PART II

Patterns of collective consciousness and their relation to societal structures in South Africa
The relation between societal structures and convictions — a theoretical model

6.1 THE AIM OF THIS CHAPTER

The relation between the material and the cognitive world has occupied the minds of Western thinkers since the times of Greek antiquity, whether in the form of Platonism vs. Aristotelism, "realism" vs. nominalism, rationalism vs. empiricism, idealism vs. materialism, sociology of knowledge vs. Marxism, or Neo-Marxism vs. positivism. Much of this perennial debate is outdated in terms of modern scientific insight (Morris 1980). What seems to emerge as the task of today is the development of a comprehensive systems-analytical model in which the different components which make up the complex relationship between 'human consciousness' and 'the real world' are depicted in their relation with each other and their relative impact on the whole.

This chapter contains the brief summary of an attempt to devise such a paradigm from the specific perspective of this study. Figure 1 presents the model as a whole in the form of a diagram. In our discussion we shall proceed from one cluster to the other, beginning at the top and the bottom ends respectively and
ending up at the crucial zone of interaction in the middle. Each proposition is meant to be a hypothesis. It is a conflict model rather than a fuctionalist model as will soon become apparent.

6.2 BASIC CONVICTIONS

6.2.1 Components of convictions

Human beings are not only guided by natural laws and inbred instincts. They have to make sense of the reality in which they find themselves. That means that they always live, whether consciously or unconsciously, in the context of an overarching system of meaning, however fragmented or unified it may be.

The system of meaning derives its relative stability and consistency from a couple of non-negotiables or axioms which human beings do not, or dare not question but which they simply take for granted. We call them 'ultimates' because they cannot be reduced to something more fundamental: they can only be replaced by other ultimates which prove to have a greater power of conviction. Ultimates can be conceptualised in a variety of ways: dynamistic, animistic, polytheistic, monotheistic, pantheistic, atheistic, idealistic, materialistic, etc.

The power of ultimates lies in two functions: (a) they are able to give meaning to one's universe and (b) they can confirm or withhold one's basic right of existence on the basis of their own criteria. The human being cannot live without either of the two.
Figure 1
Paradigm of the interaction between convictions and social structures

ULTIMATES
SYSTEM OF MEANING

HISTORICAL DIMENSION: TRADITION

NORMATIVE SYSTEM

PRIORITYED PERCEPTION (VALUES)
OPERATIVE INFORMATION

MORAL ACCEPTABILITY

SPECIAL INITIATIVES

OVERALL FLOW OF LIFE

VITAL INTERESTS

MENTAL PRE-DISPOSITIONS

SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS

MATERIAL NEEDS

POSITION IN THE POWER STRUCTURE

HISTORICAL DIMENSION: CAUSALITY

HISTORICAL DIMENSION: TRADITION

MOTIVATION (GOALS)

SPECIFIC INITIATIVES

SELF-JUSTIFICATION

VOLITIONAL INCLINATION

SPECIFIC INITIATIVES

MORAL ACCEPTABILITY

OPERATIVE INFORMATION

SELECTIVE PERCEPTION

AVAILABLE INFORMATION

ETHICAL JUDGMENT (NORMS)

HISTORICAL DIMENSION: TRADITION

MORAL ACCEPTABILITY

OPERATIVE INFORMATION

SELECTIVE PERCEPTION

AVAILABLE INFORMATION

ETHICAL JUDGMENT (NORMS)

HISTORICAL DIMENSION: TRADITION

MORAL ACCEPTABILITY

OPERATIVE INFORMATION

SELECTIVE PERCEPTION

AVAILABLE INFORMATION
In practical life ultimates are often overshadowed by less absolute, penultimate, intermediate, more proximate authorities, such as the dogmas of a religion, the conventions of a scientific tradition, the interpersonal dynamics of a primary group and the multitude of popular beliefs, customs, habits, fashions, fads, sudden desires, etc. These intermediate authorities are not absolute; they can be transcended to something more fundamental. Yet in practice they are powerful dispensers of meaning and normative demands.

A system of meaning always implies a notion of what reality ought to be. We call that a normative system. In practical life a great number of seemingly unrelated, floating demands or clusters of demands receive attention. But a conflict within this whole realm can only be resolved by asking penetrating questions concerning the overall system of meaning.

The system of meaning and the normative system are closely related, yet different. If we disregard the system of meaning the result is confusion and disorientation. If we disregard the normative system the result is guilt, shame and social sanction. The cure for the first is insight, enlightenment, clarification; the cure for the second is confession, restitution, expiation, atonement and social conformity. Nevertheless there is a constant interplay between the normative system and the system of meaning. Without meaning norms lack authority. Without normative consequences meaning lacks relevance.

There are various horizons within the normative system. If we think in global terms, we speak of a vision. It can be the vision of comprehensive well-being called shalom in the Old Testament, the New Testament vision of the eschatological Kingdom of God, the Marxian vision of a classless society or the
pragmatic vision of technological omnipotence. If we think in social-structural terms we speak of the functions of institutions. If we think of human collectives we speak of the identity of a cultural group or the historic mission of a nation, etc. In individual terms we speak of a super-ego, a self-image, a purpose in life, one's authenticity, etc. If we think of the place of the individual in his/her social context we speak of status and role.

6.2.2 Types of conviction

For the purposes of this study we distinguish between three types of conviction:

Type A: Convictions which pertain to comprehensive systems of meaning based on religious or metaphysical assumptions: the Christian faith, Islam, etc. Various principles of classification are possible: number of focal points (e.g. monotheism, polytheism, animism, dynamism); deity-centred, man-centred or nature-centred; mystical, speculative or practical; binding or liberating, etc.

Type B: Convictions based on cultural group identification. Apart from cultural differences, such convictions vary from narrow particularism (e.g. tribalism) to a humanity-encompassing universalism.

Type C: Convictions which are related to the distribution of economic potential: capitalism, socialism, etc. Economic potential always implies social status and political power as well but we do not focus our attention on those. Such convictions range from complete equality to extreme discrepancies, from total individual freedom to absolute control.
To these we can add *vital interests* (type D) which do not readily qualify for the category of convictions but which contain elements of meaning and normativeness and are, for this reason, comparable with convictions (see section 6.4 below).

6.3 MENTAL PREDISPOSITIONS

On the other side of the spectrum we have to take our point of departure from the overall societal power structure, an example of which we analysed in Part I of this study. Here the location of a group or a section of the population in the system is crucial. In this connection we may refer back to our discussion of the situations of absolute poverty, relative deprivation, relative privilege and absolute affluence in chapter 4, section 4.2. A closer investigation of these situations reveal that they have not only a material but also a consciousness dimension.

On the one hand it is obvious that one's position in the economic power grid largely determines one's unfulfilled material needs, such as food, clothing and shelter. But there are socio-psychological needs as well: acceptance, belonging, appreciation, a sense of achievement, self-esteem. Regarding 'social expectations' we saw that acceptance by one's peers, one's 'significant others' or one's 'reference group' implies a certain level of material consumption. But the consumption pattern of one's reference group also determines personal wishes to quite some extent because it defines what is desirable in the first place.

The way in which these material and socio-psychological needs are put together leads to what we shall call a *mental predisposition*, e.g. a general mood of acquiescence, ambition, revolt or self-satisfaction. When these mental predispositions become
focused and conceptualised in concrete and specific wants or demands we call them vital interests.

6.4 VITAL INTERESTS

Vital interests are not identical to instincts, needs, cravings or desires. Needs do not have to determine interests, nor do they have to be gratified under all circumstances. Rather, interests are needs and desires already interpreted, evaluated and arranged according to priorities. This means that they contain elements of meaning and norm. In fact, the overall system of meaning and its normative system greatly influence what can become a vital interest in the first place. Interests can be defined in such a way that need or desire gratification is suspended, deferred or excluded. A scientist on the verge of a discovery may crave a holiday spree but her academic career interests preclude the latter. A Buddhist monk may long for sexual gratification and a happy family life but his way to Nirvana may not be jeopardised by such carnal pursuits. It is this affinity between the two that makes interests comparable with convictions.

Vital interests demand attention. An empty stomach, falling in love, the profitability of a firm or the security of a state cannot be ignored. In most cases they seem to be more powerful than convictions with their normative ideals. This also implies that they can be, and usually are, in conflict with the latter. While they may be more powerful, however, they are not necessarily more authoritative. They are not in a position to give meaning to one's universe. Nor are they able to confirm or question one's right of existence in the ultimate sense of the term. And that is where the authority of ultimates lies. The status symbol of a herd of cattle, a powerful car or a TV-set may superficially
function in this way and become a small ultimate (or 'idol'). But
in the final resort the pursuit of vital interests needs to be
justified or legitimised before the forum of one's convictions.

6.5 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN NORMATIVE SYSTEM AND
VITAL INTERESTS

We can distinguish three dimensions in which the normative
system and vital interests interact. The first is the whole area
of values. Conviction-based values determine the way in which
reality is perceived, interpreted or defined. Values assign
priorities to the impressions we get from the outside world.
Thus they emphasise certain aspects of reality and neglect or
ignore others. A tree is seen, for instance, as a precious
specimen of a threatened species. We could speak of weighted or
prioritised perception in this regard.

Vital interests introduce counter-values. They lead to what is
commonly called selective perception. The same tree is seen, for
instance, as so many cubic metres of fire-wood. Whether the
one or the other interpretation of the tree gets the upper hand
probably depends partly on the strength of one's convictions
concerning nature conservation and partly on how exposed one is
during an icy winter night.

The outcome of the interaction between normative system and
vital interests leads to the selection, and interpretation of
available information which informs the moral behaviour of an
individual or group. We call that operative information.

The second dimension in which normative system and vital
interests interact is the area of norms. Norms present a screen
of acceptable behaviour. Conviction-based norms confirm or
question a group's right of existence, that is its right to be what it is and to do what it does or wants to do. It also confirms or questions the legitimacy of social institutions. We summarise all this in the concept of ethical judgment.

When vital interests are in conflict with the system of meaning and its system of norms we have to choose between gratification and right of existence. This is a painful choice. It is avoided as far as possible through a sort of judicial negotiation in the minds of those concerned. Vital interests posit the validity of counter-norms. But since interests cannot arbitrarily invent new norms we should rather speak of counter-arguments. Their function is to justify the pursuit of self-interest. This is necessary because more often than not the pursuit of self-interest is conducted at the expense of other people who may share the overall system of meaning and norms but not, the specific interest of the group concerned. Psychologists refer to such a system of self-justifications as rationalisation. Radical sociology calls it ideology. In institutional terms we speak of legitimation.

Rationalisation, ideology and legitimation follow three basic ways to make vital interests seem acceptable:

(a) They interpret the ruling system of meaning and, particularly, its system of norms in such a way that it seems to cover the pursuit of vital interests concerned. If there is a choice, for instance, between possible emphases and interpretations within the prevailing conviction, they will unconsciously or consciously fall for those emphases and interpretations which legitimate the pursuit of the interests concerned. But they may also manipulate the truth in more massive ways.
(b) They present the *vital interests* concerned (and the actions and institutions necessary to fulfil them) in such a light that they seem to be covered by the prevailing system of meaning and normative system. Again it is a case of emphases, interpretations and manipulation of truth.

(c) They maintain that the particular area in which the vital interests occur, for instance business or politics, falls outside the jurisdiction of the prevailing system of meaning and normative system. This *autonomy* in fact means that a new conviction is introduced alongside the original one which is more in line with the interests concerned so that a syncretistic or polytheistic situation emerges.

In cases where a group is faced with a choice between competing truths neither of which has impressed itself compellingly on the consciousness of its members, it may consciously or unconsciously fall for the option which is most in line with the vital interests of the group.

Ideological self-justification is, basically, a defensive mechanism of the mind. But the more it succeeds to convince both its perpetrators and its social environment the more assertive it becomes. Having re-interpreted the system of meaning and norms or having proved itself to be acceptable before the forum of the latter, it will now usurp the moral authority vested in the system of meaning and its system of norms. It will not only absolutise its own interpretation of the system of meaning but also confirm or question man's right of existence according to its own interpretation of the normative system. And because there is a basic doubt which has to be overplayed, it will become quite fanatic as a pseudo-metaphysical and a pseudo-moral authority.
This leads to a further strange but common phenomenon: Ideologies develop a life of their own. Obviously there is a constant interplay between vital interests and ideological self-justification. The latter is meant to underpin the former. But because of its self-imposed rigidity an ideology may generate its own logic and dynamic and move away from the vital interests it is meant to cover. It can also stagnate and remain in an obsolete position when vital interests move away from their previous position because of structural change. Although the ideology then becomes disfunctional in terms of its prime purpose it is still invested with the authority of the system of meaning and the normative system and exercises a considerable amount of power over the minds of decision-makers and followers alike. This means that an ideology can lead a group into a direction quite contrary to its own vital interests.

The third dimension in which normative system and vital interests interact is the area of goals. Conviction-based goals are the source of motivation. Vital interests introduce what we shall call a volitional inclination. It is primarily directed towards need satisfaction and as such provides a strong counter-motivation or drive. The conflict in the motivational sphere is as complex as that in the sphere of justification. Its outcome then is a specific decision, behaviour or action. This influences the overall flow of life into which such decisions or actions are fed. Depending on their direction and relative power they may then lead to structural change.

Obviously then, there is a lot of tension between convictions and vital interests. But there is a lot of interplay which leads to mutual adjustments as well. An accepted system of meaning and its normative system play a vital role in defining what can become a vital interest in the first place. Obviously they also
provide the normative terms of reference for ideological self-justification. Conversely vital interests and their ideological justifications constantly influence the concrete interpretations of the system of meaning and the normative system. Often they go to the extent of changing their entire contents.

6.6 POWER, AWARENESS AND TIME

When it comes to structural change, three further factors have to be considered:

(a) The relative power or potential a group or section of the population is able to muster in relation to the power of other such groups or sections. This is directly dependent on the location of the group in the power system. Power obviously determines the extent to which a group is capable of pushing its demands and letting its ideas and ideals materialise in the structural sphere. This is the area of power politics.

(b) The 'horizon' and general awareness of a group or section of the population relative to those of other such groups. These are a result partly of the group's position in the power grid, and partly of its convictions. They determine in how far a group is conscious of the possibilities and potentials at its disposal to make an impact in the sphere of structures. This is the area of 'conscientisation'.

(c) The historical dimension. The evolutionary continuity of convictions is called tradition, while structural processes are subject, at least partially, to chain-reactions or networks of causality. We also remember, however, that structural power is utilised by its bearers to enhance their own competitive position at the expense of weaker groups, a process which has a cumulative effect (cf. chapter 5,
section 5.5). The historical dimension reminds us of the fact that it is impossible to restructure the world from scratch and overnight according to one all-inclusive, ideal design. Not even the most radical revolutions do.

6.7 THREE DECISIVE AREAS OF CONFLICT AND INTERACTION

So far we have located the main area of conflict in the interaction between structures and convictions in the relation between vital interests and normative systems. But there are two other areas of conflict which have been implied all along in our discussion and which we have to make explicit: the conflict between one conviction and another, and the conflict between the interests of one group or section of society and another. The latter is the result of the respective location of different groups in the power system.

![Figure 2](image_url)

Three levels of interaction and conflict.
The three kinds of conflict can be summarised as follows (cf. figure 2).

(a) The conflict (and interaction) between different convictions, for instance between the Christian faith and Islam, or between capitalist liberalism and Marxism. (From the point of view of a Christian theology this would be the area of missionary dialogue or evangelisation.) In this confrontation between the ultimates, the truth of one conviction uproots that of another, they settle on the basis of a syncretistic compromise, or they merge into a synthesis.

(b) The conflict (and interaction) between the vital interests of different groups or sections of society, for instance capital owners and labourers. (In theological-ethical terminology this would be the area of social justice.) In an unredeemed world the best we can probably achieve is a situation in which interest groups place the interests of the whole over the interests of a part, in that they are willing to accept a balance of power and an equal access to the potentials of the society as a whole. Where this is not the case, the power of the more powerful will inevitably grow at the expense of the less powerful, as seen in Part I of this study.

(c) The conflict (and interaction) between a particular set of convictions such as the Christian faith, and the vital interests of a particular group. We have dealt with this extensively under 6.4 above. (In theological terms this is the area of justification and sanctification.) There is also the possibility that the vital interests of two antagonistic social groups relate to the same set of convictions (for instance both employers and employees appeal to 'human rights' which is the normative system of secular humanism) or that the same interest group refers to two different sets
of convictions (for instance when a revolutionary avant-garde includes adherents both of the Christian faith and of Islam - perhaps on the basis of a Marxian catalyst). We do not need to go into further detail at this stage.

6.8 SUMMARY

In this chapter a paradigm for the interaction between societal structures and convictions was developed.

Convictions entail a system of meaning, based on ultimates, and a normative system. We distinguished between various horizons and types of convictions (6.2).

The location of a group in the societal structure leads to a mental predisposition (6.3). When focused and conceptualised in concrete and specific terms this crystallizes into interests. Interests are interpreted and prioritised needs and desires which contain elements of meaning and normativeness. As such they are comparable with, and in conflict with convictions (6.4).

The interaction between convictions (or, more precisely, their normative systems) and interests takes place along three avenues: perception (guided by values), justification (guided by norms) and motivation (guided by goals). Of particular importance for this study are ideological self-justification mechanisms (6.5).

The translation of the ideas and ideals of convictions into structural terms depends on three further factors: the relative power of a group, its overall awareness and the dimension of historical time (6.6).
In terms of our theme (the interaction between convictions and structures in an ethical perspective) not only the conflict between convictions and interests but also the conflict between alternative sets of convictions, and the conflict between the interests of different groups in society are of relevance (6.7).

The overall impression gained from this chapter is that neither classical idealism nor classical materialism are capable of doing justice to the complex network of interaction between consciousness and societal structures.
CHAPTER 7

Structure-induced mental predispositions

7.1 THE AIM OF THIS CHAPTER

In section 6.3 of the previous chapter I have argued that the various needs derived from the location of a group in the societal power system combine to form basic mental predispositions which, when focused and conceptualised in specific and concrete demands or wants, form vital interests. We shall now attempt a brief historical survey of the emergence of such mental predispositions both in the dominant (centre) group and the dominated (peripheral) group. We begin with a stylised history of colonial relations and then apply our insights to the specifics of the South African situation. Here we briefly mention some of the ideological systems of thought which grew on the soil of such mental predispositions.

This chapter should, again, be understood as the presentation of a model for research, not as an abstraction from research. Statements made are hypothetical and need to be confirmed or challenged by detailed historical investigation.
7.2 THE RELATION BETWEEN COLONIZERS AND COLONISED

7.2.1 The Western dynamic

Centuries back a new dynamic was born among the civilisations of mankind. It began in the countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea and later shifted to North Western Europe. It combined Greek and Hebrew insights into a unique synthesis. The Greeks discovered that reality is structured according to dependable principles which can be explored by empirical research and rational thought. The Hebrews contributed the vision of a linear goal-directed history and the power of a supreme will. Asian, oriental (e.g. Persian) Latin and Germanic influences also contributed.

Originally the new mentality was embedded in metaphysical and religious thought but it became progressively human-centred and secular. Its view of reality became mechanistic, evolutionary, optimistic, progress-oriented. Correspondingly its ethic was one of active subjugation of reality and world transformation. It had a pioneering and missionary spirit in which idealist zeal to help mankind solve its problems combined with the most ruthless pursuit of self-interest. It released the individual from traditional authorities and hierarchical structures. It placed a premium on the optimum utilisation of all available potentials to obtain maximum private gain and led to a spirit of fierce competition.

Liberalism - the justification of the pursuit of individual self-interest - found a counterpart in nationalism - the justification of the pursuit of collective self-interest. But the dominating achievement norm produced its own antithesis in the equality norm, at least in the form of an equality of opportunity. This
is the basis of socialist thought. The legitimation of the acquisition of power was countered at least to some extent by the demand for a balance of power. This is the basis of democratic thought and the demand for human rights.

For a long time the potential dynamic of this new synthesis between Hebrew and Greek thought seems to have been arrested by legal and hierarchical thinking, firmly based in a static metaphysic and a superstitious religion. But gradually it discarded these shackles and picked up speed. In our times it has acquired a breath-taking rate of acceleration which has long become institutionalised and entrenched as the dominant determinant of human life (Toffler 1971).

Viewed in the totality of the history of mankind very divergent phenomena appear to be aspects of the same movement:

(a) The voyages of discovery and conquest which led to the establishment of global empires and the subjugation of virtually the whole of mankind under the rule or hegemony of a handful of European nations: Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, France, Russia, Belgium and - for a short time - Germany (Fieldhouse 1965).

(b) The development of science and technology which - drawing from much older roots in Egypt, Greece, China, India and the Islamic world - came into its own with Copernicus, Kepler, Galilei and Newton and led to the astounding achievements of our century: space travel, genetic manipulation, artificial organs, nuclear power, etc. (Mason 1961).

(c) The emergence of the capitalist system - built first on commerce and colonial exploitation, then on an industrial revolution and finally on information technology - which led to an accumulation and concentration of wealth and power
unheard of in all the prior phases of the history of mankind and which produced its own antithesis in the form of Marxist socialism.

(d) A missionary movement of global proportions followed by similar waves of secular, materialist (liberal and socialist) thought which swept through the elites of the entire world.

In Europe some were more advanced along the way of emancipation, enlightenment and progress than others. They soon outperformed and ousted the old hierarchical leadership, and formed a new elite. But it was a staggered elite whose basic orientation was not upward, but forward. It did not want to be the top of a new pyramid but the engine of a moving train. Behind the leaders came the aspiring leaders and so on. At the end came the masses of people who did not share the vision, the drive, the education, the economic success, the political power of the elite, who resented and resisted the new spirit but were, in spite of themselves, dragged along and forced into the new age. The conservative reaction had no future.

Sooner or later the underdog understood that it could keep its own only by the acquisition of collective counter power in the form of trade union solidarity and democratic party politics.

Sooner or later the underdog understood that it could keep its own only by the acquisition of collective counter-power in the form of trade union solidarity and democratic party politics.

7.2.2 The reaction of the South

Through exploration, conquest, colonialism and imperialism this new dynamic poured over the rest of the world. This brought development in the modern sense of the word to the conquered
countries but it was a traumatic experience for their populations. Old patterns of conviction and established social structures were, at first, threatened then thrown into disarray and finally put out of gear. New systems of meaning, new values and norms, new roles and status definitions rendered the old mindsets and social hierarchies obsolete. People were subjugated, their political sovereignty abolished, their social structures reorganised, their economic potentials exploited, their youth re-educated. Responsible grown-ups who had run the affairs of their communities for ages with self-confidence became minors, primitives, uneducated and unskilled. The breakdown of social structures was paralleled by a breakdown of morale.

We can distinguish a few typical reactions to this traumatic experience of Third World populations (see figure 1). The first one was resistance and, when that did not work, withdrawal into the old traditions. All cultures are, to a certain extent, in motion. They assimilate new ideas, adjust to new circumstances, face new challenges. Third World populations which managed to remain in control of their own affairs (Japan, Russia, Turkey), were on occasion able to integrate the Western spirit and transform their cultural heritage to such an extent that they were able to compete. But in the case of the colonised, the conqueror was perceived as a tornado leaving disorganisation and destruction of local traditions and structures in its wake. When resistance was of no avail, withdrawal into the fortress of silent encapsulation seemed the only alternative. Traditional cultures always move very slowly. But now they tried not to move at all. Fear of a landslide once they give way, led to stagnation.
To a certain extent this was a hopeless position. Even in remote areas the impact of the new dynamic slowly but surely eroded the foundations of the old traditions. Since no motivation existed to deal with the problem in a constructive way, people fell into \textit{anomy}, hopelessness and lethargy. Social and moral decay was the result - greatly intensified by the destructive power of material poverty.

The alternative reaction was dependency. \textit{Dependency} is not foreign to traditional cultures. In a hierarchy which extends beyond death to the ancestors, nobody ever comes of age. You find acceptance, belonging and security in your particular, well-defined place in the system. You depend on those above
you as those below you depend on you. In this mindset freedom is not desired but feared, because a dependent personality has not learnt to cope with a situation of individual responsibility. When the new masters came it was not too difficult to transfer one's loyalty and dependence to them (Mannoni 1956).

The new masters, on the other hand, were flattered. They experienced in this faithfulness the legitimation of their leadership and supremacy. Tired of the agony of constant competition at home the colonial Europeans fell back into a static feudal relationship and fed on his patriarchal position. Thus, they dropped out of the accelerating dynamic which continued in the motherland (Mannoni 1956).

From a situation of dependency two types of mentality emerge. On the one hand there are those who are satisfied that they will never play a leading role on a par, and in competition with the dominant group. They do not think that they are meant to, either. They find security, acceptance and belonging in their subordinate position. They know that without their superiors they will be nothing. You can become great by identifying with, and serving a great master. This is acquiescence.

The alternative to acquiescence is ambition (cf. Schlemmer 1980a for the following). The individual becomes fascinated by the new powers which his masters seem to control. He tries to penetrate into their secrets. Particularly those who did not enjoy high status in the old system, recognised their chance to move up. Their stake in the traditional heritage was small. They eagerly desired to discover the sources of the power which rendered the colonialists supreme in all respects. They imitated and became caricatures in the process. But there was no way back. They used every opportunity to learn and to play a role
in the new system. Colonialists made use of these acculturating natives as handy tools in their further conquests, domination, administration and exploitation. They made sure that they would remain in subordinate, auxilliary functions. But when the age of decolonisation dawned ambition eventually succeeded in bringing this new elite to power.

The goal of becoming equals with their former masters now seemed to have materialised. But that was an illusion. In the new world created by the West it is not formal independence that counts but competitiveness. For a number of reasons, competitiveness was difficult to attain during colonial times:

(a) Conditioned from childhood by the traditional culture, they found it difficult to compete with those who were at home in the new civilisation. The tug-of-war between the unconscious demands of old loyalties, assumptions, values and norms and the new normative system prevented an all-out identification with, and dedication to, the new dynamic - if its inner spiritual works were recognised at all (Schlemmer 1980a:12).

(b) It is difficult to move from one culture to another. It is more difficult to cross over from a relatively static culture to a moving alternative. It is most difficult to hold your own in a new culture, the dynamic of which is accelerating all the time (Toffler 1971). By the time you know where the gears are, your competitors are far ahead of you. By the time you change from first to second gear they are in fourth. Only the most gifted and the most determined are able to catch up and compete. For the majority it is a frustrating experience.

(c) The ambitious and acculturating group was not easily accepted by the dominant group. During colonial times the
ruling elite tried to maintain exclusivity and social distance towards the ruled majority. They feared that their privileged position might be threatened if diluted by newcomers. They also feared the competition of the latter. Last but not least, they saw a caricature of themselves in the imitating native - an object of ridicule, or pity at best, but certainly not of acceptance on equal level. Meanwhile, the ruling elite had become the reference group for the acculturating group. To be rejected by the group whose judgment matters, although you have done your best to fulfil its norms, is a shattering experience.

Frustration can lead to further possible reactions. In the first place you can fall back on the community you came from. In the eyes of those who had remained behind, you have achieved a lot. Your people are proud of you. They also need your knowledge of the secrets of the dominant group. They will be willing to give you a position of leadership. But their social system is hierarchical and you will have to fall in with their expectations. So you end up in a feudal position and revert to the patriarchal attitude that goes along with it.

The power vacuum existing in such circumstances is a fertile breeding ground for corruption. The position of the new elite seems unassailable. Moreover, release from the agony of competition and the acquisition of the relative status, power and wealth a Third World context can offer to its leaders, soothes one's sense of failure higher up the ladder. After independence this type of reversion seems to have occurred on a vast scale.

The second reaction to frustration is revolt. Revolt can consist of a wild determination to overcome the obstacles placed in your way, either by increased effort to achieve or by force. The two
possibilities are very close to each other. A reduction of repression can channel the built-up motivation of revolt into achievement. Alternatively, an escalation of repression will turn the achievement motive into a revolutionary spirit.

If the latter finds no outlet it may turn into extreme anger and disgust. A spirit of defiance against the whole Western system may emerge. You turn against the group you have adored. You discover that modern civilisation is individualistic, selfish, cruel, inhuman, decadent. You are thoroughly disillusioned. You posit that the heritage of your fathers is superior on all counts as far as human values are concerned. There is communal responsibility, hospitality, mutual aid, human dignity even for the lowly, spiritual depth, peace of mind.

But it is not all that easy. When you turn to the traditions of your ancestors you find that there is no way you could settle down there. You have not left them without reason in the first place. They provide no foundations for the type of life to which you have become accustomed. Apart from that, the dominant culture dictates the rules of the game in all public contexts. It is also impossible to discard your initial fascination with its indisputable powers and achievements. While you have learnt to despise the new civilisation, you also adore it - at least, you cannot detach yourself from it. It is a sort of love-hatred. Defiance is a cul-de-sac.

One way out is that you turn to the East. You can be sure that they will receive you with open arms. If you plan to begin a guerilla war you will be supplied with training and arms. You will also be given some re-education which will supply you with sufficient ideological arguments to justify not only your frustration with the West but also your armed struggle. In any case
you can be sure that those who were the cause of your frustration will be perplexed if you turn to their declared enemies.

Many of the Third World elite have followed this line of action. But many have also been disillusioned. Marxism is, after all, an integral part of the Western materialist, secular, technological and oppressive mentality. Marxism-Leninism is as imperialist as capitalist liberalism. Unselfish solidarity with the oppressed is as much a theory in the East as freedom and equality of opportunity is in the West.

As a system it does not necessarily fit African or Asian conditions, nor does it necessarily pull an underdeveloped country out of misery. And again you are told what to do. The relative freedom to which you have become accustomed in the West, is frowned upon. If you do not toe the ideological line you are in trouble. By and large, Marxism-Leninism has not been an obvious answer to frustrated acculturated Africans and Asians. In Latin America's semi-Western underdog population it may be different.

Thus, revolt is not a stable position. One has to continue to live the one way or the other. To overcome the dominant culture is impossible. At best you can give it your own particular stamp. But ultimately you have to re-adapt. This can be done in either of two ways. One way is that you give up your ambition to get to the levers of power. You are satisfied to be one of the coaches in the train which are hurled along by the engines in front. You will be in good company. The majority of Westerners are also in this position. This is the new type of conservatism: You settle down in the moving train and only get upset when it stops. We may call this reaction integration.
The alternative is that you must the willpower and possess the talent for an all-out effort to become fully competitive. Because of all the obstacles along the way, only a tiny minority of Third World leaders in science, technology, commerce, industry and politics reaches this point. But that is equally true of Westerners. The elite is staggered and it is difficult to say when you can be counted as one of those who really determine the course of events. This, then, is the ultimate stage of reaction to domination.

7.2.3 The crisis in the West

There was a dialectical oscillation in the Western spirit as well. The first great earthquake was the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. It was followed by a period of restoration. But towards the end of the 19th century social, economic and political forces had built up sufficiently to point to a major crisis. The industrial revolution had created a restive urban proletariat. The big European powers had entered a phase of intense competition. Spiritual certainties began to crumble. Then came World War I. It shook Europe to its foundations. The aristocracy was finally pushed out of control. The whole value system of the Victorian (or Wilhelmian) era crumbled. The capitalist system went through its worst crisis in history. In the mighty Russian Empire the first communist state came into being. In Central and Western Europe fascist regimes came to power.

Of these, the regime of Adolf Hitler in Germany was the most aggressive and radical. It strove to revenge the humiliation suffered by Germany in the peace of Versailles. Moreover, it strove to conquer Europe - possibly as a first step to greater
things. Its anti-semitism was so extreme that it contrived to eradicate all Jews from the face of the earth.

The combined forces of East and West ultimately smashed this "beast from the abyss". But World War II left a shattered Europe in its wake. The former world powers were exhausted and their empires soon dissolved. The USA and the USSR emerged as the new super-powers and the European nations became their respective satellites. Scores of colonies became politically independent. The self-confidence of Europe had collapsed.

Not so of the USA. It saw itself in the role of world saviour. It set out to bring economic development, democracy and freedom to the rest of the world and to save it from the communists. But a series of events shattered its self-certainty, too. While the Marshall plan was successful in its attempt to rebuild Europe (particularly Western Germany) and Japan, similar policies had no effect on the poverty of the Third World. The Marxist critique of capitalist "under-development through exploitation" gained credence. The civil rights campaign of the US negroes showed to the world that all was not well within its own borders. While the USSR was seen as a ruthless oppressor in Eastern Europe (Eastern Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Poland) the USA was seen to be doing much the same in Chile, Nicaragua and other Latin American countries. More detrimental to its self-image and prestige was the defeat of the USA as a superpower by guerilla forces in Vietnam. The humiliation by Iran and the Watergate scandal were added. Then came the oil crisis. A handful of oil producing Third World countries (OPEC) was able, for a time, to hold its own against the mighty group of industrial countries.
At the same time the Western (and Eastern!) world was shocked by the first revelations concerning the "Limits of Growth": Industrial growth would soon choke the world in pollution and deplete it of its non-regenerable resources. Population growth would outstrip food production and lead to mass famine. Competition for declining resources would lead to armed conflict (Mesarović 1974).

All along the arms race continued. The prospect of a nuclear holocaust which could destroy the entire globe, began to loom large (Albrecht 1983). Capitalism went into another recession coupled with inflation (stagflation). It could no longer secure jobs even for populations of the industrialised countries. The youth in these countries became thoroughly disillusioned. Desperation gained ground. "No future" became a powerful slogan. The peace initiatives of the "Carter-line" failed and produced even greater gloom.

The West is therefore no longer certain of its mission. For centuries one had taken for granted that science and technology would lead mankind into a bright future free from famine, disease, oppression and war. Now one had to realise that the forces that were unleashed, could destroy mankind any minute, and that the enormous wealth accumulated in the industrial nations was gained at least in part at the expense of the rest of mankind. "The world cannot afford another America". But can it then afford the existing America? The demands of a new "steady state" or ecological model are still so foreign to the thinking of decision-makers that they are not heard either (Daly 1974).

The Reagan era tries to restore confidence by returning to the old slogans and recipes of unmitigated capitalism and military
superiority. Whether this can stop the erosion of credibility of the Western world is open to debate.

The Eastern counterpart did not do any better, either. Its failure to catch up with the West economically and to solve its agricultural problems, the conflict between the USSR and China, its obvious oppression in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan, its meddling in domestic affairs of numerous countries, the defection by former Third World allies, particularly Indonesia and Egypt, its setbacks in Latin America and Black Africa, all contributed to the partial demise of its image.

The crisis in the West (and the East) cannot help but also affect the Third World. One should not forget that the West is still the "realised Utopia" for the Third World elite, the ideal to which they aspire, the reference group from which they obtain their norms. They are also economically so dependent on the West that the very idea of shaky foundations in the West is threatening. Alternative Southern models have not been too convincing either - the Tanzanian one, for instance, because of its lack of success and the Chinese one because of its human cost. Those who seem to grow economically (Hongkong, Taiwan, Singapore, etc.) have followed Western ways - and become more and more dependent in the process. There does not seem to be a way out at present.

7.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXAMPLE

7.3.1 The Whites

Dutch settlement at the Cape began when the Netherlands experienced its Golden Age. Amsterdam had become the centre of world trade. The Eighty-Years' War had led to independence
from Spain, the Dutch East India Company was leading the trade with the East. Clearly the half-way station founded at the Cape was a result of one of the earlier peaks of the Western dynamic.

On the other hand the settlement at the Cape was meant to be no more than a supply station and as such remained a backwater of Dutch activity. The early Dutch and German settlers came from the lower strata of society and did not necessarily share the drive of the elite. The subjugated (Khoi-Khoi) (Hottentots) and the slaves imported from the East soon formed an underdog population while the settlers became the master class. The step from a colonising, enterprising spirit to a feudal system and to concomitant patriarchal attitudes was unavoidable (Mannoni 1956). As the settlement expanded, the settlers were cut off from the mainstream of the European dynamic and the feudal-patriarchal pattern was firmly entrenched and never challenged for one and a half centuries.

When the British took over the Cape, the Western dynamic had evolved considerably. The American and the French revolutions had taken place. The Napoleonic Wars had led to an upsurge of nationalism. Liberal thought was becoming dominant. Adam Smith had written the *Wealth of Nations*. Wilberforce led his campaign for the abolition of slavery. For the British too, the Cape was a backwater. But they felt their responsibility to protect the Hottentots against the Dutch settlers, to emancipate the slaves and to be an impartial arbiter between the colonists and the Black tribes on the Eastern frontier. British settlers also acquired the feudal-patriarchal mentality inherent in the situation, but on the basis of a general mindset which had advanced in terms of the Western dynamic if compared to that of the Dutch settlers who had arrived much earlier.
For the Dutch settlers this was a traumatic period which profoundly determined future developments. A triple pincer situation developed (for a more differentiating historical analysis of this period see Giliomee 1983:1-27):

(a) A feudal-patriarchal colonial mentality was confronted with the dynamic liberal spirit of Europe. The political authority of the latter slowly penetrated the settler communities from its centre in Cape Town.

(b) The subservient classes, Khoi-Khoi and slaves, discovered that they had an ally in the British authorities against their feudal masters and began to use this leverage to their own advantage.

(c) On the Eastern frontier they encountered the massive settlements of Black tribes who could not be subjugated. Between 1779 and 1834 a series of clashes occurred on the border. Often enough the authorities at the Cape, both Dutch and British, were seen to take sides with the Blacks.

The half century between 1779 and 1835 may have been the primal mould of the Afrikaner 'laager' mentality which - combined with remnants of the feudal-patriarchal spirit - continues as a strong undercurrent tradition even today. Social distance tests consistently revealed a much lower level of tolerance amongst Afrikaans speaking than amongst English speaking Whites over decades (see e.g. Schlemmer 1982e:11ff).

The settlers in the Cape colony had sufficient knowledge of the occurrences in Europe to cultivate a spirit of revolt against their Dutch and British colonial masters and to begin to long for their own independent republican form of government. But as can be expected from a feudal-patriarchal elite they did not share the emancipatory groundswell which characterised the revolutionary
spirit in Europe. On the contrary, they utilised these ideas selectively to strengthen their claim to a dominant position over the Hottentots, slaves and Blacks. When the pressures became too great to endure, a large number of the settler avant-garde on the Eastern frontier packed up their belongings and moved out of the Cape Colony in search of an area where they could establish republics on their own feudal-patriarchal terms.

However, the Western dynamic soon overtook them. The discovery of diamonds and gold poured secular materialism, ruthless entrepreneurship, chaotic urban development and technological advance into the feudal-patriarchal setup. At the same time Western imperialism reached its peak and the British conquered the whole of Southern Africa, including the Boer republics. Withdrawal was no longer possible and resistance was of no avail. Defeat, impoverishment and humiliation sapped the morale of the Afrikaner as much as that of the Blacks. Dependency and acquiescence became the only option for many.

Yet then a struggle to regain the initiative began. To a large extent it was made possible by the fact that Afrikaners, in contrast to other race groups, were granted full citizenship rights with the English. Fired by an exclusive ethnic nationalism the Afrikaners built their cultural institutions, gained political power and slowly but surely gained economic competitiveness (Adam 1979; de Klerk 1975).

This ethnic-nationalist movement seemed to be consonant with the traditional feudal-patriarchal mentality of the Afrikaner. At least it confirmed their claim to superiority over other race groups. But at the same time nationalism is the collective version of the Western dynamic pursuit of self-interest. Feudal-patriarchal thinking was forcefully transformed into a spirit of
ruthless competition (O'Meara 1983). The aim was to outwit, out-compete and out-manoeuvre the English and to keep any would-be competitiveness of other race groups at bay.

Both goals were achieved but with varying degrees of permanency. The English-speakers lost the initiative politically and are now a spent force in the cultural sphere. A process of integration and assimilation into the Afrikaner-dominated White society is under way. The Coloureds have long been the annexe of the Afrikaner cultural group and the Indians follow the English. But the Black majority is an insurmountable problem for Afrikaner cultural, political and economic hegemony. So far the basic principle of Afrikaner policies has been to enhance the competitiveness first of Afrikaners, then Whites, and curtail the competitiveness of other race groups - a principle which led to outright domination of Whites and direct repression of Blacks on a large scale.

However, Whites are not all on the same social level. Their structural position can be expected to lead to quite differing mental predispositions or 'moods'. Where the feudal-patriarchal system is still largely intact, as on many White farms, traditional dominance is still in evidence. No 'cheek' of subordinates is tolerated.

In contrast with this rather static mentality the economic and political elite has an enterprising spirit. Its security is derived from the certainty that it will always be able to outwit and out-perform its competitors. Therefore it can afford to be condescendingly liberal in outlook (Adam 1971).

The great number of Whites whom we classified as 'dependent but privileged' above, civil servants and salaried employees in
particular, display a mood of being *protected*. Their political party, their trade union, their social securities, their socio-economic privileges are a bulwark against threats.

Intellectuals feel rather *uncertain*. They know too much to believe a propaganda which suggests that all is well. Some liberals and radicals are aggressively against the system, some are cynical, some 'enlightened', some only troubled, some defensive, some compensate with an aggressive option for the system.

The lower class instinctively realises that it is threatened in the extreme - not only by the prospects of an eventual demolition of White privilege in the wake of a Black take-over but even by the slight shift of the political leadership away from White exclusiveness in commerce, industry, administration and government. Their mental predisposition is one of *compensatory self-assertion*: They have to display conspicuously that they are bosses because they are White.

A recent experience of mine (which could be multiplied) will highlight this mood better than many quotations from books. On one of the major motor dealers' premises in Pretoria I was looking for a spare part for my car. The sales counter was manned by three men each handling a micro-fiche apparatus: one Black, one Coloured and one White. The former two went about their business quietly. The White was exceptionally loud, jovial, and 'master of the situation'. From the outset it was clear that he had to compensate for the fact that the two others were doing the same job just as efficiently as he did. While I was still waiting for my turn, a Black man with a badge of the same firm on his overall passed by. The White salesman addressed him with the following words: "Man, jou pa het darem lelike kinders gemaak." (Man, your father really created ugly children!). When the Black man did not understand the first time, the words were repeated with a raised voice. I could not balance my feelings between indignation and pity. Here was a man who is, together with his whole social group, threatened by rapid social decline.
For all these strata of White society the basic interest is to remain in a dominant, or at least a privileged position. The ideological justification of the maintenance of their interests has, however, been rather complicated. As the dynamic competitive spirit ousted the static patriarchal world-view, a number of successive ideological stages ensued - one always slightly more 'liberal' in outlook, yet all geared to the maintenance of White domination. Let us look at this process in greater detail.

The feudal-patriarchal pattern is relatively stable because it is based on its own system of meaning and normative code. The lower class finds acceptance and belonging under the umbrella of the higher class. The Western dynamic pattern is also based on its system of meaning and normative system. As such it is stable in its ongoing movement. But it presupposes a situation of open competition. If the claim to innate superiority by the elite is carried over from the static feudal-patriarchal system into the dynamic competitive system, protective benevolence turns into oppressive domination. Such a situation is inherently unstable because the dominated obviously strive to get rid of the obstacles to their own competitiveness. The result is growing repression by the dominant to keep the revolt at bay.

Repression is not covered by the new system of meaning and its normative code. A barrage of criticism has, therefore, been showered upon the White ruling elite for decades. In order not to lose faith in one's own integrity one had to build up a system of rationalisations to support or disguise the repressive policies. Thus, five types of ideology have emerged:

(a) **Baasskap (lordship)**. Here the other race groups are supposed to be inferior because of their innate racial, cultural and intellectual characteristics and therefore
predestined to be subject to the White master race. The crisis of this rationalisation regularly comes when there is evidence of the potential competitiveness of the other race groups, particularly when through education and training Blacks advance beyond the level of the lower strata of the White community. The baasskap ideology will then invariably call for discriminatory and repressive policies "to keep them in their place" - which is, of course, a logical contradiction to the basic assumption of inherent inferiority.

(b) Guardianship. The other race groups are now supposed to be immature and the Whites have to accept responsibility for their welfare under the circumstances. This rationalisation is akin to the feudal-patriarchal mentality as well as the baasskap ideology. However, it yields to the dynamic spirit in that it theoretically allows for a time when the other race groups will be sufficiently advanced to determine their own destiny. The obstacles placed in the way of such advance (and the determined subjugation of precisely the most advanced) soon made this rationalisation sound hollow.

(c) Separate development. The slogan "separate but equal" seems to cater for two fundamental needs: (i) the preservation of White group identity and (ii) justice in the form of equality of opportunity. Blacks were to be conceded their own territories in which they could develop to the maximum of their own capacity on a par with the Whites, and gain their full economic and political independence. The demands of decolonisation and full competition seem to be met. But it did not take long before this rationalisation had also been unmasked. The Whites were not willing to make the sacrifices which would have been necessary to give the scheme at least some sort of credibility. Influx into the White controlled urban centres continued unabated. The attention of the aspiring Black elite could not be
diverted to the "homelands". Repression became more severe. At least its economic goals had to be abandoned as unrealistic. A new rationalisation had to be found.

(d) State security. The next rationalisation was that of a 'total strategy' necessary to ward off a communist inspired 'total onslaught' directed at the country as a whole. Racial overtones were avoided. Discrimination was recognised as evil. 'Ideology' has become a dirty word. Pragmatism and realism became the new foundations of policy (Posel 1982). Repressive measures, the build-up of considerable security and defence machines and the integration of all the country's resources into a common effort all found their legitimation. The only trouble is that aspiring Blacks cannot be convinced that the buildup of power is not directed against themselves. Neither can the Western friends of White South Africa.

(e) Technocracy. All along another rationalisation has been gaining ground among the White elite: White superiority in the field of science and technology is a fact which cannot be denied and bears a relevance which cannot be questioned. Africa is a 'dying continent'. White South Africa as a 'regional superpower' is the only hope for the subcontinent. Its scientific and technological expertise and its economic power make it the natural leader on the path of development. Its political stability and military might make it the guardian of peace and order in the whole region. Particularly the 'Black nations' and their 'national states' are dependent on its benign leadership. They would soon fall into the chaotic conditions one observes elsewhere in Africa if South Africa would withdraw its aid.

The problem is that leading Blacks within and outside the country do not see it this way. They consider the
presence of White South Africa to be oppressive rather than conducive to development, destabilising rather than stabilising. They do not welcome but resent White technocracy, whether in its administrative, economic, or military form. This is not because they are indifferent to the importance of technological progress, expertise and efficiency but because they want to break the virtual monopoly Whites have built up over decades in this respect.

The original patriarchal mentality and the five successive types of rationalisation overlap to a considerable degree (even within the same individual or group) to create more complex systems of argumentation. Most Whites are convinced that Blacks are not capable of running their own affairs, let alone those of South Africa as a whole. They need the guidance and control of Whites. This patriarchal, baasskap or guardianship attitude can claim that Blacks are given their own areas to show what they are able to do, and then register the failure of the homelands experiment with a kind of relief: "We told you so!"

On the other hand the emphasis on state security does not mean that the ideas of geographical segregation, homeland consolidation and ethnic independence have been abandoned as principles of practical politics. It is not easy to acknowledge the failure of a policy with which one has identified for decades. One will rather adjust it, to give it another lease on life. The incorporation of Black and White areas into development regions, allowing capital investments in the Black areas and the hesitant acknowledgement of the permanency of urban Blacks are such adjustments.

Yet pride and inflexibility are not the only reasons for maintaining a policy. The fact is that all these rationalisations are
still functional as ideological legitimations of White supremacy on various levels. The argument that Blacks are inherently inferior, can be used to explain the poverty and inefficiency of Blacks; the "separate but equal" argument can be used to justify group areas, black spot removals, the withholding of civil rights, influx control and migrant labour; the "total onslaught" idea explains the occurrence of terrorism, civil unrest, even challenging insights of intellectuals, or the exhortations of church leaders. The technocratic argument is particularly appealing since it presents a liberal rationale (thus one which seems to be acceptable in the modern world) in the face of the economic and political predicament of Africa south of the Sahara.

Although the arguments are logically inconsistent with each other, they do have a common root and can, therefore, be used variably without a sense of contradiction. The common root is that White domination cannot be abandoned and cries for some sort of legitimation.

Although the ideological justifications of White domination overlap to quite some extent, certain groups in society seem to have their particular emphases. For obvious reasons farmers are most likely to continue in their feudal-patriarchal frame of mind. White 'workers' (in fact supervisors of Black workers) are more in the baasskap mood and, if they rationalise their privileged position at all, are prone to share the guardianship ideology. 'You cannot trust a kaffir with a spanner.' Public servants, teachers, professionals, etc. are likely to cling to the separate development idea. The political, economic and military elite may be moving towards the abandonment of earlier rationalisations and towards the state security argument. Intellectuals will most easily subscribe to the technocratic view.
Thus there seems to be a definite shift of emphasis, not only in terms of historical time but also in terms of social strata. This may explain the crisis in the political self-understanding of the Afrikaner and the rift in Afrikaner political unity which emerged in the late seventies and early eighties. The extent and consequences of the latter cannot be fully assessed at this stage. What seems certain, however, is that it is at least partially due to a growing stratification within the Afrikaner community (Giliomee 1982:xvi).

There is a relatively small minority of Whites who strive for an open, non-racial and fully democratic society with various degrees of enthusiasm and various types of mental reservations or provisos (Rich 1984). To these belong a number of intellectuals, church leaders and business people. The ideological component of these attitudes lies in the minimisation of the importance of racial, cultural and class differences. The slogan "all men are equal" tends to boil down to the often quite naive (and imperialistic) expectation that all people share, or should share the one world culture - which is, essentially, our own European culture. (For the rare prophetic case of an Afrikaner intellectual who feels that White South Africans should turn African, see Kruger 1984).

Because Whites belonging to the lower classes would find it difficult to maintain their socio-economic position in an open society and have the greatest psychological need to be counted among the privileged, they are not likely to belong to this group of "liberals".

If all this is true, it should be possible to locate the different ideological emphases in the population-potency model. There must be some sort of correlation between the type of ideology
one finds most convincing and the position one happens to occupy in the system. We investigate this in chapters 8 and 9.

It can also be expected that the greatest number of Whites will share some sort of patriarchal, baaskap or guardianship conviction, followed by those who emphasise the "separate but equal" idea, then by the state security and technocracy categories and finally the tiny group of true liberals. In other words, we hypothesise that the pattern of rationalisations roughly corresponds with the population-potency model as far as Whites are concerned.

7.3.2 The underdog population groups

Both the Khoi-Khoi (Hottentot) and the San (Bushman) populations offered resistance to the colonial settlers almost immediately after the arrival of the latter at the Cape. The San were largely eradicated while the Khoi-Khoi were incorporated into colonial rule in various stages and, together with the Malayan slaves, finally became part of the conglomeration of groups today called the "Coloureds".

These groups were assimilated into the Cape Dutch culture to an overwhelming extent and are now part of the Afrikaner cultural group. For a long time their ambition has been to be recognised as such. To the self-understanding of the Afrikaner as part of the European family of nations and of the White ruling elite, this was emotionally impossible and politically not feasible in terms of Afrikaner interests. In fact, Apartheid has been applied to Coloureds with considerable harshness. The result has been the alienation of the latter from the Whites and at least partial solidarity with the Black cause.
The Indians are in a similar position, although their history in the country is much shorter. Some still speak their languages and keep to their cultural traditions at home, but in public life they have become an annexe to the White English language group. An immigrant group themselves, with a higher standard of living and a greater self-esteem in the stratification system of South African society than the Blacks, they are not popular among the latter and have little cause to feel at one with them. Their natural ambition is to be recognised by Whites as a potential part of the elite. Afrikaner reaction to their claim has been even fiercer than in the case of the Coloureds. This drove them into the camp of Black solidarity to some extent almost in spite of themselves.

The separate-development era left a policy vacuum concerning Coloureds and Asians, apart from overall discriminatory principles such as 'group areas', etc. The new constitution seems to indicate a direction in which

(a) these groups are co-opted partially into the White power structure with at least some liberties and privileges, yet

(b) they are not integrated into the White elite but kept subordinate to and separate from the latter.

The rationale seems to be to maintain the White racial identity undiluted and the White power base intact while strengthening the latter by giving to the aspiring elites of the other race groups a stake in the system. The relatively positive response of these groups to the new constitution - at least in its pre-implementation stage - betrayed their true structure-induced mental predisposition. Solidarity with the "Black struggle" embodied in the United Democratic Front, reversed this initial tendency as a matter of practical politics.
Blacks have resisted the impact of White domination from the outset - not only by force of arms but also by fortifying their cultural and social cohesion (Wilson 1969 part I:256ff). When their defences gave way those who could afford it, withdrew into their old traditions. There are groups of considerable strength in the Black areas who have maintained that attitude up to present times. Where this stronghold breaks down, anomy is the result.

For others the most natural way was into dependency. This is the overruling pattern on White farms and in White households. It may also occur in smaller firms where there is a minimum of stable personal relationships. Many of those who belonged to Black communities in White rural areas have been moved out and resettled, many of them without land rights and far from employment opportunities. Under these circumstances a great deal of anomy can be expected to flourish.

Dependency moves either in the direction of acquiescence or of ambition. The latter was the motive of the groups supporting the ANC in its liberal (pre-1960) phase. They wanted to be granted access to the social elite, then composed entirely of Whites, who had become their reference group. The older generation often settles for the former. The efforts of their youth to move beyond acquiescence have been frustrated so often that their spiritual energy is exhausted. The younger generation usually continues to be ambitious. Education and training are prime goals. Those who are unable to attain higher levels because of poverty, lack of opportunity or intelligence fall into anomy. The neglected, unschooled and unemployed youth makes up a large proportion of the marginalised population in Black areas and the townships in White urban areas.
Some of those who are relatively successful are absorbed into the higher class of the segregated Black community, especially the bureaucracy of the "Black States". Here the temptation to revert to a feudal-patriarchal mentality is great. One is placed in a position of status and power with little competition and the population entrusted to your care expects you to be, or at least tolerates you, as a 'little chief'. This is one of the reasons for the occurrence of corruption and lack of efficiency in the Black bureaucracy. Such things regularly seem to occur in cases where a small elite moves into a power vacuum without competition, controls or countervailing powers.

Others would like to push through to full competitiveness with Whites but are frustrated in the process. The result is a spirit of revolt. It is particularly marked among the most advanced on the ladder of acculturation - students and young intellectuals. Their basic aim is to remove obstacles to their own advance and their resources of spiritual energy are still largely untapped. They may leave the country for training in guerilla warfare or anti-apartheid diplomacy when pressures become too great. But many find their way into commerce and industry where they become integrated somewhere in the hierarchy of the existing system. Depending on circumstances, ability and opportunity, a minority may eventually become fully competitive.

Meanwhile the acceleration of social processes has overtaken the sequence of generations. High school and primary school students have taken over the initiative for the struggle of liberation. The Soweto riots were, although eventually quelled, a signal. Youngsters openly accused their elders and teachers of having failed. Increasingly fearless and ruthless, they are determined to bring about the long awaited social transformation. The immediate cause of the new upsurge of violence was the
referendum and the implementation of the new constitution. Here Blacks finally realised that they are to be left out of a new dispensation. Geared to communal values Blacks can endure a lot of hardship and humiliation. But to be cast out is unbearable. One either had to accept being an outcast, or one had to fight for supremacy.

The main interest of Blacks has been to overcome their inferior social, economic and political position. But the ideological legitimation of the "struggle" has moved through a number of stages. From the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 to the beginning of World War II Black movements followed the strategy of petitions. From about 1940 to about 1950 the strategy turned to protest, after that to defiance. The Sharpeville incident and subsequent banning of the major Black political movements, the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress, led to the strategy of sabotage and finally, since about 1980, to what they consider to be guerilla warfare and what the White authorities consider to be terrorism. The latest stage is the attempt to make Black urban and rural areas "ungovernable". During this time the ideological background of Black movements turned from a basically liberal spirit which sought nothing but a place in the (Western) sun for Blacks, to Black Consciousness where the main pre-occupation was gaining one's own identity and generating one's own power so as to be able to counter White superiority, and ultimately to class analysis rather than race analysis with a marked tendency to accept Marxist presuppositions and explanations. The latter phase corresponds with a massive come-back of the ANC in internal Black politics.
NOTES

1. Sociomonitor (Market Research Africa) found the following typical groups in Black urban areas (reported by The Star, airmail ed. 14-1-84):

(a) The *motivated* : interested in improving racial harmony; prepared to work hard for better houses, higher standards of living and better jobs; concerned about fitness and health. Stated to cover 31% of literate urban Blacks.

(b) The *frustrated* : resentful of being exploited as consumers and workers; distancing themselves from materialistic goals; not interested in racial harmony and 'pragmatism' which in their view brought them nowhere. Most are youths with low educational standards, coming from poor and crowded homes.

(c) The *traditional* : concerned about the security, future and wellbeing of authority, elders, and tribal law; reassured by familiar patterns; increasingly involved in religion. Said to cover 22% in 1982.

(d) The *swingers* : Youth with frustrated education; very conscious of their image which they display by defiance of authority, use of alcohol, etc. - particularly over against their own set.

It is clear how these categories fit into our own scheme with the exception of the 'traditional' which display characteristics of dependency, acquiescence and ambition - probably a typical phenomenon.

2. In his work for the Buthelezi Commission, Schlemmer produced some remarkable findings which are relevant to our theme (1982d).

(a) The level of political dissatisfaction has been rising considerably between 1977 and 1981. Thus men in KwaZulu and the Reef who chose 'angry and impatient' from a continuum ranging from 'very happy' to 'angry and impatient' rose from 39% to 53-56% (p.4).

The occurrence of the self-rating 'angry and impatient' rose continuously with level of education and was higher on the Witwatersrand than in rural areas: Wits, below Std. 2 : 48% : with degree : 80%. Natal/KwaZulu : below Std. 2 : 29% : with degree : 64%.
On the Witwatersrand those choosing 'angry and impatient' rose consistently with higher incomes: from 47% (R1 - 79 p.m.) to 83% (R500 or more). In Natal/KwaZulu the higher income groups showed a slight drop, the highest occurrence being in the income group R250 - 299 viz. 64% (p.5). This could be an indication of the 'reversion' category amongst higher income groups in KwaZulu. We also remember that cP is privileged but dependent on cC and thus less likely to opt for the enemies of cC. In this regard the social control of Inkatha, a typical cP-party, should not be underestimated (for these abbreviations cf. chapter 3).

A question which asked how many Blacks would help ANC guerillas when requested to do so, was answered as follows: most 19%, many 29%, a few 29%, nobody 8%.

Indications for support for the ANC rose with educational level and urban location (from 5% for Natal/KwaZulu below Std. 2, to 60% for Witwatersrand above Std. 10). However, the support for the ANC dropped slightly among people with degrees - and more so on the Witwatersrand than in Natal (40% vs 50%). Do they have too much to lose?

A question asking what would happen if there was no change in the next 10 years, was answered as follows:

'Blacks will be too frightened of police/army to act' : 9%.
'Many more will leave the country for military training' : 56%.
'Mass strikes by Black workers' : 65%.
'Bloodshed / war / revolution' was spontaneously added by 98% of respondents (p.6).

There was no significant difference between Witwatersrand and KwaZulu respondents.

(b) That equality with the White reference group is of vastly higher priority than mere material progress came out in the following responses (Schlemmer 1982d :9): 'Blacks and Whites receive same salaries for the same jobs with very small increases' : 90% preference.
'Black and White salaries stay unequal for some years but everybody gets quite large regular increases' : 10%.

(Comment: When salaries are as unequal as our analysis in chapter 3 has shown, equality with Whites is perceived to be of much higher material benefit than mere increases because it normally does not occur to people that equalisation may mean that salaries of privileged people have to
drop considerably. But there are three further factors: (i) In a competitive society equal opportunity is more important than immediate material benefits. (ii) The self-image of Blacks has been traumatised and equality of dignity is more important than material income. (iii) Traditional African culture has an egalitarian tendency.)

3. The problem of acquiescence of South African Blacks is treated extensively by Petryszak (1967:453ff). More particularly this attitude goes along with what the author terms 'genosuicidal' characteristics: in-group aggression (crime), promiscuity, alcohol and drugs, witchcraft and ritual magic, religious adherence, ethnic solidarity, conformity because of fear etc. (For crime in metropolitan areas see Gentle 1984).

In the underdog population groups there are many religious justifications. The ancestral religion can be used to justify a withdrawal into tribal traditions. Mental dependency, acquiescence, reversion and integration can all be based on the mentality of African religions, but they can also be underpinned by submission to the Biblical God and the authorities he has appointed.

In contrast, African Christians can discover that they have a right to be considered creatures of God, pardoned sinners, accepted children of God with equal dignity and entitled to equal rights with Whites. They will then become loathe to tolerate their underdog position and claim their birthright. Frustrated in their attempt to attain recognition they will begin to revolt in the name of God. Black Theology is one of the major expressions of this revolt with defiant religious undertones. The fact that the same Biblical religion can be used to underpin such divergent motivational levels is a clear indication that justification of respective interests is taking place.

Although Blacks are less secularised than Whites and therefore more inclined towards religious justifications, this does not mean
that secular ideological aspects do not play a prominent role. The Zulu kingdom founded by Shaka, for instance, had a particularly powerful military ideology. Feudal-patriarchal arguments paradoxically also serve the underdog in justifying their subservience. The liberal spirit gleaned from the Whites underpins Black ambition. Idealised tribal customs function as justification for reversion in the Black bureaucratic leadership. Revolt can draw on the liberal spirit with its latent revolutionary fervour, develop into 'Black Power' ideology and assimilate radical socialist (increasingly Marxist) patterns of thought. Those who become integrated or competitive are likely to fall back on liberal capitalist achievement doctrines.

7.4 SUMMARY

This chapter gave a brief review of the emergence of structure-induced mental predispositions, first in general colonial history, then in the South African case.

In Europe a unique spirit of conquest, exploration and control led not only to modern science and technology but also to the massive accumulation of power and the domination of the rest of mankind by a few nations of the northern hemisphere (7.2.1).

A number of typical reactions emerged among the dominated, ranging from primary resistance and withdrawal, through dependence, ambition and revolt, to integration and competitiveness (7.2.2). The crisis in the self-confidence and viability of their Western reference group has serious consequences for the acculturating underdog population groups too (7.2.3).

Recent South African history took place in the context of general colonial history. Of particular importance was the threat to the
first wave of colonists (the emerging Afrikaner) by the second wave of colonisers (British imperialists) and by the Black colonised majority. The need for continuing domination led to a series of ideological self-justifications among the offspring of these various waves of colonisers, viz. South African Whites (7.3.1).

The indigenous population groups reacted to conquest and domination in much the same way as spelt out above, with significant local peculiarities (7.3.2).

The overall picture which emerges in this chapter is that in spite of the complexity of actual attitudes amongst Whites and Blacks in South Africa, a certain degree of predictability exists when one looks at the mental predispositions of social groups, induced by their respective location in the evolving structure of a society characterised by domination and subjugation.