This proverb flashes thro' his head
'The many fail, the one succeeds'.

Alfred, Lord Tennyson (1809–1892)

Introduction
(The Praetorship and Proconsular Command)
The successful election of Marius to the praetorship in 116, even to the sixth and last place in that year's college, opened the way to a prominent position in the senate. Newcomers to public life were not regarded as social or political lepers at any stage of the senatorial career, and definitely not once they had obtained any of the curule
magistracies. Acquisition of the office of praetor also made the prospect of the consulship a real possibility, and it is abundantly clear that in most years a large number of praetorii presented themselves to the electorate as consular candidates. By the end of the second century it may have become virtually customary for the majority of the praetorian college to campaign in elections for the consulship. In his praetorship, Marius could look forward to a provincial command from which he might accumulate still further wealth to magnify his dignitas, and with which he might finance his

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1 An important contemporary document furnishes clear evidence in support of this contention. Thus, following the date of 101 proposed by H. B. Mattingly, 'The Date of the Senatus Consultum De Agro Pergameno', AJP 93 (1972) 412-423, after D. Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor, Princeton 1950, 2.1055, n. 25, note the politicians, in the consilium of the senatorial decree concerned with the collection of tribute in the province of Asia, who either probably had no senators in their family beforehand, or who had only fairly recent ancestral senatorial representation: M. Pupius (3), Q. Valgius (6), C. Coelius (10), P. Albiius (11), P. Gessius (13), L. Afinius (14), C. Rubrius (15), M. Falerius (17), M. Lucilius (18), L. Filius (19), C. Didius (20), P. Silius (24), L. Afinius (27), M. Munius (35), C. Herennius (40), M. Serrius (42), M. Lollius (48), Cn. Aufidius (51). Of the fifty-five witnesses to the decree nearly half of those known possess nomina which either feature nowhere else or only among the senate from early in the first century. For the entire consilium see Th. Mommsen, Gesammete Schriften, Berlin 19652 8.345-346 (copy from Adamyttium); A. Passerini, ‘Le iscrizioni dell’agorà di Smirne concernenti la lite tra i publicani e i Pergameni’, Athenaeum 15 (1937) 282-283 (Smyrna copy); R. K. Sherk, Roman Documents from the Greek East, Baltimore 1969, 69-70 (a reconstruction incorporating elements from both inscriptions); G. Petzl (ed.), Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien, Volume 24.1: Die Inschriften von Smyrna, 2.1 & 2.2, Bonn 1987 (a reproduction of both inscriptions); R. K. Sherk, Roman Documents from the Greek East, Baltimore 1969, 69-70 (a reconstruction incorporating elements from both inscriptions); G. Petzl (ed.), Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien, Volume 24.1: Die Inschriften von Smyrna, 2.1 & 2.2, Bonn 1987 (a reproduction of both inscriptions); 'Rester eines ephesischen Exemplars des Senatusconsultum de agro Pergameno', EA 6 (1985) 70-71 (a new fragment). For a discussion of the date of the SC de agro Pergameno, and for a gradual shift in opinion from the earlier date of 129 to 101 see most recently F. de Martino, 'Il Senatusconsultum de agro Pergameno', PP 38 (1983) 161-190; H. B. Mattingly, 'Scipio Aemilianus and the Legacy of Attalus III', LCM 10 (1985) 117-119; E. Badian, 'Two Notes on senatus consulta concerning Pergamum', LCM 11 (1986) 14-16; MRR 3.23-24.

Respected and influential senators need not necessarily have acquired the most senior magisterial offices. Note, for example, the role played by Sp. Mummius in the embassy to the East in 144/3 or 140/139 with Scipio Aemilianus and L. Caecilius Metellus Calvus (cos. 142), MRR 1.480-481 and n. 2; H. B. Mattingly, 'Scipio Aemilianus' Eastern Embassy', CQ 36 (1986) 491-495. He was a brother of L. Mummius (cos. 146) and the son of a praetor, but his career is completely unattested, Cic. Brut. 94; cf. Sumner, Orators 45, who believed that he must have reached the praetorship. Moreover, the powerful P. Cornelius Cethegus, Cic. Brut 178, may have been only an aedilicius in the post-Sullan senate; cf. Sumner, Orators 106, who credits him with a praetorship in the mid-80s and a date of birth between 131 and 127. Note also Appendix 2 for a more detailed analysis of the members in this consilium.

2 Cf. Develin, Patterns 81-95, who considers that elections to the consulship ‘might be predictable’; Evans, Acta Classica 34 (1991) 123-124; Broughton, Candidates 3-4.

3 Develin, Patterns 95: ‘...electoral competition ... had grown, one of the chief factors being the increased number of praetorships...’; Broughton, Candidates 3: ‘... among those who competed only a few could be elected, and many even among those who could count on status, means, and support were likely to fail in the contest for the praetorship and the consulship’; Evans, Acta Classica 34 (1991) 123: ‘... between 218 and 49 there were usually more candidates than could be accommodated in the most senior magistracy of the cursus.’
candidacy for the highest magistracy. Plutarch states (Mar. 6.1) that Marius was awarded the province of Hispания Ulterior as his proconsular command, which was fortunate indeed since it was a region in which his military expertise could be put to good use, and about which he would already have acquired some knowledge. It was, moreover, a province which was reserved, albeit perhaps unofficially, for politicians considered to have a rosy future. A more settled region did not offer the same chances for personal fame, a useful addition to the portfolios of all aspiring consular candidates, but which was possibly a more urgent requirement for political newcomers who were unable to draw on past family glory to prop up their candidacies.

Plutarch's account gives the impression that Marius' praetorship was respectable but quite uneventful, at the conclusion of which he left the city for a posting in Spain.

The praetorships of the great Roman republican politicians seldom elicit much information of great interest, and Marius is no exception to this rule. He seems to have spent much of his time abroad on routine police duties (Mar. 6.1). There are, however, a number of points relating to his praetorship and proconsular command which are worth some attention. Plutarch was evidently under the impression that Marius spent his praetorship year in Rome. Since P. Decius Subulo was the urban praetor in 115 (Vir. III. 72.6), this would suggest that Marius was praetor peregrinus or president of the repetundae court, and that legal matters kept him in the city until the expiry of his year in office. If Marius did not serve in either of these official

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4 It is surely not merely coincidental that, of the eight consuls between 109 and 106, four appear to have served as governors of Hispания Ulterior. The province was clearly an attractive proposition in terms of winning military laurels and where a fortune might be obtained, which would facilitate a candidate's pursuit for high office. If Marius was sent to Spain, even if the allotment of the province to him was simply a matter of chance, he was still well placed to canvass for the consulship at the earliest opportunity.

5 Cf. the propraetorship, in about 96, of Sulla in Cilicia and Cappadocia, Plut. Sull. 5.3-6; MRR 3.74.

6 Cf. Plutarch's account of Caesar's governorship of Hispания Ulterior, somewhat more detailed, but essentially of similar substance, Caes. 11-12; Suet. Iul. 18.

7 MRR 1.532. 3.81; Badian, 1956: 93-95. The consul M. Aemilius Scaurus had broken Subulo's curule chair and ordered that he desist from any of the praetor's usual functions during his year in office, Vir. III. 72.6. Neither Broughton nor Badian, however, infer the obvious conclusion that he was praetor urbanus. This contention would entail reassigning the praetorship of M. Livius Drusus (cos. 112), who was also an urban praetor, from 115, MRR 1.532, to 116. He was, hence, a year late in winning the consulship. My thanks to H. B. Mattingly for drawing my attention to this point.
capacities in Rome, then there would be no reason to detain him at home, and he might actually have been sent abroad at the beginning of that year. Plutarch is certainly vague about Marius’ praetorship, about which there was obviously no anecdotal material.

The date of Marius’ governorship is usually assigned to 114, a rather brief but largely successful tenure of Hispania Ulterior, before he was replaced in 113 by M. Iunius Silanus (cos. 109). The order of the governors of this province, for long accepted, who are unusually well attested during this period, is as follows:

C. Marius (cos. I 107): 114–113 (?)  
[M. Iunius Silanus (cos. 109): 113]  
L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi (pr. 112?): 112–111  
Q. Servilius Caepio (cos. 106): 109–107  
L. Caesius C.f. (pr. 104?): 104 (?)–103  
M. Marius C.f. (pr. 102?): 102–101

The various permutations applicable to Marius’ term as praetor would necessarily affect this chronology. Furthermore, the identity of his successor is now no longer considered to have been M. Iunius Silanus. Had Marius’ command been prorogued, as seems to have been the practice with all his other immediate successors, this leaves no room for Silanus in this sequence. L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi was praetor in either 113 or 112 and, after he was killed during his tour of duty, he was succeeded by Ser. Sulpicius Galba who was in turn followed by Q. Servilius Caepio, probably without an intervening governorship. So much is well corroborated, but the date of Silanus’ praetorship is an assumption, preceding a governorship of Hispania Ulterior, the evidence for which is based on an apparently muddled reference made by Rufius Festus (Brev. 5.1).

In the course of a brief historical survey of the Roman provinces, Festus gives a short synopsis of the conquest of Spain. In what seems to be an allusion to Hispania Ulterior, he mentions the proconsular command, between 137 and 133, of D. Iunius Brutus Callaicus (cos. 138) and then states:

8 Plutarch could have been influenced by the situation which existed after Sulla’s reforms, when all praetors had to remain in Rome during their year in office, and he was unaware that he was committing a factual error. On this issue see Passerini, Caius Mario 23 n. 2. For Marius’ proconsular command see J. S. Richardson, Hispaniae: Spain and the Development of Roman Imperialism, 218-82 BC, Cambridge 1986, 192.
9 MRR 1.535 and n. 3; Sumner, Orators 72.
10 For Piso Frugi see MRR 1.538 and n. 4; R. J. Evans, ‘Missing Consuls (104–100 B.C.): A Study in Prosopography’, LCM 10 (1985) 76. For Sulpicius Galba and Servilius Caepio see MRR 1.540, 3.201; Sumner, Orators 72; Richardson, Hispaniae 192.
11 MRR 1.535.
13 For Festus’ work in general see Den Boer, Some Minor Roman Historians 173-223.
'Postea ad Hispanos tumultuantes Sylla missus eos uicit.' Sulla's career cannot conceivably have included a campaign in Spain, nor can other Cornelii Sullae be shown to have been active at this time and, therefore, both Wilsdorf and Münzer postulated a Iunius Silanus. Since the MSS of Festus appears not to have been corrupted in any way, Eadie has argued, however, that any mention of a Sulla was an error committed by the author himself, and that no emendation in the text to 'Silanus' is needed. Meanwhile, Sumner, noting the inadequacy of the evidence, similarly discounted the possibility of a governorship in Hispania Ulterior for M. Iunius Silanus. The consensus view has thus swung away from including Silanus in the list of governors of any Spanish province during this period.

Nevertheless, attributing a blunder to the author of the Breviarium does not satisfactorily explain away the existence of a 'Sylla' who seems to have served in Spain some time after D. Brutus Callicius and before the war with Q. Sertorius in the 70s, unless he is to be regarded as completely imaginary. Festus' 'Sylla' might stand for other cognomina besides Sulla and Silanus which, therefore, makes available one other option at least that might just solve this problem. M. Sergius Silus was quaestor about 115, but he would have been too young to have been a praetor and governor of a Spanish province following Marius' command. That proconsul may, however, be the M'. Sergius Silus > known to have been in Hispania Citerior towards

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15 Eadie, Breviarium 37; Richardson, Hispaniae 193.

16 Sumner, Orators 78, and accepted by Broughton, MRR 3.114.

17 However, it is not impossible for 'Sylla' to have become confused for Silanus. The praetorship of M. Silanus in 113 is described by Broughton as the latest possible date under the terms of the lex Villia annalis, which does not mean that it cannot be placed earlier than 113. The time between the governorship of Marius and Piso Frugi is rightly seen as being too short to accommodate a viable command for Silanus, but his praetorship might well date to several years before his successful campaign for the consulship in 110. Moreover, as Münzer pointed out, Silanus' career at some stage must have included military honores. This suggestion would also dispense with the present chronological problem. Silanus was a son of D. Iunius Silanus Manlianus (pr. 142/141) who was disgraced after his return from a governorship in Macedonia, MRR 1.477, 3.113; H. B. Mattingly, 'A New Look at the Lex Repetundarum Bembina', Philologus 131 (1987) 74-75, and he could easily have been born as early as 155 and have reached the consulship after some delay. The Tabula Bembina indicates that the author of the lex Iunia repetundarum was 'M. Iunius D.f.', whose tribunate is assigned to 124/123, MRR 1.513, 3.114, Sumner, Orators 78. A praetorship about 116 is, therefore, not out of the question, with a governorship of Hispania Ulterior which preceded that of Marius. M. Iunius Silanus, mon. ca. 116, Crawford, RRC 1.330-301, no. 285, could be a son of the cos. 109, while D. Iunius Silanus (cos. 62) would have been a younger son of the same politician, born shortly before 108. M. Iunius Silanus (cos. 109) should therefore keep his place among the governors of Hispania Ulterior, but as Marius' predecessor, not successor.

18 Crawford, RRC 1.302, no. 286.
the end of the century, who was either a governor or a legatus and hence a contemporary of Caepio or Caesius in next-door Ulterior.\footnote{L. Caesius C.f., monetalis in 112 or 111, Crawford, RRC 1.312, no. 298; MRR 3.44. Richardson, Hispaniae 193, 199–201, cites the evidence from the Tabula Alcantarenensis (text and discussion included) for Caesius’ position as governor of Hispania Ulterior during Marius’ second consulship in 104. On this issue note also C. Ebel, ‘Dum populus senatusque Romanus vellet’, Historia 40 (1991) 440–441. For M’. Sergius <Silus> and also a Q. Fabius Labeo in Citerior at about the same time see A. Degrassi (ed.), Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae, Florence 1957, 461–462; T. P. Wiseman, ‘Roman Republican Road-Building’, PBSR 38 (1970) 140, n. 150; Richardson, Hispaniae 166–167.}

This solution would allow Festus’ evidence to stand for he does not specify in which Spanish province his ‘Sylla’ was active, and it would continue to fit the chronological pattern in his account. Besides, this also leaves a year vacant which might be filled with Marius’ prorogation (114–113). Marius’ term as governor may well have been of the same duration as that of the other promagistrates who held commands in this region. He spent his time as praetor in Rome in 115, involved in the legal suits affecting resident aliens or dealing with crimes of extortion, and left for Spain at the start of 114, returning towards the end of 113, just before Piso Frugi succeeded him. A proconsular command of rather closer to two years would have allowed Marius the time to win the fame which is accorded him in the sources (Plut. Mar. 6.1; Cic. Verr. 3.209).\footnote{A further possible mix-up in the literary sources should also be mentioned at this juncture. Plutarch clearly believed that Marius had been given a command abroad after 115, but it is worth noting that his younger brother, who does not feature in the Life, and about whose existence the author may not have been aware, also served as governor of Hispania Ulterior before the end of the century. Cicero (Verr. 3.209) certainly seems to suggest that Marius was responsible for a province, though this might equally well apply to either Numidia or Gaul at a later date. Moreover, the Augustan elogium apparently made no mention of a praetorship, CIL 12.1 195. Marius may never have set foot outside Rome after his praetorship, while Plutarch transferred this governorship from M. Marius to C. Marius, an unintentional slip on his part. However, I think it is as likely that both Marii were governors in Hispania Ulterior, and that M. Marius’ posting was due to the immense influence of his brother, by 102 elected to his fourth consulship, and that Spain was also an area where the Marii had by then substantial connections, Carney, Marius 23–24. See further below, Chapter 4.}

The Campaign for the Consulship

Although Plutarch (Mar. 6.1) says that Marius’ proconsulship was successful, and that he pacified an otherwise unruly province, he was not awarded a triumph nor did he obtain any significant financial gains from his appointment (οὔτε πλοῦτον οὔτε λόγον). As Carney points out, however, Marius surely profited from his governorship because of new commercial contacts and would have reached Rome with his personal fortune much enlarged.\footnote{Diod. 34.38; Carney, Marius 23.} The portrayal of an upright and honest official who did not deign to profit...
from his public position is clearly a *topos* which Plutarch employs elsewhere (*Aem. 4.5*). In the *Life* this feature should be regarded as more in keeping with the *virtus* of a military figure than with a facile or misconstrued opinion about the supposed integrity of Roman officials, of whom even the most incorruptible returned from foreign service with bulging pockets. Plutarch should be credited with some knowledge about the worth of the servants of the Roman government.

After a successful provincial command it is likely that Marius, in common with the majority of his fellows from the praetorian college of 115, would have set his sights on a campaign for the consulship of 112 or 111. A possible prorogation of his governorship of Hispania Ulterior meant that he was free to leave Spain at the end of the campaigning season in 113, roughly nine months before the consular elections were due for 112, and a good twenty-three months before the elections for 111. Although Marius would have had sufficient time to organize a candidacy for either year, it will be recalled that Cicero, fifty years later, left nothing to chance and all but ensured a successful result by initiating his canvass up to two years before the poll (*Att. 1.1.1*). A consular candidacy by Marius is unattested in the sources, but may be assumed with some confidence for either 113 or 112, or both, even if Cicero’s evidence (*Off. 3.79*) might appear to rule out such a contention. Few politicians who achieved the praetorship will, after all, have been content to remain with the status of *praetorii* in the senate when the prize of the very highest office lay beyond the hurdle of winning just one more election. Few will have been able to resist the temptation, regardless of their chances in such a vigorously competitive system. The victorious candidates in 113 were M. Livius Drusus and L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, in 112 P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica and L. Calpurnius Bestia; and with the exception of Nasica none was from an especially distinguished consular family. Indeed, Drusus was in all probability praetor in 116 and hence a year later than the minimum age for the consulship, which suggests that he may have been defeated in 114, while Bestia was hardly less of a newcomer to politics than Marius.

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23 Cic. *Att. 6.2.4*: ‘* uno quod omnino nullus in imperio meo sumptus factus est; nullum cum dico non loquor unum; nullus inquam, ne terruncius quidem’; *Att. 6.3.3*: ‘Reliqua ple na adhuc et laudis et gratiae, digna ipsis libris quo dilaudas: conservatae civitates, cumulate publicanis satis factum; offensus contumelia nemo, decreto justo et severo perpauci ...’


25 MRR 1.540.

Unlike the lucky Drusus, Marius may have been a candidate twice and possibly suffered the indignity of two repulsae in successive years. Assuming that he was rejected by the Roman electorate on one or two occasions, he was faced either with remaining among the ranks of the praetorii or waiting for a year in which the prospect of success was more favourable. The eventual delay between his praetorship in 115 and his consulship in 107 was not excessively long when compared with the careers of other senior politicians in this period.27 During the last forty years of the second century an interval exceeding a biennium between praetorships and consulships became an almost regular occurrence. Although the setback to Marius' career is among the more lengthy indicated below, it is not significantly longer than that experienced by Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 102), who campaigned in four consular elections, and is a great deal less spectacular than the delay suffered by P. Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105), who is known to have been a candidate just twice.

C. Laelius: pr. 145(?), cos. 140
M. Aemilius Lepidus Porcina: pr. 143(?), cos. 137
Q. Calpurnius Piso: pr. 140, cos. 135
L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi: pr. 138(?), cos. 133
P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus: q. 151, cos. 13128
L. Cornelius Lentulus: pr. 137(?), cos. 130
C. Fannius: pr. 127(?), cos. 122
L. Opimius: pr. 125, cos. 121
M. Aemilius Scaurus: pr. 119, cos. 115
Cn. Papirius Carbo: pr. 117, cos. 113
C. Caecilius Metellus Caprarius: pr. 117, cos. 113
M. Iunius Silanus: pr. 116(?), cos. 109
M. Livius Drusus: pr. 116, cos. 112
L. Cassius Longinus: pr. 111, cos. 107
C. Marius: pr. 115, cos. 107
P. Rutilius Rufus: pr. 118, cos. 105
Q. Lutatius Catulus: pr. 109(?), cos. 10229

Plutarch’s account of Marius’ activities for the next few years is obviously contrived. Here he was obliged to place an episode which illustrated Marius’

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28 Sumner, Orators 52, argues that Crassus Mucianus must have been born by 178 or 177, with a quaestorship which is tentatively dated to 151, Val. Max. 2.2.1. His consulship twenty years later must mean that he was above the minimum age. It is also possible that his brother, P. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 133), born perhaps a year or two beforehand was likewise a couple of years above forty-two in his consul candidacy.
29 Other politicians who were also above forty-three in their consulships include: C. Flavius Fimbria (cos. 104), defeated in tribunician elections, Cic. Planc. 52, and who reached his senior offices late, Brut. 129; Broughton, Candidates 45-46; Cn. Mallius Maximus (cos. 105), who had two sons serving in his army at Arausio, Oros. 5.16.2; Wiseman, New Men 167 n. 1; T. Didius (cos. 98), tribune in 103, praetor in 101, either won his first curule magistracy late or, like Marius, was older when he entered public life.
exemplary fortitude (Mar. 6.3; cf. Reg. et Imp. Apothegm. 202 B) during an operation to remove a varicose vein from his leg.\textsuperscript{30} The one item of interest which Plutarch was able to glean from his sources was that, during this seemingly second blank period of Marius' life, he became connected by marriage to the patrician Iulii Caesares.\textsuperscript{31} With a single member in the consulship in 157, the Caesares were not a prominent consular family in the second century, though they had managed to secure regular representation in the praetorship since, at least, the Second Punic War and were therefore not lacking in influence and prestige. The later fame of Julius Caesar has caused a certain amount of retrospective glamour to be cast on this family's name, and has made it seem as if an ambitious Marius found social acceptance among the senatorial establishment through a connection with this ancient patrician family.\textsuperscript{32} The possession of wealth, which enabled a politician to participate in public life and make possible the same career for his descendants, was a more likely basic criterion for any marriage contract among the elite of republican Rome of this time. Marius' status as a novus homo counted neither for nor against the association, but his personal fortune, which made the marriage a sound venture advantageous to both signatories of the contract, probably clinched the arrangement.\textsuperscript{33} The marriage occurred some years before Marius' consulship, some time between 113 and 110 being the most probable years, since the younger Marius was aged about twenty-six when he became consul, which suggests a date of birth in either

\textsuperscript{30} The patient ordered the doctor to desist after the one was removed without an anaesthetic; cf. Cic. Tusc. 2.35, 53, without an intimation of the date; Carney, WS 73 (1960) 90.

\textsuperscript{31} The interesting possibility that Sulla was also related to another branch of the Caesares has been raised most recently by H. B. Mattingly, 'L. Iulius Caesar, Governor of Macedonia', Chiron 9 (1979) 160-161 and n. 68.

\textsuperscript{32} See, for instance, Carney, Marius 23-24, where the danger of attaching too much prominence to a family simply because it later produced a celebrity such as Caesar is at once evident.

\textsuperscript{33} New men of an earlier period also made good marriages. The elder Cato, for example, married a Licinia, perhaps related to P. Licinius Crassus, pontifex maximus (cos. 205). Plut. Cato Mai. 20.2; Pliny, NH. 7.62. His son married a daughter of L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 182). Plut. Cato Mai. 20.12, 24.2; Aem. 5.6, 21.1; A. E. Astin, Cato the Censor, 54, 67, 104-105. Within a generation or two it became common practice for wealthy aristocrats from the city to marry women of municipal origin, such as P. Licinius Crassus (cos. 97), whose wife was a certain Vinuleia, Cic. Att. 12.24.2. His son M. Licinius Crassus (cos. 70) married his own brother's widow, Plut. Crass. 1.1, whose name, Tertulla, is preserved by Suetonius, Iul. 50.1. For the marital relationships of the Crassi see B. A. Marshall, Crassus: A Political Biography, Amsterdam 1976, 9, 12-13; A. M. Ward, Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic, Columbia 1977, 47-48, 55. L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (cos. 58) was married to a Calventia from Placentia, Ascon. 4-5 C; Shatzman, Senatorial Wealth 314. It became rare for senatorial families to marry only within their own narrow social circle, and such exclusive attitudes might prove foolhardy in a political environment in which financial assets were viewed with more favour than merely the possession of a famous name. Names alone could not raise the necessary expenditure for candidacies for the various political offices. See further below, Chapter 4.
109 or 108.\textsuperscript{34} Marriage to a Iulia shortly after his return from Spain in 113 ties in well with a conjectural consulship campaign soon after.\textsuperscript{35} A decided change in the political climate occurred during the next five years, which greatly assisted Marius’ electoral chances. However, the circumstances which contributed to his future success lay not so much in events at Rome, but in those abroad. Military affairs were generally perceived, owing to a lower standard of leadership, to be little short of chaotic and a dangerous undermining of the security of the res publica. Following the triumph of Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia, which reversed an embarrassing spell of Roman defeats, armies were victorious in campaigns along the frontiers of the empire. C. Sextius Calvinus (cos. 124) defeated the Salluvii in southern Gaul, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 122) had beaten the Allobroges in battle and Q. Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus (cos. 121) inflicted a defeat on Bituitus, king of the Arverni (Liv. Per. 61). Q. Marcius Rex (cos. 118) was successful in a campaign against the Styini and L. Caecilius Metellus Dalmaticus (cos. 119) won more military honours in Illyria (Liv. Per. 62). After a spate of military victories, however, disasters began to accumulate at a depressing pace: C. Porcius Cato (cos. 114) was defeated in Thrace and, in a more dramatic engagement, the army of the consul Cn. Papirius Carbo (cos. 113) was wiped out by the Cimbri,\textsuperscript{36} who made their first appearance on the edge of the civilized world as they migrated southwards in search of new land. The Cimbri retreated after this Roman debacle, but the military reverses continued to outshine, by far, successes such as those of M. Livius Drusus (cos. 112) against the Scordisci (Liv. Per. 63).

The war which began in Numidia due to Roman exasperation with the ambitions of Jugurtha, who had usurped the throne after murdering his two half-brothers Hiempsal and Adherbal, brought not an easy conclusion to hostilities and a quick solution to the problems in this quarter, as was eagerly awaited, but two bungled campaigns which reflected poorly on the integrity of the senate and its ability to conduct military adventures. L. Calpurnius Bestia (cos. 111) who was in charge of the initial campaign against Jugurtha was reputedly bribed to cease his offensive, and his replacement Sp. Postumius Albinus (cos. 110), although a better general, was unfortunately obliged to sail for Rome in order to oversee the consular elections.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34} See Badian, 1957: 323; FC 195; who posits a date close to 110; cf. ‘Lex Acilia Repetundarum’, AJP 75 (1954) 382 n. 43, for 112; Carney, Marius 23-24, for 110.

\textsuperscript{35} Carney, Marius 23-24 and n. 126-127, suggests that Marius was pursuing new interests through which to increase his political influence, which would also suit a situation following one or two defeats for the consulship.

\textsuperscript{36} Strabo, 5.1.8; MRR 1.535; Harris, War and Imperialism, 246 and n. 1, on the identification of Noreia in Illyria as the site of the battle.

\textsuperscript{37} Both Bestia and Albinus, along with L. Opimius, C. Porcius Cato and C. Sulpicius Galba, were condemned and exiled under the terms of the quaestio Mamiliana, MRR 1.546; see also Chapter 3. G. M. Paul, A Historical Commentary on Sallust’s Bellum Jugurthinum, Liverpool 1984, 117, also suggests that the politicians named in the sources were only the most important of those condemned.
In his absence, the consul’s younger brother, left in charge of the army as the senior legatus,38 suffered a humiliating blow which culminated in his army being forced to pass beneath the yoke. This was the first occasion that this had happened since 137, when the same penalty had been imposed on the vanquished army of C. Hostilius Mancinus (cos. 137) by the Numantines.39 The peace arranged by A. Albinus, like that engineered by Ti. Gracchus for his commander Mancinus in 137, was repudiated by the senate (Sall. Iug. 39.3). But the damage which this episode caused to the auctoritas of the Roman government and the doubtful light it cast on its competence in military matters promoted a return to radical tribunician activity, a situation of which Marius was to be the prime beneficiary.40 Q. Caecilius Metellus (cos. 109), who was the new commander in the Jugurthine War, followed the age-old routine of re-training his army before he attempted to come to grips with the enemy. His unimaginative tactics may have produced pleasing results in 108, but it was too late because the Roman voters now wanted more than just moderate gains from their leaders, especially after they had been thrown into utter panic by the reappearance of the Cimbri in Gaul and this tribe’s victory over Metellus’ colleague, M. Iunius Silanus.41

It was the war in Numidia, where he held the senior position in the consilium of Metellus,42 that gave Marius the chance to progress further in public life. Opinions about Metellus’ stature as a general differ considerably among the ancient writers who dealt with this war.43 Although it seems likely that he was reasonably competent, just like any other general in a major campaign, he was in need of the presence and advice of tried military men. In such circumstances, Marius fulfilled a necessary role more than adequately. Both Sallust and Plutarch highlight the rivalry and distrust

38 A. Postumius Albinus (cos. 99) was probably praetor in about 111, and his brother’s senior officer. His career prospects were shattered by this reversal, but he was able to take advantage of the political situation in 100 to enter the consular elections as a late candidate and to emerge successful. MRR 3.173; Sumner, Orators 83-84.
39 For the ancient sources on the disgrace of Mancinus see MRR 1.484.
40 For further discussion of tribunician activity at this time see below, Chapter 3.
41 MRR 1.545, 3.114, for the date of Silanus’ defeat.
42 P. Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105) was also present in the consilium, Iug. 50.1, though he is better remembered as an honest administrator than as a general. Like Marius, he may have been keen to serve with Metellus to resuscitate his flagging career. Diodorus, 34-35.38.1, claims that Marius held an inferior place among the legates, but this is not borne out by the actions ascribed to the novus homo, and possibly ancestry is meant rather than rank. Since no other experienced commander is mentioned during Sallust’s extensive coverage of Metellus’ campaigns, Iug. 43.5-83.3, it is justifiable to presume that Marius was the senior legatus.
43 Sallust’s view of Metellus as a ‘great and wise man’, Iug. 45.1 (‘magnum et sapientem virum’), is probably derived from an encomiastic source. According to Carney, WS 73 (1960) 98-99, this is at some variance with Cicero’s own assessment of this politician with whom he was probably acquainted in the 90s, Verr. 2.147; de Orat. 2.276. However, elsewhere Cicero is quite openly supportive, Dom. 87: ‘Q. Metelli praedlarum imperium in re militari fuit, egregia censura.’
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which developed between commander and subordinate during interludes in the campaigns, which appear to have included the capture of Vaga, a victory over Jugurtha at the River Muthul in 109, the siege and capture of Thala and an advance on Cirta in 108.44 Marius had undoubtedly accepted the offer to join Metellus’ staff in order to open the way for a consular candidacy, a fact which cannot have escaped his commander’s notice. Thus, on the one hand, Metellus sought to exploit Marius’ expertise while, on the other, Marius looked to winning personal glory to enhance his electoral prospects (Plut. Mar. 7.1). This uneasy situation, though it can hardly have been unusual, probably accounts for the tension between these two which heightened as the war progressed.

Marius must soon have decided that his prospects of winning a consulship for 107 were relatively good, if Sallust has given a correct perspective of events (Lug. 64.4; Plut. Mar. 8.4) in asserting that he asked Metellus a number of times for permission to return to Rome, probably in the early part of 108. In normal conditions a commander would have sent his legate home with his blessings but Metellus, perhaps recollecting Marius’ treatment of his elder brother in 119, or because of their increasingly frosty relationship, declined to approve the request. These appeals and refusals were repeated until the climactic encounter ended with the general’s infamous retort to the effect that the time would be right for Marius to seek the consulship when his, Metellus’, son was also of an age to canvass (Lug. 64.4: ‘Ac postea saepius eadem postulanti fertur dixisse, ne festinaret abire, satis mature illum cum filio suo consulatum petiturum.’). This anecdote, with its infuriating and insulting message, obviously captured the imagination of ancient writers who relate the incident as if it were the source of a later intense mutual hatred. Sallust relates the episode in oratio obliqua as if he had obtained the details from another source though, since Cicero, for one, does not reminisce about this notorious interview, it was perhaps an invention of a later writer.45

Plutarch (Mar. 8.3; cf. Dio, fr. 98.3) evidently had no reservations about

44 For a discussion of Metellus’ campaigning in 109-108 see MRR 1.545, 1.549; Paul, Commentary 132-204.

45 The characterization of Metellus is complex, as Carney, WS 73 (1960) 91-92; Marius 26-29, has well illustrated. Cicero, the earliest writer whose works survive, surely relied on his memory for recent events. That he never mentions this distasteful interview is suspicious. He also employed Numidicus as an exemplum after his own return from exile. He had much opportunity, therefore, to make use of a famous saying if it was really ever authentic. Sallust may be the author of these ‘dicta Metelli Numidici’. Moreover, Cicero was apparently less impressed with Metellus’ ability as a general, Cluent. 95, than Sallust who must have extracted information from the memoirs of Scaurus, Catulus and Rutilius, all of whom presumably lavished praise on Metellus. Sallust was in a quandary. He had to portray a good general, though evidence for that may have been conspicuously absent, but with sufficient faults and prejudices to be overshadowed by Marius.
its authenticity, however, for he relates the episode as if it had actually happened: 46

Do you propose to leave us, noble sir, and set sail for home to campaign for the consulship. Would it not satisfy your ambitions to be a consul with my son?

Whether the rhetoric was genuine or whether it was a first-century BC invention, it served to diminish the reputation of Metellus, and gave Marius the grounds for the subterfuge which followed.

The other incident which served to sour relations permanently between Metellus and Marius was the affair involving T. Turpilius Silanus. 47 The citizens of Vaga were persuaded by Jugurtha to lure their Roman garrison into a false sense of security, murder the occupying force and hand the city back to the king. Turpilius alone survived the slaughter, whether, as might be inferred, because he had connived at the conspiracy or whether for another reason not disclosed; the fact that he was not killed was sufficient to condemn him in the eyes of Sallust who brands him 'improbus intestabilisque' (Iug. 67.3). Metellus retook Vaga within two days (Iug. 69.3) and Turpilius was tried before the general's consilium, convicted of treason and executed after scourging. Plutarch presents the alternative version that Turpilius was spared by the Vagenses because he had been an honest commandant and, moreover, produces the additional information that he was

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46 Cf. Paul, Commentary 172, who correctly argues that the whole story is unhistorical, but his suggestion that none of the three ancient writers who mention it treat it as historical fact is not as convincing.

47 The name is supplied in full by Sallust, Iug. 76.3, with the title praefectus oppidi; Plutarch, Mar. 8.1, gives a variant 'Turpillius' and the office as praefectus fabrum; cf. MRR 3.210 with 'Praef. soc.,?'. Neither the epitome of Livy (Per. 66) nor Diodorus, in fragmentary Book 35, have details about the episode. Cf. Appian, Num. 3, who may have had access to a different source since he alone asserts that the Boulé of Vaga was executed together with Turpilius, whose relationship with Metellus is not mentioned. Marius' role in the affair is also not discussed. Appian's description of the treatment of deserters by Metellus, though a further indication perhaps of the general's superbia, certainly suggests a source not employed by either Sallust or Plutarch: Θρακας ὁ δὲ καὶ Λίγυρος ἀυτοκτόνος καὶ Λιγυρίων παρὰ Ἰουγόρθα, τῶν μὲν τὰς χεῖρας ἀπέτημεν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν τὴν γῆν μέχρι γαστρὸς καταώρσακε, καὶ περτυφεύμονα ἐξ ἀποκοντωθίσθην ἐνεμπύρωσεν παρὰ ὑπερήφανον ('after Thracian and Ligurian deserters had been delivered to Metellus by Jugurtha, the hands of some were cut off and others were buried up to their stomachs in the ground, and after they had been run through with arrows and javelins they were set alight while still alive'). On the business of the trial, its outcome and the status of Turpilius, either a Latin or more probably an eques Romanus from a municipium see MRR 1.547 and n. 3; Paul, Commentary 182: 'Turpilius ought not to have been scourged and killed because he was a citizen, not a Latin...'; cf. Badian, FC 190 n. 2, 196: '... a Latin who gained the citizenship...'; Valgiglio, Vita 37-39; J. Van Ooteghen, Caius Marius, Brussels 1964, 129-132; E. Koestermann, C. Sallustius Crispus Bellum Iugurthinum, Heidelberg 1971, 256-257; Passerini, Studi 29-32.
a hospes to Metellus (Mar. 8.2). In his trial, according to Plutarch, Marius, naturally a member of the court of inquiry, induced his colleagues to convict Turpilius and Metellus was obliged to hand down the severest penalty. Then a remarkable twist is introduced into the story since subsequent events were to prove Turpilius’ innocence. While most of those present at the trial rallied to their commander’s defence regarding a wrongful execution, Marius cleverly used the miscarriage of justice to his own ends by declaring that Metellus was solely responsible for the death of his guest friend, thus further undermining the latter’s standing.

As both Badian and Paul indicate, Metellus, caught on the horns of a dilemma, was, in Plutarch’s account, completely outwitted by Marius. He would have incurred much resentment from those who could have claimed that a politician from a city family had subverted the law by saving a client; but by condemning Turpilius to death without an appeal he brought equal odium upon himself for arrogant behaviour. Marius could therefore only profit from his intrigue. Sallust is perhaps surprisingly silent about Marius’ underhanded role, which illustrates a ruthless subtlety commensurate with a hardened republican politician, but which was not in keeping with the virtus of a simple military man. On the whole, Sallust gives a more neutral account of Marius’ part in the Turpilius affair than Plutarch, which possibly indicates that he either knew of a more sympathetic tradition or suppressed some material at his disposal. Sallust also dates the trial of Turpilius after the confrontation between Marius and Metellus (Iug. 76.2–77.3), while Plutarch (Mar. 8.1–2) makes the massacre at Vaga and the trial of Turpilius contributing factors to the eventual rupture of their relationship. Neither writer is to be trusted implicitly when it comes to even a broad chronological framework: Sallust’s chronology of the Jugurthine War has long been suspect and Plutarch has achieved a certain notoriety for arranging his material as he thought fit. And one need not, in any case, attach too much significance to dates, though rather more to the intention of illustrating Metellus’ loss of dignitas and the consequent, almost inevitable, climb to fame of Marius. Sallust retells the story of a traitor rightly condemned for his perfidious actions and Plutarch once again gives us a glimpse of Marius stooping to the meanest machinations to attain his goal of the consulship.

The snub given to Marius by Metellus and the controversy over the conviction of Turpilius through which Metellus lost face exacerbated the situation between the commander and his senior legate. While Marius remained in Metellus’ camp little worthwhile would be accomplished, but to despatch
him home would be another sign of defeat. As Plutarch describes, Metellus finally chose to take the second course, perhaps in the belief that Marius would fail in the elections. However, Metellus had misread the political situation entirely. Almost in passing (Mar. 7.4) Plutarch mentions that Marius had used his time as legate to ingratiate himself with the soldiers, who wrote to their families and friends urging that he be elected consul, for only this man could put an end to the war. When Metellus realised that Marius' presence was actually a hindrance to the campaign he at last gave permission for him to leave, but only when twelve days remained before the scheduled date for the consular elections (Plut. Mar. 8.4). Marius is supposed to have travelled from Metellus' camp to Utica in two days and made the crossing to Rome in another three, arriving in the forum seven days before the poll (Plut. Mar. 8.4-5).

His haste, besides being related to the need to canvass in person, was also determined by the formal requirement of submitting his candidacy to the presiding magistrate for approval. The exact timing of the professio is unknown for the second century, but some interval must surely have been in existence from the announcement of candidacies to the date of the poll itself. It seems plausible that Marius began his canvassing for the consulship in the shortest time allowable under traditional practices; and if Plutarch is accurate, it shows that Metellus tried up to the last minute to prevent Marius' candidacy, but that he ultimately failed in his endeavour.

The details of Roman elections which generally emanate from other sources do not accord well with the brisk character ascribed to Marius' consulship campaign. It is perhaps more believable that Metellus allowed his legate to depart somewhat earlier than Plutarch claims. Sallust seems to be unaware that Marius' return to Rome was undertaken with alacrity, and the failure to mention his arrival only just before the vote throws some doubt on the description provided by Plutarch. The information found in the Bellum Jugurthinum creates the impression that Marius had very skilfully prepared his campaign some way in advance. After he had been the recipient of Metellus' degrading remarks, Marius courted the popularity of his troops by relaxing the discipline (lug. 64.5), and also voiced his complaints to negotiators in Utica, many of whom were Roman or Italian with good connections in Rome. Besides relaying his dissatisfaction with Metellus' generalship and playing on fears about a protracted war which might have had adverse affects

50 For the professio and its timing see Staveley, Elections 147; Astin, 1962: 252, who believes that the professio was made a full trimumdinum before the elections were held, though that this was made a legal requirement only in 98 after the passage of the lex Caecilia Didia; cf. Earl, 1965: 328-331, who argues that candidates were not required to make their professiones in person before at least 63.

51 Q. Pompeius' consular candidacy in 142 must have been accepted on the day of the poll, Cic. Amic. 77; Gruen, RPCC 34, but he was present in Rome and so well able to canvass unofficially for some time beforehand.
on commercial interests, his objective was to curry favour by assuring the businessmen in particular that if he were placed in command, with even half the army he could capture Jugurtha in a matter of days and terminate the war ('dimidia pars exercitus si sibi permitteretur, paucis diebus Jugur-tham in catenis habiturum').\(^{52}\) There can be little doubt that such a claim would have gone down well with merchants worried about diminished profits from a strife-torn North Africa. The concern that Metellus was content to extend the war in order to enhance his personal gloria would also have been transmitted, together with the name of the informer; and all this was to the advantage of Marius. With his patience at last exhausted, Metellus released Marius from his post (\textit{lug.} 73.2) allowing him to return to Rome where news of the friction between the two would have preceded him. Marius' version of events seems to have triumphed, probably aided to some considerable extent by allies in the tribunician college of 108 (\textit{lug.} 73.5: 'seditiosi magistratus') whose identities, however, are not revealed.\(^{53}\) Marius' candidacy was not a hastily improvised exercise, but was planned with care and great thoroughness. It was greeted with much enthusiasm, and the elections themselves seem to have taken place in almost a carnival atmosphere. With his knowledge of the real nature of republican political life, Sallust's evidence should be preferred to the account given by Plutarch. In particular, Sallust (\textit{lug.} 73.6) suggests that Marius had the time to spread the word around about his forthcoming candidacy so that the opifices and agrestes might turn out en masse for the elections. Had Marius' intention to seek the consulship only been announced at the very last minute, he would have found it difficult to pack the \textit{comitia centuriata} with the additional support necessary if not to win the contest, then to put pressure on the voters whose opinions counted most.\(^{54}\)

\(^{52}\) It is worth comparing this boastful gesture to Cleon's promise to take Sphacteria in 425, Thuc. 4.27-30, which, of course he fulfilled, and to retake Amphipolis, Thuc. 5.2, 5.7-10, a venture which failed and in which he was killed. My thanks to B. Baldwin for drawing my attention to what possibly became another \textit{topos} in ancient historiography. On the influence of Thucydides on Sallust see, most recently, T. Wiedemann, 'Sallust's \textit{Jugurtha} : Concord, Discord, and the Digressions', \textit{G&R} 40 (1993) 48-49.

\(^{53}\) It is remarkable that the names of at least some of the tribunes of 108 have failed to survive in any source, \textit{MRR} 1.548-549. The \textit{quaestio} established by C. Mamilius Limetanus in 109 probably continued to operate in 108 and was surely protected by a tribune of similar persuasion. For the \textit{quaestio Mamiliana} see Paul, \textit{Commentary} 116-123; cf. Gruen, \textit{RPCC} 142-149, who believes that the 'heat of the tribunal burned itself out quickly'. Mommsen, \textit{RS} 3, 3.862, thought it possible that C. Servilius Glaucia may have been a tribune in 108 or 107 since he was a senator before the censorship of Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus and C. Caecilius Metellus Caprarius in 102. This idea no longer finds favour, \textit{MRR} 3.196, where Broughton expresses a preference for 101 instead; cf. H. B. Mattingly, 'Acerbissima Lex Servilia', \textit{Hermes} 111 (1983) 302, who argues for 105/4. If Glaucia was not Marius' tribunician ally in 108, then he was a politician of equal talent, and who was worthy of the title \textit{seditiosus magistratus}.

\(^{54}\) Paul, \textit{Commentary} 188-191, analyses the likely support for Marius, and contends that the 'plebes' referred to by Sallust must have included \textit{equites, publicani} and \textit{negotiatores}. Paul
Sallust contends (Iug. 65.5) that by the end of 108 everything favoured the election of Marius as consul (‘ita Mario cuncta procedere’), and this view must be essentially valid. Marius’ career prospects by 112 may have appeared negligible (Cic. Off. 3.79: ‘C. Marius cum a spe consulatus longe abesset et iam septimum annum post praeturam iaceret, neque petiturus umquam consulatum videretur ...’), but these gradually became brighter in inverse proportion to the succession of military defeats which occurred in the interim. His chances of obtaining the consulship increased markedly, helped along by the popular view, whether true or not, that the inconclusive campaigns of Metellus in Numidia showed that this general was prolonging an unnecessary war (Plut. Mar. 7.4). The sudden threat of an invasion of Italy by the Germanic tribes, whose meanderings along the frontiers of the empire caused hysteria to reign in Rome (Diod. 35.37), also furthered Marius’ political ambitions. On the other hand, Marius also worked long and hard on his canvass and, while Sallust’s description of Marius’ campaign trail may to some degree be questionable and contaminated by what the writer knew about political life in his own day, it must surely be evident that here was a sophisticated and concerted effort to win the support of the electorate. Marius’ success in the poll in 108 had become a near certainty.

Marius and his First Consulship

The election victory of Marius caused a sensation, according to Sallust (Iug. 73.7), who states that the nobles were defeated, and that after many years the consulship was voted to a new man (‘... perculsa nobilitate, post multas tempestatibus novo homini consulatus mandatur’). To what extent the result was really of the magnitude ascribed to it by Sallust,55 and to what

also names C. Memmius (trib. 111), C. Mamilius Limetanus (trib. 109), Cn. Mallius Maximus (pr. 108?), C. Flavius Fimbria (pr. 107?) and politicians such as L. Valerius Flaccus (cos. 100) and M. Antonius (cos. 99) as possible senatorial allies at this stage. Marius had to win the votes of the most influential sections of the community to win, but by summoning other, possibly more vocal supporters, he gave himself a better chance of victory in a charged atmosphere than if the comitia had drawn few besides the citizens resident in the city.

In the various lists of novi homines given by Cicero, Verr. 5.181; Font. 23; Mur. 16–18; Brut. 96, Q. Pompeius (cos. 141) is considered the last to be elected consul before Marius, E. Badian, ‘The Consuls 179-49 BC’, Chiron 20 (1990) 380. Note, however, P. Rupilius (cos. 132), M. Perperna (cos. 130), C. Licinius Geta (cos. 116) and L. Calpurnius Bestia (cos. 111), who were certainly newcomers to the consulship. The election of Marius may have facilitated the success of other new men: Cn. Mallius Maximus (cos. 105), C. Flavius Fimbria (cos. 104), T. Didius (cos. 98) and C. Coelius Caldus (cos. 94). See Chapter 4 for further discussion on this point. Gelzer, Roman Nobility, 51–52, assigns ‘new man’ status to Cn. Octavius (cos. 165) and L. Mummius (cos. 146), since they were the first members of their families to attain the consulship. Both were, however, the sons of praetors and since Gelzer obtained this information from Cicero, it illustrates how vague the concept was in reality. See above, Chapter 1, n. 18. Note also D. R. Shackleton Bailey, ‘Nobles and Novi Reconsidered’, AJP 107 (1986) 260, who argues that terms such as novus homo were ‘governed by usage, not by legal definition’; R. T. Ridley, ‘The Genesis of a Turning Point: Gelzer’s Nobilitat’.
extent he manipulated any evidence he may have unearthed to suit his over­
riding theme of old-fashioned Roman virtues, exemplified by the new man
Marius triumphing over aristocratic *superbia*, is a problem not readily solved.
However, the other ancient writers who dealt with this period are hardly
unanimous in their support of Sallust’s assessment of this political occur­
rence.

Had the election result actually been as remarkable as Sallust made it
out to be, it ought to have become the focus for all literary material cover­
ing the last decade of the second century. Yet the epitome of Livy, which
surely reflects the most memorable events, fails even to mention Marius’
success (*Per.* 65), and only his eventual defeat of Jugurtha (*Per.* 66) is noted.
It is of course possible, though still odd, that the epitomator should simply
have missed the significance of the year 107. But what little control can
be established over Livy’s account suggests that these elections were dealt
with in much less detail and that he did not grant them quite the same promi­
nence given them by Sallust. Livy is usually a reliable guide for electoral
contests in the first half of the second century, and the epitome also singles
out some elections which he obviously discussed at length. It looks as if
Livy, who was apparently dismissive of Sallust’s ability as a historian,
therefore not only ignored the *Bellum Iugurthinum* as a source, but also laid
much less stress on the election victory of Marius. Diodorus’ coverage of
events at this time remains only as fragments, but major episodes have a
tendency to survive if they were present in the text in the first place. In the
course of his description of the Jugurthine War (34–35.38) he mentions
Marius’ presence with Metellus, but the subsequent consular elections do
not feature at all, and Marius simply reappears as commander in Numidia
(34–35.39). Diodorus, on the whole, gives a negative appraisal of Marius’
character and career (37.29.1–5), and it seems feasible that he, like Livy, did
not set great store by Marius’ election as consul. Evidently Plutarch was also

*Historia* 35 (1986) 474-502, especially 501, who notes that Gelzer’s list of *novi homines* ‘is of
equestrians who reached the consulship’, though, in the case of Octavius and Mummius,
this assertion is palpably incorrect. In this instance, Cicero can only have used the term *no­
vus homo* to mean that these politicians were the first consuls from families which had al­

56 Florus, Orosius and Eutropius, who all used Livy as a source, fail to relate Marius’ election.
Moreover, Obsequens, 40-41, who might have picked up omens pertaining to the election of
a *novus homo* after so many years, singularly omits to mention any, nor does he notice
anything unusual during Marius’ consulship year. Thus another possible indication that
Livy did not devote much space to home affairs in 108–107.

57 The two *repulsae* suffered by Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus in 146 and 145 appear to
have been worthy of interest, *Oxy.* *Per.* 52. The absence of this episode from the other epi­
tome suggests that its writer concentrated more exclusively on foreign and military affairs,
which plausibly also explains the omission of Marius’ election in 108.

Classical Library*).
not under the spell of Sallust when he dealt with Marius' win in the consular elections. Although he may have employed a similar or the same source for much of Marius' career, he omits all reference to his status as a *novus homo* when he relates the election results for 107. Furthermore, departing from Sallust's account, he also has an unnamed tribune introducing Marius to the electorate before the poll (Mar. 8.5), where the opportunity arose to denounce Metellus in public, an attack which apparently contributed to the result. There is no hint from Plutarch, however, that Marius' victory was the first in thirty-five years for a new man (Mar. 9.1). This fact would surely have impressed this writer, and implies that he avoided using Sallust's monograph as a source when he composed this life, or that he read much less significance into the affair as a whole.

Elected together with Marius was L. Cassius Longinus who had been a vigorous praetor of impeccable reputation in 111 (Sall. Iug. 32.5). He may have hoped to have gained the consulship at the earliest opportunity, but possibly received a *repulsa* in the previous year's elections if an extended provincial command had not kept him away from Rome. Sallust (Iug. 73.7) confirms that the elections for 107 were fiercely contested and, although the names of the defeated candidates have not been preserved, neither Marius nor Longinus can have enjoyed a run at the consulship unhindered by competitors from established senatorial families. In fact, the whole tenor of Sallust's account is surely meant to establish that certain notable politicians were beaten by the *novus homo* from Arpinum. He may have been aware of the identities of these candidates, though on balance it is rather more likely that, nearly seventy years later and with the information no longer available to him, Sallust was obliged to leave anonymous these aristocratic competitors, who failed to draw much support from the citizen body.

Immediately after he became consul designate Marius plunged into the fray. On the one hand, he indulged in a number of open attacks on the *auctoritas* of the senate and its more entrenched membership and, on the other, he engineered, through the good services of the tribune T. Manlius Mancinus, the transfer of the Numidian command from Metellus to himself by the unprecedented move of a *plebiscitum* passed by the *concilium plebis*.

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59 In 109 Hortensius won the election with Ser. Sulpicius Galba, but he was convicted while still *designatus*, either for *repetundae* or *ambitus*, and M. Aurelius Scaurus secured the suffect position, MRR 1.548, 3.32; Gruen, RPCC 149-150. Including a possible candidacy by Longinus, there would have been at least four contenders for this consulship.

60 The other competitors in 108 are unattested, but C. Attilius Serranus (cos. 106), who defeated Q. Lutatius Catulus in 107, Cic. Plane 12, had perhaps campaigned before.

61 Among other possible contenders in 108 were a C. Cornelius [Cethegus?], L. Memmius and a Q. Valgius who all appear in the *consilium* of the *SC de agro Pergameno*, dated here to 101, as *praetorii*. If Marius repulsed a patrician, possibly a son of the cos. 160, M. Cornelius Cethegus, it would certainly have added lustre to his success. See also Appendix 1.
Moreover, soon after he had won this new appointment he enlisted an army consisting, in some measure, of volunteers, and by recruiting *capite censi* he broke with the traditional method of conscripting men from among the five propertied classes.

The speech (Sall. *lug.* 85) or speeches (Plut. *Mar.* 9.2–4) attributed to Marius once he was elected have been subjected a number of times to considerable scrutiny. Carney, in his examination of Marius’ oration in the *Bellum Iugurthinum*, has asserted that the ‘speech gives substantially the trend of Marius’ actual words on this occasion’. Paul concurs with this assessment though both Skard and Syme have been more cautious in their evaluations. Although post-election orations in the senate or *comitia* delivered by newly elected consuls might later become famous and regarded as worthy of quotation by later writers, neither Sallust nor Plutarch is remembered as an accurate purveyor of his subject’s words. Indeed, ancient historiography is not remarkable for its veracity when it comes to speeches. It is therefore more probable that both writers either chose to repeat sentiments suitable for the event in question, in the tradition of Thucydides, from some, in all likelihood imperfect, memory of the real occasion, or have been guided in their portrayal by a tradition they found in sources fairly close to Marius’ own day.

Sallust’s extensive treatment of a speech by Marius mirrors the central position of the orations delivered by Caesar and the younger Cato in the *Bellum Catilinae*; in both monographs they act as devices through which the writer might indulge his artistic temperament and turn aside, albeit briefly, from the narrative. The initial opinions expressed by Marius (*lug.* 85.1–4) seem quite consistent with an oration occasioned by a successful election to high magisterial office: thanks for the support of the electorate, preparations for the new campaign to crush Jugurtha and the departure from the long-established formula for conscription. Thereafter, Sallust’s speech of Marius must certainly have departed from an original, if one ever existed, which is doubtful indeed, with a sustained attack on the senatorial government, the ‘superbissumi homines’ (*lug.* 85.38). Contrasting sections follow, forming the greater part of the oration, concerned with the speaker’s deprived childhood (a blatant lie), his exemplary behaviour (omitting all

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63 Carney, *SO* 35 (1960) 66 n. 1: ‘These speeches are here regarded as embodying the substance of Marius’ actual remarks because both Sallust and Plutarch give much the same account of those remarks, which must have been very well known.’

64 Paul, *Commentary* 207; cf. Skard, *SO* 21 (1941) 98; Syme, *Sallust* 169, n. 37: ‘The oration is Sallust’s own, but goes back in some particulars to things said, or rather allegedly said, by Marius’. On this speech see also K. Von Fritz, ‘Sallust and the Attitude of the Roman Nobility at the Time of the Wars against Jugurtha (112–105 B.C.)’, *TAPA* 74 (1943) 166–168.
mention of charges concerning *ambitus* in 116), and the suggestion (completely fanciful) that a man from a more ancient and illustrious background, but with no military experience could be appointed to lead an army in Numidia (Marius had not much more experience in generalship than most of his fellow senators). Thus politicians such as L. Calpurnius Bestia, Sp. Postumius Albinus and Q. Caecilius Metellus may have possessed ancestral *imagines*, but they all succumbed to *avaritia, imperitia* and *superbia* (lug. 85.45).

Orations such as these do not deserve to be analysed too precisely for hidden meanings or pertinent historical messages since more often than not they are inserted into a text purely as entertainment or as an illustration of the writer’s creative ability. Plutarch, whose reference to Marius’ speech or series of speeches is brief and much abridged, if Sallust’s oration is accurate, is also credited with a moralizing discourse which in this instance may be coupled with his overall antipathy towards the subject. His version of Marius, the consul designate, making an address to the citizen body is surely nothing more than a *topos* based on earlier Greek demagogues such as the fifth-century Cleon or the speeches of a Roman tribune of the plebs such as C. Gracchus. Moreover, it is plausible to suggest that Sallust, rather than portraying a demagogic Marius, in fact reflects more about the political practices of the 50s and 40s with the stock-in-trade phrases of politicians such as Clodius and Milo.65

Marius’ win in the consular elections came about not merely by chance, nor did he have to face the active and concerted opposition of a united senate. Both Badian and Paul have shown clearly enough that Marius was never an isolated political figure and, to secure the consulship, not only must he have obtained the support of a considerable number of *equites* whose votes he needed in the *comitia centuriata*, but he must also have possessed a large following within senatorial ranks since it was his fellow senators who were able to call out their clients to vote for him.66 His subsequent attack on aristocratic privilege, unless it was contemporary rhetoric, as claimed by Plutarch (Mar. 9.4), makes little sense and is ill-tailored to the context in which it is supposed to have taken place. The lengthy speech as related by Sallust has regrettably little historical value, at least for the second century,

65 Syme, for example, *Sallust* 217–218, finds allusions to the triumvirs Antonius, Lepidus and Octavian in the prologue of the *Bellum Iugurthinum*. Current political behavior and beliefs were bound to intrude into a work about a period for which there were relatively few literary sources, Earl, *Sallust* 77. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that Latin literature and philosophy should have acquired quite the sophistication, by the end of the second century, with which Sallust’s work would seem to credit it. The fragments of late second century writers do not exhibit the same high degree of refinement found in the literature of the first century, but the sentiments expressed in attacks on the senate, if they were made by politicians such as Marius and C. Memmius, would not have been unfamiliar. 66 Marius’ various family connections and political alliances are discussed further in Chapter 4.
reflecting as it does what might have been said in public debates in the 50s and 40s rather than a verbatim account of an oration belonging to 107. Marius may have had a grievance for the way in which he had been treated by Metellus in Numidia, but there are contraindications that he was not entirely innocent of disloyalty and deception. In other respects, he had little or no reason to indulge in vituperation of a system of government in which even successful novi homines found rapid acceptance. Newcomers to political life, throughout this century at least, had achieved respectability, high status and exalted places in the existing institutions.67

Plutarch (Mar. 9.2-4) devotes much less space to an attack on the senate by Marius and consequently reduces its significance. He perhaps had access to a different source from the one employed by Sallust since the oration found in the Bellum Iugurthinum, although similar, is scarcely identical. Plutarch also adds a rather curious yet perhaps compelling reason for the hubristic remarks he attributes to Marius (οἱ λόγοι θρασεῖς ὄντες ὑπεροφία καὶ ὑβρεί): that the people expected and enjoyed such invective especially when it was made at the expense of the senate and, in order to maintain their favour at a time when he was apparently needing new recruits for the army, it was necessary that he take this course of action whether or not he believed wholeheartedly in what he said. Thus Sallust’s speech of Marius has been taken at face value, while Plutarch’s explanation for this harangue actually seems at least credible in the circumstances, lending support to the idea that Marius was not greatly interested in exploiting his ‘new man’ status for political purposes. Even if the Sallustian oration contains a kernel of truth it is obviously nothing more than an elaborate invention and bears no strict relation to what might have been said by Marius. As such it may be exposed as misleading evidence for second-century republican political life.68

67 M. Porcius Cato (cos. 195) and Q. Pompeius (cos. 141) both proceeded to win censorial elections. M’. Acilius Glabrio’s hopes for the censorship and entire reputation were ruined by the allegations made by two tribunes and his fellow candidate Cato that he was guilty of corruption, Liv. 37.57.9-58.2; A.W. Lintott, ‘Electoral Bribery in the Roman Republic’, JRS 80 (1990) 4-5. The descendants of these three novi homines were to become as aristocratic as any of their fellow senatorial politicians. New consular families such as the Domitii Ahenobarbi (first consul in 192), Octavii (first consul in 165) and Mucii Scaevolae (first consuls in 175 and 174) very soon, like Cornelius Tacitus much later, became the staunchest upholders of the establishment. Marius’ aspirations, presumably the same as his peers, were surely to perpetuate his name and lineage among the highest levels of theordo senatorius and not to subvert or destroy the existing system. A speech or series of speeches containing such abuse, as related by Sallust and to a lesser extent by Plutarch, becomes virtually nonsensical in this context.

68 The Sallustian oration of Marius obviously contains numerous first-century topoi commonly found in political speeches, Earl, Sallust 77. Cicero’s speech, In toga candida, delivered during his campaign for the consulship, will certainly have been designed to bolster his canvass through use of his origins as a novus homo. The Commentariolum Petitionis also possesses
Nevertheless, a purpose for a speech of this sort may be assumed, though it had nothing to do with exultation over attaining the consulship or, on account of an inferior social position, with bloodying the nose of the senate. Republican politicians could ill afford to succumb to emotional actions which might easily weaken their personal images. And Marius, who was no novice when it came to political scheming, would have used the chance of a post-election speech to accelerate the transfer of Metellus’ command to himself. We are told that his election campaign was devoted to persuading the citizen body that he alone could end hostilities in Numidia (Sall. lug. 64.5, 65.4-5; Plut. Mar. 8.5: ‘and promised that he would kill Jugurtha or take him alive’), and that the most influential sections of the electorate desired a speedy conclusion to this war (Sall. lug. 64.6) with drastic changes in the character of the campaign. However, Marius faced an uphill struggle over this transfer since the senate had not selected Numidia-Africa as a consular province for 107, intending to further prorogue Metellus’ proconsulship. In an ingenious move Marius therefore turned to his allies among the tribuncian college who successfully urged the people to overturn the senate’s decision and thereby deprive Metellus of his command in this war.69

In comparison with the election of Marius as consul, or his apparent attacks on the senate or indeed his reforms of the army, the consequences of the transfer of Metellus’ command at the beginning of 107 were, in the long run, far more damaging to the res publica. It is therefore somewhat surprising that neither Sallust nor Plutarch, nor in fact any ancient writer, should have discussed what was little short of a constitutional revolution, which directly paved the way for the end of collective government at Rome. The recruitment of capite certis into the army drew an understandable reaction many of these same topoi, but in the form of an exhortation to an earnest candidate (2.7): ‘ac multum etiam novitatem tuam adiuvat quod eius modi nobles tecum petunt ut nemo sit qui audiat dicere plus illis nobilitatem quam tibi virtutem prodesse oportere’. The second oration against the agrarian proposal of the tribune P. Servilius Rullus, Cicero’s first speech at an assembly of the citizen body after his election, was also taken as an opportunity to celebrate his acquisition of the consulship (de leg. agr. 2.3): ‘me perlongo intervallo prope memoriae temporumque nostrorum primum hominem novum consulem fecistis et eum locum quem nobilitas praesidii firmatum atque omni ratione obvallatum tenebat me duce rescidistis virtutique in posterum patere voluistis’. It is highly unlikely, however, that the election to the consulship of L. Volcatius Tullus (cos. 66) or L. Gellius Poplicola (cos. 72), the first of their respective families, had been forgotten by the audience. For Volcatius Tullus see R. J. Evans, ‘A Note on the Consuls from 69-60 B.C.’, Acta Classica 31 (1988) 101. For Gellius Poplicola see R. J. Evans, ‘The Senatorial Origins of L. Gellius Poplicola, Consul 72 B.C.’, LCM 5 (1980) 201-203; Badian, 1990: 392. C. Coelius Caldus (cos. 94) the last consul to be acknowledged as a novus homo by Cicero, de Orat 1.117; Mur. 17; Comm. Pet. 11; Badian, 1990: 388, was also hardly beyond living memory.

69 The move did, however, have some similarity in the way in which Scipio Aemilianus had obtained the Numantine command in 134, though no plebiscitum was formally enacted on that occasion, MRR 1.490 and n. 1; Astin, Scipio Aemilianus 183-184.
because it was regarded afterwards as a dramatic break with the traditional practice of conscription. But the import of this change, hinging rather more on Marius’ obtaining charge of the war against Jugurtha, has been much overstated ever since antiquity. Sallust himself betrays a certain lack of interest in the reasons for the new recruitment procedures (Iug. 86.2: ‘inopia bonorum’). Instead he chose to emphasize Marius’ action as one designed to preserve his popularity through avoidance of a compulsory levy of property-tied citizens, which naturally linked up handsomely with the content of his post-election address.

However, this account distorts the real picture. Plutarch (Mar. 9.1; cf. Flor. 1.13) moreover, clearly under the influence of hostile sources, like Sallust, portrayed the move as a further example of Marius’ ambitio. His evidence here is also invalid for, as Brunt and Rich have both argued, the property qualification for army service had become nearly meaningless by 107, and the difference between the assidui, members of the fifth and lowest class of citizens in the census, and the proletarii had become very slight indeed. Both Brunt and Rich see Marius’ changes to the recruitment scheme as a relatively small adjustment to what had probably already become normal practice, and the reforms simply caught up with what was the reality of the situation. By the close of this century, men officially below the property qualification were expected to serve in the army, but from 107 conscription was, to some extent, augmented by volunteer enlistment, which had not happened before except during a state of emergency or tumultus. These volunteers were probably, but not necessarily, proletarii, and served together with the assidui who continued to be conscripted as long as the senatorial government remained in existence. It was the volunteers who came to look to their commanders for retirement gratuities, while those conscripts from among the normal assidui still returned to their subsistence farming on the termination of a military campaign.

The total number of volunteers was small (on Rich’s estimate, between three and five thousand) and the primary motive for enrolling them surely a question of speed. Marius is said to have promised an end to Jugurtha’s independence within a matter of days (Sall. Iug. 64.5), but the usual method of levying troops could take a great deal of time, whereas volunteers supplied with arms by the state could be collected much more rapidly. Marius

70 For a discussion of the enrolment of proletarii see, most recently, Paul, Commentary 215-216.
73 Proletarii, freedmen and slaves had been recruited in the Second Punic War and during the first half of the second century, Liv. 22.57.11, 23.14.3-4, 32.26.10-12, 34.56.11-13, 40.26.6-7, 41.5.4; Rich, 1983: 290-291.
was obviously under an obligation to hurry on with his campaign: his senior legate Manlius was despatched in advance (lug. 86.1), he followed soon after (lug. 86.4), leaving his quaestor L. Cornelius Sulla in charge of levying the cavalry detachments in the normal way from among the Latins and the Italian allies (lug. 95.1). Thus the extent of the army reforms ascribed to Marius, as they are mentioned by ancient writers, have been inflated by modern scholars impressed with the idea that the root of all later civic instability lay squarely with the creation of a professional or semi-professional army. But a new army was not the result of proletarii being recruited for service, and this innovation should rather be regarded as a minor factor in the internal condition of the res publica in the first century.

Plutarch appears to be under the impression that Marius' election to the consulship carried with it the command against Jugurtha; his ignorance of republican constitutional practices may perhaps be forgiven. Although Sallust (lug. 73.1) mentions the transfer of Metellus' command he does not make much of the episode and instead implies that the senate bore the responsibility for the tribune's manoeuvre since it had already been obstructionist in denying the will of the people.

The implied accusation against the senate is, of course, quite groundless and totally misleading since it was bound by certain strict traditional practices and legal restraints concerning its assignment of proconsular commands. Marius was not the injured party in this instance for it was his tribunician allies who, through their activities in the concilium plebis, tore away a fundamental controlling mechanism which the senate possessed over its magistrates, and which thus far had preserved stability in the state by curbing individual ambitions.

Sortition had long been employed as a method of assigning provinces especially when a conflict of interest had occurred between elected officials, and in particular the consuls. The system was, nonetheless, open to abuse and eventually brought into some disrepute in 125. In that year, in response to a bill introduced by the consul M. Fulvius Flaccus, designed to give the right of provocatio and citizenship to the socii, opponents in the senate managed to have him appointed to a proconsular command at short notice. The city of Massilia was threatened with an attack by the Salluvii and Vocontii, and the consul was ordered to bring relief to this ally of Rome. Flaccus returned in 123 and celebrated a triumph for his victory over these Gallic
A serrated denarius issued by L. Licinius Crassus (cos. 95) and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 96) when they were placed in charge of the foundation of Narbo Martius ca. 118. The reverse portrays a naked Gallic warrior in a biga holding a shield, *camyx* and reins in his left hand, and hurling a spear with his right hand.

tribes; in his absence the bill which he had sponsored had been abandoned.\(^75\) However, Flaccus is unlikely to have forgotten this political reversal, and he may be assumed to be the driving force behind the subsequent *lex Sempronia de provinciis consularibus* passed by his close friend and ally C. Gracchus during this politician’s tribunate.\(^76\) The new law stipulated that forthcoming commands had to be announced publicly before the consular elections were convened, at least six months or more before the new consuls took up their office. Competitors for the senior magistracy were therefore prevented from campaigning on a platform aimed at obtaining specific commands. The legislation is generally seen as popular legislation for foiling senatorial contrivance of commands, and for reducing the political intrigue which often accompanied the selection of generals. It was also a sound administrative device which cracked down on the ambitions of senators who sought the leadership of special military ventures.

The decision of the senate not to allot the war against Jugurtha as a

\(^{75}\) Cf. Badian, *FC* 177–178, who attributes the law solely to C. Gracchus; Gruen, *RPCC* 80; Brunt, *FRR* 33 and n. 63.

\(^{76}\) For the date of this measure see *MRR* 1.514, under Gracchus’ tribunate in 123. Flaccus triumphed in 123, so the law governing the assignment of provincial commands to consuls may plausibly be dated to after his return and, therefore, more probably belongs to 122 than to the year before.
consular province in 108, before the elections took place, cannot have been an instance of premeditated engineering intended to enhance the position of Metellus at the expense of his troublesome legate. Even if Marius was known to be a probable contender for the consulship, no one at that stage could have predicted with absolute certainty that he would emerge the victor from the poll. Furthermore, on Plutarch’s evidence (Mar. 8.4), Marius entered the electoral contest late in the day just before the vote, some time after Metellus’ command had been effectively prorogued, and while he was still not yet in Rome. Sallust does not mention a late candidacy by Marius and seems to imply (Iug. 73.7) that members of the senate were well aware of this politician’s desires, and pre-empted any move by him to acquire this command by extending Metellus’ proconsulship during the election campaign, or after the result had been made known. Such a scenario is impossible. Marius certainly knew by the time he declared his candidacy for the consulship, whenever that precisely was, that he would have to overturn a ‘popular’ law to achieve his aspirations.

It was Marius and Marius alone who was ultimately responsible for the plebiscitum transferring the Numidian command from Metellus to himself; it was not in retaliation for senatorial intransigence. In subverting the law of C. Gracchus, Marius created a precedent which could be used by other equally ambitious and unscrupulous politicians. Both ancient and modern writers have dwelt to an inordinate degree on the military reforms of Marius and their possible consequences, though these may now be seen to be almost insignificant in comparison to his assault on the republican constitution. By ignoring the sequence of events which occurred in 107 the sources have obscured the fact that a dire and irreversible factor had been introduced into political life which was seriously to undermine the intricate machinery of government. The later tradition produced an anecdote about the effect on Marius of prophecies about a great and outstanding future career (Sall. Iug. 63.1), but in truth he grasped the consulship after a canvass of considerable dexterity, recognized that control of the campaign in Africa offered a possible easy avenue for further glory, and employed the tribunician college to his advantage to obtain his goal. Marius was evidently a popular choice for the consulship in 108, but his activities before his election or afterwards do not conform to any notion of demagogic behaviour. His aim was self-aggrandizement at any expense and, by the beginning of 107, it appeared that he had won the position in the res publica which he had long sought.

The Iterated Consulships (104–100)77

Although Marius failed to make good the promise made to the voters during

77 Marius’ seventh though brief tenure of the consulship in January 86 is examined in Chapter 3 together with the tribunician legislation for that period.
the election campaign\textsuperscript{78} to end expeditiously a war which he claimed was being needlessly protracted, he was nevertheless elected \textit{in absentia} to a second consulship in 105. Marius had not exhibited any extraordinary talents as a general during his command of a war which hardly deserves to be described as much more than a minor encounter in the history of Rome. His boast of being able to capture or kill the Numidian king within a matter of days was vividly demonstrated to be false. With campaigns which were at least as long and costly as those of his predecessor Metellus Numidicus,\textsuperscript{79} and with his command twice prorogued by the senate, he could not safely assume that his career would prosper further.\textsuperscript{80} The \textit{res publica}, however, was faced with the immediate threat of invasion from the north where the Cimbri and Teutones had overcome the armies of the consuls M. Iunius Silanus, Q. Servilius Caepio and Cn. Mallius Maximus.\textsuperscript{81} The consternation which ensued resulted in the surprising re-election of Marius, not so much because he was an exceptional general but because, like Scipio Aemilianus, he had actually concluded a military venture successfully. In Marius' case this was a phenomenon not widely enjoyed by the Romans for some time.\textsuperscript{82} An election \textit{in absentia} was without recent precedent but was definitely not illegal (Caes. BC. 1.32). Marius' acquisition of a second consulship within a decade of his first was theoretically both unconstitutional and illegal, though Cicero (Leg. Man. 62) and Livy (7.42.2, 10.13.8) state plainly that no law was sacrosanct, and that the senate and the people, through their representatives in the tribunician college, had the last say in all such matters.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{78} E. Badian, \textit{Publicans and Sinners: Private Enterprise in the Service of the Roman Republic}, New York 1972, 85 and n. 15, sees in Marius' failure to obtain a prompt victory in Numidia, the reason why Q. Servilius Caepio (cos. 106) was able to pass a measure depriving the \textit{equites} of control of the juries in the law courts.

\textsuperscript{79} Metellus, hereafter with his honorific name 'Numidicus', which was bestowed on him by the \textit{populus Romanus} after his triumph early in 106, \textit{MRR} 1.554, 3.40-41. He was consul in 109, his command prorogued for 108 and again for 107, though this second prorogation had been overturned on the order of the same people who afterwards granted him this \textit{agnomen}.

\textsuperscript{80} Marius took up his new command in the spring of 107; this was extended into 106, \textit{MRR} 1.554, and again for 105, \textit{MRR} 1.556-557. It was only in the campaigning season of 105, after over two years of warfare, that Marius finally brought about the defeat and capture of Jugurtha.

\textsuperscript{81} Moreover, L. Cassius Longinus (cos.107) had been defeated and killed by the Tigrurini, \textit{MRR} 1.550. For Silanus' disastrous encounter with the Cimbri see \textit{MRR} 1.545, 3.114, dated to 108. For the catastrophe at Arausio see \textit{MRR} 1.555.

\textsuperscript{82} Besides the defeats of Silanus, Longinus, Caepio and Mallius Maximus, the army of Sp. Albinus had been forced to surrender to Jugurtha, Sall. \textit{Iug.}, 38.9; \textit{MRR} 1.543. Metellus Numidicus was awarded a triumph for his successful campaigns against Jugurtha, but not for terminating the hostilities.

\textsuperscript{83} Marius was the first politician to be elected to a second consulship within a decade of his first since M. Claudius Marcellus (cos. 166, 155, 152), C. Marcius Figulus (cos. 162, \textit{vitio creatus}, 156), P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica (cos. 162, \textit{vitio creatus}, 155). Scipio Aemilianus' second
Plutarch (Mar. 11.1) suggests that the proposal to elect Marius to a second consulship did not go unchallenged, but that the voters in the *comitia centuriata* refused to accept the candidacy of any other politician (οὐδὲνος ἄνα-
σχήμενον τῶν ἀπὸ γένους μετάξον ἡ πλούσιων οἶκων ...), and only once he had been proclaimed victor in the poll was the vote taken for his colleague. The presiding magistrate in these elections was P. Rutilius Rufus, later no friend of Marius, who could have refused to allow this unorthodox candidacy, but who, perhaps in the interests of public unity in the face of an incursion into Italy by the Germanic tribes, gave way to the mounting pressure for the nomination of a tried and tested general. At least two other candidates for the other consulship are attested: C. Flavius Fimbria, who emerged successful though he had probably campaigned before, and Q. Lutatius Catulus who had also been defeated in the previous year (Cic. *Planc.* 12). It is highly probable that there were other competitors in the race, including C. Billienus, whose praetorship is tentatively dated to 107/6 and who, according to Cicero (*Brut.* 128), was denied the senior magistracy only because of Marius’ iterations. He may well have campaigned on more than one occasion. A Cn. Aufidius is known from epigraphic sources as ἀντιστρατηγός and credited with a praetorship in about 107; a consular candidacy immediately

consulship in 135 was twelve years after his first. Aemilius was the first man since the Second Punic War to be elected consul while absent from Rome, Cic. *Rep.* 6.11; *MRR* 1.490 n.1. C. Flaminius was also supposedly elected to a second consulship while away from Rome for 217, but this example is doubtful, *MRR* 1.242. Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus were, however, elected to the consulship for 213, ‘ambo absentes’, Liv. 24.43.5.

84 Following the example of the consul L. Porcius Licinius in 184 who refused to accept the illegal candidacy of Q. Fulvius Flaccus for a suffect praetorship, Liv. 39.39.1–5. Flaccus ignored this judgement which was referred to the senate which decreed that the elections be abandoned altogether; Scullard, *Roman Politics* 149–150; Astin, 1962: 252–255; R. Develin, ‘Scipio Aemilianus and the Consular Elections of 148 B.C.’, *Latomus* 37 (1978) 485; *Patterns* 26 n. 56; *Practice* 141. On the other hand, the people’s choice of Scipio Aemilianus as consul for 147, five or six years beneath the minimum age, Cic. *Phil.* 5.47, was eventually accepted by Sp. Postumius Albinus Magnus, the presiding magistrate, Liv. *Per.* 50; *App. Lib.* 112. For a discussion of these elections and the controversy caused by Scipio’s candidacy, which may not have been as spontaneous as the sources suggest, see Astin, *Scipio Aemilianus* 61–69; Develin, *Latomus* 37 (1978) 488. Note also Plutarch, *Mar.* 12.1, who draws the inevitable comparison between Marius’ election and that of Scipio Aemilianus, with the observation that ‘... they [the people] did not consider that now was the first time that the law had given way’ (ἡγοῦντο γὰρ οὔτε τού πρῶτον εἶδον τού συμφέροντι τού νόμου).

85 Fimbria may have been a praetor in 107, Paul, *Commentary* 189; cf. Sumner, *Orators* 76, who suggests that he was born before 147, and as early as 154, since Cicero implies that he won the consulship in excess of the minimum age, *Brut.* 129; *Planc.* 12; *Verr* 5.181; *MRR* 1.551 and n. 4.

86 *MRR* 1.551; Sumner, *Orators* 105, for the date of his praetorship. For his aspirations to the consulship see R. J. Evans, ‘The Consular Candidacy of C. Billienus’, *LCM* 14 (1989) 103–104.

87 *Inscriptions Graecae*, 12.5.722; *MRR* 1.551 and n. 2, 3.29–30. The Cn. Aufidius placed at (51) in the *consilium* of the *SC de agro Pergameno* should certainly be regarded as a younger relative. See Appendix 2.
following the end of a proconsular command in the east may confidently be postulated. The interesting fact to emerge from the little evidence available for these elections is that Marius, contrary to Plutarch’s assertions, pushed aside not a single politician from an especially influential senatorial family, and must clearly have been perceived as the strongest possible candidate in what otherwise appears to have been a rather weak field. Of the possible competitors in 105, Fimbria and Billienus were novi homines, Catulus came from a family without consular representation since the third century and the Aufidii, although senatorial in the second century, had never held high magisterial office. Marius’ election was not quite as startling as his biographer would have liked his readers to believe.

Marius returned from Africa only towards the end of 105 in time to assume his consulship on 1 January, the same day on which he celebrated a magnificent triumph (Sall. lug. 114.3). He was immediately assigned Gaul as his proconsular command to deal with the Cimbri and Teutones, possibly as a result of a second plebiscitum (Cic. leg Man. 60; Vell. 2.12.2).

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88 The consular ancestors of Catulus were the cos. 241 and cos. 220(?), MRR 2.584. Second-century Aufidii include a tribune of the plebs dated to 170, MRR 2.535. R. Syme, ‘Missing Senators’, Historia 4 (1955) 55-56, suggests the Aufidii were a single family in the second century.

89 Sallust, lug. 114.3, states that ‘magna gloria consul triumphavit’, and Plutarch, Mar. 12.4, describes the wealth deposited by Marius in the aerarium. The seemingly impressive data: 287 000 drachmai of coined money, 5 775 pounds (λειψα) of uncoined silver and 3 007 pounds of uncoined gold, obscure the fact that the spoils from Numidia were really a meagre amount to set against the costs of the war. This becomes more readily explicable when the figures are translated into talents: the coined money represents just 48 talents, the uncoined silver, at roughly 84 denarii to the pound, Crawford, RRC 2.594, represents 80 talents and the uncoined gold, at roughly 40 aurei to a pound (1 aureus = 25 denarii), Crawford, RRC 2.593, represents 501 talents. In total, Marius deposited about 629 talents into the state treasury in 104, but this is a mere fraction of the 5 000 talents delivered by L. Aemilius Paullus after his conquest of Macedonia in 167, Pol. 18.35.4; Harris, War and Imperialism 71. The Jugurthine War was evidently not financially beneficial. Unless Marius had salted away a substantial percentage of the plunder, he probably did not benefit very much from this command; and his legendary wealth can only have been accumulated from the Cimbrian War. Thus anecdotes about Marius’ lust for possessions, Plut. Mar. 34.2-4, should be seen in context; as the continuing characterization of a rustic nature associated by then with unbridled ambitio. Cf. M. Jaczynowska, ‘The Economic Differentiation of the Roman Nobility at the End of the Republic’, Historia 11 (1962) 487, who considers that Plutarch describes Marius’ wealth as ‘royal’; Shatzman, Senatorial Wealth, 279 n. 139, who inflates the amount of booty obtained from Numidia by misquoting Plutarch: ‘3 700 pounds of gold ... 87 000 denarii’. Shatzman believes that Marius’ ‘enrichment’ must date to between 109 and 101, and if he became as fantastically wealthy as Plutarch claims, then the dates may be narrowed to between 102 and 101, the very last stage of the Cimbrian War. Marius’ gaffe of appearing in the senate in triumphal robes, Plut. Mar. 12.5, is surely apocryphal, and intended to emphasize the rustic element of Marius’ character. It is unbelievable that an experienced politician with fifteen years’ service in the senate could have committed such an elementary error. Thus Livy’s evidence, Per. 68, which suggests that he was granted the privilege of entering the senate in the regalia of the triumphator should be preferred.
though more probably in terms of the *lex de provinciis consularibus*. Some ancient writers also believed that Marius again encouraged the *capite censi* to enlist for service in the army but Rich, following Gabba, recognizes the likelihood of confusion over the date of the military reforms, or even of a second version of those measures set against the more serious menace posed by the wanderings of the Germanic tribes. It is also not impossible, considering the variable quality of sources accessible to ancient writers, that a historical doublet should have developed over this issue.

In military terms the year turned out to be much quieter than had been anticipated, since the Cimbri and Teutones had turned west into Spain, allowing Marius the time to train his new army in readiness for a future engagement (Plut. *Mar.* 14.1). On the other hand, political intrigue in Rome appears to have been quite frenetic, although the activities of C. Flavius

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90 Cf. Cicero, *Prov. cons.* 19: ‘Gallici belli provinciam extra ordinem decernebant’, seems to imply a decree of the senate. Sallust, *Iug.* 114.3, uses the phrase, ‘Marius consul absens factus est et ei decreta provincia Gallia’. As Paul, *Commentary* 258; and Gabba, 1972: 779, n. 85, suggest, Gaul had been declared a consular province in accordance with the law of C. Gracchus. By electing Marius first, the people ensured that he received this command according to seniority, but he may also have come to some less formal arrangement with his colleague after they entered office. The consular elections seem to have been convened only after news of the rout at Arausio on October 5th, Paul, *Commentary* 257–258. Since the consuls elections preceded those of all other regular magistracies, the polls had obviously been delayed by up to three months. This postponement is inexplicable unless Marius already had his heart set on a second consulship after bringing the Numidian war to a close. He may have had tribunician allies who employed delaying tactics with this end in mind, and the debacle at Arausio greatly aided his ambitions. Cf. Mommsen, *RS* 3 1.583; Badian, 1984: 103, who draw attention to the possibility that elections in the second century may have been scheduled for the autumn months, and not mid-summer, a change which they claim occurred after Sulla’s dictatorship. However, if Plutarch, *Mar.* 22.3, is correct in stating that Marius received news of his election to a fifth term as consul on the field of Aquae Sextiae, those elections must have taken place before the end of the summer. The defeat of the Teutones came during the summer months of 102 as they made their way east intending, no doubt, to settle in northern Italy before the onset of winter. It is understandable to relate autumn elections to a consulship year which began in March, but when this was altered to January in 153, *MRR* 1.452, it seems logical to suppose that elections were shunted back to earlier in the year.

91 Ps.-Quintilian, *Decl.* 3.5; Gell. *NA.* 16.10.14; Rich, 1983: 324: ‘[T]he Cimbric War version was perhaps the invention of a pro-Marian writer seeking to represent Marius’ actions as a necessary expedient in a time of national crisis.’ A second tradition may have emerged about the enlistment of *proletarii*, though with the weight of ancient opinion favouring the earlier date, this may simply be an example of befuddlement among later writers. Cf. E. Gabba, *Republican Rome: The Army and the Allies*, trans. P. J. Cuff, Oxford 1976, 13–14, who considers a second and more sympathetic tradition more likely than mere confusion.

92 Perhaps the most memorable event of this hectic year was the removal of L. Appuleius Saturninus as *quaestor Ostiensis* for alleged mismanagement of the corn supply. He was replaced by the *princeps senatus*, M. Aemilius Scaurus (cos. 115). The insult to Saturninus’ *dignitas* was reputedly the reason why he sought the tribunate and ultimately for the violent repercussions in 100, Cic. *Har. resp.* 43; *Sest.* 39; Badian, 1984: 102 n. 6. For Saturninus’ removal as quaestor see *MRR* 1.560; G. Rickman, *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome*, Oxford 1980, 47–48. For a discussion of the criminal prosecutions in 104 see E. S. Gruen, *Politics and the Courts*
Fimbria, no stranger to the law courts (Cic. Brut. 129: ‘diligentia tamen et virtute animi atque vita bonus auctor in senatu’), have attracted no comment. An invasion of Italy remained a real prospect, and the senate voted Gaul a consular province for 103, which meant that there was no alternative but to re-elect Marius to a third term (Plut. Mar. 14.6). His command might have been prorogued, as it was in Numidia, but he would also have found himself in a subordinate position in the event of a consul being sent to his aid. The voters, with the battle of Arausio evidently fresh in their minds, refused to countenance the possibility of a conflict between a proconsul and an incumbent magistrate and precluded the issue entirely. The move for Marius’ re-election made sound sense, therefore, given the apparent enormity of the crisis and, once the ‘ten-year-rule’ governing iterated consulships had been breached owing to popular demand, it was very much easier to set the law aside for a second time or, indeed, for as many times as were necessary to conclude this particular campaign. Marius’ colleague for 103 was L. Aurelius Orestes, a son of the consul of 126, whose untimely death midway through his consulship left no one at Rome empowered to hold the elections for the following year. Marius was thus recalled by the senate, and set out on an excursion which entailed no great risk to his army because the Germanic tribes had yet to reappear in Gaul.

The details of the electoral campaign for 102 may, to some extent, be gleaned from Plutarch (Mar. 14.7).

Many worthy men sought the consulship, but Lucius Saturninus having greater influence over the people than any other tribune, and won over by flattering remarks, persuaded them through his speeches to re-elect Marius.

It is perhaps predictable that the losers in this contest should go unnoticed in the sources although at least four possible candidates may be identified for the other consulship of that year. The first, and eventual winner of the race to become Marius’ colleague, was Q. Lutatius Catulus, whose canvass was his fourth in five years. He had been defeated by C. Atilius Serranus in 107, by Cn. Mallius Maximus in 106 and by C. Flavius Fimbria in 105 (Cic. in 104 B.C.’, TAPA 95 (1964) 99–110; E. Badian, ‘Three Non-Trials in Cicero: Notes on the Text, Prosopography and Chronology of Divinatio in Caecilium 63’, Klio 66 (1984) 306–309.  
93 Cicero notes his presence among the consulares in 100, Rab. perd. 21, but not afterwards. He may, however, have lived on well into the 90s. See also Chapter 4.

94 Q. Servilius Caepio (cos. 106), proconsul in 105, had refused to cooperate with the consul Cn. Mallius Maximus or place himself under the latter’s command. As a result of their squabble both commanders were beaten individually by the Cimbri and Teutones, MRR 1.555, with the total loss of their armies.

95 MRR 1.562. Orestes was obviously the natural father of the consul of 71, Cn. Aufidius Orestes.
Although still considered by some scholars to have been a perpetual loser, without any real hope of success until he was befriended by Marius as a potential and malleable fellow consul, his long quest for the senior magistracy was certainly not unique. Furthermore, Plutarch (Mar. 14.8) was obviously under the impression, no doubt from writers sympathetic to Catulus or from the memoirs written by this politician, that Marius did not court voters on behalf of any particular candidate, and that Catulus was elected because he was, or had become a familiar and, by then, popular figure with the electorate (τιμώμενον ὑπό τῶν ἄριστων καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑμ. ἐπαχθή). C. Billienus, mentioned above as another seasoned campaigner, should also be included in the race for the ‘free’ consulship of 102. Like Catulus, he may have been veteran of several consulship contests but, unlike his luckier competitor, was destined never to grasp this most coveted of republican public offices. L. Caesius, recently revealed as a governor of Hispania Ulterior in the last years of the second century, is assigned a praetorship in 105 or 104. He could easily have returned to Rome in time to participate in the campaign for 102, though 101 should not be excluded as a year in which he, too, may have tried for the senior magistracy. C. Sempronius C.f., who appears in the ninth place on the SC de agro Pergameno, and who was probably a fairly recent ex-praetor by 101, may be identified as the son of the consul of 129, C. Sempronius Tuditanus. It is quite likely that he had been a praetor by 105, and he may also be added to a list of putative candidates during these years.

The field of candidates again appears to have lacked the dignitas of men

97 Badian, 1957: 323: ‘... promoted to previously unattainable office with the support of C. Marius’; DUI 149; Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, Oxford 1968, 52: ‘... helped the much-defeated Q. Catulus to the consulship that he probably no longer expected’; 1984: 127: ‘he was the man helped by Marius to a consulate after three repulsae’; A. Keaveney, Sulla: The Last Republican, London & Canberra 1982, 33: ‘Catulus, in fact, had made three unsuccessful bids for the consulship – normally nobody was stupid enough to make a fourth attempt – before finally obtaining it with Marius’ help.’
98 Compare the example of Q. Fulvius Flaccus, suffect consul in 180, who had received three repulsae in consular elections before he was finally successful following the death of the consul C. Calpurnius Piso, Liv. 40.37.6; Develin, Practice 171, Evans, Acta Classica 34 (1991) 116 and n. 33.
99 Cf. Sull. 4.2, where Plutarch is less complimentary about Catulus’ ability, especially as a general (ἀνδρὶ χρηστῷ μὲν, διμιλιτερῷ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγώνας).
100 Cf. Taylor, VDRR 253, who accepted the earlier date of 129, and argued that this Sempronius was an otherwise unknown Sempronius Longus. The career of C. Sempronius C.f. had probably progressed close to suo anno. Cf. the careers of the two Valerii Flacci, cos. 131 and cos. 100, the two Aquillii, cos. 129 and cos. 101, and the two Aurelii Orestes, cos. 126 and cos. 103. M’ Aquillius (cos. 129) and the elder Tuditanus were contemporaries, and it is possible that their sons’ careers also closely mirrored each other. Moreover, note a C. Annius C.f. in eighth position in the same consilium, another possible consular candidate in the period 105 to 101. See further below, Appendix 1 & 3.
from really famous senatorial families,\textsuperscript{101} and so it is perhaps not remarkable that L. Appuleius Saturninus was able to orchestrate public demands, at a \textit{contio} just before the vote, for Marius to be voted a fourth consulship. No question arose over the validity of a magistrate standing as a candidate in elections over which he himself was to preside since one of the heroes of the Second Punic War, Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator, had also been re-elected for 214 under similar circumstances.\textsuperscript{102} The alliance between Saturninus and Marius, which first saw the light of day in this year and which was to have such unfortunate consequences for the \textit{res publica}, may already have been viewed with some considerable disquiet in the more cautious political circles. Saturninus, well into his tribunician year, had proved to be a formidable and irascible politician with an ambitious legislative programme reminiscent of the days of the Gracchi.\textsuperscript{103} From Plutarch’s evidence (\textit{Mar.} 14.7), it seems that Marius probably decided to take a calculated risk by initiating the connection with Saturninus since he was concerned about his chances of acquiring another term in office. Their relationship was not in the same category as Marius and Metellus Deltamicus or T. Manlius Mancinus and Marius; Saturninus had won the tribunate without Marius’ aid, he was his own man and all the more daunting for this independence. And while Marius may have been keen to see land allotted to his enlisted volunteers, or to have land set aside and available for the end of the campaign, he was perhaps preoccupied with the problem of re-election. The timely alliance with Saturninus indicates that support for Marius was ebbing away. He had, after all, again failed to bring about a speedy conclusion to a war, no matter that the enemy had disappeared. His fourth consulship was not a foregone conclusion, and it certainly appears as though Marius required Saturninus’ considerable oratorical skills (Cic. \textit{Brut.} 224) to make sure that the result was as he had wished it to be.

It transpired that Marius’ re-election not only proved to be vital for the fortunes of the \textit{res publica}, but was also a glorious vindication of the people’s decision, unique in the verifiable period of republican history, to allow

\textsuperscript{101} Many of the more established senatorial families simply do not appear to have been able to provide consular candidates during this period, Evans, \textit{LCM} 10 (1985) 76–77.

\textsuperscript{102} Fabius Maximus was elected suffect consul for 215, Liv. 23.31.14; \textit{MRR} 1.254, supervised the elections for 214 and was himself re-elected, Liv. 24.9.3, \textit{MRR} 1.258. He also presided over the comitial proceedings for 213 which ended with his own son being returned as consul, Liv. 24.43.5; \textit{MRR} 1.262; R. Develin, ‘Religion and Politics at Rome during the Third Century B.C.’, \textit{JRH} 10 (1978) 3; \textit{Practice} 158–161.

\textsuperscript{103} For the laws of Saturninus dated to 103 see \textit{MRR} 1.563. These included a \textit{lex agraria} which provided 100 iugera of land for veteran volunteers in Marius’ army, which suggests that he either disbanded a number of troops in 103, who may have been serving since 107, or that he was already making provision for the future. Saturninus also passed his \textit{lex de maiestate}, and was also responsible for the \textit{plebiscitum} which exiled the hapless consul of 105, Cn. Mallius Maximus. For a more thorough examination of Saturninus’ laws see Chapter 3.
one politician to hold the consulship three years in succession. As they moved along the coast of Gaul towards Italy after suffering a defeat in Spain at the hands of the Celtiberians (Liv. Per. 67), the Teutones and Ambrones, who had taken a more southerly route than the Cimbri, were destroyed by Marius' army in two battles at Aquae Sextiae (Plut. Mar. 18.3). Shortly after the ending of the hostilities messengers arrived from Rome bringing news of Marius' election to a fifth consulship (Plut. Mar. 22.3) and, in Plutarch's account, a good illustration of the fact that the events of a whole year have been condensed into a matter of two to three weeks of military activity in Gaul.

Meanwhile, Marius' consular colleague Catulus had been ordered to hold the Alpine Passes, and to block any advance the Cimbri might attempt into the Po Valley. Their king Boiorix was understood to have chosen a more indirect route into Italy, but by marching around the northern foothills of the Alps he could not have known that the Teutones had lagged far behind him, and the projected pincer movement against the Romans failed to materialize. Marius may have relied on the inability of the Germanic tribes to coordinate a joint attack, and hence expected his fellow consul to spend a fruitless year employed in garrison duty. Assailed from the north by superior numbers, Catulus was forced to retire from the mountains to the south bank of the Po following a fierce onslaught (Plut. Mar. 23.2-6; Reg. et Imp. Apothegm. 202E; cf. Liv. Per. 68; Sull. 4.2-3). Nevertheless, his command was prorogued by the senate for 101 because Marius' newest colleague in the consulship was needed in Sicily to suppress a major slave rebellion, which had disrupted the province since 104. M'. Aquillius, who had served as Marius' legate between his praetorship and the consulship, was elected to the consulship for 100 BC.

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104 The battle was preceded by omens and portents which seemed to foretell a famous victory, Liv. Per. 68; Pliny, NH. 2.148; Plut. Mar. 17.3-4; Obseq. 44, 44a. Plutarch also relates the arrival at Rome of Battaces, the priest of the Magna Mater, who also predicted triumph for the Romans, Mar. 17.5-6.

105 During the absence of both consuls, Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus and his cousin, C. Caecilius Metellus Caprarius, were elected censors. Numidicus was soon in open conflict with Saturninus and his ally C. Servilius Glauce when he tried to exclude them from the ordo senatorius, MRR 1.567; Gruen, RPCC 181.


107 The slave revolt began during the governorship of P. Licinius Nerva either in 105 or 104, MRR 1.559 and n. 3. He was replaced by the praetor L. Licinius Lucullus who had already been engaged in putting down a similar rebellion at Capua, Diod. 36.2.5-6, MRR 1.559. With some success to his credit Lucullus could have expected his command to be extended, but he was obliged to yield his appointment to C. Servilius, praetor in 102, MRR 1.548, who fared much worse, with the result that the senate voted Sicily a consular province for 101. Both Lucullus and Servilius were later prosecuted for their mismanagement of the crisis in Sicily. For the possible dates see Badian, Klio (1984) 301-306.
and his canvass for the consulship, may have enjoyed the active support of his former, though still absent, commander in his campaign. Aquillius is the first consular colleague of Marius who may tentatively be identified as an amicus of Marius, though amicitia between them probably cannot be traced back very far. They did indeed serve a spell together in Gaul (Plut. Mar. 14.7), and Marius later rallied to Aquillius' defence in his trial de repetundis which occurred on his return from Sicily (Cic. de Orat. 2.195–196; Liv. Per. 70). His connection with Marius is rather overstated in modern studies, however. As the son of a recent consul, Aquillius probably did not require the approval or support of any single prominent politician; his own family was reasonably illustrious and provided the prerequisite social and political standing to indulge in a strong challenge for the consulship. His service in the Cimbric War under Marius may have been to his advantage, and made him a popular choice with the voters, especially since a man of some military qualification was required to quell the slave uprising in Sicily. Still, it should also be stressed that military expertise was evidently not uppermost in the minds of those who attended the comitia centuriata on the day of the elections; for Aquillius had participated in no active warfare while he served with Marius, and certainly in no victorious battles. The fame of his consular family and mere association with Marius, even if of short duration, probably accounts for his success in the poll for the consulships of 101.

Two other politicians should probably be included among the consular candidates for this year. The first was P. Licinius Nerva, praetor in 105 or 108 Aquillius may have been praetor in 104 if he joined Marius' staff in 103, MRR 1.559 and n. 1. Cf. Sumner, Orators 91, for a praetorship date of 104. Since Aquillius' father had been consul only in 129, the son's career must have progressed close to suo anno.

108 Aquillius may have joined Marius in Gaul only at the beginning of 103 after serving as praetor urbanus or the peregrine praetor and, therefore, served as legatus for just one season, during which he was left in charge of the army while Marius went to Rome. His connection with Marius was really rather brief in duration. His replacement was M. Claudius Marcellus, MRR 3.55; Cf. Badian, FC 201; Studies 45; Gruen, RPCC 190; Keaveney, Sulla 78, who all confidently place Aquillius firmly among a group of politicians who supported Marius. But note Brunt, FRR 157: '... no good reason to think that even Manius Aquillius, who had been on good terms with him [Marius] was merely his tool ...'.

109 Aquillius had no opportunity for building up a personal reputation for military competence since he saw no active service in Gaul where there was a lull in the fighting. In his trial, dated to between 97 and 95, Badian, 1957: 330-331; Gruen, RPCC 194, his military experience was grossly inflated by his counsel M. Antonius (cos. 99), and this tradition duly found itself into the ancient sources where it has been accepted largely without question. Prior to the Sicilian expedition he does not appear to have achieved recognition as a general; his youthful service in the army, though taken for granted, is also unattested. Indeed Cicero shows quite plainly, Flacc. 98, that Aquillius' gloria sprang from his successes in Sicily and not from beforehand: 'M'. Aquillium patres nostris multis avaritiae crimini­bus testimonisque convictum, quia cum fugitivis fortiter bellum gesserat.' The failure to mention valiant deeds against the Germanic tribes when he had the chance, de Orat. 2.195, suggests that there was nothing to relate.
104, a man who may have been connected with Marius in the past, and whose family background would have made a candidacy a strong possibility.\textsuperscript{111} The second was A. Postumius Albinus, brother of the consul of 110, under whom he had served in Africa.\textsuperscript{112} His career had received a severe setback after his defeat by Jugurtha (Sall. \textit{Iug.} 38.9-10), and was not helped by his brother’s arraignment before the \textit{quaestio Mamiliana}. Sp. Albinus was exiled in 109. A. Albinus won the consulship for 99 with a late candidacy, which must have fully exploited public revulsion at the way Marius ruthlessly crushed the \textit{seditio} of Saturninus and Glaucia, but he may well have chanced his hand before, though in 102 the time was as yet inauspicious.

In retrospect, Marius’ fifth consulship may be viewed as the crowning point of his career for it culminated not only in his destruction of the Cimbri at Vercellae (Liv. \textit{Per.} 68), but also in his triumph in Rome and his election to a sixth consulship. He appeared in person before the senate to relate the favourable outcome at Aquae Sextiae (Plut. \textit{Mar.} 24.1), rejected or rather deferred the triumph which had been decreed to him until he should fulfil the overall task with which he had been entrusted, and he set out to assist Catulus. The Cimbri were at first unwilling to join battle because they refused to believe that the Teutones had been utterly destroyed (Plut. \textit{Mar.} 24.2). After proof of the annihilation was produced in the form of captured chieftains in chains (\textit{Mar.} 24.4), the Cimbri prepared to advance. Plutarch’s account of the battle was extracted from Sulla’s memoirs in which Marius’ role had apparently been understated (\textit{Mar.} 26.3), and dwelt instead on the heroic actions of the writer himself and his commander Catulus. Whatever truth might lie behind information emanating from an autobiographical text, the basic facts emerge. The Cimbri were slaughtered in their thousands just as their cousins the Teutones and Ambrones had been almost exactly twelve months before,\textsuperscript{113} and the Romans, after a second breathtaking victory over the Germanic tribes, removed the peril to peace and stability in Italy. It is perfectly natural that a writer such as Sulla should wish to portray his role in a famous event in as positive a light as possible, and to give more credit than was perhaps due to a politician who became an ally, and also to denigrate the role played by the man who was later to become his bitter

\textsuperscript{111} Nerva was from a family which had reached praetorinan rank in the senate for at least two generations, \textit{MRR} 2.581. A candidacy from a politician with such respectable pedigree might be expected, but his canvass may have been seriously hampered by his mostly incompetent handling of the crisis in Sicily, Diod. 36.3.2-5.

\textsuperscript{112} A praetorship before 110 is highly likely, see above. The Roman electorate was not renowned for its lengthy memory, and a candidacy some eight years after his disgrace is by no means improbable. On A. Albinus see L. Hayne, ‘The Condemnation of Sp. Postumius Albinus (COS. 110)’, \textit{Acta Classica} 24 (1981) 66; Badian, 1990: 404.

\textsuperscript{113} The battle of Vercellae took place on the third day before the Calends of Sextilis (August) 101, Plut. \textit{Mar.} 26.4.
opponent. Plutarch was not so entirely naive that he did not recognize the inherent bias in his source material for this affair, and he states clearly enough that at the time it was Marius who was hailed the architect of the defeat of the Cimbri (Mar. 27.5), the third founder of Rome, and the general who deserved to be the sole beneficiary of the two triumphs awarded for the decisive conclusion of the war. It may be assumed that he did not obtain this material from Sulla, which indicates either that he knew of another tradition concerning the battle or had a secondary source which he also consulted.

The entire success was attributed to Marius because of his previous victory and his superior rank. Moreover, the people hailed him as Rome's third founder, on the grounds that the danger from which he saved the city, was no less than that of the Gallic invasion.

It remains not inconceivable, nevertheless, that Catulus and his officer Sulla had played significant parts in this victory, which would go some way to explaining why Marius chose to celebrate one triumph jointly with his former colleague, rather than the two which had now been voted to him alone. As a stratagem it illustrates a perfect grasp of the political situation at Rome. Marius urgently desired a sixth consulship, probably for two reasons: to ensure the settlement of land grants for his veteran volunteers and as a gratuity for his undisputable military successes. But the celebration of a double triumph could have been construed as a sign of superbia, which might also have cost him support in the comitia centuriata, where favour always had to be curried, and have alienated, if not exactly overwhelming senatorial support, acquiescence in a further consulship. The vote of a double

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114 Catulus, who commanded the centre of the army, with Sulla probably as one of his senior legates, bore the brunt of the fighting, according to Plutarch, Mar. 26.3; MRR 1.573. P. F. Cagniart, 'L. Cornelius Sulla's Quarrel with C. Marius at the Time of the Germanic Invasions (104–101 B.C.)', Athenaeum 67 (1989) 145 and n. 29, considers that Sulla was a military tribune in this campaign. Marius, presumably in command of the right wing, was said to have missed the enemy altogether in a dust storm. Keaveney, Sulla 34, however, suggests that Marius initially routed the Cimbric cavalry before descending on their infantry from the rear.

115 He does not, however, seem to have had access to Catulus' Commentarii, Mar. 26.5, and clearly references Sulla as his main, and probably sole, source for Vercellae. For the memoirs of Catulus see Cic. Brut. 35; E. B(adian), OCD2 217.

116 Cicero, Tusc. 5.56, notes the shared triumph of Marius and Catulus and likens the latter to Laelius, the former by allusion presumably to Scipio Aemilianus. Although the Romans were not, on the whole, successful in their foreign ventures between 110 and 100, the number of triumphs accorded to victorious generals exceeds the number awarded in the decades before and after: four triumphs between 120 and 111, seven between 110 and 101, six down to 90, E. Pais, Fasti Triumphales Populi Romani, Rome 1920, 1.206-226.
triumph was a great honour, but it could not be accepted if Marius wanted his sixth consulship. The offer to share his triumph with Catulus was another gesture which opened the way for another term in the senior magistracy. The joint triumph, far from compromising Marius' good standing, actually increased his hold over the electorate, and appeared simultaneously to be a conciliatory move to ward off criticism from opponents in the senate. Thus his victory in the poll was as much assured by his acute assessment of the lie of the land as were his patient reforms of the army the basis of his wins on the field of battle.

Plutarch accepts the word of Rutilius Rufus (Mar. 28.5) that Marius' sixth consulship was obtained through excessive bribery, which also accounted for the election of L. Valerius Flaccus, described as more like Marius' assistant than a true colleague (ὑπηρέτην μᾶλλον ἢ συνάρχοντα τῆς ὑπατείας). Since Rutilius Rufus is assumed to have been hostile towards Marius, his evidence is dismissed by Badian, who sees the reference to the purchase of votes as a malicious distortion of what was the usual and acceptable distribution of gifts following a triumph.\(^{117}\) The disposal of largess was certainly not an illegal practice, but its timing cannot have harmed Marius' candidacy in elections which he himself was again about to oversee.\(^{118}\) When the polling day arrived, Marius had become the clear favourite to win one of the consulship places for 100. No politician would have undertaken the expense of a canvass in the knowledge that Marius would unquestionably emerge the victor from the elections, so widespread was the esteem in which he was held throughout the community (Plut. Mar. 27.5). Still, Plutarch, perhaps under the influence of his sources and determined to maintain the rustic thread in his characterization of Marius, claims that Marius was uncomfortable once confronted with the complexities of political life at Rome (Mar. 28.2). This is at odds not only with what the biographer had written about Marius' post-election speeches in 107 (Mar. 9.2), but also with the cunning way in which the victor of the Cimbric War organized the campaign trail for his next consulship.

Such competition as occurred was once more confined to the selection of Marius' latest colleague. Although L. Valerius Flaccus, who was elected, has been portrayed as the willing friend and ally of Marius who benefitted from Marius' supreme position in the res publica,\(^{119}\) he would have been a strong contender under any conditions since he was the member of one of the very few families which had won consulships in each generation in

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\(^{117}\) Badian, 1984: 121 n. 46, with reference to Vell. 2.12.6, who thought that Marius' sixth consulship was a gift in return for his almost unsurpassed service to the state; cf. FC 202, where he believed that Marius' disbanded army had been crucial in securing the vote. Note also Gruen, RPCC 180, who considers bribery a possibility.

\(^{118}\) M'. Aquillius returned from Sicily to celebrate an ovatio only in 99, MRR 2.2; Pais, Fasti 1.221.

\(^{119}\) Valgiglio, Vita 132; Badian, 1957: 333; FC 201; 1984: 122; Van Ooteghem, Caius Marius 236.
the second century. Furthermore, his public career must certainly have advanced close to *suo anno* with a moneyership dated to 109 or 108, and a praetorship in 104 or 103. His long career in the senate, including the censorship, was not especially notable, though as *flamen Martialis* many of the avenues open to other ambitious senior politicians were forbidden to him. Nonetheless, in 86 he was chosen *princeps senatus* by the censors, L. Marcii Philippus and M. Perperna, a position he held well into the 70s. Plutarch, or rather his source, probably Rutilius Rufus, believed him to have been a placeman who owed everything to Marius but, considering his respectable career before 100 and his family name, some distortion of the facts has quite probably crept into the literary tradition.

Plutarch further confirms the presence of at least a third candidate in these elections, naming him as a Metellus (*Mar. 28.5*), who may plausibly be identified as the *consularis* and ex-censor Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus. Although Numidicus would have canvassed for office in contravention of the law governing the same magistracy twice, the multiple consulships of Marius could be cited as a precedent for failure to comply. Moreover, Marius, who was the presiding magistrate, might have declared the candidature of Numidicus invalid but, given his own example, was outmanoeuvred by the strategy of this potentially difficult opponent. Numidicus attempted to win another term as consul in order to forestall the proposed legislation of Saturninus, who intended, or who had just recently won, a second tribunate, and Glaucia, who was a candidate for the praetorship. Plutarch also states (*Mar. 28.4*) that Marius was keen to see Numidicus exiled, but Numidicus’ election would have foiled a move for a criminal prosecution.

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120 Valerii Flacci, *all direct descendants of the cos. 227*, were consuls in 195, 152 and 131, *MRR 2.629*.

121 Flaccus’ father was a direct contemporary of the elder Aquilius, Orestes and Tuditanus, all of whom had sons who either reached a consulship at about the minimum age or who came close to winning that office. For his moneyership see Crawford, *RRC* 1.316, no. 306 and compare with M’. Aquilius, *monetalis* at roughly the same time, Crawford, *RRC* 1.314, no. 303. Cf. Mattingly, 1982: 44, who suggests that the moneyerships of both politicians should be dated to 108/7. Flaccus’ career was not retarded, and he appears to have been the same age or a year younger than Aquilius, who held the consulship immediately ahead of him. He may have been prosecuted for *repetundae* after his praetorship, *Cic. Div. in Caec.* 63; Badian, *Studies* 86; 1984: 122 and n. 47; *Gruen, RPCC* 178–179; cf. Sumner, *Orators* 80–82, who argues that the L. Valerius Flaccus in question was the suffect consul of 86. In *Klio* 66 (1984) 299–301, Badian concurs with Sumner’s suggestion.


123 *MRR* 2.54.

since he would have been immune to all judicial charges at the same time as his enemies held their various offices. The endeavour to seek a second term was well worth the effort because so much was at stake and, if it had succeeded, Numidicus might have been in a position to cripple the intended bills of Marius and his allies. A similar ploy to negate the legislation of political opponents was to be undertaken, though unsuccessfully, by M. Calpurnius Bibulus, the consular colleague of Caesar in 59. It may be assumed that the result for the unassigned consulship was close since Numidicus had been a popular figure in Rome after his return from Numidia. However, Marius' more recent fame carried the day, particularly if he was active on behalf of L. Valerius Flaccus. And as Plutarch says (Mar. 28.6), never before had the citizen body entrusted so many consulships to one man in such a short space of time. Marius' achievement was without question unparalleled.

Conclusion

Marius' stature as a general and a strategist has to a large extent been the product of a rather simplistic conception of history, perceived in antiquity to be dependent on the individual exploits of great men. The literary source material for a study of this stage of Marius' career, primarily the works of Sallust and Plutarch, tended to ignore the equally important role he played in the internal affairs of Rome, especially between 108 and 100. In denying political ability to Marius, who was portrayed for various specific reasons either as a hero or as a villain, ancient writers have bequeathed an image which is very far from complete, and which has remained, if not quite a standard representation, a commonplace in modern studies. Indeed, Roman republican history has until recently been dominated by the examination of senatorial generals triumphant in expansionist wars at a time of imperial growth. In this chapter I have therefore presented Marius' consular career in the context of republican political life and, while not excluding his concerns for a reform of the Roman army or his successes in warfare, have relegated these and other issues to a less prominent position where they probably belong.

The picture which seems to emerge shows that Marius was originally little different from his fellow senators but that, as often occurs in time of crisis, greatness was thrust upon the man who was able to make the most

125 The events leading up to the exile of Numidicus and the causes for the senatus consultum ultimum which led to the death of Saturninus and Glaucia more properly belong to the discussion in Chapter 3.

126 Plutarch, Mar. 28.6, mistakenly refers to a 'Corvinus Valerius' and actually means M. Valerius Maximus Corvus, cos. I 348, II 346, III 343, IV 335, V 300, VI 299, MRR 2.630; Valgiglio, Vita 132; Van Ooteghem, Caius Marius 236; Develin, Patterns 60; Practice 148.

127 See, above, my comments in the Prologue.
of the prevailing conditions. Considering the competitive nature of the elec­toral process, although Marius campaigned for the consulship at a later age than some politicians, his career was not especially retarded. His canvass for the highest magistracy in 108, however, was astute and calculating. The eventual success over the Numid­ian princeling Jugurtha was obviously not comparable to the splendid victories over Carthage and Macedonia of earlier Romans such as Scipio Africanus or Aemilius Paullus. However, like Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia, Marius’ triumph brought a much-needed boost to Roman self-confidence after a long series of disasters and, although the war had been merely a frustrating minor incident, it established his credentials as a general. By 105 he was evidently seen as the only senator capable of saving Rome and Italy from devastation at the hands of the Germanic tribes. A number of fortuitous events thus brought Marius to the forefront of public life in 104, and his re-election to a second consulship is not really that surprising. Thereafter he was not at the head of an expedition which pursued and put to flight a feared enemy, but of a command which was, for its greater part, a harmless and inactive frontier exercise. Three of Marius’ five iterated consulships saw no military action whatsoever, yet the voters continued to re-elect him consul with commendable consistency and loyalty until, in just two military engagements which occupied considerably less than two campaigning seasons, the danger from the Cimbri and Teutones was forever removed.

Marius’ election to his sixth consulship reveals his mastery of the political system. His resounding victory in the elections for 100 must surely also indicate, not that he had finally learned the tricks of his trade, but that he had always operated in this skilful fashion. The ancient writers who, until that stage in his career, had been more concerned with military events were now obliged to turn their attention to political affairs and with that change of emphasis provide a more accurate image of a man who was first and foremost a politician. The campaigns for his first and sixth consulships show the level of Marius’ political expertise. The consulships he acquired in between, in the sources a gift of the populus Romanus, must also have been acquired through his political judgement and sagacity. Throughout history, men who achieved great renown have been favoured with opportune situations and personal ambition in equal proportions, and they rose to the occasion offered them; Marius was no exception. He used to the utmost all the opportunities which fell his way and while no Roman republican politician would have done otherwise, that alone is sufficient to earn him universal admiration.