellaneous Notes’, *PBA* 43 (1957) 196-205; Carney, *NC* 19 (1959) 79-88; R. Rowland, ‘Saturn, Saturninus and the Socii’, *CP* 62 (1967) 185-189. These studies were based on a chronology of republican coinage devised by E. A. Sydenham, *Coinage of the Roman Republic*, London 1952, which has since been superseded by the work of Crawford, *RRC*, with many adjustments. Although some points of interest have been raised, the alteration in the chronological data, which now continues to be debated only in particular aspects, means that episodes which are claimed to refer to Marius bear little real relation to the actual events in question.

\(^90\) Note, for example, the coinage struck for Sulla by L. Manlius Torquatus, proquaestor in 82, Crawford, *RRC* 1.386-387, no. 367; and the aureus issued by A. Manlius A.f. (quaestor) in 80, Crawford, *RRC* 1.397, no. 381, with its portrayal of an equestrian statue of Sulla. The series of denarii which celebrate Caesar’s victories in Gaul and refer to his mythical ancestors marks a new departure altogether in republican coinage, Crawford, *RRC* 1.461-495.

\(^91\) These papers, referred to above, were written at a time when there was a general belief that mints operated throughout Italy and Gaul. This theory is now discounted, and most issues are recognized as being the products of the mint at Rome.

\(^92\) I argued above that the denarius of P. Licinius Nerva, Crawford, *RRC* 1.306-307, no. 292, may be tied to Marius’ career. It seems probable, however, that the choice of type lay with Nerva and not with Marius. This moneyer sought to make political capital for himself out of the passage of the voting law of 119, and he cannot be cited as a client of Marius.

\(^93\) Aquillius and Flaccus have, of course, been identified as allies of Marius, but the denarius of the former, Crawford, *RRC* 1.314, no. 303, gives no hint of this, while the issue of the latter, Crawford, *RRC* 1.316, no. 306, refers to his father’s flaminate. Cf. Mattingly, 1982: 44 who posits the date 108/7.
Punic War of the consul C. Lutatius (cos. 241).\textsuperscript{94} Another name often associated with Marius is M. Herennius (cos. 93), possibly a close relative of the C. Herennius who claimed patronage over the praetor elect in his trial \textit{de ambitu} in 116 (Plut. \textit{Mar.} 5.4–5), who was also moneyer in about 108 or 107.\textsuperscript{95} Marius' family may originally have been the clients of the Herennii, but there is nothing to suggest, from this moneyer's coinage that he had in the meantime become a supporter of the \textit{novus homo}.\textsuperscript{96} The denarius issue of M. Herennius displays, instead, a reference to \textit{Pietas}, a typical virtue of the Roman household and family, which does, however, have a close link with the \textit{patronus/cliens} relationship.

Marius set out to take command of the expedition against Jugurtha early in 107, and so it is not really surprising that in his absence from Rome until the end of 105, the coinage, which at this time, has only very rare references

In ca. 108, on the reverse of his denarius issue, the moneyer M. Herennius (cos. 93) portrayed a scene in which one of the brothers, Amphinomus or Anapias of Catana, carries his aged father to safety during an eruption of Mount Etna. This action was clearly one of filial duty, and the obverse has the head of \textit{Pietas}.

\textsuperscript{94} Cerco's quaestorship is dated by Crawford, \textit{RRC} 1.315, no. 305, to 109 or 108, who makes the point that it was close to the consulship campaign in 107 of his kinsman Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 102). It is possible that this moneyer took the opportunity to advertise his family's glory in the hope of impressing the voters, but to no effect since Catulus was defeated, Cic. \textit{Planc.} 12.

\textsuperscript{95} See Crawford, \textit{RRC} 1.317-318, no. 308, for a possible explanation of the reverse type of Herennius which portrays one of the Catanaean brothers.

\textsuperscript{96} Badian, FC 201 n. 10; \textit{Studies} 223; Gruen, \textit{RPCC} 241, consider this connection likely; cf. Brunt, \textit{FRR} 417, for the view that, by the first century BC, 'no senator is ever called a client by Roman writers'.
to contemporary issues, should contain no mention at all to his victories in Africa. He also spent much of his time between 104 to 101 in Gaul or northern Italy with only brief visits to the city to oversee elections or present reports to the senate (Plut. Mar. 14.7, 24.1). Although there were politicians in these three years who may have been Marius’ allies, and who also held the moneysiphip, no mention of him or his triumphs appear on the coinage. Thus Saturninus, probably moneyer in 102 or 101, portrayed the god Saturn as a pun on his own cognomen. The issue of C. Coelius Caldos, dated by Crawford to about 104, may allude to recent Roman triumphs with its portrayal of Victory in a biga.

A number of denarii with variations of Caldos’ type are dated to about 102 and 101, and these may refer to the defeat of the Germanic tribes, but since none is specific they do not allow the assumption that these types or their moneyers were under the control of Marius. The quaeestorian issue of C. Fundanius, dated to 101 by Crawford, might well have a portrayal of Marius’ triumph in that year. A triumphator appears in a procession in a quadriga crowned by the flying Victory with a younger or smaller figure, perhaps Marius’ young son, riding on one of the chariot’s horses. If Fundanius had been Marius’ quaestor, his general may indeed have urged the type which was to be minted. This would have been a major innovation in the coinage of the Republic, and one which was exploited by Sulla’s quaestors twenty years later.

However, Mattingly has argued that this particular denarius belongs to a series of quaeestorian issues, which should be dated to the mid-90s when it would therefore appear to be a commemorative type rather than an illustration of current news. Fundanius might not have been associated with Marius after all. In fact, Marius’ supposed patronage over the college of moneyers during his period of ascendancy is quite unremarkable. He clearly did not resort to using the coinage as a means of advertising his successes to the community, except perhaps in just one instance. The monetales and quaeestorii discussed here were evidently for the most part not his clientes, and maintained a strictly independent line free from interference from senior magistrates. The coinage of the late second century, like much of the literary

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98 Crawford, RRC 1.324, no. 318; cf. Mattingly, 1982: 45, who dates Caldos’ moneyship to 101, in the same year as Saturninus.
99 The denarii of C. Fabius Hadrianus, Crawford, RRC 1.326-327, no. 322; L. Iulius, Crawford, RRC 1.327, no. 323; M. Lucilius Rufus, Crawford, RRC 1.327, no. 324. Hadrianus, a novus homo and possibly a recent civis Romanus, who rose to the praetorship, MRR 2.60 and n. 1; Taylor, VDRR 212; Badian, Historia 12 (1963) 133, was later among the followers of Marius and Cinna, and was killed at the end of the civil war in 82 at Utica, MRR 2.69.
100 See above.
material, fails to provide support for the emergence and sustained growth of a body of politicians committed to the support of Marius.

The evidence of more junior politicians, possibly to be regarded as his clients, is very slight indeed. However, as I suggested above, A. Manlius, probably Marius' senior legate in Numidia in 107, was a brother of the tribune responsible for the plebiscitum which overturned Metellus' command of the Jugurthine campaign. A senior place in Marius' consilium may well have been the favour returned for services rendered by a friendly tribune. Manlius, by that stage perhaps an ex-praetor, benefited from this connection, and may be numbered among Marius' supporters in the senate. However, Marius' own equivocal role as senior legate to Metellus Numidicus should alert us to the possibility that presence in a general's consilium need not illustrate either friendship or political empathy.

Before concluding this examination, some discussion of L. Cornelius Sulla, Marius' quaestor in the Jugurthine War, is warranted because he seems to have been close to his commander. Sulla clearly viewed this tie as a means of advancing his career, though in this respect he can hardly have been unusual. His attempt to win the praetorship in 99 was ill-timed, coming as it did when Marius' authority had been seriously undermined because of his support for, and subsequent opposition to, Saturninus and Glaucia. Sulla's long service with Marius ought to indicate the existence of amicitia which was later concealed and glossed over with the assertion that the activities of the younger man had incurred the resentment and jealousy of his commander (Plut. Sull. 3.4, 4.1). It may well be that a gradual distancing took place between the two men which was never reversed. The breaking of the attachment between a client and his political patron was hardly uncommon where the client won a niche for himself in public life. The tie of clientele was not permanent and unchangeable, and it is perhaps unwise to read too much into the connections established primarily to obtain political goals. Sulla may be an atypical example of Marius' political clients, with a friendship which went beyond public life. No other politician is

102 For Manlius see MRR 1.552, and further discussion in Chapter 3.
103 The same possibly also applies to M. Claudius Marcellus, a senior officer of Marius in Gaul in 102, MRR 1.569, 3.55. Badian, 1957: 329, believes he was a supporter of Marius before 100, but had deserted him by 91, 337-339, 341, though as a member of a distinguished family he is even less plausibly to be regarded as a client.
104 Marius may have chosen Sulla to be his quaestor, Badian, 1976: 39-40; Keaveney, Sulla 14. L. A. Thompson, 'The Appointment of Quaestors Extra Sortem', PACA 5 (1962) 17-25, argues that this must have been quite in order. Plutarch, Mar. 10.3-4; Sull. 3.1, clearly implies an intimacy which later soured, Mar. 10.5; Sull. 4.2. Cf. Val. Max. 6.9.6, where Sulla is said to have been assigned to Marius by lot, and whose appointment the consul did not welcome, Bloomer, Valerius Maximus 170. It would seem as if Valerius Maximus, unlike most of the ancient writers, had access to a source sympathetic to Marius.
105 In his Commentarii, Sulla could well have insisted that this is what had occurred between him and Marius, especially since Plutarch, Sull. 3.4, attributes him with a considerable vanity.
known to have been associated with Marius for so long or to have reaped so abundant a harvest.\footnote{96}

\section*{Conclusion}

In a political situation in which the pursuit of power was entirely unaided by party machinery, it is inevitable that patronage, personal ties and connections between individuals should play an undisputed and major part. However, it is incorrect to regard senatorial politics of the late second century as being dominated by factions or even informal \textit{partes}. The ancient literature simply does not provide sufficient evidence for this hypothesis. Sallust (\textit{ Jug. 41.5}) may have observed that the unity of the \textit{res publica} was shattered 'in duas partes' after the destruction of Carthage in 146 and the removal of the 'metus hostilis', but he possibly reflects current thinking about the political situation of the 40s rather than that of the second century. Similar phraseology may be found in the works of Cicero (\textit{ Dom. 24, 102; Har. resp. 41; Brut. 103}) and the history of Livy (\textit{ Per. 58}) which refer to the Gracchan upheaval, and may well indicate that the idea gradually became little more than another \textit{topos} of later literature.\footnote{107} Nevertheless, Sallust's statement allowed the notion to be fostered of a state in which politicians could be assigned to one of two more or less permanent parties.\footnote{108} Yet Sallust never explicitly says that parties of any form were in existence at the end of the second century. His \textit{nobilitas} is, in fact, more a state of mind than a recognizable or formal structure, and is little more than a social convention, which was easily broken.\footnote{109} It was not a political ideology.

Still, it would be equally improper to interpret Roman politics as a state of affairs in which politicians never interacted with one another, for this is also against human nature. The chase for individual fame and glory was conducive to the formation of cliques and friendships though for the most part, and almost invariably where these involved more than two men, they

\footnote{96} Lack of evidence need not mean that there were no other political clients, but the overall number was probably small. Orosius, 5.17.5, mentions a P. Mettius, whom he describes as a 'satelles' of Saturninus. T.P. Wiseman, 'Lucius Memmius and his Family', CQ 17 (1967) 166; P. J. J. Vanderbroeck, \textit{Popular Leadership and Collective Behaviour in the Late Roman Republic (ca. 80-50 B.C.)}, Amsterdam 1987, 53. Mettius may also have been a \textit{cliens} of Marius. Cicero, \textit{ Brut. 168}, mentions a certain Q. Rubrius Varro, 'acer et vehemens accusator', a senator or \textit{eques Romanus}, who was declared a \textit{hostis} in 88 along with Marius. He may also be plausibly identified as a supporter and possible client of Marius himself. Ultimately, however, Marius had no compelling reason to help numerous young men in their careers for, as the example of Sulla shows plainly enough, gratitude was not necessarily forthcoming. Marius placed his own interests first.

\footnote{107} Seager, 1972: 56, and my comments above.

\footnote{108} On this issue see, for example, H. Smith, 'Factio, Factones and Nobilitas in Sallust', \textit{C&M} 29 (1969) 187-196.

\footnote{109} On \textit{nobilitas} see J. Hellegouarc'h, \textit{Le Vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la république}, Paris 1972\textsuperscript{2}, 224-227.
must have been, in the natural order of things, easily made and fleeting in duration in comparison to modern party formations.

During Marius' long political career it is reasonable to expect to find that the sources have preserved some memory of his various, mostly pragmatic, associations. What does not emerge, however, is evidence for the build-up of a strong following of like-minded politicians with similar aims in mind, or of a great band attached to Marius in the last decade of the second century, followed by its demolition because of the after-effects of Saturninus' failed revolution in 100. There was, of course, an inner core of support for Marius, but understandably this came from his own family and his closest neighbours and non-political friends from his own municipium, who stood by him throughout and later by his son. This simplistic infrastructure is also to be expected in a society which was considerably more primitive than that in which politicians are active today. The support available to Marius was identical with the basic assistance available to all republican politicians. The men closest to a Roman politician of any eminence were not inconsequential, but they are nameless, though the wealth and influence they commanded served them and their favourites well in the vigorously competitive electoral system. Some of Marius' Arpinate circle followed him into the senate. His brother became praetor, his brother's adopted son won the praetorship twice and the Gratidii achieved minor senatorial offices.110 These men came from families which lacked an ancient tradition of participation in city politics but they were nevertheless favoured by an electorate which for a short time worshipped Marius. Other novi homines from other centres also brought home new political trophies at this time, following in the footsteps of Marius, which indicates that the citizen body was not always conservative in its choice of magistrates. High office at Rome was clearly open to those who dared to gamble with the affection of the voters and persevere in their quest for honours.

In contrast to the local support for Marius, which was most enduring, his political associates obviously changed according to political circumstances because these links were motivated by a desire to achieve short-term gains. Marius' marriage to a Iulia perhaps brought him closer contacts with politicians hitherto beyond his reach, although it is just as likely that by then this tie merely reinforced his already secure social position. Alliances or friendships with his fellow praetorii from 115 and with his consular colleagues and consulares from 107 were undoubtedly forged, but none need have been of special significance. Indeed, what could be more natural than to expect two consuls to cooperate in their year in office for the wellbeing of the state, especially when one was obliged to be absent in the field or when both commanded armies against a common foe? But this is not illustrative of a bond

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110 For Marius Gratidianus see MRR 3.140-141; for M. Gratidius, leg. 88, MRR 2.43-44.
more intimate than that between political *aequales*, who were well acquainted with one another, and who had respect for each other’s place in the senate.

Also fully acceptable is the attachment of younger men to older and more experienced politicians. A political client would welcome the aid of a senior senator in his attempt to win a junior magistracy, but the extent of this patronage and the control which the elder man exercised over his junior, particularly in the long term, should not be overestimated. A man who won a junior office with the help of a more influential politician might remain loyal and might have been expected to do so, but this state of affairs was not enforceable, nor did a rupture between two such politicians necessarily adversely affect the junior’s career. It seems certain that the possession of a curule magistracy, at least, caused the tie between a patron and a client to cease, but in the event of this taking place there was nothing which forbade its substitution by a friendship on a more equal basis. Thus Marius’ dependence on the Caecilii Metelli or the Herennii to begin his career in Rome is probably overstressed in modern scholarship, because his link with these families is not comparable with that of a poor and lowly client seeking the favour of his omnipotent *patronus*.

In a similar way, Marius’ patronage of younger senators between 110 and 86 is fully explicable, but men such as Saturninus, Glaucia and Sulpicius had more in common with Clodius and Milo in the 50s. Some tribunes were undoubtedly the spokesmen for more senior figures in the senate, as Syme rightly suggests, but others lived a freer existence unattached for any length of time to any single politician. They were powerful figures in their own right. Thus Marius was able to free himself quickly from any obligations to the Caecilii Metelli in 119. The members of this family may have nurtured a grudge, and have tried to exact revenge by attempting to upset his election victory in 116 (they may have been partly responsible for his failure to win an aedileship) but ultimately they were unable to prevent him from pursuing a glorious career.

In fine, Roman political life at the close of the second century was personal, interpersonal and parochial. All the participants knew each other. Associations were ever present, and were made and broken in dizzy succession. Likes, dislikes and jealousies, on which stratagems were frequently based, were often paramount in the minds of politicians; and such criteria also formed the bases for enmities and friendships. Enterprises, whether pursued singly, jointly or as member of a group, were temporary in character, and were rapidly replaced by others. There were no grand strategies in this

111 E. S. Gruen, ‘P. Clodius: Instrument or Independent Agent’, *Phoenix* 20 (1966) 130: ‘... Clodius was no puppet with strings pulled by the Roman trio of dynasts’; *Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, Berkeley 1974, 98-100; 108: Milo, ‘driven by morbid ambition and addicted to violence’.

112 Syme, *Sallust* 171, 175.
period of Roman history, and no great political movements. Marius obtained his pre-eminent place in public and military affairs at the close of the second century largely through his own efforts in a system which almost defies definition, but which was characterized not by a multiplicity of parties but by a large number of conspicuous personalities.

113 Mitchell, *Ascending Years* 16–18, who voices a similar scepticism regarding the significance of factions or groups in republican politics in this era. In more general terms, Wallace-Hadrill, in *Patronage in Ancient Society* 63–81, agrees with him.
The life and career of Gaius Marius justifiably became a focal point for ancient writers because it was so obviously more conspicuous than those of his contemporaries in the senate. First, for the fact that he held the consulship seven times and, second, for his military exploits especially against the marauding Cimbri and Teutones, which freed the res publica from external threat. For this last exploit he was understandably acclaimed the third founder of Rome. After a paucity of great triumphs abroad, to be precise, in over two decades, he restored the dignitas and auctoritas of the Senatus Populusque Romanus with victories which were regarded as exceptional and certainly comparable with those of Scipio Africanus, Aemilius Paullus and Scipio Aemilianus. In later times Marius became celebrated for his military triumphs, but it is for his contribution to developments in political life that he actually best deserves to be remembered.

In sum, Marius' career in the city was more radical than were his reforms to the Roman army. His achievements in the domain of politics were arguably far greater than were his victories on the battlefield. His long and successful senatorial career, particularly during the period of his six

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1 After Romulus and Camillus, Plut. Mar. 27.5. However, whether this appellation dates to 101 or was a later creation must remain in doubt. Cf. Weinstock, Julius 177–178.
consulships, was inseparably bound up with political, legal and social innovations which were among the chief reasons for the evolution of the Roman constitution from senatorial-oligarchic rule to government by a quasi-autocrat. The portrayal of Marius as a passive player in republican politics, guided by other, usually much younger, colleagues who ultimately came to use his greatness for their own personal ends is therefore an unfair reflection of his real participation in public life.

It is not simply the vagaries of the survival of the ancient source material which have given rise to a distorted image. The problem is a common enough feature, which bedevils the assessment of any politician’s career in antiquity. But the potent propaganda generated by his fellow politicians and by later writers, without the counterbalance of a rendering provided by the subject himself, highly influences the picture. With sentiments which are as relevant today as they were when they were first quoted over thirty years ago, Badian encapsulated the entire problem of such disinformation by having recourse to the apposite words of Samuel Beckett. Yet must we believe what we possess in the literary sources when only the interpretation of Marius’ political career by his opponents found its way into the historical tradition? His own records, which surely existed, and those of any of his supporters were soon lost or discredited.

I have argued in the preceding pages that Marius, the son of an eques Romanus, entered the army at the end of the 140s at more or less the usual age for an adolescente of his circumstances and background. He possibly served initially with Q. Pompeius (cos. 141) in Spain, and remained there until the conclusion of the Numantine campaign, by which time his commander was Scipio Aemilianus. Returning to Rome in 132 or 131 Marius was immediately elected tribunus militum, and accompanied the army of either Crassus Mucianus or M. Perperna to Asia where he participated in the suppression of the Aristonicus rebellion. Thereafter he spent seven or eight years involved in municipal affairs with perhaps another term in the army as a legatus, and came to the city to try his hand at political life when he sought the office of a tribune of the plebs. Marius secured this position, possibly after one repulsam, and used his year as tribune in 119 to moderately good effect. He failed to win either the curule or the plebeian aedileship, probably in 117, but gained the praetorship in the following year, surviving a charge of ambitus while still praetor designate. He served as praetor peregrinus or president of the repetundae court in 115, after which he possibly governed Hispania Ulterior from 114 to 113. Marius is likely to have campaigned for the consulate either in 113 or 112, or in both years, after his arrival back in Rome or following a decent interval after his praetorship.

One repulsa or more severely diminished his hopes for the senior magistracy. However, the position of senior legate to Metellus Numidicus in the Jugurthane War gave him the springboard to aspire to greater gloria and, through a supremely effective electoral campaign, he was finally chosen consul for 107.

Already in the activities of his tribunate in 119 may be detected a certain amount of political acumen which, nonetheless, nearly backfired when he was prosecuted after the praetorian elections. But by overcoming this test of strength Marius was thereafter established as a man not visibly shackled with obligations to any single family or politician. His exploitation of public dissatisfaction with the course of the war against Jugurtha and with the possibly overcautious generalship of Metellus Numidicus again reveals his effectiveness as a politician with a sound grasp of current feelings at Rome. Sallust’s account of a cunning and thorough canvass for the consulship in 108 is surely a good indication of Marius’ preparation for a successful assault on the highest magistracy. The way in which he obtained the command of the Numidian expedition further illustrates his ability to manipulate the concilium plebis, and to utilize compliant tribunes to do his bidding. However, the ambition to achieve a proconsular province immediately after his election as consul, in the only region where major military laurels might be obtained, led eventually to the erosion of senatorial authority. The plebiscitum which granted Marius the imperium of Metellus Numidicus

The goddess ROMA appears on the obverse of the denarii minted by C. [Caecilius] Metellus in ca. 125. ROMA features regularly on the obverse of the denarius during the second century, but the significance of the Phrygian cap, which also has the head of a gryphon at its tip, is unknown.
henceforward became the regular method for acquiring military commands outside Italy. The grave dangers inherent in taking this step were shockingly revealed even within Marius' own lifetime after he tried to wrest control of the war against Mithridates VI of Pontus. His pursuit for personal glory was, as it was for most Roman republican politicians, extremely shortsighted. It ultimately damaged beyond repair the senate's ability to govern the state.

Tribunes had regularly been the mouthpieces of senior political figures in the senate throughout the second century, and the concilium plebis became the accepted minefield through which most legislative programmes were obliged to pass. Marius himself may initially be identified as the representative of the interests of Metellus Deltmaticus in the tribunician college in 119, though the association between these two was not enduring. Marius' own connections with tribunes such as T. Manlius Mancinus in 107 therefore followed a well-trodden path and, by then, a traditional pattern. But during the decade of his iterated consulships, the way in which consuls and tribunes operated together became more overt, even vulgarly blatant, as events, particularly in 100, clearly illustrated. The cooperation in public life between the consuls and the tribunes was not by itself a destabilising factor in republican politics. Nevertheless, once the prospect of massive rewards from the tactics employed by Marius and his allies Saturninus and Glaucia were disclosed to the world, even when the concomitant risks were great, the urge to emulate the manoeuvre was too overwhelming to deter further and equally ambitious politicians in the future. Only a drastic curtailment of the tribunes' powers could have prevented this form of joint activity from recurring, and since Sulla's attempts in 81-80 proved merely evanescent, the way lay open for more disruption to civil life until that brand of traditional senatorial politics had been completely destroyed.

Although Marius' five successive consulships could be described for form's sake as a vital necessity brought about by the fear of an invasion of Italy and the need to have a magistrate of tried and tested ability at the helm of the ship of state, they too became an example to which other politicians might aspire. Marius' acceptance of the consular iterations may be an intimation of a belief in his own worth to Rome, and in his competence as a general of her armies in the forthcoming conflict with the Germanic tribes. Yet for a man endowed with enough skills to reach this unprecedented position, he either displayed singular ineptitude in not realizing that he was creating a goal which others might wish to equal and exceed or, due to his superbia and selfish ambition, he simply did not care. And when that imitator arose through the senatorial system in which Marius flourished, that system would be at an end. It says something of the conservatism of Roman society, and of Roman politicians in general, that it was over fifty years before Caesar was able to achieve the same lofty pinnacle, though in scaling
those heights he also extinguished the senatorial rule of the Roman empire.

The military reforms of Marius, at first required to win an unpopular war in Africa and later to augment the army in its fight to repel a threatened incursion from the north, may originally have been regarded as a temporary measure designed to meet an extraordinary situation, and which need not be repeated. However, once the capite censi had been enlisted in the armed forces it was only a matter of time before this happened again, and then on a routine basis which paved the way for the professional army instituted by Augustus at the beginning of his principate.

The employment of landless citizens in the military inaugurated a new series of political problems which accompanied each demobilization, because a share in the spoils of war was no longer considered an adequate remuneration for safeguarding the res publica. Therefore the appropriation of land or the foundation of citizen colonies, often abroad, became another habitual and increasingly irksome chore, which dogged the footsteps of senior politicians on their return to Rome from service overseas. Inevitably, too, in order to tackle the problem of rewarding army veterans, the connection between the consulares and the tribunes was reinforced, for the legislation for new lands had to pass successfully through the concilium plebis. The opponents of any particular senator who sought to make political capital for themselves, to assist their own careers, naturally used the occasion of promised leges agrariae or colonial laws to hinder or prevent the process. The scene was set once more for civil discord.

In 100 the senate ordered Marius to reimpose order in the city after his former allies Saturninus and Glaucia had been exposed as by far the most dangerous adversaries of the current form of government. Marius probably undertook the task willingly since, not so long before, he had severed all ties with politicians by whom he felt betrayed. However, by restoring peace through the use of the senatus consultum ultimum, he introduced another disquieting element into political life. For the first time in its long history, the senate declared martial law against properly elected magistrates to preserve its own position. In preventing these public officials from carrying out what they claimed to be the will of the electorate, the senate damaged its credibility as a government representative of all sections of the community. The laws enthusiastically promulgated by Saturninus and Glaucia could very easily be repeated, and so could the senate’s response. This was an ideal recipe for further disruption which might in due course lead to civil wars and the demise of the body politic.

The end result of this study may thus appear to be altogether negative. However, seen from the viewpoint of the senatorial government to which Marius bequeathed new perils, this conclusion is inescapable. The precedents which this novus homo created by his own example, or which he engineered for his own purposes, or those which were dictated to the senate
on account of his political intrigues all add up to just one outcome: a time of escalating instability in Rome and in her empire. The direct consequence was civil strife and, finally, the emergence of new forms of governmental structures. Still, to recognize him as a politician of inestimable capability is simply to grant Marius his due. He deserves to be ranked amongst the most proficient of all political practitioners to grace the floor of the Roman republican senate, and he was a good and successful general besides. He probably anticipated no fundamental change to a political framework in which he was able to prosper but nonetheless the all-consuming desire for pre-eminence in the public life of the city proved to be disastrous. Indeed, in many respects he qualifies more obviously for the epithet 'The Deadly Reformer' than does his younger contemporary Sulla.³ Marius' political schemes immeasurably weakened the senate's ability to govern. Its vulnerability had been exposed by the tribunician activities of the two Gracchi, but it was Gaius Marius who dealt the mortal blow from which no full revival could ever realistically be entertained.