It has been said that if you swim in the sea, you cannot avoid getting wet. Thus even strong anti-apartheid bodies in South Africa were not able to escape the consequences of apartheid policies and laws. In terms of legislation that laid down that institutions as well as individuals had to be racially classified, the SACC became a black organisation at its national conference of August 1972.\(^1\) As Rees later explained to the SACC Executive, this was because, for the first time in its history, the national conference – the organisation’s supreme legislative body – had a majority of blacks (36 blacks to 31 whites).\(^2\)

The advent of black majorities in the ruling bodies of both individual churches and the SACC, and the movement of blacks into the seats of power in church and ecumenical bureaucracies, is referred to in this study as ‘structural indigenisation’. As far as mission-based churches were concerned, it was, of course, part and parcel of their attainment of autonomy which involved the ‘euthanasia’ of their founding missions. Structural indigenisation and autonomy represented a major development among South African churches. It began in the nineteenth century, but reached its full flood in the mid-years of the twentieth century. One of the
best indicators of this development is to be found in changes in the membership of the CCSA and SACC during the twentieth century.

The changing church scene

The white-dominated, multiracial churches which initially had been colonial wings of their mother churches in Britain, were the first to achieve autonomy. The leader in this process was the Congregational Church, the beginnings of autonomy being dated to 1859. The CPSA followed in 1872, the Methodist Church of South Africa in 1883 and the PCSA in 1897. Over the next half-century, the number of similarly autonomous churches in the CCSA grew very slowly. By 1950 there were only seven such churches in membership, compared with twelve overseas-based churches and mission societies. In contrast, by 1975 ten of these mission societies had been superseded by twelve autonomous black churches. The remaining two overseas-based missions, the Church of Scotland Mission and the Paris Evangelical Mission, survived as administrative entities rather than actual missions. Table 4 details the metamorphosis of CCSA/SACC membership.

The churches listed in the table attained their autonomy much later than the four churches mentioned earlier, but there was a more important distinction between the two groups. While the older churches were all multiracial which, in practice, as has been pointed out, meant that their controlling bodies were white-dominated, the membership of the newer group was almost entirely black, although they retained some whites in administrative capacities.

The importance of the last-mentioned fact becomes evident from an analysis of the composition of the first black-majority national conference of the SACC in 1972. The representation of multiracial churches, which included the largest proportion of Christians
in their ranks, reflected the skewed representation of the races in their controlling bodies, in that they sent 18 whites and only 9 blacks to that conference. In contrast, the new black churches sent 16 blacks but only 6 whites. Thus it was the black churches, originally founded by the mission societies, which ensured the advent of the black majority and helped, finally, to bury white dominance of the SACC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ex-mission churches in SACC membership in 1975</th>
<th>Date of entry into CCSA/SACC</th>
<th>Date of autonomy</th>
<th>Founding mission society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bantu Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Church of Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moravian Church of Western Cape</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Moravian Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Lutheran Church South-eastern Region</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Berlin Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Church of Norway Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Church of Sweden Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>American Lutheran Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hermannsburg Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Lutheran Church Transvaal Region</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Berlin Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Afrika</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Lutheran Church Cape/Orange Region</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Berlin Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Congregational Church of Southern Africa</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>American Board Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>London Missionary Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congregational Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moravian Church Cape Eastern</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Moravian Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsonga Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Swiss Reformed Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Lutheran Church</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Hermannsburg Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Reformed Church</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Evangelical Church of South West Africa</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Rhenish Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Finnish Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederduitse Gereformeerde Sendingkêr</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Lutherans move in**

Among the most important of the black churches entering CCSA/SACC membership in the late 1960s were those that replaced the German, Scandinavian and American Lutheran missions. These were the Evangelical Lutheran Churches of the South-eastern Region (1962), the Transvaal Region (1964) and the Cape-Orange Region (1968). Although numerically powerful, representing more than 500,000 members, these churches made little initial impact on the CCSA; one reason being that white missionar­ies retained a controlling position in them even after they had been granted autonomy. However, they were in the final phases of attaining full autonomy and once they had moved into the seats of power in these churches, black Lutherans such as Dr Manas Buthelezi, were not disposed to assume the low profile with which the conservative white missionaries had been content. In 1966 the Federation of Evangelical Lutheran Churches in South Africa (FELCSA) was formed, which brought the newly emergent black Lutheran and Moravian Churches into closer contact with each other. These included the two dominant churches in Namibia (then called South West Africa), the Ovambokavango and Rhenish Mission Churches. Their leaders, such as Dr Lukas de Vries, author of *Mission and Colonialism in Namibia*, and Pastor Zepheniah Kameeta, head of the Otjimbingwe Lutheran theological seminary, were particularly radical and outspoken. An indication of their impact is evident in a report in *Ecunews* on the two-yearly meeting of FELCSA held in Johannesburg in February 1973, which noted:

> The South West Africans came . . . in a truculent mood. And when the conference began discussing some roughly worded proposals . . . to make Lutheran unity more tangible and real, they were strongly supported by Black leaders from South Africa like Bishop Rapoo of the Tswana Lutheran Church and Bishop Mhlungu of the South Eastern Region Church. When the Whites present tried to stall the unity issue, the blacks responded in an emotional way. In a highly charged speech, Dr J L de Vries . . . said: “Our struggle in
South Africa is a life and death one . . . We came here because we need and expect help, but it appears you are not prepared to give it.”

After this conference, Ecunews described FELCSA as emerging ‘as a new, united force, not only in the church world, but in the whole of Southern Africa’. FELCSA had very close ties with the SACC; from 1972 onwards they shared the same building, while the Rev A Habelgaarn, who was elected president of the SACC in 1971, was also president of FELCSA. The general secretary of FELCSA at that time, Pastor K H Schmale, was a member of the SACC Executive. In contrast to pre-World War II Lutheran missionaries, Schmale strongly attacked the ethnic basis of the various Lutheran churches in South Africa and played an important role in effecting the unity of these churches in Namibia,11 where the United Evangelical Lutheran Church was formed in 1972. As recounted earlier, the South African black Lutheran and Moravian churches also moved towards structural unity, which was accomplished in 1975 when the United Evangelical Lutheran Church in South Africa was established, extinguishing the theology of ethnic churches among black Lutherans, although white Lutherans stayed out of the new church.

**Black Nederduitse Gereformeerde churches move in**

A decade before this, however, the beginnings of an equally notable development became manifest when the NGKA, the African ‘daughter church’ of the NGK, joined the CCSA as an observer member. The NGKA, was a very recent creation. It was based on missionary work among the African population undertaken by the various synods of the NGK. At first, African converts were simply added to the NGSK created for coloured people in 1881. In time, separate churches and synods for the African converts were established – the first being that of the Orange Free State in 1910. A similar synod was created in the Transvaal in 1932 (it was a member of the CCSA between 1936 and 1940), the Cape
Province in 1951 and Natal in 1952. The separation between these synods came to an end in 1963, when the NGKA was formed.12

Although the NGKA immediately moved to associate itself with the CCSA, for several years it was quiescent as far as secular affairs were concerned. It was easy to conclude that because of its close alignment with the white NGK, this church would have been inclined to support apartheid. Indeed, its very existence as a separate ethnic entity was predicated on the same premises as government policy. There were also strong pragmatic factors which might have made it sympathetic to apartheid. Although legally autonomous, it was still extremely dependent on the NGK for financial subsidies,13 while the white missionaries of the ‘mother church’ working in the NGKA not only exercised a powerful influence within it, but remained members of, and responsible to, the white church rather than to the NGKA itself.

Thus the entry of the NGKA into observer membership in 1963 was somewhat surprising to the CCSA, but of course, not unwelcome. The minutes of the CCSA Executive meeting of 7 February 1963 record that when Brown reported that the NGKA had inquired whether it could send observers to the next biennial meeting, the request was granted ‘with real joy’.14 When the NGKA was eventually accepted into observer membership at the biennial meeting of 1966, Brown expressed ‘a very special word of welcome to these brethren’. Ironically, the CCSA was benefiting from the separate racial structures of the NGK, since the separation of the black ‘daughter’ churches from the white ‘mother church’ enabled those black churches to develop an outlook and ethos which differed from the NGK in many respects. If the proponents of apartheid had used the three-self formula to their own advantage, the establishment of autonomous, indigenous churches was beginning to produce some wholly unintended consequences for them and it became clear from the early 1970s that the NGKA was going its own way. Voices began to be raised within the church
urging it to speak out on human rights and racial discrimination.\textsuperscript{15} A straw in the wind was an address given, significantly, at a meeting of the CI in September 1973, by the Rev T Mofokeng of the Northern Transvaal synod. Among other things, he asserted that ‘the Church in South Africa should be involved in a relevant theology of liberation for the whole man’.\textsuperscript{16} The most arresting demonstration of thinking in the NGKA came in November 1973 when a meeting of a hundred NGKA ministers issued a statement denouncing apartheid as ‘unChristian’. Explaining the background to the statement, the Rev S P E Buti, the secretary of the NGKA synod, said: ‘It came out boldly from the meeting that we could no longer hold our peace against the ideology of separation on the basis of colour.’ In their statement, the hundred ministers called on their colleagues to ‘conscientise the people in the Theology of Liberation of the whole man’.\textsuperscript{17}

As in the ethnically divided Lutheran churches, there were strong calls for an end to structural divisions based on race within the church. On this score, black NGKA leaders and those of Lutheran churches found enough in common to begin a series of consultations together which, in time, led to the formation of a new black organisation, the Association of Black Reformed Evangelical Churches in South Africa.\textsuperscript{18}

Not only the NGKA was causing a stir by its anti-apartheid stands. That the much older NGSK was following the same line became evident at its general synod of 1974 – which took resolutions on unity among NG churches and on issues such as mixed marriages which, commented the CI journal Pro Veritate, amounted to a rejection of the core of separate development.\textsuperscript{19} In the same year, it also joined the SACC as an observer member church. As a further indication of the trends of thinking in this church, it simply needs to be mentioned that Dr Alan Boesak, a leading exponent of black theology and increasingly recognised as a leader of black nationalist resistance in South Africa, was a product of the NGSK.
The black NG churches’ moves towards the Ecumenical Bloc were extremely important for a number of reasons. For one thing, this was the first time since the NG Transvaal synods had withdrawn from the CCSA in 1940 that there was any sign of a possible rapprochement between the Ecumenical and at least the black segment of the Dutch Reformed Bloc. The most momentous move of all, however, happened in 1975 when the NGKA decided to take the simple step of transforming its observer membership of the SACC into full membership of the organisation. The full significance of that move is best appreciated in the light of other developments which need to be set out first.

The end of CPSA/Methodist dichotomies

If black nationalism was engulfing apartheid and the theology of ethnic churchplanting on which it was founded, it was also engulfing liberalism and neo-liberalism. The effects of this in maintaining white dominance of churches as well as ecumenical bodies are evident in changes in their leadership and particularly their clergy. The number of blacks in the clergy advanced very slowly during the first half of the twentieth century. According to Gerdener, the percentage of blacks in the ministry of South African churches rose from 35 per cent in 1910 to only 43 per cent in 1953, a rate that certainly did not reflect the expansion of Christian profession in South Africa during the same period. More detailed breakdowns relating to individual churches are difficult to obtain. Table 6 indicates the rate of black advance among the clergy of the two largest multiracial churches – the CPSA and Methodist – between 1940 and 1970.

If clergy are seen as the leaders of churches, the figures demonstrate the increasing extent to which the leadership of these two denominations was increasingly skewed in favour of whites since, as was demonstrated in Chapter One, their black membership was growing at an explosive rate during the period covered. While the percentage of black clergy in the Methodist Church was
TABLE 5: Black clergy in the multiracial Methodist and CPSA churches, 1940 to 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total number of clergy</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940 Methodist Church</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Methodist Church</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 Methodist Church</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 Methodist Church</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of the Province of South Africa</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Church of the Province of South Africa</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 Church of the Province of South Africa</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 Church of the Province of South Africa</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

practically static for three decades after 1940, black advance in the leadership of the CPSA was even slower. The first black suffragan bishop in this church was not elected until 1960. He was Bishop Alpheus Zulu, then working in the diocese of St John's. He became the first full black bishop of the CPSA in 1971 when he was elected head of the diocese of Zululand. In 1975, out of a total of 14 on the CPSA bench of bishops, only Zulu and 2 other suffragan bishops were black. In the Methodist Church at that time, a similar situation prevailed in that only 2 of the 14 chairmen of the regional synods were black.22

It seems strange in the light of these figures that the onset of self-sufficiency in theological training took place at a much earlier date for blacks than for whites. The explanation for that lies in the discrimination churches practised against black clergy by refusing to send the great majority overseas for theological training in the same way as were whites before World War II. A department of divinity for the training of black clergy had been established at Fort Hare University College as early as 192123 and ac-
According to Gerdener, full self-sufficiency in the theological training of black clergy was established by the 1930s.  

However slow the black advance in the white-dominated Ecu- menical Bloc churches, from the 1960s onwards there was a growing realisation of the necessity for a greater Africanisation of their leadership. That resulted in the Rev Seth Mokitimi being elected president of the Methodist Church in 1964 (two years before he became president of the CCSA), for instance. In addition, during the 1960s the old mission/church dichotomy evident in the racial division of the structures of these churches was deliberately abolished. The CPSA began that process in 1960 when it replaced its old Provincial Board of Missions with a Board of Missionary Strategy. In a report made to this body in 1963, a committee appointed ‘to consider the Church’s Ministry in the changed conditions in South Africa’ stated:

> Only when the Church can show itself as genuinely African and no longer an import in its modes of theological thought and appreciation, in its life, worship and activity, can it hope to make an effective impact on neo-African society.

These thoughts – and even the wording – are reminiscent of those used by Jacottet and Lennox in the GMC in 1904 and 1909 respectively when they advocated the establishment of ‘native churches’. A powerful injection of the theology which had led to the merger of the WCC and IMC in 1961 was given to the worldwide Anglican communion by the Anglican Congress in Toronto in 1963 which produced what has been described as an ‘epoch-making document’ entitled *Mutual Responsibility and Inter-dependence in the Body of Christ*. Its ideas on the unity of the church and mission were repeated in a book published by the CPSA in 1963, *Methods of Mission in South Africa*, which was authored by the locally born bishop, John Carter. The final resolution of the mission/church dichotomy in the CPSA can be dated
to its Provincial Synod of 1965 which abolished the Board of Missionary Strategy together with the diocesan missionary conferences, while the concept of ‘missionary dioceses’ was also discarded. Although a missionary department of the church continued to exist, mission was from this time seen to be the responsibility of the whole church and applicable to whites as well as blacks.

In the Methodist Church the name of the Methodist Missionary Society was changed to the Missionary Department as early as 1944. Moves in the direction of resolving the mission/church dichotomy were not as overt as in the CPSA until 1961, when the Methodist Conference adopted a standing resolution which stated the fundamental aim of Methodist missionary policy to be: ‘Going to every place where men are without Christ ... to spread Scriptural Holiness throughout the land by the proclamation of the evangelical faith’. The lack of any mention of ‘converting the heathen’ and stress on the universality of mission was also an echo of world theological trends in this regard. The same was true of the alteration by the PCSA of the name of its Africans Missions Committee in 1960 to the Church Extension Committee (African).

The changes in the CCSA constituency during the 1960s were the most extensive it had experienced to that date. They were not immediately transferred either to its operations or to the composition of its controlling bodies, although there was a foretaste of changes to come in the election of Mokitimi as president in 1966. The victory of Bishop G Pakendorf of the newly formed Evangelical Lutheran Church, Transvaal Region, over the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town in a contest for the CCSA presidency in 1964 indicated a new willingness to break with the long-established tradition of Anglican/Methodist dominance of the CCSA.
The establishment of the black majority

As when the Moravian Church Western Cape entered into full membership of the CCSA in 1957, the historic nature of the first black-majority SACC national conference in 1972 was, if not ignored, then not well appreciated. This, however, was understandable. The numbers of blacks in SACC bodies had been growing slowly over a number of years and, in fact, the advent of a new dispensation had already been signalled by three notable developments at the national conference a year earlier. These were, firstly, a statement by Rees that from henceforward the organisation would deliberately seek to reflect the black-majority situation of its constituency in both its staffing and Executive bodies. Secondly, it was at this conference that the first black-majority Executive was elected; and, thirdly, there was the election of a black president, the Rev August Habelgaarn of the Moravian Church. He was not the first black to be elected to that post. However, the election of the Rev Seth Mokitimi to the presidency in 1966 was a gesture of tokenism rather than a recognition of the realities of growing black strength in every sector of South Africa as a whole and in the Ecumenical Bloc in particular. Mokitimi’s election certainly did not reflect any predominance of blacks in the controlling bodies of the CCSA; at the biennial meeting which elected him, only 26 out of 76 delegates were black.

Although not much was made of it at the time, the advent of the black majority was a notable event. It reflected the outcome of a historical process which had begun almost two centuries earlier when the first missionaries left the shores of Europe and North America to ‘convert the heathen’. It also coincided with the emergence of a powerful new force.

The coming of black consciousness . . .

The situation of Ecumenical Bloc churches vis-à-vis black nationalism changed radically between 1970 and 1975. One of the
reasons for this was that the earlier anti-black nationalist bias of white liberals was submerged as blacks moved into their seats of power. This also resulted in a new vision which saw Christianity as a vehicle of nationalism in terms of the new ideologies of black consciousness and black theology.

Black consciousness, as noted earlier, represented a new wave of African nationalism which, for a period, eclipsed that embodied in the ANC and the PAC. The seeds of black consciousness—expressing, in the words of its leading proponent, Steve Biko, ‘group pride and determination of the black to rise and attain the envisaged self’—were found in the writings of Franz Fanon (particularly *The Wretched of the Earth*) and American black power leaders such as Malcom X and Stokely Carmichael. Black consciousness represented the ultimate reaction to the old idea of superior and inferior races and cultures. While that had been discarded both in the secular and religious spheres, this was in the nature of a white concession as it were, that other races were indeed equal. Black consciousness was an aggressive assertion by blacks themselves of their equality and human worth, summed up in the statement: ‘Black is Beautiful’. However, according to the proponents of black consciousness, this could not stop at mere verbal assertions; it had to be seen and experienced in practice as an existential reality. In many respects, this could not happen overnight because a mind-set of white superiority and black inferiority had existed for hundreds of years among blacks as well as whites. For that reason it was necessary for blacks to separate themselves from whites because in racially mixed situations, whites invariably ‘took control’. Thus blacks needed to be on their own, free of any white influences or ideas, and indeed any white presence, in order to establish their own confidence and selfhood. Once that had been accomplished, they could then return and encounter whites on a basis of a true equality. (The same line of thought was also evident among radical feminists, who argued for the same reasons that women needed to separate themselves from men.)
For many, and particularly liberals, this demand for separation between whites and blacks sounded uncomfortably similar to apartheid thinking, and indeed black consciousness was described by some liberals as ‘apartheid in reverse’. It certainly seemed to deny the ‘unity of humankind’ theme which was so strongly stressed in ‘The Message’ by the neo-liberals. Not that the proponents of black consciousness ever saw any redeeming features in apartheid. Whatever the theory behind even separate development, its practical results represented the ultimate statement of white privilege and superiority over blacks. However, it is interesting to speculate on whether the progenitors of the three-self formula, Venn and Anderson, would have seen black consciousness as much of a threat as did many liberals.

... and black theology

Although black consciousness was a reaction against the assumption that white, Western values were inherently superior to those of black, non-Western people, it did not embody a reaction against Christianity as such. A reason for this, as Biko wrote, was that

African religion in its essence was not radically different from Christianity. We also believed in one God, we had our own community of saints through whom we related to God, and we did not find it compatible with our way of life to worship God in isolation from the various aspects of our lives.36

Another reason was that black theology, which emerged very nearly concurrently with black consciousness, was seen to be an aspect of the nationalist liberation struggle, since it was a strongly ‘contextualised’ theology. In Biko’s words, black theology ‘wants to describe Christ as a fighting god, not a passive god who allows a lie to rest unchallenged. It grapples with existential problems’.

The emphasis on liberation in a political sense as much as in any other, is stressed again and again in writings on black theology. As a statement issued by a regional seminar on black theology in 1971 put it:
Black theology is a theology concerned with the future of the black man in the light of Christ as liberator . . . We understand Christ's liberation to be a liberation not only from circumstances of internal bondage but also liberation from circumstances of external enslavement.38

The most powerful statement of all was made by Dr Alan Boesak five years later:

Black theology is a theology of liberation. Black theology believes that liberation is not mere "part of" the gospel, or "consistent with" the gospel, but is the content and framework of the gospel of Jesus Christ. Black theology takes seriously the black situation, black experience, and grapples with the suffering of black people under oppression.39

With this emphasis on liberation, black theology came at a critical moment for churches. According to the Rev M Mogoba, who was later to become president of the Methodist Church and subsequently leader of the PAC: 'When young students in universities, colleges and schools were seriously rejecting the Christian religion as a White man’s religion, [black theology] saved Christianity for our sub-continent.'40 This statement can be compared with Gerhart’s observation that while the black consciousness movement faced formidable obstacles in reaching a mass audience through workers’ organisations, it fared better among black churchmen, and seminary students were among the earliest and most ardent proponents of black consciousness.41 The part played by black church people in several other black consciousness organisations and events confirms this. The University Christian Movement (UCM), created as a students’ organisation by Ecumenical Bloc churches in 1967 after they had withdrawn their support from the conservative Students’ Christian Association (SCA), was rapidly taken over by student proponents of black consciousness and became the launching pad for the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO) in 1968.42 Black Christians
also played a major role in the Black Peoples’ Convention, an umbrella organisation which included journalists, students, artists and a federation of women in its ranks. It was formed in 1972.43 Church people were again prominent in the organisation of the Black Renaissance Convention at Hammanskraal in 1975, which brought a wide range of black consciousness organisations together.44

While some proponents of black consciousness displayed outright hostility towards Christianity and the churches, in some cases the opposite applied. Frank Chikane, in his autobiography, relates how in the early 1970s Christian students at the University of the North who supported black consciousness practised their faith ‘underground’ rather than comply with demands of leaders that they reject their religion because it was an instrument of white oppression.45 One of the leading thinkers on black theology at the time, the Rev Ernest Baartman of the Methodist Church, wrote in 1973 that ‘the black man is grateful to God for His Church’ and that ‘thanks to the Church, the black man has been awakened’.46 Other spokesmen for black consciousness tended to be more critical of the churches, often referring to their situation of white domination; but while, as SASO stated in 1971 that Christianity as propagated by these churches had helped in the oppression of blacks by supporting the status quo, it nevertheless also expressed support ‘for those Christians in this country who are making a new departure to take the Christian message to the people of God, and consequently welcomes the emergence of black theology.’47 It is significant moreover, that suggestions put forward from time to time that blacks form their own separate churches, which would have been very much in line with the ideology of black consciousness described above, found little support. Although blacks mostly chose to stay within white-dominated churches, the 1970s were marked by an ever-increasing black outspokenness in the synods and assemblies of those churches as well as in the SACC.48
In the changing reactions of the SACC and its constituent churches to the concepts of black consciousness and black theology is to be found the clearest pointer to the end of the long period of white liberal dominance. Initial reactions were ambivalent, tending towards hostility. In October 1971, the SACC mouthpiece, *Kairos*, stated that while the current stress on black identity within churches was very significant and that black-white polarisation was recognised as a necessary strategy for change, nevertheless, 'however much polarisation may be a necessary political expedient, it is not a mark of the Church'. More overt hostility to black consciousness/black theology was evident in the attitudes of churches towards the UCM, their own creation, when it emerged as prominent platform for the new ideology after 1968. As a result of its increasingly radical stands, churches began to express reservations about its activities. In 1970, for instance, the CPSA Synod of Bishops asked Bishop John Carter to represent their church at consultations between the Johannesburg leadership of UCM and local denominations. In a confidential report submitted to the synod in September 1971, Bishop Carter stated that as far as relationships between the UCM and the churches were concerned

a love-hate relationship exists, in which mutual criticism predominates at present. The Churches find it very hard to go on justifying their endorsement of UCM, which appears to be encouraging disaffection. UCM wants the Churches' support, but as its critique of society becomes more radical it increasingly sees the "White-dominated Churches" as part of the oppressive system that must be destroyed.

Carter recommended that the CPSA keep in touch with the UCM while making clear its theological differences and its objections to UCM attacks on the institutional church. The Methodist Church went further; in 1971, after hearing a report on UCM given by Professor W M Kgware of the University of the North, the annual conference of the Church decided to sever Methodist links with
UCM altogether. Interestingly, Professor Kgware described UCM as merely an arm of SASO.\textsuperscript{51}

The ambivalence and hostility of the white-dominated SACC constituency was not shared by the Cl, whose journal, \textit{Pro Veritate}, gave its full support to the new black movements. However, when the SACC moved into the same position, this was not due so much to the Cl as simply to the onset of the effects of structural indigenisation which enabled blacks to put their point of view much more forcefully from an official position of power. Thus, the first ‘non-token’ black president of the SACC, the Rev August Habelgaarn, stated in his presidential address to the national conference in 1972 that black theology offered an opportunity to produce a confession of faith which expressed an interpretation of the gospel by the people of Africa. Black theology, he said, would produce not only new theological thought patterns, but ‘also free the man of Africa from inferiority and help him towards a discovery of his worth and identity’\textsuperscript{52}. Another indication of the impact of the new black majority situation in SACC deliberations is afforded by a report from a task force on violence and non-violence set up by the Justice and Reconciliation Division of the SACC. The task force was composed of nine blacks and four whites, and its report is worth quoting at length.

What happened to this group was more significant than any recommendations it made... [Its] composition made for a high degree of personal and emotional involvement in the issues discussed, and identification of a strong feeling on the part of the Black majority that the few Whites were (must be) alienated and ignorant of this experience... Therefore the presence of Whites in this group (and by implication in other such groups) focused cathartically their resentment, and in some cases hostility, to all Whites, for all their responsibility for the situation in the country, their resistance to basic change or even to taking any practical steps to share in the sufferings of the majority.
The white members of the group, said the report,

all felt uncomfortable, helpless and baffled at being accorded no role but to bear this aggression . . . What happened was that three of the four Whites came willingly to accept the need of Blacks at least for an initial separation.53

When this last sentence is compared with the *Kairos* editorial quoted earlier, it is evident that the presence of a black majority was bound to have a major impact on thinking in the SACC. Thus there was a fairly rapid turnabout in its attitudes towards black consciousness. This is most evident in a report made by the director of the Justice and Reconciliation Division, Professor Brian Johanson, to the SACC Executive in December 1973 in which he wrote that black consciousness

needs to be encouraged and supported by churches, helping blacks to overcome and throw off oppression by consent, to realise their dignity, exercise their initiative and support each other in acting on their convictions. The Black man must first liberate himself and develop his attitudes so that he can operate without the lead of the White man.54

From this time onwards, the SACC gave its wholehearted support to, and endorsement of, black consciousness and black theology. In 1975 the Rev John Thorne, who succeeded Habelgaarn as president the year before, stated in his presidential address to the national conference of that year that ‘black consciousness has become one of the great events of our time’.55 In response, the conference, in a ‘Statement on Race Relations’, accepted a motion which read

We accept the reality and importance of Black Consciousness as defined by the President of the SACC and encourage the churches to promote and support Black awareness in this country.56
Yet while Rees stated in his address to the 1975 conference, ‘the future of South Africa is now firmly in the hands of the black man’, the SACC itself never travelled far along the road mapped out by the theoreticians of black consciousness. A reason for this was that their movement suffered major setbacks as a result of savage State action against its institutional expressions such as SASO and the murder of its leader, Steve Biko, while he was in detention in 1977. Thereafter, black consciousness suffered something of a decline. That its purist thinking never made great inroads into the general population seems evident from the fact that even after they had been allowed, once more, to operate freely from 1990 onwards, black consciousness organisations such as the PAC and the Azanian Peoples’ Organisation (Azapo) did not score much electoral success. The ANC continued to be the main vehicle of black liberation and political achievement. In contrast to black consciousness organisations, it never wavered from its commitment to multiracialism and had whites among its leading figures all through its period in exile and thereafter in government.

The SACC followed the same pattern. While welcoming the contribution of black consciousness to black assertiveness and power, and hence to black liberation, neither its constituent churches nor the SACC itself ever made any significant moves to create separation between blacks and whites as demanded by black consciousness proponents. Not only did that indicate that the ‘unity of humankind’ theology remained the most powerful in the Ecumenical Bloc, but also that developments in the SACC – and particularly the change from white to black leadership – ensured that it had become too valuable an instrument in the anti-apartheid struggle to be discarded for any reason.

The impact of black majorities
While the move to black majority rule in the SACC happened uneventfully, this was not the case as far as the outcomes were
concerned. It is interesting to compare the experience of the SACC with that of the international missionary and ecumenical movements resulting from the entry of ‘younger churches’ into their counsels from the time of the Jerusalem conference onwards. Just as the influence of those churches had deeply affected the theology and direction of the IMC and WCC, so within two years of the establishment of a black majority of the SACC it had been pushed in a more radical direction too, aligning itself unequivocally with the aims of black nationalism in general and of the ANC in particular.

The gap between the white leadership of the CCSA/SACC and the aspirations of the black nationalist movements probably opened to their widest during the 1960s when, as Mandela stated in the Rivonia treason trial in 1964 – which led to his life imprisonment – attempts to effect change by peaceful means were abandoned.58 The churches of the Ecumenical Bloc, however, remained committed to non-violent solutions, not only out of conviction but because to do otherwise would have invited savagely punitive reactions from the apartheid State. However, it was precisely at this stage that radical new forces in the international ecumenical sphere were being strengthened in the WCC by the merger with the IMC and its constituency of autonomous indigenous churches from newly independent countries. Not only did this result in an increasingly favourable response to anti-colonial nationalisms, but thinking was also being strongly influenced by the missio dei theology and the theologies of revolution propounded by M M Thomas.

The increasingly strong stands of the WCC were embodied in resolutions taken by its Church and Society Conference in Geneva in 1966 and also at its fourth general assembly in Uppsala, Sweden, in 1968 which noted that ‘ominous events’ demanded new efforts to eliminate racism and called for the establishment of a special programme on the issue.59 A WCC-sponsored conference
on racism at Notting Hill, London, in 1969, attracted sensational publicity – not only because of several controversial racial incidents, but because it also led to a realisation that, in the words of a South African participant, the Rev Ian Thompson, the ‘theology of the powerless’ propounded at the meeting ‘will perhaps involve the recognition that what are dirty words in today’s theology: terms like “Revolution”, “violence”, . . . are perhaps the only terms capable of expressing the reality of Christian mission’.60 One of the recommendations of this conference was that ‘all else failing, the Church and churches support resistance movements, including revolutions, which are aimed at the elimination of political or economic tyranny which makes racism possible’.61

The white leadership of the CCSA/SACC reacted with shock to these developments. The SACC general-secretary Bishop Burnett, commenting on the Notting Hill Consultation in his report to the 1969 national conference of the SACC, declared that he thought the statement was poorly constructed and badly expressed, which made it difficult to commend it to people in South Africa. The reaction of many was to ask that the Church should condemn it out of hand.62 The gap between this type of thinking and that of the WCC was fully demonstrated in 1969 when the Central Committee of the WCC resolved to accept the recommendations of the Uppsala assembly and the Notting Hill Consultation, and gave its approval to the establishment of a PCR. The struggle against racism, stated the Central Committee, was ‘not against flesh and blood. It is against the principalities, against the powers of evil, against the deeply entrenched demonic forces of racial prejudice . . . Ours is a task of exorcism’.63 Among the activities of this new programme was the setting up of a ‘special fund to aid oppressed racial groups and organisations supporting the victims of racial injustice’. The first grants from the SUS200 000 were announced in September 1970, and pre-eminent among the recipients were the liberation movements involved in violent struggles against the Portuguese empire in Africa and the white regime in Rhodesia.
There was a storm of angry and hostile reaction from most of the whites and the media in Southern Africa. The SACC summoned an emergency meeting of South African church leaders five days after the grants had been announced. The action of the PCR, stated that meeting, could be regarded as identification by the WCC with organisations ‘whose purpose is to change the social order in Southern Africa by the use of force’. For that reason the church leaders dissociated themselves from the action.64

However, this stance changed in a time. In place of its outright dissociation from the grants, the journal of the SACC, Kairos, reported in 1976 that the SACC had moved to a position in which it unreservedly supported the aims of the PCR, although it disagreed with some of the methods adopted to effect those aims.65 Two major factors had led to this change; the first was that the PCR grants had driven the SACC to dialogue much more closely with the WCC on the issues which had brought the PCR into existence. This led to a better understanding of the rationale of the PCR’s grants. Closer contact with the WCC was made more urgent by the pressure brought to bear on South African member churches both by the apartheid government and by many whites in their own ranks, to withdraw from the WCC. Led by SACC officials and by Rees in particular, they refused to do so. They too, saw themselves as being involved in a struggle to combat racism, although by different means, and thought it vital to maintain contact with the international church community as represented by the WCC. As an alternative and also to indicate to the WCC that peaceful change was possible in South Africa, the SACC resolved in 1971 to establish its own counterpart to the PCR in the form of a new Division of Justice and Reconciliation which would devote intensive study to the racial, political and economic situation in South Africa.66

The second major factor which changed SACC attitudes to the PCR grants was the advent of black autonomous churches, as de-
tailed earlier – into its membership which, in turn, produced black majorities on SACC controlling bodies after 1971. This was crucially important because both in the SACC and in its constituent churches, blacks had responded favourably to WCC actions and particularly to the activities of the PCR.67 Indeed, that blacks were a major factor in preventing the WCC member churches from withdrawing from the organisation was a pointer to the way that black majorities and black control were going to turn the anti-apartheid struggle of the Ecumenical Bloc into much more radical directions.68

The new direction: the ‘Conscientious Objection Resolution’

The full extent of changes of attitude in the SACC towards not only the PCR grants but also to the liberation struggles being waged by exiled nationalist movements became apparent in the form of what was known as the Conscientious Objection Resolution passed by the SACC national conference in 1974. It took its name from a clause which called on churches ‘to challenge all their members to consider . . . whether . . . identifying with the oppressed does not, in our situation, involve becoming conscientious objectors’. Although addressed to all the members of churches, in fact, the application of the resolution was limited to whites, since only they were subject to military conscription. This in itself was significant, since there was no similar appeal to blacks to refrain from resorting to violence to rid themselves of oppression.

The resolution used typical ‘liberation theology’ terminology. It began by acknowledging ‘as the one and only God Him who mightily delivered the people of Israel from their bondage in Egypt and who in Jesus Christ still proclaims that he will “set at liberty those who are oppressed” ’. While advocating conscientious objection, the resolution did not advocate pacifism, being rather based on the ‘just war’ theory. It asserted that the defence of a system such
as South Africa's, characterised by oppression and violence, could not be classified as a 'just war'. An important clause read:

The injustice and oppression under which the Black peoples of South Africa labour is far worse than that against which Afrikaners waged their First and Second Wars of Independence and that if we have justified the Afrikaner's resort to violence... or claimed that God was on their side, it is hypocritical to deny that the same applies to the Black people in their struggle today.

Although not as explicit a blessing on the cause of the nationalist liberation movements as that pronounced by the WCC and PCR, the implications of the 'Conscientious Objection Resolution' were nevertheless similar.

The way in which the SACC conference came to its conclusions is important. The resolution was not thought out beforehand, but was conceived and drafted during the conference itself in response to a report given by Rees on the fourth assembly of the AACC held in Lusaka, Zambia, earlier in 1974. That assembly was characterised by great excitement caused by the victories of nationalist movements in the Portuguese colonies in Africa a short while before. It was, moreover, attended by a good number of members of various African liberation movements, who were hailed with the singing of 'Onward Christian Soldiers'. During the conference, Rees and other South African delegates made contact with members of South African nationalist movements in exile, including the ANC and the South West Africa Peoples' Organisation. Rees stated that on the basis of information given to him by the representatives, 'terrorist' attacks could be expected in South Africa within 18 months.

In the discussion following Rees's report, a delegate of the Presbyterian Church, the Rev Douglas Bax, himself a theologian of some note, raised the idea of conscientious objection as means of protest against the situation in South Africa, which was seen to be
the cause of the threat of violence and war, described Rees. Bax’s thinking on the issue, he afterwards stated, ‘stemmed from my study and understanding of thinking of the prophets and Jesus on violence, on war and on God’s use of Assyria and Babylon to punish Israel for its injustice, oppression and worship of idols’. All this was a clear echo of ‘liberation theology’ and of the concepts of missio dei. When he later drafted the conscientious objection resolution, Bax did so in conjunction with Beyers Naude, who also seconded it when it came before the conference; a significant fact in the light of the role that the CI played in acting as conduit for the ideas of the international ecumenical movement and black consciousness up to that time. Several white delegates, realising the importance of the resolution and its likely repercussions in South Africa – whose white population was extremely nervous of the ‘terrorist threat’ following the fall of Angola and Mozambique – resisted the resolution strongly. Chief among these was Bishop Philip Russell of the CPSA and the Rev Peter Storey of the Methodist Church. However, the newly established black majority in the national conference proved decisive. Of the 56 voting delegates present, 39 were black and it soon became clear that Bax had the majority behind him. After a five-hour debate, the resolution was accepted. In its implied approval of the actions of the liberation movements dominated by the ANC, the SACC had completed its alignment with black nationalist forces.

One of the most perceptive comments about the new situation came, rather surprisingly, from a Rev Dawid Botha, a white official of the NGSK, which was accepted as an observer member of the SACC at that same national conference of the SACC which he attended as an official delegate. He afterwards reported to his church:

As a result of the Blackening of the SACC and the rise of black consciousness, the influence of the white liberals is decreasing sharply. These fighters for justice were always a major divisive factor in
church life in South Africa in the past. In my opinion, the present composition of the Council offers a much better starting point for the restoration of relationships with the NG Kerk.\textsuperscript{70}

In the short term, he was wrong on this point. However, events were to show that the eclipse of the liberals and the new composition of the SACC would indeed, in the final analysis, lead the restoration of relationships if not with the NGK, then with the Dutch Reformed Bloc as a whole.

The events surrounding the passing of the ‘Conscientious Objection’ resolution took place in a dazzling blaze of publicity which gave the SACC an even higher profile than it had established at the time of ‘The Message’ in 1968. Reactions to the resolution were revealing. While it evoked the heaviest governmental attack on the SACC which it had sustained to that time – and also created doubts among its own white constituency there was equally strong support from its black constituency.\textsuperscript{71} In September 1974, less than two months after the passing of the resolution, the largely black United Congregational Church of South Africa as well as the black Evangelical Lutheran Church, Transvaal Region, gave official support to the resolution. They were followed by the BPC, the United Evangelical Church of South West Africa and the Tsonga Presbyterian Church in October. Later, the Provincial Standing Committee of the CPSA voiced its support, while the Methodist and PCSA expressed support, although less directly.\textsuperscript{72}

The most significant of all endorsements of the ‘Conscientious Objection Resolution’ came not from within the long-established constituency of the SACC, however, but from within the Dutch Reformed Bloc. As already described, it was after the resolution had been passed that the NGKA decided to move into full membership with the SACC. This was a largely symbolic act – by then the NGKA had been an observer member of the CCSA/SACC for 12 years and in that capacity enjoyed all the rights of membership
other than being able to vote. The acquisition of that right was critical, neither for itself nor the SACC in which a black voting majority had been established three years earlier. However, that in practical terms the NGKA move meant so little, underlined the importance of its full identification with the SACC and with that organisation's new status as a platform of, and voice for, black liberation. Accomplishing that did not come easily for those in the NGKA who supported the move. When it came before the church's 1975 synod, it was strongly opposed by white missionaries as well as a good number of black members. However, when, after a fierce debate, a majority voted in favour of full SACC membership, the decision was greeted with singing, chanting and cheering. There was singing and cheering once again when, a little over a month later, the national conference of the SACC received the first delegates of the NGKA into full membership status.

Although most involved in those events probably did not know the details of the history, their vocal acclamation demonstrated that they were certainly aware that this was a historic occasion. There was among them probably an unconscious, but instinctive, realisation that they were standing at the confluence of two great streams of missionary effort in South Africa which had begun to divide and conflict not long after Shaw wrote to his London Committee in 1820. Despite that, both the integrationist/assimilationist and the segregationist/apartheid stream, with its strong roots in the three-self idea, had played equally important roles in bringing about their ultimate convergence. Those who supported the former idea and who came to be known as liberals, had created the instrument, the SACC, which provided the platform for the visible accomplishment of the convergence. However, it was those churches which had arisen out of the ideas originally encapsulated in the three-self formula, which led the way towards the full realisation of the implications of the autonomy hoped for, but whose consequences were probably never wildly dreamt about, by the early missionaries. The totally unintended outcome of their work,
as is demonstrated in Chapter Seven, was that both liberalism and apartheid were simply left behind by the black churchmen who were taking control of the SACC.

The rejoicings at the 1975 synod of the NGKA and the national conference of the SACC, also betokened a realisation that finally the brand of Christianity produced by mission work, was being transformed into one of the most effective battering rams used in the final assault on the bastions of white control in South Africa, as embodied in apartheid.

Notes
1. SACC Executive Minutes, 7 to 8 March 1973, 2.
2. Figures taken from the attendance register of the Minutes of the National Conference of the South African Council of Churches held on 2 to 3 August 1972.
5. Data assembled from SACC records and various denominational sources.
6. National Conference Attendance Register for 1972. (The remaining 20 delegates present were from organisations such as the Christian Institute and the groupings of AICs, which were in membership with the SACC.)
7. For example, although granted autonomy in 1963, the Evangelical Lutheran Church South-eastern Region, did not appoint its first black bishop until 1971. He was Bishop P B Mhlungu, elected to his post on 10 July 1971. Ecunews Bulletin, 5/71, 3.
9. See, for instance, Kameeta's article on 'A Black Theology of Liberation.' In Lutheran World, vol 22, no. 4, 1975, 177–8. Later, the Namibian churches were to withdraw from the SACC when the Namibian Council of Churches was established.


18. *Ecunews* Bulletin, 13/75, 14/5/1975; also 14/75, 4 and 15/75, 5.


22. Ibid.


29. There was apparently no resolution to this effect: the new name appearing without explanation in the 1944 Minutes of the Methodist Church.


32. *Kairos*, vol 3, no. 7, August 1971, 1 and 3. Of the 16 members of the Executive (including two co-opted members), 10 were black. This exactly reversed the black/white ratio on the last white-majority Executive elected in August 1970. *Kairos*, vol 2, no. 7, September 1970, 4–5.


37. Ibid.


40. Interview with the author, 1983.


48. This is evident from numerous *Ecunews* Bulletins (published weekly) during this period.

49. *Kairos*, vol 3, no. 9, October 1971, 8.


52. *Kairos*, vol 4, no. 8, August 1972, 1.


56. Ibid., 79.

57. Ibid., 6.


63. A J van der Bent, ed. *World Council of Churches Statements and Actions on Racism*.

64. *Kairos*, vol 2, no. 8, October 1970, 3.


66. SACC Executive Minutes, 18–19 March 1971, 5.


68. Only one church, the white-majority Presbyterian Church of Southern Africa, came near to withdrawing from the WCC when its Executive Commission voted in favour of that step in 1971. Legal opinion showed that because only the General Assembly of the church was empowered to take such a decision, it was *ultra vires*. See Thomas, *Councils in the Ecumenical Movement*, 77.


70. ‘Notule van die Sinode van die NG Sendingkerk te Woester 1974, F–Laat ingekome stukke. Verslag van die waarnemer by die Konferensie van die Suid-Afrikaanse Raad van Kerke gehou te Hammanskraal,’ 31 July to 2 August 1974, 311.


72. Ibid.


CHAPTER 7

A Reflection

While the period after 1975 falls outside the purview of this study, developments within the next quarter of a century call for some reflection. By 1975, the stage had been set for the climactic years of the SACC’s history. It moved into the forefront of the struggle against apartheid after the CI had been suppressed in 1977 and Beyers Naude had been silenced by a seven-year banning order. Of course, the place of the CI as an extra-institutional ‘think-tank’ was taken by the ICT – founded in 1981 – a fact emphasised by its founders who consciously chose its title, states Cochrane, because its abbreviation, ICT, was that of the CI reversed.1 Under the leadership of Fr Albert Nolan who ‘saw the concern of the Institute for Contextual Theology moving beyond the academic circle of theology by offering an alternative, “a peoples’ theology” ’,2 the members of the ICT redoubled the grass-roots mobilising and gadfly roles of the CI. Like the CI, the organisation established very close links with the SACC. The famed Kairos Document – drawn up under the auspices of the ICT – was, in fact, launched by the then SACC general-secretary, Beyers Naude, while he was in Europe. Spong says in his official history of the SACC, *Come Celebrate*, many thought the Kairos Document had been produced by the SACC. Just how close the ICT
and SACC were was illustrated by the way Frank Chikane, the first full-time director of the ICT, moved into the general secretariat of the SACC in 1987.

However, the SACC cannot be thought of simply in terms of its leadership. While Chikane and his predecessor general-secretaries, Desmond Tutu and Beyers Naude (appointed to the post after his banning order had expired), were towering figures, the positions the organisation took were based on decisions of its national conferences composed of delegates from its constituent churches and organisations. As has been shown in Chapter Five, the 'coming of age' of the former mission churches meant that those national conferences were increasingly black-dominated. Here, besides black consciousness and black theology, a new factor began to make itself felt from the mid-1970s. In Cuthbertson's words:

The social experience of Blacks led to the adoption of a more radical approach . . . and in the Christian context, to a radicalisation of Christian theology. Liberation theology took a harder line, showing itself to be increasingly susceptible to Latin American theology which was influenced by the Marxian critique of religion.3

This was reflected, among other things, in the endorsement by SACC national conferences of radical statements such as the Harare Declaration, the Kairos Document of 1985 and the Lusaka Declaration of 1987. Either overtly, or by implication, each of these gave support to the use of violence to overthrow the apartheid regime. It was stated in the Kairos Document that 'there is a long and consistent tradition about the use of physical force to defend oneself against aggressors and tyrants. In other words, there are circumstances when physical force may be used.'4 The authors of the document strongly rejected the concept of reconciliation (strongly supported by neo-liberals), declaring: 'Nowhere in the Bible or in Christian tradition has it ever been sug-
gested that we ought to try to reconcile good and evil. God and the devil. We are supposed to do away with evil, injustice, oppression and sin – not to come to terms with it." This position, they implied, was that adopted particularly by the ‘English-speaking’ churches, whose ‘church theology’ they attacked along with the ‘state theology’ of the apartheid government. This attack was taken up by Denis van der Water, general-secretary of the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa in writing about the ‘Prophetic Theology and the Challenge of the Kairos’ in 2001. Van der Water betrays a historical superficiality in his failure to mention that while the ‘English-speaking churches’ evinced strong reservations about the Kairos Document, it was endorsed by the SACC national conference. None the less, that he implicitly differentiated between these churches and the wider Ecumenical Bloc illustrates the way in which its black majority had moved the SACC in much more radical directions than the ‘English-speaking’ churches were willing to countenance at that point. The effect of the black majority on the SACC is also evident in Spong’s report of the debate in the 1987 SACC National Conference on the Lusaka Declaration. The debate, he wrote, was ‘an emotional matter, where most blacks, but not all, and most whites, but not all, stood on different sides of the issue.’ Balia asserts that the debate was a direct confrontation between black and white ‘factions’ and if that is something of an exaggeration, according to Tingle, there was a ‘large majority’ in favour of the statement, something which could only have been reflective of the overall black majority.

That majority helped push the traditional anti-apartheid position of the Ecumenical Bloc into a significantly different new direction, best described in terms of Cochrane’s typology as moving from a ‘challenge to the legality’ of apartheid to a much more far-reaching ‘delegitimising’ of the apartheid government. This development was clear in the Kairos Document and was even more strongly evident in the findings of the Harare conference at which,
writes Borer, 'three types of legitimacy were listed: legitimacy under international law, moral legitimacy and theological legitimacy. The conference concluded that the government was illegitimate on all three accounts. The virtual sanctioning of violence to overthrow apartheid was a natural corollary to this conclusion and on this score, the SACC had gone a long way beyond the positions it had adopted under either the old liberals or the neo-liberals. No doubt the members of the pre-World War I GMC would have been appalled by this unintended consequence of their efforts to 'convert the heathen'.

However, the violence dimension should not be allowed to overshadow the significance of the delegitimisation notion. In this, the SACC was moving 'beyond democracy' in the same way as the Allies in World War II who, irrespective of what the majority of Germans thought or wanted, had destroyed the Nazi government, not only in Berlin under Hitler, but also its successor under Dönitz in Flensburg because they regarded its existence as morally intolerable. While up to 1985 both the white- and the black-dominated SACC had often pronounced anathema on apartheid, this was not extended to the Nationalist governments, since they had been 'legitimately' elected, albeit by only the white population. Now, regardless of their overwhelming electoral support among whites, the moral anathema had been extended to the governments themselves, which constituted a sanctioning of attempts to destroy them by physical force if necessary.

On the surface, this seemed unlikely to have much effect on those governments which almost automatically rejected and condemned anything the SACC said or did. However, in contrast to the situation in 1948, when the most devastating tactic of the Nationalist government was simply to ignore the old Christian Council, this was no longer possible. The profile of the SACC was too high both in South Africa and in the international sphere. Thus the organisation came under increasingly fierce verbal, intellectual and,
finally, physical assault. This took the form of the government-sponsored Eloff Commission of Inquiry into the SACC in the 1980s, and culminated in the destruction of the SACC headquarters in 1989 by a bomb planted on the orders of the State President, P W Botha. In the same year there was the attempted assassination of Chikane. The resort to violence by the apartheid government and the sanctioning of violence by its opponents in the SACC, seemed to belie the prediction made by the Rev Dawid Botha that the black majority in the SACC would bring about a *rapprochement* between the SACC and the NGK; the gap between them seemed to have widened, if anything, in the years following the conscientious objection resolution of 1974.

However, while this might have been true of the white NGK, it was not so of the black Dutch Reformed Churches. In a development reminiscent of that in both the international missionary/ecumenical movement and in the Ecumenical Bloc in South Africa, it was these indigenous churches that mounted perhaps the most damaging assault on apartheid. That it emanated from within the Dutch Reformed Bloc meant that the white NGK was unable to withstand the shock, and its close ties with the government meant that that would have been speedily telegraphed through to those in the seats of political power. As related in Chapter Six, the black Dutch Reformed assault on apartheid had become visible from the early 1970s, particularly in the increasingly bold stands of the African NGKA, which culminated with its decision to move into full membership with the SACC in 1975. The so-called coloured NGSK entered the membership of the SACC in the previous year and from there on it took the lead in the anti-apartheid campaign within the Dutch Reformed Bloc. In 1978, the synod of this church declared apartheid to be a sin, also asserting that its ‘moral and theological justification was a mockery of the gospel and its consistent disobedience to the Word of God was a theological heresy.’ This was repeated at the 1982 synod of the NGSK, where the Belhar Confession elevated condemnation of apartheid into a *status confessionis* or an article of faith.
The black churches were also attacking the NGK through bodies outside South Africa, particularly the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC). Their lobbying had earlier, in 1982, led to the white NGK being suspended from membership of this body, one of its last international ecumenical links.\(^{14}\) ‘The General Synod in October 1982, was shaken by the WARC decision,’ report the authors of a publication put out by the NGK itself entitled *The Story of the Dutch Reformed Church’s Journey with Apartheid.*\(^{15}\) The initial reaction of most was that the Church should turn its back on the WARC just as it had on the WCC after Cottesloe. But, ‘although the majority of synod delegates requested that the Church withdraw completely from the WARC, the two-thirds majority required for such a decision could not be obtained,’ report the authors of *The Story.*\(^{16}\) Still, pragmatists within the church, such as its moderator, Johan Heyns, could see that because of its support of apartheid, their church was now in great danger of total isolation. Its withdrawal from the WARC would infuriate the black churches and possibly prompt the expulsion of the NGK from even its own ‘family’. It must have been clear that the only way to avoid being rejected by that family was for the NGK to do the unthinkable and itself reject apartheid.

Thus at its next General Synod held in 1986, a policy document entitled *Church and Society* was adopted in which, among other things, it was stated:

The Dutch Reformed Church is convinced that the application of apartheid as a political and social system by which human dignity is adversely affected, and whereby one particular group is detrimentally suppressed by another, cannot be accepted on Christian ethical grounds because it contravenes the very essence of neighbourly love and righteousness and inevitably the human dignity of all involved.

Following the reflection that has taken place through the years in church periodicals, conferences, committees and synods concerning the policy which has become known as apartheid, the convic-
tion has gradually grown that a forced separation and division of peoples cannot be considered a Biblical imperative. The attempt to justify such an injunction as derived from the Bible must be recognised as an error and be rejected.17

The same document also officially withdrew the church’s support for the Immorality Act, which not only prohibited racially mixed marriages, but also made inter-racial sexual intercourse a criminal offence, punishable by imprisonment. What aroused most fury among the conservative white sector of the church were synodical resolutions which declared ‘the membership of the Dutch Reformed Church open [to all races]’ and that ‘services of worship and other meetings are open to all visitors who desire to listen to the word of God’. This led to the formation of a breakaway denomination, the Afrikaans Protestant Church, which demanded that ‘membership of the Dutch Reformed Church be reserved for white Afrikaners’.18

That the black Dutch Reformed churches had played such a major role in forcing the NGK to abandon apartheid, constituted a grand-scale unintended consequence of its missionary work and missionary theology. It was so amazing that opponents of apartheid found it difficult to believe. More radical elements dismissed the Church and Society statements as mere window dressing designed to improve the image of the NGK in ecumenical bodies, particularly the WARC.19 While it might have seemed to be too good to be true in the crisis situation of South Africa at the time, in hindsight it is clearer that this was a crossing of an ideological Rubicon with major implications for the apartheid regime as much as for the church. If, as Kinghorn argues, it was the NGK which provided the Nationalist government with the theological and therefore the moral underpinnings for apartheid or ‘separate development’ in the first place, these had now been swept away by the same church.
Also in hindsight, it is clear that apartheid was both economically and militarily untenable, and therefore its fall was no great surprise. What was surprising was how quickly the end came. In later years, the noted commentator Herman Gilliomee remarked that while there were few areas of the world which had been more written about and analysed than South Africa, practically no one had predicted that things would turn out the way they did and that the transition would be largely peaceful. A number of factors contributed to that outcome, although none of them were very obvious at the time because attention was focused on the seeming inevitability of a violent denouement. While on the surface the Nationalist government appeared to be as committed as ever to apartheid and was prepared to defend it with maximum force, in fact, it was retreating from hardline positions. One visible pointer to that was the steady dismantling of racial segregation while in an amazing ‘backstage’ development, it secretly began to negotiate with Mandela while he was still in prison. I would, however, argue that one of the most telling blows to apartheid and the Nationalist government was delivered in 1985 and 1986 when both the Ecumenical and Dutch Reformed Blocs stripped it of its last vestiges of moral credibility. That even the NGK had joined the swelling ranks of those calling for an end to apartheid must have made many in government realise that the game was up, and that, in turn, was also surely an important factor in helping persuade most whites to surrender their grip on power in a comparatively peaceful fashion.

That the two church blocs were now agreed on a rejection of apartheid did not mean that the divisions between them were automatically healed. As already noted there were still deep suspicions about the motivation of the NGK and the road to reconciliation was to prove a long one; its end still not having been reached as late as the turn of the twentieth century. However, important initial steps on that road were taken at the Rustenburg Conference of Churches of November 1990, which, at the suggestion of
the then president, F W de Klerk, brought together representatives of 80 different denominations. It was arranged by a committee of church leaders headed by Frank Chikane, general-secretary of the SACC, and Dr Louw Alberts of the NGK. ‘In some respects it was comparable to the Cottesloe conference,’ according to the NGK publication cited earlier and among the notable happenings was a speech by Dr W D Jonker of the church’s theological seminary at Stellenbosch, in which he said:

I confess before you and before God not just my own sin and guilt, and my personal responsibility for the political, social, economic and structural injustices under which our entire country are still suffering, but I also venture to do so vicariously on behalf of the Dutch Reformed Church, of which I am a member, and for the Afrikaners. I am at liberty to do so because at its last General Synod the Dutch Reformed Church declared apartheid a sin and acknowledged guilt for its own omission, in that it did not long ago warn against and distance the church from it.22

In response, Desmond Tutu, who by then had become primate of the CPSA as Archbishop of Cape Town, said that he accepted Jonker’s confession of guilt and had no doubts about its sincerity. The next day the leader of the NGK delegation, Prof P C Potgieter, told the conference that his delegation fully associated itself with Jonker’s statement. Again Tutu responded by saying that although he had been subjected to a great deal of criticism for accepting Jonker’s words since the guilt of the NGK could not be forgiven so easily ‘he had no doubts: if guilt was confessed, the Lord would forgive – and Christians should forgive each other similarly. Up to seventy times seven, said the Lord Jesus.’23 Perhaps the most spectacular demonstration of the new situation of the NGK came at its quadrennial NGK synod in November 1994, which was addressed by the new president of the ‘new South Africa’, Nelson Mandela, who was emotionally received by delegates. Beyers Naude also received a ‘hearty welcome’ when he visited the gathering, which became known as the Synod of Reconciliation. So,
at last, it seemed that the Christ divided between the Ecumenical and Dutch Reformed Blocs was being conveyed to the sepulchre. However, that Christ proved almost as difficult to bury as Jesus himself.

**Post-apartheid débâcles**
The end of apartheid was not the beginning of a brave new world for either the Dutch Reformed or the Ecumenical Bloc. The NGK continued to be excluded from ecumenical bodies such as the WARC on grounds, argued by the black Dutch Reformed churches among others, that its rejection of apartheid was cosmetic rather than real. Its attempts to join the SACC were rebuffed for the same reasons and by the end of the century it found itself weakened and still isolated from the world church community. While the sins of the fathers in formulating and supporting apartheid are still being heavily visited on the present-day 'children' of the NG, the story of the black churches has also been an unhappy one. Their attempt to form the Uniting Reformed Church of South Africa in 1994 was only partially successful. A sizeable rump of the African NGKA stayed out of the union and the closing years of the century were characterised by long drawn-out court battles between this group and the new Uniting Church over ownership of property.

The lot of the SACC has not been much better. It rapidly receded from public and church consciousness once the battle against apartheid had been won and the new ANC government installed. While it had played a significant role in resisting and undermining apartheid, it was given no special place in the negotiations that brought apartheid to an end. All attention became focused on the political parties moving into the seats of power. After that had been accomplished in 1994, the SACC in common with peak church bodies in other countries, became just one more ‘do-gooding’ organisation among many non-governmental agencies. Apart from the purely political sphere, it also lost ground in the
ecclesiastical. The urgency about ecumenism of the mid-years of the twentieth century and which, according to the SACC constitution was its prime reason for existence, began to evaporate. This was due to some extent to pragmatic experience which indicated that structural church unity was an unrealisable ideal. Overseas church unions in Britain and Australia, for instance, failed to produce the galvanising effects on church life hoped for, and did little to halt the decline in church membership. In South Africa, attempts to unite the two churches which seemed to be the obvious candidates for such a move, the Presbyterian Church and the Congregational Union of Southern Africa, collapsed in 1986. Moreover, little had come of the long drawn-out negotiations of the Church Unity Commission established with such high hopes in the 1960s, nor was there much encouragement to be gained from the experience of the Uniting Reformed Church. This may have been due to a growing perception that the quest for church unity was a ‘modernist’ project which, in seeking the creation if not of a meta-system of Christian truth, then at least of a meta-Christian church, was out of joint with the times. In the anti-authoritarian and individualistic social climate of the late twentieth century, people were inclined to view the blooming of a thousand doctrinal and religious flowers with post-modern equanimity. That made both church division and church unity seem, if not irrelevant, then no longer a major priority.

The decline of the ecumenical ideal was only a partial explanation for the decline of the SACC; just as important was the fact that the defeat of the apartheid had seemingly deprived it of one of its major raisons d’être. This is certainly one interpretation of the fact the overseas agencies which had thought it urgent to support the SACC financially while the anti-apartheid struggle was being fought and won, afterwards diverted their support to other areas of the world where needs seemed to be more pressing. That, of course, meant the SACC suffered great financial contraction and, as local churches have never had the wherewithal to make much
of a financial contribution, its activities also shrank. Thus during the later 1990s, the position of the SACC was in many ways reminiscent of that of the Christian Council during the 1950s.

**An unfinished ecumenical quest**

That their exclusion from the national political process seemed to condemn both these organisations to weakness and obscurity might give weight to the argument, that they were always more concerned with politics than with religion. However, there can be no doubt that both the CCSA and the SACC were correct in seeing the political issues surrounding race as being fundamentally ‘religious’ in that they represented the struggle to answer the question asked of Jesus: ‘Who is my neighbour?’ Another way of posing the ‘neighbour’ question is that stated earlier in this study: ‘What is the best, the most Christian way, of dealing with racial and cultural difference?’ While at the end of the twentieth century, it was generally and emphatically agreed that the forcible separation of races as envisaged by apartheid was not the answer, it was also clear that the integrationist answer given by Ecumenical Bloc churches, or the CCSA and SACC, was not adequate either. As has been demonstrated in this study, under the banner of non-racialism, the integrationist position produced a situation of white domination which was not very different to that which segregationists consciously maintained and defended. As has been argued, what brought an end to the white monopoly on power in the Ecumenical Bloc, were those churches originally set up in terms of the three-self formula, which was the antithesis of integrationism.

The integrationist philosophy also produced the idea of assimilationism. This was, in fact, widespread among people of white, European descent throughout the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While sheer racial arithmetic made its large-scale application unfeasible in South Africa, this was not true of other newly colonised parts of the world, particularly the United States of America, Canada and Australia. Here whites
quickly became a numerical majority and practised policies of forcible assimilation of indigenous peoples well into the twentieth century. In all three countries, one aspect of this policy consisted in removing indigenous children or those of mixed indigenous/white antecedents from their parents and placing them either in institutions or in the homes of white foster parents. Here, it was thought, they would grow up with little knowledge or memory of their peoples' culture, and so be assimilated easily into white society. That churches colluded closely with governments in the execution of this policy, providing many of the institutions in which uprooted children were placed, indicates the extent to which they too, subscribed to assimilationism. The policy not only failed but had disastrous consequences for both individuals and communities. What has been termed in Australia as The Stolen Generation constitutes a blot on the history of both the county and its churches, this form of assimilationism being widely interpreted as an attempt at cultural genocide.

While the accession of the ANC to power in 1994 finally abolished apartheid and installed doctrines of non-racialism in South Africa, racism and racial tensions still haunt the country. Not that the mere existence of racism is proof of moral failure or corruption; racism is a world-wide phenomenon and in the last quarter of the twentieth century produced much worse outcomes in places such as the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Israel and Fiji than ever it has in South Africa. Racism also continues to be rife in countries with vaunted democratic institutions, such as the United States of America and Britain and, speaking from first-hand experience, it is also alive and well in the country in which I have lived for many years, Australia. Much more important than racism itself is what should be done both to contain and, if possible, to eradicate it. Official policies of non-racialism are necessary but not enough; mind-sets and discourse need to be changed from the ground up, and in this regard there are still great worlds both for churches of South Africa and bodies such as the SACC.
to conquer. That the need for this is recognised in the wider community, is indicated by the fact that the first time the SACC was able to attract significant public attention for a number of years, was when it held a conference on Churches and Racism in November, 2000.

However, in the quest to find a methodology for dealing with racism, heed should be given to history. What the history presented in this study shows is that for over a century Christ was divided in South Africa between apartheid Christians who absolutised human diversity and the liberal Christians who absolutised 'the unity of humankind'. There are many lessons to be learnt from the failure of both prescriptions. Against that background, it may be argued that working out how the tension between diversity and unity can be peacefully and fruitfully managed in multi-ethnic communities, could form one of the great ecumenical projects of South Africa's churches in the twenty-first century.

Notes
5. Ibid., 18.


11. That document declared ‘a tyrannical regime has no moral legitimacy [original emphases] . . . if it is a tyrannical regime it is is, from a moral and theological point of view illegitimate’, 25.


13. Ibid., 16–17.


16. Ibid., 18.

17. Ibid., 19.

18. Ibid., 20.


21. See A Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country. The Inside Story of South Africa’s Negotiated Revolution (Sandton, 1994).

23. As attested, for example, in the thoughtful article by Max du Preez, ‘Racial Genie pops out of bottle.’ *The Star*, 10 October 2000, 12.