The formation of the University of Johannesburg

Benito Khotseng

This chapter, based primarily on secondary sources, discusses the merger of the Rand Afrikaans University (RAU), a historically advantaged, Afrikaans-medium institution; Technikon Witwatersrand (TWR), a historically advantaged, English-medium technical institution; and the incorporation of East Rand and Soweto campuses of Vista University, a historically disadvantaged institution. The new institution, the University of Johannesburg, was legally formed on 1 January 2005. In the second set of national mergers, therefore, the initially reluctant partners found themselves facing a merger framework which had already been tried and tested and found to be quite airtight by previous 'dissenters' (such as the partners in the new Unisa). Attention here is focused on debates that took place at each campus and the role played by the internal and external stakeholders in the merger process. Aspects of specific institutional culture are not foregrounded due to lack of primary project research on the campuses, but they are alluded to parenthetically. The chapter argues that once the initial resistance of the largest partner, RAU, faded, the institution's operational and managerial strengths made it the dominant partner in the new merger. This was quite ironic, given that TWR had been more receptive to the idea of the merger proposals.

The process of merging Rand Afrikaans University (RAU) and Technikon Witwatersrand (TWR), and the simultaneous incorporation of the East Rand and Soweto campuses of Vista University, generated protracted and tough debates among the stakeholders of the three institutions. In my opinion, there were three main reasons for such intense discussions: the desire for each institution to change as little as possible in the transformation process, to protect its turf and the fear of becoming part of an unknown entity: a comprehensive university. The merger process was therefore debated thoroughly by all internal and external stakeholders at all campuses. This debate occurred in conditions of shifting sands, as the original report of the National Working Group of February 2002 recommended that RAU and TWR remain as independent institutions. The NWG felt that they should not merge with any institution given their efficiency in their respective roles and sound academic histories.

In the phase of institutional comment that followed the release of the report, RAU was positive about the recommendations. The reaction of the
university, through the rector, was that the university was pleased with the way that the Working Group had considered the problem. The assurance that the institution would remain independent on condition that it was transforming and cooperating with other Gauteng universities to eliminate duplication of programmes was also accepted. According to the rector, this was in line with the initiatives that RAU, the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) and TWR had already taken to eliminate duplication and promote greater cooperation. The widespread commonsense/public expectation that the two universities, RAU and Wits, might be directed to merge fell away; the report did not mention anything along those lines. The fact that the report highlighted the need for the three Gauteng universities – the University of Pretoria, Wits and RAU – to cooperate in order to promote access and equity was seen by RAU’s management as an implicit assurance that RAU would remain an independent institution in the future. The response of the TWR to the report was also generally positive and it supported the recommendations.1 The only concern expressed through the office of the vice-Chancellor was that the report ‘is silent on the fact that the technikon sector is a relatively new one which deserves a totally different treatment …’.2 On the whole, however, TWR supported the NWG report, which was described as a progressive piece of work in higher education.

During 2002, however, the National Department of Education made drastic changes to the NWG recommendations, and submitted a revised set to the national cabinet for final approval. In contrast to the Group’s recommendations, the government proposals in mid 2002 recommended that TWR should merge with RAU and incorporate the Soweto and East Rand campuses of Vista University in order to form a comprehensive institution.

This announcement by the Minister of Education sparked enormously negative responses – even in historically Afrikaans higher education institutions, which were traditionally regarded as submissive to the state. Institutions and staff questioned the extensive powers that the Minister of Education had to drive the merger process. Some felt that the process of institutional merger and closure was too complex to be driven by formal power alone. It was warned that the involvement and cooperation of all stakeholders was critical, or else the process of merger would fail.

Yes and no

The initial response on the proposed merger of RAU and TWR with the incorporation of Soweto and East Rand Vista campuses came from the Vice-Chancellor of TWR on 31 May 2002. In the media release, the Vice-Chancellor expressed TWR’s disappointment with the merger recommendation. TWR stated that it was supportive of the Minister’s call for the restructuring of higher education, but did not see any rationale for the proposed merger with RAU.
and the campuses of Vista University. She told the staff and students that TWR management had not received sufficient reasons for the proposed merger, but indicated that she would use the next three months to consult internally and externally with the technikon’s stakeholders. She assured them that she would be the champion for TWR throughout the process and would communicate with them on an ongoing basis. At RAU, meanwhile, there was no initial response in either voice or action from management or staff; all was quiet – as if RAU had not been directly affected.

In pursuance of the promise to involve staff and students in the merger process, in the Bulletin 06/2002 of 5 June, the TWR Vice-Chancellor called on staff to air their views about the proposed merger between TWR and RAU and the Vista campuses. She asked them to give reasons why TWR should remain a ‘stand-alone’ institution. She assured them that the responses would be taken to a TWR management conference which would convene the following week. In the management meeting held on 10–12 June (which for the first time included the labour unions), the stakeholders present took a u-turn in their outlook on the merger. They decided to ‘take the initiative to enhance the status of technological education in Gauteng’ through recommending to TWR Council that the merger be approved and a merger forum and merger working groups be constituted. The TWR Council met urgently the following day and unanimously approved the recommendations of management. It further decided to engage the National Department of Education positively in the creation of a dynamic, comprehensive institution. On 14 June, the Vice-Chancellor sent out a bulletin to staff in which she reported these recent developments.

Following the meeting of TWR council, a Merger Working Group was constituted. It was mandated to consult regularly and keep the TWR campus abreast of merger developments. This was followed by the circular in which the Vice-Chancellor encouraged all staff to keep communication channels open and air their views about the possible merger between TWR, RAU and the Vista campuses. Noting the divergent views that were being articulated in the media about the mergers and how they would adversely affect the institutions, the Vice-Chancellor attempted to explain to staff and students what the envisaged new institutional landscape for South African higher education would be and how it would affect TWR. For the first time, she called on TWR students to send their views and questions on the merger to an email address on campus.

In the media release of 31 July 2002 entitled ‘The Future … Taking the Initiative’, the Vice-Chancellor stated that TWR had taken a stance to position itself strongly in the new comprehensive institution that would be created through the merging of RAU with TWR and the two Vista campuses. The merged comprehensive institution would have a student body of 34 000, a challenge which TWR was prepared to face. She assured the institution’s external stakeholders (business and industry) that the culture of TWR and
tradition of working in close partnership with them would be retained in the new institution.

The situation was very different at RAU. Its Senate eventually rejected the merger proposals and asked the Ministry of Education to provide reasons why it had overlooked the NWG’s recommendations that RAU should be retained as a separate institution. In a critical reaction, the RAU Senate declared: ‘We deplore the decision by Cabinet. The proposal places the future of these two institutions at serious risk.’

During discussions with the Minister on 12 August 2002, RAU management was invited to submit alternative restructuring proposals. The resulting position paper accepted the incorporation of the East Rand and Soweto Campuses of Vista University into RAU, but continued to reject a merger with TWR on the grounds that it was neither a cost-effective nor innovative response to the higher educational requirements of the region.

At the same time, the TWR communications office issued a press release in which it indicated that TWR would continue to help build a new South Africa: ‘We are taking the initiative in contributing to unique, dynamic bid of higher education committed to greater access, enhanced productivity, but above all, committed to excellence in teaching, learning, research and community outreach.’ The Minister of Education welcomed TWR’s acknowledgment of the benefits of the merger of the three institutions; he believed TWR had done its homework well and looked forward to receipt of its proposals at the end of October. The Minister’s statement was followed by the report of the *Sunday Times* newspaper of 4 August 2002, in which it was stated that TWR had embraced the proposed merger while RAU remained opposed to the idea. According to the TWR Vice-Chancellor, the merger posed no problem if everybody saw it as a golden opportunity.

With the closing date for comments on the merger looming, RAU management was still engaged in the process of engaging all stakeholders with a view to finding a common strategy. The rejection of the merger by the Senate was unanimously endorsed by the academic staff and the labour unions. All agreed that while there was no justification for merging RAU with TWR, they supported the merger with the two Vista University campuses. They felt that a merger with TWR would undermine the process of transformation that was taking place at RAU, and that a forced merger between two historically advantaged institutions did nothing to address historical apartheid divisions.

The academic staff also wanted to know why Minister Asmal had rejected the recommendations of the NWG regarding RAU. As the debate on the RAU and TWR merger continued, the black academic staff at RAU – as a branch of the National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (Nehawu) – also voiced their rejection of the merger. Like the Senate and university management, black staff was supportive of the incorporation of the two Vista University campuses.
into RAU, but rejected the merger between RAU and TWR. They were of the opinion that the proposed merger would not achieve the desired results of transformation: 'We are concerned that the proposed merger would wreck a stable and well-functioning university and a successful technikon,' they noted. They suggested to the Minister that a Merger Investigation Task Team for RAU and TWR be established in preference to any forced merger based on proposals by the Minister, and that RAU should hasten its transformation through the appointment of a special Transformation Committee.

Noting the stance that had been taken by the Senate and internal organisations, the RAU Council subsequently rejected the Ministry's proposals on RAU and TWR. Council felt that the proposed merger of RAU and TWR had not been adequately thought through. Its argument was that the two institutions were both large and successful, and there were no overlaps in terms of academic disciplines and programmes. The council emphasised that the rejection of the merger should not be seen as anti-transformation, because they favoured the merger with two local Vista University campuses.

Despite RAU's intransigence, the acting Vice-Chancellor of TWR informed staff and students that meetings between the managements of RAU and TWR had taken place. In September, the stance of TWR on the proposed merger was reiterated and published in local and national newspapers. During November, TWR management called for submissions on the name of a new institution from internal and external stakeholders.

It is not clear how the process was conducted, but from the list of submissions received, the following names were put forward for further debate: University of Johannesburg, University of Gauteng and Egoli University. Meanwhile, new academic programmes for the new institution were being developed under the leadership of Professor Tyobeka.

On 9 December 2002, the Ministry of Education made a final announcement regarding restructuring and configuration of the institutional landscape of higher education. The Minister indicated that the mergers would herald the beginning of a new era for higher education in South Africa. He highlighted key transformational aspects such as the racial and gender profiles of staff which, he asserted, would change to reflect the race and gender balance of the country. Further, language policies would receive urgent attention in transformation of all institutional processes. The Minister also announced the establishment of a Merger Unit within the higher education branch of the Department of Education to facilitate the mergers and ensure stability of institutions. RAU and TWR were among the institutions that the Minister again announced would merge to form one of the new comprehensive universities. The East Rand and Soweto Vista university campuses would be incorporated into the new institution. According to the Minister, the comprehensive institutions
represented a creative contribution to the restructuring of higher education, and he urged all stakeholders to work together on these exciting developments.8

Responding to the Minister of Education’s final decision to merge RAU and TWR, the RAU Council issued a statement indicating that it welcomed the Ministry’s initiatives to stabilise and strengthen the higher education system, which would result in the development of a more responsive national system of higher quality. Further, Council aligned itself with the views expressed by Senate, Nehawu and management supporting the incorporation of two Vista campuses as a novel opportunity to extend the educational domain of RAU and directly serve a broader community. Council committed itself to supporting the initiative, as it believed it to be the most logical way to achieve transformation.

However, Council continued to reject the merger between RAU and TWR, and indicated that the university would only collaborate in a process of institutional cooperation, which they regarded as a more prudent and cost-effective reconfiguration, than a forced merger. As its final step, Council asked the Ministry to provide it with written reasons for effecting the merger between RAU and TWR. It also indicated to the Ministry that irrespective of the decision on the way forward, RAU would continue to expand the whole spectrum of quality programmes on offer and engage in high-level research.9

A change of heart

When the 2003 academic year commenced in mid January, the Vice-Chancellor of TWR reminded staff and students that the Minister of Education was expecting from all stakeholders an indication of the preferred name, address and date of establishment of the new institution by the end of June 2003. The various parties would also be expected to submit names of nominees for appointment to the interim council. In the Bulletin of 19 February 2003, the Vice-Chancellor informed staff and students that she had appointed a Merger Coordinator. His tasks would be to represent TWR in merger discussions and to inform the TWR community on all matters relating to the merger.

The tide was turning. After an extraordinary meeting of the RAU Council held on 27 February 2003, it was announced that the RAU Council had decided to accept in principle the Minister’s desire to merge RAU and TWR.10 The decision was reached after in-depth analysis of issues relating to the future of RAU, ‘provided, however, that prior agreement on certain crucial conditions can be reached’.11

Council also mandated the management committee of RAU to approach its counterparts at TWR to prepare for a process of consultation and planning concerning key issues that would affect the creation of the new university: these included financial sustainability, protection of interests of staff, arrangements that would protect the standard and integrity of current academic programmes,
and language policy. The RAU Council argued that the merger would succeed only if the planning process led to the establishment of an institution that was more than a university in the traditional sense, but strove for world-class status. Importantly, Council also indicated that if agreement on its pre-conditions for merger negotiations could not be reached, RAU would withdraw its participation, while remaining committed to the merger process. In the meantime, the Vice-Chancellor of TWR informed staff and students that the RAU Council had accepted in principle the merger between TWR and RAU, news which she welcomed.

RAU management immediately sent out a circular entitled ‘About RAU and the Merger’, in which it explained to staff, students and the community why the merger and incorporation had been accepted, and how it would affect RAU and its staff and students. Issues such as academic standards and the timing of the merger process were explained. The University management also assured staff and students that RAU would ensure that the status of the new university lived up to the reputation and prestige that RAU enjoyed, and that quality assurance would remain central to all academic endeavours. The incorporation of Vista campuses would be completed by January 2004, while the official date for the mergers between RAU and TWR was January 2005. Management called on staff and students to support the process, as it would require the concerted effort of all stakeholders. It gave the assurance that RAU Council and management committee would act in the best interest of every RAU stakeholder, and it would do everything possible to preserve and sustain the proud heritage and reputation that had been established through commitment to excellence in teaching, research and community service over the past decades.

Once the RAU Council had agreed on the incorporation of The Vista University campuses and the merger with TWR, inter-institutional restructuring processes were started. Senior managers of RAU and TWR met on 11 March 2003. Task teams were then constituted. The academic task team would engage in exchanging and analysing data in respect of academic activities, and a joint management task team would address issues of immediate concerns such as the name of new institution. In the meantime, RAU had established a Restructuring Office to support all the processes required to effect a successful merger and incorporation. RAU also volunteered to staff the office. Both the restructuring and management committees, which were led by RAU, met once a week.

The entry of RAU into merger and incorporation processes changed the role of TWR, as RAU took over the leadership. Merger activities that TWR had already completed were repeated. In the Bulletin of May 2003, the TWR merger manager, Mr. Alf Higgo, informed TWR staff and students that a merger co-coordinating team had been appointed. The team would work with a similar team at RAU. Working groups had been formed to focus attention on merger issues in academic, finance, human resource and infrastructure areas, and to
ensure continuity in a number of academic and support areas. They were also to define features and structures that were required for the new institution. Committees were also established to ensure broad consultation and participation at all levels. Joint representation was set up in the Restructuring Office and Student Representation Councils. A joint steering committee was elected to oversee the merger process, and a joint web-page was created to inform both RAU and TWR communities. The most pressing issues for RAU and TWR were the immediate presentation to the minister of the preferred name for the new institution, and a list of names from which he would select the Interim Council.

A process to develop the vision, mission and core values for the new university was launched. Formal workshops for delegates from various departments and divisions of RAU and TWR were organised. This resulted in the formulation of a preliminary vision and mission statement that would ensure that the institution was a truly comprehensive institution which combined the strengths of the existing institutions to best serve the needs of the community, region and country.

In the Bulletin of June 2003, the Vice-Chancellor of TWR stated that the process of naming the new institution was to start. It would be inclusive and consultative, and would be preceded by a joint press advertisement of RAU and TWR. She called on staff and students to submit their preferred names before 23 July.

On 8 July 2003, the Department of Education hosted a meeting in Pretoria to which delegates from RAU, TWR and Vista University were invited. Its aim was to review the progress in the merger and incorporation processes. A follow-up meeting of managers was held on 17 July at RAU.

Once the merger and incorporation had been accepted in principle by all campuses, numerous comments were received from staff and students. Most individuals and groups articulated their support for the merger, and reflected on the strain of having to work in separate campuses which were in fact so close together. Significantly, very few students rejected the merger. Here are some comments gleaned from the website:

I'm from TWR and personally support the merger. I hope the merger will both transform RAU and TWR. Since the TWR has the best IT School in SA, the merger will certainly improve RAU's school of IT. It would have been much better if the merger [also] included Wits.

Just to let u know RAU has the best IT department. How many computers do you have? 100? Shame ... Statistics have proved that a lot of TWR students come to do their post grad in IT here at RAU.

I think that amalgamation will be great for RAU because this will contribute to the competitiveness with other universities around the world. Go for it, that's great.
There were also critical comments:

The minister should rather focus on merging thousands of colleges in the country in which some of them mislead many matriculants by promising them better education and jobs after their studies...

So merger will imply that the name called RAU will diminish and what about the history and reputation of the university? Our qualifications in ten years down the line will be outdated.

Some students from TWR were worried about a potential increase in dropouts, since RAU had relatively high academic standards and was now providing the leading voice in the merger. Their thinking was that RAU would not allow its standards to be lowered to accommodate those of other institutions. 'Perhaps TWR students might cope, but looking at students from Vista, it will be rather difficult to adjust.'

Although TWR students were generally positive about the merger, they still had fears about accessibility of the new institution. They were also fearful of how increased fees would affect them. Would students from disadvantaged backgrounds not be excluded through higher standards and much higher (perhaps comparatively exhorbitant) tuition fees? Similarly, staff members saw value in the merger, but feared job losses in the process. They were, however, happy with the process since they had been involved in all decision-making. 'The merger between TWR and RAU is a major challenge for both institutions. It can only be good from student’s perspective but will mean major job losses at both institutions.'

It is evident that most students from RAU and TWR were positive about the merger. The main concern of RAU students was the possibility that entry and assessment standards might be lowered to accommodate students from other campuses. They were confident, however, that such fears would be addressed. They were certain that they would still have their degrees and did not anticipate that academic programmes would change dramatically. Some were worried that students from Vista University campus might fail in large numbers, a situation which would not be acceptable.

**What’s in a name?**

During July and August 2003, public meetings were convened at the campuses of RAU, TWR and Vista University to debate the name of the new institution. The external stakeholders were also invited through the media to submit suggestions. At TWR, public meetings were held on 31 July at Doornfontein campus and on 5 August at Auckland Park campus.

As the work of choosing a new institutional name continued, a parallel process of public consultation was instituted by the three institutions to ensure
transparency and participation by all stakeholders. The public was invited via the media to submit further proposals, and extensive campaigns were launched at all campuses to solicit support. After all proposals had been consolidated, voting on the preferred name was conducted at all campuses. At the same time, the different Senates, Student Representative Councils and Institutional Forums had the opportunity to vote on the name, where after it was referred to respective Councils for endorsement.

In a joint meeting, the Councils of RAU and TWR proposed that the interim name ‘University of Johannesburg’ be used for the new comprehensive institution. They agreed that the name was ideal and suitable, for it provided necessary national and international recognition, and that it would bind all stakeholders of the new institution. In their first joint letter to the Minister of Education on 29 August, RAU and TWR stated: ‘It is the two councils’ belief that this name not only reflects the new University’s geographical locality, but also the vibrant spirit and economical, industrial and business acumen associated with it.12

Once the preferred name of the new university had been made known, different views and opinions were articulated by students from all the campuses. Most of the responses from students were published in the Kampus Beeld, the RAU students’ newspaper.11

The Kampus Beeld of 17 September 2003 had as its headline: ‘Groot gemors oor naam!’ (‘Big mess on the name!’) According to the editor, students felt that the name change was unconstitutional, not transparent and unnecessary.

Ek wil nie my graad by Universiteit van Johannesburg kry nie. Watter kredietwaardigheid het dit dan? (I do not want to get my degree at a University of Johannesburg. Is it credit worthy?)

Ek hou nie van ander naam nie. Die naam Johannesburg maak die koppeling met misdaad en dit kan die Universiteit met ’n slegte beeld gee!! (I don’t like the other name. The name Johannesburg is associated with crime and it will give a bad image to the university!!)

Ons is die RAU en die RAU sal ons bly. (We are RAU and shall stay RAU.)

Ek dink dis gepas want almal waarmee ons Saamsmelt is mos in Johannesburg. (I think it fits because we all meet in Johannesburg.)

I don’t have a problem with it. I think everything will stay the same.

Students from TWR did not respond to the issue of the preferred name for the new institution, as they were protesting against strict rules in their residences at this time; indeed, TWR had to be closed for several weeks.14 Thus RAU students were alone in commenting on the issue at this critical moment.
In October 2003, the TWR communication office issued a statement on the future model for the functioning of the merger. The release explained the options TWR management had developed for the efficient functioning of the new institution. It indicated that the institution could be a University of Technology – with a university campus and a technology campus – or it could function as a comprehensive technological institute with different campuses and multi-level facilities. The last option was an Institute of Technology for Gauteng. The staff was again asked to make suggestions.

On 22 October, the staff and students of RAU and TWR were informed that the Minister of Education had accepted the joint recommendation that the new institution be called University of Johannesburg and that the date for the merger would be 1 January 2005. An interim council – consisting of Dr. Ihron Rensberg, Prof. E.H. Davies, Mr. A.S. du Plessis, Mr. M.C. Geghardt, Dr. R.D. Marcus, Mr. D. Mpofú, Mr. L. Ndlovu, Mr. M.S. Phalatse and Ms. J. Siwani – was appointed by the Minister. At a meeting between the two Vice-Chancellors and senior management members, it was agreed that future planning for RAU and TWR should be done jointly. The merger coordinators from the two institutions would form a task team charged with the responsibility for joint planning. One of the merger coordinators would be elected by the Vice-Chancellors to lead the team from a central point.

On 10 March 2004, the first issue of EMERGE was distributed on the RAU and TWR campus. This newsletter was intended to inform all stakeholders on relevant merger news regarding the University of Johannesburg.

By the end of April 2004, the two institutions had laid sound groundwork for the merger to take place in January 2005. Although good progress had been made, there was still a feeling from RAU management that the merger might not bring that many academic changes. The academic programmes offered by RAU would continue. The use of Afrikaans and English as mediums of instruction would be maintained, even though TWR was an English-medium institution.

Conclusion: Looking backwards to look forward

This study of the early phases of the formation of the University of Johannesburg through the merging of RAU and TWR and the incorporation of the two Vista campuses has shown what may in the end amount to a virtual takeover of smaller, less prestigious institutions, by a stronger partner. RAU made gains through agreeing to the merger: a new name that was not linked to apartheid-era history; access to new resources and educational reach in the merger; and perhaps even the spread of the Afrikaans language into new areas of instruction. In its pre-merger discourses, once RAU had bowed to the inevitability of the merger, it remained true to its underlying determination to change as little as
possible. This orientation was displayed throughout the pre-merger stages. At TWR, on the other hand, the initial hopes of spreading the vision and reach of its technologically oriented perspective through a new comprehensive institution for Gauteng seemed gradually to fade. Further research is needed to ascertain whether these pre-merger dynamics contributed to the development of an operationally stronger, or weaker, institution. The extent of transformation, in terms of organisational and operational cultures, also remains to be assessed.
What we as an institution have placed at the centre of our mission is to develop excellence in our capacity to deal with educational disadvantage. We have done that and we pride ourselves on being leaders in that field in spite of the fact that the government does not fund bridging support and academic development activities. We know, however, that until South African universities learn to gear themselves to the needs of the majority of the population, and their historically induced educational deprivation, they will wittingly or unwittingly be reproducing the essentials of the apartheid-racial order.¹ (emphasis added)

This quote from Prof. Jakes Gerwel in 1991 succinctly sums up the tasks of the higher education restructuring mission that South Africa took on in 2002: to serve the majority, to address the deprivation with which it was burdened, and to break the heavy links of inequality that apartheid had forged in higher education. Although our choice of institutions and our timeframe were, of necessity, limited, what do our case studies tell us about whether or not the higher education system is moving – however slowly or incrementally – towards freeing itself of the ‘apartheid-racial order’?

Micro-level commonalities in our findings

As noted in Chapter 1, our study collected an enormous amount of micro-level detail about the ins and outs of pre-merger phase developments on our campuses. This section presents the main issues around which these details cohered: operational culture, the fate of legal challenges, interim leadership, the role of the Department of Education Merger Unit, fee levels and academic arrangements for students, differences in negotiating power across institutions, financial and human resources costs, and challenges in bringing operating systems together.
Operational cultures

The Peninsula Technikon/Cape Technikon and ML Sultan Technikon/Technikon Natal mergers show intriguing parallels in terms of operational culture. Our respondents described Pentech and MLST as institutions where budgets were tightly and centrally controlled, and where careful cases for expenditure had to be made and supported. Respondents described Cape Tech and Technikon Natal, in contrast, as institutions where greater individual latitude and a certain flexibility around budgeting were more the order of the day. Staff in all four institutions reported themselves as previously largely unaware of the extent of these kinds of differences.

Pre-existing differentials in terms of financial and management strength were not addressed in any way before the merger. These differentials translated into asymmetries. In some cases, the stronger partners were able to dominate the weaker partners. In others, battles that were either personally or institutionally damaging resulted when the institutionally weaker partners refused to give way.

Legal challenges a waste of time?

Institutions which did not agree with initial merger instructions (the University of South Africa in the WGDE process; Pentech after mid 2002) found the Ministry unsympathetic to their protests and reasoning. The courts were their last resort, but the court cases were, in the end, withdrawn. The Durban Institute of Technology unions went to court; Unisa’s new leadership did as well, but found face-saving ways to abandon their efforts. Pentech’s leadership finally yielded under great pressure but never really abandoned the view that the merger was misguided.

Interim leadership

The merger timetables with which institutions were presented were largely predicated on rhythms of leadership changes at the level of Councils and management staff. All the institutional mergers had a timetable in which existing Councils dissolved in favour of an interim Council which would be in place at the time of the legal merger (1 January 2004 or 1 January 2005). At that point the existing management became interim managers until the interim Council could put a process in place to choose new, permanent management and confirm a new Council.

These timetables meant that on the ground, institutions sometimes faced living through two or three complete changes in leadership and management personnel. To borrow an American term, in such a situation, the nett effect
often is that one lame duck administration followed another. But these changes happened at the exact moments that crucial decisions about the academic and financial structures of the new institutions had to be made. In our studies, staff repeatedly expressed the frustrations of not knowing how to work when it was clear that the people or persons in charge might be replaced by others who had no investment in whatever decisions had already been made and would also have the authority to reverse those decisions or processes as they saw fit. Thus, just when it made logical sense to do as little as possible, the requirement to do as much as possible for the sake of students and colleagues was mounting. As discussed in the DIT case, the fact that the institution continued to run at all was simply a tribute to the grittiness of the staff as the process wore the resources of the institution practically down to bedrock.

The Stellenbosch/University of the Western Cape Dentistry merger proved the rule of the importance of stable leadership. This was a relatively smooth process. From the two rectorates down, there were no changes in leadership. This meant that agreements negotiated in any one six-month period, say, were still regarded as valid in the next — a surety which staff in many other institutions could not count on. It also meant that leaders could take calculated risks like trying to stretch the merger framework to make it fit, knowing that their positions were secure. Similarly, the new leadership of the old Unisa and erstwhile Technikon South Africa were in place to take the new Unisa institution through the entire post-WDGE merger process. This institutional security also proved invaluable.

The Merger Unit

The Merger Unit of the Department of Education was not reported as having played a particularly facilitating role in the pre-merger phases of the institutions that we studied. The Merger Guidelines that were developed were so lacking in specifics that they were of little use. When the Unit provided extra funds — which it did in a few cases - or refused to do so (more the norm), it entered into the negotiating stage. The basis for deciding which institutions received funds for merger-related expenses such as external consultants and which did not, was never divulged. Positive interventions by the Unit, however, were not generally reported, and staff across the institutions expressed uncertainty as to what value the Unit could add to difficult processes. Consequently, each institution faced and solved its problems largely on its own. This must result in a variety of solutions to common problems.

In the absence of firmer guidelines, institutional leadership came to play absolutely crucial roles. As one of our critical readers pointed out, a merger in this restructuring process 'had to be led, not merely managed'. The personalities of leaders became crucial factors in whether or not pre-merger phases proceeded
smoothly. This dependence on individuals could also lead to idiosyncratic solutions to general problems.

**Fee levels**

Our research strongly suggests that fees of merged institutions rose faster than they would have done had the institutions not been merged, and faster than the rate of inflation. This had a negative impact on educational access.

**Pipeline students**

Making arrangements for pipeline students entering the new institution presented difficult problems in each case. In general we found little evidence of meaningful consultation with students about such arrangements while they were being made.

**Financial and human resources costs**

At least in the short and medium terms, it seemed clear that restructuring would cost a great deal more financially than would be saved. These costs came in myriad forms. For example, some campuses faced the need to replace costly information technology systems when the hardware and/or software used by one of the new partners were found to be incompatible with or of less utility than those of the other partner.

In other mergers, institutional assets such as artwork and equipment disappeared as systems were integrated. The duplication of technical facilities was another issue: should duplicated physical assets continue to be maintained, or just scrapped? In some cases, the new institution developed more complex management structures, necessitating higher salaries for new kinds of managers. As salaries were generally harmonised across campuses, salary bills inevitably rose. In human terms, staff sometimes found their productivity fell as they had to meet new demands – like driving, sometimes up to 75 kilometres one way, to attend meetings (does one drive to the meeting, then drive back to the office? Or just go home after the one meeting?). Finally, there was the invisible cost of the flight of intellectual capital as the stresses and strains involved in merging pushed some of the institutions’ best staff members away to institutions which could promise less chaos.

**Repent at leisure?**

Merging partners often found it impossible to resolve all the ‘back-office’ issues before the date of legal merger. In some institutions, operations such as finance, student admissions and registrations, human resources policies and
IT continued on parallel tracks in the first year(s) after merger. The quality of some solutions, reached under the enormous time pressure of imminent legal merger deadlines, must in some cases be questionable in the long term.

**Micro-level contradictions**

There were some aspects of the restructuring exercise reported to us by institutional players that they simply could not negotiate away. These we have termed as enduring ‘contradictions’ in the process, and were related to the interactions of individual institutions with the restructuring framework as a whole.

**Energy consumption**

The pre-merger phases in all the institutions that we studied were hugely expensive in terms of staff time and energy. Completing the tasks involved in the merger of one faculty, as in the Stellenbosch/UWC Dentistry merger was described as exhausting; so much more so the merging of entire institutions of more than 100 000 students, such as Unisa and TSA. This huge expenditure of time and energy occurred in the context of the Ministry policy that staff time was not ‘a merger cost’ and was thus not reimbursable. No institution could claim funds from the Ministry in order to employ new staff to do either merger work or ‘old operational’ work; nor would there be funds available to pay overtime rates to existing staff.

This policy had at least three consequences. First, the myriad new tasks that had to be performed before the arrival of the legal merger deadlines meant that staff had to put normal institutional planning on the back burner: curriculum reform and development, capacity development, quality assurance, and employment equity and compliance planning had to wait. Second, the personal resources of staff working in and around merger matters were stretched to (and in some cases beyond) their outer limits. Merger burn-out was a reality, and institutions will probably discover its real cost as time goes on. Third, institutions that had internal resources which could be called upon in this extremity were advantaged in terms of merger negotiations and preparations. Institutions which did not have internal financial or human capital capacity to spare (or somehow within reach) were therefore by definition, battling to keep up.

**Cultural differences**

Cultural differences were used by the Ministry as a rationale for mergers but they were not taken seriously as possible operational impediments to achieving them. In some institutions, staff were encouraged to socialise with each other in
the pre-merger phases but we did not encounter any instances of serious studies of 'how do we do things and how do they do things?' before or after the merger mandates arrived from the Ministry. Everything happened in the heat of the moment. At best, institutions had some direct knowledge of each other's *modus operandi* - but more often there were only rumours, hearsay and stereotypes for guidance. Our studies tend to support the idea from the private sector literature that cultural differences in operational matters between merging partners can act as obstacles to smooth partnering.

**Many inventions of the wheel**

The independent solutions to common problems that developed at the new comprehensive institutions suggest that this group of institutions and their academic programming will at best turn out to be highly varied but perhaps quite disparate from one to the next, in the years to come.

**Stress across campuses**

Institutional management was often put under so much strain in the pre-merger phase that relations with their campus communities suffered.

**Lack of evaluative mechanisms**

There was no mechanism to review and/or ensure the survival of good academic programmes or policies that had been in place at administratively weaker partner institutions. Everything was left to the roulette-wheel of who was better at negotiating their way into the new institution. It is more than likely that many of these programmes had been put in place to address the needs of disadvantaged students. If such experience and structures were lost to the new institution, such students might very well be further disadvantaged.

**Macro-level implications of these findings**

It would be facile to leap to totally negative conclusions about the merger dynamics in the institutions that we studied. In the particular time period that we researched, frustrations and difficulties abounded, and these certainly were repeatedly and forcefully expressed. It was a time in which some institutions said bitter goodbyes to proud histories and bowed to the yoke of the new. But other institutions found that merging presented opportunities to legitimise themselves and shake off the conceptual burdens of their pasts. Overall, this was a period when institutional players gradually decided to try to 'tame the merger' and make the Ministerial mandates work as best they could. This is
to the credit of everyone involved in these institutions. Given that the South African restructuring exercise is unique in the world, the fact that the merged institutions are operating and educating students is a real testament to South African determination and tenacity.

Yet our research suggests that the burden of change fell disproportionately on those who perhaps could bear it the least easily: individual staff members who were operationally insecure, students and families whose fee burdens rose, and disadvantaged institutions which could not call on the same magnitude of ‘change resources’ as their new, advanced merger partners. A procedure that claims to be challenging past inequalities and unjust differentiation by relying on those same inequalities to produce new technically and administratively demanding results must be conceptually and operationally flawed, perhaps deeply so. This suggests that the higher education system is indeed moving—but obliquely rather than directly, towards fulfilling its historic goals.

Questions for future research

- The most urgent research questions must be to track the medium- and long-term fates of students who were enrolled (‘in the pipeline’) at their respective institutions at the time of the merger. Faced with increased fees, did they continue with their studies? Faced with changed rules of assessment and promotion, did they enrol again? If they failed a course or courses in the final pre-merger year or immediately following the merger, what did they do if their courses and lecturers disappeared in the settlement arrangements for the new institution?
- Were there clear differences in institutional culture around operational issues such as budgeting; academic assessment; human resources protocols and policies; and internal decision-making? How were these differences resolved in the medium term? Did the strongest simply subsume the weaker, or were new cultures developed? If so, what facilitated this positive process?
- Have uniformly higher fees restricted the access of students from disadvantaged communities and families to the new institutions? How do the demographic profiles of students after 2004 and 2005 compare to those of the pre-merged institutions?
- Do the merged institutions now display better staff equity profiles than the individual institutions did before they merged?
- Are the academic programmes of the new institutions simply re-treads from the strongest of the old partner institutions, or have new and/or better programmes been developed? Has academic quality suffered in the integration of programmes?
• What have the experiences of staff in the Education Ministry and the Merger Unit been in relation to the restructuring exercise? Have their expectations been met?
• In terms of the national budget, what will the restructuring exercise have cost over five- and ten-year periods?
• Has the restructuring led to the exodus of skilled personnel from affected institutions? If so, what are the long term implications and hidden costs of the resulting stress and loss of expert colleagues for staff who have remained? If there has been no exodus, are the new institutions rather attracting new blood and energies to meet the challenges?
• Do teaching, administrative, and management staff at the new institutions feel that their work in ‘taming the merger’ has been personally rewarding and nationally valuable?
• The Higher Education Quality Committee, responsible for the maintenance of academic standards across the sector, approaches the complex issues of quality in terms of value for money. Will this result in the better-resourced new institutions being able to forge ahead while others fall behind (again)?
• Are students experiencing improved service delivery and educational satisfaction at the new institutions?
• Finally, what performance measures flowing out of the NPHE and the restructuring goals – especially those related to the achievement of diversity and differentiation in the higher education system – should we be using to evaluate outcomes?

Only after such questions have been answered in detail will we know if the restructured sector as a whole and individual institutions in particular are meeting the challenge cited at the beginning of this chapter: to produce a new era of substantive equality of opportunity in South African higher education.
Appendix

Histories of ML Sultan Technikon and Technikon Natal

Lesley Anne Cooke and Kalawathie Sattar

There is a rich history associated with each of the individual institutions that cannot be fully reflected within the constraints of this appendix. While the lineage of the institutions has been documented as part of this research for the purposes of this report, the information below is drawn primarily from the annual reviews of the ML Sultan Technikon and the Durban Institute of Technology. Figure 4 depicts a timeline of the main historical developments at each of the institutions.

ML Sultan Technikon

The roots of ML Sultan Technikon (MLST) are firmly embedded in the community, and showing what a community was able to achieve through determination and a sense of belonging or ‘community spirit’. Despite the challenges that it endured and ‘against a backdrop of racism that underpinned education policies in South Africa for over a century, ML Sultan Technikon emerged to become a leading tertiary education provider’.

The origins of the MLST went back more than 20 years before its well-known benefactor and namesake, Hajee Malukmahomed Lappa Sultan, donated funds in 1941 for the erection of a technical college building in Durban.

The first indentured labourers arrived in the colony of Natal (late 1800s and early 1900s) to work on the sugar cane plantations. The pressing need for education was highlighted by the threat of repatriation of these workers that was a consequence of the Cape Town agreement (1927). This led to the offering of adult classes at St Aidan’s Mission School in Durban, as well as technical classes ‘in a range of subjects, including commerce, typewriting and bookkeeping’.

The Natal Workers Congress, formed in 1928 under the leadership of Advocate Albert Christopher, was instrumental in pressing for educational facilities for Indians. They approached the relevant authorities at the time, but
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were not successful. This, together with the threat of repatriation, led to the emergence of important leaders who provided direction and leadership in the struggle. Key figures were Advocate Albert Christopher and Mr PR Pather, who advanced the cause of working Indians with regard to education. In August 1929, afternoon classes were offered at the Higher Grade Indian School in Carlisle Street in Durban, and evening classes were offered at the Hindu Tamil Institute in Cross Street. The number of students that were in attendance by the end of that year exceeded 230.

The looming threat of segregation spurred Advocate Christopher into inviting Dr BM Narbeth, the principal of the Natal Technical College, to visit these classes in Carlisle Street and Cross Street. The outcome of this strategic invitation was a report from Dr Narbeth to the Minister of Education, which resulted in his being given permission to assist the Indian Committee of Management.

The first meeting of the Indian Technical Education Committee was held on 27 June 1930 and was attended by volunteer teachers and interested people. This was a key event that led to the eventual establishment of the ML Sultan Technical College. The following year saw a financial upswing for Indian Education when the government committed itself to an annual grant-in-aid of £150 and the Carnegie Corporation funded the purchase of equipment and machinery. The Indian community also contributed hundreds of pounds. The classes rapidly outgrew the premises they occupied and were re-located to Sastri College and the Hindu Tamil Institute. Classes were offered on a part-time basis and teachers worked after regular school hours. The enrolments continued to increase and courses were diversified to attract more students.

It became apparent that a consolidated campus was needed, and in 1941 an amount of £33 000 was pledged by Hajee ML Sultan for the construction of a technical college building. The government agreed to the construction of the building and subsidised it on a pound-for-pound basis, and the Durban City Council agreed to find a site and to provide the initial funds.

In 1946, the Minister approved the ML Sultan Technical College as a higher education institution and Major H Natrass was appointed as the first principal in 1947. The coming to power of the National Party in 1948 and its policy of separate development resulted in uncertainty because the site for the building was changed a number of times. In 1953, the Durban City Council finally presented the title deeds of a site at Curries Fountain.

The first sod was turned by Advocate Christopher in 1954 and thus began the construction of the College in Centenary Road. Dr Narbeth, Chairman of the College Council, laid the foundation stone later that year. The College continued to grow and opened branches (satellites) in outlying areas such as Tongaat and Umkomaas. The ML Sultan Technical College was officially
opened on 7 August 1956, and at this time had 240 full-time students, 4,760 part-time students and nine branches.

At the launch of the new College, Mr PR Pather encouraged the community and businesses to make further donations to the Building Fund, and the response resulted in the construction of additional workshops and a gymnasium. The expansion of the institution was supported by local industry, and the pledge made by the Natal Indian Cane Growers Association in 1959 is particularly noteworthy. They pledged five cents per ton of cane that was cut. This subsequently resulted in the construction of the Cane Growers Hall.

The apartheid policies of the National Party government affected all spheres of people's lives, including education. One of the key issues was that of the admission of African people, which was prohibited by law. The College Council was committed to assisting African students and eight Africans were among the recipients of the Diploma in Boiler Stoking in 1957.

Other changes in national legislation also affected the College. The promulgation of the Indian Advanced Technical Education Act in 1969 resulted in a name change to a College of Advanced Technical Education (CATE), in line with similar colleges around the country. The status of the institution changed again in 1979 when, together with all CATEs, the College became a Technikon. The final coming of age for ML Sultan Technikon occurred in 1984 when it became a full tertiary institution comprising nine schools, which were later reconfigured into four faculties: Arts, Engineering and the Built Environment, Science and Commerce. A new seven-storey academic block was completed by 1987, and the Hotel School was relocated to new premises in Ritson Road in 1989. This expansion continued until 1991, when a multi-storey administration and academic block was completed.

The Technikons Act of 1993 enabled technikons to respond to the challenges of transformation and empowered them progressively to shake off the shackles of apartheid. The amendment to the Technikon Act later that same year allowed technikons to offer degree programmes, thus aligning them with other higher education institutions in the country. Furthermore, technikons could determine their own statutes and rules in consultation with all stakeholders.

It was quickly apparent that fundamental changes were necessary to drive transformation and that legislation alone was insufficient to address the challenges faced by the institution. This gave rise to conflict between staff, students and management and culminated in the establishment of an interim management team. This team, together with the Broad Transformation Forum, proactively addressed the need for change.

The need for balancing the history and culture of MLST with the need for transformation was a challenge for the new Vice-Chancellor, Professor BC Goba, who was appointed in 1997. At this time, the Higher Education Act was
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promulgated and focussed on the transformation of higher education. This facilitated the planning initiatives of the new management who steered a new course for the MLST into the new century. It moved away from its history as an institution designed for Indians to become one that reflected the demographics of the region that it served. Prof. Goba left the institution in April 2001, and was succeeded by Professor DJ Ncayiyana, who led MLST through the merger process until his retirement at the end of March 2005.

Technikon Natal

The roots of Technikon Natal can be traced back to 1907, when Dr Samuel George Campbell, a physician who was dedicated to the establishment of higher education and professional training institutions, founded it. The institution was originally known as the Durban Technical Institute, and it initially operated from cramped premises in Russell Street, with 382 part-time students. Dr. Campbell became the first chair of the Institute’s Council.

In 1909, the first Principal, Benjamin Narbeth, arrived from Wales. He served the institution and education in the region for 24 years. It is noteworthy that, even at this time, there was a relationship between the two institutions that would eventually merge. As indicated above in the history of MLST, Narbeth was granted permission to assist the Indian Committee of Management, which would itself become instrumental in the establishment of the institution that would become MLST.

The passing of the Act of Union in 1910 saw the demise of Natal as a colony. At this time, the Durban Technical Institute learned that the former government of Natal had not transferred the cost estimates for running the Institute or for the proposed development of new premises. This placed the Institute in an embarrassing situation, since the first prime minister of the Union, General Louis Botha, had invited the Duke of Connaught to lay the foundation stone. However, although funding was made available by the South African government, enabling the foundation stone to be laid as planned, the relationship between the Institute and the new national Department of Education was soured as a result.

By 1912, the new buildings in Warwick Avenue, Smith Street and West Street were ready for official opening and the crest and motto of the Institute, Per Adua Ad Alta (Through Work to the Heights) were launched. The Institute was renamed the Durban Technical College in 1915.

The continued development of the College occurred during the First World War, despite the fact that, according to the historian Norman Parkington, ‘half [the College’s] staff ploughed through the blood-soaked trenches of Flanders’. After the end of that war in 1918, a College expansion scheme was established and implemented. The College also began to campaign for the establishment
of a University College in Durban, which successfully culminated in the establishment of Natal University as a separate institution in 1931.

By 1923, the Higher Education Act enabled the College to become the Natal Technical College, and by 1926 the Association of Technical Colleges had been formed. Notably, also in this year, the institution suffered the profound loss of Dr Campbell. Donations from various benefactors, including Arthur May, AH Smith, Alfred Okell and TB Davies (with buildings named in commemoration), enabled the College to continue to grow.

The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 also affected the College in several ways:

The Central Organization of Technical Training (COTT) was established to train technicians to serve the machinery of ‘modern’ warfare. For seven years, under the guidance of Principal Humphrey Jones, the College played its role in training men and women for war — and later to train them for the needs of peace in the burgeoning industrialized society that South Africa has become’.6

In 1949, the National Party (which had come to power in 1948) implemented a policy of bilingualism, which recognised English and Afrikaans. Through enforcing continued restrictions and regulation, including the passing of the Vocational Education Act of 1955, the technical colleges were placed under state control.

From this time onward, the student numbers continued to grow. By the time of the celebration of its Golden Jubilee in 1957, the College had accomplished the important goals for which it was founded, namely the training of apprentices and the provision of higher education in the arts, humanities and technologies.

Several notable events occurred in 1960, which included the death of Benjamin Narbeth, the delivery of the ‘Winds of Change’ speech in Cape Town by the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth, and the Sharpeville Massacre.

The provinces shed ‘bantu’, ‘coloured’ and Indian education between 1953 and 1965, to become responsible only for the education of whites. In 1967, about two years before the equivalent for Indian Education, the Advanced Technical Education Act established the CATEs in white institutions, and required all students to possess at least a senior certificate for entry.

The dawn of the 1970s heralded new developments in the history of the institution. For example, stimulated by the publication of the Holford Report on Durban’s town planning in 1968, the search for a new site for further development began. In 1971, the College held the first Diploma ceremony and thus took its place ‘as a serious player in South Africa’s evolving tertiary education landscape’.7 The resignation of George Campbell in 1974 marked the end of a 70-year relationship between the Campbell family and the institution.
By the close of the 1970s, the College had become known as Technikon Natal, and for the first time full-time registrations exceeded part-time students. Furthermore, the Technikons were able to offer qualifications above the level of diploma and higher diploma.

During the 1980s, the Technikon continued to grow and develop, and in 1981 the planned expansion of the Berea campus was boosted with the award of a R13.5 million contract to build the first of three pairs of towers, which opened on 16 May 1983. Also in 1983, on 1 April, the new Director, Professor André Lorenz du Preez, took over from Professor Alan Pittendrigh, who retired. Taking the work of his predecessor further, du Preez led Technikon Natal in becoming a national institution with a reputation for ‘[s]cholarship, innovation, commitment and practical application … the institution, the nature and range of courses continued to expand while hi-tech business management principles were applied to all facets of Technikon operations. This progress was made in the face of increasing inflation and the struggle for higher subsidies.’

The expansion of infrastructure continued and, through a donation of R250 000 from Cecil Renaud, the Lecture Theatre Centre, which bears his name, was opened in 1988. In August 1991, the Certification Council for Technikon Education approved the issue of certificates or diplomas to graduates by Technikon Natal themselves. This marked an important development in the history of Technikons because state examiners had previously certified such awards. As with MLST, the promulgation of the Technikons Act of 1993 pushed developments forward again.

Violence on campuses across the country prior to the first democratic elections in 1994 saw students at Technikon Natal storming the Rector’s offices, burning the national flag and demanding representation on the governing board of the institution.

The elections in 1994 and the coming to power of the African National Congress (ANC) stimulated many new initiatives and developments at Technikon Natal. Noteworthy among these was the appointment of the first black senior executive, Dr Bennie Khoapa, as Vice-Rector Student Affairs Division. This Division was created at Technikon Natal ‘as a direct response to the rapid social and political changes taking place in South Africa. A black consciousness stalwart and returned exile with a string of academic qualifications to his name, Khoapa tackled many issues that arose as more and more non-white students entered what was historically a “white” institution’.

In 1995, for the first time, applicants did not have to state their race or colour, and the student numbers rose to over 12 000, with around 40 per cent of the total being black. This year was also marked by continued student unrest, with some students refusing to pay their fees, a situation that seriously affected the financial stability of the institution.
In 1996, the initial merger discussions with ML Sultan Technikon began, steered from Technikon Natal by the newly appointed Vice-Chancellor, Dr Khoapa, who led Technikon Natal ‘through the difficult and sometimes volatile years between 1996 and 2002, which saw it leave behind its “white institution” stigma and embrace the challenges of transformation, directly addressing equity issues and the restructuring of curricula.’

[10]
The historical events in the development of ML Sultan Technikon

1860
Indian indentured labourers arrive in Durban aboard SS Truro & Belvedere

1909
BM Narbeth arrives in SA

1910
Act of Union Natal

1907
Dr. SG Campbell founds the Durban Technical Institute

1912
New buildings open; crest & motto launched

1915
Renamed Durban Technical College

1919
College expansion scheme

1923
Higher Education Act

1926
Association of Technical Colleges formed; Dr S G Campbell dies

1928
Natal Indian Workers Congress established

1929
Afternoon classes start at Carlisle Street

1930
Inauguration of Indian Technical Education Committee

1931
Government & Durban City pledge annual grant

1940
Need for consolidated campus

1945
First Principal (Nattrass) appointed

1946
ML Sultan Technical College established

1949
ML Sultan Charitable Trust established

1954
First sod turned

1953
Land donated in Centenary Road

1956
ML Sultan Technical College opens

1957
College celebrates Golden Jubilee

1860
The historical events in the development of Technikon Natal

1959

Figure 3. Timeline: 1860–1997: The historical events in the development of ML Sultan Technikon and Technikon Natal
The historical events in the development of ML Sultan Technikon

1960
Death of B N Narbeth

1968
Indian Advanced Technical Act No. 12 passed

1969
ML Sultan becomes a CATE

1979
ML Sultan CATE becomes a Technikon

1984
Full tertiary institution with 9 Schools

1989
Four Faculties established

1993
Disruptions to academic programmes; Prof Soni's services terminated

1995
Strategic Planning process commences

1996
Executive Management resign. Acting VC appointed; Initial merger discussions

1997
50th Anniversary New Management New Council

The historical events in the development of Technikon Natal

1960
Death of B N Narbeth

1967
Advanced Technical Act establishes CATE's in White institutions

1968
Search for new site for development begins

1970
End of Seventies name changes to Technikon Natal

1971
First Diploma Ceremony held

1981
Building of S Blocks on Berea campus commences

1988
Cecil Renaud Lecture Theatre Centre opens

1991
SERTEC approves TN to grant certificates & diplomas themselves

1995
Student numbers rise to > 12000 40% black; Student unrest

1996
Initial merger discussions


Figure 3 (contd). Timeline: 1860–1997: The historical events in the development of ML Sultan Technikon and Technikon Natal
Notes

1. Introduction

1 In 1988, 94 per cent of executive and management positions, and 89 per cent of instruction and research posts in South African universities, were filled by whites; 92 per cent of the former category and 73 per cent of the latter were men: D. Cooper and G. Subotzky, A Skewed Revolution: Trends in South African Higher Education, 1988–1998 (Bellville: EPU, University of the Western Cape, 2001), p. 211.


2. The development of restructuring policy


2 Ibid., p. 13.

3 Ibid., p. 17.

4 Ibid., p. 18.

5 Ibid., p. 23.


7 Ibid., p. 34.

8 Ibid., pp. 36, 38–9.


10 Ibid., p. 51.

11 Ibid., pp. 52–4.
13 Ibid., p. 22.
16 Huisman, ‘Differentiation, Diversity’, p. 22.
20 Ibid., p. 357.
4. Merger complexities: The Durban Institute of Technology

1 In April 2006, the DIT became the Durban University of Technology (DUT). However, this chapter retains the name DIT to avoid confusion. Acronyms are given in full in the list on page viii.

2 The Appendix discusses the histories of the merging partners, and Figure 4 therein illustrates a timeline of relevant historical events.

3 ML Sultan Technikon and Technikon Natal, Merger Project Newsletter 10 (2002).

4 Ibid.


8 Research access was granted in 2003 by the incumbent Vice-Chancellor.

9 To protect anonymity of interviewees, reference is only made to the employment level, the previous institution and the date on which the discussion or interview took place.

10 The lack of access to certain key documents – for example, minutes of key meetings – was one of the limitations of the research that could not be overcome.

11 As this was the first higher education merger in South Africa, the media showed an intense interest in the unfolding process. Newspaper reports therefore provide insights about public perceptions of the merger process.


16 Refer to the Appendix for the discussion of the historical backgrounds of the merger partners.


19 Ibid., 12.
22 Ibid.
24 The author is not acknowledged; however it can be surmised that he is the Senior Manager from ex-TN who had conducted the research.
27 Harman, ‘Merging Divergent Campus Cultures’.
29 See Appendix.
31 Ibid.
32 Bourantas and Nicandrou, ‘Modelling Post-acquisition Employee Behavior’.
37 Harman, ‘Merging Divergent Campus Cultures’.
39 It is interesting to note that the new Senate was only formally constituted in April 2006.
41 Bourantas and Nicandrou, ‘Modelling Post-acquisition Employee Behavior’.
42 Merger Project Newsletter 05, 2000.
43 Merger Project Newsletter 01, 2000.
45 Ibid.
46 Merger Project Newsletter 01, 2000.
47 Ibid.
48 Merger Project Newsletter 02, 2000.
49 Ibid.
51 PWC, 1999a. The DIT vision, mission and goals were launched on 5 August 2005. It is interesting to note that the task team for this activity did not have sight of the feasibility information.
52 ML Sultan Technikon, ‘Minutes of a meeting on the merger between ML Sultan technikon and Technikon Natal with the members of Executive Management, Deans, academic Heads of Departments and administrative directors held in the conference room, 7th floor, Block-D of the ML Sultan Technikon on Wednesday, 2 February 2000, commencing at 09:00’ (2000).
53 Merger Project Newsletter 01, 2000.
54 PWC (2000).
56 A comprehensive environmental scan, as conducted in many Australian universities, would have provided key information for, inter alia, planning the merger, identifying strategic directions, and achieving academic excellence.
57 PWC (2000).
58 Interestingly, in a subsequent newsletter of September 2005, the word ‘country’ was changed to ‘community’: Merger Project Newsletter 04, 2000; Merger Project Newsletter 05, 2000.
59 PWC (2000).
60 Merger Project Newsletter 05, 2000.
65 ACCORD, 2000a).
66 The unions subsequently took legal action: see the section ‘Role and Impact of the Unions’.
67 ACCORD (2000b).
68 ACCORD (2000a).
69 Ibid.
It is a moot point whether this imbalance in labour representation influenced the acceptance of decisions taken.

As late as 15 November 2001, the merger date was still identified as being 1 January 2002 (Merger Project Newsletter 08, 2001).

In June 2006, the future of this Council hung in the balance while the Minister of Education proposed the dissolution of Council and the appointment of an administrator to take on its role.

Makhanya, 'Is the Merger a Murder?'


It must be noted that this consolidation was only completed in June/July 2003.

The establishment of these units was protracted: for example, the Council only formally approved the Centre for Quality Promotion and Assurance in June 2003.

The vision and mission statement of the DIT was launched in August 2005.

By June 2006, the seventh version of the Conditions of Service had finally been approved, with the exception of some key elements, for example, leave.

The issue of financial stability, the lack of a due diligence report from TN and the lack of a business plan for the new institution seriously affected the ability of the Minister to gazette the merger timeously for 1 January 2002.

Naidu, 'Sultan Staff Cry Foul'.

Merger Project Newsletter 11, 2002.
NOTES


96 A variety of terms have been used interchangeably for this package. These terms include ‘voluntary severance’, ‘voluntary merger exit’ and ‘voluntary exit’. For purposes of this case study, the term ‘voluntary exit package’ (VEP) will be used.

97 Merger Project Newsletter 08, 2001.


102 Ibid.

103 Ibid.

104 DIT, data provided by the Management Information System, 16 September 2005 (2005).


107 This emphasis by the Minister appears to completely undermine the ‘voluntariness’ of the DIT merger.

108 Naidu, ‘Technikon Debt Row’.


111 An entry on 25 April 2002 indicates that the unions had accepted an out of court settlement.

112 Makhanya, ‘Staff Unions Fear Job Losses’ (2002b).


116 Ibid.

117 Merger Project Newsletter 09, undated.

118 DIT, ‘Minutes of the Interim Senate Meeting held in the Examination hall, ML Sultan Campus on Wednesday, 31 July 2002 commencing at 14:00’ (2002b).


120 See Appendix for the history of MLST.


123 Ibid.
125 M. Laganparsad, ‘Merger Must Go On, Says Asmal: Technikons Buy Their New Name’, The Mercury, 11 March 2002. There is an irony in the purchase of the name since, by ministerial decree, it changed in any case to Durban University of Technology in 2006.
133 Ibid., p. 3.
137 Johnson, Scholes and Wittington, Exploring Corporate Strategy.
139 This refers to destruction by internal groups or individuals, and is a reference to the destruction wrought by white ants (termites) on trees.
140 Johnson, Scholes and Wittington, Exploring Corporate Strategy.
142 Johnson, Scholes and Wittington, Exploring Corporate Strategy.
143 Ibid.
146 Harman, ‘Merging Divergent Campus Cultures’, p. 106.
147 Ibid., p. 97.
5. Living the merger

1. All interview material quoted is from a Focus Group meeting conducted with Department X staff on 23 March 2005.


3. Ibid., p. 6.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. It was only in 2005 that a faculty-based, DoE-subsidised foundation programme was implemented.


9. Ibid., p. 3.

10. Ibid.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. In April 2006, the DIT experienced student action that resulted in brief closure. This action was driven, *inter alia*, by dissatisfaction with the quality of resources and infrastructure.

6. Establishing the 'new' Unisa

1. All acronyms are defined in the list on page viii-viii.


7. Ibid., p. 56.
8. Ibid., p. 62.
15. Ibid., p. 235.
16. 'A Brief History of Technikon SA', accessed at www.tsa.ac.za/corp/techhis.htm
17. D. Moore, 'From Correspondence to Flexible Learning: Thoughts on Education and Institutional Change at Technikon SA' (Florida: Rectorate Occasional Papers no. 1, 2000), pp. 11–12.
18. 'A Brief History of Technikon SA'.
19. Ibid.
7. The perfect merger?

1 A due diligence report lists assets, liabilities and risks of the merging institutions: University of Stellenbosch and University of the Western Cape, 'Merger of the Faculty of Dentistry of the University of the Western Cape and the School of Oral Health Sciences of the University of Stellenbosch and the Incorporation of the New Dental Faculty in the University of the Western Cape: Due Diligence Report' (Unpublished report, 8 August 2003).


4 Ibid.

5 Interview SM2, W4.


7 The history of the University of the Western Cape is available on the university website: http://www.uwc.ac.za/about/history, accessed Online 18 October 2005.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.


11 The history of the University of Stellenbosch is available on the university website: http://www.sun.ac.za/university/StratPlan/stratdoc.htm.


14 UWC and Pen Tech were literally separated only by a road which ran between them.
16 A memorandum from Professor U. Chikte (Associate Dean, Faculty of Health Sciences of the US and Acting Head of the School of Oral Health Sciences of the US) to Professor T. Pretorius (Chairperson of the Cape Higher Education Consortium, CHEC), 14 August 2002.
17 Interview SM3, S1.
18 Ibid.
19 P. Naidoo, Report on the Merger of the Faculty of Dentistry of the University of the Western Cape and the School of Oral Health Sciences of the University of Stellenbosch and Incorporation of the New Dental Faculty in the University of the Western Cape (Sahems project report, 2004).
20 Interview SM3, S1.
21 Ibid.
22 Interview, SM4, W6.
23 Interview, SM5, W8.
24 University of Stellenbosch, No date, ‘Background and Run-up to the Merger’ (Unpublished memo).
25 Ibid., p. 2.
27 Ibid., p. 1.
28 JMITT, Memorandum of Understanding, 1 April 2003.
29 Interview, SM4, W6.
30 JMITT, p. 1.
31 Ibid., p.1/2.
32 Ibid., p. 2.
33 Ibid., p. 3.
34 Ibid., pp. 3–4.
35 Ibid., p. 4.
37 Interview SM4, W7.
38 Interview SM4, W6.
39 Ibid.
40 Interview SM2, W4.
41 Naidoo, Report on the Merger, p. 3.
42 Ibid., p. 3.
43 University of Stellenbosch, ‘Background and Run-up to the Merger’.
44 Naidoo, Report on the Merger, p. 3.
45 Interview SM1, W1.
46 University of Stellenbosch and University of the Western Cape, ‘Merger’.
49 University of Stellenbosch and University of the Western Cape, 'Merger'.
50 Ibid.
51 Interview SM4, W6.
52 A memorandum was issued to all parents of current students and postgraduate students in Oral Health Sciences at the University of Stellenbosch, 23 May 2003.
53 Interview SM6, W9.
54 Interview SM6, W9.
55 Ibid.
56 Interview SM2, W4.
58 Interview SM2, W4.
59 Interview SM4, W6.
60 Interview SM5, W8.
61 Interview SM2, W4.
62 Interview SM1, W1.
63 Ibid.
64 Interview, SM1, W2.
65 University of the Western Cape. Institutional Operating Plan. (IOP) (Bellville: UWC, November 2004).
66 Interview SM1, W2.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Interview SM3, S1.
71 Interview SM3, S1.
72 Ibid.
73 Interview SM2, W4.
74 UWC, IOP.
75 Interview SM4, W6.
76 Ibid.
77 A memorandum dated 11 June 2003 was issued to the parents of current students in Oral Health Sciences at the University of Stellenbosch as well as postgraduate students.
78 Report: Incorporation of Stellenbosch School of Oral Health into the UWC Faculty of Dentistry.
79 Memorandum, 11 June 2003.
80 Interview SM2, W5.
81 Ibid.
82 Interview SM4, W6.
83 Interview SM5, W8.
85 Harry Elcock was appointed as change manager and Hans Peter Bakker in the communications position. Interview SM1, W2; Naidoo, *Report on the Merger*.
86 The purpose of the study was to provide the necessary information to Institutional Planning, student development and the support offices, which was needed to meet successfully the needs of the students. T. Barnes, ‘UWC Student Perceptions and Experiences of Aspects of Academic and Student Development Services: A Report for the Office of Students Development and Support, VLIR, Equitable Access Project and Institutional Planning Office’ (Unpublished report, Bellville, UWC Centre for the Study of Higher Education, 15 December 2004).
87 Ibid.

8. More than the sum of its parts?

4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
8 This was a trend across the historically white technikon sector: Cooper and Subotzky, *Skewed Revolution*, pp. 79–89.
NOTES


14 M. Horrell, The Group Areas Act – Its Effect on Human Beings (Johannesburg: Institute of Race Relations, 1956), quoted in Western, Outcast Cape Town, p. 123. A Pentech manager interviewed for this project recalled that the institution was built on land situated between a rubbish dump, a sewage plant and an industrial area. Interview SM10, P13.


20 This oral history information was supplied by Patricia Kolbe, to whom I am most grateful, from a research project at Pentech which led to the publication of Peninsula Technikon Remembers: Reflections of an Era (Bellville: Peninsula Technikon, 2004).

21 I. Wilkins and H. Strydom, The Super Afrikaners: Inside the Afrikaner Broederbond (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1980), p. A247. The first heads of the black institutions in the 1960s – all of whom were white Afrikaners – were all members of the Broederbond.

22 Oral history research notes supplied by Patricia Kolbe.

23 This group was not only made up of white institutions as ML Sultan had been a member since 1974; but as the head of ML Sultan was white, Profs. Sonn and Figaji were its first black individual members.


25 Ibid., p. 11.


28 Cooper and Subotzky, Skewed Revolution, p. 92.


30 Ibid., pp. 5, 7.

31 Interview SM11, P15.
32 ‘Peninsula Technikon Remembers’, p. 50.
33 Interview SM2, W5.
39 J. van der Merwe, ‘Tech Merger Shock: Bombshell Announcement Mystifies Rectors’, Cape Argus, 31 May 2002. This was the announcement in which the formation of the University of Johannesburg was proposed, and the retention of Fort Hare University was confirmed.
40 Interview with Brian Figaji, Pentech, 6 December 2004.
41 Van der Merwe, ‘Tech Merger Shock’.
42 Unpublished letter from N. Badsha, Deputy Director General, Department of Education, to Prof. Marcus Balintulo, Cape Technikon, 29 July 2002, enclosing ‘Memorandum of Clarification on Transformation and Mergers in Higher Education’.
46 Interview SM11, P15.
47 Advertisement in free community newspaper, Southern Suburbs Tatler, 29 August 2002.
50 ‘Summary of the NWG Submission to the Minister of Education’, Bulletin: Cape Technikon Staff Newsletter, 11 March 2002. Adrian Coetzee, chairperson of the Future Options Group, was to be appointed Cape Technikon’s merger manager in 2003.
51 Ibid., p. 25.
52 Ibid., p. 23. This service point was an existing part of Cape Technikon and did not refer to Pentech.

SM7, C10.

SM7, C10.

SM10, P12.

SM6, C7.

Mail & Guardian, 7 May 2004.

SM7, C10.

SM1, P1.

SM3, P5.

SM9, P11.

SM5, C3.

SM6, C8.


SM2, P4


SM6, C6.

SM6, C6.


SM4, C1.

SM4, C1.

SM2, P3.

As long as they passed their courses. If a pipeline student had to repeat a year, he or she would be assessed the higher CPUT fee upon re-registration.

The position of the new institution’s permanent (as opposed to interim) Vice-Chancellor was only advertised in September/October 2005, presumably with interviews to follow before the end of the year.

‘Need for a clear indication of our intention with respect to the process for merger between Pentech and Cape Technikon’, 16 March 2004.

SM11, P15.

SM4, C2.

SM5, C4.

SM3, P7.

SM7, C10.

SM5, C3.

SM4, P13.

9. The formation of the University of Johannesburg

4 It is not surprising that students were involved so late in the merger process, because students in the technikon were traditionally not very active in higher education politics and transformation.
5 Mogale, 'The Future'.
6 Minutes of RAU Academic Staff Meeting, Johannesburg, 8 October 2002.
7 Ibid.


15 Interestingly, Dr. Rensburg was appointed Vice-Chancellor of the University of Johannesburg in January 2006.


10. **Taming the mergers: Major findings and questions for further research**


**Appendix**


3 Ibid., 70.


6 Ibid., 78.

7 Ibid., 79.

8 Ibid., 80.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.