The Neo-Liberal Interlude

The term *neo-liberal* applies to those white churchmen who dominated the CCSA and the SACC in the 1960s and early 1970s. Several important points distinguished them from previous generations of liberals in the CCSA: firstly, many were South African rather than overseas-born and had had their education and theological training in South Africa. Thus old European-based divisions such as that between Anglo-Catholics and ‘low churchmen’ were not so important to them. Secondly, these were churchmen, not missionaries, and they fervently subscribed to third-phase ecumenism with its ideal of church unity. This brought them into close touch with the WCC just at the time, as was pointed out in Chapter Two, when it was turning in radical directions on racial issues. Thirdly, while they subscribed equally fervently to the ‘four fundamentals’ of liberalism as set out by Dav- enport and were therefore adamantly opposed to racial ideology and practice, they never overtly subscribed to the doctrines of racial assimilation of the older liberals.

Still, that there was a long-lasting ‘hangover’ from assimilationist liberalism was evident in the continuing white dominance of the
structures of Ecumenical Bloc churches as well as the CCSA and the SACC, for a decade after the last of the old liberals had left the CCSA. While the neo-liberals moved to align the CCSA much more decisively than the missionary liberals with the international ecumenical movement, there were still some wide divergences between them. This was particularly evident in the understanding of black nationalism. The neo-liberals tended to be as hostile to this phenomenon as their predecessors. This point was noted by a South African, Ms Winsome Munro, when she reported to the CCSA on a conference on Christian Education in Changing Africa sponsored by the AACC in Harare, Zimbabwe (then known respectively as Salisbury and Southern Rhodesia), in January 1963. She remarked that the emphasis on ‘curricula . . . geared to economic needs and the new sense of national identity. There is to be increased stress on science, technology and agriculture, and on “Africanisation” so as to correct the former neglect of African languages, literature, art, music, geography and history’. Both black and white South African delegates, she remarked, in contrast tended to be wary of slogans such as ‘the African personality’ since these seemed to reflect racist thinking.¹ Much more open opposition to nationalism was evident in a statement of Professor A S Geyser quoted by the Christian Council Quarterly in 1962, when he told a student rally at Cape Town University that any attempt to ‘nationalise’ Christianity would result in reducing Christ to a tribal god. Nationalisms were the repository of ‘sizeable amounts of hatred – hatred of other races and other nations linked with fear’.² As late as 1970 this thought was being echoed in Kairos, which had replaced the Christian Council Quarterly as the SACC’s official mouthpiece. It called into serious question ‘the tendency both in other parts of Africa and in our Republic to create an alliance between the Gospel and the political cultural philosophy of nationalism’.³ However, being exposed to the new thinking on nationalism set out in Chapter Four the thinking of the neo-liberals began to change rapidly in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The neo-liberals ‘take power’

The end of the period of old liberal dominance in the CCSA can be dated to 1961, when Blaxall was at last allowed to resign from the secretaryship. He was replaced with the Rev Basil Brown, a Congregationalist and the first non-Anglican/Methodist to hold the position for two decades. Divergences in the thinking of the old and neo-liberals are clear from a confidential letter sent by Shepherd to Brown in July 1964. This was in response to a request by the CCSA for church leaders’ endorsement of a statement decrying the sentences imposed on Nelson Mandela and other ANC detainees after their trial in which they were condemned to life imprisonment. He was shocked, wrote Shepherd, that so badly worded a declaration and one that made no mention of the government’s duty to contain a revolutionary movement, should have been submitted to the heads of Christian churches. ‘The shock was deepened when it was made known that the declaration was intended by some to be a foreword to a pamphlet the contents of which were unknown to the signatories . . . It is well known that it is an ordinary bit of communist technique.’ It was unfortunate that Brown had refused to change his position when personally requested to do so by the moderator of the PCSA who made a special trip to Cape Town for that purpose. It was also unfortunate that the action was taken in respect of the possible imposition of death sentences before the result of the trial was known. ‘The World Council of Churches and the Commission of Churches on International Affairs are unsafe guides, when they are not taking similar action against the arbitrary executions, prison sentences or detentions in other countries like Ghana, Russia etc.’ Apologising for his ‘unusual candour’, Shepherd stated he had no wish other than to help the Christian Council ‘with whose beginning and development I was so closely associated’. His candour also indicated that this last representative of the missionary liberals and the CCSA had finally parted company.
Brown was typical of the new generation of churchmen in the Ecumenical Bloc. Although born in England, he had been brought to South Africa at a young age and had obtained both his school and undergraduate university education there. After theological training at Oxford, he returned to South Africa to work in the Congregational Union in which he became a recognised leader, and twice served as its national chair (in 1948 and 1958). His first involvement in ecumenical bodies had been with the Cape Peninsula Christian Council, of which he also served as chairman for a number of years. He had long been associated with the CCSA having served on its Executive as far back as 1940. He became chairman of its ‘Action Committee’ in 1956 and in 1960 he was elected its president. It is probably significant that in contrast to the liberal missionaries of the rural Eastern Cape, his working life was spent in the urban and non-African Western Cape.

Despite his service in the CCSA, its Executive strongly resisted his appointment to the secretaryship, the reason being his insistence on continuing to live in Cape Town, while the Executive argued that the secretary should be based in Johannesburg. Although there is no direct evidence, it is possible that the executive’s objections to Brown were also based on his non-membership of the old missionary group. The BCC, whose grants had made the employment of a full-time secretary possible after 1958, exerted strong pressure on the Executive in favour of Brown, as did the CPSA Archbishop Joost de Blank. He also represented a new generation of churchman, and while he was Anglo-Catholic, he was strongly committed to ecumenism. He interested himself in the affairs the CCSA immediately after he had arrived in South Africa in 1957. He proved to be a formidable critic of apartheid and quickly became a *bête noire* of the Nationalist government. In 1962 he was elected president of the CCSA; a post he held for two years. That he was deeply involved in the search for a successor to Blaxall appears from correspondence between them starting in August 1960, when Blaxall wrote to the Archbishop:
'I am surprised to read that your correspondence . . . is tied with one individual as it seems to me this may be seriously misused by some people as an attempt to stampede the appointments committee.' De Blank replied that 'as I made clear to you in my last letter' he had mentioned the name of Brown simply 'to indicate the quality of the person in mind'. After further acrimonious correspondence, the Executive had to back down and accept Brown.

Although the neo-liberals shared some of the attitudes of the old liberals, they were exposed to completely new forces, both outside and inside South Africa, which progressively changed their thinking. Thus, when they, in turn, surrendered their control of their churches and the SACC to a new black leadership, they did so willingly; when John Rees stepped down from the post of general secretary in 1977, he expressed the wish that his successor be a black. This was fulfilled. His immediate successor was the Rev John Thorne of the Congregational Church, whose short tenure was followed by that of Bishop (later Archbishop) Desmond Tutu.

The forces that impacted on the neo liberals during the 1960s can be categorised as:

1. The ecumenical movement, and particularly the WCC.
2. CI.
3. The new doctrines of ‘separate development’ originating in the Dutch Reformed Bloc and which were embodied in the actions of the increasingly repressive Nationalist government.
4. The forces of black consciousness and black theology. These are important enough to demand a chapter to themselves.

The coming of third-phase ecumenism
As has been demonstrated, the CCSA was weak and lacking in significant influence during the 1950s. A warning that it was being supplanted by the WCC as the chief bearer of the ecumenical
ideal in the eyes of Ecumenical Bloc churches was sounded after a visit by the WCC's general secretary, Dr W A Visser 't Hooft in 1952. Blaxall reported that 'strong feelings' had been expressed about associating WCC member churches in South Africa more closely and that it was clear the CCSA was not adequate for this purpose.

Another reason for the impatience was that it appeared during the 1950s that the WCC was able to succeed where the CCSA had failed in the bringing together of Afrikaans and English-language churches. In 1954 the Cape synod of the NGK entered into WCC membership, following the lead of the Transvaal synods of that church and the NHK. This meant that not only did a significant group of Dutch Reformed churches belong to the WCC along with English-language churches, but also that the two groups were given an opportunity to work together in South Africa as, for instance, in a WCC-sponsored project on Christian Responsibility Towards Areas of Rapid Social Change. The appointment by the 1959 conference on the same theme of a Continuation Committee to explore the establishment of a wider council of churches, related in Chapter Four, underlined the point that the best chance of a rapprochement between the divided sectors of the church in South Africa seemingly lay in the WCC. Hopes on this score rose when in 1960 – following the Sharpeville crisis – at the suggestion of the WCC its member churches met together in the momentous Cottesloe Consultation in order to discuss the racial situation.

The outcome of the consultation, however, which caused the withdrawal of the Dutch Reformed churches from the WCC in 1961, showed that the world body was as incapable as the CCSA of bridging the chasm between the two blocs of churches. That was not apparent at the Cottesloe Consultation itself, the decisions of which were supported by delegates of all churches apart from those of the NHK. Still, Cottesloe had held out the promise of even further co-operation by appointing a 'Provisional Commit-
tee’ to investigate the establishment of a body representative of WCC member churches in South Africa, whose number had risen to nine since 1948. This was something which had been under discussion long before Cottesloe, and would undoubtedly have led to the rapid extinction of the CCSA since the major South African WCC member churches were unlikely to have been willing to support two parallel bodies. Brown avoided that possibility. Even before he became secretary to the CCSA, he had been against a WCC-based Council of Churches in South Africa because he feared the ‘stifling of free expression of Christian thought through the dominance of the Dutch Reformed Church’, as he wrote to Blaxall in 1959.8

Brown’s views remained unchanged, despite the withdrawal of the Dutch Reformed churches from the WCC after Cottesloe. Rather than setting up a new council, he believed the CCSA should be reformed. After taking up the office of secretary in March 1962, he immediately presented a set of proposals with this in view. His description of the situation of the CCSA was reflected in a minute which stated:

There was a strong feeling that the time had come for the Council to be constituted much more definitely as a Council of Churches. It was pointed out that most of the member Churches of the Council had either attained full autonomy or had attained a good measure of autonomy, and that the time was ripe for the Council to consider itself no longer an association of Churches and Missionary bodies but as a Council of Churches.9

Another important point made by Brown was that the CCSA should become an associate member of the WCC and that the ‘sections’ or departments of the CCSA should be brought into line with those of the WCC. He urged that the work of the CCSA be promoted through a more aggressive propaganda campaign which would be backed by his personal contact with churchmen and church organisations throughout the country. He saw the
CCSA's role as that of a 'forum for Christian thinking, planning and action'.

Brown’s strategy succeeded. A delegation from the Cottesloe committee investigating the establishment of a council of WCC member churches visited the biennial meeting of the CCSA in Bloemfontein in May 1962. After that meeting the leader of the delegation, Bishop Bill Burnett, stated that Brown’s reorganisation scheme would satisfy the WCC ‘who were keen that there should be an effective organisation for ecumenical action in South Africa’. The idea of a separate council was thereafter discarded and for the time being the CCSA remained the chief institutional expression of ecumenism in South Africa.

The 1962 biennial meeting accepted Brown’s reorganisation proposals and a new constitution drawn up by him was adopted at the next biennial meeting in 1964 with the significant exception of a proposed new name: the Christian Council of Churches in South Africa. On this point Brown was defeated by the arguments of one of the delegates, the Rev C W Parnell of the Baptist Union. Parnell’s opposition was based on Baptist theology which postulates the local congregation as ‘the Church’, and will not allow for anything but pragmatic co-operation between local congregations. What this meant was that while the Baptists could go along with second-phase ecumenism since it was based on the same utilitarian approach they themselves had to inter-church activity, they rejected third-phase ecumenism with its aim of effecting structural unity between churches. It seems strange that the biennial meeting was persuaded by Parnell’s arguments. Within the CCSA constituency, not even the Congregational Union adhered to the doctrine of local congregational sovereignty as strictly as the Baptists, while the other churches, particularly the Anglican and Methodist, were very far removed from it. The final vote indicates continuing confusion among Ecumenical Bloc churches about the full implications of third-phase ecumenism which they had accepted.
on every other point of Brown’s reorganisation scheme and again demonstrates that South Africa was still lagging behind the thinking of the international ecumenical movement.

The local ecumenical climate was, nevertheless, altering rapidly, being powerfully influenced among other factors, by the Vatican Councils and the aggiornamento in the worldwide Roman Catholic church during the early 1960s. The long shadows of the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation which had lain over Christendom for 400 years were at last beginning to disappear. This was reflected on the local scene as dialogue and contact between Catholics and Protestants expanded. One of the outcomes was that the South African Catholic Church moved into observer membership with the CCSA in 1966, betokening the onset of the new era of Catholic/Protestant rapprochement. In addition, it meant that the most powerful missionary enterprises that had been directed to South Africa in the late nineteenth century had finally been brought together in the Ecumenical Bloc.

When Brown retired from the CCSA secretaryship in 1966, he was replaced with Bishop Bill Burnett whose denomination, the CPSA, had taken a leading role in promoting third-phase ecumenism after 1958. In that year, Anglo-Catholic sensitivities about structural unity with other churches were over-ridden by the 1958 Lambeth Conference of bishops of the worldwide Anglican communion when they officially encouraged member churches to seek union with any other churches willing to discuss the subject.\(^{12}\) In 1960 the CPSA initiated talks with the PCSA and the BPC, and over the next few years the number of churches involved in the discussions increased significantly, so that by 1967 a ‘Church Unity Commission’ with seven member churches, including the Methodist, CPSA, the Presbyterian Church and Congregational Union had been set up.\(^{13}\) The striving towards structural unity between churches had thus become an accepted fact of life when Bishop Burnett, who had succeeded Brown as secretary,
presented another new constitution to the biennial meeting of the CCSA in 1968. This stated the primary object of the new organisation to be the fostering of unity among churches. Among the proposals attached to this constitution was, once again, one relating to the name which, it was recommended, should be changed to the *South African Council of Churches*. When the Baptist delegate Parnell renewed his objection, he could not find a seconder and could no more than record his vote against.14

This, of course, was a full 20 years after the formation of the WCC and again demonstrates how tardy South African churches were in aligning themselves with developments in the international missionary and ecumenical movements. Still, the inauguration of the SACC as an affiliate of the WCC in 1968 sealed the tie between the two organisations which, as will be related in Chapter Six, was to have momentous results for the SACC.

**The impact of the Christian Institute**

The period of neo-liberal dominance was marked by a significant strengthening of the structures and administration of the CCSA/SACC. Its new general secretary, the Rev Basil Brown, was an efficient and energetic worker. During his term of office important new departments, including Inter-Church Aid providing finance for both disaster relief and economic development, were initiated, while there was also a considerable expansion of regional councils of churches in various areas of South Africa. By the time he retired in 1966, two more full-time staff workers in the CCSA reflected the expansion of its organisational structures.15

His successor, Bishop Bill Burnett, continued the pattern after he became general secretary in 1967. Burnett represented a new strain of Anglican churchmen who, also South African born, had been nurtured and trained outside the Anglo-Catholic ethos. His first experience of ‘ecumenism’ had been as a soldier in North Africa during World War II where he encountered and worshipped with
men from many other denominations. Coming back into the CPSA after the war and experiencing its anti-ecumenical ethos was like ‘trying to fit into a shoe that pinched’, he said.\textsuperscript{16} His enthusiasm for ecumenism was in inverse proportion to Anglo-Catholic hostility towards it. When he became general secretary of the CCSA in 1967, he was regarded as a leading churchman both in his own denomination and in the ecumenical movement. His move to the CCSA immediately gave that body a higher public profile.\textsuperscript{17}

However, perhaps one of the most important results of Burnett’s appointment to the SACC secretaryship was that it brought about a close liaison with the Cl. It was established under the leadership of the Rev Beyers Naude in 1963 to keep ecumenical contacts between the Dutch Reformed and other churches alive following the post-Cottesloe withdrawal of the former from the WCC. That the Cl had an exceptionally high profile was largely due to the personality and political skill of Naude, who proved to be as tough and wily an operator as anyone on the apartheid side of the divide between the blocs. Indeed, as someone who had been near to the heart of the Afrikaner Nationalist establishment – he was at one time moderator of the white NGK’s Southern Transvaal synod – Naude appeared to enjoy ‘getting up the nose’ of his former Afrikaner Nationalist colleagues in Church and State. This he did by coming out in much more forthright condemnation of apartheid than either the CCSA or any of the Ecumenical Bloc churches. The government made the mistake of subjecting him to bitter attack and harassment, which had little effect other than to raise his public profile.\textsuperscript{18} The impact of the Cl was widened by the presence on its staff of two Afrikaner theologians, Drs Ben Engelbrecht and W B Brückner de Villiers, successive editors of its journal \emph{Pro Veritate}. While their background was that of the Dutch Reformed Bloc, it is evident from the pages of this monthly publication that the Cl was far more closely in touch with the theological developments shaping the ecumenical movement and the WCC than was the CCSA. In contrast to the \textit{Christian Council Quarterly}, for
instance, which was either silent on, or hostile to, African nationalism, *Pro Veritate* was an accurate reflector of the more positive attitudes which had been developing in the international ecumenical movement. Thus is it was natural that in the later 1960s the CI should have become an important platform for black consciousness, as will be described in the next chapter.

In 1967 the CI became a member organisation of the CCSA. Before this time, the CI and the CCSA appear to have had little contact with each other and indeed there is evidence of tension between the two bodies, the CCSA showing sensitivity about CI activities in fields which it considered to be its own preserve. In 1966 a meeting between CI and CCSA officials was held in Kimberley to sort out their differences and while these were settled amicably, it is significant the CCSA conceded that the CI was better equipped than itself to operate in the field of ecumenical studies. The tensions dissolved when Burnett became CCSA secretary because he was both a member and a strong supporter of the CI which, he described as ‘a witness to our freedom in the gospel’ when he addressed its annual general meeting in September 1967. From the following year, the two organisations had offices in the same building and Naude sat on the SACC Executive as a co-opted member. Although tensions reappeared after Burnett’s resignation from the SACC in 1969, the fact that the two organisations were located in the same building (Diakonia House) from 1968, meant that the SACC was continually exposed to the ‘input’ and actions of the CI which, despite its weak numerical base, was undoubtedly the most important ecumenical organisation in South Africa during the 1960s.

**Rapprochement with the African Independent Churches**

The South African Christ was divided not only between the Ecumenical and Dutch Reformed Blocs, but also between them and
the AIC Bloc. However, the division between at least the Ecumenical Bloc and the AICs had slowly begun to be bridged as far back as the 1920s as the initial opposition of the missionaries to the AICs softened with the passage of time. Although Lea condemned the AICS in the *The Native Separatist Church Movements in South Africa* published in 1923, the *Year-book of South African Missions* of 1928, in contrast, published a sympathetic article by the Rev L N Mzimba who himself was a leader of the African Presbyterian Church, a typical example of the ‘Ethiopian’ brand of AICs. Another of these, the African Methodist Episcopal Church which was bitterly attacked by the GMC in 1904 along with the AICs in general and for the same reasons, had, by 1925, been admitted to the membership of the GMC. The opening up of relationships continued over the following decades. When the Presbyterian Church of Africa was accepted into the membership of the CCSA in 1961, it signalled the start of a new era in which the suspicion and hostility of the first few decades of the century disappeared.

This was reflective of trends in the international ecumenical movement and particularly in Africa. In 1962 Brown reported he was one of several South Africans who had attended a consultation on ‘separatism’ in Kitwe in Zambia (then known as Northern Rhodesia). As a follow-up, several regional consultations in different areas of Africa were being planned, at which ‘the possibilities of building bridgeheads between the recognised churches and these groups will be considered’. Two years later the CCSA set up a research project on the AICs under the guidance of a Methodist minister, the Rev Gabriel Setiloane. He had to leave the country after a few months’ work, however, and although a white American researcher, the Rev Robert Parsons, replaced him and no report was ever issued.

Two years later, Brown reported that the CCSA was jointly sponsoring a theological education scheme for AICS, which had formed
themselves into a body called the African Independent Churches Association (AICA).\textsuperscript{27} This body had come into being in the previous year as a result of an approach by AIC leaders to the CI to help them with theological training. That indicated that not only were attitudes in the Ecumenical Bloc towards the AICs changing, but that the process was also happening in reverse.

Besides the PCSA, several other AICs made application for CCSA membership during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{28} Few could be accepted because they failed to comply with membership conditions laid down by the CCSA, which, in fact, faced the same situation as the GMC of 1904 when its president, James Stewart, warned of ‘the whole of the Ethiopians coming down on us’. That possibility had become a reality in the 1970s; in 1975 the SACC general secretary, John Rees, reported that no fewer than 106 AICs had applied for membership, threatening to swamp the 33 bodies in that membership already and forcing the organisation to tighten up its conditions of entry.\textsuperscript{29} A way out of the dilemma was provided by the formation of AICA and several other associations of AICs, which then applied for membership in the category of Christian organisations. This entitled each association to representation at national conferences and on departmental committees, giving individual member churches of the associations at least indirect representation in the SACC. AICA was granted this status in 1971 and by 1975 there were three other such associations of AICs in the SACC membership, these being the Apostolic Ministers' Association of South Africa, the Federation of Pentecostal Apostolic Mission Churches in South Africa and the Reformed Independent Churches Association. The individuals in membership with the churches represented by these association probably numbered more than one million.

The factors which had led to the new era of relationships between the AICs and Ecumenical Bloc of churches were set out in a memorandum presented to the SACC national conference in 1973 by
its Director of Theological Training, Dr Axel-Ivar Berglund.

There was a time when one spoke of Africans in terms “primitive”, “backward”, “unsophisticated”, “rude”. Hence one acted in a paternalistic manner, convinced that the correct views came from oneself. The views of the receiver were looked upon as unrealistic, or insignificant, or not to be heeded.

With time, approaches to each other have changed. Today we are becoming aware of each other’s integrity and values. The fact that we must not only accept each other’s presence, but also realize the burning need of dialogue, is increasingly becoming apparent... I suggest we are at the doorstep into the realm of dialogue.

In a time when there is an increasing awareness of being neither sects nor deserters, but simply fully just Churches, some so-called Independent units are seeking recognition through and in the SACC. Jealous of their particular characteristics, and increasingly weary of isolation to people of their own ranks only, they are looking across borders to others who also name themselves Christians. It is among these that they hope to find understanding respect, moral support and administrative and financial assistance. Well acquainted with humiliations and embarrassments, they wish to lift themselves to a place alongside others.³⁰

The last few sentences indicate the price the AICs paid for their severance from the orthodox Christian mainstream in South Africa. This applied especially to smaller churches which found themselves trapped in vicious circles of poverty and weakness. Their desire to raise their standing by means of a better-trained ministry led several of these churches to approach the CI for help with the provision of theological education in 1965.³¹ Their approach to the CI was an indication of their continuing suspicion of the white-dominated, multiracial denominations, while the CI’s credibility had been established in their eyes probably as a result of continuous government attacks on it.
The CI thus acted as catalyst in effecting a *rapprochement* between a significant number of these churches and the Ecumenical Bloc. It helped with the foundation of the AICA in 1967 and the establishment of a theological training college to serve the organisation a year later.

Yet while the acceptance of AICA in 1967 into CCSA membership betokened a new era of sympathy for the AICs in the Ecumenical Bloc, relationships between the two sectors were difficult. The AIC associations were constantly rent by power struggles and financial disputes, and the resentments of the contending factions tended to be projected to representatives of the orthodox Christian bodies with which they were involved. In 1972 AICA broke its links with the CI, collapsed the following year and was resurrected under a new leadership soon afterwards. Its theological college disappeared in the turmoil and it turned to the SACC to help it re-establish a scheme of theological training. In 1975 the Theological Education Division of the SACC was chiefly responsible for founding the South African Theological College for Independent Churches. Although this was also destined to collapse after a brief and tumultuous existence, the Ecumenical Bloc had been exposed to powerful new black influences from the AICs. As Dr Berglund put it in 1973, ‘entering this realm will involve many now unknown challenges. But on the other hand our entry will imply an exciting time of learning from each other, in that we share with each other terms of reference, points of departure, evaluations and expressions’.

*Mortal combat with apartheid*

The neo-liberal era in the CCSA/SACC coincided with the apo­geee of apartheid. After the death in 1958 of the last of the old­style segregationist Nationalist prime ministers, J G Strydom, South Africa was taken at an ever-increasing pace along the apart­heid road by his successor, the formidable Dr Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd. The country had already experienced a revolution in
race relations under the Nationalists after 1948, as they implemented the segregationist ideas which had crystallised under Hertzog three decades earlier and to which the missionary liberals had objected so strongly. Under Verwoerd, segregation was taken to its logical extremes and even beyond. Verwoerd is said to have asserted that whites and blacks should not even shake hands, and while that may be apocryphal, he refused to see delegations from the SAIRR because they included black people.34

This new phase of apartheid presented a far greater challenge than the old segregationist doctrines in that it was based on much more sophisticated thinking which discarded ideas about superior and inferior cultures. In the words of Kinghorn, a new concept emerged, that of ‘separate development’ in which ‘one of the core values of modernity – the equality of people – was affirmed’. On this score, the proponents of separate development were actually ahead of the liberals. Kinghorn argues that the impulse for this new thinking came not from the Nationalist government, but from the Dutch Reformed Bloc of churches, who based their theology of race relations on the notion that

the division of nations is to be directly derived from the authority of God and represents the social embodiment of the divine structure of authority.35

The decisive moment, Kinghorn states, occurred in 1950 when the switch to the new ideology and theology of separate development emerged at a ‘peoples’ congress’ called by the Federal Mission Council of the NGK to discuss the ‘native question’. Particularly active in the drive behind this congress was Dr G B A Gerdener, professor of missions in the Theological Seminary at Stellenbosch. As was pointed out in Chapter Four, Gerdener had been very closely associated with the international missionary movement and had sat on the central committee of the WCC. Kinghorn’s summation of the conference findings is as follows:
South Africa was described as a cosmos of nations (i.e. not races), each with a unique character and culture but at different stages of development. The only Christian way to safeguard every culture and to avoid friction and abuse was to separate the nations, thus providing room for the organic development of each according to its special needs.

The concept of a South African community of autonomous states was born at this congress... Hendrik F Verwoerd, when he became prime minister in 1958, began to implement those resolutions of the Congress which appeared to him to be practical politics. Verwoerd’s approaches laid down a much more rigorous separation not only between blacks and whites, but also between what were described as ethnic or tribal groups. It was noted in an earlier chapter that one of the major architects of separate development was Dr W W M Eiselen whose old-style Lutheran missionary background placed great emphasis on the virtues of ethnically based churches. In line with this teaching, the proponents of separate development asserted that there were at least eight different ‘nations’ in South Africa, each of them based on a different culture, ethnicity and language. The Nationalist government borrowing the idea of de-colonialisation which, was in full swing in Africa and Asia at that time, began from 1963 onwards to attempt to set up ethnically based sovereign ‘nation-states’. These were the notorious ‘Bantustans’ comprising that 13 per cent of the land which had been set aside for exclusive black occupation by the 1913 Land Act. Here the black majority was supposed to exercise the same rights that the white minority enjoyed in the 87 per cent of the country it allotted to itselfs. Kinghorn notes that until the late 1980s, all the white churches in the Dutch Reformed Bloc ‘carried forward the ideal of separate development, which to them was the embodiment of true biblical justice under South African conditions.’ However, whatever the visions of its progenitors, the practical implementation of the new policy resulted in a
nightmarish system of oppression, which met with universal condemnation, even from the Dutch Reformed Bloc over time. Thus the attempt to dignify the policy with the new terminology of separate development failed hopelessly and it continued to be known and vilified simply as apartheid.

While the struggle over race issues was a theological as much as a political one, the neo-liberals were initially ill-equipped to deal with it. In 1963 Brown noted in the *Christian Council Quarterly* that the spate of important legislation which had passed through parliament was affecting ‘the whole pattern and structure of African life’, and stated that ‘we cannot but continue our strongest opposition’. Among the measures to which objection had been made by the CCSA was the Bantu Laws Amendment Act, the General Laws Amendment Act – which had introduced detention without trial (the 90-day clause), the Liquor Bill and the Sunday Sports and Entertainment Bill. The interdepartmental definition of who could be considered a member of a congregation, said Brown, ‘we regard as a direct invasion by the State into the realms of the Church’. State action was also affecting churches as a result of the workings of the Group Areas Act. ‘Historic churches in long-established areas are becoming redundant, schools are being forced to close down; old associations and traditions are being broken and uprooted.’ The State had reared a ‘Golden Calf of Apartheid’, wrote Brown, ‘and as a country we are in danger of bowing down to worship an idol god, setting aside our treasured Christian heritage and love of justice and freedom in pursuit of a political whim or a doctrinaire ideology’. CCSA objections to specific items of government legislation were gathered together in a booklet entitled *The Last Bastion* in 1964, the title of which was indicative of the role the organisation saw itself playing in South Africa at that time.

Despite his observation that the ‘whole structure’ of African life was being affected, the CCSA continued to oppose apartheid on a
piecemeal basis. There was no notable reaction in its documents and statement to change from apartheid to the more sophisticated and far-reaching concepts of separate development. Thus the CCSA was silent on the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 which laid down the basis of the Bantustan ('homelands') policy; nor did it react to the creation of self-government in the first of these Bantustans, the Transkei, in 1963.

In fact, the alternatives to separate development postulated by the CCSA during this period were not very different from those of the era of liberal missionary dominance. In the absence of any recent statement of its own on race relations, the CCQ in 1963 quoted a statement made by the Christian Citizenship Department of the Methodist Church which laid down that a ‘Christian country’ would base its life on Christian principles, not merely on self-preservation, the maintenance of a ‘traditional’ policy or the supremacy of one section or racial group. It would be a country which would eschew racial discrimination, while a key paragraph read:

It was and will be a land where national unity will prevail. Eenheid ‘Unity’ rather than apartheid will be its goal. Sectional loyalties will be discouraged and so-called white unity will be superseded by national unity.\(^\text{39}\)

The words were an echo of the findings of the CCSA’s 1949 Christian Citizen in a Multiracial Country Rosettenville conference, although this statement differed from those of the earlier period in that there was no mention of ‘backward’ and ‘advanced’ civilisations or of the idea of trusteeship. Lacking any ideological or theological underpinnings, the call for national unity constituted a rather weak and inadequate response to Verwoerdian separate development. Despite this, the unrelenting pressure of apartheid legislation was making a new stand and statement of their position unavoidable for Ecumenical Bloc churches.
The neo-liberals fight back: A Message to the People of South Africa

The governmental drive to enforce segregation began to be felt in an area closely linked with the CCSA when officials of the Bantu Administration Department, together with police, visited the Wilgespruit Fellowship centre near Roodepoort in 1963 and insisted that in future permits would have to be obtained for all Africans using the centre. The Wilgespruit centre had originally been established by a group of laymen with the specific aim of creating a multiracial conference venue. It was situated adjacent to the Enzenzeleni School for the Deaf and Dumb of which Blaxall was the principal and where he lived. Lacking any legal corpus of their own, they had asked the CCSA to become the trustee of the property when they bought it in 1956. This meant that the CCSA was actually the owner of the Wilgespruit centre and it was to the CCSA Executive that Blaxall and the warden of the centre reported the permit demand of 1963. In view of the difficulties this posed for the holding of inter-racial conferences at the centre, the CCSA Executive agreed to send a delegation to the Minister of Bantu Administration to ask for the granting of a blanket permit to cover all functions. Not only did the minister refuse to grant the delegation’s request, but the local municipality refused to grant permits in 1966 to allow Africans to stay overnight; a move which undermined its reason for existence.

So seriously did the CCSA regard the earlier threat to freedom of inter-racial gathering that in 1965 it summoned a ‘summit meeting’ of the leaders of its member churches to discuss the situation. An eventual result of this meeting was the establishment of a theological commission in 1966 ‘to consider what obedience to God requires of the Church in her witness to her unity in Christ in South Africa’. This commission, like that appointed after the 1949 conference, was all-white. Its initial task was to produce a document which would fulfil the mandate of the commission. This
it did in 1968 under the title of *A Message to the People of South Africa*, which became better known simply as *The Message*. Secondly, the commission was mandated, in Burnett's words, 'to outline some ways in which the Christian ethic could find practical expression in South Africa society'.

Like the findings of the CCSA's 1949 Christian Citizen in a Multiracial Society Conference, which had encapsulated the philosophy of the older missionary liberalism, 'The Message' was a crystallisation of neo-liberal thinking. In 1949 the CCSA rejected apartheid in forthright terms; in 1968 the SACC referred to separate development as 'a false faith, a novel gospel', which was being presented as 'the way for the people of South Africa to save themselves ... in the name of Christianity'. While in 1949 there was an acknowledgment of differences between 'primitive' and 'advanced' social structures despite the 'essential unity' of humankind, the 1968 statement declared:

> The Christian Gospel requires us to assert the truth proclaimed the first Christians, who discovered that God was creating a new community in which differences of race, language, nation, culture, and tradition no longer had power to separate man from man. The most important features of a man are not the details of his racial group, but the nature which he has in common with all men and also the gifts and abilities which are given to him as a unique individual by the grace of God; to insist that racial characteristics are more important than these is to reject what is most significant about our own humanity as well as the humanity of others.

What is clear from this statement is that the concept of superior and inferior civilisations had disappeared. On that score, the public position of the neo-liberals had 'caught up' with the thinking of the proponents of separate development. Now, however, while the assertions of the latter about the absolute validity of 'differences of race, language nation [and] culture' were rejected on theological grounds (an interesting comparison with the attempt by
Rheinallt Jones to refute segregation on ‘scientific’ grounds four decades earlier) ‘The Message’ also represented the liberal tendency to deny that these differences had any validity at all.

Still, in ‘The Message’ the neo-liberals had armed themselves with an effective counter-ideology to that of separate development. Unlike the 1949 statements of the Rosettenville conference, however, ‘The Message’ made no attempt to lay down the practical implications of its stands in the political, social and economic life of the country. There was no setting out of a franchise policy, for instance, as there had been in 1949 statement. A reason for that was the unlike in 1949, when the liberal churchmen in the CCSA still had some hope of seeing their policies being put into practice (the Nationalist majority in parliament was still only five), in 1968 the makers of ‘The Message’ were concerned mainly with a desperate defence of their position against an attack by the massively powerful and entrenched State.

As already mentioned, ‘The Message’ was the first theological statement of principle on racial affairs which had been published by the CCSA/SACC for close on two decades. It had a wide-ranging impact, receiving not only extensive coverage in the media, but as the records of the SACC show, was publicised and discussed among church members at a local level over the whole of South Africa. Letters of reaction came in from congregations in such unlikely places as Beaufort West and Sasolburg, while a Catholic priest in the remote parish of Kranskop, Natal, wrote to congratulate the SACC on ‘The Message’, but also recording:

Unfortunately it wasn’t too well received in this little Village where I work. When I read it I was accused of all sorts of things including Communism, and since then not one European has put their foot in the Church.47

A not dissimilar reaction came from the prime minister, B J H Vorster, who warned clerics ‘who want to do the same thing
here in South Africa that Martin Luther King did in America’ to ‘cut it out . . . for the cloak of religion you carry will not protect you.’

The impact made by ‘The Message’, despite the essentially defensive nature of its initial mandate, can be attributed to a well-planned publicity campaign by the SACC, which by that time had acquired the full-time services of the Rev (later Dr) John de Gruchy as its Director of Ecumenical Studies and Publications. In his capacity as director, de Gruchy also handled the publicity aspect of the SACC’s work, and under his aegis close on 10 000 copies of ‘The Message’ were distributed for study by local congregations throughout the country. The public standing of Bishop Burnett also helped to widen the impact of ‘The Message.’

Practical alternatives: the SPROCAS reports
While the SACC played the major role in drawing up and publicising ‘The Message’, the CI was the main driving force behind the execution of the second stage of the original mandate; the delineation of practical alternatives to separate development. This took the form of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society (SPROCAS) which worked through six commissions dealing with various aspects of South African life, namely economics, education, legal affairs, politics, the churches and social relations. Launched in 1969 and completed four years later, SPROCAS was overwhelmingly white in its composition and, in fact, embodied the final developments in neo-liberalism up to 1975.

The proposals put forward by the SPROCAS commissions were far more detailed than anything advanced by the CCSA either at its 1942 Fort Hare conference or that of 1949 in Rosettenville. Two points need to be made about the SPROCAS reports; while they can hardly be said to be a product of the SACC, since they were composed of academics and professional people rather than churchmen, they, nevertheless, bore the official SACC stamp of
approval as a co-sponsor of SPROCAS together with the CI. Sec-
ondly, the reports were bound to have a deep impact on the think-
ing of the Ecumenical Bloc, which had lacked a ‘think-tank’ of
this nature since the liberal missionaries had disappeared from
the scene.

The SPROCAS reports indicated new trends in neo-liberalism.
This is most evident in the report of the Political Commission
entitled South Africa’s Political Alternatives, which declared itself
‘committed to the idea of an open, pluralistic society tolerating
social and cultural diversity within the bounds of a necessary com-
mon consent . . . In an ethnically heterogenous and multi-racial
society this means that any policy of forced assimilation or cul-
tural imperialism is rejected by the Commission’.50 This rejection
of cultural assimilationism not only differed radically from the
older missionary liberalism, but even differed from the emphasis
on the unity of humankind set forth in ‘The Message’ which, with
its tendency to brush aside differences of race and culture, con-
tained echoes of the old liberal assimilationist thinking. The re-
port of the SPROCAS Political Commission added the importance
of recognising ethnic heterogeneity to liberalism’s ‘four funda-
mentals’, and separated it decisively from the old liberalism. The
divergence between the new strain of liberalism and the old liber-
alism was best summed up in the minority report of the commis-
sion submitted by one of the last surviving representatives of the
old liberalism, Dr Edgar Brookes. The commission had demol-
ished traditional British and American liberalism, he said, very
largely because it made individuals the basis of society, not groups.
However, asserted Brookes, whites with close African, Indian and
coloured friends ‘know well that there are no group differences
which divide us as much as friendship and our common humanity
unite us’. The turning from the individual to the group, Brookes
rightly observed, gave direction to the whole report, which was
aimed at producing a state in which groups would co-operate for
the common good.
But these are still *groups*, and groups based mainly on race and colour... It assumes that this working through groups will bring us closer together, but is this assumption justified? The ‘black consciousness’ movement does not seem to work in that way, and Afrikaner nationalism does not either.\(^{51}\)

Brookes claimed that the report would be ill-received by both ‘world Christian consciousness’ and the black community. He was wrong as far as the former entity was concerned; in fact, in the Political Commission the neo-liberals were aligning themselves with that aspect of ‘world Christian consciousness’ which, ever since the IMC’s 1928 Jerusalem conference, had acknowledged the validity of differing group experience and existence. However, later developments proved that Brookes was right when he said that the report was not likely to be well received by blacks, but not for the reasons he put forward. Although there was little notable black reaction at the time, the representatives of black nationalist thinking by and large rejected the embodiment of the thinking contained in the report, which could be seen in the constitutional proposals put forward by the liberal Progressive Federal Party (PFP) in 1977. The congruence of the SPROCAS report and the PFP plan was not coincidental. Dr David Welsh, the secretary of the Political Commission, also played a leading role in drawing up the PFP’s constitutional plan. The dispensation envisaged in that plan involved establishing a federal system whose geographical units would be partly based on the existing ethnic Bantustans. Blacks saw this as an attempt to maintain the divide-and-rule aspects of Nationalist policy. The black consciousness leader Steve Biko summed up the feelings of many radical blacks when he said that SPROCAS was ‘looking for an alternative acceptable to the white people’.\(^{52}\)

White neo-liberalism of the kind evident in the SPROCAS Commission reports never gained a significant foothold in the SACC. For one thing, the era of white numerical dominance on its policy-
making bodies was coming to an end; for another, a new era of black nationalism, expressed in the form of black consciousness, was commencing. This was also highlighted by the SPROCAS commissions, particularly the Social Commission, which argued that progression towards democracy based on the extension of voting rights to blacks over a period of time was not necessarily the only form of change that would satisfy the requirements of justice based on Christian values. Since whites were not likely to make changes without considerable pressure being brought to bear on them, "it would seem that pressure from blacks themselves offers the only real hope for incisive change in the foreseeable future". The commission further argued that the quest for equality would be carried out under the banner of race, and that the resolution of conflicts engendered by that fact would take the form of some bargaining or confrontation between different racial groups.

These thoughts were even more powerfully taken up by the director of SPROCAS, Peter Randall, in his book *A Taste of Power* published in 1973 to draw together the different strands of the six commission reports. Randall stated on its first page that the aim of change was to reallocate power to enable the black majority to exercise an effective role in the decision-making processes of society and to gain a more just share of the country's resources. This kind of change, he wrote, would be initiated by blacks. South Africa was in the early stages of a new historical process in which the initiative for change would pass into black hands. Whites could no longer ignore the 'sweeping growth' of black consciousness, which was manifesting itself among students and workers as well as in the development of related concepts such as black theology, black drama and black poetry. These were as significant as anything emanating from the white community and black workers, students and political leaders, said Randall, 'have begun to have a taste of power'.
The neo-liberals relinquish power

Randall’s forecasts about the advent of black power said as much about the evolution of thinking among neo-liberals as they did about political developments among blacks. While, as has been said, for the greater part of the 1960s the neo-liberals were hostile to nationalism, they had by their actions and stances unwittingly transformed the SACC into a natural platform for black nationalism. By overhauling and strengthening the structures of the SACC, aligning it more definitely with the international ecumenical movement and involving a much wider segment of its constituency than simply the missionary wing of churches in its work, the neo-liberals had made it into a much more effective and credible organisation than it had been under the missionary liberals.

All three men who had successively occupied the crucial post of secretary during the 1960s, Brown, Burnett and, most especially, John Rees – who moved into the post in 1970 – contributed to this in growing measure. Rees in particular was a remarkable figure in the life of the Ecumenical Bloc in general and the SACC in particular during the 1970s. Unlike his predecessors, he was a layman, and although he had no theological training, was infused with a religious fervour typical of the Methodist Church in which he had been born and brought up. His working background lay in the field of public administration, having gone straight from school into the service of the Johannesburg Municipality in its Non-European Affairs Department. This had given him close contact with black people and brought him face to face, in a way not experienced by many whites, with the devastating effects on individual lives of Verwoerdian apartheid. Rees was passionately opposed to apartheid and as general secretary of the SACC, became almost as much a thorn in the flesh of the apartheid government and its security apparatus as Beyers Naude.

In many ways Rees, in his energy, vision and ambition, resembled John Mott, who was also a layman. Rees proved to be an able
networker and negotiator in both the international ecumenical sphere and in the secular world and, moreover, displayed a good understanding of, and a capacity for, managing the mass media. During his term of office in the SACC, its bureaucracy and sections dealing with different areas expanded enormously, so that it became a major organisation with a public profile and impact that the old liberal missionaries and even his immediate predecessors could only have dreamt about. Most of the new activities were financed by monies that Rees had raised in copious quantities from overseas churches and donor agencies anxious to help in the struggle against apartheid.

This, however, was to prove his Achilles heel; while the SACC’s budgets expanded exponentially, the organisation’s infrastructure was not well equipped to cope with the inflow and administration of these large sums. Rees was not as careful an administrator as he might have been, and although he retired amid accolades from the SACC in 1978, a few years later when he was director of the old liberal institution, of the SAIRR, he was arrested and charged with defrauding the SACC. The action against him did not originate from either the SACC or any funding agency, but from the State, which had obtained access to the records of the SACC through the activities of the Eloff Commission set up by the government to investigate the SACC in the 1980s. The case of the State proved to be well founded because when he was haled into court, Rees could not account for an amount of R30 000 of SACC monies (his supporters claimed that this was because he was protecting the recipients of the money who were involved in clandestine anti-government activities). Although the judge found that he had not personally gained from this, in legal terms he was guilty of fraud, having diverted monies to uses other than that for which they were intended. He escaped a jail sentence and, instead, was heavily fined which, of course, constituted a criminal offence. Despite that, Rees continued to command widespread respect, and later became the administrator of the Avril Elizabeth Home
for physically disabled people. That cancer brought his life to an end at the comparatively young age of 56 meant that he never saw the emergence of the ‘new South Africa’ for which he had worked so hard.

In expanding the work of the SACC and raising its profile to unprecedented heights, he transformed it into a major body in the life of both Church and State in South Africa. While arguments over finances created long-lasting acrimony between him and Bishop Desmond Tutu, who succeeded him as SACC general secretary, perhaps among the most important contributions he made was the way in which he facilitated the transition of power in the SACC to its black majority and so helped to euthanase liberal dominance in at least this sector of the Ecumenical Bloc.

Notes
2. CCQ, no. 69, Third Quarter, 1962, 5.
4. SACC archive, 623/7. In his reply, Brown described Shepherd’s statements as ‘wild and unfounded’, and asked him to retract them. There is no record of Shepherd having done so.
5. CCQ, no. 62, Third Quarter 1961, 1.
6. SACC archive, AC 623/2/1.
7. CCQ, no. 52, July 1952, 2.
8. Ibid.
10. CCSA Executive Minutes, 8/5/1962, 5.
11. CCSA Executive Minutes, 20/5/1964, 2.


16. Interview with the author.

17. Indicating that despite Brown’s efforts the CCSA still did not have a strong public standing, is a letter written by the Bishop of Johannesburg to the Archbishop Joost de Blank in response to the proposal to make Burnett general-secretary of the CCSA. While that would be a ‘wonderful’ move, wrote the Bishop, ‘I am myself so convinced about the value of the Council as to be able to urge the appointment. From what I have seen of the Council, they never seem to get down to anything definite.’ SACC archive 623/1/1.


19. CCSA Executive Minute no. 2918, 2/2/1967, 419.


26. CCSA Executive Minute no. 284, 14 to 15 June, 1966, 375.

28. These were the African Orthodox Church (1967), the African Zionist Mission South Africa (1964), the Bishop of St John Mission (1964), Christ the Rock Mission (1968) and the Order of Ethiopia (1969).

SACC archive AC 623(9).


33. *Kairos*, vol 7, no. 4, March to April 1975, 10.


36. Ibid., 145.

37. Ibid.


40. CCSA Executive Minute no. 169, 7/2/63, 270.


42. CCSA Executive Minutes, 9/2/1966, 371–2.


44. CCSA Executive Minutes, 15/6/1966.

45. General Secretary’s Report to the *Biennial Meeting* of the Christian Council of South Africa, 29 to 30 May 1968.

47. SACC archive AC 623/6.


51. Ibid., 243–4.


54. Ibid., 49.


57. That Rees had learnt this lesson was clear to the author when working with him a few years later in the SAIRR. On his return from an overseas fund-raising trip, Rees stated he could easily have raised millions of rand for the work of the institute. However, he said, he turned most of the proffered money down because he realised that the institute was not equipped to handle it.