CHAPTER 6

*Volunteer regiments, military men and militarism*

Natal's history was regularly punctuated by wars, violent disturbances and calls to arms. This chapter argues that an important and neglected reason for this was the militarism that pervaded the colony. Militarism, in turn, was the carefully nurtured product of white men, something woven deep into the constructions of settler masculinity.

Militarism in dictionary terms is 'an excess of military spirit' or a 'tendency to overvalue military power or to view things from a soldier's point of view'. While there are a great many definitions of the term (Berghan 1981), these ones will suffice. This chapter looks at the gendered mentalities that were expressed through militarism and how this militarism impacted on the region and defined the class and gender identities of the ONFs.

Natal's colonial history was characterised by concern about defence. The proximity of Zululand with its large black population served as a constant reminder of the 'black threat'. Even after the Zulu kingdom had been defeated in the 1879 war and thrown into disarray by the civil wars of the early 1880s, white settlers remained vigilant. Evidence of their suspicion and vigilance was to be found in the establishment and maintenance of a civilian military capacity.
Volunteer regiments were established under the auspices of the colonial government. Three of them that were based in the Midlands will be examined in this chapter: the Natal Carbineers (NC), the Umvoti Mounted Rifles (UMR) and the Natal Mounted Rifles (NMR). For much of the nineteenth century, the regiments remained basically independent, bearing their own costs (in peace-time particularly) and administering themselves. This is particularly significant because it marks them out as social institutions just as much as repressive state apparatuses, which is how they would be conceptualised within an Althusserian framework.

Within the Colony, whites had a virtual monopoly on firearms. In Zululand, Africans had possessed many firearms but defeat in 1879 led to a reduction in the number. In addition, the *amabutho* system, upon which the military strength of the polity rested, was disestablished. It is true that African men continued to own traditional weapons, but equally, the military threat posed hereby was limited. By contrast, settler forces expanded steadily through this period. While there were worries expressed occasionally about the potential of settler forces to deal with a ‘black threat’, the presence of imperial troops and the overwhelming advantage of firepower meant that any doubts about security were little more than *swart gevaar*.

For several reasons, and in many ways, the volunteer regiments served as a base for settler militarism. Militarism developed in the schools and through sport and came to envelop the colony as a whole. Militarism, of course, incorporated understandings and displays of masculinity described in previous chapters. It goes without saying that the regiments were single-sex, exclusively white institutions. In them, men could express (sometimes to excess) those aspects of masculinity shaped in the other institutions. Team work, perseverance, aggression, toughness, precision, competence, obedience and the protection of white ‘brothers and sisters’ were all drilled into members. Military heroes were made, revered, mythologised. Men like Duncan McKenzie became part of the ONF lore, symbols of settler masculinity. The growth of militarism throughout the colony established, in another way and through a complementary institution, hegemonic masculinity.

The military were part of the fabric of colonial life and the settlers were members of the military. Yet the military as an institution constituted a social node where the ONFs extended and reinforced the networks which were central to their social cohesion and influence. In fact it would be better to consider the military as being the generation point of specific values by which the ONFs identified themselves and disseminated their worldview as well as an institution which provided status and was considered to be a mandatory aspect of class membership. The military as an institution allowed for social integration. Particularly when the recruitment of settlers into regiments picked up, the class composition of membership became more diverse. The class ethos of the regiments was policed by the officers.
New volunteers (and later draftees) became soldiers with regimental pride, and a set of class and gender values which accorded, at least in the areas touched by military life, closely with those of the ONFs.\(^1\)

The class nature of the regiments was an achievement, rather than something than flowed automatically from the creation of the regiments, or remained inertly within them once they were formed. The volunteer regiments were sites of contestation, not only about their class orientation, but also about their gender regime. Nowadays, challenges to the gender order are obvious, finding their way into headline news. Should women be allowed to serve? Should they be engaged in combat? Should gays be admitted? (Morgan 1994). While such questions were inconceivable in the period under discussion, contemporary challenges serve to remind us that the gender order is prone to challenge too.

**The military and militarism**

For much of the period between 1880 and 1920 Natal relied on an imperial military presence. Imperial troops were garrisoned in the colony continuously until 1906.\(^2\) Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, settlers remained concerned about the ‘security’ situation in the colony. This concern was expressed in parliamentary debates and the press, but more importantly in persistent, indeed obsessive, preoccupation with the domestic military strength of the colony itself. Herein was the manifestation of the colony’s militarism. Natal’s military spent much less time at war that at peace. In the period under discussion Natal’s regiments were involved in three wars: two against ‘white foes’ (South African War (1899–1902) and First World War (1914–1918)) and one against the internal ‘enemy’ (Bambatha’s Rebellion (1906)). Despite the limited need for the use of military force, settler hawks in positions of political authority and a masculinist cadre of settlers pushed for an extension of the colony’s military capacity. Militarism was not confined to the military commanders and their political allies. When the First World War occurred, Natal sent proportionately more men than any other province to fight. And it is to the men from Natal that the most heroic ‘South African’ moment of that war belongs: Delville Wood (Ruth Gordon 1978:57).

Reasons for militarisation were couched in the language of danger – the blacks would rise up, the Boers would invade, the Germans would challenge British rule. These fears were real enough, even if the danger itself was more imaginary than real (Krikler 1993). But what actually was feared? Specific answers are seldom given to this question by people living at the time. It was an unstated and assumed fact that the ‘way of life’ held to be the
essence of what Natal as a colony was about was endangered. And who or what might endanger it? There were a range of suspects. The unruly native, the untamed savage, the non-conformist bounder, an insensitive Colonial Office, a rebellious white working class. Obviously not all these foes could be militarily subjugated. But the military was not only about firepower and force. The military was about accommodating and elevating a particular stratum of colonial society and about cementing certain values. The white boys and men of the Old Natal Families and their masculinist values injected a civil agenda into the Natal military, ensuring that that institution remained a key site of social power.

The groundwork for the militarism of the volunteer regiments was laid in the schools and on the sports fields. There, the notion of teamwork was entrenched and the importance of bravery and self-sacrifice underlined. Further it provided, through such figures as Duncan McKenzie and George Leuchars, heroes for the colony. These heroes, apart from their symbolic importance, wielded considerable political power. Like many other commanders and senior officers of the Natal Midland regiments, these men had political power. This either came with political office or via the occupation of powerful positions within the civil service.

Recent literature on the military in Europe at the turn of the century tells us that despite the revolutionary changes of the preceding centuries which elevated the bourgeoisie and its institutions, the military remained an important locus of power. It was undergoing professionalisation which brought the new middle class into positions of command and transformed it into a bureaucratised institution. Nevertheless, it remained an easily identifiable caste-like social entity with substantial political influence (Mann 1993). In the transformation of the military, old rituals and values were retained and accepted not only by the new officer corps, but by civil society which drew from the military its codes of behaviour (Nye 1993). More recent studies have shown that militarist values can also effectively be disseminated via non-state ideologies and institutions (Gibson 1994). (The role of old boys’ clubs and associations in this regard was suggested in chapter 5.)

It is terribly obvious, but a point that needs to be made, that modern warfare has been constructed as a quintessentially masculine pursuit. Armies, by the same token, are quintessentially masculine institutions; manned and with militarist values that comfortably support views that boys are ‘by nature’ aggressive and therefore the logical protagonists in war. The continuing political prominence of the military in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was of profound gender importance. Not only was a male-exclusive institution central to the conduct of politics and influential in the passage of laws, it also put its imprint on social life. The continuing influence of militarism should not conceal the fact that the civil establishment had risen and overtaken the military in influence during this period. Expenditure
on the civil establishment increased, having overtaken military expenditure in 1881. Nevertheless, Mann (with Giddens (cited in Marshall 1994)) rejects the Foucauldian view that the military’s influence was on the wane as other forms of surveillance began to dominate modernism’s repressive mode. Domestic repression remained a dominant theme of military activity taking the form of presence, show and ultimately violence (Mann 1993:408).

The concept of militarism, puzzlingly, is seldom used in the historical literature dealing with military conflict in Natal and South Africa. There is exhaustive coverage of wars and rebellions, but the militarised social context is ignored. Somehow it is just accepted that the Boers had commandos, the British army was either in the field or available for war and that disgruntled and dispossessed Africans could form impis and rebel. Soldiers and soldiering do not exist in a vacuum. They exist and occur when people believe in the need for or the danger of war. These beliefs are at the heart of militarism. Militarism is one component of the colony’s hegemonic masculinity.

\textit{Natal’s volunteer force}

Up until 1855 the military capacity of Natal was in imperial hands. In 1854, however, Ordinance 8 was promulgated by the lieutenant governor allowing for the establishment of volunteer units. The preamble of the founding document of one of the first volunteer units formed read, ‘In a Country thickly populated by barbarous tribes it is generally determined on the part of the white population of this Town (Durban) to associate together for mutual benefit and protection’ (Du Plessis 1975:3). Reference to the ‘Zulu threat’, real or imagined, was to underpin much of the writing and talking which served to produce and disseminate a militarism through the colony.

It is still debated in military circles which regiment actually was the first formed (Cook 1985). The regimental pride of Pietermaritzburg’s Natal Carbineers is at present inflated with the claim, though the Natal Mounted Rifles (now based in Durban) still contest the issue. Both were formed in terms of the Ordinance in 1855. These mounted units were the mainstay of the colony’s military establishment. In addition there were artillery and infantry regiments. Apart from the police force, which could be called up in times of war, there was no permanent colonial military force.

Volunteer regiments were established in Britain in 1859 to counter the threat of French invasion and they ‘became a popular institution, whose spectacular annual manoeuvres or field days were treated as public holidays’ (MacKenzie 1992:2). In Natal, volunteering in the
mid-Victorian period had a similar feel about it. It 'was a popular outlet for energy at a time when men were accustomed to tempt fortune in the performance of extravagant feats of personal or equestrian prowess' (Hattersley 1945:12). This description testifies to the concern amongst men at the time that they prove themselves by feats of daring, bravery and endurance. (The gendered aspect of militarism will be explored in greater detail below.)

Volunteer regiments (including the Umvoti Mounted Rifles (formed 1864)) brought gentlemen together. Their rules and procedures gave them the distinction of clubs where membership was a privilege and the good name of the club sacrosanct. Command of a regiment was generally taken by a prominent local, often the magistrate. Later a few of the key positions of
a regiment (for example commanding officer, regimental sergeant major) became paid positions. These provided limited opportunity for settlers, imbued with the British idea that a military career was noble and distinguished, to promote a military ethos within the colony.

As the end of the century approached, the military in Europe was becoming 'more autonomous within the state (and) more capable of insulated infrastructural control over “its” armed forces' (Mann 1993:505-506). 'It was bureaucratising and professionalising and often acted to repress popular notions of class and citizenship' (Mann 1993:402). These developments were not apparent in Natal’s settler forces. Here the trend was to create military élan and preserve an elitist hierarchy. This served to consolidate the class character of settler society and to act as a balance to the local imperial military presence which was viewed at one and the same time as worthy of emulation and as an unwanted foreign intrusion in local matters. As we shall see below, the settler military did become influential in local politics, but did so not from an autonomous military base, but via a process of social and political infiltration, using a host of overlapping memberships and networks to achieve the aim.

After the defeats at Isandhlwana (1879) and Majuba (1881) debates about the state of the colony's defence were given much air. In Europe at this time conscription was becoming common. Apart from swelling numbers, the practice was valued for its civil role. Conscription mixed the classes, preventing disloyalty on the basis of class and geographical affiliation. The major means of so doing was by strengthening authority through broadening ‘authoritative organisation’. Modern transport and communication development enabled men to be located within large structures yet duped them into believing that they were fighting to protect a local community rather than a grand impersonal value or nation. A major mechanism here was the creation of territorial units with affiliation to specific locales (Mann 1993:428-429).

In Natal the military's civil role was somewhat different. The exclusion of blacks altogether from the volunteer regiments and the close scrutiny of membership meant that the regiments were beacons of class and race solidarity. There was no question of allowing blacks in. The class composition of settler society (at least in the Midlands) was sufficiently homogeneous for class ‘disloyalty’ not to be a serious problem. The regiments nevertheless operated to produce conformity of outlook in members, operating to initiate members into important class and race rituals or to transform members who lacked the basic educational, familial or social backgrounds into deserving affiliates of the core elite.

Throughout the period, laws were passed which expanded Natal’s domestic military capacity. In 1885 the Volunteer Law was passed. 'Marching pay' was introduced, which reduced the financial burden on volunteers. Membership of the regiments rose, but not enough to silence demands for conscription. Settlers pushing for responsible government status demanded a permanent force to strengthen their claim for greater independence from Britain. These
arguments directly challenged the elitism of the volunteering tradition. Yet both supporters of conscription and defenders of volunteering were proponents of militarism. They shared views about the importance of a military experience for manhood and about blacks being the ‘enemy’. The debates therefore pursued a tortuous route with other factors such as the right of the individual complicating matters further. The NC’s Commanding Officer, Lt Col E M Greene, a staunch traditionalist, believed any form of ‘compulsion’ to be ‘repugnant’. He opposed the 1893 recommendations of the Archibald Committee on the colony’s defence capacity, which advocated compulsory three-year enlistment, arguing that it would be the ‘death blow to mounted volunteering in the colony’ (Hattersley 1945:27).

This position rested on the principle of democratic exclusivism. It was believed that the regiments retaining the volunteer ethos should retain the associated traditions of election of officers. The idea that the regiments were basically a peer group in which the consent of all ensured military and social efficacy dominated.

The debate got hotter once responsible government had been awarded in 1893. Natal became liable for its own defence. Imperial forces were to begin withdrawing after five years. To meet the increased demands for troops another Volunteer Act was passed in 1895. The Act aimed ‘to provide for the Better Organization, Regulation, and Discipline of the Volunteer Force of the Colony’ (Goetzsche 197?:96). It set out and coded orders, discipline, punishments, methods of appeal, recovery of fines, imprisonment, privileges and death compensation (widows, for example, would get £52). The Act gave the Commandant of Volunteers the power to coordinate and rationalise the colony’s forces. Under the Act, the volunteer force grew yearly until war broke out in 1899. But of 12 000 men available for service, under the law only 2 000 were actually liable for service. In wartime this was a clear problem. So in 1903 the Militia Act was passed which ‘imposed on every class of European inhabitant, between certain ages (18–50), the liability to undergo military training and service’ (Goetzsche 197?:92). Conscription had arrived. Schools were not exempt either. Uniformity in cadet training had been achieved in 1896 when the first general encampment had attracted 1 200 boys (Hattersley 1945:30). Cadet training now became compulsory from the age of ten. Yet the power of the volunteer lobby ensured that the regiments were not disbanded or reorganised. Furthermore, the elective principle in officer selection was retained but diluted. The fighting force remained all-white, though blacks could be called out ‘for employment as scouts, drivers, labourers, stretcherbearers’ (Goetzsche 197?:93).

Hattersley describes the transition well.

The ‘nineties thus represented a transition period in colonial volunteering. In mid-Victorian times, it had been an aspect of social life. It was pretty haphazard with very lit-
government supervision and intervention – efficiency was a function of officers, not of some externally imposed and monitored standard. Paid regimental staffs did not exist nor were drill instructors attached to regiments. Elected officers were expected to know drill and teach it (Hattersley 1950:28–29).

In 1906 the Active Militia stood at 5 000 with 15 000 reserves. This meant that about 40 per cent of the colony’s white males (the white population (men and women) was about 100 000) were actually within the military. When one considers that boys under ten and those not at school, plus men over 50, were not eligible, the percentage is much higher. On this basis it is possible to say that most white men in the colony by 1906 had direct acquaintance with the local military.

Within two years of Union a totally new system was in place. The 1912 Defence Act put the military onto a new footing, diluting local regimental particularity and forcing all units to confirm to a centrally determined structure. This threatened the existence of the volunteer units, but concerted protest prevented their contemplated dissolution (Hattersley 1950:50).

The volunteer regiments were, at conception, units for gentlemen. A member had to provide his own horse, saddlery and uniform. A small horse allowance was paid and after 1913 a uniform allowance. In 1903 it was estimated that the costs to a volunteer for three years’ service were £46/15. Apart from the financial costs, volunteers were expected to attend parades and an annual ten-day encampment. For farmers this could be most disruptive and some employers resisted by refusing either to permit employees to attend, or to pay them in their absence.

Natal Carbineers

The Natal Carbineers (NC) were established in Pietermaritzburg in 1855. The NC attracted the largest membership of all the volunteer regiments and used this, its age and its war record to claim domestic military pre-eminence. As Victor Fly put it, ‘This was THE Midlands regiment. The pride of Pietermaritzburg, it was idolised on parade, by dogs, picanins and thombazanes’ (Fly interview 1992). From the outset, men of the Midlands ‘fig-ured prominently’ (Wood 1946:2). The unit was organised into regionally based troops. These were to be found, for example, in the Karkloof, Boston, Eston, Estcourt, Richmond
and Impendhle. In 1910 the NC ‘allied to the Imperial Cavalry Regiment, the 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabineers [sic]) Prince of Wales Dragoon Guards’ becoming the first colonial regiment to claim this honour (Hurst 1945:30). The prestige of the unit was also testified by the importance and subsequent influence of the commanding officer. From 1881, the commanding officers were Lt Col W Royston (1881–91), Lt Col E M Greene (1891–1902) and Lt Col D McKenzie (1902–1907). Each of these men went on to higher things. Royston became the Commandant of Volunteers and McKenzie became Commandant of the Militia and led Natal’s forces in the 1906 Rebellion and in German South West Africa (1914). Greene became Minister of Railways and Harbours in Natal’s last parliament.

The Carbineers were involved in all the minor skirmishes and wars in the colony. They were the first volunteer unit to suffer losses (1873) and bore very heavy losses at Isandhlwana (1879). They also had men killed in the 1899–1902 War and in the Bambatha Rebellion.
By the 1890s the Carbineers had become an integral part of Maritzburg life. The Regimental Ball and Gymkhana had joined the Regimental Race Meeting as important social occasions, and the annual encampment had become a major event. Their standing in the community was high and in 1897 a contingent was sent to London to celebrate the 60th year of Queen Victoria’s reign (Coghlan & Paterson 1988:114).

After the First World War the NC’s existence was jeopardised by reorganisation in the Union Defence Force. A Natal Witness campaign in 1920 saved the regiment. In the 1920s a NC Veterans Association was created, which strengthened the links with the city, and in 1922 the regiment began parades in the capital after seven years’ quiescence. In 1929 it affiliated with the Hilton College Cadets, formed in 1872, the oldest cadet unit in the Commonwealth (Coghlan & Paterson 1988:115).

Natal Mounted Rifles

The Natal Mounted Rifles (NMR) was the product of an amalgamation in 1888 of the Alexandra Mounted Rifles (Umzinto), Umzimkulu Mounted Rifles (Port Shepstone), Victoria Mounted Rifles (Verulam) and the Durban Mounted Rifles. The unit was unwieldy because it covered such a wide area, so in 1894 it was divided into two separate regiments. The Border Mounted Rifles (BMR) was established in Ixopo and the NMR continued with its headquarters in Durban.

The NMR saw action in the South African War and Bambatha’s Rebellion, frequently campaigning alongside the Carbineers. On 1 January 1914 a new military district system was introduced. Natal and Transkei became a single military district, causing a reorganisation of regiments. The BMR and NMR were amalgamated, becoming the 3rd NMR regiment, commanded by William Arnott. It had three troops: one drawing its members from the North Coast, the second from Durban and the South Coast, and the third from Ixopo, Dronkvei, Polela and Harding. It mobilised for the 1914 Rebellion on the highveld and was involved in two skirmishes with rebels in the Orange Free State before demobilising. The regiment also participated in the German South West African campaign, taking a leading role in the Battle of Gibeon in April 1915.

The regiment remained popular despite the inroads made into regimental identity and volunteering by the 1914 reorganisation (Goetzsche 1977:133). In 1920 when the regiment called for volunteers, an ‘astonishing’ number of desirable recruits ... came forward voluntarily, without compulsion. The deeply ingrained volunteer spirit, which had been so noticeable a feature in the past, was persisting, notwithstanding the decidedly changed out-
look' (Goetzsche 197?:152). There were other explanations. Young men who had not been old enough to serve felt shame felt inadequate (Fussell 1977:110). And military men like Duncan McKenzie played on this. In an address at Hilton College after the war, McKenzie said 'much as we may feel that this Great War has done little good to humanity would you have your Boys and your friends do other than they did - would you have them stay at home and live ashamed and without honour, no, Ladies and Gentlemen, you can easier bear the loss of an honoured one, than the shame of a slacker and these brave men would not have done other - than they did for they knew their duty too well' (McKenzie [n d]:21). He concluded, 'they died the noblest death a man can die - a death that any one might be proud to die - the death of a soldier - fighting for his King and Country, and doing his duty to the last' (McKenzie [n d]:22).

Umvoti Mounted Rifles

The Umvoti Mounted Rifles (UMR) was founded in Greytown in 1864. Their first commander was local magistrate Ashe Windham, who was elected to this position at the meeting of initiation. Windham was educated at Rugby, Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge. He was also to become chairman of Pietermaritzburg's prestigious Victoria Club (see chapter 5). He set the unit along the road to being a gentleman's regiment by imposing strict penalties for bad behaviour and enforcing stringent entry requirements (Du Plessis 1975:9).

For a time the UMR was amalgamated with the NC but in 1893 it became separate and independent. The unit was involved in the wars of 1879, 1899–1902 and 1914–1918, in addition to the 1906 Rebellion. In the latter campaign it was commanded by George Leuchars, a local farmer and Minister of Government.

The men who joined the regiments

The membership of the regiments changed over time, reflecting compositional changes in the settler population. In the 1860s and 1870s, the membership of the Carbineers, for example, was drawn from the families who settled early. The list of men who set off to deal with Langalibalele is replete with well-established settler families, many of them Byrne settlers. Wheelwright (prominent in the Natal civil service, providing Natal with a Chief Native Commissioner), Vanderplank (the family that introduced wattle to Natal), Shepstone (synonymous with native administration), Raw (Nottingham Road farmers),
Royston (to provide commanding officers of the Carbineers and the irregular unit, Royston’s Horse), Pepworth (well-known family of lawyers), Erskine (prominent in civil service, (Sir David was Colonial Secretary)), Otto (prominent landowning family in the Karkloof who gave their name to Otto’s Bluff), Lindsay (a farming family that provided the NC with a commanding officer), King (earliest settlers in Nottingham Road), Speirs (a prominent and numerous farming family in Lidgetton) (Speirs 1985), Shaw (farmers, lawyers and a family renowned for their polo skills) (Shaw 1971), Fannin (original owners of the farm Dargle – lawyers, farmers, civil servants) (Pearse et al 1973:7). Virtually all of these families sent their sons to Hilton or Maritzburg College and many were intermarried.

One should not exaggerate the homogeneity of membership at this point. Amongst the above families there were large differences of wealth, but the unifying forces of education and marriage seem to have overridden or at least to have reduced the significance of such differences.

By the 1880s the settler population was growing. Whereas members of the regiments knew one another personally before joining the regiment, or at least knew family members, it increasingly became the case that ‘unknown’ men would volunteer for membership. Membership was not automatic, and debates began about who should be eligible. Considerations of finance were a convenient gatekeeping mechanism. Not all could afford to be members. Opinion in Natal on this point was divided. Some felt that in the interests of a common, white, Natalian identity, such obstacles should not be an impediment to membership. Others staunchly held to an elitist line.

The regiments transformed themselves, becoming more open as time went on. The ‘black threat’ unified whites and the spread of hegemonic masculinist and class values served to homogenise the calibre of aspirant member. Regiments still presented themselves as elite, but now the claim was based not on being purely constituted of ONF stock, but on the quality of the soldiering. Reviewing the troops at a NC camp in 1910 Lord Methuen (the Governor) declared: ‘I do not think you could wish for a finer body of men than have been assembled in this camp, and I say so not in a general way but because I do not suppose that if you were to search the whole world round you would find men who are finer horsemen, who have to a greater degree the instincts of being good shots, or who know so well how to make use of ground’ (Stalker 1912:287–288).

A major reason that the regiments were able to attract members ‘of the right stamp’ is to be found in the cadet system. Education for white youth did not become compulsory until 1909 (Behr 1971:182) but for those who went to school (and the ONFs enthusiastically supported educational achievement), cadets was a central activity. And when the education sys-
tern was elaborated and cadets became compulsory, the enrolment of boys in cadets was impressive. In 1908, there were 3,277 cadets organised into 57 school corps.

Cadets alone cannot explain the love of war to which the high enrolment of old boys for active service in the First World War testifies. A total of 371 Old Hiltonians fought in the First World War and 47 were killed (McKenzie [n d]:21). As many as 91 Old Collegians died in World War I. Cadets, however, did instil in schoolboys a love of guns and the idea of war. As the Rector of Michaelhouse put it, ‘Boys leave this school with a taste for military work.’ In explaining the continuing influence of the military in Europe, Mann notes the importance of ‘the primacy of the command principle (McNeill 1983)’ (Mann 1993:429). This principle enshrined obedience and ensured that mutiny and disloyalty were rare. The principle was established in the schools and their cadet corps. Prefects, for example, were given many duties and responsibilities. They had to monitor bad language and to receive complaints from young boys about bullying. They had limited corrective power but in this situation both punished and punisher were imbued with the command principle (McKenzie [n d]:12). These ingredients fuelled the development of settler militarism.

While there were changes in the schools and in the social values which inhabited them, it is the continuity between McKenzie’s Hilton of the 1870s and Maritzburg College in 1908 that is striking. Giving the speech at the annual prize-giving, Governor Sir Matthew Nathan offered the following thoughts:

The conditions are such that every boy has to learn to be a ruler, for he is to remember that Natal is much more than a self-governing colony, for its small white community is not only to govern itself, but it is also directly responsible for the peace and happiness of ten times its number of alien races. Practically all the boys here will have to take part in the ruling of this country, most of them only as electors, while many of them will, no doubt, become members of Parliament, and a few of them magistrates and ministers. Hence it is primarily necessary that they should acquire in this College those qualities of fearlessness, patience, broad sympathy, and quiet unassuming strength, which have enabled boys trained in the public schools in England to rule hundreds of millions of natives in Asia and Africa, and to maintain the Pax Britannica among them.

Nathan continued that an important means of achieving these aims was via the cadets where boys learnt to ‘obey and to respect authority, learn in the best way to command and to make their own authority respected’.

Nor did the political disaster of Union affect the schools’ commitments to cadets. In 1924 at the unveiling of a memorial to MC’s war dead, it was remarked that
the boys of the College have always taken a high place in the cadet movement, in
shooting, and in every form of physical training, and with such a record it is not sur-
prising that the school afforded a large number of recruits ... They (the fallen) serve as
examples of bravery and devotion to a great cause, and they help to cultivate the spirit
of loyalty and sense of duty which must have its effect on the future manhood of the
country. They also help to show us of what our boys are capable when King and Country
call on their services, that patriotism is an inherent virtue of our people, and that no
sacrifice is too great when the principles of justice and right are violated.15

Links between the cadets, volunteer regiments and ONFs were very important in spinning
an apparently seamless web between boyhood and adulthood, between school and army
and between the ONFs. The links were fostered in a host of different ways. Duncan
McKenzie, for example, kept up his associations with the school by attending anniversary
celebrations and giving occasional addresses. It was his son, Lt Col A G McKenzie, then
commander of NC, who assisted the affiliation of Hilton College Cadets to NC in 1929. As
Hattersley proudly commented of this union, ‘In Natal’s senior volunteer regiment and in
its oldest public school, the spirit of colonial Natal lives on’ (Hattersley 1950:62).

Not surprisingly, military men like NC commander Col E M Greene were very much in
favour (‘heart and soul’) of the cadet movement.14 They regularly used cadet parades to
strengthen links between cadets and volunteer regiments.15 And the demand for these links
did not only come from the military establishment. Ernest Barns, headmaster of
Maritzburg College, gave evidence to the Colonial Defence Commission in 1903:

Question: Do you think that a boy, when he leaves school, would like to be linked, in
any way, with his old school?

Answer: I think he would like to be put on a proper footing. I notice that the boys of
the College are very fond of their old school, and are continually in connection with us,
in one way or another, and the Cadet Corps would be another link – something between
the Cadet and the Volunteers’ (179).

As time went on, the volunteer regiments attracted men of rougher background. Dr James
McCord, the American missionary, described them as ‘youthful Colonial rowdies’ (McCord
1957:120). The prospects of ‘action’ encouraged the new, urbanised white population to
join.16 One such man, an enthusiastic member of the BMR, angrily expressed his displea-
sure at not being called up to fight in 1906: ‘It is downright rubbish to say that the natives
will give trouble here (southern boundary), and yet the regiment is kept idle! ... there is
scarcely a member who would not go to the front at the present time ... Half-pay is better
than stay-at-home, while fighting is on' (Natal Mercury 19 May 1906, cited in Goetzsche 1977:107). Nor were all ONFs obedient to the gentlemanly codes of the regiments. Hattersley observes that '[v]olunteering was a popular outlet for energy at a time when men were accustomed to tempt fortune in the performance of extravagant feats of personal or equestrian prowess' (Hattersley 1950:12). Not surprisingly, things occasionally got out of hand. In the Ixopo Mounted Rifles for example, 'Discipline apparently was not of a high order and after particularly insubordinate acts by several of the members the Ixopo Mounted Rifles were disbanded by Government Proclamation of 19th July 1880' (Hurst 1945:56).

It was no easy task to preserve the aggression and winnow out inappropriate behaviour. Elitists, like NC commander Greene, a strict disciplinarian and moralist, rejected many volunteers. 'If I have the slightest idea that a man is disposed to imbibe too freely I won't have him ... the feeling among all the officers is that we will only have decent men in the regiment.' Other officers, on the other hand, were unfussed by drinking and swearing, being concerned only with a man's ability to fight. Colonel Hilmar Bru-de-Wold, for example, swore a great deal - he was renowned for his brand of Norwegian cussing. Like many, he found that 'violent expressiveness and crudity was one way of relieving tension' (Phillips 1987:183).

The class homogeneity of the regiments was challenged by the issue of conscription (the Militia Act of 1903 and the Union Defence Act of 1912). A stiff and largely successful rearguard action was fought by officers like Colonel Greene to defend the class nature of the regiments. This may have been because 'poor whites' and other men who did not fit were converted through the regimes of masculinity into desirable, manly soldiers. Equally, it may have been an effect of the selection procedures. Probably it was a combination of both. The result was that the gap between officers and men was not great. Commanding officers like McKenzie and Arnott had a high regard for the ability of their men. This should be contrasted with the British army where generals considered the (working-class) rank and file to be worth little more than cannon fodder (Fussell 1977:13).

The officer corps of the regiments changed over time. Initially commissioned officers were educated civil servants like Windham and Barter (Chief Magistrate of Pietermaritzburg). Subsequently ONFs came to fill positions. These were gentlemen officers, rarely full-time soldiers, but interested in this institution as a way of entrenching and spreading family prestige. There were good reasons that the ONFs were suitable for commissions. They could afford the costs (commissions were purchased), and were well enough known to get the elective support necessary. Furthermore they were for the most part educated. As the military developed, education became more important. Officers needed to read maps,
handle logistics and have a knowledge of strategy. In Britain, where this development occurred, an education did not replace class position as a criterion for admission to the officer corps, it simply fused with it (Mann 1993:430). In Natal the process was slightly different. Since the white secondary schooling system was little differentiated, it became possible for recent settlers by dint of hard work, state support and access to education facilities to enter leadership positions. Whereas in Britain, Mann comments, the sons of industry and commerce were virtually absent from the officer corps, in Natal men entering leadership positions came from a wide range of economic class positions.

Militarism and masculinity

The origins of militarism are both well understood and hazy. Amongst those causes commonly cited would be the role of bellicose politicians, economic crises and the media. In this period the role of Boy's Own Paper is well documented (Richards 1992; Swart 1994). Commitment to hegemonic masculinity amongst the volunteers themselves was probably a major contribution to the colony's militarism.

Amongst volunteers there flourished a set of values which underscored and defined colonial militarism. This was not an expansionist militarism such as that found in Europe, rather it was the militarism that produced belonging, that evoked an 'other', an enemy.

A key element of the value system, as Nye has noted for France, was honour:

It traditionally regulated relations among men, summed up the prevailing ideals of manliness, and marked the boundaries of masculine comportment. Its codes sprang from the social and political arrangements of maledominated warrior societies in which the possession of honor, together with its wealth and its perquisites, was essential for elite status. With time, the company of honorable men expanded to accommodate worthy individuals of non-noble blood; but, even though the criteria for the possession of honor had broadened sufficiently at the threshold of the twentieth century to include most men, the connection between honor and masculinity remained intact and was affirmed (Nye 1993:vii).

In Europe generally, and in France in particular, the pinnacle of the honour code was the duel, by which individual honour was protected and the honour code perpetuated. By the 1870s duels in Natal were outlawed, but an honour code was still very much alive. Honour regulated personal relationships. To accuse a man of lying or cowardice, for example, was to impugn his honour. But metropolitan France differed from colonial Natal in important
ways. The sharp class divisions of modern France (which the honour code succeeded in straddling) were absent. And in Natal there were blacks.

The concept of the team was as important as honour. Teams were central to the organisation of schools, sports and regiments. Two models of the racially exclusive teams were constructed to organise social interaction and collective behaviour in the regiments. Officers like Bru-de-Wold built a team by stressing oneness, by narrowing the social gap. When Bru-de-Wold swore, he was making himself the same as the humble mule drivers who were noted ‘as the finest swearers in the regiment, better even than the farriers’ (Hurst 1945:84). On the other hand, men like Duncan McKenzie led by example. His model of the team was hierarchical: of a captain sharing in the challenges and glories equally with his team. The team was the product of the men as well as officers. Esprit de corps cannot be foisted onto a regiment; it has to be built. Much of that building is done by soldiers associating themselves with the regiment. As General Jan Smuts put it in his foreword to Hurst’s military history:

‘The ordinary private soldier’s pride in his own platoon and in the wider prowess of his regiment is the spirit that gains victories’ (Hurst 1945, foreword).

An integral part of the team is the hierarchy. Regimental routine constantly stressed hierarchy. In promoting greater emphasis on parade-ground drill, Commander Nicholas William Chiazzari (an old Hiltonian) said, “The idea of drill is not only to make a man perfect in drill, but also to make him amenable to the word of command.” Anybody bucking the system, challenging the hierarchy implicitly or explicitly, was brought into line by military discipline. The rules of the NC made it ‘lawful for the commanding officer, on any member appearing at muster in a slovenly state, either in person or accoutrements, to inflict a fine, not exceeding 5s, on any offender who has been twice warned, and if the irregularities are further persisted in, after the infliction of such fine, to order a court martial on the party so transgressing’ (Stalker 1912:218–219).

All the regiments consciously fostered the team metaphor. A team needs an identity: a badge, colours and distinguishing rallying calls. Regiments had these. A unit without a motto or badge considered itself incomplete. This was the condition of the BMR in 1899 when Governor Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson visited the officers mess. He is reputed to have said ‘Ah, this is Spartan, Rethman (the commanding officer), and what I like to see; rough and ready.’ The regimental Medical Officer, Captain H T Platt, thereupon picked up a top boot with spur attached and firmly setting it on the bare table amongst the empty bottles, said, “This is the only plate we have, sir” (Hurst 1945:100). This led to the motto and the top boot and spur as the badge.
Regiments also all had ‘warcries’ and mottos. It is not clear when ‘warcries’ were adopted but the first reference I found was to the NMR motto ‘Just and Frank’ taken in 1888 (Hurst 1945:83). This was replaced in 1914 with ‘Rough and Ready’. In 1898 the regiment adopted the warcry of the Durban Bellair Troop, ‘Qobolovayoji’. This was said ‘to have been the warcry of a famous Zulu regiment at the time of Tshaka, and is a challenge or cry of defiance. Another Zulu cry still used in the Regiment is ‘Se si Fikile,’ (sic) meaning “now we have arrived, so all is well’” (NMR [nd]).

The UMR also had a warcry, ‘Hubu, hubu, hubu, hubu’. Hurst comments that ‘it is not clear when and where this originated, but it is a startling and fearsome cry when shouted together by hundreds of men’ (Hurst 1945:46). Du Plessis, official UMR historian, says the warcry (‘Mahubu hubu’) was borrowed from the Zululand Mounted Rifles after amalgamation in 1912 (Du Plessis 1975:22).

This is not the place to explore it, but the creation of a military identity drew heavily on existing metropolitan as well as indigenous value systems. The military identity was not, however, locked ineluctably to the discourse from which its emblematic identity was created. Take, for example, the ‘Zulu’ warcries. These made sense in a period when the ONF boys had linguistic and emotional ties with their Zulu-speaking peers (see chapter 4). But as racial identities hardened, the warcries no longer testified to a connection across racial and linguistic barriers, but became part of a colonial discourse that was largely antagonistic to pre-modern idiom. Such warcries then became part of a settler culture in which the people who uttered them had little affinity, liking or sympathy for the cultures and people who had inspired them in the first place.

A colonial identity was constructed in the regiments, but the process was complicated by the ambiguous relationship with the metropole. Volunteers disliked the arrogance of imperial troops and regarded their officers as ignorant intruders (Phillips 1987:135). At the 1873 debacle at Bushman’s Nek, colonial temperatures were raised by stories that Durnford, the imperial officer in command, had criticised the NC troops under his command. ‘(I) heard him (Durnford) say something about “If we were Englishmen”. Someone replied that it would be madness to stand here, in fact we had lost confidence in our leader’ (Testimony of Sgt Varty in Pearse et al 1973:28). By the turn of the century, the distinction was commonly made between colonials of ‘the better class’ and ‘young men that come from England (who) ... are incapable of doing work’ (Stalker 1912:203).
The progress of developing a Natal identity separate and in some areas divergent from that of the metropole accelerated after the granting of responsible government in 1893. Feelings of loyalty to the empire never disappeared (they are with us still, as bumper stickers of ‘Natal: The Last Colony’ remind us) but were periodically diluted. When the imperial government attempted to prevent the execution of Bambatha rebels, loyalty to Britain ebbed. When war was declared against Germany, it soared.

A Natal identity woven around militarist themes potentially faced problems of another kind. At this time, in Britain, a pacifist movement which included the Bloomsbury set (particularly Bertrand Russell and the author Lytton Strachey) was making itself felt. It combined a critique of empire and bourgeois culture with a rejection of war as a legitimate way of prosecuting politics and solving differences. In Natal, I have not come across any evidence of a comparative colonial impulse. The closest example was Donald McKenzie, the eldest of the McKenzie brothers. Unlike his famous brothers, Donald lived a low-key life as farmer. Of all the McKenzie boys, he alone did not attend Hilton College, a fact which his grand-nephew cites to explain his friendliness towards Africans and his dislike for the competitive and hierarchical values that came out of the school system. Donald’s son, Archibald, served in the First World War. Warfare, the behaviour of the officer corps and his first observation of white poverty converted him to Fabianism. Archibald subsequently avoided all contact with his regiment (Pat McKenzie interview 1993). Here we come closest to open rejection of the ONF norms. More common, though nevertheless infrequent, was dissidence around the issues of conflict, rather than conflict itself. So, for example, whether it was appropriate to fight against the Boers in 1899–1902 was an issue which divided some ONFs. But here there was no disagreement over militarism per se. It was accepted that military solutions were appropriate, and that militarism’s contribution to masculinity was important. In short, a dissident gender position on warfare did not exist in the colony.

The metaphor of the team was particularly efficacious when a rival team could be invoked. In the colonial context, the Zulu army conveniently provided opposition. Admiration for the other team was frequently expressed: during the 1879 war the ‘dash, elan and fearlessness’ of Zulu warriors were widely admired (Laband 1993:159).

Yet Africans were also seen as menacing (Laband 1993:49). Fussell describes the need to demonise or ‘otherise’ the enemy. “We” are all here on this side; “the enemy” is over there. “We” are individuals with names and personal identities; “he” is a mere collective entity. We are visible; he is invisible. We are normal; he is grotesque. Our appurtenances are natural; his, bizarre. He is not as good as we are ... Nevertheless, he threatens us and must be destroyed, or, if not destroyed, contained and disarmed. Or at least patronized’ (Fussell
1977:75). There developed a ‘versus habit’ (a term redolent of team play) requiring the representation of difference as being so gross as to require eradication (Fussell 1977:79).

Not all whites were frightened of blacks. As we saw in chapter 4, many had grown up with African children, spoke the Zulu language and were familiar with African customs and traditions. The elaboration of racial codes within colonial society and the creation of racist legal and administrative barriers plus the instances of settler wars against the Zulu polity gradually fostered a society-wide prejudice. With the passage of time, the ambiguity which had allowed white and black people to relate to one another without race being a barrier was eroded and replaced by an unbridgeable gulf.

By the turn of the century, as Marks remarks, white attitudes towards Africans were ‘a curious blend of paternalism, fear, and contempt’ (Marks 1970:11). The militarist angle on race was unapologetic and straightforward. In the wake of the 1873 rebellion, the view was expressed by the Natal Mercury that ‘immediate and inflexible severity will mean true and lasting mercy’ (Guest 1976:39). A similar view held in 1906.

Profiting by the history and experience of much native warfare in South Africa it was recognised as imperative that no early set-back to the European forces should be sustained, for even a simple and small reverse would raise the whole country and might prove disastrous. Commanders were enjoined to plan with the utmost care and caution, to strike with surprise, suddenness and force and to follow up with vigour and thoroughness. This was the policy followed by the field commanders and it proved most effective and singularly economical in casualties to the attackers and most expensive to the rebels (Hurst 1945:90).

In a common case, the Secretary of Native Affairs investigated complaints against the UMR of flogging in 1906. Captain George Moe justified the assault: ‘The natives in question were punished for insolent behaviour and for not showing the required respect to the King’s uniform. Strong measures had to be resorted to to teach the natives, who had utterly got out of hand in and around the Mapumulo District, to pay the due respect to the white man.’

There was another angle to the militarist outlook on blacks. The view was held that ‘Zulus’ were very good warriors. While some contested the wisdom of providing them with arms, many believed that under white supervision that would be of great value. Colonel Beningfield, for example, stated in 1904: ‘[T]he Zululand Police are a splendid body of men, and have done excellent service when required ... I do not think you have to fear the Zulus. I think they will always take our part ... I think they would be very useful, especially
in the event of a native rising.' Asked by a member of the Colonial Defence Commission: 'Indians versus Natives?', he answered, 'Very good indeed. I do not think there is any great love between them.' The qualities that supposedly made a 'Zulu' such a good soldier were obedience, ferocity, toughness. Yet the dark, unknown but threatening, quality of the 'other' was held also to contain some of these ingredients. It was considered natural that Africans were warlike and would fight among themselves. This was regarded as most desirable amongst military men. J W Shepstone believed that 'The faction fight keeps up jealousy. It is a healthy thing as far as the Natives are concerned, because they let off steam in that way.' William Arnott had a similar view: 'I don't think the Government should be too hard on them, because a little letting off of steam on each other saves them from letting it off on us.' And the NC's Col E M Greene's view was: 'I have always looked upon the faction fight as an admirable institution.' The military's view of the African was thus quite simple: if he could be harnessed, made to understand the rules, then he could become a part of the team. If not, then he was dangerous and not to be trusted.

The danger that Africans represented was most powerfully captured in the image of black man raping white woman. As Vron Ware puts it, 'in any colony, the degree to which white women were protected from the fear of sexual assault was a good indication of the level of security felt by the colonial authorities' (Ware 1992:38). In chapter 4, we saw how swart gevaar was often expressed at times of insecurity and frequently took the form of fear about or expressions of outrage at sexual assault on white women. One of the responses to this was to arm women and teach them to shoot (Wood 1946:3). Another response, loudly heard in the aftermath of the Bambatha Rebellion, was for stricter racial segregation. Men responded to the call to arms to defend their womenfolk. 'White women provided a symbol of the most valuable property known to white man and it was to be protected from the ever-encroaching and disrespectful black man at all costs' (Ware 1992:38).

And so in order to protect white women (in effect themselves and their own masculinity and notions of empire and civilisation), white men endured a variety of hardships which were inscribed within hegemonic masculinity.

A soldier was expected to endure physical hardship, and to endure it cheerfully. Part of being a soldier was not complaining. Not complaining was part of military obedience. The rigours of camplife in peacetime provided many opportunities for the soldier to experience these hardships. Once hostilities commenced, the soldiers could then be expected to cope with an arduous regime. Toughness became a virtue, rather like the ability of a long-distance runner to finish a marathon. In 1873 most of the reports of the Bushman's Nek debacle focused on the heroic achievement of getting to the top of the pass. Durnford, the commanding officer, was 'pulled back by his horse, rolled many feet down a precipice, dislocat-
ed his shoulder, and otherwise injuring him in the head and body ... Full of energy, however, he struggled on to the top’ (Pearse et al 1973:11). In 1906 the NC again had to cope with a very difficult terrain. ‘The column marched along the bridle path across the ‘Devil’s Gorge’ at the Insuzi to the Ntingine, then to the Madhlosi Mountain on the Qudeni range. A terrible journey it was! The Insuzi river lay about 1,000 feet beneath and a slip would have been fatal in almost every case. It took three hours to cross the drift in the dark ... after being in the saddle for fourteen hours the column rested’ (Stalker 1912:189).

Soldiers were also expected to risk their lives. Here the military requirement that one put one’s life at risk dovetailed with the soldier’s code of honour, for to refuse to risk the halo of death was a stain on one’s honour. As Nye reminds us, honour ‘was never secure, (it) required constant reaffirmation, and was always open to challenge’ (Nye 1993:13). Militarism as an ideology thus fed hegemonic masculinity by promoting war and by creating men who believed that death in battle was the most glorious, the most manly, of ends. And this was not just a male sentiment. Charlotte Moor (wife of the future prime minister, Robert Frederick), wrote approvingly of her son’s desire to fight in the South African War and scolded those ‘very occasional people who refused to take up arms.’ An accusation of cowardice was intolerable for a soldier. The 1873 inglorious and chaotic retreat at Bushman’s Nek was widely blamed on a Sgt W Clark. Letters to the newspapers made the allegation openly. Clark tried to clear his name in the press, but to no avail. He emigrated saying ‘As no old soldier can live in a country and be pointed at and branded as a coward, I am leaving Natal’ (Pearse et al 1973:37).

Durnford was similarly criticised for the Bushman’s Nek debacle. He retrieved his honour in death. Charles Barter, his second command on that day, yet one of his sternest critics, commemorated his death at Isandhlwana in 1879.

Durnford was there, the Engineer
A man to those he trusted dear:
As eagle bold, with haughty crest,
Yet with deep feeling, though represt;
Cool and contemptuous in tone,
No counsel pleased him but his own:
Proud of his flag, a soldier born,
He held the Volunteers in scorn

And yet, on Isandhlwana’s plain,
Between the slayers and the slain,
At head of a Colonial band
He made a last and des'prate stand.  
They fought and died, and, sooth to tell,  
With those he scorned the hero fell.  
They rest alike in honour’s grave:  
None can be braver than the brave!  
(Pearse et al. 1973:45)

For soldiers, the reality of war went a lot deeper than glory and honour. Combat unleashed emotions and impulses generally held in check. And even the prospect of 'a fight' could provoke anxiety about one’s masculinity. On a personal note, in 1975 I was a serviceman in the South African Defence Force. Stationed at Rundu in what was then South West Africa, rumours of war 'up north' set the camp abuzz. Before long there was a call for volunteers to go into Angola, where the SADF was supporting Unita and FNLA against the newly installed MPLA government. I can remember clearly now the debates I conducted with myself: should I volunteer – prove myself a man by killing another, by placing myself at risk, by experiencing front-line combat? Or should I preserve myself, keep myself from danger, stay in the relative safety of the camp? The choice before me was very much about my own masculinity, even though it was a choice also about 'serving my country'. Dilemmas of this kind must have occurred, but evidence is hard to come by. Similarly, there is little evidence of extreme behaviour – battlefield madness – which reportage of modern wars has now revealed to be common. At the turn of the century, excessive behaviour in the service of one’s country could not openly be admitted, though it was possible to report a merciless massacre as a feat of military brilliance, glossing over the inhumanity of it all by keeping reportage at a distance. There are some unguarded descriptions of wartime brutality amongst white soldiers which show, unsurprisingly, that conduct in battle was not always by the rule book. At the Battle of Khambula in 1879, Major R H Buller was described by his colleagues as 'like a tiger drunk with blood' (Laband 1992:163). In the battle mounted soldiers pursued and cut down fleeing warriors and killed the wounded where they lay (Emery 1983:22–23). Similar sentiments were expressed by Carbineer Harte during the February 1906 sweep towards Ixopo. Harte wrote his mother: We 'are quite prepared to entertain 2 000 or 3 000 black skins to dum-dum bullets if they look for the sensation. Am afraid there is too strong a force here for the liking of any native impi that could be mustered.' A day later he wrote again about an execution of some rebels. 'Yes, Walter's services have been invaluable and the poor chap seemed to be completely done up when we left him on the scene of the execution. I suppose he told you all about it. We shall probably have ceremonies of a similar character to perform, I want to be among the next firing party! I feel very blood thirsty!!' Finally, with candour and an ability for extraordinary juxtaposition he wrote, 'We don't feel the heat so much, there has really only been one hot day since we came out. I hope we are to shoot those niggers that have been caught.'
But what of soldiers’ emotions? What of the trauma? And how did they cope? Masculinity is not just about violence and aggression. Carbineer Harte’s comments on Walter alert us to the hidden and unacknowledged aspects of warfare. A key context to the playing out of masculinity was the peer group.

The standard kind of friendship was with one’s mate – frequently a man who joined at the same time, who had the same rank and who was often somebody who was a family or neighbourhood friend. Such friendships could last a lifetime, particularly as regimental associations fostered friendship outside the confines of the regiment itself (Pepper interview 1994). Jock Phillips, in the New Zealand context calls this mateship. In wartime, Phillips comments that one’s mate was ‘the only consolation for the desolation and daily tragedy’ (1987:179). Yet he and writers like Segal and Morgan are quick to point out that friendship was a complex phenomenon and not what the media liked to portray it as – as purely a cosy and sociable place. Armies do ‘help forge and consolidate certain dominant patterns of masculinity’ (for example excluding the public expression of feelings of tenderness towards a woman) (Segal 1990:20). But David Morgan observes that it was not the regiment itself which was creating this masculinity; rather it was that men were ‘learning to identify masculinity and being male with these (military) traits and pieces of behaviour’ (Morgan, cited in Segal 1990:20).

Friendship as a micro-institution did not, as a matter of simple reflex, echo back to the regiment its unexpurgated version of masculinity. Friendships were places of misogyny, drunkenness, disrespect, sexual and emotional experimentation and rebellion. Some of this behaviour was officially sanctioned, others not. A perusal, for example, of the NMR regimental orders shows men being disciplined for absence without leave, drunkenness and insubordination. But in times of actual combat, there was much greater latitude, with a blind eye being turned to excesses such as stealing, drunkenness, laxness with regard to routine. A member of the NMR described, for example, conduct in the 1906 rebellion: ‘There were very strict orders against taking cattle, goats, fowls, etc., from the Natives, but every good soldier is a good scrounger, so that there were many tasty and varied meals cooked and eaten under the name of bully beef stew’ (Goetzsche 197?:123).

All-male institutions made private friendship difficult. Even if homophobia was not an issue, close friendships between two men were considered exclusionary and inappropriate. There were differences between peacetime and wartime, with the advent of trench warfare at the turn of the century promoting close friendships by dint of changing military geography. In peacetime, friendship was not expected to detract from the team metaphor which shaped regimental life. For men who did not fit into the team, who rocked the boat, grim experience was in store. The record I consulted is conspicuously silent on the issue of victimisation and bullying. In another context, Fussell notes how British soldiers refused ‘to say anything in
their letters home (which) indicates how pervasive the style of British Phlegm became’. There was an absolute refusal to talk about grim things – as one observer put it, ‘Nothing is “horrible”. That word is never used in public’ (Fussell 1977:181). The silence of the record is testimony to another aspect of masculinity – the requirement that one silently endure. And this was not just an order from officers; this was implicit in the social fabric of regimental life.

**The effects of militarism on political life**

Mann points out that whereas in the eighteenth century economic and military power pre-eminently shaped society, in the nineteenth century political and economic power were more important. During the nineteenth century the military was specialising to fight wars and was less involved in domestic repression (which was increasingly undertaken by the police and other arms of the civil service). This specialisation produced new careers as well as turning the gaze of the military men to empire and their minds to expansion (Mann 1993:410). In Natal, specialisation occurred primarily around the turn of the century and was associated with Britain shifting the economic burden of government to the colony and the colony developing a distinctive identity, a major component of which was an independent, reliable military capacity.

But the Natal experience differed from Europe too. The military was not just an increasingly autonomous war machine. It was the location of elite identity and its constituent parts (the volunteer regiments) still retained a social agenda largely separate from their strict military functions.

What we see in Natal is some evidence of militarist expansionism and bellicosity, but much more importantly the attempt by military men to preserve the regiments as class institutions and to use these regiments and their positions to infuse public discourse with views which reflected gender and class agendas. It is argued, therefore, that as the military became specialised, efforts were made to prevent this specialisation from distancing the military from its influential social location.

There were a great many volunteer officers in Natal’s parliament. In 1903 Major George Tatham estimated that ‘about half of the House’ were volunteer officers. There was periodic discussion about whether the military should be entirely separate from ‘politics’. It was suggested, on the one hand, that volunteer officers be excluded from parliament. The concern amongst military men was to keep their autonomy. Bru-de-wold responded to a question during evidence to the Colonial Defence Commission. ‘Are you of the opinion
that Commanding Officers should sit in Parliament? – I feel very strongly that the proper course with regard to that is to follow the practice at Home, and I am under the impression that that debars members of the active force from sitting in Parliament.'

The effect of military men on parliamentary politics would require a study in its own right. For our purposes, we shall briefly refer to Edward Greene, NC commanding officer for thirteen years (until 1902). Greene was born in 1857 in Pietermaritzburg. His father was James Green, Dean of Pietermaritzburg. He attended Lancing College, became an advocate and farmer (in Nottingham Road). In 1897 he was elected to represent Lions River in parliament. Between 1908 and 1910 he was Minister of Railways and Harbours. His military career in the NC spanned twenty-six years.

Greene’s loyalties were to his regiment first. He became embroiled in an angry exchange with parliament in 1896 when his offer to send volunteers to Rhodesia was turned down (Stalker 1912:269–272). That same year he spoke out strongly against the regiments being subject to government interference. The ministry, he said, should not make decisions about regimental matters. It was wrong, he continued, ‘to make volunteers subject to political considerations – it should rest with the Commandant ... he would have no ministry telling him that if he behaved himself he would get five years’ extension (of service), and that if he did not he must go’ (Stalker 1912:274–275). Having vigorously defended the autonomy of the military, it fell to Greene to put his views inside parliament a few years later.

Hattersley sums up Greene’s career as parliamentarian: ‘Colonel Greene’s influence can be traced not only in the important development of compulsory cadet training but in other steps to maintain the efficiency and add to the prestige of the colonial militia. In particular, with the cooperation of the governor, Sir Matthew Nathan, he initiated the correspondence which issued in the official affiliation of his old regiment with the 6th Dragoon Guards’ (Hattersley 1950:49–50). Furthermore, after Bambatha, Greene became convinced that Natal could only solve the ‘native problem’ by becoming part of a greater South Africa and supported negotiations for a federal union.

One did not have to be in parliament to influence politics. Duncan McKenzie’s views were always potent and he was not shy in supporting one or other position. McKenzie believed in tribal hierarchy, which he felt was synonymous with law and order. He did not let opportunity pass to make this point. In 1906 he supported Chief ‘Gileni’ of Ixopo, who complained ‘of the power taken away from us. We are not able to impose a fine of more than 40s. We want our powers extended so that we can inflict a fine of a beast so that we may have more power over our people.’ McKenzie responded, ‘Tell him I quite agree with that
and I will represent it strongly to government. Tell him Mr Foxon, and I think all the Magistrates, agree with him.  

McKenzie was strongly opposed to liberal elements within the Native Affairs Department. He supported magistrates like F E Foxon, who took a firm line and opposed R C A Samuelson, an old Hiltonian himself, who preferred working with Africans rather than ruling over them. In 1908 he endorsed the view of Hosking, a stock inspector at Camperdown, about the need to discipline ‘insolent’ Africans. Hosking bemoaned government indecision: ‘I quite agree with you Sir: This is a business that should have been dealt with much more firmly: we soon will lose entire control over the Natives: the whole thing has been very gauling [sic] to us.’  

While some magistrates asserted their judicial autonomy against militarist pressure to deal harshly with blacks, others found no difficulty in fusing their government office with that of their military affiliation. Charles Barter and Frank E Foxon, magistrates of Pietermaritzburg and Ixopo respectively, were both senior officers in NC. They unashamedly supported strong measures against Africans. Barter came out to Natal with H J Leuchars in 1850 and was on good terms with McKenzie. Foxon’s father emigrated to Natal in 1854. Frank was a lifelong friend of McKenzie. Barter was also a Pietermaritzburg Legislative Council member, where he put his views on the need to control the African, lamenting at the same time the passing of old tribal discipline. Foxon, a Maritzburg College product, took an implacable dislike for lawlessness and disregard for Africans into his work, supporting the execution of rebels at Trewhirgie (Richmond) in 1906 and passing harsh sentences against Africans routinely in his court.  

All of Natal’s governors were closely associated with the military. When they addressed public meetings it was frequently in association with one regiment or another. Official approval for militarist values implicit in these events helped ensure that the military was never out of the public eye and that military men were seldom ignored.  

There were many reasons for the incessant debate about the capacity of the colonial military in a context where little call was made upon it. These reasons include imperial insistence that Natal take responsibility for the military in return for responsible government; international affairs (the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 was seen by many as a harbinger of a generalised war climate); and the efforts of the ONFs to preserve their class interests and by using the volunteer regiments to achieve this. In addition military men fanned the war fires. Military men were able to utilise and even provoke a general fear of Africans, to create a climate of alarmism. An example of this is Duncan McKenzie’s claim after the rebellion of
1906 had been crushed that ‘nearly every native race in South Africa was implicated in what was to be a general rising of blacks against whites’. This climate was conducive to increasing their importance within settler politics, giving their words weight in matters (such as the route of the railway in southern Natal) apparently devoid of military significance. Yet it was not automatic that their demands would be acceded to. Parliament was cashstrapped and fiscal capacity was put as a constant objection to demands for increased spending.

The fortunes of the militarists in their struggle over the colonial budget were mixed, with the budget increasing dramatically in the years following the granting of responsible government. The budget in 1892 was £66,454 and in 1899 £278,307 (Paterson 1985:141). In the early years of the twentieth century, the military budget fluctuated between 9.01% (of total colonial expenditure) in 1902–03 to 12.96% in 1904–05. With the economy in serious difficulty and the Natal government struggling to cover debts incurred in the rebellion, the military budget declined steadily if undramatically up to Union (11.07% in 1909). In this period, some expense was shifted back onto the volunteers in the active militia leading to a decline in the numbers – from 3,335 (1905) to 2,580 (1909) (Paterson 1985:143).

Military men like Arnott and McKenzie took the number of men in the Mounted Rifles (as the volunteer regiments came to be known) as a measure of the militarist condition of the colony. Arnott believed that town boys were soft or pampered and couched his advocacy of conscription in these terms. When numbers of Militia declined after the rebellion, McKenzie as Commandant of Volunteers put this down to complacency, ‘lack of interest’, ‘decadence of volunteering spirit’ and employers’ refusal to employ militiamen. It was for these reasons that he called for a permanent force and conscription. But the eyes of the colony were now on the political challenge of Union and his fulminations went unnoticed. In future, military policy would be dictated by Pretoria. The political influence of the local military men was in decline.

Sir Duncan McKenzie, O.N.F. career soldier

The most prominent soldier of the period was Duncan McKenzie or, as the media liked to style him, Brig-General Sir Duncan McKenzie, CB, KCMG, DSO, VD. He was by no means the only career soldier of his time. George Leuchars of Greytown shared many of his hallmarks. Both came from landed families, both were born into wealth. Leuchars went to Bishops College (which later became Michaelhouse) and McKenzie went to Hilton. As senior officers in the Natal Carbineers and Umvoti Mounted Rifles respectively, they led by example. They kept a distance from the troops, enforcing old notions of officer aristocracy reminiscent of the school prefect hierarchy with which they had been familiar.
Duncan McKenzie was one of five McKenzie brothers. They grew up on a large Nottingham Road farm. Their father, Duncan Senior, was a tenant farmer who came out in 1850 as a Byrne settler. He made money transporting sawn wood to the Orange Free State and bought the farm ‘Lion’s Bush’ near Nottingham Road. He and his sons continued with transport-riding – Duncan Junior getting the early nickname ‘Gwa Head’ (from transport-driving days when he told his black assistants to ‘Go ahead’ (McKenzie [n d]:8). His success was attributed in some quarters to ‘an uncanny control over the raw native mind’ (Cape Times 1929:537).

Duncan Junior began farming in 1881 at ‘Maritzdaal’ in the Dargle. He married Katherine Agnes McArthur, daughter of one-time mayor of Durban, Alexander McArthur, in 1883. He was a successful farmer, using indentured Indian labour to farm with sheep, cattle, horses and mealies. He was ‘progressive’ in his methods, being amongst the first to mechanise, fertilise and experiment with new methods of farming (McKenzie [n d]:26:34; Pat McKenzie interview 1994).

Duncan established a gentleman’s estate with a huge house built of dressed stone and elaborate out-quarters. He kept exotic animals (Indian spotted deer, Mauritius deer and local varieties), imported a Humber motorcar in 1909 and was the first in the district to get a telephone (c 1914) (McKenzie [n d]:36).

By the 1890s Duncan Junior was an avid soldier. He had made enough money to leave his farming to his brothers. In 1897 he went north to fight in the Mashonaland risings. He rose rapidly in the ranks of the Natal Carbineers and was captain before the outbreak of war in 1899. An excellent polo player, he was renowned for his ‘dashing’ cavalry charges and his ability for ‘brilliant manoeuvre’ (Stalker 1912:274). Already by the relief of Ladysmith (1900), Duncan, now a major, was the darling of the military establishment (McKenzie [n d]:42). He was also developing and expressing strong opinions about the military capacity of the colony. Describing the colonists as ‘some of the best irregular cavalry in the world’, he criticised the failure to mobilise them in the war. ‘They would have consisted mostly of farmers who understand the Boers’ ways and would have been equal in every respect to the Boers themselves, he said.45

From 1903 to 1906 Duncan commanded the NC. In 1906 he was appointed as overall commander of colonial forces mobilised against Bambatha’s rebels. By now he had developed a fierce and unyielding reputation. He embarked initially on a reign of terror in the south (towards Ixopo) and then concluded the rebellion with the merciless ‘battle’ of Mome Gorge, in which about 600 African men were killed for the loss of three white soldiers.46 In the process he acquired a new nickname, ‘Chaka’ (Du Plessis 1975:96).
In 1907 he was appointed commandant of the Natal Militia and was knighted for his services to the colony. In the First World War Duncan commanded a large section of the South African forces in German South West Africa. He was promoted to general during this campaign.

Undoubtedly a hero throughout settler society, Duncan's relationships with his close neighbours were much more problematic. He was often unfriendly, uncooperative and bellicose. In a celebrated 1884 case, Duncan's neighbours contested his arbitrary closing of a road which necessitated a 15-mile detour. Prominent ONFs were involved in the case: W C Shaw, N G Phipson, Charles, Alex and A S Speirs and C A S Yonge. The Lions River Local Road Board, including the resident magistrate, J C C Chadwick, George M Sutton, Frederick Bucknall and James King, found against Duncan. Duncan contested the matter further in the Supreme Court in 1885 and then sought damages from the Road Board, which was entirely without assets. He had its minute book attached to cover his costs.

And yet if Duncan could be bad-tempered and unneighbourly, there were equally moments when his integrity shone through. In 1917 he joined Smithfield Cold Storage Company as a director. As his son puts it, he 'was no business man', being 'far too honest and trusting' (McKenzie [n d]:330). When the company overstretched itself, many directors resigned and avoided liability. But not Duncan. '[H]e felt that he could not let the shareholders down ... (and) must try to put things right' (McKenzie [n d]:331). He mortgaged his farms, but the strain told. He had a stroke and died in 1932. His estate was worth a mere £4 618.

If Duncan's social record was checkered, his reputation in labour matters was less ambiguous. His grand-nephew remembers Duncan in terms of a tale about his difficulty in getting labour. Duncan was short of labour so bought a thorn farm, Colenso. All the African occupants moved off the farm out of dislike or fear. Duncan bought another farm, but with the same effect. He eventually got his labour by buying land right up to the Thukela river (the border with Zululand and across which the occupants would not migrate) so he eventually got his labour. 'Whether this story is true or not, I don't know, but it's a nice story' (Pat McKenzie interview 1994).

The official record contains many instances of Duncan's cruelty toward his Indian labour. We have these accounts because of the position of protector of immigrants. His brief included receiving all complaints surrounding the treatment of indentured labourers. Duncan's treatment of African labour is less clear as the record is largely silent, but Patrick McKenzie recounts tales of Duncan using a hayfork first to pinion African labourers to the ground, and then thrashing them with a sjambok. There are many references from 1885
Duncan had many friends in high places. When in 1913 five Indian labourers deserted in protest at ill-treatment, he used the courts to sort out the situation. First, Estcourt magistrate Foxon (originally of Ixopo and renowned for his lack of sympathy with blacks) was given the case (on the instruction of the Minister of Native Affairs). He absolved McKenzie of any wrongdoing, saying ‘that he could not believe the Indians’. Duncan then used the law against the labourers. Polkinghorne (protector of Indians) suggested that the labourers should continually be resentenced to hard labour until they were willing to return to Duncan’s employ.  

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*General McKenzie’s funeral, Dargie, 1932*
*Pallbearers: Col McKay, Col Lindsay, Col Blew, Col Lewis, Col Wood, Col Loudon.*
*Campbell Collections*
Duncan McKenzie became a legend even before his death. In 1929 he was described as ‘a brilliant soldier and strategist, a successful farmer and a trueblue sportsman’ (Cape Times 1929:538). His legacy lives on: roads in Pietermaritzburg and Durban are named after him; newspapers still recall his past. In 1971, for example, the Daily News described Sir Duncan as intrepid transport rider and beloved commander of troops.58

Sir Duncan’s funeral in April 1932 was marked by eulogies and the assembling of Natal’s most famous and important people. Newspapers gave full and convergent accounts of the event. The Natal Witness’s story was typical, commenting that 500 people ‘representative of every portion and class of the Province’ attended. ‘Among them were many of the late general’s colleagues and comrades, who spoke in low voices of his courage, his friendship, his integrity ... On the outskirts were numbers of natives who had also come as a mark of respect.’59 Amongst the pallbearers was Magistrate Foxon, a Lieutenant Colonel in the NC. Duncan’s chaplain, Rev W Turnbull, gave one of the speeches at the graveside: ‘Words fail me. There was no one more generous, more loyal, more constant in friendship than Duncan McKenzie, and in the great work he did in connection with defence I am sure others can speak more ably than I. I am proud to have associated with them.’60

A writer for the Natal Mercury wrote, ‘As a Natalborn British Imperialist, magnificent soldier and courageous, upright man, we, young and old, can only hope to emulate his example. It was an amazing experience when travelling through Rhodesia to hear the widespread genuine admiration of those who had known him during his sojourn there. His capacity for overcoming difficulties was spoken of everywhere; to him these were only obstacles to be brushed away.’61

His NC comrade, Col G Molyneux, gave a military appreciation. ‘Vivid, valiant and utterly winning in all his ways, Sir Duncan’s memory will always be associated in the minds of his comrades with the great cause of Empire that he made his own. This is possibly the memory he would himself have desired. He played a great and splendid part in the history of Natal and his life is a timely reminder to us all that men, not material, gain the day. And, above all else, Sir Duncan McKenzie will be remembered as a true man.’62

But not everybody mourned his passing. Before the funeral, so local legend has it, the gravedigger attempted to dig his grave in an obscure part of the cemetery because his memory was not locally esteemed. A swarm of bees put an end to this plan and Sir Duncan was given a more prominent position as supposedly befitted his social and military station (Kimber Interview 1994)!

171
Commitment to military values united Natal’s whites and through the Volunteer Regiments gave the ONFs an ideal vehicle on which to launch their class and gender values into settler society. Militarism had the effect of uniting white men under a mantle of shared masculinist values.

In the forty years under discussion, the ONFs were able to maintain the regiments, with some moderations, as class institutions. They supplied the commanding and senior officers to the regiments. The regiments and their officers were able by word and deed to infuse colonial life with militarism, a militarism which was necessary for the perpetuation of the military’s social and political importance.

During this period, the military became a key institution in which ONF values were propagated and members mingled. A dense network grew up uniting families, regiments, schools and positions of government. Much of this was mutually reinforcing, though not all military men held the same views, not all military men were in favour of naked repression. Despite differences between military men and more broadly amongst ONFs on issues such as the treatment of Africans, there were strong uniting features.

The capacity of the ONFs to hold onto the regiments rested primarily on the spectre of subaltern challenge. By creating alarmism, regiments, ONFs and the emerging military men could all claim the need for the military as well as retaining its control. It was an easy matter to bolster white fear of blacks because total control over the indigenous population had never been achieved and a tenuous balance existed, effectively a compromise with pre-existing African forms of governance and orientation.

Bambatha’s Rebellion was an ideal opportunity for the military to prove its importance. In the action, it was demonstrated that bureaucratic solutions were not always possible and that the regiments had their place. In the campaign itself, masculinist values were reiterated. These included the military code of honour. And this code, which required that no bad be spoken of honourable men, allowed for the construction of unimpeachable and unflawed heroes like Duncan McKenzie. It was the same discourse which forced subversion and critique into the distant corners of rustic churchyards.
Notes

1 In the case of Durban's white tramway workers, for example, there was widespread enlistment to go on active service (Van der Tang 1996:73).

2 Technically, a small imperial presence remained until 1914 when the South Staffordshires left Fort Napier. But military responsibility had effectively been taken over from the metropole by 1906 (Hattersley 1945:51).

3 An attack on precisely such logic, which still operates today, comes from Brian Moon: 'The correspondence of violence and masculinity must be seen ... in terms of two interconnected factors: first, the existence of systems which encode differential power relations (boss/worker, priest/parishioner, doctor/patient), and second, the systematic recruitment of men to the most powerful positions. It is certainly the case that men are the custodians of social organisation in which violence is a functional component. But the violence is primarily a feature of the systems, and it is the positioning of men within these systems that requires explanation' (Moon 1992:196).


5 There was something to this argument: conscription in New Zealand (1916) produced a large gap between officers and men and aggravated antagonism between the two (Phillips 1987:172).


7 The membership of these families lasted throughout the period, and was augmented by newly arrived Midland farmers. Natal Carbineers Archive, Roll of Officers on the Reserve List.

8 There is nothing surprising about this: the record of English public schools shows that these boarding schools effectively channelled their boys into senior positions in the military (Devlin & Williams 1992:292).


10 The Pietermaritzburg College Magazine, IV:49, June 1924.


13 Maritzburg College Magazine, IV, 9 June 1924:32.


15 The Hiltonian, 5, 9 July 1906:16.

16 The prospect of a 'good fight' was too good for many men to turn down. In the 1879 war 1 193 of Chelmsford's 18 000 troops were 'irregular colonial horse'. This was a high percentage of the male settler population and all were volunteers (Laband 1992:46).

17 Amateur historian of Ixopo, Michael Johnson, disputes Hurst's view, arguing that the Ixopo unit was disbanded when numbers dropped below 20. See Government Gazette, 19 July 1880.

18 Colonial Defence Commission 1903:127.

19 Colonial Defence Commission 1903:182.

20 John Frederick Rethman (1852–1936) was a farmer, trader and politician. In 1890 he was elected to parliament for Umzimkulu and after Union represented the area on the provincial council.

21 According to H C Lugg (quoted in Goetzsche 1972:52) the Qobolwayo warcry originated from the 'hunting song (or chant) of natives living in the Valley of a Thousand Hills'.

22 CSO 2849, Evidence of Magistrate J C C Chadwick to Police Commission, 1904:2.
23 SNA 1/1/340, 1224/1906, Statement by Capt Moe, 30 April 1906. Colonel Bru-de-Wold fully approved such measures (SNA 1/1/340, 1399/06).
24 Colonial Defence Commission 1903:73–75.
26 Colonial Defence Commission 1903:108.
29 Killie Campbell Library, KCM 42219, Diary of Charlotte Moor, September 1899:3, 6.
30 Natal Carbineers Archive, Pietermaritzburg, Harte to his mother, 16 February 1906.
31 Natal Carbineers Archive, Pietermaritzburg, Harte to his mother, 17 February 1906.
32 Natal Carbineers Archive, Pietermaritzburg, Harte to his mother, 23 February 1906.
33 NMR Archive, Regimental Orders 1903–1911.
34 Evidence, Colonial Defence Commission 1903:152.
35 Colonial Defence Commission 1903:46.
36 SNA 1/1/339, 1906/1220 interview between Col McKenzie and Chief Gileni at Ixopo, 5 March 1906.
37 Local History Museum, Durban, E J B Hosking, Mid Illovo stock inspector, to McKenzie, 26 December 1908.
38 His son, E B Foxon, followed close in his father’s footsteps. Also a MC product and accomplished sportsman, he became magistrate of Estcourt in the 1930s. A file on his history in his school’s archives records with pride that he shot dead eight African tax defaulters (‘without missing a shot’) who were part of an impi which attacked him. MC Archive, File ‘Eddie B Foxon’.
39 NC Archive, McKenzie 1906:54.
40 Figures calculated from Paterson 1985:142–146.
41 Described as ‘trader, farmer, soldier, politician’ and ‘genuinely popular Natal sportsman’ he was held to have ‘with no adscititious aids’ risen to ‘superior circumstances’ (Cape Times 1929:477).
44 I have been unable to unearth anything on McKenzie’s exploits in Rhodesia; indeed, detail on Natal volunteers (of whom there were about 60) is very hard to come by. The pioneer column which secured ‘Rhodesia’ for the British South Africa Company in 1890 was made up of fortune seekers, many the sons of South African farmers (Kennedy 1987:13). In the 1896/7 Ndebele Shona risings (the first Chimurenga), Natal volunteers served with imperial forces. J P S Woods, Estcourt farmer and lieutenant colonel in the NC, first saw action in Rhodesia. Duncan is recorded as having fought in Mashonaland in 1897, while his brother, Peter, had a finger shot off in the war. Cape Times [n d]:522–523; Cape Times 1929:537; AGO 20111/1/8, 20CS 815/1896; Local History Museum, Durban, File ‘McKenzie’; Sykes 1972:56, 59; Zimbabwe National Archive, Land Settlement Department, S1107, f426, 19 January 1897; notes from an interview between Nan Slade and Marjory McKenzie (in Nan Slade’s possession). Thanks to Bob Challiss, Ian Phimister, Pip Stigger for assistance on this point.
45 Local History Museum, Durban, File ‘McKenzie’, handwritten note [n d].
46 Shula Marks’s assessment of McKenzie is seldom contested: ‘McKenzie had long been prophesying an African uprising; for him the incident which led to martial law represented a ‘golden
opportunity' to inflict 'the most drastic punishment on all leading natives found guilty of trea-
son', disarming them, and 'instilling a proper respect for the white man'. From the very outset of the disturbances, McKenzie was convinced that only the most drastic punishment would deter the whole African population of Natal from rebelling' (1970:189).

47 SGO 111/1/53 20SG 2675/1884.
48 I/HWK 203/1/2 20R155/1885.
49 CSO 1069 201886/957; SGO 111/1/54 20SG 150/1886.
50 See CAD, JUS 412, 5/95/25. The company was liquidated in 1925 with shareholders losing £40 000. Despite allegations of a swindle, the Department of Justice found nothing irregular. See also Morrell 1986b:523.
51 Local History Museum, Durban, File ‘McKenzie’, newspaper clipping, no details.
52 There is a lot of truth to the story. In the 1910s Duncan McKenzie owned 19 243 acres in the area and was trying to buy more. Commenting on these efforts, the Minister of Lands commented: 'Sir D McKenzie owning so much land there does not seem to be any great necessity to enable him to get more' (CAD, LDEN 397, 3815, Land Board, Natal, notes of meeting 5–6 September 1916).
54 II 1/78, 201624/1895.
55 II 1/78, 1510/1889, protector of immigrants to colonial secretary, 8 May 1889.
56 II 1/121, 12060/1903, note from deputy protector, 7 November 1903.
57 AGO 1/8/145, 20183A/1913, Attorney General, Natal to Secretary of Justice, Pretoria, 5 December 1913.