Theories and practice of “soft power”: Their relevance for China (as a rising power) in its relationship with African states

By

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ABSTRACT

This study emphasizes the role of soft power in China’s relations with Africa. It attempts to explore and interpret China’s role in Africa from Joseph Nye’s perspective of soft power and Realism in general.

China’s foreign policy is ideologically underpinned by nationalism. In the past two decades, it is based on the need to protect its national interest, by expanding trade and diplomatic relations. For this reason, China has expanded economic interest in Africa by means of mutual development and investment, economic cooperation and trade. This has led to the growth of ‘soft’ ties between China and Africa, through the provision of aid and diplomatic cooperation. By using ‘soft power’ as a vehicle to promote the perception of a peaceful rise to power, it also makes a valuable contribution to the Chinese goal of constructing a harmonious world.

Based on the research, the conclusion is that China has achieved impressive gains in its overall level of soft power in Africa, especially in economic and political aspects of its relationship with Africa and less in its cultural penetrations.

Key words: China and Africa, soft power, Joseph Nye, Realism, economic soft power, political soft power
I declare that *Theories and practice of “soft power”: Their relevance for China (as a rising power) in its relationship with African states*

is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

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SIGNATURE     DATE
Ms Farhana Paruk
# TABLE OF CONTENT

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................2
List of Figures .....................................................................................................................................8
List of Abbreviations ..........................................................................................................................9
CHAPTER ONE: .................................................................................................................................12
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................12
1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................12
1.2 Motivation for the study ..................................................................................................................14
1.3 Literature review ...........................................................................................................................16
1.4 Research question ..........................................................................................................................22
1.5 The study’s objectives ...................................................................................................................23
1.6 The theoretical framework ............................................................................................................23
1.7 The limitations of this study ...........................................................................................................24
1.8 Research methodology ..................................................................................................................26
1.8.1 ........................................................................................................................................................26
1.8.2 Interview methodology ...............................................................................................................27
1.8.3 Research conducted at Harvard ................................................................................................30
1.9 Structure of the study ....................................................................................................................30
1.10 Concluding Remarks ..................................................................................................................32
CHAPTER TWO: ................................................................................................................................34
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................34
2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................34
2.2 Realism: National interest as a key component .............................................................................34
2.2.1 Neo-realism ...................................................................................................................................37
2.2.2 National Interests .......................................................................................................................38
2.2.3 Defining power (Realism and Neo-realism) ..............................................................................40
2.2.4 Attribute Power Approach .........................................................................................................43
2.2.5 Relational Power Approach .......................................................................................................44
2.2.6 Structural Power Approach .......................................................................................................45

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List of Figures

Figure 1: Forms of Behavior between Hard Power and Soft Power
Figure 2: African exports to China 2012
Figure 3: China’s Trade Volume (2000-2012)
Figure 4: China’s Total Trade volume April 2011
Figure 5: Structure of China’s imports from African, 2010
Figure 6: China main African trading partners in 2012
Figure 7: China Africa Trade USD 2012-2013
Figure 8: Breakdown of China’s foreign direct investment in Africa
Figure 9: African imports and exports from China by country
Figure 10: China’s imports from Africa
Figure 11: China Exim Bank project cycle
Figure 12: China’s Exim Bank concessional lending agreements- 1995-2007
Figure 13: China’s Foreign Aid to Africa-April 2011
Figure 14: Official development assistance to Afric-2008
Figure 15: Distribution of China’s Foreign Aid
Figure 16: China’s Grand Strategy
Figure 17: Countries in Africa showing interest in Beijing consensus
Figure 18: Freedom House Ratings
Figure 19: Voting in the Security Council from 1980-1989
Figure 20: Voting in the Security Council from 2000-2009
Figure 21: Key Security Council Decisions- 2004-2007
Figure 22: China’s FOCAC 2006, Promises
Figure 23: China’s Influence compared to American influence in Africa
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>CACF</td>
<td>China-Africa Cooperation Forum</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>CNOOC</td>
<td>Chinese National Offshore Oil Company</td>
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<td>CNPC</td>
<td>Chinese National Petroleum Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPAs</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreements</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MNCs</td>
<td>Multi-National Corporations</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>The New Partnership for African Development</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudanese People's Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>SAIIA</td>
<td>South African Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<td>SEZ</td>
<td>Special Economic Zone</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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This has been a very ‘long walk to freedom’. Completing a doctoral degree has been my life time dream. From the time I can remember I wanted to pursue my PhD.

In 2006 I was first introduced to China by a dear friend and colleague. Since then China has become my great passion and love. For the past seven years I have been obsessed with my topic; I have lived it in every aspect of my life.

I have been exceptionally fortunate to have travelled to many different regions of China over the years. I have been to at least 20 provinces, usually invited by the Chinese government or to attend conferences. I would especially like to thank the CAFIU, which have so graciously hosted me on so many occasion, they have contributed tremendously to my better understanding of China and its people. I would also like to thank the various government departments in China for always being willing to assist me with my research and always accommodating me.

In 2007, I was appointed as program researcher to head the China Africa desk at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). This provided me a wonderful opportunity to research China on a full time basis.

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CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The importance of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the world has been steadily growing during the past few decades. China, with a soaring economy as well as an increasingly affluent population, is now the second largest trading nation in the world in GDP terms, only trailing behind the United States of America (USA). China’s economy is entering a new phase, looking outwards and investing in different nations around the world\(^1\). In order to acquire resources and assets for its growing population, Chinese companies have been searching the global stage for new markets and technologies\(^2\).

The point of departure of this study is that China is using soft power to promote its national interest on the global level. This study is therefore not intended to provide evidence to prove that China is using soft power in Africa, but instead it is used as a premise for this study. In this regard three articles written by Joseph Nye can be cited which illustrate that China is indeed using soft power. They are: *The Rise of China’s Soft Power*\(^3\); *Why China Is Weak on Soft Power*\(^4\) and *China’s Soft Power Deficit*\(^5\). Many other quotations and references appear in the chapters that follow which elaborate on this premise. The main purpose of this study is to investigate *how* soft power is used by China in Africa (see especially chapter 5 and 6). In chapter four we examine in detail China’s concept of soft power in general.

In China the concept of soft power has become very fashionable among Chinese political leaders, academics and policy makers. Since Joseph Nye first coined the term in 1990 in his book

Bound to Lead⁶, Chinese leaders have been quick to adopt this concept into their political strategy. Mingjiang Li argues that “the discussion of China’s soft power has been particularly notable. The concept of soft power provides a unique perspective not only on China’s current foreign and security policy but, more significantly on the trajectory of China’s rise in the long term”⁷. National President and the Secretary-General of the Communist Party, Hu Jintao, noted at the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting on 4 January 2006 “that the increase of China’s international status and influence depends both on hard power, such as the economy, science and technology, and defense, as well as on soft power, such as culture”⁸ He reiterated again in the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 the need to build China’s cultural soft power to meet its international and domestic challenges.⁹ Various government organizations, such as the ministries, the State Council Information Office and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conferences (CPPC), are regularly discussing ways for China to exercise its soft power by means of public diplomacy.

Chinese academic works were initially focused on introducing and evaluating the concepts of soft power but later took the discussion one step ahead to develop Nye’s ideas by adapting his concept to suit China’s needs.

As China’s status rises on the global stage, its soft power has become a subject of scholarly scrutiny in recent years. China has moved quickly and made self-conscious efforts to mobilize its soft power resources to promote its interest and cultivate its influence as a rising power. In order to ease growing tensions and anxieties about China’s rise, it has embraced the notion of soft power, as it is compatible with Chinese cultural and political imperatives.

China has come to see soft power as a fundamental component of its comprehensive national power, which includes economic, military and political power. In the words of Tsinghua University’s Professor Yan Xiaetong, “during a period of globalization, the sphere of competition is no longer about land, resources or markets but rule-making, setting regulations,

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⁸Hu Jintao, Report to the 17th Party Congress, October 15, 2007
⁹Hu Jintao, Report to the 17th Party Congress, October 15, 2007
norms. Building soft power is a way to advance China’s domestic and international agenda, to guard Beijing against criticism, and to boost the country’s international standing.10

China’s economic growth and rising prosperity at home has given rise to a greater demand for the world’s resources, as well as the need to develop stronger bilateral relations with different nations. Among the strongest and clearest of these examples are China’s relationships with African states. It will be argued in this study that China’s expansion and penetration into the African continent is mainly through the use of “soft power”. If will become clear later in the study that soft power implies the use of persuasion and attraction rather than coercion.11 Given this, some of the key questions underlying the research in this study will be: is China’s use of soft power succeeding in Africa? If so, how and what are the instruments of soft power that China uses in its bilateral relations? How is soft power used in its political and economic relations with Africa? This research therefore hopes to determine the nature of China’s use of soft power in Africa.

1.2 Motivation for the study

China has been the most successful developing country in the modern era of globalization.12 China was regarded as one of the poorest countries at the beginning of its economic reforms after 1978. Since then its economy has expanded at a steady annual average rate of eight per cent of GDP, which dramatically improved the living standards of ordinary Chinese people.13 According to David Dollar, this “growth rate has fueled historically unprecedented poverty reduction; the share of the population living beneath the World Bank’s cost of basic needs poverty line declined from 60% at the beginning of economic reform in 1978 to 7% in 2007”.14 For Africa's part, Chinese involvement is arguably the most momentous development on the continent since the end of the Cold War. China’s approach to Africa has dramatically changed since the end of the

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10 Hooghe Ingrid, *The limits of China’s soft power in Europe, Beijing’s public diplomacy puzzle*, Netherland Institute of International Relations, page 4, January 2010
Cold War. Authors like Alden argue that after the end of the Cold War and since the mid-1990s, the emergence of “China as a significant political force in Africa has instigated a transformation in the continent's traditional international relations orientation”\(^{15}\). For much of the past “thirty years Africa has been considered as a developmental failure plagued by bad governance, economic decline (macroeconomic instabilities, resource curse), acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), environmental degradation and conflict. Since lately, China's engagement with Africa has turned the attention of the scholar community (among others), and watchers are debating the nature and scope about the Chinese motives in the region”\(^{16}\).

Stephen Marks writes that “China’s relationship with Africa has shifted from Cold War ideology to a more classical pursuit of economic self-interest. But it’s not all negative - as the global economic giant bulges, opportunities also arise for Africa”\(^{17}\).

On the other hand, other writers argue that China’s pursuit of economic self-interest – through its access to raw materials, markets and spheres of influence through investments, trade and military assistance – can be viewed as pursuing the goals of any classical imperialist power.

China’s engagement with Africa commenced as early as 1949 after the victory of Mao’s Communist Party over the Chinese nationalists. During the period from the late-1950s to Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, China played a significant role in Africa’s liberation movements. The 1980s heralded an end to the Sino-African engagement based primarily on ideological or Third World solidarity as Chinese development efforts were diverted inwards in tandem with policies enunciated by Deng Xiaoping. Through the 1990s China increased its aid to African governments on the premise of mutual respect and non-interference in their domestic affairs. Trade between China and Africa expanded rapidly from approximately US$12 million in 1950 to more than US$10 billion during 2000-2003\(^{18}\). By 2013, the *Economist* indicated that


\(^{16}\)Carmody, P., *Globalisation in Africa: Recolonization or Renaissance?*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010, page 1


\(^{18}\)Moyiga, Nduru, *China and Africa in an Ever-Closer Embrace?, Sometimes thornier embrace?* Johannesburg, IPS, 8 December 2004
China has become Africa’s top business partner and trade between the two countries has increased to US$166 billion\textsuperscript{19}.

There is however a depth and complexity to China-African relations that require a much more sophisticated study and analysis. The main motivation for this study is to determine how China is using power – and specifically ‘soft power’ (as conceptualized by Joseph Nye and others) – in its relations with African states to maximize its own self-interest and in the process to enhance its international status as an emerging or rising world power.

Since the 1980s China has displayed a significant rise to power as a result of the opening up process and accelerated economic growth\textsuperscript{20}. Subsequently, China’s interest in Africa has seen a renewed impetus, as is evident in growing relations with the continent in recent developments. This growing Chinese interest in the African continent has led to critical assessments of the nature of China-Africa relations and whether these are mutually beneficial and are based on harmonious principles aimed to forge a new multilateral world order, or, conversely, whether they are based on economic exploitation aimed at fuelling China’s rising power status. Many of the studies on this issue assess mostly ‘hard’ power aspects of China’s expanding influence and therefore neglect a critical element of Chinese foreign policy that may be at the crux of a potential multilateral world order based on South-South cooperation and a greater role for China in international leadership.

1.3 Literature review

In this section an overview is presented of the state of academic research or literature on China’s use of soft power in its relations with African states. It is not presented here as an exhaustive list of all the publications on this topic. The purpose is rather to present an overarching perspective on the existing literature and therefore the literature discussed represents specific themes or


tendencies on our research topic. In the case of theoretical literature on soft power, it is expanded further in Chapter Three.

In the last decade, the literature on China’s soft power in Africa has dominated many scholars in Africa and abroad. The literature review will provide a general overview of the state of literature on China and its use of power as well as its perceptions about soft power and its status as a rising power. The literature review will focus on academic scholars who have already written on soft power in China-African relations. It will provide the reader an indication of the nature of the existing the literature, some of the main tendencies in the literature and therefore also some of the main shortcomings in it. It will also provide an indication of the prominence Africa has already received in this research. It is not the only opportunity to address this topic and in Chapter Three scholarly aspects of soft power are discussed again.

In 1968 George Yu, a leading contributor to China–African research, wrote that “studying China in Africa is much like pursuing a dragon in the bush. The dragon is imposing but the bush is dense”21. This analogy of the dragon operating in the unfamiliar African bush describes China-Africa relations very well.

In July 1961, The Institute of Asian-African Studies was set up following Chairman Mao’s observation that “we don’t have a clear understanding of African history, geography and the present situation”22. There was a marked shift in the quality of the research produced within China, which was affected by political developments within and outside China, as Li Anshan has noted: “African studies in China have been more or less a mystery to Africanists in other parts of the world”23. The earliest and the most comprehensive historical background regarding relations between China and Africa was Philip Snow’s book The Star Raft: China’s Encounter with Africa24. It provided a comprehensive account of historical contacts between the two continents.

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There appeared a limited number of publications on China–Africa relations during the 1990s; Ian Taylor provided probably the earliest study on Taiwanese diplomacy in Africa. Chris Alden’s *China in Africa* is arguably the foremost publication providing serious analysis on the topic. Another significant publication which utilizes the Chinese concept of “soft power is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: The politics of human research development” edited by Li Anshan and Funeka Yazini April.

Taylor’s *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise* and *China in Africa: Mercantilist predator or partner in development?* edited by Garth le Pere as well as Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong’s analysis provide critical interventions of China’s links with Africa. A special edition of the *South African Journal for International Affairs* and *African Perspectives on China in Africa*, provides a diverse range of views.

Trade and resource publications have increased and have focus primarily on resource extraction which is the driving force behind China’s current engagement in Africa. However

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the contentious subject of governance issues regarding China and Africa has not yet received much academic attention\textsuperscript{34}.

Literature on the relationship between South Africa and China is more extensive than in the case of other African countries. This is expected, given China’s importance and interest in South Africa. Garth le Pere and Garth Shelton (see for example, \textit{China, Africa and South Africa}) are regarded as notable South African scholars on China and South African relations\textsuperscript{35}.

With regard to the long and short-term impact of China’s engagement in Africa, two contrasting views are presented. Authors like Alden argue that “Africa without Europeans” broaches the possibility of transformative impact whereas authors like Clapham argue that China’s intervention is unlikely to change Africa fundamentally\textsuperscript{36}.

The literature on soft power has gained much interest and momentum in China and among scholars. Mingjiang Li’s survey of Chinese articles published in Chinese journals and periodicals is kept in a vast database called the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). It was found that the annual number of articles with references to "soft power” averaged about eight during 1994-2000\textsuperscript{37}. This number increased to 53 during 2000-2004, and continued to increase to 314 during 2005-2007\textsuperscript{38}. During this period, the senior Chinese leadership, including President Hu Jintao and Chairman of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference, Jia Qinglin, stressed in several meetings that China should strive for its soft power\textsuperscript{39}. In \textit{The Dragon’s Hidden Wings}, Ding argues that the popularity of soft power as a concept could be traced to China’s need to fend off the ”China threat” argument (discussed in Chapter 6) and to assure the world about the peaceful nature of a rising China. Chinese scholars also believe that soft power is embedded in

\textsuperscript{36} Alden, Christopher, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, \textit{China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace}, C. Hurst, 2008
\textsuperscript{37} Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu, \textit{China’s Soft Power and International Relations}, Routledge, 2012, page 2
Chinese traditional ideology\textsuperscript{40}. The popularity of soft power in China, and China’s efforts to aggressively cultivate soft power has dominated scholarly debate. One of the best known authors on China’s soft power is Joshua Kurlantzick who has written several books and articles on it. He emphasizes that China uses soft power by attracting African elites and it is gaining popularity in Africa. Similarly, Kurlantzick, Zhu and Wibowo have also written extensively on China’s soft power manifestations in Africa.

The mainstream literature on China’s soft power focuses on its popularity in China and the major tools China uses to cultivate soft power and strengthen its image abroad. This literature largely follows what Mingjiang Li called the “behavioral approach” of soft power, which focuses on the soft use of power.

The notion of soft power is very popular in China but because it is meant to support its rise as a major power in the future, the question is whether it will not constitute a contradiction: that it uses power to be attractive but ultimately its international power can become a threat for others. These arguments from different perspectives are presented by scholars. In addition to reviewing the literature on soft power, it will therefore also be useful to look at some of the literature on China’s rise as a major power.

Since the early 1990s scholars, policy makers, governments and key business leaders began questioning China’s new role as a rising power in the international domain. Andrew J Nathan and Robert Ross explained in their book \textit{China’s New Foreign Policy Strategy: The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress} that the rising China will not necessary become a threat\textsuperscript{41}. At the time of writing their book in 1997 their view was that China has not yet sufficiently demonstrated its real intentions and that its economy needs time to be integrated into the world system. On the other hand, more critical authors like Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, in their book \textit{The Coming Conflict with China}, published also in 1997, predicted an inevitable conflict with Asia and even more so with the United States\textsuperscript{42}. They foresaw an “inevitable conflict between an expansionist China that views itself as the rightful arbiter of power in Asia and a naïve and unprepared United


\textsuperscript{42} Bernstein, Richard and Ross H. Munro, \textit{The Coming Conflict with China}, New York, A.A Knopf, 1997
States that has already entered three wars in the last half century to prevent any single country’s domination”\(^\text{43}\).

Some commentators argued for the past decade that China will become a superpower of unprecedented proportions\(^\text{44}\), while others suggest that “an economically strong China would become bolder, more demanding and less likely to cooperate with other major powers in the region”\(^\text{45}\). Some also claim that China will become a hegemonic power in East Asia. Engaging China: the Management of an Emerging Power by Alastair Iain Johnson and Robert S. Ross provides a comprehensive and provocative analysis of China’s rise within the region. Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis have authored a thoughtful study of China’s grand strategy that looks at the security implications of China’s rise. They argued that “an assertive China is likely to appear over the long haul”\(^\text{46}\). Avery Goldstein adopted a more theoretical approach by looking at the applicability of various international relations theories to different aspects of China’s rise and integration into the international order\(^\text{47}\). Numerous articles published on China’s rise focus on China’s elite perception and military capabilities. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang focus on the internal variables that shape China’s behavior in the international arena\(^\text{48}\).

In examining China’s rise, authors like Alastair Johnson and Robert Ross have posed the question - what implications do the growth of Chinese power have for peace and stability in the international system? They addressed this question by providing an in-depth analysis of China’s foreign policy.

In a book published in 2006 titled New Dimensions in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy\(^\text{49}\) they explored rising China’s foreign policy from multiple dimensions, including different research agendas, diverse methodologies and research materials. They argued that the rising

\[\begin{align*}
43 & \text{Bernstein, Richard and Ross H. Munro, \textit{The Coming Conflict with China}, New York, A.A Knopf, 1997, page 45} \\
44 & \text{Brown, Michael E, Owen R. Cote, Sean M Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. \textit{The Rise of China}, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2000} \\
48 & \text{Deng Yong and Fei-ling Wang. \textit{In the Eyes of the Dragon: China View and the World}, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 1999} \\
49 & \text{Johnson, Alastair Iain and Robert S. Ross, eds. \textit{New Dimensions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy}, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2006}
\end{align*}\]
China may not be a stabilizing force in East Asia. Conversely, other authors like David C. Kang’s *China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia* argued that China’s rise from its neighboring countries can be a stabilize factor in the region both politically and economically\(^50\).

David Lampton’s *Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money and Minds* looks at the military, economic and intellectual aspects of China’s rising power\(^51\). Other examples of authors who have addressed the issues of Chinese foreign policy include: Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang’s *China Rising: Power and Motivation in the Chinese Foreign Policy*\(^52\); Sujian Guo’s *China’s Peaceful Rise in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions*\(^53\); and Sujian Guo and Shiping Hua’s *New Dimensions of Foreign Policy*\(^54\).

Most of these authors are of the view that China possesses significant power resources that can be mobilized to pursue the country’s national interest. A key question raised by many of them is however whether China will become a responsible power in the twenty-first century?

Despite increased research on China’s soft power and rising power status, as presented above, the existing literature on it is still limited and under-researched, and from the discussion it should be apparent that it is the case particularly in regard to China’s use of soft power in Africa. This conclusion serves as an additional justification for this research project.

### 1.4 Research question

The main focus of this study is to analyze the concepts of “power” and “soft power” in the context of China and Africa. It is based on two assumptions: The first is that China aspires to become a ‘world power’ and it raises the issue of the nature of that power. Secondly, as a rising world power, its relationship with African states is based on a diverse use of that power to achieve its objectives. The research question therefore arising is:


\(^{52}\) Deng Yong and Fei-ling Wang, eds. *Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy*, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2004


~ 22 ~
In its relationship with African states, how does China use soft power to promote its national interest? What is the nature of that soft power and does it also affect our theoretical understanding of soft power?

1.5 The study’s objectives

Following from the research question the purpose of this study is to achieve the following two objectives:

1. To determine the salient features of ‘soft power’ and their application in Chinese relations with African states. Moreover, to determine China’s perception of what "soft power" is and how it can be used in Africa.

2. To test the theories of ‘soft power’ in the process of their application to Chinese relations in Africa. Based on the preparatory research for this study it is assumed that the Chinese application of soft power can be divided into two main areas: the political and economic aspects of soft power.

1.6 The theoretical framework

The theoretical approach at this study is grounded in the traditions of International Relations (IR) and Global Political Economy (GPE). China’s involvement in Africa will therefore be explained from a Realist perspective an International Relations, since it emphasises the different dimensions of power and therefore can explain China’s stance towards Africa in terms of soft power. In discussing Political Economy, the theory of Economic Nationalism is most apt for analysing China’s economic involvement in Africa. Chapter Three is dedicated to develop this theoretical framework in more detail. In this section only a few introductory remarks are made, mainly about Realism and Economic Nationalism. In Chapter Three ‘soft power’ as a theoretical concept for this study is explained.
According to Hans Morgenthau as one of the pioneers of Realism, the main aim of states within the global system is to pursue their national interests “defined in terms of power”\textsuperscript{55}. In order to build power and gain an advantage in the balance of power equation, states are inherently self-centered entities. Morgenthau believed that the national interest is defined within the ‘political and cultural context’ of foreign policy formulation\textsuperscript{56}. Therefore, power and its use will depend on the current political and cultural context.

China’s foreign policy can therefore be viewed “as responsive to the changing dynamics of the international environment”\textsuperscript{57}. For example, ‘energy security’ is seen as a strategic national objective for powerful states and therefore is an economic articulation of Realism which can be aligned with Economic Nationalism in theoretical terms.

1.7 The limitations of this study

Studies of Chinese politics and economics are numerous and vast in their focus areas. This study forms part of that corpus of literature but must be demarcated so that the reader does not have unrealistic expectations. The first limitation of this study is that the analysis uses mainly qualitative methods. Due to the nature of the topic, namely the role of soft power, it is difficult to measure it in qualitative terms. The concepts of soft power are not easily quantifiable and even its main protagonist, Joseph Nye, have not made any attempt to quantify it. The qualitative nature of this research excludes any additional value that could be gained from quantitative data, and opens the analysis to subjective interpretations and normative deductions on the part of the researcher.

The second limitation is related to the focus of the study and, more specifically, to the necessity to contain the topic within a practical framework. Firstly, the scope of the study is bound by the specific theories underpinning the analysis and the selection of cases is made in accordance with

\textsuperscript{57}Zhao Quansheng, \textit{Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy}, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1996, page 12
expected outcomes. The case selection is done in an attempt to derive general trends based on comparisons. It provides an overview of what the researcher understands as China-Africa relations and might therefore inherently lack empirical depth and precision. The timeframe of the study is also limited to the period from 1990 to 2012.

A major challenge in conducting this research from an empirical point of view is the lack of reliable data on both traditional and non-traditional types of Chinese investment in Africa. The Chinese central government departments’ trade statistics may be biased or inaccurate and therefore some of the data maybe unreliable. Every effort has been made to cross-check it for accuracy and consistency during interviews and when obtaining data, but they are still limited in their accuracy, especially those that depend on statistics from African states.

This is often true for private Chinese companies and Chinese SOEs, which receive funding from a number of Chinese investment banks with close connections to the Chinese government. Data on these subjects is usually drawn from third-party sources engaged in monitoring activities, which may not capture the full scale of Chinese activity, or may suffer from reporting bias. This is equally true when obtaining any information from African countries. In many cases any data maintained by African governments is generally unreliable and not up to date. However, every effort was made by combining and comparing information from several sources to ensure accuracy.

Another limitation to this research was the magnitude of the task of covering 53 African countries. African countries are not homogenous and in fact are very different in their political, economic, social and historical background and therefore this made the task difficult. This study is therefore not about with each of the African states but is a continental perspective with some comparative elements. It does not pretend to represent an analysis of each of the African states. It should also be made clear that the study is approached from the Chinese perspective and not the perspective of the African states. In that sense it is limited to only one side of the power relationship.
1.8 Research methodology

In this study the concept of China’s soft/hard power will be analyzed in order to develop a deeper understanding how China uses soft power in its foreign policy towards African states. The method used in this study is primarily analytical and explanatory, and provides a detailed account of China’s political and economic involvement in Africa. The methodology consists of the following components:

1.8.1 Qualitative approach

This study uses a qualitative approach and not an empirical, quantitative one which means that the sources of information are mainly in published form or derived from interviews. It does not include statistical analyses or manipulation of empirical data, survey analysis or mathematical modeling. It is based on sources like scholarly research work published in academic journals, books, and publications from Chinese and Western think tanks and research institutes. In addition, the research relies also on official documents and reports of Chinese origin and by other official bodies (including Chinese documents like the White Paper on China's African Policy). The Chinese and Western media were also consulted, including web-based publications. The method applied in this respect was a literature analysis of the published information and a qualitative content analysis of the interviews. The literature and official documentation included several types of information, ranging from empirical statistics to theoretical analyses in international relations and history.

The qualitative approach in this study is primarily comparative in nature. The comparisons are a combination of longitudinal (i.e. comparisons over time) and cross-sectional (i.e. amongst states at the same point in time) approaches. The comparisons are sometimes amongst focused case studies and in other instances a comparison of the statistical data of a number of states.

One possible method for this study was to concentrate on one or more case studies based on the premise that they will be representative of African states in general. It is, however, almost
impossible to identify a small number of cases that will be representative of the entire Africa. In the absence of representative cases any of the conclusions of a case study will only apply to that case and cannot be generalized about. Therefore the comparative approach instead of case studies was chosen.

The qualitative method of content analysis is used in the study. It is primarily in the form of logical interpretation of texts (including interview texts) and does not include codifying core concepts or phrases in texts for the purpose of empirical analysis.

1.8.2 Interview methodology

The methodology regarding interviews involved the following:

1. Selection of interviewees:

All the interviewees were experts in one or more aspects of the research topic. An important contribution to this research is the wide range of personal expert-based (or key informant) interviews designed for qualitative information analysis and conducted over a period of seven years (from 2007 to 2013).

During this study’s proposal stage 23 interviewees were initially identified based on their direct relevance for the research topic. The selection was based on persons identified as relevant during the literature review or the researcher’s work experience on China at the Institute of Security Studies and in other capacities. Interviewees were selected from various disciplines and sectors such as academics, think tanks, senior government officials, the diplomatic corps, and private sector. Snow-balling methods were also used in the sense that some of the interviewees referred the researcher to other experts.

The interviews were conducted in the USA, China and South Africa. During my seven visits to China I had the privilege to interview several senior government officials, senior academics, policy makers, researchers from think tanks, leaders from the business community and diplomats posted in Beijing and in Africa.
The selection of interviewees was never intended to constitute a representative sample of a larger population. It was also never intended to constitute a survey with generalized conclusions. It was confined to the notion of “elite interviewing”\textsuperscript{58} which could produce unique, qualitative information.

2. Format of the interviews:

Interviews can be based on either a well-prepared structured format, or a semi-structured format or even an unstructured format. The structured format means that the same questions are put to all the interviewees or respondents. Such a format is very useful for comparative purposes. If the questions are a closed set of options and not open-ended questions, then they are also useful as surveys which can be presented in the form of statistical data. Semi-structured interviews are a combination of the structured format and questions designed specifically for each respondent. The structured parts are useful for quantitative analysis while the unstructured parts are more appropriate for qualitative analysis, except if codified content analysis is done.

An unstructured format is used if each respondent or interviewee has unique information available which constitutes a source in itself and is not regarded as merely one opinion amongst many. The interview is then designed to discover the unique information with specifically-targeted questions. According to Manheim & Rich, such a format suits elite interviewing\textsuperscript{59}:

In this context, people are referred to as \textit{elite} if they have knowledge which, for the purposes of a given research project, requires that they be given individualized treatment in an interview. Their elite status depends not on their role in society but on their access to information that can help answer a given research question, though people who get elite treatment in research are often persons of political, social, or economic importance.

Most of the interviews for this study were conducted in an unstructured manner in order for the questions to be flexible and responsive to the course taken by the interview while the interviewee was able to speak freely and respond to open-ended questions. The unstructured interviews were designed for their specific expertise and access to information. The questions were therefore not


meant to be an empirical source of information to be used for comparative purposes or
representing any specific categories of persons or the views of specific types of organizations or
institutions. These interviews were recorded and transcribed; furthermore, notes were taken
during the interview process. These formed the textual source of the interview.

For ethical reasons all the interviews were conducted with the clear understanding that they were
not confidential (or ‘off-the-record’) and that the interviewed person understood that it would be
used for this research.

3. Interpretation and use of interview information:

The interviews were transcribed and therefore became a “text” for the researcher. The
interviewee provided the context of the text, in particular the person’s institutional or political
position justified his/her authority to make observations or statements about a particular matter.
Therefore they cannot be treated as equal in value and some information weighs more than
others. Manheim & Rich made the following observation about it60:

… never treat what interviewees say as factual data, but rather treat the fact that they said
it as data. In understanding political behavior it is often as important to know what
people believe or claim to be true as it is to know what is true.

The ideal is that information gained through an interview should be verified by information from
other types of sources and vice versa. It is however not always possible, because some
information can be unique and is not available in any other form. Interview information is not
necessarily less reliable or “objective” than other forms of published information. A limitation on
interview information, however, can be if an interviewee’s memory is not any more reliable.
Most of the information gained from interviews for this study is however relatively current in
nature; some of it is also about interpretation or opinions and therefore does not rely exclusively
on correct historical “facts”.

In this study the interviews were treated as important sources of information similar to the other
sources. Their texts were analyzed by means of content analysis and were, where possible,

60 Manheim, Jarol B. & Rich, Richard C., Empirical political analysis: Research methods in Political Science,
integrated with the literature analyses of the other published sources. In some instances the interviews were independent and could not be complemented by other sources. In other instances a form of cross-referencing was possible.

1.8.3 Research conducted at Harvard

In 2008/2009 the researcher was awarded a Harvard-South African fellowship and thereby was given the opportunity to pursue pre-doctoral studies at Harvard University. The researcher was able to utilize the facilities of the well-known Harvard China Centre which provided assess to a unique source of unpublished reports and archival material which contributed to a deeper understanding of the subject matter. Access to other well renowned resource centers like the Harvard–Yenching Library, Harvard University’s Asia Center, the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and its H.C. Fung library, provided me with primary and secondary sources that are often not available in Africa or South Africa. Several interviews were also conducted with leading academics and China experts in Washington, DC and at Harvard University.

The research at Harvard utilized both the qualitative and interviews methods. The rich collection of resources there included the latest statistics on China provided by the IMF and World Bank, UNDP, and the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). These relatively new statistics and information on Sino-Africa economic affairs provided a clear track on the extent of imports, exports, investment figures and aid contributions between China and Africa.

1.9 Structure of the study

This thesis consists of seven chapters. The study focuses on China’s influence in Africa and for that purpose it is divided into the following chapters:
**Chapter One** introduced the rationale for this study, its research objectives, the problem statement, the research methodology and an introduction to the theoretical framework that will be used in this study.

**Chapter Two** provides a historical background to the relationship between China and Africa. Most of the focus is on the period from 1949 to 2000. This background is not presented as a history of China but instead identifies some of the most salient historical aspects for understanding China’s current use of soft power in Africa.

**Chapter Three** provides the theoretical perspective of this study, by observing China’s rise from different perspectives, including the Realist perspective and comparing it with other international relations perspectives like classical power analyses focusing on soft/hard power (coercive use of national power in international relations) and its related power resources. Finally, we present Joseph Nye’s theoretical view of soft power.

**Chapter Four** traces China’s application of soft power in general and not only in Africa. Although it is Nye who first coined the term ”soft power”, the idea of soft power has always been embedded not only in recent Chinese foreign strategies, but also in ancient Chinese ideology and culture. This chapter reexamines it in more detail and describes soft power from the Chinese perspective.

**Chapter Five** analyzes how China has used economic soft power in its relations with African countries, in various sectors like trade and foreign aid. A number of case studies are used to support the findings.

**Chapter Six** examines China’s political soft power in Africa. This chapter focuses on China’s political diplomatic skills in persuading African countries to become strategic partners by signing several treaties and agreements that may have led to increased cooperation or stronger ties between Beijing and African countries. Additionally, this chapter includes an analysis of how the issue of Taiwan plays a role in the relationship between China and Africa through Beijing’s pursuit of the One-China Policy. This chapter also analyzes the frequency of meetings between high-level cabinet Ministers and Head of States and how this has cemented stronger relations between countries; and finally

~ 31 ~
Chapter Seven the conclusion, presents the findings of this research. The chapter provides an overall answer to the questions posed in this research, namely: In its relationship with African states, how does China use soft power to promote its national interest? What is the nature of that soft power and does it also affect our theoretical understanding of soft power? It concludes with an analysis of and several final thoughts on the direction of Sino-Africa relations and where they may be possibly heading in the near future.

1.10 Concluding Remarks

As mentioned earlier Realism is the theoretical point of departure of this study and Realist theorists argue that a rising power has a high potential to disturb the balance of power in a particular context, which can possibly lead to conflict. According to Realist scholars, emerging great powers often resort to ‘force’ (war, military actions) to change the status quo in accordance with its own national interests. On the other hand, existing powers feel threatened by such action and therefore are normally determined to preserve their status within the international arena. Some theorists differ by stating that economically developed world is the area for “complex interdependence” among states. These complex interdependencies can sometimes promote cooperation. From this point of view it can be argued that China is becoming increasingly integrated into the larger capitalist system and globally more interdependent on other states. They argue that therefore China cannot be defined as a revisionist power that wants to radically change the current international balance of power. They further argue that China’s reforms have increasingly changed its foreign policy from communist Maoism to a reformist policy.

This literature review has presented different perspectives on China’s power perceptions and their possible implications. Though it presented a rich tradition of publications on China’s use of soft power, Africa as a region is not particularly well represented in it. Earlier it was already mentioned how prominent China is becoming on the African continent but it is not yet reflected in the scope and magnitude of research studies done on its use of different forms of power to achieve it. Even in more specific terms this literature review concludes that soft power in its existing theoretical form and in the way China utilizes it in relation to African states has not yet
received sufficient research attention. It therefore provides a justification in its own right for such a study to be conducted.
CHAPTER TWO:

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

2.1. Introduction

The rise of China has become the focus of attention because of its rapid economic growth and active diplomacy in world affairs. This chapter seeks to establish a theoretical and conceptual framework for an analysis of China’s rise to such prominence based on its relationship with African states. For that reason it will use a theoretical and empirical connection between Nye’s soft power concept and China’s rise in relation to Africa.

Based on the above research question of this study in Chapter 1, which includes assumptions about China’s power, an investigation into the driving forces for China’s involvement in Africa will require theoretical tools that deal with a range of dimensions about power, the use of different forms of power to promote its interests, and the prominence of national interest as a concept in China’s foreign policies and relations. It is unrealistic to expect that one set of theoretical propositions will suffice for this study and therefore a combination of them is presented here. The first of them is Realism which is historically the theoretical tradition in International Relations most associated with the concept of power. Economic nationalism is another theoretical tool of analysis to understand China’s rise. Finally, I shall draw from Joseph Nye’s theory of soft power in order to understand China’s use of soft power in Africa.

2.2 Realism: National interest as a key component

Realism provides the most appropriate analysis to understanding power and hence the notions of on ‘soft power’.$^{61}$

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$^{56}$Carr, E.H., The Twenty Years Crisis, New York, Harper & Row, 1964, page 24
From the early 1930s to the twenty first century leading political scientists, international relations theorists and policy makers have given prominence to the Realist view of understanding the world. According to the historian E.H Carr, the starting point to understanding international relations was to believe that inherently human beings and countries will be in a constant state of conflict. However, there are imbalances where certain people and some countries are better off than others.\textsuperscript{62} But countries and human beings will always, as a first priority, defend and preserve their privileged position. The less privileged or the “have-nots” will constantly want to better their situation.

In describing ‘essential Realism’, Dunne and Schmidt put forward three elements common to all Realist works: ‘statism, survival, self-help’.\textsuperscript{63} This makes the state the key unit of focus and analysis. Although the state, which has monopoly on legitimate violence, provides for the security of its inhabitants, internationally the absence of an over-arching body leads to a void that forces states to compete with each other. Ultimately, this is a competition between states for their survival which is necessary before they can carry out their other responsibilities.\textsuperscript{64} Through self-help, state at a global level can achieve security, but uncertainty about states intentions can turn security capabilities into perceived threats. For many Realists, a balance of power is necessary for stability.

Jackson and Sorensen described the key elements of Realism as ‘a pessimistic view of human nature’; a view that international relations are fraught with conflict, ‘ultimately resolved by war’; with priority going to ‘national security and state survival’; and scepticism of the possibility of

progress.\textsuperscript{65} Levy noted that Realist leaders focus on the short term and ‘adopt worst case thinking’\textsuperscript{66}.

Realism can be classified in from classical realism, through modern Realism to neo- or structural realism, which includes a number of branches, among them defensive and offensive realism\textsuperscript{67}. A sketch of the development of Realism should help anchor it in the broad streams of IR thinking overall and help us in our later reconsideration of ‘soft power’.

International relations viewed through the prism of Realist theory are essentially about how inter-state relationships are used to maximize states’ national interests and desires. Another element of Realism is that the state is regarded as the key actor in international relations and its only priority is to ensure the survival of the state by maximizing its power. Self-help is also another important tenet of Realism.

One of the most significant Realist theorists was Hans Morgenthau, who brought the theory to the United States. His book \textit{Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and peace}, first published in 1948, dominated the studies of international politics for two generations.

Morgenthau’s point of departure was that human nature is the base of international relations and humans are self-interested and power-seeking, resulting in ultimate aggression. Therefore the international system causes states to become self-interested entities, with the aim of building power and gaining and maintaining an advantage in terms of the balance of power. It was Morgenthau’s belief that national interest must be situated within the ‘political and cultural

context’ of foreign policy. It therefore means that power and how it is utilized is dependent on the current political milieu. Consequently, China’s foreign relations policy and conduct “are seen as responsive to the changing dynamics of the international environment”

The rise of fascism in the 1930s in Europe is highly debated and challenged and influenced the theoretical assumptions of Realism about human nature in very important ways. The same applies to Hannah Arendt’s notion of totalitarianism. Einstein believed that the “human lust for hatred and destruction is intrinsically in all humans” Freud corroborated with this view that such an “aggressive impulse did indeed exist, and he remained deeply skeptical about the possibilities for taming it”.

A second departure point for Realism is its focus on the struggle for power - “the ultimate aim of international politics, power, is always the immediate aim”. According to Morgenthau, international relations are essentially a struggle for power and for survival, justified by promotion of a state’s national interest. The quest for power certainly characterized the foreign policies of Germany, Italy and Japan in the 1930s; it also characterized much of the Cold War and it still today characterizes many states’ international behavior.

2.2.1 Neo-realism

Kenneth Waltz broke new ground in his book *Theory of International Politics* which illustrated a different Realist theory inspired by the scientific ambitions of behaviorism. His theory is often referred to as ‘Neo-realist’. Waltz departs from classical Realism in showing no interest in the

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ethics of statecraft or the moral dilemmas of foreign policy - which are emphasized in the Realist writings of Morgenthau.\textsuperscript{73}

Waltz points out that the balance of power and security concerns are the main Realist analytical tools. There is special focus on great powers as they have the most influence on the international stage. Waltz specifically refers to the period after the Second World War which was dominated by two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. This bi-polar system, he predicted then, would tend to balance each other. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States naturally became the dominating power. However his ‘balance of power theory’ implies that other countries will attempt to neutralize the more powerful country by trying to establish a balance with it - in this case the USA. Furthermore, the smaller and weaker states will tend to align themselves with great powers in order to preserve their maximum autonomy. In arguing this, Waltz departs from the classical Realist argument that human nature is only about self-interest and is manifested by recurring conflicts, rivalries and wars. According to Waltz “states are power-seeking security-conscious not because of human nature but rather because the structure of the international system compels them to be that way.”\textsuperscript{74}

The main differences between classical Realism and Neo-realism is that classical Realists situate the basis of international conflicts (war) in the inhumanity of man while Neo-realists believe that its roots are to be found in an anarchic international system.

2.2.2 National Interests

Realism and its variations share the notion that states are primarily concerned with promoting their national interests in their relations with other states. One of the most important means of promoting national interest is to maximise their power on the international level.


\textsuperscript{74}Jackson, Robert and Sorensen Georg, Introduction to International Relations, Theories and approaches, Oxford University Press, 2003, page 51
The national interest can be defined as things that satisfy the material and spiritual needs of a nation. It includes economic, military, and cultural interests. The primary national interest is the state's survival and security. The pursuit of wealth and economic development and prosperity are also important national interests. Many states (especially in modern times) regard the preservation of the nation's culture as of great importance.

National interest can be divided into core national interest, important national interest and ordinary national interest. Core national interest is the interest that concerns the existence of a nation and is usually not compromised. Important national interest refers to the interest that is important for national survival. For example, the Chinese government regards Taiwan as a core national interest.

National interest can also be categorized into short-term, mid-term and long-term national interest. National interest is usually viewed as the basis of the foreign policy and international activities of a nation.

Realists define national interest in terms of power and tend to view national interest from the domestic aspect. Morgenthau believes that national interest should include three aspects: territorial integrity, sovereignty and cultural integrity. Within it, the most essential national interest is the problem of national existence. Liberals define national interest more as economic interest and believe that the different nations can have common interests. Keohane put forward three kinds of national interest: existence, independence and economic wealth. Both Realists and Liberals’ national interest concept absolutely reflects a materialist ontology. However, constructivists believe that national interest is decided by national identity, with the implication that a change of national identity, results in national interest also changing. According to

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~ 39 ~
Wendt, different people within one nation will have different perceptions on national interest, for example national existence, independence and economic wealth\textsuperscript{79}.

\textbf{2.2.3 Defining power (Realism and Neo-realism)}

The most basic question asked in every work on power analysis and therefore also in Realism is: What is power? Power has been traditionally defined as the ability to realize wishes and to produce the effects one wants to produce. For example in Bertrand Russell’s theory of social power, power was simply defined as “the production of intended effects”\textsuperscript{80}. Max Weber offered this definition: ”Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests”\textsuperscript{81}. The discussion here is not intended to be an exhaustive treatise on power, because ultimately for the purpose of this study only very specific notions of power (mainly ‘soft power’) will be concentrated on, but a general and brief introduction is required.

According to John Mearsheimer the first orthodox view of power is defined within a Realist paradigm: “realists believe that state behavior is largely shaped by the material structure of the international system”\textsuperscript{82}. However this definition of Mearsheimer misrepresents Morgenthau’s view of power - because he believes that “power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the power of man over man…..from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one minds controls another”\textsuperscript{83}. It is evident from the literature that classical Realism and Neo-realism view power in very opposing ways. Classical Realism emphasizes human nature as the basis of international relations while Neo-realism concentrates on the anarchic international system\textsuperscript{84}.

\textsuperscript{79}Baylis, John and Smith Steven, \textit{The Globalization of World Politics, An introduction to International Relations}, Oxford University Press, 1997. page 120
\textsuperscript{84}Brown, C with Ainley, K, \textit{Understanding International Relations}, London, Palgrave, 2005 page 92
Morgenthau’s classical Realism is based on a fixed and universalistic account of human nature (as articulated by Thomas Hobbes or Machiavelli). Realism makes the point that “politics, like society in general is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature”\textsuperscript{85}. According to Morgenthau, “the struggle for power at the international level is largely the result of animus dominant; the political man’s urge to dominate others, a concept influenced by Nietzsche’s metaphysics on the will to power”\textsuperscript{86}. However, Morgenthau moves beyond just looking at human nature when he regards the “state as a collective reflection of political man’s lust for power and the unit which carries out its impulses at the international stage”\textsuperscript{87}. In Morgenthau’s theory the state is the central object and the agent pursuing power in international affairs. The Maslow hierarchic order is used in support of it, because it accepts that the pursuit of power (as a survival need) is important; hence the desire to dominate others. It is also the motivating factor in states behavior which occurs as long as the international system remains anarchic.

For Morgenthau, an important aspect of power resides in the armed forces, but even more important is a nation’s character, morale and quality of governance\textsuperscript{88}. This is further elaborated when he states that “power….tends to be equated with material strength, especially of military nature, I have stressed more than before its immaterial aspects”\textsuperscript{89}. Waltz provides a narrower definition of power or capabilities than Morgenthau, which includes the “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence”\textsuperscript{90}. Waltz’s emphasis on materialism is due to his commitment to ‘scientific’ realism. Consequently, he limits his definition to mainly tangible variables which are easier to qualify.

\textsuperscript{86}Peterson, U, Breathing Nietzsche’s Air, New Reflections on Morgenthau’s Concept of Power and Human Nature. Alternatives, 24, 1999, page 83-113
\textsuperscript{90}Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, New York, McGraw-Hill,1979, page 131

~ 41 ~
‘Rising powers’ or new emerging powers like China have always been regarded as a threat by status quo powers. Power is conceptually relational in nature and therefore a ‘rising power’ is emerging in relation to other powerful states. In order to understand the relational dimension of the concept of ‘rising power’ one needs to look beyond the Realism family for answers to the question: “what is power?” Beyond the realm of International Relations power has been traditionally defined in Political Science “as the ability to realize wishes and produce the effects one wants to produce”\(^91\). Robert A. Dahl views power as “A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do what he would not otherwise do”\(^92\). According to Dahl, power is exercised in order to cause those who are subject to it to follow the private preference of those who possess power. Other political theorists like Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz believe that a “power relationship should include a second face – A has power to prevent B from doing what he wants to do”\(^93\).

In Steven Luke’s book, *Power: A Radical View* he argues that power needs to be looked at from a multidimensional basis. He argues that “the exercise of power is one in which A affects B in a significant manner contrary to B’s interest and this is applicable to both individuals and collectives”\(^94\). The first dimension is the ability of A to change the behavior of B; the second is when A is able to define the agenda and thereby preventing B from expressing her/his interest in the decision–making process; and lastly when A determines what a grievance is and creates the perception that B acknowledges that he/she does not have any significant grievances\(^95\). Luke believes that the most effective type of power is the ability to influence and manage people’s thoughts and desires so as to preempt future conflict. This aspect of power can be viewed in the processes of socialization and control of information and the control of mass media.

\(^93\) achrach Peter and Morton Baratz, Two Faces of Power. *American Political Science Review*, vol 57, no 4, 1962, page 947-52
There are two basic distinctions that can be drawn between behavioral power - the ability to obtain the outcomes one desires - and resource power - the possession of certain resources associated with the ability to reach the outcomes one wants. During the past decades, several interpretations have been conceived about power. It is seen as either the attributes of the state, the attributes of relations among states or the structure of the international system. Each of these is represented in a conceptual school of thought on power in the field of international relations. These schools are complementary to the different approaches already discussed but emphasize different aspects of power.

We will discuss three traditional approaches (attribute power, relational power and structural power) in the conceptualization of power. These approaches can be useful to determine the nature and extent of China’s power.

2.2.4 Attribute Power Approach

The first conceptual approach to understanding power is commonly held to be determined by the properties attributed to the state and this is called the attribute ‘power approach’. This is central to the idea of the balance of power between states and alliances. Based on this approach, power resides “in the aggregate capabilities of the state relative to others and can be measured by some inventory of state attributes. It is a basic power conversion model that presumes the ability to translate underlying capabilities into effective influence or compliance through the imposition of costs or conferring of benefits on the opponent or the threat or promise to do so”96. This view was further developed and expanded by Hans Morgenthau who believed that power was not only an immediate aim but also a means to the nation’s end. Morgenthau vehemently argued that international relations are the struggle for continuous power and all nations strive to realize their goals by means of attaining the ultimate power. He defined power as “man’s control over the minds and action of other men, and political power as the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and people at large”97. He also distinguished

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~ 43 ~
two elements of power: relatively stable elements and those subject to constant change in determining the power of nations. The first concept of relatively stable factors includes geography and natural resources (food and raw material). The second idea of constant change includes industrial capacity, military preparedness (technology, leadership, and quality of armed forces), population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and the quality of government\textsuperscript{98}.

2.2.5 Relational Power Approach

The second approach argues that power is embedded in the relations between actors; this is called the relational power approach. The concepts of ‘global power’, ‘superpower’, ‘regional power’ or ‘rising powers’ all assume an element of comparison with other states, and therefore power is determined in relation to other states. This approach adopts the view that power is not limited to the properties that inhere in the state actors but include resources that emerge from all kinds of exchanges between actors. Robert Kahl suggests “that power terms in modern social science refer to subsets of relations among social units such that the behaviors of one or more units … depend in some circumstances on the behavior of others”\textsuperscript{99}. These factors include force, sanctions, trade, aids, technology transfer, and direct investments. The analysis of relational power can also be extended to non-state actors like international organizations, multinational corporations and individual persons.

According to this approach state power is relative, not absolute. The relational power approach focuses on attraction and co-option rather than coercion by physical force in international politics. Advocates of these theories employ an analytic framework of interdependence and dependency to explain how power operates in international politics.\textsuperscript{100}

2.2.6 Structural Power Approach

The third approach, the structural power approach, believes that power emanates from the structures of the international system. This approach views power as residing in the unequal distribution of various resources in the international system. Today it is seen in concepts like the North/South or formations like the G8 or the G77+China, in the governance structures of the IMF and World Bank or the P5 in the UN Security Council.

Calls for the reform of the UN, for example, are essentially a call for a change in the structural power relations. At the national level, citizens who have limited assets and resources and who therefore feel structurally powerless, more often engage in conflicts. Susan Strange, who specializes in international political economy, elaborates on this concept as structural power within international relations. Structural power decides how things are determined and the ability to shape frameworks whereby states relate to each other or relate to corporate enterprises. Strange argues that what matters is “the share of world output – of primary products, minerals and food and manufactured goods and services”. She elaborates that a country’s power can also be determined by other intangible forms - like information technology. The US has dominated the market in information technology which makes the US a major economic power.\(^{101}\)

2.2.7 Multidimensional Power Approach

After discussing the three traditional approaches of the concept of power within the ambit of international relations, the following observation can be made: one of the fundamental weaknesses is the absence of a multidimensional approach to understanding power. It would be true to say that the three traditional approaches rely only on a single dimension of power: the attributes of the state, or the relations among states, or the structure of the international system. Many international relations theorists have attributed the lack of analytic leverage of the Realist conceptualization of power to its uni-dimensional view of power resources and not much synthesizing of the different approaches.

Critics and theorists argue that there is no comprehensive theory in a multidimensional approach and hence one has to draw theories from other disciplines like sociology, psychology and natural sciences to obtain a better understanding of the subject of power.

There are at least two reputable perspectives on the multidimensional view of power. In the first perspective three analytically distinct types of resources (utilitarian resources, coercive resources and normative resources) coexist and each lends itself to a distinctive mode of domination\textsuperscript{102}. The second perspective distinguishes between allocative resources (control over material objectives) and authoritative resources (control over human beings)\textsuperscript{103}. The multidimensional use of allocative and authoritative resources prevents power analysts from equating power with violence\textsuperscript{104}.

This study will use a multidimensional framework (based on a combination of the approaches discussed above) to understand power from different perspectives within an international relations framework as a means to understanding China’s relationship with African states as an aspect of its ascension to a world power position.

2.3 Joseph Nye's Soft Power\textsuperscript{105}

The term “soft power” was conceived and coined by Joseph Nye. Although the concept can be traced to earlier political and social scientists, Morgenthau recognized the importance of the ‘quality of diplomacy’ as an important factor. Although Nye attempted to redefine soft power, he still referred to traditional Realists like Hans Morgenthau, Klaus Knorr and Ray S. Cline, who

\textsuperscript{102}Lehman, Edward W. \textit{Political Society, A Macro sociology of Politics}. New York, Columbia University, Press 1977


\textsuperscript{104}Lehman, Edward W, The theory of the State versus the state of theory \textit{American Sociological Review}, vol 53, issue 6, 1988 , page 47-48

\textsuperscript{105}Some aspects of this discussion is informed by my attendance of series of lectures by Joseph Nye at Harvard University in January to April 2009
believed that the definition of power as the possession of resources might be more practical than a behavioral definition of power\textsuperscript{106}.

Soft power should not at all be understood as the “soft” strength of a state. Since soft power leads to compliance and agreement, it can be more strategic and provide longer-term benefits than hard power\textsuperscript{107}.

Nye believed that soft power can achieve the desired goals through persuasion or attraction (or co-option), without the necessity of using force\textsuperscript{108}. It also includes political and cultural ideals, institutional and organizational imperatives, and the extent to which these factors shape or attract others who have similar desires.\textsuperscript{109} Nye contends that a country could obtain the outcomes it desires when other nations, who admire that country’s values, copy it, and strive for its level of prosperity and openness\textsuperscript{110}. Nye, however, stresses that soft power is not the same as influence\textsuperscript{111}. According to him, influence may also be the outcome of the use of hard power through threats or payments\textsuperscript{112}. He argues that soft power is more that persuasion, admitting that it is still a key part of soft power and that, in fact, it is attraction that usually leads to acquiescence. In behavioral terms, soft power is attractive power\textsuperscript{113}, and soft power resources produce this attractive power\textsuperscript{114}. Three resources, according to Nye, constitute the soft power of a country, namely political values, culture, and foreign policies\textsuperscript{115}. Political values consist of a

\textsuperscript{111}Nye, J. S. \textit{Soft power, The means to success in world politics}, New York City, New York, Public Affairs,2004, page 100

\textsuperscript{~ 47 ~}
government’s domestic and international policies that can be leveraged as soft power so long as these policies appeal to others. Culture includes a country’s pop-culture, education, and commerce.

Foreign policies contribute to a country’s source of soft power in that it can provide legitimacy and moral authority to that country\textsuperscript{116}. With regard to hard power, military power relies on using threats of force through coercive diplomacy, war, and alliances with the aim of coercion, deterrence, and protection. Additionally, economic power, which consists of using aid, bribes, and economic sanctions in order to induce and coerce, also forms part of hard power. Hard power differs from soft power in that the former is used to force, while the latter is used to co-opt. They sometimes however strengthen and meddle with one other\textsuperscript{117}. As Nye indicates, hard power can create a sense of invincibility that may lead other nations to emulate the country that utilizes hard power\textsuperscript{118}. At times, when a large nation’s military power is accompanied by soft power, weaker nations maybe attracted to it and follow the lead of the larger nation\textsuperscript{119}. When it comes to hard power and soft power, both are complicatedly intertwined in today’s world\textsuperscript{120} – as illustrated in the figure below.

\textbf{Figure 1: Forms of Behavior between Hard Power and Soft Power\textsuperscript{121}}

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{118}Nye, J. S. \textit{Soft power, The means to success in world politics}, New York City, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, page 150
\textsuperscript{120}Nye, J. S. \textit{Soft power, The means to success in world politics}, New York City, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, page 91
For the institutionalism theorist, ‘interdependence’ also denotes certain characteristics of contemporary international relations, such as the greater complexity of, and the decreasing state independence in international relations. Against this backdrop, the concept of soft power provides a new approach to analyzing rising powers and the current “interdependent” world in which power not only has been distributed in a multidimensional pattern, but also has been owned by many more non-status quo powers and new international actors.

In contrast with Waltz, Gilpin and Rosecrance, Nye elaborates on other important issues in defining power - which are less concerned with military power. Kenneth N. Waltz describes power politics in a bi-polar world as “competition (that) becomes more comprehensive as well as more widely extended. Not only just military preparation but also economic growth and technological development become matters of intense and constant concern”\textsuperscript{122}. Robert Gilpin notes that besides military, economic and technical know-how, factors like public morale and the quality of political leadership have the ability to influence political events\textsuperscript{123}. Richard Rosecrance stresses that since 1945 the world is moving toward a system composed of states that view power as a trading system that has the potential to change the traditional views of self-sufficiency\textsuperscript{124}.

In comparison to the above authors, Nye’s analysis of power transition in the new international environment includes factors like global information, culture, ideology, institutions, technology and education. He believes these aspects have become more important than factors like geography, population and raw materials.

It is clear that Nye does not reject the Realist definition of power. On the contrary, there is a clear link between his definition and those of the Realists. In fact Nye provides a neoliberal paradigm in which to explore Morgenthau’s power analysis. Nye admits that while world politics have become much more complex and new approaches need to be adopted, traditional views of

\textsuperscript{122}Waltz, Kenneth N. \textit{Theory of International Politics}, Reading, MA, Addison-Weslet, 1979, page 172

~ 49 ~
military balance of power should not be abandoned, but rather its limitations should be accepted and supplemented with insights about interdependence\textsuperscript{125}.

Nye criticizes the traditional attempts to define power in a narrow sense in terms of traditional military power and strategic power based also mainly on traditional military and strategic aspects. Those narrow definitions preclude a country from obtaining desired political outcomes without threats or manipulation. Nye argues that in the age of rapid globalization, culture, political values and foreign policies, as elements of soft power, are increasingly important in achieving great power status\textsuperscript{126}.

Thus important manifestations of power are inclined to become less tangible and less coercive among developed countries. It is evident that as developing countries embark on a modernization process and enter the globalization process, soft power becomes more important in international relations. Nye explains that since the Cold War, the United States has become an economic and military superpower.

Based on the institutionalist alternative to Realism, Nye’s concept of soft power has been developed in his three books. In Bound to Lead, The Changing Nature of American Power, Nye regards the ability to get other states to change the directive or commanding method of exercising power, which is the same as inducements, carrots or threats approach. This is occasionally referred to as the “second face of power” - an indirect way to exercise power. He describes the second face of power as follows:

A country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects. In this case, it is just as important to set the agenda and structure the situation in world politics, as it is to get others to change in particular situations. This aspect of power - getting others to want to what you want - might be called indirect or co-optive power. It is in contrast to the

active command power behavior of getting others to do what you want. Co-optive power can rest on the attraction of one’s idea or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others express.... The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions. This dimension can be thought of as soft power, in contrast to the hard command power usually associated with tangible resources like military and economic strength.\(^\text{127}\).

Furthermore, he claimed that the United States had abundance of soft power resources as well as traditional military and economic hard power resources, which could ‘meet the challenges of transnational interdependence’. The question was whether America could rally the ‘political leadership and strategic vision’ to convert them into ‘real influence’ in a changing world.\(^\text{128}\). Nye viewed complacency and an unwillingness to make the effort to bring others along as danger.\(^\text{129}\)

In a follow-up second book written in 2002, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone*, Nye provides insightful analysis when he discusses the implications of the information revolution and globalization for American foreign policy. He emphasizes that information technology elevated knowledge to the level of an important power resource. Knowledge and information access (for example, on the internet) has become an important weapon in the power hierarchy. The sovereign state has become intrinsically interdependent on the global information system. Hence military force is not the only source of power. Economic interdependence and information flows also play a pivotal role.

On reviewing Nye works one is inclined to believe that his soft power theory has been premised on an institutionalist understanding of the current world’s “interdependence”. According to Keohane and Nye, there are three main characteristics in the world of “complex

interdependence”: these are multiple channels, the absence of hierarchy among issues, and a minor role for military force:

Multiple channels connect societies, including informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among nongovernmental elites… and transnational organizations … The agenda of interstate relationships consist of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy…. Military security does not consistently dominate the agenda…. The distinction between domestic and foreign issues became blurred….. Military force is not used by government towards other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails… force is often not an appropriate way of achieving other goals (such as economic and ecological welfare) that are becoming more important130.

In this milieu, Nye believes power is distributed among states in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game131.

In Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), Nye analyses the sources and limits of US soft power. He included other countries and non-state actors, not threatening US power as before, but leveraging soft power themselves. Nye addressed the issue of soft power usage, mainly through public diplomacy, as he attempted to reinforce the view that the foreign policy of the United States might improve following the invasion of Iraq132. Consequently, Nye argued for the necessity of getting soft and hard power working together, as well as getting the United States to work with countries by incorporating some of their interests.

Nye began to increasingly use anecdotes to illustrate his arguments and his advocacy became more urgent. “Soft power is attractive power”, Nye said133. To gain cooperation it used “an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those

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values”. Currently, soft power resources stem from an organization’s culture and values, through its internal practices and policies, and in the manner it handles its relations with others. Countries are in a position to enhance their power by embracing and acknowledging causes that are attractive to others, and institutions could help to build soft power by increasing others’ perceptions of legitimacy.

The main sources of a country’s soft power, Nye stressed is:

[Its] culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).

Nye indicated that for power to be effective, the context has to be appropriate. He acknowledged drawbacks to American culture in some places, but conversely, America’s outlook to modernity and innovation was viewed as a positive in most contexts. Culture was not only transmitted through the consumption of cultural products, Nye explained, but also through personal contacts, like, studying abroad, as well as through business exchanges. Some of these interactions had greater impact than others at reaching ‘elites with power’.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 damaged its soft power in most regions of the world. Nye stressed that soft power did not belong to government ‘in the same degree’ that hard power was.

Nye stated that soft power depended ‘more than hard power on the existence of willing interpreters and receivers’. Nye believed that the concentration of power amongst a few could lead to soft power having less traction. Soft power worked best in certain circumstances but it

could not do some of the hard tasks that are necessary. Therefore soft power of governments could not surpass the soft power of private business, organisations and individuals.

Nye believed that power resources were limited and did not always produce the ‘desired outcomes’ for countries and that the ‘objective measure’ of potential soft power had to be ‘attractive in the eyes of specific audiences’. More importantly, was that this attraction had to ‘influence policy outcomes’. Identifying the link between policy context and concrete policy decisions was not an easy task, and Nye pointed to the role of the United States as an example of such a link popular and high culture in Europe after World War II, and in the ‘victory’ in the Cold War.

Nye expanded his earlier argument that politics had become ‘a competition for attractiveness, legitimacy and credibility’. He elaborated “that advantages would go to countries with multiple channels of communication; whose dominant culture and ideas are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism and autonomy); and whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international values and policies. The United States was not alone in this competition; nor was the game confined to large and important players”.

2.3.1 Political values

Political values are one of the three main sources of soft power identified by Nye. More specific attention can therefore be paid to it.

Within the realm of political science, it has been difficult to define the concept ‘value’ but according to Kluckhohm, “a value implies a code or standard that has some persistence through time, or more broadly put, which organizes a system of action. A value, conveniently and in

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accordance with the received usage, places things, acts, ways of behaving, and goals of action on the approval-disapproval continuum”144.

In 1948 Hans Morgenthau was one of the earliest writers to link political values with national power. Within his framework for analyzing national power he refers to political values which relate to national morale. National morale also implies “national will, which encompasses national cohesiveness, leadership and government efficacy, as well as concerns over national strategy and interests”145. Morgenthau also further explained that “public opinion, national will or national morale provides an intangible factor without whose support any government, democratic or autocratic, is able to pursue its policies with effectiveness, if it is able to pursue them at all”146.

In Morgenthau’s view the quality of government is another important element of national power and political values. He believed that a democratic system that successfully addresses popular aspirations is the best foundation for strong national morale. In this manner, national morale could be undermined by undemocratic rule, ethnic or national dissension, and class divisions. Since Morgenthau emphasized the strong connection between political values (human rights and democracy) and national power, political theorists see this as an important component in developing a country’s foreign policy. However, Samuel Huntington argues that the promotion of democracy is not the main objective of foreign policy. According to Huntington “the belief that non-western people should adopt Western values, institutions, and culture, is if taken seriously, immoral in its implications…. The interests of the West are not served by promiscuous interventions into the disputes of other peoples”147. However Francis Fukuyama concluded that “the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end with the


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world settling on democratic ideals, free market capitalism, and related neoliberal economic policies after the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{148}

In comparison to the above debates on political values, Joseph Nye contributes a new approach in investigating how values are applied in global politics. According to Nye, “the state’s values depend on its own domestic governance performance, because how a country implements its political values can enhance its image and perceived legitimacy, which has important implications for the advancement of foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{149} Nye also stated:

The United States, like other countries, expresses its values in what it does as well as what it says. Political values like democracy and human rights can be powerful sources of attraction, but it is not enough just to proclaim them … Others watch how Americans implement our values at home as well as abroad…. How America behaves at home can enhance its image and perceived legitimacy, and that in turn can help advance its foreign policy objectives. It does not mean that others need or want to become American clones.\textsuperscript{150}

While Nye does not try to repudiate Huntington and Fukuyama’s views on political values in international relations, he defines political values as an important component of soft power resources, which he believes are important to a state’s foreign policy, but which cannot be imposed on other countries. Nye adds that it is more important to increase the attractiveness of political values at home before they are propagated abroad. He warned that political values can either repel or attract others. For example, American feminism can be regarded in some Middle East countries as offensive.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{149} Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, page 55-57
2.3.2 Criticism of Joseph Nye’s Soft Power

There are criticisms of Nye’s theoretical framework of soft power, particularly in Mingjiang Li’s *Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics*. Li and others do not criticize Nye’s core propositions; however, they focus on his conceptualization of soft power\(^\text{152}\). They argue that “soft power does not exist in the nature of certain resources of power but rather it has to be nurtured through a soft use of power”\(^\text{153}\) adding that “it has to be intentionally cultivated through prudent use of all sources of power available in certain social relationships”\(^\text{154}\). They also criticize his distinction between hard and soft power\(^\text{155}\) by noting that Nye did not provide a clear line between the two, which leaves the definitions blurred\(^\text{156}\). By way example they indicate that “if country A provides economic aid to country B without explicitly or implicitly asking for any favor in return, is that soft power or hard power for country A?”\(^\text{157}\)

They also criticize Nye’s resource-based approach to soft power, indicating that his sources of power – culture, ideology, values – are not always attractive, persuasive or appealing\(^\text{158}\). It is their contention that soft power can be counter-effective in certain situations, leading to resentment, repulsion or hostilities instead of attraction, persuasion and appeal\(^\text{159}\). An example is the United States’ use of cultural power in Hollywood. Although this has strengthened its soft

power, the portrayal of certain cultures, characters, and the use of actions such as graphic sexual
violence has led to opposition to certain American values in some regions of the world. Li et al.
also explain that hard power can have attraction and appeal, for instance, in the use of military
power in humanitarian or international peacekeeping activities, as seen in Haiti in 2010\textsuperscript{160}. They
believe that it is the behavioral approach that defines the essences of soft power\textsuperscript{161}. Instead of
soft power they call for the soft use of power by stating:

If culture, ideology, and values can be used for coercion, and military and economic
strength can be used for attraction and appeal, a better approach to soft power is how the
resources of power are used rather than associating sources of power as soft or hard. In
essence, soft power lies in the soft use of power to increase a state’s attraction,
persuasiveness, and appeal… If a state uses its resources of power in a prudent, cautious,
accommodating, and considerate approach in its relations with other states and plays a
leading role in providing public goods to international society, it will surely win respect,
amity, and positive reciprocity from other states\textsuperscript{162}.

They believe that focusing on how a state uses its capability instead of focusing on the resources of
power, there will be a greater understanding of how culture, values, and institutions can be brought
into the discussion\textsuperscript{163}. However, while agreeing that an ideal state could use all its resources to gain
soft power, the difficulty with this proposition is that states have their own self-interests that diverge
from one another\textsuperscript{164}.

\textsuperscript{160}Mingjiang, L., Chen, G., Chen, J., Cheng, X., Deng, X., Deng, Y., Kurlantzick, J., Pang, Z., Wibowo, I., Zhang,
L., Zhang, Y., Zhao, S., & Zhu, Z. \textit{Soft power: China’s emerging strategy in international politics}, Lanham,
Maryland, Lexington Books, 2009, page 7
\textsuperscript{161}Mingjiang, L., Chen, G., Chen, J., Cheng, X., Deng, X., Deng, Y., Kurlantzick, J., Pang, Z., Wibowo, I., Zhang,
L., Zhang, Y., Zhao, S., & Zhu, Z. \textit{Soft power, China’s emerging strategy in international politics}, Lanham,
Maryland, Lexington Books, 2009, page 8
\textsuperscript{162}Mingjiang, L., Chen, G., Chen, J., Cheng, X., Deng, X., Deng, Y., Kurlantzick, J., Pang, Z., Wibowo, I., Zhang,
L., Zhang, Y., Zhao, S., & Zhu, Z. \textit{Soft power, China’s emerging strategy in international politics}, Lanham,
Maryland, Lexington Books, 2009, page 7
\textsuperscript{163}Mingjiang, L., Chen, G., Chen, J., Cheng, X., Deng, X., Deng, Y., Kurlantzick, J., Pang, Z., Wibowo, I., Zhang,
L., Zhang, Y., Zhao, S., & Zhu, Z. \textit{Soft power, China’s emerging strategy in international politics}, Lanham,
Maryland, Lexington Books, 2009, page 8
\textsuperscript{164}Mingjiang, L., Chen, G., Chen, J., Cheng, X., Deng, X., Deng, Y., Kurlantzick, J., Pang, Z., Wibowo, I., Zhang,
L., Zhang, Y., Zhao, S., & Zhu, Z. \textit{Soft power, China’s emerging strategy in international politics}, Lanham,
Maryland, Lexington Books, 2009, page 9
As explained earlier, this research will analyses China’s soft power in relation to its diplomatic initiatives and policies – foreign and formal diplomacy, political and economic policies. China’s using of soft power in bilateral relations differs from country to country in Africa leading to different levels of success.

The issue of China’s rise and its use of power are increasingly being discussed amongst scholars\textsuperscript{165}. A possible reason is that when it comes to discussing China’s use of power, there seems to be differences among scholars who criticize Nye’s original conceptualization of soft power and who believe that China’s use of power is a combination of soft and hard power or simply, a broadened form of soft power\textsuperscript{166}.

When it comes to scholars who see China’s use of power as being a broadened form of soft power, Kurlantzick explains that when Nye initially developed the term soft power, he “used a more limited definition, excluding investment and aid and formal diplomacy”\textsuperscript{167} - these Kurlantzick admits are traditionally “harder forms of influence”\textsuperscript{168}. However, Kurlantzick explains that in examining China today the term applies a broader interpretation of soft power, including investment and aid, and one which he, as well as other scholars, and this research, uses to examine soft power\textsuperscript{169}. Li et al go even further in criticizing Nye’s conceptualization of soft power\textsuperscript{170}. They believe that instead of going forth with Nye’s resource-based approach to soft power, scholars should focus on a “soft use of power approach”\textsuperscript{171}. In this study both the use by

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Nye and those who criticize him (like the “soft use of power”) will be considered for application. In the end one of the conclusions of this study might be about how appropriate Nye’s framework for China is.

2.4 Economic Nationalism

Economic nationalists advocate the primacy of the state in the global system and maintain that its role has not diminished because of globalization. Furthermore national economies are the most important actors in international economic processes. Another similarity is that Realism and Economic Nationalism are both preoccupied with power. The key concern of Economic Nationalism is the bolstering of national power by economic means. This assumes that national power implies a combination of political and economic power. When economic power is maximized it has an impact on political power and vice versa. Therefore Economic Nationalists agree that there is a connection between wealth and power.

For Economic Nationalists, the well-being of the state is of central importance to increasing power. In order for the economy to develop and modernize, the state needs to mobilize the nation through its monetary, trade, legal, and education policies, thereby creating a national market. This ultimately leads towards the formation of a national identity, because “economic development forms and enforces the idea and sentiment of the nation, which increases the political power of the state. Thus, the relationship between the economy and the nation is an important issue for Economic Nationalism.” While it is argued that Economic Nationalism has often been associated with mercantilism and protectionism, however, it is distinctly different from those approaches. Where the mercantilist’s goal is autarky, the Economic Nationalist’s goals are centered on national unity, autonomy and maximization of national power.

Mercantilists advocate protectionism, while Economic Nationalists advocate free trade if it bolsters national power. The proponents of Economic Nationalism, like Alexander Hamilton and

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172 O’Brien Robert and Williams Marc, Global Political Economy, Basingstoke, Palgrave 2004, page 15

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Friedrich List, were in favor of tree trade\(^{174}\). The approach is pragmatic and calls for implementation of the policy that best supports national power. Therefore, Economic Nationalists advocated protectionism and state intervention in the economy in particular circumstances, such as “if a nation capable of industrializing had not yet done so”\(^{175}\).

Economic Nationalists believe that liberal economic policies in the global economy differ from the practice of liberal policies in the national economy. They argue that state intervention is a prerequisite for successful participation in the global economy; hence economic policies are usually designed to strengthen national unity. These policies typically include industrialization, Keynesian policies and currency manipulation. Therefore, this theory is appropriate to analyze China’s foreign relations, because it has a long history of nationalism and its foreign policy orientation remains distinctly nationalist.

Chinese nationalism was inflamed by western hostility towards the country as well as colonial rule over parts of China especially during the Opium Wars in the 19\(^{th}\) century. It is within this context that China encouraged nationalism as a means to confront external hostilities and re-asserts its independence\(^{176}\). It was this nationalism that was the key driving factor behind Chinese foreign policy for most of the 20\(^{th}\) century. Since 1949 the Chinese government had aggressively promoted ‘state nationalism’, building a Chinese nation as opposed to ethnic nationalism, and adjustments in Chinese foreign policy were adopted to achieve this goal. According to Zhu this was “to see and preserve China’s national independence”\(^{177}\). The key drivers of Chinese nationalism are economic development, national unity and independence, and international prestige, of which economic development is seen as the most important priority; the one that encompasses all other national aims\(^{178}\).


\(^{175}\)Ibid, page 741

\(^{176}\)Zhu Tianbiao, Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy, *China Review*, vol 1, issue 1, 2001, page 4

\(^{177}\)Ibid, page 4

\(^{178}\)Chen Zimin, Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy, *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol 14, issue 42, 2005, page 52
2.5 ‘Rising Power’ as a manifestation of power relations

Many view China as a potential rising power or the new rise in status quo power in the twenty-first century. We shall examine China’s rise to power from a Realist perspective. According to Brzezinski: “only the United States unambiguously earned the ranking as the most powerful state in every twenty year intervals since 1880, and the gap in the 1990s between the top-ranked United States and the rest had become even wider than ever before”179.

Approaching the twenty first century, more scholars have concluded that China will become a superpower of unprecedented proportions180. Certain analysts suggest “an economically strong China would become bolder, more demanding and less likely to cooperate with other major powers in the region”181.

Most of these authors state that China possesses significant power resources which can be utilized to pursue its national interest. A key question posed by some of these authors is: will China transform into a responsible power in the twenty-first century?

As discussed in the earlier chapter, Realist theorists argue that rising power will inevitably lead to war. According to the Realist approach, great powers often resort to ‘force’ (war, military) to change the status quo in accordance with their own national interest. Alternatively, existing powers feel threatened and therefore are determined to preserve their status within the international area. However, many theorists have a contrary position arguing that the economically developed world is the terrain of ‘complex interdependence’ among states and societies. These complex interdependences can sometimes promote cooperation. From this point of view analysts argue that China is becoming increasingly part of the larger capitalist system and globally more integrated. They argue that China cannot be defined as a revisionist power

based on the traditional power transitional theory. They further state that China’s reforms have increasingly changed its foreign policy from communist Maoism to a reformist policy\textsuperscript{182}.

Classical international relations theorists in the Realist tradition argue that a state’s interests are shaped firstly by its power, which is measured by its material resources and political influence.

Martin Wight argues that it is the “nature of powers to expand … They have always wanted to spread their cultural, economic and political influences to the other countries with the final goal of expanding their territory”\textsuperscript{183}. Robert Gilpin argues that the state will attempt to transform the international system only if it is advantageous to itself, in other words, if the balance of power in the system is to its advantage\textsuperscript{184}.

John Mearsheimer argues that great powers have tried to move the burden of preserving the balance of power onto both allies and rivals, and thereby using wars between states to preserve their \textit{status quo} in international politics\textsuperscript{185}. In contrast, inequality of power has often led to peace and stability as there is no benefit for weak states to declare war with a powerful state. Therefore, no “matter how a state’s natural power is measured, an equal power distribution among major states has been relatively rare in world history”\textsuperscript{186}.

China is often presented as a rising world power and in the context of this study, its implications for international power relations (including with Africa) are therefore important to analyze. According to Hans J. Morgenthau, if rising powers are challenged by another power they will in turn develop their own capabilities or form alliances to confront the dominant power. In this milieu, the rising power will always be perceived as a threat by the dominant powers. Morgenthau states “a nation whose foreign policy aims at acquiring more power than it actually has, through a reversal of existing power relations - whose foreign policy, in other words, seeks a

\textsuperscript{183}Wight, Martin, \textit{Power Politics}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition. Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1978, page 144
favorable change in power status - pursues a policy of imperialism”\textsuperscript{187}. According to Randall Schweller, the expansion of a rising power is as a result, not only of internal pressure, but also of threats and opportunities in the external environment Schweller believes that the weakness of surrounding states promotes opportunities for rising power states. The dangers for a rising power of not expanding into a power void left by weak states are twofold: “(1) other powerful states may not be equally restrained from doing so, and (2) weakness implies political instability that may spill across national borders”\textsuperscript{188}.

Therefore, a rising power is bound to expand its influence or even territory. An example is Japan in the first half of the twentieth century. During this rising process, dominant powers unleash large scale wars to overthrow the established order or occupy more territory.

According to Realist thinking, an emerging power is often perceived as a threat to the balance of power and international security, leading to war either because it uses force to change the international order to suit its national interest or because the existing leading power launches a preemptive war to preserve its status quo status.

Against this backdrop, China, as a rising power in the twenty-first century, is likely to be regarded as a threat to some states in the existing international order. Many scholars believe that China, being an authoritarian state on the rise, will prioritize its foreign policy strategy to focus on expanding its national interest or exercise its power outside its territory.\textsuperscript{189}

Rising power is also related to revisionist power. Morgenthau stresses the possible misconceptions in defining revisionist power - “not every foreign policy aimed at an increase in the power of a nation is necessarily a manifestation of revisionism”\textsuperscript{190}. Schweller has described revisionist power as follows: “revisionist states value what they covet more than what they

Currently possess…. they will employ military force to change the status quo and to extend their values.”\(^{191}\). Based on this description, China cannot be regarded as a revisionist power, because in its three decades as a rising power Beijing has rarely been involved in military conflicts with other countries or in a full-scale war. Instead Beijing has employed non-military power resources to increase its political, economic and cultural power and status, especially in dealing with external issues like Taiwan. It will become clear in the discussions that follow that China defines itself as an emerging power that wants to change and therefore revise the existing international balance of power.

Alastair Iain Johnson argues that it is acceptable to determine whether a state pursues a *status quo* or revisionist foreign policy. Therefore Johnston believes that China’s foreign policy behavior in recent years needs to be examined. Beijing has become more compliant with existing international rules and norms and has supported various global or regional security institutions and economic multi-lateral organizations.\(^{192}\) Beijing has embraced more predictable and pragmatic approaches in its foreign policy since the end of the Mao era. However, it would be true to say that Beijing did not adopt a revisionist approach. As David Kang asserts: “China’s expected emergence as the most powerful state in East Asia has been compared with more stability than pessimists believed ….. it has provided credible information about its capabilities and intentions to its neighbors: east Asian states believe China’s claims, and hence do not fear - and instead seek to benefit from – its rise.”\(^{193}\).

Thus, according to Johnson, China’s foreign policies are constructed on the Realist theoretical framework leaving one to conclude that China is not a revisionist power and will become a threat to international security.\(^{194}\) For example, he states: “with more rigorous criteria for determining whether a state’s foreign policy is status quo or revisionist orientated than have been used in

\(^{191}\)Scheweller, Randall. *Bandwagon for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In*, *International Security*, vol 19, no 1 (Summer 1994), page 105


international relations theorizing, it is hard to conclude that China is clearly a revisionist state operating outside or barely inside, the boundaries of a so called international community”\textsuperscript{195}.

Realists argue that a rising power is by nature a threat, pursuing its natural interests and argues for an expansion policy. However, in the past few decades China has not pursued a revisionist approach in accordance with it being the most dominant and powerful state in the Far East and its Asian neighbors. In fact its Asian neighbors seem to bandwagon China’s rise rather than counterbalance it.

Certain elements of Realism theory are aligned with China’s rise. Realists would argue that rising powers are inevitably interested in challenging existing institutions, norms and power distribution. Within the Realist framework, China’s rapid military buildup and economic expansion are indicators of a rising power. Many scholars and political analysts accept the Realist notion of a rising power as an inherent threat to \textit{status quo} powers and its neighboring countries, although some other international relations theorists refute this argument. However others argue that international institutions, international regimes and international law weaken state behavior, and that states have more to gain from cooperation than competition\textsuperscript{196}.

Many theorists discard the traditional approach of wielding power as a foreign policy imperative that includes coercion and bullying, and they have started to look at new approaches to power and power politics. The works of Keohane and Nye have analyzed alternative approaches including “neoliberal institutionalism”. Keohane and others have argued that due to the involvement of multi-lateral institutions and a new age in technology cooperation is possible even during times of anarchy. By seeking to link neoliberal concepts like “interdependence” onto Realist’s view of power, these scholars argue that under certain circumstances governments participate in cooperative international arrangements even to their dislike.

Based on this theoretical framework, it is possible to conclude that a rising power is not a threat, and is more likely to cooperate with other countries, because it is in their interest to do so. Rising

powers can use international norms and institutions to their advantage in multilateral organizations to assert their policy objectives. Therefore they do not have to change the status quo through revolution or rapid change but rather by evolutionary processes in an incremental way. By working together, international security can be strengthened by arms control agreements and peacekeeping missions and international trade expanded to achieve mutual benefits. The differences between the Realist and the institutional theoretical framework in interpreting the rising power’s intention reflects their understanding of nationality as a state seeking to maximize its short term self-interest and the rationality to pursuing long term collective benefits. In the latter, acquiring wealth is more important for rising powers than gaining power relative to other states.

2.6 Chapter Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the main concepts that will be used in this study and to link them to a theoretical framework. It is seldom that a study can depend on only one theoretical premise to provide an analytical or explanatory framework. This study is no exception.

Given the fact that China’s relationship with African states is located in the domain of its emergence as a major world power, power as a concept is central in this study. Traditionally power is associated with the schools of Realism and Neo-realism, which still remain relevant for this study also. Different dimensions of power – attribute, relational, structural and multidimensional – are also incorporated in this study’s framework.

It is given that China views itself as a ‘rising power’. Though this study is not concerned with China’s domestic development processes but only with how its relationship with African states contributes towards it, the notion of a “rising power” forms the backdrop of this study.

For the purpose of analyzing its current relationships with African states this study will use a combination of the theories of soft power and economic nationalism. Soft power has theoretical links to the Realism/Neo-realism schools but there is doubt whether its form articulated by
Joseph Nye is most appropriate for China. An alternative in the form of the soft use of power is therefore also included for use in this study.

Finally, though this is not a study in theory, the application of the combination of theories discussed in this chapter provides an opportunity to make some observations about their appropriateness for studies like this one. It applies in particular to Nye’s soft power.
CHAPTER THREE:

HISTORICAL VIEW OF CHINA AND AFRICA

3.1 A Short history of China

According to well renowned scholars Garth le Pere and Garth Shelton, “China is an ancient civilization, and a country that has historically always had a strong sense of its identity and place in the world. Chinese Civilization, with a history of 4000 years, has proved itself to be the most enduring and resilient in the world, and hence China is one of the world’s most extraordinary and unique countries. Calling itself the ‘Middle Kingdom’, Chinese tradition and mythology held that their emperors were preordained to rule ‘all under heaven’, in a universe composed of concentric circles, with China forming the core of the natural order.”

Prior to the 20th century, China’s history is divided into several periods of dynastic rule. These dynasties witnessed different patterns of rule, during which time China rose and fell and experienced periods of growth and decay. “When a dynasty fell, it had lost the ‘Mandate from Heaven’, giving the people the right to rebel: and when another rose, its ability to establish itself was proof that it enjoyed the approval of the gods to inherit the mandate”. Imperial China was characterized by misrule, corruption, nomadic invasions, natural disasters and social discontent. The fall of one dynasty was replaced with another vigorous and seemingly self-assured dynasty. Among the main successes of the Qin Dynasty, (which ended in 221 B.C) was its ability to unify China, standardize a system of writing and the standardization of weights and measurements. Significantly, it was during this period that the Great Wall was completed.

In the Han Dynasty (206 BC and AD 220), Confucianism became the official state doctrine and an examination system for selecting elite government officials was established. The Han period also allowed ethnic Chinese to expand beyond the Yellow River cradle area into the rich Yangzi valley to the south. The collapse of the Han dynasty was followed by four centuries of division.

and disruption until the country was politically reunited under the Sui Dynasty in 590. The Sui Dynasty was distinguished by a period of great engineering and construction of the ancient world - the 2000 kilometer long Grand Canal linking north China with the Yangzi valley to the south.\textsuperscript{199}

The next 500 years were known as Tang (618-906) and Northern Song (960-1126), commonly referred to as China’s ‘medieval flowering’ period.\textsuperscript{200} During this period China experienced great advances in agricultural production, water management, improved seed variation, better fertilization and establishment of public administration and institutions of government. However, this period came to end in 1279 with the first invasion of the Mongol conquerors, Genghis Khan and his grandson Kublai Khan. Although the Mongol’s were great conquerors, they proved to be poor rulers. Their dynasty only lasted a century (1279-1367)\textsuperscript{201}.

3.2 The Opium Wars

The Opium Wars (1839-1860), caused by British merchants illegal trade in opium, are regarded by the Chinese as a period of ‘great humiliation’. After losing both wars, The Qing Dynasty was forced to tolerate opium trading and to sign the treaties of Nanjing and Tianjin that opened Chinese ports to international trade. Hong Kong was occupied and further territorial concessions were made to the British. Similar treaties were signed between other powers and China, including Japan, which occupied Taiwan in 1895 following a short Sino-Japanese war.

China’s humiliation by the ‘unequal treaties’ with European powers created domestic unrest against the powerless Qing Dynasty leading to the Taiping (1850-64) and Boxer (1899-1901) rebellions. This led in 1911 to the overthrow of the monarchy and the official proclamation of the Republic of China on 1 January 1912 by Chinese nationalist Sun Yat Sen. The control of the Kuomintang (Sun Yat Sen’s National Party) over Chinese territory, was tenuous leading to civil


strife organized by provincially based Chinese war lords. General Chiang Kai-shek attempted in the late 1920s to reunite China under Kuomintang rule but was repelled by opposition forces including Mao’s Communist Party of China (CPC). The Kuomintang and the Communists joined forces in 1931 to fight Japan after it invaded Manchuria. With the withdrawal of the Japanese after the Second World War in 1945, civil war broke out once again. The Chinese Communist Party controlled most of China and drove the Kuomintang into retreat to Taiwan (which the Japanese had been forced to hand back to China at the end of the Second World War). Thereafter Mao Zedong established the People’s Republic of China, under the rule of the CPC on 1 October 1949.

3.3 Mao and Revolutionary China

Mao Zedong’s dominated China’s political landscape from 1949 until his death in 1976. Although Mao succeeded in unifying the country and establishing the CPC, he failed in delivering its main goal, economic development. Mao adapted his economic model from its key ally the Soviet Union, which turned out to be disastrous, especially in rural China. Mao’s ideas evolved through different phases but it was limited by the ideological imperatives of the permanent social revolution.

The first phase saw the launch of the first five year plan which emphasized both the reconstruction of the heavy industrial complex and a socialist rural reform programme. This led to the nationalization of all private property, similar to the Soviet model. All links with capitalist countries were either summarily ended or severed, resulting in China becoming increasingly dependent on Moscow. However, in the 1950s, the ideological tension between Beijing and Moscow led to China competing with the Soviet Union for leadership of the communist movement, particularly the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa.

Because of the command economy’s increasing inefficiency and its unsustainable production levels for a growing urban population, Mao adopted a more radical approach from 1959 to 1961 which he called a ‘Great Leap Forward’. The Great Leap Forward was designed to engender self-sufficiency by transferring all labor to the national development project in rural communities.
However this failed and in fact it further impoverished the country, leading in the latter years to famine\textsuperscript{202}. Opposition grew among intellectuals and purges followed, leading to a dark period in Chinese history known as the ‘Cultural Revolution’, which lasted from 1966 to 1976. During this period China’s economic situation deteriorated. Its population experienced massive starvation pushing the country on brink of disaster.

The end of the Cultural Revolution was declared in 1969, but it was only after Mao’s death that the conflicts and tensions began to diminish. During this period, China’s domestic situation was fraught by turmoil, while its foreign relations were beginning to stabilize. The PRC’s admission to the United Nations in 1971, with the support of many African states, led to a period of normal relations with the West that had important implications for China’s development.\textsuperscript{203}

### 3.4 Deng Xiaoping and the ‘Opening’ and Reforms in China

With the death of Mao and the dismissal of the Gang of Four, a moderate faction under Deng Xiaoping took gradual control of the CPC. Deng Xiaoping pursued a reformist path to development. The ‘Four Modernization’ reform initiatives initiated by Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai in the 1960s, included industry, national defense, science and technology.

These ‘modernizations’ were written into the Chinese constitution and became the bedrock from which China developed into a modern and powerful socialist state.

The third plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPC in December 1978 approved these reforms within the context of the gradual opening up to the outside world. The agricultural sector began the reformation with the ending of the People’s Communes and the establishment of the rural household responsibility system based on a 15 year land lease. This allowed households to sell a significant part of their production in the market, creating a new-found demand for production. With improvements in technology and increased production, there was an expansion in the labor market, fuelling migration to urban centers. This resulted in the expansion of the


\textsuperscript{203}Michel, Serge and Michel Beuret, \textit{China Safari, on the trail of Beijing’s Expansion in Africa}, Nation Books 2009, page 61-70
light labour industry. The second phase of reforms focused on the coastal urban centers which addressed the preferential fiscal investments policies and international trading rights.

Three decades of economic backwardness under Maoism was compared to the economic successes of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. Deng Xiaoping included these territories into his reform strategy under the ‘one China, two systems’ project. Deng Xiaoping aimed to preserve the liberal economic structures that engendered their success. Furthermore, the first Chinese Special Economic Zones (SEZs) - Shenzhen, Xiamen, Shantou – were created in 1980 and were established around Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.

The intention was to benefit from their access to the world market and to reduce the income gap between those and the new SEZs so as to allow for a smooth reintegration. These SEZs opened up China’s markets gradually, avoiding disruptions in the system, as had happened in the Soviet Union. In aiming to quickly establish a vibrant export-led light industry through foreign investment, technology, China wanted an outlet for its production to the outside world.

During these changes, Chinese socialism underwent transformation in order to bypass the contradictions and to instil a new ideological framework that would accommodate the Marxist ideological tendency. Deng introduced the ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ policy during the 12th National Party Congress in September 1982. Deng’s reformist tendencies are best captured in his celebrated statement: “it does not matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice”. According to Deng the “goal is to have the best of both worlds: the freedom of private initiative and the administration and regulatory power of the state.”

During the 3rd plenary session of the 12th CPC Central Committee convened in 1984, the CPC approved a resolution that expanded economic reform by launching the foundation of a planned economy based on public ownership. The focus was to restructure production forces in the urban

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206 Michel, Serge and Michel, Beuret: *China Safari, on the trail of Beijing’s Expansion in Africa*, Nation Books 2009
areas. The first state owned enterprises (SOE) were given autonomy during this period, and gradually public entities began listing on the world stock exchanges. The private sector grew rapidly and foreign entities began investing in China through joint ventures. Private and foreign capital was encouraged to invest in most sectors except for electricity, oil, telecommunications and defense, where the Communist party had absolute control.

The Tiananmen protest in June 1989, led by students and other groups, resulted in a widespread government crackdown. US and European countries reacted by imposing sanctions. However, Deng continued on his reformist path and argued that a market economy was compatible with both capitalism and socialism and urged the Chinese to increase the pace of the economic reforms. During the 14th National Congress of the CPC in 1992, Deng emphasized that the main aim of his policies was the creation of a socialist market economy with a central and macro regulatory role for the state.209

Part of the modernization policy saw the reorganization of the education system which led to thousands of Chinese students and researchers being sent to America and European universities to acquire knowledge and technological expertise that were critical for China.210

With the death of Deng Xiaoping in September 1997, Jiang Zemin came to power and at the 15th National Congress he committed to deepening the economic reforms process. By this time China had emerged as the largest global production platform and the largest emerging market.

In 2002, Hu Jintao championed a policy for greater integration into the global economy by urging China to surpass the export-led model. This would mean that China’s new economic strategy would expand globally on two major fronts - trade and investments.

210 Sutter, Robert: *Chinese Foreign Relations, Power and Policy since the Cold War*, Rowman and Littlefield, 2008, page 95
3.5 Period of Isolation between China and Africa 1949-1955

From October 1949 until the end of the Korean War (1950-1953), the newly founded PRC under Mao Zedong, was preoccupied with a number of domestic and external problems which precluded China from actively pursuing its foreign policy\textsuperscript{211}. This also excluded engagement with the African continent. In the first PRC’s plenary session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, it stated that “the principle of the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country”\textsuperscript{212}. During this period its foreign policy was mainly dominated by stabilizing China’s borders with her surrounding neighbors, for example Manchuria and Tibet\textsuperscript{213}. On the domestic front, China was preoccupied with unifying the Chinese people under the Communist Party and “began a process of the reorganization of Chinese society”\textsuperscript{214}. Chinese scholars have characterized this period as an attempt to ‘bury thoroughly old humiliations in the country’s foreign affairs’\textsuperscript{215}.

As stated earlier there was very little contact with African peoples except with South Africa. In fact South Africa is one of the only documented countries during this period that provided an African visitor to Beijing. Walter Sisulu, the Secretary General of the African National Congress (ANC) was apparently impressed by the Chinese government and was a great admirer of Mao\textsuperscript{216}. It is important to note that not one of the four independent African countries at the time, Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa recognized the Beijing government\textsuperscript{217}. Any official contact between these countries in the post-revolution, pre-Bandung period was negligible. However in

\textsuperscript{211} Raine, Sarah, \textit{China’s African Challenges}, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge May 2009: page 72
\textsuperscript{212} Common Program: The Common Program and Other Documents of the First Plenary Session of the People’s Political Consultative Committee. Beijing Foreign 1950: Language Press
\textsuperscript{215} Xinhua News, November 25, 1994
1951, a Chinese delegation did visit Cairo to attend a joint meeting of the Universal Postal Union and the International Air Transport Association.²¹⁸

3.6 Bandung Conference – revival period for China and Africa

The Asian-African Conference, convened in Bandung, Indonesia between 18-24 April 1955, was a milestone in China–Africa relations. Twenty nine countries attended the conference, of which six were African - Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya and Sudan²¹⁹. The only independent ruler attending the Conference at the time was President Nasser of Egypt. There were a number of discussions between Beijing and Cairo and Zhou Enlai, the foreign Minister at the time, extended an open invitation to the Egyptian delegates to visit Beijing²²⁰. This led to the establishment of a trade agreement between Egypt and China on 22 August 1955 and Egypt became the first African country to establish relations with Communist China in 1956²²¹. Sudan was the second country to recognize Communist China on 4 February 1959.

Some scholars argue that the Asia-Africa Conference was significant in that it marked the start of a definite interest by the PRC in Africa and in the developing world in general. Others argue that “Africa was relatively unimportant to China at Bandung”²²². This period, dubbed ‘the Bandung Era’, saw the beginning of China’s involvement in Africa and the anti-colonial struggles developing on the continent became definite. During this conference, the Afro-Asian solidarity adopted the five principles of peaceful coexistence²²³ as their foundation²²⁴. These principles were:

1. Mutual respect for sovereign and territorial integrity
2. Mutual non-aggression

²²³ These principles were first used in negotiations with India over Tibet in 1954
²²⁵ Today, the 5 principles are now 8 principles which are still very much the core values of Chinese strategic alliances.
3. Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs

4. Equality and mutual benefit

5. Peaceful coexistence

These five principles were later extended to eight principles and as Brautigam observes, these principles still reflect how China operates in Africa today.\textsuperscript{226} These eight principles will be discussed later in Chapter Six.

In 1956, the Department of West Asian and African Affairs was established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Ian Taylor, “the change in nomenclature reflects the perceived growing in strength of anti-colonialism and the importance that China attached to this development.”\textsuperscript{227}

A few years after the Bandung conference, a wave of independence movements began to spread across the African continent and many colonial states in Africa gained independence. The PRC provided funds and supplies, as well as advisors, to several independence movements and also to some of the nations that were facing great opposition from their colonial masters e.g. Zimbabwe’s African National Union (ZANU).\textsuperscript{228} China’s engagements in Africa were still limited to diplomatic engagements and were rather superficial in nature. However, this changed in 1955 when a trade delegation from Egypt led by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mohammed Abu Nosseir, visited China and signed a three year Trade Agreement.\textsuperscript{229} Shortly after that, the PRC extended an aid project to Guinea.\textsuperscript{230} Diplomatic ties with Guinea were established in 1959 and in 1960 China advanced an interest free loan to the country for the construction of a cigarette and match factory in the country.\textsuperscript{231}

During this period, China concentrated on North Africa countries, in particular Algeria and Egypt. In Algeria, the Chinese issued propaganda on behalf of anti-French rebels and supplied

\textsuperscript{228} Brautigam, Deborah, *The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*, Oxford University Press, 2009
\textsuperscript{229} Fernando, Chronology of China-Africa Relations. China Report 43, 2007
the FLN with weapons and training in their fight against the French colonial power.232 At the same time, China began developing strong trade relations with Nasser’s Egypt by purchasing large amounts of cotton from the country. The following countries established diplomatic ties with China: Morocco on 1 November 1958, Algeria on 20 December 1958 and Sudan on 4 February 1959 respectively.233 By 1957, Chinese attendance at international conferences was the main avenues by which Beijing developed linkages with Africa: the first Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference held in Egypt, followed in April 1958 by the First Conference of Independent African States in Ghana.234 By 1959, Chinese interest in the continent had rapidly increased, with ten Chinese delegations visiting Africa, while in 1960 the number had doubled to 25 and by 1962 this number was 52.235

Between 1960 and 1965 the PRC entered into relations with 14 newly independent African states: Ghana, Mali, Somalia (1960); Zaire (1961); Uganda (1962); Burundi, Kenya (1963); Benin, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia (1964); and Mauritania (1965). On the international front, the Soviet Union stopped its aid to China due to differences in communist ideologies.236 Furthermore, Taiwan still occupied its seat at the United Nations (UN). With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the support for Taiwan from the USA, as well as the economic embargo on the PRC, China worked hard to gain influence on the international stage by establishing diplomatic ties with the newly independent African countries. In 1971, the PRC gained its UN seat with the support of its allies, most of which were the newly independent African countries.238

According to Ian Taylor, secret army documents obtained in 1961 indicate that China viewed “the revolution situation in Africa in the long-term and Chinese activities in the 1960s can be seen to be aimed at this. Africa was evidently regarded as a key point of world interest”239. In

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1960, Sekou Toure of Guinea became the first African head of state to visit China.\textsuperscript{240} His visit was a turning point in Chinese policy towards Africa as Beijing for the first time committed itself to economic and technical aid to a newly independent African state.\textsuperscript{241}

By the end of 1963, Zhou Enlai, China’s foreign minister embarked on a ten-nation tour of Africa. The main purpose of his tour was firstly to strengthen China’s policies in Africa, secondly to promote the Bandung conference, and finally to promote the PRC’s anti-Soviet policies and persuade African countries to marginalize Moscow from attending the conference.

In 1964, the Eight Principles of foreign aid were established. These eight principles were drawn from the five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that the Afro-Asian solidarity adopted in 1955 in Indonesia. Not only did these new principles begin a new era in China-Africa relations then, but they also provide guidance for China’s foreign aid today. The Eight Principles of foreign aid are:

1. Emphasize equality and mutual benefit
2. Respect sovereignty and never attach conditions
3. Provide interest-free or low-interest loan. Help recipient countries develop independence and self-reliance
4. Build projects that require little investment and can be accomplished quickly
5. Provide quality equipment and material at market prices
6. Ensure effective technical assistance
7. Pay experts according to local standards\textsuperscript{242}.

After the establishment of the Eight Principles of foreign aid, China’s aid programme expanded rapidly to many other African countries: Tunisia, Congo, Zambia, Tanzania and Ghana in 1964; Mauritanian, Uganda in 1965; Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia in 1970; Nigeria, Rwanda, Cameroon, Sierra Leone and Burundi in 1971; Mauritius, Togo, Madagascar, and Benin in 1973; Gabon in 1974; Botswana, Mozambique, Comoros in 1975; Cape Verde, and Seychelles in 1976.

\textsuperscript{240} Peking Review, September 13, 1960
\textsuperscript{241} Fairbank, J., China’s Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective, Foreign Affairs, no 47, 1969
By the late 1970s, China provided aid to forty-three African countries. These aid programmes were established in the form of interest free loans, grants combined with loans, and also the construction of a number of infrastructure projects. The interest free loan offered to Zambia and Tanzania in 1967 for the construction of the Tan-Zam Railway (1967-1976) is a good example of such a loan. The Chinese also provided these African countries with technical support both in terms of know-how as well as skilled technicians, to work with and train Africans to build bridges, hospitals, schools and roads.

Furthermore, China provided diplomatic support as well as military support as well as material provisions for training of the liberation movements. Rising anti-colonialism, and growing tensions with the Soviet Union, saw China involved in the politics of the Cold War in Africa. Twenty eight African countries supported Beijing’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council in 1971, which it was able to secure. This accounts for 34 per cent of the General Assembly votes. By 1976, only thirty nine states recognized the government in Beijing and only eight had diplomatic ties with Taipei. Beijing commenced the normalization of diplomatic relations with African countries and the extension of economic assistance to selected governments, irrespective of their ideological orientation as long as they accepted the one-China policy.

3.7 Deng Xiaoping’s “open door” policy towards Africa

After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping advocated for a more socialist market economy and an “open-door” policy. The aim of his reform was to increase the role the market by reducing state planning and central control. Subsequently China joined the IMF and the World Bank and became an increasingly attractive country to invest in. Several Western countries provided bilateral aid and investments to China.

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247 Hu Jintao, Building towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity (speech at the opening session of the UN), September 2005.

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During the early 1980s modernization and economic development became priorities and during this period, China’s aid to Africa started “being less political altruism to being more commercially oriented”\(^{248}\). In the latter part of the 1980s, China’s leaders announced that they would undertake new aid projects on the scale of the Tan-Zam Railway through the promotion of joint prosperity. In addition, China announced in 1987 that 69% of China’s aid funds must be spent on Chinese equipment,\(^ {249}\) thereby tying the aid down and securing economic benefits for China. The post-Mao reforms indeed accelerated changes during the 1980s and 1990s and a variety of new forms of aid were incorporated with joint ventures, assisted sustainability and aid-to-profit.\(^ {250}\)

By this time, China was clearly on the rise and its relations with the West had improved. Between 1979 and 1982, China’s aid programme slowed down temporarily as Chinese leaders were getting use to the more market-oriented “open-door” international economic policy\(^ {251}\). China’s commitment fell from $254 million in 1980 to just $25 million in 1981, before rising up to $289 million in 1984 out of which $258.9 million went to Africa, making China the sixth largest donor in Africa that year.\(^ {252}\)

In 1982, Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang visited eleven African countries to promote South-South cooperation with an emphasis on the principals of equality and mutual benefit, practical results, diversity, and common progress. The event was regarded as an important move in China-Africa relations. After this time, China’s engagements in African were more economic in nature.\(^ {253}\) This corresponded well with China’s plan to switch from aid towards other forms of engagements that would benefit both partners. In other words, China had learned from opening-up its market to

\(^{248}\) Raine, Sarah: *China’s African Challenges*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, 2009, page 44


\(^{253}\) Brautigam, Deborah: *China’s Foreign Aid in Africa: What do we know?* in: China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence. Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2008 page 203-204
economic cooperation, which meant a decreasing of direct aid and an increase of combined aid with trade and investment.  

3.8 China’s ‘Going out Strategy’

In 1995, China changed its focus towards trade and access to mineral resources in its engagement with Africa. However resources were not the only reason for Chinese engagement, as Brautigam observes: “the Chinese are interested in everything.” Since the foreign policy reform in 1995, Chinese leaders began to emphasize the significance of China’s ties to Africa. From 1991 onwards, it became a tradition for China’s Foreign Minister to visit a group of African countries in January of each year.

According to Brautigam, China’s engagement with Africa during the late 90s till the present has been a “well-thought-out and long-term strategy”. This strategy developed in three important stages: Firstly, in 1995 the major aid reforms linked aid, trade and investments. In 2000, Chinese leaders took their role as promoters of “common prosperity” very importantly and created several regional organizations that supported programs that combined aid and economic cooperation. Thirdly, China joined the WTO in 2001, and in addition to that, China introduced the “going out strategy” as a tool to help its domestic restructuring by pushing its mature industries overseas to invest. This was perceived as complementing the “open door” strategy.

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3.9 Chapter Conclusion

As we observe in this section, it is obvious that the way China deals with the outside world, including Africa, is very reflective of what is happening in China’s internal affairs. From the beginning when China was isolated and it had prioritized securing diplomatic ties, it dealt with the outside world in this manner. However, we see that throughout the history of China’s relations with Africa, there is a shift in China’s foreign policy as China began to put economic development in the center of its affairs. In writing this section, the knowledge acquired has been that, to properly understand the history of China-African relations, one has to investigate the history of development in China itself which undoubtedly mirrors changes in the policies and objectives of the Chinese and the way China interacts with the rest of the world.
CHAPTER FOUR:

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN CHINA'S STATUS AS A RISING POWER AND ITS USE OF SOFT POWER

4.1 Introduction

The period between the first Opium War (1840) and the end of the Second World War (1945) are referred to by the Chinese historians as “one hundred years of humiliation”. It was also during this period that China was defeated by Japan in a humiliating way in 1895, which China has never forgotten. Many Chinese believe that China will regain its rightful place as a respectable global power. During the last one and half centuries, Chinese leaders and scholars, from Sun Yat-Sen and Mao Zedong to the current CPC leaders regularly label their dreams of China’s rise as the Zhenxing Zhonghua\textsuperscript{260} (i.e. the rejuvenation of China). As Yan Xuetong points out Zhenxing (rejuvenation) referred to the psychological power inherent in China’s rise to its former world status. In his article, ‘The Rise of China in the Chinese eyes’ Yan Xuetong quoted the following:

First, the Chinese regard their rise as regaining China’s lost international status rather than as obtaining something new. This psychological feeling results in the Chinese being continuously dissatisfied with their economic achievements until China resumes its superpower status. Second, the Chinese consider the rise of China as a restoration of fairness rather than as gaining advantage over others. With this concept, the Chinese people take the rise of their nation for granted. They never concern themselves with the question of why China should be more advanced than other nations, but rather frequently ask themselves the question of why China is not the number one nation in the world\textsuperscript{261}.

The above quotation indicates that China’s rise is closely related to a strong nationalist sentiment among Chinese people. Others will argue that China’s rise is less pragmatic and less nationalistic. This is observed by authors like Fei-ling Wang, who argues that;

Increasingly confident and self-assured, China is now rightfully feeling safe as a nation. Many of its people believe that rejuvenation of Chinese civilization is approaching. Despite the noticeable nationalist sentiment, aspirations and even ambitions common to a rising power, China appears to have accepted two basic facts of today’s international relations: first, the world is organized in a nation-state political system and in international market economy rather than anything like the Chinese world order of the Middle Kingdom: second, China is still clearly a backward or developing nation that lacks the economic clout, capital, and technology necessary to realize its potential as a great power.\textsuperscript{262}

Other Chinese scholars argue that in the last century, Chinese rulers have paid more attention to defending its borders and strengthening domestic control rather than focusing on foreign conquest. They argue that China has been introverted in its foreign policy and does not have a history of colonization but of one exploration. This has been equally true of the nineteenth century, where it has focus on defending its boarders rather than expanding its borders.\textsuperscript{263} However, political scientist will argue that territory expansion is not the only condition for evaluating the rise of China. It is true, that in the history, power states have been judged by territory expansion or military power. In the case of China, it was based on economic power. For example in 2005, China has become the third largest foreign trade country with the largest foreign exchange reserves. Many economists predict that China’s economic size measured in terms of purchasing power parities\textsuperscript{264} will overtake the United States by the next decade.

Still China’s rise to power should not be determined primarily by traditional criteria like military hegemony, political supremacy and territorial gain but rather by other definitions of power such as ‘soft power’.


\textsuperscript{263} Lai Hongyi and Yiyi Lu, China’s Soft Power and International Relations, Routledge, 2012, page 22-25

\textsuperscript{264} Lai Hongyi and Yiyi Lu, China’s Soft Power and International Relations, Routledge, 2012, page 15
4.2 Discussions of Soft Power in China

Since the 1990s, the concept of soft power has taken major prominence among Chinese scholars, academics, policy makers/think tanks, political leaders, journalists and government. It has been argued that it has become one of the most important aspects of Chinese foreign policy strategy and least researched and understood by the Western world\(^{265}\). It is for this reason that the concept of soft power will be examined from a Chinese perspective in this chapter.

A good starting point is to examine the overall understanding of soft power among Chinese intellectuals and the implications of this understanding for China’s International strategy. We will examine how China understands and interprets the meaning of soft power? Why is there a strong and growing interest in soft power in China? What role do the Chinese elite assign to soft power in China’s international strategy in the new century, especially in the context of China’s rise? A conscious effort has been made to look at official documents endorsed by the top Chinese leadership and articles in prominent Chinese journals.

China’s research and interest on the topic has surpassed any other country, even including the U.S\(^{266}\). The concept “soft power” which is translated as *ruan shili* (or *ruan liliang*) in Mandarin Chinese is a familiar concept among academics and policy makers. However, *ruan shili* or soft power has different interpretations and understandings among scholars and academics\(^{267}\). For the Chinese scholars the clear definition between soft (*ruan*) and hard (*ying*) is difficult to understand because according to the ancient and still popular Chinese philosophy, the hard could become soft and vice versa\(^{268}\).

In 1993, President Jiang Zemin’s chief advisor and former Professor of Fudan University, Wang Huning published an article, stressing the importance of soft power in China’s foreign policy\(^{269}\). Another prominent academic, Pang Zhongying, published an article emphasizing Nye’s soft

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\(^{266}\) Liu, Debin, *The origins and the development of soft power*, *Jilin University Journal of Social Science*, no 4, 2004, page 55

\(^{267}\) Interview with Mr. Wang Xiaoyi, (Chinese Association for International Understanding, CAFIU), Beijing, 13 November 2011

\(^{268}\) Interview with Mr Wang Xiaoyi, (Chinese Association for International Understanding, CAFIU), Beijing, 13 November 2011

\(^{269}\) Lai Hongyi and Yiyi Lu, *China’s Soft Power and International Relations*, Routledge, 2012, page 11

~ 86 ~
power theory in detail\textsuperscript{270}. Various think tanks in China have held conferences and seminars to debate Nye’s theory. Some scholars have criticized his theory, asserting that Nye’s soft power pertains to American circumstances and might not be relevant from China’s perspective\textsuperscript{271}.

Soft power was first mentioned in the political report to the 16\textsuperscript{th} Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 2002, stating that “in today’s world, culture intertwines with economics and politics, demonstrating a more prominent position and role in the competition for comprehensive national power”\textsuperscript{272}. On 28 May 2004, the Central Committee focused on how to develop China’s philosophy and social science. Two months later the CCP publicized a document titled “Suggestions of the CCP Center on further Developing and Boosting Philosophy and Social Science”. Political analyst commented that the study session suggested and signified the leadership’s will to accelerate the growth of China’s soft power to a strategic level\textsuperscript{273}.

Another article published in the official weekly of the Chinese government, Outlook (liaowang) revealed that the CCP had a study session on soft power and debated the official thinking behind soft power\textsuperscript{274}. The CCP during this study session also discussed the Chinese model and the Beijing Consensus. In this article, soft power was defined as “international appeal and attraction of one’s nation’s culture, values, political system and development model”\textsuperscript{275}. It was reported that the Chinese leadership could align themselves with soft power theory.

Another article published by one of the Chinese government official think tanks stated “China needs soft power” and that “soft power comprised of culture and ideology and is a necessary element in the competition among nations. The aim of China’s soft power was to gain international recognition and respect”\textsuperscript{276}.

In October 2007, at the Seventeenth Congress of the CCP, President Hu in his speech emphasized that culture is an important part of national cohesion and overall national power. The

\textsuperscript{270}Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, China’s soft power, Asian Survey, Vol. XILVIII, No 3, May/ June 2008
\textsuperscript{271}Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, China’s soft power, Asian Survey, Vol. XILVIII, No 3, May/ June 2008, page 453
\textsuperscript{272}Jiang Zemin, Political Report to the 16\textsuperscript{th} CCP Congress, 8 November 2002.
\textsuperscript{273}Li, Mingjianq, Soft power: China Emerging strategy in International Politics, Lexington Books, 2009, page 23
\textsuperscript{274}Lai Hongyi and Yiyi Lu, China’s Soft Power and International Relations, Routledge, 2012, page 11
\textsuperscript{275}Lai Hongyi and Yiyi Lu, China’s Soft Power and International Relations, Routledge, 2012, page 11
Party should “enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people’s basic cultural rights and interests”\(^{277}\).

In July 2010 the CPC Politburo held the twenty-second study session, at which President Hu Jintao stressed the importance of comprehensive national power. Furthermore, the Party decided to enhance Chinese culture and its soft power\(^{278}\).

In October 2010, the Central Committee of the CPC issued a Five-Year Plan, from 2011 to 2015. In this document, article 9 discussed the need to develop national soft power through incorporating traditional Chinese culture, domestic innovation, export of cultural products and external media initiatives\(^{279}\).

With these developments and interest, Chinese policy makers and intellectuals have tied together some aspects of soft power into its national strategy that aids China into becoming a global power. The concept of comprehensive national power (Zonghe Guoli) or grand strategy also emerged in the 1990s: “as soft power gained wider recognition as an important component of comprehensive national power”\(^{280}\). Among scholars, academics and government officials, the concept of soft power became a key national objective. A published article, *The Theory on Comprehensive National Power* describes comprehensive national power as comprising hard power (i.e. economics power, science and technology power, national defense power, and national resource power)”. While soft power consists of political power, diplomatic power, and cultural and educational power.

Professor Ye Zicheng from the Peking University argues “that China should strengthen its soft power in the areas of politics, economy, and foreign policy in order to avoid following in the footsteps of the Soviet Union”\(^{281}\). In his opinion, the Soviet Union collapsed because it lacked


\(^{279}\) Great Development and Great Thriving of Culture and Enhancing National Cultural Soft Power is included in the Central Committee’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan, available at: Beijing Review, 14 December 2006 5 December 2010

\(^{280}\) Zhang Jianjing, Zhongguo Jueqi, Rise or else: China’s road to a great power, *Beijing Xinhua Chubanshe*, 2005, p. 126

soft power, which in turn diminished its international influence, even though the Soviet Union was one of the strongest military powers. Ye proposed that China uses ‘institutional innovation’ in all areas (especially political, economic, and cultural institutions) as a method of increasing China’s soft power. \(^{282}\) Zhang Youwen and Huang Renwei shared a similar view in their article in China’s *International Status Report* 2005, that strengthening of soft power is one of the key criteria to increase China’s national power. They argued that China’s soft power increased in 2004 chiefly because of its attempt at institutional building.\(^{283}\)

During the Hu Jintao era, policy makers in the CCP understood that China must strengthen its soft power on a strategic level as well as hard power to develop into a global rising power.\(^{284}\) As a result, the Chinese government realized it needed to strengthen its education in socialist ideology and institute policies to protect China’s traditional culture.\(^{285}\)

With the CCP emphasizing the need to increase China’s soft power, various Chinese organizations and research institutes have organized conferences on the topic. The China Foreign Language Bureau hosted a forum on “trans-cultural communications and soft power building” in Beijing in August 2006. In 2007, the International Public Relations Research Center at Fudan University sponsored a forum among government officials and leading scholars on national soft power construction and the development of China’s public relations. The China Institute on Contemporary International Relations did a special study on soft power.\(^{286}\) The Institute of Strategic Studies of the Central Party School also conducted a comprehensive study on soft power.\(^{287}\)

The literature on soft power was dramatically increased among officials and scholars. Mingjiang Li conducted a survey, and noted the number of articles (in Chinese) that mentioned soft

\(^{283}\) Lai Hongyi and Yiyi Lu, *China’s Soft Power and International Relations*, Routledge, 2012, page 13
\(^{285}\) Interview with Professor Zhang Zhongxiang, Shanghai Institute or International Studies, Department of West Asian and African Studies: Stellenbosch August 17th 2014.

\(~ 89 ~\)
power\textsuperscript{288}. The outcome was that in the period 1994-2000 it was mentioned in eight articles but increased in the period 2000-2004 to 53 articles and during the period 2005-2007 to 314 articles\textsuperscript{289}.

4.3 China as a Rising Power

The preceding discussion demonstrated why and how China understands the concept of soft power. However, some analysts will argue that there are other reasons why China is enthusiastic about soft power. One of the most frequent arguments is that soft power is part of the comprehensive power that any major power is expected to possess. It is believed in Chinese strategic circles that soft power is an important indicator of a state’s international status and influence\textsuperscript{290}. “A great power has to have material or hard power as well as soft power in order to enjoy flexibility in international politics and maintain advantageous position in international competition”\textsuperscript{291}. In light of this, many Chinese analysts have argued that soft power is inseparable from China’s rise.

According to various scholars, building soft power is commensurate with China’s major power status and influence has become part of China’s development strategy\textsuperscript{292}. The first of its development task was China’s hard power (i.e. economic, technological and military build-up) and the second is to develop a harmonious society, where its focus must be on culture, national cohesion and to maintain political stability to create favorable condition for China’s peaceful rise.

China’s emergence as a new global power is perceived in different ways. Many states in the global South or developing world regard China as a rising power which will dramatically change the global balance of power in Realist terms more towards the global South. It makes China


\textsuperscript{289}Lai Hongyi and Yiyi Lu, \textit{China’s Soft Power and International Relations}, Routledge, 2012, page 12

\textsuperscript{290}Li, Mingjiang, \textit{Soft power: China’s Emerging strategy in International Politics}, Lexington Books, 2009, page 30

\textsuperscript{291}Huang Jing and Yue Zhanju, Building soft power and China’s peaceful development road, \textit{Contemporary World and Socialism}, vol. 5, 2006, page 103

\textsuperscript{292}Li, Mingjianq, \textit{Soft power: China Emerging strategy in International Politics}, Lexington Books, 2009, page 31
attractive for them and therefore provides a basis for its soft power. The status quo powers on the other hand, are cautious about China’s rise and regard it as a potential challenge for their status.

In the discussion below a general discussion of China’s rising power is followed by an exposition of the development the concept has undergone. Initially the Chinese described it as “rising power” but because of the negative suspicion it elicited, they changed it to “peaceful rise and development”, which was later adjusted to “peaceful development” and finally captured in the notion of working towards a “harmonious world”. Each of them is discussed later in the chapter.

Many perceive China as a potential rising power or the “new rise” in the twenty-first century. In 2004 the American strategist, Zbigniew Brzezinski claimed that “only the United States unambiguously earned the ranking as the most powerful state in every twenty year intervals since 1880, and the gap in the 1990s between the top-ranked United States and the rest had become even wider than ever before”.

Similar to the United States, China’s vast territory, ever growing population, rapid economic growth, deep cultural roots, geo-strategic position, ever expanding domestic market and rising international prestige, will enable it to be a potential superpower. During the Cold War China was unable to attain great power status under Mao’s rule as he retarded economic growth and adopted an inward foreign policy approach. It was only when Deng Xiaoping succeeded Mao that China began to attain potential great power status and adopted an ambitious national strategy of ”reform and opening up” in the late 1980s. It was during this period that China began transforming its economic, political and economic strategy. Unexpectedly, China emerged as an important player in the international arena, especially during the 1980s in US-USSR-China relations.

Since the early 1990s scholars, policy makers, government and key business leaders began questioning China’s new role in the international domain. In 1997 Andrew J. Nathan and Robert Ross explained in their book, China’s New Foreign Policy Strategy: The Great Wall and the

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Empty Fortress that rising China will not necessarily become a threat, arguing that China had not sufficiently demonstrated its real intentions and that China’s economy needs time to integrate into the world economy. More critical authors like Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro who wrote The Coming Conflict with China, predicted an inevitable conflict with Asia and more so with the United States. They predicted an “inevitable conflict between an expansionist China that views itself as the rightful arbiter of power in Asia and a naïve and unprepared United States that has already entered three wars in the last half century to prevent any single country’s domination “.

Approaching the twenty-first century, more scholars have concluded that China will become a superpower of unprecedented proportions. Certain analysts suggest “an economical strong China would become bolder, more demanding and less likely to cooperate with other major powers in the region”.

Most of these authors point to the fact that China possesses significant power resources which can be used to pursue its national interest. A pointed question raised by some of these authors is: will China become a responsible power in the twenty-first century?

As discussed in an earlier chapter, Realist theorists argue that rising power will inevitably lead to war. According to the Realist approach, great powers often resort to ‘force’ (war, military) to change the status quo in accordance with their own national interest. Alternatively, existing powers feel threatened and therefore are determined to preserve their status within the international area. However, many theorists have a contrary position arguing that the developed world is a site of ‘complex interdependence’ among states and societies. These complex interdependences can sometimes promote cooperation. From this point of view it is argued that China is becoming increasingly part of the larger capitalist system and globally more integrated. It implies also that China cannot be defined as a revisionist power in terms of the traditional

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~ 92 ~
power transitional theory. They further state that China’s reforms have increasingly changed its foreign policy from communist Maoism to a reformist policy.

### 4.4 Rise to power

Scholars and historians have admitted that China’s rise dates back as far as 1949, but during the Maoist era an active approach to gain more international power was not pursued. It was only with the advent of Deng Xiaoping that China openly aspired to become a ‘great power’. It believed that this mission should be accomplished by 2040 when the ‘Four Modernizations’ will become reality. According to Guo Shuyong, China will embark on three major steps to achieve its ‘state’s rise’ (guojia jueqi), namely

1. The construction or preparation stage (ying zao jieduan) when the state builds a peaceful neighborhood and prevents splits in the country;
2. The ‘Mould stage’ (suzao jieduan) when China takes initiatives to recover lost territory;
3. The ‘Strategic economy stage’ which lays the foundation for a new global economic order or political economy and which will enable the international community to accept the new order and ensure equality and justice.

China’s rise or power status in the international arena can be measured by both tangible means (such as economic status and its military power which is regarded as hard power) and by intangible means like its attractiveness (referred to as soft power). As mentioned in chapter 3, Joseph Nye has noted that effective soft power “is a means to success in world politics”. Hence China has calculatedly reinforced these images of softness in its state regulated media. The *People’s Daily* of China regularly publishes articles with titles like ‘The Charm of China’s Soft Power’, ‘Making China’s Charm visible by soft power’, ‘how to improve China’s Soft

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299 Shuyong, Guo, The logic of researching big power rise, available at: www.tecn.cn/data/detail.php?id =6233
Power Image’ and ‘China’s Soft Power set for global audience’. The Chinese government and
the general public are aware that China’s rise incorporates soft power and ‘smile diplomacy’\textsuperscript{301}. China’s soft power is visible through its foreign policy and programme initiatives within the
international community. Joshua Kurlantzick labels it as China’s soft power strategy or China’s
charm initiative. Kurlantzick pointed out China’s use of discourse, cultural, publicity and
business tools in cultivating a good image in the developing world, especially in South East Asia,
Africa, and to a lesser extend in Latin America. Kurlantzick emphasized that China’s ability to
secure energy deals is gaining popularity in Africa.

The PRC realized that it had to enhance its public diplomacy by advancing China’s international
image and pursuing public relations and building up national power. In 2008 Wang made the
following observation:

In recent years, China has sought to supplement its traditional use of ‘hard power’ with
‘soft power’, and thus the Chinese government has paid more and more attention to
public diplomacy…. To make full use of the modern media … by creating a Chinese
international image in the twenty-first century, public diplomacy can be the mirror of
China’s rise….public diplomacy can be the lubricant for China’s rise\textsuperscript{302}.

One of the key challenges for China is to manage the post-Cold War “chorus of China threat”\textsuperscript{303}
as a result of its public commitment to rise as a major power. The PRC is cautious and haunted
by the suspicion of a “China threat” within the international area. The reason that Beijing is
cautious is because the “China threat” theory could create tension amongst global powers and it
could work against China’s development. Hence China’s public diplomacy is an important tool
to reassure the international community, to avert any China threat fears and to prevent forming
any alliance against each other.

\textsuperscript{301}People’s Daily, China should endeavor to strengthen soft power, 10 October 2010.
\textsuperscript{302}Wang Yiwei. “Public diplomacy and the rise of Chinese soft power”, Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, vol. 616, issue 1, 2008, page 257
\textsuperscript{303}Deng Yong, China’s Struggle for Status, Cambridge University Press, 2008, page 104, 120

~ 94 ~
4.5 Peaceful Rise and Development

Discussion of China’s rise took a turn in 1995 when Chinese academic like Shi Yinhong from the People’s University used the “peaceful rise” concept to describe China’s foreign policy in years to come. It was not yet officially adopted as a new concept. In 2003 Zheng Bijian, a professor of the Central Party School and senior adviser to the Chinese leadership, first announced the concept of “peaceful rise” at the Boao Forum. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao commented in a 2004 speech that “peaceful rise meant that, unlike past emerging powers whose new might had caused shock waves across the world, China would threaten no nation, even as it becomes a global power. China’s rise will not come at the cost of any other country, nor pose a threat to any other country”\(^{304}\). This quotation encapsulated all the sentiments of peaceful co-existence earlier articulated by the Soviet leader Khrushchev. According to Joshua Kurlantzick, the Chinese leadership created the “peaceful rise” concept as it realized that its hard power was not effective and that it created mistrust among First World countries.

During the 1990s China used its military strength to intimidate its neighboring countries. It used an aggressive approach to try to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea, with Tibet and India. Similarly Beijing also tried to persuade Asian countries and other developing countries to abandon their alliances with the United States. Beijing failed to achieve this as most of these countries condemned Beijing’s aggressive behavior and increased their security and military links with the USA. It also created other responses like the Philippines convening its National Security Council to deal with the Chinese military presence in the region. This created hostility and mistrust between China and its neighboring countries. As a result David Shambaugh argued that in the 1990s China appeared to have had no coherent or effective foreign policy in Asia\(^{305}\).

By the late 1990s, Beijing realized that its aggressive foreign policy turned many countries against China. As a result it adjusted its strategy by offering financial assistance to Asian countries during the financial crisis in 2000. Financial assistance” became the core strategy that helped China turn enemies into friends. The Chinese leadership decided to downplay their


\(^{305}\)Shambaugh, David, *Power shift*, University of California Press, 2005
aggressive military approach and instead focused on building China’s global soft power. In the Chinese Communist Party report in 2002, it decided to make “becoming friends and partners with neighbors that is nearby developing nations - a top strategic priority”\textsuperscript{306}. According to Shambaugh, Chinese leaders therefore decided to have a peaceful environment conducive to domestic development by focusing on soft power.

By 2009 Chinese officials were often quoted in public, reiterating “that the west will need to get used to the rise of China. China will rise, is rising, and that is a fact of life now”\textsuperscript{307}. They also insisted that the rise of China is an indisputable fact\textsuperscript{308}. According to Yan Xuetong in his article \textit{Zhongguo Jueqi (China Rise)}, “the Chinese regard their rise as regaining China’s lost international status rather than obtaining something new”\textsuperscript{309}. He further argued that “the Chinese people take the rise of their nations for granted”\textsuperscript{310} and “the rise of China is an indisputable fact”\textsuperscript{311}.

Peaceful rise is soft power language suggesting that China’s rise is all about soft power. The \textit{People’s Daily} suggested in 2004 that “the peaceful rise of China is the most favorable counterblow at the theory of ‘China threat’”. In the \textit{Beijing Review} it was argued that “the proposed peaceful rise provides a theoretical instrument to refute scares of China threat”\textsuperscript{312}. With reference to International Relations (IR) theory, the official interpretation of the “peaceful rise” concept is the opposite of offensive Realism. Political scientists like John Mearsheimer argue that China’s peaceful rise serves as a framework of what other hegemonic powers (like France, Germany, Japan and Soviet Union) have failed to establish. Instead China sends out a message “not to challenge but observe existing international law and regulations”\textsuperscript{313}.

\textsuperscript{308}\textit{Asia Times}, The Rise of China as a security linchpin, Tang, S, 21 June 2003.
\textsuperscript{309}\textit{People’s Daily}, 19 February 2004, China’s peaceful rise - A road chosen for rejuvenation of a Great Nation,
\textit{Beijing Review}, China’s peaceful rise, J.Li, 22 April 2004
\textit{People’s Daily}, World sees chance as China pursues peaceful rise, 25 June 2004
\textsuperscript{311}\textit{People’s Daily}, China’s rise benefits world, 2 March 2004.
\textsuperscript{312}\textit{People’s Daily}, China’s peaceful rise, Lin, S, 2 May 2004
\textsuperscript{313}\textit{People’s Daily}, China’s peaceful rise, Lin, S, 2 May 2004
On the other hand China advocates argue that:

Peaceful Rise is now very much an idea …. that the world, including other major countries, can live side by side with a rising giant as a peaceful partner to do business with, not a big bully for others to contain or fear for. They can share China’s development dividends314.

According to Chinese authorities peaceful rise is a “mutually beneficial situation for China and for the world. It is win-win situation and common prosperity”315.

In 2004 China’s Premier Wen Jiabao explained that peaceful rise is a “tool to help China’s ongoing national strengthening in promoting China’s peaceful rise; we must take full advantage of the very good opportunity of world peace to endeavor to develop and strengthen ourselves. China’s rise will require a long period of time and probably the hard work of many generations of Chinese people”316.

Prime Minister’s Wen words can be interpreted to mean that peaceful rise is a mechanism for the Chinese leadership to delay completion of China’s four modernizations317. In Wang Yiwei’s article in the Beijing Review it was mentioned that ”China is a rising power… right now China is keeping a low profile but preparing….this build-up period is expected to last for twenty years”318. For Wang this “low profile current transition period will be used by China to serve its grand strategy of peaceful rise … to grasp the 20 year period of opportunity, winning time at the cost of…. a degree of concession”319 in the short term. According to Wang, in the long term, though, “China could look for changes in the international system whereby the US is today’s only superpower while China will be tomorrow’s world power”320.

314People’s Daily, 2 May 2004, China’s peaceful rise. Lin, S 2 May 2004
315Interview with Ms. Wu Jin Lan, (Deputy Director-General: Foreign Affairs Office, Shanghai Municipality), Shanghai, 25 May 2010
317Lai Hongyi and Yiyi Lu (eds) China’s Soft Power and International Relations, Routledge, 2012, page 49
However, the phrase of peaceful rise encountered many criticisms from both the domestic and international arena. On the domestic front, criticism was that peaceful rise could mean that countries like Taiwan or Japan could invade China. Internationally, the notion of a peaceful rise can imply a negative meaning associated with aspirations of super power status.

By 2003 the concept of peaceful rise encountered harsh criticism from within China and Western countries. From within China, the term was seen as limiting the PRC’s use of military force in confronting Taiwan in the future. Critics from outside emphasized the noun ‘rise’ as being controversial. According to Scott, there is a negative association of “rise” at the expense of others, and “that a rise for China inherently meant a Paul Kennedy-style ‘fall’ for others.” Due to the harsh criticism of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ concept it was changed to peaceful development (heping fazhan), as an alternative phrase.

4.6 Peaceful Development (Heping Fazhan)

China’s change to peaceful development was to show the world that its image was peaceful and civilized. In 2005 the official Chinese media observed:

In its push for development China will not and cannot retrace the path traditionally taken by powers on the rise. Our only option is peaceful development in which all countries are winners.

Peaceful development has several advantages as it focuses on China’s socio-economic development rather than on its political-military rise. This is less threatening to the international community. It is in China’s own interest to pursue peaceful development to enable its peaceful rise. Li Junru, the then vice president of the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC argued that “therefore, it is an even more urgent work for China to build up its image of peaceful China …. China’s peaceful development means that China will emerge in the world with an

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322 Scott, D, Soft language, soft imagery and soft power in China’s diplomatic lexicon, in China’s Soft Power and International Relations, edited by Lai Hongi and Yiyi Lu, Routledge, 2012, page 48
323 China Daily, Peaceful growth will benefit every nation, 23 December 2000; People’s Daily, China’s peaceful development promotes world stability, 14 April 2005,
ethical and progressive image”\textsuperscript{324}. A White Paper released in September 2011, “China’s Peaceful Development Road”, concluded that “looking back upon history, basing itself on the present reality and looking forward to the future, China will unswervingly follow the road of peaceful development”\textsuperscript{325}. The White Paper further reiterated that “the road of peaceful development accords with the fundamental interests of the Chinese people… China is now taking the road of peaceful development, and will continue to do so when it gets stronger in the future”\textsuperscript{326}. The White Paper therefore made it abundantly clear that it is in China’s own interest to pursue a path of peaceful development as a means for its peaceful rise. However, its assertion that China will continue to modernize and become stronger in the future, elicited some criticism from Western policy makers because they were concerned that China could become a rising threat\textsuperscript{327}. With China’s military expenditure increasing, its rapid economic development drive (i.e. acquiring large amounts of foreign assets) and its ‘Going Out’ policy China has raised some external fears. In response to these fears China introduced in 2004 the concept of a “harmonious world”.

4.7 Harmonious world

“The term “harmonious world” is associated with the term “great harmony” which is rooted in old Confucian norms”\textsuperscript{328}. According to Chinese commentators like Shen Ding, the notion of a harmonious world is a “globalist phrase, appropriate in an age of globalization and one of the most popular lexicons for talking about Beijing’s ideal of international order in the age of China’s rise”\textsuperscript{329}.

“Harmonious world” has been given prominence by Hu Jintao’s UN World Summit speech in September 2005, entitled “Building towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common

\textsuperscript{324} Li J, China’s road of peaceful development and Chinese significant revitalization of its civilization, International Review (SIIS), 2006, issue 2, page 6-7
\textsuperscript{327} People’s Daily, China pledges to pursue peaceful development road forever, 22 December 2005
\textsuperscript{328} Ding Sheng, To build a harmonious world: China’s soft power wielding in the global South, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2008, vol. 13, no. 2, page 193
\textsuperscript{329} Ding Sheng, To build a harmonious world: China’s soft power wielding in the global South, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2008, vol. 13, no. 2, page 193

~ 99 ~
Prosperity”. It received similar prominence during the 17th National Congress in 2007, when the Party’s Constitution was formally amendment to strive for the building of “a harmonious world characterized by sustained peace and common prosperity”330.

According to former Chinese foreign minister, Tang Jiaxuan, “building a harmonious world is a major strategy and a new vision that the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Government put forward in the new stage of development in the 21st century”331. The harmonious world concept, according to the minister in 2006, was a strategy by the PRC to enhance its foreign cultural strategy and to strengthen its soft power. “China’s own national interests have also been materialized on a broader scale with its positive image and international status increasing globally”332.

“It can also be used to differentiate China from other types of overbearing big powers; our philosophy on building a harmonious world… should set a good example for the rest of the world, especially other big powers like the USA”333. The concept harmonious world can be seen to deflect the criticism from China’s international rise. The People’s Daily commented that the “harmonious world” helped to rebut the “China threat” theory334. According to the People’s Daily the “harmonious world was very inspiring to the world, as a way to strengthening China’s soft power”335.

According to Yu in 2007, “the idea of harmonious world expresses a long coveted dream of human-kind building a new international political and economic order characterized by peace, tranquility this new takes on the development of the ancient Chinese dream of Tianxia Datong (great harmony of the world)”336.

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330 Lai Hongyi and Yiyi Lu, China’s Soft Power and International Relations, in China’s Soft Power and International Relations, edited by Lai Hongi and Yiyi Lu, Routledge, 2012, page 51
332 People’s Daily, China’s first step forward in its harmonious world-oriented diplomacy. Yan, X, 19 December 2006
334 People’s Daily, Harmonious World helps rebut China Threat, Wu Jianmin, 20 March 2006
335 China Daily, We must work to create a harmonious world, Yu, K, 10 May 2007
336 China Daily, We must work to create a harmonious world, Yu, K, 10 May 2007.
The harmonious world concept has its own shortcomings and created also controversial issues. One of the criticisms is that it does not incorporate the issues of diversity or human rights especially when it comes to individual political liberal democratic norms\(^\text{337}\). The Chinese rebuttal, however, was that human rights are defined as “human rights with Chinese characteristics”.

### 4.8 Chapter Summary

Most Chinese believe that China was predetermined to be a great nation. Their mentality that China’s Middle Kingdom had to be restored, informs us that China wanted to be the center of the world in the past. At present, China’s Africa policy and behavior still reaffirms a continued presence of the Middle Kingdom mentality. The logic is that if other countries recognize or respect China as a great power, China will reciprocate with economic benefits to them.

This chapter presented the view that the PRC uses concepts deliberately in the way it wants to project its soft power image. Phrases and words like “peaceful rise”, “peaceful development” and “harmonious world” are all strategically chosen to emphasis that China’s intentions are peaceful. China is careful to use language that does not present a negative image. The concept “peaceful rise” has been replaced with “peaceful development” and more recently China decided to project an image of a “responsible power”. Therefore the phrase “harmonious world” is intended to reduce potential international friction between China and other major powers and to prevent possible counter measures and blocks on China’s rise\(^\text{338}\) to be imposed. According to Yan Xuetong “whether nationalists or communists Chinese people consider ‘peaceful rise’ as a mechanism for the great revival of the Chinese nation after years of humiliations”\(^\text{339}\).

As already indicated, China’s emergence as a “rising power” leading it towards a super power, is regarded as a given in this discussion. There is almost no evidence that can challenge China’s rise as a global power. It already passed Japan as the second biggest economy in GDP terms. In

\(^{339}\) Xuetong Yan, The Rise of China through Chinese Eyes, Available at: www.irchina.org.
this chapter the focus was on soft power and how it influences China’s self-perception of its emergence as a major power. These perceptions were articulated in a series of terms (i.e. rising power, peaceful rise, peaceful development and others) chosen to maintain or protect China’s motivation to appear attractive and non-threatening to the international community. In that sense soft power considerations were paramount in determining China’s public diplomacy language.
CHAPTER FIVE:

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF CHINA’S SOFT POWER IN AFRICA

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the economic relations between China and Africa, and how China uses economic ‘soft power’ in its engagement with African countries. This chapter will focus on trade and investment, oil and raw material, energy and China’s financial aid as a means of soft power.

This century has witnessed expanded economic engagement between China and Africa, resulting in China’s immediate economic needs being met and also contributing towards the achievement of China’s economic development. Beijing’s relations with Africa are largely premised on economic nationalist goals, particularly the maximization of national power through economic development which is facilitated by state intervention. It will be argued here that China’s scramble for Africa is not based on humanitarian idealism but rather on a preoccupation with accessing Africa’s raw materials and markets. China needs commodity and energy assets and should it failed to securing these vital assets, China’s economic growth will be undermined. Oil procurement for China is a matter of ‘national security’. According to Akwe in *Foreign Policy in Focus*, “in its engagement with Africa, China certainly aims to build a political constituency for its much-touted peaceful development”\(^\text{340}\). But its primary interest is petroleum and raw materials. If Beijing’s goal of quadrupling the size of the economy by 2020 is to be met, energy, consumption, and therefore demand, will increase. According to Akwe, “Africa has resources in abundance but almost no capacity to process those resources: a perfect opportunity for a rising economy like China. Africa can supply its raw inputs and also provide a market for China’s manufactured products”\(^\text{341}\). Most African countries dependent on imported manufactured goods and consumables and therefore need investments and stable infrastructure in order to develop their economies, whilst China requires raw materials to feed its manufacturing base and suitable

\(^{340}\) Amosu, Akwe, China in Africa: It’s (still) the Governance, stupid, *Foreign Policy in Focus*, 9 March 2007, Available at www.fpiif.org, accessed on 12 June 2013


~ 103 ~
markets to export its cheap manufactured goods. From a Chinese point of view this situation provides it with an opportunity to create a link between its growth needs for basic materials and African states’ development needs for imported goods and financial assistance for their infrastructural development. China’s challenge is to make it attractive enough for African states so that it is not out-maneuvered by other powers that are also competing for new African markets. For that purpose China needs to develop its economic resources into soft power.

Paul Hubbard argues that the “absence of conditionality is the key element of China’s soft power diplomacy”342. China differentiates itself from other world powers by refusing “to make demands upon other nations’ sovereignty, economic models, governance or political culture”343. China’s political thrust, while focusing on preventing foreign interference, has moved to poverty alleviation which has appealed to many African leaders. Africans are also impressed by China’s rise in such a short space of time. China also offers financial and social appeal to Africans through many supportive and cooperation programs, projects and policies such as low or no-interest loan programs, low cost road construction projects and debt forgiveness. He Wenping of the Chinese Academy of Social Science refers to it as “soft power to magnify their influence”344. Evans and Downs explained that the tenets of soft power exercised in Africa, such as extensive aid and loans with few strings attached, are indirect sweeteners which are an added appeal to Chinese bids for resources345.

Recently scholars like Kurlanzick and Li346 have underlined the limitations of Nye’s soft power theory, in its classical forms, particularly in the case of Chinese expansion in Africa. Other sources of soft power not mentioned by Nye, namely business, economy and development are also significant. It is argued in this chapter that business and development-related tools of soft

344 Interview with Dr He Wenping, (Director of African studies section: Chinese Academy of Social Science), Stellenbosch, 14 September 2012; also interviewed her in Beijing on 12 January 2008
345 Down, Erica, Testimony before the U.S-China Economic & Security Review Commission. 13 April 2011

~ 104 ~
power are very important, especially in the relationships with poor, underdeveloped countries. In fact they are probably even more important than freedom and democracy, which Nye characterized as the most important American soft power tools. Lum et al. applied this kind of expanded interpretation to the economic constituents of Chinese soft power in South East Asia. Along with its economic success, China’s development model is also referenced as an important source of Chinese soft power, not only in developing countries but also in the USA.

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission claims that China is building African infrastructure without looking at direct benefits to African people, but only for its corrupt leaders. An International Monetary Fund document reported in 2006 that Beijing’s “policies risk unleashing a new wave of hidden debt for Africa”. Whilst the World Bank, under Paul Wolfowitz, states that Chinese loans gave borrowers an opportunity to avoid governance safe guards, multilateral banks are “losing projects in Asia and Africa to Chinese banks because (the Chinese) don’t bother about social and human rights conditions.”

In the early 1990 Chinese policymakers made a strategic decision to diversify and secure energy and resource supplies across the globe. Policy makers encouraged “a go out and buy policy”, “primarily focused on a strategy which has seen Chinese oil and resources companies move into Africa”. Stephanie Rupp argues “that the alignment of Africa’s natural resources endowments with China’s core economic interest has placed Africa at the center of emerging geopolitical tensions”. Rupp claims that in this century, “China will succeed to become Africa’s biggest and largest economic trading partner who will ultimately displace traditional relations with Euro-

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350 Financial Times, 8 December 2006, China Lends Where the World Bank Fears to Tread., Alan Beattie and Callan, Eoin, page 6
351 The Financial Times, 8 December 2006, China lends Where the World Bank Fears to Tread, Beattie Alan and Callan Eoin, page 6
352 Interview with George Kwanya, (Counselor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Kenya), 22 July 2012
American partners who have dominated over 150 years of colonial rule and neo-colonial influence"\textsuperscript{354}.

5.1.1 Historical understanding of China’s economic growth

There is a traditional view among Westerners that China has been an economically backward country. This is an historical inaccuracy because since the 18\textsuperscript{th} century China was regarded as one of the greatest trading nations in the world. The Mongol Empire stretched halfway around the globe, and the Silk Road was one of the greatest trading routes. In the early fifteen century, Emperor Zhu Di developed one of the largest shipping fleets in the world. Chinese ships reached Africa and established trading posts a decade before the Portuguese.

In the 1980s and 1990s, structural economic reforms undertaken by the Chinese government transformed an agrarian economy into one of the largest and fastest growing economies. Since the 1980s, China has consistently averaged an economic growth rate of eight per cent per annum\textsuperscript{355}. Broadman states that: “A signal of China’s growing economic strength was its rising need for oil imports. In 1993 China became a net importer of oil, and in 2003, overtook Japan to become the world’s second largest consumer of oil behind the US”\textsuperscript{356}. Between 1978 and 2000, energy demand in China grew by four per cent per year, but since 2001, demand increased by 13 per cent, outpacing annual economic growth. China’s net oil imports were approximately 3.9 million barrels in 2008. An indication of this need for oil is illustrated by the potential growth of motor vehicles from 27 million in 2004 to an estimated 300 million in 2030. According to Dow Jones Commodities News Service, China’s oil consumption in 2010 reached 8.6 million barrels\textsuperscript{357}. It is not surprising that China considers oil procurement as a national security priority, using all state resources to satisfy the nation’s need for energy.

\textsuperscript{355}Rotberg, Robert, China into Africa: Aid, Trade, Influence, Brookings Institute Press, Washington, DC, 2008
5.1.2 How do the Chinese see Africa as an economic investment the backdrop?

Africa is a highly heterogeneous continent with fifty four countries, each with different sized economies, from small to vast populations and with diverse languages. There is also a differential level of income - with GDP per capita ranging from US$200 to US$7000. But most importantly, it is highly fragmented geographically, with extremely poor infrastructure networks, underdeveloped market institutions, constraints on business competition and weak governance, which makes trade and investment extremely difficult. Furthermore, countries are characterized by corruption practices and the continent is prone to conflict and instability. For foreign investors, Africa is a difficult place to do business, relative to other regions in the world. In this respect the following context should be kept in mind:

After the Cold War, the importance of Africa as a strategic region diminished within the USA, Europe and Russia; the ideological battles were no longer relevant. As a result Africa experienced a period of marginalization, which saw a decrease in investments and increase in debts. Although Africa was undergoing structural adjustments fostered by the Bretton Woods institutions, 43 of 139 British companies withdrew from Africa. The total debt of sub-Saharan Africa was US$6 billion in 1970; in 1980 the figure grew to US$84.3 billion; Africa’s debt reached US$200.4 billion in 1993 and US$210.7 billion in 1994. According to the World Bank, in 1995 the debt-export ratio of 28 African countries was over 200:1.

However, with the recent discovery of oil and other raw materials on the continent, Africa’s GDP growth rate has been 5.4 per cent on average in the last decade. From early 2000, many African countries like Ghana, Uganda, Mozambique and Ethiopia have made significant economic progress.

Broadman Harry, Africa’s Silk Road, China and India’s New Economic Frontier, The World Bank, 2007
Despite these developments, Africa’s export market shares have continuously fallen. Making African firms more competitive and thus increasing the volume of exports are clear priorities for Africa. It is through this prism that Chinese investment and trade on the continent is being viewed by the Chinese and by African policy-makers, business people, workers and the international community\textsuperscript{361}. Economists have argued that while Africa in 1980s minimized its dependence on raw materials, it has failed to take advantage of international trade to leverage growth. A prominent debate among scholars is whether Chinese investments in Africa will serve to exacerbate or help reduce the continent’s export dependency on natural resource commodities.

One of the reasons that Africa and Latin America are eager to do business with China is because it provides an opportunity for developing countries to prosper. Prolonged decades of underdevelopment and not being able to benefit from globalizations have caused many African countries to look for new partners and new economic relations, beyond their historic ties to Europe and the United States. In this Chapter, it will become clear that China’s economic relations with the continent are driven by economic nationalist imperatives, by consolidating national power through economic development that is facilitated by the state.

5.1.3 Trade between China and Africa

In this section the focus is on bilateral trade in order to determine its importance as an element of China’s bilateral relations with African states. Its scope will present a case for demonstrating its influence and importance in China’s overall strategy in Africa over and above the policy statements made by Chinese officials. Overall Sino-African trade has expanded since 1990: between 1989 and 1997 trade increased by a massive 43.1 per cent; between 1999 and 2000 trade increased by 60 per cent from US$6.5 billion in 1999 to US$10 billion in 2000; by 2002 trade had reached US$12.39 billion\textsuperscript{362}, jumping to US$18 billion in 2003\textsuperscript{363}. In 2004 “overall trade

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{361}Broadman, Harry. G, \textit{Africa’s Silk Road China and India’s New Economic Frontier}, Washington, DC, 2007
\item \textsuperscript{362}Soko M, \textit{Trade Pact Expiry Weaves Worry for Global Textile Industry}, Johannesburg, South African International Institute of International Affairs, 2005
\item \textsuperscript{363}Beijing Aixix, The China Analyst, China’s Continued Quest for Natural Resources, April 2014, available at: www.thebeijingaxix.com/ tca, page 26, accessed 17 July 2014
\end{itemize}

~ 108 ~
saw an increase of 58.9 per cent over 2003 to US$29.46 billion. By the end of 2005, trade had reached US$39 billion\textsuperscript{364}.

According to the Beijing Axis, an independent South African consulting company based in Beijing, the latest statistics indicate that in 2013, China Africa trade had reached US$ 210.2 billion, an increase of 6.2 percent\textsuperscript{365}. On average, since 2001, Sino-African trade has grown by 31.2 per cent per year\textsuperscript{366}. By 2010, China became Africa’s largest trade and investment partner\textsuperscript{367}.

\textbf{Figure 2: African Exports to China 2012}\textsuperscript{368}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exporting countries</th>
<th>Value total export to China</th>
<th>Main products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>44,653,737</td>
<td>CNES (65%), iron (12%), Platinum (5%), coal (4%), diamonds (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>33,561,897</td>
<td>Crude oil (99%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>4,555,407</td>
<td>Crude oil (94%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>3,527,095</td>
<td>Copper (55%), crude oil (21%) and cobalt (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>2,686,560</td>
<td>Copper (92%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2,053,732</td>
<td>Crude oil (97%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table indicates that in 2012 China became the largest export destination for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia, Angola, the Republic of Congo, South Africa.


and Zimbabwe. For the DRC, the exports to China were mainly copper, crude oil, and cobalt. Zambia’s export to China was dominated by copper. For Angola and the Congo exports to China consisted almost completely of crude oil. Another sub-Saharan African country for which China was an important export destination in both 2002 and 2012 was Sudan.

For South Africa the table indicates that the exports to China were iron ore which accounts for 35 percent, platinum for 14 percent, coal for 10 percent and diamonds nine percent. This shows that China’s imports from South Africa are more diverse than from other African countries.

According to Sanne van der Lugt’s table it can be concluded that China is predominantly buying crude oil, copper and iron from Africa. Like many other analysts, she concluded that China is mainly interested in Africa’s natural resources 369.

A key element of the development of Sino-African trade is the improved quality of the products. In the early 1950s, this trade focused on cotton, minerals and other primary agricultural products, while from 1960s to the 1970s, the trade led to an increase in the export of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. In the 1990s China mainly exported textiles, light industrial and other labour-intensive products to Africa. This led to a gradual move to electromechanical products with greater value. However, since 2000, mechanical, electrical and high-tech products have accounted for more than 50 per cent of China's exports to Africa 370.

Another aspect of this development is the increased diversity of trade. In the early stages of the partnership, this trade was non-governmental, while currently Sino-African trade includes foreign investment, project contracting and foreign aid to governments. During the 1950s and 1960s, only North African countries such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia traded with China, today China trades with all African countries 371.

370 Alden, Chris, Leveraging the Dragon: Towards an African That Can Say No, Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2005
In the 21st century, relations between China and Africa have grown closer because the volume of trade has increased and they are better quality products. While China has trade relations with more than 50 African countries, it has also signed bilateral trade agreements with more than 40 of them. It has established a Committee on Economy and Trade with 28 African countries and signed a "Bilateral Agreement on Encouragement and Protection of Investment" with these economies. Furthermore it has signed an agreement to avoid double taxation with eight African countries. Since 2005, China has allowed Africa's twenty nine least developed countries to be eligible for tariff-free imports across 190 products. These agreements and policies are mutually beneficial and have led to the promotion of the sustainable development of Sino-African trade.

372 Alden, Chris, Leveraging the Dragon: Towards an African That Can Say No, Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2005, page 7
374 Alden, Chris, Leveraging the Dragon: Towards an African That Can Say No, Johannesburg, Africa, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2005

~ 111 ~
According to the China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation (2013) database, “From 2000 to 2012, the proportion of China-Africa trade volume as a part of Africa’s total foreign trade volume increased from 3.82% to 16.13%: the proportion contributed by Africa’s exports to China went up from 3.76% to 18.07%, and that by Africa’s imports from China from 3.88% to 14.11%” 378.

Nevertheless, China’s trade with Africa “from 2000 to 2012, the proportion of China-Africa trade volume as a part of China's total foreign trade volume increased from 2.23% to 5.13%” 379.

This shows that the overall percentage of 4 percent is not that high (see table below).

The China-African relationship is reflective of the classic North-South model, where Africa exports mostly raw materials and imports mostly value-added goods. China’s main exports to Africa are machinery, electronics, textiles and apparels, technological products and manufactured goods. The manufactured exports to Africa are intermediate components of products assembled in Africa and afterwards shipped to third market regions, such as the EU and USA. Others are capital goods (such as machinery and equipment) destined for African manufacturing sectors, and some are consumer nondurables, which compete with domestic manufacturers in Africa.

China imports mainly primary products (fertilizers, grains, ores, etc.) and raw materials (including oil, iron ore, cotton, and diamonds from Africa). Trade between China and Africa is skewed in favour of China. It is argued by some economist that this imbalance is caused by China’s surplus industrial capacity, together with its tendency to export products through third

countries\textsuperscript{383}. Recently, statistics have shown that Africa’s “exports to China have grown rapidly, reaching US$93.2 billion in 2011 and increasing 39% year on year. In 2012, African exports to China totaled US$113.17 billion, an increase of 21.4% over the previous year”\textsuperscript{384}. These increases, however, can be credited to oil exports, without which these imbalances would be severely negative\textsuperscript{385}.

In 1993, China emerged as a net oil importing country, and since 1995 has pursued “outward-looking oil economy policy”\textsuperscript{386}. Energy security has become an important component of China’s economic policy. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) are regarded as Ministries and part of the State Economic and Trade Commission. China now imports 800 million barrels of oil annually and is the world’s second largest importer of oil (after Japan)\textsuperscript{387}.

After the USA, China has become the second largest consumer of oil\textsuperscript{388} with the Energy Information Administration predicting that China's oil demand will reach 9.4 million bbl/d by 2020, with net imports of 5.9 million bbl/d, making it a major factor in the world oil market\textsuperscript{389}. It was estimated in 2006 that by 2010 China will depend on imports for 45 percent of its oil use\textsuperscript{390}. Many scholars have stated that China has developed closer ties with African countries that are oil producing, for example Sudan, Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and now recently Kenya.

\textsuperscript{383} Broadman, Harry G., Africa’s silk road China and India’s New Economic Frontier, Washington DC, 2007
\textsuperscript{384} White Paper on China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation, Information Office of the State Council, August 2013, Beijing, page 17
\textsuperscript{388} Ofodile, Uche, Trade, Aid and Human Rights: China’s Africa Policy in Perspective, Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, vol.4, issue 2, 2009, page 88
\textsuperscript{389} Ofodile, Uche, Trade, Aid and Human Rights: China’s Africa Policy in Perspective, Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, vol.4, issue 2, 2009, page 88
\textsuperscript{390} Botha, Llana, China in Africa, friend or foe?: China’s contemporary political and economic relations with Africa, Master’s thesis, University of Stellenbosch, December 2006
China’s imports from Angola and Sudan grew from US$1.47 million in 1998 to US$1.71 billion in 2004\textsuperscript{391}. Currently, Angola and Sudan are China’s largest suppliers of oil, and it is Sudan’s number one trading partner, with 64.3 per cent of its exports in 2004 going to China\textsuperscript{392}. According to Jeremy Steven, a Beijing-based economist at Standard Bank, some of these imports are oil, coal, with iron ore and copper making up 14 per cent of imports\textsuperscript{393}. Manufactured goods and machinery equipment account for the majority of exports, while chemicals and food products account for less than 10 per cent of the total. Chinese manufactured goods (e.g. electronic toys, textiles) have relatively low prices, thus making them affordable to lower income Africans\textsuperscript{394}.

**Figure 5: Structure of China’s imports from Africa, 2010\textsuperscript{395}**

![Chinese imports from Africa](image)

China’s top trading partners are resources based. Angola’s trade with China consists mainly of oil, whilst South Africa’s exports to China are largely ore and metal-based products. These base metals and mineral products account for 70 per cent of South African’s export to China\textsuperscript{396}, whilst

\textsuperscript{391}Shinn, D and Eisenman, J, Dueling Priorities for Beijing in the Horn of Africa, Beijing, *China Brief*, vol. 21, The Jamestown Foundation, page 6

\textsuperscript{392}Shinn, D and Eisenman, J, Dueling Priorities for Beijing in the Horn of Africa, Beijing, *China Brief*, vol. 21, The Jamestown Foundation, page 7

\textsuperscript{393}Pretoria News, 28 March 2013, China-Africa’s new best friend, David Malingha Doya and Robert Mbakouo

\textsuperscript{394}Renard, Mary-Francoise, China’s trade and FDI in Africa: African Development Bank Group, no. 126, April 2011, page 16


machinery and equipment, as well as chemicals, pulp, paper, textile, clothing and live animals have shown increased growth. China’s trade with Africa is highly concentrated (see the pie chart in figure 2 above). Angola has been China’s main trading partner, accounting for 24 per cent. South Africa occupies second position (16 per cent), followed by Sudan (8 per cent), Nigeria (7 per cent) and Egypt (6 per cent)\textsuperscript{397}.

\textbf{Figure 6: China’s Main African trading partners in 2012\textsuperscript{398}}

According to Raphael Kaplinsky, there are many advantages for China’s entrance into Africa. Firstly, China accounts for 20 per cent of the world population; secondly China’s high trade intensity makes China the second largest trading nation in the world\textsuperscript{399}. Finally the most important fact is that China holds the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, valued at $2 trillion in March 2009\textsuperscript{400}. According to a working paper by SAIIA, “China and Africa have a strong interest in developing the continent’s infrastructure as this will allow the countries to fully

\textsuperscript{398}Global Trade Atlas 2013
\textsuperscript{399}Kaplinsky, Raphael, Asian Drivers and Sub Saharan Africa; The Challenge to Development Strategy, Rockefeller Foundation, July 2007
\textsuperscript{400}South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), The China-Africa toolkit: A Resource for African Policymakers, September 2009
realize the potential of their resource endowment, and will enable China to access much needed commodities to fuel the increasing demand of its booming economy”\textsuperscript{401}.

Evidence from an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study shows a possible link between China’s increased demand for commodities and Africa’s expanded growth\textsuperscript{402}. Africa’s real GDP grew at an average (year-on-year) of 3.3 per cent between 1997 and 2000, compared to 4.2 per cent between 2001 and 2004, reaching 5.4 per cent by 2009\textsuperscript{403}. This can be attributed to an increase in commodity prices, which is determined by Chinese demand. Africa’s terms of trade have improved through increased commodity prices and favorable market conditions. African countries with favorable trade increases are those that export mainly oil, metals or agricultural products. These include Sudan and Angola (oil), South Africa (metals, agriculture), Uganda (agriculture) and to an extent Zimbabwe (agriculture, minerals).

The study by the OECD’s Development Centre indicates that the benefits of China’s increasing demand for African goods are offset by the high volatility of demand. This is increased by the fact that a “large percentage of China’s manufacturing exports are produced by multinational corporations, some of which have moved their production sites to China from elsewhere. Increased demand from China, therefore, may in some cases be merely a reflection of the movement of production”\textsuperscript{404}.

\textsuperscript{401}South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), \textit{The China-Africa toolkit: A Resource for African Policymakers}, September 2009
\textsuperscript{402}Chen Michael Xiaobao, \textit{China and India: What is in it for Africa?}, Preliminary Draft, OECD Development Centre, January 2006, page 46
\textsuperscript{403}Kaplinsky, Raphael, \textit{Asian Drivers and Sub Saharan Africa - the challenge to Development Strategy}: Rockefeller Foundation, July 2007
\textsuperscript{404}Chen Michael Xiaobao, \textit{China and India: What is in it for Africa? Preliminary Draft}, OECD Development Centre, date, page 10
This increase of trade has a potentially positive impact on the extractive industries in Africa, but there is a danger that it will encourage corruption and the enrichment of elites in oil export-dependent African countries, with benefits likely to trickle down to the affluent only.

5.1.4 China’s Investment in Africa - FDI

It has been reported that China has one of the largest foreign reserve holdings, exceeding, for the first time Japan’s foreign reserves, up recently ranked first in the world. By December 2011, China’s foreign reserve holding had reached US$3.3 trillion compared to US$609.9 million by the end of December 2004.

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Accordingly, China has the resources to pursue an aggressive foreign investment policy. In 2003 China was the fifth largest investor in the world after the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and France. The country’s foreign investment totaled US$2.087 billion, which represented an increase of 112 per cent over the amount for 2002, giving it an active presence in 160 countries.

Chinese investment in Africa concentrates on key sectors that are of strategic importance to it – namely the extractive industries. Chinese firms have invested billions of dollars in African countries and have used their engineering and construction resources to develop the oil, gas and other natural resources in these countries. Since the early 1990s China has targeted developing countries for its investment projects with the result that it has increasingly sought new investment opportunities on the continent, often signing joint venture agreements with local or foreign companies.

African governments have welcomed Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which provides much needed capital due to decreasing FDI from developing countries. Statistics indicate that Chinese investments in Africa have been growing steadily. By the year 2000, the total contractual investment amounted to US$200 million, and by the end of 2011 Chinese investment into Africa had reached to 2.9 billion. By 2012 it had reached US$ 166 billion. Chinese companies have invested in resources, transport, agriculture, and in construction, (largely in infrastructure development). Making China the largest developing country investor in Africa.

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416 UN Comtrade 2014, United Nation Commodity Trade Statistics, Database, SITC. Rev.3, Comtrade.un.org
China’s FDI in Africa is motivated by strategic considerations. The Chinese government plays a key role in determining which sectors Chinese firms (mostly State Owned Enterprises) should invest in. This is done in order to ensure investment in select industries that would contribute towards China’s overall economic plan. It therefore encourages investments in manufacturing, resources and technology. More often than not, Chinese investments in Africa are driven by the central state rather than by market forces. Consequently, many Chinese investments in Africa lead to the formation of joint ventures with African companies, which forms part of China’s aid program to Africa.

China’s investment strategy is to move manufacturing goods first to Africa for export to Europe and North America. In the process, China takes advantage of the preferential trade terms for African countries under the US’s Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the EU’s Cotonou Agreement. By exporting these goods from third countries, China avoids the strict

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import quotas levied on Chinese goods imposed by the USA. In this regard investments in the clothing and textile sectors have been encouraged.

As mentioned earlier, the African countries that receive the largest FDI from China are Sudan, Nigeria, Angola, Guinea and South Africa. These countries mineral and oil reserves are strategically important for China. For example, South Africa is a rich source of platinum and ferrochrome while other countries provide oil resources\textsuperscript{419}. It is clear that Chinese FDI in certain African countries is very strategic and is specifically selected to secure resources and raw materials.

5.1.5 China’s involvement in Africa for Commercial Interest

In this chapter we have seen how China uses economic power as one component of soft power. We have primarily focused on China’s attraction to Africa’s natural resources and how it used its economic diplomacy to make itself attractive for African governments. However another important soft power element that is often neglected is China’s potential to expand its goods and manufactured consumables into the African markets. China regards African markets to be suitable for its manufactured goods and consumables. To understand the impact of Chinese exports on African economies it is necessary to consider the significance of Africa’s imports from China for individual countries.

According to a DFID report in 2005, China accounted for more than five per cent of total imports in Uganda (5.1 per cent), Kenya (6.4 per cent), and Tanzania (9.1 per cent) as well as in Sudan (14.2 per cent) and Ethiopia (6.4 per cent)\textsuperscript{420}. An influx of Chinese goods can have two effects: either, imports may jeopardize the jobs of unskilled African workers, and therefore increasing poverty; or, on increase in affordable consumables could reduce living costs and thus raise the real incomes of the poor\textsuperscript{421}. Studies have indicated that Chinese consumables in African markets


\textsuperscript{421}Jenkins, R. and Edwards C, \textit{The Effect of China and India’s Growth and Trade Liberalization on Poverty
have a positive impact on living standards, for example, Uganda imports a high percentage of basic Chinese consumer goods.\textsuperscript{422}

Economics Professor at Cape Town University, Mike Morris argues that Chinese imports have had a positive impact on the poor. It has enabled the poor communities to afford luxury items that they would otherwise not be able to afford, like washing machines, television sets, DVD players etc.\textsuperscript{423} A DFID study supports this finding that basic consumer goods comprise 37 per cent of Uganda’s total imports from China, and in Tanzania they account for 17.7 per cent. In both cases the poor have potentially gained from their increased access to basic consumables.\textsuperscript{424} A textile worker in Qwa Qwa interviewed by the author commented: “A Chinese television set might not last me 20 years but at least I own a television set… I am not looking for quality but rather I want cheap goods.”\textsuperscript{425} While anecdotal, it can be assumed that more similar cases exist and therefore it can be assumed as a general proposition that Chinese imports into local African markets have had a positive impact on the lives of the poor.

However, the influx of cheap Chinese goods into other African markets is at the same time potentially devastating for local producers and manufacturers. Critics argue that Chinese goods are an “economic malignancy spreading across African markets, displacing African-made goods and in the process destabilizing African industries.”\textsuperscript{426} Stephanie Rupp reiterates this in his research observing that Chinese investors view “African people as a substantial, undersupplied market for their manufactured goods. Chinese manufactures take aggressive advantage of this opportunity to supply the African Market, bringing in massive quantities of low quality, inexpensive goods. Africans consumers note the bitterness, the substandard quality of Chinese


\textsuperscript{423}Author’s research done with Oxfam, internal document (mimeo.); Morris, Mike and Raphael Kaplinsky, \textit{The impact of China on Sub Saharan Africa}, DIFID, April 2006.


\textsuperscript{425}Interview done for Oxfam in QwaQwa, 23 June 2007

\textsuperscript{426}Lyman, Princeton, \textit{China’s Rising Role in Africa: Presentation to the US- China Commission}, 21 July 2005
goods imported into Africa versus those produced for Euro-American markets, and intuit their position as second-class consumers”\textsuperscript{427}. In the Zimbabwean markets, Chinese goods are often referred to in derogatory terms as ‘zing zhung’, alongside racial epithets against the Chinese\textsuperscript{428}. A common remark regarding these goods is that they are “cheap, nasty and likely to fall apart at the first attempt to use” them\textsuperscript{429}. Other Zimbabwean complaints include that “they come here, sell all their zing zhung rubbish, don’t do anything for Zimbabweans and take all the money they make out of the country”\textsuperscript{430}.

Job losses and factory closures in the South African textile industry amply illustrate this threat and statistics reveal that compared to the rest of Africa’s imports from China, South Africa imports the greatest proportion (21 per cent) of goods\textsuperscript{431}. Since Beijing regards Southern Africa as one of its most important trading partners, trade relations between China and South Africa will be analyzed carefully in the following section.

\textsuperscript{427}\textit{BBC}, Should Africa embrace China: on line discussion program for Africans, 4 March 2005
\textsuperscript{428}\textit{Sunday Times}, 19 May 2013, The Banknotes are dirty-and so are the unwelcome Zing-Zhong, Vice,Telford,, page 20
\textsuperscript{429}\textit{Sunday Times}, 19 May 2013, The Banknotes are dirty-and so are the unwelcome Zing-Zhong, Vice, Telford, page 20
\textsuperscript{430}\textit{Sunday Times}, 19 May 2013, The Banknotes are dirty-and so are the unwelcome Zing-Zhong, Vice, Telford page 20
\textsuperscript{431}Draper, Peter & Garth Le Pere, \textit{Enter the Dragon. Towards a Free Trade Agreement between China and the Southern African Customs Union}, Institute for Global Dialogue, Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs
The bulk of China’s current trade with Africa is concentrated within a few countries which are more or less the same for both imports and exports. The chart above depicts China’s respective African trading partners for both imports and exports in 2010 together with the market share of each country. Amongst the major trading partners, as already highlighted, trade is concentrated among the few countries. For imports Angola (36 percent) and South Africa (18 percent) account for over 50 percent of total trade while in terms of exports South Africa (18 percent); Nigeria (11 percent) and Egypt (10 percent) account for about 39 percent share.

The discussion in this section presents evidence that China’s efforts to become attractive for African states by using economic means can also have negative consequences. The impact of Chinese imports on local industries and economies can stifle their own development, which in turn will have a negative impact on China’s soft power in relation to those states. A proper evaluation has to incorporate both the positive consequences of Chinese lending, trade, investments and infrastructural developments and the negative consequences of Chinese exports to these countries, and how it affects the public perceptions in those countries.

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5.1.6 Case study: China–South Africa trade relations: The textile industry

Since formal diplomatic relations were established in 1998, bilateral trade between China and South Africa has increased. Two way trade in 1997 totaled about US$1.5 billion \(^{433}\) by 2000 it had doubled to US$3 billion, \(^{434}\) and according to official Chinese statistics, by the end of 2005 bilateral trade totaled US$7.27 billion, an increase of 23 per cent over 2004 \(^{435}\).

While China exports mainly manufactured goods, including footwear, textiles, electrical appliances, plastic products and glassware, South Africa exports minerals, base metals and primary products to China, including gold, diamonds, platinum, timber, and aluminum and chromium ores \(^{436}\).

In 1993 South Africa’s exports to China comprised almost fifty percentages of manufactured products, while in 2003 these goods accounted for only eight per cent of South Africa’s exports to that country \(^{437}\). In that year advanced manufactured were 46.8 per cent \(^{438}\) of South Africa’s imports from China. While China’s manufacturing base seems to be expanding, South Africa’s manufacturing market is appears to be diminishing largely because of the importation of cheap Chinese goods. The importation of these cheap goods has had a detrimental effect on South Africa’s economy as it is saddled with severe unemployment problems.

The sectors worst impacted by these Chinese goods are the labor-intensive industries, including light manufacturing, construction, textiles, clothing and footwear \(^{439}\). For example, in 2003 approximately ten per cent of the manufacturing workforce (i.e. 20 000 blue-collar workers)

\(^{436}\) Mills, Greg and Garth Shelton, *From butterflies to take off? Asia Africa trade and Investment ties*, Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2003
\(^{439}\) Morris, Mike and Raphael Kaplinsky, *The impact of China on Sub Saharan Africa*, DIFID, April 2006;
became unemployed as a result of retrenchments and factory closures. Furthermore, local traders and merchants have also been affected by competing with Chinese entrepreneurs. The textile industry in South Africa has been severely affected. Trade unions in South Africa have voiced their opposition to Chinese imports calling for greater protection for the industry.

By 2006 imports of clothing from China increased by 480 per cent and job losses in the apparel industry reached approximately one million. Not only was South Africa affected but countries like Lesotho, Swaziland, Madagascar, Mauritius, Ghana and Kenya also experienced a massive downturn in the textile industry. Many factories were closed down resulting in massive unemployment in families and communities. While conducting research in Botshabelo in the Free State near Lesotho in 2007, I was alerted to the closure of six textile factories, resulting in over 10 000 workers losing their jobs and thereby affecting thousands of other dependents. For every job lost, there is an exponential increase in poverty rates as there are a number of people dependent on a single person’s wages for their livelihood. Furthermore, unemployed textile laborers (often women in the Western Cape) are often unable to be absorbed into the economy, resulting in long term unemployment.

It is estimated that in South Africa, a single job in the formal sector supports approximately four people. The Chinese argue “that increased competition is a natural result of economic globalization, and the only reason for the increase in Chinese textile exports to South Africa is the extremely high demand for “Chinese goods, which [are] of high quality and reasonable price”. Furthermore, in alluding to the textile issue, Liu Guijin, the Chinese ambassador to South Africa said that it is only natural for an “intimate relationship to engage in a minor

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Morris, Mike and Raphael Kaplinsky, *The impact of China on Sub Saharan Africa*, DIFID, April 2006;


Oxfam report in 2008- China’s footprint- China and South Africa


Interview with former Chinese Ambassador to South Africa, Liu Guijin, 18 and 19 November 2010 in Pretoria.
bickering, and that the textile dispute is quite common as a result of [their] fast growing bilateral trade.”

In conclusion, the experience of the South African textile industry as a result of Chinese trade dominance is a good example of the problems experienced by China to sustain its soft power in all sectors. South Africa is not a unique case and anti-Chinese xenophobia is also prevalent in countries like Zambia and Angola. China’s challenge is that it wants to establish new markets for its surplus manufactured goods as a matter of self-interest but on the other hand it wants to use its financial and economic power as a means to build friendship with African governments. Sometimes these objectives create internal contradictions that don’t serve China’s soft power ambitions.

5.2 Energy and Resources

5.2.1 The need for oil and raw materials

Energy security is an important concern for China’s involvement in Africa – often referred to as the “scramble for Africa’s resources”. Oil and minerals are the key resources concerned. While China is a latecomer to the global oil industry, its oil companies take high risks and outbid their competitors to gain upstream opportunities and also invest in countries that have been ignored by multinationals. It has been accused of pursuing neo-colonial policies and solely interested in extracting resources from Africa. There is nothing unique in China’s engagement with Africa for importing raw materials with little or no processing done inside these African countries. However, China faces a dilemma in trying to balance its national interest of accessing energy and raw materials as cheaply as possible and at the same time fostering relations with African countries.

445 China Monitor, Center for Chinese Studies University of Stellenbosch, Letter from Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to South Africa, August 2005, page 5
In the past twenty years China has sustained an annual average GDP growth rate of eight per cent\(^\text{448}\). Its rapid economic growth and the rise in living standards have increased the demand for raw materials, especially oil.

Rognvaldur Hanneson maintains that there is a link between increased GDP and energy consumption\(^\text{449}\). This rapid economic growth would lead to similar growth in energy demands\(^\text{450}\). According to Hanneson “scarce resources would drive China to look beyond its boundaries to secure resources at whatever the cost”\(^\text{451}\), and that is making Africa a viable and stable source of scarce resources. It is estimated that China will use 10.9 million barrels of oil per day by 2025, with net imports of 7.5 million barrels per day\(^\text{452}\). With its large population and huge energy consumption, China continues to be plagued by constant energy shortages\(^\text{453}\). In January 2006, 5.8 million cars were sold in China, a 26 per cent increase from 2005\(^\text{454}\). It is estimated that by the year 2030 China will have 300 million vehicles on the road\(^\text{455}\). The dramatic increase in vehicles, air travel, and road links have increased oil demand beyond China’s limited domestic supply, forcing it to seek oil resources elsewhere. However China’s reliance on imported oil as a percentage of total energy remains relatively low (approximately eight per cent)\(^\text{456}\) but as China rapidly urbanizes and its demand for transport increases so will its demand for oil. According to a BP report: “Between 2000 and 2006, China’s oil consumption increased from 4.7 million to 7.4 million (47 per cent derived from imports)”\(^\text{457}\). Barclays analysts in London claim that China’s oil demand grew to 480,000 barrels daily in 2013, or roughly five per cent of the 2012 annual levels\(^\text{458}\).

\(^{448}\)Rotberg, Robert, China into Africa: Trade, Aid, Influence, Brookings Institute Press, Washington, 2008
\(^{452}\)Kenny, Henry, China and the competition for oil and gas in Asia, Asia-Pacific Review, vol. 11, issue 2, November 2004, pages 36 - 47
\(^{455}\)Executive Research Associates, China in Africa: A Strategic Overview, October 2009, page 5
\(^{458}\)Forbes – China wants more oil , 18 February 2013,
Although China is the third largest geographical country in the world, it has limited oil reserves. In parts of the Daqing and Shengli areas oil is in limited supply but declining in production. The rich basins of the Junggar and Tarim areas have modest oil reserves to supply the vast Chinese population. The International Energy Agency predicts that China’s oil consumption will increase from 1.5 million barrels per day in 2009 to approximately 10.9 million in 2030 – by this time China will be importing 77 per cent of its oil. China realized that its demand for oil will outstrip its domestic supply, hence in 1977 it took the decision ‘to go and buy’ outside its borders. However it is important to mention that Western multi-national companies had an advantage of at least fifty years in dealing with major oil producing countries. In the last decade China had to compete with countries like the US, Japan and Europe on the open market. China had to ensure it was self-sufficient, should supplies be terminated in times of global conflict.

Although China has huge coal reserves, pressure from the international community to cut back on pollution level has put into question its efficacy as a reliable energy source. Consequently China has also made investments in alternative sources of power – the Three Gorges Dam is an example of its investment in hydro-electric power. It has also invested in nuclear power and natural liquid gas. However, there is limited infrastructure for hydro-electricity, with nuclear power seemingly expanding only incrementally. Hence the need and pressure for oil remains a major part of China’s energy requirements. In 2003 China exceeded Japan as the second largest importer of oil and in 2004 became the second largest energy consumer globally after the United States. In order to meet these domestic demands, Beijing has attempted to secure oil and minerals from foreign sources. Its use of soft power is regarded as one of the most important means to guarantee secured oil imports. An illustration of this point is how pragmatically the Chinese moved from the (northern) Sudanese to the South Sudanese government to secure access to its oil resources despite continuing conflict and political instability in the south.


5.2.2 China’s dream of energy self-sufficiency

By the early 1990s China realized it needed to be self-sufficient in energy resources; hence China’s ‘going abroad strategy’ was officially adopted in 1997\(^{462}\).

With this in mind, it restructured the state oil and gas enterprises into two major companies: the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the Chinese National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec). Both companies produce and import oil. Sinopec is involved in refining and thus is a major buyer of foreign oil\(^{463}\), while the smaller China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) focuses on offshore investments.

In earlier years (1990s) Sinopec and CNPC were regarded as agencies of the communist party but in 1998, when China changed to the ‘go out policy’, these companies moved towards more

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\(^{462}\)Baker, James, The Changing Role of National Oil Companies in International Energy Markets: Implications for the Middle East, Institute for Public Policy, Houston, April 2007, page 9

\(^{463}\)Interview with Mr Li Bingxin, (First Secretary, Chinese embassy in South Africa), Pretoria, 28 June 2008.
market orientated and commercial practices. This resulted in a combination of state control with
a small percentage of free market activity. During interviews with officials it was difficult to
ascertain the exact percentage, as there is little transparency in the industry. Erica Downs, a
leading U.S. expert on Chinese oil policy argues that “investment decisions often have been
generated from the bottom up and have not been highly coordinated with the relevant
government agencies”, adding that the “more high-quality assets a company acquired, the more
likely it was to obtain diplomatic and financial support from the Beijing government for its
subsequent investments”464.

Although the employees of the oil companies, Sinopec, CNPC and CNOOC, argue that they
operate independently from the party, it was clear in interviews that all senior board members
belong to the CPC465. Employees of these oil companies maintain that it is “difficult for them to
ignore ‘requests’ made by the central government since failure to respond could decrease the
probability of future promotion”466.

China’s success in penetrating the African oil market has been a combination of team work with
Chinese oil companies, the country’s export-import bank, its economic and trade agencies, and
key trading companies, many of which are still state run. This combination gives China the
advantage to offer low-financing and other complementary economic ventures like infrastructure
development. According to Shalmon and Lee, “China’s oil companies are now an unusual
agglomeration of modern entrepreneurial talent striving for earnings growth and ever-greater
profitability, while at the same time remaining arms of government increasingly focused on
China’s long-term energy needs”467.

With China’s growing demand for oil and gasoline, it has three choices: firstly to import
gasoline, secondly, to build new refineries to maximize gasoline production, and lastly, to
purchase light crude oil that result in greater gasoline production.468 China decided not to import
more gasoline but pursued joint ventures with Middle East state oil companies to build new

465Interview with Tian Wenhui (Deputy director: China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development
Corporation), Beijing, 20 May 2010
467Lee, Henry and Dan Shalmon, Searching for Oil, China’s oil strategies in Africa, in Robert Rotberg, China into
Africa, Trade, Aid and Influence, World Peace Foundation, 2008
468Interview with Tian Wenhui (Deputy director: China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development
Corporation), Beijing, 20 May 2010

~ 131 ~
refineries. Therefore, for China to access light crude oil has become extremely valuable (crude with lighter viscosities are easier to refine into products such as gasoline, and aviation and diesel fuel). Unfortunately, the availability of light crude as compared to heavy crude is declining, and this trend will continue. However, there have been new discoveries of light crude on the continent especially in the Gulf of Guinea and off the Southern African coast. With oil from Angola and Nigeria becoming increasingly valuable in today’s market, China is determined to access this oil.

In the developed world, most of the oil has already been explored while in Africa many countries have only recently discovered oil and gas, especially countries like South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana and Mozambique. Hence opening trade links with these countries proved to be extremely valuable for China. It is therefore not surprising that China aggressively pursues these countries.

However, an exception has been Libya, where China has been limited to bidding for one or two production sharing agreements. Oil from Libya has to be taken out through the Mediterranean Sea, which lies within the European ambit. According to the former Libyan Ambassador to South Africa, China’s relations with Qadaffì (then leader of Libya) were not so easy – compared to other African countries that were desperate for capital and investment. Libya employed a transparent bidding process for new oil and gas licenses, which does not favour China. According to the Chinese, oil from Angola, Sudan, Mauritania or Kenya was more easily available.

China has signed multiple trade agreements with Nigeria, which has significant reserves of light crude oil and forecasts a doubling of production by 2025. While China is very keen in developing this relationship, continued attacks by militant insurgents have forced Nigeria to cut back on production. As Down points out: “the value of Chinese oil companies’ investments in Africa is just 8 per cent of the combined commercial value of the private multi-national

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469 Interview with A.A. Alzubedi (former Libyan ambassador to South Africa), Pretoria, 10 July 2012
470 Interview with A.A. Alzubedi (former Libyan ambassador to South Africa), Pretoria, 10 July 2012
471 Interview with Mr Li Gang (Chinese embassy official), Pretoria, 14 February 2008
investments”. In fact in the next decade, China will purchase more oil from African state than it produces from its own concessions.

5.2.3 What has been China's competitive advantage (soft power) to Western governments/companies in acquiring oil from Africa?

What gives China a competitive edge over other energy clients in acquiring oil from African countries? Firstly, the CNPC and the CNOOC, two state-owned enterprises, act on behalf of Beijing by purchasing land and developing joint ventures with domestic producers. An example of this was when in 1997 the CNPC outbid Exxon, Texaco and Amoco to acquire and develop oil fields in Iran, Venezuela and Sudan. Chinese companies or state enterprises are more successful in outbidding other competitors and other Western companies because Chinese businesses are not “short stay but rather strategically orientated to position themselves for the future”.

Secondly, Beijing is able to operate in high risk and conflict areas in exchange for energy. A good example is when Angola ended its 27-year civil war in 2002. The country was ungovernable and economically devastated and it became difficult to do business with it. Most Western countries had disengaged with Angola years ago. In March 2004 Beijing extended a $2 billion loan to Angola for a contract to supply 10,000 barrels of crude oil per day. The agreement stipulated that the loan must be reinvested in infrastructure construction, with 70 per cent of the loan set aside for Chinese companies and the rest to local subcontractors. Angola became the largest supplier of oil to China, replacing Saudi Arabia as the top supplier by 2008.

476 Los Angeles Times, November 14, 2004, Don Lee: China Barrels Ahead in Oil Marker
During Premier Wen’s visit to Angola in 2007, the country received $2 billion in aid. Similar arrangements have been made with other African oil producing countries. In July 2005, Petro-China entered into an $800 million deal with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to purchase 30 000 barrels of oil per day for one year. In July 2005, Petro-China entered into an $800 million deal with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to purchase 30 000 barrels of oil per day for one year.479

In January 2006, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), after failing to acquire the American-owned Unocal, purchased a 45 per cent stake in the underdeveloped Nigeria AKPO fields, for $2.27 billion.480 The Nigeria National Petroleum Company would own 50 per cent of this concession. Gabon’s poor oil industry has attracted huge investments from the China National Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC), which hopes to explore Gabon’s onshore and offshore oil reserves.

Thirdly, Chinese companies have committed huge capital for exploration in remote areas. It has also imported Chinese skilled labour like engineers to assist with these developments. Sudan was one of the earliest and largest overseas energy projects conducted by China’s major energy companies. Chinese investments in Sudan include pipeline building, excavation of sites and deployment of labour.482 The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has a 40 per cent stake in Greater Nile Petroleum, which dominates the Sudan oilfields.483 In 2006 China purchased more than half of Sudan’s oil exports.484 In 2007, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) bought a 35 per cent stake of an exploration license in the Niger Delta for $60 million.485 Using Chinese companies, the Chinese government controls a significant

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479 Linebaugh, Kate and Shai, Oster, CNOOC Pays $2.27 Billion For Nigerian Oil Gas Stake, New York, The Wall Street Journal, January 10, 2006
480 Linebaugh, Kate and Shai, Oster, CNOOC Pays $2.27 Billion For Nigerian Oil Gas Stake, New York, The Wall Street Journal, January 10, 2006
482 Higher Organizing Committee Economical sub-committee, February 2009; Interview with Dr Ali Y. A. Alsharif (former Sudanese ambassador to South Africa), Pretoria, 30 July 2012
483 Higher Organizing Committee Economical sub-committee, February 2009; Interview with Dr Ali Y. A. Alsharif (former Sudanese ambassador to South Africa), Pretoria, 30 July 2012
484 Higher Organizing Committee Economical sub-committee, February 2009; Interview with Dr Ali Y. A Alsharif (former Sudanese ambassador to South Africa), Pretoria, 30 July 2012
485 China Institute at University of Alberta: www.chinaualberta.ca, accessed 20 July 2014; Higher Organizing Committee Economical sub-committee, February 2009; Interview with Dr Ali Y.A. Alsharif (former Sudanese ambassador to South Africa), Pretoria, 30 July 2012

~ 134 ~
proportion of its oil demands while shielding the Chinese economy from potential price hikes or supply disruptions.

Fourthly, China is not selective in who its partners are, even if they experience domestic political legitimacy problems or are criticized by the international community. In 2007, China accounted for 65 per cent of Sudanese total exports at the time of the Darfur crisis. Another example of not making political judgments was in 2004 when China and Zimbabwe reached an energy and mining deal worth US$1.3 billion. In exchange for building three coal-fired thermal power stations, Zimbabwe paid China with rich deposits of platinum, gold, coal, nickel and diamonds.

By 2006 China had made successful oil investments in most parts of the world. In a short space of time it has become one of the largest importers of oil. According to some observers “China’s ability to link its oil investments to government-to-government financial assistance gives its companies an unfair advantage”. Human rights lobby groups accuse China of leveraging its investments to back some very abusive, corrupt and violent governments. China’s support for the Sudanese government was already mentioned and its reluctance to condemn the genocide practice of the Janjaweed militias in Darfur or to support UN sanctions (discussed in Chapter 6).

The other contentious issue is China’s refusal to interfere in domestic or political issues of African countries and that it tries to keep the nature of its relationships strictly commercial. Critics argue that without “China’s investment and tacit support, African governments like Sudan would be forced to amend their behavior”.

At this juncture, it is important to address the question: how does China successfully woo and win African countries to obtain what it desires?

The first strategy China employs is its policy of non-involvement or non-interference in the domestic policies of the host country. China does not interfere or pass judgment on the behaviour

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489 Interview with Fred Mutesa (University of Zambia, lecturer in Civil society, Governance, and Development Cooperation), Beijing, 11 April 2008

~ 135 ~
of other countries with which it trades. Furthermore it does not link its commercial relationship with any standard of conduct or conditionalities. A Chinese government official explained in an interview conducted in Beijing that China understands how colonial powers have interfered in countries’ development – “China itself experienced what is referred to as the ‘hundred years of humiliation’ in the nineteenth century at the hands of Western interest and therefore China respects a country’s sovereign rights and resents any foreign interference in its domestic affairs”\(^{491}\). In 1964 Zhou Enlai stated in his speech in Khartoum that “China was grateful to the Sudanese for killing British General Charles Gordon in 1885”\(^{492}\). During the reign of Mao Zedong China resented outside interference, even rebuking the US for its criticism of its human rights. Others argue that China’s unwillingness to criticize unethical behavior stems from its own national interest goals. By continuing to assist undemocratic states, China obtains a competitive advantage by acquiring unlimited supplies of oil where other countries would not support these countries based on moral or human rights concerns. It is clear that China’s non-interference policy is motivated by economic concerns. Critics argue that without China’s financial aid, repressive and corrupt governments will not survive in Africa (for example, Sudan, Angola and Zimbabwe). China’s support for the “Sudanese government has enabled Khartoum to purchase arms to use against the rebels in the South and to supply the Janjaweed militias in Darfur, enabling them to slaughter thousands of civilians”\(^{493}\). Human Rights Watch had severely criticized China for supporting the northern government in North-South war in Sudan.

A second element in China’s strategy is to create a level of interdependence that promotes trade and building stronger bonds, simultaneously securing a constant flow of oil to China. By purchasing oil supplies or investing in oil production, “China would invest in the economies of African oil producers and would help the host governments meet their immediate infrastructural or commercial needs”\(^{494}\). For example China is rebuilding Angola’s transport network, constructing a large hydroelectric dam in Sudan, and opening up commercial enterprises throughout the continent doing over US$11.7 billion worth of business\(^{495}\). Finally, another

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\(^{491}\) Interview with Counselor Wang Shiting, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Beijing, 17 May 2010.


\(^{493}\) Higher Organizing Committee Economic Sub-committee, February 2009


\(^{495}\) Interview with Carlie Kiala (Advisor to the Consulate General of Republic of Angola in the Hong Kong Special Administration Region), Pretoria, 20 July 2012; Ling Yen Song, In the African Firing Line, *Energy Compass*, 25 May 2007
component of China’s soft power is the direct link with China’s arms trading with Africa, where China pursues oil-sales and exploration-investment relationship.

To understand what motivates China’s participation in Africa, it will be useful to examine two oil producing countries in Africa: Sudan and Angola. In both countries, in order to leverage its influence, China has promised to increase trade and investments (besides oil) and to provide access to cheap capital through its unregulated and government-controlled financial institutions.

5.2.4 The cases of Sudan and Angola

Since the 1990s, Sudan has become one of the largest suppliers of oil to China. In 1996 the CNPC acquired a 40 per cent stake at a cost of US$441 million in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC)496. Since 1997, the CNPC has been actively involved in the Mughlad Basin, where it is engaged in the production and transportation of oil.

In 1999 CNPC built a new refinery north of Khartoum, by providing half of the investment of US$540 million497. The CNPC has a 41 per cent share in the Petrodar Operating Company (PDOC), which was established in October 2001. Sinopec also holds a six per cent stake498. China has also provided finance for the construction of oil pipelines in Sudan as well as provided expertise, supplies, equipment and construction materials. China has also built a two million tonnes oil terminal at Port Bashir, 25km south of Port Sudan499.

Chris Alden indicated that “Chinese firms are acquiring equity shares in ventures that are engaged with already established oil fields instead of securing rights for future exploration and

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498 Shichory, Yitzhak, Sudan: China’s Outpost in Africa, China Brief, vol. 5 no 20, The Jamestown Foundation, 2005, page 9

~ 137 ~
development” 500. Alden argues that “such behavior shows that Chinese firms prefer to integrate vertically because it ensures higher energy security, and allows firms to provide oil to Chinese consumers at cheaper prices than on the international market” 501.

Chinese companies have made investments in infrastructural projects that ultimately support oil production. For example, China’s Harbin Power Company constructed the Qarre I Station (approximately 50km north of Khartoum), which was funded by China’s Central Bank to the amount of US$149 million 502. Furthermore it has invested in hydropower plants – with an 85 per cent stake in the construction of the Kajbar Dam and the Merowe (Hamdab) Dam. Both were financed by credit loans issued by the Chinese government 503.

Sudan derives large oil revenues from Chinese investments. However, the Chinese favor importing their own labor, effectively marginalizing local jobs. In the Merowe project, 90 per cent of the engineers and 75 per cent of the technicians are Chinese, while local Sudanese make up only 20 per cent of the workforce 504. The Sudanese government argues that only skilled labor can facilitate technological transfer and skills creation 505. However, this is not possible when the skilled Chinese workers (with their language and cultural differences) are not equipped to transfer skills in an effective manner 506. In many cases Africans are unable to absorb these new skills without adequate education and training 507.

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500 Alden, Chris, China-Africa Relations: The end of the beginning, in Draper, P and Le Pere, G (ed) Enter the Dragon: Towards a free trade agreement between China and the Southern African Customs Union, Institute for Global Dialogue and the South African Institute for International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2005; page 139
502 Shichory, Yitzhak, Sudan: China’s Outpost in Africa, China Brief no.5, issue. 21, The Jamestown Foundation, 2005, page 9
503 Shichory, Yitzhak, Sudan: China’s Outpost in Africa, China Brief no. 5, no. 21, The Jamestown Foundation, 2005, page 9
505 Interview with Dr Ali Y. A. Alsharif (former Sudanese ambassador in South Africa), Pretoria, 30 July 2012
506 Author’s visit to Khartoum in December 2010 to interview local Sudanese.
507 Shichory, Yitzhak, Sudan: China’s Outpost in Africa, China Brief no. 5, issue 21, The Jamestown Foundation, 2005
China’s relationship with Sudan indicates its capacity for providing ‘package deals’ that include aid, credit lines and investments in infrastructure and other sectors which commercially-minded companies and Western donors would not entertain.

China’s “no-questions asked” policy also applies to other oil-producing African countries, like Angola, which has become China’s number one source of oil imports. China’s willingness to pay more for assets is linked to its eagerness to tie oil sector participation to non-oil sector perks. Sinopec is in a joint venture with Sonangol to finance and manage a new refinery in Lobito. For more than a decade this has been a pet project of the leadership, but despite the involvement of major foreign consulting firms, its doubtful revenue streams meant that Western companies were not interested in investing in the project.

The refinery project is far more than just a simple business exercise for Sinopec. By providing three credit lines of almost $5 billion in just two years, the Chinese have allowed the Angolans to pursue their post-war reconstruction strategy while at the same time keeping their distance from the IMF’s transparency prescriptions or conditionalities.

Both these countries (Sudan and Angola) illustrate a Realist interpretation of a state pursuing its national interest. Not surprisingly, China considers oil procurement a matter of national security, using all state resources to satisfy the nation’s need for energy. China utilizes its diplomatic and economic muscle in order to leverage oil imports from whichever source it can, regardless of the moral implications of these engagements.

5.2.5 China’s telecommunications footprint in Africa

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511 Rotberg, Robert, *China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence*, World Peace Foundation, 2008, page 1-20
China’s increased involvement in the African telecommunications industry is part of a multidimensional engagement in the continent to serve its broader strategy to enhance its global standing, counter Western influence and to obtain resources and new export markets to feed its rapidly expanding economy. Alongside construction, energy and mining, telecommunication is one of the four strategic pillars underpinning China’s economic development and providing the necessary platform from which to challenge the West for global technology. It is therefore regarded a vital industry for Chinese strategic interests on several fronts; firstly the acquisition of foreign technology, dual use of military application, reinforcing China’s space and satellite development programme and breaking into new markets\(^{512}\).

Such assessments are closely driven by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and related ministerial and strategic planning institutions that have as their primary mandate, the emergence of competitive international companies aligned with strategic political consideration of the motherland. Importantly, Chinese telecom companies do not operate in isolation but operate in tandem with Chinese geo-strategic objectives. This makes the need for effective countervailing strategies all the more important in dealing with the Chinese telecommunication challenge in Africa\(^{513}\). Initial assessments suggest that China has chosen several hubs to roll out its telecommunication strategy on the African continent. These include Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa\(^{514}\). Chinese companies that are leading projects are Huawei and Zhongxing Telecom (ZTE) - both are linked to the Chinese military and intelligence\(^{515}\). These companies have the added advantage of access to cheap state subsidized funding sources, state political support and low costs production. As a result these companies have a competitive edge that other private independent telecom companies don’t have.

5.2.6 Infrastructural development projects

\(^{513}\) Interview with Dr David Purnell, (China specialist, University of Iowa), Hangzhou, 19 May 2008  
\(^{514}\) Interview with Dr Anthony Saich, (Director of Ash Institute, Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government), Cambridge, USA, 28 February 2009  
\(^{515}\) Interview with Dr Anthony Saich, (Director of Ash Institute, Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government), Cambridge, USA, 28 February 2009
China’s efforts to rebuild African infrastructure is one of the most important aspects of its investment in Africa and efforts to make it attractive for African states. This was largely neglected by colonial powers and even more so in the post-colonial period. In the twentieth century, trade and aid were mainly confined to building democratic institutions.

For many African countries infrastructure development has been retarded, because of interstate-conflicts and civil wars. Transportation and communication networks have fallen into disrepair and neglect. Chinese assistance in refurbishing these national assets also serves the political interests of African governments. Former Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade publicly expressed his “sense of relief that African nations have a newfound power to choose not to accept funding from traditional Euro-American partners, a sense of power so fresh…..embracing Chinese efficiency and snubbing former overbearing development partners”\textsuperscript{516}. These African political elites now take credit for infrastructural improvements, especially high profile construction projects like stadiums for national football teams. These projects “have proven effective in sweetening popular perceptions of both Chinese economic presence in Africa and the African leadership”\textsuperscript{517}. Some critics argue that this entrenches relations between Africa and China and reinforces many of the current less democratic African political regimes.

For the Chinese, these trade and aid packages accomplished several important strategic objectives, namely:

- Offering infrastructural development to African governments and especially political leaders enhances China’s economic soft power and confidence building and most of all its appeal to Africans.
- The aid package assisted with refurbishment, reconstruction or development of roads, ports and airports and it benefited local Africans communities.
- Basic infrastructure projects are essential to transport African resources to ports that can be exported efficiently to China and other destinations. Thus Chinese (re)development of

\textsuperscript{516}Remarks by Abdoulaye Wade at the Forum, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 27 September 2007  
\textsuperscript{517}Rupp, Stephen, Engaging Post-Colonial Interdependencies, in Rotberg Robert, China into Africa: Trade, aid and Influence, World Peace Foundation, 2008, page 75
roads, railroads, ports, and airports reflect the impact of Chinese investments. For example, the construction of colonial railroads along the West African coast was intended to connect African markets and communities within the continent. Rail lines were developed to transport resources from the interior to coastal port cities, where European-owned vessels took them directly to European industries and markets. Another example, on the other hand, is the Chinese reconstruction of the Benguela rail line in Angola (built during the Portuguese colonial period), which runs from the Angolan coast directly eastwards towards the rich mining zones of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. It is clear that some of these large-scale projects are designed primarily for external commercial interests and less for African benefit. However, it is fair to say that much of the infrastructure development by the Chinese is also of great importance to African states and citizens.\textsuperscript{518}

- China is able to build and construct at an accelerated speed compared to its Western counterparts who require environmental impact reports, approvals and confronting other bureaucratic hurdles that impede progress. International lending agencies like the World Bank, the IMF and Euro-American nations unable to compete with China in these areas. Many African elites view this as refreshing and an efficient approach.

- Chinese support to refurbish presidential palaces and funding of their militaries is detrimental in achieving political reform.

While the link between trade and aid seems ambiguous, aid to African countries has been influential in securing trade deals for the Chinese. China has redeveloped Angolan infrastructure (which was devastated by civil war), and has extended a US$2 billion soft loan in exchange for Angola’s promise of unrestricted supply of crude oil to China.\textsuperscript{519} This agreement enabled China to secure a monopoly on access to deep water oil sources outbidding the European and Indian investors\textsuperscript{520}. Bilateral trade between Angola and China increased by US$5 billion in 2006, and

\textsuperscript{518}Rupp, Stephen, Engaging Post-Colonial Interdependencies, in Rotberg, Robert, China into Africa: Trade, aid and Influence, World Peace Foundation, 2008, page 75

\textsuperscript{519}Ferreira, E. Manuel, “China in Angola: Just a Passion for Oil?”, in Chris Alden, Daniel Large, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (ed). China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, Hurst, 2008, page 280

\textsuperscript{520}Myers, Amy, Jaffe and Stevens W. Lewis, Beijing’s Oil Diplomacy, Survival, Academic Research Library, vol.44, issue 1, spring 2002, page 115-129

by 2010 trade between the two countries had reached US$ 120 billion\textsuperscript{522}. The value of Angolan oil exports has risen from US$7.6 billion in 2002 to US$ 68.5 billion in 2012\textsuperscript{523}. Angola became China’s second largest oil trading partner, supplying 15 per cent of its oil imports and surpassing Saudi Arabia’s oil flows to China\textsuperscript{524}. The details regarding trade relations between China and Angola are not transparent and are often secretive, serving the interest of both the Chinese and Angolan governments which means that “neither the international observers nor domestic civil society groups are easily able to challenge Angola’s use of the enormous receipts it has gained from China”\textsuperscript{525}.

Likewise, many African civil society organizations and communities have openly criticized the potential negative repercussions of oil exploration on African social and natural environments. “Many African commentators note with trepidation the environmental degradation of China’s own landscapes and resources, and express serious concerns about uncritical acceptance of Chinese development initiatives in Africa”\textsuperscript{526}. China’s engagement in African infrastructural development with the aim to create a positive image of itself in Africa and at the same time develop an infrastructure that will support its trade with African economies are therefore not without complications and its success with developing a soft power foundation for itself is therefore not an unqualified success.

5.2.7 China Seeking Other Resources: Zimbabwean agriculture and South African and Zimbabwean minerals

\textsuperscript{524}News Report, 23 June 2006, Horta, Loro, China and Angola Strengthen Bilateral Relationship, Power and interest.
\textsuperscript{525}Rupp, Stephanie, Engaging Post-Colonial Interdependencies, in Rotberg, Robert, China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence, World Peace Foundation, 2008, page 74
\textsuperscript{526}Rupp, Stephanie, Engaging Post-Colonial Interdependencies, in Rotberg, Robert, China into Africa: Trade, aid and Influence, World Peace Foundation, 2008, page 76

~ 143 ~
Another major priority for the Chinese government is ensuring adequate food and agricultural products for its growing population. As a result, Chinese firms are encouraged to invest in agriculture, fisheries and similar secondary production sectors in Africa.\textsuperscript{527} Zimbabwe has been targeted for these types of investments even though it is seen as a pariah state. President Mugabe’s regime has been sanctioned by Europe and the USA following the land reform crisis, human rights abuses and generally undemocratic practices. This has reduced aid and investment from the West and the imposition of sanctions. China has however deepened its relations with that country, leading to a shift in Zimbabwe’s foreign policy over the last six years to favour the East, often referred by Mugabe as the “Look East” policy. The “Look East” policy emphasizes Zimbabwe embracing China and shunning the former colonial powers in Europe and the USA. It is characterized by deepening political and economic bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and China (and other Eastern countries like Singapore and Malaysia).

China has acquired vast tracts of land in Zimbabwe in order to engage in agricultural and beef production\textsuperscript{528}. It has entered into similar deals in Zambia and Tanzania\textsuperscript{529}. China’s interest in land and agriculture is due to the increasing domestic demand for these products, and because of its expanding manufacturing base, resources are being redirected from agriculture into manufacturing. Consequently, China would have to import more agricultural products in the near future. By investing in these sectors, China has been able to secure these products for its own domestic market.

China has shown keen interest in Zimbabwe’s vast untapped mineral reserves – another key sector in China’s strategy. It has the second largest platinum deposits in the world, as well as huge deposits of gold, ferrochrome, silver and copper. Due to financial constraints and lacking other resources, Zimbabwe has not been able to fully exploit these reserves. As a result, Beijing has entered into a number of deals, including the construction of a ferrochrome

\textsuperscript{527}Alden, Chris, China-Africa Relations: The end of the beginning, in Draper, P and Le Pere, G (ed) Enter the Dragon: Towards a free trade agreement between China and the Southern African Customs Union, Institute for Global Dialogue and the South African Institute for International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2005, page 139
\textsuperscript{528}Brautigam, Deborah, Chinese Aid and African Development: Exporting Green Revolution, Basingstoke, 1998, page 33-38
smelting plant in Selous. Zimbabwe will grant the company a five-year tax break as well allowing the entry of foreign technical expertise for the construction of the furnace. Many analysts argue that it is ironic that while Zimbabwe has a large unemployment rate, it still needs to acquire foreign labor from China.

China is keen to exploit South Africa’s rich mineral reserves and in this regard the China Steel and Iron Industrial and Trading Corporation have invested US$74 million in the exploitation of chromium reserves in the country. China’s interests in both Zimbabwe and South Africa also involves the exploitation of these country’s coal reserves. China is particularly interested in South Africa’s Coal-to-Liquids (CTL) technology, developed by SASOL during the sanctions era, which converts coal to oil. SASOL has agreed to a joint venture with China to develop two CTL plants in the country and signed in June 2006 an agreement to embark on a second feasibility stage for this project. However, some commentators argue that this venture solely benefits China as it acquires South African technology to fuel its own industries with very little benefit for South Africa.

Zimbabwe has also been offering its mineral resources (coal and coke) to China in exchange for finance assistance and mining equipment. Furthermore, two Zimbabwean firms, Hwange Colliery and Ele Resources have recently entered into a deal with China Machine-Building International Corporation worth US$1.3 billion to construct coalmines and three thermal power stations. The thermal power stations are to assist Zimbabwe’s state power company to supply electricity. The deal will, it is reported, grant Beijing access to Zimbabwe’s minerals, including platinum, gold, chrome, nickel, coal and diamonds.

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530 China Monitor, April 2005  
531 China Monitor, April 2005  
536 Rotberg, Robert, *China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence*, World Peace Foundation 2008, page 1-20
Although Chinese investments in industries such as mining and agriculture can have a positive impact on job creation, analysts have warned that trading Zimbabwe’s precious mineral resources to China in exchange for short-term cash assistance might be detrimental to Zimbabwe’s long-term economic development. This resource-seeking investment has led to an increase in the number of Chinese entrepreneurs immigrating to Africa. Often, Chinese firms employ expatriate managers and supervisors, who tend to leave the employing firm to establish their own company’s in the host country. The number of Chinese immigrants to Sudan had reached 24,000 by 2004, triple the amount in the late 1990s.\footnote{Large, Daniel, Sudan’s Foreign Relations with Asia, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper 158, February 2008}

5.2.8 Concessional Loans

This section examines China’s concessional lending program, which is referred to as preferential or low-interest loans extended to developing countries by the Chinese government. The concessional lending program is separate to the bank’s commercial lending facilities.
Figure 11: China’s Exim Bank project cycle

As the diagram indicates, the first stage is the signing of a bilateral agreement between the borrowing country and the People’s Republic of China. The second stage is drawing up of a loan agreement between China’s Exim Bank and representatives of the borrowing country’s government. These agreements are signed between a high-ranking government official, a Minister or Deputy Minister and the President of Exim Bank. The signing agreement is preceded by

by an elaborate signing ceremony. On the Exim Bank website, details are given of the agreements that have been signed but no information is provided on the interest payments, the kind of loans or any other details. Harris notes that “although the newswire Reuters did carry a report of China’s 2006, concessional loans to Eritrea, the story did not provide project details other than a quote from the Eritrean information minister Ali Abdu, that the US$23 million loan would be for the development of infrastructure for both fixed and mobile telephone”.539 Although the terms of the loan are not reported, the size of the loans is stated as RMB 166 million, (US$23 million), and very little information is given about the wireless network project. The network project is aimed to increase telephone subscription in Eritrea from 1.5 to 6.5 per cent540. From 2009 to 2012, China provided US$ 10 billion in financing to Africa in the form of “concessional loans”541.

According to the China Daily, in 1997 the Exim Bank has provided RMB 1 billion (US$138 million) in concessional loans to fifteen projects in six countries, namely Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Kenya and the Sudan. The China Daily reported that Beijing had funded, through concessional loans, 30 projects in Cameroon, Guyana, and Papua New Guinea542. In 2001, the People’s Daily reported that there were seventy-two concessional loan projects in thirty-six states. By 2002, the Chinese claimed they were funding ninety projects in forty-one states543.

From 2002 to 2006, it appears that the lending activity process was partially handed over to The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These bilateral agreements were called ‘economic cooperation agreements’ or development loan agreements. It is unclear if these were all concessional lending or not. According to the Foreign Affairs Minister, there are twenty-one bilateral agreements referred to as concessional loan framework agreements. Although the framework agreement makes it possible to borrow under the concessional scheme, the existence of a framework

539 Reuters, 12 April 2006, Harris Ed, Eritrea Signs Phone Loan from China, available at www.alenalki.net/content/view/115/2/, accessed 8 June 2012
542 China Daily, 18 May 1998, Bank Broaches Concessional Loan Rethink; China Daily, 4 August 1997, Exim Bank to Finance Equipment Exports

~ 148 ~
agreement does not guarantee that a loan is actually disbursed by the Exim Bank. The framework agreement sets the broad parameter for Exim Bank to extend a loan, but the framework agreement expires if the loan is not finalized within a fixed period\textsuperscript{544}.

5.2.9 How much is borrowed?

Official Chinese reports of Concessional Loan signing ceremonies and documentation from China’s Exim Bank indicate that twenty-eight separate concessional lending agreements were entered into. In figure 12 (China’s Exim Bank Concessional Lending Agreements) one is able to identify the size of the loan and the sector in which the concessional loan was provided for. Between 1998 and 2007 there were RMB5.9 billion (US$773 million) loans made.

Kurlantzick argues that China’s definition of aid does not necessary qualify as official development assistance (ODA) nor does it apply to concessional loans. Qualification as ODA depends on the specific terms of the loan. In the Chinese case, these terms are routinely omitted in reports about the Exim Bank loans. The bilateral framework agreement that authorizes the loan does, however, set the broad parameters for the loan. Although these details tend not to be reported, electronic copies of six of these framework agreements appear on a provincial government’s information website.

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546 Kurlantzick, Joshua, Charm offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World, Yale University Press, 2007, page 97
A series of articles on trade and investments in Africa, published in the *Market Daily* (a publication of the *People’s Daily*), noted that, in order to support and assist Chinese firms trading in Africa to overcome insufficient funding, Beijing had already signed reduced interest concessional loan funding agreements with 26 African countries\(^{547}\). These funds were tied to certain conditions, namely: that a Chinese firm should purchase and import from China as much equipment, technology, and services as possible; and the host site should have plentiful local resources, vast markets for goods and favorable economic prospects\(^{548}\).

### 5.3 AID

#### 5.3.1. China’s Foreign Aid to Africa: A Means of Soft Power

China’s aid and assistance program needs to be viewed against the backdrop of China’s economic engagement with the African continent. Aid is China’s most important tool in wooing African countries and therefore it is one of its most important components of soft power.

Aid is primarily tied to China’s political and strategic goals on the African continent, rather than for humanitarian reasons. According to Kurlantzick, “aid has played an important political role in China’s strategy to win support and protect its interest in Africa”\(^{549}\). China has provided aid as a form of exchange or gift-giving which is a pivotal component of China’s ancient culture, dating back to imperial times. However, today it can be referred to as a form of soft power or a tool of diplomacy: an instrument to meet political, strategic and economic objectives.\(^{550}\) A South African businessman working in China claimed that Chinese loans are conditional on the basis that contracts are given to Chinese companies.\(^{551}\) According to Kurlantzick, in 2004 Beijing had given a US$2 billion loan to Angola, where 70 per cent of the contracts were reserved for

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\(^{548}\) *Market Daily*, 22 October 2004, Zequan Huang, How to apply for concessional loan (invest in Africa).

\(^{549}\) Kurlantzick, Joshua, *Beijing Safari, China’s Move Into Africa and Its Implications for Aid, Development and Governance*, Carnegie Endowment, November 2006

\(^{550}\) Kurlantzick, Joshua, *Charm Offensive, How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World*, Yale University, 2007, page 165

\(^{551}\) Interview with Vincent Maphai, (Chairman BHP Billiton, SA), Johannesburg, May 2010
Chinese firms\textsuperscript{552}. China’s aid and debt forgiveness allows China significant leverage among African states and in turn gets support for China in the UN and other multilateral forums\textsuperscript{553}.

China’s aid program assists in developing stronger political and economic ties between China and other countries and abroad it is often perceived as a rising and responsible power. At the same time Kurlantzick believes that “China also demonstrates little respect for transparency and other aspects of good governance”\textsuperscript{554}. In the past decade aid has been an important component of China’s foreign policy, in winning support against Taiwan with developing countries and it’s lobbying at the United Nations Security Council.

The question one needs to ask is why African countries are attracted to China’s aid? It can be argued that Africa’s socio-economic conditions are conducive for China’s aid. African countries, burdened with high-interest loans and underdevelopment, were attracted to China because it did not interfere in their internal affairs and more importantly aid was offered without any conditionality. Brautigam notes that in the early days, China’s main focus was to gain as much support for Taiwan’s exclusion in the UN. China sent ‘special envoys’ on secret missions to court African leaders in exchange for aid\textsuperscript{555}.

5.3.2 China’s history of aid to Africa

China’s engagement with the African continent is not a new phenomenon. Some would argue that it dates back centuries ago to the period of trade with the communities at Great Zimbabwe and others along the east African coast. Its engagement in the form of aid is however a more recent phenomenon and was originally in the form of support to liberation movements. After independence that historical relationship was converted into official bilateral relations that most of the time also included an aid component. While in the past it was often tied into the Cold War

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{552}Kurlantzick, Joshua, Beijing Safari, China’s Move into Africa and its implications for Aid, Development and Governance, Carnegie Endowment, November 2006

\textsuperscript{553}Thompson, Drew. China’s emerging interests in Africa: Opportunities and challenges for Africa and the United States, African Renaissance Journal, July/ August 2005, page 22

\textsuperscript{554}Kurlantzick, Joshua. Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is transforming the world, Yale University, 2007, page 165

\textsuperscript{555}Brautigam, Deborah, China’s Foreign Aid in Africa: What Do We Know? in Hubbard, Paul Chinese Concessional Loans: China into Africa , Trade, Aid and Influence, Brookings Institution, 2008, page 197-217
\end{footnotesize}
contestations, more lately it assumed the role of a soft power instrument. According to Chinese policy documents, Egypt was the first African country in 1956 to receive development assistance and thereafter Beijing became increasingly occupied in Africa as these nations won their independence.\textsuperscript{556} Development finance was initially provided in support of socialist leaders in Ghana and Mali, but later expanded for direct political goals such as leveraging support from these new states to recognize Beijing instead of Taipei. The initial aid-giving was confined to neighbouring countries like North Korea, North Vietnam and other socialist countries that were in close proximity to China.

In 1964, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai introduced the ‘Eight Principles of Economic and Technical Assistance’, which included, amongst other, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty and helping aid recipients become more self-sufficient. During the Cold War, China expanded its involvement in Africa to counter United States and particularly the Soviet Union’s influence\textsuperscript{557}.

In the 1970s forty-three African countries received Chinese aid programs for the next three decades. China established formal diplomatic ties with all African countries except those that had formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan or where not yet independent. In the late 1970s and 1980s, under Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese economy opened up to foreign investment and trade, leading to a greater emphasis on projects for mutual benefit, intersection of aid, trade, and investment\textsuperscript{558}. The resource-credit swap model was used where loans were repaid in local products and primary goods, from cattle hides in Mali to cotton in Egypt and copper in Zambia. The Chinese adopted this model from Japan, who supplied loans to China in return for shipments of coal and oil. This model would become a key feature as China sought access to important natural resources from petroleum to minerals. By 1979, Chinese companies were legally permitted to transfer their businesses abroad, allowing them to bid on international projects, including those funded by the multilateral banks.

The Cold War pushed China to engage more actively with African countries and to counterweight the Soviet presence and “capitalist imperialism”, and more importantly, it

\textsuperscript{556}Brautigam, Deborah, \textit{The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China and Africa}, Oxford University Press, 2009
\textsuperscript{557}Brautigam, Deborah, \textit{The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China and Africa}, Oxford University Press, 2009
\textsuperscript{558}Wenping, He, China-Africa Relations Moving into an Era of Rapid Development in African, \textit{Africa Institute of South Africa, Inside AISA}, October/December 2006, page 2-6
strengthened its international position by winning the UN seat, which was held by Taiwan. George notes that “from 1961 to 1971, when Beijing took its seat as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China extended aid to twenty-three new countries, sixteen of them were African”\(^559\).

By 1987 the ‘new open door’ to the West and a change from a socialist to a market-driven economy reshaped China’s foreign aid program, blurring the lines between foreign aid and other forms of economic relations. During this period China was ‘promoting joint prosperity’ as a foreign policy goal, through the use of foreign aid. In December 1982, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang travelled to Africa to promote South-South cooperation “aimed at gradually switching the emphasis of China’s cooperative economic and technical relations with other Third World countries from extending loans to developing cooperation which can benefit both partners”\(^560\).

By 1983, China had shifted away from foreign aid to technical cooperation programs. China’s aid commitment of US$258.9 million to Africa made it Africa’s sixth-largest donor for that year, surpassing Japan, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom\(^561\). In 1987 Beijing announced that 69 per cent of China’s aid funds were spent on Chinese equipment, the rest presumably was spent on local cost (local labour, energy, and material)\(^562\). According to Michel and Beuret, Chinese aid was entirely tied to the purchase of Chinese goods and services\(^563\). In the early 1980s, economic gain was not the primary focus, but rather building relationships with African government officials\(^564\).

By the 1990s, Beijing had restructured its foreign aid programmes as interest-free government loans were replaced by guaranteed discount loans from Chinese banks, and aid grants being superceded by joint ventures and other forms of cooperation\(^565\).

During this period there were a number of tripartite cooperations or agreements, where China jointly funded a project with other government agencies, international aid agencies, and private

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\(^{559}\) Yu, T George, Africa in Chinese Foreign Policy, *Asian Survey*, XXVII, 1988, page 854

\(^{560}\) Ke, Li, China’s Aid to Foreign Countries, *Beijing Review*, XXVI, 1983, page 18

\(^{561}\) Brautigam, Deborah, *Chinese Aid and African Development*, 47, OECD, Aid Program of China, page 8


\(^{563}\) Michel, Serge and Beurest, Michel, *China Safari on the Trail of Beijing Expansion in Africa*, Nation Books,: 2009

\(^{564}\) Interview with counsellor Wang Shi-Ting, (South African Embassy), Pretoria, 23 June 2008 and in Beijing, 17 May 2010

companies. For example, China would supply equipment or manpower for a project while another donor would supply the funding. Kewi notes that “the Chinese have supplied technicians, equipment, and management to the World Bank and financed projects such as well drilling and rice cultivation in Somalia and rice cultivation in Rwanda”. These can be viewed as economic cooperation, or joint ventures between China and African countries. According to the China statistical yearbook, “Between 1976 and 1988, Chinese firms worldwide had fulfilled $6.9 billion type of profit-oriented contracts; between 1989 and 2005, the value of completed contracts increased to $166.7 billion”.

In many cases, China encouraged debt-equity swaps, which allowed debtor governments to invest part of their loan debt (in local currency) in joint ventures. During Zhao’s visit to Zaire in 1983, he promised to write off a tenth of Zaire’s debt-equity swap. Brautigam noted another example in the form that “Chinese companies originally established by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations to implement aid projects also became part owners of a sugar company in Togo and Tanzania”.

In the 1980s Western donors experienced financial meltdown caused by austerity cuts and liberalization in structural adjustments policies that failed to address the fiscal and balance of payment crises caused by plummeting commodity prices. China offered ‘assisted sustainability’ to countries that suffered during the economic crisis. This assistance provided aid at very reasonable rates. It would assist with repairing decayed railways tracks, renovating irrigation dams or companies that had fallen into bankruptcy. According to Brautigam, “the state-owned corporation China Complaint sent a team to Africa in 1982 to survey fifty-two projects to determine the need for spare parts and ways to improve their supply”.

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566 Interview with Mr Sun Piwen, (Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, Ministry of Commerce, PRC), Beijing, 15 January 2008
567 Zhang Kewi, Chinese Assistance to Third World, Beijing Review, XXX, vol. 29 1987, page 29
570 Brautigam, Deborah, China’s Foreign Aid in Africa: What Do We Know. China into Africa, Trade, Aid and Influence, World Peace Foundation, 2008, page 197-217
571 Interview with Mr Sun Piwen, (Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, Ministry of Commerce, PRC), Beijing, 15 January, 2008
572 Brautigam, Deborah, China’s Foreign Aid in Africa: What Do We Know? Hubbard, Paul Chinese Concessional Loans: China into Africa, Trade, Aid and Influence, Brookings Institution, 2008, page 197-217
Another success was what Brautigam referred to as ‘aid to profit’. Chinese state-owned corporations, who first came to Africa to provide aid, realized the vast opportunities to make money. These contractors realized that they could compete against their US and European counterparts, because Chinese labour was cheaper and furthermore China was willing to undertake projects for ‘cheaper prices’ in order to secure long term contracts. Thus under the banner of aid, Chinese companies stayed on in the host countries either setting up independent companies or establishing joint ventures with local partners\textsuperscript{573}. For example, in many African countries, airports and sports stadiums were completed on the basis of such an arrangement. Under the guise of development and aid, Chinese companies “brought over for construction, and charging only depreciation against aid project accounts, worked to give the new companies a tremendous cost advantage when bidding for commercial construction contracts in their host countries”\textsuperscript{574}. Confusion arose when African countries were unable to distinguish between a Chinese aid project and a commercial entity.

During the CPC congress in 1995 foreign aid became a very contentious issue. As a result Beijing decided to convene a large conference to reform China’s foreign assistance program in line with the economic rationality used in China’s domestic decisions\textsuperscript{575}. By 2000, Chinese businesses in Africa had become well entrenched; trade with African countries had dramatically increased and as a result, foreign aid became a smaller component of China’s economic relations with African countries. This shift in policy also resulted in China restructuring its Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation to become the Ministry of Commerce in 2003.

From 2000, China adopted a ‘win-win’ strategy, where Beijing and forty-four African countries launched a multilateral ‘strategic partnership’ known as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Pledges from China to Africa have doubled at each FOCAC summit: in 2006, US$5 billion was pledged; in 2009, US$10 billion and in 2012, US$20 billion. The release of a White

\textsuperscript{573}Michel, Serge and Beurest, Michel, \textit{China Safari: On the trial of Beijing’s expansion in Africa}, Nation Books, 2009


\textsuperscript{575}Interview with Sun Piwen, (Deputy Division Director, Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, Ministry of Commerce), Beijing, 15 January 2008
Paper on China’s Foreign Aid in April 2011 also represented a major step forward for Beijing, as it classified some of the government’s outgoing financial flows as foreign aid\textsuperscript{576}.

\textbf{Figure 13: China’s Foreign Aid to Africa - April 2011}\textsuperscript{577}

- Double the 2006 level of aid to Africa
- Provide $3 billion in preferential loans and $3 billion in preferential buyer’s credits
- Establish a $5 billion fund to encourage Chinese investments in Africa.
- Provide 4,000 university scholarships a year by 2009; build 100 rural schools, 30 hospitals, and 30 malaria prevention and treatments centres.
- Build 10 agricultural technology demonstration centres staffed by 100 senior agricultural experts;
- Set up 3 to 5 special economic cooperation zones for Chinese investments
- Provide some $1.4 billion in additional debt relief to low-income Africa for all overdue, zero-interest loans owed to China, and
- Send 300 youths volunteers to work in Africa

The Chinese government’s White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid, shows that 45 per cent of all Chinese aid in 2009 went to Africa, 32 per cent to Asia, and 13 per cent to Latin America and the Caribbean. Of this, two fifths was spent on projects conceptualized, planned, financed and delivered by Chinese actors. From 1978 China has aggressively followed a policy where aid equaled trade. This has boosted Chinese export and foreign exchange earnings and secured contracts for state-owned companies. Corporations like China Complete Plant Imports and Exports and China Civil Engineering and Construction Corporation are ranked today as China’s largest companies and have successfully done business in infrastructural projects in Africa.

\textsuperscript{576}People’s Republic of China (PRC), China’s Foreign Aid Information Office of the State Council, Beijing, 21 April 2011
\textsuperscript{577}Foreign Ministry, China, www.fmprc.cn/eng/, accessed 4 March 2008

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Some scholars and critics argue that China provides aid to African countries that have natural resources, while at the same time enhancing its own economic growth. A recent report by the Centre of Global Development explains that Western policymakers accuse “China of expanding its presence in Africa for largely self-interested reasons: securing access to natural resources, subsidizing Chinese firms and exports, cementing and expanding political alliances, and pursuing global economic hegemony”, while it claimed that “rogue” donors like China “couldn’t care less about the long-term well-being of the population of the countries they aid”\(^{578}\). However, there is no evidence to prove this.

In August 2012, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on her trip to Africa stated “that America is committed to democracy and human rights in Africa, even when it might be easier or more profitable to look the other way to keep the resources flowing”\(^{579}\). China’s official *People's Daily* newspaper responded that “China's investment in Africa is based on respecting the will of Africa, listening to the voice of Africa and caring about the concerns of Africa, thus earning the trust of most African countries”\(^{580}\).

African policymakers are also divided as to what impact Chinese development aid will have on social, economic and environmental outcomes. In 2008, then President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, in a *Financial Times* op-ed, took umbrage with Western donors for criticizing Chinese aid and investment programs: “China’s approach to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of European investors, donor organizations and nongovernmental organizations. ... With direct aid, credit lines and reasonable contracts, China has helped African nations build infrastructure projects in record time - bridges, roads,

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When it comes to aid and developmental assistance, China has focused on “mutual benefit” and “diversity of form”. According to Brautigam, Chinese aid takes the form of mutually beneficial agreements in various sectors, including education, health, agriculture, infrastructure development, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping and at the same time establishing profit-generating joint ventures involving Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)\textsuperscript{584}.

More “conventional” aid is usually in the form of soft loans and debt relief, rather than direct grants. Chinese aid to Africa is an important plank in Beijing’s foreign policy and is linked to

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strategic and political objectives\textsuperscript{585}, of which one is to use aid and assistance to cement ties with resource-rich African economies\textsuperscript{586}. China’s other goals for aid assistance include the desire to augment Beijing’s domestic legitimacy by enhancing local perceptions of China’s as an aid-giving nation. Chinese aid to Africa differs from Western aid to Africa, in that it does not impose any economic or political conditionalities, maybe with the exception of adherence to the ‘One China Policy’, on African clients.

When offering aid to developing countries Western donors conditionalities are rooted in a particular history. When developing countries were steeped in the debt crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s, the IMF and World Bank offered aid that was tied to the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)\textsuperscript{587}. These neo liberal economic prescriptions, known as the “Washington Consensus”, claimed that the debt crisis was attributed to excessive government spending\textsuperscript{588}. The result is that “developing countries today are overwhelmed by economic and political conditionality attached to economic assistance from the North”.\textsuperscript{589}

However, Chinese aid, which does not contain Western economic prescripts, is greatly appreciated by African governments, who resent the policies imposed by Western governments, or are unwilling to adhere to reforms dictated by conditionalities.

On the surface, the types of projects that China invests in or funds varies and is not consistent with any clear plan. Some of these projects seem strange, as they are not aimed at promoting development or investment – for example, the building of sports centers or stadiums in Kenya, Uganda, Liberia, Mali and Zimbabwe. Other projects such as the construction of government offices or parliament buildings in Liberia, Guinea and Mozambique, or conference centers in

\textsuperscript{589}Kevlihan R, Becoming a “Player”: Ireland and Aid Conditionality with reference to Sudan, \textit{The European Journal of Development Research}, 2001, vol. 13, issue1, page76

\~ 160 ~
Mali and Mozambique can be viewed as development projects. The value of building a cinema in Guinea remains unclear. Other projects providing infrastructure development are clearly aimed at facilitating Chinese business ventures and economic interests. The development of a power station in Ethiopia and a hydropower station in Guinea, methane-generating pits in Kenya and Uganda, and various factories or mills in Liberia, Mali, Mozambique and Zimbabwe\textsuperscript{590}, are indicative of such ventures and interests. However, other projects are typical development projects, such as the dispatch of technical assistance in the form of medical teams and providing scholarships for African students to study in China.

5.3.4 Institutional structure of Chinese aid

The institutional arrangement through which the Chinese government provides aid or assistance consists of a number of key bodies. They include two types of banks and two important Ministries. PRC assistance or aid to Africa is controlled by the state-owned Export-Import (Exim) Bank of China, established in 1994. Exim Bank is the vehicle for which official PRC bilateral concessional loans, export credits and international loan guarantees are provided. The Aid to Foreign Countries Department of the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) manages and executes the PRC’s bilateral foreign aid policy, budgeting and project implementation. It does this by controlling the bidding and vetting processes for soft loan contract projects undertaken by PRC firms. Another important entity is the China Development Bank (CDB) established in 1994, whose core function is to serve as a ‘development orientated financial institution’ under the direct jurisdiction of the State Council (this is the supreme decision making body of the PRC leadership). The CDB is the main source of funding for the China-Africa Development Fund. The various ministries (e.g. Health, Education) deploy technical and advisory teams to Africa under the MOC guidance. Other export agencies and provincial organizations such as chambers of commerce and export promotions also play a role in foreign assistance projects.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and MOC officials advise top policymakers on assistance to Africa. However, political and policy decisions are made by the PRC leadership,

commonly referred to as the State Council, in conjunction with the leading Group on Foreign Affairs of the Communist Party. The State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) focuses on economic aspects of Africa’s assistance.\footnote{Interview with Mr Sun Piwen, (Deputy Division Director: Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, Ministry of Commerce), Beijing, 15 January 2008; Interview with Mr Cai Fang, (Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, Ministry of Commerce), Beijing, 16 January 2008; Interview with Mr Yang Youming, (Department of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Beijing, 16 January 2008; Dumbaugh, Kerry, \textit{China’s Foreign Policy and Soft Power in South America, Asia, and Africa}, Congressional Research Service, 29 April 2008}

During my interviews for this study I was informed that Chinese ambassadors meet periodically to propose aid levels for their countries and that individual projects are vetted by country desk officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For example, the construction of the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, estimated at US$150 million, was also vetted by the Ministry of Finance.\footnote{Interview with Mr Cai Fang (Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, Ministry of Commerce), Beijing, 11 May 2010} Large scale projects, like energy investments in Africa are first passed by the Office of the National Energy Leading Group, the SDPC and the MOC with advice from China’s three key state-owned oil companies, which also implement such policy goals.\footnote{Dumbaugh, Kerry, \textit{China’s Foreign Policy and Soft Power in South America, Asia, and Africa}, Congressional Research Service, 29 April 2008, page 115}

Aid programs in Africa are designed and managed based on the requirements of an individual country, but within the PRC policy objectives for Africa. However, the common factor is that the aid is offered “as part of or contingent upon sealing of larger, integrated bilateral commercial, military, and/or political package agreements”.\footnote{Lancaster, Carol, \textit{The Chinese Aid System}, Centre for Global Development, June 2007, page 3} Government officials claim that the country by country approach allows China not to apply a monolithic Chinese model of socio-economic development on individual African countries.\footnote{Interview with Prof Yang Libua, (Centre of Southern African Studies IWAS, Chinese Academy of Social Science), Beijing, 18 May 2010} Officials also claim that PRC bilateral cooperation is designed to meet the needs and priorities of each individual country. However, critics argue that the PRC targets countries that are of relevance to them economically or politically. China does not coordinate its aid in Africa with other donor countries; however, it is beginning to consult with successful donor-oriented Nordic countries.
5.3.5  How much aid does Africa receive?

China has committed US$75bn in aid and development projects in Africa in the past decade, (2000-2011)\(^{596}\). According to some researchers the scale of aid is often referred to as “Beijing’s escalating soft power charm offensive” to secure political and economic clout on the African continent\(^{597}\).

Aid is one of the most important policy instruments for China applied in its various engagements with Africa. The Chinese government releases very little information on its foreign aid activities, which remain state secrets and thus it is difficult to obtain accurate figures. It is estimated that by the end of 2009 Africa has received 45.7 percent of the RMB 256.29 billion cumulative foreign aid of China\(^{598}\).

China provides eight types of foreign aid, namely goods and material, technical cooperation, human resources development cooperation, medical assistance, emergency humanitarian aid, volunteer programs and debt relief\(^{599}\). China’s aid to Africa covers a wide range of activities from agriculture, education, transportation, energy, communication, to health.

According to the Ministry of Commerce, external aid includes grants and zero-interest loans and concessional loans made by Exim Bank\(^{600}\). Most of the Exim Bank loans come from capital raised domestically and on the international capital markets. Exim Bank is given a strict quota of concessional loans it offers annually. From 2009 to 2012, China provided US$10 billion in

\(^{598}\)Sun Yun, China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah, Brookings Institution, February 2014, available at: http://www.brookings.edu/ research/opinions/2014/02/07-china-aid-to-africa-sun, accessed 23 June 2014
\(^{600}\)Interview with Mr Sun Piwen, (Deputy Division Director: Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, Ministry of Commerce), Beijing, 15 January, 2008
financing to Africa in the form of concessional loans\textsuperscript{601}. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first overseas trip to Africa in March 2012, he doubled this amount to US$20 billion\textsuperscript{602}. The head analyst of Export-Import Bank of China predicts that by 2025, China will provide Africa with US$1 trillion in financing, including direct investment, soft loans and commercial loans\textsuperscript{603}.

A detailed analysis of Chinese budget expenditures, reports and media announcements, supplemented by interviews with Chinese officials, have provided interesting insights into Chinese aid to Africa (for details, see Brautigam 2011). Figure 14 compares China’s official African development aid in 2008 with ODA as reported by major donors.

\textbf{Figure 14: Official development assistance to Africa, 2008}\textsuperscript{604}

The above diagram indicates that the USA provided US$7.2 billion of aid to Africa in 2008. The second largest donor was the World Bank which gave US$4.1 Billion, whilst China as seen in the graph is one of the smallest aid donors to Africa (US$1.2 billion)\textsuperscript{605}. Although development aid provided by China to Africa has increased, it is still not as large as compared to the USA, the

\textsuperscript{602}Cai Xin, 25 March, 2013, China to provide 20 Billion USD credits to Africa in three years, available at: http://international.caxin.com/2013-03-25/100506116.html, accessed 23 June 2014
\textsuperscript{603}South China Morning Post, 18 November 2013, China to Provide Africa with 1 Trillion (USD) financing, Toh Han Shih, http://www.scmp.com/business/bank-finance/article/1358902/china-provide-africa-us1tr-financing, accessed 23 June 2014
\textsuperscript{604}Brautigam, Deborah, \textit{The Dragon’s Gift: The real story of China in Africa}, Oxford University Press, UK, 2009
\textsuperscript{605}Brautigam, Deborah, \textit{The Dragon’s Gift: The real story of China in Africa}, Oxford University Press, UK 2009, page 23

~ 164 ~
World Bank and other European countries. A comparison in the above graph indicates that China is still modest and a medium sized donor contrary to what other researchers have indicated.

Between 2001 and 2005 concessional loans had grown almost 35 per cent per year. By 2005, Exim Bank had approved 200 projects in Africa amounting to US$6.6 billion. However a World Bank report revealed that in 2005, Exim Bank had only funded US$800 million worth of concessional loan projects in Africa (approximately 55 projects)\(^\text{606}\). In 2007 China pledged US$3 billion for preferential loans and $2 billion export-buyer’s credit over the course of the following three years. This was doubled in 2009 when it pledged US$10 billion and also pledged US$1 billion for small and medium sized businesses\(^\text{607}\).

These pledges were seen favorable by the former Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi who stated: “We, the Africans leaders are able to take the necessary measures to benefit us from the opportunity created by our partnership with China in a manner that is consisted with our principles of solidarity”\(^\text{608}\). The Ethiopian Minister of Trade, Girma Biru, also commented on Chinese policy, stating: “China has become our most reliable partner and there is a lot we can learn from Beijing”\(^\text{609}\). In Angola, after three decades of civil war, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) convinced the government that oil revenues should be allocated to social programs. Angolan Ministers were initially receptive to the IMF loans; however at the last minute the Angolan government broke off talks with the IMF and instead decided to receive loans and credits for oil reconstruction from the Chinese. Beijing offered Angola loans and credits worth $5 billion without the conditionalities that the IMF had attached to the credit arrangements\(^\text{610}\).


\(^{610}\) Interview with Carine Kiala, (Advisor to Consulate General of Republic of Angola in Hong Kong), Pretoria, 21 November 2011
This indicates that China’s official loans provide a major challenge to Washington-based institutions such the IMF and the World Bank. It is important to note that in 2005, OECD countries’ funding for African grant projects was still larger (US$30.7 billion) compared to China’s. The remarks made by the Ethiopians and Angolans are classic indicators of the success of soft power or a state’s attractive power for others. Chinese aid based on the “Beijing Consensus” model (discussed in Chapter 6) is therefore a key element of its economic soft power configuration.

According to some think tanks, most Chinese financing to Africa is associated with securing Africa’s natural resources - referred to as the ‘Angola Model’, where China provides low interest loans to nations who rely on commodities, such as oil or mineral resources as collateral security.

In addition to securing Africa’s natural resources, China’s capital flows into Africa also create business opportunities for Chinese service contracts, such as construction companies. According to Chinese analysts, Africa is China’s second largest supplier of service contracts: “we provide Africa assistance of RMB 1 billion, we will get service contracts worth USD 1 billion (RMB 6 billion) from Africa”. In exchange for Chinese financial aid, Beijing requires that Africans favor a Chinese service provider, which means that 70 percent of contracts go to ‘approved’ state owned Chinese companies. In some cases local joint ventures with Chinese companies are encouraged as an alternative. In this sense, China’s financing for African states creates business and employment opportunities for Chinese workers.

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~ 166 ~
In most African countries China had constructed public buildings, such as ministerial office blocks, cultural centers, schools, hospitals, clinics, roads and bridges. China has also supported light industry – factories that produce bricks, textiles, paper or cement. It has also funded projects in the agricultural sector. However, most of China’s aid went towards supporting small to medium size projects, such as a loan of US$8.6 million to construct two administration buildings in Burkina Faso, or the launch of a US$3 million irrigation project in Ghana.\footnote{Brautigam, Deborah, \textit{China, Africa and the International Aid Architecture}, Working Papers Series no.107, Tunis, Tunisia, African Development Bank, page 50}

China has provided only a small quantity of aid to South Africa and this has been limited to education and training. In support of the government project AsgiSA aimed at training and job creation, China has provided US$6.3 million for technical training in South Africa. During President Hu Jintao’s visit to South Africa in 2007, he promised an additional US$25 million.

The funding was originally intended to assist the textile industry with skills development. However, due to the lack of response from the South African textile industry, the fund was diverted to technical training in agriculture, tourism, defense and foreign affairs. Thus China’s small aid package to South Africa has had almost no impact on employment or poverty alleviation. Embassy officials emphasize that ironically South Africa has a relatively higher per capita GDP than China.

As China’s population increases, it faces growing pressures to meet internal demands for natural resources. Taylor observes that “African nations such as Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria also have significant untapped natural resources and are witnessing a donor race to gain access to these resources.” Some analysts believe that this need for resource security is the main motivator for Chinese aid and investment. Others argue that “China’s ‘tied aid’ for infrastructure usually favors Chinese companies (especially state-owned enterprises), while its loans are in many cases backed by African natural resources.” Similarly, Foster et al. conclude that “most Chinese government-funded projects in Sub-Saharan Africa are ultimately aimed at securing a flow of Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources for export to China.” However, Beijing flatly rejects the claim that its aid program is only designed to secure access to other countries’ natural resources.

China’s policy of non-interference in the domestic politics of sovereign governments has raised the assertion that China is underwriting “rogue states” or very undemocratic states and its

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619 Interview with Mr Wang Shi-Ting, (Counselor, Chinese embassy in Pretoria, South Africa), Pretoria, 10 March 2008

~ 168 ~
support is enabling their continued survival. The Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2000) states that “[t]he politicization of human rights and the imposition of human rights conditionalities on economic assistance should be vigorously opposed.” To Western analysts, this is a convenient rationale for China “turning a blind eye” and doing business in undemocratic and corrupt regimes with a poor human rights record. A common view is that when Western donors withhold aid because of undemocratic practices or human rights violations, African governments simply make a deal with China, thereby undermining aid conditionality. Scholars have argued whether easy access to cheap Chinese loans with “no strings attached” has delayed good governance and the introduction of anti-corruption reforms. Lombard points out that the Angola government was able to resist IMF pressure for oil revenue transparency because it was able to access an interest-free loan from the Chinese Export-Import Bank. There is a belief amongst analysts that China has effectively become a lender of last resort for those governments with poor economic governance who are unable to secure loans from the Bretton Woods Institutions. For example, Downs (2011a: 93-94) points out that, in spite of “gross economic mismanagement” by the Venezuelan government, the Chinese Development Bank gave a US$20.6 billion loan that helped “finance [Hugo] Chávez’s bid to win a third consecutive six-year term as president”. There have been similar claims about China’s support for Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in power for 33 years and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, in power since 1980.

626Naim, Moises, Rogue Aid, Foreign Policy, 14 February 2007
630Collier, Paul, The Bottom Billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it. Oxford University Press, 2007
5.3.6  Sudan, Angola and Zimbabwe: Cases of aid

Beijing’s aid programs are linked to a country’s own economic and political objectives. In Sudan, China has been able to secure Sudanese oil partly because of its attractive offers of aid. In 2002 the Sudanese government received a US$2.5 million grant for the refurbishment of a hospital, and in June 2004 they signed a preferential loan agreement for US$3.6 million for the construction of a new International Conference Hall and the training of Sudan’s Ministry of International Cooperation’s employees.

Since 1997, China’s State Council has provided preferential loans with interest deductions to enterprises involved in specific projects in strategic industries. Simultaneously, the State Council began to rapidly expedite a number of different projects, and increased the amount of aid thus facilitating increased trade and commercial engagement with Africa. In Zimbabwe small and medium sized enterprises (SME) have been granted credit from Chinese banks, which has enabled Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises to reserve US$12 billion for the country’s SMEs engaged in the textiles, soap, and tile and fiberglass manufacturing. Huge state-owned enterprises are also assisted in this manner: an example is the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company and the China Capital Iron and Steel Corporation’s joint venture in June 1999 to reconstruct a blast furnace with the assistance of buyer’s credit from China’s Export-Import Bank.

These soft loans are often provided to improve or construct infrastructure that facilitates trade and investment, as well to leverage commercial opportunities. In Sudan, the Chinese government credit loans are financing the construction of hydropower plants, including an 85 per cent investment in the construction of the US$470 million, 300 megawatt Kajbar Dam and the 2 500 megawatt Merowe Dam, totaling US$1.73 billion. When completed in 2008 these dams will

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potentially increase two or three fold Sudan’s capacity to generate electricity. In Mozambique, China’s Export-Import Bank extended a US$2.3 billion loan for the construction of a new hydroelectric power plant that will be utilized in mineral exploitation. During Wen Jiabao’s tour to Africa in June 2006, an agreement was signed to finance the construction of a railway line from Pakwach (in Uganda) to the southern Sudanese capital of Juba.

In 2004, Beijing extended a US$2 billion soft loan to Angola for infrastructure projects, including repairing railroads, building roads, constructing offices, construction of a fiber-optic network, and exploring for oil. The loan was granted based on the understanding that Chinese firms will secure a 70 percent portion of these projects, which was guaranteed by a contract for the sale of oil from an Angolan oil field that produces 10 000 barrels per day. The Angolan government welcomed the loan, especially as it was reluctant to turn to the IMF who was pressuring the government to improve transparency in its oil sector and combat widespread government corruption. It was China that benefited from providing loan since it secured contracts for Chinese firms as well had access to Angolan oil.

China has been criticized by the IMF and World Bank for extending such loans to poor African governments with little prospect of repayment.

There is clear that China provides financial aid to African countries for developing infrastructure that will facilitate even more Chinese commercial involvement as well as to gain favour with African elites. Ultimately China’s foreign aid is linked to Chinese companies who are contracted to provide the services for which the aid is intended. This guarantees that China gains political and economic benefits through its assistance to Africa. The question is whether the Chinese aid

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637 Shishor, Yitzhak, Sudan, China’s Outpost in Africa, China Brief 5, no.21, The Jamestown Foundation, 2005 vol. 21.
and assistance makes it more attractive to the African recipients. From the evidence presented above it can be concluded that the governments or elites, especially of states with problematic democratic records, see it as an attractive alternative for the IMF and World Bank. The same is not clear in the case of local businesses and the public in general. One of the key elements of Chinese aid is acceptance of Chinese businesses and labour to implement the assistance projects. Local economies already in the field can be threatened by the Chinese presence while economies not yet active in that field might benefit from the Chinese presence. Its implications for Chinese soft power in Africa are therefore not one-dimensional.

5.4 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter attempted to explore the economic relations between China and African states, with specific focus on trade and investment as elements of China’s projection of its soft power into Africa. It revealed that general trade between China and Africa grew exponentially over the last decade and that this increase has seen China importing mostly raw materials, commodities and primary products while African states importing mostly manufactured and value-added goods from China.

Africa’s exports to China has increased, largely as a result of China’s growing need for energy security which has resulted in increased oil imports from Africa, particularly from Sudan.

China’s increasing demand for commodities has the potential to have a positive impact on Africa’s growth, as this is linked to the growth in their foreign exchange and capital for more investments. However, these benefits could be outweighed by the high volatility of demand for Africa’s commodities depending on tendencies in the Chinese domestic market.

A further problem is that China’s presence in Africa has the potential to encourage rent-seeking behavior, where the elites are enriched with little or no benefits for the masses. In addition, China has carefully developed relationships with Sudan and Zimbabwe, which allows it to extract oil (in Sudan) and commodities like tobacco, diamonds, gold and agricultural products (in Zimbabwe) in exchange for weapons and military equipment.
The influx of cheap Chinese manufactured goods and consumables has a potentially positive impact on the purchasing power of the poor, such as in Uganda where the general population has benefited from access to affordable consumables at no expense to local industry. However, in economies such as South Africa, where there is a mature manufacturing sector, Chinese imports have been detrimental to the textile and footwear industries, which have seen numerous factory closures and job losses. The trade relationship between South Africa and China was singled out because South Africa is China’s largest trading partner in Africa.

It is clear that China is seeking new investments opportunities in African countries and for the most part, these investments are welcomed by African governments, especially in the light of decreased European and North American investments. It is important to note that it is the state rather than the market, that determines Chinese investment projects and that many of these companies are State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which are accountable to party officials rather than commercial managers.

China’s economic involvement in Africa conforms to an Economic Nationalist explanatory framework. The nature of China’s business in Africa is premised on the notion of promoting its national interest as its primary priority and as such bolstering China’s domestic economy irrespective of its impact on the African economies. In particular, China’s interests in African minerals and oil are aimed at bolstering its domestic manufacturing base and energy security and therefore these relations with African states are aimed at furthering its own economic development, and, within Realist terms, its national power.

China decided to make its largest investments in Africa’s energy sector in order to secure its own oil flow. Most African companies see China as a reliable partner and one that allows them to offset the influence of the private multinationals oil companies. China has become a major player in almost all the oil producing countries on the African continent. China’s strategy of aggressively offering economic investment package and trade opportunities is working, while at the same time improving its ability to gain opportunities either to purchase additional oil supplies or to develop partnerships with state oil companies.
It is evident that China’s investment interests lie in raw materials, primary products and the extractive industries. While these investments have some positive consequences, such as employment creation and technological transfer, it is “likely that these investments are adding to the riches of the elites, with little positive impact on the poor and needy”643. China’s aid to Africa is not unusual by any standards. Many Western countries have provided generous aid since colonial times; however, China uses aid in a sophisticated manner that is disguised in many forms which enhances its soft power. China uniquely operates its aid program by its own rules and terms, different to Western norms – aid channeled through Exim Bank.

The intention of China’s aid to Africa is benign but not altruistic. China publicly states that it does not seek to use aid to influence the domestic politics of African countries or dictate policies. Instead, its stated motivation is to assist African countries’ development. However, China is not helping Africa in exchange for nothing. Chinese projects create access to Africa’s natural resources and local markets, business opportunities for Chinese companies and employment for Chinese laborers. Chinese officials often refute this statement by claiming that China also provides aid to countries that are not rich in natural resources, but neglect to mention that China may have other intentions like support for Beijing’s “one China policy”, or for China’s agenda for its multilateral forum. China’s aid policy to Africa is complex, comprehensive and multi-dimensional and defies any simplistic view.

China’s success lies in that its bankers do not impose governance preconditions on lending by African governments. The one positive aspect to China’s foreign aid has been the boom in Africa’s infrastructural projects, creating much needed electrical, transportation and telecommunications capacity.

Finally, inclusion of economic elements in the discussion of China’s soft power does not follow closely the Nye approach to soft power. It suggests that China uses its economic means and trade relations with African states in a manner different from the USA and most European countries. Hence this chapter argued by way of demonstration that the Chinese economic elements assume

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the role of soft power components much more than in the case of the American approach – hence
the deviation from the Nye approach. It should not, however, be understood that the Chinese
approach is not an unqualified success, as explained earlier, and therefore that inclusion of
economic elements as part of soft power should be regarded as an unqualified new theoretical
contribution. Its theoretical implications should however be more closely investigated in future.
CHAPTER SIX:

How China Uses Political Soft Power in Africa

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter concentrated on China’s use of economic soft power in Africa. This chapter is concerned with its ancillary element, namely political soft power. Nye’s notion of soft power remains the main point of reference but in addition one can include also specific articulations of soft power by scholars on China. Bonnie Glaser and Melissa Murphy noted in their study that China’s leading philosophers and sociologists tend to think that China’s soft power stems from its culture, while international relations scholars view political power as the critical element of soft power. Men Honghua, an expert at the Central Party School, identified five key aspects of soft power: culture, concept, mode of development, international institutions and international image. In 2006, Tsinghua University Professor Yan Xuetong regarded soft power as the government’s ability to politically mobilize a nation for internal and external purposes. While Yan posits that hard and soft power work together, other Chinese scholars argue that military soft power is necessary to consolidate political, spiritual and hard power. In this chapter we will therefore focus on how China uses political soft power in its relations with African countries.

Chinese government leaders have identified soft power as a key component of national power. At the 16th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 2002, President Jiang Zemin said: “in the present day world, culture is interactive with economic and political activities and its status and functions are becoming more and more outstanding in the competition in overall national

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646 Xuetong Yan, The Path for China to increase its Soft Power, China and World Affairs, March 2006
In recent years, Chinese experts have developed a better understanding of the role of soft power and concluded that soft power will help address both external and internal interests.

In this chapter we discuss China’s political soft power in Africa. Firstly we look at China’s grand strategy, its foreign policy objectives in general and its foreign policy towards Africa. It is followed by an examination of how China uses political soft power in Africa. In this regard we look at four areas of Chinese soft power in Africa, namely the “one China policy” (and the issue of Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition), the Beijing Consensus as an alternative for the Washington Consensus, how China uses the United Nations as a means to demonstrate soft power. Sudan and Darfur is used as case study to illustrate the use of political soft power. The fourth and final area of Chinese soft power is FOCAC.

The next instrument of Chinese soft power in Africa is how military and peacekeeping operations are used to make it attractive for African states. Another instrument that is discussed in this chapter is China’s political outreach as means of soft power. It is followed by a discussion of Chinese image-building in Africa. The final two instruments of soft power are the role of state security and intelligence and the embassies as used by China in Africa.

6.1.1 China’s Grand Strategy

Scholars like Deng, Wang and Shambaugh have argued that during the 1990s China developed a new grand strategy for its global relations which also included its relations with Africa. They argued that there has been a marked shift in the orientation of Chinese foreign policy that dates back to the mid-1990s. Goldstein (2005) calls this a neo-Bismarckian strategy, where “China’s capabilities were increasing and its military was improving, both compared with its own recent past and relative to others. Yet its modest increase in power hardly seemed to justify the alarmed

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648 Yang Taoyuan, Rising China’s Soft Power, Tisheng Zhongguo Ruan Shili, 23 June 2004, page 14-20
reaction it elicited, and it was this reaction that would shape China’s emerging grand strategy.\footnote{649}{Goldstein, Avery, \textit{Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security}, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005, page 69}

The contours of the Chinese grand strategy remain somewhat vague, but most scholars point to China’s active role in regional and international organizations, commitment to multilateralism, proliferation of partnerships and alliances around the globe, and leadership role in international issues, including arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. Collectively, these examples represent a marked shift in Chinese foreign policy, which in the past focused almost exclusively on economic relations.\footnote{650}{Goldstein, Avery, \textit{Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security}, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005, page 69}

However, before we look at China’s grand strategy, it is important to define what that grand strategy is. International relations scholars define grand strategy as an approach examining how a state can best protect its core interests given its available national resources and international constraints.\footnote{651}{Walt, M. Stephen, \textit{The Origins of Alliances}. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1987.} There is very little distinction between grand strategy and foreign policy. Foreign policy determines state behavior in specific policy areas or issues (with an emphasis on tools and tactics), while the broader notion of a grand strategy includes a state’s strategic objectives, intentions, and plans for achieving them. A grand strategy does not exist in a vacuum, but rather reflects the external security environment, domestic political concerns, and available resources. To understand China’s grand strategy, one must consider the underlying beliefs that drive state behavior. Since ancient times China was seen as a ‘World Empire’ without any rivals in East Asia. Its political and cultural influences were very strong in Japan, Korea and Vietnam and on the northern nomadic tribesmen, the Mongols.\footnote{652}{Zhang, T, \textit{Self-Identity Construction of the Present China}, \textit{Comparative Strategy}, no. 23, 2004, page 283-284} However, the empire suffered a major blow during the 19th century when the West and Japan controlled large parts of China, practically rendering it a protectorate. Being at the receiving end of colonial Japanese and Western aggression, both regarded as ‘inferior barbarians’ in Chinese cosmology, Beijing adopted an ambiguous position of 'admiration and indignation' towards Japan and the West.\footnote{653}{Womack, B, \textit{Contemporary Chinese politics in historical perspective}, Cambridge University Press, 1991, page 209}
injustice, termed the ‘Century of Humiliation’, is still dominant and drives Beijing’s ambitions. Since the early 20th century Chinese elites as well as nationalist leaders like Sun Yet-Sen and communist leaders such as Mao proffered two reasons for the Chinese elites to reassert this strong nationalism, which became part of its foreign relations. First, the Chinese regard their rise as regaining their lost international status rather than obtaining something new. Second, they consider the rise of China as the return of fairness rather than gaining advantages over others. Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin repeatedly called for the ‘rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ and this is evident more than ever during the last three decades.

Under Mao Zedong, China’s bilateral relationships and foreign policy behavior was guided by the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, which included mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in one another’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. After China opened up to the world in 1979, the country embraced Deng Xiaoping’s dictum that China should not seek a global power status, but should instead emphasize ‘peace and development’\(^{654}\). Even after the Cold War, China remained committed to this slogan, as part of its grand strategy. However, the dramatic changes in the regional and global environment, along with China’s increased engagement with global institutions and its rapid economic growth, prompted many members of China’s foreign policy elite to re-examine China’s grand strategy for the 21st century.

China’s booming economy, aggressive military modernization plans and increased diplomatic activity has confirmed the ‘rise of China’ in the international arena. Realist theorists of international relations predict that as China’s international status improves, it will begin to seek more influence on other actors and institutions. In its own statements Beijing has called for greater national power and an end to hegemony and has encouraged the international community to pursue a multi-polar future. According to Realist theorists, China’s foreign “policy preferences, and likelihood that a rising China will engage in conflict with other states is a given”\(^{655}\).


\(^{655}\) Bulkeley, Jennifer, Perspectives of Power: Chinese Strategies to Measure and Manage China’s Rise, Unpublished dissertation, Graduate School of Arts and Science, Harvard University, 2009, page 22
Authors like Avery Goldstein, Michael Swaine, and Ashley Tellis who examined China’s rise and grand strategy policy, argued that a rising power essentially has two options: to either balance against the hegemony through competition and confrontation or to assimilating with hegemony or with the existing system\textsuperscript{656}.

As China designs its grand strategy, its leadership must determine which grand strategy best fits its objective and beliefs: either (1) to become a regional hegemony, or (2) to establish a superpower status through spheres of influence, or (3) to become a responsible stakeholder with global influence or (4) to challenge American hegemony and replace the United States as the world’s only superpower.

All these four possibilities will reduce American influence in the global landscape, resulting in China taking a greater leadership role on the international stage\textsuperscript{657}. Below is a schematic summary of the Grand Strategy:

6.1.2 Political or Ideological Sphere of Influence.

China’s recent emphasis on building soft power may be accompanied by an attempt to spread its political ideology, taking into account that soft power is driven by ideology and extends beyond cultural ties, to shape political, economic, military, social and diplomatic relations as well. Although China continues to insist that it does not seek to export a particular ideology, Beijing’s call for anti-hegemony and non-interference in another state’s affairs is very appealing to developing countries. This will be discussed later in the chapter.

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658 Author’s own interpretation
659 Yu Xintian, Building Soft Power, China’s Foreign Strategy, Guoji Wenti Yanjiu, March 13, 2008
6.1.3 China's Foreign Policy Objectives

Ye Zicheng, a professor at Peking University, argues that China should try to strengthen its soft power in the areas of politics, economy, and foreign policy in order to avoid following in the footsteps of the former Soviet Union. In his opinion, the Soviet Union collapsed because of its weak soft power which reduced its influence in the international arena. According to him, China’s foreign policy is based on four objectives, namely:

1) Modernization
2) To protect is sovereignty
3) To enhance its security
4) To attain a great power status

These objectives are not only unique to China’s foreign policy, but are shared among all super power states. However, what make China’s objectives different is its historical experience, (i.e. its ‘Hundred Years of Humiliation’), its Communist tradition, and its strong nationalism. A challenging question for China watchers is whether China will, as a rising power, “become a rational, peaceful, and pragmatic power or an irrational, bellicose and expansionist state”\(^{660}\)? As Nye argues, foreign policy is a key element of soft power resources, and the implementation of a well-thought out foreign policy can greatly affect a country’s soft power. China is no exception. In this regard, the peaceful rise and peaceful development policies have been regarded as diplomatic strategies to realize China’s development into a global power. According to Cho and Jeong, China’s rise has great significance with regard to its foreign policy. Firstly, there is a change from the American-centered diplomacy to a neighbour-centered diplomacy; secondly, China’s diplomatic objective is to be accepted into the international area with the ultimate goal of being a global leader and increasing its comprehensive national power\(^{661}\). In other words, the ‘peaceful rise’ theory maintains that China’s global strategy has been transformed from an internal to an external orientation. Cho and Jeong argue that the “peaceful rise theory now


\(^{661}\)Cho Nam Young and Jeong Ho Jong, China’s Soft Power: Discussions, Resources and Prospects, Asian Survey, vol. XLVIII, no.3, May/ June 2008, page 467
reflects China’s continued expansion of national power, the change in perception of domestic and foreign conditions within China, and the desire to search for a new foreign policy facilitating China’s emergence as a global power.662

From the outset, in order to understand China’s foreign policy, one needs to comprehend China’s national interest. According to Chinese policy documents, the national interest is often used interchangeably with state interest. This concept is essentially an appeal to nationalism.663 In the 1980s, Chinese policy documents categorized national interest under two broad ideas: first, “preservation of existing national interests and the second the protection of its future national interests.”664 The former included preserving “it’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, developing national economic and industrial and trade systems, as well protecting the people and their properties.”665 The second element was to operationalize or promote national development, in other words, the resources that would enhance China’s national power. In fact, national interest actually reflects China’s “lessen concerns with survival of the nation, and instead, reveals China’s overarching dream of attaining great power status.”666

During the last decade, China’s pursuit of multilateralism, multi-polarism, the New Security Concept and good neighbourly relationships are the essence of China’s desire to create an external environment favourable to itself and to protect and maximize its national interest.667 Similarly, China’s African policy is also directed at protecting and maximizing its national interest. Scholars and researchers have argued that the concept of national interest is referred to as China’s Comprehensive National Power (CNP) (zonghe guoli). This refers to the “totality

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664 Bhattacharya Abanti, China’s Foreign Policy Challenge and Evolving Strategy, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: Strategic Analysis, January-March 2006, vol. 30, no 1, page 189
665 Ibid

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of its economic, military and political power in a given period"\textsuperscript{669}. According to Cho and Jeong, “soft power is an important component of this comprehensive national power (CNP)\textsuperscript{670}.

The CNP was first mentioned in 1992 in the 14th Party Congress Report. China’s investment in building strong military and self-sufficient resources is some of the ways to enhance CNP and is part of China’s grand strategy. China’s grand strategy is not only for survival but is “increasingly contingent on its rise as a great power”\textsuperscript{671}. Another pivotal part of its grand strategy is rapid economic growth to ensure the survival of Communist Party rule. According to author Fei-Ling Wang, “China’s primary motivation behind its foreign policy remains the preservation of the political system of the Chinese Communist party” (CCP)\textsuperscript{672}. Hence the Chinese leadership is currently focused on economic and technological development as opposed to previous great powers that focused primarily on military security.

Many Chinese scholars regard the strengthening of China’s soft power as a key national objective. In the \textit{Theory on Comprehensive National Power} Huang Shuofeng describes comprehensive national power as comprising of hard power (i.e. economic power, science and technology power, national defense power, and natural resource power) and soft power (i.e. political power, diplomatic power, and cultural and educational power). Some observers conclude that discussion of soft power in China falls under two categories: soft power as national development strategy and soft power as a tool for foreign policy.

\subsection{6.1.4 China’s Africa policy objectives}

China’s wielding of soft power diplomacy has been most successful on the African continent when compared with Latin America. The contemporary Sino-African relationship can be traced back to former Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s ten-country tour from 13 December 1963 to 5

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\textsuperscript{669}Bhattacharya Abanti, China’s Foreign Policy Challenges and Evolving Strategy, \textit{Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: Strategic Analysis}, January-March 2006, vol. 30, no 1, page 189
\textsuperscript{670}Cho Nam Young and Jeong Ho Jong, China’s Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects, \textit{Asian Survey}, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, May/June 2008
\textsuperscript{671}Bhattacharya Abanti, China’s Foreign Policy Challenges and Evolving Strategy, \textit{Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: Strategic Analysis}, January-March 2006, vol. 30, no 1, page 190
\end{flushleft}
February 1964\textsuperscript{673}. In those early years China’s interest in Africa was to build ideological solidarity with other developing countries and to promote Chinese–style communism and repel Soviet revisionism and American imperialism in the Third World. Its mantra was anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism. In many ways, China in the Maoist era strongly supported the non-aligned countries even thought it had limited military and economic capabilities during that period.

In the early 1960s and 1970s, China’s Africa policy was unclear and it was unsure which national liberation movement to support in post-colonial Africa. In those early years Chairman Mao Zedong considered the Soviet imperialism more of a threat than US imperialism\textsuperscript{674}. The Chinese leadership, at the time, was faced with a serious dilemma regarding which national liberation movement to support. In South Africa, for example, Beijing supported the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) instead of the African National Congress (ANC). In Mozambique, it supported the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee against the Liberation Front of Mozambique. In Angola, China supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) – which was supported by the US’s Central Intelligence Agency and the South African Apartheid regime against the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)\textsuperscript{675}. In all three cases the Chinese leadership supported the wrong side.

By the late 1960s and 1970s, China’s Africa policy was mainly focused on competing with Taiwan’s Nationalist Government for international influence and diplomatic recognition. China’s main objective, besides promoting a ‘one China policy’, was also to lobby African countries to reject Taiwan’s seat at the United Nations. (This will be discussed in more detail later.)

By the early 1980s, China’s rapid economic growth prompted it to redefine its international relations policy goals. It began to pursue bilateral ties defined by more pragmatic economic and trade-related motives rather than political or ideological ones. “China increasingly began to use cost-benefit analyses in making decisions about investing in projects in Africa”\textsuperscript{676}. During this

\textsuperscript{673} Le Pere, Garth and Shelton, Garth, \textit{China, Africa and South Africa: South-South co-operation in a global era}, Institute for Global Dialogue, 2007
\textsuperscript{674} Cheng Joseph and Shi Huangao, China’s Africa Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, \textit{Journal of Contemporary Asia}, vol. 39, no 1, February 2009, page 89
\textsuperscript{675} Cheng, Joseph and Shi Huangao, China’s Africa Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, \textit{Journal of Contemporary Asia}, vol. 39, no 1, February 2009, page 89
\textsuperscript{676} United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, 29 April 2008.

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period, Africa was no longer considered a strategic priority by Western countries. The United States’ interest in Africa was diverted to other regions like the Middle East while European countries became indifferent to Africa’s problems. In the 1980s, China’s shift in its foreign policy to promote South-South co-operation culminated in Premier Zhao Ziyang’s visit to Africa in January 1983. He put forward his four principles on strengthening South-South co-operation namely “equality, mutual benefit, stress on practical results, diversity in the form and attainment of common progress”677.

China’s new diplomatic campaigns in Africa started to primarily focus on economic co-operations on the basis of respect for state sovereignty and a win-win strategy, rather than political rhetoric.

During the last decade (1990), the style and substance of Beijing’s Africa policy have shown the following features that are closely associated with Chinese soft power strategy.

China’s political-economic bilateral goals and relations in Africa are defined in its new African policy document announced in January 2006, entitled China’s Africa Policy. This document outlines the PRC’s goal of creating “a new type of strategic partnership with Africa”678 which also provides the foundation for a long-term relationship with the African continent. It consists of diverse types of cooperation guiding Chinese foreign policy principles. The document is based on past policy papers such as the Beijing Declaration, the Programme for China-Africa co-operation in economic and social development (October 2000) and the Addis Ababa action plan (December 2003)679.

The 2006 document consists of six aspects of China’s relationship with Africa. It emphasizes China’s intention to promote an ‘independent foreign policy’ with each individual African country based on China’s ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’ and China’s commitment to ‘peaceful development’. It identified key elements, namely ‘sincerity, equality, mutual benefit, solidarity and common development’ as the driving force between China and Africa.

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678 China’s Africa Policy, Online text: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng, accessed on July 2013
679 Le Pere, Garth and Shelton, Garth, China, Africa and South Africa: South-South Co-operation in a global era, Institute for Global Dialogue, 2007, page 133

~ 186 ~
6.2 Non-interference, the respect for sovereignty and human rights as China's relationship policy issues in Africa

China emphasizes the need to respect sovereignty and equality among nation states. This is due to the fact that past violations and interventions of China's sovereignty by outside powers are still regarded as major diplomatic threats since the foundation of the PRC. China's past experience with foreign countries has led it to embark on a principle of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of other sovereign countries. It emphasizes sovereignty among all nations and maintains that all countries should be treated equally with no country having the right to dictate or interfere in the affairs of other states.

China’s adherence to the principle of non-interference has served to protect its own sovereign rights. While western countries believe that human rights arise from the need to protect citizens from state abuse and therefore obliged to intervene and protect people wherever they are, developing countries, including China and most African nations, argue that state sovereignty key in that the human rights protection regime is a state-based mechanism. Ultimately non-interference means that no country should interfere in another’s internal affairs and by holding to this principle, China has ensured its own sovereignty and gained the trust of African nations. This principle has served China well over the past decade as many human rights resolutions against China were defeated at the United Nations.

It is evident that China’s Africa policy is silent on human rights issues, considering that its own domestic policy on human rights is problematic. However, one can argue that prior to 1970 the United States’ foreign policy was also absent of any human rights considerations. While the U.S. pioneered the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 and was the main

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680 Qu Xing, *Fifty Years of the Foreign Affairs of China*, Hangzou Jiangsu Renmin Press, 2000, page. 375-376
681 Le Pere, Garth and Shelton, Garth, *China, Africa and South Africa: South-South co-operation in a global era*, Institute for Global Dialogue, 2007, page 133
architect of human rights in the United Nations, “it took until the late 1970s for human rights to be explicitly made a major part of the US foreign policy formulation”\textsuperscript{683}.

The Chinese interpretation on human rights focuses on the right to food, clothing, shelter and economic development (similar to African needs)\textsuperscript{684}. Many critics argue that China deliberately ignores and become indifferent to human rights issues in Africa. The Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth comments that: “when it comes to human rights, China’s foreign policy is deliberately agnostic”\textsuperscript{685}. China’s perceived indifference is rooted in its policy of non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign states. According to Beijing, the “human rights issue is relative to different cultural perspectives - in other words, each country must define its own understanding of human rights”\textsuperscript{686}. There is a concern that Beijing’s disregard for human rights in Africa could undermine unilateral and multilateral efforts to marginalize pariah governments in Africa. According to Roth, “China’s policies have not only propped up some of the continent’s worst human rights abusers, but also weakened the leverage of others trying to promote greater respect for human rights”\textsuperscript{687}.

According to China’s African policy document, it advocates ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, namely mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits and peaceful coexistence. These are guiding principles of the China-Africa cooperation and exchange between the two countries. However, the human rights component is unclear. According to Dr. Uche Ofodile, a human rights lawyer and Professor of Law at the University of Arkansas, the “absence of human rights considerations in China’s Africa policy is a concern to critics”\textsuperscript{688}.

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\textsuperscript{684} Interview with Mr Li Bingxin, (First Secretary at Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa), Pretoria, 23 October 2011
\textsuperscript{685} International Herald Tribune, Roth, Kenneth, China’s Silence Boost Tyrants, 2006, available at: http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/19/opinion/edroth.php, accessed on 1 September 2013
\textsuperscript{686} Interview with Mr Wang Shi-Ting, (Political Counsellor in the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa), Pretoria, 23 June 2008
\textsuperscript{687} Human Rights Watch, China-Africa Summit Focus on Human Rights, Not Just Trade, available at: http://hrw.org/English/docs/2006/11/02/china14498.htm, accessed on 3 August 2013
\end{flushleft}
David Zweig and Bi Jianhai observe that human rights have “little room for morality”\textsuperscript{689}. This is supported by four aspects of China’s policy in Africa. Firstly, China’s indifference to the human rights situation on the continent; secondly China’s unconditional support for brutal dictators; thirdly, China’s non-involvement in unilateral and multilateral human rights initiatives; and finally China’s insensitivity towards trade and human rights issues. Referring to the crisis in the Sudan, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Zhai, is quoted as saying “business is business. We try to separate politics from business. Secondly, I think the internal situation in Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose on them”\textsuperscript{690}. In 2006, he further stated: “We’ve never imposed on other countries our values… and we do not accept other countries imposing their values on us either”\textsuperscript{691}. China appears to be resolute in defense of its policy of non-interference. He Wenping, head of African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Science, states that this principle has had a positive impact in building Chinese influence and “that developing countries appreciate very much and that won’t change in the future”\textsuperscript{692}.

Critics argue that China’s non-interference policy is used only when it is in China’s interest not to intervene. As Roth argues, “when Western governments try to use economic pressure to secure human rights improvements, China’s no-strings rule gives dictators the means to resist”\textsuperscript{693}. Sophie Richardson, Deputy Director at Human Rights Watch (Asia Division) argues that “China insists that it will not ‘interfere’ in other countries domestic affairs, but it also claims to be a great friend of the African people and a responsible major power. But that doesn’t square with its silence while mass killings go on in Darfur”\textsuperscript{694}. Many human rights organizations have accused China of supplying arms to Sudan, to be used in Darfur. Darfur Human Rights Watch has urged China to stop aid to Sudan and for Sudanese President, Omar al Bashir to allow UN

\textsuperscript{689} Zweig, David and Bi Jianhai, China’s Global Hunt for Energy, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, September 2005, vol. 84, issue 5, page 30

\textsuperscript{690} \textit{New York Times}, August 8, 2004, Howard, French, China in Africa: All Trade, With No Political Baggage, page 4


peacekeeping into the region\textsuperscript{695} (which has happened in the meantime in the form of the UN/AU hybrid force). The US Congress also informed Beijing that the 2008 Olympic Games would be severely affected if China does not halt the bloodshed in Darfur\textsuperscript{696}.

China’s principle of non-interference and respect for national sovereignty should be investigated beyond its formal statements and should also look at its practices. China’s military development, in recent years, has been reinforced by increasing arms sales to African states. Any military engagement has direct political implications and often influences the domestic political situation in the recipient state. The weapons can be used either against internal opposition or in regional relations. It means that ostensible non-interference can become implied or covert interference.

Human Rights Watch has criticized China’s arms sales to autocratic or undemocratic regimes in Africa. According to \textit{Le Monde}, China sold approximately US$142 million worth of military equipment to Africa between 1955 and 1977\textsuperscript{697}. Arms sales from China made up 10 per cent of all conventional arms transfers to the continent from 1996 to 2003\textsuperscript{698}. China is the largest supplier of arms to Sudan, selling, in 2005, US$8 million in weapons, aircraft and spare parts\textsuperscript{699}. Weapons and military training has also been provided to Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. A Rand Corporation report of 1999 indicated that China’s arms deals were motivated primarily by foreign policy considerations and not driven by commercial imperatives\textsuperscript{700}. Arms sales and deals are not contravene international human rights laws, except when UN sanctions are in place, but considering that Africa has been plagued by genocide wars and brutal dictators have used arms against innocent civilians, such a policy and practice can have disastrous effects.

\textsuperscript{695} Ibid
\textsuperscript{696} \textit{BBC News}, China appoints Special Envoy for Darfur, Thursday, 10\textsuperscript{th} May 2007, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6641929.stm, accessed 4 April 2013
\textsuperscript{698} Ibid

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An example of this was when the media revealed on 18 April 2008 that China was supplying arms to Zimbabwe. ‘An Yue Jiang’, a Chinese ship carrying 77 tons of ammunition to Zimbabwe was halted at the eastern coastal port of Durban, South Africa. An investigation by the Institute for Security Studies, (ISS) revealed that the cargo originated from Beijing and that the shipping company was a parastatal of the Chinese Ocean Shipping Company. The delivery address was the Zimbabwe Defence Force in Harare\(^{701}\) and at the time Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe had been accused of violating human rights against his own people.

The South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) called on its members not to unload the weapons from the ship and the South African Litigation Centre (SALC) applied for an urgent interdict to stop the arms being offloaded. The shipment consisted of approximately three million rounds of ammunition, 1500 rocket-propelled grenades, and 2500 mortar rounds\(^{702}\). Initially, the South African government confirmed that these weapons were on board a ship in South African waters, and that Pretoria would not intervene in what it regarded as trade matters between China and Zimbabwe. However it later retracted this statement. China’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement stating: “China and Zimbabwe maintain normal trade relations. What we want to stress is China always had a prudent and responsible attitude towards arms sales, and one of the most important principles is not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries”\(^{703}\). Unofficial reports indicated that the An Yue Jiang arms shipment landed on Angolan shores and did eventually find its way to Zimbabwe.

In the final analysis, Beijing’s economic and security interests may override human rights considerations. According to Breffni O’Rourke, “China has never been known for shying away from business on the grounds of human rights abuses”\(^{704}\). As Ian Taylor noted:

> According to China’s non-interference policy, sovereignty trumps everything and so it is up to each country to decide what to do with Beijing’s assistance. But if sovereignty is


\(^{704}\) O’Rourke, Breffni, China: Africa Trade Offensive Part of Global Expansion, 18 January 2006, available at: http://www.rferl.or/featuresarticle2006/01/1D874E7-9CF4-4E46-A3BD-769D4EB445F2.html, accessed on 7 June 2013
the guarantor of human rights and that sovereignty is being used to effectively undermine developmentalism, then there is a profound contradiction at the heart of China’s discourse on human rights. Surely, in such cases China is complicit in not only siding with autocrats and undermining a nascent human rights regime (one now supported by a number of African states). It is also undermining its own conception of human rights based on developments, as well as its own interpretation of the linkage between human rights and sovereignty705.

Both China and Africa have suffered from the disastrous colonial periods and this shared experience underlines the respect for sovereignty that each has in their approach to international relations. For example, China shares the African Union’s position with regard to the Zimbabwean issue. When Robert Mugabe demolished countless urban dwellings in 2005 in a crackdown on illegal shantytowns in Harare, Britain and the United States urged the AU to act. However the African Union desisted and gave Mugabe its blessings to resist sanctions imposed by the West706.

With regard of Darfur, there is debate whether the situation there should be described as a “genocide,” which would oblige the international community to intervene and protect the Darfurians.

It was only United States who described the conflict as “genocide”, while neither the United Nations nor regional organizations applied it to describe this complex issue. China and some Africa countries believe that developing countries must not be judged using the same standards by which developing countries are judged. This foreign policy imperative has not changed since the beginning of Sino-African relations.

But this principle of non-interference is not an absolute in the Africa Union as on membership, countries agreed bringing an end to intra-African conflicts. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, the

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706 The Guardian, African Union Defends Mugabe, January 25, 2005

~ 192 ~
African Union intervened to stop humanitarian disasters, while in Togo and Mauritania the AU stepped in to support democracy. The AU’s Constitutive Act also acknowledges the principle of collective intervention in domestic affairs when “grave circumstances” prevail (Article 4(h)). The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, however, remains very controversial in Africa, especially after the events in Libya in 2011.

China respects these AU’s principles and goals but does not consider it has the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of African countries as a foreigner. And though it has been criticized for adhering to the principle of non-interference, China considers itself incapable of making pronouncements on African domestic affairs and considers the AU more qualified to do so.

China’s policy of non-interference is presented as not deliberately ignoring humanitarian disasters, but as a justification for respecting the sovereignty of nations and acknowledging its limitations in solving such a crisis. In diplomatic engagements with African nations, China refrains from discussing issues of governance and intra-state affairs.

The difference between Chinese interventions and Western pronouncements is that the Chinese adopt a friendly rather than a coercive manner.

On Darfur, China has consistently opposed economic sanctions on Sudan and believes that it is a developmental issue, and which sanctions can only do more harm to the region, especially in view of a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 2007 report which states that”environmental degradation, as well as regional climate instability and change, are major underlying causes of food insecurity and conflict in Darfur.” From a realpolitik point of view it is understandable why China does not support sanctions against Sudan or even other African states. Sudan is one of its main providers of crude oil. Sanctions would therefore sever vitally important economic links for the Chinese and be an impediment to its own growth. Principle and interests are therefore delicately balanced.

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708 Reuters, China Urges Patience on Sudan, Opposes Sanctions, May 31, 2007
709 UNEP, Sudan Post-Conflict Environment Assessment, 2007, page 329
China’s aid policies are positioned as targeting poverty. China has built schools, hospitals and water projects for Sudan and has already provided US$10 million in humanitarian aid and promised to offer more. Beijing insists on using influence without interference and regarding respect as vital for finding solutions. For example, China has persuaded the Sudanese government to cooperate with the United Nation over Darfur. Since it has sought to alleviate the suffering of the Sudanese people with a solution agreeable to all parties, Khartoum trusts China. For example, the Sudanese government has accepted the “hybrid peacekeeping force” in Darfur, which China claims that the turning point for the political process resulted from negotiations with the Sudanese government based on equality, not coercion or the threat of sanctions.

Other members of the UN Security Council have also claimed credit for the progress made in Sudan (Darfur) but the important point is not who must receive credit for it, but how the Chinese explain or justify their involvement in the situation.

The principle of non-interference points to China’s respect for the economic and political choices that African nations make although this is not always advantageous to China. In fact, during the past 50 years, China has seldom used its aid commitments to intervene in African internal affairs. An example of this was in 2003 when a Canadian oil firm decided to sell its interests in Sudan, which the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) wanted to purchase. Khartoum rejected the Chinese offer and awarded the shares to an Indian firm instead. Beijing accepted the decision without meddling in the affairs of Sudan.

The principle of equality in China’s relations with other countries is more than just a slogan. Although this concept is largely the norm between individuals, it has never been effectively applied in the realm of international relations. Powerful countries have always created and dictated the rules in the global community and perhaps China’s practice in Africa challenges this reality and offers an alternative model for inter-state behavior.

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710 See UNEP, Sudan Post-Conflict Environment Assessment, 2007, page 330

~ 194 ~
The intention of this section was to demonstrate that China is using its stance towards sovereignty, non-interference and human rights in a strategic manner to make relationships with it more attractive than relations with its competitors. This approach is therefore used as a form of soft power in a diplomatic or political sense and is meant to provide China with a strategic advantage over other major powers.

6.2.1 Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation

The most important principles driving China’s policy in Africa are mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. Based on these principles, “China supports African countries' endeavor for economic development and nation building, carries out cooperation in various forms in the economic and social development, and promotes common prosperity of China and Africa. It will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the UN and other multilateral systems by supporting each other's just demand and reasonable propositions and continue to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and development in Africa. China and Africa will learn from and draw upon each other's experience in governance and development, strengthen exchange and cooperation in education, science, culture and health. Supporting African countries' efforts to enhance capacity building, China will work together with Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable development”[712].

Prior to the 1980s, China supported the anti-colonial struggles and independence movements in Africa and many of these states reciprocated by giving political support to China. In 1972, Beijing regained its seat at the United Nations with the assistance of 26 African votes (out of a total of 76 affirmative votes).

Chairman Mao Zedong described it clearly: “We were brought back into the United Nations by our black African friends”[713]. While more recently China has backed African candidates for the position of United Nations Secretary-General and for reforming the Security Council in favour of

712Rotberg, Robert, China into Africa, Trade, Aid and Influence, Brooking Institute, 2008, page 17
713Weng Ming, Person Selected Rights Before the Journey: Lord Qiao’s First Visit to the UN. In Fu Hao and Li Tongcheng (eds) World Affairs: Diplomats in the UN, Beijing, Chinese Overseas Publishing House, 1995
greater African representation, African countries have backed China on the issue of human rights and Taiwan\textsuperscript{714}. However, a shift in focus in China’s policy towards Africa has prioritized economic cooperation. Africa’s rich natural resources meet China’s increasing demand for raw materials and energy. Conversely, Chinese investment in Africa energy is often accompanied by aid for infrastructure, which helps to attract more foreign investment in these countries. For example, Chinese companies have been involved in the oil production industry in Sudan for almost a decade. Beijing not only imports a large percentage of Sudan’s total oil exports, but these companies also assist Sudan to establish a productive oil export industry ranging from exploration, production and refining to sales of crude oil, gasoline and petro-chemical products.\textsuperscript{715}

Some African scholars have acknowledged that China has played a significant role in helping African economies to achieve long-term growth through the principle of mutual benefit. One poignant analysis points out that “unlike Belgium, which built roads solely for the extraction of resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo, China is constructing or improving roads that are suitable not only for the transport of resources but which citizens can also use to travel”\textsuperscript{716}.

This mutual benefit is also reflected in areas of fair trade and debt reduction. China has also opened its market by lifting tariffs on the number of items (from 190 to over 440 before the end of 2009) exported by least developed African countries that have diplomatic relations with Beijing. Also, when China benefits economically from Africa’s emerging markets, it reduces and relieves African countries’ debts. At the Beijing Summit of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2006, China waived the debt of the twenty one heavily-indebted African countries from governmental interest-free loans due at the end of 2005\textsuperscript{717}.

Western countries have largely refused technical assistance and cooperation in science and technology with African countries, but this is now rapidly becoming part of Sino-African relations.

\textsuperscript{714}Qian Qichen, \textit{Ten Notes on Diplomacy}, Beijing, Beijing World Affairs Press, 2003, page 255
\textsuperscript{715}Qian Qichen, \textit{Ten Notes on Diplomacy}, Beijing, Beijing World Affairs Press, 2003, page 255
\textsuperscript{716}Marks Toya, \textit{Want’s China’s Investment in Africa? Business Enterprise}, New York, March 2007, page 34
\textsuperscript{717}Xinhua News Agency, China has remitted a total debt of $10.9 billion of 21 African countries, October 17, 2006

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Following the principles of mutual respect, “China will promote its cooperation with Africa in
the fields of applied research, technological development and transfer, speed up scientific and
technological cooperation in the fields of common interest, such as bio-agriculture, solar energy
utilization, geological survey, mining and Research & Development of new medicines. It will
continue its training programs in applied technologies for African Countries, carry out
demonstration programs of technical assistance, and actively help disseminate and utilize
Chinese scientific and technological achievements and advanced technologies applicable in
Africa”718. Recent collaboration between China and Nigeria in a ground-breaking project to
launch a communication satellite, Nig-Sat I, saw China provide much of the technology
necessary for the launch, on-orbit service and even the training of Nigerian command and control
operators. While Nigeria acquired the satellite technology, China gained from the collaboration
by enhancing its credentials as an important player in the international commercial satellite
market719. Additionally, China has recently sent oil expert and engineer Wang Qiming of Daqin
to Sudan to provide African engineers with new extractive technologies that assist in seemingly
exhausted oil fields720.

Key to the principle of mutual benefit is the establishment of exchange cooperation in areas such
as Human Resources Development and Education. The Chinese Government will fully promote
the role of its "African Human Resources Development Foundation" which will train African
personnel. Its aim is to identify priorities, expand cooperation and provide more input to meet the
needs of African countries so as to achieve greater results. China wants to increase the number of
government scholarships, continue to send teachers to assist in Chinese language teaching and
carry out educational projects to help develop Africa's weak disciplines.

The Foundation intends to strengthen cooperation in the fields of vocational education and
distance learning while at the same time encouraging educational exchanges and cooperation
between academic institutions of both sides. Educational influence on the students of African
countries has been established as one of the most successful means used by European countries


~ 197 ~
and the USA to make themselves attractive to the young professional elite. A similar approach was used by the Eastern bloc countries during the Cold War period and especially during the anti-colonial struggles in Africa. Arguably China learnt important lessons from it for its soft power approach.

China implements agreements of cultural cooperation reached with African countries, by maintaining regular contacts with their cultural departments and increasing the number of exchanges of artists and athletes. It also promotes cultural exchanges between people's organizations and institutions in line with its bilateral cultural exchange programs and market demands. China will continue to send medical teams and provide medicines and medical equipment to African countries and assist them to establish and improve medical facilities and train medical personnel.

China has increased cooperation with African countries in the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS and malaria and other diseases. It intends to expand its research and experience of traditional medicine regarding public health emergencies. According to the policy paper the second emphasis is that China’s Africa policy should be designed to promote a win-win exchange and that African countries will adhere to the ‘one China policy’, which implies that they will terminate all diplomatic ties with Taiwan. As part of the win-win approach the policy paper also identified six areas for strengthening China-Africa co-operation; firstly by increasing high level exchange visits between legislative bodies, exchange between political parties, consultation mechanism (such as bilateral committees), co-operation in international affairs and exchange between local governments.

These six areas of strengthening China–Africa cooperation suggest that China’s intention is to intensify political relations with African countries. The Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister, Lui Guozeng stated: “Our objectives is to show the international community the importance China

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722 Le Pere, Garth and Shelton, Garth, *China, Africa and South Africa: South-South Co-operation in a global era*, Institute for Global Dialogue, 2007, page 133
accords to Africa, and to demonstrates China’s strong will to develop friendly relations with African countries.”

Several measures were proposed to strengthen Sino–African political and economic cooperation. In the economic sphere, China’s Africa policy seeks to boost Sino-Africa trade, including PRC duty-free treatment for some African countries; negotiating Free Trade Agreements with African countries and regional organizations and the provision of export credits for PRC investments and business activities in Africa, notably in infrastructure and utilities contracts. They also include establishing China-Africa joint Chambers of Commerce and Industry. These organizations will be responsible for establishing preferential loans and buyer credits to encourage Chinese investments and business in Africa. It seeks to enhance dispute settlements, investment protection, and double taxation accords, and seeks enhanced joint business promotion efforts. Organizations such as the China-Africa Agricultural Co-operation Programme and the Beijing’s African Human Resources Development Foundation were also established. The latter was set up to increase the number of government scholarships to promote student exchange; science and technology co-operation; medical and health co-operation.

In the context of China’s on-going program to broaden links with Africa, the China-Africa policy document also included the cultural aspects of soft power that includes education, science, health and culture. China has promised continued training for African students in China; increase science and technology co-operation, more cultural exchanges, better quality medical personnel and information exchanges, media co-operation, administrative co-operation, including the training of African government personnel, consular co-operation to ensure the safety of nationals, people to people exchange among youth, environmental cooperation; and, disaster relief assistance and training.

One typical example of China’s increased activity in diplomatic exchanges with African states was the five major diplomatic events in 2006: between 11 and 19 January the Chinese Foreign

\footnote{Le Pere, Garth and Shelton, Garth, *China, Africa and South Africa: South-South Co-operation in a global era*, Institute for Global Dialogue, 2007.}


\footnote{Le Pere, Garth and Shelton, Garth, *China, Africa and South Africa: South-South co-operation in a global era*, Institute for Global Dialogue, 2007, page 133}
Minister visited Cape Verde, Senegal, Mali, Liberia, Nigeria, and Libya; on 12 January the Chinese Government released China’s first official policy paper on Africa; between 24 and 29 April Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya; from 17 to 24 June, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao toured Egypt, Ghana, Republic of the Congo, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda; and finally in November, Beijing laid out the red carpet for fifty heads of African states to celebrate fifty years of diplomatic relations between China and Africa. This was part of the preamble of a decade of ‘political brotherhood’ with African countries.

6.3 How China uses political soft power in Africa: Four areas.

We shall now examine China’s exercise of political soft power in Africa in four areas: the “One China policy”; the Beijing Consensus vs. the Washington Consensus or China’s development model; China in the United Nations in the context of multilateralism; and FOCAC in the context of regional multilateralism.

As a rising power, China is keen on gaining influence in Africa by actively and aggressively seeking new friends and allies. It needs support at the United Nations (UN) and in other international forums to sustain its foreign policy and to counter Western pressure on issues like human rights, economic openness, and political freedom. Africa, which represents more than one quarter of the UN General Assembly, is a significant voting bloc at the world body. To optimize implementation of its strategy in Africa, Beijing attempts to navigate between the conventional foreign policies of the West and the policies of the global South. In fact Beijing adopts different ways and means to do this, including traditional diplomacy, commercial diplomacy and increasingly, public diplomacy and soft power. The four areas of soft power are now discussed.

6.3.1 Area one: The Issue of Taiwan and Beijing – the ‘One China policy’

One of the most important aspects of China’s Africa strategy is winning support from African countries to exclude recognition for Taiwan as an independent country and to promote the ‘One China policy’ in Africa. The ‘One China policy’ is aimed at obtaining support from all African
countries to isolate Taiwan. This has been the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy since the advent of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and has guided Beijing’s Africa policy since Zhou Enlai’s tour in 1963-64.

Taiwan’s status has gradually declined among the African countries since China was admitted to the United Nations General Assembly in October 1971. This was further enforced when in 1979 Washington switched its support from Taipei to Beijing. Between 1971 and 1979, 46 African states recognized the PRC instead of the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan).

This has largely been a result of a consistent and aggressive policy by the PRC to obstruct Taiwan’s relations with the world community, by maintaining that ‘China’ (which includes Taiwan) is governed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing. The ultimate aim of such a policy is to try and coerce Taiwan into the PRC fold under the rubric of ‘one country, two systems’ (yiguo liangzhi)\(^{726}\). The aim of opposing Taiwanese influence on the continent is clear by the statement issued by the head of the China National People’s Congress, Qiao Shi, who said that “at present the Taiwan authorities are very active in the world in an attempt to turn Taiwan into an independent country”\(^{727}\), adding, “we will never allow it to do so”\(^{728}\). He added that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory, stressing that any attempt to create ‘one China and one Taiwan’\(^{729}\) or two Chinas will never succeed.

The main implication of China’s policy towards Taiwan is that it isolates any African country that supports Taiwan diplomatically or politically. China severs all relations with any state that establishes diplomatic relations with Taiwan. According to Chris Alden, “China punishes African countries by withdrawing foreign assistance and other projects”\(^{730}\). China’s White Paper on Africa asserted that if African states choose to accept the “one China principle as the potential foundation for the establishment and development of China’s relationship with African

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\(^{727}\) Qiao Shi, Chairman of China National People’s Congress, at Liberian parliament, *Xinhua* news agency, 20 October 1995

\(^{728}\) Qiao Shi, Chairman of China National People’s Congress, at Liberian parliament, *Xinhua* news agency, 20 October 1995

\(^{729}\) Qiao Shi, Chairman of China National People’s Congress, at Liberian parliament, *Xinhua* news agency, 20 October 1995

countries,” China will “co-ordinate positions on major international and regional issues and stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity, and human rights”731.

According to Ursula Van Beek, “China gives money to every country in Africa, with the exception of the few that continue to maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan”732. Countries that still have diplomatic relations with Taiwan are Burkina Faso, Gambia, São Tomé and Principe and Swaziland. These countries are mostly small and weak and do not play a significant role in the global environment or in the Security Council. At the UN General Assembly in September 2005, President Hu offered debt forgiveness and duty free entry to exports from the world’s poor countries, except for those that recognize Taipei733. African nations switching recognition are aware of the potential economic gains and are making decisions in their best interest. For a state to switch recognition and warm relations with Beijing who will reciprocate with promised aid, investment, economic opportunity, and education, the potential costs are very low while the advantage is that it will please China greatly and will potentially avoid a missed opportunity.

China is able to pursue its aggressive policy against any African country that supports Taiwan, through its economic and political power. In particular, China’s seat on the Security Council of the United Nations and the veto power that goes with it is the ultimate trump card that China holds against Taiwan. The position that it holds in the Security Council is an extremely powerful one, which enables it to use the ‘carrot and stick’ approach to persuade African countries to sever official relations with Taiwan.

Hence “no state would wish to be the first to openly challenge China’s policies vis-à-vis Taiwan and gamble with the almost certain economic and political fall-out with China”734. In many cases, China has been known to react aggressively to any gestures of support to Taiwan. Beijing’s reaction over President Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 trip to his alma mater in America is a case

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731 Taylor, Ian, China in Africa: Engagement and Compromise, Routledge, 2006, page 37
734 Taylor, Ian, Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and Africa: The Limitations of Dollar Diplomacy, Journal of Contemporary China, 2002
in point. Whilst such over-the-top displays appear to outside observers as bizarre over-reactions, in the context of Chinese foreign policy they make sense and are quite rational: China is intent on serving a warning to others thinking of developing unofficial linkages with Taipei. Nonetheless, through generous aid disbursals, Taipei is able to win over some diplomatic allies, particularly in economically depressed regions in Africa.

Africa’s importance for China is evident by its advantage as the largest single regional grouping of states that engage in ‘bloc voting’ in multi-lateral fora at the United Nations and its agencies. African governments have supported China whenever its conduct has been criticized. This was seen when African votes were crucial for China when the International Olympic Committee awarded the 2008 Olympics to Beijing or blocking resolutions at the UN Commission on Human Rights which condemn Chinese human rights abuses. As Premier Wen Jiabao has stated: “China is ready to co-ordinate its positions with African countries in the process of international economic rules formulation and multilateral trade negotiation”\textsuperscript{735}.

A common practice by China is to reward African countries that support the ‘One China policy’ by financial means. For example, US$24 million in grants and interest free loans were granted to Tanzania and a US$3.6 million grant to Zambia during Chinese Premier Li Peng’s visit to Africa in 1997\textsuperscript{736}.

Chris Alden argues that “a crucial component of expanding China’s presence in Africa has been the use of foreign assistance to cement ties with governments….and winning new diplomatic allies”\textsuperscript{737}. However, aid is not the only incentive used to gain political favour. Whilst the global community considered economic sanctions against Nigeria following the execution of activist Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995, China was busy negotiating a US$520 million deal to furnish the country with new locomotives and restore Nigeria’s crumbling rail system\textsuperscript{738}. This was the period when the West and the Commonwealth countries condemned Nigeria for its human rights

\textsuperscript{736}Taylor, Ian, Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and Africa: The limitation of Dollar diplomacy, \textit{Journal of Contemporary China}, vol.11, issue 30, 2002, page 134
\textsuperscript{738}Taylor, Ian, Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and Africa: The limitation of dollar diplomacy, \textit{Journal of Contemporary China}, vol. 11, issue 30, 2002, page 135
abuses. In addition, Li Peng, the Chinese Prime Minister, spent two days in Nigeria in May 1997, and invited then Head of State General Sani Abacha to visit China.

6.3.2 South Africa as an example of China’s influence on Taiwanese diplomatic relations

South Africa’s decision to switch diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China brought an end to a 20 year relationship with Taiwan. The change came after aggressive pressure from Beijing on Pretoria to abandon Taipei.

South Africa made the decision to switch to China even though there were 620 Taiwanese companies trading in the country, employing 45,000 people and two-way trade between Taipei and Pretoria had reached US$1.7 billion. Taiwan even offered to invest US$3.5 billion in a petro-chemical complex in the Eastern Cape, however Beijing countered that with a US$18 billion investment in an industrial development complex in the Northern Province (today called Limpopo), which would create half a million jobs.

In 1994, after the ANC came to power, President Mandela tried to pursue the ‘dual recognition’ of both Beijing and Taipei, but was rejected by Beijing. Pretoria eventually gave in to Chinese pressure in November 1996, when all diplomatic ties were severed in favour of the sole recognition of Beijing.

It is true that South Africa had its own interest in severing ties with Taiwan in favour of China, because according to Taylor, it is “almost certain that Beijing would have expressed great displeasure at this state of affairs and in all certainty vetoed any move to promote South Africa to the [UN Security] Council. One needs only to remember China’s use of its position on the Council to express its displeasure against states with diplomatic links to Taipei”. An example of China’s growing influence in Africa is Beijing’s demonstrably adverse reaction to any

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739 Taylor Ian, Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and Africa: The limitations of dollar diplomacy, Journal of Contemporary of China, vol. 11, issue 30, 2002, pages 125-140; Geldenhuys, Deon, South Africa and the China Question: A Case for Dual Recognition, Johannesburg, SAI, 1995
741 Taylor, Ian, Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and Africa: The limitations of dollar diplomacy, Journal of Contemporary of China, vol.11, issue 30, 2002, page 128

~ 204 ~
invitation to the anti-China Dalai Lama. This is demonstrated by the numerous invitations extended to the Dalai Lama by civil society organizations to visit South Africa. In 2011 Archbishop Desmond Tutu invited the Dalai Lama to his 80th birthday celebrations in Cape Town. The South African government prevaricated in issuing a visa for the visit. This was done so as not to offend Beijing. After much delay the Dalai Lama was not granted the visa to visit the country. It was a victory for the Chinese and is a clear indication of the subtle use of soft power in order to achieve its objectives.\(^\text{742}\)

In conclusion, it is clear that China’s growing engagement with Africa has marginalized Taiwan and that a pre-requisite for doing serious business with China is to recognize it and sever any ties with Taiwan. In the early 1990s, 20 African countries had recognized Taiwan but by 2008 only six countries had remained. China’s success in luring states away from Taiwan is an example of China’s successful soft and hard power diplomacy in Africa.

6.3.3 Area two: The Beijing Consensus versus the Washington Consensus

Both China and the West are associated with macro-economic developmental frameworks or models that they promote in other parts of the world. They are captured in the concepts of the “Beijing Consensus” and the “Washington Consensus’ respectively. Both models have powerful implications, because if accepted, it automatically draws a state into the economic paradigm and therefore influence sphere of that sponsor state.

The soft power implications of the Beijing Consensus model cannot be overstated. First, the Chinese approach sidelines political reforms in favor of economic growth, something which many authoritarian regimes would greatly like to imitate.\(^\text{743}\) Second, countries (notably in Latin America) that implemented the Washington Consensus reforms (directed by the IMF and World Bank) failed to achieve the growth predicted by proponents of the plan. China’s path to growth

\(^\text{742}\) *The Guardian*, Dalai Lama forced to pull out of Desmond Tutu birthday in visa dispute, Smith, David, 20 October 2011, Interview with Ebrahim Ebrahim, (former South African Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation), Pretoria, 10 July 2011

represents an attractive alternative to the market reforms advocated by Western governments and institutions. The Beijing Consensus has been especially attractive to developing countries that have observed China’s rapid economic growth in the last thirty years.\textsuperscript{744}. For their part, the Chinese are actively promoting the Beijing Consensus style of reforms in Africa, encouraging African governments to develop their economic systems in a similar fashion\textsuperscript{745}.

The concept “Washington Consensus” was first coined by John Williamson in 1989 in his study of the policy and structural inadequacies of developing countries. According to him, the Washington Consensus contains ten policy imperatives: fiscal discipline, tax reform, re-ordering public expenditure priorities, a competitive exchange rate, privatization, trade liberalization, liberalizing interest rates, deregulation, liberalizing of inward FDI and property rights. These rules mirrored the tenets of liberal market-oriented capitalism and policies of the then Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher governments who were strong promoters of capitalism and neoliberal ideologies. It is clear from the transformations of China after 1978 that the Beijing Consensus promotes a model of top-down control of development and poverty reduction, while preventing any real political change but ensuring economic prosperity\textsuperscript{746}.

The concept “Beijing Consensus” was conceived in 2004 by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a senior advisor to the investment firm Goldman Sachs and Professor at Tsinghua University. Cooper Ramo described the social and economic transformation of China as the new physics of power and development. Four key policy characteristics, according to him, constitute the Beijing Consensus: a policy toolkit, corporate allegiance, resources, and long-term planning\textsuperscript{747}. The policy toolkit refers to Beijing’s ability to interfere in a country’s economy through the use of policies that can regulate tax and hand out business contracts or policies that allow meddling in financial markets if authorities feel the need to do so\textsuperscript{748}. Corporate allegiance refers to the ability of Beijing to not only have state-owned companies, but also to hold all companies accountable to the government. It also refers to the ability of the Chinese government to select their

\textsuperscript{744}Kurlantzick, 	extit{Charm Offensive, How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World}. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2007, page 57
\textsuperscript{745}Kurlantzick, 	extit{Charm Offensive, How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World}. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2007
\textsuperscript{746}Kennedy, Scott, 	extit{The Myth of the Beijing Consensus, Journal of Contemporary China}, vol.19, issue 65, 2008
\textsuperscript{747}The New York Times, January 28, 2011, Bennhold, K. What is the Beijing consensus?
\textsuperscript{748}The New York Times, January 28, 2011, Bennhold, K. What is the Beijing consensus?
management, and those managers’ report to the government\textsuperscript{749}. Resources refer to the vast amount of control Beijing exerts in regard to resources, allowing the central government to receive not only a steady stream of profit from state-owned businesses, but also allowing the control of all land\textsuperscript{750}.

Long-term planning refers to Beijing authorities setting long-term strategic priorities and then systematically pursuing them with five-year-plans\textsuperscript{751}. Ramo’s “consensus” was embedded in three principles, namely, innovation, promoting work through chaos management and self-determination\textsuperscript{752}. It implies that China’s economic success was rooted in constant innovations that improved its total factor\textsuperscript{753} productivity, while its quest for economic development was not limited to growth only but towards equitable distribution of wealth. The third component symbolizes the ability of China to chart and maintain her developmental polices as a model for other countries to follow and emulate. Therefore, the term “Beijing Consensus” was the sum of the five pillars of the economic policies that China crafted over the years. These included incremental reform, innovation and experimentation, export-led growth, state capitalism and authoritarianism\textsuperscript{754}.

Ramo states that China has become a competitor to the USA in terms of comprehensive national power and argues that the Beijing Consensus is far more appealing than the Washington Consensus, especially for developing countries\textsuperscript{755}. The Beijing Consensus refutes Western notions of political liberalization or viewing economic reforms as long-term development. China, in many ways has exported its economic development model (with Chinese characteristics) to African countries by encouraging trade and investment in infrastructure development, without dictating any political or economic reforms as preconditions. As a new developmental model, Ramo argues, the Beijing Consensus “has given hope to developing countries in an uncertain

\textsuperscript{749} The New York Times, January 28, 2011, Bennhold, K. What is the Beijing consensus?
\textsuperscript{750} The New York Times, January 28, 2011, Bennhold, K. What is the Beijing consensus?
\textsuperscript{751} The New York Times, January 28, 2011, Bennhold, K. What is the Beijing consensus?
\textsuperscript{754} Williamson, J. Is the “Beijing Consensus” Now Dominant? Asia Policy, no 13, 2012
\textsuperscript{755} Ramo Cooper Joshua, Beijing Consensus: Notes On the New Physics of Chinese Power, London Foreign Policy Centre, 2004, page 3-4
international situation”\textsuperscript{756} where the financial crises in 2008 and the on-going deadlock of World Trade Organization negotiations, are reflections of a weak Washington Consensus.

The Beijing Consensus advocates a strong central government to employ “the principles of non-interference, multilateralism, and asymmetric power projection in order to secure regime legitimacy and pursue further economic development in a way that fits with individual characteristics of the country”\textsuperscript{757}.

With decades of economic success and poverty reduction under its belt, China’s anti-liberal model appears to be attractive especially to authoritarian or semi-authoritarian nations. Under this model, and just as China has, the regime is able to commit to the economic engine as its associated elites remain in power. China has liberalized much of its economy, but the Communist Party still remains in power. A final aspect of the “win-win” strategy is China’s generous offerings to even the smallest of countries. China focuses on small nations, providing significant respect, and without notice is able to greatly influence the outcomes of any bilateral agreements. Small nations add up and in an ensuing game of balancing power and influence they may decide the outcome.

Many scholars argue that this new brand of ‘Chinese style socialism’ may inspire other authoritarian regimes to adopt a similar political system and social structure\textsuperscript{758}. While Chinese leaders have reassured foreign observers that Beijing does not seek to export the Chinese development or political model abroad, leaders in North Korea, Laos, Burma, Cuba, Vietnam and Zimbabwe have demonstrated a willingness to apply the Chinese model for their own growth\textsuperscript{759}. As China continues to play a more prominent role on the international stage, its success may further legitimize its system in the eyes of other states that have been overwhelmed by Western calls for more democracy and greater respect for human rights.

\textsuperscript{756}Ramo, Cooper Joshua, \textit{Beijing Consensus: Notes On the New Physics of Chinese Power}, London Foreign Policy Center, 2004, page 3-4

\textsuperscript{757}Ramo, Cooper Joshua, \textit{Beijing Consensus: Notes On the New Physics of Chinese Power}, London Foreign Policy Center, 2004, page 3-4


\textsuperscript{759}President Hu Jintao's speech at the opening of the third "China Africa Cooperation Forum" and Chinese and African leaders' summit on November 4, 2006 (mimeo.)
This could encourage leaders in those countries to seek closer economic ties with China rather than accepting the demands placed upon them by the Washington Consensus.

In a February 2007 speech, former Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi maintained that China’s inflow of investment was a tangible demonstration that the Western model of development has failed: “the need to build a strong development state ….that neo-liberal reforms advocated by the World Bank and other have failed to generate the kind of growth expected”. 760

For good governance to take root, Zenawi suggested, it should be home grown and not imposed from the outside. This implied that African leaders should worry less about meeting the demands for transparency, accountability, rule of law, and other such neo-liberal objectives and focus instead on economic growth and with the presence of China, the resources needed for growth will be found. 761

Despite the allure of the Beijing Consensus and the need to justify the one party state and a new developmental model, Western and Chinese analysts argue that China’s development model cannot work for all countries because it is carefully tailored to China’s economic conditions such as national control over its own resources, markets that have been protected from foreign completion, and the lack of a powerful capitalist class 762. Others argue that China’s current economic disparities, widespread corruption, and the lack of democratic practices will prevent other states from adopting China’s model of development. According to Blazquez-Lidoy, “perhaps the most important aspects of the Beijing Consensus model is an approach to global relationship that seeks, in multinational relationships, a new global order founded on economic relationships, one that still recognizes politico-cultural differences and variations in regional and national practices within a common global framework” 763.

760 Amosu Akwe, China in Africa: It’s (still) the Governance, Stupid, Foreign Policy In Focus, March 9th, 2007
761 Amosu Akwe, China in Africa: It’s (still) the Governance, Stupid, Foreign Policy In Focus, March 9th, 2007
762 Schweickart, David, You Can’t Get There From Here: Reflections on the Beijing Consensus, Paper for the International Symposium on the China Model or Beijing Consensus for Development, Tianjin Normal University, August 8, 2005
Although Beijing denies that it is promoting a competing development model against the US and other developed nations, China’s political and economic success proves its case. Many developing countries, especially those that are disenchanted with the Washington Consensus have shown keen interest in China’s reform experience. As the table below indicates, many African countries, not only authoritarian or post-communist states but also some liberal democracies, are looking to China as a role model for economic growth.

Whether it is the listening aspects in public diplomacy of the “win-win” strategy or the active participation in multilateral organizations or establishing itself as a model for developing nations or supporting nations with failing relationships with other great powers or offering the utmost respect to the smallest of nations, China’s charm strategy is certain to woo many countries and gain substantial world influence. With a box of influence tools afforded to it, China will make serious gains in accomplishing its goals through soft power, the power of attraction through culture, values, and public diplomacy.

Drew Thompson, a China scholar who studies Beijing’s strategy towards Africa notes, “The Chinese government has also actively promoted their own brand of economic development and reform model to African countries, encouraging…African governments to fashion their economic systems after China’s own”\textsuperscript{764}. China’s ability to present itself as a model for top-down political and economic development is a success. In contrast to the Washington Consensus, which failed in many Latin American and African nations, the Beijing Consensus appealed to many authoritarian and semi-authoritarian developing nations. For countries like Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Sudan, Bolivia, Argentina, and many others like them, China’s model shows how an economy can liberalize to a degree, while ensuring the ruling party remains in power.

The China model is appealing to any struggling developing nation and aids in China’s goal of developing a network of allies who share Beijing’s concerns of nations intervening in others affairs.

\textsuperscript{764}Thompson, Drew, China’s Soft Power in Africa: From the ‘Beijing Consensus’ to Health Diplomacy, China Brief, 13 October 2005
The table below combines indicators of the democratic or open nature of societies with their preference for either the Beijing or Washington Consensus. In combination it illustrates China’s willingness to maintain close relations with undemocratic African countries. The table is based on Freedom House ratings (ranging from 1 as very good to 7 as very poor):

**Figure 17: Countries in African showing interest in the Beijing Consensus**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African Countries</th>
<th>Country’s own regime type</th>
<th>Interested in: Washington or Beijing Consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Authoritarian rule</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Authoritarian rule</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Authoritarian rule</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political Rights</th>
<th>Civil Liberties</th>
<th>Country Average</th>
<th>Beijing Consensus</th>
<th>Washington Consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0 free</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0 not free</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0 not free</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.5 not free</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0 partly free</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.5 partly free</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5 free</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5 free</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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765 Author’s own general interpretation
In conclusion, it is clear that the Beijing Consensus has had great appeal to developing countries, especially in Africa. However, China’s export of the Beijing Consensus has had very important implications – the idea that authoritarian political systems and the perpetuation of non-democratic structures can be maintained while pursuing high economic growth has been attractive to ruling elites. African countries have increasingly acknowledged the Chinese model due to its capabilities and effectiveness in coping with the 1998 Asian financial crises and the latest global financial crises since 2008. Many developing countries regard some aspects of China’s experience of development, such as political stability, economic development and the improvement of people’s livelihood, as worth learning. With respect to the Chinese model itself, it can be generally considered as part of the Chinese soft power.

However, if the Beijing Consensus is imposed on other countries in future, it will indicate use of hard power by the Chinese. In the final analysis it is clear that the Beijing Consensus is an important instrument in China’s political and economic soft power objectives in Africa.

6.3.4 Area three: China’s use of political Soft Power at the United Nations

The third component of political soft power is China’s use of the United Nations in order to project itself as a world power with an independent position that is sympathetic towards African and other states. On 29 October 1971 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, which transferred representation of the seat granted to the “Republic of China” under Article 23 of the UN Charter to the PRC. This meant that control of the “China seat” shifted from Taipei to Beijing. A few weeks later a delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua arrived in New York to declare its “rightful seat” (hefəxiwei) in the UN. In the early 1970s China’s role in the UN and its role in the Security Council revolved around promoting the “revolutionary” principles of anti-hegemony and self-determination, often in opposition to both the Soviet Union and the USA.

However, China rarely directly confronted either the USA or the USSR, instead making its point by refusing to participate in or abstaining from voting in the General Assembly. One can argue
that over the past three decades China, the USA and USSR used the UN General Assembly as a forum to demonstrate their soft or hard power among the three powers.

Since the formation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China has aggressively sought UN membership. Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai declared that accession to the UN “[is symbolic] as a badge of sovereignty and legitimizes the government and its status as a great power”\(^767\). He sent correspondence to the UN Secretariat arguing that the new government in Beijing should be represented at the UN.

The Soviet Union and the USA both supported China’s inclusion into the UN, however, circumstances changed with the Korean War in October 1950, with the PRC finding itself in conflict with the USA and the UN. As Bosco observed, “had China abstained from the Korean War, it likely would have joined the UN much earlier”\(^768\). During the 1950s to 1970s, the PRC was excluded from all UN activities, primarily by the diplomatic maneuvering from the United States. The US followed a three course strategy: firstly, ensuring that its allies would vote against proposals to admit China to the General Assembly; secondly, from 1961 onwards, supporting resolutions regarding China’s membership to be postponed because it required a two thirds majority in the General Assembly, (hence lowering its chance of success); and finally, in the late 1960s, advocating that both Taiwan and China must be represented, but China rejected this approach, stating that it was a violation of the UN’s principle of only one seat in the organization for China \(^769\).

A more important reason why the USA rejected China’s admission to the UN was its Communist policies. In 1966 China’s radical views such as the “expulsion of all imperialist countries” from the UN and its resolution denouncing the US as an “aggressor” in the Korean War made the US reluctant to include China in the UN. However, by the late 1960s, several changes laid the basis for China’s entry. Firstly, decolonization, particularly in Africa, led to the advent of a number of newly independent states that changed the composition of the UN. By 1965 almost 76 per cent

\(^768\)Waijiao, Pinglun, China’s Foreign Policy toward the UN, 1949-1971, *Foreign Affairs Review*, no. 85, December 2005, page 63-64.
of its members derived from third world countries, which supported China’s political ideology\textsuperscript{770}.

Secondly, countries like Italy, Austria, and Canada, recognizing the PRC’s size, status as a nuclear power, and its growing influence in world affairs, switched their recognition from Taipei to Beijing. These countries began to support China’s bid for UN representation.

Thirdly, tensions rose between China and the Soviet Union, when the latter invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. Beijing abandoned its “prerequisite conditions of imperial occupations and began to support the US view of Soviet hegemony”\textsuperscript{771}.

Fourthly, and probably the most important reason, was Henry Kissinger’s secret negotiations with China in July 1971, which culminated in allowing “one China seat” for the PRC. Thus, in 1971 the General Assembly passed Resolution 2758 by a vote of 76 in favor, 35 opposed, and 17 abstentions\textsuperscript{772}. Following the election of Richard Nixon in 1968 as American President, the USA also began to change its attitude about containing China. In a \textit{Foreign Affairs} article candidate Nixon argued against immediate UN admission for China, but stated that “taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to forever leave China outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors”\textsuperscript{773}.

In July 1971 when China was included as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, Zhou Enlai appointed Huang Hua, former Ambassador to Canada, to represent the PRC in the Security Council. The Vice-Foreign Minister, Qiao Guanhua stated in his memoirs that the Chinese delegation was quite unfamiliar with this institution.


We need to honestly study and become familiar as soon as possible, so that China can carry out its duties as a permanent member of the Security Council.”

This echoed what Chairman Mao had told the delegation privately a few days earlier: “China needed to adopt the attitude of a “student,” avoid “rushing into battle unprepared and “meticulously” consider the complex issues with which it would soon be faced before making decisions.”

According to many political commentators, these pragmatic decisions in the early years helped shape China’s behavior in the Security Council for years to come.

Between 1971 and 1979 China’s tactic was not to vote in the UNSC on resolutions that it had ideological misgivings about. These included missions to monitor ceasefires between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Lebanon and between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. China either abstained or refrained from casting any vote, by using what it labeled the “fifth voting style”. This non-participation functioned as a form of abstention, allowing China to register its presence and to give justificatory speeches. However, China dropped non-participation in favor of the more conventional device of formally abstaining in the 1980s.

By abstaining or not participating, it was able to disassociate itself from UN peacekeeping.

Wang Yizhou, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, attributes China’s negative attitude toward peacekeeping during the 1970s to its experience of United Nations forces during the Korean War. Wang also notes that China viewed UN intervention in the Congo in the 1960s and Cyprus from 1964 onwards, as a pretext for US geopolitical ambitions.

A second characteristic of China’s behavior during the 1970s was its support for the Non-Aligned Movement’s (NAM) condemnation of both Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa. The NAM countries were critical of the Western powers for supporting “racist” and “illegal” regimes. Similarly, it was mentioned earlier already that China backed the anti-colonial

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struggles and independence movements in several African countries. Often African nations reciprocated and gave political support to China. It was mentioned earlier that when China gained its seat at the United Nations with the assistance of 26 votes from African countries (out of 76 affirmative votes), Chairman Mao Zedong described it bluntly: “We were brought back into the United Nations by our black African friends”\textsuperscript{778}. In the last few years, African countries have supported China on the issue of human rights and Taiwan\textsuperscript{779}.

During this period the U.S. and the U.K. vetoed a number of draft resolutions and abstained on several others. The result was that China’s voting affinity with the West on these issues was quite low. Between 1971 and 1979, China’s voting affinity with the U.S. on resolutions pertaining to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was only 29.2 per cent (7 out of 24). In comparison, China’s overall voting affinity with the U.S. during these years was 46 per cent (91 out of 195)\textsuperscript{780}. These voting patterns were used by China to develop its own international legitimacy and attraction in the developing world and especially in Africa.

By supporting the liberation movement in Southern Rhodesia (specifically ZANU) and opposing apartheid in South Africa (by supporting the PAC), China was able to express solidarity with the NAM countries. For example, on 29 September 1972 the Security Council considered a proposal by Guinea, Somalia and Sudan, which called on the U.K. to release Zimbabwean political prisoners\textsuperscript{781}.

Following a veto by the U.K., Huang Hua said:

> The British Government has once again shown that it stands completely on the side of the white racist regime of [Ian] Smith and that it deliberately supports the latter in perpetuating its brutal colonialist rule over 5 million Zimbabwe people...The people of Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa will surely draw the necessary lesson there-from and

\textsuperscript{778}Weng Ming, Person Selected Rights Before the Journey: Lord Qiao’s First Visit to the UN. In Fu Hao and Li Tongcheng (eds) World Affairs: Diplomats in the UN, Beijing, Chinese Overseas Publishing House, 1995, page 9
\textsuperscript{779}Qian Qichen, Ten notes on diplomacy, Beijing World Affairs Press, 2003, page 255
\textsuperscript{780}Wuthnow, Joel, Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy in United Nations Security Council, Doctoral thesis in the Graduate School of Arts and Science, Columbia University, 2011

~ 216 ~
will further unite them to carry out the necessary struggles and to put an end, with their own hands, to the brutal rule of the Smith racist regime." 

Wang Yizhou argues that “China’s goals were rather to use rhetorical power to support the NAM, which it did many times, to use the UN as a conduit through which to forge diplomatic ties with states”.

Hence from 1971 to 1979, 57 countries switched from supporting Taipei to Beijing.

6.3.5 China in the Security Council from 1980 to 1989

During 1980-1989 China preferred to refrain from using party ideology and preferred to play a more passive role in the Security Council. This was evident when China began to vote on issues relating to peacekeeping operations. It voted on every draft resolution on peacekeeping operations considered in the 1980s. The cause of this shift was that China faced criticism in the General Assembly for its failure to contribute to the peacekeeping operation budget since 1971. Under Article 19 of the UN Charter, any state may be stripped of its voting privileges in the General Assembly for budgetary arrears.

In exchange for revising its policy on peacekeeping, the General Assembly passed a resolution in December 1981, stating that China would not be held accountable under Article 19.

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Figure 19: Voting in the Security Council, 1980-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting behaviour</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
<td>93.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstentions or non-participations</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetoed</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source785

From 1981 to 1988 there were approximately 14 votes on the issue of South Africa. China’s delegate offered remarks on only one occasion on 26th July 1985786. Qian Yongnian urged the Council to “adopt various measures of sanctions against South Africa and to support the heroic struggle of the South African people against apartheid”787. One of the main reasons for China’s relative silence in the 1980s was that it subordinated its ideological beliefs to maintain positive ties with the USA and with the UN system, both of which it viewed as indispensable to the goals of modernizing its domestic economy, acquiring advanced technology, and opening its market to foreign trade and investment788.

In the 1980s, China adopted a ’differentiated and flexible policy’ in the United Nations, whereby it would abandon its opposition to peacekeeping, contribute to the peacekeeping operations budget, participate in subsidiary bodies, such as the Disarmament Commission and the Human Rights Commission, and refrain from rhetorical attacks against the superpowers. This was part of Deng Xiaoping’s broader “independent foreign policy of peace” announced in September 1982.

786 Qian Yongnian was then a relatively low-ranking official with the title of Minister in the Chinese mission, specializing in African Affairs. He eventually rose to the position of Vice Foreign Minister in the 2000s. It was, and is, unusual for any representative of any state below the rank of Deputy Permanent Representative to deliver speeches in the Security Council.
through which amicable relations with major states and institutions, such as the UN and the IMF would be prioritized over ideological struggle\(^{789}\).

However, China did assert itself on one issue during this period. In late 1981 the PRC blocked the appointment of Kurt Waldheim to a third term as Secretary General of the UN, favoring Tanzanian candidate Salim Ahmed Salim. The result was a prolonged clash with the USA, who favored Waldheim and used its own influence to block Salim\(^{790}\). Bosco attributes China’s position to its general support for the Third World\(^{791}\). However, as we have seen, China tended not to confront the USA when it did not have major interests at stake, relying primarily on abstentions. Others argue that China used this situation to express its grievances with Ronald Reagan’s decision to consider selling advanced weapons to Taiwan and to pursue what the PRC believed was a “two China policy”\(^{792}\).

During the 1990s, the Security Council made increased use of sanctions against delinquent states. Compare it with the fact that the Security Council had enacted only two sanctions regimes during the entire Cold War (on South Africa and Southern Rhodesia)\(^{793}\). China in principle opposed the threat or use of sanctions on the grounds that coercion tends to be counterproductive. For instance, in March 1992 the UN authorized sanctions on Libya in relation to the latter’s intransigence over international legal proceedings following the Lockerbie bombings. Justifying his abstention, China’s delegate, Li Daoyu, said that “In principle we do not support the Security Council imposing sanctions against Libya, because sanctions will not settle the question but will rather complicate the issue further, aggravate regional tensions and have serious economic consequences for the countries concerned in the region”\(^{794}\).


\(^{793}\) A full listing of sanctions committees established by the Security Council can be found online at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees

By the 21st century, China had moved beyond a restrained posture and toward a more active role in the Council. Firstly, the PRC made notable contributions in supporting UN peacekeeping operations. China’s motivation in doing so was to improve its image as a responsible power, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Secondly, China took a more active and contentious role in discussions on how to address the challenges created by a series of pariah states, including North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Burma and Zimbabwe. So far China’s voting behavior in the UNSC in the 21st century has been indistinguishable from other UN members. In the 636 votes that took place between 2000 and 2009, China voted affirmatively 97.8 per cent of the time, abstained on only 12 ballots and used its veto twice. Its abstention rate was slightly higher than the US’s 795. Below follows a comparison of the voting patterns:

**Figure 20: Voting in the Security Council, 2000-2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=636</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
<td>97.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstention</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetoes</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 796

The question that follows is: what is the main motivation or national interest consideration for China to use soft power in such a manner to shape the outcome of UN action? The most plausible response is that it is China’s dependence on energy imports, which are increasingly critical for the growth of China’s domestic economy. Its reluctance to support punitive UN sanctions is premised on its fear that they may cause domestic or regional instability which might threaten China’s supplies from these states, and might strain its political relations with key


~ 220 ~
countries. This point applies particularly to Sudan and Angola, which were the third and sixth largest suppliers of China’s petroleum imports in the first half of 2009. The PRC also holds large equity stakes in these countries’ national petroleum corporations. As John Bolton writes:

China’s large and growing demand for energy has been and will increasingly be a driver of its foreign policy, leading it to seek assured sources of supply around the world. China’s solicitude for undesirable and threatening governments like those of Iran, Sudan and Burma can be explained in large measure by its desire to support governments that can help China achieve its broader objective of energy security.

China’s reluctance to be part of decisions that impose sanctions on particular states can be understood on the one hand as motivated by its interest-based approach not to jeopardize trading partners, especially if they provide energy resources. On the other hand it can also be understood as part of its soft power approach to present itself as one of the exceptions in the international community who consistently refrains from interventions in the domestic affairs of other states. It is designed to make it attractive especially for smaller states that often feel intimidated by big powers. Darfur has been chosen as a case study to illustrate these points.

6.3.6 Sudan/ Darfur: A case study of how China avoids sanctions to increase soft power

In response to the international effort to impose sanctions on Sudan because of the civil war in Darfur, China opposed any further calls for sanctions in 2007. At face value, it was Beijing’s judgment that sanctions would undermine Sudanese stability. He Wenping, director of African studies at CASS, wrote in 2007 that sanctions would harm Sudan’s development, and thus create

797 Data drawn from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, online at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Oil.html, accessed on August 2013
more instability\textsuperscript{799}. Jin Liangxiang, a researcher at SIIS, held a similar view, arguing that the “responsibility of the international community is to alleviate suffering, not to add to it\textsuperscript{800}.

For many reasons it is in China’s national interest to promote stability in Sudan and Darfur. One of the most compelling arguments is the PRC’s reliance on Sudan’s continuous supply of oil. Sudan’s exports to China rose from US$1.8 billion in 2006 to US$4.1 billion in 2007, with Sudan ranking as China’s fifth-largest supplier, and second-largest in Africa, after Angola\textsuperscript{801}. Another reason is that China is a majority shareholder in two of Sudan’s largest oil consortiums, with stakes in fields in Darfur among other investments\textsuperscript{802}. Sudan has also accounted for seven per cent of the PRC’s overseas arms sales between 2003 and 2007\textsuperscript{803}. China also has interests in exploring oil reserves in neighboring Chad\textsuperscript{804}. Finally, China’s interest in maintaining the status quo is because conflict in Darfur threatens not only its economic interests, but also the safety of Chinese workers in the area\textsuperscript{805}. As one Chinese diplomat commented, Beijing does not “want Sudan to turn into Somalia”\textsuperscript{806}. Arguably it is more accurate to conclude that China is concerned about maintaining the status quo and not about the conflict in Darfur in general. Following this logic, it could be in their interest to support conflict if it is a means to protect the status quo. In order to understand China’s role in Sudan and its opposition to sanctions in the UN during 2007, one needs to understand the background to the conflict.

\textsuperscript{806}Interview with Chinese diplomat Xu Weizhong,( Director, Department of African Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)), Beijing, 9 November 2011
The dispute between black African farmers and Arab herdsman for land, water and other scarce resources erupted into large-scale violence in early 2003, pitting rebel groups, such as the Sudan Liberation Movement, against Arab militias collectively known as the Janjaweed. The Khartoum government supported the Janjaweed and provoked the situation by supplying arms and ammunition to them. By 2004, some 200,000 Darfurians had been killed, another 200,000 had fled to Chad, and 2.5 million had been internally displaced. The violence in Darfur occupied mainstream Western media and it became a diplomatic issue. The USA and other partners in the UN sought to draft a resolution that would impose sanctions on Khartoum if it did not halt its attacks in Darfur and disarm the Janjaweed. Supported by Pakistan, the Arab League and other representatives of the developing world, China opposed a punitive approach but agreed to enact a ban on arms sales to “all non-governmental entities and individuals” operating in Darfur. During voting at the UN, China abstained with Wang Guangya arguing to a New York Times reporter that sanctions would be counterproductive “You cannot alienate the Sudan government. Without them, the U.N. [mediation] mission will fail.”

By 2004 the situation in Darfur continued to deteriorate further. In September, the Security Council passed another resolution, calling for a “rapid expansion” of the AU observer force in order to “protect the welfare of the people of Darfur.” The US and other European countries warned Khartoum that sanctions would be imposed on its petroleum sector if it did not disarm the militias. China again abstained in order to signal its ambivalence, as did Russia, Algeria and Pakistan. In his explanation, Wang said that he would not veto the draft resolution on account of its positive references to the AU effort, but would not cast an affirmative vote either, since threatening language would “send the wrong signal and make negotiations more

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808 Higher Organizing Committee Economical sub-committee, Sino-Sudanese Golden Jubilee. February 2009, (mimeo)
812 U.S. Presents New Resolution on Darfur to Security Council,” Africa News (U.S. State Department), September 10, 2004
The situation in Darfur continued to worsen in late 2004, with repeated breaches of the ceasefire.

On 29 March 2005 a draft resolution was circulated which included an arms embargo, travel and financial restrictions on individuals and the creation of a Panel of Experts to monitor compliance. However, sanctions on Sudan’s oil industry were omitted, reportedly to avert a Chinese veto. Wang argued that, in order to achieve progress on the political front, “it is necessary to keep appropriate pressure on the parties”. Yet he also asserted that China had asked for “major amendments to the text” and, since these were not accepted, there was no choice but to abstain. Despite Wang’s remarks, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that: “We don’t support sanctions or constant pressure. It’s no good for a peaceful resolution to the issue.”

In January 2006 the Panel of Experts identified 17 potential targets, including senior officials of the Sudanese government, including the interior minister, head of national intelligence, defence minister and President Omar Bashir. The USA had proposed only four individuals, a Sudanese Air Force officer, a Janjaweed leader, and two rebel commanders. They were accused of violating the ceasefire agreement. China again abstained. According to some analysts the list was narrowed down at the behest of China, which was defending its oil interests in Sudan by protecting the Sudan’s government.

Below is a summary in a table of China’s positions in the Security Council regarding resolutions on Darfur and the Sudan.

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817 Associated Press, China Opposes UN Sanctions against Sudan, March 31, 2005
China has used its permanent member status at the UN Security Council to oppose concrete measures intended to address the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. This has increased the breach and tension between Sudan and the West but at the same time it has bolstered Beijing’s prominence to Khartoum. This use of soft power by China in respect of Sudan has convinced many African countries to avoid condemning at the UNHC China’s human rights practices. One of the objectives of the Chinese African policy is to ensure support for its domestic and foreign policies within specialized organizations such as the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).

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6.3.7 Area four: The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC): China’s soft power in the form of multilateralism

In support of the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,’ China established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in October 2000 in Beijing. By providing a new institutional base and mechanism for communication between China and its economic partners in Africa, Beijing seeks to foster closer ties with African regimes. Since its creation the Forum has held four summits, where African and Chinese leaders, investors and business people meet to discuss trade, investment and development opportunities. As with China’s development model, the soft power Beijing exerts through the FOCAC is one of the central points in China-Africa relations.

FOCAC was created to facilitate cooperation between China and Africa in a number of sectors, including trade, aid, investment, culture and international affairs. The Forum’s first Ministerial Meeting was held in Beijing in 2000 and its second meeting was convened in Addis Ababa in 2003. In October 2004 the Forum established the China-Africa Business Council and during the third Forum in Beijing in November 2006, President Hu Jintao acknowledged that the history of China-Africa relations had crossed vast distances and defied the oceans. He stated that “China’s friendly contacts with Africa date back to the 15th century when Mr. Zheng He, a famous navigator in the Ming dynasty, reached the coast of Africa four times, writing an important chapter in the history of China-Africa relations” 822.

At FOCAC’s first Ministerial Meeting two documents were produced: the “Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation”, which set out the foundations, principles, goals and objectives of the Forum; and the “Beijing Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development” which outlined the principles, objectives and procedural framework for cooperation in various fields, including intergovernmental cooperation, trade, investment, infrastructure, debt relief, agriculture, tourism, natural resources, health, technology and

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822 ANC Today, Thabo Mbeki, At Heaven’s Gate, Hope is Born, Johannesburg, 10-16 November 2006
education. The Beijing Declaration stated that FOCAC is “a framework for collective dialogue between China and African Countries”. The cooperation was founded on equality and mutual benefit, with the main objective being peace and development.

“The Declaration clearly stated that China-Africa cooperation is facilitated by South-South solidarity and a common identity affirmed by their shared status as developing countries and common fundamental interests. The Declaration also stressed the long history of Sino-African relations and their time honored traditional friendship. In addition, the Declaration emphasized the strategic and necessary relationship between China and Africa within an unjust and unequal international system, characterized by the developed North and developing South. The Declaration calls for the establishment of a just and equitable new international political and economic order that includes developing countries, particularly with regard to decision-making in the international system. The Declaration stresses the importance of close cooperation and consultation between China and Africa on matters of decision-making within the global arena.”

The China-Africa Forum has had many successes in strengthening cooperation between the two regions. Between the first and second Ministerial Meetings China hosted more than thirty African leaders, and former Chinese President Jiang Zemin and the previous premier Zhu Rongji both visited Africa during that period. China furthermore eased the debt burden of 31 African countries, thereby facilitating greater economic and social development. In addition, trade between the regions increased notably since the inception of the Forum, and human resource cooperation has been significant. Greater cooperation has been forged through technical assistance in a number of fields, including medical research aimed at preventing the spread of infectious diseases and collaboration in the promotion, manufacture and marketing of traditional medicines.

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825 Adeola, F, China-Africa Cooperation from an African Perspective, Keynote Address presented at a Seminar on Supporting Africa’s Development Experience to Reduce Poverty, Beijing September 23, 2004
Despite these apparent successes, some commentators however believe that the FOCAC was created with a number of other strategic objectives in mind. It is regarded as a platform where China is able to expand its soft power in Africa\(^\text{826}\). As Muekalia argues: “by positioning itself at the helm of a coalition of African Council and improve its bargaining power in other international institutions”\(^\text{827}\). Another aim of the Forum is to extend China’s development model by highlighting its achievements during its modernization period, and in so doing persuading African countries to implement similar reforms, partly in order to lessen China’s foreign aid burden\(^\text{828}\). It can be argued that China has fostered self-development, and discouraged dependency on “hand-outs”. Consequently, through the framework of the FOCAC, China supports the goals of NEPAD.

Another objective appears to challenge the leadership of the United States. In an indirect criticism of US condemnation of China’s human rights abuses, Beijing has called for the creation of a new international order and criticized the politicization of human rights and the attaching of conditionalities to aid and assistance\(^\text{829}\). Added to this is the objective to consolidate and exert China’s leadership role in the developing world\(^\text{830}\). The Forum’s documents repeatedly stress global inequality and injustice, the negative effects of globalization on poor nations and the merits of debt forgiveness. At the first Conference, Jiang Zemin referred to China’s leadership status, and emphasized the similarity between the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the OAU and UN charters. Liu argued: “by linking the diplomatic principles of the largest developing country with the OAU and the UN, Beijing strongly implied its hope to lead developing countries, including African states, in the UN”\(^\text{831}\). The Forum was also subtly used to curtail Taiwan’s influence in Africa.

\(^{826}\) Shinn, D and Eisenman, J, Duelling Priorities for Beijing in the Horn of Africa, Beijing, China Brief, vol. 21, 2005, page 7
\(^{827}\) Muekalia, Domingos Jardo, Africa and China’s Strategic Partnership, African Security Review, vol. 13, issue 1 2004
\(^{828}\) Taylor, Ian, The Forum on China- Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Routledge, 2011
Taiwan was never explicitly mentioned, but documents and speeches at the Forum continuously repeated support for the ‘One-China Policy’\textsuperscript{832}.

**Figure 22: China’s FOCAC 2006 Promises \textsuperscript{833}**

- Assistance Double development to Africa by 2009
- Provide $3 billion in preferential loans and $2 billion in Preferential buyer credits to Africa over the next three years
- Set up a China- Africa Development Fund to reach $5 billion to encourage Chinese companies to invest and support firms investing there:
- Build a conference centre for the African Union
- Increase from 190 to more than 400 number of export items exempt from entry tariffs in China for the least developed African countries with diplomatic relations with Africa.
- Establish between three and five trade and economic co-operations zones in Africa over the next three years
- Over the next three years, train 15,000 African professionals; send 100 senior agriculture experts to Africa: set up ten agriculture technology demonstration centers in Africa: build 30 hospitals in Africa and provide 300 renminbi grants to cover the provision of anti-malaria drug artemisinin and construction of 30 malaria prevention treatment centers in Africa: build 100 rural schools in Africa


6.3.8 Chinese peacekeeping and military operations in Africa as a means of political soft power

Earlier it was mentioned that during most of the Cold War period China did not want to participate in any military or peace-keeping operations, including in Africa. Gradually it changed its stance and arguably it was motivated by the advantages it saw in terms of gaining soft power in the process. Peace-keeping operations are the UN and international community’s means of direct intervention in dealing with conflict or transition situations. In addition to establishing peace, most transitions are also directed towards laying the foundation for a democratization process. By being associated with these values the Chinese want to present themselves as responsible world citizens, promoting peace and democracy and therefore being seen as an attractive power. Chinese peace-keeping operations and security cooperation in Africa are therefore a part of China’s grand strategy of developing soft power and as a way of promoting its interests on the African continent. China continues to maximize its military and security relationship with African countries, especially with countries that have large quantities of oil and raw material. There is an obvious correlation between China’s military cooperation and important oil producing countries like Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Chad and Libya. It can be noted that China is not deterred from supporting a country in spite of international pressure to impose sanctions - Sudan is a good example where UN sanctions prevailed but China still continued with bilateral diplomatic and economic relations. For China, maintaining access to African oil, gas, minerals and timber is important as it fuels the Chinese economy and hence Beijing will make every effort “to expand military-security cooperation with resource-exporting countries”834. China’s support for the UN and AU peacekeeping in Africa provides China with military access to African countries and its military undertakes intelligence gathering, especially in conflict areas. This was illustrated by China’s peacekeeping contributions in Sudan that help deflect some negative criticism by the international community against its oil connections and the sale of arms to Khartoum. China’s military or grants assistance in Africa is directly related to military infrastructure projects. China is willing to give low-interest funding to projects in Angola and Ghana in the areas of military and infrastructure

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development. According to David Shinn, “Chinese state-owned companies manufacture the products: the loans are transferred from one government account to another. The same concept applies to military aircraft and sales equipment”.

Chinese involvement in African peace-keeping has resulted in increasing cooperation between Chinese and African troops. Joint training is a relative low-cost manner to maintain a bilateral military relationship. The Chinese view it as a long-term benefit in developing more personal ties between African and Chinese military personnel. While most analysts argue that Chinese interest in expanding security of the sea lanes are not significant, it is possible to argue otherwise based on the following considerations.

A white paper entitled *China’s National Defence in 2006* stated that “the navy aims at gradual extensions of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operation and must guard not only coastal areas but also nearby oceans”. Willy Lam interprets this reference as an intention to develop a blue-water fleet with long-range, all weather capabilities. In a memorandum the former American Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, argued that China is building military forces and setting up bases along sea lanes to the Middle East to ensure its global military power in the region but more importantly to protect its oil shipment.

According to David Shinn, “China is constructing a deep-water Indian Ocean port at Gwadar in Pakistan and building a container port facility at Chittagong, Bangladesh. Together with Chinese developed ports in Cambodia and Burma, these facilities will eventually permit the Chinese navy to extend its sea power into the Indian Ocean”. According to Cortez Cooper, Director of East Asia Studies at Hicks, by the year 2020 Beijing hopes to have military capabilities in its ‘greater periphery’, more importantly in the Straits of Malacca, the Indian Oceans and the Persian Gulf.

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835 Interview with Carlien Kiala, (Advisor at the Consulate General of the Republic of Angola in Hong Kong Special Administrative region), Pretoria, 23 July 2012
837 Interview with Mr Wang Ke, (Counsellor African Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Beijing, China, 10 January 2008
839 Lam, Willy, China outlines Ambitious Objectives in its Defence White Paper, *China Brief*, vol. 11, 10 January 2007, page 2-3
Cooper notes that “China will require the development of a blue-water fleet and strategic bomber force to protect trade in goods and natural resources”\(^{843}\).

Most analysts link Chinese interests in expanding security of the sea lanes to oil coming from the Middle East, which contributes up to 50 per cent of China’s oil imports\(^{844}\). However, due to the political and economic unrest in the Middle East in 2011/12, China’s imports have decreased from this region. China will require more oil from the African continent, and will also import large quantities of minerals and timber from Africa that are essential to China’s booming economy. Hence the arguments for secure shipping routes in other regions will also become very important to China in the African region.

Another reason for China to expand its sea lanes is the growing strength of India’s naval capabilities in east Africa and along the African islands in the Indian Ocean. Although China and India have been at relative peace for the past decade, China still sees India as a competitor. China still has an unresolved boarder dispute with India and China’s close relations with Pakistan could in the future pose a problem. Hence, it is in China’s interest to protect its maritime interests in the Indian Ocean by securing the transportation of its commodities. Hu Jintao’s visit to the Seychelles on his 2007 Africa tour was not a mere coincidence. China’s naval presence can therefore be interpreted from different perspectives: for Pakistan it is a form of soft power while for India, the Philippines and other states involved in territorial disputes with China it can be seen as a form of hard power. China’s naval presence around the African coast is still limited and not yet used in its bilateral relations. No cases of direct confrontation between the Chinese and American or European navies in African waters have been reported. It might therefore still be seen as a form of soft power.


6.3.9 Peacekeeping

An important aspect of China’s foreign policy with strong soft power reverberations is its United Nations (UN) peacekeeping activities. Despite frequent and ongoing statements about non-intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign states, China now has more UN peacekeepers in operation in Africa than any of the other four UN Security Council permanent members. The image of China now as a responsible member - or even a leader - of the international community, contributing its share to the “greater good” is a typical objective of soft power and is something Beijing is keen to portray.

In 1971, when China became a member of the Security Council, it was opposed to peacekeeping operations. By the early 1990s China decided to play a more assertive role by sending a small number of observers to Mozambique, Liberia and Sierra Leone. By 2000 it contributed ten observers to the UN mission along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border and in 2001 China had sent 200 troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 2003 it contributed 600 troops and police to Liberia and in 2004 it sent a small number of observers to Cote d’Ivoire and Burundi.

China not only provides personnel but also medical expertise, transportation equipment, engineering, and logistical specialists for UN operations and more importantly it provides financial assistance to the AU for the peacekeeping mission in Darfur. By April 2008, China was the twelfth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations with 1,981 personnel participating in seven UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. These included 613 personnel in Sudan, 13 in Cote d’Ivoire, 581 in Liberia, 234 in Democratic Republic of the Congo, two in Ethiopia-Eritrea and 14 in Western Sahara.

It can be noted that China’s most prominent peacekeeping involvement in Africa is directly linked to countries that have strategic natural resources. For example, China has a strong

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847 Interview with Brian da Silva, (Office of the US Special Envoy to Sudan), Pretoria, 21 November 2009

peacekeeping presence in Sudan where it also has oil interest in the region. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, China has important mining concessions, while in Liberia, China is a major importer of timber. With regard to Liberia, China has invested in the country as a “reward for terminating its recognition of Taiwan and restoring relations with Beijing in 2003. China sent nearly 600 engineers, medical personnel, and transportation specialist to the UN peacekeeping operations in Liberia”\(^849\). The President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, informed the media that “Liberia will never forget the friendship of Chinese peacekeeping soldiers”\(^850\). This comment is arguably the most direct evidence of acceptance of Chinese soft power by means of its involvement in peacekeeping operations. At the same time Western powers like the USA contribute vast amounts of financial assistance to UN peace operations but are not directly involved in the form of troops. One noticeable exception is France which is less involved in UN peacekeeping operations but more directly in security operations. China therefore does not have a monopoly in this field and is in competition with these other powers.

6.4 China’s instrument of soft power in Africa: Political outreach

6.4.1 Party to Party relations as form of soft power

Over the past few decades the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has devised a strategic campaign to build lasting ties with African political parties and organizations. In this section we examine how China uses different instruments of political influence to ensure Africa’s commitment to Beijing.

In the 1950s and 1960s Beijing’s primary motivation in Africa was to promote China’s own brand of Communism and to support revolutionary, anti-colonial liberation movements. This led the Communist Party of China (CPC) to developing political relations with a wide spectrum of governing and other parties in Africa. In Angola, for example, the CPC supported the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) as well as the rival National Liberation

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\(^{850}\)Sunday Tribune, Chinese President in the spotlight over Sudan, 2 February 2007.
Front of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). In the case of South Africa, the CPC supported the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and to a lesser extend the African National Congress (ANC) during this period. During the anti-colonial struggle it also supported ZANU in Zimbabwe while the Soviet Union supported ZAPU, which was a close ally of the ANC. However during this period party-to-party contacts were minimal and few African politicians visited China. Official documents indicate that no CPC officials travelled to Africa. The occasional contacts China had with Africa were mainly with the military or other subordinate CPC groups. During this period China’s focus was on the ongoing Cold War tensions and exporting its revolutionary Maoist ideology. Although many African leaders were following Maoist revolutionary thinking, direct contacts with CPC were limited.

In 1969, under the leadership of Premier Zhou Enlai, there was a shift in China’s policy towards Africa. The CPC turned away from an aggressive ideological programme to following a path of pragmatism in placing geopolitical objectives before ideology, similar to the Soviet Union. This shift resulted in a policy change in the CPC’s outreach to African political parties. The CPC began to concede that African countries did not have to accept Chinese ideology in order to develop a relationship: “China was able to grant ideology autonomy” to its partners. In many ways the absence of overtly stated ideology in China’s foreign policy was the preamble for the CPC to build ties with African ruling parties across the political spectrum. By the 1970s, China began to send ambassadors to all the countries it had diplomatic relations with.

During the past three decades the PRC has implemented an outreach program designed to build lasting ties to African political parties and organizations. This was done in order to enhance official bilateral state-to-state relations and in support of Chinese domestic economic developments. Since the third plenary session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee held in 1978, the Communist Party of China and the Party’s International Department (CPC-ID) have emerged as the departments that are primarily responsible for the party’s international exchange.

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851 Interview with Professor Zhao Qiong (Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University), Stellenbosch University, 16 August 2011
854 Interview with So Pui-kin-Stanley (Policy Officer, Oxfam), Hong Kong, 10 January 2008
and communication with foreign political parties and organizations. Deng Xiaoping supported the new CPC-ID strategy to develop contacts with various parties and during his period, the CPC-ID began to receive its first African delegations. This was a breakthrough in the CPC’s history of foreign affairs and it improved the relationship between China and Africa. It also meant that for the first time the CPC no longer limited its contacts to Communist parties only.

The CPC’s Twelfth Assembly in 1982 defined the new principles of its party-to-party relations. These four principles were independence, complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.

The CPC-ID was given four responsibilities, namely:

1) to research foreign developments and key global issues
2) to provide briefings and policy proposal to the Central Committee
3) to carry out exchanges with foreign political parties, and
4) to carry out exchanges with organizations.

From these four principles and four responsibilities, the CPC-ID derived seven guidelines to govern its interactions with foreign political parties. These were laid out in a 2001 speech by the CPC-ID Vice-Minister Cai Wu. These were firstly to establish new types of relationship between parties, secondly no party should judge the achievements and mistakes of foreign parties on the basis of its own experience, thirdly every party should decide its own country’s affairs independently, fourthly all parties should be completely equal, and they should respect each other and not interfere in each other’s internal affairs, fifthly ideological differences should not be obstacles to establish a new type of party-to-party relations, sixthly the purpose of exchange and cooperation with foreign parties should be to promote the development of bilateral state-to-

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855 Interview with Joshua Eisenman (American Foreign Policy Council, Fellow in Asia Studies), Washington, DC, 10 May 2009
856 Guanghua, Jiang, Records on Visits to Foreign Parties, Beijing, 1977, page 451
state relations, and finally all parties should look to the future and forget historical sensitivities\(^{859}\).

These guidelines for establishing a new type of party-to-party relations served to operationalize the CPC strategy and stands as a useful guide to understand the CPC’s political outreach in the modern era\(^{860}\).

These policies were instituted by the CPC to engage African ruling parties and establish stable relationships, regardless of ideology (in accordance with the guidelines listed above). These bilateral meetings provided a forum for exchange of views, coordination of policies, and provision of economic assistance. The leaders of China’s state-controlled firms depend on the CPC-ID and other related organizations like the Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAFIU) to arrange appropriate meetings and social activities with African delegations, while African party leaders rely on the CPC-ID to introduce them to the relevant Chinese political and business leaders.

This policy proved to be successful, because from 1978 to 1990 the CPC-ID conducted over 300 exchanges with African political parties\(^{861}\). By the early 1990s the initiative, led by the CPC-ID, was coupled with economic incentives that began to woo many African countries who officially cut their diplomatic ties with Taiwan. In exchange for such political loyalty, China offered grants, loans and low-cost infrastructural projects to many African countries that pursued a ‘one China policy’.

The so-called third generation of CPC leadership under Jiang Zemin followed the same political outreach and strategic methodology as his predecessor to foster economic growth and integrate the country into the global economy. This required the CPC to develop stronger political relationships to support such goals, where countries like Egypt, Ethiopia, South Africa, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe provided some of the strongest partnerships in the early 1990s to cement

\(^{859}\) Wu Cai, Vice Minister of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, *A Review of the Reflections on the 80 Years of Foreign Contacts of the Communist Party of China (CPC)*, available at www.idcpc.org.cn/english/article/20010701.htm, accessed on 11 June 2010

\(^{860}\) Wu Cai, Vice Minister of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, *A Review of the Reflections on the 80 Years of Foreign Contacts of the Communist Party of China (CPC)*, available at www.idcpc.org.cn/english/article/20010701.htm, accessed on 11 June 2010


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the Sino-Africa relations. Hu Jintao accelerated China’s growth by increasing the value of political capital with resource rich African states and in turn the CPC increased the importance of political outreach on the African continent. An example of China’s political influence was seen in Zambia’s 2006 presidential elections where the CPC supported the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) party. There were strong rumors that the CPC provided financial support for MMD. According to media reports, the opposition party leader of the Patriotic Front, Michael Sata, a strong opponent of Chinese investments in Zambia, alleged that the Chinese had financed the MMD. Sata informed the media that Chinese Ambassador Li Baodong threatened that “Beijing would have nothing to do with Zambia if Sata wins the elections.” This threat became a reality when Sata was indeed elected as Zambian President in 2011 on an anti-Chinese campaign ticket.

6.4.2 Hospitality and negotiations approach as form of soft power

Another political instrument used for the development of soft power in Africa is diplomatic hospitality. Chinese hosting practices consist of a mixture of traditional Confucius teachings and modern hospitality which are very appealing to ruling elites. African political elites and NGOs are hosted in first class luxury and showered with gifts. Another factor that impresses these elites is that there are seemingly no conditionalties attached to China’s hospitality. The CPC’s mantra of equality, mutual respect, and non-interference has won over African government and nongovernment officials across the political spectrum. According to Joshua Eisenman, “visits from African political party delegations give the CPC-ID an opportunity to practice its intoxicating mix of contemporary and traditional hospitality.” Between 1997 and 2006, the CPC-ID feted over sixty African party leaders during which time the leaders and their Chinese
counterparts transformed party ties into long term bilateral cooperation for mutual interest and concern. These meetings provide a forum for exchange of views and coordination of policies.\textsuperscript{866} According to Solomon, “the most distinctive characteristic of Chinese negotiating behavior is an effort to develop and manipulate strong interpersonal relationships with foreign officials (and) feelings of good will, obligations, guilt or dependence to achieve their negotiation objectives”\textsuperscript{867}. Hosting these meetings allows the Chinese “to carry out negotiations on their own turf and by their own rules while maximizing (the visitor’s) sense of gratitude, awe and helplessness”\textsuperscript{868}. This explains why China has been so successful in its political negotiations.

6.4.3 High level visits as form of soft power

China implements its international diplomacy by dispatching high-level delegates on official visits to various countries. It appears that these visits take place more frequently to developing countries. A possible reason could be its symbolic importance for leaders in developing countries because of China’s rising stature and importance in the international system. Chinese delegates also pay frequent official visits to countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa. These high-level contacts allow China to demonstrate the importance it attaches to its relations with those countries. Premier Wen Jiabao stressed on a visit to Fiji that “China maintains that all countries whether big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community and should treat each other as such”\textsuperscript{869}. Visitors from developing countries who are given little attention in Washington or London are given the full red carpet treatment by China. Senior Chinese state officials make a point of visiting small countries who otherwise receive little attention, with aid announcements and agreements usually part of the visit\textsuperscript{870}.

One former Ugandan ambassador to China explains: “When I was arriving at my post, I was scheduled for a brief meeting and photo with the President and CPC Chairman Jiang Zemin.

\textsuperscript{866} Interview with Ma Xiaolin, (Third Secretary, African Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China), Beijing, 13 May 2010
\textsuperscript{867} Solomon, Richard H, \textit{Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior, A Brief Analysis}, Santa Monica, 1985
\textsuperscript{869} Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu, \textit{China’s soft power and International Relations}, Routledge, 2012, page 154
\textsuperscript{870} Interview with Mahmoud Allam (Egypt’s Ambassador to China), Beijing, 15 January 2008
Instead, we spoke for nearly an hour. President Jiang not only had a broad continental view of Africa but I was impressed by his detailed knowledge of African issues”\textsuperscript{871}. Another example was the president of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, who expressed his acknowledgement of this approach saying that “China’s approach to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of European investors”\textsuperscript{872}.

The number of high-level visits from senior Chinese officials to Africa since the early 1990s reflects the importance of Africa for China’s foreign policy agenda. Chairman Mao, while meeting Asian and African visitors for the first time in 1964, declared them to be close friends\textsuperscript{873}. Despite changes in leadership and a change in political strategy, President Hu Jintao, in reinforcing China’s position in 2006, stressed that “China and Africa are good friends, good partners and good brothers”\textsuperscript{874}. China maintained the momentum of mutual visits and dialogue with African leaders, in order to facilitate communication, deepen friendships and promote mutual understanding and trust. China favours increased multi-level and multi-channel engagements based on mutual respect between the National People's Congress (NPC) and African parliaments and the Pan-African Parliament of the AU, so as to deepen understanding and cooperation\textsuperscript{875}.

Top level meetings or “summit diplomacy” between Chinese and African heads of state since the 1960s, have been key in establishing direct communications and have set the tone for bilateral relations and policies. As early as 1963-64, Premier Zhou’s visit impacted on the structure of international relations as Beijing won the friendship of many African nations, thereby expanding its diplomatic reach. Brian Hotron, Chief Diplomatic correspondent of Reuters, believes that Zhou Enlai’s visit was “a big move for China to expand China’s presence and influence in Africa,” and “a significant development in Asian-African political relations and the relations between the East and the West”\textsuperscript{876}.

\textsuperscript{871} Interview with Phillip Idro, (the former Ugandan ambassador to China), Pretoria, 10 September 2007
\textsuperscript{872} Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu, \textit{China’s soft power and International Relations}, Routledge, 2012, page 154
\textsuperscript{873} Jiasong Li, Big Events in the History of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, \textit{World Affairs Press}, vol. 1, 2001, page 310-311
\textsuperscript{874} \textit{People’s Daily} online, Good Friends, Good Partners, Good Brothers, 22 June 2006
\textsuperscript{875} Peng He Wen, China’s African Policy, Driving forces features and global impact, \textit{African Review}, vol. 1, issue 1, page 48, 2009
\textsuperscript{876} \textit{The Christian Science Monitor}, Beijing focuses on Africa, 9 December 1963
During China’s policy shifts in Africa in the 1980s, the Chinese Premier initiated more visits to the continent to reassure its friendship, despite Beijing’s burgeoning growth and new business partnerships with previous ideological competitors. Beijing publicly stated: “We will not forget old friends when making new friends, or forget poor friends when making rich friends”\(^{877}\). Importantly, this diplomacy has sought to instill confidence by consistently applying these principles to Sino-African relations. Reinforcing this cooperation on the basis of equality has become a tradition of Chinese diplomacy.

While the West largely neglected Africa after the Cold War, Chinese foreign ministers made African nations their first official stop when travelling abroad from 1991 to 2008. These visits were both symbolic and real gestures of China’s respect for Africa.

Two-way visits between Africa and China have dramatically increased since the turn of the century\(^{878}\). China’s increased economic engagement with Africa since the early 1990s led to an increase in diplomatic visits: in 1992 former President Yang Shangkun visited Africa, followed by former President Jiang Zemin in 1995, 1996 and 2000. In 2006, dubbed the ‘year of Africa’ by Beijing, important Chinese delegations visited almost every country in Africa.

In January 2006, the Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visited Cape Verde, Senegal, Mali and Liberia, as well as Libya and Nigeria. In April President Hu Jintao visited Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya; and in June Premier Wen Jiabao toured Egypt, Ghana, the Republic of Congo, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. Before the June visit, the Premier’s previous visit to Africa was in December 2003 when he participated in the China-Africa Forum in Addis Ababa\(^{879}\).

The countries visited are also strategically important for China. Nigeria, Sudan and Angola are important oil-producing countries and are sources for China’s oil imports. South Africa, as a

\(^{877}\) *Yearbook of China’s Foreign Economic Relations And Trade*, Beijing Outlook Press 1986, page 47


\(^{879}\) South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2006 (press statement)
strategic ally and the economic powerhouse in Africa, has received a number of high-ranking Chinese officials since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1998. The importance of South Africa to China is frequently stated, particularly in relation to China’s agenda regarding ‘South-South cooperation’ and boosting China as the leader within this framework. Commenting on the Chinese Premier’s visit to South Africa in June 2006, the Chinese ambassador to South Africa, Liu Guijing, said: “We have realized that South Africa is one of the most important countries”. At the same time, the Chinese Embassy in Pretoria hailed the cooperation between China and South Africa in international affairs, as well as African affairs and matters of South-South cooperation, saying that this “cooperation constitutes a very important part of China-Africa and South-South cooperation”. South Africa also regards China as an important ally, considering its own aspirations in the international system and increasing its own status amongst developing countries. This is attested in a statement released by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) following a South African delegation’s visit to China (led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad) in June 2006, which stated: “discussions affirmed that South Africa is a strategic partner for China and that both countries were allies in efforts to achieve the developmental agenda of the South. Both countries agreed to continue their cooperation in multilateral forum with a renewed focus on the implementation of the developmental agenda of the South”.

On a state visit to South Africa during April 2000, President Jiang Zemin and President Thabo Mbeki signed the ‘Pretoria Declaration on the Partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa’, which aimed to increase economic cooperation, as well as cooperation in international affairs. The most important outcome of the Pretoria Declaration was the setting up of a bi-national commission (BNC), which was aimed at facilitating bilateral relations and cooperation between China and South Africa as well as providing a platform for

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882 South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2006 (press statement)
discussions on all matters of mutual interest. Mbeki’s visit to Beijing in December 2001 saw the official launch of the BNC.  

The following five sectorial committees have been established under the BNC: diplomatic affairs, trade, education, science and technology, and defence. The second BNC was held during Vice President Zeng Quighong’s visit to South Africa in 2004, which focused mainly on strengthening cooperation between the two countries.

6.4.4 Image building as a form of soft power

The CPC is very aware that it has to constantly improve its image and influence public sentiment within the African countries. It does this through its embassies. In 2007/2008 the CPC’s international outreach organization tasked a number of African embassies to undertake a perception survey. The main purpose of this exercise was to determine China’s image in Africa. China decided to conduct this survey in order to improve its image, especially after the negative reports it was receiving in the media. The media were reporting that China’s entry into Africa ‘was another form of colonialism’. CPC allocated “$3 billion for exerting more international influence through diplomacy and national image lifting. The results of the survey are not known and therefore a substitute was looked for to include in this study. In 2007 the Pew Center conducted an attitude survey in African states to determine how citizens view the comparative influence of China and the USA in their countries. The figure below indicates the attitudes about their respective good and bad influences and the difference between the two powers’ good influence.

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883 Interview with Aziz Pahad, (former South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), Johannesburg, 20 November 2009
884 Interview with ex-South African diplomat who was a South African intelligence officer in Beijing, Pretoria, 19 August 2013
885 World Tribune, China Budget $3 billion for perception Ops, 23 March 2007.
Senegal, Tanzania and Ethiopia stand out as states where there is the biggest difference in attitude in favour of China, while South Africa is the only state where the American influence is regarded as more than the Chinese influence.

6.4.5 Role of the Ministry of State Security and other intelligence agencies in soft power

Any discussion on China’s political and economic activities on the African continent must take into account the covert role played by the country’s intelligence organs which serve the economic and political interests of the state. Unlike Western corporations which operate independently of any state intelligence structures, Chinese companies are closely interwoven into state structures (which include intelligence). Furthermore, heads of management and CEOs are

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~ 244 ~
appointed by the government. Chinese companies work in tandem with the state’s economic, political and developmental strategic plans, ensuring proper alignment of companies with the state’s economic and political objectives. Hence all negotiations with foreign governments and business entities are subject of on-going assessments by a number of PRC intelligence structures⁸⁸⁷. In the context of China’s growing energy and resources acquisition in African countries, the information provided by the embassies feed into the Chinese intelligence system.

Some of these intelligence operations are conducted by the Ministry of State Security, known as Guoanbu, followed by the National Security Ministry (MSS), which is the country’s single most important strategic intelligence service, and operates both internally and externally. Under the MSS is the People’s Liberation Army, which falls under the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the all-powerful Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)⁸⁸⁸. MOFCOM is the head of China’s economic and business intelligence and evaluation structure in the country which provides vital information on the country’s internal and external relations. It relies on industrial intelligence through the use of analysts and researchers, through its Second Bureau, Eighth Bureau Economic office, 10th Bureau of Science and Technology, and the infamous Technical Department (Jishubul), which spend considerable resources on spying and monitoring foreign businesspeople⁸⁸⁹.

Unlike in other countries, the dividing line between state and private enterprises in China is deliberately blurred, with individuals acting in overlapping capacities. A Chinese business leader may head a state-held Chinese company; at the same time he may also report to MOFCOM and be a member of the MSS or a high ranking CCP official working in one of the many research organizations or think-tanks⁸⁹⁰. Shambaugh argues that foreign attaches “do not openly identify themselves as such, usually identifying themselves simply as Foreign Ministry personnel”⁸⁹¹. A South African diplomat observed that “the CPC-ID official posted to an African

⁸⁸⁷ Interview with an ex-South African diplomat who was a South African intelligence officer in Beijing, Pretoria, 19 August 2013
⁸⁸⁹ Interview with an ex-South African diplomat who was a South African intelligence in Beijing, Pretoria, 19 July 2013
embassy carried three different cards; one from the CPC-ID bureau, another as a PRC embassy staff member, and yet another as a research fellow at CAFIU”892.

Adding to the confusion is that the MSS often sends delegates or ‘business delegates’ to attend international policy conferences or to attend complicated trade negotiations. These ‘delegates’ provide background intelligence, sum up opposition negotiating positions and provide relevant advice to business officials.

MOFCOM also plays a vital role in economic intelligence gathering. Although MOFCOM’s main function is to interface with foreign commercial interest groups, it also has sub-intelligence units that deals with economic information gathering. According to the French publication, Intelligence Online, MOFCOM works closely with MSS. MOFCOM’s main objective is to keep an eye on China’s massive economic development on the global stage. This would involve monitoring developments within organizations like the WTO as well acquiring new technologies for the country893.

MOFCOM also acquires information from a commerce ministry service within the Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs. Other organizations that MOFCOM acquires information from are research institutions and think tanks that have been established in the past two decades. Some of these are the Foreign Trade Research Institute, the National Economic Research Institute of Beijing and the Shanghai Economic Research Institute. MOFCOM’s economic, business and financial information is processed by the Chinese Communist Party894.

MOFCOM supplies Chinese companies with information on trade and investment opportunities in Africa and is known in the host countries as the Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Offices (ECCO)895.

Another aspect of Chinese intelligence gathering is through social relationships and personal networking, known as the “United Front”. Chinese expatriates act as a reservoir for intelligence

892 Interview with Busani Ngcaweni, (Head of Branch, Office of the Deputy President, The Presidency, Republic of South Africa), Pretoria, 29 January 2011
893 Interview with John Tesha, (Executive Secretary, Africa Forum), 24 April 2012, Pretoria; Executive Research Associates, China in Africa: A strategic overview, October 2009
894 Executive Research Associates, China in Africa: A strategic overview, October 2009
895 Interview with Bharti Daya, (Director of International Trade and Economic Development, Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa), Johannesburg, 26 May 2011
gathering, local networking and influencing operations. Some of the examples of how MSS have assisted in Africa are for example in Angola where it was able to assist China’s entry into the country’s energy sector and open back channels to Sao Tome Principe.

In Guinea Bissau the MSS was able to monitor Taiwan’s relations with Gambia. In Senegal it was able to monitor Taiwanese activities in Dakar before Senegal switched sides in October 2005. In Niger it was able to monitor Taiwan’s relations with Burkina Faso and the movements of Islamic militants possibly linked to the Uyghur’s from Xinjiang Province.\(^{896}\)

In Nigeria, the MSS was able to expand China’s strategic interest in energy resources and new markets. In Sudan, (until the recent Peace accords) the MSS was used to monitor and provide tactical information of rebel movement across the country and in Darfur. In Egypt and Algeria, the MSS was able to monitor the movement of Chinese Islamists Turkestan and Uyghur’s across North Africa. The MSS monitored South Africa because of its strategic locality and importance in the developing world and its gateway into Africa. In Mozambique, China interest was because of its strategic location in the Indian Ocean and its proximity to Taiwan’s support for Swaziland”.\(^{897}\)

MSS personnel are more concentrated in countries that are rich in raw minerals like Sudan, Nigeria, Angola and South Africa. The most successful MSS operations have been in Senegal and Chad, where it played an important role in opening back channels to get these countries to switch diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China.\(^{898}\).

Chinese intelligence officers are not only found in embassies but also in Chinese companies, and also under the guise of media organizations. Media outlets like New China (Xinhua) News Agency or journalists act as an important conduit in conveying information back to headquarters. Chinese business intelligence also plays a critical role in China’s energy resource acquisition agenda. Companies like CITIC, China Overseas Shipping Corporation (COSCO), Huawei, ZTE, and Semi-tech relay intelligence through the state body for Science and Technology (SSTC). Some employees in Chinese companies are also used as intelligent operatives in order to

\(^{896}\)Interview with Isa Dolkun, (Secretary General of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), Germany), Berlin, Germany, 12 May 2011


understand the local environment and interface with local decision-makers to strengthen Chinese political institutions. An unofficial source claimed that “China targeted competitors in the energy and natural resource sector” to gather intelligence information on De Beers Diamond in 2005 in the Central African Republic (CAR)\(^{899}\). This highlights the symbiotic relationship that exists between Chinese companies, MOFCOM and China’s state intelligence apparatus.

Intelligence is therefore used as a means of determining what is in the interest of soft power, in strategic terms how it should be coordinated and in which areas it should be applied.

### 6.4.6 The role of an embassy as a vehicle for Soft Power diplomacy

The wide-range of exchange and co-operation activities lay out under the FOCAC framework and in the China’s African Policy is implemented by an extensive network of PRC diplomats in Africa\(^ {900}\). China maintains embassies and has diplomatic ties with 49 countries and has commercial offices in 40 of these countries and seven Consulates General in five of them. Chinese diplomats are extremely fluent in the local languages. The embassies are pivotal instruments in preparing for high level leadership exchange visits, including regular annual trips to Africa by top PRC authorities\(^ {901}\). Regular leadership visits are encouraged to build personal ties and cement bilateral relationships. The local embassy staff members are very important in identifying opportunities for Chinese businesses, for bilateral cooperation and for Chinese interventions in the local conditions. Draft agreements are prepared and finalized by the visiting PRC leadership.

These top PRC leadership visits are usually accompanied by large delegations including business representatives. They sign major agreements which are financed by PRC state agencies at

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\(^{900}\) Interview with Phillip Idro, (the former Ugandan ambassador to China), Pretoria, 10 September 2007; Interview with Dave Malcomson, (Minister in the South African Embassy in Beijing), 13 January 2008 and Pretoria, November 2012

\(^{901}\) Interview with Mr. Xu Weizhong, (Deputy Director and Research Professor at Institute of West Asian and African Studies and China Institute of Contemporary International Relations), Beijing, 19 May 2010
preferential rates. African heads of state accompanied by a large retinue of political, trade, and business leaders also make frequent reciprocal visits to China\textsuperscript{902}.

Low level exchanges include training by the Chinese for senior and mid-level African diplomats, economic officials, business professionals and other key decision-makers and policy implementers. These training programs began in the mid-1990s and are a pivotal part of China’s political soft power and charm offensive. Although one can argue that all countries engage in these charm offensives, China is very effective in delivering on its promises. Exchanges between legislative bodies, the PRC’s Communist Party and African political parties, local governments and think tanks take place and these trips are generously funded by the PRC.

Embassy personnel play a critical role in providing information to the PRC. However, this is not unique to China as all embassies provide similar functions to their governments. However Chinese embassies operate slightly differently and in order to understand the Chinese political system we need to understand its structures.

It is reported that MSS Officers are located in most African embassies and in many cases they hold senior positions. In the Chinese embassy in Pretoria, MSS members are active in collecting information on South Africa’s economy. The MSS also looks for business opportunities and they facilitate meetings with South African business leaders. According to an anonymous source, the PRC at one stage had approximately 30 specialist MSS agents inside Liberia. This was the runner up to the 2005 Presidential election. The MSS were positioned in Liberia to determine if any financial assistance would be given by Taiwan\textsuperscript{903}.

The local Chinese embassies are therefore essential elements in the Chinese network of instruments that galvanize its political soft power all over the world, but specifically in Africa. This study has identified the role played by embassies as a specific element of soft power; a fact not explicitly acknowledged in theoretical terms by Nye.

\textsuperscript{902}Interview with Dr Eddy Maloka, (special advisor to the Minister in International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO), Pretoria, 10 March 2010

\textsuperscript{903}Interview with John Tesha, (Executive Secretary, Africa Forum), Pretoria, 24 April 2012
6.5. Chapter Conclusion

In an article “China and Africa,” Gerald Segal asserted that China, as a rising global power, would be more important to Africa than vice versa and surmised that Africa would be of least importance to China’s foreign policy\textsuperscript{904}. An examination of current Sino-African relations clearly disproves Segal’s observations. In fact, Africa has become a key region for Beijing’s international political and economic agenda.

In this chapter we examined how China uses political soft power in its engagement with African countries. From 1980 it was primarily driven by a Realist foreign policy. According to Realism theory, it is in the interest of the every state to seek power and influence in order to promote its own security against other states through economic and political maneuvering. Moreover, asserting influence on other states to enhance one’s own goals and policies can be achieved through forceful coercion (‘hard power’ like military intervention) or through appeal, known as soft power.

The question that needs to be asked is why is China driven by a Realist foreign policy? One explanation is Chinese nationalism which might have been spurred by Western hostility towards China. In this context Chinese rulers promoted nationalism as a way to oppose external hostility and assert their independence\textsuperscript{905}. Nationalism was a driving factor in Chinese foreign policy for most of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and since 1949, Beijing has actively promoted ‘state nationalism’ (i.e. building a Chinese nation as opposed to ethnic nationalisms). Nationalism still dominates China’s foreign policy orientation – “to seek and preserve China’s national independence”\textsuperscript{906}. The key factors of Chinese nationalism are economic development, national unity and independence and international prestige.

\textsuperscript{904}Segal, Gerald, China and Africa, \textit{American Academy of Political and Social Science}, vol. 519, no.1, January 1992, page 126
\textsuperscript{905}Zhu Tianbiao, Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy, Beijing, \textit{China Review}, 2001, vol. 1, issue 1, page 4
\textsuperscript{906}Zhu Tianbiao, Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy, Beijing, \textit{China Review}, 2001, vol.1, issue 1, page 4

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Of the three, economic development is regarded as the most important priority and the one that encompasses all other national aims. It is within this framework that China’s political soft power is regarded.

In this chapter we analyzed elements of China’s political soft power. I argued that China’s ‘one China’ policy is a way of marginalizing Taiwan’s presence on the continent and preserving its national security. China’s other objective is to reinforce its political influence within the developing world so as to increase its global legitimacy among the international community.

Secondly, as a rising power, China is keen on mustering political influence in Africa by aggressively pursuing new allies. It requires votes at the United Nations (UN) and other forums to support its foreign policy and to ease pressure from the Western democracies regarding issues like human rights, economic openness and political freedom. Africa represents more than one-quarter of the UN General Assembly membership and China is attempting to divide conventional foreign policies of the West and the global South. In fact, Beijing uses several methods including traditional and commercial diplomacy and increasingly, public diplomacy and ‘soft power’. is one of the objectives of China’s Africa policy is to ensure support for its domestic and foreign policies within specialized organizations such as the UN Council on Human Rights (UNCHR). For this reason, China provides unconditional support to African countries, and subsequently, African nations have supported Beijing. With regard to Sudan, China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has opposed any measures intended to address the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. By using its influence in the Security Council, China has managed to drive a wedge between Sudan and Western countries, a move that only increasesBeijing's stature to the oil-rich Khartoum regime. On the other hand, African states have avoided condemning Chinese human rights practices at the UNCHR. As soon as China was assured of the support of more than half of African countries, it established its African multilateral partnership in the form of FOCAC.

China’s pledge of “non-interference” in the political affairs of African countries and the absence of conditionalities in making investment deals and offering development assistance has appealed

to African leaders. Many of these countries are ruled by corrupt, autocratic leaders and elites who disregard human rights and the rule of law. China readily strikes deals that lack transparency, accountability, and other criteria established by the World Bank and IMF, Western governments and NGOs. As Lafargue notes, China provides such regimes with the opportunity to steer clear of these measures and to suppress opposition political movements and civil society who call for democracy, transparency, the rule of law and the end of corruption. China’s non-interference policy has been rightly deemed “deeply disingenuous”908.

Beijing is an attractive partner for Africa’s authoritarian leaders and regimes for whom “the distribution of patronage remains an exigency for political survival”909. These resource-rich African regimes have very little incentive to diversify their economies and to promote development outside of the resource sector. Indeed, they have no interest in developing a social order with a middle class that would demand the rule of law, democracy and an end to corruption and good governance, which would threaten their hold on power.

Alden outlines this predicament in much of Africa: “For many elites in Africa, wealth generation and survival does not depend on productive development on a nationwide scale. Elite survival depends on access to rents to distribute to patronage networks. Consequently, China’s economic and political support could offer African politicians increasing leeway in misusing public funds and manipulating institutions to preserve their own power”910.

908 Lafargue, F., China’s presence in Africa, China perspectives, no. 61, September-October, 2005, page 2-9.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to explore and analyses the concept of ‘power’ and soft power in particular in the context of China and Africa. The purpose of the study was to firstly determine the salient features of soft power and its application in Chinese relations with African states. Secondly, it was to apply the theories of soft power in the context of Chinese relations with African states. The preparations for this study made it clear that China’s applications of soft power could be confined to two main areas, namely political and economic soft power.

In this chapter the first part will summarise the concluding remarks and arguments of each chapter, and in the latter part the key findings of the study will be presented. The chapter will end with some concluding thoughts on the topic.

This study has made attempts to show that China’s foreign policy underwent a shift from 1978, following the implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s domestic modernization process. This shift was characterized by China’s increased engagement with the outside world, and the beginning of its integration into the global economy.

The scope of this study is grounded in the fields of both International Relations (IR) and Global Political Economy (GPE). The theoretical underpinning for such a discussion was elaborated on in Chapter 2. This theoretical framework was constructed from three separate but interrelated concepts. It included Joseph Nye’s theory of soft power, the Realist perspective and the theories of Economic Nationalism. These theories provide us with instruments for analyzing and understanding China’s involvement in Africa and specifically its soft power relations with African states.

Joseph Nye’s concept of ‘soft power’ was examined and elucidated further. This concept is closely associated with non-material forms of power and has become a powerful weapon for states in their international relations and diplomacy. This is especially evident in the manner in which China relates to Africa. It is clear that soft power attracts new relationships and legitimizes actions whilst building alliances and consensus. At the same time it is a peaceful alternative to the zero-sum strategy of the Realists, who predominately focus on excessive use of hard power capabilities.
The literature review presented different perspectives on China’s power perceptions and their possible implications. Though it referred to a rich tradition of publications on China’s use of soft power, Africa as a region is not particularly well represented in it. More specifically the literature review concluded that soft power in its existing theoretical form and in the way China utilizes it in relation to African states has not yet received sufficient research attention. This therefore provided a justification for the present study to be conducted.

The research in Chapter 2 indicates that China’s behavior in Africa is amenable to the Realist descriptions and predictions of state behavior. The concepts of ‘power’, ‘national interest’ and ‘self-interest’ are recurring themes in China’s relationship with Africa especially in its economic, and political engagements with the African continent. This study also assumed that China’s quest for resources in Africa is well suited for interpretation by the Economic Nationalist theory. The heavy influence of the state in China’s economic interaction with Africa also demonstrates how Economic Nationalist theory is suitable for interpreting China’s policies.

Though in theoretical terms soft power is ‘attractive power’ or the ‘carrot’ in the ‘carrot and stick’ approach, it is still in essence a form of power and has therefore theoretical links to the Realism/Neo-realism schools. There is however doubt whether its form articulated by Joseph Nye is most appropriate for China’s purposes. An alternative in the form of the ‘soft use of power’ is therefore also included for use in this study.

In Chapter 3 we introduced the main concepts used in the study and linked them to a theoretical framework. It is seldom that a study can depend on only one theoretical premise to provide an analytical or explanatory framework. This study is no exception.

Given the fact that China’s relationship with African states is located within the domain of its emergence as a major world power (i.e. a rising power), power as a concept is central to this study. Traditionally power has been associated mainly with the schools of Realism and Neo-realism, and for the purpose of this study it was understood that ‘soft power’ is used to promote a state’s national interest and therefore can be integrated into the traditions of Realism and Neo-realism. This point has not been discussed in depth in theoretical terms but serves as a premise for this study.
This study’s topic refers to China as a ‘rising power’. Given the fact that the main objective of this study was to concentrate on China’s relationship with African states and the role the continent plays in China’s development as a world power, this study is not concerned with China’s domestic development processes but only with how its relationship with African states contributes towards its status as a “rising power”. The purpose of this study was therefore not to demonstrate how China’s power is developed – it is accepted as a given – but how one region contributes towards that power development. More specifically this study wanted to demonstrate how China’s ‘soft power’ specifically contributes towards that development.

We have noted that the manner, in which Beijing deals with the outside world, including Africa, is very reflective of what is happening in China’s internal affairs. From the 1940s onwards, when China was isolated and it had prioritized securing diplomatic ties, it dealt with the outside world in this manner. However, we observed a shift in China’s foreign policy towards Africa as it began to place economic development at the center of its affairs. An important conclusion of Chapter 3 is that a proper understanding of the history of China-African relations depends on a thorough understanding of the history of development in China itself which undoubtedly mirrors changes in the policies and objectives of the Chinese and the way China interacts with the rest of the world.

In Chapter 4 an historical overview of the reasons why most Chinese believe that China is destined to become a great nation with its rise to super power status in the international system is provided. They believe that this rise, as a great nation, has been predetermined and presently, China’s Africa policy reaffirms the presence of this mentality. The logic is that if other countries recognize or respect China as a great power, China will reciprocate with economic benefits for them.

One of the most significant conclusions of this study is that China applies soft power in the African context not only to be attractive for the continent but also to address possible perceptions that its emergence as a global power may pose a direct threat to the status quo world powers. The study demonstrated how the PRC’s use of terms like “peaceful rise”, “peaceful development” and “harmonious world” are carefully calibrated to emphasise that China’s intentions are peaceful. It is very careful and guarded about using of language that does not present a negative image. The concept “peaceful rise” has been replaced with “peaceful development” and more
recently China decided to project an image of a “responsible power”. Therefore the phrase “harmonious world” is intended to reduce potential international friction between China and other major powers and to prevent possible counter measures on China’s rise.

In examining China’s economic relationship with Africa in Chapter 5, the study concluded that Beijing selects African countries according to their potential source of raw materials or alternatively as potential market for China’s manufactured goods. China’s increasing demand for commodities has had a positive impact on Africa’s growth. Furthermore the influx of cheap Chinese manufacturing goods and consumables has had a positive impact on the purchasing power of the poor in some African states. The research clearly indicates that China has made its largest investment in Africa’s energy sector, in order to secure its own oil flow. China has become a major player in almost every oil-producing African country and Beijing’s strategy has been to negotiate lucrative oil prices in exchange for attractive investment packages, trade and aid. Although China’s aid to Africa is by no means unusual, as many Western countries provide similar forms of aid, it is clear that China uses aid in a sophisticated, soft power manner that other Western countries don’t.

The research concluded that China’s aid to Africa is by no means altruistic but is motivated by economic self-interest – providing access to Africa’s natural resources, penetrating African markets, creating new business opportunities for Chinese companies and creating employment opportunities for Chinese labour. However, the one positive aspect of China’s foreign direct investment in Africa has been the boom in Africa’s infrastructural development.

There is almost no evidence that can challenge China’s rise as a global power and therefore its status as a “rising power” is regarded as a given also in this chapter. It already surpassed Japan as the second biggest economy in GDP terms. This Chapter also examined ‘soft power’ and how it influences China’s self-perception of its emergence as a major power. These perceptions were articulated in a series of terms (i.e. rising power, peaceful rise, peaceful development and others) mentioned already earlier to make China attractive and non-threatening to the international community. In that sense, we can conclude that soft power considerations were paramount in determining China’s public diplomacy language.
Economic soft power focuses specifically on trade and investment as elements of China’s power projection into Africa. The study demonstrated that general trade between China and Africa grew exponentially over the last decade and that this increase has seen China importing mostly raw materials, commodities and primary products, while African states importing mostly manufactured and value-added goods from China.

While China’s increasing demand for commodities has the potential to have a positive impact on Africa’s growth, as this is linked to the growth in their foreign exchange and capital for more investments, these benefits could be outweighed by the high volatility of demand for Africa’s commodities depending on tendencies in the Chinese domestic market.

A further problem is that China’s presence in Africa has the potential to encourage rent-seeking behavior, where the local elites are enriched with little or no benefits for the masses. For example, China has carefully developed relationships with Sudan and Zimbabwe, which allows it to extract oil (in Sudan) and commodities like tobacco, diamonds, gold and agricultural products (in Zimbabwe) in exchange for weapons and military equipment.

As we have indicated, the influx of cheap Chinese manufactured goods and consumables has a potentially positive impact on the purchasing power of the poor, such as in Uganda where the general population has benefited from access to affordable consumables at no expense to the local industry. However, in economies such as South Africa, where there is a mature manufacturing sector, Chinese imports have been detrimental to the textile and footwear industries, which have seen numerous factory closures and job losses.

In the most part the research has shown that Chinese investments are welcomed by African governments, especially in the light of decreased European and North American investments. It is important to note that it is the state rather than the market, that determines Chinese investment projects and that many of these companies are State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which are accountable to party officials rather than commercial managers.

China’s economic involvement in Africa conforms to the Economic Nationalist explanatory framework. The nature of China’s business in Africa is premised on the notion of promoting its national interest as its key priority and as such bolstering China’s domestic economy irrespective of its impact on the African economies. In particular, China’s interests in African minerals and
oil are aimed at bolstering its domestic manufacturing base and energy security and therefore these relations with African states are aimed at furthering its own economic development, and, within Realist terms, its national interest and power.

China decided to make its largest investments in Africa’s energy sector in order to secure its own oil flow. In terms of soft power most African companies see China as a reliable partner and one that allows them to offset the influence of the private multinational oil companies. China’s strategy of aggressively offering economic investment packages and trade opportunities is working to promote its soft power, while at the same time improving its ability to gain opportunities either to purchase additional oil supplies or to develop partnerships with state oil companies.

Following the soft power approach China publicly states that it does not seek to use aid to influence the domestic politics of African countries or to dictate their policies. Instead, its stated motive is to assist African countries’ development. However, China’s assistance is not one way only. Chinese projects create access to Africa’s natural resources and local markets, business opportunities for Chinese companies and employment for Chinese laborers. Chinese officials often refute this fact by claiming that China also provides aid to countries that are not rich in natural resources, but they neglect to mention that China may have other intentions like gaining support for Beijing’s “one China policy”, or for China’s agenda for its multilateral forum. China’s aid policy to Africa is complex, comprehensive and multi-dimensional and defies any simplistic view.

China’s success lies in that its bankers do not impose governance preconditions on lending to African governments. The one positive aspect of China’s foreign aid, as indicated by the research, has been the boom in Africa’s infrastructural projects, creating much needed electrical, transportation and telecommunications capacity.

Finally, inclusion of economic elements in the discussion of China’s soft power does not strictly follows Nye’s original approach to soft power. This suggests that China uses its economic means and trade relations with African states in a manner different from the USA and most European countries. Hence the conclusion is that the Chinese economic elements assume much more the role of ‘soft power’ than in the case of the American approach – hence the deviation from Nye’s
approach. This however is not an unqualified success, as explained earlier, and therefore the inclusion of economic elements as part of soft power should not be regarded as an unqualified new theoretical contribution. It is my contention that these theoretical implications should be more closely examined in the future.

In Chapter Six, in respect of political soft power, we analyzed why China is driven by a Realist foreign policy in Africa. This Chapter concluded that indeed nationalism is the driving factor in China’s foreign policy towards Africa in the 21st century and that it may have been spurred by Western hostility towards China.

In addition to its economic soft power China uses political soft power in its engagement with African countries. One of its policy elements is the ‘one-China policy’ as a way to marginalize Taiwan’s influence in the continent. This has been one of China’s most successful achievements. From 1980 onwards its approach was primarily driven by a Realist foreign policy towards Africa, which means that it is in the interest of the state to seek power and influence in order to promote its own security against other states through economic and political maneuvering. Moreover, asserting influence on other states to enhance one’s own goals and policies can be achieved through forceful coercion (‘hard power’ like military intervention) or through appeal, known as soft power.

The question that continually underpinned the research is: why is China driven by a soft power foreign policy? It is clear that Chinese rulers promoted nationalism as a way to oppose external hostility and assert their independence. Nationalism was a driving factor in Chinese foreign policy for most of the 20th century and since 1949, Beijing has actively promoted ‘state nationalism’ (i.e. building a Chinese nation as opposed to ethnic nationalisms). Nationalism still dominates China’s foreign policy orientation – “to seek and preserve China’s national independence”. The key factors driving this nationalism are economic development, national unity and independence and international prestige.

Of the three, economic development is regarded as the most important priority and the one that encompasses all other national aims. It is within this framework that China’s political soft power was considered.
It is evident that, as a rising power, China is keen on mustering political influence in Africa by assertively pursuing new allies. China requires votes at the United Nations (UN) and other forums to support its foreign policy and to ease pressure from the Western democracies regarding issues like human rights, economic openness and political freedom. African states represent more than one-quarter of the UN General Assembly membership and China is attempting to establish a divide between the conventional foreign policies of the West and those of the global South. In fact, Beijing uses several methods to achieve it, including traditional and commercial diplomacy and increasingly also public diplomacy and ‘soft power’. One of the objectives of China’s Africa policy is to ensure support for its domestic and foreign policies within specialized organizations such as the UN Council on Human Rights (UNCHR).

China’s pledge of “non-interference” in the political domestic affairs of African countries and the absence of Chinese conditionalities in making investment deals and offering development assistance has appealed to African leaders – in other words, they are used in the form of soft power. Many of these countries are ruled by corrupt, autocratic leaders and elites who disregard human rights and the rule of law. China readily strikes deals that lack transparency, accountability, and other criteria established by the World Bank and IMF, Western governments and NGOs. From empirical evidence, it is clear that China provides such regimes with the opportunity to steer clear of these requirements and to enable them to suppress opposition political movements and civil society who call for democracy, transparency, the rule of law and the end of corruption.

It is equally evident that Beijing is an attractive partner for Africa’s authoritarian leaders and regimes for whom patronage is essential for political survival. These resource-rich African regimes (as well as China) have very little incentive to diversify their economies and to promote development outside of the resource sector. Indeed, they have no interest in developing a social order with a middle class that would demand the rule of law, democracy and an end to corruption and good governance.

In the final analysis, the use of political soft power is not premised on any moral judgments or that it serves as a means towards the end. The research concluded that Beijing uses soft power to achieve certain political goals that promote its national interest in terms of relations with other states or enhancing its international power and prestige. Its objective is not to promote good
governance, human rights, democracy or even economic development through its use of soft power. It is concluded that in China’s view such an insistence on political moral aspects is not generally popular in the international community.

China’s approach to soft power is diametric opposed to Western and North American uses of soft power, which often includes a political-moral or value dimension, for example human rights or democracy. This study showed that China deliberately intends to distance itself from this approach and anticipating it will make itself more attractive to African states with uncertain democratic dispensations.

While the research has attempted to analyses and answer some of the fundamental propositions raised, it has also raised some fundamental questions regarding China’s future. While the use of the ‘one China policy’ as a soft power pillar has been highly successful, the question remains: what is the purpose of this policy? Can it still be used for or to promote soft power policy in Africa? As China enhances its status on the international stage, the question is: does Beijing need a new theoretical framework for its foreign policy issues?

In the chapter’s final section the focus returns to the research questions posed in the Introduction, section 1.4. The question was the following:

In its relationship with African states, how does China use soft power to promote its national interest? What is the nature of that soft power and does it also affect our theoretical understanding of soft power?

In order to address this question, the following two objectives were identified for the study:

1. To determine the salient features of ‘soft power’ and their application in Chinese relations with African states. Moreover, to determine China’s perception of what “soft power” is and how it can be used in Africa.

2. To test the theories of ‘soft power’ in the process of their application to Chinese relations in Africa. Based on the preparatory research for this study it is assumed that the Chinese application of soft power can be divided into two main areas: the political and economic aspects of soft power.
In all the discussions the premise was used that Chinese use of soft power in Africa can be reduced to two elements, namely political and economic components. Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated the multitude of ways in which the Chinese apply them in Africa, which therefore serve as a validation of the premise that Chinese policies indeed rely on economic and political soft power. To avoid a tautological argument, it is also evident from the discussions in the two chapters that no evidence exists to refute the argument that China relies on those two elements to constitute the core of its soft power in Africa. It does not suggest that these are the only forms of power used by the Chinese in Africa but the focus of this study was to determine how the Chinese use specifically soft power in Africa.

The discussion found little evidence of any other major elements of soft power used by the Chinese in Africa. The most direct question in this regard is: what about cultural soft power? Nye attaches much weight to it in his conceptualization of soft power, especially in the form of American popular culture (i.e. music, Hollywood, fast foods, literature, etc.) as a factor in American appeal to others. Though China has embarked on establishing Confucius Centres in many parts of the world, it is unable to compete with the Anglo-Americans on this level. Mandarin cannot compete with English as a global language and therefore cultural goods like music or films are equally affected by it. Indirect mediums of culture, especially electronic platforms like Google, Facebook or Twitter, are challenged by the Chinese, not so much to establish competing cultural mediums but to limit the democratizing challenge they pose for the autocratic Chinese political milieu.

Attractive foreign policies are also included in Nye’s soft power concept. China is certainly aware of its potential and therefore includes it in both their economic and political uses of soft power. China’s promotion of its Beijing Consensus as a paradigm for national development and as a basis for bilateral economic relations is one of the best examples. China’s need for natural commodities in exchange for providing attractive loans or becoming involved in African infrastructural development projects is a policy designed to present an alternative for the Washington Consensus approach of interest-based loans with political and economic conditionalities. Another example of its policy approach is China’s insistence on respecting countries’ national sovereignty and therefore no intervention in domestic affairs. Western
interventions are often associated with promotion of specific values like human rights, multiparty politics, limited presidential terms or good governance.

From the discussion so far it should become evident that the Chinese use of soft power has some theoretical implications for the original Nye version of it. While in the original articulation of the concept culture has played a key role, in the Chinese version as articulated in Africa it is much less prominent. In its place the emphasis is almost exclusively on economic and political considerations. This study gave different content to economic and political soft power, such as participation in peacekeeping forces in Africa, the use of embassies and intelligence, and the use of multilateral bodies like FOCAC in the form of political outreach to African countries.

Finally, the impact of soft power in China’s relations with African states has been positive for China in many respects but it also produced negative results in other instances. On the one hand it provided access to manufactured goods in underdeveloped African economies while in developing economies it became a competitor with local industries and therefore not popular (i.e. negative soft power). Its intention to remain a-political and not to become involved in the internal politics is also increasingly being more difficult to uphold. Darfur, South Sudan and Zimbabwe are a few examples of this dilemma for the Chinese. Other major powers have also realized that Africa is a new and emerging market worth competing for. Therefore Japan (TICAD), Turkey, Brazil, India together with the historical presence of France (Francafrique) and the European Union, and since 2014 also the USA (US-Africa summit) pose a direct challenge to China in Africa, which implies that it will have to revise its soft power approach more regularly. However, this study has demonstrated that Africa served so far a very important purpose for China’s emergence as a global power. Other regions (like Asia or Latin America) have played a similar role in their own right but study’s conclusion is that China’s success in its relations with Africa was primarily based on its application of a soft power approach to the continent.
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## APPENDIX I

### List of Chinese Dynasties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese Dynasties</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prehistoric Times</td>
<td>1.7 million years-the 21st century BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xia Dynasty</td>
<td>21st - 16th Century BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shang Dynasty</td>
<td>16th-11th Century BC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhou Dynasty</td>
<td>Western Zhou (11th Century BC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Zhou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spring and Autumn Period( 770BC-476BC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Warring States Period (476BC-221BC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qin Dynasty</td>
<td>221 BC-206 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans Dynasty</td>
<td>Western Han (206 BC-24 AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Hans (25-220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Kingdoms Period</td>
<td>220-280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin Dynasty</td>
<td>Western Jin (265-316)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Jin (317-420)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern and Southern</td>
<td>Northern Dynasties (386-581)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynasties</td>
<td>Southern Dynasties (420-589)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sui Dynasty</td>
<td>581-618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tang Dynasty</td>
<td>681-907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five Dynasties and Ten States</td>
<td>Five Dynasties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Later Liang (907-923)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Later Tang (923-936)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Later Jin (936-946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Later Han (947-951)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Later Zhou (951-960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ten states (902-979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Dynasty</td>
<td>Northern Song (960-1127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Song (1127-1279)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dynasty</td>
<td>Years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liao Dynasty</td>
<td>916-1125</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jin Dynasty</td>
<td>1115-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuan Dynasty</td>
<td>1271-1368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ming Dynasty</td>
<td>1368-1644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qing Dynasty</td>
<td>1644-1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of China</td>
<td>1911-1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
<td>1949-present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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