Chapter 9

Education and Southern Rhodesia's poor whites, 1890–1930

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A considerable percentage of children were receiving no education at all. It was exceedingly important in this country, where they had a black population and an inferior race side by side with them, that the white children should have some sort of education. They saw the results of the neglect of giving white children education in the Union at the present time. In the Union they had a considerable population known as poor whites — they were unemployed and unemployable. It was a penny wise and pound foolish policy for this country in any way to starve the education vote at present. They would only be laying up for themselves very great trouble in the future (B. I. Collings, MLC, 20 May 1914. Southern Rhodesia, Debates in the Legislative Council. First Session of the Sixth Council, 15th to 17th April, 4th to 26th May, 8th to 10th June and 5th to 22nd October, 1914, p. 455).

In 1897, the Administrator of Mashonaland bluntly outlined colonial policy for the region: "Where white man and black man had to live side by side, it was necessary for every government to ensure the supremacy of the former." To achieve this aim, successive Southern Rhodesian governments relied on armed force, white settler privilege in the occupational structure of the territory and a racially segregated educational system which greatly favoured whites. Difficulties encountered in the implementation of this educational policy soon gave rise to fears about the emergence of a large class of poor whites. These fears exerted increasingly powerful influences on the nature of the white settler educational system by 1930, when it was at long last possible to enforce compulsory attendance at school of all white children between seven and fifteen years of age. Largely as a result of the nature of this white settler educational system, it was necessary to impose constraints upon the education of blacks which retarded their social, political and economic progress.
Educational policy, 1890–1930

Thanks largely to the vigorous efforts made by the numerous Christian religious bodies that were encouraged by Rhodes to participate in the conquest and white settlement of Southern Rhodesia during the 1890s, remarkably swift progress was made in the establishment of schools for all races in the territory. Under the Education Ordinances of 1899 and 1903, state expenditure was channelled almost entirely to schools under the management of the religious bodies. White settler education received the lion’s share of state aid.3

Large contributions made by blacks to the public revenues of the territory promoted missionary criticism of the racial inequity of government expenditure on education. However, in 1901 the superintending Inspector of Schools, George Duthie, defended the policy on the grounds that the education of blacks in the territory had been 'much more looked after than the education of whites' largely as a result of philanthropic endowment, mainly by overseas benefactors. Consequently, although the government was not 'against educat­ing the natives', it felt obliged to do as much as it could to assist with the education of whites. This was considered to be particularly necessary if further white immigration and the development of the territory was to be encouraged.4 Of course, when overseas philanthropic benefaction of black education diminished particularly after the First World War, it became much clearer that white supremacism was the chief purpose of persistence with racially discriminatory public expenditure on education.

Racially differentiated curricula also functioned to serve the white supremacist aim. Schools for whites were expected to offer primary and secondary courses directed at university entrance. Schools for coloureds and Asians had to place less emphasis on the academic side and greater attention to practical subjects like needlework, sewing and carpentry. As for black pupils, the small minority of them in attendance at schools where whites gave instruction could obtain an almost complete primary education, although the government encouraged instruction in spoken rather than written English. These pupils were also required to receive at least two hours of industrial training daily. It was to be a 'simple' kind that could not result in competition with skilled white artisans, but which emphasised the inculcation of 'habits of discipline and cleanliness'. State aid was only granted to schools which fell into line with these expectations. The great majority of black pupils, however, attended single-teacher kraal schools where instruction by very elementarily educated black catechists was confined to the three R’s in the vernacular.5

In the first decade of the twentieth century news of the poor white problems of the Cape began prompting fears that, for want of adequate education, many
white settler children in Southern Rhodesia might become socially undesirable and politically dangerous. At that time only about 600 of the 1,406 white settler children aged between five and fifteen years attended schools. An important reason for this situation was that private bodies could no longer cater for the educational needs of a white settler population that had begun to change rather rapidly in its nature at the turn of the century.

The rapidly changing nature of white settlement, 1890–1930

It became evident during the pioneer decade that Southern Rhodesia was not another Eldorado. Consequently, the Chartered Company (BSAC), anxious to obtain quick returns on its considerable investment, sold exclusive mineral concessions and extensive areas of land to large mining and development companies. When it became clear that these companies had acquired their assets mainly for speculative rather than development purposes, the BSAC began to pay greater attention to the stimulation of immigration of individual farmers, prospectors and small mining investors who were likely to get on with the job of exploiting the economic resources of the territory more rapidly.

Although the majority of white settlers resided in towns during the pioneer decade, the new impetus given to immigration at the turn of the century, but particularly after the South African War had ended, soon resulted in a much greater proportion of white settlement in rural areas. The number of whites working on the territory's scattered mines rose from 949 in 1904 to 2,255 in 1911. Similarly the white farmer population rose steadily. In 1897, only 250 farms were actually occupied. In 1904, the figure had risen to 900 farms and by 1914 to about 2,000.

By 1921 it was estimated that 27 per cent of the white working population was engaged in agriculture, whereas commerce accounted for 16 per cent, mining 15 per cent, railways and communications 12 per cent, public services 12 per cent, industry 11 per cent, commercial services 4 per cent and the professions 3 per cent.

Afrikaner 'apathy' about education

The proliferation of white settler children on distant, widely dispersed mines and farms, and the roving nature of the population during the early years of rural white settlement, led to low school attendance before 1905. However, there were also special reasons why in these early and even in subsequent years, Afrikaners were conspicuous amongst those who either failed to attend school at all or did so only very briefly. Although Afrikaners never constituted
much more than 20 per cent of the white populace, and probably less than this at the turn of the century, they usually came to the territory in large family units and with generally more children than settlers of British stock. More importantly, many Afrikaners, but particularly those who trekked to the territory during the pioneer decade to acquire farms at virtually no cost, were Trekboers, frontier folk, who placed very little value on the formal education of their children.

Described by Duthie in 1904 as being 'far from industrious and ... content to subsist on mealies and game', the Trekboers felt that the acquisition of sufficient knowledge of Dutch required for confirmation in the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) and elementary literacy in die taal (Afrikaans) sufficed for the educational needs of their children. Fiercely independent in their outlook, Trekboers feared that too much formal education might inspire their children with yearnings for a town rather than a farming life. Moreover, school attendance prevented the utilisation of child labour on family farms, particularly when adult males were engaged in transport riding in order to raise a bit of money.

In 1895 the Rev. P. A. Strasheim, a Predikant acting on behalf of the Cape Synod of the DRC, with the encouragement of Sir Cecil J. Rhodes made an agreement with Dr (later Sir) Leander Starr Jameson whereby the BSAC offered grants towards the salaries of teachers and building costs for schools conducted by the DRC. This agreement lapsed in 1902, when DRC schools were expected to conform with other bodies for state aid under the Education Ordinance, 1899. However, even before this happened, attendance at the DRC schools was all too often brief and far from universal. Matters were aggravated by the advent of the South African War and a requirement under the Education Ordinance that English should be the sole medium of instruction in state-aided schools. This requirement was retained under the Education Ordinance, 1903, because white settlers felt that they formed an essentially 'English community and as such should be assisted'. Indicative of Afrikaner resentment of this was the fact that in 1906 only one of the five schools under DRC direction in the territory qualified for state aid. In the others, Afrikaans was the medium of instruction. However, many Afrikaner children also failed to attend school at all, simply because of the 'deplorable apathy of parents, especially in the case of farmers of Dutch origin'.

Mindful of how the poor white problem was being dealt with at the Cape and keen to create conditions likely to stimulate white farmer immigration, the BSAC decided in 1906 to introduce a system of farm and mine primary schools. The government appointed and paid the salary of a teacher wherever parents provided him or her with suitable board and lodging for rental, erected a schoolroom and gathered together a minimum number of ten
fee-paying pupils. English was retained as the sole medium of instruction in these schools, a requirement that the Resident Commissioner, after consultation with the High Commissioner for South Africa, Lord Selborne, regarded as 'absolutely essential', for Afrikaner children spoke only die taal at home, so would otherwise be 'handicapped for life' if they did not learn the official language of the country at school. However, the Resident Commissioner also recommended that any inducement that might have the effect of persuading Afrikaners to accept this view of the matter was 'evidently desirable'. Various inducements, such as some Dutch-medium instruction and school fee remission, were offered to encourage DRC schools to come into the government system. By 1911, all DRC schools had joined the government farm and mine system.16

White settler agitation and educational progress, 1906–1914

It was not so much the plight of the rural uneducated but the nature of educational facilities in towns that engaged the closest attentions of the majority of white settlers in 1906. Of special importance in this regard was growing dissatisfaction with continued reliance upon mainly religious bodies for the voluntary establishment and conduct of schools for whites.

In Bulawayo, the Roman Catholics and Anglican Church authorities shared a virtual monopoly of primary and secondary school provision. American and Wesleyan Methodists respectively enjoyed similar positions in Umtali. There was a government school for whites in Salisbury, but many parents objected to it because it was co-educational, had an unfortunate history of unsuitable teacher appointments, and gave free tuition to pupils of inferior social status.

White Rhodesians also complained of declining government expenditure on education in the post South African War depression (1906). Agitation for reform originated in Bulawayo but soon spread to other main centres. An education committee representing the main centres argued that prolonged failure by the BSAC administration to rectify matters warranted Imperial government intervention. Eventually, the Legislative Assembly decided to appoint a public committee of enquiry into white settler education. In the meantime Alfred Beit, financier and close friend of Rhodes, had died, leaving a large endowment to white settler education.17

Government accepted the 1908 recommendations of the Committee of Enquiry to transform education from a voluntary to a state system. With better funding, intervention rapidly achieved results. By 1911 only 935 of the 2 262 white children between seven and fourteen years of age failed to attend
school, a situation that compared favourably with the one that had arisen when reforms were demanded in 1906. However, a variety of difficulties soon strengthened rather than weakened fears that, for want of adequate education, a large class of poor whites might soon emerge in the territory. Most importantly, anxieties were to be aroused by rapidly increasing numbers of blacks in attendance at mission schools.

After the suppression of the Ndebele-Shona risings (1896-1897), blacks began to attend mission schools in steadily increasing numbers. By 1914, when over 21,000 black but only 3,000 whites attended schools, the fact that many white settler children still grew up with little or no education at all became a special cause for concern. It was considered to be a matter of the ‘highest importance’ that all white settler children, ‘brought up as they were, in the midst of uncivilized natives, should have the best possible education’. Whites could retain power only ‘by maintaining the distance ahead which divided them from the native races’.

In 1913 Duthie found it particularly deplorable that even in Salisbury, where there was no excuse for non-attendance at school, there were children who could ‘hardly avoid the ultimate destiny of adding to the criminal classes’. In one such instance a white girl was ‘daily employed along with natives’ by her parents. In another case, Duthie suspected that the parents lived on the immoral earnings of their daughter. But the problem was most pronounced in rural areas where Duthie knew of white girls ‘clad more or less like natives’ and ‘quite at home amongst them. Uneducated whites, Duthie lamented, ‘tended rapidly to the status of the native’ which was ‘not good for the white race or the future of Rhodesia’ and hindered quests for ‘a solution to the difficult native problem’.

By 1914 government was responding more purposefully to the perceived need for a state-controlled education system. All voluntary schools, except for four Roman Catholic schools (three of which were state-aided), were either taken over or closed down. Government schools increased in number to 58 in 1914. Over half of these were farm or mine schools.

Rural white settler agitation for reform and compulsory education

By 1914, in the context of growing anxieties about the capacity of white settlers to maintain their supremacy, particularly in the face of increasingly positive black responses to mission education, the BSAC and settler leaders were in agreement about the vital need to introduce compulsory education as quickly as possible. However, there were two major impediments to the immediate
achievement of this objective. The British majority of farmers baulked at compulsory education because of dissatisfaction with the existing structure of the white settler educational system and the Afrikaner minority of farmers became increasingly averse to the anglicising influences of government schools.

The British farmers wanted their children to have the 'best possible' education, but the quality of instruction given in the small, usually single-teacher farm and mine schools rarely matched what was offered by their larger urban counterparts. There was also a rapid turnover of farm and mine school teachers, mainly because they were usually single women who soon married and gave up teaching. Well qualified teachers prepared to face the rigours of rural life were hard to find. Afrikaner farm life was often particularly primitive, to the extent that one school mistress complained of having to subsist on only 'dry bread, biltong and coffee'.

Farmers were particularly disadvantaged with regard to secondary education. Many of them were struggling to establish themselves and were financially far less well-off than the majority of white settlers resident in towns. This meant that it was often impossible for farmers, even with state aid, to undertake the relatively heavy expenditure on travel and boarding costs necessary to send their children to the centralised high schools. Consequently, it was observed in the Legislative Assembly in 1915 that if 'the younger sons of well-to-do families and men of Public School education' were to be attracted to the territory as farmers, they should not have to face the tragedy of seeing their children 'growing up in ignorance'; a tragedy all the 'greater' in the case of 'a public school man'.

The Administrator of Rhodesia, W. H. (later Sir William) Milton, was not always very sympathetic to the high educational aspirations of rural parents. His own children attended expensive English public schools. He castigated government expenditure on boarding grants to assist rural white pupils to attend high schools as 'excrescences on national education'.

**Origins of Afrikaner nationalist opposition to the state system of schools**

Although Afrikaners constituted a minority in rural areas, they nevertheless contributed to the rapid increase in white settlement after the turn of the century. Consequently, in 1920, when Afrikaners retained majorities in the Melsetter, Chipinga and Enkeldoorn constituencies, they also formed large minorities in the rural Marandellas, Salisbury, Victoria and Western District constituencies. The substantial increase in the numbers of children attending
school by 1911 resulted largely from the success of efforts made by the government to induce Afrikaners to participate in the farm and mine school system from 1906 onwards. However, Afrikaners were again conspicuous when the numbers of children who failed to attend school began to rise again after 1911. An explanation for this deterioration in the situation can be found largely in the relaxation of strictures imposed upon Afrikaner immigration and influences exerted in the territory by Afrikaner nationalists from South Africa.27

By 1914, the fact that many of the Afrikaner children tended to receive little or no education at all gave rise to fears about more than merely the emergence of a large class of poor whites. With reference to the Afrikaner nationalist rebellion of that year in South Africa, the warning was given in the Legislative Assembly that 'a large proportion of the future white settler population of Southern Rhodesia might be supplied by those very people who, through ignorance and misleading', had been persuaded to take part in that rebellion.28

The direct influence of South African Afrikaner nationalist agitation in Southern Rhodesia would appear to have begun when the future Nationalist Party premier, Dr D. F. Malan, visited the territory in 1911. When he returned to the Cape he published criticism of allegedly widespread neglect of Dutch instruction in Southern Rhodesia to the extent that most Afrikaner children were growing up without any knowledge of the official language of their church. In July 1913, the Rev. C. R. Kotze, who had recently left the Cape to take up the post of DRC Predikant in Salisbury, led Afrikaner delegates from Melsetter, Umtali, Felixburg, Headlands, Somabula, Marandellas, Bulawayo, Salisbury and the Charter District, to present the Administrator, Milton, with petitions that they had gathered. They demanded the use of the mother tongue as the medium of instruction in schools, the teaching of Dutch in the ordinary curriculum, and local control of schools by parental committees with full powers of appointing teachers. Rejection of these demands prompted Kotze to embark upon the establishment in the territory of a separatist system of schools of the kind favoured by the Christian National movement in South Africa. Pending the establishment of separatist schools in some areas, some parents did not send their children to school at all.29

**The Education Commission, 1917**

Growing anxiety about problems affecting white settler education was revealed at the biennial conferences of the Rhodesia Agricultural Union, and in prolonged Legislative Assembly debates on education in 1914 and particularly in 1915. Eventually, the government commissioned a second public enquiry into white settler education in 1916, whose main concern was the fact that over
a third of white settler children between seven and fourteen years of age failed to attend school. The commissioners had to ask whether primary education should be made compulsory, and if so, how this should be implemented, particularly with regard to costs and the special difficulties of parents in rural areas.\textsuperscript{30} The commissioners recommended that compulsory education should apply to all white settler children between seven and fifteen years of age, for only by ‘the education of all [white] children within the territory’ could ‘the present danger be averted of a large number of poor whites growing up uneducated’.\textsuperscript{31} However, it was felt that fees should continue to be charged, except in necessitous cases, for the majority of white settlers, most of them resident in towns, could easily afford to pay them. Small as the total contribution of fees was to the cost of white settler education, they helped to maximise funds available for expansion.

Special recommendations for the improvement of rural educational facilities included increases in the number of boarding schools in smaller centres of settlement, better salaries for farm and mine school teachers, insistence upon improvements in their living conditions, and where insufficient numbers could be assembled for farm and mine schools, the appointment of governesses by the government for the instruction of small numbers of very young children in their own homes.\textsuperscript{32}

Action on recommendations made by the commissioners was confined largely to the appointment of governesses. Compulsory education could not be adopted mainly because of unexpectedly strong Afrikaner nationalist opposition to the government system of schools and the inability of the government to raise funds necessary to build additional classrooms and hostels. By 1923 both of these obstacles were in large measure removed, but it is necessary to closely examine what happened between 1914 and 1923 because prolonged obstruction of educational efforts to avert the creation of a large class of poor whites resulted in important changes in white settler attitudes to education.

**Afrikaner nationalist opposition to the state system of schools, 1914–1922**

Kotze relied heavily on Afrikaner nationalists in South Africa for financial support and teacher supplies, but this source was greatly reduced after the failure of the South African rebellion of 1914. Only a handful of rather small separatist schools had been established in various remote parts of Southern Rhodesia when the education commissioners confidently reported in 1916 that the separatist movement would soon collapse completely. However, a visit to
the territory by another South African Afrikaner nationalist leader, the Rev. P. S. van Heerden of the Orange Free State, was followed by a vigorous revival of the separatist movement in 1917. By 1921 eight separatist schools catered for 240 pupils. The largest school was in Salisbury, where 100 pupils were enrolled, 40 of them boarders. Some pupils defected from government schools, as did at least one teacher. In Melsetter, where a local Predikant was a particularly ardent supporter of the separatists, defections from local government schools eventually led to the closure of the government school hostel in 1922. By then, however, financial difficulties and an undertaking that Afrikaans would soon be taught in all government schools tended to weaken the separatist cause.

Certain prominent Afrikaner leaders, notably the Rev. Liebenberg of Enkeldoorn and Louw of Morgenster Mission, always remained steadfast in their co-operation with the government in white settler educational affairs. Another influential leader, the Rev. A. J. Botha, who was in charge of the DRC orphanage which he had transferred from Bulawayo to Daisyfield in 1915, wavered in his allegiances. To help retain his loyalty the Department of Education invited him to assist with the experimental teaching of Afrikaans at the government school attended by the orphans in 1919. In 1921 Afrikaans replaced Dutch, which had been accepted as an alternative to French in the normal school curriculum of government schools in 1918.

In 1921 the separatists appealed as far afield as Holland for financial aid. This alarmed the Colonial Secretary, Churchill, who had succeeded Milner in that year. Evidently he feared that they might prejudice his and Smuts’s plans for the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia with South Africa. A number of Southern Rhodesian Afrikaners were likely to share in such trepidation. On the eve of the Referendum in 1922 the separatists agreed, after some months of negotiations, to let the government assume responsibility for their schools in the following year. The agreement included an undertaking by government to retain the services of the separatist schools teachers and hostel matron, who wished to remain at their posts.

Financial obstructions to the introduction of compulsory education for whites

Lack of funds was the major obstacle to the implementation of compulsory education in 1917. Legal difficulties continued to prevent the full use of the Beit bequest until 1922. Normally, the BSAC might have assisted with building loans, as it did in 1910, but it baulked at doing so after 1915 because of a dispute with white settlers over the ownership of unalienated land in the
territory. When a judicial committee declared in favour of Crown ownership of the land in 1918, the company felt even less generously disposed towards the settlers.\(^{37}\) Consequently, a policy of persuasion instead of compulsion was adopted. Large increases in public expenditure from the annual revenues catered for the expansion that resulted from this policy and the influx of white settler children after the end of the First World War. However, the reservation of many skilled occupations for only a limited number of white settler artisans aggravated difficulties by greatly inflating building costs. Indeed, inability to erect a sufficient number of buildings during and shortly after the war meant that the Department of Education had to hire private premises, mainly for additional hostel accommodation at the high schools in Bulawayo and Salisbury.

As a result of special pleas made by elected members of the Legislative Assembly early in 1920 the Colonial Secretary recommended that the Imperial government should break with colonial policy precedent by authorising the granting of loans for public building needs in Southern Rhodesia, which would be repaid after the advent of responsible government in 1923. When Churchill succeeded Milner in 1921, he delayed granting these loans in order to sharpen white settler awareness of the financial advantages likely to be derived from Union with South Africa. Only when Churchill was made fully aware of the difficulties faced by many white settlers, and particularly the struggling farmers, as a result of economic recession in the early 1920s and stagnation in the development of public amenities generally, did he finally relent. Consequently, the ‘Milner loans’ were not utilised before 1922, when the lion’s share of their first instalment was devoted to the erection of mainly white settler school buildings and the provision of costly teaching equipment.\(^ {38}\)

The Milner loans and cessation of active Afrikaner nationalist opposition allowed the white settler system of schools to enjoy unprecedented progress from 1922 onwards. By 1928, only 591 of the 8,647 white settler children between six and fifteen years of age failed to attend school.\(^ {39}\) However, anxieties arising from prolonged inability to deal effectively with the problem of inadequate school enrolments from 1914 onwards would appear to have exercised important influences on white settler educational policy and attitudes. The animosities between Boers and Britons, which had so strongly informed policy before 1914, tended to diminish in strength, mainly as a result of sharpened white settler perceptions of their collective interests in the racial context.
Anxieties about poor whites and trends towards the creation of an egalitarian system of white schools

An important element in changing white settler attitudes to education was the fact that the majority of them were socially ‘on a fairly general level’ and financially ‘in medium circumstances’. Really poor whites were found mainly in rural areas, particularly amongst Afrikaners. Although many white farmers of British stock could be counted amongst the ranks of the rural poor, they usually had more positive attitudes to education than did their Afrikaner counterparts in general. These struggling, rather than poor, white farmers had largely accounted for the rising tide of dissatisfaction that led to the public enquiry into white settler education in 1916. Their plight subsequently did much to prompt egalitarian trends amongst white settlers.

The struggling farmers were often prepared to make considerable sacrifices in order to send their children to the distant high schools. However, they strongly resented the ‘stigma of pauperism’ associated with the declarations of poverty that had to be made, usually before local magistrates, in order to qualify for the award of boarding grants and remission of tuition fees. Also, there arose a growing resentment amongst settlers in town and country alike of the ‘invidious distinction’ made between free and fee-paying schools in Bulawayo and Salisbury.

Poverty amongst white settlers became particularly acute after the First World War when the territory was afflicted by the influenza pandemic (1919), drought and economic recession. Farmers were particularly hard hit. Many of them resorted to the indignity of signing ‘promissory notes’ in lieu of fee payments in order to avoid the premature withdrawal of their children from boarding schools. Pupils at these schools often had only tattered clothes on a scale that sometimes necessitated the special employment of seamstresses to supplement the duties of hostel matrons. It was not the sunshine but poverty that promoted some white pupils to go shoeless to school.

The advent of war and the influenza pandemic certainly helped to draw the small white settler community closer together, but white settler egalitarian trends were even more strongly promoted by consciousness of a privileged status amidst a vast majority of blacks. Prolonged difficulty affecting white settler education tended to arouse extreme aspirations in the racial context. It began to be felt that white settler children should not merely receive the ‘best possible education’, but that this should be ‘at least in every case’ superior to that received by the ‘inferior race’. Schools should help to mould ‘the peoples of Rhodesia into one united race’, but in doing so, aim at the development of ‘a good type of child’. Such children should not rely on ‘a purely artificial’
Egalitarian trends amongst white settlers of British stock soon had to embrace the by no means insignificant minority of Afrikaners. If dominance in the territory by the white racial minority was to be sustained, class and ethnic divisions would also have to be removed with regard to the educational opportunities of Afrikaner children. The Afrikaners could not realistically expect acceptance of bilingualism and Christian National principles of education in a community of predominantly British settlers. Even so, government inflexibility on the language question provided ample opportunity for South African Afrikaner nationalist exploitation of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Persistence of Afrikaner dissidence after the war rendered recognition of the need for rapprochement between Boers and Britons in the territory increasingly evident. Afrikaners who had always been loyal to the government undoubtedly facilitated this rapprochement by winning the confidence and respect of white settler leaders.

In the end only compulsory and free education could overcome the intrinsigence of a small number of usually poor but stubbornly backward Afrikaners who could not be persuaded, even by their own DRC ministers, to have their children properly educated. In 1921 a case involving two Afrikaner girls aged twelve and fifteen years who were found guilty of sexually seducing blacks underlined what was perhaps the most compelling reason why the formal education of all Afrikaner children had become a matter of supreme importance in the eyes of white settler leaders by 1930. The girls did not attend school and their parents were admonished from the bench as follows:

Mr Justice Tredgold ... remarked that the cases were the most scandalous he had heard during the course of his career as an advocate. ‘You people,’ he said, ‘by the way you neglect your children, not only disgrace your race [sic] but bring the whole of the white people into disrepute. Two cases have been dealt with of attempted rape on white women, and I am confident that the cases are connected. If girls allow themselves to go with Kaffirs, then Kaffirs will try to take advantage of other White girls.’

**Poor whites and curriculum development in white settler education**

Educational strategies for the prevention of the emergence of a large class of poor whites were for long confined almost entirely to securing better attend-
ance at schools. It became evident, however, that a mere primary school education could hardly suffice in a situation where there was little or no scope 'for the white labourer as such as there was in other countries'. After the turn of the century uneducated Trekboers could no longer freely acquire farms, and cheap black labour quickly replaced white labour in all spheres of menial employment. With few exceptions, notably where railway workshops engaged a small number of apprentices, white youngsters who left school after learning little more than the three R's had little opportunity to obtain on-the-job training. Most of these youngsters had attended farm and mine schools, but hardly any farmers could afford to take them on as learner-assistants. Consequently, it was recommended by Duthie in 1914 that the government should establish farm and trade schools for the post-primary vocational training of rural white youngsters.

The First World War and financial stringency prevented the implementation of the farm and trade school scheme before 1922. In that year the Primary School of Agriculture was established on the Matopos Estate bequeathed to the nation by Rhodes. The school aimed to provide at small cost to poorer rural parents a practical training for a 'civilized life' and 'earning a living on the land' for youths from farm and mine schools. A second farm and trade school was founded by the DRC orphanage authorities at Daisyfield in 1924. The Matopos school closed down in 1930, mainly because the introduction of compulsory education in that year meant that free tuition could now be obtained at the more prestigious high schools. The DRC school eventually developed into a private high school for Afrikaners who favoured the education of their children under DRC influences.

More sophisticated vocational training was offered at the Technical High School established in Bulawayo by the government in 1927. The school was intended for pupils unsuited to the academic education given at ordinary high schools where, with the exception of certain commercial subjects, the curriculum was restricted to English, French or Afrikaans, Latin, Geography, History, Mathematics and the General Sciences. Evening classes were also offered at the Technical High School for the large number of pupils who left high schools prematurely to take up 'dead end occupations' as clerks, shop assistants and the like. It was lamented in 1925 that many of these 'untrained youngsters [were] able to command very considerable salaries and in consequence they [did] not see the need for binding themselves down to work hard at nights'. In this regard, matters were evidently rectified to some extent, at least in Bulawayo, for by 1930 there were 250 pupils in attendance at the Technical High School evening classes. However, only 100 pupils were in daily attendance at the school.
Egalitarian trends tended to have adverse effects on efforts made to broaden the scope of the curriculum. Many parents were averse to the low level of training that was offered at the Primary School of Agriculture and were sensitive even to the association of the institution's name with the Bulawayo Primary, or free, school. For similar reasons, the Technical School in Bulawayo was poorly attended. Parents were wary of premature vocational training and feared that the general educational value of the school would be inferior to what was imparted at the ordinary high schools. As members of the white settler aristocratic elite, parents tended to be strongly prejudiced in favour of the high schools that had for long been held in great esteem. Many parents were unwilling to believe that their children might not be suited to the academic curriculum offered in the schools. However, for many years very few pupils remained long enough at the schools to sit for the South African matriculation examinations. Among the reasons were the lack of aptitude and ability of pupils, the financial straits of parents and the ease with which white youngsters could obtain well paid jobs even without completing their secondary education. The performances of those who did sit for the examinations was not always very good. In 1928, for instance, only 25 of the 52 candidates were awarded certificates.50

The 1929 Education Commission

Of course, mere attendance at primary schools of virtually all white settler children went only part of the way towards averting the emergence of a large class of poor whites. Mere attendance at high schools by many pupils who failed to obtain certificates hardly augured well for the future of white supremacy in the territory. Growing concern about needs to maximise the effectiveness of white settler education and the large sum of money now available for expenditure upon it, prompted a decision to appoint yet another public enquiry. Under the Chairmanship of an eminent educationist of international repute, Frank Tate, the Education Commission of 1929 was concerned mainly with the curriculum and general nature of white settler education instead of the ways and means of ensuring that all children attended schools. Indeed, in the words of a Southern Rhodesian MP, the Tate Commission enquired into what was 'perhaps the most important question ever considered in [the] country, namely the education of future citizens, legislators, and even ... the future Premier'.51

The Tate Commission strongly criticised the academic bias and recommended the establishment of a decentralised system of junior high schools where special attention should be given to the individual aptitudes of pupils and local needs. However, the decentralised system of primary and secondary schools
advocated in 1916 had already begun to make way for a more equitable distribution of educational facilities between town and country. Despite efforts made to widen the scope of the curriculum in these schools, parental pressure and preference tended to restrict it to rather narrowly academic lines. Moreover, the very high standard of white settler education that was to be a much vaunted feature of later years developed slowly. Favourable climatic conditions, the nature of white rule, particularly with regard to leisure time afforded by domestic servants, and the recruitment of teachers from English public schools, meant that athleticism, the attractions of outdoor life in the wilds and militarism in the form of compulsory cadet corps training distracted attention from studies and the pursuit of academic excellence. Whites were often slow to heed the words of their premier, Huggins: 'I... admit that although our youth may be able to play Ruby Football and to preserve their white skins with rifles and differential legislation ... if they survive, it will be nothing except by superior education.'

The key to success: black education and the poor white problem in the 1920s

It was not the creation of a particularly superior system of white settler schools so much as the retardation of progress in the education of blacks that most effectively helped to prevent the emergence of a large class of poor whites in Southern Rhodesia. In 1920 it was asserted in the Legislative Assembly that:

They had heard a great deal of race supremacy, and the only means they had of retaining race supremacy was not by keeping the native in ignorance, but by efficiently educating the white. (Hear, hear.) They could not afford to leave that great asset, the native, undeveloped, and certainly, they could not afford to allow that great asset, the white child, to remain undeveloped in such a way that he was not able to maintain the directive power ... He had never heard it contradicted that there were 30 per cent of white children who were illiterate. Under these conditions they had no claim to call themselves a civilised country.

For long, as Huggins had lamented, whites were not 'efficiently' educated. Indeed, only the protection afforded by such measures as land apportionment and job reservation saved many whites of average and below average abilities from having to compete for their livelihoods on equal terms with blacks. In the 1920s an educational policy was to be devised for blacks that, in essence, had the effect of 'keeping the native in ignorance', and thereby greatly serving the purpose of those other racially discriminatory measures that helped to entrench white settler power and privilege. Indeed, implementation of the new
policy of the education of blacks by 1930 was to have the effect of greatly delaying the emergence of skilled and well-educated blacks in sufficient numbers likely to threaten white settler dominance. It is necessary to consider this new policy on the education of blacks in some detail, for, although it greatly assisted with the prevention of the emergence of a large class of poor whites in Southern Rhodesia, its formulation and implementation was as much the responsibility of the Imperial government and Anglo-American missionary and philanthropic bodies as it was the result of any white settler and Southern Rhodesian government initiatives.

Policy on the education of blacks in southern Rhodesia was for long undertaken entirely by Christian missionaries along lines that loosely conformed with what Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth had advocated on behalf of the Imperial government in 1847 in his memorandum entitled ‘Practical suggestions as to day schools of industry, model farm schools and normal farm schools, for coloured races of the British colonies’. Inter-denominational competition for black converts, and limited missionary resources for the establishment of large, mainly white-staffed normal and industrial training centres of the kind advocated by Shuttleworth, resulted instead in a proliferation of small kraal schools. To raise standards in these humble schools, the Department of Education encouraged missionary teacher education centres, mainly by means of increased state aid between 1903 and 1921.

However, by 1914, the Department of Native Affairs had become particularly alarmed by fears that the widely dispersed, weakly supervised proliferation of kraal schools might all too easily allow for the dissemination of subversive ideas. Rapid progress in teacher education, it was feared, would soon create a class of potentially troublesome black intellectuals. The Chief Native Commissioner, H. (later Sir Herbert) Taylor, felt that kraal schools should be reduced in number and that greater emphasis should be placed on the establishment of well-equipped industrial training centres for the stimulation of economic, and particularly agricultural, development in native reserves. The Director of Education, L. M. Foggin, strongly opposed this policy. He felt that the kraal schools constituted a vital element in the sound development of a universal educational system for blacks. Foggin also believed that emphasis on industrial training instead of teacher education constituted confusion between educational and general economic development.

The policy favoured by Taylor began to prevail by 1920, mainly because it conformed with Imperial government views on how to handle race relations in Southern Africa. Very influential in this regard was the Director of Native Education in Natal, Dr C. T. Loram. In his book The education of the South African native, published in 1917, Loram argued that blacks were a backward
race who needed special protection in the context of escalating racial friction. Loram opposed white 'repressionists' who wished simply to exploit blacks as cheap, unskilled labourers, and rejected as impractical and undesirable the view of 'equalists' who felt that well-educated blacks should be fully integrated with whites on a basis of racial equality. Instead, Loram favoured the views of 'segregationists' who believed that competition for jobs between whites and blacks should be minimised by trying to encourage blacks to develop gradually 'along their own lines' in native reserves.  

The reports of the Phelps-Stokes Commissions in 1922 and 1924, sponsored by American philanthropic bodies and keenly supported by the Imperial government and the International Missionary Conference, strongly endorsed racially segregated development in Africa. The Phelps-Stokesists, propagandist rather than investigative in their work, were mainly inspired by the apparent success of the late black leader Booker T. Washington in his promotion of racially differentiated education for separate development in the southern United States. The Phelps-Stokesists claimed that this should serve as the model for black African education and development.

A Native Commissioner and apostle of Phelps-Stokesism, H. S. Keigwin, spearheaded implementation of the policy on the African continent in 1920 by establishing the first government schools for blacks in Southern Rhodesia at Domboshawa. Industrial training based on the development of agriculture and traditional African craftsmanship rather than skilled artisan work and low-level instruction was undertaken at Domboshawa and at a similar centre founded by Keigwin at Tjolotjolo in 1921. The aim was to produce blacks capable of promoting schemes for the general economic and social development of recently re-constituted native reserves.

After official endorsement of Phelps-Stokesism by the Imperial government for adoption in all parts of British Tropical Africa in 1925, the policy was vigorously promoted in Southern Rhodesia. A keen Phelps-Stokesist, Harold Jowitt, was recruited from Natal to take charge of a newly created Department of Native Education in 1927. The proliferation of kraal schools was immediately curbed in favour of the establishment of industrial training centres. The training was on traditional lines for the promotion of development in native reserves, instead of skilled training likely to result in black competition with white artisans in towns. State aid to missionaries was devoted mainly to industrial training instead of raising literary standards in teacher education.

The trends towards white racial solidarity were greatly strengthened by the 'liberal' Anglo-American educational policy for the promotion of separate black development in native reserves. Phelps-Stokesism gave what amounted to an
international seal of approval for white racial privilege and power. Indeed, the widely applauded Chairman of the Phelps-Stokes Commissions, Dr Thomas Jesse Jones, even recommended that special efforts should be made to increase the rate of white settler population growth for the promotion of general progress under white settler control in Africa. Delayed black educational development, particularly after the introduction of Phelps-Stokesism from 1920 onwards, provided time for the rectification of matters with regard to the inadequate education of white settler children.63

Conclusion

An important consequence of locally devised educational strategies for the prevention of the emergence of a large class of poor whites in Southern Rhodesia is to be found in their contribution to white settler solidarity. The authoritarian basis of this solidarity and its contribution to the estrangement between the races greatly helps to explain the inclination and ability of Ian Smith and his Rhodesian Front government to command strong white settler support for defiance against the world in the 1960s. Ethnic solidarity was particularly significant. For a long time educational disputes of the kind that characterised tensions between Afrikaners and the state before 1920 tended to persist.64 However, by the 1950s, when Afrikaners shared in the general prosperity enjoyed by whites, particularly in the farming sector, and when Afrikaners had generally adopted more positive attitudes towards the formal education of their children, ethnic animosities began rapidly to subside. Whites in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa also began to acquire a closer identity of interests in the face of the rising tide of African nationalism and British government policies on the ‘winds of change.’ The Rhodesian Front government was more widely representative of all sections of white settler society, but Afrikaners were disproportionately well represented in Parliament.65

In addition to the white solidarity trend, niggardly government expenditure on the education of blacks can also largely be explained by prolonged fears about the emergence of a large class of poor whites in Southern Rhodesia. Although the adoption of Phelps-Stokesist policy in the 1920s involved a comparatively large increase in public expenditure on the education of blacks in the 1920s, the restrictive nature of this policy gave rise to little cause for concern amongst white settlers. However, the decision by Milner to depart from colonial policy precedent by offering Imperial government loans before the advent of responsible government would also appear to have partly explained white settler acceptance of increased expenditure on the education of blacks.
The adoption of Phelps-Stokesism was probably the most significant aspect of what happened in the period up to 1930. The policy undoubtedly provided ready relief with regard to problems arising from prolonged difficulties affecting white settler education. Even so, Phelps-Stokesism was informed as much by internationally prevalent white racial prejudices about blacks as it was by any particular local interest and concerns of whites in Southern Rhodesia. White settler educational problems and fears about poor whites, therefore, provided only an incidental explanation for the adoption and consequences of repressive policy on the education of blacks from 1920 onwards.

In 1938, Professor W. M. Macmillan warned with specific reference to increasingly well-informed black opinion and aspirations generally in Africa that it was 'dangerous political expediency to try to check the process of “detribalization,” or to even give the appearance of seeking to put the clock back'. However, this was precisely what the Phelps-Stokesists had been trying to do for nearly two decades in Southern Rhodesia and elsewhere in British Tropical Africa. By 1930 all white settler children were granted considerable opportunity to obtain the best possible educational preparation for whatever their choice of career might be. Under Phelps-Stokesism, on the other hand, the numbers of blacks in receipt of a formal education was, for a short while in the early thirties, actually reduced. At the same time, the curriculum in schools for blacks was confined to what whites considered to be most appropriate for the gradual and orderly process of blacks 'along their own lines'. Consequently, deliberate steps were taken to retard the development of secondary, technical and tertiary education for blacks. Ultimately, then, white education could not be separated from black education.
Introduction: The poor whites: a social force and a social problem in South African history

Chapter 1: The poor whites of Middelburg, Transvaal, 1900–1930: resistance, accommodation and class struggle

Some of the ideas expressed here were first included in a paper to the 1984 History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand. This version has benefited much from the perceptive comments of Rob Davies and Mike Morris for which I am most thankful.

4 State aid was given chiefly to big, progressive farmers. Helping the poorer, small farmer was only a secondary consideration. S. Marks and S. Trapido, 'Lord Milner and the South African state', History Workshop Journal, 8(1) 1979, pp. 68–72; R. Morrell, 'Competition and cooperation in Middelburg, 1900–1930', in W. Beinart, P. Delius and S. Trapido (eds), Putting a plough to the ground, Ravan, Johannesburg, 1986.

7 Bisschoff, ‘Die rol’, pp. 8–9, 22.


14 After the war burgher land settlements were established to put former ‘bywoners’ back on their feet, but were conspicuously unsuccessful in staunching the flow of poor whites to cities. Marks and Trapido, ‘Lord Milner’, p. 70.


22 Evidence to Unemployment Commission, 1920, p. 1141.

23 See V. Harris’s chapter in this volume.


26 There is a growing body of literature which shows that ‘wage labour was often the royal road to kulak rather than proletarian status’ (G. Clarence-Smith, ‘Thou shalt
not articulate modes of production', Canadian Journal of African Studies, 19(1), 1985, p. 21). William Beinart, for example, shows that wage labour was an option for those seeking to avoid full incorporation as workers in capitalist society. Wages earned in the capitalist sector were invested by rural dwellers in their agricultural production to prevent the complete severance of ties with the soil. (The Political Economy of Pondoland, Ravan, Johannesburg, 1982.)


29 There were few constraints on mobility either. Before 1900 only 5 per cent to 10 per cent of Mapochs Gronden residents owned more than two head of stock, and after the South African War, this percentage declined further. Since few owned land there were few bonds which tied people to any particular area.

30 The Middelburg Observer, 10 August 1923. As has often been observed, trekkers were normally poor and looking for a way out. they were not the rich investing venture capital (W. K. Hancock, 'Trek', Economic History Review, X(3), 1958, p. 334).

31 Central Archives Depot, Pretoria (CAD), Department of Lands (LDE), 7223/26, Official memo, 29 May 1926.

32 TAD, LD 1581/811/08. I would like to thank Albert Grundlingh for drawing my attention to this source.

33 LDE 7223/26, Lands Department memo, n/d (c. 1920).

34 Many seem to have settled for periods as short as a fortnight before moving on to avoid being caught. F. G. E. Nilant, Lagerdrift, NG Kerk-boekhandel, Pretoria, 1966, pp. 15–16; LDE 4174/12; LDE 4699/12.

35 See chapter by Tim Clynick, pp. 77, 85.


37 LDE 4174/101, De Lagersdrift Superintendent to Secretary of Lands, 22 February 1922. All translations are my own.


40 Stals, Afrikaners, 178. For an impressive account of the Afrikaans working class in Johannesburg, see Van Onselen, 'Main reef road'. The danger that Afrikaners believed poor whites posed is described by Deneys Reitz when referring to the influx of poor whites into his commando during the South African War. Describing
them as people of 'inferior quality', he said 'their presence among us was a source of weakness rather than strength'. Patterson, Last trek, p. 139.


43 Evidence of R. Colson, Acting Assistant Resident Magistrate, Belfast, TG 13–08, p. 362.

44 Nilant, Lagersdrift, pp. 20–21.


48 I have been unable to find evidence of the 'earlier trouble' referred to. UG 42–16, p. 275; Commissioner of the South African Police (SAP) Vol. 1/1/23, Conf. 6/245/14/280, A. Maitland to District Commandant, 29 December 1914; Statement by P. F. J. Steenkamp, 3 January 1915; Statement by S. C. J. Vermaak, 5 January 1915; A. Maitland to District Commandant, 14 January 1915.


51 See John Bottomley's chapter, p. 32.

52 It should be noted that even those burghers who eventually engaged in combat with the rebels had ambivalent feelings. It is recorded that some of the commandos contemplated arresting Botha and Smuts while in some districts commando members fraternised with the rebels. B. Hirson, J. Wells, and J. Jancovich, 'Whatever did happen at Jagersfontein or Diamonds are forever – but gold is for now!', unpublished paper, History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand, 1987, pp. 17–18.

53 Rosenthal, General de Wet, pp. 159–160; Stals, Afrikaners, p. 105.

54 Yudelman, Emergence, p. 83.


58 LDE 4666, SNC Driver to NC Nylstroom, 15 July 1909.


60 Whites had worked for blacks in Middelburg for a long time and as late as 1920 some were still ploughing for Africans. The practice of illegal liquor selling by poor whites to Africans was also very common and regarded as a major ‘evil’ (Evidence of B. P. Dodd, UG 32–18, pp. 17, 188, 213; Evidence of P. Bothma to Unemployment Commission, 1920, p. 1145; Cillie, ‘Mapochs Gronden’, p. 76). During the South African War there was substantial black/white military co-operation and Albert Grundlingh has suggested that the rebels of 1914 attempted to recruit black assistance from Lesotho as well (Personal communication; P. Warwick, *Black people and the South African War*, Ravan, Johannesburg, 1983).


63 See, for example, competition for wood. LDE, 53/238, J. C. van Ganswijk to Secretary of Lands, 18 April 1919.

64 Grosskopf, *Rural impoverishment*, p. 168. This is not a novel point and is made, for example, by M. Legassick, ‘Gold, agriculture and secondary industry in South Africa, 1885–1970: from periphery to sub-metropole as a forced labour system’, in
R. Palmer and N. Parsons (eds), *The roots of rural poverty*, Heinemann, London, 1977, p. 178. Stanley Greenberg identifies 'verswarting' as a major point of concern for white 'bywoners', small landowners and labourers as late as the 1950s. He explains this as a result of the demand by white farmers for black, rather than white, labour and the willingness of the state to meet these labour demands. Indirectly, therefore, it was the state and big capitalist farmers who were really behind the threat to poor white agriculture (*Race and state in capitalist development*, Ravan, Johannesburg, 1980, p. 95).


66 Later on this included providing poor whites with railway and forest work, out of harm's way in the countryside. See chapters by Grundlingh and Pirie in this volume.


69 See Sue Parnell's chapter, pp. 117–118.

70 Movement into the reserves was monitored through the issue of trading and prospecting licences issued through the NAD. NTS 39/162, SNC Pokwani to NC Middelburg, 3 September 1909.

71 NTS 67/319, NAD memo, 17 April 1925; NTS 260/162, Detached Clerk to NC Middelburg, 6 December 1927; NTS 429/308, ANC Pokwani to NC Middelburg, 10 December 1928.


74 Hertzog’s speech, 17 December 1925, quoted in Moodie, *The rise*, pp. 82, 97.


76 The Police acknowledged this. JUS 387, 3/1208/24, District Commandant’s report, 9 December 1924, p. 6.

77 JUS 368, 2/10/23; *The Middelburg Observer*, 30 July 1926.

78 NTS 530/308, Petition, 29 January 1927; JUS 551, 331/30, A. S. de Beer to Minister of Justice, 16 August 1928.


80 JUS 368, 3/10/23.

81 This is the argument of R. Davies, *Capital, state and white labour*.

82 *The Star*, 3 January 1921; *The Middelburg Observer*, 4 February 1921.
83 *The Middelburg Observer*, 30 January 1920. See also Bottomley’s chapter, p. 39.
87 LDE 4174/101, Superintendent of De Lagersdrift to Secretary of Lands, 22 February 1922; Nilant, *Lagersdrift*, p. 29.
88 The question of whether rural poor whites were in touch with urban poor whites is an open one. As Freund observes, such ties were common amongst the developing African working class and Hirson shows that migrant workers in South Africa did involve themselves in the struggles taking place in the rural areas from whence they had come. Elsabe Brink, however, cautions that white workers and the white unemployed appear to have made a much sharper break with their country brethren. Bill Freund, *The making of contemporary Africa*, Macmillan, London, 1984, p. 147; B. Hirson, ‘Rural revolt in South Africa: 1937–1951’, *Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries*, ICS Collected Seminar Papers, University of London, 8, 22, 1977; E. Brink, personal communication.
90 Rural support dwindled when rumours that the strike was a ‘Bolshevik plot’ began to circulate. Johnstone, *Class, race and gold*, p. 135.
91 CAD, Department of Agriculture (LDB), 1702/1, Vol. 3, Report by J. D. Kleynhans, 28 July 1930; Evidence of Rev. Burger and P. N. Ferreira to Unemployment Commission, 1920, pp. 1294, 1164.
93 *The Middelburg Observer*, 5 May 1922, 13 June 1924. The combined presence of class cleavages among rural whites and the perpetuation of the robust political traditions of the poorer strata is shown by Helen Bradford in her analysis of the white gangs who attacked the ICU offices in Greytown, Natal in 1928. She found that most were ‘poorer whites partially or completely proletarianised’. ‘Lynch law and labourers: the ICU in Umvoti, 1927–1928’ in Beinart et al., *Putting a plough*, p. 441.
and labourers: the ICU in Umvoti, 1927-1928' in Beinart et al., Putting a plough, p. 441.


95 From 1915 to 1929 the NP increased its support in the district from 43.5 per cent to 54.6 per cent of the electorate. B. M. Schoeman, Parlementêre verkieings in Suid-Afrika, 1910-1976, Pretoria, 1977.

96 Nilant, Lagersdrift, pp. 3-39.

97 This is not meant to suggest that the Pact supported Labour wholeheartedly. Both Davies and Yudelman have argued that the white working class was emasculated in this period. This chapter nevertheless does argue that the Pact assisted poor white cultivators and worked more in the interests of the white poor than Yudelman and Davies are prepared to admit, though this is not to say that Pact solved the poor white problem. The solution came in the mid-1930s with accelerated industrialisation and white employment. See R. Morrell, 'The South African state in 1924', Transformation, 4, 1987.

98 Johnstone (Class, race and gold, p. 61) and Davies (Capital, state and white labour, pp. 227-228) agree on this.

99 This interpretation is supported by Parnell's figures on the rapid rise in the poor white population in Johannesburg between 1923 and 1933, p. 121. My argument is that employment opportunities in the cities got much better and attracted poor whites there though it is equally possible to argue that 'push' factors account for this rise.


101 These figures could be incomplete as many evictions may not have been recorded. Since they are all we have, these figures have to be used, but used cautiously. One noticeable feature is the fact that certain individuals were evicted time after time. N. J. Stols, for example, was evicted four times from 1921 to 1922. This kind of person would in all probability have constituted a member of the 'dangerous class'.

102 From 1918 to 1921, Middelburg's white population rose by 14 per cent. Much of this population located itself in Mapochs Gronden. Union Bureau of Census and Statistics Report, UG 15-23, p. 42; Hansard, 1926, col. 1418.

103 Davies estimates that 11 000 poor whites became land-owners under Pact. Capital, state and white labour, p. 227.

Poor whites did not entirely disappear. A white criminal element remained visible and isolated instances of defiance were still to be found. JUS 440, 1/82/28, Annual Report for 1928; LDE 4174, Vol. B, Advances to settlers of De Lagersdrift Labour Colony, c. September 1926, p. 5; LDE 4174/33, Secretary of De Lagersdrift to Secretary of Lands, 2 January 1926.

The Middelburg Observer, 21 March 1930, 20 April 1928; State aid did not transform poor whites into the intended models of agricultural productivity. As late as 1931 settlers were still seeking manual work to earn cash wages and evidence suggests that many of them found employment in the construction of Loskop Dam, Middelburg, in 1934.

LDE 12450/137, Draft Annual Report for Department of Lands, 1 April 1926 to 31 March 1927.

For a similar response in Pondoland, see Beinart, *Political economy*, p. 137. See also S. Gray, "Piet’s progress". Douglas Blackburn’s satire on capitalist penetration in the Transvaal in the 1890s, in Bozzoli, *Town and countryside*, p. 404.


Chapter 2: The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whiteism

1 The following is a loose and personal translation of the passage of Afrikaans poetry by 'anonymous' written in the early twentieth century in D. J. Opperman, Groot verseboek (Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1951), p. 26:

The locusts and the drought
are thick upon our land
and what will result
is beyond my comprehension

Money is also so scarce
and the coffee has become so expensive
The foreign banks rule us
and their 'interest' consumes like fire

This chapter is the condensed and reworked result of two earlier papers: John Bottomley, 'The Rebellion of 1914; the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whiteism'; paper presented to the African Studies Seminar, University of Witwatersrand, 1982, and 'Political resurgence in the Orange River Colony and the Brandfort Congress of 1904'; paper presented to History Workshop conference, University of Witwatersrand, 1987.


3 For the republican dimension of the rebellion see for instance J. D. Kestell, Christiaan de Wet (Cape Town, 1920); G. D. Scholtz, Die Rebellie, 1914–1915 (Johannesburg, 1924); J. C. G. Kemp, Die pad van die veroweraar (Cape Town, 1946); S. G. Maritz, My lewe en strewe (1939); C. H. Muller, Oorlogscherinneringe (Cape Town, 1936). The economic crisis of the 1890s in the Orange Free State is discussed in Timothy Keegan, 'Trade, accumulation and impoverishment: mercantile capital and the economic transformation of Lesotho and the Conquered Territory 1870–1920', Journal of Southern African Studies, 12, 2 (1986).


5 Transvaal Archives Depot (TAD): List of the Archives of the Central Judicial Commission (1903–1906), compiled by W. J. Retief and B. Kriek (1979) and Albert M. Grundlingh, Die 'Hendsoppers' en 'Joiners': die rasional en verskynsel van verraad (Pretoria, 1979). The greatest percentage of 'protected burghers',
'handsuppers' as opposed to 'joiners', came from the wealthy eastern districts along the Basutoland border and surrendered in an effort to protect their wealth.


9 The most recent reiteration of the traditional interpretation of the Rebellion is to be found in Trewella Cameron and S. B. Spies (eds), *An illustrated history of South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1986), chapter by S. B. Spies entitled 'Unity and disunity, 1910–1924', pp. 236–237. Spies acknowledges that the rebellion in the Free State was largely a northern phenomenon, without attempting to explain why this should have been so.

10 TAD, Smuts Papers, Merriman to Smuts, 20 December 1915, 190/101/1915 and 190/102/1915.


14 This trend and its cause were noted by the magistrate of Winburg in the census of 1918: 'With regard to the district of Winburg it is very noticeable that in the rich and fertile parts of the district the number of people to the square mile is half and even two-thirds less than on the western side of the district where land is cheap. Farmers paying [high prices] in better parts of the district cannot afford to keep bijwoners and these latter with their families have consequently moved elsewhere. The abnormal rise in the price of farmland with the consequential cutting up of farms has left no room for the bijwoner with his usually large family. It is interesting to note that in the year 1902 'there were 1,365 farms in the Winburg district which then included the district of Senekal. With a combined area of 1,651 miles less than in 1902 there were 1,555 farms and an additional 50 awaiting registration,' *Census of the European or white races of the Union of South Africa*, UG 56–1920, p. 20. See also *Third census of the European or white races of the Union of South Africa*, UG 37–1924, p. 41, which noted the same trend in the Kroonstad district: 'the number of farms owing to subdivision has increased by about 300. This has a tendency to eliminate the bywoners who with their usually large families generally move to urban areas.' Also Stanley Trapido, 'Landlord and tenant in a colonial economy: the Transvaal 1880–1910', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 5, 1 (1978) and Timothy Keegan, 'The restructuring of agrarian class relations in a colonial econo-

15 Select Committee on the Rebellion, SC 1–1915, p. 247.


21 Keegan, 'Dispossession and accumulation'.

22 UG 56–1920, p. 19.


25 *Ibid.*, p. 66. As the magistrate of Lichtenburg, one of these dry areas, noted in 1912: 'The cry “northwards” was manifesting itself', *Annual Report of the Justice Department for Calendar Year 1912*, UG 44–1913, p. 143.

26 UG 42–1916, p. 201.

27 Keegan, *Rural transformations*, p. 16.

28 Free State Archives Depot (FAD), reference 159/16/1, Van Riebeeckfees Collection, Frankfort: 'Die ontwikkeling van handel en nywerheid'.

29 *Ibid*.

30 FAD, DLS 142, file A4951. See also FAD, ORC CO 325, particularly reference 7616/03, and ORC CO 471 and ORC CO 475.

31 List of the *Archives of the Central Judicial Commission* (1903–1906).


33 General C. de Wet, a leader of the Rebellion in the Free State, frequently used labour grievances to garner support for the Rebellion. For example at a meeting at the Kopjes 'poor white' settlement of 22 October 1914, he 'referred to the question of the natives being allowed to roam about and not being controlled as they used to be controlled', SC 1–1915, p. 295.

34 Central Archives Depot, JUS 199, file 3/848/141, J. C. Juta, Magistrate of Lichtenburg, to Secretary of Justice, 25 August 1914, and JUS 199, file 3/844/14 J. de V. Roos, Secretary of Justice to J. C. Juta, 29 August 1914.

Chapter 3: ‘God het ons arm mense die houtjies gegee’: poor white woodcutters in the southern Cape forest area, c. 1900–1939

Abbreviations

CAD – Central Archives Depot, Pretoria
FOR – Department of Forestry Archives
LDE – Department of Lands Archives
SC – Select Committee
UOD – Unie Onderwys Departement Argiewe
UWL – University of the Witwatersrand Library

Notes

1 N. L. King, ‘The Knysna forests and the woodcutter problem’, Journal of the South African Forestry Association, 3, 1939, pp. 7–8; F. von Breitenbach, ‘Indigenous forests of the southern Cape’, Journal of the Botanical Society of South Africa, 58, 1972, pp. 34–36; A. Nimmo, The Knysna story, Cape Town, 1976, pp. 94–96. Whereas relatively little was written before the early eighties about the dynamics of the woodcutter community, the novelist Dalene Matthee has done much since to popularise the topic (Kringe in 'n bos, Cape Town, 1984; Fiela se kind, Cape Town, 1985; Moerbeibos, Cape Town, 1987). Her work reflects some sensitivity to the historical forces at work, but understandably, given her medium, these are not her main concerns.


4 UWL, AG 1280, Minutes of evidence before the Unemployment Commission of 1920, T. Searle, 3 December 1920, p. 2364.

5 De Kerkbode, 5 January 1922, ‘Het arme blanke vraagstuk in de ring van George’.

omic footnote to history, London, 1920, p. 99 for the approximate average wage in the area.

7 Cape Argus, 23 May 1922, 'Gen. Smuts on the Budget Debate' (newspaper cutting in CAD, FOR 187/310). See also CAD, FOR 187/310, Chief Conservator of Forests to Chief Clerk Department of Labour, 26 May 1922; Social and Industrial Review, January 1926, p. 24, 'Afforestation settlements'.

8 Social and Industrial Review, January 1926, p. 25, 'Afforestation settlements'.

9 Social and Industrial Review, February 1928, p. 91, 'Welfare work on a forestry settlement'.

10 CAD, FOR 259/446, M. Bouwer to Gen. J. Kemp, 11 December 1925.


15 LDE 3718/1848 , 'Enquiry into the poor white question as affecting the Cape Province', 1911 (Rev. A. D. Luckhoff), pp. 1–2.


19 Van Rensburg, 'Boswerkers', pp. 103–104; CAD, UOD 1944/180/I, Theron and Rothmann memorandum, 1933.


21 See for example CAD, FOR 259/446, M. Bouwer to Gen. J. Kemp, 11 December 1925 complaining about coloureds being on the registered list.

22 CAD, FOR 58/56, G. van Rooyen and 117 others to Prime Minister, 4 March 1907.
23 CAD, UOD 1944/180/II, Theron and Rothmann memorandum, 1933. Quotations translated from Afrikaans.


26 CAD, UOD 1944/180/II, 'Memorandum deur H. F. Verwoerd oor die Knysna bos-streek vir die Ekonomiese Volkskongres', 1934. Quotations translated from Afrikaans.


31 UWL, AG 1280, Minutes of evidence before the unemployment commission of 1920, C. W. Thesen, 6 December 1920, p. 2626.


33 Winquist, 'Scandinavians', p. 216.

34 Cf. Von Breitenbach, 'Forests of the southern Cape', p. 39; Grut, Forestry industry, p. 4.

35 CAD, FOR 58/56A, H. Ryan to Assistant Conservator of Forests Knysna, 15 February 1911.


37 UWL, AG 1289. Minutes of evidence before the Unemployment Commission of 1920, R. Burton, 6 December 1920, pp. 2689.

38 CAD, UOD 1944/180/II, Transcript of an interview between J. F. W. Grosskopf and R. Burton, 1929.

39 CAD, FOR 350/14225, C. Legat (Conservator of Forests) to Chief Conservator of Forests, 9 May 1927 and W. Rode (Inspector of Co-operative Societies) to Assistant Chief Division of Agricultural Economics and Marketing, 11 April 1927.


41 CAD LDE 3718/1848, 'Enquiry into the poor white question as affecting the Cape Province', 1911, p. 12.
42 CAD, UOD 1944/180/II, Transcript of an interview between M. E. Rothmann and unnamed woodcutter, 1933.

43 SC 9–13, p. 218 (Rev. A. D. Luckhoff).


45 House of Assembly Debates, 33, 10 February 1939, col. 235.


48 Keet, 'Historical review of forestry', p. 266.

49 House of Assembly Debates, 33, 2 March 1939, col. 1113.


52 CAD, FOR 259/446, M. Bouwer to Gen. J. Kemp, 11 December 1925. Quotation translated from Afrikaans.


Chapter 4: Time to trek: landless whites and poverty in the northern Natal countryside, 1902–1939


2 UG 34/1921, p. 1.

3 See table ‘Categorisation of landless whites in northern Natal’.

4 A weightier study addressing these aspects would have to rely heavily on private papers and oral evidence. Other sources which would have to be consulted for such a study are local newspapers, church records, the records of the Christelike Maatskaplike Raad, political party records and Deeds Office farm registers (to gauge the extent to which subdivision of property was a factor in impoverishment).


6 See map ‘Northern Natal: veld types’. Klip River County is that portion of northern Natal west of the Buffalo River; the ex-South African Republic territory is that portion east of it.


8 The Ngotshe district covers the eastern extremity of northern Natal, the seat of its magistracy being at Louwsburg.

9 Natal Regional Survey, 1, p. 51.


11 Natal Regional Survey, 1, pp. 69–70.

12 Natal Regional Survey, 13, pp. 36.


14 Central Archives Depot, Pretoria, Archives of the Secretary for Native Affairs, 280 (7396/F 684): Ngotshe magistrate to Chief Native Commissioner, 13 March 1912.

15 Correspondence with G. Pringle, 13 February 1986.

16 Natal Archives Depot, Pietermaritzburg, Archives of the Secretary for Native Affairs, 1/1/298 (4213/1902), p. 2.


19 Natal Archives Depot, Pietermaritzburg, Archives of the Magistrate and Commissioner, Bergville (hereafter cited as 1/BGV), 4/3/1/22 (33/7/4).

20 Natal Archives Depot, Pietermaritzburg, Archives of the Magistrate and Commissioner, Newcastle (hereafter cited as 1/NCS), 5/1/1/1/12 (33/7/4/24).

21 Natal Archives Depot, Pietermaritzburg, Archives of the Magistrate and Commissioner, Babanango (hereafter cited as 1/BGO), 3/1/2/5 (33/7/4/33).

22 1/NCS 5/1/1/1/12 (33/7/4/35).


24 See table 'Categorisation of landless whites in northern Natal'.


26 1/PPB 3/3/1/3 (8/8/2/2).


29 UG 14/1926, p. 106.

30 See graph 'White population of northern Natal, 1904–1946', constructed from official population census figures. It must be noted that the compilers of these figures defined an urban area as one possessing a local authority, many obviously farming communities being categorised as urban in consequence.

31 Magistrates' Annual Reports, 1904: Report of Vryheid Magistrate.


33 Natal Archives Depot, Pietermaritzburg, Government House Archive 1707, p. 17.

34 Ibid., pp. 17–18.

35 Ibid., p. 17.


37 Natal Archives Depot, Pietermaritzburg, Archives of the Secretary for Native Affairs, 1/1/298 (4213/1902), p. 3.


39 Natal Archives Depot, Pietermaritzburg, Archives of the Magistrate and Commissioner, Ngotshe, Correspondence File 17/3/20.

40 This resilience is examined in depth by me in 'Land, labour and ideology'.

41 See, for example, 1/BGO 3/1/2/4 (17/14/2, Part 1).


44 In making this point I do not mean to identify social classes with specific political parties. As has been stressed by Belinda Bozzoli, the relationship between class hegemony and the form and activity of state apparatuses is complex and frequently contradictory. B. Bozzoli, The political nature of a ruling class: capital and ideology in South Africa 1890–1933, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, pp. 142–143.

45 UG 14/1926, pp. 113–114.

46 Grosskopf, Rural impoverishment and rural exodus, p. 15.

47 1/BGO 3/1/2/5 (33/7/4/31). This extract is a translation from the original Afrikaans.

48 1/NCS 5/1/1/11 (33/7/4/14). 'A bad time to move.'


50 Magistrates' annual reports contained in correspondence files. These figures refer almost exclusively to whites.

51 Ladysmith Mayor's Minute, 1933–1934, p. 11.

52 UG 61/1937, p. 12.

53 Ladysmith Mayor's Minute, 1932–1933, p. 8.

54 See, for example, the response of the Vryheid local authority. Natal Archives Depot, Pietermaritzburg, Archives of the Town Council, Vryheid, 1/1/1/21, p. 3 and 1/1/1/24, p. 221a.
Chapter 5: ‘Digging a way into the working class’: unemployment and consciousness amongst the Afrikaner poor on the Lichtenburg alluvial diamond diggings, 1926–1929

1 This chapter is constructed from material contained in my MA dissertation, ‘Political consciousness and mobilisation amongst Afrikaner diggers on the Lichtenburg diamond fields, 1926–1929’, University of the Witwatersrand, 1989.


9 These farms were Klipbankfontein No. 82, Uitgevonden No. 99, Ruigtelaagte No. 203, Klipkuil No. 210, Witklip No. 149, Grasfontein No. 240 and Welverdiend No. 294.

10 The Star, 5 June 1926


12 ‘Abnormal distress considerable in all districts,’ wrote the Secretary for Labour in 1926, ‘... primarily due to drought and locusts during the last 2 or 3 years. Many farmers from districts in the vicinity of diggings have drifted thither, and have
generally met with little success' (ARB 200, Ref. LB555, Part 1, 'Unemployment. General', Memorandum, 'Abnormal Distress. Transvaal, 1925'). See also TPS 60, TA 2/13857, Memorandum from CHO to the Acting Provincial Secretary, Ref. LB511/4, 7 July 1926.

13 The Star, 9 June 1926.
14 The Star, 28 August 1926.
15 The Star, 27 October 1926
16 The Star, 28 August 1926.
17 The Star, 21 July 1926.


20 The Mining World and Engineering Journal, 3 July 1926.

21 These A&E farms were Blaaubank (into 15 portions), Houthaaldoorns (into 5), Mooimeisjiesfontein (into 17), La Rijs Strijd (into 15), Kliplaagte (into 8), Zamenkomst (into 9), and Grasfontein (into 22 portions). See MNW 898, mm 379/27, Van Eyssen to F. W. Beyers, 4 May 1927; The Star, 11 December 1926.

22 The Mining Journal, 29 January 1927.

23 Deeds Office, Pretoria, Grasfontein No. 240; MNW 898, mm 2370/27, 'Precious Stones Act 44/1927, Section 23. Holdings of interest by corporate bodies, syndicates and associations of persons'. Schedules A1 and A2 B1 and B2, Statements showing number of owners and discoverers' claims held by corporate bodies, syndicates, and partnerships, 22 November 1927.

24 He was accused of illegally expediting the passage of the diagrams of the Carrigs property holdings at Grasfontein through the liberal offering of batches of 100 shares to various officials.


26 Ibid. 'Bonanza Syndicate (H. A. Dawson) Application to work claims on Grasfontein in partnership under section 73(4) of Act 44/1927', letter H. A. Dawson to Mining Commissioner Klerksdorp, 30 November 1927; The Star, 15 November 1927.

27 The 'flags' referred to here were used to indicate the boundaries of the claims on the portions of Welverdiend. MNW 886, mm 525/27, 'Comments on the Precious Stones Act', Memorandum F. J. Mathews, 'Returns of diamonds won on Welverd...
died 249, Lichtenburg district, by prospectors, under agreement with Lichtenburg Gravels Ltd. and Welverdiend Diamonds Ltd.', and Memorandum, 'Lichtenburg Gravels Ltd.', Reference 85G, no date. See also The Star, 28 January 1927, 26 February 1927, 4 August 1927. The Potchefstroom Herald, 30 March 1928.

28 The Star, 30 July 1926.

29 Ibid. Thus on Ruigtelaagte there were two licenced diggers (the two farmowners) under whose licences worked over 800 prospectors each paying 10 to 15 per cent of their finds to the owners.

30 The Star, 22 January 1927.

31 The Star, 31 December 1926.

32 The Star, 31 December 1926.

33 The Potchefstroom Herald, 2 July 1928.

34 See, for example, The Star, 1 September 1927, 'The shebeen menace', 15 July 1927, 8 December 1927, 'Life at the diggings'.

35 The Star, 5 June 1926.

36 MNW 918, mm 496/28, 'Lichtenburg diggings (poverty on the diggings), Ref. mmct 654/30, Memorandum Lichtenburg Mining Commissioner to Secretary for Mines, 26 March 1928; See also E. Krause, 'Maatskaplike toestande op die Lichtenburgse alluviale diamantdelwerye, 1926-1929', Contree, 19, 1986, pp. 16-24.

37 The Star, 3 November 1926, 13 November 1926, 31 December 1926.

38 The Star, 3 November 1926, 13 November 1926.

39 In fact the large diamond capitalists were most concerned at the discovery of this unregulated diamond source and attempted, by a variety of stratagems, to circumscribe and control the Lichtenburg production. These ranged from the floating of a dummy company, High Level Gravels, to purchase and hold up production from portions of Grasfontein and Welverdiend, to the financing of a local digger movement which was opposed to the local diamond capitalists. For details of the responses of these large diamond capitalists, see Clynick, 'Political consciousness and mobilisation', chapters 3 and 4.

40 The Star, 5 July 1927, 6 July 1927.

41 MNW 898, mm 2332/27, 'Report of meeting', 'Notes on meeting held in the Minister’s Office', 18 November 1927, Opinion of Lieutenant Colonel De Beer.

42 MNW 898, mm2332/27, 'Report of meeting', Notes of meeting held in the Minister’s Office', 18 November 1927, Opinion of Lieutenant Colonel De Beer.

43 The Star, 31 December 1927; MNW 901, mm 2515/27, Commissioner of Police to Secretary for Mines, Ref. SAP 1/179/27, 'Precious Stones Act No. 44 of 1927', 29 February 1928.

44 MNW 918, mm 496/28, 'Lichtenburg diggings. Section 76(2) of P/S Act', 'Memorandum Mining Commissioner Klerksdorp to Secretary for Mines, Ref. mmct 654/30, 're Conditions on Lichtenburg Diamond Diggings', 1 April 1930.

45 The Star, 1 December 1927; MNW 901, mm 2520/27, 'Precious Stones Act No. 44/27. Section 73(4). Partnerships’ Minute, Mining Commissioner Barkly West to Minister of Mines, 'Partnerships', 21 February 1928.
46 The Star, 21 November 1927, 23 November 1927, 24 November 1927, 31 December 1927; MNW 903, mm 2604/27, 'P/S Act, 44/1927 — Forfeited claims under section 73', Acting Secretary for Mines to Mining Commissioner Klerksdorp, 'Forfeited claims under section 73', 15 December 1927.

47 The Star, 31 December 1927.

48 MNW 918, mm 496/28, 'Lichtenburg diggings', Lichtenburg Magistrate to Provin­
cial Secretary, ref. 105, Minute, 23 March 1928.

49 Die Burger, 1 March 1928.

50 Die Burger, 1 March 1928, 2 March 1928.

51 The Star, 10 March 1928.

52 Ibid.

53 The Potchefstroom Herald, 27 April 1928.

54 Ibid.; The Star, 9 April 1928.

55 MNW 898, mm 2332/27, 'Report of meeting Mining Commissioner Klerksdorp. Question of proclamation of new ground', J. Senekal, President of DU, to Minister of Mines, 17 November 1927; MNW 892, mm 1866/24, 'Dissension of Diggers' Committee/Union, October 1927, over deputation to Minister of Mines', 'Memorandum of interview with Mr Z. J. Senekal, House of Assembly, 18 October 1927', Ref. mmct 811/27; The Star, 3 December 1927, 12 October 1927.

56 The Star, 29 December 1927.

57 Ibid.

58 The Potchefstroom Herald, 28 February 1928; The Star, 29 December 1927.

59 MNW 918, mm 496/28, 'Lichtenburg diggings', M. Theunissen, Chairman DU Relief Committee to Chief Magistrate Lichtenburg, 're pauper relief', 29 February 1928; The Star, 5 April 1928, 9 April 1928.

60 MNW 918, mm 496/28, 'Lichtenburg diggings', M. Theunissen, Chairman DU Relief Committee to Chief Magistrate Lichtenburg, 're pauper relief', 29 February 1928.

61 Ibid.

62 Theunissen ran as an Independent digger candidate for the 1929 general elections until, in November 1928, he was charged for illegally carrying out the functions of an attorney and committing theft. He subsequently withdrew his candidacy. The case against him was dismissed in June 1929 (The Star, 9 November 1928, 26 June 1929).

63 MNW 918, mm 496/28, 'Lichtenburg diggings'. Memorandum Lichtenburg Mining Commissioner to Under-Secretary for Mines, 12 March 1928.

64 The Potchefstroom Herald, 3 March 1928.

65 For example, see The Star, 10 March 1928.

66 The Potchefstroom Herald, 27 March 1928; The Rand Daily Mail, 23 March 1928.

67 The Potchefstroom Herald, 27 March 1928.

68 See footnote 36 above.

69 The Star, 10 March 1928; The Potchefstroom Herald, 27 March 1928.

70 The Star, 23 December 1927.
71 Ibid.
72 *The Potchefstroom Herald*, 27 March 1928.
73 See Clynick, 'Political consciousness and mobilisation', chapter 4.
74 *The Star*, 13 December 1927.
75 *The Star*, 14 December 1927.
76 *The Star*, 15 December 1927, 20 December 1927.
77 *The Star*, 21 December 1927.
78 *The Star*, 12 December 1928
79 *The Star*, 17 September 1928.
80 MNW 930, mm 2424/28, 'Report on M. C. P. Brink: member of the newly formed Diggers’ Union in the Western Transvaal', Detective Head Constable R. E. White, Office of the Diamond Detective Department, Venterdorp, to Senior Inspector, Diamond Detective Department, 6 February 1928.
81 See for example *The Star*, 3 December 1927, 13 December 1927, 20 December 1927, 21 December 1927, 22 December 1927.
82 *The Star*, 31 December 1927; *The Potchefstroom Herald*, 6 March 1928, 30 March 1928.
83 *The Star*, 20 December 1927.
84 MNW 898, mm 2332/27, ‘Report of meeting’, Telegram Minister for Mines to M. C. Brink and F. Rheeders (President DU), Grasfontein, 24 February 1928.
85 *The Potchefstroom Herald*, 30 March 1928.
86 MNW 898, mm 2332/27, ‘Report of meeting’, Telegram Minister of Mines to M. C. Brink and F. Rheeders (President DU), Grasfontein, 24 February 1928.
87 *The Potchefstroom Herald*, 27 March 1928.
88 *The Star*, 5 April 1928.
89 *The Star*, 9 April 1928.
90 *The Star*, 19 April 1928.
91 *The Potchefstroom Herald*, 24 April 1928.
92 Ibid.
93 *The Star*, 18 June 1928.
94 *The Star*, 28 June 1928.
95 *The Star*, 10 March 1928.
97 *The Star*, 2 August 1928.
98 *The Star*, 22 August 1928.
99 For biographical details see Clynick, 'Political consciousness and mobilisation', chapter 4.
100 The Star, 3 August 1928.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 See Clynick, 'Political consciousness and mobilisation', pp. 93–121.
104 The Star, 18 August 1928.
105 Ibid.
106 The Star, 6 September 1928.
107 Ibid.
109 The Star, 24 December 1928. These proclamations took place on 9 January 1929.
110 The Star, 29 December 1928.
111 The Star, 3 January 1929.
112 The Star, 8 January 1929.
113 The Star, 4 February 1929.