Chapter 3, pp. 29–41

5. Ibid., 251.
6. Ibid., 251.
8. Ibid., 149.
17. Robertson, ‘Social Theory’, 73.
Notes


30. Ibid., 2.
31. Ibid., 2.
32. Ibid., 4.
33. Ibid., 2.
36. Boyd-Barrett argues for the use of the term ‘media imperialism’ as opposed to the term ‘cultural imperialism’ (Tomlinson, 1991) or ‘media-cultural imperialism’ (Schiller, 1976) saying, ‘It refers to a much more specific range of phenomena than the term ‘cultural imperialism’ and lends itself much more easily to rigorous study’ (1977:119). Furthermore, he argues, ‘It is also possibly the single most important component of cultural imperialism outside formal educational institutions, from the view-point of those who are actively engaged in extending or containing given cultural influences’ (1977:119). Commenting on the different terms used by theorists to describe the impact that global media have on local cultures, Tomlinson points out that neo-Marxists tend to use the term ‘cultural imperialism’ as they see the media as central to the general process of cultural domination, whereas pluralist theorists prefer the term ‘media imperialism’ since they do not accept the general theory of cultural domination: ‘They (pluralist theorists) tend to keep the focus on the media so as to try to establish the ‘facts’ without making more general theoretical assumptions about cultural imperialism’ (1991:21). Tomlinson (1991) rejects the
pluralist position for two reasons. Firstly, while we may be able to make an analytical separation between the media and other cultural phenomena, they are experienced as an interwoven totality by people. For example, he argues, television viewing cannot be separated from the politics of the family or patriarchal ideologies. Secondly, he argues, the pluralist desire to separate these two terms mirrors the generally anti-theoreticist stance of this position (in their attempt to get at the 'facts' without making more general theoretical assumptions about cultural imperialism) and can easily result in the loss of the critical sense of the term 'media imperialism'. Thus Tomlinson writes, 'Media imperialism . . . as I understand it, is a particular way of discussing cultural imperialism. It is not simply a name for the study of the media in developing countries or of the international market in communications. It involves all the complex political issues and indeed, of political commitments entailed in the notion of cultural domination' (1991:22). That the media provide information (news), entertain, and educate is undeniable. However, like Tomlinson (1991), I believe that in carrying out these functions, the media also play important cultural and ideological roles, generating and circulating meanings that help either sustain or challenge social relationships of domination and subordination. But at the same time, I also believe that the cultural and ideological role played by the media needs to be distinguished from that of other cultural agencies (e.g. the school system and religious institutions). For this reason, when referring to the perceived role of the media in obtaining and maintaining Western cultural hegemony, I will use Schiller's (1992) term 'media-cultural imperialism'.

42. Ibid., 283.
43. Schiller, 'Not Yet the Post-Imperialist Era', 14.
50. Lemish et al., 'Global Culture in Practice', 540. Whether media imperialism is a result of 'inevitable' market laws, unaffected by ideological motives, or whether it needs to be seen as a deliberate political and ideological process is open to dispute among theorists (Biltereyst, 1996:4). Biltereyst (1996:4) refers to these as the 'free-market' and 'dependency' paradigms respectively.
51. Schiller, 'Not Yet the Post-Imperialist Era', 14.
53. Ibid., 6.
56. Ibid., 17. In this regard, Oliveira (1993), writing on Brazilian television, remarks that the major influence of programmes imported from the West has never been so much their foreign source as the institutionalisation of a model. With regard to the Brazilian soap opera, the telenovela, he argues that it should not be seen as a reaction against an imported worldview. ‘On the contrary, it exemplifies the creolisation of U.S. cultural products. It is the spiced up Third World copy of Western values, norms, patterns of behaviour, and models of social relations’ (O. S. Oliveira, ‘Brazilian Soaps Outshine Hollywood: Is Cultural Imperialism Fading Out?’, in *Beyond National Sovereignty: International Communication in the 1990s*, ed. K. Nordenstreng and H. I. Schiller (New Jersey: Ablex, 1993), 119).
61. Ibid., 119.
62. Ibid., 118.
65. Ibid., 174.
67. Robertson, ‘Globalisation or Glocalisation’, 36.
69. Sinclair quoted in ibid., 114.
70. Ibid., 114.
71. Robertson, ‘Globalisation or Glocalisation’, 36.
75. Moores, *Interpreting Audiences*, 1
78. Ibid., 15.
Chapter 4, pp. 43–57


5. As Giliomee and Schlemmer point out, to the advocates of apartheid, state-enforced separation was necessary to ensure the survival of whites: ‘Only through apartheid could whites maintain themselves in a society in which they were outnumbered and in which there existed fundamental differences between white and black in civilization, culture, and a general way of life. They believed that failure to impose apartheid would lead to the political suicide of whites. Consequently, Africans should exercise and have rights only in their own areas and communities. Economically, white workers should be protected in the labour market to enable them to maintain their living standards. Socially the policy should aim at maintaining racial differences’ (1989:54). Black South Africans were deprived of their South African citizenship as more and more homelands became ‘independent’.

envisaged a vertical division between equal ethnic groups or nations. Apartheid also differed from the liberal model which English-speaking opinion formers of the time used to categorize society. The liberal model is based on the individual who is invested with rights. The apartheid model portrays man as a social being who finds fulfillment only in a community. The individual is seen to have no rights while the *volk* has a God-given right to exist; whatever rights the individual enjoys are derived from the collectivity' (1989:40–41). Apartheid was aimed at enhancing Afrikaner nationalism by entrenching white political control in South Africa: ‘Through apartheid, Afrikaners governed not only themselves, but also all other groups in the society’ (1989:41). As the authors note, ‘Afrikaner nationalists defined *volk* as a collectivity whose members were of similar descent and racial stock, and who shared a common history, culture and sense of destiny’ (1989:45).

15. Ibid., 1.
16. Ibid., 29.
17. Ibid., 29.
25. Ibid., 58. Giliomee and Schlemmer argue that if one is to understand apartheid, one needs to understand that Afrikaner nationalism urged Afrikaners to separate themselves from both non-Afrikaner whites and various black groups. Underlying this ideology was a primary claim to the land and a fear of being overwhelmed. The claim to the land was based on the myth that the land had been vacant at the time of white colonisation and that Afrikaners had been in South Africa before the English-speaking settlers. With regard to the second claim, the fear of being overwhelmed, the NP ideologues argued that since Afrikaners had nowhere else to go, they needed to ensure their survival within South Africa: ‘The only way they could safeguard their culture, language and “bio-genetic” identity was through exclusive political control over “white” South Africa. In any unitary state Afrikaners (and other whites) would be swamped’ (1989:42).
27. Ibid., 63.
29. Ross, A Concise History of South Africa, 121.
32. Davenport, South Africa, 535.
34. Liebenberg and Spies, South Africa in the 20th Century, 326.
35. Davenport, South Africa, 533.
36. Quoted in Giliomee and Schlemmer, From Apartheid to Nation-building, 93.
39. Wolpe, Race, Class and the Apartheid State, 66.
40. Ibid., 66.
41. Ibid., 67.
42. Ibid., 103.
44. R. Jennings, D. Evaratt, A. Lyle and D. Budlender, eds. The Situation of Youth In South Africa (Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE), 1997), 23.
47. Ibid., 106.
49. Marais, South Africa, 3.
50. Ibid., 123–24.
52. Marais, South Africa, 3.
53. Ibid., 303.
54. See, for example, M. Gevisser, 'That other Holomisa', Mail and Guardian, 13 September 1996, 14.
59. Ibid., 57–58.
60. In 2003, as part of the South African government’s rationalisation of tertiary education, the Grahamstown campus was ceded to Fort Hare University.
63. Central Statistical Services (CSS), *October Household Survey 1995: Eastern Cape* (Pretoria: Central Statistical Services, 1997). The population figures for 2002/3 are as follows: white (10%), African (78%), Indian (2.5%) and coloured (8.6%) (SAIRR 2002/3).
64. After 1954, ‘Bantu’ education was administered by the Department of Education and Training (DET). The Eiselen Commission (1949–1951) had recommended schooling for African children which, in accordance with apartheid ideology, would strengthen their roots in African culture and society, and prepare them to take up their ‘places’ in the South African economy. From about 1960 onwards, secondary schooling for Africans was concentrated in the ‘Bantustans’. Bantu education sought to retribalise Africans with a heavy emphasis on teaching in the African mother-tongues. The Homelands policy was supported by the establishment of black tertiary institutions. All coloured and Indian education was administered by the provincial governments. The Coloured Affairs Department (CAD) was established by the NP government after 1948 to serve the special social and welfare interests of the coloured people. In 1964 the CAD assumed control of coloured education. According to the De Vos Malan Commission their education ‘had to make them conscious of their separate existence and readiness to work’. Indian education followed a similar route and the government promoted Christian National Education for white schools. White education was comparatively generously funded for the provision of buildings, amenities, and teachers to accommodate the Compulsory Schooling Act. In 1992 the National Government issued an Education Renewal Strategy which established Model C schools. After 1994, all schools became non-racial but fee structures ensured that Model C schools were mainly white.
70. Jennings et al., *The Situation of Youth In South Africa*, 2.
72. Van Zyl Slabbert et al., *Youth in the New South Africa*, 12.
73. Ibid., 13.
76. Willis, *Common Culture*, 7–8.
78. Ibid., 150.
84. Willis, *Common Culture*, 10
85. Ibid., 11.
86. Ibid., 12.
87. Boethius, ‘Controlled Pleasures’, 151.
91. Ibid., 210.
92. Ibid., 211.


102. See, for example, Jennings et al., *The Situation of Youth in South Africa*; Van Zyl Slabbert et al., *Youth in the New South Africa*; Everatt, *Creating a Future*.


Chapter 5, pp. 59–77


14. Ibid., 15. Bryman does note that some writers would probably challenge the treatment of the two terms as synonyms.

15. Ibid., 16.
16. Ibid., 15.
17. Ibid., 15.
18. Ibid., 15.
19. Ibid., 16.
20. Ibid., 16.
31. Ibid., 100. Also see Lindloff, *Qualitative Communication Research Methods*, 23.
36. Ang, *Living Room Wars*, 70
37. Ibid., 73.
38. Ibid., 75.
39. Ibid., 75.
40. Lindloff, *Qualitative Communication Research Methods*, 245.
42. M. Berman, *All that is Solid*, 36.
44. Ibid., 288–91.
45. Ibid., 293.


52. Wolff et al., ‘Focus Groups and Surveys’, 119.


60. See, for example, Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 75; Willis, *Common Culture*, 13; Reimer, ‘Youth and Modern Lifestyles’, 113; Nielsen, ‘Youth Culture’, 2.

61. See, for example, Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 211.


63. Rhodes University, *Digest of Statistics* (Grahamstown: Rhodes University, 1999).

64. All significance tests examine a null hypothesis which states that there is no difference between two samples or that there is no relation between two variables. The significance test works out the probability that the null hypothesis is true. In the social sciences the cut-off point, referred to as the significance level, is usually 5 per cent (0.05) (equivalent to 95 per cent confidence limits). If the probability that results from the test is less than 5 per cent, then we reject the null hypothesis. This means that we reject the idea that this is due to sampling error and that the difference in the sample reflects a difference in the population. Chi-square is a frequently used test of significance in the social sciences (Harvey and MacDonald, *Doing Sociology*, 248; E. Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1989), 460).


67. See for example, D. Morley, *The ‘Nationwide’ Audience* (London: British Film Institute, 1980).


74. Deacon et al., *Researching Communication*, 54.
75. Ibid., 53
76. Ibid., 54.
77. Ibid., 54–55.
78. Maxwell, ‘Understanding and Validity’, 293.
79. See Morgan, *Focus Groups*, 47.
81. Ibid., 268.
84. See, for example, Lunt and Livingstone, ‘Rethinking the Focus Group’, 823; Morgan, *Focus Groups*, 43.
85. For a discussion of this problem, see Lunt and Livingstone, ‘Rethinking the Focus Group’, 823; Morgan, *Focus Groups*, 43.
92. Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism*, 61
93. Ibid., 61
94. Silverstone, ‘Television and Everyday Life’, 175; B. Hoijer, ‘Social Psychological Perspectives in Reception Analysis’, in *Approaches to Audiences: A
Notes

95. Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social Research, 104.
96. Ibid., 123.

Chapter 6, pp. 79–99

2. Lindloff, Qualitative Communication Research Methods, 25.
3. Thompson, The Media and Modernity, 175.
6. Ibid., 720.
8. Ibid., 76.
13. Ibid., 41.
15. Ibid., 175.
18. Ibid., 169.
20. For further discussion of this, see Morley, ‘Electronic Communities and Domestic Rituals’; Hoijer, ‘Social Psychological Perspectives’, 169.
25. The term used to refer to a man in Xhosa culture.
31. Ibid., 137–38.
32. Ibid., 137.
34. Soul City is a locally produced drama series that tackles social issues such as HIV/Aids and violence against women.
38. Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism, 74.
39. Morley, ‘Postmodernism: The Highest Stage of Cultural Imperialism’, 145; I. de Sola Pool, ‘Direct Broadcast Satellites and the Integrity of National Cultures’, in National Sovereignty and International Communication, ed. K. Nordenstreng and H. I. Schiller (New York: Ablex Publishing, 1979), 124. It was the tacit recognition by the NP government that foreign television programmes could undermine the ideology of apartheid that led to the delayed introduction of television into South Africa. The Meyer Commission of Enquiry, which was set up to consider ‘matters relating to television’, was very clear about the political imperatives of the new service which was eventually introduced in 1976:
A television service for South Africa . . . should be founded on such principles as will ensure that the Christian system of values, the national identity and the social structure of its various commitments will be respected, preserved and enriched (quoted in L. Strelitz and L. Steenveld, ‘1922 and South African Television’, Screen 35 no. 1 (1994): 38).
41. Ibid., 12.
43. Ibid., 157.
44. Berger et al., The Homeless Mind, 15.
47. Nielsen, ‘Youth Culture’, 23.
48. Ibid., 2.
52. Ibid., 144.
53. Ang, *Living Room Wars*, 70.

**Chapter 7, pp. 101–121**

2. Lemish et al., ‘Global Culture in Practice’, 541.
3. Ibid., 542.
4. For similar findings among youth in Israel, Denmark and France, see Lemish et al., ‘Global Culture in Practice’, 545.
10. Ibid., 191–92.
11. Ibid., 194.
12. Ibid., 194.
13. Ibid., 203–04.
14. Ibid., 205.
20. Ibid., 305.
29. This takes place any time after the age of 17 and consists of various rites of passage (including circumcision) towards becoming an adult.
30. Because the Zimbabwean students are not eligible for bursaries at South African universities, the majority tend to come from middle-class families who can afford the fees.
32. M-Net is a local subscription channel that screens primarily American films, sitcoms and drama series.
36. During the years of apartheid, many black families were split up in this way. As the overcrowded and impoverished rural ‘homelands’ were unable to support and sustain black families, fathers were invariably forced to seek work in the cities, sending money home to their rural families.
37. This term is used by Schou, ‘Postwar Americanisation’, 24, in his discussion of the modernisation of post-war Denmark.
43. Ang, *Living Room Wars*, 70.

**Chapter 8, pp. 123–139**


6. Ibid., 151.


10. Ibid., 74–75.


23. Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism*, 73

24. Ibid., 74.


185
42. Fiske, *Television Culture*, 63.
43. Ibid., 65–66.
44. Ibid., 66.
46. Ang, *Living Room Wars*, 70.
Bibliography


Bibliography


Nielsen, H. K. ‘Youth Culture and the Completion of Cultural Modernisation’. Young 1 (3) 1993:1–12.


Bibliography

# Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>adolescence</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advertisements</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>music</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>renaissance</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alternative press</td>
<td>33–34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>culture</td>
<td>3, 125, 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gangster styles</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>media</td>
<td>5, 92, 93–95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multinational corporations</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>music</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>popular culture</td>
<td>80, 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soap operas</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>television</td>
<td>20, 92, 95, 118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transnational conglomerates</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anarchy</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>2, 47, 48–49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ang, I</td>
<td>24, 29, 63–64, 97, 127, 130, 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apartheid</td>
<td>21, 108, 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alternative press</td>
<td>33–34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ideology</td>
<td>46, 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberal press</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opposition</td>
<td>48–49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political context</td>
<td>43–46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>school system</td>
<td>47–48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>segregation</td>
<td>43, 44, 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social context</td>
<td>43–46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social effects</td>
<td>49–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social policies</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>university education</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>audience(s)</td>
<td>4, 8, 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autonomy</td>
<td>7–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnographic</td>
<td>21, 22, 24, 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interpretive freedom</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local</td>
<td>41, 79, 104, 105, 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>power</td>
<td>2–3, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>research</td>
<td>3, 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and texts</td>
<td>7–27, 29–30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authenticity</td>
<td>123–39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global cultures</td>
<td>123–26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local cultures</td>
<td>123–26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autonomy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>audiences</td>
<td>7–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantu culture</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berger, G</td>
<td>19, 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>black</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American culture</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade unionism</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Consciousness</td>
<td>86–87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonfadelli, H</td>
<td>52, 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyd–Barrett, O</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British culture</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Screen tradition</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bryman, A</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cable systems</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>campus culture</td>
<td>116, 128–30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitalism</td>
<td>38, 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circuit of culture</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codesa</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cognition and culture</td>
<td>82, 83–97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commercial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>culture</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>media</td>
<td>20, 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conglomerates</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural outputs</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mass</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

201
poverty 49
progressive television 97
public tastes 23

Q
qualitative research 60, 62–66
quantitative research 60–62
questionnaires 68–70
design 68–70

R
racial segregation 44
education system 46–48
racist ideology 45
radio 104, 105
realism 6, 113–14, 123–39
equalitarian 134
empirical 130–34
research
data collection 67, 70–71
constructivism 65
descriptive validity 65
ethnographic audience 21, 22, 24, 26
generalisability 65
interviews 71–77
methodology/methods 5, 59–77
qualitative 62–66
quantitative 60–62
questionnaires 68–70
Rhodes University 51–52, 68–70,
91–92, 101–03, 106–21, 128–30
social 60
social contexts 43–57
student essays 77
surveys 68
triangulation 60, 66–67
youth 54–57
reverse cultural invasion 124
Rhodes University 51–52, 68–70, 91–92,
101–03, 106–21, 128–30
Robertson, R 38

S
SABC 25
satellites 32
Schiller, HI 35–37
schools
apartheid 47–48
Schou, S 97
segregation 43, 44
education system 46–48
self-formation 55
sexuality 21
shebeens 115
Silverston, R 83
Sipho (interviewee) 93–97
soap operas 19, 87, 94, 97, 132
social
apartheid 45
cultural contexts 8, 43–57
effects of apartheid 49
experiences 16, 40
and the individual 82–83
meaning 55
relations 23
research 60
policies 5
socialisation 108
societies
modern 50, 55, 106
Third World 98
traditional 50
socio-cultural structures 82
South Africa(n)
advertisements 39
apartheid contexts 43–46
creolisation of culture 124
economy 44
education system 46–48
foreign television 110
jazz 125
media 33–34, 126, 128
national identity 127–28
poverty 49
radio 104, 105
segregation 43, 44, 46–48
television 24–25, 33–34, 104, 105
Third World society 98
tsotsis 15–16, 17
youth 4, 5, 53, 115, 128–30, 141
youth research 56–57
Soweto education crisis 47, 48
Straubhaar, JD 104
structural contradictions 17
structuralists 17
surveys
analytical 68
global media 103–05
descriptive 68
symbolic
distancing 79–99
meaning 55, 56, 69
resources 139
Mixed Reception is a study of media consumption in a time of rapid globalisation, written for both undergraduate and postgraduate Media Studies students.

The book begins by describing the major competing theories of text/audience relationships, and providing a useful chapter on research methods for the study of media reception. It then explores the author's research, looking at how a cross-section of South African youth responded to media texts, mainly television dramas, which were produced internationally but broadcast locally.

Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods, the study discovers a complex interplay between agency and structure, between individual choice and wider social and historical factors in accounting for media consumption choices. It shows how, with media consumption deeply rooted in their everyday experience, young people from different backgrounds actively use the texts of popular media in their ongoing attempts to make sense of their lives.

Given these findings, Mixed Reception demonstrates that the media imperialism thesis, which claims that cultural homogenisation is the most significant effect of media globalisation, cannot be crudely applied to media reception by South African youth audiences.